Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity: Japanese Education in Manchukuo, 1931-1945

by

Andrew Reed Hall

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M.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1995

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This dissertation was presented

by

Andrew Reed Hall

It was defended on

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and approved by

Ann Jannetta

Evelyn Rawski

J. Thomas Rimer

Richard Smethurst, Chair
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by

Andrew Reed Hall

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Constructing a ‘Manchurian’ Identity: Japanese Education in Manchukuo, 1931-1945

Andrew Reed Hall, Ph.D.

University of Pittsburgh

This study investigates the creation and implementation of elementary and secondary education policy for Chinese-language schools by Japanese officials in the puppet state of Manchukuo. Using Manchukuo textbooks, education journals, and post-war memoirs, it examines the background of the policy-makers, the nature of the ideology they constructed, and the role language played in dissemination of the ideology.

The study traces the efforts by the Japanese officials to create a new “Manchurian” national consciousness which they hoped would replace Chinese nationalistic identity among the majority Han Chinese. Originally they tried to shape this identity by employing familiar Chinese models which they expected would mask Japanese control. They used Confucian terminology and appeals to historical precedents to try to legitimize the creation of an independent northeastern state. In time, however, the weight of Japanese demands for empire-wide ideological orthodoxy
led the Manchukuo leaders to abandon the Chinese models, and instead portray the state as client, dependent on the Japanese Emperor and in need of an injection of Japan’s superior culture. Leading Japanese officials began to support forcing the Chinese to follow Japanese linguistic and ceremonial forms in hopes that it would cause them to appreciate and even willingly support the Japanese effort towards creating a unified Greater East Asia. In other words, their goals changed from securing an acquiescent population to creating willing allies, an effort in which they were ultimately unsuccessful.

While the Manchukuo education bureaucracy supported the shift towards an emphasis on the Japanese language, as late as 1943 they resisted attempts at filling the curriculum with Japanese militaristic and imperial material, defying the current trend in Japan and Korea. This resistance was lead by a group of Japanese educators who were participants in the liberal “New Education movement” of the 1920s, who found in Manchukuo an opportunity to implement school reforms which had become impossible in the increasingly conservative atmosphere in Japan. Their success at keeping militaristic elements at bay demonstrates the Japanese empire was less monolithic than usually thought.
Chapter 1
Setting the stage

The creation of Manchukuo and the role of education

On the evening of September 18, 1931, elements of the Japanese Kwantung (Guandong) Army stationed in Fengtian Province manufactured a clash with Chinese troops which led to their occupation of the entire Northeast China region. The coup leaders acted in order to create a military base of operations and buffer zone against the Soviet Union, to protect existing Japanese economic interests from Chinese competition, and to secure the region as a source of future raw materials and industrial development. They then fabricated an indigenous autonomy movement as a pretext for the creation of a nominally independent state. The new state of Manchukuo (in Chinese Manzhouguo, in Japanese Manshūkoku) was established on March 1, 1932, with the former Qing emperor Pu Yi as Head of State. The Japanese government allowed the Kwantung Army to control Manchukuo as a virtual colony until the war’s end in 1945.

By creating a puppet state, the Kwantung Army opened a new chapter in Japan’s colonial experience. In Japan’s formal colonies of Taiwan and Korea the populations were considered subjects of the Japanese Empire, and therefore all attempts at creating a national or cultural identity separate from Japan were automatically suspect (Ching 2001). In Manchukuo, however, nominal independence created ideological breathing room, a freedom which some Japanese saw as an opportunity to create a new kind of culture and national identity.

The largest-scale institution for disseminating the Japanese leadership’s vision for Manchukuo to the people was public education. The region’s education system had been ravaged by the fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops from 1931 to
1934, and the Japanese put considerable effort into reopening the schools, reorganizing and expanding the system, and creating new curriculum content. They hoped that by investing in the education system they could communicate a new state ideology, train a compliant class of collaborators, and gain public legitimacy.

Some might ask why the Japanese bothered to create a state ideology and make an effort to reorganize and expand the school system when they had occupied the region primarily for strategic reasons. While Japan’s initial military operations in East Asia were often marked by brutality, and open resistance was met with immediate and disproportionate suppression, indefinite large-scale military occupation was an expensive and unattractive option for Tokyo. As in nearly all colonial regimes from ancient times, the Japanese relied on local leaders to act as their agents in the business of local administration.

In the 20th century, however, the size of governments world-wide rose dramatically in colonial as well as independent regimes, which in turn created a demand for a larger number of educated workers to staff official posts. Governments came to rely on public education to meet their increased staffing needs. Benedict Anderson found a key aim of French educational policy in late-19th and early-20th century Indochina to be the production of “a carefully-calibrated quantum of French-speaking and French-writing Indochinese to serve as a politically reliable, grateful, and acculturated indigenous elite, filling the subordinate echelons of the colony’s bureaucracy and larger commercial enterprises” (Anderson 1991, 126). This assessment closely matched the goals of the Japanese in Manchukuo.

Naturally the public also recognized the new job opportunities, and also demanded improved public education to prepare their children. If Manchukuo could
not supply modern education on a scale as large as or larger than the previous regime, it would lose any chance it had for public legitimacy.

Objectives of the study

This study has two major objectives: 1) to analyze the new “Manchurian” ideology that the Japanese officials hoped would replace Chinese nationalism among the majority Han Chinese, and to examine the implementation of the ideology in the country’s elementary and middle schools, and 2) to explore the range of opinions among Japanese in Manchukuo concerning this ideology, focusing on the resistance among a group of liberal educators toward the more assimilative and ultra-nationalistic policies of the Manchukuo government.

Originally the Manchukuo leadership tried to shape a new Manchurian identity by employing familiar Chinese models which they expected would mask Japanese control. They used Confucian terminology and appeals to historical precedents to try to legitimize the creation of an independent northeastern state. In time, however, the weight of Japanese demands for empire-wide ideological orthodoxy led the Manchukuo leaders to abandon the Chinese models, and instead began emphasizing the state’s subservient relationship to Japan and need to adopt Japan’s culture. The state’s leading Japanese officials began programs which tried to force the Chinese to follow Japanese linguistic and ceremonial forms, in hopes that these forms would cause the Chinese to appreciate and even willingly support the Japanese effort toward creating a unified Greater East Asia. In other words, their goals changed from securing an acquiescent population to creating willing allies, an effort in which they were ultimately unsuccessful.
While the Manchukuo education bureaucracy supported the shift toward an emphasis on the Japanese language, they resisted attempts at filling the curriculum with Japanese militaristic and imperial material, a stand which went against the trend developing elsewhere in the empire. This resistance was led by a group of Japanese educators who had long experience in the region, and who were participants in the liberal “New Education movement”. The ideas of the movement had gained currency in Japan in the 1920s, but fell out of favor as the state and society moved to the right during the 1930s. Among the items on their agenda were student-centered and hands-on teaching methods, an emphasis on practical and vocational learning over academicism, internationalism over nationalism, and the encouragement of individual talents over group conformity. They saw in Manchukuo an opportunity to implement school reforms which had become impossible in the increasingly conservative atmosphere in Japan. They spoke openly against the education and cultural trends occurring in Japan, such as the retreat from language reforms and the frequent use of ultra-nationalistic messages. Although they were beaten back by 1945, in part because of their efforts Manchukuo never became the site the kind of extreme assimilative campaigns as occurred in wartime Korea and Taiwan. The effort of these educators to create a unique and relatively liberal school system and their success at keeping militaristic elements at bay even after the Pacific War began demonstrates the Japanese empire was less monolithic than usually thought.

Besides the two major aims of charting Manchukuo state ideology and exploring the diverse nature of opinion among Japanese colonial officials, this paper has two secondary aims: 1) examining the degree to which the Manchukuo leaders
achieved their goals, and 2) analyzing Japanese attitudes toward the role of language in colonial education.

Just as the leadership engaged in an evolving dance between the goals of teaching a pro-Japanese message and of keeping the schools attractive to students, likewise Chinese students and their families faced the question of whether to attend schools sponsored by what many saw as an illegitimate government, or risk going without an education. In the end the desire of the students and families for modern education took precedence, and the numbers attending the elementary and middle schools swelled. Japan also apparently succeeded in convincing the population that outright rebellion was unwise, as after 1933 there were few major attacks on Japanese interests in Manchuria, and Guomindang and Communist organizers had little success organizing a resistance movement in the region after the Sino-Japanese War began in 1938. A preliminary survey of Manchukuo-era and post-war interviews of Chinese suggests, however, the Japanese failed to create a generation who were friendly to Japan, much less supportive of Japan’s imperial rule.

Manchukuo provides a useful stage for examining Japanese attitudes toward language and its role in empire during the period. After a preliminary period in which the Japanese language was not stressed in Manchukuo, the government joined an empire-wide shift to what might be called an “optimistic” view of the power of the Japanese language to instill loyalty in the hearts of non-Japanese Asians. Despite generally approving of the shift, leading Manchukuo educators opposed the use of excessively chauvinistic and Japan-centered classroom materials, and supported Japanese language orthographic reform proposals which were becoming taboo subjects in Japanese society. Their approach, which I call “reform optimism,” differed
significantly from education in colonial Taiwan and Korea, where by the 1930s the colonial governments disparaged nearly all aspects of the traditional local cultures and expected the people to see themselves as Japanese.

Until recently, only the birth, death, and planned economy of Manchukuo have been subjects of historical study among Chinese, Japanese, and Western historians. Only in the last ten years have scholars begun to more deeply explore Manchukuo government and society during the years of relative calm. These new fields of study are important for two reasons. First, Manchukuo was a watershed in Japan’s colonial experience. It has often been noted that Japanese experimented with new economic models, architectural styles, railway engineering, and even legal forms, in Manchukuo, in the hopes of exporting the results to Japan and the rest of the empire. They also

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1 Besides frequent studies of the Manchurian Incident and its diplomatic wake, there have also been numerous studies of the Kwantung Army’s attempts at creating a planned economy in the region, beginning with Joseph Schumpeter, and going up to recent studies by Ramon H. Myers and Takaufusa Nakamura. Among the recent major studies of Manchukuo’s government, ideology, and society in English are Y. Tak Matsusaka, “Managing Occupied Manchuria, 1931-1934,” in The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945, eds. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton University Press, 1996); Lincoln Li, The China Factor in Modern Japanese Thought: The Case of Tachibana Shiraki, 1881-1945 (State University of New York Press, 1996); Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (University of California Press, 1998); Rana Mitter, The Manchurian Myth (University of California Press, 2000); Mariko Asano Tamanoi, “Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classifications: The ‘Japanese’ in ‘Manchuria,’” The Journal of Asian Studies, 59, no. 2 (May 2000).

2 For example attempts by Japanese to institute a colloquial legal code in Manchukuo, which they hoped would inspire imitation by lawmakers in Japan, is examined in Yasuda Toshiaki, “Nihongo hōritsu buntaigoka to ‘Manshūkoku’” Hitsotsubashi Ronshū, 128, no. 3 (Sept. 2002).
experimented with new colonial political forms, including increased local participation and limited acceptance of ethnic plurality, and applied the lessons learned in the regions it conquered after 1937. To appreciate the Japanese imperial imagination after 1931, one must understand what happened in Manchukuo. Second, in Manchukuo one can explore the development of government ideology and policy in a multi-ethnic society in which a minority group controls the levers of power. This includes how the dominant group works to form a national identity which meets the demands of the hegemonic metropole ideology while still appealing to local interests, as well as a consideration of the place of language and historical memory as signifiers of identity. The Manchukuo case provides a contrast to similar situations in apartheid-era South Africa and the non-Russian Soviet Republics.

Chapter 1 provides a brief background of the region’s history, including the pre-1931 education policies of the Chinese provincial governments and local Japanese-run school systems. In Chapter 2 the makeup of the Manchukuo education bureaucracy is outlined. Changes in the bureaucracy’s leadership are traced using contemporary documents and post-war memoirs, and the question of how these changes impacted the direction of the country’s education is discussed. Special attention is paid to the place of New Education movement thinkers in the education bureaucracy, and how they used Manchukuo as a laboratory for their ideas. Chapter 3 includes a discussion of the creation and development of Manchukuo’s state ideology, using propaganda authored by the Manchukuo state and its supporters. These documents demonstrate a change from an initially familiar Chinese model which emphasized good government based the Confucian concept of wangdao, or the “kingly way”, as well as ethnic equality, to one centered on loyalty to the Japanese Emperor and recognition of
Japanese superiority. Chapter 4 aims to scrutinize Manchukuo’s Japanese language program, comparing it to language programs in other contemporary empires, and analyzes the competing positions among Japanese educators about the role language education should play in creating a supportive, even assimilated, population. I am interested in the way faith in what some Japanese saw as the sacred nature of their language blinded them to the alienation their efforts caused among Chinese students.

Finally, Chapter 5 features an analysis of elementary and middle school textbooks, which demonstrate the nature and changes in ideological messages in terms of teaching the students consciousness of Chinese, ‘Manchurian’, and Japanese history, culture, and language. Along with the textbooks, the messages sent by rituals and other extra-classroom activities the schools required of their students are examined. In both chapters 4 and 5 the reaction of Chinese students to their Manchukuo school experiences is briefly introduced, as ascertained by post-war interviews.

Before beginning the examination of Manchukuo education, a review of the region’s history is in order. Of particular interest for this study are 1) the long-term historical question of the region’s Chinese or non-Chinese identification, and 2) the more recent history of region’s modern schools and the Japanese presence.

**Manchuria and China**

The territory originally occupied by Kwantung Army in 1931 was a region known in the West and in Japan as “Manchuria”, and is usually called the “northeast” (*Dongbei*) by Chinese. It is made up of the present-day provinces of Liaoning (also known as Fengtian or Liaodong), Jilin, and Heilongjiang. A large central plain covers one third of the region, ringed by three mountain ranges. To the east and north of the
plain are deeply forested areas, while high dry plateaus lie to the south and west. The dominant central plain is well suited for agriculture, especially the area from Changchun down to the end of the Liaodong peninsula. The vast majority of the population lived in rural villages on this central plain. By 1934 the Kwantung Army also occupied Rehe province to the south-west and the eastern section of Inner Mongolia to the west, and integrated them into the newly created Manchukuo state, so that it covered over 380,000 square miles of territory.

The region was controlled by a variety of peoples in the centuries before the Qing. In ancient times Tungusic peoples created a series of small kingdoms which battled for control of the region with Chinese and Korean kingdoms, as well as northern Xiangnu, Kitan, and Mongol peoples. In 1582 a Jurchen Tungusic chieftain named Nurgaci began a series of campaigns that by 1616 succeeded in gaining for his clan supremacy over the region later known as Manchuria. In 1635 and 1636 his son Hung Taiji publicly transformed the khanate into an empire. He invented the name Manchu, or Manzhou, as a new name for the Jurchen bannerman clans, and renamed his empire Qing. In 1644 the Qing occupied Beijing, and after a period of consolidation conquered all of the former Ming Empire (Crossley 1997, 47-80).

The term “Manchuria” is controversial, because some feel it implies a natural division from the rest of China. The first known use of the word to refer to a geographical area, as opposed to an ethnicity, was by a Japanese mapmaker in the late 1700s. The use of the term as a toponym then spread to the West, and was even used by some Chinese in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Elliott 2000, 626-635). Whatever its name, Qing emperors from the time of Kangxi in the late 17th century encouraged a sense of separate space for the region. For example the Kangxi emperor
sent an expedition to explore the region and establish the sites of historical and
mythical events from the royal Aisin Gioro family’s past, and asked his Jesuit advisors
to help complete a detailed map of the region. The Qianlong emperor commissioned a
history of the Manchu people, which emphasized differences between them and the
Han, and later led the composition of the epic poem *Ode to Mukden*, which praised both
the people and land of his ancestors. Apparently a major reason for these efforts was to
facilitate a sense of ethnic identity among Manchu bannermen, who were by then
scattered in garrison towns throughout the empire (Crossley 1997, 122-125, Elliot 2000,
607-617).

Another aspect of the Qing emperors’ efforts to cultivate Manchu ethnic identity
was their efforts to keep Han Chinese from dominating the area. As the Qing
dispatched Manchu bannermen throughout their newly acquired territories, significant
numbers of Han farmers from nearby Northern provinces began to immigrate to the
region to take advantage of economic opportunities. In 1669 the Qianlong emperor
tried to limit the number of Han who could settle in the central plain of Manchuria by
creating a marked boundary, the “Willow Palisades”. Despite these and similar
measures taken over the next two hundred years, thousands of farmers moved into the

During the 18th and 19th centuries the Russian empire began making territorial
claims to the Amur River region in northern Manchuria, and in 1860 the Qing ceded to
Russia all lands north of the Amur. Japan also made its first major inroad into the area
during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, when for a time it occupied part of the
Liaodong peninsula. These developments convinced leaders in the Qing government
that their efforts to keep Han Chinese out of the region had the unintended result of
making it easier for foreign powers to move in. Choosing territorial integrity over their efforts of ethnic-preservation, the Qing in 1860 began to open large sections of the region to Han immigrants. In 1905 the Qing lifted all bans on Han land ownership, and in 1907 they revised the administration of the northeast provinces, replacing the previous military districts with three new provincial governments, and creating administrative structures which mirrored those found in the provinces south of the Great Wall. These actions appear to have brought Manchuria into the Chinese consciousness as an indivisible part of the realm. Mark Elliot, however, has pointed out that the Qing’s two centuries of treating the region separately from the rest of the empire had fostered among the Chinese “a separate sense of place” for the northeastern provinces (Elliot 2000, 617-619).

With the development of the railroads and steamship lines in the early 20th century, Manchuria became more closely connected with the rest of China and the world, and the production of soybeans for the world market became the staple industry of the region. The resulting demand for agricultural laborers in the sparsely populated region, together with the improved transportation and overpopulated conditions in North China, resulted in a new and greater flood of Han immigration into Manchuria. Most were single male migrant laborers from Shandong and Hebei Provinces, but a substantial number brought their families to settle in the region (Gottschang and Lary 2000). Although population estimates are sketchy, it appears that the total population of the region rose from around 5 million in 1898 to 20 million in 1915, and 30 million in 1930. In 1932 Han Chinese made up almost 95% of the population of the region. Around 630,000 Koreans lived in the region in 1932, making up 2% of the population, although their numbers doubled to 1,200,000 by 1945. Approximately 800,000
Mongols, 230,000 Japanese, and 200,000 Manchus also resided in Manchuria in 1932 (Hirano 1982, 125).

Since the 1880s voices from within the Japanese army had called for the creation a strategic foothold in Manchuria. Just as Korea was seen as critical to the defense of the home islands, the Liaodong peninsula was seen as essential for the defense of Korea. Japan’s 1905 victory over Russia gave it the opportunity to declare Korea a protectorate and appropriate Russian interests in southern Manchuria. These included the Liaodong leasehold, which Japan renamed the Kwantung (Guandong) Leased Territory. Japan also won control of the Russian-built railway line from Dalian to Changchun, along with special economic and administrative rights in towns situated along that railway. To manage the railway and the other assets that came with it, the Japanese government in 1906 authorized the creation of the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR). The railroad company served as the spearhead of Japanese economic and cultural activities in Northeast China, and accumulated substantial profits for much of its history. The Japanese army stationed troops, named the Kwantung Army, in the leased territory and along the SMR rail line.

China dissolved into civil war in the years after the 1911 Chinese revolution, and by 1920 the warlord and former bandit Zhang Zuolin and his Fengxi (or Fengtian) military clique gained control over most of Northeast China. Zhang walked a difficult course between the demands of the local Japanese military and commercial leadership and Chinese nationalists. In the 1920s the Chinese nationalist movement spread from Shanghai and Beiping north to the educated segments of northeastern society. In the northeast, Chinese nationalism naturally took Japan, the locally dominant imperial power, as the touchstone against which it defined itself. Popular anger against the
Japanese presence was expressed through the Recovery of Rights Movement, which in the northeast centered on a demand that Japan return the Kwantung territory. Nationalists, many who came from the developing Chinese bourgeois class, led rallies and drew up petitions calling for the return of rights. Zhang distrusted the nationalists and did little to respond to their demands. He also had a complex relationship with the Japanese, who provided him with money and advisors, but eventually became frustrated with his unpredictability.

On June 4th, 1928, Zhang was killed in a plot engineered by maverick Kwantung Army officers. Apparently they hoped that Zhang’s death would lead to instability in the northeast, giving the Kwantung Army an opportunity to intervene and take over the region. The incident did not lead to wider hostilities, however, and Zhang Zuolin’s son, Zhang Xueliang, was eventually able to take his father’s place as the region’s ruling warlord.

Zhang Xueliang, unlike his father, supported many of the goals of the Chinese nationalists, and therefore had an even more difficult relationship with the Japanese than did his father. The younger Zhang tried to consolidate his rule by harnessing and directing the power of nationalist sentiment. He allied himself with a group of local young activists, and together they planned the region’s transformation. He declared an alliance with the Chiang Kaishek’s Guomindang government in December 1928, although his relationship with Chiang never moved beyond mutual mistrust. As will be discussed below, the new ties with Nanjing led to the adoption of the Guomindang education system, including the use of textbooks which contained anti-Japanese materials.
Zhang tried to reduce the region’s dependency on Japanese institutions by creating a new railway line and a port at Huludao which would compete with the SMR and the Japanese-run port of Dalian (Dairen) in the Kwantung Leased Territory. Japanese commercial and military leaders alike were disturbed by the regime’s actions (Mitter 2003, 150-154). This fear and mistrust, together with Japanese military ambitions for control of the region, led directly to the Kwantung Army’s occupation of the region beginning in September 1931.

Education in pre-1932 Manchuria and the Japanese presence

Neither modern education nor Japanese-run schools were new phenomena in Manchuria in 1932. Unlike Europe’s colonies in Africa and Asia, Manchukuo in 1932 had a short but significant history of an indigenous modern school system.

In 1932 only twenty five years had past since the abolition of the Qing examination system. Chinese dynastic governments for centuries had sponsored the examinations, which tested the students’ ability to memorize classical texts and master the forms of stylized essays, as a way of recruiting government officials. During the Qing period the court oversaw the administration of the exams, but it did not involve itself in the education process other than banning certain books and giving occasional grants to favored schools. Education occurred in private, family, and clan schools. Because of the emphasis on the exams, the schools tended to avoid teaching any kind of “practical learning,” such as math or science. Despite the lack of government support, there was a remarkable growth in literacy and school attendance during the Qing period (Rawski 1979). Under pressure from reformists and after decades of military and
social disaster, the court abolished the exam system in 1905 and called for the creation of new schools based on Western models.

Change on this scale, of course, took considerable time. Modern education in Northern China, which was considered a cultural backwater in the late Qing, was further handicapped by the relatively low percentage of people who had attended any school under the old system. Once source states that in 1908 in Shenyang, the largest city in the region, 27% of the men and 0.5% of the women were literate, lower than Rawski’s estimate of literacy for China as a whole at the time, which was 30-45% of men and 2-10% of women (Hirano 1982, 386, Tsukinoki 1989, 2-5). Zhao Erxun, the powerful military governor of Fengtian in the last years of Qing rule, made the investment of provincial funds into the creation of schools a priority, and invited Japanese and Western educators to the region to help set up colleges and medical schools. Throughout the 1910s, however, most elementary and middle schools were little more than reorganized academies, which continued to use traditional methods such as the memorization of Confucian classics.

After the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japanese institutions stepped into this educational lacuna with their own modern schools. The two main agents of Japanese interests in the region, the Kwantung territorial government and the South Manchurian Railway, founded a number of schools for local Chinese and Korean students, as well as for Japanese. Just as Japan’s political status in Manchuria was volatile and disputed throughout the 1905-1931 period, the schools sent their local students a series of contradictory and changing messages about their nationality and their connection with Japan.
Without going into too great of detail about the nature of Japanese-run education in Manchuria from 1905 to 1931, one should note the significant divergence in content between the SMR and Kwantung Territory schools, which was caused by their differing locations. The Kwantung government held complete control over its territory, and carefully observed and regulated private Chinese and missionary-run schools in its domain. In the railway zone, however, the Japanese had less political power and had to compete for students. While both systems required students to study the Japanese language beginning in the first grade, the Kwantung schools took extra steps to create an atmosphere as closely resembling a school in Taiwan or Korea as possible, requiring the students to sing the Japanese national anthem and training them in Japanese-style military drill. The SMR, on the other hand, closely followed the contemporary Chinese government’s system for its elementary school practices and curriculum. The SMR schools used textbooks published in China more often than did the Kwantung schools, and the company required its teachers to have a greater understanding of Chinese culture, exemplified by its practice of sending teachers to Beiping for a period of study before they took their posts (Isoda 1998, 55, Kumano 1934, Takenaka 2000, 2:122).

In March 1914 the SMR began editing its own Japanese language textbooks. SMR Japanese language textbooks were modified versions of those published by Japan’s colonial government in Korea, with some key omissions. While the SMR retained chapters on the Japanese flag and Japanese customs found in the Korean textbooks, it removed all references to the Japanese Emperor. Apparently the SMR intended for its schools to familiarize the Chinese students with things Japanese, they
did not try to turn the students into imperial subjects, which was a key goal in Korean colonial education (Isoda 1998).

The May 4th movement changed the cultural landscape of China beginning in 1919, and the reform of education was at the center of contemporary debate. Those influenced by John Dewey and other progressive Western educators criticized the continued emphasis on the memorization of classical texts in schools, and called on teachers to facilitate individual thought, personal freedom, and the study science in the classroom. The reformers supported more access to education for women, increased use of the written vernacular, administrative decentralization, and the creation of kindergartens and coeducational schools. Many of their goals were codified by the Chinese central government in the National Education Plan of 1922, which ordered a redesign of school structure and curriculum based on American models.

The progressive education movement in China faltered in the mid-1920s as intellectuals began to doubt the applicability of American-style education. In 1928 the increasingly conservative Guomindang party took control of the government and gradually discarded the 1922 regulations. They replaced them with a centralized education system modeled on those of France and Germany, including military training and ideological instruction intended to promote a cohesive national identity (Pepper 1996).

In the northeast, although Zhang Zuolin used the lion's share of his revenues to finance his military expeditions, the region's relatively strong economic position allowed for higher funding for education than in most other regions of the country. The challenge and example provided by the Japanese SMR and Kwantung schools also
may have served to goad the northeastern Chinese into building a respectable system.\(^3\) Zhang Xueliang promised to increase support for education after his father’s death in 1928, and his nationalist allies saw the growth of schools as a key to the dissemination of their nationalist ideology. By 1930 there were over 15,000 schools in the three northeastern provinces, including 300 middle schools. The younger Zhang also gave substantial personal donations to Northeastern University, the pinnacle of the region’s education pyramid. The ratio of enrollment in Fengtian schools was high compared to the rest of China: 30% of the elementary school-age population in Fengtian were enrolled in 1929, compared to 28% in the Japanese-run schools in Kwantung and a 17% overall percentage for China. The more rural and politically weaker provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang had 21% and 11% enrollment rates (Hobo 1932, 35-37, Shimada 1935, 736).

Throughout the period from 1922 to 1931 Chinese educators and students in Manchuria were among the leaders in demonstrations against special rights for Japanese interests. In February 1929 the Fengtian Provincial Education Department announced it would implement the Guomindang’s recommended school curriculum and textbooks. This curriculum included a “political studies” course for elementary and middle schools, which included lessons criticizing foreign countries, particularly Japan,

\(^3\) Northeastern Chinese officials often toured the Japanese-run schools and wrote reports detailing aspects which could serve as models for Chinese-run schools. For example, a 1918 delegation of Fengtian Provincial education officials reported in an education journal on a visit to an exhibit of work by Chinese students in Ryojun and Dairen. They remarked positively on the vernacular essays, the art based on real life, rather than copies of old paintings, and the utilitarian handicrafts, and while they were critical of the Japanese-run schools, they focused more on encouraging Chinese teachers to use the Japanese teaching methods as models (Tsukinoki 1989, 26-27).
for their occupation of China. A contemporary Japanese report labeled the
Guomindang-approved textbooks as “anti-Japanese,” and concluded that “children who
are educated today with these textbooks will become ardently anti-Japanese in ten
years” (Tachibana 1931a, 135).

When the Kwantung Army created Manchukuo in 1932 a small but significant
number of young people had received a modern education, which included nationalist
and anti-Japanese ideological training. To dismantle the school system or allow it to
disintegrate might rid the Japanese of this annoyance, but it would also devastate any
Japanese effort to claim legitimacy for the new state. A major challenge facing the
Manchukuo leaders, therefore, was to remove the anti-Japanese aspects of education,
while preventing a decline in the number of schools or students.

In 1931 competing forces of Chinese nationalism and Japanese imperialism
clashed in Manchuria, each with their own armies, ideologies, and schools. By the
spring of 1932 the Japanese controlled the body of Manchuria, as only a few
anti-Japanese militias remained in the field along the northern and western boarders.
The struggle for the minds of the Manchurians, however, had only just begun.
Chapter 2

New Education reformers in the Manchukuo government: A clash of ideologies

Colonial rule in Manchukuo was a chaotic mix of interests and ideologies. Kwantung Army officers, the local Japanese settler community, experienced bureaucrats recently arrived from Japan, and leading Chinese all took part in the administration of the state. Although for many years scholars have appreciated the generative role military leaders in the field played in Japanese foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s, it is only recently that they have come to appreciate that the administration of the empire was also disjointed and ad-hoc, rather than centralized and monolithic. The Governors-General of both Taiwan and Korea were both appointed directly by the emperor, and thus enjoyed considerable authority to plan and carry out policies without approval from the Japanese cabinet. Although the Army leadership in Tokyo regained control over the Kwantung Army and won oversight over the puppet state by 1934, day-to-day administration of Manchukuo remained in the hands of the Kwantung Army and its hand-chosen civilian officials. As long as the military retained firm control of the colonies, the Japanese Army allowed the colonial authorities to govern as they saw fit, and even helped to minimize pressures from the civilian segments of the Tokyo government.

While independent from Tokyo, conflicts over ideology and bureaucratic privilege within Manchukuo’s ruling institutions were fairly frequent. A well-known rivalry developed within the Kwantung Army between officers Ishiwara Kanji and Tōjō

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4 The contradictory nature of Japanese imperialism is a conclusion drawn by a majority of authors in the recent anthology Li Narangoa and Robert Cribb, editors, *Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945*, 2003.
Hideki, for example. Among civilians there was tension between long-time Japanese civilian residents who had participated in the formation of the new government and Japanese officials the Kwantung Army later recruited from Japan, most of whom had no previous experience on the continent. This certainly occurred within in the education bureaucracy as well.

The differences between local Japanese and new arrivals was partly a bureaucratic power struggle, but a difference in viewpoints was also involved. Local Japanese educators, particularly those connected with the SMR, tended to be participants in what is usually called the New Education movement, a campaign which called for reforms based on Western liberal education theories. In Japan the movement peaked in the 1920s, but then lost momentum in the early 1930s. In Manchuria, however, the local Japanese educators continued to experiment with many of the ideas, in hopes that they could inspire change back home in Japan. The recent arrivals from Japan tended to try to replicate Japanese education in Manchuria. After an initial period of conflict the two sides came to an understanding, and from 1937 to 1943 they worked together to create a unique education system, which combined some of the more conservative, statist principles of 1930s Japanese society with the liberal ideas of the New Education movement.

This chapter introduces the nature of the Manchukuo government, and summarizes the history of the state’s education bureaucracy and school structure. This framework which will help the reader put the developments in education content presented in later chapters into context.

Although this chapter focuses on the Japanese policy makers who created the Manchukuo education system, there were also many non-Japanese, particularly Chinese,
officials within the education bureaucracy. Unlike in Korea and Taiwan, Manchukuo was established on the premise that the local non-Japanese population created the state and were at the center of its rule. In reality, of course, the Japanese held all the reigns of power. I will begin with a short section on the role of non-Japanese in the creation of Manchukuo and in the education world.

*The creation of the Manchukuo government: Co-opting local elites*

Rana Mitter recently has pointed out that while most Chinese accounts of war years imply there was a high degree of active resistance to the Japanese, these accounts are greatly exaggerated. In reality the Kwantung Army was successful in inducing a significant number of Chinese leaders to acquiesce in the creation of Manchukuo by March 1932. A few paramilitary units put up sporadic resistance in the field, and a number of civilians with direct ties to Zhang Xueliang fled to the south where they unsuccessfully lobbied the Nanjing government to actively support these units (Mitter 2000, 130-132). For the most part, however, local elites decided against active opposition to the Japanese, and some even supported the creation of the new state.

Mitter states that the collaboration which occurred in Manchuria was for the most part a passive, rather than active one:

To take a well-known European example, the Nazis in the Sudetenland acted as a fifth column in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s, actively agitating for the assimilation of the region into the German Reich . . . In contrast, there seems to have been no such activity in France before 1940, even on the part of French fascist organizations such as the Croix de Feu; however, once the German occupation was a fait accompli, there was an enthusiastic clique of French politicians who sought active collaboration with the Germans for their so-called National Revolution. Despite decades of local Chinese collaboration with Japanese dominance in the Northeast before 1931, the
Manchurian case seems to belong to the French rather than the Czech type. . . . Once the coup had happened, the dynamics of domestic Manchurian politics meant that the Japanese were able to find collaborators for their new “state” in the Northeast (Mitter 2000, 18).

This lack of resistance can be attributed to a Confucian worldview which gave high priority to achieving a stable social order, frustration with the Zhang regime, and a history of ties between Japanese and the region’s elites.

The Kwantung Army worked quickly to assure the elites that it would establish a responsible government. The Shenyang Shibao, a Japanese-owned Chinese language newspaper which was the largest circulation periodical in the region, published daily articles and editorials aimed at winning the people’s support for the creation of the state. For example Xi Xia, a military leader who was named governor of Jilin Province as a reward for his cooperation, sat for an interview with the newspaper on Oct. 14, 1931. Xi assured the paper’s educated Chinese readers that government structures would remain largely unchanged under the new regime, and that therefore officials and soldiers did not need to fear for their jobs. He also promised financial reforms, including the reduction of taxation and government expenditures (Mitter 2000, 84-85).

Elite frustration with the Zhang Xueliang regime was also a major factor in cooperation with the Japanese. Support for Zhang was especially weak among the more rural and conservative elites in Northeast society. Many were disillusioned because of the tax burden he imposed, his continued high military expenditures, involvement in wars outside the region, and his refusal to grant power to the provincial assemblies.
Finally, many members of the region’s elite had established close contacts with Japanese since the Sino-Japanese War. Yu Chonghan, for example, was a leading Fengtian politician and an early supporter the concept of an independent state. He had served as Zhang Zuolin’s foreign minister until 1927, and opposed the younger Zhang because of his recalcitrance against shifting political power to provincial assemblies. He had studied at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies as a young man and worked for the Japanese Army as a translator and spy during the Russo-Japanese War. Prominent figures like Yu who were familiar with the Japanese apparently saw the Kwantung Army’s coup as an opportunity to return to power (Mitter 2000, 34-37, Komagome 1996, 251-253).

If these Chinese collaborators had any illusions about their own place in the new government, these were soon shattered. The Manchukuo government, on paper, was based on the Chinese Republican model, including a powerful Prime Minister and a number of ministries. As Y. Tak Matsusaka has noted, however, “Behind this grand façade . . . stood a nearly vacant lot” (Matsusaka 1996, 106). The ministries were mostly symbolic, intended to impress observers and co-opt local power holders to whom posts were given. Few were intended to do actual governing work. The Kwantung Army chose Japanese officials to hold all of the real policy-making posts in the government, and reserved the right to make final judgments in all major decisions.

The main organ through which the Kwantung Army controlled Manchukuo was the General Affairs Board of the Council of State (Kokumu-in Sōmu-cho), which was nominally part of the Manchukuo Prime Minister’s office. Through this office the Kwantung Army directed the government, an arrangement they referred to as “internal guidance.” The board was always headed by a Japanese who acted under the direction
of the Kwantung Army chief-of-staff (Matsusaka 1996, 107, Yamamoto 1993, 92). An example of the board’s centrality to Manchukuo economic plans can be seen in the job placement of Furuumi Tadayoshi, a bureaucrat from Japan’s Ministry of Finance, who was sent to Manchukuo in July 1932 to create the country’s budgets. Initially he was attached to the weak Finance Ministry, but almost immediately he was transferred from the ministry to the Finance Department of the General Affairs Board, where the real financial decisions were made (Tsukase 1998, 29).

A sense of the subservient role of the Chinese ministers can be gleaned from the record of a March 1932 conference of the Council of State. At one point Komai Tokuzō, the first director of the General Affairs Board, proposed that Japanese officials hold twenty percent of the positions in the central government. Xi Xia, the Jilin Governor and Minister of Finance, objected to the proposal, and asked that Pu Yi’s opinion be solicited. Komai angrily dismissed Xi’s comments and scolded him, saying, “Japan sacrificed more than any other in the Manchurian Incident. If you think you can build Manchukuo on your own, go ahead and try” (Tsukase 1998, 42). The actual ratio of Japanese officials in the government turned out to be much higher. In December 1934 Japanese held 53% of the top positions in the central government (835 out of 1587 total positions). In 1940 Japanese held 69% of the posts. More importantly, Japanese vice-ministers and bureau chiefs, rather than the non-Japanese ministers, were the real power holders in each government organ (Tsukase 1998, 43).

Just as the identity of the real policy-makers within the Manchukuo government is murky, so too is the inner workings of the state’s education bureaucracy. Presently only a few post-war accounts of the bureaucracy’s inner workings by are known to exist, all written by Japanese. This is not surprising, since Chinese who served in high
positions in the puppet state were often discriminated against or even branded as traitors in post-war Chinese society. The Japanese who wrote about their experiences make few references to their Chinese colleagues except in social terms. Since all of these authors were writing for a Japanese audience, it may have been that they simply disregarded the role of the Chinese. A more plausible explanation, on the other hand, was that most of the Chinese officials were not dedicated to the Manchukuo experiment enough to take vigorous steps to strengthen the state. It appears that most did their jobs, furthering the work of training teachers, writing textbooks, and opening new schools, but they were not greatly involved in the creation of a wider vision for Manchukuo, especially after 1935, when the state ideology began to turn from Confucianism to a focus on the Japanese Emperor.

*Manchukuo’s Japanese leadership*

The management of Manchukuo’s state affairs can be divided into three areas, according to the Kwantung Army’s ability and interest: 1) those controlled directly and openly by the Kwantung Army; 2) those controlled covertly by the Kwantung Army with the assistance of civilian Japanese; 3) those left to the management of Japanese bureaucrats under light Kwantung Army supervision. The Kwantung Army openly controlled national defense, the area in which it was most interested and able, under the terms of an agreement signed with the Manchukuo government on March 10, 1932. The state budget, monetary policy, and economic development, areas in which the Kwantung Army was greatly interested, but had no practical experience, were directed by the General Affairs Board of the Council of State, under the Kwantung Army’s close supervision. The third level of government was those areas which the Kwantung
Army recognized as important, but had no immediate interest or expertise, and therefore turned over to Japanese bureaucrats in the ministries. These included education and health. The Kwantung Army still ultimately controlled these areas by picking the leading officials and reserving the right to veto policies. Beyond the basic expectation of training a compliant and productive population, however, the army appears to have allowed Japanese officials considerable leeway in the formation of education policy.

The background of the civilian Japanese working in the Manchukuo government changed over time. In November 1931 the Kwantung Army began setting up Self-Rule Guidance Committees (jidō jichi iinkai) in the region’s provinces and prefectures to assist local governments in the transition toward the new system of rule. The committees were staffed by both local Chinese leaders and members of the Japanese settler community. Most of the local Japanese were SMR employees, and many participated in one of two political groups, the Manchurian Youth League and the Daiyūhōkai. Most of the committee members became officials in Manchukuo’s state or local governments after March 1932. By the end of the year, however, Japanese army authorities deemed many of the local Japanese untrustworthy or ill-trained for their missions, and removed them from office. In the place of these Japanese, the Kwantung Army recruited bureaucrats from Japan’s central government, particularly the Finance and Home Ministries (Mitter 2000, 105-106).

Louise Young has noted how the creation of Manchukuo created job opportunities for a large number of ambitious Japanese officials and intellectuals. Not only did the state bureaucracy need to be filled, but so did the SMR’s newly created Economic Research Association, which was entrusted with the job of planning the state’s economic direction. This demand coincided with a generally difficult job
environment in Japan due to the Great Depression, and more specifically with the job
difficulties of leftist academics because of ideological repression in Japanese
universities. Many leftist Japanese intellectuals went to work in Manchukuo, despite
their ideological differences with the Kwantung Army leaders. Young found the leftist
intellectuals justified the contradiction between their principles and their employment
with the hope that they could help bring about progressive change in the new, unsettled
environment of a new state. Manchukuo seemed to offer them the first chance to put
their ideas into practice. Also, their employment gave them an opportunity to continue
their own research, while earning a much larger paycheck than what they could expect
in Japan (Young 1998).

Clearly many of these intellectuals were frustrated with the pace of change in
Japan, and hoped that the fruits of their efforts in Manchukuo would inspire change
back home in Japan. In 1941, however, the Kwantung Army began to crack down on
the leftist intellectuals working for the SMR and in the Manchukuo government. The
first wave of arrests occurred in November of that year, and continued until the end of
the war. Many of the leftists’ utopian projects were also abandoned at this time,
sacrificed to the more immediate needs of the war.

An example of such a person was Chikusa Tatsuo, a Tokyo judge who joined the
Manchukuo Justice Ministry in 1938. Chikusa for years had written in support of a
large-scale reform the Japanese legal code. He was particularly interested in rewriting
the laws in colloquial Japanese so they could be understood by the common people, and
liberalizing inheritance laws. In Manchukuo he began writing a new legal code, and
spoke openly about his dream that it could serve as a model for Japan. He completed
his plan in 1943, but the government failed to institute most of it, largely because of a
rising political tide against reforming the Japanese language. After the war he returned to the Tokyo Regional Court, and also served for 27 years on the government’s Language Research Committee, where he was a key figure in the linguistic reform of Japan’s legal code (Yasuda 2002, 64-79).

Manchukuo’s education bureaucracy also had many who hoped their reforms would inspire change in their homeland. The education bureaucracy was unique, however, in that the majority of these reformers were men with long-standing experience in Manchuria, rather than recent arrivals.

The New Education movement and Manchuria

Since at least the mid 1920s many Japanese educators in Manchuria subscribed to the ideas of the New Education movement. The term New Education movement refers to the agenda of a loosely connected group of Japanese educators who were influenced by Western theorists like Dewey, Pestazolli, and Montessori. From around the time of World War I the movement gained great support among Japanese educators, but in the 1930s the movement lost ground and leading activists began to abandon the movement’s more liberal elements.

Among the items on the agenda of New Education activists were increased use of student-centered and hands-on learning, an emphasis on practical learning over rote memorization, the use of physical objects, maps, and charts in teaching, internationalism over nationalism, decentralization over central control, an emphasis on instruction about local conditions, and the encouragement of individual talents over group conformity (Linicome 1999, 339). The central figure of the movement was Sawayanagi Masatarō, a former vice-minister of education and founder of Seijō Academy (Seijō Gakuen).
The editors of textbooks in the Japanese Ministry of Education in the 1918-1932 period were obviously influenced by the New Education movement. Compared to textbooks from the earlier periods, as well as those that followed, the 1918-1932 textbooks contained many more detailed descriptions of foreign countries, more stories set in modern times, and contained many positive references to Western-style democracy and civics. The editors also provided two different sets of Japanese language readers, so local teachers could choose the materials most appropriate for their children. Sawayanagi and other movement educators did not think the reforms went nearly far enough, however. They criticized the textbooks for remaining too state-centered, and advised teachers to create their own classroom materials, rather than relying too heavily on the textbooks (Karasawa 1955).

The center of New Education movement activity in Manchuria was the SMR’s Manshū Kyōiku Senmon Gakkō (Manchuria Education Training School), which is usually referred to by its abbreviation Kyōsen. Kyōsen was founded in 1925 by Hobo Takashi, then the SMR’s director of education. At the time Japan was suffering from a teacher shortage caused by the strong economy, which made it difficult for the SMR to find enough qualified teachers to staff its elementary schools. Hobo convinced the company to let him build a teacher training school that would supply teachers for the company schools. The SMR sent him to Europe and the United States for nearly two years to study their school systems. He returned as a strong critic of contemporary Japanese education, particularly normal education, which he felt provided teachers with inadequate training and promoted conformity. At the time Japanese normal schools stood at the same educational level as middle schools, accepting elementary school graduates and training them to teach at elementary schools. Hobo thought that
elementary school teachers should graduate from college, or at least *senmon gakkō* level schools.\(^5\) He also wanted the schools to train students to think for themselves, rather than conform to norms presented by the teachers. In a 1927 school address, Hobo said, “[In Japanese normal schools] the youths’ natural feelings are suppressed and their humanity is corrected . . . National Morals curriculum is over-emphasized, causing the students to lose their intellectual critical powers . . . [The schools] create blindness and obedience.” He demanded that Kyōsen, on the other hand, produce “bright students who can read original texts . . . [and] who are not conservative” (Ryōnankai, 1972, 37, Suzuki 1989, 555-556).

Hobo hand-picked a staff of like minded New Education movement instructors. Prominent among them was Fujimoto Fusajirō, a former director of Sawayanagi’s Seijō Academy, a hotbed of New Education thought, and Terada Kijirō, who would later go on to head the Manchukuo textbook editing department. In 1933, because of economic reasons, the SMR closed Kyōsen. The school produced around 140 graduates during the eight years of its existence, most of whom went on to teach in SMR schools. A large number of them also went to work for the Manchukuo education bureaucracy, especially during the 1932-1934 and 1938-1945 periods, as I will discuss below. They brought to the Manchukuo government a spirit of reform and experimentation and an desire to emphasize local educational needs.

Other leading New Education movement participants had ties to Manchuria. Uchihori Korefumi, an associate of education reformer Sawayanagi, from 1917 to 1923 was the principal of the SMR’s only secondary school for Chinese students, Nanman

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\(^5\) *Senmon gakkō* refers to a level of education between secondary schools and colleges, for which there is no accepted translation in English.
Middle School, and may have been the original conduit to Hobo of New Education ideas. Sawayanagi himself visited Northeast China for six weeks starting in October 1925 at the invitation of the South Manchuria Education Association, an organization of SMR and Kwantung Territory teachers. In his speech to the association he spoke of the need to develop Japan’s cultural level rather than its military power and the importance of promoting a spirit of internationalism rather than nationalism (Nomura 1995, 124).

The SMR textbook editing department appears to have been strongly influenced by the movement. Unlike the textbook department in Japan’s Ministry of Education, it was staffed by active teachers, not education officials, and from 1924 until 1945 it published textbooks designed to fit local conditions. The texts encouraged hands-on, physical-participation education of a kind that would not appear in textbooks in Japan until the early 1940s (Isoda 1989, 16-19). In 1927 Hobo Takashi was promoted to the position of SMR Regional Affairs Director, which strengthened his power to shape the region’s education. By the time Manchukuo was established, the spirit of the New Education movement had permeated the entire Japanese education world in Manchuria.

The Manchukuo Education Bureaucracy

The Manchukuo division of government responsible for education fluctuated between the ministerial and sub-ministerial levels. When the state was created in March 1932 the new Education Bureau was part of the Civil Affairs Ministry (Minsheng-bu). Kamimura Tetsuya, the first director of the Education Bureau, together with Prime Minister Zheng Xiaoxu convinced General Affairs Board director Komai to create an independent education ministry. As a result the Education Ministry
(Wenjiao-bu) was created on July 24, 1932. In July 1937 the Education Ministry was dissolved and education affairs were reabsorbed into the Civil Affairs Ministry. In March 1943 the Education Ministry was recreated, and remained in place until the state ceased to exist at the end of the war. The bureaucracy was given authority over education for primary and secondary education for all non-Japanese in the country. The Japanese ambassador to Manchukuo was responsible for education for Japanese children in Manchukuo, an area not examined in this paper.

Prime Minister Zheng served as the first Education Minister in 1932-1935, and afterward the post continued to be held by high-ranking Chinese officials. Real decision making-power, however, was held by the ministry’s department chiefs, primarily the General Affairs Department Director and secondly the School Affairs Department Director, offices always held by Japanese. Many of the middle and lower level bureaucrats were Japanese as well. The Kwantung Army established a ratio of 3 Japanese officials to every 7 non-Japanese as the model make-up of the ministry. The actual percentage of Japanese officials in the ministry fluctuated throughout the 1930s from 36% to 47%, and the leading officials were always Japanese (Tsukase 1998, 43, Yamashiro 1993, 170).

After the Education Ministry was created in July, Kamimura held both the General Affairs and School Affairs Division Director posts for a time. He was an experienced Manchuria hand, having worked for the SMR as a civil affairs official since 1919. Both his choice of friends and his writings clearly mark Kamimura as a supporter of the New Education movement. He enjoyed very close ties with three of the most prominent Japanese liberal educators in Manchuria, Hobo Takashi, Terada Kijirō, and Maenami Nakao (the second principal of Kyōsen). He was also a lifelong
friend with fellow Kagoshima native Owara Kunio, the president of Tamagawa
Academy and a leading figure in progressive education efforts in Japan (Ryōnankai

One of the few documents written by Kamimura known to exist confirms his
New Education orientation. It is a transcript of a speech to the Manchukuo National
Teacher Training seminar in June 1932, which was published as a pamphlet by the
ministry and distributed to Chinese teachers throughout the state. In the speech
Kamimura spoke against forcing opinions on students rather than teaching them to think
for themselves. “We can describe a pen, tell about its shape, and observe that despite a
shortcoming at the top, the ink still comes out well. We give this information to the
student, and the student can make a judgment based upon that information. This is
education, letting the student make his own choice rather than giving our own
predetermined judgment. Propaganda is the opposite, telling them that there is only
one pen, and that they don’t have a choice. It tells them that there is only one pen that
they need, with no other information about other options. This kind of education is
truly an evil thing, but tragically it is the norm today, not just in the Chinese Republic,
but also in Japan . . . My hope is that education can be separated from propaganda, and
become true education.” (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 238). Likewise, he criticized Japan for
its “narrow nationalism” which he claimed it shared with China and Western countries,
and called for increased international understanding as a cure (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 240).
These opinions show Kamimura placed himself squarely in the New Education camp.

Kamimura immediately began staffing his bureaucracy with former SMR and
Kwantung Territory teachers and education officials, including many from Kyōsen, the
center of the New Education movement in the region. This was a natural move, since
he had personal connections with these men, and they had experience teaching in the region. However, officials with significantly different backgrounds were also appointed to the ministry around the time. On September 30, 1932, as part of the general trend of bringing Japanese bureaucrats into the Manchukuo government, Nishiyama Masai was named the Education Ministry General Affairs Director, with Kamimura staying on as School Affairs Director, a position with slightly less authority. Nishiyama was a Monbushō (Japanese Ministry of Education) veteran who had experience directing the Japanese ministry’s Senmon Gakkō and Religion departments. He brought with him a number of Japanese education officials with no previous experience in Manchuria. By mid-1933 a struggle between Nishiyama’s “Monbushō faction”, and Kamimura’s “local faction” became quite heated. Although several sources mention the conflict, there is no clear indication whether it was caused by a substantial ideological difference between the two groups or simply was a turf war between officials from different backgrounds. By late 1934 and early 1935 many members of the local faction had left the ministry, some accepting transfers to provincial governments and some leaving the Manchukuo government entirely (Ryōnankai 1972, 209-210, Tsukinoki 1993, 171-175).

The first years of the ministry’s existence was marked by confusion and inter-ministry conflict.\(^6\) Previously there was no unified education bureaucracy for the

\(^6\)Besides the battle between the local and Monbushō factions, there was a heated battle between Iwama Tokuya and Nagamine Yoshitsuna, the leaders of the textbook editing department and the ministerial inspectorate, over the nature of the new curriculum and textbooks. Both were presumably allied with the local faction. Iwama, who first came to teach in Jinzhou in the Kwantung Territory in 1904, was the most senior member of the Japanese education community in Manchuria, while Nagamine, from Kagoshima, was an associate of Kamimura’s. One former official claims that the disagreements
region, so the infrastructure of the ministry, including personnel, communication with regional education officials, and the process of collecting information, had to be created from scratch. More importantly, armed conflict continued in many parts of the country, forcing most schools to close and scattering teachers and students alike. The most immediate job was to locate teachers and get the schools reopened. If ministry statistics are to be believed, the number of enrolled elementary school students recovered to pre-incident levels relatively quickly, by 1934. The middle school student population, on the other hand, remained below pre-incident levels until 1938 (see Table 4.7). The ministry appears to have left the particulars of reopening schools to the local provincial and prefectural governments, and focused its energy on training teachers and creating content for the newly opened schools.

The structure and content of Manchukuo education will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Briefly, however, the ministry in the 1932-1937 period did not initiate any major changes in the existing Republican education system. The general curriculum, number of years of schooling, and normal education system remained unchanged. There were some significant changes in content, however. The ministry moved swiftly to eradicate pro-Republican and anti-Japanese messages in the schools by finding and banning textbooks which contained offending passages, or at least ordering those passages inked out (Manshūkoku Shikai 1970, 1104). The ministry encouraged schools to teach from the Chinese classics until its textbook department could edit and publish replacements. Also, it established summer retraining courses for Chinese teachers from the Republican era who remained at their between the two delayed any serious progress on the establishment of a nation-wide curriculum for almost a year (Tsukinoki 1993, 174-176).
jobs. The new textbooks and teacher retraining emphasized Confucianism, particularly the idea of *wangdao*, or the kingly way, as well as ethnic harmony, international cooperation, and a positive picture of Japan. Compared to education content in the colonies of Korea and Taiwan, however, Manchukuo’s 1932-1937 education could not be described as assimilationist. Japanese language education, for example, was quite minimal compared to that found in the two formal colonies at the same time. The ministry first directed elementary schools to begin teaching Japanese language in 1934, but only for two hours a week, beginning in the third grade. In Korea, by comparison, elementary school students from the first grade spent ten hours a week on Japanese language study in the early 1930s.

**New Education in Fengtian**

As mentioned, the particulars of reopening and staffing the schools was left to the provincial and prefectural governments. The Education Department in Fengtian Province, by far the largest and most powerful economically of the northeastern provinces, was the most well organized and functioning education organ during the early years of the state’s existence, and was the sight of considerable New Education experimentation. The department’s success probably was linked to its inheritance of the structure, documents, and personnel of the Republican-era provincial education department, and because it was led by Tsubokawa Yokichi, a Japanese educator who was able to blend the previous Chinese education bureaucracy with his own set of hand-picked, loyal Japanese subordinates. Tsubokawa was among the most experienced Japanese in the Manchuria education world, working as a teacher in SMR schools for Chinese since 1910 and as principal of the SMR Fengtian City school since
1922. The Fengtian school was the SMR’s “model” or experimental school for Chinese, and thus presumably was a site of much New Education movement activity (Ômori 1994). Tsubokawa became the Fengtian Provincial Education Department General Affairs Director in January 1932. Many of the Republican-era Chinese in the department remained at their posts, perhaps because Tsubokawa was well acquainted with them from his years of experience in the area. Tsubokawa brought with him several Japanese educators with local experience; most had taught in SMR schools under Tsubokawa.

The department quickly demonstrated its ability by publishing a detailed plan for a new provincial education system on March 1st, 1932, the very day of the Manchukuo declaration of establishment (Fengtian-sheng Jiaoyu 1932). Also, in September 1932, it published a series of elementary school textbooks to be used in place of those Republican textbooks banned for containing anti-Japanese material (Wenjiao-bu 1932a, 21-22). These textbooks were approved by the central Education Ministry for use throughout the country until it was able to begin publishing its own textbooks in 1934. The Fengtian Education Department also began publishing its own Chinese language education journal, Fengtian Jiaoyu (Fengtian Education) in January 1933. The journal continued to be published monthly until at least 1940.

While none of the Japanese officials in Tsubokawa’s department had direct contact with Kyôsen, almost all were former SMR educators, and they appear to have been strongly influenced by the New Education movement. This is born out in the pages of Fengtian Jiaoyu, which published numerous articles about the benefits of physical participation education. Physical participation education (rōsaku kyōiku) was based on the ideas of the Swiss education philosopher Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, and
popularized in Japan after the First World War by Kitazawa Shūichi, the principal of the Tokyo Girls’ Higher Normal School. Kitazawa emphasized the importance of student initiative and creativity, and encouraged teachers to invent activities which would prepare students for their likely future occupations. He encouraged the creation of school gardens, aquariums, and aviaries where students could learn both responsibility and actively gain an appreciation of nature (Isoda 1999). The journal frequently referred to the innovations of Kitazawa and his fellow reformers.

A 1933 issue of Fengtian Jiaoyu, for example, records in Chinese speeches given at a January 1933 training conference on elementary school physical participation education. Seven Japanese teachers from Kyōsen and the Kyōsen-attached elementary school taught the workshops, which presumably targeted Chinese teachers. In his welcoming address Fengtian Provincial Education Inspector Morita Ryōichi, a Tsubokawa subordinate, declared, “We must implement physical participation education in Fengtian, as it is the pinnacle of education theory and action.” He praised the Kyōsen-attached elementary school as “[t]he ideal elementary school in Manchuria, where profound research into both the theory and practice of physical participation education is taking place.” The lectures featured suggestions such as that of Kuwara Shiji, a Kyōsen-attached elementary school teacher, who spoke in detail about the need to synergistically teach history and geography, using objects the students could physically manipulate; such as maps, lineage charts, and newspaper articles (Fengtian Jiaoyu 2-1, May 1933, 17, 63-68). All of the lecturers were clearly influenced by the New Education movement.

