OPERATIONALIZING THE VALUES OF HISTORY AND HISTORICAL EDUCATION
FOR SECONDARY TEXTBOOK DESIGNS

by

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Textbooks are not adequate resources from which to teach secondary history for two reasons: first, they largely disregard the nature of history, and second, they do not employ a sound method to learn history. In an attempt to address this problem, I employ three research questions:

• What have been the standards of United States history curriculum in secondary education over the past three decades, since the publication of *A Nation at Risk*?

• What is the nature of history and historical education in light of Nietzsche and Dewey respectively?

• How can the proper use of a curriculum design help in the authentic learning of history using Nietzsche and Dewey?

The study will analyze the discourse on history education to discern a set of values underwriting the field. Once discerned, these values will serve as a paradigm by which alternative curricular designs can be created.

The study will rely on two philosophers interested in both history and education, Friedrich Nietzsche and John Dewey. Nietzsche’s (1873) “On the Use and Abuse of History for Life,” argued that history is justified insofar as it affords us equipment for life. Dewey’s (1938) *Experience and Education* posited that education is justified insofar as it is an authentic experience. With the discussion of their views in mind, the study shows that Nietzsche and Dewey’s insights lend themselves to a typology of values that prove helpful when attempting to move beyond the impasse on historical understanding and instruction. These values come in the
form of five commitments: to life, action, the present, the useful, and the interplay of permanence and change.

This typology serves as a reminder of those values of history and historical education that, over the years, may have been neglected. It also provides directions and aspirations for teachers and students who may have been misguided. But before this typology can be introduced to the history classroom, its terms must be given a concrete curricular face. This comes in the form of a critical reading of a primary document, and a discussion and illustration of the tasks and skills embedded in a new curricular design.
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PREFACE

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PROBLEM IN EDUCATION

In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education released its report *A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform*. The purpose of that report was to address the then Secretary of Education T. H. Bell’s concern about ‘the widespread public perception that something is seriously remiss in our educational system’ (p. 1). The report offered an ominous warning: “Our nation is at risk” (p. 5). According to the Commission, the risk emanated from “a rising tide of mediocrity” whose economic and political implications were quite serious. From an economic perspective, the report explained that the educational status quo did not adequately prepare students to enter the competitive global marketplace, where “knowledge, learning, information, and skilled intelligence are the new raw materials of international commerce” (p. 7). From a political perspective, the report pointed out that the emerging ‘information age’ effectively disenfranchised citizens who would be unable to develop the skills and proficiencies that new technologies demanded. Both perspectives depicted bleak prospects for future generations if educators would not heed a basic principle from the nation’s founding: “A high level of shared education is essential to a free, democratic society and to the fostering of a common culture, especially in a country that prides itself on pluralism and individual freedom” (p. 7).
Such disparaging findings prompted researchers and educators in all disciplines to reexamine their curricula at all levels of schooling. One such attempt at reexamination came four years after the publication of *A Nation at Risk*. The Bradley Commission on History in Schools (1988) emerged in response to concerns regarding the kind of history that American students were learning in school. The first national group to focus on history exclusively, this Commission was comprised of sixteen of the most respected members of the history profession, including former presidents of all the major professional organizations in history and a number of award-winning history teachers and writers.¹

Upon forming, the Bradley Commission established two goals:

1) Explore the conditions that contribute to, or impede, the effective teaching of history in American schools, from Kindergarten through Grade 12

2) Make recommendations on the curricular role of history, and on how all of those concerned—teachers, students, parents, school administrators, university professors, publishers, and boards of education—may improve the teaching of history as the core of social studies in the schools. (p.8).

As the two goals indicate, the Bradley Commission focused on curriculum. Subsequent guidelines in professional development and pedagogy, as well as the foundations of the *National Standards for History*, were based on this Commission’s work. The Commission’s recommendations were articulated in *Building a History Curriculum: Guidelines for Teaching History in Schools*, first printed in 1988. The report has been reprinted in two newer editions (2000 and 2003).

₁ Kenneth T. Jackson chaired the Commission, and, along with 189 concerned historians and educators, went on to form the National Council for History Education (NCHE) in 1990. The Commission's work was funded by the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation.
One of the report’s more serious criticisms focused on history textbooks: “Thoughtful teaching will require better textbooks. Much recent criticism of textbooks is well-founded. They are often overstuffed with facts, distracting features and irrelevant graphics, and they are rarely organized to clarify the larger themes and questions the Commission finds indispensable” (p. 33). These “themes and questions” include civilization, cultural diffusion, and innovation; human interaction with the environment; values, beliefs, political ideas, and institutions; conflict and cooperation; comparative history of major developments; and patterns of social and political interaction.

Another major development in the area of curricular reform in history was the publication of the Fordham Institute report, *A Consumer’s Guide to High School History Textbooks* (2004). The stated purpose of the report is to help teachers, administrators, school board officials, and parents to make educated decisions about the history textbooks that they choose for use in the classroom. Responding to the way in which textbook editors had treated the events of 9/11, the report observed that they had hurriedly sought to include the tragic events of that day in their next edition. However, a combination of hasty writing and complex politics had led to over “simplified and sanitized” historical accounts. This was cause for concern among historians, who thought that publishers had not acted responsibly. The report characterized history textbooks as “fat, dull, boring books that mention everything but explain practically nothing; plenty of information but no sorting, prioritizing, or evaluating; and a collective loss of American memory” (p. 5).

Complicating the issue of inadequate textbooks further, the Fordham report pointed out that the majority of high school history teachers do not hold a major or minor in history—most of them hold a major in education or, at best, specialize in social studies education. As such,
most teachers are obliged to treat “the textbook” as the authority for content and pedagogy in their classrooms. In the light of this attitude, the report posed the question, “How many—if any—live up to that obligation?” (p. 6) To answer this question, the Fordham Institute solicited the help of educational historian Diane Ravitch, who assembled a team of experts in United States and World history to assess twelve textbooks, six on United States history and six on World history. Ravitch made her textbook selections on the basis of their wide circulation. The team of experts then evaluated the quality of the chosen textbooks according to twelve criteria: accuracy, context, organization, selection of supporting material, lack of bias, historical logic, literary quality, use of primary sources, historical soundness, democratic ideas, interest level, and graphics.

The experts’ evaluation identified *The American Journey* written by Joyce Appleby, Alan Brinkley, and James M. McPherson (2003) and published by Glencoe as the best in the United States history category. It also identified *American Nation*, written by Paul Boyer (2003) and published by Holt, Rinehart, and Winston as the runner up. However, these rankings did not do much to recommend these textbooks, as both received an average grade. In fact, the report stated that its evaluation of all of the textbooks left the panel with “a sense that they make history dull” (p. 63). Moreover, the report noted that the writing of these textbooks “blunts the edges of events and strips from the narrative whatever is lively, adventurous, and exciting” (p. 63). Further, the authors observed that the writing in these textbooks exhibits “the lack of an authorial voice and the ability to express wonderment, humor, outrage, or elation” (p. 63). Not surprising, these inadequacies impact the attitudes of students, who, the report pointed out, generally regard history as a subject that is boring, useless, and essentially dead. Table 1, Fordham Report’s

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2 For the purposes of this study, I am concerned with United States history textbooks.
Evaluation of Two Top-Selling American History Textbooks, and Figure 1, Fordham Report’s Points of Evaluation of Two Top-Selling Textbooks, below show the experts’ evaluation at a glance

Table 1. Fordham report’s evaluation of two top-selling American history textbooks

<table>
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<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Appleby American Journey</th>
<th>Boyer American Nation</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall: 78%</td>
<td>Overall: 73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C+ “Acceptable”</td>
<td>C- “Acceptable”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of Supporting Materials</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>7.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Bias</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>6.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Historical Logic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literary Quality</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of Primary Sources</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Soundness</td>
<td>9.25</td>
<td>9.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Ideas</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Level</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graphics</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>6.75</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Average</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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One of the major contributors to the Fordham report, Diane Ravitch, sought to expose the forces responsible for the poor quality of history textbooks. In her *The Language Police: How Pressure Groups Restrict What Students Learn* (2004), Ravitch argued that the status of current textbooks is the result of a long history of disputes between liberal and conservative thinkers. The “language police,” as Ravitch called them, are those who petition the publishing industry to follow their own ideological predilections by censoring content that they deem offensive. For the religious right this includes inappropriate behavior, contradictions to the Bible, ‘secular humanism,’ and ‘situation ethics’ (p. 24). For the liberal left this includes exclusionary, stereotypical, and racist statements. Ravitch argued that “the bias guidelines are censorship guidelines. Nothing more, nothing less” (p. 48). These petitions and guidelines lack any kind of democratic deliberation or decision; essentially they are demands that publishers accommodate out of fear of losing markets. But if this is so, Ravitch has asked: “What’s left after the language police and the thought police from the left and the right have done their work?” This is her answer: “The result of all this relentless purging is dishonesty, a purposeful shielding of children

Figure 1. Fordham report’s points of evaluation of six top-selling textbooks
from anything challenging, controversial, or just plain interesting. It is a process that drains literature of its life and blood, converts it into dreary reading materials, and grinds reading materials into pabulum” (p. 29-30).

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

As presently written, textbooks are not adequate resources from which to teach history in secondary education for two reasons: first, they largely disregard the nature of history, and second, they do not employ a sound method through which students can learn history. In an attempt to address this problem, I will employ three research questions:

1) What have been the standards of United States history curriculum in secondary education over the past three decades, since the publication of *A Nation at Risk*?

2) What is the nature of history and historical education in light of Nietzsche and Dewey respectively?

3) How can the proper use of a curriculum design help in the authentic learning of history using Nietzsche and Dewey?
The literature that will help to frame the investigation of the problem is the discourse on secondary history education that followed the release of the 1983 *A Nation at Risk* report. As noted above, that report delivered a severe jolt to the field of history education and inaugurated a marked change in the way in which stakeholders at the local, state, and national levels have been thinking about the status quo of their curricula and standards. The ensuing discourse on secondary history education is a body of work that traces the lines of thought among scholars and teachers on what the standards of historical education should be, how schools should assess them, and how students might satisfy them.

I hypothesize that the relevant literature will problematize the standards movement after the publication of *A Nation at Risk*, as it will likely indicate that scholars have not agreed upon history standards; nor have these standards remained consistent over time and circumstance. In this way, the literature promises to offer insight into the continuities and changes in history education standards over the past three decades. The literature also promises to offer critical insights into the nature of our current dilemma with standards and textbooks.

The study will analyze the discourse on history education standards from 1983 to 2010. The goal of this analysis is to discern a set of values underwriting historical education. Once discerned, these values will serve as a paradigm by which alternative curricular designs can be created.

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3 See Literature Review.
1.4 RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODS

Any discussion of standards involves a consideration of values, those things that justify and are reflected in human practices. But if this is so, a discussion of standards in the teaching of history in secondary education involves considerations of the values that justify standards for two specific practices: history and education. To consider which standards history and education must meet in order to be worthwhile, this study will rely on two philosophers interested in both history and education, Friedrich Nietzsche and John Dewey. More specifically, this study will rely on Nietzsche’s (1873) “On the Use and Abuse of History for Life,” which argued that history is justified insofar as it affords us equipment for life. At the same time, this study will rely on Dewey’s (1938) *Experience and Education*, which posited that education is justified insofar as it is an authentic experience. Although Nietzsche and Dewey may seem to be two radically different thinkers, my preliminary reading suggests that when it comes to the issue of the study of history they are kindred philosophical spirits. The use of Nietzsche and Dewey will serve three functions. First, it will offer a philosophical grounding of history and education, separate from and unaffected by the recent debates on historical education. Second, it will provide a historical background against which the contemporary discourse on standards of historical education will be portrayed and made meaningful. Third, it will furnish a typology of values, which can be operationalized into concrete learning. The section below offers a preliminary sketch of Nietzsche and Dewey’s views on history and education respectively.

Nietzsche is not so much interested in what history is as how it is used. In his “On the Use and Abuse of History for Life,” he argued that history is not simply a matter of knowing but, more importantly, a matter of living. This is how he put it: “To be sure, we need history. But we need it in a manner different from the way in which the spoilt idler in the garden of knowledge
uses it, no matter how elegantly he may look down on our coarse and graceless needs and distresses. That is, we need it for life and action, not for a comfortable turning away from life and action or merely for glossing over the egotistical life and the cowardly bad act. We wish to use history only insofar as it serves the living” (p. 1). With this broad justification in place, Nietzsche identified three uses of history: the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical. The monumental use enables us to celebrate great accomplishments of the past and inspires us to achieve greatness in the present. In Nietzsche’s terms, “History belongs, above all, to the active and powerful man, the one who fights a great battle, who needs the exemplary men, teachers, and comforters and cannot find them among his contemporary companions” (p. 4). The antiquarian use aids us in our reverence and preservation of the past and connects us to the great chain of humanity by affording us justification for our being in the world. As Nietzsche put it, “Antiquarian history knows only how to preserve life, not how to generate it. Therefore, it always undervalues what is coming into being, because it has no instructive feel for it, the way, for example, monumental history has” (p. 7). The critical use issues from the human capacity to suffer from the errors, sins and crimes of the past, and the wish to be delivered from them. This is how Nietzsche put it: “In order to be able to live, a person must have the power and from time to time use it to break a past and to dissolve it. He manages to do this by dragging the past before the court of justice, investigating it meticulously, and finally condemning it” (p. 8).

In his *Experience and Education*, Dewey explained that the problem with education is that it defines learning as the acquisition of knowledge that is already complete. In his words, knowledge “is thought of as essentially static. It is taught as a finished product, with little regard either to the ways in which it was originally built up or to changes that will surely occur in the future” (p. 19). In the case of historical knowledge, this translates into a past limited to facts—
names, places, and dates rather than a past that invites engagement, analysis and criticism. According to Dewey’s line of thought, students would benefit from history if they learned it authentically, that is by doing it; and to do history means to acknowledge upfront that history is open to question and subject to reconsideration.

Alongside Nietzsche and Dewey, I will be able to determine the extent to which the discourse on the standards of historical education (1983-2010) represents a fulfillment of or a deviation from what Nietzsche and Dewey have had to say. At the same time, I will be able to propose an alternative approach to historical education. The goal of such a proposal will be to incorporate those values that are reflected in both the discourse on standards and the philosophical work of Nietzsche and Dewey.

With Nietzsche and Dewey’s reflections in place, the typology of values will become evident. These shared values between the two philosophers will serve as a reminder of those values of the fields of history and historical education that, over time, may have been lost. At the same time, it will provide a clear course for teachers and students whose historical study may have been informed by political ideology rather than the typology. Before this typology can be introduced into the classroom, its terms must be given a concrete curricular face. Accordingly, the study will continue by rendering the five values of the typology meaningful in terms of particular learning exercises. This lends itself to a critical reading of a primary document in United States rhetorical history, Frederick Douglass’ (1852) “The Hypocrisy of American Slavery,” as well as a discussion and an illustration of tasks and skills embedded in a new curricular design. The goal is that this approach will help students and teachers uphold the typology of values in their own historical work.
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS

Subsequent chapters of the dissertation include a review of literature, the approach to the study, the findings of the study, and implications of the study. Chapter two, the review of literature focuses on the values of history education over the past three decades. Chapter three outlines the philosophical lenses of Friedrich Nietzsche and John Dewey through which I will evaluate the values of history education uncovered by the review of literature. Chapter four evaluates the values of history according to the philosophical approach and operationalizes the new set of values into a concrete curricular face. Chapter five concludes the dissertation with implications of the new designs as well as recommendations for further research.
2.0 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The central aim of this review of literature is to survey the field of United States history in secondary education over the past three decades. Through this review, I hope to identify the standards on the basis of which the discipline of history delivers instruction to grades 9-12. The literature review in this chapter is a collection of primary and secondary sources, including sources pertaining to the teaching of United States history; namely, books, journals, pamphlets, etc.

Standards in history education can be arranged into three main categories: content, student performance, and process. Content standards refer to history’s objective knowledge, namely, significant facts, names, dates, and events from the past. Historically, issues over history content standards have been contentious, highly politicized, and subject to regional and local interests and jurisdictions. Content can be as varied as the historians who write and study it. Student performance standards refer to the extent to which students acquire the knowledge established by content standards. Student performance standards often reflect minimum expectations and have more to do with acquiring a certain amount of knowledge than showing mastery of or appreciation for the values of the discipline. Process standards refer to the habits of mind that the discipline expects. Process standards provide the pedagogical framework for the
other two sets of standards. Process standards reflect the extent to which history curricula espouse the principles and values of the majority of historians.

2.2 REFORM MOVEMENT

2.2.1 The Impetus to Reform

In 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education released its report *A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform*. The Commission, appointed by President Ronald Reagan, did not conduct its own original research; rather, it offered a compilation of other findings within the field of education. The report issued an ominous warning, “Our nation is at risk” (p. 5). According to the Commission, the risk issued from “a rising tide of mediocrity,” which will compromise America’s economic and political stability. The dramatic language elicited a great deal of media attention particularly among conservative thinkers, who were interested in remedying an educational system that was still suffering from the effects of the permissiveness and social upheaval of the 1960s. In a climate intensely concerned with preserving American superiority in global economics, industry, science, technology, and security, the report functioned as a political tool that served to justify much of the economic and defense policies of the Reagan Administration.

Among the many indicators of risk outlined by the National Commission, the following were especially troubling to policy makers and educators in the humanities:
Some 23 million American adults are functionally illiterate by the simplest tests of everyday reading, writing, and comprehension. About 13 percent of all 17-year-olds in the United States can be considered functionally illiterate. Functional illiteracy among minority youth may run as high as 40 percent. Over half the population of gifted students do not match their tested ability with comparable achievement in school. Many 17-year-olds do not possess the ‘higher order’ intellectual skills we should expect of them. Nearly 40 percent cannot draw inferences from written material; only one-fifth can write a persuasive essay… Average tested achievement of students graduating from college is also lower.

Critics of *A Nation at Risk* challenged one of the report’s conclusions that SAT scores had declined significantly over the span of two decades (Rothstein, 2008; Urban, 1988). They pointed out that the analysis failed to take into account the changing dynamics of test takers. Other critics charged the National Commission and others like it with fabricating a crisis for political and economic reasons rather than educational ones (Stedman & Smith, 1985; Tanner, 1984). As Ronald A. Evans (2004) put it, the reports expressed a “corporate agenda for schooling, and demanded more traditional education for human capital development” (p. 153). Regardless of the report’s shortcomings or political agenda, the negative perception of the nation’s school system was solidified in the minds of the American public and educational policy makers.

The discourse about the problems of American education was further intensified by E. D. Hirsch, Jr.’s (1987) controversial *Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know*. Hirsch explained that a society’s need to reassess its own cultural literacy comes only after a confrontation with its own illiteracy at the point when we are “shocked into recognizing the importance of the information that we had unconsciously assumed” (p. 19). Hirsch’s solution was a “descriptive list” of “information actually possessed by literate Americans” not a “prescriptive list” of required books, concepts, and ideas (p. xiv). He argued that such a descriptive list is necessary as American students suffer from “content-neutral curricula,” which emphasize skills and process (i.e. analysis, critical thinking, etc.) over content. He called for a “corrective theory” that would repudiate Dewey’s process-driven pragmatism and infuse into the current curricula the specific knowledge that would help democratic citizens “deliberate and communicate with one another” (p. 12). In his view, the inability to communicate effectively renders the right to vote meaningless as any level of illiteracy effectively disenfranchises
citizens. Hirsch himself understood the paradox of his program: “the goals of political liberalism require educational conservatism” (p. xii).

