AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA (1945-1975):
THE CONTAINMENT POLICY AND THE PERCEPTIONS OF “THREAT”

by

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This paper analyzes the U.S. foreign policy of containment as it was applied to Latin and South America, from 1945 through the 1970s, which U.S. policy makers employed to prevent the spread of “communism.” The containment policy defines communism as the most significant threat to U.S. interests: a threat that directed policy theory and catalyzed policy action. That is, when a situation was deemed a “communist threat,” U.S. policy makers responded through a variety of options including, but not limited to, the use of covert intervention (such as the orchestration of military coups to unseat supposed communist leaders), of economic reprisals (such as the removal of U.S. economic aid to a given country), and even of military force. But, through my study of the containment policy, I realize that the way U.S. policy makers characterized a “communist threat” was not always consistent, for they did not always react to similar circumstances in similar ways. I contend that how U.S. policy makers viewed world events, that is, how they judged and perceived those events (for example, land reform in a given country) was not always congruent from situation to situation. In this light, the purpose of this paper, then, is to explain why this discrepancy in perception occurred, and therefore to explain the evolution of American foreign policy and action from the late 1940s through the early 1970s.

First, I contend that U.S. policy perspective (a term I coined to describe how U.S. policy makers judged world events) and U.S. foreign policy evolved from 1945 through the 1970s,
causing U.S. policy makers to define threats in different ways across time. In layman’s terms, U.S. policy makers were not as anti-communist by the 1970s, which caused them to be less critical, and perhaps more practical, when judging a situation to be a “communist threat.” Second, I will argue that whether or not a regime was democratic or dictatorial was significant, in that U.S. policy makers favored dictatorial regimes as the best defense against “communist threats” in the Western hemisphere. As a result, U.S. policy makers were more sensitive to “communist threats” in democratic regimes and more likely to investigate such regimes with greater scrutiny for the possibility of these threats.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLE

In order to focus my discussion, I refer to three case studies—Guatemala 1944 to 1954, Chile 1970 to 1973, and Peru 1968 to 1975—which, when compared, will outline the “discrepancy in perspective” to which I have alluded. In two of these cases—Guatemala 1954 and Chile 1973—U.S. policy makers helped plan coups d’état because they believed that each regime was a “communist threat.”

In the first case of Guatemala, I evaluate the Presidencies of Juan Arevalo (1944 to 1950) and Jacobo Arbenz Guzman (1950 to 1954). U.S. policy makers labeled Arevalo as a potential “communist threat” as early as 1945, but did not respond through intervention because the threat had not yet gone beyond a threshold or standard that would require U.S. action at that time. The perception of a threat grew under the Presidency of Jacobo Arbenz who, in 1950, succeeded Arevalo. Although U.S. policy makers initially supported Arbenz prior to his election, soon after, they believed he and his regime to be a threat. By 1952, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the U.S. had formed plans to overthrow Arbenz, plans that were later carried out in 1954 by Guatemalan rebels, with the aid of CIA propaganda and with U.S. air support. The “communist threat” in Guatemala had become substantial enough in the minds of U.S. policy makers to act.

The second case refers to the Chilean Presidency of Salvador Allende from 1970 to 1973. As early as the 1950s and throughout Allende’s career, U.S. policy makers considered Allende a “communist threat.” Consequently, U.S. policy makers engaged in covert anti-Allende
propaganda campaigns, including the bribery of various Chilean politicians in the 1964 Chilean Presidential elections and during Allende’s successful campaign in 1970. Thereafter, the U.S. government formed plans to overthrow Allende, and on September 11, 1973, Allende’s regime was ousted in the ensuing coup d’état.

And, in the third case, I evaluate General Juan Velasco’s authoritarian military regime in Peru, from 1968 to 1975. Velasco and his regime were never considered to be “communist threats” by U.S. policy makers, but perhaps they should have been.

In light of these three cases studies, I have chosen two “positive” cases (Guatemala and Chile) and a “negative” case (Peru). The term positive refers to instances when U.S. policy makers considered the regimes (i.e. those of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Allende) to be “communist threats,” while the term negative refers to instances when U.S. policy makers did not view a regime (i.e. Velasco) to be a “communist threat.” Thus the reader might posit:

1) Why is the Peruvian case important? Why should it have been considered a threat?

2) If Peru should have been considered a threat, why was the Peruvian regime never perceived to be a threat by U.S. policy makers?

In response to these questions, I contend that U.S. policy makers intervened in the Guatemalan and Chilean states because they considered specific variables (e.g. land reform in Guatemala) to signify that a “communist threat” was present in each case. The case of Peru is significant because the variables in Guatemala that led U.S. policy makers to label the Arevalo and Arbenz regimes as threatening were, in large part, also evident in similar circumstances in Peru from 1968 to 1975, but, as argued, U.S. policy makers did not consider Velasco or his regime to be a threat. The variables that caused U.S. policy makers concern in the case of Guatemala were: the expropriation of U.S. business interests (specifically the land reform program that seized the land of the United Fruit Company, the largest U.S. company in
Guatemala at the time), the communist party’s (CP) control of their respective labor movements, and the influence of the CP in government, which U.S. policy makers believed was largely based upon the CP’s influence in the labor movement. Also, a major worry for U.S. policy makers was that Arevalo and Arbenz’s regimes had formed relations with the Socialist bloc. Although Arbenz’s regime engaged in only one known arms trade with the Soviet bloc in 1954, U.S. policy makers considered the arms sale as an indication that a “communist threat” existed.¹

In Peru under the Velasco regime, although the CP held virtually no government posts, Velasco’s closest advisors were exceptionally radical, favoring state control of the economy. Indeed, Velasco’s respective social reform programs were far more advanced than Arbenz’s, while Velasco’s government formed extensive bi-lateral trade agreements with the U.S.S.R including the Peruvian regime’s purchase of Soviet weapons. Moreover, the CP in Peru wielded great influence over the Peruvian labor movement, which become increasingly radical and in the final years of Velasco’s tenure a third of the labor force went on strike and violently demonstrated.² Nevertheless, U.S. policy makers in the 1970s concluded that the Velasco regime was not a “communist threat.” As Kees, Koonings, and Dirk Kruijt, editors of Political Armies: The Military and nation building in the age of democracy, argue, “During the Cold-War, US-related concepts of national security were diffused all over Latin America. In Peru, however, the ‘normal’ overwhelming anti-communism of the Latin American security thesis was felt much less strongly.”³ So, my research question: What caused U.S. policy makers to perceive the Velasco regime with a different perspective?

¹ See Chapter 2
² See Chapter 2
The discrepancy in the perception of U.S. policy makers toward the regimes of Guatemala and Peru is further complicated by the case of Allende’s Chile from 1970 to 1973. The case is a clear instance of U.S. covert intervention in Latin America during the very same years of Velasco’s tenure. Hence, we cannot explain away the Peruvian situation by simply arguing that U.S. policy makers were no longer interested in the U.S. Cold War containment policy. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, U.S. policy makers feared Allende well before his election to the Chilean presidency, actively sought to prevent his election in several instances, and were perturbed once Allende was elected on the grounds that he and his eventual regime posed an imminent “communist threat” to the Western hemisphere. Once again, the question: Why was Velasco’s regime overlooked? And what distinguished Velasco and his regime from both Arevalo and Arbenz and their respective regimes in Guatemala and Allende and his regime in Chile?

1.1 SOLVING THE PUZZLE:

Abstractly speaking, for my first thesis, I contend that U.S. policy makers did not view the Velasco regime’s land reform programs, expropriation of U.S. businesses, extensive relations with the U.S.S.R, the CP’s control of the labor movement, the fact that Velasco’s closest advisors were radical and had a Marxist Socialist orientation, as “communist threats” because U.S. foreign policy and the way U.S. policy makers understood international relations had evolved from 1944 through the 1970s. That is, the way U.S. policy makers “judged” the world fundamentally changed. Hence, the discrepancy in perspective was not a mere anomaly, but was a consequence of this different world outlook. I will also introduce a second thesis: U.S. policy
makers favored dictatorships over democracies and thus scrutinized the democratic Arevalo, Arbenz, and Allende and their regimes to a much greater extent that Velasco’s Authoritarian military government in Peru. Thus, in this light, I contend that U.S. policy makers were more likely to judge a situation as threatening in a democracy over a dictatorship.

In more concrete terms, regarding my first thesis, U.S. policy makers in the late 1940s and early 1950s framed virtually every international and domestic issue in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations and religiously sought to prevent the spread of communism under the auspices of the containment policy. Particularly, in the 1950s, U.S. policy makers saw the world as ridden with “communist subversion”; they were convinced that the Soviet leadership sought to indoctrinate the minds and souls of every individual with communist ideology. Indeed, like so many other U.S. citizens, President Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower were consumed by the fear of communism and its outward expansion from the U.S.S.R, and they viewed international relations in a bi-polar way: U.S. versus U.S.S.R. and democracy (“good”) versus communism (“bad”). As a result, the U.S. saw “communism” as a single enemy and anything related to “communism” would be considered a threat. Thus, in the early 1940s and 1950s, U.S. policy makers believed that every individual instance of communist growth, whether it was a growing number of communist members in a given country or a “leftist” reform program that U.S. policy makers had associated with the communist agenda, needed to be prevented (a universal goal, to say the least). In short, the communist fight was all that mattered from 1945 through the early 1960s. Indeed, the early 1960s cannot be underestimated because U.S.-Soviet tensions were exceptionally tense. For example, the Cuban Revolution and the Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in 1959 and 1962 respectively, marking the height of U.S.-Soviet tension, in which nuclear war was serious possibility.
Yet, by the 1970s, the fear of communism, although it remained present in the minds of U.S. policy makers, had subsided in comparison to the hysterical anti-communist political atmosphere of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Many events contributed to this shift in perspective. For example, the new anti-communist foreign policy of modernization, under the auspices of President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress program, called for a renewed interest in sending U.S. economic aid to Latin America, while simultaneously bolstering Latin America’s social reform programs. The land reform program in Guatemala probably would not have caused U.S. policy makers concern if it counterfactually had taken place in the 1960s. Also, in the late 1960s, the Vietnam War forced U.S. policy makers to reconsider their foreign policy goals for a variety of reasons. When the U.S. citizenry turned against the War, the crusading efforts to prevent communism everywhere fell out of favor. Moreover, as a result of the Soviet split from communist China in 1961—when the Sino-Soviet political and ideological relations worsened, which ultimately resulted in China’s complete rejection of the Soviet styled Marxist ideology—U.S. policy makers recognized that the Cold War was not defined by neat bi-polar categories. In this regard, President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s National Security Advisor, who were both once staunch “anti-communist crusaders,” came to view the world as multi-polar; by the 1970’s they lost interest in responding to every instance of communist growth because it was not only impractical but U.S. policy makers might be supporting one communist regime against another (i.e. Nixon supported China in the 1970’s to combat the threat that the U.S.S.R. posed). Thus, U.S. policy makers adopted a more practical approach of “selective containment.” That is, policy makers responded to world issues with a greater degree of understanding in order to determine if a situation was indeed a threat rather than automatically categorizing every issue in the context of the Cold War. Hence, my first thesis: the evolution of U.S. foreign policy
perspectives and U.S. foreign policy explains why U.S. policy makers viewed and responded in different ways to similar variables in Guatemala and Peru.\(^4\)

### 1.2 HOW FOREIGN POLICY AND POLICY PERSPECTIVE EVOLVED:

In light of this explanation, I argue that four variables shaped “U.S. foreign policy perspective” from 1945 through the 1970s: (1) **international political context**, where world events unfold in the present as decisions are being made; (2) **U.S. domestic political atmosphere**, where the general sentiment of U.S. policy makers, the general citizenry, the media, and U.S. business interests characterize the general collaborative mood in the United States and interpret global and domestic issues; (3) **U.S. foreign policy theory**, where U.S. policy makers form a theoretical response to world issues; (4) **foreign policy action**, where U.S. policy makers react to world issues in light of their view of such issues and the prevailing foreign policy of the time.

Although the four variables are interdependent, each of them can—and perhaps should be—looked at independently. However, the length restraints of this essay make it impossible to give each variable its due share of analysis. Nonetheless, I explore each variable in order to explain the discrepancy in U.S. perspectives and action across time.

I contend that the international context set the stage for how U.S. policy makers formed their foreign policy perceptions (i.e. how they viewed the world). Naturally, it would be impossible to have a perspective, let alone a foreign policy, without the occurrence of world events. Hence, U.S. policy makers interpreted world events and formed a theoretical “game

\(^4\) See Chapter 1 for full citations and explanation of this overview.
plan” for how the U.S. would react (i.e. foreign policy theory). Yet, foreign policy, in theory, did not catalyze U.S. action but merely directed it. Without individual policy makes to employ the theory, U.S. foreign policy theory was like a car without a driver. The theory provided the vehicle for action, but U.S. policy makers were the ones who had to drive the theory and apply it to specific issues. In turn, the actions taken by U.S. policy makers naturally impacted the way world events unfolded, but the actions also further defined policy theory and set precedence for how later action would subsequently be employed. The constant influx of world events, the variety of perspectives on such events, and the individual application of policy theory to individual issues demonstrate that foreign policy was a breathable, malleable, and ever changing theoretical outlook. I have created the following chart to illustrate and clarify this cycle.
Although this diagram oversimplifies the entire process of forming U.S. foreign policy perceptions, foreign policy theory, and how policy perception and policy theory, when applied to a given situation, creates policy action, it nonetheless characterizes the general trend. I argue, then, that this “trend” provides sound circumstantial evidence to explain, abstractly, not only that foreign policy evolution is possible, for it surely is, but how U.S. foreign policy and the way U.S. policy makers viewed the world had evolved and why U.S. policy makers became less anti-communist from 1945 through the 1970s.
But, if the atmosphere was not so charged, then why was Allende’s regime considered exceptionally threatening in the 1970s and, thus, overthrown in a similar manner to Arbenz in 1954? Furthermore, if Allende’s regime was considered a communist threat at the same time as Velasco was in power (and was not seen as a threat), wouldn’t this contest my basic assertion that policy and policy perspective had evolved? I submit that such a contention would cause my thesis difficulty if U.S. policy makers had considered Allende and his regime to be a “communist threat” on similar grounds that rationalized intervention and a perception of threat in Guatemala, for U.S. policy makers would have acted similarly in similarly circumstances from 1945 through the 1970s and, thus, a change in perception would not be apparent (a basic requisite for my entire thesis). Hence, the paper would have to explain through other means—beyond the rational that foreign policy and policy perspective evolved—why U.S. perception of threat in Peru was nonexistent. However, my first thesis is not challenged because I argue that the variables of expropriation of U.S. business interests, CP in government, trade relations with the U.S.S.R., so forth and so on were only auxiliary threats to the main motivating variables that caused U.S. policy makers concern with regards to Allende. Indeed, Allende was considered a threat well before such variables had come into being for his respective administration. That is, Allende was considered a threat, unlike Arevalo and Arbenz, well before he had ascended the Chilean Presidency because of variables that transcended the ones seen in Guatemala or Peru: Allende self-affiliated as a Marxist Socialist throughout his career and a Marxist Socialist president during his Presidential tenure (As my survey shows, “Marxism,” whatever it may have entailed, was a label that caused equal consternation for U.S. policy makers in comparison to the label
“communism”); And, Allende had openly affiliated with the international communist movement, while idealizing communist leaders, such as the U.S.S.R.’s Premier Joseph Stalin, throughout his political career. Hence, these variables substantiate why U.S. policy makers considered Allende a threat even into the 1970s.

But, for arguments sake, even if we do take into account similar variables that caused U.S. policy makers concern in the case of the Guatemala regimes, it is apparent that Allende’s regime included a CP that was more integrated, evolved, and certainly more advanced than the CP in Arbenz’s regime and obviously Velasco’s. A quick glance at CP party size, CP involvement in government, and CP role in politics as a whole, in Guatemala, Peru, and Chile, supports this claim. Thus, even if we ignore the extra variables—Marxist affiliation and international communist proponent— that moved beyond those seen in Guatemala (e.g. expropriation or CP control of labor), and focus solely on the variables present in Guatemala, Allende’s Chile was simply more “radical” and perhaps more “communist” even by this comparison. In total, U.S. policy makers, despite their new commitment to “selective containment” and the presence of less anti-communist atmosphere, could not ignore the threat that Allende and his regime posed. Hence, the threat of Allende eclipsed a threshold or standard that was much more stringent by the 1970s in comparison to the one utilize to determine threat in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
1.4 THESIS 2:

The discrepancy in perspective between the cases of Guatemala and Peru, and why U.S. policy makers considered Allende’s regime a threat in the 1970s, can also be explained by my second thesis: **U.S. policy makers favored dictatorial regimes over democratic ones because they believed that dictatorships were the best defense against communism in the Western Hemisphere.** Arevalo, Arbenz, and Allende were all democratically elected Presidents under constitutional democracies, while Velasco was an authoritarian military dictator who took power through a military coup d’état. Hence, I argue that the regimes of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Allende received greater scrutiny from U.S. policy makers because their democratic regime type.

I hope to show that Allende was investigated and considered a threat well before his election and as early as the late 1950s, while Velasco was not “tracked” in this manner. Once again, for Allende, U.S. policy makers had not only formed their opinion that he was a “communist threat,” but actively pursued a policy of preventing Allende from being elected President in both 1964 and 1970. Similarly, U.S. policy makers engaged in an intensive investigation of Guatemala as early as 1944, well before any indication of a “communist threat” was evident. Contrastingly, in Peru, U.S. policy makers never considered Velasco as more than a potential threat, while he was in power, that is, if they considered him a threat at all, and, furthermore, they never investigated him for communist “sympathies” or threat prior to his tenure. In short, my survey evidences that U.S. policy makers not only concluded that no “communist threat” was apparent in Peru, but they did not look in the first place. Yet, another important piece of evidence for the second thesis is that U.S. policy makers quickly concluded that Velasco was anti-communist shortly into his tenure and, subsequently, utilized Velasco’s regime as a non-Marxist revolutionary example to Allende’s Marxist Socialist regime in Chile.
Lastly, in my first chapter, I will also touch upon a U.S. report on Guatemala that clearly suggests the U.S. favored the Velasco regime because it was authoritarian. **Hence, in total, it appears that a clear bias directed greater scrutiny of the democratic regimes in the cases of Guatemala and Chile.**

In summary, the initial puzzle and discrepancy in perspective that I have touched upon to such a great extent can be explained by the shift of U.S. policy makers’ beliefs, from 1944 through the 1970s, and the sustained policy that favored dictatorships over democracies.

### 1.5 ALTERNATIVE THESIS:

Before turning to the body of work and for the sake of argument, I need to address a pressing concern for my entire paper. I initially began my entire discussion by highlighting one key premise: U.S. interventions—at least in the cases of Guatemalan and Chile— were motivated by the containment policy of stemming communist threats. Indeed, the concern that I must address is one that challenges this basic premise.

Specifically, various historians have argued that the rational for intervention in Guatemala and Chile was not entirely based upon the need to stop communism, but, rather, stemmed from a much greater concern for U.S. business interests and the protection of U.S. business assets in both countries. Thus, in this light, containment was not utilized to stop communism, but was used as a rationale to intervene on the behalf of U.S. business interests.

Stephen Streeter, in “Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist perspective” further defines this alternative thesis. He argues that
there are three scholarly perspectives that have evolved and attempt to explain the rational for U.S. intervention in Guatemala: realist, revisionist, and postrevisionist. A quick summary of these terms will clarify the difficulty that I am presented with. According to Streeter:

Realists, who concern themselves primarily with power politics, have generally blamed the Cold War on an aggressive, expansionist Soviet empire. Because realists believe that Arbenz was a Soviet puppet, they view his overthrow as the necessary rollback of communism in the Western Hemisphere. Revisionists, who place the majority of the blame for the Cold War on the United States, emphasize how Washington sought to expand overseas markets and promote foreign investment, especially in the Third World. Revisionists allege that because the State Department came to the rescue of the [United Fruit Company] UFCO, the U.S. intervention in Guatemala represents a prime example of economic imperialism. Postrevisionists, a difficult group to define precisely, incorporate both strategic and economic factors in their interpretation of the Cold War. They tend to agree with revisionists on the issue of Soviet responsibility, but they are much more concerned with explaining the cultural and ideological influences that warped Washington’s perception of the “communist threat”. According to post revisionists, the Eisenhower administration officials turned against Arbenz because they failed to grasp that he represented a nationalist rather than a communist.5

Hence, the revisionist perspective characterizes the alternative thesis, whereas, the post-revisionist perspective is more in line with my own thesis. In effect, the revisionist argument contends that the UFCO and high ranking U.S. officials, such as the Dulles Brothers, John and Allen Dulles, who were the respective Secretary of State and Director of Intelligence, conspired to inflate an already present communist threat that was believed to exist in Guatemala in order to legitimize Arbenz’s overthrow, not in the name of containment per say, but in the name of protecting UFCO assets that were being expropriated. Although Streeter is only referring to the case of Guatemala, a similar explanation might be employed to explain U.S. intervention in Chile (i.e. one might argue that U.S. policy makers intervened in against Allende and his regime

because of the threat they posed to U.S. business interests, not necessarily because of the “communist threat” they posed.)

I contend that although the protection of U.S. business interests may have been an auxiliary concern in both Guatemala and Chile, the main concern was the communist threat that U.S. policy makers believed to exist. Without going too much into the matter, Streeter thoroughly articulates how the revisionist perspective evolved in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but was later refuted and debunked by “archival” evidence of the CIA plans to overthrow Arbenz and postrevisionist authors such as Piero Gleijese who wrote his account of the Guatemalan intervention in *Shattered Hope*, published in 1991. For example, Streeter contends that “*Shattered Hope* verified the claim of post-revisionist studies that Eisenhower administration officials had viewed the Fruit Company’s plight as a “subsidiary” problem, secondary to the issue of communism.” In fact, my account of the U.S. perspective for the Guatemalan case, which focuses on the telegram correspondence between the American embassy in Guatemala and the U.S. State Department, also thoroughly supports the claim that the U.S. government was primarily motivated by the containment policy and the goal of stemming a “communist threat” in Guatemala. Indeed, my survey agrees with Streeter that even at the height of Arbenz’s expropriation of UFCO’s assets, the “Eisenhower administration officials worried less about the impact of Arbenz’s land reform on United Fruit than they did about its impact on the countryside.” In other words, U.S. makers, although clearly concerned with the land reform program and although concerned about its impact on the UFCO, was ultimately far more concerned with how the land reform program related to CP strength in Guatemala and in Arbenz’s regime.

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6 Ibid., p. 66, 67.
Moreover, in support of my refutation of the revisionist theory, Louis Halle, the Jr. Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, argues that U.S. policy maker’s primary concern was communism in Guatemala. In a telegram to the Director of Policy Planning Staff, on May 28, 1954, and only a month prior to Arbenz’s overthrow, Halle stated:

The nationalistic and reformist elements in the Guatemalan situation have hitherto loomed larger for the Latin Americans than the element of international communism. They believe that we exaggerated the latter for our own purposes, and this belief is not weakened when we meet it with redoubled protestations... If the above analysis is sound the conclusion must be that the time is not ripe for a collective inter-American action.”

Thus, Halle fully recognized that certain factions, in this case Latin Americans, were suspicious of U.S. intentions in Guatemala and believed that the “threat of communism” was really a front to legitimize U.S. intervention that would be enacted to protect U.S. business interests. But the tone of this letter indicates that Halle did not favor U.S. intervention because he realized how such an intervention would look, that is, it would appear to be an imperialist intervention for the sake of protecting U.S. business interests. Consequently, Halle called for a more “relaxed attitude generally” (i.e. non-intervention) because he worried that intervention would “turn all of Latin America against us to the advantage of the international Communist movement” and if the intervention failed would “strengthen Communism in Guatemala while antagonizing Latin American generally.”

Hence, Halle’s stance on Guatemala was ultimately related to how communism was impacting not only the Guatemala state, but Latin America as a whole. However, it might be argued that Halle’s point is moot because the U.S. covert intervention had been planned for two years prior to Halle’s report letter and the intervention commenced a month after the report. Thus, Halle was clearly unaware about the plans, which

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would further support a conspiracy theory because Halle’s disposition was not characteristic of the more elite policy makers who favored a “collective inter-American action” and actually planned and orchestrated the coup.

Yet, even if we disregard Halle’s perspective, President Eisenhower’s position on Guatemala substantiates that although he may have been concerned about the expropriation of U.S. business interests, his overriding concern was the prevention of communist power in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in his book *Mandate for Change, the White House Years, 1953-1956*, published nine years after Arbenz’s overthrow, Eisenhower argued:

The troubles had been long-standing, reaching back nine years to the Guatemalan revolution of 1944, which had resulted in the overthrow of the dictator General Jorge Ubico. Thereafter, the Communists busied themselves with agitating and with infiltrating labor unions, peasant organizations, and the press and radio. In 1950 a military officer, Jacabo Arbenz Guzman, came to power and by his actions soon created the strong suspicions that he was merely a puppet manipulated by Communists...For example, on February 24, 1953, the Arbenz government announced its intention, under agrarian reform law, to seize about 225,000 acres of unused United Fruit Company land. The company lost its appeal to the Guatemalan Supreme Court to prevent this discriminatory and unfair seizure...Expropriation in itself does not, of course, prove Communism; expropriation of oil and agriculture properties years before in Mexico had not been fostered by Communists.  

Notice how Eisenhower refers to Arbenz’s land reform only in how it related to the presence of a possible communist threat in Guatemala, but was not described as threatening for its own sake. He even contends that “expropriation itself does not, of course prove communism.” Once again, the expropriation was highlighted because it suggested a “communist threat.” Eisenhower also supports the claim that the U.S. intervention in Guatemala was motivated by a fear of communism when he states:

In the two months from March to May, 1954, the agents of international Communism in Guatemala continued their efforts to penetrate and subvert their neighboring Central American states, using consular agents for political purposes and

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fomenting political assassinations and strikes. In Guatemala itself the government answered protests by suspending constitutional rights, conducting mass arrests, and killing leaders in the political opposition.\textsuperscript{10}

The language here further exemplifies Eisenhower’s focus. When he states the “agents of international Communism in Guatemala continued their efforts,” he is clearly supporting the claim that U.S. was focused on communism and the threat it posed in Guatemala and to U.S. interests! The only way to refute such statements is to suggest that Eisenhower purposely was lying in his book in order to frame the Guatemalan situation as a “communist threat” in order to cover up the conspiracy. Perhaps it is not impossible that Eisenhower would lie, but such a claim appears highly skeptical, to say the least. Moreover, Eisenhower does not merely suggest that containment motivated action in Guatemala, but explicitly outlines this point:

\begin{quote}
I considered the matter carefully. I realized well that United States intervention in Central America and Caribbean affairs earlier in the century has greatly injured our standing in all of Latin America. On the other hand, it seemed to me that to refuse cooperate in providing indirect support to a strictly anti-communist faction in this struggle would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Caracas resolution (i.e. anti-communist resolution). I had faith in the strength of the inter-American resolve therein set forth. \textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

In this statement, Eisenhower recognizes the same difficulties that Halle highlighted in 1953: intervention would have serious ramifications in how Latin American’s would judge U.S. action. Nonetheless, Eisenhower favored intervention because he believed the communist threat outweighed the importance of catering to the concerns of Latin Americans. Once Arbenz’s regime was ousted, Eisenhower concluded, “By the middle of 1954 Latin America was free, for the time being at least, of any fixed outposts of Communism.”\textsuperscript{12} In summary, Eisenhower and U.S. policy makers were first and foremost concerned with the “threat of communism.”

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
Aside from Eisenhower’s perspective, according to Streeter, the CIA official who orchestrated the plans (i.e. PBSUCCESS) to overthrow Arbenz, Richard Bissell, reported “I never heard Allen Dulles discuss United Fruit’s Interests.” Indeed, Assistant Secretary of State also told Costa Rican leader Jose Figueres: “Of course, we expected American rights to be protected, including the United Fruit Company; but the United Fruit Company’s interests were secondary to the main interest.” Thus, all of these sources unanimously agree that communism was the main issue. Yet again, a refutation to this claim would be to suggest that all of these sources conspired to lie.

However, to affirm that the main motivation for intervention in Guatemala was to “roll back” a communist threat is not to say that the UFCO played no part in causing U.S. officials to become more anxious and more aware of a threat in Guatemala. In fact, I grant that U.S. business interests and their respective lobbying of the U.S. government and propaganda campaigns, which included the hiring of professional journalists to characterize Arbenz and his regime and Guatemalan society as a whole as a hot bed for communists, aroused further suspicions that were already present for U.S. policy makers. Such efforts were most likely quite effective considering the extreme sensitivity to communist threats in the U.S. from 1945 to 1954. Thus, such efforts would surely “stoke the fire.” Hence, the issue of economic imperialism and the policy of containment were clearly not mutually exclusive from one another. The point remains, however, that the underlying motivation for action in Guatemala was rooted on the belief that a communist threat was present.

Moving on to the other case studies—Chile and Peru—I can also say the Allende and his regime in Chile were overthrown because of the “communist threat” they posed and not to

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13 Streeter, p. 65.
14 Ibid.
protect U.S. business interests. As with Guatemala, the “communist threat” may have been exacerbated by a concern for U.S. business interests because, like Guatemala, U.S. businesses, such as ITT, offered money to combat Allende’s regime and lobbied the U.S. government for action. But, still, U.S. policy makers had determined that Allende was a threat well before his election and before he posed an economic threat. The fear of Allende’s Marxist orientation predated the other concern of possible expropriation, let alone the other variables. Indeed, U.S. policy makers labeled Allende a “communist doup” in the 1950s. It would be absurd to suggest that U.S. policy makers planned twenty years in advance for how they would combat Allende to prevent his potential expropriation of U.S. business interests if he happened to find his way to the presidency. Nevertheless, as in the case of Guatemala, containment and the protection of U.S. business interests was not mutually exclusive from one another. Hence, once Allende was in power, it might be correctly argued that U.S. businesses played a role in furthering efforts for his overthrow, but, as in Guatemala, the primary motivation for Allende’s overthrow was ultimately linked to the original U.S. concern that Allende and his regimes posed a “communist threat.”

Lastly, the case of Peru also thoroughly supports the fact that U.S. policy makers were not willing to intervene to protect U.S. business interest, especially in the 1970s. As I will argue, Velasco and his regime engaged in widespread expropriation on a similar scale to Allende’s regime and a much larger scale than Arbenz’s. Yet, U.S. policy makers (although reacting to the Peruvian regimes’ respective expropriation of U.S. business interests through economic sanctions, such as the Hickenlooper amendment, which called for the removal of U.S. aid to countries that expropriated U.S. businesses) never proposed intervention and thus intervention was never an option. In fact, in reference to the expropriation of the U.S. owned International Petroleum (IPC) Company in Peru, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Covey Oliver responded to the expropriation and reported that “the United States recognized the right of a sovereign nation to take territory within its jurisdiction for public purpose.” Oliver did clarify, “however…the U.S. also expected fulfillment of the corresponding obligation under international law to make prompt, adequate and effective compensation.”\(^{15}\)

Yet, I must note that the ICP did not lobby the U.S. government nearly to the extent that the UFCO did in Guatemala. In fact, the IPC actually favored that the entire expropriation be kept quiet. Hence, it might be argued that this lack of lobbying effort or propaganda campaign may have been a difference that mattered, that is, because the IPC did not heavily lobby congress and did not engage in propaganda campaigns, the U.S. did not intervene. Yet, this is a moot point because other U.S. companies in Peru that were expropriated did lobby the U.S. government. For example, the Peruvian government expropriated the very same firms that lobbied so heavily for Allende’s overthrow in Chile, including Harold Geneen’s ITT, who surely lobbied the U.S. government for action.\(^{16}\)

Moreover, not only was there no intervention, or discussion of one, but U.S. policy makers supported the Velasco regime as a non-Marxist revolutionary example to Allende’s Marxist-Socialist regime in Chile. \(^{17}\)Thus, although U.S. policy makers were clearly concerned with the expropriation of U.S. businesses in Peru, such as the IPC expropriation, and heavily focused on this issue in their diplomatic correspondence, they were clearly more worried about the Marxist-revolution in Chile, thus substantiating that the main threat was still communism, at least in terms of the motivating factor that caused U.S. intervention. In light of this entire


\(^{17}\) See U.S. perspective on Peru in Chapter 3
discussion, the alternative thesis does not refute my most basic claim: U.S. policy makers were motivated by the containment policies goal of stopping the spread of communism.

1.6 HOW THE PAPER WILL PROCEED

Turning to how the entire paper will argue for my general thesis, I separate my discussion into three chapters. Chapter 1 summarizes and articulates how the four variables—international political context, domestic political atmosphere, foreign policy theory, and foreign policy action—impacted policy perception and how U.S. policy makers respond to individual events. Furthermore, this chapter describes how foreign policy and policy perception evolved, which explains the discrepancy in perspective between the case of Guatemala and Peru. Also, I will explain how U.S. policy maker’s policy of favoring dictatorships over democracy was present from 1945 through the 1970s. Chapter 2 will examine the similarities that I argue existed between the cases of Guatemala and Peru, which is a very basic prerequisite prior to my explanation that a difference in perception existed between the cases (it might go without saying that an inconsistency in perception and action would be inconsequential if the variables were not similar), a conclusion that I will thoroughly argue for in Chapter 3. Also, in Chapter 2, I will provide evidence for my claim that Allende and his regime were considered a threat in the 1970s because of extra-variables—Marxist ideology and international communist supporter— beyond those seen in the cases of Guatemala and Chile (e.g. land reform). With regards to Chapter 3, I will analyze U.S. policy makers telegram correspondence and conversations in the State Department, the CIA, and between the respective U.S. presidents and their advisors for all three cases, which will provide grounds for my claim that U.S. policy makers viewed the variables of
expropriation of U.S. business interests, CP control of labor movement, relations with the U.S.S.R., and the respective leaders relations with the CP as indications that a communist threat was present in Guatemala. Moreover, the analysis of these telegrams and prime sources from the National Security archive will show that U.S. policy makers did not consider Velasco’s regime as a threat and never framed the variables considered threatening in Guatemala as a threat in Peru. Moreover, I will show how U.S. policy makers were exceptionally concerned about Allende well before his election to the presidency and sought to oppose his election both in 1964 and 1970. I will lastly highlight that such efforts failed and when Allende won the presidential election, U.S. policy makers quickly formed plan to overthrow him. In total, all three chapters support my general argument that I have proposed up until this point.
CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE CONTAINMENT POLICY: EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY AND FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVE

In this chapter, I will provide evidence for my basic claim that the four variables—international political context, domestic political atmosphere, U.S. foreign policy theory, and U.S. foreign policy action—determine policy perception and how it evolved over time, which provides explanation for the discrepancy in perspective and foreign policy from 1945 through the 1970s. In short, this chapter attempts to show how U.S. policy makers were exceptionally anti-communist in the later 1940s and early 1950s, but were far less anti-communist by the 1970s.

2.1 THE COLD WAR BEGINS:

At the end of the World War II, the Allied powers converged on Berlin, Germany—the U.S.S.R. from the East and the remainder of the allied forces from the West. Although the U.S.S.R. and allied forces had once united for a common cause, the end of the War resulted in a divided Europe: the U.S. and allied forces dominating the Western half of Europe and the U.S.S.R. dominating the east.

According to noted historians Thomas Paterson, Garry Clifford, Shane Maddock, Deborah Kisatsky, and Kenneth Hagan, “As Washington moved to fill the power vacuums left
by the defeated Axis and retreating colonial powers, it encountered an obstreperous competitor in Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union.”\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, Paterson, et al. argue that “The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union derived from the different post-War needs, ideology, style, and power of the two rivals and drew on a history of frosty relations. Each saw the other, in mirror image, as the world’s bully.”\textsuperscript{19}

From the U.S. perspective, and, perhaps, the allied powers alike, Griffin Fariello, in \textit{Red Scare: Memories of the American Inquisition}, recounts that Averell Harriman, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, “Warned President Harry Truman on April 20, 1945, that America was faced with a ‘barbarian invasion of Europe.’ Truman replied that he was ‘not afraid of the Russians’ and intended to be ‘firm.’”\textsuperscript{20} Likewise, on May 12, 1945, Winston Churchill, the former Prime Minister of Britain, telegraphed President Harry Truman and reported that “An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind. There seems little doubt that the whole of the region east of the line Lubeck-Trieste-Corfu will soon be completely in their hands.” In the same telegram, Churchill warned that a removal of American troops from Europe would bring “Soviet power into the heart of Western Europe and the descent of the iron curtain between us and everything eastward.”\textsuperscript{21}

Despite such fears, Paterson, et al. also contends that “The United States emerged from World War II a full-fledged global power for the first time in its history. An asymmetry—not a balance—of power existed.”\textsuperscript{22} Likewise, according to Geir Lundestad, in \textit{Major Developments in International Politics: 1945-1986}: “The power base of the Soviet Union was not comparable to

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 231.
\textsuperscript{22} Paterson et al., p. 228.
that of the United States. The U.S.S.R. had suffered enormous losses during the War. Its populations had been cut in half. Similar conditions existed in agriculture” and “The Soviet Union produced 65,000 cars a year, the United States seven million.”23 Hence, we might posit whether or not the anxiety of U.S. policy makers was over exaggerated.

