

**TRANSNATIONAL CONVERSIONS: GREEK CATHOLIC MIGRANTS AND RUSSKY
ORTHODOX CONVERSION MOVEMENTS IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, RUSSIA, AND
THE AMERICAS (1890-1914)**

by

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AMERICAS (1890-1914)**

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Beginning in the 1890s, communities of migrants from Austria-Hungary, living and laboring in the United States, converted from one form of Eastern Christianity, known as Greek Catholicism, to another, called Russky (or Russian) Orthodoxy. In doing so, they also underwent ethnic, national, and racial conversions as “Rusyns,” “Russians,” “Ukrainians,” “Hungarians,” “Slavs,” and “Whites.” Soon, migrants also began converting *en masse* in Canada, Brazil, and Argentina. Ultimately, the conversions, likely numbering 100,000 by 1914, spread to migrants’ villages of origin in the Austro-Hungarian regions of Galicia and Subcarpathia, through remigrations and correspondence. For twenty-five years, conversion and counter-conversion movements in each of these regions interacted with and mutually influenced one another, in the context of transnational migration.

As a consequence of these transnational conversions, a great war broke out, and not only in a metaphorical sense. For in addition to the protracted, heated, and periodically violent battles erupting between converts and opponents of conversion in all affected regions, these multi-continental ethnoreligious shifts also cast sparks, which contributed substantially to the outburst of that great global conflagration, beginning in September 1914, called World War I. Diplomatic tensions arose as statesmen at the highest governmental levels in Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany, as well as the major Great Power presses, vied with one another to define the conversions: either as Russian political machinations among “Ruthenians,” justifying future annexation of Austro-Hungarian territories inhabited by presumed “Russians”—identifiable by Orthodox religion—or as mere religious movements among Russia’s innocent, co-national expatriates, persecuted by the Austro-Hungarian regime. The same statesmen in

July 1914 engaged in diplomatic hostilities surrounding Serbia, but the preceding years, months, and weeks, devoted to the issue of converting Greek Catholics, had helped set the stage for the July Crisis. Because the “East European” conversions resulted primarily through transatlantic migration, this study argues for the “American” origins of the Great War. In its simplest, most reductive, and unqualified form, it suggests that, because a migrant coal miner in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania decided to attend a different church one day, World War I happened.

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1.0 TRANSNATIONAL CONVERSIONS

Beginning in the 1890s, communities of migrants from Austria-Hungary, living and laboring among the railroad yards, anthracite coal fields, and saw, flour, and steel mills across the United States, converted from one form of Eastern Christianity, known as Greek Catholicism, to another, called Russky (or Russian) Orthodoxy.¹ Soon, migrant communities followed suit in Canada's plains and cities, and in the coffee plantations and sugar cane, yerba mate, and rice fields of Brazil and Argentina. Ultimately, the conversions even reached migrants' villages of origin in the Austro-Hungarian regions of Galicia and Subcarpathia. As a consequence of these transnational conversions, likely numbering over 100,000 before 1914, a great war broke out, and not only in a metaphorical sense. For in addition to the protracted, heated, and periodically violent battles erupting between converts and opponents of conversion in all affected regions, these multi-continental ethnoreligious shifts also cast sparks, which contributed substantially to the outburst of that great global conflagration beginning in September 1914, called World War I.

In June 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Empire concluded that year's second of two trials, which together tried over one hundred defendants—priests, student activists, peasants, and a number of returned migrants from the Americas—for treason. The charges included spying for the neighboring Russian Empire and spreading pro-Russian propaganda, intended to convince some of Austria-Hungary's citizens, and the world, that they were truly "Russians," rather than "Ruthenians" or "Ruthenes" as classified by Austria-Hungary, in preparation for the annexation of Austrian Galicia and Hungarian Subcarpathia by

¹ On the retention of "Russky," (rather than translating the term, as is customary, as "Russian"), together with an extended terminological discussion, see: Appendix C.

that “Great Russian Bear.” In reality, the defendants incurred such an indictment chiefly by converting from Greek Catholicism to Russian/Russky Orthodoxy, and influencing many others to do likewise: the conversions, argued prosecutors, exhibited a purely political, rather than religious, character.

One Michal Gibor testified as a witness in one trial that, during his stay in an Austro-Hungarian village embroiled in a conversion movement, he heard from residents “that on account of the arrest of the Orthodox priests, it will come to war with Russia.”² Rumors in an obscure village hardly offer conclusive evidence for the origins of World War I—or grounds to fault the existing historiography for almost completely ignoring the conversions as a contributing factor to the war. Yet the conversions did, in fact, generate considerable international hostilities between Austria-Hungary’s, Russia’s, and Germany’s statesmen and war-makers at the highest levels of government, as well as in the major Great Power presses, shortly before the war. On June 5, 1914, Austria’s foreign minister, Conrad Berchtold, notified his prime minister that, in the matter of “the fight of the pro-Russian and Orthodox agitation...It is no exaggeration when I say that our relations with Russia, which are of such great importance, will depend in the future on our success in preventing the Russification of the Ruthenes, which is being vigorously pursued on our territory...”³ Following Franz Ferdinand’s assassination a mere three weeks later, Berchtold became Austria-Hungary’s chief architect for war.

While Great Power diplomatic unrest centered upon Russia’s alleged propagandist activity in Austria-Hungary, those accused of treason identified the catalysts for conversion not in the East, beyond the Austro-Russian border, but rather to the West, across the Atlantic Ocean. As the defenses in the two trials argued, many defendants had converted as migrants in the Americas, while others did so as a result

² The Bukovinan village of Waszkowce, which lay three miles south of, and just across the river from, the Galician village of Zaluche where a Russky Orthodox movement had taken place. Zaluche’s Greek Catholic residents began attending Waszkowce’s Orthodox parish as early as 1903. A transcript of the Lviv treason trial appeared in daily editions of the Polonophile *Slowo Polskie*, as republished between 2004 – 2006 in *Przegląd Prawosławny* 6, no. 228 (2004) – 7, no. 253 (2006). For the archival sources, see Issue 6, no. 228. All issues are available through *Przegląd Prawosławny*’s online archive at <http://www.pporthodoxia.com.pl/archiwum.php>. Hereafter, references to trial testimony are cited: *Przegląd Prawosławny*.

³ *Werwaltungsarchiv*, June 4, 1914, 2976 MP and 7262 MI ex 1914, cited in Z.A.B. Zeman, *The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire: 1914-1918: A Study in National and Social Revolution* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961): 12.

of remigrant influence. There was truth to the arguments issuing from both sides of the courtrooms: old country and new world factors, in fact, coincided to facilitate the conversions. Yet transatlantic migration to and back from the Americas did constitute the single most important catalyst for the East European conversions between 1890 and 1914. In 1912, a Galician Greek Catholic priest accurately concluded that “the source of schism” in Austria-Hungary was, in a word, “America.”⁴

This study is the first to tie these ethnoreligious conversion and counter-conversion movements in all affected regions of Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Americas together in a unitary history of transnational migration: sequential causality and persisting migrant ties connected the movements across disparate regions separated by vast distances and an ocean. It represents a substantial contribution to transnational migration studies, the scholarship of race, ethnicity, and nationhood, the history of Eastern and Western Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, and theories of religious conversion. Lastly, it contends somewhat provocatively that transnational conversions of Greek Catholics to the Russky Orthodox Church played an important role in the origins of World War I. Naturally, that argument requires considerable annotation and contextualization; yet in its simplest, most reductive, and unqualified form, “Transnational Conversions” suggests that, because a migrant coal miner in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania decided to attend a different church one day, World War I happened.

1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A series of mass conversion movements, beginning in the tenth century and emerging periodically throughout hundreds of years of contestation between eastern and western Christianity, provide the historical context critical to understanding turn-of-the-twentieth-century mass conversions of

⁴ Fr. Mykhaylo Zhuk, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (January 2, 1912), 126. Archiwum Państwowe w Przemyślu, Akta Archiwum Greckokatolickiego Biskupstwa w Przemyślu, (1551-1946),” (hereafter referred to as *ABGK*).

Greek Catholics to the Russky Orthodox Church. The so-called “Baptism of Rus” in the ninth century entailed large-scale conversions of the inhabitants of Kievan Rus from pagan traditions to Byzantine (“Greek”) Christianity. Some did so willingly, whether out of “genuine” religious conviction or the desire for social advantages in a now-Christian state; others did so under threat of force. This mass conversion occurred during a period of growing estrangement between the eastern (Byzantine) and western (Latin) halves of Christianity, which began especially in the seventh century and perhaps solidified finally with the sacking of Constantinople by Western crusaders in 1204.⁵ Their ultimate separation, known as the Great Schism, produced the churches today known as Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic.⁶ According to partisans of either side of the schism, the other had “converted” to a new religion, distinct from authentic, ancient Christianity.⁷ Inhabitants of Kievan Rus, who had earlier adopted the eastern form of Christianity, thus now “became” or, alternately, “remained” Orthodox.

Following the Great Schism, the most successful attempts at *rapprochement* between representatives of East and West took place under the auspices of the so-called Unia accords.⁸ In these agreements, of which there were ultimately many, a number of Eastern Orthodox hierarchs indicated their desire to join Catholicism, whereupon the Roman Catholic Church accepted the churches under its jurisdiction, with certain stipulations. While the formerly Orthodox churches retained a degree of autonomy—with respect to their liturgical rites, matters of discipline (e.g., a married clergy), and even with qualification its hierarchy—these now Catholic churches submitted to the authority of the pope and

⁵ Historians often employ the shorthand date of 1054 for the “Great Schism,” in reference to the mutual excommunications of the patriarchs of Rome and Constantinople. These were only individual excommunications, and even the patriarch of Constantinople only excommunicated the pope’s emissaries. Intercommunion between eastern and western Christians persisted well after this date.

⁶ In reality, “Eastern Orthodox” is less frequently used than the national terms, like “Greek Orthodox,” “Russian Orthodox,” “Bulgarian Orthodox,” etc. Any use of “Orthodox” or “Orthodoxy” (capital “O”) in this study refers to Orthodox Christianity, not Orthodox Judaism.

⁷ Partisans of either side would have used terms like “apostasy,” “heresy,” or “schism,” rather than “conversion,” but this is also true for many who commented upon the turn-of-the-twentieth-century conversions under consideration.

⁸ The most famous attempt prior to the Unia Agreements took place at the Council of Florence (1431-39), at which bishops of the church of Constantinople accepted union, likely at least partly in exchange for Western assistance against the encroachments of “the Turk.” The majority of the Eastern Church, however, rejected the union, and it ultimately failed. See: Thomas E. FitzGerald, *The Ecumenical Movement: An Introductory History*, Contributions to the Study of Religion (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Conn., 2004), chapter three.

accepted certain characteristically Catholic forms of doctrine.⁹ The Unia agreements of immediate relevance to this study took place within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1596, at the Union of Brest, and in the Kingdom of Hungary in 1646, at the Union of Uzhorod.¹⁰ The churches bound by these agreements became known commonly as Uniate churches (the churches of the Unia).¹¹

⁹ Such as the belief in purgatory, the seven sacraments, and the *filioque* clause (the line in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan creed stipulating that the Holy Spirit proceeds “from the Father *and the Son*”). As Barbara Skinner has noted, however, even the acceptance of these theological tenets was measured at the outset. In the lead-up to the Union of Brest, the potentially joining bishops proposed a compromise clause in the creed, that the Holy Spirit proceeds “from the Father *through* the Son.” As for purgatory, they simply indicated no “dispute” with the concept and a willingness to be “instructed” in the matter. In a time of counter-reformation, doctrinal clarity, and the clarification of distinctions between Catholicism and non-Catholicism, though, Rome demanded greater concessions at the Union of Brest, to which the joining bishops agreed. Barbara Skinner, *The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in 18th-century Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009), 23-24.

¹⁰ For a good introduction to the Unia agreements at Brest and Uzhorod, see Paul Robert Magocsi and Ivan Pop, “Unia/Church Union,” in Paul R. Magocsi and I. I. Pop, *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture* (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Paul Robert Magocsi, “Greek Catholics: Historical Background,” in *Churches In-between: Greek Catholic Churches in Postsocialist Europe*, ed. Vlad Naumescu and Stephanie Mahieu, *Halle Studies in the Anthropology of Eurasia* (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2008), 42-46. There is a substantial body of literature on the Union of Brest. Some works in English include: Bert Groen and William Peter van den Bercken, *Four Hundred Years Union of Brest (1596-1996): A Critical Re-evaluation: Acta of the Congress Held at Hernen Castle, the Netherlands, in March 1996*, Eastern Christian studies (Leuven: Peeters, 1998); Borys Gudziak, *Crisis and Reform: the Kyivan Metropolitanate, the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Genesis of the Union of Brest* (Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1998); Oskar Halecki, *From Florence to Brest (1439-1596)* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1968 [1958]). On the Union of Uzhorod, see: Michael Lacko, *The Union of Uzhorod* (Cleveland: Slovak Institute, 1966). Discounting migration, the people influenced by these agreements live today in regions of Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. During the period under consideration in this study (1890-1914), they lived in Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire (again, discounting migration, e.g., to the Americas). Other Unia agreements include those in Egypt (1741), Ethiopia (1846), Syria (1781), India (1930), Lebanon (1692), Albania (1628), Bulgaria (1861), Serbia (1611), Greece (1829), and Transylvania (1697). Of these, the Unia in Transylvania (agreed to at Alba Iulia) wielded the greatest influence on the conversions of some of the people under consideration in this study (Subcarpathians). In 1900, a number of village churches which had come under the jurisdiction of that agreement, beginning with the village of Säcel, Hungary, experienced an Orthodox movement. That movement appears to have had some influence on the conversion movements in the Iza region. The total official count for the churches of the Unias of Brest and Uzhorod today are 4,269,000 (Ukrainian) and 597,000 (Ruthenian). See: Magocsi, “Greek Catholics: Historical Background,” 37.

¹¹ While today, many members of the churches of various Unia agreements regard the term “Uniate” as pejorative, those churches did, for nearly two centuries, use that term as one of self-identification. I use it here, but not for the period 1890-14, when it was more commonly employed by Russky Orthodox partisans as a term of derision. Explanations for these mass “conversions” to Catholicism vary. The Unia agreements took place in the context of the Protestant Reformation and Counter-Reformation: it is possible to understand church union in part as a side effect of the impetus to reassert Catholicism in the face of advancing Protestantism. In this age of “confessionalism” and reform, Orthodox hierarchs also sought reformation, some of them in the form of union with the Western Church. For an excellent study of this “confessional” context, see: Skinner, *The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in 18th-century Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia*, 11-14. Additionally, some historians have pointed to the socioeconomic marginalization of Orthodox clerics and hierarchs within Catholic states—a state of affairs, which conversion to Catholicism could in some measure remedy. Naturally,

The retention by Uniate churches of characteristically Eastern ritual elements represents probably the single most important factor for conversion, catalyzed by turn-of-the-twentieth-century migration. Notwithstanding fluctuating incursions of “Latin” Catholic elements into Uniatism (rosaries, western-style iconography, devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, prayer for the pope rather than the local Orthodox bishop, recitation of the *filioque* clause in the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, etc.), the churches of the Unia continued, through the twentieth century and even beyond, to resemble Orthodox churches in the most obvious ways. Churches of the Unia, like Orthodox Churches, celebrated the Divine Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom, featured icons and iconostases (icon-screens) prominently in worship, administered the sacrament of communion in two species, and chrismated, in addition to baptizing, infants (anointed them with oil). Thus, in many cases, “conversions” of Greek Catholics to the Russky/Russian Orthodox Church, 1890-1914, resulted in almost no discernible change in religious practices.

Whatever the circumstances of origin, the Unia only gradually took hold over Polish-Lithuania’s and Hungary’s Orthodox communities over the course of a century and a half (roughly 1600-1750), with Orthodox and Uniate churches and dioceses often existing alongside one another, in a state of occasional or frequent antagonism. Often, constituents of some churches officially joining the Unia simply never recognized the fact of their conversion. Into the twentieth century, many individuals and communities, particularly in the Carpathian Mountains, continued to self-identify as “orthodox/Orthodox,” despite official designation as Greek Catholic by bishops and states.¹²

Following the triple-partitioning of Poland-Lithuania (1772, 1793, and 1795), the liquidated Commonwealth’s Uniates (i.e., those officially designated as such) now inhabited the Habsburg and Russian Empires. The government of the latter systematically eliminated the Unia, with the last diocese

Greek Catholic partisans have generally contended that a genuine recognition of the error of schism and the truth of Catholicism motivated the conversions.

¹² Indeed, the continued, sanctioned use by Greek Catholic churches of the term *pravoslavny* (“orthodox/Orthodox”) facilitated ambiguous identifications, something this study explores at length.

disappearing (i.e., becoming Orthodox) in 1875.¹³ The Catholic Habsburgs preserved the Unia in Austria, as well as in Hungary, once the Monarchy solidified control there. In 1774, two years after annexing the Uniate-inhabited province of Galicia, the Habsburg Empress Maria Theresa implemented educational and administrative reforms of the Uniate churches and coined for them the term “Greek Catholic”—a reference to their Byzantine rite, not Greek ethnicity—to indicate, if not actually reflect, equality in status with Roman Catholic churches within the Habsburg Empire.¹⁴ After the Dual Compromise of 1867 transformed the Habsburg Empire into Austria-Hungary, Greek Catholics tracing their lineage to Brest and Uzhorod resided in both halves of the Dual Monarchy. Roughly 3,000,000 Greek Catholics worshiped in 1,894 parishes in the Austrian province of Galicia (in the dioceses of Lviv, Przemyśl, and Stanislaviv).¹⁵ Between 342,000 and 600,000 Greek Catholics resided in the Subcarpathian region of Hungary (in the dioceses of Prešov and Mukachevo).¹⁶

Following the initial Brest and Uzhorod agreements of 1596 and 1646, many churches and constituents, first in Poland-Lithuania and Hungary, then in the Russian Empire and the Habsburg *cum* Dual Monarchy, had moved back and forth between Greek Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy in connection with religious polemics, territorial shifts, and forcible repressions. The “return to Catholicism” movements of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Unia agreements had therefore

¹³ Skinner, *The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in 18th-century Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia*, 3. In 1794, shortly after the second partition, Catherine II initiated broad efforts to destroy the Unia by persuasion and force. By 1796, more than 1.5 million Uniates in the Russian Empire had converted to the Orthodox Church. Subsequent, intermittent attempts to make that “return” to Orthodoxy complete unfolded under Nicholas I (especially 1831-1839) and then under Alexander II. Under the latter’s rule, the last remaining Greek Catholic diocese in Russia, Chelm (Kholm), disappeared in 1875. See also [Chapter Two](#) of the current study for more on the liquidation of the diocese of Chelm.

¹⁴ While this reform did lead to improvements in the social status of Greek Catholic elites, including greater educational opportunities, parity existed in name alone.

¹⁵ Magocsi, “Greek Catholics: Historical Background,” 41. In 1912, Lviv’s Greek Catholic periodical, *Nyva*, provided figures for Galicia’s Greek Catholics in 1890 (2,790,894), 1900 (3,109,972), and 1910 (3,378,451). For the Orthodox it provided the following figures: 1890 (1,429), 1900 (2,233), and 1910 (2,816). See: “Scho kazhe statystyka Halychyny za poslidne 10-litye?,” *Nyva* 9, no. 13-14 (June 1, 1912): 377-81.

¹⁶ Paul R. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus’, 1848-1948*, Harvard Ukrainian series (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), 9, 353-54. The Galician numbers are more reliable than the Subcarpathian figures. However, emigration renders both estimates problematic.

engendered various reactionary “return to Orthodoxy” movements in the ensuing centuries.¹⁷ The first major attempt at mass conversion to Orthodoxy in the new Austria-Hungary took place in 1881-82, in the Galician village of Hnylychky.¹⁸ This *Russky/Russian* Orthodox movement was the first exhibiting ties to Russophilism, a nineteenth- and twentieth-century religio-political movement comprised of Greek Catholics and eventually Orthodox converts, who inclined culturally and sometimes politically toward “Historic Rus” and contemporary imperial Russia.¹⁹ Beginning with Hnylychky, conversions to Orthodoxy within Austria-Hungary, and among Greek Catholic migrants abroad, became associated by critics and some—though not all—converts, with political fidelity to the Russian Empire.²⁰ It is primarily due to the ambiguous and contested political and ethnonational character of the conversions that this study consistently eschews the term “Russian Orthodox”—as is most common (opaquely so) in English-language references—in favor of the multivalent, and therefore more precise neologism: “Russky Orthodox.”

¹⁷ See especially: Skinner, *The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in 18th-century Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia*.

¹⁸ John-Paul Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: the Greek Catholic Church and Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900*, McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Religion. Series Two (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 73-78; Włodzimierz Osadczy, *Święta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej Europejskie Kolegium Polskich i Ukraińskich Uniwersytetów Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2007), 246-55. Because Bukovina had largely escaped incorporation into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Unia agreements had not taken hold there. At the time of its incorporation into the Austrian Empire (1775) Bukovina's Eastern Christians were Eastern Orthodox. They largely remained so through the turn of twentieth century. As with their counterparts in Galicia and Subcarpathia, the residents of Bukovina have been referred to as “Rusyn,” “Ukrainian,” and “Russian” (among other designations).

¹⁹ Skinner, *The Western Front of the Eastern Church: Uniate and Orthodox Conflict in 18th-century Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia*, 35. The Orthodox churches which had resisted the Unia agreements in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the sixteenth century had been under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitanate of Kyiv, which was itself subordinate to the Patriarch of Constantinople, rather than to the Patriarch of Moscow. However, in 1685, with the subordination of the Metropolitanate of Kyiv to the Patriarch of Moscow, adherence to Orthodoxy within the Commonwealth “now had political implications that added to the confessional divide” between Uniates and Greek Catholics. In 1721, the reforms of Peter the Great, which replaced the Moscow patriarchate with the Holy Synod, a college of bishops with a secular servant of the state (an *uberprocurator*/chief procurator), lent further political import to pro-Orthodox movements.

²⁰ Although the 129 prospective converts in Hnylychky addressed their declarations of conversion to the bishop in Chernivtsi, Austrian Bukovina (not the Holy Synod or a bishop in the Russian Empire), a prominent Galician Russophile, Father Ioann Naumovych, facilitated their conversion, and the ensuing trial focused upon Russian influences in the conversions. Constituents of a number of other conversion movements with which this study is concerned in Austria-Hungary also addressed their requests for conversion to Orthodox bishops in Austria-Hungary (i.e., non- Russky Orthodox bishops)—but Austria-Hungary nevertheless feared, with justification, that Russia was behind the conversions.

Following the Hnylychky incident and Austria-Hungary's repression of Russophilism, including Russky Orthodox movements, a new catalyst emerged to promote conversion: transatlantic migration. As part of the so-called "New Immigration" of the late nineteenth century, Greek Catholics began migrating between Eastern Europe and the Americas in the 1870s and on a large scale by the 1880s. They came first to the United States (1870s), then to Canada (early-1890s), then Brazil (mid-1890s), and Argentina (late-1890s). Formal conversions of Greek Catholic migrants to the Russky Orthodox Church, entailing mass declarations within Greek Catholic parishes, began in the United States in 1890-91. The movements spread across the United States and reached Canada by 1897. By 1901, converted remigrants brought Russky Orthodox conversion movements to a village in northern Hungarian Subcarpathia, and by 1903 remigrants were also spreading conversions in numerous eastern Subcarpathian villages.

Compelling evidence suggests that by that same year, migrants who converted in Canada had spread the movement to eastern Galicia, probably through correspondence. In the meantime, the movement had spread from Subcarpathia to Argentina, when some of the converted returnees from the United States, sojourning only briefly in their Subcarpathian village of origin, set out again across the Atlantic Ocean for Argentina, where they helped establish a convert parish, contributing also to the dissemination of the conversions to several other Argentine regions inhabited by Greek Catholic migrants. By 1908, emissaries associated with the Argentine conversions also missioned to Brazil's Greek Catholic migrants. By then, migrants had begun returning from the United States to western Galicia's Lemko region as Russky Orthodox converts and proselytizers. Thus, by the first decade of the twentieth century, Greek Catholic-to-Russky Orthodox conversions were unfolding in multiple localities within the United

States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Hungarian Subcarpathia, and Austrian Galicia.²¹ The movements all exhibited direct, causal linkages to one another, through the phenomenon of transnational migration.²²

The most dramatic developments in these transnational conversions commenced in the winter of 1911-12. At that time, the first mass movement related to returning converts awakened in Galicia's Lemko region, while simultaneously the movements in eastern Galicia and Hungarian Subcarpathia (dating back to 1903) revived. The new and resuscitated movements resulted in the arrest of "agitators" (clerics, journalists, and students) as well as incarceration of hundreds of peasants and harassment of many more. In 1913-14, the Austro-Hungarian government staged two massive, well-publicized treason trials in Maramorosh Sighet, Hungary, and in Lviv, Galicia. Prosecutors charged activists and converts with acting in the interest of the neighboring Russian Empire by promoting "Russian" conversion, espionage, and spying. It was these trials which so enflamed relations between diplomats in Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and elsewhere, and contributed to heated international press feuds, shortly before the outbreak of the Great War: Gavrillo Princip's June 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the ostensible spark igniting the "powder keg of Europe," came just two weeks after the Lviv trial's conclusion. The interrelation between the trials and the war's origins was no more incidental than that which tied migration to conversion.

The outbreak of war in August 1914 marks the chronological terminal point of this study, for the war effected dramatic transformations upon both migration and conversions. Migration between Eastern Europe and the Americas diminished considerably (though not completely) 1914-18; conversions on either side of the Atlantic Ocean thus developed more (though not completely) independently of one another. Transnational conversions, 1890-1914, however, produced an enduring legacy. Within a few months of the war's beginning, Russia's army annexed Galicia and occupied a small portion of

²¹ For maps of these regions, see Appendix A. For delineations of "Subcarpathia" and the "Lemko region," see Appendix C.

²² This constitutes one of the major innovative arguments of this study. The existing secondary literature has noted causal connections between movements in a few of these regions, but none have provided the entire picture.

Subcarpathia. Russian statesmen justified this action with the same claims that had so troubled Austro-Hungarian statesmen before the war: Galicia's and Subcarpathia's inhabitants were "Russian"—identifiable by their Orthodox faith—and therefore inhabited territories belonging rightfully to the Russian Empire. In the occupied regions, the promotion by Russian statesmen and churchmen of further conversions resulted in more rapid proliferation and greater numbers of converts than before the war, when conversion generally prompted decisive Austro-Hungarian repression. After the war's conclusion in 1918, redrawn international borders placed Eastern Europe's Greek Catholics primarily in the new Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hundreds of thousands of them began joining the conversion movements begun some forty years earlier through transatlantic migration. Ongoing ties with migrants in the Americas also factored in the East European conversions of the 1920s and 1930s. Additionally, complementing religious implications, Ukrainian national consciousness, during its formative period prior to 1914, emerged largely in conversation with the perceived Russky/Russian orientation of Orthodox converts.

As for the Americas, the events of 1890-1914 also produced impacts long after August 1914. Greek Catholic parishes in the Americas continued re-affiliating in significant numbers as Russky Orthodox during the war. The Bolshevik Revolution led to divisions within the Russky Orthodox Church in the Americas, after 1917, just as in the new Soviet Republic; while those divisions preoccupied the Russky Orthodox in the Americas, Greek Catholic conversions nevertheless continued, matched by Greek Catholic counter-responses. The last major outbreak of Greek Catholic conversions to the Russky Orthodox Church took place in the United States beginning in the late 1930s, and the ethnonational character of the conversions in the period 1890-1914 shaped those latter-day conversions, as well: reacting against the ostensibly Russian orientation of their predecessors, these Greek Catholics formed a new Orthodox jurisdiction, the American Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, under the slogan, *Ani do Rym do Moskvy*—"neither to Rome nor Moscow."

1.2 FIELDS OF CONTRIBUTION

This study of Greek Catholic migrants and Russky Orthodox conversion movements, 1890-1914, contributes especially to five fields of research: (1) transnational migration studies; (2) race, ethnicity, and nationhood; (3) the historiography of Catholicism and Orthodoxy; (4) theories of conversion; and (5) the origins of World War I.

“Transnational Conversions” represents, first and foremost, a major advance in the study of migration and religion: especially transnational migrant religion, and in particular the dual phenomena of conversion and counter-conversion among transnational migrants. It joins a small but growing body of literature in asserting the importance of religion in transnational migration studies.²³ By coincidence, the terms which Russky Orthodox partisans and Greek Catholic loyalists employed during the period 1890-1914 to describe conversion also referred to migration: in particular, the terms “*perekhodyty*” and “*vernuty*.” Most Greek Catholic loyalists used the term “*perekhodyty*”²⁴ to describe the act of “conversion” to the Russky Orthodox Church, most frequently in the construction “*perekhodyty do skhizmu*”—to convert to schism. Literally meaning “to pass over,” the verb “*perekhodyty*” could signify

²³ Helen Rose Fuchs Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz, *Religion across Borders: Transnational Immigrant Networks* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2002). Other works on transnational religion include: Kenneth J. Guest, *God in Chinatown: Religion and Survival in New York's Evolving Immigrant Community*, Religion, Race, and Ethnicity (New York: New York University Press, 2003); Suna Gülfer Ihlamur, "The Romanian Orthodox Churches in Italy: The Construction of Romanian-Italian Transnational Orthodox Space" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Trento, 2009); Lisa DiCarlo, *Migrating to America: Transnational Social Networks and Regional Identity Among Turkish Migrants* (London; New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008). Also see the collection of essays in the special edition of *Latin American Perspectives* 32, 1: “Religion and Identity in the Americas.” For a survey of post-1965 immigrant religion in the United States, including studies of transnational religion, see: Wendy Cadge and Elaine Howard Ecklund, "Immigration and Religion," *Annual Review of Sociology* 33(2007): 359-79. Ebaugh and Chafetz provided some explanations for the lack of attention to transnational religion: the lack of government data on religion, surveys which fail to include sufficient numbers of small populations, the anti-religious bias of social scientists in general, the anti-religious (anti-colonial) bias of insider social scientists, and the absence of large numbers of insider social scientists. The last two observations reveal that the authors generally do not acknowledge earlier eras of transnationalism. Helen Rose Fuchs Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz, *Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2000), 15.

²⁴ Past tense: “*perekhodyly*.”

both “to convert” and “to migrate.” Thus, Greek Catholic migrants who “*perekhodyly do Ameryky*,” around the turn of the twentieth century, also “*perekhodyly do skhizmu*.” They “passed over” (converted) to the Russky Orthodox Church, even as they “passed over” (migrated) to the Americas.²⁵

Russky Orthodox partisans, on the other hand, preferred the term “*vernuty*,”²⁶ to “*perekhodyty*,” in describing the act of conversion from Greek Catholicism. “*Vernuty*” literally meant “to return,” and many converts claimed that they “*vernuly do Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Viry*,” they “returned to the Russky Orthodox faith” of their ancestors. Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox partisans alike also frequently used “*vernuty*” to refer to a form of migration critical to this study: remigration. At the 1913-14 trial in Marmorosh Sighet, Hungarian Subcarpathia, the lawyers defending Russky Orthodox converts from charges of treason denied that “agents” from the Russian Empire had caused Austria-Hungary’s mass conversions; rather, they attributed the conversions to the remigration of converted labor migrants from the Americas. As one argued, “The poverty of the population compels them to emigrate to America, where Uhro-Rusyns come into contact with the Orthodox and realize that against their will were they torn from the faith of their ancestors. *Returning* [to their region of migratory origin], they are trying to *return* to Orthodoxy...”²⁷ Similarly, in 1912, a Greek Catholic priest employed the verb “*vernuty*” in this dual sense, in his description of the *reversion* of many converted, Russky Orthodox migrants to Greek Catholicism, upon remigration across the Atlantic Ocean to Austrian Galicia. “Until not long ago,” he noted, “those accepting Orthodoxy in America and *returning* to their native side, *returned* again, with few exceptions, to the bosom of the holy Catholic Church.”²⁸

²⁵ “*Ameryka*” signified regions in North and South America, not just the United States. See Appendix C.

²⁶ Past tense: “*vernuly*.”

²⁷ Grabets, *K istorii Marmoroshskago protsessia: dielo 94*. Emphasis mine. Grabets’s secondary work is in Russian and used two different terms for “return”: *vozraschatsya* and *vernutysya*. The lawyers would originally have used Hungarian terms in court. In the language of the converts, themselves, *vernuty* would have been the term of choice for both concepts (remigration and conversion). By “Uhro-Rusyns,” the lawyer meant to indicate Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox converts originally from the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy.

²⁸ Zhuk, “Letter to Bp. Konstantyn,” *ABGK* syg. 437, 126-27, 41. Emphasis mine. The two forms of *vernuty* were “*vernuayuchy*” (participial) and “*vernuly*” (past tense). Father Zhuk’s point was that, by 1912, these remigrants had, instead of “returning” to their native Greek Catholicism, begun converting en masse to the Russky Orthodox Church.

Thus, “*perechodyty*” and “*vernuty*” could and did each refer to both conversion and migration. One could just as easily translate the phrase, “*perekhodshi perekhodtsi*” as “converting migrants” or, alternatively, as “migrating converts;” by the same token, it would be possible to translate “*vernuvshi vernuvtsi*” either as “remigrating converts” or as “converting remigrants.” This terminological coincidence—although only a coincidence—is nevertheless suggestive of the central argument of this study. Far more than terminological multivalence connected the turn-of-the-century migrations and conversions of Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox. It is impossible to understand the conversions in either the Americas or Eastern Europe without considering the context of transnational migration; furthermore, the conversions reflexively shaped the dynamics of transnational migration.

Not only were the conversions “transnational,” features of those conversions also demand revisions to existing models of migrant transnationalism. The emerging field of transnational migration studies has been an interdisciplinary one: cultural anthropologists were its pioneers, but sociologists, political scientists, economists, historians, and recently religionists have contributed to the literature.²⁹ Partly due to diffusion across many disciplines, “transnationalism” has suffered from definitional ambiguity.³⁰ The vanguard work on transnationalism, *Nations Unbound*, defined its subject as:

the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, and political borders. Immigrants who develop and maintain

²⁹ For key works on transnational migration, see: Linda G. Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, Cristina Szanton Blanc, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-states* (Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach, 1994); Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, “Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration,” in *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered* (New York: Academy of Sciences, 1992); Thomas Faist, *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Alejandro Portes, “Introduction: The Debates and Significance of Immigrant Transnationalism,” *Global Networks* 1, no. 3 (December 2002); Alejandro Portes, “The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 2 (March 1999). For overviews of transnationalism studies, see: Peggy and B. Nadya Jaworsky Levitt, “Transnational Migration Studies: Past Developments and Future Trends,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 33 (August, 2007): 129-56; Peter Kivisto, “Theorizing Transnational Immigration: A Critical Review of Current Efforts,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24, no. 4 (2001): 549-77; Steven Vertovec, “Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 2 (March 1999): 447-62.

³⁰ On the myriad uses of the term, see: Kiran Patel, *Nach der Nationalfixiertheit: Perspektiven einer transnationalen Geschichte* (Berlin 2004), 5-7. Perhaps the least helpful usage has been as a synonym of “globalization.”

multiple relationships—familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political—that span borders we call ‘transmigrants.’ An essential element of transnationalism is the multiplicity of involvements that transmigrants sustain in both home and host societies.³¹

Broadly speaking, this statement has provided definitional parameters of “transnationalism” for many migration scholars, and it also informs my usage in this study.³² Transmigrants “live across borders.” Ties between sending and receiving regions develop through kin and friend networks, migrant organizations, political associations, and other arenas, sometimes achieving such a strength and density that migratory sending and receiving regions constitute “a single arena of social action.”³³

The current study emphasizes the persisting ties, which migrants between Austria-Hungary and the Americas established between these regions, insofar as they facilitated the mutual influence of Russky Orthodox conversions movements, as well as Greek Catholic counter-conversion movements, between all relevant regions. Migrants maintained such connections through written correspondence and especially through return migration and multiple remigrations. Once remigrants and corresponding migrants influenced their Austro-Hungarian regions of origin with the “social remittances” of Russky Orthodox conversions, that impact reciprocally influenced the Americas, via governmental and ecclesiastical interventions, as well as subsequent migrations, directed from Austria-Hungary toward the Americas.³⁴ Once *those* influences modified circumstances in the Americas, new reverberations echoed across the ocean to Austria-Hungary yet again, in a dialectical process. For this reason, not only were converting migrants “transnational,” so too were the conversion and counter-conversion movements of which migrants were constituents.

³¹ Basch, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-states*, 7.

³² I indicate my disagreements with other aspects of the *Nations Unbound* argument elsewhere.

³³ Maxine Margolis, “Transnationalism and Popular Culture: The Case of Brazilian Immigrants in the United States,” *Journal of Popular Culture* 29, no. 1 (1995): 29.

³⁴ Peggy Levitt has defined social remittances as “the ideas, behaviors, and social capital that flow from receiving to sending communities.” Peggy Levitt, *The Transnational Villagers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Peggy Levitt, “Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion,” *International Migration Review* 32, no. 4 (Winter, 1998): 926-48; Peggy Levitt and Deepak Lamba-Nieves, “Social Remittances Revisited,” *International Migration Review* (under consideration).

Speaking of turn-of-the-century “transnational conversions” among Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholic migrants, their kin, and friends calls for the rectification of three deficiencies within transnationalism studies: relative inattention to late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century migration, the retention of the nation-state as a primary unit of analysis, and insufficient consideration of the religious factor in migrant transnationalism. Most research has deemed the category of transnationalism applicable only to recent waves of migration (specifically, for scholars focusing upon U.S. migration, waves following the relaxation of immigration laws in 1965). Yet the major causal and facilitating factors, as well as characteristic forms of contemporary transnationalism, prevailed also during the era of mass migration, beginning in the late-nineteenth century. Improving communication and travel technologies—including proliferating railroad networks, steamship travel, and the telegraph—facilitated transnationalism by expediting the transfer of people and correspondence between disparate locations. Major causal factors for contemporary transnationalism, discernible before 1900, included a global system of inequity, in which migrants from economically peripheral regions (Galicia and Subcarpathia, in this case) traveled, frequently only temporarily, to economically exploitative core regions (the Americas), where they encountered racialized prejudice and socioeconomic marginalization (in this case, on the basis of perceived “Slav” racial identity).³⁵ The current study contributes to a handful of studies, which have begun to shift the chronological parameters of transnationalism backward, to the late-nineteenth century.³⁶

³⁵ The *Nations Unbound* group appeared to argue that this development had only occurred in the latter part of the twentieth century.

³⁶ This critique of transnationalism as a “new” phenomenon relies largely upon: Ewa Morawska, “Immigrants, Transnationalism, and Ethnicization: A Comparison of This Great Wave and the Last,” in *In E Pluribus Unum? Contemporary and Historical Perspectives on Immigrant Political Incorporation*, ed. Gary Gerstle and John Mollenkopf (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001). For studies of “old transnationalism,” see: Nancy Foner, *From Ellis Island to JFK: New York’s Two Great Waves of Immigration* (New Haven; New York: Yale University Press; Russell Sage Foundation, 2000); Christiane Harzig and Dick Hoerder, “Transnationalism and the Age of Mass Migration, 1880s to 1920s,” in *Transnational Identities and Practices in Canada*, ed. Vic Satzewich and Lloyd Wong (Vancouver; Toronto: UBC Press, 2006); Donna R. Gabaccia, *Italy’s Many Diasporas*, Global Diasporas (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000); Adam McKeown, *Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural*

Secondly, a focus upon transnationalism in an age of empires (1890-1914) bolsters criticism of the reliance in *transnationalism* studies upon the nation-state as the unit of analysis. The nation-state frequently has had little to do with the manner in which migrants engaged in supposedly “transnational” behaviors. The individuals in this study did not necessarily identify with “nations” exhibiting statehood (e.g., “Rus” or “Ukraine”). Some identified with multi-national states (the Austro-Hungarian or Russian Empires), undifferentiated multi-state regions (“America”/the Americas), sub-regions (Galicia, Hungary), sub-sub-regions (the Lemko region, Subcarpathia) or far more narrowly with villages of origin or towns and cities of destination. Of course, some simply called themselves “*tuteshni*,” the “people from here.” Even the suggestion that migrant identifications have transcended an individual nation-state (“nations unbound”), by extending to a second (or third, or fourth...) nation-state, relies upon nation-states at the poles. Alternate terms, such as “transregionalism,” “translocalism,” or “transculturalism,” are probably preferable to “transnationalism,” though the current study does retain the latter term, given its currency in the literature.³⁷

Thirdly, this study contributes to the minimal body of research analyzing transnational migrant religion. While that literature has expanded over the last decade, much work remains to be done, especially—given the neglect “old” transnationalism in general—transnational migrant religion in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Religious conversion provides an especially fertile subject area for consideration within the framework of migrant transnationalism, given comparable paradigm shifts within the fields of migration studies and conversion studies. The multivalence of the emic terms *perekhodyty* (“to move,” “to migrate,” “to convert”) and *vernuty* (“to return,” “to remigrate,” “to revert”) underscores the analogical connections between migration and conversion. Like migrants, converts have frequently been depicted as “journeying” from one “place” to another, leaving one religious sphere

Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii, 1900-1936 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001); Rebecca Kobrin, *Jewish Bialystok and Its Diaspora, The Modern Jewish Experience* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

³⁷ Dick Hoerder, "From Interest-Driven National Discourse to Transcultural Societal Studies," in *From the Study of Canada to Canadian Studies: To Know our Many Selves Changing across Time and Space*, ed. Hoerder (Augsburg: 2005), 316-25; Matthew Frye Jacobson, "More 'Trans-' Less 'National'," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 25, no. 4 (Summer, 2006): 74-84.

behind and moving to a separate one, altogether: a conception particularly apparent in the common portrayal of conversion as “pilgrimage.” Intriguingly, just as migration scholars have critiqued the validity of the “uprooted” paradigm—for older as well as more recent migration waves—scholars of conversion have also increasingly challenged prevailing depictions of conversion as a complete, radical, and decisive break.³⁸ It is frequently possible to discern substantial continuities underlying the apparent transformation entailed by conversion. Converts, like migrants, can exhibit persisting ties to where they “came from.” As the current study demonstrates, such continuities persist even for converts within supposedly more exclusivist “Western” religious traditions, like Christianity, and even between Christianity’s purportedly more exclusivist forms, like Catholicism and Orthodoxy.

Neither migration nor conversion represented absolute ruptures for many Greek Catholic migrants who affiliated as Russky Orthodox, who frequently underwent no major changes in religious practices or preferred terms of self-identification. In addition to participating in virtually identical rituals, some continued to call themselves “Greek Catholic” after converting (a practice embraced by the Russky Orthodox Church), while others, who had always called themselves “orthodox/Orthodox” before converting despite official designation as “Greek Catholic,” simply continued to do so afterward. Many migrants, in fact, freely traversed back and forth across the ostensible Greek Catholic/Russky Orthodoxy divide concurrently with multiple trans-Atlantic journeys: not a few who attended Russky Orthodox parishes in the Americas rejoined native Greek Catholic parishes, during remigrations or sojourns to East European villages of origin, only later to rejoin Russky Orthodox parishes in the Americas. Individuals, who by their migratory behaviors minimized the separation between *regions* of origin and destination, often perceived no great distinction between *religions* of origin and destination. Therefore, in addition to expanding current understandings of transnational migrant religion, this study also makes a substantial contribution to the study of religious conversion.

³⁸ See [Chapter Four, Section Two](#).

Equally as important as the religious element, Greek Catholic-to-Rusky Orthodox conversions exhibited racial, ethnic, and national dimensions. Some equated conversion to the Orthodox Church with “conversion” from “Rusyn” or “Ukrainian” to “Russian.” Others converted to Orthodoxy partly due to a belief that remaining Greek Catholic would result in their “conversion” into “Hungarians,” “Ukrainians,” or “Poles.” Discourses of race/ethnicity/nationhood in each of the major regions under consideration (Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Americas) interacted through processes of migration. These discourses influenced migratory practices, including migrant transnationalism, and influenced decisions of Greek Catholic migrants to undergo Rusky Orthodox conversion. Thus, some of the same forces prompting ethnoreligious conversions facilitated their dissemination throughout multiple regions.

As a contribution to the study of race, ethnicity, and nationhood, the current study synthesizes regional scholarly variations in the treatment of these discourses, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Americas, together with analysis of interactions with religious identifications.³⁹ Especially since the 1980s, the proliferation of broadly comparative studies of race, ethnicity, and nationhood have undermined “neat distinctions” between these categories, otherwise logical when limited to one region: “race” means one thing in Brazil and another in the United States; the definition of “nation” in Eastern Europe bears little resemblance to that in Canada.⁴⁰ Chronological variations complement regional ones: scholars in the United States only began speaking of “ethnicity,” rather than “race” or “nation” in the 1950s, just as the term “*natio*/nation” shifted over hundreds of years in the East European context. Following the work of sociologist Rogers Brubaker, this study’s cognitive approach treats race, ethnicity, and nationhood not as things “*in* the world” but as perspectives “*on* the world.”⁴¹ Approached in this

³⁹ “Nationhood” is Rogers Brubaker’s term: it is preferable to “nationalism” in that it avoids the pejorative connotations associated with that term in the social sciences. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁴⁰ Rogers Brubaker, Mara Loveman, and Peter Stamatov, “Ethnicity as Cognition,” *Theory and Society* 33, no. 1 (February, 2004): 47.

⁴¹ According to Brubaker and his collaborators, “What cognitive perspectives suggest, in short, is that race, ethnicity, and nation are not things in the world but ways of seeing the world. They are ways of understanding and identifying oneself, making sense of one’s problems and predicaments, identifying one’s interests, and orienting one’s action. They are ways of recognizing, identifying, and classifying other people, of constructing sameness and

way, race, ethnicity, and nationhood comprise elements of a single classificatory domain—differentiated, perhaps, therein, but not so neatly as to warrant three “clearly bounded subdomains.”⁴²

Several concepts are central to this study’s synthesis of regional variations on race/ethnicity/nationhood: whiteness, whitening, and ethnicism. Critical whiteness studies, a field which takes as its primary subject the system of privilege based upon membership in the category of “white,” informs this study’s interpretation of racial classifications of migrants in the Americas (the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina).⁴³ Two key sub-arguments within critical whiteness studies about late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century migrants are of particular relevance, dealing respectively with North and South America. In North America, many individuals now perceived as white by dominant United States and Canadian society, did not enjoy that status at the time of initial arrival. Southern and East European migrants of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were, in fact, regarded as both racially new and inferior, prompting some whiteness historians to employ descriptors such as “off-white,” “not-quite-white,” and “in-between peoples.”⁴⁴ Only after many years, and as both mainstream and

difference, and of 'coding' and making sense of their action. They are templates for representing and organizing social knowledge, frames for articulating social comparisons and explanations, and filters that shape what is noticed or unnoticed, relevant or irrelevant, remembered or forgotten.” Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 47-48. Although this study considers race, ethnicity and nationhood together as ways of perceiving, it does not go as far as adopting Brubaker’s suggestion to subsume all three terms into one category (“ethnicity”). As a matter of convention, this study retains terms like “national” (as opposed to “racial” or “ethnic”) to describe movements which resulted in the “Springtime of Nations,” just as it refers to discussions of “black” and “white” in the United States as “racial” ones (as opposed to “ethnic” or “national”). At the same time however, it attempts to call into question the implied assumptions of those categories, such as the notion that commentators who deployed the term “race” meant then what today people call “ethnicity,” or that “Polish-Ukrainian” “national” (or “ethnic”?) conflicts differed fundamentally from “racial” disharmony between “blacks” and “whites.”

⁴³ The best and most popular early theories of whiteness were economic arguments, generally issuing from the field of labor history. David Roediger argued that class relations within American capitalism engendered racial distinctions among so-called “white ethnics:” competition for scarce resources led to hierarchization by race. David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class*, The Haymarket series (London ; New York: Verso, 1991). For a collection of important critiques of whiteness studies—the slipperiness of the definition of whiteness, the lack of grounding in archival sources, the misuse of De Bois’s concept of “the psychological wage,” the lack of attention of whiteness scholars to other important categories of self-understanding (e.g., “nationality”), and the possibility for whiteness studies to devolve into mere identity politics—see the discussion in: “Whiteness and the Historians’ Imagination: Vol. 60 of International Labor and Working-Class History. (October 2001).”

⁴⁴ Irving M. Abella and Harold Martin Troper, *None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948* (Toronto, Ont.: L. & O. Dennys, 1986); John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965); Valerie Knowles, *Strangers at our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2006* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007); Donald Avery, “European

migrant racial attitudes shifted reflexively, did the so-called “new immigrants” achieve perceptual racial homogeneity with dominant white American and Canadian societies.⁴⁵

Insights of whiteness historians regarding “in-between peoples” arriving to North America hold considerable explanatory value for turn-of-the-twentieth-century migrant transnationalism, though many transnationalism scholars have ignored these findings. Conceding that transnationalism emerged—especially among post-1965 migrants from the Global South—partially in response to inequities of white privilege and socioeconomic marginalization of “non-whites,” they have largely failed to note comparable (though by no means identical) racial discrimination directed at Southern and Eastern Europe’s late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century migrants to North America. They, too, sought alternative sources of economic and social capital through ties to regions of origin.

Notwithstanding the racial undertones of the mandate to “people the prairies” of Canada with “men in sheepskin coats”—already peopled, as they were, by indigenous populations—a more powerful racialized “pull” force prevailed in South America, where relatively highly regarded European migrants served governmental initiatives to “whiten” Brazil and Argentina.⁴⁶ Conditions in regions of destination, however—inhabitable climates, poor farming conditions, threatened and hostile indigenous populations, and escalating doses of popular nativism—all contributed to migrant transnationalism south of the

Immigrant Workers and Labour Protest in Peace and War, 1896-1919," in *The History of Immigration and Racism in Canada: Essential Readings*, ed. Barrington Walker (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2008); Donald Avery, *Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); Harzig and Hoerder, "Transnationalism and the Age of Mass Migration, 1880s to 1920s."

⁴⁵ For works in this vein, see: Thomas A. Guglielmo, *White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (New York: Routledge, 1995); Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). For the most forceful argument about “Slav” whiteness, see: David R. Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White (The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs)* (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

⁴⁶ Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1993 [1974]); Thomas E. Skidmore, "Racial Ideas and Social Policy in Brazil, 1870-1940," in *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940*, ed. Richard Graham (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990); Aline Helg, "Race in Argentina and Cuba, 1880-1930: Theory, Policies, and Popular Reaction," in *The Idea of Race in Latin America, 1870-1940*, ed. Richard Graham, *Critical Reflections on Latin America Series* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990).

equator.⁴⁷ In both hemispheres of the Americas, it is necessary to identify specific ethnic/national/racial perceptions operative upon late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century migration waves, the impact for migrant transnationalism, and the interrelationship of those categories with religious ones.

While ethnicity and race have been foremost in North American discourse, ethnicity and *nation* has factored more prominently in East European scholarship.⁴⁸ The works of sociologist Rogers Brubaker and historian Jeremy King especially inform the current study's methodological approach.⁴⁹ Modernist scholars of nationalism have for some time pointed to the constructed, conditioned character of *nations*.⁵⁰ Yet, as King notes in his critique of "ethnicism," historians continue to refer to *ethnic* groups as bounded entities that actually existed, in periods well before the construction of those identifications had matured.⁵¹ King relied upon Brubaker's trenchant critique of "groupism:" "the tendency to take bounded groups as fundamental units of analysis (and basic constituents of the social world)." Brubaker has advocated "relational, dynamic, and processional" treatments of how ethnicity works, "not only, or even especially, in and through bounded groups, but in and through categories, schemas, encounters, identifications, languages, stories, institutions, organizations, networks, and events."⁵²

⁴⁷ However, in Brazil and Argentina, too, migrants eventually encountered racialized hostilities

⁴⁸ Ethnicity and nation have factored in America as well, but there "nation" is generally used synonymously with "country," such that the issue is the compatibility of ethnic consciousness with "national" unity (that of the American state) and citizenship: i.e., debates between cultural pluralism and assimilation schools. As Brubaker has noted, in typologies of race, ethnicity, and nationalism, formulated in the United States, nationalism is something that "happens elsewhere." (Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov, "Ethnicity as Cognition," 47.)

⁴⁹ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Jeremy King, "The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond," in *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present*, ed. Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Central European Studies* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2001).

⁵⁰ Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition, Past and Present Publications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

⁵¹ King, "The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond." King attempted to rectify the historical obscuration of terms such as "Czechs" and "Germans" to describe eighteenth- and nineteenth-century residents of the town of Budweis. Jeremy King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002). For another study in this vein, see: Tara Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis," *Slavic Review* 69, no. 1 (Spring 2010).

⁵² Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*, 3.

The work of these two scholars bears affinities with constructivist literature on American ethnicity and race; indeed, contrary to popular perceptions, East European ethnicity hardly represents a stable, enduring counterpart to the supposedly more fluid, constructed, ephemeral ethnicity of the North American context. Ethnic institutions and organizations ought not to be confused with the existence of bounded ethnic groups, either historically or in the present, either in Europe or the Americas. That among people under consideration in this study, even ethnic institutions (churches, fraternal benefit societies, schools and other organizations) exhibited fluid, shifting, and permeable boundaries only further underscores the need for caution when discerning ethnic groups in reality.⁵³ This study, therefore, avoids either positing groups or ascribing names (“Ukrainians,” “Rusyns,” “Russians,” etc.), whether to groups or the individuals supposedly comprising such groups. Instead, the focus rests upon how groupist language and various identifications actually functioned in the context of Greek-Catholic-to-Rusky-Orthodox conversions.

Notwithstanding the world historical significance of the conversions treated in this study (i.e., their contribution to the origins of World War I), they have remained obscure and unfamiliar to most scholars, outside a circle of specialists within the fields of Rusyn, Ukrainian, Russian, and Slovak history, or of Russian Orthodox and Greek Catholic history.⁵⁴ That circle, however, has generated a veritable cottage industry of publications on the subject. At least twenty monographs and numerous articles in at least ten different languages have devoted sustained attention to the conversions taking place between 1890 and 1914, in one region or another.⁵⁵ I have relied considerably upon the insights of many of these

⁵³ While Brubaker is a constructivist, he criticized the employment of “clichéd constructivism”—marked by buzz words such as “fluid,” “shifting,” and “negotiated”—alongside the persistent usage of “groupist” language.

⁵⁴ Within today’s iterations of the Rusky Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches (e.g., the Orthodox Church in America, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the Byzantine Catholic Church), the clerical elite are often familiar with the conversions in some of these regions. Although there are, of course, exceptions and variations by parish, diocese, church, and region, many of the laity are generally unfamiliar with this history.

⁵⁵ The number of languages depends, naturally, upon what exactly one wishes to count as a language. I have found secondary works written in modern-day English, Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, Hungarian, Slovak, French, Spanish,

and German, as well as less universally recognized languages/dialects: Rusyn, Lemko, and the “Ukrainian-Russian” hybrid used by many Russophiles (the “Russky” language).

With important exceptions, the existing works on the conversions, themselves, have tended to emphasize one region or another in which the conversions took place, one ethnonational group or another, or one religious tradition or another. Some studies have focused almost exclusively upon conversions in the United States, others on those in Subcarpathia, and still others on the movements in Galicia, Canada, or Argentina. I am unaware of any study that has given substantial attention to conversions in Brazil. A few studies have attempted to treat the conversions in more than one region. Some of these have done so only in very cursory fashion, either as a prologue, an afterword, a side note, or an afterthought. Those studies which have given equal and significant attention to more than one region have expanded that sustained focus to, at most, two regions. The current study follows the lead of those works as important precedents and incorporates many of their findings; this study represents an advance in that it focuses upon the mutual, transatlantic influence of conversions and counter-conversion efforts in seven major regions (the United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Galicia, Subcarpathia, and the Russian Empire). It also more briefly considers conversion movements in England and Serbia, as well as the influence of Austrian Bukovina. Of all the “American” regions (the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina), the conversions in the United States have generated the most substantial literature.

Works dealing with the United States have generally focused upon the conversions of migrant Greek Catholics from either Galicia or Subcarpathia, or both. Works dealing with the conversions primarily in the United States include: Paul R. Magocsi, *Our People: Carpatho-Rusyns and Their Descendants in North America*, 4th rev. ed. (Wauconda, Ill.: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2005); Walter C. Warzeski, *Byzantine rite Rusins in Carpatho-Ruthenia and America* (Pittsburgh: Byzantine Seminary Press, 1971); Myron B. Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954* (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Konstantin S.J. Simon, "The First Years of Ruthenian Church Life in America," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 60, no. 1 (1994); John Slivka, *Historical Mirror: Sources of the Rusin and Hungarian Greek Rite Catholics in the United States of America (1884-1963)* (Brooklyn, New York); Mark Stokoe and Leonid Kishkovsky, *Orthodox Christians in North America 1794-1994* (Syosset, NY: Orthodox Christian Publications Center, 1995). A few studies have attended more specifically to the biography of Father Alexis Toth and his role in the conversions in Minneapolis and Wilkes-Barre. See: Keith S. Russin, "The Right Reverend Alexis G. Toth and the Religious Hybrid" (St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 1971); Keith S. Russin, "Father Alexis G. Toth and the Wilkes-Barre Litigations," *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly* 16(1972); Keith P. Dyrud, "East Slavs: Rusins, Ukrainians, Russians, and Belorussians," in *They Chose Minnesota: A Survey of the State's Ethnic Groups*, ed. June Drenning Holmquist, *Publications of the Minnesota Historical Society* (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1981); Konstantin S.J. Simon, "Alexis Toth and the Beginnings of the Orthodox Movement among the Ruthenians in America (1891)," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 54, no. 2 (1988); Michael Palij, "Early Ukrainian Immigration to the United States and the Conversion of the Ukrainian Catholic Parish in Minneapolis to Russian Orthodoxy," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 8 no. 2 (Winter 1983); Dellas Oliver Herbel, "Turning to Tradition: Intra-Christian Converts and the Making of an American Orthodox Church" (Ph.D. dissertation, Saint Louis University, 2009). Most of these studies of the conversions in the United States have, after providing an overview of the “old country” as historical background, dealt exclusively with the United States. To my knowledge, while a few of these works made some reference to the remittance of conversions to Austria-Hungary, none of them considered the movements in the United States together with those in Canada or South America. An exception, perhaps, can be found in: George Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, 4 vols., vol. 4 (Chilliwack, British Columbia: Synaxis Press, 1988), 64, n. 3. Soldatow's text, which is a sourcebook of Father Alexis Toth's writings, not a history of the conversions in the United States, includes in a footnote a reference to converted migrants who returned to Subcarpathia from the United States, then migrated once again to Argentina, where they became founding members of the conversion movement there.

The origins of the conversion movements in Canada were clearly tied to the Russky Orthodox Church in the United States, insofar as the first convert parishes were staffed by priests who came from the United States (after having originally migrated from Russia and Austria-Hungary, themselves). Accordingly, several works detailing the history of the Canadian conversions have provided a sense of connections between the Canadian and United States context. Orest T. Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1991); David J. Goa, ed. *The Ukrainian Religious Experience: Tradition and the Canadian Cultural Context* (Edmonton and Downsview, Ontario: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies;

Distributed by University of Toronto Press, 1989); Vadim Kukushkin, *Ukrainian and Belarusian Immigration from the Russian Empire to Canada* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007). Only recently have the conversions in South America received sustained attention. Serge Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community* (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS Press, 2011 (forthcoming)). For other works dealing less substantially with the conversions in Argentina, see: Andrii A. Strilko, "Z istorii diialnosti tserkovnykiv sered ukrainskykh immihrantiv u Latynskii Amerytsi," *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal* 7 (1973); Iakiv Lavrychenkom, "80-richchia ukrainskoi emigratsii v Argentyni i Ukrainska Avtokefalna Pravoslavna Tserkva," *Litopys Volyni*, 15 (1988); Bishop Andrii Sapeliak, *Ukrainska Katolytska Tserkva v Argentini* (Buenos Aires 1972). This recent research has provided the first overview of its kind of the Argentine conversions, and it alludes also to the conversion movements in Canada and the United States; however, it does so in the form of drawing parallels, rather than presenting the direct connections between the Argentine and North American conversions. Furthermore, it does not establish the influence of the conversions in Subcarpathia to those in Argentina; nor does it develop the influence of the Argentine movements upon those in Brazil or Galicia. I am aware of no secondary works upon Russky Orthodox conversions among Greek Catholic migrants in Brazil, prior to 1914. The current study, however, demonstrates that Russky Orthodox activists were at work in Brazil before 1914, and that Greek Catholics loyalists feared that Brazil's Greek Catholic migrants would begin to convert en masse, just as they were elsewhere in the Americas. I have found only three other works mentioning the potential for Brazilian conversion movements during this period: Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddzialywanie Idei Prawoslawia w Galicji*; Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*; Andrii A. Strilko, "Z istorii diialnosti tserkovnykiv sered ukrainskykh immihrantiv u Latynskii Amerytsi," 105-10. The turn-of-the-century "Subcarpathian" conversions—i.e., those in Hungarian Subcarpathia, surrounding the villages of Becherov, Velyki Luchky, and Iza—have generated a substantial amount of research.

Works focusing primarily upon the conversions in Subcarpathia, 1901-1914, include: Andrea Gönczi, *Ruszin Skizmatikus Mozgalom a XX. Szazad Elejen*. Ungvár-Beregszász: Poliprint, 2007; Maria Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, ed. Patricia A. Krafcik and Paul Robert Magocsi, trans. Janos Boris, East European Monographs/Carpatho-Rusyn Research Center (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997 [1977]); Jurij Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya* (Uzhorod: Karpaty, 2009); Jurij Danilec, "Z Istorii Pravoslavnoho Rukhu v s. Velyki Luchky Mukachivskoho Rayony," (2008), http://www.ukrterra.com.ua/developments/history/modern/danilec_luchky.htm; Jurij Danilec, "K Ystoryy Pravoslavnoho Dvyzhenyya v Zakarpatskom Sele Yza," *Intenet Zhurnal Sretenskoho Monastirya* (2009), <http://pravoslavie.ru/arhiv/29381.htm>; Jurij Danilec, "Vtoroy Maramorosh-Syhotsky protses protyv pravoslavnykh v Zakarpatye," *Ystorychesky Ezhehodnyk* (2009); Jurij Danilec, "K Ystoryy Pravoslavnoho Dvyzhenyya v Zakarpatskom Sele Velyke Luchky," *Intenet Zhurnal Sretenskoho Monastirya* (2009), <http://www.pravoslavie.ru:8080/arhiv/31208.htm>; Jurij Danilec, "Perviy Sudebniy Protsey Protyv Pravoslavnykh Zakarpatya v Maramorosh-Syhoty," *Relyhiya y Smy* (2009), <http://www.religare.ru/article64743.htm>; Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948*; Archimandrite Vasyly Pronyn, *Ystoryia Pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy na Zakarpatye* (Mukachevo: Svyato-Nykolayevsky Mukachevsky Monastir, 2005); Kyryll Frolov and B.M Razhulov, "Apostol Karpatskoy Rusy," *Vishensky palomnyk* 1, no. 9 (2000), <http://www.pravoslavie.ru/put/podvizhnik/apkarpat.htm>; Miroslav K. Grabets, *K istorii Maramoroshskago protsessa: dielo 94* (Uzhorod 1934); Msr. Miroslav Zupina, "Z histórie Pravoslávnej cirkevnej obce Becherov," *www.pravoverni.sk* (2005), <http://www.pravoverni.sk/in05chramy01slovenskoAA014.html>; Kyryll Frolov, "Russkye Karpati: Terra Incognita Pravoslavnoho Myra," *Pravoslavie.ru* (2001), <http://www.pravoslavie.ru/archiv/ruskarpaty.htm#4>; Paul Robert Magocsi, "Alexei Kabaliuk," in *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*, ed. Paul R. Magocsi and I. I. Pop (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2002). Some of these works have also given significant consideration to the conversions in the United States (though not in Canada, Brazil, or Argentina); in so doing, they have attended not only to parallels, but direct, mutual influence between the conversion movements in the two regions. A few of these studies have also remarked in passing upon the Galician conversions (for example, Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*.)

The "Galician" conversions of the early twentieth century have also generated significant scholarly interest. Works focusing primarily upon the conversions in Galicia, 1900-1914, include: John-Paul Himka, "The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I," *Ukraina: Kul'turna spadshchyna, natsional'na svidomist', derzhavnist'*. *Zbirnyk naukovykh prats'* 9 (2001); Bogdan Horbal, "Triyokh Sandovychiv," *Rusyn*, no. 1 (1993); Bogdan Horbal, "Halytski Starorusyni i Rusophili i Odnoshynya do Nykh Habsburskoyi i Tsarskoyi Monarkhi do

works, and the current study would not be possible without them. Substantial overlap—even redundancy—however, quite often without reference to existing scholarship on the same events, raises an important question: why another treatment of this apparently well-trodden material?

In short, this study is the first to analyze the interrelationship of the conversion movements in all regions under consideration—Austria-Hungary, the Russian Empire, and the Americas—and set the conversions within the necessary context of transnational migration. It relies upon a new synthesis of the existing secondary literature, together with major contributions from my archival findings in the East European and migrant presses in the Americas, in contemporaneous publications such as pamphlets, and in the archives of the Greek Catholic bishop of Przemyśl, Galicia. Those who have studied particular regional histories of the conversions will likely recognize familiar material; however, they will also discover many new historical details regarding their own region of focus. More importantly, the transnational framework provides a far more comprehensive and illuminating context within which to consider regional developments. The most innovative argument—that ethnoreligious conversions of transatlantic labor migrants represented a causal factor in the origins of World War I—relies upon

1914 roku," *Rusyn* 9, no. 3 (2007); Jaroslav Moklak, "Pravoslavia v Halychyni—Politychni Aspekty" *Zustrich* 1, no. 2 (1990); Jaroslav Moklak, "Rosiyske Pravoslavva na Lemkivschyni v 1911 – 1915 Rokach," *Lemkivschyna* XIX, no. 1 (Spring 1998); Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*; Anna Veronika Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland, 1848-1915* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2001); Paul J. Best, "Mosophilism Amongst the Lemko Population..." in *Ukrainian Political Thought in the Twentieth Century* (Institute of History of the Jagiellonian University; St. Vladimir Foundation in Cracow May 28-30, 1990); Anna Krochmal, "Specyfika stosunków wyznaniowych na Lemkowszczyźnie w XX w.," in *Lemkowie i Lemkoznawstwo w Polsce*, ed. Andrzej A. Zieby (Kraków: Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności, 1997). Generally, although a number of these studies remark in passing upon the role played by the United States in the Galician conversions, through return migration and correspondence, they have not developed this factor in great detail. For a survey of the passing remarks on the American influence in the Galician conversions, see [Chapter Eight](#). The work to give the most extensive treatment to this subject is: Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*. Only Osadczy's 2007 monograph has referenced Canada, Brazil, or Argentina; while Osadczy did acknowledge the direct influence of remigration and remitted literature from the United States in the Galician conversions, that study treated the conversions in Canada and South America as parallel movements, rather than ones intersecting with either the Galician or Subcarpathian movements. Almost all of these studies of conversions in Galicia have ignored or given only scant attention to those which took place in Subcarpathia. For exceptions, see the comparative studies in: Jan Bruski, "Zakarpacie a Lemkowszczyzna. Podłoże i Rozwoj Ruchu Prawosławnego w Okresie Miedzywojennym," in *Lemkowie i Lemkoznawstwo w Polsce*, ed. Andrzej A. Zieby (Kraków: Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności, 1997); Klaus Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*, Schriftenreihe des Österreichischen Ost- und Südosteuropa-Instituts Bd. 25 (Wien: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 2001). The first text is a simply comparative work; the latter is treated later in this introduction.

connecting my research in the transnational dynamics of conversion with the existing studies and original archival research on the role of the East European conversions in the escalation of Great Power diplomatic tensions. “Transnational Conversions” not only advances an understanding of the conversions, in their own right, it also establishes their critical relevance to scholars of migration and World War I origins.

Not merely a matter of comprehensiveness, a multi-regional focus is crucial, because conversion movements in each region featured close, frequently causal connections with conversions in other regions. It is impossible to understand the “Canadian” conversions fully without reference to the “Galician” ones, or the “Argentine” movements apart from their “Subcarpathian” counterparts. It is altogether improper, even, to distinguish any of the conversion movements as “Canadian,” “Galician,” “Subcarpathian,” “American,” “Argentine,” or “Brazilian”—as if they belonged to that region alone. “Argentine” movements (i.e., those occurring in Argentina) were just as much “Galician,” “Subcarpathian,” and “American”—and the same may be said for the conversions in all regions.⁵⁶

Some histories have commented in cursory fashion upon “transnational” features of the conversions, though without employing either the terminology or framework of transnationalism.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Furthermore, given the earlier discussion regarding the limitations of the nation-state as the unit of analysis in the study of transnational migration, it would also be inadvisable to circumscribe the conversions within other *uni-regional* or *uni-local* designations (the Lemko region, the American North East, the province of Misiones, the city of Winnipeg, the town of Tres Capones, the village of Zaluche): the “Minneapolis” conversions were just as much “Becherov” or “Subcarpathian” conversions, and vice versa.

⁵⁷ Several studies have adopted a sustained, bi-regional focus, in particular several works dealing with connections between the conversions in the United States and either Subcarpathia or Galicia; these include especially, the work of Dyrud, Mayer, Danylec, and Osadczy. Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolitya*; Keith P. Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I* (Philadelphia; London: Balch Institute Press; Associated University Presses, 1992); Keith Paul Dyrud, “The Rusin Question in Eastern Europe and America, 1890-World War I” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, August 1976); Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*; Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*. Osadczy’s monograph gives the most sustained attention to the mutual influence between Galicia and the United States; it does not equal presentations of Mayer and Dyrud, however, in terms of conveying ongoing reciprocity between two regions. Danilec’s work mentions the role of the old country background in the U.S. conversions and the role of remigration and remitted literature in the Subcarpathian conversions. It does not, however, convey a sense of ongoing reciprocity. Mayer and Dyrud, in particular, have been able to convey an ongoing sense of reciprocity between the conversion movements in the United States and Subcarpathia, insofar as they narrated several stages of a dialectic process. In their narratives, the Austro-Hungarian background partly led to conversions in the United States. The

Besides the fact of migration, itself, scholars have noted variously: the role of remigration in the conversions;⁵⁸ the influence of church hierarchies in sending regions upon migrant communities in the Americas through correspondence and emissaries; Hungarian governmental attempts to forestall conversions in the United States by retaining expatriate loyalties (the “American Action”); migrant correspondence with regions of origin, like requests for priests or letters between kin and friends; the temporary nature of some migration; migrants’ economic remittances to regions of origin; and “homeland” or “diaspora” consciousness.

The current study expands upon these insights as a starting point, by setting them in transnational perspective. First, old country influences were not limited to “background.” Forces for conversion, emanating from and to the old country, influenced individuals while in migration. Transatlantic correspondence from pro-Rusky Orthodox priests in Galician villages (what one contemporary referred to as “agitational gravity from the *kray*”⁵⁹) as well as pro-conversion donations from the Americas to Austria-Hungary reflexively galvanized donating migrant communities. Moreover, reciprocal impacts (i.e., prompted by the remittance of conversions to Eastern Europe) went beyond the governmental sphere (“the American Action”) and beyond Subcarpathia and the United States. Significantly, the United States was also not the only “America” remitting conversions to Austria-Hungary.

The remittance of conversions to Austria-Hungary also produced previously undocumented effects upon the Americas. New waves of migrants left Austria-Hungary for the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Brazil, already exposed to the “American” conversions through kin and friends corresponding or returning from the Americas. Pre-migration encounters with conversion influenced subsequent ethnoreligious practices, beliefs, and affiliations while in migration. Some joined—or more vehemently opposed—existing Rusky Orthodox parishes while abroad, while other second-wave (and

remittance of the conversions to Subcarpathia then led to a Hungarian religio-governmental response: the American Action. That response then contributed to further conversions in the United States.

⁵⁸ They have focused mostly upon remigration from the United States to Subcarpathia, neglecting remigration from the United States to Galicia; or from Canada, Argentina, or Brazil to either Galicia or Subcarpathia.

⁵⁹ Migrants generally used “*kray*”—literally, “the country”—to refer to their region of origin, which might be conceived narrowly or broadly. They also spoke of the *stary kray* (the “old country”). See Appendix C.

third- and fourth-wave) migrants conveyed conversions to new regions of the Americas. The ability of many converted migrants to rejoin native Greek Catholic parishes upon remigration also affected conversions in the Americas, insofar as potential remigrants there could hope to “convert” and “revert” with impunity. Increasingly, and certainly by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, many Russky Orthodox partisans and Greek Catholic loyalists alike recognized the conversions as transnational phenomena, requiring comparably transnational measures—either for promotion or counteraction.

Some scholars have described a few stages in the cycle of transnational religious and governmental reciprocity in the history of the conversions; this study details others, while incorporating previously ignored, though critically relevant economic and political contexts. Remigrating converts prompted the dispatch of a polarizing Greek Catholic bishop to the United States, for instance, at virtually the same time a new catalyst for remigration arose: a U.S. and Canadian economic depression following the Panic of 1907. In 1908, Austro-Russian tensions following the annexation of Serbia, together with a shift in Galicia’s political leadership, rendered Russky Orthodox conversions especially unpopular with provincial and imperial governments. Thus, massive new waves of converting migrants returned to regions of origin at virtually the exact moment when their arrival was least welcome: something no existing study has noted. The mass conversions beginning in Galicia and Subcarpathia shortly afterward in the winter of 1911-12, which were responsible for the treason trials of 1913-1914 and surrounding pre-war Great Power tensions, prompted further interaction by migrants in the Americas with the East European developments: through correspondence, economic contributions, and continued remigration. This engagement reflexively transformed migrant communities, as did the new waves of (already-) converting migrants departing for the Americas.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ No other study has noted that massive remigration coincided with the first instance of the conversions in the United States, either: conversions in the United States began around 1890, and following the crash of 1893, a four-year long depression ensued. It is likely not a coincidence that mass conversions appeared for the first time in Austria-Hungary following this period of massive remigration.

The most broadly relevant contribution of this study to the historiography of the conversions lies in its linkage of transnational migration and the conversions to World War I origins. Tens of thousands of histories of the war have been published; thus, the question of the necessity for yet another arises with even more force than with respect to the much-studied conversions, themselves.⁶¹ In short, this study's focus upon transnational migrant religion represents an innovative argument for an entirely novel class of causation in the origins of World War I. The literature relating Russky Orthodox conversions among Greek Catholics to pre-war Great Power tensions remains extremely limited, and the few existing studies have only connected the conversions in Subcarpathia and Galicia to those tensions.⁶² Those findings have virtually been ignored by most World War I historians. Research connecting the conversions in the Americas and the pre-war imperial tensions does not exist.⁶³ The current study is the first to combine sustained argumentation for the transnational character of the conversion movements together with a fully developed thesis on their role in World War I origins.

The vast majority of works on the Great War has highlighted—justifiably—the Balkans, Serbian nationalism, and Russian pan-Slavic support for Serbia; by comparison, hardly any have noted the role of ethnoreligious conversions in Galicia or Subcarpathia in the origins of the war.⁶⁴ Yet, long before

⁶¹ For an analysis of World War I historiography, see: J. M. Winter and Antoine Prost, *The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the present*, Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁶² I have in mind here works directly connecting pre-war, diplomatic tensions to the conversions, not those which merely point to Austria-Hungary's interpretation of the conversions as the fruit of propaganda from the Russian Empire. Essentially all works that have dealt with the conversion movements in Subcarpathia and Galicia (already cited) have remarked upon this Austro-Hungarian characterization of the conversions; I have cited them already and will not do so again here.

⁶³ The lone exception is one helpful study juxtaposing a brief reference to American influence on the conversions with an equally brief reference to the possible role of the conversions in the origins of the war: Horbal, "Halytski Starorusyni i Rusophili i Odnoshynya do Nykh Habsburskoyi i Tsarskoyi Monarkhi do 1914 roku."

⁶⁴ On this point, see: Hugo Lane, "Review of Bachmann, Klaus, Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland. Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)," *HABSBURG, H-Net Reviews* (January, 2002), <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=5824>. Within the massive bibliography of World War I causation, the few works which have addressed the role of these conversions in pre-war tensions Great Power tensions include: Joseph Goricar and Lyman Beecher Stowe, *The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue or How the World War was Brought About* (Garden City and New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1920); Vladimir Stepankovsky, *The Russian Plot to Seize Galicia (Austrian Ruthenia)* (Jersey City [London]: Ukrainian National Council, 1915 [March 1914]); Z. A. B. Zeman, *The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire, 1914-1918: A Study in National and Social Revolution* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1961); D.C.B. Lieven, *Russia and*

Gavrillo Princip fired his famous shot in Sarajevo—as far back as the 1880s—a “Slav Problem” of a different sort had been aggravating tensions between Russia, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary and Germany, on the other: Russky Orthodox conversion movements among Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics.⁶⁵ It was a problem that only escalated in priority in the years, months, and weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of war.

In contributing a new element to World War I causation, this study cannot avoid the “war guilt” debates, which have unfolded since the very first days of the war.⁶⁶ Discussions of the Russian Empire’s

the Origins of the First World War, ed. Geoffrey Warner, *The Making of the 20th Century* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1983); Samuel R. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, *The Making of the 20th Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*. By far, Bachmann’s work has given the tensions which these conversions caused the most sustained treatment. Although Vlodzimierz Osadczy was not primarily concerned with pre-war tensions, he did discover previously secret documents in the Russian archives demonstrating that the Russian government, including the Tsar, himself, were subsidizing the conversions in Austria-Hungary. See: Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*.

⁶⁵ The conversions resulting in the Hnylychky trial of 1883 created diplomatic unrest among German, Russian, and Austrian statesmen.

⁶⁶ For a well-known early study, see: Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, *The Disclosures From Germany* (New York: American Association for International Conciliation, 1918 [1916]). Particularly influential in the early “war guilt” debates was the clause in the Treaty of Versailles, requiring that Germany take sole responsibility for starting the war. Historians in the Allied countries generally sought to demonstrate Germany’s culpability: its imperialist aims, these historians claimed, led the empire to seek out a war. Historians in Germany, on the other hand, with state support and/or pressure, attempted to refute that position, blaming instead the collapse of the international system prevailing at the time. Toward this aim, statesmen in Weimar Germany oversaw the publication (1923-27) of imperial Germany’s pre-war and war-time government documents, in versions carefully edited to emphasize Germany’s lack of culpability. By the late-1920s and 30s, historians in the Allied countries also began blaming the system more than they did Germany. Non-German revisionist historians went as far as to argue that the Allies had been the major aggressors. See, for example: Harry Elmer Barnes, *The Genesis of the World War: An Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1926); Sidney Bradshaw Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928).

More recent, influential research attributing blame to international relations, writ large (the “powder keg thesis”), has identified problems with the international alliance system, escalating militarism, military mobilization strategies, and diplomatic relations. James Joll, for example, has analyzed the interlocking international treaty system, in which any conflict in the Balkans would result in world war, while L.C.F. Turner and Paul Kennedy have emphasized that the general militarism prevailing at the time produced an unavoidable conflict. James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, 2nd ed., *Origins of Modern Wars* (London; New York: Longman, 1992); Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980); Leonard Charles Frederick Turner, *Origins of the First World War*, *Foundations of Modern History* (New York: Norton, 1970). In studies of militarism and mobilization strategies, it is Germany’s Schlieffen plan which has received the most attention. It called for a fast defeat of France, so as to be able to devote military resources elsewhere—this required a hair-trigger response to Russian mobilization.

Notwithstanding the contributions of the revisionists, by the 1950s, most non-German historians believed Germany was to blame for the war. The most prominent historian in this camp, Luigi Albertini, provided a systematic argument in this vein in his three-volume work, published in 1942-43. Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, 3 vols. (London; New York: Oxford University Press, 1952). In 1961, Fritz Fischer published the

complicity in the conversions, and the Austro-Hungarian and German responses to the conversions, have bearing on the blameworthiness of various imperial powers. The major tensions surrounding the conversions centered upon Russia's alleged irredentism toward Austro-Hungarian territories and the "treason" and "espionage" of Russky Orthodox converts, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary's alleged

first history of the war with access to previously suppressed German imperial archives; it caused a major stir in its forceful case for German fault in the origins of the war. Fritz Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967 [1961]). In his 1961 book and subsequent works, Fischer argued that various parties in German society, together with the growing threat of democratic impulses, placed pressure on German policy makers to start a war, with the aim of becoming a major imperial power. (Fritz Fischer, *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1975).) Fischer and his students have also thus become associated with the "Berlin War Party" thesis, which posited that German statesmen made the decision for war at a meeting (the "war council") in December of 1912; they then simply waited for the right opportunity to put the plan in place, or so the argument goes. For histories representative of the "Fischer school," see: Volker R. Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914*, *The Making of the 20th Century* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973); Imanuel Geiss, *German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914*, Routledge direct editions (London; Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Wilhelminian Germany, 1897-1914," *Central European History* 24, no. 4 (1991); Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy before 1914," *Central European History* 6(1973).

Following Fischer's work, it became overwhelming orthodoxy that Germany had, indeed caused the war, as the Treaty of Versailles had charged. Dissenting voices, however, have argued that Fischer failed to place Germany's belligerence in the context of a general atmosphere in which all interested imperial powers exhibited some form of belligerence. Moreover, whether or not Germany actually "made the decision for war" at the December 1912 meeting remains a subject of debate. (See: Annika Mombauer, *Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War*, *New Studies in European History* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 143.) While many histories composed in Germany held Russia primarily responsible for the war, fewer works outside Germany agreed. (For an example of a German study from the 1980s, situating Russia's role in the origins of the war within the context of a fifty-year period of Russian imperialism, see: Dietrich Geyer, *Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).) An exception may be found in Turner's work, which argued that it was ultimately Russia's impetuous mobilization in defense of Serbia which represented the point of no return—had Russia stalled a bit longer, Britain may have been able to intervene diplomatically with Germany. Leonard Charles Frederick Turner, "The Russian Mobilization in 1914," in *The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914*, ed. Paul Kennedy (London: 1979). The most well-known work in English on Russia's involvement is Lieven's history. Without absolving Russia of blame (see below), it nevertheless concluded ultimately that Germany's military aggression was at fault. Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War*. See also McMeekin's recent work exploring Russia's complicity in the war, without, however, considering the role of Greek Catholic-to-Russky Orthodox conversions: Sean McMeekin, *The Russian Origins of the First World War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011).

Works placing the blame squarely on Austria-Hungary are much fewer than those blaming Germany, an ironic development, considering the fact that it was, after all, Austria-Hungary which made the first declaration for war. Exceptions to this include Williamson's work, which posited that Austria-Hungary risked a local war so as to counter Russian expansion in the Balkans and the centripetal forces that unchecked Serb nationalism would unleash. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*. The Marxist historian Arno Meyer, too, blamed Austria-Hungary for the war, but situated this within the broader framework of war-making as a method to counter the domestic social unrest—in this analysis, Austria-Hungary was simply *most* guilty, among a group of empires (all of which were guilty, to a degree). Arno Mayer, "Domestic Causes of the First World War," in *The Responsibility of Power*, ed. Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern (New York: Macmillan, 1968). According to Graydon Tunstall, "Today, serious scholarship into the origins of the war focuses, unambiguously, on Austria-Hungary." Graydon A. Tunstall, "Austria-Hungary," in *The Origins of World War I*, ed. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 144. Tunstall's chapter provides an excellent sketch of Austria-Hungary's key decision-makers for war.

oppression of its “Russian” citizens on the other. To label the promotion of conversions a Russian governmental initiative (as parties in Austria-Hungary and Germany did without hesitation) would be reductive, and an overstatement. Nevertheless, representatives of the Russian Empire—some at the highest levels of government—did promote and subsidize the conversions. If “genuine” or “authentically” religious and national concerns motivated those efforts, it appears rather likely that political and territorial motivations did also. On the other hand, Austria-Hungary initiated harshly repressive measures against its converting Greek Catholic citizenry that could not but incense Russia’s government. Lastly, the presses in both Russia and Austria-Hungary, as well as in Germany, all employed the conversions opportunistically to escalate hostilities toward enemy empires already embroiled in an atmosphere of war.

The current study provides the most comprehensive narrative of the role of the conversions in pre-war Great Power tensions to date, in several respects. First, by synthesizing a few secondary works that have considered one dimension or another of tensions over the conversions, this study provides a more holistic picture: of the attitudes of Austria-Hungary’s and Germany’s statesmen toward Russia and vice versa, rhetoric in the Great Power presses, and popular sentiments.⁶⁷ I have augmented that research on diplomacy with an original analysis of press conflicts, based partially upon my own archival findings in select Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian presses.⁶⁸ Of course, the major contribution of this study to the study of World War I lies in its argument that the most important source of the conversions—around which significant pre-war Great Power tensions centered—lay in transatlantic migration between Austria-Hungary and the Americas.

⁶⁷ For example, those in: Fischer, *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914*; Grabets, *K istorii Maramoroshskago protsesssa: dielo 94*; David Saunders, "Britain and the Ukrainian Question (1912-1920)," *The English Historical Review* 103, no. 406 (January 1988); Jonathan French Scott, *Five Weeks: The Surge of Public Opinion on the Eve of the Great War* (New York: The John Day Company, 1927); Klaus Wernecke, *Der Wille zur Weltgeltung: Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit im Kaiserreich am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1970). I have also found Troy Paddock’s recent work illuminative of the role of the press in these tensions: Troy R.E. Paddock, "Still Stuck at Sevastopol: The Depiction of Russia during the Russo- Japanese War and the Beginning of the First World War in the German Press," *German History* 16, no. 3 (1998); Troy R.E. Paddock, *Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the Public Sphere, and National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890-1914* (Rochester, New York: Camden House, 2010).

⁶⁸ Especially: *Kölnische Zeitung*, *Reichspost* and *Novoe Vremia*, though I have also referenced others.

To sum up, this is the first history to place Greek Catholic-to-Rusky Orthodox conversions in transnational perspective: it is the first to show that the conversion movements and counter-conversion efforts in *all* regions under consideration (the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Galicia, and Subcarpathia) mutually influenced one another, such that it is impossible to fully understand a movement in one region without reference to all others. It is also the most complete study of the role, which the conversions played in World War I origins, especially in the emphasis upon transatlantic migration and “the American factor” in the causation of pre-war imperial tensions and, thus, the Great War.

1.3 ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY

This investigation of mutually influential transnational phenomena cannot adopt a purely linear, chronological approach to this twenty-five year period of Greek Catholic conversions to the Rusky Orthodox Church. While attending to distinctive regional trajectories of conversion and counter-conversion movements, this study emphasizes a circular pattern of reciprocity between each region. The resulting presentation of research represents a balance between chronological, regional, and thematic considerations, with no one method of organization dominating.

The key regions under consideration are: Austria-Hungary (Galicia and Subcarpathia, and to a lesser degree, Bukovina); the Americas (the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina); and the Russian Empire. The main periods of note—some of which overlap with one another, and some of which extend beyond August 1914 (the terminal point of this study) include: large-scale transatlantic migration (post-1880); mass Rusky Orthodox conversions in the Americas (post-1890 in the United States; post-

1897 in Canada; post-1902 in Argentina; and post-1908 in Brazil⁶⁹); the remittance of conversions from the Americas to Austria-Hungary (post-1901); the escalation of conversions in both Austria-Hungary and the Americas associated with the arrival in North America of two new bishops (one Greek Catholic, the other Russky Orthodox) and economically-motivated massive remigration from the United States and Canada (post-1907); and the onset of new outbursts of mass conversion in Austria-Hungary (1911-14), which most proximately occasioned the treason trials of 1913-14.⁷⁰

[Chapter Two](#), “The Migration of Race, Ethnicity, and Nationhood,” establishes the regional contexts for the conversions, through analysis of particular discourses of race, ethnicity, and nationhood in relevant migratory regions. This presentation reflects the fact that intra-European and transatlantic migration set these discourses in conversation. An analysis of conditions in Austria-Hungary and Russia simultaneously provides a description of: the historical “background” to the late-nineteenth century conversions associated with transatlantic migration; an ongoing source of influence in those conversions; and the actual location in which many of the conversions—those remitted from the Americas to Eastern Europe—took place. Secondly, this chapter suggests that old country circumstances, together with racial/ethnic/national dynamics in the Americas, partially influenced migratory practices, including the original act of migration, as well as likelihood of second-stage migrations.

[Chapter Three](#), entitled “Transnational Communities: Remittances and Remigrations,” establishes the framework of transnational migration, by analyzing modes through which migrants sustained ties with regions of origin and between multiple regions of destination: remittances (both economic and social) and second-stage migrations (remigration, cyclical migration, migration elsewhere in the Americas, and even migration from the Americas to Russia). The transnational character of migration among Greek Catholics and converting Russky Orthodox individuals in large part accounted for the source of the conversion movements, as well as the multi-regional proliferation of conversions and counter-conversion efforts.

⁶⁹ No new “officially” Russky Orthodox churches were formed by Greek Catholics in Brazil between 1890-1914; however, the scanty evidence available indicates that Russky Orthodox activists began conducting missionary work among Brazil’s migrant Greek Catholics in 1908.

⁷⁰ For a more specific timeline, see Appendix F.

[Chapter Four](#), entitled “Converting the Americas: History and Theory,” provides a historical overview of the conversions which unfolded in the Americas between 1890 and 1914, with emphasis upon connections between the movements in each “American” region (the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Brazil). The second part of this chapter assesses the meaning of “conversion” in the context of shifting and persisting identifications as “Greek Catholic” and “Russky Orthodox.” It challenges prevailing theories of conversion, based upon the reality that many understood their behaviors in terms of continuity, rather than transformation, and did not consider their behaviors “conversions,” as such. This perception represented a major—perhaps the primary—causal factor in the conversions, both in the Americas and in Austria-Hungary.

[Chapter Five](#), entitled, “The Causes of Conversion,” analyzes other catalysts for conversion in the Americas, considering both old country and new world influences, as well as the exigencies of migration, itself. Rather than treating the old country as “background,” this chapter suggests that, thanks to transnational migrant ties, factors on either side of the Atlantic Ocean continually and dialectically interacted to produce conversions in the Americas. Additionally, in order to highlight non-migrant consciousness of conversion movements in the Americas, this chapter narrates the causes of the “American conversions” largely through “old country” sources (i.e., located in East European archives), such as correspondence from migrants to individuals or East European periodicals.

[Chapter Six](#), entitled “Cannons and Cossacks in Remigrants’ Pockets,” examines the manner in which migrants remitted conversions from the United States through remigration and correspondence to several specific regions of Hungarian Subcarpathia, resulting, after 1901, in mass conversions there, coupled with Hungary’s and the Dual Monarchy’s suppression of them as alleged Russian political machinations. The second part of this chapter analyzes reciprocal impacts of the remitted conversions in Subcarpathia upon the ongoing conversion movements in the Americas, specifically: (a) migrants departing for the Americas having already encountered the “American” conversions; (b) the dissemination of conversions elsewhere in the Americas, to Argentina and Brazil; and (c) Hungary’s religio-governmental counter-conversion effort, known as “the American Action.”

[Chapter Seven](#), entitled “A Perfect Storm,” narrates the next stage in the ongoing reciprocal impacts of the East European conversion movements upon the Americas. Five factors together escalated the conversions in the Americas, the remittance of those conversions back to Austria-Hungary, and the hostilities with which parties in Austria-Hungary greeted new waves of converts; they were: (a) the introduction of a new, polarizing Greek Catholic bishop in the United States in 1907 and a papal bull limiting his powers; (b) the nearly simultaneous appointment of a new Russky Orthodox bishop of North America, who promoted Russky Orthodox conversion even more energetically—and with greater transnational focus—than his predecessors; (c) a severe economic crisis in the United States and Canada beginning in 1907 leading to massive remigration; (d) Austria-Hungary’s unilateral annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, which exacerbated Great Power tensions; and (e) the assassination of the Galician governor in the same year, followed by his replacement by a hardline anti-Russophile. These events 1907-08 set the stage for new waves of politically inflammatory conversion movements in Austria-Hungary beginning in the winter of 1911-12.

[Chapter Eight](#), entitled, “Crossing the Carpathians by Steamship,” details the manner in which conversion movements spread from Hungarian Subcarpathia across the Carpathian Mountains to Austrian Galicia, indirectly via an 8,500-mile round trip to the Americas. The introduction traces a 1903 conversion movement in Eastern Galicia to Canada, where Galician migrants were converting largely due to exposure to the movement underway among Subcarpathian and Galician migrants in the United States. The chapter then focus upon the period 1907/8 - 1911/12. Galicia’s Greek Catholic hierarchy initiated a systematic internal investigation in 1909, based upon 1908 intelligence from informants in the Americas, that converted remigrants had for some time been arriving to their dioceses, especially but not limited to Western Galicia’s Lemko region (diocese of Przemyśl) and rejoining native Greek Catholic parishes. Concurrently, the North American economic crisis after 1907 transformed more individualized and episodic remigrations into a large wave of converts returning within a compact period of time, providing the critical mass necessary to sustain overt conversion movements in Galicia—as well as resuscitated movements in Eastern Galicia and Subcarpathia—eventually erupting winter 1911-12.

[Chapter Nine](#), entitled, “Transnational Reforms,” argues that not only did remitted conversion movements dramatically modify religious conditions in regions of migratory origin, so too did corresponding Greek Catholic reform movements. Persisting Greek Catholics on either side of the ocean implemented transatlantic measures to bring converts back into the fold and counter further losses. That so many fought conversion in their own region, whether the Americas or Austria-Hungary, by directing their efforts across the Atlantic Ocean, provides yet another testament to the essential transnational character of the conversions, as well as the critical importance of “the American factor” in the East European movements. The reform movements also represent the first part of the effort to undermine the conversions; the second part entailed governmental suppression and trials for treason.

[Chapter Ten](#), entitled “The Great War that Began in Minneapolis and Wilkes-Barre,” presents the most broadly relevant historical contribution of this study: the culmination of the conversions in significant Great Power tensions on the eve of World War I. It narrates the events preceding and surrounding two treason trials in Lviv and Marmorosh Sighet, 1913-14, following the winter 1911-12 outbreak of numerous mass movements in Galicia and Subcarpathia. An analysis of diplomatic turmoil and inflammatory press coverage surrounding the trials—especially in Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany—demonstrates that the conversions did exacerbate tense inter-imperial relations. While the most important source of those portentous conversions lay in transatlantic migration of the preceding decades, the more immediate cause could be found in the 1911-12 arrival of missionaries from Russia: in actuality, Galician and Subcarpathian émigrés ordained in Russia and dispatched to their native regions. Nevertheless, the “American factor” continued to play a major role in the East European conversion movements after 1911, even as migrant convert communities in the Americas continued to respond to East European developments, as they had for decades.

2.0 THE MIGRATION OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONHOOD

At the turn of the twentieth century, Greek Catholics underwent Russky Orthodox conversion in the context of migration between Austria-Hungary and the Americas and, to a lesser degree, the Russian Empire. Discourses of race, ethnicity, and nationhood in each region influenced migration patterns and informed the dynamics of conversion. In turn, migratory flows set regional discourses in conversation. Migrants accustomed to thinking in terms of “Magyars” and “Rusyns” in regions of origin mapped such taxonomies onto distinctions between “whites” and “blacks,” in regions of destination. Demarcations between “Anglos” and “Huns” in the Americas also crossed the Atlantic Ocean to reach Austria-Hungary’s non-migrants, more familiar with “Polish,” “Ukrainian,” or “Russky” classifications. Those discourses and their interaction shaped the perceptions and behaviors of migrants and non-migrants alike.⁷¹ This chapter surveys the discourses of race, ethnicity, and nationhood in the migratory regions of Austria-Hungary (Galicia and Subcarpathia), the Russian Empire, and the Americas (the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina). The first part deals with the regions of origin in Austria-Hungary and intra-European migration, while the second part focuses upon the Americas

⁷¹ Sociologist Rogers Brubaker and his collaborators have remarked that the proliferation of more broadly comparative studies of race, ethnicity, and nationhood have undermined “neat distinctions” between these categories, which might otherwise seem logical when limited to one region. This chapter adopts a cognitive approach, which treats race, ethnicity, and nationhood not as things “*in* the world” but as perspectives “*on* the world.” Race, ethnicity, and nationhood comprise elements of a single classificatory domain, rather than three sub-fields. Although a myriad of criteria might differentiate race, ethnicity, and nationhood within this domain, none do so neatly enough to warrant three “clearly bounded subdomains.” Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov, “Ethnicity as Cognition,” 47-48.

2.1 INTRA-EUROPEAN MIGRATION

As part of a divide-and-conquer strategy to maintain the integrity of its multi-national empire in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Habsburg Monarchy—this study’s primary “region of migratory origin,” known as the *kray* by Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox migrants—pitted citizen partisans of differing national ideologies against one another. The rise of various movements in the 1830s and 40s (e.g., Czech and Hungarian) had led to increasingly assertive calls for autonomy within the empire, culminating in the 1848-49 “Springtime of Nations.” The revolutions in that year augured centripetal forces, which unchecked nationalism could unleash. The empire defensively redirected various movements against one another through tactical, measured, and placating concessions to interest groups—“the Hungarians,” “the Poles,” “the Ruthenians,” and others—constraining each other’s power without ever (until 1918) allowing for national self-determination. In the borderland regions of Galicia and Subcarpathia, the proximity of the Russian Empire complicated Austria-Hungary’s domestic power dynamics.

Capitalizing upon Austria’s 1866 military loss to Prussia, partisans of the Hungarian cause in 1867 obtained the greatest degree of autonomy any faction would enjoy within the empire, until its 1918 demise. Without going as far as the full independence briefly gained and lost during the 1848-49 Hungarian revolution, the Dual Compromise did reorganize the empire into a Dual Monarchy: the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The new Hungary possessed its own government, including a parliament and prime minister, enjoying substantial autonomy in domestic policy. Within Hungary, partisans of the “Magyar” (Hungarian) orientation were able to implement policies of forced Magyarization. The Hungarian language, already dominating mainstream society, became also the language of bureaucracy and schools.

Adopting Hungarian language and identification at the expense of others (like “Rusky/Rusyn” or “Russky/Russian”) became a means of acquiring social capital.⁷²

Shortly after Hungary secured the Compromise, Polish-identifying activists achieved lesser concessions in the Austrian province of Galicia. Consequently, Galicia enjoyed extensive autonomy after 1873, though its rights within the Dual Monarchy never matched Hungary’s. Accordingly, partisans of the Polish national movement who dominated the Galician Diet remained beholden to Vienna to a greater degree than did Hungary. Vienna also checked Polish interests in Galicia by providing qualified support to the Rusky-Ukrainophile movement. “Polonization” dominated the state apparatus, the school system, and Galician society, though without coming close to the rate or intensity of Magyarization in Hungary.⁷³

Variances between Austrian Galicia and Hungarian Subcarpathia held significant implications for Greek Catholic elites and peasant masses. In Hungary, a majority of clergy, hierarchy, and secular intelligentsia adopted a Magyarophile orientation and became Hungarian-speakers (Magyarones). A minority adopted a Rusynophile orientation, and a smaller, though still significant, minority opted for a Russophile orientation, which—for some—also incorporated Orthodoxophilism.⁷⁴ In Galicia, a majority of the intelligentsia, the ecclesial hierarchy, and the clergy opted for a “Rusky-Ukrainophile” orientation, calling themselves first “Rusky” (one “s”), then “Rusky-Ukrainian,” then simply “Ukrainian.”⁷⁵ The

⁷² F. R. Bridge, *The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers, 1815-1918* (New York: Berg; St. Martin's Press, 1990), 8-16; Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, chapter three.

⁷³ Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996).

⁷⁴ In this study, “Rusynophile” always refers to individuals in or from Hungarian Subcarpathia who used the terms “Rusky” (adjectival, one “s”) and “Rusyn” (nominative) to describe themselves.

⁷⁵ This study uses the term “Rusky-Ukrainophile,” rather than the more commonly deployed “Ukrainophile,” because the latter term obscures the ambiguity inherent in the earlier nomenclature. At the beginning of the period 1890-1914, most activists of the “Rusky-Ukrainophile” orientation used the terms “*Rusky*” (adjectival) and “*Rusyn*” (nominative); by 1914, “Ukrainian” (adjective: *Ukrainsky* / nominative: *Ukrainets*) had become the term of choice for most, though still not all. As the transition was occurring, some opted for the hyphenated, composite term, “Rusky-Ukrainian” (*Rusky-Ukrainsky*). Thus, the term “Rusky-Ukrainophile” refers to partisans who may have used either term (“Rusky” or “Ukrainian”) or both (simultaneously or in successive stages) to describe themselves, their “people,” and their cause. The distinction between the Rusynophiles of Hungarian Subcarpathia and the Rusky-Ukrainophiles of Galicia was starker near the end of the period under consideration, but for a time, both used the terms “Rusky” (one “s”) and “Rusyn.” Prior to World War I, Rusky-Ukrainophilism and Orthodox Christianity in Galicia were mutually exclusive. Only during and after the war did a “Ukrainian Orthodox Church” become a viable possibility. Today, the term “Rusyn” is frequently used as an adjective to describe the descendants of some of the people in the current study. In the original language, this term was nominative, while “Rusky” was the

remainder of Galicia's Greek Catholic clergy assumed a Russophile—and sometimes Orthodoxophile—orientation, calling themselves “Russky” (two “s”s) people.⁷⁶

It is of critical relevance to this study that almost all Russophile Greek Catholic priests in Austria-Hungary remained Greek Catholic. Despite contemporaries' criticisms to the contrary, it was possible to identify as Russophile without inclining toward Orthodoxy; nevertheless, a number of Russophile Greek Catholic priests did so incline or even considered themselves “actually” Orthodox. Sympathizing with mass conversion movements, they tolerated or even promoted conversions among their flock, without formally converting themselves. Their critics perceived them intentionally remaining Greek Catholic so as to capitalize on their insider status and conduct religious espionage as “wolves in sheep's clothing.”⁷⁷

A more plausible explanation lies in the social, economic, and political consequences, which an ex-Greek

adjective. In order to avoid confusion with today's Rusyn movement, I avoid the use of the term “Rusyn.” I do however, retain a form of it in the term “Rusynophile,” without using it to imply a “forerunner” to today's Rusyn movement. As with all of these terms, in quoted speech I have made every attempt to reproduce the original forms (minus grammatical inflection) used by the speakers/writers. See Appendix C.

⁷⁶ A number of works have explored the Russophile phenomenon; see: Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland, 1848-1915*; Paul R. Magocsi, "Old Ruthenianism and Russophilism: A New Conceptual Framework for Analyzing National Ideologies in Late 19th Century Eastern Galicia," in *American Contributions to the Ninth International Congress of Slavists: Kiev, September 1983*, ed. Paul Debreczeny, *Literature, Poetics, History*, (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica, 1983), 305-24; Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*; Moklak, "Pravoslavia v Halychyni—Politychni Aspekty": 147-54; Moklak, "Rosiyske Pravoslavlya na Lemkivschyni v 1911 – 1915 Rokach."; Horbal, "Halytski Starorusyni i Rusophili i Odnoshynya do Nykh Habsburskoyi i Tsarskoyi Monarkhi do 1914 roku," 122-45; Bogdan Horbal, "Rusofilstwo czy Moskalofilstwo lub Moskwofilstwo. Przyczynek do Dyskusji Nad Nieścisłościami Terminologicznymi," in *Prace Komisji Wschodnioeuropejskiej*, ed. Antoni Podraza, Andrzej Zięba, and Helena Duć-Fajfer (Kraków: PAU 9, 2004), 191-94; Mark Von Hagen, *War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914-1918*, Donald W. Treadgold Studies on Russia, East Europe, and Central Asia (Seattle: Herbert J. Ellison Center for Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies Distributed by the University of Washington Press, 2007); Paul Vysny, *Neo-Slavism and the Czechs: 1898-1914*, Soviet and East European Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*.

⁷⁷ A pejorative freely used by converts and loyalists alike to disparage one another. The fact that some Greek Catholic migrant priests in the Americas remained Greek Catholic while ostensibly promoting conversion, even in more liberal contexts, does lend greater weight to the “religious espionage” argument (e.g., Father Theophan Obushkevich, who did eventually convert briefly 1916-17, but who had apparently been fostering conversions in the United States since before the turn of the century). Still, loss of salary—and means of support for self and family—was also a concern in the Americas; moreover, clergy who entertained the notion of returning to their region of origin were hardly free of the social and political pressures to remain Greek Catholic while in migration. That reality is made evident by the clergy who, undergoing Russky Orthodox conversion in the Americas, returned to their region of origin and to Greek Catholicism as marginalized penitents (e.g., Fathers Gregory Hrushka and Michael Pozdrey to Galicia and Fathers Dmitri Gebei and Victor Toth to Subcarpathia).

Catholic clergyman would have faced. Within Austria-Hungary, to convert to the Russky Orthodox Church would result in loss of salary for self and family (most Greek Catholic priests were married) and almost certain political harassment, arrest, and treason charges—in other words, the same threats ensuring that the mass movements far exceeded the numbers of formal conversions registered by the state.⁷⁸

Russophiles' interactions with the state differed in Galicia and Subcarpathia. Vienna increasingly identified Russophiles as enemies within the gates, particularly after 1881-82, when Subcarpathian and Galician Russophile activists were tried for treason, accused of acting in the service of Russia to promote Orthodox conversion in Galicia and Russia's annexation of Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholic-inhabited territories. Vienna's attempts to marginalize Russophilism politicized and radicalized the movement, giving rise to so-called "new course" (*novokursny*) Russophilism, which transitioned from a merely cultural orientation toward historic Rus' and in some cases Russia, to more radically political attachments to the tsarist empire, including advocating annexation.⁷⁹ Still, Polish-identifiers sought to curb Rusky-Ukrainophile influence in Galicia by forging a Russophile alliance in the early-1890s, thereby mitigating Vienna's anti-Russophile policies. Thus, in contradistinction to Hungarian Subcarpathia, Russophiles enjoyed political representation in the Galician Diet (the *tverdy*—"zealous"—party); in addition, Eastern Galicia's Polish-identifying, Latin rite Catholic magnates promoted Russophile Greek Catholic clerical appointments in their lands. In Galicia, Russophile strongholds existed in the East, along Russia's border, and in the Lemko region in the West: not coincidentally, those regions became primary staging grounds for mass Russky Orthodox movements.

Budapest exhibited far greater direct influence in Subcarpathia than did Vienna in Galicia. Not only did Subcarpathian Russophilism buckle under aggressive Magyarization, Hungary's policy makers held special disdain for individuals exhibiting affinities for the tsarist empire, which had helped subdue the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49, at Austria's invitation. When Hungarian partisans regained

⁷⁸ See Appendix D for a table clarifying the relationship between these ethnonational and religious identifications in Galicia and Subcarpathia.

⁷⁹ As with any shift in a movement, it was possible to find Russophiles with a more radical political agenda before anyone identified the "new course." Austria-Hungary's initial reservations were not without merit.

substantial autonomy within the monarchy in 1867, they exhibited little tolerance for Russian-sympathizers. Despite repressions, a Subcarpathian minority, including figures like Adolf Dobriansky and Father Ioann (Ivan) Rakovskyy, continued to espouse Russophile views, with important consequences for subsequent conversion movements.⁸⁰ However, in the absence of a more powerful patron group (e.g., Galicia's Polish-identifiers), Subcarpathian Russophilism remained marginal at the political level.⁸¹

Some Russophiles, especially in Galicia, maintained ties with Pan-Slavists—or more precisely in this case, “Pan-Russianists”—in Russia, beginning in the 1870s with Russia's powerful *uberprocurator*, Konstantin Pobedonostsev.⁸² The key institution, and an object of intense focus in the treason trials of 1913-14, was the Galician Russky Benevolent Society: a trans-border organization, comprised of Galicians and Russian citizens and headed by Russia's statesmen and Orthodox churchmen, such as Count Vladimir A. Bobrinsky, Bishop Evlogy (Georgievsky), and Bishop Antony (Khrapovitsky). These and other religio-political actors in Russia subsidized Russophile publications in Galicia, like *Prykarpatska Rus* (“Subcarpathian Rus”), *Halychanyn* (“the Galician”) and *Lemko*, as well as Bukovina's *Russkaya Pravda* (“Russky Truth”) and *Tserkva i Vira* (Church and Faith). They also coordinated the missionary efforts to capitalize upon Russky Orthodox sentiments in Austria-Hungary, from fall 1911 through the onset of war.

Austro-Hungarian officials regarded elite-level Galician and Subcarpathian Russophilism and contacts with Russia's Pan-Slavists/Pan-Russianists with great apprehension; however, it was the mass manifestations of Russophilism—conversions of peasant Greek Catholics to the Russky Orthodox Church—which most alarmed Austria-Hungary's officials, and which raises for this study the very

⁸⁰ Dobriansky was implicated (and tried for treason) in the Hnylychky conversion movement of 1881-2. Rakovskyy was the long-time priest in Iza. Following his death, a conversion movement began there in 1903, in part due to Rakovskyy's influence, and in part due to remigrant influence from the United States.

⁸¹ In Subcarpathia, the Russky Orthodox conversion movements pushed the Greek Catholic hierarchy, which had previously lent greater support to the Rusynophile movement, more firmly into the Magyarophile camp, because they needed the government's help in suppressing the conversions. The Rusynophile movement suffered as a consequence. See: Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*.

⁸² Going beyond the customary Pan-Slavic appeal to “fellow Slavs,” such actors argued that Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholics were “fellow Russians.”

question asked by prosecutors in the early twentieth-century treason trials: did peasant conversions represent ethnonational and political acts? In truth, there did exist a degree of popular engagement with the various ethnonational—and often politicized—orientations of Rusynophilism, Rusky-Ukrainophilism, Magyarophilism, and Russophilism. Not a few of Galicia’s peasants, for example, participated as members in institutions like the Kachkovsky (Russophile) and Prosvita (Rusky-Ukrainophile) societies, and there is evidence of ethnonational and political interpretations of Greek Catholic-to-Rusky Orthodox conversion by both peasant converts and peasant loyalists. Thanks to aggressive Magyarization, comparable peasant-level institutional ethnonationalism was virtually non-existent in Subcarpathia.

Despite some popular consciousness in Subcarpathia and Galicia, it is most useful to begin as a baseline with the “national indifference” of the masses.⁸³ In both regions, many of the Greek Catholic rank-and-file exhibited little or no concern with the ethnonational debates occupying many of their pastors and some of their fellow peasants. They may have employed non-national, geographic self-descriptors at the imperial, regional, or village level (“Austro-Hungarian,” “Galician,” “Becherovans”) or simply called themselves *tuteshni*—“the people from here” who spoke *po nashomy*—“according to ours.” They may have also preferred to identify themselves in purely religious terms: “Greek Catholic” or “Orthodox.”⁸⁴ By at least the time the conversions began, however, there were also a significant number of peasants in Galicia and Subcarpathia who called themselves “Russky/Rusky” and “Rusyn,” and who referred to their religion, whether Greek Catholic or Orthodox, simply as “our Russky/Rusky faith” (*nashsa Russka/Ruska Vira*).⁸⁵ Even many of those who identified as “Russky/Rusky” and “Rusyn” exhibited national indifference, though, when those terms carried neither political significance nor a platform for collective action; it would be erroneous to classify such individuals as “Russophile” in the

⁸³ On national indifference, see: Zahra, "Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis."; Brubaker, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town*; Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*; King, "The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond."; King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948*.

⁸⁴ It will be remembered that many who were officially designated as Greek Catholic continued to call themselves “orthodox/Orthodox.”

⁸⁵ Indeed, the use of this ambiguous moniker became a facilitating factor for conversions.

same sense as politicized Russophile elites, even if those “nationally indifferent” individuals allied with Russophiles in the matter of Rusky Orthodox conversion.