Critics of *Cultural Literacy* argued that it was “short-sighted and narrow-minded,” that its solution was too simplistic for the complex problem of illiteracy (Adams & Cotton, 1989). One critique cites a College Board (1988) publication which suggests that ‘lists usually take the issue-ness out of issues,’ meaning that whenever a topic is reduced into one word, one neglects its complexities. Other critiques argued that Hirsch’s list was too demanding, as each of its entries lends itself to ‘a whole network’ of characteristics, conflicts, and nuances, all of which can be overwhelming to primary and secondary school students. Still others feared that a common cultural lexicon was a step backward toward poor teaching practices and rote memorization (Urban, 1988; Mulcahy, 1989; Estes, et al., 1989). However, the most persistent criticism was that Hirsch’s descriptive list set “an elitist social agenda” favoring white males (Mullican, 1991). This argument maintains that the most privileged members of a society are legacies of a heritage that would provide them with the “cultural literacy to get into the University of Virginia or the Ivy League, but would exclude from privileged higher education women, blacks, Hispanics, most recent immigrants, inhabitants of central cities and remote rural areas, and anyone lacking the sixty to one hundred thousand dollars requisite for four years’ tuition at the elite institutions” (Adams & Cotton, 1989, p. 286).

The debate on improving literacy continued at a national level as reports began to emerge seeking solutions at the disciplinary level. One such report focused on the liberal arts and came from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), which was funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) under the direction of Lynne V. Cheney (1986-1993). *American Memory: A Report on the Humanities in the Nation’s Public Schools* (1987)
echoed Hirsch’s way of thinking. It argued that the traditional aim of public education, the “transmission of a common culture to all students” was being supplanted by a trend, which “points to emphasis on process over content” (Cheney, p. 1). According to the report, this emphasis was responsible for “the fundamental deficiency in humanities education” (p. 1). NEH’s recommendation for reform in the humanities was threefold: “1) More classroom time dedicated to history, literature, and foreign language study; 2) improvement of the content in textbooks; and 3) changes in teacher training programs to include advanced curriculum study” (p. 1).

An analysis of American Memory came from Diane Ravitch and Chester E. Finn, Jr. (1987). The report, What Do 17-Year-Olds Know?: A Report of the First National Assessment of History and Literature, surveyed approximately 8,000 eleventh grade students across the country in American history and literature. The report’s findings indicated that, on average, students could answer 54.5 percent of the questions related to American history correctly, effectively earning a failing grade. Most alarming to readers was the finding that 78.4 percent of the students were enrolled in an American history course at the time of the test. In the light of these findings, throughout their chapter, “A Generation at Risk,” Ravitch and Finn made the following comprehensive recommendations to improve the quality of history education:

1) Teach history in context
2) Devote more time to teaching history at every grade level
3) Students should study at least two years of world history
4) History should include geography
5) Collaborate with English teachers to include narratives, journals, stories, biographies, and autobiographies in history curricula
6) Stress the “human dimension”

7) Purchase the best possible history books and supplementary materials

8) Hire highly-qualified teachers who have degrees in the field of history and offer in-service training programs

9) Teachers should participate in the selection of textbooks and teaching materials and should be integrally involved in the writing of curricula

10) Expert teachers should be the community’s connection to history-related programs and offerings

11) Offer teachers opportunities to keep up with their discipline through summer institutes, workshops, and professional organizations and publications

12) Authors, historians, editors, and universities should collaborate in the schools

13) Teacher preparation programs should be improved to qualify future teachers to teach content

14) Knowledge of history should be assessed among various grade levels with questions that stress important knowledge rather than “content-free skills”

Following the release of *What Do 17-Year-Olds Know?* three significant reform movements emerged, all of which sought to refine the status quo in history education and follow the recommendations of Ravitch and Finn. These three movements are reflected in 1) the History/Social Science Framework for California Public Schools; 2) the Bradley Commission; and 3) the National Commission on Social Studies in the Schools.
2.2.2 History/Social Science Framework for California Public Schools

The educational policies of the late 1980s demonstrate that the prior educational reports were successful in making the case that reform was necessary and that content matters. In 1987, California’s State Board of Education approved a new framework for the state’s history/social science curriculum. The primary authors of the framework were Charlotte Crabtree of the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) and Diane Ravitch of Columbia University’s Teacher College. According to Ravitch (2003), the goal of the framework was “to strike a balance between the nation’s *pluribus* and its *unum*, between our common American democratic heritage and the newly awakened forces of ethnic heritage” (p. 99). For Crabtree and Ravitch (1987), accomplishing these ends meant connecting “intellectual skills” with specific historical content. In grades nine through twelve, these skills fall under three major categories: 1) chronological and spatial thinking; 2) historical research, evidence, and point of view; and 3) historical interpretation.

Under chronological and spatial thinking, the Framework asks that students practice the following intellectual skills:

1) Compare the present with the past, evaluating the consequences of past events and decisions and determining the lessons that were learned.

2) Analyze how change happens at different rates at different times; understand that some aspects can change while others remain the same; and understand that change is complicated and affects not only technology and politics but also values and beliefs.

3) Use a variety of maps and documents to interpret human movement, including major patterns of domestic and international migration, changing environmental preferences and settlement patterns, the frictions that develop between population

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groups, and the diffusion of ideas, technological innovations, and goods.

4) Relate current events to the physical and human characteristics of places and regions. (p. 40).

Under the category of historical research, evidence, and point of view, the Framework asks that students

1) Distinguish valid arguments from fallacious arguments in historical interpretations.

2) Identify bias and prejudice in historical interpretations.

3) Construct and test hypotheses; collect, evaluate, and employ information from multiple primary and secondary sources; and apply it in oral and written presentations. (p. 40)

Under the category of historical interpretation, the Framework asks that students

1) Show the connections, casual and otherwise, between particular historical events and larger social, economic, and political trends and developments.

2) Recognize the complexity of historical causes and effects, including the limitations on determining cause and effect.

3) Interpret past events and issues within the context in which an event unfolded rather than solely in terms of present-day norms and values.

4) Understand the meaning, implication, and impact of historical events and recognize that events could have taken other directions.

5) Analyze human modifications of landscapes and examine the resulting environmental policy issues.

6) Conduct cost-benefit analyses and apply basic economic indicators to analyze the aggregate economic behavior of the U.S. economy. (p. 41)
Crabtree and Ravitch emphasized the importance of assessing these skills in conjunction with specific historical content to which the skills should be tied. Critics of the California Framework took issue with the ways in which the authors underrepresented or overemphasized certain ethnic groups.4

2.2.3 The Bradley Commission on History in Schools

What A Nation at Risk (1983) did for educators in general, the Bradley Commission on History in Schools (1988) did for history educators in particular. The Commission, funded by the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation and chaired by Kenneth Jackson, advocated for the primacy of United States history within the broad scope of social studies. This Commission was the first national group to focus on history exclusively. It consisted of 16 members of the history profession, including former presidents of each of the major professional organizations in history and a number of award-winning history teachers and writers.5 Its authors asserted that the binding heritage of Americans is “a democratic vision of liberty, equality, and justice,” and that the preservation of this vision requires that “all citizens understand how it was shaped in the past, what events and forces either helped or obstructed it, and how it has evolved down to the circumstances and political discourse of our time” (p. 8). The Commission argued that the study of history is the most powerful means to achieve the above ends, as it is a gateway to all of the humanities. Moreover, it posited that history speaks to students’ “individuality, to their

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4 In her Language Police (2003), Ravitch lists complaints about the historical content from Armenian, Polish, Arab American, feminist, professors of social studies, and conservatives.

5 Kenneth T. Jackson chaired the Commission, and, along with 189 concerned historians and educators, went on to form the National Council for History Education (NCHE) in 1990.
possibilities for choice, and to their desire to control their lives” (p. 11). The Commission’s work was guided by two goals: 1) to explore the conditions that contribute to, or impede, the effective teaching of history in American schools, from Kindergarten through Grade 12, and 2) to make recommendations on the curricular role of history, and on how all of those concerned—teachers, students, parents, school administrators, university professors, publishers, and boards of education—may improve the teaching of history as the core of social studies in the schools (Jackson et al., p. 8).

The Bradley Commission's recommendations came in its report, *Building a History Curriculum: Guidelines for Teaching History in Schools* (1988, 2000, 2003). The original report makes the case that the objective of the history curriculum should be the “perspectives and modes of thoughtful judgment” that come from studying the past. To achieve this objective, the Commission outlines thirteen habits of mind that, it maintains, ought to be the principal aims of a truly historical education:

1) Understand the significance of the past to their own lives, both private and public, and to their society.

2) Distinguish between the important and the inconsequential, to develop the ‘discriminating memory’ needed for a discerning judgment in public and personal life.

3) Perceive past events and issues as they were experienced by people at the time, to develop historical empathy as opposed to present-mindedness.

4) Acquire at one and the same time a comprehension of diverse cultures and of shared humanity.
5) Understand how things happen and how things change, how human intentions matter, but also how their consequences are shaped by the means of carrying them out, in a tangle of purpose and process.

6) Comprehend the interplay of change and continuity, and avoid assuming that either is somehow more natural, or more to be expected, than the other.

7) Prepare to live with uncertainties and exasperating, even perilous, unfinished business, realizing that not all problems have solutions.

8) Grasp the complexity of historical causation, respect particularity, and avoid excessively abstract generalizations.

9) Appreciate the often tentative nature of judgments about the past, and thereby avoid the temptation to seize upon particular ‘lessons’ of history as cures for present ills.

10) Recognize the importance of individuals who have made a difference in history, and the significance of personal character for both good and ill.

11) Appreciate the force of the non-rational, the irrational, the accidental, in history and human affairs.

12) Understand the relationship between geography and history as a matrix of time and place, and as context for events.

13) Read widely and critically in order to recognize the difference between fact and conjecture, between evidence and assertion, and thereby to frame useful questions.

(p. 14)

The Commission made it clear that achieving the above aims would require a change in history textbooks. In its estimation, the textbooks in use at the time left much to be desired. In
its words, “Much recent criticism of textbooks is well-founded. They are often overstuffed with facts, distracting features and irrelevant graphics, and they are rarely organized to clarify the larger themes and questions the Commission finds indispensable” (p. 33).

The Bradley Commission noted that its report had earned the endorsement of the Organization of History Teachers (OHT), the American Historical Association (AHA), and the Organization of American Historians (OAH). However, critics of the report argue that it had not addressed appropriately the biggest factor that affects the quality of history education: teaching. As Burson (1989) put it, “If history curriculum of the schools is to be enriched, history teacher education must also be improved” (p. 60). The Commission had recommended more time in the history classroom and teachers with at least a minor in history. Even so, “Changing the history curriculum” Burson wrote, “will do little to improve the teaching of history in the schools unless the classroom teacher’s understanding of history is also improved” (p. 60-61).

2.2.4 The National Commission on Social Studies in the Schools

In 1987, the Organization of American Historians (OAH), the American Historical Association (AHA), and the National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) created the National Commission on Social Studies in the Schools (NCSSS) to study the status quo in America’s social studies classrooms and make recommendations for curricular change. The ensuing report, Charting a Course: Social Studies for the 21st Century (1989) offers goals and recommendations for the social studies curriculum (grades 7-12), and for teaching strategies. The Curriculum Task Force recommended that the goals of social studies education should include the development of:
1) Civic responsibility and citizen participation.

2) A global perspective through an understanding of students’ life experiences as part of the total human experience, past and present.

3) ‘Critical understanding’ of the history, geography, and the pluralistic nature of the civil institutions of the United States.

4) A multicultural perspective on the world’s peoples through an understanding of their differences and commonalities throughout time and place.

5) Students’ capacities for critical thinking about ‘the human condition.’ (p. 1)

The Commission endorsed teaching strategies that foster critical thinking, problem-solving, decision-making, and in-depth study, all of which are crucial for democratic participation. The Commission also suggested that students engage in reading, writing, observing, debating, role play, simulations, and the use of statistical data through cooperative and collaborative efforts. Finally, the Commission recommended that the curriculum offer students a rich variety of original source materials such as literature, films, television, artifacts, photographs, historical maps, computers, and courseware (p. 4).

Together, the three major reform efforts asked that students move beyond such tasks as discerning facts, collecting, recording and retaining them and, instead, begin dealing with the treatment of information. Put another way, the reforms asked that students begin figuring out what a set of facts means and how it informs citizens’ lives. Critics of the reform movement argued that collectively, the three separate efforts damaged the stability of social studies, which was struggling to respond to concerns that it was unable to articulate its commitment to curricular content and overarching goals (Risinger & Garcia, 1995, p. 226). Risinger and Garcia (1995) explained that opponents of the reforms “undermined the concept of a unified field of
social studies and paved the way for the fragmentation that threaten[ed] any true reforms in content and pedagogy” (p. 226).

2.3 THE STANDARDS MOVEMENT

2.3.1 Standards for Students and Teachers

In April 1991, the G. H. Bush Administration announced America 2000, a national education agenda with six goals set forth by the President and governors who had attended the 1989 “Educational Summit” in Charlottesville, Virginia. These goals were designed by Lamar Alexander, then Secretary of Education, and David Kearns, Alexander’s deputy secretary. To be met by all students by the year 2000, these goals were as follows: 1) All children will start school ready to learn; 2) high school graduation rates will increase to 90 percent; 3) students leaving grades 4, 8, and 12 will demonstrate competence in challenging subject matter including English, math, science, history, and geography; 4) students in the United States will be first in the world in science and math achievement; 5) functional literacy will be a reality for every adult; and 6) every school will offer a disciplined environment conducive to learning, free of drugs and violence (p. 1). These goals were an indication of the country’s willingness to increase the federal government’s role in education.

America 2000 established measures of accountability for the government and schools. These measures included developing world-class standards; creating American achievement tests; encouraging test use by colleges, universities, and employers; offering presidential accolades and scholarships; generating report cards; changing national assessment of educational
progress; creating new choice incentives; offering educational flexibility legislation to support
the school as a site of reform; rewarding schools that move toward the goals with a merit schools
program; establishing differential pay for teachers; recommending alternative certification for
teachers and principals; and honoring outstanding teachers in the five core subject areas (p. 20).
For supporters of the Bush agenda, the fulfillment of these measures depended on the result of
the presidential election of 1991. In spite of George H. Bush’s defeat, the initiative took hold as
President Bill Clinton embraced the notion of national standards, particularly as a means of
making schools more accountable for meeting the needs of minority and inner-city students. The
Clinton Administration preserved the principles of *America 2000* under a new title for a new

As a part of *Goals 2000*, Congress created the National Council on Educational Standards
and Testing (NCEST) (1992), which issued its report *Raising Standards for American Education*.
This bipartisan council sought to determine “whether national standards and a system of
assessments are desirable and feasible” and, if so, “how national standards and a system of
assessments are to be developed and implemented” (p. 1). The report concluded that the
“absence of explicit national standards severely hampers the ability to monitor the nation’s
progress toward the six national education goals” (p. 1) and that high national standards tied to
assessments ‘are desirable…’ if the country sought to “promote educational equity, preserve
democracy, and enhance civic culture and economic competitiveness” (Porter, 1994). The report
also called for a change in the current methods of assessment, which measured “low-level skills”
and did little to determine what knowledge students acquired in school or if their skills would
give them what they needed “to prosper in the future” (p.1). At the same time, the report
stipulated that the new standards and assessments should move students beyond “processing bits of data” and toward solving problems and thinking critically (p. 1).

The federal government’s effort to introduce standards into the nation’s schools in the early 1990s indicates that the country was intent on setting more rigorous expectations for students and teachers. The movement was the first of its kind, as the Constitution does not grant the federal government power over education—that power is reserved for the states.

### 2.3.2 Curriculum Change in History

The National History Standards Project (1991), co-funded by the United States Department of Education, under Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander, and the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) under Lynne V. Cheney, sought to establish a national standard for excellence in the teaching and learning of history. Contributors to the project worked to connect larger understandings and thought processes with specific historical content. The federal government awarded the funding to University of California, Los Angeles’ (UCLA) National Center for History in the Schools, under the direction of Gary Nash and Charlotte Crabtree. The Department of Education chose the National Center on the merit of its prior report “Lessons from History: Essential Understandings and Historical Perspectives Students Should Acquire” (1992). That report had made the case that the study of history must prepare students for three important facets of life in a free society:

1) Active citizenship, to safeguard liberty and justice

2) A career of work, to sustain life

3) The private pursuit of happiness, or personal fulfillment. (p. 1)
The report cites research findings sharing the premise that “the success or failure of the American democratic system depends on an enlightened citizenry, knowledgeable about its nation’s history and committed to its shared civic values” (p. 2). In an attempt to chart a course for success, “Lessons from History” (1992) suggested that history should be taught in the light of the following seven principles:

1) Chronological, Analytical Narrative. History’s power flows from its narrative character. Chronology serves not only as the organizing core for the human experience, it can help bring structure and understanding to the social sciences.

2) Interpretation of Narrative. Studying history means more than remembering answers. It must include evaluating historical information and reflecting on different interpretations of historical events.

3) Inclusiveness. Both U.S. and world history must tell the story of all the world’s peoples—men and women of all classes and conditions, ethnic and racial origins, national and religious backgrounds.

4) Pausing for Depth. It takes time to analyze and evaluate historical information. It is important to select some topics for in-depth study and the examination of primary documents.

5) Contingency and Complexity. The past must be seen on its own terms, not through today’s values. Students must see that individual and group decisions shaped history and that some stories might have turned out differently.
6) Exploring Causality. Depth and narrative help students grapple with the historical question of causality. Why and how did things happen? How is one event related to another?

7) Active Learning and Critical Inquiry. Direct contact with historical documents and different interpretations help students understand the complexity and adventure in history. Teachers should use active learning strategies appropriate to the content and student capabilities. (p. 4)

While the National Center for History in the Schools was developing new national history standards, the political climate became contentious for the humanities following a controversial exhibit funded in-part by the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). Conservatives argued that tax-paying Americans did not want to subsidize art that lacked morality or patriotism, and liberals argued that the federal government should not censor art and restrict the freedom of expression. What ensued was not only a battle over the arts, but over the country’s tolerance for “political correctness.” According to Richard Jensen (1995), “political correctness” had its benefits, namely, its emphasis on multiculturalism, diversity, and inclusiveness. Conservatives argued that inclusiveness amounted to a blatant disregard for the country’s unifying principles and a degradation of its character. This discourse had serious implications for the forthcoming history standards, as outspoken advocates on both sides of the issue debated whether American history should favor diversity or unity.