2.2 INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CONTEXT (LATE 1940S AND EARLY 1950S):

Yet, much evidence suggests that U.S. anxiety was not unfounded. For example, according to Steven Hook and John Spanier in *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*:

After Germany’s second defeat in 1945, the Russian threat reemerged. Already the heartland power, Soviet Russia extended its arms into the center of Europe, reclaimed its dominant positions in northern China, and sought to exploit weaknesses along its southern border from Turkey to Pakistan. Thus one reason for post-war conflict was geopolitical: Russian land power expanded.24

Hence, the expansion of Russian land power certainly would qualify as an existential threat, for it was not an imagined perception, but a tangible, and perhaps measurable, phenomenon. Indeed, many other facts and events substantiate U.S. fears. For example, Lundestad contends that “The Soviet Union was a superpower primarily in one field, and that was in terms of military strength, especially the number of men under arms.”25 Furthermore, according to David Painter in *The Cold War: An International History*, following World War II, U.S. efforts to rebuild Europe through the “Marshal Plan” were combatted by the U.S.S.R.26 Also, the Western European communists attempted to disrupt the Marshal Plan, while the

25 Ibid.
U.S.S.R. imposed “a blockade on all land and water routes to Berlin (June 1948-May 1949) to protest Western plans to unify and rebuild the three Western zones of Germany.” 27 Indeed, Painter concludes that “both actions increased Western suspicions of Soviet intentions.” 28

The U.S. also became increasingly alarmed by a series of communist-inspired revolutions that transpired worldwide beginning in the mid-1940s that continued into the early 1950s: the Greek and Turkish episodes in the mid-1940s, in which communists threatened the security of both states; the Soviet backed uprisings in Northern Iran in the mid-1940s 29; the communist coup in Czechoslovakia backed by the U.S.S.R. in 1948; the fall of China in 1949; and the Korean War, beginning in 1950. Also, in 1950, the U.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic of China concluded a mutual defense treaty. 30 Moreover, five years later, in 1955, the Warsaw Pact was formed, which “created a joint military command” in control of various communist-run states (The Warsaw Pact’s counterpart was the U.S. led coalition: NATO. Axelrod contends that “the creation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact hardened hostile divisions of sides in the Cold War”). 31

Yet, even further evidence demonstrates that U.S. policy makers had solid footing for considering the U.S.S.R., and thereby, communism, as a serious threat. For example, another source of U.S. anxiety was the authoritarian nature of Joseph Stalin’s regime, which committed vast human rights violations against Soviet citizens within the borders of the U.S.S.R. Caroline Kennedy-Pipe argues, in The Origins of the Cold War, that in discussing the origins of U.S. anxiety toward the Soviet Union “we cannot and should not be blinded to the great brutality that

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27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 23.
29 Paterson et al., p. 234.
31 Ibid.
Stalin’s regime and that of his successor Nikita Khrushchev visited upon the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe.”

The mounting tensions for U.S.-Soviet relations also resulted from the “arms race,” in which both nations built expansive nuclear arsenals to combat each other’s nuclear dominance. The U.S.S.R.’s first successful test of a nuclear bomb occurred in August of 1949. Kennedy-Pipe argues that “it was the Soviet creation of a hydrogen bomb in August 1953, one year after American success in this area that really marked its arrival as a superpower at least in nuclear terms.” According to Dan Lindley & Kevin Clemency, in “Low-cost nuclear arms races,” from 1951 to 1965 “the United States and the Soviet Union produced a total of 37,737 nuclear weapons (31,613 for the United States and 6,124 for the Soviet Union.)” The following chart portrays the nuclear arms buildup in the United States from 1951 to 1965:

Figure 2: Gross Increase in Nuclear Weapons Per Year

33 Ibid., p. 92.
34 Painter, p. 23.
35 Kennedy-Pipe, p. 91.
37 Ibid., p. 46.
In total, all of these events—the U.S.S.R.’s expansion of territory, Soviet resistance to the Marshal plan, world-wide communist revolutions, the authoritarian nature of Stalin’s regime, and the arms race—confirms that the fears of U.S. policy makers were substantial and based on hard evidence. However, it is interesting to note that the U.S. produced five times as many nuclear weapons from 1951 to 1965 than the U.S.S.R. Thus, once again, although the threat was not unfounded, was it exaggerated?

2.3 CONFINEMENT: THE BEGINNING

In reaction to the international political context and the threat that U.S. policy makers believed the U.S.S.R. and communism posed, the policy of containment was born on February 22, 1946, when George Kennan, an expert on the U.S.S.R. and a junior diplomat at the American Embassy in Moscow, forwarded a telegram to Washington that reflected on his view of the U.S.S.R’s growing power and its role in international relations. The telegram summarized Kennan’s view that, like former Prime Minister Churchill, Ambassador Harriman, and President Truman, the U.S.S.R. and communism were the preeminent threats to U.S interests. Thereafter, in July 1947, in Foreign Affairs, Kennan published “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” which was originally titled “X” article and effectively outlined the original telegram. In these documents and in response to the threat that Kennan believed that the U.S.S.R. and communism posed, he argued for “a policy of firm containment, designed to confront Russia with unalterable counterforce at
every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interest of a peaceful and stable world.”

According to Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor for President Nixon, Kennan’s policy recommendations originated from deep-rooted beliefs: “For Kennan, communist ideology was at the heart of Stalin’s approach to the world. Stalin regarded the Western capitalist powers as irrevocably hostile.”39 Also, according to Kissinger, Kennan further believed that the Kremlin sought to expand its territory as a result of Stalin’s increased sense of paranoia and that Soviet policy was “to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power.”40 Kenneth Jenson argues that “[Kennan] painted a dark picture of a Soviet Union ‘fanatically committed to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life destroyed, the international authority of our state broken if Soviet Power is to be secure.’”41

2.4 THE VAGUE AND ABSTRACT NATURE OF KENNAN’S POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:

Nevertheless, Kennan’s policy recommendations failed to explicitly define what the term counterforce meant. In fact, my survey of Kennan’s article as a whole reveals that he never

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39 Ibid., p. 114.
40 Ibid.
explicitly defined how communism would, in practice, be contained, but, rather, simply explained that it should be contained, thus, leaving much of his theory open to interpretation. In his book *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950*, Wilson Miscamble agrees with my survey and argues:

> Containment as expressed in the “X” article represented no more than a broad approach. It was not a prescription for policy. It did not outline in any detail exactly what the U.S. should do. The temptation to characterize Kennan as a Moses-type figure descending to give the law of containment over to a disoriented group of American policymakers should be resisted. Others would play a role in defining and fleshing out containment and the doctrine would come to be understood only in light of these actions.42

### 2.5 U.S. POLICY MAKERS AND THE AMERICA PUBLIC’S PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: LEGAL-MORALISM:

Yet, before understanding how U.S. policy makers interpreted the containment policy and defined it through action, it is important to understand how U.S. policy makers and the general U.S. citizenry viewed international relations at this time and, also, how sensitive they were to communism. As argued in my introduction, these beliefs determined how U.S. policy makers reacted to world events.

Jonathan Knight, in *George Frost Kennan and the Study of American Foreign Policy: Some Critical Comments*, argues that American Foreign policy was evolving through a “legalistic-moralistic” approach to international politics: an approach that “attempts to substitute moral judgment for calculations of the national interest and legal norms for the precarious

relations between states.” Michael Polley clarifies the “legal-moralistic approach” in *A Biography of George F. Kennan* and contends:

According to Kennan, most American’s assumed that the legal principles that had provided such great stability in American domestic politics could also bring stability to international relations… aggressors and victims, for instance, would be clearly defined… In addressing the moralistic component of the American approach to international relations, Kennan focused on twentieth-century diplomacy… Ever since the first half of the nineteenth century, Americans exhibited a passionate tendency to embrace “good” liberation movements and their struggle against “evil” tyrants.

According to Jerel Rosati and James Scott, in *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, what Jonathan Night labeled a “legal-moralistic” was synonymous with “Cold War internationalism.” Rosati et al., contend that “Cold War internationalists saw a conflict-ridden, bipolar world that pitted the Soviet Union and communism against the United States and democracy.” Furthermore, Rosati et al. argue:

One common tendency in world politics… is for the mind to form beliefs and schemas of the “other.” The enemy image—according to which “we are good” and “they are bad”—may be the most simpleminded image of all. Such is the image of the Soviet Union and communism that most Americans acquired during the Cold War. Once formed, such an image of the enemy tends to be very rigid and resistant to change.

Perhaps most importantly, according to Kennan (following his service as a foreign diplomat) in his personal Memoirs: *1925-1950*, published in 1967:

On many occasions… I have been struck by the congenital aversion of Americans to taking specific decisions on specific problems, and by their persistent urge to seek universal formulae or doctrines in which to clothe and justify particular actions… to this day I am uncertain as to the origins of this persistent American urge to universalization or generalization of decision. It was not enough for us, when circumstances forced us into World War I, to hold in view the specific reasons for our entry: our War effort had to be clothed in the form of an effort to make the world (nothing less) ‘safe for democracy’ … we did not feel comfortable until we had wrapped our military effort in the

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46 Ibid., p. 294.
wholly universalistic—and largely meaningless—generalities. Something to this compulsion became apparent in the post War period in the tendency of many Americans to divide the world neatly into Communist and “free world” components, to avoid recognition of specific differences among countries on either side, and to search for general formulas to govern our relations with the one or the other.\textsuperscript{47}

2.6 IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEGAL-MORALISTIC PERSPECTIVE:

As a result of U.S. policy makers’ and citizens’ perspectives on international relations in the post- World War II period, from 1945 through the mid-1950s, Walter Lippmann and Hans Morgenthau, in 1947, denounced “the sweeping implications of the containment formula” believing that containment entailed commitments without proper limits to U.S. action. \textsuperscript{48} Lippmann and Morgenthau argued that the policy of containment prescribed an unconditional U.S. response to “communist threats.” Therefore, they contended that the policy oversimplified the complexity of the “communist problem” and one universal answer would never suffice, much like one key does not fit all locks. According to Jerry Sanders, in \textit{Breaking out of the Containment Syndrome}: “those who recommended a course of moderate containment argued for measured and reasonable means to achieve ends based on irrational and totalistic premises.”\textsuperscript{49}

In an attempt to combat the legal-moralistic perspective, “Morgenthau appealed to the American public to forget about ‘the crusading notion that any nation, however virtuous and powerful, can have the mission to make the world over in its own image.’”\textsuperscript{50} According to Polley, “Kennan [like Lippmann and Morgenthau] turned to the question of how to impose a realist

\textsuperscript{50} Gati, p. 30.
perspective that would modify the shortcomings of legal-moralism, his suggestions were brief, but the introduced theme that would recur constantly in his diplomatic writings...a rejection of the universal application of American values.”

It might be said that Kennan, Lippman, and Morgenthau were idealizing sentiments that were ahead of their time because, as will shortly be discussed, their sentiments were greatly accepted by U.S. policy makers and the U.S. citizenry by the 1970s. Nonetheless, from 1944 through the early 1960s, the legal-moralistic perspective dominated the psyche of U.S. policy makers and American citizens.

2.7 AN ANTI-COMMUNIST LIBERAL-CONSERVATISM CONSENSUS AND A DEFINING OF KENNAN’S ORIGINAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:

The legal-moralistic perspective was not limited to one faction or another. Indeed, liberals and conservatives alike viewed the world in the legal-moralistic and bi-polar way and sought to combat communism wherever it arose. Rosati, et al. contends:

During the Cold War years, according to Godfrey Hodgson, in America in Our Time, “a strange hybrid, liberal conservatism, blanketed the scene and muffled the debate.” The two major aspects of the liberal-conservative were, first, belief in a democratic-capitalistic political economy based on private enterprise and, second, the fear of communism. Thus, the foreign policy consensus behind containing the threat of Soviet communism abroad was part of a larger ideological consensus in American society.

Godfrey similarly argues that “since the [anti-communist] consensus had made converts on the Right as well as on the Left, only a handful of dissidents were excluded from the Big

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51 Polley, p. 89.
52 Rosati et al., p. 363.
Tent: Southern diehards, rural reactionaries, the more…paranoid fringes of radical Right, and the divided remnants of the old, Marxist Left.”

Moreover, Rosati, et al. reports:

Ideological anticommunism became the glue that bound the consensus among liberals, moderates, and conservatives, especially within the elite public. In the words of David Halberstam in The Best and the Brightest, “It was an ideological and bipartisan movement; it enjoyed the support of the press, of the churches, of Hollywood. There was stunningly little debate or sophistication of the levels of anti-communism. It was totally centrist and politically safe; anything else was politically dangerous. These ideological and foreign policy beliefs provided the foundation for the rise of the national security and free market ethos that prevailed in the minds of policy-makers during the Cold War years.

2.8 THE ANTI-COMMUNIST DEMOCRATS:

Although a general anti-communist consensus existed, according to distinguished political scientist David Cuate, in The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower, “in practical terms, in terms of willingness to commit funds, material, even men, to the new global policy of ‘containing’ Soviet power, the Fair Deal Democrats of the Truman era easily outstripped their Republican critics.” Likewise, Charles DeBenedetti argues in “Educators and Armaments in Cold War America”:

Antirevisionist liberals, fearful of a return to a post-World War I pattern of isolationist pacifism, resorted to a militant, interventionist nationalism which they subconsciously pawned off as idealistic internationalism. These War liberals, who previously championed a leftist cause, were now competing with conservatives for leadership in the battle against communism.

54 Rosati et al. 365.
To the same end, Rosati, et al. contend that “most liberals became strong advocates of anti-communism and containment during the late 1940s and 1950s, as Democrats concluded ‘that never again could they afford to expose their foreign policy to the charge that it was soft on communism.’” Nonetheless, Rosati, et al., report that “…conservatism and the political right were instrumental in pushing society to the right and providing conditions for the establishment of a liberal-conservative consensus.”

2.9 THE CONTAINMENT POLICY IN ACTION AND THE FURTHER DEFINING OF THE “COMMUNIST THREAT”: THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE.

Although it is vital to understand how all walks of American society castigated communism in the 1950s, it is equally important to consider how the anti-communist liberal-conservative atmosphere and the legal-moralistic approach to international relations would affect U.S. policy action in the name of the containment policy. According to my survey, for many U.S. policy makers and American citizens, because the threat of communism was so universal and so feared, policy makers interpreted Kennan’s original term *counterforce* to mean the use of U.S. military force and U.S. economic aid to fight the spread of communism at every point that it arose (such a conclusion, according to Sander’s, was not what Kennan originally had in mind, which appears logical considering his realist approach to international relations that I have touched upon).
Such a perspective was guided, and perhaps cultivated, by President Harry Truman’s “Truman Doctrine” speech on March 12, 1947:\(^60\): “It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.”\(^61\) President Truman subsequently contended:

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points… Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy. The United States must supply this assistance.\(^62\)

Indeed, President Truman’s stance and the employment of U.S. assistance to Greece and Turkey set precedence for future actions in the name of the containment policy by articulating how Kennan’s *counterforce* would be interpreted, especially when President Truman argued that all international “communist threats” had to be met with U.S. military force, or at least, U.S. economic intervention, at every geographical point that the threats arose. To this end, according to Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “In November 1947, Truman asked a special session of Congress to approve emergency legislation of some $600 million; the alternative he claimed was a Communist Europe.”\(^63\)

Although specific U.S. actions were employed in Greece and Turkey—such as the assistance of American officers and direct financial aid\(^64\)—the true purpose of the Truman doctrine, according to Axelrod, in *The Real History of The Cold War*, was to take a “precedent setting ideological stand.” Axelrod appears to be, at least, partially correct: On July 19, 1948, President Truman reflected (in his diary) upon his formulation of the Truman doctrine speech and reported that one specific line in the speech read: “I believe that it should be the policy of the

\(^{60}\) Axelrod, p. 101.


\(^{63}\) Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, p. 84.

\(^{64}\) Paterson et al., p. 241.
United States.” Truman concluded that the line was “halfhearted” and, thus, exclaimed, “…I took my pencil, scratched out ‘should’ and wrote ‘must.’” He explained: “I wanted no hedging in this speech. This was America’s answer to the surge of expansion of Communist tyranny. It had to be clear and free of hesitation or double talk.”

2.10 ANOTHER DOSE OF KENNAN’S CONTAINMENT THEORY:

Indeed, Kennan had provided the original “building blocks” and policy recommendations for the containment policy in his original “X” article, but a complex molding of the political atmosphere within the United States and new policy initiatives, such as the “Truman Doctrine,” applied the theoretical policy of containment to specific issues, such as the perceived communist threat in Greece and Turkey. Yet, although the Truman doctrine helped define containment, it was still based upon the universal premise of stopping communist expansion everywhere. Robert Frazier in Kennan, “Universalism,” and the Truman Doctrine: “Ironically, universalism later became enshrined in public opinion as a fundamental element of American Cold War policy, more as the result of Kennan’s own policy recommendations in ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’ than because of the Truman Doctrine.” But, Gati argues that Kennan’s “X” Article—especially when read together with the Truman Doctrine—was clearly understood to have signaled the assumption of a global or universal task by the United States: the task of opposing Communist power everywhere.” Regardless of who was more influential—in creating the anti-communist

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67 Gati, p. 32.
liberal-conservative consensus and legal-moralistic perspective on international relations—both Kennan’s article and President Truman’s “Truman Doctrine” were major cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy evolution.

2.11 FURTHER ACTION IN THE NAME OF CONTAINMENT: BUILDING U.S. DEFENSES AND “MAKING FRIENDS.”

Further characterizing the exceptional anti-communist political atmosphere in the United States from 1944 to 1954 and in the same month of the Truman doctrine speech, Congress passed the National Security Act to form new government agencies that would fight communism both domestically and internationally. Paterson, et al., contend that the act “streamlined the military establishment…created the Department of Defense, the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the president, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to gather and collate information.”68 Furthermore, Axelrod argues:

Unifying what were now three armed services under a single department was more than an administrative gesture. It was intended to transform the military into a thoroughly coordinated global force under the direct and immediate control of the president…Truman’s understanding that, pursuant to his “containment policy”, the U.S. military would have to be deftly used on a regular basis as a political instrument to help resolve a number of conflicts arising from communist expansive aggression anywhere in the world.69

Moreover, in April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed, in direct response to the Czechoslovakia coup in 1948 and the U.S.S.R. blockade of Berlin from 1948 to 1949, which according to Wayne McWilliams and Harry Piotrowski, in *The World Since* 68 Paterson et al., p. 246.
69 Axelrod, p. 142.
1945: A History of International Relations, was “an alliance that boxed in the Soviet Union along its western flank.” They argue that NATO was “the military equivalent of the Marshal Plan, designed to extend U.S. protection to its allies in Western Europe...Ultimately, it brought U.S. air power and nuclear weapons to bear as the primary means to prevent the Soviet Union from using its large land forces against West Germany.”

2.12 THE BEGINNING OF THE DOMESTIC PURGE OF COMMUNISM.

Opposing communism everywhere also included the purging of the communist party within the United States. On March 22, 1947, only ten days after the Truman Doctrine was issued, President Truman enacted Executive order 9835. In effect, the order created “government review boards” that evaluated the “loyalty” of government employees (i.e. to insure they were not communists). Albert Fried, editor of McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare, contends that the review boards were formed, in part, as President Truman’s reaction to charges brought by the Republican party that he was “soft” on communism. Indeed, Fried contends that the creation of the review boards were the first step in the subsequent American purge of communism throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s (both in the U.S. government and American society as a whole).

Yet, we may question how the review boards impacted government employees. According to Griffin Fariello in Red Scare: Memories of the American Inquisition:

71 Ibid., p. 77.
73 Ibid.
Government workers possessed no right to their jobs, that if found disloyal... The government review boards' task was to remove Communists. The trouble was that Communists were universally acknowledged to be devilishly clever at hiding their identities; they did not belong to “subversive” organizations; they could be anyone, indistinguishable from the neighbor next door. It was therefore necessary to seek information about suspects from any source, however dubious, and lay the burden of proof on them: they had to establish their innocence... The Truman Doctrine, it will be remembered, condemned Communism everywhere because its adherents subverted their governments for the sake of Soviet expansion and conquest. Such being the internal danger, it logically followed, all public agencies, state and local, and private institutions too for that matter, must create their own loyalty review boards, with or without even the modicum of due process that the Truman one did.  

In this light, Fried reports the experience of a government employee: “The employee in this case was a proof reader at the Government Printing Office and had been employed at the job for over seven years.” Yet, the government reported: “Specifically, it is charged that you continued sympathetic association with a known Communist, read Communist literature and made pro-Communist Statements.” Consequently, “the employee was suspended immediately.”

Also, alongside the creation of the review boards, various bureaucracies, as well as Congress, enacted other methods to purge communism from the United States, which, once again, epitomizes the extreme hatred of communism and the anti-communist liberal conservative consensus in the late 1940s and early 1950s. For example, legislation such as the Taft-Hartley Act, passed on June 23, 1947, sought to purge communists from American trade unions.  

According to Phillip Deery in “‘A blot upon liberty’: McCarthyism, Dr. Barsky and the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee”:

A range of government agencies whose combined force was formidable [in the anti-communist fight]. The agencies...were the Attorney General’s Department, the Board of Regents of the New York State Department of Education, the House Un-American

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74 Fariello, p. 24.  
75 Fried, p. 34.  
76 Ibid., p. 8.
Activities Committee, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Bureau, the Treasury Department, the Subversive Activities Control Board and the State Department. They were not necessarily working in unison nor were their different roles and activates coordinated.  

In a similar fashion to the way the “review boards” had scrutinized government employees, public figures were also investigated. For example, The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), formed through a congressional vote on January 3, 1945, investigated and indicted several Hollywood actors, known as the “Hollywood Ten,” in 1947, on communist charges. Arthur Eckstein, in “The Hollywood Ten in History and Memory,” contends that “HUAC pursued a series of official inquiries into the penetration of the film industry in Hollywood by the Communist Party of the United States of America. There were major public hearings in 1947 and 1951.” Eckstein further argues that as a result of the communist charges, the film industry placed actors on a “Blacklist”: a list banning the actors from work. Eckstein reports that “the Blacklist functioned in part officially, as shown by the joint public announcement of the motion picture firms in November 1947 that henceforth no studio would knowingly employ any member of the Communist Party…The blacklist often functioned in secret: jobs just dried up.”

Likewise, professors and students of major universities were scrutinized under the anti-communist lens. Kovel reports:

FBI agents were indeed snooping in American colleges during the inquisition. In fact, by formal arrangement the Bureau, no fewer than fifty-six universities had agents stationed on campuses, including the whole Ivy League (save brown), MIT, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, Michigan, Chicago, UCLA, and the University of Berkeley, in word, the “best” schools.

79 Ibid.
The “snooping” and “investigating” clearly had no limit. As my survey indicates, all suspicions were carefully analyzed.

2.13 NSC-68: FURTHER DEFINING THE “COMMUNIST THREAT”:

Simultaneously, along the foreign policy front, Truman intensified his anti-communist resolve in January of 1950, when he ordered a comprehensive review of U.S. military and foreign policy. The review resulted in a government report: NSC-68, published on April 14, 1950, otherwise known as the “Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense on ‘United States Objectives for National Security.’” NSC-68 further characterizes the extreme anxiety that U.S. policy makers were experiencing. According to Paterson, “Paul Nitze, who replaced Kennan as head of the Policy Planning Staff, wrote most of NSC-68.” Thus, Kennan was not as integral to the policy making process as he had been previously. Indeed, by the spring of 1950s, Kennan felt totally shut out of the American policymaking process.”

An excerpt from NSC-68 characterizes the report’s extreme position:

The Kremlin is able to select whatever means are expedient in seeking to carry out its fundamental design...At the ideological or psychological level, in the struggle for men’s minds, the conflict is world-wide. At the political and economic level, within states and in the relations between states, the struggle for power is being intensified. And at the military level, the Kremlin has thus far been careful not to commit a technical breach of peace, although using its vast force to intimidate its neighbors, and to support an aggressive foreign policy, and not hesitating through its agents to resort to arms in favorable circumstances. The attempt to carry out its fundamental design is being pressed, therefore, with all means which are believed expedient in the present situation,

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80 Paterson et al, p. 247.
81 Ibid.
82 Polley, p. 69.
and the Kremlin has inextricably engaged us in the conflict between its design and our purpose. 83

Paragraphs later, the document explains the view of U.S. policy makers regarding “Soviet Intentions and Capabilities:”

The Kremlin’s design for world domination begins at home…The massive fact of the iron curtain isolating the Soviet peoples from the outside world, the repeated political purges within the U.S.S.R, and the institutionalized crimes of the MVD are evidence that the Kremlin does not feel secure at home and that ‘the entire coercive force of the Socialist state’ is more than ever one of seeking to impose its absolute authority over ‘the economy, manner of life, and consciousness of people.’84

In reference to the Kremlin’s view on the United States, NSC-68 argues:

With particular reference to the United States, the Kremlin’s strategic and tactical policy is affected by its estimate that we are not only the greatest immediate obstacle which stands between it and world domination, we are also the only power which could release forces in the free and Soviet worlds, which could destroy it. The Kremlin’s policy toward us is consequently animated by a peculiarly virulent blend of hatred and fear. Its strategy has been one of attempting to undermine the complex forces in this country, and in the rest of the free world, on which our power is based…The capabilities of the Soviet world are being exploited to the full because the Kremlin is inescapably militant. It is inescapably militant because it possesses and is possessed by a world-wide revolutionary movement, because it is the interior of Russian imperialism and because it is a totalitarian dictatorship. Persistent crisis, conflict and expansion are the essence of the Kremlin’s militancy.85

The document finally touches upon the communist role in the Kremlin:

Two enormous organizations, the Communist Party and the secret policy, are an outstanding source of strength to the Kremlin. In the Party, it has an apparatus designed to impose at home an ideological uniformity among its people and to act abroad as an instrument of propaganda, subversion, and espionage…the party, the police and the conspicuous might of the Soviet military machine together tend to create an overall impression of irresistible Soviet power among people of the free world.86

84 Ibid., p. 393.
85 Ibid, p. 394.
86 Ibid., p. 395.
Furthermore, Polley contends that “NSC-68 placed great emphasis on Soviet Military aggression, and predicted that the greatest chance for war would occur in 1954. In order to deter the Russians, NSC-68 recommended that the defense budget be tripled, and that a campaign to assert the political superiority of Western Values was necessary.” Likewise, Richard Melanson and David Mayers, in *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American foreign policy in the 1950s*, contend that NSC 68 “urged the adoption of a strategy geared to defend all American interests through the application of appropriate military force.”

Likewise, Richard Immerman, in his book *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention*, argues that NSC-68 was founded on the basic premise that “The world was divided into two antithetical camps, led by the United States and the Soviet Union.” Paterson, et al. also contend that “The document treated communism as a monolith, ignoring differences within the communist community. It spoke of the ‘free world,’ overlooking the many undemocratic nations allied with the United States. It made sweeping assumptions about Soviet motives and capabilities without evidence. The report, in short, exaggerated the ‘threat.’” In a similar light, according to Melanson, et al: “In short, NSC 68 defined the Soviet Union essentially as a moral problem [(i.e. legal moralistic perspective)] so immense that traditional geopolitical calculations had lost all relevance.” The interpretations of NSC 68 suggest that it characterized and hyper-emphasized virtually every fear that Kennan’s original “X” article had articulated three years prior, but also perpetuated the anti-communist

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87 Polley, p. 69.
90 Paterson et al., p. 248.
91 Melanson, p. 38.
liberal conservatism consensus and legal-moralistic perspective on international relations. Indeed, by 1950, the fear of communism had grown.


Several of the Cold War Presidents, including Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Johnson shared in the perspective outlined by NSC-68: a bi-polar world, in which the U.S. was “good” and the U.S.S.R. “bad.” 92 According to J. Philipp Rosenberg, in “Presidential Beliefs and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Continuity during the Cold War Era”: (1) President Truman held the belief that the U.S. had to react to every instance of Soviet aggression 93; (2) Likewise, President Eisenhower also lamented that “communism is an ideology that seeks to defeat us by every possible means.” 94 Furthermore, Eisenhower endorsed the domino theory that if one instance of communist aggression succeeded more would follow: “You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and…the last one…will go over very quickly” 95 (3) Finally, President Johnson reported that “the existence of totalitarian Communist power in much of the Eurasian landmass-power that continuously threaten to disrupt such order as the world has managed to achieved.” 96 In summary, Rosenberg concludes, in unison with the legal-moralistic conception of international relations, that “all [three Presidents] believed that American foreign

93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Paterson et al., p. 280.
96 Rosenberg, p. 741.
policy, like domestic politics, should be played according to moral rules [(i.e. “good” versus “evil”)].”\textsuperscript{97}

\section*{2.15 THE COMMUNIST SCARE AND HYSTERIA OF THE 1950S—DOMESTIC CONTAINMENT:}

In light of the general anti-communist political atmosphere that surrounded the post-War period, from 1944 to 1954, by the early 1950s, America was fully enveloped in the domestic fight against communism.\textsuperscript{98} As was experienced in the late 1940s, anti-communist legislation was proposed to stem the “communist threat.” According to Michael Ybarra, in \textit{Washington Gone Crazy: Senator Pat McCarran and the Great American Communist Hunt}, on September 5, 1950, Pat McCarran, the democratic Senator from Nevada, spoke in front of the Senate and “explained how Congress had spent years drafting and redrafting [anti-communist] legislation.”\textsuperscript{99} Ybarra contends that a final bill—called the “Internal Security Act”—was a combination of several previous bills and mandated (among other initiatives): “Communist and front groups register with the government and label their literature as propaganda, that Communists not hold passports or government jobs, and the new crime of committing any act that might contribute to the establishment of a totalitarian dictatorship in the United States.”\textsuperscript{100} In short, and from a far removed perspective, the bill was a blatant disregard for the Bill of Rights, a conversation that

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[97] Ibid. p. 748.
\item[100] Ibid., p. 510.
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moves beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, the extreme nature of the bill still highlights that the anti-communist political atmosphere and the extensive measures that U.S. policy makers were willing to take in the name of containment from 1947 through 1954.

Part and parcel of the government investigations in the late 1940s and early 1950s was Senator Joseph McCarthy’s rise to prominence in American politics. Specifically, McCarthy, originally elected in the 1946 Congressional elections, emerged as the preeminent “cold warrior.” On February 9, 1950, in Wheeling, West Virginia, McCarthy announced “I have a list of 205… a list of names that were made known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the State Department.” In the same speech, McCarthy reported that the Secretary of State Dean Acheson had supported communists: “He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers, are swept from the national scene so that we may have a new birth of honesty and decency in government.” Henceforth, the phenomenon known as “McCarthyism” became the new label for anti-communism in the United States.

Ellen Schrecker, in “McCarthyism: Political Repression and the Fear of Communism,” argues that McCarthyism originated in Washington: “The federal government was the crucial actor here; its activities transformed the Communist party from an unpopular political group into a perceived threat to the American way of life.” Fried reports:

In the early 1950s America’s endemic hatred of Communism turned into the great American red scare. It was the trauma of those years that led the public to demand a response by government and throughout the nation of the radical kind McCarthy was


102 Ibid.

103 Schrecker, p. 1043.
identified with. So it was that the repression that had begun rather tentatively when the Cold War got under way increasingly took on the aspect of a generalized inquisition. And in doing so—to repeat the point often made here—it in fact exacerbated the fear that called forth and which it was supposed to assuage.104

Likewise, Paterson describes:

The demagogic McCarthy was the “creature” not the “creator” of the 1950s Red Scare. But as the journalist Cabell Phillips wrote, McCarthy “spit in the eye of constituted authority, undermined public confidence in the government and leaders, and tore at the nation’s foreign policy with indiscriminate ferocity of a bulldozer. He used lies, slander, and innuendo to smash his opponents and to build his own image of invincibility.’

To the same effect, according to Joel Kovel, in Red Hunting in the Promised Land: “Joe McCarthy may not have been the real issue in McCarthyism, but he was not incidental to it either. The inquisition was expressed through him, and his character was its embodiment.”105 Kovel later argues, “McCarthy was a demagogue who tapped deeply the underside of the national psyche.”106

McCarthyism was not simply a one man show, but a general sentiment in government, and ultimately, throughout the United States. On March 20, 1954, Carey McWilliams, in his editorial Crisis in the G.O.P, published in The Nation, argued that even if McCarthy was “repudiated” or silenced, others likeminded politicians would remain who embodied McCarthy’s political philosophy. Thus, McWilliams concludes that “‘McCarthyism’ merely highlights a division which would still exist if Joe were to drop dead.”107 Such an assertion appears correct, for individuals, such as John Foster Dulles, who briefly held a senatorial seat in 1949 and later became a pivotal actor in the Eisenhower administration’s “Cold War foreign policy team” as the

104 Fried, p. 115.
106 Ibid., p. 117.
Secretary of State, mirrored McCarthy’s anti-communist ideology. To illustrate this point, prior to Dulles’ service as the Secretary of State, he published *War and Peace* in 1950 and contended:

> Soviet Communism has a creed, a creed of world-wide import. It is a creed in which the hard core of Party members believes fanatically, and which they are spreading with missionary zeal throughout the world…. There is no nook or cranny in all the world into which Communist influence does not penetrate. When the Politburo is making policies it does not say there is no use having a policy for Guatemala or the Union of South Africa or the United States or Indonesia because they are too far way and cannot be reached by the Red Army or by economic subsidy.\(^{108}\)

But, as argued, it was not as if McCarthy and Dulles’ stance on communism was a minority perspective in the early 1950s. In fact, according to David Oshinskiy in *A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy*, apart from the disposition of government officials, the American public was also indoctrinated in anti-communism:

> Given the alternatives, most everyone lined up behind the hometown skunk-hunter…

> “Yes,” a farmer told [a reporter], “I guess almost everybody in this part of the country is for McCarthy. He’s against Communism —and we’re against Communism.” Said another, “I don’t care what Joe has or hasn’t done, he’s against Communism.” A young woman in Milwaukee put it this way: “I don’t like McCarthy and I don’t think I would ordinarily vote for him, but if he’s beat it would look like a victory for Communism.\(^{109}\)

In fact, the Doolittle Commission, a government committee that aimed to prevent congressional oversight of the CIA,\(^{110}\) supported the anti-communist indoctrination of American citizens. In 1954, it released the “so-called Doolittle Report,” and argued:

> It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and by whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.\(^{111}\)

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111 "Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency." 30 September 1954,
As a result of McCarthyism, and the plurality of government actions that had commenced prior to McCarthy, any stance opposed to anti-communism was stigmatized and perhaps politically unwise. For example, although Paul H. Douglas was a prominent liberal senator during the early 1950s and disagreed with McCarthy (and who was described by historian Allida Black as “a man whose credentials for liberalism and integrity were heretofore impeccable”), Douglass, nonetheless, would not oppose McCarthy publicly because it was politically risky to do so. Above all, with all of the facts I have presented, anti-communism was exceptionally entrenched in American Society.

2.16 “NEW LOOK” (NSC 162/2): FURTHER DEFINING THE CONTAINMENT POLICY

As the anti-communist political atmosphere became increasingly hysterical, yet another government report further defined how the U.S. would respond to communist threats on the international scene. According to Nick Cullather, in Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954:

In the summer of 1953, the new President encouraged his advisers to revise their strategies for fighting the Cold War. In a series of discussion, known as the Solarium talks, administration officials explored ways to fulfill Eisenhower’s promises to seize the initiative in the global struggle against Communism...The result was NSC 162/2, a policy known to the public as the “New Look.” It stressed the need for a cheaper, more effective military striking force that would rely more on mobility, nuclear intimidation, and allied armies. The new policy placed a greater emphasis on covert action.

[Doolittle Report'], unnumbered folder, record group 263, MMHB, pp.6–7 (as cited in Greenberg, p. 690.)