In December 1934 Manchukuo reorganized the state’s provincial system, breaking up the large provinces of Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang into ten smaller
provinces, in part to strengthen the central government by dismantling the traditionally strong provincial governments. The move probably weakened the Fengtian Education Department’s previously central role in Manchukuo education. Still, Tsubokawa remained the central figure in Fengtian provincial education until at least 1940, and many of his staff members were sent to the new provinces in the mid 1930s, presumably to set up departments based on the Fengtian model.

*Enforced orthodoxy in Japan*

Although Japanese educators were putting some of the progressive ideas of the New Education movement into practice in Manchuria in the 1930s, the movement was facing serious setbacks in Japan. While the Manchurian Incident provided some Japanese leftist intellectuals with opportunities in Northeast China, in Japan it gave the political right the political capital it needed in its campaign to eradicate ideologies that threatened to undermine national unity. Censorship laws already in place were strengthened, and popular rightist figures pressured the government to purge free-thinking professors such as Takigawa Yukitori (fired from Kyoto University, 1932), Minobe Tatsukichi (forced to resign from the House of Lords, 1935), and Yanaihara Tadao (forced to resign from Tokyo University in 1937). Although the number of purges were limited, they had a chilling effect on academic freedom. The message was clear: anyone who taught a world view which was centered on something other than the Emperor and the *kokutai*, such as the needs of the individual or class, was a potential target. The spirit of this turn to enforced orthodoxy is summarized in the following 1940 policy statement from the Konoe cabinet. “[Our goal is the] thorough renovation of education in harmony with the fundamental principles of the national polity, and also
the establishment of ethical principles of the nation stressing, above all, service to the state and eradicating all selfish and materialistic thoughts” (Marshall 1994, 120).

In the early 1930s the education establishment embraced a reemphasis on inculcating student loyalty toward a model of a hierarchical state family, or kokutai. The Japanese Education Ministry’s 1933 textbook revision placed a much stronger emphasis on the concept of kokutai and emperor-centered myths in elementary and secondary school textbooks. The texts emphasized racial consciousness in its stories of founding gods and ancient warriors. Chapters about ancient Japan largely replaced those about foreign cultures and individuals from the previous period. They also described the Japanese language as the repository of the Japanese people’s spirit.

Faced with this changing climate, New Education movement activists jettisoned the more liberal and individualistic aspects of their proposed reforms, while continuing to push ones which did not pose a threat to the emphasis on kokutai. These developments can be followed in the public positions of Noguchi Entarō, a close associate of Sawayanagi and president of the New Education Association, the movement’s main umbrella organization in the 1930s. Noguchi and the association bowed to the trends of the time by abandoning their previous internationalist ideology and emphasis on the development of the individual spirit. They continued to support making education as practical as possible by linking taught information to physical representations which could be manipulated by the students, and by merging curriculum subjects as much as possible, in the manner of Montessori schools in the West. History and geography were singled out as subjects which could be merged into a new
curriculum called social studies, as was happening in parts of the United States (Isoda 1991, 36-39, Lincicome 1999, 357, Nomura 1995, 124). 

The trend toward enforced theological orthodoxy gained strength under the pressure of war in the 1940s. The Ministry of Education began another major textbook revision in 1941, resulting in a set of texts in which nationalistic and jingoistic rhetoric spilled beyond morals and history into even the geography and science textbooks. Karasawa Tomitaro, in his extensive study of elementary school textbooks, estimates that over 76% of the Japanese Language curriculum chapters contained ultranationalistic messages, while almost no positive portrayals of Westerners remained. Nearly every instruction or suggestion in the textbooks were tied to appeals to the students’ loyalty to the state and the Emperor (Karasawa 1956). Elementary and middle school students spent increasingly less time in the classroom, and more in trips to Shinto shrines, in military drill, and, after 1942, in labor projects.

*The education bureaucracy and the Shingakusei, 1935-1939*

In 1935 the decision makers in the Manchukuo General Affairs Board made a series of personnel changes which ended the turf war between the local and Monbushō factions in the Education Ministry. They handed the top positions in the ministry to Japanese bureaucrats who were aligned with neither group—officials originally from the Japanese Home and Finance Ministries closely connected with the General Affairs

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7 New education reformers had recommended the creation of a social studies curriculum since the late 1920s. An example of this position can be found in an article by Tokyo Higher Normal School teachers Kobayashi Sumiami and Sasaki Yūichi in a volume published by the New Education Association, *Kyōiku Kakushin, Nihon Kyōiku no Kaizō*, 1937, p. 70 (Isoda 1991, 50).
Board. These kind of officials, few of whom had any previous experience in education, continued to lead Manchukuo education until the state’s destruction in 1945. Besides having no personal interest in the fray between former officials of the Monbushō and the SMR, their connections with the Board probably reassured the central government that the education bureaucracy would remain firmly under their control.

The first such official was Kume Nario, who replaced Nishiyama Masai, the leader of the Monbushō faction, as Education Ministry General Affairs Director in early 1935. Kume had worked his way up the ranks in the Japanese Home Ministry, eventually serving in the appointed position of prefectural governor in Oita, Ehime, and Nara Prefectures. In 1933 he came to Manchukuo to be the Fengtian Provincial General Affairs Director, the most powerful civilian position in the country’s largest province. The transfer of this leading Japanese official to the Education Ministry seems to indicate the concern Manchukuo leaders had for the state of affairs in the ministry.

The arrival of Kume brought about the end of the inter-ministry battle between the local and Monbushō factions. Kume was critical of local faction leader Kamimura because of his participation in the tensions, and arranged for him to be demoted to the position of a higher normal school principal. Kamio Kazuharu was named as the new School Affairs Director in March 1935. Like Kume, Kamio had worked in Japanese local governments, but had also served in several positions in the Korean colonial government in the late 1920s, including a stint as Education Department Director. In

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Kamimura was said to have been insulted by the transfer, and soon afterward suffered a stroke. He later returned home to Japan to teach at the reformist Tamagawa Academy (Kamio 1983, 42, Tsukinoki 1993, 175).
1933 he came to Manchukuo to work at the General Affairs Board. The new administration of Kume and Kamio fired or transferred away a large number of Kamimura’s underlings, particularly those connected to Kyōsen. Some former SMR educators and former Monbushō officials continued to work at the ministry, but now both sides were firmly under the control of the General Affairs Board (Kamio 1983, 42, Tsukinoki 1993, 175).

Little is known about the inner workings of the ministry in the 1935-1937 period, largely because there were few Kyōsen-connected educators in the ministry at the time, and most of the post-war testimonies about the ministry were written by these men. Kamio’s own memoir quickly passes over his time in the Education Ministry, merely noting that his attempts at reform were foiled by Kwantung Army interference. He blamed Kume, who was the liaison with the Kwantung Army, for failing to defend the reforms. Kamio left the ministry in February 1936, and Kume held both General Affairs and School Affairs Director positions until August 1936 (Kamio 1983, 41-43). The Ministry appears not to have sponsored any New Education reforms during this period, although Kyōsen graduates, then exiled from the government, continued to teach and conduct education experiments in SMR-run schools in the railway zone.

By 1936 the state’s domestic situation had stabilized, and the Education Ministry met its immediate goals of reopening schools and revising the curriculum. The number of functioning schools and attendance rates rebounded to the level found before the Manchurian Incident in 1931 (Kurokawa 1997, 183-189). Anti-Japanese textbooks were removed from the schools, and the ministry’s textbook editing committee published sets of state-approved textbooks for elementary and middle
schools in 1934 and 1935. Also, summer re-training courses for Chinese teachers were held throughout the country (Wenjiao-bu 1935).

With the situation stabilized, ministry officials turned to the creation of a new education system to replace the still-in-use 1922 Chinese Republican system. The ministry circulated a plan in July 1936, and invited comments from officials in the Fengtian Provincial Education Department and the SMR (Maeda 1998). In August, very soon after the process began, Kume resigned from the ministry and was replaced by a pair of lawyers, Minagawa Toyoji as General Affairs Director and Tsutomion Tsukuda as School Affairs Director. Minagawa, who had worked as prosecutor and regional official in Japan, had served since 1932 as the third highest-ranking official in the Manchukuo General Affairs Board. He was known for his geniality, political skills and ability to negotiate effectively with the Kwantung Army and other government organs (Gotō 1976, 119). Tsutomio was a constitutional scholar who had worked in the state’s Legal Affairs Department since 1933. The new team led the ministry in the completion of the Shingakusei (new education system). The ministry presented the final plan at a national education conference in April 1937, Pu Yi promulgated it in May, and it went into effect on January 1, 1938 (Minsheng-bu 1939).

The implementation of the Shingakusei in 1938 brought about major changes in both the content and structure of Manchukuo education. These changes were influenced by shifts in both the Manchukuo ideology and the New Education movement during the 1935-1940 period.

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9 The Education Ministry may have solicited replies from all of the provincial education departments, but the Fengtian reply is the only one known to exist (Maeda 1998).
The various shifts in Manchukuo ideology will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Suffice it to say that just as Japanese society and government swung to the right in the 1930s, from 1935 to 1940 Manchukuo’s public ideology moved from an image of an independent *wangdao* Confucianist state working together with its friendly neighbor Japan, to that of a client state whose legitimacy rested on the Manchukuo Emperor’s connection to the Emperor of Japan. This shift was manifested in the primary and middle school curriculums by an increased emphasis on the individual’s duty to the state and the Manchukuo Emperor, and an increase in the hours of Japanese language instruction and other Japan-related material. Japanese was for the first time declared one of the national languages, and Japanese language class time for the first time equaled or surpassed that of Chinese language instruction in both primary and secondary schools.

While the philosophical background of the Manchukuo education leaders in the mid-1930s is unclear, the plan they created appears to have been influenced by the increasingly conservative trends within the New Education movement in Japan at the time—a retreat back to a state-centered curriculum and away from internationalism and individualism, but also a renewed emphasis on practicality and curriculum synergy. Manchukuo schools became a kind of testing ground for the ideas of this more conservative form of the movement.

In terms of structure, the plan was intended to unify and broaden elementary school education, while reducing the number of secondary school years and making the schools more practical. Minagawa defended the reduction in school years by asserting that the country’s large unschooled population and underdeveloped economy required an emphasis on building more elementary schools rather than wasting resources on
building an unnecessarily large secondary education system. Minagawa and others claimed the state of the country’s economy required few skilled laborers, and therefore too many secondary schools would create a class of “educated idlers” (Minagawa 1939, 20-21, Minsheng-bu 1939, 21, Tamura 1941, 37, 46-49). Minagawa appears to have feared educated, underemployed people could become leaders in anti-Japanese activities.

To address these concerns the previously two-level middle school system was changed to a single-level system, with the total length of middle school education reduced from six years to four, and general studies (humanities and science), the favored middle school major in early 20th century Chinese schools, was eliminated in favor of vocational courses (agriculture, commerce, industry, and marine industry). This change coincided with the government’s adoption of a Soviet-style five-year economic plan in 1937. They tried to create a system in which the number of trained graduates in each field matched perfectly with the needs of each economic sector as outlined by the five-year plan. The elimination of the humanities and science major in middle schools was bitterly resented by many in the non-Japanese population (Isoda 1994).

The 1938 plan directed schools to teach synergistically, emphasizing the connected nature of subjects within the curriculum, which was a favorite reformist goal of the New Education movement. In elementary schools the curriculum subjects national language (Japanese and Chinese or Mongolian), morals, civics, history, and geography were merged into a single subject named national people’s studies (C. guomin-ke), with two textbooks a semester, one in Japanese, and one in Chinese or Mongolian.
Finally, the system was adjusted to give the central education bureaucracy greater control over education. It transferred all normal schools to state control, prepared the way for all teachers to become state-appointed employees by 1939, and increased pressure on private schools to join the state-run system.

In July 1937, as the finishing touches were being applied to the Shingakusei, a state-wide reorganization of ministries resulted in the demotion of the Education Ministry back to the status of a department in the Civil Affairs Ministry. The Mongolian Affairs Ministry’s education department was also transferred to the Civil Affairs Ministry. Except for the additional responsibility of administering education in the Mongolian regions, the mission and personnel of the education bureaucracy remained largely unchanged by these moves, and it appears to have had no real impact on the bureaucracy’s function. Minagawa remained on to oversee the implementation of the Shingakusei as the Education Bureau Director until August 1938, when he resigned to take a leading position in the Concordia Association (Kyōwakai), the Manchukuo government-sponsored mass organization, as well as serve as a director of the Manchukuo Education Society, a state-run association of educators.

Striving for uniqueness, 1938-1942

Manchukuo’s leaders chose Tamura Toshio, a Japanese Finance Ministry official who came to Manchukuo in 1932 to work as the National Taxation Agency Director, to replace Minagawa as Education Bureau Director. Tamura changed the nature of the department by hiring a large number of former SMR employees. SMR educators, particularly Kyōsen-related educators, were largely barred from the ministry during Kume’s tenure because of their participation in ministry infighting during the
Kamimura/Nishiyama years. During Minagawa’s period of leadership SMR-connected educators began trickling back into the education bureaucracy, and their numbers rose dramatically under Tamura.

A major reason for this shift in personnel was the Japanese government’s decision to renounce its rights of extraterritoriality in Manchukuo, which occurred in stages over 1937 and 1938. Because of this, the SMR ended its direct participation in education in Manchuria in December 1937. It transferred authority over its schools for Chinese students to the Manchukuo government, and its schools for Japanese students to the Japanese embassy in Manchukuo, which essentially placed them under the control of the Japanese Education Ministry. Many of the independent-minded SMR educators, who had over thirty years created their own unique education culture, bristled at their new subservient relationship to Japanese bureaucrats and left the former SMR-schools. Some of these men were welcomed into the Manchukuo education bureaucracy.

The key individual in recruiting SMR-experienced educators was Terada Kijirō, whom Tamura hired to be Textbook Editing Department Director in the fall of 1938. Terada held the position of Head Teacher at Kyōsen from its founding in 1924 until 1930, and then moved on to be a principal at SMR-run middle schools for Japanese. Terada wrote prodigiously about progressive education issues throughout the 1930s, and commanded a strong degree of loyalty from his former Kyōsen students. Because of his influence scores of Kyōsen alumni and other former SMR educators entered the Manchukuo education bureaucracy (Terada 1975, 82-86, 168, 231, Ryōnankai 1972, 239-247).

According to Terada, he and Tamura shared a common vision for the implementation and further development of the Shingakusei. Their partnership
represented an alliance between the conservative statist ideology then prevalent in both
the Japan and Manchukuo governments at the time (represented by Tamura) and the
moderately conservative wing of the 1930s New Education movement (represented by
Terada). The partnership resulted in the continuing centralization of education
administration and the strengthening of “statist” aspects of education. They further
developed Manchukuo’s unique curriculum, sketched out by Minagawa and Tsutomi in
1937, using some New Education movement principles like physical participation
education and social studies. The pair (as well as Tamura’s successor, Kita Kiyoshi)
appear to have dragged their heels, however, in implementing changes in the education
curriculum reflecting the establishment of Shintō as the state ideology in 1940. They
also resisted attempts by the Japanese Ministry of Education to assimilate Manchukuo
education into the Japanese central system (Terada 1975, 80-83).

Statism and Shintōism

Both Tamura and Terada wrote prolifically during the 1938-1942 period about
their vision for Manchukuo education. Both supported the current government line
that Manchukuo should have a strong central government with the power to direct the
economy. Their statist ideology can also be seen in their interest in linking state
planning initiatives to higher education. Tamura called for state plans like the 1937
Five Year Industrial Plan to include detailed estimates of the number of new employees
needed in each sector, so that higher education institutions could train exactly that
number. He also opposed choosing higher education students through open testing,
and instead supported a system by which recommendations by middle school principals
about the students’ abilities and “appropriateness” determined entry into the higher schools (Tamura 1941, 37, 46-49, Terada 1941, 213).

In 1940-1942, changes in Manchukuo’s public ideology and the beginning of Japan’s war with the Atlantic powers had an impact on Manchukuo education. After Pu Yi’s second state visit to Japan in May 1940 the Manchukuo government declared the country’s official ideology to be State Shintō. This included the recognition of Amaterasu, the mythical ancestor of the Japanese emperor, as the country’s “foremost god,” the establishment of a Shintō State Founding Shrine in the capital, and the construction of branch shrines near every public school (Nomura 1995, 76). In September the Japanese celebratory days commemorating Japan’s mythical foundation (Kigensetsu) and the Japanese Emperor’s birthday were added to the Manchukuo school calendar.

In March 1941 Kita Kiyoshi, an official at the General Affairs Board since 1932, replaced Tamura as the Education Bureau Director. Kita, a former normal school teacher in Japan, was the first former educator to lead the education bureaucracy since Nishiyama and Kamimura were removed in 1935. In December of that year Japan went to war with the United States and Great Britain, and in March 1942 a Manchukuo Imperial Rescript declared that the country would put all of its energy into cooperation with Japan in the war effort.

While Tamura, Terada, and Kita supported a statist emphasis in the curriculum, they were less interested in including material celebrating State Shintō. Although Tamura publicly stated that he thought the Manchukuo kokutai was an extension of the Japanese kokutai, the introduction of State Shintō, with its mythical elements so foreign to the country’s non-Japanese, appears to have gone too far for him. After the war an
education official reported that around February 1941 Tamura privately expressed his unhappiness with the State Shintō policy (Tamura 1941, 36-37, Komagome 1996, 439). While laudatory comments about State Shintō policies became *de rigueur* among Manchukuo officials in the 1940s, Tamura, Terada, and Kita almost completely ignored the subject in their significant corpus of writings during their time as education officials. Terada, who had long supported the idea of Manchuria as an unique entity independent of Japan, appears to have been particularly disturbed by the new ideology. In a 1940 article, listing the challenges faced by Manchukuo education, he hints at his dissatisfaction by saying, “[The state ideology of] State Founding Spirit is not yet completed. [I always] try to avoid these kind of abstract, ideological theories, but I think I should comment in this case. . . . Frankly, it still has many dogmatic aspects, and I do not think it is at a point where the people of the world can accept it” (Terada 1941, 223).

As a result of the education leadership’s disinterest, textbooks and education journals published in 1940-1943 mention Shintō symbols in only the most perfunctory ways. This is not to say that the textbooks and journals of that period were free of militarism—they did discuss in great detail the importance of uniting with Japan, sacrificing to win the war, and the heroic role of the military. Also, although the curriculum touched only lightly on Shintōism during this period, school ceremonies containing Shintō elements, including the worship of the Japanese emperor, were taking place throughout the country by the end of 1941.
Terada and education content

After the war Terada rationalized his participation in the Manchukuo government by claiming that he and his associates largely ignored the ideological aspects of the state, instead focusing on implementing reformist education, with the ultimate goal of inspiring change within Japan. “Secretly in my heart I wanted to blow a new wind into the elementary and middle school textbooks in Japan itself. I tried to reform Japanese education from Manchuria” (Ryōnankai 1972, 240). Among the reforms Terada tried to implement were a greater emphasis on in-class science experiments, the use of pronunciation-based kana and accent marks in teaching Japanese language, the creation of a Chinese syllabary based on the Japanese kana system, and the creation of a social studies curriculum unifying history and geography, which he hoped would replace the more traditional morals curriculum as a central tool in the building nationalist spirit. In 1940 Terada asked the renowned philosopher Miki Kiyoshi, a former student, to assist him in inviting leading Japanese scholars to advise his textbook editors. As a result Miki and the physicist Ishiwara Jun spent two months in Manchukuo in 1940 advising the textbook editors, and the literary scholar Yamamoto Yūzō, the mathematician Ogura Kinnosuke, and the legal expert and economist Tsunetō Kyō agreed to act as consultants from Japan. All of these scholars were noted for their liberal or even radical views, and it is said that Tamura had to exert great force to gain approval from Kwantung Army officials for the scholars’ participation (Ryōnankai 1972, 240, Terada 1932, 116).10

10 Although all five of these men were leading scholars at the time, Miki probably remains the most well-known figure of the group for his work on the philosophy of history, his attempts to merge Marxism and fascism in the early 1940s as a member of Prime Minister Konoe’s Shōwa Kenkyūkai, and his death.
Although Terada was clearly a participant in the New Education movement, he supported Tamura in his efforts to centralize education authority, such as limiting the number of students accepted into middle schools based on the state’s annual needs, an idea abhorrent to more liberal members of the movement (Terada 1975, 83). Terada carried this centralization effort into his textbook editing department. Previously the education bureaucracy farmed out the job of writing many of the textbooks to the provincial education bureaucracies and individual educators. Terada was determined to make his department the sole source of textbooks for all the country’s schools, and he greatly increased the size of the department to sixty editors to accomplish this task (Manshūkoku Shikai 1970, 1106).

While Terada worked to centralize Manchukuo education, he resisted pressure to go the next step and allow Manchukuo education to fall under the control of Japan’s Monbushō. At a time when there was increased pressure to “Japanize” Manchukuo society, Terada’s organization produced textbooks which were consistently unique, bearing little resemblance to the textbooks used in Japan.\(^1\) While they did contain

\(^{11}\) Although Terada did not oppose the 1938 education system’s strong emphasis on Japanese language education for non-Japanese, he insisted that it be paired together with equally intensive Chinese language instruction for Japanese living in Manchukuo (Manshū Kokugo 1940, 55).
material laudatory toward the Japanese imperial system and society, they also continued
to emphasize the region’s traditional culture and traditions, based on the idea that such
material would more naturally pique the students’ interest. The struggle with the
Monbushō can be seen in the records of education conferences held in 1939 and 1942,
which brought together education officials from the naichi (Japan) and gaichi (colonies,
puppet states, and other occupied areas). Both conferences featured lively debate over
the appropriateness of using Japanese language textbooks produced in Tokyo in the
gaichi. At the 1939 Monbushō-sponsored Conference on National Language Policy,
held in Tokyo, Japanese education officials introduced a new series of standardized
Japanese language texts designed for use in the gaichi. Unlike the representatives
from Taiwan and Korea, the Manchukuo education officials present were clearly
dubious about the texts. Ichitani Kiyoaki, one of Terada’s assistants, said “I am afraid
that the materials will contain foolish things about ethnic groups in the gaichi which
will offend them. That is why you should entrust these things to the people who live in
the gaichi.” Ōide Masayoshi, an SMR education veteran and prolific author of
Japanese language textbooks in Manchukuo and occupied China, stated in an opinion
paper submitted to the conference that the Japanese Education Ministry’s efforts were
“going too far with an ideal, so that it is not appropriate to the situation.” In the end
the Manchukuo officials agreed to accept the texts as a reference, but made no promise
to use them in their classes (Monbushō Toshokyoku 1939, 188, Ōide 1939a, 19).

The friction over the use of material from Japan continued at the 1942 East
Asian Education Conference, sponsored by the Manchukuo Civil Affairs Ministry and
held in the Manchukuo capital Xinjing [Changchun]. At the Japanese language
committee session a Japanese principal from Taiwan suddenly stood up and presented a
motion, asking that “excellent experienced people from the gaichi” participate in the editing of future Japanese language texts intended for that region, because “the textbooks they [the Monbushō] have published are full of information about Japan, which are inescapably dull [for gaichi students]. We would like textbooks which are simple and clear, linguistic, and useful in daily life.” Immediately Terada stood up to second the motion, and “everyone applauded” in support. It seems probable that Terada arranged for the proposal to be made, and that it represented the will of the Manchukuo education leadership. The Monbushō official present opposed the reduction of Japan-related material in the texts, but did admit that Manchukuo officials had the authority to decide whether to use the texts or not (Minsheng-bu 1942, 116-118, Komagome 1996, 325-326).

War and the descent into orthodoxy, 1943-1945

The nature of Manchukuo education changed again as the war conditions became more severe after 1942. Planned reforms ground to a halt as Japanese teachers, expected to be the leaders of reform, were drafted into the army, and a paper shortage made publishing new textbooks difficult. From 1943 a new emphasis on Shintō principles in the curriculum and increasing amount of time spent in “public labor service” and military drills resulted in a steep decline in the amount of academic study occurring in schools.

In April 1943 the Manchukuo education bureaucracy was raised from the level of a department in the Civil Affairs Ministry to that of an independent ministry for the second time. As before, a Chinese official was named Education Minister, but real power was held by the Japanese directly below him, led this time by Vice-Minister
Tanaka Yoshio. Tanaka brought in a new team of Japanese officials who previously had no connection with Manchukuo education. This may have been in response to the education bureaucracy’s previous reluctance to emphasize State Shintō in the curriculum. The last member of the previous administration leadership was leave was Terada, who remained as head of textbook editing until he retired in April 1944. His replacement, Katō Masayuki, was a former textbook official from the Monbushō with no previous experience in Manchukuo (Manshūkoku Shikai 1970, 1097).

Around this time the ministry leaders began filling the curriculum with State Shintō ideology that the 1938-1942 leaders had avoided. In October 1943 a deliberative council chaired by the Prime Minister and including members from throughout the Manchukuo education world was formed. In October 1944 the council presented a report detailing the state’s education principles, with State Shintō as the cornerstone, and laying out a plan for teaching those principles during wartime (Bunkyō Shingi Kai 1944). At the same time ministry officials prepared a new outline for the morals curriculum, including instructions for teachers on how to teach State Shintō principles, which was completed in June 1944. Katō’s textbook editors were assigned the job of creating new morals textbooks to go along with the new emphasis, but few if any were completed by the end of the war.

As war conditions worsened, labor service and drill began to dominate school time, particularly in the middle schools and colleges. In June 1939 the Manchukuo government first began requiring students to give free labor service to projects selected by the provincial governors. The guideline was strengthened in December 1942 by the Student Labor Public Service Law, which required college students to work 30-45 days per year on national construction projects or agricultural production as part of student
labor teams. In 1944 the Education Ministry began requiring middle school students to
join the teams as well. Middle school fourth year students were expected to work up
to 125 days a year, third year students 75 days a year, and first and second year students
up to 50 days a year. Students in elementary schools also appear to have participated
in labor service to some degree. The ministry hailed this decision as a successful
unification of practical education and labor service, but naturally the students viewed it
as slave labor (Manshūkoku Shikai 1970, 1099).

Although military drills were first instituted in Manchukuo middle schools in
1940, in 1943 they became part of the standard curriculum. Many Chinese testimonies
about this period claim that in the last years the amount of time spent on academic
subjects in the middle schools and colleges was drastically reduced. One witness
claims that during the last years the curriculum at his agricultural middle school became
insubstantial and disorganized, and the students spent only two months a year in the
Japanese students in Japan was fundamentally similar, but it seems clear from the
testimonies available that conditions for students were worse in Manchukuo than they
were in Japan.

Conclusion

Although Manchukuo was a puppet state, the power holders did not always
agree on the details of its manipulation. In many areas government idealists who really
believed in the independent and unique nature of the state quickly realized the true
nature of the situation, and either acquiesced or left the government. Education, more
than any other sector, however, continued to attract idealists, and for a time the ministry
actively welcomed their participation. Terada Kijirō was representative of this class of reformist educators who used Manchukuo as an opportunity to create a new kind of education outside the calcified institutions of Japan. They worked within a system, however, that ultimately ran at cross-purposes with many of their ideals, and in an empire in which ideological conservatives were moving society into a lock-stepped march. For a time they created a space free of some of the ideas they abhorred, but eventually they could not stop the trend of the times from overwhelming them.
Chapter 3

Independence or Dependence: The development of a puppet ideology

A major goal in the creation of the puppet-state of Manchukuo in 1932 was the neutralization of anti-Japanese attitudes among the population so they would not interfere in the establishment of a military occupation dedicated to strengthening Japan’s strategic position. The occupiers feared anti-Japanese sentiment spurred by Chinese nationalism as a potential obstacle to their goals, and immediately worked to remove the nationalist ideology taught in the region’s schools since 1929. They aimed not only at eradicating all signs of that nationalism, but also at creating a new national ideology which could take its place as a unifying social force.

Japanese began creating a rationalization for the occupation and the creation of the state of Manchukuo immediately after the commencement of hostilities in September 1931, citing Chinese misrule, historical precedent, and Japan’s special rights in the region. As the Kwantung Army moved to create a puppet state, its supporters created a state ideology under the twin rubrics of “ethnic harmony” and the “kingly way” to mask the country’s true nature. Through these mottos they hoped to dampen ethnic consciousness and play up their role in the strengthening of traditional values and the establishment of a fair government. They presented the new ideology as unique, wholly unlike those in place in Nanjing and Tokyo. The Japanese leadership changed key aspects of the ideology several times over the thirteen years of Manchukuo’s existence, reflecting changes in the leadership personnel, in the international situation, and in Japan’s domestic society. By the 1940s the ideology’s mask of uniqueness was judged to be dangerous and unnecessary, and it was stripped away, to be replaced by a blatant ideology of Japanese ethnic superiority and the Japanese emperor system.
The origins, development, and ultimate collapse of Manchukuo state ideology will be examined in this chapter, including the causes of its frequent changes of direction. The reason given for the creation of the new state will be discussed first, followed by an examination of the concepts of “ethnic harmony” and the “kingly way”. Key documents examined include the transcripts of the League of Nations debate on the Manchurian Incident, texts of key Manchukuo government proclamations, the writings of three key creators of the state ideology—Kyoto University professor Yano Jin’ichi, Prime Minister Zheng, and journalist Tachibana Shiraki, and a 1934 Manchukuo higher elementary textbook. Through a variety of sources, I intend to examine the way the state ideology was presented to different audiences, including to the international public, Japanese and Chinese intellectuals, and Chinese schoolchildren.

Justifications of Manchukuo independence

Before the Manchurian Incident the Kwantung Army plot leaders had envisioned a simple military occupation of the region, not the creation of a nominally independent state. By September 22, however, pressure from Army leaders in Tokyo made it clear to them that a puppet state would give them a better chance of keeping control over the region (Yamashiro 1993, 63-64). Therefore the Kwantung Army leaders engineered the formation of a committee of provincial leaders who in February 1932 declared the region’s independence from the Nanjing government, and on March 3, 1932 declared the formation of the state of Manchukuo, which they claimed was a sovereign and independent state.
The Kwantung Army originally defended its actions as simple self-defense.\(^\text{12}\)

As the plans for the creation of a puppet state matured, however, the plotters, together with civilian allies and eventually Japanese Foreign Ministry officials, developed a three-fold set of public justifications for the removal of the region from Chinese sovereignty, the creation of the state of Manchukuo, and Japan’s participation in the process. They were: (1) China (both the Nanjing and Zhang Xueliang governments) had lost any mandate to govern the area because of its misrule and corruption, and the independence movement reflected the will of the people in rejecting those governments; (2) the Manchurian region historically had been independent of China; and (3) Japan had a special right to intervene and assist in the removal of the previous government because of a long-standing special relationship with the region and a superior ability to bring about good government and economic development.

The Japanese claimed China as a whole suffered from decades of disorder, mismanagement, and economic extortion by warlord armies, and that nowhere was this truer than in Manchuria under Zhang Xueliang, who they claimed had driven the local population into poverty and desperation. The following passage by the

\(^{12}\) The immediate justifications for the Kwantung Army’s military actions in September 1931 and the resulting occupation of the entire region was the purported attack by Chinese troops from Zhang Xueliang’s army on a section of the South Manchurian Railway’s line near Mukden and an attack on Japanese troops sent to investigate the explosion. Japanese Army propaganda pamphlets from the period insisted the Kwantung Army acted in self-defense in all its actions, even those far from the railway lines. Once all credible military opposition melted away, however, the Japanese Army needed to construct a new justification for the Kwantung Army’s expanding activities. This they did by asserting that Japanese nationals and property were threatened by widespread outlaw activity orchestrated by Zhang Xueliang, although it would be more accurate to say the Kwantung Army itself that had thrown the region into disorder. (Young 1998: 140-145).
pro-Manchukuo Japanese writer Yano Jin’ichi is a standard presentation of this position:

When the Qing was overthrown, *wangedao* (kingly way) rule immediately disappeared in China. Bandits of all kinds ran rampant, squeezing the good people. Warlords and bureaucrats, not to be outdone, selfishly robbed the people through extortionate taxes, monopoly rights, and deliberately depressing agricultural prices. The 30 million people of Manchuria . . . at last could not stand it. They broke away, declared independence from China, and built a new state (Yano 1933, 301-302).

An official version of Yano’s claims appeared in a 1934 Chinese language Manchukuo Higher Elementary School history textbook, which stated:

Warlord dictatorial rule worsened after Zhang Xueliang took power . . . The Manchurian government became weary and weak. The warlords imposed unbearable taxes to pay for ballooning military expenditures. They issued an excessive amount of currency, which caused the economy to collapse, and they encouraged the people to participate in anti-foreign movements. Just as the Manchurian people were falling into destitution and peril, the situation was resolved by the great events of September 18 (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 62-63).

As for the Chinese state as a whole, on February 19, 1932, Japanese diplomats at the League of Nations began to claim that China could not be regarded as an “organized country” with the ability to protect the “rights and interests of foreigners” (Willoughby 1935, 245). On February 23 the Japanese government in a written statement to the League Council stated it “does not and can not consider that China is an ‘organized people’ within the meaning of the Covenant of the League of Nations . . . Its population is not organized except in patches.” It continued: “There is no unified control in China and no authority which is entitled to claim such control” (Willoughby 1935, 268-271). It was no accident that this claim was first made the day after the Chinese collaborators in Manchuria declared independence from the Nanjing regime.
Japanese propagandists also claimed that the Chinese government had violated treaties between the two countries by directly supporting anti-Japanese activities in Manchuria. Japanese diplomat Yoshizawa Kenkichi first raised these allegations in a cable to the Chinese Government at Nanjing on October 8, 1931. He wrote:

> It is to be noted that [the] anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as [an] instrument of national policy under the direction of [the] Nationalist Party . . . That movement must therefore be clearly distinguished from one which originates spontaneously amongst people. It is therefore evident that [the] present anti-Japanese movement in China is not only in contravention of [the] letter and spirit of treaties existing between [the] two countries, but constitutes [a] form of hostile act (Willoughby 1935, 77).

At League of Nations sessions on October 13, October 23, and October 26, Yoshizawa continued to claim that Japanese nationals had been repeatedly harassed and threatened by Chinese agitated by the government’s anti-Japanese propaganda. Official Chinese support for anti-Japanese activities, he held, represented an abrogation of treaties between the two countries, and justified the continued presence of Japanese troops throughout the region.

Buttressing these claims against the Chinese government were pledges of support given to the Japanese occupation by local Chinese leaders, which the Japanese portrayed as representing the overall “will of the people”. The Japanese, through a mixture of open threats and promises of power-sharing, convinced many prominent Chinese to join local governing bodies and eventually declare independence from Nanjing. Most of the declarations of independence contained references to the people’s will. For example, an October 1, 1931 declaration by the “Northeastern Gentry and People’s Committee” announced that groups “all over the Northeast” had resolved on a policy of independent self-government. “We now have an
unprecedented opportunity, having suffered under violent warlord rule, to set up a new independent government. . . . This is a genuine resolution of the popular will.” The cooperation of these bodies with the independence movement formed the basis of the commonly repeated Japanese claim that the creation of Manchukuo represented “the united will of the 30 million people of Manchuria” (Mitter 2000, 83).

The 1934 Manchukuo Higher Elementary history textbook portrayed these events as spontaneous actions by local Chinese leaders. It read:

After Zhang Xueliang’s military clique and officials fled, the region fell into a state of anarchy, and security and financial conditions became very unstable. In Fengtian Province the Regional Support of Peace and Order Committee was formed, with Yuan Jinkai as chairman. In Jilin Xi Xia declared independence. In Heilongjiang a Civilian Rule Leadership Committee was established . . . The committees wanted to find an agreement with their Friend State [Japan] and separate politically from China . . . In every province and region the people resented the cruel and heartless nature of the old political regime and desired to organize an independent state. They presented petitions of request one after another . . . Representatives from all areas of Manchuria assembled in Fengtian and held the All-Manchurian Promotion of State Foundation Conference. They released a declaration calling for the swift establishment of a new state, and quickly cabled the announcement to each region. The Administrative Committee represented the people’s will--they could not go against it, nor could they let national affairs go long in suspension (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 66-69).

The second major part of the new ideological framework was that historically, geographically, and culturally the region was fundamentally separate from the rest of China. Before discussing the specific claims of Manchurian independence, one should note that a common theme in Japanese studies of China since 1991 was the idea that the struggling Republican state would never achieve complete unification, because China
lacked a true unified ethnicity. This line of thought grew out of the studies of Japanese scholars, particularly Nakamura Kyūshirō, who were influenced by contemporary German theories of ethnic nationalism. They interpreted these theories as predicting Japan’s rise, because of its relative ethnic homogeneity, and the disintegration of China, because of its ethnic heterogeneity (Doak 2001). Many Japanese scholars and activists, using these ideas as a basis, advocated Japanese involvement in China in order to cushion the shock of the state’s inevitable disintegration into a number of smaller, viable states.

On the same day the Japanese at the League of Nations claimed China was not an organized country, they also began criticizing China’s claims of sovereignty over Manchuria by claiming that Manchuria was not an area historically populated by Han peoples. He described it as the land of the Manchus, and referred to the Chinese population there as “Chinese immigrants”, placing them on par with other foreign immigrants. He also pointed out that the Russian government had played a role in the separation of Outer Mongolia from China to form an independent country without an outcry from the world community (Willoughby 1935).

While there was significant support in Republican China for a reorganization of the state into a loosely unified federation of provinces 14, at least an equally significant

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13 The representative, named Satō, did not go so far as to claim positively that Manchuria was not under Chinese sovereignty, as Japan’s Foreign Ministry under Shidehara Kijūrō was not yet ready to take that stand. The Chinese representative replied that Manchuria was politically, historically, and culturally Chinese, that the majority of the population was Han Chinese, and the presence of a non-Han minority was irrelevant, since China was a multi-racial state. He added that Japanese claims of having no interest in infringing on China’s sovereignty resembled broken promises given to Korea in 1905.
number of leading Chinese, including the leadership of the Guomindang Party, strongly opposed any attempt at dividing the state or weakening central control. The Chinese government’s claims of sovereignty over Manchuria were eventually accepted by the Lytton Commission, the body sent by the League of Nations’ to investigate the Manchurian Incident in 1932-33.¹⁵

Pro-Manchukuo activists rallied to attack the narrative presented by the Chinese government. A leading figure among them was Yano, who since the 1920s had written extensively on the historical independence of Manchuria.¹⁶ Almost immediately after the coup he traveled to Manchuria to assist the Kwantung Army in developing an ideological framework for the new state. His writings emphasized the legacy of the


¹⁵Briefly stated, the Chinese government/Lytton Report position held that Han Chinese had dominated and controlled the region for centuries, especially since the Ming dynasty conquered the region in the Fifteenth Century. Although the following Qing dynasty’s emperors were Manchu, not Han, they eventually absorbed Chinese culture and upheld many of the conventions of the previous dynasty. During the early Qing period, because so many Manchus left Manchuria to occupy China south of the Great Wall, many Chinese immigrated into the southern part of the region, and eventually they became the dominant population there. For most of the Qing period Manchuria was ruled separately from the rest of China by military governors, but in 1907 its government was reorganized on the same provincial lines as the rest of the realm, which marked the end of its unique status. After 1912 it became part of the Chinese Republic, along with the rest of the country. They also point out that although the warlord Zhang Zuolin declared the region independent at one point, this did not mean he wanted to separate from China, rather he continued to maneuver for the unification of the country under his rule.

¹⁶Yano Jin’ichi (1872-1970) studied and taught in Beijing before becoming a professor of Chinese studies at Kyoto University in 1911. In 1932 he began working as an advisor and propagandist for the Kwantung Army and the Manchukuo Foreign Office (Fogel 1984).
non-Han kingdoms which existed in the region from ancient times, independent from
the ethnic Han dynasties which were based in the Yellow and Yangtze River valleys to
the south. At times the Han dynasties were able to conquer and occupy portions of
Manchuria, but likewise the Manchurian kingdoms were sometimes able to do the same
to territory in the south. Some, like the Bohai (or Parhae, which existed roughly
698-926), enjoyed diplomatic equality and a lively trading relationship with the
contemporary southern dynasties. The Liao (907-1113) and Jin (1115-1234) managed
to conquer much of present-day North China at their height. Finally the Qing dynasty
built an empire in the 17th century which covered almost all the territory ever controlled
by any previous Chinese entity. Therefore, Yano held, China had no more right to
claim historical dominance over Manchuria than Manchuria did to claim sovereignty
over the rest of China.

The official acceptance of this ideology in Manchukuo can be seen in the
introduction of the 1934 Manchukuo Higher Elementary School history textbook. It
began:

On the Relationship between China and Manchuria: Historically, many
states have been established in Manchuria, like the Bohai, Liao, Jin, and
Qing. These were all independent states, and contended with China
proper (zhongguo benbu) as equals. These strong ethnic groups were
able to ward off the Chinese ethnicity (zhongguo minzu). Because of
their cultural strength they could participate in equal trade with those from
the Chinese culture. Therefore, our Manchuria is a full-fledged state,
with traditional ethnic groups and a firm culture (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 1-2).
Three long-term bases of Manchurian independence were listed in another
chapter of the same textbook. They were Manchuria’s history of cultural and ethnic
difference from China, its geography, and the precedent of a succession of independent
states. It stated:
The first point is our ethnic history. Manchuria, from the time of the Shushen [an ancient kingdom] to the Qing, has had its own special customs and ceremonies, different from the customs of China (Zhongguo) . . . The second point is our geographic relationship. Manchuria has always been independent, not subordinate to China. It was occupied for a short time during the height of the Han and Tang, but the occupations could not be sustained. It was natural for those northeast of the Great Wall to establish their own state. That is why the Chinese call it ‘outside the wall.’ The third point is the established precedent of state building. In the past the Fuyu, Bohai, Jurchen, and Manchu have established kingdoms in this land. The lesser kingdoms have protected the region, while the greater ones have expanded over China’s central plain. They achieved greatness by establishing independent kingdoms (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 63-64).

Chinese intellectuals argued that Manchuria had become a fundamental part of China during the years both were ruled by the Qing from the 17th to the early 20th centuries. Prime Minister Zheng Xiaoxu and Yano Jin’ichi, in separate documents, addressed this claim by arguing that the Qing should not be considered a “Chinese” empire, but rather a “Great East Asian Empire.” Manchuria and China proper were ruled by the same dynasty, but until its final decades they were administered as separate entities. Also, since the Qing rulers themselves were Manchu, those employing the Qing precedent to prove Chinese-Manchurian unity could just as well argue that China south of the Great Wall was under Manchurian sovereignty as the other way around (Wenjiao-bu 1932, 64-66, Yano 1933, 46).

Furthermore, Yano argued, Sun Yatsen used the motto of ethnic self-determination to rally support for his Republican revolution against the Qing. When his “racial revolution” succeeded, the connection between Manchuria and the rest of China was dissolved. The successor state, the Chinese Republic, was based on Han ethnic identity. That is why Mongolia immediately declared its independence, as
Manchuria did a few years later in 1932. While Manchuria was nominally considered under Chinese sovereignty in the 1912-1931 period, actually the central Chinese government exerted little control over the region. Instead, it was controlled by warlords, most notably the Zhang family. Since their rule was illegitimate and rapacious, it should not be considered evidence of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria (Yano 1933, 292-293).

Chinese critics of Manchukuo also held that the overwhelming numerical predominance of the Han in Manchuria, 96% of the population in 1931 by one estimate, bolstered Chinese claims of sovereignty. This was a much harder argument for the Manchukuo advocates to counter. Yano attempted to rebut the position by claiming, rather weakly, that the Han population had only arrived very recently, a continuation of an ancient pattern of immigrants temporarily fleeing to the region to escape civil war in the south (Yano 1933, 286-287). For the most part, however, Manchukuo advocates avoided using ethnicity as a justification for independence. Instead, they used the concept of “ethnic harmony,” declaring that each ethnic group living in the region would be treated as equals under the new government. I will discuss ethnic harmony in a following section.

The third leg of the Manchukuo independence-legitimizing narrative claimed Japan had special rights to act in the region, even the right to remove the “illegitimate” Zhang Xueliang government and replace it with a new independent entity. Japan had earned this right, they claimed, because of its ties with the region going back to ancient times, because of the debt the region owed to Japan for saving it from Russian
deprivations in 1904-1905, and because of Japan’s sizable economic and cultural investments in the region.

Although Japanese propagandists often spoke of the “long standing ties” between Manchuria and Japan, in fact there were very few ancient ties to which they could point. The most significant were those between the Yamato court at Nara and the Bohai state in the years 727-900. A teacher’s manual to the 1934 Manchukuo history textbook gave the following instructions to teachers:

1. Have the students clearly understand that today’s spirit of friendly collaboration between the Japan and Manchuria has developed because the two countries have been in close contact since ancient times. 2. Have them understand that because there were opportunities for political communications and commercial and cultural exchanges between Japan and Manchuria in ancient times, today both countries again need to press forward toward being of one mind (Wenjiao-bu 1935c, 28).

The non-Han dynasties centered in Manchuria after the Bohai (the Liao, Jin, and Qing), however, had little to no contact with Japan which could be used by supporters of Manchurian independence.

While the propagandists made use of what ancient contacts between Japan and Manchuria they could find, their attention was more strongly directed toward Japan’s interaction with Manchuria in the more recent past. The major locus of Japan’s perceived special position in Manchuria were the sacrifices made by Japanese troops in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, which they described as an effort to keep Russian imperialists out of Manchuria and Korea.

For example, the chapter on the Russo-Japanese War in the higher elementary Manchukuo history textbook reads as follows:

Russia, after the Sino-Japanese War . . . seized special rights in Manchuria, and began expanding its power into Korea. This deeply troubled the
Japanese. During the Boxer Rebellion many Russian troops entered
Manchuria, acted as if it were their own territory, and threatened the peace
of the Orient. The Qing was weak and could not resist them, so Japan,
acting to defend the country and to assure East Asian peace, courageously
intervened.

The text then goes on to list post-war Japanese economic and cultural contributions to
the region:

[The Japanese] saved Manchuria from losing its independence. The
danger abated, and the Japanese began to develop the country. The use
of the word ‘paradise’ [to describe the region] first appeared during this
period. First [the Japanese] built up the industrial sector, using buried
and neglected resources. This development benefited the whole world.
Next they worked to raise the region’s cultural level, establish schools
and newspapers, write books, and urge students to study abroad. They
increased the number of train lines, improving transportation. Altogether
they blessed our people. The Japanese never failed to do their utmost
to provide assistance and support (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 48-51).

Besides past Japan-Manchuria connections, Manchukuo advocates also argued
that because the Japanese had created a strong centralized government and a vibrant
economy in their own country, while China had failed to do either well, that Japan was
the appropriate country to guide Manchuria into the modern world. Tachibana Shiraki,
a Japanese scholar of Chinese society and advisor to the SMR, became the Kwantung
Army plotters’ chief advisor on matters of Chinese society in 1931. Previously, in
1927, he wrote that Chinese had seldom related their own individual interests to
patriotism, their ties were to their village and region, not the Chinese state. Tachibana
and his contemporaries commonly claimed that “the Chinese do not have the least
interest in the state.” Tachibana and Colonel Ishihara Kanji, a leading actor in the plot
to occupy the region, held a lengthy discussion about Chinese society in March 1931,
and on that day Ishihara echoed Tachibana’s positions in his diary (Hirano 1982,
In a May 1931 document Ishihara wrote, “It is highly doubtful the Chinese could create a truly modern state, but I am certain that through our protection the Han people could become happy, because they could take charge of their own development” (Ishihara 1931, Yamashiro 1993, 54). Other Japanese scholars whose opinions on the weak state consciousness in China who also may have influenced the Kwantung Army officers include Yano, Wada Kiyoshi, and Inaba Iwakichi, an instructor at Japan’s War College. Yano, for example, wrote:

[Although] the Chinese Republic was created 20 years ago, they have yet to build a true country because of their lack of state values. To build state values, you have to actively help the citizens feel a reason to live and die. They are foolishly trying to remove the rights and privileges of foreign countries to make up for the lack of these values and build the state . . . but they will never succeed. The new state of Manchukuo must promote these state values, helping the citizens feel honor, joy, and pride in being citizens (Yano 1933, 296-297).

Other reasons given for the legitimacy of the new state include saving the region from Communism (Wenjiao-bu 1932, 210), and the proprietary rights of Pu Yi’s Aisin Gioro family over the region (Wenjiao-bu 1932, 267-269, Yano 1933, 15), but neither were emphasized nearly as much as those mentioned above.

Manchurian independence, therefore, was rationalized by Manchukuo advocates by claiming Chinese misrule, the historical autonomy of the region, and Japan’s special right to intervene. These, however, were not the kind of ideals that would stir the people’s souls and inspire them to live and die for their country. With this in mind, the founders of the state created a vision of the nature of the new state using more idealistic principles, which they hoped would inspire the non-Japanese into becoming patriotic Manchukuo citizens, and draw Japanese into helping participate in the Manchukuo project.
The Nature of the New State

Although the Japanese military could forcibly remove the Zhang Xueliang regime and its Guomindang allies from Manchuria, the Chinese nationalist ideals that they propagated and represented were not so easily removed from the society. Along with their military efforts against nationalists, therefore, the Japanese occupiers also attempted to root out Chinese nationalist consciousness, and replace it with a newly pieced-together ideology.

The creators of Manchukuo promised the residents of the new state that they were creating new kind of independent state, combining aspects of traditional Chinese culture with new social ideas and technology imported from Japan, led by local elites with Japanese assistance. The idealistic principles of the state can be summarized by two phrases, “ethnic harmony” and the “kingly way”. “Ethnic harmony” (C. minzu xiehe, J. minzoku kyōwa) referred to the end of racial inequality, the creation of a society in which the various ethnic groups cooperated in a common goal of creating a great nation. The “kingly way” (C. wangdao, J. ōdō) referred to a form of government extolled in the Chinese classics which acted in the best interests of the people.

The official interpretation of both of these concepts changed considerably over the period of Manchukuo’s existence. These changes occurred as the importance of emphasizing Manchukuo’s independence faded after Japan drove the Guomindang government out of Nanjing in 1937, and as Japanese tolerance of alternate social and political structures within the empire lessened. “Ethnic harmony” became more Japan-centered and assimilationist, and the “kingly way” changed from an emphasis on traditional Chinese governing principles to one which modeled itself on the emperor system in Japan.
One should keep in mind that the Manchukuo consciousness that the Japanese leadership tried to create was, as Rana Mitter has pointed out, always a “negative” consciousness, much more focused in describing what it was not (Chinese nationalist and communist) than what it was. Also, it defined the state as fundamentally allied to another state, Japan. Thus from the start this was the ideology of a puppet state, not an indigenous nationalism (Mitter 2000, 97-98). As such, while many Japanese may have been sincerely inspired by it, there is little evidence that a significant number of non-Japanese were similarly moved. Many may have accepted it as part of the status quo, but it never appears to stirred any passion or acted as a motivating force among the population.

Ethnic Harmony

“Ethnic harmony” referred to the idea that Manchukuo national identification should be based on shared geography and interests rather than ethnic ties. Within Manchukuo, ethnic groups would be treated equally, and this equal treatment would help inspire the people to cooperate in the establishment of the state. Internationally, Manchukuo would become a model of cooperation, especially with Japan, its “close friend”. The ideology was designed in opposition to Chinese nationalism and communism, portrayed as a unifying, rather than a dividing force. Proponents of the ideology hoped that by defeating nationalism and communism, which they saw as dividing society ethnically and socially, people should be encouraged to find contentment in the promotion of domestic and international peace and the economic success of the allied countries of East Asia. The discourse was first developed by
Japanese settler groups in Manchuria before 1932, and used some concepts already accepted by many in the Chinese public.

There is little indication that these concepts were ever able to hide the reality of Japanese domination from the general public. In time the contradictions between the dominant Japanese ideology of ethnic singularity and superiority and the pressures exerted by the demands of local Japanese for special services changed the discourse. It became focused on the need for non-Japanese to place themselves in harmony with Japan, rather than find an equal middle ground. The lack of real equality hollowed the ideology of much the persuasive power it might have held with the non-Japanese public. This section will discuss the creation of these principles, their changes over time, and the real position of the different ethnic groups within Manchukuo society.

In 1929 the Manchurian Youth League (Manshū Seinen Renmei), an organization of civilian Japanese living in Manchuria, first began to use the term “ethnic harmony” in its official literature, and on June 13, 1931 it declared that it would make “harmony among the races residing in Manchuria and Mongolia its main objective” (Hirano 1982, 412-414). Since 1905 the Japanese living in Manchuria had carved out a comfortable world for themselves, which began to be threatened in 1928 by Zhang Xueliang’s alliance with the Guomindang and the coincident attempt to restrict exclusive Japanese privileges. These Japanese settlers developed a vision of a Manchurian society which would feature inter-ethnic cooperation, but which would continue to protect the role of the Japanese as the region’s economic leaders (Egler 1977, 90-108). Briefly stated, their ideology held that: (1) all residents in the state, regardless of their ethnicity, are equal; (2) each ethnicity should be valued for its unique
culture and strengths; (3) the spirit of cooperation is necessary for the success of a multi-ethnic state.

The chief reason ethnic harmony appealed to Japanese settlers was it offered them the promise of acting in the region on an equal legal basis as native-born inhabitants. This is made clear in the state’s founding declaration, the Proclamation of the Establishment of Manchukuo, which stated:

There shall be no discrimination with respect to either race or caste among those people who now reside within the territory of the new State, including the races of the Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Japanese and Koreans; nationals of other countries as well, may upon application acquire as permanent residents, equal treatment with others and their rights shall be guaranteed thereby (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 1).

The proclamation held out the promise to Japanese (and other non-natives) of unfettered access to Manchuria and its resources, while before the Japanese were limited to the strip of land running along the SMR railway line.

Rather than dwell on increased Japanese economic opportunities, however, most discussion of ethnic harmony focused on its moral necessity. Pu Yi’s March 9th, 1932 Presidential Declaration (Zhizheng Xuanyuan) stated:

Humanity must cherish morality. But some feel that their race is superior to others, showing their lack of morality . . . The purpose of international competition is the infringement of other’s rights and the gaining of personal advantage . . . Through morality and charity we will rid ourselves of ethnic views and international fights (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 2).

In a pamphlet distributed to teachers, Prime Minister Zheng wrote:

Everyone who presently lives in Manchuria will be called ‘Manchukuoans’—the Han, Manchus, Mongols, and all others. All are equal; there is no difference between them. All are needed in the construction of the new state. We will cooperate in unison, acting as different bodies with one mind. Through coexistence and cooperation a healthy new state will develop. These ideas are based on the philosopher
Zhangzi’s ‘Heaven and Earth,’ in which he wrote, ‘differences make us great’ (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 70).

The editors of the first Manchukuo elementary school textbooks in 1934-35 took up this ideal by emphasizing and celebrating the unique cultural aspects of the Han, Korean, Japanese, and Mongol peoples in the texts. For example, the 3rd grade Chinese language readers included a chapter on a traditional Chinese mountain-climbing festival, a chapter poetically describing Mt. Fuji, and a chapter celebrating traditional Mongolian customs.

Besides the opportunities it offered the Japanese, and the moral authority it seemed to offer, promoters of the ideology of ethnic harmony hoped it would help to keep out the ideologies of Chinese nationalism and communism, which threatened the existence of the Manchukuo state. A middle school morals textbook published in 1934 stated the following on the dangers of nationalism:

Modern ethnicities are narrowly nationalistic, which makes the people selfish, suspicious, and jealous. Nationalists do not emphasize ethnic harmony or the morality of neighborly friendship. They use nationalism as an excuse to resort to arms and try to win wars. This happened in Europe in 1914, where suspicion and jealousy caused an international conflict, resulting in countless deaths. Guns bristled like forests, bullets fell like rain, and blood was everywhere. It produced orphans, widows, and childless parents, spreading horror and grief. We reject ethnic nationalism and advocate ethnic harmony; otherwise the result will be many times worse than the European war (Wenjiao-bu 1934c, 106).

On communism, Zheng wrote, “Communist policy is a plan to destroy the world, and is the great enemy to our theory, so we can not coexist with it” (Wenjiao-bu 1932, 70). This position was included in the above-mentioned middle school morals textbook. “Some countries promote nationalism, and some countries promote communism, which calls the workers to class conflict. These evil ideas are sources of
chaos. The only way to solve this confusion is to promote ethnic harmony” (Wenjiao-bu 1934c, 121).

Only a “moral” (non-Communist) international cooperation promised prosperity for all. Zheng, looking back to the past, said:

[W]e model our state after the ancient state of Bohai which existed here. It was an independent country which carried out peaceful and culturally advanced policies. To the west it was friendly with the Tang, and to the East it exchanged envoys and fostered good relations with Japan. For over 210 years it built a flourishing culture (Wenjiao-bu 1932, 70).

Selective use and rejection of Chinese concepts of ethnicity and the state

Although the Manchukuo ideologues proclaimed their intention to discard ethnic nationalism as unifying principle, they still desired to form a new kind of “national identity” based on non-ethnic principles. They included a shared geography and culture, and pan-Asian solidarity, which they presented as more constructive bases for a people.