In the midst of the controversy, UCLA’s National Center for History in the Schools (1994) proposed its National Standards for History, which came in two sections—American History Standards and World History Standards. The Center, directed by Gary Nash and

6 References to Robert Mapplethorpe’s homoerotic photographs, Andres Serano’s Christ-in-urine photograph, Karen Finley’s feminist performance art, and a program on homosexuality on PBS.
Charlotte Crabtree, supported by 31 distinguished educators, and advised by over 6,000 consultants and institutions, helped to operationalize the vision of America 2000. The major premise of the standards was that “all students should have equal opportunity to acquire over twelve years of precollegiate education” (Nash & Crabtree, 1997, p. 301-305). The Center offered teachers suggestions for standards in both content and process. Its point was that teachers could present substantive material to promote cultural and historical literacy, and at the same time engage students in high-level intellectual tasks. The following, Table 2, lists the American history process standards and the frequency with which they are listed alongside content standards:

| Establish temporal order                                                                 | 1 |
| Read historical narratives imaginatively                                                 | 1 |
| Reconstruct the literal meaning of a historical passage                                 | 1 |
| Challenge arguments of historical inevitability                                        | 2 |
| Differentiate between historical facts and historical interpretations                    | 2 |
| Obtain historical data                                                                  | 2 |
| Compare competing historical narratives                                                | 3 |
| Evaluate alternative courses of actions                                                 | 3 |
| Hold interpretations of history as tentative                                          | 3 |
| Identify relevant historical antecedents                                                | 3 |
| Draw upon visual, literary, and musical sources                                        | 4 |
| Evaluate major debates among historians                                                 | 5 |
| Formulate historical questions                                                         | 5 |
| Draw upon data in historical maps                                                      | 8 |
| Reconstruct patterns of historical succession and duration                              | 8 |
| Utilize visual and mathematical data                                                    | 8 |
| Identify issues and problems in the past                                               | 9 |
| Hypothesize the influence of the past (on the present)                                 | 10 |
| Evaluate the implementation of a decision                                               | 12 |
| Explain historical continuity and change                                                | 13 |
| Formulate a position or course of action on an issue                                   | 13 |
| Marshal evidence of antecedent circumstances                                            | 13 |

(Table 2. Continued)
The specific content, to which the Center attached the processes, sparked a great deal of controversy. Lynne V. Cheney (1994) was at the helm of the critics, arguing in her *Wall Street Journal* article, “The End of History” that the content from the *American History Standards* overemphasized political correctness, multiculturalism, and the shortcomings of the United States. In her estimation, the funding from the Department of Education and NEH came with the assumption that UCLA’s National Center for History would offer standards that were an extension of their *Lessons from History* (1992) report. Ultimately, Cheney saw the *American History Standards* as a betrayal against her work at NEH and against the country as a whole: “We are a better people than the National Standards indicate, and our children deserve to know it” (p. 1A). Those who initially supported UCLA’s subsidy assumed that the Standards would reflect a “consensus” between history intellectuals and the body politic; however, this assumption was clearly ill-informed. As Jensen (1995) put it, “After the 1992 election, there was apparently no need to compromise with conservatives” (p. 23).

Cheney’s critics argued that the intervention of the government in scholarship was dangerous. According to Evans Clinchy (1995) such a precedent was ‘fraught with great intellectual and social dangers and burdened with the prospect of inevitable and endless controversy’ (VanBurkleo, 1996, p. 169). Others made the case that Cheney disregarded the differences between the content within the 31 core standards within 10 historical eras, and the
subsequent 2,600 sample assignments that were meant to help teachers and students with critical thinking skills in the classroom (Miller, 2000, p. 39-49). Still others criticized the entire standards movement, arguing that it was restrictive for students as well as teachers. Eisner (1995) for example, argued that the plurality of the American school experience was what made it exceptional historically, and that standardizing content encouraged uniformity and commonality in a system that thrives on diversity. He wrote, “Diversity in education breeds social complexity and social complexity can lead to a richness in culture that uniformity can never provide” (p. 99).

In the midst of the controversy surrounding the national history standards, Donald Stewart (1993), President of the College Board pointed out that the Advanced Placement Program had succeeded in offering students rigorous content and process standards for almost four decades:

In a period of continued questioning about the quality of American secondary education and the accomplishments of our high school students, the Advanced Placement Program is nationally acknowledged as an educational approach that is a superb model for the nation to emulate. The National Education Goals Panel, America 2000, and the New Standards Project have all praised AP as a program that works on a national scale…In addition, the U.S. Department of Education is using AP data as an indicator in the annual report—The Condition of Education (Rothschild, 1999, p.192).

Patrons of the Advanced Placement Program had already been thinking along the same lines as Stewart, as funds came in from the Mellon Foundation (1987) to subsidize summer institutes for schools whose teachers were willing to learn how to teach high-level courses
particularly to poor or minority students (Rothschild, p. 195). At a time when there was much fighting over the national history standards, half of the country’s schools were offering Advanced Placement courses to their students (Rothschild, p. 197).

According to its course description, Advanced Placement (AP) history expects students “to assess historical materials—their relevance to a given interpretive problem, reliability, and importance—and to weigh the evidence and interpretations presented in historical scholarship. An AP U.S. History course should thus develop the skills necessary to arrive at conclusions on the basis of an informed judgment and to present reasons and evidence clearly and persuasively in essay format” (2010, p. 4). Furthermore, “an AP course should also train students to analyze and interpret primary sources, including documentary material, maps, statistical tables, and pictorial and graphic evidence of historical events. Students need to have an awareness of multiple interpretations of historical issues in secondary sources. Students should have a sense of multiple causation and change over time, and should be able to compare developments or trends from one period to another” (p. 11).

Both the College Board and the National Center for History agreed on the need for rigorous standards for students, but while the Advanced Placement program continued to thrive, the national standards did not. In spite of their reasoning or intentions, the American History Standards and World History Standards were dissolved by the United States Senate in an overwhelming 99—1 vote. As a preventative measure, Congress also put an end to the Goals 2000 program to preclude any individual or organization from taking control of the history curriculum. Effectively, the Senate’s vote ended history content and process standards. Nash and Crabtree (1996) eventually revised the Standards by taking out content that was especially controversial, but after the public defeat, they lost their efficacy.
Ultimately, the controversy over the Standards led to discourse about the values and principles of history education. In his Washington Post article “Whose History? Where Critics of the New Standards Flunk Out,” Theodore Rabb (1994) pointed out that the debate over the standards was simply part of the democratic process, which should also become part of history’s lessons: “To have an informed citizenry, history has to be learned, not as a set of lifeless facts, but as a felt, meaningful way of understanding oneself and one’s society. If it is to have that effect, however, it requires the exercise of judgment, which in turn demands engagement and even passion. Citizens should be able not merely to explore for themselves the content and form of history—what happened in the past and how do we know it?—but to experience the power of what we have inherited from our ancestors.” Regardless of one’s position on the controversial content standards, the point made by Risinger and Garcia (1995) remains: the controversy itself “reminds us that the way we perceive history is a powerful determinant of how we perceive ourselves” (p. 227).

2.3.3 Teacher Accreditation

Rabb (1994) posited that the kind of history education that sympathizes with the democratic process must dismiss the “canonical set of subjects.” This kind of history education, however, requires teachers who are so well-versed in history that they do not need a set of canonical subjects. In 1994, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) sought to measure secondary students’ aptitude in United States history. The data showed that 54 percent of high school seniors scored “below basic” in history, and, to make matters worse, students scored lower in history than in any other subject. Diane Ravitch (1998) argued that these poor results were related directly to the lack of adequate preparation on the part of history teachers. As she
put it, “It should be self-evident that those who teach history should themselves have studied history. If they don’t know it, how can they teach it?” (p. 496). The “Schools and Staffing Survey” from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) in the United States Department of Education (1996) revealed the full scope of this issue in its findings. According to its report, more than half of all secondary public school students in history or world civilization courses had teachers who did not have at least a minor in history. NCES revealed other statistics that were equally astounding: 1) among secondary social studies teachers only 18.5 percent have either a major or minor in history; 2) 71 percent of these teachers have their undergraduate degree in education; 3) 89 percent of social studies teachers have had an advanced degree earned it in education; and 4) only 2 percent of these social studies teachers have an advanced degree in any academic field (p. 497).

According to Ravitch (1998) teachers who do not demonstrate through examination or credentials that they are equipped to teach particular subjects fall in the area of “professional malpractice” (p. 499). Given the NCES findings, she recommended that “future teachers should know their subject and how to teach it. History teachers should study history in college. They should certainly have at least a minor and preferably a major in history, including American and world history courses” (p. 499).

### 2.3.4 Testing and Assessment

The new millennium ushered in some of the same anxieties about student readiness. Much like those who subscribed to *A Nation at Risk* (1983), new critics feared that schools were turning out students who were ill-equipped to deal with the unique demands of the twenty-first century. In
2001, Congress passed the educational reform act, *No Child Left Behind* (NCLB), thus announcing a new era of assessments of teacher and student competencies. In its own language, the legislation intended to facilitate “high-quality academic assessments, accountability systems, and teacher preparation and training aligned with challenging State academic standards so that students, teachers, parents, and administrators can measure progress against common expectations for students’ academic achievement” (p. ii.). In addition, the Department of Education states that NCLB is unequivocally dedicated to the idea that “students served by Title I are given the same opportunity to achieve high standards and are held to the same high expectations as all other students in each State” (p. ii). Initially, NCLB mandated that States assess students in mathematics and reading or language arts, but since the law’s inception, the Department of Education added science in the 2007-08 school year.7

Although NCLB does not require states to assess history specifically, it does offer teachers literature and data on best practices in the field. One effort in particular that the Department of Education commissioned in light of the legislation was the Teaching American History (TAH) Program, which set out to “improve teacher content knowledge of and instructional strategies for U.S. history” (p. ix). Grants from this program funded districts with “high-need” student populations, most notably students from minority, English as a second language, and/or free and reduced lunch populations (p. ix).

According to the report, the TAH Program sought to engage the participants in two cognitive domains established by the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP): ways

7 Initially, students were to be assessed annually to students in each of grades 3 through 8 in addition to one of the grades 10 through 12. Beginning in 2007-08, science assessments were to be administered annually to students in at least one grade in each of three grade ranges—grades 3 through 5, grades 6 through 9, and grades 10 through 12.
of knowing and ways of thinking about United States history. As TAH understands it, engagement in these two domains includes practice with the following skills:

1) finding value statements; making defensible generalizations;

2) sequencing events;

3) establishing significance;

4) rendering insightful accounts of the past;

5) weighing evidence to draw sound conclusions;

6) developing a general conceptualization of U.S. history;

7) establishing cause-and-effect relationships;

8) explaining issues, identifying historical patterns;

9) knowing and understanding people, events, concepts, themes, movements, contexts, and historical sources;

10) recognizing multiple perspectives and seeing an era or movement through the eyes of different groups; and

11) applying historical knowledge. (p. 31)

The report goes on to state that researchers were interested in the extent to which participants were exposed to or used the following tasks: analyzing oral histories; forming hypotheses and making conclusions based on historical evidence; comparing and contrasting differing interpretations of history and historical events; analyzing the historical significance of place; analyzing historical artifacts, material culture, and/or media (i.e. video, internet, music); analyzing history by themes, periods, and regions; analyzing historical documents, such as manuscripts and diaries (p. 33).
2.4 TEXTBOOKS AS CURRICULUM

2.4.1 History Textbook Standards

The standards movement was discouraging to champions of a national curriculum; however, as efforts to build and defend standards were derailed, policy makers began responding to the idea that the United States did in fact have a national curriculum in the form of textbooks. As this idea began to gain momentum, scholars turned their attention away from UCLA and toward the content inside textbooks.

The American Textbook Council (ATC) is an independent and non-partisan research organization interested in “textbook improvement and the evaluation and analysis of instructional materials” (p. 1). The Council, under the direction of Gilbert T. Sewall, the former education editor of Newsweek, and affiliate of both New York University and Boston University, understands the power of textbooks in the hands of teachers and students. According to its philosophy, the Council “endorses textbooks that embody vivid narrative style, stress significant people and events, and promote better understanding of all cultures, including our own, on the principle that improved textbooks will advance the curriculum, stimulate student learning, and encourage educational achievement for children of all backgrounds” (p. 1).

In its review guidelines, the Council establishes its values for educational resources by examining the extent to which history textbooks exhibit these pedagogical attributes:

1) the idea of a national character and civic identity;

2) systematic development of ideas;

3) in-depth study;

4) lively narrative rich with experiences of people;
5) correspondence between the narrative and the illustrations;
6) supporting biographies;
7) full or partial primary source references from different genres; and
8) inclusion of literature.

The Council goes on to identify its values in instructional activities and materials for history classrooms by offering the following suggestions to teachers:

1) look at the way in which primary sources, maps, graphs, and tables are used to enhance the core text;
2) provide varied opportunities for students to be actively engaged in the learning process;
3) offer opportunities to write;
4) offer students of differing abilities opportunities for success in learning the content;
5) include questions for students, help them to analyze the information and to think critically; that is, to reflect, hypothesize, analyze, verify, synthesize;
6) provide for curriculum integration and correlation;
7) offer students the opportunity to discuss or debate ideas presented in the textbook; and
8) offer activities that become more challenging as the year progresses.

In the area of student evaluation and assessment, the Council endorses the following methodologies:

1) both formal and informal assessment strategies;
2) strategies that enable students to hypothesize, analyze, and draw conclusions about the subject matter they are studying; and

3) strategies that include student writing exercises.

Beyond the views of special interest groups like the ATC, the scholarly discourse about high school history textbooks reached a public audience with the publication of Loewen’s (1995) *Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong*. In it, Loewen found that in secondary history courses, teachers rely on the textbook more so than in any other subject. In light of this finding, Loewen analyzed the top-circulating textbooks in an effort to test their dependability. His findings point to three significant faults in textbook design: First, the size is overwhelming. Six of the newest textbooks average 1,150 pages and weigh approximately 6 pounds each. For Loewen, this is indicative of a value of breadth over depth especially with the exorbitant number of main ideas, skill builders, terms and names, and critical thinking questions. Second, the histories themselves are predictable, free of conflict or suspense, but laden with moralistic and nationalistic overtones. As he put it, textbooks “leave out anything that might reflect badly upon our national character” (p. 5). Third, history textbooks are not usually reviewed by historians, which often leave them inaccurate and unhistorical. For Loewen, history is subjective and combative, filled with tensions and irresolutions. Yet, publishers ignore these attributes and insist on bombarding students with facts, names, and dates. Loewen’s point is clear: if textbooks are to become meaningful resources, they must provide, among other things, in-depth analyses and interpretive conflicts.

Many historians agreed with Loewen. For example, Page Putnam Miller (2000) argued that history’s greatest challenge in the public domain is “conveying an understanding of the craft of history” (p. 45). After exposing the popular notion that history is a finished product, a set of
facts to memorize and recite, she notes that for historians the past is a series of deliberate decisions such as “when to begin the story and whose voices to include,” both of which are part of the process of historical interpretation (p. 45). Miller continues that history is an ongoing project that is never complete. In her words, “Historians are always finding and using new documentary sources, and posing new questions that lead to new research, which in turn contributes to an enriched and more accurate understanding of the past” (p. 45). Miller joined others in arguing that even though the discipline’s fundamental task is “revising and enhancing our perceptions of the past,” the term ‘revisionist’ has become politicized wrongfully and given a “negative connotation on Capitol Hill” (p. 45).

### 2.4.2 Textbook Evaluation

Gagnon (1989) advanced an early critique of history textbooks and their tendency to value breadth over depth. For him, authors and publishers must make more careful selections of content. This is how he explained his point: “[B]ecause recent history in most textbooks is recounted so blandly, and in such bewildering detail, a clear focus on only three or four selected themes is all the more important” (p. 130). In other words, “there is simply too much history to cover every little detail” (p. 130). As a solution, he proposes offering broader topics in 20th-century United States history that are worthy of study. Following Gagnon, more criticism ensued from both sides of the political spectrum. Conservative critics like Arthur M. Schlesinger (1991) in his *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society*, argued that favoring multiculturalism and diversity in textbooks was having a detrimental effect on the unity and shared ideology of the American historical character. In his own words, “What students learn in schools vitally affects other areas of American life—the way we see and treat other
Americans, the way we conceive the purpose of our republic. The debate about the curriculum is a debate about what it means to be an American. What is ultimately at stake is the shape of the American future” (p. 267).

In her *The Language Police: How Pressure Groups Restrict What Students Learn*, Diane Ravitch (2003) explained that the shaping of “the American future” is a political game that has rendered textbooks dull, trite, and ineffectual. As she explained, the banality of secondary history textbooks can be attributed to the political tug-of-war between liberals and conservatives over whose version of United States history would prevail. Specifically, the conservative right advocates against history that includes Darwinian evolution, questioning of authority, secular humanism, and situation ethics. For its part, the liberal left advocates for history that welcomes multiculturalism, endorses feminism, and social justice. According to Ravitch, the audience for these political and educational interest groups is not a democratically-elected board, nor are the complaints and proceedings played out in a public forum; rather, the audience is the textbook publishers and the actions that they take amount to censorship: “The bias guidelines are censorship guidelines. Nothing more, nothing less. This language censorship and thought control should be repugnant to those who care about freedom of expression” (p. 48).

Ravitch argued that the status quo puts textbook publishers in a defensive position. While liberal-leaning California and conservative-leaning Texas both mandate that their state boards of education endorse a textbook for the entire state, and while those two states dominate the textbook market, publishers find themselves trying to please both ends of the political spectrum in the same source. Ravitch offers harsh words for this phenomenon: “The linguistic and ideological conformity that has been imposed on the American educational publishing industry is an outrage. It insults the dignity and integrity of those who work in publishing. It
destroys the possibility of freedom of thought and expression. It creates a formula to which every writer must adhere, or risk rejection and failure” (p. 48-49).

In response to this state of affairs, Ravitch makes three recommendations to reverse the current situation with textbooks: a) eliminate the State textbook adoption practice; b) create a more democratic approach to the creation and adoption of educational materials; and 3) bring better teachers into classroom, that is, teachers educated in the field of history.

The Fordham Institute’s report, *A Consumer’s Guide to High School History Textbooks* (2004), evaluates 12 of the most widely-used secondary textbooks, 6 from United States history and 6 from world history. The authors report disappointing findings, the best United States history textbook (*American Journey*, Appleby et al., 2003) earned a 78% or C+ rating; the other 5 earned an F. Chester E. Finn, Jr. (2004) attributes such dreadful results to the ‘irresponsible impersonal’ voice that plagues United States history textbooks. In his own words, “As with the vase breaking, things happen in these books (though not necessarily in chronological order), but not because anybody causes them. Hence, nobody deserves admiration or contempt for having done something incredibly wonderful or abominably evil. No judgments need be made” (p. 5).

The report arrives at the following conclusions. First, history textbooks are boring. In an attempt to avoid controversy or assign blame, textbook authors keep their perspectives sanitized and as such boring and hollow. Second, textbooks are more concerned with breadth of content rather than depth of analysis. In so doing, they “sacrifice any sense of what is important to learn about history” (p. 64). The report’s recommendations include the following:

1) History sources ought to ‘bring to the student of history a sense of wonder, intrigue, and fascination with the events of the past.’ (p. 64)
2) Schools should avoid approaching long periods of history through survey courses, and instead should focus on an in-depth study of one culture, region, or civilization. (p. 65)

The issue of history textbooks made it to the front page of the New York Times when Diana Jean Schemo (2006) wrote “Schoolbooks Are Given F’s in Originality.” This article brought to light the publishers’ false advertising about the authorship of the nation’s most popular textbooks. The issue came to light when Allan Winkler (2005), a historian from Miami University of Ohio and co-author of the history textbook Pathways, was horrified by a passage describing the events of September 11, 2001. The publisher took the liberty of including the events in an updated edition without consulting the original authors and without delving into religion, conflict, or responsibility. For Winker, their benign treatment of the terrorist attacks failed to live up to the expectations of the authors and the history of the event.