Yet, what must be noted is that according to Crockatt, in the Fifty Year War, the “New Look” policy was the Eisenhower’s administrations reaction to “the supposed negativity and passivism of Truman’s containment. Containment held out no hope for rolling back communism or creating peace.”\footnote{Crockatt, Richard. The Fifty Year War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991. New York: Routledge, 1995. p. 123.} In other words, the Eisenhower administration believed that “containment,” as it had been employed through 1953, was not pro-active in “rolling back” communism, but simply hoped to contain it. Thus, the “New Look” program sought to not only prevent the spread of communism by halting new communist outgrowths from occurring, but also sought push back against communism altogether, rather than simply maintaining the status quo balance of power. Crockatt argues that “Taken at face value, the New Look represented a radical break with the Truman Years.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 124.} Still, Crocket highlights that “containment remained the cornerstone of U.S. policy.”\footnote{Ibid. p. 124.}

### 2.17 A CHANGE IN TIDES—AWAY FROM MCCARTHYISM:

Nonetheless, although the anti-communist sentiment had dominated the post-World War II era, and although U.S. efforts to stop the spread of communism remained a focal point of U.S. foreign policy, McCarthyism and the extreme anti-communist political atmosphere was called...
into question in the mid-1950s. Several specific events proved to be key turning points. For example, according to George Hodak in “June 9, 1954: the Army-McCarthy hearings”:

As chair of the Committee on Government Operations, Wisconsin Sen. Joseph McCarthy cast a wide net in his manic quest to root out subversive elements in government. By the fall of 1953, he was investigating vague and varied evidence that the U.S. Army was "coddling Communists," a charge Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson dismissed as "damn tommyrot." On March 11, 1954, the Army fired back, alleging that McCarthy and his chief counsel, Roy Cohn, had sought an Army commission and other favors for David Schine, a recent draftee and close friend of Cohn's.¹¹⁷

Hodak contends that subsequent televised senatorial hearings investigated McCarthy’s claims. The hearings, according to Michael Gauger in “Flickering Images: Live Television Coverage and Viewership of the Army-McCarthy Hearings,” offered:

The first protracted and televised look at the senator by a national audience…Convened on 22 April, 1954, the hearings would be the subject of 18 meetings, followed by a one-week recess, and 18 more sessions, ending on June 24; in all, they would preempt 35 days of regular telecasts and consume around 187 hours of airtime.¹¹⁸

Gauger reports that *Newsweek* declared:

It seemed that little else was talked about. From coast to coast—in homes, bars, clubs, offices, even in GI day rooms—men and women clustered around television sets to watch the developing battle between Sen. Joseph McCarthy and the Army officials. . . . And while they looked, they argued among themselves. Who was lying? Who was telling the truth?¹¹⁹

In reference to the hearings, Hodak reports:

For weeks, [McCarthy] was seen badgering witnesses and brandishing doctored documents, often appearing inebriated. * When he impugned Boston lawyer Fred Fisher, a colleague of Army counsel Joseph Welch's, Welch (at left) disdained: "Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last? Have you left no sense of decency?" Welch walked out, leaving a bewildered McCarthy to ask, "What did I do?" ¹²⁰

According to Gauger:

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¹¹⁹ Ibid., p. 683.

¹²⁰ Hodak, p. 72.
Accepting the assessments of contemporary observers, much of the historiography dealing with McCarthy suggests that the confrontation [with Joseph Welch] was the pivotal moment of the nationally telecast hearings. According to this position, with the senator’s tactics and behavior exposed to the country, much of the public turned against McCarthy, clearing the way for the Senate to condemn and neutralize him politically. 121

Indeed, Hodack argues that “badly damaged personally and politically, McCarthy was censured by the Senate, 67-22, on Dec. 2, 1954.”122

This is not to say that the general mood in the United State took a “left hand turn” away from anti-communism once McCarthy was silenced, but, merely, that an opposition formed. Others were present to move forward in McCarthy’s stead. Turning, once again, to the example of Secretary of State Dulles, and perhaps my case study of Guatemala as a whole, on March 8, 1954, in the midst of the McCarthy hearings, Dulles traveled to Caracas, Venezuela to speak in front of the Organization of American States (OAS). In doing so, he contended: “My government is well aware of the fact that there are few problems more difficult, few tasks more odious, than that of effectively exposing and thwarting the danger of international communism …Today we face a new peril that is in many respects greater than any of the perils in the past.”123 It is important to highlight that, although Senator McCarthy was losing political favor, Dulles’s speech not only mimicked the tone and language of McCarthy’s Wheeling, West Virginia speech in 1950—in which McCarthy claimed to have identified 205 communists in the State Department—but, also, the speech came only three months prior to Arbenz’s overthrow in Guatemala. Hence, anti-communism was still very much on the agenda. Yet, we must also note that the forum for Dulles’ speech was in South America and was directed toward foreign—not domestic—policy.

121 Gauger, p. 679.
122 Hodak, p. 72.
Domestically, at least, Fried contends that “slowly, almost imperceptibly, resistance to McCarthyism began picking up momentum in the mid-1950s.”124 Specifically, Fried contends that from 1955 onward, governmental policy and law that had given the anti-communist “witch hunts” power was slowly counterbalanced or repealed.125 For example, among many other “roll backs” on anti-communist policy (that will not be touched upon but should be noted), the HUAC committee’s authority was undercut on June 17, 1957, when a Supreme Court decision in Watkins v. United States decided that “from now on Congressional investigative committees would have to obey limits defined by the Court.” Consequently, according to Fried, the decision “[curtailed] as it did the committee’s punitive authority—the threat of contempt, hence jail, it held over the heads of witness who refused to talk on Constitutional grounds other than the Fifth Amendment.”126

2.18 CONTAINMENT BEYOND 1954:

The retreat of McCarthyism and the domestic “red scare” was also marked by an evolution of the containment policy though the 1970s. Nevertheless, the general agenda of containment—halting the spread of worldwide communism — remained. Moving forward, however, the question we must ask is to what extent did the policy of containment, the legal-moralistic perception of international relations, and the anti-communist liberal-conservatism consensus dominate the domestic political atmosphere. Moreover, would Kennan’s term counterforce still mean what it had in the late 1940s and early 1950s, in the late 1950s through the 1970s?

124 Fried, p. 194.
125 Ibid., p. 194-215.
126 Ibid., p. 207.
Indeed, in 1955, U.S. military advisors were sent to Vietnam, marking the beginning of a twenty year war, in the name of “rolling back communism.” Likewise, the Cuban Revolution in 1958 was met by the subsequent “Bay of Pigs”: a failed invasion by U.S. sponsored “counter-revolutionaries,” which transpired in April 1961. Moreover, in 1973, as argued, the U.S. supported and planned a coup against democratically elected Salvador Allende. In total, it is evident that the containment policy did not diverge from the use of intervention as a political weapon and, thus, U.S. interventions commenced well after Guatemala in 1954.

2.19 ECONOMIC CONTAINMENT:

How then did the theoretical policy of containment change from the post-War period from 1945 to 1954 through the 1970s? Despite the continued use of force, key developments transpired in the 1950s, especially for U.S.-Latin American relations. According to Bevan Sewell in “A Perfect (Free-Market) World? Economics, the Eisenhower Administration, and the Soviet Economic Offensive in Latin America”: “By 1955, both Moscow and Washington were beginning to see emerging nations in the Third World as being crucial elements in the next phase of the Cold War.”127 As a result, Sewell contends that beginning in the mid-1950s, the U.S.S.R. extended diplomatic and financial ties to Latin and South American countries. For example, on January 16, 1956, Soviet Premier Nikolai Buganin “offered to expand diplomatic, economic, and

cultural relations, extend technical assistance, and conclude training arrangements with Latin American nations.”

In response, however, the U.S. sought to meet the Kremlin’s challenge, which as Sewell argues:

Could be rebuffed through a more successful implementation of existing U.S. economic policy, a wide-ranging attempt to promote and strengthen the ideal of intrahemispheric cooperation through the Organization of American States (OAS), and a refined and improved form of military assistance. ¹²⁹

Fully aware of these options, Eisenhower defined his approach to U.S.-Latin American relationships on April 12, 1953 before the OAS:

Ours is an historic and meaningful unity. It is triumphant testimony…that peace and trust and fellowship can rule the conduct of all nations…I know that these facts, these simple ideals, are not new. But they are given a new, sharp meaning, by the nature of the tension tormenting our whole world….I do not think its unjust to claim for the government and the whole of the United States a readiness, rarely matched in history, to help other nations improve their living standards and guard their security.¹³⁰

Furthermore, Sewell also reports:

This ‘new’ approach would be demonstrated at the Panama American Presidents Meeting in the summer of 1956, when Eisenhower would meet with Latin American heads of state and propose the formation of an Inter-American Committee of Presidential Representatives to discuss hemispheric economic relations.¹³¹

Toward this end, economic containment was considered a viable option early on in the Cold War, having origins that predated the 1954 overthrow of Arbenz. Yet, a resolve to strengthen intra-hemispheric cooperation and bolster military assistance were the key proposals.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 841.
¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 844.
¹³¹ Sewell, p. 844.
¹³² Ibid.
However, despite the newfound apparent interest in Latin America, historian Paul Sigmund argues in *The United States and Democracy in Chile*, that the Eisenhower administration’s policy toward Chile in the 1950s, which epitomized the general trend for U.S. action in Latin America as a whole, limited the economic assistance to Latin America, at least in comparison to the later Alliance for Progress:

The Eisenhower administration (1953-61) resisted pressure from Latin America for public assistance for development purposes…U.S. policy toward Chile was largely restricted to fostering Chile’s integration into the emerging interamerican security system—especially its military aspects.¹³³

Smith similarly argues that “Between 1948 and 1958, under Truman and Eisenhower, Latin America received only 2.4 percent of U.S. foreign economic aid. Asked why Washington was paying such short shrift to the region, veteran diplomat Louis Halle responded with customary candor: ‘The United States no longer desperately needs Latin America.’”¹³⁴

Yet, I must highlight that by the end of the Eisenhower administration, Smith reports that the percentage of U.S. aid to Latin America had risen to 9 percent.¹³⁵ Thus, the aid had increased substantially in relation to years prior. Furthermore, this emphasis on economic and military assistance within the 1950s and later in the 60’s—which later became known as modernization¹³⁶—were the first steps U.S. policy makers took towards the more full blown policy initiatives that would be seen in the Kennedy administrations Alliance for Progress.

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¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 139.

By the late 1940’s, coinciding with the increased interest in Latin America, U.S. policy makers solidified their support for dictatorships and military governments in the region. This is not to say the trend was new. Indeed, according to Peter Smith, in *Talons of the Eagle*, U.S. policy makers sponsored dictatorships in Latin America as early as the 1940s (if not earlier.)\(^{137}\)

Robert Holden, in “Securing Central America Against Communism : The United States and the Modernization of Surveillance in the War,” contends the U.S. policy makers further solidified their beliefs that dictatorships were the best defense against communism in the Western Hemisphere with the introduction of “modernization,” which Holden defines as “‘an almost unquestioning faith in the desirability of perfecting the technical efficiency of the Central American States, not only in the realm of surveillance per se but also more generally in military and policy matters.’”\(^{138}\) More precisely Holden argues:

Evidence of the ‘modernization’ ethos emerges again and again in the military and diplomatic archival records consulted for this study. Those records indicate that while expressing occasional reservations about the institutional characteristics of its client states in Central America and acknowledging, from time to time, a preference for ‘free’ elections and representative government, Washington demonstrated considerably greater enthusiasm for enhancing the technical instruments of rule.\(^{139}\)

Moreover, Holden contends:

In Central America, the consequence of the creation of what have been called “national security states have been well documented. Security threats emanating from the deteriorating social, political, and economic fabric were largely ignored, while democracy itself was defined as a security threat by the military governments in power and by their patron in Washington.\(^{140}\)

\(^{137}\) Smith, p. 122-124.
\(^{138}\) Ibid.
\(^{139}\) Ibid.
\(^{140}\) Ibid., p. 4.
Holden, does however, clarify that the general sentiment toward favoring technocratic advances over democratic ones was limited at least in rhetoric to the mid and late 1950s.\textsuperscript{141}

From the perspective of Nelson Rockefeller, the Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs under Eisenhower, “Dictators in these countries are a mixed blessing…It is true, in the short run, that dictators handle Communist effectively. But in the long run, the U.S. must encourage the growth of democracies in Latin America if Communism is to be defeated.”\textsuperscript{142} Likewise, Sewell contends that “At the heart of the administration’s policy was the assumption that economic modernization would eventually lead to a region that was pro-U.S. and democratic.”\textsuperscript{143} Yet, we must still question how long “the love of dictatorship” would last. As I will soon discuss, the trend continued onward into the 1960s under President John Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress and even into the presidency of Richard Nixon from 1968 into the 1970s.

\textbf{2.21 THE CONTAINMENT POLICY AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION:}

Even so, one distinction was clear: under the auspices of modernization U.S. policy maker’s favored anti-communist dictatorships, while deploring dictatorships that they deemed to be communist. For example, aside from the communist dictatorship in Vietnam, on January 1, 1959 the Cuban Revolution and the rise of Fidel Castro to the head of state in Cuba alarmed U.S. policy makers\textsuperscript{144} and was a crucial event in Cold War history. According to Political Scientist

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., p. 3.
\textsuperscript{143} Sewell, p. 848.
\textsuperscript{144} Of course much greater attention can and should be provided for the entirety of events that contributed and helped evolve the U.S., U.S.S.R. bi-lateral relation. But, because of length restraints, I will curtail the discussion to this topic.
Paul Sigmund, “The radicalization of the Cuban revolution in 1960 awakened Americans to the fact that Latin America existed.” Indeed, the Cuban revolution, as I will soon argue, greatly influenced the creation of President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress program in the early 1960s, an effort to combat communism through remedying the social and economic inequalities in Latin and South America.

In the late 1950s, U.S. policy makers saw Fidel Castro’s ascension to power in Cuba as a major threat. Although the United States initially vacillated on Castro’s communist credentials, Don Bohning, in *The Castro Obsession*, argues that “By the fall of 1959, most U.S. officials had been convinced that if he wasn’t Communist, he was increasingly under Communist influence. Consequently, on March 17, 1960, Eisenhower approved an elaborate covert operation designed to oust him.”

Yet, Eisenhower was near the end of his tenure and John F. Kennedy took the reins of the Presidency on January 20, 1961. Thereafter, only three months after his inauguration on April 16, 1961, Kennedy oversaw the covert operation that had been initiated under President Eisenhower: the Bay of Pigs. Much can be said about the consequences of this action, but the importance for our discussion is the rationale behind it (the issue, throughout this paper, is after all the nature of government and the perspective of U.S. policy makers). Specifically, Bohning recounts: “Jake Esterline, the CIA’s project chief for the failed Bay of Pigs, summarized in a 1995 interview….communism was considered the mortal enemy of America, to be confronted at every turn.” Moreover, according to Bohner Esterline argued that “Dictators and human rights

145 Sigmund, p. 1.
were secondary considerations. This attitude, in his view, didn’t really change until the last half of the 1960s when protests began to build against Vietnam.”

Indeed, although the Bay of Pigs failed, the Church Committee Report, which Bohner describes as “the most useful and authoritative documents available on not only the assassination attempts but also the framework within which they occurred,” cited “concrete evidence of at least eight plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965.” Hence, through much of Kennedy’s tenure, the goal to remove Castro remained. The trend toward exceptional anti-communism, although dissipating domestically in relation to the “McCarthyite-type communist purges” of the late 1940s and early 1950s, was still a dominant concern in the early 1960s for the U.S. policy makers and citizens alike, especially regarding international relations.

2.22 THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS:

Cold-War tensions reached their apex in the fall of 1962. Specifically, on August 29, 1962, an American U-2 spy plane discovered surface-to-air missile (SAM) construction site in Cuba. In a radio and televised report on October 22, 1962, President Kennedy addressed the nation: “unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to

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147 Ibid., p. 4.
148 Ibid., p. 3.
150 This fact might cause one to ask if anything really had changed since the U.S. intervened in Guatemala in 1954 to overthrow Arbenz, a question that deserves one's full attention, but perhaps should be left for another paper. In this paper the analysis of Chile will serve to answer a similar question.
provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.” The President subsequently argued:

The presence of these large, long range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction—constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.152

Within the same speech, President Kennedy called for seven specific measures to counterbalance the threat: (1) “halting the offensive build up”; (2)“keeping surveillance of Cuba”; (3) understanding that any launch of nuclear weapons from Cuba would be considered an attack by the Soviet Union against the U.S.; (4) fortifying security at the U.S. base at Guantanamo; (5) a meeting by OAS to consider the threat; (6) an emergency meeting by the Security Council at the United Nations; (7) and finally, the President called for Chairman Khrushchev to “halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations.”153 In summary, the Cuban Missile Crisis further characterizes the extraordinary U.S.-Soviet tensions in the early 1960s.

2.23 ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS—THE EVOLUTION OF MODERNIZATION:

Yet, once again, the international political context was innately tied to the U.S. foreign policy making process and the domestic political atmosphere in the U.S. The Alliance for Progress

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153 Ibid.
program under President John Kennedy in the 1960s sought to modernize Latin American nations, a program that both Sigmund and Smith argue was initiated by the Kennedy administration in 1961 as a response to the challenge of the Cuban revolution.\textsuperscript{154} Once again, policy was molded by the foreign policy perspectives and reaction to the present international context.

On March 13, 1961, only one month prior to the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy, while speaking at a White House reception for Latin American diplomats, outlined his goals for modernization in Latin America: “We meet together as firm and ancient friends—united by history and experience, and by our determination to advance the values of American civilization.”\textsuperscript{155} Thereafter, President Kennedy proposed “that the American republics begin a vast new ten-year plan for the Americas—a plan to transform the Nineteen Sixties into an historic decade of democratic progress…for if our alliance is to succeed each Latin nation must formulate long-range plans for its own development.”\textsuperscript{156} Indeed, the theory was set.

Abstractly speaking, according to Fredrick Pike, in \textit{Chile and the United States: 1880-1962}: “The basic ideology [of Alliance for Progress] was in accord with the observations made by economist William Glade in 1961”\textsuperscript{157}:

\ldots, while the best available purely economic policies will necessarily take years to effect meaningful change in income levels, other quite important elements of economic welfare are susceptible to quicker increases through ‘social reform’ type measures which themselves need not require heavy expenditures so much as organizational changes and which can be designed, moreover, in some cases, to provide incentives for productivity. . . Social reform . . . is no longer simply a desirable concomitant of growth in output. It

\textsuperscript{154} Sigmund, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., 355.  
is, or is rapidly becoming, a prerequisite of growth—as much an integral part of development program as any instrument of monetary control or any tax measure.\textsuperscript{158}

In practice, however, according to Smith, “The Alliance for Progress led to an immediate and substantial increase in U.S. aid to Latin America. Bilateral economic assistance nearly tripled between FY 1960 and FY 1961, thereafter climbing to well over $1 billion in the mid-1960s. Under Kennedy and Johnson, Latin America received nearly 18 percent of total U.S. aid.”\textsuperscript{159} Such efforts had nearly doubled the percentage of American funding since the Eisenhower Administration.

Yet, the Alliance for Progress’s most basic purpose, as Sigmund has alluded, was to prevent communism from gaining strength in Latin and South American nations. According to Michael Latham, in “Ideology, Social Science, and Destiny: Modernization and the Kennedy-Era Alliance for Progress”: “The ideology of modernization shaped and legitimated an ambitious, highly politicized effort to combine the promotion of Latin American development with the containment of communism.”\textsuperscript{160} To the same accord, Sigmund argued that the Alliance was an effort to combat communism in the Western Hemisphere.\textsuperscript{161}

Like the containment policy, the Alliance “reflected a broader world view, a constellation of mutually reinforcing ideas that often framed policy goals through a definition of America’s values, character, and mission.”\textsuperscript{162} In the same breath, Latham contends that “for those looking at the world through the lens of modernization, the Cold War certainly did become a struggle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the ‘developing nations’…Modernization, therefore, became a battle of

\textsuperscript{159} Smith, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{161} Sigmund, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., p. 205.
image and identity as much as it was one of program and policy.” 163 Indeed, the same “legal-moralistic” perspective from the post War period, from 1945 to 1954, had carried through to the early 1960s and U.S policy makers were still “trying to make the world over in its own image,” the very “moral crusade” that Lippmann, Morgenthau, and Kennan had argued against in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 164

Nonetheless, Latham contends that the Alliance “reflected a progressive rejection of official Cold War orthodoxy.”165 Indeed, land reform programs and many “leftist” social reforms were cultivated within Latin America only ten years after the Guatemalan land reform program initiated by Arbenz had caused U.S. policy makers great concern. Thus, some things had changed.

Even so, the Alliance for Progress theory was also similar to the original containment policy in how it directed policy action and was later defined through its application by individual policy makers to specific issues. Piki Ish-Shalom, in “Theory Gets Real, and the Case for a Normative Ethic: Rostow, Modernization Theory, and the Alliance for Progress,” argues that “We learn that even though a common agenda was established, it still did not produce a unified interpretation.”166 Specifically, Ish-Shalom contends that Walt Rostow, a United States economist and political theorist, who was originally appointed by President Kennedy as the Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and who was later appointed under President Lynden B. Johnson to be the U.S. member of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress167, acted as a key political theorist that guided the policy

163 Ibid., p. 215.
164 Gati, p. 30.

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actions of the Kennedy administration. Hence, in some sense, Rostow was to the Alliance for Progress what Kennan was to the Containment policy. Although Rostow outlined broad goals and theory for the Alliance—much like Kennan did in Article “X”—the implementation of the goals varied from policy maker to policy maker and perhaps failed to correspond with Rostow’s original intent, a theme that mirrors Kennan’s experience with the containment policy: his original policy goals did not correspond to the subsequent actions taken by U.S. policy makers. Indeed, according to Ish-Shalom, although Rostow’s theory matched up well with President Kennedy’s liberal background, Rostow’s policy suggestions did not determine President Kennedy’s agenda: “[the] agenda had already been set up and what remained was to identify people to help execute it.”¹⁶⁸ Once again, the policy would be set in motion by abstract policy guidelines that had been formed by policy maker’s reaction to world events such as the Cuban Revolution (in the case of the Alliance for Progress). Such abstract guidelines would subsequently be put into practice by individual policy makers and, in turn, more clearly defined, but also, would greatly determine the international context as well. Hence, the evolutionary cycle of foreign policy was at work.

2.24 LOVE OF DICTATORS IN THE 1960S:

Nonetheless, as argued, not all foreign policies evolved, but some policies remained constant from 1945 through the 1970s. Like the modernization initiatives under the Eisenhower administration, the early 1960s also saw a continued support for Latin American dictatorships. According to Sigmund:

¹⁶⁸ Ish-Shalom, p. 297.
The changes in the U.S. military relations...with Latin America under the Kennedy administration were institutionally separate from the alliance but conceptually related to it in its anti-communist purposes. Arguing that earlier concepts of defense of the hemisphere from external aggressions were no longer applicable, the State Department Policy Planning Staff and the Defense Department recommended that the Latin American military receive training in “counterinsurgency” to counteract the threat of Cuban-inspired guerrilla activity.\textsuperscript{169}

Although Sigmund supports the claim that policy makers continued to support military regimes in Latin and South America, he also insinuates that “concepts of defense for the hemisphere from external aggressions were no longer applicable.” Hence, it would appear that Sigmund was also arguing that a shift in perspective had occurred even by the early 1960s and that the “external aggression” was perhaps no longer as much of a threat as it had been for U.S. policy makers. Yet, as discussed, the Cuban Missile Crisis would challenge such an assertion. Nonetheless, the report that Sigmund sights was issued after the Crisis, and perhaps Sigmund is arguing that following the U.S.’s successful defense of the Western Hemisphere from the U.S.S.R.’s attempted placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba, the external threat had been vanquished.

Aside from this mild digression, the favoring of military regimes was still apparent. According to Phillip Schmitter, in \textit{Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences}:  

In the same way, one sees the U.S. placing its political interests over its democratic credo by dropping the anathema held a short while ago against those governments which did not come to power through elections. From the resigned acceptance under the Kennedy administrations of military coup d’état because of their generally conservative and anticommunist functions, advisors of the Department of state and of the President now hold to the theory of “salvation by the military” who are seen as forces of progress and agents of orderly modernization.\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{169} Sigmund, p. 21.
Indeed, over the course of the 1960s, Smith contends that “A rash of military coups” commenced. Consequently, Smith reports, “The U.S. posture toward military regimes thenceforth oscillated between passive acceptance and outright endorsement.”

### 2.25 U.S.S.R. AND CHINA SPLIT: A FRACTURE IN THE COMMUNIST ARMOR.

Although communism and the U.S.S.R. remained a major threat in the eyes of U.S. policy makers in the early 1960s and was considered a monolith that uniformly threatened democracy and the “free world” as one cohesive entity, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations was a major milestone in the evolution of international context, which, as argued, directly impacted the ways U.S. policy makers formed policy and threatened the U.S.’s bi-polar outlook on international relations. According to Crockatt, the Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated for a variety of reasons: “It is a mistake to view the split as purely ideological but it is equally erroneous to regard it simply as the result of clashing national and geopolitical interests. These elements were inseparable… Indeed ideology and national interest were both present in the ambition of each ‘to be the leader, to wield the greatest influence, if not actually to dominate world Communism.” Regardless of why the “split” occurred, Crockett contends that it became apparent that Chinese and Soviet ideologies clashed: “The ideological intensity of their struggle from the late 1950s onwards certainly bore the mark of a theological dispute, each side regarding the other’s version of Marxist-Leninism as heretical.” According to Hook, et al., “The Soviets publicly likened

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171 Smith, p. 142.
172 Ibid., p. 145.
173 Crockatt, p. 121, 122.
174 Ibid.
Mao to Adolf Hitler, while Chinese leaders described the Soviet Union as a “dictatorship of the German fascist type.”

Such a “split” shaped the way U.S. policy makers subsequently viewed international communism and reacted to it. According to Zbigniew Brezninski, in “A Policy of Peaceful Engagement: How We Can Profit from Communist Disunity,” published in 1962, the “split” was advantageous to the “West” in that “the long-range consequences of a split…might break the backbone of international Communism and shatters its sense of inevitable triumph.” Indeed, Brezninski was correct and U.S. policy makers, especially President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, exploited the “split” in the 1970s by extending a diplomatic hand to China for the first time since it had “gone communist” in 1949 in order to combat the U.S.S.R.’s power. Hook, et al., contend that “By playing the ‘China card,’ Nixon and Kissinger began clearing away mutual hostilities and exploring areas of mutual cooperation.” Hence, U.S. policy makers were, by the 1970s, willing to recognize and utilize the support of a communist regime to counter the aggression of another communist regime. Consequently, the bi-polar world of U.S. versus the U.S.S.R., democracy versus communism, and “good” versus “evil” no longer applied to the ever more complex dynamic of international relations and U.S. policy makers realized this. In the words of Hook: “The U.S. containment policy had been weakened by the fragmentation of the communist bloc. It was one thing to fight a communism that seemed monolithic, but when the communist states became more numerous and divided internally, the best Western response became more difficult to define.”

175 Hook et al., 110.
177 Hook et al., p. 111.
178 Ibid., p. 109.
179 Ibid., p. 106.
2.26 VIETNAM AND A SHIFT IN POLITICAL ATTITUDE:

Like the Sino-Soviet split, the Vietnam War was fundamental in shaping international political context and domestic political atmosphere in the U.S. In fact, according to my survey, the Vietnam War was the pivotal moment— the most significant point of transition—for U.S foreign policy: in terms of the way U.S. policy makers viewed international relations and how U.S. policy makers subsequently formed policy theory and directed policy action.

In 1964, the United States Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and subsequently, in 1965, deployed the “first major U.S. ground combat forces” in March of that year.180 According to Rosati, et al., the once firm consensus on foreign policy and anti-communism was shattered by the events of the Vietnam War. Thus, the liberal-conservative consensus became “polarized during the late 1960s and early 1970s, and fragmented during the post-Vietnam War years.”181 In fact, Rosati contends:

The events of the 1960s resulted in the growth of the political left in the United States and an alternative understanding of American society. Anticommunism and McCarthyism had silenced most liberals and leftists by the early 1950s. However, the new left entered the political scene in the late 1950s with the rise of the civil rights movement and grew dramatically as the Vietnam War intensified. Members of the new left and the counterculture dissented and rebelled against the liberal-conservative consensus of mainstream society.

Likewise, Sanders also contends that “What Vietnam did was to resurrect the progressive…impulses after a twenty year hiatus.”182 Specifically, he argues that a progressive opposition formed, originating out of three sources: the universities, the corporate and financial world, and the general public, all of whom turned against the Vietnam War effort. Whatever

181 Rosati et al. p. 366.
182 Sanders, p. 107.
impact these sources had on this change in attitude, the facts were clear, facts that show the anti-
War climate was not a fringe element, but a large faction of American society:

By 1968 the number of self-designated doves rose from 25 percent to 40 percent, while those who called themselves hawks declined from a 60 percent majority to a 40 percent figure equal to that of the doves…by November 1969, coinciding with what was at the time the largest anti-War demonstration in the nation’s history, the number of those who classified themselves as doves was nearly double that of self-styled hawks. 183

Alongside this general “anti-War” sentiment, David Dileo, in George Ball, Vietnam, and the Rethinking of Containment, argues:

…the containment doctrine, having provided an unchallenged blueprint for American foreign policy for a quarter-century since World War II, was called into question. Particularly after the military and political disappointments of 1967-68, the bipartisan consensus among American foreign policy elites about the nature of the international state system, the role of the United States in world affairs, and the constitutional framework within which foreign policy was formulated and administered appeared to disintegrate.184

Indeed, by 1968, Dileo contends, “the debacle in Vietnam prompted an agonizing reappraisal of American foreign policy.” Furthermore, Dileo argues that notable “foreign policy sages,” such as George Wildman Ball, who was engrossed in U.S. politics throughout his life, serving various politicians, and among many other accolades, was “a member of the Advisory Board of Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of International Relations,”185 and in “four major books, innumerable speeches, and dozens of trenchant essays” rethought the containment policy.”186 As a result, the refurbished containment policy looked much different. According to Hook, et al.:

The philosophy underlying American foreign policy during the Kissinger years (1969-1977) began with the assumption that world politics was not a fight between a “good” side and a “bad” side. All states, communist or noncommunist, had the right to exist and possessed legitimate interests. A nation, therefore, did not launch moral crusades against

183 Sanders, p. 109.
185 Ibid., p. 1-3.
186 Ibid., p. 186
an adversary on the assumption that differences of interests represented a conflict between good and evil. 187

Jeanne Kirkpatrick, in her book, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” argues that the overall trend by the end of the Nixon Administration in the mid-1970s was a general shift away from the Cold War fear of anti-communism:

President Carter…was not the only political leader in America to have lost his “inordinate” fear of Communism, lost his appetite for East-West competition, grown embarrassed by the uses of American power, become ashamed of past U.S. policies, and grown determined to make a fresh start. By the time Richard Nixon had left office, a large portion of the political elite in America, including a majority of Congress, had withdrawn not only from Vietnam but from what was more and more frequently called the Cold War…From these feelings were inferred the famous “lessons” of Vietnam: that the Cold War was over, that concern with communism should no longer “overwhelm” other issues. 188

In the same light, according to Hook, et al., “Anticommunism was no longer as useful a means of eliciting popular support, not just because of the Vietnam fiasco but also because the United States might well be supporting one communist state against another.” 189 Now I must clarify that the Cold War was not “over,” because it continued onward through the 1980’s until the U.S.S.R. finally collapsed in 1991. Nonetheless, by the 1970s the anti-communist consensus that had once dominated the American psyche had been substantially weakened and a new era had emerged. In this sense, although the Cold War was not over, it had greatly changed: not only in tone, but in the manner in which the U.S. would response to communism and the U.S.S.R. henceforth.

187 Hook et al., p. 108.
189 Hook et al., p. 106.
Despite this reality and although the containment policy had evolved significantly from its birth in the 1940s, anti-communism was not extinct and not every American citizen believed the War in Vietnam was “bad” or wrong. In fact, my survey of American foreign policy towards the case of Chile, from 1970 to 1973, signifies that anti-communism was still very much alive. Rosati, et al. argues that in the 1970s and 1980’s “Many Americans, especially conservatives and those on the politically right, continued to believe…that the major global threat to the security of the United States and global order was communism directed by the Soviet Union, requiring a strong American military presence in much of the world.” \[^{190}\] Moreover, Rosati argues that many conservatives “saw the Vietnam War as an honorable war lost through a failure of national will,” while, in contrast and as argued, “liberals tended to see the Vietnam War as a mistake and viewed the use of force as counterproductive.”\[^{191}\]

Nonetheless, Rosati contends that “disagreement among conservatives existed concerning the severity of the Soviet threat and the appropriate foreign policy strategy.”\[^{192}\] Without delving too much into the matter, Rosati reports that “variations” of conservative foreign policy and ideological dispositions evolved. For example, on one hand conservatives still looked at the world through a legal-moralistic lens and as the U.S. being “good” and the U.S.S.R. as “bad,” but, on the other hand, other conservatives viewed the world as being “bimultipolar”: in this light, although the world was still dominated by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the threat was not solely linked to the idea of communism and its ideological threat, but, the more progressive

\[^{190}\] Rosati et al., p. 369.  
\[^{191}\] Ibid., p. 367.  
\[^{192}\] Ibid.
“bimultipolar” disposition reflected a realpolitik concern for international relations. Rosati argues that “other Americans, especially liberals and those on the political left saw a much more complex and interdependent world in the 1970s and 1980’s.” Likewise, Hook, et al., contends:

The U.S.-Soviet balance remained the preoccupation; the Soviet Union, as a great power, still had to be contained. Coexistence with Moscow, to be achieved through negotiation and compromise, was sufficient to maintain balance of power that preserved American security. The ultimate victory, as Kissinger’s fellow realist, George Kennan, predicted a quarter of a century earlier, would not stem from an American moral crusade, but with the incremental withering of the Soviet state and society.

Perhaps, most importantly, for my analysis of U.S. foreign policy in the cases of Velasco and Allende and their respective regimes, both President Nixon and Henry Kissinger both agreed that the legal moralistic perspective was antiquated. Rosati, et al., argue that Kissinger shared in the realpolitik strategy of “selective containment,” which moved away from the original containment goal set forth in the Truman Doctrine of opposing communism everywhere. Rather, “selective containment,” called for a much greater analysis and understanding of individual issues because, as the Sino-Soviet split demonstrated, communism was no longer monolithic. The U.S. cultivated relationships with communist regimes to counterbalance the threat of another. Furthermore, Nixon argued in his memoirs that “I felt that our tendency to become preoccupied with only one or two problems at a time had led to a deterioration of policy on all fronts.” According to esteemed historian David Crockatt, “Policy must be more multifaceted, and its different elements coordinated.”