That distinction is apparent in the Rusky/Rusky terminological ambiguity. Russophiles in Galicia and Subcarpathia preferred “Rusky” (two “s”s) for self-identification.⁸⁶ Rank-and-file Greek Catholics and Orthodox converts with affinities for Russophile activists—whose own political orientation toward Russia was not a given, even—may or may not have oriented politically toward Russia, themselves. When Russophiles appealed to “Rusky” people, many peasants simply heard the term by which they had always called themselves. Rusky-Ukrainophile attempts to distinguish between “Rusky” and “Rusky” fell on many deaf ears.⁸⁷ Galicia’s Rusky-Ukrainophiles and Subcarpathia’s Magyarophiles and Rusynophiles could reject Russophile rights to the term “Rusky,” by carefully substituting alternatives like “*rossysky*,” “Russophile,” and “Moscophile,” employing scare quotes around “Rusky,” or even deploying the absurd “Russsky” to mock the fetishization of the “s.” As long as Russophiles retained the term, though, and as Rusky-Ukrainophiles increasingly insisted upon self-identifying as “Ukrainian,” many perceived “Ukrainians” and “Magyars” (Magyarized Greek Catholics) as fabricators of novel identifications, rather than “Rusky” activists who, as it were, spoke their language.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ I have retained the term “Rusky,” rather than translating it as “Russian,” as most of the secondary literature—and Rusky-Ukrainophiles of the period—have. In contemporary Russian language, “*Rusky*” means “Russian,” but in contemporary Ukrainian (and in the language of turn-of-the-century Rusky-Ukrainophiles) “*Rosysky*” is the term to indicate “Russian.” “Rusky” (two “s”s) does not appear in contemporary Ukrainian language, and “Rusky” is simply understood by today’s Ukrainophiles as an archaic precursor to “Ukrainian.” It is worth considering the ambiguity that would arise, then, when a Russophile said that he or she spoke the “Rusky” language. If someone were to ask such a Russophile, “But in which language are you saying that you speak the ‘Rusky’ language?” it would only lead to an equally ambiguous response and an interminable, circular repetition of the same series of questions and answers. See Appendix C.

⁸⁷ Many lay converts, however, did exhibit consciousness of the Rusky/Rusky distinction.

⁸⁸ As a final note in this terminological discussion, in spite of this study’s attempts to avoid naturalizing the terminology of nationalists, the use of the terms “Rusky-Ukrainophile,” “Russophile,” “Rusynophile,” and “Magyarophile” in a sense does exactly that. Adherents of all of these orientations used the suffix “-ophile” (or an equivalent, like the suffix “-one” (“-speaking”) or scare quotes) to describe one another, though they never did so for themselves. Rusky-Ukrainophiles either called themselves “Rusky” or “Ukrainian” people, but their enemies were “*Russophiles*” or “*Moscophiles*.” Russophiles, in turn, understood themselves as “Rusky” people, but their enemies were “Ukrainophiles,” “Ukrainianists” or “Ukrainians” (in scare quotes). People often date the constructivist turn in nationalism studies in the early 1980s, with scholars like Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, and Ernst Gellner; but long before these modernist theorists appeared on the scene, the nationalists themselves—primordialists *par excellence*—were articulating well-developed, constructivist and modernist theories,

Thus, elite-level Russophile-Orthodoxophile activists, who sought to foster Russky Orthodox conversion among the peasant masses, encountered a populace with varying identifications along a spectrum of ethnonational consciousness: utter indifference, mere cultural affiliation, and confirmed ethnonational and politicized partisanship. This study keeps that variance in view—whether in reference to the region of migratory origin (Austria-Hungary) or various regions of migratory destination—rather than replicating partisan claims, as some secondary works have done, which reductively lumped converts into one, monolithic category: whether “guilty political agitators,” “innocent religious actors,” or “mised ignorant masses.” Lastly, it must be said that the various ethnonational streams, exhibited by Greek Catholics in the region of origin in varying degrees of commitment, converged as migrants from Galicia and Subcarpathia found themselves living and worshiping alongside one another, for a time, at least, in the Americas.

Much of the current study focuses upon the indirect transmission of Russky Orthodox influences from Russia to Austria-Hungary via the Americas; however, migrants and their influence also traveled directly between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Relative to massive intra-European and transatlantic labor migration (hundreds of thousands), their numbers were quite small (several thousand?), though they wielded disproportionate import in Greek Catholic-to-Russky Orthodox conversions. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, at least six types of Galician and Subcarpathian eastern Christian migrants crossed the Austro-Russian border, and sometimes returned: (1) Greek Catholic priests and teachers seeking employment; (2) secular and clerical converts to the Russky Orthodox Church seeking permanent residence in Russia; (3) prospective priests who enrolled in Orthodox seminaries; (4) sons and daughters

too. In the opinion of the “Ukrainians,” the “Russophiles” had artificially constructed their nationality, and recently at that; the “Russky” people levied a comparable charge of innovation at the “Ukrainophiles.” The main difference between these nationalists, on the one hand, and modernist theorists of nationhood since the 1980s, on the other, is that, while the former only identified some nations as constructed (never their own), modernists have considered all nations “imagined.” Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*; Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*.

of Russophile priests studying in the Russian Empire's schools; (5) pilgrims to Orthodox monasteries;⁸⁹ and (6) peasants seeking free land and better living conditions.⁹⁰ The first four involved the Russophile secular and clerical intelligentsia, while the fifth and sixth refer to collective peasant phenomena.

Many Russophile migrants, primarily from Galicia but also from Subcarpathia, oriented religiously and politically toward their region of migratory destination, Orthodox Russia, as an adoptive or "rediscovered" homeland. "State Rus" (*derzhavny Rus*) formed the nucleus of "one, Holy Rus," of which their native Galician and Subcarpathian regions comprised constituent parts. Important Russophile migrations between Austria-Hungary and Russia were connected with three incidents, in particular: the Chelm affair of the 1860s-70s; the Hnylychky incident of 1882-1884; and the post-1911 Russky Orthodox conversion movements in Galicia and Subcarpathia. Along with Austria-Hungary-to-Russia peasant migrations, the elite-level migrations associated with the earlier two events contained antecedents of transatlantic migrant conversion and continued to influence those movements, 1890-1914, by factoring in collective memory and shaping Russian and Austro-Hungarian state policies. The third event, post-1911 migrations, arose as a direct result of the post-1890 transatlantic migrant conversions.

In the 1860s and 70s, Greek Catholic teachers and priests migrated to Chelm, the Russian Empire's last Greek Catholic eparchy, as the tsarist regime sought migrants to de-Polonize and de-Latinize (Russify and Easternize) the region.⁹¹ Beginning in 1864, in the aftermath of the recent "Polish"

⁸⁹ Because of its brief duration, some might not consider pilgrimage as a form of "migration," but I have chosen to include it in this discussion of migration for three reasons: first, if pilgrimage represented a temporary form of migration, so too did some of the other categories; second, the Russky Orthodox influences which pilgrims remitted back to Austria-Hungary were comparable with those remitted by others who migrated to Russia for longer periods; and third, pilgrims' notions of place shared affinities with the forms of transnationalism with which this study is primarily concerned.

⁹⁰ [Chapter Three](#) addresses yet another category of migrants from Austria-Hungary to Russia—those who did so by way of the Americas.

⁹¹ Following the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the late eighteenth century, Catherine II and her successors had aggressively sought the elimination of the Greek Catholic rite, which the Russian Empire inadvertently acquired along with its new territories. Greek Catholicism in Chelm had persisted, however, because the Empire secured control over the region relatively late, in 1809, and then under the relative autonomy of Congress Poland. Polish-Russian conflicts, however, especially the insurrections of 1830-31 and 1863-64, prompted government repression and a reassertion of the region's historically Russian character. Pressures upon Greek

rebellion, the Russian government began looking abroad for an antidote to its Polish *cum* Greek Catholic “problem:” they found it among Galicia’s Pole-hating, anti-Latin, Russophile Greek Catholics. First through the Russian embassy in Vienna and then via the university in Lviv, the Russian Empire successfully recruited dozens or perhaps a few hundred Galician migrants, mostly young men in their twenties, to work as teachers and priests in Chelm. Economic motivations complemented Russophile and, for some, Orthodoxophile ideological orientations, prompting the migrants to leave Austria-Hungary for Russia, where they enjoyed better wages and greater career prospects.⁹²

Galician Greek Catholics contributed to the “purification” and eventually the institutional elimination of Greek Catholicism in Chelm, through Russky Orthodox conversion, by 1875. Backed by oppressive and violent tactics by Russia’s police and Cossacks, the Galician Markell Popel oversaw the mass conversion as Chelm’s initially Greek Catholic, then Russky Orthodox bishop, with the assistance

Catholics to convert ethnically and religiously to supposedly “Russian” Orthodoxy formed an integral part of this project, of which attempts to “purify” the Greek Catholic rite of “Polish” Latinisms would constitute its first stage. By the 1860s, however, the government had only been able to foster a small pro-Russian, pro-Orthodox cadre among Chelm’s Greek Catholics, most of whom instead forged an anti-Russian, anti-“schismatic” alliance with Polish-identifying Roman Catholics and retained their supposedly “Polish-Latin” version of Greek Catholicism. Practically speaking, the “purification” entailed things like banning organs, Polish hymns, and rosaries, (re)introducing iconostases, and distributing Orthodox liturgical books. These heavy-handed Russification policies also inadvertently contributed to the rising Rusky-Ukrainophilism within Russia (and by association, in Galicia and the Americas). See Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: the Greek Catholic Church and Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900*, 32-41, 57-64.

⁹² Ibid., 34. Whereas in Galicia, the Polonization of schools had compromised Greek Catholic teachers’ employability and salaries, the Russian government paid them well in exchange for cooperation in its Russification efforts in Chelm. And while Greek Catholic priests in Galicia could expect some ten years of apprenticeship, itinerancy, and economic hardship before securing a parish of their own and the financial stability that went along with it, by crossing the Austro-Russian border, they could bypass this difficult period of initiation and immediately occupy Chelm’s vacant parish positions, particularly as the Russian government began forcibly removing Chelm’s indigenous priests who resisted de-Latinization, de-Polonization, and eventually, de-Catholicization. In this way, “what made things difficult for them at home was turned to positive advantage once they crossed the northern border”—it would not be the last time that material and ideological interests would coincide for potential Greek Catholic converts to the Russky Orthodox church. These migrants to Russia in the 1860s and 1870s encountered a similar set of circumstances to those which converting labor migrants and peasants in Austria-Hungary and the Americas would encounter beginning in the 1890s and continuing for the next twenty-five years: in a sense, both groups of converts “found themselves in that morally slippery situation in which the relationship between principle and self-interest becomes too convenient, when one’s views on religion and politics just happen to lead as well to the easy life.” Ibid., 35.

of many Galician émigré priests in Chelm's parishes.⁹³ Much of the general populace and many indigenous Greek Catholic priests greeted the conversion effort and the Galicians with resistance and hostility.⁹⁴

Enjoying the fulfillment of their religious and political goals, most Galician migrant priests went along with or energetically promoted the conversion. Following the purges and the liquidation of Greek Catholicism, 143 of Chelm's 291 remaining, now Russky Orthodox priests were migrants from Galicia; forming the other side of the equation in this small-scale population swap, 66 of Chelm's indigenous priests departed, under duress, to Galicia.⁹⁵ Ultimately, the Galician migrants collaborated with Russia's suppression of resistance to the forcible conversion, resulting in the deportation of some 600 Greek Catholics, 108 dead, and many more brutally harassed.⁹⁶ Cognizance of the Chelm affair—not only as a

⁹³ An arrangement between the Russian Empire and the Vatican had in 1868 secured the appointment of a Galician as Chelm's Greek Catholic bishop, though his attempt to appease both parties disappointed them both. He ultimately resigned, paving the way for Popel, whom the Vatican never recognized and condemned.

⁹⁴ Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: the Greek Catholic Church and Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900*, 37 One opponent complained, for example, of the "wolves, who are all the Galicians, who came to us not through the door, but through the window like thieves." While the official representatives of the government may have welcomed them, the Empire's Greek Catholic constituents were another story: "The Galician emigrants could have had no doubt that their actions in purifying the ritual and converting to Orthodoxy went against the will of the local population and the local clergy." *Ibid.*, 60.

⁹⁵ Of the other remaining priests, 95 were indigenous converts and 53 had migrated from other parts of the Russian Empire. In Galicia the Russophiles largely succeeded in preventing their appointment in Greek Catholic parishes. Ideology certainly played a role in these migrants' decisions to remain in Russia, as it had in their initial motivations to migrate; as one of the remaining Galicians boasted, "We returned ourselves and our brothers in Chelm to the bosom of the Russian [Russky] church and Russian [Russky] nationality. We won a battle that had been undecided for centuries. We were able to attain victory over Polonism and ultramontanism, and even more surely we shall consolidate the Russian [Russky] Orthodoxy that we introduced." (*ibid.*, 59, 60-62.) Emphasis in the original, interpolations mine. Despite the rhetoric, however, the economic motivations which had facilitated the Galician migration also factored, for failure to cooperate would have meant "return to the place from which hunger and cold had driven them." (Father Stefan Kachala made this remark at the Galician diet of 1881. *Stenograficzne Sprawozdania*, 717, quoted in *ibid.*, 60.)

⁹⁶ "Persisters" nevertheless continued to constitute a problem for Russia, and in a concession to the Poles after the revolution of 1905, it permitted the Orthodox to become Catholic once again, albeit Latin, not Greek rite. As of 1908, 170,000 of 450,000 had availed themselves of this option. (*ibid.*, 60.) It is worth keeping this in mind, when considering the repressive measures later implemented by Austria-Hungary against Russky Orthodox converts between the late-1890s and 1914: for two reasons. First, as a matter of perspective, clear violations of human rights and religious freedoms—barefoot marches through snow, beatings, arrests, deportations, and killings—characterized actions directed against both Greek Catholics and the Russky Orthodox, whether in the Russian Empire's liquidation of Chelm, Austria-Hungary's suppression of Russky Orthodox movements as treasonous, or, for that matter, the repressions of Orthodox opponents to the Unia within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Kingdom of Hungary in the seventh and eighteenth centuries. Secondly, Greek Catholic loyalists in Austria-Hungary and the Americas certainly kept the Chelm affair in mind as they battled Russky Orthodox conversions after 1890: in

historical event, but as an ongoing struggle in Russia—continued to influence activists on either side of the conflict throughout all regions of migration well into the twentieth century.⁹⁷ Greek Catholic loyalists commonly interpreted conversions in Austria-Hungary and the Americas as the extension of the Russian Empire’s nefarious deeds in Chelm. Chelm had direct bearing on future conversion movements also, as Russky Orthodox churchmen stationed there intervened in the conversion movements on both sides of the Atlantic, most notably the future Archbishop Tikhon of North America (and eventual patriarch of Russia’s Orthodox Church), and Bishop Evlogy, a key activist in the Galician and Subcarpathian conversions.

The events surrounding another, much smaller migration of Galician and Subcarpathian Russophiles directly to Russia produced a disproportionately significant impact. In 1882, 129 residents of Hnylychky (Zbarazh county, near Galicia’s eastern border with Russia) declared their intention to convert from Greek Catholicism to the Russky Orthodox Church. As the first such incident in Austria-Hungary in the nineteenth century, it constitutes an important precedent for subsequent conversions associated with mass migration, beginning around 1890. Although migration from Galicia to the Americas had begun in the 1870s, and one of the Hnylychky movement’s leaders corresponded with Russky Orthodox-affiliating migrants in the United States, at least by the late-1880s, the 1882 Hnylychky conversions likely bore no connection with migration to the Americas, instead having more to do with migration to Russia.⁹⁸ Many aspects of the Hnylychky incident, however, anticipated the post-1890 conversions which took place in the context of transatlantic migration.

response to Russky Orthodox activists, who claimed that Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics, including migrants in the Americas, only remained Greek Catholic so long as Austria-Hungary prevented return to their ancestral faith, Greek Catholic loyalists could point to the example of Chelm, where not only had Greek Catholics not converted when free to do so, they had stalwartly resisted when forced to, even well into the twentieth century.

⁹⁷ Some migrants from Austria-Hungary to America would even migrate again to Chelm in the early twentieth century as part of the efforts to install Orthodoxy there.

⁹⁸ Father Ioann Naumovych claimed in 1889 to have received letters (on unspecified earlier dates) from “Lemko” migrants living in the United States, whom he regarded as Russky Orthodox; at the 1882 treason trial he did also have in his possession a Bible printed New York. See [Chapter Five](#).

Economic interests, specifically the desire to escape financial obligations associated with constructing a new church, partially motivated Hnylychky's residents to declare their conversion. Additionally, between the 1860s and 80s, rumors circulated in Galician villages that Russia's tsar would invade Galicia and redistribute Jewish and Polish land holdings to converted peasants. Lastly, as the ensuing investigation and treason trial determined, a number of Russophile activists facilitated the conversions, including the Galician Greek Catholic priest, Father Ioann Naumovych, and the Subcarpathian activists, Adolf Dobriansky and his daughter Olga Grabar.⁹⁹ Critics of these Russophiles interpreted their role in the Hnylychky conversions in light of their supposed political orientation toward Russia. They charged that, just as the incident demonstrated Greek-Catholic-to-Russky Orthodox conversion as Russophilism's logical extension, any such conversions would necessitate suppression as Russian political movements directed against the interests of Austria-Hungary. Father Naumovych's activities were, indeed, subsidized directly by the Russian government, at the behest of *uberprocurator* Konstantin Pobedonostsev.¹⁰⁰ Convicted, Father Naumovych served his sentence, before formally undergoing Russky Orthodox conversion and leaving with his family for Russia.¹⁰¹ Grabar and her family also migrated eventually to Russia, after living temporarily in Italy.

⁹⁹ Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: the Greek Catholic Church and Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900*. For the full transcript of the trial (in a mixture of German, Polish, and close approximations of modern Russian and Ukrainian), see: Stephan Huchkovsky, ed. *Stenographychesky Otchet yz Sudovoy Rospravi po Dily Olhy Hrabar y Tovaryshey* (L'viv: Stavropyhisky Institut, 1882). The investigation determined that Father Naumovych, although a Greek Catholic priest, had drafted the petition for Hnylychky's would-be converts. Father Naumovych exhibited Russophile-Orthodoxophile sympathies and regularly traveled to Russia; he established the Kachkovsky Society, an organization aimed at enlightenment of the people in the "Russky" spirit. His *A Glimpse into the Future* argued for union with the people of Great Russia, and without explicitly calling for the annexation of Austro-Hungarian territories, implied it. During the course of the trial, the prosecution also accused Dobriansky and Grabar of maintaining cross-border ties with parties in Russia. The prosecution also introduced correspondence with the notable Russophile Greek Catholic priest, Ioann Rakovsky, of the Subcarpathian village of Iza. After Rakovsky's death, Iza became a major center of Russky Orthodox conversion (1903ff).

¹⁰⁰ See [Chapters Five](#) and [Ten](#).

¹⁰¹ Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: the Greek Catholic Church and Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900*. In Russia, according to some accounts, he received a generous pension. According to others—his Greek Catholic enemies—he found a Russky Orthodox hierarchy and society unwelcoming of him, even though he had acted as their "turncoat." Naturally, in these accounts, he died a disaffected, dejected man. For an example of such an account, see: Soter Ortynsky, "Soter Ortynsky," *Nyva* 5, no. 5 (March 1, 1908): 142.

The Hnylychky incident prefigured some of the contributing factors in many of the conversions which took place after 1890 in the context of transatlantic labor migration. The villagers converted due to a combination of economic and ideological causes. Additionally, notwithstanding Father Naumovych's eventual conversion, he facilitated the Hnylychky conversions while he himself still remained a Greek Catholic. In the ensuing decades, other priests and laypeople acted similarly, both within the Americas and Austria-Hungary. These and other activists echoed Naumovych's appeal to Orthodoxy as the ancestral faith and denunciation of the Unia as a Polish- and Vatican-orchestrated innovation, designed to de-nationalize the Russky people. Finally, some migrant converts in the Americas, like Naumovych, eventually migrated (again) to the Russian Empire.¹⁰²

The Hnylychky incident and the resulting treason trial also exacerbated tensions between Austrian officials and the Russophile movement, with the latter becoming increasingly radicalized. The legacy of Hnylychky significantly colored Austria-Hungary's response to the Russky Orthodox conversion movements, which spread back from the Americas in the early twentieth century. In this new era, Austro-Hungarian officials again overheard rumors of tsarist annexation, but now it was possible to identify "America" as their source. Furthermore, Habsburg fears were not entirely unfounded, for the Hnylychky incident appears to have prompted some of Russia's government officials—Konstantin

¹⁰² Himka, "The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I," 483; Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Kachkovs'kyi Society and the National Revival in Nineteenth-Century East Galicia," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* XV, no. 1/2 (June 1991). The events surrounding Hnylychky also produced important direct impacts on the later conversion movements. Into the twentieth century, Russky Orthodox activists continued to write hagiographies of Father Naumovych as a forerunner to the movements they were fostering in Austria-Hungary and the Americas. Greek Catholic loyalists in the later period also cited the "the apostate Naumovych," though as an example of Russophilism's deleterious and "demoralizing" impact; they highlighted his disaffection with the Russian Empire. Additionally, Father Naumovych's Kachkovsky Society would go on to establish many branches in Galician villages; it would become an important transnational organization for the dissemination of inclinations toward Russky Orthodox conversions. Not only did the Kachkovsky reading rooms help "prepare" potential migrants for conversion in the Americas, those migrants also established branches abroad. Furthermore, with the remittance of the conversion movements from the Americas back across the Atlantic Ocean, the Kachkovsky reading rooms in Austria-Hungary became important targets of converted migrants' economic remittances.

Pobedonostsev and Tsar Alexander among them—to redirect their promotion of Russophilism and Orthodoxophilism across the ocean to transatlantic migrants.¹⁰³

The third incident entailed the arrival of “homegrown” missionaries to Galicia and Subcarpathia from Russia. In the early twentieth century, a number of Galicians and Subcarpathians of Greek Catholic background migrated temporarily to Russia for Orthodox seminary training, before returning to their native regions as Russky Orthodox missionaries. The most famous to do so were Fathers Maksym Sandovych, Ignatii Hudyma, and Alexei Kabaliuk, who, as leaders of the conversions in Austria-Hungary after 1911, faced charges of treason in the trials of 1913-14.¹⁰⁴ These remigrants from the East and their sponsors in Russia responded to preexisting inclinations toward conversion, fostered especially by remigrants from the West: the Americas. The insider status of the missionaries “from” Russia ensured that they—as with transatlantic labor remigrants—were “familiar messengers,” who delivered conversion remittances to Galicia and Subcarpathia, “with references.”¹⁰⁵

Finally, two small-scale forms of migration of Austria-Hungary’s peasantry to the Russian Empire deserve mention: settlement and pilgrimage. The numbers of peasants who successfully migrated to Russia from Austria-Hungary were quite low. Between 1891 and 1892, for example, some six thousand Greek Catholic peasants responded to rumors of better living conditions in the Russian Empire, and the supposed desire of the tsar for “‘Ruthenians’ to replace the ‘useless’ Jews who had been driven

¹⁰³ It is difficult to determine the sequence of causation in this redirection with certainty. To say “Conversion did not work in Galicia, so Russia turned to the Americas,” would be an oversimplification. The 1881-82 Hnylychky incident certainly demonstrated to Russia’s activists the difficulties associated with the direct promotion of Russky Orthodox conversion in Austria-Hungary. Yet those officials did not immediately turn their attention to the Americas as an alternative: only when Father Toth and his congregation approached the United States Russky Orthodox Church in 1890 did the shift in attention of parties in Russia to the Americas become apparent. Still, Russia’s actors energetically embraced the opportunity when presented with it—an enthusiasm which must have been conditioned in large part by reticence about direct action in Austria-Hungary.

¹⁰⁴ Their return and that of other missionaries to Austria-Hungary forms the subject of the final chapter of this study.

¹⁰⁵ According to Peggy Levitt, social remittances (“the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from host- to sending-country communities”) are “delivered by a familiar messenger who comes ‘with references.’ The personalized character of this kind of communication stands in contrast to the faceless, mass-produced nature of global cultural diffusion.” Levitt, *The Transnational Villagers*, 55, 64.

out or simply killed off” during the pogroms of 1881. Russian border guards sent many of the migrants back to their native regions.¹⁰⁶ In later years, small numbers of migrants traveling first to the Americas and converting there also eventually underwent similarly idealistic migrations to Russia.¹⁰⁷

Secondly, Russophile elites led groups of Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholic peasants on pilgrimages to Orthodox sites in Russia, such as Pochaiv, just across the border, or to Kyiv, where pilgrims found impressive monasteries, churches, and Orthodox instruction. A lay activist in the Hnylychky conversions had conducted such pilgrimages in the late 1870s or early 1880s. In 1892 alone, 5,000 Greek Catholic pilgrims came from Galicia to Pochaiv, of which seventy-five converted.¹⁰⁸ In 1908, the prominent Russophile Dmitry A. Markov led some 230 Galicians on a pilgrimage to Kyiv. Austro-Hungarian governmental and Greek Catholic officials alike regarded the phenomenon as problematic and attempted to curtail it as early as the 1890s, and especially after 1910. In its mass form, such pilgrimages comprised residents of the Austro-Russian borderlands.¹⁰⁹ Although in 1908-09, the bishop of Przemyśl investigated such pilgrimages as a potential source of Orthodox conversions appearing in his western Galician diocese, he discovered a far more significant cause in transatlantic migration. “Pilgrimages” to Orthodox churches in Austrian Bukovina also factored in the Galician conversion movements surrounding the village of Zaluche. Even here, the “American factor,” specifically, migration to Canada, likely provided the primary catalyst.¹¹⁰

Besides small-scale migrations from Austria-Hungary to Russia, more numerically substantial intra-European labor migration flowed between Galicia and Subcarpathia, on the one hand, and Germany, Austrian Bukovina, and regions of Hungary, prior to and concurrent with mass migration to the Americas. Limited industrialization and arable land, together with available work elsewhere, prompted these

¹⁰⁶ Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 61.

¹⁰⁷ See [Chapter Three](#).

¹⁰⁸ Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*, 411, 19.

¹⁰⁹ Himka, "The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I," 483-84.

¹¹⁰ See [Chapter Eight](#).

migrations. Migrants from the Lemko region crossed over the Carpathian Mountains on a seasonal basis to labor in the Hungarian lowlands.¹¹¹ Many also went to Germany for seasonal labor migration. By 1900, some 44,000 Galicians were living in Bukovina, 50,000 in Silesia, 23,000 in Bohemia, and 31,000 in Moravia.¹¹² It was “the exception rather than the rule for East Central European peasants to have spent all their lives involved solely in agriculture and staying put in their native villages.”¹¹³

Each of these migratory regions bore unique significance for the conversion movements. The exposure of Greek Catholics to Orthodox communities in Bukovina, and Hungary’s potential exposure of Galician and Subcarpathian Greek Catholic migrants to one another, anticipated and coincided with analogous intermingling of Galicians, Subcarpathians, and Bukovinians in the Americas. Additionally, Greek Catholic fears of migrant defections to the Latin Rite in Germany corresponded to similar anxieties regarding Greek Catholic-Latin Catholic tensions in the Americas, largely responsible for Russky Orthodox conversions there.¹¹⁴ Lastly, labor migration to England resulted in early precedents for the conversion movements in the Americas.¹¹⁵

2.2 TRANSATLANTIC MIGRATION AND THE AMERICAS

Intra-European labor migrations served as precursors and catalysts for the transatlantic migration critical to fostering conversions in the Americas and Austria-Hungary, 1890-1914. Intra-European

¹¹¹ Paul Robert Magocsi, “Geography and Economy,” in Magocsi and Pop, *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*; Bogdan Horbal, *Lemko Studies: a Handbook*, 1st ed., East European Monographs (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2008).

¹¹² John E. Bodnar, *The Transplanted: a History of Immigrants in Urban America*, Interdisciplinary Studies in History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).

¹¹³ Ewa T. Morawska, *For Bread with Butter: The Life-worlds of East Central Europeans in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, 1890-1940*, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Modern History (Cambridge Cambridgeshire; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 39.

¹¹⁴ For an example of fears regarding Latin defections in Germany, see: Fr. Ivan Mazepynets, "Ad majorem Poloniae laetitiam," *Nyva* 5, no. 18-19 (October 1, 1908).

¹¹⁵ See [Chapter Four](#).

movements established a pattern of mass temporary labor migration, by the time that temporary transatlantic labor migration became feasible. That pre-existing culture of migration, within a “Europe on the move,” contributed to the numbers of migrants willing and eager to extend existing migration patterns beyond Europe’s shores, beyond the *kray*, to the Americas, all regions of which most migrants knew collectively as “America.”

Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics arrived to the United States first in the late 1870s, but their numbers escalated sharply in the 1880s and continued at a high rate—excepting periods of denouement during U.S. economic downturns—through the end of the period under consideration, 1914.¹¹⁶ They began arriving to Canada in the early 1890s, but in larger numbers by the end of the decade. Migration of Greek Catholics to Brazil began slightly later, in the middle of the 1890s. Lastly, they came to Argentina first in 1897, and in greater numbers around the turn of the century. The following represents a brief survey of estimates of total numbers of Greek Catholic migrants to each region.

The United States officially recorded the entrance of 254,376 “Ruthenians” from 1899-1914. In 1914, immigration scholar Julian Bachynsky estimated that 33,886 “Ukrainians” came to the United States between 1877 and 1887, and 74,379 from 1888-1898. He arrived at a number of 470,000 first- and second-generation “Ukrainians” living in the United States as of 1909.¹¹⁷ Myron Kuropas then estimated that perhaps 500,000 individuals of Greek Catholic background (first- and second-generation) lived in the United States as of 1914.¹¹⁸

As for Canada, according to Martynowych, 60,000 “Ukrainians” arrived from Austria-Hungary to Canada between 1897 and 1905, and 161,000 between 1908 and 1914.¹¹⁹ In Brazil and Argentina, a census conducted by Greek Catholic Basilian monks in 1913-14 enumerated 43,751 “Ukrainians.” The

¹¹⁶ The war diminished such migration markedly, followed by its resumption 1918-24. Immigration restriction in 1924 lasted until 1965.

¹¹⁷ Importantly, Bachynsky also attempted to factor remigration into this number.

¹¹⁸ Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954*, 24-25; Iulian Bachynsky, *Ukrainska immigratsia v Ziedynenykh Derzhavakh Ameryky* (L’viv 1914).

¹¹⁹ Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 43-44.

Basilians also believed, however, the real number to be closer to 50,000, with 42,000 in Brazil and 8,000 in Argentina.¹²⁰ One source estimated that as of 1914, 12,000 to 15,000 first- and second-generation “Ukrainians,” from Austria-Hungary and Russia, lived in Argentina.¹²¹

While these numbers are of some utility as general guidelines, to take them overly seriously would be problematic, given that they are likely significantly inaccurate. An accurate count of the number of Greek Catholic migrants who came to each region is virtually impossible, for two reasons. First, migrants in each region provided varying terms to identify themselves to immigration officials: “Austrian,” “Hungarian,” “Rusnak,” “Galician,” “Ukrainian,” “Russian,” “Little Russian,” etc.¹²² A corollary problem is that migrants began identifying themselves in different ways after arriving in the Americas. Russky Orthodox converts do not factor in every scholarly census of “Ukrainian” immigration, and the reverse holds true for attempts to count “Russians.” Yet many of the “Russians” who might count in a “Russian” census came from the same villages as “Ukrainians” who might not count, and vice versa.

Another challenge lies in extremely high remigration rates among Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox converts from Austria-Hungary between 1890 and 1914: almost certainly over fifty percent. If emigration and immigration records in the Americas were imprecise, Austria-Hungary’s remigration records were more so. Furthermore, many remigrants to Austria-Hungary eventually came again to the Americas, some making several migrations, remigrations, and re-remigrations. Multiple visits to the Americas both concealed the number who left and inflated the count of those who arrived. Ambiguous

¹²⁰ Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*, 1, fn. 3.

¹²¹ M. R., “Ukrainci v Argentyni i Uruhuai,” 40, cited in *ibid.*, 12.

¹²² Many scholars of “Ukrainian” or “Rusyn” immigration history have regarded this terminological confusion as an obstacle to determining how many migrants to a particular region were “actually” Ukrainian or “actually” Rusyn. Following Jeremy King’s critique of “ethnicism,” however, this study argues that even if migrants *had* identified themselves consistently as “Ukrainian” or “Rusyn,” this would not result in a definite determination of their “actual” ethnic identity. The main problem that multiple ambiguous terms of self-identification poses for enumeration in this study, therefore, is not its obfuscation of the correct count of “Ukrainians,” “Rusyns,” or any other ethnic group; it is rather the difficulties it poses for an accurate count of Greek Catholic migrants. The notion that these migrants were definitely “Greek Catholic” also requires qualification. Despite their official classification as “Greek Catholic” by Greek Catholic hierarchs and Austro-Hungarian officials, many had no concept of themselves as “Greek Catholic.”

ethnonational identification, together with massive remigration suggest that, while the numbers above provide a sense of regional variation across the Americas, they also do not represent an exact count of Greek Catholic migrants.

It is possible to differentiate the Greek Catholic migrants coming to the Americas beginning in the 1870s into two major groupings: temporary labor migrants and permanent settlers. It is possible to further differentiate by migrant intentions and the decisions they ultimately implemented. A percentage of those who intended to work only temporarily in the Americas eventually decided to settle there (some only after a remigration or several remigrations); likewise, some migrants originally intending their migration to the Americas to be permanent, nevertheless returned to a region of origin (some for visits and some ultimately to settle again in native villages).

The vast majority of Greek Catholic migrants to the Americas before 1914 came as temporary labor migrants. Indeed, the possibility and ease of return, afforded through improved steamship technology and expanding railroads, played a large role in promoting their migration, in the first place. The largest numbers of Greek Catholic temporary labor migrants came to the United States: for work in mines, factories, and other sectors of the industrial labor market. But Canada, Brazil, and Argentina—known especially for attracting migrations of agricultural settlement—also received Greek Catholics as temporary labor migrants. Canada boasted a number of industrial labor opportunities in frontier towns, and Brazil and Argentina both attracted temporary workers for railroad construction and factory work.

While migrants did come to the Americas “to find a better life,” most in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries intended to earn capital for a temporary period to improve their lot, and frequently that of their families, *in regions of origin*, to which they intended to return. The ultimate goal often included the purchase of land in one’s native village in the *kray*. The duration of migration could range from a few months to decades, but most commonly they remained three to four years.¹²³ Many transatlantic migrants spent more than one term laboring in the Americas—again, hoping their efforts

¹²³ Mark Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

would pay off in regions of origin. Vanguard migration waves, comprised mostly of young single men, nevertheless generally migrated as part of a family economy. Subsequent waves of temporary labor migrants included single women, married couples, and even families. Most came in a pattern of “chain migration:” networks of kin and friends on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean facilitated their migration and remigration.

Greek Catholic migrants who came as agricultural settlers went especially to Canada, Brazil, and Argentina. Although the United States had parceled out the majority of its homesteads by the 1880s, some agricultural settlers did also come there during the period. Greek Catholic agriculturalists often came to these regions, attracted through recruitment by governments and private agencies like steam liner companies and railroad cooperatives. Agricultural settlers most often came as families, sometimes voyaging together, in other cases in stages. In addition to agricultural settlers, some migrants who came for industrial work also intended permanent settlement. Their family patterns often matched those of agricultural settlers, although many “industrial settlers” had initially come as temporary labor migrants, before ultimately determining to remain. It was very common, for example, for a young man who migrated temporarily to the United States, to return to the *kray* only to marry, then migrate again to the United States with his wife and children for permanent settlement.

The baseline pattern for temporary labor migrants entailed labor for a set time in the Americas, followed by return; the pre-migration intention to earn capital abroad, for the subsidization of the family economy and/or land purchase in a region of origin, does not alone account for transnationalism among turn-of-the-twentieth-century Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox migrants, however. Migrating on a “trial basis,” many delayed decision upon the matter of ultimate settlement or return.¹²⁴ While old world magnetism, especially “land hunger,” promoted transnational ties, magnetic repulsions from regions of destination also arose to prompt sustained connections with regions of origin through correspondence,

¹²⁴ George Gmelch, "Return Migration," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 9(1980): 138.

economic and social remittances, and return migration(s). The dynamics of race in the Americas represented particularly formidable challenges to migrant integration in New World societies and provided some of the most important catalysts for transnationalism.

While the next chapter analyzes actual forms of transnationalism (remittances and remigrations), the remainder of this chapter considers race in the Americas as a transnational catalyst: the United States and Canada together comprise a “North American” unit, while Brazil and Argentina comprise a “South American” unit. Each country exhibited racial dynamics unique within its own borders, including intra-regional variations, as well as commonalities with countries in the other unit. It is possible to draw distinctions between the United States and Canada, or between Brazil and Argentina, just as it is possible to find commonalities between Canada and Argentina—and this chapter does highlight some of these qualifications.

In the mid-1970s, Fernando Cerase argued that, in addition to a “return of conservatism,” oriented toward the purchase of land in regions of origin, some individuals remigrated due to inability to incorporate into a radically unfamiliar society, characterized by forms—unspecified by Cerase—of “prejudices and stereotypes which [the migrant] finds bewildering and humiliating.” Return for these reasons Cerase deemed a “return of failure.”¹²⁵ Other scholars in the 1960s and 1970s pointed to the role of racial discrimination in motivating remigration.¹²⁶

Since the early 1990s, some scholars have incorporated return migration within a broader framework of “transnationalism.” Remigration in this schema is not a “once-and-for-all” phenomenon, but rather part of ongoing, multi-stranded ties between regions of origin and destination, sustained not just by a single return migration, but multiple return trips (cyclical migration or “transmigration”), regular

¹²⁵ Francesco Cerase, “Expectations and Reality: a Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy,” *International Migration Review* 8, no. 2 (Summer 1974): 249, 54. Cerase’s description of the immigrant encounter with American society relied explicitly on Handlin’s work.

¹²⁶ See, for example: B. Davison, “No Place Back Home: a Study of Jamaicans Returning to Kingston, Jamaica,” *Race* 9(1968); José Hernández Alvarez and University of California Berkeley. Institute of International Studies., *Return migration to Puerto Rico*, Population monograph series (Berkeley,: Institute of International Studies, 1967); E. Taylor, “The Social Adjustment of Returned Migrants to Jamaica,” in *Ethnicity in the Americas*, ed. F. Henry (The Hague: Mouton, 1976).

communication, and social and economic remittances.¹²⁷ These scholars have argued that, following the lifting of United States immigration restrictions in 1965, “new” immigration waves from the Global South and Asia to the United States encountered socio-economic obstacles to assimilation and incorporation on a bio-cultural racial basis.¹²⁸ While mainstream society might have discriminated against earlier migrants for their ethnicity or simple foreignness, ethnicity’s supposedly purely cultural content allowed for eventual migrant incorporation, via assimilation and Americanization, in a manner precluded by biological notions of race, brought to bear upon post-1965 migrants.

In this model, “Irish,” “German,” “Italian,” “Polish” or “Greek” and other migrants—the so-called “white ethnics” could, in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, “become American.” They had only to abandon old-world ties and cultural traditions in conflict with American values, participate in American democracy, assent to free-market economic principles, acquire citizenship, and perhaps enlist in the military. On the other hand, “Indian,” “Asian,” or “African” migrants of the post-1965 “new immigration” might accomplish all of these modifications in cultural behavior, but they could never alter the biological, enduring, and—in “white” American society—disadvantageous fact of their race. According to vanguard theorists of transnationalism, propensities to maintain ties with regions origin thus increased for post-1965 migrants, because their prospects for incorporation into the “host” society were closer to “never,” instead of the “eventually,” to which earlier “uprooted” migration waves aspired.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ For more on theories of remigration, including within transnationalism studies, see [Chapter Three](#).

¹²⁸ On this point, see especially Basch, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-states*. For these anthropologists, transnationalism is both an “accommodation” and “creative response” to the global penetration of capital and a hegemonic “global racial order” (*ibid.*, 10).

¹²⁹ Critics have energetically pointed out that (like Cerase) the *Nations Unbound* scholars relied heavily upon Handlin’s characterization of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century immigration in order to generate a foil against which to articulate the supposed distinctiveness of transnationalism among post-1965 migrants. American immigration historiography during the Handlin period focused upon two dominant themes: “uprooted-ness” (Handlin’s term) and assimilation (promoted especially by Robert Park and “the Chicago School” of sociology). In these formulations, immigrants to America migrated largely as individual units, in a process divorcing them from traditional kin- and friendship networks. Upon arrival, they abandoned connections with regions of migratory origin, resulting in a period of maladjustment and “alienation” (a category borrowed from the pioneering work of Thomas and Znaniecki; see: William Isaac Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America; Monograph of an Immigrant Group*, 5 vols. (Chicago, Ill.,: The University of Chicago press, 1918). While initially religious- and ethnic-based groupings facilitated adaptation, immigrants steadily assimilated to dominant American culture and relinquished not only old world ties, but also socio-cultural forms, in a supposedly

Emerging concurrently with transnationalism studies in the early 1990s, however, practitioners of another academic discipline, critical whiteness studies, began to oppose this understanding of American attitudes toward immigration before 1965, though at first neither discipline directly engaged the other. Whiteness historians demonstrated that nineteenth and early-twentieth century migration waves from Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as Ireland, faced bio-racial—not just cultural-ethnic—forms of socioeconomic discrimination in the United States.¹³⁰ Many representatives of dominant American society perceived the first wave of “new immigration,” beginning in the 1880s, as distinct from previous migration waves, not only due to its sheer volume and new regions of migratory supply, but also because

inevitable and desirable process. At the time of Cerase’s 1974 article, migration scholars were in the midst of revising some of these earlier assumptions. In 1964—incidentally, at the same time that Milton Gordon published the fullest and most influential articulation of that paradigm, with his seven-stage model of assimilation: acculturation, structural assimilation, marital assimilation, identification assimilation, attitude reception assimilation, behavior reception assimilation, civic assimilation (Milton Myron Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life: the Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).)—Rudolph Vecoli had signaled the shift from the old models (Rudolph Vecoli, “Contadini in Chicago: A Critique of The Uprooted,” *Journal of American History* 1, no. 3 (December 1964).). Between the mid-60s through the 1980s, revisionists questioned many of the assumptions of Handlin and the Chicago School, especially those regarding assimilation, Old World connections, and migration patterns. These revisionists attributed greater agency to immigrants, substituted cultural pluralism models (both descriptive and prescriptive) for assimilation approaches, acknowledged the persisting consciousness of the Old World and ties to it, noted the vital role of traditional social networks in the migration process, and offered new migration paradigms like step-, return-, and cyclical-migration. By the time that transnationalism studies emerged in the early 1990s, the paradigm shift had been well-established within American immigration history, synthesized best by John Bodnar (Bodnar, *The Transplanted: a History of Immigrants in Urban America.*), and global migration studies; but the vanguard wave of transnationalists somehow missed this shift.

¹³⁰ Contemporary scholars who highlight distinctions between race and ethnicity fall into two categories: (a) scholars of so-called “people of color,” who wish to emphasize the disparity in experience, primarily in terms of discrimination and prejudice, of their “racial” subjects from “ethnic” ones (non-“people of color”) (see, for example, Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994).; and (b) adherents of critical whiteness studies. The latter discipline takes as its primary subject the system of privilege based upon membership in the category of “white.” Economic arguments, generally issuing from within American labor history, provided the best and most popular early theories of whiteness. David Roediger (Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class.*) argued that class relations within American capitalism engendered racial distinctions among white ethnics: competition for scarce resources led to hierarchization by race. Subsequent scholars seized upon his appeal to W.E. DuBois’s concept of the “psychological wage:” the social, psychological, and economic profitability of whiteness acted as compensation for class marginalization. A key sub-argument within critical whiteness studies has been that many of the immigrant groups today perceived as white by dominant American society did not enjoy that privilege at the time of their initial arrival in America. The most well-known of these works is Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White*. Matthew Frye Jacobson supplemented purely economic arguments by introducing the correlation of whiteness and perceived “fitness for government;” Jacobson traced the evolving social construction of whiteness through three distinct periods in America’s history: following the naturalization law of 1790, during the mass immigration of the 1840s, and in the period surrounding the immigration restriction laws of 1924 (Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race.*).

of the supposed racial make-up of its constituents. Racially “new,” like migrants from Italy, Ireland, and Greece, East European Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox migrants arrived in an America hostile (not infrequently brutally so) to people of their “inferior stock”: the “Slav” or (more) pejoratively, the “Hun,” the “Hunky,” or the “Bohunk.” Alleged biological distinctions complemented cultural ones: a prominent nativist sociologist in 1914 agreed with the medical opinion that “the Slavs are immune to certain kinds of dirt. They can stand what would kill a white man.”¹³¹ Linguistic barriers and distinctive cultural traits, including religious traditions, set Habsburg migrants apart from mainstream American society, but the dramatic escalation of immigration, especially in the 1890s, also lent new impetus to the turn-of-the-century academic and national political debates over the racial identification—and fitness for integration into American society—of migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe.¹³²

While “the Slav” was not “the Negro,” “the Indian,” “the Mexican,” or “the Chinaman,” neither was this racially distinguished and frequently reviled being “the White.” Critical whiteness historians have proffered a number of terms to describe these migrants: “our temporary Negroes,” “not-yet-white,” “situationally white,” “not quite white,” “off-white,” “semiracialized,” “conditionally white,” and “inbetween peoples.”¹³³ Undeniably, Southern and Eastern Europeans could naturalize as citizens when foreign-born “people of color” could not—in this sense, they enjoyed the privileges of classification as

¹³¹ Roediger, *Working their Way Toward Whiteness*: 67-8.

¹³² I agree, therefore, with David Roediger’s critique of Omi and Winant, who correctly distinguish between the Latino, African American, Native American, and Asian/Pacific Island experience of American racism, on the one hand, and that of Southern and East Europeans, on the other, but nevertheless err in their claim that the race question was settled for the latter by the 1890s. As Roediger argued, the classificatory distinction between race and ethnicity upon which Omi and Winant relied, emerged only by World War II: “Whatever clarity we believe we possess in distinguishing between race and ethnicity was unavailable to those who labored in colleges or factories in the first forty years of the twentieth century.” See Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White (The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs)*, 27, 32.

¹³³ James Barrett and David Roediger, “Inbetween Peoples: Race, Nationality and the ‘New Immigrant’ Working Class,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 16(Spring 1997). As David Roediger has contended in a necessary caveat, the racial “othering” of East Europeans “does *not* constitute an argument that new immigrant communities were subject to this hard racism in the way people of color were.” All the same, neither did Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox migrants “live outside the system of terror through which the idea of a ‘white man’s country’ was enforced.” Roediger, *Working Their Way Toward Whiteness*, 12.

“white on arrival;”¹³⁴ so too could they find work in sectors where those identified as “Negro” could not. At the same time, the political debates continued over the racial identity and fitness for citizenship of Southern and East European migrants, culminating ultimately in the immigration restrictions of the early 1920s. Labor management continually drew comparisons between Southern and East Europeans and “negroes,” in this manner creating “an economics of racial inbetweeness that instructed new immigrants on the importance of racial hierarchy while leaving their places in that hierarchy open to judgment.”¹³⁵

Only over the course of many years and as both dominant American and migrant racial attitudes shifted reflexively did the “new immigrants” come to be seen as racially homogenous with dominant white American society. That Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox migrants *ultimately* assimilated into American society in racial, ethnic, and religious ways, in which other racialized groups (“Negroes/Blacks” “Indians,” “Asians,” and “Hispanics”) never did, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, at least until the 1920s and probably beyond then, Southern and East European migrant integration into American society on all three counts had yet to occur and was anything but given, both in terms of wider discourse and in migrants’ own estimations. Thus, insofar as Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox East Europeans remained, in the period under consideration, “not-yet-white,” the potential catalysts for maintaining transnational ties multiplied.

Many of the insights of whiteness scholars are applicable in the Canadian context, too, where Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox migrants also encountered a society at times unwelcoming to their presence. In the late-nineteenth century, representatives of the Canadian government pledged to promote domestic development and progress by attracting immigration from only the “fittest” regions, peoples, and races, with a selective policy superior even to the United States’ “open door.” When officials like Prime Minister John A. MacDonald articulated their preference for immigrants from Great Britain,

¹³⁴ On these points, see especially Guglielmo, *White on Arrival: Italians, Race, Color, and Power in Chicago, 1890-1945*; Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race*.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 72.

Northwest Europe, and the United States, they explicitly referenced the “negative” model of the supposedly insufficiently discriminating United States. While largely unrestricted immigration policies had allowed millions of Southern and East Europeans to overwhelm their southern neighbor, some elites hoped that the supremacy of Canada’s immigration policy would lie in the preeminence of its racism.¹³⁶

Two of Canada’s primary interests in domestic development undermined the immediate and wholesale implementation of racist immigration restrictions: westward settlement of the plains and the labor demands of industrial capital. The founders of the Canadian republic had agreed in the 1860s upon the necessity of settling Canada’s western territories. An agriculturally viable “British North American nation from sea to sea” would not only promote economic strength, it would also forestall ongoing and substantial emigrations southward to the United States. Although a failure until the mid-1890s, by the turn of the century, westward expansion through agricultural settlement gained new life, with the advent of superior strains of wheat, the farming technologies to cultivate it, and an increasingly advantageous world wheat market. At the same time, Canada’s late-nineteenth century industrial boom increased demands for unskilled labor. Immigration solely from the “desirable” world regions and populations could hardly satisfy the concurrent population demands of industrial labor and agricultural settlement.¹³⁷

Officially, agricultural settlement carried the greatest weight with Canadian policy makers. The fact that race constituted a looming “elephant in the room” is clear in the statements on agricultural immigration of Clifford Sifton, Canada’s Secretary of the Interior (1896-1905) and the dominant figure in turn-of-the-century Canadian immigration policy. “Our desire,” he wrote, “is to promote the immigration of farmers and farm labourers. We have not been disposed to exclude foreigners of any nationality who seemed likely to become successful agriculturalists.”¹³⁸ Clifton deftly avoided the race question in his famous call for “men in sheepskin coats,” actually a masculinized misquotation of his words: “I think a stalwart peasant in a sheep-skin coat, born on the soil, whose forefathers have been farmers for ten

¹³⁶ Avery, "European Immigrant Workers and Labour Protest in Peace and War, 1896-1919," 125.

¹³⁷ Reg Whitaker, "Canadian Immigration Policy," *Chinook Multimedia* (2001).

¹³⁸ Knowles, *Strangers at our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2006*, 85.

generations, with a stout wife and a half-dozen children, is good quality.” According to Christina Harzig and Dirk Hoerder, “Through this careful phrasing, he skirted the issue of racial origin, high on the agenda of public opinion in the Atlantic world. If he had called for peasants from Ukraine, he would have raised the issue of ‘dark’ eastern-European people coming to a ‘white’ Dominion.”¹³⁹

Canada’s call for agriculturalists contained a racial subtext in another sense. Policy makers wished to avoid the sudden influx of Southern and East European migrants to Canada’s industrial centers as unskilled workers. The readily available example of the United States demonstrated to Canadians the potential for social disruption and class conflict latent in such forms of immigration. Using the provisions of the Alien Labour Act, Canada in 1898 rejected a group of migrants, originally from Italy, who had resided temporarily in the United States, before attempting to migrate across the northern border in search of industrial work.¹⁴⁰ That rejection proved to be an exception to general practice, however, and the goal of “agriculture-only” immigration failed, as the interests of industrial capital won out. Industrialists demanded not only unskilled labor, but multi-racial and union-busting labor, for just as in the United States, they employed migrant laborers as strike breakers, while undermining class solidarity with a “divide-and-conquer” strategy among the ostensibly multi-racial labor force. As a result of industrial capital’s promotion of unrestricted immigration, while many migrants did arrive to settle the plains, more flocked to the cities as unskilled, often temporary, laborers.¹⁴¹

Anti-Asian immigration restriction laws in Canada discriminated against migrants from the Punjab, south China, and Japan, just as they did in the United States. Opposition to the migrants from Japan unfolded not least due to Japan’s victory over Russia in the 1905 war, which lent new meaning to a

¹³⁹ Harzig and Hoerder, "Transnationalism and the Age of Mass Migration, 1880s to 1920s," 45-46. Harzig’s and Hoerder’s anachronistic use of “Ukraine,” which did not exist as a state during the period under consideration in their study, refers really to the regions of Austro-Hungarian Galicia, Subcarpathia, Bukovina, as well as the Russian Empire, which today comprise independent Ukraine: in other words, the primary regions of migratory origin under consideration in this study.

¹⁴⁰ Knowles, *Strangers at our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2006*, 86.

¹⁴¹ Harzig and Hoerder, "Transnationalism and the Age of Mass Migration, 1880s to 1920s," 46.

“Japanese invasion” of Canada.¹⁴² “Negro” immigration from the United States never factored very highly on Canada’s agenda, but riots did break out in Edmonton, when it looked as if Oklahoma’s racial strife might prompt a sudden influx. Remarking in 1912 upon the arrival of some “Negroes” to the Canadian West, superintendent of immigration William Duncan Scott stated with apprehension, “The Negro problem which faces the United States, and which Abraham Lincoln said could be settled only by shipping one and all back to a tract of land in Africa, is one in which Canadians have no desire to share. It is to be hoped that climatic conditions will prove unsatisfactory to those new settlers, and that the fertile lands of the West will be left to be cultivated by the white race only.”¹⁴³

For Southern and East European migrants, the situation was somewhat different around the turn of the century. Notwithstanding vociferous calls for the restriction of their immigration, the Canadian government was largely content to maintain a hands-off approach. As Harzig and Hoerder concluded, “In the late nineteenth century, the Canadian state imposed few regulations on migrants, provided many regional options for arrivals, and collected few taxes but also delivered few services.” Furthermore, in contrast to the escalating Americanization drives beginning south of the border in 1910, two factors undermined the notion of “one Canadian nation” and thereby compromised comparable efforts to aggressively assimilate migrants into Canadian society: the ambivalence of Anglo-identifying parties toward nationhood versus British loyalty, on the one hand, and Canada’s Anglo-French duality, on the other.¹⁴⁴ These factors combined to provide Southern and East European migrants with “maneuvering space;” at the same time, however, other forces worked to constrict that space.¹⁴⁵

Sifton’s language of “stalwart peasants in sheepskin coats” might have obscured the racial aspect of Canadian immigration when it came to policy, but it could hardly mask the apparent “fact” of racial difference—and inferiority—upon the migrants’ arrival in Canadian society. Popular resistance to

¹⁴² The Immigration Act of 1908 effectively excluded migrants from the Punjab by banning migrants who did not come directly from their region of origin. (Punjab migrants did not have the practical means to do so.)

¹⁴³ Knowles, *Strangers at our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2006*, 118.

¹⁴⁴ Harzig and Hoerder, "Transnationalism and the Age of Mass Migration, 1880s to 1920s," 49.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 46, 49.

Sifton's prerogatives began in the late 1890s, and nativist opposition to the arriving Southern and East European migrants commenced in both the industrial centers and on the plains, where migrants from Galicia and Bukovina were targeted with particular hatred.¹⁴⁶ When Frank Oliver, who once referred to "the Slav" immigrant as a "millstone" around the necks of Western Canadians, took over for Sifton in 1905, official nativism escalated. Canadian civilization could not advance, Oliver argued, "if the preponderance of the population should be of such class and character as will deteriorate rather than elevate the conditions of our people and our country at large."¹⁴⁷ Without specifying Central and East European migrants, new immigration acts in 1906 and 1910 gave the government greater power to restrict immigration, in Oliver's words, "should there be a sudden influx of an undesirable class of people."¹⁴⁸

Notwithstanding these restrictions, on the whole, as in the United States, Canadian immigration policy permitted the entrance of large numbers of Southern and East European migrants. Because of widespread, frequently racist opposition to such migrants in Canadian society and the workplace, however, migrants often encountered hostility to their presence.¹⁴⁹ Canadian intellectuals like Stephen Leacock popularized the idea that Southern and East Europeans were of an inferior stock which would "pollute" the Canadian race mixture.¹⁵⁰ Policy, in other words, might have brought Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox converts in, but Canadian society contained elements which could push them out—and back to native regions.

The relevance of the preceding discussion of North American racial othering lies in whether or not migrants perceived its tangible manifestations and engaged in migrant transnationalism at least partially on that basis. Critics have criticized whiteness historians for excessive passive constructions to

¹⁴⁶ Knowles, *Strangers at our Gates: Canadian Immigration and Immigration Policy, 1540-2006*, 104.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 107.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 110.

¹⁴⁹ Avery, *Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932*, 7-8.

¹⁵⁰ Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 151; Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada*, 67.

characterize individuals' tutelage in the racial dynamics of regions of migratory destination. Relying mostly upon mainstream primary sources produced by the dominant society, rather than by migrants themselves, scholars have argued that migrants "were instructed" in the desirability of whiteness.¹⁵¹ Such constructions have deprived individuals and collectives of agency in their own racial education. Furthermore, the leap that migrants actually learned the lessons directed toward them falls flat, if unsupported by sources produced by the communities supposedly undergoing "whitening."¹⁵²

A consideration of migrant presses addresses both of these issues, though not perfectly. Coverage in migrant newspapers reveals cognizance of the racial lessons being taught. Editorial commentaries on those lessons further demonstrate the ways in which migrants actually assimilated or resisted those lessons. Naturally, certain limitations qualify the utility of migrant presses in determining migrant cognizance of racial dynamics. Not every migrant read such publications: some did not read or listen to public readings of any at all, while others ignored only particular publications: some Russky Orthodox, for example, likely avoided reading *Svoboda*, once its advocacy for Greek Catholicism and Rusky-Ukrainophilism became clear. Furthermore, an article's orientation might merely demonstrate that single author's views, and not those of the readership. Just as with dominant society sources, the fact that migrant presses *taught* could not guarantee that other migrants *learned*, though migrant students responded more favorably to lessons from familiar teachers. Many readers did also submit their own views in letters to these publications.

¹⁵¹ See various such critiques in "Whiteness and the Historians' Imagination: Vol. 60 of *International Labor and Working-Class History*." (October 2001).

¹⁵² June Alexander (June Granatir Alexander, *Ethnic Pride, American patriotism: Slovaks and Other New Immigrants in the Interwar Era* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004).), for example, argued that whiteness studies suffered from a movement away from the ethnic sources, and rather toward mainstream American sources (*ibid.*, 7). "Clawing" their way into whiteness was not one of their aspirations, she argued, "because in their minds they already were white" (*ibid.*, 226). Instead, "Their quest was far more complicated. Historical experiences and contemporary circumstances caused new immigrants and their children to view the world through the kaleidoscope of ethnic diversity, not through a lens of multihued whites" (*ibid.*, 12). I am in agreement with Zecker, however, that "Slovaks" and other Southern and East European migrants had much to say in their own cultural productions, like their newspapers, about race. (Robert M. Zecker, *Race and America's Immigrant Press* (New York: Continuum, 2011 (forthcoming)), 8.)

Notwithstanding the limitations, a study of migrant newspapers illuminates how migrants have understood racial dynamics in regions of migratory destination, as well as how those understandings might have prompted migrant transnationalism. The following focuses upon migrant interpretations of race in the United States. Some of the concepts that arise are unique to that context, especially, those dealing with “Negroes;” yet others, such as dominant “white” society’s treatment of migrants, are applicable in the Canadian context, as well.

A consideration of migrant attitudes toward “Negroes” (*nigry*) and their treatment at the hands of “whites” (*bily*) provides a useful introduction to the manner and degree to which migrants may have internalized or resisted existing racial hierarchies in the United States, even as they discerned their own potential obstacles to integration. Robert Zecker has noted that within “Slovak” and “Ruthenian” migrant presses, frequent reports of lynching, usually translated from English-language dispatches without additional commentary, normalized this facet of American race relations for migrant readers and performed several other important functions.¹⁵³ The presses publishing within migrant communities in the current study—*Svoboda*, the *Amerykansky Ruscky Viestnik*, and *Svit*—also regularly covered lynching. Zecker has argued that lynching reportage educated migrants in the substantial, sometimes fatal disadvantages of being a “Negro” and the advantages of being “white”—though the sheer violence associated should qualify any assumptions that migrants wished to assimilate into that particular variety of whiteness. He suggested even that the prevalence of lynching reports, often alongside stories of capitalist suppression of labor movements, may have functioned as “wages of whiteness,” in David Roediger’s sense: the stories provided receipts for the compensatory satisfaction of whiteness, paid to

¹⁵³ Zecker’s study included the *Amerykansky Ruscky Viestnik*, a Greek Catholic publication, in his study of primarily “Slovak” presses, because, although a publication of the Greek Catholic Union, it also catered to “Roman Catholic Slovaks” (Robert M. Zecker, “Negro Lynching and the Unbearable Whiteness of Slovaks: The Immigrant Press Covers Race,” *American Studies* 43, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 45. Notwithstanding Zecker’s justification, the paper concerned itself primarily with what it identified as “Greek Catholic” and “Uhro-Rusyn” or more simply “Rusyn” issues.

migrants by American society in lieu of fair wages and adequate working conditions.¹⁵⁴ Migrant laborers could find solace or even satisfaction for their undesirable labor situation in the reality that “at least” they were not being lynched. At the same time, however, lynching stories could generate fears among migrants whose racial identity had yet to be determined. As “provisionally white” people, learning “how lightly they had to tread in America,” such “liminal migrants likely simultaneously felt horror, contempt for the victims, and sober awareness of their own tenuous place in America's color scheme.”¹⁵⁵

The migrant presses in Zecker’s study rarely editorialized news of lynching. Certainly, many “just the facts” examples appeared in the *Amerykansky Russky Vestnik*, *Svoboda*, and *Svit*, but those publications did occasionally recoil at the brutality. The *Amerykansky Russky Vestnik* remarked in 1911 that “In the United States, Negroes are murdered in every way possible, and even burned to death from time to time in a few cases on the slightest pretext...Those people were greatly incited against the blacks, who obviously need some strong defensive society.”¹⁵⁶ *Svoboda* sometimes used stories of lynching in its larger project of debunking the American myth of liberty and freedom. The 1898 article, “Racial Hatred” adopted a stance that “whites” (*bily*) contradicted key aspects of the American mythos—democracy, freedom, and Christianity—in their treatment of “blacks” (*chorny*) or alternatively, Moors (*muryny*). In an account of a racialized battle, resulting in the shooting of ten “blacks,” the lynching of eight, and the wounding of many more, as well as the deaths of several whites, *Svoboda* reflected,

It is known that the majority of *muryny* live in the southern states, to which long ago they were brought from Africa, as slaves for work. Although here in America there is freedom, and although *muryny* have been made citizens with other *bily*, such hatred between one race and the other has not diminished, of which a continual example is the lynching of *muryny*...The *bily* in no way wish to admit *muryny* to government, they prevent them from having dignity, and they expelled a *chorny* editor from the city and burned his house. Here is what happens in the twentieth century in free, Christian America.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., 53.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 47, 48.

¹⁵⁶ October 19, 1911, cited in Zecker, *Race and America's Immigrant Press*, 60.

¹⁵⁷ “Rasova Nenavyst” (Racial Hatred), *Svoboda* November 24, 1898, 2.

Svoboda thus juxtaposed the myth of American freedom with an explicit and direct critique of domestic race relations.

Elsewhere, *Svoboda* enlisted lynching to indict America imperialism. In 1899, a front-page article, entitled “There is no truth in the world—perhaps a little in me and in God,” summoned examples from contemporary American and British imperialism to support a thesis of universal injustice. Among segments on the Spanish-American war, expansionism in the Philippines, American support for British colonialism in South Africa, and the suppression of striking foreign workers in Pennsylvania coal mines, the item “Do only Negroes act this way?” exhorted readers, “You know that Americans, especially Southerners, overrun by Negroes (black people), persecute them...”¹⁵⁸ At the “first small pretext, if some black man is merely suspected, then they immediately lynch him, hang him, burn him, shoot him, or in some other way take his life without a trial.”

While calling attention to lynching, however, the main thrust of the piece rendered its stance on such treatment of “Negroes” ambivalent. Southerners justified their actions, *Svoboda* reported, by saying “that Negroes very often rape white girls or women.” Instead of moving on to a critique of the baselessness of lynching, however, *Svoboda* instead asked, “But are Americans better? In English newspapers it was possible to read not long ago that American soldiers (whites) in the Philippines raped many girls there, for which reason great indignation reigns among the Philipinos.”¹⁵⁹

In this case, *Svoboda* introduced lynching as circumstantial evidence to try hypocritical American imperialism in the court of migrant public opinion. Reinforcing a dichotomy between “Negroes,” on the one hand, and “Americans,” identifiable by their whiteness, on the other, its only discernible critique of lynching appeared minimal. In fact, most articles dealing with relations between “blacks” and “whites” incorporated such news as evidence or examples in separate arguments, more immediately germane to migrants than “Negro” rights. Such articles reveal the limits of migrant acknowledgment of “Negro”

¹⁵⁸ “Nema pravdi v svit, khyba v meni y v bozi trokhy,” *Svoboda* October 26, 1899, 1. Parenthetical explanation (*chorny choloviky*) in the original.

¹⁵⁹ Again, parenthetical explanation (*bily*) in the original.

oppression, and a tendency to elevate migrant struggles over those of “Negroes.” Treating lynching variously, the articles coincided in their resistance to the myth of a “free America,” also refuted by negative American attitudes and behaviors toward “Slavs” and “foreigners,” with consequences for migrant transnationalism. *Any* destabilization of the myth of American freedom had potential to undermine a corollary myth: that immigrants came “to America”—for good—seeking that freedom.

In another use of U.S. black-white relations for ulterior purposes, *Svoboda* ran a lengthy 1895 biography of John Brown (*Djhahn Bravn*) which tied race, migrant cultural activity, and advocacy for migrant transnationalism. The article lauded the controversial abolitionist revolutionary—“the first fighter for American slaves”—as a heroic freedom fighter. Following his example, “Patriots and disciples of the freedom of people saw now that it is necessary to stand and fight, that otherwise one can do nothing.” The article did not primarily intend to applaud American abolitionism, *per se*, or even a more general humanist conception of freedom, though it did perform these functions incidentally; instead, *Svoboda* presented the narrative of John Brown as a model for “Ukrainians” (*Ukraintsi*) in their own “race” (*plemya*) struggles and religious battles.¹⁶⁰ The argument that historic oppression of “Ukrainians” was actually worse than that of “Negroes” in the United States revealed something about migrant conceptions of regions of migratory destination and origin.

The piece began, “Whether among us in Galicia, or among us in Ukraine, or in cold Muscovy, or in America beyond the sea—people have stood under the heavy yoke of their masters.” As for this yoke, it was “difficult to say, where it was more burdensome—here or there—although one can certainly say that among us, things were worse: *there* whites ruled over blacks, the superior race over the inferior, and among us, our own ruled over our own, Ukrainian over Ukrainian, or Slav over Slav. Thus we are convinced of the great untruth of the notion that such an order of things was easier among us, than *there* beyond the sea in America: we present that *there* it was a republic, not a monarchy.”¹⁶¹ The racial

¹⁶⁰ According to Andrusyshen “*plemya*” (which actually appeared as a typo in this article—“*pleny*”) can signify “race,” “stock,” “clan,” “tribe,” or “family.”

¹⁶¹ Emphasis mine.

ambivalences in this passage are palpable. The article championed abolitionism at the same time that it reinforced a hierarchy of “white” superiority and “Negro” inferiority. Furthermore, it argued that in the old country, the suffering of “Ukrainians” exceeded that of “Negroes” in America, because the former endured *intra*-racial oppression under despotic governments.

This passage also reveals something more about migrant notions of “place.” “John Brown,” composed by a migrant residing in the Americas, primarily for other migrants living in the Americas, consistently contrasted the “there” of an America “beyond the sea” (*zamorsky*) with the “among us” (*u nas*) of the *kray*. The persistence of a pre-migration schema of “here” (the region of origin) and “there” (the region of destination), when these locative valuations ought to have transposed following the Atlantic crossing, is suggestive of the way in which migrants may have oriented themselves toward both regions as a kind of “here.”

That the article also used Brown’s story to advocate for action in the *kray* by migrants in the Americas further supports this notion. According to *Svoboda*, Brown, raised in the Christian gospel and braving great personal danger, reminded slaves that they were people, organized his community of “many Negroes and creoles” around himself, and strove to deliver his “fatherland” from the evils of slavery. The use of “fatherland” (*batkivschyna*), usually reserved by nationalists of the period to refer to hopes for an autonomous Ukraine in Europe, is intriguing, especially set against the importance the author gave to Brown’s journey “to Europe,” where he studied “military tactics” and networked with like-minded abolitionists; *Svoboda* championed comparable networking among expatriate migrants from Austria-Hungary in the Americas.¹⁶²

At the time of Brown’s sojourn to Europe, *Svoboda* informed readers, America’s southern states perpetrated further racial injustices by seeking the legalization of slavery in new states, acquired through westward imperial expansion into territories expropriated from Mexico. As *Svoboda* told it, Brown’s transnational consciousness of these developments occasioned his return migration to America:

¹⁶² Brown traveled to England for business in 1848. Not insignificantly, this date also marked the “Springtime of Nations” in Europe, though the article did not draw this connection.

“Knowing about all this and returning home, John Brown was certain that slave masters would never consent, themselves, to liberate the slaves, that only force, rather than persuasion, could compel them.” In case *Svoboda*’s readers had any doubts whether the periodical advocated national organization in their own region of migratory destination (“America”), and the remittance of their own national movement to the *kray*, via return migration, the newspaper immediately followed the John Brown piece with a fictional story applauding “The Return of a Miner to his Family” in the *kray*.¹⁶³

These articles suggest migrant understandings of American race relations, particularly those involving “Negroes,” as well as potential catalysts for transnationalism. “Racial Hatred” and “Do Only Negroes Act This Way?” chipped away at myths of American freedom, which supposedly have primarily attracted permanent *immigration*. “John Brown” rested upon presumptions that migrant “Slavs” or “Ukrainians” in the *kray* actually “had it worse” in terms of race relations than “Negroes;” however, instead of advocating abandoning ties to regions of origin, *Svoboda* argued that intra-racial strife in the *kray* demanded migrant organization of “the people,” for the purpose of remitting a religio-national movement to the *kray*, via the implied channel of remigration. Activists of different national and religious persuasions regularly issued such calls as they navigated the turn of the twentieth century, and adherents on either side of the Greek Catholic/Rusky Orthodox divide responded. These examples may have attested to ideological motivations for migrant transnationalism, but racial discrimination and prejudice aimed directly at migrants provided far more potent catalysts for transnational ties. Migrant understandings of their own role in “America’s” racial economy developed in conversation with lessons, not only on “Negroes,” but also “Indians,” “Asians,” and other racial groups.

It was in the sphere of labor that Greek Catholic and Rusky Orthodox migrants most directly encountered biosocial racial prejudice and discrimination. In the popular discourse, nativists portrayed the “Slav invasion” of the American labor market as one of marauding, “Asiatic” Huns or even

¹⁶³ To Gorlice county, Lemko region, Galicia.

“European Chinamen.”¹⁶⁴ In 1892, as migrants in Minneapolis began adjusting to life as newly-minted Russky Orthodox converts—and perhaps preparing for remigration to the *kray*—Henry Root combined racist nativism with a critique of sojourning labor migration, when in *Forum* magazine he hyperbolized,

Already the stream of immigration from Southern Europe is sweeping toward the Northwest and the South; but it began to pour into the mining regions of Pennsylvania over a dozen years ago...one of the richest regions of the earth overrun with a horde of Hungarians, Slavs, Polanders, Bohemians, Arabs, Italians, Sicilians, Russians, and Tyrolese of the lowest class; a section almost denationalized by the scum of the Continent, where women hesitate to drive about the country roads by day, where unarmed men are not safe after the sinking of the sun. There he will see prosperous little cities like Hazleton, Mahanoy, Ashland, Shenandoah, with fine business houses and educated people, and surrounding these towns great wastes of the Commonwealth diseased by thousands and tens of thousands of foreigners who have no desire to become Americans, who emigrate to the United States for a few years to make money, who have driven to the cities and to the West the great army of English, Scottish, Irish, Welsh, Germans and Americans who once gave stability to the coal regions.¹⁶⁵

Migrants learned of these mainstream media attitudes through their own presses.¹⁶⁶

Not only employers and management, but also unions racialized East European Eastern Christian immigrants. In the 1880s, unions like the American Federation of Labor began to adapt racist anti-Chinese immigration restriction rhetoric to the “filthy Huns” from Eastern Europe: as the “vomit” and “scum” of Europe, they “lived in a manner that would disgust any crescent-eyed leper on the Pacific Coast.”¹⁶⁷ The experience by Southern and Eastern Europeans of racialized prejudice was by no means identical to that of immigrants from China. Ultimately by the early 1900s, unions, which would not admit “Negroes,” migrants from China, or from Mexico, began admitting Southern and Eastern Europeans; but they did so only on a racialized “trial basis.” Even as integration into organized labor commenced, some native-born workers continued to regard “hunkies” as nothing more than “cattle” into the 1920s: one

¹⁶⁴ Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White (The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs)*, 43-4, 51.

¹⁶⁵ Quoted in Michael Novak, *The Guns of Lattimer: the True Story of a Massacre and a Trial, August 1897-March 1898* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 5.

¹⁶⁶ *Svoboda*'s September 22, 1898 page 1 article, “They are Expelling Slavic Workers from Pennsylvania,” for example, printed a translation of *The Evening Post*, in which “foreigners” were blamed for social unrest.

¹⁶⁷ Roediger, *Working Their Way Toward Whiteness*, 80.

explained that he would not “sit next to a hunky or a nigger as you’d have to in a union.”¹⁶⁸ Native-born “whites” continued to dominate skilled and unionized sections of factories over “non-white” European immigrants, who earned as much as 10% less in wages.¹⁶⁹

Migrants from Galicia and Subcarpathia were well aware of such attitudes, behaviors, and systemic conditions: they encountered them on a daily basis at multiple points of interaction with American society. The 1904 “study in immigration,” *The Slav Invasion and the Mine Workers* portrayed strikes in Pennsylvania’s anthracite coal region as “mere episodes in [the] great conflict of races:” the “English-speaking race,” on one hand, and the “Slav” race, on the other.¹⁷⁰ The Greek Catholic migrant press characterized those labor conflicts in similar terms. *Svoboda*’s response to the 1897 Lattimer Massacre—the killing in Pennsylvania of twenty-five striking miners and the wounding of twenty-five more, most of whom were “foreigners”—provided a brutal, upper-level course in American racial dynamics.¹⁷¹ “The chief victims of American intolerance,” reported *Svoboda*, “are Slavs, whose poor orphans are wailing.”¹⁷² Another *Svoboda* article, “Protests against the Murder of Foreigners in the Free Land of Washington!” mourned, “Already from long ago we have noted the hatred here of Anglos against Slavic workers, and chiefly against workers, which in past years came to America to acquire a better fortune.” As evidence for racialized intolerance, *Svoboda* cited Pennsylvania’s three-cent non-citizen tax.

The hypocrisy of “free America” lay at the center of many such pieces: “The innocent, defenseless workers wanted only to use their American freedom to acquire for themselves a larger salary.”¹⁷³ As much of the U.S. press blamed the strikers for their own deaths and thereby “compounded the misfortune of the poor Slavic workers with the lowest slurs,” *Svoboda* instead impugned broader

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 89.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 12, 53, 72.

¹⁷⁰ Frank Julian Warne, *The Slav Invasion and the Mine Workers: a Study in Immigration* (Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott company, 1904), 8. Cited in, Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White (The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs)*.

¹⁷¹ For an interesting study, see: Novak, *The Guns of Lattimer: the True Story of a Massacre and a Trial, August 1897-March 1898*.

¹⁷² “Labor News; The Innocent Blood of Miners has Been Shed; 25 Miners Killed, 55 injured; The brutality of American sheriffs; The indignation of the people,” *Svoboda* (September 16, 1897): 4

¹⁷³ *Svoboda* (September 16, 1897): 4.

American attitudes: “Knowing, however, what antipathy each mischievous American has toward Slavs, whom they group together under the general title ‘Hungarian,’ it is possible to say for certain, that at the first small pretext from the side of the workers, the sheriff gave the order to shoot the cursed Hungarian.”¹⁷⁴ Elsewhere, *Svoboda* similarly characterized the impetuosity of Southerners to lynch “Negroes” at “the slightest suspicion.”

In “Americans, Dreyfus, and the Lattimer Affair,” *Svoboda* considered the Dreyfus affair, for perspective on Lattimer.¹⁷⁵ Americans, having learned from the complaints of “many Jews” to newspapers of the “allegedly” baseless, anti-Semitic conviction of Alfred Dreyfus in French courts had “immediately begun to call meetings to protest the trial.” *Svoboda* balked at the disparity in response to Dreyfus and Lattimer:

This they did, when in France they sentenced one man to two years of hard labor, and who knows whether he is completely innocent. And in their own home? When in Lattimer Sheriff Martin and his bandit-comrades shot not one, but several dozen to death, and severely wounded several dozen completely innocent, but poor people, and the Wilkes-Barre courts freed the assassins, saying that they had the right to do this—at that time not even one voice of protest was raised from the side of the Americans; at that time, everything was ‘*all right*.’¹⁷⁶

The massacre, the blaming of “foreign” victims, the imposition of martial law under the U.S. military, and the ultimate acquittal of the sheriff and hired agents responsible for the shootings likely helped convince Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox migrants of pervasive racial hatred directed toward them. In the encounter between “Slavic” migrants and dominant American society, Lattimer’s victims met formidable obstacles to integration, in the form of lethal bullets. It is plausible that this event and less dramatic manifestations of racialized discrimination lessened or precluded migrant attachments to their region of migratory destination, encouraged an orientation toward East European regions of origin for alternative sources of social support and capital, and elevated the probability of remigration, correspondence, and other transnational behaviors.

¹⁷⁴ “Labor News; The Innocent Blood of Miners has Been Shed; 25 Miners Killed, 55 injured; The brutality of American sheriffs; The indignation of the people,” *Svoboda* (September 16, 1897): 4

¹⁷⁵ “Nema pravdi v svit, khyba v meni y v bozi trokhy,” 1.

¹⁷⁶ *Svoboda* used the English term.

How did Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox migrants interpret their working conditions in relation to those of “Negroes”? Day-to-day interactions with the “*bos*” and “native” American workers provided the most significant flashpoints of racism. Counting industrial accidents, foremen distinguished between those of “men” and “hunkies,”¹⁷⁷ and in the words of one worker, “Only hunkies [worked blast furnace jobs] too damn dirty and too damn hot for a white man.”¹⁷⁸ Employers perceived in “the Slav” a compliant and subservient race, well-adapted to the conditions of industrial labor: not only for cultural reasons, like the dominance of Hungarian and Polish overlords, but for innate, biological ones, as well. Capitalists frequently introduced “the Slav” into the American labor market as a strikebreaker, filling a role sometimes reserved for “the Negro.” “In such positions,” wrote David Roediger, “Slavic workers would be said to be ‘working like niggers’ and would, like the most exploited Jews, Sicilians, or Louisiana creoles elsewhere, face further questioning of their whiteness based on the very fact of their hard and driven labor.”¹⁷⁹

But did migrants perceive that they were “working like niggers,” or that others considered that they did? In a word, yes. A turn-of-the-century *Svoboda* article asserted quite plainly that “Rusyn” migrant laborers were “Like Black Negroes,” inasmuch as they worked “nigger jobs” (*nigersky dzhaby*). The piece posited an inverted conception of place: “Sometimes it seems to me that we did not come to a free land from old Europe, but rather from Alabama.”¹⁸⁰ Conditions in both regions were similar: “As we struggle in the old country against Poles, Magyars, and other combatants, so also in Alabama the black (*chorny*) people battle with the whites (*bily*). As in the *kray*, our Rusyns stand for widespread electoral rights, for their schools, for better legal paths, Negroes stand in the same way for all of this in Alabama.”

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ David Brody, *Steelworkers in America: the Non-Union Era*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1960): 120, *quod*. In Roediger, *Working Their Way Toward Whiteness*, 49.

¹⁷⁹ Roediger, *Working Their Way Toward Whiteness*: 43-4, 49, 51, 75; and Roediger, “Whiteness and Ethnicity in the History of ‘White Ethnics’ in the United States,” in Roediger, ed., *Toward the Abolition of Whiteness* (London: Verso, 1994): 181-198 (191).

¹⁸⁰ “Yak Chorny Nigry” (Like Black Negroes), *Svoboda* August 8, 1900, 1.

The respective situations of “Rusyns” and “Negroes” in America mirrored each other: “And as with us, their poverty is exploited by the ruling superintendents under the shops and in the mines, in order to become even more impoverished.” In their forms of labor, also, did the two groups exhibit similarities: “Our people, as is clear, have the worst jobs, like Negroes in the South. Like them, so too do we work where it is necessary to carry heavy loads, to dig, to fire, to struggle. As we work with ‘coke ovens,’ so do they. We have the Carnegie Company, and they the Tennessee Coal & Iron Company. As we have the American Sugar Refining Company, likewise they have the same company (in New Orleans). And both we and they work in the ‘yards.’” The author concluded with a final point about dominant “white” American attitudes, which left little doubt about migrant estimations of their own potential for integration in the United States: “And like us, none of them [“Negroes”] are recognized as people.”¹⁸¹

As with other articles on American race relations, “Like Black Negroes” did not seek primarily to critique the racial disadvantages of “Negroes.” Rather, the piece used “Rusyn” affinities with “Negroes”—plain for all to see—to call unperceiving readers to action within their own enclaves. Coming from poverty in the *kray*, migrants observed their apparent, relative material increase in the United States as an improvement over their former situation; yet the acquisition of greater capital could not equate with moral and spiritual increase. “What about books?” *Svoboda* asked. “What about newspapers? What about meetings? Politics? The church?” Instead of improving themselves culturally by building schools, acquiring education, and undertaking necessary cultural work, migrant laborers contented themselves with *status quo* “nigger jobs” and the consumption of alcohol. “Wide, free America opens their eyes when they enter her land, and simultaneously at the moment of their entrance they are blinded, as beer became their faithful wife, the most abundant beverage, the sweetest friend...Having such

¹⁸¹ Roediger has argued, “Such sharing of oppression with Blacks doubtless made many Slavs question whether they wanted to be white Americans, but at the same time bitter knowledge of how Blacks fared made whiteness that much more attractive.” The encounter of East European Eastern Christian migrants with racialized discrimination was neither uniform, universal, nor coherent; this fact mitigates neither its intensity nor its prevalence. Indeed, the plurality of the racial experience proved a challenge in itself: “To the immigrant who sought to mitigate his or her non-whiteness, it would not have always been clear whether such a process was a personal or a group one, whether it entailed overcoming biology or changing habits, whether it was practicable or quixotic. See: Roediger *Working Their Way Toward Whiteness*, 53.

a friend, the people do not need much besides their shops and their mines.”

Despite all their resemblances, the author did see one important distinction between “Rusyns” and “Negroes.” Was it that the latter had undergone enslavement, lynching, and Jim Crow—something that demonstrated migrant understanding that “Negroes” endured greater hardships? Not at all. Instead, unlike “Rusyns,” “Negroes” were “elevating themselves” in institutions of higher learning. “But we?” asked the author. “We are like stagnant water, which even the wind fears to stir. Because if the wind were to stir it, the world would perceive how useless it is.” Thus, the “Negro-ness” posited of “Rusyns” was designed to motivate national-cultural activity. Far from demonstrating that laboring migrant readers were “better off” than their “Negro” counterparts, *Svoboda* highlighted the reality that migrants’ relationship with “America” was not (and might never be) an integrative one: a reality which could potentially catalyze migrant transnationalism. Even as the article hyperbolically posited a migrant populace unaware of their similarities with “Negroes,” it educated them in that supposed reality.

In sum, the racial experience of East European migrants in the United States and Canada provided a mixture of lessons. In their jobs, they learned that they were regarded as biologically and culturally inferior to “white” or “Anglo” “natives.” Some acquired this information not only through lower wages and frequent epithets of “Hun” or “Bohunk,” but in front of the guns of the Pinkertons and other strike-breaking forces. No matter how much “America” might stand for freedom, many signs warned that migrants might never successfully assimilate into that “free” society. Even if migrants from Austria-Hungary were “in-between” peoples, their experience was informed primarily by their own, largely negative encounters with “white” society—not their perception of “how much worse” “Negroes” had it. It is exactly that kind of experience that scholars of transnationalism have highlighted as prompting migrants (more recently, since the 1960s) to sustain transnational ties.

This chapter has emphasized that racism in the United States and Canada provided a powerful “push” factor toward migrant transnationalism among Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox converts. In Brazil and Argentina, the dynamics of race prompted migrant transnationalism in a very different manner.

Ironically, in South America, relatively positive racial assessments of East European migrants, functioning as a “pull” factor, indirectly played the greater role in prompting transatlantic ties, including remigration. The Brazilian and Argentine governments sought migrants from Austria-Hungary to settle the land and, to a lesser degree, labor temporarily, precisely because of their desirable racial “stock.” Attempts to attract “whites” thus precipitated the arrival of Greek Catholic migrants to these regions, which they often ultimately found unsatisfactory due to unfavorable climate, inferior land, and their unwitting insertion into pre-existing racial struggles.

Turn-of-the-century Canada and the United States adopted relatively “open door” immigration policies toward East European migrants, but nativists vociferated loudly in government and society, occasionally securing immigration restriction bills, directed partially toward East Europeans. More significantly, migrants to North America encountered virulent racism and nativism in their workplaces and communities. Brazilian and Argentinian immigration policy-makers and societies also considered Northern and Western European migrants more desirable, yet the conviction of most South American elites, that *all* Europeans were “white” and, therefore, desirable, overrode intra-European classificatory distinctions.¹⁸² Thus, notwithstanding U.S. and Canadian citizenship laws treating Southern and East Europeans as “white,” nativist rhetoric and everyday realities of the workplace demonstrated to migrants that the dominant society exhibited extreme ambivalence toward—or outright rejection of—their whiteness; that rejection was much less operative in South America.

By the late nineteenth century, Brazilian and Argentinian immigration policy makers embarked upon a program of “whitening” their respective countries, by seeking to increase the proportion of “non-black” and “non-Indian” populations within their borders, in (otherwise) “unpopulated” regions. Portuguese-identifying elites in Brazil and Spanish-identifying elites in Argentina differed somewhat in their formulations of whitening theory, but both presupposed white cultural and biological superiority, with which elites in Brazil and Argentina alike identified. Supposedly, immigration could solve the

¹⁸² Skidmore, *Black into White*, 84.

“black problem,” resulting from the abolition of slavery in Argentina (1853) and in Brazil (1888), by whitening, eliminating, and replacing the black race as a labor supply on, for example, Brazil’s coffee plantations.¹⁸³ Immigration could also solve the “Indian problem.” Though decimated by European colonization, indigenous peoples at the turn of the century persisted as a supposedly “savage” population, obstructing white progress. In Argentina, where those in power had had either killed indigenous peoples, compelled them into military service, taken them as concubines, or assigned them to labor in sugar mills, “Indian” skirmishes continued through the 1930s.¹⁸⁴

Immigration policies aimed to properly cultivate biological exigencies in the whitening process. According to the theory, the black race exhibited a lower birth rate, a higher incidence of disease, and a proclivity toward social disorganization. Furthermore, thanks to white biological superiority, a whiter populace would result from natural selection (desirable white mates) and miscegenation (dominant white “stock”). Various commentators differed on the timeline of the disappearance of the black race “into the whirlpool of the white race.” Theodore Roosevelt spoke optimistically about the impending disappearance of the “Brazilian Negro” after his 1914 visit; at the other pole, some feared that the “extreme miscegenation begun by the Portuguese” led to “the relative mental backwardness and enervation of the colonizing race.”¹⁸⁵

Regardless of levels of optimism for the disappearance of the black race, commentators generally agreed that “white” immigration would provide a critical and necessary catalyst. Brazil’s immigration law of June 28, 1890 simultaneously opened the gates to “white” immigration and closed them to “natives of Asia and Africa.”¹⁸⁶ In Argentina (as well as Brazil), “...The policies implemented converged on a single goal: to eliminate the aborigines in order to direct new European immigrants to the exploitation of

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Helg, "Race in Argentina and Cuba, 1880-1930: Theory, Policies, and Popular Reaction," 44.

¹⁸⁵ Skidmore, *Black into White*, 65-66, 68, 70-71, 130.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. As Skidmore noted, the restriction had no practical consequence as people from these regions were not trying to migrate there anyway. It does indicate the whitening policy, though.

interior lands."¹⁸⁷ Both countries, however, achieved only limited success in attracting the most desirable Northern and Western Europeans; accordingly, policy makers turned to slightly less desirable Southern and East Europeans.¹⁸⁸ The Brazilian and Argentine governments aggressively marketed their countries to prospective migrants from Austria-Hungary, even subsidizing (one-way) passage fares and land grants. During the 1895-1899 "Brazil fever," perhaps 15,000 Greek Catholics came from Austria-Hungary in search of land.¹⁸⁹ By late 1897, they were arriving also to Argentina. The governmental projects to expand whiteness in Brazil and Argentina pitted many Greek Catholic migrants in battles with the land and climate, as well as with racial "groups" they were intended to whiten, for the frontiers of whiteness coincided with the borders of arable land and tolerable living conditions. Numerous Greek Catholics who came to settle in Brazil found it uninhabitable and returned under duress to their native Austro-Hungarian regions. Greek Catholics fared better in Argentina but also faced great difficulties there.

Argentine officials wished to colonize the sparsely populated northern periphery of the country: the provinces of Misiones, Chaco, and Formosa.¹⁹⁰ In 1896, the governor of Misiones indicated the need for immigrants, regardless of nationality (*nacionalidad*) to "change the character and habits" of the province. Naturally, "Blacks" and indigenous peoples fell outside the bounds of this welcome. The governor issued positive evaluations of the migrants from Galicia, Bukovina, and eventually, some from Subcarpathia who came: the settlers overcame great agricultural difficulties "with a patience and persistence of which other agriculturalists of Italian, Spanish or any other nationality would not be capable." A n 1899 government report concluded that "the Pole" (i.e., all Galicians) "once settled, is

¹⁸⁷ Helg, "Race in Argentina and Cuba, 1880-1930: Theory, Policies, and Popular Reaction," 44.

¹⁸⁸ Carl Solberg, "Peopling the Prairies and the Pampas: The Impact of Immigration on Argentine and Canadian Agrarian Development, 1870-1930," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 24, no. 2 (May, 1982): 136.

¹⁸⁹ "Zakreska Ya. Brazyliiska Ukraina Zblyzka," *Dzvin* no. 2-3 (1993): 143.

¹⁹⁰ Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*, 2, 14. The province of Misiones, when Argentina annexed the territory from Paraguay in 1870, had a population of around 3,000. Also important was Argentina's international position, vis-à-vis neighboring Paraguay, from whom it had annexed the territory in 1870, and Brazil, who could potentially take the territory from it.

respectful, sober and hard-working. His culture is deficient, but this shortcoming is compensated by his other qualities.” The first settlers received land and other government assistance until 1903.

In Argentina, typhus, difficulty in transporting agricultural goods, and other hazards, like ants, made conditions unpleasant, though they were generally far worse in Brazil. Many Greek Catholic agricultural settlers remigrated from Brazil and Argentina, to regions of origin or elsewhere in the Americas.¹⁹¹ In addition to these “returns of failure,” others who labored temporarily, on Brazilian and Argentine railroads, for example, always intended to return and did so. Even these temporary labor migrants, like their counterparts in North America, sometimes regarded the climate and hostilities of indigenous populations as additional catalysts for remigration and correspondence in regions of destination, as is evident in an early- twentieth-century “Letter from Hell,” (i.e., Brazil) published in a Galician periodical.¹⁹² In Argentina, too, temporary labor migrants found unexpected catalysts for transnationalism, as in the case of a migrant in Montevideo, Argentina, who along with other temporary “Ukrainian” migrants, labored on a railroad in Buenos Aires. In April of 1910, he wrote to his native region to complain that, while he had hoped for good work in eight-hour shifts with spare time for “intellectual development,” he instead found only twelve-hour shifts and bosses who exploited those who did not know the “language of the *pans*.”¹⁹³ He found a new position in a Montevideo factory, but again with difficult labor in long shifts. Only lack of funds prevented him from returning to his native region.¹⁹⁴

Finally, although nativism factored more prominently in North America, anti-migrant sentiments emerged also in Brazil and Argentina, which did not uniformly welcome Southern and East Europeans. Desired for their whitening potential, Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox migrants nevertheless

¹⁹¹ Vogt, *La colonización polaca en Misiones*, 16; Ministerio de Agricultura, *Memoria de la Dirección de Inmigración correspondiente al año 1899* (Buenos Aires), 11, cited in *ibid.*, 6, 15, 17, 19-24, 21.

¹⁹² See Appendix H.

¹⁹³ The “lords.”

¹⁹⁴ “Lysty z chuzhyny,” *Emigrant* 1, no. 2 and 3 (February 1911): 28-29. The migrant claimed in the letter to have come originally from Russia. It is not clear how Lviv’s Society of St. Raphael, which published *Emigrant* and maintained an archive of such letters, would have obtained a letter from a migrant from Russia.

represented a major societal problem once they began arriving in large numbers and threatened the native-foreign balance. In Argentina, early-twentieth century nationalism, together with the relative success of whitening through immigration, engendered nativism. The build-up to the 1910 centenary of independence emphasized Spanish-ness, Argentine-ness, Argentinianization, and in some iterations, Catholicity and Latinity, complemented by increasingly xenophobic and nativist attitudes. At the same time, the success of whitening shifted attention away from “Black” and “Indian” “problems” to other matters. According to Helg, “By 1900 Argentina had almost completed one century of independence. It had fulfilled the dream of its elite...: it had become a nation of predominantly European stock. This had been possible through massive immigration, wars of extermination against the Indians, and the drowning of the blacks in the immigrant waves.”¹⁹⁵ Following this “achievement” Argentinians shifted their focus to the new “problem,” which the whitening solution had produced: the troubling presence of large numbers of foreigners.

In this atmosphere, Argentina passed restrictionist immigration laws (e.g., 1902, 1910) against foreign “agitators;” workers’ strikes (e.g., Buenos Aires, 1910) were also suppressed. Russky Orthodox convert communities became targets of nativism. Between 1910 and 1912, the newspapers *La Nación* and *La Prensa* published damning coverage of the “Independent Russian Village” in Tres Capones. A letter from the governor of Misiones to the minister of the interior warned that the “Russian colonists” spoke only Russian, flouted Argentinian law, acknowledged only the authority of their Orthodox priest, and had established a community like those on the “Muscovite steppes.” According to *La Nación*, the “rebellious colonists” also refused to pay taxes and send their children to school. Their insurrection could be traced primarily to the Orthodox religion and the deleterious influence of the priest from Russia, Father Hnatiuk, who encouraged insubordination to the state and defamed Catholicism. In 1912, police arrested Hnatiuk on suspicion of anarchist agitation; only the intervention of the Russian embassy prevented deportation and secured his release. Remigration from Argentina did occur during this period, though the

¹⁹⁵ Helg, “Race in Argentina and Cuba, 1880-1930: Theory, Policies, and Popular Reaction,” 38, 46.

existing evidence is minimal. Father Hnatiuk, himself, left for a family visit to his native Russia in 1914: how much Argentine nativism precipitated his voluntary departure (he eventually returned in 1924) would be difficult to say.¹⁹⁶

In 1900, an author in the U.S.-published *Svoboda* acknowledged, “We suffer in the *kray*, but life in America does not serve our people.” Deplorable conditions in regions of origin were surpassed by drawbacks in the adoptive land: “If someone wants to live forever here in this ‘free’ land, one must strain oneself to one’s limit of strength...I am certain, that if there were not on this side [of the ocean] such good jobs, then not one of our people would be here.”¹⁹⁷ Most migrants who came to the Americas, especially to the United States, did come for jobs; many, including those who found work, returned to or sustained ties with native regions. The same may be said for agricultural settlers, some of whom ultimately remigrated.

Migrants maintained transnational ties through correspondence and migration, not only because they had always intended to do so, but also likely due to their racially-determined “reception” in regions of destination in the Americas, including: explicit nativist rhetoric, economic discrimination, poor climate and land in regions of “whitening,” and hostilities with indigenous peoples. Even the remigration-catalyzing force of economic downturns in regions of migratory destination exhibited racial dimensions, for employers generally dismissed the “foreign” and “filthy” “Huns” first under such conditions. Race, ethnicity, and nationhood did not comprise the only or even primary catalyst for migrant transnationalism for Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox transatlantic migrants at the turn of the twentieth century, but it did constitute an important facilitating factor—just as scholars of transnationalism have argued for more recent migrant waves in the Americas.

¹⁹⁶ *La Nación* December 2, 1910; October 4, 1912; December 5, 1912; December 8, 1912; *La Prensa* December 2, 1910, cited in Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*, 30-35. He intended his stay to be a temporary one, but the war and then the Russian Revolution prevented his return until 1924. At that time, he and the Tres Capones parish came under the jurisdiction of the newly formed Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox in the United States (*ibid.*, 35).

¹⁹⁷ “Upadok Religiy,” *Svoboda* March 29, 1900, 1.

It may be useful to imagine migration waves of Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox to the Americas as a ball, attached to a paddle by a tether, bouncing toward the ground and back. Multiple factors determine the trajectory of such a ball. The paddle (the region of migratory origin) might temporarily “push” (economic hardship) the ball away toward the ground (the region of migratory destination), aided by the gravity “pulling” (economic opportunity) from that destination. The ball might pause at full extension only to have the paddle “pull” it back to where it originated (remigration), followed potentially by the repetition the cycle (cyclical migration). A strong tether (family, kin, and/or ethnonational ties) sustains the connection between regions of origin and destination, regardless of other pushing or pulling forces, while a weaker tether might break under such forces. Even in the case of a weak tie, a strong “push” from the paddle or a strong pull from the destination might snap the tie connecting the two regions. On the other hand, a “push” from the destination (economic hardship, racialized discrimination) placed upon a ball at full extension could overcome the weakness of the tie to return the ball to the paddle.

For temporary labor migrants to the Americas, the baseline form of behavior for most was return migration—for many, multiple return migrations. Those who returned did as they intended, because connections to their region of origin remained strong; some may also have experienced “push” factors of negative racial attitudes and economic hardship in their regions of migratory destination. What is critical for the current study is not whether destination societies blocked the incorporation of migrants on a racial basis, but whether those migrants perceived such obstacles and engaged in transnationalism on that basis. For agricultural settlers, who intended to stay, return resulted primarily, though not exclusively, from the “push” factors they encountered in destination regions. Many who unwittingly answered the call for “white” Europeans to Brazil and Argentina found conditions short of their expectations, which prompted their return.

Migrant transnationalism among both temporary laborers and agricultural settlers emerged due to multiple factors in regions of migratory destination and origin. Transnational migration set discourses of race, ethnicity, nationhood—and religion—in multiple migratory regions, in conversation. Supposedly

“Ukrainian,” “Rusyn,” “Russian,” and “Magyar” migrants fought one another over the legitimacy of those identifications in a contest, complicated by differing terminological valuations, brought from respective regions of origin (Galicia and Subcarpathia) and refashioned in regions of destination—even as they navigated novel racial hierarchies (“White,” “Slav,” “Black,” “Indian”). New racial/ethnic/national identifications, partly configured in the New World and partly through continuing influence from the *kray*, then traveled back to regions of origin. The next chapter develops migrants’ specifically transnational behaviors: social and economic remittances and return and cyclical migration. Transnationalism provided the context in which Greek Catholics underwent Russky Orthodox conversion throughout Austria-Hungary and the Americas in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries; it also ensured the mutual influence of conversion movements in those regions.

3.0 TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES: REMITTANCES AND REMIGRATIONS

In the U.S.-published *Svoboda*, a number of national activists in Austria-Hungary once addressed migrant audiences “in America,” in their “Vodozva do Bratov Lemkov” (“appeal to brother Lemkos”). They announced that, as part of recently implemented religio-national initiatives, they had established a new “Lemko Bank” in the city of Nowy Sacz. Offering 6 ½ to 7% interest, this Galician institution offered opportunities for migrants laboring “beyond the sea.” “Rusky Lemkos” abroad, already sending money to their families in the *kray*, could now do so through an institution dedicated specially to their own interest(s). Favorable rates of return would also ensure that migrants planning to bring earnings with them upon remigrating would more quickly realize the goal, which had initially prompted their migration: the purchase of land in their native region. One scholar has remarked that, “A round-trip ticket to America could be a long-term investment at home;” the Lemko Bank promised to help migrants capitalize on that investment.¹⁹⁸ The appeal concluded with an affirmation of the need for such services, for, “Today the times of lightning speed journeys and telegraphs have arrived. Today you yourself can visit far-away America just as you would a neighboring village.” The year was 1903.¹⁹⁹

Scholars of migrant transnationalism have highlighted the critical role played by steady communication, economic remittances, and return migration in the tendency of many migrants to orient their lives toward both regions of migratory origin and destination, as if they constituted “a single arena of

¹⁹⁸ Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 38.

¹⁹⁹ “Vodozva do bratov Lemkov,” *Svoboda* (October 1, 1903), 4;

social action.”²⁰⁰ Although modern communication and travel technologies do not, in themselves, cause migrant transnationalism, they render the phenomenon possible across broad geographic distances. When vanguard theorists of transnationalism in the 1990s spoke of “modern” communication and travel, they had in mind telephone, e-mail, websites, fax, audio- and videotapes, and air travel.²⁰¹ As a partial consequence, those scholars identified transnationalism as novel, particular to more recent migration waves, roughly since the middle of the twentieth century.

Yet, constituents of the massive migration waves to the Americas from Southern and Eastern Europe, beginning at the end of the nineteenth century, also understood, then, that a new age of travel and communication had dawned. Arriving on the scene in 1856, the transatlantic steamship had by the 1870s become the preferred form of oceanic transportation, in both directions. A journey that in previous years had taken 35-42 days now took two weeks or less. Shipboard conditions also improved, and the cost of a trip—or trips—plummeted, ranging between \$15-\$25. As Mark Wyman has remarked, “The great ocean liners that were coming into being in those days made travel safe and comfortable and brought America so near to this country, that it was just round the corner, as compared with twenty years before that time.”²⁰² By the late-nineteenth century, railroad networks had also expanded across Southern and East European regions, making the overland journey to the ocean—and back from it—more expedient and feasible. At the same time, communication also improved. The telegraph revolutionized transatlantic communication. Most, however, still communicated through letters, but those now took less than two weeks, not over a month, to reach non-migrant kin and friends.

²⁰⁰ Jean-Pierre Cassarino, "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited," *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* 6, no. 2 (2004): 262; Margolis, "Transnationalism and Popular Culture: The Case of Brazilian Immigrants in the United States.," 29.

²⁰¹ Today, such scholars might speak of social networking, Twitter, and Skype.

²⁰² Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 22-23. Wyman published his work at about the same time that transnationalism studies was emerging as an academic subdiscipline, in the early-1990s. In his descriptions of the late-twentieth century transformations in communication and transportation technologies, he used language remarkably similar to that which scholars of transnationalism were using in their studies of transformations in the second half of the twentieth century. For another excellent study pointing to improvement of travel and communication technologies in promoting “old transnationalism,” see Morawska, "Immigrants, Transnationalism, and Ethnicization: A Comparison of This Great Wave and the Last."

The potential for sustained connections with regions of origin partly motivated migration, in the first place. A migrant could leave kin and friends, knowing that while abroad, he or she could correspond regularly. Of critical importance in the migration decision was the possibility of return—and not just once, but twice, thrice, or more. Almost all Southern and East Europeans of the “New Immigration” of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries left native regions intending to return, and large numbers realized this goal. Estimates vary, but between 1880 to 1930, one-quarter to one-third of all migrants to the United States returned home: perhaps 4,000,000 people. Remigration rates from the United States during the period actually exceeded today’s percentages.²⁰³ Discounting “old” migrants of Northern and Western Europe, who continued to arrive into the twentieth century, results in even higher rates of return. Remigration for individuals from central and southern Italy has been calculated at 56%. In northeastern Hungary, an estimated 64% of “Magyars” and 59% of “Slovaks” returned. Remigration rates are notoriously difficult to calculate, but Greek Catholic migrants from both Galicia and Subcarpathia exhibited comparable rates of return, almost certainly well over 50%.²⁰⁴

Around the turn of the twentieth century, Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox migrants to the Americas not only returned frequently to regions of origin, they also undertook second-stage migrations to other regions in the Western Hemisphere: from the United States to Canada, from Brazil to Argentina, from Argentina to the United States. Some even migrated to the Russian Empire after an initial American sojourn. Migrants retained ties with regions of origin, not only through return migration, but also through remittances, both “economic” and “social.” In this migratory context did Greek Catholics convert and loyalists persist, and because of that context did Russky Orthodox conversions spread throughout all migratory regions, including those of origin in Austria-Hungary. This chapter analyzes economic and social remittances, then turns to second-stage migrations, including remigration and cyclical migrations, as well as subsequent migrations to other regions in the Americas and the Russian Empire.

²⁰³ Foner, *From Ellis Island to JFK: New York's Two Great Waves of Immigration*, 172.

²⁰⁴ Bodnar, *The Transplanted: a History of Immigrants in Urban America*, 53.

3.1 MIGRANT REMITTANCES

Within migration studies, scholars have attended to three forms of remittances: economic, social, and technological/knowledge. Economic remittances denote the transfer of migrant earnings while abroad to regions of origin. Social remittances refer to “the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from host- to sending-country communities.”²⁰⁵ Technological remittances are new technologies and skills, which migrants acquire while abroad and introduce upon remigration to native regions. Some remittances fit under more than one of these categorizations. Remittances of technology (which fall outside the parameters of this study) can, for example produce social impacts; and economic remittances can exhibit social dimensions.

Migrants abroad sent economic remittances to families, kin, and institutions in the *kray*, either through money orders or the post office, whether directly or through an intermediary such as the village priest. They also brought remittances during return visits final remigrations. Individual economic remittances generally entailed individual migrants sending money to family members: parents, siblings, wives and children, as well as to extended family. Collective remittances entail those transmitted through organizational channels and/or to collectives in regions of migratory origin, such as churches, charities, educational initiatives, political parties, ethnonational associations, and reading rooms.

Economic remittances are relevant to the current study in four respects: (1) they indicate sustained transnational ties, including correspondence and likelihood of remigration (the most critical factors in the transnationalization of the conversion movements); (2) the tendency of temporary labor migrants to minimize expenditures and maximize savings while in migration influenced ethnoreligious decisions within the migrant ethnoreligious marketplace, in that Russky Orthodox affiliation could sometimes represent a less expensive option than Greek Catholic affiliation; (3) migrants remitted monies

²⁰⁵ Levitt, *The Transnational Villagers*, 11, 55. Levitt, "Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion," 926-48. Juan Flores, citing Levitt's *Transnational Villagers*, preferred the term “cultural remittances.” Juan Flores, *The Diaspora Strikes Back: Caribeno Tales of Learning and Turning* (New York: Routledge, 2009).

through and to collective associations, affiliated with one or the other side of the Greek Catholic/Rusky Orthodox divide; and (4) such remittances influenced developments in the *kray* and produced reciprocal impacts in the Americas. Before considering these forms of economic remittances in turn, a discussion of the concept of “social remittances” is in order.

Moving beyond exclusively economic approaches to remittances, Peggy Levitt has coined the term “social remittances,” to describe: “the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from host- to sending-country communities.” A central question is how “ideas and practices are transformed in the host country [the region of migratory destination] and transmitted back to sending communities such that new cultural products emerge and challenge the lives of those who stay behind.”²⁰⁶ Migrants have transmitted social remittances during remigrations and through forms of personal and public communication. Social remittances have exhibited greater force than other methods of transferring social forms (as through mass media, for example), because, “Social remittances are delivered by a familiar messenger who comes ‘with references.’ The personalized character of this kind of communication stands in contrast to the faceless, mass-produced nature of global cultural diffusion.”²⁰⁷

Rusky Orthodox conversion movements among Greek Catholic migrants constitute a form of social remittance: the term “remitted conversions” refers to the transfer of ideas, behaviors, identifications, and forms of social capital, associated with such conversions from destination to origin regions. While the term “remittance” may refer to flows between migrants and regions of origin, regardless of direction, in practice it usually refers to a one-way flow: *to* the region of origin.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ Levitt, *The Transnational Villagers*, 11, 55. Levitt, "Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion," 926-48. Juan Flores, citing Levitt's *Transnational Villagers*, preferred the term “cultural remittances.” Flores, *The Diaspora Strikes Back: Caribeno Tales of Learning and Turning*.

²⁰⁷ Levitt, *The Transnational Villagers*, 64. The diverse ways in which social remittances have transformed regions of migratory origin includes: lower smoking rates, superior exercise habits, better weight-gain during pregnancy, lower instances of exclusive breastfeeding of babies, increased knowledge of contraception, shifts in marriage and fertility norms, elevations in violence, improvements and deteriorations in educational standards, reinforcement and transformation of gender inequalities, modifications in economic policies, changes in political practices, and the solidification of religious identifications. See: Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, "Social Remittances Revisited," 8-11. Available at: http://peggylevitt.org/pdfs/Levitt.Lamba-SR_Revisited.pdf.

²⁰⁸ Ebaugh and Chafetz, *Religion across Borders: Transnational Immigrant Networks*, 166.

By “remitted conversions,” this study generally means movements traveling *from* the Americas to Austria-Hungary; yet, mindful that “transnational flows may be two way”—and in fact, were—this study also considers the reciprocal effect produced when remitted conversions “came back” yet again to the Americas, in new forms.²⁰⁹ Further, these new remittances were modified and remitted yet again to Austria-Hungary. The continuous circulation of social remittances between regions of migratory origin and destination represents a major theme in this study: “What migrants bring and continue to receive from their homelands affects their experiences in the countries where they settle. This, in turn, affects what they send back to non-migrants who either disregard or adopt these ideas and behaviors, transforming them in the process, and eventually re-remitting them back to migrants who adopt and transform them once again.”²¹⁰

Much of the current study analyzes non-economic forms of remitted conversions to Austria-Hungary. Remigrants brought the idea of conversion back with them, as well as the experience of having conducted religious practices in Russky Orthodox parishes: they shared these social remittances with non-migrants “in person.” They also sent letters and various forms of pro-conversion, anti-Greek Catholic literature. Economic remittances also contributed to conversion and counter-conversion movements in the Americas and Austria-Hungary. Money earmarked for religio-national causes, together with “non-religious” and “non-national” personal economic remittances to family members influenced the social dynamics of the conversions. Economic remittances thus also exhibited social dimensions.

By far, money sent to family members in the *kray* constituted the most pervasive form of economic remittances among Greek Catholic and converted Russky Orthodox migrants.²¹¹ A critical element of the transnational family economy, those remittances held great significance for the spread and transnationalization of the conversion movements. Economic remittances helped foster and sustain

²⁰⁹ Ebaugh and Chafetz suggested borrowing the term “resource” from studies of network analysis, which together with the concept of “reciprocity,” indicates two-way flows. *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, “Social Remittances Revisited,” 6.

²¹¹ For a survey of economic remittances in a sample Galician village, see Appendix G.

transatlantic ties between migrants and non-migrants, manifested especially in correspondence and remigration: the necessary channels by which the conversion movements could circulate throughout the Americas and Austria-Hungary. This chapter later more fully develops the interrelationship of economic remittances in the family economy, correspondence, and remigration, as those phenomena influenced the transatlantic dissemination of conversion. First, however, another important type of economic remittance is considered: remittances designated for ethnoreligious causes (both pro- and anti-conversion) in regions of origin. Although individual remittances within the family economy far exceeded these overtly “ethnoreligious economic remittances,” both in absolute dollars and numbers of participating individuals, ethnoreligious economic remittances nevertheless played a major role in the transnational conversions.

American migrant publications like *Svoboda*, *Amerikansky Viestnik*, *Svit*, *Pravda*, and *Postup* frequently published requests from the *kray* for donations to religious and national causes and letters of gratitude when migrants responded.²¹² Russophile migrants matched Rusky-Ukrainophile remittances with donations to “Rusky” *bursas* and reading rooms in Galicia. With increasing polarization between Rusky-Ukrainophile Greek Catholics and Russophile Orthodox partisans, solicitors and migrant donors equated “religious” and “national” causes: a donation to a church contributed also to national aims, just as funds for the Rusky-Ukrainophile *Prosvita* society bolstered Greek Catholicism. Not every or migrant or even most responded. Enough did so, however, that in 1907, one commentator complained that a donation of \$500 from the Rusky National Committee in America to the “War Fund” in Galicia demonstrated that migrants more willingly remitted money to causes in the *kray* than to those in America.²¹³

²¹² In 1912, migrants in Seymour, Connecticut collected money for a reading room in the Galician village of Butyn. (Hrabar, Ya, “Dopys” *Svoboda* November 14, 1912.) In 1912, a migrant in Canada donated the “princely” sum of \$1,000 to Lviv’s Rusky-Ukrainophile *Prosvita* society and the Ridna Shkola. (“Lysty z Chuzhyny: Knyazhi Zhertvy na Narodni Tsily,” *Emigrant* 3, no. 3 (May 1913): 86. See also “Zhertva Ukrainiv” (Offering of Ukrainians), *Svoboda* December 19, 1912, 5.) In 1913, a parish in New York City donated an equally “princely gift” of \$1,000 for the same purpose. (“Kniazhyi dar” (Princely gift), *Svoboda* February 20, 1913.)