In his study, “The Quality of Pedagogical Exercises in U.S. History Textbooks,” David Bruce Lavere (2008) sought to determine the extent to which textbooks offer students higher-order thinking exercises. His findings show that among 13 nationally distributed textbooks ranging from grades 3 to 11, the vast majority of exercises were recall questions that lacked differentiation among grade levels, high-quality historical content, and historically-accurate inquiry processes. In fact, most exercises perpetuated the notion that history is simply a list of “objective” facts to memorize. Lavere concluded: “[T]extbook writers and publishers should design pedagogical exercises to reflect quality content and provide students with opportunities to engage in critical reflection” (p. 3).
2.5 THE CULTURE WARS

2.5.1 Culture Wars in Education

James Davison Hunter (1991) wrote *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* as an exploration of the most divisive issues plaguing American society; family, art, education, law, and politics. In it, he argued that public education “is not a neutral process of imparting practical knowledge and technical skills,” and that schools are “the primary institutional means of reproducing community and national identity for succeeding generations of Americans” (p. 198). Hunter explained that the profundity of this responsibility is what makes education such a contentious issue. In his words, “It is because of the intrinsic link between public education, community and national identity, and the future (symbolized by children) that the institutions of education have long been a political and legal battleground” (p. 198). Following the standards movement, Peter N. Stearns (1996) underlined the main battles within the field of secondary history: world history vs. western history; history as inspiration or as criticism; new history vs. old; and coverage vs. analysis.

Later on, Jonathan Zimmerman (2005) elaborated on Hunter’s work in his *Whose America? Culture Wars in the Public Schools*. In it, he explained that throughout the twentieth century, movements to broaden history education have worked to enhance patriotism in the nation’s story. However, current culture wars threaten to erode this story, as conflicting religious worldviews prevent different sects within the country from reaching common ground on issues of education in general and history in particular. Both sides of the religious divide campaign for their own interests in textbooks and instruction, which Zimmerman views as problematic because of the country’s longstanding tradition of personal liberty: “[I]n America, we are told,
individuals are uniquely free to decide their values, beliefs, and attitudes” (p. 10). Yet, the liberal left fights for a shared history in which “you get your heroes, I get mine” and the conservative right fights for shared “sunny story and downplaying darker ones—especially poverty, racism, and imperialism” (p. 222). The contradiction here is evident. In Zimmerman’s words, “You cannot praise America for cultivating individual freedom of thought, then proceed to tell every individual what to think. But that is exactly what most of our schoolbooks continue to do” (p. 222).

2.5.2 Culture Wars in Textbooks

Arguably, one of the most contentious issues in the American history curriculum is the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Immediately following, textbooks produced shallow explanations as they hurried to meet deadlines (Finn, 2004). In his study about the ethical issues related to 9/11, Romanowski (2009) found that among the American Textbook Council’s (ATC) (2010) list of 9 of the most widely adopted history textbooks, the vast majority “engaged in fact-stating, giving students the ‘basic’ information regarding the events of 9/11.” What was missing in these accounts was an array of complicated issues, namely, civil liberties, national security, treatment of Muslims, the Patriot Act, and weapons of mass destruction. Such omissions prevented students from understanding the complexities of the event. Romanowski’s findings led him to the following suggestions: First, adopt Loewen’s (1995) five critical questions: 1) Why was a particular event written about? 2) Whose viewpoint is presented, whose omitted and whose interests are served? 3) Is the account believable? 4) Is the account backed up by other sources? 5) How is one supposed to feel about the America that has been presented? Second, teachers should offer students different perspectives about an event. Third, teachers should use writing
assignments to develop critical thinking. Fourth, teachers should use pictures as another means to critical thinking. Romanowski argued that “instead of debating over what ‘truths’ to feed students, educators need to engage in dialogue that centers on developing the historical thinking skills that students need to analyze the past and critique the present” (p. 46).

The most recent indication that the history culture wars are still raging comes from the Texas Board of Education. In May 2010, the Board approved a set of curriculum standards that “put a conservative stamp on history” (McKinley, 2010, p. 1). Their version of history extols American capitalism and brings into question the Founders’ commitment to a secular government and minority contribution to the country’s identity. Those who support the standards want to tell the story of America’s founding as ‘a Christian land governed by Christian principles’ (Birnbaum, 2010, p. A16). The most radical revision comes from Cynthia Dunbar, “a strict constitutionalist” who advocated Thomas Jefferson’s dismissal from a list of writers who inspired eighteenth- and nineteenth-century revolutions. As a New York Times article explained, “Jefferson is not well liked among conservatives on the board because he coined the term ‘separation between church and state’” (McKinley, p. 1). On the one hand, conservative board members argue that their curricular decisions are an attempt to add balance to the discipline of history, which, has been affected by academia’s liberal bias. On the other hand, a dissenting voice within the Board, pointed out that “‘they [conservatives] are not experts, they are not historians…They are rewriting history, not only of Texas but of the United States and the world’” (McKinley, p. 4).
2.6 SUMMARY

This review of literature brings to light the values of secondary history education that have been in place for almost three decades. The literature points to a polarization between liberal and conservative camps, each of which has its own ideas about what students should learn. On the one hand, the conservative camp focuses on three main standards: 1) a content-rich curriculum; 2) an emphasis on an idealistic portrait of the United States; and 3) an emphasis on the importance of the country’s unity. On the other hand, the liberal camp is concerned with 1) a process-based curriculum; 2) an emphasis on a realistic portrait of the United States; and 3) an emphasis on the importance of the country’s diversity.

Conservative thinkers who assess the quality of historical education according to content gained credibility through the work of E. D. Hirsch, Jr. (1987) who made the case that there is specific content that citizens must know in order to be culturally literate. For him, “Literate culture is the most democratic culture in our land: it excludes nobody; it cuts across generations and social groups and classes; it is not usually one’s first culture, but it should be everyone’s second, existing as it does beyond the narrow spheres of family, neighborhood, and region” (p. 21). As I have shown, other authors, publications, and organizations within the field perpetuated Hirsch’s idea, most notably Diane Ravitch and Chester E. Finn, Jr. (1987) who designed their research studies to addresses problems in secondary schools “where history was taught topically, without regard to chronology, and others where history had been replaced by unrelated courses in the social sciences” (p. 2). In collaboration with Ravitch, Charlotte Crabtree (1987) tied specific content to the intellectual skills that she included in the California History/Social Science Framework. In conjunction with historical methods related to chronology, spatial thinking, historical research, evidence, point of view, and historical interpretation, Crabtree
included content ranging from the Enlightenment and the Declaration of Independence to the social issues during the Clinton Administration.

The discussions about content-rich curricula inspired more discussions about the most appropriate content for students. For conservatives, history education should focus on the merits and accomplishments of the United States. As the review of literature mentions, Lynne Cheney bemoaned the lack of “celebratory prose” in curriculum, while pointing out that “African and Native American societies, like all societies had their failings, but one would hardly know it from the National Standards” (New York Times, p. 1A).

Liberal thinkers tend to subscribe to process-based learning, first outlined by Dewey’s pragmatism. In his Democracy and Education (1916), Dewey understood education as a “communicated experience” put in place for the betterment of society. He goes on to explain that “[a]ll communication is like art. It may fairly be said, therefore, that any social arrangement that remains vitally social, or vitally shared, is educative to those who participate in it. Only when it becomes cast in a mold and runs in a routine way does it lose its educative power” (p. 7).

As mentioned in the literature, the Bradley Commission and those who supported it understood that “narrative history must illuminate vital themes and significant questions, including but reaching beyond the acquisition of useful facts. Students should not be left in doubt about the reasons for remembering certain things, for getting facts straight, for gathering and assessing evidence. ‘What of it?’ is a worthy question and it requires an answer” (p. 14-15).

The inclusion of process-driven standards in secondary history curricula invokes the processes of criticism and analysis. The critical orientation brings to light much of the harsh realities that groups, minorities in particular, suffered throughout United States history. As the literature pointed out, the UCLA National Standards (1994) addressed some of these struggles
(i.e. slavery, abuse of Native Americans, etc.). Loewen (1995) followed suit making the case that no textbook or author can become “the arbitrator” of history, the one author who perpetuates a one-sided version of the past. Rather, the only effective way for students to approach the past is to become “independent learners who can sift through arguments and evidence and make reasoned judgments” (p. 356).

Arguments among liberal thinkers value diversity in United States history. Authors like Rabb (1994), Eisner (1995), and Zimmerman (2005) made the case that the multiplicity of experience within the American school system is what made it successful historically. Although most scholars would be hard pressed to dispute that secondary teachers should be specialists in their field, most disagreed with pedagogical standards that are too structured and regimented. Eisner (1995) made the case that masterful teachers are qualitative in their approach, that they must employ intuition and experimentation. In his own words, “artistry and intuition are enormously important aspects of all forms of teaching and teachers need the space and encouragement to use both in their work” (p. 103). This space translates into more freedom from predetermined curricular scripts. Zimmerman (2005) has summarized the liberal perspective, which argues that commitments to prescribed historical content sell students a truth about the past. This policy diminishes the chance to debate the legitimacy of that truth. As he put it, if our country was committed to teaching democracy, “we would encourage our children to develop their own interpretations instead of foisting a single view upon them” (p. 10-11).

This analysis of the literature brings me to four important conclusions. First, the debate between the liberal and conservatives camps is an ongoing argument with no resolution in sight. The past three decades suggest that the battles between content and process, idealism and realism, and unity and diversity will continue. Second, the nature of the debate creates more
divisions as it invites one to “take sides.” This kind of dichotomy prevents collegial reconciliation, and has invited more autonomous actions like those taken recently by the Texas State Board of Education. Third, members of both camps are resolute about their own approach to secondary history education, but at the same time, they advocate the importance of democracy. Paradoxically, each side’s resolution defeats democracy so long as it resists compromise or consensus. Fourth, neither the conservative nor the liberal camps offer a universal remedy for the problems in secondary history education. Both sides of the debate have merit in their own right; however, each resists including the merits of the opposing side. The conclusions indicate that the issue has reached an impasse, and as a result, this study seeks to offer new ways of looking at the issue and new questions to consider.

The first question is, what is the nature of history? The literature points to a broad range of values and priorities of history education, both liberal and conservative, but there is little to no discussion about the extent to which these values and priorities reflect the character of the discipline itself. It appears that over the past three decades history education been a product of political demands rather than historical ones. Second, if one understands the nature of history, how should secondary educators teach it? Or, to put it another way, what is the nature of history education? If the standards of history education are firmly entrenched to reflect history’s nature, history educators must learn how to create a typology within a curriculum in order to accommodate the discipline more authentically. Chapter three will explore these questions and employ the philosophical insights of Friedrich Nietzsche and John Dewey.
3.0 APPROACH TO THE STUDY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The review of literature in the previous chapter points to an impasse between the liberal and conservative camps, both of which want to see their political agendas influence the historical education of American students. However, as I suggest in Chapter Two, both camps have failed to consider two basic questions which promise to breathe new life into the debate: What is the nature of history? What is the nature of historical education? Without a consideration of these questions, it would seem that any discussion about standards is shortsighted.

This chapter considers these two questions through the lenses of Friedrich Nietzsche (1873) and John Dewey (1938) respectively. Together, these philosophers serve three important functions in this dissertation. First, they offer two philosophical perspectives separate from and unaffected by the recent controversies in the literature of the last thirty years. Second, they provide a historical background that situates the contemporary discourse on standards of historical education into a larger picture. Third, they furnish a typology of values that supports, challenges or otherwise problematizes those implied by the review of literature. By virtue, then, of two philosophical perspectives, a larger span of history, and a non-contemporary typology of values, the recent discourse on historical education can be re-examined and made more sensible.
3.2 HISTORY OF NIETZSCHE

3.2.1 Systems and Philosophy

Friedrich Nietzsche began his now famous career in 1872. Even during the course of his professional life, which lasted until his mental collapse ten years before his death in 1900, his contemporaries considered him a legend. Today, most intellectuals regard him one of the most influential thinkers of the western intellectual tradition. Those who have studied him extensively, however, have difficulty equating his philosophy to a system of thought. Historians have classified him as a nihilist, an existentialist, an atheist, or a series of contradictions. In *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (1974) his most distinguished biographer, Walter Kaufmann, contends that the difficulty in reducing Nietzsche’s way of thinking to a system comes from the philosopher’s own skepticism about systems of thought. Kaufmann has explained Nietzsche’s position thus: “[A] system is reducible to a set of premises which cannot be questioned within the framework of the system—and the basic assumptions give expression to the mental make-up of the philosopher…The thinker who believes in the ultimate truth of his system, without questioning its presuppositions, appears more stupid than he is: he refuses to think beyond a certain point; and this is, according to Nietzsche, a subtle moral corruption” (p. 81). But if this is so, Nietzsche deliberately resisted the intellectual limitations that come with a commitment to a single school of thought. For him, any loyalty toward a system’s primary assumptions diminishes one’s capacity to question any and all premises, a fatal flaw for a philosopher in search of truth. Nietzsche preferred to commit himself to “fearless questioning,” multiple perspectives, and above all, life.
3.2.2 Philosophy and Science

During Nietzsche’s rise to prominence, much of Europe’s intelligentsia was preoccupied with the sciences. The wave of industrial and technological innovation, particularly in Germany, had created a great deal of faith in science, which many assumed would bring Europe the sense of progress that it craved. Nietzsche himself was very interested in science, in effect joining those who were driven by “fearless experiment and the good will to accept new evidence and to abandon previous positions” (Kaufmann, 1974, p. 86). However, he also thought that exclusive fascination with science and its promise to get inside the inner-workings of nature spelled trouble for art, a field prior and not subject to scientific analysis. As Erich Heller (1988) has explained in *The Importance of Nietzsche*, “[S]cience itself will rejoice in exposing this long-suspected world as a mechanical contraption of calculable pulls and pushes, as a self-sufficient agglomeration of senseless energy, until finally, in a surfeit of knowledge, the scientific mind will perform the somersault of self-annihilation” (pp. 6-7). Insofar as Heller is accurate, Nietzsche assigned the highest priority to the exuberance of life. That this is so is evident in his view of history, which I discuss below.

3.2.3 Nietzsche on Education

Although Nietzsche’s interests are more closely associated with history, he also offers some thoughtful comments about the field of education. In his *On the Future of Our Educational Institutions* (1872), a series of lectures that he revoked from publication, Nietzsche contemplates what a society would be like if education and culture were the most pressing priorities beyond economics and politics. Even the state, he wrote, cannot be “a border guard, regulator, or
overseer for his culture rather the robust, muscular comrade, ready for battle, and companion on
the way, who gives the admired, nobler, and, as it were, unearthly friend safe conduct through
the harsh realities and for that earns his thankfulness” (p. 28). Education, then, is not the result
of institutional arrangements or governmental programs; a self-generating component of culture
created and recreated by the teachers and the taught. In his lecture series, Nietzsche foresees a
society among those whose priorities are the renewal and refinement of culture: ‘I daresay I see a
time coming, in which serious human beings, in the service of a fully renewed and purified
culture and in common labor, even again become the legislators of everyday education – of
education toward just that culture…’ (Nietzsche et. al, 2005, p. 28).

3.2.4 Nietzsche on Education

During his tenure as a young professor of classical Philology at the University of Basel,
Nietzsche became acquainted with the renowned historian of the Renaissance Jacob Burckhardt.
Whether this acquaintance influenced Nietzsche’s view of history we cannot say with certainty.
What we can say, in fact several of Nietzsche’s biographers point this out, there are remarkable
similarities between Burckhardt and Nietzsche’s sense of history (Heller, 1988; Kaufmann,
1974). Heller (1988) demonstrated that Burckhardt’s “anecdotal” writings about the culture of
the Renaissance are filled with “romantic flavor” and “fanciful dramatization” rather than
evidentiary recordings and narratives. Heller also observes that whereas a political historian is
generally sensitive to objectivity and method, a cultural historian attends to the “imagination and
spirit” of an age. Heller explained Burckhardt’s position: “If he is to recapture the quality of life
lived by a certain age, the historian must bring to his study not only industry, intelligence and
honesty, but also something of the sensibility and intuition of the artist” (p. 41). Heller
characterizes this orientation to history as “creative sympathy” (p. 41). The “creative” part of this phrase comes from Burckhardt’s disregard for “textbooks, digests and interpretations” as well as his interest in original sources, which, are the place in which “imagination can be stimulated as well as purified” through “an ever-renewed contact,” which will time and again “reproduce the impact made upon particular minds by an event in human history” (Heller, p. 42). As for the “sympathetic” part, it comes from Burckhardt’s warning against the ‘value judgments’ that come from our own contemporary understandings and priorities. In other words, a historian must suspend his present-day values in order to capture the spirit of an age on its own terms. Nietzsche’s sense of history seems to be aligned with Burckhardt’s; he, too, adopted the view that “creative sympathy” is necessary for an historian seeking to grasp the essence of a culture rather than reduce it to innumerable details and banal minutia. This is evident in his most notable work on the nature of history, “The Use and Abuse of History for Life,” published in 1873.

3.2.5 Nietzsche’s “On the Use and Abuse of History for Life”

In his essay Nietzsche (1873) declares in no uncertain terms: “To be sure, we need history” (p. 1). This declaration comes with the corollary that history “enervates activity,” and as such ought to be used “for life and for action, not for a comfortable turning away from life and from action or for merely glossing over the egotistical life and the cowardly bad act” (p. 1). A people or a culture must “serve history only insofar as it serves the living” (p. 1). However, those who serve history, be they historians, instructors or students, need to understand its possibilities as well as its limitations, both “the worth and the worthlessness of history” (p. 1). To the extent that history augments life, it is worthwhile; but to the extent that it “atrophies or degenerates” it, it is
worthless (p. 1). This double awareness, in turn, can be had by focusing on three basic traits of the human being (p. 1): first, as one who is “active and striving” toward accomplishment; second, as one who “preserves and reveres” what has come before; and third, as one who suffers and seeks deliverance. For Nietzsche, these three traits correspond to three kinds of history respectively: the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical (p. 4).

3.2.5.1 Monumental History

For Nietzsche, monumental history calls us to action; it asks us to look to the past as a source of inspiration especially when we find ourselves in a current state of mediocrity, which generally invites feelings of resignation and despair. In effect, monumental history encourages us to mine the past for lessons and advice that can brighten our present and contribute positively to our future. Nietzsche makes the case for monumental history as follows:

In order not to despair and feel disgust in the midst of weak and hopeless idlers, surrounded by apparently active, but really only agitated and fidgeting companions, the active man looks behind him and interrupts the path to his goal to take a momentary deep breath. His purpose is some happiness or other, perhaps not his own, often that of a people or of humanity collectively. He runs back away from resignation and uses history as a way of fighting resignation. For the most part, no reward beckons him on, other than fame, that is, becoming a candidate for an honoured place in the temple of history, where he himself can be, in his turn, a teacher, consoler, and advisor for those who come later (p. 5).