But, how did this shift in foreign policy perspective away from legal-moralism impact U.S. policy maker’s beliefs on anti-communism and the “threat of communism” in

193 Ibid.
194 Ibid., p. 368.
195 Hook et al., p. 109.
196 Ibid., p. 371.
198 Crockatt, p. 221.
general? Aside from my case studies, which show that the standard for judgment had changed and what had once been considered threatening in the 1940s and 1950s was no longer viewed in this way, Crocket explains that Kissinger realized that “it was no longer necessary to hammer home one’s distaste for Soviet ideology.”199 In the same way, according to Crocket: “After a period of confrontation’, Nixon announced his inaugural address, ‘we are entering an era of negotiation.’ The words are vague enough, but they denote an important shift of attitude on the part of Nixon and Kissinger. Both, after all, were old cold warriors whose early careers had begun during the years of high ideological tension between the superpowers.”200

2.28 DÉTENTE: THE RELAXATION OF SOVIET-U.S. TENSION

Marking the change in foreign policy and foreign policy perspective by the Nixon administration was the policy of Détente, which called for a relaxation of tensions between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Keith Nelson, in “Nixon, Brezhnev, and Détente,” argues that like the shattering of the liberal-conservatism consensus, Détente was a direct result of the Vietnam War: “The massive dissatisfaction of opinion brought about by the Vietnam War—a disaffection from conventional Cold War foreign policy—was crucial in stimulating the creative reorientation of American diplomacy that took place during the Nixon administration.”201

Détente included actions such as: Nixon’s reopening of relations with Communist China in 1971 through “Ping Pong diplomacy,” a policy that allowed the U.S. ping pong team to visit

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199 Ibid.
200 Ibid., p. 219.
China following a 22 year hiatus of no diplomacy\textsuperscript{202}; Nixon’s unprecedented visit to China on February 28, 1972; the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (Salt I) agreed upon on May 26, 1972, between the U.S. and U.S.S.R, which sought to reduce the nuclear arms race; and various other initiatives that sought to reconcile that vast ideological, political, and diplomatic difficulties that had been experienced between the communist nations and the U.S. since the end of World War II. Indeed, a major point in Détente was reached in August of 1975 with the “Helsinki Accords.” Axelrod summarizes:

Thirty five States, including the United States and the Soviet Union, signed accords…the accords became the basis for monitoring and enforcing international human rights and resulted in pressure on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact satellites and allies to liberalize political policies that resulted in the imprisonment, torture, and even deaths of dissidents.\textsuperscript{203}

In light of Détente, and in congruence with the overall shift of American foreign policy perspective and the beliefs of U.S. policy makers on anti-communist, Crocket reports “Détente represented an acknowledgment that the world had changed radically in the direction of multipolarity, a diffusion of the “communist threat”, and the rise of new economic forces which cut across the rigid lines of the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{204}

\subsection{2.29 NIXON AND THE LOVE OF DICTATORS:}

Still, it was not as if twenty years of foreign policy perspective had disappeared. As articulated, remnants of the past were still evident in the 1970s, even regarding the U.S. foreign policy

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\textsuperscript{202} Axelrod, p. 377.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.,p. 383.
\textsuperscript{204} Crockett, p. 222.
\end{flushright}
toward dictatorships. For example, Nixon carried the torch for favoring dictatorships over democracy. Paul Sigmund describes:

In the late 1960s...a series of military takeovers in Latin America suggested that democracy was not necessarily “the wave of the future” in Latin America—notably Nixon’s adoption of a “low profile” in the visibility of U.S. diplomacy and his sending of a mission to Latin America … which recommended closer relations with military governments.205

Precisely, Nixon’s viewed democracy in Latin America as a liability and openly expressed this sentiment in his discussions with his aids (captured on tape). In a conversation with Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Nixon argued: “When you look at Latin America, [it is] not a very encouraging place to see, except those countries that got dictators in it and successful dictators, they’re all in a hell of a mess.”206 Nixon similarly demonstrated his disdain for Latin American democracies during a conversation with Kissinger: “I mean France is, is, a Latin country. It couldn’t, even France, with all its sophistication, couldn’t handle democracy…Spain, and no country in Latin America that I know of, except for Colombia [can handle democracy].”207 Thereafter, in 1971, Nixon argued that self-government and constitutional democracy had failed within Latin America: “Look at Latin America…They all followed the America constitution. Making a country in Latin America is making it dead. The only one that’s really making it at the moment is Brazil…but it’s now a dictatorship.”208

With such sentiments in mind and in reference to my case study of Chile, Roseti, et al., reports that when Allende was overthrown in 1973, the U.S. “installed Augusto Pinochet as the

205 Sigmund, p. 3.
dictator of Chile for the next sixteen years.\textsuperscript{209} According to Hook, et al., “The United States allied itself with a military dictatorship in Chile [to replace Allende following his overthrow] rather than run the risk that a nation would become a beachhead of Marxist revolution…From the American perspective, anything was better than a totalitarian Marxist regime.”\textsuperscript{210}

In fact, Smith reports that when Nixon won the presidency, he commissioned his political rival Nelson Rockefeller to “conduct a study of U.S.-Latin American relations.” To this end, Rockefeller and his “entourage” conferred with over 3,000 Latin America leaders and, in report, concluded that U.S.-Latin American relations had “deteriorated badly” and “Latin America presented a disturbing picture.” Furthermore, it contended that “clearly, the opinion in the United States that communism is no longer a serious factor in the Western Hemisphere is thoroughly wrong.”\textsuperscript{211} Nonetheless, Smith reports that “the Rockefeller group found one strong and positive influence: the Latin American military. As the commission contended:

A new type of military man is coming to the fore and often becoming a major force for constructive social change in the American republics. Motivated by increasing impatience with corruption, inefficiency, and a stagnant political order, the new military man is prepared to adapt his authoritarian traditions to the goals of social reform and economic progress. \textsuperscript{212}

The report further argued that “military governments have an intrinsic ideological unreliability and vulnerability to extreme nationalism. They can go in almost any doctrinal direction.” Thus, according to Smith, the report concluded, “it made much more sense to collaborate with Latin American military rulers than ‘to abandon or insult them.’”\textsuperscript{213} In reference to my case study of Peru, Smith argues that this entire report “implicitly [referred] to the

\textsuperscript{209} Rosati et al., p. 231.
\textsuperscript{210} Hook et al., p. 116.
\textsuperscript{211} Smith, p. 145, 146.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
maverick regime in Peru.”^214 Hence, it seems evident, in this light, that Nixon was coddling the Velasco regime because of its authoritarian and military roots. Indeed, Smith concluded that “Cooperation with dictators would therefore continue to be a basic element in U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America in years to come.”^215

2.30 CONCLUSION:

In total, the U.S. policy of containment was born out of abstract policy goals that were formed following World War II in reaction to U.S. policy makers’ judgments of the international context. The theory was subsequently applied in practice to individual issues by individual policy makers. In the eyes of U.S. policy makers and American citizens, the world context from 1945 to 1954 was exceptionally tense. Alongside the international politic context, a combination of factors helped create a hysteria driven anti-communist political atmosphere within the United States and a general anti-communist liberal-conservative consensus that viewed the world from a legal-moralistic perspective. Policy action, such as: the employment of the Truman Doctrine in Greece and Turkey; the Korean War, the covert ousting of Guatemalan President Arbenz in 1954; emergence of modernizing initiatives; the Cuban Revolution; the Sino-Soviet “split”; and later the Vietnam War determined how the policy of Containment would be applied in practice. Nonetheless, these same events catalyzed policy change and evolution. For example, as I have argued the once threatening land reform program in Arbenz’s Guatemalan regime would have been accepted and promoted by the Alliance for Progress program in the early 1960s under

^214 Ibid.
^215 Ibid.
President Kennedy. Hence, an evolution in perspective and policy was apparent from 1945 through the early 1960s. Moreover, aside from the evolution of U.S. foreign policy, the policy of favoring dictatorships over democracy was cultivated in the 1950s with the appearance of new modernization initiatives and carried through to the early 1960s.

As the hysteria of the late 1940s and early 1950s slowly dissipated from 1955 through the 1970s, a new political context evolved. The same events that caused the policy of containment to evolve also impacted the general sentiments of U.S. policy makers and citizens alike. By the early 1960s and through the 1970s, with critical events such as the Sino-Soviet “split” and the Vietnam War, the U.S. political atmosphere turned against the extreme anti-communist liberal-conservative consensus and legal-moralistic approach to international relations. Epitomizing the change in foreign policy and policy perspective, Nixon’s administration Détente policy was initiated. Although the Cold War was not “over,” important government actors, such as Henry Kissinger, were more sensitive to the complexities of international relations and realized the necessity of “selective containment” in place of the universal call to action that the Truman Doctrine embodied in 1947. Still, the favoring of dictatorships over democracy carried through to the Nixon administration.

2.31 APPLYING CHAPTER 1 TO THE CASE STUDIES: GUATEMALA, CHILE, AND PERU

Yet, once again, it is important to highlight how these conclusions relate to my case studies. The extreme anti-communist consensus from 1945 to 1954, the very years that Arevalo and Arbenz were in power, reveal how U.S. policy makers were exceptionally sensitive to “communist
threats.” It might be said that U.S. policy makers were hysterical and even biased in comparison to the way they later characterized “communist threats” in the 1970s. This provides an explanation as to why Arbenz and Arevalo were considered such threats, despite the fact that, all things considered, their land reform programs, expropriation of U.S. businesses, relation with the CP, and CP in government were relatively mild in comparison to regimes such as Allende’s.

In contrasting, the way U.S. policy makers, especially Kissinger, who was the principle actor in the way U.S. foreign policy proceeded in the cases of Chile and Peru, viewed international relations and characterized threats much differently in the 1970s. For this reason, Velasco and his regime, although similar to Arevalo, Arbenz, and their respective regimes, was not deemed a threat. Indeed, under the auspices of “selective containment” Kissinger was able to accurately determine the level of threat and realize that Velasco’s regime, despite many similarities with Arevalo and Arbenz’s regimes in Guatemala, was simply not a threat. Moreover, the difference in perspective surely was related to the Nixon administration’s stance toward dictatorships and military regimes. Specifically, he cultivated relations with the Velasco regime because of its authoritarian and military roots. As will later be argued, Velasco’s regime was also favored by U.S. policy makers, especially Kissinger, as an alternative example to Allende’s Marxist-Socialist revolution in Chile. As previously discussed, despite the changes of political atmosphere, international political context, U.S. foreign policy, and the beliefs of U.S. policy makers, Chile could not be ignored because of the extreme existential threat it posed.
3.0 CHAPTER 2

THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN GUATEMALA, PERU, AND CHILE AND THE RELATIVELY RADICAL STANCE OF ALLENDE’S CHILE

This chapter argues for two conclusions: (1) the “similarities” that I have touched upon in my introduction between the case of Guatemala and Peru exist, which is a basic prerequisite for my claim that a discrepancy in perspective occurred for policy makers when judging the similar variables; (2) Allende and his regime were more radical and more communist than the other two cases, thus explaining why it was considered a threat in the 1970s despite the less charged political atmosphere.

I will first provide a historical summary of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco in order to compare and contrast them: in terms of their political ideologies, their relationships with domestic communists, their stances on Marxism and communism, and their stances on democracy (i.e. Arevalo and Arbenz pro-democratic, Velasco authoritarian and anti-democratic). I will also compare the Arbenz and Velasco regime in terms of: expropriation of U.S. business interests, CP members in government, and the regimes relations with the Socialist Bloc. Lastly, I will compare the CP’s control of the labor movement during the tenures of Arbenz and Velasco. I will also provide further evidence in the case of Velasco’s Peru that may have caused concern for U.S. policy makers if it had counterfactually occurred in the later 1940s and early 1950s: Velasco’s agenda was closely aligned with the CP and other Marxist groups and Velasco’s
cabinet became increasingly radical. Aside from this “extra point,” all of the other variables directly correspond to what U.S. policy makers pointed to in order to ground their claim that a communist threat existed in Guatemala. Hence, if I can assert that many similarities are present, and further demonstrate that other variables that may have been considered threatening in Guatemala were also present in Peru, then my subsequent research question of why a discrepancy in perspective occurred is compelling and the entire thesis has solid footing to proceed.

Second, I will give a summary of Allende’s Marxist orientation and his close relations with international communism. Also, I will briefly touch upon the radical nature of his government coalition and his Socialist party in order to further demonstrate why he was still considered a threat in the 1970s. This explanation should remedy the concern that I presented in the first chapter: that if Allende’s regime was still considered a threat by similar standards used to define threat in Arevalo and Arbenz’s regimes, then my basic thesis—my contention that a change in foreign policy and policy perspective explains the discrepancy in perspective—would be challenged because policy makers would have still viewed the similar variables as equally threatening in the 1970s. I will also provide a brief discussion of the Chilean regime’s relationship with the Socialist Bloc and its respective expropriation of business assets in order to demonstrate its similarities to the other cases.

3.1 A COMPARISON: THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN AREVALO, ARBENZ, AND VELASCO (CONCLUSION 1):

Preface: Much of my research in Guatemala is based upon three main sources.
1) Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kenner’s *Bitter Fruit* (1999)  
2) Piero Gluiness’s *Shattered Hope* (1992)  
3) Ronald Schneider *Communism in Guatemala* (1959)

### 3.1.1 A quick note on the three major authors:

When determining the accuracy of these three perspectives—between Schneider, Kinzer, et al., and Gleijeses (and other sources for that matter)—it is important to note that *Shattered Hope* was published in 1992 and Kinzer and Schlesinger’s *Bitter Fruit* was published in 1982. In contrast, Schneider’s *Communism in Guatemala* was published in 1958. These dates are important because, as previously discussed with regards to my alternative thesis, Stephen Streeter contends that the explanation that scholars have provided for why the U.S. intervened in Guatemala was influenced by the period in which they wrote. Unlike my original discussion of Streeter’s essay, where I focus on the revisionist and postrevisionist perspective, here, I focus on the realist perspective.

Specifically, Streeter contends that Schneider’s work fell under the “realist” heading, a heading completely apart from the Kennan or Kissinger typed “realist” defined in the first chapter. Indeed, Streeter uses the term *realist* in a much different way: “Realists…generally blame the Cold War on an aggressive, expansionist Soviet empire. Because realists believe that Arbenz was a Soviet puppet, they view his overthrow as the necessary rollback of communism in the Western Hemisphere.”216 Moreover, Streeter contends that “In the 1950s, anti-communist scholars such as …Ronald Schneider [who was a realist]… asserted that the Eisenhower

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administration had accurately gaged the “communist threat” in Guatemala.”²¹⁷ In short, realists embodied the McCarthyite perspective and Truman-like, legal-moralistic and Cold War internationalist outlook that I have previously discussed. As such, “realists” were naturally more sensitive to communist threats because they wrote within the extreme anti-communist environment from 1945 through the 1950s. This is not to suggest that Schneider’s work is not noteworthy (I have cited him multiple times), but, simply that Gleijeses and Kinzer, et al., and other authors apart from the “realist perspective,” were working in a less biased environment in the early 1970s onward and, therefore, were not influenced by the political atmosphere of the 1950s.²¹⁸ Hence, it is imperative to weigh these facts when determine which “experts” account of the “Guatemalan situation” is more accurate. Specifically, we must be cautious when Schneider speaks in a similar way to the “cold War internationalist” tone of the 1940s and 1950s U.S. policy makers. Furthermore, we should take notice when Schneider “takes it easy” on Arevalo and Arbenz because his bias would never incline him toward such sympathy.

### 3.1.2 Arevalo and Arbenz: Political Ideology, Relationship with Domestic Communists, Stance on Marxism and Communism, and Stance on Democracy:

I will first discuss Arevalo and Arbenz’s political ideology, their relationship with domestic communists, their respective stances on Marxism and communism, and their pro-democratic stances, variables that will subsequently be analyzed in the case of Velasco.

²¹⁷ Streeter, p. 63.
²¹⁸ Streeter, p. 62.
To begin, Arevalo became president in March 1945 following the 1944 “October Revolution.”\textsuperscript{219} Shortly thereafter, Arevalo claimed to have formed a revolutionary ideology: “Spirited Socialism”:

Our socialism does not...aim at an ingenious distribution of goods, or the stupid economic equalization of men who are economically different. Our socialism aims at liberating men psychologically, granting to all the psychological and spiritual integrity denied by conservatism and liberalism.\textsuperscript{220}

In part, Arevalo believed “Spirited Socialism” sought to transcend the clash between liberalism and communism by forging its independent political and economic path.

Yet, according to Schneider “Spirited Socialism” was not practical in action: “The ideas which he expressed were to prove a wholly inadequate basis for his government and never attained significant acceptance as the philosophy of the Guatemalan social revolution.” Rather, Schneider argues that Arevalo’s more “practical approach to politics” was called Arevalismo.\textsuperscript{221}

In this regard, Kinzer, et al. argues that “When Juan Jose Arevalo took office in March 1945, he set forth priorities to guide him during his six-year term: agrarian reform, protection of labor, a better educational system and consolidation of political democracy.”\textsuperscript{222} In an undated report from the U.S embassy to the State Department, Earl T. Crain reflected on Arevalo’s view on his presidential tenure:

In a reply to a question as to what he considered the best accomplishment of his Government, Arevalo stated that he was especially proud of the social legislation enacted under his regime. He explained that formerly the laws on the subject were the product of a group of capitalists who legislated exclusively from the point of view of their own interests. Arevalo stated that this group, consisting of ten percent of the population had governed the other ninety percent.\textsuperscript{223}

\textsuperscript{220} Ibid., p. 17.
\textsuperscript{221} Schneider, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{222} Kinzer, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{223} Crain, Earl T. "Habana 2194." (No Date or Filing number: Presumed to occur around January 1951; Check 714.001). AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. University of Pittsburgh Library: Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm.
Indeed, Arevalo’s agenda was clearly focused on remedying the vast inequalities of Guatemalan society.

Yet, over the course of his Presidency and even in retirement, Arevalo argued that neither he nor his political agenda was influenced by communist ideology. Nonetheless, according to Kinzer, et al., Arevalo confided in Jose Manuel Fortuney, “Guatemala’s number one communist.”224 In fact Schneider argues, “There is irrefutable proof that Arevalo numbered some of the Communist leaders among his close friends and political collaborators and appointed them to responsible and influential positions in his government.”225

Even so, as my survey shows, Arevalo was predominantly opposed to communism, not only from an ideological standpoint, but politically as well. Schneider admits, “It would appear that Arevalo viewed them as home-grown variety of communists [opposed to the more dangerous international communists I suppose],” and therefore Arevalo felt, “that he could control them.”226 In one of his campaign speeches, Arevalo argued:

Communism is contrary to human nature, for it is contrary to the psychology of man…Here we see the superiority of the doctrine of democracy, which does not seek to destroy anything that man has accomplished, but humbly seeks to “straighten out the crooked paths.” The philosophy of democracy is satisfied with working with human elements, retouching, harmonizing movements as in an unfinished symphony, hoping not for infinite beauty.227

To the same effect, Earl T. Crain, a U.S. diplomat in Guatemala, reflected on Arevalo’s stance on communism in an undated Dispatch titled, “Habana 2194,” which suggests that Arevalo was unconcerned about any of his “relations” with “home grown” communists. According to the document, Arevalo, while on a visit to Cuba to meet with the Cuban President Carlos Prio Sacarras, was questioned concerning communism. Crain reported: “Amused by the

224 Kinzer et al., p. 57
225 Schneider, p. 23.
226 Ibid.
227 Kinzer et al., p. 32
subject, [Arevalo] stated that communism was an extravagant idea...to which relatively few were dedicated. He added that communism was a theme exploited by the Catholics as a means of frightening the people...to such an extent that to talk about it would be like talking about the devil.”

According to Schneider:

The official position of Arevalo as president toward Communism was based upon toleration of Communists as individuals but opposition to the formation of an organized Communist party...While in some of his earliest speeches he professed disagreement with the principles of Communism, he accepted the help of Communists on the ground that he needed all the possible support. The sum of his public statements was that Communism as a doctrine was innocuous, but the Communists as a political power were a danger, although less so than the falangists. While Soviet imperialism was a potential threat, according to Arevalo that posed by the United States was immediate.

Moreover, following Arevalo’s presidency on November 15, 1950, Arevalo was asked to reflect on “Spirited Socialism” and his view on Communism in Guatemala during an interview. The interviewer asked, “How do you describe the left of center, extreme left of center, combination of socialism and free enterprise? Is your socialism similar to the Labor Government of Great Britain? That is, do you believe in nationalization and collectivization of industry more than the British Socialists?” In response, Arevalo stated, “The political position of the President of Guatemala has nothing to do with the political sects of England nor the United States, nor of other European or American powers. The political position of the president is Guatemalan and nothing more than Guatemalan, being focused on the present problems in Guatemala.” Subsequently, Arevalo was also asked to comment on his country’s fight against communism. In response, he stated, “Communism and every kind of totalitarianism is prohibited under the laws of Guatemala as organized entities, but not as individual thinking.”

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228 Crain, Earl T. "Habana 2194." [No Date or Filing number: Presumed to occur around January 1951; Check 714.001]. AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm.
229 Schneider, p. 22, 23.
During his presidency, Arevalo’s actions mirrored his sentiments. On January 25, 1946, Arevalo ordered the closing of Escuela Claridad, “a Communist-run indoctrination center and training school for labor leaders.”\(^{231}\) A year prior, he had also ousted fifteen foreign communists in the face of growing anti-communist feelings in the country.\(^{232}\) Ralph Woodward Jr. argues in his article “Octubre: Communist Appeal to the Urban Labor Force of Guatemala, 1950-1953,” that at the end of Arevalo’s tenure, “from July 9\(^{th}\) to September 6\(^{th}\), 1950, and again from September 13\(^{th}\) to November 1\(^{st}\),” Arevalo “suppressed the publications of Octubre, the communist run newspaper because of “its obvious identification with foreign interest [(i.e. international communism)].”\(^{233}\) Hence, in total, Arevalo was clearly not a communist sympathizer. His opposition to their political freedom thoroughly demonstrates this point.

In regards to Arevalo’s commitment to democracy, in his inaugural speech, Arevalo lectured on Guatemalan freedom, while reflecting on his idol President Franklin Roosevelt: “He taught us that there is no need to cancel the concept of freedom in the democratic system in order to breathe into it a Socialist “spirit.”\(^{234}\) According to Kinzer, et al., when Arevalo took office he set out to consolidate Democracy, which above all the other goals—agrarian reform, protection of labor, and a better education system—“was perhaps the least complicated most universally demanded.” Kinzer, et al. further reports that “Arevalo liberated the long-suppressed energies of his people by permitting and encouraging the formation of political parties” and “guided the nation’s first Congress,” which attained “full equality with the executive branch.” Moreover,

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\(^{231}\) Kinzer et al., p. 56.
\(^{232}\) Schneider, p. 23.
freedom of speech “flourished.”235 In his final act as President, Arevalo oversaw the peaceful transfer of power through the democratic election of Jacabo Arbenz Guzman.

Arbenz ascended the presidency in March 1951. Like Arevalo, Arbenz’s political platform focused upon remedying the ills of the Guatemalan political infrastructure. Consequently, he proposed sweeping reforms similar to that of Arevalo. In his inaugural address, Arbenz argued:

To transform Guatemala from a dependent nation with a semi-colonial economy into a country that is economically independent; to transform Guatemala from a backward country with a semi-feudal economy into a modern capitalist country; to proceed in a way that will ensure the greatest possible improvement in the standard of living of the great masses of our people.236

Despite such goals, as will be argued in Chapter 3, U.S. policy makers were critical that social programs, especially Arbenz’s land reform program, signified a “communist threat” in Guatemala. Consequently, Arbenz refuted any charges that his reforms had an affiliation with communist ideology. For example, in the case of his largest social venture—land reform—Arbenz affirmed his right to such action and argued that “The landless will be granted title to the land according to the Constitution” and “Industrialization of the country cannot be achieved without agrarian reform.”237 From Arbenz’s perspective, the grounds for land reform were based upon an overarching need for economic growth in Guatemala:

I do not exaggerate when I say that the most important pragmatic point of my government and of the revolutionary movement of October is that one related to a profound change in the backward agricultural production of Guatemala, by way of an agrarian reform which puts an end to the latifundios and the semi-feudal practices, giving the land to thousands of peasants, raising their purchasing power and creating a great internal market favorable to the development of domestic industry.238

235 Ibid., p. 37.
236 Gleijeses, p. 149.
237 Aybar, p. 168.
238 Kinzer et al., p. 54.
Hence, in my survey of Arbenz’s land reform program, Arbenz never claimed that the program was connected to Marxist of communist ideology, nor did he say that it was influenced by it.

Although Arbenz argued that his land reform program was not communist inspired, Arbenz’s political ideology was impacted by Marxist thought prior to his presidency. According to Gleijeses, Maria, Arbenz’s wife, received a copy of the Communist Manifesto at a “woman’s congress” and shared it with Arbenz. In the interview, Maria stated, “Together we talked about the Manifesto. It seemed to us to explain what we had been feeling.” She went on to state, “Marxist theory…offered Jacabo explanations that weren’t available in other theories. What other theory can one use to analyze our country’s past? Marx is not perfect, but he comes closest to explaining the history of Guatemala.” Maria concluded, “Through all this reading…Jacabo was convinced that the triumph of communism in the world was inevitable and desirable. The march of history was toward communism. Capitalism was doomed.”

I hope to point out, however, that, as always, actions speak louder than words. While in tenure, Arbenz never joined the CP or ever claimed to support the CP for anything more than the political support they offered him. Moreover, as far as my research suggests, U.S. policy makers neither heard Maria’s testimony nor heard of these thoughts from any other source. Thus, as argued, U.S policy makers were reliant, predominantly, on secondary sources to form an opinion about Arbenz. Even Schneider agrees, “Publicly at least, Arbenz’s attitude toward the Communists was undefined.”

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239 Gleijeses, p. 141.
240 Ibid., p. 147.
241 See p. 154, 155.
242 Schneider, p. 36.
Yet, for Arbenz, the communists were still a valuable political tool. Like Arevalo, Gleijeses argues that “More and more, Arbenz appreciated the honesty and discipline of a small group of friends—the leaders of the clandestine communist party of Guatemala.”243 Kinzer argues that, “Though the president himself never joined any political party, he did turn increasingly to the communists—who had helped him in his campaign and formed the smallest component of his four-party coalition in Congress—because, with their control of some urban-based unions, they could mobilize popular support for his programs.”244 However, Kinzer, et al. argues that “Arbenz, whose primary ideology was nationalism, enthusiastically accepted the backing of the Communists,” but “never doubted that when the need arose, he could keep them in line”245 (a stance very similar to Arevalo’s). In fact, in a *New York Times* editorial titled, “The Ghosts of Guatemala’s Past,” Stephen Schlesinger, co-author to Kinzer in *Bitter Fruit* similarly argued:

> It is true that Arbenz’s supporters in the Guatemalan Legislature did include the Communist Party, but it was the smallest part of his coalition. Arbenz had also appointed a few communists to lower-level jobs in his administration. But there was no evidence that Arbenz himself was anything more than a European-style democratic Socialist.246

Although Arbenz spoke little of his disposition towards communism and how it impacted his agenda, he publically defended the communists’ political freedom. Arbenz argued that the communists’ political freedom was deserved under a democratic system (in direct contrast to Arevalo’s stance on the CP’s political freedom) and expressed this belief in his speech while opening congress on March 1, 1954:

> The democratic and progressive forces of Guatemala are not something isolated from the democratic and patriotic program of these same forces, which were grouped around my

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243 Gleijeses, p. 455
244 Kinzer, p. 58.
245 Kinzer et al., p. 61.
candidacy and firmly support my government. To attempt to combat certain democratic and progressive forces without attacking at the same time our program is not only paradoxical but presume an ingenuousness on our part in agreeing to lose the support of what has been the basis of the conquests achieved by the program of that regime. 247

In the face of a growing concern over communist influence in government, Arbenz continually suggested communist political success was an aggregate of democracy and freedom in the political process. Arbenz reflected following his overthrow:

The political parties which aided the government were of the most varied tendencies. Among them were found some moderates and some extreme leftists. My government counted also on the aid of the Guatemalan Labor party (communists). There was a great stir over the participation of this party in the activities of my government, but this was only the external excuse for the (U.S.) aggression. Among the parties, among them all, the Communists had the same opportunities as others. 248

Furthermore, the protection of democratic values was evident: Kinzer et al. reports that in 1953, a “conservative American Journalist,” contended that “Anti-Communist and pro-American newspapers were still in business. They attacked the government as hotly as Hearst used to attack the New Deal, yet their editors walked the street unharmed.”249 Indeed, over the course of Arbenz’s tenure, although he may have had Marxist inspiration in private, he was fully committed to constitutional democracy and only used communist support for political purposes and electoral strength.

3.1.3 Velasco: Political Ideology, Relationship with Domestic Communists, Stance on Marxism and Communism, and Stance on Democracy:

Yet, how did Velasco compare with Arevalo’s and Arbenz’s political ideology, their relations with domestic communists, their stance on communism and Marxism, and their pro-

247 Schneider, p. 41.
248 Ibid., p. 192, 193.
249 Kinzer et al., p. 60.
democratic stances? The Velasco regime took power in 1968, following the successful coup d’état of Fernando Belaunde Terry, and, according to Christine Hunefeldt, in *A Brief History of Peru*, “The government intended to find a route of development for the country that would be neither communist nor capitalist, a sort of state capitalism with social redistribution to benefit the poorest in the country.”250 Orin Starn and Carlos Degregori, the editors of *The Peru Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, also argue that Velasco’s regime “would forge a ‘third way’ of state-directed national development between capitalism and socialism.”251 Similarly, Ruben Berrios and Cole Blasier argue, in “Peru and the Soviet Union (1969-1989)” that Velasco, “stressed that Peru would follow its own ways and was determined to shake off foreign domination.”252

In this light, Alfred Stepan argues in his book *The State and Society: Peruvian Comparative Perspective* that the Velasco regime adamantly rejected Marxism.253 In the same breath, however, Stepan also reports that Velasco simultaneously rejected U.S. styled liberalism: “Liberalism and Capitalism were attacked for engendering the ‘free manifestation of interests and the egoism of the individual without any discipline and without any restraint.’”254 By the same token, the Peruvian state believed that the advent of capitalism precipitated the occurrence of communism and Velasco believed that the presence of capitalism in “developing states” “contributed to a ‘state of inconceivable misery of the masses.’”255 On the whole, with such sentiments in mind, Hunefeldt contends that “What Peru’s military leadership envisaged was “socialism from above” in order to prevent “socialism from below.”256 She further notes that,

254 Ibid., p. 143.
255 Ibid., p. 143.
256 Hunefeldt, p. 229.
“Velasco’s policies were soon labeled in the United States as the ‘Peruvian experiment’ and in the Soviet Union as ‘Peruvian socialism’.”

The congruency between Velasco’s political philosophy and Arevalo’s “spirited socialism” is apparent: both favored revolutionary paths that transcended the doctrines of communism and liberalism. And, moreover, like Arevalo and Arbenz, Velasco’s agenda sought to abridge the inequalities in Peruvian wealth—between rich and poor—while providing structural change to bolster the economy. According to Article 2 of Decree law No. 17063, the first two goals of the revolutionary government were to:

1. Transform the structure of the State making it more dynamic and efficient as required for a proper Government action; and

2. to promote the less favored segments of the population to higher standards of living compatible with the dignity of the human being. This is to be achieved through the transformation of the economic, social and cultural structures of the Nation.

To the end of assisting “the less favored segments of the population,” Hunefeldt argues that, like Arbenz and Arevalo, Velasco favored land reform: “General Velasco regarded agrarian reform as a necessary first step toward more sweeping reforms throughout society.” Velasco proclaimed on June 24, 1969, while addressed the nation on national television:

This is an historic day. And it’s important that we all be aware of its full significance. Today, the Revolutionary Government has issued the Agrarian Reform Law, thereby giving the country its most vital instrument of transformation and development. History will remember June 24 as the beginning of an irreversible process that will lay the groundwork for true national greatness, founded on social justice and the real participation of the people in the wealth and future of our motherland.

257 Hunefeldt, p. 231.
259 Ibid., p. 274.
260 Hunefeldt, p. 234.
Velasco’s announcement mimics that of Arbenz’s; Like Arbenz the word choice of development was a keystone in their respective speeches.

Although Velasco rejected Marxism as an economic and political model (as did Arevalo and Arbenz), he was not opposed to communist support. Stepan argues:

In order to create a countervailing power to APRA in the trade union sector, the military government granted official recognition and valuable support to a national Communist party trade union confederation CGTP (Confederacion General de Trabajadores del Peru). The CGTP and the Communist party in return gave the new government much needed support in the installation period.262

Yet, despite this political relationship, no evidence suggests that Velasco formed close personal relations with the domestic communists in Peru as was seen with Arevalo and Arbenz in Guatemala.

In reference to Velasco’s stance on democracy, Maxwell Cameron and Phillip Mauceri, in The Peruvian Labrynth: Polity, Society, Economy, argue that “Velasco… emphasized that authoritarian rule was necessary for a period because of the failure of the previous democratic administrations—particularly the failure of the various political parties—to implement the changes that appeared appropriate for the era.”263 In my survey of Velasco’s coup, I also contend that Velasco removed the democratically elected Fernando Belaunde because his regime had failed to carry out the social reforms that it had promised and thus Velasco hoped to succeed where Belaunde had failed. Furthermore, according to Cameron, et al., Velasco’s dictatorship was only a temporary and necessary measure before achieving the “long-term” goal of a “true” democracy.264

262 Stepan, p. 148.
264 Ibid., xi.
Yet, under the auspices of “authoritarianism,” political parties were greatly limited in their ability to impact change through the political process. Indeed, Cameron, et al., contend that the Velasco government hoped to increase political participation, but “contradicted” itself “by its refusal to surrender its own authority and by its rejection of national and local elections. Moreover, in the so-called no-party thesis, the government repudiated political parties, including a progovernment party.”

Yet, over the course of Velasco’s tenure, Cameron, et al. reports that “a dramatic strength in political organizations” was apparent.

Indeed, political freedom was not altogether vacant. In fact, to a limited extent, parties and civilian policy makers held positions within the Velasco regime. Gorman describes that:

The military opted to assume control of only those positions that directly concerned decision making, leaving the more technical positions in the hands of the trained civilian bureaucrats. This dependency on civilian state employees was accepted as the only alternative until the military could form its own core of experts to take on the full range of public administration functions.

Moreover, Civilian parties maintained a limited level of political strength in government through a parliamentary body. In the 1960s, three parties received over 80% of the votes: APRA, Accion Popular (AP), and UNO, while Marxist parties, including the CP only received 4 percent.

Even so, over the course of the Velasco tenure, Velasco’s cabinet was comprised solely of military men and the military dominated the government as a whole: By mid-1975, “6 out of 14 vice-ministers, 33 out of 48 sectorial advisors, 30 out of 91 major agency heads, the

265 See p. 110.
266 Cameron et al., xii.
268 Cameron, p. X.
269 Ibid., p. 149.
directors of all independent bodies of the Government, and the presidents of 16 state industries, were also military men.”

In summary, all three leaders—Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco—hoped to modernize their respective countries. The prime difference between the three was that Arevalo and Arbenz were pro-democratic and they came to power through the electoral process under the Guatemala constitutional democracy, while Velasco took power through a military coup and imposed an authoritarian styled rule throughout his tenure. Yet, aside from these similarities, the three leaders stance on communism and Marxism were similar in many ways. First, Arevalo and Velasco were clearly anti-communist. The degree to which one was more anti-communist than another is not exceptionally clear. Indeed, the fact that Arevalo formed personal relations with domestic CP suggests that he was not adamantly opposed to them. In his own words, communism as an “organized entity” was not allowed, but it was permitted as “individual thinking.” Yet, although Velasco claimed to be exceptionally anti-communist, as I will soon argue, Velasco cultivated the CP’s support and provided them official recognition in his term. But, unlike Velasco, Arevalo did not form personal relations with the domestic communists. Hence, the difference between Velasco and Arevalo is not exceptionally clear. With regards to Arbenz, we can see from a historical perspective that he may have favored a Marxist approach to politics, but his actions and statements throughout his tenure were not explicitly pro or anti-Marxist or communist. This is not to say he did not utilize communist support, because he surely did, both politically and personally. Nonetheless, his disposition was always that of protecting constitutional democracy and, as many experts suggest, he was no more than a nationalist. Even so, Arbenz was surely more pro-communist than Arevalo and Velasco. The difference between

270 Ibid., p. 150.
Arevalo and Arbenz, however, was that Arbenz, like Velasco, officially recognized the CP in his term and utilized them for support. But like Arevalo, he confided personally in domestic CP members. Despite such difference, explicitly clear similarities can be drawn between all three leaders. Once again, why was Velasco judged in a different light than Arevalo and Arbenz?

3.2 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REGIMES: ARBENZ AND VELASCO

3.2.1 Arbenz’s Guatemalan Social Platforms:

Another variable that caused U.S. policy makers concern was Arevalo’s and Arbenz’s expropriation of U.S. business interests, which, as I will argue, U.S. policy makers considered as evidence that a communist threat had manifest in Guatemala. In 1944, Arevalo’s government engaged in sweeping reforms aimed to remedy the social ills of Guatemala’s antiquated society, political system, and economic system. To this same end, Arbenz’s agrarian reform of 1952 called for the expropriation of private estates and idle land.271 The decree mandated that, “Estates of more than 672 acres would be expropriated; idle land in estates of between 224 and 672 acres would be expropriated only if less than two thirds of the estate was under cultivation: estates of less than 224 acres would not be affected.”272 In total, the decree led to the redistribution of

271 Gleijeses, p. 150.
272 Ibid.
603,615 hectares out of 2.8 million hectares of cultivable land area\textsuperscript{273} to around 100,000 families\textsuperscript{274} by the time Arbenz was overthrown.