Some Manchukuo ideologues, Tachibana in particular, sited Sun Yatsen as a source of their ideas. Sun’s ideas on ethnicity and nationalism evolved over his lifetime. At one point he turned away from the influential ideas of the anti-Manchu nationalists like Zhang Binglin, who framed their calls for revolution against the Qing in ethnic terms—the Han majority overthrowing the usurping Manchus (Chow 1997). He said the term “Chinese national” (guomin) should apply to any Asian born in the state’s territory. The state would act in the interests of what he called the “five nations” of China (the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Uighur, and Tibetan peoples) and grant ethnic minorities a reasonable degree of political autonomy. Also, in a 1924 speech given in the Japanese port city of Kobe, Sun called for increased “pan-Asian” cooperation and
urged Japan to take the lead by abandoning what he called its Western militarism and return to its pacific Eastern heritage.\footnote{Sun’s pan-Asian ideals, although rejected by Chiang Kaishek, continued to find some support after his death. In 1930 a new journal Xīnyàxiá (New Asia) was founded by GMD party member Dai Jitao, which listed the promotion of Sun’s pan-Asianism as among its chief goals (Duara 1997).}

The Manchukuo ideologues borrowed both the ideas of “five nation’s harmony” and “Pan-Asian cooperation” from Sun. They originally defined the five nations of Manchukuo as the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Korean, and Japanese peoples. In other words, geography and a broadly shared “Eastern” tradition were emphasized over ethnic differences. The 1934 middle school morals textbook stated that there were three ways for a minzu (ethnos/nation) to form, shared lineage, shared geography, and shared culture (including language). While identity based solely on shared lineage is defined as “narrow” and destructive, the second and third routes are portrayed in a more positive light (Wenjiao-bu 1934c, 103-104).

At the same time as they borrowed Sun’s idea of “five nations harmony”, Manchukuo ideologues claimed moral superiority over the Chinese Republic by asserting that its founding state ideology was inherently discriminatory against non-Han peoples, both foreign and domestic. Tachibana and editors at the Japanese-run Manshū Nippō claimed in 1931 and 1932 that the discriminatory ideas of Zhang Binglin were held by the current leader of the Guomindang, Chiang Kaishek. They said Chiang had turned away from Sun’s promises of autonomy to ethnic minorities because he feared local autonomy could harm state unity. Symbolic of this choice was his decision in June 1928 to replace the Chinese Republican flag, which had five colors
representing five races, with a white sun flag. The pro-Manchukuo writers described Chiang’s actions as a betrayal of Sun’s ideals, and claimed that Manchukuo represented a return to the values of ethnic autonomy, international cooperation, and Eastern morality (Komagome 1996, 240-245).

Pro-Manchukuo writers also did not feel any compunction about simultaneously borrowing ideological capital from Sun’s enemy, the defunct Qing Empire. The establishment of the Aisin Gioro family, the former Qing ruling house, as titular rulers of Manchukuo was represented by some as a rejection of the Chinese Revolution and a return to what they described as the Qing ideal of cooperation among peoples. Yano wrote, “Manchukuo is a refutation of the racialist nature of the 1911 revolution. The people of Manchukuo, by turning to Pu Yi, have rejected racialism and affirm the greatness of the Qing, which was the greatest of the Chinese dynasties” (Yano 1933, 293).

As these early attempts to link Manchukuo to China’s past suggest, Manchukuo ideologues publicized their ideology as the natural development of the most forward-looking people from throughout East Asia, rather than presenting it as a new idea imported from Japan. There was a vibrant stratum of Pan-Asian thought found in 1931 Chinese society that the Manchukuo creators were able to mine, including the literature produced by popular Chinese “enlightenment societies” like the International Morality Society and the Red Swastika Society.

The International Morality Society and the Red Swastika Society were both formed in Shandong in the early Republican period. Leaders of these organizations tried to instigate a return to what they called traditional Eastern values such as international cooperation, stable families, and charitable works, as a way to bring order
back a society that they saw as rocked by the rapid influx of Western ideas and technologies. The International Morality Society in particular sought to bring about ethnic harmony within China by de-emphasizing ethnic differences and emphasizing a shared cultural heritage of Confucian order and Buddhist charity. In this it was influenced by the former Qing reformer Kang Youwei, who served as the society’s president from its foundation in 1918 until his death in 1927. At the end of the Qing dynasty he had opposed Zhang Binglin’s ideas of racial warfare and insisted on the fundamental similarities between the Manchus and the Han. During the Republican period the organization attempted to transcend national and religious boundaries by incorporating the best aspects of all the major world religions and encouraging members to, in today’s parlance, “think globally”. In the 1920s they organized drives to raise money for victims of natural disasters in Japan and the Soviet Union as well as at home. Prasenjit Duara has stated that the Chiang-led Guomindang, after establishing themselves in Nanjing, “regarded all the redemptive societies, as it did the Morality Society, with extreme hostility and banned them” because they represented an alternative, internationalist model which threatened the orthodox nationalist ideology being produced by the state (Duara 1997, 1035).

The Manchukuo government embraced these societies and may have used their ideologies as models in the creation of their own concepts of “ethnic harmony” and “the kingly way”. In 1933 the Xinjing (Changchun) chapter of the Morality Society declared independence from the central organization, and in 1936 the Manchukuo Morality Society was created, with Manchukuo government leaders in many of the leading positions. The society opened hundreds of lecture halls, clinics, and schools,
and appears to have developed a large active membership under the Manchukuo regime (Duara 1997, 1550-1551, Komagome 1996, 265-268).

Although Manchukuo government declarations promised ethnic equality and harmony, in reality the Japanese took control of all government functions they deemed important from the very beginning. There was some attempt to hide the true racial inequality of the society in early Manchukuo propaganda, but by 1935 the Japanese began to be singled out as the state’s “leading race”. Over time even the token attempts at recognizing the worth of non-Japanese cultures withered away, and cultural policy moved toward instilling Japanese traditions, language, and religion into the culture of the region’s population. In the next section the image pro-Manchukuo writers tried to present of the different ethnic groups’ place in Manchukuo society will be discussed.

*Ethnicity and ethnoyms in Manchukuo*

The creators of the Manchukuo ideology had to define the state’s legitimacy on something besides ethnic self-determination, because the overwhelming majority of the population was Han Chinese. When discussing ethnicity, therefore, pro-Manchukuo writers were forced into one of two rhetorical maneuvers, either emphasizing Manchu and Han ethnic difference, or eliding them. The first rhetorical approach, favored during the years preceding and immediately following the Manchurian Incident, required the writer to emphasize the region’s past ethnic makeup over the current situation. Yano took this approach, as did Ishihara, as seen in this 1928 statement:

Manchuria does not belong to Han people; it is the Japanese who have a deep relationship with the region. Those who speak of racial self-determination must understand that Manchuria belongs to the Manchu
and Mongol peoples, who are racially closer to the Japanese than to the Chinese. Even though most living here now are Han, economically they are closer to our country than to China proper (Yamashiro 1993, 58).

Ishihara first asserts the region’s independence on ethnic terms, but then in mid-thought he recognizes the reality of a Han majority, and switches to a claim that economic ties override the population’s ethnic makeup. Ignoring the contemporary ethnic reality, however, was not a promising approach in a period which valued ethnic self-determination.

To avoid this difficulties, most post-1932 Manchukuo propaganda and official documents avoided discussing the question of multiple ethnicities altogether, referring simply to “the people of Manchukuo”. When they recognized the existence of ethnicity, they utilized a creative (but inconsistent) set of ethnonyms. They almost never used labels which could link the Manchukuo population with the Chinese Republic, such as Zhongguoren (Chinese) or “Han”. Instead they usually referred to the Han population in new terms which obfuscated ethnic divisions, most commonly manren (满人-Man person), but also manzhouren (満州人-Manchuria person) and manxi (满系-Man descent). The meaning of these terms was unfixed, and could vary widely with each author. They did not refer directly to the Manchu ethnic group, who for years had been called manzu (满族). For the most part the terms referred to both Han and Manchus, lumping together the two peoples that Ishihara and Yano had tried so hard to separate rhetorically. For example, in the March 1932 State Founding Declaration, the “five races” of Manchukuo were listed as the “Han, Manchu, Mongols, Japanese, and Koreans”. In 1936, however, a similar list by the Concordia Association
(Kyōwakai) merged the Manchu and Han into one category, and filled the open space by including the small Russian minority (Manren, Mongols, Japanese, Koreans, and Russians). Sometimes Manren referred to all non-Japanese East Asians who lived in Manchukuo, and on rare occasions it even included the Japanese as well (Tamanoi 2000, 255-257).

In any case, by labeling as “Manchurian” those people conventionally known as Han Chinese, the Manchukuo government was asking millions to deny a part of their cultural and family heritage. Remember that the majority of Han living in Manchuria had come from Shandong and Henan provinces in the previous century, and many doubtless retained contact with family members still living in their home villages. As will be discussed in Ch. 5, the Manchukuo government does not appear to have ever demanded the Han population completely give up its cultural heritage. Textbooks in the 1934-1937 period, and to a lesser extent after 1937 as well, included a significant amount of material on traditional Chinese history and culture, affirming the historical ties of the majority to what they considered their heritage. By changing the name of their ethnicity, however, the government apparently did intend for the majority to think of themselves as something “more” than just Han Chinese.

Mariko Asano Tamanoi has pointed out that when pro-Manchukuo authors wrote about a Han in Manchukuo involved in criminal or anti-state activities they often called the perpetrator zhi-rena (支那人) a common Japanese language term for “Chinese”, but when lauding a Han for a positive act, they always referred to them as manren (Tamanoi 2000, 257). I believe the unspoken thrust of the pro-Manchukuo rhetoric was that manren are Han (or other East Asians) who had been changed by their connection with the geography of Manchuria and by their close association with
Japanese. The government affirmed much of the positive heritage and attributes of Han culture, but also implied that the Manchurian Han had taken a forward step beyond their fellows in the south. Criminals and others deserving of censure, however, had somehow failed to allow themselves to be changed, and therefore were fit only to be called zhina-ren.

Ideological contradictions and the rhetorical construction of Japanese leadership

While Pro-Manchukuo writers portrayed Han Chinese as a people who required the metamorphosis that Manchukuo could provide, there was little such expectation that Japanese were in need of as significant a transformation. The Japanese in Manchukuo presented themselves as society’s natural leaders, advanced to such a degree that they had no need of fundamental change.

The Manchukuo ideology of ethnic harmony directly contradicted with the widespread Japanese ideas of racial superiority and uniqueness, which by the 1920s had become the hegemonic discourse in Japan and which was fundamental to justifying its imperial efforts. Early on, most pro-Manchukuo writers remained silent about this contradiction. One exception, an apparent true believer in the new Manchukuo ideology, was Kamimura Tetsuya, who as the first Manchukuo Education Ministry General Affairs Chief was mentioned earlier. In a 1932 handbook distributed to Chinese-speaking teachers, Kamimura hints that he thought the Manchukuo ideology superior to the ideology of Japanese racial uniqueness and superiority. “All of the leading countries”, he wrote, “have mistaken ideas of selfish nationalism. Even present-day Japan is influenced by this narrow nationalism” (Wenjiao-bu 1932, 240).
Clearly most Japanese in Manchukuo, however, felt they held a special leadership role which placed them above the other ethnicities. Local Japanese avoided speaking openly about Japanese control in 1932-1933, while the Lytton Commission was still preparing its report, but their reticence disappeared soon thereafter. For example in 1933 Tachibana, who was among the most committed of the Japanese to a real “ethnic harmony”, affirmed that Japanese held special “leadership qualities,” and stated “as long as the leading race is not arbitrary and selfish it has the right to lead” (Tachibana 1933).

Tachibana, a founding editor of the independent Japanese-language journal *Manshū Hyōron* (*Manchuria Review*), actually presented one of the most liberal Japanese plans for multiethnic and democratic participation in the government. Tachibana’s plan, however, was rejected by the Kwantung Army, who never allowed the creation of a representative Manchukuo assembly.

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18 Tachibana presented his plan in a January 1932 *Manshū Hyōron* article “My plan for establishing a new Manchurian State”. He hoped it would serve as an alternative to a recently completed Kwantung Army sponsored plan by Matsuki Satoru. Although many writers professed a desire for ethnic harmony in Manchukuo, Tachibana backed up his words by proposing the creation of a National Assembly with an ethnic ratio of representation set at: Han:7, Japanese:7, Manchus:3, Koreans:2, Muslims:2, Mongols:2, and Russians:1. He also recommended the creation of provincial assemblies with representation ratios established based on the ethnic makeup of the local population. Since the population of Manchukuo was overwhelmingly Han at this point, the 7:7 ratio of Han to Japanese in the proposed legislature was far from fair. Still, it was an attempt to create a system of shared power between the ethnicities, and was thus much different from anything found in the colonies of Korea and Taiwan (Tachibana 1932a).

19 Some Japanese leaders apparently defined “cooperation” as meaning an ethnic division of labor, or even enforced ethnic separation, not an integrated society with free competition between the different peoples. In an April 1931 internal Kwantung Army document, Ishihara Kanji described the division, designating commerce, agriculture, and manual labor to the Han Chinese, pasture ranching to the Mongols, rice farming to the Koreans, and industrialization and military affairs to the Japanese (Ishihara
By 1934 Chinese language school textbooks and government propaganda began to openly proclaim the leading role of the Japanese in Manchukuo. For example a chapter of the 1934 Manchukuo History textbook, after a section lauding Japan for its history as the region’s benefactor, described in paternalistic tones how Japanese officials assisted the Manchukuo government:

Japan sent advisors to help guide the central administration immediately after the establishment of the state. Legions of Japanese officials have come to help with the sundry affairs of state in every segment of government (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 74-75).

Although the government urged the Han Chinese to adjust their ethnic identity and refer to themselves only as “Manchurians”, they never asked Japanese in Manchukuo to undergo a change to that degree. In 1933 Yano wrote:

When Manchuria becomes such a great country that the Chinese (zhinaren) people living there will not see themselves as Chinese, but as happy Manchurians (manzhouren), it will have a great influence on China. When Manchuria becomes such a great country that the Japanese living there see themselves as happy Manchurians, it will have a great stimulus on Japan (Yano 1933, 306-307).

While it is true that Yano does point to some degree of adjustment in the Manchurian Japanese sense of ethnic identity, it is important to notice he did not say that he did not

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1932a, Hirano 1982, 410). He wrote that peaceful cooperation could be achieved by encouraging the ethnic groups to stick to the jobs which suited them the best, applying the Confucian ethic of “Know one’s place and be content with one’s lot”. Keeping each in its own element would disengage the ethnic groups, lessening racial contacts and conflicts, and allowing peaceful coexistence to develop. I have not yet been able to find any indications of this idea in the Manchukuo Chinese-language propaganda or textbooks, so if the idea of ethnic separation was prevalent among the state leaders after Ishihara, they did not introduce it into the public ideology.
say he expected them to abandon their identity as Japanese, as he did for the Chinese. There was a vision of Japanese coming to Manchuria to stay for many generations, willing to “bleach their bones in the Manchurian sun”, as many Japanese authors put it (Ichijō 1932, 59). Authors who used these terms usually expected Manchurian Japanese to take on the more rugged, action-oriented characteristics that the colonial Japanese imagined separated themselves from their compatriots (Tamanoi 2000, 268-269). None of these authors ever suggested that a Japanese would loose his basic Japanese identity by becoming Manchurian as well.

The Japanese constructed a vision of themselves as heroes in a struggle to build a state out of scratch both for the glory of Japan and the benefit of the world. Hoshino Naoki’s statements serve as an example. Hoshino was a Ministry of Finance official sent to help with Manchukuo’s finances, and he eventually became the General Affairs Board chief, the most powerful civilian position in the Manchukuo state government. At a 1939 lecture he said:

The most important thing for Japanese in Manchuria is the necessity of having pride in yourself as a Japanese wherever you go. Always remember you bear the responsibility of building Manchukuo, and therefore you should remain here to the end, putting your whole heart and soul into creation and progress” (Hoshino 1939, 718).

Hoshino apparently saw no contradiction in the need to have pride as a Japanese while at the same time being a Manchukuo citizen.20

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20 In a post-war memoir Hoshino stated, “Throughout Manchukuo’s short life we tried to bring happiness to all the people of Manchukuo and create a new paradise, but we had never-ending trials. It ended as a dream that we still cling to. During that time young Japanese showed a determination to work hard, and I am confident that it is something of which the Japanese can be eternally proud. I certainly do not think that I am the only one who is proud of my efforts in establishing Manchukuo” (Tsukase 1998, 116-117).
No matter what the rhetoric, the Japanese were at firmly ensconced at the apex of power, and therefore received a lion’s share of services and privileges from the government. Schools for Japanese children were given greater funding, Japanese employees received better wages and higher quality food, even special passenger cars were set aside exclusively for the Japanese (Yoshino 1942). Few Japanese thought of themselves as “Manchukuo citizens”, and few had any contact with Chinese outside of the servants in their household. An examination of post-war reminiscences written by Japanese who worked in the Manchukuo government shows that they kept together as a insular group in the capital, planning “progressive” policy experiments, but rarely including non-Japanese in their deliberations (Tsukase 1998, 39, 119-120). Tachibana openly criticized other Japanese officials whom he felt had a “dekasegi [migrant worker] spirit.” “Instead of a consciousness of being loyal servants to Manchukuo, the Japanese officials see themselves as spokesmen for Great Capitalist Japan . . . and plan to return home” (Tachibana 1934c).

While some, like Kamimura and eventually Ishihara, became enamored with the vision of a new kind of moral, pan-Asian modernism, most of the Japanese were fully aware that they were simply colonial masters. Tōjō Hideki, a Kwantung Army leader in the mid-1930s, was one such realist. In a postwar memoir Kwantung Army economics advisor (and later Kenkoku University professor) Okuno Kiraki recalls Tōjō laughing at him during one meeting, saying, “You mean you take this business about Manchukuo independence and ethnic harmony seriously?” (Okuno 1977, 114). Whether they took the vision seriously or not, the position of the Japanese as the rulers of the country was never in doubt to anyone on the scene. The willingness of the Japanese to openly display their political position, however, changed over time.
The retreat from “ethnic harmony”

The decisions in 1931-1932 to create an ideology of ethnic “harmony” or “equality” were made in the context of trying to win support (or at least deflect criticism) for the Manchukuo project domestically and internationally, and were a reflection of popular pan-Asian and democratic ideals of the times. As the 1930s wore on, however, these ideals were emphasized less as Manchukuo’s existence became more secure, Japan became increasingly estranged from the West, and the trend toward greater cultural assimilation in the colonies became stronger. Accordingly, there was increased emphasis in the Manchukuo propaganda toward patterning the state after Japan, looking to the Japanese emperor as a source of legitimacy and an example of morality, and encouraging the population to copy Japanese customs. The celebration of all things Japanese could not help but make the position of Japanese in Manchukuo even stronger.

A major shift toward modeling the state on Japan occurred with the promulgation of the 1935 Huiluan Imperial rescript. As I will discuss in greater detail below, Pu Yi made his first state visit to Japan in 1935, including an audience with the Japanese emperor. The rescript promulgated in his name upon his return lauded the moral nature of the Japanese state, and declared Pu Yi’s loyalty to the Japanese emperor. It stated:

I am unified in spirit with the Japanese emperor . . . [W]e must be at one heart and morality with our friend, creating a base for our two countries’ eternal relationship, and bringing forth true Oriental morality (Nomura 1995, 97).
The document played a role in Manchukuo schools similar to that of the Rescript on Education in Japan, recited at school assemblies and studied in the Morals curriculum.

Louise Young has pointed out that in Japan the image of Manchukuo as a “branch family” of the Japanese state began to be used at this time, although it does not appear to have been used in Chinese language materials until 1940 at the earliest. Japanese-language materials designed to attract rural Japanese to Manchukuo asserted the “superiority of the Japanese race” among the “five races”. They were to act as the “nucleus,” “pivot,” and “axis,” of society, holding “positions of leadership and guidance” and playing a “driving force.” The racial differences between Japanese and non-Japanese in Manchukuo were asserted by pointing to Japanese superiority in technology and hygiene. Young demonstrated, however, that this technological gap was more fantasy than reality, as Japanese settlers, portrayed as teachers of superior Japanese farming methods, actually desperately tried to learn local cultivation practices from Chinese and Korean farmers once they arrived in the foreign climate (Young 1997).

Before 1935 only Chinese and Mongolian were recognized as Manchukuo’s “national languages”, while Japanese was taught in the elementary schools as a “foreign language”. In 1937 the government designated Japanese as one of the official national languages, and in 1938 it decreed that Japanese be the only language taught in all public schools, thus imbuing it with the highest status of the three national languages. That same year the government increased the hours of Japanese language instruction in elementary schools from 0-2 hours a week to 6-8 hours a week, with similar increases in middle schools. A handbook of regulations for the 1938 new education system stated,
“Japanese language is to be emphasized as one of the national languages, upon which the spirit of Japanese-Manchurian unity is based” (Minsheng-bu 1937, 4).

Besides the changes in language and legal policy, the textbooks published in 1938 presented a new vision of “ethnic harmony” emphasizing assimilation rather than cooperation. The following remarks by the Japanese educator Yamamoto Haruo are typical of the period, “Ethnic groups usually dislike each other and are estranged, . . . [but] the mission of the people of Manchukuo is to follow the ideal of the Japanese people” (Yamamoto 1940, 14). The Manchukuo people were now explicitly encouraged to model themselves on the Japanese. There was debate within the

21 Yamamoto, who was invited by the Manchukuo government in 1939 to write a report on the state of education in the country, predicted a future in which the Japanese and non-Japanese would intermarry to such a degree that they would form a group united by blood and culture. He wrote “The Japanese and Manchurians (including the Han, Mongols, and Koreans) come from the same culture and race, and inter-ethnic marriage will open more paths toward union of the ethnicities. As long as there are ethnic conflicts and barriers domestically, the formation of a truly unified state can not be achieved. This has been proved in the British-Irish conflict, the black conflict in America, the British in India, French in Indochina, and Italians in Ethiopia. People’s sense of superiority, based on “East is East, and West is West”-ism, firmly makes it illegal for a white person to marry a yellow or black person. So states based on true ethnic harmony will never be formed in these lands. But between the Manchurians and Japanese this barrier does not exist. For example the Emperor’s brother married a Japanese woman. Japan has melded with other people before, for example in the distant past when the Yamato people, the nucleus of the Japanese ethnicity, merged with the Izumi people, forming the Great Japanese People. So it is not strange to imagine this happening in Manchukuo” (Yamamoto 1940: 28-29). Others, however, strongly opposed the idea of mixing the races. Eto Toshio, an SMR librarian and long-time Japanese resident of Manchuria, wrote in 1942, “By mixing five sho [9 liters] of beer and five sho of urine, you can make one to [18 liters] of beer-colored liquid. But this [mixture] is after all urine, and can be used only as a fertilizer. If [the Japanese race] becomes one with vice of the Han race, and becomes one [with the Han race] in the flesh, strong as it is, the Yamato [Japanese] race would have to perish. If one is to call that concordia, nothing more is insulting for the Japanese” (Eto 1942, 74).
Manchukuo education community on the question of how far they should go in encouraging assimilation, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.

Also, by 1937 the legal system, which in 1932 retained most of the laws inherited from the Chinese republic, was reorganized based on Japanese models. Manchukuo courts began treating the Japanese language texts of laws (which were written in both Japanese and Chinese) as the official version, and a bureaucratic promotion system based on the results of Japanese language tests was set up (Yasuda 1997, 35-37). Japan’s extraterritoriality rights in Manchukuo were abrogated, but this action actually gave Japanese citizens a greater opportunity to exploit business opportunities outside of the former SMR railway zone. The Imperial succession law of 1937 left the door open for a child of Pu Yi’s brother and his Japanese wife (from the Japanese imperial family) to become the next emperor. In a variety of ways the legal system was manipulated to give Japanese interests the greatest leverage and Japanese symbols the greatest prestige (Tsukase 1998, 34-35). In 1940 Shintoism and the Japanese emperor system replaced the Confucian “kingly way” ideology as the other main principle in the Manchukuo ideology, as will be discussed below. This removal of the last vestiges of traditional Chinese philosophy in the ideology probably further strengthened the pressure on non-Japanese in Manchukuo to assimilate themselves to Japanese ways if they wanted to rise in Manchukuo society.

The trend in the Taiwan and Korea colonial governments toward the cultural assimilation of the colonial populations in the late 1930s and early 1940s doubtless had an effect on the Manchukuo ideology. A 1936 pamphlet by a Japanese colonial official in Taiwan criticized the Manchukuo ideology and called for a closer official connection between Manchukuo and Japan. The author apparently feared Taiwanese
reformists saw the potential for popular participation latent in the early Manchukuo ideology as an opening to call for political reform in the colonies, and therefore represented a threat to the colonial governments. An internal Korean colonial government document created around 1940 criticized Manchukuo’s “ethnic harmony” ideal, stating:

Even though Manchukuo was founded on the principle of ethnic harmony, at this time when the Koreans are preceding on a route toward unification with Japan . . . it should be discarded. There is significant concern that this inconsistency will create ethnic dissonance (Komagome 1996, 279-281).

The document went on to insist on the necessity of having “an empire with fixed guiding goals throughout Japan, Manchuria, and China.” The colonial Korean government had by 1940 embarked on a campaign to wipe out Korean national identity, even banning the use of the common term Chōsenjin to refer to the Koreans, instead calling them “peninsular people”, so it is not surprising that even empty promises of ethnic equality troubled them. Although it may have served a purpose in helping to deflect criticism immediately after the coup, the ideology of ethnic harmony clashed with the mainstream of Japanese ideology in the rest of the empire, and as a result was de-emphasized in stages from 1933 until the end of the war (Komagome 1996, 279-281).

Still, efforts toward the cultural assimilation of the non-Japanese people of Manchukuo never occurred to the degree that they did in Korea and Taiwan in the 1938-1945 period. Japanese language instruction never reached the levels found in those colonies, and the principle of ethnic equality was never formally abandoned. I believe there are two reasons for this. First, the energy required in creating a state ideology fundamentally different from Japan’s made it difficult to abandon. Although
its main purpose was to hide Japanese control, the ideology gained enough discursive inertia that even by 1945 it was not possible to completely abandon it. A second reason is that there were not enough Japanese colonial agents available to act as models and enforce policies of assimilation. Most elementary schools did not have Japanese teachers, and many did not even have any Chinese teachers with significant Japanese language training. Facing the massive bulk of the Manchurian population and dwindling resources, the Japanese struggled simply to keep the people acquiescent. Training a significant amount of the population in the Japanese language and customs was beyond their abilities.

The status of minority groups in Manchukuo

Pro-Manchukuo propaganda made little mention of the other minorities living in Manchukuo beyond listing them as members of the “five races of Manchukuo.” The three largest minorities were the Koreans, Manchus, and Mongols. A sizable Korean population had lived in Manchuria since ancient times, and the flow of immigrants shot up in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Most lived in the Jiandao region, just across the Yalu River from Korea, where they pioneered the use of wet rice agriculture in Manchuria. Their numbers more than doubled from around 630,000 in 1932 to 1,200,000 in 1940. They are an enigmatic group, who deserve more attention among historians of East Asia. East Asian historians Barbara Brooks and Carter J. Eckert have done some preliminary work, and have found that they fell into a shifting set of identities, manipulated by all the parties based on their needs. Contributing to the impermanent nature of the Koreans’ position was their lack of a well defined legal status, their economic rivalry with Han farmers, and the ability of many to pass as
Japanese. Japanese officials often set the Korean population against neighboring Han Chinese as a way of keeping both groups weak and under control.

An example of Japanese manipulation includes the Japanese reaction to elements of Zhang Xueliang’s retreating army, which killed thousands of Korean residents in Manchuria immediately after the start of the Manchurian Incident. The Japanese, claiming these Koreans were Japanese subjects, played up the incidents as examples of Chinese crimes against Japan. Japanese officials also encouraged Korean farmers to immigrate to Manchukuo because of their success in wet rice farming, and helped them displace Han Chinese, sometimes immediately after the Japanese had displaced those same Koreans on the peninsula. These immigration policies fueled distrust between the Koreans and Han (Kin 1992).

There was a great deal of uncertainty about the Koreans’ legal status in Manchukuo. In 1932 and again in July 1938 the Kwantung Army claimed that the resident Koreans were “Manchukuo nationals” (kokumin) (Gendai Shi Shiryo #11 1965, 956). But in May 1939 the Korean Government General announced that those Koreans were, like the Japanese, part of the “population” (jinmin) of Manchukuo, but not “subjects” (shinmin) of Manchukuo. Instead they were subjects of the Japanese Empire. Although the implications of these differences for resident Koreans are not yet clear, in at least one case their position as subjects of the Japanese empire seems to have taken precedence over their position as Manchukuo nationals. Conscription of Koreans into the Japanese Imperial Army was implemented in August 1943, and the first draft inspection was held in 1944. The Manchukuo government decided on a plan which conscripted the Koreans in Manchukuo into the Japanese army the same way as if
they lived in Korea (Tsukase 1998, 102-106). So for the draft, resident Koreans were treated as if they were subjects of formal Japanese empire, not Manchukuo.

Just as the Japanese used the Koreans to further their colonial ends, educated Koreans also used Manchukuo as a way to get ahead in the extended Japanese empire. At a time when Japanese rule in Korea was becoming increasingly harsh, many Koreans found new opportunities in the empire as comparative “insiders”. Because Japanese language education had a longer history in Korea, the relatively large numbers of Koreans fluent in Japanese were in demand in Manchuria, where the small number of Japanese migrants made the need for Japanese-speaking officials, policemen, and educators a priority. Also, a considerable number of Koreans attended the Manchukuo military academy, probably in hopes of using it as a stepping stone to the Japanese military (Brooks 1998, Eckhart 1996). As an example of this migration of educated Koreans, Eckhart points out the striking number of Koreans who appear in a November 1938 list of newly registered medical doctors in Manchukuo. Koreans from Korea made up about 48% of the 323 new doctors in the listing, compared to about 37% Japanese and 15% Chinese (Eckert 1996, 35). The Koreans in Manchukuo, therefore, had an ambivalent status as both colonizers and colonized.

Although the Manchukuo imperial family members were ethnic Manchus, pro-Manchukuo propaganda said little about their place in Manchukuo society, usually lumping them together with the Han as *manren*. The Manchu population has been estimated at between two and four hundred thousand, only around 1% of the total Manchukuo population. There were few attempts to use the Manchus as symbols of the state. The Manchukuo textbooks included a few chapters about past Qing rulers,
especially in the 1934-1937 period, but to a much smaller degree than the attention paid to Japanese and Chinese history and culture. Although Japanese groups sponsored a considerable amount of study of ancient Manchu texts and archeological sites, there was no effort made at reviving the Manchu language and culture. As for Manchu support, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official in Jilin wrote to his superiors in March 1932:

   Of course the Manchus are happy about the new state, but the degree of excitement is greater among the Manchus from south of the wall. The ones from Manchuria tend to be indifferent. Those in China have long stood apart from Han society and have been unsympathetic toward it. They have not forgotten that during the Republican revolution they were greatly persecuted . . . So it means a lot to them that a new country with the head of their house as leader has been created. On the other hand, the Manchus that live in Manchuria . . . are more conciliatory toward the Han and their customs . . . and so they are not greatly excited about the new state (Tsukase 1998, 106-107).

I have not seen any other information about the Manchus to confirm or deny this statement. More work in this area remains to be done.  

There were between 800,000 and one million Mongols in Manchukuo, only 2 or 3 percent of the population, but they occupied almost one third of the state’s total area. Among the upper classes of Inner Mongolian society there appears to have been substantial initial support for the creation of Manchukuo. Mongol princes had cooperated with Japanese agents in a number of earlier attempts at creating an independent Manchurian-Mongolian state, largely because they hoped that such state could help stem the influx of Han settlers on Mongol pasture land. Support from the

22 A recent dissertation by Dan Shao, “Ethnicity in Empire and Nation: Manchus, Manzhouguo, and Manchuria (1911-1952)” (University of California, Santa Barbara, 2002) addresses these issues.
Mongols provided needed ideological cover for the Kwantung Army, as it strengthened their claim that the region was multi-cultural, and not therefore inherently part of China. When Manchukuo was created in 1932, it included the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, which they organized into the semi-autonomous Xingan Province. The province acted as a base for the organization of the western part of Inner Mongolia into pro-Japanese governments beginning in 1936, and was also an important military site, as it shared a border with the Soviet-dominated Mongolian People’s Republic.

The Japanese made good on their promise to prohibit excessive Han immigration. They also worked to diffuse primary education in the region, and opened the way for Mongol students to enter colleges in Manchukuo and Japan (Nakami 2003, 101). A 1936 Manchukuo government edict instructed officials to encourage Mongols to build the state by maintaining their traditional culture and working together with Japan. From the little material I have seen, education in the Mongol regions was less Japan-centric than in the Han regions. In the 1932-1937 years they were encouraged to keep and value most aspects of their traditional culture, while also learning to value Japan and its culture, just as in the Han areas. But while positive messages about Chinese culture decreased precipitously after 1938 and especially 1942 in Han area education, positive messages about Mongolian culture appear to have continued in their schools during the later period. For example in 1942 the government built a shrine to Genghis Khan in Wang-yin-sume, at a time when the government was working to move attention within the Han community from the cult of Confucius to worship at shrines to the Shinto goddess Amaterasu.23
The creators of the ideology of ethnic harmony and pan-Asian cooperation promoted it as a force which could unite the different peoples of Manchuria rather than divide and weaken them, as ethnic nationalism and communism would do. They claimed that the West desired to control all of East Asia, and in the face of this threat Asians were obligated to choose this road of strength. Pu Yi’s acceptance of the position of Manchukuo head of state symbolized the region’s return to the pan-Asian cooperation they claimed was a mark of the Qing dynasty. While the ideology may have given the Han Chinese population a greater degree of freedom of expression and access to social advancement than was afforded the colonial populations of Korea and Taiwan, in all it offered little comfort in the face of military occupation. Within a few years the few benefits offered by the ideology disappeared, and the dream essentially died, harmony turned out to mean little more than a multi-ethnic forced march.

*The Kingly Way*

The second major principle of the state presented in pro-Manchukuo propaganda was that its government would be based on a traditional Confucian philosophy of “the kingly way” (C. wangdao, J. ődō). Over time, however, wangdao and other traditional Chinese concepts disappeared from the Manchukuo writings, and by 1940 the Japanese emperor and Shintoism became center of the state ideology. This section will cover the original use of the principle of wangdao, its change over time, and its eventual abandonment.

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23 Li Narangoa has recently pioneered the study of Mongols in Manchukuo. See her article, “Educating Mongols and Making ‘Citizens’ of Manchukuo.” *Inner Asia*, 3, 2001, for specifics.
The Manchukuo advocates’ basic definition of *wangdao* rule was encapsulated in the phrase *shuntian anmin* (順天安民), which can be translated as “follow the mandate of heaven and bring peace to the people”. This meant that the head of state held his position by the intervention of heaven, and that the state should provide not only peace but competent and impartial government. The Manchukuo advocates presented the ideology as a positive alternative to both liberal democratic and communist forms of government. They traced the origin of *wangdao* to the ancient philosopher Mencius, who said that the ruler must be virtuous, reflect the will of the people, and act in behalf of the total population, not a small group. The ancient philosophers considered *wangdao* to be the opposite of the more common *badao*, or hegemonic rule, based on raw power.

Beyond these basic principles, however, the definition of *wangdao* was both unstable and vague throughout Manchukuo’s history, as the Manchukuo ideologues disagreed on whether rural autonomy, capitalism, the emperor system, nationalism, and anti-militarism fit in the framework of *wangdao*. The one aspect of *wangdao* which was particularly troubling to some Japanese was the ruler’s position being dependent on the “mandate of Heaven” declared through the people’s will. This left open the possibility of a legitimate transfer of power through a popular revolution. This was disturbing in both practical and ideological terms to the Japanese officials. In practical terms, it left open an avenue for popular protest. Ideologically, it went against modern

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24 This phrase was used in the State Establishment declaration of March 1932, which read, “The polity is based on the Way, and the Way is based on heaven. The purpose of establishing a new state is chiefly to achieve *shuntian anmin.*”
Japanese Emperor system dogma which denied the legitimacy of mandate revolution. In 1935, when Japanese officials moved to make the Manchukuo ideology more closely resemble Japan’s, the idea of the mandate of heaven disappeared from pro-Manchukuo discussions of *wangdao*.

Throughout the 1930s the meaning of *wangdao* remained vague. This lack of clarity probably was useful in that it made the concept flexible and easy to manipulate, but it also meant that it had little power to inspire. Still, there was enough inherent danger to Japan in the idea of *wangdao* that in the 1940s the concept disappeared entirely from pro-Manchukuo writings.

**Wangdao and the formation of Manchukuo**

Japanese in Manchukuo first started using the word *wangdao* in conjunction with a new state system in late September 1931, soon after it had become clear to the Kwantung Army coup leaders that they had to create a puppet state rather than simply occupying the region. They turned to three Japanese China experts—Tachibana, Noda Ranzō, and Koyama Sadatomo—to help them create their governing principles. All three were paid advisors to the SMR and frequent contributors to the journal *Manshū Hyōron*. By October the three began meeting with the Kwantung Army plotters and became part of their brain trust. Tachibana later claimed that soon after the Manchurian Incident he discussed using the concept as a way to win support from the Chinese population with Ishihara. He wrote:

> Katakura Tadashi, in his daily record of the Kwantung Army’s actions after the Manchurian Incident, recorded a meeting on Oct. 9th between the Kwantung Army leadership and “Noda Ranzō, a SMR advisor, and the taciturn Tachibana Shiraki, experts on Chinese society.” (Gendai Shi Shiryō #7 1964: 206-207).
Colonel Ishihara, as plainspoken as ever, said, “What exactly is wangdao? It must not be some kind of deception or empty words.” But it was not a deception. I explained how it would work and that the Chinese would immediately accept it. It would be very convenient, but not just that, it would be a suitable theoretical base. So we used it (Zadankai 1941).

The Manshū Hyōron group’s definition of the term wangdao, however, appears to have gone beyond the expectations of the Kwantung Army leaders, to include democratic and socialist ideals. Noda was the first of the group to publicly use the term, in the October 31 issue of the journal. He championed the Manchurian Incident as “a wangdao mandate change,” with the purpose of overthrowing warlord violence and capitalistic exploitation, and restoring the “autonomous rule of rural society” to the region. The Japanese military, in response to the desires of the average farmers, was administering “divine revolutionary punishment” against a rotten system. Signs of the popular discontent could be found in the “increasing activities of lower class rural religious organizations and bandit organizations” (Noda 1931). Like the rest of the Manshū Hyōron group, he defined wangdao rule as a decentralized, rural, anti-capitalistic, and democratic phenomenon, based on the people’s will.

The leftist and pro-rural viewpoint of the Manshū Hyōron group was shared by many members of the SMR’s Economic Research Group, another part of the Kwantung Army’s brain trust, who were influenced by Japanese communist Kōza-ha doctrines on

26 The first known published use of the word wangdao in Manchuria after the coup was in a September 29 editorial in the Japanese language newspaper Manshū Nippō, which opined that the 1911 Revolution was a true mandate change, but that the Zhang warlord clique and the nationalists under Chiang Kaishek had perverted the principles of wangdao, and thus had lost the mandate in the Northeast (Komagome 1996, 241).
economic development. The *Manshū Hyōron* and Economic Research Group had their
greatest influence on the creation of the Manchukuo ideology and policy in 1932, before
the arrival of most of the Japanese officials from the Tokyo bureaucracy at the end of
that year (Li 1996). Both of the local groups appear to have been at least as interested
in creating a new anti-capitalistic, anti-party model for Japanese domestic reform as
they were in creating a working state for the people of Manchuria. Apparently this
opportunity convinced Tachibana and the others to work with the Kwantung Army in
the creation of Manchukuo.

Tachibana and his allies tried to win Chinese support for their ideas by using
ideological terms employed by Sun Yatsen and by having leading Chinese collaborators
echo their support. Sun impressed many Japanese with his 1924 Kobe speech in which
he called on Japan to help lead a struggle against Western militaristic *badao* culture
using Eastern *wangdao* culture. Tachibana, who had written several pieces about Sun
before the Manchurian Incident, also admired his ideas on organizing a state based on
local autonomous villages. Tachibana’s group often used the authority of Sun’s name
in explaining their hopes for the development of Manchukuo.

In the last months of 1931 Yu Chonghan and Yuan Jinkai, leading landowners
and former Fengtian provincial officials, came out in support of the creation of a state in
Manchuria based on *wangdao* principles, and became key members of the autonomous
councils which eventually declared the region’s independence. The Kwantung Army
placed these men in key positions because of their history of cooperation with Japan,
and because as landowners they could be expected to oppose Zhang Xueliang and his
military and industrial policies. Both Yuan and Yu publicly voiced their support for a
*wangdao*-based government that would end the heavy taxes placed on them in support
of warlord armies, and provide the peace needed for the development of a prosperous economy (Yamashiro 1993, 76-78, 82-87, Komagome 1996, 250-252).

After 1932 civilian bureaucrats seconded from the Japanese bureaucracy replaced Tachibana and his allies as the Kwantung Army’s principle advisors. The Japanese bureaucrats’ plans for stabilizing the Manchurian economy and building up a centralized, industrial economy appealed to the Kwantung Army leaders, whose desire to use the mining and industrial potential of the region for military purposes apparently overrode their interest in seeing the region become a model of rural reform for Japan. The SMR Economic Research Group was disbanded in 1935, and although Tachibana continued writing articles and editorials for the Manshū Hyōron throughout the Manchukuo period, his voice was sidelined in the creation of Manchukuo ideology and policy (Li 1996).

Two thinkers whose writings appear to form the basis of the Manchukuo ideology of the 1932-1935 period were Zheng Xiaoxu and Yano Jin’ichi. Zheng was a Confucian scholar and Qing loyalist who joined Pu Yi’s retinue in Tianjin in 1923, and acted as a liaison between the deposed emperor and the Japanese in the negotiations leading to Pu Yi’s acceptance of the title of Head of State in 1932. Zheng had written about wangdao as early as 1882, and used the term frequently to describe the ideal Manchukuo government. His understanding of the term was informed by the orthodox Zhu Xi school of Confucianism, which emphasized the role of the emperor and the importance of a strong centralized state, as opposed to Tachibana’s Daoist and Mohist-based ideas, which called for rural village autonomy and a state-based welfare system.
Yano held a similar ideological position as Zheng, and he penned numerous books in Japanese justifying the Manchurian Incident and explaining wangdao and the history of Manchuria. In 1932 he began working as an advisor and propagandist for the Kwantung Army and the Manchukuo Foreign Office (Fogel 1984). Both Zheng and Yano emphasized the importance of modeling state and society on the moral codes found in ancient Confucian texts.

Next to be examined are five aspects of wangdao government as the Manchukuo advocates defined them, fair government, local autonomy and state welfare, anti-modernism, the head of state, and the role of the people’s will.

Fair Government

One aspect of wangdao rule that all the commentators agreed upon was the promise that it would bring fair, impartial, and able government to all of society. This promise was usually signified by the four character slogan anmin leye (安民樂業), which can be defined as “live in peace and work in contentment.” Naturally this was the aspect of the Manchukuo project that was most attractive to the residents of Manchuria. The Fengtian notable Yu Chonghang specifically mentioned the need for fair government when announced his support of an independent state in November 1931. He complained that for twenty years the residents of Manchuria had suffered “for the sake of one man and his family,” meaning the Zhang regime. In particular he blamed

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27 Key elucidations of Zheng’s ideas are found in Materials on Spreading the Spirit of the State’s Founding, a two-volume Chinese-language set intended for distribution to Manchukuo teachers, published in October 1932 and May 1933 (Wenjiao-bu 1932).
the warlords for creating an unfair taxation system and wasting most of the revenue on military spending. He asked that relations with Zhang Xueliang and the Nanjing government be cut, the tax burden be lightened, the quality of officials improved by raising their pay and establishing government inspectorate divisions, the police system be reformed, industry and transportation be developed, and local rule respected. Although it was their very military actions which destroyed the functions of government and placed the region in turmoil in the first place, the Japanese in Manchuria were happy to promise a government which would address all of Yu’s requests (Yamashiro 1993, 82-87).

The Manchukuo government, in a 1934 elementary school history textbook, claimed that it was instituting the kind of reforms that Yu desired. It stated:

Our country was founded on the great principle of wangdao . . . Because morality and benevolence are the foundations of wangdao, the ability to live in peace and work in contentment is the result. Therefore our country truly seeks to lighten punishments, relieve the tax burden, encourage agriculture and sericulture, promote business, philanthropy, and benevolence, and cooperate with all nations (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 79).

Over the next two chapters the textbook gave detailed claims of the state’s success in accomplishing reforms in education, civil administration, rural medical services, the judicial system, the tax code, the monetary system, the management of natural resources, the transportation system, and international relations (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 79-85).

Local autonomy and state welfare

More controversial than the general concepts of honest and responsive government, however, were the specific interpretations of wangdao as a decentralized, rural-based system with an active social welfare network, made by Tachibana and his
ally. Tachibana, unlike Zheng and Yano, did not define wangdao in Confucian terms, but rather in utopian Daoist and Mohist terms, tinged with modern socialism. Although his interpretation was ultimately rejected by the Kwantung Army, Tachibana’s voice retained some degree of influence in Manchuria throughout the 1930s, and several Japanese officials continued to try to carry out his ideas.

Lincoln Li has pointed out that Tachibana’s vision of Chinese society was one in which datong (大同, great commonwealth) could only be achieved through the realization of xiaokang (小康, small prosperity) (Li 1996). Tachibana’s “datong” referred to the kind of socialist utopian society in which poverty would be eliminated, education stressed, and the weak protected. In December 1931 Tachibana quoted the Book of Rites, one of the Chinese classics, to explain the nature of a great commonwealth society:

The great way is observed, and heaven rules. Wisdom is chosen, ability developed, belief is taught, and harmony practiced. A man treats not only his own parents as parents, nor only his own child as his child. There are places for the old to end their lives, the strong to be of use, and the young to grow up. There are places to help the sick and destitute . . . There is no robbery, so no one locks their doors. This is datong (Komagome 1996, 260, Tachibana 1931).

He went on to quote Mencius’ on the well-field system to elucidate the communal nature of this society: “Each household on 100 se of land will gather together for education, preparation of the fields, and savings, protecting by two- and three-fold the livelihood of the populace.” Tachibana intended Manchurian society to reach a communal ideal which had never actually been realized in China.
The socialist nature of Tachibana’s ideas were confirmed in February 1932 when the *Manshū Hyōron* published the founding declaration of the study group the Kenkoku-sha, written by Tachibana’s ally Noda Ranzō, which asserted:

*Wangdao* is the realization of Confucian *datong* society thought, making ethical the political way, and protecting the people’s livelihood by socializing wealth. It is the great way of government (Nōda 1932).28

Komagome Takeshi has pointed out that the vision of a great commonwealth society quoted by Tachibana in the Book of Rites was influenced by Daoist and Mohist ideas, and had been lightly regarded by Confucianists since ancient times. In particular the concepts of treating all old people as one’s parents and paying as much attention to the support of the young as the old went against the grain of Confucian thought. These ideas did have mainstream popularity in Chinese society, however. For example, Kang Youwei, one of the men behind the 100 Days reforms and president of the International Morality Society, used the ideas from the Book of Rites in his attempt to create a national religion based on classical Chinese thought. Sun Yatsen (who probably was Tachibana’s source for the idea) and Mao Zedong have also said that a *datong* society was their end objective (Komagome 1996, 260-261).

In order to achieve a *datong* society, Tachibana held, “small prosperity” needed to be the immediate goal of the state. By “small prosperity” Tachibana meant rural prosperity and autonomy. This would be achieved through creating a decentralized government, with autonomous regional governments responding to the needs of small

28 In March 1932, when Manchukuo was formally created, the year 1932 was declared “*Datong* Year 1”, and the word remained the state’s era name until a new one was chosen at the time of Pu Yi’s ascension to the imperial throne in 1934.
landholding farmers through programs like rural credit cooperatives, which would free farmers from their dependence on large landholders. The state would prioritize agricultural development over large industrial projects, in part because the capital for industrial development would have to come from untrustworthy elements in Japan and in the West.

Cooperation from rural elements could be obtained, Tachibana reasoned, by winning over the leaders of popular societies like the Red Swastika Society and the International Morality Society. Cooperation with these groups was appealing not only because, as mentioned above, they tended to support pan-Asian efforts, but also because they took the achievement of a datong society as one of their goals. As mentioned above, Kang Youwei was both a proponent of datong society and a past leader of the International Morality Society. The society appears to have been a key organ of Chinese collaboration in Manchukuo. The Xinjing chapter of the Morality Society declared its independence from the main body in 1933, and included key Chinese collaborators among its leaders. In 1936 it was reorganized into the Manchukuo Morality Society. Kobayashi Ichiro, a bureaucrat in the Manchukuo government Religion Agency, said the Society:

conformed to national policy and showed strenuous efforts at enlightening the population. The national policy of building a wangdao polity and moral state coincided with the Society’s aims (Komagome 1996, 264-268).

The cooperation of the Morality Society, however, was almost the only area where Tachibana’s plans were realized. There was opposition to his ideas both from former Japanese Finance Ministry bureaucrats, who favored a centralized government and industrialization over rural reform, and from Prime Minister Zheng, whose
orthodox Confucian views clashed with Tachibana’s ideas about a *datong* society. While the Kwantung Army leaders may have been sympathetic to Tachibana’s rural-centered, utopian ideas, doubtless few of them actually cared enough about the lives of the common Chinese peasants to invest effort in such a major undertaking which promised little in return for them.  

While they, like Tachibana, feared the power of untrustworthy capitalists, they apparently felt that by controlling the economy at the center they could keep the upper hand over outside investors. In 1935 the economic bureaucrats took the country off of the silver standard and pegged the currency to the Japanese yen, which made investment from Japan easier. In 1937 they moved closer to instituting a centralized economy by creating the country’s first five year plan (Mitter 2000, 120-121, Li 1996).

Prime Minister Zheng also favored a strong central state, not because of the ability of such a state to control the economy, but because as a Qing loyalist he wished to return power to the imperial family, and as an orthodox Confucianist he thought that a strong central government was the best way to ensure good government. For

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29 From the beginning of the Manchukuo project the mainstream position amongst the Kwantung Army leadership was that the new entity be a centralized state able to direct the extraction of resources and development of industries needed by the military. On November 7, 1931, Matsuki Satoru, a civilian Kwantung Army advisor, presented the first detailed plan for the state to the Kwantung Army. It went against many of Tachibana’s ideals, calling, for example, not only for strong centralized state, but also the extermination of popular Chinese societies, which he saw as a danger to the state (Gendai Shi Shiryō #7 1964: 247-253). Also, in January 1932, Royama Masamichi, a political scientist, advised the Kwantung Army that because there was no real indigenous support for the state, it should be treated just like Japan’s other colonies (Li 1996). Tachibana publicly criticized both Matsuki’s and Royama’s advice, but their views ultimately were more influential than his.
example, during the discussion over the nature of the newly created Kyōwakai, a state sponsored organization, Zheng rejected a July 1932 plan by Tachibana to make the fundamental mission of the society the encouragement of local autonomy, according to Tachibana (Tachibana 1934b). Despite the defeat of Tachibana’s large-scale plans, some individual Japanese from the SMR Economic Research Group (and its successor, the Manchukuo Interim Economic Research Unit), pursued large-scale rural research projects in hopes of bring about rural reform. For example two socialist disciples of Tachibana, Ōgami Suehiro and Satō Daishirō, tried to build agricultural cooperatives within the Manchukuo state structure in the mid-1930s. They promised the cooperatives would both link the peasants more closely to the state and improve productivity by providing a structure that would free them from their dependence on rich landlords and their general stores for loans and goods. By November 1941, however, the Kwantung Army grew distrustful of the leftist researchers and began arresting many of them, ending the rural reform efforts. Both Ōgami and Satō died in prison before the war ended (Young 2000, 298-301, Tsukase 1998, 123-125).

**Anti-modernism**

With the victory of Zheng’s vision of the state ideology over Tachibana’s, several government decrees were issued in an apparent effort to reintroduce Confucian values into the official realm. As an orthodox Zhu-xi school Confucian, Zheng found nationalist and patriotic rhetoric distasteful and disturbing to the peace, and therefore spoke out against the trend in Republican China of teaching military education in the schools. He was also distrustful of the pursuit of overseas education and the success of the *baihua* (colloquial Chinese) movement, which he claimed had sullied Chinese
culture in the years since the fall of the Qing. Zheng’s comments on these subjects to educators were published by the Manchukuo Ministry of Education in two 1932 documents. Two examples of his ideas put into policy include the March 25, 1932 directive ordering elementary schools to replace nationalist textbooks with the Confucian classics as the main study material, and the July 23, 1932 government edict reinstating the Festival of Confucius.  

Like Tachibana’s plans for regional autonomy and social state dreams, however, most of the anti-modern aspects of Zheng’s wangdao Confucianism appear to have gained little traction with the Japanese military leaders. Middle school morals textbooks published in 1934 show signs of Zheng’s influence. They included chapters which warned of the dangers of unfettered nationalism and capitalism, and said little about the modern military or technologies. The textbooks published from 1935 onwards, however, promoted pride in one’s Manchukuo nationality, respect for the military, and praise for modern technological achievements. I will discuss the contents of these textbooks in greater detail in Chapter 5.


31 Zheng’s comments are found Manchukuo Education Ministry documents, republished in MKSS 2-1 (Wenjiao-bu 1932a) and MKSS 2-2 (Wenjiao-bu 1932b). “China has the oldest culture and greatest learning in the world. But in the last twenty years others have trampled upon and weakened the culture. Although there are various causes, students who have gone to other countries to study bear a heavy responsibility for the situation. They come to overly revere and gullibly accept what is taught in the foreign schools. Then they loose the ability to see the good in their own country’s traditions. They come home and sneer at their country’s education. Taking their foreign education as a model, they work to destroy China’s ancient morality and culture. This pains me
The Head of State

Another area in which Manchukuo advocates disagreed was the nature of the head-of-state. The journalist Tachibana, who felt that the state was a restoration of the revolutionary ideals of Sun Yatsen, argued that sovereignty rested with the multiracial citizenry. Although he did not publicly object to the instillation of Pu Yi as President in 1932, he never showed any interest in using Pu Yi as a propaganda tool. In January greatly. For example, they try to replace the ancient beautiful morality with the Three People’s Principles, and try to replace our deep culture with light baihua texts” (Wenjiao-bu 1932a).

“Today all countries train their citizens become thinkers, patriots, and able people. This is education for a military populace. The reason that countries train their citizens is because they are afraid of falling behind other countries. But they should know the point of patriotism is to hate others . . . The result is the destruction of social stability and human life, and also great improvements in electricity and weaponry. Although both the accuracy and price of military weapons are thousands of times greater than before, warfare has not ceased. Clearly the people don’t stop dying, and the treasury gets used up. So wangdao is the cure to save the world. It can rid of world of the catastrophe of war, create social stability, and provide happy lives and business. If we want to carry out wangdao, we must clean out old patriotism thought. The main idea is to build universal love. We must get rid of military education, and instead teach propriety and justice.”

“Today the countries of the world base their education on patriotism and militarism. But that is unknowingly taking them down the terrible road to war. Of course no one wants war, but patriotism must lead to anti-foreignism, and militarism toward a passion for war. We are in increasingly great danger of experiencing another major war in the near future. If our new country follows the example of schools in of the world’s leading countries, which emphasize patriotism and strong troops, we too will become a war-loving country, and our state’s founding will lose all of its meaning. Therefore Manchukuo should replace patriotism and militarism with wangdao, thereby avoiding meaningless wars. It must dispense with patriotism and xenophobia, and replace them with charity. Replace militarism with the Eastern morality of Confucian worship and benevolence. If we base ourselves on correct ideas like these, develop men of high character, and build customs of peace and happiness, we will avoid the great tragedies of war and destruction” (Wenjiao-bu 1932a).
1934 the government announced that Pu Yi would become emperor, and that the official name of the state would be changed to *Manzhou Diguo* (Manchurian Empire). Tachibana was unhappy with this decision, and wrote an editorial in the *Manshū Hyōron* that month stating that royalty was not a necessary part of a *wangdao* government (Tachibana 1934b). Zheng and Yano, however, valued the legacy of the Qing empire more than that of Sun Yatsen, and thus held Pu Yi’s participation as the head of state and then emperor as a source of the state’s legitimacy. This was not only a reflection of Zheng’s Zhu Xi-based philosophy, which centered on the role of the emperor, but also was due to his position as a Qing loyalist and long-time supporter of Pu Yi. Also, as an outsider in the Northeast he lacked any local power base, so his position depended on the Manchu emperor.

Both Zheng and Yano emphasized the Confucian idea of the ruler’s role as a sage, ruling by example and standing as an intermediary between heaven and his people. In one piece Yano defines the *wangdao* state by invoking Mencius, saying:

> It is a polity where if even one person has not gained his proper place, the ruler must feel the responsibility to personally lend a hand, as if it were he himself who had been pushed into a ditch. When rich men living a luxurious lifestyle exist simultaneously with poor people struggling for their daily lives, the King will feel great responsibility . . . In modern terms, a *wangdao* polity is one in which there is absolutely no exploitation . . . [and] the morality of the ruler forms the basis of the polity (Yano 1933, 297-299).

If a ruler is necessary for a *wangdao* government, why was the former Qing Emperor Pu Yi chosen as that ruler? Yano and Zheng explain the choice as being based on the imperial family’s long personal connection with the Manchurian region, and what they described as the Qing house’s record of high moral rule and the morality of Pu Yi himself. In 1933 Yano wrote of the Qing house’s morality:
In all of Chinese history there has never been a ruling house of more benevolent and wise rulers . . . Sun Yatsen made various critical remarks about the Qing polity, but all of his claims were nonsense . . . Emperor Pu Yi, who abdicated as a result of a racial revolution has been appointed Head of State of this new country. Manchuria is the homeland of the Manchu dynasty, the origin of the Manchu people, and the site of their hard experiences. The majority of the people are Chinese (J. shina-jin), also known as Han, but they have rejected the racist ideas found among their fellow Han, and installed Pu Yi. In doing so, they have regained the blessings of benevolent rule by the Qing dynasty (Yano 1933, 292-294).