²¹³ Strutynsky, Father N., “V oboroni svoiy, Narodnoho Komitetu i Narodnoho Domu” (“In defense of our own National Committee and National Home”), *Svoboda* February 14, 1907, 4.

Even if most migrants devoted the greater part or all of their economic remittances to their own personal interests—e.g., investment in land—“individual” remittances within the family economy could become tied to ethnoreligious causes. In 1906, *Svoboda* admonished migrants, “Do not forget your family in the old country” and advised sending money only through “Rusky” agents or *Svoboda*.²¹⁴ The 1903 appeal from “Ukrainian-Rusky” Lemko Bank representatives to migrants in the Americas, cited at the beginning this chapter, claimed, “the sun has been shining,” on the Lemko region, because supporters of the national cause (*narodovtsi*) had collaborated in the establishment of a number of “Rusky” and “Rusky-Ukrainian” institutions in Nowy Sacz. They had founded a Rusky *bursa* for children, at a cost of 46,000 crowns. They had collected 15,000 crowns to build a Greek Catholic church. The number of students at the *gymnasia* had increased, between 1898 to 1902, from 13 to 86. Additionally, they had founded a “Filio Prosvita” and a Prosvita reading room. Lastly, these “faithful sons of the Rusky people” had founded the Lemko Bank, which would protect the interests of their “brother Lemkos.”²¹⁵

Just as economic crises in regions of destination could temporarily cut off the flow of remittances to families and churches, they could also undermine the economic base of “national work” in the old country. An August 4, 1911 letter, published in *Svoboda*, thanked migrants by name for their donations of \$69 (347 crowns) to the local “Ukrainian-Rusky *Bursa*” in the Lemko region.²¹⁶ The letter called again, however, “across the sea...to the free land of Washington” for more assistance. The solicitors acknowledged that tough times prevailed in America due to economic depression and many factory closings. They admonished potential donors, though, appealing to their self-interest: “Dear Brother Lemkos, remember that this is for you, for your Brother Lemkos and your children—here in the Lemko

²¹⁴ “Ne Zabuvayte na Vashy Rodyni v Starom Krayu!” (Do Not Forget Your Family in the Old Country!) *Svoboda* January 25, 1906, 7.

²¹⁵ “Vodozva do bratov Lemkov,” *Svoboda* (October 1, 1903), 4. The possibility that the directors of the Lemko Bank may have couched ulterior business interests in such rhetoric would not negate the connection between personal economic remittances and ethnoreligious causes.

²¹⁶ The donations were to go to Father Emiliyana Mentsinsky, the parson in Małastów, near Gorlice.

region.” They argued that the sooner migrants contributed the requested \$500, the sooner conditions would improve for both “you and us.”²¹⁷

Economic remittances also played a direct role in the Austro-Hungarian conversion movements. As the conversion movements traveled from the Americas back to Austro-Hungarian villages along with remigrants, those still in the Americas sent economic remittances abroad, designated specifically for either for Greek Catholicism or Russky Orthodox conversions. In 1901, remigrants to the Subcarpathian village of Becherov brought \$600 with them for construction of a church.²¹⁸ Russophile, Orthodoxophile priests in Austria-Hungary also requested money for their parishes from convert migrant communities. In 1910, a priest in St. Louis charged that Father Vlad Durkot, Greek Catholic priest in Mysczowa, Galicia had requested donations for his parish from a Russky Orthodox priest in Desloge, Missouri, whose flock consisted of converted migrants from Mysczowa.²¹⁹

Loyalist Rusky-Ukrainophile Greek Catholic and Russophile-Orthodoxophile migrants in the Americas battled each with their dollars in the churches and *bursas* of Austria-Hungary. In 1903, a writer from Monessen commented in *Svoboda* upon the recent letter which Victor Hladyk, editor of the American Russophile-Orthodoxophile newspaper *Pravda*, had published. Hladyk admonished his readers, “I hope that you, as Lemko Rusyns, will not support a foreign bursa...,” though by “foreign,” he did not mean “abroad.” Instead, he denounced as “foreign” only the “Ukrainian” *bursas*, “founded by our enemies to our shame” in Galicia. According to Hladyk, “Students in the Ukrainian bursa [in Nowy Sacz] reported that no Ukrainian student can call himself a Ukrainian if he believes in God; such students that

²¹⁷ The letter was published in “Do Sester i Brativ Lemkiv v Amerytsi” (To Sister and Brother Lemkos in America), *Svoboda* (August 31, 1911), 7.

²¹⁸ Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 64; Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 87.

²¹⁹ Fr. Dymitry Chanak, “Letter to Bp. Konstantyn,” in *ABGK* (March 28, 1910), syg. 4929, 13-14. Russophile priests apparently also requested money from Greek Catholic sources. In the January 7, 1914, article, “Whether to Laugh or to Cry?” *Svoboda* claimed that “many people write to America for donations, thinking that in America dollars overflow in the streets.” The editor was incredulous, though that a Russophile priest had actually dared recently to request donations from “Rusky” (not Russky) Greek Catholics. The solicitor, according to *Svoboda*, had given himself away as a Russophile by writing not in the “Rusky” language (*po-Rusky*), but rather in the “Muscovite” one (*po-Moskovsky*). “Smiyaty sya chy plakaty?” (“Whether to laugh or to cry?”), *Svoboda* January 7, 1914, 7.

prayed were persecuted." Rather than promote this "foreign" evil, Hladyk advised that migrants instead contribute to "our Russky *bursas* or to churches [in Galicia] which teach our people to become patriots."²²⁰ Perhaps it was the same writer from Monessen who complained to the audience of Lviv's *Nyva* at the end of the decade that some of their co-religionists and countrymen were soliciting "schismatic" newspapers in the United States from the old country: "They do not even fear," he said, "to write to the schismatic *Pravda*, *Svit*, *Postup* and appeal for donations for the Moscophile *bursa* in Gorlice." He added that many other "Lemko priests" conducted similar agitation under pseudonyms.²²¹

Russky Orthodox and Greek Catholic activists explicitly envisioned their respective remittances to the old country as countermeasures to each other's goals. On May 7, 1914, *Svoboda* praised members of the Ukrainian National Association for raising \$2,000 (10,000 crowns) for charitable aims in Galicia, and then compared these funds to those raised by the Russophile organizations, like the Society of Russky Brotherhoods, over the past two years "for the hungry in Galicia" (*Svoboda*'s scare quotes implied ulterior motivations in those collections.) To counter the Russophile measures, the article suggested collecting at least \$4,000 or \$5,000.²²² Another article that year warned similarly that Russophiles in the United States were donating thousands of dollars to Galician causes.²²³ It would be difficult to say how much "competing remittances" spurred migrants to greater donations, but by July 2, 1914, the Ukrainian National Association had remitted over \$4,600 to Galicia for "famine relief."²²⁴

Migrant communities in the Americas also remitted funds to bolster the mass conversion movements which began in earnest in Galicia and Subcarpathia after 1911, in conjunction with the arrival of missionary priests from Russia. In 1911-12, Simon Turchik, a migrant in New York, sent "about

²²⁰ Semaniuk, M. "Dopysy," *Svoboda* (December 3, 1903), 3. They could send their money either to Hladyk or to Father Teofil Kaczmarczyk in the village of Biltsarov.

²²¹ Fr. Kosta Kyryllo, "Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi," *Nyva* 7-8, no. 13-24; 3-4 (July 1910-February 15, 1911): 465. Father Kosta Kyryllo was the priest in Monessen at the time that he wrote this article. According Father Kyryllo, "In the mentioned newspapers they sign their names, Frs. 'Vlad Y. Kaluzhnyatsky, Y.N. Yurczakevycz, Y.T. Durkot, Teod. Y. Durkot, and Kaczmarczyk from Biltsarev.'" [Binczarowa?]."

²²² "Slavno Spysalsia Viddily R.N. Soyuz" ("UNA branches distinguish themselves famously"), *Svoboda* May 7, 1914, 3.

²²³ "Choho Pryikhav Getsev" ("Why did Getsev come?"), *Svoboda* July 16, 1914, 5.

²²⁴ "Amerykanski Ukrainsti..." *Svoboda* July 2, 1914, 3.

twenty dollars” to subsidize a reading room and the burgeoning Orthodox movement in Grab, Galicia. He also urged Grab’s residents (many of them remigrants from the Americas) to appeal for more material assistance from American migrant communities and the Russky Orthodox archbishop of North America.²²⁵ In 1913-14, Archbishop Platon collected such funds through *Svit* and made personal donations as well, totaling at least \$540 by 1914.²²⁶ Economic remittances also directly subsidized the efforts of the missionary activists who arrived to Galicia and Subcarpathia from Russia after 1911.

These remittances not only influenced regions of origin, but also produced a reciprocal impact in American communities. The \$600, remitted by convert migrants in the United States to Becherov for the construction of a convert church, prompted the Austro-Hungarian government to remit 68,500 crowns, in 1903 alone, back to the United States to subsidize the counter-conversion effort known as the “American Action.” The money funded migrant clerics and the construction of churches expected to foster Hungarian loyalty.²²⁷ Archbishop Platon coupled his 1913-14 appeals to migrants in the Americas for assistance in the conversion efforts with simultaneous requests for greater monetary support of the conversion efforts in the Americas.²²⁸ Around the same time, he also established a new society. The purpose of the “Society of the Propagation of the Russky Orthodox Faith in North America” was:

To give moral and material assistance to oppressed Russians from the Carpathians, who incline toward Orthodoxy: to unite more closely in an Orthodox Russky fatherland, Russky immigrants from Austria and Russia in America, and to develop, strengthen and deepen in them the realization of Russky nationality...To work for the diffusion, support, establishment and development of Holy Orthodoxy, both in America and in the old world, especially in those countries with Russky populations that have been led away from Orthodoxy by their union with the Latin Church and by sectarianism.²²⁹

²²⁵ Simon Turchik, "Letter to the residents of Grab, dated January 24, 1912," in *ABGK*, syg. 437, 273-77.

²²⁶ “Na Muchenykov za Pravoslavie v Avstro-Venhri” (“For the martyrs for Orthodoxy in Austria-Hungary) *Svit* March 27, 1914. In 1914, the student Vasyl Koldra, a defendant on trial for treason in Lviv for his role in the Russky Orthodox conversions in Galicia, attributed the catalyst for the conversion movement in one village to exploitation by the village’s local Greek Catholic priest. He had apparently taken advantage of his role as an intermediary for migrant remittances to appropriate the money for himself: “In another parish, the priest took money from the post, which came from America for Lemkos and which they sent for themselves. As a consequence, the villagers issued a loud protest.” (*Przegląd Pravoslavy*).

²²⁷ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 205, 08. See [Chapter Seven](#).

²²⁸ *Svit* November 14, 1913.

²²⁹ Alexander Konta, "Russia’s Conspiracy against Americanizing Aliens," *New York Times* March 16, 1913. Konta cited the mission statement in the 1913 *Kalendar*—I have replaced “Russian” (Konta’s translation) with the original “Russky.”

Thus, the archbishop simultaneously advocated new assistance for the conversions abroad and used the East European developments to galvanize his migrant constituency to more energetic proselytization among potentially returning, fellow migrants.

Reciprocal impacts of these migrant remittances extended beyond migrant communities. In 1913, a nativist argued in the *New York Times* Saturday magazine that the archbishop's appeals attested to the incompatibility of the Russky Orthodox Church with U.S. society.²³⁰ The mission of the archbishop's new society testified

with amazing frankness to the un-American, and in consequence, anti-American nature of the Russian Orthodox propaganda in this country...Here, then, is the real purpose of all this activity confessed with naïve plainness. Russification is the purpose, not Americanization. Russification by means of religion, especially Russification of the Slavs of Austria-Hungary and the Balkans living in this country. In fact, Americanization is to be counteracted in every possible way, it seems, since the real service of these converts will not lie in their continued residence in this country, but in their return to the old, where they are to swell the numbers and the influence of the Panslavist [*sic.*] campaign for the westward extension of Russian power.

The Russky Orthodox mission had thus, the article claimed, endeavored to prevent a “large portion of the new immigration—the Slavs—from identifying themselves with the country that offers them a home and the means of subsistence. Here is a State Church counteracting with State funds, in subterranean ways, the huge labor of assimilation and naturalization in which this country has been engaged for the last quarter of a century. Russia is boldly playing in the United States the game she is playing in Eastern Europe.”²³¹

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid. Given that the Holy Synod and the Tsar himself were providing subsidies to the Russky Orthodox mission in North America, it is worth questioning to what degree the money sent from the Americas to Austria-Hungary for the purpose of conversion actually represented migrant remittances, rather than the “forwarding” of money originally sent from Russia. In February of 1912, one Greek Catholic partisan claimed, regarding the ongoing Galician conversion movements, that “rubles for that activity come in the form of dollars via America.” One is left to wonder how much the conversion efforts suffered as a result of the fees which would have been associated with the double exchange of Russian rubles in the form of American dollars into Austrian crowns. Regardless of such accusations, migrants from Austria-Hungary did contribute their own money to the conversion efforts. Aleksandr Hovda, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (February 1, 1912), syg. 437, 185.

Other reciprocal influences emerged through the financing of resources, such as books, for remittance back to the Americas by migrant funds.²³² In 1913, the Ridna Shkola and the Provincial Educational Association in Lviv even sent two songs, as a gift for “Ukrainians” in America, who had donated to those institutions.²³³ Activists from Rusky-Ukrainophile and Russophile organizations—beneficiaries of migrant remittances—also traveled to the Americas to garner further support for ethnoreligious causes in Austria-Hungary and to galvanize migrant communities.²³⁴

Ethnoreligious consciousness, generated through economic remittances for such causes, affected migrants in the Americas and remigrants to native regions. Those who donated while in migration returned with potentially increased consciousness, frequently to a region significantly already altered partly due to “American” influences. Indeed, some solicitors appealed to potential donors on the very basis of intended return, assuming that—just as with remittances in the family economy—individuals would reap the ethnoreligious returns on their investment upon remigrating. Not only did migrants return to changing regions, new migrant waves left those regions for the Americas, having already encountered “America” in their native villages, with implications for decision-making in migration: migrants who departed from Austro-Hungarian regions after the early twentieth-century appearance of remitted conversion movements, subsidized by migrants in the Americas, frequently joined Rusky Orthodox parishes in the Americas.²³⁵

²³² “Dialnist Prosvitnoi Komisii” (“Activity of the Enlightenment Commission”), *Svoboda* July 3, 1913.

²³³ “Hymny Amerykanskykh Ukraintiv” (Hymns of Ukrainian Americans), *Svoboda* December 11, 1913, 3.

²³⁴ In 1914, a Dr. Getsev, proponent of Rusky Orthodox conversions in Austria-Hungary and the Americas, sojourned in the United States, where he at once propounded the Rusky Orthodox cause and requested donations to subsidize conversion efforts in Austria-Hungary. And one Rusky-Ukrainophile activist recognized the transnational dynamics of such exchanges when on October 2, 1913, following the visit of Galician Rusky-Ukrainophile leaders to the United States, he called for the formation of a joint Galician-American organization which could coordinate “national aims” across the Atlantic Ocean. Bogdan Horbal, “Łemkowie w Rosji 1915-1919 na tle exodusu rusofilskiej ludności Galicji i ruchu karpatoruskiego,” 11 (Wrocław, 2007): 99-117. ,” *Wrocławskie Studia Wschodnie* 11(2007). “Potrzeba Ukrainiskoho Politychnoho Towarystva” (Need for Ukrainian Political Society), *Svoboda* October 2, 1913, 5.

²³⁵ It would be difficult to say whether such tertiary waves of migrants would *not* have joined Rusky Orthodox parishes in the Americas, had they *not* encountered the conversions before departing. After all, fellow villagers—the vanguard migrants/remigrants responsible for the remittance of the movements—had joined such parishes without the benefit of previous exposure to “America.” Nevertheless, it is *highly* unlikely that pre-migration exposure to remitted conversions would not have influenced migrants’ religious affiliations abroad to some degree.

An indirect relationship likely also connected migrant remittances, Russky Orthodox conversions, and remigration. Scholars have established clear linkages between migrant remittances and intentions to return. Migrants who envisioned time abroad as temporary were likelier to remit more money than those who intended or eventually decided upon permanent settlement abroad, for several reasons.²³⁶ First, temporary labor migrants generally retained stronger affective ties to kin and friends in regions of origin and made greater economic investments in their well-being. Further, the location of the most likely recipients of remittances determined the destination of remittances: members of temporary labor migrants' nuclear families were more likely to remain in regions of origin than those of permanent migrants, whose families often came too or followed shortly afterward. Lastly, migrants intending to return hoped to benefit from their own remittances: a "special form of savings."²³⁷ Regular remittances, together with occasional remigrations, facilitated sustained identifications with regions of origin, as well as reintegration at the time of remigration(s).²³⁸

Contemporaries reporting upon migration and Russky Orthodox conversion movements at the turn of the century also considered migrant remittances predictors of remigration. In 1897, a writer in Hungary's semi-official newspaper, *Budapest Hirlap*, argued that migrant conversions in the Americas threatened Hungary, due to the impending remigration, which economic remittances surely augured: "When these people return home—and they are getting ready for that, otherwise they would not send their savings to their homeland—then a solid connection will be established between the northeast

²³⁶ See, for example, O. Galor and O. Stark, "Migrants' Savings, the Probability of Return Migration and Migrants' Performance," *International Economic Review* 3, no. 2 (1990); L. Merkle and K.F. Zimmermann, "Savings, Remittances, and Return Migration," *Economics Letters* 38, no. 1 (1992). For example, a recent study of Moldovan households found that temporary migrants remitted 30% more than their permanent counterparts, even though permanent settlers earned significantly higher wages. Pia Pinger, "Come Back or Stay? Spend Here or There? Return and Remittances: The Case of Moldova," *International Migration* 48, no. 5 (2010): 142-73.

²³⁷ B. Poirine, "A Theory of Remittances as an Implicit Family Loan Arrangement," *World Development* 25, no. 4 (1997). This reality is perhaps most obvious when migrants brought their remittances upon return, but migrants also subsequently benefited in through remittances invested via post or money order. As of 1913, for example, the temporary labor migrant Fedir Kamyansky of Yasenev Pilny, Galicia had, during his seven-year stint in in Winnipeg, not only remitted 2,400 crowns, he had also purchased a field and paid the debt. See Appendix G.

²³⁸ Cassarino, "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited," 262.

Carpathians and Moscow, and it is horrible to think what consequences such a connection will have for Hungary.”²³⁹ In 1908, a Greek Catholic analyst in Galicia also wrote that the reported 112 million crowns, wired by migrants in the United States to Austria-Hungary in 1907 (discounting money sent via post or brought by remigrants), attested to close ties with the *kray* and desire for return.²⁴⁰

While converts and persisting Greek Catholics alike remitted money in anticipation of remigration, religious economics in the Americas likely contributed to inherent potential within migrant Russky Orthodoxy for remittance to the *kray*. Pinger has noted that “temporary migrants try to transfer as much consumption as possible to the time after their return, while permanent migrants are more induced to save and spend their money in the foreign country.”²⁴¹ Because temporary labor migrants tended to maximize earnings and savings in migration, anticipating delayed gratification upon remigration, they were generally more willing than their permanent counterparts to work long shifts, seven days a week, in the most difficult jobs. They were also less likely to spend in regions of destination.

Along with other factors, economic motivations contributed to some Russky Orthodox conversions. Temporary labor migrants have not uncommonly avoided religious economic “obligations.” A Hungarian-identifying minister in Cleveland, for example, experienced great difficulties in securing donations from migrants, who told him that “they had come to America for only a short time, and would soon go home; meanwhile they were paying church taxes at home.” A migrant from Italy also refused to contribute to a church, saying that his purpose in the United States was “to work, make some money and go back home. When we return to Italy, there we will attend mass.”²⁴² For like-minded Greek Catholic

²³⁹ "Slovatskoe y Russkoe Sviaschenstvo v Amerki," *Budapest Hirlap* April 4, 1897. Quoted in *Pravoslavy Amerikansky Russky* May 15, 1897, 370-2. Also quoted in George Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, 4 vols., vol. 1 (Chilliwack, British Columbia: Synaxis Press, 1978), 6. Emphasis mine.

²⁴⁰ Y L., "Lehkovazhena kvestiya," *Nyva* 5, no. 10 (May 15, 1908): 290-92. He suggested that the fact that hardly any women were migrating partly accounted for the temporary nature of this labor migration.

²⁴¹ In this claim, she followed Merkle and Zimmerman. Pinger, "Come Back or Stay? Spend Here or There? Return and Remittances: The Case of Moldova."; Merkle and Zimmermann, "Savings, Remittances, and Return Migration."

²⁴² Reidar Grunde Simonsen, "Returned Emigrants: a Study of Repatriated Norwegians," unpublished thesis, University of Oslo, 1982, 20; Rudolph J. Vecoli, "Prelates and Peasants: Italian Immigrants and the Catholic Church," *Journal of Social History* 2 (Spring 1969), 230-31, both quoted in Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 63.

migrants, Russky Orthodox affiliation provided an opportunity to retain religious customs *and* minimize expenditures. Certainly not all—perhaps not even most—converted for material reasons, and those that did were also influenced substantially by other factors. The testimony of many remigrants, however, that they converted “in America” because “there, it is not necessary to pay” accords with a profit-maximizing, expenditure-minimizing model of temporary labor migrant behavior.

The Russky Orthodox Church in North America, with funding from the Holy Synod in Russia and private citizens, including the Tsar himself, often helped defray the costs of establishing and maintaining a church. In addition, converts and Greek Catholic partisans alike complained of excessive sacramental fees levied by some Greek Catholic priests in both Austria-Hungary and the Americas. Even Greek Catholic parishes with “fair” rates could make greater demands upon migrants’ wallets, because they relied to a greater extent on material support from the community. In many cases, migrants sought to maximize earnings in a Russky Orthodox, rather than Greek Catholic, parish, due to the lower cost of affiliation.²⁴³

The case of the returned migrant Andrei Repak is illustrative. At age fifteen, Repak migrated to first to Bonne Terre, then Desloge, Missouri, where he worked as a miner. Based upon reports from the United States, the bishop of Przemyśl suspected Repak of conversion to Orthodoxy in the United States. When Repak remigrated to his native village of Mysczowa in 1910, then age twenty, to rejoin his family, the parish priest conducted an interview, in which he questioned Repak’s attendance at a Russky Orthodox parish, rather than the nearby Greek Catholic parish:

Q. And in neighboring St. Louis was there not a Greek Catholic priest?

A. In St. Louis there was some Uniate priest, but very briefly, because it was a small parish, not worthy to maintain a priest itself. And besides that it was a great loss: the journey to St. Louis costs two dollars one way, and for confession there it is necessary to

²⁴³ This is not to say that Russky Orthodox activists were “buying” converts, as Greek Catholic critics charged that they did. More vulgar accusations included stories of conversions traded for “beer, apples, and nuts.” See, for example, “Z amerykanskoyi Rusy,” *Nyva* 6, no. 1 (January 1, 1909): 22-23. Russky Orthodox parishes also relied upon material support from their migrant constituencies—just less so in some cases. For a much fuller and more nuanced treatment of the controversial matter of economic motivations for conversion, see [Chapter Five](#).

pay—I do not know how much—whether a dollar, or more or less. It is necessary to skip two days of work, so people also lose work.²⁴⁴

The economic underpinnings of Repak's flirtation with conversion are clear. Attending the Greek Catholic church would have undercut his capital gains in several respects: through expenditures (the fare from Desloge to St. Louis plus sacramental fees) and two days of missed work. Repak, however, could achieve his primary migration goal—acquisition of capital—and still maintain religious practices, the importance of which is evident in his statement, "I confessed to the Orthodox priest and received communion, because everyone did likewise, such as I did, because I had not to live as an animal without confession." Attendance at the Russky Orthodox parish required neither train fare nor lost work, and confession at the Russky Orthodox parish presumably cost less than "a dollar, or more or less." While some profit-maximizing migrants avoided religion entirely, Andrei Repak and other enterprising Greek Catholic migrants enjoyed another option: Russky Orthodox affiliation.

Theoretically, taking only economic factors into account, temporary labor migrants most likely to minimize expenditures should have affiliated as Russky Orthodox at higher rates than permanent migrants.²⁴⁵ Consequently, higher rates of likely remigrants should have populated Russky Orthodox parishes. Remigrants' testimony of economic motivations for conversion cannot substitute for systematic, quantitative survey, but it suggests the economic attractiveness of Russky Orthodox affiliation for temporary labor migrants. Future remigrants—most likely to transfer social remittances to regions of origin—were very possibly overrepresented in convert parishes. As the less expensive option, conversion thus contained inherent potential for remittance.²⁴⁶ What is certain is that economic remittances—

²⁴⁴ Fr. Vlad Durkot, "Protocol with Andrei Repak," in *ABGK* (April 2, 1910), syg. 4929, 6-9.

²⁴⁵ Economic factors, however, are certainly *not* the only consideration; furthermore, permanent migrants were hardly immune to profit-maximizing behaviors.

²⁴⁶ It is also suggestive that some returned migrants also converted in Austria-Hungary—or "sincerely" converted after having attended the Russky Orthodox church in America—for economic reasons. Among the first to join the conversion movements in the village of Velyki Luchky (beginning in late-1902), were returned migrants eager to buy land with the money they remitted from the United States. Not only could they more effectively accomplish when freed from the exorbitant sacramental fees charged by the Greek Catholic priest in that village, a rumor circulated that the Russian Tsar would soon invade the region and redistribute land only to converts. In the village

whether within the family economy or designated for ethnoreligious causes—bore close linkages with remigration(s), which, together with other second-order migrations in the Americas and to Russia, forms the subject of the next section.

3.2 TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION

By the turn of the century, *Svoboda* became one of the most widely-read publications for Eastern Christians in the Americas and Austria-Hungary. The weekly covered national and religious developments in both the “new world” and the “old country.” It also devoted much ink to the vicissitudes of the migrant experience. In 1903, the paper’s masthead captured that experience pictorially.



Figure 1: *Svoboda* masthead, turn of the century

of Grab in 1911, widespread resentment against the local Greek Catholic priest, Father Kisielewsky, who had extorted a sizable sum from his parishioners, catalyzed conversions among migrants who had already attended a Russky Orthodox parish in America for economic reasons. Seven witnesses—returned migrants from America to Grab—testified at the 1914 treason trial in Lviv that they went to the Orthodox Church in America “because there it is not necessary to pay,” but that they converted formally in Grab, because they were “compelled by the conduct of Father Kisielewsky, who ‘murdered’ them.” Interestingly, Father Kisielewsky fled to the United States, and from there he repaid (remitted) his debt to the villagers of Grab. Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*, 246.

In a vivid image, a mustachioed migrant stood with his feet on American ground—perhaps more accurately *in* American soil, for the pick-axe he grasped in his right hand identified him as a miner. Immediately behind him, burning smokestacks signified factories and booming industry, drawing other laborers like him “*do Ameriky*” in droves. At this moment, the migrant rested from his labors and shielded his eyes to peer across the ocean toward his native land. There, in the *kray*, the national bard Taras Shevchenko returned his gaze. Among other symbols of the nation and just beyond the Carpathian Mountains, the on-looking expatriate discerned the onion domes of the church in his native village, shimmering in the sun. A *bunchuk*²⁴⁷ extended back toward him from the European shore, so close that were he to let his pick-axe fall to his side, he could reach out and take hold of it. Lest *Svoboda*’s readers were to mistake this as an image of mere nostalgia—lest they were to assume that the drawing depicted an immigrant who, having left his native land behind once and for all, still remembered it with fondness—a ship steamed across the Atlantic in the background, just below the letters “SVOBODA” (Liberty). It headed not in the direction of the Americas, bringing along more “immigrants;” instead, the ship traveled eastward—toward the old country, bearing migrants back to their regions of origin.

In his seminal 1885 study of migration, E.G. Ravenstein remarked that “Each main current of migration produces a compensating counter-current.”²⁴⁸ Remigration, in other words, comprises an integral aspect emigration and immigration. A list of the terms, which scholars have employed to describe the phenomenon of migrants returning to native regions, includes: reflux migration, homeward migration, remigration, return flow, second-time migration, repatriation, and retromigration. A related category is “re-emigration”: a second (or third or fourth...) outward migration following the first (or second or third...) migratory return.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁷ A pole decorated with animal hair and capped by a ball, historically displayed like a flag by Cossack leaders in battle.

²⁴⁸ E. G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration," *J. R. Statist. Soc.* 48, no. 167-227 (1885). Cited in Gmelch, "Return Migration," 135.

²⁴⁹ Gmelch, "Return Migration," 136.

Though the concept of “return migration” does not, in the strictest sense, exclude the possibility of subsequent migration and return migration, in practice, the term may often connote the final step of a two-stage migration: to speak of “return migration” in this sense is to speak of an individual who left his native region for another, then remigrated home, once and for all. Many “remigrants” did exactly that. But it was also not uncommon for a migrant to make the voyage to the Americas and back multiple times. Terms of relevance to this phenomena, then, include “multiple,” “cyclical,” and “seasonal” migration, all connoting the idea of multiple returns. The discipline of transnationalism studies has encompassed migration in both directions—in multiple directions, in fact, between multiple nodes—with the terms “transnational migration” or more simply, “transmigration.”²⁵⁰ This study retains the interchangeable terms “remigration” and “return migration,” though certainly not always in the sense of return “once and for all.”²⁵¹

Scholars of American, Canadian, Brazilian, and Argentinian immigration initially largely ignored remigration. In Oscar Handlin’s paradigm of “uprooted” *immigration*, for example, individuals who came to the United States left the old world behind once and for all.²⁵² Although that paradigm persists in popular perceptions, migration scholars since the mid-1960s and especially since the 1980s have increasingly taken remigration seriously.²⁵³ Several schools of analysis have arisen around the data,

²⁵⁰ Basch, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-states*. A [later section](#) of this chapter develops the conception of remigration within transnational migration studies.

²⁵¹ In this study, “remigration” always refers to return migration to the region of origin (whether once and for all or temporarily); it does *not* simply mean “migration again” to another location which is not the region of origin.

²⁵² Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951).

²⁵³ Several factors account for the initial inattention to return migration within migration studies and enduring vernacular conceptions of immigration as a “once-and-for-all” event. In the first place, migration studies originated in the mid-nineteenth century, just before the advent of steamship travel and rapidly improving railroad networks made return and cyclical migration more feasible than ever before. The old paradigm, nevertheless, continued to hold sway. See: J. A. Jackson, ed. *Migration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). Other reasons include the early dominance of the “rural-urban” framework in migration studies: in a global process of modernization and urbanization, people moved *to* cities—often to ones located across the Atlantic in America—not *back* to villages. Additionally, the practical considerations of anthropological studies of migration—particularly their brief duration and narrow regional focus—failed to elicit the kinds of data on remigration which lengthier, broader studies would eventually produce. See: R. Rhoades, “Toward an Anthropology of Return Migration,” *Pap. Anthropol.* 20(1979). Ironically, as Gmelch remarked, most of the studies on remigration have dealt with remigration from urban areas to rural native regions. Gmelch, “Return Migration,” 136. To these factors, it is also

including: (a) neoclassical economics, (b) the new economics of labor migration (NELM), (c) the structural approach, and (d) transnationalism studies.²⁵⁴ Matters of *duration* of and *motivation* for remigration have dominated remigration typologies. How long did migrants stay in regions of migratory destination before leaving? For what purpose did they come? Factors of *intention* and *agency* further complicate matters. Did migrants originally intend to stay permanently or temporarily? If temporarily, for how long? Did they choose remigration or were they compelled? If remigration was a choice, was it consistent with original intentions?²⁵⁵

Adherents of neoclassical economics argued that remigration represented a migrant's failure to achieve his or her original goals: establishing a viable livelihood in a region of destination. In other words, migrants followed the money, and those who returned must not have found it. The NELM school, however, expanded the unit of analysis beyond the individual to broader social networks of kin and friends.²⁵⁶ NELM researchers instead found that remigration indicates successful achievement of migrant objectives. In a family economy, migrants left native regions intending to accrue savings more rapidly than they could at home. While in migration, they remitted some earnings to relatives, partly to support the family during their absence, but also in preparation for ultimate return. Insights of structural approaches to remigration suggest that, beyond economic motivations, contextual factors in both regions

necessary to add the national myth of American exceptionalism, positing that immigrants came to the United States seeking "a better life." In this myth, the political, ideological, and economic greatness of America—its "freedom," its "democracy," its "opportunity"—caused individuals to leave the "despotism," "tyranny," and "poverty" of the old world behind; the previous chapter seriously called this into question. Of course, nearly all migrants did come seeking a better life; but they did not necessarily envision ultimately living out that aspiration in America. For many transatlantic labor migrants, America instead represented a means of improving their lives in the native regions to which they returned. Wilbur Shepperson remarked return migration contained within it "the chastening values of disapproval," something which has perhaps led some to ignore it. As Wyman put it, "Returned immigrants rejected America and, it seems, American scholars have rejected them." *Emigration and Disenchantment*, vii-viii, 196, cited in Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 14.; *ibid.*, 4. For a recent survey of remigration research, see: Cassarino, "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited," 254. Even before 1980, a substantial body of literature had considered return migration, although as Gmelch's 1980 "state of the field" essay pointed out, without much in the way of synthetic theorization. Gmelch, "Return Migration."

²⁵⁴ Cassarino, "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited," 253.

²⁵⁵ Gmelch, "Return Migration," 138.

²⁵⁶ Oded Stark, *The Migration of Labor* (Cambridge, Mass., USA; Oxford, UK: B. Blackwell, 1991). See also, however, similar ideas articulated in John Bodnar's earlier work: Bodnar, *The Transplanted: a History of Immigrants in Urban America*.

of migratory origin and destination have influenced remigration, including: power relations, affective ties, acquired skills, traditions, values, and social changes.²⁵⁷

Although structural approaches have considered both regions of migratory origin and destination, they have tended to compartmentalize the two, ignoring sustained linkages maintained through correspondence and multiple migrations. Cassarino has helpfully summarized the approach of transnationalism studies to remigration:

Unlike the structuralists and the advocates of NELM, return does not constitute the end of a migration cycle. In the view of transnationalists, the migration story continues. Return migration is part and parcel of a circular system of social and economic relationships and exchanges facilitating the reintegration of migrants while conveying knowledge, information and membership. One of the main contrasts between transnationalism and structuralism lies in the fact that, according to transnationalists, returnees prepare their reintegration at home through periodical and regular visits to their home countries. They retain strong links with their home countries and periodically send remittances to their households.²⁵⁸

The current study emphasizes transnationalism—particularly sustained linkages between migratory regions—in the analysis of migration. The conversion movements and counter-conversions they prompted, unfolded in the context of ties maintained through remigration, remigrations, correspondence, and social and economic remittances, in the twenty-five years preceding World War I.

The current study also draws from the insights of other schools on remigration, however, insofar as multiple forms of remigration prevailed during the period under consideration, each partly explainable by neoclassical economic, NELM, and structural approaches to remigration. The migration upon which NELM scholars have focused accurately characterizes the “baseline” form of migration adopted by most migrants under consideration in this study. Most migrants left Austria-Hungary for the Americas seeking work, as members of family units. They earned capital to realize family objectives in the *kray*, through remittances, return migration(s), and ultimate reintegration into native communities. Even most of the

²⁵⁷ Francesco Cerase’s influential work is representative of the structural approach. See Francesco Cerase, "From Italy to the United States and Back: Returned Migrants, Conservative or Innovative?" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1971); Cerase, "Expectations and Reality: a Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy," 245-62.

²⁵⁸ Cassarino, "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited," 262.

young, single men dominating vanguard migration waves continued to regard themselves as belonging to families of parents, siblings, grandparents, and non-immediate family; most also eventually married, frequently to a partner from or still in the old country.

Some of these migrants, however, did return due to “failure,” as posited by neoclassical economists, or at least partial failure: although they “succeeded” in remigrating as intended, they did not do so under their own terms. Numerous studies have pointed to economic downturns as a source of remigration.²⁵⁹ Major economic downturns, especially in the United States after 1893 and in the United States and Canada after 1907, catalyzed waves of remigration with dramatic implications for the remittance of conversion movements to Austria-Hungary. Some migrants, who came to earn capital and ultimately return, shortened their intended stays in the Americas when, following an economic downturn, they lost their jobs. Those who had only recently arrived “cut their losses and ran” (failure). Others who had lived and worked in migration for some time “quit while they were ahead,” even if not as far ahead as originally intended (partial failure/partial success). Additionally, many representatives of both categories later migrated yet again to the Americas, when economic conditions became more favorable (temporary setback, followed by either success, failure or partial success/partial failure).

Individuals in this study who remigrated because they failed to achieve their original objective of permanent settlement in the Americas were fewer than temporary labor remigrants. Many settlers originally migrated as families, whether together or in stages, with vanguard (usually male) individuals later sending for the rest of their family. Many, though not all, of these kinds of migrants settled as agriculturalists in Canada, Brazil, and Argentina. Agriculturalists also came from Austria-Hungary in

²⁵⁹ Hernández Alvarez and University of California Berkeley. Institute of International Studies., *Return migration to Puerto Rico*; J. Hernandez-Alvarez, "Migration, Return and Development," *Econ. Dev. Cult. Change* 35, no. 116 (1968); B. Kayser, "The Situation of the Returning Migrant on the Labour Market in Greece: Results of Surveys. Emigrant Workers Returning to their Home Country," *OECD Supplement* (1967); B. Kayser, "Cyclically Determined Homeward Flows of Migrant Workers," *OECD* (1972); R. L. King, "Return Migration: Review of Some Cases from Southern Europe," *Mediterranean Studies* 1, no. 2 (1978); R. Rhoades, "Intra-European Return Migration and Rural Development: Lessons from the Spanish Case," *Hum. Organ.* 2, no. 1 (1978); R. Rhoades, "From Caves to Main Street: Return Migration and the Transformation of a Spanish Village," *Pap. Anthropol.* 20(1979); Rhoades, "Toward an Anthropology of Return Migration."

much smaller numbers to the United States, and some migrants who came to labor in industry, particularly in later migration waves, also intended permanent settlement. The most significant numbers of remigrants from among intended settlers left South America, particularly Brazil, due to harsh conditions.

To repeat an argument from the previous chapter, racial hostilities, in both regions of origin and destination, represented an important structural factor, affecting the goals of both temporary labor migrants and permanent settlers, agricultural or otherwise.²⁶⁰ Differing racial equations (discrimination in a region of origin, lack thereof in a region of destination), could “change the mind” of a temporary labor migrant, or “confirm the mind” of a prospective settler, and in both cases, forestall remigration. Conversely, some might otherwise have considered remaining in the Americas had they not encountered there the “othering,” dehumanizing label of “the Hun,” or found themselves unwitting instruments in Brazil’s racial conflicts with “Blacks” and “Indians.”

Scholars have faced difficulties establishing migrant intentions, partly because migrants, themselves, may not have been entirely clear on the matter. Often, an array of intentions informed migrant decisions, not all of them equal or even conscious. Furthermore, many migrated “on a trial basis, letting their decision of whether or not to return and when to return be guided by the opportunities they [found] in the new society.”²⁶¹ Even after long durations in migration, some individuals have retained an “ideology of return,” partially sustained by economic remittances and correspondence.²⁶²

²⁶⁰ For several studies of racialized discrimination prompting return migration, see: Davison, "No Place Back Home: a Study of Jamaicans Returning to Kingston, Jamaica."; Hernández Alvarez and University of California Berkeley. Institute of International Studies., *Return migration to Puerto Rico*; Taylor, "The Social Adjustment of Returned Migrants to Jamaica."

²⁶¹ Gmelch, "Return Migration," 138.

²⁶² C. Brettell, "Emigrar para voltar: a Portuguese ideology of return migration," *Pap. Anthropology* 20, no. 1 (1979); B. Dahya, "Pakistanis in Britain: Transients or Settlers," *Race* 14(1973); D. Hill, "The Impact of Migration on the Metropolitan Folk Society of Carriacou, Grenada," *Anthropol. Pap. Am. Mus. Nat. Hist., NY* 54, no. 2 (1977); H. Rubenstein, "The Return Ideology in West Indian Migration," *Pap. Anthropol.* 20(1979).

Greek Catholic migrants and those who affiliated as Russky Orthodox so frequently returned to regions of origin that migrant publications regularly offered advice on the various religious, national, economic, and practical facets of the remigration process.²⁶³ As early as 1895, *Svoboda* counseled potential remigrants in the matter of Russky Orthodox affiliation, exclaiming, “Read this! Greek Catholic Rusky priests in the old country will not accept to Holy Confession any of those Rusyns, who return from America to the old country and in America accepted Orthodoxy.”²⁶⁴ The announcement attempted to influence migrant behavior, both in the Americas and following return(s). Other religious advice included the 1905 suggestion that “Rusyns going to America and those that are returning from America to the *kray*,” who passed through the port of Bremen, would do well to pay a visit to the resident priest, Father D. Dobrototvor. A remigrant from the Americas, himself, exhibiting “affection for Rusky people” undergoing migration, he could provide “sincere council” to those departing to or returning from the Americas.²⁶⁵

An 1895 *Svoboda* article addressed one of the most common demographics engaging in remigration: young boys, under the age of eighteen at the time of migration. Their reasons for return varied. The “old father” might call with a promise of land. The boy might return to find a wife and then bring her with him to America. There was also the too-common occurrence of a young boy who, out of “foolishness,” bought his steam liner tickets only to visit his native village and show his friends there, “Here then am I, a *dzhentelman*.” Unfortunately, however, the very next day after the arrival of “our *dzhentelman*,” the gendarmes arrived and conscripted him into military service. “Our poor *dzhentelman*” cried and wailed during his four years in the army and having fulfilled his term, departed immediately again to America. Yet, the article reported incredulously, “already he says to several people that he will return to the *kray*.” *Svoboda* thus advised all boys to apply for U.S. citizenship immediately upon arrival:

²⁶³ See, for example, “Radymo nashym krayanam” (“We advise our countrymen”), *Svoboda* October 31, 1895, 2.

²⁶⁴ “Chytaytel,” *Svoboda* May 22, 1895, 2. In fact, many old country priests appear to have done so quite commonly.

²⁶⁵ *Svoboda* (March 23, 1905), 1. On his way through Bremen, Bishop Soter blessed a Greek Catholic chapel in Bremen for this purpose. See [Chapter Eight](#).

citizenship meant employability, for Pennsylvania had passed a law requiring citizenship for some factory and state jobs; it also protected individuals from military conscription upon remigration.²⁶⁶

Svoboda also offered advice regarding the most common motivation for remigration: the purchase of land in the *kray*. “Who Wants to Buy Good Land” noted that, “Many of our people that work here in America after ten or more years, collect their labor wages into a little pile, in order afterward to return to the old country and buy their ancestral land from Jewish hands, or in some other way buy something for their own property.” Commending the purchase of land, the article criticized dumping “hard-earned money” into the rocky, inferior quality plots surrounding villages “in their own mountains.” Remigrants were advised instead to buy land in Jarosław County, at some distance from their village of origin, but hardly as far as the Americas. Clearly, the customary path entailed return to one’s native village, even if this meant settling for sub-par land.²⁶⁷

Many migrants remigrated multiple times. A n 1895 *Svoboda* article referenced people who several times “return to the old country, taking money each time.” So prevalent was the practice that *Svoboda* was compelled to advise a more cost-effective method. Rather than suggesting fewer migrations, the recommendation was to invest money in a bank “here” (in the Americas), then take the full sum plus interest, only on one's final trip home.²⁶⁸ Others criticized multiple remigrations as counterproductive to migrants’ acquisition of capital. In 1903, a Northampton, Pennsylvania correspondent to *Svoboda* reported that many people from that city were returning to their native land, because cement factory jobs had recently dried up. The majority, who still remained in Northampton, faced a difficult decision regarding remigration, in the face of sustained economic hardship. “When there is no work,” he explained, “then many go back to the *kray*, with the intention that, when work starts up again, they will return here again.” The author criticized the practice, saying that migrants who paid up to

²⁶⁶ “Cherez nashu bauduzhnost my sche pozadu” (“Through our indifference we are still backward”), *Svoboda* (November 28, 1895), 1.

²⁶⁷ “Kto khoche kupyty dobry hrunt” (“Who wants to buy good land”), *Svoboda* April 29, 1895, 3.

²⁶⁸ “Ne marnui krovavytsi!,” *Svoboda* October 3, 1895, 1.

fifteen dollars for one trip only worked “to buy steam liner tickets to go there and back, from country to country. Only the steamship company is profiting from this.”²⁶⁹

Correspondents to *Svoboda* commented more than once on the migrant practice of “working for steam liner tickets:” spending earnings on unnecessary return migrations. In 1895, a correspondent wrote that several people had recently arrived to Shamokin and Mt. Carmel, Pennsylvania from the old country. Apart from one person, all were “our old people:” familiar migrants who had already been in the United States. As soon as these “foolish ones” earned enough money for a round-trip ticket, they returned home, only to visit the village tavern and treat their comrades to beer. The individuals in question had already “peregrinated” back and forth to the *kray* four times. One man, said the letter writer, visited his native village for just two months, during which time he married. Almost immediately, he abandoned her and “ran away headlong again to America.” As he had been known to tell other migrants in Mt. Carmel, he left because: “There, instead of meat, I ate cabbage and potatoes, and instead of beer, I drank *var*.”²⁷⁰ The sojourner resolved, though, to “peregrinate” no more, since “four times is enough.”²⁷¹

If multiple remigrations meant unnecessary expenditures, they also threatened to obstruct development of viable religio-national migrant communities, for remigrants did not want “to belong to a church, nor to a brotherhood or any organization...”²⁷² In 1900, a writer from Freeman, West Virginia protested that migrants who spent on multiple remigrations could put earnings to better use in the service of the “national aim,” by purchasing *Svoboda*. “Our people love to read *Svoboda*,” he said, “but they do not love to give even one cent for it.” Even considering recently favorable employment conditions, “our men, having worked, return with those cents more quickly to the *kray*. And after a year or two, or a couple of months, they again return here.” Some had done so already two, three, or four times: “To the

²⁶⁹ M. Doda., "Dopysy," *Svoboda* October 15, 1903, 3.

²⁷⁰ Juice from dried fruit.

²⁷¹ "Novynyky," *Svoboda* November 21, 1895, 3.

²⁷² "Dopysy," 3.

national aim, such a man never contributes, but if the *bos* brings to him in the mines an agent who sells an English newspaper, then he gratefully will give a dollar, in order to have favor with the *bos*.”²⁷³

Alternatively, others considered that remigration strengthened national development.²⁷⁴ In June of 1904, Myroslav Stechyshyn wrote from San Francisco to *Svoboda* to disagree with a previous letter writer, who had urged “Lemkos” not to remigrate, because their land-buying fervor drove up prices. Stechyshyn countered that emigration would be harmful to the national movement if done once and for all, rather than temporarily. “Lemkos and other Ukrainians” ought to return to Galicia, he said, because it was the “duty” of “our emigrants” to devote themselves to “liberating” Ukraine from various yokes. Permanent settlement in the Americas would only result in assimilation and the loss of national consciousness, *a la* “Germans” and other migrants who had stayed, thereby “diminishing the vital strength of the native [*ridny*] people.” “Therefore, he said, “When, having made one’s money, one returns back to the people, we only listen upon this with gladness.”²⁷⁵

Svoboda published a third correspondent’s response, “Two Rus’s,” which claimed that Stechyshyn provided only part of the truth. Yes, he said, “Rusyns” were losing their language in America, but language was not essential to nationality. Neither “Jews” nor “Irish,” he said, still spoke their original language; yet they retained national consciousness. Moreover, migrants choosing stay in “American Rus” could more effectively earn and collect material assistance for the *kray*, not only to help their families, but also to donate to “patriotic aims” like the church or the *bursa*.²⁷⁶ It was the duty of “European Rus,” on the other hand, to provide “American Rus”—its “daughter in foreign lands”—with intelligent, honorable, and enlightened leaders: something which had yet to happen. He thus called for a

²⁷³ “Dopysy,” *Svoboda* December 13, 1900, 2.

²⁷⁴ Several studies have cited the concept of “love of the homeland” as a motivating factor for remigration: George Gmelch, *Return Migration and Migrant Adjustment in Western Ireland* (Hum. Dev.: Irish Found, 1979); A. Richardson, “A Shipboard Study of some British Born Immigrants Returning to the United Kingdom from Australia,” *International Migration Review* 6(1968); N. Toren, “Return to Zion: Characteristics and Motivations of Returning Emigrants,” *Soc. Forces* 54, no. 3 (1976).

²⁷⁵ Myroslav Stechyshyn, “Dopysy,” *Svoboda* June 4, 1903, 3.

²⁷⁶ A semi-religious boarding school.

two-way, transatlantic flow of resources, mediated by the establishment of two committees—one in Galicia, the other in America—which could conduct this (trans-) “national work.”²⁷⁷

In May of 1913, Lviv’s *Emigrant* provided one method by which migrants still abroad could benefit that “the national work.” The item “Noble Contributions for National Aims,” reported that the migrant proprietor Hryhory Kraykivsky had sent \$1,000 from Edmonton, Alberta for Lviv’s Rusky-Ukrainophile Prosvita society to help preparing students for the future “Ukrainian” school in Galicia. By these contributions, “with gladness” and “in American” (*po-Amerykansky*) had migrants demonstrated “the strength and rebirth of Ukraine.” *Emigrant* encouraged more contributions from its transatlantic readership for Galician causes like the *Ridna Shkola* and the Greek Catholic Church. The piece concluded with mixed messages, however, arguing that these ethnoreligious initiatives minimized emigration, “which is a shame to us.” *Emigrant* thus acknowledged the benefit of migrant remittances, but earmarked them for initiatives, which, by reducing emigration, could undercut future remittances.²⁷⁸

Other individuals in the *kray* analyzed migrations, remigrations, and the “national work.” In 1908, a writer in Lviv’s *Nyva* asserted that, “Uncontestably, one of the most important contemporary events of our national life is emigration to America.”²⁷⁹ Yet, although Galicia sent more emigrants to America than any other Austrian province, the politically engaged in Austria-Hungary hardly knew that the “emigration question” existed. As a result, emigration, especially of “Rusyns,” proceeded without oversight. As proof of emigration’s great social, political, and economic significance, he pointed to emigration laws passed by nearly every country except for Austria-Hungary. Politically engaged individuals and clerics needed to address the issue, “Because emigration has significance, not only for nationality, but also for the church, our clergy, more than any other people, must have it in view.”²⁸⁰

Contemporary transatlantic migration, he continued, held particular significance for “nationality” and “church,” because it took “a completely different form” than in previous eras, when emigrants left

²⁷⁷ "Dvi Rusy," *Svoboda* June 11, 1903, 4.

²⁷⁸ "Lysty z Chuzhyny: Knyazhi Zhertvy na Narodni Tsily," 86.

²⁷⁹ L., "Lehkovazhena kvestiya," 289.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 289-90, 93.

“with the intention never to return.” “Today’s emigrants,” on the contrary, “try to find in lands across the sea only temporary, well-paying work, in order with the money earned to return from there to the native land...As we already know, the majority of our emigrants today have no intention to remain continually in America.” Migrant remittances only confirmed this. For this reason, Catholicism’s decline in America represented a threat for migrants abroad and for the religio-national cause in the *kray*. Catholicism—integral to the national ideology of Rusky-Ukrainophile Greek Catholic clergy—had been “dying” for thirty years in the United States, due to democratic religious pluralism and bewildering diversity, the absence of religious instruction in public schools, and a lack of priests. Without action, these temporary labor migrants would be lost to Catholicism and the nation, even after their return to Austria-Hungary.

In Hungary, too, parties perceived the influence of migration and remigration upon religion and nationhood in the *kray*. An 1897 article in Hungary’s *Budapest Hirlap* advocated arousing and maintaining migrants’ national loyalties—and desire to return—through direct governmental subsidization of Hungarian-loyalist initiatives, like dispatching “patriotic” Greek Catholic priests. That recommendation eventually came to fruition in the form of Hungary’s “American Action.”²⁸¹ Other voices in Hungary considered migrants “lost causes,” undesirable for repatriation. In 1903, delegates at a national convention proposed that Hungary restrict 90% of returning migrants, because of their anti-Hungarian nationalization as “Slovaks” or “Russians.” The Hungarian government did approve a 1907

²⁸¹ "Slovatskoe y Russkoe Sviaschenstvo v Amerki." Quoted in *Pravoslavny Amerikansky Russky* May 15, 1897, 370-2. Also quoted in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 1, 6. The Greek Catholic hierarchy in both Galicia and Subcarpathia maintained close ties with the state, but those ties were closer in Hungary. On the “American Action,” see [Chapter Seven](#). In his otherwise outstanding monograph, Wyman incorrectly grouped the text of the *Emigrant* masthead together with the desire of the “authorities” to “keep the Hungarians in America good Hungarian citizens.” Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 95-96. *Emigrant*, published in Lviv by a voluntary association of Galician Greek Catholics, had no formal ties to the government. Although the interests of the Austrian government and the Greek Catholic Church did coincide in the matter of preventing Rusky Orthodox conversions, *Emigrant*’s stance differed from that of the American Action, in its promotion of a Rusky/Ukrainian national orientation, rather than a Hungarian one.

law to readmit only “Hungarian” migrants, though apparently without any enforcement. The interests of capital and the need for a steady labor supply trumped the nationalists.²⁸²

Like capitalists, many ethnoreligious activists in the *kray* refused to write off their migrant constituents; instead, they exhibited sustained interest in migrants’ behaviors: especially their Russky Orthodox conversions and probable remigration(s). Every migrant convert depleted the constituency of Greek Catholicism’s religio-national movements in Austria-Hungary: in Galicia, the “Rusyn-Ukrainian” movement, and in Subcarpathia, the Hungarian and Rusyn movements, respectively. The danger of remigrants conducting “schismatic agitation” among non-migrant friends, family, and fellow villagers made action all the more pressing. The eventual encounter of Greek Catholics and Austro-Hungarian officials with conversions remitted by corresponding and returning migrants in their own territories, beginning at the turn of the century, confirmed the merits of these fears.

In addition to remigration and multiple, cyclical remigrations to the *kray*, migrants originally from Austria-Hungary also undertook subsequent migrations to other localities in the Americas.²⁸³ They traveled to other areas within the United States, Canada, Brazil, or Argentina, and they also crossed international and hemispheric borders. Border-crossings occurred between the United States and Canada, between Brazil and Argentina, and between North and South America. Clerical and labor migrations of this type proceeded on a much smaller scale than the massive two-way labor migration between a given Austro-Hungarian region and a given “American” one, but second-order migrations across the Americas produced an impact out of proportion with their numbers.

Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox missionary priests who undertook second-stage migrations within the Americas usually travelled from a region with lengthier Eastern Christian migrant presence to

²⁸² Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 96. At the 1903 conference, the Hungarian Manufacturer’s Alliance, in need of a steady labor supply, argued for active promotion of remigration, and won.

²⁸³ Many of these migrants would also have engaged in intra-European seasonal labor migration before their first trip across the Atlantic Ocean.

more recently established communities. They moved from the United States, where Greek Catholics had arrived since the mid-1870s, to Canada or Brazil, where they began arriving in the mid-1890s; or they crossed from Brazil into Argentina, where Greek Catholics arrived in significant numbers around 1900. Father Ivan Volansky, the United States' first Greek Catholic priest (1894-1890), traveled also to Brazil in December 1896 for a six-month mission. In March 1908, Father Klymentii Bzhukhovsky, originally stationed in Brazil, became the first "permanent" missionary Greek Catholic priest in Argentina.²⁸⁴

To the vexation of Greek Catholic partisans, Russky Orthodox priests preceded their Greek Catholic counterparts by several years in missions to Greek Catholics in Canada, Brazil, and Argentina.²⁸⁵ The first Russky Orthodox priests came to Canada from the United States, when a number of "Malorussky Uniates" appealed in February of 1897 to the archbishop in San Francisco for a pastor who could facilitate their conversion.²⁸⁶ In summer of that year, Archbishop Nikolai sent Father Dimitri Kamnev and Deacon Vladimir Alexandrov on the 1,200 mile journey by train and wagon to Stary Wostok, Rabbit Hill, and Limestone Lake in Alberta.²⁸⁷ Soon after, Father Michael Malyarevsky came to Winnipeg and rural Manitoba, and Jacob Korchinsky came to Edmonton as Canada's first "permanent" Russky Orthodox priest. In Fall of 1901 and again in April of 1902, Father Constantine Popov of Minneapolis made the two-day journey to Saskatchewan, where he ministered to Bukovinans and, in Winnipeg, Galician converts from Greek Catholicism. By 1906, several Russky Orthodox priests, some who had originally migrated to the United States, resided semi-permanently in Canada, but others from

²⁸⁴ Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*, 29. His tenure proved not to be so "permanent:" it lasted less than a year.

²⁸⁵ This differed from the United States, where (Greek Catholic) Father Ivan Volansky's 1884 arrival preceded Father Alexis Toth's 1889 arrival (and vanguard 1890-91 conversion to the Russky Orthodox Church). Still, Greek Catholic loyalists everywhere, including in the United States, for decades complained that Russky Orthodox priests continued to "beat them to the punch" in various localities, due to consistent shortages of Greek Catholic priests throughout the Americas.

²⁸⁶ "Otradnaya Visti yz Kanadi," *Pravoslavny Amerykansky Rus* February 1 (13), 1897. The editor chose the term, "Malorussky Uniates," to describe the migrant community. A number of the primary sources from the early period of Russky Orthodox conversions, together with a well-written history and some translations into English, have been reproduced in the "Roots of Community" online exhibit, hosted by the Orthodox Church of America, Archdiocese of Canada, at its website: <http://www.archdiocese.ca/exhibit/index.html>.

²⁸⁷ Fr. Dimitri Kamnev, "Pravoslavie v Kanadi," *Pravoslavny Amerykansky Viestnik* 1897, 26-29. Alexandrov visited again in 1898, by which time he had been ordained a priest.

Seattle and Minnesota continued to make visits of shorter duration. The archbishops of the North American Rusky Orthodox Church also made pastoral visits from the United States to Canada. In 1901, Archbishop Tikhon traveled from New York to consecrate three churches in Alberta, to Manitoba and Saskatchewan in 1903, and finally, in 1904, to Edmonton and Winnipeg, where he consecrated two churches.²⁸⁸ His successor, Archbishop Platon, made a similar visit in 1908.²⁸⁹ Many of these priests and both archbishops had originally migrated to the United States from Russia, but migrant clerics also traveled originally from Austria-Hungary to Canada, via the United States.

Greek Catholic priests, who began arriving to Canada directly from Galicia in 1898 (within a year of the first Rusky Orthodox conversions), also entered and left Canada by way of the U.S.-Canadian border. Following his arrival as the first bishop for Greek Catholics in the United States in 1907, Bishop Soter in 1908 dispatched Father Mykola Strutynsky, originally of Galicia, from the United States to Winnipeg and other communities in Manitoba. Hostilities with Winnipeg's Latin rite bishop quickly ended the visit. And while the Rusky Orthodox archbishops freely traveled north of the border after the turn of the century, Latin rite opposition prevented Bishop Soter from doing so until 1910 (with Metropolitan Sheptytsky of Lviv).²⁹⁰ Conflicts with the Latin Rite also precipitated the second-stage migration of Father Domaskyn Polivka. Originally arriving from Galicia as a Greek Catholic Basilian missionary to Canada in 1899, he subsequently left for Northampton, Pennsylvania, following run-ins with the Latin rite bishop.²⁹¹ Originally Greek Catholics in Galicia, Fathers Humetsky and Ivan Krohmalny traveled in 1909 to the United States, after stints in Canada, as Rusky Orthodox converts.²⁹²

Priests were not the only ones crossing international borders in the Americas. In December 1889, Father Alexis Toth notified Bishop Ivan Valyi in Prešov that on major church holidays, in order to

²⁸⁸ "Puteshestvie eho Preosviaschenstva Preosviaschennyshaho Tykhona, Epyskopa Aleutskaho y S.-Amerykanskaho, po Eparkhiy," *Pravoslavny Amerikansy Viestnik* September 15 (28), 1901. *Pravoslavny Amerikansky Viestnik* October 1 (14); 15 (28); December 1 (14), 1904.

²⁸⁹ *Pravoslavny Amerikansky Viestnik* April 1 (14), 1908.

²⁹⁰ Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 201-03.

²⁹¹ Indeed, Polivka wrote to the old country from the United States to seek interventions in Canada, his former region of migratory settlement.

²⁹² Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 201-03, 12 fn. 74.

conduct religious practices in a Russky Orthodox parish, Greek Catholic migrants “always” made the “two to three day’s journey to Alaska from Wisconsin, Iowa, and Montana,” which would have taken them through Canada’s Yukon territory.²⁹³ Others left their original migratory destination in the Americas for other regions in the Western Hemisphere, for longer durations.

Some who came first to the United States subsequently migrated to Canada, for instance, following the promise of arable land there. In 1896, after surveying Canada’s viability as a migratory destination, Dr. Josef Oleskow visited Shamokin, Pennsylvania before returning to his native Galicia. His advice to the Rusky National Union prompted *Svoboda* on August 6, 1896 to advertise “free homesteads in Canada” to Eastern Christian migrants from Austria-Hungary living in the United States. The advertisement received limited response, due to the overrepresentation of temporary labor migrants in the United States. Still, a few did come, where, according to Martynowych, they “made a significant impact.” Theososy Wachna, for example, originally of the Lemko region, subsequently of Mayfield, Pennsylvania, migrated to Stuartburn, Manitoba in 1897, where he became secretary-treasurer of that municipality in 1902.²⁹⁴ Other migrants in the United States hoped to find work across the northern border. During the United States’ post-1907 economic depression, Galicians laboring in the United States wrote to fellow Galicians in Canada to inquire about the availability of work there.²⁹⁵ Lay people also crossed international borders in South America: Cipko suggested that Eastern Christian migrants may have illegally crossed from Brazil into Argentina.²⁹⁶

Migrants originally from Austria-Hungary also left South America for North America. In 1909, Mike Vowk arrived to Buenos Aires, then went elsewhere for work within Argentina. After three years,

²⁹³ Father Alexis Toth, “Letter to Ivan Valyi, dated December 16, 1889,” in Slovak State Archive, Prešov, Eparchy of Prešov fund, 1890/21, cited in Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 200-03, 64.

²⁹⁴ Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 62. Vladimir J. Kaye, *Early Ukrainian Settlements in Canada, 1895-1900; Dr. Josef Oleskow's Role in the Settlement of the Canadian Northwest*, The Canadian Centennial Series (Toronto: Published for the Ukrainian Canadian Research Foundation by University of Toronto Press, 1964), 380., cited in *ibid.*, 75, fn. 11.

²⁹⁵ “Lysty z chuzhyny,” *Emigrant* 1, no. 1 (March 1910): 13-15. This information was contained in a December 18, 1907 letter of a migrant in Canada to his relatives in Strusiv, Galicia, reprinted in Lviv’s *Emigrant*.

²⁹⁶ Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*, 12.

he departed for Canada, “with the intention of returning someday.” Michael Kulik of Galicia hoped to gain entrance to the United States through Argentina; after two years of laboring in Argentina he succeeded.²⁹⁷ Greek Catholic migrants—or originally Greek Catholic migrants—also left Brazil for North America.

On November 21, 1905, Ivan Honevych and Ivan Sedletsky, migrants from Galicia living in Parana, Brazil wrote to the *Svoboda*’s editor in the United States for advice about further migration. They had arrived in 1896 to the colony of General Carneiro, where the government provided them with eight acres of land. The land was infertile, however, and they could not find other viable employment. Living and working unceasingly for ten years, they had nothing to show for their labors. While the old people had resigned themselves to their “bitter fate,” a number of young men, ages 24 to 30, hoped to change their lot by migrating again: they only needed counsel regarding the optimal destination.

Having read previously in *Svoboda* of better conditions in the United States, they asked whether it would be for them to come, how much the trip would cost, by which route they should journey, and whether they could earn enough money after a time to send for their families, who would remain until then in Brazil. They also entertained the notion of subsequent migration after that, even, for they asked whether they might be able to purchase any land, whether in the United States or Canada. (If they ever did so, they would have migrated from Galicia to Brazil to the United States to Canada.) “Dear brothers,” they concluded, “we submit ourselves to you to show us the way out of this hell.” The editor provided the information solicited.²⁹⁸ Some migrants in the Americas also traveled to other American regions, only

²⁹⁷ Rose Jardine and Harriet Austen, eds., *Many Trails Crossed Here: A Story of Oyen, Alberta, and the Surrounding Districts* (Oyen: Oyen and District Historical Society, 1981): 194–95, cited in *ibid.* *Svoboda*, April 25, 1907, cited in *ibid.*, 7.

²⁹⁸ Ivan Honevych and Ivan Sedletsky, "Z Brazyliyskoho Raiu," *Svoboda* April 26, 1906, 3. The editor reported that, unlike Brazil, the United States was a “cultured land” with many factories. Almost all “Rusyns” there were materially better off than those in either the old country or in Brazil. Those who would come from Brazil were advised to travel via Rio de Janeiro, rather than the port of Parana, because the latter route was indirect and expensive. A ship left Rio for New York on the 29th of each month, and the trip to New York lasted 21 days. Only those who were young, strong and healthy should come, and they could send for their families later.

Apparently, some migrant Galician Greek Catholics in Brazil also left for Hawaii, when Canada was not an option for them. In 1900, two brothers of the Zembik family chose different paths across the Atlantic, from their native Zbaraz, Galicia, with one settling his family in Manitoba, the other in Brazil. The latter fared worse than the

after sojourns in their native land. Father Volansky, who traveled from Galicia to the United States (1884-1889, 1890), spent periods in Galicia (1889 and 1890-1896) before sojourning in Brazil (1896-97). He then returned to Galicia, where he lived out the remainder of his life. The Zbihly brothers, migrant laborers who originally left Subcarpathia for the United States, remigrated to Subcarpathia as Russky Orthodox converts, then migrated yet again to Argentina, where they established a convert parish, together with migrants from Galicia and “cradle Orthodox” Bukovinians.

The prevalence of remigration, second-stage migrations, and multiple migrations is apparent from the concerns that some individuals expressed. In 1906, an A. Tymtso wrote *Svoboda* to say he frequently received letters from Galician Greek Catholic migrants, living currently in Brazil and Argentina, inquiring as to the advantages of second-stage migration to the United States.²⁹⁹ Having lived in all these regions himself, he ventured to say a few words on the matter. Deteriorating conditions in Galicia had prompted an increase in migration, he wrote, consisting of people who came only for work, as well as those who intended to settle. Yet they did not find significantly better conditions. In the United States, “our people” had to work the most difficult jobs for the lowest wages. Although the “Irish boys” had come to the United States together with “our boys,” within a short time, the former had become either “*bos*” or “*polise*,” because “the Anglos already taught them the English language at home.” Similar

former, for he wrote his sibling, saying “Brother, if there was dry land from here to your country, we would be prepared to walk all the way to reach your Canada. For from what you wrote me, though you work hard, you live in Paradise.” It appears that the Brazilian settler’s son then migrated for work to Hawaii, where he settled. Michael Ewanchuk, *Hawaiian Ordeal: Ukrainian Contract Workers, 1897-1910* (Winnipeg, Manitoba: Michael Ewanchuk, 1986), 156-57.

The Hawaiian case deserves further study. Galician Greek Catholics arrived there as contract workers beginning in 1897, one year before Hawaii became a U.S. territory. There was a Russky/Russian Orthodox presence there at the time, at least until 1900 when Russian diplomats departed and the Orthodox chapel was closed. Attempts to form a Russky Orthodox parish began in the first decade of the twentieth century, and in 1915 arrived Father Jacob Korchinsky, who had already been instrumental in the conversion of Greek Catholics in the United States and Canada. That Father Korchinsky’s successor was of “Carpatho-Russian” (i.e., Greek Catholic) background and educated at the Russky Orthodox seminary in Tenafly, New Jersey, is suggestive of a possible formerly Greek Catholic parish constituency. Further investigation is necessary to determine whether (a) any Greek Catholics affiliated as Russky Orthodox in conjunction with the Russian diplomatic presence, pre-1900; and to what degree Greek Catholics participated in the formation of the new parish after the turn of the century. Amir A. Khisamutdniov and Rev. Antatole V. Lyovin, *Two Hundred Years on the Road: A History of the Orthodox Church in Hawaii* (Honolulu, Hawaii: Holy Theotokos of Iveron Russian Orthodox Church).

²⁹⁹ A. Tymtso, “Kilka Sliv Pro...” *Svoboda* August 30, 1906, 2.

developments, with variations on which favored groups had managed to usurp “Rusyns,” occurred also in Canada and Brazil. Moreover, secondary factors balanced out apparent wage differentials between regions: the United States’ high cost of living mitigated its higher wages, relative to South America. Besides economic considerations, climatic, racial, national, and religious factors contributed to the undesirability of migratory regions. Severe cold and heat prevailed in Canada and Brazil, respectively. “Indians,” suppressed sufficiently by the “Anglo-Saxons” in the United States, still posed great danger in Brazil. In spite of Argentina’s current prosperity, the small and dispersed numbers of “Rusky” Catholic migrants there could not establish a viable community of “our people.”³⁰⁰ Migration to the Americas also presented unique dangers for Greek Catholics, because Rusky Orthodox priests (“popes”) “came with” them, to separate them from Rome in the service of Moscow.

All of these factors suggested to Tyntso that no region really enjoyed superiority over the other. Each exhibited its own advantages and, mostly, disadvantages. Thus, he advised potential migrants to remain where they were: “From Argentina they emigrate to Brazil. From Brazil they go to the United States. From the United States they go to Canada, and from Canada to the United States. From Hawaii they go to California...and in their journey, they only discover that in no region is there enough. I myself similarly migrated and came to the conclusion that the best way is to make your lot better in the place you find yourself.”³⁰¹

³⁰⁰ Thus, notwithstanding its hot climate and Indian attacks, the article did advise, at least, that migrants in Argentina head toward Brazil. This one exception to his advice to simply find satisfaction wherever one found oneself suggests the importance he attributed to national considerations.

³⁰¹ Tyntso, “Kilka Sliv Pro...”. Various scholars of migration have remarked upon the phenomenon of “shuttle migrants:” as “cultural commuters,” they “move back and forth between home and host societies never fully satisfied with where they are.” As historian George Gilkey put it, “at home their dream was of America; in America their dream was of home.” Indeed, Tyntso characterized migrants in similar terms, though he described a state of eternal sojourn not just between two, but multiple regions. Notwithstanding Tyntso’s claims to have been a shuttle migrant, himself, the claim that such migrants are never satisfied in any one place has generally issued from outside observers. To be sure, discontent has been the experience for some; yet anecdotal personal narratives suggest that many found satisfaction in the sum total of their experience in both, or multiple, regions of migration. Even the criticisms levied at such migrants, some of which this chapter has reproduced, hint at this reality. It often appears that commentators, not the subjects of their critique, have exhibited the greatest degree of dissatisfaction with migrant itinerancy. Practitioners of transnationalism studies, for their part, have sometimes spoken of such practices in a positive sense, suggesting that they arise as a creative response to the hegemonic forces of capital and the global dynamics of race. H. R. Bernard and S. Ashton-Vouyoucalos, “Return Migration to Greece,” *J. Steward Anthropol.*

The most common second-stage migrations of Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox converts consisted of migration to other localities within one country (e.g., from Pittsburgh to Chicago; from Rabbit Hill to Winnipeg) and remigration to an Austro-Hungarian village of origin. Those two types of migration—especially the latter—had the most far-reaching impact for the transatlantic dissemination of Russky Orthodox conversion movements. Migrations from one “America” (the United States, Canada, Brazil, or Argentina) to another were less common, but frequent enough to make major contributions to the transnationalization of conversion. The case of the Zbihly brothers (the spread of conversion from the United States to Argentina via Subcarpathia) is perhaps the most striking case, but Russky Orthodox conversion spread also through important lay and clerical migrant streams between countries in the Americas. Transnational migration—across the Atlantic Ocean and throughout the Americas—provided the fundamental context in which Russky Orthodox conversions occurred.

Besides remigration between the Americas and Austria-Hungary, and between regions in the Americas, another type of second-stage migration, though very limited in numbers, held significance for transnational Russky Orthodox conversions. Following their conversion, some migrants from Austria-Hungary to the Americas subsequently voyaged again to the *kray*; the “old country” to which they “returned,” however, was actually an entirely new destination: the Russian Empire. Such migrants complemented the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century direct migrations of Austria-Hungary’s Russophile and Orthodoxophile Greek Catholics to Russia for employment in Russia’s churches or education in Russia’s seminaries and *bursa*’s.³⁰² Father Gregory Hrushka, who arrived from Galicia to the United States in 1889, converted in 1896 and then migrated to the Russian Empire in 1901, where he served as a parish priest in Volhynia. He soon returned to Galicia and to Greek Catholicism, in both of

Soc. 8, no. 3 (1976): 6; Gmelch, “Return Migration.” George Gilkey, “Italy and America: The Migrations of the Early Twentieth Century,” unpublished paper, 3, cited in Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 51. Basch, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-states*.

³⁰² See [Chapter Two](#).

which he remained until his death in 1913.³⁰³ Similarly, Dmytro Gebei, a Greek Catholic originally of Subcarpathia, emigrated to the United States in 1898, where he served as a parish priest in Bridgeport, Connecticut. He soon migrated to St. Petersburg, returned to the United States as an Orthodox priest, then left again for Russia. From there, he wrote in 1904 to his former Greek Catholic bishop requesting readmission into the Mukachevo eparchy as a prodigal son.³⁰⁴ Not all such “Austria-Hungary-to-America-to-Russia” migrants reverted or returned to their actual native regions. In the late-1890s, the Russky Orthodox archbishop of America, Nicholas, sent five young men of Greek Catholic background to seminaries in the Russian Empire for training. Among them, Father Peter Kohanik, who came as a small child from Becherov, Subcarpathia, converted along with his parents in Minneapolis, then traveled to Russia for seminary training and returned to the United States as a Russky Orthodox priest in 1902. He became a leading Russky Orthodox activist there for decades.³⁰⁵

Greek Catholic activists frequently enlisted the trope of the convert priest, disaffected with the realities of the Russian Empire, as evidence of the foolishness of conversion; given the bias in these sources, it is difficult to determine the accuracy of these reports. Nevertheless, one alleged case deserves particular mention. Galician priests had traveled directly to the Greek Catholic diocese of Chelm in the 1860s and facilitated mass conversions to Orthodoxy there. In 1912, Galicia’s *Ruslan*, and subsequently the United States’ *Svoboda*, reported that Evlogy, Bishop of Chelm, had invited I. Y. Lutsik, editor of the United States’ Russophile newspaper *Pravda* and convert as of 1908, to Chelm, to contribute to the ongoing efforts there to Orthodoxize “Rusyn-Ukrainian” Greek Catholics.³⁰⁶

³⁰³ Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954*, 121, 429 fn. 232.

³⁰⁴ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 148-49, 258, fn. 86.

³⁰⁵ Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 72-73. The other four seminarians were Peter Dzubay, Alexander Veniaminov, Paul Chuberov, and Nicholas Metropolskii. All were either migrants who had been baptized as Greek Catholics (the so-called 1 ½ generation) or had parents who had been, but migrated and converted before their birth.

³⁰⁶ "Utecha z rosiyskoho 'rayu'," *Svoboda* January 25, 1912, 4. The appointment of Archbishop Tikhon, formerly of the Chelm diocese, to North America in 1898, likely had much to do with his experience with Chelm’s Greek Catholics. Lutsik’s visit to Russia thus represented a re-remittance of the conversion initiative.

According to *Svoboda*, Bishop Evlogy, intending to re-ordain this “missionary” (*Svoboda*’s scare-quotes) as a Russky Orthodox priest (*batiushka*), had Lutsik travel from village to village like “some comedian.” Lutsik’s use of “Ukrainian” language naturally appealed to the people, and the rejoicing Evlogy did not begrudge Lutsik any monetary support. Evlogy’s plans came to naught, however, for Lutsik “tasted fully of the tsarodox ‘paradise,’” and recoiled upon recognizing that it paled in comparison to his idealized vision. Lutsik quickly renounced his desire to become a priest and fled across the Austro-Russian border to Lviv, where he remained two or three weeks. There, he proclaimed to Russophiles that “not even the Tsar himself could convince him to come again to his ‘paradise.’” Destitute and hounded by creditors demanding payment of debts incurred before his initial migration to the United States, Lutsik appealed to the editor of *Russkoe Slovo* to pay his passage back to America. “This situation with Lutsik,” *Svoboda* claimed, “made an unpleasant, disheartening impression upon incliners to tsarodoxy here [in America].” The questionable accuracy of this report aside, Lutsik’s migrations (Galicia, United States, Russian Empire, Galicia, United States) had an impact in all of these regions or, at the very least, upon the transatlantic readership of *Ruslan* and *Svoboda*.

In the late-nineteenth century, other Greek Catholic inhabitants of Austria-Hungary, besides clerics and educational migrants, occasionally migrated directly to Russia, following rumors of better conditions and the beneficence of the Tsar; in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, some only did so after first converting in the Americas. Martynowych, based upon reports in *Svoboda* and *Ukrainskyi Holos*, found that around 1901, Father Jacob Korchinsky, originally of Russia, then of Alaska, then Canada, convinced several Galician families in Canada to migrate to the Russian Empire to procure free land.³⁰⁷ On September 1, 1898, *Svoboda* ran a report, authored by “Non-Orthodox,” that on April

³⁰⁷ *Svoboda* December 17; March 30; May 25; June 1, 1903; October 5; June 14, 1905; July 5, 1906; January 3, 1907; September 17, 1908; *Ukrainskyi holos* October 26, 1910, cited in Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 208, fn. 15. Father Korchinsky’s other migrations are worth mentioning. After having migrated to Canada from Russia via Alaska with his wife, the Father Korchinsky returned to Russia in 1902 for several years, before returning again to North America, this time to Northampton, Pennsylvania, then Newark, New Jersey. At some time during this period he also served as priest in Mexico City. After the war, he would also

25th, returned migrant Panko Ropytsky sent a letter from Hańczowa, Galicia to his son in Newark. Having converted in New York to “crookedoxy” and “tsarodoxy,” Panko had believed the assurances of the Russky Orthodox priest that he would find “paradise” in Russia. Traveling to Russia with a letter from the New York priest, Panko approached a priest in Odessa for assistance. Perplexed at Panko’s arrival, he asked, “And how did that man convince you to come here in such a severe winter? In America do they not know that there is more misery here than there?” After sleeping under a bench for three days, Panko discovered that tsarodoxy “did not and would not give him ‘salvation,’” and he departed for his native Galician village of Klimkówka. Panko concluded his letter with an admonition to his son, saying, “God forbid you even think about Russia—do not believe the deceivers and protect yourself from them, because I already surveyed matters myself and have cast off tsarodoxy.” The “non-Orthodox” author of the piece, for his part, could not resist asking the Russky Orthodox priest in New York rhetorically whether or not he would “continue to put our people in a fog about the joys in Russia.”³⁰⁸

It is within the context of the transnational migration that Greek Catholics began converting from Greek Catholicism to the Russky Orthodox Church in the 1890s. Migrants established and maintained ties between Austria-Hungary, the Russian Empire, and the Americas. Through correspondence, remittances, and various forms of second-stage migration, they connected Austro-Hungarian Galicia, Subcarpathia, and Bukovina with the United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and finally, Russia. Conversion movements spread from some of these regions to others; once they had, the conversions in all regions mutually influenced one another. Subsequent chapters analyze the regional histories of the conversions, beginning with the Americas, then in Subcarpathia and in Galicia: it is critical to keep the migrant context in view for these interconnected histories.

serve terms in Hawaii and Australia. See: Michael Alex Protopopov, "A History of the Russian Orthodox Presence in Australia: The History of a Church" (Ph.D. thesis, Australian Catholic University, 2005), 30ff.

³⁰⁸ "Pravoslavny y Tsaroslavny Durnnsviti," *Svoboda* September 1, 1898, 3.

4.0 CONVERTING THE AMERICAS: HISTORY AND THEORY

This chapter analyzes conversions and conversion. The first section narrates the history of Russky Orthodox conversion movements as they proliferated among Greek Catholic migrants in the Americas, spreading from the United States to Canada, then to Argentina, then to Brazil, in conjunction with migratory flows. The second section considers the concept of “conversion” in the context of shifting and persisting religious identifications as “Greek Catholic” and “Russky Orthodox.” In calling into question the notion that these “conversions” represented shifts in identification, it provides an important preliminary qualification of the term, “conversion,” while also challenging prevailing theories of conversion. Additionally, it argues that the phenomenon of individuals who may not have viewed their behaviors as “conversion,” at all, became one of the many causes for the “American” (and, subsequently, “Austro-Hungarian”) conversions.³⁰⁹

4.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The following historical overview of the conversions movements in the Americas references the movements in Austria-Hungary, also, inasmuch as conversions in the *kray* influenced those in the

³⁰⁹ [Chapter Five](#) provides a more extensive analysis of other causes of conversion. The conversions referred to in this chapter refer to Greek Catholic-to-Russky Orthodox conversions. Large numbers of Greek Catholics “converted” also to the Latin Rite throughout the Americas, and a number also converted to Protestantism (in the United States and, especially, Canada).

Americas.³¹⁰ A fuller treatment of the conversions in Eastern Europe is reserved for later chapters. To my knowledge, this is the most comprehensive survey to date of the conversions in all affected regions within the Americas: the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Brazil.³¹¹

Most histories of Russky Orthodox conversions among Greek Catholic labor migrants have begun with Father Alexis Toth, who, following a hostile encounter with the local Latin rite bishop of St. Paul, Minnesota, in December of 1889, resolved to convert, along with his Minneapolis parish, sometime during 1890; the mass conversion of the parish officially took place on March 25, 1891. In this version of events, based primarily upon his own recollection, Father Alexis Toth provided the conversion catalyst: evidence of his saintliness, for Orthodox partisans, and of his perfidious role in leading people astray, in the opinion of Catholic loyalists.³¹² Neither Father Toth nor his parishioners in Minneapolis, however, were the first to affiliate as Orthodox in conjunction with labor migration.

A few scholars working in European archives have discovered important stages in the pre-history of the so-called “Toth movement.”³¹³ As it turns out, the story of laboring convert migrants begins not in

³¹⁰ Appendix A includes a world map, highlighting some of the localities mentioned in this overview.

³¹¹ I know of only one other text that has referenced the conversions in all of these regions. Włodzimierz Osadczy, in his study of Russophilism and Russky Orthodox conversions in Galicia, did include a useful summary of developments in the United States and Canada, as well as a reference to a 1910 *Svoboda* article mentioning the appearance of conversions in Argentina, and intimating a similar phenomenon in Brazil. Osadczy, *Święta Rus: Rozwój i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*, 255-68. It did not, however, develop the connections between the movements in each American region (i.e., United States origins of the movements in Canada, Argentina, and Brazil). My survey also benefits from Serge Cipko’s recent history of “Ukrainian” migrants in Argentina. Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*. A few studies of the conversions in Canada have made attempts to incorporate the history of conversions south of the border—specifically, in the United States—into the Canadian history of the movements. For the most successful examples, see: Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*. For the most part, however, the various histories have focused upon a single country. Many of the existing studies are extremely valuable, and I have incorporated many of their findings into the current study.

³¹² Father Toth may have related this story for the first time at the property trial in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, following the indication by part of that Greek Catholic community that they wished to join the Russky Orthodox Church.

³¹³ It is imperative to incorporate the research of Konstantin Simon, who explored the archives of the Vatican’s Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (henceforth, Propaganda Fide), and Maria Mayer, who investigated the archives of the Subcarpathian bishop of Prešov, into the total history of these conversions. Propaganda Fide is the division of the Vatican responsible for the Catholic Church’s missionary realms. At the time of Mayer’s research, the Greek Catholic bishop’s archives were housed in Czechoslovakia’s state archives; today they reside in Slovakia’s state archives.

Minneapolis, Minnesota, but rather in Lancashire, England; moreover, migrant flirtation with Russky Orthodox conversion began in the United States before Father Toth arrived there.

On May 5, 1888, the German-identifying Jesuit missionary, Joseph de Lassberg, who was at the time ministering among England's migrant workers, reported to the local Irish-identifying Roman Catholic bishop of Liverpool, Bernard O'Reilly, that Greek Catholic migrants from the Prešov region of Hungarian Subcarpathia, laboring in the Lancashire cotton mills, had begun attending Orthodox churches in Liverpool and Manchester. The migrants preferred the familiar rites in the Orthodox churches, including communion in both kinds (bread and wine), as they were accustomed in their native parishes. They could not do the same in in England's Latin rite Catholic parishes.³¹⁴

On June 18, Bishop O'Reilly wrote to the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide/Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith (the Vatican's missionary department: hereafter, "Propaganda Fide")—on June 18 to ask that Ivan (Valyi), Greek Catholic bishop of Prešov, write to his migrant flock, instructing them to attend Latin rite parishes. On July 27, Propaganda Fide forwarded the information to Bishop Ivan, along with a request for a celibate missionary priest. Ivan's October 19 response to Propaganda Fide contains the first reference to Greek Catholic-to-Orthodox conversions in the Americas. He indicated his awareness of the difficulties, manifested in migrant Orthodox affiliation in England, for others were doing so already in the United States. Estimating that "ten thousand individuals had already left his diocese," he requested finances for missions. Propaganda Fide declined.³¹⁵

The extent to which Bishop Ivan possessed a sense of the Orthodox threat in the United States in 1888 is unclear, but labor migrants had by that time begun affiliating with Orthodox churches. They were doing so in England, which Father Toth never visited, and in the United States, at least a year before his arrival there. The attraction of these labor migrants to Orthodox parishes, ostensibly due to ritual similarities, therefore preceded the impact of this most influential of activists for conversion. Although it

³¹⁴ Simon, "The First Years of Ruthenian Church Life in America," 197-98.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

would be a mistake to minimize the role of Father Toth and other Russky Orthodox activists in the conversions, it is evident that they capitalized upon pre-existing behaviors among the migrant masses.

Father Toth, himself, confirmed in an early letter from the United States that Russky Orthodox movements preceded his own arrival and conversion. In December of 1889, just days after his encounter with Bishop John Ireland, and on the virtual eve of his fateful 1890-91 conversion to the Russky Orthodox Church, the still-Greek Catholic Father Toth wrote to Bishop Ivan in Prešov to inform him of unfavorable American religious circumstances. After expressing consternation at his reception by Bishop Ireland, Toth listed the indignities to which hostile Roman Catholics had subjected their Eastern Rite counterparts. With Greek Catholic priests barred from entrance into Catholic churches and graveyards, the migrant faithful could neither attend confession nor bury their dead with the services of a priest; the people thus “lived beyond church norms, rather than attend masses served by Roman Catholic priests, especially if they were Irish.” Toth’s subsequent, October 29, 1890 letter explained in even greater detail the complaint that “Irish” Roman Catholic bishops opposed the rite of chrismation and the administration of communion in both kinds, and revealed that Greek Catholics were reluctant to sign over church properties to the same bishops.³¹⁶

Father Toth, still “an outsider and even an opponent” to the Russky Orthodox Church, warned Bishop Ivan in the December 1889 letter of the danger of an Orthodox movement.³¹⁷ He cautioned that, given “Irish” Catholic proscriptions on cherished liturgical traditions, “Some [migrants] were prepared to go ‘to Russian chapels or to Alaska where there is an Oriental, non-united [Orthodox] bishop, ... and during the main church holidays Greek Catholic believers always make the two to three day’s journey to Alaska from Wisconsin, Iowa, and Montana.’” In the October 1890 correspondence, he warned that,

³¹⁶ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 200-03. For the contents of Father Toth’s letters, I have relied upon Mayer’s text. The first letter was dated December 16, 1889 (likely on the Old Calendar, given that it reports on the December 19, 1889 encounter with Bp. Ireland) and the second October 29, 1890. Both may be found in the Slovak State Archive, Prešov, Eparchy of Prešov fund, 1890/21 and 1890/2916. In the 1889 letter, Father Toth also references an earlier letter he had written to the bishop (contents unknown), dated December 5, 1889 (Mayer, 264). At the time of Mayer’s research, these archives were housed in in Czechoslovakia.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

“The first alarming piece of news came from Philadelphia, where suspicious-looking individuals were said to be trying to lure Hungarian Greek Catholics to the side of the schism.” A Montenegrin merchant who had addressed Greek Catholics, presumably about Orthodox conversion, had also urged Father Toth to seek material aid from North America’s Russky Orthodox bishop, Vladimir. Father Toth thus raised another potential cause for conversion, that migrants who were “loath to pay, yet want to have a church, will readily accept such a change [to Orthodoxy], because it is the Russian government that would cover the costs for priests and maintain the churches here.”

Father Toth’s 1889-1890 correspondence with Prešov’s Bishop Ivan Valyi, like that in 1888 between Propaganda Fide and Bishops O’Reilly (Liverpool) and Ivan, demonstrates that potential catalysts for conversion preceded Father Toth’s activities: Latin rite discrimination, restrictions on traditional ritual practices, proselytization from Orthodox sources, and economic benefits. Father Toth and others did not initiate a mass movement: one was already in the making. Furthermore, the first available documentation of conversions among labor migrants refers to those taking place in England.

The conversions in the United States nevertheless had the greatest global impact, both in numbers and as the primary source from which the movements spread. And while Russky Orthodox conversions began as popular movements among lay people, clerical activists were also necessary facilitators. Several Greek Catholic priests preceded Father Alexis Toth to the United States: the first was Father Ivan Volansky (John Wolansky), who arrived in 1884 in response to a request from migrant Greek Catholics in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania. Father Volansky also ministered to migrants elsewhere in the United States (and eventually in Brazil), including Minneapolis. It was Minneapolis’s parishioners, mostly migrants from the Subcarpathian village of Becherov, who appealed to Bishop Ivan in Prešov for a priest; in 1889 they received Father Toth. Father Toth, who held a doctoral degree in canon law, approached Bishop John Ireland of St. Paul, as per the requirements for Greek Catholic priests at that time. As Father Toth told of their encounter many times, in his writings in the United States as well as in correspondence to Bishop Ivan, Bishop Ireland became angered that Father Toth was a Greek Catholic and widowed. The

Latin rite bishop refused to grant Father Toth jurisdiction, saying that Greek Catholic migrants could go to the Polish-identifying Latin rite priest in Minneapolis.

In Father Toth's conversion narrative, this encounter provided the final provocation to do what he had long considered: become Russky Orthodox. In winter 1890, he dispatched John Mlinar to San Francisco to inquire about conversion. On March 25, 1891, Archbishop Vladimir officially received the parishioners of St. Mary's—361 in all—under his jurisdiction. Father Toth did not specify ritual details, but he did note that "The people who were called and to whom everything was explained with loud voices denounced the wrong-teaching of the Papal church, and we returned there, from where our forefathers were separated by lie, by flattery, by force and by malice..."³¹⁸ Greek Catholics had for several years been attending Orthodox parishes in England and the United States, but this was the first formal mass Russky Orthodox conversion among labor migrants in the nineteenth century.³¹⁹



Протоіерей-митраль о. А. Г. Товъ,
первопачинникъ возвращенія русинскихъ униатовъ до прахдѣшной —
правосл. вѣры.

Figure 2. A photo taken in the United States of Father Alexis Toth, migrant from Hungarian Subcarpathia, wearing the mitre of the order of St. Vladimir, presented to him from Russia by Tsar Nicholas in 1903, in recognition of his conversion of migrants from Galicia and Subcarpathia to the Russky Orthodox church (*Russko-Amerikanskii Pravoslavnyi Kalendar'* 1906)

³¹⁸ Father Alexis Toth, "From the History of the Church and Parish in Minneapolis," in George Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 2 (Chilliwack, British Columbia: Synaxis Press, 1982), 78.

³¹⁹ And the first among Greek Catholics outside Russia since Hnylychky, Galicia, in 1881.

Soon, parishioners of St. Mary's Greek Catholic Church in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania learned of the Minneapolis conversions. Whereas the Minneapolis congregation consisted mostly of Subcarpathians, the Wilkes-Barre parish was comprised mainly of migrants from Galicia, mostly from the Lemko region.³²⁰ In November 1892, perceiving economic exploitation by Greek Catholic priests, parish representatives wrote to Father Toth, asking him to facilitate their conversion.³²¹ He arrived on December 3, 1892. In his own account, Father Toth emphasized his clear instruction in Greek Catholic-Russky Orthodox distinctions. He gave parishioners three full days to determine whether they were "ready to renounce all this Uniate foolishness, and to believe in that which the Orthodox Church and faith teaches." On the evening of the mass conversion, so he reported, he again fastidiously distinguished between the two religions and provided numerous opportunities for parishioners to decide for themselves.³²²

It appears that the declaration of intent to hand over the parish property to the Russky Orthodox Archbishop (now Nicholas, as Vladimir had left for Russia), signed by over six hundred individuals, served as a formal declaration of conversion. On December 13, the church was officially received into the Russky Orthodox Church. Bishop Nicholas performed the dedication on July 9, 1893, assisted by two chaplains and a choir of seamen from two Imperial Russian warships, docked at that time in the New York harbor.³²³ With the conversions in the Minneapolis and Wilkes-Barre communities, migrants from both Galicia and Subcarpathia had now "officially" converted, thus setting the stage for the remittance of conversion to both Austro-Hungarian regions

Following these developments, the Russky Orthodox Mission more actively pursued the conversion of Greek Catholic migrant communities. Under Bishop Nicholas, between 1891 and 1898, a total of eleven other communities of Greek Catholics in the United States—most in Pennsylvania, but

³²⁰ My thanks to Rich Custer for this information, based upon his survey of the Wilkes-Barre metrical records.

³²¹ See [Chapter Five](#) for more on the economic factors motivating the Wilkes-Barre parish.

³²² Father Alexis Toth, "From the History of the Orthodox Church in Wilkes-Barre," in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 1, 79-82.

³²³ *Ibid.*

some also in Illinois, Connecticut, Ohio, and New York—joined the Russky Orthodox Church.³²⁴ Father Toth facilitated many of these other conversions, though other convert priests contributed also: Father Toth's brother, Victor, Father Gregory Hrushka (former editor of *Svoboda*), and Father Michael Balog. In addition to these ex-Greek Catholic priests, the Russky Orthodox Church also began supplying larger numbers of “cradle Orthodox” priests from the Russian Empire to “formerly” Greek Catholic parishes. Use of the term “formerly” accords with the characterization of Greek Catholic loyalists, but it is potentially a misnomer. Members of these parishes contended—often in courts of law whenever property disputes arose—either that they had been founded as Orthodox parishes or, if founded as Greek Catholic parishes, that they remained so now, notwithstanding acceptance into the Russky Orthodox Church: they were “Russky Orthodox Greek Catholic” churches, in what became, after 1903, the “Russky Orthodox Greek Catholic Church in North America.”

During the last decade of the twentieth century, converts founded several important Russky Orthodox and Russophile-Orthodoxophile institutions, including a mission school in Minneapolis and two fraternal societies. Two major Greek Catholic mutual aid societies had formed earlier: the Greek Catholic Union (1892), comprised initially of both Galicians and Subcarpathians, but soon espousing the Subcarpathian Rusynophile cause; and the Rusky National Union (1894), initially comprised of both Russophiles and Rusky-Ukrainophiles from Galicia and Subcarpathia, but eventually espousing an exclusively Rusky-Ukrainophile stance (it became in 1914 the Ukrainian National Association). The Russky Orthodox Mutual Aid Society (ROMAS) formed in 1895, and in 1900, Russophiles dissatisfied with Rusky-Ukrainophile dominance in the Rusky National Union also founded the Russky Brotherhoods Society (RBO).³²⁵ Because the RBO was comprised of both Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox

³²⁴ Peter Kohanik, *Rus' i Pravoslavie v Sivernoy Ameryki* (Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania: Russke Pravoslavne Katholycheske Obschestvo Vsaymopomoschy, 1920). The other parishes were located in: Streator, IL; Chicago, IL; Pittsburgh, PA; Osceola Mills, PA; Bridgeport, CT; Ansonia, CT; Sheppton, PA; Catasauqua, PA; Cleveland, OH; Buffalo, NY; and Old Forge, PA.

³²⁵ Often called the “Russian Brotherhoods Society” in English. Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 69-70.

Russophiles, critics in the Rusynophile and Rusky-Ukrainophile camp lampooned the organization's Greek Catholic members as "crypto-Orthodox."

These Rusky Orthodox societies contributed to conversion. As members, Greek Catholics fraternized with converts. ROMAS's mission explicitly advocated conversions among migrant Greek Catholics and to regions of migratory origin, while both ROMAS and RBO directly subsidized Russophile-Orthodoxophile causes in Austria-Hungary. ROMAS helped finance parishes in the United States (contributing, on average, one-time sums of \$400 to each parish), as well as an abortive 1900-01 attempt to establish a parish in Becherov, Subcarpathia (the Minneapolis converts' native village). The societies also published the newspapers *Svit* (ROMAS) and *Pravda* (RBO), which ran Russophile-Orthodoxophile items read by migrants throughout the Americas, and remigrants and non-migrants in Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire.³²⁶

During the late-1890s, conversions began spreading from the United States to Canada. In February 1897, from their adoptive residence in Edmonton, Alberta (since spring of 1896), Galician migrants, originally from the East Galician regions of Kalush and Brody, solicited Bishop Nicholas in San Francisco for a cleric who might help them transition to the Rusky Orthodox Church.³²⁷ Theodore Fuhr wrote on behalf of the "Malorussky Uniates" (Little Russians/Little Rusyns) explaining,

With great eagerness we have been waiting for a priest...are we poor Galician exiles to be in this foreign place as orphans without a Church or priest?...Our ancestors were all Orthodox...not willingly did our ancestors submit to the Uniates...with humility I dare to write in the name of the majority of the colonists: Your Holiness, please lovingly undertake this for us, leave us not as poor Malorussky orphans, long without a church, priest and religious instruction.

Escalating conversion movements in the United States probably provided the model for this group of potential converts: they could easily have learned of the conversions south of the border from several

³²⁶ *Svit* became the official voice of the Rusky Orthodox Church in North America, while *Pravda* exhibited Russophile-Orthodoxophile sympathies, without explicitly identifying itself as a Rusky Orthodox publication (not unlike Lviv's *Halychanyn*).

³²⁷ "Otradnaya Visti yz Kanadi." Kalush and Brody were Russophile strongholds close to the Russian border.

sources, prior to or after their departure from Galicia. *Svoboda*, published in the United States and read widely in Galicia, had been reporting on the U.S. conversions for some three years, as had some Galician publications, like *Dushpastyr*. Galician migrants living in Canada also subscribed to *Svoboda* as early as 1894.³²⁸ Additionally, small numbers of individuals, who came first to the United States and underwent second-stage migrations to Canada, may have brought news of the conversions.

However migrants in Alberta knew to contact the Russky Orthodox Mission in 1897, the Mission was already well-acquainted with the potential for conversion, through the acceptance of numerous U.S. parishes into its fold. In summer of that year, Archbishop Nicholas dispatched Father Dimitri Kamnev and Deacon Vladimir Alexandrov to the Alberta settlements in Stary Wostok, Rabbit Hill, and Limestone Lake.³²⁹ Reportedly six-hundred Greek Catholics converted at Limestone Lake, and one-hundred more in Rabbit Hill. Echoing Father Toth's recollection of the conversions performed under his oversight, Father Kamnev reported in the *Amerikansky Pravoslavny Viestnik* that, at a Saturday evening service for the migrants, he and Alexandrov explained that they had come, "because of their desire, with the blessing of our Archpastor, to become one with the Holy Orthodox Church, at which time were explained the divergences of the western church from the teachings of the Orthodox Church." Father Kamnev also described the manner in which the parish became Russky Orthodox:

Next day, in the early morning the people were already in full assembly. We began with Matins, and before the dismissal, the priest again turned to the people with the words as yesterday, and repeated the differences in teachings between the Latin Church and the Orthodox Church, and after which, in response to the question: "do you want to be sons of the true Orthodox Church?" came the answer as one, "we want to, Father, we were Orthodox in soul and the Latin way was always repugnant to us, and we renounce it!" After Confession and after the Rite of Union, the Divine Liturgy was served, during which those who had received Confession received the Holy Mysteries.³³⁰

Father Kamnev reported also that after the mass conversion, they prayed for the "Russky royal family," performed six baptisms, and blessed several houses, "in front of which many of them wished to place a

³²⁸ See "Nasym vratiam v Kanadi" (To our Brothers in Canada) *Svoboda* February 15, 1894, 1, which advised subscribers in Canada that *Svoboda* would continue to send issues to them.

³²⁹ Kamnev, "Pravoslavie v Kanadi," 26-29.

³³⁰ Father Dimitrii Kamnev, "Pravoslavie v Kanadi," *Amerikansky Pravoslavny Viestnik* (no. 1) 1898, 26-29. See also the English translation of this report in the "Roots of Community" online exhibit.

[triple-barred] cross as a sign that they were now Orthodox.”³³¹ The cornerstone of the future church building was engraved with the following, decidedly transnational inscription:

In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, this first Orthodox church in Canada, the Church of the Life-Giving Trinity, was founded in the summer of 1898, on the fourth of June, during the reign of Nicholas II, Tsar of all the Russias and Queen Alexandra Victoria of Great Britain.

In this way did migrants from Austria-Hungary residing in Canada at once pledge fidelity to secular and religious authorities in Canada, Britain, Russia, and the United States.³³²

Soon afterward, Russky Orthodox priests—both originally from the Russian Empire, as well as converts from Austria-Hungary—began traveling from their adoptive region of the United States to minister to converting migrants communities in Winnipeg, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. Many of these communities consisted also of migrants from Austrian Bukovina and the Russian Empire. Bukovinans and Russian subjects could be found in U.S. parishes also, but it appears that these “cradle Orthodox” migrants exhibited a greater influence for conversion in Canada (and in Argentina), than they did in the United States. Under Archbishop Tikhon, from 1898-1907, the Russky Orthodox Church, which officially became the “Russky Orthodox Greek Catholic Church in North America,” accepted under its jurisdiction thirty-two formerly Greek Catholic communities: twenty-three in the United States, bring the U.S. total to thirty-six, and nine in Canada.³³³ In the United States, new states to add parishes to the Orthodox fold included Texas, Colorado, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, and Washington. Canadian provinces with new Russky Orthodox communities included Alberta and Manitoba.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Brigit Farley, *Circuit Riders to the Slavs and Greeks: Missionary Priests and the Establishment of the Russian Orthodox Church in the American West, 1890-1910*. Washington, D.C., Kennan Institute Occasional Papers (2000), 4.

³³³ Kohanik, *Rus' i Pravoslavie v Sivernoy Ameryki*, 55. They were, in the United States: Garfield, NJ; Galveston, TX; New Britain, CT; Yonkers, NJ; West Troy, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Reading, PA; McAdoo, Pennsylvania; St. Clair, PA; Scranton, PA; Mayfield, PA; Simpson, PA; Oliphant, PA; Charleroi, PA; Marblehead, Ohio; Patton, PA; Madison, IL; Wisconsin; Denver, CO; Pueblo, CO; Calhan, CO; Hartshorne, OK; Wilkeson, Washington. In Canada, they included: Wostok, Alberta; Bukovina, Alberta; Kiselevo, Alberta; Shandro, Alberta; Edmonton, Alberta; Winnipeg, Manitoba; Stuartburn, Manitoba; Rabbit Hill, Alberta; and Beaver Creek, Alberta.

By the turn of the century, converts from the Americas began returning to Austro-Hungarian regions of origin. Movements for Russky Orthodox conversion in Austria-Hungary, related to remigration, began in the Subcarpathian villages of Becherov (northern Hungary) in 1901 and in Velyki Luchky and Iza (eastern Hungary) in 1903. In Austrian Galicia along the Bukovinan border, a movement began in Zaluche in 1903, almost certainly connected to influence from Zaluche's and nearby Zavallya's migrants, who had converted in Canada.³³⁴ In Galicia's Lemko region, movements also began in 1911 related to remigration. The return of converts to Galicia, and almost certainly to Subcarpathia, preceded the advent of mass movements by several years, at least: in all likelihood, migrants returned as converts to both regions in the mid-1890s, without initiating conversion movements (they simply rejoined their native Greek Catholic parishes). Remitted conversions to Austria-Hungary had important reciprocal effects upon migrant communities in the Americas, including the spread of conversion to Argentina and Brazil.

The first formal conversions to the Russky Orthodox Church in South America took place in Argentina, among Greek Catholic migrants living in four nearby villages—Las Tunas, Apostoles, Azara, and Tres Capones—located on either side of the Las Tunas River, in the province of Misiones.³³⁵ Greek Catholics in Azara first conducted religious practices together with Polish-identifying Latin rite Catholics in a parish they built together in 1902. By 1903, Greek Catholics had constructed their own chapel in Las Tunas, and in 1904, they petitioned the Galician hierarchs for a priest. Migrants also began constructing an Eastern rite church in Tres Capones in 1904, and at some time before 1913, they constructed a chapel in Azara, across the river. The first organized effort to establish Russky Orthodox conversions occurred in Tres Capones. Some reports from the period attributed the conversions to the influence of “cradle Orthodox” migrants, from Bukovina. Besides convincing the Galician Greek Catholics of the truth of the

³³⁴ See [Chapter Seven](#). The evidence for this connection (to my knowledge this is the first study to make this connection) is circumstantial, but strongly supports the probability of influence from Canada, either through correspondence or remigration.

³³⁵ The four villages were located within five miles of one another. Azara lay directly across the Las Tunas river from Tres Capones. The village of Apostoles lay directly across the Las Tunas river from the village of Las Tunas.

Russky Orthodox Church, the Bukovinans argued that a Russky Orthodox priest would charge lower sacramental fees.³³⁶ It is entirely likely that the Bukovinian factor influenced the conversions, but indirect influences from the United States also played a critical role.

Several migrants from Becherov, who initially labored in Minneapolis where they converted along with Father Toth, returned to their native Becherov in 1901, where, with money collected from converting migrant communities in the United States, they attempted to establish a Russky Orthodox parish. Following a Hungarian crackdown, summoned by the local Greek Catholic priest, several converted remigrants set out again across the Atlantic Ocean. This time, however, they migrated not to Minneapolis, nor even to the United States, but rather to Argentina. In Las Tunas, two of those Subcarpathians—the brothers Andrei and Vasily Zbihly—became, according to the 1913 Russky Orthodox *Kalendar*, published by ROMAS in the United States, “the first activists for Orthodoxy in Argentina.” In this way did Russky Orthodox conversions migrate to Tres Capones from Minneapolis, by way of Becherov.³³⁷

³³⁶ Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*, 24-27.

³³⁷ Ellis Island records indicate that “Vasylya Zbihlej” came to the United States in 1895 at age 23, along with another member of the “Zbihlej” family. Two different “Andras Zbihlej”’s from Becherov came to the United States in 1906 (age 27) and 1909 (age 35). It is unknown whether either of these migrants were the same Andrei Zbihly of Minneapolis and Tres Capones. The former had been in the United States twice before, in 1897 and 1902 in at least one location: McKees Rocks, Pennsylvania. It is possible that the same Andras (“A. Zbigley”) was a founding member of a Russky Orthodox parish in Ambridge, Pennsylvania. If this were the right Andras, it would be likely that he came to the United States in 1897, remigrated to Becherov, came back to the United States in 1902, then migrated to Argentina, and then back to the United States in 1906, perhaps with a couple more remigrations to Becherov, in between and even afterward). As of 1991, “Zbigley”’s continued to reside in Tres Capones. (see: “Ten Years: The Miracle of the Myrrh-streaming Iveron Icon at www.roca.org/OA/120/120k.htm).




Figure 3. The Zbihly brothers, Andrei and Vasily (standing), Migrants from Becherov, temporary residents in Minneapolis, remigrants to Becherov, and the “First activists for Orthodoxy in Argentina” in Tres Capones. *Russko-Amerikansky Pravoslavny Kalendar* (1913)

It is probable that migrants began construction of the Tres Capones church in 1904 under conditions similar to those in the United States and Canada: the founding members were comprised of individuals who would eventually identify with either side of a Greek Catholic/Russky Orthodox split. That dynamic accounts for the sense of loss expressed by a Greek Catholic priest, Father Ananyavych, who in 1913 wrote from Azara, across the river, to Bishop Konstantyn (Chekhovych) in Przemyśl, Galicia: “the church constructed on the other side already seven years ago fell into schismatic hands. These ill-fated ones today have the church, they have a priest (the apostate, Hnatiuk from below Brody [Galicia]), and they have a cemetery; and thus [the priest] keeps hold of them.”³³⁸ It is difficult to pinpoint when the conversions began; it is also unclear when after 1901 the Subcarpathian converts

³³⁸ Ananyavych, F. I. (June 22, 1913). Letter to Bp. Konstantyn. *ABGK*: Syg. 5139, 431-433.

arrived; both, however, preceded the 1906 completion of the church building, when parishioners contacted the Russky Orthodox Mission in Buenos Aires to convert.³³⁹

The Russky Orthodox Mission had commenced in Argentina on January 1, 1889, when Tsar Alexander III responded affirmatively to the Russian foreign consul's request to establish a mission. Archpriest Father Konstantin Izraztsov arrived from Russia in 1891, and between 1897 and 1901, oversaw the construction of a church in Buenos Aires, with funding from the tsar; it remained until 1906 the only such church in Argentina. In 1906, Father Izraztsov responded affirmatively to the request of migrants in Tres Capones.³⁴⁰ It seems likely that the prior experiences of Russia's Holy Synod—with which Father Izraztsov was in regular contact—with Greek Catholic converts in the United States and Canada would have informed the prompt response. Father Izraztsov visited the parish, celebrated a liturgy, and blessed the church. He also agreed to secure a priest, provided the parishioners signed over the parish property and agreed to support the priest financially.³⁴¹ Reportedly, Tsar Nicholas II donated the bells, a censer, and two icons.

By 1906, the Greek Catholics living in Azara and Apostoles were also considering Orthodox conversion: in a letter to Metropolitan Andrei of Lviv, Galicia, they asked whether, in the absence of any Greek Catholic priests, it would be permissible to join the Orthodox Church. In August 1908, the priest whom Father Izraztsov secured through the Holy Synod, Father Tykhon Hnatiuk, arrived from Russia. Hnatiuk was himself of Greek Catholic background, his parents having migrated earlier from Galicia to Volhynia.³⁴² By the time of his arrival, perhaps 600 Greek Catholics had joined the new Russky Orthodox parish.³⁴³ In his 1913 letter to the Bishop of Przemyśl, the Greek Catholic Father Ananyavych reported that “Already 150 of our families sink in the mire of that schism, and among them are scattered

³³⁹ Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*, 28.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 27-28.

³⁴¹ An important qualification for those who would say that migrants converted for economic reasons alone.

³⁴² Father Hnatiuk's Greek Catholic background accounts a Greek Catholic priest's labeling of the Orthodox priest in 1913 as an “apostate.” Ananyavych, F. I. (June 22, 1913). Letter to Bp. Konstantyn. *ABGK*: Syg. 5139, 431-433.

³⁴³ Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*, 27-28.

Catholics, up to 60 families.”³⁴⁴ Father Izraztsov also oversaw the formation of three other parishes, of which Greek Catholic converts were likely members in Argentina before 1914: in San Isidro, Oberá, and Picada Gobernador López. He also became involved across the border, in Brazil.

In 1913, the Basilian Greek Catholic priest, Father M. Shkyrpan, wrote to Metropolitan Sheptytsky that, in Brazil,

there is not that same evil with our people in religious matters, as prevails in North America. There are not among us those members of the Galician intelligentsia—those unfinished academics; and the intelligentsia of other nationalities do not have access to our people, either. Therefore, the Rusky people maintain church and religion. Young men roaming after jobs do become a little free-thinking. But soon they will marry and become farmers, set themselves to work, and once again come to their senses.³⁴⁵

I have been unable to locate any evidence for “official” conversions of Greek Catholic individuals or parishes in Brazil, prior to 1914; however, Greek Catholic partisans from an early time saw conversion movements in Brazil as a very real threat. In June of 1897, a correspondent from Brazil wrote to *Svoboda* that Latin rite hostilities and the corresponding lack of Greek Catholic priests would only serve the interests of the Russky Orthodox Church, which would build grand churches and assign priests, as they had in the United States, with the result that “twenty thousand Rusyns of Parana would be lost for the Catholic church.”³⁴⁶ By October of the same year, *Svoboda* reported that a newspaper in Russia, the *Times*, carried a story that “thousands of Rusyns from Galicia in the United States and in Brazil submitted a request to the bishop in San Francisco, in order that he would accept them into Orthodoxy and (an interesting thing) the ‘Russian nationality.’”³⁴⁷ Additionally, it does appear that the convert communities surrounding the Tres Capones church in neighboring Argentina, as well as the activities of Father Izraztsov, produced an impact in Brazil before 1914.