To say the least, the largest land owner in the country—the United Fruit Company—was not pleased. It owned 550,000 acres, of which 386,901 acres of uncultivated land was expropriated.\textsuperscript{275} As compensation, Arbenz offered the company $627,572 based upon the UFCO’s declared tax value for the land.\textsuperscript{276} In contrast, the UFCO wanted much more, and with the strong arm of the U.S. State Department, asked for $15,854,849. Kinzer recounts that although Guatemala’s offer averaged $2.99 per acre and the company had only paid $1.49 acre twenty years prior, the State Department was asking for $75 an acre.\textsuperscript{277}

Aside from the land reform, according to Stephen Kinzer, Arbenz was also motivated by recommendations by the World Bank to combat the domination of foreign business through direct competition rather than nationalization.\textsuperscript{278} For example, he sought to end the monopolization of the IRCA railways and also the UFCO’s ports, by beginning construction on a “highway to the Atlantic” and a publically owned port. Similarly, he began work on a publically owned electric company to combat the monopoly enjoyed by the American owned electricity company.\textsuperscript{279} Nevertheless, above all, these social reform initiatives were docile in comparison to those seen in the Velasco regime.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{275} Kinzer, p. 75.
\item \textsuperscript{276} Ibid., p. 76.
\item \textsuperscript{277} Ibid., p. 76
\item \textsuperscript{278} Ibid., p. 53.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Ibid., p. 53
\end{itemize}

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3.2.2 Velasco’s Peruvian Social Platforms:

Indeed, by 1968 the military decided to remove President Belaunde because he had failed to carry out the modernist reform program that he had originally campaigned for in 1963. In his stead, as argued, Velasco Alvarado picked up the reigns and initiated sweeping social reforms. Philip Mauceri recounts that Velasco acted quickly once taking office: “The first act of the ‘revolutionary’ regime was to nationalize the International Petroleum Company (IPC), whose generous treatment by the Belaunde government had created a national scandal.” Starn, et al. ed. argue that Velasco’s “reforms included the selective nationalization of foreign enterprises, the creation of a state-run system of mass organizations called the National System of Social Mobilization (SINAMOS), and, most importantly, the massive agrarian reform, handing over the estates of big landowners to their former serfs and employees.” Stepan recalls that there were sweeping changes in education, health care, and communication and “the state nationalized many foreign firms in sectors such as mining, communications, fish-meal plants and banking.”

Francisco Durand argues, in “The Growth and Limitations of the Peruvian right”: “The military regime inaugurated a new era of intense governmental controls, radical social reforms, and widespread intervention of the public sector in the economy.” Furthermore, Hunefeldt contends that “a reform of Peru’s enterprises” included “[turning] over 50 percent of firm shares to its workers,” and “According to Velasco’s plan, these enterprises were to become ‘industrial communities,’ in which workers became shareholders and participated in the

280 Mauceri, p. 16.
281 Ibid., p. 17.
283 Stepan, p. 120.
enterprises management and profits, or they might become a ‘social property enterprise,’ owned by the workers.” Nonetheless, as discussed, for the United States, the most pressing issues revolved around the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company.

Yet, as previously indicated, of all of the social reform initiatives enacted by the Velasco regime, land reform may have been the most important for Velasco. Originally initiated in 1969, Velasco’s agrarian reform law distributed land to over 350,000 families (one fourth of the entire rural population). From 1968-1980, 7,889,008 hectares were redistributed out of 7.6 million cultivable land area, comparably more significant than the land distribution reform in Guatemala 20 years earlier (only 600,000 hectares).

Putting the entirety of Velasco’s social reforms into perspective, Stepan compared Peru’s “bold structural changes” to Cuba, arguing that no other “Latin American change-oriented regimes” had succeeded in such a vast overhaul of the state. The Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress reported:

At the end of the Belaunde government in 1968, three-quarters of mining, one-half of manufacturing, two-thirds of the commercial banking system, and one-third of the fishing industry were under direct foreign control. Velasco reversed this situation. By 1975 state enterprises accounted for more than half of mining output, two-thirds of the banking system, a fifth of industrial production, and half of total productive investment.

Indeed, such massive social reforms far exceeded those seen in Guatemala twenty years prior. Once again, why was Velasco’s regime overlooked?

286 Ibid., p. 232.
287 Stepan, p. 137.
289 Albertus, n. p.
290 Stepan, p. 120.
291 Hudson, p. 51.
3.2.3 The CP in Arbenz’s regime: 292

Despite the aforementioned similarities, what role did the CP have in the regimes of Arbenz and Velasco? First, in reference to Arbenz’s regime, according to Schneider, the communists influence in government can be attributed…[to] their ability to hold key positions in the Arbenz administration. 293 Schneider contends that the communists, the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT), were the smallest of a five group government coalition in 1954,294 the supposed height of communist infiltration, according to U.S. policy makers. The other four parties were the General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (CGTG), the National Confederation of Campesinos (CNCG), the Revolutionary Action Party (PAR), and Party of the Guatemalan Revolution (PRG). Nonetheless, Schneider argues that the communists were gaining influence in PAR.295 In fact, he further argues:

By the beginning of 1953 the political structure of the Arbenz regime was becoming apparent. The Communists were now a full partner in the official coalition and in a position to aim at establishing their hegemony over the other parties. During the third year of Arbenz’s presidency the Communist party grew rapidly in size and influence. In the government they were able to bring about the Guatemalan withdrawal from the Organization of Central American States in April 1953 and were instrumental in shaping the ultra-nationalistic policy which resulted in a defense of Communism by the Guatemalan delegation at the Caracas Conference in March 1954. In the countryside they exploited agrarian reform and the rivalry of the major government parties to become the most dynamic factor in Guatemalan politics. 296

Yet, Schneider’s account portrays the role of the CP into the Arbenz regime as far reaching and exceptionally influential, but not all authors agreed on this perspective. In contrast
to Schneider, Kinzer, et al. argues that the communist were relatively limited throughout government:

Communist numbered about 26 in the 350-member staff of the National Agrarian Department, the government agency in which they had the strongest influence. But in terms of numbers, the party remained marginal. There were only 4 Communists deputies in the 1953-54 Congress. (The rest of the ruling coalition consisted of 24 deputies from the dominant PAR, 16 from the Party of the Guatemalan Revolution and 7 from the National Renovation Party—for the most party moderates and liberals.) No more than seven or eight Communists ever held significant sub-cabinet posts, and neither Arevalo nor Arbenz ever appointed a single Communist to his cabinet.  

Kinzer also acknowledges that “the total membership of the party never exceeded 4,000 in a nation of almost 3 million people.” In contrast, Schneider admits that “the CGTG claimed over 100,000 members, while its agrarian counter party CNCG, boasted a membership more than twice as large.” Hence, in comparison, the communist party was numerically infinitesimal to the other major parties in Guatemala.

To the same accord, historian Cole Blasier contends in his book *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Response to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* that the communist power in Guatemala was not significant:

All the…evidence leaves no doubt that Guatemalan Communists had made substantial political gains in a half dozen years. They dominated the Guatemalan labor movement and had relatively free access to and influence with the president. Influence is one thing; control is another. It would be difficult to determine quantitative methods whether the Communists “controlled” or “dominated” the Guatemalan government. As events so dramatically show later, the Communists most emphatically did not control the most powerful organization in the country—the armed forces. And the weight of evidence would seem to show that, lacking a single cabinet post, they could scarcely have controlled Guatemala as a whole. What would, no doubt, be fairer to say is that the groups which controlled Guatemala under Arbenz had interests and policies established independently of the Communists which the Communists supported. As a result of domestic and foreign developments, the government’s and the Communists’ policies

297 Kinzer et al., p. 58, 59.
298 Ibid. et al., p. 59.
299 Schneider, p. 40.
overlapped in many areas...President Arbenz found Communist support useful. As he grew weaker, he needed that support even more. 300

Based upon the fact that Schneider is clearly speaking in unison with U.S. policy makers on the subject, as I have argued he would, I find it difficult to agree with his position on this matter. Thus, it appears that the latter two accounts are more accurate. Although it is perhaps obvious, Blasier was not speaking from a “realist” position and his book was published well after the Coup in 1954. In summary, although CP members gained government posts, their numbers were relatively infinitesimal and no CP members gained access to Arbenz’s cabinet. Thus, we must question the extent of influence the CP wielded.

3.2.4 The CP in Velasco’s regime:

Although there has been far less analysis of the role of the CP in Velasco’s regime, when compared with Arevalo and, especially Arbenz, my survey suggests that no CP members held government posts apart from their very minor role in the Peruvian parliament.301 Stephen Gorman, in his book, “Post-Revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation” argues that the military dominated the government during Velasco’s tenure, which naturally limited civilian, and therefore political parties, access to government positions. Hence, although I cannot supply an exact rational for why CP members did not hold positions, it is reasonable to suggest that the limitations on access to government positions played a role. Yet, it is crucial to highlight that Cameron, et al. contends:

All of us scholars, including Carol Wise and Carmen Rosa Balbi…agree that whatever the Velasco government’s political intentions were, the result was a dramatic increase in

301 Cameron et al., p. X.
the strength of popular political organizations, in particular of the political Left. Political parties of the Marxist Left won 29 percent of the vote in Peru’s 1978 [(three years after Velasco’s overthrow)] Constituent Assembly election, in contrast to less than 4 percent in the 1962 and 1963 elections.302

Although the CP did not hold government positions, it and other “leftist” parties gained considerable strength during Velasco’s tenure. Moreover, as I will argue the lack of government positions did not hinder the influence of the CP in State politics. Indeed, much like the CP in Guatemala, the CP in Peru’s major strength and source of influence was through the respective labor movements in each country. Thus, the fact that a limited number of CP members held government positions in the Arbenz’s regime opposed to Velasco’s should not be of great consequence. Still, the question should be whether or not U.S. policy makers considered this difference to matter. As I will argue, U.S. policy makers were aware of the CP presence in government, but the major source of threat came from the labor movement and the land reform program.

3.2.5 The Arbenz Regime: Relations with the U.S.S.R. and Socialist countries.

A major point of threat for U.S. policy makers was the possibility that Arevalo and Arbenz’s regimes had engaged in diplomatic relations with the Socialist Bloc and the Soviet Union. Yet, Gleijeses argues that the Soviet Union, on only one occasion, tried to establish interest in “developing ties with Guatemala,” with reference to banana sales, but because of a lack of transportation abilities the conversations halted.303 The only other known interaction between Arbenz’s regime and a Socialist Bloc member occurred on May 17, 1954, when Swedish ship

302 Ibid.
303 Gleijeses, p. 187.
was apprehended while delivering Czechoslovakian weapons to Guatemala. In hind sight, Cullather reports that Manuel Fortuney “had met in Prague in November [of 1953] with Antonin Novotony, first secretary of the Czech Communist Party, to negotiate the purchase of 2,000 tons of captured Nazi weapons.” Yet, Cullather notes that the CIA did not know of Fortuney’s travels, but only realized that Arbenz’s regime had engaged in trade relations with the Socialist bloc when a State Department official realized “that the Bank of Guatemala had telegraphically transferred $4,860,000 through the Union Bank of Switzerland and Stabank, Prague, to the account of Investa, a Czech firm.” In response, the U.S. began scanning the Guatemala coast to apprehend any shipments from Czechoslovakia, which resulted in the discovery of the arms shipment. Stephen Kinzer reflects, that despite this discovery, “No serious evidence ever turned up after the coup establishing a secret tie to the Soviets…the much-publicized claim that Guatemala could become a base for a Soviet seizure of the Panama Canal was…difficult to sustain.”

Aside from formal diplomatic relations between the Guatemalan State and the Socialist Bloc, Gleijeses contends that even the local Guatemalan communists, let alone the regime, did not form relations with the international communist movement to any great extent: “On occasion the PGT leaders did travel to the Soviet bloc…but] The evidence in the Guatemalan Transcripts supports the testimony of PGT leaders that their contacts with West European and Soviet bloc communist parties was very limited.” In an interview with the two main Communist leaders, Gutierrez and Fortuny, both men explained, “We were a provincial party; we didn’t look beyond

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305 Cullather, p. 54.
306 Ibid., p. 78.
307 Ibid., p. 78.
308 Kinzer et al., p. 107.
309 Gleijeses, p. 186.
our village; we didn’t even have an international committee.” They continued by explaining, “We were overwhelmed with work. We were preoccupied with the development of PGT and with Guatemala domestic politics.”

3.2.6 The Velasco Regime: Relations with the U.S.S.R. and Socialist countries.

In contrast to the limited Guatemalan-Socialist Bloc relations, the Velasco regime engaged in extensive interaction with members of the Socialist Bloc. Berrios argues that for the Peruvian regime:

Relations with the United States were strained after a number of U.S. firms were nationalized, provoking the threat of application of the Hickenlooper and Pelly Amendments by the U.S. government. In redefining her foreign policy, Peru began to diversify her foreign trade and, for the first time, expanded her diplomatic ties with the Socialist countries.

Velasco specifically argued, “Contact with countries...whose markets can open to our products and who technical and economic cooperation can be very useful in the undertaking of national development.” Likewise, According to noted historian Richard Walter, the Velasco’s number two man— General Mercado Jarrin— the Peruvian Foreign Minister, was also interested in forming relations with the Socialist Bloc to combat the United States domination of Peruvian politics.:

[Mercado’s] first and paramount concern was how to deal with the United States, which he saw as the main threat to Peruvian sovereignty and the kind of revolutionary and nationalistic policies the regime planned to implement. Recognizing the power of the United State and the relative weakness of Peru, he devised a strategy to try to counterbalance U.S. influence through various manipulations and maneuvers. These

310 Ibid., p. 188.
311 Berrios, p. 367, 368.
312 Gormon, p. 181.
included establishing links with the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and other communist nations, which he claimed was his idea.\textsuperscript{313}

Mercado and Velasco thus promoted relations with the Socialist bloc in order to counterbalance the influence of the United States.

In order to achieve this end, according to Berrios, et al., “Diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union were established on February 1969. Javier Perez de Cuellar, later Secretary-General of the United Nations, was appointed Peru's first ambassador to Moscow.”\textsuperscript{314} Subsequently, Berrios contends that “Peru became the center of Soviet operations on the continent. Soviets interaction with Peru, which began in 1969, was part of Soviet global strategy.”\textsuperscript{315} A part of this strategy, according to Berrios, was the acquisition of a land strip for Soviet planes to land in South America. In fact, Berrios argues that once the landing strip was created it became the “main point of access to South America” for the Soviet airline Aeroflot where Soviet passengers could “fan out from Peru to neighboring countries.”\textsuperscript{316}

According to the Stephen Gorman, in “Peruvian Foreign Policy Since 1975: External Political and Economic Initiatives”: “Peru established diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and numerous other Socialist countries, including, eventually, Cuba.”\textsuperscript{317} Barrios recounts, “The trade agreements initially signed with the U.S.S.R. involved intergovernmental, bilateral commissions to exchange goods, and to find areas of cooperation and facilitate credit lines.”\textsuperscript{318} As the trade relations cemented, the U.S.S.R.


\textsuperscript{314} Berrios, p. 373.

\textsuperscript{315} Berrios, p. 366.

\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., p. 367.


\textsuperscript{318} Berrios, p. 368.
“exported more to Peru than to any other Latin American state except Argentina and Brazil, and its clients, Cuba and Nicaragua.”\textsuperscript{319}

Moreover, the Peruvians also sought to bolster their military power. Under the Belaunde government, preceding Velasco, Peru had purchased fighter jets from France, resulting in a backlash from the United States and a “reluctance” to sell “sophisticated weapons systems to Peru.” Berrios contends that the Peruvians looked to other sources for such weapons and the U.S.S.R. responded favorably. Stephen Gormon describes that “The Soviet Union…became an important source of arms and related technology over time [to Peru]. The army and air force took full advantage of this credit to acquire some of the most modern equipment that existed in South America.”\textsuperscript{320} Near the end of the Velasco regime in 1974 and 1975, and even after Velasco’s overthrow, through the 1980’s, Velasco’s regime and the Peruvian regimes that followed, received “250 TS 5 tanks and a fleet of 36 supersonic SU-22 Sukhoi fighter bombers as well as seven MI-8 helicopters and I6 Antonov planes.”\textsuperscript{321}

In summary, the Velasco regime engaged in extensive relations with the Socialist Bloc and especially the Soviet Union. This evidence alone, above all the other variables, reveals that U.S. policy makers had plenty of evidence that they could legitimize that a communist threat was present. Once again, why was Velasco’s regime not considered a threat?

3.2.7 CP Power in Guatemalan Labor:

Yet, another major point of concern for U.S. policy makers was the CP’s power in Guatemalan labor movement, which they felt indicated a “communist threat.” My survey relies

\textsuperscript{319} Ibid., p. 366.
\textsuperscript{320} Gorman, “Peruvian Foreign Policy Since 1975: External Political and Economic Initiatives.” p. 164.
\textsuperscript{321} Berrios, p. 376.
predominantly upon Schneider’s research in *Communism in Guatemala*, which is the most comprehensive account and research of the Guatemalan labor movement that I have found. In total, I contend that the CP’s influence in labor was far reaching. But, this was not always the case. In fact, Schneider contends that “At the time of the overthrow of Ubico, no real trade unions existed in Guatemala.”

Henceforth, following the success of the October Revolution in 1944, the labor movement grew rapidly. Logically speaking, the growth was most likely an aggregate of the new found freedom to form unions under the Arevalo regime. Kinzer et al. argues that:

…the Arevalo administration’s 1947 Labor Code” provided that “government should no longer automatically support large farm owners and other employees. Arevalo’s Minister of Labor explained, ‘a capitalist democracy ought to compensate with the means at its disposal, some of which are legislative, for the economic inequality between those who possess the means of production and those who sell manuallabor.”

Furthermore Gleijeses contends that the labor code “In a more advanced country… would have been a moderate document; in Guatemala, it was radical. It affirmed the right to unionize (but set crippling limitations on agriculture unions.) It afforded protection from unfair dismissals and guaranteed the right to strike within a conciliation mechanism.”

Yet, even prior to the “new labor code,” the CTG (Confederacion de Trabajadores de Guatemala) was formed on December 5, 1944 and encompassed seventeen “embryotic” trade unions in Guatemala’s capital. At this time, according to Robert Wasserstrom, “many of the men who were active in union affairs were Communists and Socialists.” Although the CTG split in 1945 into two factions—SAMF (the Sindicato de Accion y Mejoramiento

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322 Schneider, p. 124.
323 Kinzer et al. p. 38, 39.
324 Gleijeses, p. 41.
325 Schneider, p. 125.
Ferrocarrileros) and STEG (the Sindicato de Trabajadores en Educacion de Guatemala)—the workers movement was ultimately consolidated in the General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (CGTP) in the midst of Arbenz’s tenure.\footnote{For a more thorough account of the history of the Guatemalan labor movement see Schneider, p. 124-155.}

In the late 1940s, the National Worker’s Political Committee (CPNT) was formed to allow the leaders of labor unions to convene in order to unite workers behind a single candidate.\footnote{Schneider, p. 134.} Woodward argues that the communist newspaper Octubre similarly agreed: “[Octubre] insisted that unity was the key to control by labor of national policy.”\footnote{Woodward, Ralph L. “Octubre: Communist Appeal to the Urban Labor Force in Guatemala, 1950-1953.” Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 367, July 1962. Web. 5 Nov. 2011. <http://www.jstor.org>.
} In fact, Woodward further argues “Octubre had launched a vigorous campaign to unify” the segregated unions.\footnote{Ibid.} Schneider explains that, to this end, in 1949, “Top leadership of the labor federations gathered to make plans for a convention of all workers’ political committees. Five of the dozen leaders were secretly Communists and four of them were elected to the nine-member national committee.”\footnote{Schneider, p. 134.} The main purpose of the CPNT was to bolster working class and campesino support for Arbenz’s presidential campaign, to prevent votes from being divided up among other parties and candidates, and to make a transition towards a true working class party.\footnote{Ibid., p. 135.}

The end result was CGTG, which formed from a collaboration of worker-based parties. By 1951 the CGTG had 60,000 members. Schneider argues, “Within each union there functioned a Communist fraction which was under instructions to meet in advance to coordinate their work….In this manner the less than 2,000 Communists in the CGTG were able to control its political line and speak in the name of its 100,000 members.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 147.} Moreover, “The CGTP and the CNCG (the National Campesino Confederation), rather than the parties, proved to be the most
efficient instrument for bringing the rural masses into the national life and developing them into an effective political force.” 334 In fact, Schneider argues:

The overall impression obtained from an extensive reading of CGTG correspondence with members and local unions is that the hesitancy to accept Communism as the legitimate political expression of the working class was greatly reduced in the two years which followed the unification of the labor movement. This can be attributed to the revelation by an increasing number of labor leaders that they were Communists, to the acceptance of the Communists by the President and the leader of the other parties, and to the intensive Communist propaganda campaign carried on within the ranks of labor. From late 1952 on, many labor leaders left the other parties to join PGT.335

Schneider further contends:

Through the unions the Communists won the confidence of the workers, first on labor and economic matters, then in politics. Through their control of organized labor the Communists were able to exert influence over the government and the revolutionary parties. In short, control of the labor movement gave the Communists a lever in the political process and put them in position to offer Arbenz readily mobilized popular support.336

Quickly following the official recognition of the Communist party in 1952, Fortuney and the respective Communist leadership started a massive propaganda campaign distributing 65,000 copies of the communist party manifesto to campesino’s and rural laborers. 337 Even prior to this, in 1951, the party had been working through its communist newspaper Octubre distributing 150,000 pieces of propaganda and on agrarian reform 210,000 items of propaganda were circulated.338 Octubre made bold statements such as: “The laboring class must develop the party which it directs itself; only a Marxist-Leninist party is able to be the instrument of struggle capable of assuring a proper policy for the workers and peasants, the group capable of leading all the people.”339 With growing propaganda and membership, the PGT collaborated with the

334 Ibid., p. 39.
335 Ibid., p. 147.
336 Ibid., p. 61.
337 Ibid., p. 84.
338 Ibid., p. 103.
339 Woodward, p. 368.
CGTG, whose leader, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, was the unquestionable leader of 100,000 organized workers.\textsuperscript{340} Moreover, as Schneider recounts, “in every significant union there was a Communist fraction operating under the directions of the PGT.”\textsuperscript{341} Historian Cole Blasier, in a similar tone toe Schneider, contends that the communists “dominated the Guatemalan labor movement.”\textsuperscript{342}

Nonetheless, Gleijeses argues:

The PGT, however, never controlled the labor confederation. Its influence depended on Arbenz’s support and on the personal prestige of a handful of CGTG leaders who belonged to the party. Within the CGTG, individual unions retained a large degree of autonomy, and only a few were led by PGT members.\textsuperscript{343}

Hence, Gleijeses appears to depart from Schneider and Blasier’s firm claim that the CP controlled the labor movement. Nonetheless, Gleijeses highlights that “With the exception of union elections, the great majority of the hundred thousand CGTG members voted for the revolutionary parties and for the PGT.”\textsuperscript{344}

Although it is difficult to reconcile Schneider and Blasier’s overwhelming contention that the CP controlled the labor, while Gleijeses argues the CP did not control the labor, the ultimate conclusion is that, at the very least, the CP wielded considerable influence in the labor movement, a conclusion that even Gleijeses could agree upon.

\textbf{3.2.8 CP Power in Peruvian Labor:}

In comparison to the CP’s influence in the Guatemalan labor movement, the CP’s influence, and or control, of the Peruvian labor movement was also extensive. Moreover, the labor movement in

\textsuperscript{340} Schneider, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{341} Ibid., p. 107.
\textsuperscript{342} Blasier, p. 156, 157.
\textsuperscript{343} Gleijeses, p. 191.
\textsuperscript{344} Ibid.
Peru wielded considerable power and influence in the State. Mauceri argues that the communist party (in part because of the symbiotic relationship to the Velasco regime) became the predominant force in the labor movement while working with their communist union affiliate the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP). Consequently, Mauceri contends that 44 percent of all unions were affiliated with the communist party. According to Carmen Rosa Balbi in “Politics and Trade Unions in Peru”: “In the past, the CGTP was the main political representative of organized labor. The CGTP was consolidated during the 1970s in a struggle for workers’ rights and for improved labor legislation.”

With the CGTP and the CP firmly in control of Peruvian labor, the Velasco regime had a vested interest in the growth of industry and saw labor as a source of potential success for industrial growth. Moreover, Hunefeldt argues that “Velasco [created] new union organizations for peasants, students, workers, and professionals” to “gain popular support.” Indeed, much like Arevalo had done for the labor movement in Guatemala, Velasco sought to bolster the freedom and strength of the labor movement in Peru. Kenneth Roberts describes Velasco’s impact on labor by stating, “Structurally, rapid industrialization expanded the manufacturing labor force from 428,700 in 1961 to 643,900 in 1971. Industrial conflicts over wages and demands such as labor rights and union autonomy also increased. The reforms of Velasco had a politicizing effect.” Furthermore, Mauceri reports that the “The number of Labor organizations during the Velasco era dramatically increased. Nearly 2000 new unions were

345 Mauceri, p. 21.
346 Berrios, p. 378.
347 Mauceri, p. 22.
349 Hunefeldt, p. 231.
officially recognized from 1969 to 1975, the same number of unions recognized in the previous 30 years.” The following table charts the increased growth in unions under Velasco.

![Growth of Peru's Recognized Trade Unions](image)

**Figure 3: Growth of Peru's Recognized Trade Unions**

From 1968 to 1973, a substantial growth in unions was seen in all sectors. No sectors saw a fall in the number of unions during this time period.

Mauceri argues that the growth in unions coincided with the strengthening of the left: “The regime implemented a variety of new schemes in the labor sector that favored a strong leftist presence.”\(^{351}\) Spurred on by the regime support, the CGTP initiated a new set of labor strategies that included “confrontational and combative tactics,” including marches, rallies, propaganda, and even violent confrontation with authorities or employers.\(^{352}\) Elizabeth Dore explains this process when stating:

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\(^{351}\) Ibid., p. 22.
\(^{352}\) Ibid., p. 23.
While the number of labor unions nearly doubled under Velasco, they were not the compliant, coopted organizations envisioned by government planners to ameliorate class conflict through social reform. Their autonomy not only allowed the Communist-led CGTP to expand, but also made it possible for the radical Left to advocate militant class identities and confrontational tactics to break with traditional clientelistic relations in the workplace.353

Mauceri contends that the CGTP and its offspring were responsible for the majority of strikes in the country, “accounting for 63 percent of the man-hours lost to strikes in this period.” Another 20 percent was attributed to other Marxist oriented groups that included the Maoists and the New Left Labor Federations. 354 The following chart’s demonstrates the increased number of strikes under the Velasco regime:

![Total Number of Strikes](image)

**Figure 4: Total Number of Strikes**

353 Roberts, p. 76.
354 Mauceri, p. 23.
Figure 5: Workers Involved in Thousands
Notice that the total numbers of strikes per year, consistent from 1960 through 1972, dramatically increased from 1973 to 1975, the latter half of Velasco’s tenure. Following
Velasco’s removal, in 1976, we see another dramatic shift in the amount of strikes returning to the levels seen in the 1960s. Yet, the percentage of man hours lost doubled from 1966 to 1975 and the percentage of the total labor force striking increased from 6.3 percent in 1966 to 28.9 percent in the final year of the Velasco regime in 1975. Once again, these statistics fell back to 12 percent the following year in 1976.

The increase in strikes during the Velasco regime should not be minimalized or taken for granted as a source of social unrest. According to Stephen Gorman, “The labor disturbances eventually culminated in three nation-wide general strikes, one of which lasted three days and semi-paralyzed the country. The military regime lost political ground to the unions since it had already lacked popularity to begin with.”

Hence, with such widespread social unrest and the drastic increase in labor unions and their strength to affect change in the country, there is little doubt that in comparison with the threat that the labor movement may have posed in the Guatemalan regime, the labor movement in Peru was on equal par. With such a compelling comparison in mind, why was Velasco’s regime not considered a threat, or at the very least, why was the CP’s strength in labor not considered a threat in Peru?

355 Gorman, p. 165.
3.3 EXTRA VARIABLES TO CONSIDER: MAKING THE ARGUMENT THAT VELASCO AND HIS REGIME SHOULD HAVE COUNTERFACTUALLY BEEN CONSIDERED A THREAT IN THE LATE 1940S AND EARLY 1950S.

As an extra point of argument, I highlight, beyond all of the other similarities I have pointed out, Velasco’s policy initiatives mimicked exceptionally “leftist reforms” that I contend should have counterfactually would have been considered a concern in Guatemala. Specifically, Stephen Gormon argues, in Post-revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation, that the agenda for both the “left”— which according to Cameron et al., was dominated by Marxist political parties, including the CP\textsuperscript{356}—and the CTGP and the military government were closely aligned. The closeness of their policy goals is demonstrated by the following charts. The first figure lists the political parties that are compared, of which I highlighted the “left,” the CGTP, Velasco’s military government. In the same figure a list also defines the various issues that the parties are taking position on. The second figure demonstrates the issues agreement between the military government, the “left,” and the CGTP, which is expressed through (+) and (-).

Table 1: Selected Key Factors in the Political Economy of Peru

\textsuperscript{356} Cameron, p.X.
### TABLE 9.1
Selected Key Actors in the Political-Economy of Peru

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<td><strong>1.</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Armed Forces (MILITARY)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political Parties</strong></td>
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<td>A. Acción Popular (AP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B. Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>C. Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)</td>
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<td>D. Parties of the Left (LEFT)</td>
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<td><strong>3.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Labor Federations</strong></td>
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<td>A. Confederación General de Trabajadores Peruanos (CGTP)</td>
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<td>B. Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú (CTP)</td>
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<td>C. Frente Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros y Metalurgicos del Perú (FNTMP)</td>
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<td><strong>4.</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Peasantry</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>A. Confederación Campesina Peruana (CCP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B. Confederación Nacional Agraria (CNA)</td>
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<td><strong>5.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Urban Migrants</strong></td>
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<td>A. Confederación General de Pobladores del Perú (CGPP)</td>
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<td>B. Local squatter settlement organizations (LOCALS)</td>
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<td><strong>6.</strong></td>
<td><strong>The State Bureaucracy (GOVERNMENT)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>7.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Industrial, Agricultural, and Mining Interests</strong></td>
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<td>A. Agricultural cooperatives (COOPS)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B. Industrial Communities (INDCOM)</td>
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<td>C. Sociedad Minera (SM)</td>
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<td>D. Sociedad de Industrias (SI)</td>
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<td><strong>8.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Indians (INDIANS)</strong></td>
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### TABLE 9.2
Key Issues Related to the Political Economy of Peru

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<td><strong>1.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Encourage foreign investment (FINV)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reduce size and scope of government (SGOV)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>3.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reduce inflation (RINP)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>4.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Increase real wages (IWGS)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>5.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Increase total external indebtedness (IDBT)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>6.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reduce import tariffs (RITR)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>7.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Promote exports, particularly “non-traditional” exports (PEXP)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>8.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Promote national defense (PDEF)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>9.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Raise prices on essentials (food, gas, electricity) to real market levels (IPRC)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>10.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Maintain civilian government (MCIV)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>11.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Increase production of agricultural and other primary products (IPRD)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>12.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Promote self-help and local infrastructural development projects (PHLP)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>13.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Maintain vigorous support for the Andean Pact (FACT)</strong></td>
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Table 2: Matrix of Policy Orientations of Key Groups

**TABLE 9.3**
Preliminary Matrix of Policy Orientations of Key Groups

+ = favors  N = Neutral  - = opposes  * = high priority issue  ( ) = considerable power to affect

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<tr>
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<th>TWGS</th>
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<th>KVR</th>
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In summary, aside from “promoting national defense,” the “left” and the military shared positions on all other key issues. Similarly, the CGTP maintained similar views with the military aside from the issue of maintaining a civilian government, which the military actually favored, while the CGTP did not. The only other points of differentiation between the CGTP and the military regime were on the topics of “promoting self-help and local infrastructure development projects” and the issue of “maintain[ing] vigorous support of the Andean Pact,” both of which the CGTP took a neutral stance for both issues, while the military government took a favorable position for both. I must make clear that these “issues” were not grounds for U.S. policy makers to consider Velasco’s regime a threat per say, but, I high light them to show how the Military regime, the “left,” and the CGTP shared similar political platforms, which may have caused concern from the perspective of policy makers in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Yet, not only did Velasco’s regime mirror the CP’s political platform in this way, it became increasingly radical. Barrios argues that, “The new leftist military government, some of whose advisers were from Marxist parties or the labor movement, set Peru off on its own course seeking independence from its traditional allies in the West.”

Radicals [in government] wanted state-intervention, control of foreign investment, partial redistribution of wealth; they did not hesitate to call themselves “Socialists,” and encouraged a certain kind of mass participation. Moderate reformists shared the radical’s inclination for state intervention and the control of foreign investment, but put more emphasis on growth and

358 Berrios, p. 367.
productive investment rather than on distribution. Conservatives resisted attempts to transform the status quo, although they would support limited, specific change.  

The shift of key policy makers in Velasco’s cabinet toward the “left” is further demonstrated by the following charts. These charts show the shift in balance from moderate ideologies of key policy makers in Velasco’s cabinet to more radical policy makers over the course of Velasco’s stay in office.

**Figure 8: Velasco’s Cabinet Composition of Conservatives, Moderate Reformists and Radicals**

In 1968, Velasco’s cabinet was comprised of only conservatives and moderate reformists. Yet, in 1969 three radicals were introduced and, in 1971, four radicals were installed in Velasco’s cabinet. By 1975 five radicals held cabinet positions, while the number of

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360 Ibid., p. 121, 130, 147, p. 366.
conservatives had decreased from 5 in 1969, to 4 in 1973, and 3 in 1975. In summation, such evidence should have been considered as a prime indication that a communist threat was manifesting in Velasco’s regime, that is, if such variables had been present in the late 1950’s and early 1950’s. For the last time, why was Velasco’s regime not considered a threat?

3.4 OVERVIEW OF COMPARISON:

Table 3: Arevalo's and Velasco's relations with CP in their respective countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Banned CP</th>
<th>Formed relations with international communists</th>
<th>Formed close relations with domestic CP</th>
<th>Exiled CP members to show opposition to their growing strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arevalo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velasco</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No, but closest advisors were “radical” and perhaps Marxist Socialists.</td>
<td>No, but claimed to be willing to kill CP members if they stepped out of line.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Arevalo and Velasco’s political philosophies, defense of their regimes (i.e. anti-communist), and stance on democracy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Claimed to be anti-communist</th>
<th>claimed to favor alternative paths to liberalism and communism (i.e. non-Marxist Socialist or communist)</th>
<th>Pro-Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arevalo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velasco</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Comparison of Arbenz and Velasco: The extent of Arbenz
and Velasco’s “relations” with domestic CP, pro-communist or Marxist, and stance on democracy, and Marxist or communist affiliation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Granted CP official recognition</th>
<th>Pro-Marxist or Communist</th>
<th>Maintained personal relations with CP members</th>
<th>Pro-Democratic</th>
<th>Defended regime was not communist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arbenz</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Never publicly announced that he was pro-Marxist during his tenure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (claimed to be a pro-democratic and never claimed to be Marxist or communist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velasco</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No, claimed to be vehemently anti-communist, but still granted CP official recognition during his term and used it for political support</td>
<td>No, but, as argued, his closest advisors became increasingly radical and may have been Marxist Socialists</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, claimed to reject communism entirely as a guiding ideology for his regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Arbenz and Velasco regimes: CP in government, relations with international communists, social platforms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political platform: anti-imperialist, favored institution building, and sweeping social reform that included the expropriation of U.S. businesses</th>
<th>CP hold government posts</th>
<th>Relations with Soviet Bloc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arbenz Regime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (but very few and only 4,000 CP in country as a whole)</td>
<td>Yes (but only on two occasions, one of which was only “talks” of possible trade relations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velasco Regime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, but only very limited influence in parliament alongside other Marxist groups during Velasco’s tenure, but during his tenure the “left’s” influence appreciated; three years following Velasco’s overthrow, they won 29 percent of vote in Parliament</td>
<td>Yes (extensive)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 7: Communist Control/Influence of the labor movement in Guatemala and Peru

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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Significant (main source of CP power in country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Significant (main source of CP power in country)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this section, I hope to affirm several basic points that provide grounds for my claim that Allende was more communist than the other leaders and was thus considered a threat in the 1970s, despite its less charged atmosphere and a change in U.S. foreign policy and policy perception. The two prime variables that caused U.S. policy makers to consider Allende a threat were:

1. Allende was openly Marxist, favoring a “Marxist-Socialist revolution” through his career; and

2. Allende openly supported the international communist movement and praised various communist, Marxist, and Socialist leaders.

These two variables alone caused U.S. policy makers to view Allende as a threat well before his election to the Chilean Presidency in 1970 or attempted election in 1964. Thus, U.S. policy makers did not initially consider Allende a threat because of the variables that caused U.S. policy makers such concern in Guatemala in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. Hence, as discussed in my introduction, the case of Allende cannot be used to discount my thesis.

Still, the variables seen in Guatemala were, in large part, present in Allende’s regime once he ascended the Presidency in 1970 and may have further motivated U.S. policy makers to act. Even so, these variables were certainly only auxiliary threats to in comparison to the two variables listed above. Indeed, without a further cause for threat, the case of Velasco’s regime, as I will argue for in the third Chapter, clearly shows that the U.S. was not willing to act upon the variables that had once been considered as threatening in Guatemala, at least on their own.
Nonetheless, I will also briefly touch upon Allende’s regimes relations with the Socialist Bloc, his expropriation of U.S. businesses as a point of comparison with the other cases, and the role of the CP in his government, which I argue was far more “advanced” when compared to the role of the CP in both of the Guatemalan regimes and Velasco’s regime. The last point—the CP’s advanced role in Allende’s coalition and government—thoroughly demonstrates how Allende and his regime were more communist than the other cases.