In their claims of Pu Yi’s own high personal morality, Chinese-language writings often featured a story in which Pu Yi’s purported actions mirrored a well-known tale from the 14th century collection of stories of pre-Imperial China, Romance of the Three Kingdoms. In the original story a group of nobles visit a hero in his mountain retreat in a time of crisis and ask him to be their leader. He initially refuses, but eventually gives in to their supplications, agreeing to “leave the mountains” and take on the burdens of rule. Both Zheng’s 1932 handbook for educators and the 1934 Manchukuo history textbook mention the Aisin Gioro family’s heritage in Manchuria, and refer to the “leave the mountains” story. The textbook stated:

Manchuria was the homeland of the Qing house, of which His Majesty was the last lord. Added to this, he is a man of the highest morality and extraordinary character, who has the respect of our 30 million people. So for reasons of history and personal character they [the provincial leaders in Manchuria] all urged that he, as the most appropriate person, become Head of State. So the Administrative Committee . . . sent representatives to go to him in Pt. Arthur. They had to plead with him several times before His Majesty agreed to leave his retirement and take the position. Finally, because of the representatives’ sincerity and the aspirations of the 30 million people, he finally accepted (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 70-73, Wenjiao-bu 1932).
The Mandate of Heaven

In the decision to reinstate the forms of the Qing empire, however, the creators of Manchukuo ran into the problem of what to do with a central aspect of Chinese political philosophy that was not in tune with the contemporary political tide in Japan, the idea that the mandate of heaven is declared through the people’s will. Early writings on Manchukuo claimed the people’s will was the source of legitimacy of the state’s creation and the ascension of Pu Yi. In time, however, this position was de-emphasized, and eventually the publicly asserted source of legitimacy was transferred to the will of the Japanese emperor.

When Manchukuo was created, Sun Yatsen’s vision of a Republic based on the people’s will was still the most widely accepted form of government among Chinese intellectuals. The state’s supporters tried to co-opt the concept by claiming they enjoyed popular support (Ogata 1964). In the October 1, 1931 declaration of independence, for example, the Chinese signatories claimed that their actions were based on “the people’s will.” Kwantung Army advisor Matsuki Satoru’s November 1931 confidential outline of the new state stressed the importance of choosing a state structure which appears to be based on the people’s will:

The independent Manchurian state should be a people’s rule government (minshu seitai). We do not need to strictly adhere to the formalities of people’s rule, but it does need to be some kind of system based on people’s will. Therefore the head of state (it does not matter whether he is a prince, president, or chairman) must represent the people’s will. This follows the last 5000 years of Chinese popular traditional thought (Gendai Shi Shiryō #7 1964, 252-253).

In the same document, however, Matsuki writes that a parliamentary system should be avoided because “the masses’ political consciousness is not yet developed in the area,”
and that a “advisory body of imperial retainers” should have the power of “direction and guidance” over important laws. The government Matsuki recommended resembled the Japanese-run system in Korea in 1905-1910, while it was occupied but not yet a formal colony. Yamashiro Shin’ichi has noted the Matsuki’s plan took into consideration the section of Sun’s influential political manifesto *Three People’s Principles* on democracy, and detects:

an ambivalent situation where although they [the coup supporters] opposed the Three People’s Principles, they realized that unless they brought in some kind of democratic causal agent, they could not present Manchukuo as an entity that could stand next to the Chinese Republic (Komagome 1996, 257-258, Yamashiro 1993b, 92).

In 1932 the Manchukuo government announced the creation of the Concordia Association (*C. Xiehehui, J. Kyōwakai*), a state controlled party or “mass organization,” which the government heralded as the organ through which the people’s will could be legitimately expressed. In reality, of course, it did nothing to connect the voice of the people to government decisions. The preamble of the organization denied any role as a political organization, stating “This society will not engage in political movements”. Although one of its roles was to solicit the views of the people on government policies, it had no official connection with or input into Manchukuo government organs. Its main functions were to publicize and win support for the government’s policies and root out anti-Manchukuo activities. Louise Young notes that the organization appealed to Japanese because it seemed to overcome the problem of bourgeois democracy that many saw as disruptive to Oriental societies, and allowed them to believe that the new state represented the local population and provided them with services. One Japanese publicist claimed that under the system “representatives . . . truly express the opinions
of the multitude,” that “people say frankly what they think to officials . . . Officials get
people to understand what they intend to do,” and “both the people and the officials
cooperate.” Although the system was clearly not democratic, the Concordia
Association rhetoric gave it “a populist gloss” (Young 1998, 288-289).

The United Council of the Concordia Association, in a state without a legislature,
provided the only forum for non-Japanese to express their opinions and criticize the
government in a public debate. The council was created in 1934 and existed on the
state, regional, and country levels. Okamura Hiroshi’s study of the Seventh State
Council of September 1940 has shown that the participants did not simply support the
government policies, but instead offered their own critical opinions (Okamura 1993).
Still, there was no system by which the council’s decisions could be turned into policy,
so the debates ultimately meant little more than talk.

Komagome Takeshi has pointed out that during the 1933-35 period Japanese
officials in Manchukuo began to have doubts about the usefulness of the wangdao
philosophy as interpreted by Confucianists like Prime Minister Zheng. Probably
changes in the international situation contributed to this feeling. In 1933 Japan
withdrew from the League of Nations, and therefore the need to camouflage the state’s
puppet nature became less important. Also, in 1934 the Nanjing government began the
New Life movement, which reemphasized Confucian concepts like propriety,
righteousness, incorruption, and shame, and revived the Festival to Confucius.
Therefore Manchukuo’s use of wangdao lost its effectiveness as a Confucian bulwark
against the Guomindang government (Komagome 1996, 279). Also, as mentioned
above, the Manchukuo leadership appears to have received pressure from the colonial
leaders in Korea and Taiwan to remove aspects of the ideology which potentially could inspire indigenous movements in the colonies to call for similar forms of autonomy.

Domestically, Japanese began to face the problem that the Manchukuo ideology, based as it was on Confucianist ideas, held within it the concept of a legitimate popular revolution if the government is deemed to have lost the mandate of heaven. In 1933 the educational theorist Chiba Meikichi published his work, “A Criticism of Manchuria’s Wangdao Thought” after a visit to the country. He wrote:

Wangdao is closely related to and indivisible from the three ideas of Virtuous Rule, Revolution, and People’s Rule... It is hard to believe that wangdao in today’s Manchuria can spiritually and intellectually pacify the two-fold threat of Communist forces working among the Koreans and bandits remaining from Zhang’s army. Spreading education and teaching wangdao thought may give malcontents who have lost their positions and power the motivation to join revolutionary movements (Chiba 1933, 43, 107).

In other words, Confucianism is fine when it is taught to the ruling classes, but when it is made the educational content for the children of the masses, you teach them that they have the right to rise up against a bad government. The ability of the concept to pacify the people, which itself was highly in doubt, was not worth the potential danger it posed.³²

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³² Yano Jinichi avoided defining the mandate of heaven in his writings on wangdao. In a 1933 work, although he clearly states what “people’s will” in a wangdao system is not, a parliamentary system, he is vague about what it is. “Under a constitutional system the will of the people is followed, but this is not the same as the people’s will in a wangdao state. Under a constitutional system the people’s will is the economic desires of the people, but under a wangdao system the people’s will is... a moral sentiment. It is this sentiment itself which is the people’s will and heaven’s will... Government must follow the
Still, the concept of the “people’s will” continued to be used by Zheng and Tachibana in early 1934 in the context of Pu Yi’s forthcoming ascension to the position of emperor. In a January 1934 document, “The Prime Minister’s Proclamation on Implementing the Imperial System,” Zheng wrote, “All the people sing odes of praise to wangdao, and with all their hearts desire an emperor who will rule according to Heaven” (Komagome 1996, 278). In an article in the Manshū Hyōron the next month, Tachibana criticizes Japanese bureaucrats who were uncomfortable with the “mandate of heaven” concept, and would have preferred a system closer to Japan’s Tennōsei (emperor system). He quoted one as saying, “I fear that something that can be proposed by the people’s will can also be brought down by them,” and claiming that “there is a heaven’s will which rejects the people’s will,” that is, the Emperor’s will should always be considered sacrosanct. Tachibana, who hoped to harness the power of the political traditions of the Chinese masses, scoffed at those who “see the Chinese people’s ideology darkly.” He stated:

Because wangdao thought says, ‘The people’s will is heaven’s will,’ then it naturally follows that ‘what is supported by the people’s will can also be overturned by the people’s will.’ So yes, wangdao thought certainly does not guarantee the eternal nature of this new dynasty begun by Mr. Pu Yi. The only emperor in the history of historical China to claim an eternal blood line was the First Emperor of Qin. No wonder this political article of faith has sunk deeply into the Chinese people’s consciousness” (Tachibana 1934a, Komagome 1996, 278).

In this area, as others, Tachibana’s version of Manchukuo state ideology would soon be rejected by those who ran the state.

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true people’s will, not private opinions. It must not act with prejudice toward the different ethnicities living in the territory of the new state, but instead treat all equally” (Yano 1933: 299).
The fall of “the people’s will”

1935 was a pivotal year in the development of Manchukuo’s ideology. In that year the Confucianist concepts found in the rubric of wangdao began to be de-emphasized, replaced by the Japanese emperor as the source of the state’s legitimacy. The first public display of this shift was the Huiluan Xunmin Zhaoshu, or Imperial Rescript Admonishing the People Upon the Return of the Imperial Carriage (hereafter referred to as the “Huiluan Rescript”) released on May 2, 1935, after Pu Yi returned from his first state visit to Japan and audience with the Shōwa emperor. In the Rescript, said to be written by the Japanese classics scholar Satō Tomoyuki, Pu Yi expressed devotion and loyalty to the Japanese emperor, climaxing with his statement, “I share the same spirit as the Japanese emperor.” Wangdao terminology, which were frequently used in previous rescripts, were not mentioned, and in their place a Japanese concept of a son-to-father style of loyalty to the emperor was emphasized. As mentioned above, the document was intended to play the same role in Manchukuo that the Rescript on Education played in Japan, recited in schools daily and at other public events (Nomura 1995, 77). Note also the symbolism of Pu Yi’s trip to Japan, reminiscent of East Asian envoys to imperial China, petitioning for imperial recognition as vassal states. Not coincidentally, in 1935 Zheng was removed from his position as Prime Minister and replaced by Zhang Jinghui, a near-illiterate former warlord, who posed little in the way of an ideological challenge to the Japanese.

On September 18, 1936, for the first time an internal Kwantung Army document defined the meaning of “heaven’s will” as the will of the Japanese emperor, not the people, as previously stated by Zheng and others. In doing so, they clearly defined the
Manchukuo emperor as subservient to the Japanese emperor. Apparently written by Chief of Staff Itagaki Seishirō, it stated:

The Manchukuo emperor’s position is based on heaven’s will, in other words he receives his position by the Imperial will of the Tennō (Japanese emperor). He serves the Tennō, and acts through the Tennō’s will. Eternally he stands below the Tennō as the center of the Manchukuo people and as the manifestation of the principles of the nation’s founding . . . His position is like that of the moon, which reflects the light of the sun. Therefore if by any chance the Manchukuo emperor should oppose the ideals of the state’s founding, he would lose the Tennō’s great will, and the Tennō would remove him from his position . . . Therefore the Tennō has suzerain authority over Manchukuo . . . Wangdao government means the manifestation of the Tennō’s will, not a government of philosophers, as wangdao thought was in ancient China” (Gendai Shi Shiryo #11 1964, 909).

Pu Yi chaffed at restrictions placed on him by the Kwantung Army, in particular the requirement that he act as the ritual inferior to the smaller Shōwa emperor (Crossley 1997). The Kwantung Army may therefore have been preparing for the eventuality that they would have to discipline Pu Yi for disobedience.

This same document also hinted at removing the public fiction of Manchukuo’s independence. It stated: “Establishing Manchukuo is the first step in the Yamato people’s course of world historical development, with the mission of achieving the ideal of ‘Eight corners under one roof,’ . . . Manchukuo is an independent state within the Japanese Imperial Alliance, of which the Tennō is the Great Center.” Similarly the March 1937 Imperial Succession Law stated “The beauty of the achievement of eternal unity between ruler and the people . . . is achieved with the help of the His Majesty the Japanese emperor” (Yamamoto 1993, 77).
Soon these principles were finding their way into pro-Manchukuo writings and official government documents. For example, in a November 1936 Manshū Hyōron essay, the publisher, Koyama Sadatomo, stated that while Manchukuo had not yet attained the level of a kōdō (皇道-Japanese imperial) government, achieving that position should be the country’s primary goal. He defined wangdao government as one based on philosophical principles, with the leader subject to mandate change, and kōdō government as one based on the eternal reign of a divine family, exempt from mandate change. Kōdō government was the greatest and most moral form in the world, with wangdao government a lesser form, although itself far greater than “class-based governments” like parliamentary democracies, dictatorships, and fascism. For Manchukuo to reach the desired stage, kōdō principles had to replace wangdao principles. For example, the relationship between the emperor and the people needed to be expressed in terms of a father and his children, a common rhetorical framework in Japan at the time (Miyazawa 1997, 14-15). The need for changes of this kind was often discussed in Manchukuo journal articles and government documents in the 1936-1940 period (Yamamoto 1940, 8-9).

As will be described in Chapter 5, this change can be traced through the different editions of Manchukuo textbooks. The 1934 morals textbooks centered around Confucian principles, rarely mentioning Japan or Japanese things. A morals textbook for Higher Elementary Schools, published in December 1935, however, included a chapter which replicated in Chinese the text of the Japanese Imperial Rescript on Education, which had been taught in both Japan and its colonies for decades as a centerpiece of the Japanese imperial ideology (Wenjiao-bu 1937, 76-81). In April 1937 the long-awaited Shingakusei (new education system) was announced. Under the
new system, besides greatly increasing the hours of Japanese language education, the Education Ministry did away with instruction based on the Confucian classics and replaced them with “National Morals” textbooks which emphasized positive aspects of Japanese culture and Japan-Manchukuo unity. An Education Ministry official later explained:

It (wangdao) did not fit with the national policy of Manchukuo, a country of Imperial succession, so of course we had to eliminate the ideas of abdication and changing the dynasty (Minsheng-bu 1939, 60).

In 1939 Tamura Toshio, the Manchukuo Education Department Director, went further in his criticism of the original ideology, stating:

The most active agent working to block the achievement of Manchukuo educational spirit has been wangdao thought from ancient China, an Oriental-style democracy. Not only that, but they have made it hard to understand the nobility of kōdō, and hindered Japanese-Manchurian unity” (Yamamoto 1940, 9).

At the same time wangdao ideas began to be rejected by Japanese officials in Manchukuo, Japanese running the puppet governments in other parts of China also declined to use them. The first Japanese-run puppet government in Northern China, the Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government (1936-1937), in a document on school textbook selection, stated that the new texts would include materials on “cooperation and great peace between the East Asian peoples” and “Eastern (Tōyō) morality” (Tōa Bunka Kyōkai 1937, 35). The use of the term “Eastern Morality” instead of “wangdao” probably stemmed from an understanding of the problem of the revolutionary potential of the latter term in Manchukuo. Although they built on many of the puppet-state forms first developed in Manchukuo, I have not found the concept of wangdao in any of the official documents of any of the other puppet-states in China.
Pu Yi’s second state visit to Japan in May 1940 heralded changes in the official Manchukuo ideology which were much more drastic and abrupt than the changes of the 1934-1939 period. Officials tried to accelerate the cultural assimilation of the culture through the establishment of Japanese State Shintō as the country’s official ideology, including the recognition of Amaterasu, the mythical ancestor of the Japanese emperor and premier god of State Shintō, as the country’s “foremost god”. They also established a Shintō State Founding Shrine in the capital, as well as branch shrines at every public school.

During his state visit, Pu Yi declared “We intend to make Japan’s Amaterasu our own god.” To achieve this, he presented a specially made mirror to the Ise Shrine of Amaterasu, where it was imbued with the divine presence. He then returned to Manchukuo with the mirror and enshrined it in the newly built State Founding Shrine. In the July 1940 Rescript on the Foundation of the National Polity (C. Guoti Dianding Zhaoshu), Pu Yi announced that he and his subjects were expected to worship at the shrine, showing their devotion to Amaterasu and their loyalty to the Japanese emperor (Nomura 1995, 76-77). The worship of Amaterasu replaced the Aisin Gioro family’s traditional worship of their Qing ancestors, and marked the final removal of all significant ties to their Chinese imperial past.

The nature of State Shintō, or “The Way of the Gods” (yuishin no michi), as it was usually called, was discussed in a 1941 middle school textbook:

The establishment of our country, and its developments since its founding, are all based on the divine virtues of Japan’s Great Ancestor, the god Amaterasu Ōkami, and the protection of the (Japanese) Emperor, the living god . . . The Way of the gods is the principle ideology of our country, and comes from the (Manchukuo) Emperor’s firm conviction and understanding (Minsheng-bu 1941, 145-146).
The textbook went beyond the Rescript on the Foundation of the National Polity by clearly declaring that the Japanese emperor himself was a living god, and that Amaterasu was the ultimate source of the creation of Manchukuo. Sakuta Sōichi, the founder and vice-chancellor of the state-run Kenkoku University, wrote in 1942:

Manchukuo was born and created by the will of god. This will of god was afterwards shown to be “the way of the gods,” or Amaterasu . . . At the time of the state’s founding wangdao spirit was elevated, but this was not the spirit by which the country was born and created . . . The Japanese emperor, who is the direct manifestation of the divine will, protects and guides Manchukuo (Nomura 1995, 76).

The change in national ideology is also reflected in the changes in the national anthem. The words to the first Manchukuo national anthem, written by Prime Minister Zheng, praised the moral principles of wangdao, which would eventually bring the world together in peace. A new anthem, announced as part of the state’s tenth year celebration in 1942, instead celebrated the morality of the Japanese emperor (Tsukase 1998).

These changes reflect the developments in domestic Japanese society at the time. The establishment of the Educational Reform Council soon after the 1935 Emperor Organ Theory controversy played a major role in the change of Japanese Emperor system ideology in Japan in the mid-1930s. The Council’s 1936 report recommended that the government officially emphasize the position of the emperor as a living god and father of the family state. In response to this recommendation the Ministry of Education in May 1937 produced a pamphlet entitled Kokutai no Hongi (The Fundamental Principles of the State Polity), which did just that. Several members of the Education Reform Council, including Hiraizumi Kiyoshi and Sakuta Sōichi, were subsequently appointed as the founding committee members of
Manchukuo’s Kenkoku University in early 1937. They became very close to the Kwantung Army leadership and became their main ideological advisors. They recommended the creation of a central State Founding Shrine in the capital, although they disagreed over what divine figure should be the object of worship. Although their plans were delayed by the start of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937, they remained leading ideological figures in Manchukuo; Hiraizumi as “Lecturer to the Emperor” on Manchukuo history, and Sakuta as vice-chancellor of Kenkoku University. Presumably they were involved in the decision to introduce State Shintoism in Manchukuo in 1940 (Komagome 1996, 283).

Naturally the sudden importation of a complex foreign ideology was confusing and difficult to justify. The Japanese textbook editors, for example, were frustrated by the constant need to create new textbooks to match the state’s frequent ideological shifts (Terada 1975, 84). Members of the Concordia Association assigned to work with collaborating Chinese religious groups like the Red Swastika Society and the Morality Society complained that Shintō principles clashed with the organizations’ traditional Chinese principles (Komagome 1996, 285). Another Japanese official, Yamashita Nobutsune, wrote in a 1941 book, “If we claim that kōdō is superior, and embellish wangdao with ideas from ancient Japan, the Chinese will simply see it as a tool of Japanese subjugation. We say we are following the ‘kingly way’, but are really pursuing the ‘hegemonic way’. This could help the communists win the hearts of the Chinese.” (Kōain 1941a).

The internal contradiction of imposing an ideology based on racial superiority and blood lines onto a foreign country also caused difficulties. For example at a Concordia Association round table meeting in 1943 a Japanese official commented that
for the sake of unity the remaining differences between Japan’s and Manchukuo’s political systems should be removed. Tazaki Masayoshi, the national Concordia Association leader, rejected this proposal, saying if one ignores the distinctions between the two countries, the youth would “not recognize the absolute uniqueness of kōdō, which would be an unforgivable offence to kōdō.” Tazaki’s argued that true kōdō exists only in people of “the same blood and same source.” This demonstrates the contradictions found between the imperialist need to use a logic of kōdō universality, and the nationalistic need to insist on absolute uniqueness (Komagome 1996, 284-285).

At the same time that the quasi-religious Shintō ceremonies were being pushed on the Manchurian population, attempts to more completely mobilize the population into the war effort further alienated the people. At the 10th anniversary of the state’s founding, in March 1942, an new imperial rescript declared that the country would devote all of its power into the “service” of the war effort. The rescript made clear Manchukuo’s subservient position by elucidating who would do the service (the people of Manchukuo), and who would receive the service (Japan). In December of that year the Guominxun (国民訓), a pledge of allegiance, was promulgated, with the intention of it being recited at schools, places of work, and in prisons. Besides calling for the worship of Amaterasu, it proclaimed the achievement of “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity” as the country’s ultimate goal, rather than earlier goal of attainment of world peace based on the wangdao philosophy (Kenkoku Kyōiku 1943.3, 10, Nomura 1995, 79). Also, the amount of time spent by students in forced labor in support of the war effort ballooned after 1943, and by 1944 students spent very little time in the classroom.
If for the non-Japanese the *wangdao* philosophy of the state’s first years was vague and lacking motivating energy, the changes introduced in the 1940s emphasizing Shintō ideas and pro-Japanese service appear to have caused a great deal of anger and frustration. Kimura Haruyoshi, a Japanese official in the Fengtian post office, later recalled the Han “had their own firm faith, so of course they could not believe in Amaterasu.” Several of his non-Japanese subordinates refused to worship at the State Founding Shrine, and as a result were fired (Tsukase 1998, 72).

**Conclusion**

As soon as the Manchurian Incident occurred on September 18, 1931, the Kwantung Army and its allies began creating a vision of the region as an ideal state, born out of the pure efforts of heroes, and destined to bring peace and happiness to the entire world. To avoid the problem of explaining the power they wielded as a minority ethnic group, the Japanese employed the construct of *minzoku kyowa*; while to avoid the problem of admitting a dictatorial rule, they utilized the ancient concept of *wangdao* rule. Although it was obvious to most that it was ruse to cover a Japanese *coup*, some Japanese came to accept it and devote their lives to it. In time even Ishihara appears to have come to believe in his own creation and became angry when Japanese officials treated the country too much like a puppet. Japanese educators were among the key creators and disseminators of this idealistic vision, and thousands of them made the commitment to join the effort, leaving home and family behind.

Over time the façade of universalistic principles expressed early in the state’s history was removed, because it contradicted Japan’s ideology of Emperor-centered uniqueness, and left open the possibility of a legitimate popular revolution.
period from 1935 to 1940, pro-Manchukuo writers tried to present a vision of a system which mixed the best of China and Japan, but by 1941 the true socially unequal and politically dependent nature of Manchukuo became an officially recognized part of the state ideology. The sight of Chinese children forced to participate in Shinto rituals, rituals which implied the Japanese were immutably set apart as the superior people, destroyed any remaining credibility the ideology may have had in the sight of the Chinese.
Chapter 4

Language Policy in Manchukuo: Imperial optimism and opportunistic reform

In 1938 the Manchukuo government raised Japanese to the status of a state language and gave it a higher *de facto* status than Chinese and Mongolian, the other two state languages. This policy shift was part of a series of changes initiated in 1935, when the Manchukuo government began abandoning its efforts to win popular support by trying to make the state look like a fundamentally Chinese entity. It significantly increased the hours of Japanese language instruction in the elementary and middle schools, and used language proficiency exams, language requirements for government officials, and a new Chinese language phonetic writing system as tools in asserting the dominance of Japanese. They switched to a system in which students were expected to accept aspects of the Japanese imperial ideology and feel a unity with Japan, although not necessarily completely abandon their native ethnic heritage.

The Japanese were engaged in what Robert Phillipson calls “linguistic imperialism” or “linguicism”, which he defines as:

ideologies, structures, and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language (Phillipson 1992, 47).

Japanese colonial governments always used education to “legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce” their power. By 1938 the Manchukuo government, however, decided that the previous system, which emphasized Chinese culture and friendship with Japan, had failed. An insufficient number of the population viewed the state as a legitimate institution, nor were enough people actively cooperating with the Japanese. The government decided the schools should go beyond teaching simple friendship, and
instead try to foster a sincere loyalty toward Japan. They considered the Japanese language the primary tool in achieving this task.

The change of direction in Manchukuo ideology was part of an empire-wide shift to what might be called an “optimistic” view of the power of the Japanese language to instill loyalty in the hearts of non-Japanese Asians. While by 1938 a number of key leaders in the Manchukuo bureaucracy, led by Terada, were Japanese language optimists, they were also dedicated reformers. They opposed the use of excessively chauvinistic classroom materials, and supported Japanese language orthographic reform proposals. Their approach differed significantly from education in colonial Taiwan and Korea, where by the 1930s the colonial governments disparaged nearly all aspects of the traditional local cultures and expected the people to see themselves as Japanese.

This chapter begins by examining the evolving views on the role of language education in the Japanese empire, in particular a school of thought I call “reform optimist”, which animated the Manchukuo education world. This is followed by an investigation of language policy in Manchukuo, including the number of classroom hours, textbook content, debates about the proper teaching style, efforts to foster Japanese language use outside the classroom, and finally the degree to which they were successful in teaching the language.

Kotodama and the roots of Manchukuo policies on language

Yamaguchi Kiichirō (1872-1952) could reasonably be called the father of Japanese language policy in Manchukuo, although he never held a bureaucratic position in the puppet state. In Taiwan at the turn of the century he created the Direct Method,
a teaching system which revolutionized language instruction throughout the empire. He felt the Japanese language was infused with a living spirit, which could be experienced by anyone who immersed themselves in the language. He therefore held that language instruction was the Japan’s most effective tool for gaining a subjected people’s loyalty. For him it was the language itself, not propaganda messages taught in language class, which was effective, and so he opposed efforts to win over students with frequent tales of Japanese military might or Japanese divinity. Although thought the spoken language was “sacred”, he did not feel the same way about the orthographic forms created to express the language, and supported reforms to simplify the written language. In his career he taught in schools in Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and China, and he was able to spread his ideas throughout the empire. A number of educators who were receptive to his ideas, including Fukui Yū and Terada, were appointed to leading positions in the Manchukuo education bureaucracy, where they were able to put the ideas into practice.

Before looking at the debate between the Yamaguchi camp and its rival schools of thought, an examination of the intellectual roots of Yamaguchi’s ideas are in order. From pre-modern times there existed a belief in Japan that certain words had a mystical power when used in rituals and public events, and played a role in the relationship between humans and spirits, or kami. This innate power which existed in language was called kotodama, or “the soul of words”.

In the Edo period century nativist kokugaku (Japanese studies) scholars such as Motoori Norinaga searched for what was fundamentally Japanese about the society. One of their main objects of interest was the Japanese language, a system which could be traced to ancient times, even to the age of the gods, but remained in use to that day.
For them, therefore the “signs”, or Japanese words, were not arbitrary, but rather were vessels connecting them to a sacred past.

The Western-trained linguist Ueda Kazutoshi (1867-1937) did more than any other person in his age to systematize kotodama theories of language and nationalism. In 1894 Ueda returned from three years of study in Germany sponsored by the Japanese Ministry of Education, and took a position at Tokyo Imperial University. Influenced by European nationalist language scholarship, as well as the Edo-period kokugaku scholars, he became convinced the Japanese people needed to understand and gain a pride in their language, and the Japanese government needed to reform the written language. On the first point he held that the Japanese language was the unifying force of the nation, the “spiritual blood of the Japanese people.” He insisted that the spirit of the language was the source of Japanese people’s moral and intellectual strength, and therefore was what made them uniquely Japanese. On the second point, he called for the state to abolish the use of kanji (Chinese characters), and institute in their place a phonetic Latin or reformed kana system. Since Japan’s kanji characters came originally from China, they did not share in the language’s kotodama, and therefore warranted no special consideration (Lee 1996, 96).

The idea that a language holds sacred power was not uniquely Japanese. Many ancient religious communities believed took great pride in their possession of texts written in a sacred language. Benedict Anderson has pointed out belief in a sacred language leads to an idea among ancient peoples that was “largely foreign to the contemporary Western mind”: the non-arbitrariness of the sign.

The ideograms of Chinese, Latin, or Arabic were emanations of reality, not randomly fabricated representations of it . . . In the Islamic tradition, until quite recently, the Qur’an was literally untranslatable (and therefore
untranslated), because Allah’s truth was accessible only through the unsubstitutable true signs of written Arabic. There is no idea here of a world so separated from language that all languages are equidistant (and thus interchangeable) signs for it. In effect, ontological reality is apprehensible only through a single, privileged system of re-presentation: the truth-language of Church Latin, Qur’anic Arabic, or Examination Chinese (Anderson 1991, 14).

The use of these truth-languages across cultures allowed some ancient peoples to imagine themselves part of a global community.

In the West during the Enlightenment, Anderson goes on, age of exploration discoveries demonstrated the existence of other great civilizations, and the development of print technology helped to spread the use of written vernacular languages. These developments led to the fall of Latin and the rise of vernaculars, which in turn caused the idea of the non-arbitrariness of the sign to wane.

Although the idea of a Latin being imbued with a sacred power declined in the West during the Enlightenment, in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century ideas of linguistic superiority began to come to the fore. Aided by the energy gained from the Industrial Revolution, France, Britain, and other Western European states began to move out of their trading enclaves and colonize large swaths of Africa and Asia. The economic and military imbalance between the colonizing and colonized peoples helped convince the Westerners that they were superior in all ways, including their language. The British, as Richard Bailey argues, began to see English as:

the "natural" language of the highest human ideals, and the zeal that propelled economic and cultural imperialism was coupled with the use of English. The intrinsic qualities of the language were believed to be so superior for all manner of intellectual activity that it was easy to confuse
altruism with self-interest and generosity with exploitation (Bailey 1991, 110).

An example of the zeal and assurance of superiority with which some British promoted their language was the British philologist Julius Charles Hare (1795-1855), who said:

And as of all the works of man language is the most enduring, and partakes the most of eternity, and as our own language, so far as thought can project itself into the future, seems likely to be coeval with the world, and to spread vastly beyond even its present immeasurable limits, there cannot easily be a nobler object of ambition than to purify and better it (Bailey 1991, 106).

The self-satisfying pleasure of seeing others work to achieve the language of one’s childhood was not the only reason given for language instruction. Another British philologist, William P. Russel, proclaimed in 1801:

If many schools were established in different parts of Asia and Africa to instruct the natives, free of all expense, with various premiums of British manufacture to the most meritorious pupils, this would be the best preparatory step that Englishmen could adopt for the general admission of their commerce, their opinions, their religion. This would tend to conquer the heart and its affections; which is a far more effectual conquest than that obtained by swords and cannons: and a thousand pounds expended for tutors, books, and premiums, would do more to subdue a nation of savages than forty thousand expended for artillery-men, bullets, and gunpowder” (Bailey 1991, 106-107).

33 Just as with the Japanese (as shall be discussed in this chapter), there were wide variations within Western colonial ideology on the questions of how European the colonized peoples could become, how many people should the colonizers try to educate, and how much of the native language and native topic be allowed in the schools. Most everyone involved in colonizing enterprises in the 19th and 20th century, however, saw education as a way of co-opting the local population; tying them emotionally to the
French colonial policy in late 19th and early 20th centuries was even more focused on language instruction as the molder of minds. While the British tried to limit education to an elite few for the most part, the French tended to see themselves on a mission to “civilize” the non-Europeans, with the French language as their primary instrument. For example, Georges Hardy, the Inspector General of Education in French West Africa in 1912-1919, said of an African child learning French, “He can not possibly forget the good ideas that were introduced to him via this language . . . these are our ideas, which constitute our moral, social and economic superiority, and little by little they will transform the barbarians of yesterday into disciples and assistants.” Similarly, in 1930, Governor General Brevie of French West Africa said, “The native’s mind can become disciplined by the mastering of spoken French” (White 1996). Accordingly, government-run schools in French Sub-Saharan Africa, from the time they were first opened in 1857 through to the end of the colonial era, banned the use of all languages besides French in the classrooms, similar to the situation in Taiwan and Korea after 1937.

colonizers. For example Rambaud, the French Minister of Public Education in 1897, wrote about three waves of conquest in Algeria. The first was military, and the second administrative. “The third conquest will be by the School; this should ensure the predominance of our language over the various local idioms, inculcate in the Muslims our own idea of what France is and of its role in the world, and replace ignorance and fanatical prejudices by the simple but precise notions of European science” (Phillipson 1992, 113-114).

A French senior inspector in 1910 said colonial education would: “connect them to the Metropole by a very solid psychological bond, against the day when their progressive emancipation ends in a form of federation, as is probable . . . that they be, and they remain, French in language, thought, and spirit” (Phillipson 1992, 114).
The British and French, based on ideas like those proffered above, created education systems in its colonies in which the metropole languages became the gateway to success. The numbers of students the various colonizers tried to teach, and the degree to which the tried to teach the language, differed with each colony and under each governor. Built into the structure of each colony, however, was the belief in the superiority of the metropole language. Today the idea that European languages are the only means to a wider intellectual life continues to reverberate throughout the Third World. Ali Mazrui has said, “Education to many people came to mean simply the ability to speak English” (Mazrui 1975, 150). Many in sub-Saharan Africa believe that secondary schools, in which the medium of instruction is English or French, are the key to all social and educational advance, since they are the only channels through which the dissemination of European knowledge is possible. The prevalent view is that without European languages there can be no history, mathematics or science teaching. To this day many educators hold that scientific and technological fields must be taught in English because vernaculars can not develop terminologies precise and modern enough to convey the particulars of these fields. A corollary to the dissemination of English as the language of civilization is that vernaculars, along with vernacular knowledge, are denigrated and maintained in isolation from modern discourses (Collins, Burns, and Ching 1994, 211).

There were some significant historical differences between the situation in Europe and in Japan. Although the Japanese language certainly went through great transformations over the centuries, there was not as strong a sense of a vernacular overthrowing a sacred language. At the turn of the century, at the same time Ueda and others brought the idea of kotodama to the fore, Japan also began to expand overseas,
which resulted in a surge in nationalistic pride. While in Europe modern nationalistic pride in the metropole languages was basically a secular phenomenon, in Japan this pride also had a religious connotation, which could not help but contribute to the virulence of the Japanese colonizers’ sense of superiority over their neighbors.

Colonial language policy schools of thought

In the first decades of the 20th century, as Japan embarked on its age of colonization, at least four different schools of thought on proper colonial language policy began to emerge: gradualists, utilitarians, nativists, and reform optimists. The first two groups tended to be pessimistic about the power of the Japanese language, while the last two were optimistic language could play a role in winning the loyalty of non-Japanese colonized peoples. The following section will examine the views of these groups on Japanese language education, native language education, and Japanese language reform.

Gradualists

Gradualists generally were not believers in the power of kotodama. Trained in Western linguistics, they eschewed seemingly irrational concepts of sacral languages. While they may have viewed Japan as superior to its neighbors, they saw the difference in terms of Japanese technological superiority, not ties to an ancient sacred past.

For the most part the leading colonial policy makers in Taiwan and Korea in the first two decades of the century were gradualists. They felt native culture and tradition were so deeply engrained that state-sponsored efforts at cultural assimilation, including Japanese language education, could not bear much immediate fruit. The
most that could be hoped for was a compliant, overawed population who would cause little trouble for the government. They were influenced by 19th century Western concepts of “scientific racism” embodied in the writings of Haeckel, Lamarck and Spencer. The diffusion of social Darwinism, in particular, provided scientific legitimacy for the notion that social and political development was a manifestation of the interplay of natural forces (Weiner 1997). They therefore implicitly rejected Ueda’s claim that the Japanese language was the “spiritual blood of the Japanese people,” because anyone can learn a language, and therefore this “spiritual blood” would be theoretically transfusable. They denied the colonized peoples an equal place within the Japanese nation, and gave no hope that their status would change in the foreseeable future.

Gotō Shimpei, Tōgō Minoru, and Kumamoto Shigekichi, Japanese colonial officials in Taiwan and Korea in the period from 1900 to 1920, were representative examples of the gradualist position. Gotō, the top civilian administrator in Taiwan from 1898 to 1906, supported Japanese-language education, but insisted that the numbers be limited to training a small corps of government functionaries. Gotō often spoke of a “hundred year plan” to raise the colony to civilization, and once wrote that only after 3000 years of loyalty could the Taiwanese become like the Japanese and enjoy the benefits of the Meiji Constitution (Gotō 1921, 10, Komagome 1997, 60). Tōgō, a civilian administrator in Taiwan insisted that colonized peoples would never give up their ethnic identity and desire for self-rule, which would doom any attempt at assimilation to failure and disorder. He recommended a system in which indigenous languages and customs be allowed to continue unmolested in return for local cooperation with the colonial power’s economic and political control (Peattie 1984,102,
Kumamoto, a leading education official in Korea at the time of the annexation, wrote in a 1910 interagency memo that because of the huge cultural gap between Koreans and Japanese, Koreans could never achieve the sense of unity with the Japanese ruling house that he claimed Japanese enjoyed. Any effort at assimilating the Koreans and making them loyal subjects to the Japanese throne was hopeless and in vain. Rather than loyalty, colonial schools should teach students to be obedient (Lee 1996, 255-157).

Gradualists, for the most part, called for a long-term approach in education, starting with a few schools for gentry class children. Schools should focus on Japanese language education, but also allow some continued native language study, and teach traditional subjects like the Confucian classics to gain the trust of the gentry families.

Under their direction Japanese was declared the “official language” off the colonies immediately after annexation, and was taught from the first grade of public elementary schools. Japanese language was taught ten to twelve hours a week in Korean elementary schools in 1911-1937, which made up about a third of the total class time. In those same years Korean language classes were taught for three to six hours a week. Other courses were taught in a mixture of Japanese and Korean, depending on the abilities of the teachers and students (Oguma 1998, 74). The system was essentially the same in Taiwan.

Utilitarians

A second group, the utilitarians, agreed with the gradualists that the Japanese language contained no special power. They held colonized peoples would only
become interested in the Japanese language once they saw economic benefits such study could bring. The utilitarians became increasingly critical of the colonial governments empire-wide in the 1930s as the governments came to demand immediate cultural assimilation.

Among the utilitarians was the Kwantung Territory educator Tomiyama Tamikura, who in 1932 criticized an article by Tokyo Imperial University language professor Hoshina Kōichi supporting compulsory Japanese language education in Manchukuo schools. Tomiyama, who had previously worked as a teacher in Korea and Taiwan, wrote of the impossibility of forcing the Japanese language on colonized peoples: “Real progress in learning a language comes when a student begins seeking for it. Forcing language study will produce no more than temporary surface progress” (Tomiyama 1932). Similarly in 1940 the language scholar Ogaeri Yoshio said that because the Chinese nature was highly practical they would not put any effort into their studies until they saw concrete economic benefits to learning the language (Ogaeri 1940).

Yanaihara Tadao, a noted liberal critic of Japanese colonial policy, in 1937 wrote that although the French had found some success in their attempts to assimilate Africans by teaching them Enlightenment ideas, and promising social and political freedom, Japanese colonial policy makers were following an irrational path of trusting the Japanese language to imbue Koreans with the “Japanese spirit”. He wrote: There is nothing to show spreading a language will lead directly to harmony between the different peoples. Language is nothing more than the outward form of social life, it can not change people’s hearts directly . . . Language is a means of expressing and spreading ideas, it is not the birthplace of ideas . . . The policy of using national language
education to assimilate the local population is an inversion of the relationship between ideas and language (Yanaihara 1937: 304, 326).

Nativists

The third group, nativists, were believers in the concept of *kotodama*. Like the reform optimists, they were language optimists. That is they held that instruction in the Japanese language and culture could change non-Japanese, despite a lack of blood ties. They were convinced that if the colonized peoples could be made to speak Japanese and learn Japanese customs, their character would naturally become more refined, and they would appreciate and become allies in Japan’s mission to lead a unified East Asia. Calls for increased enrollments and eventually even compulsory education in the colonies tended to come from members of the optimistic camps. Unlike the reform optimists, nativists saw the language as not only bound to the *kokutai* (national polity), but even as its chief protector. They supported the complete reorganization of colonial society based on Japanese models. They opposed allowing any residual native language education, in fear that mixing Japanese and native culture in the schools could lead to cultural miscegenation. The leading voice in this camp was the linguist Yamada Takao (1873-1958).

Nativists were the ideological allies of supporters of Hiraizumi Kiyoshi’s conservative “imperial history” (*kōkoku shikan*), which fervently defended the historicity of the divine origins of the Imperial family and the Japanese people. Because of this divine connection, they saw Japanese as a unique language, making comparisons with other language impossible. In 1943 Shida Engi, an ally of Yamada’s, expressed the group’s position on the unique nature of Japanese:
The national language protects the *kokutai* and trains the people in righteousness. It was called *waga kuni no kotoba* ‘(our country’s language)’ [in ancient histories], never *Nihongo*, which one uses when speaking of it in an international sense, equating it with other languages. The word *kotoba* (language) is not the same thing as the academic language thought of by scientific linguists (Lee 1996, 307).

The nativist linguists regarded any attempt at simplifying the language, like *kana* reform, as sacrilege. In 1940 Yamada wrote the following in rebuke to the reformers:

They say the national language is in disorder and uncontrolled, but really who is trying to make the language disordered? Since the Meiji restoration it has been the roman letters supporters, *kanji* abolitionists, *kana* usage-destroyers, and national language reformers—these are the ones responsible for confusion. They use their ideas to willfully disrupt the state’s education, sullying the purity of the national language (Lee 1996, 304-305).

34 Although nativists tended to strong support Japanese language education in the colonies, there is also a sense of reservation in some of their writings about trying to transfuse the spiritual blood of the Japanese language to the colonies, and feared attempts to teach the language to foreigners would result in a disastrous simplification of the language. In 1940 Yamada Takao criticized efforts to simplify the language for foreigners as signs of a “servile vulgar attitude” (Lee 1996). Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler have commented that colonialism is often a tenuous balance between programs that would bind the interests of specific groups to the colonial state and policies that would maintain a range of cultural distinctions designed to contain and curtail the aspirations of the colonized (Cooper and Stoler 1997). Although nativists strongly supported colonialism, they also desired to maintain a cultural distinction with the colonized. Their fears resembled that of many Britons during the height of their Empire, according to Ali Mazrui, saw “the phenomenal spread of the language . . . as at best an amusing phenomenon, and at worst as something which is tending to pollute and corrupt their language” (Mazrui 1975, 75).
Yamaguchi and the reform optimists

The fourth group, reform optimists, agreed with the nativists that language has an indefinable power which changes a person who learns it. Unlike the nativists, they did not see Japanese as unique in that respect—learning any language will naturally incline the learner to empathize and even feel allied to the speakers of that language. While they frequently expressed their pride in Japanese cultural achievements, they did not see the language as singular, and therefore sacred. They also supported orthographic reform as a way to stimulate language reform in the empire, because they saw the complicated kana system in use as a barrier to the literacy of Japanese and non-Japanese alike.

The first reform optimist to lead a colonial education effort was Izawa Shūji, the Taiwan Education Department Chief in 1895-1898. In 1901 he wrote, “Our eternal purpose is to spread our national language to the Taiwanese . . . [It] will instill in the hearts of the Taiwanese respect and loving loyalty to our Emperor, creating a bond that must never be broken. There is truly no other way to accomplish this except through national language education” (Isoda 1998, 56). Izawa supported the rapid spread of public schools in Taiwan, all teaching Japanese, his efforts were halted by budget limitations and the ascension of Gotō Shimpei and his pessimistic view of gradual education expansion.

Related to the optimistic view of language education was the “direct” teaching method developed by Yamaguchi Kiichirō. Yamaguchi taught in schools in Japan since 1887, and then went to Taiwan in 1896 to teach at a training center for Japanese language teachers. There he discovered a book by French educator Francois Gouin on foreign language immersion education. He led other teachers in in-class experiments
with techniques advocated by Gouin, and eventually developed his own set of techniques, which he called the “direct method”.

The central concept of the direct method was that a foreign language must be learned the same way the child learns its native language. Teachers were instructed to not use any written characters in the first weeks of instruction, but to instead teach listening comprehension and pronunciation using pictures, physical objects and “total physical response” activities (physically acting out sentences while speaking them). They could introduce Japanese kana and eventually kanji characters only after the students mastered basic pronunciation. Students were banned from using their native language at all stages of learning. Teachers not only forbade students from asking questions in their native language, they did not provide them with any written translation of the materials for use either in the classroom or at home.

In 1933 Yamaguchi said his theory was based on the inherent meaning and spirit of words (kotodama), which could be understood only in the context of other concepts expressed in the same language. Defining a word out of context destroyed its essence, and in fact any attempt at defining a word acted as a barrier to learning. He saw the intellectual process of understanding the meaning of a word (denotation) as fundamentally opposite to feeling it emotionally (connotation). Language could not be properly learned intellectually, but rather through complete immersion, he claimed, and therefore he urged schools to provide no translations of Japanese materials (Komagome 1996, 333). Yamaguchi envisaged his method was the polar opposite of what he called the “translation method,” that is, learning a language by comparing a target language text with a translation in the learner’s native language. Educated Japanese were familiar with the translation method as it was the primary means of teaching English in
Japanese middle and higher schools at the time. Yamaguchi and his allies often held up the study of English in Japan as a negative example which Japanese language education in the empire must not follow.

The Taiwan colonial government actively promoted the direct method, publishing two pamphlets on it in 1900 and requiring all language teachers to attend training courses run by Yamaguchi, who became a school inspector. In November 1911 Yamaguchi transferred to a position at a middle school in Korea, which had become an official Japanese colony the year before. He succeeded in making the direct method widely accepted in that colony as well.

In 1914 the SMR invited Yamaguchi to come to Liaoyang in the railway zone to teach a training course on his method. The course was attended by language teachers from throughout the railway zone and the Kwantung Territory, and resulted in the method becoming the standard in Japanese-run schools in Manchuria (Takenaka 2000, 263-267). In 1925 Yamaguchi transferred to a position at the Ryōjun 2nd Middle School and Normal School in the Kwantung Territory, where he continued to influence SMR and Kwantung language teachers, some of whom went on to become leaders in the Manchukuo education establishment. In 1938 Yamaguchi moved to Beijing to lead the teaching staff at a new Japanese-run school named Shinmin Gakuin. In each area his methods became accepted as the standard Japanese language teaching model among teachers from Japan.

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35 The SMR and Kwantung teachers had already adopted the similar Berlitz system in 1912, so the switch to the Yamaguchi direct method was apparently not a difficult one (Takenaka 2000: 260-262).
In 1941 Yamaguchi wrote:

One learns Japanese (or any foreign language) at school by learning the meaning of a thing, imagining it, considering it, feeling it, and willing it, all through the Japanese language. By doing these things students can feel the true word-spirit (kotodama) of Japanese, understand Japan’s culture, and experience Japanese spirit (Yamaguchi 1941).

Note that he does not say Japanese language teacher must teach specifically about Japan. Rather the process of learning the language itself transmits Japanese spirit. For Yamaguchi it was the form of the language, not the content, which played the vital role. In fact, Yamaguchi opposed the use of ideological and pro-Japanese propaganda material in the elementary school classroom, a position the nativists opposed. He felt that teachers needed to use materials familiar to the students and universal in nature. These would pique the students’ interest, while nationalistic Japanese material would only serve to drive them away.

The triumph of language optimism

Although the ideology of Yamaguchi’s teaching methods was “optimistic”, they were at first used by the relatively “pessimistic” colonial governments to teach Japanese to a very limited population in the 1910s. In the 1918-1922 period a major shift away from gradualism occurred in the colonial governments, due to the policies the Japanese Prime Minister Hara Kei, and in reaction to the 1919 March 1st rebellion in

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36 While most Japanese educators supported Yamaguchi’s method, some commentators critically noted many teachers used the techniques only because they gave them excuse to not learn the students’ language (Ogeari 1940: 190, Shinohara 1941: 949).
Korea. New colonial governments under Den Kenjirō in Taiwan and Saitō Makoto in Korea tried to win popular support in two ways, offering some concessions to popular demands, while also ramping up cultural assimilation efforts. For example they responded to demands for more education opportunities by embarking on a massive school-building program. This served to placate to some degree local concerns, while also advancing the cause of Japanese language education.

Also in the early 1920s the colonial governments published new series of elementary school textbooks, which featured less stories with Japanese characters, and less emphasis on the Japan state and its divine origins, while there were many more stories about Chinese and Koreans (these changes will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5) (Yi 1985). In general the changes represented a victory for Yamaguchi and the reform optimists, although Yamaguchi complained the government should have gone farther in reducing the ideological nature of the textbooks (Komagome 1997, 335-336).

In the 1930s, however, colonial policy in Taiwan and Korea began to move away from the positions of the reform optimists and toward those of the nativists. The first sign of the shift was a new set of textbooks published in Korea from 1930 to 1935, which included much more on the Japanese state and its divine origins, although it continued the trend of the 1920s textbooks of including many references to Korea (Yi 1985). In 1937, however, as Japanese society turned away from internationalism to a more self-confident ultranationalism, there was a fundamental change in the colonies. The Taiwan and Korea colonial governments launched campaigns to wipe signs of non-Japanese identity from among the colonial peoples through removing of all non-Japanese language education in the public schools, closing non-Japanese language
newspapers, enforcing public worship at Shintō shrines, instituting compulsory name changes, and military recruitment. This effort is generally called the kōminka campaign, kōminka being a Japanese word for “changing the people into Imperial subjects”. In Taiwan the campaign began in April 1937, when the government removed classical Chinese from the elementary and middle school curriculums and abolished the use of the Chinese language from all newspapers. In 1938 the Korean colonial government not only removed Korean language class time from most schools, it banned students from using Korean at school in any context, and even tried to discourage them from speaking the language outside of school.37 All Korean language newspapers were forced to close around this same time (Chou 1996, 49). Both colonial governments tried to promote the use of Japanese among general society, although the Korean government was particularly forceful in its efforts.38

Although Japanese colonial authorities moved toward cultural assimilationist optimism in the 1930s, in the social and political spheres the state still barred colonized peoples from gaining rights equivalent to Japanese citizenship. Japanese scholars Yamanaka Hayato and Komagome Takeshi have urged scholars to avoid calling kōminka policy “assimilation”, but rather “stratification policy” (Komagome 1996, 17-18). Rather than promising a future where assimilated colonized peoples could

37 In some areas of the colony Korean language did remain an optional subject until 1941, when it was completely removed from the curriculum (Chou 1996: 49).

38 In Taiwan there was no attempt to ban the public use of Chinese or other indigenous languages, except for in a few city halls. Taipei prefecture began a program in 1937 honoring those families who claimed to speak only Japanese in the home. In Korea the colonial government considered the native language a greater threat than Taiwanese was considered by the Taiwan colonial government, and worked more actively to ban it from public places (Chou 1996: 50-54).
gain citizenship rights, stratification policy merely offered them the opportunity to gain their natural and proper place in a racially defined hierarchy of dependent peoples within the empire. By subjecting the colonized peoples to increasingly optimistic assimilative requirements, while remaining “pessimistic” about embracing them as citizens, the colonial governments’ kōminka policies only deepened the contradictions of colonialism.

After the start of the second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 the government began supporting an active language dissemination policy for its growing empire, a change from the previous practice of leaving colonial cultural policies to the colonial governments. An example of this kind of optimism was found in a June 1939 speech by Araki Sadao, a nativist general who was serving at the time as the Minister of Education. The setting was the first Japanese Language Policy Conference, a meeting marking the Ministry’s first attempt to unify Japanese language education in the empire. Araki, giving the keynote address, invoked Ueda Kazutoshi when he stated:

Our national language is the spiritual blood flowing through our people (kokumin), and this spiritual blood firmly ties the people together. If we can send our language, this spiritual blood, flowing through the peoples of East Asia at a time our country embarrasses the great ideal of ‘eight corners under one roof’ (hakkō ichiū), they will cooperate with us in achieving the great work of establishing a New East Asian Order and laying the foundations of world peace. That is why it is vitally important to craft policies that work toward this goal (Monbushō Toshokyoku 1939, 1).

Increased reliance on Japanese as a tool to in winning the hearts of the people can also be seen in a June 1939 document by the Cultural Division of the Kōa-in (Asia Development Board), a sub-ministerial agency involved in administering occupied China. Titled “An Outline for Japanese Language Diffusion Policy,” it stated, “The foundation of Asian development efforts is the kind of education which imbues a
In other words, Japan’s “spiritual blood” could be “transfused” throughout East Asia. The optimist view of language, in particular the nativist variety, was by 1939 a central pillar in the ideology of Japan’s formal colonies.

Reform optimism in Manchukuo

Although the governments of Taiwan and Korea became dominated by nativist thought by the late 1930s, in Manchukuo the reform optimists controlled education policy into the 1940s.

In the state’s first years cultural policies reflected the gradualist view. As Manchukuo was a puppet state, and the majority of the population was not considered subjects of the Japanese Emperor, the possibility of cultural assimilation must have seemed even more remote than in Taiwan and Korea. Leading Chinese officials like Zheng, as well as a few Japanese like Tachibana, argued that Manchukuo government and society should pattern itself chiefly on Chinese models. An attempt at assimilation would only prove the state’s dependent status. Concern for exposing the true nature of the puppet state, however, ultimately proved to be a weak barrier to empire-wide assimilation optimism.

From Manchukuo’s earliest days Japanese educators and officials nearly unanimously supported teaching the Japanese language in the schools to at least some degree. Some were ultilitarians, who claimed language learning would economically

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soul with imperial way spirit. Schools must train students to become pure Japanese who can lead the people of the continent . . . The weapon is Japanese language” (Komagome 1997: 318).
and politically benefit non-Japanese, and that Japanese could act as a *lingua franca* for the region’s various ethnic groups. By 1937, however, assimilation optimism had swept through the ranks of Japanese officials and educators in Manchukuo, becoming the mainstream (although not sole) opinion.

An example of assimilation optimism can be found in the writings of Fukui Yū. Fukui had taught Japanese to Chinese students in SMR-run schools in Manchuria since 1918. In 1932 he became a Manchukuo Ministry of Education textbook editor, and was placed in charge of editing the 1934-35 and 1938-39 series of elementary school Japanese language textbooks. He was one of the few SMR-connected educators to survive the ministry’s purge in 1934 and 1935. In a 1939 article he criticized those who defended Japanese language instruction on utilitarian grounds:

> They encourage Japanese language study by claiming it will help students advance in the world and find business success. But this is not true, some students, despite years of diligent study, have not succeeded in business nor risen in position, and now feel that they should have done something more practical in school. Utilitarian encouragement works even less for school students living in distant mountainous regions who will never meet a Japanese face to face in their lives. The entire approach is wrong. The purpose of learning Japanese is not to have a *good command* of language, as in a foreign language course. Japanese language training itself brings about complete education. *In other words, the students’ feelings and lifestyle themselves will be reconstructed by the Japanese language.* This is the real reason. Even if they never have the opportunity in their lives to use their Japanese language skills, it is worth it. They will become Manchukuo nationals, without interest in their original ethnicity. *It is for this mental training that they must learn Japanese* (Fukui 1939, 3, italics added).
Fukui here abandons all pretence of the usefulness of Japanese in the people’s daily lives. Instead, the language is a tool for “mental training”, intended to reshape the population’s minds so they would become amenable to Japanese interests. His words echo those of the French Governor General Brevie, mentioned above, who claimed the French language would introduce the African population to mental discipline.

While other Japanese educators in Manchukuo were less willing to discount the practical uses of Japanese than Fukui, many agreed with him that the Japanese language had the ability to “reconstruct” the personalities of the students in positive ways. Kazumizu Yoshiyama, a Japanese teacher at Fengtian First Normal School, said in a speech to Chinese teachers in 1936:

All Manchukuoans have the duty to learn Japanese . . . Most people study Japanese in order to learn how to express themselves, but this should not be the main reason. In Japanese there is the expression kotodama. It means when you study a word, you do not just learn its outside meaning; you have to learn its spirit . . . By understanding the Japanese spirit, the Manchukuo people can learn their correct role, and carry it out faithfully (Kazumizu 1936, 30).

In the same speech, Kazumizu, like Fukui, said that only after the students completed the four Japanese language elementary school readers (two years of material) could they “for the first time be called Manchukuo nationals (Manzhouguo-ren)”. To them the Japanese language was not just an important tool of communication, it was the essence of citizenship in the new state.

Hori Toshio, a SMR Japanese language teacher and Fengtian provincial education inspector, wrote in 1940 that the purpose of Japanese language education was to teach the Manchukuo population to “realize the goodness, greatness, and strength of
Japan and Japanese people, and use these things to completely reconstruct their lifestyles” (Hori 1940a, 24). Fukui, Kazumizu, and Hori clearly demonstrate the almost religious faith held by some educators in the power of the Japanese language. Like most optimistic assimilators of the era, they also showed no indication that they were bothered by their implicit suggestions of Chinese cultural inferiority to Japanese.

