

**SUCCESS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF HUMAN SERVICES MODELS
TRANSFERRED TRANSNATIONALLY:
A MODEL FOR TRANSFER AND FIVE CASE STUDIES**

by

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This dissertation examines the success and sustainability of international transfers of human services models in five NGOs in Hungary. In the transitional democracies of Central and Eastern Europe an increasing number of NGOs have claimed their place in social service provision. Supported by an influx of foreign aid, they have often looked for models outside their countries. These initiatives have often survived only while the external funding was available.

Drawing on the literature of technology transfer, evidence-based practices, implementation, and international development, this exploratory case study examines the characteristics and defining attributes of success/sustainability of model transfer and five contributing variables of the social aspect: 1) Identification of Need, 2) Values and Philosophy, 3) Investment in People, 4) Business Approach, 5) Management and Evaluation. Using key informant interviews, a survey, and document reviews it documents and critically examines the experiences and views of personnel at five Hungarian NGOs.

The research findings reveal that the main differentiating factor in the success of the model transfer is the importing NGO's focus on the model, the organization, and its relationship with the exporting NGO during the early years of the model transfer. Intentionally managing the differences that arose from the dissimilar cultural contexts and value sets of the source and the destination countries is also shown to be a critical factor.

The importing NGO's focus on the "just manageable" quantities of work in dealing with the operating environment has relevance in other areas in the international development field. The study also identifies and finds support for the factors that contribute to the success of model transfers, and it operationalizes the "socio" aspect of the transfer process, which will allow for the development of a testable framework of transnational model transfers.

KEY WORDS: technology transfer, human services, implementation, NGO, sustainability, Hungary, Central and Eastern Europe.

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PREFACE

To my Mother and Father

As with transnational model transfers, this paper is truly a community project. Thus, it is hard for me to thank everybody. I was inspired and supported by so many during the years that naming them all itself would produce a dissertation. Yet, I will attempt to acknowledge those who have contributed to the completion of this dissertation.

Dr. Louis A. Picard who offered me an opportunity, inspired me, supported me beyond my wildest imagination, and to whom I will be forever indebted for what I am and what I may become. My family: Ilona and Laszlo, my parents, who believed in me, allowed me to explore possibilities, created opportunities for me to try for myself, and to decide for myself, and supported me all along; and the kids, Gergo and Szilard, who endured long belated outings as birthday presents, sometimes as late as a year. Pressley Ridge, the organization that bears my dedication and commitment, but first of all Mary Beth Rauktis, the member of the dissertation committee who started out as a colleague, but soon developed into a personal mentor. Then to Scott, my boss, who trusted that I would be able to create two major undertakings at the same time, namely the Pressley Ridge Hungary program, and this dissertation. And especially to my colleagues at the Pressley Ridge Hungary Foundation, Jucus, Moni, Kata, Eszter, and Sanyi, who have observed my going from an all right leader to a horrible one, and then back again, but have

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This dissertation is your product, too.

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO TOPIC

This dissertation is a mixture of my long interest in non-profits, my experiences with them abroad and in Hungary, my marveling of how much two systems may be impermeable, and my idealism in not accepting that seeming reality. The dissertation, strictly speaking, started as an inquiry into the factors that contribute to a successful model transfer in the human services by exploring the views of key personnel of five Hungarian NGOs. In a broader sense, it is the story of my journey through life up to the present day, and the persistence of beliefs that rationality has the potential to solve problems and make the world a better place one service at a time, a habit of perseverance which I share with the staff and volunteers of those NGOs.

1.1 MY PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE TRANSFER OF HUMAN SERVICE TECHNOLOGIES

In 1989 the regime changed in Hungary. For eight years prior to this date I had worked as a youth leader in the Alliance of the Hungarian Young Pioneers, an organization that at that point allowed us a fair amount of independence and democratic decision making, and inspired us to constantly improve our programmatic practices. When the regime changed and the Alliance was eliminated as a communist legacy, continuing our work felt natural.

By 1991, it became obvious that the operating environment had changed, and also that it was impossible to support the work of about 400 youth workers through an informal network, without an organizational background. Thus on June 16, 1991 the membership organization “The Catcher in the Rye” was registered as a non-governmental, non-profit youth organization by the Court of the City of Budapest.

I became one of the three elected leaders of the NGO at its inception. While serving in this position, I had the opportunity not only to develop and run programs, but also to experience my first ever “program replication.” Besides the central Budapest group, we set up 12 local branches of the NGO around Hungary, and outside the borders, in Transylvania. In addition, I also learned about the difficulties of NGO management in a newly forming operating environment first hand.

Needless to say that the struggles of solidifying our NGO’s operations sparked my curiosity, and I started to search for answers to what NGOs and non-profits do in a society, what their role is and how they contribute. Quickly, I found that if I wanted some answers, I had to look outside our country. In 1995, I received a scholarship from the East Central European Scholarship Program to spend three semesters in the US to study government and non-profits. After completing my studies, and having spent 18 months in the States, my idealism flourished as I returned to Hungary to assume a position in the Democracy Network Program, a USAID funded program that aimed to strengthen civil society organizations in Hungary.

So there I was again, equipped with newly acquired knowledge and experiences trying to put them to good use at organizations that had sprung up like mushrooms nurtured by the enthusiasm of citizens in my country. I tried again to import ideas and

approaches from a foreign country, and use them so that they would become part of the everyday practices of the NGOs. This was a painstakingly slow process and required much smaller steps in the work with the NGOs, than our funders had originally imagined. Yet, there was pride in the work, as we faced the reality of some of those NGOs taking off, and seemingly setting out on a path to self-sustainability.

In developed countries, non-profit organizations can have a considerable role in social service provision. In those democracies, due partially to the historic traditions, and partially to the conscious restraint of government participation in social service provision, non-profits often take over government responsibilities and their advocacy and support activities are often amended with those of service provision (Bocz, 2009). However, in my experience in the late 1990s, this was certainly not the case in numerous Hungarian NGOs. Most of them remained “briefcase organizations” meaning an individual, passionate for a cause and trying to work miracles in a still very highly government monopolized social service arena, carrying the whole organization, i.e. articles of incorporation, project plans, and grant proposals, etc., in his/her briefcase. I felt like a missionary, when I was talking to them about long-term goals, strategic plans, logical models, logframe, sustainability, and the like, in exchange for a sizeable grant amount the volume of which was unprecedented in the history of free association after the regime change in the country.

It seemed natural to me that an existing need of a vulnerable group, a good and innovative idea to meet that need, and grant funding were not enough to make a program work, let alone to stay around beyond the funding. There must be something else to it I thought, and figured out for myself that management was that crucial piece. It was so

apparent, that it boggled my mind why other funders, especially the Hungarian government bodies did not put emphasis on this aspect and why they let countless highly plausible and needed social service programs of NGOs evaporate into thin air after the funding dried up.

Since it did not make sense at all, again I thought that the answer must be found in the Western democracies. In 1999, I had the honor to meet a distinguished professor from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and on his recommendation I applied to the MPIA program with the specialization in Economic and Social Development. I considered myself very privileged to be able to join the school and complete my studies. However, instead of finding precise answers to my issues in NGO capacity building, my horizon broadened, and I was faced with my dilemma again, except this time it was on a much bigger scale. I was blown away by the volume of valuable knowledge and good practices to respond to social problems in the US that could be applicable in other countries. There is so much money invested in development projects, yet so few of them become sustainable, and even fewer are integrated into local human service systems. So the question remained: what is to be done?

It was around that time, that my personal journey and good fortune presented me with the biggest opportunity and challenge of my life. Pressley Ridge, a US non-profit serving troubled and troubling children, youth, and their families, posed the question, whether I wanted to work for them to establish their services in Hungary, as well as in Eastern Europe. Under the weight of my long haunting question, and still filled with idealism, I accepted the challenge. I was convinced that it could be done, that it was

possible to take a human service model from a country, and transfer it to another in such a way that eventually it would become part of the recipient country's service system.

The challenge was to work out how. So in 2005, I moved back to Hungary and set to work. Here I will only say that from me being the only person on the ground in 2005, the Pressley Ridge Hungary Foundation now has six full-time employees and so far has doubled its income from local sources in each year of its operation. Is it the end of the story? Certainly not. So far, so good one could say, but it is still only the beginning of a long voyage towards sustainability and becoming part of the national system of care.

Having these experiences allowed me an insight, namely that idealism and a good working model, even when coupled with appropriate funding, were not enough for successful model transfer, i.e., for a model transfer that achieves similar results with clients in the recipient country, yet is compatible with local circumstances, and becomes part of the local system of care, which in turn ensures long-term sustainability. I suspected that there was more to it, and as I started to ponder what that "more" might be, this research started to take shape.

1.2 AREA AND TOPIC

"The advancement and diffusion of knowledge is the one true guardian of liberty."

James Madison

The above quote outlines a clear-cut path for human kind to establish universal freedom and advancement. Madison exhorts us to experience, discover, create new knowledge,

and then let it spread to all in need. It sounds simple. However, at a more pragmatic level there exist numerous factors that make this laudable goal difficult, or sometimes even impossible to attain.

International development and development management have actively concerned themselves with transferring viable solutions and models since World War II. International development has exported ideas, views, technologies, approaches, methods, etc. from advanced democracies to the less developed and less fortunate countries of the world. As Rogers & Burdge put it “development is a type of social change in which new ideas are introduced into a social system in order to produce higher per-capita incomes and levels of living through modern production methods and improved social organization.” (Rogers & Burdge 1972, p. 403) In essence the core of the international development work is replicating best practices (in the broadest sense) in regions that lag behind in respecting the rights of, and providing needed care and services for, their own citizens.

Similarly, it is also fair to say that public administration in a broad sense is about taking care of citizens (service delivery), and as such deals with replicating best practices within and among nations. Yet, this seemingly simple approach did not yield large scale measurable results in Hungary after the regime change. Quite to the contrary, the general feeling in the country has been that nothing has been effective. I personally have witnessed too many failed projects. This, despite the fact that non-profit organizations, instead of, or in tandem with, government and business sectors, could play a more significant role in meeting existing societal needs and advocating for various disadvantaged social groups. Effective non-profit involvement can manifest the idea of

social solidarity. In addition, these organizations serve as a platform for the interaction of citizens with the governmental institutions, and as such, they transmit norms, values, culture, and interests (Bocz, 2009). Hence, I started to ponder the idea of what constitutes a successful model transfer.¹

Dictionaries define a model as a representation containing the essential structure of some object or event in the real world, or as a schematic description of a system, theory, or phenomenon that accounts for its known or inferred properties and may be used for further study of its characteristics, for imitation, or for comparison. Very simply put, it is anything which serves or may serve as an example for imitation. Similarly in this research, a model is defined broadly. A model refers to the practice of a human service agency in providing a certain service to a certain group of clients within a country. A model includes both structures and processes, and is used as an example for replication in another country, in this example, Hungary.

Scientific models have certain characteristics that are intrinsic to the definition of a model. One of them is that scientific models are necessarily incomplete. Since they are representations, they do not contain all aspects of the real world; if they did, they would no longer be models. Thus, to create a model, scientists make assumptions about the crucial construction and relations of objects, as well as events of the real world. These assumed elements represent what is needed to explain the phenomenon. It is also assumed that there are other aspects outside the model that influence the phenomenon;

¹ In this study technology transfer will be used interchangeably with model transfer, model replication, and diffusion of innovation, and relates to the circulation of know-how of human services across national boundaries.

however, they are not deemed to be part of the essential structure. Factors not included in the model will contribute to error in predictions made by the model.

As with a scientific model, a model in human services is also necessarily incomplete. As defined above, for the purposes of this research, a human service model refers to programming and describes the practice of service provision by an agency. As such, the human service model is comprised of organizational routines and often lacks formal descriptions. Often, such a model exists only as a combination of given characteristics such as target groups, staffing patterns, interventions applied, physical appearance of sites, and staff perceptions of know-how.

At the same time, many elements are treated as “obvious” and are dismissed from the model. The transfer process is intended to replicate crucial elements in a new setting. Nevertheless, just as in the case of the scientific model, seemingly non-essential elements, i.e. those that are not part of the model, will contribute to error. I am interested in identifying these non-essential factors; and explaining how they influence model transfer. I believe that many of these features present are, in practice, neglected due to their perception of being self-evident. Instead of treating them as obvious, they could and should be included in the model description.

Consequently, my study is aimed at gaining insight into the factors contributing to successful model transfer in the human services field from one country to another. In the wide area of the intersection of international development and public administration, I am particularly interested in issues of cooperation between governmental and non-profit organizations, as they strive to build viable systems and strike a healthy balance in working together. Specifically, my study attempted to identify the key attributes of five

variables, all of which relate to organization of work during the transfer process, as well as to examine their effect on the sustainability of model transfers.

1.3 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

In the transitional democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the state is no longer able to provide all social services at the level it purportedly offered during the socialist regime. Prevailing demand-side non-profit theories cited this failure of the state to provide services as the number one explanation for the existence of non-profits. They defined government failure as the inability of public agencies to achieve their intended objectives (Dollery & Wallis, 2003). Weisbrod (1977, p. 30) argued that "... a class of voluntary organizations will come into existence as extra governmental providers of collective-consumption goods" and they will "supplement the public provision (which can be zero) and provide an alternative to private-sector provision of the private-good substitutes for collective goods." He asserted that governmental entities provide the public goods at a level that satisfies only the median voter. Thus, there is some residual unsatisfied demand for public goods among individuals whose taste for such goods is greater than the median. Non-profit organizations are formed to satisfy this demand by providing public goods in amounts that are supplemental to those provided by the government (Weisbrod, 1977). Though his proposition has been widely criticized since, it still explains why the private provision of collective goods occurs, and indicates that the inadequacy of the former socialist state will call for alternative models of care and means of service provision.

By the mid-1990s, the dissolution of the socialist regime coupled with the inability of governmental institutions in developed countries to provide an adequate level of social services, resulted in a significant increase of NGOs in Hungary and the CEE region. These NGOs have claimed their place in the service provision area. Disillusioned with forms of service provision which left populations un-served or under-served, these non-profits were looking for innovative ways of providing care. Their development was augmented by an influx of foreign aid into the transitional states of CEE during the 1990s that brought numerous models of social service provision to the region.

In the early 1990s, Hungary witnessed model transfers in the area of democracy building. Later as the democratic processes and institutions were established, and the country started down the path of becoming a developed country, the inadequacies of the social service systems became more apparent, and critical new societal issues, such as unemployment, poverty, and homelessness emerged. These concerns had to be addressed, and as a result there was a significant shift towards the transfer of social service models into Hungary.

This phenomenon was coupled with the efforts of the Hungarian government to implement comprehensive societal reforms in human-service systems such as the health care and education sectors. To date neither governmental efforts, nor non-profit initiatives, have been successful in their attempts to import social service best practice into Hungary. Few, if any, have been incorporated at a systemic level in government or civil society. Few of the imported models have been acknowledged by appropriate governmental agencies as a preferred way of service provision and advocated for use by

service providers. A trial and error mode of service provision – especially in the field of education – still characterizes current reform endeavors. Therefore, it is useful to look at the requirements for model transfer sustainability at a systemic level.

For the purposes of this study, “systemic level” is defined as the universal application of a service provision model by both government and non-profit agencies. That is, the provision of the given service does not occur at a single point or by a single organization only, but rather is integrated into ongoing practicum at all levels of service. It also presupposes some sort of government funding be it per quota entitlement or a contract with a non-profit that goes beyond project funding.

To gain insight into the prevalent operating environment for Hungarian service providers, one must examine the current “systemic level”; that is, what characterizes the realm of social service provision in the country with special attention to the role of NGOs. Bocz (2009) asserts that conditions for the formation and development of non-profits in Hungary differ greatly from those in countries with long traditions of democracy.² As a consequence, the contractual relationship for public service provision between the government sector and non-profits in Hungary is very limited. The controversial nature of the development of the contractual relationship, and the lack of established criteria and processes to become eligible for such contracts pose an obstacle to all Hungarian non-profits attempting to achieve a stable position within the service provision system. Not only do they have to prove the efficacy of their client services, but also must rely almost exclusively on their own resources to do so, in an environment in which the state establishes an institutional system that strives to preserve the state’s own

² For a detailed explanation of Bocz’s assertions see section 2.4, Literature Review, International Development.

power. In addition, this operating environment also favors project funding. Funds without strings attached are very narrowly available for non-profits. Hence, high quality services and professional management of existing resources appear to be essential for those NGOs that want to move towards such contractual relationships.

Since Hungary has moved from the dictatorship of the Socialist party government to a democratic system and market-based economy, using it as a case for examining the question of transfer of social service models seems to be reasonable. The historical perspective that Bocz (2009) provides by reviewing some of the 19th and 20th century German philosophers' views of civil society offers a deeper understanding of the issue and supports the argument for the example of Hungary as a case in point.

As Bocz (2009) states, Immanuel Kant believed that people should treat other people as ends in themselves, and not as means to the ends of others. Kant echoed Hume's relegation of ethics and morals to the private sphere; however, he believed that it was publicity that showed the tendency of separating the private and public spheres. He promoted the idea of a public arena of rational and critical discourse concerning the "ends" that the state imposed on its citizens. For Kant, publicity ensures equal rights, and as such, is the organizing power of a civil society. Kant's position was the first to differentiate civil society from the state.

G. W. F. Hegel also envisioned a civil society as a sphere separate from the state. Hegel's civil society is an entity that is the result of historical developments. In his view, civil society is the platform of contacts and commerce independent from the state, one in which people are workers and consumers of other people's work at the same time. As such, it is sharply distinct from governance, and stands in opposition to the state, while

operating in symbiosis with it. Because the plethora of competing interests in civil society generally operates without consideration of the common good, civil society is incapable of independently maintaining social order and stability. Thus, the state is needed to control individual freedom in order to protect the freedom of others, while at the same time guaranteeing its citizens their individual rights and economic independence. In other words, ultimately the state is the intermediary, providing the necessary moral direction for the civil society.

Capitalist societies, by guaranteeing independence of commercial endeavors, have, to some extent, always remained open to civic initiatives and to the private sector. Marxist ideology on the other hand – due to the assumed priority and defining role of ownership structures – originated all conflicts from these, as well as from different class interests. The result of this growing tension is the worsening of the hostile relationship between the state and civil society. Marx equates civic society with civil society, and narrows its actors down to participants in the economy alienated from each other while pursuing their own interests. He views civil society as a sort of bourgeois camouflage and the tool of exploitation. Marx refuted Hegel's idea of the state providing a moral path for the society and ensuring the common good among competing interests. He found the working class to be the power that can preserve the duality of state and society.

Consequently, in Lenin's communist ideology, the party as representative of the working class becomes the manifestation of the general interest. After "the party" takes over power, civil society becomes an undesirable phenomenon. Starting at that point, civil society is harmful since it portrays particular individual interests. At the same time,

there is no need for separate expression of interests and for independent public opinion, because “the party” represents the general interest.

Bocz, examining the 18-year period after the socialist regime changed in Hungary, observed that the lack of a clear government strategy to promote efficient division of labor between the government and non-profit sectors, in order to provide services and produce public goods, was characteristic for each of the elected governments. Those 18 years in question witnessed constant restructuring of government structures dealing with non-profits, redefinition and redistribution of tasks and responsibilities among various levels and institutions of government, and financial decisions very much influenced by party politics (Bocz, 2009). For that reason, Hungary’s history and processes of transition from the totalitarian regime may serve as a basis for comparison with regards to the current research question. The lessons learned from Hungary’s example may have relevance for other post-communist countries, as well as for African, South American, or other countries in the world, in which the changing of their system from a dictatorial to a democratic appears to be a long, slow process.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

The topic of international transfers of technology in the human services field administered by NGOs brings together numerous areas with vast scholarly literature. One can look at the topic from various interrelated aspects. First and foremost technology transfer or diffusion of innovations is the most obvious body of literature that comes to mind. The term “technology transfer” originates from agencies that concerned themselves with the dispersal of equipment and devices primarily in the military and business sectors. Scholars in the field deal mainly with the diffusion of technologies that require a major initial investment of both human and financial capital, involve a physical entity, and have completed their development stage. The literature terms these technologies as high/medium, embodied and formed and they largely appear in the field of manufacturing.

Most research takes an economic approach to technology transfer. Nonetheless, this body of literature also includes the adoption versus adaptation discourse. Scholars of diffusion of innovations, spearheaded by Everett Rogers’ work, have focused their studies on the first steps of diffusion and mainly conducted their research on the decision to adopt an innovation and the circumstances of the decision making. Rogers (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) notes that the diffusion literature does not take the readers beyond the point of the adoption decision, and fails to examine the implementation of the given

innovation with fidelity. He also observes that less than 3% of the more than 1000 articles he reviewed pertained to implementation.

Scholarly activities on program replication in the human services field focus on evidence-based practices (EBP) and implementation issues. These two research areas examine two interconnected aspects of technology transfer. Evidence-based practice research examines, and attempts to establish the key factors of, intervention processes. In other words, it looks at what contributes to the success of an intervention or service in terms of achieving the intended outcomes with clients. Implementation research centers on success factors of implementation. It concerns itself with identifying what influences the success of replicating successful interventions, services, or programs. Both of these research areas deal with soft technologies, i.e. programs in the human services field, developed both by NGOs and governmental agencies. Each research area, from its respective point of view, explores the features that contribute to the successful replication of existing models in the field.

Technology transfer, diffusion of innovations, EBP (evidenced-based practice), and implementation research have all focused their attention mainly on the US. To ensure an international perspective, relevant parts of international development literature will be reviewed. One would assume that a considerable part of the development literature is on transnational model transfer. However, this is not the case. There seems to be a void in this area, except for the initial writings on agricultural transfer from the 1950s and more currently topical issues such as global health. At the same time, development theories of the early years must be taken into consideration and thus reviewed.

In addition, other specific segments of the development literature must be considered. Felner (as cited in Fixsen, Naoom, Blase, Friedman, & Wallace, 2005. p. 7) writes “The community both defines the problem to be solved and tests the adequacy of the answer.” In other words, the success or failure of an international technology transfer is very much dependent on the recipient environment. Thus, there is a need to review the literature about the context and operating environment for NGOs with special attention to the Hungarian circumstance. Besides the various non-profit theories, the development of the Hungarian non-profit sector is also briefly introduced. The history of voluntary, non-profit organizations in the country and the changes in the regulations governing their operations in the past 20 years define the issues they have to face, and the environment in which they function, which in turns influences their programming initiatives.

The current study is exploratory in nature, and its aim is to investigate what happens on the ground in human service organizations that import models from another country. I am interested in exploring the big picture and learning the viewpoints of the selected NGOs on what factors might have been in place when they underwent the transferring process. After careful consideration, the above three major areas were chosen for review. They adequately address the main issues that surround such a transfer process and shed light on its many aspects. The literature on technology transfer outlines questions about the nature of the technology, and identifies the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral preparation of people as important aspects of transfer and diffusion. These include readiness to change at the individual level, as well as organizational change.

Currently, the literature on technology transfer does not really address the human services area. Replication issues of these kinds of soft technologies and readiness to

change at both individual and organizational levels are dealt with in the EBP and implementation literature. The two bodies of literature complement each other on this topic. Finally, literature on international development and the history and characteristics of the Hungarian non-profit sector places the research question in context.

2.1 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

There has been quite extensive research carried out on technology transfer in the development context. However, most of the research focuses on the relationship between technology transfer and economic growth, and emphasizes the economic aspects of transfers (Chatterji, 1990; Gibson & Smilor, 1992; Kaimovitz, 1990; Robinson, 1988). Furthermore, these researchers almost exclusively deal with the “productive” industries, i.e. manufacturing, heavy industry, communication and information technology, agriculture, etc.

There have been as many attempts to define technology transfer as the number of authors dealing with the problem. Goulet’s definition from 1977 captures the essence of the issue: “Technology transfers relate to the circulation of know-how which is directly applied to the production of goods, the provision of services, and the formulation of decisions affecting these.” (Goulet 1977, p. 4) Similarly, many have concerned themselves with categorization of technology from various aspects and identifying the factors that play a role in the transfer process. The main factors they name to influence the quality of technology transfer are the type of technology being transferred, the mode of transfer, the adaptation process that involves the cultural aspect, human resources, and

what I term implementation issues including management, readiness for change and organizational change.

R. Murray Thomas who writes about the cross-cultural transfer of educational technology identifies political conditions, economic conditions, cultural suitability, and the magnitude of change as realms within which the transfer of educational technologies takes place. All of which have a great impact on the transfer (Thomas & Kobayashi, 1987).

The above mentioned factors can be categorized into two overarching components, namely the technical (or productive) aspect and the social aspect (Bugliarello, Pak, Alferov, & Moore, 1996; Goulet, 1977). Bugliarello et al. (1996) assert that the process of technology transfer is shaped very much by these two issues. They see the socio-technical nature of technology transfer as key in the success or failure of the transfer process. They posit that the nature of the transfer transcends technical considerations and operates differently in different cultures. They emphasize the need for a much greater and more systematic focus on the multiple and complex interfaces between the technical and social factors of the process.

All authors reviewed, acknowledge and offer insight into the importance of human resources, the adaptation process in the technology transfer, as well as implementation, but handle these issues more at a societal or corporation level. Though their findings have informed my research, they have little practicality when examining small non-profit human service organizations with limited resources. Similarly, although the categories established by this body of literature on technology transfer can be applied

generally to social service organizations, the content of each still remains to be specified in the context of my area of interest.

Therefore, I am now going to turn to the literature on knowledge base and technology transfer in the drug abuse and prevention field. When selecting the appropriate literature for review, this area offered the most extensive coverage of model replication in human services. There has been substantial research done in this field, first and foremost by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) in the US. The Institute primarily carries out research on drug abuse and develops intervention and prevention programs; at the same time it has concerned itself with how to bridge the gap effectively between research results and practice, and how to replicate successful intervention programs at different locations for more than 20 years.

NIDA, in its 1995 monograph, states that successful technology transfer is highly dependent on behavioral change. Therefore, their researchers approached the question from the behavioral science perspective. NIDA concluded that technology transfer involves behavioral change in communities and society in general, in organizations as part of the new ways of production or service delivery, as well as among individuals whose personality and motives must be understood and dealt with to ensure effective programs. In other words, technology transfer expects people to change their own behavior within an organizational setting that must also change resulting in uncertainty and anxiety. For this reason, new technologies must have positive rewards and must include encouragements that outweigh the negatives involved in the change process. Thus, effective technology transfers must contain strong, targeted strategies to overcome barriers to behavioral change and provide support during each stage of the process.

In his 1990 paper, Backer attempted to systematically review the field of “knowledge utilization and planned change.” He concluded that many different terms were used by those studying and taking action on the various phenomena covered by the broad term: technology transfer (hard and soft). However, these various approaches to technology transfer consist of interrelated components.

The term “technology transfer” originates from the military/defense sector and from private businesses that concerned themselves with “hard” technology, namely with equipment and devices. In health and human services, technology transfer has primarily been used to describe the dissemination of health care technology, such as artificial hearts, tomography, etc. “Soft technologies” like training programs, administrative practices, and counseling or therapy methods can also be found under this rubric; however, they have been studied much less systematically (National Institute on Drug Abuse 1991, p. 3). The fact that there is still some controversy within the field of technology transfer, as to whether “soft” technologies should be included under this rubric at all, characterizes its ambiguous nature. At the same time, the different efforts to categorize technology transfers include the so-called “soft” technologies.

Battista (1989) categorized technologies according to the investment and resources they require. High technologies necessitate major capital investment and the mobilization of substantial human, physical, and financial resources (the examples include CT scanning, and coronary bypass grafting). Medium technologies require intensive developmental activities, but can be adopted and used without substantial support systems (for example upper gastrointestinal endoscopy). Finally, the adoption

and diffusion of low technologies require relatively little financial and human resource investment (like anti-smoking counseling, or Pap tests) (NIDA 1991, pp. 3-4).

Feeny (1985) established the categories of embodied and disembodied technologies. Embodied technologies involve a physical entity such as new equipment or a drug. Disembodied technologies embrace a new procedure or method, such as a new surgical technique. This categorization also suggests a difference in the way technology is diffused. Diffusion of disembodied technologies is primarily a learning process; in this case the adopter does not need to purchase anything to adopt and implement. Feeny also asserts that in the health field diffusion of technologies that involve a physical entity tends to have a long developmental phase that includes testing, assessment, and governmental approval. Once completed, the diffusion of this type of technologies is quite predictable.

On the other hand, diffusion of technologies that require changes in technique or procedures is less predictable and harder to characterize. There has been less research conducted on disembodied technologies and on the role skills, learning, and experience play in their adoption. In addition, Gelijns (1989) argues that there is a lack of governmental systems to regulate development and diffusion of procedural-based techniques (NIDA 1991, p. 4).

Greer (1988) offered yet another conceptual analysis of medical technologies. She distinguished between formed (complete) and dynamic (still developing) technologies. Formed technologies are often expensive equipment (i.e. CT scanners). They have been tested and assessed for a significant amount of time; they have well-defined characteristics, and thus, can be diffused quickly and in predictable ways. On the

other hand, technologies that are still developing while being diffused follow a much different process before being widely adopted. The early phase of the adoption process of dynamic technologies is characterized by controversy and rejection. They usually arrive in the local (medical) community via individual innovators and are promoted by idea champions. During a so-called observation period local opinion leaders assess the characteristics and outcomes of the technology and reach a consensus on whether to adopt the innovation (NIDA 1991, pp. 4-5).

The above categorizations of technology provide good insight into its nature. All three of the authors point out the indistinct nature of the “soft” technologies and conclude that the outcome of the diffusion of these technologies is a lot more unpredictable. The technologies of the human service field this study is focusing on are largely low, disembodied, and dynamic technologies. As such, the importance of the social factor in their transfer is even more significant.

The NIDA study also provides a good overview of the different definitions of technology transfer. Since the diverse aspects of the model transfer, elucidated by these various approaches, are very relevant for the purposes of this study, I will provide an overview of them below.

Information Dissemination and Utilization: The roots of information dissemination activities are found in library science. They encompass methods of getting information out to larger audiences, such as information clearinghouses, special publications, toll free telephone hotlines, etc. Assistance provided in the actual adoption effort after the information has become available is called utilization activities. In the

latter case, knowledge is usually more refined and has some pretested “value” (NIDA 1991, p. 5).

Research Utilization: The foremost subject of utilization efforts has been research-based innovations. Work conducted on utilization in the late 1980s focused on innovations emerging from health, human services, and education research. At the same time, innovations may also originate in field work or demonstrations that are not the results of a research process (NIDA 1991, p. 5).

Innovation Diffusion: Rogers (1983), who conducted studies of the agricultural extension agent in the 1950s, was the first to define innovation diffusion. The term most often depicts the spread of information about innovations (a particular technology, procedure, or organized body of information) that results in individuals adopting the innovative practices and procedures. In the health domain, the diffusion of innovative care practices among physicians and other professionals is a prime example (NIDA 1991, p. 5).

Sociology of Knowledge: Sociology of knowledge deals with the study of social groups and their interactions around the exchange of knowledge as observed by researchers, as well as the traditional communication channels such as scholarly publications, conferences, etc. Development of theories which explain the transmission mechanisms and their impact also forms a part of the term (NIDA 1991, p. 6).

Organizational Change: When an organization adopts an innovation, the way the organization operates changes. The dynamics of organizational change; planned change strategies; and the individual, group, and structural factors that account for successful

change have been the topic of numerous researches in management and social science (NIDA 1991, p. 6).

Policy Research: Public policies often facilitate the process of organizations or social systems adopting innovations. Legislators may use social science knowledge to form a piece of legislation, or to decide how to vote on an issue. Policy research aims to understand how these processes take place, including what role knowledge and its utilization have in the policy making process” (NIDA 1991, p. 6).

Interpersonal and Mass Communication: For an innovation to be adopted it is inevitable that potential adopters – whether individuals or organizations – are aware of it. To get the message across effectively, a targeted communication effort is required. Therefore, strategies and theories of interpersonal and mass communications also affect knowledge utilization (NIDA 1991, p. 6).

“One of the challenges facing the field is how to both integrate and differentiate these various definitions and the work they embrace.” (NIDA 1991, p. 6) It is interesting to observe that while technology transfer in the drug abuse and prevention field mostly refers to “hard” technologies, and that is the question that has been the subject of many of the researchers, the above seven definitions all focus on the social aspect of the phenomenon, and hardly mention the technical side. My initial research interest suggested that these approaches would have great relevance, when examining the nature of transnational technology transfer in the human services. The transfer process can be defined as the sum of all of the above outlined definitions. Attention must be paid as to how to manage each characterization. The aspects embedded in each of these definitions

informed the study when formulating the independent variables. In addition, they were taken into consideration when analyzing the data.

Similarly, Rogers & Burdige's work was utilized in the formation of the variables of this study. They define diffusion as a special type of communication in which an innovation spreads among members of a social system. They find that the four crucial elements of diffusion are (1) the innovation, (2) the channel through which it is communicated, (3) time, and (4) the members of the social system (Rogers & Burdige 1972, p. 352). According to their definition, "a social system is a collectivity of individuals who are oriented to a common goal." They argue that social system norms, as well as opinion leaders and change agent attributes, affect diffusion. Opinion leadership is the ability to informally influence individuals' attitude or behavior in a desired way with relative frequency. A change agent is a professional who influences innovation decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change agency, and usually seeks to obtain the adoption of new ideas. Thus, for a diffusion to be successful, it is essential to understand the system's norms, ascertain client needs, use opinion leaders, and anticipate social consequences (Rogers & Burdige 1972, p. 360-73).

A study at the Harwood Manufacturing Corporation provides insight into effective ways of managing change, when new technologies are introduced. Workers at the company resisted new methods and jobs. Early research indicates that resistance to change is a combination of individual reaction to frustration with strong group induced forces. Therefore, to study the topic, it is appropriate to use the group methods experiment. In the experiment conducted, there were three degrees of participation in planning for change: 1. the reasons for change were explained to participants, but there

was no participation; 2. participation happened through representation; 3. total participation of participants. The participants of the third group, who fully participated in the planning for change, recovered faster from the change effect (i.e. the relearning period), than the other groups. As the experiment showed, there was a drop in production resulting from the transfer; however, the rate of recovery was found to be proportional to the amount of participation. “It is possible to modify greatly or to remove completely group resistance to changes in methods of work and the ensuring piece rates. This change can be accomplished by the use of group meetings in which management effectively communicates needs for change and stimulates group participation in planning the changes.” (Coch & French, as cited in Cartwright & Zander 1968, p. 350)

The literature on technology transfer establishes the socio-technical nature of the transfer process. In addition, it states that the type of technology, the mode of transfer, the adaptation process, and the human resources all influence the quality of the technology transfer. It concludes that “soft” technologies are indistinct in nature, and the outcome of their diffusion is unpredictable. The following is a review of the literature on evidence-based practice that attempts to establish defining attributes of “soft” technologies.

2.2 EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE

In recent years in the US, there has been an enormous upswing in public policy regarding use of evidence-based practices. For example, in Pennsylvania only those practices that are evidence-based or evidence-informed are funded for juvenile delinquent services – at

least public policies are moving in that direction. Concurrently, creating human service models, and proving that they achieve the results intended, has been another matter of great interest, especially in the past decade. The field is moving towards “evidence-based practice.” In other words, human service organizations and researchers are on a quest to create comprehensive models of service that not only include the “what” and “how”, but also the “why” of service delivery. Professionals developing service models based on evidence-based practice also create a superstructure including model “fidelity” scales,³ program manuals, technical support centers, standards, etc., all with the aim of assuring adherence to program practices that will produce the expected positive outcomes for clients served. The goal is to achieve fidelity in the face of the desire to “reinvent”; that is, to preserve model characteristics when adapting it to local conditions or perceived needs of the adopters.

“Evidence-based” (EB) is now becoming a common descriptor in many fields within human services such as Social Work, Health Service, or Medicine. Evidence-based practice and all its variations like evidence-based treatment or program, empirically supported treatment, etc. basically refer to practices that meet rigid standards of research and show statistically significant results as defined and assessed by a governing or funding body (Scriven, as cited in Harper, 2010). The EBP approach classifies research results by using a hierarchy of evidence. It uses a linear model of value, moving from “Personal communication/anecdotal/testimonial” evidence at the bottom, through “Qualitative methods” and “Quasi-experimental design,” to “Systematic reviews/meta-

³ Fidelity refers to the degree of implementation of an evidence-based practice (EBP), and a scale that measures fidelity is called a fidelity scale (Bond, Evans, Salyers, Williams, & Kim, 2000).

analysis of Random Control Trials” (RCTs) at the very top. This classification is the brief summary of the hierarchical models generally presented in the literature.

Table 1. Hierarchy of Evidence

Rank	Methodology
1.	Systematic reviews / meta-analysis of RCTs; Random control trials; Experimental designs
2.	Quasi-experimental design; Cohort-control studies; Case-control studies
3.	Consensus conference; Expert opinion / Delphi group; Observational studies; Interview / audit; Qualitative design
4.	Personal communication / anecdotal / testimonial

Adapted from Harper, 2010.

The National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP), provided by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA, 2007), lists programs that meet the “gold standard” research requirements for prevention and treatment of mental health and substance use disorders. EBP currently holds a privileged status related to program recognition and funding, and thus, it deserves scholarly criticism challenging its hegemony (Holmes, Murray, Perron, & Rail, as cited in Harper, 2010). As Harper (2010) vehemently points out, the issue here is that current government bodies such as SAMHSA, by setting out these standards of hierarchy with the RCT and systematic reviews of RCTs being at the top, place these methods in a dominating, positivist position. This, in turn, not only renders much available knowledge and experience redundant by the negation of other forms of evidence, but also creates a

situation that is very much guided by political and economic forces, and which seriously limits effectiveness of programming in Adventure Education and Therapy (Harper, 2010).

Other authors have also criticized the hierarchy of evidence in EBP. Harper (2010) cites Avis & Freshwater 2006, Duncan, Miller, & Sparks 2007, Gandhi, Murphy-Graham, Petrosino, Chrismer, & Weiss 2007, Holmes, Murray, Perron, & Rail 2006, and McCall & Green 2004 from such diverse fields of practice as social work, nursing, substance abuse prevention, or psychology, as heavy critics of the discounting of any other forms of evidence than RCT. They assert that EBP ignores other knowledge claims, diminishes the role of the clinician/practitioner in making judgments, and displaces the humanistic approaches in favor of the scientific approaches. Holmes et al. (as cited in Harper, 2010, p. 41) even go to the extreme of calling EBP “outrageously exclusionary and dangerously normative.”

Furthermore, Harper (2010) establishes that a major issue with the process of awarding model program status is that it is often based on only one or more evidence-based studies. If statistically significant results are achieved on the chosen outcome(s), as is the practice of SAMHSA, the program then is listed as a model program that can be replicated elsewhere. Adherence to the model, in turn, will ensure funding for the given replica. Gorman, Conde, & Huber (as cited in Harper, 2010) point out that the drawback is that the course of future practice, in extreme cases, is set by a single study which is evaluated only by its design and results, but lacks consideration of other issues of validity or analysis.

In addition, secondary analysis of data often results in different outcomes or “evidence.” Gorman et al. (as cited in Harper, 2010) revisited the studies conducted on the Strengthening Families Program (SFP)⁴ and other EBP research, and concluded that the results from previous studies were very elusive and their results were possibly dependent on the analysis. This raises the question to what extent EBP models are prone to bias by the way they are analyzed.