Lastly, I will touch upon Allende’s commitment to democracy, despite his Marxist-Socialist orientation. This is important to highlight in order to show that a difference in regime type—dictatorship versus democracy— is indeed present between Allende’s Chilean regime and Velasco’s regime in Peru, as it is also present between the regimes of Arevalo and Arbenz when compared to Velasco’s regime. As I have previously argued, this difference, in part, explains the U.S.’s anxiety in Guatemala and Chile and the lack of anxiety for Velasco and his regime.

3.5.1 Salvador Allende: A Marxist

Allende’s Marxist roots predated his political career and followed him all the way to the presidency. Peter Winn, who interviewed Allende during the height of his Presidency reports that Allende described himself early in his life as a poor medical student living in impoverished neighborhoods. Winn recounts that this was Allende’s exposure to the “tragedy of poverty” and that “Part of his subsequent appeal as a political candidate was his image of a doctor in politics, curing society’s ills.”

Allende lamented, “My studies taught me that Socialism was the only

solution to these problems and that Chile had to find its own road.”

Salvador Allende became Secretary-General of the Socialist Party in 1943 and was subsequently elected to the Chilean Senate in 1945. He even claimed to have been one of the “founders of the Socialist party.” The Socialist party was, in fact, a “Socialist Marxist party.”

A decade and a half later, Allende won the presidential office, while maintaining his Marxist badge, self-proclaiming himself a “Marxist Socialist President.” Upon taking office he exclaimed, “The President of the Republic is a Socialist…I have reached this office to achieve the economic and social transformation of Chile, to open the road for Socialism. Our aim is Marxist Socialism, total and Scientific.” Toward this end, in Allende’s inauguration speech, he declared:

“This Victory belongs to the workers, to those who suffered and endured for more than a century and a half, under the name of independence, the exploitation of a ruling class which was unable to provide progress and wasn’t even concerned about it. We all know the truth that the backwardness, ignorance and hunger of our people from it.”

Allende affirmed, in January 1971, “The people of Chile chose the road of revolution and we have not forgotten the fundamental principle of Marxism: the class struggle. During the electoral campaign we said that the purpose of our struggle was to change the regime, the system.” He subsequently concluded that the “backwardness” of Chili’s society was directly linked to capitalism.

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362 Ibid.
365 Debray, p. 67.
368 Debray, p. 81.
369 Johnson, p. 151.
3.5.2 Allende’s personal relations with international communism:

Moreover, Allende’s commitment to international communism began early in his career. For example, in 1953, Allende was one of the “principle speakers” at a ceremony to honor Joseph Stalin following his death. Allende exclaimed, “Stalin was to the Russian People a banner of revolution, of creative execution, of human sentiment; a symbol of edifying peace and unbounded heroism…but above all this is his enormous faith in Marx and Lenin doctrine and his unyielding Marxist behavior.” It is crucial to understand the gravity of this statement, a statement that can be interpreted as nothing other than full acceptance of the international communist movement. Without going into a full discussion of Stalin, no one other than a communist member or devout Marxist follower would make such statements. Moreover, when contrasted with the public comments of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco, there is no mistaking that Allende’s ideology is explicitly pro-communist and Marxist, whereas the stance of the other men was always obscure, if not, overtly anti-communist.

Now this is not to say that he fully agreed with Stalin on every issue, but, generally speaking he supported international communism. For example, Peter Winn reports:

Allende’s political principles were revealed by two acts of solidarity that he undertook in 1948: the first was to visit the Moscow-line orthodox Communist leaders imprisoned in the desert concentration camp of Pisagua; the second was to express his solidarity with the dissident Yugoslav Communist leader Tito in his conflict with Stalin and the Soviet Union, affirming ‘each people is free to choose is own road to socialism.’

Even late in his career, during his presidency Allende maintained his support of international communism and, “In a speech in the Kremlin on December 7, 1972, Allende even called the communist superpower the ‘Big Brother’ of Chile.” In the same breath, according to

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370 Pinera, p. 23.
371 Winn, p. 136.
Jose Pinera, “having met with Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin and Nikolai Podgorny, Allende, said that he had reached an ‘identical point of view’ with the communist leaders. Thereafter, he received the ‘Lenin Peace Prize.’”\textsuperscript{372}

Moreover, according to a Fact on File Publication, \textit{Allende and Chile}, on December 6, 1972, Allende traveled to Moscow where he met Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, President Nikolai Podgorny, Premier Alexei Kosygin and 100,000 citizens. Four days later, Allende arrived in Havana, Cuba and was met by Premier Fidel Castro, President Osvaldo Dorticos, and “a large crowd.”\textsuperscript{373}

As a final point of evidencing his strong support for international communism, while being interviewed by Debrays, Allende explained that Fidel Castro had sent him a gift following the election of Popular Unity:

He sent me a copy of \textit{Granma}, the official organ of the Cuban revolution, which had the news of our electoral victory splashed across the front page. He had been at the offices of the newspaper waiting for the news from Chile, and he sent his congratulations on the front page proclaiming that ours was a victory against imperialism, signed it and had it signed by everyone around him. I keep it as a souvenir. He also called me that morning after the election to congratulate us.\textsuperscript{374}

When Allende was asked what he had learned from the Cuban revolution, he responded: “An extraordinary lesson… when it has responsible leadership, when it has men who are able to interpret the people’s will, to feel that the people are the government, and this is the case with Fidel.”\textsuperscript{375}

Lastly, I highlight that throughout this interview Debray continually referred to Allende as “comrade president,” to which Allende would also refer to Debray as “comrade.” The term

\textsuperscript{372} Pinera, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{374} Debray, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{375} Debray, p. 73.
comrade was adopted by international communists and was used throughout the Socialist bloc to refer to friends or supporters of the Soviet State and communism in general. Hence, above all, it is quite difficult to refute the claim that Allende was a supporter of international communism, a stance that was never shared with the leaders in my other case studies.

3.5.3 Allende’s Regime: A quick note on the regimes relations with the Socialist Bloc:

Aside from his personal relations with international communists, Allende’s regime sought aid from other Socialist countries. According to Dale Johnson, in his book The Chilean Road to Socialism, representatives of the Chilean regime engaged in a “technical mission” for the purposes of gaining aid to bolster Chileans antiquated technological fields and industrial infrastructure. Johnson contends that the Soviet Union, the Polish Government, the Yugoslavs, the Hungarians, the Bulgarians, and the East Germans were willing to contribute to Chileans needs after a multi-month tour by the Chilean technical mission in these countries. In 1972, Chile established diplomatic ties with both North Korea and North Vietnam, “becoming the first South American nation to recognize either country.” Beginning on May 28, 1972, Chile secured a loan from China for 65 million dollars. Thus, the Chilean regime’s relations with the Socialist Bloc appear quite similar to the Peruvian-Soviet relations from 1968 to 1975, but were clearly more advanced than those experienced by Arbenz’s regime.

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376 Johnson, p. 144, 145, 146.
377 Sobel, p. 105.
3.5.4 Chile Social Platforms:

In the first year of Allende’s Presidency, Allende immediately began nationalizing companies, including those from the U.S. For example, a slew of nationalizations occurred: On November 20, 1971, Allende ordered the nationalization of Nibsa, a plumbing and heating fittings manufacturer and on December 1st of the same year, the government nationalized Bellavista Tome, the country’s largest fabric manufacturer. Twenty days later, on December 21st, the government gave orders to nationalize the copper industry, including three American companies—Anaconda Co., Kennecott Corp., and the Cerro Corps, order that were approved by Congress on July 11, 1971.\textsuperscript{378} On December 30, 1971, Allende called for the nationalization of the banking system, while excluding any national banks from operating in Chile.\textsuperscript{379} On January 1, the trend continued, and the Agriculture Minister Jacques Chonchol announced the government plan to expropriate farms larger than 80 hectares and stated that all of these farms would be legally expropriated by the end of 1971.\textsuperscript{380}

Many more expropriations occurred, all which will not be discussed. It suffices to say that in October 19, 1971, Allende sent a bill to congress that listed 150 Chilean firms that he felt should be nationalized.\textsuperscript{381} Among the most controversial of the expropriations was with American owned ITT. The point stands that, like Arbenz and Velasco, Allende sought a drastic overhaul of the state and succeeded immensely before being overthrown in 1973. Once again, the similarities to Velasco’s regime are quite apparent, while Arbenz’s social reforms were far more docile and less expansive in comparison.

\textsuperscript{378} Ibid., p. 52.
\textsuperscript{379} Ibid., p. 38.
\textsuperscript{380} Ibid., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{381} Ibid., p. 57.
3.5.5 Allende’s Coalition: Popular Unity

As a final point, in order to demonstrate how Allende and his regime were more radical and more communist than Arevalo, Arbenz, Velasco and their regimes, I highlight the extensive role of the CP in Allende’s government and how Allende’s socialist party was even more radical than the Chilean CP. Indeed, according to Pinera, the Chilean CP “was the largest and best organized of all the communist parties in Latin America, and the third largest in the Western world, after those of France and Italy.” Yet, Allende’s government was a conglomerate of “leftist” ideologies, that Julio Faundez argues, in his book *Marxism and Democracy in Chile*, were “not homogeneous.” Regardless, Faundez contends that the Socialist and Communist Parties were the two largest and most influential parties in Allende’s coalition: “the bulk of the coalition’s elector strength was derived from three of its six members: the Communist, Socialist and Radical parties.” Fuandez reports that the strength of the CP and the Socialist was demonstrated in the 1969 general elections:

> In the general election of 1969, the combined vote of these parties had in fact reached 41 per cent, that is, 5 percent more than Allende had obtained in the 1970 presidential elections. In these same 1969 electoral results, the largest of the three parties was the Communist Party, with 15.9 per cent of the vote, followed by the Radical and Socialist parties with 13 and 12.3 per cent of the vote respectively.

Fuandez further argues that members of the three largest parties “were appointed to ten out of the fifteen cabinet posts.”

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382 Pinera, p. 22.
383 Faundez, p. 198.
384 Ibid., p. 198.
385 Ibid., p. 199.
Although all of the parties did not share exacting ideologies, the CP and Socialist parties, wielding the most significant power, shared a mutual goal of Socialist revolution in Chile; a goal that I contend would not have been ignored by U.S. policy makers, regardless of time period. Julio Faundez briefly summarizes the similarities and differences between the two party’s respective ideologies in the 1950s, which generally characterizes a mutual end of Socialist revolution, but a contrasting method for accomplishing this end:

When the FRAP was created in 1956 the political strategies of communists and Socialists were notably different. That of the Communists, known as the national liberation front, was based on the conception of a Socialist revolution with two clearly defined stages. The first would prepare the ground for socialism by freeing the economy from the fetters of imperialism and the landed oligarchy. During this stage, the process of democratization within the existing capitalist state would be furthered by a political alliance between working-class parties and those groups within the bourgeoisie whose interests were in conflict with imperialism and the local oligarchy. This stage, also described as the national democratic stage of the revolution, would last for an unspecified time, but would be followed by a second stage, in which the working-class parties would conquer power and begin a period of Socialist transition. The line developed by the Socialist in the early fifties, known as the Worker’s Front Strategy started from the assumption that the local bourgeoisie was incapable of carrying out the democratic tasks as set out by the Communist Party in the first stage of the revolution. Accordingly, it described the Socialist revolution as an uninterrupted process led, from the start, by the working class.  

Notice that differences are apparent, such as the “two stage” versus “one stage” approach to accomplish the mutual goal of Socialist revolution, but the end goal is still the same: Marxist Socialist revolution!

In fact, the Socialist party was more radical than the CP. The communists became “leading advocates of united front tactics and a peaceful way to socialism” beginning in the 1930’s and favored peaceful methods. In contrast, Faundez contends that “there was a marked radicalization of the Socialist Party from 1952 to 1970. After adopting the Workers’

386 Ibid., p. 160.
388 Ibid., p. 44.
Front Strategy in the mid-1950s, it followed a line which was consistently to the left of the Communist Party.  

The radical stance of the Socialist party is characterized by an annual Socialist meeting in 1965, when an unnamed Socialist proclaimed, “Our strategy in fact rejects the electoral route as a way to achieve our goal of seizing power…the Party has one objective: in order to obtain power, the party must use all the methods and means that the revolutions struggle requires.” Likewise, a “resolution” passed in another Socialist meeting in 1967 and contended:

Revolutionary violence is inevitable and legitimate….It constitutes the only route to political and economic power…Only by destroying the democratic-military apparatus of the bourgeois State can the Socialist revolution take root…The peaceful or legal expression of struggle do not, in themselves, lead to power. The Socialist Party considers them to be instruments of limited action, part of the political process that leads us to armed struggle.  

Even Allende did not appear opposed to the use of force. For example, in January 1971, while in the Presidency, Allende argued, “The revolutionary struggle may be found in the guerilla foco or in urban insurrection; it may be the people’s war and it may be an insurgence through the polling booths; it depends on the content it is given. In some countries, there is no alternative to the armed struggle.” Nonetheless, Faundez reports:

By the mid-1960s, [Socialists] repudiated the electoral process, declaring that revolutionary violence was inevitable. Yet despite this rhetoric, its practice was, as ever, consistent with its parliamentary traditions…once it became clear at the practical level that there was no easy alternative to the Communist strategy, it followed their lead while, at the ideological level, embracing the view that violence was the only way to Socialist revolution.  

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389 Faundez, p. 164.
390 Pinera, p. 21.
391 Ibid.
392 Debray, p. 127.
393 Fuandez, p. 164, 165.
However, regardless of whether violence was or was not carried out, I argue that the mere rhetorical call to violence was so blatantly threatening that U.S. policy makers could not ignore it.

3.5.6 Allende’s Pro-Democratic Stance:

Allende’s stance on democracy also indicates that he ultimately favored a “peaceful road to socialism” and favored constitutional democracy in Chile, but, as argued, his commitment to democracy is important because of my general contention that U.S. policy makers favored dictatorships over democracy’s, which, partially explains why U.S. policy makers, as argued, were so threatened by Allende even well before his ascendency to the presidency. In light of Allende’s “communist credentials,” U.S. policy makers realized that Allende had a real “shot” at achieving power through the electoral process and were threatened as a result.

According to Edgardo Boeninger, in *The Chilean Road to Democracy*, “At the dawn of the 1960s, Chile enjoyed the enviable reputation of being one of the few stable democracies in Latin America.”394 Indeed, Daniel Hellinger, in “Electoral Change in the Chilean Countryside: The Presidental Elections of 1958 and 1970,” argues that “Chilean elections during the period of the Republic are generally acknowledged to have been fairly administered and free from corruption.” Yet, Hellinger also reports that if any interference in the electoral process occurred it was a result of “foreign intervention” and especially the CIA. My survey of Chile in the next

chapter will thoroughly support this claim. Nonetheless, the Chilean democracy, on its own, was fully intact. 395

Following Allende’s ascension to the Presidency, throughout his tenure, he maintained a commitment to democracy. Immediately following his election to the Presidency, at the National Stadium in Santiago on November 5, 1970, Allende exclaimed:

The People of Chile are proud of having made the political road prevail over the violent one. This is a noble tradition, a lasting achievement. Throughout our permanent battle for liberation, the slow and hard struggle for justice and equality, we have always preferred solving social conflicts by means of persuasion and political action. From the bottoms of our hearts, we Chileans reject fratricidal struggle—but without ever giving up the defense of the right of the people. Our coat of arms says “By reason or force,” but it puts reason first. This civic peace, this continuation of the political process, is no accident. It is the result of our social economic structure, of a particular relationship of social forces which our country has been building in keeping with the reality of our development. 396

Even well into his tenure, Allende spoke of protecting Chilean Democracy. Lester Sobel, in Allende and Chile, summarizes one Allende’s speeches presented on November 4, 1971, in front of 70,000 workers and students: “Allende insisted his government did not intend to destroy the institution of private property. He promised that the country, while following the ‘Chilean road to socialism,’ would remain a pluralistic, democratic and free society.”397

Likewise, Peter Winn describes a conversation he had with Allende in 1972:

His ambition was to be the first leader in history to reach socialism “without violence because there are millions of people in the world who want socialism, but without having to pay the terrible price of civil war.” “If that is being ambitious,” he stressed, “then I am ambitious, but it is not an ordinary or vulgar ambition. It is a historic ambition.”

In summation, Allende’s commitment to democracy was quite evident.

3.5.7 Conclusion:

Overall, Allende was a Marxist Socialists, supported international communism, and was committed to democracy. I argue that all three of these variables are what caused U.S. policy makers to view Allende as an extreme threat well before his election and throughout his tenure in the 1970’s, above and beyond the variables that caused U.S. policy makers to consider the Guatemalan case as threatening. Nonetheless, Allende’s regime shared similarities with the Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco’s regime in terms of several of the variables that U.S. policy makers considered threatening in Arevalo and Arbenz’s regime. The Chilean regimes expropriation of businesses mimicked the actions of Arbenz and Velasco, while his regime’s trade relations with the Soviet Bloc mimicked that of Velasco’s regime. The Chilean CP was the largest in South America and had an extensive influence in Allende’s government coalition. Furthermore, Allende’s own Socialist party was more radical the Chilean CP and favored, at least in rhetoric, violent methods to achieve a Marxist Socialist revolution. In total, Allende and his regime were more radical and more communist than the other leaders and their respective regimes.
3.5.8 Overview:

Table 8: A comparison of Allende’s regime with the regimes of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Expropriation of U.S. business interests</th>
<th>CP in government</th>
<th>Relations with Soviet Bloc</th>
<th>Pro-Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arevalo regime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbenz regime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (but very limited)</td>
<td>No (except on instance of arms shipment in 1954)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velasco regime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (but exceptionally limited)</td>
<td>Yes, extensive</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allende regime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (CP party second largest party in government coalition and largest CP in South America)</td>
<td>Yes, extensive</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: A comparison of Allende personal ideology and relationship with domestic and international communists in comparison to Arbenz, Arevalo, and Velasco:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Close relations with domestic communists</th>
<th>International communist follower</th>
<th>Ideology favors Marxism and a transition to a Marxist Socialist state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arbenz</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No, favored constitutional democracy and liberalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arevalo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No, favored a unique brand of non-Marxist socialism and favored, and although claiming to favor a unique path away from liberalism and communism, most likely adopted a liberalist outlook.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velasco</td>
<td>No, but closest advisors were radical and some were Marxist Socialists</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No, favored an independent ideology from both liberalism and communism (a form of populism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allende</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CHAPTER 3
THE PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. POLICY MAKERS AND THE PERCEPTION OF “THREAT”

In light of the similarities described—between the cases of Guatemala and Peru—the purpose of this chapter is, above all, to demonstrate that U.S. policy makers not only judged the regimes of Arevalo and Arbenz as exceptionally threatening in the late 1940s and early 1950s, but it will also bring to light that U.S. policy makers undertook extensive investigations to substantiate and legitimize that a threat was present in Guatemala. In contrast, U.S. policy makers were not only unconcerned about the threat of communism in Velasco’s regime, but did not provide the same breadth of investigation to search for a communist threat as was seen in the case of Guatemala. Hence, a discrepancy in perspective was apparent between the two cases, which, as argued can be explained by a change in foreign policy and policy perception and my second thesis (U.S. policy makers favored dictatorships).

This chapter will also demonstrate that U.S. policy makers considered Allende a threat well before his election to the Chilean Presidency—even in the 1950s—and sought to prevent his election as early as 1964. Like the case of Guatemala, U.S. policy makers, once again, scrutinized Allende and the Chilean State in search of a communist threat to a much greater extent than policy makers had scrutinized Velasco and his regime. As argued, Allende and his regime were still considered a threat in the 1970s because they were far more radical and
communist than the other cases. However, I also contend that the greater scrutiny applied to the
democratic regimes of Arevalo, Arbenz, and Allende, when compared to the lack of scrutiny
applied to the authoritarian Velasco and his regime, suggests that U.S. policy makers favored
dictatorships over democracies, hence, my second thesis. Moreover, the fact President Nixon and
Henry Kissinger sought to use Velasco’s regime as a non-Marxist example to Allende’s Marxist
regime further supports this argument, alongside the evidence provided in Chapter One. I argue:
the second thesis also accounts for the discrepancy in perspective between the case of Guatemala
and Peru, and further explains why Allende was seen as a threat in the 1970s.

In light of these claims, the fact that U.S. policy makers did not intervene and did not
even consider intervention in Peru as an option superficially supports the conclusion that a
discrepancy in perception was apparent; however, this chapter further articulates and
demonstrates how a change in perspective occurred: by analyzing, in all three cases, the
correspondence between U.S. policy officials in the U.S. embassy and the State Department and
conversations between top policy makers.

I argue that the study of U.S. policy makers’ correspondence, in all three cases,
demonstrates the change in foreign policy and policy perception from 1945 through the 1970s,
thus linking my case studies to my argument in Chapter One. For example, I highlight that U.S.
policy maker’s use of language—word choice, tone, and the conclusions reached in their
respective telegrams and conversations— in the 1940s and 1950s is much different than was seen
in the 1960s and 1970s. In the case of Guatemala, U.S. policy makers clearly believed that the
idea of communism had indoctrinated the Guatemalan society. That is, words such as
“subversion,” “dupe,” and “fellow traveler,” were used by U.S. policy makers to explain that
they were worried not only of communists themselves, but a much larger communist conspiracy.
Such sentiments directly correspond to the way U.S. policy makers sought to purge the American CP from U.S. government and society. In such efforts, U.S. policy makers charged that any individual who had relations with a communist was also a threat. Law enforcement agencies (e.g. the FBI) and Congress engaged in widespread investigations and hearings to uncover communist threats, regardless of how small. As argued, new legislation, such as the National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA, effectively, continued the investigations and “search” for communist threats abroad. Hence, even a modicum of suspicion, then, would induce an investigation or a charge that a communist threat might be present.

I contend: The very same policy perceptions that drove the domestic communist “witch hunt”— the legal-moralistic perspective of international relations and the anti-communist liberal-conservative consensus in the U.S.—were the same sentiments that motivated the U.S. response in Guatemala. Such a claim is further bolstered by the fact that the very same years in which the hysterical anti-communist political climate was at its climax, from 1947 to 1954, U.S. policy makers considered Arevalo and Arbenz a threat. Furthermore, at the peak of McCarthy’s influence, around 1952 and 1953, coincided in time with the formation of plans to oust Arbenz’s regime. Hence, there is exceptionally strong evidence that suggests the political atmosphere of the time, alongside the foreign policy of containment, as it was interpreted to mean defeating the spread of communism everywhere, impacted U.S. policy makers’ perception of threat in Guatemala.

By the 1960s and 1970s, the fanatical anxieties of the McCarthyite political atmosphere in the 1950s, and the “witch hunt” like attacks on the American CP and international communism, had dissipated. Although communism was a predominant concern for U.S. policy makers, their correspondence indicates that communism was viewed in a much different way. A
change in perspective regarding land reform and social reform as a whole, under the auspices of Kennedy’s Alliance for progress, was significant because unlike the late 1940s and 1950s, not every “leftist” reform would be considered as a potential communist threat. Rather, not only were these social reforms not considered as an indication of communist threats, by the late 1950’s through the 1970s, but they were conversely utilized in the fight against communism. But also, events such as the Sino-Soviet “split” in 1961 and the Vietnam War greatly determined U.S. policy maker’s foreign policy abroad. As argued, not every instance of a supposed communist threat would be combatted and a more “selective” and practical approach of realpolitik would guide U.S. policy maker’s actions. Thus, in Peru, U.S. policy makers such as Henry Kissinger were no longer threatened by Velasco’s leftist reform programs, the CPs influence in labor, his regime’s relations with the Socialist bloc, or Velasco’s radical cabinet, because Kissinger was able to determine, with his more analytical and realpolitik approach to international relations, that Velasco and his regime, although leftist, did not support communism. Yet, simultaneously, Kissinger was also able to recognize the threat that Allende posed, a threat that was linked to his Marxist orientation and his relations with the international communist movement. Hence, in response, Kissinger employed the “selective containment” policy and sought to remove Allende.

4.1 GUATEMALA: U.S. PERSPECTIVE

As an aside from the introduction to Chapter Three thus far, in this section—U.S. perspective in Guatemala—I hope to substantiate that the ways in which U.S. policy makers defined the threat in Guatemala were linked to: (1) Arevalo and Arbenz’s relations with CP members; (2) the
regimes social platform; (3) CP in government; (4) the regimes relations with the Soviet Bloc; (5) CP power in the Guatemalan labor movement. Although it is impossible to quantitatively determine which of these variables caused U.S. policy makers greater concern, it is clear that the land reform program, the CP control of labor, and the belief that a “communist conspiracy” throughout Guatemala was the main source of worry. Thus, the worry was not directly linked to the amount of communists in the country, because policy makers even acknowledged that the CP numbers were quite limited, but, as argued, U.S. anxieties were linked to a more obscure worry that the idea of communism was gaining support throughout Guatemalan society. Thus, although Arevalo and Arbenz may not have been considered communists, the idea of communism was feared to have greatly influenced their regimes.

Also, in my account of Guatemala, I highlight that U.S. embassy officials were less convinced that a communist threat influenced Arevalo’s and Arbenz’s regimes than the CIA, the President, and the highest officials in the Department of State such as John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State (who believed Arbenz’s regime posed an imminent communist threat and needed to be removed as a result). U.S. embassy officials were, nonetheless, convinced that the CP controlled organized labor had the ability to “infiltrate” the “countryside,” but generally concluded that no intervention was necessary and Arbenz’s regime was not in danger of “turning communist.” Although this paper will not delve into why a difference in perspective occurred in the case of Guatemala between lower level State Department officials and higher up state department officials, the CIA, and President Truman and Eisenhower, such a discrepancy, at the very least, demonstrates how a perception of threat is relative to an individual policy makers perspectives. Moreover, it demonstrates the exceptionally anti-communist stance of President Truman and Eisenhower and their goal of stopping communism everywhere, a goal that was
reflected by Truman’s containment policy and Eisenhower’s “new look” goal of “rolling back” communism, especially through covert means.

To begin, Milton Wells, the Foreign Service Officer in the American Embassy in Guatemala, described by Gleijeses as “the embassy’s most influential official,” reported on November 27, 1950, that “the extent to which Communism has infiltrated the present revolutionary regime in Guatemala is a subject which has occupied a great deal of the Embassy’s attention since 1944.” 398 According to Richard Immerman, in The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention, Wells was suspicious of communist influence within one of Arevalo’s reform programs as early as 1945. Led by Carlos Manuel Pellecer (who was described by the State Department as one of the “most fiery and least inhibited of the young Communists”), the program called for “traveling cultural missions…mobile units that went into the outlying regions to educate those Indians who had no other available facilities.” Immerman reports, “Wells lamented that these missions had been suspected of radicalism since 1945, but now that their chief [(Pellecer)] was ‘a Communist in heart if not in fact…at the same time these backward Indians get their A.B.C’s, they get a shot of communism.’” 399 Hence, even as early as 1945, Wells anxiety about communism was clearly evident.

Nevertheless, according to “a December 1946 intelligence report on Soviet objectives in the Western Hemisphere,” Gleijeses argues that the report “…expressed no anxiety about communism in Central America, except in Costa Rica. In the other four republics, the report noted, the Communist party was banned, and ‘there was no indication that if any real communists exist, they have an appreciable influence.’” 400

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399 Immerman, p. 92.
400 Gleijeses, p. 99.
However, by 1948 and 1949, near the end of Arevalo’s tenure, and during the rise of exceptional anti-communism in the U.S., the U.S. embassy in Guatemala had become increasingly anxious. In 1948, one year after the emergence of the “Truman Doctrine,” Wells’ suspicions had developed. For example, he argued (in a 28 page report on the Communist situation in Guatemala) on May 16, 1948:

Communist penetration made startling progress during the immediate post-revolutionary period (1944-1947), as evidenced by the radical nature of social, labor, and economic reforms, accompanied by strong overtones of class warfare. Infiltration of indoctrinated communists, fellow-travelers, and Marxist ideas unquestionably reached dangerous proportions.401

Yet, others also shared in this perceptive. For example, on November 3, 1949, the Guatemalan desk officer of the State Department similarly reported:

Many sources allege that the present Government of Guatemala is Communist (Moscow)-directed. When I visited there recently our Embassy did not go so far as that but did characterize the Guatemalan government as “almost” in that category and certainly as a menace to Inter-America unity and defense. Furthermore, some Embassy officers maintained that the present Guatemalan government is so far involved with international Communism that there is no possibility of its disentanglement.402

Thus, U.S. embassy officials appeared thoroughly convinced that a communist threat was present in Guatemala by 1949. Furthermore, according to Gleijeses, “By the late 1940s the Truman administration [also] saw Guatemala as a nightmarish world infested not only by communists, but also by ill-defined yet dangerous species such as pro-Communists, fellow travelers, extreme leftists, and radical leftists.”403 Immerman argues that “The Truman administration’s alarm grew concurrently with the enactment of Arevalo’s Labor Code and the rising number of strikes involving the United Fruit and International Railways of Central

401 Ibid., p. 89.
402 Gleijeses, p. 121.
America. He added: “William Barber, Truman’s deputy assistant secretary of state for American republic affairs...[explained] in 1949 that Washington viewed government programs such as agrarian reform bills, which damaged United States investments, as symptoms of a much larger problem.” In effect, U.S. policy makers believed the “leftist” land reform programs and labor unrest during Arevalo’s tenure signified that a communist threat was present in Guatemala.

However, despite this seemingly firm conclusion, from 1949 through 1952, U.S. policy makers vacillated on whether or not communism posed a serious threat. Indeed, my survey of the U.S embassy official’s correspondences reveals that they were undecided on how threatening Arevalo and Arbenz’s regimes were. Gleijeses affirms, “With abrupt swings toward greater pessimism, this ‘centrist’ view prevailed, both in the embassy and in Washington. Despite their fears and their irritation, U.S. officials conceded occasionally in 1949 and 1950 that Arevalo and his government could act in a constructive manner.”

In this light, Wells admitted by 1949 to being unsure about the threat that Arevalo’s regime posed. For example, on March 31, 1949, Wells contended that Arevalo was the, “Biggest Enigma” and on July 7, 1950, Well’s reported that Arevalo had condemned communism in his speeches. In fact, Arevalo had directly told Wells that the communist’s “identities are known,” and Arevalo stated that “come a crisis, [the communists] would be rounded up in twenty-four hours.” Thus, as my survey supports, no explicit evidence, apart from a worry about Arevalo’s land reform program, suggested that Arevalo’s regime posed communist threat in 1949, but, as detailed, Arevalo argued that he was firmly in control of his regime.

404 Immerman, p. 87.
405 Ibid., p. 82.
406 Ibid., p. 121.
407 Ibid., 120.
In the same year, Jacabo Arbenz, the presidential front runner at the time, was not yet considered a “communist threat.” For example, on August 11, 1949, less than five year before Arbenz’s overthrow, the American Ambassador to Guatemala Richard Patterson telegrammed the president of the United Fruit Company and reflected upon Arbenz’s potential ascension to the Guatemalan Presidency:

The first inclination of most people here was that it forecasts a sharper leftward move in the Government. All along I have felt that this is not necessarily the case because of the kind of man I believe Arbenz to be. He is an opportunist with no deep seated leftist convictions…Since he wants to be President and is clever, his best bet is an alliance with the United States. Therefore, if he remains in the saddle it means better results for American interests and the possible eradication of the foreign Communist element. In any event, I believe that United Fruit and other interests will not suffer because of the revolution.408

Similarly, Wells was not threatened by Arbenz in 1949:

With obvious sincerity and clarity of language Colonal Arbenz spoke at length on the basic aims of the 1944 Revolution and the Arevalo regime—which, in simple terms, are social and economic betterment to the people, and to establish a decent, democratic way of life, which will make impossible the old-style military coup d’etat and personal dictatorships under which the people have suffered for generations. It must be understood; he argued…that the laws of the land are general, affecting Guatemalan and United States firms and persons alike. 409

Gleijeses contends that by 1949, “Arbenz’s opportunism had become an article of faith for U.S. officials. This opportunist would have few qualms, they argued, at betraying his friends from the PAR and organized labor (including the Communists) after he had used them to win elections.”410 Hence, as Gleijeses argues, in the eyes of U.S. officials in 1949, Arbenz was utilizing communist support for political purposes. As a result, Arbenz’s “self-interest,” in the minds of U.S. policy makers would “drive him into the familiar embrace of Washington.”411 Likewise, according to Cullathers, U.S. embassy officials in Guatemala were not yet overtly

408 Gleijeses, p. 127.
409 Kinzer et al., p.127.
410 Gleijeses, p. 127.
411 Ibid., 127.
threatened by Arevalo, his regime, or Arbenz’s potential Presidency. For example, Cullather reports that in May 1950 Thomas Mann, director of the State Department’s Office of Middle American Affairs, and his colleagues:

…saw Arbenz as conservative, ‘an opportunist’ concerned primarily with his own interests. They expected him to ‘steer more nearly a middle course’ because his economic and military dependence on the United States required it…although Embassy officials had only vague notions of its internal politics, they considered it free from Communist influence.412

Naturally, intervention was not yet considered an option in 1950. For example, on May 15, 1950, Thomas Corcoran, the UFCO’s lobbyist (who subsequently became the UFCO’s liaison with the CIA during the plot to overthrow Arbenz) and Mann discussed possible action in Guatemala. 413 The report asserted that Corcoran “had been turning over in his mind the possibility that the American companies might agree between themselves on some method to bring moderate elements into power in Guatemala.” Corcoran inquired if the State Department “had any program for bringing about the election of a middle-of-the-road candidate.” Gleijeses recounts that “[Corcoron’s] overture was rebuffed by Mann, who argued that any attempt to interfere in the elections would become known, causing a backlash in Guatemala and throughout Latin America.”414 However, Mann ominously stated, “I would not like to try to guess what the policy in the future might be if it were definitively determined that the Guatemalan Government and people had fallen under the totalitarian control of Communist elements.”415 Although intervention was not an option in 1950, Mann certainly foreshadowed the inevitable coup.

In contrast to the perception of U.S. embassy officials, the CIA was far more concerned about the threat of communism in Guatemala. Cullather reports:

412 Cullather, p. 17.
413 Kinzer et al., p. 93.
414 Gleijeses, p. 129.
415 Ibid.
Agency officials were more apprehensive about Guatemala than their counterparts at State. Officials in the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) grew concerned in August 1950 about “the rapid growth of Communist activity in Guatemala and the probability that Guatemala may become a central point for the dissemination of anti-U.S. propaganda.”

Yet, the U.S. embassy, although more relaxed in its “anti-communist perspective” of Guatemala, was still searching for answers regarding the communist situation. As a result, embassy officials engaged in an intensive investigation for the “truth.” To this end, U.S. embassies across Latin America engaged in widespread interviews and investigations, collecting an assortment of sources that ranged widely from “experts” in sociology, Guatemalan residents, business men, to Guatemalan government officials, the Guatemalan Embassy, and Arevalo and Arbenz themselves.

4.1.1 Anti-Arevalo and Anti-Arbenz sources:

Many of the sources argued that communism was a major threat in Arevalo’s regime and that Arevalo and Arbenz constituted communist threats. For example, on August 1, 1950, a telegram was sent from the American Embassy in Mexico to the State Department. The document summarized the testimony of four recently exiled Guatemalans who were exiled “for political purposes” and concluded, “Juan Jose Arevalo has been openly communistic and in so many instances, anti-north American.”

Thereafter, on August 16, 1950, the State Department reported that the minister of Guatemala to Colombia, Virgilio Rodriguez, had argued that “The Arevalista party’s…political...
program is ‘anti-imperialist,’ which means anti-American. They have subterranean relations with Russia.”

The document explained that Rodriguez is a personal friend of Arevalo, but is, “Not friendly to the group who surround Arevalo and keep him a virtual prisoner.”

Similarly, on September 6, 1950, the American embassy reflected on a conversation with Dr. Gonzalez Allende (not to be mistaken with Salvador Allende) who was the Chilean Ambassador to Guatemala at the time: “On the subject of Communism, the Ambassador’s opinion was we should not underestimate the influence of the relatively few internationalists in Guatemala...It would not surprise him if Guatemala is already the center of a Communist network in the hemisphere, since this seems to be about the only country where they still enjoy unrestricted liberty.”

Hence, many sources supported the claim that Arevalo’s regime posed a communist threat, or, at the least, communists were gaining strength throughout Arevalo’s tenure.