**Manchukuo language policy**

Japanese was not recognized as a Manchukuo state language until 1937. Chinese was generally treated as the national language, with Japanese usually designated a foreign language. In pre-1938 textbooks, for example, Chinese language and literature were taught as “National Language Studies”, while Japanese language courses were placed in the “Foreign Language Studies” category. In time, however the public status of Japanese rose, as the government required an increasing amount of Japanese in public spaces. In 1937 Manchukuo moved to a bi-lingual system similar to that used in Taiwan and Korea before 1937, while the governments in Taiwan and Korea moved on to monolingual language policies, the likes of which never occurred in Manchukuo.

Yasuda Toshiaki, in an examination of the languages used in Manchukuo government business, found the central government published official documents primarily in Chinese in 1932, but by 1936 they had declared the Japanese language version of documents to be the authoritative versions (Yasuda 1997, 36). Yasuda also

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40 Yasuda looked at the central government’s daily digest of official communications and directives, the Seifu Kōhō (C. Zhengfu Gongbao), which became increasingly Japanese-centered as time progressed. From March 1932 to April 1934 a Chinese language “original” and a “Japanese translation” of the digest were published separately. In April 1934 the digest switched to a single bilingual version, with Chinese
examined the authorized language of treaties the Manchukuo government signed with foreign governments. English, German, and Chinese were used as the official languages in treaties with non-neighbors. In a very important agreement on national boarders with Mongolia (a puppet of the Soviet Union), however, Japanese and Russian were declared the two authorized languages. So in a case where imperial powers saw a treaty as truly important, they bypassed the client states’ languages and relied on their own languages (Yasuda 1997, 37).

The Japanese language in Manchukuo schools: 1932-1937 plans and policy

In the 1932-1937 period the government did not emphasize Japanese language education in elementary and secondary schools, particularly when compared to schools in Korea and Taiwan. The low number of Japanese language hours fit the public ideology of the period, which downplayed Japanese domination and emphasized the state’s link with Chinese tradition. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, Manchukuo state ideology was taught primarily in the history, morals, and Chinese classes.

There were several factors which retarded the spread of Japanese in the region besides concessions to the state ideology. One was the small number of Japanese and Japanese-speaking Chinese available to act as language teachers. There was probably never more than 2000 language teachers from Japan in the country at a time, as will be on the top and Japanese on the bottom. On November 11th, 1935 the government announced that the Japanese version of official communications and other government documents, previously considered simply a translation, would begin to be considered as an equally official version beginning January 1st, 1936. Local governments, on the other hand, continued to use only Chinese or Mongolian for their official business up to 1936.
discussed later in the chapter. In contrast, the country was huge, both in terms of area and population. By the time the state’s boundaries stabilized in 1934 it covered over 400,000 square miles and contained 30 to 35 million people. By contrast, Taiwan is only a 13,000 square mile island, and less than three million people lived there when Japan took control in 1895. In 1910 there were between 15 to 20 million people living in Korea, a territory covering more than 84,000 square miles.

The prior existence of an embryonic modern education system in the region also presented a difficulty for the Japanese, completely unlike the situation they faced in Taiwan in 1895 and substantially different from Korea in 1910. A relatively small segment of the public in those colonies expected public education at the time the Japanese took control, so the colonial governments could begin by teaching a small elite population of students and then gradually expand. As they expanded, normal schools could train native students as Japanese language teachers to help with the demand for teachers. In Manchuria, on the other hand, there were as many as 13,000 elementary schools in existence before the Manchurian Incident. In the years immediately after the coup the government tried to gain the population’s trust by reopening schools closed by the disorder and fighting. By the end of 1934 the number of open schools and student enrollment returned to pre-1931 levels—12,896 elementary schools and 346 middle schools, with over 870,000 total students enrolled (Kurokawa 1997, 190). In comparison, in Taiwan in 1905, ten years after annexation, there were 180 elementary schools for Taiwanese with 32,000 students enrolled, and in Korea in 1919, nine years after annexation, there were 89,000 students in state-run elementary schools. Japan did not have enough surplus teachers to meet the needs of a major language teaching program in a country of this size and with this many schools.
The first body assigned to create a plan for Manchukuo education was the SMR Economic Research Group. In January 1932, two months before Manchukuo was established, Kwantung Army Chief of Staff Miyake Mitsuharu wrote the SMR president asking him to establish a board to “act as the military’s advisors, investigate a variety of matters in Manchuria, and create plans for developmental policies and programs,” including education (Nomura 1995, 96). The group’s report, completed in August 1932, recommended that Manchukuo retain the previous Republican elementary and secondary education system, with its 4-2-3-3 pattern of elementary and middle schools.

41 The Education Division was led by Tsuji Masao, a SMR employee who became one of the founding officials of the Ministry of Education, and included several other past and present SMR and Kwantung Territory educators, as well as advisors from the Japanese Ministry of Education. Two less detailed plans for Manchukuo education were created in 1931 and 1932. Both focused on long-range goals, presaging the system created in 1937-1938. The first was Kwantung Army advisor Takagi Shōsuke’s “On Establishing an Independent Manmo.” Takagi presented his plan in December 1931, three months after the Manchurian Incident and before the establishment of the puppet state. He called for strong state control over education and a curriculum which would emphasize the Japanese language and Japanese culture, which he claimed would cause the Chinese to come to love Japan. He proposed that elementary schools teach Japanese from the first grade for at least six hours a week, and that middle schools teach it for ten or more hours a week (Takagi 1932: 589). Although not quite to the level of Taiwan and Korea, where Japanese was taught for 10-12 hours a week from the first grade, it was an ambitious plan. Similarly, in 1932 Hoshina Kōichi, a leading scholar of Japanese at Tokyo Imperial University, wrote supporting a similar level of Japanese language education in Manchuria. He added that Japanese should be made the only language of officialdom, with the other local languages reduced to vernacular status, similar to the pre-1937 policy in Taiwan and Korea. More uniquely, as I will discuss later, Hoshina proposed that Chinese language characters be phased out, and Japanese phonetic kana be used in all official documents (Hoshina 1932:3). As it turns out, Manchukuo’s post-1937 system followed Takagi and Hoshina’s ideas quite closely. For 1932, however, the goals were out of the government’s reach.
They suggested the only changes which should be made in the curriculum were the removal of pro-Guomindang textbook materials and the addition of Japanese language classes. Japanese courses should be a required beginning in the first year of higher elementary school, or 5th grade, and be taught for 2-3 hours a week. Depending on the local conditions, however, local authorities could exempt higher elementary schools from the Japanese language requirement. Essentially, the group asked elementary schools to teach a minimal amount of Japanese wherever possible, while admitting that at least for a time there would be areas where it would be unfeasible. Japanese language instruction should be adamantly required only in the middle schools, of which there were only 144 at the time (Minami Manshū Tetsudō 1935, 31-32, 37).

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42 Lower and higher middle schools under the Republican system, both three year institutions, taught English language for six hours a week. The SMR group recommended that in lower middle schools all six hours be switched to Japanese, and in higher middle schools two of the six be switched to Japanese. Since there were so few middle schools open at the time, they probably felt confident that language teachers could be found to teach these classes (Minami Manshū Tetsudō 1935: 37). Lower elementary schools would have the option of offering Japanese as an elective for students beginning in the 3rd grade.

Parallel to the SMR Economic Research Group’s planning, the provinces, led by Fengtian Province, began to set up their own language education plans. In March 1932 the Fengtian Education Department, which had just been reorganized with the assistance of Japanese educators from the SMR, published a plan similar to the SMR group’s. It set the Japanese language curriculum at three hours a week, starting in 5th grade. Middle schools would teach Japanese from 2 to 7 hours a week, depending on the kind of school. Some schools would be allowed to teach English or Russian instead, depending on local conditions (Fengtian-xiang Jiaoyu Choubei-chu 1932). A September 1932 Jilin provincial plan closely resembled the Fengtian plan, while a May 1932 Heilongjiang Provincial plan instructed that Japanese be taught only in middle schools, not higher elementary schools. Each province also created Japanese language academies, designed to teach the language to elementary school graduates outside of the standard middle schools. For example, a May 15, 1932 order by the Heilongjiang Provincial government mandated the creation of a Mass Japanese Language School with three teachers to teach 80-100 students for two hours a day (ZG #15, 17-18, June 9, 1932).
The Manchukuo Ministry of Education accepted almost all of the Economic Research Group’s recommendations, perhaps because, as discussed in Chapter 2, the ministry was in a state of disarray in its first years, and it was unable to come up with its own plan. It retained the Chinese Republican education system for the time being and inserted Japanese language instruction only the few middle schools. It was probably not until 1934 that the government began publishing textbooks and encouraging Japanese language study in elementary schools.

In that year the Ministry of Education announced its first general curriculum guidelines and published its first textbooks, including Japanese language texts for

43On June 14, 1932 the Education Department of the Civil Affairs Ministry began providing make-shift textbooks published by the SMR to the schools, and promised a new set of textbooks compiled by the Fengtian Education Department would be available in September of that year. Among the Fengtian textbooks was a Japanese language middle school textbook, edited by Ōide Masayoshi, a former SMR educator and textbook editor, but no Japanese language textbooks for elementary schools (ZG, June 18 1932: 8, Fengtian Jiaoyu, June 1933: 6). On July 29-30, 1932, the newly created Ministry of Education convened the First National Education Administrators Conference, a meeting of ministry and provincial education leaders. There Fengtian Education Department General Affairs Director Tsubokawa Yokichi recommended that middle schools throughout the country teach Japanese as part of the already existing foreign language curriculum (almost always English), rather than as a new subject. Concerned with student reaction to a sudden switch, he said, “How would the students feel if suddenly we completely changed [the foreign language curriculum] to Japanese? We should take a gradual method. For example, schools which have been teaching English for six hours [a week] should divide that time in half, and teach three hours of Japanese [and three of English]. I think this half and half way would be appropriate.” Ministry of Education leader Kamimura applauded the idea, and asked the other provinces to follow Fengtian’s example (Wenjiao-bu 1932a: 28). In fact a gradual shift in middle schools did occur. The 1934 national curriculum split the middle schools’ six hours evenly between Japanese and English. A 1936 revision resulted in four hours of Japanese and two of English. Finally the 1937-1938 New Education System completely eliminated English language instruction from middle schools and set Japanese language instruction at six hours (Wang 2000: 166).
elementary and middle schools. The number of Japanese language class hours under the 1934 system, however, was minimal. The curriculum guidelines declared that Japanese should be taught beginning in the third grade, at least two hours a week for third and fourth graders, and three hours a week for fifth and sixth graders. It could also be taught from first grade in areas with “superior educational ability.” For example, two model “experimental” elementary schools created in 1935 taught Japanese from the first grade, for four to five hours a week (Isoda 1998, 67). These standards were met in elite elementary schools, but not in many others. An informal 1936 survey of Japanese language education found that Japanese was taught in all provincial and city elementary schools and in most county schools, but only about half of village schools and private schools (Hori 1940b, 9-10). In 1936 there were 3,772 provincial, city, and county schools in the state, and 9,322 village and private schools. Slightly over half the total enrolled elementary school students attended village or private schools (they tended to be smaller than the provincial, city and country schools) (Wenjiao-bu 1936, 6). By 1936, therefore, roughly 2/3 of the country’s elementary school students were receiving some kind of Japanese language education. Only around 1/4 of the total elementary school-age population was enrolled in 1936, so only around 1/6 of elementary school-age children were being taught Japanese. Of course the amount and quality of the instruction varied greatly.

44The textbooks themselves mention recommended class time hours, and these hours were codified in the December 13 1935 Ministry of Education Directive #127, “Regulations on Elementary School Curriculum”, and the Dec. 14, 1935 Ministry of Education General Affairs Department’s journal article “Some points to be aware of in implementing Elementary School Curriculum” (Fengtian Jiaoyu 4.8, Nov. 1936).
Although the encouragement of Japanese language education had become Manchukuo state policy by 1934, Japanese still was considered a foreign language. For example, a January 1937 elementary school regulations revision emphasized the place of Chinese as the main language of instruction in the schools. It said that Chinese needed to be studied “so students can clearly write and express their ideas.” Japanese instruction, on the other hand, aimed only at teaching “simple words and phrases, for practical use” (Shi 1993). Compared to Korea and Taiwan, where since 1912 Japanese was taught from 10 to 12 hours a week from the first grade, the amount of time spent on Japanese in Manchukuo was quite limited.

Japanese as a national language: The Shingakusei

In May 1937 the Manchukuo Ministry of Education promulgated a set of laws and regulations, called the Shingakusei (new education system), which greatly changed the structure and content of elementary and middle school education throughout the state. The changes went into effect on January 1, 1938. Under the new system the ministry raised Japanese to the level of the pre-eminent national language, although Chinese and Mongolian also remained national languages. They significantly increased the number Japanese hours of instruction, while cutting native language instruction hours. They also cut the standard number of school years and merged a number of curriculum subjects.

Ministry of Education officials began planning the new system by at least 1936, a time many Japanese in Manchukuo were clearly impatient with the limited degree of Japanese language education in the schools. Feeling more secure in their control of
the population and less concerned with the opinion of the West, they felt that the new state’s “founding spirit” could not be properly communicated through the existing system, which was dominated by Chinese language, history, and morals classes.

In July 1936 the Ministry of Education created the first known internal draft of a new education system. On March 10, 1937, while internal debate on the new system continued, the ministry first publicly indicated they would strengthen the official position of the Japanese language. They did this through a directive sent to all provincial governors ordering them to “thoroughly disseminate the Japanese language in all schools . . . in order to help students understand the indivisible nature of the hearts and minds of Japan and Manchukuo.” Accompanying the directive was a nine-point plan which directed language teachers to help the students “experience Japanese spirit, culture, and customs.” It also called for an increase in casual Japanese use by the

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45 This impatience can be seen in the words of the Japanese teacher Kazumizu Yoshiyama. In May 1935, after Pu Yi’s first visit to Japan, the Manchukuo government promulgated the Huiluan Rescript, which shifted claims for the state’s legitimacy away from the mandate of heaven toward the will of the Japanese Emperor. In July of that year Kazumizu, in a lecture to a group of Chinese teachers, said, “As Japan and Manchukuo are united in all things (politics, industry, transportation, national defense, etc.), the Japanese language is vitally important for the Manchukuo peoples’ daily lives, and a necessary element in Manchukuo’s development” (Kazumizu 1935: 92-93). In a talk given to a similar audience one year later, he went farther, saying, “Today Japanese is a necessary language in Manchukuo. It is not a foreign language; all Manchukuo citizens have a duty to learn it” (Kazumizu 1936: 92).

46 Both the July 1936 plan and comments on the plan by the Fengtian Education Department continued to treat Japanese as a foreign language. Neither documents contained details on the number of hours the language would be studied, or from what grade (Maeda 1994, Maeda 1998). A separate January 1937 plan by the Fengtian Education Department, however, called for Japanese language instruction in the provincial middle and normal schools to increase to six to ten hours a week (up from four), and Chinese language course to go down to four to five hours a week (down from six) (Fengtian Jiaoyu 5.2, April 1937: 112-127).
teachers and students both at school and at home, encouraged holding speech contests and performances, and called for the use of the Japanese syllabary (kana) to accompany scientific words written in Chinese characters in Chinese language documents (Fengtian Jiaoyu 5.5, July 1937, Takaogi 1940, 47-48). This final point is reminiscent of the Western conception of the inability of non-European languages to express modern concepts.

In May 1937 the government promulgated the New Education System. The system renamed the four-year lower elementary schools “People’s Schools” (J. Kokumin Gakkō, C. Guomin Xuexiao) and two-year higher elementary schools “Advanced People’s Schools” (J. Yūkyū Kokumin Gakkō, C. Youji Guomin Xuexiao). In both elementary school levels the language, ethics, science, history, and geography curriculum were merged into a single subject called “national people’s studies” (J. kokumin-ka, C. guomin-ke), which took half the schools’ classroom hours.

The system changed the middle schools even more fundamentally. Previously middle school education was split into lower and higher levels, which lasted three years each. The government merged these two levels into a single four-year middle school, called “Higher People’s Schools” (J. Kōtō Kokumin Gakkō, C. Gaodeng Guomin Xuexiao) (to avoid confusion, I will continue to call the schools lower elementary, higher elementary, and middle). The government required each middle school to declare a vocational specialty—agriculture, commerce, industry, or marine industry. Arts and science middle schools, previously the norm, were no longer allowed (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1937a).

One of the key features of the new system was the establishment of Japanese not only as a national language, along with Chinese and Mongolian, but also the
language with the greatest prestige. Under the new laws Japanese became the only commonly studied language throughout the system. Schools in Chinese areas were required to teach Japanese and Chinese language classes, while in Mongolian areas they were required teach Japanese and Mongolian. Japanese instruction now began in the first grade, for six to eight hours a week. The number of Japanese language classroom hours remained slightly below Chinese/Mongolian language classroom hours in the lower elementary schools, were equal in higher elementary schools, and were greater in middle and normal schools. Recognizing the continuing lack of Japanese language teachers in the elementary schools, however, the regulations also allowed local governments, with permission from the provincial governor, to exempt some schools from the Japanese language requirement. In any case, the new system brought about a sharp rise in the expected amount of Japanese language instruction. Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 illustrate the rise in Japanese language instruction hours and drop in other language instruction in the elementary and middle schools.

47 Section three of the Education System Outline (Gakusei yōkō) stated, “The Japanese language shall be emphasized as one of the national languages, upon which the spirit of Japanese-Manchurian unity is based” (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1937b). The state never promulgated a language law, so the 1937 education laws were the sole source of the language’s national language status (Maruyama 1942: 120-121). Contemporary Japanese commentators were often quick to point out that since Japanese was the only language taught throughout the country, the system established it as the primary national language, although words such as “primary” or “superior” appeared nowhere in the laws (Ebata 1940: 2-4, Maruyama 1942: 127). Miyai Ichirō, a Japanese resident of Fengtian, commented in 1940 that many Japanese mistakenly believed Japanese was the only official national language (Kawamura 1994: 180).
### Table 4.1: Weekly language curriculum instruction hours in Manchukuo elementary schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Lower Elementary</th>
<th>Higher Elementary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934: Japanese</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>6-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total school hours</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938: Japanese</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese/Mongolian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total school hours</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943: Japanese</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese/Mongolian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total school hours</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Kazumizu 1935, 93; Kazumizu 1936, 31; Wenjiao-bu 1936b, 12; Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1937c, 35-37; Saki 1943, 66, 74; Wang 2000, 156. Hours for the Chinese [Guowen] class differ in different sources over the 1934-1937 period.)

### Table 4.2: Weekly language curriculum instruction hours in Manchukuo middle schools, 1934 (1936 adjustment shown in parentheses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Lower Middle</th>
<th>Higher Middle</th>
<th>Normal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
<td>3 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
<td>3 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total hours</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Manshū Teikoku Nenpō 1934; Wang 2000, 166. Japanese hours increased and English hours decreased in 1936.)
Table 4.3: Weekly language curriculum instruction hours in Manchukuo middle schools, 1938-1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Middle (1938-1945)</th>
<th>Normal (1938)</th>
<th>Normal (1943)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese/Mongolian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Wang 2000, 169; Xu 1996, 155)

A related question is the degree to which Japanese was used in non-language courses, such as in ethics, math, and science. From 1934 to 1942 all textbooks in elementary and middle schools were written in Chinese, except for those used in the Japanese language course itself. This and other anecdotal evidence suggests the majority of school instruction during these years took place in Chinese. One source claims that in 1941 middle schools began to require students to use Japanese in a variety of school situations, including formal greetings upon entering and leaving the school, when addressing teachers, and when entering the teachers’ room (Wang 2000, 180). In 1943 the government decided that future textbooks outside the language curriculum would be written in both Chinese and Japanese, with the Chinese text appearing on the top of the page and Japanese on the bottom (Terada 1943, 70). In 1943 middle schools began shifting the teaching of non-language courses from Chinese to Japanese, just before the first generation of students who had studied Japanese since the first grade were enter the middle schools. One former student, for example, claims that in his higher elementary school in 1940 and 1941 Chinese was the standard classroom language for all classes except for the Japanese language class. At the normal school
(then at the same level as the middle schools) he attended in from 1942 to 1944, however, all courses except for math (and presumably Chinese) were taught in Japanese. These classes would have included ethics, science, education, and physical education (Ômori and Li 1994, 291).

Throughout the existence of the Manchukuo state, therefore, Japanese language instruction in elementary schools did not exceed 25% of the total curriculum hours, although it may have gone much higher in middle schools by 1943. For the most part, Japanese remained one of the courses of study, not the general language of instruction. In this way the structure of the Manchukuo education policy resembled that of the non-Russian schools in the Soviet Union from 1938 to 1958. During that period the Soviet government mandated that schools for non-Russians had to begin teaching Russian in the third grade, but that it would remain a course of study, not the general language of instruction. The Soviet government resisted requests from a variety of quarters to increase Russian language instruction in the non-Russian schools, because they were determined to support the continuing existence of minority people’s native language and cultures and thus avoid the image of imperialism. One of the ways the Soviets tried to legitimize itself was to define the state as fundamentally different from a Western-style empire. They wanted the state to be seen as a multi-ethnic partnership of equals. In the schools, therefore, the government expected the students to accept the Soviet civic ideology while retaining their ethnic identity. Although the government accepted a certain amount of instruction in the lingua franca of Russian was needed for national unity, particularly for those eligible to enter the military, for the most part the ideology could be taught in the students’ native language (Martin 2001, 69-70, Blistein 2001, 254).
While the structure of the Manchukuo schools resembled the 1938-1958 non-Russian Soviet schools, the Shingakusei-period ideology of education more closely resembled French colonial policies, as I have described. Like the Soviets, the Japanese expected civic unity, but not complete ethnic assimilation, to prove that they were different from Western imperialists. Unlike the Soviets, and like the French, however, the language optimists among the Japanese (like Yamaguchi and Fukui) felt that certain principles could only be taught in the metropole language. A major reason for this difference was that in the Soviet case the government-sponsored civic identity taught in the schools to teach was largely an intellectual construct, based on Marxism. Since Marxism was presented as a logical construct, it presumably could be expressed equally well in any language. In the Manchukuo case, however, the civic identity was more of an emotional construct—they expected the people to believe in the divinity of the Japanese Emperor and Japan’s sacred role as protector of East Asia. As ideas that required more faith than logic, they were deemed untranslatable by the language optimists, a “non-arbitrary sign”. To teach these important concepts, therefore, they deemed aggressive Japanese language instruction to be necessary.

As schools for Chinese are the focus of this study, I will only briefly mention the state of language education for the other ethnic groups in the state. Mongolian was recognized as one of the national languages at least by 1937, and education in that language was always allowed (Narangoa 2001). Ethnic Koreans living in Manchukuo were considered Japanese imperial subjects, and so for the most part their schools, like the schools for Japanese children, did not come under Manchukuo government jurisdiction. They were run by a variety of different Japanese colonial instructions over the course of the Japanese occupation. In the first years of the state the schools
for Koreans taught in both the Korean and Japanese languages, and used textbooks published by the colonial Korean government. In 1939, following the lead of the Korean government, the schools banned all use of the Korean language on school grounds for every grade. Very few schools for Koreans taught any Chinese language during the Manchukuo period (Isoda 1994, 105). At this point I have little information on the education system for Russians in Manchukuo.

**Divisions among Japanese educators**

While Japanese educators in Manchukuo generally agreed that the local population would “benefit” from learning Japanese, they were divided on the questions of content and methods of instruction. I perceive two major divisions, between language optimists and utilitarians over the use of the direct method versus the use of translations, and within the optimist camp between conservatives (or nativists) and reformers over language curriculum context and Japanese written language reform.

**Division #1: Teaching methods**

The first division, over language teaching methods, was between the language optimists, who endorsed Yamaguchi’s “direct method,” and utilitarians who supported Ōide Masayoshi’s “accelerated method”, which used translations.

The Manchukuo government early on endorsed the direct method in public schools. Teachers’ manuals for the 1934 Japanese language elementary school textbooks, the first published by the Ministry of Education, instructed teachers to use no other methods. One manual, probably written by Fukui, stated:

> Teach using the direct method, not translations. Teach the language only in Japanese, never use any Manchurian [Chinese]. You will fail unless you are firm on this. Teachers who use Manchurian think it will make it
easier on the children and help them understand, but it always results in complete failure. It unconsciously sets an expectation among the students that lessons will be explained in Manchurian, and provides a barrier to careful listening to the sound of the language as well as self-expression. Students then become dependent on translations and fail to learn how to speak, no matter how much they practice (Wenjiao-bu 1937, 10-11).

Although the Manchukuo government supported using the direct method, a significant number of Japanese language teachers in Manchukuo (and later northern China) were followers of Ōide Masayoshi and his accelerated method (Ogaeri 1940, 189).

Ōide Masayoshi (1886-1949) graduated from Tokyo Higher Normal School in 1886, taught in normal schools in Japan until 1913, and then went to Korea, where he taught at several higher education institutions. In 1919 the SMR hired Ōide as a school administrator and member of the company’s education research center. In 1922 the Kwantung Territory and SMR formed a joint textbook editing department, the South Manchuria Education Society Textbook Department (Nanmanshū Kyōikukai Kyōkasho Henshūbu). Ōide was one of the department’s chief editors, and acted as department chair in 1926-1929. As an editor he oversaw the creation of the standard Japanese language elementary and middle school textbooks used in SMR and Kwantung Territory schools.

The textbooks Ōide edited in the 1922-1931 period contained no Chinese language translations, basically following Yamaguchi’s direct method. By 1931, however, Ōide began to express doubts about the method’s applicability in Manchuria. In a teacher’s manual for a set of 1931 textbooks (published before the Manchurian
Incident), he pointed out some limitations in the method. First, because Japanese schools in Manchuria were on “leased territory”, not formal colonies, Japanese had to be taught as a foreign language, not a national language. Because the schools existed within an environment of anti-Japanese activities, the schools had to stress the usefulness of the language, not the language as “the embodiment of the Japanese spirit,” as Yamaguchi held. Ōide also noted that Yamaguchi’s insistence that all classes should be taught in Japanese was impractical in Manchuria. Since the schools taught Japanese for fewer hours than in Taiwan and Korea, the students’ language ability was quite low at the early levels. That made Japanese language instruction in other subjects, like science and math, impossible (Takenaka 2000, 276-277).

As Japan’s empire grew beyond the formal colonies after 1931, Ōide became increasingly convinced that the direct method was not appropriate for most schools in the extended empire. Besides his concern over the antagonism an emphasis on Japanese spirit would cause among the students, Ōide felt that the nature of language education in mainland China was fundamentally different, in that a significant percentage the student population was made up of older students. Schools in occupied Manchuria and Northern China in the 1930s enrolled older children and adults to a much greater degree than occurred in Taiwan and Korea at the time Yamaguchi first developed his methods. There were also many secondary and higher education institutions in existence in Manchuria and Northern China when Japan occupied those regions, most of which were allowed to reopen on the condition that they add Japanese language courses.

As Ōide may have deduced, and linguists have now determined, immersion methods such as Yamaguchi’s work best with pre-elementary and elementary
school-aged children. Summarizing the present consensus, one linguist has said in order to gain native pronunciation in a second language, children must be part of an extended immersion program before age six. To gain native grammar ability children must be part of such a program before age twelve. Also, in order for the programs to succeed, the children must have sufficient motivation, such as a strong belief that language study will result in significant benefits. For older learners, a mixture of explicit language instruction in the learners’ native language and language practice in the target language is considered most effective, rather than relying solely on immersion methods.\(^{48}\)

From 1930 to 1934 Ōide researched these questions while working as vice-principal at the SMR-run Nanman Middle School. He later wrote about these experiences:

> An opportunity for a sudden advance in Japanese language study presented itself after the Manchurian Incident . . . Those of us with experience fanned out all over Manchukuo to study language instruction. Our expectations, however, were crushed, as general Japanese language ability [among Chinese students] did not improve. Japanese was being taught in all levels of schools, from elementary to college, and also in many schools for adults. However none of these schools achieved good results . . . The “speaking method” [direct method] then in use is a long-term program created with young children in mind. The kind of language instruction needed immediately after the establishment of Manchukuo, however, was a fast method which would produce quick results, not a slow method requiring many years. I then realized that the previous teaching methods would not be effective (Ōide 1940, 410-411).

\(^{48}\)Personal correspondence with Dr. Jenifer Larson-Hall.
To meet the needs of the situation Ōide created an “accelerated” teaching method. The fundamental principle of the method was to split up the students’ learning into two steps, learning the meaning of the material, and then learning how to express the material in Japanese. Students were expected to do the first step as homework, using a version of the Japanese text which included a translation into Chinese, explanatory notes, and pronunciation guides. In class the teacher would lead oral exercises, using only Japanese. In 1934 Ōide left his position at Nanman Middle School and founded his own private publishing company, *Manshūkoku Shobungu*. In 1935 he began publishing new versions of Japanese language texts he had previously edited for the South Manchuria Education Society Textbook Department and the Manchukuo government, adding Chinese language translations and footnotes. Also, from 1937 he began publishing his own series of textbooks designed to be used with his accelerated method. These original textbooks were designed to prepare the learner to

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49 Ōide appears to have had a complicated relationship with the Manchukuo education leadership. Many in the leadership were his former colleagues from the SMR. In 1937 the Ministry of Education asked Ōide to write the Japanese language texts for the middle schools and normal schools that were to be reorganized under the New Education System in 1938. Many middle school textbooks in 1937-1940 were farmed out to scholars living in the country, probably because the state textbook division was swamped by the job of creating whole new sets of textbooks for the new curriculum. These privately authored texts were published as “state-approved” (*kentei*) rather than “state-edited” (*kokutei*) textbooks. By 1939 Ōide published at least seven texts for the first two grades of the boys and girls middle schools and the normal schools. In November 1938 former SMR educator Terada Kijirō was named the new Textbook Division Chief, and by the end of 1939 he convinced the leadership to stop the “state-approved” system, and began a process of writing new texts in-house to replace the privately edited texts. In 1943 the Ministry of Education published the first replacement text. Terada’s actions probably had more to do with his desire to bring all aspects of education under state control rather than any personal animus toward Ōide and the other authors (Terada 1943: 65, Terada 1975: 85). What may have been divisive, however, was Ōide’s private republication in “notes and translation” for all the textbooks he wrote for the government, as well as others. These versions could be used in classrooms...
pass a level of the Manchukuo state-run language proficiency text, which could lead to workplace bonuses.

Like Yamaguchi, Ōide opposed an over-emphasis of pro-Japanese propaganda in language education, although for different reasons. He rejected Yamaguchi’s claim that key Japanese principles could only be taught through the Japanese language, and appears to have had no interest in the concept of *kotodama*. Rather, he suggested that such ideological teaching should occur in other parts of the curriculum, where it could be taught in the students’ native language. In 1942 he wrote:

> There are some who think Japanese language instruction and Japanese spirit should be linked, that the spirit is transmitted through language instruction . . . Moreover, they say this link should be forged at the elementary language level. Experience on the continent has shown that this to be a wasted effort, in fact it has poisoned Japanese language learning . . . We should teach about Japanese spirit and leading principles before we teach the Japanese language. We should teach these things in their own language, so they can thoroughly understand it first (Ōide 1942c, 51).

Ōide did not deny the importance of teaching Japanese spirit, but he thought the principles could be taught better in Chinese than in Japanese. His position struck at a fundamental principle of language optimism—that Japan’s unique culture could be taught only in Japanese, and as a result he was heavily criticized by Yamaguchi’s

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using Ōide’s accelerated method, which conflicted with the government’s support of the direct method. Ōide must have received permission to republish these texts, but I have seen no indication that the government supported their use. Advertisements for the text did not appear in the central Manchukuo Education Society’s monthly journal *Kenkoku Kyōiku* (1940-1943), but did appear in the 1940 issues of the Fengtian Provincial Education Society’s journal *Fengtian Jiaoyu*.
disciples. They derisively called his method a “translation method”, lumping it together with previously discredited non-verbal teaching methods. One Yamaguchi supporter, Hino Seibi, censured Ōide for promoting practical concerns over the Japanese spirit and crudely appealing to the financial interests of the Chinese by referring to language proficiency test bonuses (Hino 1942, 72-73). In a reply Ōide did not deny his method’s focus on practicality over spirit, but rejected the charge that it was a translation method, pointing out that he instructed classroom instruction to be done only in Japanese, and therefore his method had more in common with the direct method than translation methods. Ōide also expressed concern that he was widely seen as a leader of a camp arrayed opposed to Yamaguchi, when he actually agreed that the direct method was ideal for elementary schools in which there were enough trained teachers. He felt that his method, however, dealt with the reality of the situation in Manchukuo and North China that Hino and others seemed to ignore (Ōide 1942b, 19-22).

While I am aware of no comprehensive survey of teaching methods in Manchukuo, there is substantial anecdotal evidence showing that in the 1938-1945 period Ōide’s method was widely used, as well as the cruder translation method. Naganuma Naoe, then a Japanese Ministry of Education textbook editor, recently claimed Ōide’s methods were used in many Manchukuo schools, while Yamaguchi’s were used in only “special cases, which caused Yamaguchi to sigh with indignity” (Kawamura 1994, 182). The Kōa-in (Asia Development Board), a Japanese government sub-ministry involved in governing occupied China, sponsored a study of teaching methods used in Northern China in 1941, which had an education system similar to that of Manchukuo. It reported that true direct method teaching was done
almost nowhere in the region because there were not enough trained teachers and
instruction time was too brief. Many ethnic Chinese in charge of Japanese language
instruction used only the translation method. The author of the study suggested
promoting Ōide’s texts as appropriate transition material away from the translation
method. Japanese teachers who understood no Chinese could use it to teach
effectively without trying to achieve total immersion, and Chinese teachers with limited
Japanese skills could also use it with some effectiveness (Kōa-in 1941b, Tani 2000,
26-30).

Although the Manchukuo government continued to support the use of the direct
method, it appears to have eventually accepted the widespread use of Ōide’s methods in
the schools. They granted Ōide permission to publish versions of state-edited
textbooks sometime around 1937, and advertisements for these textbooks began to
appear in the provincial education journal Fengtian Jiaoyu in 1940. In 1940 Hori
Toshio, the Fengtian provincial education inspector, led a group of Fengtian educators
in an study of Ōide’s texts as used in an adult night school, and concluded that it was a
useful method for adults. Hori continued to insist, however, that the direct method
best for teaching elementary students (Hori 1942c, 38).50

50 While Ōide’s methods and texts were widely used in Manchukuo and occupied northern China, Hori
and other leading Japanese educators writing in colonial education journals remained troubled with the
continuing use of the translation method in Manchukuo schools. Hori wrote: “Both before and after
Manchukuo’s establishment [Japanese language teachers in Manchuria] generally avoided the translation
method, using instead the direct method. But some of the Manchurian [Chinese] teachers were still
used translation methods, making it hard to tell whether they taught a Chinese or Japanese language class.
When you ask why they use the translation method, they say that the students’ Japanese ability is so poor
they can not understand any other way . . . We reject any instruction which is similar to how English has
been taught in Japan. That is why we encourage students to being their study by practicing
conversation, not reading books” (Hori 1940b, 12-13, 16).
The division between the Yamaguchi and Ōide supporters is not easily divisible into terms of reformist and conservative ideologies. Both opposed the nativist demand of emphasizing Japanese spirit in elementary school language texts, in fear that such teaching could damage students’ interest in learning the language. Their difference sprung from their views of the role of the Japanese language. While Ōide made his life work the teaching of Japanese to non-Japanese, he disagreed with Yamaguchi that there was anything inherently superior about the language, or that kotodama could change the hearts of non-Japanese. For Ōide motivation had to come before learning, while for Yamaguchi motivation came after learning.

Division #2: Language education content

The second division among Manchukuo education officials and teachers was over the content of Japanese language education. Reformers and nativists disagreed over how to achieve the overall goal of creating a population friendly to Japan. Nativists thought schools should present the same Tennōsei ideology being taught in schools in Japan, including concepts of Japanese superiority and the divinity of the imperial house, in the expectation that these concepts would teach the students a respect for Japan. Reformers, like Yamaguchi, wanted to teach the language in an environment as free from ideology as possible, and trust that the kotodama power of the language itself would win over the students. Utilitarians like Ōide also tended to oppose the use of strongly ideological material in language education. Until around 1943 the Manchukuo education bureaucracy was dominated by reformers who managed to keep elementary textbooks remarkably free of strongly ideological material.
In the 1938-1943 period, when the Manchukuo government used the Japanese language as a major tool in the effort to create a new Manchukuo consciousness, the language textbook editing department and teaching community were dominated by former SMR educators. They included Fukui Yū, who was the editor in charge of the Japanese language textbooks from 1934 to 1940, and Terada Kijirō, who, as previously discussed, led the Manchukuo Textbook Department from 1938 to 1943. Fukui, Terada, and the majority of Japanese in the Textbook Department were strongly influenced by liberal tradition in the SMR education system, originally fostered by Hobo Takashi. Their background aligned them against the empire-wide swing in emphasis toward the glorification of the military, the divinity of the imperial house, and declarations of Japanese superiority. They were also influenced by Yamaguchi’s position that kotodama is best transmitted through the form of the language, rather than the content. They followed Yamaguchi’s admonitions to keep Japanese nationalistic material in elementary school textbooks to a minimum, expecting that the act of learning the language itself would be sufficient to inculcate the students in Japan’s spirit.

As was mentioned in Chapter 2, Manchukuo education officials in 1939 and 1942 publicly expressed concern over the Japanese Ministry of Education’s plan to edit a single language textbook series for all overseas territories, because they feared such texts would contain too much material about Japan, which would bore or offend non-Japanese. In a 1942 roundtable of Manchukuo educators, Terada and two Japanese language professors from Kenkoku University (the state’s most prestigious university, founded in 1938 and located in the capital), Maruyama Rinpei and Uehara
Hisashi, spoke about their frustration with those who wanted to use Japanese language class time to teach Japanese nationalistic concepts:

Terada: Some Japanese language teachers think that the purpose of their teaching is to communicate Japanese spirit. They are only interested in teaching spirit, with the language . . . acting only as the organ of transmission . . . This does not result in improved language ability.

Maruyama: I think ‘Japanese spirit’ can be misunderstood. Overbearing lectures on the subject do nothing but bore the students. I think language teachers should [start with] subjects that seem useful to the students, like how to say ‘this is a pencil, this is a book.’ Eventually one can naturally start talking about Japanese culture. I have found this to be the best way to teach them to appreciate Japanese things and become interested in the language.

Uehara: I have experienced that same thing. Teaching Japanese by overbearingly forcing Japan’s culture on students is doomed to failure . . .

Terada: I am relieved to hear this from Kenkoku University professors . . . Many have argued that national studies [the morals curriculum] and our language courses must be taught together, . . . but we have replied that those who try to teach Japanese spirit and culture in language class from the start end up producing students who arrive at the higher peoples’ schools [middle schools] with terrible pronunciation. Not only are their language skills poor, they have also not been taught about Japanese spirit well . . . So they end up not learning anything in their Japanese classes. If we teach Japanese linguistically, then those advancing to the next level will both acquire good Japanese language skills and absorb Japanese spirit and culture without even being aware of it. When [a student] uses Japanese he can not help but gain Japanese spirit.

Maruyama: That has been my experience as well. That is what the Manchurians clearly have been saying. When they come to Kenkoku University they say they are tired of all the emphasis on Japanese spirit. So we do not repeat it, but rather try to find interesting, entertaining things to teach, until they gradually come to appreciate the language.

Terada: One might ask how can saying [simple phrases like] ‘this is a face, this is an eye’ teach Japanese spirit? Well, look at how we learned English. Phases like ‘this is a dog, this is a cat’ [in English] did not teach
about the British Spirit. But as we learned the language and read more texts until we came to understand British ideas of what makes a gentleman. It simply takes time (Kenkoku Kyōiku, July 1942, 30-31).

Iwazawa Iwao, a Nanman Middle School teacher, wrote in support of Terada’s position a few months later, saying:

Japanese spirit naturally resides within the Japanese language. You do not need to go around pointing it out, saying, ‘here it is, and here’. Japanese words contain kotodama; the words themselves are spirits. Therefore when students speak Japanese they will use the Japanese spirit which exists within it. . . Japanese is not the only language which acts this way. It is true of Chinese or English as well. If you speak the Chinese language frequently you will naturally come to comprehend the world as a Chinese, or if you use English, you will become like an Englishman (Iwazawa 1942, 23).

Besides using the idea of kotodama in an attempt to keep out nationalistic material, both Terada and Iwazawa, by using the example of English, undercut the idea of the unique nature of Japanese then being propagated by Yamada Takao and other nativists.

It is quite remarkable that such public conversations and articles occurred in a military-controlled puppet state in May 1942, a time when Japanese militarist and Emperor-centered discourse was being ratcheted up to unprecedented levels throughout the empire.  

51 Although they were few in number, during the 1940s there were voices raised in the wartime occupied territories in support of keeping potentially divisive ideological materials out of the schools. For example, in a March 24, 1942 Yomiuri Shinbun roundtable of officials in the Philippines, the Pilipino in charge of the territory’s Education Department, replied to a Japanese army officer who said schools needed to strengthen Japanese spirit that such education was appropriate only in Japan, and that the country’s of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere should have their own unique education content. At the 1941 conference on Japanese language held by the Japanese Ministry of Education,
invoking it (whether they truly believed in it or not), education officials for a time could keep nationalist and militarist material at bay. The leadership of former SMR employees was the key factor in this defiance.  

Some nativist Japanese educators were disturbed by the efforts of the leadership to control the amount of Japanese-centered content in Japanese language textbooks. For example in 1940 Asakawa Yoshihiko, a teacher at the Jilin Higher Normal School, bemoaned what he saw as Chinese continuing to learn Japanese only for utilitarian purposes, with no interest in Japanese culture or spirit. Besides the Chinese themselves, he blamed the SMR education system and educators, who he said began the dominant trend of emphasizing utility over spirit. As a corrective he called for an increase in Japanese literature instruction in Japanese language classes of all levels. Only language classes which emphasized Japanese culture could change the people’s spirits, not linguistic-centered instruction (as Terada claimed) or Chinese-language ethics classes (as Ōide suggested) (Asakawa 1940, 22-24).

Asakawa, therefore, agreed with the Yamaguchi/Terada line that the Japanese language

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Okubo Shōtarō, an education administrator in Central China said, “When teaching Japanese in East Asia, it shows more dignity not to emphasizing Japan and the Japanese spirit, and instead teach Japanese as an Asian language”. Ishikuro Osamu, a Japanese language scholar at Hosei University in Tokyo, wrote in the journal *Bungei* in 1942 that the students in occupied China showed a dislike for those teachers who tried to instill “Japanese spirit” in language class (Yasuda 1997, 71).

Ōide, who also was a former SMR educator, complained in 1941 that many language teachers then arriving in China and Manchukuo from Japan were warped by ultra-nationalism: “They do not [see themselves] as just Japanese language teachers. They boast of their great responsibility as representatives of the Japan people to lead the continental peoples. They ignore the Japanese language classroom, and spend their time on political and official affairs.” (Ōide 1941: 24-25).
education which disseminated its *kotodama* spirit was the key to inculcating the students in Japanese spirit, but differed on the question of appropriate content.

In the editing of Manchukuo textbooks, how much did the textbook officials’ put into effect Terada’s concern about keeping “Japanese spirit” material from dominating the classroom? Currently about two-thirds of the Japanese language textbooks created or approved by the Manchukuo education bureaucracy are available for examination. Going through the available texts, I have calculated the percentage of chapters which contain *Japan-related* and *imperial* materials. By Japan-related, I mean any mention of Japan, Japanese individuals, or Japanese customs. By imperial, I mean material which tried to portray the Japanese military or Imperial household as powerful or awe-inspiring, or which taught about Japan’s founding myths. These are what I believe Terada and others referred to as material which asserted “Japanese spirit”. The second figure is a subset of the first. For example, if I say that a text contains 20% Japan-related material and 10% imperial material, then the reader may deduce that the remaining 10% of Japanese-related material is of a less ideologically charged nature. These included such things as a depiction of Japanese children at play, a description of the train-system in Tokyo, or a story about a successful Japanese scientist. While positive about Japan and the Japanese people, these chapters did not present them as objects worthy of awe, uniquely gifted or powerful, or connected to the divine.

There were three periods of textbook publication. The first was in 1934-1935, before the establishment of the New Education System. In these years Japanese was taught for two to three hours a week, beginning in the 3rd grade. Two texts for lower elementary, two for higher elementary, and three for the lower middle schools were
created. Details on all of these texts are available. The second period was 1938-1941, after the establishment New Education System. Japanese was now taught six to eight hours a week in lower and higher elementary schools, and eight hours a week in the now four-year middle schools and two-year normal schools. Two textbook volumes were published for each lower elementary grade, for a total of eight. Details on five of these eight are available. It is not clear whether new textbooks were published for the higher elementary schools after 1938, some sources imply that the higher elementary schools continued to use the 1934-1935 texts (Minsei-bu 1941a, 113, Fukui 1939, 7). Ōide Masayoshi edited six middle and normal school textbooks for the government in 1938-1939, five of which are available. In 1941 the Textbook Department published four middle school volumes, three of which are available. In 1943 the Textbook Department was ordered to create an entirely new set of textbooks appropriate for the state's changed ideology and war footing. At least one elementary school textbook and one middle school textbook were completed before war conditions halted further publication. Although the middle school textbook is available, the elementary school textbook is not.

Table 4.4 shows the percentages of Japan-related and imperial material in the 1934-1935 and 1938-1941 elementary school Japanese language textbooks.
Table 4.4: Themes in Manchukuo elementary school Japanese language textbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Japan-related</th>
<th>Imperial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Lower Elementary #1 (3rd grade)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Lower Elementary #2 (4th grade)</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Higher Elementary #1 (5th grade)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Higher Elementary #2 (6th grade)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1934-35 Average</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Lower Elementary #1 (1st grade)</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Lower Elementary #2 (1st grade)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Lower Elementary #3 (2nd grade)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Lower Elementary #4 (2nd grade)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Lower Elementary #7 (4th grade)</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1938-1941 Average</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I believe the second set of percentages is a more relevant indicator of the assimilative nature of the textbooks than the first. It is to be expected that any Japanese language textbook would contain material that mentions Japan and Japan-related matters. The Manchukuo elementary school textbooks are in fact remarkable for the lack of such references. A majority of the people, landscapes, and situations depicted in the elementary textbooks are Chinese, not Japanese. This probably reflects the influence of Yamaguchi and the new education movement educators, both of whom encouraged the use of everyday texts and materials with which students would be familiar. Many of the chapters are directly copied from South Manchuria Education Society textbooks edited by Ōide from 1922 to 1931. Ōide had made a point of placing the materials in those textbooks as much as possible in a local context. One scholar has estimated that 24% of the 1934-35 elementary school texts came from the 1924 South Manchuria Education Society textbooks (Takenaka 2000b).
Examining the figures, one can see that the amount of both Japan-related and imperial material rose along with the student’s age, as might be expected. The 1934-35 lower elementary texts contained a very small amount of Japan-related material and no imperial material. The 1934-35 higher elementary school texts contained much more of both forms of content, a rather sudden spike. Most of the imperial material in the Higher Elementary #1 text is made up of a series of rather benign chapters based on the Japanese foundation myths taken from the *Kojiki*. The myths are presented without special reverence, and no attempt is made to link the ancient Japanese gods to the Manchukuo state, as occurred later in the 1941 and 1943 textbooks. Both Japan-related and imperial material is very light in the 1938-39 texts for 1st and 2nd graders, but jumps up in the 1941 4th grade text, which contains 15% imperial material, including a story about Amaterasu from the *Kojiki* which mentions that the Manchukuo government made Amaterasu the state’s “founding god” the year before.

The four 1934-35 texts averaged 20% Japan-related material and 9% imperial material. Since only five out of the eight 1938-1941 texts are available, a precise average can not be found, but a rough estimate, based on an extrapolation of the existing figures, finds 13% Japan-related material and 9% imperial material. Thus from the first series of textbooks to the second the amount of imperial material basically remained unchanged, and the amount of Japan-related material actually dropped significantly. This drop occurred despite the outbreak of full-scale war between

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53 Another problem in comparing the 1934-1935 and 1938-1941 texts is that the first set included two texts for higher elementary (5th and 6th grades), while the second set included only texts for lower elementary (grades 1-4).
Japan and China and the shift in Manchukuo state ideology in the years between the publication of the two series.

It is instructive to compare these figures to those of Japanese language textbooks produced for students in Japan and Korea. The Japanese Ministry of Education began publishing its third textbook series in 1918 and its fourth series in 1933. The Korean colonial government began publishing its third textbook series (for Korean students) in 1930 and fourth in 1939 (Li 2000, 343-347). In 1941 the Japanese and Korean governments both began publishing fifth and final series before the end of the war. I do not, however, yet have information on the two 1941 series.

Table 4.5: Elementary school Japanese language textbooks in Japan and Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Series</th>
<th>Japan-related</th>
<th>Korea-related</th>
<th>Imperial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan 3rd series (1918)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan 4th series (1933)</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea 3rd series (1930)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea 4th series (1939)</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scholars have often pointed out that the Japan third series was edited during the height of the new education and internationalist movements, and as such contained an unprecedented amount of material with international settings. The fourth series appeared at a time when a more conservative version of the new education movement was ascendant, and therefore contained much more statist and imperial material, but also many more stories about children. The Korean third series is notable for the increase in the amount of material about Korea and decrease in material about Japan, including imperial material, compared to the previous Korea second series published in
1923. This trend was completely reversed with the fourth series, when Japan-related material again became dominant and the amount of imperial material greatly expanded.

The amount of imperial material in Korean and Japanese texts rose in a parallel manner in the 1930s, with the amount slightly greater in the Korean texts in both periods. The amount of imperial material in the Manchukuo texts, however, remained constant at 9%, at a much smaller level than in either Japan or Korea at any period. Also, while the amount of general material about Japan was the same in the Korea and Manchukuo texts of the early and mid 1930s, they diverged significantly in 1938-1939, with the amount rising dramatically in Korea while dropping almost as dramatically in Manchukuo.

Turning to the Manchukuo middle and normal school textbooks, the amount of Japan-related and imperial material tended to be greater than in the elementary school textbooks, particularly in the later years. These texts were created for a much smaller population than the elementary school texts, as only 2 to 5% of elementary school graduates moved on to middle school throughout Manchukuo’s history.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Japan-related</th>
<th>Imperial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Lower Middle #1 (7th grade)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Lower Middle #2 (8th grade)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Lower Middle #3 (9th grade)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1934-1935 average</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Middle #1 (7th grade)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Middle #2 (7th grade)</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Middle #3 (8th grade)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1938-39 average</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Middle #5 (9th grade)</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Middle #7 (10th grade)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Middle #8 (10th grade)</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1941 average</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1938-1941 average</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Middle #1 (7th grade)</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1935 middle school texts had less Japan-related and imperial material than the exceptionally Japan-centric 1935 higher elementary school texts. The average of the 1935 middle school texts were 27% Japan-related and 6% imperial material. In 1938-1939 Ōide, as a private citizen, edited the first four middle school textbooks for the government (three of which are available). The texts contained 31% Japan-related material and 10% imperial material, both somewhat higher than the 1934-1935 texts. The 10% still was well below the amount found in the contemporary Korean and Japanese textbooks in the lower elementary school level (I have not seen figures for
contemporary middle school textbooks from Korea or Japan). Also, Ōide’s imperialist materials seem quite restrained when compared to what followed.

In 1941 the Manchukuo government published the last four middle school textbook (three of which are available). The number of Japan-related and imperial materials rose significantly from the level of those produced by Ōide, 44% Japan-related and 30% imperial. Some of these texts were about life in the military and the Manchukuo army’s place as a partner in defending the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. The immediate cause of this change may have been a 1940 conscription law, which forced some middle school graduates to enter the military after graduation. These texts can be seen as a preparation for that conscription. Even more frequent than the militaristic texts, however, were those which described the Manchukuo population as an army of workers, cooperating in the Co-Prosperity Sphere through their labor. I believe this emphasis demonstrates the primary role Japanese leaders saw the Manchukuo people playing in the Co-Prosperity Sphere at the time, workers rather than soldiers.

In 1943, after Pacific War had begun, the Ministry of Education published the last known Manchukuo middle school textbook, which contained 48% imperial material. Besides chapters about Amaterasu and general cooperation with Japan, nearly a third of the textbook contained war-related material, which indicates how militaristic the middle schools had become. For example one chapter lionized a self-sacrificing soldier serving in China, while another described the attack on Pearl Harbor. Besides the chapters on the Japanese army, there were also several chapters depicting local Manchukuo soldiers involved in the war effort by protecting the railway lines from bandits and patrolling the northern boarder with the Soviet Union. This may show a
shift in the leadership’s conception of the Manchukuo population away from being chiefly economic labor toward becoming more active in the military side of Japan’s war effort. The nature of the material also differed substantially from Ōide’s 1938-1939 texts, which had some militaristic material, but little about actual fighting. For example, a chapter in Ōide’s Middle School #1 textbook described General Nogi’s childhood, including his parents’ Spartan philosophies. The 1943 Middle School #1 text, on the other hand, contained a chapter describing General Nogi Maresuke leading the Japanese army to victory in the Russo-Japanese war.

The 1934-1935 and 1938-1939 secondary school texts, then, while containing considerably more Japan-related material than the elementary school texts, had only a slightly greater amount of imperial material. In 1941 and especially in 1943 the demands of the war and a growing expectation to change the Manchukuo people into loyal subjects resulted in the amount of imperial material raising sharply and becoming exceedingly militaristic.

Assuming that Terada and his allies saw the materials which I define as “imperial” as the excessively ideological “Japanese spirit” materials which they feared would discourage students from studying the language, they were successful in keeping them from becoming major elements in the elementary school textbooks at least through 1941. The elementary school textbooks, particularly in the 1938-1941 era, emphasized the lives of Manchukuo students in Manchukuo, while mentioning Japan and the Japanese only occasionally, and using imperial materials very rarely. Since no 1943 elementary school texts have been found, it is not clear whether this trend continued during that more militaristic period. In the secondary school texts, on the other hand, editors included much more material about Japan, although they kept the amount of
imperial material down in 1935 and 1938-1939. In 1941 and 1943, under the pressures of the war conditions, they made the middle school textbooks increasingly ideological, emphasizing the greatness of the Japanese imperial household and military and the people’s patriotic duty as industrial and military soldiers. Perhaps it was these texts about which Terada, Murayama, and Uehara expressed frustration in their 1942 conversation.

Division #3: Japanese language reform

The third division among Manchukuo educators was over the question of Japanese language reform or preservation. In particular, should Manchukuo schools teach the kana syllabary system then in use in Japan, or a newer, easier to learn system? This, like the other divisions, was part of a larger struggle found throughout the Japanese education world. Within Manchuria the split mirrored that of teaching Japanese spirit. The SMR-related educators who supported a language reform were basically the same people who supported the use of non-ideological materials. Nativists, who supported the preservation of linguistic tradition as well as the use of ideological materials, tended to be newer arrivals from Japan.

As has been mentioned, the Meiji-era linguist Ueda Kazutoshi was a pioneer in the Japanese language reform movement. Members of the generation of language scholars after Ueda proposed a variety of written language reforms, in particular what was usually called the “historical kana” system, so-called because its characters did not consistently represent a single sound. For example, the kana う could be pronounced [i] or [hi] and は could be pronounced [ha] or [wa] depending on the situation. Reformers felt that these inconsistencies made learning the language unnecessarily
difficult, and proposed a variety of “pronunciation kana” systems in which each kana represented a single sound.

Language nativists, or preservationists, on the other hand, argued that the historical kana system was linked to the state kokutai, and therefore declared any tampering a sacrilege. Conservative scholar Yamada Takao was a leading voice in the preservationist camp, calling attempts at reform a “destruction of tradition.” Sato Haruo, another nativist, said that language itself was a god with a spirit, and therefore any criticism of it was a blasphemous act. “To lightly change eternal words for short term convenience is a short-sighted act. Wounding the life of our national language will surely bring sorrow to following generations” (Mitani 1996, 112).

The Japanese Ministry of Education vacillated between these two camps. It sponsored several kana reform studies, and in 1924 approved a pronunciation kana plan created by the ministry’s own Language Research Conference. Strong opposition by Yamada and others, however, forced the Ministry to postpone implementing the plan throughout the pre-war and wartime eras. Even Hirao Hachisaburō, a former director of the Kanamoji-kai, a leading reform group, was unable to produce any significant changes during his term as Minister of Education from 1936 to 1937 (Komagome 1997, 322).

Although language reform was halted in Japan proper, supporters of reform among colonial education officials were free to experiment in the territories under their authority. Many held that a logical pronunciation kana system was necessary in teaching non-Japanese. The editors of Korea’s colonial-era elementary Japanese readers, beginning with the first series in 1912 and continuing through the fifth series in 1941, used a pronunciation kana system in the first seven of eight Japanese elementary
school language readers. They introduced the historical kana in the final eighth volume, and then used historical kana in the middle school readers. This pattern became the standard for elementary school Japanese textbooks in Manchuria, beginning with a 1916 SMR series. The South Manchuria Education Society 1924 and 1931 textbooks, Manchukuo government 1935 and 1938-41 elementary school textbooks, and Ōide’s 1937 private “accelerated textbooks” all used pronunciation kana (Takenaka 2000b), while the middle school textbooks from these same institutions used historical kana. The pronunciation system used in the Korea elementary textbooks used what Ōide called an “eclectic system”, keeping some inconsistent elements of the historical system, such as は (normally pronounced [ha]) as the subject marker (pronounced [wa]). This system became the standard kana system in Japan after post-war orthographic reforms and remains so today. The South Manchuria Education Society, Manchukuo government, and Ōide-edited texts, on the other hand, used a more radically consistent system, for example using わ (pronounced [wa]) as the subject marker (Ōide 1941, 24-26).54

Komagome Takeshi has written that these debates over orthography and differences of usage in different parts of the empire betrayed the premise that there was a single standard Japanese language, and thus was an example of how imperialism illuminated the contradictions which existed within nationalist ideology (Komagome 1997: 322-323).