Both the literature on technology transfer and that on diffusion of innovations, likewise stress the role the human factor plays in such processes. With the primacy of RCTs as the only evidence, EBP removes the social factors from what the technology transfer literature terms the socio-technical nature of the transfer process. In this process, especially in an international transfer, it is crucial to understand client mindsets and stakeholder involvement, and decode the understanding and experiences they have with regards to the program or service. These aspects are valuable from both the clients’ and the program’s perspective. These questions call for certain research methods (interviews, personal communications, testimonies, etc.), most of which are placed at the bottom of the list in the EBP hierarchy of evidence, and appear to be the least valued form of evidence. When a technology is transferred to, or a model program is replicated in, a new environment, the needs of the client group, as well as their voice along with

⁴ SFP is a nationally and internationally recognized parenting and family strengthening program for high-risk families. SFP is an evidence-based family skills training program found to significantly reduce problem behaviors, delinquency, and alcohol and drug abuse in children and to improve social competencies and school performance. SFP was developed and found effective in the early 1980s. More than 15 subsequent independent replications have found similar positive results with families in many different ethnic groups. In the more than two decades since its development, SFP has been reviewed by researchers and rated as an exemplary, evidence-based program. It has been approved for implementation with federal and state funds by: HAY, ONDCP, NIDA, CSAP, CMHS, USDOE, OJJDP (Retrieved Jan 24, 2011, from <http://www.strengtheningfamiliesprogram.org>).

practitioners, program staff and other stakeholders must be taken into consideration. Thus, forms of evidence resulting from non-RCT methodologies cannot be treated as irrelevant or dismissible as EBP calls for.

This statement is also supported by Carter, the evaluator of Project Venture (PV), a culturally based experiential substance abuse prevention program for Native American Youths developed by the National Indian Youth Leadership Project (as cited in Harper, 2010). Since its inception, about 25 years ago, PV has been replicated more than 110 times in the US and abroad, and today has more than 15 years of research and evaluation of program processes and outcomes. Over the years PV has received several recognitions of effectiveness, and in 2004 was named a model program by CSAP and SAMHSA's NREPP.

Interestingly, despite its model program status and the program fidelity required for replication, PV's website under the "Adoption Information and Materials" label starts with the following quote from McClellan Hall, the founder of PV: "By adopting Project Venture you are joining a new community of youth workers willing to implement a program that is not 'canned,' but requires creativity and dedication not usually found in other models."⁵ In March 2010, I had the opportunity to organize and participate in a PV replication training in Budapest, Hungary. Throughout the training, and in my discussions with them, McClellan Hall, founder and CEO, and Bart Crawford, lead trainer, emphasized the importance of paying attention to the local circumstances, and adapting the program model to the needs and characteristics of local target groups (Hall & Crawford, 2010).

⁵ Retrieved Jan 24, 2011, from <http://www.niylp.org/project-venture-info.htm>

Carter (as cited in Harper, 2010) confirms this approach, when she points out the difficulties in maintaining program fidelity at replication sites. She attributes this, on the one hand, to the lack of resources for implementation and evaluation at the adopting organizations, and on the other hand, to programmatic and cultural adaptations. For complex, multicomponent, and high-dosage / high-intensity programs, such as PV, a substantial level of commitment and related costs are needed for adopting organizations to be able to meet the requirements of the model program. Furthermore, she states that the level of community readiness for the adopted program may determine the success or failure of the replication at the end of the day. This includes not only the receptivity of clients towards the new program, but also the requirements of local funding sources and licensing requirements. Thus, she states that it is unlikely that PV will be able to replicate the program with the fidelity as expected by its model program status.

In fact, there is an ongoing discourse on fidelity vs. adaptation in the diffusion literature, too. A common phase in the diffusion process is what Rogers (2003) calls “reinvention.” It describes the phenomenon of the technology being adapted to local conditions, which often entails significant changes in the original model. The contrasting phenomenon in diffusion is “adoption.” In this case, the model is “borrowed” from the developer, and the adopting sites strive to replicate the original innovation as closely as possible. The “pro-fidelity” side argues that any modification of the original model decreases the effectiveness of the technology. The proponents of the “reinvention” side, on the other hand, assert that innovations are developed in a certain political, economic, social, and cultural environment which may differ greatly from those of the recipient sites (Mandiberg, 2000, p. 107-108).

To sum up, I would like to underline EBP's focus on measurement of, and offering practical value to, client outcomes, as a crucial component of soft technology transfers. However, as seen from the adoption vs. adaptation discourse and the literature introduced above, other factors play a key role in model replication. The shortcomings of EBP in considering these other aspects and dismissing other forms of evidence are addressed in the literature on implementation research. I will now review that literature.

2.3 IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH

Successful technology transfer is highly dependent on behavioral change. It involves behavior change in communities and society in general, at the level of the organizations, as part of the new ways of service delivery, and among individuals, which often results in uncertainty and anxiety. For an effective technology transfer, the personality and motives of these individuals must be understood and dealt with. This in turn, requires strong and targeted strategies to overcome barriers to behavior change and to provide support during the process. In addition, Feeny's category of disembodied technologies comprises a new procedure or method, and its diffusion is primarily a learning process. Diffusion of technologies that require changes in technique or procedures is less predictable and harder to characterize. There has been less research conducted on disembodied technologies and on the role skills, learning, and experience play in their adoption (NIDA, 1991).

Due to the primacy of EBP in human services in recent years, practitioners of these fields in the US have become increasingly interested in understanding the variables

that determine successful implementation of effective interventions, and there has been an upsurge of research on implementation issues. Both scholars and practitioners argue that implementation know-how plays a key role in the success of program replication, and should be part of any intervention or program model. This growing body of literature addresses the nuances of the diffusion of disembodied technologies that the NIDA study found lacking. The following is a review of the major findings of implementation research.

Fixsen et al. (2005) write that implementation research, as a field, has discovered that all the papers in file cabinets and manuals on shelves that have been produced over the years are not enough to ensure the successful transformation of human service systems through innovative practice. These documents represent what is known about effective interventions, but are not used effectively to achieve behavioral health outcomes for children, families, and adults across all levels of service provision. It is clear that policies aiming to improve human services require more effective and efficient ways to translate policy mandates for effective programs into the actions necessary to realize them. In addition, they state that it became evident that thoughtful and effective implementation strategies are needed, if we are to systematically attempt to use the products of science to improve the outcomes for clients. Thus, they equate implementation with coordinated change at all levels of service provision, i.e. system, organization, program, and practice.

The authors conclude that essentially implementation seems to be most successful when four factors are in place: first, those who deliver the service are carefully selected and trained, and receive adequate coaching and performance evaluation; second, the

organization has the capacity to provide training, supervision, coaching, as well as process and outcome evaluations in a timely manner; third, both community and clients are involved in program selection and evaluation; fourth, there exists a hospitable environment for the services in terms of funding channels, policies, and regulations. They also find that relevant implementation features and procedures are common across fields. Thus, the key to successful national-level diffusion of innovations to improve client outcomes is the systematic application of the implementation processes.

Petersilia (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 2) writes that “The ideas embodied in innovative social programs are not self-executing.” Instead, she calls for an approach that comprehends the post-adoption events and the role of those who put a model into practice as crucial in the success or failure of replication. It is true that considerably more energy is put into developing models than into large scale replication; however, one without the other is not satisfactory. Measuring client outcomes only, no matter how extensive or how well delineated, will not help much to improve the success of implementation, although that is the focus.

From the implementation point of view, the intervention processes and outcomes, and the implementation processes and outcomes must be differentiated. It must be emphasized that these two aspects are at play at the same time. Both these areas must be well defined and prudently evaluated in their outcomes for their intended clients; in the case of intervention for those who will receive the services, and in the case of implementation for those who are supposed to implement the intervention. Bernfeld, 2001; Blase et al., 1984; Dusenbury, Brannigan, Falco, & Hansen, 2003; Forsetlund, Talseth, Bradley, Nordheim, & Bjorndal, 2003; Goodman, 2000; Mowbray, Holter,

Teague, & Bybee, 2003; Rychetnik, Frommer, Hawe, & Shiell, 2002 (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) conclude that the variables of the implementation process cannot be equated with the variables of the interventions. It is important to measure and analyze the implementation outcomes when attempting replication.

Fixsen et al. (2005) define implementation as a set of specific activities that are needed to put a well-described intervention or program into practice. They differentiate between the “intervention” which refers to treatment or prevention activities at the client level, and “implementation” which encompasses the efforts to incorporate the practice at the practitioner, agency, or community levels. After defining what the term “core component” means, the authors identify both intervention and implementation core components. At the same time, they acknowledge that core characteristics of both areas are very much influenced by the environment in which they appear. Therefore, they are examined in the contexts of the community as well as of the organization.

According to Fixsen et al. (2005) core components include the most essential and indispensable elements of a model applicable to both the intervention, and the implementation elements. Core components outline which characteristics are replicable, how these qualities come into being, and what the favorable features of the environment are which foster successful replication. EBP research is concerned with establishing core components of interventions. An EBP is the collection of skills, methods, techniques, and procedures that a practitioner can use in order to change a certain client condition. The Dissemination Work Group (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) finds five common elements of evidence-based programs: clear philosophy, beliefs, and values; specific

treatment technologies; treatment decision making within the program framework; structured service delivery components; and components for continuous improvement.

However, Arthur & Blitz, 2000; Gallagher, 2001; Harachi, Abbott, Catalano, Haggerty, & Fleming, 1999; Winter & Szulanski, 2001; Wolf, Kirigin, Fixsen, Blase, & Braukmann, 1995 (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) all find that despite extensive research, it is difficult to identify the core components of an EBP, before replications in new environments have been carried out and assessed. At the same time, these authors assert that knowing the core components of the intervention, i.e. understanding what needs to be in place to reach the intended results with the clients, may increase the speed and effectiveness of the implementation, and make the decision making on adaptation areas more straightforward in determining the suitability for local circumstances.

Defining the core components of the interventions that have been demonstrated to cause positive changes in the clients' lives, in other words, identifying what must be maintained in order to achieve fidelity and effectiveness in the outcomes for clients, refutes Rogers' long-standing view of the impossibility of strict implementation and the necessity of local adaptations. While treatment procedures do not exist in isolation and they always appear in context, and so, to some extent, adjustment to local conditions must always occur, it is not necessary to "reinvent" the model at each and every replication attempt.

Fixsen et al. (2005) list six core implementation components which are essential for the successful implementation of EBPs. These were established based on the commonalities of successfully implemented programs. The goal of the implementation is to ensure that practitioners incorporate the research findings (EBP) in their actions and

interactions with clients. The common elements that support this, are “staff selection, pre-service and in-service training, ongoing consultation and coaching, staff performance and program evaluation, facilitative administrative support, and systems interventions.” (Fixsen et al., 2005. p. 28)

Staff selection includes the requirements for practitioners, and methods of selection. It is an area that intersects with larger system variables, such as development and availability of workforce, the economy, etc. Pre- and in-service training provides the opportunity to convey knowledge of background information, values and beliefs, operating philosophy, and theory, as well as key practices. The skills introduced and practiced during the training must be further developed through constant and regular coaching and consultation. Training and consequent coaching are the key to induce behavior change in staff members, and to assure that core intervention components are in place. Staff evaluation supports this process in that it assesses the use and outcomes of the skills and behaviors outlined in the core intervention components. It further enhances the results of staff selection, training, and coaching. Program evaluation, at the same time, ensures the continuous implementation of the core intervention components by assessing the overall performance of the agency. Facilitative administration means leadership and usage of data to make decisions, support the processes, and keep staff focused on anticipated client outcomes. Lastly, systems interventions involve the approaches to working with the environment and acquiring the necessary resources for program implementation.

Drake, Gorman, & Torrey (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 35) find that “We are faced with the paradox of non-evidence based implementation of evidence-based

programs.” Fixsen et al. (2005) reviewed the research on four of the above core implementation components. Their findings are summarized here. Implementation, in essence, is behavior change. Its core components revolve around the human factor; namely they are factors that concern the staff of the implementing organization. Enabling policies, adequate funding sources, organizational structures, practices and culture, administrative support, and adept trainers and evaluators are all very important aspects in the implementation process. However, they can only exert their influence on the clients via the practitioners. Thus, practitioners must be competent to employ the intervention core components in their actions and interactions with clients in order to achieve the promised outcomes of an EBP. When an organization manages to put the core implementation components in place, it becomes easier to change practitioner behavior and to improve it to a level at which the EBP is proficiently performed.

The first implementation core component is staff selection. Fixsen et al. (2005) find that while this has been proposed as a driver of implementation, it is seldom evaluated in human service programs. A meta-analysis of research in business suggests that methods and criteria used in selection of staff may be important in achieving intended intervention outcomes with clients. Other research has approached staff selection from the point of view of staff characteristics in organizations undergoing change. They find that certain traits, such as resilience, being better informed, and self-efficacy, are associated with better acceptance of new practices.

Despite the existence of some research, Fixsen et al. (2005) conclude that staff selection is a neglected area within implementation research. The authors emphasize that as EBP implementation becomes more wide-spread, research on staff issues will become

more imperative. They call for further research on staff selection criteria which, in these authors' opinions, will promote successful implementation at various sites. Identifying best practices for practitioner selection will also shed light on aspects of an interview process for EBPs.

Similarly, staff training in itself will not result in positive outcomes either for implementation or for intervention. At the same time, training and workshops are effective means for conveying important information to practitioners. If training is coupled with additional supporting methods, these together contribute to desired outcomes. The literature agrees on training being an important part of the implementation process, yet few studies examine the impact of training on participants' implementation at work. Gingiss (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) states that learning usually progresses from orientation and new learning through mechanical use, routine use, refinement, and integration to innovation as new knowledge, skill, and abilities fully develop over time.

This statement establishes that in the process of implementation, there must be a mode to introduce new knowledge and skills, for which training seems to be suitable. Despite this, training by itself is an unproductive method for implementation. It appears that knowledge of the program, as well as demonstration and practice of key skills are also functional elements of staff training. Again, as a consequence of their review of research on staff training, Fixsen et al. (2005) call for assessment of the most effective and efficient circumstances for practitioner and organizational staff training. Insight into these two areas will help organizations adopting EBPs decide the advantages of working

with existing staff or hiring and training new staff to key positions such as practitioner, trainer, evaluator, coach, administrator, etc.

Like Gingiss' in the above taxonomy, Joyce & Showers (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) believe that training and coaching are a continuous set of activities, the goal of which is to achieve behavior change of the participants. Since behavior change is very difficult for most people, training without coaching or vice versa is insufficient. Formal knowledge (acquired through training) must be accompanied by practical knowledge in which a practitioner has the opportunity to experience the relevance of his/her new knowledge in real life situations. Fixsen et al. (2005) observes that newly-learned behavior is crude and incomplete when compared with the performance of expert practitioners. Practitioners' competency in performing newly learned behaviors is also fragile when it comes to reactions from clients and others in the service provision. To shape the newly-learned behavior into becoming functional in the service setting, continuous support is required.

Coaching is most effective when it is work- and situation-based, readily available, and reflective, i.e. when it provides feedback and debriefing to practitioners in real time on real life work experiences. It also has to be readily available for them. Another aspect of coaching is the emotional and personal support of practitioners. In human services, it is the person (the practitioner) who delivers the intervention through his/her action and words. To put it in another way, in human services the practitioner equals the intervention. Thus, to ensure the adequate delivery of EBPs by the staff on the ground, special attention needs to be paid to coaching. As Fixsen et al. (2005) conclude from the literature findings, coaching clearly contributes to the preparation of practitioners.

Effective coaching presupposes the availability of coaches, who are not only experts in the content, techniques, and rationales of the program, but also are “encouraging, supportive, committed, sensitive, flexible, respectful, enthusiastic, diplomatic, patient, and willing to share information, credit, and recognition.” (McCormick & Brennan, as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 45) Key elements of coaching appear to be teaching and reinforcing EBPs and adaptation of skills and practical knowledge, in order to adjust these to the given practitioner’s personal style. Furthermore, personal emotional support might be another core component, though this has not been confirmed empirically.

In addition, Fixsen et al. (2005) point out that coaching is interposed between staff selection and training, and staff performance evaluation. They conclude that further research is needed on the relative contributions of staff selection, training, and coaching to implementation, as well as the interaction effects among them.

Finally, staff evaluation and fidelity measures, i.e. examining how closely staff follows procedure, complete the cycle of service delivery in replication programs. Fixsen et al. (2005) note that, in general, organizations that use performance evaluation tend to embed this function as an essential part of the treatment program. Context, compliance, and competence seem to be the three areas that are measured in staff performance and fidelity. Context includes those circumstances that must be in place in order to operate the program, such as staff-client ratio, required trainings, location of service provision, etc.

Compliance examines the extent to which the practitioner uses the core implementation components established by the EBP; whereas competence describes the

skill level of the practitioner in applying the core intervention components. In organizations functioning at a high level, evaluation of the staff is part of a system of support that is designed to have good people well-prepared to perform their jobs effectively. Fixsen et al. (2005) conclude their review of research on staff performance and fidelity by stating that even the most effective intervention will fail to work if it is not implemented. Therefore, assessment of performance is crucial to implementation. Measuring context, compliance, and competence will enable coaches to improve their methods and agendas for professional development of the practitioners; while administrators can use the measurements to assess the quality of training and coaching.

As discussed earlier, core components do not exist in a vacuum. As Fixsen et al. (2005) state “No matter how good the program may be, if national policy changes and certain services are no longer funded, those services will disappear.” (p. 58) The authors assert that core implementation components are crucial in changing the behavior of frontline staff and other professionals who implement EBPs within an organization. At the same time, these components appear in the framework of the given organization, which either supports or hinders them. The organization’s established administrative structures, its processes to select, train, coach, and evaluate practitioners, its program evaluation functions, and its interventions with external systems to ensure continuous resources and support for the EBPs, all influence the outcomes. In other words, the presence of core implementation components guarantee fidelity and positive outcomes, while organizational components enable and support those core components in the long term. Over the years, such implementation occurs in the context of unpredictable, yet dominant changes in governments, leadership, funding priorities, economic boom-bust

cycles, shifting social priorities, etc. Organizational and external influence factors seem to be ubiquitous and prevalent at all levels of implementation.

After surveying the relevant literature, Fixsen et al. (2005) conclude that it suggests that the three elements of core implementation components, the organizational components, and external influence factors, interplay to produce implementation outcomes. At the same time, they find that there is very little information on the cooperation of individuals, organizations, departments, and political groups. This indicates that organizational and systems intervention strategies and skills will prove to be a crucial research area for large scale implementation of successful programs. The authors hypothesize that measuring all three levels concurrently will increase understanding of the contribution of organizational components and external influence factors to the effectiveness of the core implementation elements. The table below summarizes this hypothesis, as well as provides a framework for assessment in the current study.

Table 2. Postulated Relationships among Core Implementation Components, Organizational Components, and External Influence Factors that may Help Explain Various Implementation Outcomes

External Influence Factors	Organizational Components	Core Implementation Components	Possible Fidelity Outcomes	Possible Sustainability Outcomes
Generally Enabling	Strong	Strong	High	Long term
		Weak	Low/Medium	Medium term
	Weak	Strong	High	Medium term
		Weak	Low	Short term
Generally Hindering	Strong	Strong	High	Medium term
		Weak	Low	Medium term
	Weak	Strong	Medium/High	Short term
		Weak	Low	Short term

Source: Fixsen et. al, 2005. p. 59.

Another interesting perspective comes from Hernandez & Hodges', who (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) categorize the goal of implementation into three groups. In all three cases, adoption of the innovation serves as the reason for the new policies, procedures, and processes. Paper implementation, or recorded theory of change as Hernandez & Hodges term it, refers to putting new policies and procedures into place. Rogers (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) estimates that 80-90% of innovations that depend largely on people, stop at this level of implementation. Process implementation, or expressed or active theory of change, puts in place new procedures in order to conduct training and employ new forms of supervision and reporting. In this case, structural elements of an intervention are adopted; however, they often remain at the surface level and do not become related to service provision. Performance implementation, or integrated theory of change, puts procedures and processes in place to ensure that the functional elements of the adopted intervention are applied so as to achieve results with the clients. In my opinion, these degrees of implementation simply describe the same interaction of the three components outlined above, however from a different point of view. Paper implementation can be interpreted as the external influence factors, process implementation may be equated with organizational components, while performance implementation may refer to core implementation components.

As a result of their analysis of the literature, Fixsen et al. (2005) create a conceptual framework for implementation of defined practices and programs. Their framework has five elements; a source, a destination, a communication link, a feedback, and a sphere of influence. Source refers to the original program, or collection of practices, that was evaluated. Through attempts at replication, its best features are

defined and emphasized. In my study, source is referred to as the EBP. Destination is the organization that adopts the EBP, and houses, supports, and funds its implementation. Communication link refers to an individual, or group of individuals, representing the EBPs who actively work on implementing the model with fidelity and seeking good results at the implementation site. Fixsen et al. (2005) call this person a “purveyor.” In this study, he or she is also referred to as the “change agent,” or “enthusiast.” Feedback mechanism means the consistent flow of reliable information about performance that is acted upon by the appropriate practitioners, administrators, and purveyors. Finally, sphere of influence comprises the social, economic, political, historical, and psychosocial factors that impact the people, organizations, or systems involved, either directly or indirectly.

Fixsen et al. (2005) find that implementation components and outcomes exist independently of the quality of the EBP being implemented. Ineffective programs can be implemented well, and effective programs can be implemented poorly. Nevertheless, desirable outcomes are achieved only if effective programs are implemented well. Thus, essential implementation outcomes consist of changes in adult professional behavior, changes in organizational structures and cultures that routinely bring about and support changes in adult professional behavior and changes in relationships with clients, stakeholders, and systems’ partners.

Based on the above framework, Fixsen et al. (2005) view implementation as a process. They establish six stages in the implementation process: Exploration and Adoption, Program Installation, Initial Implementation, Full Operation, Innovation, and Sustainability. These stages are more or less self-explanatory. The Innovation phase

provides an opportunity to refine and expand the intervention, as well as the implementation practices. Each implementation or attempt to replicate an EBP is a chance to learn more about the program and the conditions in which it can be used with fidelity and to produce the desired outcomes. Winter & Szulanski (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 17) note that “adaptations made after a model had been implemented with fidelity were more successful than modifications made before full implementation.” The goal of the Sustainability stage is the long-term survival and continued effectiveness of the implemented EBP in a constantly changing environment. Therefore, the leadership and practitioners of the implementation site, along with the community, must be aware of the fluctuating influence factors and adjust the program without losing the essential functional elements of the EBP, or dying due to lack of adequate financial and political support.

The problem, as Fixsen et al. (2005) point out, is that the feedback loops of implementation efforts are long term. It takes years to develop an implementation site and then observe its success in both intervention and implementation outcomes; a number of additional years are needed to make adjustments and experience the outcomes. Gilliam, Ripple, Ziegler, & Leiter (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 18) find that “Outcome evaluations should not be attempted until well after quality and participation have been maximized and documented in a process evaluation. Although outcome data can determine the effectiveness of a program, process data determine whether a program exists in the first place.” Therefore, intervention outcome evaluation conducted at the early stages of implementation may produce poor results. This is not because the

program is ineffective, but because the program was measured before it was fully implemented and completely operational at the implementation site.

In summary, the implementation literature calls for clearly defined core intervention components that may increase the speed and effectiveness of the implementation and adaptation processes. At the same time, it underlines the necessity of the conscious handling of the core implementation components. They include the careful selection and training of the service provider staff, organizational capacity to provide training, coaching and conduct evaluation, involvement of the community and clients, and the existence of a hospitable environment for the services in terms of funding channels, policies, and regulations. These implementation features and procedures are common across fields, and the success of national-level diffusion of innovations to improve client outcomes depends on their systematic application.

2.4 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

All previously reviewed literature on technology transfer, EBP and implementation has a US domestic focus. To provide context to my research interest, major development theories are briefly reviewed in this section, followed by a short overview of the history and development of the Hungarian non-profit sector.

Modernization theory states that development is achieved by following processes used by the developed countries. It looks at the internal factors of a country and assumes that “traditional” countries can achieve development in the same way as more developed countries, given that they receive assistance. The theory contends that stages of

development apply to all countries. Development is viewed as a linear process which every country has to go through (Huntington, 1968). Modernization theory aims to identify social factors that contribute to social progress and the development of societies.

The major source of social change appears to be the new technology; societal change occurs as a response to new technologies. Through technology, a society of more innovations and broad social change becomes possible. Via new technologies traditional societies have the opportunity to become more modernized in spite of their internal conflicts, repressive governments, or other unfavorable circumstances, and they can acquire the benefits of those technological advances. At the same time, traditions are often seen as the obstacles to economic growth. In addition, modernization may occur through radical and violent change in traditional societies; however, it is believed to be worth the price.

Classical political modernization theory assumed that socioeconomic development was the responsibility of the state. Consequently, it advocated the position that a democratic state had to be developed with an apparatus accountable to the people. The strategy involved replacing traditional values and organization with the institutions, which had worked in the West, (i.e. democratic form of government, rational bureaucracy, citizen equality, etc.) based on Easton's system's analysis of political life (Almond 1960s, Apter 1965, Pye 1966, Coleman 1976).

Riggs (1964) warned that most societies will adhere to their ancient traditions and cultural norms while importing and accepting a façade of practices and patterns. He theorized the prismatic society; the prism symbolized the society in transition in which the traditionally organized society is turned into an industrialized one. Riggs rejected the

escalator model of modernization and maintained that prismatic characteristics would not quickly disappear. Rudolph & Rudolph (1967), and Gusfield (1976), followers of the dialectical modernization theory argued that traditional values and institutions could positively contribute to the political development process. They also asserted that developing countries would follow different paths in their political development determined by their traditional institutions and practices, rather than sharing a common route as the classical modernization theorists had predicted.

Later Sandbrook (1985) and Hyden (1983, 1986) extended this theory to cover entire societies. Proponents of the political order and state-building strategies, Huntington (1968) and Clapham (1985) argued that political institutions have to be put in place before a nation can proceed with democracy and socioeconomic development. They claim that the inability of the political institutions to meet rising expectations, may lead to undermining of the system's stability through potential violence by frustrated citizens.

Critics of modernization theory state that traditional societies have been demolished without realizing the gains of promised benefits, and traditional poverty has been replaced by new forms of desolation. Dependency theory is predicated on the notion that resources, both in terms of cheap labor and raw materials, flow from a "periphery" of poor and underdeveloped states to a core of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. Its central contention is that the way poor countries are integrated into the world system impoverishes them, while enriching the rich. Unlike in modernization theory, its opponents do not see development and underdevelopment as

the result of internal conditions that differ between countries/economies, but view them as relational.

Developed in the 1970s, dependency theory refutes the contention that underdeveloped nations are in an earlier stage of development, which developed countries have already passed through. Thus, it is sufficient to accelerate the common stages of development in order to help lift developing nations out of poverty. Theorists of this school argue that underdeveloped countries have their own unique structures and characteristics, and need to decrease their connectedness to the world market in order to follow their own path of progress, more in line with their own needs and less influenced by external forces. In other words, dependency theory claims that the poverty of societies on the periphery is a result of how they are integrated into the world system, and not because they are not incorporated in it.

Dependency theorists Amin and Frank in their early work considered internal political institutions and practices inferior to external economic linkages. Shanin (1982) criticized them for their too ethnocentric conceptions. Thus, in the early 1970s Cardoso established an approach with more balance between external and internal conditions, and in 1981, Amin and Frank also modified their theories in this direction. More recently, as a critic of both the modernization and dependency schools, Bayart (1991, 1993) stated that both schools pay too much attention to external factors as major determinants of the political changes in developing countries. Instead he suggested the 'historical trajectory' approach, which takes into account developing countries' distinct historicity in their differing political development processes.

World systems theory expands the arguments of the dependency theory and distinguishes the core, the semi-periphery, and periphery in a system in which semi-periphery is exploited by the core and exploits the periphery. The semi-periphery is industrialized, but with less sophisticated technologies and lack of financial controls. The theory focuses on inequality as a separate entity from growth in development and examines change in the global capitalist system. Tausch (2003) states that the rise of one group of semi-periphery countries is always at the expense of another such group; however, a world economy based on this system of unequal exchange is likely to stay stable. There is a prevalent distrust of the state in this theory; the state is viewed as a group of elites, and the theory holds that industrialization cannot be equated with development.

State theory responds to the distrust of state in the World Systems Theory by stating that the economy is intertwined with politics and therefore, the take-off period of development is distinct in each country. It stresses the effects of class relations, and the strength and autonomy of the state on historical outcomes. Consequently, development comprises interactions between the state and social relations; and the ability of the state to function is impacted by class relations and the state's nature. In addition, development depends on the state's stability and its external and internal influence. A developmentalist state is needed that takes control of the development processes within the country.

Early development theories focused exclusively on economic development to the extent that they equated it with economic growth. The common characteristic is their one-dimensional approach; the sole factor considered is increased income, illustrated by

various growth models, such as the Harrod-Domar, or labor surplus, or agricultural output models; all of which examine the sources of growth (Harrod 1939; Domar 1946, 1947; Lewis 1955, Fei & Ranis 1964). Their followers, the early modernization theorists Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Nurkse (1953), Kuznets (1955), Lewis (1954, 1955), Hirschman (1956), Perroux, Rostow (1960), Gerschenkron (1953, 1962) viewed capital as the main source of growth, thus focused their analyses on capital accumulation for industrial growth. They also argued that as income increases, human conditions improve. Empirical historical evidence refutes such theories. Even after a long period of growth, very little of such effects occurred. Thus, the main drawback to these orthodox theories is that, by and large, they overlooked the human aspects of development. In particular, they failed to consider the poor as an influential factor in the course and pattern of economic growth. Neither did they deal with the social implications of economic transformation. When the awaited results of the prevalent theories and their subsequent policies did not appear, the focus started to shift towards broader concepts of development.

Starting in the early 1970s, a group of scholars devoted themselves to studying the interaction between economic growth and social organization outside the public and private sectors (Martinussen 1997). Greatly differing from prevailing schools of thought, these alternative approaches viewed the unit of analysis as the individual in terms of his/her social life. In addition, these theories are more explicitly normative since along with causal relationships, they also deal with the desired quality of development (Martinussen 1997). They can be divided into two categories, redefinition of development goals and theories of civil society.

Theorists of the first group, Seers (1969, 1972), Sen (1988), Streeten (1982, 1993, 1994), and ul Haq (1995), among others, did not accept economic growth as the end. Yet, they did not reject the whole body of mainstream economic development theories. Instead they supplemented it by putting emphasis on aspects of welfare and human development with the objectives of enhancing people's choices. They studied social inequality and poverty through examining development as a process and its different meaning and implications for various social groups. Ul Haq (1995) asserted that the difference between economic growth and human development schools is that the first focuses exclusively on the expansion of only one choice -income-, while the second embraces the enlargement of all human choices -whether economic, social, cultural, or political. Based on this assertion, and on the work of a group of economists lead by ul Haq, the UNDP started to employ the Human Development Index, which is a composite indicator of people's ability to make choices about their education, health and standard of living.

The second group, the civil society theorists, in addition to decomposing the development process, focused on the social organization of citizens outside the state and the private sectors. They viewed strong and autonomous local communities both as means to promote human well-being and as an end in itself (Korten 1990). In this view the state is a part of the problem and so should be avoided as much as possible. The theoretical origins of civil society theories have several roots. One is conservative romanticism and utopian socialism, which were both normative reactions against the emerging 19th century capitalist society, advocating for a better society based on

‘gemeinschaft’ as opposed to ‘gesellschaft’⁶ (Hettne 1990). Another is within the Western political philosophy, which has a long tradition of constructing concepts on civil society including Greek philosophers and thinkers such as Hegel and Marx. However, the modern notion of civil society was introduced by Antonio Gramsci who distinguished between state, economy, and civil society. More recently, this notion can be traced back to Hungarian-born Karl Polanyi, who theorized on different forms of social and economic integration and distribution.

In addition, several conferences and seminars on the human environment organized by various UN bodies had a central role in the formation of the new development agenda. These events, since the early 1970s, gave rise to two strands of the alternative approaches. One argued that the highest priority should be given to satisfying the basic needs for food, water, and shelter; the other was most concerned with the devastation of the environment and exhaustion of non-renewable natural resources. A good depiction of the shifts in theory is provided by statistics. In the early stages statistics, as well as theory, did not include the poor. Then they became visible, but remained a passive group to be developed by others. Finally they were recognized as active human beings, capable of maintaining themselves without external support (Martinussen 1997).

The changes in perception naturally led to the formation of different strategies. The first among them is the basic needs approach. Formulated by the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS), and based on the

⁶ Both words are German origin. *Gemeinschaft*: Spontaneously arising organic social relationship characterized by strong reciprocal bonds of sentiment and kinship within a common tradition. *Gesellschaft*: Rationally developed mechanistic type of social relationship characterized by impersonally contracted associations between persons.

work of Chenery et al. (mid-1970s), the approach identifies three types of basic needs: (1) necessities of daily life; (2) access to public services; (3) access to participate in, and influence political decision making. The core of this approach attempts to provide opportunities for full physical, mental, and social development of the human. It proposes the creation of employment, and the extension of public services, though with varying emphasis (Streeten et al. 1982, Hunt 1989). Lipton & Maxwell (1992) elaborated on the strategy identifying three central elements of poverty eradication.

The second, the human development school, is based on the work of the group led by ul Haq under the auspices of UNDP as discussed above. The approach focuses on enlarging people's choices in three essential areas, and argues that human welfare cannot be left to market mechanisms. It calls for public policies, which create the link between human welfare and income growth. Later several other aspects of choice were added and the name was changed to 'sustainable human development'. This dimension stresses the importance of sustaining resources so that the needs of future generations could be satisfied, too.

The third approach was suggested by Robert Chambers in 1983. He asserts that rural poverty is under perceived. Due to six biases, only the conditions of the less poor are properly understood. To increase policy makers' understanding of rural poverty, Chambers suggests several strategies on how to learn from and collaborate with the poor on more equal terms.

Finally, development research that focuses on poverty and inequality also considers the implications of growth on women and men. The Women in Development and the Gender and Development approaches (Rathgeber 1990, Young 1993) propose

strategies to integrate women into the mainstream of economic, political, and social life and to focus on the totality of women's and men's lives in their analyses.

The alternative development approaches introduced a new actor, civil society⁷ to the development practice. Anglo-Saxon and German literature explain the formation of non-profit organizations both with economic and sociological factors. Economic theories explained the development of the non-profit sector, and its variance among countries, by looking at the scarcity of public goods (Weisbrod, 1977), a greater trust in non-profit organizations (Hansmann, 1987), and the heterogeneity of demand (James, 1987). Sociological approaches emphasized the prevailing societal and historical factors, the opposition to the power structure, the changes in lifestyle and societal structures, and the meeting of needs of various interest groups. These approaches equate the formation and prevalence of non-profit organizations with opposition to the existing power structure (Smelser, 1963; Tilly, 1978), the overload of the state (Etzioni & Halevy, 1983), the constant adaptation to the environment (Touraine, 1981), and with changes in lifestyle, the intent of influencing societal and political decision making, and the achievement of results for the various interest groups (Krashinsky, 1997). Interdisciplinary approaches explicate the differences among non-profits with the dissimilar historical, cultural, and economic development of countries (Salamon & Anheier, 1998), the advocacy functions of non-profits in welfare states (Evers, 1988), and the "organized diversity" of the evolutionary theories (Grabher & Stark, 1996).

Contesting the general passion for NGOs, Clark poses the question: "Is the glowing image realistic? Can NGOs deliver all that is expected from them?" (Clark

⁷ Please note that NGOs are part of civil society and the two are not equivalent. However, for the purposes of this paper they can be, thus will be treated as synonymous.

1991, p.45) His concern is not unique, since NGO operations in the development field did not live up to the initial expectations. NGOs structural and functional weaknesses started to become apparent and many of the researchers have critiqued NGOs and raised concerns. Clark (1991) identifies several major concerns, which include the following:

- Legitimacy – NGOs are not representative of the population and since in developing countries it is easy to set them up, they often become self-serving, pursuing the personal goals of the founders. In addition, being dependent on donor funding their legitimacy becomes highly questionable. To put it in another way, funding from both public and private sources can lead to cooptation (Peterson & Runyan 1999, Hudson 2000).
- Accountability – regarding the multifaceted stakeholder group of NGOs it is difficult to determine to whom they should be, and in fact are, accountable. Another problem is the lack of established organizational structures and procedures, which jeopardizes their accountability (Edwards & Hulme 1996).
- Leadership and management problems – NGOs often lack the capability to consciously develop their leadership and management potentials.
- Staffing problems – NGOs are often dependent on a charismatic leader, surrounded by weak staff, which leaves the organization in a volatile position. Furthermore, they are often forced to rely on volunteer contributions, which exacerbate the problem.
- Learning problems – the lack of institutional memory hampers the professional performance.

- Amateurism of staff – insufficient resources, and project funding often lead to inadequate staffing, which in turn is likely to cause continuity problems.
- Small scale – NGOs are usually small in size and volume creating several drawbacks: NGOs are usually financially resource poor raising the issue of sustainability (Fox & Schearer 1997, Robinson 1992). Also, participation is easy to be maintained while the organization is small, but the participatory approach becomes hampered with growth. This may force the NGO toward maintaining the status quo. Further, due to the small scale, NGOs are unable to absorb large quantities of money necessary to make a difference (Uvin & Miller 1996). Finally, they may lack self-confidence of organizational mandate, vision, mission and values (Harare Declaration 1998).
- Commitment of the staff – lack of, or limited staff commitment, makes it difficult to implement organizational changes.
- Idealistic rhetoric – despite of their claims, in reality NGOs often do not reach the poorest of the poor, or do not operate in a participatory way, limiting beneficiary participation to implementation (Robinson 1992).

In addition to these problems, the literature points out several other concerns, such as lack of transparency (Fox & Schearer 1997); inefficiency (Robinson 1992); inability to collaborate and build networks (Ashman 2001); fixation on projects, limiting strategic thinking and causing problems in replication; anti-state attitude which may be perceived politically threatening, therefore limiting their impact (Uvin & Miller 1996); ties with existing local elites; and being so focused on capacity building that they fail to reflect on organizational past/history (Postma 1998). Clark (1991), complementing his list of

concerns, asserts that the main challenge for NGOs is to maximize impact and the value of the lessons drawn from experience without compromising the quality of their programs. At the same time, he also suggests that NGOs should move from a tactical to a strategic approach.

A significant body of literature deals with the challenge of scaling-up. Uvin & Miller (1996) define scaling-up as expansion of membership within the target group. In practical terms, it is the process and act of an NGO expanding the scope of its services and/or replicating them in other areas. Chambers (1992) differentiates four strategies for scaling-up; working with government, linking the grassroots with lobbying and advocacy, advocacy in the North, and generating, spreading, and improving approaches and methods. In their study on major NGOs in the UK, Billis & MacKeith (1992) conclude that scaling-up is an organizational, as well as a policy question; and that the kind of organizational change that scaling-up must involve is a highly complex process. Thus, Billis & MacKeith (1992) suggest that successful scaling-up is more likely, if NGOs do so through planned multiplication of micro-level inputs rather than through macro-level projects.

Vachudova (2005), examining the transitions of six Central Eastern European states, argues that the level and quality of competition in the political system defined the variation in democratic outcomes, and in the character of economic reform immediately after the regime change. She proposes that in those East European countries where the creation and strengthening of a competitive democratic political system happened soon after the collapse of communism, relatively quick progress of building liberal democratic political institutions and a market-based economy should be expected. In her

classification Hungary was definitely one of those countries of high expectations. It is implicitly implied in this expectation that the rapid transition to democratic establishment and market economy will also create the vibrant civil society that is described in the non-profit theories and that is assumed to be essential for a balanced structure of social service provision.

All foreign and Hungarian authors writing on non-profits agree that government policies by their conscious shaping of the criteria system of the environment have a great influence on fostering the development and the proliferation of non-profits, as well as on their role in service provision. Despite this, the relationship between the government and the non-profit sector in Hungary has been ambiguous. Contrary to the expectations implied by Vachudova (2005), the circumstances of formation and the development of non-profits in Hungary to a great extent differ from that of countries with long traditions of democracy. In Hungary the changes in the political structure after 1989, the survival of the “non-profit” organizations of the previous regime, the change in the economic and ownership structures, and the operation of the service provision by government agencies with very limited financial resources influenced the establishment of the non-profit sector more than anything else.