4.1.2 Pro-Arevalo and Arbenz sources:

Conversely, other sources collected by the State Department were less pessimistic regarding Arevalo’s regime and Arbenz. For example, on August 23, 1950, John W. Fisher, a U.S. embassy official in Guatemala, summarized his conversation with Fernando Gallo, who Fisher described as “a young Guatemalan I have known for over two years, of a good business family, who studied banking at Berkeley on a State Department Scholarship, is intelligent, well-informed, friendly, and in my opinion very pro-American”: “Today [Gallo] said that he has

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419 MemoConv. (Dr. Rodrigo Gonzalez Allende, Chilean Ambassador to Guatemala), September 6, 1950, AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. no. 248, NA. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. (Did not have a filing number included, check roll 1).
become convinced that Arbenz’s election is assured, and that Arbenz will turn toward the center.”\footnote{MemoConv. (Fernando Gallo and John W. Fisher), August 24, 1950. AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. no. 201, NA. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm. (Did not have a filing number included; check roll 1).}

Moreover, on September 5, 1950, the U.S. embassy reflected on the opinion of a Mr. Leo A. Suslow: “Mr. Suslow, who last year wrote a thesis on social reforms in Guatemala, called today. He just returned from a three month visit in Guatemala where he had been studying the Social Security System in conjunction with his candidacy for a doctor in international sociology… [Mr. Suslow] does not believe that either of these men are real communists although he said that Arbenz has been reading some “Marxian literature and the ‘impact of this on second-rate mind might be strong.”\footnote{MemoConv. (Mr. Leo A. Suslow, Mr. Sircusa),”Conversation with Mr. Leo A. Suslow.” September 5, 1950. AmEm, Guatemala to DOS. NA 714.00/9-550. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm.}

Perhaps it goes without saying that the strongest defense of the regime came from the Guatemalan Embassy and Arevalo himself. According to the Guatemalan Embassy: “It is not communist; there are no Russian or other foreign bases in Guatemala.”\footnote{“Guatemalan Embassy in Mexico Issues Defense of Arevalo Regime.” August 10, 1950. AmEmb, Guatemala to DOS. NA 714.00/8-1050. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm.} Likewise, a report on August 14, 1950, reflected upon the U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Antonio Goubaud’s conversation with President Arevalo, in which Arevalo argued that Guatemala was clearly opposed to communism worldwide. For example, the report noted that President Arevalo was willing to help with the U.S. war effort in Korea:

President Arevalo told him he could tell the State Department that Guatemala was one hundred percent behind the United State and United Nations, that if the United States needed bases in Guatemala it could have them and that Guatemala was prepared to make available to the United Nations men for the armed forces if needed…Guatemala stood shoulder to shoulder with the United States and the other American Republics on the question of communist aggression in Korea and other places in the world.\footnote{MemoConv. (Antonia Goubaud Carrera, Ambassador to Guatemala, Mr. Thomas Mann, Mr. Edward Clark), "Ambassador Goubaud’s Trip to Guatemala,” August 14, 1950. DOS to AmEm, Guatemala. NA 714.00/8-1450. University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003. Microfilm.}
Similarly, on September 15, 1950, an office memorandum summarized another statement issued by the Guatemalan government: “The people and the government of Guatemala treasure the democratic liberties and principles that are represented here and were established in Guatemala in 1881, and will continue to resist any threat to these liberties.” In summary of all the sources, regardless of whether they supported Arevalo and Arbenz, the U.S. embassy officials clearly engaged in a sweeping investigation to identify a communist threat in Guatemala. What was to be determined was how the U.S. Embassy and U.S. policy makers interpreted these sources.

Initially, U.S. embassy officials appeared to be swayed by Arevalo’s defense of his regime. The U.S. embassy acknowledged “Arevalo’s strong statement on his countries policy toward Communism at home and abroad. The Department has noted with satisfaction Guatemala’s statement of intention to resist all forms of communist aggression.” Yet, this was soon to change.

Nonetheless, during this time, the U.S. embassy also remained uncertain about Arbenz’s stance on communism. John Fisher argued on September 20, 1950:

Colonel Jacabo Arbenz has apparently judged the time ripe to display coolness toward his extremist supporters, as part of the general campaign recently undertaken by the Arevalo Government to make itself out as anti-Communist. No overt developments can be pointed out, but Arbenz is reportedly behind a move against pro-Communist Manuel PINTO Usaga, and the pro-Arbenz press has recently adopted a new line against the Communists.

One month later, on October 13, 1950, Wells likewise lamented on his uncertainty towards Arbenz’s communist affiliations and sympathies:

Arbenz is playing both ends against the middle on the Communist issue. His friend Colonel Elfego H. Monzon, has come out as Guatemala’s most enthusiastic anti-Communist. At a large pro-Arbenz meeting in the central square of the capital on October 11, the main speaker was none other than Guatemala’s front-rank Communist, Victor Manuel Gutierrez…With the principal actors stubbornly refusing to commit themselves openly to the Communist issue, it is impossible to say more than that the best evidence is that Arevalo and Arbenz allowed Monzon to test public opinion with his anti-Communist measures, dropping him without compunction when they proved distasteful to the official parties, who have, after all, for the past six years been more sympathetic to Communism than opposed to it. 427

A week later, on October 19, 1950, Fisher argued, “Arbenz’s stand on Communism remains obscure as ever, in the absence of any clarification from him personally or from his campaign headquarters. However, it is observed that the Communists are prominent on the Arbenz bandwagon.”428 On November 27, 1950, a report issued by the U.S. embassy argued that “No one knows positively if the president of the republic is really a communist or a communist sympathizer on the one hand, or if he is really a true democrat and tolerant of ideology on the other. Neither, perhaps can we furnish the correct answer to this question.”429 Hence, U.S. embassy officials were clearly uncertain about Arbenz’s stance on communism.

Although no explicit evidence suggested that communism greatly impacted Arevalo or Arbenz’s social platform or political agendas by 1950, more prominent U.S. officials, apart from those in the U.S. embassy in Guatemala, believed a communist threat was explicitly clear and that communists had considerable influence in the government. For example, the Cuban President of the time, Carlos Prio Socorras, had traveled to Guatemala to meet personally with

Arevalo in the summer of 1950, after growing worried about the increased U.S. anxieties regarding the potential communist threat in Guatemala. On August 25, 1950, the State Department received a personal letter from President Prio, which was intended to be sent to President Truman, which stated, “My anti-Sovietic convictions are unalterable,”430 and, “Neither Arevalo nor Arbenz sympathize with communism, but neither is in a position to act against them.” In conclusion, Prio argued, “I have been able to verify, with great relief, that this (communist infiltration) is all pure fantasy, and still worse a selfish campaign, maintained by subsidized newspapermen. I have been able to verify that doctor Juan Jose Arevalo’s greatest desire is to defend democracy.”431 Although this letter was dated on August 25th, the Secretary to the President, Mr. William Hasset, the Presidential secretary, revealed that it was not received until September 21st and the response was not completed until October 13th. Hasset suggested that delay had been a result of three primary causes. He argued that:

The principle cause for the delay…was emphasized by the fact that the comments were to be made in writing by President Truman, by the probability that the letter would be shown to President Arevalo and by the possibility that it would leak to the press if anti-United States elements considered it to their advantage to do so. The other horn of the dilemma was that communists have influenced Guatemalan government policy to such an extent that it was necessary to make perfectly clear our concern and to encourage the removal of Guatemalan communist from position of political influence. Thirdly, the delay…might in fact have a beneficial in discouraging President Prio from lending his moral support to the tendency of President Arevalo to temporize with the communist problem in Guatemala.432

By October 25, 1950, Hasset had written to James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State and noted that, “[It is] recommended President Prio’s suggestion not be followed.”433 Hence, Hasset

431 Ibid, p. 3.
433 Ibid.
clearly indicates that prominent U.S. policy makers believed a communist threat existed and thus ignored Prio’s defense of Arevalo’s regime.

Although the embassy was unsure about Arevalo and Arbenz’s stance on communism, the U.S. embassy also soon believed that a communist threat was growing within Guatemala as a whole. A report issued by the U.S. embassy on November 27, 1950, argued that “communists functioned in official and private newspaper staffs through its affiliates or sympathizers and in workshops and farms through “activists” charged with the responsibility of leading strikes and provoking political incidents.” Moreover, the report contended that “Foreign and native-born communists have directed communist activities in this country along the lines of the international European parties, taking strategic positions within government, union organizations, farms groups, etc…Guatemala is a country that became an earthly paradise for communists, for dealers in Soviet ideology, and for ambitious politicians, both native an foreign.” Hence, the threat for U.S. embassy officials, and perhaps other U.S. policy makers, was not initially linked to Arevalo or Arbenz’s stance on communism, but was linked to a deeper seeded “communist conspiracy” that U.S. policy makers believed to exist.

Yet, although Arevalo’s stance on communism was not clear for U.S. policy makers through 1950, on January 22, 1951, Edward Clark, the Guatemalan Desk officer to the Department of State, made firm declaration about Arevalo: “…I heartily share the feeling that President Arevalo is responsible for tolerating the Communists and that we have no reason whatsoever for doing anything to show pleasure with his administration.” Likewise, my survey agrees that U.S. policy makers, from 1951 onward, believed that Arevalo was a

435 Ibid.
“communist sympathizer.” Richard Immerman argues that this sentiment had evolved as early as 1950:

A State Department memorandum to Ambassador Edwin Kyle called attention to the code’s [referring to a specific element of Arevalo’s land reform policy] provisions, which appeared to ‘discriminate in practice against U.S. companies.’ By 1950, Guatemalan experts were so disturbed by the ‘continued mistreatment of U.S. business concerns,’ that Kyle’s successor, Richard Patterson, Warned Arevalo that ‘Cordial relations between Guatemala and the United States cannot continue if the persecution of American interest does not cease.’

Hence, U.S. policy makers appeared to be returning to their initial pessimism of 1948 and 1949: once again, U.S. policy makers believed that Arevalo was a communist sympathizer and that his regime’s social platform signified that a communist threat was indeed present in Guatemala.

Despite the concerns about Arevalo and his regime, U.S. policy makers were still uncertain about Arbenz. In fact, some reports affirm that U.S. policy makers believed Arbenz would turn against the communists. For example, on February 6, 1951, the Department of State messaged Edward Clark, the U.S. embassy desk officer, and argued in favor of Arbenz’s regime, stating that it would not be sympathetic to communists in the future: “[Communists] are probably seeking to strengthen themselves against the possibility of finding themselves in disfavor with future [Arbenz] administration.” Also around January of 1951, in a document sent by the American Embassy in Guatemala to the U.S. State department, called “Tab ‘A,’” and titled, “Capabilities of the Guatemalan Communists to Seriously Challenge the Country’s Armed Forces,” the U.S. embassy reflected on communist strength and argued that communists neither were capable of taking power nor could they threaten Arbenz’s regime. Moreover, as argued in the “January report,” U.S. “Tab ‘A’” argued that Arbenz might turn against the communists.

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437 Immerman, p. 87.
438 Gleijeses, p. 127.
(“Tab A” is undated, but we can assume that it occurred proximally to the report in which Well’s cited “Tab A” on January 9, 1951.) “Tab A” reported:

1) There is no organized Communist Party in Guatemala and the number of Communists is probably under 500. Because they have infiltrated into the Administration political parties, have established influential connections in the Government, and particularly because they dominate the labor movement, they wield an influence out of proportion to their numbers. It is not believed, however, that they are capable of taking over the Government, nor even of dominating Guatemalan international policies. They are in a position to influence domestic matters, particularly in relation to labor matters.

2) There has been much discussion concerning the attitude that the President-elect, Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, would take concerning Communism. He accepted Communist support in his campaign and, as the Administration candidate, may follow the toleration policy of the current Administration toward the Communists. There have been reports, however, that he might attempt, with the backing of the armed forces, to eliminate the Communists from influence in Guatemala. The Guatemalans have requested approval of the purchase of 12 F-51 planes on the grounds that they would be a decisive factor in a contest between the Armed forces and the Communists. The request presumably is connected with possible moves against the Communists when Arbenz takes office.

3) There is no reliable evidence available to G-2 that the Communists or Communist-dominated groups in Guatemala have significant quantities of arms.

4) It is estimated that the Guatemalan Armed Forces, if united and determined as it is expected they would be against the Communists, could win any struggle against them. 439

In short, the report firmly established that the communists were not a significant threat to overthrow or threaten Arbenz’s regime.

Even Wells appeared to agree with such a conclusion. On January 9, 1951, in a response to the Guatemalan government’s request for aircraft to fight the Communists, as was cited in the previous document, Wells argued:

As far as my personal opinion goes, I see no need whatsoever for F-51’s [aircraft] to fight Communism in Guatemala. If the issue should come to a show down between the armed forces and the extremists, the former could make much better use of basic trainers from which could be dropped a few well-placed hand grenades from low altitude. The

Communists by no stretch of imagination are going to possess aircraft which would have
to be shot out of the skies by F-51’s.  

The language of this statement is critical. Note that Wells did not passively suggest that
request for aircraft was merely an exaggeration, but sarcastically replied that a possible
counteraction of dropping several well placed hand grenades to combat the communists would
suffice. Thus, Well’s implicitly affirms the conclusion that was reached by “Tab ‘A’”; that the
communist threat was not significant.

However, a difference in perspective was yet again apparent between U.S. policy makers.
For example, apart from the U.S. embassy, U.S. policy makers in the State Department’s Office
of Intelligence were concerned with the level of support that Arbenz’s government was giving
the communists. A report issued on March 16, 1951 argued: “Other Latin American
governments…have in the past worked with Communists, generally because of their influence in
labor unions. In no other Latin American country, however, has the ruling group in power
accepted the Communists with such cordiality into a political partnership including the frequent
support of the Communist line by administration media.”

Even Well’s changed course from his stance in the “January 9th” report: On June 6, 1951,
Wells became increasingly alarmed when he realized that Arbenz had recognized the PGT (the
communist party) as an official party: “Whatever the long range advantages or disadvantages to
the Communist movement in Guatemala, the open appearance of the Party has had the effect of
focusing public attention on the fact that Communism actually exists here. Government
spokesmen may no longer deny their existence.” Yet, Wells was even more concerned by the
“fellow traveler” or “communist sympathizer”: He argued that “The problem of Communist

440 Wells to Clark. January 9, 1951. (No filing numbers, Check roll 714.001). University of Pittsburgh Library. Wilmington, Delware:
441 Gleijeses, p. 226.

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penetration cannot be solved by the simple expedient of outlawing the avowed Communists identified within the “Octubre” group. The many crypto-Communist who remain affiliated with PAR and other pro-Government political parties are probably more dangerous and influential. Their undercover influence may be expected to continue to agitate the genuinely nationalistic and pro-labor tendencies of the present revolutionary regime.”  
Hence, although Wells acknowledged that the creation of an official party caused great concern, the threat was also, once again, linked to an unseen and intangible communist conspiracy of the “crypto-communist.”

Still, by the middle of 1951, officials in the U.S. embassy had not argued for any course of action against Arbenz’s regime. Gleijeses recounts the words of Bill Kreig, the DCM at the U.S. embassy in Guatemala, who stated, “incident after incident accumulated and we became increasingly concerned and pessimistic, but no irrevocable line had been crossed.”  
As a result intervention was not yet an option. According to Gleijeses:

Until the spring of 1952, Truman’s policy toward Arbenz was similar to that adopted toward Arevalo in the late 1940s. Diplomatic pressure was accompanied by the denial of economic aid. Washington continued to refuse to sell weapons to Guatemala and began a successful effort to prevent Arbenz from acquiring arms in other Western countries. In June 1951, the United States halted financial assistance for the construction of the Guatemalan segment of the Inter-American Highway.

Although intervention was not yet an option, U.S. policy makers continued to closely analyze what they believed to be further evidence that a communist threat was growing. By January of 1952, the U.S. policy makers in the CIA spoke with much greater resolve about the threat of the communism in Guatemala. For example, On January 11, 1952, Joseph King, the

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443 Gleijeses, p. 227.
444 Ibid.
Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA argued that “The Communists continue to be very active in Guatemala and continue to receive government support.” King also reported:

Since the anti-communist rioting in July 1951 the Communists have softened their overt campaign for immediate action in the political field, but they have forged ahead in the labor movement, succeeding in forming…a central labor organization comprising almost all the unions in the country…The Guatemalan Communists are small in number, but their influence in government and labor is substantial.445

Thus, King indicates that the threat of communism was, in part, directly linked to the CP’s influence in the labor movement. Moreover, Cullather argues that the CIA also considered Arbenz’s land reform as indication of further communist “subversion”: “To CIA observers, land reform seemed a powerful weapon for the expansion of Communist influence…they regarded Decree 900 (Arbenz’s land reform bill) as a menacing instrument of Communist penetration.”446 Nonetheless, despite such evidence, according to Cullather, even CIA officials agreed: “no immediate danger of communist subversion of power in 1952” existed.

Further analysis of communism in Guatemala was also provided by the State Department in a “National Intelligence Estimate” on March 11, 1952:

The Communists already exercise in Guatemala a political influence far out of proportion to their small numerical strength. This influence will probably continue to grow during 1952. The political situation in Guatemala adversely affects U.S. interests and constitutes a potential threat to U.S. security…[communists] have been successful in infiltrating the Administration and the pro-Administration political parties and have gained control of organized labor upon which the Administration has become increasingly dependent…Any deterioration in the economic and political situations would tend to increase the Administrations dependence on and favor toward organized labor, with a consequent increase in Communist influence.447

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Hence, much like the CIA, the State Department also agreed that the CP’s influence in labor was a major cause for concern. The report also agreed with the CIA’s analysis that communists were not capable of seizing power:

It is unlikely that the Communists could come directly to power during 1952, even though, in case of the incapacitation of President Arbenz, his present legal successor would be a pro-Communist…In present circumstances the Army is loyal to President Arbenz, although increasingly disturbed by the growth of Communist influence. If it appeared that the Communists were about to come to power in Guatemala, the Army would probably prevent development…In the longer view, continued Communist influence and action in Guatemala will gradually reduce the capabilities of the potentially powerful anti-Communist forces to produce a change. The Communists will also attempt to subvert or neutralize the Army in order to reduce its capability to prevent them from eventually taking full control of the Government. 448

Once again, in 1952, the State Department explicitly agrees that the CP could not overtake Arbenz’s regime. Yet, they did worry that the communists would attempt to do so. In regards to Arbenz’s relationship with the CP, the document reported:

The present political situation in Guatemala is the outgrowth of the Revolution of 1944. That Revolution was something more than a routine military coup. From it there has developed a strong national movement to free Guatemala from the military dictatorship, social backwardness, and “economic colonialism,” which had been the pattern of the past…President Arbenz himself is essentially an opportunist whose politics are largely a matter of historical accident…by 1951 the toleration of Communist activity which had characterized the early years of the Arevalo Administration had developed into an effective working alliance between Arevalo and the Communists. Arbenz, to attain the Presidency, made with the Communists commitments of mutual support which importantly affect the present situation. He did not, however, surrender himself completely to Communist control…The CP of Guatemala has no more than 500 members, of whom perhaps one-third are militant. It is in open communication with international communism, chiefly through the Communist controlled international labor organizations. With the assistance of the Government, Communist and Communist-influenced labor leaders have been the most successful organizers of Guatemalan labor…Through their control of organized labor and their influence within the pro-Administration political parties the Communists have been successful in gaining influential positions with the Government…The communists do not fully control the Administration, however. Over their protests, President Arbenz has recently dismissed a pro-Communist Minister of Education and appointed a non-Communist Minister of Communications…If President Arbenz should become incapacitated…the Army would

448 Ibid.
probably seize power itself in order to prevent the Communists from gaining direct control of the Government.449

The report explicitly defines, in sequence with other reports, that communists would not be able to take power, especially since the army would stop such efforts, but, once again, the report affirms that the State Department believed that the CP’s major source of influence in Guatemala and with regards to Arbenz’s regime stemmed from their influence in labor. Yet, the report notes that the communist do not “fully” control the administration, insinuating that they did, at least, partially influence Arbenz’s regime.

Although the “National Intelligence Estimate” and certain members of the CIA had concluded that a communist takeover of the Guatemalan government was not feasible in 1952, King argued on March 17, 1952, “If the Guatemalan Government does not fall of its own weight it is conceivable that more direct measures may eventually become necessary, and planning for such an emergency will proceed.”450 Cullather summarizes that CIA officials, “predicated a slow, inevitable deterioration of the situation in Guatemala” and thus believed counter measures to prevent the inevitable should be undertaken (i.e. intervention).451 Thus, for the first time, intervention was a proposed option, at least in theory. The divergence in perspective henceforth became increasingly apparent.

In fact, only one month later, Gleijeses argues that the Truman administration began planning for Arbenz’s overthrow when Anastasia Somoza, the Nicaraguan dictator at the time, “approached the United States” in April of 1952. On a private trip in April and May of 1952, Somoza met with Truman and other executive officials. He argued, “Just give me the arms, and

449 Ibid.
451 Cullather, p. 25.
I’ll clean up Guatemala for you in no time.” Furthermore, Colonel Cornelius Mara (who was the personal assistant to General Harry Vaughan, Truman’s personal military assistant) joined Somoza on his trip to Guatemala, in which, Somoza further incited Mara to allow him to “take care of Guatemala.” Gleijeses contends that “Mara became Somoza’s champion. His report to Truman must have been truly eloquent; so eloquent, in fact, that Truman immediately ‘Initialed the report’ and instructed General Walter Bedell Smith, the CIA director, ‘to put it into effect.’ Truman did not inform Acheson or any other State Department official.” Thereafter, the subsequent plan was formulated by the CIA and was titled PBFORTUNE. By June 1952, CIA correspondence was no longer centered on the perception of threat that communism posed, but was discussing the specific actions and costs of a military coup. That is, the theoretical option of intervention was put into action because the communist threat in Guatemala was substantial enough in the eyes of Truman and his closest advisors to react.

However, the plan was not implemented because, as Gleijeses contends, certain government officials believed PBFORTUNE would not succeed because of various logistical problems. Nonetheless, by the time Eisenhower had come to office, the predecessor to PBFORTUNE—PBSUCCESS—was underway. In brief, the goal to remove Arbenz had merely been sidetracked and was still alive. Thus, Eisenhower and his closest advisors initiated a renewed effort remove Arbenz.

In the process of planning the PBSUCCESS, Cullather argues that CIA officials sought approval from the State Department’s highest officials before finalizing PBSUCCESS: including King; Allen Dulles, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; John Dulles, the Secretary of

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452 Gleijeses, p. 229.
453 Ibid., p. 230.
State; Thomas Mann of the State Department; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edward G. Miller; the under Secretary of State David Bruce; John Moors Cabot, the Assistant Secretary of Latin American Affairs; and several others. Cullather contends that these men gave specific approval before moving forward on September 9, 1952 to proceed with operation PBSUCCESS. Hence, each man’s approval indicates that U.S. policy makers at the highest levels of the U.S. government believed the “communist threat” in Guatemala required a U.S. response: intervention.

Yet, despite the shift towards favoring intervention, many U.S. policy makers, who were unaware of the pending coup, still believed that a threat did not warrant intervention because they believed that communists could not overtake Arbenz’s regime. For example, on January 1, 1953, the State Department argued:

… there are serious limitations to the Communist position. Although the Communists have enjoyed considerable success in capturing key positions among important groups in Guatemalan society, they have not yet gained a substantial consistent popular following. They must continually contend with an essentially inarticulate and conservative mass. On higher levels they must face the fact that the economic groups which subscribe to the principles of the Revolution of 1944 are not extremists and that many seeming pro-Communist political allies are, in fact, primarily opportunists.455

The report concluded:

The real answer to Communist success in Guatemala lies with the attitude of the administrations of Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-), for, despite democratic overtones, Guatemalan political life is still largely run by the executive. Arbenz, in particular, has favored Communist development because he has found its leadership cooperative and capable. Whether or not he fully appreciates the dangers of Communism, he apparently believes that he controls the Communist organization. He has the power to check or break the Communist organization at will. In the last analysis the Communists are dependent upon the executive's pleasure for their positions and probably the great bulk of their financial support. In themselves they lack

the economic resources and popular following to contest determined opposition from the President.456

Thus, in complete opposition to the findings of the CIA, President Truman, President Eisenhower, and their closest advisors, U.S. officials in the State Department clearly believed that communism did not pose a serious threat, at least one that warranted intervention. In the same way, according to Stephen Rabe, in *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, in August 1953, “the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the State Department noted, in a draft paper prepared for the NSC, that ‘it is possible that President Arbenz thinks of the Communists in Guatemala only as reformers and useful allies rather than as Soviet agents.’” In fact, Rabe further argues that “the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs found that, ‘almost without exception,’ Guatemalan Communists were ‘indigenous to the area and are Mexican trained rather than Moscow-trained, although some have visited the Soviet orbit and may have received brief instruction there.’”457 Hence, if all the U.S. government had ever uniformly agreed on the threat that communism posed in Guatemala, that general consensus was now gone and a discrepancy in perspective was exceptionally clear.

However, a discrepancy in perspective did not halt PBSUCCESS from moving forward. Obviously, the CIA, the Presidents, and their closest advisors were the ones that made the decisions; thus, their perspectives were the ones that mattered. On December 16, 1953, Peurifoy had dinner with Arbenz and subsequently wrote a five-page report, in which he stated, “I am definitely convinced that if the President is not a Communist, he will certainly do until one comes along.”458 Immerman recounts that in a 1954 report, “The House subcommittee on

456 Ibid.
458 Gleijeses, p. 255.
Communist aggression claimed that Communists and Communists sympathizers came to dominate all of Arevalo’s propaganda outlets, including the information offices, the official newspaper, and the government-owned radio stations.” Likewise, President Eisenhower’s own brother wrote to him following a fact finding trip to Latin America, stating:

The possible conquest of a Latin American nation today would not be, so far as anyone can foresee, by direct assault. It would come, rather, through the insidious process of infiltration, conspiracy, spreading lies, and the undermining of free institutions, one by one. Highly disciplined groups of Communists are busy, night and day, illegally or openly, in the American republics, as they are in every nation of the world…One American nation has succumbed to Communist infiltration. (Emphases added).

Likewise, Walter B. Smith, former Central Intelligence Director, head of the CIA, and current Under Secretary of State reported to President Eisenhower in on January 15, 1954:

We have repeatedly expressed deep concern to the Guatemalan Government because it plays the Communists’ game. Our relations are further disturbed because of the merciless hounding of American companies there by tax and labor demands, strikes, and, in the case of the United Fruit Company, inadequately compensated seizures of land under a Communist-administration Agrarian Reform Law.

The Guatemalan situation has attracted the interest of many American journalists who have visited Guatemala and independently reported on their findings. Prominent Congressmen and Senators of both Parties have shown increasing concern with Communism in Guatemala.

Hence, such policy makers clearly were convinced that a communist threat was present and were willing to intervene to prevent the threat from growing.

To this end, according to Aybar de Soto, in 1954, prior to the coup, Allen Dulles traveled to the Tenth Inter-American Conference (TIAC), which usually was organized to consider “hemispheric economic problems.” Dulles’s main initiative and goal was to achieve a resolution that provided, “the United States with a regional ‘legal’ instrument that would allow it legally to

459 Immerman, p. 91.
intervene in Guatemala. The result of Dulles’ efforts at TIAC was a passage of a resolution titled, “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against International Communist Intervention,” passed on March 13, 1954. The resolution stated:

That the domination or control of the political institutions of an American State by the International communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extra continental power would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of measures in accordance with existing threats. 462

In effect, Dulles was gearing up for the intervention.

The planners of PBSUCCESS received their final piece of evidence in May of 1954 that grounded their claim that the Guatemalan regime was a threat: as discussed in Chapter Two, U.S. policy makers discovered a bank transfer from the Guatemalan regime to an investment firm in Czechoslovakia and they subsequently sought to track down incoming shipments from the Socialist Bloc to Guatemala. Ultimately, U.S. policy makers discovered an arms shipment off the Guatemalan coast, which had indeed originated from Czechoslovakia. Cullather argues that “the arms purchase handed PBSUCCESS a propaganda bonanza.” Specifically, Cullather reports:

On May 17, [1954], the State Department declared that the shipment revealed Guatemala’s complicity in a Soviet plan for Communist conquest in the Americas. John Foster Dulles exaggerated the size of the cargo, hinting that it would enable Guatemala to triple the size of its Army and overwhelm neighboring states. The press and Congress responded on cue. House Speaker John McCormack sputtered that ‘this cargo of arms is like an atom bomb planted in the rear of our backyard.’ 463

Hence, one arms shipment was enough to cause not only U.S. policy makers great concern, but the American populous in general. It suffices to say, only three months after the

462 Aybar de Soto, p. 239, 240.
463 Cullather, p. 79.
arms shipment was apprehended, the coup was initiated on June 18\textsuperscript{th} and Arbenz resigned on June 27\textsuperscript{th}.\footnote{Kinzer et al., p. 7.}

In summary, U.S. policy makers engaged in an intensive investigation of Arevalo’s regime that dated back to 1944, suggesting that U.S. policy makers were looking for a communist threat well before it was apparent. Indeed, from 1944 to 1948, little evidence suggested that a communist threat was present. Yet, by 1948 and 1949, U.S. policy makers became increasingly concerned, especially with regards to Arevalo’s land reform program. Nevertheless, from 1948 to 1951, U.S. policy makers were largely undecided about Arevalo’s stance on communism. But by 1951, U.S. policy makers once again concluded that Arevalo was a “communist sympathizer.”

Up until 1951, however, U.S. policy makers were even more perplexed by Arbenz and, at times, concluded that he was pro-American, and, thus, was only utilizing communist political support to advance his own political career. From this perspective, U.S. policy makers labeled Arbenz as an “opportunist,” rather than a “communist sympathizer.” Yet, this initial optimism soon changed around 1951 and Arbenz was henceforth labeled as a “communist sympathizer.” Among the variables that U.S. policy makers considered as threatening, U.S. policy makers considered Arbenz’s land reform program and the CP’s influence in Guatemalan labor movement as significant evidence that a communist threat was growing. Also, U.S. policy makers feared of a pervasive “communist conspiracy” that included not only the CP themselves, but also the communist’s “fellow traveler.” Although many U.S. policy makers believed that the CP did not pose a threat to overthrow Arbenz, President Truman, and his closest advisors believed the communist threat required a response and initiated PB FORTUNE in 1952, a plan to
remove Arbenz and his regime. Although PBFOURTE failed, another plan, PBSUCCESS, was ultimately successful in removing Arbenz from power in 1954.

While many U.S. policy makers did not believe that a communist threat required U.S. action, all U.S. policy makers believed that a communist threat was present. The U.S. policy makers breadth of analysis, intensity of focus, and the use of language regarding the search for a communist threat clearly indicates that U.S. policy makers were working under the auspices of the legal-moralistic and anti-communist liberal-conservative consensus perspective that dominated U.S. policy perspective in late 1940’s and early 1950’s.

4.2 PERU: U.S. PERSPECTIVE

By the late 1960s and 1970s, in the case Peru, U.S. policy makers were no longer working under the policy guidelines or anti-communist political atmosphere experienced in the 1950s. This section will demonstrate that U.S. policy makers were no longer threatened by the expropriation of U.S. businesses or any other social reform regarding communism. This is not to say that the expropriation of U.S. business interests was favorable in the eyes of U.S. policy makers—because U.S. policy maker’s main focus in Peru was the expropriation of the International Petroleum Company and the economic threat that it posed—but, nonetheless, the expropriation was not related to the threat of communism in anyway. Furthermore, U.S. policy makers likewise were not threatened by the CP’s influence in labor, the growing strength of the labor movement, or the massive labor unrest that ensued during Velasco’s tenure. In fact, for all the variables that I have discussed in the case of Guatemala and that were also present in Peru, U.S. policy makers
never considered the Peruvian state as a whole, Velasco, or his regime as a communist threat. I also, as promised, will highlight the lack of investigation in the case of Peru and how U.S. policy makers, with little effort, concluded he was anti-communist and not a threat.

Before turning to the U.S. perspective regarding Velasco and his regime, I will briefly summarize the perspectives of U.S. policy makers regarding the regime of Fernando Belaunde Terry (the Peruvian President from 1963 to 1968, who was ultimately overthrown by Velasco’s military coup d’état in 1968) in order to substantiate that little investigation of a communist threat occurred prior to Velasco’s ascension to power. Indeed, communism is only mentioned in passing in several reports, in which the Belaunde regime is described as anti-communist. In fact, not only is communism not mentioned as a threat, but, in line with the Alliance for progress, U.S. policy makers explicitly outline how they favor the economic and social development programs initiated by Belaunde to counter the threat of communism. For example, on January 29, 1966, Lincoln Gordon, the Ambassador to Brazil under President Johnson, argued: “Aspects of the Belaunde program are designed to bring the long neglected Indian population into the mainstream of national life, thereby countering communist efforts to use Indian discontent to launch a guerilla movement.”

Moreover, despite concerns with the expropriation of the IPC, initiated under Belaunde’s tenure, U.S. policy worried that an aggressive stance against Velasco’s regime in response to his expropriation of the IPC would “pose a serious threat to U.S.-Peruvian relations and to [the U.S.’s] Alliance image.” Hence, furthering social reform and protecting the U.S. image in Latin America, under the auspices of the Alliance for Progress Program, was a prime concern for U.S. policy makers in the late 1960s.

Near the end of Belaunde’s term, in an information Memorandum from William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, the U.S. was concerned that Belaunde stay in power (perhaps because was he the main U.S. ally in the IPC case); however, no discussion of communism is evident. Indeed, throughout my entire survey of the diplomatic correspondence during Belaunde’s tenure, little discussion of communism is evident.

Thus, with U.S. policy makers clearly unconcerned with communism in Peru, Belaunde was overthrown on October 3, 1968, and Velasco seized power, installing the ominously named, “Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces.” In an information Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow to President Johnson on October 4, 1968, Rostow summarized the coup:

The Military Junta appears firmly in control in Peru, supported by a united military establishment and some conservative civilians…Unlike the case of the Argentine coup in 1966, we have made no official statement condemning the action of the military leaders, although State officials have made our unhappiness clear on a background basis…better to allow the weight of Latin American sentiment to register first. In support of my general contention, this quote demonstrates that U.S. policy makers did not link the military overthrow to any communist threat.

Rather, the threat was an economic one in the eyes of U.S. policy makers: they were concerned with possible expropriation of U.S. businesses interests. For example, on October 10, 1968, the Secretary of State Rusk publically commented on the coup and the IPC case and stated, “We are very concerned and disappointed about the developments in Peru.” Yet, once again, Secretary Rusk never expressed a concern regarding communism. The remainder of the message focused on the U.S. government’s position on the IPC case. Rusk reported:

We don’t know yet what this announced move against the IPC will involve. As we go forward, there is one thing we have to watch with great care: our public deprecation of the coup has for various reasons been limited to working levels. (Personally I think it wiser not to advise public lamentations at very high levels. But not having rended our garments and torn our hair in public heretofore, it would be bad in Latin America and here if we should go very suddenly into public outcry after IPC nationalization. Fortunately, IPC’s parent does not want us to. 469

Just as U.S. policy makers were concerned about upholding the U.S. “Alliance Image,” Rusk, once again, demonstrates that U.S. policy makers were concerned with how U.S. action would be interpreted in Latin America. Yet, communism and the threat that it might pose was still not mentioned with regards to the IPC expropriation, Velasco, or his regime.

Moreover, on October 11, 1968, a memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson discussed the “implications of the IPC case”:

The Revolutionary Government, which appears to be highly nationalistic, justified its grounds of general unrest and loss of public confidence in Government. The new Regime particularly stressed the pretext that the August 13 agreement with the Government and the International Petroleum Company…was a sellout. The president announced the expropriation of IPC’s oil fields, refinery, and other assets…The Implications of the IPC expropriation are being explored, including all relevant U.S. legislative provisions. 470

Although the U.S. State Department acknowledge that Velasco’s regime was “revolutionary” and “nationalistic,” as it had done in the case of Arevalo and Arbenz, still, no perception of a threat is apparent.

In the wake of U.S. pressure and reaction to the IPC expropriation, Velasco and his closest advisors defended their regimes right to expropriation. A key actor in the Velasco regime was General Mercado Jarrin who was appointed as the Foreign Minister under Velasco, soon after the 1968 coup. Richard Walter, in Peru and the United States, 1960-1975, explains: “Mercado was a natural choice for the all-important Foreign Ministry post, which…could be

469 Ibid.
considered the second-most important within the new regime…According to Mercado, Velasco gave him free rein to run foreign affairs as he saw fit.” On October 11, 1968, a State Department report summarizes General Mercado’s defense of the IPC expropriation:

In connection with the foregoing discussion on IPC, General Mercado sought repeatedly to give assurance as to the “special” nature of IPC case. He said the revolutionary government, while it is nationalistic, is neither statist nor leftist and that it recognizes the need to protect and encourage private capital and to attract foreign private investment.

