

THE UKRAINIAN VOTER
Electoral Behavior in a New Democracy

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University of Pittsburgh, 2011

The “normalization” of politics in new democracies is an important concern of political science research. Normalization could refer to democratic consolidation when democracy “becomes the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996). Some of the factors contributing to normalization are stable institutions, the rule of law, and transparency in power transfer, among others. Yet, it can be argued that the democratic process is normalized when programmatic parties compete for political office by wooing a sophisticated and knowledgeable electorate (Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000). This inquiry is a story of such normalization in the case of a new post-communist democracy – Ukraine. In the literature the Ukrainian public is depicted as highly apolitical, unsophisticated, and divided along the ethno-cultural regional cleavage which contributes to the problems of normalization of electoral competition. Moreover, there is a general sense that voters are “the least likely segment of Ukrainian polity” to influence political processes (Copsey 2005). Yet, the events of the Orange Revolutions showed otherwise. It does not seem reasonable any longer to ignore the Ukrainian voter and her role in the development of a democratic Ukraine. Recently Timothy J. Colton (2011) lamented the lack of the individual level analysis of Ukrainian electorate. This study is a decisive attempt to remedy this oversight. Using the survey data from International Foundation for Electoral Studies (IFES) from 1994, 1997 -2008 I develop and analyze a model of the sophisticated voter in the new democracy. I argue that over time, as voters have more experience with democratic processes, they learn how to properly link their

own preferences with appropriate parties and candidates, relying on numerous factors including, but not limited to, the ethno-cultural and socioeconomic attributes, such factors as evaluation of the political leaders and issues are also instrumental in voter decision making. The results of this study have important implications for the study of Ukrainian politics and a broader literature on voting behavior. The curious case of the Ukrainian voter suggests a need to reexamine the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of democratic consolidation hypotheses as well as the developmental modes of electoral behavior.

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PREFACE

Dedication

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1.0 INTRODUCTION: A NEW DEMOCRATIC VOTER

A frequently asked question of political science research of the new democracies has to do with the “normalization” of politics in these societies. Normalization could refer to democratic consolidation, or stabilization of regime, when democracy “becomes the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996). There are many factors that contribute to this so-called normalization, such as stable institutions, the rule of law, and transparency in power transfer, among others. Yet, one can also argue that the democratic process is normalized, stabilized, and/or consolidated when programmatic parties compete for political office by wooing a sophisticated and knowledgeable electorate (Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000). This inquiry is a story of such normalization in the case of a new post-communist democracy – Ukraine. While there have been several studies analyzing the normalization of politics by examining institutional structures and elite behavior (D'Anieri 2006; Hesli, Reisinger, and Miller 1998; Kuzio 1997; Kuzio 2000; Kuzio 2003, 2005; Zimmer and Haran 2008), this study takes a different approach. Put simply, it is a story of the development of a sophisticated democratic Ukrainian voter and her role in electoral politics of this new democracy.

Ukraine has often enjoyed a reputation of a divided society. Having a very short history of independence, the very existence of this territorially and culturally cohesive polity-state has been questioned numerous times. The electoral cycles have contributed to these speculations as well, particularly during the 2004 presidential elections when the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the western, central, eastern, and southern Ukraine reached unprecedented peaks, threatening to tear Ukraine apart. This research project focuses on the mechanisms

behind the development of electoral patterns in a new democratic state of Ukraine. What are the bases for the political elite-electorate relationship?

The presence of institutionalized programmatic political parties is a necessary component of consolidated democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996). The political parties serve several key functions in the democratic process. They organize the political elites, aggregate the political views of the public, and articulate these concerns into public policy proposals. In short, the political parties provide organizational structure for the relations between voters and elites (Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000). However, the formation of these parties has been nothing but problematic in the new post-communist democracies including Ukraine due to the legacy of “patrimonial” communism, the overall distaste for political parties, and sheer lack of prior experience with the democratic process. It has been suggested that in new post-communist democracies the programmatic parties would be difficult to form and sustain as long as 1) there is no economic growth and 2) voters remain unsophisticated (Kitschelt 1992).

Among the scholars of Ukrainian politics, the voters received very little attention. Moreover, there is a general sense that voters are “the least likely segment of Ukrainian polity” to influence political processes (Copsey 2005). However, as the events of the Orange Revolution have shown, the Ukrainian public is ready and capable to take on a more prominent role in politics. In the following pages I develop and analyze a model of the sophisticated voter in the new democracy. Voters are capable of making appropriate electoral decisions on the basis of numerous factors available to them. What is more, the accuracy of electoral decisions increases as voters learn from the experience with the democratic process.

As Herbert Kitschelt (1995) rightfully points out, nearly all of the studies of political party competition in any part of the world rely on the conclusions reached by Martin Lipset and

Stein Rokkan (1967) regarding political party developments in Europe. According to these conclusions, the political parties develop a unique set of programmatic appeals based on the cleavage structures introduced by the national and industrial revolutions. The political competition, thus, takes places within the scope of these ideological programs by means of which the voters are mobilized in their partisanship and vote choice. However, more recent studies of electoral competition have suggested that voters and parties do not behave exactly as predicted by Lipset and Rokkan. Some have suggested a decline in the salience of the cleavages introduced by Lipset and Rokkan (Andersen and Yaish 2003; Clark 2001; Clark and Lipset 1991, 2001; Knutsen 1988; Norris 2004) others identified new factors that guide the voter/party relationship, such as particular issue(s) stances (Achterberg 2006; Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

The new democracies of the post-communist Europe provide a unique laboratory for the scholars of electoral competition to test the new and old hypothesis. As these societies are often new to electoral competition, they offer a somewhat blank canvas upon which the new democratic drama plays out. Given the historical legacies of imperialism and communism, a number of the post-communist states did not enjoy the full experience of the national and industrial revolutions the same way as the rest of Europe. Often these states are hosts to numerous ethnic and linguistic groups, who have divergent political agendas. Moreover, the communist experiment stifled the development of socioeconomic societal distinctions, such as development of the middle and working class. Thus, numerous scholars have argued that the development of socio-cultural and socioeconomic cleavage based politics in these societies is inevitable. Ethno-cultural cleavages are arguably the easiest to form in the wake of democratization (Birnie 2007; Linz and Stepan 1996; Snyder 2000). Many scholars have argued

that the democratic transitions contribute to the rise of nationalism and ethnic hostility within the society (Basch 1998; Cordell 1999; Ellingsen 2000; Kohli 1997; Mousseau 2001; Riggs 1998; Smith 2000; Snyder 2000; Vetik 1993).

As economic market reforms take root and the social welfare net previously provided by the communist regime disintegrates, it is not unreasonable to expect that socioeconomic divisions should manifest themselves as well. The increased awareness of differences in life choices based on the new socioeconomic realities should fractionalize voters along the lines of socioeconomic status. Moreover, the political actors could capitalize on these divisions in their campaign for office. Several scholars have found evidence of social cleavage development, ala Lipset and Rokkan, in these societies and suggest that socioeconomic cleavage development is pivotal for electoral politics (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1993; G. Evans and S. Whitefield 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1998, 2006; McAllister and White 2007). Thus, one should expect manifestation of these cleavages in the political realm and programmatic stances of political parties and candidates.

Yet, Kitschelt (1992, 1995, 2000) argues that in cases of post-communist Europe the development of political competition politics is a bit more complicated than the scenario presented by Lipset and Rokkan. In post-communist newly democratic states that are undergoing economic as well as political transition, politically salient cleavages revolve around the various experiences of population with economic market reform as well as country specific socio-cultural divisions. The socioeconomic cleavage, Kitschelt argues, develops between the “winners” and “losers” of the reforms and transition. The winner of economic transition or those persons whose “occupational resources” (Kitschelt 1992) are easily transferable into the market economic system are pegged against those persons who will surely lose in the process of market

transition. Further, the development of programmatic parties depends on the communist legacies of institutional structures, economic development, and resource allocation (Kitschelt 1995). The legacies of pre-democratic regime make it easier for some democracies to develop programmatic parties while also making some systems more prone to clientelistic and charismatic parties.

Ukraine is a perfect laboratory to evaluate the cleavage and political party formation. It is a new democracy transitioning from a command economy. Among the former Soviet republics, Ukraine has been among the precious few to avoid backsliding to authoritarianism and develop a meaningful democratic institution. Moreover, Ukraine is a brand new state that has never had experience with sovereignty. From a cursory glance Ukrainian society is ridden with socio-cultural and socio-economic differences. Moreover, the development of programmatic politics in Ukraine is further hampered by its pre-democratic legacy of “patrimonial communist” which fosters clientelistic and charismatic political relationships between the electorate and leaders (Kitschelt 1992). In the literature the Ukrainian public is depicted as highly apolitical, unsophisticated, and divided along the ethno-cultural regional cleavage which contributes to the problems of normalization of electoral competition.

In the following pages I argue that these conclusions are hasty and oversimplified due to the limited capacity of the existing developmental models in the literature. While the emphasis of ethno-cultural and socioeconomic cleavages as the basis for electoral politics is quite important, these models tell only a part of the story. The ethno-cultural and socioeconomic factors play a large part in voters capacity to evaluate their electoral choice and cast votes, however, they play very little role in the systematic *development* of voters’ capacity over time. The developmental process is much broader and extends far beyond the mere economic self-interest or group affiliation. I argue that over time, as voters have more experience with democratic processes,

they become more sophisticated and learn how to properly link their own preferences with appropriate parties and candidates, relying on numerous factors including, but not limited to, the ethno-cultural and socioeconomic attributes, such factors as evaluation of the political leaders and issues are also instrumental in voter decision making.

Moreover, I attempt to link the various aspects influencing vote choice to the development process of democratic consolidation more generally. I develop a model that utilizes the mathematical and theoretical principles of Lau and Radlawsk's "correct voting" measure (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lau, Redlawsk, and Andersen 2008) to argue that as democracy ages the voters are becoming more correct in their vote choice. Moreover, the correctness of the vote does not depend solely on ethno-cultural or socioeconomic factors. Issue self-placement and evaluation of political leaders are pivotal in determining the vote choice. The empirical evaluations of this study utilize the survey data from International Foundation of Electoral Studies (IFES) from 1994, 1997 -2008. This range of data allows me to focus on the individual level of voter and thoroughly evaluate the behavior of Ukrainian voters since the first free democratic presidential and parliamentary elections of 1994.

My analyses suggest that Ukrainian society is a vibrant patchwork of political interest comprised of politically-savvy voters. First, Ukrainians are well aware of their socioeconomic status and form opinions on the salient domestic and foreign policy issues based on these characteristics. Second, as democracy ages, the Ukrainian public is displaying higher levels of voter sophistication overtime. This suggests that voters are learning the democratic process and are capable of evaluating the political performance of political leaders and cast their votes appropriately instead of relying on the group cues alone. These findings are promising for the

stabilization of Ukrainian democracy, provided the institutional climate remains stable and political elites maintain democratic commitments.

This inquiry presents several contributions to the broader literatures on comparative political behavior, post-communist transitions, and to the literature on Ukrainian politics in particular. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a more thorough sketch of the overall scope and argument of this inquiry, and is organized in the following fashion. First, I outline the models of electoral linkages in the broader literature. The political map of Ukrainian electoral landscape then follows. Here I attempt to provide an overview of Ukrainian political actors and their ideological and political placements in light of the broader developmental literature. The curious case of the Ukrainian voter is presented in the next section where I seek to review the up to date evaluations of Ukrainian electorate. The concluding section of this chapter provides a roadmap of the argument to be developed in the following chapters and concludes with several important implications of this study.

1.1 ELECTORAL LINKAGES OF PARTY COMPETITION

Political parties serve very important and specific roles in democracies around the world. Parties provide structure to the political contestation that is associated with democratic governance. They serve as vehicles of interest, aggregation, and articulation of these public concerns in to policy proposals. As Kitschelt (1992; 1995; 2000) suggests, parties provide organizational structure for the voter/politician relations. It is rather costly in terms of time and energy for each voter to make detailed inquiries into the candidates' policy proposal. Likewise, the cost of mounting a political campaign alone proves very costly to any one candidate. Political parties

solve these problems. Parties identify the common ground (platform) where numerous politicians can converge, thus providing voters with clear identification of political actors and their policy stances. The formulation of such ideological platforms allows voters to easily identify the positioning of the party members vis-à-vis other parties, as well as their approximate stances on wider variety of political issues (Kitschelt 2000).

In the developed democracies, political party systems and the way parties provide the important link between voters and their elected leaders have undergone much scholarly scrutiny. The majority of studies delving into the topic of political party formation are linked to the historic-sociological model proposed by Martin Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan in their 1967 classic *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. These scholars suggest that there is a connection between the development of party systems and societal divisions. Focusing on the modern history of Western Europe, they trace the important developments of the national and industrial revolutions that have created societal divisions or cleavages along religious, ethnic, and racial lines as well as introduced economic and class cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). These social divisions imply that there are convergent political interests among various groups. Thus, the political distinctions between these groups can be summarized in the presentation of several dyadic relationships – capital versus labor, urban versus rural, religious versus secular, center versus periphery, and others.

The links between parties and voters as conceptualized by the sociological model of voting, then, exists on both the supply and demand side. On the supply side, the political parties organize themselves along the lines of these social conflicts and translate them into political platforms. On the demand side of the relationship, the social groups align themselves with those parties that are most representative of their interests. When such links are established, the party

systems stabilize in such a way that parties and electorates aligned according to these ideological distinctions. Thus social cleavages, according to Lipset and Rokkan, very much influence the formation of party systems in the countries of Western Europe.

Several studies of electoral politics have taken this argument out of the context of Western Europe and found convincing data elsewhere to support the claims of sociological model of vote choice. Religious, ethnic, linguistic, and social class differences between groups have been named as important predictors of vote choice (Chandra 2004; Featherman 1983; Horowitz 1998; Landa, Copeland, and Grofman 1995; Leighly and Vedlitz 1999; Lijphart 1971, 1979). Gender and age group distinctions have also been added to the list of social characteristics dictating the vote preferences (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Yet, the sociological model is not without its faults and has been criticized widely. The cross-national analysis of the model proved that there is a host of cleavages that might be deemed responsible for particulars of electoral competition in one given society. However, which cleavages can be seen as most powerful cross-nationally? While socioeconomic class has been given much attention in developed democracies of the west, studies in other contexts proved that religious, ethnic, and linguistic differences trump class as predictors of vote choice (Horowitz 1985, 1990, 1998; Lijphart 1971, 1979).

Further, critics have argued that even in developed western democracies the party systems have hardly been “frozen” and have undergone quite a few changes. More recent studies have come to criticize the sociological model by bringing new evidence that voters in developed democracies have begun to align with parties based on considerations other than socially based divisions (Dalton 2000). Socioeconomic class, for instance, has been pronounced by many as a poor predictor of vote choice and party identification (Clark 2001; Norris 2004). Inglehart and

Welzel suggest the shift of values in these societies to “post-materialism” might explain why class’ predictive value is waning (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). As the populations moved along the path of industrialization to post-industrial societies, the near universal education and heightened levels in quality of life have contributed highly to resolution of the “old” social conflicts and introduced new sets of values. These values then dictate the new types of political divisions along the lines of one’s positioning with regard to one of the other issue and not her social positioning per se. Thus the political parties also have tried to adapt to these new moods by adjusting their programmatic platforms in order to meet the demand of realigning issue publics (Bafumi and Shapiro 2009).

Thus in an attempt to deal with the seeming inadequacies of the sociological model, which by some account include the inability to deal with change and disregarding the individual voter’s choice by lumping the voters all into groups, several alternatives are proposed in the literature of political behavior. These more psychological theories suggest that voters’ choices are derived from their attitudes toward specific candidates and, in line with Ingleheart and colleagues’ proposal, specific issue stances.

The importance of candidate evaluation in vote choice has been primarily analyzed with regard to presidential elections, where candidates are few, widely publicized, and clearly identifiable. Some scholars have focused on the specifics of candidate personalities, behaviors, appearances, and even facial expressions during debates as means to determine what is more important in a voter’s evaluation of candidates (Milton Lodge, Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick Stroh 1989; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1995; Marcus 1988). The research has also divided along the lines of incumbent versus novice candidate evaluation, thus introducing an additional component to evaluation of candidates – voters’ evaluation of previous performances

and experiences. This retrospective evaluation of a political leader's performance is of particular importance for the study of the new democracy. In the context of the newly introduced political competition, the voters should be able to punish and reward the political actors, a privilege denied to the citizens under previous non-democratic regimes. Thus, one can expect that leadership evaluation should be one of the prominent features of new democracies.

However, in the context of parliamentary elections several challenges exist. An evaluation of individual politicians is more difficult if candidates are many and less known. One can suggest that candidate evaluation in these election could be easier done in electoral situation of SMD, where there are clearly identifiable candidates competing for single seat. In the case of PR, however, specific candidate evaluation becomes more problematic. Thus, as in presidential elections the personality and behavior of the party leader might be much more important in this situation. Recent studies on the evaluation of political leadership in parliamentary contexts suggest that party leaders and future Prime Ministers receive much electoral attention (Aarts, Blais, and Schmitt 2005). In this case, evaluation of party leadership is directly linked to the vote for a specific party. Negative as well as positive feelings toward candidates/leaders are quite important.

Issue voting is another possible explanation for vote choices in recent literature examining electoral behavior (Franklin 1985; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992). While not uncontroversial, issue voting has solicited much support in the literature focusing on the developed democracies. Evaluation of voters' stances on particular issues allows accounting for cognition of individual voters as well as accounting for the ever-changing climate of politics. Voters, this line of reasoning argues, can and do identify issues that are important in that or the other political landscape and cast their vote based on their own position on the issue. Thus, it is

not the emotional reaction to the candidate and/or party leader or group identification that drives vote choice; it is the individual voter's rational ability to carefully evaluate her choices based on her individual preferences (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000).

The controversies with issue voting analysis arise from several related areas. The first problem is the variability of issues. How can we determine the importance of some issues vis-à-vis others and the role campaigns and media play in making them important? Issues tend to vary not only cross-nationally, but also between elections in a single society (Dalton 2000). Secondly, it seems that there are far too high expectations placed on voters by proponents of issues voting. The voters are expected to be able to identify and make up their own minds about the issues as well as identify those politicians/parties that are closest to their own opinions. This requires a great deal of time investment as well as political knowledge. Unfortunately, voters do not think about political issues as often as or as much as a political scientist would like them to.

While all of these theories have certain shortcomings, when analyzed empirically in "old" democracies the "new" democracies of post-communist Europe give us an opportunity to test these hypotheses in the new context. Previous studies have shown that each of the three explanations is applicable to some of the "new" cases. This study tests these theories in the context of a new democracy and a seemingly divided society of Ukraine. Moreover, it relies on these theories to produce a picture of a sophisticated democratic voter.

The discussion on voter sophistication has deep roots in the normative discussions of democratic theory and empirical political behavior literature. The normative discussion of voter sophistication revolves around the capacity of voters to make "wise" decisions that foster democracy and benefit the society at large. Statesman and philosophers are often concerned with the "wisdom" or lack thereof behind collective decision-making. Churchill once said that the best

argument against democracy is a short conversation with an average voter. However, such normative concerns do not enter directly into the discussion raised in my analysis.

The debate within the empirical political behavior literature revolves around the mechanisms of sophisticated vote. The voter's sophistication is based upon the complexity of the judgment and evaluation criteria for vote casting. The raging debate in political behavior literature revolves around these evaluation criteria. Some argue that the more cognitively demanding the techniques, such as evaluation of ideological stances and issues, the more they qualify as sophisticated (Campbell et al. 1964; MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1995).


The inquiry undertaken in *The American Voter* conceptualized sophistication as an ideological understanding of issues (Campbell et al. 1964). The study showed, however, that the American electorate was not sophisticated. The analysis showed that voters lacked ideological constraints and their decisions varied (even were contradictory to the ideological stances) over time from election to election. However, this analysis came under scrutiny as showing perhaps not the level of (un)sophistication but rather a non-ideological side of poorly informed electorate. Since then, the concept of a "sophisticated" voter has been revisited and reanalyzed by several scholars.

Some have argued that it is impossible to expect all voters to be well informed about every political issue. People do have lives outside politics and certain other activities take precedence over voting. Instead, voters have a special set of issues that they find most important and make their judgments based on these issues rather than every possible issue within society (Converse 1974; Converse 1964, 1964). Yet, the research has also shown that individuals quite often rely on cognitive short cuts, cues, and heuristics such as group identities to make their decisions (Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk 2001). Evaluation of issues and one's

positioning vis-à-vis the candidates, is presumably a more cognitively involved process that requires the individual to engage more deeply in the analysis of issue components and self-reflection than heuristic use. Thus, a sophisticated voter employs more complex cognitive processes.

Dalton suggested that all of the components presented in the above theories identify important predictors of vote choice (Dalton 2006). Moreover, it might be simplistic to focus solely on merely one set of predictors. Rather, the historical, cultural, and other social cleavages influence vote choice on a different level, yet remain in conjunction with election specific predictors, such as evaluation of leaders and issue stances. Following this assumption, I construct the “Funnel of Causality” of vote choice which identifies the broad and intermediary determinants of voting preferences.

Figure 1 The Funnel of Causality of Vote Choice



In the context of this study I develop a model of sophistication of voters that is closely linked to the complexity of the decision making process. While there have been suggestions that issue voting is perhaps the most sophisticated of the modes of electoral decision making, there is

much debate about the specific basis and causal mechanisms of such processes (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Macdonald 1991; MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1995; Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989). Instead of focusing on the specific mode of decision making as more or less sophisticated, I suggest that voter sophistication in general is linked to the appropriate use of decision making tools. That is, a sophisticated voter is that voter who uses all of the tools available to him, and what is more importantly, uses them to derive electoral choices that are most representative of his own positions.

This study is an attempt to test the developmental hypothesis in the case on the new Ukrainian voter. Tracing the effects of social cleavages, issues voting, and candidate/leader evaluation over the years of democratic development in Ukraine enables one to evaluate the sophistication hypothesis as pertaining to new democracies. Does more experience with democracy produce more sophisticated voters? My answer is a resounding yes.

1.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY SYSTEM IN A “NEW” DEMOCRACY

The new democracies of the former communist bloc provide scholars with an interesting and unique opportunity to test the hypotheses dealing with the party system development and function. Most of these societies have had very brief or no experience with democracies prior to the communist rule and have been undergoing unique social, economic, and political transformations since the collapse of the Communist regime. Thus, the new democracies of post-communist Europe have drawn much attention from the scholars of electoral politics. After the collapse of the communist regimes some scholars expressed concerns over the development of

electoral politics in these countries. The rate and the process of political party development have been under much scrutiny over the past twenty years.

The concerns were raised based on a variety of speculations and arguments. On the one hand, concerns were raised from the so-called “institutionalist” camp of the discipline. These authors have suggested that to properly function, the political parties need organizational structure and resources. However, in light of the previously non-democratic regimes that had banned any kind of political competition, the new party organizers had very little resources and know how to produce functioning parties. On the other hand, others suggested that the problem with party formation is more than that of institutional structure alone. The new party organizers will find serious challenges from ideational sources as well. The previous experiences with the all-encompassing party – that is, the Communist Party – has left a sour taste in the mouths of the citizens of the new democracies. As such, the sheer concept of political party would be perceived as potentially vicious and be treated with suspicion. Boris Yeltsin’s refusal to create a political party to rally around him in the wake of August putsch in 1991 has often been cited as evidence of this hypothesis (Sakwa 2008). Simply put, any political party would have a very hard time mobilizing support among the population that is suspicious of party as a mere concept.

Some have argued that due to the long history of authoritarian regimes these countries’ citizens lack the necessary experience with democratic process. In the words of Linz and Stepan (1996), the political society would have troubles developing due to the flattened landscape of the civil society left over from the previous non-democratic regime. The lack of socio-political competition among citizens presented serious challenges for the formation of meaningful party competition. Therefore, strong and charismatic leaders were able to forge political parties around their own personalities in order to gain political clout. These personalistic parties offered

very little in terms of ideological party platform and relied on populist politics in order to boost the popularity of their leader. In similar vein others sought to secure the electorate's favor by promising and delivering various perks and/or material benefits to their supporters.

The question of whether or not the political parties of these countries would develop along clear lines of conflicting political programs is a relevant question not merely for the prognosis of democratic development in these countries, but also for a wider study of electoral politics. The prognosis of scholarly works published in early 1990s suggested that in post-communist societies, the development of party systems would be a trying undertaking. The end result could vary greatly across countries depending on the kind of electoral system that leadership opted for and the political landscape leftover after the initial transition to democratization was complete (Kitschelt 1995). The rules presented by a single member plurality electoral system allow for very different forms of competition than those allowed by proportional representations. Similarly, the relationship between the old Communist party structure and the new liberalizing forces during the initial transition could dictate the degree of freedom granted to the players in the electoral competition as well as electoral and institutional resources available to each.

The expectation that the political parties in these societies would develop along the lines of the traditional western matrix of left/right, liberal/conservative scale proved rather problematic, as few of these new parties seemed to fall neatly within these categories. The sheer array of political parties that sprung by the mid-1990s, including the parties of Beer Lovers and parties proclaiming to be against everyone else, created numerous problems for programmatic classification.

Likewise, the party system of new Ukrainian democracy has been a long work in progress. The disintegration of the communist regime in Ukraine was of a peculiar kind. The liberalization did not start from the reform of the communist party as in Estonia or Hungary, nor was there a strong opposition to the regime from liberalizing alternative sources as in Poland or Russia. Although the activities of nationalist-minded civic groups were a major force behind regime change (Surzhko-Harned 2010), the collapse of the regime was not brought on by cataclysmic forces of popular demand. The regime gave in clumsily, unwillingly, and in spite of itself. The Communist party of Ukraine was not banned or discredited; the society did not go through the period of lustration.

The creation of political parties, therefore, was a reactionary activity. The first political parties sought first and foremost to build opposition to the remaining institutionalized and still strong Communist party. As elsewhere in the post-communist world during the first few years, political party formation was a difficult task. The novelty of political competition as a concept meant that both politicians and voters were unsure about the role and necessity of political parties. While a host of new parties sprang mostly from the previous social groups, the communist party remained strong and continued to dominate the parliamentary elections for most of the first decade of independence. One such new party was the People's Rukh that had been formed initially with the blessing of the communist government in late 1980s as a social movement supporting Gorbachev's reformist policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*. However, the group gained much political clout due to its firm commitment to independence from the USSR and anti-communist sentiments. People's Rukh and the Communist Party remained two of the most popular parties during the 1990s and gained parliamentary seats during each election.

The novelty of political competition also meant that parties were formed around very narrow and specific interests. Many of them adopted similar positions as each other and varied on minute points, thus confusing the voters. For instance, several Democratic and Reform parties appeared in early 1990s. On the left, several socialist parties claimed their spot under the sun, trying to differentiate themselves from one another and most importantly from the Communist Party. Not surprisingly these parties proved rather volatile and often did not survive through one electoral cycle. Many were subsumed by bigger blocs or dismantled completely. According to the Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine, there were over 36 parties and electoral blocs registered for the 1998 parliamentary elections. This multitude of parties further bred distrust of and dissatisfaction toward political parties on the part of the voters. The presidential elections further exemplified this trend. The candidates for the post of the president often ran as independents, trying to sharply underscore their political purity by being untainted by the association with the “dirty party squabbling.”

By the late 1990s, however, the political parties in Ukraine began to stabilize. Several of the existing parties formed electoral blocs that became rather stable and successfully competed in the 2002, 2006, and 2007 (emergency round) elections. Table 1.1 depicts the summaries of the electoral results since first parliamentary election in 1994. It is evident that the Communist Party and Rukh held political dominance in the 1990s. However, the support for the Communist party declined by 2002 and Rukh was subsumed by the new reformist bloc Our Ukraine, led by anti-establishment politician Viktor Yushchenko. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, two other parties had gained political importance and began to dominate the landscape – Bloc Yulii Tymoshenko (BUT) and Party of Regions lead by Viktor Yushchuk. Both were formed shortly before the 2002 elections and have gained prominence since, as Table 1.1 depicts.

Table 1-1 Parliamentary Elections Results 1994 – 2007 (Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine)

		1994
Party name	% of popular vote	
Communist Party		25
People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh)		8
Party of Greens of Ukraine		7
Bloc "Derzhavnist"		7
Bloc "Center"		11
Bloc "Agrarians of Ukraine"		11
Bloc "Reforms"		8
People's Democratic Party		8
		1998
Party name	% of popular vote	
Communist Party		24.7
People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh)		9.4
Socialist Party of Ukraine/Peasant Party of Ukraine Bloc		8.6
Party of Greens of Ukraine		5.3
People's Democratic Party		5.0
		2002
Party name	% of popular vote	
Victor Yushchenko Bloc "Our Ukraine"		23.6
Communist Party of Ukraine		20
For United Ukraine Bloc		11.8
Electoral Bloc Yuliyi Timoshenko		7.2
Socialist Party of Ukraine		6.9
United Social Democratic Party of Ukraine		6.3
		2006
Party name	% of popular vote	
Party of Regions		32.14
Bloc Yuliyi Timoshenko		22.29
Bloc "Our Ukraine"		13.95
Socialist Party of Ukraine		5.69
Communist Party of Ukraine		3.66
		2007
Party name	% of popular vote	
Party of Regions		34.37
Bloc Yuliyi Timoshenko		30.71
Bloc "Our Ukraine"		14.15
Communist Party of Ukraine		5.39

While there remain a sprinkling of varied political parties the formation of electoral blocks and emergence of the few stable and powerful political parties can be said to be at least partially the result of the electoral system put in place in Ukraine. Through the 1990s, Ukrainian elections were based on a mixed electoral system, which combined both SMD and PR electoral rules. Half of the seats in the Rada, Ukraine's unicameral parliament, were distributed by plurality vote, while the other half was allocated based on the vote for party list. As such, Ukraine developed a "two and a half" party system like that in Germany. There are two strong parties that dominate the elections and a handful of smaller parties that serve as coalition "makers" or "breakers". Thus in the 1990s the Communist party and the Rukh were the two strong parties, with Socialist Party of Ukraine and Green Party serving as small parties necessary for the formation of a majority coalition. While strong in the 2002 elections the bloc Our Ukraine, also known as Our Ukraine Self-Defense, has fallen out of voters' graces along with the Communist Party. Now, Bloc of Yulii Tymoshenko and Party of Regions assumed the role of the two dominant parties since the 2006 election.

The political parties of the developed democracies can be easily classified along the ideological scale of left/right, libertarian/authoritarian extremes. Unfortunately, such classification proves more problematic in case of political parties in new democracies. According to Kitschelt's argument, the programmatic parties will have difficulties forming as long as 1) there is no economic growth and 2) voters remain unsophisticated. As a result, clientelistic and charismatic politics persist in Ukraine. Ukraine has moved toward a growing market economy in the early 21st century. The study of voter sophistication is paramount in determining the future development of Ukrainian democracy. Using the empirical results of this inquiry, I seek to show that there are reasons for cautious optimism as voters appear to exhibit some sophistication.

Kitschelt argues that economic development and voter sophistication have much to do with institutionalization of programmatic political parties due to the nature of the conflict produced by market economic relations and the ability of voters to act based on their true political interests (1992). During the early stages of political and economic transition, where the economy is weak and political instability is high, the axis of political competition polarizes the political landscape between leftist authoritarians and economically rightist political liberals. The public is also polarized between the two camps with the majority leaning towards the redistributive agenda of the left in light of weak economic performance and toward political authoritarianism in light of political volatility. However, as the economic reforms take place, Kitschelt predicts a shift in the axis of political competition.

In the condition of high economic performance, the political competition axis changes dramatically and runs between the leftist market, correcting and cushioning the policies of social democrats, and rightist authoritarian tendencies. Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 depict these developments in Ukrainian political competition.

Figure 2 Axis of Party Competition in the Weak Economy of the early 1990's




Figure 3 Axis of Party Competition 1998-2004





Figure 4 Axis of Party competition since market transition and growing economy (post-2005)



During the early 1990s, the political competition took place along the lines of Kitschelt's argument (Figure 1.2). The Communist party opposed both the political pluralism and liberalism and rapid movement toward market reforms. On the other hand, the People's Rukh of Ukraine professed democracy that it perceived as tied to Ukrainian national sovereignty and supported a

move toward the market. During the mid-1990s several more parties appeared and joined the competition along the axis of party competition. However, the movement toward the market started to introduce shifts in the nature of the conflict.

During this turbulence the formation of programmatic parties is quite difficult. The parties form in reactionary manner for the reasons other than formulation of an ideologically sound programmatic platform, as discussed above. Thus, we can see a number of centrist, charismatic, and clientelistic parties competing with one another for votes (Figure 1.3). The lack of programmatic appeals behooves the parties and their leaders to campaign on other basis of populist issues. In 2005, Ukraine has successfully consolidated its market economy and has experienced a period of economic growth. Figure 1.4 represents the shift in political party competition as suggested by Kitschelt. It is evident from the figure that the political parties of Ukraine are not fully aligned with this axis. However, if Kitschelt's (1992) assumption is correct, the changed nature of the political competition and the presence of sophisticated voters should contribute to the necessary changes.

It is with this broader thought in mind that I undertake the analysis of the Ukrainian voter in order to understand the process by which the interaction with democratic system increases the complexity and therefore sophistication of new democratic voter.

1.3 THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE UKRAINIAN VOTER: ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY SINCE 1991

Since independence there have been several attempts to analyze Ukrainian political behavior. Unfortunately, the studies either include Ukraine as one of the cases among several, thus giving

very little attention to the particulars of this society or focus on data other than individual voters' responses. Reisinger et al (1994) include Ukraine as one of the cases in their evaluation of political values along with Russia and Lithuania. These scholars suggest that regional divisions are most important in predicting vote choice. Furthermore, they suggest that ethnic and linguistic differences are responsible for regional distinctions.

Evans (2006) includes Ukraine as one of the cases in his evaluation of the social basis for electoral behavior in new democracies of the post-communist Europe along with Russia, Poland, Czech Republic, and Lithuania. Regional differences are again cited as the most important predictors of vote choice. While Evans doubts that linguistic and ethnic differences are the sole explanations of regionalism, he suggests that it is still not clear if "the economic differences between [the regions] are as significant as their historical inheritance."