The latest of the above factors, namely that state and local government agencies founded non-profits to offset their scarce financial resources, is also a unique Hungarian feature. This type of organization is the so called public benefit company which is a hybrid type of non-profit; it is founded by a state or local government, operated with significant government funding, but run like a business, while the distribution of profits is forbidden. The law allowed the formation of these hybrids starting in 1994, and due to

the above mentioned features these types of organizations quickly gained advantage over the government and business entities in the service provision area in Hungary.

Government policies –the constant change of the legal and financial regulations– after the regime change have also directly and indirectly influenced the development of the non-profit sector, as well as the operating environment of individual organizations in the country. Bocz concludes that development of the non-profit sector in Hungary has been influenced more by the local processes of change in societal and economic structures, as well as governmental regulatory activities, than by the factors outlined in the dominant international non-profit theories. This creates the paradox of the situation of the Hungarian non-profit sector. Despite the noteworthy growth in the sector’s funding by government sources between 1996 and 2006, the number of non-profits contracted to perform state and government tasks is still very low.⁸ In addition, the majority of the per-quota funding for performing such services is concentrated at two types of non-profits: public benefit companies and foundations.

In Western democracies, increase in government funding to non-profits is typically coupled with increased contracting out, which results in higher employment by this sector. In Hungary this is not the case. Neither heightened number of contracting out, nor significant employment by the sector is apparent.⁹ Instead of contracting with private non-profits for services, various government entities established their own “non-profit” agencies, which basically allowed for redistribution of public funding along with

⁸ In the ten year period of 1996 and 2006 the percentage of non-profits receiving head quota funding from the national government was 1-4%. At the same time, .5-2% of non-profits received head quota funding from local government (Bocz, 2009).

⁹ During the same period, the percentage of non-profits with at least one employee never exceeded 18%. In 2006, 57% of all the non-profit sector’s employees were employed by public benefit companies (Bocz, 2009).

tapping into private funding. Thus, the contractual relationship for public service provision of the government sector and true non-profits in Hungary is very limited.

To recap, I would like to point out that these development theories define development in the realm of state – social interactions as well as in the “developed” and “non-developed” relationship. As such, development is a function of both internal and external relations. Increased economic integration in the world may have made the above reviewed development theories outdated; nevertheless, they still have relevance in human development. As we consider the area of human services, developed countries provide an example for treating citizens equally and with dignity, concomitantly with providing services that aim to enhance and fulfill their human potential. Many would argue that there is still a long way to go in these areas even in the developed countries. However, I believe that their democracies, indisputably the longest standing in the history of the modern state, have created a mindset and framework sensitive to the needs of underprivileged groups. In my view, human needs are universal; thus these countries can set an example for less developed countries in delivering human services. The question however remains how this example setting, i.e. the transfer of human services models, is played out in the aspects of the exporter – importer relations, as well as in the importer – domestic government ambience.

2.5 SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on technology transfer, the drug abuse issue, implementation, and international development emphasizes the importance of the human aspect. The

technology transfer and implementation literature identifies the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral preparation of people as important features of transfer and diffusion. They include readiness to change at the individual level, as well as organizational change. At the same time, the latest development and non-profit theories underline the necessity of client and stakeholder involvement in all aspects of the development process. While the literature identifies human behavior and attitude towards change as the greatest influence on the success of technology transfer, it seems that very little research has been aimed specifically at examining these factors, especially in the international development field. Therefore, in this study I will attempt to discover the relevance of some of those social components that may contribute to successful model transfer. I would like to finish this section with two direct quotes, both of which emphasize the importance of the human context in the technology transfer process:

“The one thing we have rather conclusively demonstrated in the course of 20 years of public programs intended to promote technological change – in fact, through long years of agricultural extension as well – is that one cannot pay people enough, long enough, to get them to do things or use tools that do not have intrinsic worth and value to the participants. ‘Incentives’ that do not institutionalize a clear long-term yield have only short-term effects. While one can through ‘demonstration programs’ or other subsidy mechanisms induce the temporary use of a technique or policy, it will not outlast the subsidy unless it becomes structured as part of the system and interconnected to it in multiple ways, because it provides such value. External sources cannot provide that value, it must be the value to those who practice it. This is one of the hardest lessons all change agents must come to terms with. It implies that change agents much concentrate far more attention on how people think about change than what actually changes.” (Eveland 1986, p. 317)

“It is important to consider people’s needs and capacities for change when considering introducing new technologies. Technology may often be thought of as neutral with respect to culture, as if it should therefore be transferrable from one culture to another, especially if accompanied by the necessary training required to operate or utilize the technology. However,

the use of technology is by people, and it is intended for the benefit of people. People live in a specific human context, that is, in the context of a specific culture, and a specific physical, social, and spiritual environment. The effect of a technology therefore is modified by the human context into which it is placed. Therefore the effective transfer of technology from one human context to another is dependent on how appropriately it fits into the particular context.” (Harder 1995, p. 199)

3.0 APPROACHING THE ISSUE (THE RESEARCH SET UP)

There are several apparent gaps in the literature which call for an exploratory approach. The matter of transnational transfer of soft technologies has not been addressed in its entirety nor has the incorporation of knowledge gained from the latest developments on issues pertaining to model transfer or replication in the US. This chapter describes the thought process by which the study was developed, from stating the problem, through formulating the research question, to establishing the hypothesis and developing a conceptual framework, to designing and conducting the research.

For the purposes of this study, model transfer is defined as the replication of a program or intervention in the human services field, regardless of whether it has a formal description or not, at another site or location outside the country of origin, and by a different organization. Formal description on the one hand means written documentation of the interventions and management practices applied in a program; on the other hand, it means intervention and practice that are supported by evidence gathered from empirical research.

This definition is narrow and broad at the same time. It is narrow in the sense that it pertains to a very specific field, namely human services, and that it only looks at international transfer of models. This is solely a reflection of the researcher's interest. It is also broad in the sense that it does not require the model to be established and evidence

supported. Thus, the know-how of any program that serves a certain population and is operational can be treated as a model. As pointed out earlier, in this paper the term model transfer is used interchangeably with technology transfer, model replication, program replication and the likes.

3.1 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

3.1.1 Problem statement

It is fair to say that at the time of the regime change Hungary was the most advanced country of the region with some examples of democratic practices, aspects of market economy, and the seeds for a strong civil society in place. The country appeared to stand a good chance for a quick transition to democracy and a free market economy. Yet, almost twenty years later, the system still operates on premises originally established by the socialist regime. Change is always difficult, and a natural resistance to change is always present in those involved. If change happens at a societal level, as it did in Hungary, progress is slow. This ordinary resistance to change in Hungary was coupled with a particular way of organizing work, in other words with a specific style for conducting business and management. The people of Hungary exhibited a deep attachment to significant state guarantees and the egalitarian human services of the previous socialist regime. This was manifested in continued adherence to existing institutional features.

The socialist regime was not renowned for its effectiveness and efficiency in accomplishing tasks or providing services, which in turn created a less than favorable environment for successful model transfers. This is also obvious from the development of the Hungarian NGO sector after the regime change as described by Bocz (2009). I argue that model transfers have failed because they have overlooked important management and cultural aspects involved in the transfer process. From my personal experience in model transfer, I have concluded that implementation issues, such as the above mentioned management and cultural factors should be part of model transfer and should be deliberately discussed and given particular attention during this process. The literature on technology transfer and implementation in the US supports this idea (Backer, David, & Soucy, 1995; National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1991; Rogers, 2003; Rogers & Burdge, 1972; Fixsen et al., 2005).

The underlying assertion in this study is that NGOs in the human service field, especially on the recipient side of model transfer, seldom pay appropriate attention to these social and cultural aspects of such transfer. Quite to the contrary, they often seem to rush into taking the productive part of the model and expecting it to immediately produce the same results it does in its place of origin. Whether it is the “pull” or the “push” at play (i.e. whether the transfer is initiated by the supply or the demand side),¹⁰ we tend to assume that comprehensive “models” of service provision exist at the place of origin. In other words, we assume it is enough simply to describe the service provision of

¹⁰ In the process of model transfer one can identify two distinct modes. On one hand, with the countries of the former Soviet bloc opening up as potential markets, Western private organizations looked for opportunities for expansion and in that strived to export their models into these countries (“push” effect). On the other hand, citizens’ organizations of these less developed countries, dissatisfied with the level of services provided by their own governments, looked for models in Western countries and imported them (“pull” effect).

one country in order to replicate it in another country easily and successfully. “... Westphal et al. (1985) argue that trade in technology transfers the elements but not the capabilities to provide them.” (Radosevic 1999, p. 18)

This thesis presents the view that the approach of replicating only the productive part of a technology is especially true in the human service field in Hungary. Even objective factors of transferability – such as funding streams – are often not considered and organizations tend to deal with them in an ad hoc manner. Furthermore, the assumption is that the model works well and effectively at the place of origin (i.e. necessary cooperation is in place, information is available, etc.) This may or may not be true. Nevertheless, this perception obviously creates a discrepancy of investment and intended goals, that in turn often leads to failed attempts, and results in vegetating or abandoned programs.

3.1.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis

Based on the above assertion, I propose to conduct a study to inquire into the factors contributing to successful model transfer. The study’s central question is whether there are means of transnational model transfer in the human services field that are more successful than others in pointing out the direction of wider model diffusion in the recipient country. Generally speaking, I am interested in learning about the experiences and views of NGO personnel on the ground in recipient countries with social service model transfers, as well as listening to their ideas about what constitutes a successful model transfer.

Specifically, the research tried to examine the role that social and cultural aspects of model transfer, such as management, organizational, or institutional cultures play in the model transfer process of NGOs in Hungary. Goulet (1977) points out that conflict in the transfer process arises from the competing interests of the supply and recipient side. Similarly, Bugliarello et al. (1996) state that the process of technology transfers is shaped by the interaction of social and technical issues. Therefore, they suggest that it is useful to look at any technological system or entity as composed of two parts, the “techne” and the “social component.” The “techne” means both hard and software including know-how, processes, procedures, designs, and rules, while the “social component” is what produces the “techne” and operates it. It includes designers, manufacturers, operators, users as well as financial systems that allow for the production of the “techne.”

As the key to the success or failure of technology transfer is its socio-technical nature, my study strived to examine the characteristics and defining attributes of the success/sustainability of model transfer as well as of the five contributing variables to the social aspect: 1.) Identification of Need; 2.) Values and Philosophy; 3.) Investment in People; 4.) Business Approach; and 5.) Management and Evaluation. Each of these variables was pre-defined; the explanation of each is found in the Conceptual Framework section of this chapter.

As the study was being formulated, I hypothesized that the success of the model transfer or its sustainability in the new environment was dependent on the five variables mentioned in the previous paragraph. I formulated the argument that a significant part of social service model design is (or should be) to understand implementation issues with regard to the above described variables that encompass planned approaches to deal with

all factors of transferability. If these variables are not an integral part of the “model,” the chances of failure of long term sustainability are almost certain.

However, after reviewing the literature, it became apparent that testing such a hypothesis was premature. Instead, further explorations into the nature of the dependent and independent variables were needed. Thus, the study attempted to further define these five independent variables empirically as well as to gain insight into their relationship with the success/sustainability of model transfer as the dependent variable. Consequently, the causal relationship between the dependent and independent variables has remained a quasi-hypothesis in the scope of the current study. The results of the study may contribute to establishing a measure to test the hypothesis in future research.

3.1.3 Significance

The volume of technology transfer in the human services i.e. export of social service models will increase as global attacks on poverty, HIV/AIDS, lack of sanitation, etc. increases. The list of issues is numerous. Yet, the existing body of literature does not appropriately address the question of transferring social service models across countries. My study will attempt to bring together research findings on model development in human services in the US, with those on international technology transfer in the production/manufacturing area. It will then apply the lessons of these two areas to transnational transfers of social service models. In addition, the study will shed light on issues involved in such transactions, as well as identify the characteristics of those factors that play a key role in them.

As a result of my research a measurement tool might be constructed. Based on the findings of this study, the attributes of the essential factors for successful model transfer will be identified, and arranged in a format that allows subsequent researchers to evaluate possible outcomes of model transfers. With the help of such a tool, quantitative studies could be conducted to determine the relationship and possible causalities between the independent and dependent variables. It will also allow for additional quantitative and qualitative inquiries into the topic of transnational technology transfer in the human services.

3.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The review of the literature demonstrates that there are many aspects from which one can examine international technology transfer. Goulet asserts that “competing interests of sellers and buyers of technology; tensions between overall development goals and the impact of imported technology in poor countries; and general questions as to the possibility of harnessing technology in any society to such humane ends, as a satisfying scale of operations, ecological soundness, and the just allocation of resources” are all prone to raise conflict (Goulet 1977, p. 3). In the dynamics of organizational relationships involved in the transfer process often there is a mismatch among organizational structures, motivations, goals and their hierarchies, technical and ethical standards, skills, attitude, and culture which –if not dealt with– likely will result in problems. Generally speaking, there are two domains present in any technology transfer

process, namely the productive and the social contexts (Aasen, Hansen, Lotherington, Stenseth, & Wilhite, 1990; Bugliarello et al., 1996; Radosevic, 1999).

The conceptual framework with which I am going to approach this study draws heavily on the idea of the socio-technical nature of technology transfer presented in the literature. It is strongly supported by the author's empirical observations while working in the field, which, in fact, initiated the idea of this research. Three years of experience in transferring intervention methods and establishing services for troubled and troubling youth in Hungary confirmed that it is not enough to export the "productive" feature of the technology. If one is to successfully transfer the model an equal, if not greater, emphasis should be put on the social contexts, including values, stakeholders, organizational culture, and management.

The framework of this study is intended to be applied to human service organizations that are involved in transnational transfer of social service models. Social services "refer to the social care provided for the deprived, neglected, or handicapped children and youth, the needy elderly, the mentally ill – in short, all disadvantaged persons with substantial psychosocial problems." (Kramer 1987, p. 240) Organizations providing social services are called human service organizations. "They work directly with people whom they seek to change, process, or care for by making available critical resources for their maintenance, enhancement, protection, or restoration of well-being." (Kramer 1987, p. 242) In this field technology encompasses the ways in which the care is provided, what we do with people and how we do it, and how we prepare the service deliverers for their job.

From this point on the focus is going to shift from technology transfer in general to the export – import of social service models in the international development context. I argue that a significant part of social service model design is (or should be) implementation issues with regards to needs assessment, management, and evaluation, as well as planned approaches to deal with all factors of transferability. Instead of looking at model transfer as a magic bullet, we have to view it as a capacity building process. In addition, we have to take an ecological approach; that is, in model transfer we have to work with more actors than just beneficiaries and providers of services. We have to take into consideration several aspects such as needs, how historic development of social services affects today's processes, legacies, actors, etc. and work with all stakeholders.

Furthermore, I argue that in the transfer of social service models from one country to another there is a process that can be termed “double diffusion.” “Double diffusion” is the twin processes of the phenomenon of a new social intervention diffused within country A (in this paper the donor country) and country B (recipient country). The transfer to recipient country does not necessarily occur at a point in time when the particular intervention in question has been fully diffused into the system of the donor country. Instead the diffusion happens parallel in the donor and the recipient countries. This situation is of course true for all technology transfers.

Yet, in my opinion it seems to be a more prevalent problem for social service models for three reasons. First, social service providers often serve smaller target groups with special needs who, in general, are less capable of advocating for their needs. This lower demand for the service might make the diffusion process more cumbersome because these underserved populations may not pose such a threat on society that there

un-served needs are perceived as the failure of the government in service provision. Secondly, social service provider agencies are most often non-profit organizations. This fact, especially in recipient countries, limits their capabilities and means for innovation and for activities that promote diffusion. Thirdly, as described in the literature review, the disembodied and dynamic nature of the social service technologies, as opposed to the embodied and formed character of “hard” technologies, requires more emphasis on the social factors in the transfer process. Rodgers & Burge (1972) substantiate this by arguing that for a diffusion to be successful, it is imperative that one understands the system’s norms, ascertain client needs, use opinion leaders, and anticipate social consequences.

Based on the above review of research in relevant areas of model transfer, I theorize that five factors play a key role in the success and sustainability of transnational human service model transfer:

- Identification of Need
- Values and Philosophy
- Investment in People
- Business Approach
- Management and Evaluation.

The next section presents these variables and provides a brief explanation of each. The variables attempt to incorporate the aspects identified in the various bodies of literature. They are constructed to reflect the key elements thought to contribute to the outcomes of model transfers. At the time of the design of the research, the attributes of the variables were based on empirical observations, as well as on input from the

literature. As stated earlier, this is an exploratory study; thus the research was aimed to corroborate these attributes or modify them as necessary. At the same time, an assumption of the study was that there was a clear model and/or description of the model which included values, operating philosophies, methods of intervention and theory of why that particular intervention worked, as well as implementation elements, such as staff to client ratios, competencies of staff, required training, etc.

Success of Model Transfer / Sustainability

Success of the model transfer or its sustainability is the dependent variable of the transfer process. Defining this variable seemed easy at first: success of the model transfer. However, when one regards the context of human service transfers carried out by NGOs, several other possibilities arise. Success can be judged from two main perspectives; one being the social service technology, which is the subject of the transfer, and the other the NGO that performs the transfer.

The angle of the model, i.e. the social service itself, can be further refined by looking at time factors. For one, the success of the transfer can constitute the setting up the service in the recipient country; it entails the needs assessment, familiarization with the model, training and preparation of the staff, adaptation, and maybe a pilot phase. In brief, it is the point when the model is ready to be run in the recipient country. Further out in time, the second point is when the model starts producing the results that it is intended to achieve with its target group. Finally, another point of success can be the time when the imported model starts to diffuse into the local system, and eventually becomes part of the system of care in the recipient country. None of these is a distinct

point in time, and they may vary due to a myriad of factors, including the nature and characteristics of the technology, the capacities of the importing NGO, as well as the operating environment in the recipient country.

From the perspective of the importing NGO, success can be defined as the survival of the NGO beyond the initial funding for the model transfer. In less developed countries, the operating environment for non-profit, non-governmental organizations is often harsh, and an NGO's existence is uncertain. As Bocz (2009) pointed out, the development of NGOs in Hungary after the regime change was, to a great extent hindered by government activities which influenced their legal and financial environs. In such a less than favorable operating environment, an NGO's subsistence, in and of itself, can constitute an achievement, without which the model transfer obviously cannot be successful. Since all these setups are dynamic, it is best to define the dependent variable by attributes that may ensure that the NGO and the model are moving in the direction described above. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, sustainability is defined as a process, or rather as a set of processes in place:

- The service provider NGO (the one importing the model) has the capability to constantly assess needs and evaluate its results. Based on the findings, it re-evaluates its services, and is capable of adjusting them to satisfy existing needs and to achieve intended results.
- In addition, the NGO has the ability to present its case and secure funding for services.

In well-functioning (sustainable) NGOs we will find a strong component of strategic thinking and managerial skills. In addition they are mission-driven and demonstrate a strong belief in values and principles.

The current broad definition of this variable allows for flexibility to equate the sustainability of the NGO with the success of the model transfer, as well as the sustainability of the model. Given the lack of information on this element in the literature, this study attempted to collect information on the attributes of success of model transfer as the key personnel of the importing NGOs view it. Exploring these findings will afford an insight into how professionals on the ground assess the phenomenon, which in turn will assist in delineating, whether success should or should not be separated from sustainability. In other words, the study will reveal how importing NGOs evaluate their job in transferring a model and how they define success.

The Dissemination Work Group (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005) identifies clear philosophy, beliefs, and values; specific treatment technologies; treatment decision making within the program framework; structured service delivery components; and components for continuous improvement as the five common features of evidence-based programs. They include both intervention and implementation components. The independent variables of this conceptual framework address these issues; however emphasis is put on those aspects that often seemed to be overlooked in international technology transfer processes. The independent variables' names strive to reflect this emphasis.

Variable 1. Identification of Need

Prior to the actual transfer process, the need for the given service(s) in the recipient country must be assessed and demonstrated. It is also desirable that society recognizes it as a threat or problem, in contrast to the practice of many NGOs in just assuming a need. Furthermore there is a process of adapting the original model to meet the local needs.

No matter how well a model operates in one country, if it is being replicated in another country, the model cannot be adjusted to local circumstances and made operable within a short period. Before a model can operate well in differing cultural settings, a longer trial period is needed. After an initial adjustment phase, the model needs to be tried out in practice. Then, based on the experience of running it in the target country, a specific local version has to be developed. I would argue that a longer period of model adjustment is needed, which also allows a program to properly identify the specific needs. In this process the local operating environment can be studied, the local stakeholders can be involved in shaping the “product,” and a trial and error approach can be allowed to develop and finalize the model.

Transferring procedural technology from one country to another is more complex than transferring physical technology. The former is often less codified and more intertwined with the social context. Rogers & Burdge also state that “The diffusion of innovations requires time. ... a considerable time lag exists between the introduction of a new idea and its widespread adoption. This is true even when the economic benefits of the innovation are readily apparent.” (Rogers & Burdge, 1972) In addition, Fox et al. (2004, as cited in Harper, 2010) also express their views that there is a substantial

concern when model programs are replicated without taking into consideration the voice and specific needs of the clients served.¹¹

Variable 2. Values and Philosophy

The model or intervention exported should have strong values and operating philosophy demonstrated by the people who are exporting the model. These values should resonate with the stakeholders on the recipient side. Virmani & Guptan (1992) argue that transfer of concepts should be done with appropriate blending with local practices and values. Otherwise policies and practices will not be implemented properly, resulting in a gap between what is intended and what actually happens (as cited in Virmani & Rao 1997, p. 44).

As outlined in the Conceptual Framework, the question of the “push” and “pull” effect also shapes the underlying values and philosophy. On one hand, a foreign NGO, pushing its model and looking for places to export it, will bring its own values. At the same time, a domestic NGO, struggling with a particular social problem and actively looking for models to help them address that problem, will have its own set of values. Those two different value sets may or may not coincide when it comes to serving clients.

As a starting point in my study, I assumed that there is mutual agreement on the need for the model transfer between the exporting partner and the importing NGO. In my experience there is always some sort of greater good or common interest involved that

¹¹ Etzioni’s mixed-scanning approach may provide a good framework for assessing needs and making decisions regarding model transfers. In his model, Etzioni (1967) attempts to eliminate the unrealistic aspects of the rational decision making by limiting the details required in fundamental decisions, but also makes it possible to explore longer-term alternatives restricted in the incrementalist approach. Though Etzioni’s model was originally offered to societal decision making, the mechanism of the decision making in the mixed-scanning approach seems to be an applicable approach for NGOs importing technologies into their changing societies.

brings the two partners of the transfer process together. In addition, it is difficult to clearly identify cases of “push” or “pull.” If one wants to be successful in the transfer process and create a sustainable model, a certain adaptation process has to occur to ensure that the values and philosophy fit with the local values systems. At this point in the enquiry the role of the “push” and “pull” effects is ambiguous. Therefore, my study will pay special attention to this aspect and will attempt to clarify its function in the transfer process.

Variable 3. Investment in People

Change is always difficult and people have a tendency to resist it. It is, therefore, necessary to overcome their resistance and get them ready for change. Building loyalty to the model among various stakeholder groups, but first and foremost among clients, will enhance this process. In addition, it is very important to address how the implementers (staff of the importing NGO) will be supported during the process. This support may come in many forms: training and preparation of staff, ensuring that they feel part of a bigger system, and that they are treated as partners to the exporting organization, giving them the chance to shape the model, being open to learn from the importing NGO staff, and accepting the importing NGO’s best practices as valuable, just to name a few.

An OECD study (1992) found that “the aid system failed to provide sufficient investment in human resource capabilities while overspending on capital equipment.” (as cited in Radosevic 1999, p. 27) The study also asserts that the introduction of new technologies requires major organizational restructuring if their full potential is to be

realized. Similarly, Lall (2001) posits that the efficient assimilation, adaptation, and further development of imported knowledge require a complicated process of building new capabilities, which often maybe costly and risky.

Variable 4. Business Approach

All stakeholders should feel that they are getting something valuable to them from being affiliated with the NGO, or involved in the service. At the same, time stakeholders must understand that this is only possible, if they are willing to commit resources as well. Establishing the basis of the exchange among all partners will help eliminate the mismatch of organizational structures, motivations, goals and their hierarchies, technical and ethical standards, skills, attitude, and culture. In the realm of the exporting and importing organizations, a clear basis of exchange will help overcome the discrepancy in expectations and resources, as described in the introduction of this chapter.

Moreover, as Bocz (2009) stated, applying a business framework to the running of the organization remains unattainable for the majority of NGOs in Hungary. The general thinking of many NGOs still focuses on the social aspect of “we are here to do good, and serve the helpless, and we do not want profit.” In extreme cases, an NGO might even believe that profit, i.e. generating income, is bad or frowned upon if it comes to an NGO. They fail to recognize that it does not matter whether an organization is a for-profit or non-profit, governmental or non-governmental, running it is like running a business, which means, running it professionally.

The lack of business thinking in NGO management diminishes the efficiency of the operations and organizational processes. It prevents the formation of organizational

mechanisms that would support effective and efficient service provision. Those NGOs that realize the importance of applying the business approach to their operations and management practices are the only ones who can expect operations to be sustainable in the long run, and can tackle the issue of “fair exchange” with all stakeholders effectively.

Fixsen et al. (2005) find that the significance of knowing the strength and needs of the community prior to selecting a model for adoption is a theme that runs throughout the literature. In addition, the implementation literature consistently points out the importance of buy-in and involvement of stakeholders, no matter which domain they examine. Fox & Gershman (as cited in Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 8) summarize their years of experience with the World Bank by stating that “... for a mutually reinforcing coalition to emerge, each potential partner must make an investment with a high degree of uncertainty regarding the commitment, capacity, and intentions of their potential partner.” Thus, establishing the basis of the exchange among all stakeholders when one sets out to transfer a model into a less developed country is essential, specifically, because in these countries this kind of approach is often minimal or non-existent.

Variable 5. Management and Evaluation

Organization of people, flow of information, communication, etc. in a way that guarantees the most efficient service provision, and best results for an intervention, may be common sense in one cultural setting, but of big concern in another. Thus, a strong emphasis must be put on management and considerable effort in model replication must be put into how the model importer should organize distribution of tasks in order to

ensure successful implementation. This, of course, has to be done in a way that takes into consideration the existing management style(s) or the lack thereof.

The same is true for measurement and evaluation; organizations are assumed to understand and value the information that can be gained by collecting data and measuring impacts. However, in reality, an integral part of a model has to be to educate prospective implementers on how evaluation can inform implementation and practice, as well as model adjustment. “If a significant part of technology is tacit and embodied in people and organizational routines, then the efficient transfer of technology means the transfer not only of technological information, but also the capability to master that technology.” (Radošević 1999, p. 18)

This study was guided by the conceptual framework elucidated above. Nonetheless, this conceptual framework served only as an initial approximation, and the framework further developed as the research unfolded. Maxwell stresses the provisional nature of the conceptual framework: “in a qualitative study the activities of collecting and analyzing data, developing and modifying theory, elaborating or refocusing the research questions, and identifying and dealing with validity threats are usually going on more or less simultaneously, each influencing all of the others.” (Maxwell 1998, p. 70) Thus, the present conceptual framework was open to adjustments based on the findings. It was expected though, that by the end of the analysis it would become possible to outline a satisfactory model for testing the relationship between the established variables.

3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

3.3.1 Design Strategy

After reviewing the literature, a gap in studies considering the perspectives of recipient NGOs on contributing factors to social service model transfers, was revealed. Despite the fact that I had conceived a hypothesis with six quite well-defined variables based on empirical findings, it was obvious that setting up a research platform to test the relations among those variables was limited by the insufficient information, and was therefore premature. Thus, I decided to conduct exploratory research utilizing several qualitative research methods.

Maxwell states that qualitative studies are particularly useful for two research purposes: to understand “the particular context within which the participants act, and the influence this context has on their actions” and “the processes by which events and actions take place.” (Maxwell 1998, p. 77) “..., when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real life context” Yin suggests applying the case study methodology to investigate “how” and “why” questions (Yin 1994, p. 1).

In the case of my research interest, context is key. The design of the study did not clearly explicate what in the context of the phenomenon was important, or whether the phenomenon and the context were distinguishable. Therefore, the application of a case study methodology was reasonable. The nature of the problem in question, with its many intertwined aspects, and the lack of a workable conceptual framework, called for the adoption of an exploratory case study methodology. The study also employed a review

of agency documents, reports, memos, minutes of meetings, etc. to help identify the central issues of model transfer, and verify whether or not they in fact correspond with the established variables.

Within the scope of this study, I planned to collect information from four Hungarian NGOs operating in the social services field with experience in model transfer. Key informant interviews, surveys and document review were planned to investigate the characteristics of the six variables as well as the general approach taken in the transfer process.

3.3.2 Case selection

The organizations that were studied in this research were selected through purposeful sampling. Purposeful sampling selects information-rich cases for in-depth study (Maxwell, 1998; Punch, 2000). Due to the exploratory nature of the present study, it was necessary to select cases that would provide meaningful insight into the numerous aspects of the topic. I chose to apply combination (or mixed) purposeful sampling.

According to Patton (2000) the logic of intensity sampling is that the researcher seeks certain intense cases that have the ability to shed light on the nature of success or failure, but are not at the extreme, which may distort the manifestation of the phenomenon of interest. Intensity sampling requires prior information about the cases to explore the nature of the variation in the issue to be studied. The researcher then needs to use considerable judgment to choose those cases that represent intense examples of the phenomenon under study. Employing intensity sampling allowed me to select cases that

provided substantial information about my research questions, but reduced the distortion that examining extreme cases might have caused.

Patton introduces “operational construct sampling” which “simply means that one samples for study real-world examples (i.e., operational examples) of the constructs in which one is interested.” (Patton 2000, p. 239) This sampling method proves to be useful when random sampling is not possible due to the lack of knowledge of the whole population. Based on Patton’s assertion, my strategy for case selection also involved operational construct sampling: I identified possible cases that seemed to manifest the theoretical construct of my study, and thus would support elaboration and examination of the aforementioned construct.

In addition to the described sampling strategies, I established two selection criteria for picking the cases:

1. The recipient entity is a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)

The model transfer was carried out by an NGO that is a locally registered non-profit organization (Hungarian legal entity), which implemented a foreign “model” service.

2. The NGO operates in the Human Services Field

The NGO provides a social service based on a model that comes from the human services field such as education, mental health, health, community service, minorities, etc. as defined by the National Organization for Human Services.¹²

¹² The field of Human Services is broadly defined, uniquely approaching the objective of meeting human needs through an interdisciplinary knowledge base, focusing on prevention as well as remediation of problems, and maintaining a commitment to improving the overall quality of life of service populations. The Human Services profession is one which promotes improved service delivery systems by addressing

The selection criteria were purposefully set very broad. This allowed me to include a variety of cases in my study, but also to focus on the type of organization (i.e. non-profits), in which lack of successful transfer is more likely. In the selection process 13 NGOs were identified. When making the final case selection, a thorough evaluation of each NGO was carried out based on the criteria and requirements of intensity and operational construct samplings as described above.

Another essential consideration when choosing the cases to examine was the variance in both the dependent and independent variables. To assure this variance, the above collection of NGOs included cases in which, based on my previous knowledge, the model transfer has worked better, and others where it has worked only moderately well or not at all. When making the final selection of the four cases for my case study analysis, this aspect of success in model transfer was also carefully evaluated. Nevertheless, since my research was intended to gain insight into the nature of this particular feature (i.e. to explore and define what constitutes successful model transfer), the final decision about the cases had to be made on assumptions of success and failure. Accordingly, applying the combination purposeful sampling strategy not only helped in triangulation, but also allowed for flexibility, and again, fit the exploratory nature of this study well.

not only the quality of direct services, but also by seeking to improve accessibility, accountability, and coordination among professionals and agencies in service delivery.

The Human Services profession is dedicated to providing services to individuals and families in need of assistance. The goal of human services work is to enhance the quality of life for those who are served.

Human service professionals perform a variety of roles. Some of these roles are:

- counselor to those who need support
- broker to help people use community resources
- teacher of daily living skills
- advocate for those who are unable to advocate for themselves
- mediator between clients and between clients and agencies
- caregiver to children, elders, disabled adults

Source: National Organization for Human Services www.nationalhumanservices.org

In the process of data collection, opportunistic sampling was also allowed for, that is, the investigator was prepared to follow new leads emerging during the course of the field work if they proved to be significant to the study. This led to the inclusion of a fifth NGO in the study on the basis of under-representation of seemingly unsuccessful cases in the original selection. Thus, the Association of Open Study Groups was involved in the research.

3.3.3 Data Collection – Instruments and Procedures

Throughout the study, data was collected from a number of sources utilizing several data collection methods. Data collection instruments are included in Appendix B. Semi-structured interviews were conducted as the main data source with key informants from the selected NGOs. An interview guide was developed based on the conceptual framework of this study. Altogether 24 interviews were conducted; 23 in Hungarian and 1 in English. All of them were with key personnel including leaders and staff members of the case NGOs.

A survey questionnaire was also applied to retrieve information from the sources. The survey was designed by using conceptual constructs. These constructs were formed based on the literature, and on my hypothesis about the characteristics of the six variables at play in model transfers. Moreover, the survey design attempted to elicit information from a wider group of respondents in addition to what was explored in the interviews.

Surveys were internet based and were distributed to participants via email. An email letter containing the link to the survey website was constructed and sent to the CEOs of each NGO. They then distributed the email to all their staff. 85 completed

surveys were returned; 60 of them were fully completed, while 25 were only partially completed. Demographic information about the survey respondents is presented in Table 8.

Relevant official documents relating to the participating NGOs, as well as published and unpublished reports, were also reviewed. Documents were collected from the CEOs of the five NGOs as well as from the organizations' websites.

3.3.4 Participants' Recruitment and Protection

Participants in both the interviews and the survey were recruited via personal contact with the selected NGOs. The CEO of each NGO was contacted by telephone and appropriate consent to conduct the research was obtained. Interviewees at each organization were identified by the CEO. They then were contacted by telephone or email to obtain personal consent and set up the interview. Similarly survey respondents were recruited via the CEOs of the five NGOs. An email letter containing the link to the survey website was distributed to all staff by the CEOs. The investigator did not have direct contact with the survey respondents.

People involved in the research had full information about the research including why and how they had been chosen. Communication happened via introductory letters and phone calls as well as via personal meetings. The informed consent of all participants was obtained at the time they were asked to participate in the study.

All information collected has been kept confidential. All data has been dealt with in a way that protects the anonymity of the participants. No information has been identified with a person in any way.

All information and data pertaining to the participants and conclusions of the research will remain the property of the researcher. Information and data will not be used for any other purposes than the execution of this study. However, participating NGOs will receive the study findings. A presentation on findings will also be delivered to each participating NGO should they wish to have it.

3.3.5 Data Analysis

The main vehicle for the data analysis was the comparative case study method. Information gained from the interviews was recorded and transcribed. Data then were entered in NVIVO qualitative data analysis software and coded into appropriate nodes. This enabled the researcher to systematically compare and contrast the interview data to extrapolate relevant findings with regards to the research question. Basic documents of each NGO such as articles of incorporation, mission, vision and description of methods and activities were reviewed. In addition, where available, strategic plans and other relevant documents with regards to the model transfer were studied.

Data from the survey questionnaire was entered in a database. In the data cleaning process two qualitative commentary questions were deleted, because they did not provide substantial additional information about the pertinent central questions. In addition, nine responses that contained no data or had approximately half of the responses missing were deleted from the database. During the analysis subscales of the survey items were created conceptually, using the predesigned constructs. Factor analysis to look for underlying constructs was not conducted. After checking for Cronbach's Alpha coefficient ($\alpha > .60$) the pre-conceptualized constructs yielded two sets of subscales. One

set (Importance) relates to the importance of the given scale in the successful operation of a transferred model. In this set, 6 subscales were computed. The other set (Item in reality) refers to how respondents viewed the role of the given item in their NGO's success in the model transfer. In the second set 8 subscales were computed. The subscales with the items comprising them, as well as the reliability scores, are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Constructs of Model Transfer with Reliability Scores

Name of Subscale	Items Included	Cronbach's Alpha (α)
Financial stability	We have a steady source of income	.755
	We do not have financial difficulties	
Quality of service	Our clients are satisfied	.705
	Our clients receive high quality services	
	Our stakeholders are satisfied	
	Our staff is satisfied with their jobs	
Needs assessment	Our services meet the needs of our clients	.704
	We measure what our clients' needs are	
Integration with local system	We have government contracts	.732
	We have established channels to talk to various government agencies	
	We advocate for the cause of our clients	
	We participate in policy making about our clients	
Model fidelity	Our model works the same way as it does in the originating country	.767
	Outcomes for our clients are comparable to those in the originating country	
Management	We are achieving our organizational goals	.642
	Our staff believes in our model	
	We have enough staff to perform the duties / work	
	We adjust our services based on evaluation	
	We receive good feedback / evaluation from our clients	
	Our partner agencies value what we do	
	Our foreign partner (exporter) is satisfied with us	

Name of Subscale	Items Included	Cronbach's Alpha (α)
Financial stability in reality	There were adequate finances to adapt the model	.714
	We had the resources necessary to implement the model on a long-term basis	
	Our NGO had the ability to secure sufficient funding	
Quality of service in reality	Our stakeholders felt that they were getting their "money's worth"	.645
	We made sure that we provided high quality services	
	Our organizational leadership was willing to talk the decision up with staff	
	We asked our stakeholders' feedback on how we did our job	
Needs assessment in reality	We assessed the needs of the clients before starting the model	.737
	We consulted stakeholders before starting the model	
Fit with local reality in reality	We adapted the model to the Hungarian circumstances	.748
	We made sure that values of the original model were matched with the values in Hungary	
	We involved clients in the adaptation of the model	
	We involved stakeholders in the adaptation of the model	
	Staff opinion was asked during the adaptation process	
	We tried the model first, and then made adjustments to it	
	Our NGO had the ability to present its case to various government agencies	
	Our NGO was prepared to handle differences of the two environments/systems (origin and local)	
	We constantly assessed the needs of our clients	
Model fidelity in reality	Our staff understood the original model well	.694
	Once trained our staff could perform the tasks necessary to implement the model	
	Our staff was confident to implement the model	
	Our staff knew the model well enough to implement it	
	Our NGO could handle the difficulties of implementation	
Management in reality	Our NGO was mission driven	.822
	Our staff strongly believed in our values and	

	principles	
	We thought about the longer future (Strategic thinking)	
	Our staff believed that the model was a valuable addition to our NGO's work	
	We were clear on what our goals were in adapting the model	
Managing change in reality	There was enough time for our staff to understand the model	.884
	There was enough time for our staff to accept the model	
	We had the opportunity to consult our foreign partner whenever we needed to move forward	
	We had regular contact with our foreign partner	
	Our foreign partner (exporting NGO) supported us	
	We had easy access to experts who knew the model	
	Technical assistance was available for us as we moved forward with implementation	
	We could express the doubts we had about the model	
	Our staff felt supported during the adaptation process	
	Our leaders (board and top management) supported us in implementing the model	
	Our staff felt ownership for the model	
	We had the manpower necessary to support the ongoing implementation	
	We had the right people to do the work	
	Our organizational leadership was willing to put forth a great deal of effort to see that model implementation is successful	
Program evaluation in reality	We evaluated our program on a regular basis	.833

After computing the construct variables, descriptive statistics for both the original and the construct variables were computed. Finally, information obtained via the three different methods was cross evaluated.

4.0 FINDINGS

This chapter summarizes the research findings as follows. After briefly revisiting the research question, it presents CEO provided organizational data, and based on that discusses the categorizing of the cases into successful and unsuccessful groups. This is followed by a detailed description of each case focusing on aspects of their stories that are relevant for the model transfer. Then, the demographic information of both survey and interview respondents is described. Finally, the information that emerged from the collected data is presented, organized by following the logic of the conceptual framework. What respondents thought important is summarized in terms of this question.