54 Ōide called the system used in the Manchuria texts “pronunciation kana.” He illustrated the differences between the three systems with examples of the sentence “Mr. Ō is probably not coming to school today” (王さんは今日学校を休むでしょう).

Historical kana: わうさんはけぶがくかうをやすむでせう.

“Eclectic” kana: おうさんはきょうがっこうをやすむでせう.

“Pronunciation” kana: おおさんわきょおかっこおおやすむでせよ (Ōide 1941: 25).
Fukui and Terada, the two key leaders of Manchukuo textbook editing, publicly supported the use of pronunciation *kana* in the elementary school Japanese language readers (Fukui 1939, 4). Terada went as far as to call for an empire-wide conversion to pronunciation *kana*, even using the police to force public institutions like newspapers and publishing houses to make the switch.\(^{56}\)

\(^{55}\) A 1972 history edited by former Manchukuo government officials incorrectly claimed that Terada, who became head of the textbook division in November 1938, introduced the pronunciation *kana* system. It said: “In 1941 when the Japanese language readers were revised, the previous traditional kana were for the first time replaced with new pronunciation *kana*, and new words were given with accent marks to show how they are pronounced in the standard language. This use of pronunciation kana was due to a suggestion from the advisor Yamamoto Yūzō” (Manshūkoku Shikai 1970: Kakuron 1108). While both Yamamoto, who was a leading figure in Japan’s post-war language reform efforts, and Terada both supported teaching pronunciation *kana*, the system was already in place before Terada joined the ministry. Pronunciation *kana* were used in the 1934-1935 and 1938 elementary school textbooks, all edited by Fukui.

\(^{56}\) In a post-war memoir Terada wrote: “Secretly in my heart I wanted to blow a new wind into the Elementary and Middle School textbooks in Japan itself. I tried to reform Japanese education from Manchuria . . . In Japanese national language texts . . . we used use pronunciation *kana*, and included accent marks for new words, demonstrating correct Tokyo standard pronunciation. The *kana* usage was a forerunner of that used today in Japan, although the accents still are not used in Japan” (Ryōnankai 1972, 240-241). Manchukuo textbook officials felt that there needed to be pronunciation guides to go along with the textbooks, probably not only because many of the teachers were Chinese, but also because a majority of the ethnic Japanese teachers in Manchukuo came from Kyūshū and western Honshū, and therefore spoke with non-standard dialects. In 1938-1939 they made a series of 13 records of a Japanese speaker from Tokyo reading the text of the first four elementary school textbooks. They abandoned this direction because of the expense of recording and manufacturing the records, however, and in 1940 created pronunciation guides utilizing a system of accent orthography, which it included in the elementary school teaching manuals (Fukui 1939: 6, Kenkoku Kyōiku July 1942: 26-27, Minsei-bu Henshin Kanshitsu 1940: 17-21).
In 1943 Terada wrote that reform policies were easier to enact in Manchukuo than Japan:

Manchukuo is a new state, and so there is little pressure from tradition and convention to slow us down. In this way it is superior to Japan. For example, former Prime Minister Zheng extremely respected ancient books, so when he served concurrently as the Minister of Education, he arranged for the [Chinese language] textbooks to be based on the classics. However, the 1940 Textbook Advisory Committee Conference decided on a ratio of classical and colloquial Chinese texts, with colloquial texts taking up the great majority. It was enacted, and remains the policy today. I do not think we would have been able to come to such a simple conclusion if this was Japan. We have recently established polices on having joint Japanese and Manchurian [Chinese] language texts for middle schools, the reform of Japanese language notation, and the merging and splitting of curriculum, each of which would have taken at least five to ten years to achieve in Japan. In Manchukuo we are able to move nimbly. If we fail we can try it again a different way (Terada 1943, 67).

In the previously mentioned 1942 roundtable, Terada talked in greater detail about his vision of language reform, and the possibilities of leading that reform from the gaichi. Among those present were the previously mentioned Kenkoku University language professors Maruyama Rimpei and Uehara Hisa, Chigusa Tatsuo, a Justice Ministry official trying to reform the language of the laws, and Matsukawa Heihachi, one of Terada’s subordinates in the Textbook Division. Matsukawa was a former student of Terada’s at Kyōsen, the SMR teacher training school, and a fervent supporter of kana reform.

Terada: I think we should move ahead more positively in some areas. Matsukawa, please tell us your opinion.

Matsukawa: My ideas are very radical, and might seem mad . . . I think we should eliminate kanji, and only use pronunciation characters. Just as [former Education Minister] Hirao has written, if we are able to create the
custom of writing just as we speak, our problems will be solved. Then we will see rapid success . . .

Terada: I would like colloquial writing to be like a voice recording.
Uehara: Isn’t that impossible?
Terada: I am not sure. I want to throw away the present contrived writing style, and work at getting as close to recorded speaking as we can. We would write just as we speak, so that even a child can read and have no trouble understanding. I think the time has come for written Japanese to go through a major reform.

Chigusa: Today in Japan they are going to extremes to keep out foreign words—I want to avoid that. Any attempt to ban words which have become a natural part of Japanese will end in failure. The same thing is going on in Europe. England, France, and Germany are trying to keep out each others’ words, and punishing people for using them. They are trying to reverse the course of language evolution. I would also like to see language simplification, making the written language reflect the spoken language.

Terada: Mr. Uehara has spoken about the need for a revolution in kana usage in Japan, but can it be done?
Uehara: There is opposition.
Terada: Some so-called scholars oppose it. It is connected to the Kokutai problem.
Uehara: The language reform in Japan has died away (smiles).
[Uehara says this phrase in an archaic form, perhaps mocking language preservationists.]
Terada: I think it is like the situation in Japan just before the Manchurian Incident. There were two political camps, some who thought Japan could not progress unless the current state of affairs was destroyed, while others profited from the status quo, and did not mind if it continued. Today as well there are two such camps arguing about the national language problem. There are those like us, who may be in the extreme, but who want more than anything else for the language to be organized so it can advance into the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and the world. Then there are those in the homeland who just work at their desks and can not imagine change. Today, because we must move into the South Seas and India, the Japanese language must be organized. We need to concentrate on this effort.
Uehara: [But what if the language] that goes overseas and the language which stays at home do not move together?

Terada: There may be an interim period in which there will be a difficult bifurcation . . . There needs to be government enforcement. Just like when the (Japanese) Ministry of Education issued orders to newspapers and magazines on what kanji could be used and how they should look in block printing . . . Another problem is that in the Manchukuo region we use pronunciation kana and restrict the number of kanji in the schools. But every day the newspapers and magazines published in Manchukuo freely act in ways which oppose our efforts. This contradiction disturbs us textbook editors. If we want the Manchurians to quickly learn Japanese, pronunciation kana and restriction of kanji must not occur only in the textbooks but also in all newspapers and magazines. If they do not participate, we are in trouble. We need to work together in order to teach the Japanese language to foreigners and the people of Manchukuo.

Later in the discussion Terada spoke about his vision of transforming the language throughout the empire:

Terada: If we make the decision to move toward pronunciation kana, in 30-50 years all written materials can be put into pronunciation kana. We can’t destroy historical kana use in just 3-5 months.

Maruyama: What about Japanese culture? . . . You will have to rewrite all previous culture, like the Manyōshū, Kōjiki, Genji, and so on.

Terada: Just like enacting the metric system, there will be a buffer period of some decades, then after 30 or 50 years there will have to be a law against the use of anything but pronunciation kana (Kenkoku Kyōiku, July 1942, 21-29).

Terada and Matsukawa were clearly the strongest supporters of reform in this group. They put their ideas into action as leaders in Manchukuo government efforts to reform both Japanese and Chinese. The state first became directly involved in language reform issues in January 1938, when the Civil Affairs Ministry created the Manchukuo Language Investigation Committee, a government organ dedicated to
researching and formulating language policy. In October 1939 a group of educators and others involved in cultural institutions in Manchukuo established a non-governmental body which they named the Manchukuo Language Research Association. Terada and other former SMR educators were among the leaders of the organization. The association pledged to study issues on all the languages of Manchukuo and published a journal, *Manshū Kokugo*, of which at least ten issues appeared in 1940 and 1941. The government merged the two groups together in 1941. 57 These organizations actively researched and crafted policy statements on Japanese and Chinese pronunciation characters, Chinese language standardization, and language promotion activities.

The authors who appeared in the journal *Manshū Kokugo* were overwhelmingly pro-reform, frequently citing potential salutary effects of using pronunciation *kana* and limited numbers of *kanji* on the education of both Japanese and Chinese children (Akatsuka 1940, Hori 1941a). The journal also ran some opposing views, however, as did other local education journals. Jilin Higher Normal School teacher Asakawa Yoshihiko, who was quoted earlier in his support of the emphasis on Japanese spirit in language education, accused reformers of “acting sacrilegiously

57The Manchukuo Language Investigation Committee (満州帝国民生部満語調査委員会) focused on Chinese language issues, and included three sub-committees, one dedicated to national language policy research, one on the establishment of a standard list of Chinese characters, and on research on a system of phonetic orthography. Matsukawa was a central member of this organization. In October 1941 the government merged the Manchurian Language Investigation Committee and the Manchukuo Language Research Association to form the National Language Investigation Committee (満州帝国民生部国語調査委員会), with the mandate to research the languages of Manchukuo for the purpose of advising the Civil Affairs Minister (Yasuda 1997: 96).
against the national language” by trying to change the traditional writing systems (Asakawa 1940, 24). Onodera Miyasuke, a Manchukuo middle school vice-principal, wrote in Fengtian Jiaoyu about his disappointment with the Manchukuo language textbooks for their focus on pronunciation instead of kanji and historical kana:

Up to now we have used phonological-style Japanese language textbooks. The phonological style is nothing more than a convenience, teaching syllabic mimicry, not the true essence of Japanese. Without kanji, students can not understand the complex nature of Yamato words, which are the heart of the language’s mystery. The phonological method also destroys true Japanese by not using the pure historical kana rules, which are set by the state. Simplified language is an expression of a vulgar culture, while complex language expresses a state’s high culture. Manchukuo’s use of the “convenient” phonological method is very regrettable (Onodera 1938, 74).

Despite these opposing voices, reformist educators dominated the Manchukuo central education bureaucracy for most of its existence, and were able to see many of their plans enacted. They brought to the organization a zeal for change both for the sake of improved education in Manchukuo, and as a way to demonstrate the results of reform to their home country. The short history of the state, as Terada noted, meant that there was little tradition or bureaucratic inertia to slow down their reform plans. These same men, however, could never have lost sight of who held final control over all major government decisions, the Japanese military. After 1941, when the war became a pressing concern for the state’s ruling generals, only those reforms that contributed to the state’s immediate goals were allowed to remain. They allowed written language reforms to progress, as the army itself was exploring reduction of kanji and kana simplification in the early 1940s to improve communication among soldiers (Tani 2000,
Textbooks which did not emphasize the people’s duty to the Japanese emperor nearly as much as textbooks in Japan and Korea, however, were not acceptable at a time when local non-Japanese students were being drafted and trained to help replace the dwindling Japanese forces. Therefore the government ordered the Ministry of Education to rewrite its entire series of elementary and middle school readers in 1943, an order which clearly annoyed Terada and may have lead to his resignation in March 1944 (Terada 1943, 69-70).

The military provided the reformers with a freedom of action which they did not have in Japan, but to do so they had to agree to participate in a system which forced a style of education on a population which clearly would have preferred something else. The following section will examine the overall failure to win the population over through the Japanese language.

Results of Japanese language dissemination

While the above debates about the nature of Japanese language education may tell us much about the colonizers’ view of their language and its place in Asia, they do not tell us the degree to which the language ultimately was taught in Manchukuo. This section will focus on three areas: the number of Japanese recruited to teach their language in Manchukuo, the degree to which members of the indigenous population were trained as language teachers, and anecdotal evidence about language ability and interest in Japanese among the general population. This brief survey will show that Japanese language instruction in almost all elementary schools was quite limited, while the few elite students who attended middle schools received relatively substantial training.
In 1939 Fukui set forth a vision of Japanese language instruction occurring on two widely separated levels:

In the future the people will be divided into two groups—first the common masses, who will be able to speak simple Japanese but not find it necessary to write complex texts. Then there will be the leadership class, who will become skillful at the Japanese language, understand commonplace writing, and have the responsibility to introduce and guide the common masses in these things. They will be able to both read and speak in both the modern formal and colloquial styles. Because they will be able to read and understand ancient texts, they will understand Japanese traditions and truly be able to enjoy Japanese culture (Fukui 1939, 4).

The basis for this bifurcated view of the future was the limited amount of resources Japan could afford to use in Manchukuo language education.

As schools slowly reopened after the Manchurian Incident, one of the government’s first priorities was to staff the regions’ few middle and higher schools with Japanese language teachers, as these schools were the training grounds for future leaders of society. Throughout the Manchukuo period the number of middle school students was only 2% to 5% that of elementary school students (see Table 4.7). From as early as 1935, the most prestigious provincial schools in the largest cities were well staffed with both ethnic Japanese and Chinese with substantial Japanese language experience. In 1935 between 7% and 9% of the teachers in Fengtian Province’s twenty-one provincial middle schools, some of the best in the country, were Japanese, while an additional 5% to 8% of the teachers were Chinese who had studied in Japan or in Japanese-run schools (Fengtian-sheng 1935, 470, Liaoning-sheng 1990, 822-823). Since Japanese language instruction was only expected to take up three hours of school time a week, this number of Japanese-speaking teachers was more than adequate. In
1937 the Japanese teachers made up 13% of Manchukuo’s middle school teachers, and the amount rose to over one-third of the total in 1939 and 1942. The Japanese tended to be clustered in the provincial schools, there were fewer qualified language teachers in the less prestigious city and county schools, particularly those in more isolated areas of the country. Wartime manpower shortages caused a drop in the number of Japanese teachers after 1942. Still, these sizable numbers demonstrate that the government envisaged middle schools as a place in which a small elite population could experience a Japanese-centered education that went far beyond simple language training.

Providing teachers for the much larger elementary school population, on the other hand, was far beyond the state’s means throughout its existence. Figures for 1937, 1939, and 1942 show that Japanese teachers probably never made up more than 2% of the elementary school teaching population.
Table 4.7: Manchukuo elementary and middle school attendance and teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Elementary school students</th>
<th>Percentage of student-age population enrolled</th>
<th>Japanese elementary teachers, % of total</th>
<th>Middle school students</th>
<th>Middle/elementary student ratio</th>
<th>Japanese middle teachers, % of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931*</td>
<td>747,176</td>
<td>19-20%</td>
<td></td>
<td>38,575</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21,896</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>502,223</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>25,387</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>830,960</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>28,866</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>896,054</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>26,324</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1,012,491</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29,375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1,179,910</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>33,640</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1,613,751</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>38,703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1,792,560</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>35,944</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,972,156</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>42,745</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>2,099,342</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51,267</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>2,159,864</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>57,341</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>2,241,322</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>990</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* - Before the Manchurian Incident.


In February 1936 the Manchukuo government established a five-year plan to increase the number of ethnic Japanese teachers. Previously teachers were hired unsystematically from Japan and the Japanese settler communities in Manchuria and Korea, and were given little training. Under the 1936 plan the Manchukuo government asked Japanese prefectural governors to recommend qualified secondary students. These students were tested in selected cities in Japan beginning in 1937. In the first round of tests fifty elementary school teachers were chosen out of 157 applicants. The selected teachers then spent six months training at the Jilin Higher
Normal School (Ōmori 1996, 63-65). The process was repeated annually until 1941, when the Japanese government, concerned the number of teachers leaving Japan to teach in the extended empire was causing a drain on domestic education, set limits on the number allowed to leave the country each year (Komagome 1997, 329). These limitations appear to have ended the 1937 recruitment system.

In 1938, with the increased need for Japanese-speaking teachers under the New Education System, the government took a new track by establishing its own normal school for Japanese teachers. They established the school in the capital Xinjing and named it the Central Teacher Training Center. It was a two-year program for training Japanese middle-school graduates, rather than veteran teachers as in the 1937 recruitment system. In 1940 the school began accepting Japanese elementary school graduates for a five year training course. The center trained at least five hundred Japanese boys from 1938 to 1945.

Although these methods provided sufficient teachers for the limited number of secondary schools in Manchukuo, they could not hope of placing many ethnic Japanese teachers in the elementary schools. The alternative was training local non-Japanese to be Japanese language teachers. The government reorganized its system of normal schools for non-Japanese in 1938, placing all under state control (rather than county or provincial control) and emphasizing instruction in the Japanese language, knowledge about Japan, and “state founding spirit.” The quality of students in these schools is suspect, however, because of the low number of applicants. Tsukinoki Mizuo has found that in 1939 the four normal schools in Fengtian Province (the economic and cultural heart of the region) had only 853 applicants for 701 positions, or an 82% acceptance rate. The average acceptance rate for middle schools throughout the
country that same year, on the other hand, was 38% (Tsukinoki 1990, 15, Wang 2000, 171). A 1942 yearbook stated, “The number of applicants to the normal schools is decreasing, which is terribly troublesome, and makes the achievement of our goals very difficult” (Manshūkoku Tsūshin 1942, 229).

Terada and Hori both pointed to low teacher pay as the major reason for the lack of Chinese applicants to normal schools. In fact, Terada claimed that the national average pay for non-Japanese teachers, 42 yen a month, was lower than that of unskilled laborers (Terada 1941, 23, Hori 1941b, 58).

Ideological opposition to the school system was doubtless another factor in the low normal school enrolment rates. Kimura Osamu, a Fengtian City elementary school teacher, described with credulity the attitudes of Chinese teachers and students: “Manchurian teachers have no desire to continue learning Japanese. Maybe it is because many already know it to a degree, but you never hear a Manchurian teacher asking how to say a certain word. Students are the same, except for those about to take a test; they have no desire to learn” (Kimura 1942, 36). What Kimura labels obstinacy,

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58 Statistics for 1935 show that in Fengtian Province Japanese elementary teacher salary averaged 143 yen a month, while non-Japanese averaged 60 yen a month. In Jilin province Japanese teachers received about the same, but non-Japanese averaged a much higher 92 yen a month. Japanese lower middle teachers in Fengtian Province averaged 157 yen, while non-Japanese averaged 117 yen. In 1939 the Civil Affairs Ministry claimed that the ideal pay scale for non-Japanese teachers was 36-49 yen for graduates of the normal school main course and 26-34 yen for graduates of the less prestigious special course. Terada in 1940 stated that Japanese elementary school teachers in the capital Xinjing earned 133 yen, non-Japanese in the capital averaged 66 yen, and non-Japanese throughout the country averaged 42 yen. A 1942 Education Department yearbook claimed the average pay for normal school graduates was 44 yen (in 1933 the Manchukuo yen was pegged to the Japanese yen at a one-to-one basis) (Fengtian Jiaoyu 7.3, March 1939, Kenkoku Kyōiku 3.12, December 1941, Terada 1941: 23, Minsei-bu 1942: 65).
others might call passive resistance. In this atmosphere, becoming a teacher in a Japanese-run school must not have appealed to many would-be normal school students.

To help deal with the shortage of teachers, in January 1943 the Manchukuo government introduced an emergency measure shortening the number school-years required to become an elementary school teacher. Under the 1938 system normal schools accepted students who had completed three years of middle school education, and trained them for two years. In 1943 the normal schools were restructured as four year schools which accepted graduates of higher elementary schools. Therefore normal school graduates finished with one less year of school experience. As a result, youths as young as 15 could become elementary school teachers (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1941, 37).59

The lack of teachers from Japan, together with poor teacher training and widespread disinterest on the part of Chinese teachers and students, resulted in extremely low Japanese proficiency in elementary schools. Yasui Katsumi, a member of the Manchukuo Language Research Association, said of urban elementary school children in 1942:

I have yet to meet a Manchurian child who speaks Japanese well . . . Very few Manchurians who graduate from higher elementary school can pass the SMR Japanese language level three test, which requires only simple conversational ability. On the street they use their own language, not

59 A March 1941 initiative created a two-year preparatory course which admitted higher elementary school graduates. Graduates of the preparatory course were expected to then go on to the two year normal school main course. The option to enter the main course after three years of middle school remained until 1943, but the faster preparatory route was more widely used. In 1943 the normal schools’ preparatory and main courses were merged into a single four-year course accepting higher elementary school graduates (Wenjiao-bu 1944: 529, 575-576).
Japanese. Go to the athletic field, pick out any of the students, and try to talk to them in Japanese—they will not understand (Yasui 1942, 34-35).

The level of education in the countryside was especially low. Tōjō Tsuchirō, a Japanese teacher who transferred from a city elementary school to a rural middle school, wrote in 1940:

Because there are many ethnic Japanese teachers in the towns along the railroads and in the big cities, the students there do much better. In most other areas there are no ethnic Japanese teachers and Japanese language is used only in the language classrooms, therefore the students have low ability. The students in the big cities are twice, even ten times more prepared than the students in the countryside . . . I can see their elementary schools were poor by listening to new middle school students reading from a text. They are at the elementary school 3rd grade level (Tōjō 1940, 33-34).

An inspection of elementary schools in the rural Tonghua Province in 1940 found that any teacher who passed level two of the government proficiency test, a level designed (ideally) for middle school graduates, left the schools to find a better paying job. In fact very few schools had any teachers who had passed the level three test, designed for higher elementary school graduates. The local school inspector requested that the government publish Chinese language versions of the Japanese reader teacher manuals, since the teachers could not understand the Japanese-language instructions (Honkai Dōjin 1940, 53). As a result of such requests, beginning in 1942 Japanese language reader teacher manuals began including instructions in both Japanese and Chinese.

Under these conditions, language education in the elementary schools was doomed to failure. In November 1942 Ōide wrote the following about the situation:
The main problem is the lack of teachers. Looking across the continent, I can not be optimistic. In Manchukuo, ten years after its founding, and even with Japanese becoming a national language, elementary language education is in confusion and has achieved nothing. I do not even want to mention north China, central China, and the Mongolian areas . . . In Manchukuo they are working to train a large number of Manchurians as Japanese language teachers, but they have not been able to get enough students enough to fill the normal schools, and those that do enter are not good quality (Ôide 1942d, 47).

Post-war interviews with former students confirm that few were interested in learning Japanese, although some, recognizing that it was the key to advancing in school and finding a good job, did make an effort. Rumors of Japan’s eventual defeat, which would end the language’s usefulness, also acted to depress student interest (Komagome and Chô 1999, Qi 1997, Tanaka 2002, Takenaka 2003).

**Japanese language dissemination outside of the schools: Tests, officialdom, and Mango kana**

We now turn to government-sponsored efforts at spreading Japanese outside of the schools, government-sponsored training classes, the establishment of the language proficiency exam system, and the creation of Mango kana, a Chinese language phonetic orthographic system based on Japanese kana.

The government encouraged Japanese language competency for non-Japanese officials from the beginning. So-called “Self-rule training centers” were established in many of the major cities soon after the Manchurian Incident. In 1932 the state General Affairs Board unified these centers into a single state-run school named Datong Academy, which trained both Japanese and non-Japanese middle school graduates to be
government officials. The curriculum for non-Japanese students focused on the Japanese language and state ideology (Suzuki 1979, 23). Also, as early as 1932 the Ministry of Education and the Fengtian Provincial government created part-time language training seminars for non-Japanese officials. An Ministry of Education official claims that 770 officials signed up for its first course in 1932 (Wenjiang-bu 1932a, 29).

In June 1936 the General Affairs Board created a system of language proficiency tests designed to encourage government employees to learn one of the main Manchukuo languages besides their own, and rewarded those who passed with monthly bonuses. There were tests in Japanese, “Manchurian” (Chinese), and Mongolian, evaluating oral, listening, reading, and writing skills. For each language there were four levels of tests: special, first, second, and third, with third being the lowest (Yasuda 1997, 41). In 1938 the government reorganized the system, placing the Civil Affairs Ministry in charge of administering the tests, adding Russian as one of the language options, and allowing the general public, including students, to participate, rather than limiting it to government officials.

An apparent de facto restriction of the test was that Chinese, Mongols, and Russians could only take the Japanese-language test, not any other non-native language. Japanese, on the other hand, were free to take any of the other language tests. Koreans, considered Japanese subjects, could take the Chinese, Mongolian, or Russian tests, but not the Japanese test (Yasuda 1997, 41).

Ideally, the Japanese third level test represented mastery of the higher elementary school language curriculum, while the second level was equivalent to a middle school graduate’s ability. As mentioned above, however, language education
in the schools often failed to reach this ideal (Manshū Kokugo 9, January 1941, 34, Matsuo 1944, 10).

The government encouraged its officials to take the tests through a system of monthly bonuses. Those who passed level three, regardless of the language, received a bonus of six yen a month for one year. Level two resulted in a monthly ten yen bonus for two years, level one was monthly fifteen yen bonus for two years, and the special level resulted in a monthly twenty yen bonus for five years (Morita 1942, 81-82). For a teacher from Japan living in the capital Xinjing, whose salary averaged 133 in 1940, passing the third level test resulted in a bonus worth 5% of his or her monthly salary. For a non-Japanese teacher in the same city, receiving an average of 66 yen a month, the third level bonus was worth 9% of his or her salary. In 1938, when the test was opened to the general population, the government encouraged companies to award similar bonuses to their employees. The state central bank, for example, gave employees who passed the third level test a single 80 yen bonus, slightly higher than the government. A former student has reported that students at the middle schools who passed a level of the test were given silver stripes to wear on their uniforms as a sign of their achievement (Qi 1997, 228).

The first test was held in only fifteen major cities, but by the early 1940s the test was offered at sites in most counties as well as at Manchukuo consulates in Tokyo, Beijing, and Nanjing. From 1936 to 1943 over 170,000 non-Japanese took the Japanese language test, with over 17,000, or 10%, passing them. 42,000 Japanese and

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60 An individual could pass a level of the exam, and thus receive the bonus, only one time. To receive another bonus after the payment period of the first bonus ended they would have to pass the next level of the exam (Manshū Kokugo 9, January 1941: 31).
Koreans took Chinese language tests, with 6000 passing it. Only 3600 took the Russian test, with 390 passing, and 376 took the Mongolian test, with 66 passing (Shi 1993, 71, Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1937b).

As part of the added official emphasis on the Japanese language in 1938, new regulations made success on the language tests a requirement for certain kinds of bureaucratic promotions. Japanese who had passed a government promotion test in Japan, which did not include a foreign language requirement, however, were exempted from taking Manchukuo promotion tests. The result was a system which required non-Japanese to pass the language exams to gain promotion, but did not require language study of many of the Japanese. In 1943 the government further strengthened the emphasis on Japanese language competence by making language test success within a set time a requirement for continued employment for all non-Japanese provincial and central officials under the age of 40 (Yasuda 1997, 44-45, Manshū Kokugo 9, 1941, 36).

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61 By analyzing the names of those who passed the tests in 1936-1940, Yasuda Toshiaki has found that although more than three times as many Japanese as Koreans took the Chinese language test, more Koreans passed the two highest levels than did Japanese. This was probably due to the number of Koreans who had lived in China for a long period of time, and the strength of classical Chinese studies in Korean academies in the first half of the century (Yasuda 1993: 42-43).

62 The nature of this 1943 system is still unclear. One source calls the test they were required to take “level four”, suggesting that it was a simpler test than the previously lowest level three (Matsuo 1944: 10). The non-Japanese had three years to pass the test, but there is no known time limit for Japanese. Yasuda Toshiaki has estimated 100,000 officials passed this test in the closing years of the state (Yasuda 1997: 58).
The Manchukuo government, therefore, tried to encourage its non-Japanese officials to set the example for their countrymen by learning the Japanese language. Originally this encouragement was demonstrated by the bonus system, but gradually the stick, in the form of minimum requirements for employment, was applied along with the carrot. Unlike the colonial governments in Taiwan and Korea, however, the Manchukuo government also encouraged Japanese officials to learn one of the languages of the local population. Similarly, Chinese was taught in most elementary and middle schools for Japanese students, although for fewer hours than non-Japanese studied Japanese. Also, since good grades in the Chinese language courses were not required to advance to the next level of education, most Japanese students did not take the courses seriously (Takenaka 2003, 139). Japanese students and officials, therefore, were encouraged to study Chinese only with the carrot; there was no stick.

Manchukuo officials, as I have mentioned, usually called the Chinese language “Manchurian” (*J. Mango*, *C. Manyu*) as part of their efforts to encourage the Han Chinese to develop a new “Manchurian” consciousness and stop thinking of themselves as Chinese. One of the ways Japanese officials tried to separate the Chinese from their national heritage was their effort to create a new Chinese phonetic orthographic

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63 Pro-Manchukuo language scholars debated the establishment of a pronunciation standard for the language, especially after the government instituted the language proficiency exams. Several pointed out the dialect spoken in the Manchukuo capital Xinjing and Jilin City was similar to standard Beijing dialect, while the language spoken in Fengtian Province and the rest of the south was more similar to the Shandong dialect, since many immigrants from Shandong settled in the south. A secondary source claims the dialect spoken in the “Sungari river area,” which includes Xinjing, Jilin, and Harbin, was declared the national standard in 1944. However, the government appears to have never published a national dictionary or standard pronunciation guide (*Manshū Kokugo* 1, 52-53, Yasuda 1997: 46-47).
system based on Japanese *kana*, usually called the “*Mango kana*” plan. The plan was primarily the creation of Matsukawa Heihachi, who was, as noted above, a Japanese official passionate about written language reform. He saw the plan as a way to improve literacy, spread Japanese language and culture throughout the country, and keep out unwanted ideological messages. Some Chinese scholars have claimed that the system was an attempt to weaken the population’s Chinese character literacy, and therefore further separate the population from the rest of China. Although it is not clear that Matsukawa or others specifically intended the system as a wedge between Manchukuo and China, they certainly did intend for it to draw people closer into the Japanese cultural orbit. Unlike the debates over language reform and teaching Japanese spirit, this was a case in which the goal of education reformers and supporters of cultural assimilation worked together hand and hand.

For years there had been a variety of proposals for the creation of a Chinese language phonetic character system. Some of these used Latin characters, principally the Wade (or Wade-Giles) system. In 1918 group of scholars sponsored by the Chinese government created a system of phonetic characters now known as the National Phonetic System (which remains in use in Taiwan). In 1937 the Manchukuo government formed a phonetic characters research subcommittee under the previously mentioned Manchurian Language Investigation Committee. Although early on a majority of the committee members favored using a system based on either the National Phonetic System or a Latin system, Matsukawa called for a new plan based on Japanese

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64 The National Phonetic System was used in some 1933 textbooks published by Fengtian Province.
Education Department Director Minagawa endorsed Matsukawa’s proposal, and placed Matsukawa in charge of the effort to create the system.\(^65\)

The resulting plan, as described in a 1941 document, used only *katakana*, with no other special marks (although one document states that marks representing the four tones could also be used). Each syllable was to be expressed with four *kana* characters or less. Without going through the details of this complicated system, here are two examples: Fengtian (奉天): フォン テイアヌ, Manchukuo (満州国): マヌ チオウ ギウ.

At time of its public announcement in 1943, the government claimed the goal of the system was to assist in spreading literacy. They justified the decision to use *kana* rather than other accepted systems by pointing to the Japanese language’s position as a national language and *kana*’s historical connection with China.\(^66\)

\(^{65}\) In April 1937 Minagawa spoke of his opposition to systems that used the Latin alphabet, and in favor of limiting the number of standard Chinese characters (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1939: 41-42).

\(^{66}\) The official announcement read: “The complexity of Manchurian [Chinese] characters has made teaching and learning in our elementary schools for Manchurians difficult. Research on pronunciation characters has led the way in solving these problems. Anciently there were many ways to represent the sounds of Chinese characters, and in modern times there have been the Chinese Republic’s pronunciation marks, roman letters known as Wade-Giles, and Japanese *kana*. Research on Japanese *kana* has borne the most fruit. This is because: 1. Japanese is a Manchuko national language, and is taught in all the schools. Students have become familiar with the Japanese *kana* symbols, so they will be easy to remember. 2. *Kana* originated from Chinese characters, so they have a deep connection with those characters. Moreover, they can be freely written either horizontally or vertically. 3. *Kana* have been used since ancient times in East Asia. The characters are intended to be used as pronunciation symbols to assist in teaching and studying in our elementary schools for Manchurians. They are certainly not meant to eradicate Chinese characters. Rather, the main goal is to facilitate the memorization of
Although the plan’s official description denied any intention of trying to eliminate Chinese characters, its chief architect clearly did see such this as a long-term goal. Matsukawa, as has been mentioned, was a member of the first graduating class at the SMR teacher-training school Kyōsen, a hotbed of education reform thought. His former classmates described him as a lifelong language reformer, determined to eliminate the use of Chinese characters throughout East Asia, as he felt that they kept Japanese as well as Chinese culturally behind Westerners. Matsukawa’s ideas were rooted in Ueda Kazutoshi’s writings, and were not uncommon among contemporary Japanese language scholars.

With the establishment of Manchukuo, Matsukawa saw an opportunity to put his ideas into effect. By 1933 he joined the Concordia Association, the Manchukuo government’s main mass mobilization and social education organization, and also worked for several years in the state education bureaucracy. While working for these organizations he began developing his ideas for a Chinese-language kana system (Ryōnankai 1972, 234). In a 1941 newspaper article he wrote, “The system will save the majority of the Manchurian population from the consuming effort of memorizing so many characters. In the end there is no other way to plan for long term intellectual liberation of the people” (Yasuda 1997, 48).

Characters. At the same time, the illiterate masses and younger students at the elementary schools, through using kana alone, will be able to express their thoughts. In other words it is a step in learning Chinese characters, opening a new road for a portion of humanity, and will contribute to the cultural advancement of all Manchukuo’s people” (Shi 1993: 76-77).

67For example Tokyo Imperial University professor Hoshina Kōichi, a leader in the Japanese orthinagraphic reform movement, proposed in 1932 that Japan’s kana (Chinese characters) be replaced by kana (Hoshina 1932:3).
Matsukawa also defended his plan by claiming it could help spread Japanese culture to the Chinese people. At a 1938 conference of the Kanamoji-kai, a group dedicated to the elimination of kanji in Japan, Matsukawa said, “The most effective way of improving Manchukuo education efficiency and importing Japanese culture is to teach Japanese kana.” At that same conference the head of the reform group noted the pride different Asian ethnic groups had in their written languages, and the difficulty involved in divesting them of those systems. He stated that Japanese kana would be the best way to help them forget their own systems, and gradually introduce them to the Japanese language (Kurokawa 1938). Plans for creating kana systems for Mongolian, Malay, and Thai also appeared the Kanamoji-kai’s journal Kana no Hikari during the 1938-1945 period. Matsukawa and his reformist allies, therefore, saw the Manchukuo project as part of a greater effort to help create a united East Asian cultural zone through the phonetic kana characters. The marginalization of the various native written languages, and presumably the native cultures, appears to have been at most of little concern, and possibly even an unspoken goal of these efforts.

68 Many Chinese scholars, including Shi Gang, a scholar based in Japan, have claimed that the real intention of the plan was the eventual merger of the two languages into a new pidgin language, which they called “Kyōwa-go (cooperation language)” (Shi 1993: 78). The Japanese scholar Yasuda Tosihaki, on the other hand, maintains there is no evidence to back up this claim, and said the term “Kyōwa-go,” often used by Chinese scholars, had not yet been found in Manchukuo-era documents (Yasuda 1997: 52-53). I agree that it is very doubtful that the Mango Kana planners intended to create a single pidgin spoken language. However I have found the term “Kyōwa-go” used by Japanese educators in Manchukuo. In almost every case it was used pejoratively to describe the habit of some Japanese and Chinese to mix words from the two languages into one sentence. I did find one Japanese author, a middle school teacher, who used the term positively about the developing pidgenization, supporting of the idea of an eventual merging of the languages (Kawaguchi 1941). He was clearly in the minority among the Japanese on this issue, however.
Just as Matsukawa saw the system as actively working to spread the Japanese language and culture, he also recognized the defensive role the elimination of Chinese characters could play in keeping unwanted ideological messages from reaching the people. In another 1941 newspaper article Matsukawa described how the Soviet government, after the Russian Revolution, planned to create Latin alphabet systems for the languages of minority ethnic groups within the state and in nearby puppet governments. He described how by Latinizing the language of the Mongolian People’s Republic they “imported Red culture by opening up [the society] to the importation of many Russian words.” He thus linked Latinizing programs with communization—if the Soviets could successfully import their ideology to Mongolia through Latin characters, widespread use of Latin characters in Manchukuo could have the same result. “We need to unify the characters of all the ethnicities in East Asia through kana, completely scattering [the opposition],” he said (Yasuda 1997, 48, see also Matsukawa 1942). The Soviet example acted as both a warning of the role Western alphabets could play in the spreading dangerous Western ideas, and an example of the power of a unified empire-wide writing system.

Another situation of which Matsukawa may have been aware was French Indochina, where the French colonial authorities strongly encouraged the use of the Romanized Quoc Ngu transcription system for Vietnamese. By teaching this script, and discouraging the use of Chinese characters, the French hoped to cut the Vietnamese off from the education traditions of the private academies, which traditionally had served as centers of popular mobilization against the state when it became too oppressive (Kelly 1991).
The Concordia Association and the state education bureaucracy ran a series of experimental *Mango kana* lessons in schools and adult education facilities around the country from 1941 to 1943. In February 1944 the system was officially announced as the state’s sole Chinese language pronunciation system. It is not clear how widely the system was taught and applied, but it appears that it had not gotten far by the time the state ceased to exist in 1945.\(^69\) So far no Manchukuo government documents or school materials using the system have been discovered.\(^70\)

In the public sphere, as well as in the schools, the Manchukuo government never made a major effort to force the majority ethnic groups to abandon their native languages. Not only that, it encouraged a moderate degree of Chinese language study among the Japanese settler population, and developed a plan to boost rudimentary Chinese language literacy. From at least 1937 on, however, it made perfectly clear which language was favored—Japanese. Japanese officials and educators of almost all stripes, reformists and nativists, agreed on this point, and worked to encourage increased Japanese language use throughout the country.

**Conclusion**

This chapter discusses the debates among Japanese colonial official and educators about the proper content of colonial schools. Clearly there was a diversity of opinion among these men, a diversity tolerated by the colonial governments. In Manchukuo, the relatively liberal education leadership was able to keep extreme

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\(^69\) In 1945 two linguists, 林雪光 (I am not sure if this person is Japanese or Chinese) and Kuraishi Mushirō, wrote articles analyzing and ultimately opposing the *Mango kana* system on practical grounds (Yasuda 1997: 51).

\(^70\) In 1945 two linguists, 林雪光 (I am not sure if this person is Japanese or Chinese) and Kuraishi Mushirō, wrote articles analyzing and ultimately opposing the *Mango kana* system on practical grounds (Yasuda 1997: 51).
Japanese nationalistic material to a minimum, and also found the room to try out a variety of reforms. By 1943, however, this freedom began to disappear, and Manchukuo education increasingly resembled Tennōsei education throughout the empire.

Throughout the Manchukuo period, however, regardless of shifts in government policy, the educators failed to stir much interest in Japanese among the people. Nor were they able to inspire many locals to become active allies in the Japanese cause. In 1942 Ōide Masayoshi, speaking to a group of Japanese language teachers, expressed his doubts that the people of Manchukuo would ever desire to learn the Japanese language, and thereby become partners in Japan’s efforts in building the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

We have been teaching Japanese in Manchukuo for ten years, and we have had the advantage of the experiences of the SMR schools which existed for decades before. We should have seen success by now. Today’s results are not good, and there is no indication that it will ever get better, no matter how long we try. I would be glad if I was wrong, but we are not that lucky. Can any of you teachers who have experienced the situation tell me I am wrong? (Ōide 1942a, 51).

Post-war interviews with former Manchukuo students have confirmed Ōide’s pessimism. The state succeeded to a only a very limited degree in its “negative” goal, of preventing Chinese children from gaining a sense of themselves as Chinese, through a combination of censorship, repression, and rewards. They failed, however, in the more “optimistic” goals of the 1938 system, which included fostering among the Chinese an enthusiasm for learning the Japanese language, leading to their “true” understanding of Japan and the righteousness of its cause, and finally their assumption
of Japan’s state goals as their own. The inequality of the state’s social situation and the very oppression that kept Chinese nationalist messages out taught them that the Japanese were not their friends. The switch toward emphasizing the Japanese language and State Shintō ceremonies only deepened popular cynicism toward the Manchukuo state. Idealistic optimism in the power of the Japanese language was another case of Japanese overconfidence in Japanese national spirit, which contributed to the Japanese government’s disastrous imperial over-extension and inability cut their losses throughout the 1937-1945 period.
Chapter 5
Textbooks and the struggle over Manchurian identity

The Manchukuo government worked to create a Manchurian consciousness in the minds of its students in two places, the school curriculum and school ceremonies. The bulk of this chapter is dedicated to an examination of the school curriculum for Chinese students through an analysis of the content of Manchukuo’s elementary and middle school Chinese language studies, Japanese language studies, morals, and history textbooks. Nowhere does the Manchukuo government give a clearer picture of what it hoped the rising generation would think and believe than in these textbooks. The main themes taught in the textbooks changed several times over Manchukuo’s history because of changes in the state ideology and changes in the education bureaucracy’s personnel. The first image of a model Manchukuo citizen portrayed a young person steeped in Confucian morals, aware of the region’s dual Chinese and independent heritage, and friendly to Japan. Over time the central themes changed to loyalty to the Manchukuo Emperor and the state, and recognizing the greatness of Japan and the Japanese, while the emphasis on Confucianism, Chinese culture, and the region’s independent history faded.

The original ideals never completely disappeared, however, and textbooks as late as 1943 continued to portray Manchukuo as a unique state with a culture at least to some degree independent from Japan. Other textbooks, on the other hand, closely resembled those published in Korea during the height of cultural assimilation. Differences in emphasis between Manchukuo textbooks of the same era indicate differences within the government over the messages they wanted to present.
Methods and objects of study

The purpose of this study is to discover what ideological messages the Manchukuo government intended to pass on to the country’s elementary and middle school children. Public schools are a prime location for a government to influence society and culture by creating a shared experience for a generation of children. By looking at the textbooks, we can see the nature of the “citizen consciousness” they tried to teach—what they wanted the children to understand about the country and their role as citizens (or, after 1934, subjects). Also, what messages about the country’s culture did they disseminate? What was the source of the materials used in the schools; did they hope to see Manchukuo society develop based on Chinese precedents, Japanese precedents, or something unique to the region?

To explore these questions, I have focused my analysis on how much each textbook refers to the state (both Manchukuo and Japan), and what messages are presented in these references. I look at how many references are made to China and Chinese individuals, Japan and Japanese individuals, and people and places unique to the Manchurian region, to determine the degree to which students were encouraged to identify with these cultures.

I also break the textbooks into groups based on categories created by scholars in their analyses of contemporary textbooks in Japan and Korea, to facilitate comparisons with those works. For example, following the lead of Lee Jung-su’s study of Japan and Korea textbooks, I categorize each chapter in the Japanese language studies and Chinese language studies textbooks into one of three categories: practical, national, and literary (Lee 2000). I further divide these categories into twelve sub-categories. The “practical” category is subdivided into chapters on lifestyle
(including family, home, play, and traditional events), vocation, society and school, and science and nature. The “national” category is divided into chapters on the state, military, history, and geography. The “literary” category is divided into chapters which contain fictional stories and fables, historical stories (which do not have a strong tie to the state), poetry, and miscellaneous literary subjects (including dramas, grammar lessons, and letter writing practice).

I am particularly interested in the “national” chapters. I have created my own sub-division of the “national” category, which I call “hard state”. Hard state chapters are those which present strongly ideological messages about the creation, legitimacy, and requirements of both the Manchukuo and Japan states. These include chapters about the Emperors, including their mythological ancestors, descriptions of military life or war, depictions of state symbols such as the flag, and discussion of the people’s obligations to the state, such as payment of taxes. The “hard state” category is similar to the “imperial” category used in Chapter 4, except that it includes state-centered material about Manchukuo as well as Japan. Chapters that are “national” but not “hard state” include chapters on the country’s geography and historical chapters which are not linked to the state’s foundation or Imperial house.

In my analysis of the morals textbooks, I use a system of categories which Karasawa Tomitarō developed for his 1956 study of textbooks in Japan. He divides the chapters thematically into those that teach about individual morals, family morals, society morals, state morals, and international morals (Karasawa 1956).

There were four clearly defined periods of Manchukuo textbook publication, and one of those eras can be broken down further into two sub-periods. The first, or transition period, went from the founding of the state in March 1932 to September 1934.
During this time the government instructed schools to use textbooks published by the SMR, Fengtian Provincial government, traditional Chinese classics, or Chinese Republican textbooks with offending portions removed. It is very difficult to know what textbooks were used during this period, so I have not tried to analyze those I have found.\[71\] The second period begins in September 1934, when the first Ministry of Education textbooks were published, until the end of 1937. I divide the 1934-1937 textbooks into two groups: 1) those published in 1934, before Pu Yi’s Spring 1935 state visit to Japan and the subsequent change in state ideology toward a greater emphasis on unity with Japan, and 2) those published afterward in late 1935 (as well as a few published in 1937). Copies of almost all of the 1934-1937 textbooks are available for analysis. The third, or \textit{Shingakusei} (new education system) period, began in January 1938 and ended in 1942. Because of radical changes in the school system and

\[71\] Besides textbooks published by the SMR, Fengtian Provincial government, and traditional Chinese classics, schools also used Chinese Republican textbooks with anti-Japanese and pro-Guomindang sections removed. One Chinese normal school teacher reports that he had to ink out the sections of the textbooks that used the words “imperialism” or “national shame” to refer to Japanese actions on the continent (Qi 1997, 100). The textbook editing department for the SMR and Kwantung Territory schools kept careful records of what texts published in China contained anti-Japanese and other objectionable material, so the Manchukuo Ministry of Education probably used reports from that department as a guide during the state’s first years (Takenaka 2000a, 141-142). In 1935 the ministry published its own report documenting which texts from China were approved, as well as documenting which pages of non-approved texts were objectionable, presumably so teachers could ink those sections out (Wenjiao-bu 1935d).

The SMR Chinese language textbooks were originally published for the SMR schools in 1931 and 1932. I have not yet examined them. The Fengtian Provincial Education Department edited at least nine of its own Chinese language texts in 1932. I examined one Fengtian Provincial textbook written for higher elementary schools, and was surprised to find no mention of Japan at all, even in a chapter about the Manchurian Incident and the founding of the country.
curriculum in 1938, the government had to create a completely new set of textbooks for the elementary and middle schools. Some of the textbooks published in the first part of this period were revised in 1941-1942. Terada was the supervisor of textbook editing for most of this period. The amount of state-centered and pro-Japanese material in many of these textbooks increased significantly over the 1934-1937 textbooks, although a few subjects remained largely propaganda-free, even after the commencement of the Pacific War. Unfortunately, less than half the textbooks published during this period are known to have survived. The final period began in 1943, when the government ordered a complete revision of all textbooks to more closely reflect the state’s wartime goals. Because of wartime conditions, including a paper shortage, very few textbooks were actually published during this period, and I have found only two to analyze.

The first textbooks to be analyzed are those published in 1934 and 1935, starting with those created for Chinese language studies (guowen).

*Chinese language studies in Republican China and Japan’s colonies*

Manchukuo Chinese language education was a confluence of two traditions: the region’s previous Republican-era language education, and Japan’s native language education policies in Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria.

China’s education system went through a series of major changes in the period from 1912 to 1931. Emerging from an age dominated by private schools focused on traditional literary studies, the central and provincial governments began to introduce math, science, vocational studies, and foreign languages into the elementary and middle school curriculums. Chinese literary studies continued to act as the central course of
study, however, taking up over half of the total recommended school hours during first 10 years of the Republic. In 1922, during the May 4th movement, China’s Ministry of Education instructed schools to de-emphasize Confucian materials, especially in the early grades, and instead use materials which reflected the modern “Republican spirit” and which were written in colloquial Chinese (*baihua*). The Ministry of Education did not publish its own textbooks during this period, although it did approve privately published textbooks. In the northeast Zhang Xueliang allied himself with the Guomindang in 1928, and schools in Northeast China began using texts which reflected the Guomindang ideology, including criticism of Japanese and Western imperialism.

In Taiwan the Japanese encouraged the study of traditional Confucian texts in the first decades of colonial rule, but in 1922 considerably scaled back Chinese language study to two hours a week, and schools began banning students speaking Chinese at any other time in the schools. The Japanese did not encourage the study of modern *baihua* texts in the Taiwan schools. In 1937 the study of Chinese language texts was completely eliminated from Taiwan schools. In Korea the study of Chinese and Korean language texts was combined into a single subject, with Chinese taking up the majority of the time. This non-Japanese language study took up 23% of the total school hours in elementary school, a higher total than in Taiwan. Like Taiwan, however, in 1938 the Korean colonial government instituted a major cut in non-Japanese language instruction, limiting Korean language courses to the 1st grade.

In SMR railway zone and Kwantung Territory schools before the Manchurian Incident, Japanese administrators bowed to the local political reality and gave a much larger percentage of school-hours to native language education. This was particularly true in the SMR-run schools, where all classes, except for Japanese language studies,
were taught in the students’ native language. Putting aside the question of schools for Koreans, the regulations for Chinese-language SMR schools declared that Chinese language studies would amount to 36% of the total school time in 1914, 35-42% in 1923, and 42% in 1931 (Takenaka 2000a, 143-147). They also followed the Chinese Ministry of Education’s 1922 switch in policy toward a greater use of *baihua* texts featuring modern individuals and themes. The SMR schools used texts published in Shanghai until 1931, when the increasing amount of anti-Japanese material in the texts created the need to publish their own unique Chinese language studies texts.

*Manchukuo textbooks in 1934-1937*

There are widely varying reports on how many hours a week students were to spend in Chinese language studies in elementary and middle schools during the 1932-1937 period. Plans drawn up in 1931 by the SMR Economic Research Group and in 1932 by the Fengtian and Jilin provincial education departments called for an amount nearly identical to that taught in Chinese Republican and SMR schools. Ministry of Education descriptions of the 1934 and 1935 Chinese language studies textbooks, however, recommended a large cut in Chinese language study hours, nearly half of the 1931-1932 plans, with the additional hours taken up in part by increased science and Japanese language instruction hours. A 1937 Education Department document indicates that the officials had adjusted the Chinese language recommended hours upwards to a position half-way between the 1931-1932 plans and the 1934-1935 recommendations.
Table 5.1: Recommended number of weekly hours of Chinese language class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Grades 1-2</th>
<th>Grades 3-4</th>
<th>Grades 5-6</th>
<th>Grades 7-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931-1932 plans (SMR, Fengtian, Jilin) Percentage of total hours</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>36-48%</td>
<td>24-31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934-1935 textbook prospectus Percentage of total hours</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4 (6)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>13 (19)%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937 regulations Percentage of total hours</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7 (9)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>22 (28)%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1934-1935 and 1937 curriculum descriptions included an additional two hours a week of readings in the Chinese classics in Higher Elementary grades 5-6. The hours in parentheses indicate the inclusion of these hours (Wenjiao-bu 1932a, 47, 74, Minami Manshū Tetsudō 1935, 86-89, Wenjiao-bu 1935a, 76, Wenjiao-bu 1936b, 11, Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1937c, 35-37).

The Manchukuo Ministry of Education produced eighteen Chinese language studies texts for lower elementary, higher elementary, and lower middle schools in two stages, the first four lower elementary and all lower middle school texts in September 1934, and the last four lower elementary and all higher elementary texts in December 1935. The 1934 and 1935 Chinese language studies textbooks are significantly different in tone and character. The 1934 textbooks rarely mentioned the state, either Japan or Manchukuo. When they did, it was in the context of the Confucian ideal of wangdao (the kingly way). The 1935 textbooks contained much more ideological material and often made positive references to Japanese people and institutions. These differences in all likelihood stem from changes both in the official state ideology and in the Ministry of Education leadership in the intervening years.

In the spring of 1935 Pu Yi, the Manchukuo Emperor, made his first state visit to Japan, and upon his return issued the Huiluan Rescript, written by his Japanese advisors. In it, Pu Yi expressed devotion and loyalty to the Japanese Emperor, and
announced that the government and people of Manchukuo should strive in all things to be united “in one heart and one spirit” with Japan, as he was with the Japanese Emperor. The rescript was intended to play the same role in Manchukuo that the Rescript on Education played in Japan, recited in schools daily as well as at other public events. It signaled a major change in the tenor of the ideological messages produced by the state toward a greater emphasis on pro-Japanese material.

Parallel to these ideological changes was a change in the Japanese personnel at the Ministry of Education. I believe Kamimura Tetsuya and Zheng Xiaoxu were the moving forces behind the 1934 textbooks. Kamimura led the ministry’s School Affairs section from its creation until March 1935. As discussed in Chapter 2, Kamimura had stated in a 1932 pamphlet distributed to Chinese teachers that he was opposed to emphasizing ideological and “narrowly nationalistic” messages in education, as he felt occurred in both Republican China and Japan, and said education should instead teach children how to think for themselves (Wenjiao-bu 1932b, 238, 240).

The two officials in charge of textbook editing under Kamimura were Iwama Tokuya and Nagahama Yoshitsuna. Iwama was the dean of Japanese-run education for Chinese in Manchuria; he had been the principal of the Nankin Academy in the Kwantung Territory since 1905. Iwama was known as a maverick in the Manchuria education world; he often clashed with the Japanese territorial leadership, but was very popular with the local Chinese population. He refused to teach Japanese language courses for as many hours as called for in the territorial regulations, and instead constructed a curriculum mixing traditional Confucian moral education and modern vocational training, all taught in Chinese (Tsukinoki 1982, 82-87). Kamimura also brought in Nagahama, a fellow Kagoshima native, who had been a girls’ middle school
teacher in Japan. Not much is known about him, but since Kamimura sponsored him, it can be presumed that he shared his superior’s New Education movement views. Kamimura, Iwama, and Nagahama were just of the few ministry officials with local and New Education movement ties in the years from 1932 to 1934.

Zheng, a conservative Confucian scholar skeptical of modernizing reforms, including the Chinese *baihua* colloquial language movement, patriotic nationalism, and urbanism, was one of the creators of the *wangdao* ideology of the early Manchukuo period. He appears to have played an influential role in the ministry; he visited the ministry offices once a week, and installed several of his Chinese disciples in ministry positions. Two Japanese officials in the ministry in the 1932-1934 period, who were former SMR educators, spoke very highly of Zheng and his disciples, so there appears to have been a good relationship between those two camps (Ryōnankai 1972, 197, Tsukinoki 1993, 176-177).

In late 1934 and early 1935 many of the former-SMR and New Education movement education officials left the central education bureaucracy, in part because of a rivalry with officials who came from the Japanese Ministry of Education (Monbusho). In early 1935 the powerful General Affairs Board, in a bid to gain control over the Ministry, dismissed the leadership of both the “local (SMR)” and “Monbusho” factions. By summer Kamimura, Iwama, and Nagahama had all left the ministry. Prime Minister Zheng was also forced into retirement in May 1935, and his Chinese disciples appear to have left the ministry around that same time. The incoming education leadership was made mostly of non-educators with strong ties to the General Affairs Board and little experience in the region. Inagaki Shigeichi became head of the textbook department in August 1935, and remained there until June 1937. I have not
been able to find any information about his background, except that he had no previous experience in Manchukuo. As for the remaining Chinese officials, there is no indication that any wielded the kind of influence in the ministry that Zheng had after his retirement.

The 1934 textbooks were a collaboration between Kamimura’s group and Zheng’s Chinese officials. Within Chinese language studies they seem to have divided the job of textbook editing, with the Japanese officials in charge of the elementary school textbooks and the Chinese officials in charge of the middle school textbooks. The four lower elementary school Chinese language studies textbooks published in 1934 were very similar to textbooks edited previously by the SMR, and nothing like elementary school readers then being produced in China, as I will discuss below. The six lower middle school Chinese language studies textbooks published that same year, however, were very traditional in character. Each was made up entirely of classical language stories and essays written in pre-modern times, from the ancient Zhou period up to the reign of Qing Tongshi (1862-1874). None of the chapters were written by Japanese, there was no mention of Japan, and there was no attempt to select stories set in the Manchuria region. An ethnic Han student who attended middle school in Liaoyang City beginning in 1937 reports that the middle school Chinese language studies textbooks were:

very complex and systematic. They gave the students a good understanding of classic Chinese literature, but did not teach anything about modern literature. They included nothing from the cultural reforms of the May 4th movement; Lu Xun and Hu Shih were forbidden (Qi 1997, 126).
The 1935 textbooks, published after the purge of the SMR/New Education movement Japanese and the Zheng-affiliated Chinese, were significantly different from the 1934 textbooks. The Ministry of Education’s goals for the textbooks, as stated in a ministry-published prospectus, show how in the 1935 texts they moved away from the accent on the founding principles of *wangdao* and ethnic harmony, focused on the state rather than the citizen, and emphasized Japan to a much greater degree. The 1934 prospectus said the texts would teach students how “to be citizens of the new state . . . including the pure principles of the state’s founding and of *wangdao*”. The 1935 prospectus did not mention *wangdao*, but instead spoke of teaching students to understand the state’s “national polity” (*C. guoti*, *J. kokutai*), a term closely tied to contemporary Japanese political ideology. The 1934 prospectus emphasized the importance of using materials full of local flavor, which would appeal to the students. It also spoke of the importance of teaching ethnic harmony. The 1935 prospectus did not mention using local materials or teaching ethnic harmony, but did insist that Chinese language studies, along with the morals curriculum, were the subjects most appropriate for teaching “loyalty to the monarch and national patriotism”. Finally, while the 1934 prospectus said nothing about Japan, the 1935 prospectus stated the texts must “deepen the students’ understanding of Japan, teach about Japan and Manchukuo’s unbreakable relationship, and the *Huiluan* Rescript”. The students, it continued, “must understand the spirit, customs, and ways of the Japanese people” (*Wenjiao-bu* 1935a, 76, *Wenjiao-bu* 1936b, 11).