The benefits of monumental history notwithstanding, Nietzsche warns that those who aspire to stand alongside individuals who have achieved greatness and immortality for their
accomplishments may be discouraged by the magnitude of the deeds and status of their predecessors. Imitating the deeds and thus matching or surpassing the status of a Plato, an Alexander the Great, a Michelangelo, a Shakespeare, or a Beethoven is not that easy. Even so, Nietzsche observes, the monumental past can reassure those who aspire to make a sizeable contribution to their own generation that their aspirations have a strong warrant. Nietzsche makes this point in terms of a question and an answer: "Now, what purpose is served for contemporary man by the monumental consideration of the past, by busying himself with the classical and rare person of earlier times? He derives from that the fact that the greatness which was once there at all events once was possible and therefore really will be possible once again. He goes along his path more bravely, for now the doubt which falls over him in weaker hours, that he might perhaps be wishing for the impossible, is beaten back from the field" (p. 5).

The use of monumental history springs from one’s wish to achieve the same kind of greatness that those who have come before have achieved; and as long as historians write about past moments of glory they will be urging the ambitious to rise above the mediocrity of their present. When one senses that these moments are “still vital, bright, and great,” (p. 5) one will give in to the impulse to create and will leave behind “the monogram of their most essential individual essence, a work, a deed, an uncommon inspiration, a creation” (p. 5) all of which will be commemorated by future generations. For Nietzsche, commemoration is “the thing which does not let the ambitious sleep” (p. 6).

The abuse of the monumental kind of history occurs among those who cloud the creativity of others out of disdain for their own inability. In Nietzsche’s words, “[T]he creative person always stands at a disadvantage with respect to someone who merely looks on and does not put his own hands to work, just as, for example, the political know-it-all has always been
wiser, more just, and more considerate than the ruling statesman” (p. 6). The abusers of monumental history assume that instances of what we now consider “monumental” will not “rise up once more” (p. 6) and that all great actions of the past are unattainable in the present. Those who see history in this way use the authority of the monumental to justify their non-monumental claims. Nietzsche exposes their inverted logic and demolishes their most fundamental premise as untenable: “Monumental history is the theatrical costume in which they pretend that their hate for the powerful and the great of their time is fulfilling admiration for the strong and the great of past times. In this, through disguise they invert the real sense of that method of historical observation into its opposite. Whether they clearly know it or not, they certainly act as if their motto were: let the dead bury the living” (p. 6).

3.2.5.2 Antiquarian History

Whereas monumental history serves to “create greatness” antiquarian history serves to maintain the “customary” and “what is traditionally valued” within a culture (p. 6). Antiquarian history is a form of reverence for the past, or one’s appreciation for “the conditions under which he came into existence” and one’s desire to preserve those conditions “for those who are to come after him” (p. 6). Those who have a feel for antiquarian history are generally content in their own surroundings by virtue of their determination that “here one could live, for here one can live, and here one will be able to go on living” (p. 7). With its emphasis on preservation, the antiquarian points our attention toward the remnants of tradition, toward an appreciation for what one can still encounter from the past. This appreciation does not demand the pursuit of greatness; rather, it is satisfied with the greatness cast from the past creators of culture. For antiquarians, it is those creators who built the foundation of a house in which others can live happily in the “spirit of the house” (p. 7). Nietzsche elaborates: “[The] antiquarian historical sense of reverence has the
highest value when it infuses into the modest, raw, even meager conditions in which an individual or a people live a simple moving feeling of pleasure and satisfaction” (p. 7). For Nietzsche, this feeling of satisfaction is what pacifies groups overshadowed by the monumental but still seeking relevance and justification in the world because they want to feel neither less and inferior nor “arbitrary and accidental” (p. 7). This contentment, this longing for conservation is not only for one’s own culture, but for oneself, as one small link in a larger chain of tradition and custom. Nietzsche notes: “The small, limited, crumbling, and archaic keep their own worth and integrity because the conserving and honouring soul of the antiquarian person settles on these things and there prepares for itself a secret nest. The history of his city becomes for him the history of his own self” (p. 7).

Antiquarian history is useful for life when it perpetuates a communal “sense of well being” or the kind of satisfaction that comes with knowing oneself. When history helps an individual feel purposeful and connected rather than aimless and disconnected, it engenders meaningful associations and a sense of belonging to the human species. For Nietzsche, this sense of belonging is similar to “the sense of well being of a tree for its roots, the happiness to know oneself in a manner not entirely arbitrary and accidental, but as someone who has grown out of a past, as an heir, flower, and fruit, and thus to have one’s existence excused, indeed justified” (p. 7). Beyond the personal satisfaction one derives from the antiquarian orientation, there are practical benefits for a society as well. Nietzsche makes the case in the form of a rhetorical question: “How could history better serve living than by the fact that it thus links the less-favoured races and populations to their home region and home traditions, keeps them settled there, and prevents them from roaming around in foreign places looking for something better
and, in search of that, fighting competitive wars?” (p. 7) Clearly, it is tradition that binds a people to a region and creates a sense of loyalty particularly in the face of an opposing enemy.

The benefits of antiquarian history aside, the moment the respect for our traditions and the reverence for our progenitors begin standing in the way of engendering new life, antiquarian history enters the phase of abuse. This phase includes the loss of perspective, which leads to the inability to measure properly the “value and proportions” of historical events. When this condition obtains, the antiquarian “takes everything as equally important” (p. 7). In effect, he places unwarranted and unconditional faith in the past, and thinks that “each single thing is too important” (p. 7). Nietzsche explained the abuse of the antiquarian sense thus: “[E]verything old and past, especially what still enters a field of vision, is simply taken as equally worthy of reverence, but everything which does not fit this respect for ancient things, like the new and the coming into being, is rejected and treated as hostile” (p. 7). This rejection, this hostility amounts to a perversion of the will to revere and preserve. In its abused form, then, this will “knows only how to preserve life, not how to generate it” (p. 7). But if this is so, the honest historian needs to be aware of the precise points in time when antiquarian history “buries further living, especially higher living, when the historical sense no longer conserves life, but mummifies it” (p. 7).

3.2.5.3 Critical History

We have already seen that critical history issues from human suffering and the search for deliverance. Nietzsche further explained that critical history is for he who is “oppressed by a present need and who wants to cast off his load at any price” (p. 6). Those who use the critical approach put their own plight before history’s “court of justice” (p. 8). They seek to condemn past injustices in order to open a new path leading to an unencumbered present. Critical history “sits in judgment and passes judgment” (p. 6). By doing so it demands that we forget the
intimate connection between living and injustice. As Nietzsche put it, it “requires a great deal of power to be able to live and to forget just how much living and being unjust are one and the same” (p. 8).

For Nietzsche, the use of the critical approach to history occurs when one is able to spurn the forgetfulness that gives birth to monumental actions and instead “demands the temporary destruction of this forgetfulness” (p. 8). However, bringing one’s oppression to light does not always come with vindication; more often than not, it comes with some damage. In Nietzsche’s words, “For if its [a culture’s] past is analyzed critically, then we grasp with a knife at its roots and go cruelly beyond all reverence. It is always a dangerous process, that is, dangerous for life itself. And people or ages serving life in this way, by judging and destroying a past, are always dangerous and in danger” (p. 8). Here Nietzsche points out that critical history can be injurious to culture; even in cases in which tyrannical traditions die and are replaced by free ones. His point is that even critical actions that eliminate cruelty do not necessarily yield independence; such actions are still defined by oppression itself. This is how he put it: “For since we are now the products of earlier generations, we are also the products of their aberrations, passions, mistakes, even crimes. It is impossible to loosen oneself from this chain entirely. When we condemn those mistakes and consider ourselves released from them, then we have not overcome the fact that we are derived from them” (p. 8).

For Nietzsche, the abuse of the critical orientation to history happens when we employ it needlessly. Accordingly, he warns against those who impart criticism at every turn, especially those who themselves are unable to make a culturally significant contribution. Even more near-sighted are those who shy away from the meritorious for the sheer fact that one has criticized it. Nietzsche explained this line of thought: ‘For everything that arises is worthy of perishing.'
Therefore, it would be better that nothing arose’ (p. 8). However, he explained that what arises from this way of thinking is a complacency with the occurrence of nothing. He wrote: “The stringent and profoundly serious consideration of the worthlessness of everything which has happened, of the way in which the world in its maturity is ready for judgment, has evaporated to a skeptical consciousness that it is in any case good to know everything that has happened, because it is too late to do anything better. Thus the historical sense makes its servants passive and retrospective” (p. 18).

Nietzsche further explained that the abuse of critical history occurs when a culture dissolves that which serves life into “pure knowledge,” or a compilation of data. He uses the example of religion which “ceases to live when it is completely dissected” by historical instruction. The same occurs in music when composers like Mozart and Beethoven are burdened “with the entire scholarly welter of biographical detail and are compelled through the systematic torture of historical criticism to answer to a thousand importunate questions” (p. 16). For him, critical history has the capacity to “paralyze” those aspects of life that offer us the most beauty and solace. The abuse of the critical approach, then, amounts to giving into “our curiosity at countless microscopic details” and redirecting our relationship with religion and art toward a preoccupation with sterile knowledge. Ironically, it is in these very realms of life, the artistic and the religious, “where we should learn to live and to forget all problems” (p. 16).

Nietzsche shows that a culture may use the monumental, antiquarian, and critical kinds of history to its benefit or abuse them to its detriment. Beyond this perspective, he also observes that in order to put history in the service of life, one must be able both to forget and embrace history; in other words, to be able to employ the unhistorical and super-historical states of being in the world. Together, these two states balance one another; they are in Nietzsche’s words, “the
natural counter-measures against the excessive growth of history on life, against the historical sickness” (p. 26).

3.2.5.4 The Unhistorical

The unhistorical state is a form of forgetting history’s burden, that “invisible and dark weight” (p. 2) which haunts us with memories of “struggle, suffering, and weariness” (p. 2). One who cannot forget the past “no longer believes in his own being, no longer believes in himself, sees everything in moving points flowing out of each other, and loses himself in this stream of becoming” (p. 2). In this case, one sees that he is defenseless against history’s current, which works to shape and move him in spite of his own desire to develop and act differently. The ability to forget history is his only chance to define himself and be active and creative. As Nietzsche put it, “Forgetting belongs to all action” (p. 2). It is the only means one has to be unfettered by rules, typified manners, traditions, or conventions. One’s pain and psychological burdens can cripple his ability to find happiness in the same way that one’s culture and historical traditions can destroy his capacity to accomplish extraordinary feats. Only those who can forget their troubles are able to survive in a way that does justice to their unique individuality. As Nietzsche explained, “it is completely and utterly impossible to live at all without forgetting” (p. 2). For him, the unhistorical state affords one the ability “to enclose oneself in a horizon with borders” (p. 25). It is within these borders that one can find protection from those corrupting influences that erode one’s talents and contributions to culture. Nietzsche wrote that if one can create this “atmosphere” for himself, he can become a “healthy, strong, [and] fertile” member of a culture and realize his creative potential (p. 3).
3.2.5.5 The Super-Historical

The second state of being in the world, the super-historical, is the result or the consequence of a great historical event. Nietzsche explained that those who operate from the super-historical sense are those who “could feel no more temptation to continue living and to participate in history, because [they] would have recognized a single condition of every event, that blindness and injustice is the soul of the man of action” (p. 4). Rather than partake in amoral action and assume the role of “man of action” (p. 3), those who adopt the super-historical attitude assume that the meaning of their existence will emerge “in the course of its own process” (p. 4). As such their action comes not from forgetting but from their astute knowledge of the past, which they trust will offer indications for future conduct. In other words, their investment in the lessons of history is what drives the super-historical to “look backwards only to understand the present by considering the previous process and to learn to desire the future more keenly” (p. 4). However, their concern with history is not fueled by the desire to acquire pure knowledge but by the wish to serve the living. Those who rely on the super-historical sense do not give priority to history; rather, they acknowledge that both the past and the present have equal legitimacy. For Nietzsche, the super-historically minded realize that “the past and the present are one and the same, that is, in all their multiplicity typically identical, and as unchanging types everywhere and always present, they are a motionless picture of immutable values and an eternally similar meaning” (p. 4).

Nietzsche explained that the vibrancy of an individual, a people, or a culture emerges only after they come to terms with both the unhistorical and super-historical states of being in the world. Indeed, their health depends on their ability to shuttle deliberately between history’s brightness and darkness; in other words, they can sustain themselves through their capacity to
use history’s brightness as a call to action and its darkness as a call to reflection. Nietzsche explained that historical greatness comes to those who have the ability to know “how to forget at the right time just as well as...remember at the right time” (p. 4). This cannot occur unless one is receptive to the “powerful instinct” that drives us toward the “equally essential” historical or the unhistorical states of being (p. 4).

At the same time that Nietzsche discusses the monumental, antiquarian, and critical kinds of history as well as the unhistorical, and super-historical senses, he also addresses the different approaches historians use for their accounts of the past. For him historians are creators, or artists, whose responsibility is to bring to light what a people or culture knows about itself so thoroughly that it has become “universally known” (p. 15) and hence neglected and forgotten. To do so, however, historians must have experience in the world, as experience provides the proper perspective on accomplishment and greatness. As he put it, “Anyone who has not lived through something greater and higher than everyone else will not know how to interpret anything great and lofty from the past” (p. 15). This is another way of saying that “only the man who builds the future has a right to judge the past” (p. 15).

3.3 HISTORY OF DEWEY

3.3.1 The Intellectual Legacy of Charles Peirce

John Dewey belongs to the school of pragmatism, a philosophy that began with Charles Peirce during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Peirce posited a connection between belief and conduct, specifically that “our beliefs are really rules for action” (James, 1910, p. 23). He
observed that “to develop a thought’s meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance” (p. 23). In other words, the principal determinant in the construction of meaning is the connection between thought and action. William James (1910), a student of Peirce, carried this philosophical orientation in his own work. In his Pragmatism and other Essays, he elaborates on Pierce’s perspective: “To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object…we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects…is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all” (p. 24). Put another way, the meaning and significance of an idea, policy, or issue are inseparable from the ways in which each impacts “real-world” action. Following Peirce’s way of thinking, we assign fixed meanings to our environment according to a consistent, unilateral method of pragmatism. Peirce’s desire for a firm, theoretical approach to the construction of meaning was partly due to his twofold interest in “the art of making concepts clear” (p. 24) and following the rigors of the scientific method. Yet, it was not until William James that pragmatism acquired its distinctive character as a philosophical perspective.

3.3.2 The Pragmatism of William James

Whereas Peirce was a logician who understood the pragmatic as a necessary means to an end, James was a humanist who appreciated the pragmatic as one method toward an end. James (1910) explained this divergence from Peirce thus: “The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life,
if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one” (p. 25). For James, the drive toward what is realistic, or sensible rejects the traditional philosophical apparatus, namely, abstractions, “fixed principles,” dogma, “bad \textit{a priori} reasons,” the concrete, and the monolithic. For the pragmatist, what replaces this apparatus is a commitment to the “practical cash-value” of one’s perspective. This line of thought assumes that no statement or idea has the final word; rather, each serves as the basis from which more investigations are called for as new situations and predicaments arise (p. 26). In this way, James’ version of pragmatism is more encompassing and flexible as he accepts that all theories, even his own, “become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest” (p. 26). However, pragmatism cannot avoid questions about its own capacity to find answers or get to the truth. In a collection of lectures entitled \textit{The Meaning of Truth} (1909), James argued that the “affirmation of certain beliefs could be justified by the means of the nature of their consequences or by the differences which these beliefs make in existence” (Dewey, p. 31). Here, pragmatism takes a notable turn toward the empirical. Much like the intellectuals of the early twentieth century understood the natural sciences, James posited that a theory is credible when it prescribes the way in which facts will behave through “the intermediary of experience” (Dewey, p. 32). In other words, when experience demonstrates that facts correspond to the stipulations of a theory, the theory earns more credibility. Dewey’s own work as a pragmatist developed from James’ interest in experience. But whereas James’ work moved into the province of psychology, Dewey’s moved into the field of education.

\subsection*{3.3.3 Dewey’s Pragmatism}

If there is one philosopher who took the pragmatism of Pierce and James to its further stages of development, that philosopher is John Dewey. His version of pragmatism was influenced by that
of James, particularly when it comes to the role that experience plays in verification. Dewey’s own work, published between 1910 and 1938 has had an enduring influence in the field of education vis-à-vis his astute observation that education is the forum in which theory and experience come together. In his *Experience and Education*, Dewey (1938) analyzed the “traditional” and “progressive” educational movements of his day. He argued that both forms of education are insufficient, even “miseducative,” because neither takes experience into account. Beyond his criticism of both movements, he recommended that educators avoid making a commitment to a single way of thinking, or what he calls some “ism.” Instead, he advocated for an educational system that values meaningful experience above everything else.

### 3.3.4 Dewey on History

Dewey’s discussion of experience is reminiscent of James’ with its loyalties to the scientific orientation. For Dewey, experience “is a matter of the interaction of organism with its environment, an environment that is human as well as physical, that includes the materials of tradition and institutions as well as local surroundings” (p. 251). Clearly, Dewey views society and nature as inextricably bound together, thus making the case that “rational operations grow out of organic activities” (p. 19). In effect, Dewey supposes that rational inquiries about one’s experience are not tied to a “truth;” rather, they are a means of navigating uncharted waters.

Although Dewey’s philosophy has been studied extensively by scholars in the field of education, it also includes some thoughtful insights for students of history. Specifically, Dewey explained that historical inquiry is a process that consists “(1) of selection and arrangement, and (2) is controlled by the dominant problems and conceptions of the culture of the period in which it is written” (*Logic*, p. 236). Put another way, historical interpretations and writings are subject
to the contemporary interests and political demands of the day. For Dewey, however, history is not a reconstruction of events contrary to documented evidence and narratives; rather, it is a “pragmatic exercise” that helps a society cultivate its own “public consciousness” (Gabriel & Crick, 2006, p. 360). This view, does not relegate history to a purely communicative experience, but points to the fluidity of its nature, and the role that discourse plays in gauging a society’s values and collective memories. Gabriel and Crick (2006) show that for Dewey the most reliable inquiries and narratives are those that “lead us to experiences that are continuous with our expectations” (p. 361). In Dewey’s own words, any ‘past event has left effects, consequences, that are present and that will continue in the future’” (p. 361). Applied to history, the commitment to the present and the future points out that the most constructive interactions with our past are those that mark future experiences as “productive interaction with our natural and social environment” (Gabriel & Crick, p. 361). Out of the field of history, Dewey carves out his most reputable professional undertaking, which is to determine which interactions are the most productive for students.

3.3.5 Dewey’s Experience and Education

In his *Experience and Education* (1938), Dewey argued that the problem with most education is that it values the acquisition of knowledge that is already complete. In his words, knowledge “is thought of as essentially static. It is taught as a finished product, with little regard either to the ways in which it was originally built up or to changes that will surely occur in the future” (p. 19). As Dewey understood it, static knowledge is simply a form of reassurance among “traditional” educators content to convey certain information and justify its usefulness by means of the promise that it will help students in the future. In the case of history, this translates into a past
limited to factual material—names, places, and dates. His critique of such an outdated understanding of historical education is that it does not create meaningful connections between students and the material. For him the issue at hand takes the form of a question that all teachers of history ought to ask: “How shall the young become acquainted with the past in such a way that the acquaintance is a potent agent in appreciation of the living present?” (p. 23)

Drawing on his previous work, Dewey locates the answer to the question in the notion of experience. For him, there is an “organic connection” between learning and engagement. To illustrate his point, he poses the rhetorical question, “How many students, for example, were rendered callous to ideas, and how many lost the impetus to learn because of the way in which learning was experienced by them?” (p. 26). This question leads him to distinguish between benign and meaningful experiences. Benign experiences are those that disengage students and, as a result, have no educative value. By contrast, meaningful experiences are those that are engaging, and consequently, educational. Dewey measures meaningful experiences by two criteria: first, the extent to which they are agreeable; and second, the degree of influence they have on future experiences (p. 27). These two criteria point to Dewey’s interest that educative experiences serve life, or are acceptable and helpful to the members of a society. For him, the most meaningful experiences in American life are those that are tied closely to democracy and democratic participation.