“... there are models that can be transferred as they are. But I think when it is about theatre, arts, pedagogy, then they never can be transferred as they are, because obviously there are production methods that might be. But as soon as the people, the society, the environment are different; it is a different environment, then it is obvious, that it cannot be transferred as it is to that place, and it needs to be adjusted, it needs to be tamed to the local circumstances, to the local way of thinking. And maybe we can look at it as finished at the moment, when you can say that this is not that model already, but this is this model, that exists here, and when you can already put it in words what it is that you took from there, and what it is that was already formulated here.”¹³

¹³ Interview quotes were translated from Hungarian, therefore at times English grammar is not correct. To preserve the anonymity of the respondents all of them are referred to in the male form. In addition, when names were mentioned in the quotes they were replaced by XYZ, and in cases in which it might have been incriminating organization names were also omitted.

This quote sums up the essence of the current research as it ponders the question of factors that characterize the success of transfers of intangible models into a different culture. Specifically, the study's research question aimed to examine the characteristics and defining attributes of the Success of Model Transfer or Sustainability, and the five other variables of Identification of Need, Values and Philosophy, Investment in People, Business Approach, and Management and Evaluation as perceived by staff of the case NGOs, who imported human services models into Hungary.

One goal of the research was to gain social validation of the content of those variables and collect information to allow for further development of the conceptual framework. Therefore, the findings are presented in an unusual arrangement that borrows from the traditional case study format, while, at the same time, addressing the variables of the conceptual framework. The case descriptions are brief introductions to the NGOs' history relating to their experiences in the model transfer, focusing on attributes of the dependent variable as viewed by respondents from each NGO. After that, under each independent variable, the focus is on what differentiates successful cases from the unsuccessful ones; however overarching findings are also presented under each. Finally, the conclusions section of this chapter summarizes the themes that emerged from the data and highlights the main findings in response to the research question.

4.1 CASE DESCRIPTIONS

This section first presents the organizational data provided by the CEOs at the time of the data collection (Tables 4., 5., 6.). Based on this information the classification of the

NGOs into successful and unsuccessful cases is discussed. Then a detailed description of each case is provided.

Table 4. CEO Reported Organizational Characteristics on Model Transfer

Item	NGO (in actual numbers)				
Model Transfer	Bator Tabor	CSF	DIA	Kava	NYIKE
Operations started	2001	2001	1999	1994	1986
NGO founded	Aug 2002	2002	1999	1996	1989
Exporting NGO's name	Camp Barretstown, Ireland	International Institute for Restorative Practices and Community Service Foundation, USA	Youth Service International, USA	Several organizations; Big Brum TIE Company, England, Round Table TIE Center, Hungary	Netherlands Platform Older People and Europe, The Netherlands
Origin of model	Hole in the Wall Camps, USA	Restorative Practices, USA	Service Learning, Community Service, USA	Theater in Education, Great Britain	Leadership Institute for Active Ageing developed in 1999 by the University of Maryland, USA
Decision to adopt	Pull	Pull (Push)	Pull (Push)	Pull	Pull

In examining the circumstances of the model transfer, three items are apparent. The first is that all NGOs, except for one, had started their operations informally, and only after at least one year of operation, was a legal entity established. With the exception of NYIKE, all NGOs were established specifically for the model implementation. NYIKE operated informally for three years, prior the legal foundation

of the NGO. It is the only one of the case organizations that was formed before the adoption of the model in 2004. Second, all but one of the models originated in the US. And third, in none of the cases was the model initiated by a foreign NGO; in all cases there was an invitation from the Hungarians. At the same time, in the case of CSF and DIA some elements of the “push” effect were also at play. Though in both of those cases the model transfer was initiated by Hungarians, at CSF, after learning about the Hungarian efforts, the US partner offered its model for replication. At DIA, it was a US individual living and working in Hungary, who initiated the transfer based on his experiences in the country. Despite the heavier involvement of the foreign partner in these two cases, it was a certain situation in Hungary that initiated the transfer process, thus both can be classified as “pull.”

Table 5. CEO Reported Organizational Characteristics on Staff Numbers

Item	NGO (in actual numbers)				
	Bator Tabor	CSF	DIA	Kava	NYIKE
Paid staff	24	5	26	12	1
Full time	22	2	7	10	1
Part time	2	3	19	1	0
In direct service provision	15	3	22	8	4 (1 full time and 3 volunteers)
In managerial positions	5	1	2	4 (1 in direct service, too)	5 (5-member Board and 3-member Oversight Committee)
In support positions	2	1.5	2	1	4 (3 on contracts, 1

					volunteer)
Volunteers	2000	10	15	0-5 (no full time; always changing)	6

One observation that jumps out of this table is the low number of paid staff in CSF and NYIKE; five and one respectively. Comparing the individual organizational data on number of staff in direct service provision and support positions to those in management, the ratios show a very diverse picture, ranging from 7.7% in DIA to 500% in NYIKE. These extreme values reflect the reality of NGO operations in Hungary as described by Bocz (2009). At the same time, the percentages at Bator Tabor (20.8%), CSF (20%), and Kava (33.3%), more or less correspond with the 25% of staff working in managerial positions reported in the demographics section of the survey (Table 8.).

Table 6. CEO Reported Organizational Characteristics on Strategic Activities

Item	NGO (in actual numbers)				
	Bator Tabor	CSF	DIA	Kava	NYIKE
Ever conducted formal strategic planning activities	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time of latest strategic planning	In last 6 months	In last 6 months	In last 6 months	In last 6-12 months	12+ months ago
What constitutes as a formal	The leaderships updates the	Board members, management,	Currently we are going through a full	4-5 days of planning per every 3	Needs assessment; assessment of

strategic planning activity?	strategies for the next 3 years	international partners, (direct staff, marketing professional)	strategic planning process with the support of an external consultant	years, preparation of next three years' strategy	financial, human, and other resources; goal setting; action- and cooperation plans; internal division of work, plans for responsibilities and evaluations
Frequency of formal strategic planning	Once a year	As needed, but at least once a year	As needed	Once in every 3 years	As needed
Frequency of needs assessment of clients	Several times a year	As needed for programming	As needed for programming	Once a year	Several times a year

As shown in Table 6., all five CEOs state that their NGOs carry out formal strategic planning activities. Three of them also say that they conduct these once a year, or as needed. This frequency indicates that they may not be engaged in classic strategic planning. Further enquiry into the nature of these activities would be required for a more complete understanding of this phenomenon. Lastly, all CEOs claim to conduct needs assessment with their clients on a regular basis. Their statement conflicts with the information from the interviews, which shows that the activities termed needs assessment are not organized and comprehensive, and remain at the level of sporadic feedback from clients.

CEO reported organizational data, coupled with information from document reviews, provided the basis for identifying each case as successful or unsuccessful. Classification criteria were deliberately left broad and consisted of two aspects. One was having an existing strategic plan, and the other was the balanced development of the NGO in programming and management. Using the self-reported information and organizational documents for analysis purposes, I subjectively and authoritatively classified three of the cases as successful: Bator Tabor, DIA and Kava, while two were classified as unsuccessful: CSF and NYIKE.

This determination seems to be confirmed by survey respondents. When asked to rate their NGO's success in the model transfer, they gave it a very high score of 4.55. However, computing the average scores for the "successful" and "unsuccessful" NGOs, the scores given by their staff show a .8 point difference. Staff in the successful cases reports a 4.63 success in model transfer, while those at the unsuccessful cases rate their performance in the model transfer at 3.80. The average scores of success in model transfer, given by the respondents, by organization, also confirm the classification of the NGOs into successful and unsuccessful groups. The successful NGOs themselves report higher success rates in the model transfer, than the unsuccessful ones. These are shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Average Staff Score on NGO's Success in Model Transfer

(1=totally unsuccessful; 2=somewhat unsuccessful; 3=somewhat successful; 4=successful; 5=very successful)

Item	To what extent your model/program that you imported from the foreign country is successful?	
	n	Average (Standard Deviation)
All cases	74	4.55 (.600)
Successful cases	51	4.63 (.528)
Unsuccessful cases	5	3.80 (.447)
By NGO:		
Bator Tabor	18	4.89 (.323)
Kava	13	4.77 (.439)
DIA	20	4.3 (.571)
CSF	3	4.0 (.000)
NYIKE	2	3.5 (.707)

The case descriptions first present the successful cases, followed by the unsuccessful cases. At each NGO, the source of the model and the circumstances of the decision to adopt is described, the mission and main activities of the NGO are introduced, an assessment of program achievements is offered, and finally the definition of the success of model transfer by the given NGO staff is presented. In the last, the information provided by NGO staff in response to the direct question “How do you define success in model transfer?” is summarized for each case.

4.1.1 Bator Tabor Alapítvány – Camp Courage Foundation

Source of the Model and Decision to Adopt

Starting in 1997, Hungarian children with cancer attended the therapeutic recreation camp in Barretstown, Ireland. A young Hungarian professional who served as the recruiter and liaison, started to recruit adult volunteers too. After the camp in 2000, nine Hungarian volunteer doctors, teachers, and social workers, who accompanied those children to Ireland, came together for a reunion and to share photos. During this meeting an idea sparked, and by the end of the meeting they had decided to establish a similar camp in Hungary. With the approval of the Barretstown Camp, they set out to organize a one-week camp for the following summer. One of the founders met a prominent Hungarian business person, who was interested in the idea, and agreed to fund the first camp session. As a result, in 2001 the first Bator Tabor session was launched with the participation of 35 children with cancer.

After the first year's success, in August 2002, the Bator Tabor Foundation¹⁴ was registered. The founders were those nine professionals, who had attended Camp Barretstown as volunteers for a number of years, and had decided to run a pilot camp in Hungary.

Mission and Main Activities

Bator Tabor's mission is to run a Central- and East-European center of therapeutic recreation for children with serious chronic diseases and their families. The goal of the

¹⁴ In the Hungarian legal system a foundation is a form of non-profit, in which a founder dedicates a certain amount of funding to a specific purpose, and appoints a Board of Directors to manage the fund to serve the given purpose. When setting up the foundation, the founder parts with his money, so to speak, and has no other control over it than the right to recall and appoint board members. When the purpose of the foundation is fulfilled, the foundation is dissolved.

programs is to support the children's healing through the method of therapeutic recreation. Participation for children and their families is free of charge.

Every summer Bator Tabor provides camp experience for children with chronic illnesses in six sessions. In addition, they offer two four-day Family Camps and a Sibling Camp annually. Bator Tabor serves children with cancer, diabetes, JRA (Juvenile Rheumatoid Arthritis), and hemophilia. 630 kids attended camp in 2010.

Relative Program Success

From the initial nine volunteers, who became the NGO's founders, Bator Tabor now has 24 paid staff, and works with a pool of 2000 volunteers. Each year they realize their camps with the help of about 400 of them. Bator Tabor has seen dynamic growth since its foundation in 2002. They have made significant investment in infrastructure at their camp site, hired new staff members, and steadily increased their income. In acknowledgement of its professional achievements, in June 2007, Bator Tabor was accepted as a full member of the Association of the Hole in the Wall Camps, a worldwide association of therapeutic recreation camps founded by Paul Newman. Today, Bator Tabor's volunteer training and management system makes them one of the most significant NGOs in Hungary.

Success of Model Transfer Defined by Bator Tabor Staff

Six out of nine Bator Tabor interviewees defined success of the model transfer as the same model operating in Hungary, as at the place of origin; at least the basic operations must be the same. Three respondents also mentioned that the program's outcomes with clients (children) should be the same as in the original model. They

emphasized that it must also be adapted to the Hungarian circumstances (cultural, social, economic, etc.); in other words, it has to be developed into a Hungarian model.

In addition, five people pointed out that a model was successfully transferred, when the organization has reached a state of stable operations. This means that the NGO has a carefully planned and well thought out structure of operations, as well as sustainable fundraising; it achieves the goals set out in its strategic and business plans, and is characterized by professionalism. Financial sustainability is also a key to success. However, as one of the interviewees stated, a non-profit organization is sustainable, if 1/3 of its income is from interest earned on its assets, 1/3 is coming in voluntarily from supporters, and only 1/3 of the income is resulting from fund raising initiatives. “We are awfully far from that.” Bator Tabor’s development as an organization (infrastructure and financial resources) was stated as satisfactory. At the same time, it is interesting, that four out of the nine respondents defined success as “no pressure for expansion.”

Two people said it was important for the NGO’s services to meet a need, which in Bator Tabor’s case is attested to by children and youths coming to camp. However, to define success, the results must be measurable. Operating on a set of basic values is also an attribute of success, as well as remaining faithful to the tradition, i.e. the original model, as well as keeping the program’s structure intact. This, however, requires a clear and exact understanding of the model. Three respondents also pointed out that staff and volunteers should enjoy working in the program.

Three people mentioned that positive feedback from the exporter is also a measure of success. They also emphasized how important it is that the relationship with

the exporter be a “two-way street,” and that the NGO works as a partner with the exporter to give back expertise that has been developed on the ground by the importer.

4.1.2 Demokratikus Ifjuságot Alapítvány (DIA) – Foundation for Democratic Youth

Source of the Model and Decision to Adopt

An American Peace Corps volunteer, who worked in Hungary as a teacher of English language, decided that introducing service learning and community service in Hungarian high schools would be a good way to foster the democratic changes that were happening in the country. Together with a mentor friend of his in the US, they founded Youth Service International to promote service learning in Hungary and in CEE. Parallel to this, they also founded DIA in Hungary; it was registered as a Hungarian foundation in 1999. The aim was to make youth service well understood and wide-spread both within and outside of the school system.

Mission and Main Activities

DIA’s current mission is as follows: “To provide opportunities for youth to learn the democratic values and behaviors based on those, in an experiential way. DIA aims to develop the citizens’ skills of young people through community learning, in Hungary and in the region, and strives to draw decision makers’ and youth professionals’ attention to the topic.” DIA expresses its vision as: “It is our belief that modern democracies should rely on the active participation of well-informed citizens. Therefore, our aim is that community service and learning, as a form of active citizenship, became an

acknowledged and wide-spread practice, both inside and outside the formal education system.”

The main activity at the beginning of their operations was bringing youth service into the formal school system, through teacher and youth training, awareness raising, consultation, and a small grants program. There was an emphasis on building a network of schools that would apply youth service. As the network grew, DIA started to organize National Youth Service Day campaigns, and coordinated international youth exchange programs. Later, due to sizeable funding, they added youth development activities to their programs focusing on youth volunteering, and active citizenship.

Lately, they have offered hands-on training modules for teachers and youth workers in formal debating via their 3D program (Dilemma – Debate – Democracy). In addition, they have started to focus on youth employability; they now run programs which help disadvantaged young people to become successful as employees or entrepreneurs. Recently, DIA has also become active in policy advocacy, working with professionals and decision-makers in order to make a wider impact on youth development and the education system.

Relative Program Success

Today DIA has a network of about 150 schools and 300 communities involved in community service and service learning projects. At their annual National Youth Service Day they involve about 20,000 youth in volunteering. DIA is the Regional Lead Agency for Global Youth Service Day 2011. DIA’s experts have been part of various think tanks working on the National Strategy on Global and Active Citizenship Education, and on the preparations for the European Year of Volunteering.

DIA has been the local implementing NGO of NOKIA's Make a Connection program for nine years. However, in order to receive the funding from NOKIA, a shift of focus was required, which resulted in the drift of the model. DIA has also partnered with GE, and Morgan Stanley to deliver youth programs, all of which had different foci than the original model.

Currently DIA has 26 employees. It is interesting though, that only nine of those are full time employees. According to interviewees, despite the significant amounts they have received for programs, and the volume of the programs they have managed, in terms of infrastructure and management DIA is still very fragile. They have an interesting hiring practice; persons competent in programming (i.e. in DIA's interventions and methods) are, at first, hired to fill administrative positions, such as office manager. Then, as opportunities open up, and there is funding available, the new hire moves over to programming. It is also characteristic of DIA's operations to move staff around in programs and positions annually, depending on the funding sources available. In that sense, they have not reached a state of stable operations as yet.

Success of Model Transfer Defined by DIA Staff

When asked how they defined success of a model transfer, three out of six DIA respondents explained, that they did not transfer a model. Instead, they said they were trying to adapt an approach to Hungarian circumstances. "...because, now that..., the model of experiential learning, that something happens, and then we reflect on it, and then next time you will do differently..., now that is a common place, therefore, with this we did not transfer anything special." One interviewee said that the model transfer was done very quickly; "...the absolute basics, really much on a technical, primitive level was

done in the very beginning, in the first year.” Five people expressed the view that changing attitudes is very much a part of the job their NGO does on an everyday basis, in order to achieve success.

At the same time, all but one of the DIA interviewees mentioned that it is desirable for the model to make it into the system and being embedded. Success was defined as the model becoming part of the Hungarian education system and operating even without the exporter NGO.

“I think that in the case of every model transfer, and in the case of DIA definitely, it is key how much it can be embedded in the domestic circumstances. To what extent it can be understood what the given model, or program, or I don’t know what, would like to achieve; to what extent it can be interpreted and followed by those who participate in it. To what extent a teacher can integrate it into his/her teaching materials, whether there are links to that, or it remains like a UFO, a foreign object, that is really a great thing, but cannot be replicated.”

One concern with the model being embedded in the system is that it “loses the grassroots nature and loses flexibility, which is actually the beauty of this model,” as one interviewee expressed it.

Four people pointed out that the ten years that DIA has been in existence have been a huge success from the point of view of development as an organization. There is now a “DIA identity, and a strong network.” Nonetheless, the same is not true for the model transfer. From the point of view of outcomes with clients (developing youth’s competencies) the model transfer is successful only in that the idea, or concept has appeared in Hungary. Yet, three people view DIA’s program of giving experience in the community for kids, as a good thing in the Hungarian reality. In that sense they feel that it achieves similar outcomes with clients as in the country of origin. When talking about

success, it is very difficult to differentiate between the model and the NGO: the model is successful if/when it makes it into the system and there is head quota funding for it; at the same time, the NGO depends very much on funders' support, which often causes the model to drift.

Respondents believe that other keys to success are a charismatic leader (or lack of one) who goes out and tells the story, and having strong management. According to half of the interviewees, it is also important, that the NGO, as well as the purveyor,¹⁵ is credible, and leads by example. In other words, there are strong operating philosophies and values present in the NGO. The drawback to this kind of modeling behavior and experiential learning is that changing attitudes is a slow process. Nevertheless, the results and changes will be more organic (internalized) and longer lasting. Due to this philosophy, even DIA's operations were slowed down at times. In the interviewees' experience, the terminology needed ten years to be clarified, while a break through at the teacher level (understanding the model and exhibiting the right attitude) happened after about three years. As one respondent commented, to achieve deeper and faster results with teachers, more intense training and mentoring are needed.

Additionally, three respondents responded that they believe that the model must fit clients' needs and respond to an existing need, as well as serving a purpose. The "basis of exchange" among stakeholders should be established. Also, as two respondents pointed out, a clear description of the model is needed, and importers must understand how the model operates at the original site.

¹⁵ This study borrows the term "purveyor" from the implementation literature. It refers to the individual or group of individuals who initiated the model transfer, made the adoption decision, and who actively worked on implementing the model in Hungary. In this study he is also referred to as "change agent," or "enthusiast."

4.1.3 Kava Kulturális Műhely – Kava Drama/Theater in Education Association

Source of the Model and Decision to Adopt

The leader of a youth theater group in a small Hungarian town, together with a group of nine other Hungarian drama pedagogy professionals, participated in a short study tour in Great Britain, in 1992. During the trip they visited Theater in Education (TIE) programs, got introduced to the method, and met several TIE companies. Upon return to Hungary, he decided to establish a TIE program in Hungary. One of his goals was to provide a living for those young actors that were graduating from his youth theater group. A few basic books on TIE were translated, and the Roundtable Theater in Education Center was formed.

In 1996 four young actors of the Roundtable started to innovate in TIE and create new types of TIE programs. After experimenting with the new performances for about a year, they left the Roundtable and established their own NGO. Hence, the Kava Drama/TIE Company, a Hungarian association,¹⁶ was registered in 1997. Three of the founders of Kava still work at the company.

Mission and Main Activities

Kava is the first TIE company in Budapest. Their main task is to create complex theatre in education and drama programs, and performances that exceed the limits of a traditional theatre performance. In the performances, the actor-drama teachers “teach” democracy, and analyze social and moral problems with the participants through action.

¹⁶ Under the Hungarian regulations a non-profit can also be registered as an association. An association is a membership organization, in which the members pay dues, and elect their officials from among themselves. All major decisions of an association are made by the assembly of the members.

Theater is used as the means of finding the way towards deeper understanding of certain problems. Topics include drug prevention, the prevention of juvenile crime, discrimination, aggression, and exclusion, to name a few. The young people are not only observers, but also the writers, directors, and actors of the story, which is created through thinking, analyzing, compression, transformation, and in many cases through acting out certain situations. Kava works with groups of 9-18 year old children and young people, many of whom are disadvantaged; they come from all over the country.

During the school year, Kava offers approximately 110, three-hour long, TIE performances for school groups. In addition, they regularly perform drama lessons and workshops, and theatre trainings with a varied focus which is defined by the clients. “DramaDrom – The Way of Drama” program works with integrated communities of young Roma and non-Roma people in isolated areas of Hungary to foster positive change. Furthermore, Kava constantly develops the TIE methodology and innovates. They are also actively involved in developing a network of TIE companies in Hungary and in the region. Moreover, they coordinate several research initiatives, and advocate for policy changes both at the national and EU levels.

Relative Program Success

Since the establishment of the group, more than 60,000 young people have taken part in Kava’s programs. At present, they offer more than 200 programs annually, at least half of which are TIE performances. DramaDrom was certified as a model program, and was invited to Washington, DC in 2003, where it was selected as one of the 200 best projects of the world. Kava has facilitated and supported the foundation of a number of other TIE groups in Hungary, and currently manages their network. Kava’s actor-drama

teachers are among the most experienced and well-trained theater and drama in education experts in Hungary. As a result of Kava's lobbying activities, TIE was added to the definitions in the legislation on performing arts, and a separate Theater in Education fund was set up by law. In 2008, Kava undertook the coordination of the first ever impact evaluation of TIE and drama programs. The DICE¹⁷ research ran in 12 countries and was supported by the EU.

From the four founders, Kava has expanded to 12 full time employees today, four of whom work in management positions. The organization puts special emphasis on applying business principles in their operations, including hiring from the for-profit sector for management positions, and they are firmly committed to the application of European quality standards to continuously improve operations.

In spite of the successes and the relatively stable operations of the NGO, the majority of Kava's income is from grants. The majority of the programs they offer are free for the youth groups. In other words, they are subsidized from grant funding. Their sustainability is questionable if the funding is discontinued. Furthermore, all Kava employees officially are getting the minimum wage, and additional compensation is paid to them from existing grants. Therefore, Kava is vulnerable to any changes in the grant funding environment, which makes its operations less than stable.

Success of Model Transfer Defined by Kava Staff

When defining the success of their model transfer, four out of five Kava respondents mentioned, that they thought the model was successful, if it achieved the

¹⁷ DICE: Drama Improves Lisbon Key Competencies in Education is a cross-cultural research study investigating the effects of educational theatre and drama on five of the eight Lisbon Key Competencies. These are key competences for lifelong learning as defined by the European Council in Lisbon, in March 2000.

same outcomes with clients in Hungary as at the original site. To produce similar outcomes, the model must fit with existing needs. It must be adapted to the local circumstances; thus, changes in attitudes are required. It is also important to its success, that the program has high-quality, and really well-prepared direct service providers (actor-drama teachers) to deliver the intervention. Three interviewees also underlined the importance of measuring the model's impact. They talked about Kava's initiation of the DICE research, which is a systematic evaluation to measure those outcomes empirically.

Several respondents mentioned the need for a written model description, or at least some definitions of the intervention. It is such an essential aspect, that Kava has been actively involved in developing a "definition of the field." In addition, all but one person felt that the transfer of the model is continuous; there is constant learning from the exporter. The model development is also continuous at both the original and the destination sites. Kava's interviewees believe that one indicator of success is when the exporter acknowledges the high quality of the work by the importer. One respondent also highlighted the importance of management in the NGO's success. He added that this piece is often missing from NGO attempts, or that NGOs do not even understand why it is so important.

Three of the five respondents stated, that the transfer is finished and success is achieved "when you have your own model and its multidimensional development can start." Two people expressed the opinion that they did not feel that the model was spreading at a high enough speed in Hungary. As a result, Kava spends considerable effort on creating and developing a network of groups that can provide the same service in Hungary.

From an organizational point of view, Kava's 18 years of existence can be termed a big success. At the same time, from the point of view of the model being embedded and diffused in Hungary, there is no real achievement. One respondent defines success as "It is supported and accepted, if we do not have to constantly fight for survival. If I could feel a little bit, that, let's say, the Ministry of Education, which is responsible for education, acknowledged the existence of it [TIE, the model], and would consider this method, and accept, that it is, let's say, part of pedagogy." Though the foundations of the model were laid quickly, diffusion and embedding takes a long time and much effort. Thus, Kava puts significant effort in changing attitudes. They have positive results in the fields of pedagogy and theater, as well as in non-profit operations, yet interviewees are dissatisfied with the level of the model's diffusion in Hungary.

At the same time, respondents realize that the fate of Kava (the NGO) is not tied to the fate of TIE (the model). There are strategic plans for the NGO in place that can ensure its existence. As for the TIE model, a network of providers is needed in Hungary, but "who knows." Therefore, it is Kava's goal to support the network's development, since they do not have a large enough capacity to get this service to all kids in Hungary.

4.1.4 Kozossegi Szolgaltatasok Alapitvanya – Community Services Foundation (CSF)

Source of the Model and Decision to Adopt

The purveyor, a Hungarian professional, was developing methods in Hungary to work with youth in a juvenile justice facility in the late 1990s. At around the same time, one Hungarian government official attended a conference in Canada, where he was

introduced to the two US developers of the restorative practices model. In 1999, they were invited to come to Hungary to offer training to 12 Hungarian professionals. They met the purveyor at this training, and after discovering the overlap of their methods, they suggested that he should move to the US, and participate in a one-year on-the-job training to learn about the methods in depth. The goal was that upon his return to Hungary, both the institution and the approach would be introduced in the country.

In 2001, the purveyor moved back to Hungary, and started preparations for the model implementation. In 2002, Community Services Foundation was established and registered in Hungary. The founder of the NGO is one of the model's original developers, who also serves as the president of the importer, i.e. CSF's US partner organization.

The emerging social science of “restorative practices” offers a common thread to tie together theory, research, and practice in seemingly disparate fields, such as education, counseling, criminal justice, social work, and organizational management. The restorative practices concept has its roots in “restorative justice”, a new way of looking at criminal justice that focuses on repairing the harm done to people and relationships, rather than on punishing offenders (although restorative justice does not preclude incarceration of offenders or other sanctions). Originating in the 1970s as a tool for mediation between victims and offenders, by the 1990s, restorative justice had broadened to include communities of care, together with victims' and offenders' families and friends, participating in collaborative processes called “conferences” and “circles.”

Mission and Main Activities

The goals of CSF are three fold. One is to strengthen ties within families by offering community building, family therapy, and conflict management mediation programs and services, as well as support to families in need. The second is to adapt and employ restorative practices in Hungary to foster the personal development and re-socialization of children and youth with special needs, and to promote their re-integration into society. The third is to establish and conduct an agency that offers an alternative daytime learning opportunity and therapy for children and youth, in order to achieve the second goal. In addition, training is provided for those professionals who want to learn the restorative practices model.

The main activities of CSF are trainings, consultation sessions, supervision, and distributing books, films, and other education materials, in order to develop problem solving and restorative techniques in Hungary.

Relative Program Success

Two years after the operations started in Hungary, CSF opened its alternative daytime educational and therapeutic facility in Budapest, in 2003. The program started with four children enrolled and over time had reached a total of 68. It had four to seven full-time staff during its course of operation. It was operated exclusively on grant funding and provided its services to the children and families free of charge. After two years, CSF was not able to cope with the bureaucracy and other difficulties of the operating environment and the program was closed. The NGO decided to re-focus its efforts on spreading the concept and approach of restorative practices in Hungary, instead of running their own program.

As the CEO reports, CSF currently has two full-time, and three part-time employees. They are a partner organization of the International Institute for Restorative Practices (IIRP) that is a world-leader organization in this field. Today CSF operates mainly as the European training arm of IIRP. Together with three other partner organizations, Real Justice Australia, IIRP Canada, and IIRP United Kingdom, they have trained thousands of people since the Real Justice Program started in 1995.

In Hungary the approach and methods of restorative practices have now appeared in the fields of education of children and youth with serious behavioral issues, juvenile justice, probation and reintegration of convicts into society, conflict resolution, and mourning and loss therapy.

Success of Model Transfer Defined by CSF Staff

When asked about the success of model transfer, one respondent began by saying “it depends on what the goal of the transfer is. It is not the goal that matters, it is the road.” As reported by the same person, the goals of the transfer were not clearly defined. “I wanted to meet expectations, that were not there in reality, or that were not big expectations, rather I made them up.”

Again, according to him, success of the model transfer also depends on what is viewed as the model. Respondents expressed an ambiguity about it. If the model is the alternative daytime education, then the transfer was not successful. On the other hand, if it is the approach of restorative practices, then it was very successful, due to the applicability of the approach in various fields such as juvenile justice, probation, and mourning and loss, just to name a few.

One interviewee stated that it is success that the society of educators started to be interested in the approach. Changing attitudes in Hungary, and thus, creating a need for the service, or intervention in the society by telling the story can be interpreted as success of the model transfer. Nevertheless, when considering direct intervention with children and youth, success is producing the same outcomes with kids (as clients), as those produced at the site of the origin.

4.1.5 Nyitott Kezzesek Egyesulete (NYIKE) – Association of Open Study Groups

Source of the Model and Decision to Adopt

NYIKE is the only case in which the NGO existed prior to the adoption of the model. It started its operations in 1986 as an informal group of adult educators with the goal of fostering democratic social changes via innovative educational programs. The NGO was registered in 1989 as an association, with a membership of cultural managers, community development workers, youth workers, and researchers from all regions of Hungary. In the late 1990s, the elder members of the association became interested in offering learning opportunities for senior citizens. This coincided with the International Year of the Elderly in 1999. Thus, NYIKE started exploring potential international partners to work with in this area.

At this point, a German NGO invited members of NYIKE to a preparatory meeting of an EU project. As part of the project, there was a conference in Amsterdam at which the Dutch NGO, the Netherlands Platform Older People and Europe (NPOE), was introducing their training of Senior Volunteer Consultants. The Leadership Institute for Active Aging of the University of Maryland in Washington, DC, which developed the

original model in 1999, was also present at the conference. The president of NYIKE learnt the model of senior volunteering at this conference. He decided to bring it to Hungary, and to develop the idea into a Hungarian program around 2002.

Mission and Main Activities

The mission of NYIKE is “To offer innovative educational programs aiming at democratic social changes in Hungary.” The main approach the organization has taken to further its mission is introducing innovative approaches in Hungary. These include conferences and other information dissemination activities about trainings and educational programs NYIKE encounters in their participation in international exchanges. Typically, after piloting the ideas, they are passed on to other Hungarian organizations for implementation.

NYIKE is a voluntary, non-political, and non-profit organization of trainers, educators from the formal higher education system, and researchers active in the fields of lifelong learning and citizenship. The main goals are: to develop the motivation and competences required to be active agents for democratic changes at local level; to increase the chances of youth for a better life through non-formal training and learning opportunities; and to build a bridge between the formal and non-formal education fields. They work with local and national NGOs and networks, community cultural centers, and directly with citizens.

The main projects of the association are as follows. NYIKE facilitates co-operation of local citizens and NGOs. They offer a national training course and regional mentoring for informal groups of citizens and NGOs intending to take part in the EU Programs for European Citizenship. They also provide youth training courses, project

learning, and mentoring in urban areas. In addition, they do youth training on, for, and through democracy, and organize solidarity and citizenship actions at the local level.

Finally, they run the Active Citizenship and Senior Volunteering project, which is the one NYIKE model this research focused on. The model was adopted by NYIKE in 2004. Contrary to the organizations previous practice, after the piloting they decided to run this model themselves, instead of passing its implementation on to another NGO. This project is carried out to provide retired people with new opportunities to be active, to undertake new challenges, and to learn how to learn in the third age. It also aims to change the stereotypes of, and prejudices against retired people, and to draw the public's attention to their life experience, wisdom, and human resource potential currently going to waste. The project's activities include trainings of seniors in consultancy skills, and work activities and the reality of non-profits; matching seniors with non-profits; and offering a Senior Club to organize spare time activities for disadvantaged children. In 2009, the project had 24 senior participants, and in 2011, they have 21 seniors participating.

Relative Program Success

Currently, NYIKE's membership consists of 18 individuals, two training centers, two community cultural centers, and one library. Since it is a voluntary membership organization, the bulk of the projects are expected to be realized by members. As the CEO reported data on the number of staff shows in Table 5., NYIKE has only one paid employee who works full time. The CEO also reports only six volunteers, which limits the scope of activities the NGO can carry out. In addition, NYIKE's income is almost solely from grant funding, which characteristically provide for program costs, but not for

human resources, or operational costs. However, NYIKE has a contract with a district government in Budapest to utilize an office and training space in exchange for organizing events in the district.

Success of Model Transfer Defined by NYIKE Staff

When asked about how they defined the success of a model transfer, all three NYIKE respondents mentioned the spread of the model beyond their own NGO. “I think a model is successful in the classic interpretation of innovation: not when we implement it somehow at one place one time, but when it spreads and operates [at multiple locations].” As one of them pointed out, a model can be treated as a model when it contains the necessary elements for replication. Another one states that the model becomes “ours,” if it is built on Hungarian circumstances and adapted to them. “When it operates in a way that we look at each other and say: ‘Oh yes, we did not invent this, we got the idea from somewhere else’.” However, this might cause shifts in the model.

One of the interviewees emphasized, that actually piloting the model directly under the auspices of NYIKE was important. It provided insight into issues of replication, as opposed to just talking about the model at conferences, and passing its implementation on to other NGOs, as it had been NYIKE’s previous practice. He also pointed out, that in hindsight it seems that they should have put more focus on management of the model implementation initially. This deficiency prevented the model from achieving greater results. The respondent also believes that for a model to be successful also requires a significant cause. As he reports, in the case of the senior volunteering model, actors, types of training, and modules were all present, but the “cause” was missing for which their clients, the senior citizens, were needed. Two

interviewees mentioned, that for about two years from the adoption of the model “... nobody believed in it. We had big doubts about it, too.”

4.2 DEMOGRAPHICS

Data collection consisted of semi-structured interviews with personnel in management positions, and a written survey of all NGO staff. Demographic information about the survey respondents is presented in Table 8. The following is a summary of the demographic information about the interview respondents. There were 24 interviews conducted in all. Bator Tabor had nine interviews, DIA had six, Kava had five, and CSF and NYIKE combined had four. In terms of their roles in the model transfer, there were four purveyors and/or founders interviewed. According to their positions at the NGO, two were board members, six were CEOs, and 14 were in high or middle level management positions. Several of the respondents have held more than one position during their tenure with their NGO. They moved from staff position to board, or the other way round. 16 of the interviewees are current, and eight are former employees of the NGOs.

Table 8. Survey Sample Description

	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Age (n = 59)		
18-24	6	10.2
25-34	23	39.0
35-44	22	37.3
45-54	7	11.9
55 or above	1	1.7
Gender (n = 60)		
Female	43	71.7
Male	17	28.3
Highest level of education (n = 59)		
High school	4	
College/Bachelor's degree	17	
University/Master's degree	37	
PhD	1	
Position at the NGO (n = 57)		
Board member	2	3.5
Top management	12	21.1
Middle management	16	28.1
Direct service provision	20	35.1
Support staff	5	8.8
Volunteer	2	3.5
Years working at the NGO (n = 56)		
0-2 years	16	28.6
3-5 years	19	33.9
6-10 years	13	23.2
More than 10 years	8	14.3
Name of the NGO (n = 57)		
Bator Tabor	18	31.6
DIA	20	35.1
Kava	13	22.8
CSF	4	7.0
NYIKE	2	3.5

The number of respondents by organization is high when compared to the total number of the paid staff at each NGO (Bator Tabor 18/24, DIA 20/26, Kava 13/12, CSF 4/5, NYIKE 2/1). The later information was provided by the CEOs at the time of the data collection, and it is presented in Table 5.

It is impossible to determine an exact response rate, since the survey was conducted on the internet. An email with a link to the survey website was sent to the CEOs of each NGO, and they were asked to forward it to all of their employees. CEOs report 68 paid employees in the five NGOs, while 85 completed surveys were returned. Therefore, it is assumed that the survey was also completed by board members, volunteers, as well as former employees.

As shown in Table 8., 86.4% of the respondents are younger than 45 years of age. Most of the staff at these NGOs is relatively young. This corresponds with the findings from the interviews, that working at these organizations requires a lot of flexibility and dedication. This also seems to be confirmed by the data on years spent working at the NGO. 71.4% of the staff has worked at these NGOs for more than 2 years. Despite the difficulties of the operating environment described in the interviews, personnel at the case organizations work out of dedication, which results in their being involved with the organization for a long time. At the same time 52.6% of the respondents claim to work in management positions, which seems high. Comparing this figure with the information provided by the organizations' CEOs, shows a discrepancy in this question. According to them, only 25% of staff is in managerial positions. Finally, the high level of education of the staff is notable. 93.2% of the respondents hold a college degree or higher.

4.3 ATTRIBUTES OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES EMERGING FROM THE DATA

In this section the themes that emerged from the interview data are summarized. Since, they corresponded with the five independent variables of the study's quasi-hypothesis, they were categorized and presented under these variables. Also, the experiences of the successful NGOs, as well as of the unsuccessful cases show considerable similarities; therefore, this presentation of the findings seems appropriate. For all variables there were aspects that are universal for all cases. These are introduced first, and then what differentiates the successful cases from the unsuccessful is presented under each variable.¹⁸ The information presented in this section captures what staff thinks really happened in their NGOs as they were introducing and implementing the model in Hungary.

4.3.1 Identification of Need

An overarching aspect of this variable in all of the cases is that a purveyor, the person who stumbled upon the original model, saw a momentum in Hungarian society which called for some new solutions. More specifically, they saw the model and sensed that there was a need in Hungary for which the given model could be a good answer. In none of the cases, was there an existing need identified first and then solutions actively sought to address that need or problem, let alone different solutions or models considered. In a

¹⁸ For dimensions of each variable, please refer back to the Conceptual Framework, which explains in detail which aspects are included in the given variable.

sense we can say, that adoption decisions were not made rationally. Quite on the contrary, they were made based on emotion and personal preferences.

Another theme, regardless of whether the respondents work for a successful or unsuccessful case NGO, is the existence of a need at the time of the adoption decision. There are two groups of interviewee opinions with regards to this question. One group said that there was an active demand for the services, because the programs they offered at the pilot phase were filled with participants and they did not have to put a lot of effort into finding participants. The interviewees in the first group, regardless of organizational affiliation, seem to be the ones who were around the model transfer from the very beginning, and they “felt” that there was a need.

The other group stated that there was no active demand or even no demand at all for the services, because clients did not even know what the service was, and some clients might even have been afraid of it. Instead, the services “had to be wanted.” In other words, clients had to be somewhat persuaded to participate and offered immediate rewards for participation such as free service, a promised trip to the US, free training, and/or financial support. The respondents in the second group seem to be those who had joined the various NGOs later in the transfer process, so were not around when the decision to adopt was made. In DIA’s case, clients turned out to like the model for different reasons than originally thought. They liked it because they received a support network for themselves, not because of the change it generated in their students.