³⁴⁴ Ananyavych, F. I. (June 22, 1913). Letter to Bp. Konstantyn. *ABGK*: Syg. 5139, 431-433.

³⁴⁵ Quoted in Andrii A. Strilko, "Z istorii diialnosti tserkovnykiv sered ukrainskykh immihrantiv u Latynskii Amerytsi," 109.

³⁴⁶ Liubomyr R-skyi, "Sravi Brazylslykhy Rusynov," *Svoboda* June 2, 1897; June 10, 1897.

³⁴⁷ "Visti z Kanady," *Svoboda* October 21, 1897, 2. I have been unable to corroborate this request from Brazil. Apparently, *The Times* was an English-language newspaper published in Russia. This article reprinted the term “Russian nationality” in the original English.

In 1908, Vatican representatives attempted to have the Argentine government declare the Tres Capones church illegal, on the basis that constituents had not properly registered the church; the government refused, wishing to preserve relations with the Russian Empire.³⁴⁸ The Vatican thus sought other avenues to curtail the movement. In the same year, the apostolic nuncio in Rio de Janeiro sent the Basilian Greek Catholic Father K. Bzhukhovsky (originally from Galicia, at the time stationed in Brazil), a telegram, with the order to take up residence in Tres Capones and forestall the “schism.”³⁴⁹ In the same year that Father Bzhukhovsky crossed from into Argentina, however, it appears that Rusky Orthodox missionaries crossed in the other direction, from Argentina to Brazil. *Svoboda* repeated a report from the Brazilian newspaper *Zoria* that two Rusky Orthodox priests (perhaps including Father Izraztsov) had recently come from Argentina, “in order to, under the guise of collecting donations, sniff out whether or not it would be possible to insinuate themselves among our migrants...As is clear, the Orthodox intruders are also not allowing our people to breathe in Brazil, and step by step the uninvited ones are clamoring after them.”³⁵⁰ In 1910, another correspondent wrote from Brazil to report that in Argentina, “several thousand Rusyns converted to Orthodoxy,” because, the author said, “it is not difficult [to obtain] an Orthodox priest.” He added, “In Brazil, the same,” though without providing any details.³⁵¹ Also in 1910, Greek Catholic Basilian priest monks concluded that, in certain circles in Prudentopolis, Brazil, the people were “inclined to schism” (as well as to “extreme liberalism and Protestantism”).³⁵²

Additionally, Father Irzaztsov also oversaw the formation of some Rusky Orthodox parishes in Brazil after World War I in, for example, Sao Paulo and Villa Alpino. It is highly likely, given the previous cases in the United States, Canada, and Argentina, that converted Greek Catholics contributed to their constituency. Furthermore, even if the “inclination to schism” among Greek Catholic migrants in

³⁴⁸ Andrii A. Strilko, "Z istorii diialnosti tserkovnykiv sered ukrainskykh immihrantiv u Latynskii Amerytsi," 108. Father Izraztsov and the Russian emissary in Argentina, M.E. Prozor, both met with the Argentine minister of foreign affairs in this matter.

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ "Brazyliiska chasopys," *Svoboda* July 2, 1908, 1.

³⁵¹ Quoted in Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*, 266.

³⁵² Andrii A. Strilko, "Z istorii diialnosti tserkovnykiv sered ukrainskykh immihrantiv u Latynskii Amerytsi," 110.

Brazil did not produce formal conversions before the war, that inclination did catalyze pre-emptive counter-conversion initiatives, specifically the formation of Greek Catholic loyalist brotherhoods, in order to fulfill the “need here [in Brazil] for knowledgeable Catholics, that are enlightened in the matters of the Catholic Church.”³⁵³ Finally, as the second half of this chapter develops, much of the Russky Orthodox affiliation taking place throughout the Americas and Eastern Europe also failed to qualify as “formal” conversion. Those who would have inclined toward Russky Orthodox conversion in Brazil would not have differed all that greatly from many who did so elsewhere in the world.

If 1908 marked the first appearance of Russky Orthodox missionaries to Greek Catholics in Brazil and the first full year of existence of an “official” convert parish in Argentina, it also signaled new developments in the North American conversions.³⁵⁴ The 1907 arrival of Bishop Soter (Ortynsky), the first Greek Catholic bishop in the United States, had been intended to curtail the defections of Greek Catholics; paradoxically, his presence promoted the opposite. Russky Orthodox activists, especially the Russky Orthodox Mission’s energetic new archbishop, Platon (Rozhdestvenskii), fostered more conversions, in part by capitalizing upon Bishop Soter’s alleged Rusky-Ukrainophilism and the limitations placed upon him by the Vatican. Canada’s Latin rite hierarchs also prevented Bishop Soter from exercising episcopal oversight in Canada, which remained without a Greek Catholic bishop until 1912. Father Peter Kohanik reported in 1908 that it was as a direct result of Bishop Soter’s “Uniate-Ukrainian fanaticism,” that most parishes converted, such as those in Passaic, Jersey City, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Conemausk, and “ten others.”³⁵⁵ That evaluation was an oversimplification, as migrants converted for many and varied reasons, even during the Ortynsky period. Nevertheless, anti-Soter

³⁵³ Ibid., 109-10. A similar brotherhood formed also in Argentina, though the Greek Catholic priest there, Father Ananyavych, reported that “It is sad, very sad, that only four of the young men here have registered [with the brotherhood].” (Quoted in *ibid.*)

³⁵⁴ A resurgence of conversions occurred around this time in Subcarpathia’s Velyki Luchky and Iza, and in Galicia’s Zaluche, where movements had begun in 1903.

³⁵⁵ Father Kohanik was born to parents originally from Becherov, who had converted from Greek Catholicism to Russky Orthodoxy in the United States.

sentiments did contribute markedly to the “perfect storm” of massive conversions and large-scale, economically motivated remigration after 1907.³⁵⁶

Under Archbishop Platon (1907-1914), another sixty-five parishes of converted Greek Catholics formed in North America: fifty in the United States and fifteen in Canada.³⁵⁷ Thus, by 1914, a total of one-hundred-and-thirteen Russky Orthodox parishes, comprised largely or at least partly of former Greek Catholics, had formed in the Americas since 1890: eighty-six in the United States, twenty-four in Canada, and four in Argentina. The memberships of individual parishes could range, at any given time, between dozens and thousands. Some parishes formed from other convert parishes, whenever enough migrants arrived to a nearby locality to justify the founding of another church. Greek Catholic migrants also attended other Orthodox parishes, the establishment of which preceded the arrival of Greek Catholics, as in Liverpool, Buenos Aires, and San Francisco. In Brazil, Russky Orthodox missionaries did begin to make some impact, which manifested in parishes and formal conversions only after World War I.

It is difficult to determine the total number of conversions in all the Americas. Alongside migrations within and between American regions, the phenomenon of remigration—a critical aspect of the current study—resulted in highly unstable communities, and thus, fluctuating memberships. Such instability was more prevalent in the United States than in Canada, and more so in North America than South America; nevertheless, the continual migrations and remigrations in all American regions make an accurate count impossible. In 1914, a polemical tract, published in English in the United States, noted of the U.S. communities that, “There is no regular registered church membership, because, according to the

³⁵⁶ Kohanik, *Rus' i Pravoslavie v Sivernoy Ameryki*, 51-52.

³⁵⁷ In the United States: Auburn, New York; Brooklyn, N.Y.; Jersey City, NJ; Danbury, CT; Fall River, MA; Mayville, Rhode Island; Meriden, CT; Newark, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Salem, MA; Stamford, CT; Terryville, CT; Waterbury, CT; Wilmington, DE; Coaldale, PA; Edwardsville, PA; Hanover, PA; German, PA; Lopez, PA; Laukens, PA; Minersville, PA; Mount Carmel, PA; Slatington, PA; Berwick, PA; Akron, Ohio; Ambridge, PA; Benld, IL; Black-Lick, PA; Bruksak, Alabama; Butler, PA; Carnegie, PA; Chicago, IL; Connemau, PA; Desloge, MI; Detroit, Michigan; Export, PA; Gary, Indiana; Germania, PA; Jeanette, PA; Jacob's Creek, PA; Juliette, PA; Madera, PA; Maysontown, PA; Muddy, IL; New Castle, PA; New Kensington, PA; New Salem, PA; Clayton, Wisconsin; Vintondale, PA; Monessen, PA.. In Canada: Montreal; Arhaka, Manitoba; Boyany, Alberta; Kanora, Saskatchewan; Fort William, Ontario; Gardenton, Manitoba; Gymly, Manitoba; Mundare, Alberta; Pakan, Alberta; Salkoms, Saskatchewan; Shego, Sask.; Sifton, Manitoba; Smoke Lick, Alberta; Toronto, Ontario; Valley River, Manitoba; Wakaw, Saskatchewan.

authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church in this country, only a small number of Russian and Austro-Hungarian immigrants settle here permanently, but the number of those attending the orthodox [*sic.*] churches here is put at 200,000.”³⁵⁸ This tract, which regarded the Russky Orthodox Church as a threat to Americanization, had reason to exaggerate its membership; still, it correctly identified that any “official” numbers would drastically underestimate the Russky Orthodox constituency, and thus, the total number of Greek Catholic migrants attending Russky Orthodox parishes.

In 1914, the Russky Orthodox Church reported, in its annual *Kalendar*, a North American membership consisting of 40,000 Galicians and Subcarpathians: i.e. Greek Catholic converts.³⁵⁹ By 1914, however, migrants had not only been converting in the Americas for twenty-five years, they had been returning in large numbers to regions of origin: at a rate of likely well over fifty percent under normal conditions, and at much higher rates during economic depressions in destination regions, such as that prevailing in North America after 1907.³⁶⁰ That 1914 census would have failed to count individuals, who converted and remigrated to native villages prior to the census, unless by that time they had returned yet again to North America. Many, in fact, had done exactly that, but the fact remains that during any given census, significant numbers of converted remigrants were residing, whether permanently or otherwise, in the *kray*. In some cases, those converts would be represented in the “official” counts of converts in Austria-Hungary; the vast majority were not, however, for two reasons: large numbers of Russky Orthodox converts in the Americas “reverted” willingly to native Greek Catholic parishes in the *kray*; in addition, Austro-Hungarian governmental and Greek Catholic ecclesial officials in many instances intentionally obstructed formal declarations of conversion. Unknown but substantial numbers

³⁵⁸ Alexander Szarski and Faust C. DeWalsh, *The Great Conspiracy* (New York City: German-American Literary Defense Committee, October 1914), 7.

³⁵⁹ Naturally, Galicians and Subcarpathians represented converts from Greek Catholicism, because either they had converted upon their arrival in North America, or they had done so in Austria-Hungary, once mass conversion movements began there after the turn of the century, and subsequently migrated.

³⁶⁰ To counter supposedly exaggerated claims about the North American Russky Orthodox Church’s membership, the figure is sometimes cited that only 25,000 Greek Catholics had converted by Father Toth’s death in 1909, based upon the census of that year. That census probably returned the greatest possible underestimation of the decade, for between 1907 and 1909, more migrants left North America than arrived.

of migrants in either or both of these situations between 1890 and 1914 would not have appeared in an official count in any region, whether in the Americas or Austria-Hungary.

The fact that many “converts” actually reverted upon returning to the *kray* raises another question germane to numbers (a question treated in the next section of this chapter): who exactly “counted” as a convert? Migrants in the Americas at the time of a mass conversion of a given parish may have perceived a dramatic shift in their declaration for conversion, but many subsequent migrants made no such declarations and merely attended a parish with religious practices almost identical to the ones they knew in native regions: it is for this reason that this study often uses the term “affiliation,” rather than “conversion.” Even many present at the time of a mass conversion perceived little or no change in their “conversion,” or if they did, they understood that they were returning to what they had “always been.” As for Brazil, “incliners” almost certainly existed among Greek Catholics there before 1914, but would they “count” (if it were possible to count them) as converts?

Notwithstanding the difficulties, it can at the very least be said that the official 1914 numbers of the North American mission represent a significant underestimation of the total numbers of conversions/affiliations which had taken place in the Americas by that date. It is entirely possible, and I would venture, likely that prior to 1914, conversions of Greek Catholics to the Russky Orthodox Church in the Americas—in one form or another, whether permanent or not—exceeded 100,000 individuals.

4.2 CONVERSION, REVERSION, AND “CONDUCTING RELIGIOUS PRACTICES”

Any assessment of the “conversion” component of turn-of-the-century Greek Catholics transferring to the Russky Orthodox Church must account for three major issues: (a) those shifts represented a form of “mass conversion” (b) individuals made their decisions in that context of mass

conversion; and (c) the status of these individual and collective shifts as “conversions” requires substantial qualification.

As for the first point, most theorists have analyzed conversion in terms of individual psychological experience. The current study does as well, but it is first necessary to recognize that individuals’ shifting identifications together represented a form of mass conversion. Fenggang Yang has defined “mass conversion” as “the phenomenon of religious conversion happening to many individuals in a society within a relatively short period of time.”³⁶¹ Were this study to define “mass conversions” in terms of numbers and timespan alone, the turn-of-the-century conversions of Greek Catholics to the Russky Orthodox Church would surely qualify. While exact figures are impossible to determine, thousands converted in individual years, tens of thousands did so over individual decades, and conversions in all migratory regions combined, between 1890-1914, likely exceeded 100,000. Beyond 1914, numbers certainly escalated into the hundreds of thousands, in both Austria-Hungary and the Americas, but particularly in Eastern Europe.³⁶² Besides the total figures, dozens, hundreds—in a few cases, thousands—of individuals in particular parishes made declarations for conversion in single moments.

Beyond sheer numbers, the fact that the conversions entailed structural and institutional changes also lent them “mass” status. In Samuel Klausner’s structural definition, mass conversion is:

a concept in social rather than psychological theory. The concept does not refer simply to the numbers of converts or the rates of conversion, though those may be a consequence. Rather, it refers to a change in the religious character of a society and of its social institutions. A change in the religious character of groups, as such, is a form of social change. Social change may result from a shift in population composition, or from a refraction of the group’s symbol system or culture. The focus here is on change rendered by a structural differentiation. A societal conversion occurs when a subgroup

³⁶¹ Fenggang Yang, “Exploring Mass Conversion to Christianity Among the Chinese: an Introduction,” *Sociology of Religion* 67, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 126. Also see the articles in this special issue of *Sociology of Religion* for treatments of mass conversions among individuals from China.

³⁶² By 1915, the Russian presses were reporting over 500 new Russky Orthodox parishes in the occupied territories. After the war, the conversions in Eastern Europe took on an even more substantial mass character, in the newly created countries of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Magocsi reported that in Czechoslovakia alone, by 1921, 60,986 Greek Catholics had converted, and by 1930 the number of Russky Orthodox converts had climbed to 112,034. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus’, 1848-1948*, 179; Moklak, “Rosyiske Pravoslavyya na Lemkivshyni v 1911 – 1915 Rokach,” 7.) The Tylawa schism, beginning 1926 in the new Poland’s Lemko region also resulted in 17-18,000 new converts by 1934.

differentiates itself from the body of its community and becomes a candidate for absorption into the wider society or to another society. At the same time, a subgroup, structurally differentiated from the wider, or other, society acts as a receiving sector for that society.³⁶³

Subgroups among migrant Greek Catholics differentiated themselves from the collective to which they, until then, ostensibly belonged: the institutional Greek Catholic Church. In so doing, they became “candidates for absorption” into the Russky Orthodox Church, with their subgroupings—newly converted Russky Orthodox parishes—“acting as a receiving sector” into that broader Russky Orthodox society. Individual migrants who arrived in tertiary waves, following the establishment of such parishes in the Americas, may not have participated directly in their formation as a collective event; yet individuals nevertheless joined or attended existing parishes in the context of ongoing mass conversion. And, insofar

³⁶³ Samuel Z. Klausner, "How to Think about Mass Religious Conversion: Toward an Explanation of the Conversions of American Jews to Christianity," *Contemporary Jewry* 18, no. 1 (1997): 78. Several studies of the subject of conversion have referred to mass forms of conversion, perhaps most often against the backdrop of colonialism. Peter van der Veer, ed. *Conversion to Modernities: The Globalization of Christianity* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Gauri Viswanathan, *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity, and Belief* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Robert W. Hefner, ed. *Conversion to Christianity: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives on a Great Transformation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Mass conversions have often occurred among indigenous populations through colonial expansion, for example: to Christianity with the spread of Christendom throughout Europe; to Islam following the conquests of South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa in the seventh century; to Eastern Orthodoxy with the spread of the Russian Empire; to Catholicism with the colonization of South America; and to Protestantism with the colonization of India, North America, and elsewhere. Mass conversions have also occurred under less compulsory circumstances, as when missionaries spread Buddhism throughout China, or during the “Great Awakenings” of American Protestantism. Without theorizing these conversions, historians have nevertheless treated them frequently as mass phenomena. Stark and Finke’s arguments that no evidence can be found to support any instances of mass conversions in any historical era—that these are invented stories to motivate missionaries—rests upon refuting the notion that large numbers of people suddenly experienced personal, radical, world-altering shifts nearly simultaneously. Rodney F. Stark and Roger Finke, *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 126; Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, *The Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy* (Piscataway, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 70-71. This is something quite different than the structural definition of mass conversion articulated by Klausner, for which demonstrable historical examples abound.

It is possible also to identify mass conversions in the historical background to the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century conversions under consideration in this study. The tenth-century “baptism of Rus,” entailed a transformation of a non-Christian population to Christianity, and the Unia agreements of 1596 and 1646 resulted in mass conversions from Orthodox to Catholic Christianity. Historians have treated these particular events as “mass conversions,” insofar as they have posited various generalized, rather than personalized, explanations for the source of those conversions. Some have highlighted the threat of force implied in Prince Vladimir’s tenth-century “invitation” to the residents of Kyiv to join Christianity, so as to avoid becoming enemies of the prince, as well as the actual employment of brute force against pagan uprisings during the Christianization of Rus. As for the Unia agreements, some have pointed to the marginalized position of Orthodox Christians in Catholic empires—the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and, subsequently, the Habsburg Empire—and the relative social, economic, and political advantages gained through conversion.

as all migrant participants engaged in the task of community maintenance (to varying degrees, even if only minimally, through infrequent attendance), they continued to comprise part of a mass phenomenon.

That these were mass conversions allows for the postulation of general patterns which cut across individual reasons for conversion. At the same time, because individuals comprised the converting collectives, individual psychologies of conversion are also key: different individuals likely exhibited different motivations or clusters of motivations. The starting point, though, must be at the level of a mass phenomenon, given that “individual religious conversions follow from this social contextual change.”³⁶⁴

The current study consistently refers to “conversion,” specifically from “Greek Catholicism” to “Russky Orthodox” Christianity: it is critical to define these terms. Each conveys certain meanings for scholars, and each meant something different to the people who “converted” and to those who did not. Moreover, partisans on either side often avoided those terms altogether, preferring alternatives. It is therefore necessary to clarify: (a) *from what*, exactly, did people convert?; (b) *to what*, exactly, did they convert?; and (c) what exactly is meant by “conversion?”

Actors used numerous terms to refer to what this study most frequently calls “Greek Catholicism.” Greek Catholic loyalists, in addition to “Greek Catholic” (*hreko-katolychny*) used terms like “Rusky Catholic,” or “Ukrainian Catholic.” Russky Orthodox activists frequently called Greek Catholics, pejoratively, “Uniates,” “Ukrainian Catholics,” or more simply “Ukrainians,” or “Magyars,” though some Greek Catholic loyalists also used these as terms of self-description. Greek Catholic loyalists rarely deigned to call converts by their often-preferred term of self-identification, “Russky Orthodox” (*russky pravoslavny*); they instead tended to use terms like “schismatic” or “apostate.” Parties on either side also shared a number of terms—or more accurately, used the same terms and argued over who could do so validly. Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox alike used the first person plural

³⁶⁴ Klausner, "How to Think about Mass Religious Conversion: Toward an Explanation of the Conversions of American Jews to Christianity," 76.

possessive (“our”) to modify a number of terms, resulting in such ambiguous constructions as “our church,” “our faith,” and “the faith of our ancestors.”

Even more confusingly, loyalists and converts alike employed *both* of the terms “Greek Catholic” and “Russky/Rusky Orthodox” to identify themselves. It is worth repeating that many Greek Catholic loyalists exclusively used the term “Rusky” (one “s”) to modify their “church” or “faith,” while, on the other hand, many converts exclusively used “Russky” (two “s”s) to modify those terms; this distinction was likely lost on many—though not all—migrants, many of whom were illiterate. It is clear that Greek Catholic loyalists worried that Russky Orthodox activists’ use of the similar term would lead to confusion, because the former almost invariably used the term “*rossysky*,” instead of “Russky,” so as to characterize (and disparage) Orthodoxy as unambiguously “Russian.” As for the other terms, both sides legitimized their usage of the modifier “Greek” (*hreko*), because both used the Greek/Byzantine rite. Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox alike also claimed that they belonged to the “true” orthodox, catholic church, though they understood each of those terms slightly differently.³⁶⁵

Major contention arose over the term “orthodox” (*pravoslavny*). At the center of the disagreement lay the fact that, while *the* Orthodox Church, including the Russky Orthodox Church, contained that word in its official title, the Greek Catholic Church nevertheless continued to employ the term as one of self-identification in its liturgy. For example, during the Divine Liturgy, at the time of the Great Entrance—the procession with the Holy Gifts (the bread and wine)—priests in Greek Catholic churches commemorated “all you orthodox Christians” (*pravoslavni khrestian*). Furthermore, other Greek Catholic services besides the Divine Liturgy referred to Catholicism as “the orthodox faith” (*pravoslavna vira*). The history of Catholic-Orthodox relations, and the circumstances of the formation of the Greek Catholic churches accounts for this usage.

³⁶⁵ Roman Catholics have generally defined “catholic” as “universal,” whereas Eastern Orthodox have preferred to speak of “the fullness of the church” present in every local manifestation of the church. On distinctions between the Catholic and Orthodox understanding of catholicity, see: John Meyendorff, *Catholicity and the Church* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1983).

In the millennium before the Great Schism, when churchmen composed and codified the Eastern liturgical rubrics, the term “orthodox Christian” had not denoted: “someone who is not Catholic.” As self-acknowledged communicants of the same church, both the Eastern and Western halves of Christianity applied “orthodox” and “catholic” as terms of self-identification, and before the two hemispheres became estranged from one another, a Christian of the Eastern rite could easily refer to a Latin rite Christian as “orthodox,” just as a Latin rite Christian could refer to his or her Eastern rite counterpart as “catholic.” Representatives of both Christian halves thus understood themselves as belonging to the same orthodox, catholic Christian Church. In the wake of the Great Schism, however, Eastern and Western Christianity catalyzed into separate, mutually exclusive institutions, with the West adopting as its primary identifier the term “Catholic,” whereas the East favored for itself the name, “Orthodox.” Consequently, over the course of several hundred years between Schism and Unia, the term “orthodox” in the Eastern liturgy took on new meanings, oppositional to the term “catholic.”

Yet, when through the Unia agreements, East European Orthodox churches submitted to the authority of the Roman Catholic pope in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they did so with the understanding that they would retain their Eastern rite, including their distinctive use, at the time of the Great Entrance and in other religious services, of the terms “orthodox Christian” and “orthodox faith.” Thus, Uniates, or as they were later called, Greek Catholics, continued to refer to themselves at select, prescribed ritual moments as “orthodox,” at a time when their primary polemical partners had adopted for themselves the official title of “Orthodox.” In the meantime, those persisting Orthodox churches had, in kind, revalued their commemoration of “all orthodox Christians” to signify among its other meanings: “not Catholics.” For this reason, when Russky Orthodox conversion movements began proliferating among Greek Catholics in Austria-Hungary and the Americas around the turn of the twentieth century, the term “*pravoslavny*” (*pravoslavni* in the plural) suffered from an ambiguity of meaning comparable to, and perhaps even exceeding that of “Rusky/Russky:” not even an extra letter distinguished the *pravoslavni* people commemorated by Greek Catholics from those commemorated by the Russky (not

Rusky) Orthodox. Various agents could therefore deploy both terms comprising the compound identifier “Rusky Orthodox” to signify multiple meanings to different people for myriad aims.

Greek Catholic loyalists accused Russophile-Orthodoxophile priests of capitalizing upon this confusion over the term “orthodox” (*pravoslavny*) to promote their agenda, in both the old world and the new. One commentator in Galicia charged: “Also aiding [the Russophiles’] deception is the word ‘orthodox,’ the meaning of which the people do not understand. And the Russophile fathers do not stir the pot, because to them [the confusion] is good. On the contrary, resting upon that word, used in our Divine Liturgy, they proclaim: yes, we are Orthodox.”³⁶⁶ Father M. Halyntsynky claimed in 1912 that Russophile priests avoided the term “catholic,” altogether, when they described their faith and that of their parishioners. “Priests of our ecclesial provinces,” he said, “above all those of the *tverdyy* [“zealous,” i.e., Russophile] party, rarely mention the difference between the Catholic Church and the schismatic [church]. And on account of that, our people, trusting in our spiritual direction, are little acquainted with Catholic dogmas.” He continued rhetorically, “Do you hear from the mouth of a Russophile-priest in his sermons,” terms like “the catholic faith” or “the catholic church?” No, he concluded, “You often only hear more ambiguous titles, such as ‘Holy Rus,’ ‘our faith,’ and ‘our church.’” The current state of affairs brought about by such priests, he claimed, was like that prevailing during the first century of the Unia, ca. 1600s/1700s: “The ecclesial views of our simple people and the intelligentsia do not differ much from the views of the Uniates in the times before the catastrophes of our church organism because of Catherine II, Nikolai I, and Alexander II.”³⁶⁷ Were Galicia to be connected to Russia...I am convinced that not only the majority of Russophiles, but even part of the [Rusky-Ukrainophile] nationalists would convert to

³⁶⁶ "Pravoslavna propaganda," *Nyva* 9, no. 5 (March 1, 1912). Father Gregory Hrushka, editor of the United States' *Svoboda*, provided another reevaluation of these terms, for the purpose of eliding Catholic-Orthodox distinctions: “We brothers are all uniates, because we are all united in the love of Christ...Further, we are all orthodox [*pravoslavny*] because according to orthodoxy, in the proper manner do we worship the true God and the Holy Trinity with praise.” Fr. Aleksey Toronsky, "Nezhoda mezhy Rusynamy v Amerytsi," *Dushpastyr* 8, no. 7 (April 13 (25), 1894): 55.

³⁶⁷ I.e., successive tsars who oversaw the suppression and liquidation of Greek Catholicism in the Russian Empire, following the acquisition of territories from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

schism.³⁶⁸ Another anonymous author alleged that Russophile priests failed to clarify the differences between Catholicism and Orthodoxy to their parishioners, "...because by that method they would destroy among the people the nimbus of 'Russ-ness.'"³⁶⁹

An episode from the earliest conversion movement in the Americas reveals how this old country terminological confusion transferred to the new world. In the winter of 1890-1891, Father Alexis Toth dispatched John (Ivan) Mlinar to San Francisco to the Russky Orthodox bishop of North America. Mlinar stated to Toth that he indicated to the Russky Orthodox abbot that he was "an orthodox of the Greek Catholic faith of the Russky religion."³⁷⁰ When Mlinar approached communion, however, the abbot identified him as a Uniate, because he crossed himself from left to right. A period of confusion ensued.

As Mlinar asked Father Toth,

So what kind of unknown faith are we? We were taught and you teach us, that we are Orthodox people, and here the Orthodox bishop did not permit me to receive communion, sent me to the Catholic *biscup*,³⁷¹ and the Catholic *biscup* did not want to talk to me and chased me to the Russian bishop...Therefore, what kind of faith is this? I am told that I am a Uniate; what Uniate? I did not ever hear that before...I have always considered myself an Orthodox Christian?...³⁷²

Father Toth himself later wrote,

With surprise an Orthodox person who inquires in a real Russian-Uniate village, 'What faith do the villagers profess?' will hear more than once the same answer 'We are Orthodox Rusins,' and if the villagers would be told that they are Uniates, they will get angry and argue about that, since these poor people have not even heard about Unia! They have never been told and no one will tell them about it... They study in catechism that they are 'Orthodox Christians of the Russian Faith.' In church from their *ksendz* they also hear: 'and all of you Orthodox Christians,' etc.³⁷³

³⁶⁸ Fr. M. Halytsynsky, Ch.S.V.V., "Probudjim sja zi snu! (Prychyna ta zherela skhyzmy v nashim narodji)," *Nyva* 9, no. 2 (January 15, 1912): 34. Joseph Semashko oversaw the conversion of Eastern rite Catholics in Belarus to Orthodoxy in 1839 at the Synod of Polotsk.

³⁶⁹ "Pravoslavna propaganda." In other words, to distinguish between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, for the purpose of promoting the latter, would separate the masses from their Russky identity, and push them toward another (the most likely candidates of which were, in the opinion of Russophiles: Hungarian, Ukrainian, or the ever-popular "Polish-via-Ukrainian").

³⁷⁰ Simon, "Alexis Toth and the Beginnings of the Orthodox Movement among the Ruthenians in America (1891)," 400.

³⁷¹ Russky Orthodox adherents sometimes referred to Catholic bishops as "*biscup*" and priests as "*ksendz*."

³⁷² Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 4-5.

³⁷³ George Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, 4 vols., vol. 3 (Minnesota: AARDM Press, 1988), 33. Keith Rusin reported that Father Toth made similar statements in the litigation over the Wilkes-Barre church property: "Father Toth stated that in the old country, the United [Uniate] Greek priests neither

It was also clear, however, that many recognized a real difference between the Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox churches, such that some even suggested the necessity of eliminating that difference in the name of ethnonational unity. In 1894, Father Alexei Toronsky, editor of Galicia's *Dushpastyr*, reported that the Greek Catholic priest and editor of the American migrant publication *Svoboda*, Father Gregory Hrushka, had recently advised Russky Orthodox and Greek Catholic combatants to set aside their religious differences in order to achieve national "Rusky" unity in America. According to Father Toronsky, after "reprimanding the good Rusyns in the old country," *Svoboda* and Father Hrushka justified Greek Catholic-Russky Orthodox unity to "American Rusyns" in the following way: "We call upon you, dear brothers, not to act in such a way and not to quarrel among yourselves over whether you are Uniates or Orthodox! Because mother Rus gave birth to both, and you both are *ridny* brothers, and both were baptized in one Rusky Church." By the phrase "Rusky Church," devoid of either an "Orthodox" or "Catholic" modifier, *Svoboda* posited a religious institution with which Orthodox and Greek Catholics who understood themselves as "Rusky" could both identify. "One should not ask the other:" Father Hrushka continued,

whether you renounce...schism or whether you promise to become Uniates. Rather, you should ask one another: whether you renounce Satan and all his deeds and all his angels and all his service and all his pride? Further you should ask one another: whether you promise to serve Christ and believe in Him? And a Christian father and mother responded for you thrice [at your christening], that they would separate themselves from hell and its deeds, and they promised to believe in Jesus Christ and to serve him.³⁷⁴

If Father Hrushka's (American and, by extension, East European) audience remained attached, however, to their self-identification as "Uniate" or "Orthodox," Father Hrushka posed a solution. "You see, yourselves," he exhorted, "that you do not have the least cause to slander or wound one another on account of whether that one is a Uniate, or that one is Orthodox. We brothers are all uniates, because we

taught nor dared to teach the people that the Pope of Rome is the head of the church, for the reason that the union was made without the knowledge of the people and that they tried to keep the people in ignorance of it." Russin, "The Right Reverend Alexis G. Toth and the Religious Hybrid", 68.

³⁷⁴ Hrushka referred here to liturgical practices and sayings common to both Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox.

are all united in the love of Christ and we all belong to his Holy Church, which He established by His own blessed blood, and we became Christians. Further, we are all orthodox [*pravoslavny*] because according to orthodoxy, [that is] in the proper manner, do we worship the true God and the Holy Trinity with praise.” For *Svoboda*’s Father Hrushka, resolving these religious conflicts would facilitate the greater interest: national unity. And by simplifying the history of the Great Schism, he hoped to demonstrate the arbitrariness of the Greek Catholic-Rusky Orthodox divide: “For what reason is there quarrelling, when by the same you also bring misfortune to the national movement. For what reason must Rus suffer, and the national life become stinking mud for the reason, that in the year 863, some crafty Greek did not want to submit to the horde of Romans?”³⁷⁵ Finally, he urged his readers to, “Leave religious differences to the....scholastics” and to consider themselves as Rusky brothers, “because with one heart and mouth do we say: ‘*Otche nash...*’ [‘Our Father...’]”³⁷⁶

Judging American conditions from Galicia, however, Father Toronsky cast the migrant Father Hrushka’s very Catholicism in doubt. The former concluded that such remarks “not only do not establish agreement among American Rusyns, but on the contrary, introduce among them even greater conflict, because we doubt that other Rusky priests would agree with this precept. It is not possible even for Orthodox priests to agree with it...” Father Toronsky further disparaged Father Hrushka’s argument, because he believed it would lead to the “spread of religious ‘indifferentism,’ which shames any religion.”³⁷⁷ Religious “indifferentism” would be harmful for several reasons, as Father Toronsky explained to his Austro-Hungarian audience. Firstly, subordinating faith and rite to national interests, as Father Hrushka seemed to advocate, would countermand not only religious objectives, but national ones as well; as he elaborated, “Religious indifferentism, established among our Rusky people in America, can

³⁷⁵ Father Hrushka referred to the Christian East-West tensions in the aftermath of the Battle of Lalakaon, in which the Byzantine Empire defeated an invading Arab army, thereby paving the way for the “Christianization of Bulgaria,” according to the Eastern rite. Boris, the non-Christian leader of Bulgaria, had until that time been in communication with the pope of Rome regarding converting to the Latin Rite.

³⁷⁶ Toronsky, “*Nezhoda mezhy Rusynamy v Amerytsi*,” 155.

³⁷⁷ In Catholic theology, “indifferentism” holds a specific meaning: the regard of no one system of belief as superior to another. (See, for example, the 1913 *Catholic Encyclopedia*’s entry on “religious indifferentism.”)

with time lead them completely to perdition. They will sink at that time into the more powerful seas of other peoples: Poles, Slovaks, and Russians. Losing the love which is tied to the holy faith and rite, they will lose also their nationality.”³⁷⁸ Not insignificantly, Father Toronsky feared that such indifferentism would, through the remigration, spread back from the Americas to the *kray*.

Not every Greek Catholic migrant who affiliated as Russky Orthodox in the Americas had never heard that they were Greek Catholic in the *kray*. Those who identified themselves as such, however, could also find terminological continuity in the Russky Orthodox Church. Individual parishes, even after their entrance into the Russky Orthodox Church, retained the term “Greek Catholic” in their title. The term could be found not only in cornerstones and charters of now Russky Orthodox Churches, but also in converts’ conversation as a persisting term of self-identification. As the influx of “former” Greek Catholics into the Russky Orthodox Church steadily increased, the North American Mission, itself, adopted the official, somewhat verbose, and decidedly pregnant title (in English) of “Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of North America.”³⁷⁹

³⁷⁸ Father Toronsky could likely also have cited religious indifferentism as the cause of Father Hrushka’s eventual reversion to Greek Catholicism, after a brief stint as a Russky Orthodox priest in the Russian Empire.

³⁷⁹ As a result, not only converts, but “cradle” Orthodox now officially became “Greek Catholics.”



Figure 4. 1911 cornerstone for Cleveland’s “Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic St. Theodosius Church” (*Russka Pravoslavna Katholycheska Tserkov Yma Sv. Theodosia*). Photo: Rich Custer



Figure 5. 1910 church cornerstone for Newark’s “Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic St. Michaels Church” (*Russkaya Pravoslavnyaya Hreko-Kathol. Tserkov Sv. Arch. Mykhayla*) Photo: Rich Custer



Figure 6. 1913 church cornerstone and seal (*pechatka*) for South Philadelphia’s “Holy Virgin Russian Orthodox Greek Catholic Church” (*Ruska Pravosl. Hr. Kath. Tserkov Usp. Pr. Brdtsi.*)³⁸⁰ Photo: Rich Custer

Property disputes factored in the name change (a judge might be more inclined to grant a church property charted as “Greek Catholic” to a larger entity bearing that name); but the change was also meant to appeal to prospective Greek Catholic converts. Thus, if pre-existing self-identification as *pravoslavny* facilitated a sense of continuity for many converts, others who retained self-identification as “Greek Catholic” could also find a home in the Russky Orthodox Church. Even the sainted Hieromonk Alexei Kabaliuk, who converted from Greek Catholicism to the Russky Orthodox Church on Mt. Athos—the monastic center of world Orthodoxy, of all places—could write from his jail cell in Debrecen, Subcarpathia to Russky Orthodox Archbishop Platon of America in April of 1914, requesting economic remittances from the American Russky Orthodox Church, which he addressed as follows: “I greet, by the Lord Jesus Christ, the American G.C. Holy Church and I ask that you not forget to remember me a sinner in your prayers in the holy Divine Liturgies.”³⁸¹

The migrant Greek Catholic priest, Father Kosta Kyryllo of Monnessen, Pennsylvania, made sure to inform readers in the *kray* of this development: “American schismatics have appropriated the title of

³⁸⁰ Interestingly, “Ruska” is spelled with one “s” on the cornerstone, but two on the seal. In the seal, “Greeko” represents an amalgam of the term in their native language (“*Hreko*”) and English (“Greek”)

³⁸¹ *Svit* April 8, 1914.

Greek Catholic for themselves, and in their directory officially present themselves under [this title].”

Furthermore, Father Kyryllo reported that in 1910,

the Russian Orthodox Archbishop Platon...went with several of his priests to Washington, D.C., where he introduced into the “Supreme Court of the United States of America” a motion to legally charter the Russian [*rosissky*] Orthodox Church under the name “Greek Catholic Church”—however, without the addition, which they use here in their official directory: “russian orthodox [*sic*-given in English].” Their intimate desire and intentions are clear: because still not all of our churches are signed over to the Greek Catholic Bishop Ortynsky, and in great parts of our community, there exist strife and disagreements from the agitation of the Russian mission, Uhro-Rusky intrigues or even those peculiar to us here, the “independents”...³⁸²

Father Kyryllo thus warned that the Russky Orthodox Greek Catholic Church might now be calling itself simply the “Greek Catholic Church,” with the aim of obscuring its true identity.

A state of terminological confusion and ambiguity prevailed then, over what constituted essential “Russky Orthodox” or “Greek Catholic” Christianity. The question of why someone “converted” from one to the other becomes nonsensical if both terms signified the same thing. This study does not argue that either converts or loyalists “got it wrong,” any more than it attempts to answer whether the people under consideration were “actually” Russian, Ukrainian, Rusyn, or something else.³⁸³ Without prejudicing the question of legitimate usage of the terms “Greek Catholic” and “Russky Orthodox,” the point is that different people used different terms to refer to different traditions. Accordingly, people often discerned little or no difference between Greek Catholicism and the Russky Orthodox Church, or

³⁸² Kyryllo, “Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi,” 110, 524.

³⁸³ In part, strict adherence to the methodology of this study—the avoidance of terms that obscure the ways in which people actually identified themselves—would demand abandoning the ascriptive term “Greek Catholic.” If, as I have argued, there were many who never understood themselves to be “Greek Catholic,” even before their “conversion” *from* Greek Catholicism, it is no more legitimate to call them “Greek Catholics” than to call them “Ukrainians.” I have chosen, however, to retain the term “Greek Catholic,” to describe even people who never identified themselves as such, partly because, in the social sciences, religious identification does not suffer from the same obfuscation as does ethnic identification. While some nationalists might talk of the “essential” Catholic or Orthodox character of a given “people,” social scientists generally understand religious identification as a choice—whether made by individuals or made for them by others—and not some essential, enduring quality of a people; the same cannot be said for ethnicity. Even those who have adopted the constructivist approach to nationhood still continue to engage in what Jeremy King has called “ethnicism.” Thus, while there is a real danger that the usage of the term “Ukrainian” would convey that these people were “essentially” Ukrainian, that danger is minimal in the usage of the term “Greek Catholic.” However, it must be remembered that, not only were these people not “essentially” Greek Catholic (or Russky Orthodox or anything else), neither did many even actually consciously identify themselves as such.

between one or the other church and what they had “always been.” Accordingly, many who “converted” (though not all) never acknowledged that they had done so; and many (not all) saw in their “conversion” no change in religious affiliation, whatsoever.

Russky Orthodox activists interpreted these enduring identifications as the legacy of their ancestral faith: though the Unia agreements had been compelled upon the “Russky” people in name, they retained their “true” identification as Russky Orthodox. Some commentators have spoken about these persisting identifications as the characteristic “conservatism” and the “closed” nature of particular societies in the Carpathian Mountains, like in the Lemko region, where communities resisted the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Unia agreements, which spread more quickly elsewhere.³⁸⁴ Greek Catholic loyalists, for their part, interpreted these tendencies as a sign of the *temnist*—ignorance—of the people. They identified non-migrant villagers in the *kray* and labor migrants in foreign lands alike as *temny* or as living in *temnist*. Greek Catholic masses had not been converting, they said, based on well-informed, personal religious convictions, but rather the lack thereof, which left them susceptible to the machinations of “crafty” agents of schism.

Perhaps more than any other factor, Greek Catholic loyalists cited the *temnist* of the people—specifically, a lack of cognizance of the distinctions between the two traditions—as the underlying cause of conversion. If the lack of Greek Catholic priests in the Americas was a problem, it was because the *temny* masses were helpless without oversight. If Russophile Greek Catholic clerics in the *kray* “prepared” migrants for conversion in the Americas, it was because they preyed on their *temnist*. If the freedoms of migration or liberties in specific regions of the Americas resulted in conversions, it was

³⁸⁴ Krochmal, “Specyfika stosunkow wyznaniowych na Lemkowszczyznie w XX w.,” 135-36. The notion that mountain-region societies have resisted the religious developments of the lowlands is not particular to the Carpathians. Ferdinand Braudel, for example, saw in the mountains of the Mediterranean world an obstacle to the dissemination of Islam and Christianity; as he wrote, “Everywhere in the sixteenth century, the hilltop world was very little influenced by the dominant religions at sea level; mountain life persistently lagged behind the plain...A separate religious geography seems then to emerge for the mountain world. See: Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 35.

because the *temny* masses could not be trusted with such freedoms. If migrants rejected Greek Catholicism as a spurious “Ukrainian” or “Magyar” innovation, they did so without recognizing their real identity as a people. And if migrants found attendance at a Russky Orthodox parish more economically advantageous, again, it was because the *temny* masses did not understand the gravity of such an action.

Father Ivan Sendetsky, writing on ecclesial affairs in Lviv’s *Nyva* in March and April of 1912, encapsulated many of these sentiments toward the *temny* masses. He prefaced his dossier with a warning to his Galician audience that he would “deal with very painful wounds:” specifically, the way in which “our people, famous for their piety and loyalty to faith and rite” upon migrating to America “convert with relative ease to another religion and desert their ancestral faith.” Father Sendetsky endorsed “Lemkos” as “sincerely pious, loyal to their rite, skillful, industrious, sincere, of open heart, in which we can take pride.” Nevertheless, he could not deny the disquieting reality that “Catholic-wise, they are categorically of minimal consciousness;” more troublingly, they were contributing “the greatest percentage of conversion to schism.” As for the “Hungarian Rusyns,” who represented another “large percentage of schism,” he affirmed that they “are a people with those same attributes as Lemkos, but unfortunately, they have as pastors almost all renegades, not just Magyarones, but straightforwardly declared Magyars.” Disagreeable though conceding these aspersions might be, especially applied as they were toward a people for whom he held affection and regard, Father Sendetsky averred that in his analysis he would “hold fast to the precept: *amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.*”³⁸⁵

Education, or lack thereof, underlay his analysis of two population groups. It might seem that the author pointed to the distinctively religious ignorance of “Lemkos” (lack of Catholic consciousness), while highlighting in particular the ethnonational darkness of “Hungarian Rusyns” (resulting from obfuscations of the Magyarized Greek Catholic clergy). However, the remainder of Father Sendetsky’s article attested that he had both ethnonational and religious unconsciousness in mind for both the groups he identified. Similar to many of his Rusky-Ukrainophile Greek Catholic compatriots, Father Sendetsky

³⁸⁵ “Plato is my friend, but truth is a better friend:” Father Sendetsky was not about to let personal affinities stand in the way of a truthful assessment of the situation.

imagined Rusky/Ukrainian Greek Catholicism as a unified whole. When Father Sendetsky sought to answer the riddle, “Which Rusyns went into emigration, and how were they prepared religiously and morally in the *kray*?” he established, as the subject of his analysis, factors contributing to both the ethnolinguistic and religious ignorance, undergirding conversion to the Rusky Orthodox Church.

“This people,” he determined, “are maltreated, illiterate, landless or possessing little land, and their greatest concern in the *kray* was hunger for bread.” In a series of ensuing rhetorical questions, Father Sendetsky suggested that labor conditions in the *kray* may have mitigated sufficient moral and religious education: “Did they have time and means to go to school, and if they did, were these schools everywhere, especially among Lemkos, the first pioneers in emigration? Did these manorial farmers’ servants, all ‘serfs’ working from sunup to sundown, have time—that is, were they given the means to go to church for the Divine Liturgy and catechization?” His readers in Galicia could assume that they did not. Topping his list of causes was the charge of “insufficiency of preparation in religious questions among our emigrants, or a complete lack of such preparation among our emigrants.” Ultimately, the *temnist* of the people had paved the way for mass conversion.³⁸⁶

How did Rusky Orthodox activists respond to Greek Catholic claims that the migrants whom they were converting did so only out of ignorance? Predictably, they articulated a counter-narrative in which they transposed the agents of ignorance and enlightenment. For Rusky Orthodox activists, Greek Catholicism represented darkness and the Rusky Orthodox Church, “the light.” For Rusky Orthodox proponents, various Catholic parties had obscured that light. While persisting Greek Catholics continued to refer to those who converted as “ours,” Rusky Orthodox activists similarly employed the plural possessive to encompass the people whom they believed had been led astray forcibly by the pope and the Polish Jesuits, beginning with the Unia agreements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Just how *temny* were those who had fallen away from the Greek Catholic Church into the hands of the Rusky Orthodox? In all likelihood, many of them were largely uninformed regarding many

³⁸⁶ Fr. Ivan Sendetsky, “Pro tserkovni vidnosyny v Amerytsi,” *Nyva* 9, no. 5-9 (March 1, 1912; March 15, 1912; April 1, 1912; April 15, 1912): 260.

elements of their former Catholicism. The following testimony of persisting Greek Catholics involved in the 1894 Wilkes-Barre litigations over the church property, following Father Toth's facilitation of the conversion of most of the parish, speaks for itself.

1. Q. Do you believe in purgatory?
A. What is it?
Q. Do you know what purgatory is?
A. No sir, I don't know. I know a grass, a certain weed, that is called jistus.
Q. Do you believe in the immaculate (sic) conception?
A. I don't understand it at all. I don't know what it is.

2. Q. Do you believe in the immaculate conception?
A. I believe in such people as us and being sinless, being without sin, I believe in such a people as ourselves.
Q. Do you believe in purgatory?
A. I would tell you if I know. What is that good for?
Q. Do you believe that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. That is holding everybody, if he would let go we would all vanish on the earth.

3. Q. Do you believe in the infallibility?
A. We are saying that the Holy Virgin is not a sinner.
Q. Do you believe in the infallibility?
A. Yes, I do
Q. Do you know the meaning of the word infallibility?
A. I don't know it any other way.

4. Q. Do you believe in the infallibility?
A. I don't know it. There is the priest for that I don't know nothing about it.
Q. Do you believe in the immaculate conception?
A. That belongs to a different religion even if I could read it I couldn't understand it.

5. Q. What religion do you profess?
A. I am a Russian.
Q. Do you believe in infallibility?
A. I don't know what it is.
Q. What is the difference between Father Balogh's religion and Father Toth's religion?
A. I don't know. The difference is that we have to denounce our religion and I don't care to go into another religion.³⁸⁷

³⁸⁷ This testimony was taken from migrant parishioners George Kacsur, John Fucilla, John Krajnyacsok, Michael Waszily, and Michael Deleman, respectively: "Greek Catholic Church, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, et. al. v. Orthodox Greek Catholic Church, et. al." vol. 1 (Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County, Wilkes-Barre,

Notwithstanding the language barrier at work in the collection of such testimony, it is suggestive that both Greek Catholics and Rusky Orthodox activists spoke of the Greek Catholic masses, some of whom converted, as unenlightened in Catholic matters.

Such was not the case for all converts, however. Certainly, clerical converts like Father Toth, who had served as director and professor of canon law and church history at the Greek Catholic seminary in Prešov, knew well the tenets of Greek Catholicism. As for lay converts, while many may have been relatively ignorant of the distinctions between Greek Catholicism and the Rusky Orthodox Church, others may have been privy to an education via institutions which Rusky-Ukrainophile Greek Catholics would have in no way considered enlightening: the Kachkovsky Society, the Russophile Rusky bursas, and schools and seminaries in the Russian Empire.

“Study, pray, work, and prosper:” thus ran the slogan of the Kachkovsky Society. Comprised of a peasant majority and intended “to spread knowledge, morality, industriousness, thriftiness, sobriety, civic awareness, and all aspects of integrity among the Rus’ people of Austria,” the Kachkovsky Society also served, according to its Rusky-Ukrainophile opponents, as fertile ground for Russophilism and Orthodoxophilism alike.³⁸⁸ As early as 1892, a Galician viceroy described the society as a Russophile-Orthodoxophile threat: he “couched his suspicions by raising the specter of an Orthodox threat from the Russian east: ‘We cannot be indifferent when a society, in which we see Catholic priests, publishes books which on the first page include well-known figures who have left the faith for the Great Schism.’”³⁸⁹ Of course, that one the vanguard converts to the Rusky Orthodox Church, Father Ioann Naumovych, had founded the organization did not endear it to Rusky-Ukrainophiles, either. As a result of severe repression of non-Magyar cultural activity in Subcarpathia, the Kachkovsky Society remained within Austria-Hungary primarily a Galician and Bukovinan phenomenon; however, as the Society extended its

Pennsylvania, 1894): pp. 135, 193, 201, 204, 221, cited in Russin, "The Right Reverend Alexis G. Toth and the Religious Hybrid", 68-69.

³⁸⁸ Magoesi, "The Kachkovs'kyi Society and the National Revival in Nineteenth-Century East Galicia," 55.

³⁸⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*, 69.

influence into the Americas, it also reached migrants from Subcarpathia. As Magocsi discovered, “the Kachkovs’kyi Society did make its presence felt among immigrants to the New World (mostly from Subcarpathian Rus’ and the Lemko region [i.e., among those regions supplying the greatest percentages of converts]), and beginning in the 1890s it frequently sent its publications to immigrant organizations in the United States, Canada, and Brazil. By 1903, there were 139 Kachkovs’kyi Society members in the United States, most of whom were in branches located in Seymore, Connecticut, and in Olyphant and Shamokin, Pennsylvania.”³⁹⁰

Other forms of “education” (or, alternatively, “propaganda”), included the purportedly Russophile *bursas*—semi-religious boarding schools—in Galicia. A March 1, 1912 news item is representative of the suspicion held by Rusky-Ukrainophiles Greek Catholics toward these bursas:

Already now newspapers brought news that Orthodox propaganda spreads not only among the simple (*prosty*) people, but also among the school youths, and chiefly in the Russophile *bursas* in Lviv. And all voices in this matter remain without echo. As Orthodoxy is spread, thus it spreads further among the *bursaks* [boarders at the bursas], chiefly among Father Kostetsky's pupils. It turns out that the students, even of the lowest year class, simply sneer to themselves about the catechists, when they teach about the Catholic church, about its meaning, about the heresy of Orthodoxy, etc. Father Kostetsky's pupils do not completely conceal before their catechists their own Orthodox views. In one of Lviv's Polish *gymnasia*, the catechist confiscated a Pochaiv brochure from one *bursak*, and on that occasion, discovered that Pochaiv literature is generally spread among the *bursaks*. And to the *bursak*, this is no cause for wonder.³⁹¹

The same article complained of another “educational” threat: the phenomenon of Russophile Greek Catholic clerics sending their children to the Russian Empire for their education. Austrian government officials also considered this a matter of concern in 1911 and 1912.³⁹² The *Nyva* news item, gleaned from a “Polish” newspaper, related that contributing to this “spread of Russification (and therefore Orthodoxization) in Galicia” was Russian Empire’s “abundant” subsidization with “all manner of material easements” of Russophile clerics’ children—specifically their daughters—in schools in the Russian empire. The danger of this development lay in the potential for “persuasion” in “the Russian-Orthodox

³⁹⁰ Ibid., 57.

³⁹¹ "Pravoslavna propaganda," 176-77. Pochaiv was an Orthodox center of pilgrimage and publishing.

³⁹² Himka, "The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I," 483, 93.

mind;” furthermore, “Many of those young women (the daughters of Russophile priests!) raised in the Russian-Orthodox mind, will return here to Galicia and become a significant factor in Russian propaganda.”³⁹³ Rounding out the list of phenomena, which Rusky-Ukrainophiles would have deemed as pseudo-educational, was the instruction of Austro-Hungarian Greek Catholics in upper-level religious institutions—seminaries and monasteries—in the Russian Empire and other Orthodox lands.

The American context also added to the contributions of these “old country” educational institutions in the education of migrants. Timothy L. Smith has notably spoken of migration (specifically, immigration to the United States) as a “theologizing experience—just as it had been when Abraham left the land of his fathers, when the people of the Exodus followed Moses into the wilderness, and when Jeremiah urged the exiles who wept by the rivers of Babylon to make the God of their past the hope of their future.” Relying upon the “uprooted” paradigm, he considered the migration experience so psychologically jarring, because of the permanent separation of ties with regions of origin, that “the confusing agonies of anomie cried out for religious explanation.”³⁹⁴ While many migrants did sever old country ties, many did not; still, one need not accept Smith’s causation to concur that for many, migration did constitute a theologizing experience. Other factors account for an increased focus upon religious education in the New World included: the replacement of religious institutions’ *de facto* status with the “voluntary principle,” the need to produce a constituency capable of “translating” religious traditions unfamiliar to dominant societies in regions of migratory destination, and the assimilation of characteristic

³⁹³ “Pravoslavna propaganda,” 174.

³⁹⁴ Timothy L. Smith, “Religion and Ethnicity in America,” *The American Historical Review* 83, no. 5 (December 1978): 1174-75. Smith also weighed in directly on the people under consideration in this study, saying, “The Rusins, often called Ukrainians or Ruthenians, illustrate particularly well the role of religion in setting new ethnic boundaries. For decades the First Greek Catholic Union and its affiliated organizations defined the ethnic identity of persons of that faith so completely that Slovaks who had been Greek Catholics in Europe became Ruthenians in the United States. During the 1890s wholesale conversions of Greek Catholic Rusins to Orthodoxy in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Ohio produced virtually all the ‘Russians’ who lived outside California before 1920, a situation only slightly altered by the arrival after both world wars of refugees more accurately labeled ‘Russian.’ One of the few exceptions to the rule that faith defined ethnic boundaries in America was a third contingent of Rusins—those of both Greek Catholic and Orthodox affiliation—whose political aspirations were so powerful in both the Old World and the New that they, their prelates, and their priests were swept into the Ukrainian national movement” (ibid., 1171-72.). Smith referred, here, to the later (post-1915) development of a Ukrainian (as opposed to Rusky) Orthodox movement.

forms of religious practice in regions of migratory destination. Ebaugh and Chafetz found that as “taken-for-granted religious routines and community acceptance were relinquished,” the migrants they studied in Houston felt the need to become more knowledgeable about their faith.³⁹⁵

Religious conversion complemented these other “theologizing” catalysts.³⁹⁶ As one history of the Orthodox Church in North America has observed, “Education assumed a new importance in the era of mass immigration and mass conversion.”³⁹⁷ The Russky Orthodox Church established a mission school, and then a seminary in Minneapolis in 1905.³⁹⁸ Father Alexis Toth undertook a number of initiatives to educate migrants in the spuriousness of the Unia, and the superiority of the Russky Orthodox Church to Greek Catholicism, or “Uniatism,” as he usually referred to it. He preached about these issues in sermons as he traveled to various potential convert communities. He wrote about them in letters, articles, and most famously in his pamphlet *Where to Seek the Truth?*. He participated in the founding of *Svit* (The Light), which combined secular and religious news.³⁹⁹ Other activists did likewise. Father Ivan Krohmalny

³⁹⁵ Ebaugh and Chafetz, *Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations*, 48, 331. In a community of Buddhist migrants from Vietnam, for example, monks translated and taught constituents the meaning of sutras which were unintelligible to most migrants in their region of origin.

³⁹⁶ Chen has argued similarly that the intensification of Buddhist identifications among migrants from Taiwan in the United States owed less to American religious pluralism than it did to pluralism within the migrant community itself: namely, the existence of migrants converting to Christianity alongside those retaining their traditional Buddhist practices. Carolyn Chen, *Getting Saved in America: Taiwanese Immigration and Religious Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

³⁹⁷ Stokoe and Kishkovsky, *Orthodox Christians in North America 1794-1994*, Chapter Three.

³⁹⁸ The situation of the only Russky Orthodox seminary in North America in Minneapolis, the sight of the first Greek Catholic conversions, attests to the importance of former Greek Catholics within the broader framework of the North American mission. The seminary moved to Tenafly, New Jersey in 1912.

³⁹⁹ It is interesting to offset Father Toth’s self-characterization against the report of one returned migrant, whose contact with Russky Orthodoxy came to the attention of the bishop of Przemyśl attention in January of 1910. After searching Wysowa parish metrical records, Greek Catholic priest Father Orest Martynowych found that one of his parishioners, a returned migrant, had been married in a Russky Orthodox parish in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The migrant admitted that “he definitely married in Wilkes-Barre, that he christened a son, Ivan, by Aleksey [Alexis] Toth, but only because of the reason that Father A. Toth claimed to be a Greek Catholic.” In this version of events, Father Toth preyed upon the inability of the people to distinguish between Russky Orthodoxy and Greek Catholicism. “When [the migrant] Matiy found out that Toth was Orthodox, he went to another church, and now there in the *kray* goes to the Greek Catholic church.” (Fr. Orest Martynowych, “Letter to Bp. Konstantyn,” in *ABGK* (January 21, 1910).) Whether this returning migrant reported the truth or not is difficult to say. This characterization of deception on the part of Father Toth certainly accords with the accusations of many of his Greek Catholic detractors; yet it is at odds with the convert priest’s frequent emphasis upon education in large portions of his writings. Of course, the returned migrant would not have been without motivation to shift the blame for his affiliation with Russky Orthodoxy in America, from himself to someone else, given the pressures from church and state, to which he might have opened himself by admitting a sincere conversion to Russky Orthodoxy.

preached in Canada and Philadelphia (as related in his English-language brochure circulated in Philadelphia and reprinted in complete translation in Galicia's *Nyvva*), that the agents of Catholicism had, in the *kray* "by betrayal and cunning converted our Russian nationality to the Latin faith." Father Krohmalny had portrayed forcibly-converted, formerly Orthodox Greek Catholics as fettered: "In a word, the insatiable Italian pope tramples our Russian rights and forces us to become damnable Latins. And why do we sleep? Why do we put our neck in chains?" Ultimately, it was necessary for the people to awake from that slumber, in order to cast off those bonds and the captors who had placed them on them: "Out of the way with our enemies who try to deceive you!"⁴⁰⁰

In some cases, it was not only clerics who were "theologizing," but also lay converts. Reading rooms, connected to convert parishes, proliferated in the Americas. Those migrant communities also supported the formation of reading rooms in the *kray*, as well. Greek Catholics noticed that converts were receiving an education in religious matters, though they disparaged its quality. In 1910, a Greek Catholic lay migrant informant in Philadelphia, Teodor Bulyk, wrote to his parish priest, Father Aleksandr Durkot, in Jaworze, Lemko region, regarding "our Rusyns," that, "Here in Philadelphia very few of our parishioners are under [the pope's] authority. Isn't it a shame that what our ancestors recognized as good we deny. If our churches in the *kray* are under the authority of Rome, therefore, then also here in America let that same state of affairs exist. And I went in the *kray* to school and studied catechism... and therefore heard many times that we are not permitted confess to the schismatic priest. And what is happening now that they disrespect their faith and here [in America] honor schism?"⁴⁰¹

In this criticism of converts, it is possible to detect the author's self-affirmation as an upstanding Greek Catholic; one who had maintained his faith when others had fallen away, who had retained his consciousness of traditions instilled in the *kray*, and who saw in migration no mitigation of those traditions. Bulyk cited his personal religious credentials, acquired through a catechetical program in the

⁴⁰⁰ Kyryllo, "Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi," 605-06. I have translated the Rusky-Ukrainophile Father Kyryllo's term "*rossysky*" as "Russian," because Father Krohmalny's brochure, which appeared in English, likely used that term. In his own language, Father Krohmalny undoubtedly employed the term "Russky."

⁴⁰¹ Teodor Bulyk, "Letter to Fr. Aleksandr Durkot," in *ABGK* (March 23, 1910), 706-07.

kray, and expressed frustration that those credentials did not afford him the social capital he desired in migration, especially when dealing with converts in his Philadelphia community. As he complained,

And I am very angry if a man from our parish or from [the Galician village of] Świątkowa learned to write a little and now says that the Holy Virgin was conceived in Original Sin, but the Holy Spirit purified her when she gave birth to God's son. And then that their images are not necessary to venerate at all because they are wood, metal, or even stone. Furthermore, that purgatory does not exist, and the priests only imagined this into creation to make people give them money, and that Jesus spoke only about hell and heaven and nothing about purgatory. Many times on that matter I debated, but you can say what you want, and I will not listen to that. Or I will go to the native land, and I will maintain the faith of my family, fathers, and grandfathers.⁴⁰²

Bulyk discovered that, rather than commanding the respect he felt due him as an educated Greek Catholic, he ran up against characteristically Orthodox Christian higher order critiques of Catholic theology and rituals, articulated by individuals, whom he regarded as presumptuous and uneducated. It appears that, miffed that his credentials failed to impress this segment of his American community, he sought validation elsewhere: in the support of his priest in Galicia.

The fact that some migrants were educated in distinctions between Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox Christianity, before their migration or while in migration, provides an important qualification: not all migrants had little or no sense of the distinctions. The fact of the matter, however, is that many saw little difference between Greek Catholicism and the Russky Orthodox Church—or, perhaps more accurately, between the Russky Orthodox Church and what they had “always been.” That perception of sameness or at least similarity facilitated their shift from one to the other, which they may not even have regarded as a shift.

This discussion of conversion and *temnist* raises the question: just what did migrants think they were doing when they attended a Russky Orthodox parish in the Americas? Furthermore, what did the opponents of conversion think they were doing? The answers to those questions raise yet another question: is it proper to deploy the term “conversion” in the scholarly analysis of this history?

⁴⁰² Ibid, 708. Here, Bulyk sought to characterize Russky Orthodox beliefs which newly converted migrants were allegedly articulating.

The Latin root for “conversion” means “to revolve,” “to turn around,” or “to head in a different direction.”⁴⁰³ Classic understandings of individual religious conversion emphasized conversion as a radical break, generally an event-centered act that produced a dramatic transformation of one’s worldview. William James described the form of conversion to which he devoted most of his attention—the “type by self-surrender”—as a radically instantaneous “event,” in which “a complete division is established in the twinkling of an eye between the old life and the new.”⁴⁰⁴ Some scholars of conversion have appealed to Thomas Kuhn’s concept of a “paradigm shift” to emphasize the scope of the transformation connoted in this image of conversion.⁴⁰⁵

William James, however, also included room in his typology for the “volitional type:” conversion entailing change through a gradual, “piece by piece” process. James demonstrated little interest in this type, but social scientists have more recently emphasized conversion as process rather than event and spoken of “stages” of conversion or the “conversion career.”⁴⁰⁶ As a counterpart to the disjunctions created by conversion, they have highlighted the great degree to which continuities between the old and

⁴⁰³ Henri Paul Pierre Gooren, *Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation: Tracing Patterns of Change in Faith Practices* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 10.

⁴⁰⁴ William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (New York: New American Library, 1958), 177.

⁴⁰⁵ Gooren, *Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation: Tracing Patterns of Change in Faith Practices*, 19. Paula Fredriksen has noted that, underlying the focus of many twentieth-century theories of conversion upon immediate, radical psychological shifts in identification, the wholesale acceptance of the new tradition, and the rejection of what came, has been the legacy of classic conversion narratives in Christian history: Saul/Paul’s dramatic encounter with the resurrected Jesus on the road to Damascus, or St. Augustine, who “took up and read” Paul’s words and suddenly embraced Christianity. Paula Fredriksen, “Paul and Augustine: Conversion Narratives, Orthodox Traditions, and the Retrospective Self,” *Journal of Theological Studies* 37(April 1986): 3-34.

⁴⁰⁶ See, for example, Lewis Rambo, *Understanding Religious Conversion* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1993); Andrew Buckser and Stephen D. Glazier, “Preface,” in *The Anthropology of Religious Conversion*, ed. Andrew Buckser and Stephen D. Glazier (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Diane Austin-Broos, “The Anthropology of Conversion: An Introduction,” in *The Anthropology of Religious Conversion*, ed. Andrew Buckser and Stephen D. Glazier (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Amy Slagle, “‘Nostalgia Without Memory’: A Case Study of American Converts to Eastern Orthodoxy in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 2008). Gooren, *Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation: Tracing Patterns of Change in Faith Practices*, 43-52.

the new prevail as conversion unfolds.⁴⁰⁷ Notwithstanding this shift in emphasis, however, these scholars have still retained some notion of transformation in conversion.

The existing approaches to conversion—whether as dramatic event or as gradual process—apply to some of the conversions under consideration in this study. Some converts may have experienced a kind of epiphany, recognizing a clear distinction between what they had been and what they would become, casting off the former while embracing the latter. Likely even more underwent some form of gradual transformation once they had joined a Russky Orthodox parish, over many years and particularly as generations passed: the children of converts often became the most vociferous proponents of the Russky Orthodox Church, which they explicitly juxtaposed against Greek Catholicism.⁴⁰⁸ It would seem, however, that most who “converted” saw their behaviors *primarily* in terms of continuity. Many recognized no shift at all, and those who did framed that shift within the framework of “return” to what they had “always been.” Conversely, the studies of conversion in recent years which have emphasized continuities have instead framed those continuities within the broader framework of change.⁴⁰⁹

Greek Catholic loyalists *did* perceive attendance at Russky Orthodox parishes as real and significant transformations; when they spoke of “conversion,” they most often used the term “*perekhodyty*”—literally, “to pass over:” converts *perekhodyly do skhizmu* (“passed over to schism”).⁴¹⁰ Various, loyalists also charged that converts “disrespected their faith and honored schism,” “separated (*vidirvatysya*) from Rome,” “became prodigal,” “changed (*zminyty*) their faith,” “abandoned (*vidstupstva*) their faith,” “joined (*prystaty*) the schismatic church,” “pulled (*prytyahaty*) the faithful to schism,” “fell into grave sin,” and became “sincere partisans of the schismatic church.”

⁴⁰⁷ In part, these approaches have arisen as a necessary response to the cross-cultural study of conversion—the recognition that conversions to, from, and between less exclusivist, practice-based, non-Western or non-Christian religious traditions do not produce the supposedly clear delineations that occur in the case of conversions involving Christianity or other such supposedly doctrinally-focused, exclusivist religions. Buckser and Glazier, “Preface,” xvi.

⁴⁰⁸ Father Peter Kohanik is perhaps the most well-known example.

⁴⁰⁹ Rambo, *Understanding Religious Conversion*; Andrew Buckser, “Social Conversion and Group Definition in Jewish Copenhagen,” in *The Anthropology of Conversion*, ed. Andrew Buckser and Stephen D. Glazier (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003); Austin-Broos, “The Anthropology of Conversion: An Introduction.”

⁴¹⁰ This study has noted that the primary definition for this term—“to migrate”—coincidentally suggests the close connection between migration and conversion described in the current study.

Just as often, however, Greek Catholic loyalists preferred to describe the “conversions” in terms of specific behaviors. When, at the direction of the Greek Catholic bishop of Przemyśl, village priests began interviewing remigrants migrants suspected of conversion in the Americas, they did not ask them whether or not they “converted,” but instead, in which church they had “conducted religious practices.” Greek Catholic loyalists became wary when migrants “went to,” “visited,” “frequented,” or “conducted religious practices” in an Orthodox parish. They were concerned when individuals “confessed to a schismatic priest,” when they “went forward for the schismatic Holy Mystery” (communion), or when they married or had children baptized “in the schismatic church.” In the civic realm, they bristled when migrants “took an oath in court,” that they were Orthodox, which occurred during property disputes.

Greek Catholic loyalists drew distinctions between these behaviors in a hierarchy of problematic actions. It emerges from Greek Catholic bishops’ personal files—like those of the bishop of Przemyśl—that although hierarchs found attendance at a Russky Orthodox parish concerning, migrants’ sacramental practices caused the greatest alarm. That unease was likely because: (a) migrants’ performance of sacraments in another church resulted, according to Catholic canons, in *de facto* excommunication; (b) such behavior represented a sign of “actual” conversion, even if the offending migrants did not acknowledge that fact; and, finally (c) Greek Catholic bishops and priests had an obligation to “guard the sacraments”—in particular, *the* sacred sacrament of the Holy Mystery.

This emphasis on specific behaviors raises a corollary point, that many saw religious “identification” less so in terms of affiliation with a hierarchical church—the “Russky Orthodox Church” or the “Greek Catholic Church”—or in terms theological tenets, and more in terms of religious practices. They confessed before priests, they received communion, they baptized children, they performed funerals, they said prayers, they sang hymns, they celebrated holy days and commemorated saints—all in a prescribed manner, according to established liturgical rubrics and the church calendar. Because the Russky Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches were both of the Greek/Byzantine Rite, these practices were virtually identical in the two churches.

Greek Catholic commentators often remarked upon the potential for schism latent in the similarity, or even sameness, of the Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox rite (*obriad*), which they feared could easily confuse the *temny* masses. Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky of Lviv remarked upon the dangerous combination of ignorance, similarity of rite, and migration, when he lamented, “How terrible—what a shame to think—how many people then will submit to error because of the opponents of the holy faith. They arrive in America and do not even ask at all, where our churches are and where are our priests, and immediately go to the Orthodox Church. If they do not completely know their own faith, then they will neither love nor value it. That the rite in the Orthodox Churches is so similar as in ours, this everyone knows...”⁴¹¹

One migrant’s “conversion” narrative, recorded in the United States by E.N. Matrosov and published in the Russian Empire in 1905 justifies Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s fears.⁴¹² Petro Tkatch, originally of Galicia, then of Bridgeport, Connecticut, and then Synecdoche, New York, recounted that when he came to work in a Bridgeport a paper mill, he began attending a Russky Orthodox parish.

At the first Easter Pascha, I wanted to go to the Divine Liturgy. There was no Greek Catholic church, and I began to go to the Russky Orthodox one. Many of our people went to the orthodox Church all the time, after work. Many of them did no such thing, but about them I will not even begin to speak, rather only about myself. Although I am a Uniate, although I was born in the Greek Catholic Church, for me, there is no difference at all between the Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox Church. I know neither the Uniate Church, nor the Orthodox one: I know only the Russky one. Only here, where I hear the Slavonic service alone, which I recall from my youth, only where I hear our Russky sermon, there do I go—and I did not fear to do so in either church, whether Orthodox or Uniate. In the Bridgeport Russky Church, the priest, born in Ukraine, wonderfully uttered sermons in our Russky tongue, and exactly the same service as here, in our Synecdoche church or in any other Russky church in Galicia, or in Russia or here in America.

At a point in his story, Tkatch’s deep voice transitioned to an excited “high baritone.”

Again, I repeat: I know neither Uniate Church, nor Orthodox Church. I know only the Russky Church alone. I am neither Uniate nor Orthodox; I only know that I am a Rusyn; I am only a Rusyn! And all of us belong together only as Rusyns, and we will only be

⁴¹¹ Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, *Pamyatka dlya ruskykh robotnykiv v angliyi, argetyni, brazyl'iyi, daniyi, kanadi, nimecheni, spoluch. derzhavakh, frantsyi, shchvaytsari i shvetsyi*, 2nd ed. (Lviv: Tovarystvo sv. Raphayila, 1914 [1912]; reprint, 2nd edition), 42.

⁴¹² Matrosov, "Tolko Rusyn (Ocherk yz rusko-amerkykanskahoho zhytia-bytia)," 187-88.

Rusyns: neither more nor less—only Rusyns. Be only Rusyns and remember, that all of us—of one Russky blood—are sons of the one great Mother Rus! Once we remember that once and for all, then all fighting and strife among us about faith will cease once and for all. Be neither Uniate, nor Orthodox, nor converts to another faith—only Rusyns, only Rusyns!

Tkatch's comments also serve as a reminder that for some, like *Svoboda's* Father Gregory Hrushka, ethnonational identification could exacerbate the tendency to perceive sameness between Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox churches.

Beyond that perceived sameness, in some cases in the Americas, it was actually Greek Catholicism that diverged further from traditions with which migrants were familiar in regions of origin, for three reasons: restrictions placed upon Greek Catholicism in the Americas by Latin rite Catholics, the mixture of Galicians and Subcarpathians in single parishes, and real or perceived Ukrainianization or Magyarization. Due to Latin rite restrictions, to “retain” one’s Greek Catholic rite in the Americas often meant accepting celibate priests (foreign in their native villages), sacrificing the chrismation of their children at baptism (anointing them with oil), or receiving communion in one, rather than two species (wine, as opposed to bread and wine together). Meanwhile, those who “abandoned” Greek Catholicism could continue to conduct these religious practices as “converts” in a Russky Orthodox parish. In a Greek Catholic priest’s 1909 interview with Sophia Krynytska, returned migrant the parish in Wysowa, Galicia (Lemko region), Krynytska denied that either she or her husband had converted in the United States. She then answered some questions about other migrants:

Q) Did other emigrants convert to Orthodoxy?

A) Many converted.

Q) Who advised them to convert to Orthodoxy?

A) That is happening, but chiefly our people convert to Orthodoxy for the reason that the Greek Catholic churches’ priests do not want to chrismate the children after baptism, and the Orthodox both baptize and chrismate, as among us in the *kray*.⁴¹³

⁴¹³ Fr. Dionysy Dombrovsky, "Protocol with Sophia Krynytska," in *ABGK* (November 14, 1909). A 1912 issue of the Galician Russophile Greek Catholic publication *Tserkovny Vostok* confirmed that the chrismation issue was not insignificant, reporting, “It is not unusual to hear that remigrant villagers from America, asked why they converted to Orthodoxy, respond: “Because I wanted to baptize and chrismate my children and our [Greek Catholic] priests

Migrants from Galicia and Subcarpathia, gathered in the same parishes together, also frequently clashed over which regional variation of Greek Catholic liturgical practice they would adopt, with problems arising most frequently surrounding the matter of *prostopyne*: a form of congregational “plainchant,” common in Subcarpathia, not in Galicia. In an interview in Dolishnii Luzhok, Galicia, a remigrant explained his “conversion” as follows:

I was in America for six years, and before the seventh I returned. In America I was married and conducted religious practices. I went in America to the schismatic church, because in that place there was no Greek Catholic Church, only Hungarian [i.e., Subcarpathian Greek Catholic], in which the worship did not produce a liking in me, because it was another rite not belonging to ours, and for that reason also in the schismatic church I received the holy sacraments and I performed holy confession. I received the holiest sacrament, I married, and I baptized two children [in the schismatic church].

Apparently, spending time in the Russky Orthodox church had not impressed upon him any epiphany of the differences between the two churches, for he claimed, “Returning three years ago from America, I forgot my practices there in America and performed religious practices in our Greek Catholic parish church, that is, I confess, I receive the sacrament, and I baptize my children.” Begging further ignorance of religious distinctions, he confessed, “I did not know that by that I was an apostate, or that I transgressed for the reason that I went to the schismatic church for my religious practices ...” In other words, he had not recognized that in attending the “schismatic” church, he had withdrawn from one faith and joined another. Apparently, only his sudden interrogation in the *kray*, regarding his religious practices in migration, brought the distinction to his attention, for he now asked whether or not it might be necessary to perform once again the sacraments of marriage and baptism, originally performed in a Russky Orthodox parish in America: this time in the *kray* and in a Greek Catholic parish.⁴¹⁴

Converts also perceived transformations of their cherished rite by Ukrainianizing and Magyarizing Greek Catholic clergy. In 1908, even after the priest in their native Galician village wrote

don't have authority to chrismate there." (Father Dr. D. Dorozhynsky, "Propahanda t.zv. Pravoslavia v Halytskoi Tserkovnou Provyntsiu," *Tserkovny Vostok* (1912): 88. Interpolation in the original.)

⁴¹⁴ "Protocols with Teodor Lebischak, Ivan Fedorychik, Teodor Tatarsky, and Philemon Fedyn," in *ABGK* (November 13, 1909), 155-56.

them to differentiate Greek Catholicism and Russky Orthodoxy and admonish them not to convert or confess to a Russky Orthodox priest, under any circumstances, migrants in Desloge, Bonne Terre, and St. Louis, Missouri continued to attend a Russky Orthodox parish and confess to its priest, unable as they were to tolerate the Rusky-Ukrainophile priest in the Greek Catholic parish. As the migrant Symeon Tirpak wrote from Desloge, “Our people themselves confess to the Orthodox priest, for the reason that it is not possible to get a good Russky [i.e., Russophile] priest; but for that, we are not converting to any other faith, nor are we departing from under the oversight of the Pope of Rome—but we did not want to submit to that radical [i.e., the Rusky-Ukrainophile priest].”⁴¹⁵ Tirpak’s insistence that performing sacraments in a Russky Orthodox parish did not preclude essential Greek Catholic identity and fidelity to the Pope demonstrates that even migrants informed of “official” distinctions between the two traditions preferred their own interpretations of permissible behavior with respect to one, as members of the other.

Migrants, therefore, who attended Greek Catholic parishes sometimes underwent greater changes in religious practices than “converts,” who could in many cases actually *more* successfully preserve their cherished traditions in Russky Orthodox parishes. At the very least, many “converts” saw no fundamental distinction between the two, a point critical to any assessment of reasons for conversion. The question “Why did they convert?” loses its meaning when asked of individuals who did not acknowledge their conversion, in the first place. Migrants, who prior to migration identified themselves as “Russky” and “orthodox”—as many did vernacularly—could not “convert” to the Russky Orthodox Church in the Americas, properly speaking, for they could not change into what they already were, at least in their own self-understanding. Advocates of conversion, for their part, rarely used the term “to convert” (*perekhodyty*) to describe their behavior.

Because so many believed that they were simply doing as they and their ancestors had always done, they used no unique term to describe their actions, except perhaps to say that they “maintained” their faith. One Greek Catholic migrant who attended a convert parish in the United States, upon

⁴¹⁵ N.N., “Koe - Chto O Prychynakh Rasprostraneniya Pravoslavia v Nashem Narod v Ameriki,” *Tserkovny Vostok* 5-6(1912): 299.

returning to his native village, simply told his Greek Catholic priest that, while in migration, he had maintained that faith “which daddy-papa and mama taught me.”⁴¹⁶ Combining the similarity of practices with the multivalence of the terms “*pravoslavny*” (orthodox) and “Greek Catholic,” migrants who conducted religious practices in a Russky Orthodox parish could do so without ever identifying themselves as “converts.” In fact, according to Russky Orthodox activists, it was Greek Catholic loyalists who had introduced a new religion: *they* were the converts. In a sense, then, using the term “conversion,” as the current study does, entails privileging one interpretation of these events over others.⁴¹⁷ The current study retains “conversion” and “convert,” however (generally, henceforth, without scare quotes) as a matter of convention, while also aiming for the greater specificity of terms like “affiliation,” “attendance,” and “conducting religious practices.”

Proponents of the Russky Orthodox Church who did acknowledge that the conversions represented a shift often used the verb “*vernuty*” (“to return”) to describe that shift. Such individuals understood that they “returned” to the Russky Orthodox faith, the faith of their ancestors.⁴¹⁸ In this formulation, the “Russky” people had once been Orthodox, hundreds of years ago before the Unia agreements had taken hold; now, they were becoming so again. A tension exists between the action of “returning” and the object of “the faith of our ancestors,” for “return” connotes having first “left” something behind. “Return” might mean continuity with something in the distant past, but it also indicates a break with what transpired in the interim: the period of the Unia, extending up to the moments of individual conversion to the Russky Orthodox Church, during which converts had been Greek Catholics. Yet converts did not perceive a distinction between their faith and that of their parents and grandparents, who had officially been Greek Catholic.

⁴¹⁶ Durkot, “Protocol with Andrei Repak,” 6.

⁴¹⁷ Insofar as “conversion” usually connotes a “change” in religion, the use of the term runs the risk of following the majority Greek Catholic interpretation—without, at least, adopting a denigrating understanding of that change.

⁴¹⁸ As this study has noted, as with the dual meaning of *perekhodyty* (“to convert,” “to migrate”), the term *vernuty* could indicate both migratory “return” and ethnoreligious “return.”

It was possible for converts to harmonize this apparent disjunction. Russky Orthodox affiliates envisioned continuity with the ancestral faith, which even practitioners subject to the Unia maintained: hence, persisting self-identifications as “*pravoslavny*” (orthodox). Russky Orthodox activists argued that, despite what various “persecutors” and “deceivers” (the Pope, the Jesuits, the Poles, the Magyars, the Ukrainians, etc.) had perpetrated, the good, simple people still sensed their essential Russky Orthodox-ness: they were the “crypto-Orthodox” that Latin rite Catholics charged that they were, after all.⁴¹⁹ Converts could thus perceive themselves returning to an *open* expression of a temporarily (350 years or so) clandestine self-identification. In 1912, for example, British author W.H. Birkbeck visited the village of Grab, Galicia, in which a conversion movement had begun after two decades of migration to and back from the United States. One convert told him, “We were always Russians [*sic*: Russky people] and Orthodox, and so were our fathers and forefathers before us; we know now that Ukrainism is a bridge to make Poles of us, and that the *unia* is a trap to turn us into Papists (*Katoliki*): we have left the *Unia* forever, and they may fine us and rob us of our cattle, or even hang us and cut us up, but we will never go back to it.”⁴²⁰ This convert could thus claim that he and his immediate ancestors were *always* Russky Orthodox people, but that they he had also now “left” what he had previously been: a subject of the Unia.

Perhaps the clearest testament to the reality that many migrants saw no fundamental difference between the Greek Catholicism they practiced in the *kray* and the practices they conducted in Russky Orthodox parishes in the Americas is the common practice of many, upon remigrating to regions of origin, to simply rejoin their native parish. Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholic hierarchs and priests became extremely concerned with these reversions, which took place “as if nothing ever happened.” The converting/reverting migrants, themselves, exhibited less anxiety than their shepherds: many, apparently, saw no incoherence whatsoever in their alternation between the two churches.

⁴¹⁹ To the vehement denials of loyalist Greek Catholic Rusky-Ukrainophiles. See, for example, Fr. Ioann Yosyf Melnyttsky, “De sydyt skhizma?,” *Nyva* 5, no. 4; 5 (February 15, 1908; March 15, 1908): 103-04.

⁴²⁰ W.J. Birkbeck, “Religious Persecution in Galicia (Austrian Poland),” (London: George Berridge & Co., 1912), 1912. Birkbeck translated “Russky” as “Russian” in English. For more on Birkbeck’s involvement, see [Chapter Ten](#).

Existing typologies of conversion may provide some insights into the conversions under consideration; yet even more strictly structural and more nuanced, continuity-based psychological categories—e.g., “denominational shifts,” “reaffiliation,” “alternation,” and “conversion career”—generally do not accommodate much of the phenomena associated with these conversions.⁴²¹ Some scholars have remarked that notions of conversion as “a radical, sudden change of belief, one in which old ways and associations are left behind as a result of a new theological outlook” have run up against difficulties when applied to “non-Christian religions, which often regard belief as less important than religious practice.”⁴²² But the conversions in the current study suggest that the “conversion as rupture” model cannot hold up even in particular instances of Christian conversion—even in forms of Christianity

⁴²¹ David Snow and Richard Machalek spoke of conversion, as have many others, as a “radical change,” but they noted that this formulation begged the question, “how much change is enough to constitute a conversion?” David A. Snow and Richard Machalek, “The Convert as a Social Type,” in *Sociological Theory*, ed. Randal Collins (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1983), 264. In his interdisciplinary answer to just “how far someone has to go socially and culturally in order to be considered a convert,” Lewis Rambo did include “institutional transition”—like a “denominational shift”—as a mark of conversion, without stating whether the individual or collective needed to *acknowledge* that transition for it to be conversion. Rambo did acknowledge that institutional transition or “denominational switching” could, instead of involving a “significant religious change based upon profound religious experience,” entail “simple affiliation with a church because of convenience (such as geographical proximity).” Still, this begs the question of cognizance of a shift. In addition to *institutional transition*, Rambo’s other types of conversion included *apostasy/defection* (“repudiation of a religious tradition or its beliefs by previous members”), *intensification* (“revitalized commitment to a faith with which the convert has had previous affiliation, formal or informal”), *affiliation* (“movement of an individual or group from no or minimal religious commitment to full involvement with an institution or community of faith,” and *tradition transition* (“the movement of an individual or a group from one major religious tradition to another,” e.g., Christianity to Islam). Rambo, *Understanding Religious Conversion*, 12-14. Social psychologist Richard Travisano drew a distinction between what he called “conversion,” which entailed “complete disruption” of identity, and “alternation,” which rather than rupture, involved “relatively easily accomplished changes of life which do not involve a radical change in universe of discourse.” According to Travisano, “Alternations are transformations to identities which are prescribed or at least *permitted* within the persons’ established universes of discourse.” Richard V. Travisano, “Alternation and Conversion as Qualitatively Different Transformations,” in *Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction*, ed. G.P. Stone and H.A. Faberman (Waltham, MA: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), 601. The latter more accurately describes the kinds of conversions undertaken by most migrants in this study, though for many, the notion of “transformation” would have to be stricken altogether, as many saw no change at all. It would be difficult to say into which of the categories proposed by Rodney Stark and Roger Finke these conversions would fit: *conversion* (“shifts across religious traditions”) or *reaffiliation* (a shift within the same religious tradition). Stark and Finke, *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion*, 114. Henri Gooren’s category of “reaffiliation,” on the other hand, seems to allow room for the conversions in this study: for Gooren, *reaffiliation* denotes “members becoming regular visitors without ever reporting a conversion experience” or “formal membership in a religious group, without change of identity.” Gooren, *Religious Conversion and Disaffiliation: Tracing Patterns of Change in Faith Practices*, 40, 48-49, 50. In Gooren’s model, however, reaffiliation is just one stage in a “conversion career:” a step along the way toward ultimate conversion. If that ultimate stage were never to occur, would a conversion still have taken place?

⁴²² Buckser and Glazier, “Preface,” xvi.

(Catholicism and Orthodoxy) generally regarded as especially dogmatically institutional and exclusivist. Of course, the same Christian traditions are also typically more reliant upon ritual than most Protestant traditions. Many converts, in fact, placed greater value in maintaining ritual practices, which they could in many respects accomplish in a Russky Orthodox parish, than they did either on doctrinal or institutional fidelity to Catholicism.

One recent study defines an Orthodox convert as someone “who has undergone the Orthodox Christian initiation rituals of baptism/chrisamation...and/or confession in adolescence or adulthood,” with an exception for converts from Roman and Byzantine (Greek) Catholicism, who sometimes join Orthodoxy through confession, only.⁴²³ These criteria for conversion are consistent with contemporary practice, and some converts in the current study did also convert through one of these methods. Few, if any, converted through baptism and chrisamation, for they had already undergone these rituals in the Greek Catholic Church, but many did indicate affiliation by having their children baptized and chrisimated in a Russky Orthodox parish. Some articulated a confession of faith, which appears to have occurred mainly when a portion of a Greek Catholic parish decided upon conversion and officially made the initial switch, often along with an agreement to sign the church property over to the Russky Orthodox bishop. But many migrants apparently attended the Russky Orthodox Church and conducted religious practices there, including sacramental practices, without any formal ceremony or declaration of conversion.

The preceding discussion should call into question not only notions of what “counts” as conversion, but also traditional concepts of what “counts” as religious affiliation within Christianity. Traditional dichotomies of exclusivist, doctrinally-centered, and institutionally-based Christianity—or, more generally, “religions of the West”—on the one hand, and on the other, pluralistic, practice-centered, “religions of the East,” characterized by porous boundaries and loose criteria of affiliation, may rely too heavily upon formulations from elite-level sources: bishops, priests, and theologians. In the supposedly

⁴²³ Slagle, “Nostalgia Without Memory”: A Case Study of American Converts to Eastern Orthodoxy in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania”, 46, fn. 13.

most institutional and exclusivist forms of Christianity—Catholicism and Orthodoxy—many practitioners saw no disjunction in their alternating affiliations with both churches.

This study retains the term “conversion” to describe the practices under consideration in this study, but with qualifications. First, these were mass conversions, both in terms of numbers and timespan, and in terms of structural and institutional modifications. Yet, to use the term “convert” to refer to an individual who affiliated in some way with a Russky Orthodox parish—whether through occasional or regular attendance, sacramental practice, or “sincere” confession of faith—should not necessarily imply some dramatic reorientation of the convert’s worldview, theology, or ritual practices. This study attempts to maintain a balance, allowing for converts’ choice in their conversions, but at the same time, emphasizing the fact that they perceived that choice primarily in terms of maintaining their faith. When attempting to ascertain just why it was that so many converted, of course, it is important to ask at the same time, why so many did *not* convert. That particular formulation of the question, however, obscures the real dynamics of conversion and non-conversion, as well as reversion, for that matter: many representatives of both groups believed that they were simply doing as they had always done. The question, then, ought to be framed rather in terms of why migrants believed that one church, as opposed to the other, provided the best opportunity for the maintenance—not transformation—of their traditions.

5.0 THE CAUSES OF CONVERSION

The preceding historical overview hinted at underlying causes for mass conversion movements of Greek Catholic migrants to the Russky Orthodox Church in the Americas, beginning in the late-nineteenth century and spreading by the early-twentieth century to all regions of migratory destination: the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Brazil. Probably the most important cause for conversion lay in the perception by most converts of continuity, rather than radical transformation, in their ostensible shift in religious identification. This chapter expands upon other important causes for conversion in the Americas, with the caveat that Greek Catholics “converted” only in a highly qualified sense.

One scholar of the conversions has remarked, “The question most historians answer one way or another is: ‘Who was responsible for the American Catholic church’s loss of over one-third of its Rusyns to Orthodoxy?’” Indeed, this chapter seeks to answer who—or what—prompted the conversions in the Americas.⁴²⁴ Because primarily migrants converted, together with non-migrants in the *kray* exposed to migrant influence, a consideration of migration phenomena promoting conversion is paramount. Historians have attended to the “migration factor” in the causation of conversion only in a limited sense, usually with a focus upon conditions prevailing in an individual migratory region of destination (e.g., “French” Catholic Latin rite hostility to Greek Catholics in Canada or the “trustee system” in the United States). Yet, a comprehensive treatment of the migratory context, characterized by sustained

⁴²⁴ And minus the ethnic designation, “Rusyn,” naturally.

transnational ties, remigration(s), correspondence, social and economic remittances, and interacting “old country” and “new world” factors, is critical.⁴²⁵

This chapter considers the transnational dynamics of causation for conversions, including: pre-existing orientations; freedoms of migration; freedoms in regions of migratory destination; Latin Rite-Greek Catholic hostilities; clerical labor shortages; Russian monetary subsidies; encounters with “cradle” Orthodox migrants; and topography and geography. Each factor consisted of “old country” and “new world” dimensions. Causation of the conversions evolved over time, particularly as movements spread back to Austro-Hungarian regions of origin. As an example, many eventually left native villages for the Americas already having encountered “American” conversions via remigrant kin and friends, and through remitted literature; many tertiary waves of migrants also joined existing Russky Orthodox parishes, established in previous years by their converting predecessors (who might have remigrated).⁴²⁶ Additionally, in response to the conversion movements, Austro-Hungarian governmental and Greek Catholic ecclesiastical officials implemented transatlantic measures affecting the conversions in the Americas. In short, while causal factors highlighted in this chapter operated during the entire period under consideration, causation also varied across earlier and later migration waves.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁵ Several scholars who have considered the conversion movements in two regions—Subcarpathia and the United States—have taken some important first steps toward a transnational perspective. See, especially: Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*; Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*; Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*. These scholars have not generally emphasized the notion of ongoing relations between the two regions, nor have they given significant attention to the Canadian, Brazilian, Argentine, or Galician context. (It should be said, however, that both Dyrud and Danilec briefly mentioned the conversions in Galicia.)

⁴²⁶ Greek Catholic migrants continued to establish Russky Orthodox parishes throughout the period under consideration. The point here is that many localities of migratory destination already possessed an existing Russky Orthodox parish.

⁴²⁷ A methodological point about this chapter’s use of “old country” sources is in order. The “background” of, and for some migrants, persisting orientations toward the *kray*, influenced the conversion movements in the Americas. Whereas scholars of immigration have referred to “homeland consciousness” or “diaspora consciousness,” this study identifies “transnational consciousness.” Migrants were not the only individuals and collectives to exhibit such transnational consciousness. Through migration, non-migrants sometimes became “transnationalized,” both in consciousness and behaviors. Levitt, *The Transnational Villagers*, 200.

While this study attends also to non-migrant *behaviors* intended to influence the “American” conversions (even as migrants in the Americas intervened in the movements in the *kray*), this chapter highlights *consciousness*, exhibited by non-migrants, of the conversions in the Americas, a necessary prerequisite for later interventions.

It is also worth keeping in mind that, insofar as the appearance of conversions in Austria-Hungary led to pre-war, Great Power tensions—and insofar as remigration and remittances from the Americas largely account for the mass character of the East European conversions—the catalysts for conversion analyzed in this and the previous chapter also contributed to the origins of World War I. (Of unique relevance in this respect are two causal factors: so-called “American freedoms,” which gained meaning in relationship to “Austro-Hungarian repression,” and Russia’s interventions in the Americas, at least partially motivated by the potential for the remittance of the conversions to Austria-Hungary.)

Such consciousness represents a form of social remittance. I have chosen to let “old country” sources attest, themselves, to non-migrant transnational consciousness. Whenever possible, I analyze causation of the conversions in the Americas, based upon sources which brought cognizance of those conversions to the *kray*. Remigration represented an important method of transmitting the idea of conversion across the ocean; however, this chapter focuses upon written correspondence, including personal letters between migrant and non-migrant family members, migrant parishioners and village priests, and migrant priests and old country bishops, as well as letters and articles submitted by migrants to presses in regions of migratory origin. In many cases, the express purpose of such correspondence was to stimulate some sort of intervention in the conversions, whether targeted at their old country or new world causes/effects, or both. I retrieved this correspondence from the Americas from East European archives.

Even articles in the “American” migrant presses (*Svoboda*, *Amerykanský Russký Věstník*, *Pravda*, *Postup*, *Canadskaya Rus*, *Svit*, etc.) technically count as “old country sources,” insofar as non-migrants and (returned) migrants read them widely in in Austria-Hungary, in their first printing and quoted in old country presses. Apart from the American migrant presses, these are sources which are today contained in East European archives. By utilizing these old country sources to discuss the conversions in the Americas, especially the causes of those conversion, it emerges that many non-migrants in the *kray* possessed great and detailed knowledge of the migrant conversion movements, well before the movements arrived along with remigrants, back in their own Austro-Hungarian regions. A review of the sources employed in the previous chapter also reveals that the historical overview of “the American” conversions relied heavily upon old country sources.

This is hardly the first study to attempt to relate aspects of the conversions in the Americas via old country sources. It is the first, however, to do so in the interest of making a methodological point about transnational consciousness, rather than necessity. Other scholars have relied upon the East European archives due to a lack of access to the American sources. For examples of this, see: Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*; Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*. That these modern-day scholars could produce fairly accurate and detailed histories of the conversions in the United States based almost exclusively on these sources reveals the degree to which parties in the old country at the time of the conversions were aware of the conversions. Indeed, that fact raises another methodological point. It is true that the “old country” sources suffered from some limitations, which only access to the American sources could resolve—see, for example, the editorial corrections in the American edition of Mayer’s text. However, in many cases, the old country sources provide information that the new world sources could not. Migrants who corresponded with parties in the old country, in order to provide the context for the information they wished to convey, had to explain much that might otherwise have gone unsaid in correspondence between two parties within the same region of migratory destination. It is true of all historical sources that much is left unsaid, and it is often the task of the historian to reconstruct what was left unsaid. What was left unsaid in correspondence between two parties in the same context, however, was often spelled out explicitly when one party attempted to translate the conditions in one region (of migratory destination) to someone else living in another region (of migratory origin). This point should be of utility to all scholars of migration.

5.1 TWO-WAY BAGGAGE

Migration scholars have long employed the trope of “cultural baggage” to refer to cultural traits “carried” by migrants, as it were, “in their suitcases” and shaping their behaviors and identifications in migration. In the 1970s, constructivist theorists argued instead that cultural identifications like “ethnicity” arose solely from the immigrant context: migrant “Poles” only became so in the United States.⁴²⁸ Following this turn, the “old country” made a comeback as scholars in the 1980s and early 1990s adopted an interactionist approach, allowing the influence of both old country and new world factors upon migrants.⁴²⁹

Utilizing a transnational framework, this study argues that old country and new world factors have interacted *continually* to influence migrant identifications, behaviors, and collective consciousness in regions of migratory destination *and* origin. Prior to migration, influences in the *kray* predisposed many Greek Catholics to ethnoreligious conversion in the Americas; in turn, migrants’ behaviors in the Americas determined social remittances to the *kray*.⁴³⁰ An assessment of causes of migrant conversions in the Americas begins therefore with factors particular to regions of migratory origin, while keeping in view multi-stranded ties connecting migrants to those regions.⁴³¹

⁴²⁸ In United States scholars have explained the rise of ethnicity—or “ethnicization”—by appealing to factors like: structural features associated with the American city, dominant American society’s reductive ascription of ostensible immigrant “groups,” and immigrants’ group alliances as defense mechanisms in the face of economic, political, and social adversity. See, for example, Jonathan Sarna, “From Immigrants to Ethnic: Toward a New Theory of ‘Ethnicization,’” *Ethnicity* 5(December, 1978); William Yancey, Eugene Ericksen, and Richard Juliani, “Emergent Ethnicity: A Review and Reformulation,” *American Sociological Review* 41(June 1976).

⁴²⁹ For an influential essay in this vein, see Katherine P. Conzen and et al, “The Invention of Ethnicity: A Perspective from the USA,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 12(Fall 1992). Conzen and her collaborators highlighted mostly features in the United States, but they did reaffirm the significance of regions of migratory origin in the process of ethnicization. They did not, however, develop that significance in great detail.

⁴³⁰ Similarly, Levitt and Lamba found that migrants from the towns of Boca Canasta and Villa Sombrero, Dominican Republic, have arrived to the United States “with a keen interest in sports, a long history of community organization, a robust track record in participatory democracy, and a strong sense of responsibility to the collective good. These values and practices affect how migrants interact with the broader community in the U.S., what they are exposed to and adopt there, and what they ultimately send back to their communities in the Dominican Republic.” Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, “Social Remittances Revisited,” 4-5.

⁴³¹ In other words, it is dubious even to speak of factors “particular” to the old country, once migrant transnationalism modified regions of origin.

“Old country” factors do not necessarily or even primarily represent a “prologue” or “background” to the conversions in the Americas, any more than the appearance of those movements in Austria-Hungary form an epilogue. After the impetus for conversion arrived from the Americas in Austro-Hungarian territories, more migrants continued to go out—some of whom had already been in the Americas, and others who left for the first time, already imbued with a mix of old country and new world influences. Consequently, old country factors continually influenced the migrant context in the Americas, even as conditions in old country regions responded to reciprocal influence from the Americas. Major “old country” factors facilitating conversions in the new world included: enduring identifications of many as *pravoslavny* (“orthodox”/“Orthodox”), adherence to specific ritual practices, and the Russophile-Orthodoxophile movement.

5.2 “AGITATIONAL GRAVITATION FROM THE *KRAY*”

Prior to migration, experiences in Austria-Hungary facilitated later conversions in the Americas; “old country” influences also persisted after migrants left. Russophilism’s and Orthodoxophilism’s Galician and Subcarpathian origins preceded the age of mass transatlantic migration by a decade or two. Even once such migration commenced in the 1870s, the first Russky Orthodox movement among Greek Catholics in Galicia (the village of Hnylychky, ca. 1881-82), bore no apparent connection to transatlantic migration, an important reminder that the Americas, alone, did not account entirely for the East European conversions, even in movements due *primarily* to transatlantic migration. Furthermore, the same factors underlying those first Galician conversions “primed the pump” for conversions in the Americas. Migrant priests who identified with Russophilism in the *kray* sometimes affiliated as Russky Orthodox in the Americas, as did lay migrants exposed to Russophile and Orthodoxophile parish priests, literature, and religio-national societies, prior to migration. Commentators frequently singled out the Lemko region, for

example, as a Russophile stronghold and a kind factory, processing materials—Russophile migrants—necessary for the finishing stages of manufacture—conversion—in the Americas.

Pre-existing orientations affected the behaviors of migrant clerics—both conversion activists and Greek Catholic loyalists—in the Americas. Scholars have frequently posited Father Alexis Toth's 1890 United States conversion as a reaction against discrimination by Latin rite Bishop John Ireland of St. Paul, Minnesota: an interpretation supported by Father Toth's own conversion narrative. Yet Father Ivan Volansky, whose arrival to the United States preceded Father Toth's by five years, remained a Greek Catholic his entire life, despite encountering comparable prejudice not only from Bishop Ireland, but also Archbishop Patrick Ryan of Philadelphia, and even during his sojourn in Brazil. The major distinction between the two priests lies in their respective pre-existing orientations: by his conversion, Father Toth acted upon something he claimed he had long had in mind, namely an Orthodoxophile and Russophile predisposition, brought from the *kray*.⁴³²

Father Toth's own conversion contributed to tens and eventually hundreds of thousands more in the Americas and Eastern Europe, certainly by the 1930s; yet even Russophile priests choosing to remain Greek Catholic, even those remaining in the *kray*, facilitated conversions in both regions. Russophile priests in Galicia supported conversions in the Americas in several ways, as Kosta Kyrillo, a Greek Catholic priest in Monessen, Pennsylvania, informed audiences of Lviv's *Nyva* in 1910-11. First, their exhibition of Russophile-Orthodoxophile orientations in the *kray* lent moral support to activists abroad: "Our Moscophiles here [in America], knowing what is happening now in the *kray*—that Moscophile priests in the *kray* support such an aspiration [Orthodox conversion]—will with a light heart further recruit for their campaign [in America]."⁴³³ Activists in the Americas, therefore, could take heart that like-minded individuals in their region of origin supported their ideals.

⁴³² Konstantin Simon noted this point, too. He also cited Toth's "impetuousness" in the source of his conversion: Simon, "Alexis Toth and the Beginnings of the Orthodox Movement among the Ruthenians in America (1891)," 393.

⁴³³ Kyrillo, "Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi."

More significantly, Russophile clerical activism in the *kray* laid foundations for conversions among lay migrants, particularly those from Galicia's Lemko region:

It is a well-known fact that our Galicians from a parish in the old country, where the pastor is a Moscophile, without the least of scruples boast of their confession of Orthodoxy and, in America, go over sincerely to the Russian schism. In addition, it may be that all Lemkos here [in America] are enraptured with schism, and altogether they make up 12,000 men, as counted in the official Russian *shematism*. These are above all from the counties: Gorlice, Hryvivsk, Staro and Novo Sandetsk, Jaslo, and from around Brod, Stanisliv, and Kolom—there in those places, wherever Moscophile propaganda cloaks itself in a priestly robe.

Galicia's Greek Catholics thus learned that village priests had, by fostering Russophile-Orthodoxophile sympathies among migrating parishioners, fostered actual conversions in the Americas.

Greek Catholic loyalists claimed that Russophiles “prepared” migrants in the *kray* for conversion. Shortly after arriving to the United States in 1907, Greek Catholic Bishop Soter (Ortynsky) warned Bishop Konstantyn in Galicia that wherever people fell under the influence of a “Moscophile priest” in their village of origin, the people became “strongly imbued with schism,” and further, that, “Those that now are coming from the *kray* to America, and were under Moscophiles [in the *kray*] will become propagators of schism” in America.⁴³⁴ The conversions in America provided a “sign that the work of the Moscophiles in the *kray* is ruinous for the church and the people,” and that the Russophile movement threatened both America and the *kray*. He implored the Galician bishops to take action, “before it is too late.”⁴³⁵ A Russky Orthodox activist and defendant in the 1914 Lviv treason trial acknowledged the

⁴³⁴ It was worst, he added, “among Lemkos.” Bp. Soter Ortynsky, “Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, undated but received September 16, 1907,” in *ABGK*, syg. 444, 9-12. As he put it in another letter to Bishop Konstantyn a few months later, “Our people, prepared in the *kray* for schism, sincerely join it” in America. Bp. Soter Ortynsky, “Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, dated November 14, 1907,” in *ABGK*, syg. 444, 19-23. By “America,” he likely meant, at the very least, the United States and Canada. While the bishop could technically only operate in the United States, he also exhibited great concern for Canada's converting Greek Catholics. It is possible he had in mind South America (Brazil and/or Argentina), as well, where he originally intended to migrate as a missionary priest.

⁴³⁵ Ortynsky, “Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, undated but received September 16, 1907.” Another Greek Catholic loyalist wrote in similar fashion in Lviv's *Nyva*, saying, “We wonder at the clandestine fruits of propaganda [in the *kray*] in the apostasy of thousands of American emigrants from the Lemko region, the fruits of Moscophile parsons... We see that the Moscophile press already speaks shamelessly about their Orthodox sympathy and aspiration, and then not only among the intelligentsia, but—what is worse—among the uncritical masses of the people...” Fr. Gn., “Holos iz provintsy: v spravi pravoslavnykh zatyiy v Halychyni,” *Nyva* 7, no. 5 (March 1, 1910): 134.

importance of such preparation, saying, “Among conservative Lemkos, until now lives an old tradition of Orthodoxy, which is invigorated by massive emigration to America, where men encounter Orthodoxy.”⁴³⁶

Greek Catholics demonstrated the significance of old country factors to the conversions in the Americas by their opposition. One Greek Catholic urged combatting the “Pharisaic politics” which had infiltrated Galicia, “not waiting until Orthodoxy seizes the wide masses of the people—especially via the path of propaganda by Lemko-apostates, returning to the *kray*....”⁴³⁷ In other words, if left unchecked, Russophilism in Austria-Hungary would generate conversions in the Americas among migrants, poised to return and spread a mass movement in their region of origin. Bishop Soter also exhorted the old country bishops to undercut the foundations of conversion in the Americas by contesting Galicia’s Russophile movement.⁴³⁸ Similarly, Father Kyryllo of Monessen spoke of the “great desire” for more pointed and aggressive episcopal action in the Lemko region, for “[I, myself] not once, but twice, had the opportunity to talk with Lemkos here...and I became manifestly convinced that the agitational gravitation was already from the *kray*.⁴³⁹”

In one sense, Father Kyryllo’s evocative phrase—“agitational gravitation from the *kray*”—conveyed to his readers in Austria-Hungary the notion of “prepared” migrants “gravitating” to conversion in the Americas. Yet not only “gravity” to Russky Orthodox conversion, but also the “gravity” of transatlantic ties with Russophile priests in the *kray* exerted force upon converting migrants. “Agitational gravitation” existed not merely “in” the *kray* or, following migration, “in” the Americas, but also extended “from” the *kray*, across the Atlantic Ocean. Such “agitational gravitation” operated especially through written correspondence: “Lemko-region [Greek Catholic] priests themselves, with letters from the *kray* to their far-away parishioners [in America] support ‘the ancient, holy, Orthodox faith’ and

⁴³⁶ The activist was Semen Bendasiuk. *Przegląd Prawosławny*.

⁴³⁷ Gn., "Holos iz provintsy: v spravi pravoslavnykh zatyiy v Halychyni," 134.

⁴³⁸ Bp. Soter Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, undated but received October 24, 1908," in *ABGK*, 28, 30.

⁴³⁹ Kyryllo, "Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi," 465.

sincerely spit on ... ‘Ukrainian Catholicism’⁴⁴⁰ ... Here *irsissima verba*⁴⁴¹ of one Lemko: ‘Since I arrived, I have already received two letters, that the reverend [in the *kray*] wrote, [urging me] to flee with haste from [Greek Catholic Bishop Soter] Ortynsky.’ *Sapienti sat!*⁴⁴²”

For the benefit of *Nyva*’s Galician audience, Father Kyryllo supplied intelligence on the specific Galician villages, from which Greek Catholic priests promoted Russky Orthodox conversions among their migrant parishioners in the Americas:

People from [Sukovaty, Lisko county] say that their priest in Sukovaty praises Orthodoxy (that is, the Russian [*rossisky*] faith), tells them to maintain it, and even by letters to emigrants here encourages them to “Orthodoxy.” The true agents of schism are: [migrant laymen] Hnat Khortyk, Yurko Katyak from Sukovaty and Semen Rusyn, who brought a letter from his priest from the *kray*. And [I] read in it, regarding the Orthodox schism, that “This is our faith, the one faith of our fathers, the one suitable and pure for Galician Rusyns!”⁴⁴³

Other Greek Catholic loyalists issued similar accusations about such “agitational gravitation.”

Notwithstanding the Rusky-Ukrainophile proclivity to equate Russophilism with “schism,” many Russophile priests did remain Greek Catholic loyalists throughout their lives. When Lviv’s Rusky-Ukrainophile *Dilo* levied the same accusation—saying, “there is nothing strange...that [migrants in America] become Orthodox, because they respond: our pastor says nothing against it”—some Russophile Greek Catholics took umbrage.⁴⁴⁴ In his article explaining “the spread of Orthodoxy among our and American Lemkos,” published in Lviv’s Russophile Greek Catholic *Tserkovny Vostok*, an anonymous Greek Catholic priest averred that, “Not easily did my flock convert to Orthodoxy!” in Desloge, Bonne Terre, and St. Louis, Missouri.⁴⁴⁵ According to him, antagonisms with their new Rusky-Ukrainophile parish priest, who arrived in 1908, together with hostilities toward bishop Soter, forced migrant laborers

⁴⁴⁰ Father Kyryllo included scare quotes around “Ukrainian Catholicism” to indicate the way in which Russophile-Orthodoxophiles referred to Greek Catholicism, pejoratively; of course, Rusky-Ukrainophiles were increasingly using this as a term of self-identification, themselves.

⁴⁴¹ *Lat.*: “the very words”

⁴⁴² *Lat.*: “enough for the wise,” i.e., understandable to anyone with sense. Kyryllo, “Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi,” 465.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, 721.

⁴⁴⁴ Quoted in N.N., “Koe - Chto O Prychynakh Rasprostraneniya Pravoslavia v Nashem Narod v Ameriki,” 299.

⁴⁴⁵ It is possible that the author was Vlad Durkot of Mysczowa, whom the Greek Catholic priest in St. Louis personally accused to Bishop Konstantyn of Przemyśl of having encouraged his migrant parishioners to convert.

in those three U.S. localities to seek religious alternatives in the Russky Orthodox Church: his expatriate parishioners had written him numerous letters, asking whether it would be acceptable to confess to a Russky Orthodox priest.⁴⁴⁶ He responded in a letter explaining the supreme authority of the Pope and the separation of the Orthodox faith from the proper Greek Catholic faith. Additionally, he admonished them, saying “one can be a zealous Russky person and simultaneously an upstanding Catholic.” If his migrant parishioners absolutely could not tolerate the “Ukrainian” priests, then they ought to request a zealous (*tverdy*) Russky priest (i.e., a Russophile) from Metropolitan Sheptytsky of Lviv: under no circumstances were they to convert to Orthodoxy.⁴⁴⁷ “Am I such an agitator for Orthodoxy,” he asked rhetorically in conclusion, “such that I ‘myself convinced my parishioners to Orthodoxy!?’” “No!,” he stated emphatically. “We were and will remain Catholics!...”⁴⁴⁸ This case serves as an important reminder that Russophilism did not always lead directly to Orthodox conversion; yet, regardless of the objections of this apparently loyalist Greek Catholic Russophile, the fact remains that other members of his orientation did encourage their flocks to conversion in the Americas. Furthermore, the Russophile orientation fostered by this priest among his parishioners clearly paved the way for their conversion in the Americas, even if he personally advised against it, and even if it would not have happened without the antagonizing catalyst of Rusky-Ukrainophilism.