To illustrate this idea, Dewey examines Abraham Lincoln’s (1863) Gettysburg Address, which extols American democracy, a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people” (p. 29). Dewey explained that within this American rhetorical landmark, the three words, “of,” “by,” and “for” are not attached to anything obvious or “self-evident” to its citizens. Each implies that democracy is a process, one that originates within society, which its members
build from their own means, and employ in service of their own growth. Put another way, these words serve as “a challenge to discover and put into operation a principle of order and organization” (p. 29). As he understood it, the knowledge required to operationalize the principles of a democratic society comes primarily from valuable experiences, which help citizens articulate which qualities are meaningful and which are not. The role of education then, is to help the young prepare for adult life by teaching them to distinguish between the two different kinds of experience (p. 40).

Dewey asserts that democratic education is the most beneficial. Although he does not offer an explanation of this assertion in Experience and Education, he justifies it via the logic of comparison in the form of a rhetorical question: “Can we find any reason that does not ultimately come down to the belief that democratic social arrangements promote a better quality of human experience, one which is more widely accessible and enjoyed, than do non-democratic and anti-democratic forms of social life?” (p. 34) For him, however, democracy is more than a form of government; it is the most meaningful discursive community. As he put it, democracy “is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience” (Dewey, 1916, p. 101). But if this is so, a democratic education must prepare the young to experience public life as a life that depends on the give-and-take of human interactions; as such it must help them to become interdependent, articulate, and contributing members of their community.

To say, as Dewey does, that democracy is a discursive community is to imply that a democratic society is highly communicative. But if this is so, the needs of a democratic society must be addressed by its educational institutions. In other words, what is taught in schools must be taught with an eye to the maintenance and progress of the society. This is how Dewey put

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8 Dewey discussed this conclusion at length in his Democracy and Education (1916).
the matter in his discussion of the character of democratic education: “The scheme of a
curriculum must take account of the adaptation of studies to the needs of the existing community
life; it must select with the intention of improving the life we live in common so that the future
shall be better than the past” (p. 7). Clearly, Dewey believes in progress. But such a belief has
implications for education, most specifically that “the needs of the existing community life” are
not the same once and for all but tend to be in the process of emerging. But if the needs of a
democratic society are always emerging, their emergence must be reflected in the curricula
which purport to address them. As Dewey put it, “[I]t is a mistake to suppose that the mere
acquisition of a certain amount of arithmetic, geography, history, etc., which is taught and
studied because it may be useful at some time in the future, has this effect, and it is a mistake to
suppose that acquisition of skills in reading and figuring will automatically constitute preparation
for their right and effective use under conditions very unlike those in which they were acquired”
(p. 47). For Dewey, then, a society’s needs cannot be addressed by the acquisition of static
knowledge; they can only be addressed by emerging knowledge. Because progress requires the
capacity to be both reflective and corrective, it is these very capacities that educators must
cultivate in the classroom.

Dewey notes that democratic education is not a boundless process. Although it
emphasizes creativity among its students, it does not suggest that experts should stand to lose
their influence or credibility in the light of creative ideas among immature students. On the
contrary, the objectives of a democratic education are still grounded in the maintenance of and
adherence to the principles of a free and democratic system of government. He wrote that in
their planning, educators “must be flexible enough to permit free play for individuality of
experience and yet firm enough to give direction towards continuous development of power” (p.

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In other words, Dewey argued that education is the process of developing freedom, not restricting it. This development comes in the form of skills that serve both the individual and the greater society; namely, the “power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them; power to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation” (p. 64). In short, the goal of democratic education is to develop within students the “power of self-control” (p. 64).

For Dewey, self-control is the capacity to capitalize constructively on freedom of intellectualism, while not losing sight of the continuous development of knowledge. Here, the aim of the educator is not to limit students’ freedom in an attempt to prevent their misuse or abuse of it; rather, it is to provide experiences whereby students can learn how to use their own freedom wisely. Dewey explained: “Since freedom resides in the operations of intelligent observation and judgment by which a purpose is developed, guidance given by the teacher to the exercise of the pupils’ intelligence is an aid to freedom, not a restriction upon it” (p. 71). One way through which “intelligent observation and judgment” can be stimulated is by problematizing the students’ experiences. Dewey observes that “problems are the stimulus to thinking” (p. 79). His twofold assumption is that 1) all problems grow out of present conditions, and 2) the search for solutions demands “an active quest for information” and ultimately, the creation of ideas (p. 79). Here Dewey noticeably wants to instill a healthy sense of agency among students, or a sense of self-determination that comes from identifying a discipline’s problems, grappling with its questions, objectives, issues, and challenges. Presumably, students who deal with such problems understand the value of past knowledge and know how to engage in inquiries that seek to fill a lack of knowledge or clarify a discrepancy. But if this is so, the educator’s challenge is to create opportunities within the classroom that reflect the issues of a
discipline, which will offer the “promise and potentiality of presenting new problems which by stimulating new ways of observation and judgment will expand the area of further experience” (p. 75). In other words, opportunities that elicit lessons and instill habits of mind can be applied effectively to future situations. As Dewey wrote that educators “must constantly regard what is already won not as a fixed possession but as an agency and instrumentality for opening new fields which make new demands upon existing powers of observation and of intelligent use of memory. Connectedness in growth must be his constant watchword” (p. 75). It is from these educational opportunities that students can create meaning that is relevant to their own time and circumstance.

3.4 TYPOLOGY OF VALUES

3.4.1 Introduction to the Typology

Thus far this chapter has sought to provide answers to two questions (What is the nature of history? What is the nature of historical education?) by relying on the philosophical views of Nietzsche and Dewey respectively. With the discussion of their views in mind, this section shows that Nietzsche and Dewey’s insights lend themselves to a typology of values that may prove helpful when attempting to move beyond the current impasse on historical understanding and instruction. These values come in the form of five commitments: to life, action, the present, the useful, and the interplay of permanence and change.
3.4.2 The Commitment to Life

The analysis of Nietzsche’s (1873) essay “On the Uses and Abuses of History for Life” has shown that the past is best conceived as a source of inspiration, not a container of countless informational minutiae. The same analysis has demonstrated that the mere acquisition of knowledge of the past is inadequate. The persisting sentiment in Nietzsche’s writing is that people should use history “not as a crowd of pure thinkers” who pose as outsiders watching life go by and are content to “be satisfied by knowledge” (p. 8). His hope is that people use history “only for the purpose of living” (p. 8). Put another way, our historical consciousness cannot be fulfilled by knowledge alone; its fulfillment demands an active stance best demonstrated by deeds that augment the life of the individual and the life of the culture in which he lives.

The discussion of Dewey’s views on education has also shown that, as a philosophical perspective, pragmatism seeks to serve life. At its best, pragmatism aims at the improvement of life in the present by reference to life in the past. To improve the life of the present means to come up with better solutions to current problems, to bring about better conditions for living, and to generate better insights for addressing life’s issues. When applied to historical education, Dewey’s pragmatism focuses not so much on the educators’ already-lived life as on the students’ yet-to-be-lived life. A good starting place for such an orientation is the students’ own life experiences. Dewey goes as far as to say in *Experience and Education* (1938) that any system of education that ignores the life of those it seeks to instruct is simply ill-conceived.
3.4.3 The Commitment to Action

Nietzsche’s discussion of the monumental, antiquarian, and critical uses of history revolves around the axis of action. Even though action is featured most prominently in monumental history, the antiquarian and the critical kinds also require action—the antiquarian by way of preserving past traditions, and the critical by seeking deliverance. Nietzsche points out that the deciding factor of who will be remembered or forgotten by history is action. As he observes, “History is borne only by strong personalities; the weak personalities it obliterates completely” (p. 12). This is so because the strong are driven toward persistent and independent action, which unsettles the many, who generally conform to and depend on others. For Nietzsche a vibrant culture is vibrant because it urges and admires actions that transcend the conventions of a past or present age. Transcendence of this kind marks those historical moments that render an individual, an event, an artistic creation, or a culture extraordinary. By contrast, an unhealthy culture is unhealthy because it despises actions that deviate from the ordinary. The ordinary marks those “splendidly ‘objective’” historical moments that are protected by the weak, “who could never create history themselves” (p. 12).

Much like Nietzsche, Dewey stresses the cardinal importance of action in both education and citizenship. As a leader of the movement of progressive education, he warns that any new movement (e.g. literary, scientific, or historical) risks defining itself not on its own terms, but against the terms it seeks to transform or overthrow. To avoid such a risk, progressive education must always strive for “a correct idea of experience” (p. 20). Here we should recall that the term “experience” is one of the key terms in his attempt at educational reform. Yet he senses that “experience” may be defined as something that simply happens to a person. But as we have seen, such a definition is a far cry from his own definition. Significantly, Dewey endorses action
not only in general but also in the specific case of designing an educational system. Accordingly, he insists that the most educative moments are a function of active engagement; they originate in fruitful classroom experiences, which can later be modified and applied to situations that arise in the students’ public lives as citizens. On this point, Dewey is quite clear: modifying past experiences for the purpose of improving the future is an active undertaking.

### 3.4.4 The Commitment to the Present

As we have seen, the sentiment in Nietzsche’s writing is that history’s goal should be to make the most of life in the present: “to serve the future and the present, not to weaken the present, not to uproot a forceful living future” (p. 8). Although Nietzsche’s perspective does account for memory and anticipation, its emphasis falls squarely on the unfolding of life in the present mode. Again and again he asserts that living is a forward-moving activity that must not be burdened by the memories of what is finished and the worries of what has yet to disclose itself. While he admits that the present is largely a set of consequences of past actions, he insists that happy living dictates that these consequences be disregarded and their causes forgotten, at least temporarily. Nietzsche acknowledges that the activity of living paves the way to tomorrow. However, he observes that such consciousness treats living as a means to the end of future living, not as an end in itself. Accordingly, he recommends that the highest priority of living is indeed living.

Dewey’s commitment to the present is not as pronounced as Nietzsche’s. For him the present is the site where we negotiate the balance between the past and the future. Put differently, the present is the site in which we determine which aspects of the past are useful for us now, and how we can best utilize those aspects for a brighter tomorrow. Dewey’s perspective
on education and citizenship illustrates well his commitment to the present. In both fields, he observes, the older generations come into contact and communicate with the younger ones (p. 38). During this meeting, the wisdom and the skills of the older generations are transferred to the younger. This transference, however, is far from perfect. This is so because the present renders some of the older generation’s skills and insights outdated and, therefore, useless. As such the older generations should not transfer all they have acquired, regardless of the present realities, now in place. Rather, they should be selective, offering only those skills and knowledge that will likely prove useful to the younger generation, as it strives to cope with its uncertain future.

### 3.4.5 The Commitment to the Useful

As I have noted earlier, Nietzsche’s thought does not lend itself to easy classification. In his sense, it is easier to say what he is not than what he is. As such we can say, strictly speaking, he is not a pragmatist. Even so, his view that history should serve life and strengthen an individual or a whole culture amounts to a pragmatic proposition whereby history is the means and life the end. Walter Kaufmann shares this position. In his *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (1974), he points out that Nietzsche’s commitment to experimentalism is reminiscent of pragmatism, which was likely an outcropping of his philosophical interest in Kant and his contemporary association with Darwin, who together solidified the principle that “our ‘truths’ are not accurate descriptions of a transcendent reality, but simply statements that ‘work’ and thus fit us for survival” (p. 88). Kaufmann suggests that Nietzsche’s sense of the pragmatic is evident in his interest in experimentation. As he put it, Nietzsche avoided questions of abstraction opting instead for those that elicit the response ‘Let us try it!’ (p. 89). For Nietzsche, careful selection
of experiments allow one to ask important questions, live within their answers, and in so doing, use experience to measure the worth of those answers.

To say that Dewey has a commitment to that which is useful is to state the obvious—after all, the useful is one of the key terms of his philosophy of pragmatism. His commitment to the useful is evident in his discourse on the pragmatic character of education. For him, the purpose of education is to instill a love of learning in students. Without this love, he notes, they will suffer more than a “lack of preparation,” they will lose the opportunity to cultivate their “native capacities” (Dewey, p. 48).

3.4.6 The Commitment to the Interplay between Permanence and Change

Nietzsche’s discussion of the tripartite nature of history acknowledges that the use of the past involves both permanence and change. On the one hand, he explained that the past belongs to one who “preserves and honors” (p. 6). In this case, the use of the antiquarian kind of history serves a people not only to remember and honor the customs and traditions of a culture but also to preserve them for generations to come. For Nietzsche, the preservation of time-honored activities is what renders a culture sufficiently stable to be identifiable and distinguishable from others. On the other hand, he posited that the past belongs to one who is “active and powerful” (p. 4). Here, the use of the monumental and critical kinds of history serves a people by helping them to forget the past and be inspired to act in ways that fashion a new present. Here, it is the bold departures from the ordinary or the typified that make a culture strong and viable. Perhaps most importantly, the greatest benefit one can enjoy from history depends on his ability to balance permanence and change; to remember and forget as the times and the culture of the living dictate.
Dewey’s discussion of experience demonstrated that he, too, values the interplay between permanence and change. A dominant theme in his work is that progressive education, although a break from tradition, does not altogether reject certain educational principles: “When external authority is rejected, it does not follow that all authority should be rejected” (p. 21). For Dewey, what is permanent is the principles of democratic life, as well those of communication and social interaction. What is ephemeral is the particular experiences that help students to espouse these principles. The problem, however, arises when one opts solely for permanence or for change. For example, traditionalists tend to rely on their own past experiences to inform the education of the youth; on the other hand, progressives tend to the demands of the day. Dewey explained that this “Either-Or philosophy” (p. 21) polarizes citizens by making them think that education must be one or the other, not both. However, for Dewey, education must be a blend of the two, a philosophy of “Both-And.”

3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to address two interrelated contemporary issues: the meaning of history and the character of historical instruction in secondary education. It has done so by relying on the perspectives of Nietzsche’s (1873) “On the Uses and Abuses of History for Life” and Dewey’s (1938) *Experience and Education* respectively. After explicating Nietzsche’s view of the monumental, antiquarian and critical uses of history, as well as his understanding of the unhistorical and super-historical states, and after outlining Dewey’s view of progressive education as an outgrowth of his philosophy of pragmatism, the chapter has identified a typology of values on which both philosophers converge. This typology has been articulated in terms of
their commitments to life, action, the present, the useful, and the interplay of permanence and change.

The next chapter has two objectives: first, to explain the way in which the typology of values guides historical study through a critical reading of a primary document from United States rhetorical history; and second, to give the typology of values a concrete curricular face through a discussion and illustration of the tasks and skills embedded in a new curricular design.
4.0 APPLICATION

4.1 INTRODUCTION TO APPLICATION

The previous chapter has put forth a five-part typology about some of the enduring values of history and historical education. This typology serves as a reminder of those values of history and historical education that, over the years, may have been lost, misunderstood, or neglected. At the same time, it provides clear directions and high aspirations for teachers and students who may have traveled off-course or been misguided. But before this typology can be introduced to the history classroom, its terms must be given a concrete curricular face. Accordingly, the goal of this chapter is to render the five values of the typology meaningful in terms of particular learning exercises. In order to accomplish this, the chapter will offer a critical reading of a primary document from rhetorical history, Frederick Douglass’ (1852) speech “The Hypocrisy of American Slavery.” In addition, it will discuss and illustrate the tasks and skills embedded in a new curricular design that will help students uphold the typology of values in their own historical studies.
Our historical heritage comes in many forms e.g., architecture, monuments, artwork. However, the most common form is the written document. Documents can be classified into two types: primary and secondary. What makes a document primary is the fact that its authorship can be traced back to the period under consideration. Primary documents can include legislation, treatises, ephemera, poems, speeches, or manifestos. Unlike secondary documents, which discuss and comment on primary ones, primary documents generally reflect more accurately the spirit of the age in which they were written. Further, primary documents can be said to be diachronic as they typically continue to attract the interest of generations of future commentators. The Declaration of Independence (1776), The United States Constitution (1787), and Lincoln’s (1863) Gettysburg Address are but three examples of primary documents from the history of the United States.

4.2.1 Types of History

Contemporary historians generally agree that their work lends itself to a particular type of history. The proposed curricular design in this chapter features primary documents from six widely studied types of history: political, economic, social, cultural, rhetorical, and intellectual. Although there is considerable overlap among these types, each represents a different focus or perspective on the past. The following explains briefly each type of history.
4.2.1.1 Political History

Political history is concerned with the ways in which political power was acquired and changed hands among individuals, political parties, institutions or nations. Political historians are generally interested in the actions of past leaders as well as the consequences of those actions. For the most part, they view history as a series of power struggles that affected decisively those who lived during a given period. Political history typically focuses on the nation-state as the main agent of change; it includes such topics as legislation, ways and means, war and peace, and diplomacy.

4.2.1.2 Economic History

Economic history is concerned with the exchange of commodities and the ways in which trade affected relations within or among nations. Economic historians view the past as a series of economic shifts that impacted the lives of those who lived under certain economic conditions and structures by creating opportunities for some and hardships for others. Economic history relies on the science of economics to explain such phenomena as class relations, the shape and direction of industry and business as well as employment, wealth and poverty. Economic history pays special attention to theoretical and practical explanations of markets, resources, production, distribution, consumption and services.

4.2.1.3 Social History

Social history is interested in the actions of ordinary people, how they experienced the world of their times, their stories of everyday life, and the manner in which they preserved their own past. Social historians are interested in the emergence of societal trends, the establishment of norms, and the ways in which people contributed to social change by means of reform or revolt. The
study of social history focuses on such historical evidence as diaries, personal letters, literature, folk art, interviews, and photographs.

4.2.1.4 Cultural History

Cultural history concerns itself with human societies, their ways of living, their traditions, rituals and interactions. It pays special attention to the arts (literature, painting, music, architecture, theatre, etc.) and the ways in which they defined an era. Cultural historians understand the past as a sequence of creative developments that express an entire people and let us know how they felt about themselves and the world around them. At the same time they are interested in a society’s responses to its artists and how the meaning of artistic creations varied over time.

4.2.1.5 Rhetorical History

Rhetorical history attempts to understand the past by studying various forms of persuasion, especially public speeches seeking to move audiences to action. Rhetorical historians assume that the course of human affairs is shaped by public language. As such they study the orations of prominent orators, public debates, and cultural controversies.

4.2.1.6 Intellectual History

Intellectual history is interested in the life of the mind, the generation, circulation and impact of ideas. As such it is closely related to the history of philosophy. Intellectual historians regard the politics, economics, society, rhetoric and culture of the past as functions of ideas. Their main focus is the work of philosophers whose insights were influential in a particular period of history and beyond.
To reflect some of the differences among the above types of history, a curricular design should ideally include primary documents from each type of history. In this way, students can develop not only a well-rounded sense of the past but also some inclination toward a particular disciplinary interest within the study of history.