According to the data, only Bator Tabor conducted a needs assessment at the very beginning of the transfer process in Hungary. Even in their case, the results were not decisive in whether or not to introduce the service. The study’s purpose was rather to

support the implementation of the model. In all cases, the initial piloting of the model confirmed the need attested mostly by participants' and clients' feedback, and by anecdotal evidence. Two respondents pointed out that there is an active demand for their service now, but they note that the service is still free for the clients and pose the question whether it would be the same if there was a fee, even a nominal one, for the service.

As presented in Tables 11. and 12. for successful and unsuccessful cases respectively, survey respondents from both types of cases rated the importance of needs assessment in the success of an imported model's operation, second highest of all items, at 4.22 in successful cases and 4.67 in unsuccessful cases. When asked about the contribution of this item to their NGO's success in the model transfer, respondents from the successful cases rated it the lowest on the list of contributing items, at 3.55. Respondents from the unsuccessful cases rated it at 3.60, which is the third lowest score. The scores indicate that while respondents believe that assessing needs is an important contributing factor to the success of a model's transfer, in reality their NGOs did not pay much attention to it when actually carrying out the transfer process. Nor did they believe that needs assessment contributed much to their success in the model transfer.

Successful cases

At the initial phase of implementation, typically the same eight to ten people were involved in all aspects of the process, and did all the work on the ground supported mostly by grants. "In the beginning it was a very informal thing. Well, when a person has his friends on the Board... So this NGO was founded like 90% of the NGOs... well, based on this kind of friend connections, that a person wants to do something, so he establishes an NGO. So the Board was not a professional Board, with management, there

was not such a version of it.” The decision maker was the one who started “recruiting” others first from his personal network, and also the one to find interested clients. These staff people were primarily working on a volunteer basis. Supporters, financial and otherwise, also came through contacts of the personal network. People involved in this phase wore a number of different hats and in the beginning they typically dedicated a lot of their spare time and efforts to the projects. This period of informal operations lasted for about two or three years. “It operated out of XY’s home.” “Well, in the beginning, we started out to do it as volunteers, what is more, we even invested our own money in it, quite a bit of it; we worked a little like maniacs.” There was an enormous emotional support coming from the group of volunteers who were in it together, and this enthusiasm created the motivation for over extended work. However, later this led to burn out. This cycle was stabilized after about three to four years of operations.

The early implementation phase is characterized by considerably strict fidelity to the original model. Because it was carried out by the people who themselves knew the model, it was easier to maintain adherence to it. Nevertheless, due to lack of proper model description, they started to build from scratch, using their personal experiences and knowledge of the model. There was scarce planning, which was focused only on implementation issues. Piloting the models in Hungary, and using the experience to inform further steps and developments of the model transfer, helped attract more supporters. There was a step-by-step approach, operations started out small; according to a respondent they just wanted to see whether and how the model worked in Hungary. Piloting the model seems crucial in aligning it with the local reality, as described in one interviewee’s experience in opening a program in another country:

“... they were planning from then on that a camp can only become a member of the network when it is perfectly ready by those [central] criteria. [...] And the experiences of the Italian camp made them say, ‘no, this does not work this way.’ That you must have that knowledge, must have that experience, must have one to two years of operations, after which a camp can surely respond to those challenges indeed. This brings a different impetus to it.”

Adaptation of the original model was necessary, mostly because the Hungarian environment did not have the same attitudes as the society at the place of the origin. “... there is a very effective form to be copied. The copying of which obviously meant from the very first moment, that there was a really well functioning model there, that needed to be translated to the Hungarian social, cultural environment, the healthcare environment, and the local needs and demand. Therefore we couldn’t just take it as it was.” At the same time, all respondents felt that “from the first moment it was our / a Hungarian model.” It was also emphasized that at the beginning there was a strict fidelity to the original model, but they were aware of needing to adapt.

“We wouldn’t have dared to take the risk back then, only after we had tried it, and had our own experiences, and then this way slowly and gradually. We were quite rigid in this, however in the Hungarian circumstances we changed some very small things. For example, we did not want to allow new elements to come in either – now Hungarian, or not Hungarian? But quite strictly we wanted to stick to how we had seen it worked.”

At first, NGOs looked to the exporter for examples of the various situations they needed to implement, and used those as a basis on which to build their own.

“I always ask for these [examples from the exporter] and look at them, and then I add what my experience is, what the Hungarian reality is from the cultural, societal, professional points of view, and then that way I knead a solution. By the way this works really well. [...] There exists a lot of experience abroad already and here there is a very talented and creative

team. And generally the solutions that come out of the foreign experiences and our own creativity is always superb.”

As one respondent said, the adaptation process lasted for the first seven to eight years and happened step by step. “Nicely gradually, to such extent as the pace of our understanding allowed it.”

Unsuccessful cases

The two unsuccessful case NGOs exhibit a similar story in terms of the initial phase of implementation. However, in their case the number of “enthusiasts” recruited at the very beginning was far less, only two to four people, and the bulk of the early work of model implementation was carried out by the purveyors themselves. Another difference is that the purveyors of the two unsuccessful cases were trying to fit their models to the Hungarian circumstances from the very beginning.

In NYIKE’s case, instead of implementing the model with strict fidelity at first, the piloting of the model saw significant changes from the original one. Two staff members, who were not deeply immersed in the model, developed the Hungarian pilot program. Key intervention components were changed before the first implementation in Hungary. Also, at the very beginning of model implementation, additional changes were made to the model due to a push from clients. Furthermore, most of the adaptation work was done by two of the NYIKE staff based on assumptions. “We assumed what knowledge the seniors would lack, but I must emphasize that this was a hypothesis, and also what knowledge they should have.”

CSF piloted its model with strict fidelity, putting a rigid focus on the model’s connection to the existing system of social services and regulatory environment. This in

Hungary was considerably different from the US, where the model originated. Nevertheless, they were trying to maintain links to decision makers and to the system that were similar to the ones in the US. In other words, CSF was trying to adapt factors in the operating environment that were out of their control.

One respondent constantly contradicted himself by talking about not having to adapt anything, because the model worked just the same way in Hungary as in the US, while at the same time saying that it did not work in Hungary. He claimed that they did not adapt anything, but “were flexible” and went in the directions they could.

Several interviewees, both from successful and unsuccessful cases, expressed the idea that the values brought to Hungary with the model in certain ways clashed with prevalent values in the country. There is apparently a difference between “spreading the attitude” and “implementing the model,” though there is agreement that both need to be accomplished in the transfer process. Thus, two distinct means of implementation can be formulated.

One way, as the successful cases demonstrate, is by sticking strictly to the original model and finding ways to explain and make sense of the interventions and their components so that they seem right to a Hungarian audience. In these cases, a different communication or explanation is needed, as exemplified by Bator Tabor’s interpretation of the 2:1 staff to kid ratio. “There are rules the interpretation of which is totally different in the Hungarian realm, than let’s say in an Irish or American.” “The 2:1 rule [...] we knew that it might not make sense, yet it is important. Or rather we [Hungarians] think it is pointless, but still it is important that we have it in our rules and regulations too, because they had a reason to include it.”

The other means of implementation is more “spreading the approach”; NGOs that take this route are more focused on bringing in the new attitude and planting the seeds of it in Hungary. Respondents in this group emphasize that “nothing in the model had to be changed” and “we did everything the same way,” but then proceed to talk about how, due to the Hungarian environment, they were not able to make progress with building an operational program using the model. In one case, even one core intervention component was abandoned due to the inability of aligning it with the Hungarian environment. “... we let this processing piece go... for a while we really demanded that this was done, but for a while they have let it go again, because... realizing that it doesn’t work here.”

4.3.2 Values and Philosophy

Several characteristics of this variable that emerged from the data are generally true for all cases. In all of the NGOs examined, the operating philosophy and values are present in everyday life both at the organizational and the individual levels. The operating philosophy is present more as an approach and attitudes that they want to spread in Hungary. “Whether we are doing a casino for an evening program, or drama, or I don’t know, a zoo, it doesn’t really matter, if it is in line with the operating principles that were laid down.” The basic values are lived on a daily basis; organizational management strives to model the required behavior for staff, as well as staff modeling it for clients. “What we emphasized was to work with our staff as we would like the coordinators to work in the groups. So we pay attention to their development... .” According to respondents, there was a huge impetus in Hungary for the new, democratic attitudes, values. “The society is changing around the same values, which is about freedom of

choice, responsibility for making your own decisions...” Two interviewees felt that this might have been the result of Hungary’s accession to the EU.

In all cases, when the decision was made, there was a “momentum” in society. Circumstances were aligned to accept a new approach, or at least, allow room for it to be piloted. In this momentum, there was either a Hungarian abroad (Bator Tabor, CSF, Kava, NYIKE) or a foreigner in Hungary (DIA) who either experienced openness for new values, or saw some need, and fell in love with the model. “So what I see is that almost all of these 11 camps were established in the way that somebody went to one of the camps and fell in love with it, and being at the right place, at the right time, meeting the right people, he could make it happen.”

The decision was almost exclusively taken by individuals without prior needs assessment, or other considerations. Neither were the capability of other models to respond to the perceived need considered. “Well, it was obviously about, well, that there is this very well-functioning structure to be copied.” It seems that the “pull” is more characteristic than the “push.” In fact, all NGOs examined represent “pull”, which means that individuals in Hungary wanted to import the model, as opposed to foreign entities wanting to export it. In the case of DIA, a US citizen who were working in Hungary at the time, initiated the transfer process, yet it can be classified as “pull.”

Again, typically the decision to adopt was made by one person or a few at most. In addition, the decision was not made based on logical reasoning, but rather more on emotions. “I think it had a strong emotional reason, too, he was very much attached to Hungary, so I do not know to what extent it was rational, and to what extent it was rather emotional. I think that it was more emotional [decision].” Consequently, the decision to

adopt was made relatively quickly in the face of how much the adopters actually knew about the model and the operating environment at the time.

Model description is supposed to be the depository of operating philosophies and basic program values. As one of the respondents states “... in my interpretation we can talk about a model, when we basically do a program, or a work, or an experience, and we think that we want to multiply it, and if we can find the conditions of the multiplication in that work or not. And from there on it must be a conscious chain of actions. [...] This requires additional time, and requires additional resources, so that it is funded.” As the data suggest, there was no real model description at the exporter NGOs in the successful, or in the unsuccessful cases. Distinctive elements of the intervention were not clearly identified, either. The respondents’ view of this issue is controversial at the least: many of them felt, that there was a well-developed, clear model description at the exporter NGOs. However, when asked to name the key elements of their model, they gave very different answers and grasped different aspects of the model. When asked about the key elements of the model, all of them started out with describing the intervention components.

In the cases at which the business thinking is more prevalent, more respondents mentioned management or structural elements as part of the model. “I think that the foundation itself will be the model and not the therapeutic recreation.” Factors that respondents mentioned as parts of the model can be categorized into three groups: operating philosophy or principles, components of the intervention, and management aspects. In the case of Bator Tabor, in which there is an association of similar programs world-wide, there are specific management expectations. However, they seem to remain

intervention related and not general organizational ones: "... how the Board should look like, how to solve governance, how to have uhm..., on that there is nothing [guidelines]. Though, a lot of people say that we should have them." At the other end of the spectrum in the case of NYIKE, one of the unsuccessful cases, none of the respondents actually described their model in the interviews.

In addition, management was not part of the original model; neither, did most interviewees think, it should be.

"So building the organization was more like our own; I mean we didn't adopt the organizational model, it is for sure, that we didn't copy it. We didn't hire people they way they did it there, but we hired people as we needed them. A good example for this is fundraising. So, when I worked there they already had a six to eight people team for fundraising. [...] but we didn't need this. What's more in the beginning a CEO..., we didn't need such a CEO either, who was good in financial matters, and management, or we didn't think so. So rather it was under our direction, so what we had seen and experienced, and thought would be good, that's what we did. And it was about five and a half years ago, when we decided that we needed a CEO who was a real CEO, and was better in finances."

As described in the Identification of Need section, despite strict fidelity to the original model at the beginning, importers were aware of having to adapt the model to the Hungarian circumstances. This was manifested in copying intervention components, but recreating management elements, as the NGO's given resources at the time allowed for. There were no real efforts put in management considerations in the beginning; in fact, management practices were not adopted, or not even considered, but rather recreated by the importing NGOs as the interventions moved forward. Findings in this area are presented in detail in the Management section of this chapter.

Some interviewees, both from successful and unsuccessful cases, mentioned that if a model has already been replicated in a country other than the original, before coming

to Hungary, it might be easier for Hungarians to adopt. In addition, the model might be different. “I know from experience that the Irish also struggled through the American model, or the American will. The Americans brought this model to Ireland, and there they shaped it a little bit into Irish.” A respondent expressed the contention that if original protocols which are attributable to an intervention’s effectiveness are followed strictly, then better solutions may result in terms of how the intervention is carried out, which in turn might create a “new” model. Nevertheless, this procedure did not help NYIKE in their efforts. They heard about the same model from the Americans, Dutch, and Germans, and it appears that they were not able to identify its core elements. Thus there was considerable confusion on what to transfer.

Successful cases

Because of the individuals’ decision to adopt, all cases started building from the bottom up. In the successful cases, at this time the focus was on the intervention itself. There was not much of a needs assessment conducted, or thinking about fitting the model to Hungarian society beyond serving the intended clients and the self-satisfaction of the importers. It was not very clear who the clients were; in DIA’s case for example they started out to be students, but after a while the focus shifted to extending efforts for teachers. Nevertheless, the interventions were tried in Hungary, and when there was enough experience and proof that the model could be done in the country, the organization started to build further. It is notable that the respondents’ stories from the same NGOs about the early times of the model transfer are very consistent. The stories seem to be part of the organizational histories.

The cause is something that can be easily supported, it appeals to people, but for two of the case NGOs it is not that easy, because their services do not have tangible outcomes. Data suggests that at the beginning NGOs let the program “speak for itself,” and stakeholder buy-in was not much of a focus. Whatever small efforts were there were geared mostly towards funders and clients. Conscious building of stakeholder support has been rather incidental, even in the successful cases, and based on whatever capacity (if any) remains within the NGO. Those NGOs which dedicate capacity to building stakeholder support seem to be more successful, despite the fact that their efforts remain narrowly focused on certain topics. Advocacy for the cause, to be precise capacity for advocacy work, increases costs, and there is no expertise in advocacy, lobbying, or bargaining, as one respondent stated. Collecting feedback from stakeholders is also ancillary; generally the clients who send feedback are those who think positively about the given model or service.

Needs of stakeholder groups are rarely assessed; emphasis is on assessing clients’ needs if anything. “... we don’t really assess needs externally.” “This is a weakness at the moment.” At the same time, respondents believe that constantly being in touch with the stakeholders and providing information for them is important. Focus is more on the direct and indirect beneficiaries, kids, parents, teachers, and funders. They seem to be dedicated to the cause of the NGO. However, in some cases it is also ambiguous. Clients often “enjoy” the services, but are not consciously dedicated to the cause. Also, if clients had to pay for the services, they might not stand up for the cause any more. “Because, when we bring teacher training in a school for free, and we even give them accredited

documentation on the training, and written curriculum and mentoring for the teachers, then how the hell wouldn't they like us."

My successful cases have an established working relationship with at least one of the other sectors: business or government. In the case of Bator Tabor, the contacts are hospitals, businesses, financial supporters, and to some extent parents. At DIA, relationships include private funders, and schools and teachers; at Kava they include the EU, local governments, some funders, the theatre profession, and schools and teachers. All three NGOs are also involved in partnerships with other NGOs in championing the cause of voluntarism in Hungary. Two respondents also pointed out, that it is easier to build stakeholder buy-in from the various stakeholder groups in smaller towns.

In addition, impact evaluation has been a conscious effort of the successful NGOs, driven by funder requirements. However, there is only anecdotal evidence for stakeholder support. It is assumed, that staff as a stakeholder group must be dedicated, otherwise they cannot credibly do their jobs and deliver services. Assessing needs of decision makers as a stakeholder group varies to a great extent, and in most cases remains fortuitous. "... of course the stakeholders were up on the whiteboard all the time, the local governments, and decision makers, but this I think remained empty content-wise. Thus, I don't feel that we would have very serious results in this area, that local governments, and decision makers, etc."

In the lack of an existing model description at the exporter side, successful and unsuccessful cases show a lot of similarities. As presented earlier, the decision to adopt the model was made by individuals. These purveyors saw the model abroad, and more or less learned it through some sort of "on-the-job training"; some might even have read

some materials about it. With this background, they started to implement something in Hungary. Once it was shown that the model might take off in Hungary, and others joined in the work, the successful cases felt the necessity of writing down the “model.” This was the point when they started to dedicate effort to it, and put it in writing. “... we didn’t have a description, we did a description of what we had seen, and what it should look like, and what we would like. [...] Thus, this is not that we didn’t have the model; only that we didn’t get a set panel. So it existed, except we had to put it in words. We had to re-write it again.” Generally there was no extra capacity for this model description work at any of the three NGOs. At least, none of the respondents mentioned this. Even when there were human resources available, this work was done in addition to other tasks. Nevertheless, as practice evolved, “best practices” as well as management and program policies, were written down in documents that created the “model description.”

Several interviewees also pointed out that the people who started the “model” in Hungary may not have understood the “model” well enough at the beginning. These respondents felt that the model should be seen in operation at the place of origin as well, to enhance understanding of why and how it operates and achieves results; this learning cannot come from books or other materials. “It is freaking difficult to describe it by the way; one must see it.” Many respondents from DIA emphasized the approach/attitude, saying that instead of bringing the model into Hungary, they brought an approach. In this case there was some confusion as to what the model is and different respondents named somewhat different interventions as their model. At the same time, a strong need for clear model description was felt among the respondents. In Kava currently one of the main foci is defining the field. “... we are trying to define what Theater in Education is.

So what we call Theater in Education here and now as a model is not yet a clear definition.”

Unsuccessful cases

Interview data revealed that building stakeholder support was conducted more purposefully at the unsuccessful cases. As interviewees from this group reported, these efforts were focused more on the macro level and targeted policy makers, government officials, universities, and funders primarily. Namely, they were the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social Affairs, local governments, government grant distributing agencies, etc. In the successful cases, the emphasis was on the micro level, directing efforts to clients, direct beneficiaries, volunteers, staff, partners, and funders. The specific examples include a cultural center, a camp site, parents, horse owners, school teachers, just to name a few.

Interviewees from the unsuccessful cases did not mention efforts to measure client satisfaction or to evaluate program implementation or results.

Respondents from the unsuccessful cases seem to have felt that their exporting counterparts had clear model descriptions. Nonetheless, there were not any written model descriptions. An interviewee from NYIKE also emphasized that “it came to us more like an idea, and not as a model. And we built it up here at home, from our own thoughts, based on our assumed and real knowledge.” This response is in line with their reporting having three different foreign partners involved as the exporter of the model. This may also explain why NYIKE respondents did not provide an actual description of their model. In addition, unlike the interviewees from the successful cases, they did not

report any efforts to create model descriptions or operating procedures as they moved forward with implementation.

Contrary to the successful cases, the need for a clear model description and deeper understanding of the model was not apparent among the respondents from unsuccessful cases. They seem to be satisfied with their level of comprehension of the model and its interventions. Their tactic of “spreading an approach” allows for their command of the model to remain superficial, which in turn leads to diversion from key components of the model.

4.3.3 Investment in People

This variable represents the preparation of staff on the ground for the changes that the implementation of a new model would mean for them. As such, it looks at the matter from the point of view of the relationship with the exporter, the extent of their support, and efforts put into staff training in Hungary. The general themes related to this variable that emerged from the data are the lack of conscious staff preparation on site in Hungary by the exporters before model implementation, and the scarcity of contact with the exporters at the beginning of the transfer process. These are described first in this section.

There was not a lot of training and preparation given by the exporter before and when implementation started in Hungary. In only two of the cases, one successful and one unsuccessful, Hungarians learnt the model on-the-job at the original site, and only in the case of the unsuccessful NGO, was it planned in preparation for model transfer. In neither case, was there a concentrated training effort in Hungary by the exporters.

“While I was working in it, I don’t remember them [exporter] coming here to do training for us. We did the trainings for ourselves.” The others had no specific and conscious training; rather they saw the example and then recreated it in Hungary. “So I had to read the materials and find out from those how it worked abroad. Well, I had never seen how it worked in real life, right”? In these cases, the educational background and personal experiences of the staff served instead of training in the model. “There was no preparation. This was just using our own common sense and judgment and creativity and... I mean obviously we had our educational background, our own experiences as being volunteers.”

In general it can be said that there was no organized training either by the exporter or at the replication site which would allow all staff in key positions to acquire the basic knowledge and skills necessary for model implementation as an organization. Respondents said “... their preparation [the Hungarian staff] didn’t happen. There wasn’t a half-a-year conscious training. What happened here was that we needed to learn on-the-job what this thing was.”

Support from the exporter was also “on demand;” whenever Hungarians needed some materials, examples, or advice, or had questions, they had to explicitly ask for assistance, especially in the beginning. “We would have done well with support, but I think..., I think we probably didn’t ask so much for it, or were very specific about it. On the other hand, probably there wasn’t so much of... offer.” Visits from the exporters in the early phase of model implementation were also sporadic.

Successful cases

The relationship with the exporters started out similarly in both the successful and unsuccessful NGOs. In the case of the former, after piloting the model, when it was shown that Hungarians were serious about the model implementation, and were able to run it themselves, and it was observed that the model worked in Hungary, then the relationship with the exporter started to pick up, and evolved into more of a partnership. Asking for help became easier when personal relationships were formed; when Hungarian staff on the ground was able to put a face to the name at the exporter side. In two of the successful cases, the Hungarian practice, or “model”, exceeded the original model, and best practices for the exporters came out of the Hungarian implementation.

When relation with the exporter became a more professional partnership, the external standards set by the exporter pushed the development of the model in Hungary. Having external standards and expectations was very beneficial for the Hungarian model and contributed to success because they required learning at the importer NGO. In Bator Tabor’s case external expectations set by the Alliance focused on sustainability and provided for a big forward thrust in terms of developing the organization.

“There is quality assurance. [...] With lots of questions that didn’t make sense. But it had value, and there are things that we did due to this pressure; things that we wouldn’t have done otherwise, but in the meantime are very useful. [...] And it is really good, because it standardizes to a great extent; it is not easy in a lot of cases to make them accepted by the volunteers, but we have so many [volunteers] now that we need all of these [expectations].”

In addition, the expectations of the exporter can and will help with model fidelity and quality improvement.

“We had fears about joining the international organization as members, but then it has become a guarantee. The membership in the Alliance is the guarantee that Bator Tabor will not deter from the original model. There are so strong quality requirements that I, as a founder, have become convinced that the bases of the original model would be so much focused on, that there would be no way to drift from them.”

The criteria in the Alliance were developed based on practice. As one of the respondents described, he suggested that the Criteria Committee be formed by inviting the most respected professionals from existing programs. They included one of the best CEOs, one of the best program directors or camp directors, and three medical doctors from different locations, in addition to Board members. This group of the best practitioners then developed the criteria that camps were to meet. Nevertheless, it was not until after the sustainability criteria were established and accepted, that the Alliance started to focus on program criteria as well. “And it was in the past three years that the Alliance has had a more unified set of program criteria.”

Interviewees believe that having an independent list of criteria, against which the NGO can check its operations continuously, is beneficial. This can serve as a tool for improvement and corrections. “One can see on time, if something goes in the wrong direction. And usually what happens is that we only see this, when there is already a big problem.” At the same time the criteria cannot be applied too rigidly.

“The camps that are being built now in the US, they tell them that they are a Hole in the Wall camp from the very first moment, but they must meet all the criteria. But the experiences of the Italian camp had them say, that it doesn’t work this way. You need the knowledge, you need the experience, you need one to two years of operation, after which a camp can meet all the challenges. [...] for example in the Italian camp there is a very high staff turn-over, exactly because it wasn’t built on an established and more permissive approach, but from the very first moment it was the most important that it is a Hole in the Wall camp starting from the first nail to everything, and they didn’t have any leeway in the

beginning to fit this thing to the cultural differences or to something like that.”

Clear expectations and standards are important in the replication of the program, however, equally important is the pilot phase and acquiring the local experiences.

In DIA’s case, funders expected the outcomes of the intervention to be measured. That is very important, no doubt about it; however, without organizational capacity and skills this requirement became a burden. In both Bator Tabor’s and DIA’s cases, there were instances in which the requirements were applied rigidly and there was no room for discussion.

“Well, they [the exporter] provided that support, because they knew, that they had undertaken with a big funder that they would implement this program with us. So it was a commitment on their part, and –let’s not be naïve about this– they got a big chunk of money for this brokerage. And they knew when they saw something here that didn’t meet the requirements of program implementation, and then they started to pressure us about what was going on, with this indicator and that indicator. So they didn’t do any trainings for us, but those expectations were pulling this thing upwards.”

Examining the relationship with the exporter over time also provides an insight into aspects of support. As several interviewees pointed out, in the beginning there was almost no relationship at all with the exporter. This later developed into a more partnering relationship and “sharing of best practices.” A general trend at the three successful cases is that there were three distinct stages in the growth of cooperation with the foreign partner NGO.

There is an initial phase in which the foreign partner provides materials, advice, encouragement, discussions, and sometimes even training and preparation.

“... in that year we went to Ireland, and we asked for an appointment with their leadership, that we would like to sit down with them, because we did this and we’d like to get information and help. And it was very interesting, because then they uhm... like brushed us off. So, they said it was great, they were happy for us, superb, how good we were, but as a matter of fact we didn’t receive any kind of support. Neither in fundraising, nor in bringing the know-how here. And this whole thing changed basically when XY, as a businessman joined us.”

There is a commitment on the exporter side, but only rhetorical. They wish good luck, but support does not go much beyond this point. They definitely do not support the initiative with funding. “We received informal help in all this basically,” Respondents explain this as a lack of trust on the exporter’s side. “In the beginning it was difficult, because they didn’t trust us, I think.” “An obstacle in the beginning was that they didn’t take us seriously.”

The second phase is a relatively longer period, during which there is not much contact.

“For me, he represented the mother organization at the beginning. And in my opinion, there was not enough professional support, or what we received I couldn’t make the most of that. And then it only surfaced in conflicts. [...] So very often I felt, that we were left alone in this story, well, financially for sure, and in reality professionally too I think, and after the initial push, we went on our own way, and then from time to time we had to face that it wasn’t good that way.”

The importing NGO does its work in Hungary; it pilots the model, establishes the operational ground rules, sets up the organization and starts institutionalizing it. This period typically takes three to five years. When the importing NGO reaches a certain, high level of operations, in terms of staff, funding, proven results in programming, etc., and demonstrates high quality work, the relation with the exporter NGO revives. “...

when this funder came in, etc., etc., and a fairly serious matter started to shape up, then right away the Board became more active.”

In the third phase, the Hungarian NGO turns to the exporter again for additional professional support in order to improve services. To achieve the highest quality of services and management, it self-imposes and adheres to the operational standards and practices of the foreign partner, even though it is not an explicit expectation of the exporter. With the stringent meeting of expectations, it often exceeds the foreign partner’s practices in certain aspects.

“Bator Tabor has gotten into the phase that other camps use it as an example. [...] But we have to create the ways in which these kinds of experiences and knowledge can flow back to this organization [the Alliance]. [...] We need to have a two-way traffic. And in some ways we have to involve internationally those people who are really good locally, but who can add to the whole thing globally. And this is often missing.”

At this point the relationship between the importing and the exporting NGOs becomes more balanced. They start to collaborate more as partners with learning happening in both directions. “They didn’t just demand from us, they also provided support.” “... when we appeared at these conferences that really increased Bator Tabor’s credibility. And now in the past one or two years, we got to the point that they asked me to serve on two committees that relate to the Alliance’s common professional work.”

At the same time, the idea of “rivalry” also appears at this point. “Here in the Alliance there was a moment in which we became competitors of the Irish. [...] I think that it is there. It has never been malice and a strong one, but I felt that it needed to be handled tactfully. [...] If nothing else, in prestige; so far they were the European center, and there was nobody else, only American camps.” In this stage the exporter NGO also

opens up some funding sources for the importing NGO, or they seek external funding in a partnership for various further development projects. In two of the three successful cases, the exporting and importing NGOs have developed and implemented projects together that go way beyond their individual goals in their respective countries and have noteworthy international significance. One of these projects is at the EU level, while the other one is in the Hungarian – European – American relations.

In the following, findings on staffing patterns are summarized. Typically in all successful cases many of the staff have a background of previously being a volunteer at the NGO, or from the NGO's network. These organizations consciously created social networks among volunteers, as described in the Identification of Need and Values and Philosophy sections. Bator Tabor, for example, has a very developed, high quality system for recruiting, selecting, training, monitoring, and evaluating the performance of their volunteers. Recruitment, selection, and training are designed based on the needed competencies. The organizational structure of mid-level leaders at camp ensures continuous monitoring and coaching, and at the end of camp the performance of the volunteer is evaluated. Satisfactory evaluation is a prerequisite to attend camp in the following year.

In DIA's case the percentage of staff who were formerly volunteers with the organization is as high as 80%. As interviewees report, it is good on the one hand, because these staff members have a thorough understanding of the NGO's work. On the other hand, their supposed knowledge of the NGO is often greater than their actual knowledge. Therefore, their preparation for the job should not be taken lightly. At Bator Tabor bringing volunteers into paid positions prompted the development of written staff

orientation and introductory materials. However, their highly-developed volunteer training system is only narrowly applied with paid staff. Nonetheless, traces of the system can be found in their staffing procedures.

At the same time, it is hard to find staff externally that fit into the organizational culture and are able to pick up the work style and pace. “We are investing a horribly lot of energy in each and every staff person” to train them in what they are supposed to do, but often they leave the NGO very quickly. High quality of programs and services require a certain type of delivery of tasks, therefore, it is a priority to train staff. However, due to the demand for quality work coupled with the relatively low salaries at non-profits, many staff decide to leave the NGO fairly soon and use their newly acquired competencies elsewhere.

Unsuccessful cases

At the unsuccessful NGOs, external standards, the relationship with the exporter, and the staffing patterns show a very different picture. In their cases there were no expectations set either by their exporters, or by a funder at any point of model implementation. As one of the respondents said “I wanted to meet expectations, that were not there in reality, or that were not big expectations, rather I made them up.”

At CSF, the relationship with the exporter seems to have moved backwards, from a very close one in the beginning, to a “more and more informal” one. In their case there was an in-depth one-year long initial on-the-job training of a staff person, who upon return to Hungary was supported both financially and professionally. Two other Hungarians were brought to the US to be trained in the model. One of them was not able to complete the one-year training and returned to Hungary halfway through. The other

person abandoned the program and never returned to Hungary. By the time the one person who completed the training fully returned to Hungary, the one with the six-month preparation had moved on with his professional life, and did not want to participate in the model transfer any longer.

After training CSF staff in the US, the exporter made additional investment in infrastructure in Hungary, and piloting of the model started. In addition, all seven staff received a one-month basic training in the US. At this time, staff was heavily focused on the intervention components, and the pilot seemed to produce the expected results. There was little capacity left for advocacy efforts, so despite the good outcomes, CSF staff was not able to raise enough funds to sustain the program. This, combined with the difficult operating environment, resulted in their emphasis shifting to “spreading the approach in Hungary.” At this point the relationship with the exporter became looser and less formal. “So from 2005, when we decided that it [Hungary] is not at the point yet, or that we should now move into a different direction, because that is what’s needed, then..., since then the relationship is much looser in the sense that we don’t have daily consultations.”

In NYIKE’s case there was only the initial meeting with the originator of the model. In this case, even the question of which exactly was the exporter organization, remained to be clarified. As an interviewee recalled, NYIKE was involved in a Grundtvig project with a German NGO. Through this organization, the representative of NYIKE met a Dutch NGO, for whom the originators of the model from the US presented at a conference. “Our relationship [with the Americans] was limited to that conference only. We did not continue this, because we did not get responses to our questions. And we didn’t understand why not. [...] But back then and there, we learnt more from the

Dutch, about the Dutch's experiences, and what's more from the Germans. From our point of view both potential European partners provided more relevant information.” After this first contact, the relationship has been limited to two or three more personal meetings since the adoption of the model.

As described earlier, the unsuccessful cases did not consciously build their social network of supporters from the beginning. Therefore, they had a very limited pool of enthusiasts, and volunteers. Due to this, in these cases, the staffing pattern of moving from a volunteer status to staff positions did not happen. Instead, they hired staff from the outside. Tasks were compartmentalized, and as one of the respondents expressed, he did not have information on how or why the decision to adopt the model was made, and added, that “My job was to do the training. Basically, I developed the training, and then he [the purveyor] also delivered parts of it.”

4.3.4 Business Approach

This variable supposes the existence of capacity to run the NGO on business principles and apply business management strategies. Interviewees talked at length about the difficulties of their operating environment, which sheds light on legacies and other forces that result in the lack of business thinking at NGOs in Hungary. Thus, in this section these findings about the national context are summarized first, and then the issues relating to business thinking are presented.

Common themes about the operating environment which emerge from the data include the following. There are many obstacles in Hungary that make it hard for NGOs to operate. The state cannot be a reliable partner, and social issues are far too politicized

in the country. If individuals, who can be linked to a party, support a cause or NGO, then the NGO is immediately linked to the given party. One example is the allegations against Bator Tabor as a money laundering venue for one of the main Hungarian parties, due to a big donation given to the camp by one of the party members.

Also, there seems to be a legacy of dichotomy in Hungary in its citizens' relationship with power. That is, citizens complain about everything that is happening, or done in the country; at the same they expect somebody else (typically the state or government) to solve the issues for them. It is, without any doubt, the legacy of the socialist regime. In addition, the state is unpredictable; there are senseless laws and regulations, "The Hungarian regulation is an idiot regulation, that says that there is no such thing as executive leadership. [...] Everything is decided by the Board. So in reality, there is the Board, and the Board authorized, I don't know, me as the president, and I authorize the CEO. But as a matter of fact, he always acts on behalf of me. This is an incredibly stupid regulation." In addition, politics and politicians are not credible. This also seems to be confirmed by the survey responses. The subscale, Integration with the local system, was rated the lowest at 2.43 on the list of items contributing to the success of model transfer. See Table 10.

Due to the same legacy, several other situations are prevalent in today's Hungarian society. "There is a resistance to the world of business, and there is a perception that the business world is dirty." Indeed, in general, the public views businesses as dirty. Likewise, because of shenanigans shortly after the regime change, there is a negative public view of non-profits in the country. Even within non-profits, the notion still holds that getting paid for working at a non-profit is bad. It is still widely

believed, that work at non-profits must be done out of charity, or on a voluntary basis. Therefore, individuals work out of enthusiasm for a cause. In many cases enthusiasts have three or four different hats within the NGO. They typically invest all their energies in the work, then soon burn out, and the work for the cause dies. “We have partner NGOs in which the leader took out a mortgage on his own house, so that he can run the NGO.”

In turn, this view has resulted in a lack of professionalism, especially adequate management skills, in most of the country’s non-profit organizations. Also, non-profits do not have the financial capacity to employ staff, or if they do, the salary levels are very low. This often creates internal tensions; it causes conflict among the staff when there is ample money for programs, but not for salaries. This is partially due to the lack of adequate financing: most income of non-profits is from grants that rarely support operational costs. This delimits non-profits mindset when thinking about funding: the most common, and often the only, idea for funding is writing grant proposals. “In the typical way of Hungarian civil organizations, we started writing grant proposals.” It also results in many organizations becoming money-driven, as well as creates a void of long-term planning.

“... it is very difficult to create this balance of not overburdening the organization, so that your people become exhausted, at the same time making the money to carry out your core activities, because nobody supports those.” “It is a big problem that in Hungary these are mostly one-year funding programs. Therefore, it is difficult to plan for the long-term, because two- or three-year funding is rare. Essentially, every year it starts again and again, that we try to establish its sustainability.”

One of the respondents termed the Hungarian non-profit sector as “lame, crippled”, because of these shortcomings, and because of people still not seeing their opportunities to stand up and do something. As one of the respondents puts it,

“in this country violating the rules and deceiving the authorities is a national sport. So when, in the case of NGOs, we see that they are doing some shenanigans it is partially due to this, and partially to the fact, that if you are honest, you cannot survive. And this is true not only for the civil sector.”

One example of the conniving unspoken agreements that exist in the society is the employment of teachers. The salaries of teachers are some of the lowest in the country, but in exchange for the low income they are free to use their extra time as they please, after they teach their 20 hours per week. “...there were a few colleagues who left, because it was very strange... for particular colleagues, that being a psychologist I need to work so much.” This is also the legacy of the previous regime, as well as the existing inability in the government system. Very few public servants or officials take on the responsibility of making decisions. Instead they make promises or point to other departments.

Similarly, there are undeveloped social contracts such as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), the notion of giving back, volunteering, or individual giving. These concepts have not taken root through generations in Hungary, and nobody in the country has an understanding of what they are. “... in Hungary, or Eastern Europe, where there is no culture of individual giving, and where people always expect the state to solve everything, we cannot go for major gifts.” “Unfortunately in Hungary CSR is at the point that the so-called company, which wants to do something for the society, expects something in return for its support. In reality it is still public relations and

advertising.” There is also an apparent lack of theory in many fields in the country, especially in education and drama. Finally, there is a significant level of jealousy in the country. “At the beginning there was incredible jealousy towards Bator Tabor about what we are doing, and what we are taking away, etc. And then, this was frightening, let’s say this part of it, whether the profession would send any kids to us”

On the positive side respondents mentioned two things. One is that the theoretical and legal framework for governments to contract out services already exists in the country. The other is that there is openness in the business world to support worthy causes and thus, cooperate with non-profits.

Successful cases

Analyzing the data has outlined two trends in policy advocacy. One trend is characteristic of the successful NGOs. In the beginning, these NGOs consciously stayed away from policy advocacy or lobbying work. “I believe that in Hungary, if something has government support, then it would come with so enormous responsibilities, such responsibilities which might not be useful for us, or it would set us back, or we might lose our flexibility, so it is not for sure, that it would be good for us.” After a while, they come to recognize the need for it, and understand its importance. They start to initiate policy advocacy activities and to dedicate resources to them. They also feel a need to be open to other, more general topics than their core cause; for example, volunteering, or general non-profit issues. This conscious focus on advocacy happens after about 10 years of operations. In order to keep their political independence, these NGOs do not pursue government funding in Hungary, or it represents a very small percentage of their income. “It [policy work] hasn’t been a priority up until lately. We thought, that we would be

building it from the bottom up what we are building, and about a year, year and half ago it came up, that we should pursue this with much more intensity from the other side, too. This appears in our 10-year anniversary publication that we have policy goals as well.”

In the beginning, the prevalent mode of advocacy was personal story telling at all the NGOs. “... in the first one or two years there was kind of a personal contact. [...] so I think that this kind of personal contact or personal appeal was always very important.” At the successful cases, being credible and transparent, as well as providing high quality work, is identified as the basis for advocacy. “Well, I personally represent this cause by trying to create and participate in very good theater in education programs.” In addition, at these NGOs, there was some research or evaluation carried out. For most respondents from these NGOs, advocacy means being associated with one or another political party. That is why they emphasized the importance of “staying away from politics.”

Advocacy requires different skills and attitudes; it also needs organizational capacity, which the NGOs lack. It is difficult to devote the same time and energy to the advocacy activities as is dedicated to core issues. “What we were trying to do really was to make a change at all levels where we could. So grassroots, local governments, regional governments, national government, educational sector, the non-profit sector, we tried to do it all. And this was, of course, we were not very effective on all levels. I mean our strength really was on the local grassroots level, and I think it’s still there.”

Furthermore, it is not clear to the NGO what conditions would impel it to work for policy change. “... for what, and how they want to get the support of policy makers is sort of at a parking place, because I think there is and wasn’t concrete ideas to what they want to get the decision makers’ support for.”