Beyond “preparing” (influences in the *kray* prior to migration) and “fostering” (transatlantic forces concurrent with migration), the old country facilitated conversions in the Americas in a third manner. Patterns of behavior and association in migration, themselves shaped by pre-migration experiences, have in turn determined the nature of migrant remittances to regions of origin.⁴⁴⁹ As reciprocal influences from the Americas began to alter the old country through correspondence and

⁴⁴⁶ Parishioner Ivan Hlad wrote on March 25, 1908, “I will abide by your pastoral response, whether we Greek Catholics may receive Great Confession from an Orthodox priest...If it is not permitted to go to him, then we will not confess.” Hnat Bakan wrote on April 10, 1908: “I ask, Father, to write me, whether I may go to that [Orthodox] priest to confession?” (The interpolation was the priest’s.)

⁴⁴⁷ They converted anyway, or at least attended the Russky Orthodox parish and confessed to the priest there. For more on the way in which these migrants understood their “conversion,” see [Chapter Four](#).

⁴⁴⁸ N.N., “Koe - Chto O Prychynakh Rasprostranenia Pravoslavia v Nashem Narod v Ameriki,” 292-301.

⁴⁴⁹ On this phenomenon, see: Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, “Social Remittances Revisited.”

remigration(s), migrants introduced new materials into the “curriculum” of the *kray*’s “preparatory school” for conversion. Once the Americas penetrated the old country, migrants departed having already encountered new world influences—having already begun adapting to regions of migratory destination.

Nyva’s Galician audience discovered that transatlantic support for Russophilism and Orthodoxophilism flowed two ways. Father Kyryllo reported that priests in the *kray*, who wrote to migrant parishioners to encourage conversion, requested remittances for their own causes: those priests, he said, “do not even fear to write to the schismatic [American migrant periodicals] *Pravda*, *Svit*, and *Postup*, with appeals for donations for the Moscophile *bursa* in Gorlice [Galicia].”⁴⁵⁰ Not only did migrants modify regions of migratory origin with donations *through* migrant publications, they remitted the publications, themselves. By 1901 at the latest, converted migrants returned to Subcarpathia with *Svit* and Father Alexis Toth’s pamphlet *Where to Seek the Truth*, published in the United States, which became the “bible” of the conversion movements in Subcarpathia. Migrants also disseminated other “American” Russophile-Orthodoxophile publications in Austria-Hungary.

In Galicia, where Bishop Soter had charged that Galicia’s Russophile priests were “preparing” migrants for schism, returning and corresponding migrants made their own contributions to the old country “preparatory school.” When, in a November 2, 1908 letter to Metropolitan Andrei (Sheptytsky) of Lviv, Bishop Soter contended that, “Almost all of those who come *from under Moscophiles* in Galicia go straight to the schismatic church” in America (emphasis mine), he referred to pre-migration exposure to Russophile-Orthodoxophile publications—but not those published in the *kray*. “Agents are in Galicia,” he explained, specifying, “There is *Postup*, a newspaper published in America by the schismatics and Obushkevich’s *Pravda* [also published in the United States], which comes to the aid of *Postup*.”⁴⁵¹ Thus,

⁴⁵⁰ Father Kyryllo identified those who signed their names in such requests as “Frs. ‘Vlad Y. Kaluzhnyatsky,’ ‘Y.N. Yorchakevych,’ ‘Y.T. Durkot,’ ‘Teod. Y Durkot,’ ‘sov. Kachmarchyk’ from Biltsarev, a writer to *Pravda*.” Additionally, he said, “Many other Lemko priests slander under pseudonyms, conducting agitation.”

⁴⁵¹ Ortynsky, “Letter to Met. Sheptytsky, dated November 2, 1908,” in Volodymyr Lvovych Ortynsky, *Vychodets z Drohobychynny Stefan-Soter Ortynsky - Pershyj Epyskop Ukrainskoi Diaspory v SHA* (L’viv2010), 69. Father Theophan Obushkevich, editor of *Pravda*, was a Greek Catholic priest in the United States who nevertheless facilitated many Russian Orthodox conversions there. He himself converted briefly in 1915.

“old country” Russophile influences consisted by now also of remitted Russophile publications from the Americas. (To complicate matters even further, those publications frequently contained Russophile-Orthodoxophile letters from individuals—both migrants and non-migrants—in the old country.)⁴⁵²

In 1911, a deacon reported that “very many newspapers from America” with anti-Greek Catholic orientations appeared in at least eight Galician villages of which he knew, specifically, “those from which the greatest number of people go out to America.”⁴⁵³ A Galician Lemko region parish priest reported that in his village, “almost every parishioner reads *Pravda* and *Postup*.”⁴⁵⁴ In Subcarpathia, too, publications from the United States became problematic enough for the Hungarian government to order their confiscation.

The case of migrants from the Galician village of Dolishnii Luzhok attests to the dynamic interplay of “old country,” “new world,” and “new-world-in-the-old-country” catalysts for conversion. On September 29, 1908, Father Simeon Chyzowych, Dolishnii Luzhok’s parish priest, wrote to the bishop of Przemyśl, while abroad on sabbatical in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.⁴⁵⁵ There, the sojourning priest discovered that many of his migrant parishioners “attended the schismatic church and received the Holy Sacrament.”⁴⁵⁶ Father Chyzowych blamed pro-Russky Orthodox literature circulating in Dolishnii Luzhok, including the Galician-published *Russkoye Slovo*, the *Pochaiv Lystok* from the Russian Empire, and also *Svit*, published in the United States. *Svit*, which he “held in his own hands” before departing

⁴⁵² These publications arrived to Austro-Hungarian villages, both as migrants sent them to family and friends, and through actual subscription.

⁴⁵³ Sprawozdanie grekokatolickiego dziekana w Strzeliskach ks. Stefana Donarowicza, Borynicze (March 22, 1911), *RGIA*, fond 821, op. 150, d. 671, p. 223-223v, quoted in Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*, 555-56. The villages were: Strzeliska Stara, Strzeliska Nova, Knisieles, Leszczynie, Podkamienu, Bienkowcach, Dulibach, and Rusatycz.

⁴⁵⁴ Fr. Orest Martynowych, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (March 15, 1911), syg. 4931, 548-549, 556. The village was Wysowa.

⁴⁵⁵ Fr. Simeon Chyzowych, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (September 29, 1908), syg. 4929, 142-150. Dolishnii Luzhok lay just south of Sambir. Father Chyzowych, who arrived to the United States in Spring of 1908, was brother-in-law to Bishop Soter, who, like many of Father Chyzowych’s parishioners from Galicia, made his residence in Philadelphia. Rev. Ivan Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916* (forthcoming), chapter four.

⁴⁵⁶ Chyzowych, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," 142.

Dolishnii Luzhok for Philadelphia, criticized Greek Catholic clergy and “encouraged people to schism.”⁴⁵⁷

Together, Russophile-Orthodoxophile Greek Catholic priests in the *kray* and the United States also fostered Dolishnii Luzhok’s migrant conversions. In Dolishnii Luzhok’s reading room, three priests from nearby villages had advised withdrawing support Father Chyzowych, for as one allegedly told his audience, “You are Orthodox.”⁴⁵⁸ Afterward, one villager, Ivan Fetsorychk, became a leading proponent for Orthodoxy. Although Fetsorychk made a pilgrimage to Russia, “such a man” could *fully* express these inclinations upon migrating to America, “the land of liberty where one is free to say and write as he wishes,” and where “Galician agents” of the Russky Orthodox church advanced old country Russophilism to its logical conclusion. After also blaming the Russian government’s material assistance to the Russky Orthodox mission in North America, Father Chyzowych concluded, “The situation of the Greek Catholic church in America is so disagreeable, because the people are almost prepared to come to America to schism [*do Ameryky do schyzmy*], adding to that freedom, a sinful life, and the work of Galician agents, like the now converted...editor in America of *Pravda*, a public adherent of ‘Orthodoxy’ ...”⁴⁵⁹

In summary, as the case of Dolishnii Luzhok demonstrates, migrants initially left regions which prepared them for conversion in the Americas. Individuals in the *kray*, especially Russophile Greek Catholic priests, fostered those conversions with transatlantic “agitational gravitation from the *kray*.” Migrants in the Americas then remitted supplemental conversion catalysts to their regions of origin, which interacted with existing old country factors to prepare new migrant waves for conversion in the Americas. Finally, as migrants left a region changed (and still changing) by influences from the

⁴⁵⁷ This means that *Svit* had begun to arrive in Galician villages by spring of 1908, though it likely appeared earlier, too. The American migrant publication had begun to arrive in Subcarpathia, specifically Becherov, by 1901. *Pochaiv Lystok* came to Dolishnii Luzhok via the villager Philemon Fedyn. Father Chyzowych claimed that he had explained the difference between Greek Catholicism and “schism” to Fedyn several times, but to no avail.

⁴⁵⁸ Father Chyrpansky, Father Skobelsky of Prus, and Father Teodor Krushynsky of Stupnyts.

⁴⁵⁹ The editor and convert to whom he referred was Victor Hladyk, who promoted conversions in both the Americas and Austria-Hungary.

Americas, they arrived to Americas changed (and still changing) due to old country factors. There, they contributed to the next stages in this dialectic process.

5.3 THE INTERSTICES OF MIGRATION: “THEY GO WITHOUT CONTROL”

Migration afforded individuals certain freedoms facilitating their conversions, including freedoms arising from the interstices of migration, as well as from unique conditions prevailing in the Americas. Before turning in the next section to the more liberal political and religious circumstances that migrants discovered in the Americas, this section considers how migration, itself, provided important preconditions for conversion. Departing migrants often (though not always) evaded close oversight of their community and its leaders. Whereas varying pressures at the community, parish, church hierarchical, regional, and imperial governmental levels obstructed conversions in Austro-Hungarian regions, migration could permit expressions of Russky Orthodox affinities with little or no repercussions.⁴⁶⁰ With migration came both geographic and ideological distance from forces, which traditionally maintained Greek Catholic loyalties.

Migration afforded freedom from oversight, not only in migration, but also upon return to native regions, especially for individuals undertaking multiple remigrations. For instance, just as attendance at a Russky Orthodox parish in the Americas could sometimes free migrants from economic obligations to a Greek Catholic one, remigrants could avoid payments to Greek Catholic parishes in native villages, as well. In 1909, Teodor Lebischak, a Dolishnii Luzhok migrant accused of Russky Orthodox affiliation in

⁴⁶⁰ While this study has emphasized preexisting *pravoslavny* (“orthodox”) and Russophile orientations in migrant conversions, such views did not hold the majority in every village of origin. Even in villages with majority support for such identifications, the priest did not in all cases support those identifications—this ideological dissonance between pastors and their parishioners sometimes occurred, for instance, when a Russky-Ukrainophile replaced a Russophile parson.

Philadelphia, aroused further suspicion following his return, due to a lack of support for his native village's parish. He explained himself, saying,

I was in America thirteen months. I went in America to the schismatic church, but only out of curiosity, in order to gain an impression of the difference in rite and to investigate for myself.... I didn't perform any religious practices myself in the schismatic church. I was sometimes in the schismatic church, but because others went, but not in order that I went there alone. I will confess my religious practices in the Greek Catholic Church in America [during a future migration], and I did not practice here [in Dolishnii Luzhok], out of the necessity that, making a bed here for a short time—for one month—I did not generally go pay monetary donations to the church treasurer, and as I am going out to America again, I thus gave to my parish priest [there].⁴⁶¹

Regardless of the truth, a multiple migrant could conceal Russky Orthodox conversion and lack of Greek Catholic contributions, anywhere: exigencies of transatlantic migration posed formidable challenges to anyone wishing to confirm his testimony.⁴⁶² Migrants inclined to conversion could thus avoid obligations to a Greek Catholic church in both native and adoptive regions.

Migrants could capitalize upon the interstices of migration to avoid other parochial obligations. Father Volodymyr Herasymovych's 1911 article, "A Proposal for Church Control Over our Emigration to America," published in Lviv's *Nyva*, attributed the conversions to "lack of control" over migrants.⁴⁶³ Speaking as a village priest, he complained, "We cannot control where and when our parishioners emigrate," as "agents" for the shipping companies ("especially Jews") convinced prospective migrants to avoid their priests, whom, they said, collaborated with the "*pans*" ("the masters") to "keep the people in the *kray*, so as to have cheap workers."⁴⁶⁴ Given these challenges to pastoral oversight, individuals who went and returned as they pleased lacked adequate preparation for and supervision over their migration.

⁴⁶¹ "Protocols with Teodor Lebischak, Ivan Fedorychuk, Teodor Tatarsky, and Philemon Fedyn," syg. 4929, 151-157.

⁴⁶² Formidable, but hardly impossible: Lebischak had come to the attention of Bishop Konstantyn of Przemyśl because Lebischak had been found out by his own parish priest in Dolishnii Luzhok, Father Simeon Chyzowych, who had taken a sabbatical to Philadelphia to assist his brother-in-law, Bishop Soter.

⁴⁶³ Fr. Volodymyr Herasymovych, "Proekt Tserkovny Kontrol nad Nasheyu Emigratsiyeyu do Ameryky," *Nyva* 8, no. 22 (1911): 676-88. The Galician hierarchs' March 31, 1910 pastoral letter regarding migrants and Russky Orthodox conversions immediately occasioned Father Herasymovych's proposal. The bishops had called for greater pastoral attention to their flock before their migration to the Americas and after their return. Father Herasymovych claimed that he had also raised this proposal at the August 24, 1911 at the Novo Selo deanery meeting in Supranivka. (ibid., 678.) The publication of the proposal in *Nyva* sparked an international debate between several priests over exactly who was to blame—the "old country" or "new world" clergy—in the defections to the Russky Orthodox Church.

⁴⁶⁴ He served the parish in Terpylivka.

Among other negative outcomes, migrants failed to maintain proper metrical records. They neither provided proper records from their native parish upon arrival to a new parish in the Americas, nor did they bring records from their adoptive parish home with them upon returning to the *kray*.⁴⁶⁵

Father Herasymovych related a story about two of his parishioners who migrated “to America” for work and to marry against their parents’ wishes.⁴⁶⁶ No one heard any news of them until, “after two years appeared in the parish office two ‘*dzhentelmen*’: he in elegant clothes, a small collar *a la* Roosevelt, a polka dot tie, leather shoes and she in a fashionable dress.” The priest narrated the conversation, peppered with English phrases (identified in italics), conducted with the husband:

“Glory to Jesus Christ!”

“Glory forever!”

“Reverend, do you not remember us? We are the same ones that, two years ago, our parents would not allow to marry. I went first to America,” says the *dzhentlman*. “I sent her a steam liner ticket, and afterward she came and we got married in New York.”

“And do you have the metrical record of your wedding?” I ask.

“Yes!” the gentleman responds, pulling the testimony of his marriage from his pocket, performed by a priest in New York.

“And we had a child, begging your Reverence, now five months old, named Peter.”

“And do you have the metrical record of his baptism?”

“No!, because we had him baptized in a second place, in Northampton, Pa, and we are coming now from Scranton.”

“And what will you do, when he grows up to be a young boy?” [I.e., How will you confirm his baptism so that he can legitimately partake of the sacrament of communion.⁴⁶⁷]

“Not at all, begging your Reverence, we are returning back after a month or so, because it is impossible to live here. The old people are cross that we married and no one wants to ‘recommend’ us, and we have nothing to do here. We are going to

⁴⁶⁵ Herasymovych, "Proekt Tserkovny Kontrol nad Nasheyu Emigratsiyeyu do Ameryky," 676.

⁴⁶⁶ Father Herasymovych reported that on December 31, 1910, that of 953 total souls in Terpylivka, 124 were not present: 103 were in America and 21 in Prussia. In the filial parish of Klymkivtsi, of 430 total souls, 43 were not present: 37 in America, 5 in Prussia, and 2 in the military service. The priest found it interesting that, among the 103 who had emigrated from Terpylivka, twenty-seven had not provided an address and no one “even from their closest family” knew their location in America, because they had not bothered to write. He complained that this undermined his ability to provide complete statistics. This lends support to a caveat, which this study has earlier articulated: not all migrants lived transnational lives. Still, the locations of 76 of the 103 were known. Ibid., 677.

⁴⁶⁷ The practice of “first communion” developed within Greek Catholicism following the Unia agreements. Traditionally a Roman Catholic practice, it is not found within Eastern Orthodox churches, in which infants receive communion at the time of their baptism. Interestingly, some former Greek Catholic churches which have become Orthodox in the twentieth century have substituted the practice of “first confession,” which is more in line with Orthodox canons, for “first communion.”

Northampton, Pa., and there we will set ourselves to work. Well, the metrical record of our [son] Petrusya is there, and everything will be *all right*.”⁴⁶⁸

The liminality of migration posed great danger: lacking the mechanisms of control—metrical records and pastoral oversight—migrants fell precipitously into depravity. Young men, for example, left wives behind to work in America, where inadequate recordkeeping permitted second, illicit marriages. “What can be the benefit,” Father Herasymovych asked:

if those emigrants ... wander about, to America and then back to their own village. I have such parishioners, that already three and four times have gone and returned back. The worst happens with the girls and young boys. ...Usually they write in the beginning, that they are very well, either that they have work in a cigarette factory or in a textile factory, but afterward no one writes, until someone from there comes and says that so-and-so “Marynka has come to nothing” or that she “lives out of wedlock with some Jew,” and so forth. Such then are the benefits from our emigration... because they go without control, without any papers...⁴⁶⁹

Not all migrants abroad evaded the oversight of their parish priests and the Greek Catholic hierarchy, but those who did could attend Russky Orthodox parishes without reprisal in the *kray*. In fact, many who affiliated as Russky Orthodox in the Americas simply rejoined their native Greek Catholic parishes upon their return, with none the wiser. The interstices of migration therefore offered freedoms conducive to conversions; as the next section details, relatively greater political and religious freedoms in regions of migratory destination contributed to further conversions.

5.4 THE FREE LAND OF WASHINGTON

Officially Catholic, Austria-Hungary technically tolerated both Orthodoxy and religious conversion within the demographically multi-religious empire: the Serbian Orthodox Church existed legally, for example, and Bukovina represented an Orthodox stronghold. Governmental reprisals in the

⁴⁶⁸ Herasymovych, “Proekt Tserkovny Kontrol nad Nasheyu Emigratsiyeyu do Ameryky,” 676.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid: 667. As a solution, the priest advocated distributing a “Religious Legitimation Booklet,” in which migrants could record religious and sacramental practices while in migration.

1880s toward converts in Hnylychky, Galicia demonstrated, however, that the empire would oppose conversion from Greek Catholicism to the specifically Russky/Russian iteration of Orthodoxy in Galicia and Subcarpathia, with force if necessary; in fact, the government would oppose conversion to any iteration of Orthodoxy (even Serbian) among Greek Catholics, for Russia would ultimately coopt such conversions for political aims.⁴⁷⁰ Migrants discovered another set of circumstances in the Americas. Protestantism constituted the majority religious form in the United States, as well as in most of the Canadian regions to which Greek Catholic migrants arrived; Catholicism enjoyed dominance in Brazil, Argentina, and in parts of Canada. While degrees of religious pluralism differed across these regions, in none could one religion claim official establishment. Converting migrants thus encountered minimal state-sponsored resistance to their religious choices in “free America”—a term applied by Greek Catholic loyalists and Russky Orthodox converts alike to all of the Americas as an explanation for the conversions—and particularly in the United States, the “free land of Washington.”⁴⁷¹

In 1908, an author in Lviv’s *Nyva* argued the relevance of the emigration question to every Greek Catholic priest, given the defection of “almost two-thirds” of the faithful from the United States Catholic Church: “What is the cause of this loss? Above all, complete personal freedom. Each is free to recognize the faith which one regards as most suitable to oneself or even to create one’s own faith. North America is a land without a confession.”⁴⁷² In 1912, another Greek Catholic loyalist wrote to *Nyva* from the United States saying that migrants came “to a country, about which each American says with pride: ‘free country’ (*phri kuntri – vilny kray*).” The “worst elements” of “our emigrants,” he said, took the “limitless

⁴⁷⁰ Even when, around the turn of the century in Hungarian Subcarpathia, potential converts among Greek Catholics directed their appeals to the Serbian Orthodox Church, the government suppressed the conversions, for fear that the solicitors would eventually demand incorporation into the Russky Orthodox Church.

⁴⁷¹ This notwithstanding the religious nativism directed toward both Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox converts which, together with “racial” discrimination and violence, partially discredited the myth of “free America.”

⁴⁷² L., “Lehkovazhena kvestiya,” 292-93. For another article emphasizing great religious diversity in the United States, see “Vidnosyny tserkovni v Spoluchenykh Derzhavakh,” *Nyva* 9, no. 8-9 (April 15, 1912): 281-82.

freedom” of the United States to mean “anarchy” (*svavolya*) or “free to all,” and became the primary authorities in religious matters: “Free with God? Then free also without God.”⁴⁷³

“American freedom” did not, in and of itself, cause the conversions. Religious liberties afforded multiple confessional options, and migrants could join a number of religious traditions, or none at all. Indeed, large numbers of Greek Catholics became Latin rite Catholics or Protestants in the Americas. That so many affiliated as Russky Orthodox, however, suggests that “freedom” meant, for many migrants, free expression of pre-existing orientations toward Russky Orthodox Christianity.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷³ Sendetsky, "Pro tserkovni vidnosyny v Amerytsi," 162-63. Parenthetical additions in the original: this article frequently included the English word (in Latin letters and in Cyrillic transliteration) together with the translation. On “de facto congregationalism,” the tendency of immigrant communities to adopt characteristic forms of American congregationalism, see Stephen R. Warner, "Introduction: Immigration and Religious Communities in the United States," in *Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration*, ed. Stephen R. Warner and Judith G. Wittner (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), 3-34; Stephen R. Warner, "Work in Progress Toward a New Paradigm for the Sociological Study of Religion in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology* 98(1993); Stephen R. Warner, "Religion and New (Post-1965) Immigrants: Some Principles Drawn from Field Research," *American Studies* 41(2000); "Structural Adaptations to the Immigrant Context," in *Religion and the New Immigrants: Continuities and Adaptations in Immigrant Congregations 2000*, ed. Helen Rose Fuchs Ebaugh and Janet Saltzman Chafetz (2000), 49-70; F. Yang and Helen Rose Ebaugh, "Transformations in New Immigrant Religions and their Global Implications," *American Sociol. Review* 66(2001): 270; C.L. Bankston and M. Zhou, "De Facto Congregationalism and Socioeconomic Mobility in Laotian and Vietnamese Immigrant Communities: a Study of Religious Institutions and Economic Change," *Review of Religious Research* 41(2000): 453–70. Scholars identify the characteristics of congregationalism as: (1) a formal list of members who elect; (2) local governing body of lay members w/policy-making authority; (3) committees to do work of the institution; (4) clergy selected by the local organization; (5) collection of most operating funds from own local members. Sendetsky described each of these factors in detail in his 1912 article. For a useful summary of the literature on congregationalism, see: Cadge and Ecklund, "Immigration and Religion," 361-63. For a critique of the concept of “de facto congregationalism,” based upon a recognition of religious organizational heterogeneity in the United States, see Wendy Cadge, "De Facto Congregationalism and the Religious Organizations of Post-1965 Immigrants to the United States: A Revised Approach," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 76, no. 2 (2008): 344-74. Russky Orthodox partisans spoke similarly of the abandonment of faith due to such freedom. Father Alexis Toth, complained, “Our people who came to America, oppressed in their home in Hungary, got full liberty here, which they understood poorly, and they explained to themselves that they, as free people, do not have any responsibilities even toward God!....” Father Alexis Toth, “From the History of the Church and Parish in Minneapolis,” in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 2, 77. For his part, the Greek Catholic loyalist, Father Sendetsky went on to describe not atheism, but rather characteristic features of a “congregation” (he used the English term) and American congregationalism, insofar as these led to greater independence and one of the underlying conditions of conversion. Sendetsky, "Pro tserkovni vidnosyny v Amerytsi," 162-63.

⁴⁷⁴ This was true for clerics and migrants alike. On March 7, 1912 Father Teofil Pryty of the parish of Duliby, Galicia made the complaint to the deanery council of Vyspa that Russophilism among fellow Greek Catholic clerics was responsible for burgeoning conversion movements in Galicia. To support his contention that “whoever is a Russophile must also spread Orthodoxy and himself be also a schismophile,” he pointed to the “natural” extension of the Russophile orientation, when left to run its course unhindered: “Proof of this can even be found among Russophile priests, chiefly in free America, like Father Krohmalny [an open convert from Galicia] and others.” Father Teofil Pryty, "Nebezpeka pravoslavnoy propagandy i yak iy protyvdylaty: Referat o. Teofilya Pryty

Ironically, an indicator of the role of “American freedom” in the conversions appeared in mutual accusations, between Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox, that the other party undermined that freedom. Many Russky Orthodox partisans understood their conversions in “American Rus” (“Rus” in the Americas) as the free expression of desires, which various “old world” oppressors—the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Austria-Hungary, Poles, Hungarians, Ukrainians, the Pope, the Jesuits, the “Uniate” hierarchy—had prevented in their “subjugated” region of origin: “Rus-under-the-yoke” (*pidyarmy Rus*).⁴⁷⁵ In this schema, Greek Catholic loyalists attempted to extend the old country yoke(s) over migrants in “free America.” Thus, while conversion manifested the American freedoms, which counter-conversion efforts contravened. Father John (Ivan) Krohmalny, a convert priest (originally from Galicia, then of Canada and finally the United States) captured this idea in an April 1910 pamphlet, published originally in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. It is worth quoting at length, as an article in *Nyva* did in 1910:

It has been over 330 years since our enemies the Poles, with their Jesuits and priests, tried to tear us from our ancient, true Orthodox Church and lead us to *Unia* with Rome. It is true that Pope Clement VIII signed an agreement, that our church was to remain as it was—that is, the Orthodox way—but subsequent popes broke this diabolical agreement completely and did not honor our rights in Rome. They then tried to introduce Latin inventions into our Orthodox rite, and by betrayal and cunning converted our Russian nationality to the Latin faith. The current Pope Pius X intended to completely convert our Russian nationality into the Latin faith, and to that end he sent to us, to America, the papal bootlicker hierarch Bishop Soter [Ortynsky], and with him the cursed [papal] bull [*Ea Semper*], in which it was stated, that the bishop is sent here for the Rusky nationality.⁴⁷⁶ In response to this, the bishop from Daulia [i.e., Bishop Soter] began to summon to America his faithful “Catholics.”⁴⁷⁷ Observing that our people began to stand up against [being called Rusky/Ruthenian in the papal bull], [Bishop Soter] began to call himself, without any right, a Greek Catholic... What kind of Greek catholic bishop is he, when ...for a miter and *omophor*,⁴⁷⁸ he came here [to America from the *kray*] in order to sell out the Russian nationality? What kind of a bishop is he, who does not have the right to ordain married male priests, and his priest is not free to chrismate children?

Brother Russians! By that bull, the Roman pope prevents our priests from rightfully baptizing our children according to our Orthodox rite and constrains us to

parokha Dulib, vidchtany no soborchyku dekanalnim v Vyspi 7/3 1912," *Nyva* 9, no. 17-18, 19-20 (October 1, 1912; November 1, 1912): 585.

⁴⁷⁵ As opposed to Russia: “state Rus” (*derzhavny Rus*).

⁴⁷⁶ The word used in the *Ea Semper* bull was “Ruthenian.”

⁴⁷⁷ I.e., priests faithful to the *Unia*.

⁴⁷⁸ I.e., a bishop’s vestments.

baptize our children according to the Latin Rite...Besides that, we have to change our Russian calendar and we have to observe our holidays jointly with the Latin ones. In a word, the insatiable Italian pope tramples our Russian rights and forces us to become damnable Latins. And why do we sleep? Why do we put our neck in chains? Why must we bend on our knees to our damnable enemies, the Poles? Why must we slander the faith of our ancestors—the Orthodox faith—and scorn it? That faith, which St. Volodymyr received in Kyiv from the Greeks, is our Orthodox faith.⁴⁷⁹ It is our Russian faith, and because we remain until this time Russians, we decidedly do not preserve the Uniate faith (Unia with Rome), but the Russian faith. Do we not know that the Uniate faith is the same one as the Latin faith, only with the Greek Rite?! Do we not know that the Uniate faith is a wolf in sheep skins, and is the corrupt bridge transferring Russians to Latins? No! No!⁴⁸⁰

Having argued that these enemies—the pope, the Jesuits, Latin rite Catholics in general, the Poles, the Magyars (Hungarians), the first Greek Catholic bishop in the Americas, and the United States’ Irish Catholic hierarchy⁴⁸¹—merely transplanted old country yokes in the new world, this migrant priest issue a rousing appeal to take advantage of American freedoms: “We were in the old country oppressed by Jesuits, Magyars, and Poles. Why would we here in America, in the free land of Washington, be stripped naked of our national right by Irish bishops and their bootlicker here, Soter M (Ortynsky)? For what reason are we stripped naked from our free right, for which our predecessors rotted in chains!”⁴⁸²

For Russophile-Orthodoxophiles, remigration from “free America” to “Rus-under-the-yoke” only highlighted the degree to which “Russky” people remained subject under Austro-Hungarian rule. When Father Alexis Toth commented upon the 1901 return of converts from his former Minneapolis parish to their native village of Becherov (Subcarpathia, Hungary), he reported to his migrant audience that the

⁴⁷⁹ St. Volodymyr/Vladimir was the Prince of Kiev, credited with having baptized Rus and its people in the Orthodox faith in 988 CE.

⁴⁸⁰ Kyryllo, "Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi," 605-07.

⁴⁸¹ When he was addressing migrant audiences in Canada, he likely would have identified the “French” Catholic hierarchy as the source of the yoke; had he ever gone to Argentina or Brazil, he would have singled out the “Brazilian” or “Argentine” Latin Catholics. Over a decade earlier, Father Alexis Toth used similar rhetoric to decry submission to the “foreign” yoke of the Irish-identifying Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United States: “We have here an Orthodox Russian Bishop, there is an orderly Russian diocese, the Word of our Lord is given here as it was taught by the Holy People to our great grandparents... Therefore why do we need something foreign? Why do we have to suffer disorder, disagreements, laziness, arguing, and tyranny? LET’S GO ON THE ROAD OF BRIGHT AND GOOD ENLIGHTENING ACTIVITY, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF OUR OWN BISHOP—OF OUR OWN NATION, AND NOT UNDER THE IRISH KSENDZES!...” (Father Alexis Toth, “The Imposter,” in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 3, 73. Emphasis in the original.)

⁴⁸² Kyryllo, "Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi," 605-07.

gendarmes suppressed them under “the Hungarian yoke and oppression.”⁴⁸³ The same sentiments were discernible among Austrian Galicia’s migrants. During the 1912 visit of British Slavophile William Birkbeck to Galicia’s Lemko region, he met “some fifteen” peasants who had “been in America and could talk English.” As Birkbeck recounted,

A fine young man, over six feet in height, and with long yellow moustache and blue eyes, who had been mining in Pennsylvania, told me that he had come back to help his father on his farm, but that, on his father's death, he intended to return to America, as it was a country where he was allowed to practise [*sic.*] his own religion, and where he could read and teach his children his own language without interference by the police.⁴⁸⁴

On the other hand, Greek Catholic loyalists, too, argued that *their* opponents, Russky Orthodox activists, deceived migrant converts into squandering the liberties of “free America,” through voluntary obedience to another locus of “foreign” domination: an oppressive, tsarist Russian Empire and the Holy Synod. As one Greek Catholic loyalist admonished in 1895, “On account of Orthodoxy, will Rusky workers submit their neck to a heavy yoke in the free American land without need? Think!”⁴⁸⁵ Greek Catholic presses in the United States like *Svoboda* and *Amerikansky Russky Viestnik* often described repressions of religious minorities in Russia, especially Chelm’s Greek Catholics. A favorite motif was the naïve convert migrant who, making a second-stage migration to Russia from the Americas, became disillusioned upon discovering deplorable living conditions even for Russia’s Orthodox believers. In an 1895 parody of the Russky Orthodox version of the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, *Svoboda* presented the tenets, which “our Rusyns, who are converting to tsarodoxy in America, must believe and renounce.”⁴⁸⁶ To the question “Do you believe and confess that each Russian [*rosiysky*] Orthodox does

⁴⁸³ Father Alexis Toth, “Fear Has Big Eyes,” in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 61. For the full quotation, see [Chapter Six](#).

⁴⁸⁴ Birkbeck, “Religious Persecution in Galicia (Austrian Poland),” 15-16. Birkbeck did not specify the native village of these fifteen remigrants, except to say that he encountered them twenty miles east of the village of Grab (and that they did not come from Grab). The language question here centered around the conflict between the Lemko region dialect (closer to Russian) and the dialect used by Rusky-Ukrainophiles.

⁴⁸⁵ “My Pobidyly,” *Svoboda* May 8, 1895, 2.

⁴⁸⁶ “V Scho Viryty a Choho Vidrikatsya Mayut Nasy Rusyny Perekhodyachy na Tsaroslaviye v Amerytsi,” *Svoboda* May 22, 1895, 3. The councils of Nicea (324 CE) and Constantinople (386 CE) formulated the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, also called the “Symbol of the Faith,” at a time when the Western and Eastern parts of Christianity remained united. The Western church’s later (ca. 6th-11th centuries) unilateral addition to the creed of the *filioque* clause, which stated that the Holy Spirit proceeded not only from the Father (as stated in version

not have his own will, but is cattle, which must submit to the tsar's knout?"⁴⁸⁷ a caricatured converted migrant replied dutifully, "I believe and I confess."⁴⁸⁸ Thus, in their derision toward each other for

produced in 386) but also "from the son" became a major issue of contention precipitating the Great Schism between the Western (Roman Catholic) and Eastern (Orthodox) churches. The *Svoboda* article parodied the Russky Orthodox Church's rejection of the *filioque* clause in the following way: "*Question*: Do you renounce... that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son? *Answer*: I do renounce it. / *Question*: And do you believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the Moscow censor? I believe and I confess" (*ibid.*).

⁴⁸⁷ A lash used in Russia. Not only Greek Catholic loyalists, but nativists in the Americas employed these accusations of total submission to the tsar. Those nativists argued on this basis that the "Russian" Orthodox Church represented a fundamentally anti-assimilatory institution. More independent-minded proponents of the use of American freedom to cast off foreign yokes argued that autocratic forces on either side of the Orthodox-Catholic divide undermined the ideals of American freedom. In 1902, for instance, Father Michael Ardan, a soon-to-be-excommunicated Greek Catholic priest and leader of an Independent movement, argued, "The tsarodox yoke is no better than the Roman yoke.... We [just] want to be Christians, and we believe that we can be so without the oversight of either the Popes or the Synod." "Skazhim Sobi Pravdu v Ochy!," *Svoboda* February 17, 1902, 3.

⁴⁸⁸ For their part, Russky Orthodox partisans like Father Toth defended fidelity to the tsar. In 1892, a number of Greek Catholic priests apparently reported to the United States government that those who had converted from Greek Catholicism to the Russky Orthodox Church were praying for the tsar of Russia. Father Toth portrayed these accusations as evidence of the failure of the accusers to adapt to the freedoms of their region of migratory origin: "Those poor devils thought that our American Republic is a police state like Hungary, that the Russian tsar is pictured here as the same kind of a monster as he is pictured in Hungary!..." Father Alexis Toth, "The Publication of Ruthenian Church Books," in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 68. Elsewhere, he wrote in a similar vein that "they forget, that they are not in Austria but that they live on free American soil, and that here with such fears there cannot be put 'fear to the *Liakhs*' and that nobody can be proven committing '*hochverrat*.'" Father Alexis Toth, "From the History of the Orthodox Church in Wilkes-Barre," in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 1, 82. "Liakh" is a pejorative for "Poles." "Hochverrat" is German for "high treason." In his defense of prayers for the tsar, Father Toth wrote explained that "The Russian tsar (emperor) is a Russian, and not 'Moscow's' tsar;; his title is 'Sovereign' and Emperor (Caesar) of 'All-Russia'; which means of all the Russians on this planet... Each true Russian—even if he is not the tsar's citizen, every person, who has even one drop of Slavic blood—has to pray for his health and for his royal house, because the Russians and the Slavs have in the Russian tsar their only protector on this planet. He is not any kind of head of a church, as the Pope is. He does not give orders how and what people should believe." Father Alexis Toth, "Where to Seek the Truth," in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 3, 28. Accordingly, he found fears of praying for the tsar "very funny," saying "But for whom do people expect that the Russian people would pray, if not for their own sovereign? Maybe they should pray for the Chinese Bogd Khan, the Hungarian king, or the president of the Andorran republic?" Father Alexis Toth, "The Publication of Ruthenian Church Books," in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 68. Father Toth argued further that the prayers of Russky Orthodox converts for the Tsar were no different than prayers of Anglicans for the Queen of England on the occasion of her 60th Jubilee: "He who knows the liberal establishment of the great and glorious Republic of the 'United States' and knows its history, would never come to the conclusion, that the citizens of that Republic licked somebody's shoes or that they wish again to be subjects of the English crown!" Now that "all Anglo-Episcopal churches" were filled and praying for the Queen, "to the mind of no one of the Americans comes the idea to accuse our Episcopalian citizens of treason, and *hochverrat*!" Yet Greek Catholic loyalists insisted on denouncing Russky Orthodox converts as traitors. "Isn't it disgraceful," he chastised, "Isn't it shameful? Well! Let's assume that it was not possible to [pray for the tsar] in the homeland... but who prohibits doing so here on our free unrestricted land... on the land of the American eagle!... Oh, no!" Father Alexis Toth, "The Jubilee of the English Queen and our Brother Uniates!" in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 1, 77-78. Father Toth elided the fact that during the American revolutionary period, Anglicans had come under suspicion for alleged loyalties to the English monarchy

alleged submission to foreign yokes, Greek Catholic loyalists and Russky Orthodox partisans alike agreed that “free America”—religious and political liberties prevailing in the Americas—facilitated conversions.

5.5 RITES OF DISCORD: LATIN RITE-EASTERN RITE HOSTILITIES

Scholars have probably most often cited the hostility of Latin rite Catholics toward Greek (Byzantine rite) Catholics as a catalyst for Russky Orthodox conversions in the Americas;⁴⁸⁹ more seldom have they situated pervading Latin Rite/Greek Rite tensions throughout all the Americas within a transnational framework of interacting old country and new world dynamics. Latin rite antipathies toward Greek Catholics emerged in global Catholicism and Vatican policy, as well as among local hierarchies in Galicia, Subcarpathia, the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina, based variously upon: perceptions of the inferiority of the Byzantine Rite to the Latin, desires for global and regional Catholic unity, and fears of the Byzantine Rite’s inherent susceptibility to Orthodox conversion. Ironically, the actions of Latin rite policy makers promoted conversions in several respects.

Noted most frequently in the existing historiography, Latin rite enmity produced one of the Russky Orthodox movement’s most vociferous activists, Father Alexis Toth: Latin rite transgressions against “our ancestral faith” formed a consistent theme in his subsequent missionary activity and that of other conversion activists. Secondly, defensive Greek Catholic reactions against perceived Latin rite offenses fostered more broadly anti-Catholic sentiments. Thirdly, the prohibition of characteristically Greek Catholic ritual forms could mean that, in some respects, Russky Orthodox parishes preserved cherished traditions more successfully than did Greek Catholic parishes. Fourthly, lay migrants who independently established their own churches balked at efforts of Latin rite hierarchs to secure those

⁴⁸⁹ On this point in the United States conversions, see Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 103. Practically every history of the conversions has mentioned Latin rite hostilities.

properties in the name of canon law. Fifthly, opposition to married clergy exacerbated a sense of “trampled” historic rights, and more importantly produced serious clerical labor shortages. Finally, resistance to the establishment of distinctive administrative units, headed by their own Greek Catholic bishops, left Greek Catholicism in the Americas largely disorganized, headless, and ill-equipped to stage a systematic counterattack to the Russky Orthodox threat.

In 1902, representatives of an independent Greek Catholic (though not Russky Orthodox) movement in the United States attributed Latin rite enmity primarily to Rome: “Some cast blame for our persecution exclusively on the Poles,” they said. “This might be true perhaps in Galicia, but not in America [i.e., the Americas].” In the United States, it was “not Poles, but Irish” who did not “recognize our rights.” In France, it was also “not Poles, but French Catholics who would like to rule over our Rusyns.” Again, in Brazil, it was “not Poles, but Brazilians” who dominated Catholicism and restricted even celibate Basilian Greek Catholics.⁴⁹⁰ Together, these cases demonstrated that “Rome will not suffer Greek Catholics, whether in Galicia, Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria, Asia, South or North America.”⁴⁹¹

From the advent of the Unia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Byzantine rite churches remained marginal and subordinated within global Roman Catholicism, despite officially enjoying equality. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the Vatican promoted Greek Catholicism’s assimilation with Western Catholicism’s Latin rite features.⁴⁹² Clerical celibacy represented a major flashpoint for this aspiration, particularly in the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina, where

⁴⁹⁰ "Zyizd Ruskykh Svyaschennykov y Delegatov Ruskykh Tserkovnykh Hromad v Harysburgu, Pa.," *Svoboda* April 3, 1902; April 10, 1902; April 17, 1902.

⁴⁹¹ "Skazhim Sobi Pravdu v Ochy!"

⁴⁹² As with the Byzantine Rite, employed by Greek Catholics, the “Latin Rite” refers not only to the language of the liturgy (Latin), but also to other characteristic liturgical, theological, and disciplinary elements. The most important of these features, for the purposes of relations with Greek Catholics included: the use of the Latin language, clerical celibacy, the Gregorian calendar, baptism only (without chrismation), and communion “in one kind” (the administration of bread without wine). Other relevant “Latinisms” which at one time or another became an issue for Greek Catholics included, but were not limited to: the use of confessionals (as opposed to face-to-face confession), the absence of iconostases (icon screens), devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, recitation of the Rosary, and the preference for Western art forms over Byzantine ones.

Vatican decrees eventually mandated clerical celibacy for Greek Catholics as early as 1890.⁴⁹³ The disdain of local hierarchies for married clergy helped prompt those decrees; yet, the Americas allowed the Vatican to immediately implement a policy it hoped to enact elsewhere in the Catholic world.

Within the framework of Vatican antipathies toward Greek Catholicism, regional Latin-Byzantine hostilities emerged in Austria-Hungary and the Americas. Greek Catholics quarreled with, in Subcarpathia, Hungarian-identifying Latin rite Catholics, and in Galicia, the Polish-identifying Latin Rite.⁴⁹⁴ The latter conflict produced a marked impact in the Americas. First, anti-Polish and anti-Latin Catholicism manifested as more generically anti-Catholic sentiments among migrants. Secondly, Greek Catholics clashed with Polish-identifying Catholic migrants in the Americas. Lastly, a Polish-identifying Catholic held the prefecture of the Vatican's Congregation for Sacred Propaganda of the Faith.

In 1912, Father Ivan Sendetsky, a migrant Greek Catholic priest living in the United States, explained to his counterparts in his native Galicia that anti-Latin *cum* anti-Catholic antipathies in the old country facilitated conversion in the Americas. Referencing migrants' lack of religious education, he asked further, "But even if they had the means, and all of them were taught the need for creed and salvation, was the appropriate emphasis placed upon the essence of Catholicism?" Proceeding tactfully,

⁴⁹³ At the First Vatican Council (1869-70), a commission urged the promotion of celibacy among Eastern Catholic churches, and a number of ensuing regional synods, over the course of the next several decades, promoted and, in a few cases, even mandated clerical celibacy. In its final resolution, the Lviv Provincial Synod of 1891, for example, supported celibacy as the preferred clerical status. Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: the Greek Catholic Church and Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900*, 101-21. Representatives of the Vatican supported the statement, while most Greek Catholics in Galicia did not.

⁴⁹⁴ By the late-nineteenth century, "the Poles" and "Polish Catholics" represented a group clearly "other," in the perspective of Galicia's Greek Catholics. For Rusky-Ukrainophile Greek Catholics, "Polish Catholics" were clearly the enemy; Russophiles, on the other hand, may have struck up an alliance with them, but they still regarded them as clearly distinct from themselves. It was through "Poles" which Galician Greek Catholics most frequently encountered Latin rite antipathies toward Greek Catholicism. In Subcarpathia, the situation was somewhat different. There, the majority of Greek Catholic clerics had, by the time period of the current study, adopted a Magyarophile orientation and even identified themselves simply as Magyars. An entire diocese—that of Hajdúdorog—had in fact formed to accommodate Hungarian-speaking Greek Catholics. Paul Robert Magoesi, "Greek Catholic Eparchy of Hajdúdorog," in Magoesi and Pop, *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*. Although Latin Catholics in Hungary certainly looked down upon their Greek Catholic counterparts, the pro-Hungarian orientation of most of the Subcarpathian Greek Catholic clergy served to mitigate hostilities between themselves and Hungarian-identifying Latin rite Catholics (at the same time that it led to greater hostilities between the non-Magyar-identifying Greek Catholic masses and their clergy).

he allowed that if priests in the *kray* had failed to accentuate the “essence of Catholicism,” they—or, rather, the transnational “we,” which Father Sendetsky posited—had certainly not done so intentionally; rather, out of “most high confirmation in loyalty to our own Catholic faith,” had Greek Catholic clerics battled “Latin-dom,” [*latynstvo*] and the “the shamelessness of the [Polish] Latin clergy in collecting Rusky souls [i.e., the conversion of a number of Greek Catholics to the Latin Rite].” Further, he explained that “In Galicia, we were completely and utterly secure” from the danger of Russky Orthodox conversion; but while Greek Catholic apologists “simultaneously and with equal strength struck at schism,” was it possible, he asked, that zealous resistance to Latin Catholic encroachments upon Greek Catholic domains pushed the faithful toward Russky Orthodox conversion, once they arrived in the Americas?⁴⁹⁵

Transatlantic migration hardly curtailed the Greek Catholic-Polish Catholic antagonisms sometimes fostering Russky Orthodox conversion. Not only did Greek Catholics in migration contribute transnationally to the debates in Austria-Hungary, they clashed also with Polish-identifying migrant communities in the Americas. The first to solicit a Greek Catholic priest from the old country charged the local Polish-identifying priest (in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania) with suppressing their heritage; once Father Ivan Volansky arrived, Father Joseph A. Lenarkiewicz refused him the use of his parish for services and denounced him from the pulpit.⁴⁹⁶ Priests like Father Lenarkiewicz also fostered anti-Greek Catholic attitudes among Latin rite hierarchs in the Americas.⁴⁹⁷ From Parana, Brazil, a correspondent to *Svoboda* claimed that “the Poles” had been telling the “Rusky” people that “There will never be Rusky literature or Rusky priests here; only Polish ones will come here.”⁴⁹⁸ Another blamed “intrigues from the side of several Polish priests (*kSENDZES*)” for the opposition of the Latin rite bishop of Curitiba to the arrival of

⁴⁹⁵ Sendetsky, “Pro tserkovni vidnosyny v Amerytsi,” 160-61.

⁴⁹⁶ Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954*, 40-41.

⁴⁹⁷ On Polish-identifying priests acting as informants to the Latin rite hierarchy in the United States, see: Simon, “The First Years of Ruthenian Church Life in America,” 195. Such priests were losing parishioners to new Greek Catholic parishes.

⁴⁹⁸ Teodor Pototskyi, “Dopys z Brazyluii,” *Svoboda* November 5, 1896, 2. Another correspondent wrote, “The Poles are building a New Poland in Parana. This is a wonderful thing, but leave Rusyns in peace.” “Visti z Brazyluii,” *Svoboda* April 21, 1898, 2.

Greek Catholic priests.⁴⁹⁹ In Argentina, too, Greek Catholic migrants accused their first pastor, a Polish-identifying priest, of “Latinizing” and opposing appeals for a priest of their own.⁵⁰⁰

Finally, “Poles” became a thorn in the side of Greek Catholics at the Vatican level. From 1892 to 1902, a Polish-identifying cardinal from the German Empire held the prefecture of Sacred Propaganda, which oversaw Catholic hierarchies in the Americas. While Cardinal Mieczysław Ledochowski did approve the arrival of Basilian missionaries to Canada and Brazil, he more often worked against Greek Catholic interests. In 1900, concerns over Russky Orthodox conversions prompted Canadian Latin rite hierarchs to invite Greek Catholic Metropolitan Andrei (Sheptytsky) of Lviv to visit his migrant faithful. Sacred Propaganda blocked the visit, however, because, as a contemporary put it, “Cardinal Ledochowski, as all other representatives of the Polish aristocracy, is not friendly to Ruthenians.”⁵⁰¹

Adding to regional Latin rite conflicts, transplanted from the old country (particularly those with Polish-identifiers), new regional Latin rite hierarchies in the Americas also undermined the Greek Catholic cause, and likely contributed to Russky Orthodox conversions. Regional varieties of Catholicism dominant in the Americas developed as migrants from varying regions of origin established and maintained their respective Catholic traditions. While initially English- and French-identifying Catholics dominated the Catholic hierarchy in the United States, migration from Ireland beginning in the 1830s and 1840s, and anew after 1865, resulted in the dominance of Irish-identifying hierarchs by the late-nineteenth century.⁵⁰² In Canada, where migrants from England outstripped migrants from France, Anglo-French duality prevailed, both in Canadian society and in the Catholic Church. Still, it was

⁴⁹⁹ R-skyi, "Sravi Brazylskykh Rusynov," 2.

⁵⁰⁰ Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*, 25.

⁵⁰¹ Bohdan Kazymyra, "Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyckyj and the Ukrainians in Canada," *Canadian Catholic Historical Association Report* 24(1957): 79-80. This characterization was Abbot Dom Greas', according to Archbishop Langevin of Winnipeg.

⁵⁰² According to Olson, “Under that ethnic influence, Irish clerics stamped American Catholicism in an Irish-Catholic mold: a sense of strict authoritarian obedience and discipline; weekly observance of confession and communion; social isolation from the surrounding Protestant society; a militant feeling of ethnoreligious pride; strong suspicions of sexuality and equally strong feelings of guilt; celebrations of celibacy, self-denial, and moral virtue; an emphasis on daily prayer and devotions; and an attitude of reverent respect for and loyalty to the clergy.” James Stuart Olson, *Catholic Immigrants in America* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1987), 29.

primarily the French-identifying hierarchy with which Greek Catholics most often interacted. Beginning in the sixteenth century, migrants from Portugal and Spain who colonized Brazil and Argentina, respectively, brought the forms of Catholicism unique to each Iberian region of origin. Common modes of engaging Greek Catholics prevailed across all of the different “American” Catholicism’s: an insistence upon celibate clergy, for instance. But local Latin rite hierarchical interaction with Greek Catholics varied by region, as well as according to episcopal personalities. The position of those hierarchies vis-à-vis other religions and the state constituted an especially important factor.

In the United States, the “Americanization” of Catholicism promoted negative attitudes toward Greek Catholics.⁵⁰³ Eager to demonstrate Catholicism’s compatibility with United States society and unify a diverse constituency from multiple migratory regions, some Catholic hierarchs adopted aggressive policies to accelerate Catholicism’s assimilation.⁵⁰⁴ In addition to ethnonational distinctions which Americanizing bishops saw in migrants like “Poles” and “Italians,” Greek Catholics celebrated a wholly different rite, officiated by a scandalizing married clergy. Anti-Greek Catholic sentiments among Americanizing Latin rite hierarchs factored not only in Father Alexis Toth’s conversion narrative, but also directly affected the Greek Catholic rank-and-file, especially in terms of ritual practice. At the direction of Archbishop Patrick Ryan of Philadelphia, Latin rite priests refused to bury Greek Catholics or permit Father Ivan Volansky to celebrate funerals.⁵⁰⁵ Prior to his conversion, Father Toth notified his bishop in Prešov that Greek Catholics avoided Latin rite clerics—“especially Irish”—and attended Russky Orthodox parishes partly because of the lack of chrismation and communion in both kinds.

⁵⁰³ In a predominantly Protestant society, Roman Catholicism had long defended itself from accusations of un- and anti-Americanism. The age of mass migration, beginning especially in the 1880s, and comprised largely of Catholics, exacerbated anti-Catholic sentiments. The American Protective Association, for example, a nativist organization formed in 1887, championed the un-American-ness of Catholicism. David Harry Bennett, *The Party of Fear: From Nativist Movements to the New Right in American history*, 2nd Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). Responses of Catholic hierarchs to Greek Catholics in the United States, which heated up in the late 1880s and early 1890s, must be read in light of the Cahensley controversy of the 1890s, in which the United States hierarchs resisted the requests of German-identifying partisans for the establishment of national churches.

⁵⁰⁴ For example, Bishop John Ireland of St. Paul, Minnesota and James Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore, Maryland.

⁵⁰⁵ Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954*, 40-42.

Greek Catholic loyalists blamed hierarchical- and parish-level Latin rite hostilities for conversions to the Russky Orthodox Church. As reported to Lviv's *Nyva*, an unnamed priest's experience in the United States revealed that Latin rite projections of a conversion-prone Eastern Rite contributed ironically to the realization of that fear.⁵⁰⁶ When the priest suggested to the Apostolic Delegate in the United States that "Rusyns" must have their own rite and bishop to counter "Russian" Orthodox encroachments, the latter responded, "I believe that your people are generous, but you Rusyns ought already to have understood that not only must there be one faith, but also one rite. As long as among you Rusyns is sung '*Hospody pomyluy*,'⁵⁰⁷ you will still stink of schism." As related in the article, he concluded, with apparent insensitivity and wanton disregard for the danger of Russky Orthodox conversions, "We know that many of you Rusyns will drown in schism, but we are still able to draw many to ourselves—that is, pull them to the Latin Rite—as many as will turn to us."⁵⁰⁸

In Canada (outside Quebec) French-identifying Catholics, like their Irish-identifying counterparts to the South, adopted a defensive posture, even a "siege mentality," toward increasingly more numerous, mostly Anglo-identifying Protestants. Archbishop Langevin of Winnipeg, "perhaps the last French-Canadian churchman to dream of a 'Catholic Empire' in the west," oversaw Catholicism in Canada's western regions, where most Greek Catholic migrants settled. Like much of Canadian society, he

⁵⁰⁶ He did so second-hand, through commentator Father Ioann Joseph Melnytsky.

⁵⁰⁷ "Lord have mercy"—the oft-repeated phrase in both the Catholic and Orthodox Byzantine rite.

⁵⁰⁸ Melnytsky, "De sydyt skhizma?," 103-06. He explained that, during an earlier encounter with a Latin rite hierarch in the United States (in which he introduced himself "as a priest, a Rusyn, and a Greek Catholic"), the bishop produced a letter from the Vatican's *Congregation de propaganda fide*, which, in the words of the incredulous priest, marginalized the rights of Greek Catholics "in America" by subordinating them to the Latin rite hierarchy. Thus concluded the unnamed migrant priest's story, as related by Father Ioann Joseph Melnytsky. While many Greek Catholics acknowledged the danger of similarity in rite for the *temny* masses, as opposed to the educated clergy and intelligentsia, this hierarchical Latin rite Catholic in America made no such distinction; educated or not, all Greek Catholics stunk alike of schism. In order to explain the matter further in his commentary on the American story, Father Melnytsky appealed to an analogy, which he presumed his audience in Austro-Hungary would easily understand: "When these Latins look on our separateness, the same idea comes into their heads as we Christians have, when we observe the conversion to Christianity of a Jew, who after baptism still did not give up his Jewish manners and customs. At that time we say thus: Whether a Jew is unbaptized or baptized, however, he always smells like a Jew. Thus, when Latins observe our separateness, we appear to them not as sincere Catholics, only as crypto-schismatics. . . . something in between schism and Catholicism. . . [or] half-schismatics." In this way, then, did Father Melnytsky liken (his own "people's") anti-Semitism to anti-Greek Catholic prejudice among Latin rite Catholics.

maintained a pecking order of migrants suitable for the prairies: French-Canadians, French-speakers from Europe, then migrants from Ireland and England, then those from Germany, Poland, and Hungary. Greek Catholics were least desirable, not only due to low status in Austria-Hungary, but also due to their Byzantine Rite. Perceiving them simultaneously as allies in his fight to defend Catholic rights and as a challenge to his authority, he sought to Latinize Greek Catholics “prudently and gradually” and obstructed the arrival of Greek Catholic priests and the appointment of a bishop.⁵⁰⁹

The status of Catholicism vis-à-vis broader Brazilian and Argentine society differed markedly from the United States and Canada. In both South American countries, the entrenched hierarchy consisted of native born descendants of migrants from Spain and Portugal. As the majority religion in both countries, Catholicism eluded the Protestant domination of North America. Nevertheless, the Church’s hold on Brazilian and Argentine society waned, even as Greek Catholic migrants arrived at the end of the nineteenth century. Catholicism no longer enjoyed official establishment in Brazil after 1889, and while the Argentine government continued to provide official support, there too the Church’s influence declined. Catholic bishops hoped to consolidate control over their constituencies in Brazil and Argentina, where, just as in North America, migration produced an increasingly diversified constituency. As in North America, that goal marginalized Greek Catholic interests. In 1897, the U.S. publication, *Svoboda*, reported that the “Brazilian” Latin rite bishop of Curitiba compelled Brazil’s first Greek Catholic priest to return to the *kray*, orchestrated the transference of the second to Rio Claro from Prudentopolis, and resisted even a celibate Greek Catholic Basilian.⁵¹⁰ As a correspondent wrote, “The

⁵⁰⁹ In the prairies, the percentage of French-speaking Catholics decreased between 1871 and 1911 from roughly 50% to 17%. In the Western part of Canada, French-speaking bishops dominated the hierarchy, while in the East, English-speaking bishops, primarily from Ireland, dominated. Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 163-69; 82-83. Fathers Domaskyn Polivka, Nestor Dmytriw, and Paul Tymkiewich although celibate Basilian priestmonks, all ran afoul of Archbishop Langevin. According to Martynowych, “Only the emergence of popular opposition in the United States and Canada, which threatened to destroy the allegiance of Ukrainians to the Catholic church, forced Langevin to modify his attitude to the Eastern rite and its clergy.” *Ibid.*, 185.

⁵¹⁰ Father Antony Mykhalevych was the first, Father Nikon Rozdolsky the second. Apparently, the justification for Father Mykhalevych’s dismissal was his lack of a mandate from the Metropolitan of Lviv, Sylvester (Sembratovych). The Basilian Father Sylvester Kyzma even arrived with an order from Cardinal Ledokhovsky of Sacred Propaganada. “Novynky,” *Svoboda* January 21, 1897, 3; “Zvisty z Brazillii,” *Svoboda* May 27, 1897, 1.

matter of the Rusky church in Brazil is still not decided. The Latin bishop in Curitiba did not want to accept the appointment of priests of the Greek Rite; he did not want to recognize that rite.”⁵¹¹

In sum, when Greek Catholics arrived to the Americas, they identified their primary hierarchical interlocutors in the United States as “the Irish,” in Canada as “the French,” in Brazil as “Brazilian,” and in Argentina as “Argentinian.” Each hierarchy exhibited idiosyncratic prerogatives, responsive to their respective societies; all coincided, however, in the goal of unifying Catholicism in their own region. Irish-identifying hierarchs promoted monolithically “Hibernian” form of Catholicism in the United States, just as other hierarchs promoted distinctively French, Brazilian, or Argentinian Catholicism elsewhere in the Americas. In all regions, Greek Catholics threatened that unity, not only by speaking a different language, but also by celebrating a different rite and featuring married clergy. Latin rite responses to that threat included restricting certain Greek Catholic practices, barring married Greek Catholic clergy, and obstructing the establishment of Greek Catholic bishoprics. These measures rendered Greek Catholicism even more susceptible to Rusky Orthodox defections.

One of the more disastrous effects included the shortage of priests. Given that only a small minority of Greek Catholic clerics remained celibate, potential priests to serve migrants in the Americas could only be drawn from a small pool, without raising the ire of Latin rite ordinaries there. Greek Catholics feared, with justification, that the scarcity of capable clerical leadership would result in Rusky Orthodox conversions. Following the Vatican’s October 1, 1890 decree mandating clerical celibacy in the United States and Sacred Propaganda’s early 1891 request that Galicia’s and Subcarpathia’s Greek Catholic bishops recall married and widowed priests from the United States, the Subcarpathian bishops protested, saying the common layperson could not distinguish a Greek Catholic priest from a Rusky Orthodox one. Ironically, they noted, it was the inability—or unwillingness—of Latin rite priests to make this distinction that fostered the very discrimination against the Greek Rite, which paradoxically opened

This article speculated that it was, as “Moscophile” newspapers (e.g., *Halychanyn*) had reported, he was without priesthood. Father Mykhalevych came from Buchach, along with other Greek Catholic migrants. Elsewhere, *Svoboda* speculated that he had done so “chasing after rubles.” See: “Novynky,” *Svoboda* October 15, 1896, 3.

⁵¹¹ R-skyi, “Sravi Brazylsyykh Rusynov.”

the gates to schism. As evidence, they charged that Sacred Propaganda had compelled Greek Catholic migrants in Liverpool, England to join the Latin Rite by obstructing attempts to assign a Greek Catholic priests there.⁵¹²

Within only a few months of this warning did Father Toth and the Minneapolis Greek Catholic parish join the Russky Orthodox Church, and by 1892, Greek Catholic priests in the United States protested to Sacred Propaganda that, if they were forced to leave the United States, *all* the people would convert to Orthodoxy.⁵¹³ Once the mass conversions were well underway, on April 20, 1893, the new Subcarpathian bishop of Mukachevo, Iulii Firtsak, wrote to Archbishop Michael Corrigan of New York, saying, “Our people are abandoned like sheep without a shepherd. What will be the consequences of this deplorable state of things, but many will fall into schism [Orthodoxy] or Protestantism.”⁵¹⁴ Soon enough, others were complaining of the role of Latin rite hostilities, especially toward other migrants.

Without shepherds, migrants in Canada also “fell into schism.” The first Greek Catholic cleric to minister in Canada, the Basilian Damaskyn Polivka (arrived October 21, 1899) quickly left his temporary residence following run-ins with Archbishop Langevin of Winnipeg.⁵¹⁵ On October 12, 1900, Father Polivka informed Bishop Konstantyn of Przemyśl of the antagonism of the “French” bishop: in particular, his impediment of the construction of a Greek Catholic church.⁵¹⁶ In November or December, Father Polivka, now the rector of a Greek Catholic church in Northampton, Pennsylvania, wrote again to his Galician bishop. From his new post, he continued missionizing north of the border among Canada’s communities by helping them to construct a chapel.⁵¹⁷ “The most important thing,” he said, “was that [Langevin] did not already say to register the property to him,” for in such cases, “all the people convert to Orthodoxy!” He attributed decline in Canada’s Greek Catholic communities to “lack of means,” great

⁵¹² Simon, "The First Years of Ruthenian Church Life in America," 216-17.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, 227. As the fears of these Greek Catholic bishops and priests increasingly manifested themselves in escalating conversion movements, Propaganda Fide relented slightly: it maintained its ban on the arrival of new married priest, but temporarily rescinded the recall of those already in the United States.

⁵¹⁴ AANY, G-3, Firtsak to Corrigan, April 20, 1893. (cited in Kaszczak, 61)

⁵¹⁵ Kazymyra, "Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyckyj and the Ukrainians in Canada," 81.

⁵¹⁶ Fr. Damaskyn Polivka, "Letter to Bishop Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (October 12, 1900).

⁵¹⁷ Fr. Damaskyn Polivka, "Letter to Bishop Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (November or December 1900).

distances between migrant communities, Latin vs. Greek Catholic episcopal jurisdictional issues, and most importantly, lack of priests. Father Polivka advised the dispatch of other celibate Basilians, “because no other could endure here, except for people who do not have any families or personal obligations...” He worried about a rumor, however, that Sacred Propaganda had issued an outright ban on “Rusky” priests (i.e., Greek Catholic ones) in Canada, regardless of marital status. “If it were so,” he said, “then the Rusky people would in one day be Orthodox!” If it were true, the Galician bishops would have to protest, while strengthening their jurisdictional ties with the communities in the Americas.⁵¹⁸

Greek Catholics in Brazil also connected a lack of priests to Russky Orthodox conversions. The bishop of Curitiba’s obstructionism toward Greek Catholic priests prompted a correspondent to *Svoboda* to demand swift and decisive action from Rome, rather than the current policy of “*widzi mi sie*”—in Polish, “let us see.”⁵¹⁹ As the author argued from Brazil to *Svoboda*’s international audience, “This is demanded not only in the interest of Rusyns, but also for the Catholic Church, because if they would not wish to give Rusky-Catholic priests to Brazilian Rusyns, then Russian [*rossysky*] Orthodoxy will only take advantage of that.” What the bishop of Curitiba and his “Polish counselors” simply did not understand was that, in the absence of Greek Catholic priests, the Russky Orthodox church would immediately draw from its readily available funds to build grand churches and assign their own priests among “Rusky” communities: in this eventuality, “twenty thousand Rusyns of Parana would be lost for the Catholic church.”⁵²⁰

In Argentina, a similar story unfolded, when migrants appealed to their Galician hierarchs for a Greek Catholic priest to staff the chapels they had begun building in 1903, in Las Tunas, and shortly afterward in Tres Capones. None came. They wrote again in August of 1906, complaining that they were forced to attend the Latin rite parish and listen to sermons in Polish. They asked whether a priest would

⁵¹⁸ Ibid.

⁵¹⁹ In Polish: not insignificantly, given that Greek Catholics blamed “Poles” for many of their woes in the Americas.

⁵²⁰ R-skyi, “Sravi Brazylsyykh Rusynov,” 2.

be sent, or in lieu of that, if they would be “permitted to join another rite or even Orthodoxy.”⁵²¹ Soon enough, through the combined influence of cradle and convert Orthodox migrants from Bukovina and the United States (via Subcarpathia) the Galicians joined Russky Orthodox church with its own priest. In 1909, Lviv’s *Nyva* blamed one culprit for the Argentine movements: “The Russian consul in Brazil in his referendum about Argentinian emigration publicized that 2,000 Galician Rusyn migrants went over to Orthodoxy. The cause of conversion has to be the great lack of our priests!”⁵²²

Beyond the shortage of priests, Latin rite obstructionism delayed the appointment of Greek Catholic apostolic visitators and bishops and the establishment of a Greek Catholic hierarchy in the Americas: persisting institutional disorganization rendered Greek Catholicism susceptible to Russky Orthodox conversions and ill-equipped to sustain an effective, systematic counter-offensive. Latin rite Catholics who desired the assimilation of the Greek Rite into existing Latin rite structures believed that disorganization would expedite that process. Thanks to the opposition of the regional Latin rite hierarchy and Propaganda Fide, it was not until 1902 that the United States received an apostolic visitator, and the first bishop arrived only in 1907—even then, he had only limited authority.⁵²³ Canada would wait another five years, until 1912, for a bishop, and Greek Catholics in Brazil and Argentina received nary a visitator nor bishop during the period under consideration.

As early as August 19, 1892, the bishop of Mukachevo wrote to Propaganda Fide, saying that delaying the appointment of an apostolic visitator to the United States would produce the “horrendous scandal of apostasy” to schism. On November 30, 1892, Metropolitan Sylvester (Sembratovych) weighed in on the matter. Having only recently presided over the 1891 Lviv Synod—which in part responded to the conversions in the Galician village of Hnylychky and pro-Orthodox sentiments among the clergy and

⁵²¹ Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukrainy u Lvovi, fond 201, opys 4b, sprava 1531, quoted in Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*, 25-26.

⁵²² "Z amerykanskoyi Rusy," *Nyva* 6, no. 23 (December 1, 1909): 812-13.

⁵²³ An apostolic visitator (or visitor) represents the Vatican in a short-term canonical visitation, with the mandate to investigate and report on conditions of religious relevance in the designated region.

faithful in Galicia, the metropolitan now turned his attention to forestalling similar movements in the Americas. He urged Propaganda Fide to appoint a vicar.⁵²⁴ Again on February 28, 1893, the Subcarpathian bishops Valyi and Firtsak wrote Propaganda Fide to call for a bishop and, provisionally, a visitor. Citing the Wilkes-Barre conversions associated with Father Toth, they likened delay in the matter to the excessive debate in the Roman senate, which precipitated the fall of Saguntum to Hannibal in 219-218 BCE.⁵²⁵ As conversions continued to escalate by the turn of the twentieth century, Greek Catholics continued to make similar appeals: a 1902 *Svoboda* article implored the Vatican, "Have mercy on American Rus" by sending a bishop "to halt the exodus to the Russky Orthodox Church."⁵²⁶

In sum, Greek Catholic loyalists accurately identified as a source of conversion a lack of priests and prelates, caused by the obstructionism of local Latin rite hierarchies in the Americas, backed by the Vatican's Propaganda Fide. One of the chief propagators of the conversions, Father Alexis Toth, converted in response to Latin rite hostilities. More broadly, Greek Catholic loyalists not only engaged in rear-guard skirmishes with Latin rite Catholics that diverted their energies away from the fight against Russky Orthodox conversion, they also fought that battle short-staffed and headless. Latin rite hostility to Greek Catholics as "crypto-schismatics" proved a self-fulfilling prophesy. As one Greek Catholic priest charged, the Latin rite prejudice that Greek Catholic/Russky Orthodox ritual proximity led to the conversions resulted, ironically, in a "Latin-provoked schism"⁵²⁷

5.6 THE RUSSKY ORTHODOX MISSION AND "ROLLING RUBLES"

If Latin rite hostilities repelled Greek Catholic migrants toward Russky Orthodox conversion, the influence of the Russian Empire, through its government, Holy Synod, *uberprocurator* (the secular head

⁵²⁴ Simon, "The First Years of Ruthenian Church Life in America," 219-20.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, 225.

⁵²⁶ "Zmylutesia nad amerykanskoiu Ruseiu," *Svoboda* December 11, 1902.

⁵²⁷ Melnytsky, "De sydyt skhizma?," 103-04.

of the Holy Synod), and private organizations and individuals, proved an attracting force for conversion in the Americas. This section details how parties in Russia, including the government, initially became involved in the conversions in the Americas; secondly, it analyzes how economic support from within the Russian Empire may have fostered conversion.

The study has suggested previously that the initiative of Greek Catholics, themselves, first alerted the Russky Orthodox Mission, the Holy Synod, and other interested civilian and governmental parties in Russia to the potential for conversions among migrants.⁵²⁸ It is likely, however, that some of those parties possessed some sense of this potential, even before Father Toth dispatched John Mlinar to San Francisco in December 1890 to inquire about the conversion of the Minneapolis parish. In a March 1889 article in St. Petersburg's *Russky Vestnik*, the infamous Father Ioann Naumovych (of the 1881-82 conversions in Hnylychky, Galicia) championed the essential, Russky Orthodox character of Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholic migrants to the United States.⁵²⁹ According to Naumovych, "around 14,000" migrants had gone there from Galicia, many of whom remigrated, even multiple times. "There are families," he said, "from which four of its men are located in America. There are Lemkos, who were there already around five times." All of these Galicians, claimed Naumovych, "preserve the faith of their fathers," which, he claimed, was Russky Orthodox, and not Greek Catholic.⁵³⁰ Letters arrived to him from Lemko region migrants now in the United States, which he claimed attested that, although migrants were "summoning priests to themselves from Galicia," (i.e., Greek Catholic ones), "it is clear that the people are undoubtedly Russky and Orthodox."⁵³¹

⁵²⁸ Indeed, many Orthodox partisans have made this point, in an attempt to emphasize the pre-existing inclinations of converts, over against the aggressive activities of the Russky Orthodox Mission.

⁵²⁹ Ioann Naumovych, "Pysmo Otsa Naumovycha y Chervonorussi," *Russky Vestnik* 201, no. 4 (March 1889): 257-70. I am unaware of any secondary literature which has referenced this striking article. It is the closest link (that is, not a direct, causal one, and after the fact) which I have been able to make between the Hnylychky conversions and transatlantic migration. Naumovych had by this time served his sentence following the treason trial and migrated to Russia.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*, 262. Presumably he referred to the enduring identifications among the Lemko regions ostensible Greek Catholics as "*pravoslavny*" (orthodox/Orthodox).

⁵³¹ Naumovych did not indicate whether he received such letters when he was still a Greek Catholic priest in Galicia (whether before or after the Hnylychky incident), or a now Russky Orthodox one in Russia.

Naumovych hoped to convince his audience, primarily readers in the Russian Empire, to provide land in Russia at a fair for these “Russky Orthodox” migrants, whom Austria-Hungary spuriously designated as “Greek Catholics.” He mentioned a “Lemko” from the village of Hladisha, Gorlice county, who, having sojourned twice in America, migrated yet again to Kyiv, Russian Empire, hoping to buy land, but without success. Naumovych claimed to have received many such letters about resettlement in Russia and that “Lemkos, going to America and establishing a colony there, do not willingly remain there, and *do not abandon their land*” in regions of origin. Rather, following their migration, those “Russky” people were “tied to their Russky land more than ever.”⁵³² He argued, therefore, for the establishment of banks to facilitate the purchase of plots in their “Russky land,” by which he meant the Russian Empire, rather than the “Russky land” under Austro-Hungarian rule. Reprimanding those in Russia who “will not accept them,” saying “clearly the Galicians are Uniates,” Naumovych referred to the role of Galicians in the liquidation of Greek Catholicism in Russia: “A terrible impression! And who brings Orthodoxy to the Chelm eparchy?”⁵³³

Thus, in this remarkable March 1889 article, the man who facilitated the first nineteenth-century Greek-Catholic-to-Russky-Orthodox conversion movement in Austria-Hungary now alerted readers in the Russian Empire to the potential for conversions also among Greek Catholic migrants in the Americas. And while, toward this end, he advised resettlement in the Russian Empire, it is entirely possible that Russia’s policy-makers foresaw advantages in a different course: promoting conversions among migrants who, at the time of remigration—or perhaps one of *five* remigrations (!)—would spread the movement in native Galician and Subcarpathian villages. One who likely drew this conclusion was Konstantin Pobedonostsev, *uberprocurator* of the Holy Synod and Tsar Alexander III’s closest advisor: a man wielding enormous influence in Russia’s domestic policies, as well as in the Russky Orthodox Church abroad. Pobedonostsev subsidized Father Naumovych’s activism for conversions among Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics: in 1882, he sent 2,000 rubles to Father Naumovych during the Hnylychky

⁵³² Naumovych, “Pysmo Otsa Naumovycha y Chervonorussi,” 263. Emphasis in original.

⁵³³ *Ibid.*, 264.

incident and, in 1893, requested another 1,000 from Russia's minister of finance. When, in 1884, Father Naumovych wrote Pobedonostsev informing him of the "despairing wail of the Russian population of Galicia over their inescapable plight in the struggle with the Polish administration to whom they were given over by Austria," Pobedonostsev forwarded the letter to Tsar Alexander III, saying, "Naumovych, who recently came over from the Uniate religion and broke all ties with Rome, is a respectable fellow and actually serves as the best representative of the greatest part of the Russian inhabitants of Galicia."⁵³⁴

Pobedonostsev probably not only read the March 1889 article, he very possibly financed its publication, as he did with Father Naumovych's other works.⁵³⁵ Russia's *uberprocurator* later oversaw the subsidization of Father Toth's Minneapolis parish and other measures for conversion among Greek Catholic migrants in the Americas. According to his biographer, Pobedonostsev became "particularly eager to convert Uniates who had emigrated from Galicia to cities such as Pittsburgh and Chicago, in part because this might assist his campaign among the Uniates in Galicia, the Carpatho-Ukraine, and Russia itself."⁵³⁶ It is difficult to say with certainty when Pobedonostsev, Alexander III, the Holy Synod, and other power brokers in Russia decided upon intervention in the Americas; however, it is likely that at an early stage, one of Russia's most influential men saw potential for conversions among Austria-Hungary's migrant Greek Catholics and the possibility of remitting those conversions to Austria-Hungary.

The current study has earlier suggested that, given Russia's subsidization of the Russky Orthodox Mission among Greek Catholics in the Americas, economics likely factored in the conversion movements in the Americas, as well as in Austria-Hungary. Inclinations of temporary labor migrants toward expenditure-minimizing and savings-maximizing behaviors increased the likelihood of migrant affiliation with financially less demanding Russky Orthodox parishes, while major economic downturns in the Americas escalated conversions and remigration. The question remains whether Russia's interventions

⁵³⁴ Warren B. Walsh, "Pobedonostsev and Pan Slavism," *Russian Review* 8, no. 4 (October, 1949): 319-20. See also: Melvin C. Wren, "Pobedonostsev and Russian Influence in the Balkans, 1881-1888," *The Journal of Modern History* 19, no. 2 (June 1947): 135.

⁵³⁵ Robert F. Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev: His Life and His Thought*, Indiana University International Studies (Bloomington; London: Indiana University Press, 1968), 224.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, 219. He based this claim upon his analysis of his personal correspondence with Tsar Alexander III.

undergirded the economic bases for conversion: a highly politicized question during the period. Greek Catholic loyalists regularly charged that many converted solely because Russia's Holy Synod and the Tsar generously financed the Russky Orthodox Church in the Americas.⁵³⁷ They levied accusations of “buying” converts: either by directly placing “rubles” in palms and pockets, or indirectly, by subsidizing grand church buildings and accoutrements (bells, cupolas, vestments, icon screens, liturgical books), paying exorbitant clerical salaries, or bankrolling the Russky Orthodox press. Some scholars (especially Greek Catholic partisans) have simply replicated these claims as fact,⁵³⁸ while others (especially Orthodox partisans) have contended utter baselessness for the charges, or at least suggested that Russian rubles factored less significantly than imagined.⁵³⁹ The following assessment of turn-of-the-century accusations reveals that, while Greek Catholic loyalists likely exaggerated the scope, Russian subsidization hardly remained insignificant for converting labor migrants.

In 1894, Father Alexei Toronsky probed the news, published in the U.S. *Svoboda*—which he read in his native Galicia—that Orthodox “Rusyns” had appeared in the United States. He hazarded some guesses to the question, “From whence came Orthodox Rusyns in America?”:

We don't remember, ourselves, that any Rusyns emigrated from Bukovina or from under Russian domains. Therefore, it is hard for us to understand from whence Orthodoxy arrived there [to America]. Perhaps it is those thousands of rubles, which Russia assigns

⁵³⁷ Greek Catholic loyalists also made these claims about the conversions in Austria-Hungary: they argued that not only was Russia subsidizing the American conversions with the idea that remigrants would remit the conversions to Austria-Hungary, they were directly subsidizing the conversions in Galicia and Subcarpathia (and also funneling money through Bukovina).

⁵³⁸ On this point, see: Kukushkin, *Ukrainian and Belarusan Immigration from the Russian Empire to Canada*, 241, n. 36. Kukushkin argued, however, that the parishes in the United States were better funded than those in Canada (*ibid.*, 147).

⁵³⁹ Keith Dyrud, for instance, estimated that, before 1907, the annual subsidy probably averaged two dollars per member of the Russky Orthodox Church in North America, and after 1907, less than one dollar. Dyrud, "The Rusin Question in Eastern Europe and America, 1890-World War I", 160. Simon urged less emphasis upon the financial support, and greater emphasis upon “the desire for administrative independence shown by the laity. More conducive to leaving the Catholic Church were the prospects of being supplied with a parish priest who would celebrate liturgical services in their own rite, and being loosely incorporated into the Russian diocese.” Simon, "Alexis Toth and the Beginnings of the Orthodox Movement among the Ruthenians in America (1891)," 402-03. Soldatow spoke of the notion of substantial subsidies as “legends.” Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 1, 5. As for the contributions directly to the Austro-Hungarian cause, Himka and Wendland found these “insignificant.” Himka, "The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I," 488; Wendland, *Die Russophilen in Galizien: Ukrainische Konservative zwischen Österreich und Rußland, 1848-1915*, 475, 77, 83.

for the aid of Orthodoxy in America, that created them. This is perhaps the same history, that has appeared among us [in Austria-Hungary], that on account of competitive gifts, some among us convert to the Latin Rite—but in America to Orthodoxy, because without a doubt, it is easier to take seventy-five rubles as aid, than [independently] to put together [funds for] a church, a parochial school, and support for a priest.⁵⁴⁰

Hungary's *Budapest Hirlap* reported on April 4, 1897, that the Russky Orthodox Mission in America provided an annual salary of 3,000 rubles to any converting Greek Catholic clergy.⁵⁴¹ In his 1900 letter from Northampton, Pennsylvania to Bishop Konstantyn in Przemyśl, the Basilian Father Damaskyn Polivka expressed bewilderment that, in America, Russia would subsidize—\$214,000 annually, by his reckoning—missionary efforts among “a people,” which the Tsarist Empire had historically subjected: its “serfs of long-ago.” He recognized that, “Russia sincerely woos the Rusyns, because in this, she has an interest,” though as to what that interest might be, “only the Lord himself knows!”⁵⁴²

In 1910, Father Constantin Kyryllo of Monessen, Pennsylvania, reported in Lviv's *Nyva* that Russian rubles had financed conversions in the United States on a number of occasions. “The Russian government,” he said, “equally with the St. Petersburg Synod gives much capital, in order to establish grand churches and, by that method, unite our Galician faithful.” One Father Zaklynsky had organized a Russky Orthodox mission in Philadelphia “with all certainty on [Russky Orthodox Archbishop] Platon's tab.” Rubles had also financed the Russky Orthodox side in a parish property dispute in Syracuse, New York.⁵⁴³ Once the United States' *Svoboda* emerged as a Greek Catholic advocate, it carried many “rubles for conversions” briefs. An 1896 correspondent lamented that, on December 28th of the previous year, two Orthodox priests proselytized ignorant (*temny*) Greek Catholics in Buffalo, New York. The missionaries asked a crowd of fifteen whether they wanted a priest, and in exchange for conversion, promised to build a church, provide bells “even from Russia,” and collect low membership fees: six dollars a year from married people, and from singles, three dollars. They would perform baptisms, funerals, weddings, and other sacraments free of charge, “and the people were very content with that.”

⁵⁴⁰ Toronsky, "Nezhoda mezhy Rusynamy v Amerytsi," 153-54.

⁵⁴¹ Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 1, 5.

⁵⁴² Polivka, "Letter to Bishop Konstantyn," 99-100.

⁵⁴³ Kyryllo, "Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi," 399 n. 2, 466, 526.

The correspondent concluded by suggesting that the economic catalyst “greased the wheels” of the appeal to ancestral Orthodoxy: “Not all—it is true—not all, but many of our Galician people are saying that all is one—one faith—because they say that we were Orthodox at some time.”⁵⁴⁴

In some Greek Catholic narratives, the Russky Orthodox failed to deliver the promised rubles to converts. An 1897 *Svoboda* correspondent from Jersey City claimed that newly arrived Russky Orthodox priests promised to chrismate the children of converts, “with a chrism they got from God knows where,” and for which they “would not have to pay.” The people, readers of *Svoboda* and the old country newspapers, however, would not be taken in; furthermore they had learned from the example of Ansonia, Connecticut, where the Russky Orthodox priests, salaried by the Holy Synod, nevertheless charged exorbitant fees.⁵⁴⁵ Similarly, in 1899, another contributor to *Svoboda* reported that those who converted “under the influence of the golden cross of archpriest A. Toth” in Sheppton and Oneida, Pennsylvania, had been victimized, when Archbishop Nicholas reneged on his gift of \$3,000 for their mortgage.⁵⁴⁶

How accurate were these reports of material assistance, actual or promised? Are historians justified in dismissing the economic factor? Revisions of the Greek Catholic—and Austro-Hungarian and German—narrative of “rubles for conversions” have relied upon the recorded sums which the North American mission received from the Holy Synod, as well as Father Alexis Toth’s writings. More research is required to determine an exact monetary total from Russian sources directly subsidizing missions among Greek Catholic migrants, but a presentation of the existing data is instructive. After the conversion of Father Toth’s Minneapolis parish, the Government Council in Russia pledged \$2,200 annually to maintain the parish.⁵⁴⁷ Father Toth was to receive an annual subsidy of 1,500 rubles for his priestly duties in Minneapolis and missionary work elsewhere. Additionally, a teacher/cantor was to

⁵⁴⁴ Y. B., “Dopys z Buffalo, N.Y. (Pravoslavna Propaganda),” *Svoboda* January 9, 1896. The correspondent remained unimpressed: “But to me it seems that it is a shame to submit to Orthodoxy. ... And then a shame to the people and to all Uniate clergy not only here, but also in the old country.”

⁵⁴⁵ “Dopysy “Svobodni” z Jersey City, N.J. March 1, 1897,” *Svoboda* March 11, 1897.

⁵⁴⁶ A. B., “Tsareslavny podvyh,” *Svoboda* September 28, 1899.

⁵⁴⁷ Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 67.

receive 700 rubles, 60 more rubles were donated to open a school, and the Holy Synod also provided vestments and liturgical books. Also ordered was a report on the personal salaries which might be necessary for converts. Father Toth's correspondence revealed that the Russky Orthodox mission also helped subsidize a property case (with at least \$800), following the conversion of part of the congregation in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.⁵⁴⁸ At the very least, the Holy Synod donated 43,988 rubles in 1899 to the North American missions, and eventually, it was sending at least \$70,000 in aid per year. (There was a break in funding to the North American mission from 1896-1901, at least for formerly Greek Catholic parishes.⁵⁴⁹) Additionally, the Synod donated \$600 to *Svit* for its role in converting Greek Catholics.

The tsar himself made a number of private donations to parishes throughout the Americas. In 1899, he donated 5,000 rubles explicitly for the mission efforts among Greek Catholics in North America. He donated another 5,000 rubles in 1900 for the construction of the Russky Orthodox cathedral in New York—a total of 60,000 rubles came from Russia for that endeavor. In 1901, the tsar donated another 5,000 rubles to the New York cathedral, 5,000 for a church in Chicago, and 2,000 for one in Pittsburgh. In 1908, he donated 5,000 rubles to establish a Russky Immigrant Home in New York.⁵⁵⁰ The *New York Times* also reported in 1910 that, according to the Russky Orthodox priest in Passaic, New Jersey, Father “Ignatz Klopotov” (Elias Klopotovskiy), the tsar had donated \$40,000 for the construction of a new church, the total cost of which was estimated at \$120,000.⁵⁵¹ In addition to these monetary contributions, the tsar made a number of donations of material objects, like church bells, to individual parishes: for example to the parish in Bridgeport, Connecticut, or to the one in Tres Capones, Argentina.⁵⁵² Beyond these figures, it would be difficult to say, without further research, how much came from Russia.⁵⁵³

⁵⁴⁸ Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 17-18.

⁵⁴⁹ Arkhymandryt Tykhon (Zatekyn), *Sviatitel Tikhon, Patriarkh Moskovskii i vseia Rossii* (Nizhnii Novgorod: Yzdatelskii Otdel Nyzhehorodskoi eparkii: Voznesenskii Pecherskii Muzhskoi Monastir, 2010), 103-07.

⁵⁵⁰ Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 67-68.

⁵⁵¹ “Czar Aids a Church Here,” *New York Times* September 9, 1910.

⁵⁵² A Mt. Athos Russky Orthodox monastery also donated icons to convert parishes in the United States.

⁵⁵³ One Orthodox source claimed that the North American diocese requested \$1,000,000 in 1916, but received only half that (\$500,000). Stokoe and Kishkovsky, *Orthodox Christians in North America 1794-1994*, Chapter Three.

Some historians regarding the economic factor as exaggerated have relied upon Father Toth's correspondence with the Russky Orthodox archbishop in San Francisco, in which he frequently noted his personal financial destitution, due partly to his own expenditures upon missionary work. If, however, that correspondence attests to his lack of financial interest in Russky Orthodox conversion (as it almost certainly does), it hardly does the same for the converting Greek Catholic masses. Father Toth's writings clearly indicated that in the Minneapolis and Wilkes-Barre cases, as well as in other converting and potentially converting Greek Catholic parishes, economic factors provided an important impetus for conversion. In October of 1890 and still a Greek Catholic, Father Toth stated in no uncertain terms to Bishop Ivan (Valyi) in Prešov, Subcarpathia, that Greek Catholic migrants in the United States who were "loath to pay, yet want to have a church, will readily accept such a change [to Orthodoxy], because it is the Russian government that would cover the costs for priests and maintain the churches here."⁵⁵⁴

Father Toth's 1897 report to Archbishop Nicholas on the convert community in Bridgeport, Connecticut, revealed the economic concerns at stake in the earlier Minneapolis conversions. The resettlement of some Minneapolis parishioners in Bridgeport, he said, created turmoil in the latter parish because they began "inciting the local people, since they also did not pay anything for the church over there [in Minneapolis]—Vladyka⁵⁵⁵ has paid all their debts." Apparently, under the guardianship of the "cradle-Orthodox" priest, supplied by the Russky Orthodox Mission and replacing Father Toth, the parishioners determined that clerical services were *gratis* for Russky Orthodox converts.⁵⁵⁶

Father Toth recounted the former Minneapolis parishioners telling Bridgeport's congregants: "For the services it was not necessary to pay. That is demanded only by 'Hungarian priests' [Subcarpathians

The Orthodox Christian Publications Center is the official publishing house of the Orthodox Church in America, of which the Russky Orthodox Greek Catholic Church in North America was the forerunner.

⁵⁵⁴ Father Alexis Toth, "Letter to Bishop Ivan Valyi, dated October 29, 1890," in Slovak State Archive, Prešov, Eparchy of Prešov fund, 1890/2916, quoted in Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 200-03.

⁵⁵⁵ The archbishop.

⁵⁵⁶ It was during Father Toth's sojourn in Wilkes-Barre that a coup of sorts was organized in the Minneapolis parish. Upon his return, he found that the parishioners whom he had helped convert had chosen the "cradle" Orthodox priest over him—it appears that economic considerations may have been at play in this decision.

like Father Toth], but the Russky ones [from the Russian Empire] do not...” Father Toth concluded that, having learned of the financial circumstances in Minneapolis, the Bridgeport community now considered also asking Bishop Nicholas for a “Russky and not a Hungarian priest,” presumably on the assumption that the former would not charge. In the same letter, he indicated similar situation prevailing among converts in McAdoo, Pennsylvania. Father Toth had written the curators of that now Russky Orthodox parish to say “that if they could pay to the Uniate priest \$80, and to the reader \$35, then at least they could pay to the Orthodox priest \$50 and to the reader \$30 and also for services, and apartment, coal, etc. I was talking only about \$50...but to all of that the people from McAdoo kept deep silence!”⁵⁵⁷

Father Toth also testified to economic catalysts underlying the 1892-1893 Wilkes-Barre conversions (the second mass conversion of Greek Catholics in the United States). He explained that, preceding his involvement, a cadre of Greek Catholic priests formed a kind of monopoly, the members of which adhered to a strict minimum for their services: “always the song was the same: ‘Give \$80!’” The parish at Wilkes-Barre, refused to pay (though they would have gone as high as \$70) and remained without a priest for eight months: “There was nobody to baptize, to marry or to bury. It cost big money to call the...*kSENDZES!*” (the members of the Greek Catholic clerical monopoly).⁵⁵⁸

When once more the residents of Wilkes-Barre appealed to the committee for a priest, once more the committee demanded \$80, and one of the parish curators reportedly retorted, “Well: then we will turn ourselves to the Orthodox priest from Minneapolis...”⁵⁵⁹ The economic connection, here, quite frankly, could not be any clearer. According to Father Toth, at an ensuing parishioner meeting, the head curator, Andrei Pivowarnick, suggested that “since they cannot in any way get a priest from the stubborn *kSENDZES*, there is no other way, but only to ask an Orthodox one to come. The meeting unanimously decided, ‘It does not matter, who [the priest] will be, only that the church would not stand empty...’”

⁵⁵⁷ Father Alexis Toth, “Letter to Bishop Nicholas, dated February 3 (15), 1897, in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 2, 35.

⁵⁵⁸ Father Alexis Toth, “The Church Lawsuit in Wilkes-Barre,” in *ibid.*, 54-55.

⁵⁵⁹ Father Toth reported that to this, the head of the clerical committee, Father Nicephor Chanath replied “If you would like to sit in the church from the early morning until the evening then you can call for yourself an Orthodox priest.” *Ibid.*

Father Toth's unintentionally comical description of the ensuing interchange between the parishioners and himself may reveal something about the degree to which higher order doctrinal distinctions—as opposed to economic considerations—mattered to Wilkes-Barre's converting Greek Catholics. After they requested that he come in November of 1892, Father Toth wrote the curators a fourteen-page (double-sided) letter, probing the motivations for their conversion and asking, "What is the Orthodox faith, what is the Uniate, asking them if they know what they are doing? What is the reason for such action on their part?" From Wilkes-Barre came a substantially briefer response; as Father Toth related, "To this I received a reply by telegraph: 'We know all of that, but come as soon as you can.'"⁵⁶⁰

Father Toth recounted his own fastidiousness, after his arrival, in articulating the distinctions between Greek Catholicism ("Uniatism") and Orthodoxy and confirming potential converts' cognizance: he provided hours-long sermons and multiple educational sessions, allotted several days for further consideration, and provided multiple opportunities to decide against conversion. In Father Toth's narrative, the Wilkes-Barre parishioners demonstrated great eagerness for conversion, but one is left to wonder to what degree belief in the superiority of the Russky Orthodox Church over the Greek Catholic one rested upon economic considerations, rather than doctrinal distinctions.

Father Toth often worried that purely economic considerations motivated the Greek Catholic communities calling upon him to facilitate their transition into the Russky Orthodox Church. In an 1896 letter to the Bishop Nicholas, Father Toth explained that members of a newly-formed Orthodox fraternity in Scranton, Pennsylvania, indicated their desire for union with Orthodoxy, saying, "We know that this is 'true faith' and that which we had until now is not our faith, because that one is Catholic." Father Toth questioned where they had heard of Orthodoxy: "We heard it from the others, and we read a book *Where to Seek the Truth*,⁵⁶¹ and anyhow if it would be the true Russky faith, then we would not be forced by our priests to go under an Irish (Catholic) *biscop*, and they would not give our church to the Irish to bless, but to a Russky bishop." Father Toth pressed them further: "Maybe you are expecting God knows what kind

⁵⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁶¹ Father Toth's pamphlet which drew clear distinctions between "Uniatism" and the Russky Orthodox Church.

of advantages, or rewards from the Russky Orthodox if you would unite?...Or maybe to free yourself from the payment to your grand magnate pan Chanath⁵⁶²...or because of his disturbances and unrest in your church you would like to get united?” They answered in the negative.⁵⁶³ In other cases, Father Toth did discern primarily economic motivations. In another 1896 letter, he reported that “the movement toward Orthodoxy in Mahanoy seemed very suspicious.” As one of the solicitors told him, “We don’t have any more patience with the supremacy of Mr. Smith,⁵⁶⁴ and we cannot pay so much to the priest, and to have so many collections, and in the church treasury there is nothing.” Father Toth indicated that his role was not to “liberate” them from the “rule” of Mr. Smith, nor to provide them with a Russky Orthodox priest and deacon, free of charge. When his attempts at doctrinal education met only limited success, he advised the bishop to take a “wait-and-see” approach.⁵⁶⁵

Father Toth reported a similar incident in 1897, regarding his visit to a potential convert parish in Philadelphia. Bearing a sizeable debt, the parishioners “were scared that they will have to pay themselves. It occurred to them to transfer the church to the Orthodox people.” They asked him two questions at the meeting: “Who will pay the salary of the priest if they will transfer their church?” “You yourselves,” he answered. “And if we will transfer our church, who will pay the church debt?” He told them, “Not even a cent!...only you yourselves would have to pay.” Following this, “the excitement died down, and people left the meeting.” Father Toth explained to Bishop Nicholas, “The disturbances will continue in other places where the Uniates live. The main reason is that with the present unemployment, new developments and the great need in which the people live, they cannot pay their priests, they cannot

⁵⁶² A leader of the Greek Catholic clerical cadre.

⁵⁶³ Father Alexis Toth, “Letter to Bishop Nicholas, dated December 16 (28), 1896,” in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 1, 67.

⁵⁶⁴ An individual who in the Mahanoy Greek Catholic parish was “autonomously ruling there morally, but also financially.”

⁵⁶⁵ Father Alexis Toth, “Letter to Bishop Nicholas, dated August 14 (26), 1896, in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 1, 48-50.

pay their own debts.” Thus, the years-long economic depression in the United States, following the 1893 crash, had apparently led to an increase in labor migrants’ inclinations toward conversion.⁵⁶⁶

The absence of personal economic interest in the conversion and missionary efforts of a clerical labor migrant, Father Toth, contrasts starkly with the unmistakable financial motivations of many (not all) labor migrants affiliating with the Russky Orthodox Church. Father Toth’s correspondence, together with remigrants’ testimony to priests in native villages and juries in Austro-Hungarian treason trials, confirms that many attended a Russky Orthodox parish “in America” because “there, it was not necessary to pay.”⁵⁶⁷ In his personal correspondence to Russia in 1898, even the newly arrived Russky Orthodox Archbishop of North America, Tikhon, acknowledged that, due to a temporary hiatus in funding from Russia since 1896, the conversions of “Uniate” parishes to the Russky Orthodox Church had ceased for the moment.⁵⁶⁸

It is critical to consider the economic factor together with other catalysts for conversion, particularly pre-existing inclinations toward the Russky Orthodox Church. It is unlikely that if another religious tradition, ritually foreign to Greek Catholics and lacking the justification to “return to what we always were,” provided the “cheaper” alternative, conversions would have occurred on a comparable scale.⁵⁶⁹ Furthermore, the steadfastness of many converted remigrants in the face of steep fines—not to mention occasional violence and charges of treason—at the hands of Subcarpathian and Galician regional authorities, obviates any strictly economic argument. During his 1912 visit to Galicia, the British Slavophile William Birkbeck questioned the residents of the village of Grab whether it were true “that

⁵⁶⁶ Father Alexis Toth, “Letter to Bishop Nicholas, dated August 21, 1897,” in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 3, 68. It is worth repeating, here, that the same catalyst for inclinations to Russky Orthodox conversion—economic downturn—also catalyzed massive emigration. It was only four years after this letter (1901) that remigrants initiated a conversion movement in Becherov, Subcarpathia.

⁵⁶⁷ See [Chapter Ten](#).

⁵⁶⁸ (Zatekyn), *Sviatitel Tikhon, Patriarkh Moskovskii i vseia Rossii*, 103-07.

⁵⁶⁹ Large numbers of Greek Catholics did convert to the Latin Rite, as well as to Protestantism—while economic factors may have factored in those conversions, it appears that other factors were more significant. The Latin Rite, for example, aggressively attempted to absorb Greek Catholics, through its policies on intermarriage. And conversion to Protestantism likely had more to do with assimilation (though naturally critics of Protestant proselytizers sometimes charged them with wooing converts with monetary gifts).

Russian propagandists had been among them, and had been paying them from 50 to 100 rubles a head to change their religion.” He reported that,

The effect of this question was indescribable. The men clenched their fists, the women burst into tears. “It’s a lie,” they said, “No one from independent Russia (*derzhavnoi Rusi*) has ever been here, nor did we ever see a single rouble [*sic.*] in our lives. We get no money for being Orthodox: the Poles take our money, and our cattle, and our goods, and the gendarmes tell us that they will go on doing so until we go back to the Uniate Church. But we will starve to death first.”⁵⁷⁰

Still, that level of recalcitrance emerged mainly in villages exhibiting bona fide mass conversion movements; far more commonly did remigrants simply rejoin native Greek Catholic parishes upon remigration. Furthermore, regardless of the motives of Birkbeck’s particular interlocutors in Grab, some of Grab’s residents testified rather explicitly in the 1914 Lviv treason trial that they had attended a Russky Orthodox parish in the United States for economic reasons. Acceptance of the economic argument does not require vilification of the Russky Orthodox Church. Parties seeking a culprit could just as easily accuse the Russky Orthodox Church of buying converts, as they could charge Greek Catholic Church with extorting migrants into conversion. Naturally, one could blame the converts, themselves, many of whom made strategic economic decisions based upon available ethnoreligious options. On the other hand, anyone wishing to exculpate the Russky Orthodox could point out that virtually all viable missionary endeavors require economic support for personnel and infrastructure. The Russky Orthodox Church did not “buy” converts by literally giving dollars—or rubles—to potential converts in exchange for a declaration of conversion. Rather, it defrayed the costs of maintaining a parish for migrants of limited means.

Likewise, apologists for Greek Catholic clerics could argue that, in lieu of state subsidies in the migrant context, church dues and sacramental fees were necessary. In 1912, a Greek Catholic priest wrote to Lviv’s *Nyva* to explain why Greek Catholic migrants might “solemnly believe that in America ‘the priests extort,’ ‘for confession they say to pay,’ and ‘they will not admit you to church.’”⁵⁷¹ Besides

⁵⁷⁰ Birkbeck, "Religious Persecution in Galicia (Austrian Poland)," 13.

⁵⁷¹ Fr. Lev Sembratovych, "Dopys z Ameryky," *Nyva* 9, no. 3 (February 1, 1912): 94.

other religious duties, he said, it was incumbent upon all migrants to pay the monthly parish collection, ranging between fifty cents and one dollar. “But those people—” he said,

who do not pay any parish collection, nor pay any contributions, whether for a school or for bells or for something else—those same people want to have the same rights to everything, even to the direction of the parish treasury—even to the spiritual service. And when you respond to them that, if they want those rights—chiefly to have confession before high holidays—then they must regulate their parish duties. Then they say, that the ‘priest tells you to pay for confession,’ and they do not confess. Then they return to the *kray* and there calumniate further.⁵⁷²

Such individuals therefore shirked their responsibilities, he said—“entreating “foreign priests [i.e. Russky Orthodox ones], only in order to confess”—not due to Greek Catholic clerical perfidy, but rather out of selfish negligence.

One might also exonerate migrants converting for economic reasons, and not only by blaming Greek Catholic priests in the Americas and the *kray*. If “non-religious” economic causes facilitated conversions, “non-religious” causes—limited religious freedoms and the pressures of state and society—also accounted in part for Greek Catholic loyalties in the *kray*, as well as the initial transference of Orthodox Christians to Catholicism under the Unia agreements. The purpose of the current study is neither to condemn culprits, nor absolve any blame; it simply argues that, in many cases, attendance at a Russky Orthodox parish, rather than a Greek Catholic one, proved economically advantageous, and that some—probably many—converted at least partially on that basis.

Like other causal factors, the economic one must be understood in the context of transnational migration. Temporary labor migrants exhibiting cost-minimizing, savings-maximizing propensities were very possibly overrepresented in Russky Orthodox parishes in the Americas, which would have rendered the conversions especially remittance-prone; what is certain is that numerous temporary migrants populated convert parishes and transferred the conversions to Austria-Hungary.⁵⁷³ The economic factor operated also in regions of migratory origin—before and during migration, as well as after remigration—

⁵⁷² Ibid.

⁵⁷³ See [Chapter Three](#).

and may have contributed to decisions for conversion in the Americas and the emergence of bona fide movements in the *kray*. Greek Catholic peasants in many Austro-Hungarian villages had long resented costly ecclesiastical and sacramental fees: the 1881-82 conversions in Hnylychky, Galicia were largely attributable to increased financial demands upon Greek Catholic parishioners (for the construction of a church). Furthermore, the economic factor provided the “final straw” in many of the full-scale movements emerging eventually in Austria-Hungary, due to converted or Russky Orthodox-inclining remigrants. In some Subcarpathian villages, high sacramental fees together with “land hunger,” especially among remigrants, provided the ultimate catalyst for a movement. In Galicia, too, remigrants claimed that, while they affiliated as Russky Orthodox in migration, clerical exploitation in native villages upon returning prompted their final, formal conversion. Thus, if economically-motivated anti-Greek Catholic resentments fostered Russky Orthodox conversions in the Americas, those resentments likely arose not only in the new world, but lingered from past experiences in the old country and may have anticipated renewed or novel exploitation upon return.

Parties in Russia apparently appreciated the transnational dynamics of the conversions. The actions and rhetoric of activists in Russia for the “American” conversions suggests that a major—and for some, primary—justification for subsidizing the conversions in the Americas lay in the potential for remittance to Austria-Hungary. Having achieved limited success in fostering Russky Orthodox movements directly in Austria-Hungary, Russia’s *uberprocurator*, Pobedonostsev, appears to have redirected his attentions to the Americas, upon the assumption that a critical mass of migrants who converted in “free America” might be especially effective in spreading the impetus for conversion back to their native regions. In 1912, a Bukovinan newspaper, subsidized by Russia’s activists for conversion, argued for steps to ensure that “*each and every worker would return already from America to the old country as confirmed Orthodox Christians.*”⁵⁷⁴ In 1913, the Russky Orthodox Church in North America, still under the direction of Russia’s Holy Synod, established an immigrant home for that

⁵⁷⁴ *Russkaya Pravda* (April 13, 1912), in *ABGK*, syg. 437, 369. Emphasis in original.

purpose, as well as a society with the explicitly stated mission of fostering and supporting conversion movements in Austria-Hungary, by influencing potentially returning migrants. Those new measures represent only the culmination of a pattern of Russian governmental-ecclesial support for the conversions, based largely upon the potential for remigration, at work since about 1890, and probably before that.

5.7 ETHNIC/NATIONAL/RACIAL AFFINITIES AND DISJUNCTIONS

Transplantation of old country ethnic/national/racial antagonisms and affinities to the new world coincided with new antagonisms and affinities in the migrant context to foster Russky Orthodox conversions. This section only briefly summarizes the major features of that theme—a dominant one throughout this study.⁵⁷⁵ Most significantly, Russky/Russian Orthodoxophilism emerged as a religious *and* ethnic/national/racial alternative to “Rusky-Ukrainian,” “Magyar,” or “Rusyn” Greek Catholicism, both in the *kray* and the Americas. Opposition arose, for example, against the Magyarophile orientation of the first Greek Catholic apostolic visitor to the United States, as well as toward the alleged Rusky-Ukrainophile bishops of the United States (post-1907) and Canada (post-1912).

Conflicts between Galicians and Subcarpathians also contributed conversion. First, clerical infighting between Galicia’s Rusky-Ukrainophiles and Subcarpathia’s Magyarophiles compromised a unified front against Russky Orthodox conversion. These old country regional conflicts also played out at the parish level in the Americas, as Galician and Subcarpathian laypeople distinguished between each other on ethnic and ritual bases. Many churches had standing agreements that, if the priest were Galician, the cantor would be Subcarpathian, and vice versa. Church splits upon regional (racial/ethnic/national) lines between Galicians and Subcarpathians sometimes occurred upon alleged violations of such

⁵⁷⁵ This chapter has already detailed conflicts with Polish-identifying, as well as with “Irish,” “French,” “Brazilian,” and “Argentine” Latin rite Catholics.

agreements.⁵⁷⁶ Greek Catholic loyalists saw susceptibility to Russky Orthodox opportunism in such divisiveness. In 1910, a priest reported in Lviv's *Nyva* the entire Galician community in Johnstown, Pennsylvania and nearby Conemaugh converted to the Russky Orthodox Church in 1907, because "*causa recta*," a misunderstanding had arisen with the Subcarpathians. This, however, was only a "screen," upon which the Russky Orthodox Mission quickly capitalized by sending its own priest.⁵⁷⁷

Greek Catholic migrants also encountered "cradle" Orthodox migrants, particularly from Austrian Bukovina and the Russian Empire, whom they identified as ethnationally akin to themselves. (They also encountered cradle Orthodox from Greece, Syria, the Balkans, and elsewhere). Some of Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholics had met Orthodox individuals before, via intra-European labor migration to Bosnia and Bukovina, for example.⁵⁷⁸ In the Americas, however, they encountered cradle-Orthodox migrants on a much larger scale, and many did so for the first time. Orthodox Bukovinans migrated to the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina, and their influence was particularly strong in the Canadian and Argentinian conversions.

5.8 GEOGRAPHY AND TOPOGRAPHY

Geography and topography factored in old country catalysts for conversions: proximity to Russky Orthodox strongholds—the Russian Empire and Austrian Bukovina—translated into inclinations toward Russky Orthodox conversion among Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholics. Additionally, the isolation of

⁵⁷⁶ In the United States, the Subcarpathians and Galicians eventually formed their own Greek Catholic jurisdictions (1917) and then dioceses with their own bishops (1924). Today, these are the Byzantine Catholic (Subcarpathian background) and the Ukrainian Catholic (Galician background) Archeparchies. Due to the minimal presence of Subcarpathians in Canada, Brazil, and Argentina, only the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church exists in those countries.

⁵⁷⁷ Kyryllo, "Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi," 655, n. 12.

⁵⁷⁸ Some Greek Catholics, in fact, worried that such contacts would result in Orthodox conversions. In 1913, Lviv's *Emigrant* published a letter from Hrynko Nogas, a Greek Catholic residing since 1900 in Bosnia as part of a colony of "Rusyns" there from Galicia (Rudka and Brody). They had begun construction of a church, but due to the expense, some had instead converted to the Serbian Orthodox Church. "Lysty z chuzhyny," *Emigrant* 3, no. 2 (March 1913): 37.

villages in the Carpathians promoted socially conservative communities, which long resisted the dissemination of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Unia agreements. Many of the converts in the Americas came from these mountainous regions.

Geographical and topographical considerations also promoted conversions in the Americas. Great distance separating migrants in the Americas from the *kray*—with its attending mechanisms of social control—fostered conversions; in the words of one Greek Catholic loyalist, “The Lord God is up high and America is far.”⁵⁷⁹ Additionally, geographic proximity between the United States and Canada, and between Argentina and Brazil—together with relatively permeable international borders—contributed to the spread of the conversions from one region to the other. Greek Catholicism’s overextended clerics also contended with the wide geographic dispersal of Greek Catholic communities in the Americas. To compound matters, migrants occasionally lived and worked closer to Russky Orthodox parishes than Greek Catholic ones, as did Andrei Repak, who rather undertaking the sixty-plus-mile journey to the Greek Catholic church in St. Louis, Missouri, attended the Russky Orthodox Church in Desloge.⁵⁸⁰

Geography played a unique role in Argentina’s conversions. In 1913, the missionary Greek Catholic priest, Father Apanyavech, wrote from Azara, Misiones, to Bishop Konstantyn in Przemyśl to describe the unlikely prospect of rehabilitating converts, who had constructed/appropriated the church in Tres Capones, just across the Las Tunas river, as well as the danger to Tres Capones’ persisting Greek Catholics.⁵⁸¹ “To restore those who have strayed is not possible,” he explained. “The cause is thus: the river Tunas divides this colony into two parts. The river often overflows such that communication is completely suspended for several days between the two parts of the colony.” The natural barrier of the waterway rendered Azara’s existing Greek Catholic chapel insufficient: “Therefore, the need exigently emerges [*lit.*: ‘from underneath the water’] for a church on both sides of the river.”⁵⁸²

⁵⁷⁹ Sembratovych, "Dopys z Ameryky," 94.

⁵⁸⁰ [Chapter Three](#).

⁵⁸¹ Ananyavych, F. I. (June 22, 1913). Letter to Bishop Konstantyn. *ABGK*: Syg. 5139, 431-433.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*

Perhaps the most surprising geographic dimension to the conversions lies in the unexpected spread of Russky Orthodox conversions, not directly across relatively short distances in the old country, but rather across vast expanses through transatlantic migration. The movements did not pass primarily from Russia across the Austro-Russian border, nor across the Galician-Bukovinan border, nor across the Galician-Subcarpathian border. Instead, the most critical channel through which the conversions spread throughout Eastern Europe was through Atlantic crossings and “far-away America.”

The causes for conversion to the Russky Orthodox Church among Greek Catholic migrants in the Americas lay in both the new world and the old country—sometimes simultaneously, and sometimes as these factors interacted with each other across the Atlantic Ocean. This study therefore situates the causation of conversion in the Americas within a transnational framework: by appealing to developments in both regions of migratory destination and origin, as well as the sustained connections tying those regions together. Additionally, it has been necessary to highlight connections between multiple regions of migratory destination in the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Brazil.