The literature examining Ukrainian voting behavior, therefore, is resigned in focusing primarily on regional divisions. These regional divisions in Ukrainian voting are not a new development. This trend can be traced to the first competitive election in Ukraine in the early 1990s. This phenomenon has attracted much attention from the scholarly community and has produced a variety of explanations. The bulk of these explanations gravitate toward historically rooted ethno-linguistic differences between the regions of contemporary Ukraine.

Ukrainian regions are divided along geographic lines – the West (a region to the west of the Dnipro River), the East (lands east of the Dnipro), and as some would argue, the South (the Crimean Peninsula and the territory along the shores of the Black Sea). Figures 1.5 and 1.6 present a visual representation of the difference in voting preferences among the regions of Ukraine.

Figure 5 Parliamentary Election 2006¹





Figure 6 Presidential Election 2004 Second Round²



¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wahlkreise_ukraine_2006_eng.png Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled "GNU Free Documentation License"

² [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ukraine_Presidential_Dec_2004_Vote_\(Highest_vote\)a.png](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Ukraine_Presidential_Dec_2004_Vote_(Highest_vote)a.png) Permission is granted to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2 or any later version published by the Free Software Foundation; with no Invariant Sections, no Front-Cover Texts, and no Back-Cover Texts. A copy of the license is included in the section entitled "GNU Free Documentation License"

Figure 1.5 represents the results of the 2006 parliamentary election. The blue regions depict those regions of Ukraine where the Regions Party won the majority of votes. The red color represents the regions where Bloc Yuliji Timoshenko (BYuT) secured the majority of votes. The orange represents those regions where Bloc Our Ukraine came victorious. Figure 1.6 depicts the results of the second round of the infamous 2004 presidential election where Viktor Yanukovich of the Regions Party battled Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of the Bloc Our Ukraine. The images in both figures show very clearly a strong regional effect on Ukrainian voting preferences in both presidential and parliamentary elections. Much like the electoral map of the United States of America is deemed to be divided into the so-called “red” and “blue” states, so it would seem, Ukraine is divided into “blue” and “orange” regions.

These regional differences, as noted above, are not a new phenomenon. The results of the 1998 Parliamentary election also show a regional division. The Communist party of Ukraine collected most votes in the regions lying east of the Dnipro River, including Kiev and Zhitomir administrative districts (at the center of Ukraine), while the People’s Movement of Ukraine (*Rukh*) and the Socialist/Peasant Party shared the success in the western regions. During the first presidential election of 1991, as Clem and Craumer (2005) rightly point out, the regional division was apparent. The western regions of Ukraine gave their primary support to the leader of People’s *Rukh*, Vyachaslav Chornovil, while eastern regions of Ukraine supported Leonid Kravchuk, who ran as an independent. The presidential elections of 1999 also reflected this pattern. According to the election results available through Ukrainian Central Electoral Committee, the regional differences between votes in favor of Leonid Kuchma, an independent, and his main opponent, a leader of the Communist party, Petro Simonenko, are apparent.

Kuchma secured the majority of national votes; however, his largest support came from the western regions, while Simonenko came as a favorite candidate in the eastern regions of Ukraine.

But why exactly do these regional differences exist? There are two related explanations that enjoy most support. Among the attributes deemed responsible for these differences, linguistic differences (Barrington and Herron 2004; Clem 2005; Ryabchuk 1999; Shevel 2002) and ethnic divisions (Bremmer 1994; Gee 1995) are seen as most prominent among the contributing factors. Historical, institutional, and cultural reasons have also been called upon to explain these regional differences (Abdelal 2002; Flesnic 2003). Some scholars, however, suggest that neither of the above factors alone can explain East-West division in Ukrainian voting behavior, citing economic and political legacies of the USSR as the main reasons contributing to the persistence of regionalism (Kubicek 2000; O'Loughlin 1999).

However, there is another related explanation as well – the geopolitical policy orientation of the party/candidate in question. Ukraine finds herself in a unique geographic and historic position. Being the second largest country in continental Europe and bordering the European Union to the west and Russia to the east, Ukraine serves as a buffer zone between these two world powers. Historically, Ukraine is able to independently determine the vector of its economic and political orientation for the first time. In translation from old-Slavic language “Ukraine” or “Ukraïna” means “a land at the periphery” or “a country by the borderline.” The use of this name is first recorded in 1187 as a description of Kiev and Halychina territories at the western periphery of the Russian dominion. In the present context the irony is evident, as the crucial question remains -- a periphery of what? Will Ukraine be an eastern border of the European Union, or will it continue to be a western periphery of the zone of Russian influence?

According to most observers of Ukrainian politics, these are the questions that fuel the regional division in Ukraine. The western regions are seen as most supportive of candidates/parties who advocate the pro-western vector of Ukrainian development, while the eastern regions are supportive of pro-Russian ties and outlook. These allegiances, it is argued, are rooted in linguistic and ethnic differences between the western and eastern regions' populations (Clem 2005; Pirie 1996; Ryabchuk 1999). According to the scholars of Ukrainian regions, there are three main voting groups in Ukraine – Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians of the west, who support pro-western candidates/parties, Russian-speaking Russians of the east and south, who support a pro-Russian orientation, and Russophone-Ukrainians of the east and center regions, who often represent the swing vote (Barrington and Herron 2004; Shevel 2002)³. The events of the hotly contested 2004 presidential election, which culminated in the so-called “Orange Revolution”, are often used to illustrate this point. The westward oriented Viktor Yushchenko opposed the previous administration's favorite for presidency, eastward oriented Viktor Yanukovich. The support for the two candidates based on their geopolitical orientation reflected the domestic east/west division, as shown in Figure 1.6 above.

While the discussion of regions in Ukraine as a locus of political behavior is interesting and presents a useful delineation of basic cultural and historic dynamics within this society, it is limited in scope and undermines a broader understanding of voting preferences among Ukrainians. I suggest that there are two main interrelated problems with the regional approach to Ukrainian voting behavior as it has been applied in the scholarly literature to date. Both problems stem from the fact that the regional approach exclusively relies on aggregate level data, such as

³ Ukrainian State Statistics Committee reports that over 17% of Ukrainian population declare themselves ethnically Russian, while over 24% of the population declares Russian their native tongue – the so-called Russophone Ukrainians.

geographic or administrative districts of Ukraine. This kind of data masks large variations of individual preferences within particular regions and hence provides too simplistic a view of how Ukrainians vote.

The first problem, stemming from this methodological shortcoming, has to do with the fact that the focus on regions leads generally to the conclusion that the sole electorally -relevant cleavages in Ukrainian society are those of ethnicity and language. Although the studies of regions tell an elegant story about the differences in opinion between Russians and Ukrainians as ethnic groups, the conclusions that all of the Ukrainian voting dynamic can be explained by the ethnic group affiliation are highly suspect. As Richard Rose (2005) rightfully suggests, “such reductionist approach” does not take into account that other social, value, or economic differences might influence individual voting behavior. In short, the suggestion that regional affiliation predicts individual voting preference is subject to the ecological fallacy, or improper extension of the conclusions derived from the aggregate evidence to the individual voter. Simply because one region tends to vote “orange” does not imply that this is characteristic of every voter, and none of them could have voted “blue.”

The second problem with regionally based analysis of Ukrainian voting behavior is connected to the first; however, it presents a separate and as great a challenge. The region’s approach is static in nature. By focusing on regions as the unit of analysis and ethnicity and language as the main explanatory variables, the regional approach cannot explain the changes in electoral preferences of Ukrainians over time.

Paul J. D’Anieri (2006) evaluates the patterns of political behavior of the representatives in the Rada in order to illuminate the political cleavages dividing Ukrainian politicians. He finds that politicians in the Rada behave very practically and don’t always vote on the basis of their

regional, ethnic, or linguistic orientations. D'Anieri finds that politicians often cross regional lines in order to work with those politicians closest to them ideologically. I argue that Ukrainian voters over time develop very similar pragmatic approach to vote choice. While group identities remain important predictors of vote choice, I will show that Ukrainian voters have learned how to approach the electoral choices from a broader perspective, which also includes evaluation of salient issues and political leaders.

1.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter 2 is devoted to the exploration of the ethno-cultural and socioeconomic cleavages in Ukraine. In this chapter I examine the manifestation of socioeconomic and socio-cultural cleavages in the Ukrainian electorate. The statistical results support the hypothesis that ethnic and cultural divisions are important political dividers. Yet, the impact of the ethno-linguistic division is unstable and the results show no notable trends on these cleavages on electoral choice. The results also show some support for Kitschelt's argument that the transition to a market economy produces cleavages between winners and losers of the transition. It seems that during the 1990s the socioeconomic status played a role in voting preferences of electorate. However, there is again no good evidence that points to the development of trends in socioeconomic class voting in Ukraine over the past 20 years.

Chapter 3 analyses the impact of issue and candidate evaluation on voting behavior. In this chapter I analyze the effects of issue stances and candidate evaluation on vote choices in presidential and parliamentary election. The results show that both of these factors are highly significant in predicting vote choice. This leads me to believe that Ukrainian voters are more

individual in their assessment of electoral choices. They rely less on cues from social groups and are capable of evaluating their choices on the important issues and candidate traits.

The correct vote measure is introduced in Chapter 4. This chapter further analyzes the political sophistication of Ukrainian voters by taking in a step further. I argue that with experience of democracy voters learn how to cast their votes appropriately. My results support this assertion. Using the mathematical and theoretical framework of Lau and Redlawsk (1997; 2001), I construct a correct vote measure and apply in to every presidential and parliamentary election in Ukraine since 1991. I find an increase in correct vote over time. I propose and test several hypotheses regarding the differences in correct vote in sub group variations in correct vote. I find significant differences in electoral decisions between age cohorts and sexes as well. Chapter 5 is devoted to a deeper exploration of this phenomenon.

The gender relationship remained un-politicized and confined to the realm of private domestic relations during the communist regime of Ukraine. However, the democratic process allows for gendered grievances to spill into the public political realm. Political, social, and economic reforms associated with regime change require a certain level of flexibility and aptitude toward learning. Therefore, one can expect that the differences between the political preferences of age cohorts should vary. Chapter 5 focuses on the gender and age cleavages structure by reviewing the relevant political behavior literature as well as the historical development of gender relations in Ukraine. The results suggest that there are important differences between age cohorts in vote choice. The situation with gender, however, is trickier. There are no real trends over time to suggest a widening gender gap. However, a presence of a new feminist movement in Ukraine that attracts younger women speaks volumes to a possible

change in this a-politization of women. I rely on my interview with the leader of FEMEN to address several important developments in Ukrainian gender relations and politics.

In addition to a thorough evaluation of Ukrainian politics, this study sheds light on the broader literature of electoral competition. The concluding Chapter 6 outlines the main finding of this inquiry and places them with in broader literature of political behavior in the new democracies. By tracing the voter/party relationship over time the study tests the aforementioned hypothesis defining the basis of these relationships – social cleavages, issues stances, and charismatic leadership evaluation. I suggest that Ukrainian public exhibits a complex pattern of voting preference formation. Voters have defined feelings toward party leaders as well as their stances on important issues facing the society both domestically and in terms of foreign policy. They are also acutely aware of the differences between their life choices based on their group identities that influence their party choices as well as positions on issues. The existing developmental models of electoral linkages are too narrow and ignore voters' capacity to engage in the cognitive learning process during elections.

2.0 THE POLITICS OF ETHNO-CULTURAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLEAVAGES

The examination of the electoral politics in the established democracies around the world reveals that political parties often have close connections with certain social groups that serve as social basis for these parties' political activity. This is largely attributed to the historical experiences of the social groups with each other and the broader historic-political context. Thus, in the United States the Democratic Party has enjoyed the support of African American community due to the Party's activity during the Civil Rights Movements of the 1960's in the US. In the context of British society, the Labour Party could consistently rely on the support of blue-collar workers and laborers, while business owners and entrepreneurs throw their support behind the Conservative Tories.

The sociological branch of the study of political behavior suggests that structure of the political competition closely represents the structure of social divisions or cleavages in that society. That is, the voting preferences of the electorate are motivated by voters' identification with one or the other social group. The social characteristics and social group affiliation, therefore, can serve as a good predictor of voting preferences among the citizens. According to this line of argument social cleavages develop as society undergoes major historical transformations (Flanagan 1980). Furthermore, as the new cleavages take root within the society they serve as important links between the electorate and the political elite of decision makers, who in turn reinforce these social cleavages via political competition. Among the salient

cleavages that inform and structure the political landscape of democratic systems are ethno-cultural (ethnicity, language, religion, region) and socio-economic (occupation, income bracket, level of education, urban/rural dwelling) cleavages age and gender (Clarke 2004; Evans 2006; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Lijphart 1971, 1979; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

Due to the novelty of the political competition in the new democracies several scholars of the developing democracies around the world and more specifically post-communist Eastern Europe pay special attention to the role of social cleavages on political landscape of these societies. These scholars argue that certain cleavages could serve as the basis for political competition in these societies similarly to the developed democracies (Birch 1995; Evans 2006; G. Evans and S. Whitefield 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1998; Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000; Zielinski 2002). These “developmental” theories suggest that new democracies should go through the same or similar process of political behavior formation and cleavage based political alignments will manifest themselves. Societies that lacked social, economic, and political freedoms under previous undemocratic regimes offer very little political fragmentation save for their group identification. Therefore, the group based divisions or social cleavages become an important tool for both electorates and elites. Group identifications based on such easily identifiable characteristics as ethno-cultural and socio-economic differences often prove a useful heuristic for the voters and an accessible tool of political mobilization for the elites.

In this chapter I seek to analyze the role of cleavage based voting in the case of Ukraine. It is a transitioning society that has only recently achieved recognition as a market economy⁴. It

⁴ On December 1, 2005 José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission and Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, during their visit to Kiev as part of the 9th Annual Ukraine-EU Summit, declared that EU recognizes Ukraine as market economy.

is also been painted as a divided society plagued by ethno-cultural and historical divisions. Given this politico-economic climate, one should expect to find cleavage based politics in this society. I begin by reviewing the role of social cleavages in politics as portrayed in the wider literature of political behavior. I, then, analyze these cleavages in the context of Ukrainian democracy over time in an attempt to uncover the developmental aspects of social group politics. I rely on the individual level survey data collected by IFES researchers in 1994, 1997-2008. This allows me to track the developmental changes in cleavages since Ukraine transitioned to democracy in early 1990's. The data and the methodological tools used are described in detail in the later part of this chapter.

As the literature review below discusses in detail there is a general debate over the influence of the socio-economic cleavages (Achterberg 2006; Brooks and Manza 1997; Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, and Manza 2006; Clark 2001; Clark and Lipset 1991, 2001; De Graaf, Heath, and Need 2001; Evans 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000; Franklin 1985). Moreover, the scholars of the developed democracies find that in the presence of the ethno-cultural cleavages the socioeconomic differences yield in political influence (Lijphart 1971, 1979). Given Ukraine's socio-political history I expect to find persistent and strong ethno-cultural cleavages. However, given its recent experience with democracy and market economy I also expect to find the development of socio-economic cleavages in Ukrainian society as well. The analysis supports my general expectations and suggests an existence of numerous cross-cutting cleavages in Ukrainian society, which influence the voting behavior of individuals' overtime unevenly.

2.1 SOCIAL CLEAVAGES IN POLITICS

As Toka (1998) rightfully points out the meaning of the word cleavage in the literature is often used to mean numerous things. In this study following the work of Franklin and colleagues (1985, 2001; 1992) I define cleavage as a group-based politically relevant division within the society. Martin Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan's 1967 classic *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* is often cited as the foundation of the sociological model of electoral connection. The authors evaluate the historical developments in Western Europe and paint a convincing picture of the intricate relationship between social cleavages and party preferences in developed western democracies. They suggest that there is a historical connection between the development of political parties and societal divisions. Important group divisions occur within the societies in light of traumatic developments that societies undergo during their historical experiences. In the contexts of "old" European democracies, the authors identify the National and Industrial revolutions as such monumental events.

The National revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought with them an important concept of national identity. This identification, based either on ethnic or a broader civic basis, created a division between in and out groups. The distinction was created between compatriots, co-nationals and the others. The ethno-linguistic, cultural and religious identities informed and solidified such group differences. In many European societies the forging of the nation has also coincided with the formation of democratic politics and representative governments. The question of ethno-national group identity, in this context, took on the more weight and meaning. Who are the people to be included in the polity and nation? This question produced the further rift between the ethno-cultural "in" and "out" groups. On the same note the

democratic procedure allowed the groups to express their differences through political representation in the form of political parties.

The Industrial revolution, on the other hand, reformed the relationship between the members of the society further along the lines of people's relationship to the means of production. Technological advances in production techniques led to the re-evaluation of manufacturing practices and ushered in the era of urbanization, industrialization, and capitalism with the creation of bourgeois and working classes. These socio-economic and ethno-cultural cleavages have spilled into the political realm and influence the formation of political party competition in the countries of Western Europe (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The political conflicts between the groups continued to reproduce themselves in the society and served as the legitimate basis for electoral competition between the political parties. Moreover, according to the authors the groups become linked to political parties representing their interests and remain attached until the group conflict is resolved or overshadowed by a new conflict.

Lipset and Rokkan argue that there are three main stages of development of social cleavages – emergence, institutionalization, and eclipse. As mentioned above the cleavages emerge as societal response to major changes within the society and as Flanagan (1980) rightfully points out, it is at this stage that social cleavages are more prominent and disruptive. The political parties become representative of the social conflict during the institutionalization stage. That is, the political parties form along the lines of social division and the social groups align themselves with those parties that are most representative of their interests. These alignments remain stable until the next shift within the society, which mutes or resolves some cleavages and introduces new ones. At this point the process of realignment ensues where the significant changes in party attachment takes place, thus altering the political party system (Key

1955). In the new developing democracies one should expect to identify the emergence and institutionalization of the cleavages. Thus, one should look for the disruptive clear societal cleavages and the emergence of the political actors aligning with these societal demands.

The power of the group identification is explained though both rational evaluation of tangible political interests and emotional group attachments. On the one hand, group identification suggests a degree of political interest congruence between the group members. That is, all blue collar workers have certain interests in common and these interests oppose sharply the interests of the business owners as a group. Thus, ones' livelihood and wellbeing is connected to the group s/he belongs too. On the other hand, group affinity could be informed by a deeper psychological attachment. The members of the same ethno-national or religious group are presumed to share deep communal connection that in turn informs their values and attitudes.

The social group characteristics can be beneficial to both the electorate and the political elites. Group identification can serve as a cognitive short cut for a voter trying to make an electoral decision. In making such a decision the voter might employ the following logic—"If these people look (talk, live, work, worship, etc) like me, then we must have similar views and desires and therefore a similar political outlook". Thus, an individual does not need to invest much energy and time into researching the particular candidate's/party's stances. For the elites group attachments serve as tools for support mobilization. Thus, according to the sociological model social cleavages serve important roles in democratic process and the development of electoral politics. Ethno-cultural and socioeconomic cleavages have been identified as the two important groups of cleavages. I now turn to the evaluation of these groups of cleavages and their influences on electoral behavior as presented by the scholarly literature up to date.

2.1.1 Ethno-Cultural Cleavages

The ethno-cultural basis for vote choice has been receiving much attention in recent decades. The studies have focused on the electoral competition in both “old” and “new” democracies alike. The comparative literature on the ethno-cultural basis for vote choice has developed in two different, yet complimentary directions. The first addresses the question of *how* does ethnicity determine voting behavior (Featherman 1983; Ferree 2004; Greeley 1974; Landa, Copeland, and Grofman 1995). Scholarly work focusing on this question is concerned with finding out whether ethnicity matters and the extent to which it does. The second complimentary direction addresses the question of *why* ethno-cultural differences matters (Chandra 2004; Horowitz 1985, 1998; Medrano 1994; Parenti 1967; Wolfinger 1965). Scholars working in this direction attempt to formulate theoretical explanations for the reasons behind the power of ethno-cultural determinants on the formation of voting preferences.

Almost all of the literature, however, seems to agree that the utility of the use of ethno-cultural heuristic or cues is very high indeed because such group membership provides an individual with valuable political information at a very low cost. As Birnir argues group members learn from one another the necessary political attitudes and behaviors. The ethno-cultural group identification are particularly salient because characteristics like ethnicity, language, race, culture and religion are either impossible or very difficult to change or forge (Birnir 2007). Moreover, these attributes are easily recognizable unlike other social groups’ characteristics. Thus, voters can throw their support behind a candidate based on a set of certain familiar characteristics. The analysis of local election in Philadelphia (Featherman 1983) and Toronto (Landa, Copeland, and Grofman 1995), for instance, find that recognition of ethnic names plays an important role in voter’s decision to support the candidate.

Because ethno-cultural cleavages are based on such aspects as ethnicity, language, culture and religion the extent of self-interest as the basis for group belonging has been questioned (Kinder 1981). It has been argued that the extent to which one's belonging to a trade union, for instance, defines one as a person is incomparable to one's belonging to ethno-national group. The emotional response that is solicited by ethnic belonging is fundamentally much stronger and deeper psychologically than a pure calculation of self-interest. Moreover, the nature of conflict between ethno-cultural groups often raises deeper psychological issues such as "love and hatred" (Horowitz 1998). The empirical comparative studies have suggested that emotional attachments play a greater role in the use of this particular heuristic (Chandra 2004; Ferree 2004). Thus, ethno-national group belonging is a powerful political tool in developed democracies (Parenti 1967; Wolfinger 1965).

In the new democracies undergoing the transition the rise in the significance and potency of ethno-cultural identities can be expected. Traditionally the concepts of nationhood and democracy have been intimately linked and the formation of the nation and democratization went hand in hand during the so-called first wave of democratization in Europe and Americas (Huntington 1991). The link between the two is both intellectual and practical. The establishment of the government that claims to represent the people produces an inevitable question about who these people might be and what unites these people in a single polity and state (Riggs 1998). The particularly intense rise of ethno-nationalism has been cited as one of the outstanding characteristics of the so-called "third" wave of democratization that includes the post-communist transition in Europe (Linz and Stepan 1996; Snyder 2000).

The increase in nationalism in ethnically heterogeneous societies can lead to an increased sense of ethno-cultural differences and even conflict. In the literature on democratization one can

find an established empirical link between democratization and the rise of ethnic conflict (Basch 1998; Cordell 1999; Ellingsen 2000; Kohli 1997; Mousseau 2001; Riggs 1998; Smith 2000; Snyder 2000; Vetik 1993). In Europe, the rise of ethnic tensions during democratic transition has been well documented (Cordell 1999; Snyder 2000). Lieven (1993) and Vetik (1993) in their respective analyses of Baltic states' path to democracy pay special attention to the rise in ethnic conflicts in the region. They suggest that there is a complex relationship between the liberalization associated with the collapse of the USSR and the rise of ethnic tensions in the region. Observations of this relationship are not limited to Europe. Smith (2000) comments on the empirical evidence of ethnic conflict and democratization in Africa. His study explicitly tests the expected relationship and finds strong support that ethnic tensions rise at the initial stages of democratic transition. Linz and Stepan (1996) remark on the connection between ethnic conflicts and democratization, or what they call the issue of *stateness* in the *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* by devoting an entire chapter to this issue.

It is important to mention that the existence of the empirical link does not suggest that democratization causes ethnic differences. The ethnic-cultural cleavages develop through the historical interaction of social groups regardless of the regime. In many cases ethnic identification are manifested long before suffrage is introduced (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The authoritarian regimes however are more efficient in containing the ethno-cultural hostilities (Linz and Stepan 1996). Yet, democratization and liberalization on the other hand afford a degree of freedom to the population. Freedom of assembly and freedom of speech among others give an opportunity to feuding ethnic groups to freely express their negative view toward each other (Alonso and Ruiz-Rufino 2007). If these negative relationships are not ameliorated, the bloody conflicts are unavoidable (Snyder 2000), as developments in Yugoslavia have vividly

exemplified. As Huntington points out the rise of nationalism in single-party East European Leninist states was reaction to the failures of the authoritarian regime installed and supported by the USSR (1991).

The rise in ethno-national identities can also be attributed to the fact that such identities sometimes prove to be the only salient source of political mobilization. The reliance on nationalist rhetoric could be a useful tool in hands of the political elite during the initial democratization process, in the societies where the previous undemocratic regime eliminated other sources of political pluralism (Surzhko-Harned 2010). The electoral politics in these democratizing societies is often characterized by low information and high degree of uncertainty. The voters and the elites in these societies lack experience with democratic process. The political parties are brand new and therefore do not have a historical record available for voters' evaluation. In such an environment the use of ethno-national heuristic is quite rational on behalf of the new voters. In her examination of ethno-linguistic cleavages and their role in electoral politics Birnir argues that the reliance on ethno-cultural cues in the new democracies is quite high. Moreover, it contributes to the stabilization of party preferences as voters and decision-making elites align along the ethno-cultural cleavages (Birnir 2007). In the case of Bulgaria, Birnir further finds that linguistic identities in particular are more salient in producing lasting political linkages between voters and political parties. She suggests that this is largely due to the fact that in an environment of low information, linguistic cues are the easiest and least costly to follow.

This brief overview of literature suggests that one should expect to find the manifestation and institutionalization of ethno-cultural cleavages in new post-communist democracies. The political manifestation of ethno-cultural cleavage can be attributed to numerous factors, such as

the nature of the relationship between the ethno-cultural groups and their experiences and treatment under the previous authoritarian regime. There are very few ethnically homogenous countries around the world today, and post-communist Eastern Europe is filled with multi-ethno-national states. The previous one-party Communist regimes, moreover, often attempted to suppress the expressions of ethno-cultural cleavages. Although, the severity of the regime repression of the ethno-cultural identities varied, it was based on the Marxist-Lenist assertion that nationalism is a bourgeois invention, constructed as justification of class subjugation.

This cleavage should be one of the first to become politically manifested during the initial liberalization and democratization, due to the deep psychological connection between the group members and lack of other salient sources for political pluralism. The institutionalization of the ethno-cultural cleavage should be expected to follow, as democratization continues and electoral politics is introduced in the society. Low information, high uncertainty, lack of other cues, and the ease and low cost of ethno-cultural heuristic contribute to the development of electoral link between electorate and elites based on ethno-cultural characteristics.

2.1.2 Socio-Economic Cleavages

Socioeconomic cleavage is often characterized by the political confrontation between socio-economic classes. Yet, class based voting is not an uncontroversial subject within the political behavior literature. There is a fierce debate, which has been raging for over a decade now between the supporters of the proposition that “class is dead”(Clark and Lipset 1991), and those suggesting that the “rumors of its death are highly exaggerated” (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993). As Clarke and Lipset point out in the introductory chapter of their *The Breakdown of*

Class Politics, their suggestion that class is dying in 1991 met serious criticism from the Oxford and Berkley scholars (2001).

Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan identify class as one of the major social cleavages that originated with the Industrial Revolution (1967). The basic definition of the class based distinction rests on the different life experiences of the workers and the employers, the laborers and the owners of the means of production. The political expression of this social cleavage became possible through the idea of party interest representation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). The laborers and workers organized into the unions that helped to establish the support for political parties that represented the interests of the working class. The Russian revolution and the emergence of the numerous communist parties around the globe seemed to be a vivid testament that class based social distinctions lead to the class based political distinctions.

The primacy of class cleavages seemed to be solidified in the social sciences in the first half of the twentieth century. Sociologists, though not claiming to subscribe to Marxist doctrine, none the less were all too eager to exploit Marxian class distinction as explanation of the social phenomena (Clark 2001).

Studies of class voting suggest that the lower class (workers) were more likely to support leftist parties, while the upper class (owners/employers) were more likely to support rightist parties. Oddbjørn Knutsen in his review of class as an explanatory variable of vote choice cites Nieuwbeerta, 1995 and suggests that the studies of class voting can be grouped into three “generations” (2006). The first generation of the first decades after WWII sought to explore whether there is a relationship between socio economic class and voting behavior. The second generation of class voting literature came in mid-70’s. This generation was more methodologically advanced than the first one and sought to explore the relationships of class and

voting preferences in more detail. The third generation, which emerged in the 80's, took the exploration of class voting to the cross-national level. These researchers also introduced much more sophisticated methods to distinguish between the so-called absolute and relative class voting as well as argued against the previously used dichotomies of class variable and defended a more detailed class classification.

The conceptualization of class has also undergone fluctuation and alterations. As Clark (2001) points out the definition of class can be summarized in three categories as well. First meaning of class comes from classical Marxism definition, juxtaposing proletariat and bourgeois in capitalist societies based on their relationship to the means of production. The second definition has a broader meaning. It includes more detailed distinctions than the Marxian definition, stretching beyond production or work related differences. Clark (2001) cites Dahrendorf's inclusion of "conflict groups generated by the differential distribution of authority in imperatively coordinated associations." The third definition is still broader and derives the meaning of class from any situation where the equality of a group vis-à-vis other groups is compromised. This broad meaning would then include ethnic or sexual minority groups under the definition of class. As Clark rightfully points out the different definition of class might be a root of the debate, while these later broad definitions of class make it very difficult to conceptualize and examine class in general.

The shifts in the research questions of each generation of class voting literature as well as the shift in the conceptual understanding of social class inevitably lead to the different operationalization and measurement of class variables. The two most cited and prominent measurement indexes involved in the debate on salience of class are the Alford's index and Goldthorpe's schema (Clark 2001; Evans 1999). Alford's index of measurement was first

introduced in his 1963 comparative study of class voting in English speaking industrial democracies. It is based on the Marxian conception of class and makes a distinction between blue-collar and white-collar workers' party preferences (Alford 1963). This is a relatively simple cross tabulation often associated with the first generation of class voting scholarship. This measure of class has come under criticism due to its overall simplicity and the subsequent generations of scholars introduced more advanced measurements, which relied on more elaborate and numerous categories (Jeroen, Achterberg, and Houtman 2007; Lambert and Curtis 1993). Goldthorpe's schema is a response from the Oxford and Berkley scholars, according to Clark (2001). This schema identifies a class of small employers/self-employed, the service class of professional and managerial groups who are themselves divided between lower and higher income positions, the non-manual workers class, and the working class divided into semi- and unskilled and skilled worker categories (Evans 1999). Evans argues that this schema is more useful for its richness and allows for more accurate comparative analysis cross nationally and overtime (Evans 2000). The uses of inferior indexes, according to advocates of class persistence, contribute to the biased results that suggest class decline.

However, class dominance as an explanatory variable of social and political relations come under sharp criticism well before the present debate. In 1958 Robert Nisbet suggested that class was in decline as an explanatory variable in political and social spheres because of the changing dynamic in economic relations (Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993). This suggestion was further supported by empirical studies of Philip Converse (1964) and Arend Lijphart (1971) who have also called into question the explanatory power of class vis-à-vis other variables such as religious and ethnic cleavages. The already mentioned seminal work of Alford (1963) has also shown similar results suggesting that in the English speaking industrial democracies the

importance of class depends highly on the presence of religious and ethnic cleavages that take primacy over class.

The contemporary debate does not seem to be asking *if* class is in decline, but rather *why* is it in decline or why does it appear to be in decline (Evans 1999). Besides, the already mentioned problem of conceptualization and measurement, Evans (1999) lists five reasons for the decline in class based politics in modern post-industrial societies.

1. Because of the “embourgeoisment” of the working class and “proletarianization” of white-collar occupations, social class has lost its important as determinant of life experiences in these societies.
2. The significance of class declined because new “post-material” social cleavages emerged and replaced the traditional class based conflict.
3. Voters are able to make more educated, issue based decisions in vote choice, because of their higher levels of education. Thus, the reliance on class based collective identities declines.
4. Party preferences are based more on the post-material values that emerge and not on the traditional left-right divide.
5. The decline of the manual working class as percentage of population has led left-wing parties to focus on the middle-class instead. This led to much mutation within the left-wing party platforms and weakening of the class based distinctions.

These reasons suggest that the decline in the influence of class on voting preferences might be due to both the real changes within the society as well as to the changes in the behavior

of both voters and parties. These changes, produce the process of *dealignment* or the decline in traditional structural cleavages, as well as introduce the process of *realignment*, with new cleavages substituting the old ones (Knutsen 1988). Hence, as some scholars have suggested, the emergent “new politics” of post-materialism is the explanation for this occurrence. Ronald Inglehart is the scholar most strongly associated with the development of this thesis. He argues that in the advanced post-industrial societies the material values have lost their salience because the level of development within the society was able to satisfy most fundamental material needs of the population as per Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. He concludes that instead the non-material values have become dominant. The salience of value-based cleavages is the foundation of the new post-material politics (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

The decline of class politics, however, is not supported by all in the discipline. Scholars focusing on the new democracies in the former socialist bloc have argued that because the post-communist societies do not share the same experiences of capitalist market economy and democratic political system the same observation of cleavage based politics that is observed in the developed democracies are not applicable. They further suggest that over time, as economic and democratic changes take root in these societies, economic and class cleavages develop and become politically relevant. Evans and Whitefield (Evans 2006; G. Evans and S. Whitefield 1995; 1998, 2006) have argued in numerous publications that the class relationships are new to post-communist states. They develop overtime as market economies develop within the societies after democratization. The ideological distinctions between the social groups develop and the class relations emerge and become salient over time.

One of the main reasons for this is because the debate of modernization/post-modernism does not directly apply in the post-communist context. The experience of communist regimes in

the states of Eastern Europe left an immense imprint on the economic and social development of these societies. Unlike western democracies, modernization was a state-directed affair in the countries of Eastern Europe. That is, modernization was imposed on these societies by the State. This is particularly true of the former republics of the USSR, where the policies like NEP (New Economic Politics) were implemented in the 1920's. These policies turned the agricultural lands of Eastern Europe and Russia into the industrialized states. Because of the command economy and the fact that the state owned all of the means of production these societies did not develop the traditional class cleavages. However, this is not to say that there weren't other basis for socio-economic cleavages in these societies.