The report subsequently argued that General Mercado was questioned about several criticisms of the Peruvian government—that the Velasco regime was “influenced by a group of “Nasserist” colonels,” the radical advisors that surrounded Velasco. The report summarized General Mercado’s response: “He asserted that the armed forces was unified as a single man in determination to carry out their obligations to their country as they saw them under the constitution and to bring about necessary revolutionary reforms.” Notice that the colonels were labeled as “Nasserist” rather than “communist sympathizers,” “fellow travelers,” or “dupes,” as they most likely would have been in the context of the early 1950’s. Moreover, Mercado’s defense of his regime was quite similar to that of Velasco’s and Arbenz’s. Yet, in Guatemala, although Arevalo’s initial “defense” received positive praise from the State Department, the Cuban President Prio’s defense was discarded.

In contrast from the way U.S. policy makers responded to Arevalo’s defense, in the case of Peru and Mercado’s defense, U.S. policy makers were quick to determine that Mercado’s claim was valid and that the expropriation, Velasco, and his regime were not communist threats. For example, the previously cited report also included Ambassador Oliver’s response to General Mercado’s defense: “I replied that it was not my purpose to discuss expropriation since the

United States recognized the right of a sovereign nation to take territory within its jurisdiction for public purpose. I said, however, that the U.S. also expected fulfillment of the corresponding obligation under international law to make prompt, adequate and effective compensation.”

Hence, such a position is prime evidence that policy makers viewed expropriation in a much different light than was seen in the Guatemalan situation, but also that they were more open to Mercado’s defense. Thus, although the regimes expropriation of IPC, while unfavorable, was not considered to be an indication of a “communist threat” in Velasco’s regime.

In 1969, despite overt nationalism and anti-American rhetoric, the State Department remained certain that Velasco was anti-communist. For example, a memorandum from the department of state for Kissinger declared:

The military government used the IPC issue as their principal pretext for the October coup, and derived enormous popular support from expropriating the IPC properties. That act remains highly popular and no sector or leader can afford to repudiate it or even appear to "sell out" on this issue. Anti-U.S. nationalism is not only something on which the Velasco government has built its appeal, but it may be something it will use to transfer from the shoulders of itself, the elite and the population generally, the blame for any future political and economic failures. This nationalistic antipathy was not created by Velasco or the IPC issue itself. It has roots in other irritants—disagreements on fishing and territorial waters, aid terms, the Mirage issue—as well as in the country's heavy dependence on official and private U.S. finances. U.S. firms dominate the export industries and U.S. aid has been heavy. Beneficial as this relationship has been, viewed through the eyes of Peruvian nationalists, it creates emotional reactions against "dependence".

Although U.S. officials acknowledge that Velasco and his regime relied on “nationalistic support,” and U.S. policy makers further cite how his regime engaged in sweeping social reform, no discussion of a communist threat is apparent. Likewise in a report titled “The President has

474 Ibid.
directed that a review be undertaken of U.S. policy toward Peru,” Kissinger reported that “The review is to examine...the present situation and short-term outlook in Peru, with particular focus on the International Petroleum Company expropriation issue.”476 In the entire report, no mention of communism is made.

In fact, one month later on March 6, 1969, the CIA defended the Velasco regime's recent formation of relations with members of the Socialist Bloc and argued that Velasco’s regime was not communist or impacted by the CP:

Peru’s recent moves to establish diplomatic and economic relations with the U.S.S.R and other European Communist countries, which were begun last year under President Belaunde, probably are more a show of independence from the U.S. than a serious intention to develop a firm and close relationship...[Velasco’s] personal entourage is composed of men whose views cover the political spectrum from extreme right to extreme left...There is no evidence so far that advice or support of the Peruvian Communist parties have been important to Velasco...[and] the officers in the regime...have uniformly anti-Communist backgrounds.477

The same day, a Special National Intelligence Estimate on March 6, 1969 reiterated the CIA’s sentiments:

President Velasco's personal entourage, apart from those in the cabinet who support him, is composed of men whose political views cover the spectrum from extreme right to extreme left. All appear to be ultra-nationalistic and anti-American. We have no evidence to indicate that the advisers on the political left have influence on Velasco which is different from or greater than that of the other ultranationalists.478

Moreover, the CIA, which was exceptionally concerned in the case of Guatemala did not view Velasco’s land reform program as a threat whatsoever. For example, in A CIA Intelligence


Bulletin, issue on June 26, 1969, the title page listed the contents of the bulletin:

**Central Intelligence Bulletin**

**CONTENTS**

*South Vietnam:* Situation report. (Page 1)

*Laos:* Communist pressure against Muong Soui has eased, but enemy forces are dug in nearby. (Page 3)

*Peru:* The new agrarian reform law probably will meet strong opposition and disrupt agricultural production. (Page 4)

*Argentina:* Renewed student and labor unrest is in prospect during the next few days. (Page 5)

*Panama:* National Guard Commander Torrijos is trying to delay elections, promised for next year. (Page 6)

*Nationalist China:* New cabinet changes broaden the powers of Chiang Kai-shek's son. (Page 7)

*Israel:* Electoral prospects point to a renewal of Mrs. Weir's mandate as prime minister. (Page 8)

Figure 9: Central Intelligence Bulletin

Notice how Peru’s agrarian reform law is listed directly under a discussion of South Vietnam, which directly cites “communist pressure.” Hence, when read with the entirety of the report, communism, although on the mind of CIA officials in the case of Vietnam, was not associated with the Peruvian regimes’ land reform program. In fact it, the report positively described: “In patriotic and nationalistic tones, Velasco appealed to peasants and students to support the new agrarian reform program, which is the military government’s first major step toward “the economic and social transformation of the country.”

Later that same year on November 13, 1969, National Security staff member Viron Vaky summarized a CIA report on President Velasco’s disposition towards the United States, relations with the U.S.S.R, and towards communism. Vaky reported that according to the CIA report, President Velasco stated:

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While people believed his regime is anti-U.S., this is not so. He was opposed to the way U.S. big business attempts to impose its conditions on Latin American countries, but he wants to have good relations with the U.S. He feels that the Nixon Administration desires to have good relations with Peru...His regime is not pro-Communist. If the Communists tried to exceed their bounds he would round them up and have them shot. He was unhappy with the favorable comments being made by Castro about Peru’s revolution. The Peruvian revolution is an economic one not a political one. He knows there are leftists among his advisors, but he needs their technical expertise. He would accept Soviet aid on government projects if no other aid was forthcoming. He is aware of the danger of Soviet technicians becoming active in the subversive field.  

Much like Arevalo had done in the early 1950s, Velasco was appealing to the U.S. government in defense his regime’s anti-communist stance. But in contrast to the response that Arevalo received from the U.S. government, and just as U.S. policy makers had accepted General Mercado’s defense of the IPC expropriation and Velasco’s government a year prior, U.S. policy makers quickly agreed that Velasco and his regime were anti-communist and no communist threat was present in Peru.

Specifically, Velasco found an unexpected ally in Kissinger. Noel Maurer recounts that Kissinger “had to work to convince Nixon that Velasco was sincere in his anti-Communism.” In 1970, Kissinger defended Velasco by recounting one of Velasco’s anti-communist speeches. In part, it stated, “Intolerance, totalitarianism, bureaucratization are, in the unimpeachable light of history, structural failures of Communist societies and not simply secondary deformations. Therefore, such societies cannot serve as a model for our Revolution. And, therefore, in regard to Communism ...we place ourselves in opposition.” Nixon subsequently responded, “makes


481 Maurer, p. 10.
sense—perhaps we should make a gesture towards him—as we continue our coolness toward [Chile’s] Allende.”

Later that year, on November 27, 1970, Kissinger similarly appealed to the President, arguing, “We may find it possible over time to work with the “new military” in Peru and to influence the course of their “revolution” away from Cuban/Chilean patterns and into channels that may be more acceptable to us.”

Most significantly, a meeting memorandum sent to the U.S. embassy in Peru referred to a meeting held on September 29, 1971 in Kissinger’s office in the White House and reported, in unison with the previous report, that Kissinger was not only convinced of Velasco’s anti-communist stance, but that Peru’s revolution could be utilized to counterbalance the threat posed by Allende’s Chile. The participants included Kissinger; Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, the Peruvian Foreign Minister; Fernando Berckemeyer Pazos, Peruvian Ambassador to the United States; Arnold Nachmanoff, National Security Council Staff; and Ashley Hewitt, National Security Council Staff:

Mercado…reviewed the development of the past three years since the inception of the Peruvian revolution. He emphasized that the ideological orientation of the revolution is nationalist and not Marxist or Communist…The Foreign Minister emphasized that the Peruvian experiment is purely national in character with no desire to either export its own practices and precepts or to import those of others. He repeated that it is anti-Communist and he said that Peru viewed with concern the emergence of a Marxist regime in Chile arising from outside influences. Mercardo said that those who seek power in Latin America by means of guerilla warfare and terrorism will fail to achieve it, but that coalitions of Leftist forces working through the legal structure were a far greater threat. He said that the Popular Front in Chile, if it is successful in socializing a country, will have a powerful demonstrated effect in Latin America. Mercado then advanced the idea that Peru is of great importance as a demonstration of alternative and less violent means…He noted that the success of the revolution certainly should be in our interests…[Foreign Minister Mercado] said he felt strongly that the success of the Peruvian experiment was the best defense against the spread of Marxism in Latin America. He stated that Peru had recently experienced a wave of strikes, especially in the


483 Ibid.
mining industry, led by Communist agitators. He said that these strikes demonstrated that the Communists themselves were aware of the risks to their program if the Peruvian experiment succeeded and were using these means to attack it at its weakest point—the economy. He said that at some future time it might be necessary to take strong action to get rid of agitators of this kind, but the government took pride in the peaceful nature of the Peruvian revolution and wished to put off as long as possible action of this kind.

The report subsequently, and for our purposes, most importantly, summarizes Kissinger’s reply to Mercado’s statement:

Dr. Kissinger replied that domestic policy and decisions were Peru’s own affair and that the U.S. had no wish to become involved in them…Dr. Kissinger went on to emphasize that, these distractions aside, the Foreign Minister was correct, that we are interest in the success of the Peruvian revolution—both for its own sake and as a non-Marxist alternative to the Chilean experience in Latin America…He repeated our fundamental desire for improved relations with Peru and our interest in the success of the Peruvian experiment. 484

Several Months later, on February 8, 1972, a memorandum sent from Kissinger to President Nixon declared that Velasco, “believes that the U.S. now recognizes that his government is non-communist and offers a reasonable alternative to the Communist regimes in Cuba and Chile.” The report further stated: “President Velasco noted his concern over the implications for Peru should Chile become armed with Soviet military equipment. He suggested the importance of increasing cooperation between Peru and the U.S. in the face of our common foe, communism.”485 Hence, above all, there is unequivocal evidence that the U.S. supported the Velasco regime in the fight against communism in Latin America.

Although U.S. policy makers had definitively concluded that the Peruvian regime was not communist, nor communist inspired, U.S. policy makers were still concerned about the


U.S.S.R.’s influence. A report prepared the NSC Interdepartmental Group on Latin American Affairs, on September 26, 1972, argued:

Our non-overt economic pressure policy [regarding IPC and Peruvian expropriation U.S. business interests] has contributed to an adversary relationship between Peru and the U.S., which in turn, has provided opportunities for exploitation by the U.S.S.R. There is considerable evidence that the Soviet Union, in working to increase its influence in Latin America, desires the loosening of ties between the U.S. and Latin America and the creation of an atmosphere of hostility in the region toward the U.S. The Soviets pay particular attention to Peru in this regard. U.S. pressure probably has contributed to Peruvian assertions of independence.

The report went on to argue:

Our policy is interpreted in Peru and elsewhere in Latin America as further evidence that the defense of IPC is more important to the U.S. than its other interests, including peaceful, non-Marxist economic and social reform. This stimulates alienation from the U.S. in Peru, tends to strengthen radicals within the Peruvian military and government, and provides opportunities to our adversaries. Current policy tends to give the impression that we make little distinction in our treatment of Peru and Chile despite the fact that Chile’s Marxist government presents a wider threat to a broader range of U.S. interests than does the Peruvian military. 486

Although the document affirms that U.S. policy makers were still worried about the possible threat of communism and that the U.S.S.R. posed in Peru, the report definitively supports the claim that U.S. policy makers did not considered Velasco, his regime, or the variables that were considered threatening in Guatemala as communist threats. First, the document affirms that U.S. policy makers did not see Velasco’s regime as a “communist threat”; it makes a clear distinction between the threat that the U.S.S.R.’s potentially posed, and the way U.S. policy makers viewed Velasco’s regime (i.e. non-threatening); the report never defines any members within Peru as Marxist or communist, which the document highlights, as the main concern regarding the U.S.S.R; the report makes a clear distinction between “radicals” in Peru and Marxists; it

blatantly affirms that Chile “presents a wider threat to a broader range of U.S. interests” than the Peruvian regime; and it finally suggests that the U.S. government was perceived by other nations as giving greater attention to the IPC case than other interests such as non-Marxism, peaceful revolutions.” Once again, Velasco and his regime were not considered a threat.

In summary of the entire U.S. outlook on Peru, Noel Maurer contends, in “Much Ado About Nothing: Expropriation and compensation in Peru and Venezuela, 1968-1975,” according to President Nixon, “I believe we need to give serious and careful thought to our relation to countries in the developing world. I do not believe we understand how our aid programs and our policies, in general, actually affect the political and economic development of these countries and their orientation on foreign policy matters of concern to us…Our concern, I believe, should be primarily with their foreign policies in ways of critical importance to us.” Maurer reflects on Nixon’s statement and contends:

The implications for Peru, and for the rest of the developing world, were obvious. Insofar as a nation did not “subordinate itself” to the Soviet bloc or Communist China—eight years after the Sino-Soviet Split, Nixon distinguished between the two, but still considered both to be enemies—a nation could follow whatever domestic economic policies it wanted, whether Socialist, capitalist, or kleptocratic. It could even negotiate trade or arms deals with the Soviet Union. But, should the Nixon administration believe a nation was subordinating itself to the Communist bloc in its foreign policy, it would not matter whether the nation gave ground over American investment disputes or not: the nation would be a target. 487

In total, U.S. policy maker’s definition of a communist threat was clearly different than it was in the late 1940s and early 1950s and, thus, U.S. policy makers never concluded that Velasco’s regime was a “communist threat” because there were no overt evidence that suggested Velasco sympathized with communism. Rather, Velasco thoroughly argued that he was anti-communist and U.S. policy makers quickly agreed with this claim. The case of Peru shows that

487 Maurer, p. 8.
the variables that once caused concern in Guatemala were no longer as threatening by the 1970s. Yet, as Noel Maurer contends, and as the final document has shown, although the IPC case was the main concern in Peru, it was still a subsidiary threat to the one posed by communism in Latin America. Hence, the variables that had been considered threatening in Guatemala were not necessarily discounted because communism was not a threat on a global scale and the containment policy was dead. Rather, U.S. policy makers were not as sensitive in the 1970s and, thus, no longer considered many variables, that had once been considered as threatening, as threatening in the 1970s. Also, as argued, Velasco’s authoritarian regime type may have played a large part in quelling U.S. policy maker’s concerns. Kissinger’s belief that Velasco’s regime should have been used as an example of a non-Marxist revolution to counter balance the Marxist revolution in Chile also supports the claim that U.S. policy makers were favoring Velsaco’s authoritarian regime.

4.3 CHILE: U.S. PERSPECTIVE

At the very same time that U.S. policy makers did not consider Velasco’s regime as a threat, however, an intensive investigation and effort to combat Allende’s Presidency was underway. But, even prior to Allende’s Presidential tenure, U.S. policy makers were fervently convinced that Allende was a “communist threat.” As argued, U.S. policy makers considered Allende a threat because of his Marxist affiliation and his relations with the international communism, well before he ascended the Presidency.
Even in 1954, in language characteristic to the 1950’s, the U.S. State Department labeled him a “Communist,” “commie-liner,” and “dupe.” Over the coming years, the U.S. took measures to prevent Allende from succeeding in the Chilean political spectrum. This was especially evident in the 1964 Presidential elections. According to Paul Sigmund, “the expansion of military ties to Chile in the early 1960s was accompanied by an increase in covert activities of the CIA)...Because of the existence of a large Communist Party in Chile, the country had already become the object of CIA attention in the 1950s.” Sigmund concludes that by, “the 1964 presidential elections, the CIA was already deeply involved in influencing its outcome.”

Specifically, a 1975 report by U.S. Senate Selection Committee on Intelligence, concluded that $3 million dollars had been spent during 1962-1964 to “prevent the election of a Socialist or Communist candidate.” In 1963, Kennedy fully supported Allende’s opposition—Eduardo Frei, leader of the Christian Democrats. Lubna Qureshi recounts that the CIA, “underwrote slightly more than half of the total cost of [Frei’s campaign]” in 1964. McGeorge Bundy, in a CIA memorandum argued, “We can’t afford to lose this one, so I don’t think there should be any economy shaving in this instance. We assume the Commies are pouring in dough; we have no proofs. They must assume we are pouring in the dough; they have no proof. Let’s pour it on and in.” Frei won the 1964 election with 56 percent of the vote, defeating Allende who only received 38.9 percent. Although the U.S. had prevented Allende from winning the

488 Hove, p. 643.
489 Sigmund, p. 20.
490 Ibid., p. 20.
492 Qureshi, p. 30.
493 Ibid., p. 31.
494 Ibid., p. 34.
election, U.S. policy makers maintained a close watch on the subsequent congressional elections in 1965. Toward this end, a proposed list of favorable candidates was created.\textsuperscript{495}

Four years later, following Richard Nixon’s victory in the 1968 Presidential election, Lubna Qureshi argues that, “Nixon…dreaded what Allende represented for the rest of Latin America, and potentially for the entire world.”\textsuperscript{496} Thus when, Allende once again was entered on presidential ballot for the 1970 elections in 1968, U.S. policy makers took action. Paul Sigmund summarizes, “The question of organizing a CIA program in connection with the 1970 presidential election similar to that of 1964 had been raised with the covert action review group, now called the Forty Committee, in April 1969, but no action had been taken.\textsuperscript{497}

On March 25, 1970, Nixon’s new National Security Advisor Kissinger reported that a top-secret “40 committee” concluded that various levels of the U.S. government were opposed to Allendes election. The report stated, “The Embassy in Santiago, the Department of State and the CIA have agreed that the election of the UP candidate would be detrimental to the U.S. and that spoiling operations should be undertaken to influence a portion of the uncommitted vote away from UP (Allende’s government coalition).”\textsuperscript{498} Sigmund argues that as a result of the committee’s conclusions, “$135,000 was authorized for an anti-Communist ‘spoiling’ campaign.” Later that year, Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, proposed approval of $500,000 for a “spoiling campaign and to ‘influence’ the likely congressional runoff.” Sigmund describes that, “The State Department opposed the bribery proposal as ‘stupid and immoral,’ and it was postponed, but $300,000 was approved for the anti-Communist program.”\textsuperscript{499} For Kissinger, the

\textsuperscript{495} Ibid., p. 36.
\textsuperscript{496} Ibid., p. 51.
\textsuperscript{497} Sigmund, p. 39.
\textsuperscript{499} Sigmund, p. 40.
U.S. intervention in the Chilean elections was absolutely necessary: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people.”  

Despite U.S. intentions, the efforts of U.S. policy makers failed and Allende won the presidency with only a third of the votes on September 4, 1970 over the runner up, presidential candidate Jorge Alessandri. However, in Chile, the lack of a majority win required Allende to gain senate approval, which would later be decided in December. Because of the lack of majority vote, Alessandri was still capable of winning the presidential office in the congressional vote; however, according to Sigmund, Alessandri denied that he would accept the win, which would cause a re-vote, and through a “technicality,” the former president Eduardo Frei would be eligible to run. Sigmund argues that if this series of events occurred, “[Frei] would clearly win in a two way race against Allende.”  

The initial U.S. reaction was dramatic. Days after the election, a telegram to the Department of State noted:

> It’s a sad fact that Chile has taken the path to Communism with only a little more than a third (36 pct) of the nation approving this choice, but it is an immutable fact. Beyond, we have suffered a grievous defeat. The consequences will be domestic and international. The repercussions will have immediate impact in some lands and delayed effect in others.

Although the State Department “admitted defeat”, the CIA and President Nixon were not yet ready to allow Allende to win the presidency. U.S. policy makers were fully aware of the coming congressional vote and the technicality that would allow Frei to run.

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501 Sigmund, p. 49.
As a result of this understanding, the CIA created a “two track” (i.e. two option) program for preventing Allende from winning the congressional vote: (1) organizing a military coup; (2) swaying the congressional vote through the bribery of Chilean Senators. Sigmund contends:

The Forty Committee met to discuss the Chilean situation on September 8, and Richard Helms, head of the CIA, reported that the Chilean Congress was likely to vote for Allende and that a military coup ‘would have very little chance of success unless organized soon’…Thus, when the Forty Committee met again on September 14, it decided on a massive anti-Allende propaganda campaign and economic pressure on Chile.503

Sigmund summarizes that “both Ambassador Korry and the CIA station cabled that there was no possibility of a military coup.” Despite the policy recommendations that a coup would not succeed, President Nixon ignored these suggestions and directly supported the coup: “Track 1.”

A private note written on September 15, 1970, by CIA director Richard Helms, reflected on a recent meeting Helms had with the President, in which Nixon’s ordered Helms to initiate a CIA based coup to unseat Allende: “1 in 10 chances perhaps, but save Chile!; worth spending; not concerned; no involvement of embassy; $10,000,000 available, more if necessary; full-time-job—best men we have; game plan; make the economy scream; 48 hours for plan of action.”504 The subsequent code name for the project was “FUBELT.”

A month later, on October 16, 1970, Thomas Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans for the CIA, reflected on Kissinger’s orders for Henry Hecksher, the CIA station chief in Santiago: “It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup…We are going to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource.

503 Sigmund, p. 49.
It is imperative that these actions are implemented clandestinely and securely so that the USG and American hand be well hidden."

Two days later, another report categorized weapons shipments from CIA headquarters in Langley, VA to the CIA station in Santiago. The weapons were shipped for the purpose of kidnapping Chilean General, Rene Schneider, who was seen as a potential opponent of the subsequent coup attempt against Allende. Remember that Eduardo Frei, the leading Christian Democrat and main opposition to the Unidad Popular coalition, was later indicted in Chilean courts for knowing of the coup attempt and General Schneider’s assassination. Ironically, Frei originally appointed Schneider as the new commander-in-chief in 1968, but Schneider developed a policy that later became known as the “Schneider doctrine,” and called for non-intervention by the military in the constitutional democracy. This naturally went against the U.S.’s goals for a military coup. The plan ironically backfired, however, after Schneider’s assassination, which caused the military to become unified under the “Schneider Doctrine,” pushing further toward the end of non-interference and protection of the constitutional democracy.

Allende was approved by the Chilean Congress on October 24, 1970. Sigmund describes that, “President Nixon decided on October 21 that there was to be no congratulatory message after Allende was elected by the Chilean Congress and that a small, low-key delegation would be sent to the inauguration on November 3. In effect, the President Nixon and the U.S. government were forced “back to the drawing board.” Several options were discussed in a secret paper prepared for Kissinger and the National Security Council. The report, titled, “National Security


[509] Sigmund, p. 56.
Council, Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97), and dated on November 3, 1970, provided three options for future U.S. government perspectives on Allende's Chile. It began by asserting:

The Allende government will seek to establish in Chile as soon as feasible an authoritarian system following Marxist principles. To that end it will move (a) to bring all significant economic activity under state operation including nationalization of basic industries; (b) to gain control over the security and armed forces; and (c) to dominate public information media.

The report then summarized three possible positions for subsequent U.S. action—A, B, and C. The first of the three options argued that the U.S. should “Treat Chile as we do Communist Nations that seek independence of the U.S.S.R.” The second route contended that U.S. policy makers should “Maintain an outwardly correct posture, refrain from initiatives which the Allende government could turn to its own political advantage, and act quietly to limit the Allende government’s freedom of action.” The last option argued: “Maintain an outwardly correct Posture, but making clear our opposition to the emergence of a Communist government in South America; act positively to retain the initiative vis-à-vis the Allende government.” In a memorandum several days later, Kissinger reviewed the proposed options and discussed the changes in Presidential decisions for policy in Chile. Kissinger elaborated that “Option C” would be taken. Consequently, the President had declared two main points: First, he stated “(1) The public posture of the United States will be correct but cool...(2) The United States will seek to maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement polices contrary to U.S. and hemisphere interest.” Toward this end, the U.S. expected:

Vigorous efforts be undertaken to assure that other governments in Latin America understand fully that U.S. opposes consolidation of communist state in Chile hostile to the interest of the United State and other hemisphere nations…Close consultations to be established with key governments in Latin America, particularly Brazil and Argentina, to coordinate efforts to oppose Chilean moves which may be contrary to our mutual
interests; In pursuit of this objective, efforts should be increased to establish and maintain close relations with friendly military leaders in the hemisphere.

In support of my contention that U.S. policy makers favored dictatorships over democracy, Kissinger yet again highlights this point. Nevertheless, the report went on to argue:

This option would be posited on the belief that a satisfactory modus vivendi is ultimately impossible; that confrontations are, sooner or later, inevitable; that it is in the U.S. interest to make U.S. opposition to a Communist government in South America clear to Chile, the rest of Latin America, the U.S.S.R, and the world...This option does not recommend that the U.S. take a full range of the courses of action immediately after Allende’s inauguration, nor without provocation on his part. It does recommend that U.S. initiative be geared to the situation as it develops in Chile.510

Despite a less drastic course of action, the report ominously reported that “confrontation was inevitable.”

One year later, President Nixon and Kissinger maintained aggressive stances against Allende. Following the murder of a prominent Christian Democrat, the two men expressed their views. Nixon argued, “I don’t—I don’t—I think this guy has got a stranglehold on that country.” Kissinger responded, “Mr. President, that man is heading for a one party government as fast as he effectively can. Nixon: “I think this murder proves it.” In reply, Kissinger exclaimed:

Oh, yes. But even before that, when we had that meeting on the Ex-Im Bank, I went around the table; I asked everyone, ‘Is Allende moving slower than you expected or faster?’ Everyone agreed he’s moving faster. Everyone agreed that he’s heading for a one-party state. He’s, he’s getting control of the press. He’s, he’s isolating the military...He’s treating the military just like Hitler did...building them up while neutralizing them...He’s already taken over the police...They’ll—never be another free election in Chile511


This conversation occurred on June 11, 1971, two years before Allende’s demise. Although Kissinger supported military dictatorships, the idea of an Allende consolidation of a one party rule clearly petrified Kissinger. Hence, much like Cuba, U.S. policy makers were opposed to any Marxist or communist dictatorship. Although much more can be said about the U.S. perspective on Allende’s Chile, but the aforementioned documents portray a general consensus among U.S. policy makers: Allende was a Marxist and “communist threat” and he needed to be removed.

4.4 CONCLUDING CHAPTER 3:

This chapter has shown that U.S. policy makers considered Arevalo and Arbenz’s regime as communist threats based upon specific variables that U.S. policy makers considered threatening. However, the chapter also shows that U.S. policy makers did not view the variables that were considered threatening in Guatemala as threatening in Peru and thus did not view Velasco or his regime to be communist threats. Allende’s Chile was still considered as threatening the 1970s, and Allende had been considered a threat as early as the 1950s. For Arevalo, Arbenz, and Allende, intensive investigations were employed in all three cases, while Velasco and regime was not scrutinized to the same extent.
5.0 CONCLUSION

As posited from the outset, the way U.S. policy makers characterized a threat was not always consistent, for U.S. policy makers did not always act in similar ways to similar events. I have demonstrated how similar variables existed in both the case of Guatemala and the case of Peru and how U.S. policy makers considered many of these variables as threatening in Guatemala, but did not consider them threatening in Peru. As this paper has demonstrated, I have provided two thesis—“a change in policy perspective” and “U.S. policy makers favored dictatorships”—to explain the discrepancy in perspective between the U.S. perception of threat in the case of Guatemala and the U.S. perception of threat in the case Peru.

Moreover, I have demonstrated that Allende and his regime in Chile were also considered threats in the 1970s. I initially posited why policy makers would continue to view Allende and his regime as a threat despite a less charged atmosphere and difference in foreign policy and policy perspective by the 1970s. I argued that if Allende was overthrown on similar grounds to Arbenz in 1954, my thesis would be called into question because my contention—U.S. policy makers reacted differently to similar variables over time—would indeed be refutable. Yet, in chapter two, I discounted such a counter example: U.S. policy maker’s perception of threat regarding Allende can be explained because he was far more radical and more communist than Arevalo, Arbenz, and Velasco. But also, I show that Allende was investigated by U.S. policy makers and considered a threat well before the other variables that were present in the case of
Guatemala were in existence in Chile, because Allende was considered a threat before he ascended the Presidency. Hence, the variables that U.S. policy makers considered threatening in Guatemala were not the main motivating variables that caused U.S. policy makers to initially consider Allende a communist threat.

Nonetheless, even if I was unequivocally correct and my respective theses sufficiently respond to my initial research question—why the case of Peru was not considered a communist threat—I contend that this paper has created more questions than it has answered. Indeed, many more case studies should be analyzed in light of my findings in this paper to understand how they either bolster my findings or contest them, but, more importantly, further investigation should be undertaken to understand U.S. foreign policy: how it is created, how it evolves, and how it is applied to specific issues.

For example, the case of Bolivia from 1952 to 1964 creates several compelling questions. Like Arevalo regime in 1944, the Revolutionary Workers Party (MRN)—a left-wing political party who seized power in April of 1952—initiated sweeping reforms including expropriation of businesses, increased workers’ rights, and sought for universal suffrage almost simultaneously to the height of Arbenz’s regime. Yet, despite these facts, and despite the leftist nature of the MRN, according to James Malloy and Richard Thorn, in *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952*, U.S. policy makers initially supported the MRN in Bolivia because of the fear of communism.512 This fact would suggest that a discrepancy in U.S. perspective occurred even in the 1950s between the case of Bolivia and Guatemala.

But, what makes the case even more perplexing is that communists appeared to take a significant role in the MRN’s rise to power. According to Malloy, “The Communists also

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claimed credit for having participated in the April 1952 insurrection. According to a Soviet scholar, “the Communists took an active part in the April 1952 insurrection distinguishing themselves by the seizure of the La Paz arsenal and by distributing captures arms to the insurrectionists.” Yet, Malloy further argues:

The political importance of the Communists at this time should not, be exaggerated. The U.S. Department of States at this time estimates the number of Communists in all Bolivia at less than two thousand. The Communists were not represented in the MNR command which led the uprisings, nor did they, while still party members, hold any ministerial or comparable posts in the subsequent MNR governments. The party’s candidate received only twelve thousand votes in the 1956 presidential election as compared with more than three quarters of a million by [the] MNR candidate. 

Despite, Malloy’s contention that the importance of the communists should not be exaggerated, very similar statistics in the case of Arbenz’s regime did not prevent U.S. policy makers from believing that a communist threat was present. Although it might be argued that the MNR eschewed Marxism and such a stance might quell the concerns of U.S. policy makers, Arevalo’s equivalent pro-democratic and anti-communist stance in Guatemala did little to quell such concerns. Hence, once again, a discrepancy in perspective was apparent in the 1950s. Malloy touches upon the difference in U.S. response toward Arbenz’s regime and the MRN in Bolivia: “The flexibility of the United States Bolivian policy made it easier to defend the rigid and repressive policy toward Guatemala in the early 1950s.” In this light, and with the facts at hand, we must question what caused U.S. policy makers to respond differently to Bolivia.

Perhaps it is obvious that my first thesis does not account for why U.S. policy makers did not consider the MNR as a threat in early 1950s. Hence, another explanation is required. For example, one explanation might refer to the United Fruit Companies influence in Guatemala as

513 Ibid., p. 68.
514 Ibid.
being more influential than I have argued for and, thus, U.S. policy makers responded to a greater degree because of this extra variable. But perhaps U.S. policy makers overlooked the MRN because it did not rule democratically and U.S. policy makers favored the MRN for this very reason. Although democracy and a peaceful transfer of power in Bolivia was not altogether vacant, it is important to note that the MRN did “seize” power through force in 1952. Furthermore, according to James Malloy and Mitchel Seligson, in *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transitions in Latin America*, Bolivia from 1950 to the 1964 was not necessarily a democracy, but a “populist styled regime” that was controlled predominantly by the executive party the MRN. Malloy contends that the state “became associated almost exclusively with executive power.”

Hence, perhaps U.S. policy maker’s response to Bolivia can be explained in part because it was less democratic than Arevalo and Arbenz’s regime.

But, moreover, the Bolivian case offers even further puzzles to solve: U.S. policy makers actually turned against the MRN and became increasingly suspicious of communist activity. By the late 1950s, U.S. policy makers were concerned the communists had “penetrated” MRN and that increased “tension” between MRN and “leftist factions” was probably a result of “communist agitation.” In fact, U.S. policy makers intervened in the Bolivian election in 1964 by sending covert aid to influence Bolivian politics from 1963 to 1965. In an editorial note on the State Departments website in Bolivian document 147 of Foreign relations of the United States XXXI: South and Central America; Mexico, the document stated that U.S. covert aid ranged from 300,000 to 550,000 from 1963 to 1965. The document argued:

> The basic covert action goals in Bolivia are to foster democratic solutions to critical and social, economic, and politics problems; to check Communist and Cuban subversion; to encourage a stable government favorably inclined toward the United States; and to

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encourage Bolivian participation in the Alliance for Progress. The main direction and emphasis of C[overt] A[ction] operations is to force Communists, leftists, and pro-Castroites out of influential positions in government, and to try to break Communist and ultra-leftist control over certain trade union, student groups, and campesino organizations.  

Several questions are raised by this statement, especially in consideration of my findings in this paper. For example, was the CP’s control of labor still a major threat for U.S. policy makers in the late 1950s and early 1960s? It would appear so, because U.S. policy makers clearly sought to “break” the communist control over “certain trade unions” in Bolivia. Thus, in light of the U.S. lack of perception of threat in Peru regarding the CP influence in the Peruvian labor force, was the case of Peru a fluke or was there a point in time beyond the late 1950s when U.S. policy makers decided that the CP’s influence in a given labor movement would no longer be considered as threatening? In other words, why was the CP’s influence in the Bolivian labor movement considered as a threat in Bolivia, but not in Peru. Perhaps the change in policy perception answers this question. But, also, an answer to such a question would surely include a comment about how policy is not so “cut and dry.” And, the way U.S. policy makers responded to a CP’s influence in labor was relative to a specific case. But, broadly speaking, perhaps U.S. policy maker’s policy perspective changed under Alliance for Progress to such a degree that the CP’s control of labor would no longer be a concern henceforth. Regardless of the answer, even this specific issue—U.S. policy makers perception of threat regarding the CP influence in labor in a given country and how the perception of threat changes from country to country—raises many compelling questions and difficulties that should be further considered.

Yet, it is also interesting to note that the covert action described in the aforementioned quote did not utilize force, but merely “economic methods” for influencing elections. Was this a

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reflection of the Alliance for Progress’s renewed economic response to communist threats in the Western Hemisphere? Also, why did the U.S. perspective shift away from support of the MRN, and why did U.S. policy makers believe that communists wielded greater influence in Bolivia in the late 1950s than they had when the MRN initially took power in 1952?

Although I will not engage in an intensive investigation of such perplexities here, further investigation should be undertaken to better understand the discrepancy in perspective between the U.S. response toward Bolivian and Guatemalan in the early 1950s and the many other interesting questions that the case of Bolivia raises. Yet, even more questions arise when we considered other instances of U.S. foreign policy and possible intervention in Latin and South America, say toward the Military Coups in Brazil (April 1964) and Argentina (June 1966). Hence, the case of Bolivia, and perhaps many others, reveal how intricate, and perhaps difficult, it is to make sense of foreign policy perception and action, especially when U.S. action is not uniform for similar events. Nevertheless, the paper has succeeded, to whatever limited extent it has, in making sense of the discrepancy in perspective between the case of Guatemala and Peru, while also furthering an understanding of how foreign policy is formed and how it evolves over time. As a final word, hopefully the findings in this paper can be applied to the present day in order to better understand how U.S. policy is formulated and how it is applied to specific issues, thus allowing us to gain a better understanding of U.S. foreign policy and action as a whole.


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