Migrants converted from Greek Catholicism due to a number of interrelated causes and complexes of causes, which differed across individuals: the isolation of a single cause is therefore inadvisable. It is possible, however, to generalize the interaction of the major causes in these mass conversions, while allowing for individual psychologies of conversion. First, given that the first recorded Greek Catholic-to-Russky Orthodox conversions to take place in the nineteenth century occurred in Galicia in 1882—due to a combination of economic factors, Russophile influences, and similarities between the two rites—catalyzing factors clearly preceded migration. However, given the isolated nature of the Hnylychky incident, the exigencies of transatlantic migration also clearly contributed to the conversions in the Americas, which developed on a vastly larger scale. Migration, itself, provided freedoms from the factors restraining conversion in Austria-Hungary (societal, clerical, and civic pressures); secondly, greater religious freedoms prevailed in each “American” region to which migrants traveled. Thirdly, hostilities from Latin rite Catholicism, transplanted from the old country to the new

world, left the Greek Catholic Church in all the American regions disorganized and headless for a long period of time. For all these reasons, migrants began seeking out the Russky Orthodox Church as an alternative to Greek Catholicism.

Only then did Russky Orthodox activists realize the potential to take advantage of these preparatory factors for conversion in the Americas. The Russky Orthodox Church proselytized among Greek Catholic migrants, while adding the economic incentive for conversion through the subsidization of missionary priests and parish costs; more accurately, those subsidies contributed further to existing economic incentives, based upon resentment of supposedly exploitative Greek Catholic sacramental and parish fees, in both the old country and the new world. New conflicts between Magyarophile, Rusynophile, and Rusky-Ukrainophile elements in Greek Catholicism, the geographical exigencies of migration, and engagement with remitted conversion movements in Austria-Hungary rounded out causal factors in the American conversions.

The second half of this study explores the remittance of the conversion movements to Austria-Hungary after the turn of the century—first to Subcarpathia, and then to Galicia—and the reciprocal impacts upon developments in the Americas. It is possible, for example, to attribute the advent of the Russky Orthodox movement in Tres Capones, Argentina, to (a) the return of converted migrants from Minneapolis, Minnesota to their native Becherov in Hungarian Subcarpathia; (b) their harsh welcome by the Hungarian authorities; and (c) their resulting (re)remigration to Argentina, where they fostered a conversion movement. The case of Tres Capones is unique. More generally, the remittance of conversions to Eastern Europe constituted an important causal factor in further conversions in the Americas, insofar as the East European consequences of social and economic remittances—conversions in Austria-Hungary—meant new waves of outgoing migrants already exposed to the “American conversions.” Simultaneously, cognizance of the “East European” conversions galvanized migrant converts and potential converts in the Americas, who rallied in support of compatriots, friends, and kin in the *kray*.

6.0 CANNONS AND COSSACKS IN REMIGRANTS' POCKETS

Remigrants, who underwent Greek Catholic-to-Russky Orthodox conversion in the Americas, produced dramatic ethnoreligious, social, and political impacts upon regions of origin, on a village, regional, imperial, and global scale, beginning around the turn of the twentieth century. This chapter first clarifies the specific phenomena categorized as “remitted conversion movements.” It then details the historical circumstances under which conversions in the Americas spread to specific regions of Hungarian Subcarpathia, surrounding the villages of Becherov, Velyki Luchky, and Iza. It details the interaction of the “American factor” with old country sources of conversion and argues that the former represented a necessary element in the conversions. It then details some of the immediate reciprocal impacts of the conversions in Hungary upon those in the Americas. Many migrants now departed regions of migratory origin for the Americas, having already encountered conversion movements. Secondly, the movements, remitted to Hungary from the Americas, now spread from Hungary to Argentina and Brazil. Lastly, Hungary implemented a religio-civic international intervention, known as “the American Action.”

Can migrants produce an impact on conditions in their native lands? Can migrants’ social remittances through correspondence or remigration lead to innovation in regions of origin? Some scholars have concluded in the negative. Francesco Cerase found that structural factors undermined migrants’ innovative potential.⁵⁸³ George Gmelch wrote in 1980, “While there is ample evidence of

⁵⁸³ Cerase, "From Italy to the United States and Back: Returned Migrants, Conservative or Innovative?"; Cerase, "Expectations and Reality: a Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy," 245-62. While this study argues that migrant remittances, including remigration, were an important force for innovation in Austria-Hungary, I have nevertheless found some Cerase’s observations extremely useful in explaining the “delayed” appearance of conversion movements in Galicia. See [Chapter Eight](#).

social mobility among individual returnees, there is no evidence that return migration causes any significant change in the social structure of home communities... The few scholars who discuss the issue argue strongly that return migration has failed to bring about any significant change in the social order...⁵⁸⁴

More recently, however, scholars have attributed greater influence to migrants upon regions of origin. In his outstanding monograph on remigration from the United States to Europe, 1880-1930, Mark Wyman described the remittance of new religious forms, acquired and developed in migration, as transformative in various regions of origin. Migrants returned to their native Italy, Sweden, Poland and elsewhere as newly minted Baptists, Mormons, and Methodists. Whether as converts to new religions or proponents of reform within traditional ones, remigrants became powerful agents of religious innovation, with correspondence and literature from the United States bolstering the impact of the returnees.⁵⁸⁵ Peggy Levitt and Deepak Lamba-Nieves also found, through a survey of recent secondary literature and their own sociological research on migrants between the United States and Dominican Republic, that social remittances could bring about change at the local, regional, and national levels.⁵⁸⁶

Sociologists Helen Rose Ebaugh, Janet Saltzman Chafetz, and their collaborators have studied the remittance of religious innovation within contemporary “transnational immigrant networks,” based upon their systematic study of ties between contemporary religious communities in Houston, Texas and regions of migratory origin. They found that resources tended initially to flow *to* regions of migratory

⁵⁸⁴ Gmelch, "Return Migration," 153. Those few scholars, as of 1980, included: F. Bovenkerk, *The Sociology of Return Migration* (The Hague Nijhoff, 1974); R. Rhoades, "Foreign Labor and German Industrial Capitalism 1871-1978: the Evolution of a Migratory System," *American Ethnol.* 5(1978); Rhoades, "Intra-European Return Migration and Rural Development: Lessons from the Spanish Case."; J. Swanson, "The Consequences of Emigration for Economic Development: a Review of the Literature," *Pap. Anthropol.* 20(1979); R. E. Wiest, "Rural Community Developmen in Mexico: the Impact of Mexican Recurrent Migration to the United States," *Univ. Manitoba Anthropol. Papers No. 21* (1978); R. E. Wiest, "Anthropological Perspectives on Return Migration: a Critical Commentary," *Pap. Anthropol.* 20, no. 1 (1979).

⁵⁸⁵ "Churches, Traditions, and the Remigrant," Chapter 8 in Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 169-86. In one case, members of what would become the Polish National Catholic Church rejected the Irish-identifying hierarchical dominance in an Americanizing Roman Catholicism; migrants emphasized Polish nationalism to such a degree that they formed a new church, distinct from their native Polish Roman Catholicism. In the early twentieth century, through return migration, missionary activity, and material aid from the United States, the PNCC transplanted itself to Poland, where it became known as "the American church." (p. 178).

⁵⁸⁶ Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, "Social Remittances Revisited," 5.

destination, where novel religious beliefs and practices emerged as migrants adapted. As migrant communities gained financial and social stability, “flows of monetary resources, religious personnel, and influence often reverse or become two way,” such that new religious forms have also transferred to regions of migratory origin: a Brethren community in Houston, for example, eventually supported missionary endeavors in migrants’ native Argentinian regions.⁵⁸⁷ Ebaugh and Chafetz spoke of “tantalizing hints” that, “dense webs of two-way communication across borders, combined with regular travel in both directions, spur the spread of religious innovation.”⁵⁸⁸

Beginning around 1890, Greek Catholic migrants from Austria-Hungary began converting *en masse* to the Russky Orthodox Church in the Americas; at the turn of the century, the converts came home. Whereas old country factors played a critical role in the “American” conversions, the new world now became the major factor in the spread of conversions in Austria-Hungary. Conversions traveled back to Austria-Hungary through correspondence, literature, material assistance, and—especially—remigration. The Hungarian government first detected remitted conversion movements in Subcarpathia in 1901; by 1908, Galician hierarchs also identified returned, converted migrants in their dioceses. Well before these dates, transatlantic labor migrants, including converts who had been returning, corresponding, and remitting literature for years before their ultimate detection, had influenced the Austro-Hungarian religious context by laying important foundations for future conversions there.

Numerous “old country” factors—clerical Russophilism, enduring popular identifications as “Orthodox,” localized conflicts with Greek Catholic clergy, material interests, and geographic proximity to Orthodox Russia, Bukovina, or Romania—worked in concert with the American catalyst to promote the spread of conversions in Austria-Hungary: indeed, the same East European forces had also helped prepare migrants for conversion in the Americas, and continued to do so. However, the experience of

⁵⁸⁷ Ebaugh and Chafetz, *Religion across Borders: Transnational Immigrant Networks*, xi-xii, 174. When they spoke of modern communication/travel technologies expediting this process, they had in mind “e-mail, websites, fax, audio- and videotapes, phones, and air travel.” Relative to earlier eras, transportation and communication technologies of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were also rapidly improving.

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, xv.

forming and maintaining actual Russky Orthodox convert communities in “free America” (the Americas) while in migration—provided a necessary condition for the mass movements in the major East European regional centers of the conversions: northern and eastern Hungary, western Galicia’s Lemko region, and Galicia’s eastern borderlands with Russia and Bukovina.

6.1 CONDUITS, FORMS, AND MANIFESTATIONS OF REMITTED CONVERSION MOVEMENTS

Differences and similarities prevailed between the Subcarpathian and Galician cases of remitted Russky Orthodox conversion movements; the conversions in each region also represent both independent and interrelated phenomena. In this study, “the remittance of Russky Orthodox conversion” refers to anything that directly promoted conversion, whether immediately or after a period of time. It is possible to distinguish *forms*, *conduits*, and *manifestations* of these remittances.

Migrants remitted conversions in three *forms*: ideational, behavioral, and material. Ideational forms included religious, ethnonational, and political beliefs. Because, for example, Russophilism and Orthodoxophilism often mutually supported one another, the remittance of seemingly non-religious Russophile ideas from the Americas held the potential to foster conversion. Behavioral forms included ritual practices, formal declarations for conversion, community formation, and church construction. Material forms included, especially, money, but also religious objects. Difficult to quantify, the idea of conversion represents the first form of remittance and a crucial, initial stage in the transplantation of conversions to regions of migratory origin.⁵⁸⁹ Insofar as news of the American conversions spread by the mid-1890s to broader Greek Catholic audiences in the *kray*, the potential for remittance escalated.

⁵⁸⁹ An example of what would not count as “remitted conversions” will clarify this. Members of the Greek Catholic hierarchy in Austria-Hungary knew about the conversion movements in the United States, even before they really began. Prior to his own conversion, Father Alexis Toth had in December 1889 warned his bishop in Subcarpathia

As another example of ideational remittance, many Greek Catholic priests in Austria-Hungary exhibited Russophile and Orthodoxophile sympathies, which had had stronger support in Galicia, especially in the Lemko region and Eastern Galicia's borderland regions, but existed also in Subcarpathia. Old country Russophile priests provided a foundation for conversions among migrants; but news of the conversions in the Americas also reciprocally influenced those priests. Migrants, who converted under more politically liberal and religiously pluralistic circumstances in the Americas, provided a tangible manifestation of the aspirations of otherwise constrained Russophile Greek Catholic priests in the *kray*. It is likely that some looked upon the conversions across the ocean for encouragement or solace; some also actively promoted conversion among migrants, through correspondence, and in person with remigrants and even non-migrants. Thus, growing cognizance of conversions in the Americas, on the part of priests and laypeople in the *kray*, represented a form of remitted conversion.

Ideational, behavioral, and material forms of remitted conversions passed through three *conduits*: literature, correspondence, and remigration. Literature included newspapers, pro-Orthodox/anti-Uniate tracts and pamphlets, and ritual and theological texts. Migrants in the Americas produced much of this literature. In Subcarpathia, *Where to Seek the Truth?*, written by Father Alexis Toth in the United States and first published in New York (later also in Vienna) became the "bible" of the conversion movements in Subcarpathia. Pro-Rusky Orthodox migrant newspapers like *Svit* and *Postup*, as well as *kalendars* produced by Rusky Orthodox societies in the Americas proved more widespread in Galicia. Literature also arrived to Galicia and Subcarpathia from Austrian Bukovina and the Russian Empire, via the Americas. Rusky Orthodox migrant newspapers, remitted from the United States to Austria-Hungary, frequently contained excerpts of articles originally appearing in the Russian Empire's newspapers; in

that some migrants in the United States were prepared to go "to Russian chapels or to Alaska where there is an Oriental, non-united [Orthodox] bishop, ... and during the main church holidays Greek Catholic believers always make the two to three day's journey to Alaska from Wisconsin, Iowa, and Montana." (Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 201.) For the purposes of this study, the awareness of a single Subcarpathian bishop—one clearly opposed the conversions—will not be classified as a form of remittance, even if news might have spread to the bishop's inner circle, amongst which no sympathies for the Rusky Orthodox Church existed.

some cases, migrants in the Americas simply forwarded the original Russian publications to which they subscribed. Correspondence included letters from migrants wishing to encourage kin and friends to convert, as well as from parties with no direct relationship to the addressees other than the general desire to promote conversion and the claim of common “blood.” Remigrants represented the most influential conduit for remitted conversions, as they spread the movements through personal interactions with friends, family, and fellow villagers, “with references.”

The remitted conversions appeared in two tangible *manifestations*: their human constituency and their institutions. The human constituency of remitted conversions included migrants and non-migrants, formal converts as well as “incliners.” Many individuals formally declared conversion to the civil and religious authorities. Many more who had attended convert parishes in the Americas returned to native Greek Catholic parishes upon migratory return; while some of these “reverts” were simply reabsorbed into Greek Catholicism, others continued to incline toward conversion along with other non-migrant villagers. Such individuals later provided a basis for actual conversion movements; in some cases, they became initiators and leaders. Movements began in earnest when individuals openly established new Russky Orthodox communities, the institutions of which included reading rooms and churches—house churches and actual church edifices which they attempted to build, though prohibited by local authorities.⁵⁹⁰

The conduits, forms, and manifestations of conversion remittances interacted with each other in myriad ways. A migrant might send to kin or friends a letter outlining ethnonational and religious advantages of conversion, along with a donation for the construction of a church. Another might return to his native village and convince his wife to convert to Orthodoxy, while contributing capital earned laboring in the Americas for a reading room, supplied with American migrant periodicals.

⁵⁹⁰ No group of converts successfully constructed a Russky Orthodox church building in either Galicia or Subcarpathia before the outbreak of war.

6.2 AN UNWELCOMING CHURCH AND STATE

Converted remigrants discovered a Greek Catholic Church and Austro-Hungarian Empire decidedly hostile to their return. Because they had adopted the religion of the neighboring, tsarist empire, Austria-Hungary deemed the remigrants enemies within the gates and prosecuted them accordingly. At the invitation of Greek Catholic churchmen, the Austrian and Hungarian governments sanctioned arrests, trials, and other heavy-handed methods to suppress the spreading conversions. A number of migrants who had converted in Father Alexis Toth's parish in Minneapolis endured such reprisals upon returning to their native village of Becherov. Commenting upon the plight of his repatriate flock, Father Toth chided that "fear has big eyes." He caricatured both the Hungarian government and presses for their allegations of remitted anti-Hungarianism, allegiance to the Russian Empire, and sensationalistic rumors of "Russian cannons and Cossacks." He wondered from whence could such cannons and Cossacks have come? "Maybe," he suggested, "the people of Becherov carried them in their pockets from America?!"⁵⁹¹

Migrant-inspired religious innovation has often led to opposition in regions of origin. Wyman, found that novel, remitted religious trends, including conversions, led to social upheaval and resistance upon the part of church and state in multiple native European regions: "The churches of Europe watched nervously as the trickle homeward from America became a torrent," not least of which because remigrants challenged the religious *status quo*, by attempting to spread religious identifications acquired in migration to non-migrant compatriots.⁵⁹² In regions with close relationships between church and state, representatives of state have also often regarded migrant religious innovation as threatening.⁵⁹³

⁵⁹¹ Father Alexis Toth, "Fear Has Big Eyes," in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 62.

⁵⁹² Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 169.

⁵⁹³ Analyzing migration between Fuzhou, China and New York, Kenneth Guest concluded that, "Remittances and the regular transnational movement of overseas Fuzhouese, while encouraged by government authorities for their positive contributions in many areas of Chinese social life, complicate the government's efforts at control and regulation in the religious sphere." Guest, *God in Chinatown: Religion and Survival in New York's Evolving Immigrant Community*, 87. Similarly, subsidization of missionary activities in "Godless" Cuba by exiles of the revolution living in Florida has also challenged that communist regime; as Mahler and Hansing argued, "These

Remitted religious movements have historically undermined “the clergy’s monopoly on the truth;” even those faithful to their native religion have asserted their own prerogatives, by becoming major donors to churches or promoting literacy, traditionally the domain of the priest.⁵⁹⁴ Naturally, representatives of established churches have resisted. Protestant converts who returned to Italy in the twentieth century complained that the local priest “truly persecuted us with a combination of ridicule, boycotts, mockery, and calumny.”⁵⁹⁵ A Catholic priest in Poland assailed remigrants who returned as members of the Polish National Catholic Church in his article, “The Danger Coming from the United States,” which charged, “You left for America. You made money there but you have lost your faith, the mother of Poland...you should have been hit by the first bullet, you scoundrels.”⁵⁹⁶ A Catholic priest in Ireland simply called for migration restrictions as he exhorted, “Stop the tide of emigration. Save your flocks from the American wolf....For your people, America is the road to hell!”⁵⁹⁷ Enemies of these new, remitted religious forms had reason for anxiety; in some cases they hastened the destabilization of the religious order and, as in the case of state Lutheranism in Sweden, undermined the hold of establishment religions on state and society.

Governments and local police have historically assisted churchmen in their attempts to counter remitted migrant religious innovations, by persuasion and force. In Austria-Hungary, various agents perceived a destabilizing threat in returning, converted migrants. For a Magyarophile or Rusky-Ukrainophile Greek Catholic parish priest, the establishment of a Russky Orthodox community in his village meant local competition for souls, ethnonational allegiance, and personal and institutional material

projects subtly subvert the revolution by cultivating faith in Jesus as the antithesis of faith in the government.” Sarah J. Mahler and Katrin Hansing, “Toward a Transnationalism of the Middle: How Transnational Religious Practices Help Bridge the Divides between Cuba and Miami,” *Latin American Perspectives* 32, no. 1 (January 2005): 123-24.

⁵⁹⁴ Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 172-73.

⁵⁹⁵ Cerase, “From Italy to the United States and Back: Returned Migrants, Conservative or Innovative?”, 315, 18. quoted in Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 176.

⁵⁹⁶ Paul Fox, *The Polish National Catholic Church* (Scranton, Pennsylvania: School of Christian Living, 1961), 63. Cited in Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 177-78.

⁵⁹⁷ M.F. Shinnors, “Ireland and America: Some Notes of a Mission Tour in the United States,” *Irish Ecclesiastical Record* (4th ser.) 11 (1902), 114-26, 385-99, cited in Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 171.

support. For him, for Greek and Roman Catholic bishops, and for Vatican elites, remitted conversions also represented a salvo in the global religio-national struggle between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, and their Hungarian, Rusyn-Ukrainian, Austrian, Polish, and Russian manifestations. Austro-Hungarian governmental officials at the local, regional, and imperial levels interpreted the movements as menaces to social stability and the Empire, itself, for they allegedly emanated from the imperial neighbor to the east: Russia.

Church and state collaborated to combat the movements. In the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy, where the clergy and government first encountered the remitted conversions at the turn of the century as full-fledged movements, the government intervened immediately and forcefully in each case, at the invitation of the Greek Catholic hierarchy. They raided the house of the leader of the movement (a remigrant from America), confiscated various literature (including literature remitted from the Americas), and arrested, charged, and tried activists (many of them returned migrants) for treason. During the early years of the century, the Hungarian government, together with Greek Catholic leaders, also launched the American Action, which attempted to counter the conversions at their source, by giving material and ideological support to foster Hungarian and Greek Catholic loyalty in America. When these efforts failed, it appears that Austria superseded its imperial partner and influenced the Vatican to appoint a Greek Catholic from Galicia. Paradoxically, the circumstances of this appointment also contributed to further conversions in the Americas.

By 1907, Hungary had suppressed the conversion movements within its own territory with some, though hardly total, success; in the same year, however, deteriorating economic conditions in the United States unleashed massive remigration of converts to regions of migratory origin: a force which ultimately galvanized mass conversions beginning in the winter of 1911-1912 in Austria-Hungary. Those movements unleashed another round of state crackdowns, again in Subcarpathia and anew in Galicia, resulting in two massive show trials of converts for treason in 1913-1914.

This chapter details the way in which the conversions in the Americas transferred to Austro-Hungarian regions of origin. It also analyzes the manner in which the resulting conversion movements in

Austria-Hungary reciprocally influenced the American context, even as these modifications produced still more echoes which reverberated in the Austro-Hungarian context. Notwithstanding strong structural pressures, remigrants *did* have an innovative impact in regions of origin, through the remittance of Russky Orthodox conversion. That impact included the outbreak of Russky Orthodox conversion movements, major ecclesiastical and governmental responses, and ultimately substantial international tensions between Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany, on the brink of war.

6.3 CONVERTS COME HOME

Several studies have attended to the role of transatlantic labor migration in the conversions in Hungarian Subcarpathia in the first decade of the twentieth century.⁵⁹⁸ Maria Mayer discovered that

⁵⁹⁸ There is a substantial literature dealing with the American factor in the Subcarpathian conversions. Based upon an analysis of Hungarian governmental archives and Greek Catholic newspapers, Maria Mayer included a chapter on the conversions in the eastern Hungarian villages of Velyki Luchky and Iza (and surrounding villages) and the “first” Maramorosh Sighet trial (actually a series of three trials 1904-1906). She included detailed information on the role of returning migrants and remitted literature from the United States. Her otherwise excellent study ignored the earlier conversions in Becherov. See: “The Orthodox Schismatic Movement Among Subcarpathia’s Peasantry,” in Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 124-52. Based upon a wide range of sources, especially the primary documents from Hungarian government archives, Jurij Danilec’s sections on the pre-war conversions in Subcarpathia duplicates much of Mayer’s work, but also contributes much new information. (See Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*, 37-81. He has also published a number of articles on Iza, Velyki Luchky, and the surrounding villages, as well as the “first” and “second” Maramorosh Sighet trials. Many of these articles are also available online. See: Danilec, “K Ystoryy Pravoslavnoho Dvyzhenyya v Zakarpatskom Sele Yza.”; *ibid*; Danilec, “K Ystoryy Pravoslavnoho Dvyzhenyya v Zakarpatskom Sele Velyke Luchky.”; Danilec, “Perviy Sudebnyy Protsey Protvyv Pravoslavnykh Zakarpaty v Maramorosh-Syhoty.” Danilec also provided additional primary documents dealing with Velyki Luchky from the Hungarian governmental archives (together with an introductory article) in: Danilec, “Z Istorii Pravoslavnoho Rukhu v s. Velyki Luchky Mukachivskoho Rayony.”) Andrea Gönczi’s book also contains a wealth of information on the influence of “the American factor.” This text, probably more than any other, gives the most sustained attention to the role of returning labor migrants in the Subcarpathian conversions: Andrea Gönczi, *Ruszin Skizmatikus Mozgalom a XX. Szazad Elejen*. Ungvár-Beregszász: Poliprint, 2007. With less archival support, Archimandrite Vasily Pronyn has also spoken of the American factor in the movements in Velyki Luchky, Iza, and surrounding environs. (See Pronyn, *Ystoryiya Pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy na Zakarpatye*. Primarily studying the conversions in the United States, Keith Dyrud provided a brief, but valuable study of the remittance of the conversions to the village of Becherov in 1901. (See Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 87-88. Msr. Miroslav Zupina also briefly mentioned the role of returning migrants in the Becherov conversions in Zupina, “Z histórie Pravoslávnej cirkevnej obce Becherov.” Finally, along with his translation of Father Toth’s article “Fear has Big Eyes,” which dealt with

“those who had made money in America and wanted to buy land” comprised the vanguard constituency of conversions in the village of Velyki Luchky.⁵⁹⁹ Keith Dyrud found that by 1901, “...Rusyn emigrants to America were returning to Hungary and were convincing their covillagers to convert to Orthodoxy.”⁶⁰⁰ Remarking upon socio-economic motivations for migration to the United States, Jurij Danilec noted that “a large part of emigrants from Subcarpathia converted beyond the ocean to Orthodoxy. Returning to their fatherland, they became one of the sources of the Orthodox movement.”⁶⁰¹ Andrea Gönczi found that “time and again,” contemporary Greek Catholic commentators returned to the American factor in their search for the source of the Subcarpathian conversions.⁶⁰² Finally, Paul Robert Magocsi has written that “Returning migrants brought American dollars and Orthodox ideology back to the homeland,” where the “confluence of American immigrant dollars and Russian ‘rolling rubles’ ...meeting in the valleys of the Carpathians” promoted conversions in Hungary.⁶⁰³

The secondary literature has acknowledged the American factor in Subcarpathia’s conversions to such a degree, in fact, that Archimandrite Vasily Pronyn qualified the claims of not a few authors that “the American movement, as a spark in a powder keg, transferred to the Old Country:” notwithstanding the great importance of “the American factor,” he rightly observed that America provided only part of the story.⁶⁰⁴ Pronyn and others have demonstrated that, in addition to migrant influences, catalysts for conversion in Subcarpathia included: persisting identifications among the peasantry as “Orthodox”; Russophilism and Orthodoxophilism among elements of the clerical intelligentsia; ideological and

the role of that priest’s former parishioners in remitting the conversions to Becherov, George Soldatow included a note on the Becherov events, based upon archival evidence obtained from the migrant Russky Orthodox community in Minneapolis, Minnesota. See Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 61-65. Based upon some of these studies, a number of other scholars have remarked upon the role of the United States in the Subcarpathian conversions, especially Paul Robert Magocsi. (See: Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948*, 66-68; Magocsi, *Our People: Carpatho-Rusyns and Their Descendants in North America*, 26-27. Magocsi, "Greek Catholics: Historical Background," 49-52.

⁵⁹⁹ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 124.

⁶⁰⁰ Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 87.

⁶⁰¹ Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*, 40.

⁶⁰² Gönczi, *Ruszin Skizmatikus Mozgalom a XX. Szazad Elejen*.

⁶⁰³ Magocsi, *Our People: Carpatho-Rusyns and Their Descendants in North America*, 26-27. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948*, 66-67.

⁶⁰⁴ Pronyn, *Ystoriya Pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy na Zakarpatty*, 436.

monetary support from the Russian Empire and Austrian Bukovina; localized conflicts with village Greek Catholic priests over economic exploitation or the performance of liturgical duties; the desire for land which a benevolent Russian Tsar could supposedly grant; and resistance to institutionalized Magyarization within Hungarian Greek Catholicism.

Despite the merits of these studies, limitations have compromised a holistic picture of these transnational conversions. First, none have provided a full analysis of all the major Subcarpathian centers of Russky Orthodox movements, partly due to lack of awareness of other existing literature. Secondly, scholars considering the Subcarpathian conversions together with the Galician ones have done so as an afterthought, rather than doing systematically; further, those studies emphasize analogies, rather than their direct relationship to one another.⁶⁰⁵ Third, in their treatment of “America,” they have focused almost exclusively upon the role of the United States, rather than the Americas, including Canada, Brazil, and Argentina. Lastly, while some of these studies—the works of Keith Dyrud and Maria Mayer in particular—have suggested ongoing reflexivity between developments in the Americas and Eastern Europe, the lack of a transnational perspective has obscured the degree to which sustained transatlantic ties continued to shape the conversion and counter-conversion movements, in all the affected regions, in a dialectical process. These factors have resulted in a fragmented picture of the conversions, the “American factor,” and the transnational Greek Catholic and Austro-Hungarian governmental responses.⁶⁰⁶

⁶⁰⁵ For a well-done comparative study of the Galician and Subcarpathian movements, however, see Bruski, "Zakarpacie a Lemkowszczyzna. Podloze i Rozwoj Ruchu Prawoslawnego w Okresie Miedzywojennym." Bruski covered both the pre-war and inter-war period and acknowledged the role of returning migrants, though he cites only returnees to Subcarpathia (ibid., 148). Danilec also briefly referenced the “analogous” movements in Galicia and mentioned some of the direct ties: the cognizance of the residents of Grab of the Hungarian conversions, the connection with Count Vladimir Bobrinsky, and the role of the informant Arnold Dulishkovich. (See: Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*, 78-80.)

⁶⁰⁶ Mayer’s work was the earliest of the major recent secondary studies. Though Dyrud referenced two of Mayer’s other works, he did not reference her book, which contains the most important information on the Subcarpathian conversions, including remitted conversions to Velyki Luchky. Neither Pronyn nor Danilec have referenced either Mayer or Dyrud.

By the early twentieth century, conversion movements began to appear in Hungarian Subcarpathia in four villages—Becherov (in Saros county⁶⁰⁷), Săcel and Iza (in Maramorosh county⁶⁰⁸), and Velyki Luchky (in Bereg county⁶⁰⁹), which became centers of Orthodox conversion, from which the movements spread to numerous—perhaps twenty-five—neighboring villages.⁶¹⁰ The conversions appeared in the following order: Săcel (ca. 1900), Becherov (ca. 1900-1901), Iza (ca. 1902-03), and Velyki Luchky (ca. 1903).⁶¹¹ Rather than proceeding in chronological order, the following analysis begins with Becherov (not Săcel), which exhibited the first *confirmed* instance of conversions resulting directly from remigration from the Americas.⁶¹² Greek Catholic as well as the Hungarian and Austro-Hungarian governmental responses to Becherov’s conversions informed subsequent actions in other Subcarpathian conversion centers. The analysis then turns to one of those centers, another clear-cut case in which remigrants led the conversion movements and formed their primary constituency: the village of Velyki Luchky. Finally, it considers the conversions surrounding Iza—ostensibly the village which provoked the trials of 1904-1906 and 1913-1914—in relation to the earlier conversions in nearby Săcel, as well as to the concurrent movements in nearby Velyki Luchky.

The latter half of this chapter considers the reflexive, transatlantic impact of the counter-conversion measures launched by religious and governmental actors in Hungary. The Americas galvanized pre-existing orientations, transported from regions of migratory origin, into Russky Orthodox conversions in the Americas; the remittance of those “American” influences provoked a comparable

⁶⁰⁷ In Hungarian, Biharó. At the time, just south of, and separated by the Carpathian Mountain range from the so-called Lemko region (Austrian Galicia). Today in Slovakia.

⁶⁰⁸ At the time, just northwest of Romania. Today, Săcel is in Romania, Iza in Ukraine.

⁶⁰⁹ In Hungarian Nagylucska. Neighboring Maramorosh county to the West. Today in Ukraine.

⁶¹⁰ See the map in Appendix A. Among the villages influenced by the conversions in Iza and Velyki Luchky, various sources list the villages of Kosheleve, Nankovo, Horynchovo, Velytyne, Kryva, Vedevle, Tereble, Yehrshy, Bichkove, Yasenya, Osoye, Ylnytse, Belkakh, Dolhom, Zadnem, Berezove, Lyptse, Nyzhny Bystry, Bilky, Dulovo, Dovhe, Oleshyk, Siltse, and Horonda.

⁶¹¹ Appendix A contains a map of these regions. In 1903, a conversion movement began also in Austrian Galicia, in the village of Zaluche, close to the border with Orthodox Bukovina. In spite of that proximity, in all likelihood, the influence for conversion came first from the Americas, specifically Canada, to which Zaluchans had been migrating since the 1890s. See [Chapter Eight](#).

⁶¹² I have yet to find evidence for any role of remigration from the Americas in the Săcel conversions. That migration to (and back from) the Americas from this region began in the 1890s, however, makes it highly possible.

galvanization in Hungarian Subcarpathia: i.e., conversion movements both like and unlike those spreading throughout the Americas. Those new “Subcarpathian” movements—just as much “American”—prompted Austro-Hungarian governmental and Greek Catholic responses, which reciprocally influenced the conversions in the Americas—thus setting the stage for even further remittances to Subcarpathia, as well as Galicia.

As early as April 4, 1897, Hungary’s semi-official *Budapest Hirlap* commented on the burgeoning “Russian” Orthodox movement in the United States, which, it claimed, was purely political: several Greek Catholic priests from Galicia and Hungary, along with a reported 30,000 faithful, had converted, not only religiously, but also nationally.⁶¹³ Due to potential remigration, converted migrants threatened Austria-Hungary’s national security:

It must be remembered, that the expansion of the Great Russian Orthodox Church is nothing else but the expansion of the Russian Politic. When these people return home—and they are getting ready for that, otherwise they would not send their savings to their homeland—then a solid connection will be established between the northeast Carpathians and Moscow, and it is horrible to think what consequences such a connection will have for Hungary...When these Ruthenians come home, then the political direction will point them toward not ‘Pest and not Vienna, but St. Petersburg as is also occurring on the Balkan Peninsula...⁶¹⁴

⁶¹³ The author of the *Budapest Hirlap* article had learned this from the Galician periodical *Halychanyn*. The *Budapest Hirlap* article was itself reprinted *Pravoslavny Amerikansky Viestnik*, the organ of the Russky Orthodox Church in North America—in other words, an American migrant publication featured an article from a Hungarian periodical, which featured an article from a Galician periodical. To complete the circle, that Galician periodical (*Halychanyn*) retrieved most of its American news from American migrant periodicals. "Slovatskoe y Russkoe Sviaschenstvo v Amerki." Quoted in *Pravoslavny Amerikansky Russky* May 15, 1897, 370-372.

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 371. Also quoted in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 1, 6. This 1897 commentator’s appeal to economic remittances as evidence of provisions for remigration accords well with the observation of contemporary transnational migration studies that, “returnees prepare their reintegration at home through periodical and regular visits to their home countries. They retain strong links with their home countries and periodically send remittances to their households.” See: Cassarino, "Theorising Return Migration: The Conceptual Approach to Return Migrants Revisited," 262. In following Soldatow’s translation of the reprint in *Pravoslavny Amerikansky Viestnik*, “Russky” appears here as “Russian,” and “Rusyn” appears as “Ruthenian.” The original Hungarian article would have made the same distinction (with the Hungarian equivalents of “Russian” and “Ruthenian”), a distinction also retained in this particular passage of the *Pravoslavny Amerikansky Viestnik* reprint, but which gets lost elsewhere in the same piece. It does not make sense, for example, that the *Budapest Hirlap* article complained that the “Russky” bishop of San Francisco sent missionaries to Canada, where only “Russky” (and “Slovak”) people lived, as the translator in *Pravoslavny Amerikansky Viestnik* reported—the author of the original article would certainly have used two different ethnonyms to describe the bishop, on the one hand, and the

Thus, remigration held the potential to spread, among Hungary's Greek Catholics, a pro-Russian orientation, of a piece with similar orientations permeating the contentious Balkans. Indeed, the author, as well as the Hungarian government and populace whom he warned, did not have long to wait—1901 at the very latest—until converts began coming home.

In the meantime, beginning February 1897, Hungary's government implemented the "Highland's Program," intended to improve economic and agricultural conditions among Subcarpathia's Greek Catholic peasantry, at first in Bereg County.⁶¹⁵ Not merely altruistic, the goal was to prevent social discontent, class warfare, and the rise of socialist inclinations. It is possible to trace the partial origins of the Highlands Program to 1896, when the Greek Catholic bishop of Mukachevo, Iulii (Firtsak), met with the Prime Minister of Hungary on a return trip from Rome. In a personal note to the Prime Minister, Bishop Iulli indicated, among other wishes, his desire that the government improve living conditions among Greek Catholics in the counties of Maramorosh, Bereg, Ung, and Zemplen, for the purpose of curbing emigration to America.⁶¹⁶

Bishop Iulli's desire to forestall conversion likely factored in his request.⁶¹⁷ In an April 20, 1893 letter to the Latin rite Archbishop of New York, Iulli had complained of the prohibition of married clergy in the United States, saying "Our people are abandoned like sheep without a shepherd. What will be the consequences of this deplorable state of things, but many will fall into schism or Protestantism."⁶¹⁸ The Subcarpathian bishop thus had good reason in 1897 to prevent migration of his constituents, to a region he knew was experiencing conversion movements; he likely also feared the possibility of remitted

migrants in Canada, on the other, to make his point that the bishop had reached beyond his jurisdiction. (*Pravoslavny Amerikansky Vestnik* May 15, 1897, 370).

⁶¹⁵ On the Highland's Program, see: Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 111-23.

⁶¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁷ Other motivations would have included the loss of his constituency to the other side of the ocean.

⁶¹⁸ Archdiocesan Archives of New York, G-3. Iulii Firtsak to Corrigan, April 20, 1893, cited in Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916*, chapter two.

conversions.⁶¹⁹ Certainly by 1901, the Subcarpathian Greek Catholic hierarchy encountered remitted conversions as a reality. Such fears informed the 1908 recommendations of Greek Catholic priest Father Aladar Romanecz, who, in his pamphlet on the remitted conversions, advised further developing the Highland's Program to undercut emigration to the United States.⁶²⁰

The Highlands Program neither stopped emigration nor prevented conversions in Hungarian Subcarpathia.⁶²¹ It is unknown when the first converted migrant reappeared in Austria-Hungary, but it was almost certainly in the last decade of the nineteenth century. By 1901, Hungary's highest ranking official, Prime Minister Tisza, learned that migrants who converted in Minneapolis had begun returning to Becherov, in northern Hungary, where they persuaded co-villagers to convert. As an investigation by the Minister of Religion discovered, over one-third of the population demanded an Orthodox priest; a rumor also circulated that, upon Emperor Franz Joseph's death, Russia would claim the region surrounding Becherov, making conversion to "Russian" Orthodoxy politically and economically advantageous.

The absence of a church building prevented the conversions from adopting a mass character. A "Russian" organization in the Americas, the Russky Orthodox Mutual Aid Society, drew support in 1900 from Becherov's migrants living in Minnesota, together with other Subcarpathian migrants in Wisconsin, for the construction of such a church in the *kray*.⁶²² The brothers Vasyli and Andrei Zbihly returned with

⁶¹⁹ Bishop Firtsak's fellow Subcarpathian bishop, Ivan Valyi had dealt with the conversions more directly, for it was a priest of his diocese, Father Alexis Toth, who was the first leader of the conversions. It is probable that Bishop Valyi would have informed Bishop Firtsak of this development.

⁶²⁰ *Ruthéneink és az orosz ortodoxia* (Uzhorhod, 1908), cited in Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 249, fn. 1.

⁶²¹ That so many reports on the conversions in Hungary came from the regional offices of the Highlands Program is yet another indicator of how the origins of that program and the conversions may have been linked.

⁶²² Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 87. According to the that society's records, the money was actually collected in 1900, indicating that the plan for remitting the conversions to Becherov had been in the works since at least since that time. See: Fr. Peter Kohanik, *70th Anniversary Russkoye Pravoslavnoye Obschestvo Vzaymo-Pomoschy v Siv.-Amerykanskykh Soyedynennikh Shtatakh* (Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania: Russkoye Pravoslavnoye Katholycheskoye Obschestvo Vzaymopomoschy, 1965), 51. As late as 1915, Russky Orthodox activists for the society continued to refer to this donation to galvanize their constituency. In that year, its president, Father Peter Kohanik wrote, "the society is dedicated to fight for Orthodoxy wherever it is threatened. We must help not only in a moral but also in a material way. Therefore we have already sent \$600 to Austria with the aim of liberating Orthodoxy from tyranny." *Russkoe Pravoslavnoe Kafol. Obshchestvo Vzaimopomoschi, 1895-1915*. New York: 1915, quoted in Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 75.

\$600, which they showed to Becherov's Greek Catholic priest, Father Michael Artim, along with their collection list and the newspaper containing the appeal for donations (presumably *Svit*).⁶²³ Migrants also returned with Father Toth's pro-Rusky Orthodox tract, *Where to Seek the Truth?*⁶²⁴

Responses by representatives of the Austro-Hungarian government and the Greek Catholic Church indicated how seriously they regarded the "American factor." When in 1901, Father Artim reported to local officials that "Russian" propaganda had caused the movement in Becherov, he had in mind that propagated by migrants returning, not from Russia, but from the United States.⁶²⁵ The gendarmes confiscated the collection book indicating the U.S. sources of the donations, arrested some of those involved, including the Zbihly brothers, and on March 19, 1902, accused them either of treason or spreading anti-Catholic propaganda.⁶²⁶ According to Father Toth, the Hungarian minister Sayl also prohibited the circulation of *Svit*.⁶²⁷

After those arrested were released for lack of evidence, Father Artim continued to oppose the would-be converts. Additionally, were they not convinced before, representatives of the Hungarian government at the highest levels now acknowledged migrant conversions abroad as a clear threat to state interests. In 1897, *Budapest Hirlap* had argued for countering the "American" conversions before their remittance to Hungary; now that this "ship had sailed," so to speak, the Hungarian government acted to prevent further remittances. Even before the Becherov incident, though, the government had set a plan for a transatlantic intervention into motion, based upon its fears of potential remitted conversions. Dyrud concluded correctly that "The outcome of the Becherov investigation was to have a significant impact on

⁶²³ Presumably *Svit*. Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 64.

⁶²⁴ Zupina, "Z histórie Pravoslávnej cirkevnej obce Becherov."

⁶²⁵ Štátny oblastný archív v Prešove, fond GKB č. 2059/1901, cited in *ibid*.

⁶²⁶ Based upon documents in migrants' possession in the Minneapolis parish, Soldatow reported that the charge was treason. (Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 64.) Curiously, Dyrud reported that the district attorney identified the Zbihly (Zbihlej) brothers as priests, along with Laszlo Tutko, and charged them with anti-Catholic propaganda: Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 87.

⁶²⁷ Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 63. The assertion is likely true. Mayer reported that the Hungarian government had confiscated "Russia's Pan-Slavic" literature and prohibited postal distribution. Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 125-26.

the Rusyn immigrants in the United States,” but only inasmuch as the appearance of the converted remigrants provided final confirmation of the need for action.⁶²⁸

As early as November 9, 1900, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs notified Hungary’s Prime Minister that the Vatican had agreed to permit the Hungarian government to dispatch a Greek Catholic apostolic visitor to the United States. Concern over potential remitted conversions likely prompted this step. It was in 1901 (the same year as the Becherov incident), that Hungary’s consul in Chicago first raised through official channels the idea of dispatching Hungarian loyalist Greek Catholic priests to combat the conversions.⁶²⁹ At some point before early 1902, in the wake of the Becherov conversions, Bishop Ivan (Valyi) of Prešov also recommended that the government appoint delegates to the United States to counter the “anti-Hungarian” Russky Orthodox conversion movements.⁶³⁰

Certainly by early 1902, the Becherov conversions had solidified the resolve of Hungarian officials to implement the “American Action.” Likely prepared by the Minister of Religion, the final report on the Becherov investigation reiterated the call to immediately send “patriotic” priestly representatives of Hungary, and eventually a bishop who would be “a political agent as well,” to the United States. To gain support, the Becherov report advised, “the Vatican should be given more evidence about the Russophile movement among the immigrants who have returned to northern Hungary from America and Russophile-Orthodox influence there.”⁶³¹ On February 4, 1902, the Hungarian Minister of Religion notified the Catholic hierarchs in the United States of the plan, which it justified by citing the remitted conversions. Hungary submitted outlines of the American Action to Emperor Franz Joseph on

⁶²⁸ Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 88. Maria Mayer’s omission of the Becherov conversions is important, particularly given that those conversions factored so critically in shaping the early stages of the American Action, an initiative which Mayer analyzed extensively and with otherwise impressive acumen. Mayer herself argued that the Hungarian government implemented the American Action in early 1902 in part as a response to “the appearance in Hungary of an Orthodox movement propagated by Pan-Slavic conservative circles in the Russian Empire and in the United States which was disseminated in part, by returning migrants,” but that implementation preceded the conversions in Iza and Velyki Luchky by over a year. Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 204.

⁶²⁹ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 204-05.

⁶³⁰ Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 88.

⁶³¹ *Ibid.*, 88.

January 8 and June 3, 1902 for his final authorization, which he gave one week later. By then, Father Andrew Hodobay had already left for the United States as its first Greek Catholic apostolic visitor.

The 1897 *Budapest Hirlap* article warning of remigrating converts had recommended that, because the “Russian” Orthodox mission (allegedly) paid an annual salary of 3,000 rubles to Greek Catholic clergy who converted in the Americas, the Austro-Hungarian government ought to allot comparable funds to undercut the economic bases of conversion.⁶³² On March 9, 1903, Emperor Franz Joseph approved a plan to devote 68,500 crowns to the American Action, which would subsidize Father Hodobay and his staff, a second priest, and a “Hungarian” Greek Catholic church in Allegheny, Pennsylvania. The budget devoted separate funds to travel costs for other priests.⁶³³ Thus, officials at the highest levels of Austrian and Hungarian governments, including the Emperor himself regarded conversions as threats to church and state, and considered the “American factor” significant enough to combat the movements not only Subcarpathia, but also at their source, in the United States, through a major transatlantic religio-governmental initiative.

In 1903, a conversion movement began in the village of Velyki Luchky, in eastern Hungarian Subcarpathia. The movement’s leader and “life and soul,” according to Maria Mayer, was Iurii Rubis. A native of the village, a socialist, and an “old enemy” of Greek Catholic priests and their economic abuses of the peasantry, Rubis proved so central a figure that in 1909 the government entertained the hope that the movement might die with him, for by that time he was 75 to 80 years old.⁶³⁴ Rubis, like so many who converted in Velyki Luchky, had returned in recent years from the United States, to which Velyki Luchkans had been migrating on a large scale for temporary labor since the 1870s. Together with another leader of the movement and fellow remigrant, Ivan Hazyi, Rubis arrived from the United States in 1903

⁶³² Quoted in *Pravoslavy Amerikansky Russky* May 15, 1897, 371.

⁶³³ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 205, 08.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*, 142, 52. They were to be disappointed.

with Father Toth's pamphlet *Where to Seek the Truth?*, which had several years earlier also appeared in Austria-Hungary with Becherov's returning migrants.⁶³⁵

If, in Francesco Cerase's typology, Rubis's remigration around his seventieth year was a "return of retirement," he would hardly "quietly spend his old age" in his native village, for upon his return, his career as a religious provocateur had only just begun.⁶³⁶ On December 19, 1903, the district governor, Laszlo Horvath wrote to Bishop Iulli of Mukachevo to inform him of a recent report from the regional counselor from Velyki Luchky, who had discovered a secret meeting organized by the remigrant Rubis. The regional counselor said that Rubis was "known as a fanatical person, who wears a long beard, different from the norm, and subscribes to the Orthodox newspaper, *Soviet*, which is published from Russia." The same Rubis allegedly told the counselor of his intention to draw the people away from their current religious attachments toward the "religion of Rus" and offered the counselor Father Toth's pamphlet, published, the counselor noted, in New York. As the people of Velyki Luchky were "very susceptible to any kind of fraud," the counselor searched Rubis's house and confiscated a number of

⁶³⁵ Pronyn, *Ystoriya Pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy na Zakarpatye*, 442. Pronyn provided the date of 1903, without archival evidence—it is possible that he extrapolated a date of 1903 from the government's discovery of a movement in Velyki Luchky in December of 1903. I have been unable to confirm the exact date of return for Rubis and Hazyi. If, as is likely, the "Joh. Hazyi"—a "Hungarian" from "Luczka," who at the age of 33 arrived at Ellis Island on August 29, 1901, along with three other migrants from "Luczka"—was the same individual who returned to Velyki Luchky with Rubis, then it is probable that the two returned some time in 1902 or 1903. If so, they would both have likely been aware of the conversions in Becherov prior to their migration, since *Svit* had published the appeal for donations sometime during or before 1900. Although *Svit*, the migrant publication founded by Father Toth, was not among the publications confiscated from Rubis's house, Father Toth's pamphlet, *Where to Seek the Truth?* was. All this is to say that it is entirely possible that cognizance of the remittance of conversions to Becherov may have in some way inspired Rubis and Hazyi, still in the United States, to initiate a similar movement upon their return to their own Subcarpathian village of Velyki Luchky. Furthermore, if Rubis, Hazyi, and the other returned migrants who participated in the Velyki Luchky movement were privy to denunciations in the United States of the apostolic visitator, Father Hodobay, as a "Hungarian agent" (which commenced in the second half of 1902), a reaction against the American Action may even have galvanized such a project.

⁶³⁶ According to Cerase, "Detachment from the new society often occurs among immigrants with no offspring, no one to whom they can bequeath the results of their efforts and their aspirations. Advancing age and other dissatisfactions in the new society may cause a real suffering, which can be relieved only by a return home. In turning his mind to his native village or town, the immigrant remembers the original aspiration which induced him to leave. That desire for a piece of land returns now in the image of a comfortable house, perhaps with a garden, where he can quietly spend his old age. This type of return is called the return of retirement, the last of the four types of returnees." (Cerase, "Expectations and Reality: a Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy," 251.)

items, including religious books published in Russia, fifty-four signed declarations for conversion (together with blank versions of the same forms), and *Where to Seek the Truth?*.

On December 28th, Bishop Iulli wrote to Velyki Luchky's Greek Catholic priest, Michael Bachynsky, to inform him of the incident, order the destruction of "this ill-fated movement," and request further intelligence. The bishop also asked the governor to assist in suppressing the conversions as a purely political movement.⁶³⁷ Responding, Father Bachynsky identified the remigrants Rubis and Hazyi as the main initiators. He regarded the now 111 declarations for conversion illegitimate, and warned that supplying the petitioners with a priest from the Serbian Orthodox patriarch, as they requested, would only embolden a request for a "Russian" one. That eventuality was to be avoided at all costs, for obviously, the Orthodox Church was a "hotbed of Great-Russian ideas and Great-Russian aspirations."⁶³⁸

Among the first and most enthusiastic members of the Velyki Luchky movement were remigrants from the United States eager to purchase land; others "hearing the promises, soon followed suit."⁶³⁹ Rumors circulated, as they had in Becherov, that those unable to buy land had only to convert, and the Russian tsar, who planned to annex Subcarpathia, would redistribute plots to them.⁶⁴⁰ Other economic interests factored as well. Greek Catholic affiliation carried monetary obligations: "stole" and other sacramental fees, as well as corvee-like labor demands on the village priest's property. As the chief prefect of Bereg County remarked, "It is commonly known that in Subcarpathia one funeral will force even a prosperous family into debt; two will mean the loss of livestock; three the loss of land...Unfortunately, the church's hierarchy closes its eyes to the general greed and mercantile spirit adopted by the clergy in the performance of religious services. Although they are spiritual leaders, they invariably alienate the people from religion..."⁶⁴¹ In Velyki Luchky, the greed of Father Bachynsky, acknowledged by his own hierarch, provided a spark to ignite the embers that returning migrants brought

⁶³⁷ Danilec, "Z Istorii Pravoslavnoho Rukhu v s. Velyki Luchky Mukachivskoho Rayony."

⁶³⁸ Danilec, "K Ystoryy Pravoslavnoho Dvyzhenyya v Zakarpatskom Sele Velyke Luchky."

⁶³⁹ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 143-44.

⁶⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 124, 43-45.

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 144.

back with them from the United States; of course, there, too, economic factors had facilitated the affiliation of some migrants with Russky Orthodox parishes.⁶⁴² By early 1904, the movement spread to the nearby village of Horonda. Here too, a conflict with the local priest, whom the parishioners claimed exploited them, provided the immediate catalyst; however, the appearance of conversions in Velyki Luchky, largely remitted from Americas, provided the model for disgruntled parishioners.⁶⁴³

Other influences for conversion also made their way to Velyki Luchky from the Americas, though sometimes through indirect paths. On April 14, 1904, a Father Dmytro Gebei wrote from the village of Meshchovsk, in the Russian Empire, to the converts in Velyki Luchky. Gebei, a native of Subcarpathia, had been in contact with Father Toth and Russky Orthodox circles in the United States by at least 1896.⁶⁴⁴ Still a Greek Catholic priest in 1898, he moved to Bridgeport, Connecticut, where he converted to the Russky Orthodox Church. He subsequently migrated to Russia, where he was ordained as a Russky Orthodox priest. Returning to the United States again, he learned from the American newspaper *Svit* of the Velyki Luchky conversions. Now, once again in Russia, he exhorted converts to appeal to Russia's Holy Synod, rather than the Serbian Orthodox church, for a priest.⁶⁴⁵

⁶⁴² See [Chapter Five](#) on Russky Orthodox parishes as sometimes less expensive alternatives to Greek Catholic ones in the Americas.

⁶⁴³ Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*, 55.

⁶⁴⁴ Father Toth wrote to the Russky Orthodox bishop of North America on May 10 (22) 1896, saying, "Even that Father Dimitri Gebey will not light a candle to the Devil, it will be lit by other people, so that the Russians from Hungary will be lost forever...these people can be saved only with God's miracle!" (See: Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 1, 33.) On March 3 (15), 1897, Father Toth wrote again, "It's also strange with Father D. Gebay, why can't he decide to go one way here or stay there [in Hungary, presumably]?...It would be good to have him in Scranton, but at first there would be nothing to live on. He would be good there; as a former professor from 'biskup Chanath' he would be well informed with whom and how to deal." (See: Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 3, 66. It appears that Father Toth was suggesting that Father Gebei's familiarity with his former instructor in Hungary, Father Chanath—now a Greek Catholic leader ("biskup") and staunch opponent of Father Toth in North America—made him an ideal candidate to bring from Hungary for a post as a Russky Orthodox priest in Scranton, Pennsylvania.

⁶⁴⁵ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 148. Two days before he composed this letter, he sent a separate letter to the Greek Catholic bishop of Mukachevo, asking him to receive him back into his diocese from the "Muscovite schism" as a "prodigal son." *Ibid.*, 149, 258 fn. 86. This would have resulted in his ultimate return migration via a rather indirect path: Subcarpathia to the United States to Russia to the United States to Russia to Subcarpathia. According to Mayer, Gebei's letter to the bishop indicated that "Obviously, his conversion to Orthodoxy was a sham." Indeed, Greek Catholic loyalists generally interpreted reversions to Greek Catholicism, especially among the clergy (like Frs. Victor Toth, Gregory Hrushka, and Teophan Obushkevich), as evidence of the inauthenticity of the conversions; while this may have been so, other exigent circumstances, like the need to make a living wage, also likely contributed to such reversions.

Returning migrants became the most influential vessels for spreading conversions in Becherov and Velyki Luchky, as well as other regions in Austria-Hungary; yet literature remitted from the Americas also proved a critical force. Father Alexis Toth's *Where to Seek the Truth?* represents a quintessential product of the Greek Catholic migrant experience.⁶⁴⁶ The migrant Toth wrote and published it in the United States, and it reflected: his orientation toward conversion, predating emigration from Subcarpathia; his encounter with a Latin rite hierarch in the United States hostile to the Byzantine rite; the Russky Orthodox church as an outlet in "free" America; and persisting concern with developments in the *kray*. The migrant communities among which he lived constituted his primary intended audience, and thus provided the initial impetus for the pamphlet. Yet, he wrote for migrant and remigrating Greek Catholics, as well as non-migrants in the *kray*. For Toth, Russky Orthodox Christianity's advantages laid in essential truth and equivalence with the ancestral faith of the native land.

It is easy to see how opponents understood the pamphlet as dangerous Pan-Slavic, pro-Russian propaganda. Austro-Hungarian officials read Toth's remarks upon *Russky* faith and nationality as commentary upon *Russian* identifications, oriented politically toward imperial Russia; truthfully, Toth left little room for ambiguity. To his rhetorical question, "And why is the Orthodox Faith also called 'Russian' [Russky]?" Toth answered, "Because this Faith is confessed by the most glorious, greatest and most religious people, the Russians [Russky people]; it is missionized by the great, glorious mighty Russia where more than eighty million people are Orthodox."⁶⁴⁷ Concerning prayer for the Tsar, he explained,

The Russian Czar [*sic.*] (Emperor) is a Russian [Russky], and not 'Moscow's' Czar; his title is 'Sovereign' and Emperor (Caesar) of 'All-Russia'; which means of all the Russians [Russky people] on this planet...Each true Russian [Russky]—even if he is not the Czar's citizen, every person, who has even one drop of Slavic blood—has to pray for

⁶⁴⁶ For an English translation of *Where to Seek the Truth?*, see Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 3, 1-38.

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.

his health and for his royal house, because the Russians [Russky people] and the Slavs have in the Russian [Russky] Czar their only protector on this planet.⁶⁴⁸

Greek Catholicism's drawbacks included origination from a Polish-Jesuit plot, overseen by Polonized and Magyarized clergy. The Pope and Latin rite Catholics refused to honor the rights guaranteed by the Unia, denigrated the distinctive Eastern rite, and denationalized/renationalized the people as Ukrainians, Poles, or Hungarians. According to Toth, "To avoid all this persecution, the population of some entire villages left and moved to Russia or to America."⁶⁴⁹

As migrants remitted *Where to Seek the Truth?* to each of the major centers of conversion in Hungary, Subcarpathia's Greek Catholic hierarchs came to regard it as a major threat in both the Americas and Subcarpathia. According to Mayer, at the outset of the twentieth century, Ivan (Valyi), bishop of the diocese of Prešov (including Becherov), was "describing his former priest, Alexis Toth, as a 'dangerous adversary,' especially since [Toth] was familiar with the conditions, people, and priests of the eparchy in Europe as well as the relations between priests and the faithful in the United States."⁶⁵⁰ On July 10, 1903, Bishop Iulli (Firtsak) of the diocese of Mukachevo (including Iza and Velyki Luchky) commissioned an investigation of the book's major tenets; sometime later, the booklet "Take-Read!" circulated in response.⁶⁵¹ Beginning in February 6, 1904, several articles in Hungary's *Gorogkatolikus*

⁶⁴⁸ Ibid., 28-29.

⁶⁴⁹ Ibid., 26-27. To suggest that large-scale transatlantic labor migration, or migration to the Russian Empire, from Austro-Hungarian Greek Catholic regions began because of "religious persecution" oversimplifies the situation, though it is not completely inaccurate. If most individuals migrated for economic reasons, the complicity of many Greek Catholic clergy in exploiting their flock economically did contribute to that motivation. Between 1891 and 1892, some six thousand Greek Catholic peasants responded to rumors of better living conditions in the Russian Empire by attempting to emigrate there. Jews had left Russia *en masse* following the pogroms of 1881, and "The Russian tsar, it was said, needed 'Ruthenians' to replace the 'useless' Jews who had been driven out or simply killed off. Others implied that the tsar and the Austrian emperor had decided to trade subjects, with the tsar giving the emperor his Jews in exchange for the emperor's Ruthenians, who could leave with his blessing." Russian border guards sent many of the migrants back to their native regions. (Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 61.)

⁶⁵⁰ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 203.

⁶⁵¹ Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*, 179-80. From the United States, Father Toth had continued to cause problems for Bishop Firtsak in Hungary, not only with *Where to Seek the Truth?* On December 28, 1896, he reported to the Russky Orthodox bishop of North America that, in response to what he considered nefarious activities of Subcarpathian Greek Catholic priests in the Americas, he had recently sent a lengthy "report" to Bishop Firtsak, entitled "The Deeds of the Holy Uniate Apostles in America." Father Toth wrote to the Russky Orthodox bishop of North America, saying, "...I simply told [Bishop Firtsak] that if he will not

hirlap condemned the influence of Toth's pamphlet among Subcarpathian converts, and on June 28, 1904, the periodical began publishing the entire text along with a critique.⁶⁵²

The influence of the *Where to Seek the Truth?* persisted into the next decade. Following the death of Bishop Iulli, Antony Papp, in his first year as bishop of Mukachevo in 1912, issued a pastoral letter addressing the persisting conversion movements, in which he explained, "I also ask, *Where to Seek the Truth?*"⁶⁵³ (Naturally he did not seek it in the same place as did Father Toth.) Representatives of the Hungarian state, for their part, described Father Toth as an "outstandingly dangerous opponent."⁶⁵⁴ And, as a major piece of evidence in the "second" Maramorosh-Sighet trial, 1913-1914, prosecutors accused conversion activists of distributing and reading aloud from the pamphlet in the villages.⁶⁵⁵

The migrant publication, *Where to Seek the Truth?*, also factored in the village of Iza (eastern Hungary, proximal to Velyki Luchky), a third Subcarpathian center of conversions. Iza's relationship to migrants in the Americas is not as direct as in the cases of Becherov and Velyki Luchky; an analysis of the Iza movement, however, in relation to comparable movements in the Săcel and Velyki Luchky demonstrates that the Americas played a major role in Iza, as well. Maria Mayer, who ignored the conversions in Becherov, found the first documentary evidence of conversions of Greek Catholics in Hungary in the village of Săcel in 1900, in conjunction with the Romanian national movement there.⁶⁵⁶

recall all these jerks from America, then I would have to make a justifiable attack against him in the Hungarian newspapers, since he is the person indirectly responsible for all the disturbances which are made here by his—spiritual sons!" (Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 1, 74.)

⁶⁵² Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 180.

⁶⁵³ Bp. Antoni Papp, *Lyst Pastirsky eho Preosvyschenstva Antoniya Pappa Epyskopa mukachevskoho O Shyzmatycheskykh Ahytatsiyakh* (Mukachevo, Hungary August 6, 1912), 21. See also [Chapter Nine](#) for the Galician response to *Where to Seek the Truth?*, entitled *Where to Find the Truth?*

⁶⁵⁴ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 251, fn. 3.

⁶⁵⁵ Grabets, *K istorii Maramoroshskago protsessa: dielo 94*. The defense responded that the pamphlet made purely religious critiques of the Unia. For more on the persisting American influence in the conversion movements after 1912, see [Chapter Ten](#).

⁶⁵⁶ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 128-32. On the interrelationship of Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy, on the one hand, and the Romanian national movement, on the other, see: Keith Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and nationality: Andreiu Saguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846-1873*, Harvard Historical Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Keith Hitchins, "Chapter Five: Church and School," in *A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania*,

When a four-member delegation approached the Romanian Orthodox metropolitan of Sibiu with 1,000 declarations of conversion on November 22, 1900, it was not their first visit. The villagers' rejection of their own Greek Catholic priest most immediately occasioned their request to come under the metropolitan's jurisdiction; succeeding a priest who had mistreated and defrauded parishioners, Săcel's current priest's unpopularity lay in his friendship with the despised predecessor.⁶⁵⁷ Even replacement by the villagers' preferred candidate did not halt the conversion, and by the time of the November 22nd delegation, the movement had spread to seven other Greek Catholic villages, in conjunction with the Romanian national movement and grievances against Greek Catholic priests, who placed high monetary demands upon their parishioners.⁶⁵⁸ Following the acquittal of Săcel's converts on charges of disturbing the public order, the movement continued to spread to villages in the Iza valley and the neighboring county of Szatmár, where in the village of Dragomirești, twenty families declared their intention to convert to Orthodoxy.⁶⁵⁹

I have found no evidence proving that conversions in Săcel originated in the Americas. Migration from this region of Hungary to the Americas began in the 1890s. Romanian-identifying Greek Catholic migrants attended convert Russky Orthodox parishes in the United States and Canada before 1900 (before the Săcel conversions) and began forming their own convert parishes in the early-twentieth century (on a smaller scale than migrants identifying/identified as Rusyn/Ukrainian/Russian). Such migrants also exhibited high remigration rates. This evidence suggests the possibility of remigrant influence in the Săcel conversions, but remains purely circumstantial.

1860-1914 (Bucharest: The Encyclopaedic Pub. House, 1999); Katherine Verdery, *Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic, and Ethnic Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). Mayer wrote that the movement had spread "to every village inhabited by Romanians along the Iza and Vișeu rivers," but in consonance with this study's methodology, I will not comment upon the "actual" ethnic/national/racial identity of these villagers, except to say that adherents of the Romanian national movement considered them Romanians. (Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 129.) 1900 was also the year in which the Russky Orthodox Mutual Aid Society made a donation for the construction of a church in Becherov.

⁶⁵⁷ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 128-29.

⁶⁵⁸ The villages were Ieud, Borșa, Moisei, Vișeu de Jos, Leordina, Săliște de Sus, Batizfalua, and Strîtura (ibid., 129.)

⁶⁵⁹ Ibid., 131-32.

In 1903, conversions began in the village of Iza, which spread to as many as twenty-five neighboring villages.⁶⁶⁰ In Mayer's narrative, the movement's appearance in Iza, around March 8, 1903, resulted as the Săcel movement began to spread throughout the Iza valley, from "Romanian" to "Rusyn" villages—in Iza, conversion resonated with parishioners influenced by their former Russophile Greek Catholic priest, Father Ioannn (Ivan) Rakovsky.⁶⁶¹ Certainly the assessment of a government official, stationed in the region, that the Săcel acquittal "provoked a situation in Iza one month later," seems to confirm Mayer's timeline.⁶⁶²

Did the Americas contribute to the Iza conversions? The question is important for the current study, because it is with Iza that the series of three trials 1904-06 (in Maramorosh-Sighet, Debrecen, and Budapest), as well as the more notorious "second Maramorosh Sighet trial" of 1913-14, were primarily associated. Tensions over the mass conversions, as reflected in the press and the diplomatic offices of the Great Powers—in particular, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Germany—coalesced around that latter trial in the last two-and-a-half years before World War I. It was the residents of Iza who were tried in 1904-06, and Iza also supplied the majority of defendants in the 1913-14 trial (though inhabitants of Velyki Luchky, including remigrants from the Americas, also stood trial). After initial missionary work near Velyki Luchky, Father Alexei Kabaliuk, the key defendant in the 1913-14 trial, also conducted most of his activities in the vicinity of Iza after 1912. Given the unique significance of Iza, the question of influence from the Americas there is critical.

⁶⁶⁰ Pronyn claimed that movements spread to Kosheleve, Nankovo, Horynchovo, Velytyne, Kryva, Vedevele, Tereble, Yehrshy, Bichkove, Yasenya, Osoye, Ylnytse, Belkakh, Dolhom, Zadnem, as well as to the monasteries in Mukachevo, Byksadsky, Boronyavske, and Ymstychevskij. (Pronyn, *Ystoriya Pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy na Zakarpats'kyi, 442*.) To these, Danilec added the villages of Berezove, Lyptse, Nyzhny Bystry, Horynchovo, Bilky, Dulovo, Dovhe, Oleshyk, as well as Siltse: Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*, 62. Mayer found that in addition to the village of Horynchovo, where 100 to 120 people had converted, the villages of Lypcha, Kerets'ky, Lysychevo, Synyvyr, and Zoloteoreve were also "well aware" of the Iza conversions, and that the head of the Highland's Program office believed the movement would soon spread throughout the Rika an Borzhava river valleys. As a Greek Catholic periodical wrote, "In Iza and the surrounding area the movement is strong, and if an Orthodox priest is sent to various other places...there is no telling where it may end." *Gorogkatolikus szemle* (February 7, 1904), cited in Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 136-37.

⁶⁶¹ Rakovsky was a noted Russophile, who corresponded with some of the actors in the trial following the Hnylychky conversions of 1881-2, and whose letters were presented as evidence.

⁶⁶² Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 132.

In Mayer's narrative, Săcel's conversions spread to Iza: following the Săcel acquittal, a delegation from Iza approached the Serbian bishop on March 8, 1903 with their intention to convert. Jurij Danilec, however, found that already in 1902, residents of Iza asked the Orthodox bishop in Budapest to accept them under his jurisdiction. He advised them to turn to the Serbian bishop, which they finally did in March of 1903.⁶⁶³ Thus, it is certainly possible that the Săcel acquittal galvanized the residents of Iza; yet, that ruling came after the first signs of a movement in Iza had appeared. Furthermore, Mayer also discovered that Iurii Rubis, remigrant from the United States and leader of the movement in Velyki Luchky, contacted the would-be converts in Iza on November 19th, 1903—exactly a month before the government learned of his activities in Velyki Luchky. That correspondence indicated that Rubis had, as of November, already been in contact with the Iza activists—at some time earlier in 1903 or perhaps even earlier. He had already sent his interlocutors at least one copy of *Where to Seek the Truth?*, and he indicated that he had already written “to the other side of the sea” to request “ten more such booklets,” in the hopes of procuring enough copies for both Iza and his native Velyki Luchky. It is unknown whether Rubis's contact with the residents of Iza preceded either their March 1903 appeal to the Serbian bishop or their request to the bishop in Budapest in the previous year; however, as Mayer herself noted (albeit, in a footnote), as early as August 14th, 1903, the public administration committee of Maramorosh County indicated that “Pan-Slavic agitation” “from America” constituted the greatest influence in the burgeoning movement in and surrounding Iza.⁶⁶⁴

What is evident is that, even if no returned, converted migrants actually formed a part of the early Iza movement (I have found no evidence that any did), the “American factor” was critical from that movement's earliest stages. A key figure in the Iza conversions, as with the Velyki Luchky conversions, was the remigrant Rubis; Father Toth's pamphlet, sent from the United States, also played a critical role. Furthermore, the government almost certainly responded to the conversions in Iza in light of its earlier

⁶⁶³ Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*, 47.

⁶⁶⁴ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 255, fn. 43. Although it was Danilec who discovered that the residents of Iza made their first appeal in 1902, he did not refer to their contact with Rubis.

encounters with remitted movements in Becherov. By the time of the Iza movements (1903), the Hungarian government had already explicitly identified “America” as the source of Subcarpathian conversions (1901) and launched its American Action (1902). By early February of 1904, the Subcarpathian periodical *Nedilya* claimed in its assessment of the Becherov, Iza, and Velyki Luchy conversions together, that “America opened the eyes spiritually of our migrant villagers,” and consequently, the people “want to help themselves through changing their faith.”⁶⁶⁵ By that time, 1,000-1,200 people had converted in Iza, and more in the surrounding villages.⁶⁶⁶

Over the course of the next three years, the government initiated three treason trials against the Iza activists: one in Marmorosh Sighet, and then two appeals in Debrecen and Budapest. Though prosecutors were unable to prove treason charges, the court did convict several of disturbing public order and religious slander. While none of the defendants in those three trials appear to have been remigrants from the Americas, local officials did locate and destroy all copies of *Where to Seek the Truth?* before trial, perhaps because it had come from the United States, rather than directly from Russia. Whatever the reason, prosecutors in the 1913-14 trial of many Iza converts did cite the pamphlet for its pan-Slavic and pro-Russian rhetoric.

Labor migration to and back from the Americas thus influenced all three of the major centers of Russky Orthodox movements in Hungary—Becherov, Iza, and Velyki Luchky—and surrounding villages. Local officials, along with the office of the Prime Minister, himself, blamed remigrants for the movements in Becherov. Likewise in Velyki Luchky, the acknowledged leader of the movement and its primary constituents had all returned from the Americas, and the movement’s “bible” had been written in the United States. In 1907, the Prime Minister’s office continued to demonstrate concern with the American factor, when it ordered the chief prefect of Bereg county to determine—first, among several other questions—“have the leaders and members of the movement been to America and are they in

⁶⁶⁵ *Nedilya* February 8 (21), 1904, 124-125, quoted in Pronyn, *Ystoriya Pravoslavnoyi Tserkvy na Zakarpatye*, 441.

⁶⁶⁶ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 137.

contact with Orthodox circles in the United States or in Russia?”⁶⁶⁷ In Iza, too, the local government found the most important source of the conversions in “Pan-Slavic agitation from America.”

Hungarian suppression through arrests, quartered troops, harassment, and trials did partially subdue the movements in all three centers; activists persisted, nevertheless. Velyki Luchky’s inhabitants officially came under the jurisdiction of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate in 1906. The movement in Iza took on an increasingly anti-statist character, in response to the trials. Prevented from establishing an Orthodox church, they refused to attend the local Greek Catholic parish and traveled to Budapest instead for baptisms, or simply did not baptize their children at all.⁶⁶⁸

In 1907, the Prime Minister reiterated what he and Hungary’s government had long known: the source of conversions in Bereg and Maramorosh was unequivocally “America,” but unfortunately, it was impossible to prevent remigration of temporary laborers exposed to “Russian” propaganda circulating there.⁶⁶⁹ Ironically, in that same year, the largest waves of converted remigrants since the period 1894-7 began arriving to Subcarpathia, as well as Galicia, in the wake of a North American economic depression. Thus, when in 1912 Father Kabaliuk remigrated from Russia to his native Subcarpathia as a Russky Orthodox missionary to Velyki Luchky, Iza, and surrounding villages, he capitalized upon existing movements—partly active, partly dormant—established initially through late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century remigration from the Americas, and subsequently galvanized after 1907 by a substantial influx of new waves of remigrant converts.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid., 149.

⁶⁶⁸ Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*, 59.

⁶⁶⁹ Gönczi, *Ruszin Skizmatikus Mozgalom a XX. Szazad Elejen*, 63.

6.4 REMITTANCES AND REFLEXIVITY

The remittance of the conversion movements to Subcarpathia modified both religious and sociopolitical conditions in Austria-Hungary. Those modifications, in turn, reflexively shaped subsequent developments in the Americas, where the movements had begun. After the turn of the century, many migrants now left for the Americas having already encountered the “American” conversions in their own villages in Hungary. They thus began to adapt to the migrant ethnoreligious context prior to migration, whether this meant greater inclination toward conversion, “actual” conversion, or greater resoluteness in their Greek Catholicism. It is telling that, while not every migrant from Velyki Luchky and Becherov joined Russky Orthodox churches in the Americas in the early twentieth century, natives of those villages did establish or join convert communities in virtually all their major regions of settlement in the United States.⁶⁷⁰ While virtually impossible to determine whether that would have occurred, had these converts not first encountered remitted conversions in villages of origin, this factor would have had to play some role their religious decision-making while in migration.

Migrants who left Subcarpathian villages following the appearance of conversions also included those who had comprised the original returning wave of converts from the United States: re-remigrants, or perhaps more accurately, “transmigrants,” of which the Zbihly brothers—Andrei and Vasyli—provide a fascinating case. As related earlier, when the Zbihlys remigrated to Becherov from the United States, hoping to build a Russky Orthodox church, local authorities arrested, indicted, then released them, after which officials and the local Greek Catholic priest continued to suppress the movement. Regardless of to what degree the social and economic consequences of this “religious” persecution factored in their decision-making, the brothers migrated from Becherov yet again, though not to the United States.⁶⁷¹

⁶⁷⁰ My thanks for this observation to Richard Custer, who has been kind enough to share preliminary findings from his ongoing, systematic survey of metrical records (which usually list villages of migratory origin) of historically Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox parishes in the United States.

⁶⁷¹ Ellis Island records indicate that at least one may Zbihly, Andrei/Andras, may have migrated first to the United States again.

Instead, they settled in Tres Capones, a colony of Azara, in the territory of Misiones, Argentina. There, they, fellow migrants from Becherov, numerous Greek Catholic migrants from Galicia, and “cradle Orthodox” from Bukovina became founding members of yet another Russky Orthodox community. Not incidentally, the three “Becherov” churches—in Minneapolis, Tres Capones, and eventually in the 1920s in Becherov, itself—adopted the same appellation: Holy Virgin Protectorate.⁶⁷²

Conversions in Argentina did exert reciprocal influence, not only in Austria-Hungary, but also in the United States. The first Greek Catholics to contest the Russky Orthodox in Tres Capones were Basilian priest-monks, who crossed the border from Brazil, where they had arrived earlier from Galicia.⁶⁷³ In 1913, a Greek Catholic priest arrived directly from Galicia to Tres Capones, from which he appealed to his bishop in Przemyśl for resources in combatting the conversions “threatening” his Greek Catholic constituency.⁶⁷⁴ In 1908, the Russky Orthodox Church of North America used Tres Capones and the Zbihly brothers in its *Kalendar*, to demonstrate the global expansion of the conversions and galvanize its readership in the Americas, Galicia, and Subcarpathia. Thus, following the initial Becherov migration to the United States, the conversion influence traveled back to Becherov, then back across the Atlantic Ocean to Argentina, then both northward to the United States (again) and eastward (again) to Galicia.

The American Action, an Austro-Hungarian religio-governmental response directed toward Hungarian regions and the United States, also dramatically shaped developments in the Americas. This initiative (1902ff) gained impetus from conversions remitted to Becherov (1901), followed by Velyki Luchky and Iza (1903). The American Action sought to preserve Hungarian loyalties of its subjects in migration, especially by forestalling conversions to Russky Orthodox Christianity, the religion of the tsarist empire next door. It entailed the appointment of a “Magyar patriot” as the Greek Catholic

⁶⁷² Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 64.

⁶⁷³ It is also possible that Galicians who had originally migrated to Brazil formed part of the early constituency of Tres Capones’ Russky Orthodox community. Cipko noted that some Galician migrants illegally crossed the Brazilian-Argentine border looking for better living and working conditions in Argentina. Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*, 12, 24.

⁶⁷⁴ See [Chapter Five](#).

apostolic visitor to the United States, the assignment of other “patriots” from Hungary to U.S. parishes and the recall of anti-Magyar priests, cooption of existing Greek Catholic institutions like the Greek Catholic Union and the *Amerykansky Russky Viestnik*, the establishment of new institutions like Hungarian-speaking Greek Catholic churches and “Hungarian” Greek Catholic schools, and preparations to secure a Greek Catholic bishop for North America, loyal to Hungary.⁶⁷⁵

The apostolic visitor, Father Andrew Hodobay, first arrived to the United States in 1902; as government documents reveal, he acted as a paid agent of the Hungarian government, both coordinating the government’s aims in the United States and reporting on the religio-political conditions there.⁶⁷⁶ The government considered his role extremely important, not least of which for his potential to undercut conversions among potential remigrants; as Hungary’s Prime Minister Tisza wrote to the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, “The Hungarian Royal Government expects that by carrying out such tasks, the apostolic visitor would be able to provide a comparatively large amount of information.”⁶⁷⁷ Ironically, Hodobay’s appointment proved advantageous for Russky Orthodox activists, for two major reasons: (a) divisions resulted within U.S. Greek Catholicism and compromised unified resistance to conversion; (b) Russky Orthodox accusations of a Hungarian-papal plot to undermine historic rights of Russky, Eastern rite Christians received new support.⁶⁷⁸

⁶⁷⁵ According to Mayer, the American Action also formed a part of Hungary’s “Vatican Action,” an initiative to gain Rome’s support for Magyarizing projects in Hungary: “By exaggerating the extent of the Orthodox movement in Hungary and in the United States, the Hungarian government tried to win Rome’s support for its ‘Vatican Action’ at home (the calendar reform and introduction of liturgical Hungarian). These measures were hailed as a defense of the Catholic church and were compared to the government’s moral and financial efforts to counter the Orthodox movement both in Europe and the New World.” Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 208.

⁶⁷⁶ On the extent of Father Hodobay’s activities on behalf of the Hungarian government, see especially Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 91-102, 07-16.; and Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 204-31.

⁶⁷⁷ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 209.

⁶⁷⁸ To these two major reasons, it is also possible to add a third reason of consequence. When it became clear that Father Hodobay would not initially be able to secure control of the *Amerikansky Russky Viestnik*, he instead organized a different, Hungarian-loyalist periodical, *Tserkovnaia nauka*. The Russky Orthodox faction, however, secured control of this newspaper and used it for their own ends. Father Hodobay’s subsequent attempts, approved and financed by the Hungarian government, to acquire control over the GCU and its *ARV* also failed. (ibid., 216, 18-19.)

Father Hodobay created dissention within U.S. Greek Catholicism on many fronts. Hailing from Subcarpathia's Prešov diocese, he generated opposition from priests originating from the Mukachevo diocese. Additionally, Rusynophiles, Rusky-Ukrainophiles, and Russophiles all attacked him as a Magyarophile agent of Hungary. Some opposed him from within, such as the *Amerikansky Russky Viestnik's* Rusynophiles, who without breaking with Rome, charged Hodobay with plotting to place the migrant church in the hands of the old country government and bishops.⁶⁷⁹ Though they remained Greek Catholic, they weakened a viable anti-Rusky Orthodox front by their disunity, which the bishop of Mukachevo recognized in a pastoral letter, urging Hungarian loyalty and reconciliation between Prešov and Mukachevo, in the interest of preventing conversions.⁶⁸⁰

While many of Hodobay's Galician Rusky-Ukrainophile enemies also remained united with Rome, a strong movement for independence also arose. *Svoboda* generally opposed the visitator on grounds that he was a "Magyar," rather than a "Rusyn."⁶⁸¹ Commenting upon the Hungarian language in which Hodobay addressed a letter to migrant priests from Subcarpathia, *Svoboda* asked rhetorically, "Why? Is this letter written to Magyar priests? No, it is written to priests, whose parishioners are Rusyns and in view of that, these must be Rusky priests." Regarding Hodobay's purchase of land for the visitator's offices and residence, *Svoboda* concluded that only the Hungarian government could have provided the necessary funds; further, the only possible reason for such an investment was "to beat into the heads of Rusyns, even in a free land, that they are not Rusyns."⁶⁸²

An author in *Svoboda* denied Hodobay's jurisdiction over all priests in the United States: the work of "our vicar and apostolic visitator" (in scare quotes) applied only to citizens of Hungary, not Austrian Galicia.⁶⁸³ At the end of Hodobay's first year in the United States, *Svoboda* contended that, as a mere visitator, he lacked authority to protect the Greek Catholic rite from the exodus of Rusky Orthodox

⁶⁷⁹ *Amerykansky Russky Viestnik* July 17, 1902, cited in Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954*, 60.

⁶⁸⁰ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 214.

⁶⁸¹ See, for example: "Vizytator i yeho pershi kroky," *Svoboda* June 12, 1902, 4.

⁶⁸² "Vonmim!," *Svoboda* July 10, 1902, 4.

⁶⁸³ "Z 'Vysokoyi' Polityky," *Svoboda* June 19, 1902, 2.

converts; which the recent conversions of “around a thousand” in Mayfield, Pennsylvania—in October of 1902, months after Hodobay’s arrival, confirmed.⁶⁸⁴ Were Rome to appoint a proper bishop, conversions would cease, and converts would revert.⁶⁸⁵ “We are not children,” the author asserted, “that you can fool us with visitators...We know the conditions here well and call to you, the leadership of the Rusky Catholic church in the *kray*...Fulfill our request and save us from religious and national death! Give us a bishop!”—one, naturally, who would eschew Austro-Hungarian governmental support.⁶⁸⁶

Although this editorialist criticized Hodobay from within Greek Catholicism, other Galician Rusky-Ukrainophiles regarded his arrival, together with a series of evils perpetrated by Rome, as grounds for an ultimate break with Catholicism. On February 13, 1902, before Hodobay’s arrival, Father Michael Ardan, a Greek Catholic priest in Olyphant, characterized a papal decree directed toward Greek Catholic migrants in Brazil, requiring them to baptize their children as Latin rite Catholics—thus “separating them from their own rite and nationality”—as the latest sign that “Rome will not suffer Greek Catholics, whether they be in Galicia, Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria, Asia, South or North America.” As the Vatican’s promise of repeal concealed intent to later reinstitute the decree, Ardan proclaimed in frustration, “Away with Rome!”⁶⁸⁷ Hodobay’s arrival added to the mounting evidence of Rome’s intolerance of Greek Catholicism, not only because he served Hungary as an enemy of the “Rusky” people, but because he and the masses he represented lacked self-determination within American Catholicism. On March 26, 1902, shortly after Hodobay’s arrival, Father Ardan, who had by this time personally broken with Rome, participated in a meeting in Harrisburg, in which the principle actors—nine Galician priests and sixteen lay delegates—determined to separate from Rome, though they delayed, pending further consideration.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁴ "Zmylutesia nad amerykanskoiu Ruseiu," 2. For more on the Mayfield conversions, see the ensuing article, as well as "Vylizlo shylo z mishka," *Svoboda* November 20, 1902.

⁶⁸⁵ The dramatic escalation of conversions following the ultimate appointment of a bishop in 1907 suggests otherwise, though limitations placed upon him by Rome meant that he was not a proper bishop of a diocese until 1913. See [Chapter Seven](#).

⁶⁸⁶ "Zmylutesia nad amerykanskoiu Ruseiu," 2.

⁶⁸⁷ "Skazhim Sobi Pravdu v Ochy!"

⁶⁸⁸ Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954*, 61-63.

The Harrisburg convention did not represent a declaration for Orthodoxy, however. The participants identified three principle enemies of Greek Catholic migrants: the Latin Rite, the indifference of migrants, themselves, and the “Russian state ‘tsarodox’ churches.”⁶⁸⁹ As Father Ardan warned in an earlier assessment, “I know that the Moscophiles have an answer already. They advise us to convert to Orthodoxy... But no enlightened Rusyn could ever do this. The tsarodox yoke is no better than the Roman yoke.... We [just] want to be Christians, and we believe that we can be so without the oversight of either the Popes or the Synod.” Although staunchly anti-Russky Orthodox, the Society of Rusky Church Communities, later emerging from this movement (and to which Greek Catholics in Brazil were invited to join), nevertheless fostered a spirit of independence from Rome, forming a partial basis for future manifestations of conversions, like the post-1915 movements to “Ukrainian Orthodoxy.”⁶⁹⁰

The visitor also aroused hostilities from Russophile-Orthodoxophiles, who offered a rejoinder to Hungary’s transatlantic response to remitted conversions: more conversions. Father Toth exhorted a primarily migrant audience to convert, by providing the background for Hodobay’s appointment:

Four or five people, Russians, former Uniates who reunited here in America to the Orthodox Church, went back to the Fatherland to the village of Becherov, Saros district, in Hungary. They had not even had time to rest from their trip when the Hungarian gendarmes came and searched their houses with the intention of finding the “proclamations of the All-Russian Czar,” which were directed to all Hungarian Galician Russians instructing them to wait for just a little while, suffering under the Hungarian yoke and oppression, since soon the All-Russian—or better said in the terminology of the

⁶⁸⁹ "Zyizd Ruskykh Svyaschennykov y Delegatov Ruskykh Tserkovnykh Hromad v Harysburgu, Pa.."

⁶⁹⁰ "Skazhim Sobi Pravdu v Ochy!," 3. While “Ukrainian Orthodox” essentially constituted an oxymoron during the period under consideration in the current study, after 1915 it became a viable ethnoreligious option. For the pastoral letter of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky of Lviv in response to the resistance of the Galician migrant priests (including, specifically, the Harrisburg meeting), see: Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, "Pastyrskie Poslannya Mytropolity Andreyia do Dukhovenstva u Spravi Vizytatoriv Dlya Ukrainciv Hreko-Katolikiv u Kanadi i Spoluchenykh Shtatykh," in *Pastyrski Poslannya, 1899-1914*, ed. Mykhail et al. Hrynchyshyn (Lviv: Artos, 2007), 430-41. Metropolitan Sheptytsky wrote that he had been attempting in earnest to secure a “Ukrainian” bishop (he referred to Galicians and Subcarpathians alike by this ethnic designation) and would continue to do so. He acknowledged that, “For us it would have been decidedly better, had the visitor to the United States been selected from one of our priests [i.e., that he had been a Galician].” He remained pragmatic, though: “When, however, noting that there are forty-nine Ukrainian priests in America, of which twelve are from Galicia and thirty-seven from Hungary, we cannot be surprised when what happened, happened. The voice of Hungary in our Monarchy, as is known, is very formidable.” While he agreed that Galician priests had some basis for suspecting a Subcarpathian priest of Magyarizing tendencies, he argued that they did not need to fear, “because Magyar Ukrainians on American territory are freeing themselves from Magyar influences and becoming more so Slavs.” Naturally, the metropolitan urged loyalty to the Apostolic See (*ibid.*, 435).

Jewish-Hungarian press, “Moscow's Czar”—will send his regiments, to take the mountainous part of Ugría [Hungary] and Galicia from Austria. Then there will be harmony and prosperity for the Rusyns!⁶⁹¹

Becherov's priest had invented the “stupid fable about state treason and the proclamations of the Russian Czar,” since conversion undermined subsidies for his parish and salary: he wished to appropriate the \$600 U.S. donation for a Russky Orthodox church, “for gold plating the domes of his Uniate church.”

Describing Hungary's response, Toth claimed, “The inquisition began...With the complete efficiency and bureaucracy of Hungarian-Jewish justice, the suspect returnees were put into prison, and everything printed in the Russian language was confiscated, not only from them but from everyone who had visited America.”⁶⁹² Hungarian-identifying presses in Hungary and the United States ran headlines such as: “Panslavic movements in the mountainous part of Ugría [Hungary] and in the Saros district.” Even the phrase, “Thy kingdom come,” in the Lord's Prayer “raised the absurd suspicion that these prayers are not about the Lord's Kingdom but for the Russian Kingdom!”⁶⁹³

For Toth, it was “as if Austria was entering the next day a war against Russia!...” He attributed the unfounded fears to the presence of neighboring Russia, because “The same Orthodoxy is confessed also by the Great-Russian people; and that is what is considered by the Hungarians and Austrians as dangerous! That is the reason that they persecute everyone who reunited in America with the Orthodox Church!”⁶⁹⁴ The persecution extended even to the United States. Hungary had appointed Hodobay as a “Hungarian Police Chief” with the title of “Hungarian-Greek-Catholic *Biskup* or Vicar” to stop the Orthodox movement among migrants from both Hungary and Galicia.⁶⁹⁵ Thus, Father Toth used the

⁶⁹¹ Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 61. By “four or five persons,” Father Toth referred only to the remigrants who were arrested.

⁶⁹² In Subcarpathia, as well as in Galicia, the people under consideration in this study frequently identified Jews with the “Hungarian” (or in Galicia, “Polish”) lords (*pans*), because Jews historically held intermediary positions between the *pans* and the peasants, as managers of estates. Additionally, Jews were often charged with exploitation as managers of taverns or lawyers. Greek Catholic loyalists and Russky Orthodox converts, alike, attempted to defame one another by invoking the charge of consorting with Jews.

⁶⁹³ Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 62.

⁶⁹⁴ Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 64.

⁶⁹⁵ Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 63. Father Toth used the Polish term, “biskup,” (the Polish form of the word) to refer pejoratively to Greek Catholic bishops.

remittance of conversions from the United States (in which he had played an integral role) and Hungary's response (directed toward converts in the United States and Hungary) to galvanize migrants to further and more resolute movements for Russky Orthodox conversion. Of course, those emboldened ones could and did also remigrate, bringing along further conversion remittances.

For potential converts among the Greek Catholic migrant communities, Russophile-Orthodoxophile rhetoric coincided with criticisms issuing from Rusynophile and Rusky-Ukrainophile leaders within Greek Catholicism. Because these Greek Catholic elites fought among themselves, with some even breaking with Rome (without joining the hated Russky Orthodox), they undermined the possibility of collaboration in joint opposition to the conversions. Between 1898 and 1907, thirty-two new Russky Orthodox parishes of former Greek Catholics formed in the United States and Canada; with the arrival of two new bishops to North America in 1907—one Greek Catholic and the other Russky Orthodox—the number of converting parishes escalated even more dramatically.⁶⁹⁶

Russky Orthodox conversions began among Greek Catholic migrants in the Americas in the 1890s, partly due to influences emanating from the *kray* before and during migration, the exigencies of migration, itself, and especially due to conditions prevailing in the various “American” contexts. Subsequently, in the early 1900s, conversion movements appeared in Hungarian Subcarpathia, then in Austrian Galicia, due to remittances conveyed through remigration and correspondence—combined with the same “old country” factors, which had “prepared” migrants for conversion, in the first place—which prompted declarations for conversion among remigrants and non-migrants alike in East European villages, significant social transformations, and major ecclesial and governmental responses. Soon, new influences for conversion traveled back across the Atlantic, in the form of re-remigrants (e.g., to Argentina), new migrants exposed already to the “American” conversions, and Austria-Hungary's religio-political counter-responses (the American Action and the eventual appointment of a Greek Catholic

⁶⁹⁶ Kohanik, *Rus' i Pravoslavie v Sivernoy Ameryki*, 55.

bishop, the subject of the next chapter). All these reciprocal influences further promoted conversions in the Americas and set the stage for the next round of conversion remittances to the *kray*, which contributed ultimately to Great Power hostilities on the eve of war.

7.0 A PERFECT STORM

During the period 1907-1908, several important events in Europe and the Americas converged in a kind of storm, perhaps not “perfect,” but contributing substantially nonetheless to Great Power tensions resulting in World War I. The five major events upon which this chapter focuses are: the 1907 arrival of the first Greek Catholic bishop to the United States and the promulgation of a corresponding papal bull, *Ea Semper*; the 1907 arrival of a new bishop of the “Russky Orthodox Greek Catholic Church of North America,” and the return of his predecessor to Russia; the onset of a severe economic downturn in North America following the Panic of 1907; the 1908 assassination of the Galician governor, Count Andrei Potocki; and Austria-Hungary’s unilateral annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

On the heels of Hungary’s failed American Action, the mandate of combatting Russky Orthodox conversions in Americas—and, thereby, those in Austria-Hungary—fell upon the United States’ first Greek Catholic bishop, Soter (Ortynsky). Ironically, Bishop Soter initially inadvertently catalyzed conversions in North America. Many opposed the new bishop based upon his alleged personal orientation toward Rusky-Ukrainophilism and Latinization, on the one hand, and the limited powers granted him by Rome, on the other. The Russky Orthodox Church in North America, under the direction of *its* new archbishop, Platon (Rozhdestvensky), capitalized upon anti-Soter and anti-Rome sentiments. Archbishop Platon’s proselytization initiatives among migrant communities in the United States and Canada exceeded even his predecessors’ vigor; he also coordinated conversion efforts in both Austria-Hungary and the Americas. After 1907, the repelling force of a Greek Catholic bishop handicapped by Rome, combined with the attracting force of a Russky Orthodox archbishop empowered by St. Petersburg, generated a new round of conversions.

As the conversions in the United States and Canada escalated during this period, substantial economic forces began pushing them back to their regions of migratory origin. The so-called “Panic of 1907” and the ensuing economic crisis produced major job losses in North America and a period of massive remigration. Converted migrants had been returning to Austria-Hungary for years, but they now did so in much larger numbers, greater concentrations, and at closer intervals.⁶⁹⁷ Moreover, the wave of migrants returning from the Americas after 1907 included within it a higher percentage of converts than in previous years, thanks to the anti-Soter impetus and the efforts of Platon.⁶⁹⁸ Around the same time, two Austro-Hungarian events ensured that these returning converts found their regions of migratory origin decidedly less welcoming to their reappearance. In 1908, the assassination of Andrei Potocki, the Galician governor who had forged an alliance with the Russophile movement, resulted in the appointment of a governor more favorably disposed toward Rusky-Ukrainophiles. More portentously, Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina in the same year dramatically escalated tensions with the Russian Empire—and thus with the Russophile movement within Austria-Hungary’s Galician and Subcarpathian territories.

The convergence of all these factors, in the years 1907-08, set the stage for the events of 1911-14, namely: proselytization directly from the Russian Empire toward Galicia and Subcarpathia (to complement its indirect forms, via the Americas), and the Austro-Hungarian suppression—again in Subcarpathia and anew in Galicia—of mass conversions as politically treasonous. History, as many of its practitioners are fond of saying, is over-determined. Indeed, even this list does not exhaust the potential causes for the later European troubles. Still, the 1907-08 events represent the most salient contributing factors to pre-war Great Power tensions, which surrounded the appearance of mass conversion movements of Greek Catholics to the Rusky Orthodox Church.

⁶⁹⁷ A subsequent section of this chapter (“Mass Conversions”) reiterates a point emphasized in [Chapter Five](#): the question of numbers is no easier to answer during the post-1907 period than it is during the entire period under consideration in this study.

⁶⁹⁸ There is also a possibility that the depression, itself, contributed to conversions in the Americas, in that the economic motivations for conversion would have escalated after 1907 (for instance, as struggling migrant parishes attempted to pay their bills)—further research is necessary however, to investigate this possibility.

7.1 BISHOP OF DAULIA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The American Action had adopted as its primary goal the appointment of a bishop from Subcarpathia to oversee American Greek Catholicism. As a “Magyar patriot,” this prelate would actively serve the Hungarian government’s interests, especially the suppression of Orthodox conversion movements, threatening to shift potentially returning migrants’ national loyalties away from Hungary toward Russia.⁶⁹⁹ The arrival of Bishop Soter (Ortynsky) to the United States represents an extension of this response to conversion movements remitted to Austria-Hungary.

In 1907, Vatican officials may have instead appointed a presumed Rusky-Ukrainophile from Galicia, Father Soter Ortynsky, as the first Greek Catholic bishop for the United States, for several reasons. In the first place, the tenure of Father Hodobay as apostolic visitor unfolded disastrously, for both Hungarian and Vatican interests. Notwithstanding small successes, he proved incapable of fostering an American Greek Catholicism united in Magyar loyalty: not only did Rusynophiles, Russophiles, and Rusky-Ukrainophiles refuse to submit to his leadership, but many fellow Greek Catholics of the Magyar orientation also opposed him. As a consequence, the exodus of Greek Catholic migrants to the Russky Orthodox Church persisted during his appointment as visitor. While the Hungarian government may have entertained notions of remedying the situation—and preserving their religio-political interests among potentially returning migrants—with a more capable episcopal replacement from Subcarpathia, it would seem that the Vatican concluded otherwise: perhaps a Galician Rusky-Ukrainophile could succeed where a Subcarpathian Magyrone had failed.⁷⁰⁰

Apparently the intervention of Lviv’s metropolitan also contributed to the eventual selection of a Galician. Metropolitan Andrei (Sheptytsky) had for many years been urging the Vatican to appoint a

⁶⁹⁹ DyruD noted that this aim was clear in the 1902 report, likely filed by the Minister of Religion on the investigation of remitted conversions in Becherov. (DyruD, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*, 91.)

⁷⁰⁰ Naturally, a conversion-prone Russophile from either region would have been out of the question.

Galician as a more fitting candidate to stop the conversion movements.⁷⁰¹ He did so in the face of major opposition from the Hungarian government, which wished to prevent any affinities with the Ukrainian national movement, championed especially by Galicians, among its Subcarpathian Greek Catholic subjects.⁷⁰² Austria-Hungary's internal rivalry likely also influenced the decision. Austria's government, which gave measured support to the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia as a counterbalance to Polonophile and Russophile influence, may have attempted to exert its own prerogatives in Rome over against those of Hungary. Father Cornelius Laurisin in the United States, who as a jilted episcopal candidate could hardly claim impartiality, made an accurate observation that Father Ortynsky's selection demonstrated Austria's supersession of Hungary in terms of Vatican influence.⁷⁰³ For his part, Metropolitan Sheptytsky met with Hungary's Minister of Foreign Affairs, in order to assure him that Father Ortynsky would prove a worthy combatant against the Russky Orthodox conversions so feared by Hungary.⁷⁰⁴

Thus, although it would be several years before Galicia would experience the upheaval of mass remitted conversion movements, the transnational dynamics of Russky Orthodox conversions nevertheless contributed substantially to Ortynsky's 1907 selection as bishop for Greek Catholics in the United States, insofar as his appointment followed in the wake of the fiasco of Hungary's American Action, largely inspired, as it was, by the conversions remitted to Subcarpathia.⁷⁰⁵ Moreover, the Greek Catholic leadership in Galicia may have at first envisioned as the new bishop's primary role the curtailing of the conversion movements in the Americas; but they also had in mind the many members of their migrant constituency potentially returning to Galicia. Finally, from its experience with the American

⁷⁰¹ See: Leo Sembratovych, "Yak pryishlo do imenovania nashoho pershoho epyskopa v Amerytsi," *Yuvyleiny Almanakh Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy u Zluchenykh Dcrshavakh*, 1884-1934 (Philadelphia, 1934), 103-10; and Sheptytsky, "Pastyrskye Poslannya Mytropolyta Andreyta do Dukhovenstva u Spravi Vizytatoriv Dlya Ukrainsiv Hreko-Katolikiv u Kanadi i Spoluchenykh Shtatykh," 430-41.

⁷⁰² Bohdan P. Procko, "Soter Ortynsky: First Ruthenian Bishop in the United States, 1907-1916," *The Catholic Historical Review* 58, no. 4 (January 1973): 515-16.

⁷⁰³ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 229.

⁷⁰⁴ Sembratovych, "Yak pryishlo do imenovania nashoho pershoho epyskopa v Amerytsi," 107, cited in Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916*, chapter five.

⁷⁰⁵ By this time, converts were also returning to Galicia, though they had not yet begun to form mass movements.

Action, Rome had for some time regarded the conversions as a transnational problem—in its selection of Father Ortynsky, the Vatican would have had among its considerations the struggle against conversions on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

Father Ortynsky's preparation for his migration to the Americas began long before he finally left Galicia in 1907. Father Ivan Volansky, the first Greek Catholic missionary priest to the Americas, returned from the United States in 1890. Before he departed Galicia once again in 1896 for a sojourn in Brazil, he preached at Father Ortynsky's first liturgy in 1891.⁷⁰⁶ By 1900, Father Ortynsky also entertained notions of migrating to Brazil. On March 22, in his personal correspondence he wrote that he had learned about the process of Latinization among Greek Catholic migrants in the Americas from an article written by the Basilian migrant priest Father Damaskyn Polivka (variously of Canada and the United States) and published in Lviv's *Dilo*; he had also heard of the Vatican's decree mandating baptism in the Latin Rite for the children of Greek Catholic migrants in Brazil.⁷⁰⁷ Although he had written to Basilian Greek Catholic missionaries already working in Brazil to volunteer his services, they had refused his offer, saying that relations with Latin rite Catholics would likely soon prompt their own remigration to Galicia. In the same letter, Father Ortynsky argued that such Latinization was promoting conversions to the Russky Orthodox Church in the Americas. Those "neglected" migrants, he lamented, "oppressed by Latinism," as they were, "in small part are joining the Latin Rite, and a greater part are casting off their faith and converting to schism. [Latinization] is water on the Russian mill, the propagation of Orthodoxy..." These American developments also revealed to him the essential nature of the Greek Catholic-Latin Catholic relationship in his own region: "It became clear to me why our relations with our

⁷⁰⁶ Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916*, chapter four.; Michael Baranetsky, OSBM, "Zhyttyevyy Shlakh Ep. Sotera," *Kalendar Provydynya* (Philadelphia, PA: 1956): 38-42. Father Volansky had also returned briefly from the United States to Galicia in 1899. After a brief stay, he returned again to the United States, but stayed there only briefly as well, returning to Galicia in 1890.

⁷⁰⁷ Around this time, Polivka was also corresponding directly with Bishop Konstantyn, first from Canada, then from Northampton, Pennsylvania with respect to Russky Orthodox conversions and potential interventions.

Galician Latins are so poor—after all, as the Latins themselves say, the will of Rome and its tactics are to transform the Rusyns to Latinism.”⁷⁰⁸

In 1907, Father Ortynsky was elevated to his post as “Titular Bishop of Daulia of the Ruthenian Rite in the United States of America.” The sentiments he expressed in his first pastoral letter to Greek Catholics in the United States, which he sent from Galicia shortly before his departure, reads like a classic case of “uprooted” immigration to America. “From this day,” he began, “the battles and conflicts of Galicia are finished, the dreams of a golden fate for my nation, which I had desired to see and experience in my homeland, has ended. Christ has prepared for me a ‘new Pascha’ in a foreign land...” Father Ortynsky reluctantly accepted his elevation to the bishopric, for notwithstanding his earlier rebuttal, he had continued to prepare himself for a missionary career in Brazil: “The power of obedience held me back from the road to Brazil, where my heart desired to bring help to the poorest of our emigrants. The power of obedience placed upon me the bonds of the episcopacy, by which I was united to the fate and sufferings of our Ruthenian Church in the United States. The power of obedience told me: take up this hard and most difficult cross and crucify upon it your own ‘I,’ and through the sufferings you will endure, save both yourself and the flock under your care.”⁷⁰⁹

Prior to his ultimate departure for the United States, the newly elevated Bishop Soter made several important stops in Vienna, Budapest, Prešov, Mukachevo, and Bremen.⁷¹⁰ He first visited Vienna, where he enjoyed an audience with Emperor Franz Josef and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Aehrenthal. There, he also met with the American Consul, who urged him to become an American citizen: he responded favorably, explaining to him that “this is a natural thing because I am going to

⁷⁰⁸ Ortynsky, Father Soter, “Letter to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, dated March 22, 1900,” in Ortynsky, *Vychodets z Drohobychynny Stefan-Soter Ortynsky - Pershyj Epyskop Ukrainskoi Diaspory v SHA*, 23-24.

⁷⁰⁹ “Pastoral Letter of Bishop Ortynsky,” (Lviv: June 25, 1907), 2, cited in Kaszczak, *Most Rev. Stephen Soter Ortynsky, O.S.B.M., D.D.: The First Greek Catholic Bishop in the United States of America (1907-1916)*, 5-6.; Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916*, chapter four. See also Kaszczak’s appendix, which contains the entire text of the letter. Kaszczak has translated “Rusky” as “Ruthenian.” For the classic interpretation of “uprooted” American immigrants, see: Handlin, *The Uprooted: The Epic Story of the Great Migrations that Made the American People*.

⁷¹⁰ As a matter of convention, this study refers to priests by their last names, and Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox bishops by their first names. In keeping with this convention, I have referred to Soter Ortynsky as “Father Ortynsky,” prior to his elevation, and “Bishop Soter,” afterwards.

America for my entire life.”⁷¹¹ Next, he traveled to Budapest, where he met with Hungary’s Prime Minister: the leader of Hungary’s Magyarization program who had hoped for a Subcarpathian appointee to the American bishopric, to stop the returning tide of converts. On his way back to Lviv, he also met with Hungary’s Greek Catholic bishops in Uzhorod and Prešov. In Prešov, he met with the former apostolic visitor and returned migrant from the United States, Father Hodobay, as well as Bishop Valiy, who advised him to accept a stipend from the Hungarian government. Bishop Soter declined, promising to avoid “the politics of nationalities.”⁷¹²

After a stop back in Lviv, Bishop Soter finally departed for the United States. His brief layover in Bremen, before ultimately embarking across the sea, provided a variation on the pattern of vanguard migration waves preparing the way for subsequent migrants. American immigration scholar John Bodnar, in his discussion of the role played by migration networks, comprised of kin and communal associations, in facilitating later individual migrations, has stated pithily, “The immigrant would not enter America alone.” In Bremen, Bishop Soter blessed a chapel, so that Greek Catholic migrants who might have left their village “without God” (i.e., without confessing and receiving the Sacrament) could there invoke God’s accompaniment on their transatlantic voyage.⁷¹³

When Bishop Soter did eventually arrive in the United States on August 27, 1907, he immediately set himself to combatting the Russky Orthodox conversion movements. Key elements of his program to stop the conversions and win back those who had already converted included: asserting authority over the heretofore anarchical clergy (including excommunications where necessary), conducting pastoral visits and drafting pastoral letters to the faithful, establishing a periodical

⁷¹¹ Luke Mushyha, ed., *Jubilee Book of the UNA* (UNA, Inc.: Jersey City, 1936), cited in Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916*, chapter five. See also Bishop Ortynsky’s June 11, 1907 letter from Vienna to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, in Ortynsky, *Vychodets z Drohobychynny Stefan-Soter Ortynsky - Pershyj Epyskop Ukrainskoi Diaspory v SHA*, 39-40. The letter also appears in English translation in Kaszczak’s appendix.

⁷¹² Dyrud, "The Rusin Question in Eastern Europe and America, 1890-World War I", 269., cited in Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954*, 63-64.

⁷¹³ "Dorohovkaz dlya pereselentsiv," *Emigrant* 1, no. 4 and 5 (April 1911): 8, 23. Years later, Lviv’s *Emigrant*, under the editorship of the future first bishop of Canada, Father Nikita Budka, was advising that that all migrants should visit this chapel before boarding for America.

(*Dushpastyr*) as his mouthpiece, and acquiring parish properties into his name so as to keep Russky Orthodox converts from gaining control over them.⁷¹⁴ The bishop's efforts, however, hardly attest to the "uprooting," which he had foreseen before his departure.⁷¹⁵ He coordinated many of these initiatives with the hierarchy in Austria-Hungary, and from the outset devoted the vast majority of his personal correspondence with them to the subject of the conversions.⁷¹⁶

In the second sentence of what appears to be his first letter from the United States to the Greek Catholic leadership in Galicia (composed just weeks after his arrival), Bishop Soter dispensed with all niceties and warned Bishop Konstantyn of Przemyśl, "The situation here is very grave. The Moscovites are gathering all their strength to separate the faithful people to their own [Russky Orthodox] bishop..."⁷¹⁷ He announced triumphantly, however, that "they are not succeeding in this. The people are greeting me with enthusiasm." Still, he could not deny how dangerous matters were. Having thus far visited four cities (New York, Philadelphia, Windber, and South Fork), he concluded that the lack of Greek Catholic priests in many parishes most immediately contributed to the conversions. Six different delegations had already approached the new bishop with requests for priests, and Bishop Soter regretted that he had none to give, for only this, he believed would undercut the conversions: "If it were to receive an increase of priests, the Rusky church in America would, in a short time, become organized and most

⁷¹⁴ One of his first episcopal actions was to excommunicate a priest for his clear "tsarodox" and "schismatic" inclinations. (See Bishop Soter's proclamation, printed in *Svoboda* December 10, 1907, 1.)

⁷¹⁵ For the classic critique of Handlin's characterization of immigrants to America as "uprooted," see: Vecoli, "Contadini in Chicago: A Critique of The Uprooted," 404–17. For the best synthesis of research in this revisionist vein and model of "transplanted," rather than "uprooted" immigration, see: Bodnar, *The Transplanted: a History of Immigrants in Urban America*. For the notable initial lack of awareness within transnationalism studies of this well-established paradigm shift, see Basch, *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-states*.

⁷¹⁶ Bishop Soter's various correspondence with Bishop Konstantyn is housed in *ABGK*, especially syg. 444. His correspondence with Metropolitan Andrei can be found in the Central State Historical Archives in Lviv, much of which has been recently published in Ortynsky, *Vychodets z Drohobychynny Stefan-Soter Ortynsky - Pershyj Epyskop Ukrainskoi Diaspory v SHA*. References to the correspondence with Bishop Konstantyn in this chapter are based upon my own research in the archives in Przemyśl. References to correspondence with Metropolitan Andrei are based upon my translations of the primary sources reproduced in Volodymyr Ortynsky's source book.

⁷¹⁷ Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, undated but received September 16, 1907," syg. 444, 9-12.

wonderful. The schismatic action would soon fall, and those who converted would return [to Greek Catholicism].”⁷¹⁸

In this first correspondence from Bishop Soter to the *kray*, he also noted the “old world” sources of the conversions. He warned Bishop Konstantyn, as even the Latin rite papal nuncio had warned him, that wherever the people fell under the influence of a “Moscophile priest,” the people became “strongly imbued with schism,” and further, that, “Those that now are coming from the *kray* to America, and were under Moscophiles [in the *kray*] will become propagators of schism” in America. It was worst, he added, “among Lemkos.”⁷¹⁹ As he put it in a letter to Bishop Konstantyn a few months later, “Our people, prepared in the *kray* for schism, sincerely join it [in America].”⁷²⁰ He noted as much over a year later in a November 2, 1908 letter to Metropolitan Sheptytsky in Lviv, contending that “Moscophile” influences in the *kray* consisted of U.S.-published periodicals remitted through migrant influence. Bishop Soter urged that accordingly, “It is necessary to turn diligent attention to this in the *kray* and cut off this pernicious work.”⁷²¹ Soter contended that the conversions in America were a “sign that the work of the Moscophiles in the *kray* is ruinous for the church and the people:” the Russophile movement therefore constituted a threat in both America and the *kray*. He implored the Galician bishops to take action, “before it is too late.”⁷²²

This action included, especially, sending more, capable priests to oversee American parishes; but, in a reversal of the logic of Hungary’s earlier American Action, Bishop Soter also advised further action against the Russophile movement in the *kray* as a means of inhibiting the conversions in the Americas. While the American Action sought to undermine the conversions in Austria-Hungary by attacking their American source, Bishop Soter hoped to counter the conversions in the Americas by targeting Austria-Hungary: namely, the “ignorance” of the potential migrants living there and the Galician Russophile

⁷¹⁸ Ibid.

⁷¹⁹ Ibid.

⁷²⁰ Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, dated November 14, 1907," syg. 444, 19-23.

⁷²¹ Ortynsky, "Letter to Met. Sheptytsky, dated November 2, 1908," in Ortynsky, *Vychodets z Drohobychynny Stefan-Soter Ortynsky - Pershyj Epyskop Ukrainskoi Diaspory v SHA*, 69.