In his examination of voting in Russia, Gerber (2000) finds that as privatization policies open opportunity to private ownership the views of Russians toward economic policies change as well and these influence voters' preferences. Evans and Whitefield (1999; 2006) examine the voting preferences of Russians over time. They also find that the class cleavages are becoming more prominent. They attribute this to the learning process among voters. As the economic market reforms take shape, persons are able to recognize different life chances available to people in different social classes. This recognition leads to learning and translates into voting preferences. On the other hand, it is possible that individuals also learn to recognize those parties which represent class interest over time, thus, contributing to the politicization of class cleavages. Mateju, Rehakova, and Evans (1999) argue that it was this kind of process that is responsible for class realignment in Czech Republic post-democratization. These dynamics are also credited with the newly found resurgence of left parties in Eastern Europe (Cook, Orenstein, and Rueschemeyer 1999).

Based on the arguments of these authors we can expect that socioeconomic cleavages develop with time when democracy ages in post-communist societies regardless of the presence of other social cleavages. Moreover, tracing the development of class cleavages in the society with strong ethno-cultural divisions would further strengthen these theoretical expectations.

While these class based socio-economic cleavages are predicted by the above developmental model as a result of successful transition to market economy, the initial socio-economic cleavage distinction in the new democracies can come from a very different place. According to Kitschelt the societal socio-economic rift in post-communist states occurs well before the transition to the market economy is complete. The very debate over the merits and speed of such transition splits the society between the potential winners and losers of the transition (Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000). Among the losers of the transitions are those members of the society whose job position does not easily translate into the new market economy, thus, public sector employees, agricultural workers, unskilled laborers, retirees and pensioners, the rank and file personnel of the security forces, and local party apparatchiks are among those groups least likely to support rapid economic transition to the free market. On the other hand, the winners of the transition, such as highly trained professionals, intellectuals, skilled workers, commercially oriented farmers, technocrats and other administrators, managers of larger industrial corporations will be likelier to support such reform. This is so due to the ease with which their skills and office placements under the previous regime can be converted between the two opposing economic structures(Kitschelt 1992).

2.1.3Hypotheses

The above literature seems to suggest that in the post-communist new democracies one should expect various levels of cleavage manifestation and development. On the one hand it appears that the ethno-cultural cleavages existed prior to democratization process and therefore are quite influential in the political process of the new democracy. Moreover, as Bernir argues the institutionalization of the expressed ethno-national cleavages leads to stabilization of political party system. Thus, we should expect that ethno-national cleavages should be dominant, stable and strong in heterogeneous new democracies.

On the other hand, the socio-economic cleavages develop overtime, due to the population initial inexperience with market relations. As mentioned above, we can expect that there are two mutually reinforcing developmental trends in the development of the socioeconomic cleavage. The first occurs immediately during the market transition and splits the winners and losers of the transition into opposing groups. The second develops as the transition to market is completed and individuals are able to experience the differences in life choices afforded to them by the market relations based on their occupation and life position. Thus, the articulation and institutionalization of these cleavages takes place overtime.

Based on the above overview of literature on social cleavages I derive several general hypotheses for a newly democratic heterogeneous society that is transitioning to market economy.

Overall Impact Hypotheses:

H1. There is a political manifestation of ethno-cultural cleavages in voters' behavior

Developmental Hypotheses:

H2. The cleavage between the losers and winners of the transition is strong due to market transition

H3. Ethno-cultural cleavages become firmly institutionalized overtime as political party competition stabilizes

H4. Overtime differences between the socio-economic social classes manifest itself in electoral behavior of the citizens

H5. Socio-economic cleavages become institutionalized overtime to reflect citizens' experience with market economy

In addition to the temporal variation in cleavage manifestation and institutionalization, I also expect that context and structure should have important effect on what sorts of cleavages appear more prominent. More specifically I expect that cleavages will be manifested differently in the context of presidential and parliamentary elections. The societal and political volatility associated with presidential elections in new democracies has been well documented in political science literature. Linz has explicitly warned against the perils of adopting presidential systems in fractionalized new democracies (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1988; Linz and Stepan 1996), while many others found empirical support for these assertions in new democracies around the world (Diamond 1990; Filippov, Odershook, and Schvetsova 1999; Fukuyama, Dressel, and Chang 2005; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003). Given this literature one can argue that multiparty parliamentary elections tend to be less adversarial and less confrontational than

presidential elections, where two candidates square off against one another. This adversarial and polarizing nature of presidential elections could prompt a heightened sense of ethno-cultural division.

Structural/Context Hypotheses:

H6. Ethno-cultural cleavages are strong during the presidential elections

H7. The more adversarial the context and the closer the results of the presidential election the more prominent are the ethno-cultural divisions

2.2 CLEAVAGES IN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS

Ukraine, as a divided heterogeneous society undergoing democratic and economic transitions presents an interesting case for the analysis of the developmental hypotheses. Unlike the western democracies, Ukraine had a different path of development. The industrial and national revolutions occurred in this country at a different time and under very different circumstances. It can be argued that the events of 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence for the first time in history, were the climax of this country's national revolution. The industrial modernization in Ukraine occurred during the early days of the USSR, during the state led industrialization. However, this kind of industrialization cannot be compared to the industrial revolution of the west, because this was a state-led effort confined to the structure of command economy. The most notable changes in the economic structure of Ukraine have taken place since the collapse of

the USSR as the Ukrainian economy underwent transition to market economy. Therefore, based on the developmental social cleavage literature discussed above, one would expect that new social cleavages should develop and become institutionalized over time after the initial step toward the democratic and economic transition of 1991.

As discussed in Chapter 1, Ukrainian society is viewed as a divided society. The main divisions observed in every electoral cycle are those between the geographic regions of Ukraine, namely east, west, south and center. The divisions are believed to be linked to the ethno-cultural cleavages present in the Ukrainian society. The ethnic and linguistic groups present in Ukraine are the ethnic Russians, ethnic Ukrainians, and Russophone Ukrainians (Barrington and Herron 2004). As was the case with other “third” wave post-communist transitions, Ukraine has also experienced an upsurge of nationalism in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. In his memoirs, the first president of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk concluded that the democratic transition in Ukraine was largely due to the hard work of the nationalist minded social organizations, such as National Rukh, that served as the opposition to the communist regime (Kravchuk 2002). While the activism of Ukrainian nationalists was quite evident, the manifestation of Russian identity remained subdued (Surzhko-Harned 2010). Therefore, the obvious manifestation of the cleavages at the initial stages of democratization was asymmetrically distributed between the groups. The formation of the National Movement of Ukraine or the so-called Rukh, which became a political party and took part in the parliamentary and presidential elections in the 1990’s could serve as a reflection of institutionalization of the ethno-cultural cleavage in Ukrainian politics. Here I seek to analyze the individual voters’ preference to test the applicability of the developmental hypothesis and test the degree of voters’ reliance on ethno-cultural group cues in vote choice.

The class disparities within Ukraine are under-analyzed. There are relatively few studies that seek to flesh out socio-economic differences between Ukrainians. This could be largely due to the fact that Ukraine has only recently solidified its market economy or to scholars preoccupation with geographic regions as an all-encompassing legitimate source of political pluralism. Recently Vlad Mykhnenko (2009) had attempted to evaluate the presence of class voting during the Orange Revolution of 2004. He argued that based on the developmental hypotheses of Lipset and Rokkan discussed above and the argument of Barrington Moore regarding the link between democracy and middle class, the play of social divisions during the Orange Revolution should be examined. He suggested that if the Orange Revolution can be seen as a true turn to democracy in Ukraine, the middle class should be the class most supportive of the Orange coalition. This is a very reasonable hypothesis, unfortunately instead of examining the individual level data, Mykhnenko focuses on aggregate regional data to test his theory. While he finds that economics played a role in the election, the overall results disprove his hypothesis. The regions with a high percent of bourgeois and urban population appear to have voted against the Orange candidate. The dependency on regional and aggregate data is fundamentally at fault for these results. In this analysis I seek to evaluate the socio-economic class emergence and institutionalization using the individual level data in hopes to produce a clearer picture and test the applicability of the developmental hypotheses in the Ukrainian case.

2.3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The goal of this chapter is to determine the changes in social cleavages in Ukrainian society as they manifest themselves in the voting preferences of Ukrainians. I draw on Evans and

Whitefield's (1995; 2006) exploration of the emergence of class cleavages in Russia and Hungary as a guide for variable operationalization of this inquiry. The data used here come from International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES). These are survey data of Ukrainian population collected over thirteen years from 1994-2008. These data were combined together into a single data set. The respondents in all surveys represent a random sample of population. All of the IFES data include 1484 respondents for each year of survey. Unfortunately, 1995 and 1996 are missing from the dataset. The surveys include questions on the political preferences of population, their approval of democratic institutions and of individual leaders of the country. The questions also target individuals' opinions on the important issues influencing the political, social, and economic situation in the country. The demographic characteristics of interviewees as well as their ethnic and socio-economic positioning are also reflected.

In determining the emergence of class cleavages in Russia, Evan and Whitefield set out to evaluate the likelihood of voting preferences of different social classes for each electoral year over the period from 1993-2001. They begin by classifying the respondents into the social classes based on the Goldthorpe's schema, discussed earlier in the paper. This schema identifies a class of small employers/self-employed, the service class of professional and managerial groups separate between lower and higher, the non-manual workers class, and the working class divided into semi- and unskilled and skilled worker categories (Evans 1999). Evans and Whitefield's classification makes distinction between salariate, petty bourgeois, routine non-manual, and working classes. Then the candidates of the elections (not parties) are classified between left, right, center, and authoritarian ideologies. The authors use multinomial logit to estimate the likelihood of different classes vote choice between left leaning candidates and all others (left used as base outcome), including and excluding demographic controls.

In this chapter I follow this analysis pattern to some extent. First, I forgo the classification of between left, right, center, and other ideologies. Second, I analyze the support for both the political parties and the presidential candidates. As the first step of the analysis I focus on the exploration of social cleavages in voters' choices of political parties. I then turn to the analysis of the same cleavage structures during the presidential elections of 1994, 1999, and 2004.

Until 2006 Ukraine employed a mixed electoral system where a half of the seats in the Rada, Ukraine's unilateral parliament, were allocated by single member district (SMD) and the other half by proportional representation (PR). The utilization of such system, as per the expectations of Duverger's Law yields a multiparty system with two prominent political parties and a hand full of smaller parties necessary for the majority coalition formation. In the case of the German political system, this scheme for distribution of seats in the legislature has created a two-and-a-half political party system. A very similar situation can now be witnessed in Ukraine. The two prominent political parties, the Communist Party of Ukraine and Rukh in the 1990's and Bloc Yulii Tymoshenko, which joined Our Ukraine bloc in 2004, and Party of Regions in the beginning of the new century coexists and must take into account a hand full of smaller parties, which make and break coalition governments, as Moroz's Socialist Party has done several times in the last three years.

The parties analyzed are those that have been the prominent parties of Ukrainian politics for last twenty years. They include the Communist Party of Ukraine, which has won seats in Rada every time; People's Rukh, a prominent party of opposition in 1990's which joined forces with Bloc Our Ukraine in 2002; Bloc Our Ukraine, the force behind Yushchenko and the core of the Orange forces; Bloc Yulii Tymoshenko (BYuT), a block supporting Tymoshenko and a

former member of the Orange forces; Party of Regions, a party of president Yanukovich and an opposition to the Orange forces. The survey data included the question on the preferred political party in 1997, 1998, 2001, 2006, 2007, and 2008. The questioner asks the respondents to identify those parties that they have voted for the latest parliamentary election or would vote for if the election was held that Sunday.

The population classification is also based on the assumptions of Goldthorpe's schema. Unfortunately, the IFES survey does not ask respondents for detailed explanation of their working conditions. That is, there is no way to determine that persons are self-employed. Instead I'm able to classify the population as *intellectuals* (persons of intellectual activity such as scholars and journalists), *executives* (persons involved at the high executive positions), *skilled professionals* (mid-level executive and professionals), *unskilled labor* (manual workers), and *farmers*. These categories depict a spectrum of professions which coincide with the class distinction of Goldthorpe's schema. In plainer terms these categories also provide a distinction between the white- and blue- collar occupations. Thus, intellectuals, executives, and professionals represent the white collar population, while the workers and farmers are representatives of the blue collar electorate. Unemployed individuals and soldiers are used as a reference category and defined as "other" in the graphs and figures below.

The classification along the above categories allows for a more detailed distinction between the upper, middle, and lower classes, as well as distinction between the predicted "losers" and "winners" of the transitions. The category of executives represents the upper class, while intellectuals and professional are the occupations characteristic of the middle class. These categories also can be seen as representative of the winners. The workers and the farmers fall into the lower socioeconomic class and along with pensioners these are the losers of the

transition. In keeping with the expected hypothesis of winner and losers proposed by Kitschelt I also include a category of *pensioners* in this analysis.

Education level and size of the city are also used in the analysis to account to the “winners” and “losers” of the transition. It is expected that those with higher levels of education should be likelier to support market relations both intellectually and pragmatically. Free market liberalism presents an intellectual alternative to Marxism-Leninism, and therefore, the persons with higher education should approve of this ideology more readily. I also expect that the citizens in large cities would be more supportive of market reform and be able to adapt to the new economic system with more agility than their rural counterparts.

Based on this distinction we can then speculate that the workers, the farmers, and the pensioners of Ukraine will be more likely to support the left parties, while the intellectuals, professionals, and business executives should exhibit more support toward the right parties of Ukraine. Given the populist nature of the nationalist parties it is possible to speculate that they will appeal to the lower classes of population, particularly farmers, who might be more susceptible to populist agendas and exhibit more ethnic intolerance.

The ethno-cultural cleavages are represented by variables depicting respondents’ self-described ethnicity, language spoken at home, and region of residence. The regions of Ukraine are delineated along traditional lines of east, south, west, and center (used as a reference category). The analysis also includes variables to control for other potentially important predictors of vote choice such as age and gender (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 2003; Lijphart 1979). Religion has been identified as another important predictor of vote choice in the literature of comparative political behavior (Layman 1997; Lijphart 1979). This analysis takes religion into account and includes a measure for Orthodox Christians.

The above hypotheses dictate that the analysis must focus on the initial manifestation of the cleavages as well as the development of the linkages overtime. Therefore, I explore the effects on cleavages on party preference in a two-step analysis. First, I estimate the odds ratios of party support using a logistic regression model for each of the political parties in the analysis. This allows me to see the overall impact of the social cleavages on party preferences. The second step includes the time variation. I'm able to account for temporal changes by including an interaction of independent variables with a year count variable in a logistic regression model. In the case of this inquiry all predictors belong to the Level 1 of the hierarchical model, while the individuals are clustered in years, a Level 2 predictor. This analysis follows the logic of the hierarchical level modeling. As Mishler, Rose, and Munro suggest such model is often used in comparative studies to control for effects of country specific variables, however, it is also possible to use level modeling to account for time effects (2006). Hence, the model is comprised of two levels, the individual level variables accounting for the social group of the respondent and higher level time variables, representative of the year the survey was conducted.

The logistic probability models allow me to work under assumption that the temporal influences might be non-linear. The dependent variable is voter's self-reported support for a specific party/block. The models estimate are converted into the odds ratios of a support for political party (a dichotomous variable: 1= vote; 0= no vote) based on social cleavage identifiers. This is done one at a time for each significant party. For example, let Y (the dependent variable) depict the support for the Communist Party. The equation specifies the effects of cultural, social, economic, and demographic cleavages on the support of the Communist Party. The models can be expressed as follows.

Model 1 – Overall Impact

$$\text{Logit } (Y=1)=\beta_0 + \beta_1\text{Ethnicity}+ \beta_2\text{Language}+ \beta_3\text{Religion}+ \beta_4\text{Region}+ \beta_5\text{Class}$$

Model 2 –Temporal Variation of Cleavages’ Impact

$$\text{Logit } (Y=1)=\beta_0 + \beta_1\text{Ethnicity}+ \beta_2\text{Language}+ \beta_3\text{Religion}+ \beta_4\text{Region}+ \beta_5\text{Class} + \beta_6\text{Time} + \\ \beta_7(\text{Ethnicity}*\text{Time}) + \beta_8(\text{Language}*\text{Time})+ \beta_9(\text{Religion} *\text{Time})+ \beta_{10}(\text{Region}*\text{Time})+ \beta_{11}(\text{Class} * \text{Time})$$

For the both models the predicted probabilities of vote is calculated as follows

$$Pr(Y = 1) = \frac{\exp(X\beta)}{1+\exp(X\beta)}$$

These models thus represents the fluctuation in the support of the specific political party generally and over time given the specific social, class, gender, age, or cultural groups of the individual supporters. This allows me to account for the effects of specific cleavages as manifested by group identification of individual voters on political party support. The robustness of the standard errors is increased by clustering the data by observation years. Age and gender are included in the model estimation as controls. In the evaluation of political parties I also include a dummy variable depicting parliamentary election in order to control for structural political effects. A basic logistic regression (Model 1 above) is used in the analysis of presidential elections.

The results of the models are first depicted in the form of the tables. I then present and discuss the graphs depicting the significant coefficients of the models. Representation of the odds ratios in visual form allows for a better comprehension of the cleavages’ impact on voting preferences. Lastly, I present graphs depicting the predicted probability of vote for each of the

political parties for relevant social group overtime. These figures allow one to tract overtime fluctuations and trends visually.

2.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The developmental theory of cleavages based voting discussed above suggests that ethno-cultural and socio-economic characteristics should come to play an important role in establishing the electoral linkages between voters and political elites. The analysis conducted in this chapter seeks to evaluate the extent to which individual voters rely on group identities and socio-economic experiences in casting their votes over time. If social cleavages are indeed important in determining vote choice one should find that individual voters' group identification characteristics consistently guide their vote. Moreover, given the institutionalization hypothesis one should be able to find the evidence of the alignment process as manifested by stable use of social group identities over time.

The results of the models are presented in three tables in order to facilitate visual comprehension of the coefficients. Table 2.1 depicts the results for the ethno-cultural variables. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 focus on the socio-economic variables as predictors of individual vote choice respectively. As mentioned in the previous section the analysis is focus on the five prominent political parties of Ukraine from 1990's to present. The prominent parties of the 1990's are the Communist Party and People's Rukh, while Our Ukraine, Bloc Timoshenko, and Party of Regions are the prominent parties on the 2000's. The result tables are organized to reflect this.

Table 2-1 Ethno-Cultural Cleavages: Logistic Regression Analysis

	CPU		Rukh		Our Ukraine		BYuT		Party of Regions	
Ethnic Ukrainian	.57***	.84	.35**	18.04**	.67***		.95***	.43	.49***	.28
	.06	.3	.91	26.28	.66	.01	.5	.83	.05	9.61
Ethnic Ukrainian *YR		.97		0.79		.6		.12		.84
		.03		0.12		.75		.13		.21
Russian Language	.84***	.71	.53**	0.12***	.77*		.80**	5.87	.20*	8.25
	.19	.33	.15	0.04	.11		.09	64.95	.12	94.15
Russian Language *YR		.07*		1.19***		.77		.79		.82
		.04		0.04		.92		.36		.66
Orthodox Christian	.02	.62	.75	0.35***	.85	.99	.12	.02**	.37***	.94
	.1	.65	.15	0.05	.12	.18	.13	.04	.14	.03
Orthodox Christian *YR		.97		1.10***		.95		.28**		.02
		.05		0.02		.26		.15		.14
East	.34**	.67*	.49*	0.49**	.69*	.47	.42***	.04***	.50***	
	.16	.44	.18	0.17	.14	.5	.06	.03	.35	.83
East *YR		.97		1.04		.08		.24***		.91
		.02		0.04		.23		.06		.13
South	.55***	.07	.6	0.23**	.73	.04	.40***	.24	.89***	.27
	.22	.13	.29	0.16	.19	8.48	.08	.1	.47	8.39
South *YR		.04***		1.07		.93		.03		.94
		.01		0.08		.56		.29		.17
West	.47***	.20*	.15***	6.07e+08***	.37*		.98	.00***	.62***	64.93**
	.07	.93	.78	1.18E+09	.25		.13		.24	29.6
West *YR		.97		0.05***		.09		.52***		.75
		.04		0.01		.21		.05		.13
Year of Democracy		.78***		2.08***		.22**		.13		.57
		.07		0.09		.16		.35		.02
Parliamentary Election		.99		16.50***		.05***		.21		.97**
		.15		0.76		.33		.2		.62
Pseudo R 2	.12	.21	.13	0.20	.07	.14	.06	.10	.07	.08
N	548	548	570	2570	978	978	978	978	978	978

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2-2 Socio-Economic Cleavages: Logistic Regression Analysis

	CPU		Rukh		Our Ukraine		BYuT		Party of Regions	
Intellectual Work	.55**	.24***	.55	.56***	.82	318910.32***	.75	.67	.57**	
	.14	.08	.8	.53	.26	382063	.16	3.81	.14	
Intellectual Work*YR		.10***		.86**		0.44***		.87		.59
		.04		.06		0.03		.3		.85
Senior Executive	.45***	.44**	.77	.37***	.59	88.58	.68*	.49	.06	.01
	.12	.16	.61	.12	.2	1000.01	.14	.58	.22	.04
Senior Executive*YR		.03		.07**		0.73		.9		.38
		.04		.03		0.54		.13		.51
Skilled Professional	.63***	.68	.48	.31***	.9	664.38***	.54***	.03***	.22	.01
	.07	.25	.44	.06	.19	1629.78	.08	.03	.18	.05
Skilled Professional*YR		.03		.22***		0.66**		.20***		.35
		.04		.02		0.11		.08		.42
Unskilled Laborer	.69**	.51	.84	.40**	.82	233.30***	.58**	.02***	.22	.07
	.11	.72	.72	.16	.23	101.63	.12	.03	.24	.42
Unskilled Laborer*YR		.96		.26***		0.71***		.23**		.21
		.05		.06		0.02		.11		.42
Farmer	.54**	.73	.07	.01***	.87	15.55	.72	.56	.59	.01*
	.14	.27	.73		.3	139.67	.2	.57	.19	.03
Farmer *YR				.81***		0.82		.04		.30*
		.03		.07		0.49		.3		.19
Year Count Variable		.78***		.08***		0.22**		.13		.57
		.07		.09		0.16		.35		.02
Parliamentary Election		.99		6.50***		7.05***		.21		.97**
		.15		.76		3.33		.2		.62
Pseudo R 2	.12	.21	.13	.20	.07	0.14	.06	.10	.07	.08
N	548	548	570	570	978	2978	978	978	978	978
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1										

Table 2-3 Socio-Economic Cleavages (Continued) Logistic Regression Analysis

	CPU		Rukh		Our Ukraine		BYuT		Party of Regions	
Large City	.11*	.39	.72***	0.02***	.67***	.00***	.11*	.03	.81***	3.58
	.06	.27	.09	0.01	.13		.06	.16	.04	11.25
Large City*YR		.03		1.80***		.55***		.24		.87
		.08		0.08		.32		.42		.45
Education Level	.70***	.97	.98	1.89***	.18**	.05	.17**	.48***	.90*	.01
	.04	.11	.12	0.16	.1	.91	.08	.03	.05	.14
Education Level *YR				0.93***		.97		.93***		.99
		.01		0.01		.03		.02		.01
Pensioner	.54***	.24***	.22	0	.99	3.77	.82	.07***	.27*	.76***
	.08	.1	.52	(.)	.21	0.61	.13	.03	.18	.5
Pensioner*YR		.14***		174.62***		.84		.16***		.92**
		.04		0.59		.12		.03		.03
Year Count Variable		.78***		2.08***		.22**		.13		.57
		.07		0.09		.16		.35		.02
Parliamentary Election		.99		16.50***		.05***		.21		.97**
		.15		0.76		.33		.2		.62
Pseudo R 2	.12	.21	.13	0.20	.07	.14	.06	.10	.07	.08
N	548	548	570	2570	978	978	978	978	978	978
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1										

The numeric results presented in these tables seem to suggest three broad conclusions. First, the results suggest that overall the social group characteristics serve as basis for vote choice for individual parties. Second, a close examination of the effects, however, proves no coherent cleavage alignments over time. Lastly, the low values of the Pseudo R squared suggests that overall the impact of social cleavages on vote choice is rather limited. For a more thorough evaluation of results I turn to the graphs depicting the odds ratios of the significant coefficient

presented in the above tables. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 represent the bar graphs of the odds ratios of the significant coefficients presented in the tables above.

Figure 7 Social Cleavages - Overall Impact (statistically significant coefficients: odds ratios)





Figure 8 Overtime Changes (statistically significant coefficients: odds ratios)



At the first glance the results seem to support the hypothesis regarding the overall manifestation of ethno-cultural cleavages. The overall impact of ethnicity and language are most striking. They prove to be important overall predictors of vote choice for all of the main political parties used in the analysis. This is an expected result. The main opposition to the Communist party came from the nationalist movements of ethnic Ukrainian intelligentsia, who supported People's Rukh. The Ukrainian intellectuals perceived the Communist party as a force of ethno-cultural domination and the extension of the imperial rule from Moscow. They regarded the Marxist-Leninist ideology as a sham designed to foster "Russification" of Ukrainian cultural life. This cleavage is sustained in the votes cast for Our Ukraine and Party of Regions. People's Rukh has merged with the electoral Bloc Our Ukraine in 2002 parliamentary cycle, while Party of Regions is seen by some observers as a successor party to the CPU (Zimmer and Haran 2008).

Ethnic cleavage also appears to be important in dictating the votes cast for the Bloc of Yulii Tymoshenko. When Tymoshenko entered the political arena she had a more than questionable reputation. She has been implicated in several unsavory business practices that awarded her an arrest warrant in the Russian Federation. Tymoshenko's nick name the "gas princess" alludes to the alleged fortune she was able to amass through illegal manipulation of the gas flows on their way from Russia to Europe through Ukraine. Tymoshenko's involvement in the gas industry signaled her close relationship to the previous non-democratic elite and regime. She was born and grew up in a Russian speaking family, in a Russian speaking industrial town of Dnipropetrovsk⁵. Her maiden name Telegina also signals her connection to the Russian ethnicity. However, since entering the political arena, Tymoshenko has made valiant efforts to make herself

⁵ The city was founded in the later 18th century during the times when Ukraine remained firmly under the rule of the Russian Empire. It was named Yekaterinoslav (praise to the empress Katherine) and later even renamed Novorossisk (New Russia). During the Soviet days the city became a booming industrial center highly populated with Russian speaking citizens.

more in line with the ethnic Ukrainian image. During the 2004 Orange revolution Timoshenko aligned herself and her party with the Our Ukraine Block and its leader Viktor Yushchenko. During the anti-government demonstration of 2004 Timoshenko addressed the public speaking Ukrainian, albeit with a Russian accent. Her Ukrainian image was further reinforced by her decision to wear her hair in a tight braid wrapped around her head, which is an iconic hair style of a traditional Ukrainian woman. These actions did not go unnoticed and her popularity among ethnic Ukrainians solidified. The results of Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 depict that as well.

The regional cleavage between east and west also appears to be as prominent in determining the vote choice for all of the political parties. The CPU and Party of Regions enjoy support among the dwellers of the eastern regions of the country, who in turn do not like BYuT Rukh and Our Ukraine; both of which are supported in the west. Thus, the results for ethno-cultural characteristic support the overall impact hypothesis **HI** as well as the overall agreement among scholars analyzing Ukrainian politics that the geographic regions play an important role in vote choice.

The results of the overall impact of the socio-economic cleavages are also quite intriguing. The level of education, the size of the locale, and pensioner status are statistically significant overall predictors of vote choice for all parties. Overall, the hypothesis is supported in the sense that large city dwellers and highly educated persons are more likely to support market oriented Our Ukraine and BYuT, than the Party of Regions, which enjoys support from pensioners and less educated persons. The results for the CPU, however, are a bit surprising. The city dwellers seem to be supportive of the CPU while the pensioners are not. These results show, however, that there is an overall cleavage between the “losers” and the “winners” of the

market economic transition, that is just as important in the overall impact on vote choice as the ethno-cultural divisions.

The class identifiers based on adjusted Goldthorp index appears not at all important in determining the vote choice for the Rukh and Our Ukraine bloc. Managers and intellectuals both appear to vote against the Communist Party. On the other hand the CPU is also disliked by farmers, laborers and professional classes, who also appear to dislike BYuT. The lack of statistical significance among the class identifiers for all of the political parties seem to suggest that this particular cleavage is not yet fully developed in Ukrainian society. However, the distinction between the “losers” and “winners” is much more strongly manifested in the political preferences of Ukrainians. These results give credence to expectations outlined in **H2**.

Deciphering the presence and institutionalization of the ethno-cultural and socio-economic class cleavages overtime presents its own challenge to which I turn next by examining the graph in Figure 2.2 and the predicted probability graphs presented in Figures 2.3 – 2.8.

Figure 9 Linguistic Differences in Vote Preferences Overtime (Predicted Probabilities)




Figure 10 Regional Variations in Vote Choice Overtime (Predicted Probabilities)




Figure 2.3 suggests that over time ethnicity and language are not at all as important as one could have expected them to be. Only the Communist party appears to be able to lay a true claim to have aligned itself with the Russian speakers over time. The impact of ethnicity, however, is statistically insignificant for all parties. The lack of statistical significance of language as predictor of vote choice is truly surprising. Figure 2.3 depicts the predicted probabilities of voting for each of the political parties based on the linguistic group overtime. One can see that there are no consistent time trends for any of the parties, save the People's Rukh; however, the impact of this cleavage is very small. As discussed above Birnir finds language to be among the most salient cleavages instrumental in development of electoral linkages and voter stabilization. This seems to be not the case for Ukrainian parliamentary parties.

The examination of overtime stabilization of regional trends suggests a firm alignment of eastern voters with the Communist party and western voters with People's Rukh and Our Ukraine. Figure 2.4 depicts the predicted probabilities trends for all the regions among all the parties and provides a visual depiction of the odds ratio coefficients of Figure 2.2. The predicted probability graphs show some shifts in support among regions for BYuT and Party of Regions. The both parties seem to have enjoyed equal support from eastern and western regions of the country in the early 2000's, however, overtime the split between the regional supports of these parties widens. However, the regional impact coefficients do not seem to be statistically significant for Party of Regions and BYuT. Perhaps we can expect future regional alignments in the future. Thus, the developmental hypothesis **H3** is somewhat justified by present institutionalization of regional cleavages for some parties, yet there are no clear ethno-linguistic attachments as expected by the broader literature

Figure 11 Socioeconomic Differences in Vote Choice Overtime: Occupational Status (Predicted Probabilities)




Figure 12 Overtime Voting Trends in Various Locales (Predicted Probabilities)




Figure 13 Educational Level Differences in Vote Choice Overtime (Predicted Probabilities)





Figure 14 Vote Choice Overtime Variations among Pensioners (Predicted Probabilities)



There is very little consistency or trending among the various class groups effects on vote choice for the prominent parties. Figures 2.5 -2.8 depict the predicted probabilities for the support of political parties based on occupational status, city size, level of education, and pensioner status respectively.

The CPU seems to be enjoying a significant overtime support from the intellectuals. However, as Figure 2.5 shows the support of the intellectual did not increase drastically, rather the support for the CPU has decreased immensely among other class groups. Rukh seems to have picked up overtime support from all of the other groups save the intellectuals, whose support has

declined. As the graph in Figure 2.5 shows, the increased support among farmers is most drastic. Our Ukraine, which absorbed Rukh in 2002, shows a similar overtime decline in the support of the intellectuals. There is also a decline in vote choice for Our Ukraine among professionals and skilled labor. This suggests intellectuals' dissatisfaction with the performance of Our Ukraine, rather than institutionalization of class cleavage.

BYuT, on the other hand seems to have picked up the overtime support from laborers and professionals. However, as Figure 2.5 shows, this increase is rather miniscule compared to the other groups' trend lines. While Figure 2.5 shows strong support for Party of Regions from the unskilled labor this trend is statistically insignificant. However, there has been a significant increase in support of the Party of Regions from the farmers.

BYuT appears to be the only party that has secured strong support of the city dwellers overtime. While it has lost the support of persons with higher levels of education, as did Rukh. Among pensioners the overtime support has increased to CPU and BYuT, while it declined for the Party of Regions. Yet, as the Figure 2.8 depicts the decrease in pensioner support for the Party of Regions appears to be a result of increase in support among non-pensioner, rather than a sharp decline in pensioner support, the same is true for pensioner support of BYuT. Therefore, it seems that only the CPU can claim to have solidified that support. However, there is a general decline in CPU vote overtime. The shrinking distance between pensioner and non-pensioner supporters of BYuT and Party of Regions might suggest a closing cleavage between the "losers" and "winners" of the transition. The Party of Regions might be appearing a successor party to the communists, however, the data give very little support for cleavage institutionalization. Thus, the results show that there is evidence to support the developmental hypothesis **H4**, suggesting the

overtime manifestation of class cleavage. However, *H5* suggesting institutionalization of class cleavages is not fully supported by these data.


I now turn to the evaluation of the social cleavages impact of vote choice of presidential elections. As stated above a basic logistic regression model represented by equation of Model 1 above is used in these analyses. As the candidates varied across election I analyze each presidential election separately. Unfortunately, this does not allow me to get at time effect statistically, however, the temporal developments are non-the less visible. The models employ the same measurement for the cleavages in the above analysis of the voter's choice of the political parties. In 1994, however, IFES questioner did not include a question concerning respondent's occupational status, thus this measure of class is eliminated. Table 2.4 depicts the results of the logistic regression models. Figure 2.9 depicts the graphs of the odds ratios of the statistically significant coefficients.