A new curricular design should also illustrate some of the ways in which a primary document can be read critically, in the light of the typology of values. The rationale here is that illustrating a practice facilitates learning by showing how the practice can be done. The same cannot be said about issuing imperatives (e.g., Read, Analyze, Discuss). As I have already indicated, the primary document I use here for the purpose of illustration comes from the rhetorical history of the United States. It is Frederick Douglass’ speech “The Hypocrisy of American Slavery” delivered on July 5, 1852 at an event commemorating the Declaration of Independence in Rochester, New York:

Fellow citizens, pardon me, and allow me to ask, why am I called upon to speak here today? What have I or those I represent to do with your national independence? Are the great principles of political freedom and of natural justice, embodied in that Declaration of Independence, extended to us? And am I, therefore, called upon to bring our humble offering to the national altar, and to confess the benefits, and express devout gratitude for the blessings resulting from your independence to us?

Would to God, both for your sakes and ours, that an affirmative answer could be truthfully returned to these questions. Then would my task be light, and my
burden easy and delightful. For who is there so cold that a nation's sympathy could not warm him? Who so obdurate and dead to the claims of gratitude, that would not thankfully acknowledge such priceless benefits? Who so stolid and selfish that would not give his voice to swell the hallelujahs of a nation's jubilee, when the chains of servitude had been torn from his limbs? I am not that man. In a case like that, the dumb might eloquently speak, and the ‘lame man leap as an hart.’

But such is not the state of the case. I say it with a sad sense of disparity between us. I am not included within the pale of this glorious anniversary! Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us. The blessings in which you this day rejoice are not enjoyed in common. The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity, and independence bequeathed by your fathers is shared by you, not by me. The sunlight that brought life and healing to you has brought stripes and death to me. This Fourth of July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn. To drag a man in fetters into the grand illuminated temple of liberty, and call upon him to join you in joyous anthems, were inhuman mockery and sacrilegious irony. Do you mean, citizens, to mock me, by asking me to speak today? If so, there is a parallel to your conduct. And let me warn you, that it is dangerous to copy the example of a nation (Babylon) whose crimes, towering up to heaven, were thrown down by the breath of the Almighty, burying that nation in irrecoverable ruin.
Fellow citizens, above your national, tumultuous joy, I hear the mournful wail of millions, whose chains, heavy and grievous yesterday, are today rendered more intolerable by the jubilant shouts that reach them. If I do forget, if I do not remember those bleeding children of sorrow this day, ‘may my right hand forget her cunning, and may my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth!’

To forget them, to pass lightly over their wrongs and to chime in with the popular theme would be treason most scandalous and shocking, and would make me a reproach before God and the world.

My subject, then, fellow citizens, is ‘American Slavery.’ I shall see this day and its popular characteristics from the slave's point of view. Standing here, identified with the American bondman, making his wrongs mine, I do not hesitate to declare, with all my soul, that the character and conduct of this nation never looked blacker to me than on this Fourth of July.

Whether we turn to the declarations of the past, or to the professions of the present, the conduct of the nation seems equally hideous and revolting. America is false to the past, false to the present, and solemnly binds herself to be false to the future. Standing with God and the crushed and bleeding slave on this occasion, I will, in the name of humanity, which is outraged, in the name of liberty, which is fettered, in the name of the Constitution and the Bible, which are disregarded and trampled upon, dare to call in question and to denounce, with all the emphasis I can command, everything that serves to perpetuate slavery -- the great sin and shame of America! ‘I will not equivocate - I will not excuse.’ I will use the
severest language I can command, and yet not one word shall escape me that any man, whose judgment is not blinded by prejudice, or who is not at heart a slave-holder, shall not confess to be right and just.

But I fancy I hear some of my audience say it is just in this circumstance that you and your brother Abolitionists fail to make a favorable impression on the public mind. Would you argue more and denounce less, would you persuade more and rebuke less, your cause would be much more likely to succeed. But, I submit, where all is plain there is nothing to be argued. What point in the anti-slavery creed would you have me argue? On what branch of the subject do the people of this country need light? Must I undertake to prove that the slave is a man? That point is conceded already. Nobody doubts it. The slave-holders themselves acknowledge it in the enactment of laws for their government. They acknowledge it when they punish disobedience on the part of the slave. There are seventy-two crimes in the State of Virginia, which, if committed by a black man (no matter how ignorant he be), subject him to the punishment of death; while only two of these same crimes will subject a white man to like punishment.

What is this but the acknowledgment that the slave is a moral, intellectual, and responsible being? The manhood of the slave is conceded. It is admitted in the fact that Southern statute books are covered with enactments, forbidding, under severe fines and penalties, the teaching of the slave to read and write. When you can point to any such laws in reference to the beasts of the field, then I may consent to argue the manhood of the slave. When the dogs in your streets, when
the fowls of the air, when the cattle on your hills, when the fish of the sea, and the
reptiles that crawl, shall be unable to distinguish the slave from a brute, then I will
argue with you that the slave is a man!

For the present it is enough to affirm the equal manhood of the Negro race. Is it
not astonishing that, while we are plowing, planting, and reaping, using all kinds
of mechanical tools, erecting houses, constructing bridges, building ships,
working in metals of brass, iron, copper, silver, and gold; that while we are
reading, writing, and ciphering, acting as clerks, merchants, and secretaries,
having among us lawyers, doctors, ministers, poets, authors, editors, orators, and
teachers; that we are engaged in all the enterprises common to other men --
digging gold in California, capturing the whale in the Pacific, feeding sheep and
cattle on the hillside, living, moving, acting, thinking, planning, living in families
as husbands, wives, and children, and above all, confessing and worshipping the
Christian God, and looking hopefully for life and immortality beyond the grave --
we are called upon to prove that we are men?

Would you have me argue that man is entitled to liberty? That he is the rightful
owner of his own body? You have already declared it. Must I argue the
wrongfulness of slavery? Is that a question for republicans? Is it to be settled by
the rules of logic and argumentation, as a matter beset with great difficulty,
involving a doubtful application of the principle of justice, hard to understand?
How should I look today in the presence of Americans, dividing and subdividing
a discourse, to show that men have a natural right to freedom, speaking of it
relatively and positively, negatively and affirmatively? To do so would be to make myself ridiculous, and to offer an insult to your understanding. There is not a man beneath the canopy of heaven who does not know that slavery is wrong for him.

What! Am I to argue that it is wrong to make men brutes, to rob them of their liberty, to work them without wages, to keep them ignorant of their relations to their fellow men, to beat them with sticks, to flay their flesh with the lash, to load their limbs with irons, to hunt them with dogs, to sell them at auction, to sunder their families, to knock out their teeth, to burn their flesh, to starve them into obedience and submission to their masters? Must I argue that a system thus marked with blood and stained with pollution is wrong? No - I will not. I have better employment for my time and strength than such arguments would imply.

What, then, remains to be argued? Is it that slavery is not divine; that God did not establish it; that our doctors of divinity are mistaken? There is blasphemy in the thought. That which is inhuman cannot be divine. Who can reason on such a proposition? They that can, may - I cannot. The time for such argument is past.

At a time like this, scorching irony, not convincing argument, is needed. Oh! had I the ability, and could I reach the nation's ear, I would today pour out a fiery stream of biting ridicule, blasting reproach, withering sarcasm, and stern rebuke. For it is not light that is needed, but fire; it is not the gentle shower, but thunder. We need the storm, the whirlwind, and the earthquake. The feeling of the nation must be quickened; the conscience of the nation must be roused; the propriety of
the nation must be startled; the hypocrisy of the nation must be exposed; and its crimes against God and man must be denounced.

What to the American slave is your Fourth of July? I answer, a day that reveals to him more than all other days of the year, the gross injustice and cruelty to which he is the constant victim. To him your celebration is a sham; your boasted liberty an unholy license; your national greatness, swelling vanity; your sounds of rejoicing are empty and heartless; your shouts of liberty and equality, hollow mock; your prayers and hymns, your sermons and thanksgivings, with all your religious parade and solemnity, are to him mere bombast, fraud, deception, impiety, and hypocrisy - a thin veil to cover up crimes which would disgrace a nation of savages. There is not a nation of the earth guilty of practices more shocking and bloody than are the people of these United States at this very hour.

Go search where you will, roam through all the monarchies and despotisms of the Old World, travel through South America, search out every abuse and when you have found the last, lay your facts by the side of the everyday practices of this nation, and you will say with me that, for revolting barbarity and shameless hypocrisy, America reigns without a rival.

4.2.3 Primary Documents and the Typology of Values

Read in the light of the typology of values, this piece of rhetorical history can be said to serve life, the life of Douglass’ historical audience as well as the life of contemporary readers. It does so by defining life both negatively and affirmatively. In the first case, Douglass speaks of the
life of the typical slave, pointing out that a life of cruel suffering, indignities, oppression, and enslavement is no life at all. At the same time, he characterizes the life of mid-nineteenth century white citizens in the United States as a life of lies, hypocrisy and fraud, implying that such a life leaves a great deal to be desired. In the second case, Douglass proceeds affirmatively, lauding the country’s principles of freedom, equality, and justice, and suggesting that these principles sustain and promote life by making it worth living. Even so, he observes that the American slaves do not enjoy the advantages afforded by these principles. On the other hand, he notes that the white population half-enjoys them because they are not applied universally, the way they were meant to be. In effect, Douglass argued that the life of the people in the United States can be served by means of freedom for the slaves and honesty for the free.

Douglass’s speech can also be said to uphold the value of action, the action Douglass inspires in both his historical and contemporary audiences. It does so by defining action both critically and positively. In the first case, Douglass speaks of the limited actions of a typical slave, pointing out that all actions that limit the social, legal, and educational freedoms of blacks are counterproductive to the country’s viability. At the same time, he characterizes many of the actions of mid-nineteenth century white citizens in the United States as restrictive, oppressive, and inhumane, implying that such actions are just as contemptible as those taken by a slave owner. In the second case, Douglass proceeds positively, attesting to the actions of black Americans, pointing out that their actions in the spheres of work, education, and religion in spite of their oppressors are worthwhile for the entire country. Even so, he observes that only few white Americans act so to improve the slaves’ condition.

This primary document can also be said to serve the present, the present of Douglass’ nineteenth-century audience as well as the present of today’s readers. It does so by defining the
present both pessimistically and optimistically. In the first case, Douglass speaks of the present of black Americans, pointing out that the conditions in place disallow them from living meaningful lives. At the same time, he characterizes the present of the mid-nineteenth century American society as a present filled with bitterness, antagonism, and divisiveness, implying that such conditions are neither sustainable nor desirable. In the second case, Douglass proceeds optimistically, highlighting the country’s potential for unity, equality and prosperity, and suggesting that, if actualized, this potential will strengthen rather than weaken the present. Even so, he observes that American slaves are not enjoying even the potential of these possibilities because they seem hopelessly unrealizable. At the same time, he implies that the white population is living out of the consequences of a wrong decision, the decision to enslave human beings. In effect, Douglass argued that the present of the people in the United States can be better served by correcting its wrongful past and taking measures to improve its future.

This primary document can also be said to be useful to both Douglass’ audience as well as the audience of today. It accomplishes this by characterizing usefulness both disapprovingly and approvingly. In the first case, he regards the work of mid-nineteenth century abolitionists as useful even though inadequate because it has failed to create a white majority. All the while, he acknowledges that his own appeal to the country’s moral sensibilities with an explanation of the difference between right and wrong would be useless. In the second case, Douglass proceeds approvingly, speaking of the useful contributions of black Americans to the infrastructure of this country. On the other hand, he notes that the white population does not appreciate how useful these contributions are; in fact, they overlook what the black people do for the good of the United States. In effect, Douglass argued that usefulness can be served by means of opportunity for the slaves and recognition by the free.
Read in the light of the typology of values, this speech can be said to address the interplay between permanence and change. It does so by defining it both negatively and affirmatively. In the first case, Douglass speaks of the permanence of the principles regarding the inalienable rights guaranteed to the people of the United States. He takes these principles to pertain to all of the people residing in this country and for all times. Douglass also speaks of the institution of slavery as a harmful deviation from those guarantees and a betrayal of the ground on which the Founders erected the political structure of this country. In the second case, Douglass proceeds affirmatively, pointing out that there is room for positive change, a change warranted by virtue of this country’s political manifestos.

This primary document serves the life of today’s readers by sensitizing them to the enduring relevance of the principles articulated in the Declaration of Independence. Douglass’ speech insists that these principles support and make meaningful the life of an individual and the life of a nation. As such they must be reasserted not only in theory but also in the practice of everyday living. The fact that institutionalized slavery has officially been abolished matters little. What matters more today is that forms of oppression, injustice and exploitation exist to this day among people of every social status. But if this is so, appropriate action is imperative. Such action finds its origin in the capacities and talents of each citizen and its expression in the collective efforts of all the members of the nation. In other words, action limited to oneself is limited action—to have maximum impact, it must be carried out with others in mind. The fact that today’s Americans believe that they are guaranteed the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness matters little. Exercising these rights is an ongoing challenge that one must meet time and again. Taking them for granted is the best way to relinquish them to those who would deny them to all except themselves; by contrast, exercising them day in and day out
is the best way to ensure their preservation of the present moment in the nation’s history, and by extension for the generations to come. The fact that Douglass made a considerable contribution to his own times by means of his memorable speech matters less than the fact that our present remains open-minded and as such awaits, indeed demands, our own contributions. There are still improvements to be made in the present, and this requires committed activists, that is, activists who see the present as a link between the now and the future. As Douglass makes clear, it is this kind of perspective that makes citizens useful to themselves, to those around them, and to their nation. Meaningful contributions, however, do not always entail change. The key is to strike a balance between tradition and progress, to attend, that is, to the interplay between permanence and change. As we have seen in Nietzsche, both the antiquarian and the critical attitudes toward history have their place. And as Douglass shows, what must be preserved are the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and what must be abolished is the institution of slavery.

Consistent with the above reading, the students’ study of Douglass’ speech can be guided by questions informed by the typology of the five values:

- How does Douglass’ speech serve life in general, and your life in particular?
- In what ways does Douglass inspire you to take action?
- What kinds of action does he have in mind?
- How does Douglass’ speech address the present?
- What contemporary issues might he identify as needing discussion?
- How might Douglass’ speech be useful?
- What issues are timeless in Douglass’ speech?
- What issues are unique to himself and his contemporaries?
These and similar questions can be raised regardless of the historical document under consideration.

It goes without saying that the number of primary documents that reflect the six types of history I have mentioned is immense. Even so, a new curricular design will have to include those primary documents that are representative rather than exhaustive of each kind of history. Table 3 below is a list of such representative primary documents from a typical period of study in American history spanning the Colonial Era (1650) through early Civil War Reconstruction (1866).

Table 3. Representative primary documents from American history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of History</th>
<th>Primary Document</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Anne Bradstreet’s <em>The Prologue</em></td>
<td>1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>David Hume’s <em>Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth</em></td>
<td>1748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Benjamin Franklin’s <em>Albany Plan of Union</em></td>
<td>1754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>William Billings’ <em>Chester</em></td>
<td>1770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Daniel Dulany’s Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies</td>
<td>1765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical</td>
<td>William Pitt’s <em>Speech on the Stamp Act</em></td>
<td>1766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Phillis Wheatley’s <em>An Hymn to Humanity</em></td>
<td>1773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Declaration and Resolves on the First Continental Congress</td>
<td>1774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical</td>
<td>Edmund Burke’s Speech on Conciliation with America</td>
<td>1775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Abigail Adams’ Letter to John Adams</td>
<td>1776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Adam Smith’s <em>Wealth of Nations</em></td>
<td>1776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>Federalist Papers</td>
<td>1787-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>John Adams’ Alien and Sedition Acts</td>
<td>1789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Judith Sargent Murray’s “On the Equality of the Sexes”</td>
<td>1790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>Thomas Paine’s <em>Rights of Man</em></td>
<td>1791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Alexander Hamilton’s Letter to George Washington</td>
<td>1791</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical</td>
<td>George Washington’s <em>Farewell Address</em></td>
<td>1796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Tecumseh’s <em>Speech to the Osages in the Winter</em></td>
<td>1811-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Convention to Regulate the Commerce Between the Territories of the United States and of His Brittanick Majesty</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to John Taylor</td>
<td>1816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>James Mill’s “Essay on Government”</td>
<td>1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>James Monroe’s The Monroe Doctrine</td>
<td>1823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical</td>
<td>Andrew Jackson’s Address on Indian Removal</td>
<td>1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Henry Clay’s “The American System”</td>
<td>1832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>Alexis de Tocqueville’s <em>Democracy in America</em></td>
<td>1835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Self-Reliance”</td>
<td>1841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Mott and Catt’s “Declaration of Sentiments”</td>
<td>1848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Sojourner Truth’s “Ain’t I a Woman?”</td>
<td>1851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical</td>
<td>Frederick Douglass’ “The Hypocrisy of American Slavery”</td>
<td>1852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>John Stuart Mill’s <em>On Liberty</em></td>
<td>1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Walt Whitman’s “Beat! Beat! Drums”</td>
<td>1861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Sullivan Ballou Letter</td>
<td>1861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Lyons-Seward Treaty</td>
<td>1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetorical</td>
<td>Abraham Lincoln’s “Gettysburg Address”</td>
<td>1863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Report of Joint Committee on Reconstruction</td>
<td>1866</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thus far, I have provided a critical reading of one primary document from the rhetorical history of the United States. Yet reading this or other documents in the light of the typology of values is only one part of the whole story of a new curricular design. The other parts include: a) a set of tasks inherent in the study of history (inquiry, research, and argumentation); b) a set of skills needed to carry out the tasks (asking questions, researching primary documents, and creating arguments); and c) an illustration of those skills (using again Frederick Douglass’ speech “The Hypocrisy of American Slavery”). In what follows I discuss the above tasks and skills that must be taught and cultivated if students in secondary education are to understand history as active learners, by doing what historians do.

4.3 THE TASK OF INQUIRY

At the heart of all historical inquiry is a lack or a discrepancy. A lack indicates a gap in knowledge and/or understanding. When faced with a gap, historians seek to fill it and, in so doing, establish a more complete understanding of the past. A discrepancy may exist either within a given historical account in the form of an inconsistency or contradiction, or between two incompatible accounts. In this case, the historian’s goal is not simply to identify the discrepancy but to resolve it by examining critically the available accounts and rendering a sounder judgment.
4.3.1 The Skill of Asking Questions

To inquire means to ask questions. Historical study cannot be carried out without asking questions about the past. When contemporary historians ask such questions, they tacitly acknowledge that history is always alive and forever incomplete. Questions are keys that can unlock the mysteries and ambiguities of statements; they remind every statement that it may not have the final word.

The past can be accessed by means of two kinds of questions: factual and interpretive. Factual questions generally concern themselves with identifying events, actors, places, artifacts, dates and sources; their goal is correctness or the truth. On the other hand, interpretive questions concern themselves with describing and making sense out of situations, phenomena, circumstances, processes, factors, perspectives, methods and arguments; their goal is efficacy or effectiveness.