⁷²² Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, undated but received September 16, 1907."

movement, which took advantage of them. He requested on November 14, 1907, for example, that Bishop Konstantyn issue an order that priests “among the Lemkos” in Galicia would clearly teach the people “about the Greek Catholic faith and its difference from schism,” for “if there were no Galicians in schism, then there would be no Orthodox people in America.”⁷²³ Or as he said in an October 24, 1908 letter to Bishop Konstantyn, “Clearly, the raised flag of schism has also been frightfully transplanted in America.” He continued, “If only God’s mercy would come to my aid—if only my brothers in the *kray* would extinguish that fire, which casts the sparks of schism even to far-away America.”⁷²⁴ These metaphors, mixed though they were, reveal Bishop Soter’s vivid sense of the transnational dynamics of the causes and solutions to conversions. In the same letter and in subsequent warnings, he also reiterated the logic of the American Action by warning the Galician hierarchs of their self-interest in combatting the conversions in America, for massive remigration would after a few short years bring the majority of migrants back to the *kray*, from where they would further “agitate for schism” by correspondence or further migration.

Bishop Soter also tried to extend his influence into Canada to forestall conversions there. In 1908, he dispatched Father Mykola Strutynsky to Winnipeg and other communities in Manitoba. The Latin rite bishop of Winnipeg, Langevin, quickly orchestrated Father Strutynsky’s departure, however, for Bishop Soter’s emissary had advised Canada’s Greek Catholics: (a) not to sign over parish properties to Bishop Langevin, and (b) to petition Rome to grant Bishop Soter episcopal jurisdiction over Canada, too.⁷²⁵ In May, an Anglo-identifying bishop, Joseph Legal of St. Albert invited Soter to conduct work among Greek Catholics in his diocese of St. Albert, but the Apostolic Delegate vetoed this, saying, ““In

⁷²³ Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, dated November 14, 1907," syg. 444, 19-23.

⁷²⁴ Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, undated but received October 24, 1908," 28, 30. In this letter, he also wrote that “My current situation is completely the same as that of St. Josephat in Polodka.” (ibid., 30) St. Josephat was a Greek Catholic martyr who died in conflicts with Orthodox loyalists during the seventeenth century.

⁷²⁵ Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 201-03.

the future, in order to avoid all trouble, Your Lordship must abstain from all interference in the Ruthenian affairs of Canada, this being the mind of the Holy See on the matter."⁷²⁶

In the summer of 1909, a number of priests under Bishop Soter's jurisdiction appealed to Greek Catholics in Canada and described Bishop Langevin as a "wolf not a shepherd," incapable of stopping the conversions. Although Bishop Soter begged ignorance of the appeal, the damage had been done. In May 1909, a committee of the bishops convened to consider the idea of a Greek Catholic bishop "expressed reservations...especially as Ortynsky's American efforts to halt the spread of schism had been largely unsuccessful." Still, the report recommended extending Bishop Soter's jurisdiction to Canada, though nothing would immediately come of this.

Latin rite opposition continued to delay Greek Catholic episcopal oversight in Canada, until 1912 when Bishop Nykyta Budka became the first Greek Catholic bishop of Canada. As with Bishop Soter, one of Bishop Nykyta's primary tasks, in Canada, was to organize the migrant Greek Catholic Church and resist the Russky Orthodox movement. Until this occurred, however (and in truth, even after the arrival of Bishop Budka), the situation in Canada remained in disarray.⁷²⁷ In his correspondence with the Galician hierarchs, Bishop Soter expressed consistent concern for Greek Catholics in Canada, as well as frustrations over Latin Catholic attempts to undermine his work there. In 1910, for example, he reported to Bishop Konstantyn that together with Presbyterianism, "schism" was hounding the people in Canada: "Priests are necessary," he wrote, "and a lot at that, in order to save these perishing souls."⁷²⁸ It was only with Metropolitan Sheptytsky's North American visit of 1910 that Bishop Soter was finally able cross the

⁷²⁶ Letter dated May 15, 1909 from Apostolic Delegate Diomede Falconio to Bishop Ortynsky (protocol #2228-d), cited in Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916*, chapter five.

⁷²⁷ Metropolitan Sheptytsky argued that only a Galician bishop could forestall the Canadian conversions in March of 1911. Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 204-05. On Metropolitan Sheptytsky's efforts to obtain a bishop for Canada, see: Kazymyra, "Metropolitan Andrew Sheptyckyj and the Ukrainians in Canada," 75-86.

⁷²⁸ Bp. Soter Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, dated April 11, 1910," in *ABGK*, syg. 444, 44-47.

United States' northern border.⁷²⁹ Meanwhile, conversions to the Russky Orthodox church persisted in Canada largely unabated.

Ironically, the bishop who arrived from Galicia with the mandate to combat conversions in the Americas initially became a great catalyst for the conversions, himself, for Bishop Soter proved to be no less divisive a figure than Father Andrew Hodobay. In many ways, resistance to the new bishop mirrored antagonisms toward the apostolic visitor who preceded him. Whereas many Greek Catholics had rejected Father Hodobay as a vociferous Magyarophile, Bishop Soter, perceived as a Rusky-Ukrainophile, prompted comparable, nationally-based hostilities from Rusynophiles, Magyarophiles, and Russophiles. As with Father Hodobay's enemies, the common opposition of these groups to Bishop Soter did not engender unity among these disparate groups. Most importantly, Russophiles from both Galicia and Subcarpathia now largely redirected their attacks on Magyarophilism toward Ukrainophilism. Many expressed these antipathies in the form of Russky Orthodox conversion.

As with Father Hodobay, limitations on Bishop Soter's powers compromised his effectiveness. Prior even to his arrival in the United States, the American migrant newspaper *Svoboda* wondered at his official appointment as "Titular Bishop of Daulia," a titular see of Greece in the province of "far away Phocis." As such, wrote *Svoboda*, he would only be "a bishop *in partibus infidelium; ergo* he will not have direct authority over our people, but will only be a pawn in the hands of the Latin bishops."⁷³⁰ To make matters worse, shortly after Bishop Soter's installation, the Vatican issued an infamous papal bull, *Ea Semper*. This proclamation effectively rendered him a bishop without a diocese. As such, he would remain subordinate to the local Roman Catholic ordinaries wherever he went. While his relations varied with each Latin rite bishop, some altogether forbade his visitation of Greek Catholic parishes for which he did not possess the deed. Practically speaking, he possessed little more authority than Father Hodobay, an injustice about which he often complained in his private correspondence. Soon after the Vatican issued

⁷²⁹ Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916*, chapter five.

⁷³⁰ "V Spravi Epyskopa," *Svoboda* April 25, 1907, 4. Literally, "an instrument."

Ea Semper, for example, he stated that the bull would undermine his attempts to create a diocese, as the people feared to sign over their parish properties to the Irish bishops.⁷³¹ Russky Orthodox activists used *Ea Semper*—and the bishop it rendered “impotent”—as a symbol of Rome’s lack of respect for the Greek Catholic rite, not only in the Americas, but throughout the world: Bishop Soter possessed little power to combat such “propaganda.”⁷³²

In his second pastoral letter, (the first written after his arrival to the United States), Bishop Soter criticized *Ea Semper* to his migrant constituency, saying, “One of our priests wrote to me that the Irish bishops are overjoyed on account of this bull, because now our Greek Catholic nation will partially go over to the schism and the remainder will become Irish. In this way the faithful children of the Greek Catholic Church will cease to be in this land and we will have peace.”⁷³³ But Bishop Soter also frequently voiced his concerns to the old country. On November 14, 1907, he wrote to Bishop Konstantyn in Przemyśl, saying “This bull is a disgrace for our whole church and therefore all the bishops must protest against it, and all the priests and all the people as well. I think that they will do this in the *kray*. If not, then we must do it in America.” Reiterating (and mixing) a metaphor he had used in his pre-migration, 1900 comments on the Latinization of Greek Catholicism in the Americas, he opined, “This Bull is water in the mill of the schismatics, by which the people, already seduced by all manner of schismatic agents, are now easily caught in their nets.” He had not even announced the bull yet, because were he to do so, “all the people would go to schism.”⁷³⁴

On November 19, 1907, Bishop Soter wrote to Metropolitan Sheptytsky in Lviv, saying that *Ea Semper* had only sealed the forces for conversion already at work among the people prior to their

⁷³¹ Bp. Soter Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, dated December 8, 1907," in *ABGK*, 25-26.

⁷³² *Ea Semper* included several other provisions, which its opponents characterized as “Latinizing,” including preference for the Latin rite partner in mixed marriages of Greek and Latin Catholics and also the denial of the right of chrismation, the Greek Catholic sacrament of anointing with oil, which followed the sacrament of baptism. Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954*, 64-66.. Some migrants indicated those “Latinizations” as justification for their conversion.

⁷³³ Bishop S.S. Ortynsky, “*A Pastoral Letter of Soter Ortynsky, Bishop for Greek Catholics in the United States of North America to the Entire Greek-Catholic Clergy and all Greek Catholic Faithful on the Occasion of the Bull (January 11, 1908)*,” 4; cited in Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916*, chapter five.

⁷³⁴ Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, dated November 14, 1907," *syg.* 444, 19-23.

migration. "Most likely you are upset with me," he acknowledged, "regarding my last decisive letter about the affairs of our people, who are heading en masse toward Orthodoxy, and adamantly so. There is no place to hide the truth: the people are prepared by newspapers in the *kray*, which glorified Orthodoxy, and taking advantage of the liberty in America, they go to that, about which they heard from their leaders. The unfortunate bull completed this deed." He added that had he known about *Ea Semper* before his departure, he would never have migrated to the United States in the first place. He also appealed to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, as he had to Bishop Konstantyn, for a transnational protest against *Ea Semper*, saying, "Can you, protest there in the *kray* with the other bishops in both Galicia and in Hungary? All my priests [in America] will lodge a protest because all the people will go into schism. This is no joke." He also found Rome's denial of the authority for which he asked particularly insulting, especially given that, in America, it was the "simple Irish" who possessed episcopal powers.⁷³⁵

Several months later, Bishop Soter expressed gladness to Bishop Konstantyn that the old country bishops had issued a joint protest in the matter of the bull, and indicated that, in addition to a protest sent independently by the clergy to Rome, he would be issuing his own.⁷³⁶ By now, however, the people had learned about *Ea Semper*. As he complained, "The Bull has created a great uproar among the people, and I must pacify them." They had certainly not found out about the papal proclamation, however, from Bishop Soter, who had not dared to publicize it lest "all the people would go to schism." Nor had any other sources in the United States provided the initial information leak to the migrant populace. Rather, "If the bull had not been announced from outside America's borders, no one would have known anything about it—we first found out about it from the old country newspapers. Clearly they feared to communicate it in America." Concern in the "old country" with the migrant context, thus, underlay the

⁷³⁵ Bishop Soter Ortynsky, "Letter to Metropolitan Andrei, dated November 19, 1907," in Ortynsky, *Vychodets z Drohobychynny Stefan-Soter Ortynsky - Pershyj Epyskop Ukrainskoi Diaspory v SHA*, 64-65.

⁷³⁶ Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, dated December 8, 1907," *syg.* 444, 25-26.

publication of *Ea Semper* in Austro-Hungarian newspapers; sustained interest in developments in the *kray* resulted in the first awareness of the bull on the part of migrants in the Americas.⁷³⁷

On November 2, 1908, Bishop Soter wrote to Metropolitan Sheptytsky to say that *Ea Semper* had “aroused the people’s instincts against Rome and against me” and that the “schismatics” were thus “triumphing,” by saying that the bishop “was sent from Rome only as a figure without any authority, and his goal is to help [Latinize] the Rusyns.” By this bull, he argued, Rome, itself, “energetically” promoted the conversions. The limitations on his own authority forced him to make transatlantic appeals to the bishops in the *kray* not only to protest the bull which implemented those limitations, but also within its constraints to counter the conversions. For instance, Bishop Soter possessed little personal power in the matter of a particularly troublesome opponent, Father Theophan Obushkevich. A “clear agent of schism,” he had led “50,000 people to convert to schism,” and how many more would still convert, “no one can estimate.”⁷³⁸ The Latin Rite did not enjoy jurisdiction over Obushkevich, and thanks to *Ea Semper*, neither did Bishop Soter. As his only recourse, he implored the bishops in the *kray* to recall him: “...I want to know, can you help me displace this enemy from America?”⁷³⁹

Russky Orthodox activists would capitalize upon anti-Soter sentiments from the time of his arrival throughout his tenure: even in 1916, Russky Orthodox Archbishop Evdokim sent a letter to the *Amerykansky Russky Viestnik*, Bishop Soter’s most vocal, though still-Greek Catholic-identifying opponent, and attempted to persuade its audiences to abandon Soter and join the Russky Orthodox Church.⁷⁴⁰ Another earlier case of such Russky Orthodox opposition provides a sense of the way in which activists responded to Bishop Soter. Notwithstanding demonstrable losses from Greek Catholicism

⁷³⁷ Ibid.

⁷³⁸ As noted earlier in this study, the question of numbers is difficult to determine. It is entirely plausible that this many Greek Catholics had converted by this time in the Americas (though perhaps not under Father Obushkevich’s direct influence). Bishop Ortynsky later modified his estimates, preferring to downplay the number of conversions.

⁷³⁹ Bishop Soter Ortynsky, “Letter to Metropolitan Andrei, dated November 2, 1908,” in Ortynsky, *Vychodets z Drohobychynny Stefan-Soter Ortynsky - Pershyj Epyskop Ukrainskoi Diaspory v SHA*, 67-68. Bishop Soter issued this appeal to both Metropolitan Sheptytsky and Bishop Konstantyn, because he did not know which would be better to undertake the recall: the bishop of Przemyśl, to which diocese Father Obushkevich belonged, or the Metropolitan, who carried greater general authority. (ibid., 69)

⁷⁴⁰ *Amerykansky Russky Viestnik* July 28, 1916, cited in Procko, “Soter Ortynsky: First Ruthenian Bishop in the United States, 1907-1916,” 532.

to Russky Orthodoxy during Bishop Soter's tenure, in 1910, Father Konstantyn Kuryllyo of Monessen, Pennsylvania reported to the audiences of Lviv's *Nyva* that "It is impossible even to doubt, that with the arrival of the russ. kat.⁷⁴¹ Bishop [Soter Ortynsky], the Russian Orthodox mission loses our people from its guardianship." As a consequence, it was "exactly for that reason, that [the 'Russian' Orthodox mission] consolidates its position materially and morally by all manner of designated agents on Philadelphia territory [Bishop Soter's episcopal seat]. It establishes a church, etc.—not for its own 'Russians,' but for our Lemkos..."⁷⁴²

One Russky Orthodox priest in particular, a former Greek Catholic from Galicia, had proven a particularly troublesome agent in the Russky Orthodox counter-attack: "The most clever of all in agitational activity in the service of Russian schism appears to be Father Krohmalny, which at this moment controls and organizes—apparently, with [Russky Orthodox] Archbishop Platon as his benefactor—the area surrounding Philadelphia.⁷⁴³ And he also grinds his teeth for Philadelphia itself!"⁷⁴⁴ The *Nyva* article contended that Bishop Soter's successes in the battle against conversions had prompted the arrival of Father John Krohmalny (Ivan Krohmalny); in a sense, the conditions surrounding Bishop Soter's bishopric had also contributed to the appearance of the Russky Orthodox missionary priest in another way. As of 1910, the Canadian Latin rite hierarchs' repulsion of Bishop Soter's efforts there had left Canada's Greek Catholic communities largely disorganized and headless. Under these circumstances, Greek Catholics in Canada sometimes circumvented standard hierarchical channels and instead appealed directly to priests in the *kray* for their services. Father Krohmalny came to Canada from Galicia in response to one such request, and together with several other priests migrating to Canada under similar circumstances, he attempted to establish an "independent" Greek Catholic church between 1908 and

⁷⁴¹ This appears to be a typo. Father Kyryllo here used the abbreviation "russ. kat." (two "s"'s), whereas the title of the article uses the abbreviation "rusk. kat." (one "s"). The slippage here by an educated cleric is suggestive of how interchangeable one term could be for the other in the eyes of less informed parties.

⁷⁴² Kyryllo, "Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi," 605-07.

⁷⁴³ Eventually, a several Russky Orthodox parishes were established in neighborhoods surrounding the city of Philadelphia.

⁷⁴⁴ Kyryllo, "Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi," 605-07.

1909. By 1909-1910, Father Krohmalny had simply joined the Russky Orthodox Church, together with a Father Humetsky who had done likewise.⁷⁴⁵ In a January 1909 letter to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, Bishop Soter complained that Father Krohmalny was promoting conversions throughout Canada;⁷⁴⁶ soon, he would be doing so at Bishop Soter's doorstep, for both Krohmalny and Humetsky migrated yet again to the United States, and Krohmalny targeted Philadelphia, Bishop Soter's episcopal seat.⁷⁴⁷

The *Nyva* article, published in Lviv, included the full translation of an English-language brochure, written by Father Krohmalny under the auspices of the "Committee for a New Orthodox-Galician Church:" a "Credo" on "Russian Nationality," which had been distributed among Greek Catholic migrants in Philadelphia.⁷⁴⁸ The brochure, though published in only one thousand copies in America, reached a broader, international audience through its reprinting in Galicia's *Nyva*. At the heart of Father Krohmalny's jeremiad lay the contention of symbiosis between "Russian" nationality and Orthodoxy, as captured succinctly by his introductory aphorism: "Listen, to what our grandfathers and great grandfathers say from their sepulchers: 'Why do we sacrifice our blood for our Orthodox faith and our Russian nationality? By what road walk our grandsons? Woe! Woe to them!'" His religio-national critique of the *Unia* commenced with a history lesson, before proceeding to detail contemporary evils threatening religion and nationality. He then incorporated Bishop Soter's appointment and the promulgation of *Ea Semper* into their existing array of anti-Catholic, pro-Orthodox ideology. Father Krohmalny's proclamation gave notice of a "Russian Galician community" meeting, "in order to protect our Russian nationality from those attacks." Father Krohmalny had insisted that it was imperative that "Every

⁷⁴⁵ Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 201-03, 12 fn. 74.

⁷⁴⁶ Ortynsky, "Letter to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, dated January 1, 1909," in Ortynsky, *Vychodets z Drohobychynny Stefan-Soter Ortynsky - Pershyj Epyskop Ukrainskoi Diaspory v SHA*, 88.

⁷⁴⁷ Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 201-03, 12 fn. 74.

⁷⁴⁸ It is unclear why such a brochure would be written in English (possibilities include mitigating linguistic variations between migrants from Galicia and Subcarpathia, or targeting an assimilating second generation of migrants); nevertheless, the fact that Father Kyryllo translated from the English, rather than reprinting a non-English document, results in some interesting translation issues. For example, Father Kyryllo translated what almost certainly was the English word "Russian," as "Rossysky," even though Father Krohmalny almost certainly would have in his own language used the term "Russky." "Russian" was the English-language ethnic designation adopted by Russophile Orthodox and Rusky-Ukrainophile Greek Catholics alike (and could therefore be used even more ambiguously than the Rusky/Russky pairing).

Orthodox Russian from Galicia and Hungary must be present, because if not, then we will not have strength to resist the enemies of our faith.” In addition to Father Krohmalny, “some other Russian priests and patriots” were to be in attendance at the Philadelphia meeting, and they would “give council how to act in order to destroy our enemies.”

Father Kyryllo, the author of the article in Lviv’s *Nyva*, noted that Father Krohmalny’s April 1910 brochure, when circulated originally in America, “summoned such strife among the Galician people in Philadelphia;” he hoped that the plight of migrant communities would impress itself upon the consciousness of Greek Catholics in Austria-Hungary: “Frighteningly unfortunate are our migrants, as long as among them are found such leaders.” Further anticipating that the brochure’s contents might cause considerable angst in the *kray*, he acknowledged that, “In order to read through this proclamation to the end, it is necessary to have great strength of endurance.” In sum, the printing of this brochure in Lviv, via Father Kyryllo’s correspondence through *Nyva*, provided a lengthy (though still not exhaustive) list of contributing factors to Russky Orthodox conversions in America, as well as a strong dose of the rhetorical flourish employed to effect those conversions. Greek Catholics in Austria-Hungary discerned that contributing factors included migrants’ resentments over perceptions of: (in the *kray*) the compulsion of historic Unia agreements and continued national oppression (by “Jesuits, Poles, and Magyars”); (in America) episcopal impotence, mandated clerical celibacy, the denigration of cherished rites of passage, a discriminatory papal bull, and an unnecessary change in the religious calendar; and (in both America and the *kray*), denationalization *cum* Latinization. Greek Catholics in Austria-Hungary also learned that Russky Orthodox rhetoricians in America bestowed domestic import to these complaints, through simultaneously tradition-centered and future-oriented invocations: of the blood of migrants’ ancestors and the religio-national salvation of migrants’ children.

Some of these conversion factors prevailed in the American milieu alone. With respect to those factors with which Greek Catholics in Austria-Hungary already recognized as factors underlying Russophilism and Orthodoxophilism in Galicia, even prior to migration to the Americas, Father Kyryllo’s correspondence informed them that that newfound freedoms in America—“the free land of

Washington”—both lent greater force to those grievances and increased the potential for preexisting inclinations to arrive at their logical conclusions, namely conversion.

It was not only Russky Orthodox activists in the Americas who capitalized upon anti-Soter sentiments. Father Kyryllo's *Nyva* article informed Austro-Hungarian audiences that non-migrant Russky Orthodoxophiles in the *kray* were also at work: “Lemko region priests themselves, with letters from the *kray* to their far-away parishioners [in America] support ‘the ancient, holy, Orthodox faith’ and sincerely spit on ... ‘Ukrainian Catholicism’ ... Here *irsissima verba*⁷⁴⁹ of one Lemko: “Since I arrived, I have already received two letters, that the reverend [in the *kray*] wrote, [urging me] to flee with haste from Ortynsky.” *Sapienti sat*^{750!}”⁷⁵¹ As noted earlier in this study, Kyryllo referred to this type of influence as agitational gravitation from the *kray*.⁷⁵² While such “agitational gravitation” preceded Bishop Soter's arrival, his appointment lent new impetus to it.

Greek Catholic loyalist priests in the *kray*, at the same time, attempted to counteract transnational Russophile attempts to capitalize upon Soter's arrival. Loyalists wrote to their migrant flocks, though often without success. Father Aleksandr Durkot, a Greek Catholic priest in Jaworze, Galicia wrote to his parishioners working in Philadelphia to exhort them to loyalty to Greek Catholicism and Bishop Soter, but to no avail. As one of his parishioners, Teodor Bulyk, a loyalist living in Philadelphia wrote to him in 1910,

Respected spiritual father, I want to say several words to you as I already wrote to you about our Rusyns that live here in America. You wrote a letter to here addressed to me and Vasyli Kornoy, but it does not help at all because our parishioners that were here do not even listen to it from the *kray*, but they say what a criminal that bishop [Soter] is, as are the priests who say one ought to listen to that bishop. And everywhere conflict is working: they went under the Patriarch of Jerusalem and they do not recognize the pope of Rome as the head of the church, [and say] that he, the damned Italian, wants to turn us to Latin Christianity [*latyntstvo*]. Here in Philadelphia very few of our parishioners are under his authority.⁷⁵³

⁷⁴⁹ *Lat.*: “the very words”

⁷⁵⁰ *Lat.*: “enough for the wise,” i.e., understandable to anyone with sense.

⁷⁵¹ Kyryllo, “Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi,” 465.

⁷⁵² *Ibid.*

⁷⁵³ Teodor Bulyk, “Letter to Fr. Aleksandr Durkot,” in *ABGK* (Przemyśl, Poland: Archiwum Państwowe w Przemyślu, March 23, 1910).

Bulyk revealed that the source of troubles to be Father Krohmalny, who by way of Canada made his way to Philadelphia and he organized a well-attended “~~on~~ the crooked-dox parish.”⁷⁵⁴

Bishop Soter did not remain silent for long in the face of detractors. On January 11, 1908, he circulated his second pastoral letter to his United States constituency. It should not be surprising by now that *Nyva* also reprinted the letter in Galicia on March 1, 1908. In the letter, Bishop Soter claimed that thus far he had conducted his pastoral work “patiently” and “peacefully,” while “some of our people, angered at my silence,” had begun to call him “knave, traitor, papal hireling, Irish sacristan, Polak, Magyar, and God knows what.” He depicted the conflict with his naysayers in scriptural terms, by referencing Jesus Christ’s attitude toward his enemies. When the bishop avowed that, “I, however, remained silent and prayed to God, in order that he not reckon this to them as sin, ‘for they know not what they do,’” he simultaneously cast himself as a crucified martyr and equated the ignorance (*temnist*) of his opponents with that of Jesus’ killers.⁷⁵⁵

Bishop Soter’s taciturn absolution of his critics belied its strategic underpinnings. The bishop understood well that the crux of his problem, as is often the case with internally-waged warfare, lay in separating the wheat from the chaff. “For the time being,” he explained, “I maintained my silence, because the causes of this furor exist both among our people and among our enemies.” The prelate sought to distinguish clearly between “our enemies” and “our people.” The former had capitalized upon the ignorance of the latter, and done so based upon reprehensible motivations of self-interest. “And it became clear to me what is happening here,” the bishop revealed. “The enemies of our Church and our people rage against me and mock me, turn red and equally smear me with the swamp, therefore, because in this lies especially for them: ‘*biznes*.’” These “enemies” deserved the lion’s share of the blame, not the “people,” for the people’s only fault lay in their ignorance: “Our poor people, caught by deceit in the enemy net, neither having [means] nor knowing what to do, fell into schism, became hirelings in a foreign

⁷⁵⁴ Ibid. Here, Bulyk theatrically struck through “*pravo*” (literally: “straight”) and wrote “*kryvo*” (“crooked”).

⁷⁵⁵ Bishop Ortynsky, “Soter Ortynsky,” 141.

land, and cast off their native mother, their holy Greek Catholic Church. Not from an evil heart did they act thus, but rather from ignorance.” The people did not know better, and so they fell into schism; the reverse would also be true: “If they had known, what a heavy service to the schismatics [their conversion would bring about], and what a shame it is to betray their faith, their church, and their people, then they never would have done this.”

Even clerical leaders of the conversion movements—that is, Russophile Greek Catholic clerics who had themselves converted became “ignorant.” Bishop Soter summoned the specter of the proto-apostate, Father Ioann Naumovych, to drive home the point that ignorance underlay the conversion of *all* “our people.” Lionized both as enlightened and an enlightener by converts, for pro-Rusky Orthodox activities, Naumovych represented for the Greek Catholic bishop of America the epitome of ignorance and naiveté. Soter described the sources and consequences of Naumovych’s 1882 conversion:

The late Father Naumovych, wanting to rescue his people from the Polish yoke in Galicia, gave himself over into the service of the Russian schismatics, and for them, cast off his faith, his church, his language and his native *kray*—in a word, everything possible that is dearest in the world to a man. And what happened after this? They gave him golden fetters, and with those chains they also attached the reward of mistrust to his person. In Russia they took him for an intruder, and these chiefs saw him as a crooked eye and always, from above, treated him as some base mercenary—thus, that poor old man, gray-haired as a pigeon and yellow from conflict, wept copious bitter tears, recalling to his mind his Greek Catholic Church and his people. “To turn back would mean shame to me,” said the deceased not long before death, “but to live in schism—it would be happier to bury that life in the cold grave. Here [in Russia], such death, such coldness, such ingratitude—that it is impossible for me to endure it any longer.” And this poor and unhappy man in conflict immediately went from that world on the road to [the city of] Kavkaz, bearing with him, before the Divine Tribunal, the evil threefold oath: “so what about being Greek Catholic, so what about being a priest, and so what about being a pastor?”

Even Naumovych, however, so frequently smeared as “apostate” by his critics, had not exceeded the bounds of forgiveness, according to Soter. As he had done benevolently for the rest of “our people” gone astray, the bishop asked that God “be merciful to [Naumovych] and do not remember his sin, because of his “not knowing what he is doing.” Naumovych’s unhappy story had, unfortunately, until now failed to serve as an object lesson in the perils of religio-national ignorance, for held back by their own ignorance, “Our Rusky people, however, did not consider” Naumovych’s plight.

The bishop portrayed “ignorance” as extending even beyond “our people:” not only had masses of converts abandoned their religion due to ignorance, and not only had their paladin Naumovych done likewise, so too did “cradle” Orthodox in the Russian Empire live in comparable ignorance. Significantly, he made the point in a diatribe against Russky Orthodox agitators, whom he saw as taking advantage of the conditions of migration:

...the schismatics, losing hope of the success of their work in the old country, took it upon themselves to acquire glory in America. But we endeavor to ask them, how many different sects are there in [the schismatics’] church in the old *kray* [i.e., Eurasia, including the Russian Empire]? And why then do those same “truly Russky people”—those highly positioned leaders—convert to the Latin faith and rite in Russia? And why do they not gather all their own Orthodox people to unity and cleave to their church, instead of allowing themselves to convert with such a light heart even to the Latin Rite? Why? Because their whole faith, those dead chains wrapped in a beautiful veneer, but rotten to the core—to *that*, only an unenlightened people would submit to join, but an educated man? Never.⁷⁵⁶

Thus, in his attempt to combat the transnational efforts of his opponents, Bishop Soter attempted to use their transnational consciousness of conditions in regions of migratory origin against them, including that of his most formidable opponent, the new Archbishop of the North American Russky Orthodox Church.

7.2 ALUMNUS OF THE IMPERIAL RUSSIAN DUMA, ARCHBISHOP OF THE RUSSKY ORTHODOX GREEK CATHOLIC CHURCH OF NORTH AMERICA

The *New York Times* announced on April 25, 1907 that the Holy Synod had elected Bishop Platon (Rozhdestvensky) to replace Tikhon (Belavin) as the archbishop of the “Orthodox Russian Church in the United States.”⁷⁵⁷ Platon, the *Times* reported, “is one of the youngest prelates in the Russian Church. He was born in 1866. He is a professor and director of the Kieff [*sic.*] Theological Academy. Bishop Plato[n] is a tall man of impressive bearing, and wears a full black beard.” Having risen to political

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid., 141-42.

⁷⁵⁷ “Reactionary Bishop Coming: Bishop Plato [*sic.*] to Head the Russian Church in this Country,” *The New York Times*, April 25, 1907.

prominence for his role in subduing the populace in the Russian revolution of 1904-5, Platon had afterward become a member of the Imperial Russian Duma, where he allied himself with the party of Count V.A. Bobrinsky.⁷⁵⁸ For its part, *Svoboda* simply announced, “The replacement for the Orthodox Archbishop Tikhon for the United States is already on the way to New York. His name is Platon and he is known as a fanatical knout⁷⁵⁹ and an enemy of all progress.”⁷⁶⁰

In 1920, the Russky Orthodox priest, Father Peter Kohanik, drew a clear connection between the respective 1907 appointments of Archbishop Platon and the Greek Catholic Bishop Soter. “[Archbishop Platon’s] installation in America,” wrote Father Kohanik, “coincided with the installation of the first Uniate bishop in America, Soter, who began shamelessly to ‘Ukrainianize’ the American Carpatho-Russky people. *Vladyka* Platon skillfully gathered his clerical and secular missionaries around him and daringly advanced to battle against Soter’s “Ukrainianism” in open national meetings, through which thousands of Carpatho-Russky people were saved for Russ-dom.”⁷⁶¹ Father Kohanik went on to list no less than sixty-five “Carpatho-Russky” (i.e., Greek Catholic) parishes in the United States and Canada, which had “united to our Russky Mission” under Platon’s watch, between 1907 and 1914.⁷⁶²

Prior to the new archbishop’s arrival, many parishes which joined the Russky Orthodox Church continued to retain the appellation “Greek Catholic” in their names. One of his first major steps was to extend this tactic to the diocese itself; after 1907, he became the archbishop of the “Russian Orthodox

⁷⁵⁸ Ibid. Archbishop Platon’s enemies made much of his Duma past. A 1908 *Svoboda* article ridiculed the subservience of the Synod and Platon to the Tsar by noting that not until the Tsar freed Platon from his service to the Duma could he accept his post as archbishop of America (*Svoboda*, March 12, 1908, 2). A 1914 polemical tract, blaming Russia for World War I and labeling the Russky Orthodox Church an anti-Americanizing and anti-democratic force, alleged that Platon “was before coming to this country as chief of the Russian conspiracy a member of the Second Duma and a leader of the well-known organization of the ‘Black Hundred.’ To his and his associates’ evil influence it is due that every aspiration for justice and liberty in the so-called Russian Parliament was crushed from the start; that every manifestation of independence was penalized, and the voice of the people silenced. It was the organization of the ‘Black Hundred’ which caused the dispersion of the Second Duma; the imprisonment of the signers of the Viborg manifesto; the murder of the Jewish Duma-deputies, Professor Herzenstein and M. Yollos; and which inaugurated pogroms by arousing the passions of the ignorant Russian mob against liberal and intelligent people.” (Szarski and DeWalsh, *The Great Conspiracy* 10.) The Black Hundreds were an ultra-nationalist, pro-tsarist, Slavophile, xenophobic, anti-Semitic group formed in the early 1900s.

⁷⁵⁹ A Russian whip.

⁷⁶⁰ *Svoboda*, September 19, 1907, 1

⁷⁶¹ Kohanik, *Rus' i Pravoslavie v Sivernoy Ameryki*, 55.

⁷⁶² Ibid., 55-57.

Greek Catholic Church of North America.” As with parish names, the inclusion of both terms—“Russian [or Russky] Orthodox” and “Greek Catholic”—in the official diocesan name served the interest of conversion in at least three ways: (a) it constituted a claim to “authentic” Greek Catholicism; (b) it made it possible for migrants who identified themselves as Greek Catholics to convert without recognizing a shift in religious identification and “remain” Greek Catholic;⁷⁶³ and (c) it facilitated the retention or acquisition of church properties deeded as “Greek Catholic.”⁷⁶⁴

Svoboda certainly recognized in Archbishop Platon a major enemy to Bishop Soter and Greek Catholicism: from his arrival in 1907 until his 1914 departure, the American migrant newspaper devoted much coverage to his “meddling” in Greek Catholic affairs.⁷⁶⁵ Greek Catholics in Austria-Hungary subscribed to the American *Svoboda*, but they learned of the Russky Orthodox archbishop’s activities through Lviv’s own *Nyva*, also. In a 1911 article in *Nyva*, Father Kyryllo of Monessen, Pennsylvania related a battle between the bishops Platon and Soter; he alleged,

In March 1910, the Russian Orthodox Archbishop Platon visited “his flock”... and enflamed them to fratricidal battle. After a long conference...he went with several of his priests to *Vashington* (Washington, D.C.), where he introduced into the “Supreme Court of the United Staates [*sic*] of Amerika [*sic*]” a motion to legally charter the Russian Orthodox Church under the name “Greek Catholic Church”—however, without the addition, which they use here in their official directory: “russian orthodox [*sic*].” Their intimate desire and intentions are clear: because, still, not all of our churches are signed over to the Greek Catholic Bishop Ortynsky, and in great parts of our community, there exist strife and disagreements from the agitation of the Russian mission, Uhro-Rusky intrigues or even those peculiar to us here, the “independents”...⁷⁶⁶

⁷⁶³ On the other hand, the fact that many migrants had always identified themselves as “*pravoslavny*” (orthodox), even though “officially” Greek Catholic, also facilitated conversion.

⁷⁶⁴ Whether it amounted to “retention” or “acquisition” depended upon one’s point of view. From a juridical standpoint, the parties who “retained” the properties were to be those who founded the church as “Greek Catholic.” One might think that converts to Russky Orthodox would enjoy no such claim; however, converts often argued that they had founded a church as an “independent” Greek Catholic church, rather than one “United with Rome.” From this perspective, those wishing to be united with Rome were the converts. Predictably, civil courts in the Americas parsed these nuances only with great difficulty, sometimes in favor of the Russky Orthodox, and other times in favor of Greek Catholics (united with Rome).

⁷⁶⁵ See, for example, “Passaik,” *Svoboda* (August 11, 1910), 5, as well as the dozen and a half articles indexed under “Rozhdestvenskii, Porfirii (Bishop Platon) 1866-?” in Walter Anastazievsky and Roman Stepchuk, eds., *A Select Index to Svoboda*, vol. Three: January 1908 to July 1914 (Saint Paul, Minnesota: Ukrainian National Association, Inc.; Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, 1993), 278-79.

⁷⁶⁶ Kyryllo, “Ohlyad rusk. kat. hromad tserkovnykh v pivnichniy Amerytsi,” 524. “Independents” also received more careful scrutiny, for example, the “independent Orthodox community” in Philadelphia, “comprised of many Lemko families.” (see: *Ibid.*, 602-3)

Archbishop Platon's arrival also marked a period of increased transnational coordination of the conversion efforts in the Americas and Austria-Hungary. [Chapter Ten](#) deals more extensively with the spiritual and material support, which migrant convert communities in the Americas lent to the conversion movements in Austria-Hungary after 1911, under Archbishop Platon's direction. It is worth mentioning briefly, however, that the archbishop established two new societies in the Americas: a Russky Immigrant Home and, in 1913, a Society for the Propagation of the Russky Orthodox Faith in North America. The latter organization explicitly articulated two objectives:

- (1) To give moral and material assistance to oppressed Russians from the Carpathians, (Austria,) who incline toward orthodoxy; to unite more closely in an orthodox, Russian fatherland, Russian immigrants from Austria and Russia in America, and to develop, strengthen and deepen in them the realization of Russian nationality.
- (2) To work for the diffusion, support, establishment and development of Holy Orthodoxy, both in America and in the old world, especially in those countries with Russian populations that have been led away from orthodoxy by their union with the Latin Church and by sectarianism.⁷⁶⁷

Representatives of the Russky Orthodox Church in the Americas had for years been promoting conversions in both the Americas and Austria-Hungary; thanks to Archbishop Platon, they now possessed a formal organization through which to do so. It was also largely through the efforts of the Archbishop that American migrant communities directly subsidized the mass movements, which began after 1911 in Austria-Hungary. As a member of the Russian Duma before his departure to America, Bishop Platon had allied with the party of Count V.A. Bobrinsky; by 1911, Bobrinsky became one of Russia's major backers of the conversions in Galicia and Subcarpathia. It was Archbishop Platon who on a visit to Moscow in 1912 convinced one of the activists in the Hungarian conversions, Father Alexei Kabaliuk, to come aid in the conversion efforts in the United States for several months; and it was Count Bobrinsky

⁷⁶⁷ *Russky Pravoslavny Kalendar* (1914), 114, cited in Szarski and DeWalsh, *The Great Conspiracy* 7-8. This polemical tract used these objectives as evidence of the anti-Americanizing influence of the Russky Orthodox Church. It translated "Russky" as "Russian."

who paid for the trip. Following Father Kabaliuk's return to Hungary to stand trial for treason, the archbishop continued to assist him materially.⁷⁶⁸

7.3 MASS CONVERSIONS?

On August 31, 1911, priests (primarily Subcarpathians), who rejected the authority of Bishop Soter, sent a letter of protest against him to the Apostolic Delegate, calling for his removal. Among various other charges, they alleged that Bishop Soter had introduced "civil factional politics" into the church, and that, "Since the advent of Bishop S.S. Ortynski, in consequence of his unwise actions more than 25,000 Greek Catholics have joined the schismatic church. This fact was proclaimed by the schismatic Archbishop Platon in one of his sermons, and to our knowledge it is true." After listing by name nineteen parishes which had supposedly converted, the complaint went on to note that this Soter-inspired exodus would have disastrous implications for the old country, for "The now schismatics emigrating to their homes will infect the Cath. Church in their respective countries."⁷⁶⁹

Bishop Soter's arrival produced a counter-response from the Russky Orthodox, led by Archbishop Platon, but did the combination of these forces translate into an escalation in conversions? In response to the 1911 protest, a number of priests (primarily Galicians) loyal to Bishop Soter issued their own declaration refuting the charges. The allegation of the bishop's "civil factional politics," they said,

exposes the character of some of the subscribers, who are anti-Catholic at heart and would like to desert the Catholic Church and join the Russian Orthodox church, because their political affiliations are with that of the schismatic church. Experience in Galicia shows that priests who are pro-Russian are apostates, whenever the opportunity occurs. Neither Bishop Ortynsky nor any Catholic Bishop can favor elements so uncertain in

⁷⁶⁸ It also seems likely that Archbishop Tikhon would have acted as a consultant in both the American and Austro-Hungarian conversions, following his return to Russia. I have found no evidence that this occurred, however.

⁷⁶⁹ Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916*, appendix. The parishes they named were: Philadelphia, Mt. Carmel, Berwick, Passaic, Jersey City, Conemaugh, Brooklyn, Desloge, Carnegie, Masontown, Newark, Coaldale, Arcadia, Waterbury, Woonsocket, Brookside, Chicago, Minersville, and Jeanette.

their Catholicity. Such persons are very properly “schismatics” and “*personae non grate*” in the Catholic Church. But this does not imply any national antagonism.⁷⁷⁰

As far as the supposed 25,000 secessions, they countered that, “The absurdity of this is evident, when the Russian archbishop only reports a church membership of about eleven thousand in the United States.” Furthermore, to counterbalance the parishes which had joined the Russky Orthodox Church, Bishop Soter had overseen the reversion to Greek Catholicism of a number of congregations which had early converted to the Russky Orthodox Church, including, Passaic, Chicago, Chester, Wilmington, Edwardsville, and Wilkes-Barre. As for those parishes that had gone over to “schism,” the Russky Orthodox successes existed largely “on paper” and instead reflected the Holy Synod’s substantial financial backing, which made it possible to establish a church “for even four or five families.” This resulted in a snowball as exaggerated numerical claims based upon numbers of parishes elicited further support from Russia. Thus, concluded Soter’s advocates, the movement “is more apparent than serious and extends little further than the few people won over by the financial backing referred to.”⁷⁷¹ These Greek Catholic partisans did, however, acknowledge some mass conversions, such as those in Mayfield, Pennsylvania and Passaic, New Jersey, but these “secessions to the Russian church were caused by recalcitrant priests who subscribed to the attacks on Bishop Ortynsky. They deserted their flocks and left them prey to the Russian schismatics.”⁷⁷²

Father Ivan Sendetsky wrote an article in a similar vein, in 1912, published in Lviv’s *Nyva*. “They write and speak much about...conversion to another faith and blame the person and activity of His Eminence, Bishop Ortynsky,” the Greek Catholic priest noted, but to his countrymen in the *kray*, he posed the rhetorical question, “Does the cause of the schism here come from the bishop?” He concluded that the conversions were not due to the bishop, who had done much good for American Greek Catholicism. Instead, he blamed other factors: the lack of religious preparation among migrants, the

⁷⁷⁰ Ibid., appendix.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid., appendix. For an anecdotal report on the small size of one such parish, see: “Posvichenie...,” *Svoboda* (September 24, 1908), 3.

⁷⁷² Ibid., appendix.

initial lack of priests, the antipathy of the Irish clergy and bishops, the “Magyar chauvinism” of the priests from Subcarpathia, the leadership of some of “our priests, because apostasy is even among them,” and the very strongly organized and well-financed mission of the Russian Synod. And although he thereby acknowledged that Greek Catholics had been converting, he argued that the demonstrable increase in the American Russky Orthodox Church’s numbers since 1907 owed more to the arrival of new migrants, many of whom were “cradle” Orthodox.⁷⁷³

As this study has noted earlier, the phenomenon of remigration makes it difficult to establish the number of converts in any period with any certainty, given extraordinarily high remigration rates (*especially* beginning almost simultaneously with the arrival of Bishops Soter and Platon), the tendency of remigrants to rejoin native Greek Catholic parishes, and the suppression of conversion movements among remigrants by Austro-Hungarian officials. What is clear is that a large number of parishes of former Greek Catholics joined the Russky Orthodox Church during the Soter/Platon period. Archbishop Vladimir had overseen the acceptance of one parish (Father Toth’s in Minneapolis). Twelve parishes of former Greek Catholics converted under Vladimir’s successor, Archbishop Nikolai (1891-1898). Archbishop Tikhon (1898-1907) received thirty-two such parishes in the United States and Canada. Under Archbishop Platon, those numbers sharply escalated. Based upon my own survey of parish histories, Father Peter Kohanik’s list of sixty-five parishes of former Greek Catholics added between 1907 and 1914 appears accurate.⁷⁷⁴ Even Greek Catholic opponents claiming that the number of parishes exaggerated Russky Orthodox successes still acknowledged the addition of new parishes.

Several factors qualify these increases. Some parishes did possess relatively small congregations. In a few cases, founding members had begun taking steps toward the formal establishment of a Russky Orthodox parish before 1907 (i.e., before the arrival of Bps. Soter and Platon), and Platon simply formalized their conversion. In a few other instances, parishes had formed from other existing parishes,

⁷⁷³ Sendetsky, "Pro tserkovni vidnosyny v Amerytsi," 237, 58-60.

⁷⁷⁴ Kohanik, *Rus' i Pravoslavie v Sivernoy Ameryki*, 53-59. Archbishop Platon’s successor, Evdokim, also notched an impressive tally of fifty-four parishes of former Greek Catholics, just shy of Platon’s sixty-five.

in order to better serve those who traveled long distances. Still, the great majority of parishes which joined the Russky Orthodox Church between 1907 and 1914 began organizing after 1907. And to balance those that had begun their movement before 1907, a number which began that process under Archbishop Platon only formally converted under his successor (and thus did not factor in Platon's sixty-five). As for parishes which formed from other parishes, in many cases, these did so once enough migrants arrived in a particular satellite locality to justify a parish (i.e., the parish represented a growth in total membership, not a simple division of an existing parish). Finally, though the membership of a few parishes was quite small, there were also cases of clear mass conversions, acknowledged also by Greek Catholics, such as those in Mayfield, Pennsylvania and Passaic, New Jersey.

Conversions almost certainly increased in North America during the Soter/Platon period. Even Bishop Soter himself acknowledged as much, though he blamed *Ea Semper* and Russky Orthodox activists. By 1908, Soter reported to Metropolitan Andrei in Lviv that "Many people and one priest converted to schism because of the Bull."⁷⁷⁵ On January 13, 1909, he conceded in personal correspondence to the Apostolic Delegate that, "The propaganda of the schismatics increases daily and snatches away many souls from the Catholic Church. Many of my priests secretly favor the schismatics, who on the occasion of the publication of the Bull '*Ea Semper*' provoked disturbances among the people in a violent way."⁷⁷⁶

7.4 EXODUS

In 1907, just as a new exodus from Greek Catholicism to the Russky Orthodox Church was beginning among migrants in the Americas, an economic downturn in the United States and Canada

⁷⁷⁵ Ortynsky, "Letter to Metropolitan Andrei, dated March 9, 1908," in Ortynsky, *Vychodets z Drohobychynny Stefan-Soter Ortynsky - Pershyj Epyskop Ukrainskoi Diaspory v SHA*, 71.

⁷⁷⁶ Archives of the Archdiocese of New York: 1-50, cited in Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916*, appendix.

provided a catalyst for an major exodus of those migrants to their Austro-Hungarian regions of origin. The so-called Panic of 1907, together with its subsequent economic downturn and massive unemployment, resulted in large-scale remigration, “the best-documented wave of return migration up to that time.”⁷⁷⁷ The U.S. Panic began on Wall Street in October of 1907, as a failed stock manipulation scheme in the copper market led to a near crash of the stock market. Subsequently, the job market contracted dramatically in various industries, including railroads, steel, mining, and tanning; by mid-1908, the depression had spread from the Northeast to the Mid-West, which was “at a standstill.”⁷⁷⁸ As with previous economic downturns, like for instance, the one in the years following the 1893 crisis, migrants who had recently been hired and were least skilled were the first to be let go. Next, migrants who had held employment for longer periods also lost their jobs, until only native “Americans” remained.⁷⁷⁹ With rampant joblessness, migrants who had come primarily to earn capital and return to their native regions lost the *raison d’etre* for their presence in the Americas. As those who had successfully worked for longer periods “quit while they were ahead,” others who had arrived more recently simply “cut their losses and ran.”

In his study of nativist interpretations of remigration, Neil Larry Shumsky captured well the immediate popular reaction to the sudden upsurge of the phenomenon following the October 1907 Panic:

The *New York Times* published its first report of increased return migration on November 15, simply noting an “unprecedented rush of laborers” going back to Europe and observing that shipping facilities were inadequate to carry the throng. The next day, the newspaper reported a continuing tide, and more details surfaced a week later when the *Times* noted 25,000 weekly departures, “carrying their hordes with them.” Railroads had added special trains to bring people East, and steamship companies were hard-pressed to accommodate the demand, even though they had raised steerage fares by 50 percent. A few days later, the *Times’* articles became even more stupefying. Departures for the

⁷⁷⁷ Neil Larry Shumsky, “‘Let No Man Stop to Plunder!’ American Hostility to Return Migration, 1890-1924,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 11, no. 2 (Winter, 1992): 61-62. On the Panic of 1907, itself, see: Robert F. Bruner and Sean D. Carr, *The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from the Market's Perfect Storm* (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007).

⁷⁷⁸ Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 81.

⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 72.

previous week totaled 60,000. Steamships were booked two weeks ahead, and shipping lines were converting cargo space to steerage in order to appease demand.⁷⁸⁰

Shumsky noted that nativists had long regarded high rates of remigration among migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe as evidence for the inferiority of these “new immigrants,” who, coming as they did only for work, rather than settlement, “plundered” America, rather than making a positive contribution to its society; the sudden upsurge in remigration after 1907 added fuel to the nativist fire.⁷⁸¹ In a circular process, heightened levels of nativism contributed even further to remigrations: while exposure to heightened anti-migrant sentiments would certainly have made continued residence in the Americas less desirable, the practical manifestations of nativism in employers’ preferential treatment for “Americans” over “foreigners” would have played the biggest role.

For the next several years, rates of remigration remained extremely high, and rates of immigration correspondingly low. For example, the number of migrants returning to Italy from July 1, 1907 to July 1, 1908 actually surpassed those who arrived to the United States.⁷⁸² The 1911 Immigration Commission found that Alien emigration (i.e., return migration) in the years 1908 (395,073), 1909 (225,802), and 1910 (202,436), “exceeded the total immigration of any year prior to 1903, and approximated the combined populations of Delaware, Idaho, Nevada, Vermont, and Wyoming.”⁷⁸³ The Dillingham Commission also noted the composition of this massive wave; it found that the so-called “New Immigration” from Southern and East Europe comprised 91.1 percent of the post-1907 “exodus.”⁷⁸⁴ Greek Catholic sources confirm the role of the United States’ economic downturn in prompting mass remigration after the Panic of 1907.

⁷⁸⁰ Shumsky, "'Let No Man Stop to Plunder!' American Hostility to Return Migration, 1890-1924," 62. See *New York Times*, November 15, 1907; November 16, 1907; November 22, 1907; November 27, 1907.

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸² Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 79.

⁷⁸³ Shumsky, "'Let No Man Stop to Plunder!' American Hostility to Return Migration, 1890-1924," 63.

⁷⁸⁴ Wyman, *Round-Trip to America: the Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930*, 77.

In 1910, the first issue of Lviv's Greek Catholic periodical, *Emigrant*, reprinted a December 18, 1907 letter from a migrant in Winnipeg to his native parish of Strusov, Galicia.⁷⁸⁵ The correspondent reported that in late-1907, migrants had been without jobs for two Sundays, already, and maintained little hope of working until, perhaps, spring.⁷⁸⁶ He also related an even more dire situation in the United States, where migrants had already been unemployed for three months. "At this time," he said, "no one will find work in the factories, except those who know how to speak English." A number of "our people" had even written from the United States to the Canadian migrant community, asking whether it would be advisable for them to migrate to Canada, or if, barring that, those in Canada might provide alms for their countrymen south of the border; "And we wrote back, 'What can we do for you, when we ourselves sit idle without work?'" Accordingly, he advised that whoever wished to come to Canada or America from his native village should wait, because the labor market would be unfavorable at least until Spring, and people were, in fact, "turning back" to their region of migratory origin.⁷⁸⁷

In February of 1911, *Emigrant* ran a piece entitled, "They Return from America," which noted that in the past year, over a million migrants had returned, because—as an American economist reported—over four million people were without work. Additionally, the high level of joblessness in the United States, together with a corresponding perception that migrants "took jobs" from real "Americans," accounted for the manner in which "the American government comes down upon our emigrants in their borders, and why they target such sharp paragraphs against immigrants and deal with them so

⁷⁸⁵ "Lysty z chuzhyny," 13-15. The journal had obtained this letter, along with thirty-seven others from Father T. Tsehelsky of Strusov. The board of *Emigrant* hoped that other parish priests would send similar letters in order to begin a comprehensive archive. All the letters, *Emigrant* claimed, testified to the fact that "those migrants are connected to our native people and our native church." The fact was further confirmed, the article said, because the migrants had, while in migration, gathered contributions for churches in their native villages and regularly thanked their old country pastor for his instruction in "how they ought to live in the world." (ibid.)

⁷⁸⁶ An economic recession also hit Canada in 1907-08, leading to widespread joblessness. Based upon contemporary newspaper reports, Martynowych found that in May of 1908, many "Ukrainians" were suffering from hunger. Many sold their homes and left the city (he did not say to where). In Montreal, they dug through dumpsters. Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: the Formative Period, 1891-1924*, 131-32.

⁷⁸⁷ "Lysty z chuzhyny," 13-15.

mercilessly.”⁷⁸⁸ A number of examples of mass returns confirmed the analysis. 300 migrants who returned to Galicia via Cracow on January 25th, for example, reported great difficulties in finding employment in the United States. For several months, they said, people had been waiting for work, suffering from hunger and wandering as beggars. Noting that other migrant letters published in *Emigrant* gave similar testimony, the piece concluded that almost no one who migrated to America would be able to find work there, without first securing a job before departure.⁷⁸⁹

Greek Catholic priests in Austro-Hungarian villages provided further anecdotal evidence of massive remigrations after 1907. In connection with an investigation into potential remittances of conversions in the Galician diocese of Przemyśl, beginning in 1908, a priest in the village of Stupnyts reported in April 1909 that parishioners were “daily returning from America” in particular, from Chester and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Desloge, Missouri.⁷⁹⁰ In November of 1909, the bishop of Przemyśl ordered all the priests in his diocese to send him a report in the matter of migrants from their villages and potential converts.⁷⁹¹ One of the most striking commonalities in these reports was the news that parishes were in recent years experiencing major remigrations and minimal emigrations, due to American employment. On December 23, 1910, Father Aleksander Pryslonsky in the village of Krasnoy wrote that no one had emigrated in the second half of the year, because “the job situation in America right now is very difficult, and for that reason my parishioners are refraining from going out to America.”⁷⁹² On December 28, 1910, Father T. Merena in Reppyk wrote that for the last twenty years, his parishioners had been migrating to “America” (Canada, Pittsburgh, Manchester, and Chicago) for work, almost all with the intention to return. After as few as two or as many and ten years, most did. This year, however, he said,

⁷⁸⁸ "Vsyachyna: Zavertayut z Ameryky," *Emigrant* 1, no. 2 and 3 (February 1911): 30-31. The use of “our emigrants” together with “immigrants” in the same sentence is worth noting for the way in which it reflects differing perceptions of the same migrants by new and old country sources.

⁷⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

⁷⁹⁰ "Protocol with Fr. Teodor Krushynsky," in *ABGK* (April 14, 1909), syg. 4929, 158-165.

⁷⁹¹ For an extensive treatment of this investigation, see [Chapter Eight](#).

⁷⁹² Fr. Aleksander Pryslonsky, "Conversion/Migration Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (December 23, 1910), syg. 4931, 29-30. Father Pryslonsky also added that his parishioners who were currently in migration were only in those localities where there was a Catholic church. He stated unequivocally that that none had converted, either to another rite or to another faith.

no one had gone to America.⁷⁹³ He wrote again on January 16 and again January 18, 1912 with an update, to say that in 1911, due to lack of work in America, only four had emigrated (to New York), and twenty people returned.⁷⁹⁴

Prior to 1907, numerous migrants returned, but they did so in more individualized forms. It is true that, just as chain *emigration* often resulted in several migrants leaving together for the Americas, chain *remigration* also produced groupings in migratory returns, even when favorable economic conditions prevailed in regions of migratory destination. Yet these small-scale collective forms of remigration hardly compared to the massive wave from the United States after 1907. As subsequent chapters in this study show, this new stage in remigration patterns had a crucial impact on the nature of conversions and conversion movements remitted to Austria-Hungary from the Americas.

7.5 AN ASSASSINATION, A CRISIS, AND REMIGRATION AS TRAITORS

As migrants converted in growing numbers in the Americas and increasingly remitted those conversions through massive remigration to Austria-Hungary after 1907, two European events in 1908 rendered migrants' regions of origin decidedly more hostile to their return. The assassination of the Galician lieutenant (April 12) and Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina (October 6) exacerbated hostilities toward the Russophile movement and the conversions to the Russky Orthodox Church associated with it. By 1908, Andrei Potocki, the Galician lieutenant, had forged an alliance with the Russophile party as a means of undermining Rusky-Ukrainophile political influence. He had been among those, for example, recommending to Vienna the appointment of Bishop Soter (Ortynsky) to the United States, which would mean one less Rusky-Ukrainophile on Galician territory. Potocki's

⁷⁹³ Fr. T. Merena, "Conversion/Migration Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (December 28, 1910), 31-33.

⁷⁹⁴ Fr. T. Merena, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (January 16, 1912), syg. 4933, 89-90. He reported to the deanery in Ryppyk that all who had come back had conducted their religious practices in America in the Greek Catholic Church. (*ABGK*, syg. 4933, 95.)

assassination at the hands of a Rusky-Ukrainophile nationalist, however, resulted in the installation of a governor who favored the Rusky-Ukrainophiles over the Russophiles.⁷⁹⁵

Plans for the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina preceded the June 1907 meeting of Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, with Bishop Soter, to discuss the latter's appointment to the United States. Austria-Hungary finally declared that annexation in 1908, following an agreement supposedly reached by Aehrenthal and his counterpart in Russia, Alexander Izvolsky, on September 16th. Although Aehrenthal claimed Austria-Hungary had fulfilled the mutually acceptable terms of annexation reached by the two foreign ministers in the September meeting, Izvolsky, and the Russian Empire along with him, disagreed. In particular, Russia charged that Austria-Hungary had reneged on the agreement to open the Straits of Constantinople to Russia's military vessels. When Austria-Hungary threatened to release documents exposing the fact that Russia had for years agreed to unhindered Austro-Hungarian operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar—a revelation which would have damaged Russia's relations with Serbia—Russia acquiesced in spring of 1909. The concession did not take place, however, before Tsar Nicholas II wrote to Emperor Franz-Joseph to say that Austria-Hungary's actions, taken, as they were, in bad faith, had irreparably damaged relations between the two empires. Inasmuch as France, Britain, and Italy, along with Russia, considered the annexation a violation of the terms of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, the crisis also exacerbated tensions between those empires, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary and its ally, Germany, on the other.⁷⁹⁶

Both of these events increased the tendency of Austro-Hungarian officials to regard Russophiles in Subcarpathia and Galicia as "enemies within the gates." Since the 1882 treason trial of Russophiles Father Ioann Naumovych, Adolf Dobriansky, Olha Grabar, and others, in connection with Rusky Orthodox conversions in Hnylchyky, the Russophile movement's position had steadily deteriorated in

⁷⁹⁵ Himka, "The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I," 481-82.

⁷⁹⁶ Tunstall, "Austria-Hungary."; Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*.

Galicia.⁷⁹⁷ Escalated Magyarization, following the Dual Compromise of 1867, had done likewise for Russophilism in Subcarpathia, as had the remittance of “Russian” Orthodox conversion movements from the Americas after 1901. Austro-Hungarian officials had also grown increasingly wary with the development of so-called, “new course” Russophilism—characterized by more explicit political extremism, including calls for Russian annexation of Habsburg territories—after the turn of the century. Potocki’s assassination in Galicia provided an opportunity to replace him with a lieutenant who would follow Vienna’s anti-Russophile line. The anti-Russophile mandate became even more important in the wake of the Bosnian Crisis a few months later. Notwithstanding periods of denouement, international tensions—and a sense of impending war—remained high from 1908 until the war’s eventual outbreak in 1914. With Russia identified as a clear enemy during this time, Austro-Hungarian officials had good reason to suppress “pro-Russian” activity on its territory in any form, especially mass Russky Orthodox conversions.

On March 9, 1908, Bishop Soter warned Metropolitan Sheptytsky of Lviv that “all of our sincere [*tverdý*] converts have become traitors to Austria, because schism in America—this is a purely political action. I do not know whether I will have to refer to the [Austrian] government in this matter, inasmuch as I myself do not have the strength to give council in this unhappy work: in Hungary likewise.”⁷⁹⁸ On May 27, shortly after Potocki’s assassination, and several months before the annexation of Bosnia, Soter again warned the Galician metropolitan, “Our government does not think about the fact that thousands are selling out their *kray*, and that of those who are returning, hundreds of thousands are turning to Russia and to atheism [i.e., non-Catholicism].”⁷⁹⁹ In truth, Hungary—and even by extension, Austria—had been giving serious consideration to the remittance of conversions and aggressively suppressing these movements as treasonous since the beginning of the century, even staging a series of trials between 1904

⁷⁹⁷ Himka, *Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine: the Greek Catholic Church and Ruthenian National Movement in Galicia, 1867-1900*, 78.

⁷⁹⁸ Ortynsky, “Letter to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, dated March 9, 1908,” in Ortynsky, *Vychodets z Drohobychynny Stefan-Soter Ortynsky - Pershyj Epyskop Ukrainskoi Diaspory v SHA*, 73.

⁷⁹⁹ Ortynsky, Letter to Metropolitan Sheptytsky, dated May 27, 1908,” in *ibid.*, 80.

and 1906. In the tense atmosphere of 1908-1914, new mass movements prompted redoubled repression in Hungary and new Galician suppressions. Though this new stage in the conversions did not begin until December 1911 in Galicia and early-1912 in Subcarpathia, it was after 1907 that the constituency of those movements began returning in droves from the Americas.

8.0 CROSSING THE CARPATHIANS BY STEAMSHIP

Shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, the Subcarpathian village of Becherov became the first in Hungary to experience a mass Russky Orthodox conversion movement remitted from the Americas. In 1911, the village of Grab became a major Galician center of a similar movement. It is a striking coincidence that these two villages were situated just across the Austrian-Hungarian border from one another, separated by the ridges of the Carpathians. Perhaps it was no coincidence at all; perhaps as residents of these villages crossed directly over the mountains, as they sometimes did to find work, one movement influenced the next. I have found nothing to suggest that such a transmission ever occurred.⁸⁰⁰ Instead, all the evidence attests to the remarkable fact that the only way in which the conversions spread from Becherov to Grab, less than five miles away, was via an 8,500-mile journey round-trip to the Americas.

It happened in this way: following the 1891-2 conversion of migrants from Becherov in Father Alexis Toth's Minneapolis parish, Lemko region migrants, including many from the village of Grab, residing temporarily in the area of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, summoned the migrant priest to facilitate their conversion as well. By 1901, remigrants to Becherov initiated a movement in Subcarpathia, and by

⁸⁰⁰ The only possible direct link that I have found is testimony at the 1914 Lviv treason trial by Pelagia Sandovych that she and her husband, Father Maksym Sandovych, who served as Grab's Russky Orthodox priest beginning in 1911, traveled sometime after that across the Carpathians to Bardejov, Hungary, to see a medical specialist. It is certainly possible that the two visited Becherov's Russky Orthodox converts on this journey, though I have found no evidence to that effect.

1911, remigrants to Grab initiated the movement in Galicia. Thus did the movements cross the Carpathians by steamship.⁸⁰¹

In German filmmaker Werner Herzog's infamous 1982 film *Fitzcarraldo*, set in Peru, Irishman and opera-loving madman Brian Sweeny Fitzgerald, called Fitzcarraldo, enlists Peruvian natives to help him drag the *Molly Aida*, a 360-ton steamship, over the crest of a muddy, impossibly steep massif. On the other side runs a river which will lead Fitzcarraldo downstream to a cache of profitable rubber trees, which he hopes will subsidize his dream of building an opera house. Herzog and his crew notoriously spent four years filming *Fitzcarraldo*, during which time they, like the actors in the movie, actually lugged the *Molly Aida* overland. While the people who form the focus of the current study never literally hauled a steamship over a mountain, their story finds parallels in Herzog's outlandish tale. Between 1890 and 1914, the conversion movements proliferated in two East European regions, separated by mountains, and on disparate continents, separated by an ocean. The conversions on either slope of the Carpathian mountain range, and on both shores of the Atlantic Ocean, influenced and, in fact, mutually constituted one other in significant ways, though their relationship to one another was anything but direct. Based upon an impossible fantasy, *Fitzcarraldo*'s key elements—a transatlantic migrant, steamship travel, a mountain crossing, and exploitative labor—also appear in the narrative of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Greek Catholic conversions to Russky Orthodox Christianity. And while Herzog's Fitzcarraldo hauls his boat up a formidable hill to access an elusive waterway, the turn-of-the-century conversions in this study first steamed across the Atlantic—and from there crossed the Carpathians.

⁸⁰¹ Appendix A contains a map of these regions. This development actually represented a re-crossing of the Carpathians for the conversion impetus. The Subcarpathian Father Toth's predilection for conversion was in part inspired by his admiration of Father Ioann Naumovych and his activism for conversion in Galicia's Hnylychky (1881-2). Thus, the conversions actually spread from Eastern Galicia, via the Americas to Subcarpathia, and from Subcarpathians, via the Americas to Galicia's Lemko region.

8.1 FIRST STEPS

Around the same time that movements began developing in Becherov (ca. 1901), Iza, and Velyki Luchky (ca. 1903) in Subcarpathia, comparable movements were also beginning across the Carpathians, in Galicia. Seemingly, those early-century movements unfolded primarily in conjunction with ties to the Russian Empire and Austrian Bukovina, rather than to either the Americas or to Subcarpathia. Galicia had encountered its first “back to Orthodoxy” movement in 1882 in Hnylychky (Zbarazh county, near Galicia’s eastern border with Russia). Around the turn of the century, several more small movements began in Galicia. Stefan Olkhovetsky founded a monastery of Orthodox nuns in 1900 in Soroka (Skalat county, near Galicia’s eastern border with Russia), which appealed to, but did not receive acceptance from the Holy Synod in St. Petersburg. In 1901, the village of Sushno (Kaminka-Strumylova county, near Galicia’s northern border with Russia) saw forty declarations for conversion, in response to antagonisms with the local Greek Catholic priest and an unresponsive Greek Catholic hierarchy.⁸⁰² And in 1904, 638 residents of Zaluche (Sniatyn county, near Austrian Bukovina) appealed to the Orthodox metropolitan in Bukovina to accept them into the Orthodox Church. The Galician infantry restored order by fining seventy-seven would-be converts and imprisoning six, briefly. The replacement of a Russophile priest with a Rusky-Ukrainophile one prompted the conversion movement, and the appointment of another pastor undermined its *raison d’etre*, until 1908, when Aleksei Gerovsky encouraged a revival.⁸⁰³

⁸⁰² Himka, "The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I," 484-85. There is some record of migration from Sushno/Suzno/Sushne to the Americas (e.g., to the United States around 1911), but I have not been able to connect the 1901 conversions there to transatlantic migration. Sushno was the birthplace of Osyp Monchalovsky, a Russophile-Orthodoxophile activist and journalist, arrested in connection with the Hnylychky case, who wrote a life of Father Ioann Naumovych, eventually underwent Russky Orthodox conversion, and participated in the construction of a small Orthodox church in Lviv, in the late-1890s and early-1900s, associated with Orthodox migrants from the Balkans, Russia, Bukovina, and Moldova, who maintained a presence in Lviv since the late 18th century. (Closely watched by Austro-Hungarian authorities, this parish ostensibly remained aloof from the Lemko region movements of 1911ff, though Semen Bendasiuk, one of the defendants in the Lviv treason trial, eventually became an active participant in the parish, after his acquittal, sojourn during the war in Siberia, Japan, then the United States, 1918, and return to Lviv, 1928.) It seems likely that the 1901 movements in Sushno would have had some connection to Monchalovsky. *Karpatorussky Kalendar: Lemko-Soyuza Na Hod 1967*: Yonkers, N.Y.: Typohraphyn Lemko-Soyuza, 1967.

⁸⁰³ *Ibid.*, 485.

The proximity of all three villages either to Russia or to Orthodox Bukovina potentially inspired the idea of conversion as an outlet for localized conflicts with specific Greek Catholic priests. Of these movements, only Zaluche factored in the pre-war Austro-Russian and Russo-German conflicts of 1911ff. The Soroka and Sushno movements bore no apparent connection to transatlantic migration, but before proceeding to clear cases of “American” influence in other, later Galician conversions, it is necessary to consider the possibility of that influence in Zaluche, especially since Zaluche played a major role in the 1914 Lviv treason trial, based upon the vigorous movement there, as well as the arrest therein of two clerical activists and eventual defendants, Fathers Maksym Sandovych and Ignatii Hudyma, for allegedly measuring a local, militarily strategic bridge, in the service of Russia.

Joseph Worobec became the first person to make a formal declaration for conversion in Zaluche, in 1904. In 1903, Worobec and another villager, Michael Nahorniak, together with several other inhabitants of Zaluche, had begun attending the Orthodox parish in a nearby village, only two kilometers away, just across the border in Bukovina.⁸⁰⁴ Worobec and Nahorniak subsequently became the chief promoters of the conversion movement, which resulted in 638 declarations for conversion by the end of 1904. Witnesses at the 1914 treason trial in Lviv also confirmed that, even once the prominent Russophile-Orthodoxophile activist, Aleksei Gerovsky, and a Dr. Ivan Worobec, both of Bukovina, as well as Count Vladimir Bobrinsky and the Russky Orthodox bishop Antony, of St. Petersburg’s Russky Orthodox Benevolent Society, became involved in 1908, the laymen Joseph Worobec and Michael Narhoniak remained the chief promoters of the conversions.⁸⁰⁵

On the surface, it would seem that Worobec and Nahorniak had become familiar with the “Orthodox option,” through their attendance at the nearby Bukovinan parish. That is the explanation proffered by authorities, as well as all existing secondary literature. The simplest explanation, however, in this case, may not necessarily represent the best. Migration from the vicinity of Zaluche and neighboring Zavallye to Canada began in the late-1890s; migrants even named one town they established

⁸⁰⁴ Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*, 561.

⁸⁰⁵ *Przegląd Prawosławny*. Both also testified, themselves, at the trial.

in Alberta “Zawale.” In 1898 two brothers, one from Zaluche and the other from Zavallye, migrated to Canada with their families, arriving to Halifax on April 24, 1898. The two families consisted of: Semen Worobec, his wife, and their five children; and Hrycko (Harry) Worobec, with his wife and their three children. In 1900, a nother family joined them from the same region of Galicia: Yelena (Helena) Semiotuk, *nee* Nahorniak, originally of Zaluche, came with her husband, Elio (Alec) (of Ustysya, two miles from Zaluche), and her two children from a previous marriage.⁸⁰⁶ All three families initially settled in the area of Andrew, just outside Edmonton (Alberta, Canada). It can hardly be insignificant that Canada’s first Orthodox movement had begun in 1897 and continued to thrive in this very area, when Greek Catholic migrants living there, mostly from Galicia’s Brody county (several counties north of Sniatyn), appealed to San Francisco’s bishop to receive them into the Russky Orthodox Church. Thus, two members of the Worobec family arrived to this Canadian region in the year after a conversion movement began there, and one member of the Nahorniak family arrived two years after that, in 1900: several years before activists—and eventual leaders of the conversion movement—by the name of Worobec and Nahorniak began attending the Bukovinan Orthodox parish in a town neighboring Zaluche, in 1903.

With a coincidence highly unlikely, several possibilities remain. Given the pattern elsewhere in Subcarpathia and in Galicia’s Lemko region, it is most likely that the Canadian migrants influenced kin in their regions of migratory origin to convert. Probably one or both the Worobec brothers and/or Yelena Nahorniak corresponded from their adoptive Canadian home with a family member or members in Zaluche (Michael Worobec and/or Ivan Nahorniak) regarding their conversion to the Russky Orthodox Church in Canada. Those family members still in Zaluche then considered conversion as an option, also. The fact that Yelena Nahorniak and her family arrived two years later to the same location as the Worobec brothers (chain migration) also suggests the possibility that either she or her husband

⁸⁰⁶ Vladimir J. Kaye, ed. *Dictionary of Ukrainian Canadian Biography of Pioneer Settlers of Alberta, 1891-1900* (Friesen Press, 1984). It is not clear if Yelena and her second husband, Elio, were living in Ustysya (two miles from Zaluche) at the time of their 1900 emigration. Elio returned to his native village at some time before 1930, where he died. Yelena later died in Canada, though this does not mean that she did not return with Elio.

corresponded with the Worobec brothers after 1898 and before their departure in 1900. Thus, conceivably, Nahorniak and her family could even have encountered the conversion impetus before they left. Upon their arrival to Canada, they could have corresponded further with kin and/or friends in Zaluche to encourage conversion.⁸⁰⁷

It is also possible, but less likely, that the migrants to Canada, exposed to the Bukovinan Orthodox influence before their departure, merely happened to settle in an Alberta community which had undergone a conversion movement less than a year before their arrival; this scenario would require that the migrants in Canada did not correspond with family members about their conversion: one just coincidentally arose in their region of origin a few years later. In a third, perhaps more likely scenario, the proximity to Orthodox Bukovina influenced the migrants to Canada before their departure, producing an inclination toward conversion, which they fulfilled upon their arrival to Canada; they then corresponded with kin in Zaluche, who, also previously exposed to the Bukovinan influence, were favorably disposed to the remitted idea of converting. In sum, although the evidence is circumstantial, it is highly likely that, while the old country Bukovinan factor certainly played a role in the Zaluche conversions, the experience of expatriate Zaluchans participating in and maintaining an actual convert community in the Americas factored more significantly. It is thus probable that the migrants to Canada from the Zaluche area, beginning in 1898, remitted the idea of conversion to their kin, and, by extension, over 600 other villagers, by 1904. When authorities searched the house of Father Ignatii Hudyma—who came as Russky Orthodox missionary to Zaluche in 1911—they discovered a letter addressed to “My Orthodox Brothers and Sisters” in “America,” suggesting the possibility that the Zaluche residents were still at that time maintaining ties with migrant villagers in Canada or elsewhere in the Americas.⁸⁰⁸

⁸⁰⁷ An Ivan (John) Romaniuk also came from Zaluche in 1908 to Andrew, Alberta, where he married the daughter of Hrycko Worobec, suggesting that in 1908 (the year of the recurrence of a Russky Orthodox movement in Zaluche), the migrants in Canada were still maintaining ties with their native Zaluche.

⁸⁰⁸ Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*, 567-68. Specifically, in Canada. The village head in 1910 attributed the conversion movement to joblessness and social unrest, and mentioned migration to Canada as evidence of these conditions (*Ibid*, 564-65).

While the evidence for the influence of transatlantic migrants in the Zaluche conversions is circumstantial, indisputable evidence for the “American factor” exists for conversion movements in other Galician regions. Although several excellent articles have briefly analyzed the role of the United States in the Subcarpathian conversions based upon archival evidence, I am unaware of any secondary literature addressing the same factor within the Galician conversions with any depth, though some have briefly mentioned the subject. Klaus Bachmann referenced, without comment, a 1910 Greek Catholic pastoral letter, in which the Galician bishops called attention to converted, returning migrants and “schismatic agitation.”⁸⁰⁹ Bogdan Horbal devoted a paragraph to the “great significance” of returning, converted migrants from America: he cited Bernadette Wojtowicz’s reference to a Galician Greek Catholic bishop’s 1909 pastoral letter, in which he “turned the attention of his priests to Russian schismatic agitation from America.”⁸¹⁰ According to Horbal, “Remembering external causes, historians often forget to add the personal inclinations of Rusyns themselves, especially those which returned from America.”⁸¹¹ Horbal also mentioned specifically that it was “Lemkos returning from America” who comprised the delegation from the village of Grab which approached Father Maksym Sandovych to be their Orthodox priest.⁸¹²

Additionally, several scholars have noted the American factor in the Galician conversions without providing archival support. Paul Best devoted a paragraph to the “very powerful indirect influence” from North America, in the form of correspondence, publications, and money.⁸¹³ In a couple of paragraphs, Jaroslav Moklak spoke of “agitating postcards” and economic support, provided by converts in America to the Galician conversions, as well as returning converts who joined the “propagandist activity” upon

⁸⁰⁹ Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*, 209. Bachmann referred to the letter second-hand, as it was referenced in the Austrian governmental archives. Himka referenced the same letter, though without mentioning the reference to America. (Himka, "The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I," 490.)

⁸¹⁰ Bernadetta Wojtowicz, "The Role of Religion in the Development of National Consciousness among the Lemkos," in *The Lemkos of Poland: Articles and Essays*, ed. Paul J. Best and Jaroslav Moklak (New Haven; Cracow: Carpatho-Slavic Studies Group; Historia Iagellonica Press, 2000), 210. Horbal, "Halytskyi Starorusyni i Rusophili i Odnoshynia do Nykh Habsburskoyi i Tsarskoyi Monarkhi do 1914 roku," 133. This 1909 letter forms an important part of the current chapter.

⁸¹¹ Horbal, "Halytskyi Starorusyni i Rusophili i Odnoshynia do Nykh Habsburskoyi i Tsarskoyi Monarkhi do 1914 roku."

⁸¹² Horbal, "Triyokh Sandovychiv," 18.

⁸¹³ Best, "Mosophilism Amongst the Lemko Population...".

their return.⁸¹⁴ In his comparative study of the conversions in Subcarpathia and Galicia, Jan Bruski pointed out generally of the two regions that “religious agitation spread in the Carpathians not only directly, but also in a very complicated manner, which is difficult to trace, through Rusyn emigration to the United States, a large wave of which transpired before the end of the nineteenth century.”⁸¹⁵

Greek Catholics in Galicia, including hierarchs, knew of the conversions in the Americas from their beginnings, even before actual formal mass conversions began in the early 1890s. They were also aware that those converts had begun remitting the conversions back to Hungarian regions of the Dual Monarchy. In 1907, for example, the Galician publication *Katolytsky Vskhid* agreed with the assessment of the Subcarpathian Greek Catholic newspaper, *Katolički List*, that the Magyarophilism of Subcarpathia’s Greek Catholic priests underlay conversions of Greek Catholics from that region in America, about which “American newspapers often bring us news.”⁸¹⁶ Because the artificial language barrier between Magyarone priests and the non-Hungarian speaking masses hindered catechetical instruction in the tenets of the Greek Catholic faith, Russky Orthodox activists in America enjoyed a linguistic advantage over their Magyarone Greek Catholic counterparts: “There [in America] a people hears something in its own language and soon passes to schism.” When the Subcarpathian *Katolički List* argued that the consequences of Greek Catholic clerical Magyarophilism had rebounded from America to Subcarpathia in the form of remitted conversions—when it suggested, “From America the schism also began to transfer over among the Greek Catholics in Hungary...”—the Galician *Katolytsky Vskhid* concurred.⁸¹⁷

⁸¹⁴ Moklak, "Rosyiske Pravoslavyya na Lemkivschyni v 1911 – 1915 Rokach," 3. Moklak, "Pravoslavia v Halychyni—Politychni Aspekty ": 149-50. It would appear that both Best and Moklak based their claims upon their surveys of the records in *ABGK*, esp. syg. 437.

⁸¹⁵ Bruski, "Zakarpacie a Lemkowszczyzna. Podloze i Rozwoj Ruchu Prawoslawnego w Okresie Miedzywojennym," 147. Bruski spoke generally of both regions here, but he provided only a Subcarpathian example (Becherov) as illustration; he did, however, cite the work of Moklak.

⁸¹⁶ “Madyarska mova v Bohoslužhenyu u hreko-kat. Madyariv(!)” *Katolički List* 12, no. 3, qutd. in I. Vanchyk, "Madyarska mova v tserkovnim bohoslužhenyu a ruske dukhovenstvo na Uhorschyni," *Katolytsky Skhid* 4, no. 2 (1907): 228-29.

⁸¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 228-29.

Greek Catholics also began to experience the reverberations of the American conversions at around the same time in their own region, though not yet in the form of mass conversions. In 1896, the American migrant publication *Svoboda* complained that the Galician Russophile *Halychanyn* had intentionally misrepresented *Svoboda*'s reports on Russky Orthodox conversions in "America," in the service of: (a) undermining the "prudent national work of Rusyns in America" and (b) the Russophile political agenda in Galicia.⁸¹⁸ *Svoboda* claimed a desire to stay out of the polemics between the "old country" newspapers, because they did not "enter the program of our work in America;" however, on this occasion, *Svoboda* was forced to make a one-time exception. *Halychanyn* had claimed that "Many Russky Uniates, migrating to America, are accepting Orthodoxy," together with former Uniate priests, who comprised a well-organized Orthodox Church "beyond the ocean." Furthermore, *Halychanyn* had characterized *Svoboda*'s opposition to the conversions as unfounded and slanderous attacks. (*Halychanyn* characteristically indicated its thinly-veiled support for Russky Orthodox Christianity wherever it found it, via reportage of persecutions of the Orthodox Church, rather than overt identification or praise.)

Svoboda retorted that *Halychanyn* had no sense of general ethnoreligious developments in America, where only "several renegade priests, and along with them a small number of the people" comprised a disorganized Orthodox Church "across the ocean," in spite of "massive subsidies from Russia." *Svoboda* had criticized the activities of the Russky Orthodox because it hoped to raise the cultural level of migrants to match that of Americans, partly as a response to American religious pluralism. "In one city there are at least ten different confessional communities," *Svoboda* explained to its readers in Galicia. "Only the toleration of all religions, only the fact that that the state does not meddle in the question of the religion of its citizens, allows the machinery of business to be conducted in America, as it has done thus far." Such pluralism engendered potentially dangerous religious competition for migrant souls, for "Those people all work together, whether in the mines or factories." As religion and nationality represented inseparable components of a people's cultural level, religious defections

⁸¹⁸ "Halytska pravoslavna armiya z oruzhiyem slyakhotnoy denuntsiyatsi" (The Galician Orthodox army armed with noble denunciations), *Svoboda* (March 12, 1896), 1-2; "Vonystvuyushchaya uniya," *Halychanyn* 30 (1896).

would prove fatal for national identifications. *Svoboda* was therefore well within its rights to impugn the Russky Orthodox, who conducted “shameful agitation” like “no other religious sect.”⁸¹⁹

Svoboda vowed that following this article, it would never again react to any of *Halychanyn*’s slander, “even if that Orthodox-deformed-oppositional-destructive-progressive newspaper wanted to denounce, by name, all Rusyns in America, as it does for [Rusyns] in Galicia.” *Halychanyn*’s subsequent offences must have exceeded even that extreme, however, for *Svoboda* responded to another article in the Galician periodical just months later (chirping, “To the gentleman at *Halychanyn*, buy yourselves some glasses when you read *Svoboda*!”), and the two newspapers would sustain a lively transatlantic exchange for the next decade and a half.⁸²⁰ In 1897, for instance, Father Konstankevych, the priest in Shamokin complained in *Svoboda* of further inaccuracies in *Halychanyn*, and this time *Svoboda* implicated a co-conspirator: the Kachkovsky Society in America.⁸²¹ While heretofore *Svoboda* had generally supported the Society, even selling books obtained from its Galician arm to American migrants, matters were about to change. *Halychanyn* claimed, on the basis of information received from the Kachkovsky Society in “Mr. Keesport” (McKeesport) and Shamokin in Pennsylvania and Jersey City in “Nev. York” (New York, but actually New Jersey), that Uniate priests in America had been extorting parishioners for sacramental fees, “haggling over them even more than Jews do” and charging \$5-\$10 for baptisms and \$15-\$25 for funerals. As a result, said *Halychanyn*, many of “our poor migrants” intended to convert to Orthodoxy. Father Konstankevych responded that while he could not speak for the mystery locale of “Mr. Keesport,” he and others could vouch for the priest in Jersey City. As for his own Shamokin parish, he charged far

⁸¹⁹ *Svoboda* gave the impression that no other denominations proselytized among Greek Catholics—this was far from the case. Although Russky Orthodox activists constituted the most important threat, Protestant missionary societies also conducted their work among the migrants; hundreds of thousands of Greek Catholics also “converted” to Roman Catholicism.

⁸²⁰ “Panove vid Halychanyna kupit sobi okuliary iak chytaiete Svobodu!” *Svoboda* (October 8, 1896), 3. *Svoboda* reported that *Halychanyn* (“Yz amerykanskoj Rusy,” 191 (1896)) had again misrepresented the American publication’s reports, this time in connection with an on-going church property in Wilkes-Barre. *Halychanyn* had erroneously identified the leader of the Russky Orthodox faction as Father Hrushka, *Svoboda*’s former editor, even though *Halychanyn*’s editors “knew very well” that Father Toth was the Russky Orthodox priest in Wilkes-Barre.

⁸²¹ O.N. Khr. Konstankevych, “Neprosheni opikuny ‘neshchasnykh’ pereselentsev (vidpovid Halychanynovi),” (Unsolicited oversight over “unfortunate” migrants (response to *Halychanyn*)), *Svoboda* (December 2, 1897), 4; “Plokho dilayut v Amerytsi,” *Halychanyn* 245 (October 9, 1897).

less, he said, especially as migrants were suffering from an American economic downturn. Regarding the conversions, Father Konstankevych contended that “where our Galician priests are, no one even thinks about that,” and alleged that Father Victor Toth and even his brother Father Alexis Toth, had recently petitioned the Bishop of Prešov (Subcarpathia) “to accept them back into the bosom of the Greek Catholic Church.”⁸²²

The mid- to late-1890s discourse between the American *Svoboda* and Galician *Halychanyn* represents an important early instance of several portentous developments, which would ultimately have dramatic ramifications for Galicia and for international Great Power relations. *Halychanyn*'s reportage on the conversions among migrant communities in America represents an early, ideational remittance of those conversions to Austria-Hungary: a phenomenon which would soon commence “in person.” *Svoboda*'s response, insofar as it combated Russky Orthodox orientations both in the Americas and in the *kray*, also prefigures the transnational character of subsequent Greek Catholic counter-responses. *Svoboda* charged—not without justification—that *Halychanyn* interpreted the American conversions for its Galician readers based upon its transnational Russophile political agenda. The national-cultural development of Rusky (one “s”) people in America, said *Svoboda*, provided “the sole cause” for *Halychanyn*'s attacks; at the same time, “the politics of *Halychanyn*” were clear: “to arouse hostility toward the Austrian government by any possible means, and to turn the attention of the Rusky people to ‘God-saved Mother Russia.’”⁸²³ In other words, *Halychanyn* wished to (a) undermine the “prudent national work of Rusyns in America” at the same time as it sought (b) to translate conversions in America

⁸²² On December 27, 1897 (January 8, 1898) Father Alexis Toth complained to the Russky Orthodox bishop of North America that his brother, Victor had reverted, remigrated, and rejoined the Prešov diocese: “To my great regret I have to admit that my brother has thrown himself in with Uniate priests; the real reason was that I myself refused to communicate with him. However, in that end I had, at my own cost, to send him back to Europe. I do not envy the bishop of Prešov for this ‘acquisition’—however probably he accepted him back only because there is in the diocese [of Prešov] a great need for priests; there are now almost 25 parishes without spiritual pastors. To fill clerical vacancies, they took in, July 14, grant-aided students, while only 2 new students registered. The young talented people no longer want to become priests, since new Hungarian laws have damaged the position of priests!” Alexis Toth, “Letter to Bishop Vladimir, dated December 27, 1897 (January 8, 1898),” in Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, vol. 4, 26. It seems likely that his brother's reversion provided the basis of an exaggeration that Father Alexis had done likewise.

⁸²³ “Haytska pravoslavna armiya z oruzhiyem slyakhotnoy denuntsiyatsi,” *Svoboda* (March 12, 1896), 1-2

into conversions in Austria-Hungary, in order by which to reorient the Greek Catholic populace religiously, nationally, and politically toward the Russian Empire. The Russky Orthodoxophile press in Austria-Hungary and the Americas, together with transnational institutions like the Kachkovsky Society, would play a key role in this project.

8.2 REMIGRANTS, BUT NOT QUITE CONVERTS

It was not just ideational remittances, like those transmitted by the *Svoboda-Halychanyn* interchanges, which began flowing back to the *kray* in the 1890s; some also discerned the human material of remitted conversions in Galician territory in the middle of the decade. Although it appears that 1908 marked the first time that Greek Catholics in Galicia connected actual returning converts from the Americas with the spread of “schismatic agitation” in Galician villages, an 1894 article appearing in a Galician periodical suggests that, at least a decade earlier, some perceived in remitted migrant phenomena from America the foundations for future Russky Orthodox conversion movements in Galicia. In an 1894 issue of *Dushpastyr*, Father Alexis Toronsky commented upon the appearance of conversion movements in the United States, which had begun around five years earlier.⁸²⁴ He criticized the response of the (at that time) Greek Catholic Father Gregory Hrushka, editor the United States’ *Svoboda*, for urging reconciliation between converts and persisting Greek Catholics, in the interest of national “Rusyn” unity: in so doing, Father Hrushka had not only minimized religious differences between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, he equated the two so as to eliminate any distinction whatsoever. According to Father Toronsky, such religious “indifferentism,”⁸²⁵ permeating the masses, would undermine both religious and

⁸²⁴ Toronsky, "Nezhoda mezhy Rusynamy v Amerytsi," 153-56.

⁸²⁵ In Catholic theology, “indifferentism” refers to the belief that no one system of belief is superior to any other. See the 1913 *Catholic Encyclopedia* entry on “religious indifferentism.”

national objectives: for insofar as Rusyn national identity had a religious basis in Greek Catholicism, indifferentism toward the latter could only compromise the former.

The development of religious indifferentism in America, moreover, posed a threat for Greek Catholic and Rusky interests in the *kray*, for as Father Toronsky warned,

And still for us here in the “Old Country” such a precept, widespread in America, can be dangerous, because many return from America to their familial place, and some of them remain for good, and others go again to America. When such an American, imbued with a spirit of indifferentism will return, and begins to spread it among our people, it will create much misery, because our people have some inclination to indifferentism. They do not want to be without faith and without church, but some (namely Lemko) easily forsake the divine services in church, when a priest does not impress upon them that they ought properly to go to church; most act in this way, when not far away is some city, where people go on about their [worldly] affairs.

As early as 1894, this Greek Catholic perceived that particular modes of acting and thinking, acquired in America and supporting religious conversions there, had already begun to appear in Galicia. For readers, it would not have taken much of a leap to wonder whether such remitted “indifferentism” might at a later date produce actual Russky Orthodox conversion movements in Galicia, too.

Additionally, long before Greek Catholic priests and hierarchs in Galicia began identifying the problem of returning converts to their own territory, many of returning migrants had already converted in the Americas or had visited or conducted religious practices in a Russky Orthodox parish. *Svoboda* ran an (unconfirmed) report in 1898, purportedly based upon a n April 25 letter of the remigrant, Panko Ropytsky, of Klimkówka, to his son in Newark. The elder Ropytsky had converted in New York and then attempted a migration to Russia, where he became disaffected with the bitter conditions there. Dejected, he returned to Klimkówka and to Greek Catholicism; he advised his migrant son to do likewise.⁸²⁶ An 1895 *Svoboda* article lampooned an American Orthodox mutual aid society for wooing poor migrants to conversion with economic remunerations, in what *Svoboda* called “an Orthodox comedy, like a gypsy with honey.” As proof of the inauthenticity of those conversions, the article characterized Orthodoxy as unwanted baggage, which returning migrants casually discarded in the course

⁸²⁶ "Pravoslavny y Tsaroslavny Durnnsviti," 3. The letter had been sent from Hańczowa, via Wysowa post.

of remigrating: “The Orthodoxy of our people, as they return to the old country, remains in Bremen or in Hamburg.” Converts thus renounced their conversions upon returning to the *kray* or, rather, abandoned it along the way in German ports.⁸²⁷

The charge that remigrants from the Americas, by their corresponding return from Russky Orthodox Christianity to Greek Catholicism, revealed the “surface-level” character of the original conversions is worth taking seriously. Economic considerations—attendance at the Russky Orthodox church because “there it was not necessary to pay”—proved a factor in some of the conversions in the Americas. Additionally, many remigrants claimed that they had frequented a “schismatic” parish, because they simply did not recognize the difference. Yet, any analysis of the conversions movements must also reckon with their later robustness in Austria-Hungary, including Galicia; when mass movements finally began there at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, they persisted despite harsh repression by Austro-Hungarian authorities, suggesting that other factors were at play in the reabsorption of converted migrants into Greek Catholicism in the preceding years.

Before 1907, converted and nominally converted migrants did return to the *kray* in significant numbers; they did so, however, in more individualized, sporadic patterns. One, two, or even a handful of converted returnees who might appear in a village in a given month or year, even if they were able to convince several friends and family of the desirability of conversion, were ill-equipped to inaugurate a shift in the village’s or region’s *status quo*; neither would they have been numerically strong enough to withstand the pressures, which the local Greek Catholic priest, Greek Catholic hierarchs, and the local government and police were sure to bring to bear upon a nascent movement. Migration scholar Francesco Cerase’s analysis of what he called the “return of innovation” and the obstacles to implementing new

⁸²⁷ "My Pobidyly," 2. Notwithstanding Father Toronsky’s criticism of *Svoboda*’s “indifferentism,” that publication did its share of criticizing the promoters of Russky Orthodox conversion. This was partly due to the vacillation in the religious loyalties of the newspaper’s first editor, Father Hrushka, and, in the wake of Father Hrushka’s own conversion to Russky Orthodoxy, his replacement by a staunch Greek Catholic loyalist. At the time of this particular article, Father Hrushka still held the editorship.

agricultural or business methods and technologies, acquired in migration, apply to the ethnoreligious transformations which form the subject of the current study. Cerase's observations illuminate the difficulties, which a returning migrant wishing to retain his or her adoptive religious identification—or spread it to other villagers—might have faced.

As Cerase theorized, "...the problem for the returned migrant is a situational one: are his new ways, his new modes of acting, his new code of how to achieve success adequate in the face of the situation he has come back to?... Are these sufficient to withstand the counteractions that the local power groups, feeling threatened by his intrusion, will initiate against him?"⁸²⁸ Bovenkerk, too, found a direct correlation between the number of remigrants and their ability to implement innovations in regions of origin: the greater the numbers, the greater the influence.⁸²⁹ Furthermore, by the time that subsequent converted returnees arrived, the re-assimilation of their predecessors into Greek Catholicism could have been completed, or they might have migrated again to the Americas; both eventualities would have eliminated the potential for collaboration and mutual support. As Cerase found in his study of returnees to Italy, "the fact that they had returned at different times meant that by the time the second or third arrived, the first had already been absorbed and the possibility of concerted action was thus precluded."⁸³⁰ Under such circumstances, the most likely outcome would have been for a migrant convert—even a "sincere" one—to rejoin the Greek Catholic church, rather than attempt to establish a mass movement.⁸³¹

Regardless of whether or not it actually demonstrated the artificiality of the conversions, on the one hand, or restrictive Austro-Hungarian social and political realities, on the other, it is evident that in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, Greek Catholic parishes in Galician villages did begin reabsorbing expatriate "converts" as they returned to the *kray*; they were also doing so in Subcarpathia.

⁸²⁸ Cerase, "Expectations and Reality: a Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy," 260.

⁸²⁹ Bovenkerk, *The Sociology of Return Migration*.

⁸³⁰ Cerase, "Expectations and Reality: a Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy," 260.

⁸³¹ In a similar vein, Gmelch noted that, "Many migrants hold different attitudes toward the church, family planning, divorce, and politics, but they keep their opinions to themselves. Those who do not risk being ignored and labeled a 'Yank.'" See: Gmelch, "Return Migration," 152.

Already in 1895, *Svoboda* was warning, “Read this! Greek Catholic Rusky priests in the old country will not accept to Holy Confession any of those Rusyns, who return from America to the old country and in America accepted Orthodoxy.”⁸³² As one priest characterized this period, “Until not long ago, those accepting Orthodoxy in America and returning to their native side [i.e., of the Atlantic Ocean], returned again, with few exceptions, to the bosom of the holy Catholic Church.”⁸³³

From the United States, Bishop Soter analyzed the problem with remarkable clarity in his October 1908 letter to Bishop Konstantyn in Przemyśl. He noted that “our apparent schismatics, which here in America openly and sincerely practiced the schismatic heresy all the time, after returning home [to the *kray*] go calmly to church, confess, receive communion, and are buried in the cemeteries, as if nothing ever happened. After returning again to America, again they go straight to the schismatics...and they say that in the old country no one will say anything to them about this: on the contrary, there are even cases of praise [being offered].”⁸³⁴ Chiefly among Lemkos such a practice is accepted, and this is a great shame for the church and faith, and likewise a great responsibility before God.”⁸³⁵ By 1909, Bishop Soter was ordering that all migrants returning to the *kray* carry with them records of Greek Catholic church membership, marriage, and baptisms performed while in migration, because “...many Rusyn migrants, who converted in America to schism, returning to their country go to the Greek Catholic church and approach the Holy Mystery, as if they had not taken on a new life.”⁸³⁶

Bishop Soter’s fears were certainly warranted. The reabsorption of these returning migrants did not, however, constitute a lack of remittance of Russky Orthodox movements. As with the remitted “indifferentism,” identified by Father Toronsky in 1894, migrants who reverted to Greek Catholicism

⁸³² "Chytayte!," 2.

⁸³³ Zhuk, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," 126. As other commentators did, Father Zhuk used the verb “*vernuty*,” both to describe return to the *kray* and to Greek Catholicism.

⁸³⁴ I.e., by Russophile priests in the *kray*.

⁸³⁵ Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, undated but received October 24, 1908," syg. 444, 28-29.

⁸³⁶ "Z amerykanskoj Rusy," 812-13. The Galician hierarchs noted this order, but on October 12, 1912, they concluded that they could not ultimately enforce it, because they had no way of ensuring that all faithful Greek Catholics would receive the proper metrical records. See Andrei Kravchuk, ed. *Konferentsii Arkhyereiv Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy (1902-1937)* (L'viv: Monastyr Monokhiv Studiyskoho Ustavu Vydavnychy Viddil "Svichado", 1997), 40-41.

represented latent potential for future conversions and an important base, which Russky Orthodox activists could later galvanize. Familiarity with life as converts in the Americas—the practice of joining and maintaining an actual convert parish under freer political conditions—facilitated returnee’s participation in subsequent conversion movements in the *kray*.⁸³⁷ Furthermore, reverted migrants might even, by their very reversion, encourage further conversions; as Bishop Soter charged of those converted migrants who rejoined their village church upon return: “...and still they write to their schismatic friends [in America], in order that they not be frightened of anything, because in Galicia no one will ask them, to which church in America they belonged. When it occurs to them to go out again to America, they go again to the schismatic church and they further agitate for schism.”⁸³⁸ Paradoxically, then, the *absence* of full-scale conversion movements, and the repressions they would certainly have prompted (of the variety ongoing during this period in Hungarian Subcarpathia), could have promoted further conversions in the Americas. During perhaps one of several sojourns across the ocean, migrants could conduct religious practices in a Russky Orthodox parish, confident that, upon their return or returns to the *kray*, they could rejoin their village church with impunity.

While many migrants enjoyed freedom from surveillance, others did not escape the pastoral oversight of their loyalist Greek Catholic priests and bishops still in the *kray*. In Subcarpathia, the remitted conversions had come to the attention of the Greek Catholic hierarchy and the Hungarian government through turn-of-the century mass movements, which returned migrants and non-migrants openly attempted to establish: a substantial portion of villages like Becherov, Iza, or Velyki Luchky had formally announced the intention to convert, procure an Orthodox priest, and build an Orthodox church. In Galicia, however, the bishop of Przemyśl first learned of returning, converted migrants to his diocese

⁸³⁷ It should also be acknowledged that such familiarity could breed contempt. Certainly narratives of individuals who became disillusioned with the realities Russky Orthodox conversion occupied a prominent position in Rusky-Ukrainophile and Magyarophile Greek Catholic rhetoric. The stories of Frs. Gregory Hrushka and Teofan Obushkevich come to mind, as does Bishop Soter’s tale of Father Ioann Naumovych’s mistreatment at the hands of the Russian Orthodox. (see: Ortynsky, "Soter Ortynsky," 141-42.)

⁸³⁸ "Z amerykanskoyi Rusy," 812-13. In the earlier version of this letter, Bishop Soter had such vacillating migrants communicating the lack of consequences in person, upon their next migration to the Americas. Here, he had them doing it through correspondence while still in the *kray*.

in 1908, through reports from the United States. Galician and Subcarpathian Greek Catholics alike followed the American developments through the reports of various informants, from the earliest stages through the outbreak of war. It was in 1908, through the efforts of such informants, that the bishop of Przemyśl discovered the identities of migrant converts who had already returned to the *kray*.

8.3 A CONVERSION BACKDRAFT

On July 20, 1908, in response to a request from the American Greek Catholic bishop, Soter Ortynsky, Father Volodymyr Spolytakevych of St. Clair, Pennsylvania, compiled a list of migrants, who “now belong to the Orthodox church in St. Clair [Pennsylvania],” and sent it to Bishop Konstantyn in Przemyśl. The list included male and female villagers from Kamian, Wysowa, Czarne, Losya, and Perunka. Additionally, Father Spolytakevych named four migrants who had converted in Minersville, Pennsylvania, from the villages of Smerekovets, Wysowa, and Berest. One converted migrant, Antiy Sedensky from the village of Kamian, had returned to the *kray*. In the bishop’s notes on “the conversion of several Lemkos to schism” in St. Clair, he recorded the names of the converts, as well as their villages of origination. He wondered also whether it was possible if perhaps one to ten of them had already returned to the *kray*.⁸³⁹ It appears that he also sent a letter to the relevant villages, asking them to report whether any migrants returning had conducted religious practices or received the Holy Sacrament in the “schismatic” church, and which faith they now maintained. He also inquired whether it would be possible to determine which migrants still in America had converted.⁸⁴⁰

⁸³⁹ , in *ABGK* (November 20, 1908), syg. 4929, 263-264.

⁸⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 264.

Father Chyzowych's analysis of their conversions appealed to both old country and new world factors: pro-Russky Orthodox literature in Dolishnii Luzhok, including Galician-, Russian-, and U.S.-published materials; Russophile-Orthodoxophile Greek Catholic priests in the *kray* and the United States, including priests from nearby villages, who told Dolishnii Luzhok's residents, "You are Orthodox;" American freedoms; "Galician agents" for conversion in America; and the Russian government's material assistance in America. He concluded by requesting an extension of his sabbatical in the United States, for he had "much work" to do in order to bring his migrant parishioners back into the fold.

To his letter, Father Chyzowych attached a list of the names of some nineteen migrants from Dolishnii Luzhok living in Philadelphia, conducting religious practices in the Russky Orthodox church in one fashion or another. The list included men and women, married and single. Of those who were married, some had spouses and children still in the *kray*. It included people who attended the Russky Orthodox church, people who participated in sacraments there (baptisms, marriages, and communion), and some who were "sincere partisans" of the "schismatic church." Father Chyzowych made sure to note that those who received the "schismatic" sacraments while in migration were "on that account, completely excommunicated in the *kray* that they love." Of those whom he listed, "almost all" were familiar to him from the village. The list also included six who had already "returned to the *kray*." They are listed below, along with underlining by the bishop.

1. Vasyly Hubytsky, son of Matiya Hubytsky was married and baptized two children in the schismatic Orthodox church. In March of this year he returned to the *kray*.⁸⁴⁴
2. Hryhory Hubytsky, brother mentioned—returned to the *kray*.
3. Aleksei Fydichk, son of Vasyli (Duntsa) baptized two children in the schismatic church—returned to the *kray*
4. Hryhory Tatarsky [The brother of Stephan and Nykolai Tatarsky, who remained in America]—is in the *kray*.
5. Theodor Tatarsky [The brother of Stephan and Nykolai Tatarsky, who remained in America]—was married and baptized in the schismatic church. He returned to the *kray*...
6. Teodor Lebischak, son of Ioann (Talamarovoho) returned to the *kray*.

According to Father Kaszczak, Father Chyzowych visited the United States several times to assist his brother-in-law.

⁸⁴³ Chyzowych, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," 142.

⁸⁴⁴ 1908, i.e., at roughly the same time that Father Chyzowych was arriving to the United States.

The list only covered Father Chyzowych's parishioners who had lived or were living in Philadelphia; in Desloge, Missouri, more had converted and initiated a lawsuit against Greek Catholic loyalists, to acquire/retain the church property.

The bishop of Przemyśl's response was three-fold and entailed: (a) interrogating the converted returnees in Dolishnii Luzhok (the bishop underlined "returned to the *kray*" in every case); (b) ascertaining whether pro-Orthodox publications, including *Svit* from America, arrived to Dolishnii Luzhok; and (c) assessing the degree to which the three Greek Catholic priests named by Father Chyzowych had conducted activities among villagers, prior to their migration, which predisposed them to conversion in the United States. To this end, on March 22, 1909, Bishop Konstantyn ordered that interviews be conducted with the returnees on Father Chyzowych's list. Either some of them had migrated again to the Americas or they could not be interviewed for some other reason, because from the list, only Teodor Lebischak and Teodor Tatarsky submitted to interviews. Additionally, the bishop ordered an accounting from the village activists in the *kray* identified by Father Chyzowych: Ivan Fedorychuk and Philemon Fedyn. Finally, he drafted several questions for the three priests accused of Russophilism and Orthodoxophilism.

The main questions for the villagers Fedorychuk and Fedyn were, in the following order: (a) had they gone out to America?; (b) had they gone on pilgrimage to Russia?; and (c) had they read newspapers glorifying "Russian [*Rossysky*] Orthodoxy." Both responded in the negative to the first two questions, and Fedorychuk also responded to the third with a denial. Fedyn, however, offered, "I rarely read newspapers and brochures, and if the schismatic *Svit* will come into my hands from America, then at the same time I will destroy it, because I know that in it there is no healthy teaching. In the past I read several Pochaiv publications, to which my brother-in-law in America used to subscribe, but he is no longer sending them." If Fedyn spoke the truth, then, even the pro-Russian Orthodox publications from the Russian Empire penetrated Dolishnii Luzhok by way of America.⁸⁴⁵

⁸⁴⁵ "Protocols with Teodor Lebischak, Ivan Fedorychuk, Teodor Tatarsky, and Philemon Fedyn," syg. 4929, 151-157.

As for the returned migrant Teodor Lebischak, he, like some other returned migrants, indicated curiosity as motivation for attendance at a Russky Orthodox parish.⁸⁴⁶ He claimed faithfulness to the Greek Catholic Church, which he would maintain also in a subsequent migration. If he had failed to participate (including economically) in his Greek Catholic parish upon returning, it had been due to his intention to migrate yet again to America.⁸⁴⁷ Lebischak's testimony hardly constituted an admission, but Teodor Tatarsky openly acknowledged attendance at a convert parish in America; as he stated,

I was in America for six years, and before three years I returned [i.e., at the time of the interview, he had migrated to America and back at least twice]. In America I was married. I went for religious practices in America to the schismatic church, because in that place there was no Greek Catholic Church, only a Hungarian [*Madyarska*] one, in which I did not like the worship, because it was another rite not belonging to ours, and for that reason in the schismatic church I also received the holy sacraments and received Holy Confession. I received the Holiest Sacrament, I married, and I baptized two children. Returning before three years from America, I forgot my practices there in America and performed religious practices in our Greek Catholic parochial church, that is, I confess, I receive the sacrament, and I baptize my children. I did not know that by [these actions] I was a transgressor, and that I had sinned by going for religious practices to the schismatic church, until after my return again this year. After my return from America [this time], I have visited the village a year, [and discovered] that my marriage is illegitimate; and likewise my children, as illegitimate, need to be recognized by a dispensation of the Episcopal Ordinariat, and that for the legitimization of my marriage, my wedding ceremony must be repeated before my own current Father Parson; I state that there is nothing to do about a decision in this matter except await a resolution...I do not subscribe to newspapers or brochures, but if they are sent, whether in the reading room or [to me] from someone, then I read them: like *Ruskoye Slovo*, the American schismatic *Svit*, and *Prykarpatska Rus*.⁸⁴⁸

Tatarsky thus cited the difference in rite between the church, with which he was familiar, and a "Hungarian" (i.e. Subcarpathian Greek Catholic) one, which was foreign to him. The Russky Orthodox parish, however, accorded with the customs he recalled from his native village. Returning to Dolishnii Luzhok the first time, he returned also to his religious practices in the Greek Catholic parish. Begging ignorance, he claimed not to realize his "sin." As for the verity of his defense, Greek Catholic priests'

⁸⁴⁶ Lebischak's testimony is reproduced in full, in [Chapter Five](#).

⁸⁴⁷ It may be that he arrived in the United States again on June 21, 1910. According to the Ellis Island manifests, Pazia (married, age 26), Iwan (age 4), and Michal Lebiszczak (age 1) arrived from "Luzok d." on that date. According to Father Chyzowych, Teodor's father had also been Iwan. An Andrej Lebiszczak arrived in 1913.

⁸⁴⁸ "Protocols with Teodor Lebischak, Ivan Fedorych, Teodor Tatarsky, and Philemon Fedyn," syg. 4929, 154-156. Underlining by the bishop.

claims to have educated parishioners in Orthodox-Catholic distinctions must be reckoned with, but the pastoral letters by Galician hierarchs urging greater diligence in such instruction indicates that not all fulfilled this duty adequately. Finally, notwithstanding Tatarsky's free admission of participation in a Russky Orthodox parish in migration, he also indicated desire for full reintegration into his native Greek Catholic parish, including, potentially, the legitimization of his marriage and the baptisms of his children.

The three old country priests whom Father Chyzowych implicated simply shifted the blame to their accuser, whom they charged with abusing his parishioners in his village and now in the United States. (Chyzowych, for his part, countered their responses in another letter, dated May 21, 1910, this time written from his parish in Dolishnii Luzhok, to which he had returned by that time.⁸⁴⁹) Father Danyly Skobalsky of the parish of Prus conceded that Dolishnii Luzhok's migrants were converting in America, but he claimed that they did so out of resentment for Father Chyzowych, who was very "adversarial" toward them. Father Skobalsky advised that the appointment of a more "tactful and pastoral" priest to the village would undermine the basis for migrant conversions. Father Chyzowych's true aim, he argued, was to secure an extended absence from his pastoral duties, and in that project he had stooped so low as to accuse his fellow priests, a "very poor method of self-preservation." None of Father Skobalsky's own migrant parishioners who went for work in America had converted, he said, and when some had written to him eight or ten years prior regarding whether to confess before a "schismatic" or Roman Catholic priest, he had forbidden the former and encouraged the latter.⁸⁵⁰

Another implicated priest, Father Chirpansky, similarly charged Father Chyzowych with a "lack of respectable pastoral care." He did not remember whether Father Krushynsky told the people "You are orthodox," but the same priest had definitely said that the Holy Faith and the Greek Catholic rite were "not a shirt, which could be changed." As for Father Chirpansky's own migrant parishioners, around three hundred worked in America, about which he had heard no news of any going over to "schism"—and he believed that he would have, given that "no one does anything there without news of it, and [I] am

⁸⁴⁹ Fr. Simeon Chyzowych, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (May 21, 1910), syg. 4929, 187-193.

⁸⁵⁰ "Protocol with Fr. Danyly Skobalsky," in *ABGK* (September 7, 1909), syg. 4929, 171-174.

always informed of all, because they are all together there in Desloge, Missouri, and in St. Louis.” As evidence of the migrants’ loyalty to their Greek Catholic rite, he noted that they had remitted about 5,000 crowns to their village church.⁸⁵¹

On April 14, 1909, Father Krushynsky responded to the bishop’s questions by saying that he also did not recall whether he had told inhabitants of Dolishnii Luzhok, “You are orthodox.” If he had, though—and he emphasized again that he did not remember either way—he did so “not in some conspiring way, with a sinister intention, but with the best holy intention...of *fides catholica, fides orthodoxa.*” As to whether his parishioners attended the “schismatic” church in America or spread “schismatic agitation” through correspondence or return, he answered in the negative, but he did add that that some migrants went to the Roman Catholic priests for confession, because Greek Catholic priests charged high sacramental fees (for confession, three dollars; for baptism, five dollars; for church membership, ten cents). Finally, a number of witnesses could ratify his statements because “Parishioners in Stupnyts are daily returning from America, where they worked in Chester and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Desloge, Missouri.”⁸⁵²

Several weeks after Father Chyzowych wrote his initial letter to Bishop Konstantyn, on September 29th, 1908, his brother-in-law, Bishop Soter wrote his own letter, also regarding the matter of return migration and “schismatic agitation,” which the bishop of Przemyśl received on October 24, 1908.⁸⁵³ Soter asked for assistance in combatting the American conversions on two fronts. First, he implored Bishop Konstantyn to combat the forces of Russophilism, “preparing” migrants for conversions upon their arrival in the Americas: “If only God’s mercy would come to my aid,” he said, “If only my brothers in the *kray* would extinguish that fire, which casts the sparks of schism even to far-away

⁸⁵¹ "Protocol with Fr. Myron Chyrpansky," in *ABGK* (October 19, 1909), syg. 4929, 138-139.