Table 2-4 Social Cleavages in Presidential Elections Logistic Regression (odds ratios)

	1994		1999		2004	
	Kravchuk	Kuchma	Simonenko	Kuchma	Yushchenko	Yanukovich
Age	1.04	1.27***	1.24**	0.80***	1.13*	0.98
	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.07
Female	0.92	0.97	0.89	1.18	1.17	0.96
	0.13	0.13	0.2	0.23	0.17	0.15
Ukrainian Ethnic	2.01***	0.70**	0.79	1.09	2.56***	0.42***
	0.47	0.12	0.2	0.26	0.44	0.07
Russian Speaker	0.50***	1.49**	1.92**	0.71	0.18***	8.70***
	0.11	0.26	0.62	0.2	0.03	1.9
Orthodox	0.57***	1.39*	1.52*	0.73	0.81	1.32
	0.11	0.25	0.36	0.16	0.12	0.22
Large City	1.03	1.16**	1.55***	0.69***	1.29***	0.96
	0.09	0.09	0.23	0.09	0.11	0.09
East	0.62**	1.31	3.65***	0.43***	0.60***	1.87***
	0.13	0.23	1.16	0.12	0.12	0.39
South	1.49	0.8	1.53	0.87	0.63**	1.59**
	0.38	0.18	0.54	0.27	0.14	0.37
West	3.34***	0.41***	0.58	2.29**	1.23	0.59**
	0.69	0.08	0.26	0.82	0.23	0.13
Education Level	0.97	1.18**	0.98	0.96	1	0.9
	0.09	0.1	0.14	0.13	0.09	0.09
Intellectual			0.68	0.46	0.98	1.04
			0.47	0.26	0.34	0.4
Senior Executive			0.71	0.76	1.11	1.16
			0.45	0.42	0.37	0.41
Skilled Professional			2.35**	0.31***	0.66	1.32
			0.97	0.12	0.17	0.36
Unskilled Labor			3.38**	0.20***	0.55*	1.31
			1.64	0.09	0.17	0.44
Farmer			2.73*	0.30**	0.58	1.13
			1.66	0.17	0.23	0.48
Pensioner	1.02	0.68*			0.70*	1.1
	0.24	0.14			0.15	0.26
Pseudo R2	0.129	0.0647	0.1014	0.1463	0.1699	0.1879
N	1126	1126	526	526	1179	1179

note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 15 Social Cleavages and Vote Choice in Presidential Elections: Significant Coefficients of the Logistic Regression (odds ratios)



The results suggest that ethno-cultural and socio-economic cleavages manifest themselves during voters' decisions in presidential elections. However, their impact varies somewhat over elections and over presidential candidates. In 1994 election the decision to vote for or against Kravchuk seems to have been firmly rooted in voters' ethno-cultural group identities both ethno-linguistic and regional. Being a Russian speaker, orthodox Christian, and easterner significantly reduced the probability of voting for Kravchuk, while being a westerner and a Ukrainian ethnic significantly increases this probability. Ethno-cultural cleavage is also important in choosing Kuchma. However, class cleavages as measured by educational level, city size and pensioner status is also manifested in voter's decision to elect Kuchma who ran on a more progressive and reformist platform than ex-communist party ideology chief Kravchuk.

The 1999 election presents a very similar picture. Both sets of cleavages prove important predictors of voter's choice for both candidates. The class cleavage along occupations status and city size is evident. Professionals, laborers and farmers strongly support the Communist Party's leader Petro Simonenko. On the other hand, belonging to these professions also significantly reduces the likelihood of voting for Kuchma. Thus, it would appear that Kuchma secured the vote of the market oriented "winners" of the transition and lost the support of the economic "losers". The ethno-cultural distinction between east and west as well as Russophones and Ukrainian ethnic is also present. However, the comparison between the 1994 and 1999 elections show that Kuchma failed to secure the support of the Russian speaking easterners in the 1999 election, rather they flipped to support the Communist candidate.

The 2004 election is marked in history by the Orange Revolution that followed the dispute over the electoral fraud allegations. Thus, the second round of the election between Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovich was particularly polarizing and contentious. IFES

were collected after the revolution, therefore, tap into the leftover passion of the event. One can see a sharp and strong cleavage between linguistic and ethnic groups, as well as between regions. Yet, the class cleavage can also be seen. The probability of voting for pro-market Yushchenko is significantly low among unskilled labor and pensioner. It is also high among city dwellers and the young. The presence and strength of ethno-cultural cleavages in presidential elections supports the expectation of *H6* and *H7*, however, it is important to recognize that both class cleavages although to the lesser extent are also manifested.

The results presented in the above analysis support some but not all of the proposed hypotheses. The results suggest that ethno-cultural cleavages have a real and important impact on vote choices of Ukrainian public. However, the ethno-linguistic cleavages seem to have been institutionalized among the parties of the 1990's and lost their potency in the 2000's. There also seems to be overtime development of socio-economic cleavages. The results show a strong manifestation of the cleavage between the "losers" and the "winners" of the economic transition. However, there is little evidence to suggest an existence of a deep institutionalized cleavage between socio-economic groups.

2.5 CONCLUSION

Social group identification can serve as important heuristic for vote choice. Although the literature documents a decline in the salience of group identification as a predictor of vote choice in developed democracies, this behavioral pattern is particularly expected among the voters of the developing new democracies. Because the voters have very little or no experience with democratic process and the political system is highly unstable, the voters can be expected to turn

to the easiest, most accessible heuristics in order to make an electoral decision. The ease of the ethno-cultural group identification and the salience of the socio-economic characteristics seem to lend themselves very well to the formation of the electoral linkages between electorates and decision making elites.

The ethno-cultural cleavages present the useful cognitive short cut at a very low price. Therefore, in a heterogeneous society the reliance of ethno-cultural cues by both elites and voters can be expected. As Birnir showed and argued convincingly the stabilization of vote is highly assisted by the presence and use of linguistic differences between groups (Birnir 2007). The socio-economic cleavages can also serve as important links between electorate and political parties. These differences can develop in two related ways. On the one hand in the post-communist states making the transition from command to market economy the cleavages can form between the so-called losers and winners of the transition (Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000). The winners are those who can more easily adapt to the free market relations due to their age, occupation, or previous status under the old regime. The losers are those who will most definitely suffer losses to their well-being. On the other hand, when the market transition is achieved the differences in life choices would lead to a more traditional class division in the society (G. Evans and S. Whitefield 1995; Evans and Whitefield 2006).

This chapter sought to analyze the presence and institutionalization of social cleavages in the case of Ukraine in order to test the applicability of the developmental hypotheses to the divided societies undergoing democratic and economic transitions. The results presented in this chapter suggest that while social group identification seems to be important for predicting the vote for a certain party at a certain point of time, there is very little evidence to suggest developmental trends of institutionalization. Regional divisions seem to be the only cleavages on

their way to institutionalization, while ethno-linguistic set of ethno-cultural cleavages are less potent contrary to the expectation of the developmental hypothesis. While socio-economic differences between “losers” and “winner” of the transition are evident, there is little evidence to suggest overtime institutionalization. Furthermore, the results suggest that there are important differences between electoral contexts and ethno-cultural divisions are more likely to be more prominent during the volatile presidential elections. Yet, the low values of the R^2 for all the models might be a signal of the low predictive value of social cleavages on voting preferences of Ukrainians.

I argue that this is evidence that social group based politics is only part of the developing electorate of the new democracy. While the groups can and do provide useful heuristics, they tell only a very small part of the story. The populations of the new democracy, specifically Ukraine, learn through the process of democracy and utilize more complex methods in electoral decision-making. Thus, social group identification is only a small part of this process. The following chapters are devoted to the development of this argument.

3.0 LEADERS, ISSUES AND VOTERS: CAMPAING SPECIFIC EFFECTS

While social group attachments prove to be influential in determining vote choice and thus provide a good start for electoral competition, they tell only a party of the story. The proponents of the psychological models of vote choice have long argued that electoral politics is not confined to the rivalry between social groups. Rather the elections “revolve around the issues and candidates of the campaign” (Dalton 2000). In his challenge to the conclusions reached by the authors of *The American Voter* (1964), V. O. Key retorts with a proposition that “voters are not fools” and are concerned with issues of public policy, personality of candidates, and government performances (Key and Cummings 1966).

This chapter analyses the influence of evaluation of issue stances and individual political leaders on vote choice in the new democracy of Ukraine. I argue that both of these components prove quite important in vote casting. As the previous chapter has shown although there are important ethno-cultural and class cleavages in Ukrainian society, they tell only part of the story about voters’ electoral choices. The citizens’ evaluation of individual politicians and issues influence their vote choice on par with or even more than social group attachments. The presence of these evaluations suggests that voters’ abilities stretch beyond the boundaries proposed by the sociological development models of voting behavior in new democracies.

The argument is developed in the following way. First, I evaluate the position and specificities of evaluation of issues stances and individual political leaders in the broader

literature on political behavior and outline the important arguments as related to Ukrainian politics. The methodological approach used in the analysis is spelled out next. Each of the available elections since 1994 is examined in detail with special attention paid to voters' evaluations of issues and leaders. A brief conclusion summarizes the key findings and their implications for the research question at hand.

3.1 ELECTION SPECIFIC PREDICTORS OF VOTE

The field of study of electoral behavior in established democracies has long been convinced that long term factors, such as partisan attachments, play a pivotal role in determining vote choice. The stability of partisanship was foretold by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) as tied to social linkages between parties and social groups. Once the initial alignment has taken place, the relationship between parties and social groups will become “frozen” over time, until the next set of cataclysmic events produce new notable cleavages or else the conflicts underlining the old cleavages are reconciled with time and a process of realignment ensues producing new partisan linkages.

However, as the electoral cycles have shown, there is very little reason to believe in the static nature of electoral linkages. On the contrary the electoral process proves to be much more dynamic in nature, suggesting that other election specific factors might be at play. These more immediate factors include the evaluation of election specific issues as well as individual political leaders. While partisan and social attachment might paint a broad picture of the society, the evaluation of issues and candidates provide a more specific sketch.

Dalton groups the evaluation process in to the three broad categories: position, performance and attributes (2006). The evaluation of the policy positions speaks to voter's capacity to identify the salient issues, formulate a position regarding these issues, and evaluate her own position vis-à-vis the position of the competing elites. Such issues as social spending or foreign policy provide good examples of the evaluation of policy positions of political leaders. The voter is assumed to be capable of analyzing his/her own position on whether the state should provide generous support for the unemployed or support the next military involvement abroad and chose those parties that closely resemble his/her own views.

The rise in issue voting in the case of developed democracies has often been correlated with the decline in partisan attachments and has sometimes been lamented as an evidence of partisanship decline, as more and more voters seem to be “going it alone”, rather than relying on ideological or party cues in voting. The rise in issue voting has been explained by some as a consequence of the rise of post-materialism in the post-industrial settings. As the populations moved along the path of industrialization to post-industrial societies the near universal education and heightened levels in quality of life have contributed highly to resolution of some of the “old” social conflicts and introduced new sets of values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Thus, environmental issues and other issues regarding the quality of human life have entered the political realm in addition to the traditional issues of economic prosperity, social equality, and foreign policy.

The ability of voters to identify and evaluate the salient issues, presumably, requires quite a bit of cognitive capacity. This paradigm presumes a high level of political knowledge and interest. However, as it is well accepted now by most political scientists, to our great normative disappointment perhaps, that most citizens do not give politics as much attention as we might

desire. The debate over the un-informed citizen has impacted the discussion of issue voting as well. In their seminal work *The American Voter* the authors argue that American citizens questioned over a period of time about their positions on issues showed a general lack of political knowledge and exhibited low levels of attitude stability overtime (Campbell et al. 1964). This led them to believe that individual voters are rather unsophisticated because they are unable to engage in the cognitive activity of issue identification and evaluation.

The critics of this glum picture of voters have since argued, however, that it's foolish to believe that all voters will be interested and knowledgeable about all aspects and nuances of all the issues involved in a particular electoral cycle. Rather the voters, acting quite rationally, identify those issues that they find most important and acquire that information that is most relevant to these chosen issues (Converse 1964). These "issue publics" are not confined to one specific issue, however. Empirical evidence suggests that the majority of voters identify two to three issues that they follow closely and use as basis for electoral judgment (Clarke 2004; Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; Krosnick 1990; Petty and Krosnick 1995). Thus, not all issues are as important as others and they change from election to election.⁶

The evaluation of the performance speaks to a voter's ability to assess the success of the political party and/or individual leader. The evaluation of success might respond to the effectiveness of the leadership in pursuing the set agenda or relative satisfaction of the voter with the said performance. The economic performance of government *de jure* is tightly tied into the evaluation of incumbents. Relying on such retrospective evaluation the voters can punish or reward the candidates/parties based on the overall economic situation (Benton 2005; Fiorina

⁶ The literature dealing with issue voting delves deeply in to the effect of media and campaign strategies on the framing of the issues and priming of voters. However, this is not the main focus of the research undertaken here and therefore is not mentioned in the detail.

1981). The Democratic Party's loss of the US congressional majority in the mid-term election in the fall of 2010 could be seen as an example of the public punishing the Democrats and by extension President Obama for their perceived poor handling of economic crisis in the country. However, performance evaluation need not always be retrospective. Some scholars have forcefully argued that voters engage in the retrospective voting only when the incumbency is present. In the case of its absence voter employ prospective, or anticipatory judgments about future elite performances (Lewis-Beck 1986; Niemi and Weisberg 2001).

Closely related to the two above categories is the judgment based on evaluation of individual candidates' attributes. Here the voters might focus on such aspects as perceived trustworthiness of the competing elites to deliver on their promises. The perception of candidates and parties as trustworthy are particularly interesting and important and might be shaped by a number of factors. The voters might look for more specific characteristics that they find valuable in a good politician or a leader, such as his/her positive personality traits (whatever they might be) and a capacity to lead. Some scholars have focused on the specifics of candidate personalities, behaviors, appearances, even facial expression during debates as means to determine what is more important in a voter's evaluation of the candidates (Milton Lodge, Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick Stroh 1989; Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh 1995; Marcus 1988).

The evaluations of attributes are sometimes perceived as the least sophisticated of the three judgment criteria, presumably because it does not take much cognitive capacity to form a liking or a disliking toward a candidate (Dalton 2006). This emotional response can be triggered by such trivialities as a bad haircut, an unfortunate choice of tie, or an air of inapproachable elitism. However, as Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk (1986) argue, the use of the evaluation

of attributes is quite rational and mostly used by a more sophisticated bunch of the voters who try to distinguish the proper leader based on all possible parameters available to them.

Evaluation of individual leaders and candidates as a predictor of vote choice has for the most part been a prerogative of the research of the presidential elections. The relative simplicity of the presidential elections lends itself to the evaluation of candidates more readily than the messy parliamentary elections. However, recent research has shown that even in the parliamentary election the evaluation of leaders, more specifically of the future and an incumbent prime ministers has been on the rise (Aarts, Blais, and Schmitt 2005; Kraus and Nyblade 2005). The 2005 parliamentary elections to the German Bundestag proved quite trying to the image of the future Chancellor Angela Merkel and the British public has carefully scrutinized the new leaders of Liberal Democratic and Tory parties in Britain during the 2010 election.

In this chapter I adopt this classification of issue position and evaluation of individual leaders. Whenever possible, I seek to focus on the key dimensions of position, performance and attribute factors as manifested in the case of Ukrainian political landscape. The questions included in IFES survey questionnaires allow me to analyze some of the important economic, political, social, and foreign policy issues in the majority of Ukraine's presidential and parliamentary elections. Moreover, the questions sought to tap into citizens' evaluation of the individual political leaders' performances, trustworthiness and reliability. In the following paragraphs I will show that electoral decisions of Ukrainians extend beyond the social group attachments and personal socio-economic position. The voters use a broader range of tools in their decision making, which include election specific variables such as salient issues and evaluation of political leadership.

3.2 ISSUES AND PERSONALITIES IN UKRAINIAN POLITICS

Since the collapse of the USSR and Ukrainian independence of 1991, the society has faced a slew of problems created by the collapse of the command economy and Ukraine's transition toward democratic governance. Linz and Stepan suggested that the post-communist states of Eastern Europe faced a double transition both in economics and politics (1996). The government of the day faced difficult issues regarding the necessity and speed of impending reforms. However, in addition to the economic, social and political reforms associated with the post-communist transition, Ukraine had an uneasy task of state and nation building. These tasks of transition and state and nation building, which have often competed with one another, have shaped the political landscape of Ukraine for the last twenty years.

The ethno-federal structure of the USSR perpetuated and enabled the dissolution of the Union along the ethno-national lines. Thanks to Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin's Nationalities Policy of the early years of the USSR the titular republic were created along the ethno-national divisions of the former empire. Thus, the collapse of the USSR produced 15 new states along the lines of the titular republics. For Ukraine the project of nation-state building became the most important project in the wake of liberalization of the Soviet regime under Gorbachev. Although the existence of the Ukrainian nation has a long documented history the national independence and statehood alluded it for centuries; from the first attempts to build an independent state by the ran-away peasants turned fighters, the Cossacks, in the steps of Dnipro river to an unsuccessful attempt to build a state in the first two decade of the 20th century (Lieven 1999; Prizel 1998). The modern Ukrainian state has come into existence under the direct tutelage and supervision of the Soviet federal state. Moreover, some historians argue that Ukrainians received a very different (read "preferential") treatment from the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

due perhaps to the long history of interdependence between the Slavic nations. Ukrainians served at the top echelons of the CPSU leadership on par with Russians, a privilege denied to most ethnic groups. To say that the relationship between the Ukrainian state and the federal structure of the USSR was complicated is an understatement.

As the USSR showed signs of instability in the mid 1980's, the Ukrainian nationalist civil society sought to push for independence following the lead from the independence movements under way in the Baltics and Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic itself (Kuzio and Wilson 1994; Wilson 1996). The break from the federal structure of the USSR, thus, was primarily motivated by the movement for national self-determination rather than democratic transition and economic reform per se (Åslund 2009). The economic and social ills of the Communist era were attributed more to the imperial relations with the center than to the communist ideology. The republican Communist party retained tight control over the Ukrainian state. Moreover, as Andres Aslund insightfully notes, Ukraine's leadership "were renowned as the most orthodox Marxist-Leninist in the Soviet Union" when it came to the economic matters (2009). As a result the collapse of the communist regime in Ukraine was quite awkward and uncertain. The existing communist leadership was able to retain its privileged position shed their Communist appearance and maneuver quite easily into the new independent liberal elite. Leonid Kravchuk a former Communist Party ideology chief turned himself into liberalizing nationalist, seized the opportunity of changing tides and rode them to presidency of the new state (Wilson 1996).

Over the next few years after independence the national project overshadowed all other reforms. The rejuvenation of Ukrainian national identity via the restoration of long ignored aspects of the national history and language became the priority of the new state. Although

Russian speakers were not precluded from public activity, Ukrainian became the official national language.

The neglect of economy, however, led to the devastating results of hyperinflation, deficits, and social disparity. By 1994 it was becoming evident that reforms were necessary and an independent⁷ politician Leonid Kuchma successfully challenged Kravchuk in the 1994 presidential elections. Kuchma's reform program included combating inflation, the liberalization of prices and the privatization of state properties. However, these reforms produced greater social inequality and public disillusionment with the market economy. The Ukrainian economy has also suffered blows due to the unwise trade policy and government's handling of its assets on the international market. The prices of Ukraine's exports remained quite low compared to the international market prices resulting in the huge net losses.

During the early days of independence the nation-building project dictated an "arms-length" policy toward Russia that has been masterfully executed by Kravchuk, who took on his nationalist role with vigor.⁸ Under Kuchma Ukraine assumed a position of a buffer zone between Europe and Russia. The turn toward economic and political reforms at home was coupled with the attempt to find a direction of the foreign policy. The unfortunate experiences with the flailing economy and unstable political regime made some citizens wary of independence and nostalgic for the days of the USSR. On the other hand, the reformers advocated closer alliance with the West out the fear of the loss of state sovereignty and reversal of the market economic reforms. In foreign policy, Kuchma masterfully navigated between the Europe and Russia, pandering to both

⁷ Kuchma ran as a candidate not affiliated with any political party. This was a common occurrence in the post-communist societies, where the public suspicion of political parties as a concept precluded the formation of political party structure behind the candidates.

⁸ At one of the initial meetings of the heads of states in the forum of Commonwealth for Independent States, Kravchuk refused to speak Russian.

sides by reaching a deal on an extended stay of the Russian fleet at the Black Sea and the negotiations with the European Union and NATO. These ambivalent foreign policy maneuvers and economic concerns brought by Kuchma's reforms were central Petro Symonenko's challenge of Kuchma during the 1998 presidential election. A leader of the Communist Party, Symonenko, clearly stated his intentions to ally Ukraine closer with Russia and address the socio-economic inequality within Ukrainian society.

By the end of the decade the Kuchma regime was regarded as kleptomaniac because of its ties with business elite of oligarchs, a few wealthy Ukrainians who were able to make fortunes either through privatization schemes or in the energy trade by facilitating the gas transport from Russia to the rest of Europe (Kuzio 1997, 2005). The most controversial of the privatization schemes was perhaps the privatization of Ukraine's largest steel factory Krivorizhstal in 2004.

The level of corruption during the Kuchma regime increased dramatically in both business practices and politics culminating in the so-called Kuchmagate of 2000, when the president was accused of ordering the assassination of the prominent journalist Georgy Gongadze. Although not officially charged until 2011, Kuchma was implicated in the scandal by the tape recordings of the discussions regarding the planning of Gongadze's murder which were leaked to public by a former presidential security agent. While Kuchma denied the allegations his popularity declined precipitously. The 2002 parliamentary election was filled with anti-Kuchma sentiments.

The 2004 presidential election featured a faceoff between a myriad of candidates, from independents to the communists, however, there were three interesting leaders emerging on Ukrainian political arena. One of them was Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of the electoral bloc

Our Ukraine which formed in opposition to Kuchma in 2002. As the former Prime Minister under Kuchma between 2000 and 2002 Yushchenko led a fierce battle against corruption and introduced a host of economic reforms that propelled Ukraine toward the consolidation of a market economy in 2005. His opponent in the election was Viktor Yanukovich a leader of yet another new entity Party of Regions. While the early years of Yanukovich's life remain a matter of mystery, there have been reputable reports of gang activities and jail sentences in his youth. His rise to power occurred in 1990's when, through connections, he secured a governor's post of Donetsk where he remained until 2002 and formed a close friendship with Ukraine's richest man Renat Akhmentov (Åslund 2009). While Kuchma was not entirely ready to leave the post, he gave lukewarm support to Yanukovich, no doubt under pressure from the powerful patrons. The third notable figure was the controversial and charismatic Yuliya Timoshenko, who headed the electoral Bloc of Yulii Timoshenko (BYuT).

Yushchenko and Yanukovich faced off in the second round of the election. The official results bestowed the victory on Yanukovich, however, the elections were deemed fraudulent by international observers and many Ukrainian citizens, who took to the streets demanding a fair election. Yuliya Timoshenko, who sided with Yushchenko during the Orange Revolution, passionately campaigned for an extra round of elections. Her fiery speeches glorified the protesters who set up camps in main squares of major cities all over Ukraine and condemned Yanukovich and Kuchma for manipulating electoral procedures. The extra round of election took place in December of 2004, the "Orange coalition" became victorious and Yushchenko became Ukraine's 3rd president.

Unfortunately, the "Orange coalition" comprised of BYuT and Our Ukraine, was not successful during Yushchenko's presidency. Timoshenko and Yushchenko found each other

bickering over the priorities and their implementation. A cerebral and liberal Yushchenko did not fare well in collaborations with passionate and populist Timoshenko. The end of the Orange revolution and the euphoria it inspired came in 2010, when Yunokovich successfully ran for the post of the president defeating Timoshenko.

In the following pages I evaluate each presidential and parliamentary election since 1994 through 2008 in order to sketch out the role of issues and trust in political leaders in the voting preferences of Ukrainian voters. I focus on the policy positions, which encompass the domestic economic, political and social issues as well as issues of foreign policy, the performance issues revolving around the voters' approval of incumbents, and perceived leaders' trustworthiness. During the 1990's the pressing issues of the day included the transition to the market, the level of social equality, and Ukraine's foreign policy. However, with consolidated market transition of early 2000's the issue focus shifted to domestic political and social problems, while Ukraine's foreign policy remained an important subject. I expect to see this pattern to be reflected in the results below. While I expect that ethno-cultural and socioeconomic divisions continue to play an important role in voting behavior, they constitute a part of the voter's decision making process and inclusion of issues and leaders' evaluation enriches the overall picture of voting behavior in Ukraine.

3.3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

The goal of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of election specific factors on vote choice. Thus, the analysis is centered on the elections. Since independence Ukraine has held 4 presidential (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2010) and 5 parliamentary (1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2007)

elections. The IFES survey data allows me to evaluate 6 out of these 9 elections. The data on the earliest parliamentary election is not available. While there is an IFES survey for the 2002 electoral cycle, unfortunately, the question asked in the survey did not address voters' electoral choice. The question in this survey asked the respondents to name those parties that represented them best. Obviously, this type of question is very different from naming of the party/candidate that person voted for or will vote for if elections were held at the time of the interview. Given this inconsistency I do not include the 2002 election in this sample.

A logistic regression is used in this analysis. This model allows me to calculate odds ratios of vote for a specific party/leader at a given election as a result of social divisions, positions on salient issues and evaluation of leaders. The electoral choice is a dichotomous variable (1 = vote cast; 0= no vote cast) which lends itself nicely to such analysis. The model used here is

$$\text{Logit } (Y=1) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X1 + \beta_2 X2 + \beta_3 X3 + \beta_4 X4$$

where log likelihood of $Y=1$ is a function of ethno-linguistic cleavages ($X1$), socio-economic cleavages ($X2$), issue position ($X3$), and evaluation of individual politician ($X4$)

The predicted probabilities of vote is calculated as follows

$$\text{Pr } (Y = 1) = \frac{\exp(X\beta)}{1 + \exp(X\beta)}$$

In the case of each election and each candidate/party I employ three models. The first model depicts the log odds ratios for the ethno-cultural social cleavages of ethnicity, language,

and region. Model 1 also includes the income level and education level as socio-economic class identifiers. Model 2 includes all of the above plus the salient issues. Model 3 improves on Model 2 by including the evaluation of political leaders as predictor of vote. This is done in order to see that changes in the predictive value of attachments to the social groups with and without the issue and candidate consideration. Age and gender are used as control variables in all models.

The position issues are divided into the domestic issues and foreign policy issues, with domestic issues revolving around economic reform, social equality and domestic politics and society. For each election I've identified salient issues in at least two of these categories as allowable by the IFES survey data. I shall evaluate the impact of issue stances in accordance with these categories.

The performance and attribute issues are measures by evaluation of the incumbent's job and the perceived trustworthiness of the political leaders. IFES survey has queried the respondent about the levels of trust and confidence s/he has in a particular politician each year of the survey. The exact wording of the questions for each survey year is provided below.

1994 "If you can, name the political figure in whom you have the most trust"

1998 "In general, would you say that Leonid Kuchma has done his job as President well enough to deserve re-election, or would you support someone else for President"

1999 "I am now going to ask you about several government bodies and individuals. For each, please tell me how much confidence you have in them."

2004 (2005-2006) "And in your opinion, how effective are these institutions and leaders in carrying out the duties that are their responsibility?"

2007 “Please tell me how much confidence do you have in c. president Viktor Yushchenko d. prime minister Viktor Yanukovich e. Yuliya Tymoshenko”

2008 “Please tell me how much confidence do you have in c. president Viktor Yushchenko d. prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko e. former prime minister Viktor Yanukovich”

These questions tap into the individual’s evaluation of leaders’ performance. In each election year the political leaders were evaluated retrospectively based on their past performances while in office and their accomplishments. Thus, these questions go beyond an assessment of the basic attributes of the individual politicians, but rather ask voters to engage in cognitive evaluation of the politicians’ work, which is more cognitively sophisticated than a mere “gut reaction”.

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 depict the correlation between the variable addressing leader evaluation and vote choice for presidential and parliamentary elections respectively.

Table 3-1 Correlation between Trust in Leader and Reported Vote (Presidential Elections)

Trust	Vote	
1994	Kuchma	Kravchuk
Kuchma	0.2718	-0.0913
Kravchuk	-0.1194	0.2195
1999	Kuchma	Simonenko
Kuchma	0.6699	-0.6133
Simonenko	-0.6956	0.7758
2004	Yushchenko	Yanukovich
Yushchenko	0.4059	-0.373

Table 3-2 Correlation between Trust in Leader and Reported Vote (Parliamentary Elections)

	Vote		
Trust			
2006	Our Ukraine	BYuT	Party of Regions
Yushchenko	0.2892	0.0978	-0.2424
Timoshenko	0.2355	0.3024	-0.3485
Yanukovich	-0.2965	-0.2023	0.4846
2007	Our Ukraine	BYuT	Party of Regions
Yushchenko	-0.1631	-0.1012	0.1827
Timoshenko	0.0585	-0.624	0.3401
Yanukovich	0.097	0.2641	-0.4974

The correlations are provided here in order to address a legitimate concern as to what extent do the measure of the leadership evaluation tap into the intended vote of the respondent. While this is an ever-present danger of social science research, the low correlations between the variables give some confidence regarding their independence. As the tables show the correlations between all of the trust variables and all of the vote variables, save the 1999 election, are insignificant and quite low.

The results of the analysis are presented in the following way. Each election is analyzed individually in chronological order. The results of the logistic regression models are converted in to odds ratios and presented in the table form, where Model 1 includes just the effects of social cleavages, Model 2 includes the effects of cleavages and issue positioning, and Model 3 includes the effects of cleavages, issues, and evaluation of individual political leaders. The independent variables are measured on the different scales; therefore, a meaningful cross-group comparison is impossible with odds ratios. In order to show a relative predictive power of each set of vote determinants the coefficients are standardized around the standard deviation of predictors. The

results of the statistically significant coefficients of Model 3, thus transformed, are then depicted in the form of the bar graphs.

3.4 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

3.4.1 1994

After becoming the first president of an independent post-Soviet Ukraine in the election of 1991, Kravchuk faced a host of problems in domestic and foreign policy. A former party apparatchik and ideology chief Kravchuk was ill positioned to be the post-communist reformer. Instead he focused on the immediate needs of nation and state building. He focused on the revitalization of Ukrainian language and culture; in the foreign relations he focused on distancing Ukraine from Russia and establishing friendly relations with the West, which he achieved primarily due to his decision to de-nuclearize Ukraine. The political frictions between the president and his prime ministers led Kravchuk to resign. The second round of the emergency presidential election of 1994 featured Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma.

In the election of 1994 the neglected economy became an important issue alongside the unresolved national and foreign policy issues. Kuchma, who had served as Prime minister for a very short time under Kravchuk, emerged as a person strongly in support of the economic reform. However, as some have pointed out he too lacked the necessary knowledge to implement a meaningful and lasting reform (Åslund 2009).

The IFES data allow me to identify the questions dealing with most of these position issues as well as assess voter's perception of trustworthiness of the candidates. The questioners

asked the respondents to weigh in on their opinion on the pace of economic reform, the merit of command economy, state welfare program, the relationship with Russia, and the necessity of making Ukrainian the official and mandatory language.

Table 3-31994 Presidential Election: Logistic Regression Analysis (Odds Ratios)

	Kravchuk			Kuchma		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	1.07	1.42***	1.47***	1.14***	1.05	1.02
	0.05	0.18	0.19	0.05	0.14	0.14
Gender (Male)	1.04	0.51*	0.54*	1.08	1.61	1.56
	0.15	0.19	0.2	0.14	0.62	0.6
Education Level	0.98	1.35	1.39	1.13	1.31	1.25
	0.09	0.3	0.31	0.09	0.3	0.29
SES	1.14	0.71	0.74	1.11	1.02	1.07
	0.15	0.24	0.25	0.13	0.37	0.39
Ethnic Ukrainian	3.40***	2.65	2.46	0.63***	0.84	0.83
	0.74	2.54	2.35	0.1	0.83	0.81
East	0.58**	0.66	0.66	1.31	0.86	0.82
	0.12	0.43	0.44	0.23	0.53	0.52
South	1.36	4.00*	4.78**	0.94	0.59	0.56
	0.36	2.88	3.49	0.21	0.43	0.42
West	3.09***	3.80***	4.22***	0.43***	0.30***	0.31* *
	0.61	1.73	1.99	0.08	0.14	0.14
Guaranteed Employment		1.17	1.22		1.6	1.64*
		0.28	0.3		0.47	0.48
Guaranteed Healthcare		0.79	0.77		0.75	0.79
		0.2	0.2		0.21	0.23
Pace of economic reform		1.03	1		1.1	1.16
		0.2	0.2		0.24	0.26
State Run Economy		0.82	0.84		1.87	1.85
		0.34	0.36		0.82	0.82
Close Ties to Russia		0.17**	0.17**		2.12	1.98
		0.14	0.15		1.49	1.39
Mandatory Ukrainian Language		1.22	1.14		1.24	1.23
		0.5	0.47		0.52	0.52
Trust Kravchuk			9.31*			0.41
			10.78			0.45
Trust Kuchma			1.33			1.77
			0.64			0.83
Pseudo R2	0.12	0.17	0.19	0.05	0.10	0.11
N	1100	181	181	1100	181	181
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1						

Table 3.3 depicts the results of the logistic regression models for both candidates. It is important to note the changes in pseudo R squared between the three models for each of the presidential hopefuls. The addition of issue stances to the social cleavages increases the explanatory power of the model and the value of the pseudo R squared from 0.12 to 0.17 and from 0.05 to 0.10 for Kravchuk and Kuchma respectively. The pseudo R squared is further increased by the addition of voters' evaluation of the leaders. This suggests that the main expectation of this chapter is supported by these findings so far. During the presidential election of 1994 the Ukrainian citizens used all the tools available to them in making their electoral choice. I now turn to the evaluation of the statistically significant predictors of vote choice. Moreover, the inclusion of voters' evaluation of issues and leaders causes a decline in statistical significance of the odds ratios of most ethno-cultural variables. Residing in the western regions of Ukraine remains a strong predictor influencing the likelihood of electing Kravchuk and reducing such likelihood for Kuchma.

Figure 16 Presidential Election 1994 (statistically significant coefficients)




Figure 3.1 depict the standardized statistically significant coefficients of Model 3 for both Kuchma and Kravchuk. Notwithstanding the influence of regional cleavage, the evaluation of the leaders and issue states prove to be very influential. More specifically, the issues of domestic socio-economic policy and foreign policy influence voters' decision. Those persons who believe that employment should be guaranteed by the state are significantly more likely to support Kuchma. Voters who supported economic competition were more likely to vote for Kuchma in 1994. Those individuals who believe that Ukraine should pursue closer ties with Russia are more likely to disapprove of Kravchuk, who pursued a more independent course for the new Ukrainian nation. Thus, in the 1994 presidential election Ukrainian voters took into consideration the socio-economic and foreign policy when casting vote for the two candidates. The retrospective view of Kravchuk proves to be more important than the rest of the factors. The voters who approve of Kravchuk were very willing to reward him for his policies with another term in office as did those who supported his decisions to move away from the Russian sphere of influence.

