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Three Essays on Auctions

Tu, Zhiyong (2006) Three Essays on Auctions. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. (Unpublished)

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This dissertation studies new bidding behaviors in richer environments where bidders can either communicate or intertemporally interact. We focus on such three perspectives as collusion, strategic information disclosure and intertemporal inference. In the collusion chapter, we propose a framework to investigate the structure of endogenous collusion and show that an endogenously formed ring shall in general be a partial ring. In the informationdisclosure chapter, we study the auctioneer's optimal choice of interperiod information releaseand show the standard sequential Dutch auction or the sequential ¯rst-price auction with the announcement of each stage's winning bid can generate the highest revenue among all considered sequential auction formats. In the intertemporal inference chapter, we suggest a resale explanation for the price path in sequential auctions with multi-unit demand.


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Item Type: University of Pittsburgh ETD
Status: Unpublished
CreatorsEmailPitt UsernameORCID
Tu, Zhiyongzht4@pitt.eduZHT4
ETD Committee:
TitleMemberEmail AddressPitt UsernameORCID
Committee ChairBlume, Andreasablume@pitt.eduABLUME
Committee MemberMatros, Alexanderalm75@pitt.eduALM75
Committee MemberGal-Or, Estheresther@katz.pitt.eduESTHER
Committee MemberOchs, Jack Njochs@pitt.eduJOCHS
Date: 30 March 2006
Date Type: Completion
Defense Date: 3 June 2005
Approval Date: 30 March 2006
Submission Date: 14 December 2005
Access Restriction: No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately.
Institution: University of Pittsburgh
Schools and Programs: Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > Economics
Degree: PhD - Doctor of Philosophy
Thesis Type: Doctoral Dissertation
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: Auctions; Collusion; Information Disclosure; Resale
Other ID:, etd-12142005-225422
Date Deposited: 10 Nov 2011 20:10
Last Modified: 15 Nov 2016 13:54


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