Table 5.2 breaks down the chapters of the 1934 and 1935 Chinese language studies textbooks in terms of themes, settings, and individuals. First the content of the 1934 textbooks will be examined.
Table 5.2. Themes, settings, and individuals in the 1934-1935 Chinese language studies textbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practical</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard State</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan related</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo related</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo state</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo geography</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Manchukuo</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique individuals (frequency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Manchurians”</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>5 (9)</td>
<td>6 (7)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>17 (18)</td>
<td>18 (21)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>19 (22)</td>
<td>21 (25)</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westerners</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>2 (2)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The editors of the first and second grade Chinese language studies texts, probably influenced by the SMR and New Education movement, tried to appeal to children by using humorous materials and familiar settings, including scenes of Chinese domestic life, school, and nature, as well as children’s stories and fables. They tried to teach Chinese pronunciation through rhythmic and poetic passages, repeating a line several times with slight variations. They used only colloquial Chinese, and illustrated nearly every page of the texts. They used as their models the Chinese language texts created by the SMR for its own Chinese language schools in 1931-1932. The contemporary settings, humor, and rhythmic patterns of the SMR texts were a significant break from contemporary Chinese textbooks (Takenaka 2000a, 143-147).

*Image of Manchukuo and Japan:* 8.0% of the chapters contain national material, and only 2.0% of the chapters contain “hard state” material. Only one of the national chapters refers to Japan, describing the role Japanese troops played in the Manchurian Incident. The rest refer to Manchukuo, including a scene of villagers cheering a military squad passing through the town, a brief description of the founding of the country, a chapter on the national anthem, and a chapter on the Manchukuo flag. Pu Yi is mentioned only once, while the Japanese Emperor is not mentioned at all.

*Image of China:* The textbooks briefly touch on traditional Chinese culture. There is one chapter which shows students bowing reverently in a shrine to Confucius, although nothing about his teachings are mentioned, while another gives a short synopsis of the life of Mencius. Four other Chinese historical figures, all scholars and poets, are also mentioned, usually as part of a story or fable. Most of these individuals were identified by the dynastic period in which they lived, not as “Chinese”. In fact,
the texts used no versions of the words “China” or “Chinese”. This is an early indication of a concept implicitly taught by textbook editors throughout the history of Manchukuo education, that while the Manchuria region had its own independent history separate from China, it also claimed all pre-Republic Chinese history and culture as part of its own cultural heritage. This concept can also be seen in the lower middle school Chinese language studies textbooks published at the same time, which were made up entirely of Chinese pre-modern materials.

One other interesting aspect of the 1934 elementary school texts is the prominence given to girls. The school scenes are almost always shown as coeducational, including a picture of the students playing basketball, and girls in general appear in as many illustrations as do boys. One chapter portrays a girl asking her older brother for help reading a book. When the brother asks why, she says that while in the past few girls learned to read, in present times all girls should become educated. Ministry officials clearly intended to encourage increased acceptance of girls receiving an elementary education. The number of girls in elementary schools did increase during the Manchukuo period, although not dramatically, from 18% of the total in 1933 to 24% in 1942 (Minsei-bu 1938, 10, Wenjiao-bu 1944, 10).

**1935 elementary school Chinese language studies textbooks**

The 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th grade Chinese language studies textbooks, edited in 1935 after the purge of SMR and Zheng-associated officials, contain significantly different content from the 1934 textbooks. They are much more state-centered, including a large increase in material about Manchukuo and Japan. National and hard state material rose from 8% and 2% in the 1934 1st and 2nd texts (and none at all in the
7th-9th grade texts) to 45% and 13% in the 1935 3rd and 4th grade texts and 35% and 15% in the 1935 5th and 6th grade texts. Material about Manchukuo and Japan rose dramatically, while the number of child-centered chapters (those about the family, school, and nature) decreased, as did the number of chapters with poetry and children’s stories, as might be expected in higher-level texts.

*Image of Manchukuo:* The 1935 textbooks constitute a concerted effort by the Ministry of Education at encouraging elementary school students to gain a consciousness of the Manchukuo state by presenting a variety of state symbols and lauding past notables from the region. Material about Manchukuo rose from 8% in the 1934 lower elementary textbooks to 39% in the 1935 lower elementary and 14% in the 1935 higher elementary textbooks.

Pu Yi, the Manchukuo Emperor, is mentioned six times in the 1935 Chinese language texts. He is the central focus of a chapter in a 6th grade textbook, which portrayed him in Confucian terms as an ideal *wang dao* ruler, an image typical of the first years of the state, but rarely seen after 1935. It depicts Pu Yi as answering the pleas of the people to become the head of state, and succeeding by following the maxim “follow the mandate of heaven and bring peace to the people”, a commonly used phrase in the early years of the state. It presents him as charitable man, distributing food to Manchukuo peasants in need, and also sending relief to Japan after a fire in Hakodate in 1934. It also presents him as educated and informed, reading a variety of newspapers and other periodicals to keep up with world events. The chapter does not, however, mention the Emperor’s ties to Japan, or present his legitimacy as deriving from the Japanese Emperor, as government publications after 1937 invariably did.
Other state symbols employed by the 1935 Chinese language studies textbooks include the Manchukuo national flag, the national anthem, and the Imperial Palace. The texts frequently mention the importance of March 1st, a national holiday marking the founding of the state in 1932. Examples of how the people should celebrate the day are provided, and the celebrations are linked to commemorations of Japanese and “Manchurian” soldiers who died in the defense of the country.

Besides references to the short history of the Manchukuo state, the 1935 textbooks include a considerable number of references to the pre-modern history of Manchuria apparently in an attempt to forge a consciousness of a continuous independent history of the region. The Chinese language studies texts acted as auxiliary material in this effort to the higher elementary Manchukuo history textbook, published in 1934, which I will discuss later in the chapter. 9% of the 1935 lower elementary texts and 5% of the higher elementary texts are specifically about the region’s pre-modern history, and many of the geography chapters also comment on the pre-modern history of cities, geographic sites, or castles in the region. The pre-modern history chapters usually discussed the history of dynasties and khanates led by non-Han peoples who were independent of the southern ethnic Han dynasties, some of which won control over parts or all of what today is known as China. These included the Parhae (or Bohai) (705-926), Liao (907-1119), Yuan (1279-1368), and especially the Qing (1644-1911) dynasties.

Over half the chapters on the region’s pre-modern history were about the Qing, presumably because Pu Yi was the last Qing emperor, and therefore positive portrayals of the dynasty helped to legitimize his reign and strengthen the argument for Manchuria as a historically separate region. The materials include two chapters on the legendary
roots of the Manchu people and the Qing ruling house. Both refer to Mt. Zhangbai (Long White Mountain), the tallest mountain in the region, which Qing rulers revered as the cradle of the Manchu people. One chapter lauds the character and military abilities of Qing Shunzhi, the first Qing emperor, and four chapters mention Qing Kangxi, the second Qing emperor. One of the Kangxi chapters describes him in terms of a powerful military leader who was also concerned with the welfare of his people. Another relates a poem he wrote while on a tour of Manchuria, describing several of its sites, including Mt. Zhangbai.

Besides Mt. Zhangbai, the textbook editors portray another Qing historical site as a sacred space, the tombs of the Qing emperors near Fengtian city. Three chapters describe the tombs, one of which tells a story set during the days of the Boxer Rebellion, in which Russian troops stationed in Fengtian were dissuaded from destroying the tombs by an elderly Manchu man who pledged to defend the site with his life. Twice chapters about the tombs are immediately followed by chapters on the Meiji Shrine, which may have been an attempt by the editors to draw a parallel between the Manchurian and Japanese imperial sacred spaces. Other Qing-themed chapters include one on the Willow Palisades and one on the palaces in Rehe.

Other chapters on the region’s history include one on the Parhae kingdom, which is treated as a cultural antecedent to Manchukuo because of its active diplomatic and trade relations with the Japanese court at Nara. Another describes the military victories of Genghis Khan, ending with the claim “he is one of the great heroes among the ancestors of our country,” thus showing the editors’ intent to include Mongol as well as Manchu history in the state’s heritage. Other include a story about a Liao empress, a description of an ancient statue of Buddha, and two stories about ethnic Han individuals.
who went to live in the Manchuria region, one in order to escape conflict in the south, and the other because of economic opportunity. These final two stories may have been included to show that the region welcomed ethnic Han looking for peace and prosperity.

Another aspect of the textbook editors’ creation of a consciousness of Manchukuo was the large number of chapters on Manchukuo geography. Manchukuo geography was the theme of 27% of the 1935 lower elementary chapters, up from 3% in the 1934 lower elementary texts. Only 8% of the 1935 higher elementary texts were about Manchukuo geography, but this drop can be explained by the fact that there was a separate geography curriculum and textbook in the higher elementary schools. The geography materials included chapters on most of the country’s major cities, railroads, rivers, and mountains. They also include chapters on a variety of natural resources, and descriptions of the country’s largest coal mine and iron works. Two of the chapters describe the daily lives of contemporary Mongol herdsman.

*Image of Japan:* The amount of material which mentions Japan or Japanese people increased sharply from 1% in the 1934 lower elementary textbooks to an average of 21% in the 1935 lower and higher elementary textbooks. Of the 1935 chapters which mention Japan, about one fifth contain only passing references. Another fifth describe Japan’s geography. Most of the remainder are stories about individual Japanese, both pre-modern and modern. A total of 35 Japanese appear in the 1935 texts, far more than the 11 “Manchurians”, although equal to the number of Chinese. Twelve of the Japanese individuals, or a third of the total, were Confucian scholars from the Tokugawa period, perhaps presented to show Japan shared a cultural heritage with Manchukuo. Among the remaining Japanese were imperial officials, samurai, and modern warriors.
Two of the most strongly emphasized messages about Japan in the textbooks are the Japanese people’s loyalty to their emperors and their martial ethic. Japanese emperors themselves are the center of only a few chapters, but many other chapters describe the actions of loyal subordinates who served their imperial lords with devotion. These include two chapters on the Heian-era official Sugawara Michizane, which emphasize his continuing devotion to his emperor even while he was in exile and several stories about samurai warriors loyal to the emperors during the Kemmu Restoration and Bakumatsu periods. There are also five chapters about Japan’s modern military strength and the devotion of its soldiers, mostly set in the Russo-Japanese War. These include stories about victorious naval officers Commander Hirose and Admiral Togo, and the self-sacrificing army officers Lieutenant Colonel Tachibana and Captain Sakuma, all of whom regularly appeared in textbooks in Japan from 1910 to 1945. The respect and affection the Japanese felt for their military heroes is described in two chapter, one of which compares soldiers to cherry blossoms, and another about the Yasukuni Shrine. Clearly the editors wrote the chapters intending to impress the students with the greatness of the Japanese character and to encourage them to follow that example by becoming devoted to their own emperor and willing to sacrifice their own lives in his defense if necessary.

Shintoism and the Japanese myths are not emphasized in the textbooks, although there is one chapter on the Ise Shrine, which briefly mentions the sun goddess Amaterasu, and chapters about the Meiji and Yasukuni Shrines. These chapters focus on the architecture and beauty of the shrines, rather than describing their ceremonial aspects. There are two chapters about Mt. Fuji, one of which came almost directly after a chapter about the Mt. Zhangbai. This may have been an attempt to link the
sacred mountains of the two countries, similar to the connection made between the Qing
tombs and the Meiji Shrine.

Another aspect of the image of Japan in these textbooks are the chapters which
described in positive terms Japanese exploring or living in the Asian mainland. One
chapter tells about Mamiya Rinzo, a samurai sent by the Tokugawa shogunate to
explore the islands known today as Hokkaido and Sakhalin. The chapters relates how
in the course of his travels he landed at the mouth of the Amur River on the Asian
mainland and explored an area near what eventually became the border between Russia
and Manchukuo, enjoying friendly relations with the native peoples he encountered.
Another chapter tells the (probably apocryphal) story of Yamada Nagamasu, a merchant
in the early Edo period who traveled to Siam. The chapter relates how he became the
head of the Japanese merchant community in the Siam capital, and eventually became a
military advisor to the king during a time of civil war.

As for the modern era, a chapter tells the story of a SMR station master who
gave his life rescuing an elderly Chinese woman and child who had strayed onto the
railroad tracks. Another tells the story of Hirose Takeo, one of the heroes of the
Russo-Japanese War, describing how he prepared for his victories through careful study
of the Russian language and Manchurian terrain while living in the region before the
war. These chapters praise Japanese in Asia for their pro-active spirit, and may have
been intended to show a long history of positive Japanese involvement in the continent,
thus justifying current Japanese actions.

*Image of China:* Chinese individuals appear as often as Japanese in the 1935
Chinese language studies textbooks. A total of 34 Chinese individuals appear 43 times
in the 1935 textbooks, not counting the Qing emperors and other northern peoples who
the textbooks treat as “Manchurian”. This is about the same as the number of Japanese in the textbooks. Unlike the chapters on Japan and the Japanese, however, these chapters are almost all about pre-modern China. With these chapters the editors strive to claim Chine’s cultural heritage for Manchukuo, while for the most part ignoring the modern Chinese state.

The people who appear most frequently are ancient sages—seven individuals who appear ten times—with Confucius and Mencius mentioned the most often. Military heroes from the Three Kingdoms and Song periods also are frequently referred to, and there are three chapters telling the story of the fictional female warrior Mulan. Poets and authors are featured seven times, usually as a way of introducing a quoted piece of their literature. The only chapter that features a modern person is a Horatio Alger-type story about Xia Wenjing, a diligent orphan who eventually graduates from medical school and becomes a successful doctor. The chapter does not say whether Xia is from intramural China or Manchuria.

The higher elementary textbooks also include several chapters on Chinese geography, particularly mentioning sacred mountains. The chapters on China are limited to natural landmarks, and there is no discussion of the cities of China, as opposed to the many chapters on the cities of Manchukuo. Finally, a number of chapters condemn what the editors saw as harmful social practices in China, such as foot-binding and opium smoking.

To summarize, the 1935 elementary school Chinese language studies textbooks featured a sharp increase in the number of chapters about the governments, geographies, and histories of Japan and Manchukuo. Many of the chapters taught reverence to the countries’ imperial rulers, and lauded the exploits of past military men, particularly
those from Japan. They taught the principle of Manchuria as an independent region from ancient times, which had a long history of contact with Japan. Although Japan was not presented as having dominance over Manchukuo, many examples of Japanese conduct and attitudes were held up as models for the Manchukuo students. The editors also introduced aspects of Chinese history as part of their cultural heritage, although almost nothing was taught about the modern Chinese state. One should keep in mind, however, that the Chinese language studies courses were taught almost entirely by Chinese teachers. There were few teachers from Japan in Manchukuo elementary schools, and those that were there for the most part taught the Japanese language classes and spoke little Chinese. Presumably most of the Chinese teachers had little previous knowledge of Japanese culture and history, and many may have harbored anti-Japanese sentiments. It is doubtful, therefore, that many of them taught the chapters on Japan with much conviction.

**Manchukuo morals textbooks**

The morals curriculum was taught for one hour a week throughout elementary and middle schools in the period from 1934 to 1937, with one textbook used for each grade. As was the case with the Chinese language studies textbooks, half were published in 1934, and half in 1935. In September 1934 the Ministry of Education published the lower elementary 1st and 2nd grade and lower middle 7th, 8th, and 9th grade texts. In December 1935 the ministry published the lower elementary 3rd and 4th and higher elementary 5th and 6th grade texts.

The textbook editing was presumably influenced by the attitudes Japanese educators in Manchuria had toward the character of Chinese students. A study by
Takenaka Ken’ichi has uncovered some of the common perceptions Japanese teachers had of their students. For example, in 1934 Furubayashi Takeo, a teacher at a Fengtian SMR school, stated that Chinese were calculating, apt to follow blindly, egoistic, smooth-tongued, fond of quarreling, had a weak sense of the state, and respected the literary and civilian world while despising the military. In 1937 Tsuda Gentoku, a principal at a Kwantung Territory normal school, wrote that the four greatest weakness in the Chinese character were disobedience, a lack of moral innocence, poor hygiene, and a fondness for gambling. Others said the Chinese were apt to make up lies, and rarely took baths (Takenaka 2000).

Furubayashi tried to quantify the basis for his concerns by studying the students’ lifestyles. He found that his students took baths on an average of once every three to six days, about the same as Japanese children living in the same region. He also found, however, that nearly 20% of the children had an opium addict in their family, most frequently one of the parents. Polygamy was practiced in the homes of 8% of the children. Many of these concerns found their way into the textbooks (Takenaka 2000).

The Ministry of Education presented different goals for the 1934 and 1935 morals textbooks, as they did with the Chinese language studies textbooks. The textbook prospectus for the 1934 lower elementary texts declared the purpose of the texts to be “to teach a spirit of morality fitting for subjects of the imperial state of Manchukuo”. This included teaching students to acquire “knowledge of morality, moral feelings, and a moral will” (Wenjiao-bu 1935a, 73). The textbook prospectus for the 1935 lower and higher elementary texts, on the other hand, added to these goals an intention to “train children to have a consciousness of themselves as Manchukuo imperial subjects. That means giving them a consciousness of the correctness of our
empire, training them in loyalty and patriotism, and teaching about the close relationship between Japan and Manchukuo” (Wenjiao-bu 1936b, 1). As the prospectus indicates, the 1935 textbooks often held up Japan and the Japanese as positive examples, and were much more state-centered than the 1934 texts.

Table 5.3 breaks down the themes of the 1934 and 1935 morals textbooks into personal, family, society, state, and international. “Hard state”, a subset of the state category, includes those chapters which praise the imperial or military institutions of Japan or Manchukuo. The percentage of chapters which refer to Manchukuo, Japan, China, and the West are also calculated, as are the number and frequency of references to individuals from the different regions.
Table 5.3: Themes, settings, and individuals in the 1934 and 1935 morals textbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Themes</th>
<th>Lower Elementary</th>
<th>Higher Elementary</th>
<th>Lower Middle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#1-2</td>
<td>#3-4</td>
<td>#5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1935.12</td>
<td>1935.12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>46.8</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>32.1</td>
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<td>14.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard State</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>30.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Manchukuo</td>
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<td>12.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Emperors</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Individuals (frequency)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower Elementary</th>
<th>Higher Elementary</th>
<th>Lower Middle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>1 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>9 (9)</td>
<td>6 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
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<td>13 (19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western</td>
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<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1934 morals textbooks

The 1934 lower elementary school texts say nothing about Japan; in fact they mention no state by name. The only two references to Manchukuo are a national flag seen flying above the school in one picture, and a map of the country seen on a
schoolroom wall in another picture. The textbooks are very child-centered, teaching about personal morals such as diligence, hygiene, and neatness, family morals such as obedience to parents and the role of each member within the family, and social morals such as proper classroom etiquette, deference to elderly people, and honesty. Only one historical figure is referred to, a story about Confucius being polite as a child.

The lower middle morals texts are of course quite different in character, since they were written for much older students. Like the 1934 lower elementary morals texts, but unlike the 1935 elementary morals texts, the lower middle texts include comparatively little material about Japan. They are similar to the 1934 lower middle school Chinese language studies textbooks in that they are written in a kind of classical Chinese, and a considerable amount of the material is made up of quotes and stories from pre-modern Chinese literature, including the ancient classics. Unlike the 1934 lower middle school Chinese language studies texts, however, the editors of these textbooks discuss modern state and society issues. The textbooks portray a fascinating although contradictory vision of an independent society which would mix some liberal Western concepts with traditional Chinese values, a vision espoused by at least some officials in the 1934 Manchukuo government. The texts probably were the product of a joint effort by the Japanese former SMR and New Education movement educators under Kamimura and the Chinese disciples of Zheng.

The word “Manchukuo” is actually never used in the texts, although Pu Yi as emperor is mentioned once. Significantly different from the 1935 morals and Chinese studies texts, there is no attempt to build a consciousness of the state or increase patriotism by using state symbols. Except for the single mention of the Emperor, state symbols such as the flag, the imperial palace at Xinjing, Mt. Zhangbai, and past
Manchu and Mongol rulers do not appear. The role of the state is discussed in 17% of the chapters, but all use logic and appeals to the wisdom of ancient Chinese writers to make their points, not grand symbols or semi-divine leaders. A chapter on patriotism, for example, posits that love of country builds from the farmers’ love of the land, which naturally develops into love of village, then region, and finally country. Therefore if one loves family and neighbors, that person is on the way to becoming a true patriot. Nationalism based on fear of foreigners, it claims, however, is not true patriotism, and can harm the state.

Another chapter, on ethic harmony, presents a detailed theory on the origin of national or ethic groups (minzu), saying they can be based on mutual lineage, shared geography, or a common culture. While the author of the chapter claims the formation of national groups is natural, he also paints a vivid picture of the dangers posed by nationalism in an era with rapid transportation and fierce weapons of destruction. Manchukuo’s policy of ethnic harmony, in which all groups are treated equally, is presented as an antidote to this danger. These two chapters on patriotism and national groups are remarkable for the editors’ refusal to link national unity to a mythic past or emotional state symbols. Prime Minister Zheng, who openly spoke of his distrust of modern nationalism, may have been involved in the creation of these chapters.

Two chapters in the second volume particularly stand out as unique in the history of Manchukuo. The first outlines different rights and obligations which exist between the individual and the state, and mentions limits on the state’s power. After recognizing that the idea of “rights” is based on Western, not Eastern, tradition, it states:

Public rights are set by the law. These include the right to appoint officials, vote and be voted on in elections, receive judgment, petition, and public appeal. When these laws are set, the people’s rights are
protected. Then there are rights pertaining to liberty. One can not be arrested, tried, or punished without regard to the law. This is liberty of one’s person. One has the freedom to pick one’s own domicile, or move whenever one pleases. A government official can not illegally enter a home and search it. This is liberty of residence. Debate, authorship, and publishing are part of freedom of thought. One may believe in a religion, work at an occupation, join an organization, or assemble. For the state to push forward the public good, it must follow the laws (Wenjiao-bu 1934d, 2:120-121).

A few paragraphs later, it continues:

The people have the responsibility to vote. A constitutional state has a parliament, chosen by elections. The people must not neglect their right to vote. There is no legal punishment for not voting, but those who do not are not fulfilling their responsibility. The people need to vote intelligently, not based solely on their financial conditions, the words of authorities, or personal feelings. The moral way is to choose trustworthy people through elections, who will participate in the country’s business and politics (Wenjiao-bu 1934d, 2:122).

These are amazing principles to teach in a country which would never in its history allow free elections, or ever produce a constitution or any other laws guaranteeing individual liberties, such as freedom of speech or assembly. It apparently represents the hopes of the more liberal members of the Ministry of Education, hopes that were permanently dashed by 1935. The chapter, however, ends with the following caveat:

One must also respect the state’s authority. In order for the state to use its authority, sometimes it cannot help but restrict personal liberties. For example, in order to build a public work, it may compel participation, or requisition a part of a person’s goods. However, these limitations are tied to individual rights. Therefore trustworthy people will follow instructions and act morally. Our native oriental moral outlook recognizes the spirit of responsibility, but does not have a tradition of a spirit of rights. There is the saying, “You must not forget your debt to others”. This is the spirit of responsibility . . . which
denies the spirit of rights. Our country’s ethic holds that all have the
duty to dedicate themselves to the country (Wenjiao-bu 1934d, 2:124).

One might be able to read the first part of the chapter as simply an explanation of
the way Westerners conceive of rights, which were not applicable in the wangdao state of
Manchukuo. In no other place in the textbooks, however, do the editors go into such
detail about conditions in the West. It is clear that the author intended the readers to
understand the rights delineated as the natural outcome of a social contract with the state.
Another chapter in the series repeated many of these ideas, although it also included the
caveat of final state control:

The people have the right to speak, write, form organizations, and
assemble. However, these acts need to follow the principle of
preserving public stability. Printed materials and publications which
damage public morality, or which damage culture and civilization, or
gatherings in which excessively stimulating lectures are given, are
prohibited. If these kind of evil actions are not closely regulated, the
entire society could be damaged (Wenjiao-bu 1934d, 3:69).

Certainly these chapters are not glowing demonstrations of the government’s
devotion to a liberal society. They are, however, the only post-1932 Manchukuo
documents known to even mention the possibility of rights such as the right to vote,
freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly, or which speak of limitations on the
state’s power. All other known Manchukuo textbooks and documents say nothing of
individual rights, only duties. Rather than granting rights, the state presents itself as
providing domestic peace and stability so the people could prosper, or as a benevolent
entity providing public education and disaster relief. In other words a paternalistic
state with absolute authority, in which independent voices are not welcomed. It is
somewhat of a mystery how these sections which discussed limits on state power and individual liberties made it into government-published textbooks, even in 1934.

Over a quarter of the chapters in the lower middle morals textbooks concern social issues, such as public manners, charity, and correct behavior in one’s occupation. It is notable that two of the chapters teach the proper conduct of employers (or “capitalists”) as well as employees. One chapter states, “Capitalists must help the people. Their wealth comes from heaven and earth, so they need to assist the regular people”. The other chapter asserts that capitalists must provide good wages, avoid extreme labor conditions, help employees when they are sick, and educate employees and their children.

Chapters on the family for the most part emphasize the correct roles of each member. To a certain degree the textbook editors write supporting traditional roles, but they also call for girls to receive education equal to boys, and support the trend toward greater mixing of the sexes in public places, such as the workplace. In another chapter they call for an end to the practice of child marriages, but oppose the newly spreading idea of young people picking their own spouse. The majority of the other chapters concern topics of personal morality such as honesty, diligence, and self-discipline. One encourages young people to avoid opium, tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and going to pleasure quarters.

These textbooks use a large number of quotes and stories from pre-modern Chinese literature in the course of explaining the different moral issues. A total of 54 different works are quoted 103 separate times, or nearly two quotes a chapter. Among the most frequently quoted are Confucius (19 times), Mencius (13), the Doctrine of the Mean (5), and the Greater Learning (3). None of the quoted authors were from the
Manchuria region, and none wrote during the Republican era. Nine different Westerners are mentioned or quoted, including Socrates, Kant, and Benjamin Franklin. Only once is anything Japanese mentioned, a section in which the Russo-Japanese War hero General Nogi Maresuke is presented as an example of bravery.

1935 morals textbooks

The 1935 elementary morals texts (lower elementary 3rd and 4th grades and higher elementary 5th and 6th grades), published after the Huiluan Rescript and the reorganization of the Ministry of Education, were significantly different from the 1934 texts in character. An average of 25% of the chapters centered on the state, up from 1% in the 1934 lower elementary textbooks and 17% in the 1934 lower middle textbooks. References to symbols of the Manchukuo state, particularly the Emperor, increased significantly, as did the number of chapters which referred to Japan. There were particularly many references to Japan in the lower elementary school textbooks, 30% of the chapters. Although there were less quotes and stories from Chinese literature than in the 1934 lower middle school texts, there were still as many of these kinds of references as references to Japan.

The Manchukuo Emperor’s place as the central character in the 1935 morals textbooks is the most immediately recognizable difference from the 1934 texts. He appears in an average of 13% of the chapters of the four 1935 volumes. The Emperor is featured in the first one or two chapters of each text. The first chapter of the 3rd grade textbook, for example, opens with a full page picture of the Emperor in military uniform. The chapter then states:

Our Great Manchukuo Empire is ruled by the Emperor. The Emperor is lord of the whole country; he is honored like the heavens
and revered as divine. The subjects throughout the land venerate him. Students coming to school see his picture in the textbook, and bow to the sacred image in deepest reverence. (Wenjiao-bu 1935e, 3:2)

The next three textbooks follow a pattern of having first chapters which describe a key moment in Pu Yi’s time as head of state, and quote from declarations given in his name. The first chapter of the 4th grade textbook explains how Pu Yi was originally named the president of the country in 1932, and quotes from the Declaration Upon Taking Office. The first chapter of the 5th grade textbook describes his enthronement ceremony in 1934, and quotes the Enthronement Rescript. The first chapter of the 6th grade textbook discusses his state visit to Japan in 1935, and quotes the Huiluan Rescript. Besides these extensive quotations, the full texts of the Enthronement Rescript and Huiluan Rescript appear in each of the 1935 textbooks before the table of contents.

Besides these very formal chapters centered on imperial rescripts, other chapters in the textbooks explain how the Emperor supports education, is careful to keep taxes low, has authority over the military and the power to make treaties, acts as a father to the people, and is united in all things with the Japanese Emperor.

Other chapters concerning the Manchukuo state include several about the various national days of celebration, including two newly created events, the anniversary of the state’s founding on May 1st and the Manchukuo Emperor’s birthday on January 13th, as well as traditional Chinese events such as New Years, Confucius’ birthday, the Spring and Fall festivals, and days in celebration of the Chinese pre-modern heroes Guan Yu and Yue Fei. The textbook repeatedly instructs the students to fly the national flag at the gates of their homes on each of these days.
Other chapters describe the roles of the different organs of government, ethnic harmony, the principle of *wangdao* rule, and the importance of obeying the laws and paying taxes. The state-centered chapters for the most part focus on the individual’s duty to the state; there is no discussion of rights guaranteed by the state, as was found in the 1934 lower middle morals textbooks. Above all else, the theme of absolute loyalty to the Manchukuo Emperor runs constantly throughout the textbooks.

There are few references to the pre-modern history of the Manchukuo region in the morals texts, unlike the Chinese language studies texts. Only two chapters in the 3\textsuperscript{rd} grade textbook mention the region’s history.

Over 21\% of the chapters in the 1935 morals textbook refer to Japan or the Japanese, a significant increase over the 1934 texts. In almost half of these chapters there is discussion of Japan’s assistance in the founding and management of Manchukuo. One of these chapters labels the Japanese as the ethnic group “with the greatest abilities”.

The Japanese Emperors are mentioned rarely in the 1934 textbooks, but they appear in three chapters in 1935 higher elementary morals textbooks. In almost every case they are presented in terms of their link with the Manchukuo Emperor. The first describes the Manchukuo Emperor’s state visit to Japan in 1935, where he was received by the Japanese Shōwa Emperor. Another chapter goes into further detail about the visit, saying that the Manchukuo Emperor felt unity with the Japanese Emperor, and was deeply impressed by the loyalty shown by the people to the imperial household. The following chapter shows the Manchukuo Emperor discovering morality education as the key to the Japanese people’s unity and devotion to their Emperor, and that Japan’s education was based on the principles outlined in the Meiji Emperor’s Rescript
on Education. The chapter then quotes the entire rescript, and then encourages students to “thoroughly study the Japanese education system, and make it part of your nature”.

Several other chapters hold up pre-modern Japanese heroes and current Japanese customs for the Manchukuo students to emulate. Among the stories are a description of Japanese troops whose patriotism overcame any fear of death, a portrait of contemporary Japan in which no one throws trash into the roads and the children do not break plants in the parks, and stories about generous, cooperative, hard working, self-reliant, and filial individuals.

While there are many references to Japan and the Japanese in the 1935 morals textbooks, there are even more quotes and stories from Chinese literature, although there is less of this kind of material than in the 1934 lower middle school texts. Almost 25% of the chapters include quotes or stories from Chinese literature. Like the rest of the 1934 and 1935 texts, there are no references to modern China. Like the other texts, Confucius and Mencius are the most often mentioned, followed by military heroes like Guan Yu and Yue Fei and literary figures like Sima Gong.

Although there are fewer chapters about personal and social moral issues in the 1935 morals textbooks than in the 1934 morals textbooks, these chapters still make up a majority of the total. They include chapters which warn against the dangerous of opium, tobacco, and alcohol, urge students to avoid superstition, and admonish students to improve public hygiene, including correct trash disposal and prohibitions against spitting or urinating in the streets.

While the amount of material aimed at inculcating loyalty to the state and Emperor and positive regard for Japan in the 1935 morals textbooks rose sharply above
the level of the 1934 texts, in all likelihood the strength of the messages presented were diminished by three factors: the greater amount of time spent on traditional Chinese ethics, the background of the teachers, and the colonial nature of society.

First, the curriculum for higher elementary and both levels of middle schools in the 1934-1937 period included two hours a week for study of the Chinese classics, twice the amount of time spent in the morals courses. A series of textbooks on classics for use in these courses was published in 1934 and 1935 (Wang 2000, 156, 166, Minsei-bu 1937b, 100). These textbooks focused only on the classics, and did not mention modern China, Manchukuo, or Japan. Clearly traditional Chinese ethics remained a central part of the curriculum during this period, given even more time than material about the Manchukuo state and Japan.

Second, as with the Chinese language studies courses, I assume that the morals classes were taught almost entirely by non-Japanese instructors. Although the central and provincial governments held many retraining courses for teachers throughout Manchukuo’s existence, it is not hard to imagine that many of the Chinese teachers disliked teaching about the greatness of Japan or devotion to the new emperor, while others simply did not know much about these subjects. While they probably had little objection to the materials about general personal and family morals, contemporary observations and post-war interviews show that teachers during this period often showed little interest in the more ideological material, and some middle school teachers stealthily provided anti-Japanese materials to students they deemed trustworthy (Isoda 1994, Qi 1997, Yamamoto 1940).

Third, the colonial nature of Manchukuo society worked against the efforts of the textbook editors to present Japanese as positive role models and Manchukuo as an
ideal state. A Japanese teacher in Fengtian City expressed his frustration with the state of affairs in a 1936 article in Mantetsu Kyōiku Tayori, a SMR education journal. He said that teachers received reports that Japanese on the streets frequently cursed at Chinese:

calling them ‘chinks (chankoro)’, ‘idiots’, and ‘smelly’, and yelling at them to get out of their way. Many see all Chinese as thieves, or treat them as coolies and beggars. The students often told us Japanese would hit them for no reason, and Japanese children would throw stones at them, hurting them and making them cry. In cases like that we had to go to great lengths to soothe them. We were stuck in a bind, because we did not want to dwell on the misdeeds of Japanese, but we could not say that these good children were wrong (Takenaka 2000, 135).

The teacher reported that these conditions made it very hard to teach principles like “do not fight”, “do not tease weak things”, “do not use crude language”, and “the greatness of Japan”.

To summarize, morals textbooks published in 1934 for the most part focused on private and social morality, rather than teaching loyalty to the state or the Emperor. They made almost no reference to Japan, and very few to Manchukuo itself. The lower middle school texts, probably written jointly by lieutenants of Zheng and Kamimura, did discuss questions of general civics, but they were remarkable for describing a positive image of Western-style democracy and individual rights. For the most part they drew on the words of pre-modern Chinese writers to support the concepts taught. The 1935 elementary morals textbooks, published after the Huiluan Rescript and the change of leadership in the Ministry of Education, contained much more material about the Manchukuo state, in particular urging students to become loyal to the Manchukuo Emperor. The 1935 texts continued the tradition of using pre-modern Chinese texts to legitimize many of its messages, but made no references to modern
China. The texts also included a considerable amount of material about Japan, including the Japanese Emperor. While the amount of material about Japan and the Japanese was increasing, it still could not be called cultural assimilation at this point, because the frequency of pro-Japan lessons was still dwarfed by the amount of material which used pre-modern Chinese sources, the lack of teachers from Japan, and the distrust of the messages among Chinese students as well as teachers.

**History textbooks**

The Manchukuo government, in its attempt to disseminate a narrative of a Manchukuo state naturally independent of China and indebted to Japan, found the history curriculum to be a key route of instruction in the 1934-1937 period. Concern over unintended consequences of teaching the region’s history, however, led to the suspension of the curriculum during the 1938-1942 period.

From 1934 to 1937 the Ministry of Education recommended two hours of history instruction a week in higher elementary and lower middle schools, the same amount as taught in Republican China. In elementary schools Manchukuo history was taught in 5th grade and Japanese and Chinese history were taught in 6th grade. In the middle schools Manchukuo history was taught in 7th grade, Japanese history in 8th grade, and Western history in 9th grade. The Ministry of Education published a Manchukuo history textbook, called National History Textbook, for the 5th grade course in 1934, and a Japanese History Textbook and an East Asian History Textbook (for Chinese history) for the 6th grade courses in 1935 or 1936, all of which were available for this study. Textbooks for the lower middle school history courses were also completed in 1935 and 1936, but I have not yet seen any of them.
The 1934 Manchukuo history textbook

While presumably most of the 1934 textbooks were published by a combination of Japanese New Education educators and disciples of Zheng Xiaoxu, the 1934 Manchukuo history textbook appears to have been written by a different group. Although there is no document which clearly points out the authors, Terada has indicated that the chief author of the textbook was Inaba Kimiyama (also known as Inaba Iwakichi). Inaba was one of four members of a “State Founding History Editing Department,” and independent bureau within the Ministry of Education during this period (Wenjiao-bu 1936c, 8, Terada 1975, 85). He was an associate of two of the creators of the ideology of a historically independent Manchukuo, Ishihara Kanji, whom he became close with while teaching at Japan’s Army War College, and Yano Jin’ichi, a colleague at the Oriental Studies department at Kyōto University. The significantly different tone of the Manchukuo history textbook from the other language and morals textbooks published in 1934 also indicates it was edited by an author or group of authors separate from the ministry textbook division. For example, Japan, the Manchukuo Emperor, and the state in general were much more central aspects of the Manchukuo history textbook then they were in the other 1934 textbooks.

This textbook appears to have been particularly important to the government. Besides the creation of an apparently separate editing group for this single textbook, the Ministry of Education also produced a teacher’s manual for the course in 1935. This was the only teacher’s manual created for a lower elementary course as late as the end of 1936. The manual instructs teachers on the purpose and main points of each chapter, gives additional historical information, supplies sample questions, and coaches the teachers on the delivery of the material. In key chapters the instructions resemble
stage directions. For example, the chapter on the country’s founding directs teachers to “Solemnly explain the necessity of state founding in terms of Manchuria’s ethnicity and history. . . [W]ith great emotion explain that since the Republic, the warlords put Manchuria in a distressing plight . . . [W]ith eagerness explain how the Sept. 18th Incident was the first sign of the state founding movement” (Wenjiao-bu 1935c, 95-96).

I discussed the content of the textbook in some detail in Chapter 3. The authors’ central goals clearly were to strengthen the students consciousness of Manchukuo as an independent state by emphasizing the region’s historical separation from China, and make the region’s relationship with Japan seem natural by describing beneficial contacts with Japan which had occurred over the centuries. The textbook’s introduction began with this statement:

72 These goals can be seen in the textbook prospectus: “Purpose of the textbook: 1. Teach about the rise and fall of the various ethnicities and kingdoms in the Manchurian region, about how Manchuria has a long independent history, and how it is not part of Chinese territory, so the students can see how the founding of Manchukuo was both necessary and a continuation of what came before. 2. Tell the historical truth about the successive generations, destroying the established notions about race. Explain that the events which occurred in Manchuria over the years have historical value, regardless of what ethnicity was involved. Teach that by recording all of these events together we are acting in accordance with the true spirit of our new state’s Minzoku Kyowa. 3. Above all clarify in detail the ancient close relationship between Japan and Manchuria, and have them see that the present spirit of co-existence and co-prosperity is not at all an accident (Wenjiao-bu 1935a, 82).

The 1934 lower elementary Manchukuo history textbook was not the first textbook edited by Japanese to emphasize the region’s historic independence and debt to Japan. In 1932 the South Manchuria Textbook Group edited a volume for Chinese 5th grade students in SMR schools entitled Manchukuo History Textbook, replacing a 1930 textbook by the same department which taught the history of China and Manchuria together in the same text. It covered the history of the region from the kingdoms of the ancient period up to the Manchurian Incident. It was 46 pages long, half the length of the 1934 National History textbook (Takenaka 2000, 169).
On the Relationship between China and Manchuria: Many states have been established in Manchuria over the ages, like the Parhae, Liao, Jin, and Qing. These were all independent states, and contended with China proper (zhongguo benbu) as equals. These strong ethnic groups were able to ward off the Chinese ethnicity (zhongguo minzu). Because of their outstanding culture they could make exchanges with the Chinese. Therefore our Manchuria truly is a complete state, with traditional ethnic groups, and a firm culture (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 1).

The first two thirds of the text portrays Manchuria’s history from ancient times up to the Manchurian Incident, always emphasizing the region’s independence. The Han are presented as just one of many ethnic groups in the region. The final third of the book discusses the creation and first two and a half years of the state’s development. Connections with Japan are emphasized wherever possible. For example the textbook considers the Parhae Kingdom (705-926), which had diplomatic and trade relations with the Yamato court at Nara, over the course of three chapters, while study of the Liao Dynasty (907-1119), which had no contacts with Japan, takes up half as much space.

The textbook editors depict the relationship between Parhae and Japan as a mutually beneficial exchange between equals. It was no coincidence, however, that the editors portray Parhae as the less technologically advanced state, and therefore a model for the current status of Manchukuo as equal in name but inferior in nature to Japan. For example this comparison of the nature of goods produced in each society:

The Parhae merchants often sold pelts and hides, ginseng, and other natural resources. In exchange they bought Japanese silk fabrics, lacquer wares, and other manufactured products (Wenjiao-bu 1934a, 16).

The teacher’s manual points out the parallel to the current relationship, instructing teachers to “compare and talk in detail about the similarities between the trade of Parhae’s raw materials and Japan’s manufactured materials with today’s trade between Manchukuo and Japan” (Wenjiao-bu 1935c, 219).
Japanese actions in the region from the Sino-Japanese War to the Manchurian Incident consistently are portrayed as attempts to protect the people from Russian occupation and warlord deprivations. The textbook ends with a description of Pu Yi’s ascension as Emperor, and a plea to students to become aware of the nature of the state and their status as nationals, based on four main points: historical independence, wangdao rule, reliance on Japan, and ethnic harmony. The teacher’s manual directs instructors to end the course by having the students “pledge to strive in constructing a national people and advance the glory of the state” (Wenjiao-bu 1935c, 117).

*Japan and East Asia history textbooks*

The Manchukuo Ministry of Education’s 1935 6th grade Japanese history textbook is a condensed and translated version of the Japanese Ministry of Education’s two-volume elementary school national history textbook, published in 1934. The Manchukuo version contains less than a quarter of the material found in the version used in Japan. Two features of the textbook stand out--its focus on the Japanese imperial line and its emphasis on Japan’s history of activities abroad.

The textbook prospectus of the Manchukuo version stated the chief purpose of the text as “To clearly teach Japan’s historical development, centering on the Imperial House’s unbroken line” (Wenjiao-bu 1936b, 23). Considerable space is given to the mythical foundations of the ruling house and events during the Asuka and Nara periods, when the Imperial house was central to national events, while periods in which the Imperial house was weak, such as the Kamakura and Ashikaga shogunates, are hardly mentioned.
The editors of the 1935 textbook included nearly every story from the 1934 Japan textbooks which mentioned Japanese actions outside of the home islands, sometimes in even greater detail than in the original. Naturally they always tried to put Japanese actions in the best possible light, particularly when a member of the Imperial family was involved. Japan’s relations with the Korean kingdoms are always portrayed as that between a superior and an inferior, although relations with China are for the most part depicted in more equal terms. For example they included the legendary story of Empress Jingu’s subjugation of the Korean kingdom of Silla, emphasizing the King of Silla’s awe at Japan’s military strength and his payment of tribute to the Japanese court, a story found in all of the Japanese government’s pre-war history textbooks. They downplayed, however, the role of Korean scholars and artists who had come to the Japanese court to teach literacy and continental culture.\footnote{Satō Hideo, in a study of the depiction of the Korean scholars and artists in Japanese textbooks, found that first Japanese Ministry of Education history textbooks in 1903 mentioned two of the leading Korean scholars by name, and described them as active individuals who by their own volition decided to help Japan. The 1910, 1920, and 1934 textbooks emphasized Jingu’s role in bringing the scholars to Japan after her military success, making the Japanese the initiators of the events. The history textbooks published in 1943 said only that many people came to Japan from the peninsula because Japan was a great country, completely turning around the portrayal of the Koreans as teachers, instead implying that Koreans came to Japan to study (Satō 1996, 181). The 1935 Manchukuo text falls in between the 1934 and 1943 Japan texts in terms of this portrayal.} The editors also included the initiatives during Empress Suiko’s reign to open contact with Sui Dynasty China, and Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea.

The editors also incorporated a few stories not mentioned in the 1934 Japanese Ministry of Education textbook, particularly a description of the contacts between the Nara court and Parhae. The editors, however, portrayed Parhae as opening the
relationship by asking to be recognized as a vassal state to Japan, a significant
difference from the 1934 Manchukuo history textbook, which depicted Japan and
Parhae as diplomatic, if not technological, equals. This difference may have been due
to the Japan history textbook’s publication a year later in 1935, after Pu Yi’s state visit
to Japan, which itself resembled the missions of vassal states to the suzerain powers in
pre-modern times. It also may have been due to the difference in source material.
Inaba and the other 1934 Manchukuo history textbook editors were historians of China
and Korea, familiar with Chinese-authored histories in which the Japan-Parhae
relationship was described as one of equals, while the 1935 Japan history textbook
probably was compiled by non-historian textbook editors who probably used only
Japanese sources, which portrayed the relationship as a tributary one.

The textbook concluded with this statement of support for Japanese suzerainty:
Of course today Japan is culturally and politically among the leading
countries of the world. The Japanese people are becoming more aware
of their obligations. If we Oriental countries take Japan as our leader,
we will start on a pathway leading toward world peace (Wenjiao-bu
1934d, 66-67).

While the Japanese history curriculum delivered messages of the divinity of the
Japanese Imperial house, the legitimacy of Japanese action on the Asian continent, and
the need for Japanese suzerainty, it was taught for a limited number of hours in the
school: only half a year in higher elementary school and one year in lower middle
school. Thus the history of Japan was taught systematically for only two hours a week
in one and a half years over the course of five years of lower elementary and higher
middle school in the 1934-1937 period. Also, as with the morals curriculum, because
the textbooks were written in Chinese and because of the lack of teachers from Japan,
one could assume that non-Japanese teachers taught the course in most schools, which
may have blunted the degree to which a message of a divine and ascendant Japan was taught.

Besides Manchukuo and Japanese history, one half of a year in 6th grade was devoted to teaching Chinese history. In 1935 or 1936 the Ministry of Education published a textbook titled East Asian History, which was primarily about intramural Chinese history. When speaking in a general sense, rather than referring to certain dynasties, the country is referred to as Zhina (J. Shina) rather than Zhongguo (J. Chūgoku). The former term, a transliteration of the English term China, was commonly used in Japan at the time, while the latter, which meant “middle country,” was preferred by contemporary Chinese. This was a change from the 1934 Manchukuo History textbook, in which the country is called Zhongguo.

The East Asian History textbook includes a section which praises the system of ethics created by the ancient Chinese sages, but otherwise describes the country in a dispassionate tone. This tone changes in final chapter on the Republican Era, in which the Guomindang government is criticized strongly for anti-foreign and undemocratic policies. The textbook concludes with this criticism of contemporary Chinese society:

Some irrational people are in a hurry to change social norms. They want to foolishly throw away Confucianism, overturning integrity and honor, and overthrowing the sages. This is the fashion in modern China, and it will bring the country to ruin. This is as different as heaven and earth from the situation in our country, where under wangdao we have preserved Confucianism, and revere and worship the sages (Wenjiao-bu 1935f, 58).

The Chinese history course thus repeated the message delivered in the Chinese language studies and morals textbooks of this era, that China’s pre-modern history was
part of Manchukuo’s cultural heritage and worthy of emulation, but the modern Chinese government was inferior to Manchukuo and a danger to social stability.

The 1934 Manchukuo national history textbook more than any other laid out to the students a clear argument for the existence of the Manchukuo state, the 1935 Japan history textbook contained a concentrated effort to explain the divinity and righteousness of the Japanese Imperial house and the legitimacy of the role of Japan as leader of East Asia. Some Japanese officials, however, felt the history curriculum in elementary schools did more damage than good to their cause in Manchukuo. Their concerns may have been the reason the Manchukuo government dissolved the history curriculum, along with the language studies and morals subjects, into a single “national studies” curriculum under the new education system of 1938. Their concerns, and the changes which occurred as a result, will be discussed later in this chapter.

Japanese language textbooks

As with the morals and Chinese language studies textbooks, the Ministry of Education published Japanese language textbooks in two stages, in 1934 and in 1935, with significant differences between the two stages. Textbooks for the 3rd, 4th lower elementary grades and 7th lower middle grade were published in 1934, and textbooks for the 5th and 6th higher elementary grades and 8th and 9th lower middle grades in 1935. The 3rd grade textbook, the introductory textbook, is not included in this analysis because it was not divided into chapters.

Table 5.4 breaks down the themes of the chapters of the six textbooks under examination into three groups: practical, national, and literary. The category “hard
state” is a subset of the “national” category, referring to chapters which praise the Imperial house or military of Japan or Manchukuo. The percentage of chapters which refer to specific national symbols, and which refer to Japan, Manchukuo, China, and the West are also calculated.
Table 5.4: Themes, settings, and individuals in the 1934-1935 Japanese language textbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lower Elementary #2 4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade 1934.9</th>
<th>Higher Elementary #1-2 5-6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grades 1935.12</th>
<th>Lower Middle #1 7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grade 1934.9</th>
<th>Lower Middle #2-3 8-9&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; grades 1935.12</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practical</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard State</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo Emperor</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Emperor</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo Flag</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Flag</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan related</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifestyle</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-modern history</td>
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<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern</td>
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<td>9.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imperial myth</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo related</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China related</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West related</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1/3</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>2/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0/0</td>
<td>16/22</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>13/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westerners</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0/0</td>
<td>9/9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Japanese language textbooks published in 1934 contain an amazingly small amount of material about Japan. Only 14% of the 4th grade textbook chapters and 13% of the 7th grade chapters refer to Japan. While they contain more Japan references than the morals and Chinese language studies textbooks of the same eras, as might be expected, many of the chapters refer to everyday life events of non-Japanese students, or simply are moral exhortations. Of the chapters that refer to Japan, the majority are about the lifestyles and traditions of Japanese, such as doll displays on Girls’ Day and carp streamers on Boys Day. In fact the 1934 Japanese language textbooks contained very few “hard state” chapters. The Manchukuo Emperor is mentioned only once in the 1934 textbooks and Japanese Emperors are not mentioned at all.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the lack of Japan and hard state references in the 1934 Japanese language textbooks may have been due to the presence of SMR New Education movement educators among the editors. They tended to be disciples of the Yamaguchi Kiichirō, and therefore opposed the inclusion of overly ideological material in language textbooks in fear that it could alienate language learners. Yamaguchi supported the use of materials familiar to the students and universal in nature (Komagome 1997, 335-336). Following Yamaguchi’s reasoning, rather than including materials about the state, the 1934 Japanese language textbooks contain a considerable number of references to Manchukuo’s culture and geography, many more than are found in the morals and Chinese language studies textbooks published that same year.

The 1935 Japanese language textbooks contain many more chapters referring to Japan and to “hard state” subjects than the 1934 texts, while using less references to Manchukuo. Comparing the 1935 5th and 6th grade text to the 1934 4th grade text, the
1935 texts have an average of 33% of the chapters referring to Japan, up from 14%, and 22% of the 1935 chapters include “hard state” materials, up from 5%. Current and past Japanese Emperors, as well as the Manchukuo Emperor, appear frequently in the 1935 textbooks. There was a similar shift in content from the 1934 7th grade lower middle textbook to the 1935 8th and 9th grade textbooks. References to Japan turn from relatively benign descriptions of Japanese lifestyle in the 1934 textbooks to discussions of the greatness of modern Japanese society, portrayals of the Japanese military, and retelling the Japanese creation and state founding myths in the 1935 volumes. Clearly the 1935 editors, while continuing to support the use of the direct method in the classroom, had begun to retreat from Yamaguchi’s related concept of a non-ideological teaching environment.

To summarize the analysis of the textbooks published in 1934 and 1935, changes in the Manchukuo state ideology and personnel of the Ministry of Education precipitated a major change in the content of the government’s textbooks. 1934 textbooks, edited by Japanese who had long experience in the area and were sympathetic to the New Education movement, together with disciples of Prime Minister Zheng, were for the most part child- and citizen-centered. The elementary school Chinese language studies, morals, and Japanese language textbooks were largely free of strong ideological messages, instead using materials familiar to the students, like scenes of Chinese children going to school, associating with their family, or enjoying nature.

74 The leading editor of both the 1934 and 1935 Japanese language textbooks probably was Fukui Yū, a veteran educator who had taught in SMR schools for Chinese from 1918 to 1932, and was a supporter of Yamaguchi’s direct method (Fukui 1939).
When Manchukuo and Japan were mentioned it was usually in terms of culture and geography. The higher elementary Manchukuo national history textbook and lower middle morals textbooks contained the strongest ideological messages of the 1934 texts. Both used appeals to logic and history to make their points. The Manchukuo national history text, apparently edited by a separate group, presented a focused defense of the propositions that the Manchuria region was historically independent, that Manchukuo was a legitimate state created by the will of the people, and that Japan both in the past and in the present was a good friend to the region. The editors of the lower middle morals textbooks tried to teach a new moral order, mixing what they saw as the best of the old with the new, without resorting to nationalistic or mythical rationalizations for their authority. The people are presented as the ultimate legitimizing force of the state, which exists for their benefit.

The 1935 textbooks, on the other hand, rely heavily on national and mythical symbols to buttress a changed national ideology in which the state’s legitimacy drew no longer on the supposed voice of the people, but instead on the unifying figure of the Manchukuo Emperor. The Manchukuo Emperor’s own legitimacy is portrayed as primarily coming from his relationship with the divine Japanese Imperial house, although also on his connection with the region’s past rulers. The Chinese language studies, Japanese language studies, and morals texts include many more references to the Manchukuo state and to Japan, including repeated references to sacred Qing spots in the Chinese language texts and the mythical beginning of the Japanese Imperial house in the Japanese language texts. Stories about Japanese who acted out of loyalty to past Emperors, who displayed military prowess, and who acted heroically on the Asian continent were common in the 1935 textbooks, in an attempt to teach students to be
loyal to their own Emperor and to stand in awe and deference to Japanese military power.

Teachers for most of these classes, however, were Chinese, many of whom were educated in the midst of the New Culture Movement of the 1920s, and therefore had accepted many of that movement’s nationalist and anti-Japanese messages. The Japanese could dominate the region militarily, but found is more difficult to staff the schools with teachers who would present the state’s messages with true enthusiasm (Isoda 1994 and Qi 1997).

The 1934-1935 textbooks compared to textbooks in Korea

A brief comparison of the content of the 1934-1935 Manchukuo textbooks to those used in Korea at the same time is now in order. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Japanese language instruction in Korea during this period was much more intense than Japanese language instruction in Manchukuo. The language was taught from the first grade in Korea, and many of the other subjects were also taught in Japanese, including the morals curriculum. There was a Korean language course, but it was taught for only three to six hours a week in elementary school. Besides those for the Korean language course itself, all of the textbooks were written in Japanese.

From 1930 to 1935 the Korean colonial government published what is usually known as the Third Korean Textbook Series. One similarity between the 1934-1935 Manchukuo textbooks and the 1930-1935 Third Korean Textbook series is the considerable number of non-Japanese historical figures who appeared in the morals and indigenous language studies textbooks. The large number of Korean individuals who appear in the Korean language studies texts of the period was a continuation of a trend
begun in the previous Second Series, published from 1923 to 1924, as a part of the colonial government’s efforts to win local support after the 1919 March 1st uprisings. A difference, however, is that the Korean characters in the Korea texts were almost always passive figures, usually ancient scholars or poets. Few powerful political figures from the past appeared, and there are no cases of a Korean military figure in the textbooks. In her study of the textbooks, Yi Suk-cha has posited that this choice of characters was part of an effort by Japanese colonial authorities to portray Korea as a weak nation naturally dependent on outside forces, thereby helping to legitimize Japanese rule (Yi 1985). The 1934 and 1935 Manchukuo textbooks, on the other hand, contained several stories about powerful political or military Chinese and “Manchurian” historical figures, like Genghis Khan and the early Qing emperors.

Another difference is the positive image of Manchuria presented in the Manchukuo textbooks, compared to the frequently negative image of Korea found in the Korea textbooks. Many chapters in the Korean language textbooks focused on subjects such as past military defeats and how Korea had failed to modernize before Japan began to help. The texts also criticized some Korean customs, such as dressing in white. The Manchukuo textbooks, on the other hand, for the most part spoke positively about the region’s history and customs. Negative parts of the region’s recent history, such as warlord rule, were labeled as “Chinese” problems. Some practices, such as opium smoking and gambling, were criticized, but these were criticisms with which the many in the population could agree, and were presented in a context of praise for the region’s cultural heritage.