The standardized odds ratios predicting the likelihood of vote for the both candidates based on issue and candidate evaluation are either very close to or greater than the social group identifiers. This suggests that the voters in 1994 were quite capable of evaluating candidates and the issues stances accordingly. These finds provide support for my earlier expectation that election specific factors are taken into account by voters.

3.4.21999

Kuchma's reform programs that focused primarily on curbing the inflation, price stabilization, and extending privatization, unfortunately, did not succeed. The experience with market reform made many citizens weary as the new measures bred more social inequality. More specifically,

the voters questioned the value of rapid reforms or the so-called “shock therapy,” which was a popular approach among politicians to the economic restructuring in the early 1990’s. While successful in Poland, the Russian attempt to implement fast economic reforms proved disastrous. Russia slid into a terrible economic crisis in 1998 and many observers blamed it on the attempted “shock therapy.” After the 1994 election the Communist Party had supported president Kuchma. However, Kuchma’s failed economic policies led the Communists to withdraw their support in 1999.

Petro Simonenko and the Communist party campaigned on the strong anti-market platform. Their campaign resonated with the pensioners and other groups dependent on the state subsidies. The Communist Party of Ukraine, one of the very few communist parties in the former-Soviet bloc that survived the transition and collapse of the USSR without being disbanded, served as a relic of the past and provided hope to the skeptical and disillusioned population who refused to accept the collapse of the USSR as an irreversible fact. Moreover, the Communists voiced opposition to foreign influences in the country and supported closer ties with Russia and Belarus that would resemble the previous Union.

Meanwhile Kuchma has adopted a much more pragmatic approach to the foreign relations of his country. During his first term in office he managed to steer between the West and Russia without making concrete commitments to either. Kuchma managed to come to a settlement with Russia over the Black Sea Fleet. However, that settlement did not bring Ukraine or Crimea any closer into the sphere of Russia’s influence. Kuchma had also made headway in dealing with the West, through negotiations and cooperation with the European Union and NATO.

The IFES surveyors tapped into the salient issues of Ukraine's 1999 election by asking the respondent's position on the merits of the command economy, the value of private property as citizens' right, the need for rapid economic reforms, and the necessity of foreign investment for the country's development. Their judgment about the performance and attribute judgments of candidates are measured by the degree of perceived trustworthiness.


Table 3.5 depicts the results of the logistic models for the support of Kuchma and Simonenko in the second round of the 1999 presidential elections. Here too one can see an increase in predictive power of the models as reflected in increased pseudo R squared with inclusion of election specific factors. While social cleavages remain important predictors, the inclusion of new variables in models 2 and 3 reduce that statistical significance of these coefficients, suggesting that social group identifiers move further down the causal chain in explaining voters' choices. As the results of the Model 2 show vividly, the issues of market transition, both its overall merit and pace of the reform as well as the issue of foreign investment are quite salient along side of social cleavages for both Kuchma and Simonenko.

The candidate evaluations prove to be very strong predictors of vote choice in 1999 as well as in 1994. As Figure 3.2 shows, the evaluation of the political leaders' shows significant influence over the support as well as disapproval of the candidates. Attitudes toward the command economy, private property and the need for foreign investment also prove important for voters. The standardized odds ratios of these predictors appear as influential and regional and ethnic divisions.

Table 3-4 1999 Presidential Election: Logistic Regression Analysis (Odds Ratios)

	Kuchma			Simonenko		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	0.86**	0.94	0.98	1.22***	1.11*	1.12
	0.04	0.05	0.1	0.06	0.06	0.12
Male	0.89	0.68**	0.51**	1.13	1.50**	2.00* *
	0.11	0.11	0.14	0.15	0.25	0.6
Education Level	1.12	0.89	0.86	0.80**	1.03	1.05
	0.09	0.08	0.13	0.07	0.1	0.19
Income level	1.32***	1.23**	1.28	0.76***	0.80**	0.79
	0.11	0.12	0.22	0.07	0.08	0.14
Russian Language	0.70**	0.73	0.87	1.62**	1.35	1.99
	0.12	0.16	0.33	0.31	0.31	0.86
Ukrainian Ethnic	0.98	0.84	0.63	0.92	1.09	1.87*
	0.15	0.15	0.2	0.15	0.21	0.65
East	0.59***	0.55***	0.91	2.20***	2.75***	2.36* *
	0.11	0.12	0.35	0.43	0.66	1.01
South	0.62**	0.61**	1.02	1.96***	2.18***	1.39
	0.12	0.14	0.4	0.41	0.55	0.61
West	2.11***	2.12***	3.44**	0.49***	0.49**	0.44
	0.46	0.58	1.65	0.13	0.16	0.25
State Economy		0.53**	0.75		1.93***	1.52*
		0.06	0.15		0.23	0.33
Pace of Reform		1.32**	1.32		0.72**	0.81
		0.17	0.32		0.09	0.2
Foreign Investment not necessary		1.28***	1.22*		0.80***	0.87
		0.08	0.13		0.05	0.1
Private Property		0.98	1.24		1.03	0.70**
		0.09	0.2		0.1	0.12
Trust Kuchma			35.00***			0.04***
			10.99			0.01
Trust Simonenko			0.03***			57.43***
			0.01			19.5
Pseudo R 2	0.08	0.17	0.64	0.11	0.20	0.67
N	1170	958	806	1170	958	806
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1						

Figure 17 1999 Presidential Elections (statistically significant coefficients)



The lack of commitment toward Russia and friendly relations with the West had their consequences for Kuchma by the time of the 1999 election. Kuchma lost the support of the Russian speaking population of Ukraine. However, the support he received from the western regions was rather lukewarm, as the graph in Figure 3.2 vividly portrays. Voters residing the west strongly opposed Simonenko and his Communist party, therefore, they cast their votes for Kuchma grudgingly, opting for a lesser of two evils.

These results indicate that in 1999 the Ukrainian voters engaged in retrospective evaluation of both political leaders and their positions on issues when casting a vote. The regional cleavage between east and west remained strong.

3.4.3 2004

Kuchma's second term in office was nothing but disastrous. The policy of asymmetrical bargaining with wealthy oligarch brought nothing but additional corruption. The political corruption followed. In March 2001 a number of protesters took to the streets demanding Kuchma's resignation. The protests coincided with the anniversaries of the birth and death of the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, and were meant to send a strong political message of disapproval to the president from the cultural civil society. Kuchma's regime reacted with police crack downs and detentions. In an attempt to deprive the population of the public space for demonstration the main city street Khryshchatyk and the attached Independence Square were closed for renovation. However, the anti-Kuchma sentiments grew ever more as the presidential election of 2004 approached.

By 2004 Ukrainian economy was well on the way to the full market economy. Many of the reforms responsible for this change had been implemented by Viktor Yushchenko during this short term as Prime Minister between 2000 and 2002.⁹ After his deposition Yushchenko gained further popularity and his electoral bloc Our Ukraine did quite well during the 2002 parliamentary election and it became a part of the official opposition to the government.

However, a chorus of Yushchenko's critics voiced their disapproval of the former Prime Minister. They opposed Yushchenko's avid pro-Western attitude and even more specifically, his pro-American position. Yushchenko has had experiences with American business thought his life time. Moreover, his wife Kateryna Chumachenko is an American-born Ukrainian from Chicago,

⁹ Yushchenko was fired from the post after receiving a vote of no-confidence orchestrated by the faction of the oligarchs and the Communists, both of whom, interestingly opposed his economic policies favoring the state presence in business and preservation of opaque business practices.

who enjoyed a successful career in the numerous offices of the US government including the White House and the State Department before her marriage to Yushchenko. These connections to the US bred a host of conspiracy theories about Yushchenko's true allegiances and his vision for Ukraine.

Opposite Yushchenko in the second round of 2004 election ran a former governor of Donetsk, Viktor Yanukovich. Supported by powerful oligarchs like Renat Akhmetov, Yanukovich and his Party of Regions ran on a populist centrist platform. Preservation of closer economic and political ties with the Russian Federation, where president Putin enjoyed the peak of his popularity, were one of the main features of Yanukovich's campaign. However, the rest of the campaign lacked structure and clear messages, according to the observers (Åslund 2009; Aslund and McFaul 2006).

The allegations of fraud after the November 21 electoral count declaring Yanukovich's victory led to a massive wave of popular protests and demonstrations which became known as the Orange Revolution. After a month of protests the second round re-run took place on December 26 granting Yushchenko victory and the presidency.

Unfortunately, IFES data does not allow me to tap into many important aspects of the 2004 election, primarily because the questioners were more concerned with the events of the Orange Revolution, rather than more mundane questions of policy stances and even candidate evaluations. However, I'm able to test the significance of some important issues such as the pace of the economic reforms, the necessity for development of business, democracy and reform in health care, and the US support for Ukrainian development. These issues tap in to the important social and political domestic issues as well as a question of Ukraine's foreign policy


toward the US. I also include citizens' perceived trustworthiness of the former Prime Minister Yushchenko.

Table 3-5 2004 Presidential Election: Logistic Regression Analysis (Odds Ratios)

	Yushchenko			Yanukovich		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	1.13***	1.18***	1.20***	1.19***	1.1	1.1
	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.07
Male	0.89	0.9	0.95	1.02	1.04	0.97
	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.19	0.19
Education Level	1.19**	1.17	1.19*	0.99	0.97	1
	0.1	0.11	0.12	0.09	0.1	0.11
Income level	1.19*	1.07	1.05	0.84*	0.88	0.87
	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.08	0.1	0.11
Russian Language	0.8	1.08	1.1	1.46*	1.03	1
	0.16	0.24	0.26	0.33	0.26	0.27
Ukrainian Ethnic	2.74***	2.27***	2.12***	0.58***	0.61**	0.63**
	0.56	0.55	0.53	0.11	0.14	0.15
East	0.08***	0.09***	0.09***	18.37***	16.34***	17.40***
	0.02	0.02	0.02	4.27	4.3	4.85
South	0.12***	0.09***	0.09***	7.91***	8.39***	9.10***
	0.03	0.03	0.03	2.05	2.5	2.85
West	1.47*	1.21	1.09	0.37**	0.46*	0.62
	0.31	0.29	0.29	0.15	0.19	0.26
Necessity of Democratic Development		1.15	1.12		0.9	0.9
		0.13	0.14		0.12	0.13
Necessity of Business Development		1.09	1.07		0.86	0.88
		0.15	0.15		0.12	0.13
Pace of Economic Reform		0.81*	0.87		1.14	1.06
		0.09	0.1		0.12	0.12
Modernization of Health Care		1.13	1.06		0.97	0.98
		0.12	0.12		0.11	0.12
US Assistance		1.50***	1.49***		0.60***	0.62***
		0.17	0.18		0.08	0.08
Trust Yushchenko			2.66***			0.42***
			0.49			0.09
Pseudo R 2	0.31	0.34	0.37	0.36	0.39	0.42
N	1243.00	980.00	937	1243.00	980.00	937
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1						

Table 3.5 depicts the results for the logistic models. As in the analyses of the two previous elections, inclusion of citizens' evaluation of salient issues and political leaders increases the pseudo R squared between the models. Moreover, the inclusion of these election specific variables pushes the odds ratios predicting vote choice based on ethno-cultural identifiers toward 1 for both candidates. Yes, regional differences remain very strong in this highly contested election. The residents of the eastern and southern regions are particularly adamant in their support for Yanukovich and dislike for Yushchenko as depicted in Figure 3.3.

Figure 18 2004 Presidential Election (statistically significant coefficients)



In addition to ethno-regional determinants, education level plays an important role in this elections outcome. People with higher levels of education were likelier to support Yushchenko. Among issues support for US developmental aid proves important for the voters and packs a significant predictive punch as a determinant of the vote choice for both candidates. The predictive power of the evaluation of issues of foreign policy and former Prime Minister are about the same, higher than ethnic identifiers, yet, lower than regional affiliations.

Overall, the evaluation of presidential election, leads me to believe that I'm justified in my expectation that inclusion of election specific variables enriches the picture of voting behavior of the Ukrainian voters.

3.5 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS¹⁰

It has been widely acknowledged that parliamentary elections present a more challenging electoral environment for the voters. A multitude of less known and less publicized candidates, the multiple parties and issues all make it more difficult to collect and process the necessary electoral data. In the case of Ukraine, this process is made even more difficult by the fluctuating electoral laws and the ever changing party supply (D'Anieri 2006; Zimmer and Haran 2008).

Since the first popular free election in 1989, Ukrainian electoral laws changed three times. The 1994 parliamentary election was held by plurality rule of "first past the post" in the single member districts. In this case the voters were faced with a choice of a single representative among several candidates in their electoral districts. By 1998, however, the rules had changed. The 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections were held by a mixed system. Half of the seats were assigned by SMD the other by proportional representation. This made voters' decision making process a bit more complicated, because, now they had to familiarize themselves with the candidates and also the political parties running on the second PR ticket. After the Orange Revolution the electoral system and the constitutional arrangements were further altered and the

¹⁰ Due to IFES data limitation the 2002 parliamentary election is excluded from the analysis.

2006 election as well as an emergency 2007 parliamentary election took place by proportional representation only. Given the primacy of the Prime Minister in the post-Revolutionary system, I should expect voters to give more stock to the evaluation of the political party leaders or the would-be Prime Ministers.

3.5.11998


Addressing the 1998 parliamentary election, IFES surveys asked the respondents to express their opinions regarding the merit of state run economy and the necessity of rapid economic reform. The survey has also asked the respondents to evaluate the job of the president Kuchma.

Table 3.6 depicts the results for the three prominent political parties of the 1998 electoral cycle, the Communist Party of Ukraine, the National Rukh, and the Party of Greens. The pseudo R squared for these models also increases, albeit less drastically as in presidential elections, with the addition of evaluation of issues and Kuchma's job as the president. However, the predictive power of social cleavages remains unaltered by the inclusion of new variables. Language, ethnicity, the level of income, and regions remain strong predictors of vote choice, particularly for the CPU and Rukh.

Table 3-6 1998 Parliamentary Elections and Campaign Effects - Logistic Regression

	CPU			Rukh			Greens		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	1.43***	1.42***	1.43***	1.12	1.20*	1.19*	0.72***	0.74***	0.75***
	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.12	0.12	0.06	0.07	0.07
Male	1	1.16	1.18	1.61**	1.45	1.39	0.86	0.81	0.8
	0.13	0.17	0.18	0.36	0.39	0.39	0.2	0.2	0.21
Education Level	0.92	0.94	0.97	1.17	1.11	1.09	0.96	0.89	0.83
	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.14	0.14	0.14
Russian Language	1.35*	1.41*	1.48*	0.55*	0.40***	0.44**	1.44	1.68	1.56
	0.24	0.29	0.32	0.17	0.14	0.16	0.46	0.6	0.57
Ukrainian Ethnic	0.85	0.8	0.8	4.24***	4.67***	4.41***	0.86	0.78	0.74
	0.13	0.14	0.15	1.79	2.33	2.23	0.22	0.22	0.21
Income Level	0.82**	0.83**	0.78**	1.31*	1.31	1.34*	1.44**	1.37*	1.40**
	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.18	0.22	0.23	0.21	0.22	0.23
East	1.38	1.35	1.46	0.68	1.1	1.1	1.12	1.2	1.26
	0.28	0.32	0.37	0.26	0.47	0.49	0.35	0.42	0.45
South	2.61***	2.59***	2.62***	0.74	1.08	1.15	0.45**	0.53	0.51
	0.53	0.63	0.66	0.32	0.55	0.59	0.17	0.22	0.22
West	0.91	0.84	0.9	2.34***	2.06*	2.29**	0.95	1.09	0.95
	0.2	0.23	0.26	0.7	0.77	0.88	0.36	0.45	0.4
State Economy		1.70***	1.77***		0.66**	0.64**		0.67**	0.69**
		0.21	0.23		0.12	0.12		0.12	0.13
Pace of Reform		0.82*	0.87		1.59*	1.46		0.94	0.92
		0.09	0.1		0.4	0.38		0.22	0.22
Approval of Kuchma's Job			1.16**			0.95			0.91
			0.08			0.1			0.08
Pseudo R 2	0.10	0.16	0.17	0.13	0.16	0.16	0.07	0.09	0.09
N	1484	1152	1070	1484	1152	1070	1484	1152	1070

Figure 19 1998 Parliamentary Election (statistically significant coefficients)



However, the stances regarding the command economy prove to be quite important as well. For CPU supporters the support of command economy increases the likelihood of vote more than the linguistic or regional affinity of the voter. The same trend is seen with regard to the Rukh and Green votes. The harsh realities of the economic crisis of the 1998, which followed the crash of Asian stock markets, brought into the sharp focus the ongoing debate between the proponents and opponents of the transition to the market economy. Moreover, the nostalgia for the past economic stability and social security grew higher. Thus, as these results vividly show the population engaged eagerly in the consideration of this salient domestic issue during the electoral choice in 1998 parliamentary election.

Interestingly the evaluation of Kuchma's job as the president yields no statistically significant results for any other party but the Communist Party. Although, in all elections Kuchma ran as an independent and unaffiliated with any political party, this result is not very

surprising. The Communist Party, for the most part supported Kuchma's decisions in the Rada compared to the rest of the political forces.

3.5.2 2006

After the 2004 Orange Revolution the political society was faced with the turbulent struggle of power between three political powers – Yushchenko, Timoshenko, and Yanukovich. In 2006 this struggle was personified further through the electoral struggle for votes between Our Ukraine, Bloc Yulii Timoshenko, and Party of Regions.

The constitutional reform that was reached as a compromise in the midst of the Orange Revolution rearranged the powers of the president and the Prime Minister, giving more power to the later. The amendment took force on January 1, 2006 and the post-Revolutionary Ukraine was supposed to resemble a parliamentary-presidential system with a more empowered Prime Minister. Unfortunately, the hasty reform did not clearly specify the power relations between the presidents and the Prime Minister and the power struggle between the President, the Cabinet, and the PM ensued.

Timoshenko, a crucial ally of Yushchenko's during the revolution, became his first Prime Minister. Unfortunately, the alliance did not survive the test of the political power struggle. The strife between the President and the Prime Minister led to Timoshenko's removal only five short months after she assumed premiership. After the deposition Timoshenko took to campaigning for the 2006 election plainly stating her ambitions to return as the country's PM.

On the other hand, the leader of the Party of Regions did not give up his political ambitions. After the defeat in December of 2004, Yanukovich disputed the results of the election and stalled the establishment of the new government. In 2006 he made his intentions to run as

opposition to both Yushchenko and Timoshenko widely known. Their fierce and alas fruitless struggle that led to the collapse of the government was regarded by citizens as incompetence.


The society as a whole struggled with the aftermath of the Orange events. As Aslund (2009) writes “[t]he hangover was as heavy as the Orange Revolutions had been gorgeous.” The instability within the governing organs, the bickering of the politicians, and the populist reforms of Timoshenko all led to disillusionment and worry.

IFES surveys attempted to tap into the wide variety of the issues. The voters were asked to evaluate their stances on the power distribution between the presidents and the parliament. In the wake of the Orange revolution many worried about the lasting national unity within Ukraine, IFES surveys also ask for the voters’ opinion on this matter. Among the societal issues the respondents were asked to evaluate the necessity of the NGO’s in the country. The widespread belief following the Orange Revolution was that such organization were funded with foreign moneys and sought to destabilize the society and ruin the country. The merit of US developmental aid was once again a hot topic given Yushchenko’s alleged connection and his eagerness to join western organization such as NATO and WTO. Thus, the Model 2 includes these social and political domestic issues as well as foreign policy issues. Model 3 also includes the confidence levels expressed by the citizens with regard to the president, former PM Timoshenko and Viktor Yanukovich, leader of the Party of Regions.

Table 3-7 Electoral Behavior during the Parliamentary Election of 2006

	Our Ukraine			BYuT			Party of Regions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	1.07	1.14	1.2	1.03	0.89	0.97	1.16***	1.19	1.22
	0.05	0.13	0.16	0.05	0.11	0.13	0.05	0.14	0.16
Male	0.9	0.65	0.85	0.83	0.65	0.94	1.09	1.64	0.97
	0.12	0.24	0.35	0.14	0.25	0.41	0.15	0.61	0.41
Russian Language	2.09**	2	2.99	0.69	0.55	0.62	1.09	0.26	0.14*
	0.68	1.83	3.22	0.23	0.52	0.64	0.52	0.27	0.17
Ukrainian Ethnic	2.79***	2.06	1.62	1.49	1.23	1.41	0.50***	0.56	0.62
	0.68	1.24	1.13	0.41	0.78	1.03	0.08	0.25	0.31
Education Level	0.92	1.08	1.03	1.14	1.14	1.31	1.1	0.72	0.66
	0.07	0.24	0.26	0.11	0.28	0.36	0.09	0.17	0.17
Income level	1.06	1.16	1.16	1.15	0.67*	0.64*	0.9	1.03	1.19
	0.08	0.25	0.31	0.11	0.16	0.17	0.08	0.21	0.27
East	0.38***	0.8	0.67	0.20***	0.18**	0.22**	5.45***	3.97***	4.23***
	0.07	0.53	0.5	0.06	0.12	0.16	0.99	1.96	2.36
South	0.17***	0.45	0.39	0.42***	0.31	0.28	4.73***	2.15	2.49
	0.06	0.32	0.33	0.13	0.24	0.26	1.04	1.18	1.49
West	0.59	1.16	0.41	2.00**	0.76	0.55	0.41*	1.05	3.13
	0.19	1.13	0.46	0.69	0.78	0.62	0.2	1.09	3.77
State Support of Pensioners		0.92	0.96		0.86	0.89		1.15	0.95
		0.37	0.45		0.37	0.41		0.44	0.41
NGOs are necessary		1.26	1.2		0.65	0.59*		0.93	0.85
		0.32	0.35		0.17	0.18		0.23	0.23
Ukraine is United		1.59***	1.58**		0.70**	0.73*		0.92	0.96
		0.25	0.28		0.11	0.13		0.13	0.16
President to be more powerful than Parliament		8.32***	4.13***		2.35*	1.39		0.19***	0.51
		3.82	2.12		1.1	0.74		0.08	0.24
US aid for Democracy		0.81	0.78		1.79**	1.38		0.82	0.86
		0.17	0.19		0.44	0.36		0.16	0.18
US aid for Economy		2.48**	2.51**		0.46**	0.58		0.7	0.78
		0.94	1.03		0.17	0.23		0.25	0.34
US aid for Society		0.57	0.47*		1.83	1.77		1.44	1.36
		0.22	0.2		0.72	0.76		0.54	0.6
Trust Yushchenko			2.78***			0.50**			0.78
			0.75			0.14			0.2
Trust Timoshenko			0.7			9.47***			0.46
			0.35			5.82			0.26
Trust Yanukovich			0.15***			0.48			6.63***
			0.08			0.25			3.06
Pseudo R 2	0.10	0.28	0.40	0.10	0.16	0.25	0.19	0.35	0.44
N	1259	242	236	1259	242	236	1259	242	236
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1									

Figure 20 Parliamentary Election 2006 (statistically significant coefficients)



The results of the models are presented in the Table 3.7. Again, the inclusion of additional variables increases the pseudo R squared for all political parties. This further increases the confidence that the main expectations of this chapter are supported statistically. Moreover, the effect of ethno-linguistic divisions moves further down the causal chain when issues and candidate evaluation is introduced.

As Figure 3.5 shows, the evaluation of the party leaders proves to be quite strong predictor of the vote choice. Yet, domestic social and political issues on perceived divisions within the society and the debate on constitutional powers of the president are quite important for Our Ukraine and BYuT voters. BYuT voters also seem to be influenced by their attitudes toward the necessity of the NGO's. The very important and salient issue of the sharing of power between President and Parliament seems to be the most important, rivaling other domestic policy issues and most importantly rivaling the effect of ethno-cultural and social attachments for the voter of

Our Ukraine. For these voters the issues of US foreign aid to Ukraine are also important in decision making.

Another important finding presented in this table is the variation of issue importance between the three parties. While issues are important for BYuT and Our Ukraine voters, the voters of Party of Regions seem to have voted entirely base on their attitudes toward the leader of the party and their residence in the Eastern regions of Ukraine. The PR system was introduced in order to help the institutionalization process. This might be a suggestion of the first attempt of institutionalized issue ownership by the political parties. However, more research is need before concrete conclusions are reached.

3.5.3 2007

The new parliament elected in 2006 saw a powerful return of the Party of Regions with plurality of votes, Bloc Timoshenko came in second, while Our Ukraine came trailing in last, signifying voter's dissatisfaction with Yushchenko's reign. This decline is particularly noticeable among the supporters of BYuT, as the previous results vividly shown.

Unfortunately, the new parliament showed that the political instability of 2005 was far from over. The 2006 parliament failed to produce a working coalition between March and August of 2006. The president disbanded the legislative body and called for new elections.

The IFES survey focusing on the 2007 election features some of the same questions as in the election of 2006. Respondents weighed in with their views regarding Ukraine's unity, the necessity of NGO's, and power distribution between the two branches of government. These position questions are also supplemented by voters' views regarding Ukraine's membership in

the European Union and NATO as well as their views regarding the future of Russian Black Sea Fleet. Yushchenko's turn to the West produced a back lash from Russia, which was further exacerbated in the winter of 2006, when Russian supplies of gas to Ukraine stopped following the failure of the two governments to negotiate content of the gas prices. The demand of higher price for Russian gas caused a re-evaluation of the relationship between the two countries once again and some called for withdrawal of Russian fleet from the Black Sea. Model 2 includes these domestic and foreign policy considerations. Model 3 includes the reported confidence of the voter's in three political leaders.


The results presented in Table 3.8 show a dramatic increase in pseudo R squared between the three models for all three political parties. Yet, it is the incorporation of the evaluation of leaders that produces more changes in models. Thus, the confidence levels in party leaders still proves to be quite instrumental in predicting vote choice. As Figure 3.6 depicts, the evaluation of Timoshenko's job as Prime Minister is particularly important for the votes cast for all parties.

Among the issues it is interesting to note a decline in the saliency of the constitutional arrangements compared to the 2006 election. Moreover, there is a significant decline in support for the Party of Regions among those who support stronger parliament. The important role EU support plays in predicting vote for Our Ukraine is also noteworthy. The ethno-linguistic divisions' loses statistical significance with the introduction of issue and leaders evaluations proving again the lack of institutionalization of these divisions and voters' ability to look past the social division and engage in more sophisticated modes of electoral judgments. Yet, regional cleavage remains strong with Western regions supporting Our Ukraine and disliking Party of Regions, which in turn is supported in the East and South.

Table 3-8 Campaign Effects during the Parliamentary Election of 2007

	Our Ukraine			BYuT			Party of Regions		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	0.95	0.74	0.61**	1.04	1.01	1.01	0.92	0.93	0.9
	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.08
Male	1.03	0.63	0.28*	0.79	0.96	1.19	1.06	1.14	1.21
	0.49	0.39	0.21	0.13	0.21	0.33	0.19	0.25	0.31
Education Level	0.45	0.26	0.14*	0.84	1.34	1.35	0.7	0.75	0.55
	0.32	0.24	0.16	0.19	0.4	0.52	0.2	0.27	0.23
Income level	1.11	0.81	0.74	0.88	0.95	0.99	0.87	0.85	0.85
	0.27	0.24	0.27	0.08	0.11	0.15	0.08	0.11	0.12
Russian Language	0.59**	0.26***	0.22***	1.09	1.13	1.16	0.9	0.9	0.83
	0.16	0.1	0.1	0.07	0.1	0.15	0.07	0.09	0.1
Ukrainian Ethnic				2.44***	1.87*	1.41	0.69*	1.06	1.23
				0.7	0.67	0.64	0.14	0.28	0.36
East				0.37***	0.36**	1.2	6.81***	6.98***	6.91***
				0.11	0.15	0.68	2.07	2.75	3.22
South	3.52*	9.74**	18.86**	0.36***	0.28***	0.6	4.12***	4.48***	3.77***
	2.66	9.86	23.59	0.1	0.1	0.29	1.15	1.61	1.57
West	3.14*	2.45	3.41	1.38	1.76**	1.55	0.18***	0.24***	0.36*
	1.88	1.79	2.78	0.29	0.48	0.55	0.08	0.12	0.2
NGOs are necessary		1.25	1.4		0.97	1.03		0.96	0.95
		0.32	0.44		0.09	0.12		0.08	0.09
Parliament to be more powerful than President									
		0.61	0.85		1.25	1.08		0.88	0.74**
		0.24	0.38		0.17	0.21		0.12	0.11
Ukraine is United		0.97	0.95		1.03	0.98		0.89*	0.88*
		0.16	0.18		0.06	0.08		0.06	0.07
Join EU		3.65**	3.20*		1.28	1.11		0.9	1.03
		2.39	2.11		0.21	0.22		0.14	0.18
Join NATO		1.41	1.93		1.24	1.16		0.91	0.87
		0.61	1.02		0.2	0.24		0.19	0.21
Russian Fleet must leave		3.72*	3.11		1.22	1.25		0.79	0.83
		2.95	2.44		0.22	0.29		0.13	0.16
Trust Yushchenko			3.11***			0.83			0.74
			1.07			0.13			0.14
Trust Timoshenko			0.42**			4.61***			0.71**
			0.15			0.69			0.1
Trust Yanukovich			0.64			0.58***			2.66***
			0.21			0.08			0.32
Pseudo R 2	0.05	0.22	0.36	0.10	0.12	0.41	0.16	0.18	0.33
N	596	395	394	881	576	572	881	576	572
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1									

Figure 21 2007 Parliamentary Election of 2007 (statistically significant coefficients)



3.6 CONCLUSION

Social divisions prove to be salient predictors of the vote choice from election to election. However, they only tell part of the story, as the voters also consistently rely on the evaluation of issues and leaders. “Voters are not fools” and even in the new democracies are capable of more complex cognitive processes than prescribed by the sociological developmental model. As the above analysis suggests, despite the complicated nature of electoral environments of presidential and parliamentary elections the Ukrainian voters navigate the slew of information in a savvy manner.

What is more, the prominence of linguistic and ethnic divisions as predictors of vote choice among Ukrainians seems to be declining from 1994 to 2007. The values of the pseudo R squares for all the election improve for Models 2 and 3 compared to Model 1 as well. This also can serve as a confirmation of the predictive power of issue and candidate consideration as compared to the social identifiers alone. However, the regional divisions remain strong despite the ambiguity of ethno-linguistic predictors.

So far, I've argued that the sociological developmental model of vote choice is insufficient in explaining the development of the political behavior among voters in the new democracies, and more specifically in the case of Ukraine. This chapter sought to show statistically the likelihood of votes cast for one or the other candidate/party based on sociological factors as well as more sophisticated modes of the elections specific considerations. The results support the claims that there is more to Ukrainian voters than ethno-cultural divisions. Evaluations of salient domestic and foreign policy issues, as well as retrospective evaluation of political leaders play an important part in each electoral cycle as well. During the 1990's the importance of Ukraine's relations with Russia and Ukraine's transition to market economy were very salient and present in presidential and parliamentary elections. The completed transition to market, however, changed the focus a bit making domestic social and political issues of constitutional powers more prominent. The foreign policy concerns still remain important.

In the following chapter I take this argument further to show the progress of voter sophistication over time and examine how really all of the determinants of vote choice matter when it comes to casting a 'correct' vote. My expectation is that over time, voters learn to cast votes with more precision based on all the decision making tools available to them, including the social group affiliations and election specific issues.

4.0 LEARNING BY DOING? VOTING “CORRECTLY” OVERTIME

The Ukrainian public has been characterized as generally “passive” (Kuzio and Wilson 1994). What is more, it is a society that is generally perceived as divided further complicating the uneasy process of democratic consolidation. In the new democracies, such as Ukraine, the evaluation of the developing voters’ capacity should go further and move beyond the analysis of voting patterns and determinants of vote choice. While voting is an essential part of democratic process and arguably one of the core civic duties of democratic citizens (Dalton 2000; Norris 2002), the mere act of voting is only a part of the story in functioning democracies. A sophisticated democratic citizen must be able to vote in a way that is most representative of his/her views (Campbell et al. 1964). Thus, for democracy to function properly voters must be able to cast their votes “correctly” (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lau, Redlawsk, and Andersen 2008). Therefore, there seems to be a direct link between voter’s ability to make a correct decision and voter’s sophistication.

Up to this point I’ve argued that there is more to Ukrainian electorates’ democratic development than suggested by the sociological developmental models of political behavior. The ethno-cultural and socio-economic group identification seem to be influencing individual voters’ electoral choices, however, the reliance on these social group cues on the formation of the electoral links over time is suspect. It appears that Ukrainian voters’ choice is also informed by their stances on issues and evaluation of individual political leaders. These finds support my

argument that voters are a bit more complex and therefore more sophisticated, than previously expected. This chapter takes the analysis of voter sophistication further. It is devoted to the evaluation of the “correctness” of the vote choice in all of the free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections the Ukrainian public participated in since the independence of 1991. I expect that over time as Ukrainian public gains experience with democratic electoral process the degree of correct voting increases as compared to the beginning of 1990’s when the citizens had no direct experience with democratic system. I also hypothesize that the “correct” vote is informed by more than mere ethno-cultural attachments.

The issue of voter sophistication receives attention in the normative discussions of democratic theory and empirical political behavior literature. The normative discussion of voter sophistication revolves around the capacity of voters to make “wise” decisions for sustainability of democracy and betterment of the society at large. Statesman and philosophers are often concerned with the “wisdom” or lack thereof behind collective decision making. Churchill once said that the best argument against democracy is a short conversation with an average voter. However, such normative concerns do not enter directly into the discussion raised in my analysis. Following the empirical debate on voter sophistication, I take it for granted that each vote is the same and counts equally regardless of its normative content.

The debate within the empirical political behavior literature revolves around the mechanisms of sophisticated vote. The voter sophistication is based upon the complexity of the judgment and evaluation criteria for vote casting. The raging debate in political behavior literature revolves around these evaluation criteria. Some argue that the more cognitively demanding the voters’ techniques, such as evaluation of ideological stances and issues, the more

they qualify as sophisticated (Campbell et al. 1964; MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1995).