Nevertheless, as one tool of advocacy, Kava's DICE research is the first ever impact evaluation of drama and theater programs in 12 countries. "... it will probably bear some weight, if this 12-country evaluation proves that this kind of activities are effective and they work, and they are really important. So I think that it should have the consequences at the European level as well, and the consequences in the domestic educational policies." It is EU funded research, initiated by Kava, and carried out in partnership with the exporter. It requires significant human resources and research skills that Kava contracts out.

Business thinking, first and foremost, manifests itself in the ability to think long-term about the NGO. Respondents from all but one of the cases mentioned long-term thinking and strategies in one form or another. Respondents from Bator Tabor talked about strategic plans and business plans, which are prepared every three years and annually respectively, for all departments, and for the whole organization. Performance then is measured against these plans. Interviewees from the other NGOs also talked about the importance and existence of strategic plans, but there was no mention of business plans, or using this tool as a basis for performance measurement. The only case in which strategic thinking and planning is differentiated from the business thinking and planning is Bator Tabor, though one other person also stated that "the organization should be run like a business." As a Bator Tabor respondent emphasizes,

"Those camps are doing well at which there is a champion..., who is the engine of all these, and who can bring the business thinking into it. Because we have to consider it as a business. By the way, in my opinion a foundation works well if it is run like a business. And it doesn't work well, if the business thinking doesn't dominate in it, in the organization. [...] It's not enough to have good people who don't have business experience."

This kind of thinking is also an external expectation, required by the Alliance, which performs two main roles: sustainability through fundraising and quality assurance.

“Often it is difficult to bring in these criteria, and indeed, there is a resistance. Thus, it is built in in a different way. [...] camps can apply for financial assistance, and in the grant we have milestones built in; the camp accesses the first amount, but they only get access to the second installment, if they meet certain criteria, and let’s say bring in three additional board members. So through this, through the money, it is easier to bring in this.”

Of note is the fact that the Alliance was formed after several camps had been in operation for a considerable time, so it evidently took some time to figure out these appropriate roles for the Alliance. “... as I said the Alliance found out how it wanted to support the camps in around 2006-2007”.

The role of “business-like” operations in attracting greater funding in the second or third year of program implementation is also confirmed by statements made by those who work at the successful cases. Nonetheless, with the exception of Bator Tabor, personnel had carried out the strategic thinking activities without any formal training or experience, even at the successful NGOs for a considerable length of time, before they hired staff with business backgrounds.

“Yes, I insisted on hiring people who come from the for-profit sector, and who had done this before. Because earlier, I laid the foundations of the two areas in a way that both in financial management and communications I was self-taught, and I was learning them, and I created some systems, but I never formally studied these, and never did it in the for-profit area. And it is a lot different if it is done by somebody who has done it for 10 years.”

Even among the successful NGOs, only in Bator Tabor has a purveyor with strong business thinking who also served as a Maecenas,¹⁹ been present during the entire process. He supported the story from the very beginning; both financially, and by bringing in his contacts. “They [the Maecenas] said, or suggested that this program in the first one or two years should not be about struggling for self-sustainability, but it should prove – because they believed in it very much – it should prove, that indeed it is justified to be in Hungary.” Finding the Maecenas was serendipity, and it came into being through personal contacts. Once he was on board attracting funding became easier.

“Here again the shyness; like how much you can ask from the sponsors, and what you give in exchange. In volunteer organizations it is probably difficult to..., to see that this is a mutual cooperation, but... so he brought this in with his business point of view. And..., and... it has become prestigious to support the Bator Tabor. It was very surprising for me, who in this matter am very inexperienced. Thus, this could be ... in advance; it could be predicted, I mean he knew in advance, that this is how it works.”

The exporter started to take Bator Tabor seriously only when the Maecenas appeared in the picture. That is when the relationship became more of a partnership. The Alliance’s criteria are also about sustainability; there is one criterion that specifically focuses on structural issues that ensure fundraising. This is similar to the other two successful cases. The relationship started to pick up when a Maecenas in the form of a company and a private funder trusted them with a large amount of funding. Nevertheless, the Maecenas’ pushing for expansion created a clash between programming and the business point of view. Adequate funding is essential, but it is also important that it is a

¹⁹ Maecenas is a generous patron especially of literature or art. It is a Latin word, originating from Gaius Maecenas Roman statesman and patron of literature. Its synonyms are donator, donor, benefactor, and patron. In this paper Maecenas refers to a person with strong business aspirations who is also a financial supporter of the case NGO.

bottom-up initiative, and there were many enthusiasts who invested effort in “developing the Hungarian intervention as well as into piloting it.”

Unsuccessful cases

The other trend in policy advocacy, which is characteristic of the unsuccessful NGOs, is as follows. These NGOs carry out policy or advocacy activities from the very beginning, mostly by personally telling the story to individuals in various government positions. “... it would have been the essence in our case too, to provide such services for which per quota funding is provided.” Unlike the successful cases, these NGOs target their advocacy activities at the macro level, and negotiate with government officials. This strategy does not seem to be effective and they only get promises from the decision makers. “... bureaucracy was terrible”. They always told us from the Ministry of Welfare or Social Affairs, or I don’t know what, that ‘Later,’ or ‘Hold on, hold on a little longer, and we will work out the head quota funding,’ but after two years we said ‘Not any more, no, no, we can’t wait for it.’”

Nonetheless, the unsuccessful NGOs did report some progress in policy change, but these occurred in areas in which other non-profits were also active, and that were more general non-profit issues. In addition, Hungary’s accession to the EU also pushed change in those policy areas. As for the interventions of these NGOs, there are currently no concrete results or measurements which would provide a basis for policy advocacy.

Respondents from the unsuccessful NGOs also talked about strategic thinking. However the context in which they use strategy and long-term planning, referred more to vision. As we move from successful to less successful cases, the strategic plan becomes more of a concept and way of thinking, as opposed to a specific, concrete management

tool. As pointed out earlier, there is only one case in which strategic thinking and planning is differentiated from the business thinking and planning. In addition, interview data revealed that in the unsuccessful organizations there was a lack of a person with strong business backgrounds or inclinations. Neither was the importance of applying business principles in their operations recognized by the NGOs' staff. In general, there is an apparent void of business thinking in the unsuccessful cases.

This absence of business principles had an impact on the NGOs' ability to attract noteworthy funding at an early phase in the model implementation. As seen in data from the successful cases, to be able to attract such funding, "business-like" operations and long term goals and strategies are required. Their lack is apparent in the two unsuccessful cases.

4.3.5 Management and Evaluation

“And for a while I thought that it was difficult for this method to spread and have 15-20-30 such groups in Hungary, because exactly this management piece somehow did not get into people's heads. So, until even today, I see that somehow this is not..., it's not in the heads that if you have something, then you have to manage it, too. So that you shouldn't count on others, but it is you who have to make it happen, to organize it together, you need to go after things; you need to get the opportunities. Yes, you need those competencies that you either learn yourself, or you get the right person who has them.”

This quote from the CEO of one of the successful cases, demonstrates the importance of management, and how it is often overlooked in the operations of Hungarian non-profits. At the same time, as pointed out earlier in the Values and Philosophy section of this chapter, there was no model of management provided from the

exporter partner. Characteristically, in the beginning there were no real efforts put into management; in fact management practices were not adopted, or even considered, but rather were recreated by all of the importing NGOs, as they were moving forward with program implementation. Yet, inadvertently, the examples of the exporting partners in terms of management were at work here, and the importer eventually created similar management structures. This is in line with the survey results. The importance of Management was scored lower, at 3.89. At the same time, the survey found, that Management, at 4.52., played a significant role in the actual transfer.

One surprising additional aspect that emerged from the data is the differences in the culture of the place of origin and the replication site with regards to organization of work. Based on the interviews, these differences all appeared in the context of how they affected the importing NGOs' management practices; therefore, they are presented under variable management. Interview data revealed six distinct areas of difference. They are: 1.) program structure: Bator Tabor's 'staff' versus 'volunteers' set up; 2.) regulations: Bator Tabor's resuscitation, or CSF's alternative day-time care; and 3.) physical characteristics, such as distance: Bator Tabor's recruiter meetings in Europe versus in the US. There are also differences in the non-profits' relationships with 4.) government and 5.) funders. The former in the exporter countries is characterized by longer and better developed contracting out for services; while the later in those countries is less bureaucratic, and built more on trust and mutual understanding. "In the US, and in the Anglo-Saxon world somehow it works in a more normal way, that is 20 or 30% of your costs comes from some sort of government or public funding, because you provide a public service. And here you get shot in the foot, if three of your receipts are not in a

given order. So the existing system, the government so to say, doesn't recognize that this is a public service." These, in turn, influence fundraising methods, as well.

"What does the EU do? You fill out 450 pages of paper, and it doesn't really look at who you are, or what you do. Based on the papers, if it matches you'll get the money, if it doesn't, then you won't. With the American funders, there is a longer period at the beginning, when they get to know you, and see whether you are good or not, what is happening, and if you can stay on your feet. [...] after this period is through, and they already trust you, you'll get the money, and you are free to spend it in any ways, because they know that professionally you are good. So this is a big difference."

And last, but not least, there are differences in 6.) values: there is an apparent difference in the level of democracy between the exporter and the importer countries, as well as in management practices. "It [implementing the model] meant breaking with the cultural tradition, cultural educational values, [...] of the culture that was present within the educational system. [...] And so it's kind of a clash of values I think."

Due to these differences in values, it was obvious from the very beginning of the model transfer that the importers would have to work with attitudes.

"...the outcome [of the research] was that the values, that were really prevalent in the educational system and culture, were that of competition, rivalry, very top-down didactic teaching, very encyclopedic knowledge transfer, and on top of that it was very much about... ...I mean this was obviously not... let's say... part of the formal content of education. But what was also prevalent was the culture trying to beat and cheat the system, trying to beat others, I mean not as in beating, but as in competition: if you want to win, the others should also lose. And if the others lose, no, if you lose, then the others have to lose, too."

Significant time, two to five years was needed for Hungarian clients to realize the advantages of the new approach, and to develop positive attitudes towards it. There was an incompatibility of attitudes and understanding from the side of the importer as

compared to the exporter. At times, greater flexibility was needed by the importer to understand how things worked in Hungary, i.e. that it was different from how they worked in their own country, and from their experiences. In these cases, it was a challenge to meet exporter expectations that were not compatible with the Hungarian mentality and public thinking, and thus required different management techniques.

“In the US there is such an incredible level of camping culture, if I tell a person ‘look at this kid, he is sick and cannot go to camp,’ the person knows what I’m talking about, because everybody needs the experience of camping. [...] It is not what you have to tell people in Europe, but you have to say ‘look at this kid, he doesn’t get enough emotional support, and if we can take him to camp, then he will have therapeutic recreation, and he can get what he needs to heal there.’ Therefore, I saw this primarily in the camps’ communication; in the US it was ‘fun and joy’, and here it was ‘healing’.”

Successful cases

The interviews indicate that for the successful case NGOs, there is a general trend of about a ten year development process. All three have gone through a similar progress. At the very beginning, there are a few enthusiastic individuals who see the model in a foreign country. They think that the model would be a good idea and a needed service in Hungary, and start working on implementing it. They work as volunteers, mostly in their spare time, and without organizational support. Characteristically at this point everybody works in every position; everybody does everything. This is also a point at which the path of the NGO towards institutionalization is decided. Successful cases recognize the weight of the management aspect in the model transfer.

After the initial experiences and trying out the model in Hungary, some adaptation happens and the model is adjusted to the Hungarian circumstances, including not only clients’ needs and the operating environment in general, but also the lack of

infrastructure and management capacities. Typically this period lasts two to five years, until the point when a Maecenas embraces the cause and financial support of significance is secured. This coincides with the beginning of professionalization in the NGO. “But at that point things couldn’t be passed on via the lip service, but, but... at that point the need for putting everything in writing became a lot stronger and..., and that everything cannot be taken for granted, it cannot be taken for granted that everybody knows everything from ancient times.”

At this point, certain management functions are delineated and separate positions are created for them. They are the CEO, and a marketing and/or fundraising position. At all three NGOs, an administrative assistant position was also created and filled. After the initial informal management system, real progress starts when a business plan is developed, and a CEO is hired who is able to focus on business aspects, as opposed to program aspects. This typically happens in the sixth or seventh year. Operations in this now segmented management structure allow for further development of the main activities, characteristically in quality, and to a lesser extent in quantity. However, balancing programming and management is still challenging.

At the same time, the influx of a higher level of funding to the NGOs is coupled with the appearance of an external requirement for adhering to standards, and/or quality improvement. At Bator Tabor it is the international alliance of similar camps from all over the world that poses strict criteria for membership. In Kava’s case it is self-driven and means participation in projects aiming at quality improvement and organizational excellence. And at DIA, it is a large amount of funding from a multinational company that requires the NGO to meet set indicators and systematic evaluation of programs.

This period of focus on programmatic development and quality improvement takes another three to five years at each NGO. At this point another substantial expansion of management functions happens, and characteristically positions in finance, communication and marketing are added to the staff. All three of the successful NGOs are at this point in their life cycle. Operations are stable and can be planned, however interviewees estimate another five years will be needed before financial stability can be reached.

When the importing NGO starts to move in the direction of professional management and thus, alters the usual operational pattern, the original founders of the model in Hungary often do not understand its necessity. Or rather, it is very hard for them to accept these changes. They often feel hurt and left out, and there is a clash between their original intent to do good, and the institutionalization and professionalization of the organization.

A distinct hiring trend can also be outlined based on the data. It seems that during the beginning phase hiring is accidental. The NGO starts out with volunteers, or people who are enthusiasts for the cause. Then they meet people with whom there is mutual interest and the new people join in the work, typically also as volunteers. Then this turns into a half time position, then the new person starts to find his place within the organization, and eventually it turns into a full time position. In the beginning, program and management tasks are not separated; everybody does everything “in an incredibly awkward way,” because people have neither knowledge, nor experience in management. “No, no, no, we didn’t even call it management.” To avoid shifts in the model and assure model fidelity, in the beginning program people are insiders – friends and friends of

friends. Once that kind of human capacity is built up, they start to open up positions for external people. The lack of human resources capacity to conduct the hiring process, coupled with the ambiguity of the positions with no specified competencies, often results in hiring the wrong person. Because of this kind of hiring pattern, there is an evident lack of staff competencies in many areas.

“A further difficulty was that this organization did not have a real leader. [...] there was a Board, that basically did not operate, there was a President, who became the president out of friendship, [...] who was very sharp and loved the founder, and loved the organization, but who did not have a clue about this. And then, there was the CEO, who did not speak English, and another person who was the fundraiser, who spoke very good English and was good in writing grant proposals, but he did not have any ideas about how to develop an organization. So there was this very interesting conglomerate in which everybody was very determined and dedicated, only there was no professionalism in it.”

Even later, in the more established operations, most of the staff comes in from volunteer positions. There is a characteristic movement in positions from volunteering to staff to board, and from board to staff to advisory committee, and so on. “And then X, and Y, and Z were called in to sit on the board. I don’t think it is good, because it is not a good idea to fill up the board with ex-staff members, because then the external view is not represented. But at least people who are sitting there understand what it is all about.” This practice seems to create situations in which the necessary competencies for each of these distinct positions are circumvented. “So, sooner or later it turns out that you need either structure or professionalism, because otherwise it doesn’t work.”

Usually the program or intervention is the most defined system; things start out there and then trickle into management, and written procedures are established after a while. As one respondent stated, it is a drawback, if there is a huge gap between the

levels of development of program and of management. The two should develop parallel to each other. In each of the successful cases, at first the program aspect is stronger and more developed; then there is a focus on creating additional funding, which helps solidify the management; after that there is a new focus on program expansion, and it works in stages.

“... the program and health systems are the most developed of the foundation. [...] in fundraising we have a lot more deficiencies than in the other work groups, and there is not really where to develop what we are currently doing in those program areas, in my opinion. Yet, those are always the primary focus of development, and if it is not possible to accept 50 more kids, or add another camp session, then we are going to work on making the lunch break of the staff more effective in terms of time use. It is a very interesting example.”

It is interesting, that despite the program being almost fully developed, with fundraising lagging behind, development efforts are still being focused on programming.

Evaluation is done internally and mostly at the program level. Only Bator Tabor has regular program and staff performance evaluation, planned on a yearly basis, built into the processes of each of its work groups. The other two successful NGOs also make conscious efforts to conduct such reviews, but their actual evaluation practices remain sporadic. There is consensus on the importance of evaluation among respondents. At the same time, there is an apparent primacy of anecdotal evidence at all cases.

External evaluation only appears in two ways: to the extent of available volunteer capacity to conduct research, and by the external expectations of funders to measure programs. This, however, does not imply additional capacity for evaluation. Occasionally there are bigger research or evaluation efforts, which help to align the program with the Hungarian circumstances. “In my opinion this evaluation a little bit

brought the program down from the level of American slogans to the level of simple everyday reality of what it does, what it gives to people, or how it impacts people involved in it.”

There is also consensus that it is important to measure feedback from clients. It would be important to “make this possible to measure objectively, with research, because this is a professional intervention, and we should be able to demonstrate its effectiveness on graphs, too. This is very difficult.” Despite the will to create objective measures, client feedback remains mostly subjective and anecdotal.

“Well, if you ask many drama teachers how they know that their class was good, then they will start saying something, but most likely, sooner or later, they will talk about their feelings, or believe that they are convinced, that they saw it on the kids, that they saw how the kids reacted. But they won’t be able to prove it for you, because these researches are in their childhood. More specifically they don’t exist.”

Many respondents talk about the same thing. They state that the kids’ reception of the program is very positive, and clients are open to the services. At the same time, the impact of human services on clients is very hard to measure, and it takes a long time before the results of an intervention can be viewed. Appropriate measurement tools are rare, or do not exist. Kava’s DICE is the first objective measurement of the impact of drama and theatre education programs, not only in Hungary, but also around the world. It has happened about 15 years after the model was first implemented in Hungary and remains a unique effort.

There is also a lack of evaluation skills and methodology even within the successful case NGOs. Several respondents reported that they had to learn how to evaluate, or to meet the right professionals who were able to provide the framework.

Quantitative measurements are imposed by funders; but some respondents do not understand them or believe that these are appropriate to measure attitude change.

“We have run this [evaluation] three times already, and all three times it has yielded very similar results on totally different sample groups of kids. So it seems that it is working more or less, but fundamentally we don’t believe in such quantitative methods at all. In other words, that we can appropriately measure development of competencies by using these quantitative methods, but the funders insist on the quantitative methods.”

Furthermore, as described in the Identification of Need section of this chapter, feedback from all stakeholder groups is not consciously collected. It is limited mostly to clients, staff, funders, and in some cases to local government. In terms of all other stakeholder groups it does not exist.

In addition to the cultural differences described in the beginning discussion of this variable, language has emerged from the data as an issue that poses significant challenges to management, as well as one that has considerable impact on the success of model transfer. As interviewees from the successful NGOs point out, the lack of good English language skills on the part of the Hungarians is a problem, because their understanding the model in the beginning might not have been sufficient. “... of the whole methodology that they saw in England, what those people who went there and who translated the text, what they understood of this? [...] there were really nice translations, beautiful texts, but it could be seen that he didn’t understand what the original convention was about. There were some translational drifts at times.”

Language as a source of difficulties has been pointed out by several respondents. They feel that communication with the exporters or partners is often not good enough. “Language skills were a difficulty. [...] it is a must to have people here on the Hungarian

side who are good enough both professionally and with the language, so that they can bring this model here.” In addition, modern communication tools, such as teleconferencing, are not the best communication channels, when language is an issue. “For me teleconferencing is hard, when we have 18 people on the line, and they all speak with different accents.”

When bringing in a new model or approach, the importer must establish new concepts, which often involves the introduction of new terms; this requires attention and additional work and human capacity. “We needed ten years before the vocabulary was cleared out. [...] It took a lot of time to create something real in Hungarian from the translated materials. So that it made sense and could be used. In the case of a model, where such terms appear that do not have a Hungarian equivalent, we should have figured those out first.” Working in two different languages, and as partners with the exporter, creates at the minimum, an additional cost of the translation, in terms of either staff time, or money. “We have to have everything in English, too, so it’s a horror. It costs a lot, even if I translate them; then it costs my work time. [...] At the same time I have a drive to show how good we are, so everything should be translated.”

In addition, terms, interventions, elements, rules, etc. have to be “interpreted and explained”, or reasoned out differently in Hungary, as the example of the 2:1 staff to kid ratio at Bator Tabor, as described above in the Identification of Need section, demonstrates. “So all this, not only the curriculum, but also the language must be repackaged.” The reasons behind a rule are important, so at times it is safer to accept some rules as they are. This presupposes a certain level of trust in the model and in the exporter.

“It is hard [...] to make people here to accept that it is important, maybe it is important in America, because of that, but we reevaluated it and it has a meaning with regards to Hungary, too. [...] There are some issues that we need to think through, need to re-construe, need to say a half a sentence differently about it, and because of that it immediately gains sense, or fits more in the situation in which we are using it. And so these are sometimes difficult.”

Unsuccessful cases

The story of the two unsuccessful cases starts out similarly to the successful ones. The decision to adopt is individual and there is one purveyor, who tries to gather other enthusiasts around him. But there are a limited number of supporters in these NGOs; typically only two or three. They are all involved in all aspects of the work, yet the lack of a critical mass of devotees prevents the NGO from moving towards institutionalization. This phenomenon is coupled with an emphasis on the intervention. Unsuccessful cases did not give any weight to management aspects. As one respondent says “We were not so much interested in the organizational and management aspects of it, but from our point of view the professional/intervention aspect.” Another one adds that “The biggest problem of the whole program is that it doesn’t have a management body, because we didn’t want to institutionalize it, like many other projects.” The third one then explains; “When we started to do this it was so early that it would have needed a very strong management. So that we could get it accepted.”

One interviewee from NYIKE stated that they should have created a management division for the senior volunteering model, but they never worked that way. Instead they relied on interpersonal relations when forming their partnerships. He also explained that at some point in the model implementation they were trying to persuade the seniors (i.e. their clients) to take on the management roles.

Respondents from unsuccessful cases also report that their NGOs do not evaluate their services. “- ‘How do you measure results’? - ‘I don’t know. We don’t measure them.’ - ‘No’? - ‘No. I don’t know what I could say, because we didn’t introduce a model, but an approach. And well..., how can we measure that? For example by looking at the areas at which the official introduction of this approach has happened.’” It seems that it is hard for the NGOs to conceptualize how to measure the impact of their work, thus they do not put any efforts in it.

4.4 ATTRIBUTES OF SUCCESS OF MODEL TRANSFER / SUSTAINABILITY EMERGING FROM THE DATA

This section will summarize the findings focusing on the main research question of characteristics and defining attributes of success/sustainability of model transfers, as people on the ground of importing NGOs view them. To do that, it will synthesize information from three sources: 1.) the NGO staff definitions of the success of model transfer presented in the case descriptions, 2.) the data, that emerged from the responses with regards to the independent variables, and that relate to success of model transfer, and 3.) the data that was collected from the surveys.

In both the interviews and the surveys, questions were two-tiered. On one hand, they asked what respondents thought made a model transfer successful on a hypothetical level. The other set of questions collected information on what actually happened when the NGO transferred the model to Hungary. This part of the paper presents these combined findings.

As the data suggest, it was really hard for the interviewees to define success, and basically there were as many “definitions,” as the number of respondents. Nevertheless, it seems that organizational affiliation influences how individuals define success. In other words, the “definitions” given by the staff of the same organization seem to revolve around the same attributes. In addition, how they see “model transfer,” is also shaped by their organizational membership. The main themes that emerged from the interviews in response to this question are summarized in Table 9. These items are discussed in detail under the description of each NGO, earlier in this chapter.

Table 9. Attributes of Success of Model Transfer According to Staff by NGO

	Successful Cases			Unsuccessful Cases	
	Bator Tabor	DIA	Kava	CSF	NYIKE
Model is the same in Hungary	■				
Outcomes with clients are the same	■	■	■	■	
Model adapted to Hungarian reality	■	■	■		■
Changing attitudes in Hungary		■	■	■	
Creating need for service in Hungary				■	
Service (model) meets a need	■	■	■		
There is a significant cause					■
Strong operating philosophy & values	■	■			
High quality services			■		
Clear model description	■	■	■		
Fidelity to model	■				
Piloting model in Hungary					■
Model is embedded/spreads in Hungary		■	■		■
Results are measurable	■		■		
Strong management		■	■		■
Stable operations	■				
Financial stability	■				
No pressure for expansion	■				
Staff enjoys working in it	■				
Charismatic and credible leader		■			
Positive feedback from exporter NGO	■		■		
Partnering relationship with exporter	■		■		
Depends on goal of transfer				■	
Depends on what the model is				■	

Generally speaking there are two groups of valuations of success. While many interviewees mentioned both aspects influencing the success of model transfer, they typically emphasized one or the other. One group of interviewees saw success as the survival of the NGO and its dynamic growth. Others saw, or would like to see, success as producing the same outcomes for clients as those produced by the exporter, and having the model embedded in the system of care in Hungary.

Contrary to the later, in the survey, respondents scored “Integration with the local system” (2.43), and “Model fidelity” (2.47) the lowest on the list of items’ importance in model transfer. Table 10. shows the average scores of all respondents on the importance of the model constructs, and on the extent to which the importing NGOs carried them out in the model transfer process. Despite the “Model fidelity” subscale’s low score when its importance is regarded, respondents reported that in reality, strictly sticking to the model contributed a lot to the success of their NGO’s model transfer, as the score of 4.17 indicates. This corresponds with the interview findings, since interviewees emphasized, that they did not change anything in the original model, especially in the early phase of the transfer.

Table 10. Average Staff Score on Model Constructs by All Respondents

(1. Importance of Item: “In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates successfully, if...”

1=not important; 2=somewhat important; 3=important; 4=very important; 5=essential)

(2. Item in Reality: “In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model transfer from abroad, that...”

1=not at all; 2=a little; 3=somewhat; 4=much; 5=very much)

Subscale	1. Importance of Item		2. Item in Reality	
	n	Average (Standard Deviation)	n	Average (Standard Deviation)
Financial stability	75	3.80 (.866)	62	3.69 (.814)
Quality of service	75	4.33 (.455)	62	4.28 (.524)
Needs assessment	75	4.21 (.632)	54	3.61 (.787)
Fit w/ local reality	-	-	63	3.79 (.530)
Integration w/ local system	73	2.43 (.858)	-	-
Model fidelity	73	2.47 (.973)	64	4.17 (.451)
Management	75	3.89 (.440)	60	4.52 (.504)
Managing change in reality	-	-	64	3.92 (.613)
Program evaluation in reality	-	-	60	4.31 (.720)

As shown in Table 9., the definition of success of the model transfer involves very similar aspects in the successful cases. The same is true for the unsuccessful cases to some extent. How respondents from the two groups describe NGO experiences with the model transfer, and define its success will be introduced in the following.

Successful cases

Interviewees from the successful NGOs define success as having the same model operating in Hungary as at the place of origin, or at least, the basic operations being the

same. Building the program from bottom up, and ensuring buy-in from the direct beneficiaries from the beginning contribute to its success. They also mention that the model is successful if it achieves the same outcomes with clients in Hungary, as at the place of origin, and if staff and volunteers enjoy working in it.

Additionally, it is desirable for the model to become embedded into the Hungarian system. The model becomes part of the system, if it operates without the exporter NGO's involvement, and when there is per head funding. In other words, the model should be the same in Hungary at least in its basics, as in its place of origin, and embedded into the environment taking into consideration its cultural, social, economic, and other specific characteristics. "I think the model in and of itself is not interesting. A ready-made thing handed to you is never interesting. You only need it until you lay the basics, so that you can get started in some direction, but obviously it becomes interesting when you start shaping it to your own taste, and you start to establish it, and you start to fit it into the society in which you live." However, from the perspective of the model being embedded and diffused in Hungary there is no real achievement in any of the cases.

The average scores on the model constructs at the successful NGOs, presented in Table 11., seemingly contradict the above statement. The subscales of "Integration with the local system," and "Model fidelity" are the two lowest ranked items, at 2.45 and 2.47 respectively, in terms of their importance in the success of the model transfer. In other words, NGO staff does not believe that these two aspects are important to the success of the model transfer. At the same time, they report that these two items contributed considerably to the success of the actual transfer their NGOs carried out (3.8 and 4.18 respectively).

Based on the interview data, there are two distinct approaches to embedding the model into the local system. One, pursued by the successful cases, is “deepening”, the other one is “broadening” as it can be observed in the unsuccessful cases. Bator Tabor and Kava’s approach, in which they implement the model with high fidelity, exemplifies deepening. This approach deepens professionals’ (staff’s) understanding of the model, its interventions, and the theories behind the intervention. At the same time, the scope of the model diffusion remains narrow – only one or two professional groups are offering the service in the whole country. Kava takes both approaches at the same time; they implement TIE with high fidelity, but also put significant effort into building a network of providers. On the contrary, DIA respondents emphasized that they took the broadening approach; nonetheless, they also stated that they remained focused on staff’s profound understanding of the model.

Table 11. Average Staff Score on Model Constructs by Respondents from Successful Cases

(1. Importance of Item: “In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates successfully, if...”

1=not important; 2=somewhat important; 3=important; 4=very important; 5=essential)

(2. Item in Reality: “In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model transfer from abroad, that...”

1=not at all; 2=a little; 3=somewhat; 4=much; 5=very much)

Subscale	1. Importance of Item		2. Item in Reality	
	n	Average (Standard Deviation)	n	Average (Standard Deviation)
Management	51	3.91 (.459)	51	4.56 (.512)
Program evaluation in reality	-	-	51	4.33 (.719)
Quality of service	51	4.34 (.443)	51	4.24 (.519)
Model fidelity	50	2.47 (.960)	51	4.18 (.482)
Managing change in reality	-	-	51	3.91 (.587)
Fit w/ local reality	-	-	51	3.80 (.559)
Financial stability	51	3.88 (.810)	51	3.74 (.801)
Needs assessment	51	4.22 (.610)	43	3.55 (.815)
Integration w/ local system	49	2.45 (.841)	-	-

Furthermore, as shown in Table 9., a clear and exact understanding of the model is also a necessary criterion of success. Some respondents point out that a clear model description is needed, and importers must understand how the model operates at the

original site. Several respondents even emphasized the need for a written model. However, all interviewees expressed some ambiguity about the model.

Success is being able to run the model at the locale according to the international standards. At the same time, respondents raise the question of how the Hungarian public views the model; whether it is seen as a local model, or perceived as a foreign program. There seems to be agreement on the importance of emphasizing the local model concept, at least in program communication.

Therefore, another element of the success of model transfer, as stated in the interviews, is that it must be adapted to Hungarian circumstances (cultural, social, economic, etc.); that is, it has to be developed into a Hungarian model. Yet, strict model fidelity is required at the early phase of model transfer, before adaptation starts. Program innovation is also necessary: there is a constant development of the model at the origin, too. “I think that the fact that with all the changes we have made in the model and the way we are operating, we can still remain members in the Alliance means that those things that we changed are better or more innovative”. The transfer never finishes: continuous program development occurs at both the original and the destination sites. Hence, the transfer of the model is continuous; there is constant learning from the exporter.

For the successful cases, it is also an indicator of success when the exporter acknowledges the high quality of the work by the importer, and the feedback from the exporter is positive. The relationship with the exporter over time must be developed into a partnership, in which both exporter and importer contribute to the model development. As the data indicates, this partnership necessitates flexibility on the part of the importer in

managing cultural differences. Membership in an alliance of similar programs in different countries is desirable, and the local organizations should not operate as “islands.” One respondent points out that in international ventures or transfers, this piece is often missing. The high “Quality of service” was also emphasized in the surveys. Respondents believe that it is important to the success of a model transfer that their NGOs did well in terms of providing high quality services. The average scores for this response are 4.34 and 4.24 correspondingly (Table 11.).

In addition, it is important for the NGO’s services to fit the clients’ needs and respond to an existing need; as well as to serve a purpose. Similarly, operating on a strong set of basic program values is also an attribute of success, as well as remaining faithful to the traditions of the original model, and keeping the program structure intact. “I am working the same way with my staff as I expect them to work with teachers and students”. Yet another element of success is a charismatic, credible leader, or purveyor, who has the ability to credibly tell the NGO’s story. Approximately half of the respondents mentioned good management as a vital component of success.

Furthermore, the model is successfully transferred when the organization has reached a state of stable operations and financial sustainability. These are achieved through ensuring that at least one staff person or other close supporter with strong business aspirations is involved in the transfer process. In addition, to define success, the results must be measurable and a systematic evaluation to measure outcomes empirically is deemed desirable.

Unsuccessful cases

In their definitions of the success of the model transfer, respondents from the unsuccessful cases share the view of achieving the same outcomes with clients, and the model becoming widespread in Hungary, as the desirable state. At the same time, as Table 12. indicates in the surveys they rate the importance of “Integration with local system,” and “Model fidelity” low, at 2.92 and 3.25 correspondingly. In their opinion, in reality their NGOs did carry out these aspects to a greater extent, at 3.48 and 3.88, yet these scores are lower than in the successful cases.

Interviewees from these NGOs also name considerably fewer aspects necessary for the successful transfer of the model, than their counterparts at the successful NGOs. Table 9. illustrates that in CSF’s case there is confusion about the goal of the model transfer, and about what the model is. In NYIKE’s case, although respondents stressed the importance of a significant cause as a prerequisite for success, their responses seem to indicate a lack of such in their NGO.

Table 12. Average Staff Score on Model Constructs by Respondents from Unsuccessful Cases

(1. Importance of Item: “In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates successfully, if...”

1=not important; 2=somewhat important; 3=important; 4=very important; 5=essential)

(2. Item in Reality: “In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model transfer from abroad, that...”

1=not at all; 2=a little; 3=somewhat; 4=much; 5=very much)

Subscale	1. Importance of Item		2. Item in Reality	
	n	Average (Standard Deviation)	n	Average (Standard Deviation)
Quality of service	6	4.72 (.267)	5	4.30 (.542)
Management	6	4.10 (.267)	5	4.28 (.110)
Managing change in reality	-	-	5	4.17 (.408)
Program evaluation in reality	-	-	5	4.10 (.894)
Model fidelity	6	3.25 (.935)	5	3.88 (.179)
Needs assessment	6	4.67 (.258)	5	3.60 (.418)
Fit w/ local reality	-	-	5	3.48 (.294)
Financial stability	6	3.67 (.876)	5	3.07 (.596)
Integration w/ local system	6	2.92 (1.281)	-	-

When examining average scores on the survey constructs given by survey respondents at the unsuccessful cases, it is evident that the subscales given the highest scores for their contribution to the success of the NGOs’ model transfers are “Quality of service,” “Management,” “Managing change in reality,” and “Program evaluation in

reality.” The high scores given to these constructs contradict the interview findings. In the interviews conducted at these NGOs, these items were not mentioned at all, or were not emphasized.

As stated earlier in this section, two distinct approaches to embedding the model into the Hungarian system were identified. In their model transfer efforts, CSF and NYIKE chose to take the “broadening” approach. Despite the piloting of the model in Hungary, and CSF’s initial strict model fidelity, these NGOs have opted for spreading the approach to a greater number of organizations and individuals in the country via presentations about the model and its philosophies. The hope is to change the audiences’ attitudes to one that is more conducive for the model transfer. Due to this perception, even random positive responses by different areas and fields who expressed interest in the specific approach, are identified as successes for the model transfer. Also, this approach leaves the intervention/model at more or less a surface level, in terms of professionals’ understanding of the intervention itself, and its underlying theories. Nonetheless, positive attitudes are developed in a significant number of people, which later on might support the implementation of the full model with high fidelity.

Finally, adaptation of the model to the Hungarian circumstances is listed as an element of the success of model transfer. However, in NYIKE’s case that meant the reinvention of the model in Hungary. As interviewees report, they designed their own model to be implemented in Hungary within the loose framework of what they believed the model was.

The Case of DIA

DIA has been classified as a successful case. However, when examining aspects of success of the model transfer, DIA's practices fall between the successful and unsuccessful cases. DIA respondents agreed that a key element of success is having their model achieve the same outcomes with clients as the original model. From this point of view, model transfer is deemed successful because the concept is becoming recognized in Hungary. DIA's creation of opportunities for participants to experience community is a positive result given the Hungarian reality. Thus, in that sense, it achieves similar outcomes with clients as were achieved at the origin site.

DIA staff also kept emphasizing, that their organization did not transfer a model: "We cannot say that we transferred a model, because we brought over an approach [thought/idea], the implementation of which is not even close to the one in the US." DIA employs a special tactic within the "broadening" approach: they work mostly with part-time staff to establish more ties to the local community. At the same time, as stated earlier they expect their staff to have a high level of understanding of the model or intervention.

To sum up the findings about success of model transfer versus organizational sustainability, it can be concluded that the picture remains ambiguous. Based on the findings, it is very difficult to differentiate between the model and the NGO when talking about success. Only one of the case NGOs makes a clear distinction between the model and the organization itself. As the findings revealed, the model is successful if/when it is incorporated into the local system of care, and head quota funding becomes available. At

the same time, the NGO is heavily dependent on funders' support, which often causes the model to drift.

From an organizational point of view (infrastructure and financial resources), the approximately 10 year development period of the three successful cases is satisfactory. There is now an organizational identity, established management, significant sources of funding, a strong network, etc. But the same is not true for the model transfer. According to a respondent, the transfer is finished, and success is achieved "when you have your own model and its multidimensional development can start," which includes diffusion.

5.0 DISCUSSION

The research question examined the characteristics and defining attributes of Success of Model Transfer or Sustainability, and five other variables: Identification of Need, Values and Philosophy, Investment in People, Business Approach, and Management and Evaluation as perceived by staff of Hungarian NGOs who imported human services models to the country. The results of the investigation provide a descriptive picture of the views and opinions of key personnel from five Hungarian NGOs' on importing a human service model in terms of the above six aspects.

The quasi-hypothesis of the study was that success of model transfers and their sustainability is dependent on factors that are encompassed in the five variables. However, due to the lack of research into the nature of the issue, the current examination remained at the exploratory level. Despite this, it can be stated that the findings of the research seem to have confirmed my hypothesis of the independent variables influence on the success of the model transfer. Though the findings and their implications cannot be conclusive, the aspects of the hypothesized variables appeared in the interviewees' stories, as well as in the surveys. Some surprising factors have emerged, too. For example, one of them is the lack of the ability to communicate effectively with the foreign partner influencing the quality of the transfer.

This chapter will discuss and interpret the main findings. The findings are systematically compared with the hypothetical factors of the variables, focusing on what contributes to the success of the model transfer. Specific focus is given to what differentiates successful cases from the unsuccessful ones. First, the story of the successful cases is summarized, highlighting items from the findings about what contributed to their success in the model transfer. Findings are presented systematically variable by variable, and discussed in relation to the existing literature on transfers of soft technologies in the international context. The same process is then repeated for the unsuccessful cases. This is followed by highlighting the differentiating factors; items responsible for the achievements of the successful cases and interpreting them in the light of the literature. Finally, the limitations of the study are discussed, and implications for further research are presented.

5.1 EXPERIENCES OF THE SUCCESSFUL CASES

The major findings of the definition of success of model transfer or sustainability yielded a confused picture on staff views, regardless of whether they worked for a successful or an unsuccessful NGO. It was difficult for personnel to delineate the timeframe within which they could interpret success. Therefore, there were almost as many “definitions” of success as there were respondents. Nonetheless, in the information gleaned from the successful cases, two distinct criteria were laid out as measures of success: 1. the model producing the same outcomes with clients as at the place of origin; and 2. the model becoming embedded in the system of the importing country. Both of these aspects are

more prevalent at the successful NGOs. These responses are somewhat contradicted by the lowest score of 2.45 of the survey constructs being “Integration with local system”, when survey respondents from the successful cases ranked the factors by their importance to the model transfer. See Table 11.

Survival of the NGO was also mentioned, but only in the context of organizational development. From the point of view of the development of the NGO as an organization, respondents were satisfied and proud, although this fact was not closely tied to the success of the model. This was not mentioned by personnel at the two unsuccessful cases.