Both the Korea and Manchukuo textbooks contained material on ancient connections between Japan and the occupied country, which was intended to help
legitimize Japanese control. The Korea textbooks, however, contained far more of this kind of material than the Manchukuo textbooks, perhaps because there was a much stronger historical connection between the neighboring countries of Japan and Korea than existed between Japan and Manchuria. Finally, there was a much lower degree of militaristic and Shinto materials in the Manchukuo 1934-1935 textbooks compared to the Korea textbooks.

Therefore while the textbooks in the two occupied areas shared common traits, they varied greatly in terms of degree. Both depicted the respective regions as closely connected with Japan, but the Korea texts presented the relationship as completely dependent and one-sided, while the Manchukuo texts presented a friendly relationship of equals or near-equals. The Korea texts were for the most part negative about Korean society, thereby rationalizing the need for cultural assimilation, while the Manchukuo texts were for the most part positive about Manchurian society, allowing it to develop as something different from Japan.

The Shingakusei

In 1937 the Manchukuo government announced a sweeping set of changes in the Manchukuo education system, known as the Shingakusei (new education system). As mentioned previously lower and higher middle schools, both of which were three-year courses, were combined into single four-year middle schools, each of which was assigned a vocational specialty. None of the middle schools were allowed to specialize in humanities and science, the favored middle school major in early 20th century Chinese schools. The Japanese language was raised to the status of a national language, and the number of hours spent in Japanese language instruction in elementary
and middle schools increased sharply. The number of hours spent in vocational training in higher elementary and middle schools also increased. In elementary schools all of the “literary” subjects—Chinese language studies, Japanese language, morals, history, and geography—as well as science, were combined into a single “national people’s studies” (C. guomin-ke, J. kokumin-ka) curriculum. The government published two sets of textbooks, one in Japanese, the other in Chinese, each with different content, for use in the course. Official guidelines for the number of hours students spent in school increased at most levels, but the ratio of time spent on the “literary” subjects remained about the same as before (although more of that time was now taken up by Japanese language study).

The history curriculum after 1938

The Manchukuo government published no separate science, morals, geography, or history texts for the elementary schools in the period from 1938 to 1942; rather the Chinese and Japanese language national people’s studies readers were expected to cover those subjects. These readers contained little historical material and nothing about Manchuria’s pre-1932 history. History was taught for two hours a week in the first two years of middle school, and new middle school Japan and Manchukuo history texts were published in 1938. I have not been able to find copies of either of these texts. History in the higher elementary schools, a key part of the dissemination of the government’s message of Manchukuo independence in the 1934-1937 period, was eliminated from the curriculum.

The government offered no explanation for the deletion the history courses, but apparently some Japanese education officials feared discussion of pre-modern Chinese
History did more harm than good to the cause of instilling a national consciousness of an independent Manchukuo. For example, Kita Ryūjirō, the editor of a 1935 SMR-published “Manchurian history” textbook in 1935, wrote, “Manchuria’s history must be taught independently, not as a part of China’s history”. Rather than teaching about ancient dynasties, he said, schools needed to emphasize the actions of modern Japanese in the region, including soldiers and settlers (Kita 1967, 68, Isoda 1999, 273).

After the war the Terada wrote:

[I thought] Manchukuo History should only be the history of Manchukuo since its founding, that it should not include ancient history, like the periods of ethnic conflict and the Qing dynasty . . . This [kind of history] caused university students and others to ask why, if there was ethnic harmony, the Han people divided in two at the Great Wall? . . . I did not think it was of any value to teach insignificant things from before the establishment of Manchukuo like the history of ethnic conflicts (Terada 1975, 85, Ryōnankai 1972, 294).

These comments demonstrate that some felt teaching about the region’s pre-modern history had inadvertently resulted in raising more questions about the legitimacy of the new state in the minds of the students than it answered. Rather than force teachers to try to explain the need to separate the overwhelming Han majority of the country from their fellow Han in the south, or explain the present link with Japan in the face of a much stronger historical link with China proper, the authorities apparently decided the subject should be avoided altogether. ²⁷⁵

²⁷⁵ It would be interesting to see what was taught in the 1938 middle school Manchukuo history textbook, which I have not found. My conjecture is that it contained much less material about the pre-modern history of the region than did the 1934 higher elementary text.
This increasingly negative view of Manchukuo’s past can also be discerned in 1941, when the Education Bureau created a unified “Geography and History” textbook for normal schools, and promised to publish a similar one for middle schools later in the year. Although there are no known extant copies, an Education Bureau description of the text shows that it was almost completely negative about the region’s past, and instead taught mostly about the short history since 1931. It stated:

We are trying to create a positive history which will inspire the people. Our [pre-Manchukuo history] has seen many ups and downs; there really nothing in the history which needs to be emphasized. Now, however, as we stand on a new starting point, trying to push forward the ideal of the state’s founding . . . we should be able to create a great history. By faithfully looking at our history, even if there is almost nothing that needs to be expanded upon, we can reflect on what has been lacking, and pick important materials which will make students conscious of what needs to be fixed . . . Certainly the events of the past cannot be changed. However, there are different ways of looking at and emphasizing the past, which can give it meaning (Minsei-bu 1941b, 68).

Other factors which probably played into the decision to limit the use of historical materials in the schools were the increasing emphasis on basing the Manchukuo state’s legitimacy on its support from the Japanese Emperor, rather than claims of the region’s historical independence or the Emperor’s credentials as a

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76The unification of history and geography into a single subject (sometimes called “social studies”) was a frequent topic of debate in Japanese education circles in the late 1930s and 1940s. While the Japanese Ministry of Education did not act on this idea until after the war, the colonial education bureaucracies actively experimented with different history/geography combinations. The Korean government was first, publishing “Kokushi Chiri” textbook for elementary school 4th graders in 1938. Manchukuo followed with “Chireki” textbook for normal schools in 1941, and the Kwantung Territory published “Mikuni no Sugata” in 1943-1944. Isoda Kazuo has written extensively on the development of the Korean and Kwantung Territory texts (Isoda 1999, 208, 315).
wangdao ruler, and the conviction among many Japanese that Japanese language training was the surest way to win support from the people. 77

The shift toward ignoring or giving negative messages about the region’s history paralleled an even stronger shift occurring in Korea at the same time. In 1921, as part of a response to the disturbances of the March 1st movement, the colonial government for the first time included a few chapters about Korea in Japanese history textbooks. The material was generally negative about Korea, however, emphasizing periods when Korea was ruled by outsiders, particularly Japan. The amount of material about Korea increased while that about Japan decreased in the 1932 revision of the textbooks, and while they continued to emphasize historical contacts between Korea and Japan, the message of Japanese dominance was softened, and some positive aspects of Korean culture, such as the creation of the Hangul alphabet, were included (Isoda 1999, 195-201, Yi 1985, 403-403). These textbooks were created around the same time as the 1934 Manchukuo national history and 1934-1935 Chinese language studies texts, which also emphasized positive aspects of the country’s past. Therefore the early 1930s can be said to be the time in Japanese colonial history when governments

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77 There were similar fears about Japanese history instruction. Yamamoto Haruo, an outside observer of Manchukuo education, told in a 1940 report of the embarrassment one teacher felt after allowing students to closely examine certain aspects of Japanese history too closely. The teacher said, “In a Japanese history text there was a story of an Emperor who exiled a former Emperor to a distant island for the sake of his subjects. After reading it, the Manchurian students said, ‘The Japanese are not very loyal,’ and made light of Japanese spirit. There have been many cases where they have not shown proper respect to the Japanese Emperor and his subjects. The textbooks contain many dangerous things, so teachers should go over the historical facts lightly, focusing on the good results loyal subjects achieve in difficult times”. Yamamoto then called for a reevaluation of the presentation of Japan in the teaching materials, particularly ancient texts (Yamamoto 1940, 35).
utilized positive messages of indigenous culture and history to win support from the local people.

Policy shifted dramatically in 1937 when colonial government began instituting the fiercely cultural assimilationist *kōmin-ka* movement. The Korean government discontinued the textbooks which incorporated Korean history, and instead began using history textbooks identical to those used in Japan (Isoda 1999, 208-210). While the purportedly independent Manchukuo government did not go as far as the Korean colonial authorities in their assimilation policies, they did follow their lead in abandoning the use of positive portrayals of the occupied region’s past as a way of gaining the people’s support.

*Elementary National people’s studies readers*

The textbooks published by the Manchukuo government’s Textbook Editing Department from 1938 to 1942 are a diverse lot, with some full of ideological materials, stressing the importance of loyalty to the Emperor and the state, and endorsing the position of Japan as a worthy and even divine hegemon, while others contained little of such material. It was a period when the Manchukuo government, involved in the war with China and facing the potential of war with the Soviet Union or the Atlantic powers, began ratcheting up imperial propaganda. The Japanese who ran the state sent Pu Yi on a second visit to Japan in 1940, and upon his return in July issued the *Guoben Dianding Zhaoshu*, which declared Amaterasu Ōkami to be the country’s “foremost god”, and essentially established State Shinto as a part of the official ideology.

This period also, however, saw a resurgence of New Education movement educators within the Manchukuo education bureaucracy, led by Terada. Many of these
officials have claimed while they supported the concept of a Manchukuo state, they were uncomfortable with what they saw as an irrational attempt to force the local population to accept a foreign ideology, especially after the *Guoben Dianding Zhaoshu* rescript was promulgated (Komagome 1996, 439, Ishimori 1970, 82-83, Tamura 1941, 36-37, Terada 1941, 223). Because of their discomfort with the developments of 1940, they kept State Shintō and its related principles out of most of the textbooks until 1943. They also carved out a few places in the curriculum which contained very few ideological messages. Even in 1942, when pressure from the government to increase ideological messages in support for the war must have grown very strong, Terada and his allies managed to actually push back the ideological tide in a few spots in the curriculum.

Late in 1937 the Textbook Editing Department began creating lower elementary school readers for the new national people’s studies curriculum, two Japanese and two Chinese language texts for each grade. Of these, the Chinese language texts contain strong ideological messages from the first page of the first volume, while the Japanese language texts contain less ideological material in the initial volumes. This may have reflected the influence of Yamaguchi Kiichirō, who disapproved of the use of such materials early in a student’s study of the Japanese language. In 1941 Terada instituted a revision of the Chinese language readers, in which he significantly reduced the amount of ideological materials in at least the 1st grade, making them more like the Japanese language texts. It is not clear why Terada did this; perhaps he was uncomfortable with strong ideological instruction in any course for the youngest children in elementary school.
Looking at the lower elementary Japanese language textbooks, only about 3% of the 1st grade Japanese language readers refer to the state. These include a page showing the Imperial palace in Xinjing, references to the national anthem and flag, a scene of soldiers marching through town, a portrayal of a class visit to a memorial for the state’s war dead, and a description of a school ceremony in honor of the Meiji Emperor. The overwhelming majority of the materials portray everyday student experiences at home, in nature, and at school. The content was very similar to the introductory Japanese language readers published by the Manchukuo government in 1934.

The editors filled the 1938 1st and 2nd grade Chinese language national people’s studies textbooks, on the other hand, with ideological materials. Of the two textbooks found from that period, 24% of the chapters contain references to the Manchukuo Emperor or state (see Table 5.5). The very first words in the first volume are “His Majesty the [Manchukuo] Emperor.” The accompanying picture shows a large group of students bowing toward a portrait of the Emperor, hanging on the wall above a dais, half shrouded by a curtain (see Figure 5.1). The next page shows students cheering in celebration on the Emperor’s birthday, and a picture of the gates of the palace. Another depicts a class of students in front of the palace’s gates, where the teacher lectures to them on the Emperor’s benevolence and the need for everyone to

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I have found two Chinese language national people’s language studies textbooks, 国民学校満語国民読本 #1 (January 1938), the first volume for the elementary schools, and 国民学舎・国民義塾満語国民読本#3 (January 1938), part of a series designed for use in the recently nationalized sishu, or academy schools. The two textbooks are very similar; they clearly were created by the same editors.
show their loyalty to him. The illustration accompanying the text shows the students bowing in unison toward the gates.

(Figure 5.1) The first two pages of the Manchukuo Lower Elementary National Studies Chinese language textbook volume #1. Students bow toward a portrait of the Manchukuo Emperor.

Japan is referred to in 22% of the chapters of these early grade Chinese language studies textbooks, usually in connection to the Japanese Emperor or the military. Often the chapters encourage students to look to the Japanese as leaders. For example, a chapter on the foundation of the country in the 2nd grade textbook concludes, “We need to take the Japanese people’s moral ideal as our own. We need to take the Japanese people as our leaders, and move forward” (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi. 1938b, 12). Another chapter features a poem which praised the unity of Japan and Manchukuo, along with drawings of Mt. Fuji and the Mt. Zhangbai side-by-side. The editors here borrowed a trope often found in Japan’s colonial textbooks of placing
symbols of Japan and the colony side-by-side to demonstrate their unity. For example, Mt. Fuji and Mt. Kumgang, a mountain in Korea considered sacred, were commonly juxtaposed in the textbooks (see Figure 5.2) (Yi 1985, 346-347).

(Figure 5.2) From the Manchukuo Lower Elementary National Studies Chinese language textbook volume #1, 1938. It features a poem proclaiming the eternal unity of Japan and Manchukuo, illustrated by drawings of Mt. Zhangbai and Mt. Fuji.

These texts were published before Terada’s appointment to head the Textbook Editing Division in November 1938. Terada ordered a revision of the elementary school Chinese language studies textbooks, which were published in 1941 and 1942. I have found only one of these texts, a 1st grade reader. It shows a remarkable change in content; Terada almost completely replaced the heavily ideological messages of the 1938 Chinese readers with poetry, children’s fables, and nature scenes. The textbook contains only a single reference to the state or Japan. In it, a father and son shopping in town before the New Years holiday decide to buy Japanese and Manchukuo flags to fly in front of their homes. Looking the 1938 and 1942 texts side by side, the absence of the Manchukuo Emperor, who appears prominently in both 1938 Chinese language
textbooks, as well as the lack of almost any other reference to the state or to Japan, is a remarkable alteration. Together with the Japanese language studies textbooks, they appear to indicate an intention on the part of the textbook editors to establish lower elementary school as a space largely free of ideological messages.

If the changes in the lower elementary Chinese language studies textbooks in 1941 and 1942 represented an effort by textbook editors to turn back strongly ideological messages, they did not attempt a similar rollback in the higher elementary national people’s studies Chinese language textbooks. I have found two of these texts, one published in 1938, and the other in 1941. The 1941 volume contains even more state-centered and militaristic material than the 1938 volume. The two post-\textit{Shingakusei} volumes averaged together represent a significant change from the 1935 higher elementary Chinese language textbooks. 29\% of the post-\textit{Shingakusei} chapters contain “hard state” material, up from 15\% in the 1935 textbooks. 35\% of the chapters are about Japan, up from 21\% in 1935, and 60\% mention the Manchukuo state, compared to 14\% in 1935. Several chapters in the 1935 textbooks discuss with approbation Manchuria’s pre-modern history, while the post-\textit{Shingakusei} textbooks dismiss pre-1931 history as “a bad dream” (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1939b, 48). Japanese emperors did not appear in the 1935 higher elementary Chinese language studies textbooks at all, and the Manchukuo Emperor appears in only 2\% of the chapters. In the post-\textit{Shingakusei} textbooks, on the other hand, 11\% mention Japanese emperors, and 10\% mention the Manchukuo Emperor.

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\footnote{No Japanese language higher elementary national people’s studies textbooks are known to exist. There is some evidence to suggest that no new texts were made before 1942, and that schools continued to use the 1935 Japanese language texts at this level until that time (Isoda 1998, 70, Terada 1943, 66).}
Another major difference was the amount of material taken from pre-modern Chinese sources. Almost 24% of the 1935 higher elementary Chinese language studies chapters include quotes or stories from pre-modern Chinese literature. Only 8% of the chapters in the post-*Shingakusei* higher elementary textbooks mention China, and almost all of those chapters discuss China’s modern problems and the opportunities for the new pro-Japanese government in Nanjing. Only one chapter includes material from pre-modern China, a collection of brief selections from the ancient classics *The Greater Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean* (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1930b, 160-163). Finally, the 1941 higher elementary volume was particularly militaristic, including several references to the religious honors given to those killed in war at the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan and at Manchukuo’s war memorials, and also positive descriptions of Japan’s new Axis allies.

Table 5.5: Themes in the 1938-1942 national people’s studies Chinese language textbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Lower Elementary 1st-2nd grades</th>
<th>Higher Elementary 6th grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#1 and #3 #2 #3 #4 6th grade average</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1938.1</td>
<td>1942.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard State</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan related</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard State + Japan</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo related</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China related</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western related</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo Emperor</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Emperor</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the highly state-centered, pro-Japanese, and militaristic content of the 1938 and 1941 higher elementary Chinese language national people’s studies textbooks, the completely different nature of four middle school Chinese language studies textbooks published in the 1940s is quite surprising. These textbooks are made up overwhelmingly of literary materials by pre-modern and modern Chinese authors; they contain little material about the state or Japan. Here was another place where textbook editors were able to create a zone largely free of the otherwise relentless drumming of Japanese imperial ideology in the last years of Manchukuo’s existence. They were very different from the middle school Japanese language studies textbooks published around the same time.

A total of eight middle school Chinese language studies (Manyu Duben) textbooks, four for boys’ middle schools and four for girls’ middle schools, were published from 1938 to 1940, and at least some of them were revised from 1942 to 1943. Four of the eight are known to exist: the 1943 revised version of volume 3 for the boys’ schools (hereafter Boys #3), the 1940 original of volume 4 for the boys’ schools (hereafter Boys #4), the 1942 revised version of volume 1 for the girls’ schools (hereafter Girls #1), and the 1942 revised version of volume 2 for the girls’ schools (hereafter Girls #2) (see Table 5.6).

The majority of chapters in these textbooks were excerpts from literary essays by pre-modern and modern Chinese, mostly about personal ethics, nature, and art. Several of the chapters in the girls’ middle school textbooks were also about the family. Only 6% of the boys’ chapters and 12% of the girls’ chapters contain hard state material, and Japan or Japanese are mentioned in only 10% of the boys’ chapters and 11% in the
girls’ chapters. These were much lower than the higher elementary Chinese language textbooks published in 1938 and 1941, in which 33% of the chapters contained hard state material and 35% mentioned Japan. The makeup of the textbooks resembles the 1934 lower middle morals textbooks in its ratio of hard state and Japan-centered chapters. A major difference, however, is that these texts contained many essays and other literary works written by noted modern Chinese authors, while the chapters in the 1934 lower middle morals textbooks were anonymously written, and used quotes and stories only from pre-modern Chinese authors.

The nature of the few state- and Japan-related chapters also differed from other middle school textbooks from this period. The middle school Japanese language studies textbooks published in the 1940s, as will be discussed later in this chapter, focused on the effort to create a strong, united East Asia under Japan’s direction, and the role of Manchukuo and its people in this undertaking. Only one chapter in the boys’ middle school Chinese language textbooks mentioned the attempt to create a united East Asia, and in fact only three chapters, all in the 1943 Boys #3 textbook, even bring up the Manchukuo state. The one chapter which talks about the effort to create a united East Asia is about Manshoujie, the celebration of the Manchukuo Emperor’s birthday. The chapter compares the event with the similar Tenchō-setsu celebration in Japan, and discusses how both words are based on phrases found in the Chinese classics. It explains the proper ways to celebrate the day, lauds the Manchukuo Emperor for his frugality and devotion to the people, and emphasizes his close contact with the Japanese Emperor. Its focus on the Emperors fits in with much of the other material found in 1940s textbooks, although its detailed discussion of the pre-modern precedents for Manshoujie is unique for the era.
Besides this chapter, only two others mention Manchukuo, one which encourages recycling waste and another which praises the recently deceased former Prime Minister Zheng. A few chapters refer to the pre-modern history of the Manchuria region, another similarity to the 1934 and 1935 textbooks. Two described Manchu literary collections, and one described a Qing palace near Fengtian city. Of the nine chapters that mention Japan, only three can be termed “hard state”. One is a laudatory chapter about Motoda Eifu, a Confucian scholar and advisor to the Meiji Emperor, one describes Japan’s naval victory at the Straights of Tsushima in the Russo-Japanese War, and one tells the story of Yamada Nagamasa, the Edo-period merchant said to have become one of the King of Siam’s chief advisors. The other chapters about Japan are about Japanese culture, including an essay comparing Chinese and Japanese theater by Akutagawa Ryūnosuke, and a modern play by Kikuchi Kan.

The majority of the chapters in the two volumes for boys’ middle schools were written by Chinese authors, 39 by modern Chinese and 52 by pre-modern Chinese. Of the modern authors, the two most frequently included were Cai Yuanpei, a reformer and Minister of Education in the early years of Republican China, and Zeng Guofan, one the leaders of the self-strengthening movement in the mid-19th century and a dedicated Confucianist. Both are represented by five essays. Most of Cai’s essays discuss the development of civilization, while most of Zeng’s are letters to his younger brothers and children encouraging them in their studies of the classics. The One Hundred Days reformer Liang Qichao also was represented with four essays. Most of the other modern authors were novelists and essayists. Although some of the modern essays include criticism of modern China’s government and culture, the majority are positive about the country. Of the chapters from pre-modern sources, the majority are essays
by literary figures from the Tang, Song, and Qing periods, such as Han Yu and Su Shi, although there are also a few excerpts from the ancient classics.

The two girls’ middle school Chinese language studies textbooks, both published in 1942, contain 12% hard state material, twice as much as appear in the boys’ texts. The hard state material in the girls’ textbooks are much more militaristic as well. Still, 12% hard state content is still a much lower than that found in many other Manchukuo textbooks published in the 1940s. Three of the hard state chapters are about proud family members seeing off or thinking about brothers or sons in the military. Others discuss sacrifices required by those on the home front during the war. The few chapters about Japan, however, are all about its culture and geography. The Manchukuo and Japanese Emperors hardly appear at all. Almost 10% of the chapters mentioned the West or Westerners, and all of these references are positive, despite the fact that Japan was at war with the United States and Britain. Like the boys’ middle school textbooks, the editors chose selections from works by Chinese authors for most of the chapters, but unlike the boys’ textbooks the majority of the selections are by modern Chinese authors, with only a few by pre-modern Chinese. Modern female novelists authored many of the selections. The most frequent choice was Bing Xin (1900-1999), a popular female novelist and professor at Yanjing University in Beijing, who appears seven times in the textbooks. The editors also selected two works by the famous modern author Lu Xun. Lu’s inclusion is interesting because some have claimed that his works were banned in Manchukuo during the 1930s (Qi 1997, 127).

The boys’ and girls’ middle school Chinese language studies texts of the 1940s, therefore, are for the most part collections of pre-modern and modern literary works, mostly by Chinese authors, and include relatively few propaganda messages about
Manchukuo, Japan, or the war. Most present a positive picture of China. They show that elements within the education bureaucracy still thought Manchukuo national identity and culture should be linked to Chinese culture, and therefore be distinctly different from Japanese identity and Japanese culture. I have not encountered any other middle school textbooks published in Japanese colonies or occupied areas from this era which contain so few materials about the war effort, the state, and Japan. One should keep in mind, however, that Manchukuo middle schools from 1938 to 1945 taught Chinese language studies only three hours a week. Middle school students spent more of their time in Japanese language studies class (six hours a week), and in a combined morals, history, and geography course (an average of four hours a week). The textbooks for these courses contained much more ideological material than the Chinese language studies textbooks.

Table 5.6: Themes in the 1940-1943 middle school Chinese language studies textbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Girls’ #1-2</th>
<th>Boys #3-4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-8th grades</td>
<td>9-10th grades</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practical</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard State</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan related</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard + Japan</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West related</td>
<td>13.5% (all positive)</td>
<td>9.6% (all positive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo related</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China related</td>
<td>68.6%</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo Emperor</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Emperor</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Middle school Japanese language and morals texts

In contrast to the middle school Chinese language studies texts, Japanese language and morals texts published in the Shingakusei era, particularly in the 1940s, were filled with state-centered and pro-Japanese materials. The Education Bureau published eight Japanese language studies textbooks for the four grades of middle school. The bureau farmed out the editing of the first four textbooks, published from 1938 to 1939, to Ōide Masayoshi, a private citizen discussed in Chapter 4. The Textbook Editing Department of the bureau edited the last four, all of which were published in 1941. Six of these texts have been found, three of Ōide’s and three of the 1941 volumes.

Of the chapters edited by Ōide, 17% are hard state and 31% are Japan-related, which are about the same ratios as the 1935 lower middle Japanese language textbooks. Ōide included discussion of the Manchukuo and Japanese Emperors in his textbooks, (they appeared in 7% and 4% of the chapters respectively), as well as a few positive portrayals of Japanese military figures and descriptions of cooperation between Manchurians and Japanese during the Manchurian Incident. In the majority of chapters about Japan and Manchukuo, however, he focused on literary, cultural, and geographic issues rather than the state or military. Many of the chapters try to appeal to students on a personal level. Some are written from the point of view of a Chinese middle school student living in a school dorm, discussing his daily lifestyle. Others tell stories of friendly (if paternalistic) personal relationships between Japanese and Manchurians. One that stands out in particular is the story of a sick Manchurian army officer. At the hospital two Japanese gallantly offer their blood for a transfusion. Although the officer finally succumbs to his illness, he first thanks the Japanese doctors,
and says, “Japanese blood now flows through my own body. Even if I die, I have nothing to regret” (Ōide 1939b, 135-139). Ōide’s textbooks, therefore, avoid trying to overawe the students with lofty words about the Emperor and state, and instead try to win them through appeals to an emotional bond between the two countries.

While Terada instituted a decrease in ideological messages in lower elementary school Chinese language textbooks in 1941 and 1942, just the opposite occurred in middle school Japanese language textbooks. The 1941 middle school Japanese language textbooks edited within the Education Bureau include almost twice as much hard state and Japan-related material as the Ōide textbooks. There is nearly the same amount of material about Japanese history, geography, and culture, but there is much more about the Japanese state and its political and military ties with Manchukuo. The 1941 textbooks, unlike those written by Ōide, include almost no references to school lifestyle, instead many of the chapters discuss Manchukuo’s army and factories, probably because the government intended many of the students to become soldiers and industrial employees (see Table 5.7).

Among the militarist and state-centered chapters in the 1941 middle school Japanese language studies textbooks is one purported to be a letter to a young Manchurian army recruit from his older brother, encouraging him put all his trust in Japan, a country with a “peerless army” and a divine Emperor. “Our ancestors are looking on from afar at our present day efforts,” he reminds his brother (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1941a, 57-64). In another students from Japan, Manchukuo, and China are portrayed as writing words of encouragement to each other about their common work in the creation of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere (Minsei-bu Kyōiku-shi 1942b, 89-99). The last chapter of the 8th and final Japanese language studies textbook

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describes the 1940 Guoben Dianding Zhaoshu rescript, in which Amaterasu the country’s “foremost god,” and the subsequent construction of shrines to Amaterasu at the capital and near each school. “The establishment of our country”, it states, “and all its developments since then derive from the divine virtues of Japan’s Great Ancestor Amaterasu Ōkami, and the protection of the living god the Japanese Emperor” (144). The Manchukuo Emperor is presented as the link between these Japanese principles and his state, “The Manchukuo Emperor reveres the Japanese Emperor as a father-king, and his ancestor, Amaterasu, as the founding divinity of our country . . . [T]he Way of the gods is the principle ideology of our country, deriving from the Manchukuo Emperor’s firm conviction and understanding” (145). This final chapter probably was the kind of material about which Terada and his allies expressed their wariness, in fear that such blatant submission to extreme Japanese imperial concepts would destroy the illusion of Manchukuo independence (Ishimori 1970, 82-83, Tamura 1941, 36-37, Terada 1941, 223). It is the only chapter from the Japanese and Chinese language studies textbooks from the pre-1943 period to mention the Guoben Dianding Zhaoshu rescript, and its placement at the end of the final textbook in the series may have been their way of bowing to pressure from the central government to include the material, while tucking it away in an obscure location.  

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80 Volume #8, which included the chapter on Amaterasu as the state’s “leading god”, probably was not used in many middle schools, because the middle school Japanese language studies textbooks were written at impractical high language levels. Hori Toshio, a Fengtain Provincial education inspector and Japanese language teacher at Nanman College, wrote several articles published in the 1940s in which he complained that the Japanese texts were too difficult for students. In one he describes teaching a 9th grade class at one of the stronger middle schools in Fengtian City a lesson from a 9th grade textbook, which ended in failure because of the students’ inability to comprehend the Japanese (Hori 1942b). He
Table 5.7: Themes in the 1938-1943 middle school Japanese language textbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>#1-3</th>
<th>#5, 7-8</th>
<th>#1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Ōide)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938-1939</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literary</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard State</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan related</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Manchukuo</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo related</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other modern</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo Emperor</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Emperor</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While there was a wide variation in the ratio of ideological and non-ideological material in the Japanese and Chinese language studies textbooks published in the

also said that Nanman College, which accepted graduates from the middle schools, started its first-year students from the second volume (7th grade) of the middle school textbooks (Hori 1940b).
post-Shingakusei period, the morals textbooks published for middle schools during this period appear to have been extremely ideological in nature. Terada intimated his displeasure with these textbooks after the war, so this may have been an area where he had little control (Terada 1975, 85).

No morals textbooks were published for the elementary schools in the 1938-1942 period because the morals curriculum was folded into the omnibus national people’s studies course. There was a separate morals course in middle schools, although the course name changed in 1938 from “ethics” (終身) to “national people’s morals” (國民道德). Both Japanese and Chinese language morals textbooks for the boys’ and girls’ middle schools were published during the 1938-1942 period, only one has been found, a Chinese language text for the first grade of girls’ middle school (7th grade overall), published in October 1942 (see Table 5.8). This textbook is even more state-centered than the 1941 middle school Japanese language studies textbooks (72%), referred more often to Japan (67%), and contains several references to Amaterasu and State Shintō.

Only the first chapter of this textbook discusses the role of women. It encourages girls to prepare to be mothers who will strengthen the country by preserving the home, and instructs them to educate and morally train their children, comfort their husbands, and preserve the family’s traditions, health, and finances.

The Manchukuo Emperor appears in nearly half of the textbook’s chapters, and almost every time his link with the Japanese Emperor is mentioned. Rather than a Chinese Emperor in the traditional mold, the textbook portrays the Manchukuo Emperor as a conduit of power from a divine source of virtue, the Japanese Emperor. A major
The difference from other textbooks of this period is the frequent description of State Shintō rituals associated with the Japanese Emperor, and the place of Amaterasu as the “leading god” of both Japan and Manchukuo. Among these are two chapters which emphasize the importance the declarations of Amaterasu’s oracle at the Ise Shrine. These chapters connect both emperors’ “morality” with the oracles, and thereby the divine. So while State Shintō was not mentioned in the middle school Chinese language studies textbooks, and referred to only once in the last chapter of the Japanese language studies textbooks, it appears to have been a major theme in the morals textbooks.

Table 5.8: Themes in the 1942 girls’ middle school morals textbook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>7th grade 1942.10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard State</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan related</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo related</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China related</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West-positive</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West-negative</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchukuo Emperor</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan Emperor</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Shinto</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1943 system

In 1943 the Manchukuo government instituted a series of changes in the education system. The Ministry of Education, reduced to the level of a bureau in 1937, was recreated. In elementary school the omnibus national people’s studies curriculum was split into three subjects: science, national language (Japanese and Chinese), and
“state founding spirit” (morals). In higher elementary and middle schools the morals, history, and geography curriculum were merged into “state founding spirit”. As war conditions worsened, an increasing amount of school time was spent in labor service and military drills, particularly in the middle schools and colleges. Some former students report that it got to the point in agricultural middle schools that classroom instruction occurred only on rainy days.

The government directed the Textbook Editing Division to begin a complete revision of the textbooks to reflect wartime conditions. Because of a paper shortage, however, few new textbooks were published (Terada 1943, 97). Two have been found: a teacher’s manual for elementary school 1st grade state founding spirit (morals) course, and a middle school 7th grade Japanese language studies textbook.  

The elementary school morals teacher’s manual, published in February 1943, is a clear indication that any attempts by Terada and his allies to limit the amount of ideological material in the first years of elementary school had now ended. 65% of the chapters contain hard state material, much of it about the war. The first chapter teaches students how to bow to the Imperial portraits. The second introduces the idea of worshiping Amaterasu. Another gave instructions about what days to fly the national flag in front of ones house. Many of the chapters refer to honoring the military, including visits to memorials for the war dead. The 8th of each month is set

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81 I have also recently found a 1944 elementary school 2nd grade Chinese language studies textbook, although I have not yet analyzed its content.

82 A 1943 survey by a Chinese elementary school teacher in rural Tonghua Province found that out of 280 families whose children attended the school, only 23 owned a Manchukuo flag, and only five of those owned a Japanese flag as well (Zhao 1943, 101).
aside for special lessons about the war, as also occurred in schools in Japan. One section instructs teachers to ameliorate student concerns about the rationing system and their general poverty by telling them that conditions are even worse in the enemy countries. It then provides the teachers with detailed stories of those conditions. About England, for example, they claim all supplies of heating coal had been exhausted, and police were powerless to stop looters. In the United States saboteurs were destroying industrial production, and race riots were breaking out in all cities. In Nationalist China the people were wasting away in caves. The text then instructs teachers to “not be abstract” in their descriptions of their enemies’ sufferings (Wenjiao-bu 1943, 136-138). Another story provided to teachers is a history of the East Asian conflict told as a children’s play, with each major country anthropomorphized as characters. The Western countries are portrayed as dissembling robbers, China as a foolish drug addict, Japan as a fearless defender of Asia, and Manchukuo as “the cute, precious child of Japan.”

83 "Asia is sleeping. Without a word, someone has snuck into Manchuria. One, two, three of them. No, they are not visitors. They are burglars—white men, with pointy noses. One of them immediately waves a gun, and frightens the people, saying, ‘Hand over Manchuria!’ China is surprised, and starts shaking violently. Japan immediately gets up, and knocks the burglar down. This burglar’s name is Russia.

"Russia is bitter about Japan beating it, but can’t do anything about it. The other two burglars see this, and hide their guns behind them. They say in sweet voices, ‘Everyone, let’s be friends’. Then they turn to each other and mockingly stick their tongues out. These two robbers have stolen goods from throughout the world, and have come to steal Asia’s things. However, seeing how Japan defeated Russia, they have suddenly become scared. ‘Everyone, let’s be friends’, they say, trying to trick Asia.

“Because Japan fully understands the robbers’ evil hearts, it repeatedly warns China, ‘These men are dangerous robbers. Don’t be tricked by them’. China, however, does not listen. ‘They are wearing beautiful clothes, and have brought many presents, they must be good visitors’, China thinks. ‘Welcome, visitors, please come in, let’s be friends’, it says.

83"
“What are the visitor’s gifts? A terrible drug, opium. When the Chinese people smoke this drug, they become very sick. Their bodies and spirits rot away, and they cannot work or study. Then, with eyes glittering, the robbers pull out their guns. They are the Britain and the United States. They say to sick China, ‘Give us your goods, your land, your money’, and take it all away. Japan is concerned, and says over and over, ‘Wake up. Don’t let them cheat you’. But China turns on Japan instead. Japan feels sorry for China, whose heart has been depraved by the robbers’ drugs. In order to revive China’s bad heart, it gives it a hard slap. China begins to sob, and says to the robbers, ‘Japan hit me! Help me!’ Then the robbers, bringing many of their underlings, begin threatening Japan. But Japan faces them undaunted.

“Strong Japan, just Japan, raises its fists, and glares at them, saying, ‘Come on robbers, I am ready for you’. Then, someone tears themselves from the robber’s grasp, and flies to the side of Japan. It is our Manchukuo. Manchukuo, the cute, precious child of Japan. Seeing this, the robbers get red-faced with anger. They try to crush the newly born country. But it is safe, because Japan, the greatest country in the world, is here. Japan has helped our country, and gradually we are becoming great.

“Around this time, Russia begins to bully our country. As soon as it does, Japan immediately defeats it. 1200 of its airplanes are shot down, and Russia says, ‘I am tired of fighting with Manchukuo’, and runs away. Then Britain and the United States join hands, and trick China again. They say to it, ‘We’re here for you, slap Japan back’. So China turns on Japan. Japan angrily says to it, ‘You pitiful thing, you’ve been tricked by those two again. Aren’t you scared of them robbing you?’ But China does not listen.

“Britain, the United States, and Russia lend airplanes, artillery, and big guns to China, and it goes to war with Japan. But how can it think it is a match for the Japanese army? The Chinese army is routed by the Japanese army, and it flees to the deep hills of Chongqing. In its hiding place, the Chinese army haughtily says, ‘Here we are safe. The Japanese army won’t come here’. But the Japanese army’s airplanes suddenly fly to Chongqing and rains bombs on it. Fires burn everything. The Chinese soldiers flee into holes like moles.

“Japan is certainly not trying to bully China. It is fighting China in order to save it from the hands of the robbers. It is fighting in order to help China and build a great Asia. In the midst of this, in China friends of Japan and Manchukuo are made. New China sees how old China was tricked by the robbers, and gets angry. Japan, Manchukuo, and the new China unite their power and hearts, and turn on the enemy. The enemies see this, and bring even more of their underlings to besiege Japan. Japan has been patient for a long time, but now it is really mad, and it suddenly attacks, cutting off the enemies’ hands and feet. At this time a country named Thailand joins our group. Our numbers are growing: Japan, Manchukuo, new China, and Thailand. The enemies are surprised by Japan’s sudden act. ‘Oh, Japan has ships that move as quickly as airplanes.’ ‘Worse, they have something called
69% of the middle school 7th grade Japanese language studies textbook, published in May 1943, is made up of hard state material, which is twice as much as the already state-centered 1941 textbooks. Besides chapters about Amaterasu and general cooperation with Japan, nearly a third of the textbook contains war-related material. For example one chapter lionizes a self-sacrificing soldier serving in China, while another describes the attack on Pearl Harbor. Besides the chapters on the Japanese army, there are also several chapters depicting local Manchukuo soldiers involved in the war effort by protecting the railway lines from bandits and patrolling the northern border with the Soviet Union. This may show a shift in the leadership’s conception of the Manchukuo population from being chiefly a source of economic labor toward becoming more active in the military side of Japan’s war effort.

human torpedoes. They ride the bombs, and blow us up. ‘They do such dangerous things? Don’t they care about their lives?’ ‘No, the Japanese are so scary because they gladly give up their lives for their country’.

“The blue-eyed robbers go pale. Their legs shake violently. Manchukuo has now come to its full strength, and begins helping Japan. Because strong Manchukuo is striving so hard, Russia is scared, and does not come to our enemies’ aid. And Manchukuo is not just staring down Russia. In thanks it sends aid to Japan, including food, coal, and metal. Manchukuo is working to do all it can to help Japan establish a truly great Asia. Sending every bit of kaoliang and soybeans to Japan is more important than anything. It wishes it could give even more coal to Japan.

“Please to not forget this most important spirit. If you do forget it, you would be ungrateful to Japan for its many favors. It was terrible in the past when robbers came and bullied everyone, wasn’t it? Please understand that now Manchukuo has united with Japan to fight Asia’s enemies” (Wenjiao-bu 1943, 139-149).
The 1938-1943 textbooks compared to textbooks in Korea

The Korean colonial government published the Fourth Korean Textbook Series in 1939-1941, in order to reflect the changes in the education system instituted by the start of the kōmin-ka movement in late 1937. While the Korean language studies and Japanese language studies from the previous Second and Third Textbook Series include many references to Korean history and geography, the government erased nearly all such references in the Fourth Series. Not a single historical Korean appears in any of the Fourth Series textbooks. There are some depictions of nameless contemporary Koreans, almost all of which are portrayed as following Japanese customs such as wearing Japanese clothes, bowing toward the direction of the Imperial palace, and flying Japanese flags. Korean language studies was reduced to the status of an optional subject in 1938, and Korean language textbooks were made only for the 1st grade. The number of chapters about the military and Japanese myths nearly tripled in the elementary Japanese language and morals textbooks, while the number of chapters about State Shintō doubled in those same texts (Yi 1985, 461-495). A final Fifth Series, produced in 1942-1944, continued in this direction, becoming nearly identical with the textbooks used in Japan. Clearly, 1937-1939 was a fundamental turning point in Korean colonial education.

Manchukuo education went through its own turning point during these same years. As in Korea, Japanese language instruction increased, native language instruction decreased (although not nearly as drastically), and the amount of material about the occupied region's history decreased. One difference was that one Manchurian, the Manchukuo Emperor, appeared frequently in the Manchukuo textbooks, while there was no comparable figure for the Korea textbooks. Besides the
Manchukuo Emperor, very few Manchurian historical figures appear in the Manchukuo elementary school texts in the post-Shingakusei period. The middle school Chinese language studies texts were the one exception to this trend, they included many positive stories about contemporary figures from Manchuria and the rest of China. The number of military-related chapters increased in Manchukuo textbooks, although somewhat behind the Korean curve, spiking up in the 1942 middle morals textbook and the 1943 textbooks. The number of references to State Shintō also was high only in the 1942 middle morals textbook and the 1943 textbooks, three to four years after a similar rise in the Korean textbooks. No analytical study of the Korean middle school textbooks has yet been done, but it is doubtful there were any Korean equivalents to the Manchukuo middle school Chinese language studies textbooks, which mention Japan only briefly and continue to assert the importance of Chinese culture and the region’s independent history as a part of Manchukuo identity. The Manchukuo textbooks, therefore, followed many of the trends of the Korean textbooks in the 1938-1942 period, but for the most part did not go as far (or as rapidly) toward an emphasis on the Japanese language over the native language, the removal of materials which admitted the existence of a local identity within the Japanese empire, and a preponderance of materials about the military, Japan’s myths, and State Shintō.

School Ceremonies

The nature of Manchukuo school ceremonies mirrored the changes which occurred in the textbooks in response to changes in state ideology. They went from ceremonies which depicted the society as independent and Confucian-centered, to ones
which were increasingly Japan-centered, implying the superiority of Japan’s language and polity, and demanding the students support Japan’s war.

In the 1932-1937 period most school ceremonies appear to have been traditional Chinese ceremonies. As mentioned previously, one of the Education Ministry’s first acts was to establish the Festival of Confucius as a central part of the annual school calendar. There were some innovations, including State Founding Day and the Emperor’s Birthday, and there are two passages in the 1935 textbooks which encouraged students to fly the state flag outside their homes on those days. Japanese icons, however, for the most part did not appear in school ceremonies in this period, according to the testimonies of former students.\(^8^4\)

After 1938, however, the government discontinued most of the traditional Chinese ceremonies, and began to focus on those which glorified the Manchukuo and Japanese emperors. A September 10, 1940 law established seven “celebration days” and four “commemoration days” for schools throughout the country. The celebration days were: New Years, the Manchukuo Emperor’s birthday, Japan’s Founding Day \((Kigensetsu)\), Manchukuo’s Founding Day, the Japanese Emperor’s birthday, the anniversary of Pu Yi’s first visit to Japan, and a day in honor of Amaterasu. The four commemoration days included two separate days in honor of soldiers who died in the establishment of Manchukuo, and two traditional events celebrating the planting and harvesting seasons \((Su 2000, 2)\). Three of the eleven, therefore, were traditional Chinese events, while four focused on the Japanese imperial house. Also, all schools

\(^{8^4}\) One exception is the testimony of Meng Shaomin, who was an elementary student in Liaodong Province when Manchukuo was created. He claimed Manchukuo schools flew both the flags of both Japan and Manchukuo as early as 1932 \((Qi 1997, 125)\).
were required to hold daily morning devotionals in which rescripts supposedly written by the Manchukuo Emperor were read, and the students paid obeisance in the direction of the palaces of both emperors. Older students were expected to memorize the rescripts in Japanese as well as Chinese. Special buildings dedicated to housing a portrait of the Manchukuo Emperor were constructed at most schools, and the students were expected to treat the portrait with the utmost respect, mimicking an established practice in schools in Japan (Nomura 1995, Qi 1997, 204).

The number of longer special commemorations increased over the years, and became increasingly Japan-centered. Because the Huiluan Rescript was promulgated on May 2, 1935 special ceremonies were held on 2nd of each month. After the Pacific War began on December 8, 1941, special ceremonies were held on the 8th of each month to honor the war dead and strengthen martial spirit.

On December 8, 1942, on the first anniversary of the commencement of the Pacific War, the Manchukuo government promulgated an oath designed to be recited in schools and workplaces. Named “Precepts of the People” (J. Kokumin-kun), it began with a pledge to recognize the Shinto “way of the gods” as the foundation of the country, reflecting the change in state ideology after Pu Yi’s second visit to Japan in 1940. It also contained pledges of loyalty to the Manchukuo emperor, diligence in labor, personal honor, and unity in accomplishing the goals of the state and the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Testimonies from former students indicate the recitation of this oath became a central part of school ceremonies. Elementary students were expected to recite it in Chinese, while middle school students recited it in Japanese. It was also recited at morning devotionals by soldiers and industrial workers (Nomura 1995). In testimonies gathered after the war, many former students single out these
ceremonies as the most objectionable part of Manchukuo education (Isoda 1994, Qi 1997).

Conclusion

There are few available post-war descriptions of the internal workings of Manchukuo’s education bureaucracy, so figuring out who supported what positions is a bit like fumbling about in the dark. Clearly, however, some elements within the bureaucracy, like Kamimura and Terada, wanted to create a consciousness of Manchurians as an independent people, with their own unique culture and history. They, like a handful of other Japanese officials, believed in the vision of Manchukuo becoming a partner with Japan by its own free will. Even if they realized that was not the true state of affairs, they probably hoped that by teaching these principles in schools, the ideas could become self-fulfilling. Several Manchukuo textbooks bear their imprints, such as the 1934 middle school morals textbooks and the 1941 middle school Chinese language studies textbooks. For the most part, however, the Manchukuo textbooks became increasingly centered on teaching loyalty to the state and deference to Japan. In 1934 Manchukuo society was presented as an ideal mixture of Chinese literary culture, a heritage of rugged military and pastoral traditions from the Manchus and Mongols, and modernity provided by a friendly Japan. After 1938 the historically independent and Chinese aspects of the culture were deemphasized in all but a few hours of middle school instruction, and the image of Manchukuo dependent on and obedient to Japan was accentuated. After 1943, Manchukuo government policy had all but in name gone the way of Korea and Taiwan toward kōmin-ka, making the people into Japanese imperial subjects. The images of Manchukuo presented in the textbooks
at the end was as Japan’s “cute, precious child”, and the people were depicted as railway guards, a lowly position in the ranks of Japan’s disintegrating military.
Epilogue

Manchukuo as a window on the soul of Japanese colonialism

Why study Manchukuo’s education? One might say that it can help us understand present-day Northeast China more fully, but this is a problematic position. Recent scholarship has discovered significant physical, economic, and social legacies of Japanese colonialism in Korea and Taiwan. For example Carter Eckert has found substantial economic and social structures in Korea which date from the years of the Japanese occupation (Eckert 1996), and Leo Ching has shown the colonial legacy informs the discourse of separation from China which persists in Taiwan (Ching 2001). In Northeast China, however, the residual marks of the Japanese imperial experience are more difficult to find. In August 1945 the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and swept through Manchuria, destroying the Kwantung Army in less than a week and looting much of the most valuable industrial equipment. The region was subsequently reincorporated into the Chinese state. Although Manchukuo policies left their marks in terms of city planning and to some degree industrial development, it is difficult to find substantial signs of the Manchukuo legacy in the post-war social structures in Northeast China. Moreover, the Communist Chinese government’s unyielding opposition to the development of sub-national regional identities has destroyed any conception of a regional “Northeastern” identity which may have otherwise persisted.

As far as education, the number of students attending schools increased significantly during the Manchukuo period (see Table 4.8), and real strides were made in the areas of general literacy and middle school vocational education, although similar advances might well have taken place without Japanese involvement. Also the physical results of education policies, the school buildings themselves, remained. It is
difficult to ascertain how much Manchukuo education “convinced” the students of its various messages, and to what degree those convictions persisted after the war. All indications suggest that the general public’s distrust and fear of the Japanese, fostered by Japan’s military actions from 1931 through 1934, never dissipated during the Manchukuo era. Chinese children and parents, however, faced with the choice of accepting or rejecting a modern education laced with the ideology of the invader, overwhelming chose to accept.

Rather than looking at Manchukuo education as a building block for the future of Northeast China, however, I hold that it is a window for understanding the complicated nature of Japanese colonial thought and procedures. Manchukuo’s institutional separation from the Japanese government gave a variety of actors the breathing room to treat the country as a testing ground for their ideas, many of them working at cross-purposes. Manchukuo education illustrates the contested and ad-hoc nature of Japanese colonialism.

The curriculum created for Manchukuo schools and the application of the curriculum show what the leading Japanese officials in the country wanted the young people to think and how they wanted them to act. In 1934, the state leadership allowed the Ministry of Education, led by Zheng and Kamimura, a degree of independence in the formation of policies. They tried to teach children to see themselves as part of an important new project, an unprecedented attempt to create a new kind of society which mixed the best parts of East Asia’s historical legacy with a new vision of the future. They used familiar Chinese concepts, particularly the Confucian idea of an ideal government responsive to the needs of the people, as well as asserting a unique regional history marked by the martial spirit of the Manchus and Mongols. Added to these
legacies, the officials encouraged the students to accept their version of “ethnic harmony,” and thereby acquiesce to the current state of Japanese political and economic dominance. They did not, however, frequently refer directly to Japan in the textbooks, nor did they emphasize Japanese language study. They did not expect the students to model themselves on the Japanese. Manchukuo officials encouraged students to understand and respect Japan as a great nation, but also to proudly assert a legacy presented to them as their own. They tried to teach the students to see their state as a truly independent entity which entered into a partnership with Japan of its own volition.

In 1935 the central state authorities took greater control of Manchukuo education, and began to change the state ideology to one more closely linked to Japan. The state began encouraging the students to look to Japan as the superior in its relationship to Manchukuo, and moved toward the use of national and mythical symbols intended to create a sense of awe among the students. They continued, however, to use appeals to the region’s Chinese cultural and independent legacies.

In 1938 the trend toward teaching students to identify with Japan and speak Japanese gained momentum, as did the use of national symbols, particularly the Emperors. A new emphasis on the Japanese language was part of an assertion among some Japanese that the process of learning the language could change the very nature of the students, allowing them to feel the “Japanese spirit” and thereby become friendlier to Japan. The messages of Manchukuo’s long independent history and proud Chinese cultural heritage all but disappeared, except in the middle school Chinese language textbooks. Textbooks shifted from a focus on encouraging greater agricultural productivity to one which emphasized the industrial economy, probably a reflection of the perceived needs of the first five-year plan. Despite these shifts, however, liberal
officials in the education bureaucracy, such as Terada, worked to limit the amount of the most chauvinistic material, such as sections which praised the Japanese military or taught that the Japanese imperial house was descended from the gods.

In 1943, however, the pressures of the war enabled the government to defeat the efforts of Terada and his colleagues, and the schools began teaching much more about the military, encouraging the students to honor soldiers and become brave fighters themselves. This reflected the implementation of Manchukuo’s army conscription system in 1942, enacted because of the shift of many Japanese troops from the Manchukuo/Soviet border to battle zones in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The 1943 textbooks also included much more material about Shinto myths, as part of the government’s efforts beginning in 1940 to make State Shinto and Amaterasu central to the state’s ideology. This represented a further step in the attempt to have the students feel the “Japanese spirit”.

While the Manchukuo government always intended to use education to further Japan’s goals, the methods they used changed considerably over time. The switch from rational argument to a reliance on the “spirit” of the Japanese language and finally State Shinto to win over the population reflected the general trend in the Japanese empire away from the ideas of gradualists like Gotô Shimpei, who insisted colonial policies must be based on some kind of “reason” or “science”, to those of nativists, who relied on the perceived power of the Japanese spirit to convert the population.

In Manchukuo Japanese officials experimented with what was to them a new form of colonial control, the puppet state. They took the lessons learned there in the establishment of subsequent puppet states in Inner Mongolia and China. For example Ōide Masayoshi and Iizuka Michio, two leading textbook editors, went on to edit
textbooks for puppet governments in occupied China in 1936 and 1937 (Komagome 1996). Nishimoto Tetsumitsu, a former student of Terada’s at Kyōsen and a Manchukuo textbook editor under Terada, was sent to one of the Inner Mongolian puppet states in 1939 to lead their textbook department (Terada 1975). Officials and teachers with experience in Manchukuo took education positions in locations throughout occupied China during the war years.

Finally, in the context of the wider world, Manchukuo education provides an example of government ideology and policy in a multi-ethnic society in which a minority group controls the levers of power, and can act as a contrast in studies of places such as the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union and the black South African homelands of the 1970s and 1980s. For example, both the Soviet Union and Japan expected the people of their client states to accept a certain civic ideology and identity while retaining their ethnic identity. In the 1920s the Soviet central government expected the minority nationalities to accept communism and a “Soviet” civic identity, but they also encouraged the minorities to keep their own languages and culture, and run their own local governments (Martin 2001). In two major ways, however, the Manchukuo government’s policies were more intrusive. First, in the Soviet case, it was an intellectual construct the people were expected to accept (Marxism), while in Manchukuo after 1938 it was an emotional one, the “Japanese spirit”. Second, Marxism could be taught in any language, but Japanese spirit, the Manchukuo officials held, could be taught only in Japanese.

While both governments intended to change the people through education, the Soviets of the 1920s aimed more for the intellect, the head, while the Manchukuo officials of the period from 1938 to 1945 aimed more toward emotion, or the heart.
This overconfidence in the power of the Japanese spirit, perhaps more than anything else, accounted for Japan’s military overextension and eventual defeat.
## Glossary

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<tr>
<th>Pinvin</th>
<th>Wade-Giles/Other</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Character</th>
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<td>Xinjing</td>
<td>Hsiking</td>
<td>Shinkyō</td>
<td>新京</td>
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Manchuria education timeline

1905
September  Japan and Russia sign the Portsmouth Treaty, ending the Russo-Japanese War, and cedes a lease to the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. Japan renames the ceded region the Kwantung Leased Territory.

1906
June  Japan creates the semi-public South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR). The Kwantung territorial government and the SMR began opening schools.

1912
January  The Chinese Republic is established.

1925
The SMR establishes the Manchurian Education Specialty School (Kyōsen), under the direction of Hobo Takashi.

1928
December  Zhang Xueliang declares an alliance with the Guomindang government.

1931
September  Plotters from the Kwantung Army stage an explosion which they use as an excuse to begin occupying all of Manchuria.

1932
March  The state of Manchukuo is established, with Pu Yi as President, and Zheng Xiaoxu as Prime Minister. Kamamura Tetsuya, a former SMR official, is named as the head of the Education Bureau, a division of the Civil Affairs Ministry.

July  The Ministry of Education is created, with Zheng Xiaoxu as Minister, and Kamamura Tetsuya as School Affairs and General Affairs Director.
September  Nishiyama Masai, a former Japan Ministry of Education official, becomes General Affairs Director, while Kamimura remains as School Affairs Director. A period of struggle between the “Monbusho faction” and “local faction” begins.

1933
May  Japan and China sign the Tanggu Truce, by which the Chinese Nationalist government implicitly recognized Japanese control over Manchuria.

1934
March  Pu Yi becomes the Manchukuo Emperor.

September  The Ministry of Education publishes its first textbook series.

1935
March  Nishiyama Masai and Kamimura Tetsuya are removed from their leadership positions in the Ministry of Education, replaced by Kume Nario and Kamio Kazuharu.

April  Pu Yi visits Japan and meets the Japanese Emperor. Upon his return he promulgates the *Huiluan* Rescript, in which he declared his loyalty to Japan.


December  The Ministry of Education publishes its second textbook series.

1936
July  The Ministry of Education produces its first plan for a new education system.
August  Minagawa Toyoji is named General Affairs Director and Tsutomi Tsukuda is named School Affairs Director of the Ministry of Education. The creation of a new education system becomes the main focus of their tenure.

1937
May  The Manchukuo government promulgates the *Shingakusei* (New Education System).

June  The government dissolves the Ministry of Education, and the education bureaucracy are shifted into the newly created Education Bureau within the Civil Affairs Ministry. Minagawa Toyoji is named first director of the bureau.

July  Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

December  Nanjing falls to Japanese military.

1938
January  The *Shingakusei* (New Education System) is enacted. Japanese, Chinese, and Mongolian are declared the national languages. The Education Bureau begins publishing an entirely new set of textbooks, meant to replace the 1934-1935 textbooks.

August  Tamura Toshio replaces Minagawa as director of the Education Bureau.

November  Terada Kijirō is named director of the Education Bureau Textbook Editing Department.
1940
May
Pu Yi travels to Japan for the second time. After his return, the government promulgates the *Guoben Dianding Zhaoshu*, which declares Amaterasu as the country’s “foremost god”. The government builds Shintō shrines at the imperial palace and at many schools.

1941
March
Kida Kiyoshi is named director of the Education Bureau.

December
Japan goes to war with the United States and the United Kingdom.

1943
January
The Education Bureau enacts a revision of the elementary and middle school curriculums, and begins publishing a new set of textbooks to fit the current state ideology and wartime conditions.

March
The Ministry of Education is reestablished. Tanaka Koshio is appointed vice-minister

1944
April
Terada Kijirō resigns his position as director of the Textbook Editing Department.

October
A state deliberative council recommends new wartime education principles.

1945
August
The Soviet Union declares war on Japan, swiftly defeats the Kwantung Army, and occupies all of Manchuria. Manchukuo is dissolved.
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