The inquiry undertaken in *The American Voter* conceptualized sophistication as ideological understanding of issues (Campbell et al. 1964). The study showed, however, that American electorate was not sophisticated. The analysis showed that voters lacked ideological constraints and their decisions varied over time from election to election. However, this analysis came under scrutiny as showing perhaps not the level of (un)sophistication but rather a non-ideological side of a poorly informed electorate. Since then the concept of “sophisticated” voter has been re-visited and re-analyzed by several scholars.

Some have argued that it is impossible to expect all voters to be well informed about every political issue. People do have lives outside politics and certain other activities take precedence over voting. Instead, voters have a special set of issues that they find most important and make their judgments based on these issues rather than every possible issue within society (Converse 1974; Converse 1964, 1964). Yet, the research has also shown that individuals quite often rely on cognitive short cuts, cues and heuristics such as groups identities to make their decisions (Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk 2001). Evaluation of issues and ones positioning vis-à-vis the candidates, is presumably a more cognitively involved process that requires the individual to engage more deeply in the analysis of issue components and self-reflection than heuristic use. Thus, a sophisticated voter employs more complex cognitive processes.

The correct vote measure is designed to evaluate not merely the methods used in voting decision but also to evaluate their usage. In other words I’m concerned not only with which one of these components of vote choice matters but also how they matter. I conceptualize “correct”

vote as a vote cast for those representative decision makers who best represent the interests and views of the voter, whatever they might be. Like a matching game, the measure is a way to evaluate the degree of compatibility between the voters and candidates/parties.

In order to determine the correct vote I construct a measure of correct voting relying on the previous work on Richard Lau and David Redlawsk. The first section of this chapter addresses the nuances of the correct voting measure and its applicability to the IFES data, used in this research project. The measure is then applied to the survey data available for each of Ukraine's presidential and parliamentary elections since 1994. The results suggest that overall the correctness of votes cast increased. Moreover, there are some important differences in the percentage of correct votes cast in presidential v. parliamentary elections.

Given that Ukraine is perceived as a divided society and the expectation that social group cues will be pivotal as heuristics in vote choice, in my evaluation of Ukrainian voters I construct two measures; I call them comprehensive and naïve¹¹. Given that the evaluation of issues and candidates, as well as social group identification are all seen as important in determining vote choice the comprehensive measure includes all of these components. The comprehensive measure seeks to show the percent of supporters who voted correctly based on all of the components of voting decision. Due to the aforementioned importance that is given to ethno-cultural social identifiers in Ukrainian public, the "naïve" measure measures the percent of correct (compatible) vote among supporters based solely on their group identification. These results are compared to the comprehensive measure's results to show the superiority of the comprehensive measure of correct vote. The social characteristics effect on correct vote and inter-social group variations are also explored.

¹¹ In calling them so, I do not make a normative judgment about the quality of the vote. Rather the names refer to the complexity of the decision making process associated with each measure.

4.1 MEASURING “CORRECT” VOTING

In their 1997 and 2001 works, Richard Lau and David Redlawsk construct a measure of correct voting in the context of American electoral system and test their measure using the ANES data in presidential elections in the United States. According to the authors correct vote casting depends on voters’ ability to evaluate several important components. One can place these components into three categories 1) evaluation of stances on the issues; 2) general candidate evaluation; and 3) social group(s) endorsement. When all the components are combined in a single measure the candidate with the highest score should receive the vote. The exploration of the correct vote is thus a logical next step for the present inquiry. The application of correct measure to the curious case of the Ukrainian voter allow us to explore not merely which of the determinant of vote choice are at play but also their effectiveness when used by the public , and the changes in “correct voting” over time.

4.1.1 Evaluation of Issues

Issue voting has been cited as one of the more sophisticated strategies to decision making. Indeed it requires a great deal of cognitive capacity. First, the voters must determine their own position on important issues dominating the political agenda of the society. Secondly the voters must evaluate the position of each candidate vis-à-vis their own position on each of the important issues. Analyzing the issue evaluation in correct vote measure, Lau and Redlawsk rely on the directional model of issue voting proposed by Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989).

According to the directional theory of issue voting, voters perceive issues in dichotomous manner – yes or no, agree or disagree. The in-between gray scale variations are less important

when evaluating the issue and candidates stances on the issue. According to the directional model of voting, voters evaluate their affinity for the candidate based on the direction of the issue only, that is, whether a candidate is or is not on the same side of the issue as the voter. Formally the directional effect of the issue as developed by Rabinowitz and MacDonald(1989) can be expressed as

$$u_{ij} = (c_j - n) * (v_i - n),$$

Where n represents the neutral point, v_i is the issue position of the voter i and c_j denotes the issue position of the candidate j . Thus the utility of voter i to support candidate j is calculated by multiplication of the distance between the neutral point and candidate and voters positioning. If the candidate and voter are on the same side of the issue the effect of the issue is positive, if they are on the different sides the effect of the issue is negative. What matters is determining what side of the issue one takes. Therefore, this model is opposed to spatial model of issue voting that suggests that voters painstakingly evaluate their self-placement on the ideological spectrum and then cast their vote for the candidate closest to them. The utility of voter i in the spatial model can be formally represented as

$$u_{ij} = - (v_i - c_j)^2$$

The scholars of voting behavior are locked in the dispute over the utility and applicability of the directional versus proximity models of issue voting (MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1998; Westholm 1997). The proximity model suggests that the voter is going to favorably view those candidates whose issue stances are closest to his/her own. The directional

model on the other hand stipulates that voters perceive issues in dichotomous manner – yes or no, agree or disagree and voters cast their vote for that candidate who is on the same side of the issue as they are. Over the years, several scholars have weighed in on the debate on the utility of proximity versus directional models with the attempt to either validate one of the other model (MacDonald, Rabinowitz, and Listhaug 1998), provide an unbiased test of the two vis-à-vis each other (Lewis and King 1999), or provide an alternative or rather a more sensible unified model to satisfy the methodological and theoretical concerns of each (Merrill and Bernard 1999).

The proponents of the proximity model criticize the directional model for several interrelated shortcoming. There are two criticisms in particular are most relevant to the concerns at hand. The first issue is methodological and lies in the suggestion that the directional model tends to over-predict the percentage of vote cast in favor of the candidate (Westholm 1997). The second issues is theoretical and suggests that under the assumptions of the directional model the more extreme candidates are more preferred then the more moderate ones (Merrill and Bernard 1999; Westholm 1997). These concerns could be quite salient given that voters often oppose the more extremist views and favor a more moderate political agenda. However, these criticisms seem to apply most in those cases where the political competition is taking place under stable conditions with clearly defined ideological dimensions. What is not clear, however, is whether the voters do indeed vote proximately all the time.

In a recent article in *Electoral Studies*, Shane P. Singh argues very convincingly that despite the elegance and intuitive value of the proximity method the voters do not always chose to utilize it in their decision making process. Examining the use of the proximity voting from a comparative perspective of cross-national analysis, he suggests that a host of individual and context specific characteristics might lead voters to abandon the proximity strategy (Singh 2010).

For instance the electoral system might have important implications for voter's ability to rely on proximal evaluation of candidates. The plurality system might work as disincentive for proximal voting because of the fear of "wasting a vote" the voters might choose to vote insincerely. Much also depends of the strength of party attachments.

The number of parties and their ability to clearly place themselves on the policy dimensions can also be influential on proximity evaluations (Singh 2010). The fewer the number of political parties and more clearly they are defined ideologically the better are the chances of proximal evaluations on behalf of the voters (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Wessels and Schmitt 2008). On the other hand, the increased number of political parties that have no clear ideological distinctions make is quite hard to voters to identify which party is the closest or more proximate (Singh 2010). Singh's evaluation of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data supports this hypothesis strongly. The fewer the choices and the clearer they are marked the higher is the likelihood of proximal voting.

The important upshot of the debates seems to suggest that for a number of reasons the dispute is not near its end. However, there are some important lessons to be learnt for the discussion. Testing of the two models side by side suggests that on the one hand there are limitations to both models and on the other the empirical data does not produce significant differences between them (Lau, Redlawsk, and Andersen 2008; Lewis and King 1999)¹². I do not wish to weigh heavy on either side of the above debate quite yet; however, it seems to me that the purposes of this study would be best served by the application of directional model.

¹² Lau and Redlawsk boldly state that "extensive experimentation with each approach has never produced an instance where it mattered beyond the third decimal place which method one employs."

Following Lau and Redlawsk in the measure of correct voting I rely on the directional model of issue voting proposed by Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989). My reasons for relying on this method are dictated as much by the above debate as well as the practical limitation of data used in this inquiry. First, since the Ukrainian party system is still quite young and as discussed in Chapter 1 is not yet stabilized along the dimensions of the political dimensions, I believe that the use of proximity model in this case might be premature. Secondly, the IFES surveys like many others have adopted the dichotomous way of measuring voters' self-placement on a given issue. The respondents are often asked to evaluate their feeling toward a specific issue on a 5 point scale.¹³ The data does not allow me to speculate with confidence on the broader policy stances beyond the answer given by a respondent on the yes- and no- basis about a specific issue. Lewis and King bluntly suggest that such thermometer measures and other issue questions are generally ill suited to test either model (1999), yet, for the purposes of the study and accepting the data constraints, the directional model seems to be more logically suitable notwithstanding the theoretical and methodological issues discussed above. The use of directional model to calculate the directional effect of the issue produces values that are compatible with the use of other questions included in the complete measure of correct vote. The values produced by the model can easily be rescaled to vary from 1 to -1. These values can be combined with other dichotomous variables used in the measure, such as ethno linguistic and regional identity variables, which are binary in nature. The results produced by the use of proximity model do not lend themselves to such rescaling. The utility of vote according to the

¹³ The issues addressed in the IFES survey are quite dichotomous. As specified in Appendix II the issues used in this study's correct vote measure do not logically lend themselves for proximal placement and rather presuppose that the respondents will have a yes or no response to the question. For instance the questions like "Should Ukrainian be the national language?" or "Do you approve of the pace of the economic transition?" do not really leave much room for in between considerations.

squared Euclidean logic of the proximity model is a distance between the voter and the candidate. Thus, a larger number suggests a longer distance and less likelihood of vote. The logic behind rescaling is less clear than with directional model.

In accordance with the above, for all the relevant issues in this analysis, where possible, I use the 5 point scale or a variation of it. The respondents' answers range from strongly support, support, oppose, strongly oppose and don't have an opinion. I treat the "don't know" category as a neutral point for most of the stances on issues to intensify the polarity of the issue positions. The neutral position on the issue is coded as 3 on the 5 point scale with other options on increasing and decreasing side of 3. Where a 5 point scale is not available and voters are asked to give their opinion as yes and no, the values are recodes 1 and -1 respectively. IFES data provides a range of issues relevant for each of the elections under analysis. The important electoral issues vary for each election. However, all issues fall into one of the three important categories: 1) domestic social affair, such as the healthcare and language reform; 2) economic policy; and 3) foreign policy. The issues used and the brief variable content are summarized in Appendix II.

Determining candidate stance on the issues is a bit trickier. Lau and Redlawsk (2008) in their evaluation of the US presidential elections have a luxury of a specific question that asks the respondents to assign a value to the candidate position on the issue using the same scale. Unfortunately, IFES surveys do not include such questions. Therefore, I rely on the method used in the earlier work of Lau and Redlawsk (1997) and assign candidate's positions based on my own subjective evaluation of the candidate's programs. While such subjective measure might be problematic, the nature (i.e. the simplicity of the scale,) allow me to assign the positions with confidence. Evaluation of candidates' electoral programs, campaign promises as outlined in the

media provide enough information to be able to confidently suggest that a candidate is opposed or supportive of a certain measure. Table 4.1 depicts 1994 issues specification, as an example. Please see Appendix II for the details of issues and positions assignments.¹⁴

Table 4-1 1994 Presidential Elections Measure of Correct Vote

	IFES 1994	Kuchma	Kravchuk
Job of President Kuchma	approve/disapprove		
Trust Kuchma	yes/no		
Trust Kravchuk	yes/no		
State Economy	reduce/return	-1	-1
Move to free economy	3 points/ quick-slow	1	-1
guaranteed employment	5 point scale	2	1
guaranteed health care	5 point scale	4	2
Ukraine FP is better directed	Russia/Both/West	1	2
Ukrainian spoken as official language	yes/no	no	yes
Group Affiliation		Russian ethnic	Ukrainian ethnic
		Russian speaking	Ukrainian speaking
		east	west
		south	

Using the above formula the effect of each issue was calculated for each respondent in the dataset. When a 5 point scale ranging from 1-5 was employed the directional effect coefficient was rescaled to range between + 1 and -1. On issues where the response categories

¹⁴ The IFES survey keep the answer category to the questions regarding the economic, domestic, and foreign security issues confined to no more than 5 options. As mentioned in the text above, these responses were recorded in the following way: 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. No opinion 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree, or a variant of this scaling on appropriate responses. The candidates' positions on the issues were assigned in the similar way. For instance, in 2004 one of the issues facing the nations in realm of the foreign policy had to do with the seeming increased financial assistance from the US government to the NGO's and other social groups within Ukraine, through USAID. IFES questioners asked the respondents to identify their feelings to the US governments assistance and its influence on their country. The answers ranged on the 5 point scale -- 1. Very positive. 2. Somewhat positive 3. No opinion. 4. Negative. 5. Very negative. The candidate placement along this scale was determined by examining their campaign stances. Viktor Yushchenko, a hailed pro-western candidate was assigned a value of 1, while his opponent Viktor Yanukovich, a self-proclaimed pro-Russian candidate, was assigned a value of 4.

were dichotomous the values of 1 and -1 the similar formula was used, however, the values were not rescaled, as they already ranged between +1 and -1.

4.1.2 Candidate Evaluation

Voters' reactions to candidates often shape the decisions to support or not to support a certain candidate. These evaluations can be based on numerous conscious and subconscious factors. Some scholars have focused on the specifics of candidate personalities, behaviors, appearances, even facial expression during debates as means to determine what is more important in voter's evaluation of candidates (Hall 2009; Milton. Lodge, Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick Stroh 1989). Negative as well as positive feelings toward candidates/leaders are quite important. Liking a candidate can sway one's decisions. However, acute dislike can be a very powerful deterrent.

While inclusion of such evaluations do seem to be an important component of the measure, it is not always possible due to data limitations. The first of two measures developed in 1997 by Lau and Redlawsk included the evaluations of candidates' personalities and appearances. The authors were able to include such information because they used an experimental design that allowed them to ask the respondents directly to evaluate the two candidates in a fictitious election. However, the second measure constructed in the same study is based entirely on the ANES survey data and does not include such information. Instead authors use the evaluation of incumbent's job performance, where applicable, as the measure of candidate evaluation. This of course, poses its own problems as it seems that the measure of the correct vote for the challenger candidate avoids the candidate evaluation component.

The IFES survey data used in this analysis also does not allow me to include the specific evaluations of the candidate's appearances and personalities either. Fortunately, the surveys do ask respondents to evaluate the performance of the incumbents, as well as express their trust in candidates. The trust questions taps into the psychological and personal evaluations of the candidate and provides a good measure of candidate evaluation that I include in my measure of correct voting. What is more, the inclusion of this variable allows for the candidate evaluation component to be included in a measure of correct voting for all the candidates. Both the incumbent job approval and trust variable values are coded 1 and -1 to signify approval and trust respectively.

4.1.3Candidate-Social Group Linkages

Social group(s) endorsement holds a special place among the factors contributing to the electoral decision of a voter. Candidate-social group links can prove a useful heuristic or a cognitive short cut to decision making and can influence voters' decisions on several interrelated levels. Knowing that certain groups support the candidate can save the individual voter time and effort in evaluating that candidate's issue stances, for instance. In this case voters defers to the trusted group, like a political party, labor union, religious group (Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk 2001) or as Birnir argued to an ethnic or linguistic group, in decision making (Birnir 2007).

A sense of a social group membership can also serve as a useful tool in decision making process. By identifying oneself as a member of one or the other social group a voter can make a quick decision about a candidate with the same or opposing group identity. This identification produces a dichotomous "one of us" versus "one of them" mentality that can inform the decision maker on the candidates' stance on issues as well as drive the overall evaluation of the candidate

into positive or negative light. As discussed in Chapter 2, Martin Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan suggest that social cleavages inform and often shape the developments of domestic politics in a given system. Ethnic, racial, socio-economic, and religious social cleavages have been cited as important predictors of vote choice among electorate.

In the Ukrainian case party affiliation is unlikely to be used as a useful heuristic because the political parties are relatively new. The strong political party attachments akin to those in the Western democracies have not had a chance to develop in this society. Instead the literature on Ukrainian voting identifies regional and ethno-linguistic divisions as the most important social group affiliations informing the electoral choice. The political preference of the Western and Eastern Ukrainian have differed from the inception of the democratic process in the early 1990's and continue to manifest themselves to this day. The divergent views of Russophone and Ukrainian speakers, as well as ethnic Ukrainian and Russian populations have also been cited as major contributors in determining vote choice in Ukrainian elections. Thus, in my measure of correct vote I include respondents' ethno-linguistic group affiliation along with region of residence. These values are coded in binary code with 1 representing respondents' self reported affiliation with the group 0 otherwise. Because the ethno linguistic and regional divisions coincide in Ukraine, the candidate-group links were based on the electoral results by region provided by the Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine.

Using the 1994 presidential election as an example the correct measure is calculated combining the issue, candidate and group affiliation components to produce the following measures.

Correct vote for Kravchuk 1994

Strong ties with West + Ukrainian as State Language + support for state command economy + pace of economic reform + guaranteed employment + guaranteed health care + Trust Kravchuk + Ukrainian speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + west – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south –east

Correct Vote for Kuchma 1994 Measure

Kuchma Job approval + stronger ties with Russia -Ukrainian as State Language + support for state command economy + pace of econ reform + guaranteed employment + guaranteed health care+ trust Kuchma + Russian speaker + Russian ethnic + east + south – Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic – west

The “naïve” measure for both includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities (+ for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not)

4.2 ELECTIONS CONSIDERED

Since the initial transition to democracy in 1991 Ukraine has had four presidential and five parliamentary elections. The IFES surveys were conducted in Ukraine since 1994 almost each year, thus allowing me to focus on each of these elections with the exception of 1994 parliamentary election and 2010 presidential election where data is not available.

The first Ukrainian president Leonik Kravchuk was elected in 1991 shortly following Ukraine’s declaration of secession from the USSR. However, in 1993 Kravchuk resigned and

emergency presidential elections were held in 1994. According to the Ukrainian constitution adopted under Leonid Kuchma in 1996 the term of presidential office is 5 years. Thus in this analysis I focus on 1994, 1999 and 2004 presidential elections.

The electoral system of Ukraine allows for a multitude of candidates to run for the office and the president is elected by simple majority. Thus, often a winner is determined by the voters in two rounds of elections, when no candidate secures the majority during the first round. The two candidates who secured the most votes in the first round proceed to face each other in the second round. In this inquiry for the reasons of parsimony and due to data availability, i.e. the questions asked by IFES surveys, I focus primarily of the candidates and votes cast in the second round of the elections.

The elections to the Ukrainian parliament or Supreme Council (*Verhovna Rada*) take place every four years. The first multiparty parliamentary election in Ukraine took place in March of 1990. This election was a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's Union-wide reform of *perestroika*. The elections were for the first time open to independent candidates and parties other than the Communist Party of Ukraine. This election was considered relatively free and arguably marked Ukraine's first step to liberalization and democratization. It was this particular council that passed the declaration of Ukraine's independence in August of 1991.

Parliamentary elections have taken place in Ukraine every four years with the exception of the current Rada, which was elected during a special out of turn elections in 2007. The parliament elected in 2006 was dissolved by the president Viktor Yushchenko due to irreconcilable differences between himself and the cabinet of ministers chaired by his former ally and Prime Minister Yuliya Timoshenko. This analysis focuses on three parliamentary elections 1998, 2006 and 2007.

Unfortunately, as discussed in the previous Chapter, the 2002 parliamentary election is excluded for the analysis due to data limitation. The IFES survey questions do not tap into an important question of electoral party vote choice. Instead the questions asked respondents to identify the political party they felt best represented their interests. The answer to this question is not the same as identifying the political party the respondent voted for. As asked the question is more likely to reveal voter affinity for the party at worst and party identification at best. In the new democracy like Ukraine these affects are not always the same as the vote. In the context of this particular election this is even truer. The electoral results show that Our Ukraine bloc dominated the election and received the most votes. However, according to the IFES 2002 survey, used here the Communist party enjoyed most support among respondents.

Since the first parliamentary election there have been several changes to Ukraine's electoral law. Before the 1998 constitutional reform the parliamentary seats were distributed according to the single member district procedure. This system was adopted with hopes to facilitate political pluralism in the wake of one party rule. The plurality system was most advantageous for independent candidates, who could rely solely on personal recognition by the voters and did not need the coherent and stable party support. But this system proved detrimental to political party development as numerous short lived personalistic parties sprung up.

The reform of 1998 introduced a mixed electoral system where one half of the seats to the 450 member parliament would be elected by SMD and the other half by proportional representation. As Zimmer and Haran rightfully state the introduction of this system forced many independent candidates to form centrist parties that differed very little in terms of policy positions (2008). Finally the most recent electoral system change of 2006 put an end to the mixed system and introduced closed list proportional representation as the only way to allocate

Rada seats. All of these changes provide a fascinating context for the evaluation of correct voting among electorates.

4.2.1 Hypotheses

The main premise of this inquiry is that with time and democratic experience voters are capable of making more accurate electoral choices while using all of the cognitive tools in their arsenal. I am also interested in determining the contextual differences of correct vote, such as the differences between correct votes case in presidential versus the parliamentary election. With this though in mind, I develop the following set of hypotheses, which I test empirically in a subsequent section of this chapter.

***H1.** Voters are expected to vote with more precision over time. (Increase of correct vote overtime)*

***H2.** In their electoral decisions voters are expected to rely on all of the factors available to them. Thus, the comprehensive measure of correct vote should reveal higher level of voter's accuracy.*

Ukraine is a semi-presidential democracy; therefore, presidential elections are often seen as more important elections that require more attention from the electorate. I therefore expect that voters pay more attention to these elections in every respect.

***H3.** The vote is cast with more precision in presidential elections.*

However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the presidential elections also prove to be polarizing. The adversarial nature of the presidential election can contribute to the increase in social conflict. Therefore, one can expect that the vote cast on the basis of group identity is higher during the presidential election. I expect this to be particularly true in the case of the 2004 presidential election which resulted in the infamous Orange Revolution that pitted voters against one another. Yet, it is important to note that overall I expect that the comprehensive correct vote is always higher, as per *H2*.

I also expect to find other context specific variations in correct vote. The retrospective evaluation of the political leaders, specifically the incumbents, plays an important role in voting decision. I expect that the correct vote based on comprehensive evaluation is higher for the incumbents, than challengers.

H4. The percent of comprehensive correct vote is higher for the incumbent


4.2.2 Results

Table 4.2 depicts the overall percent of correct vote for both sets of elections as derived via comprehensive and naïve measures of correct vote. The correct vote for each party/ politicians in each election is calculated among the self reported supporters (those individuals who reported voting in favor) of the said party/politicians. The overall accuracy is a mathematical average of the percent of correct votes cast for the parties/candidates. Figure 4.1 depicts these percentages in a form of a line graph in order to visually track the fluctuations in correct vote in Ukraine.

Table 4-2 Overall Accuracy of Vote (Average Percent among Supporters)

	Comprehensive	Naïve
Presidential		
1994	69	55.50
1999	75	49.50
2004	84	82.50
Parliamentary		
1998	76.33	68.00
2006	79.67	70.33
2007	79.00	73.67

Figure 22 Percent of Correct Vote Overtime (All Elections)



Overall the results support the above hypothesis **H1** suggesting that overtime Ukrainian voters learned to cast votes with more precision. Despite the year to year (election to election) fluctuations, there is a general upward trend across all of the elections. The experience with the democratic process contributes to the voters' ability to vote with more precision.

Moreover, the correct vote cast using the all of the components of vote choice (comprehensive) yield higher percent of correct vote consistently across all of the elections as Figure 4.1 shows. Thus, **H2** is also supported by the empirical evidence. This suggests that

Ukrainian voters make more accurate decisions evaluating candidates and issues than relying on identity heuristics alone.

Although, there is also general increase in the accuracy in voting based on group affiliation, as measured by naïve measure of correct vote, the percent predicted by this measure is consistently lower and the trend line is much more volatile across years and elections. This suggests that it is difficult to speak of overtime learning in the case of voting based on the cues of social groups, as this type of voting seems to be more prone to electoral contexts and campaign influences.

Figures 4.2 and 4.3 depict the graphs of the overall percent of correct vote overtime in presidential and parliamentary elections respectively.

Figure 23 Percent of Correct Vote in Presidential Elections





Figure 24 Percent of Correct Vote in Parliamentary Elections



As expected there are differences between the percentages of correct voting for presidential candidates and those for political parties in parliamentary elections. It appears that the accuracy of the presidential vote has increased more dramatically than the vote for parliamentary elections over the years. Moreover, the public seems to be voting more correctly in the presidential elections in general. This finding supports the above hypothesis *H3*.

The comprehensive measure yield higher percent of correct vote. Yet, the percentage of correct vote driven by identity heuristic is still relatively high among Ukrainian public. There is a sizable increase in correct use of identity heuristic in presidential elections between 1994 and 2004. In 1999 election the percentage of votes cast correctly using a comprehensive evaluation increased, while the identity based correct vote decreased. These results are not surprising as stated above.

In the parliamentary elections the percentage differences between correct votes cast with identity heuristic only and a more comprehensive evaluation are considerable smaller and more consistent than in presidential elections. This might be a result of the perceived lack of

importance of the parliamentary election as compared to the presidential election. Thus, the voters are reluctant to invest too much time and energy into detailed evaluation of parties and instead rely on other cues to guide their vote.

Table 4-3 Percent of Correct Vote among the Supporters (Presidential)

	% Supporters Voting Correctly(Comprehensive)	% Supporters Voting Correctly(Naïve)
1994		
Kuchma	54	41
Kravchuk	84	70
1999		
Simonenko	65	51
Kuchma	82	48
2004		
Yanukovich	84	82
Yushchenko	84	83

Tables 4.3 and 4.4 bring a little more detail to the variation in correct voting between the parliamentary and presidential election and depict the correct vote for each party/candidate. These numbers give us an interesting insight into the context specific effects on correct vote. For all the parties/candidates the comprehensive evaluation produces more correct vote than identity vote alone, further reinforcing the expectations of **H2**. The results for the correct vote in the presidential election (Table 4.3) also support the expectations of the **H4**. In the 1994 presidential election the percent of comprehensive correct vote is higher for the incumbent Kravchuk at 84 % than the challenger Kuchma's 54% of correct vote among supporters. A similar picture appears in 1999 election, where incumbent Kuchma's supporters voted with 82% overall accuracy, while 65% voted correctly for the challenger Simonenko.

Table 4-4 Percent of Correct Vote among the Supporters (Parliamentary)

	% Supporters Voting Correctly (Comprehensive)	% Supporters Voting Correctly (Naïve)
1998		
Communist Party	85	65
People's Movement of Ukraine (Rukh)	86	71
Party of Greens of Ukraine	58	
2006		
Our Ukraine	97	92
Party of Regions	47	28
Block Yuliji Tymoshenko	95	91
2007		
Party of Regions	74	75
Block Yuliji Tymoshenko	83	76
Our Ukraine	80	70

The results thus far have supported my main hypotheses. The Ukrainian public is learning from the experience of the democratic process and casts votes with more precision overtime. Moreover, the comprehensive measure of correct vote yields higher percentages of correct vote in all of the elections, for all of the parties and candidates. Thus, Ukrainians are consistently relying on the complex models of decision making, which utilizes all of the tools available to them. And what is more, overtime they are learning to make their electoral decisions more accurately.

4.3 WHO VOTES CORRECTLY?

I now turn to an attempt to sketch out a sociological portrait of the accurate voter. First, I hypothesize about the possible demographic and social characteristics which might enable voters to cast votes with more precision. I then turn to the evaluation of these hypotheses empirically. Via cross referencing the reported vote and the predicted vote correct vote, a correct vote variable is constructed for each party/candidate across every election. Thus, the variable prescribes 1 to those persons who have voted correctly in a given election and 0 to those who did not. The data sets are then pooled in order to evaluate the effects of demographic and social characteristics on correct vote overtime. Given the dichotomous nature of the variable I first apply the logistic regression model to the data in order to sketch an overall portrait of the correct voter. I then turn to the evaluation of correct vote in sub-groups overtime. The predicted probabilities of correct vote overtime are graphed and examined. This process is done for both the comprehensive and naïve measures of vote choice.

4.3.1Hypotheses

Age, gender, and income could be seen as important characteristics enabling the ability to vote correctly. Voting is a costly undertaking; it requires time and resources to obtain the necessary information and a certain level of political knowledge in order to process the information. It could be argued that the more time, resources, and political knowledge one possessed the likelier s/he is to voter with more precision. One can expect that income level would be a salient contributor to voting correctly. Obtaining political information is a costly enterprise; therefore, those persons with higher levels of income should be more likely to cast their votes correctly.

H1. Persons in higher and middle income brackets are likelier to vote with more precision.

Related to this reasoning I expect that persons with higher education levels will vote with more precision using the comprehensive measure. However, persons with lower education levels shall rely on the heuristic cues to cast votes.

H2. Persons with higher education levels will vote with more precision using the comprehensive measure.

H3. Persons with lower education levels shall rely on the heuristic cues to cast votes.

Women have traditionally occupied an inferior social position in most societies. Confined to their traditional reproductive and nurturing roles women often lack the necessary tools to cast correct votes (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

H4. Men are likelier to vote correctly than women

Age on the other hand can be double edged sword in the new democracies. It can be argued, that older persons generally are likelier to vote with more precision. It has been shown that in the developed democracies the more mature publics are likelier to turn out to vote and have an intricate understanding of politics (Dalton 2000). This is due to many factors; however, the amount of political knowledge acquired from the experience with the democratic governance, I believe, is the key. Thus, one would expect that the young would be likely to vote with less

precision while the more mature voters will vote more accurately. In the developing post-communist democracies age presents an extra challenge. The more mature generations in the case of post-Soviet states more specifically lack experience with democratic governance. Moreover, these generations are heavily integrated into the previous non-democratic regime and ideology, than are their younger counterparts. Thus, it is unlikely that the older age groups, or the early-Soviet generation, as I call it, will be the more accurate ones.

H5. Persons who belong to the early -Soviet generation are less likely to vote correctly.

H6. Persons belonging to the early-Soviet are likelier to rely on the naïve vote

However, one should not expect that the young generations of the post-communist era shall show consistent reliance on comprehensive approach. These are persons born after 1975 or so. They grew up with very little political and social experience of the Soviet system. I expect that a post-communist generation like all younger persons all over the world lack political knowledge and motivation to participation.

4.3.2 Regression Analysis

The dependent variable is based on the comprehensive measure of correct vote described above. The correct vote is combined over the presidential and parliamentary elections in a pooled data. I employ the two step analysis in order to evaluate the overall impact of social characteristics on correctness of vote and also in account of temporal variations.

The logistic regression model includes the generational cohorts¹⁵ (the post-Soviet generation is used as reference category), gender, income levels (upper bracket is used as reference), and education levels (elementary education is used as reference). I also include the variables tapping into the ethno-linguistic and regional differences. The model also includes a dummy variable depicting presidential election. Table 4.5 depicts the results of the regression in odds ratio form.

The first important finding of this analysis supports one of the previous hypotheses regarding the context of election. It appears that presidential elections increase the likelihood of correct vote significantly. The odds of correct vote increase for both comprehensive and naïve measured. However, the comprehensive correct vote is much higher. The other results support some but not all of my hypotheses. Figure 4.4 depict the odds ratios of the statistically significant coefficient in visual form of a bar graph.


Compared to the post-Soviet generation, the odds of correct vote using naïve measure are significantly higher for the early Soviet generation. However, it also appears that this likelihood is also increased for the middle, Soviet generation. Moreover, this generation, seems to be generally voting less correctly with comprehensive measure. As expected, men tend to vote with more precision than women. However, there is not effect of gender on the use of the naïve measure.

¹⁵ Early-Soviet generation is classified as those born before 1954 and consequently spent most of their adult lives in the Soviet system. Soviet generations are those born during 1955 – 1974. Post-Soviet generation is presumed to be born after 1975.

Table 4-5 Who Votes Correctly?

	Comprehensive	Naïve
Early Soviet Generation	1.05	1.41**
	0.18	0.24
Soviet Generation	0.62***	1.43**
	0.1	0.24
Gender	1.17**	1.1
	0.09	0.08
Russian Language	1.34***	1.1
	0.13	0.11
Ukrainian Ethnic	1.04	1.08
	0.09	0.1
West	1.69***	2.60***
	0.19	0.31
South	1.45***	1.30*
	0.17	0.17
East	1.01	2.20***
	0.11	0.25
Secondary	0.98	1.11
	0.1	0.11
Vocational	0.74**	1.50***
	0.11	0.22
Higher Education	0.83	0.89
	0.11	0.12
Lower Income	0.83	0.58**
	0.22	0.14
Middle Income	0.85	0.73
	0.23	0.18
Presidential Elections	4.41***	1.27***
	0.36	0.11
Pseudo R 2	0.10	0.03
N	3568	4086
chi2	506.79***	160.62***

Figure 25 Who Votes Correctly? (Statistically Significant Coefficients)



There appears to be no consistent significant effect of income levels. However, the persons in the lower income bracket seem to vote less precise with naïve measure. Persons with vocational education appear to vote less correctly with the use of comprehensive approach. Yet, they vote significantly more correct with the use of groups cues.

Among the ethno-cultural characteristic language and region present the most interesting results. The results suggest that Russian speakers vote correctly significantly more with the use of comprehensive measure. This is a very interesting result. The regional effects on correctness of vote are also interesting. Persons living in the South and West of the country appear to vote with more precision. The naïve correct vote is also higher in West, and East. Yet, compared to the comprehensive measure, the correct vote is less in South with the naïve measure.