Comparing the findings with the attributes of the six variables established in the conceptual framework it is evident, that all of those factors are mentioned in the data in one form or another. Some of these aspects are mentioned, some of them are valued, and some of them are desired. In the next section the factors that emerged from the findings related to each variable are compared to the hypothesized ones.

Identification of Need

The key question of this variable in my hypothesis was how the need is different from that of the clients at the origin of the model. It was presumed that many NGOs only assume the need, as opposed to conducting rigorous needs assessment to justify the transfer. Furthermore, I argued that there should be a process of adapting the original model to meet the local needs in place.

The findings confirm the assumptions made about this variable. There was no real demand for the services in Hungary, and there was also a lack of a needs assessment conducted before the decision to adopt, even in all of the successful cases. Instead, the

purveyors felt a strong attraction to the model, and perceived a need for it in Hungary. Thus, the decision to adopt was more emotional than rational.

At the same time, there was a longer trial period, since the initial implementation was rather informal, based on personal networks. During the initial phase, the purveyor collected about eight to ten enthusiasts to work on implementation. These enthusiasts, just like the purveyors themselves, were younger in age, without any existential pressure or substantial other commitments. Thus, in the beginning they were able to invest a lot of time and energy into the model implementation.

Rogers (1962) talks about the nature of the adopters. In his review of earlier studies he found that early adopters are younger in age, have a higher social status, have a more favorable financial position, and tend to have more specialized operations. Rogers, however, examined these characteristics in terms of when the members of a community adopted an innovation. Yet, these features may be relevant in predicting the success of a social service model transfer in the context of less developed countries. Purveyors of the successful cases were younger than the ones at the unsuccessful NGOs. Contrary to Rogers' findings, they were of lower social status and in a less stable personal financial situation. Nevertheless, in the Hungarian context, these were individuals who were courageous enough to put all their eggs in one basket, and who had higher capability to absorb the losses from a potential failure of the model transfer. In that sense, the findings are in line with those of Rogers. Further research could determine the influence of purveyor characteristics on the success of model transfer.

During the piloting phase, enthusiasts were looking for the right paths, and attempted to assess needs. Though the nature and quality of the needs assessment

attempts remain questionable, it is apparent that these initiatives were consciously and continuously conducted at the successful cases. Based on the results of these efforts, the NGOs were trying to fit the model with the Hungarian reality. Data suggest that most of the adaptation happened because of the differences in attitudes that were experienced in the pilot phase.

Yet, respondents claim that in the beginning they stuck to the model strictly in order to be on the safe side. Adaptations of the model came only after piloting, and were based on experiences obtained from the pilot. Fixsen et al. (2005) point out, that adaptations that are made after a model has been implemented with fidelity, are more successful. The survey yielded a similar result, since respondents from the successful cases reported the same thing; likewise a similar result emerged from the interviews. Specifically, these respondents rated their NGOs at 4.18 when asked to what extent the model implementation was carried out with fidelity. The surprising point, however, is that they ranked model fidelity the second lowest at 2.47, as shown in Table 11., on the list of factors important in the success of model transfer. In addition, interviewees from DIA mentioned that even crucial elements of the model were abandoned due to its lack of fit with Hungarian attitudes.

Therefore, the research seems to have confirmed, that realizing existing problems and performing an assessment of needs are supporting factors in the success of model transfers. Interviewees of the successful cases expressed the viewpoint that when they finally assessed needs, and learned more about existing issues with clients, the support and services offered by the NGO changed, and became more targeted towards those needs. Again, at the successful cases, needs assessment and evaluation attempts have

been present from early on, and all during the implementation process. Based on the results, adjustments to the model and aligning it to local circumstances are a continuous endeavor.

Values and Philosophy

This variable revolves around the issue of why the service is delivered in a particular manner. In other words, it deals with the question of model fidelity vs. flexibility, or adoption vs. adaptation. It was assumed that the model or intervention exported would have strong values and an operating philosophy attached to it as demonstrated by the people who are exporting the model, and that the values and philosophy would resonate with those of the stakeholders on the recipient side. Furthermore, it was also presumed, that the question of the “push” and “pull” effect would also shape the underlying values and philosophy.

As the findings revealed basic values are present and lived every day in the importing NGOs. As expressed by the respondents, there was a momentum in society conducive for the model to appear. This momentum was encompassed in the “cause picking up in the country”; some such causes are volunteering when the law on volunteering was passed, or opening up the education system to more alternative pedagogical methods, or the emerging new problems of growing aggression and violence among kids. These needs all called for new solutions. Thus, there was, so to speak, a window of opportunity open in Hungary – the change of the regime, openness to new approaches, new client groups in need of services, enthusiasm about being able to do something (the sheer opportunity to be able to form NGOs), etc. This positive streak in the operating environment has seemingly influenced the success of the model transfer,

yet further enquiry into the exact nature of this “momentum” is required to allow for exploring the relationship between the two.

At the successful NGOs, the operating philosophies of the model are also prevalent. Despite the fact that there was no model description at the place of the origin, and importing staff learned their model from various documents, they strived to understand the underlying causes for the interventions. Personnel had a strong desire to clearly understand the model; they invested themselves in thorough self-preparation at the start, and looked for opportunities to view the model at the original site. These NGOs accepted the importers’ value sets, and the model’s operating philosophies, and tried to fit those to the Hungarian reality. Instead of wanting to change them, they strived to find ways to rationalize them in the Hungarian context, as Bator Tabor interviewees stated. As a result, respondents from the successful cases demonstrated a clearer understanding of what their model is.

Despite the lack of a model description at the exporter side, the successful NGOs piloted the model with high fidelity. Based on the experiences of the pilot, not only did they start to adapt the model, but also embarked on consciously creating a model description. They produced clearly written documents on the model in Hungary; though, it was done on the go as implementation proceeded. By doing this, they established those key intervention components that both the EBP and the implementation literature treat as indispensable in a replication process.

Creating the written model description, including the principles of operation, helped the successful NGOs to plan out their operations. In the successful cases, structural and business elements appeared in the responses as part of the model

description. It seems from the data, that this in turn helped the NGOs to attract more significant funding relatively early in the transfer process. So, in line with the implementation literature, the data shows that the importers had an intrinsic motivation to capture the key implementation components of their models. Once that was accomplished, their focus has become more unwavering.

The initial greater funding level brought some stability into the NGOs' life, and allowed for further model development. At the same time, in DIA's case, it also pulled attention away from model development because of the additional funder requirements that were put on the NGO. There had to be a constant balancing between focusing on the original model, and meeting the expectations of certain funders. Without an adequate model description, justifying additions of other funder required activities to the intervention became easier, and drifts from the model happened.

This variable also assumed conscious efforts to build stakeholder buy-in which, according to the respondents, was not part of the focus at the time the model was transferred. In the successful cases, deliberate building of stakeholder support appeared early in the process, beginning in the pilot phase, by focusing at the micro level. It, first and foremost, included their clients, as well as other partners key to the implementation, such as schools, cultural centers, camp sites. In this way, these NGOs were building a critical mass of supporters who became dedicated to the cause. This again seems to be a differentiating factor between the successful and unsuccessful cases.

Investment in People

This variable addresses the issue of getting implementers ready to deal with change. It, first and foremost, focuses on support for the staff of the importing NGO, and as such, supposes constant communication between the exporter and importer NGOs.

Fixsen, et al. (2005) establish staff selection, training, coaching, and evaluation and fidelity as key implementation components. Respondents from the successful cases did not recall receiving these elements from the exporters for a considerable time after the adoption decision. In all three cases, the decision to adopt was made solely by the importer, with the exporter having little or nothing to do with it. Preparation of the original importers happened before the adoption decision, and so they were pretty familiar with the model's details when they made the decision. And even after the rhetorical support of the model implementation, the exporters did not provide training for the staff of the importer NGO in Hungary. Despite this seeming lack of support, the importers were keen on understanding and learning the model in-depth. Thus, they educated themselves from available written materials, and by organizing in-house trainings by those who had learned the model from the exporter.

In terms of the relationship with the exporter, the story of the successful NGOs shows a similar progress. Their story indicates that it seems important to have an "illustration" program, from which various examples can be taken. The exporters had no relationship with the importing NGO in the early phases of the implementation. They re-appeared in the picture only when it became obvious that the transfer initiative was viable in Hungary. This then developed into a more collegial cooperation.

The case of Bator Tabor is a good example of how the relationship developed, and what the foci of each stage were. First, the relationship with the Irish camp was very strong, and the Hungarian program was modeled after it. Then, Bator Tabor became a member in the Alliance, and the focus shifted to requirements for sustainability. These expectations, focused more on management, were set by the Alliance. Third, Bator Tabor became more established in the Alliance, started to build relationships with other members, and became a role model for other camps in many respects. Here the focus was back on the intervention. Finally, when Bator Tabor needed to further develop its own program (i.e. when they decided to offer an international camp), they went back to the Irish camp for examples. This modeling, or examples of the intervention, or best practices within it, seems to be crucial. This aspect seems to appear neither in the EBP, nor in the implementation literature, but appears to be a fundamental issue in the sphere of international technology transfers.

The three distinct stages of development in the relationship with the exporter disprove my assumption that a mutual agreement is a necessity for the transfer of the model. Instead it reveals a deplorable situation. In the first stage of no relationship with, and only rhetorical support from, the exporter, the importers' persistence was key to the success of the model implementation. When their professionalism was proven, and they had some successes, the relationship picked up, and the exporters wanted a bigger part of the pie. The importers were invited to be part of a bigger network; and a balanced partnership with back and forth learning started. The clearly defined, specific external standards from the exporters during the second stage pushed the model development in

Hungary. After this stage, the importing NGO's standards in many areas typically exceeded the original model.

Two implications may be drawn from this. One is that, in line with the key implementation components, training of the importers in the model is important. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily have to be carried out by the exporter, in order to achieve success. In the successful cases, the importers themselves provided the training for the initial staff, with very high fidelity to the original model. Again, the central issue seems to be getting staff ready for the implementation, not that the training is done by the exporter. This corresponds with the relatively high score of 3.91 given by the respondents when asked about the contribution of the construct "Managing change" to their NGOs' success in the model transfer. See Table 11.

Creating well defined model descriptions at the exporter site, as the EBP and the implementation literature both suggest, will allow individual purveyors to acquire necessary levels of understanding of the model. This in turn, may help eliminate the need for heavy exporter involvement in the initial staff training. Considering the cultural differences, and costs involved with language incompatibilities, as described in detail in the section on the variable Management and Evaluation, this factor might be worth deliberating in the realm of international model transfers.

When the relationship with the exporter is more collegial, and it imposes external expectations on the importer NGOs, the development of both key intervention and key implementation components is boosted to a great extent. "If there is an external set of criteria and continuous checks against it, the startup is more systematic, and the chance for failure is less." It even has the potential for the exporter to improve its own services

and model, as exemplified by Bator Tabor. Thus, the second implication is that the exporter's presence in the transfer process is beneficial for model development for both the importer and the original program sites.

Another element of staff related issues that emerged from the data revolves around a critical mass of supporters of the model assembled by the successful NGOs. The broad appeal of the cause, the new solutions of the method, or the enthusiasm of the purveyors, helped the successful NGOs to create a large pool of volunteers from the beginning. They created conscious social networks among these volunteers, and trained them extensively.

Bator Tabor, for example, has developed a very sophisticated, high quality system for recruiting, selecting, training, monitoring and evaluating the performance of their volunteers. Recruitment, selection, and training are designed based on the necessary competencies. The organizational structure of mid-level leaders at camp ensures continuous monitoring and coaching, and at the end of camp, the performance of the volunteer is evaluated. Satisfactory evaluation is a prerequisite to attend camp in the following year. This is a good example of the key implementation components as outlined by Fixsen et al., (2005). Many of their staff were volunteers at camp for a number of years, before being hired. Bator Tabor's success with the model transfer was very much dependent on the work of these highly dedicated individuals.

It seems, that such people need to have a certain personality; they like challenges, and are willing to make sacrifices; they are excited about the unknown and by the possibility of creating something from scratch; they are entrepreneurs. Furthermore, a high level of flexibility is required from the people who work on the model, since many

of the positions at the importing NGOs are one-of-a-kind in Hungary, for example the Camp Director at Bator Tabor, or the Actor–Drama Teacher at Kava. This, again, underlines the increased risk-taking behavior of the staff of the successful NGOs, and their willingness to invest their personal assets in the model implementation for a longer time. As discussed under the Identification of Need variable above, this is in line with Rogers' characteristics of early adopters.

In the early days of model implementation, staffing at the successful NGOs utilized the personal networks of the purveyors; for that reason, many of the initial staff came in as friends. An interesting hiring practice is observable at these NGOs. This, however, may be characteristic for most NGOs in Hungary. They hire people with competencies for programming, for positions such as assistant, or office manager, and then, as opportunities open up, they move them over to programming. NGOs tend to do this to engage their supporters and enthusiasts with high competencies when they do not have the funding to put them in the appropriate position. This circumstance is due to the unpredictable and unstable funding environment. This phenomenon seems to create situations in which the necessary competencies for various positions are circumvented. Yet, this method has proven beneficial for the successful NGOs because in this way they were able to engage the people who had the needed competencies, and thus, were important and useful to the NGO.

Business Approach

This variable refers to establishing the basis of exchange among all stakeholders, and applying business approaches in the management and operations of the NGO. Both of these hypothesized areas emerged from the data.

Respondents described at length the difficulties in the operating environment. There is distrust in businesses, and an enormous government bureaucracy in the country. This calls for thorough needs assessment before the model is actually put into place, along with conscious advocacy work.

The successful cases started out by focusing on building a supporter network at the micro level. At first, they did not consciously carry out policy advocacy, but later on, when services were in place, they attempted it. It is reasonable to say that the successful NGOs managed the difficult operating environment small scale, to the extent that their capacities allowed. They started to build up their advocacy capacity step by step, first focusing on measuring, and then on publishing and communicating their results at the appropriate forums. At the same time, these NGOs remained independent of the system, and the government. They established themselves independent of the operating environment, and did not try to integrate themselves into the system, or its funding. They were building small programs that they could sustain, and they remained focused on their models. This observation is supported by the fact that survey respondents from these NGOs rated Integration with local system the lowest, (2.45), on the list of factors important to the success of the model transfer, as shown in Table 11. They only became directly involved in classic policy advocacy work when their interventions strengthened, typically after about ten years of operations.

As Bocz (2009) points out, it is difficult for NGOs to operate in Hungary; the environment is unpredictable, and there is a lack of resources. Also, the attitude and the approach of people in general (i.e. all stakeholders) must be changed due to existing legacies of the socialist regime. Because of all these, while policy advocacy, on the one

hand, is a must for NGOs; on the other hand, it is difficult to accomplish, because there is no history of advocacy in Hungary. Therefore, NGOs declare that they intend “to stay away from politics” and are set on remaining “independent.” They do not realize fully the importance of policy advocacy, however low key it may be. This issue is particular to international transfers, and as such, is not addressed by the literature. It is a given however, that in the context of international development, this aspect must be added to and further explored. Importers, like most other NGOs in the country, need training and capacity for this. Competency in, as well as a capacity for, advocacy should be deliberately built into the model transfer process.

The other area that was apparent at the successful cases is the ability to think in business terms. As one respondent stressed over and over again, NGOs should operate like a business. They need to understand how businesses operate, and they need to clearly speak the language of the business world. They need to know where they want to go, and need a clear plan of how they will get there with clear decision making processes and transparent operations. This goal is easier to achieve, if there are external criteria established with clear expectations. This should be the role of the exporter as discussed in the Investing in People variable. However, this task was not undertaken by the exporter in the beginning in any of the cases examined. When the international model transfer is done by NGOs, creating a business plan becomes a crucial factor, since NGOs typically do not have effective management capabilities or understanding of business principles.

There is openness among business ventures in Hungary to partner with NGOs. Some of those businesses actively seek opportunities to work with NGOs with whom

they can speak the same language. Yet, the lack of understanding of basic business principles prevents NGOs from becoming partners with them. Successful cases had at least one person on staff or closely involved in their operations, who was able to think long-term and create strategies in a business fashion. This individual served as a Maecenas, and helped the NGO staff realize the need for the business mindset. As a result, these NGOs took certain steps to educate, and equip themselves to be able to communicate with businesses. They also created documents that we may call business plans, and operated as guided by those. This kind of mentality, the business thinking, attracted increased funding, usually around the third to fifth years of operations.

The literature both on technology transfer and on implementation pertains to the US only. Given the level of organizational management practices in this country, business thinking does not even appear in the literature as something that might be an issue in model replication. An assumption of this study was that in an international transfer, the issue of taking a business approach is a crucial element and thus, should be part of the considerations. The findings seem to confirm this assumption, and call for building service models that include the aspect of business thinking.

Management and Evaluation

The key question of this variable is: what is the most effective way to organize the work to support the model transfer? It involves management and also evaluation practices.

As described under the Values and Philosophy variable, the data showed, that the model descriptions did not contain elements of the organization's management; neither did most of the interviewees think it should. Though respondents claim that management

was formulated by their own organizational needs, it is obvious from their responses that they copied certain management elements from the importers' practices.

At the successful NGOs, a general trend of a three-stage, approximately ten year development process can be observed. In the initial phase, there is a lot of personal investment of time and energy from the purveyor and a group of enthusiasts, mostly on a voluntary basis. Then the separation of programming and management occurs, positions solidify, and certain management positions are established. Finally, management functions are brought up to par, and balanced development of both programming and management transpires. The main factor is that these NGOs realized that management functions had to be separated from programmatic issues, and that these required a different kind of expertise. Thus, they have focused on building the management structures alongside the program.

Characteristically, programming was developed first, thus when organizational structure and management began to be formulated four to five years later, programming was already much further ahead in its development. Practices flowed over from the programming to the organizational management. "It is really hard to build an organizational structure when you know, that there is a smaller 'organization' under you that works very effectively, and very hard, and brings the existing knowledge into the organization. [...] Thus, the two should be built parallel, but not one of them years behind the other, because that is not good." Even today, at sophisticated operations, there is a considerable gap between the levels of development of programming, and of management, which results in a constant balancing of the two areas. This seems to ratify

the assumption of the conceptual framework, that structural and management questions should comprise part of the model description.

Another concern emerged from the data. Namely, that once the work was not carried out solely by the purveyors and the group of the original enthusiasts, they felt that dedication to the cause and to the high quality intervention practiced at the place of the origin, lessened. For the professionals hired later in the process, it appeared to be “just a job,” and according to the purveyors they did not put their hearts into the work. This created a clash within the organization, and the NGO had to paddle through this, and create a more professional management system. This issue raises the question of whether professionalization of management jeopardizes the quality of the interventions.

These two issues underline the key implementation components’ role in a replication. Both the EBP and the implementation literature call for well-described intervention components, thus preserving the quality of the service. At the same time, the reality of the importing NGOs in this study highlights, that due to the uneven development of programming and management, in addition to the intervention elements, management components should also be included in the model description. Fixsen et al. (2005) do not address the issues of management models within an established program, per se. Their focus is on training and supporting staff in appropriate applications of the intervention elements, and aspects of management are only addressed in this context.

In the successful cases, there is a component of evaluation present from the early days of model implementation. Although, in the beginning evaluation efforts were sporadic and remained on the level of measuring client satisfaction, the successful NGOs put an explicit value on evaluation, and exhibited continuous efforts to measure various

facets of achievement. Evaluation first meant measuring satisfaction and reaching program goals, which then evolved into efforts for impact evaluation. As Kava's example shows, impact evaluation requires significant capacity, which they have solved somewhat externally to the model. Other case NGOs lack this capacity and have continued to conduct impact evaluation within the scope of their given resources.

An unexpected theme that emerged from the data is the issue of language and the difficulties it created in the transfer process. Many respondents from the successful cases felt, that their staff did not speak the language, English, well enough. They expressed their concerns that it was doubtful how well the original importers had understood the model, especially the theories behind the interventions. For these staff members, the English language is important as a channel of communication that allows them to fully understand the original model. This reflects their desire to comprehend the operating mechanisms of the model's interventions as discussed in the Values and Philosophy variable. This finding suggests that language as a factor in transnational transfers should be addressed in its own right, not only as a communication tool, but also as a manifestation of culture and attitudes. Ban (2009), who examined language use in, and its impacts on, the European Commission, finds that language shifts are related to culture shifts in management approaches. She finds that language encompasses direct communication as well as elements of culture and power. She concludes that, for organizations, working in multiple languages can lead to misunderstandings. Thus, further enquiry is required into the current research finding on aspects and underlying issues of language.

Likewise, the topic of incompatible culture and habitus of individuals at the exporter and the importer sides emerged as a concern. Bator Tabor's experience shows that there were significant misunderstandings, time wasted, as well as beating about the bush, at the beginning of their membership in the Alliance. Respondents felt that the exporter's practices of conducting meetings and discussing problems were a lot less open than their own, which created delays in the process and made Bator Tabor staff impatient. Similarly, at times, external expectations from the exporter made the adaptation harder. Bator Tabor, like DIA, experienced inflexibility in this area, despite the fact that they had viable solutions for the same issue. These were not considered, instead, there was a rigid sticking to written rules on the part of the exporter.

The general implication of this issue is as follows: If an exporter has a well-functioning model, then it becomes very hard for them to look beyond it, or to move away from the "hows" of it, and begin to gain a thorough understanding of the local operating environment at the recipient side. It is clearly desirable to have flexibility about cultural issues on both exporter and importer sides, requiring additional efforts by the exporter.

The common element, with regards to culture, at the successful cases is their ability to manage the differences between the exporters' culture and their own. These NGOs strived to understand the original model with its underlying values and principles, and adjusted them to the Hungarian context. They also seem to have worked relentlessly with their exporters to educate them about these differences.

5.2 EXPERIENCES OF THE UNSUCCESSFUL CASES

The definition of success of model transfer was less distinct at the unsuccessful cases, as Table 9. shows. Similarly, the activities they carried out in the course of the model transfer were fewer. Specifics of each variable as emerged from the data from the unsuccessful NGOs are summarized and discussed in the following.

Identification of Need

The decision to adopt the model was made by an individual, based on emotional reasons, similarly to the successful cases. Also in a similar fashion, there was no needs assessment before the decision to adopt was made; rather needs were only assumed to exist. The difference being that the unsuccessful cases did not embark on assessing needs even as they proceeded with implementation.

The purveyors at the unsuccessful NGOs were typically older, and thus, probably more focused on sustaining themselves through a job. They only had two to four individuals working on the model transfer at the beginning. These people were enthusiasts of the model to a lesser degree, and they were hired more as professionals, than supporters of the cause. For both the purveyors and their staff implementing the model was more of a job. It seems that the unsuccessful NGOs were not able to create a “critical mass” of enthusiasts and supporters around the model that would have enabled them to implement the model with significant results despite the harsh operating environment, and that would have carried them through the initial period of heightened tasks in the transfer.

In the unsuccessful cases, adaptation of the model to Hungarian circumstances occurred from the very beginning, though the two cases differ from each other. It seems

that the purveyor at NYIKE only superficially learned the model from the importers. Based on this limited understanding, and on their perception of what was needed in Hungary, NYIKE staff designed their own program. NYIKE interviewees report that they asked their clients, both the seniors and the NGOs, about their needs and expectations, and created their intervention based on that information. One of them pointed out that in hindsight he believed that they should have focused more on the original model's central goals. In other words, NYIKE reinvented the model, trying to fit it to their clients.

This process is questionable at least; without thorough understanding of the intervention components, which in the EBP literature would be the evidence itself, only the observable, or surface, elements were replicated. This made the model prone to lose those mechanisms that ensure that similar outcomes with clients were produced as in the original program. Considering NYIKE's case, it is surprising that survey respondents from the unsuccessful cases report a 3.88 average score of model fidelity in their process of model transfer. See Table 12.

In CSF's case, the purveyor and staff were thoroughly trained by the exporter NGO at their site in the US. Unlike NYIKE, this purveyor seems to have strictly conformed to the original model. He was resolute in implementing the model with exacting fidelity. Given that determination, CSF did not assess clients' needs; instead they tried to find clients that fit the original model's target group. In addition, instead of adjusting the model to the local context, they set forth to adjust the environment to the model. This meant concerted efforts of policy advocacy from the very beginning, which is explained in more detail later, under the variable Business Approach.

Values and Philosophy

The unsuccessful cases did not have a model description from their exporter's side either; nor did the respondents from NYIKE express a desire to thoroughly understand the original model's intervention theories. Their understanding of their model remains superficial; these interviewees either did not describe their NGO's model in detail, or not at all. Yet, they were satisfied with their own understanding of the model. CSF's story differs in that their staff had a thorough immersion in the program at their exporter NGO's site. What the unsuccessful cases have in common is a lack of attempts to create a model description in Hungary. The data suggest that none of the unsuccessful cases produced their own model descriptions in Hungary.

In addition, as described above in the Identification of Need variable, these NGOs were consciously building stakeholder buy-in from the beginning of the transfer process. Unlike the successful cases, their efforts focused on the macro level, such as government offices and agencies, and grant funders. Though their stories are dissimilar, neither of these NGOs accepted the importers' value sets as they were. Instead, based on the Hungarian context and their own perceptions of it, they tried to change those values from the start. In NYIKE's case that meant the operating philosophies of the model, while at CSF, it was the values of the government system. This point is further explained below, in the Management and Evaluation variable.

Investment in People

The early phase of the model implementation at the two unsuccessful NGOs is very different with regards to initial training of their staff and their relationship with the exporters. As described earlier, in NYIKE's case there was not much of a relationship

with the exporter NGOs. It is not even clear which of three organizations should be considered as the exporter. As mentioned above, there was no drive to understand the model in detail. Therefore, the NGO neither received training and training materials from the exporter, nor attempted to develop a relationship with them. Instead, the purveyor, together with a few consultants he hired, developed a program to be implemented in Hungary. Interviewees did not mention any type of training they received before the model implementation. It seems that they were briefed on the purveyor's experiences, and shared the conference material related to the model. It is fair to say, that in NYIKE's case the preparation of the staff for model implementation was inadequate. With NYIKE's professed intention of "not wanting to institutionalize the program", Fixsen, et al.'s (2005) key implementation components were moved out of the question. However, respondents did express the view that their model transfer would have been more successful had they paid more attention to these elements.

Of all five NGOs examined, only in CSF's case there was a strong initial training, support, and investment from the exporter. This intensive training was conducted at the exporter's site, but no respondent reports exhaustive training efforts in Hungary. Furthermore, there was a lack of clear expectations from the exporter about the implementation goals. Due to the heavy focus on the intervention components, combined with the difficult operating environment, after piloting the model, CSF shifted the emphasis of their work to "spreading the approach in Hungary." This change is also reflected in the progress of their relationship with the exporter. From an initial very close connection with the exporter, it moved backwards, to a less formal one.

This experience, together with the successful NGOs' intensive and continuous staff training on the ground, seems to confirm Fixsen et al.'s (2005) findings that staff training is not sufficient for successful implementation, if it is not accompanied with coaching, and performance evaluation. In addition, initial staff training seems to support the sustainability of the model only if it happens at the replication site.

In terms of the staffing patterns for model implementation, the unsuccessful cases again show similarities. As highlighted in the Identification of Need variable above, the purveyors at these NGOs were older at the time of the decision to adopt. NYIKE and CSF had a very limited pool of volunteers, and a limited number of enthusiasts. Thus, they took a different approach to recruiting staff, which were more similar to regular hiring-for-a-job processes, than the practice of the successful cases.

As a consequence of this, a number of staff who had been trained at length, and at considerable cost, left CSF shortly after their training was completed and used their knowledge and skills somewhere else. Investment in people is costly, both in terms of time and money, and it is even more pressing in the case of NGOs with scarce resources. This loss of staff might be attributed to the lack of appropriate follow up, in terms of coaching after the initial training, as pointed out in Fixsen et al. (2005). In addition, the fact that CSF was hiring just for a job, and not recruiting enthusiasts, as the successful NGOs did may also have been a contributing factor.

Business Approach

The operating environment in Hungary is equally difficult for the unsuccessful cases. However, the manner in which they chose to manage the operating environment is very different from that of the successful cases. Both CSF and NYIKE were conducting

policy advocacy from the very beginning of the model implementation. In the absence of established services and proven results to stand as an example in Hungary, these efforts remained at the level of personal story telling by their purveyors.

At the same time, these efforts were geared toward the macro level of decision makers, government agencies, and funders. These NGOs “attached themselves to the system,” so to say. As described above, NYIKE significantly changed the model even before the first implementation; it was reinvented based on the experiences of the association’s members and their preconceptions of the Hungarian situation. CSF on the other hand, stuck to the model very strictly, and attempted to change the policy environment to become more accommodating for their model.

The study’s conceptual framework argues that advocacy and influencing policies is a contributing factor to the success of model transfers, especially in the transnational context. However, this study found that this is only true when the advocacy activities start out at the micro level, focused on the model and its immediate environment. As exemplified by the unsuccessful cases, if advocacy activities start at the system level, they do not produce the desired results. A successful strategy for the advocacy initiatives, as derived from the current research, is starting out with soft advocacy activities, such as building a supporter pool for the cause, and measuring, documenting, and communicating results. Only after the critical mass of supporters is assembled, should the NGO move on to more direct policy advocacy and aim its efforts at the system.

An interesting question is how importer NGOs can measure the outcomes of their advocacy work. As this research revealed, benefits do not materialize in the form of

increased funding for, or in advantages directed to, the model or the NGO. They appear rather in the creation of a more conducive environment for the model transfer, as exemplified by Bator Tabor's and DIA's taking a part in the formation and passage of the Hungarian law on volunteering, or by Kava's achievement in the passing the law on TIE. Both these laws created an operating environment in which the NGOs' operations of the model have become more predictable. The issue of measuring the results of advocacy is difficult, due to the subtleties involved. It calls for further inquiry, not only in the importing countries, but also at the exporters.

Furthermore, at the unsuccessful NGOs, there was no mention of a Maecenas type person in the interviews. Nor did interviewees discuss any kind of business inclination, or business thinking. As pointed out earlier, success in the model transfer in the Hungarian context seems more attainable if the requirement for application of business principles is part of the model description.

Management and Evaluation

Surprisingly, respondents from the unsuccessful cases did not mention the management aspects, or they emphasized, that they did not think those were important. Consequently, they stated that they did not build management structures in the transfer process, and they did not realize the necessity for management expertise. In addition, it is not apparent from the data, that they copied management elements from their importers' practices either. "... the goal was not for me to develop an organization, but to see how the practice works, and pass this practice on to as many people as we can. [...] there isn't a big management here, because the boss is in the US, one colleague is in England, and the third and fourth ones are in Australia, so like this... the international management is

the one that helps the work.” Managing such a multinational organization, as described in the quote, requires different approaches and significant efforts from the exporter NGO. As the lack of success of this particular case in establishing an operational model in Hungary illustrates, local initiatives stay exactly that: initiatives, if they are not supported locally.

It is interesting, that monitoring and accountability might have been something that the importers saw as part of the original model, however, due to selective perception, they failed to acknowledge and incorporate them into their own practices. In these NGOs evaluation is not valued, or planned; or at least respondents were not expressing its importance loudly. By the lack of mention of this in the data, it is also assumed that unsuccessful NGOs made little or no effort to evaluate their performance or impact. NYIKE’s case is a good example of how the lack of a comprehensive model description and the lack of understanding of the mechanisms of service delivery can lead to replicating only ‘surface’ elements. As one of their interviewees put it, they should have paid attention to creating the management of the program from the very beginning. “Today I say [the problem is] the lack of management. The problem is that things are not managed well. This ‘let’s invent Hungary, let’s invent Central Eastern Europe’.”

In CSF’s case, the reason for the lack of emphasis on management functions in Hungary is due to the existing expertise at the exporting NGO. One respondent says: “Here, the big organization [the exporter US organization] has PR and marketing staff. Thus, like at a subsidiary company, the big management is there.” It obviously provides some help, if the exporting NGO has the right management capacity, and if they undertake some of these functions. However, the question arises whether this is

sufficient support. In other words, the extent to which an overseas PR or marketing specialist can contribute to the organization on the ground of a different country is dubious. Working with experts from a different country not only eliminates knowledge of the local culture from the picture, but also creates the unnecessary burden of back and forth translations.

This relates back to the problems of the lack of adequate language skills, and differences in culture that several of the respondents brought up at the successful NGOs. In the data from the unsuccessful cases, the issue of language or culture did not stand out. These NGOs seem to have disregarded the issues of the differences in culture when importing the model, wanted very much to appropriate it, and acted too soon in Hungary. CSF started too big, immediately focusing on changing the system, namely the policy environment. NYIKE on the other hand, reinvented the model. This again points to the importance of the issues of language and processes to manage certain aspects of culture, being included in the model description, and the ways in which an importing NGO can address these in order to achieve success when embedding the model in its environment.

5.3 DIFFERENTIATING FACTORS OF THE SUCCESSFUL CASES

For the purposes of this study sustainability was defined as a set of processes in place at the importing NGO. They include constantly assessing needs and evaluating results; then based on those evaluations, re-evaluating services and adjusting them to satisfy existing needs and achieve intended results; also included is having the ability to present the case, and secure funding for services. In addition, a strong component of strategic thinking and


managerial skills must be present in its operations, and the NGO must be mission-driven, and demonstrate a strong belief in values and principles. These aspects are captured in the hypothesized variables, and have been discussed in the previous two sections of this chapter. In general, it can be stated, that all of these aspects have appeared in the story of the successful cases to a lesser or greater extent.

Considering the main research question on the nature of the success of the model transfer or its sustainability, the research findings are that it is difficult for the NGOs to differentiate between the success of the model transfer, its sustainability over time, and the sustainability of the importing NGO. This is not surprising, considering that only one of the case NGOs was in existence prior to the decision to adopt the model, and four of them were established exactly for the purpose of supporting the introduction of the model into Hungary. Data revealed that if the above processes are rigorously applied to the model transfer, they carry over into the organizational processes, as well. It is a positive finding that no respondent equated the success of the model transfer with the sustainability of his NGO. Some respondents even realize that the model and their NGO are not tied together in terms of their sustainability. Nonetheless, it remains to be explored in future research how this issue is viewed in organizations that existed before the adoption of a model.

Based on the research findings and the discussion of the successful and unsuccessful cases through the above variables, one major outcome stands out as the main differentiating factor in the success of the model transfer; namely focusing on the micro level during the early years of the model transfer. At the micro level, the model itself, the importing NGO as an organization, and its relationship with the exporter NGO,

are understood. In other words, the focus is on the model and on its immediate environment. Figure 1. below schematically illustrates the successful and unsuccessful cases respectively.

Figure 1. Focus of Successful and Unsuccessful Cases in the Transfer Process



The phenomenon of focus on the micro-level has a number of characteristics as deduced from the findings. Successful NGOs had a strong desire to understand the original model and its underlying theories, and to transfer it in its entirety to Hungary. In order to do so, they recruited a critical mass of enthusiastic supporters, who were younger and had higher risk-taking behaviors. These supporters were extensively trained in the model. Piloting the model started small, and the ultimate program was built up step by

step. In the first trial in Hungary, there was an emphasis on implementing the model with the strictest fidelity. Adjustments and adaptations occurred only after the experiences of the pilot.

Although, a written model description did not exist at the exporter NGO, and its support for the model transfer was only rhetorical during the early years, the importers were persistent in seeking a relationship with the exporter, and sought to acquire the most help possible for their efforts. The importer NGOs also set out to create their own model descriptions that involved programmatic (intervention), as well as management (implementation), elements. Initially these NGOs did not have the expertise and capacity to conduct needs assessments, and evaluation, but they recognized their importance in the operations, and continuously attempted to carry them out.

Furthermore, at the successful NGOs there was at least one person with very strong business mentality who managed to direct the NGO towards conscious applications of business approaches. This fact probably also pushed the NGOs to realize the importance of management in their operations, and to start separating their management functions from those related to the programming.

Successful NGOs, by wanting the model to produce the same outcomes for the Hungarian clients as for the ones at the original site, embraced and accepted the model's operating philosophies, as well as the importers' value sets, and tried to fit those into the Hungarian reality. They had great skills in managing the differences in culture. Instead of attempting to change those philosophies and values to better suit the local conditions, they endeavored to find ways to rationalize them in a Hungarian context.

In addition, the successful cases coped with the operating environment in a way that was manageable for them. Advocacy activities started out small, with measuring and communicating the results. The efforts were concentrated on clients and other immediate partners in the beginning. In that sense, these NGOs were building the stakeholder buy-in from the ground up. They only moved to conscious policy advocacy, when their services were established and demonstrated to be successful.

The successful NGOs established themselves independent of the operating environment. They were building small programs that they could sustain, and remained focused on their model all through the process. Consequently, their definition of the success of model transfer is more comprehensive and specific, and it involves more details. See Table 9. Examining those aspects makes it evident that most of them relate to either the model, or to the organization. Thus, they highlight the focus on the micro level again. With that in mind, some of the above described aspects are discussed in light of the literature.

Findings confirm the socio-technical nature (Rogers & Burdige, 1972; Goulet, 1977; Thomas & Kobayashi, 1987; NIDA, 1991; Bugliarello, 1996) of the transfer process. Data reveals that neither the technical, nor the “socio” nature of the process was adequately addressed in the cases at the time of the model transfer. There is an apparent lack of model descriptions that would ensure early focus on the technical nature. Furthermore, the lengthy descriptions of the hardships of the operating environment, the need to change attitudes, the lack of initial needs assessment, and of building stakeholder buy-in, indicate that the “socio” nature was even less addressed than the technical.

Nevertheless, the experience of the successful cases proves that even limited attempts to address these elements increase the chances of successful model transfers.

The EBP literature, further elaborating on the technical nature of transfers, creates a hierarchy of evidence (Harper, 2010) to support the effectiveness of human service models. In the examined cases, not only is there no evidence, but also a model description is missing, which creates obstacles to success before implementation even starts, as exemplified by the unsuccessful cases. At the same time, it is seen from the findings that in the successful cases, at which there is movement in the direction of creating a model description and evaluation takes a ‘central’ place in the NGOs’ thinking, i.e. external expectations established either by the exporter, or a funder, it appears easier to run the program successfully.

The implementation literature (Fixsen et al., 2005) establishes a framework for implementation. The framework assumes a Source, a Destination, and a Communication link. In addition, as a starting point for this study, it was also assumed that there is a mutual agreement on the need for the model transfer between the exporting partner and the importing NGO. In other words, it was almost taken for granted, that the transfer process involves a source and a destination. On the contrary, research findings revealed that in all the cases examined, the Source, or in other words the exporting NGO, was not part of the picture for a significant length of time. At the same time, it is also demonstrated, that when the exporter re-entered the process, the development of both the model, and the importing NGO were enhanced.

Consequently, the assumptions of the conceptual framework regarding the “push” and “pull” effect in the technology transfer process were not supported. It was assumed

that who initiated the model transfer made a difference in the underlying values, as well as in the power relationship, between the exporter and the importer NGOs, especially if resources came along with the “push” model. It was also assumed that the “push” effect accelerated the diffusion process in the recipient country, and strengthened the importing NGO’s capacity for policy work, thus increasing the chances of model sustainability. The research refuted these assumptions and demonstrated that a strong “push” effect in and of itself is not enough for the success of the transfer process. Thus, the emphasis falls back on the existence of values and philosophy in the model transfer.

Furthermore, Fixsen et al. (2005) establish six stages of the implementation process: Exploration and Adoption, Program Installation, Initial Implementation, Full Operation, Innovation, and Sustainability. It is evident from the data, that in all cases, these stages were followed piecemeal. The Exploration stage, that is identifying the need, collecting information from interactions with locals, assessing the fit between the community needs and the intervention program, and preparing stakeholders for adoption, was typically missing, even in the successful cases. They embarked on these as piloting the model was already under way. In addition, in NYIKE’s case, innovation happened right from the beginning, basically recreating the model while it was being implemented in Hungary. This confirms my argument for the variables of Identification of Need, and Values and Philosophy as playing a role in the success of model transfer.