4.3.2 The Illustration of Asking Questions

The following is a set of factual questions about Frederick Douglass’ speech:

- Who was in the audience?
- When did the event take place?
- Where did Douglass deliver his speech?
- How did the audience react to Douglass’ speech?
- What was the source of this account of his speech?

The following is a set of interpretive questions about Douglass’ speech:

- How did Douglass’ ideas develop over the course of time?
What were some of the challenges Douglass faced as a public figure?

How did Douglass’ speech help extend and limit people’s right?

How did Douglass’ “The Hypocrisy of American Slavery” contribute to Lincoln’s anti-slavery rhetoric?

4.4 THE TASK OF RESEARCH

Research is a systematic approach to learning. It concerns itself with the adequate collection of sources that address, directly or indirectly, the researcher’s central question. To collect sources is to bring oneself in conversation with other scholars who have had something to say about the question at hand. When the researcher places his or her concern at the center and surrounds it by the light of the work of other scholars, he or she inadvertently finds both sympathetic and antagonistic points of view. At the same time, he or she discovers new conceptual angles. In the field of history, research involves finding sources that originated in the period under consideration or emerged afterwards.

4.4.1 The Skill of Research

Proper historical study can hardly take place without the search for sources. Accordingly, students need to be shown where to search and how to collect sources for their projects. More importantly, they need to be taught how to make sound judgments about the relevance or usefulness of a document, or its potential to make a meaningful contribution to the historical project at hand. At the same time, they need to be reminded that sometimes the number of
sources is too great, other times not enough. In the former case, they must exclude some of the sources; in the latter, they must be content with inference or speculation. In both cases, however, it is the historian’s question that drives the conduct of research.

4.4.2 The Illustration of Research

Let us suppose that the historian starts with the following interpretive question: “How did Frederick Douglass’ (1852) ‘The Hypocrisy of American Slavery’ contribute to Lincoln’s anti-slavery rhetoric?” Let us further suppose that during the research stage the historian finds two primary documents: a) Abraham Lincoln’s (1860) “Speech at Jonesboro” and his “Second Inaugural Address” (1865). The first document includes the following statement: “[T]here is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (p. 65). The second document refers to the two enemies, the north and the south and includes the statement: “Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any man should dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing the bread from the sweat of other men’s faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered; that of neither has been answered fully” (p. 127-128).

Let us further suppose that the historian locates two secondary documents: a) James Oakes’ (2007) The Radical and the Republican: Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, and the Triumph of Antislavery Politics; and b) John Stauffer’s (2008) Giants: The Parallel Lives of Frederick Douglass and Abraham Lincoln. Oakes points out that Douglass and Lincoln had very different reasons for supporting emancipation. Whereas Douglass argued for racial equality, Lincoln was more concerned with America’s image abroad (p. 40). On the one hand, Oakes put
it, Lincoln “was no advocate of racial equality, but he did hate slavery” (p. 40). On the other hand, Stauffer claims that Douglass and Lincoln had similar reasons for supporting emancipation. According to Stauffer, both men believed in the self-made man. As he explained it, upholding racism meant assuming that men are “fixed and unchanging” rather than subject to growth and development. However, the two men “moved beyond the traditional idea of character as fixed and based primarily on heredity and social status, and instead saw the self in a state of continual flux” (p. 2). This movement, according to Stauffer, is actually “antithetical to racism” (p. 2).

Clearly, Oakes (2007) and Stauffer (2008) see things differently. Their respective views present us with a discrepancy in historical explanation. As I note in my discussion of the task of inquiry, resolving a discrepancy requires a critical reexamination of the available sources. Such reexamination dictates that we delve deeper into the reasoning of the two historians. Doing so dictates, in turn, that we reflect on yet another of the historian’s tasks, the task of argumentation.

4.5 THE TASK OF ARGUMENTATION

People make arguments in order to maintain their own views, as well as to defend or attack the views of others. An argument is a unit of thought. To make an argument is to take a stand in the light of an issue; in other words, to support or oppose some position. The goal of an argument is to persuade others that what its author says makes sense. The persuasive force of an argument depends on several factors. As a rule, however, the more plausible its claims, the sounder its reasons, and the more compelling its evidence, the more likely the argument will be persuasive. But even if these three criteria are met, there is no guarantee that a given argument will persuade.
This is so because people differ in the ways in which they interpret evidence and the ways in which they reason. Thus two different people may draw different conclusions from the exact same evidence. Likewise, they may give entirely different reasons when trying to prove how or why something is the case.

Generally speaking, historians ask whether a past fact has been sufficiently proved to be a fact and, as such, is still accepted by most, if not all, historians. At the same time, they ask whether an interpretation of the past is still satisfactory. When they believe that past historians have made a factual error, they take it upon themselves to prove their case, in effect, advancing a new set of claims, which they ground on new evidence and support with a new line of reasoning. Likewise, when they believe that an interpretation is unsatisfactory, they undertake the task of showing, through argument(s), that another interpretation is more satisfactory.

4.5.1 The Skill of Making Arguments

Beyond the skills of asking significant questions about the past and researching by collecting as many sources as possible, a new curricular design should instruct students in argumentation. In its most basic form, an argument consists of a claim based on evidence and supported by reasons. To make a claim is to posit that something is or is not the case. A claim, however, cannot stand on its own; nor can it be taken at face value—it needs some evidence that grounds it and some reason(s) that justify it. Claims not based on evidence are unsubstantiated and, as such, generally rejected.
4.5.2 The Illustration of Making Arguments

Let us go back to the question we asked above: How did Frederick Douglass’ (1852) “The Hypocrisy of American Slavery” contribute to Lincoln’s anti-slavery rhetoric? One response would be that it helped inform Abraham Lincoln’s anti-slavery rhetoric. On the face of it, this response is a claim; as such it must be supported by evidence and justified by reasons. This claim can be substantiated by juxtaposing a quotation from Douglass’ speech with a researched primary document from Lincoln’s (1860) “Speech at Jonesboro.” In his speech, Douglass wrote, “Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance between us. The blessings in which you this day rejoice are not enjoyed in common. The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity, and independence bequeathed by your fathers is shared by you, not by me.” Lincoln also makes the argument that the institution of slavery does not uphold the values articulated by the Declaration of Independence. In Lincoln’s own words, he explained that “there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (p. 65).

The claim that Frederick Douglass’ “The Hypocrisy on American Slavery” helped inform Abraham Lincoln’s anti-slavery rhetoric can be reasoned. The reasoning may be that although it is possible that Lincoln did not know of this specific passage in Douglass’ speech, it is more likely that he was aware of it for three reasons. First the virtually identical wording of the two passages cannot simply be a coincidence. Second, Douglass’ work predates Lincoln’s by 3 years. One could not reverse the claim and state that Lincoln’s rhetoric influenced Douglass’ in this case. Third, it is generally the president’s business to keep abreast with important public figures and their particular voices. Historians generally agree that Frederick Douglass was an important rhetorical voice in his day. Many also point out that Lincoln was well-versed in
Douglass’ writing and that the two were acquainted by this time through correspondence. With these three arguments, one can safely conclude that Douglass influenced Lincoln’s anti-slavery rhetoric.

### 4.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to render the typology of values meaningful by giving it a concrete curricular face. This face comes in the form of three tasks, each with a specific skill attached to it. Insofar as it emphasizes the cardinal significance of life, action, the present, usefulness, and the interplay of permanence and change, this curricular design aligns with the typology of values. Unlike history textbooks or databases, which mainly contain information, this design provides a framework that shows students what to do with information, how to analyze, arrange, and interpret it, in short, how to make it meaningful. Importantly, this framework is not tied to the period or the materials examined—the documents used in this curricular design are only examples of materials that characterize a particular historical era of the United States. But once students familiarize themselves with this framework, they will be able to use it productively when examining other historical periods and materials.
5.0 CONCLUSION

5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

This study begins in 1983, with the *A Nation at Risk* report, which alerted the public to a crisis in American education. The authors of the report noted that American students are caught in “a rising tide of mediocrity” which is compromising the economic and political standing of the United States. Subsequent assessments of history education have pointed to unremarkable student performance, which reports like that of the Bradley Commission attributed in part to inadequate history textbooks. Other reports in the next three decades also condemned history textbooks for disregarding the nature of history and not employing sound methods through which students can learn history (Ravitch & Finn, 1987; Jackson et. al, 1988; Gagnon, 1989; Loewen, 1995; Ravitch 2003; Finn, 2004; Ravitch et. al, 2004; Lavere, 2008). The “tide of mediocrity” identified in 1983 is still with us.

The review of literature has shown that instead of offering tangible solutions to the problem of textbook designs, the discourse of reform has become mired into a seemingly unending debate between liberal and conservative perspectives. On the one hand, the liberal camp has been emphasizing a process-based curriculum, a critical portrait of the United States, and a diverse American identity (NCEST, 1992; Nash & Crabtree, 1994; Rabb, 1994; Loewen, 1995). On the other hand, the conservative camp has been emphasizing a content-rich
curriculum, an idealistic portrait of the United States, and a unified American identity (Cheney, 1987; Ravitch & Finn, 1987; Hirsch, 1987). After almost thirty years of discourse, this debate appears to have reached an impasse. This study has sought to offer new ways of looking at the issue using two questions: 1) What is the nature of history? 2) What is the nature of historical education?

The search for answers to these questions has led to a philosophical grounding of education and history separate from and unaffected by the recent debate on standards of historical education. Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1873) “On the Use and Abuse of History for Life,” argued that history is justified only insofar as it affords us equipment for life. John Dewey’s (1938) *Experience and Education* posited that education is justified only insofar as it is an authentic experience. Together, these two philosophers provide a historical background against which the contemporary debate on standards of historical education is made meaningful. They also furnish a five-part typology of values that supports, challenges, or otherwise problematizes the values implicit in the review of literature. Nietzsche and Dewey strongly suggest that the values of history and historical education are those of life, action, the present, usefulness, and the interplay between permanence and change.

Going beyond the work of Nietzsche and Dewey, this study operationalizes the typology of their values into concrete learning exercises, the totality of which establishes a new curricular focus. These exercises include a demonstration of a critical reading of a primary document from the rhetorical history of the United States, Frederick Douglass’ (1852) speech “The Hypocrisy of American Slavery,” as well as a discussion of the tasks of inquiry, research, and argumentation as they pertain to the study of history. At the same time, the study illustrates the skills embedded in the new curricular design.
5.2 WHY THE STUDY MATTERS

As presently written, textbooks are not adequate resources from which to teach history in secondary classrooms because they have departed from the diachronic values of history and historical education. Questions on how to operationalize the values of historical study and education and on how to address political pressure groups are many (Hunter, 1991; Stearns, 1996; Zimmerman, 2005). While there is no single, easy solution to the problem of current curricular designs, history textbooks are not serving students well; their characterization within the educational community ranges from “dinosaurs” to “essentially dead” (Ravitch, et al, 2004). The pressing need for new curricular designs is evident throughout the literature. This study supposes that textbook authors will benefit from knowing what the discourses of historical study and education have deemed desirable or detrimental to the quality of history instruction. Moreover, this study assumes that teachers and students are more effective when they have access to the most academically sound resources available. With these understandings in mind, this study puts forth a new curricular design that places the writings of philosophers, educators, and other stakeholders at the forefront in an effort to offer a thoughtful response to the mounting criticism against current history textbooks.

5.3 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

Although the literature of the last thirty years makes it clear that there are many disagreements over what the best curricular designs for secondary history would look like, this study has found that there are also many agreements. For example, most authors agree on the significance of the
typology of values. This agreement would seem to indicate that the impasse between the liberal and conservative camps needs not to continue indefinitely. It would also seem to signal a golden opportunity—educators can now take productive measures to generate new curricular designs that make historical study and education more authentic and more meaningful.

One of the most divisive issues between liberals and conservatives concerns the relative priority of content and process. Whereas conservatives argue that content is the most important aspect of historical education (Cheney, 1987; Ravitch & Finn, 1987; Hirsch, 1987), liberals argue that process or skills ought to have priority (NCEST, 1992; Nash & Crabtree, 1994; Rabb, 1994; Loewen, 1995). This study, however, has found a reasonable middle ground in the identification, study and skillful use of primary documents from the history of the United States. These documents meet the conservatives’ main criterion; namely, they are a recognizable part of the American cultural experience (Hirsch, 1987; Ravitch, 2003). At the same time, they meet the liberals’ principal criterion; namely, students ought to acquire pertinent skills related to critical thinking.

5.4 ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS

The examination and operationalization of the typology of values of history and historical education find justification along three lines of thought. First, as the literature indicates, many authors are quite critical of history textbooks; yet, they have not proposed new curricular designs. This study has offered such a design all along mindful of both the strengths and weaknesses of current designs. But making a creative contribution, Nietzsche (1873) warns, is a
risky but necessary proposition. His warning implies that those who are not creative will be the most critical and the most knowledgeable about the designs in place. (p. 6)

Second, breaking out of the impasse between the liberal and conservative camps may help restore the status and reputation of history among the humanities. As the review of the literature indicates, both camps do have a point; however, each refuses to acknowledge the merits of the opposing side. This state of affairs makes it difficult for stakeholders, policymakers, and students to operate with common goals and objectives. For its part, this study does not indulge fully either side of the debate; rather, it seeks to clarify the issue at hand by means of a philosophical perspective impervious to contemporary complexities and that situates the current controversy into a larger historical framework.

Third, this study and proposed curricular design remain faithful to the idea of a common school, which is part of the democratic tradition. In his Why School?: Reclaiming School for All of Us Mike Rose (2009) wrote, “From the beginning we have invested great hope in the common school—consider Jefferson’s vision of it as central to democratic life. And from the beginning we have expected our schools to teach more than skills and subject matter, notably, a sense of civic duty and moral behavior” (p. 165). Rose’s view of civic education coincides with mine. But I would go one step further arguing that the idea of the common school implies some commonality in vision on the part of educators. In the field of history, this commonality comes in the form of the five values I have delineated as well as the attendant tasks and skills, which I would insist, not only facilitate the study of history but also instill a sense of civic-mindedness.
5.5 ISSUES EMERGING FROM THE STUDY

Some critics of this study may argue that the proposed curricular design echoes the views of the liberal camp, while others may argue that it is too sympathetic to the conservative one. However, two more pressing issues emerge from this study. The first is putting qualified teachers into history classrooms. In the light of the new curricular design, the need for teachers who can offer guidance and support to students working through historical tasks and skills cannot be overemphasized. Moreover, these teachers must have first-hand knowledge of critical reading as well as the tasks of inquiry, research, and argumentation, as they will be asking their students to engage in the same kind of work. As the literature indicates, it has been difficult to find qualified history teachers who have degrees in the field (Ravitch, 1998; Ravitch et. al. 2004). Over time, it should become more apparent to stakeholders that learning is most beneficial when it is an active process.

The second issue is the difficulty that standardized assessments bring to a classroom that adopts the proposed curricular design. In light of the demands that No Child Left Behind (2001) places on teachers and schools, the trend in assessments is increasingly toward measuring the amount of information students can retain and recall rather than the ways in which they can interpret information and make it meaningful. As we have seen, the proposed curricular design asks students to construct historical narratives by practicing the tasks of inquiry, research, and argumentation. These tasks cannot be standardized by state-wide exams. To complicate matters, federal and state governments are tying school funding to districts’ success on standardized exams. Clearly, curricular designs like the one I have proposed are facing an uphill path. Precisely how current attitudes might change is a matter of speculation, something beyond the scope of this study.
There are several research studies that can build upon the efforts this study makes toward improving the study and instruction of history in secondary education. One prospective study may survey the kinds of methods that secondary history teachers are using in the classroom. A researcher may want to focus on the challenges and accomplishments of students who learn history according to the new curricular design. More specifically, a researcher may want to study how students perform when taught the tasks and employing the skills highlighted in this study.

Another study might analyze alternative curricular designs that abide by the values of history and historical education. These designs may be useful modes of comparison and contrast between the proposed design in this study, and may help provide better options for students and teachers.

Yet another study might want to use quantitative methods to determine the correlation between new curricular designs and factors such as 1) grade point average; 2) preparation for Advanced Placement courses; 3) readiness for standardized exams such as PSATs, SATs, ACTs; 4) graduation rates; 5) college readiness; 6) subsequent history majors or minors; and 7) college graduation rates.
5.7 PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

This study has derived much of its inspiration from Nietzsche and Dewey, both of whom were advocates of the humanities. Also admirers of the creative and critical aspects of science, these two philosophers believed that the most fulfilling aspects of life lie neither in the technicalities of expert knowledge nor in the details of narrow lines of thought, but rather, in broad modes of expression—for Nietzsche, expression in the form of art, and for Dewey, expression in the form of democratic participation.

In our own time, however, the urgency and promise of scientific and technological education have been exaggerated; so much so in fact, that one would think that any other kind of education is either insignificant or a matter of luxury. Swept by this way of thinking, secondary schools have been creating programs like STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics), which promise to prepare students for rigorous, science-based learning at colleges and universities. This trend is not harmful to students—quite the contrary; but if unchecked and driven by the economic “bottom line,” it can have deleterious effects on the maintenance of our democracy and the actualization of our humanity. In other words, STEM programs, however meritorious, do not suffice to inculcate citizenly and humanistic virtues.

Richard Hofstadter (1962) and Martha Nussbaum (2010) warn that in their drive for economic dominance, countries and educational institutions are neglecting the kinds of education that cultivate well-rounded, civic-minded, critical thinkers. Our schools are producing what Nussbaum calls “useful machines” that see education not as a goal but as a means toward an end. For Hofstadter, this end is “economic competitiveness,” which consequently looks at students as merely “economic indicators” (p. x). In the spirit of Nietzsche and Dewey, Hofstadter and
Nussbaum look at schools as grounds for the development of good human beings and thoughtful citizens: persons who can participate in and criticize traditions; who can reflect on who they have been and make enlightened decisions about who they want to become; who have interpretive and analytical capacities and can put them in the service of productive ends; and “who can understand the significance of another person’s sufferings and achievements” (Nussbaum, p. 2). Without these capacities future citizens will not be able to question the status quo or arbitrary courses of action, to determine the reliability of their sources of information, and to formulate defensible public positions in speech and writing. Each of these capacities amounts to a mode of expression and an exercise in citizenship. And as such they constitute the best guarantors of our rights and the best reminders of our responsibilities. As Jean Bethke Elshtain (1995) wrote, in her Democracy on Trial, “The regime of rights cannot be sustained by rights alone” (p. 15); without these capacities, students are left unable to sustain them.

5.8 CONCLUSION

In his Democracy and Education, John Dewey (1916) wrote: “As a society becomes more enlightened, it realizes that it is responsible not to transmit and conserve the whole of its existing achievements, but only such as make for a better future society” (p. 24). In the same spirit we can say that historical education ought to transmit the kind of learning that serves life, compels action, addresses the present, is useful, and stresses the interplay of permanence and change. But as this study has revealed, these values have not been at the forefront of current secondary history textbooks, which is arguably the main reason why textbooks have earned harsh criticism.
from many quarters of the academic community. There are several different options for new curricular designs that espouse the above values of history and historical education. True, this study offers only one option, but one that has been tried, tested, and refined in a secondary history classroom. Beyond the classroom, this study hopes that future contributions to historical education will reintroduce the above values, which is the best way to ensure that teachers offer an authentic historical education to their students.