Based on these analyses the picture of the correct and sophisticated voter in Ukraine seems to be shaping up in a form of a younger Russian speaking male. On the other hand, the unsophisticated voter belongs to the older age cohorts and technical/vocational education. I now

turn to the evaluation of correct vote overtime by evaluation of the predicted probabilities of correct vote across the years. Here I seek to evaluate the learning curve among the demographic groups to add more fluidity and clarity to the picture.

4.3.3 Correct Vote Overtime

In evaluating the correct vote among the sub-groups of Ukrainian population I analyze both measure of correct vote in order to track the fluctuations in sub-group behavior and their reliance on identity heuristic. Income level, gender and age groups are considered in this analysis. Income level grouping is based on self reported socioeconomic standing (before 2002) and self-reported income level (after 2002)¹⁶ of the respondent by the interviewer. IFES data allows me to divide these respondents into three categories upper, middle, and lower¹⁷. The gender categories are self explanatory division between male and female respondents. The three age categories are comprised of three age cohorts. Early-Soviet generation is classified as those born before 1954 and consequently spent most of their adult lives in the Soviet system. Soviet generations are those born during 1955 – 1974. Post-Soviet generation is presumed to be born after 1975.


Income Levels and Correct Vote

The graph of the predicted probability of correct vote overtime by income level is depicted in Figure 4.5

¹⁶ The questions asked individual respondent to place themselves in on the following categories – have enough to save money, have just enough to get by, barely have enough, and don't have enough.

¹⁷ In the case of post 2002 IFES questions the categories are devise as follows : upper = those who can save, middle = those you have just enough, and lower = those who barely have enough and those who do not.

Figure 26 Predicted Probability of Correct Vote Over Time By Income Level



The figure includes two graphs, one for each of the measured of the correct vote. The predicted probability of the correct vote with the comprehensive measure is higher across the income levels. Moreover, there is a general decline in naïve correct vote among all the groups overtime. However, there are some important differences between the sub-groups.

The predicted probability of comprehensive correct vote is highest for the persons in higher income bracket in the early days of democracy. This supports the earlier hypothesis regarding income level effect to some extent. In the days of early democratic instability, it seems that the persons with more resources were able to vote correctly using all of the information available. However, over time this effect is reduced drastically. What is more, the upper class seems to be relying more on the heuristic voting as compared to the other groups, however, there is decline overtime.


The graph suggests that lower income class was least likely to use comprehensive correct vote in the early days of democracy, however, it is this class that has shown the most remarkable growth in comprehensive correct vote overtime. The lower class is also the least likely to cast votes naïvely. Moreover, there is consistent decline overtime in correct vote by naïve measure

for lower and middle classes. Thus, there are seems to be important differences between income level classes in correct voting overtime. The lower class appears to have benefited the most from the experience with democratic process and learned how to vote with more precision using the comprehensive approach.

Gender

The effect of gender on the predicted probabilities of correct vote as measured by both measures overtime is depicted by the graphs in Figure 4.6.

Figure 27 Overtime Changes in Correct Voting among Genders




The figure depicts a general increase in correct vote among both genders. The predicted probability of correct vote is higher with comprehensive measure. The increase in predicted probability of correct vote is more drastic overtime more among females. This suggests that women are learning fast from their experience with democratic process.

Age Groups

The overtime age differences in correct voting are shown by graphs in Figure 4.7.

Figure 28 Overtime Changes in Correct Vote among Generations



It appears the overtime the early-Soviet and Soviet generations are learning to cast votes with more precision using the comprehensive measure. The increase among the soviet cohort is particularly sharp as compared to the early –Soviet age cohort. The younger generation appeared to be the most likely to vote correctly in the early elections, however, this ability drastically declined overtime. Yet, the naïve correct vote is lowest among the members of the post-Soviet cohort. This suggests that the previous two generations are more likely to be committed o the group cues.

4.4 CONCLUSION

A sophisticated voter should be able to cast a vote in accordance with his/her political views. Analysis of voter sophistication must therefore go further than evaluation of determinants of vote choice. This chapter sought to evaluate the correctness of voting among individual Ukrainian voters. The results lead me to a few conclusions about correct voting in the new democracies in general as well as the particular context of Ukraine. Overall, it seems fair to say that as democracy ages the population learns how to vote more accurately in accordance with their

preferences. This is a good sign for democratic transition and consolidation as well as an important finding in the context of new democracies. When compared to a comprehensive measure of correct vote, the naïve measure that relies entirely on social groups characteristics proves inferior.

In Ukrainian contexts it appears that the electoral system and nature of the elections have much to do with the political choices of individual voters. The results support a hypothesis that the more salient presidential elections are more likely to enjoy higher percentages of correct voting.

The learning process is taking place unequally. While the middle age cohort of the Soviet generation learns more quickly, the youngest cohort exhibits sharp decline in the use of comprehensive measure and an increase in naïve correct vote. This might be explained by the general disinterest in politics that young persons world over tend to exhibit. These age effects, however, would be important to trace as more data become available. The lower income class is the fastest to learn and cast votes correctly with the use of all available information. However, the upper class tends to be more prone to vote correctly with the use of identity heuristic.

Women have always held an inferior position in the society, political mobilization of gender could be a first step toward the manifesting democratic political culture on the new democracy. Yet, as the analysis here has shown, women exhibit a high level of learning in casting correct vote. I expect that there are some important differences between younger and older generations of women, which might be quite important to the development of the democratic process in Ukraine. Next chapter turns to these analyses.

5.0 THE OTHER “LOSERS”: AGE AND GENDER

The effects of gender and age on political behavior in the new democracies have received some (albeit unequal) attention as compared to other factors. A majority of studies pay relatively little attention to the role of age and gender on their own merit. Age and gender have long been noted as significant predictors of political behavior in developed democracies. Much can be speculated about a person's political views and engagement based on their gender and age, due to both the life cycle and generational effects. The established literature on comparative political behavior finds without fail that older persons are more likely than their younger counterparts to hold conservative views, be interested in politics and participate in political activities diligently (Dalton 2000; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Niemi and Weisberg 2001). This could be a product of inter-generational differences in experience with politics. Additionally there is a life cycle effect, as people get older their interest in politics is increased due to their higher levels of integration within the society and deeper understanding of the political processes and their implications. A considerable gender gap in political views and modes of political participation has also been documented in the comparative literature (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). In general women have been noted to move away from their more traditional conservative stances and rely on non-traditional means of political participation to convey their messages and achieve their goals (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

In this chapter I seek to unpack the effects of age and gender relations on electoral behavior in a new democracy. I argue that these social characteristics have an important effect on the development of political behavior of new democratic electorates in their own right. Political, social, and economic reforms associated with regime change require a certain level of flexibility and aptitude toward learning. The older cohort therefore should be disadvantaged and limited by its experience with the previous non-democratic regime. The empirical results presented in the previous chapters have demonstrated that there are notable differences in the correct vote cast among voters of different age groups. This could be seen as a result of political learning where the younger cohorts (of middle aged and young population) process the information and cast votes unburdened by the previous regime's socialization. I also expect to find notable changes in political party preferences among the elderly population due to its previous experience with the communist system and the impact of the transition. Kitschelt's argument regarding the winners and losers of the transition is extended to take age and gender into consideration.

The gender gap in political behavior of the new democracies is a somewhat under theorized. In the post-communist context much literature is devoted to the explanation of the political passivity of the female citizens and a return to traditional gender roles and outlooks among the populations in general (Hrycak 2001; Johnson and Robinson 2007; Lavrinenko 1999; Marsh 1996; Zhrebkina 2002, 2003). However, it is unclear why the impact of gender should remain static overtime as democracy ages. While gender relation remained un-politicized during the communist regime, under the democratic rule one might expect to find sharper differences in gender (Johnson and Robinson 2007). As the safety net of social welfare guaranteed to women under the communist regime disintegrates and cultural acceptance of female inequality spills out unchecked into the workforce, where laws no longer guarantee equality in the public sphere, one

should expect to find gendering of political issues (Aidis et al. 2007; Johnson 2007; Zhurzhenko 2001, 2001). Moreover, one should expect a sharper contrast between the political behaviors of different generations of women. The younger cohorts, who grew up in independent Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR, are free from the Soviet legacy of the “superwoman” and are more likely to value individualism and gender equality.

The title of Ivan Turgenev’s timeless novel *Fathers and Sons* has long been synonymous with intergenerational conflicts that arise in all societies. In this chapter I seek to expand the potential ground of conflict from “fathers and sons” to “mothers and daughters” in order to further examine the degree of “normalization” of politics in this new democracy. This chapter sets out to uncover the differences between the preferences of Ukrainian voters based on age differences as well as gender relations in Ukrainian politics and society. I begin by outlining the role of age and gender as well as potential intergenerational and gender conflicts in Ukrainian society. The hypotheses are analyzed using the IFES data. Qualitative method of in-depth interview is also used to detail emerging feminist thought as exemplified by the young feminist movement FEMEN¹⁸

5.1 THE OTHER “LOSERS” OF THE TRANSITION

The discussion of age and gender differences in voting behavior and electoral preferences presented in this chapter is primarily framed as an extension of Kitschelt’s theory of “winners and losers” of the transition (1992, 1995, 2000). As discussed in Chapter 2 Kitschelt suggests

¹⁸ The author personally interviewed the leader and creator of FEMEN, Anna Hutsol on September 6th 2010. Ms. Hutsol, gave permission to use her interview for this academic work. The interview was conducted in Russian and translated by the author.

that the socio-economic cleavage in new post-communist democracies develops between the “losers and winners” of the transition (1992, 1995, 2000). Kitschelt identifies winners as those persons whose occupational status and professional training under the communist system can put them in the advantageous position during the transition to a market economy or easily translate into the competitive environment of free market. The losers of the other hand are those whose livelihood will be highly likely to suffer under the new market relations. Kitschelt’s argument focuses primarily on the occupation and profession of the individuals. Although he does define pensioners and other persons on fixed state provided income as “losers”, he does not identify them specifically as – elderly, children, and women. The argument presented here, however, extends beyond the intergenerational and dichotomous gender differences. Due to learning and varying life experiences, I expect that there is a fair amount of variation within both genders based on age; however, in this chapter I specifically focus on the females.

5.2 AGE IN UKRAINIAN POLITICS

When the USSR was on the brink of extinction following the failure of the military coup in Moscow in August of 1991, 31 percent of Ukrainian population was over the age of 50 nearing the retirement age¹⁹ and 28.4 percent of the population was under 19. Thus, about 50 percent of Ukrainian population was in some way dependent on the state income and services simply by virtue of their age alone. The persons nearing or at the retirement age depend on state pension

¹⁹ Under the soviet system the retirement age was set at 60 for men and 55 for women. The retirement age provisions did not change in Ukraine until 2010. Thus, during the years of transition many more persons were becoming dependent on state for income, by 2001 the percent increased to 32.3. (Source : State Statistic Committee of Ukraine)

and health care benefits. The children under or approaching legal age of 18, on the other hand depended on their parents for income and in many cases on state funded childcare and public schooling. Extending Kitschelt's argument about the winners and losers of the transition, one can thus suggest that the younger and older age cohorts stood much more to lose as a result of the collapse of the socialist economic system and welfare state.

However, the older cohort's loss was more than loss of income. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics was one of the founding members of the USSR in 1922. One can argue that the Ukrainian state as we know it now is a product of the Soviet system and policies. The elderly population of Ukraine is also a generation that was a product of the soviet political and social system. These persons, who in 1991 were about 50-60 years old, had lived all their lives under the communist system of governance. They were born between 1930 and 1940, which was the time of maturation of the Soviet state and the intensity of the inter-war period in the aftermath of the global economic crisis. For Ukraine this period is marked by the great famine of the 1930's that some Ukrainian historians attribute to the state policies of the USSR. Their formative years coincided with the post-WWII reconstruction period and economic boom. Their youth took place during the "golden years" of the 1960's period of Khrushchev's "thaw." In short these persons were born, raised, and indoctrinated as true Soviet citizens. The transformation of the regime therefore, meant for them much more than mere economic loss based on a self-interested cost benefit analysis. The transformation meant the loss of the very life, culture, and state they knew. The *only* state, political and social system they knew was to be transformed beyond recognition into something quite unknown and unpredictable.

The story of the losers and winners of the transition can be expanded to include the age cohorts. The older cohorts of persons over 50 at the time of transition can be expected be more

supportive of the Communist party and its successor parties, such as the Party of Regions. This could be so as a result of both a tangible loss of stable income as a result of market transition and a result of nostalgia for the communist society. The majority of Ukrainian elderly population is also female. However, I expect that the gender relationship is even more complicated.

5.3 UKRAINIAN WOMEN AND POLITICS

Gender represents a very interesting but largely neglected issue in Ukrainian politics. The formal participation and representation of women in the political life of the country remains low. Women are less likely to cast a vote than their male counterparts (Lopez Pintor, Gratschew, and Sullivan). While the percent of parliamentary seats held by women in the Rada, Ukraine's unicameral legislature, constitutes 8% as of February 2010 (2010), this number is still rather low compared to the world standards (Jennings 1983) and the view that politics is not really a woman's business seems to persist in Ukraine.

Shortly after the presidential election in January 2010, the newly appointed Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, defended his all-men cabinet by stating that women have no business in politics. As reported by Associate Press "Azarov explained that he meant he wouldn't wish any woman, especially if she has children, to work more than 15 hours a day as his ministers do" ("Ukraine Premier Accused of Discrimination" 2010). This remark inspired a chorus of criticism at home and abroad, accusing Azarov of gender discrimination. Unfortunately, these remarks are not unique to Azarov alone, Viktor Yanukovich during his campaign against Yuliya Tymoshenko has bluntly suggested that she should "go back to the kitchen" ("Ukrainian women berate "Neanderthal" PM for sexist remarks" 2010). The critics of the government seized on the

discontent these sexist remarks have inspired among Ukrainian women to suggest that such views are outdated and “Neanderthal²⁰” and further prove that the government is completely out of touch with the Ukrainian population ("Ukrainian women berate "Neanderthal" PM for sexist remarks" 2010).

The participation and representation of women in politics have been the main focus of most studies of gender and politics. In Ukraine, notwithstanding a handful of feminist intellectuals, both traditional electoral participation and representation remain very low (Hrycak 2001, 2007; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Norris 2000). Some scholars have credited the political, social, and cultural effects with these low numbers of women's formal participation and representation. The structure of the electoral system, the legacies of Communist ideology, and the revival of traditional gender roles in the post-independence nation-building process of 1990's have all been cited as reasons behind low formal political involvement (Marsh 1996). The traditional view of gender roles which confines women to the domestic sphere of child-bearing and-rearing has persisted in Ukraine since the Soviet days and has been reinforced by the new project of nation building during the transition.

5.3.1 The Soviet “Superwoman”

Communist ideology proclaims gender equality. Women are expected to participate in the building of the equal and just society alongside men. In light of this ideological prescription the Soviet women were granted “emancipation” and encouraged to enter the social life of the society. In essence women were encouraged to enter the work-force and be active citizens of the

²⁰ The term coined and publicized by the feminist movement FEMEN

USSR (Hrycak 2001). However, the “emancipation” did not challenge the traditional notion of women’s role in society; rather it existed side by side with it. The ideological emancipation had to coexist with the harsh realities of the new Soviet state formation in the aftermath of the bloody civil war. As Alexandra Hrycak (2001) rightfully points out, the decline in population prompted the Soviet state to emphasize the child-bearing duties of women as part of their citizen duties and responsibilities (2001). Women who had 10 or more children were hailed as heroes, “*mat’ geroinya*,” and awarded medals for their contributions to the state. Thus, the state hailed the reproductive duties of women as most admirable and valuable. This created a layered effect of sexual subjugation disguised by the emancipatory illusion.

Women’s participation in the workforce was confined to the lower –status and lower-paying jobs. The official policy of the state promoted gender equality at the work place, including equality of pay and social benefits. However, the equality did not extend to the opportunities for employment. Women rarely achieved managerial positions in important spheres of industry and were often confined to the unskilled labor position in manufacturing, retail, and agriculture (Hrycak 2001) and to the lower-status jobs in the spheres of culture, education, arts. This employment segregation coincided with the persistence and reinforcement of women’s traditional roles as mothers and nurturers during the Soviet period. In the USSR women were not encouraged to make important decisions; rather their job was to nurture the society both literally by being a mother, and figuratively by fostering culture and beauty.

Such state demands placed a so-called double burden on women. They were expected to devote themselves to the life of their family and children and to shoulder the responsibilities of employment. The segregation of employment, however, ensured that women remained in the lower-income brackets, further solidifying the image of a man as a sole bread-winner.

The gender relation remained un-politicized during the communist regime. This was largely due to two factors. First, the fact that most men and women had the same access to health care, education, and (even if segregated) employment produced the illusion of equality and thus prevented public or society wide grievances or disparities between the genders. Secondly, the gender relations in the private sphere were left to the realm of home and were never politicized. In other words unlike the feminists of the developed democracies Soviet women had no outlet to challenge the cultural standards of female subservience (Funk and Mueller 1993).

5.3.2 Anti-colonial struggle and National Project

The collapse of the Soviet state and newly acquired independence of Ukraine did not improve the situation of females; rather it has reinforced the traditional expectation of womanhood and introduced a host of new challenges. During the struggle for independence some women groups became active. Women groups organized in opposition to the Soviet war in Afghanistan as well as practices of hazing of the new recruit in the Red Army, of the so-called *dedovshchina*. Women also participated in the environmental groups, particularly in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster. However, post-independence female activism subsided; but, it did not disappear (Phillips 2008).

Intellectually, Ukrainian feminists faced a dilemma common to the anti-colonial feminists all over the world. The struggle for national liberation subsumed the gendered grievances by re-framing them in light of society wide colonial oppression (Yuval-Davis 1997). That is, women's grievances were said to be a direct result of Soviet state oppression and women's struggle was framed in line with the overall national struggle (Bogachevska 1993). This reframing undermines the value and validity of the feminist plight once independence is

achieved and women are at best left with no support in their fight for equality and at worst, and most commonly, are forced to assume their traditional place of solely reproductive duties.

The process of post-colonial nation building has sought to reinforce women's traditional roles as mothers of the nation. The continuing decline in birthrates creates a sense of urgency to control and stimulate the reproductive capacity of the women folk. States men portrayed women's participation in the work force as hindering the primary responsibilities of women to bear and rear children. A career-oriented female was portrayed as a burden to the society due to her incapacity to fulfill her national duties of motherhood. The often referred to image of an ideal Ukrainian woman is that of *berygynya*, of the "keeper of the hearth" a half-goddess image of motherhood. This image has become prominent in the popular culture of the new Ukrainian state. There are several songs devoted to the half-goddess. The image of *berygynya* also adorns the main tallest tower in the Independence Square, the center of Kiev.

5.3.3 De-Sovietization and Hyper-Sexualization

Public opinion research, such as World Values Survey and the surveys of International Foundation for Electoral Systems, has also shown strong popular support for traditional subservient female roles in the society. Both men and women in the 1990's seemed to firmly believe that men should earn more than women and under the conditions of the economic crisis men should have more access to jobs than women (Marsh 1996).

The widely held perception of Soviet womanhood as "over-emancipated" further contributed to the persistence or even revival of the traditional roles. That is the image of a woman as unskilled laborer became to be seen as contradictory to the image of femininity. Thus some have claimed that under USSR women have been forced to perform manly duties that led

to masculinization of a female; in post-independence Ukraine women are encouraged to re-gain their femininity(Hrycak 2001). Thus, the society encouraged women to shed the workman's coveralls and develop feminine attributes of poise and beauty. Travelling down street of Kiev one is hard pressed to find a woman out of high heels and a manicure. Unavoidably perhaps, this feminization process has been going hand in hand with the hyper-sexualization of Ukrainian society. Images of stylized female bodies at various degrees of nudity in entertainment, advertising, etc. reinforce the sexual image of females as objects of desire. Ukrainian society, even more so than other post-communist societies, has been hit with the wave of sexual exploitation. Since the collapse of the USSR Ukraine has experiences a heretofore unseen levels of human sexual trafficking, prostitution, and other forms of sexual exploitation.

The social and economic conditions of the post-Soviet Ukraine have added tension to the gender relations. With all its faults the communist regime had guaranteed a certain level of economic and social security to women. However, the disintegration of the USSR took with it the social welfare net available for disadvantaged groups including women many of whom fell into poverty. Because women remain the main caregivers of children many single mothers have found it increasingly hard to "make the ends meet", as segregation in the work place continues to exist in post-soviet Ukraine (Hrycak 2001). Low wages coupled with an increase in the cost of living has created much pressure on the women. The transition has also been detrimental in reshaping the dynamics of the Ukrainian family. The divorce rate increased during the 1990's leaving many women to fend for their families on their own. Moreover, the increased societal pressure on women to perform parenting duties has made fathers ambivalent about their paternal roles and responsibilities. The lack of state laws regulating paternal responsibilities to their children adds more socio-economic pressure on mothers (Zhurzhenko 2001).

The lack of social mobility has also been a cause for much sexual abuse and exploitation. Sexual harassment in the work place and sexual trafficking have become common place in Ukrainian society (Hrycak 2001). Given these important issues that Ukrainian women face one would expect that under the democratic rule gender differences should become more sharply manifested in politics. As the safety net of social welfare guaranteed to women under the communist regime disintegrates and culturally accepted inequality of women spills out unchecked into the workforce, where laws no longer guarantee equality in the public sphere, one should expect to find gendering of political issues (Aidis et al. 2007; Zhurzhenko 2001). Moreover, women now have a right to meaningfully cast their ballots in multiparty elections and have an opportunity to publically express their interests and grievances (Johnson 2007). In particular, expect that younger cohorts of women should exhibit different political behaviors than their older counterparts.

5.3.4 The Timoshenko factor

The prominence of Yuliya Timoshenko in the political arena of Ukraine deserves a special notice. Her personality and political activity provoke various reactions within Ukraine and abroad. In 2005 Forbes magazine named the then-Prime Minister of Ukraine, the third most influential woman in the world²¹. After her sacking as PM in 2006, she and her party still rose up during the 2007 election to pose opposition to the majority coalition headed by the Party of Regions. In 2008 she was back among 100 most influential women at number 17²².

²¹ <http://www.tymoshenko.ua/en/page/about>

²² http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/11/biz_powerwomen08_Yulia-Tymoshenko_PGEZ.html

At home her image and persona invoke both admiration and hostility. Some Ukrainians see her as a leader of the real democratic opposition in Ukraine. Some see her as an embodiment of femininity and power; others see her as nothing more than a common thug and an oligarch trying to protect her illegally made fortune. However, regardless of her political motivation and ideological inclination the mere existence of a powerful female politician provides a powerful new incentive for women's political engagement. Although Timoshenko has been criticized for her lack of focus on specifically gendered issues, I would argue that her political activity alone has been most influential for gender relations in Ukrainian society. Yet, I also expect temporal fluctuations in female voters' support of Timoshenko. While widely popular in the wake of the Orange Revolution, Timoshenko managed to tarnish her reputation during her time as Prime Minister. The lack of gendered policies on her agenda alienated some of her female supporters. This behavior supports the main argument of this inquiry regarding the ability of voters to act in a sophisticated and complex manner.

In this chapter I seek to explore the generational and gender differences in vote choice among Ukrainians by extending the theoretical expectations of developmental cleavage and learning models to age and gender in the new democracy. Similarly to the previous chapter's analysis I classify Ukrainian citizens into three generational categories of early –Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet citizens. Early-Soviet generation includes those born before 1954 and consequently spent most of their adult lives in the USSR. Soviet generations are those born during 1955 – 1974 and therefore, were formed by the Soviet system itself. The Post-Soviet generation is presumed to be born after 1975 and therefore, had very little experience with the political, social, and economic systems of the USSR.

The analysis of the previous chapter has shown real generational differences in Ukrainian citizens' ability to cast votes correctly. I further expect that there are notable differences in voting behavior between the generations. Moreover, I expect to find intergenerational differences in voting behavior among women. Theoretical extension of the "winners and losers" model to age and gender in the new democracies coupled with the learning model produces the following set of hypotheses.

5.3.5 Overall Effect of Age and Gender

H1. Older generations are more supportive of the Communist party and its perceived successors on the left.

H2. Women are more likely than men to support BYuT

H3. Younger and middle aged women as opposed to older women vote according to the gender lines.

Overtime changes

H4. Decline in voters' support for BYuT

5.4 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

The hypotheses are tested with the use of the IFES data from 1994, 1997 -2008. The models used for the test of the first two hypotheses are the same as used in the analysis employed in Chapter 2. First, the logistic regression model is used to analyze the overall impact of age and gender on voting preferences. The second model includes the inclusion of the time variable. The independent variables are interacted with the year counter. The models include all the social cleavage categories from Chapter 2 analysis. Table 5.1 depicts the results of the analysis specifically for gender and age effects.

Table 5-1 Age and Gender Effect on Party Vote (Odds Ratios)

	CPU		RUKH		Our Ukraine		BYuT		Party of Regions	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Age	1.50***	1.54***	1	1.37**	1.03	0.52*	1.08*	1.69	0.99	2.74***
	0.06	0.19	0.1	0.18	0.06	0.19	0.05	1.21	0.04	0.35
Age *YR		1.01		0.96***		1.05*		0.97		0.94***
		0.02		0.01		0.02		0.04		0.01
Female	0.79**	1.39***	0.68*	0.67	0.87	0.07	1.20*	9.26***	0.85*	0.25
	0.07	0.15	0.14	0.34	0.12	0.16	0.12	6.37	0.08	0.24
Female *YR		0.95***		1		1.18		0.88***		1.08
		0.01		0.05		0.19		0.04		0.07
Year Count Variable		0.78***		1.06		0.16***		1.1		1.96
		0.07		0.16		0.11		0.21		2.02
Pseudo R 2	0.12	0.21	0.13	0.16	0.12	0.12	0.06	0.10	0.07	0.07
N	5559	5559	2570	2570	2989	2989	2989	2989	2989	2989
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1										

The results presented here show support for the above hypotheses. Older members of the society vote predominantly for the Communist party and its perceived successor Party of the

Regions. Women on the other hand seem to be more favorable toward the Bloc Yulii Tymoshenko. Tymoshenko as mentioned before is not an uncontroversial political figure; however, she is the first truly remarkable woman politician of the post-communist Ukraine. Although Tymoshenko has been criticized by some for her lack of focus on specifically feminist issues, her presence in the political arena alone can be seen as emancipation in action. During the 2010 electoral campaign Tymoshenko's campaign ads referred to her only as *vona* or she, underlining the gender difference between her and her opponents.

The remaining hypotheses are tested in the similar fashion. Interactions of age and gender variables allow evaluating the differences between the age groups of women. Model 1 shows the direct effects of age and gender on vote. Model 2 includes the time interactions. Educational level and regional residence are included in both models as controls. Table 5.2 depicts the result of the analysis of the third hypothesis stated above, while Figures 5.1 and 5.2 depict these results in form of bar graphs. The results suggest that there are notable differences between the age cohorts of women in their vote choice. These results further support that above hypotheses. Women of the early Soviet generations are much more likely to support the Communist Party and Party of Regions than their younger counterparts. As figure 5.1 shows, the support for these leftist parties is low among the Soviet generation and even lower among the post-Soviet generation. The Communist party is often perceived as traditional and patriarchal, thus the lack of overall support among younger generations is not surprising. Moreover, the early-Soviet generation may hold special idealistic allegiance to the Communist party coupled with the nostalgia for the past.

Table 5-2 Age Cohort Differences in Vote Choice among Females

	CPU		RUKH		Our Ukraine		BYuT		Party of Regions	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Early Soviet Generation	1.50***	2.29***	0.60***	1.41*	0.64***	0.05**	1.02	1.58	1.21*	2.84
	0.12	0.63	0.12	0.26	0.11	0.07	0.12	2.15	0.13	3.36
Soviet Generation	0.56***	0.78	0.72	1.04	0.91	0.23	1.25*	1.59**	0.77**	0.16***
	0.06	0.2	0.16	0.85	0.14	0.66	0.15	0.35	0.09	0.03
Post-Soviet Generation	0.13***	7.25	1.11		1.01	21.57***	1.28*	1.2	0.70***	0.05**
	0.04	12.12	0.54		0.17	25	0.17	1.73	0.09	0.06
Education Level	0.65***	0.84***	0.89	0.87	0.93	0.97	1.06	1.03	0.99	0.98
	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.11	0.04	0.03
Region	0.72***	0.74***	2.34***	2.33***	1.31***	1.3	1.34***	1.35	0.80***	0.8
	0.02	0.05	0.2	0.45	0.07	0.33	0.05	0.27	0.03	0.21
Early Soviet Generation*YR		0.97		0.90***		1.17*		0.97		0.95
		0.02		0.02		0.1		0.08		0.07
Soviet Generation*YR		0.94*		0.96		1.09		0.99		1.10***
		0.03		0.08		0.2		0.01		0.01
Post-Soviet Generation*YR		0.77		0.99		0.82***		1.01		1.19*
		0.13		0.02		0.06		0.09		0.1
Year		0.82***		1.09		0.48**		1.66***		1.23
		-0.02		-0.2		-0.14		-0.14		-0.16
Pseudo R 2	0.09	0.17	0.10	0.10	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.02

Figure 5.1 also shows high support for the Bloc Yulii Tymoshenko among the female voters of the Soviet and post-Soviet generations. This finding supports the above hypothesis *H3* suggesting that younger cohorts are more likely to vote along gender lines than more mature women. This is an important finding suggesting that younger cohorts of women are aware of the gender issues and willing to vote in accordance with these preferences.

Figure 29 Overall Support for Political Parties Among Females by Generation





Figure 30 Overtime Changes in Political Party Support among Females by Generation



The overtime fluctuations in party support are depicted in Figure 5.2 and also support the above hypothesis. Despite the overall general support for BYuT among younger female voters, the coefficients depicting the overtime support for Timoshenko's do not appear to have statistical significance. Moreover, the results show an increase in support of Party of Regions among the Soviet and post-Soviet generations of women. This result is not entirely surprising given the overall expectation of this chapter regarding the behavior of women as potential losers of the transition. In addition to increased support for the Party of Regions, the results show an increased support for the Communist Party among women of the Soviet generation. This increased support for the leftist parties can be explained by the increased women's awareness of their status of the losers of the transition. Moreover, I expect that a certain degree of nostalgia for the past drives this increase in the support for the Communist party among women of the Soviet generation. Unlike their younger counterparts who had very little experience with the Soviet system and the Communist party and therefore have no cognitive alternative to the Party of Regions, women of the Soviet generation have this important frame of reference. Thus, the results clearly show the important differences between age cohorts as well as the ability of Ukrainian voters to properly evaluate the electoral conditions vis-à-vis personal preferences and cast their vote accordingly.

5.5 FEMEN: A RISE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMAN?

The statistical results above suggest that the gender cleavage is present in Ukrainian society. The continued support for the Blok Timoshenko might signal the beginning of institutionalization of this important cleavage. Emergence and institutionalization of gender cleavage can also be

shown by increased female activism in during the second decade of the transition. Several scholars have noted the increase in female activism in years after the Orange revolution (Hrycak 2007; Phillips 2008). This new evidence suggests that things might be changing even more as younger women become politically active. The younger cohorts of women, who grew up in the post-Soviet Ukraine, have a very different perspective on life and politics than their mothers and grandmothers. These women are unburdened by the political socialization of the Soviet state and were not subjected to the expectations to become “superwomen.” They value their femininity as much as they value their independence.

As these younger women of independent Ukraine take the political stage the gender relations in Ukraine are changing. The studies of gender relations in Ukraine, as in the rest of the former USSR republics have focused on the intellectual influences on the development of feminism. These studies explore the long standing debates among a small group of individuals who possess the intellectual background and authority to engage in deep rooted debates on women’s equality and rights. However, there is a new wave of feminism in Ukraine. This wave is exemplified in a youthful, spunky, outrageous, vocal, and sometimes outright absence feminist movement FEMEN.

Organized in 2008 by Anna Hutsol, a young economist who cares for women’s rights more than economics, FEMEN defines itself as a social movement. It is composed mostly of young women of college age. FEMEN seeks to project an image of vibrant young Ukrainian women who are aware of social inequalities plaguing their society and seek to bring awareness to these important issues. FEMEN had become famous for its theatrical protests against social and political inequalities by baring their bodies and using them as billboards for political messages in down town Kiev.

According to Hutsol, FEMEN activists believe that the younger women of Ukraine have a serious stake in the society and development of democracy. It is their goal to raise awareness of conditions that these women find unacceptable and spark the discussion on sexual discrimination in the workplace and at the institutions of higher education, sexual exploitation in form of prostitution and sexual trafficking, dwindling democratic freedoms, and government corruption. The participants, according to Hutsol, believe that democracy in Ukraine goes hand in hand with furthering women's rights. They define themselves as a movement of democratization as well as a feminist movement.

The movement has attracted some 25000 participants who communicate with one another primarily via social network sites such as Facebook, My Space, V Kontakte, etc. The activists stage theatrical protests that attract the attention of national and international media with campaigns such as "Ukraine is not a brothel" and "End to Dirty Politics." Each of the campaign involves highly sexualized method of communication in order for the messages to reach the observers. As Hutsol states, the only way to reach public and politicians is to use the shock values and media attention, both of which make the message more urgent and legitimate. Hutsol claims that had FEMEN relied on traditional ways of communication, they would not be taken seriously and that it is much harder to disregard a bunch of beautiful naked women.

When asked about the possible counterproductive nature of the methods, Hutsol states that the movement members do not believe that it is counterproductive quite the opposite. Firstly, the methods of the movement attract the participation of younger women by keeping activism light and fun. According to Hutsol the more "traditional" feminist organizations tend to be run by older women who tend to be very intellectual and "preachy" and alienate the younger crowds.

Second, the unconventional and dramatic manner of the campaigns receives enough publicity and attention to help jump start the important discussions within the society that were taboo beforehand. In essence, Hutsol claims that the backward view of young women held by Ukrainian population forbids the society and politicians from taking anything said by a young woman, no matter how salient, seriously. Yet, the publicity of the activism puts pressure on the politicians to act as well as opens room for new discourse on gender relations.

According to Hutsol, FEMEN has achieved some positive legislation dealing with prostitution laws and illegal downloads of pornography. Moreover, FEMEN has apparently influenced feminist movements elsewhere. Hutsol claims that FEMEN has international contacts with other groups and activists in Sweden, Russian, and Germany. She says that there have been more protests with the similar “signature.” Hutsol claims that FEMEN’s “signature move” “A naked woman protesting against those things she does not approve of” is being copied elsewhere.