Fixsen et al. (2005) also posit that when introducing change into an existing NGO, staff support is crucial. Overall, at every case NGO, purveyors were eager to adopt a practice, and in the successful cases they recruited others, who were also enthusiasts. At these NGOs, staff had high intrinsic motivation to adopt and implement

the new service, and while this fact, in and of itself, is not sufficient to ensure the success of the transfer; it may be a contributing factor. These results of this research have not established sufficient support for this argument; however, further inquiry into the matter may produce satisfactory evidence.

This observation is in line with Coch & French's finding (in Cartwright & Zander, 1968), that group meetings in which management effectively communicates the need for change, and stimulates group participation in planning the changes, have the potential to completely remove group resistance to changes in methods of work. Based on this assertion, the highly participatory mode of operation, characteristic in the observed cases in this research, might be a contributing factor to success.

Providing regular staff coaching is also a crucial component of successful implementation, but research is lacking on its functional components (Fixsen et al., 2005). At the least, it supposes trained staff and capacity for coaching on the exporter side. In an international setting, however, there is an extra layer of difficulty to coaching. First and foremost is the language issue, as seen in the research findings, in addition to distance, and costs associated with the distance, such as travel. Thus, effective ways for providing coaching in international model transfers remains to be further explored.

In addition, Bocz (2009) points out that a contractual relationship for public service provision between the government sector and true non-profits in Hungary is very limited. This phenomenon further hinders the integration of foreign models into the Hungarian system of service provision. The operating environment is not conducive to non-profit advocacy activities. Therefore, it is not surprising, that interviewees at the NGOs studied state almost exclusively that they deliberately stay away from policy

activities, and only get involved in advocacy work in a manner that they can control. In other words, even activities aimed at managing the environment are conducted in the fashion of remaining focused on the micro level. This tendency is especially apparent in the case of Bator Tabor, at which all of the interviewees explicitly expressed the importance of their NGO not carrying out advocacy, and staying away from politics. At the same time, when asking about specific activities Bator Tabor carried out on a regular basis, interviewees mentioned informing the public, research and evaluation, dissemination of the those findings, presentations at conferences, and meeting with local decision makers.

Bator Tabor firmly declares that it wishes to remain independent from politics and policies, not wanting to be involved in, or connected with, the Hungarian service system in any way. They consciously wish to operate on private funding that does not come with any ties or red tape. This raises a question for future research: to what extent will this mode of operation be sustainable in the long run. In other words, can Bator Tabor operate indefinitely totally independent from the Hungarian social services system, and on private funding and capital? It is obvious, that Bator Tabor will not be able to fully operate as a business, because its clientele is not capable of paying for the services. Thus, the question is whether the business sector will be willing to pay for this service and if yes, what are the factors that may motivate them to do so.

In summary, the main differentiating factor in the success of model transfers, which are solely conducted by NGOs, is the ability to remain focused on the micro levels, and all that it entails. Very broadly speaking, the technology transfer, the EBP, and the

implementation literature all direct one's attention to these facets. At the same time, the research revealed that features also crucial to the success of the model transfer, such as the critical mass of supporters, the ability to apply business approaches, realizing the role of management, the capability to manage differences in culture, as well as understanding of the operating environment, are not addressed in the literature.

6.0 CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of the current study was to gain insight into the nature of six variables that are assumed to be at play in international transfers of human services models. Overall, the research findings have confirmed that all the hypothesized aspects of those variables are present in such transfers. The degree to which exporting and importing organizations pay conscious attention to these factors varies, and these aspects are often not in place at all when the transfer happens. The research has found that at times, even the most obvious pieces of this puzzle are missing. These include rational decision making about the adoption of a model, existence of a model description, communication between the exporter and importer, established goals and success measures of the transfer process, needs assessment, and client and other stakeholder involvement. In those cases in which attempts are made to address these features, success of the model transfer is achievable. The single most important factor in success of the model transfer, based on the findings of this research, appears to be the ability of the importing NGO to remain focused on the micro level, involving the model itself, the organization, and the immediate environment.

One surprising finding of the research is the extent of the role language plays in the transfer process, both as the communication channel, and as a transporter of culture. In addition to language, the research identified six areas of differences in culture, namely differences in program structure, in regulations, in physical characteristics such as

distance, in the non-profits' relationships with government, in their relationships with funders, and in the value system. Though culture is a very broad concept, the research revealed that, with regards to transnational model transfers, the central cultural features manifest themselves in management related issues, and in the legacies apparent in the operating environment. It also emerged from the data, that successful NGOs turned these cultural differences into manageable pieces. Their focus on the micro level allowed them to tackle these issues in a way that points toward heightened sustainability of the model. In this sense cultural differences become a question of management.

Closely related to the issue of culture is the different backgrounds of the two types of purveyors identified in the research. The successful cases had younger purveyors, who became adults around the time of the regime change in Hungary. The purveyors of the unsuccessful cases gained their experiences during the socialist regime. They were the ones that approached the model transfer from a holistic point of view trying to change major mechanisms in the process. This brings up the question of whether the failure of these NGOs in the model transfer is the result of something in the Hungarian context that does not allow for adaptation, or is the result of the generational difference produced by the cultural shift that took place with the regime change. Studies that examine the same question in other CEE countries that moved from a socialist or communist regime to democracy and a market economy are needed to shed light on this fascinating question.

A definitely positive finding of the research is that none of the respondents have defined success of the model transfer as the survival of their NGO, despite of the harsh operating environment they describe. In terms of success, they were all very much focused on the intervention or service that they had imported. Different interpretations of

success, i.e. outcomes with clients, the diffusion of the model, and the spread of the approach might be the result of the reality of the Hungarian non-profit existence, namely, the unstable and oppressive operating environment, as outlined by Bocz (2009). To further delineate attributes of success of model transfers, it would be interesting to examine the issue in other countries with similar obstacles. At the same time, in the exporter – importer realm, what constitutes as success must be further explored and more exact measures established. It is patently obvious that such measures must be established at the very beginning of the transfer process. The expectation that the same model will be produced in Hungary as in the country of origin is just too high, if the model lacks the particulars needed for its implementation. Thus, it is advisable that a plan of action be drafted.

International development literature examines issues at a different level. Globalization and the advances of technology have moved developed and developing nations in the same directions. By means of television, cell phones, and the internet, the aspirations of people all around the world have become unified, and point in the direction of heightened consumption and lessened authoritarianism. People want their voices heard, and their rights respected. For this reason, human development and the development of human services have gained increasing importance. In this realm, non-profit organizations instead of, or alongside of, the government and business sectors, have gained an increasing role in promoting advocacy for various societal groups, as well as in serving their needs. These organizations through their activities manifest social solidarity. They can also serve as a platform for interactions between the citizens and the institutions of society. In this sense, they transmit norms, values, culture, and interests.

The non-profit sector's potential to meet societal needs cannot be neglected. What seems to be obvious from the current research is the importance of the individual actors on the ground, and the investment made in them. Thus, development practitioners in the future will have to incorporate this point of view into their activities. In addition, the big question I have come to ponder is whether transfer of human services models could serve as the “mover” of development in less developed countries.

6.1 CONTRIBUTIONS

The current research applied concepts from technology transfer, evidence-based practice, and implementation literature in the international context. So far these concepts have focused on, and been tested in, the US only. By applying the conceptual framework for transnational transfers of human services models, the research outlined the aspects of success of the model transfer and of the sustainability of such models. In addition, it socially validated the factors contributing to the success of the transfer process.

The literature on technology transfer points out the socio-technical nature of the transfer process, but it fails to adequately delineate the “socio” aspect. The present research, by outlining the attributes of the process, contributed to the operationalization of the “socio” aspect of the transfer process. This will allow for the development of a testable framework of transnational model transfers.

The main implications of the research findings are at the level of practice. First of all, human services models should be defined more broadly. Fixsen et al. (2005) define implementation as an itemized set of activities intended to put in place an activity or

program of known dimensions. Along the lines of this definition, and as the results of the current research indicate, beyond the intervention processes, processes of implementation should be included in model descriptions, namely structural, and management features, as well as processes to address and manage differences of certain cultural elements. In other words, the focus solely on intervention components should be shifted to implementation components. Furthermore, the separation of programming and management functions seems essential to the success of the transfer process; thus expertise in those two areas should be incorporated into the importing organizations' capacities from early on in the transfer process. Since initially, the importing NGOs typically lack expertise and capacity, in the international development context it seems imperative that the exporting partners provide guidance in this area.

Finally, the research discovered that a strong differentiating factor in the success of the model transfer is the importing NGOs' ability to manage the differences that arise from the dissimilar cultural contexts and value sets between the source and the destination countries. As outlined in this study, the importing NGO's focus on just the manageable quantities of work with regards to dealing with the operating environment might have relevance in other areas in the international development field. After further inquiry, this finding may be generalizable for other countries, as well as to other sectors, and fields.

6.2 LIMITATIONS

Internal Validity

To minimize the threats to the study's validity, data was integrated from multiple sources of information. The study applied the principle of triangulation, which minimizes the risk that the conclusions of the research reflect the systematic limitations of a specific method (Maxwell, 1998). Data was collected through a combination of key informant interviews, staff surveys, and document reviews. However, document reviews were limited to basic organizational documents, such as articles of incorporation, annual reports, and strategic plans, where available. Model descriptions and other documents relating to the transfer process were not extensively reviewed.

At the same time, data collection did not allow for exploring whether there is a pattern of interaction in Hungary that shapes the stories of the successful cases similarly with regards to their experience in the model transfer. Neither did the study investigate the existence of underlying forces that might have pushed these NGOs in the same direction; nor did it control for interactions that might have happened among the successful cases in terms of post-transfer conferences or other opportunities for discourse, as a result of which they presented their experiences in the same fashion. This is a realistic threat to the study's validity, yet my personal knowledge of, and active involvement in, the Hungarian non-profit sector does not indicate the presence of such pattern of interaction that would lead to a standard narrative.

Simultaneously, as the principal investigator of this study, my pre-existing involvement in the sector and position with the informants might have impacted the responses that were given to the interview questions. Their knowledge, or supposed view

of my expectations, may have biased the information they provided in their answers. This obviously may have compromised the study. Nevertheless, comparing information from interviewees whom I had personally known before the data collection with that from those I had not, indicates that being a Hungarian and from the non-profit sector increased my credibility and made me more trustworthy than an outsider among the respondents.

In addition, there was an inconsistency in phrasing a key question during the interviews. The following two questions were used interchangeably: When will you consider the process of the transfer completed? How do you define success in model transfer? This was realized during the analysis of the interviews, and is something that will have to be corrected in future investigations.

External Validity

A common criticism of case studies relates to their generalizability. The current study is based on five cases; therefore, it is questionable whether one can extrapolate universally applicable knowledge from them. Also, the investigation reported the perspective of personnel on the importing side only. The exporters' point of view, regarding the factors of international model transfers, was not studied. Given the bipartite nature of the transfer process, critical information was not collected. Their views may or may not correspond to what is reported in this study, and should be explored in future investigations.

Also, when selecting the cases, the existence of the NGO prior to the decision to adopt the model was not considered. Thus, four out of the five cases were NGOs that were founded specifically for the transfer of the model to Hungary. This oversight

created a predisposition, and circumvented the study's intent to examine organizations in which the model was a new addition to existing services.

Finally, the major limitation of the current investigation is the small and unrepresentative sample, especially of the surveys. The small sample size posed a restriction on how the data could be analyzed. Therefore, a more descriptive approach was taken, and qualitative information was used to a greater extent to describe the research question. Due to this, any interpretations of the findings remain limited to the participants in the research. Insight gained from this study into the matter of transnational transfer of social service models can inform future research, but must be tested on a much wider scale.

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

To further the understanding of the transfer process of human services in the international context, a number of further studies are suggested. First, exploring the views of the exporting organizations on the subject seems essential. Second, additional research on specific elements of the variables outlined in this study is needed in order to develop the conceptual framework into a testable model for transfer. These elements include purveyor characteristics following upon the finding of the age and background of the two types of purveyors in this study, the nature of "momentum," i.e. the favorable circumstances that existed in Hungary at the time of the decision to adopt the models examined in this research, levels and measuring results of advocacy activities, and

language as a factor in international development. Once the attributes of the variables are further clarified, empirical testing of the conceptual framework can follow.

The results of this study show that the single most differentiating factor in the success of the transfer process is the ability of the importing NGOs to remain focused on the micro level and manage the environment at a level that allows them to stay in control. In human services the reality of a community defines the programs offered. In international model transfers this is augmented by the differences in cultural aspects manifested in the management questions discussed above. The reviewed literature does not address this topic; thus, further investigation into the role of different management cultures in international transfer processes are called for.

A group of researchers led by Fixsen and Dean is currently developing a tool to assess recipient communities' readiness for model replication. Their findings on this issue are yet to be published; however, it is desirable to conduct additional research on this topic in the international context. At this time, the relationship between community readiness and success of model transfers is unknown. To gain insight into the issues regarding the operating environment in the recipient countries also calls for a tool that enables assessment of supporting factors, as well as potential threats to model transfers, which in turn will assist the importing NGOs to better align their transfer activities.

To sum up, I would like to agree with John Friedmann, who in 1992 criticized the alternative approaches to development, claiming that they romanticize the excellence and infallibility of people. In his opinion, the proponents of these schools are naïve in their belief that alternative development can be created and sustained in small local

communities in consistent opposition to the state. He thinks that the state's collaboration is indispensable if the goal is to significantly improve the conditions of the poor. As the research findings highlighted, the approach of focusing on the micro level seems to allow for successful transfers, even if the transfer process is carried out solely by an NGO. This includes the NGO's ability to manage as much of the environment as it is capable of, and build up its collaborations step by step. This process may take longer, yet, it may generate organic changes, not only in the community, but also in the society.

This research has led me to believe, that it is very important to realize that the best results can only be achieved through a comprehensive approach, which aims to concurrently address the various aspects of development, and to acknowledge the interdependence of those aspects in its applied strategies. My humble idealistic view, in line with Turner & Hulme (1997), who warn that Western models of management structures should be exported to developing countries with extreme caution, is that by paying particular attention to the specifics of the given country the incidence of successful international model transfers could be maximized.

In conclusion, coming back to the level of the current research, it is safe to state that the framework constructed for the purposes of this study has gained social validation. The five established independent variables and their attributes assure that both adoption and adaptation happen simultaneously in the transfer process. New technology must be fitted with the environment of the recipient, in terms of culture and social arrangements. Though, the measures in this study must be further validated and tested for utility in organizational readiness before adoption, as a result of this research the argument has been confirmed that the process of adaptation must be part of the model description.

Strong, all-encompassing models are desirable, and in all likelihood will make the transfer process more successful.

APPENDIX A – DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

Implementation of Social Skills Support Systems A Model for Transfer of Social Service Provision and Four Case Studies Andrea Gruber

Interview Guide Key Positions in Importing NGO

Your NGO has taken a model of a social service from a foreign country and brought it to Hungary. As you know I am interested in learning about how this process started and what happened since then. Thus, I am going to ask you about the story, what and how it all happened and how you feel about your success in doing so.

I very much appreciate your willingness to take time to complete this interview with me. The information you provide will be invaluable. As you know participation in this interview is voluntary and you may decide to stop at any point during the process.

Questions:

Section 1. “What happened?”

1. **How did the transfer of the model to Hungary start? When did it start? Who initiated the transfer? Were you at the NGO at the time?**
 - a. How did you find out about the model?²⁰
 - b. Was there an active demand for this service in Hungary or was it facilitated by the exporter?
 - c. What happened after the initial contact?
 - d. How long did the discussion go on before reaching the decision to implement the model in Hungary?
 - e. What other models did you look at?
 - f. Who made the decision?

²⁰ Lettered sub-questions serve the purpose of reminding the researcher for what type of information to look for. They will not appear in the interview guide and will only be asked directly during the interview if the answer to them does not come out via the main question.

- g. How did you decide that the model was needed in Hungary?
 - h. What did you do to make sure of it?
 - i. Who did you talk to when assessing the need for the model in Hungary?
What sources of information did you use?
 - j. What kind of activities did you do to gain support for the model from your various stakeholders?
- 2. When the decision was made to start the model in Hungary how did you get started building the model in Hungary?**
- a. What did you do first?
 - b. What did you do next?
 - c. Who was involved in the process? Have you involved your staff, volunteers, clients, neighborhood in the process?
 - d. Who are your internal and external stakeholders?
 - e. How did you get the support of these various groups (stakeholders)?
- 3. How did you know that you were on the right track with your model? Can you give me examples of what indicated initially that your model worked or did not work?**
- a. How did you validate empirically the model that was adopted? If at all...
 - b. What did you do to know how the model you adopted was received?
 - c. What sources of information did you use?
- 4. Did anything have to be changed in the original model as you were implementing it in Hungary? OR What did you do to adapt the model? What activities happened? OR What kind of activities did you do to fit the model to the Hungarian circumstances?**
- a. Can you describe the key elements of the original model? (In your opinion to what extent was the model well developed at the organization/in the country where you imported it from?)
 - b. When did you realize that adaptation of the model had to be done?
 - c. What was that moment/point?
 - d. Why did you think adaptation of the model was necessary?
 - e. Who was involved in those activities?
 - f. How long would you say the 'period of fitting' lasted?
 - g. Did you see any problems/difficulties in the adaptation?

Section 2. "How was the transfer process managed?"

- 1. When starting the new model how did you anticipate staff would accept this change?**
- a. What did you do to find out how staff felt about the new program?
- 2. What kind of activities did you do to help the staff better prepare for the new model?**

- a. What did you do to build their capabilities for implementing the program?
 - b. How did you make sure staff will apply the new methods?
 - c. What kind of support did you provide for your staff at the beginning of the program implementation?
 - d. What kind of support do you provide now?
- 3. What kind of structural changes did you have to do within your NGO to start implementing the new model?**
- a. When the decision was made to implement the model how did you organize the work?
 - b. What kind of established ways of carrying out the work did you have before?
 - c. To what extent did the new model influence the way you managed the work?
 - d. What kind of new positions did you create?
 - e. How many new staff did you hire?
 - f. What criteria did you use to select new staff?
 - g. How did you handle training existing staff in the new model?
 - h. Have the management practices changed since you started implementing the model?
- 4. How would you describe your work relationship with the exporter organization (from whom the model was received)?**
- a. How was the relationship at the beginning?
 - b. How is it now?
 - c. What were certain points/events/etc. that changed this relationship?
 - d. What difficulties did you have in management?
 - e. What kind of support did you have at the beginning of the program implementation from the donor organization?
 - f. What kind of support do you have now?

Section 3. “How do you evaluate the transfer process?”

- 1. You have ‘imported’ a foreign model to Hungary. When will you consider the process of the transfer completed?**
 - a. How do you define success in model transfer?
- 2. How would you describe your results in transferring the model to Hungary?**
 - a. How do you know that you are successful?
 - b. What examples do you have to prove your success?
 - c. In your opinion in general when can one say that the transfer was successful?
- 3. In your opinion what factors supported and what factors hindered the success of the model transfer? What were the difficulties?**

- 4. How satisfied are you with how your model works? How do you learn about how the model operates?**
 - a. Are you satisfied with your outcomes for clients?
 - b. In your opinion how do your stakeholders value the services you provide for your clients?

Section 4. “What are your capabilities to run the model?”

- 1. How do you measure your results and evaluate your program?**
 - a. How do you incorporate information from evaluation/measurements in your operations?
- 2. What kind of activities do you do to understand what your stakeholders need? OR Why is it worth delivering the services you deliver in the way you deliver them?**
 - a. How important do you think it is that all stakeholders feel satisfied with what they are getting from your services in exchange for their support?
 - b. Are your stakeholders committed to support your model?
 - c. In your opinion, are your stakeholders getting a ‘fair deal’?
- 3. What methods do you use to check the match of your model and services with government policies/priorities in Hungary? How do you know?**
 - a. Do you use any of the following: staff background, training, ability to research, contracting, strategic planning, etc.?
 - b. How well do you think you ‘present your case’ to the public and to decision makers?
 - c. What activities do you do that relate to this?
- 4. Where do you see your model going from here?**
 - a. Does it continue to grow and change?
 - b. What changes are foreseen for the future and why?

Section 5. “Closing the interview”

- 1. What have not I asked you that you would like to add?**

Implementation of Social Skills Support Systems

A Model for Transfer of Social Service Provision and Four Case Studies

Andrea Gruber

Survey

Hello,

My name is Andrea Gruber, I am a PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, and I am working on my dissertation research. I am interested to learn about the experiences of NGOs, who transferred a social service model from a foreign country to their own, during and after the transfer process. Specifically, I would like to learn your opinion on when you consider the model transfer successful and on your organization's success in transferring the model. The ultimate goal of the research is to determine the factors that contribute to the success or failure of such transfers.

The information from this survey will help me understand success in transnational model transfers and what factors contribute to success. Thus, in the questionnaire I will ask 4 NGOs' adult board members' and staff's opinion on factors that influenced the success of their model transfer. The survey questions will ask you about background (e.g. age, gender, years of education, your position at the NGO, number of years you spent at the NGO), as well as your opinion on when you consider the model transfer successful and what factors helped your NGO to be successful in transferring the model from abroad. There are no foreseeable risks associated with this survey, nor there are any direct benefits to you. You will not receive any payment for your participation. Completing the survey should take you 15 to 20 minutes. Please give it your thoughts. Your opinion is very important to me and your responses will very much help to accomplish my goals.

Answering this questionnaire is voluntary. You can start the survey and then quit if you decide you would rather not complete it. All of your answers will be entirely anonymous. All information you give me will be kept confidential and will in no ways be associated with your name. There is no way to link your responses to your email address. Information from this survey will only be shared with the participating NGOs in aggregate format. Once the data is collected it will be summarized and analyzed. The results will be available for interested participants to view at the www.pressleyridge.org/magyarorszag website.

You can respond to the questionnaire in two ways. Hard copies of the survey will be sent to your office along with self-addressed pre-paid envelopes. Once you filled out the questionnaire you can mail it directly to me. The address is: Andrea Gruber, 1142 Budapest, Alsoor u. 9/b.

You can also fill out the survey on-line. If you chose to do so, a link will be emailed to you to access the survey. To take the survey, you will need to click on the link. Navigating the survey is simple.

If you have any questions please to contact me at +36 20 460 0124. You can also email me at AGruber@pressleyridge.org.

Your assistance and participation are greatly appreciated. Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Andrea Gruber

Questions:

Section 1.

Attributes of Success

In this section I am interested in your opinion on what it looks like when the model your NGO imported is successful. In other words, I want to learn when you consider the model transfer successful.

Please read each statement carefully and then indicate on the scale how important you think the given item is for your NGO to successfully operate the model you imported from abroad.

Please note that on the scale 1 means “not important”, 2 means “somewhat important”, 3 means “important”, 4 means “very important”, and 5 means “essential”.

In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates successfully, if...

	Not important	Somewhat important	Important	Very important	Essential	
1. we have a steady source of income.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
2. we do not have financial difficulties.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
3. our clients are satisfied.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
4. we receive good feedback / evaluation from our clients.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
5. our clients receive high quality services.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
6. our services meet the needs of our clients.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know

7. we measure what our clients' needs are.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
8. our stakeholders are satisfied.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
9. our partner agencies value what we do.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
10. our services to clients fit into the Hungarian system.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
11. there is a niche in Hungary for our services.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
12. the model we use fits well with the Hungarian culture.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
13. we have government contracts.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
14. we have established channels to talk to various government agencies.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
15. we advocate for the cause of our clients.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
16. we participate in policy making about our clients.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
17. outcomes for our clients are comparable to those in the originating country.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
18. we adjust our services based on evaluation.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
19. our foreign partner (exporter) is satisfied with us.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
20. our model works the same way as it does in the originating country.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
21. we are achieving our organizational goals.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
22. our staff is satisfied with their jobs.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
23. our staff believes in our model.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know
24. we have enough staff to perform the duties / work.	1	2	3	4	5	I don't know

Section 2.

Predictability of success

In this section I am interested in your opinion on how successful you think your NGO is in the model transfer and what factors helped your NGO to be successful in transferring the model from abroad.

First I would like to know your opinion on the success of the model transfer your NGO completed in general. Please mark your answer on the scale.

25. To what extent would you say that your model/program that you imported from the

foreign country is successful?

Totally unsuccessful Somewhat unsuccessful Somewhat successful Successful Very successful

And now you are going to read statements. Please read each statement carefully and then indicate on the scale to what extent you think the given item contributed to the success of the model transfer your NGO completed.

Please note that on the scale 1 means “not at all”, 2 means “a little”, 3 means “somewhat”, 4 means “much”, and 5 means “very much”.

In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model transfer from abroad, that...

	Not at all	A little	Some what	Much	Very much	
26. we assessed the needs of the clients before starting the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
27. we consulted stakeholders before starting the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
28. once trained our staff could perform the tasks necessary to implement the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
29. we could express the doubts we had about the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
30. we adapted the model to the Hungarian circumstances.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
31. we involved clients in the adaptation of the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
32. we involved stakeholders in the adaptation of the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
33. we tried the model first, and then made adjustments to it.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
34. there were adequate finances to adapt the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
35. our NGO could handle the difficulties of implementation.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
36. we had regular contact with our foreign partner.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
37. we had the opportunity to consult our foreign partner whenever we needed to move forward.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
38. our NGO was prepared to handle the differences of the two environments (origin and local).	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
39. our organizational leadership was willing to put forth a great deal of effort to see that	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this

model implementation is successful.						
40. our organizational leadership was willing to talk the decision up with staff.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
41. we made sure that values of the original model were matched with the values in Hungary.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
42. there was a clear model at the original site that we could replicate.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
43. our staff understood the original model well.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
44. there was enough time for our staff to understand the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
45. there was enough time for our staff to accept the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
46. our foreign partner (exporting NGO) supported us.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
47. technical assistance was available for us as we moved forward with implementation.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
48. staff opinion was asked during the adaptation process.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
49. our staff felt ownership for the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
50. our staff believed that implementing the model in Hungary was a good idea.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
51. our staff felt supported during the adaptation process.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
52. we had the manpower necessary to support the ongoing implementation.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
53. we had the right people to do the work.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
54. our staff knew the model well enough to implement it.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
55. our staff was confident to implement the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
56. we had the resources necessary to implement the model on a long-term basis.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
57. our stakeholders felt that they were getting "their money's worth".	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
58. we were clear on what our goals were in adapting the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
59. we made sure that we provided high quality services.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
60. our staff believed that the model was a valuable addition to our NGO's work.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
61. our leaders (board and top management supported us in implementing the model.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
62. we had easy access to experts who knew	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this

the model.						
63. we constantly assessed the needs of our clients.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
64. we evaluated our program on a regular basis.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
65. we adjusted our program based on the evaluation results.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
66. our NGO had the ability to present its case to various government agencies.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
67. our NGO had the ability to secure sufficient funding.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
68. we thought about the longer future. (Strategic thinking)	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
69. we asked our stakeholders' feedback on how we did our job.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
70. our NGO was mission driven.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
71. our staff strongly believed in our values and principles.	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this
	1	2	3	4	5	We didn't do this

Is there anything else that you would like to tell me? Please add your comments here:

Section 3.

Demographics

In this section I am going to ask you some questions about your background. Please mark your answers in the space provided.

72. What is the name of the NGO you are affiliated with?

Please mark the organization even if you are not an employee, but a board member, a volunteer or you are associated with the NGO in any other ways.

- Bator Tabor Foundation (1)
- Foundation for Democratic Youth (2)
- KAVA Cultural Group (3)
- Community Services Hungary Foundation (4)
- Association of Open Study Groups (5)

73. What is your position at the NGO?

If you work in an NGO which has fewer than 5 employees, board members and volunteers together, do not fill out this question.

- Board member
- Top management
- Middle management
- Direct service provision
- Support staff
- Volunteer
- Other, please specify _____

74. In what year did you begin to work at the NGO?

Please respond to all that apply.

As a board member: _____

As a staff member: _____

As a volunteer: _____

75. What is your gender?

- Female
- Male

76. What is your age?

- 18 – 24
- 25 – 34
- 35 – 44
- 45 – 54
- 55 or above

77. What is your highest level of education?

- High school
- Bachelors degree
- Masters degree
- Ph.D.

Now you have completed the survey. Thank you very much for taking the time to answer the questions. If you completed a paper copy of the survey, please mail it in the enclosed envelope to Andrea Gruber at 1142 Budapest, Alsoor u. 9/b.

You will be able to view the aggregate results of this survey on the www.pressleyridge.org/magyarország website.

Thank you again for your participation.

APPENDIX B – ADDITIONAL TABLES OF SURVEY FINDINGS

Table 13. Average Staff Score on Importance of Individual Items in Success of Model Operation

(In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates successfully, if...

1=not important; 2=somewhat important; 3=important; 4=very important; 5=essential)

Item	n	Average (Standard Deviation)
Our staff believes in our model	74	4.58 (.574)
Our clients are satisfied	75	4.52 (6.01)
Our clients receive high quality services	75	4.52 (.623)
Our services meet the needs of our clients	75	4.39 (676)
Our stakeholders are satisfied	75	4.19 (.651)
We adjust our services based on evaluation	72	4.18 (.718)
We receive good feedback / evaluation from our clients	74	4.15 (.676)
Our staff is satisfied with their jobs	73	4.10 (.670)
We measure what our clients' needs are	75	4.04 (.761)
We have a steady source of income	74	4.01 (.972)
We have enough staff to perform the duties / work	74	4.01 (.749)
We are achieving our organizational goals	75	3.97 (.735)

We do not have financial difficulties	74	3.59 (.964)
There is a niche in Hungary for our services	74	3.58 (.936)
Our partner agencies value what we do	75	3.39 (.884)
The model we use fits well with the Hungarian culture	74	3.23 (1.041)
Our services to clients fit into the Hungarian system	72	3.18 (.998)
Our foreign partner (exporter) is satisfied with us	72	2.93 (1.179)
Outcomes for our clients are comparable to those in the originating country	70	2.70 (1.095)
We participate in policy making about our clients	72	2.67 (1.222)
We have established channels to talk to various government agencies	69	2.61 (1.018)
We advocate for the cause of our clients	67	2.31 (1.117)
Our model works the same way as it does in the originating country	72	2.24 (1.041)
We have government contracts	66	1.92 (.982)

Table 14. Frequency of Individual Items Carried out at the Time of the Model Transfer

(Did the NGO carry out the given activity?)

1=yes; 0=no)

Item	n	Frequency (Percentage %)	
		Yes	No
Our staff believed that the model was a valuable addition to our NGO's work	60	46 (76.7)	14 (23.3)
We consulted stakeholders before starting the model	62	49 (79)	13 (21)
We involved clients in the adaptation of the model	62	51 (82.3)	11 (17.7)
We assessed the needs of the clients before starting the model	62	52 (83.9)	10 (16.1)

We could express the doubts we had about the model	62	53 (85.5)	9 (14.5)
Our foreign partner (exporting NGO) supported us	60	54 (90)	6 (10)
Our NGO had the ability to present its case to various government agencies	60	54 (90)	6 (10)
We had the opportunity to consult our foreign partner whenever we needed to move forward	63	57 (90.5)	6 (9.5)
We constantly assessed the needs of our clients	60	55 (91.7)	5 (8.3)
We involved stakeholders in the adaptation of the model	62	57 (91.9)	5 (8.1)
We tried the model first, and then made adjustments to it	62	57 (91.9)	5 (8.1)
We had regular contact with our foreign partner	64	59 (92.2)	5 (7.8)
We asked our stakeholders' feedback on how we did our job	60	56 (93.3)	4 (6.7)
Technical assistance was available for us as we moved forward with implementation	61	57 (93.4)	4 (6.6)
We made sure that values of the original model were matched with the values in Hungary	61	58 (95.1)	3 (4.9)
Our NGO was prepared to handle differences of the two environments/systems (origin and local)	62	59 (95.2)	3 (4.8)
Once trained our staff could perform the tasks necessary to implement the model	64	61 (95.3)	3 (4.7)
Staff opinion was asked during the adaptation process	61	59 (96.7)	2 (3.3)
We had the resources necessary to implement the model on a long-term basis	60	58 (96.7)	2 (3.3)
There were adequate finances to adapt the model	62	60 (96.8)	2 (3.2)
There was enough time for our staff to understand the model	60	59 (98.3)	1 (1.7)
There was enough time for our staff to accept the model	60	59 (98.3)	1 (1.7)
We had the manpower necessary to support the ongoing implementation	60	59 (98.3)	1 (1.7)
We had easy access to experts who knew the model	60	59 (98.3)	1 (1.7)
Our NGO was mission driven	60	59 (98.3)	1 (1.7)
We adapted the model to the Hungarian	63	62	1

circumstances		(98.4)	(1.6)
There was a clear model at the original site we could replicate	62	61 (98.4)	1 (1.6)
Our NGO could handle the difficulties of implementation	64	64 (100)	0 (0)
Our organizational leadership was willing to put forth a great deal of effort to see that model implementation is successful	62	62 (100)	0 (0)
Our organizational leadership was willing to talk the decision up with staff	62	62 (100)	0 (0)
Our staff understood the original model well	62	62 (100)	0 (0)
Our staff felt ownership for the model	61	61 (100)	0 (0)
Our staff believed that implementing the model in Hungary was a good idea	61	61 (100)	0 (0)
Our staff felt supported during the adaptation process	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
We had the right people to do the work	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
Our staff knew the model well enough to implement it	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
Our staff was confident to implement the model	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
Our stakeholders felt that they were getting their “money’s worth”	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
We were clear on what our goals were in adapting the model	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
We made sure that we provided high quality services	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
Our leaders (board and top management) supported us in implementing the model	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
We evaluated our program on a regular basis	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
We adjusted our program based on the evaluation results	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
Our NGO had the ability to secure sufficient funding	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
We thought about the longer future (Strategic thinking)	60	60 (100)	0 (0)
Our staff strongly believed in our values and principles	60	60 (100)	0 (0)

Table 15. Average Staff Score on Individual Items' Contribution to Success of Model Transfer

(In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model transfer from abroad, that...

1=not at all; 2=a little; 3=somewhat; 4=much; 5=very much)

Item	n	Average (Standard Deviation)
Our staff believed that implementing the model in Hungary was a good idea	61	4.69 (.467)
Our organizational leadership was willing to put forth a great deal of effort to see that model implementation is successful	62	4.68 (.536)
Our staff strongly believed in our values and principles	60	4.68 (.504)
We made sure that we provided high quality services	60	4.67 (.542)
Our NGO was mission driven	59	4.61 (.644)
Our staff felt ownership for the model	61	4.51 (.674)
Our staff believed that the model was a valuable addition to our NGO's work	46	4.48 (.691)
Our organizational leadership was willing to talk the decision up with staff	62	4.44 (.760)
We thought about the longer future (Strategic thinking)	60	4.42 (.696)
Our leaders (board and top management) supported us in implementing the model	60	4.38 (.885)
We were clear on what our goals were in adapting the model	60	4.37 (.780)
Our NGO could handle the difficulties of implementation	64	4.34 (.597)
We evaluated our program on a regular basis	60	4.33 (.795)
Once trained our staff could perform the tasks necessary to implement the model	61	4.28 (.636)
We adjusted our program based on the evaluation results	60	4.28 (.761)
Our staff understood the original model well	62	4.24 (.761)
We tried the model first, and then made adjustments to it	57	4.18 (.805)

We adapted the model to the Hungarian circumstances	62	4.15 (.765)
Our staff felt supported during the adaptation process	60	4.15 (.799)
Staff opinion was asked during the adaptation process	59	4.14 (.730)
There was a clear model at the original site we could replicate	61	4.08 (.822)
Our staff knew the model well enough to implement it	60	3.98 (.701)
We made sure that values of the original model were matched with the values in Hungary	58	3.97 (.878)
Our staff was confident to implement the model	60	3.97 (.758)
Our stakeholders felt that they were getting their “money’s worth”	60	3.97 (.843)
We asked our stakeholders’ feedback on how we did our job	56	3.96 (.738)
Our NGO had the ability to secure sufficient funding	60	3.95 (.811)
There was enough time for our staff to understand the model	59	3.93 (.785)
There was enough time for our staff to accept the model	59	3.93 (.888)
We had the right people to do the work	60	3.85 (.860)
Our NGO was prepared to handle differences of the two environments/systems (origin and local)	59	3.83 (.874)
We had easy access to experts who knew the model	59	3.80 (.924)
We could express the doubts we had about the model	53	3.74 (.858)
We assessed the needs of the clients before starting the model	52	3.73 (.888)
We had regular contact with our foreign partner	59	3.73 (1.172)
Our foreign partner (exporting NGO) supported us	54	3.69 (1.286)
There were adequate finances to adapt the model	60	3.63 (1.041)
We had the opportunity to consult our foreign partner whenever we needed to move forward	57	3.63 (1.291)
We had the manpower necessary to support the ongoing implementation	59	3.61 (.788)
Technical assistance was available for us as we moved forward with implementation	57	3.53 (1.151)

We had the resources necessary to implement the model on a long-term basis	58	3.45 (1.187)
We consulted stakeholders before starting the model	49	3.43 (.842)
Our NGO had the ability to present its case to various government agencies	54	3.43 (1.109)
We constantly assessed the needs of our clients	55	3.42 (.875)
We involved stakeholders in the adaptation of the model	57	3.35 (.954)
We involved clients in the adaptation of the model	51	3.33 (1.089)

Table 16. Average Staff Score on Importance of Model Constructs in Success of Model Transfer by Successful and Unsuccessful Cases

(In my opinion the model that we imported from abroad operates successfully, if...

1=not important; 2=somewhat important; 3=important; 4=very important; 5=essential)

Subscale	Successful Cases		Unsuccessful Cases	
	n	Average (Standard Deviation)	n	Average (Standard Deviation)
Quality of service	51	4.34 (.443)	6	4.72 (.267)
Needs assessment	51	4.22 (.610)	6	4.67 (.258)
Management	51	3.91 (.459)	6	4.10 (.267)
Financial stability	51	3.88 (.810)	6	3.67 (.876)
Model fidelity	50	2.47 (.960)	6	3.25 (.935)
Integration w/ local system	49	2.45 (.841)	6	2.92 (1.281)

Table 17. Average Staff Score on Extent of Model Constructs Carried out at the Time of Model Transfer by Successful and Unsuccessful Cases

(In my opinion it helped our NGO to be successful in the model transfer from abroad, that...

1=not at all; 2=a little; 3=somewhat; 4=much; 5=very much)

Subscale	Successful Cases		Unsuccessful Cases	
	n	Average (Standard Deviation)	n	Average (Standard Deviation)
Management in reality	51	4.56 (.512)	5	4.28 (.110)
Program evaluation in reality	51	4.33 (.719)	5	4.10 (.894)
Quality of service in reality	51	4.24 (.519)	5	4.30 (.542)
Model fidelity in reality	51	4.18 (.482)	5	3.88 (.179)
Managing change in reality	51	3.91 (.587)	5	4.17 (.408)
Fit w/ local reality in reality	51	3.80 (.559)	5	3.48 (.294)
Financial stability in reality	51	3.74 (.801)	5	3.07 (.596)
Needs assessment in reality	43	3.55 (.815)	5	3.60 (.418)

APPENDIX C – LIST OF ACRONYMS

CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CSAP	Center for Substance Abuse Prevention
CSF	Community Services Foundation
CMHS	Center for Mental Health Services
DIA	Hungarian acronym for Foundation for Democratic Youth
EB	Evidence-based
EBP	Evidence-based practice
HAY	White House Office of the First Lady Helping America’s Youth
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NIDA	National Institute on Drug Abuse
NREPP	National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices
NYIKE	Hungarian acronym for Association of Open Study Groups
OJJDP	Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
ONDCP	White House Office of National Drug Control Policy
PV	Project Venture
SAMHSA	Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
TIE	Theater in Education
USDOE	U.S. Department of Education

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