While being very cognizant and frank about the dangers of such activism in present day Ukraine, Hutsol remains optimistic about the future of the organization. She suggests that the current political leadership of Viktor Yanukovich does not look kindly upon any political opposition. Moreover, she suggests that the majority of the population as well as “the powers that be” do not believe that young women are capable of organizing themselves. Hutsols suggests that people dislike the activists and call them opinionated and obnoxious or believe that their activities are organized and sponsored by the foreign government. Yet, she states that at some point in the near future FEMEN hopes to become a political party with a strong pro-democratic feminist agenda. Hutsol believes that FEMEN provides an educational ground for younger women teaches them the value of political participation and fosters good contacts for future involvement.

5.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter focused on the effect of age and gender in the development of sophisticated electorate and “normalized” politics in the new democracy of Ukraine. While age and gender are often treated as control variables, very little attention is paid to their effect on their own merit. I argue that Kitschelt’s argument regarding the “winners and losers” of the transition should be expanded to account for age and gender as possible identifiers of losers and winners during the transition. Older persons and women can be seen as losers in the transition because of their reliance on the social welfare net of the USSR. Moreover, for older generations the transition is more difficult due to their socialization and indoctrination under the previous regime.

The results presented above largely support the proposed hypotheses. The older persons are more likely to support the Communist Party and Party of Regions, which some scholars have identified as a successor party to the Communists after their decline in 2002 (Zimmer and Haran 2008). This suggests a continued commitment to the communist party on the basis of nostalgic attachments. Moreover, as Chapter 4 clearly shown the middle aged and younger population has learned more quickly to cast votes more accurately than their older counterparts.

Gender is a very real and significant factor in Ukrainian politics. The presence of such powerful female figures and Timoshenko and activism of young feminist such FEMEN seem to give rise to the institutionalization capacity of the developing gender gap. The learning model suggests that individual voters learn from their experience with the democratic process and become more sophisticated in their analysis of the electoral choices. The rise of gender in Ukrainian politics, specifically among the younger generations is direct evidence of this process. The younger women of Ukraine differ markedly from their mothers and grandmothers. Their experience with electoral politics in independent Ukraine gives them an opportunity to

legitimately view themselves as part of the political process and empowers them to act on this perception.

6.0 THE LESSONS OF THE UKRAINIAN VOTER

The “third” wave of democratization that has swept through the globe in the later part of the twentieth century produced an unparalleled ripple effect in the political science literature. Numerous scholars turned to the empirical wealth offered by the cases of newly transitioning states in order to evaluate the development of democracies and various components necessary for this miraculous socio-political transformation. The complexity of democratic development could not be underestimated. From institutional set up, to electoral procedure, to social and economic development the list of building blocks is extensive (Diamond 1993, 1999; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996).

To date the majority of work that has examined the Ukrainian path to democracy represents an impressive body of work focusing on the analysis of macro-level forces such as economic development, institutional design and elite behaviors (Åslund 2009; D'Anieri 2006; Kuzio 1997; Kuzio 2000; Kuzio 2003, 2005, 2008; Kuzio and Wilson 1994). The evaluation of individual voter's behavior, however, is largely underdeveloped when compared to the larger body of literature. Among the scholars focusing on Ukrainian politics and society there is an unfortunate consensus that Ukrainian electorate is “the least likely segment of Ukrainian polity “ to influence political processes (Copsey 2005). Yet, the events of the Orange Revolutions showed that the citizens of Ukraine had a surprise for the scholars. It does not seem reasonable any longer to ignore the Ukrainian voter and her role in the development of a democratic

Ukraine. In a recent publication Timothy J. Colton (2011) lamented the lack of the individual level analysis of Ukrainian electorate. My study is a decisive attempt to remedy this short coming.

The intricate relationship between the voters and the political elites is pivotal for a healthy democracy where organized political elites compete for the votes of the citizens they seek to represent. Therefore, the interworking of this relationship receives attention in the literature on voting behavior in established democratic societies. In the exploration of these electoral relationships a special focus has been traditionally placed on the development of the social linkages between the citizens and the elected officials. More specifically the ethno-cultural and socio-economic divisions within the society have enjoyed much exploration. These social cleavages are well documented as the root for political competition in the old western democracies and are believed to serve potentially important roles in the new democracies as well (G. Evans and S. Whitefield 1995; Evans and Whitefield 2006; Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

Such group identities are viewed as influential in the contexts of the developing democracies because they provide important electoral services to both the voters and the elites. For the voters, who are unskilled in the democratic process, group identities, such as ethnic, linguistic, and regional identification might serve as cognitive shortcuts (Birnie 2007). For the elites such identifications serve as important tools for mobilization of supporters (Snyder 2000). Yet, other analyses of voting behavior suggest that social cleavages have lost their saliency in predicting vote choice (Clark 2001; Clark and Lipset 1991, 2001; Knutsen 2006). Instead voters rely more on campaign specific effects such as the evaluation of political, economic, and social issues, as well as evaluation of political leadership in casting their votes.

In the preceding pages I've explored the development of the political behavior among Ukrainian voters in order to shed more light on this important process in the new democratic polity. Relying on the logic proposed by Russell Dalton (Dalton 1996, 2006), I proposed that voting decision in a new democracy is more than a product of social cleavages or election specific factors alone. Rather, it is a complex interplay of all of these components. Moreover, over time the voters are able to use the tools of decision making with more precision due to their experience with democracy and learning. New democracies of the post-Communist space did not spring out onto the world arena untainted by their historical experiences. Thus, these societies already possessed certain cultural, historical, political, and other divisions that could lend themselves to the formation of political social linkages. Furthermore, the degree of technological and societal development in these societies proposed a higher level of sophistication among the voters that would make it possible for them to evaluate the political satiations with high degree of cerebral activity and cast their votes accordingly.

As a case of culturally, ethnically, and linguistically divided society going through its first ever experience with democratic governance and market economy, Ukraine presents a unique laboratory for an evaluation of the developmental theories in voting behavior. As per developmental hypothesis addressed in Chapter 2, one can expect that the ethno-cultural and socio-economic division should find their way in to the political realm and heavily influence the stabilization of votes and institutionalization of political parties. The results of the empirical analysis, however, suggest that although these social group identifications and economic evaluations play an important role in determining the vote choice during certain electoral cycles, they tell only a part of the electoral story. Instead, I've argued that voters rely on a much broader inventory of cognitive tools in their decision making during the elections. To boot, as Chapter 4

has shown, over time, as citizens have more experience with democratic process, the voters hone their electoral skills and learn how to use their cognitive tools with more precision.

The results of this study have some interesting implications for the study of Ukrainian politics and a broader literature on voting behavior. The Ukrainian voter is a sophisticated citizen equipped with a variety of cognitive tools s/he employs in evaluating electoral options. The presence of such voters bodes well for the stabilization and consolidation of political party system and Ukrainian democracy more generally. Furthermore, the curious case of the Ukrainian voter suggests a need to reexamine the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of democratic consolidation hypotheses as well as the developmental modes of electoral behavior. The goal of this concluding section of my inquiry into political behavior of the Ukrainian voters is to summarize the key findings of this study and further elucidate the important implication these findings hold for the broader literature on political behavior in the new democracies, as well as for the study of Ukrainian politics and society.

6.1 CITIZENS' POLITICS IN UKRAINE

The infamous two colored map of Ukraine is a familiar sight for all who either have a slight interest in Ukrainian politics or study it with zeal. The map depicting the regional split makes its appearance without fail after each presidential and to a lesser extent parliamentary election that takes place in Ukraine. These appearances are so frequent and well publicized that the whole study of Ukrainian electoral politics has been reduced to the geographic regional focus. The

belief that we can predict Ukrainian citizen's voting preferences based on the region of their residence has become perilously widespread.

Such assumptions unfairly diminish the citizens' role in politics; a role that is already largely seen as minimal by some scholars who portray the citizens as nothing more than subjects of political play among the powerful elites and victims of institutional shortcomings. Empirically such focus is problematic because of its concentration on aggregate level data and these assumptions that might inevitably lead to the wide spread ecological fallacy. Moreover, the focus on regional differences continues to fuel a notion of Ukraine as a highly divided society plagued by ethno-cultural divisions.

It is my firm belief that it is time to shift the focus to the individual level of voters and start paying more attention to the role of citizens in this new democracy. If the Orange revolution was any indication of the political maturity of Ukrainian citizens, as it has been hailed in recent literature (Åslund 2009; Aslund and McFaul 2006), the role of individual voters can no longer be ignored. This study is a step in this direction. Throughout this inquiry I sought to show that Ukrainian society is vibrant and complex and that citizens have an important role to play in consolidating and stabilizing the democratic regime through participation.

Ethno-cultural and socio-economic divisions within Ukrainian society exists and should not be dismissed. Yet, there are some interesting fluctuations in the nature and manifestation of these cleavages. This analysis has shown that there appears to be a general decline in the salience of ethnicity and linguistic characteristics on individuals' vote choice over time and an increase in the socio-economic cleavages among Ukrainians. The increase in socio-economic considerations is particularly prominent in the late 1990's and there is a sharp increase in identity politics in the

first decade of the 21st century. I would speculate that this is a result of the population's reacting toward the salient issues of the day.

As I discussed in Chapter 3, after independence Ukraine faced several unprecedented issues including transition to market economy, development of democracy, and nation-state building. The discussion of the market reform and the issues of national sovereignty have dominated the political discourse since 1991 (Colton 2011). The question of national sovereignty was linked to the geopolitical vector of Ukraine's foreign policy. In the early 1990's the Kravchuk administration had focused primarily on the issues of state building such as the introduction of Ukrainian as the official state language and attempting to distance Ukraine from Russia, while ignoring the pressing matters of economic reforms. Kravchuk paid for this decision dearly during the presidential election of 1994 when he lost to Leonid Kuchma.

While in office 1994-2004, Kuchma brought economic reform to the forefront of the political discussion. Yet, his clumsy handling of the economic reform bred further division between different social classes of the Ukrainians. The socio-economic cleavage between the "winners and the losers" of the transition intensified as a result of a society wide debate surrounding the transition to market economy, the content and the pace of these reforms.

In the early 2000's, however, with the help of the Viktor Yushchenko²³, Ukraine's economic reforms took root and its market economy was consolidated by 2005. As a result, the debate over the economic reform subsided and the yet unresolved issue of national sovereignty and identity and geopolitical leanings of Ukraine returned to the forefront of the political discussion during the 2004 presidential election. The results of this inquiry demonstrate a

²³ A former banker and a doctor of economics, Yushchenko, served as a Prime Minister under Kuchma 1999-2001. In 2001 he was ousted from the position by a vote of no-confidence. Following his firing Yushchenko engaged in organizing his Our Ukraine party, which successfully campaigned in the 2002 parliamentary election. Yushchenko became Ukraine's president in 2004.

significant increase in the prominence of the identity politics. Both the Party of Regions and Bloc Yulii Tymoshenko are centrist parties with very similar populist agendas, their appeal to the public relies therefore on the one unresolved left over questions from Ukraine's post-Soviet, post-imperial past. The voters are therefore reacting to these appeals.

However, there is more to Ukrainian voter than meets the eye. The results of this inquiry suggested that there numerous are cross-cutting cleavages at play in Ukrainian society. The importance of linguistic and ethnic characteristics have subsided over time. The evaluation of issues and candidates are proving to play an important role in voters' decision making. Moreover, these decisions are becoming more accurate as Ukrainian voters have more experience with democratic process and learn through experience. These observations regarding the political behavior of Ukrainian voters have important implications for the future development of programmatic political parties in Ukraine as well as the further stabilization and consolidation of democracy in Ukraine.

6.2ELECTORAL COMPETITION: PARTIES AND CITIZENS

Scholars agree that the presence of institutionalized programmatic political parties is a necessary component of consolidated democracy and that they serve several key functions in the democratic process (Linz and Stepan 1996). They organize the political elites, aggregate the political views of the public and articulate these concerns into public policy proposals. In short, the political parties provide organizational structure for the relations between voters and elites

(Kitschelt 1992, 1995, 2000). However, the formation of these parties has been problematic in the new post-communist democracies including Ukraine.

As discussed in Chapter 1, the political parties that formed in Ukraine are clientelist and personalistic. The legacy of “patrimonial” communism, the overall citizens’ distaste for political parties, and their inexperience with democratic process made the programmatic political party formation in Ukraine a difficult task. According to Kitschelt it will be difficult to form programmatic parties as long as 1) there is no economic growth and 2) voters remain unsophisticated. However, the empirical results of this inquiry show there are reasons for cautious optimism. Ukraine has moved toward growing market economy in the early 21st century and voters do appear to exhibit necessary sophistication.

Chapters 2 and 3 have argued that the voters are aware of numerous components of their political surroundings and Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated that the voters have become more precise in expressing their electoral preferences. This behavior should very well push the parties toward appropriate gravitational poles of the competition axis. The results presented in the analysis of Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that the Party of Regions has already shifted to the left to fill the void left by the communists. The direction of the Bloc Yulii Tymoshenko remains unclear. Moreover, the introduction of the proportional representation in the elections to Rada, Ukraine’s unicameral parliament, might very well contribute to this process. On the one hand, PR introduces a possibility of new parties forming to fill the ideational void left by the centrist parties. On the other hand, PR should entice sincere voting among electorates and force the parties to adopt more programmatic stances in order to secure the vote and support base. A word of caution, however, remains. The question of national identity of Ukraine is still an unresolved issue that might plague Ukrainian political life for some time to come.

6.3 DEMOCRATIC CONTINUITY

As Russell Dalton eloquently puts it, like all human activity the democratic process is far from perfect, however, the power of democratic governance rests firmly on the premise that citizens are the best judges of what's best for them (2006). The key to representation is the voter's capacity to evaluate her electoral options and chose those that represent her own views and values. Through the democratic process of political engagement the citizens are capable of influencing the direction of their society. By casting their votes citizens communicate their will. Moreover, the citizens hold the ruling elite accountable for their actions by rewarding and punishing them with the extension or termination of office.

The normative theories about democracies have long suggested that a functioning democracy is only possible with a knowledgeable and engaged citizenry. If the citizens are unaware or passive they can be easily manipulated by the elites. Therefore, the development of vibrant civil society has been identified by the scholars of democratization as an important task of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996). In the absence of savvy citizenry the newly democratizing states might fall victims to the so-called "gray zone" of electoral authoritarianism, where the elites manipulate electoral process and citizenry (Carothers 2002).

The empirical findings of this study suggest that Ukrainian voters are gaining political sophistication. First, Ukrainians are well aware of their socio-economic status and form issue stances based on these characteristics. Second, as democracy ages the Ukrainian public is displaying higher levels of accurate voting. This suggests that voters are learning the democratic

process and are capable of evaluating the candidates and cast their votes appropriately instead of relying on the group cues. These findings are very promising for the stabilization of Ukrainian democracy provided the institutional climate remains static and the political elites maintain their democratic commitments.

The events of the Orange Revolution of 2004 showed that citizens of Ukraine are capable and willing to serve as the guardians of democratic process. Since the events of the 2004, Ukraine has held several parliamentary and one presidential election. All of these elections have been recognized as free and fair. The 2010 presidential election is particularly interesting in the fact that it gave victory to Victor Yanukovich, the leader of the Party of Regions and an opponent of the Orange coalition. Yet, the societies' acceptance of the results suggests the further maturation of democratic institutions, democratic values, and democratic citizens. It remains to be seen if these trends persist, however. The Yanukovich government has taken several decisive steps including repression of political activists, the repeal of the Constitutional amendment that gave more power to the parliament, arrest of the former PM Yulii Tymoshenko and an extension of Russian Fleet's presence in the Black Sea. These events make the observers wary of Yanukovich's commitment to democratic process in Ukraine. The Ukrainian citizens, however, should have an opportunity to make their sentiments known during the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.

Tymoshenko's arrest has undermined the legitimacy of Yanukovich's government at home and abroad ("US, EU condemn the arrest of Tymoshenko" 2011). She was arrested in the process of a trial where Tymoshenko was accused of corruption and exceeding her powers during the negotiations of the gas prices with Russian Gazprom officials during her term as PM in early 2009("Ukraine's ex-PM Tymoshenko arrested" 2011). Tymoshenko's arrest was justified by the

authorizes on the basis of her continued lack of respect toward the judge, the proceedings, and witnesses including the former president Yushchenko and current PM Mykola Azarov ("Freedom House condemns Tymoshenko arrest" 2011). The leaders of the EU and Russia both have expressed concerns over Yanukovich's decision to detain Timoshenko. The arrest has also led to overwhelming domestic reaction. The supporters of Timoshenko are continuing to demand her release. Most recently the young feminist group, FEMEN, staged one of their famous "topless protests" demanding the release of Timoshenko and return of Ukraine to democracy (Mamchur 2011). The protests have been frequent and peaceful suggesting Ukrainian public commitment to democratic values.

This study's analyses of gender and age effects on political behavior give further reasons for cautious optimism for the flourishing Ukrainian democracy. The study suggested that the middle aged and younger populations proved more adaptable to democratic process and learn from their experience with it the most. This suggests that the legitimacy of democracy in Ukraine as "the only game in town" increases (Linz and Stepan 1996). Moreover, the increased political activism among younger Ukrainian women is also a cause for optimism. The societal acceptance of human dignity and open dialogue about women's issues signals the move, albeit a small one, from security based transitional concerns to more democratic values (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).

6.4 BEYOND THE UKRAINIAN CONTEXT

The empirical results of this study have several important implications beyond the Ukrainian context. This study contributes to the theoretical and conceptual discussion of the development of electoral behavior in the new democracies as well as a broader discussion on democratic consolidation.

The developmental models of voting behavior that focus on social divisions as basis the for voter/elite connection are wide-spread in the literature on new democracies. Taking their root from the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), these models provide a sound argument regarding the formation of cleavages as social connections for political competition. The literature analyzing the development of the social cleavages differentiate between the ethno-cultural and socio-economic cleavages. The finding presented here support the overall conclusion of the broader literature suggesting that the ethno-cultural cleavages seem to be more prominent than socio-economic cleavages (Converse 1974; Lijphart 1971, 1979) as the finding of Chapter 2 vividly illustrated.

However, the results of this enquiry also support the claim that social class is far from dead in the new democracies of the post-communist Europe (G. Evans and S. Whitefield 1995; Evans and Whitefield 1998). The societies where the communist system prevented the development of capitalism the socio-economic divisions among the member of the society become prominent as these countries move toward market reforms. Moreover, there seem to be various types of socio-economic cleavages developing overtime. The initial debate on the merits of the market reform led to the creation of the basic cleavage between the potential “winners and

losers” of the transition. Yet, over time as economic transition establishes firmly one can expect the development of an occupation based class cleavage.

However, as I’ve argued here, as prominent as social cleavages might be they provide only a part of the story. While ethno-national and socio-economic cleavages do influence voters’ electoral choices, the population of new democracies of the third wave seem to have more cognitive tools at their disposal. A wide spread education and heightened economic and technological development might serve as root causes for a wider array of cognitive methods used by “new” democratic public. Thus, the analysis of voting behavior in the new democracies should be re-examined to take into account these sophisticated publics. The developmental process encompasses factors broader than group affiliation or economic self-interest.

The ethno-cultural and socio-economic evaluation play a tremendous part in voters capacity to evaluate their electoral choice and to cast votes, however, they play a little role in the systematic development of the voters capacity. The developmental process is much broader and extends far beyond the mere economic self-interest or group affiliation. I argue that over time, as voters have more practice with democratic process they become more sophisticated and learn how to properly link their own preferences with the appropriate parties and candidates relying on numerous factors that go beyond ethno-cultural and socio-economic attributes

As discussed in Chapter 2, Hubert Kitschelt argued that important political cleavages in the new post-communist democracies would form around the conflict between the “losers” and the “winners” of the transition(1995, 2000). By winners he means those persons whose occupational status and job placement could easily translate into the market relations. The losers on the other hand, are those persons whose professional training and occupational positioning would not fare well under the conditions of free market. Thus, during the transition highly

trained professionals occupying managerial posts are pegged against the low skilled urban and rural laborers.

While this is a very reasonable claim, the analysis presented in this inquiry suggests that this classification of losers and winners is incomplete. The analysis of the Ukrainian voter suggests that the scholarly discussion about the conflict prompted by the economic, social and political transition should be widened to include the other losers of the transition – elderly and women²⁴. The study of generational and gender relations in the society is usually left to the lot of the sociologists, however, there is much to be learned from the examination of these demographic variables in the study of democratic stabilization. The findings suggest that the middle aged and younger populations seem to be more likely to be the fast learners and therefore adapt to the new socio-political conditions more quickly. Women, on the other hand, seem to always fall in to the category of losers of political power play. Some analyses have argued that democracy and the high degree of gender equality are highly correlated (Inglehart and Norris 2000, 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 2000) Thus, more attention could be paid to such factors as women's political representation and political activism in the study of democratic consolidation.

The analysis of correct voting is a relatively new venue in the field of political behavior and up to this point has been exclusively applied in the context of the presidential elections in the United States (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk 2001). This inquiry is a first attempt to apply the methodological and theoretical assumption of these models to other contexts. Further exploration of this approach could prove helpful for further cross national analysis of the importance of heuristics in electoral decision making, as well as further

²⁴ And children for that matter, however, not having electoral say, this group is not of interest to us here

analysis of the developing democratic publics in the new democracies. The analysis presented here clearly shows that overtime voters learn how to cast votes with more accuracy. Moreover, the use of both comprehensive and naïve conceptualizations of correct vote show over time increase in accuracy.

The increase of the correct vote can speak directly to the capacity of new democratic citizens to learn from their experience and contribute to normalization of politics and consolidation of democracy. Further cross national research of correct vote in the new democracies around the world can shed more light onto this mutually reinforcing relationship. More experience with democracy seems to produce more sophisticated voters, while more sophisticated voters in their own right can contribute to democratic consolidation. At this point, such is the story of the Ukrainian voter.

APPENDIX A

CONSTRUCTING THE MEASURE OF THE “CORRECT VOTE”

A.1 1994 ELECTION -- KUCHMA V. KRAVCHUK

A.1.1 Correct Vote for Kuchma 1994 Measure

Kuchma's Job approval + stronger ties with Russia-Ukrainian as State Language + support for state command economy + pace of economic reform + guaranteed employment + guaranteed health care+ trust Kuchma + Russian speaker + Russian ethnic + east + south –Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic – west

A.1.2 Correct vote for Kravchuk 1994

Strong ties with West + Ukrainian as State Language + support for state command economy²⁵ + pace of economic reform + guaranteed employment + guaranteed health care + Trust Kravchuk + Ukrainian speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + west – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south –east

The “naïve” measure for both includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities (+ for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not)

Ethnic/linguistic group support: I include all the groups identities, not merely those who support the candidate. These groups are not mutually exclusive (Barrington and Herron 2004; Ryabchuk 1999).

Table A-1 1994 Election

	IFES 1994	Kuchma	Kravchuk
Job of President Kuchma	approve/disapprove		
Trust Kuchma	yes/no		
Trust Kravchuk	yes/no		
State Economy	reduce/return	-1	-1
Move to free economy	3 points/ quick-slow	1	-1
guaranteed employment	5 point scale	2	1
guaranteed health care	5 point scale	4	2
Ukraine FP is better directed	Russia/Both/West	1	2
Ukrainian spoken as official language	yes/no	no	yes
Group Affiliation		Russian ethnic	Ukrainian ethnic
		Russian speaking	Ukrainian speaking
		east	west

²⁵ Move to Free economy (pace of economic reform)
1 – Move as quickly as possible
-1 – Slow
0 – not introduce any measure

		south	
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A.2 1999 ELECTION -- KUCHMA V. SIMONENKO

In the previous election the question about transformation of the economy and the pace of the reform did not revolve around the question of whether Ukraine should transition to the market economy. Rather the question was how fast the transition should take place. In light of the market transformations in Poland via the so-called “shock therapy” numerous neighbor countries considered the possibility of the same policy approach. Therefore, the opposing views were fast vs. slow reform with no reform at all as a center point.

By 1999 the value of “shock therapy” has come under much scrutiny. While successful in Poland, Russian attempt to implement fast economic reforms proved disastrous. Russia slid into a terrible economic turmoil in 1998 and many observers blamed the attempted “shock therapy.” In the 1999 Presidential election in Ukraine, therefore, the question frame was changed considerably. The Communist Petro Simonenko opposed the move toward the market economy on the basis of ideology which became even more validated by the unfortunate Russian experience. The question, thus, was polarized very differently than in 1994 -- reform v no reform. Now the preferences for economic reform slow or fast found themselves on the same side of the answer scale opposing those who did not want any reform at all.

The coding of the pace of the reform variable reflects this change in framing. The variable values still range 1 to -1; however, -1 represents those who do not wish any reform at all, while preference for slow pace of reform is depicted as .5. If the voter’s own position on the

issue is .5 then his/her evaluation of the candidate's position shall reflect the positive or negative direction of the issue effect, albeit the impact is smaller than if the preferences were diametrically opposed.

After the 1994 election the Communist Party supported president Kuchma. However, Kuchma's failed economic policies led the Communists to withdraw their support in 1999. Simonenko and the Communist party campaigned on the strong anti-market reform platform. Their campaign resonated with the pensioners and other groups dependent on state subsidies. The Communist Party of Ukraine, one of the very few parties who survived the transition and collapse of the USSR without being disbanded, served as a relic of the past and provided hope to the skeptical and disillusioned population who refused to accept the collapse of the regime as irreversible fact. Moreover, the Communists voiced opposition to any foreign influences in the country and supported closer ties with Russian and Belarus that would resemble the previous Union.

Meanwhile Kuchma has adopted a much more pragmatic approach to the foreign relations of his country. During his first term in office he managed to steer between the two gravitation poles of West and Russia without making concrete commitments to either. Kuchma managed to come to a settlement with Russia over the Black Sea Fleet, however, that settlement did not bring Ukraine or Crimea any closer into the sphere of Russia's influence. Kuchma has also made headway in dealing with the West, through negotiations and cooperation with the European Union and NATO.

The lack of commitment toward Russia and friendly overtones in his workings with the West had their consequences by the time of the 1999 election. By 1999 presidential election Kuchma lost the support of the Russian speaking population of Ukraine. However, the support

he received from the western regions was rather lukewarm. Voters residing the west strongly opposed Simonenko and his Communist party, therefore, they cast their votes for Kuchma grudgingly, opting for a lesser of two evils.

A.2.1 Correct vote measure Kuchma 1999

Market v. State Economy + Pace of economic reform + Foreign assistance for economics + citizens right to private property + trust Kuchma + Ukrainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south - east

A.2.2 Correct vote measure Simonenko 1999

Market v. State Economy + Pace of economic reform + Foreign assistance for economics + citizens right to private property + trust Simonenko + Pensioner + Russian speaker + Russian ethnic + South - Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic - west

The “naïve” measure for both includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities (+ for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not)

Table A-2 1999 Election

	IFES 1999	Kuchma	Simonenko
Trust Kuchma	yes/no		
Trust Simonenko	yes/no		
Market Economy v State Economy	3 point/ mrk, state, in between	1	-1
Market v State Economy (where should UA be)	5 point scale / 1 mrk -- 5 state	1	5
Move to free economy	3 points/ quick, slow, none	1	-1

Importance of Private Property	5 point scale/ very important - not at all	2	5
Foreign financial assistance for economic dev.	5 point scale/ positive-negative	2	4
Group Affiliation		Ukrainian ethnic	Russian ethnic
		Ukrainian speaking	Russian speaking
		west	east
			south
			pensioners

A.3 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

A.3.1 Correct Vote Measure Yushchenko 2004

Development of Democracy + Economic and Business Development + Pace of Economic reform+ Modernizing Healthcare+ US government assistance to Ukraine + trust Yushchenko + Ukrainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south - east

A.3.2 Correct Vote Measure Yanukovich 2004

Development of Democracy + Economic and Business Development + Pace of Economic reform+ Modernizing Healthcare+ US government assistance to Ukraine + trust Yanukovich +

Russian speaker + Russian ethnic + South + Center – Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic - west

The “naïve” measure for both includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities (+ for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not)

Table A-3 2004 Election

	IFES 2005-06 pre-election	Yushchenko	Yanukovich
Development of Democracy and Governance	approve/disapprove 5 point (v134)	1	4
Economic and Business Development	approve/ disapprove 5 point	1	4
Pace of economic reforms	5 points (v13)	4	2
Modernizing Health Care	approve/ disapprove 5 point	1	2
US government assistance to Ukraine	positive/negative 5 point (v132)	1	4
Group Affiliation		Ukrainian ethnic	Russian ethnic
		Ukrainian speaking	Russian speaking
		west	east
			south

A.4 MEASURING CORRECT VOTE IN THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1998

– 2007

A.4.1A 1998 Communist Party

State Economy + Pace of Economic Reform+ Market v. State Economy for UA + Efficiency
rating of the CPU+ Approval of President Kuchma + pensioner + Russian speaker + Russian
ethnic + South + Center – Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic - west

A.4.2 1998 People’s Movement of Ukraine (Rukh)

State Economy + Pace of Economic Reform+ Market v. State Economy for UA + Efficiency
rating of the CPU+ Approval of President Kuchma + Ukrainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic +
West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south – east

A.4.3 1998 Green Party of Ukraine²⁶

State Economy + Pace of Economic Reform+ Market v. State Economy for UA + Efficiency
rating of the CPU+ Approval of President Kuchma

²⁶ The Green Party’s group support did not rely solely on one or the other ethnic, linguistic, or regional group. Thus, the “naïve” measure is not appropriate.

The “naïve” measure for all includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities (+ for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not)

Table A-4 Election 1998

	IFES 1998	CPU	RUKH	Green
Job of President Kuchma	5 point scale/reelect - new guy	5	4	5
Market Economy v State Economy	3 point/ mrk, state, in between	-1	1	0.5
Market v State Economy (where should UA be)	5 point scale / 1 mrk -- 5 state	5	2	2
Move to free economy	3 points/ quick, slow, none	-1	1	-1
Group Affiliation		Russian ethnic	Ukrainian ethnic	
		Russian speaking	Ukrainian speaking	
		east	west	
		south		
		pensioners		

A.4.4 2006 Our Ukraine

Division of Power between Pres and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided or united + Foreign financial assist in democracy + Foreign financial assist in economy + Foreign financial assist in health and society+ trust Yushchenko + Ukrainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – South – East – Center

A.4.5 2006 Block Yulii Timoshenko

Division of Power between President and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided or united + Foreign financial assistance in democracy + Foreign financial assistance in economy + Foreign financial assistance in health and society+ trust Timoshenko + Ukrainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + Center - West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – South – East

A.4.6 2006 Party of Regions

Division of Power between President and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided or united + Foreign financial assistance in democracy + Foreign financial assistance in economy + Foreign financial assistance in health and society+ trust Yanukovich + pensioner+ Russian speaker + Russian ethnic + South - Center – Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic – West

The “naïve” measure for all includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities (+ for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not)

Table A-5 Election 2006

	IFES 2007	Our Ukraine	BUT	Party of Regions
Trust Yushchenko	v40: 5 point scale	1		
Trust Timoshenko	v42: 5 point scale		1	
Trust Yanukovich	v41: 5 point scale			1
Division of Power between Pres and Parliament	v137: (1 pres)(-1 parliament)	-1	1	1
Is Ukraine divided or united	v139: (1 united) (-1 divided)	1	1	-1
Foreign financial assist in democracy	v 145; 5 point scale	1	2	5
Foreign financial assist in economy	v 146; 5 point scale	1	2	4
Foreign financial assist in health and society	v 147; 5 point scale	1	1	2

Group Affiliation		Ukrainian ethnic	Ukrainian ethnic	Russian ethnic
		Ukrainian speaking	Ukrainian speaking	Russian speaking
		west	west	east
			center	south
				pensioners

A.4.7 2007 Our Ukraine

Necessity of NGO's + Division of Power between President and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided or united + Support Ukraine's joining the EU + Support Ukraine's joining NATO + Support Withdrawal of Russian Black Sea Fleet Ukraine + trust Yushchenko + Ukrainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south – east – center

A.4.8 2007 Block Yulii Timoshenko

Necessity of NGO's + Division of Power between President and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided or united + Support Ukraine's joining the EU + Support Ukraine's joining NATO + Support Withdrawal of Russian Black Sea Fleet Ukraine + trust Timoshenko + Ukrainian Speaker + Ukrainian Ethnic + Center - West – Russian speaker – Russian ethnic – south – east

A.4.9 2007 Party of Regions

Necessity of NGO's + Division of Power between President and Parliament + Is Ukraine divided or united + Support Ukraine's joining the EU + Support Ukraine's joining NATO + Support Withdrawal of Russian Black Sea Fleet Ukraine+ trust Yanukovich + pensioner + Russian speaker + Russian ethnic + South– Ukrainian speaker – Ukrainian ethnic – west-center

The “naïve” measure for all includes only the regional, ethnic and linguistic identities (+ for groups supportive of the candidate; - for those who do not)

Table A-6 Election 2007

	IFES 2008	Our Ukraine	BUT	Party of Regions
Trust Yushchenko	q12c: 5 point scale	1	4	5
Trust Timoshenko	q12d: 5 point scale	4	1	5
Trust Yanukovich	q12e: 5 point scale	5	5	1
Necessity of NGO's	q17: 5 point scale	1	2	4
Division of Power between President and Parliament	q32: (1 president)(-1 parliament)	-1	1	1
Is Ukraine divided or united	q30: (1 united) (-1 divided)	1	1	-1
Support Ukraine's joining the EU	q35: (1 vote for) (-1 against)	1	1	-1
Support Ukraine's joining NATO	q40: (1 vote for) (-1 against)	1	1	-1
Support Withdrawal of Russian Black Sea Fleet	q44: (1 vote for) (-1 against)	1	1	-1
Group Affiliation				
		Ukrainian ethnic	Ukrainian ethnic	Russian ethnic

		Ukrainian speaking	Ukrainian speaking	Russian speaking
		west	west	east
			center	south
				pensioners

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