⁸⁵² "Protocol with Fr. Teodor Krushynsky," syg. 4929, 158-165.

⁸⁵³ Ortynsky, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn, undated but received October 24, 1908," syg. 444, 28-35. It is likely that Bishop Soter and Father Chyzowych coordinated their correspondence to Bishop Konstantyn. Bishop Soter also asked in this letter that Bishop Konstantyn extend his brother-in-law’s sabbatical, for he needed his assistance in the United States (*ibid.*, 32). As seen in the previous chapter, Bishop Soter was also simultaneously corresponding with Metropolitan Andrei of Lviv in these matters.

America.”⁸⁵⁴ But he also requested that Bishop Konstantyn send resources—especially priests, but also funds—so that he could fight the conversions himself in his own region, America.

In a remarkable passage, he justified the transference of such resources across the Atlantic Ocean to “far-away America,” by appealing to the self-interest of the old country bishops—and to the phenomenon of return migration: “It appears to me,” he said,

that this work [of combatting conversions in America] ought to be more of a concern to the “old country” and the bishops there, than to me here in America, because I am properly the servant of the old country bishops, working over their people, which after two, three, or four years return to the *kray*. In my state, all the people are here for work, and very few—up to only 5% or 10%—will remain in America, and even that is still not certain. When there is a change in the job circumstances, even people who have settled in America for fifteen to twenty years return. Therefore the aid which I seek from the *kray* is in the interest of the old country bishops themselves.”⁸⁵⁵

Bishop Soter thus demonstrated extraordinary insight into the transnational threat conversion, as well as the transnational methods necessary to combat them. Converts—the overwhelming majority of them—would soon remigrate to the *kray*. To stop the conversions in the New World, it would be necessary to tackle their source in the old country; but to halt “schism” in Austria-Hungary would also require targeting the Americas. It must also be remembered, however, that the hopes of Greek Catholics in the old country, that dispatching Soter would “extinguish the fire” of conversion in the Americas, had been disappointed: paradoxically, his arrival to the Americas, and the resistance he provoked, unleashed new movements to the Russky Orthodox Church, and consequently a backdraft of conversions to the *kray*.

⁸⁵⁴ Ibid., 30.

⁸⁵⁵ Ibid., 29. The bishop used the old-country territorial designation of *oblast* to refer to his adoptive American state residence, Pennsylvania. While he did overestimate the percentage of returnees (80-85%), he did not do so by much, and his figures hit even closer to the mark in terms of migrant intentions.

8.4 IN THE MATTER OF RETURNING LABOR MIGRANTS FROM AMERICA AND SCHISMATIC AGITATION

It would appear that the 1908 correspondence cited above, sent by various priests together with the Greek Catholic bishop in the United States, first raised the concerns of the old country bishops that returning, converted migrants represented a current, not merely potential, threat to Greek Catholicism in Galicia. At their conference in Lviv on June 22, 1909, the three Galician hierarchs (of the dioceses of Przemyśl, Lviv, and Stanyslaviv) decided to compose a letter to the people about “schismatic propaganda” in which they would mention “emigration and those that, converting to schism, are returning.” That letter eventually circulated in 1910, but before that, on September 16, 1909, Bishop Konstantyn drafted a letter of his own, addressed only to parish priests in his diocese of Przemyśl.⁸⁵⁶ Konstantyn’s letter represents nothing less than an attempt to systematically formulate a diocesan-wide picture of the relationship between migration and conversion. In that letter, he ordered his priests to send him a report answering which of their parishioners: (a) had migrated to the Americas; (b) had conducted religious practices there in the “schismatic” church; (c) had returned to their native village; and (d) were attempting to spread “schismatic agitation,” through personal interactions, or by sending correspondence or pro-Russky Orthodox literature from America.⁸⁵⁷

He also inquired whether any migrants participated in pilgrimages to the Russian Empire. The question reveals Konstantyn’s attempt to grapple with just how “old country” and “new world” factors combined to foster “schismatic agitation.” Besides Father Chyzowych’s 1908 allegation that an activist from Dolishnii Luzhok had made such a pilgrimage, the prominent Russophile politician Dmitry A.

⁸⁵⁶ Kravchuk, ed. *Konferentsii Arkhyereiv Ukrainskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy (1902-1937)* 30. At a subsequent meeting in Lviv on March 31, 1910, the three Galician hierarchs approved two pastoral letters “in the matter of schismatic propaganda in Galicia and in America.” In the Przemyśl eparchy, 1,000 copies were dedicated for the clergy and 3,000 for the faithful. In the Stanysliv eparchy, 600 were dedicated for the clergy, and 2,000 for the faithful (ibid.).

⁸⁵⁷ When some priests failed to respond, the bishop repeated the order on January 21, 1910 to clarify that all priests should report, not just those in villages experiencing “schismatic agitation.”

Markov had led a pilgrimage of 230 Galicians to Kyiv that same year.⁸⁵⁸ Such pilgrimages had also factored in the Hnylychky case in the nineteenth century. I located no responses, however, that villagers in Przemyśl diocese were participating in such pilgrimages, though many referred to the American factor.

The reports submitted in response to this letter, “regarding the matter of migration for work in America and schismatic agitation,” arrived to the bishop’s office by the dozens, beginning in late 1909 and continuing through 1914, long after the Galician hierarchs had turned the investigation over to local and imperial authorities (following the arrival of missionaries from Russia after 1911). Priests replied in both the negative and affirmative to the questions of whether migrants had converted “in America” and returned, spreading “schismatic agitation.” Of those who claimed that their villages remained untouched by such phenomena, many replied quite simply with a “no” on all accounts, while others were more voluminous in their negative replies; in 1912, for example, Father T. Merena in Reppyk reported that of the roughly twenty people who had returned from America: “...all maintained their religious practices, although many from them are already overcome with a spirit of liberalism, and one of them, Ivan Bodnar stated strongly that he is an atheist.”⁸⁵⁹

⁸⁵⁸ Himka, "The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I," 483.

⁸⁵⁹ Merena, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," *Syg.* 4933, 89-90.




Figure 8. Hand-drawn and mass-produced forms for Greek Catholic priests to report parishioners in Migration in 1912. The empty form on the right has spaces available to mark the name, region—“America” ([United] States [of] North [America] and Canada) or Germany—and address of migrants abroad. The recorder, instead of providing a current address, indicated village of origin and whether or not they retained their Catholic faith. Five had not. (ABGK syg. 4933)

It should not be surprising that many priests either reported confidently that their parishioners retained their Greek Catholic rite, or with less assurance, that they were merely unaware of any developments to the contrary. There were probably villages from which no migrants had converted in the Americas. But several factors would most certainly have undermined the validity of many of these claims. Greek Catholic priests lacked perfect knowledge of the activities of their migrant parishioners. Notwithstanding the boast of Father Myron Chirpansky that he would have learned of any conversions among his hundreds of faithful living abroad, because “no one does anything there without news of him, for they are always together, and [I] am always informed of all, because they are all together then in Desloge, Missouri, and in St. Louis,” Bishop Soter’s 1908 assessment that many returned converts rejoined their Greek Catholic parish “as if they had not taken on a new life,” with none the wiser, was

accurate.⁸⁶⁰ A second factor mitigating the reliability of any reports of “no converted migrants” is that many of the petitioned Greek Catholic priests were themselves Russophile-Orthodoxophiles, who walked a delicate balance between promoting their religious and political inclinations among parishioners in the *kray* and abroad, on the one hand, and their desire to maintain their livelihood and avoid prosecution by the state, on the other.

Notwithstanding the reports of “no schism” among returned migrants—of which many, at any rate, would have simply been inaccurate—many priests in Galicia did find evidence of returned migrants who had conducted religious practices in Russky Orthodox parishes in the Americas. In some cases, they did so through audits of parish metrical records. On February 18, 1910, Father Mykhaylo Dorotsky reported that, though unaware of any “schismatic agitation” in his parish of Matiyeva, he had discovered three baptismal records, deposited in the parish archives in 1907, from “St. Cyril and Methodius Russian Orthodox Church” in “Hartshorne, Indiana Territory.” As Father Dorotsky reported,

To my queries, the father of the children responded that he was able to confess in that church, because there was no other church close by. He thought that this was our Rusky Catholic Church. He returned to the *kray* two years ago, and when he now heard in the church’s teaching about the difference between our Catholic and Russian [*Rosyysky*] Orthodox Church, he came to me to ask, whether it is important that his children be re-baptized. After the appropriate direction and instruction, he promised that when he would go again to America, then he will already know where to turn with his spiritual needs.⁸⁶¹

The pastors who discovered returned, converted migrants in their villages related a variety of reasons for their apparent conversions. On February 4, 1910, Father Aleksandr Durkot in Jaworze, Galicia reported that in June of the previous year, a parishioner of his had returned from America. Yakov Betelyak had migrated to America and, during his fifteen years in residence there, converted to “schism.” Further, he had begun to proclaim, “that all is one, whether Catholic or Orthodox.” Father Durkot reported that he had summoned the wayward migrant upon his return to Galicia and raised to him the following matters: his conversion, his affirmation of the oneness of Catholicism and Orthodoxy, and

⁸⁶⁰ "Protocol with Fr. Myron Chyrpansky," syg. 4929, 138-139.

⁸⁶¹ Fr. Mykhaylo Dorotsky, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (February 18, 1910), syg. 4928, 216-217.

“how weightily on account of that he had sinned.” In response, the migrant Betelyak “promised to return to his faith.” Presumably, he acknowledged that there was, in fact, a different faith to which to return.”⁸⁶²

On June 13, 1910, Father Petro Podlyashetsky, Greek Catholic pastor in Hladyshiv, reported that his converted, returned migrant parishioner, Havryl Fedorko, after receiving instruction as to “the consequences of refusal of reconciliation” with the Greek Catholic Church, “stated that he would agree to reconcile with the holy Catholic Church, if there were not anyone with him; and if no one knew about it, he was prepared to make his promise that he will be faithful until death to the holy Catholic Church.” As it turned out, however, Fedorko could not take the oath after all, for as the priest regretted, “he went to the schismatic church in America and prayed there.”⁸⁶³ On December 16, 1911, Aleksander Tremenevsky in Sparivka reported that the two migrants who had emigrated that year had not come to him for confession before leaving, and he was thus unable to prepare them for the “enemy propaganda” they might encounter. Of the six migrants who had returned in 1911, Dmytro Pilyan, age 26, openly sympathized with Orthodox “propaganda.”⁸⁶⁴

These reports continued to point to the reality of returned, converted migrants even after missionaries from Russia arrived in Galicia in late-1911. On March 1, 1912, for example, Father Omelian Kosta of Volya Tseklynska reported that in 1911, 220 of his parishioners had migrated for work to America. During the same year, nineteen parishioners had emigrated to America, and seventeen had returned. Of those, at least five had attended the Divine Liturgy at the “Orthodox (schismatic)” church in America, and some had received confession. Three of those parishioners stated “in good faith” that did

⁸⁶² Fr. Aleksandr Durkot, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (February 4, 1910), syg. 4928, 142.

⁸⁶³ Fr. Petro Podlyashetsky, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (June 13, 1910), syg. 4930, 199-200.

⁸⁶⁴ Fr. Aleksander Tremenevsky, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (December 16, 1911), syg. 4933, 92.

not know that they were free to do so as Greek Catholics. Following their return from America, “none of those numbered departed from the Catholic Church.”⁸⁶⁵

8.5 THE PROTOCOLS

In some cases, on the bishop’s orders, parish priests conducted longer interrogations of suspected converts: “protocols.” Together with testimony collected in civil property dispute court cases in the Americas and state treason trials in Austria-Hungary, the protocols provide some of the best sources for migrants’ accounts—in their own words—of their relationship to the Russky Orthodox Church.⁸⁶⁶ In

⁸⁶⁵ Fr. Omelyan Kosta, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (March 1, 1912), syg. 4933, 341-342, 344.

⁸⁶⁶ In the protocols, the priests recorded the questions they asked in one column, and the answers provided by migrants in a second, both ostensibly verbatim. Certain factors may have mitigated such a transcript’s faithfulness to the speech actually uttered. A priest may have provided a loose summary of the interviewee’s actual words, for example. There could have been unintentional errors of transcription. Intentionally or not, a priest may have chosen his own preferred nomenclature for a particular concept. It is possible and even probable, for example, that when a priest consistently recorded his interviewee’s references to the “Orthodox/schismatic church,” the term “schismatic” represented the priest’s own editorial insertion.

Even if the protocols did report the interviews verbatim, it would still be possible to question whether or not a particular migrant’s responses represented an accurate record of his or her actual views on Greek Catholicism and Russky Orthodox Christianity. There were consequences to these interviews. A migrant who had converted could be excluded from the dominant social institution in his village. A migrant might find him or herself under the censure not only of the priest and the bishop, but also the community. Such a migrant could also wind up under arrest or on trial by the state. Thus, in all likelihood, much of migrant converts’ interior worlds remained hidden from the gaze of these protocols. A migrant might, for example, have good reason to disguise her sincere belief in one great, Russky people and instead explain her conversion to Russky Orthodox Christianity in America—or perhaps, her mere “attendance” at a Russky Orthodox parish there—by appealing to less inflammatory causation: perhaps the Greek Catholic church was too far away; perhaps it had been less expensive to go there; perhaps she simply had not known the difference. In addition, the interviewing priest may have, himself, sympathized with Russky Orthodox conversion and assisted the migrant in such concealment, by coaching her before the interview or perhaps even fabricating the interview altogether.

However, important factors work against some of these potential sources of corruption in the reported text of these interviews. First, upon completion of the interview, either the migrant would read the transcript or, if she were illiterate, the priest would read it to her, after which the migrant would indicate that the priest had faithfully reported her testimony with a signature. Usually, besides the priest and the interviewee, two other individuals—witnesses to the entire interview—would affix their signatures to the document. It is possible that a migrant and/or her witnesses who could not read well might miss slight discrepancies, or further that a migrant might not remember her exact wording. If the individuals present only listened to the priest read the transcript, they might have missed a distinction like that between “Russky” and “Rusky.” Nevertheless, the obvious differences in language between the priest’s formal questions and the migrants more informal responses, as well as the many American words peppering migrants’ speech—e.g., *havs* (house), *bahs* (boss), *mayn* (mine), *strayk* (strike) *mytyng* (meeting)—suggest that

order to gain a sense of way in which such interviews proceeded, this section considers some of these protocols at length. On April 17, 1910, Greek Catholic priest Father Vlad Durkot interrogated returned migrant Andrei Repak in the parish office of the Galician village of Mysczowa as to the matter of his conversion and the suspicious burning of the Greek Catholic church in his former city of residence Desloge, Missouri.⁸⁶⁷ Repak, age twenty, reported that he had lived in America almost five years, between Pentecost of 1905 and “the Tuesday before the Great Fast” (Lent, March) of 1910. He spent one-and-a-half years in Bonne Terre, Missouri, and the remaining time in Desloge, Missouri. As to whether he had abandoned his Greek Catholic faith, Repak responded with characteristic vagueness, “I did not renounce my faith. I retained that, which daddy-papa and mama taught me.” The ensuing series of questions and answers reveal a migrant who alternatively explained his flirtation with Orthodoxy by extenuating circumstances and by ignorance of the various developments surrounding conversion:

Q. Did you conduct your religious practice in the schismatic church, so called, or go to the schismatic church, or confess to an Orthodox priest and take communion?

A. In the beginning I went to that church there, that burned; afterwards they built a new one, and I went to that new one. I confessed to the Orthodox priest and received communion, because everyone did likewise, such as I did, because I had not to live as an animal without confession.

Q. Why did you go to confession in the Orthodox [church], and not in our Greek Catholic-Uniate [church]?

A. Because I didn't have anywhere else to go, because there was no Uniate priest—until fall, when I had already chosen a home, a Uniate priest arrived. From the Orthodox priest, I confessed only two times, because there were not [any priests] of our own, and when ours were available, I went to that one.

Q. And in neighboring St. Louis was there not a Greek Catholic priest?

A. In St. Louis there was some Uniate priest, but very briefly, because it was a small parish, not worthy to maintain a priest itself. And besides that it was a great [monetary] loss [to me]: the journey to St. Louis costs two dollars one way, and for confession there it is necessary to pay—I do not know how much—whether a dollar, or more or less. It is necessary to skip two days of work, so people also lose work.

transcripts achieved something relatively close to the actual conversation. Lastly, while dissimulation likely occurred in many instances, the rather cavalier recalcitrance of some migrants in their conversions indicates that that such was not necessarily always the case. My thanks to Hanna Lassowsky for translation assistance with these texts.
⁸⁶⁷ Durkot, "Protocol with Andrei Repak," syg. 4929, 6-9. The church to which he referred was originally Greek Catholic. In 1908, however, the conversion of some members to Russky Orthodoxy predicated a court case to determine property ownership, won by the Greek Catholic loyalist faction. The Russky Orthodox converts built their own church, and the original Greek Catholic church burned. There was some suspicion of arson.

Q. Did you also change your faith, when you went to the Orthodox Church?

A. I did not change my faith. If it was a Sunday or holiday, then people went to church, then I could not stay home. If I knew how to read, then I would have read the prayers myself at home...

Q. Did you ask my advice what you should do in that case?

A. No, because I did not change my faith, because I maintained that same faith, as in the *kray*.

Q. People also wrote to me about this matter, how easily the city-slickers fell; I wrote them back, but why did you neither read, nor listen to those letters, for I wrote to all Mysczowans?

A. I did not read, because I do not know how to read, and neither did I listen, because I was not interested in anyone. I went myself to work, and I did not know what they are doing.

Q. Did you advise anyone to conversion to schism?

A. I did not interfere with anyone, because I worked the job, because I went to work.

Q. And maybe you know for what reason others converted to Orthodoxy?

A. I don't know, because I never went to "*mytyngy*" [meetings], after work I sat in my "*havs*" [house] peacefully.

Q. How did it happen, that the Greek Catholic church in Desloge burned?

A. I don't know how that happened, because at that time I was working in the "*maynakh*" [mines] under the earth; only "*bahs*" [boss] talked to me in the mines over there, because they [the rest of the migrant community] stood above ground.

Q. Do you not know whether that church burned accidentally, on account of a lack of caution, maybe candles started the fire? Or maybe it was burned by someone, who perhaps conspired beforehand, because it burned only at the time, when they lost the court case [resulting from the property dispute between Russky Orthodox converts and Greek Catholic loyalists]?

A. I didn't hear anything—if I would have heard anything, I would have said something.

Q. Which faith do you now recognize for yourself and family?

A. That faith, in which I was baptized—I neither swept it away, nor will I sweep it away. Likewise for my family.

Q. Having returned to the *kray*, have you already confessed and received the sacrament [in the village's Greek Catholic parish]?

A. I already confessed and I received the sacrament now during the Great Confession.

Because Repak was illiterate, the priest read the protocol in his presence, with two other witnesses. Repak confirmed the protocol by writing the sign of the cross.⁸⁶⁸

Repak's answers exemplified the evasiveness of other remigrants suspected of conversion. He did not acknowledge or admit formal or "genuine" conversion; he said only that he conducted religious practices in a Russky Orthodox parish. In doing so, he had merely done as "everyone else" had. Second, while in migration, he had a need for religious services, for which no convenient Greek Catholic source was available. His illiteracy prevented him from attending to his religious duties by himself in his *havs*, and rather than "live as an animal without confession," he simply went to a Russky Orthodox parish. Finally, he cited monetary reasons, for to conduct practices in the Greek Catholic parish would have undermined the primary goal of his migration, the acquisition of capital. As for the religious intrigues surrounding him—*mytyngy*, church fires, court cases—the miner claimed to know nothing because his head was (literally) underground, where his only interlocutor was the "*bahs*."

In the introductory, April 27, 1910 letter attached to this protocol, Father Vlad Durkot asked for leniency toward his parishioner. In so doing, he appealed to Repak's youthful ignorance. Said Father Durkot, "Andrei Repak went as a fifteen-year-old boy, was in America five years, and only on the 8th of March this year returned home. For that reason, his behavior is like that of a child. Before going out to America, he could not be reasonable." Having returned, Repak now behaved "completely quietly, and peacefully" and did not "have in mind any innovations nor agitations."⁸⁶⁹ Endearing at first blush, perhaps, Father Durkot's paternalism may have stemmed from other motivations. Although Father Durkot did not hide the fact of Repak's "conversion," Mysczowa's pastor may have obscured its underlying cause: himself.

As it turns out, Bishop Konstantyn of Przemyśl, through Bishop Soter of America, also queried the Greek Catholic priest in Missouri, Father Dmitry Chanak, in the matter of Repak's conversion. One month before Father Durkot submitted his protocol with Repak, Father Chanak on March 28, 1910

⁸⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁶⁹ Fr. Vlad Durkot, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," in *AGBK* (April 27, 1910), Syg. 4929, 4.

warned Bishop Konstantyn that Durkot might misrepresent himself. The Missouri priest requested leniency toward Repak, because Father Durkot had, from Mysczowa, encouraged his migrant parishioners—“nearly all” of whom attended the local Russky Orthodox church—in their “apostasy.” Father Durkot asked Repak why the migrant had not read or listened to letters in the matter of “how easily the city-slickers fell” (presumably into conversion).⁸⁷⁰ Father Chanak confirmed that Durkot had written his parishioners, but for very different purposes than he intimated. A Russophile-Orthodoxophile, Durkot had instead advised his flock to stay away from the Greek Catholic parish in Missouri, saying that it was “better to go to confession and to the schismatic church than to the Ukrainian one.” Not only this, Chanak reported incredulously that Durkot had corresponded also with St. Louis’s Russky Orthodox priest, even requesting donations for his own Greek Catholic parish in Mysczowa. Furthermore, when Repak had returned to Mysczowa as a Russky Orthodox convert, not only did Father Durkot “not admonish him, neither did he try to teach about that filth, which [Durkot]...publically denounced in church.”⁸⁷¹

If Father Chanak’s accusations were on target, Myscowa’s priest had reason to obscure the Russky Orthodox activism of remigrants to his village in reports to his bishop. In the following year, on February 5, 1912, Durkot stated that thirteen people had emigrated to America in 1911, and twenty-two had returned. All professed that they retained their Catholic faith. Although he claimed to know of no “schismatic agitation” in the village, one villager subscribed to the American Russophile-Orthodoxophile publication *Pravda* and the Galician Russophile *Russkoye Slovo*.⁸⁷² If his parishioners were converting in America—if he were promoting those conversions, himself—he gave no indication.

⁸⁷⁰ If Father Durkot had been promoting conversions among his flock, as Father Chanak alleged, he may have intentionally avoided stating explicitly just what it was (Ukrainophilism?) into which the city-slickers regrettably “fell”—a sin of omission, perhaps, though not quite a lie.

⁸⁷¹ Chanak, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," syg. 4929, 13-14.

⁸⁷² Fr. Vlad Durkot, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (February 5, 1912), syg. 4933, 368-369.

These protocols did not just facilitate the gathering information in the matter of migration and conversion; Greek Catholic loyalists enlisted them as a means of winning back remigrant souls. They presented opportunities for priests to educate converts or incliners in the differences between Greek Catholicism and Russky Orthodox Christianity and the superiority of the former over the latter. It is also possible to discern the implementation of certain pressure tactics. At times adopting a form of interrogation, the priests conducting the protocols threatened consequences in the here and now, as well as in the afterlife.

Petro Korba, age 36, appeared unrepentant in his conversion when he first returned to his native Lemko region village of Lischyny in early 1911. On March 23, 1911, in the parish office, he unapologetically affirmed his Russky Orthodox identification to the Greek Catholic priest.⁸⁷³ Korba had lived with his wife in Mayfield, Pennsylvania for “eighteen years, with three interruptions” (that is, three return migrations to the *kray*) and had, since the last time of migration from the *kray*, lived there six years. Now, having returned a fourth time, he fielded the following questions from his parish priest: “Was there in [Mayfield] a Greek Catholic church and a Greek Catholic priest?” Korba answered, “From the beginning, when I was there [the first] nine years, there was a Greek Catholic church and a Greek Catholic priest, Father Obushkevich, and after those nine years, there was only a Russko-Orthodox Church and Russko-Orthodox priests: Opyshevshii, Chakhobtshov and Skybynsky.”⁸⁷⁴ The interrogator asked, “Which faith did you maintain in America? In agreement with which church did you conduct your religious practices? Before which priest did you confess and secondly receive the holy sacrament?” Korba answered, “For the nine years at the beginning we maintained the Greek Catholic faith and religious practices. We practiced in the Greek Catholic church and confessed before a Greek Catholic priest; and in the last nine years we maintained the Russko-Orthodox faith and we confessed before a

⁸⁷³ "Protocol with Petro Korba," in *ABGK* (March 23, 1911), syg. 4932, 261-263.

⁸⁷⁴ Father Obushkevich had attained notoriety by this time. Seen since at least the turn of the century by Rusky-Ukrainophile and Magyarophile Greek Catholics as an “enemy within” and a crypto-Orthodox, Father Obushkevich formally converted to Orthodoxy in 1916, but quickly reverted to Greek Catholicism. Many Greek Catholics, including Bishop Soter, blamed the mass conversions in Mayfield on Father Obushkevich. Some charged that he had attempted, without success, to convert formally on various occasions before 1916.

Russko-Orthodox/schismatic.” Further, he reported that, in his conversion, “No one counseled me, and we changed...consciously.”

It was in the last series of questions that Korba most ardently asserted his Russky Orthodox identification:

Q. For the last time, in which church did you go forward to Holy Confession and the Holy Sacrament?

A. One more time we went to Holy Confession and Holy Sacraments in the Russko-Orthodox/schismatic Church.

Q. In which faith do you want to live and die in the future?

A. I want in the future to live and die in the Russko-Orthodox faith.

Q. Do you know the difference between the holy Catholic faith and the schismatic faith, and do you recognize your grave sin in abandoning the one-salvific holy Catholic Church?

A. I know the difference between the holy Catholic faith and the schismatic faith. My grave sin I do not recognize, because the Russko-Orthodox church and the Greek Catholic church I reckon as one.

Q. Do you inquire about your reconciliation with the holy Catholic Church in which you were born and were baptized, in order that you would have a defense with the faithful of the Greek Catholic Church?

A. I do not ask, because I do not reckon myself for a transgressor (apostate). I consider our Greek Catholic church to be the same as the Russko-Orthodox/schismatic.⁸⁷⁵

Thus, in March of 1911, Korba apparently harbored no reservations in affirming his Orthodoxy, though how exactly he understood that Orthodoxy may have been ambiguous: it is difficult to reconcile his stalwart refusal to reject his adoptive religion with his insistence that the two religions were the same. Regardless, by the end of summer 1911, his priest had secured his declaration for reversion: on August 6, in the parish office in the village of Regietów, Korba vowed that he wished to live and die in the bosom of the Greek Catholic Church.⁸⁷⁶ A few months later, the first Russky Orthodox priest—Maksym Sandovych, native of Zdynia, neighboring Regietów—returned from Russia to the Lemko region to

⁸⁷⁵ "Protocol with Petro Korba." It is unclear whether the addition of “schismatic” to “Russko-Orthodox” was Korba’s or the priest’s. It is also unclear to whom the parenthetical insertion (“apostate”) belonged. It seems likely in both cases, though, that these represented the priest’s emendations.

⁸⁷⁶ "Protocol with Petro Korba," in *ABGK* (August 6, 1911), syg. 4932, 255-257.

conduct missionary work for conversion.⁸⁷⁷ It is unknown whether Korba or his family joined the movement.

8.6 “NO CLEAR AGITATION”: AMERICAN SEEDS OF MASS CONVERSION IN WYSOWA

The acts of the accused in the 1914 treason trial in Lviv charged that, as a consequence of the return of Father Maksym Sandovych from the Russian Empire to his native Galicia, agitation erupted in the second half of 1911 in the Lemko region. Following Sandovych’s arrival, the documents alleged, official declarations for conversion began to flood the office of the county prefect, first from the neighboring villages of Grab and Wyszowatka, and then from nearby Dolhe and Radocyna.⁸⁷⁸ In 1914, the court—and Vienna along with it—attributed the mass movements to this missionary from the East; but two years earlier, in 1909 and, in truth, as late as 1914, Bishop Konstantyn of Przemyśl focused his gaze westward, upon lay missionaries returning to the region from the West: *z Ameryky*.

At some time before November 1, 1909, Bishop Konstantyn somehow obtained information that Maksym Krynyska, of the Lemko region village of Wysowa (not to be confused with Wyszowatka, about ten miles away), had together with his family from the nearby villages of Ropki and Hańczowa, converted to Orthodoxy in America.⁸⁷⁹ With Maksym still in America, however, the bishop sought out his wife, Sophia. In response to the bishop’s order, on November 14th, the parish priest in Wysowa, Father Dionysy Dombrovsky, conducted a protocol with Sophia, who had herself recently returned from

⁸⁷⁷ Zdynia and Regietów also lay about five miles from Becherov, in Hungary.

⁸⁷⁸ *Przegląd Pravoslavny*.

⁸⁷⁹ Wysowa, also a village of the “Lemko region,” lay fifteen to twenty miles to the west of Grab and Wyszowatka (and about eight miles to the northwest of Becherov, Hungarian Subcarpathia).

America.⁸⁸⁰ Two witnesses—landowners—from the same village observed the proceedings. The protocol began with the basic questions—name and age—then turned to religion:

Q) What is your name?

A) Sophia Krynytska.

Q) How old are you?

A) 30.

Q) What is your faith?

A) That same one, which we were before I went out to America.

Q) Did you convert in America to Orthodoxy?

A) No.

Q) Did you attend an Orthodox church in America?

A) I was in an Orthodox church several times for divine services. Others went, and I was curious.

Q) Did you approach the Holy Mystery [the sacrament of Communion] in any Orthodox church?

A) No.

Q) And where were you married?

A) In Pittsburgh, by the Greek Catholic priest Father Stephanovych.

Q) Do you have children, and how old are they?

A) I have three children. The oldest boy is five.

Q) In which church were your children baptized?

A) In a Greek Catholic [church] by a Hungarian priest [i.e., a Greek Catholic from Subcarpathia].

Q) Was there a Greek Catholic church in the city of your work?

A) There is a Greek Catholic church closer, even, than the Orthodox. The priest with that church is from Hungary; and on Sunday and holidays I usually went to that Greek Catholic church.

Q) Do you recognize what is the difference between the Catholic faith and the Orthodox?

A) I know—the Orthodox do not recognize the Pope of Rome.

Q) Did your husband or anyone else from your family convert to Orthodoxy?

A) No.

Q) Did other emigrants convert to Orthodoxy?

A) Many converted.

⁸⁸⁰ Dombrovsky, "Protocol with Sophia Krynytska," syg. 4928, 28-29, 26-27.

Q) Who advised them to convert to Orthodoxy?

A) That is happening, but chiefly our people convert to Orthodoxy for the reason that the Greek Catholic churches' priests do not want to chrismate the children after baptism, and the Orthodox both baptize and chrismate, as among us in the *kray*.

Q) After your return from America, did you go to holy confession in the Greek Catholic church?

A) Not yet.

Q) Would you be able to confirm your testimony?

A) I can every minute.

Thus concluded the interview. Krynytska, the two witnesses, and Father Dombrovsky all confirmed the protocol with their signatures.⁸⁸¹

Krynytska's testimony, evidently, did not satisfy the bishop, who ordered a follow-up protocol, which Father Dombrovsky conducted on January 8, 1910.⁸⁸² The second time around, Dombrovsky noted that Krynytska had provided metrical records of her wedding to Maksym, performed on November 12, 1901 by a Father Stephanovych at a Greek Catholic church in Pittsburgh. He reminded Krynytska of her previous testimony that a "Hungarian" Greek Catholic priest had baptized her two children in America, and questioned her on that point:

Q) Can you provide evidence of the baptism of your children to prove your statement?

A) I do not have any evidence of the baptism of my children. In a year my husband will return to his native land. I will write to him, in order that he bring any metrical records with him to present them to the parish council.

Q) Did you separate yourself [from Catholicism], because the Greek Catholic priests did not administer the holy sacrament of chrismation?

A) I did not separate myself—I only heard about that from other people.

Q) Why have you still not gone to confession after your return to your native land?

A) I still have not had time, because I returned to the *kray* not long ago.⁸⁸³

Thus concluded the protocol.

⁸⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸⁸² Fr. Dionysy Dombrovsky, "Protocol with Sophia Krynytska," in *ABGK* (January 8, 1910), syg. 4928, 22, 24, 25, 23.

⁸⁸³ Ibid.

Krynytska thus never openly admitted that she or any members of her family had converted in America, and she maintained that she had solicited only Greek Catholic churches for sacramental services. Several points likely triggered the bishop's suspicions as he read the protocol, however. First, her assertion that her faith was "that same one, which we were before I went out to America" lent an ambiguity to her religious identification. Russophile-Orthodoxophile activists had for some time been promoting the idea that the people were *already* Orthodox, because Greek Catholic liturgical services commemorated all *pravoslavni* (orthodox) Christians—it is almost possible to imagine the bishop wondering under his breath, "...and which faith was that?" Furthermore, her admission of attendance at an Orthodox church in America "several times," would hardly have reassured the bishop, even if she had done so only out of "curiosity." And given the follow-up question regarding the withholding of the traditional sacrament of chrismation, it would also appear that Krynytsky's attribution of "many" migrant conversions to the chrismation issue raised red flags: was she perhaps cryptically providing the motivations for her own concealed conversion? Finally, the bishop would likely have detected the hint of obstinacy in Krynytsky's terse responses and her bold affirmation that she could confirm her testimony "every minute."

For some reason, very shortly after the second, January 8th, 1910 protocol with Sophia Krynytsky, Father Orest Matynowych replaced Father Dombrovsky as the parish priest in Wysowa; perhaps Bishop Konstantyn was unsatisfied with Father Dombrovsky's inability to prevent the conversion of many of his parishioners while in migration. That Father Martynowych's primary mandate in his new parish was to assess the situation of migration and conversion in Wysowa would support this idea. Whatever the reason for the changing of the guard, Martynowych inherited a village in the midst of a dramatic shift in the religious *status quo*. But although he would soon perceive hints of something amiss, it seems he failed to grasp the real gravity of the situation. Sometime in February, 1910, he reported to the bishop that during his month-long tenure at the parish, he had not yet attained an accurate picture of

“agitation for schism” among his new parishioners. He had discovered some troubling developments, however.⁸⁸⁴

He had heard, for instance, that American, Russophile-Orthodoxophile newspapers like *Postup* arrived sporadically to the village. He believed that in Wysowa’s filial parish of Blechnarka, there “had to be” at least one villager who converted to Orthodoxy in America. He had also uncovered four Russky Orthodox metrical records in Wysowa’s parish depository: an April 24, 1904 baptism at the Russky Orthodox Cathedral of St. Nicholas in New York; a September 29, 1909 baptism at the same church; a December 4, 1894 baptism at a chapel of St. Nicholas; and an 1896 wedding in the Russky Orthodox church in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. Of the four migrants who had deposited these records with the parish, three had migrated again to America.⁸⁸⁵

Father Martynowych approached the fourth, Matiy Koncha. The remigrant Koncha confirmed that he had married and baptized a son in Father Alexis Toth’s parish in Wilkes-Barre. He claimed, however, that he only did so because Toth had misrepresented himself as a Greek Catholic priest. According to Father Martynowych, “When Matiy found out that Father A. Toth is an Orthodox priest, he stopped attending that church, and went instead to the nearby Greek Catholic church. Now in the *kray*, he conducts all religious practices in our Greek Catholic church.”⁸⁸⁶

A year later, in February of 1911, Father Martynowych began conducting protocols with migrants who had returned from the United States to Wysowa around the end of 1910 or the beginning of 1911.

⁸⁸⁴ Martynowych, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," syg. 4931, 273-273b.

⁸⁸⁵ The date of the second record (September, 1909) would indicate a stay of just a few months, given that Father Martynowych wrote in January, 1910.

⁸⁸⁶ Martynowych, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," syg. 4931, 273-273b. In Koncha’s version of events, Father Toth preyed upon the inability of the people to distinguish between Russky Orthodoxy and Greek Catholicism. Whether this returning migrant reported the truth or not is difficult to say. This characterization of deception on the part of Father Toth certainly accords with the accusations of many of his Greek Catholic detractors, as well as with the practice of many Russky Orthodox activists to appropriate the term, “Greek Catholic,” as their own. Yet it is at odds with Father Toth’s consistent emphasis upon his very careful education of potential migrants in the differences between Unia and Orthodoxy; certainly his pamphlet, *Where to Seek the Truth?* drew clear distinctions between the two traditions. Not only Father Toth, but migrants who converted under his guidance in Wilkes-Barre, testified at the property case involving that church that they were well aware of the distinction. It must be acknowledged, however, those parishioners would have had a motivation in claiming this: winning the property. Koncha would also have had reason to shift blame for his flirtation with Russky Orthodoxy in America, however, given the pressures from church and state, to which admitting “sincere” conversion would have exposed him.

Most returnees denied that they had converted. Among those testifying that they retained their Greek Catholic rite in America were: Kyryl Hrytskanych (age 36; returned November 24, 1910 from Carnegie, Pennsylvania after six years), Hrena Astrab (age 25; returned January 28, 1911 from Carnegie after five years), Teodor Kovalo (age 27; returned October 1910 from Carnegie after six years), Konstantyn Demyanchyk (returned January 28, 1911 after six years), Onysym Amrob (returned January 10, 1911 from Carnegie, after eight years), and Tymotem Smefanovsky (returned June 17, 1910 from Monessen, after four years).⁸⁸⁷ Evthemeya Fetsenko (age 23; returned February 19, 1911 from St. Louis after seven years) also testified that she maintained her Greek Catholic faith. People had attempted to persuade her otherwise, she said, but her husband Kyryllo did not want to listen to them.⁸⁸⁸

Petro Ganz, however, returned from Yonkers, New York after two years on January 28, 1911 as a recalcitrant convert. Interviewed in Wysowa February 25, 1911 at the age of forty, he stated that he had converted to Russky Orthodox Christianity in the United States:⁸⁸⁹

Q: Was there in that municipality [Yonkers] a Greek Catholic church and a Greek Catholic priest?

A: There was a Greek Catholic church and priest.

Q: Which faith did you retain in America? In agreement with which Church did you perform religious practices? Before which priest did you confess and secondly receive the Holy Mystery?

A: In an Orthodox church, and I conducted all religious practices before Orthodox priests.

Q: Who persuaded you to change from the Greek Catholic faith? [...]

A: No one convinced me, and I converted by myself.

Q: In which faith do you want to continue to live and die?

A: In the faith of that village, where I now am.

Q. Do you know the difference between the holy Catholic faith and the schismatic faith, and do you recognize your own sin in falling away from union with the holy Catholic Church?

A. I recognize—in my opinion—it is a fact, that “Upon us the Unia is imposed.” There was no sin [in conducting religious practices in an Orthodox church].

⁸⁸⁷ *ABGK*, syg. 4931, 540-47, 550-556.

⁸⁸⁸ Fr. Orest Martynowych, "Protocol with Evthemeya Fetsenko," in *ABGK* (February 27, 1911), syg. 4911, 544.

⁸⁸⁹ Fr. Orest Martynowych, "Protocol with Petro Ganz," in *ABGK* (February 25, 1911), syg. 4931, 138-139.

Q. Do you request reconciliation with the holy Catholic Church in which you were born and were baptized, in order that you would have a defense with the faithful of the holy Catholic Church?

A. I do request that, for the reason that “I am forced to be here” [in Wysowa].

Q. Do you have anything to add?

A. I do not have anything.⁸⁹⁰

Ganz made no effort to conceal or excuse his conversion. Fully aware of the “Greek Catholic option” in Yonkers, he had, of his own volition, opted instead for the Russky Orthodox church there. He appealed to a key Russky Orthodox trope—that the Unia agreement had been forced upon the people—to justify his actions. Still, with resignation, he asked for readmission into Wysowa’s Greek Catholic parish, not so that he would have a “defense” (i.e., on the Day of Judgment), but because as matters stood, it was the only game in town, so to speak.

In his March 15, 1911 letter accompanying these protocols, Father Martynowych reported to Bishop Konstantyn that there still was no “clear agitation for schism,” either in Wysowa or its filial parish of Blechnarka.⁸⁹¹ Amazingly, however, he added that, “almost every parishioner reads *Pravda* and *Postup*.” Apparently, the omnipresence of these Russophile-Orthodoxophile newspapers remitted from the United States did not indicate “clear agitation” to Father Martynowych, because “not everyone believes in the things which are published in them.” He also reported in the letter that, in addition to Matiy Koncha, another parishioner from Blechnarka, Nykyfor Shvets, also did not recognize the difference between “schism” and Catholicism and married in the Orthodox Church in America, as metrical records attested. After Father Martynowych explained the “terrible sin” of their actions in sermons and on other occasions, however, they regretted what they had done in their ignorance. They requested reconciliation with the Greek Catholic Church, for they had partaken of the sacrament of communion in the Orthodox Church, thereby *de facto* excommunicating themselves.

Other returned migrants who had “sinned in the same way” were not prepared, however, to follow suit; nor did Father Martynowych “maintain any hope of their return,” to Greek Catholicism, for

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁹¹ Martynowych, “Letter to Bp. Konstantyn,” *syg.* 4931, 548-549, 556.

those parishioners did not wish to cause a “scandal” in the parish. He concluded the letter with some additional remarks upon the headstrong Petro Ganz. Born of a “German-Protestant” father but baptized as a Greek Catholic, Ganz had conducted religious practices in the Orthodox Church in America, but now desired reconciliation with Greek Catholicism. Although the attached protocol attested to the real motivation for such reconciliation, Father Martynowych felt no need to reiterate that Ganz—“forced” to be in one-church village—had little other recourse.⁸⁹²

In December of 1911, fifteen residents of the village of Wyszowatka along with fifty-three from Grab, declared their desire for Russky Orthodox conversion to the county prefect; by January 1912, fifty-one more residents of Wyszowatka along with forty-five from Grab announced such an intention. Simultaneously, the “entire village” of Dołhe and part of Radocyna, Gorlice county, also followed suit.⁸⁹³ The prosecution in the 1914 treason trials would single out the influence of the “Russian agitator,” Father Maksym Sandovych, in these Lemko region conversions. Notwithstanding the March 1911 declaration of a parish priest in the Lemko region village of Wysowa that “no clear agitation” existed there at the time, and comparable declarations from some other Lemko-region priests indicating ignorance of “schismatic agitation” among remigrants, this chapter has demonstrated that in winter of 1911-1912, Father Sandovych conducted missionary work in a region *already* unsettled for several years—in all likelihood since before the turn of the century—by converted remigrants from the Americas. The testimony of a number of residents of Grab at the 1914 trial that they had “converted in America” only confirms this. Indeed, the pre-existing inclination of the region’s populace—“prepared” especially by returning migrants—prompted Father Sandovych’s arrival in the first place.

It emerges immediately from the reports on migration and conversion in the diocese of Przemyśl that the bishop’s October 1909 order to file such reports coincided with a period of massive remigration. Labor migrants returned to Austria-Hungary in piecemeal fashion prior to the North American economic

⁸⁹² Ibid.

⁸⁹³ *Przegląd Prawosławny*.

downturn of 1907. Pre-1907 remigration, although numerous, adopted more individualized and sporadic patterns, which proved more conducive to reabsorption of Russky Orthodox remigrant converts and incliners into the existing Greek Catholic infrastructure, than to transformation of the *status quo*: individual returnees, even a handful of them, lacked the mutual support necessary to sustain a movement, especially in light of religious and state pressures.

During the period 1907-1911, however, the North American economic downturn transformed intermittent remigrations into a massive wave, translating into much larger numbers of converted migrants, who returned at or around the same time as one another. While no mass conversions movements associated with remigration appeared in Galicia until 1911, the reports to Bishop Konstantyn beginning in 1908 that one or several remigrants to particular villages had formally converted, conducted religious practices, or visited Russky Orthodox churches in the Americas should be seen as the tip of a substantial iceberg of ongoing remitted conversions, concealed below the surface appearance of widespread loyalty to Greek Catholicism. Bishop Soter correctly identified the “accepted practice” among many migrants from the Lemko region to attend Russky Orthodox churches in the Americas but revert to their Greek Catholic parish upon returning to the *kray*. This chapter has focused exclusively upon the Galician remittances during this period—but a wave of converts was also simultaneously returning to Subcarpathia, reinvigorating the mass movements which had commenced there at the beginning of the century.

Many migrants returned after 1907 to native villages, then, as co-religionists in their adoptive Russky Orthodox faith; not a few would also have already established even closer ties to one another as converts. The practice of chain migrations had resulted in the phenomenon of members of a given Austro-Hungarian village or region establishing specific localities of migratory destination for members in the Americas. As a result, the constituency of convert Russky Orthodox parishes in the Americas often

reflected large blocks of former—and future—fellow villagers.⁸⁹⁴ After 1907, then, many returned *en masse* to their native village having lived together in the same American town or city: not only as co-religionists, but as co-members of the same migrant Russky Orthodox parish. Such remigrants would have already participated in the maintenance and even the establishment of a convert religious community together under considerably freer political circumstances—an experience upon which they could draw upon returning to Austria-Hungary.

The winter of 1911-1912 marked a new period in the conversion movements in Austria-Hungary. In the first half of 1911, statesmen and religious hierarchs from Russia, as well as Russophile-Orthodoxophiles from Galicia, took stock of the potential for widespread conversions in Austria-Hungary. They concluded that that a large number of Galician and Subcarpathian villages *already* exhibited an inclination toward conversion; however, only a systematic, coordinated effort—dispatching missionaries, building churches, publishing literature, and conducting similar activities—would ensure that the conversions would “stick” in the face of pressures from church and state.

The crucial point is that this new initiative—which most immediately prompted the treason trials of 1913-1914 and the international Great Power tensions surrounding them—responded to the predisposition of Austro-Hungarian Greek Catholics toward conversion: a predisposition due not exclusively, but in large part to influence from the Americas, especially through remigration. Having for years provided the Russky Orthodox mission in the Americas with human, material, and ideological resources, parties in Russia now discerned their investment in the Americas paying dividends in Galicia and Subcarpathia—and they now sought to capitalize upon that investment more directly, in Austria-Hungary, itself.

⁸⁹⁴ Perhaps it would be best to call these individuals “current” co-villagers, even while in migration. Those who returned, and even many of those who never did, did not “bracket” their identification as inhabitants of a particular old country village, simply because they were living thousands of miles away from it. A notable earlier case of this block migration referenced in this study has been that of migrants from Becherov, many of whom settled in Minneapolis, and then remigrated together around the turn of the century.

The final chapter of this study develops this argument further and demonstrates that, even during the post-1911 period, the “American middle-man” remained an integral participant in the East European conversions. At the same time, the sustained engagement of American migrant communities abroad continued to bear reflexive implications for their own development. Before considering these matters, however, the next chapter turns its attention to the way in which transnational Russky Orthodox conversions led to dramatic changes within Austro-Hungarian Greek Catholicism, itself. The transnational character of the reform movements confirm the transnational character of the conversions; the reforms also represent a constituent part of the religio-governmental attempts to suppress the movements, culminating in the arrests and treason trials of 1913-14.

9.0 TRANSNATIONAL REFORMS

The remittance of Russky Orthodox conversion movements from the Americas not only contributed to shifting ethnoreligious identifications in Eastern Europe, they also contributed to substantive reforms within Greek Catholicism, in the Americas as well as Austria-Hungary. The Greek Catholic counter-conversion effort represented a movement, in itself, with transnational implications.⁸⁹⁵ Like the conversions, Greek Catholic reforms unfolded in the context of transnational migration. Indeed, the transnational scope of the reforms confirms that character of the conversions. The reforms also catalyzed conversion by prompting further resistance on the part of those inclined to conversion, on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Lastly, the reforms hold implications for Great Power tensions surrounding the conversions, insofar as they comprised part of a larger project of suppression, coordinated by the Greek Catholic hierarchy and the Austro-Hungarian state. Ultimately, state repression—which led to pre-war international tensions—proved to be the more effective anti-conversion mechanism.

Russky Orthodox conversion movements represented a challenge at once external and internal to Greek Catholicism. While Greek Catholic loyalists perceived and addressed significant alien menaces—especially the economic, ideological, and personnel reinforcements deployed by the Russian government and Holy Synod—the threat from within their own ranks was far more worrisome. It was, of course, the Greek Catholic Church’s own constituents who were converting and inclining toward conversion en masse. While it was crucial for Greek Catholics to direct some of their counter-conversion tactics against

⁸⁹⁵ In a sense, the rise of a Greek Catholic reform movement shared affinities with the Counter Reformation (or as it is sometimes called, the Catholic Revival) of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a “counter-conversion movement” in which are to be found the origins of Greek Catholicism, itself.

outside “agitation,” an interior program of conversion-prevention and re-conversion proved just as critical. In fact, Greek Catholic counter-conversion activists devoted most of their resources to the latter, internal affliction. The lines distinguishing a threat as “external” or “internal” target could shift and blur: the majority of converts were, according to Greek Catholic elites, “ignorant” (*temny*) people, led astray, by Russophile, former-Greek Catholic clerics and activist lay people, with Russia’s religio-governmental economic and ideological support. Greek Catholics generally portrayed lay activists as “apostates,” but with apparently greater potential to once again become “insiders” through recantation. Greek Catholics saw converted clerical leaders more unequivocally as alien enemies; however, of these, too, many could and did re-convert to Greek Catholicism.

Religious developments—Russky Orthodox conversions—with their immediate source in the Americas, modified religious forms in Austro-Hungarian regions of migratory origin, not only through the dissemination there of conversions, but also insofar as they prompted a dramatic overhaul of Austro-Hungarian Greek Catholicism, itself. Moreover, as counter-conversion initiatives originating in Austria-Hungary traveled across the Atlantic Ocean, they reciprocally influenced American religious developments in a dialectical process. Like the Russky Orthodox conversion movements that spawned them, Greek Catholic counter-conversion movements were transnational.

In addition to constituting a response to transnational catalysts (Russky Orthodox conversions), Greek Catholic counter-conversion reforms were transnational in two other respects: organizational collaboration and targeted regions. Parties in Austria-Hungary and the Americas alike helped combat Russky Orthodox conversion; often, they coordinated their efforts. The first apostolic visitor to the United States, the Subcarpathian Father Andrew Hodobay (r. 1902-1906), and the first Greek Catholic bishops in the Americas, the Galician Soter (Ortynsky) (United States, r. 1907-1916) and the Galician Nikita (Budka) (Canada, r. 1912-1927), for example, consulted extensively with parties in Austria-Hungary in their fight against conversions. Greek Catholic counter-conversion efforts were also transnational in that coordinated efforts targeted conversions in both Austria-Hungary and the Americas. Rather than running parallel, the counter-conversion movements in each region intersected and mutually

informed one another. Greek Catholics in Austria-Hungary attempted to influence religious conditions in the Americas directly (e.g., through the dispatching of an apostolic visitor and then a bishop), and individuals in the Americas sought to shape religious developments in Austria-Hungary just as straightforwardly, as with Bishop Soter's appeal for more stringent religious record-keeping in the *kray*.

Furthermore, parties in each region were well aware that, when they directed their activities toward their "own" regions, they would be indirectly affecting the other region, precisely because of transatlantic ties sustained by migration and correspondence. While a Galician Greek Catholic educational reform designed to differentiate Greek Catholicism from Russky Orthodox Christianity for the "unenlightened" masses might forestall conversions in Galicia, for instance, such an initiative could also reach potential migrants to America, who might then be less inclined to convert there. Or when Bishop Soter successfully won an American court battle with the Russky Orthodox over parish property, the dissuasion of some of that parish's constituents from ultimate conversion might pay dividends in the *kray* when those parishioners remigrated as persisting Greek Catholics, instead of as "schismatic agitators." As referenced earlier in this study, Bishop Soter communicated from the United States his prayer to Bishop Konstantyn in Przemyśl—"Would that God's mercy come to my aid. Would that my brothers in the *kray* extinguish that fire which is casting the sparks of schism even to far-away America."—while at the same time justifying his request for clerical and monetary resources from the *kray* by arguing that it was in the old country bishops' best interest to do so, as migrants who converted in the Americas would soon be returning to the *kray*.

Another means by which to classify aspects of Greek Catholic counter-conversion efforts includes: "in-house" tactics versus the solicitation of "contract labor," so to speak, in the form of governmental involvement. Governmental interventions in the Americas into Greek Catholic-Russky Orthodox rivalries most often took the form of property dispute resolution in the civil courts, but not infrequently, Greek Catholics (and Russky Orthodox, as well) summoned law enforcement to mediate whenever conflicts escalated to violence, vandalism, and criminality. In Austria-Hungary, Greek Catholics enjoyed much greater sway with various governmental advocates. Though marginalized within

broader Austro-Hungarian society, the Greek Catholic Church functioned as the establishment religion for Eastern Christians in the Dual Monarchy, a state of affairs facilitating the government's equation of conversion movements away from Greek Catholicism with civil unrest. More damagingly to the Russky Orthodox cause, Greek Catholics in Austria-Hungary by no means disabused government officials of the notion that, along with Orthodox religion, converts simultaneously embraced Russian nationality and, most alarmingly, allegiance to the neighboring Russian Empire. Accordingly, Hungarian- and Polish-identifying governmental authorities in Subcarpathia and Galicia, respectively (together with German-identifiers in Vienna), aided Greek Catholic counter-conversion by arresting, beating, charging, trying, and even executing alleged converts to the Russky Orthodox Church for civil disobedience and treason. The Austro-Hungarian government-sponsored arms of the counter-conversion effort—in particular the American Action—extended across the Atlantic Ocean to the Americas, with reciprocal effects in the *kray*.

It is therefore possible to distinguish turn-of-the-century counter-conversion movements according to the following, overlapping classifications: (a) responses to transatlantic solicitations for intervention, as compared with actions prompted by conversions in one's "own" territory; (b) internal reforms versus external confrontations; (c) re-conversion and conversion prevention; (d) geographical region(s) targeted (i.e., Austria-Hungary and/or the Americas); and (e) "in-house" church action versus governmental interventions.

A number of the most important reforms have already appeared in this study, including: the dispatching of priests, an apostolic visitor, and bishops, over the objections of the Latin Rite. Another major attempt at reform included the information gathering efforts launched by the Galician and Subcarpathian hierarchs (e.g., the investigation conducted by Bishop Konstantyn of Przemyśl, beginning in 1909) which not only provided information on the conversions, but also served as an occasion for instructing converts to return to Greek Catholicism, along with possible intimidation. These information gathering efforts partly served as the basis for further reforms. This chapter focuses especially upon: educational reforms, pastoral letters, sermons, oath-taking, print initiatives, censorship, liturgical

modifications, and clarifications of distinctions between Greek Catholicism and Russky Orthodox Christianity.

9.1 “FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO...”: EDUCATIONAL REFORMS

Greek Catholic reformers sought to respond to the causes for conversion, which they identified through informants and subsequent, more systematic information gathering efforts. They hoped to strike at the source: by eliminating the causes for conversion, they could hope to reclaim their lost sheep and prevent any further losses. Whatever the reasons they isolated—whether “agitators” from Russia, Russophile Greek Catholic clerics and the Russophile press, Latinization, Russian state and religious economic subsidization, land hunger, the freedoms afforded by migration, influence from the Americas—Greek Catholic reformers had to grapple with the underlying reality that significant numbers of lay individuals from their mass constituency had ultimately themselves made decisions for conversion.

To conclude that these individuals had, following careful, reasoned, systematic, and prayerful consideration of Greek Catholicism and Russky Orthodox Christianity, legitimately and conscientiously opted for the latter, would have amounted to an admission of defeat. If this were the case, and if the mass movements now underway had already sowed the seeds of irredeemable lay Russky Orthodox converts among Greek Catholic pastures, the elimination all other conversion incentives would only slow the inevitable diffusion of Russky Orthodox conversion. If the Greek Catholic masses were themselves responsible for their own conversions, both rehabilitation and the curtailing of the conversions’ spread would have been out of the question.

In order to avoid that unhappy admission, Greek Catholic reformers consistently drew distinctions between educated Russophile Greek Catholic clerical elites and lay and clerical Russky Orthodox “agitators,” on the one hand, and on the other, the “unenlightened” (*temny*) Greek Catholic

masses, whom the former had led astray.⁸⁹⁶ While “sly,” “egotistical,” and “hypocritical” individuals comprised the former group, the *temny* masses whom they deceived were “simple,” “dull,” “ignorant,” “blind,” “uneducated,” or more literally, “dark.” Greek Catholic reformers identified non-migrant villagers in the *kray* and labor migrants in foreign lands alike as *temny* or as living in ignorance (*temnist*). The Greek Catholic masses had not been converting to the Russky Orthodox Church based on well-informed, personal religious convictions; rather, the absence of the same that rendered them susceptible to the machinations of the “crafty” agents of schism.

In labeling converting and Russky Orthodox-inclining Greek Catholic masses as *temny*, Greek Catholic reformers achieved several aims. First, since the masses would not have converted on their own initiative, counter-conversion activists could rationalize focusing upon the extermination of surrounding factors leading the *temny* into error. Second, it allowed Greek Catholic loyalists to institute internal reforms. By absolving their constituents of much of the blame and placing it rather squarely upon the heads of the “true” agents of the Russky Orthodox Church, reformers could affirm the fundamental goodness and innocence of their unfortunate exiles. Those good and pious people had not truly converted, and persisting Greek Catholics were therefore justified in regarding them still as “theirs.” For this reason, the reformers imagined their reconversion efforts not as proselytizing, but rather as reclamation and rehabilitation. They could legitimate implementing educational and devotional reforms for the recovery of their wayward faithful and the protection of the persisting Greek Catholic masses. Reformers could thereby assure themselves that their tactics manifested genuine concern for the souls of the faithful. Ultimately, by casting the masses as *temny*, reformers could take heart that, instead of fighting a losing battle against an irrepressible enemy, the repulsion of the Russky Orthodox incursion remained a viable goal.

If it was the *temnist* of the masses which constituted the primary cause of the conversions—and all other causes were secondary—how could loyalist Greek Catholics address the problem? An

⁸⁹⁶ For a lengthier treatment of the supposed *temnist* of the masses, see [Chapter Four](#).

anonymous March 1, 1912 article in *Nyva* neatly captured in its recommendations many of the counter-conversion measures which Greek Catholic reformers would attempt to unfurl. As justification for internal Greek Catholic reforms, the news item neatly synthesized the respective roles of the following factors in Russky Orthodox conversion: American migrant influence, educated lay Russophilism, the Russophile Greek Catholic clerical intelligentsia, paid Russky Orthodox lay agitators, impressionable youths in Russian imperial or Galician Russophile educational institutions, and the “ignorance” of the Greek Catholic masses. “For several months,” the story began, “...emigrants, who beyond the sea changed their Catholic Faith to Orthodoxy, have been sending from America short brochures, newspapers and volatile postcards, not only to the Kachkovsky reading room, but also to individual townspeople in [the Galician town of] Stary Sambor. In these writings, the Pope of Rome and our Rusky bishops are called by many vulgar words.” The ideas conveyed in the remitted correspondence from America had not fallen upon deaf ears in Galicia; instead, they met with extremely favorable responses in some circles: “With such reading, then, have some of our ‘Russko-Catholic’ priests been unabashedly enthusiastic. They read [the brochures, newspapers, and postcards] attentively as if the wisdom and holiness in them were unknown, and they spread it among the people, especially among the Stary Sambor townspeople.”

The article supported its stance “that the consequence of Russophilism must be Orthodoxy,” by pointing to the ineffectiveness of episcopal pastoral letters to counter the same Russophile Greek Catholic clerics’ complicity in mass Russky Orthodox movements:

Notwithstanding the spiritual admonition of their superiors, the Russophile fathers did not set themselves to work in their sermons to clarify to the people the differences of faith, because by that method they would destroy among the people the nimbus of “Russ-ness.” For this reason were the [Rusky-Ukrainophile] nationalist priests—because of their clarification of the differences of faith and for the elucidation of the word “Catholic”—met with suspicion among the people about the Polish-ness of their rite, because “zealous” (*tverdyy*) fathers did not touch upon those matters ...Among the people was manufactured a sense (thanks to a Russophile priest) that Ukrainians: these are “Catholics” or Poles. But “zealous” fathers: these are the true “Russky” priests, because they proclaim the Catholic faith. The *temny* people believed their pedagogues, and more than that, the ruble and lay agitators aided the priest in confirming the people in error. From the pulpit, the Russophile priests whined that the Ukrainians proclaimed a new faith and new prayers for their own faith. And the people were innocently convinced that Ukrainians: this is a new faith...Ukrainian priests, were publically reprovved from pulpits by vulgar words...Among such senseless antipathy of Russophile fathers toward

Ukrainians, paid agitators went forth, even the sons of Catholic Russophile priests...among the people and spread their Orthodox propaganda. And the Russophile fathers—hey, these Pharisees!—they sat quietly and clamored, like those who provoked them, that they were non-participants to this same business...Orthodox propaganda, this is the flower of Russophile hypocrisy among the Russophile clergy... And therefore it is not strange that Orthodoxy spreads above all in the villages where there are [Rusky-Ukrainophile] nationalist priests, because there the people think that their priest proclaims a new faith. And therefore the people want to turn back to the Orthodox faith... And when an order comes to conduct a [Greek Catholic] mission, then the crafty [Russophile] deans go out to sermonize [against] the Ukrainian-priest, against which the people are warned, and the mission is of no profit.⁸⁹⁷

Thus, this article traced the path of Russky Orthodox conversion from American remitted propaganda, through Russophile Greek Catholic priests aided by paid agitators, to the ultimate conquest of the *temny* masses. The anonymous author, rather despairing, outlined specific ways in which Greek Catholic priests—especially Russophile ones—could eliminate the *temnist* of the people, and thereby eliminate the source of conversion. He did so by referencing a correspondent to *Ruslan*, who had himself suggested “methods by which to restrain Orthodox Propaganda in the Lemko region:”

In my opinion, it may still be possible to restrain Orthodoxy in Galicia, but here the testimonies of love, general solidarity, and submission to their archpastors and the Catholic Faith, do not in themselves suffice. Here, more decisive methods and arguments than all those are necessary. And how? First, let every priest-Russophile, not only among those threatened, but among all our pastors, for several Sundays in a row clarify well in sermons to parishioners: what then is schism, Catholicism, Unia; what is the difference between Orthodoxy and Catholicism; vigilantly show that religious schism is false, heretical, and that it leads the soul to eternal death; explain the life of St. Josephat. Let him try to establish among his own people: a Society of Apostolic Prayer to the Heart of Jesus Christ; the May Divine Liturgy; introduce the parts of supplication; teach more church hymns. Distribute among the people the brochure of Father Lezhohubsky, “Where to Find the Truth,” [and] *Missionar*. Do not permit the disgrace of our brother Ukrainians and Basilians, appear among them defended, arrange a mission with the Basilian fathers. Further, it is necessary to ban reading and propagation of writings and newspapers written in the Orthodox mind, under the threat of denial of the administration of confession. Do not receive agitators among you for dinners, and drive them away from the village! It would be good in the mission to translate out loud with the people: the confession of the faith, [and the confession of] submission to their Bishop, Pope of Rome, and the Catholic faith. As often as possible, use the word “Catholic” in sermons...⁸⁹⁸

⁸⁹⁷ "Pravoslavna propaganda," 175-76. Himka noted that Austrian government officials became aware that the Greek Catholic Father Teodor Durkot had organized a meeting “to dissuade peasants from attending the missions” of anti-Rusky Orthodox partisans. See Himka, *Propagation of Orthodoxy*,” 483.

⁸⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

Thus, if Russky Orthodox movements were intimately connected to influence from the Americas, they had prompted this Greek Catholic and many others to propose a series of significant modifications to the Greek Catholic *status quo*. In particular, the recommendation was to counter the *temnist* of the people with educational and devotional reforms, many of which are analyzed in the remainder of this chapter.

9.2 PASTORAL LETTERS

Greek Catholic loyalists sought to maintain their faithful and call back those lost to Russky Orthodox conversion through different forms of pastoral letters. First, there were the circular pastoral letters of the bishops, some of which were addressed to all the clergy and the faithful, some to only all the priests, and some to only some of the priests. Secondly, there were also the pastoral letters of individual priests to their parishioners. It is also possible to delineate both levels of pastoral correspondence into “intra-Austro-Hungarian” and international categories. Episcopal pastoral correspondence fell into both categories: bishops in the *kray* addressed pastoral letters to priests and the faithful both in the *kray* and in the Americas. While the two Greek Catholic bishops in the Americas before 1914 primarily addressed their faithful in their regions of migratory settlement, their letters were read in the *kray* (in for example, the pages of Lviv’s *Nyva*). Additionally, Bishop Soter sent his first pastoral letter from Galicia to North America, prior to his migration in 1907. As for parish priests, they addressed the bulk of their pastoral letters regarding Russky Orthodox conversion to foreign lands.

Bishops addressed their pastoral letters to both priests and the laity. They provided both orders and instruction. Those directed mainly at the clergy provided specific instructions, including what reforms to implement in order to address the phenomenon of migrants converting to Orthodoxy. To consider but one example, on March 31, 1910, the three Galician bishops jointly issued a pastoral letter to

all the clergy in their eparchies, regarding the matter of “schismatic agitation.”⁸⁹⁹ In it, they noted that “not only paid agents of a foreign state” “but even people of good faith” were claiming that no difference existed between the Orthodox and Greek Catholic faiths. It was necessary, the bishops argued, “to teach in school and church in sermons and catechizations about the Catholic faith, about the differences between the Catholic Church and Tsarist Orthodoxy; it is necessary to stand in the protection of our Priestmartyr St. Josephat, to protect the faithful from political hatred, from the misuse of the word ‘orthodox,’ from confession to non-united [i.e., non-Greek Catholic] priests, from unhealthy nationalism and schismatic agitation.” The bishops thus urged both educational and devotional reforms, to combat a threat they identified as both religious and national-political. Furthermore, they ordered tighter regulation and scrutiny of their parishioners from the mid-level hierarchy: “Let the deans investigate during their visits, whether or not there are among our parishioners any [agitational] books or schismatic agitators...” The deans were also to coordinate within their respective deaneries clerical efforts, by discussing “the question of the Holy Unia” and the ongoing “battles with schismatic propaganda.”

It is clear that the bishops understood migration to and from America as intimately connected with the “schismatic agitation,” spreading through the Galician countryside, for the same letter urged reforms in the relationship of the Greek Catholic Church to migrants: “It is necessary also for greater pastoral oversight to those, who go out for work or return from America. From [migrants]...it is necessary to take an oath that they will persevere in the Catholic faith until death.” By this recommendation, the bishops sought to retain individual migrants within the bounds of Greek Catholicism, even during their sojourn in America, where Russky Orthodox conversions operated more freely than in the *kray*. They also sought, however, to forestall the remittance of conversions from the Americas and their spread through Greek Catholic communities in Galicia, for these recommendations were directed not only toward those going out, but those returning from the Americas, as well. Thus,

⁸⁹⁹ "Pastyrskye posslanye nashoho Vyreosv. Epyskopatu do Vsch. Dukhovenstva v spravi skhyzmatytskoyi agitatsyyi," *Nyva* 7, no. 10 (May 15, 1910). As summarized in Pastoral Letters, 901-902. This 80-page letter was published in 6,600 copies: in Przemyśl eparchy, 1000 for the clergy and 3000 for the faithful; in Stanyslaviv eparchy, 600 for the clergy and 2000 for the faithful.

while in this letter, the remittance of conversion movements by migrants does not appear to have provided the sole impetus for the Greek Catholic reforms urged, nevertheless, those American religious developments constituted one contributing factor in these modifications of East European religious forms.

While such episcopal pastoral letters certainly influenced reform efforts in the villages, they also encountered Russophile opposition. On February 16, 1910, Father Aleksandr Hovda reported that, upon reading two pastoral letters from the bishop in church, "The people listened with great interest."⁹⁰⁰ On the other hand, some priests complained that the pastoral letters fell on deaf ears. As one Greek Catholic loyalist complained to *Nyva's* readers,

When in Galicia clear signs of the spread of Orthodoxy and *Tsareslavyya* ["Tsar-odoxy"] began to appear, at that time our Bishops saw fit from necessity to send a circular pastoral letter with caution before the schismatic movements...And those that had to read this letter—instead of reading it and properly clarifying and setting themselves to work—did not read it at all, or read so that to them it was disagreeable...And here again came a new pastoral letter about Orthodoxy. And did the fathers read it? Some didn't read it at all (like Father Durkot in Lavov), and others only read some. But these deans made it known [i.e., they lied], that that everything was dutifully read and instructed to all.⁹⁰¹

In addition to episcopal pastoral letters, numerous rank-and-file priests reported sending pastoral correspondence to their parishioners in the matter of conversion. The tendency of many pastors in the *kray* to correspond with their parishioners in the Americas indicates that, though separated by an ocean, pastors continued to view migrants as a part of their flock. Thus, it would be entirely inaccurate in many cases to speak of migrants as a particular pastor's "former" parishioners: although migrants attended other parishes while in migration, they remained tied to their parish in the *kray*—this was particularly true for the many migrants who returned one or more times to the *kray*. A priest in 1910, for example, had no difficulty referring to a migrant in America as "my parishioner."⁹⁰² It would be difficult to say how effective pastoral letters from priests in the *kray* to their flock in the Americas actually were, given that

⁹⁰⁰ Aleksandr Hovda, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (February 16, 1910), Syg. 4928, 190-191.

⁹⁰¹ "Pravoslavna propaganda."

⁹⁰² Bulyk, "Letter to Fr. Aleksandr Durkot."

the subject generally came to the bishop's attention when such efforts were unsuccessful, as in the case of Father Vlad Durkot and his parishioner, Andrei Repak, of Mysczowa, cited in the previous chapter.

On February 2, 1910, Father Aleksandr Durkot of Jaworze told the bishop, "I wrote... a letter to my parishioners, in order that they strongly maintain the Catholic faith and not step away from the Holy See of Peter, and be loyal to their Most Eminent [bishop]." ⁹⁰³ As it turns out, the letter was unsuccessful, for in April, Father Durkot elaborated that a loyal migrant parishioner, Teodor Bulyk, had written him that, "despite my warning and prohibition, some of parishioners converted to the schismatic church." Bulyk had notified his priest in the *kray* that, "You wrote a letter to here addressed to me and Vasyl' Kornoy, but it doesn't help at all because our parishioners that were here do not even listen to it from the *kray*." He added, "I would like to have that letter that you wrote to Vasyl Kornoy: I read it to him, but he laughed at it, that it is not true and certainly did not show it to anyone, because he was the first to go to the new parish under [the Russky Orthodox priest] Krohmalny, and he is even the manager." ⁹⁰⁴

9.3 SERMONS

Greek Catholic reformers hoped to implement their counter-Russky Orthodox educational measures—like those outlined in pastoral letters and in the Greek Catholic press—through the foot soldiers in the villages: the parish priests. Priests not only sought to enlighten their *temny* constituents through their sermons and catechization, they also used the sacrament of confession and the practice of swearing oaths, to promote Greek Catholic identification over potential Russky Orthodox apostasy. As the three Galician Greek Catholic hierarchs wrote in their March 31, 1910 pastoral letter, because "schismatic agitation" had spread among the faithful, "Therefore, it is necessary to teach in school as well as in church, in sermons and catechization, about the Catholic faith, about the difference between the

⁹⁰³ Durkot, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," syg. 4928, 142-144.

⁹⁰⁴ Bulyk, "Letter to Fr. Aleksandr Durkot."

Catholic Church and Tsarist Orthodoxy.”⁹⁰⁵ These sermons and other catechizing efforts had the effect of bringing to the consciousness of villagers in the *kray*, not only technical matters of religious distinction, but also the role of migration in blurring those distinctions. If residents in Austro-Hungarian villages—whether prospective migrants, returned migrants, or non-migrants—did not yet recognize the connection between migration, on the one hand, and on the other, conversion from Greek Catholicism to the Rusky Orthodox Church, they learned of this on Sundays, as their pastor informed them from his pulpit.




Figure 9. Title page of a sermon written by Father K. Horodysky, parson in Sanok, Galicia, entitled “About the Prophets Inimical to the Faith.” Proclaimed at the regular meeting of the Novosilsky deanery (Galicia) on November 24, 1910, the sermon drew distinctions between Greek Catholicism and Rusky Orthodox Christianity, with the latter identified as an “enemy” (ABGK syg. 4929, 465)

In addition to the sermons and other forms of catechization addressed to all, priests made special attempts to influence their migrant parishioners, especially through the sacrament of confession and the swearing of oaths, as well as personal conversations surrounding these activities. Shortly before going out, migrants would request a Divine Liturgy in their name, at which time they would make their

⁹⁰⁵ "Pastyrskoe posslanye nashoho Vyreosv. Epyskopatu do Vsch. Dukhovenstva v spravi skhymatyskoyi agitatsyyi."

confession and receive communion. At that time, the priest might provide some instruction, and then request that they swear an oath.

9.4 PROMISES AND OATHS

“More pastoral oversight is also necessary for those who go out to work and come back from America. From those...it is necessary to take an oath that they will maintain the Catholic faith until death.” Thus wrote the three Greek Catholic bishops of Galicia to their bishops on March 31, 1910.⁹⁰⁶ One of those prelates, Lviv’s Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, in his 1912 *Memorial Booklet for Rusky Workers in England, Argentina, Brazil, the Netherlands, Canada, Germany, the United States, and Sweden*, publicized the episcopal direction: “Among all our [Galician] eparchies, such is the order: those that go abroad for work must, before their departure, take their oath to sincerely maintain the holy faith and church.”⁹⁰⁷ Even before 1910, by which time the practice had become standard diocesan policy in Galicia, the swearing of oaths constituted an important method by which Greek Catholic loyalists sought to preserve the migrant faithful. The form of every oath likely varied from parish to parish and from priest to priest. The most significant variations could have resulted from different combinations of the terms “faith,” “rite,” “church,” “Catholic” and “Greek Catholic”—which could produce slight, though hardly insignificant, variations in the entity to which migrants understood themselves pledging fidelity.

An oath could perform several functions. Because peasants did not take the breaking of an oath lightly, once taken, they could promote a sense of loyalty, through self-administered compulsion. An oath provided an opportunity for the priest to exert his moral influence upon his parishioners directly. On January 25, 1911, one priest, Father Aleksandr Siletsky, explained: “Before the proclamation of this order

⁹⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁷ Sheptytsky, *Pamyatka dlya ruskykh robotnykiv v angliyi, argetyni, brazyliyi, daniyi, kanadi, nimecheni, spoluch. derzhavakh, frantsyi, shchvaytsari i shvetsyi*, 45.

[a pastoral letter of the bishops regarding conversion and migration], my parishioners going out for work to America maintained such a practice, that before their departure they would convene, maybe two or three or more, paying together for one Divine Liturgy, during which, on the designated day, they would confess and take communion. Therefore, with that occasion of Holy Confession, the possibility was given to me to influence each individual in conscience of soul and heart, from all sides, piously and successfully.⁹⁰⁸

The oath performed an educational function, as well. A brief catechesis often accompanied the oath, which in turn confirmed that catechesis. The oath itself could also contain educational content. By asking his parishioners to swear fidelity to the “Catholic Church” and the “Greek Catholic rite,” the priest availed himself of an opportunity to let migrants know that such things existed, and that these terms represented, in fact, proper terms of self-identification. In Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s booklet for migrant workers, following a summary of the history that resulted in two different faiths of the same rite (Greek Catholicism and Orthodoxy), he contended, “All these truths you will learn through that sacred vow, which you will give to your spiritual Father [i.e., the parish priest], before going out abroad. The spiritual fathers have the occasion to instruct, to remind, to keep watch; and making that promise, you yourselves understand better the danger which threatens, and you will connect yourself until death with Jesus Christ and his Holy Church.”⁹⁰⁹

For several reasons, Greek Catholic hierarchs and priests could not be certain that an oath would ensure their migrant constituents’ fidelity to Greek Catholicism. In the first place, many migrants had already left the *kray* for the Americas, without ever having taken an oath. Several priests reported to Bishop Konstantyn of Przemyśl that their parishioners, who had migrated before the March 15, 1910 pastoral letter, had not sworn any oath; they reported, however, that they had taken alternative measures. On January 3, 1911, for example, a Father Aleksander Treshnevsky reported that in the past year, three

⁹⁰⁸ Aleksandr Siletsky, "Conversion and Migration Report to Bishop Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (January 25, 1911), 316-17.

⁹⁰⁹ Sheptytsky, *Pamyatka dlya ruskykh robotnykiv v angliyi, argetyni, brazyliyi, daniyi, kanadi, nimecheni, spoluch. derzhavakh, frantsyi, shchvaytsari i shvetsyi*, 44.

people, whom he named (a 17-year-old girl, a 28-year-old man, and a 14-year-old boy) had migrated to America: "None of the indicated made a public oath of faithfulness for their church. The undersigned privately cautioned them before the Orthodox propaganda and encouraged them to faithfulness to the Greek Catholic Church."⁹¹⁰ And on December 29, 1910, Father Homorymanyk reported, "Because those emigrating to America appear to [me] about their emigration, usually at the time of Holy Confession to which they approach a day or two before their departure, thus [I] do not have anyone here publicly retake their oath of loyalty to their church. Instead of that, [I] instructed such confessing emigrants in appropriate methods...to preserve with strong tenacity there in America their faith and their rite."⁹¹¹

A second limitation of the oaths lay in the difficulty in acquiring precise information about migrants' behaviors while in migration. Notwithstanding the many detailed reports on American conditions, many of which even included individual identifying information, the majority of migrants enjoyed a substantial degree of freedom from the oversight of the *kray*. When in 1909 or 1910, Father Alexander Durkot learned that the returned migrant Yakov Betelyak had converted to schism, the latter promised to "return to his faith." As to whether the peripatetic Betelyak kept his oath, however, Father Durkot could not say. The religious freedom afforded by the exigencies of migration obscured such knowledge, for soon after selling his entire land holdings, Betelyak again "returned to America, and only in order to remain there once and for all."⁹¹² Indeed, one priest and his bishop learned that migrants had, in fact, taken a counter-oath in America, specifically in their testimony in an American church property dispute case, in which they renounced their Catholicism; as Teodor Bulyk wrote to his priest in the *kray*, "and there will perhaps be enough of them who do not return, but who, in a foreign land, pushed themselves out from their faith, and in accord with that, then took an oath here in court 'kort:' 'We don't want to recognize the Pope of Rome as the head of the Church, and neither do we want his bishop.'"⁹¹³

⁹¹⁰ Father Aleksander Treshnevsky, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (January 3, 1911), syg. 4931, 36.

⁹¹¹ Father Homorymanyk, in *ABGK* (December 29, 1910), syg. 4931, 35.

⁹¹² Durkot, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," Syg. 4928, 142.

⁹¹³ Bulyk, "Letter to Fr. Aleksandr Durkot."

Another difficulty lay in ambiguity of the meaning of an oath. Part of that ambiguity could stem from whether priests asked their parishioners to swear fidelity to “our church” versus “the Greek Catholic Church;” but even if they pledged allegiance to the latter, it could be difficult to determine what exactly the parishioner meant by “Greek Catholic.” On December 29, 1910, for example, Father Ioann Bohusky in Chornorik reported that, of the seven parishioners whom he knew had gone to America (and whom he named), “All before their departure confessed to [me] and vowed to maintain their church and their rite.”⁹¹⁴ Given the lack of modifiers and the ambiguity of terms like “our faith,” the bishop might legitimately have asked: “*Which church? Which rite?*” One way to alleviate the ambiguity was to refer specifically either to Greek Catholic bishops or especially the Catholic pope. Father Volodymyr Herasymovych proposed that migrants swear and sign the following oath before migrating:

I, Teodor Havrylok, solemnly swear before the Holy Cross and the Holy Gospel that until the end of my life, whether here, or in America, or some other country, I will always be a faithful son of the holy Catholic Church, and to my ancestral Greek-Rusky Rite, and never from my holy Faith and Rite will I withdraw, because I believe that only in the holy Faith and Church, of which the head is the successor of the holy apostle Peter, the holy Father the Pope of Rome can I find eternal salvation. Thus help me Lord God in the One Holy Trinity and all the saints, Amen.⁹¹⁵

Of course, some migrants might simply refuse to take such an oath, as did Havryl Fedorko, in Hladyshiv. Fedorko initially indicated on June 13, 1910 that he would take an oath (if no one else were to find out), but before he could, “he went to the schismatic church in America and prayed there.”⁹¹⁶ On January 31, 1911, Father Vlad Durkot of Mysczowa reported,

On the Sunday of the Samaritan, that is, May 29, 1910, at the time of the Divine Liturgy, after the Holy Gospel, I read the letter of the Most Reverend Bishopric to the faithful; afterward, I invited those planning to go to America to take the oath, that for always—until death—they will remain with the Catholic faith, explaining that this practice—the repetition of the promise already made for each at baptism—is nothing other than the only means to defend against falling away from the true faith, and security against the worthless persons, to which migrants are exposed.

Then, after the Divine Liturgy, Teodor Lysak and Samuel Froshky, came to me, donated for the Divine Liturgy, said that they are going to America, and would like to

⁹¹⁴ Ioann Bohusky, "Migration and Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (December 29, 1910), Syg. 4931, 25.

⁹¹⁵ Herasymovych, "Proekt Tserkovny Kontrol nad Nasheyu Emigratsiyeyu do Ameryky," 680.

⁹¹⁶ Podlyashetsky, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bp. Konstantyn," Syg. 4930, 199-200.

confess with their Divine Liturgy. I instructed them to swear their oath. Well, they said: “We, Spiritual Father, will not convert to any other faith, but to swear an oath we cannot. The Spiritual Father should know that there [in America], Ukrainians are working!” My explanation did not help, and neither did clarification nor strong proof; only one promised me that he will not go to that *pleyz* where ours converted to Orthodoxy. They left, did not confess, and did not give much [money] for their Divine Liturgy.⁹¹⁷

While Father Durkot did not very clearly explain why these migrants would not take their oath, Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s encouragement of migrants in his booklet suggests that the great seriousness with which migrants treated oaths accounted for it. “Do not be afraid also,” Sheptytsky exhorted, “that this promise will result in some greater sin, if you were not to keep it. It only helps to confirm [you] in the faith and unwaveringly maintain the Holy Faith. Because without that promise and oath, if someone falls away from the church, he will be an apostate like Judas, and it will be a terrible sin.”⁹¹⁸

Others simply circumvented the oath by emigrating without notifying their priest. Father Aleksandr Siletsky reported in 1911 that, although in the past he had been able to influence his parishioners through the oath-taking ritual, “After the proclamation [of the pastoral letter of the hierarchs], I instructed that each person, before his or her departure to America take an oath in the church, that in America he or she will not change his or her faith. Regretfully, I have finally had the possibility of that influence... taken away, because on the day of that proclamation, none of those who were emigrating either paid for a Divine liturgy or gave their confession. They still have not appeared [to me], but recently [I] found out from other people about their emigration, a long or short while after [their departure].”⁹¹⁹ For these shirkers, too, Metropolitan Sheptytsky posed a solution:

It may be that many of you went out from the village secretly before your spiritual father. On account of that I want you all together and each one individually, to endeavor to take that oath. If already you cannot do that in your church before your spiritual father, then would to God that you do this in your heart before the omniscient God.

I give to you here a prayer, which you can repeat to yourself not once but many times, in order by which to support more and more the holy faith, by which you can

⁹¹⁷ Father Vlad Durkot, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bishop Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (January 31, 1911), syg. 4931, 244.

⁹¹⁸ Sheptytsky, *Pamyatka dlya ruskykh robotnykiv v angliyi, argetyni, brazyliyi, daniyi, kanadi, nimecheni, spoluch. derzhavakh, frantsyi, shchvaytsari i shvetsyi*.

⁹¹⁹ Siletsky, "Conversion and Migration Report to Bishop Konstantyn," Syg. 4931, 316-317.

diligently guard against all danger in these matters. Let such an oath also be an everyday resolution and your everyday prayer. And where among you exists the custom to pray socially out loud, then affix this prayer to your everyday prayers.

Sheptytsky maintained that this oath would, in itself, instruct the migrant in sacred truths and the specific dangers which the Russky Orthodox posed to migrants.⁹²⁰ Thus, in response to conversion movements, Sheptytsky proposed a course of action requiring the migrant to daily take out his or her booklet, the cover of which provided a reminder that the migrant belonged to a multi-regional transatlantic migrant labor force, tied through faith and nationality to their migratory region of origin.⁹²¹

9.5 CENSORSHIP

When in the late 1890s and early 1900s, Greek Catholic conversions to Russky Orthodox began to spread in Subcarpathian villages, Hungarian government officials, acting in conjunction with Greek Catholic hierarchs, were particularly interested in confiscating pro-Russky Orthodox literature, including: (a) *Where to Seek the Truth*, composed by Father Alexis Toth, published in the United States and Vienna, and remitted to Austria-Hungary; and (b) *Fraternal Greetings to our Carpatho-Russky Brothers and Sisters Living in the Carpathian Mountains and in America*, written by a priest from Russia, living in

⁹²⁰ Juxtaposed in the booklet next to an image of the Holy Virgin, it read:

I believe, Lord, in everything that you revealed and which the Holy Church delivers to the faithful. I believe that the goal of instruction revealed by you is the unerring truth, because You are the God of pre-eternal truth without end, and by no other means can you show mercy to us or deliver us from error.

I want to belong to the Holy Catholic Church to which belonged my parents, grandparents, and great grandparents; I want in this Church to live and die.

In the presence of the Most Holy Virgin, of all the holy angels, and all the saints in heaven, I swear solemnly to you, Christ the Savior, that I will vigilantly maintain the holy faith unto death, that I will not reject it, and I will not submit to separate from it.

I swear, that until death I will be a good son (daughter) of the Holy Catholic Church, that I will not step away from the submission due the Vicar of Christ, the holy Father the Pope of Rome, that as I was born in the Holy Unia with the Roman See, so do I wish to die in that Holy Unia.

And you pre-eternal God, help me faithfully even until death to hold fast to this holy oath. Give to me your mercy, keeping watch for danger, strengthen my faith, keep watch over me before my enemies of salvation, and grant that I might live and die in your mercy. Thus help me God and all the Saints. Amen.

⁹²¹ Sheptytsky, *Pamyatka dlya ruskykh robotnykiv v angliyi, argetyni, brazyl'iyi, daniyi, kanadi, nimecheni, spoluch. derzhavakh, frantsyi, shchvaytsari i shvetsyi*, 45-48.

Subcarpathia, but published in St. Petersburg. Thus, two of the most important early writings in the Russky Orthodox conversion movements to fall under censorship exhibited a transnational orientation: the first publication issued originally the Americas (also *via* Vienna), from a migrant priest from Subcarpathia, promoting a pan-Russky national identity to an audience of people living in the Americas, Galicia, and Subcarpathia; the second issued from Subcarpathia *via* Russia, from a migrant priest originally from Russia, promoting pan-Russky national identity to an audience of people living in the Americas, Galicia, and Subcarpathia.⁹²²

In Galicia, too, Bishop Konstantyn was concerned with Father Toth's pamphlet (some of his informants were able to locate it in local reading rooms); however, these two pamphlets were not the only forms of pro-Russky Orthodox literature which Greek Catholics were interested in censoring. They were also concerned with newspapers, journals, booklets, and other brochures. Many informants reported that no such literature could be found in their parishes. For example, on March 4, 1910, Father Volodymyr Kozlovsky of the village of Povorznyk reported that no evidence of schism, including Russky Orthodox brochures, had appeared in his village. He claimed that, in his sermons, he had preached against possessing or reading such brochures. As for his immigrants, he claimed that he had been advising them to say their prayers, go to confession, and conduct all religious practices only in "our G.C. church," and that he would do so now even more vociferously.⁹²³ Some priests did find the offending literature in their villages, however. On January 21, 1910, Father Orest Martynowych reported that the American Russophile-Orthodoxophile *Postup* was coming to his village of Wysowa.⁹²⁴ And on April 26, 1910, one of Bishop Konstantyn's deans investigated the contents of the libraries in the Rusky Bursa in Gorlice, as

⁹²² Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 125.

⁹²³ Father Volodymyr Kozlovsky, "Migration/Conversion Report to Bishop Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (March 4, 1910), syg. 4928, 280-283.

⁹²⁴ Martynowych, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," syg. 4931, 273-273b.

well as the Kachkovsky Societies in his deanery. Particularly troubling was their discovery of an Orthodox “*Kalendar*” published in New York, along with some books from Moscow.⁹²⁵

The degree to which such literature—remitted from the Americas, or originating in Austrian Bukovina or Russia—irritated the Greek Catholic hierarchy is evident from the pastoral letter circulated on September 20, 1910, by the Greek Catholic bishop of Przemyśl to his priests, which read:

On the occasion of the journey of His Excellency, our Most Reverend Metropolitan [Sheptytsky] to America, enemies of the Greek Catholic Church, in Russky newspapers there, are hurling completely evil slander at the eminent person of the Metropolitan, by those means to defame the dignity of the Greek Catholic Hierarchy, to undermine the bond to the Greek Catholic churches, and to pull the faithful to schism. Issues 28 and 29 of *Postup* from August 11th to 18th of 1910, published in New York, were sent and reached the news here, and in significant numbers, newspapers disseminated statements from those two utterly evil editions to the priests and the people in the local eparchy.

We summon the Reverend Clergy, that they would closely track the newspaper statements, especially in the said editions, and forbid those that are weekly spread among the people. Further, because there is a possibility that schismatic agitators from America will send publications from there in the *Russky* tongue—newspapers and brochures inimical to the holy Catholic Church—to Rusyns in Galicia, the Episcopal Bishopric recommends to the Reverend Pastorate that they closely track whether such agitating newspapers and brochures are spreading among the Greek Catholic faithful. That they, with understanding and persuasive methods, warn about the danger of reading the shameful newspapers, that they guard against the visible enemies of the Catholic Church—the publishers and potentially connected anti-religious newspapers or brochures—and that they propose an index of such publications from their parishioners.

The Episcopal Bishopric anticipates that the Reverend Clergy will, in solidarity, fulfill the duty of their conscience, corresponding to the experience of the Holy Spirit, subordinating themselves to the flock.⁹²⁶

9.6 COUNTERING PRINT WITH PRINT

In addition to censoring the press and other forms of media, Greek Catholics hoped to counter the Russky Orthodox print salvo, launched from Russia, the Americas, and within Austria-Hungary, with their own pro-Greek Catholic mass media responses. These included Greek Catholic newspapers and

⁹²⁵ Father Klement Konstansky, "Report to Bishop Konstantyn," in *ABGK* (April 26, 1910), syg. 4928, 716-717, 721.

⁹²⁶ Bishop Konstantyn Chekhovych, "Pastoral Letter," in *ABGK* (September 20, 1910), syg. 4930, 191.

journals, books, pamphlets, catechisms, and prayer books. It would also be possible to include here episcopal pastoral letters (sometimes distributed in the thousands).

In the Americas, newspapers like the Uhro-Rusynophile *Amerykansky Russky Viestnik* and the Rusky-Ukrainophile *Svoboda* provided the most widely disseminated media in which Greek Catholic loyalists continuously, over the course of many years, criticized the Russky Orthodox Church and promoted fidelity to Catholicism. *Svoboda*, for example, attacked Russky Orthodox conversion as national treason, when it cast dispersions upon Russky Orthodox leaders, including the publication's former editor, who in 1897 founded *Svit*, the most prominent Russky Orthodox publication in the Americas:

Perhaps no other people on earth have raised so many traitors as the [Rusky] people. From the time of the [Rusky] rebirth to the present time, people without character fled and continue to flee into foreign camps where they listen to foreign voices, serve foreign gods, and forget about their own people. Some even become passionate enemies of their own people. These people today serve the Muscovites, Poles, Hungarians, and other peoples. We can count them by the thousands but among us today we have two, the Revs. Toth and Hrushka.⁹²⁷

The *Amerykansky Russky Viestnik* devoted much of its anti-Orthodox attentions to denunciations of the Greek Catholic bishop of America, Soter Ortynsky, whose supposed Rusky-Ukrainophile orientation they considered a main contributing factor to Russky Orthodox conversion in America.

In Austria-Hungary, journals like *Nyva* and *Gorogkatolikus hirlap* carried the pro-Greek Catholic torch. After 1910, a new journal devoted especially to the issue of labor migration also joined the fight: *Emigrant*. Published by Lviv's Society of St. Raphael, an organization founded in the early 1900s to promote greater pastoral care for Greek Catholic migrants, *Emigrant* was directed at Greek Catholic clerics and intelligentsia with prospective, current, and former migrants under their care, as well as directly to migrants. *Emigrant* proclaimed in its masthead:

Dear Countrymen! Do not discard your ancestral land thoughtlessly and forever! When desire compels you to emigrate, then would to God that you not sell your ancestral

⁹²⁷ *Svoboda*, Oct. 22, 1896. This passage is also quoted in Myron B. Kuropas, *Ukrainian-American Citadel: The First One Hundred Years of the Ukrainian National Association*, East European monographs no. 416 (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1996), 58.

farmstead, in order that you would have something to which to return. Go more gladly to your earnings, save, do not take to drink; with your earnings return and with them improve your community. Do not attend only to profits, but also pay attention to your soul – do not allow yourself to be carried away into the sea of corruption, because you will drown unto eternity! Do not forget to seek council in the “Society of St. Raphael” before going out.

That “sea of corruption,” which migrants could expect to encounter during their transatlantic sojourn, included especially the murky waters of Russky Orthodox conversion. In addition to advising migrants in matters of domestic and immigration law in the Americas and Europe, the necessary provisions for travel, and the evils of migration “agents,” who sought to exploit them, *Emigrant* also hoped to equip migrants with the proper defense against “agents” of a different sort: those who acted in the service of Russky Orthodox conversion.

One aspect of this defense centered around maintaining the faith before, during, and consequently, after migration. *Emigrant* provided recommendations for every phase of the journey. Thus, the publication advised, “Before boarding the steam ship, the most important thing is to attend the Divine Liturgy, confess and receive the Holy Mystery, because the road is far, and uncertain. Let therefore no one undertake it who is not reconciled with God.” If the migrant neglected to do this in his village of origin, he could do so in the chapel established in Bremen by Bishop Soter on his own voyage to America. In addition to their baggage, migrants were told, “Take with you a prayer book, a bible, and a catechism. This will be your sole consolation in this journey...Above all migrants undertake an uncertain and far journey, so let him go with God.”⁹²⁸

Emigrant also provided information for use upon arrival in the Americas: “When the migrant comes to that land, to where he hoped to go, let him go to a Rusky Catholic (not Orthodox-Russian) parish priest...” *Emigrant* provided the addresses of the approved Greek Catholic priests. In order that migrants not suddenly be attracted by grand Russky Orthodox churches, *Emigrant* prepared the migrant for religious realities in migration, particularly as they resulted from the lack of establishment religion in religiously plural societies. Rather than reacting to modest Greek Catholic churches with conversion,

⁹²⁸ "Dorohovkaz dlya pereselentsiv."

migrants were instead to commit themselves to greater service to their church: “When our migrants arrive to America, let him not be ignorant, that there in church everything is not as it is at home. There are not [beautiful] images there, and not such glorious churches, because Catholics themselves must attend to their church, the acquisition of a priest, and the Divine Liturgy. For that reason, let the migrant also not refuse when someone would ask him to sing at the Divine Liturgy, because there are not any deacons there. The state neither attends to the churches nor the priests; for that reason, the churches there are very simple, not grand.” If the migrant could not find his or her “own Catholic church” (in other words, a Greek Catholic church), he or she was instructed to “go to the Latin Catholic [church]: German or English, or such as there is.” Not insignificantly here, by one glaring omission, *Emigrant* left it up to the migrant to determine whether “such as there is” might include a Polish Latin Catholic church, so mistrusted by Rusky-Ukrainophile Greek Catholics.⁹²⁹

Emigrant also raised the subject of migrant fraternal, burial, and benevolent societies. In addition to recommending that “Each migrant must subscribe to some good Rusky newspaper,” the publication cautioned, “Let [the migrant] be careful, that he not go to some evil society, which are abundant in America. And instead, let him go to some good Rusky Society, about which let the parish priest advise him.” At the top of the list of “evil societies” were those with a Rusky Orthodox orientation:

The most dangerous of all for our people are the Russian Orthodox societies, especially there, where we do not have a Catholic pastor. Russians attract our people mostly by the reality that they have such similar practices in their churches, as we conduct among ourselves. Where there is not a Rusky Catholic pastor and practices: there people are led to believe that Orthodoxy is "one and the same [with Catholicism]" and even that "Orthodoxy is the better faith," and they go to their churches and join their societies. But such they do only in a fog, that they even do not know, that the Catholic faith alone is true and that whoever changes faith and casts off nationality, that one is a schismatic and apostate. Many of our unenlightened people went there [to America], lost their Catholic faith and threw away their Rusky nationality, and became schismatic Russians. ... Protect your faith and nationality with the language, as they are your dearest treasures brought from the old country.

⁹²⁹ Ibid.

It would be best instead to join a Catholic society.⁹³⁰ Methods of protecting both “faith and nationality” also included educating the second generation, by sending children to “a Catholic Rusky school,” for public schools without religious instruction would only produce a-religious children: “And you Christian families remember yet again: to send your children to Catholic schools, to talk with your children only in the Rusky language, always remind them, that with everyone they should speak Rusky. Don't ever forget, that you are Rusyns and Catholics.”⁹³¹

Greek Catholics also penned books to respond to the Rusky Orthodox threat. In the wake of Father Alexis Toth's pro-Rusky Orthodox, anti-Unia *Where to Seek the Truth*, which had influenced migrant Greek Catholic communities in America and in the Austro-Hungarian regions to which migrants remitted the booklet, some Greek Catholics hoped for a commensurate response. They found it in Subcarpathia in an essay entitled “Unio,” written by Father Ioann Rakovsky. Published in *Gorogkatolikus szemle*, it was suggested that the essay ought to be disseminated as a pamphlet.⁹³² In Galicia, Greek Catholics found Father T. Lezhohubsky's suggestively titled *De znayty pravdu* (“Where to Find the Truth”): presumably a more desirable alternative to merely “seeking” the same, as Father Toth had recommended. *Where to Find the Truth* provided a fictional account in which a Galician villager encounters an invidious Orthodox missionary from Russia, only to be saved by an enterprising Greek Catholic priest who knows well his Unia and its superiority to Orthodoxy. Published in Lviv in 1912 and again in 1914 in Philadelphia, the text was intended to be an anti-Orthodox resource for priests and laity, both migrant and non-migrant. Equipped with the truths found in that booklet, Greek Catholics could resist Orthodox propaganda in America; furthermore, they would be prepared, upon returning to Habsburg realms, to stave off the real-life counterparts to the book's fictional Orthodox missionary from

⁹³⁰ Ibid.

⁹³¹ Ibid. *Emigrant* made an especially significant contribution to the Greek Catholic counterattack insofar as it provided one of Father Nykyta Budka's most substantive engagements—as editor of *Emigrant*—with the question of migration and Rusky Orthodox conversion, prior to his appointment in 1912 as Greek Catholic bishop of Canada.

⁹³² Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 136.

Russia. Together, “Where to Seek the Truth” and *Where to Find the Truth* constituted a transnational variation on the centuries old-tradition of Orthodox-Greek Catholic polemics.

Like *Where to Find the Truth*, Metropolitan Sheptytsky’s booklet for migrants, *Memorial Booklet for Rusky Workers in England, Argentina, Brazil, the Netherlands, Canada, Germany, the United States, and Sweden* was published in both 1912 and 1914. The metropolitan wrote in simple language, easily intelligible to Greek Catholic migrants from Galicia, who either read or heard its contents. He also invoked an extended analogy likely to resonate with migrants who made the transatlantic voyage for work across the sea: “the divine ship.” “The ship,” he wrote, “that leads us to the other coast of blissful eternity, is the holy Church, that teaches the faith, preserves the faith, and gives the truth of God to the faithful. The only one who will maintain his faith, is the one who until death remains a faithful son, a good child of the holy Catholic Church. The only one who will cross the wide sea, is the one who undertakes the journey in this ship.” For the benefit of those who embarked upon the lengthy, arduous voyage from Austria-Hungary to the Americas, Metropolitan Sheptytsky assured them, “The journey [to salvation] is far and difficult.” Furthermore, “The only ship, which will safely avoid storms and winds and underwater cliffs, is that which has a helmsman appointed by God, who with the divine help of the Holy Spirit directs the ship.” The metropolitan had in mind none other than the Vicar of Christ, the Pope of Rome.⁹³³

Metropolitan Sheptytsky extended the analogy of “the divine ship,” to catechize his migrant constituents regarding the dangers of other pretenders to the one Church. “Of the churches of Christ, there is only one,” he asserted. “We believe in one church. There cannot be two true Churches. There cannot be two ships, that could carry [us] to the other side.” How then, were migrants—wary also of unscrupulous steam liner agents who overcharged or placed migrants on ships bound for unknown, undesirable locales—to determine which “ship” represented the true church? “All ships that carry

⁹³³ Sheptytsky, *Pamyatka dlya ruskykh robotnykiv v angliyi, argetyni, brazyliyi, daniyi, kanadi, nimecheni, spoluch. derzhavakh, frantsyi, shchvaytsari i shvetsyi.*

passengers are smashed along the way; only one finds salvation,” the metropolitan explained. “It is easy to recognize that ship among others; we recognize it according to its divine helmsman. And in other [ships], either there is no helmsman, or it is whoever takes the helm in his hands.” The metropolitan counted among those who took the helm in their own hands: “Methodists, Presbyterians, Anglicans, Lutherans, Baptists, Quakers, Zwinglians, Jansenists, Old Catholics, and in Russia, several families of Orthodox...”⁹³⁴

He employed the ship analogy most especially in his critique of “schismatics,” among whom, he claimed, no legitimate helmsman could be found. In the wake of their rebellion against the Catholic Church, various Orthodox bishops and patriarchs now each

have their own church, their own ship, and carry the people in it [following] after their own leader ...And who appointed them as helmsmen in each ship? For the most part, secular people. In Russia, the Synod, which stands under the ministry by which the secular *procurator* rules, appoints and dismisses bishops when and how it likes...

It is clear, that with such helmsmen of such boats it is not good to undertake the far journey to eternity; such helmsmen will easily lead to perdition those who submit to their guardianship.

Already they are leading [people] to perdition.⁹³⁵

In the metaphor of “the divine ship,” the association between migration and religious identification, between migration’s hazards and those represented by Russky Orthodox Christianity was readily apparent.

Catechisms and everyday prayer books provided yet another opportunity for Greek Catholic reformers to promote Greek Catholic fidelity over Russky Orthodox conversion. In several cases, authors appealed to catechisms in other parts of the Catholic world, composed to deal with religious differentiation, as models. In 1912, one reformer wrote, “It seems to me, that in religious instruction of

⁹³⁴ Ibid. Presbyterians he singled out for their particularly libertarian teachings, which he characterized as follows: “You can interpret the Holy Scriptures as you yourself wish, take from them what is helpful, and that faith which you take from the Holy Scripture, does not compel you in life: you may live your life to yourself as you like.” Of the Presbyterian “ship,” the metropolitan said: “Who does not see, that by such a helm, the ship must be smashed...And this teaching is the same as if someone were to say, ‘Sit on this broom like a boat and go across the sea.’”

⁹³⁵ Ibid., 34-36.

the people, too rarely is the question of Orthodoxy raised; accepting the matter *per se notum*,⁹³⁶ too rarely are the dogmatic differences of Orthodoxy introduced [to the people], too rarely are [the people] enlightened in that respect from the pulpit and in the confessional; too rarely do the people learn about the prohibition against reading the writings of apostates, about the church censors, and too little are the people catechized on the theme of Orthodoxy.” This author then turned his attention to a catechism in a German Catholic diocese, threatened especially by Protestant encroachments, in which Catholicism and Protestantism were clearly distinguished from one another. “We find ourselves today in similar circumstances,” wrote this Greek Catholic priest, “It also demonstrates to us the need to act against mass propaganda of Orthodoxy. Such an addition to our people’s small catechisms, *mutatis mutandis*,⁹³⁷ would be strongly desired.” This priest believed that such a catechism would be especially effective among youths.⁹³⁸

Also in 1912, an unidentified author in Lviv’s *Nyva* reviewed *Gospodu pomolimsja: molitvenik za grekokatolike*, a prayer book for Greek Catholics in Croatia. The book included a brief catechism, in which, as the reviewer singled out, among other catechetical series, “we find a question about the difference between Greek Catholics and the ‘Orthodox’ and the question, whether a Greek Catholic is free to go to a non-united church.” The reviewer recommended further that, “It is necessary to insert such questions into our catechisms and prayer books.” Also, with respect to the Orthodox question, the reviewer commended the inclusion in many catechisms of “beautiful prayers to St. Josephat” interspersed with “beautiful images,” presumably of staunch Greek Catholic, anti-Orthodox martyr St. Josephat, as well as other Catholic saints.⁹³⁹

⁹³⁶ Latin: “as self-evident”

⁹³⁷ Latin: “the necessary changes having been made”

⁹³⁸ Fr. O. Hn., “Prychynok do pravoslavnoyi propagandy,” *Nyva* 9, no. 3 (February 1, 1912): 105-06.

⁹³⁹ “Gospodu pomolimsya, molitvenik za grkokatolike, ulozhyv o. D-r. Dioniziy Nyarabi,” *Nyva* 9, no. 21-2 (November 15, 1912): 652.

9.7 RIGHT WORSHIPING, RIGHT BELIEVING, OR BOTH?

Many Greek Catholics reformers accused Russophile Greek Catholics of avoiding any mention of Catholicism altogether. The reformers charged also that by calling their parishioners “orthodox,” and even emphasizing that label, Russophiles, rather than highlighting their parishioners’ “co-orthodoxy” with Latin Catholics, instead wished to affirm their essential “Orthodoxy”—that is, their oneness or sameness with the Russky Orthodox Church.

A number of Greek Catholic loyalists attempted to bring some clarification to the situation. Father D. Yaremko explained in 1912 that,

The Catholic priest uses that phrase [“all Orthodox Christians”—*vsykh pravoslavnykh khrestyian*] in one sense, and the schismatic priest in another. A member of the secular intelligentsia understands this saying the same as the priest does. However, for the simple Catholic person, the saying “*pravoslavny*” is unclear: in this word, the simple people see an inclination toward schism. The word then, used by a Catholic priest, in the sense of strict-Catholic, can therefore become a cause of misunderstanding among members of his spiritual flock.⁹⁴⁰

According to self-identifying Catholics, Russophiles intentionally obscured the meaning of “*pravoslavny*” for the faithful and opposed “clarification” of the term according to Greek Catholic standards. *Nyva* even reported incredulously on July 15, 1909 that a correspondent to the Russophile Galician periodical *Rus* had gone so far as to criticize a priest, a Father Kozanovsky from Boratyn, “for the reason that he did not say in his sermons that the Catholic and the Orthodox faith are the same, but to the contrary, that he calls the Orthodox [*pravoslavni*] “schismatics” and says that the word “*pravoslavny*” in the great entrance is merely tradition. *Rus* deems the words of Father K[ozanovsky] a Jesuit fable!”⁹⁴¹

Just what did ostensibly Greek Catholic Russophile priests mean by the term “*pravoslavny*?” In 1910, Father Teodor Krushynsky explained that, he did not recall telling migrant parishioners in Dolishnii Luzhok, “You are orthodox,” (before they ultimately converted in the Americas); if he did, however, he meant it “not in some conspiring way with a sinister intention; but with the best holy intention do I make

⁹⁴⁰ Fr. Dr. D. Yaremko, “*Yak pomynaty virnykh na Velykim Vkhodi?*,” *Nyva* 7, no. 13-14 (July 1910): 419.

⁹⁴¹ “*Pravoslavna propaganda*,” *Nyva* 6, no. 18-19 (July 15, 1909): 609.

remembrance that ‘fides catholica, fides orthodoxa.’”⁹⁴² Krushynsky thus maintained that by the words, “you are *pravoslavni*,” he had intended to convey a meaning congenial to official Greek Catholic sensibilities (“orthodox”), rather than something more pernicious (“Orthodox”).⁹⁴³

Whether or not Bishop Konstantyn of Przemyśl took Father Krushynsky at his word, the prelate and his two other Galician episcopal counterparts clearly understood that the term *pravoslavny* had become problematic. Their March 31st, 1910 pastoral letter, singling out converting migrants, highlighted the way in which Russky Orthodox agitators had been taking advantage of “even such—seemingly—inoffensive things, like the ambiguity (in the liturgy, books, and in life) among us of the meaning of the word *pravoslavny*, abusing this lack of clarity...such lack of clarity (unclear to the people) could cause them to be deceived...” Not only priests, but newspapers, books, and other literature, such as the “*Kalendar Russkoho Slova*,” remitted from America, had been leading the people astray: “under the influence of such writings and others like them—enough of which are being found, unfortunately—our peasant will become accustomed to thinking that his faith is simply Orthodox [*pravoslavny*], that ‘our Church,’ is the state church in Russia—that is, that they are one and the same—and that between us and those separated of the Eastern rite, there is no difference. He learns to scorn our saints and hurl mud on everything for which our grandfathers and great grandfathers shed their martyrs’ blood.”⁹⁴⁴

9.8 AND THE ONE SHALL BECOME TWO

In the struggle against the *temnist* of the masses, Greek Catholic reformers focused pointedly upon ignorance of the distinctions between Orthodoxy and Catholicism, which they believed “schismatic” agitators exploited. Accordingly, reformers took steps to educate the masses and even the Russophile

⁹⁴² Latin: “the catholic faith, the orthodox faith.”

⁹⁴³ “Protocol with Fr. Teodor Krushynsky,” syg. 4929, 158-165.

⁹⁴⁴ “Pastyrskie posslanye nashoho Vyreosv. Epyskopatu do Vsch. Dukhovenstva v spravi skhyzmatytskoyi agitatsyyi,” 291.

clergy in the matter; they sought to affirm that, just as Greek Catholicism and Catholicism constituted not two, but one unified Church, Catholicism (or “our faith”) and Orthodoxy represented not one, but two separate entities. The educational effort was certainly not without its risks; as migrants in the Americas learned from *Svoboda* on June 5, 1914,

For a sermon against Orthodoxy, Russophile *oprychnyky* [bodyguards of the Russian tsar] severely beat Father Aleksandr Hovda, pastor in [the Galician village of] Vodnarivna and catechist of the Gorlice *gymnasia*. Father Hovda proclaimed on the 14th of May in the church in matins a sermon, in which he clarified the differences between Orthodoxy and Unia, and warmly exhorted those present that they not submit to the service of an Orthodox agitator. For this, the Russophile agitators from the unsettled village attacked him and beat him until bloody.⁹⁴⁵

The same Hovda had in 1912 informed Bishop Konstantyn that, “The source of schism in the Lemko region is America.”

Reformist Greek Catholics hoped to demonstrate Greek Catholicism’s uniqueness from Russky Orthodox Christianity in various print media. In the public forum, Greek Catholic resistance to equating Catholicism and Orthodoxy could take many forms. For instance, when in 1894 Father Aleksey Toronsky disagreed in *Dushpastyr* that Catholic and Orthodox “Rusyns” comprised one “Rusky Church,” he sought to demonstrate the harmful outcomes: religious “indifferentism,” which might spread back to the *kray*. He asserted his own countervailing, exclusivist definition of Greek Catholicism: “And never can they say: all are one, whether they are Catholic, whether schismatic, whether Protestant, because there is only one legitimate church of Christ that leads to salvation.”⁹⁴⁶

Similarly, in his *Memorial Booklet*, Metropolitan Andrei exhorted migrants, “It is a great misfortune to lose the faith, to cast it off and to convert to a false church. Because without the Catholic Church there is no salvation. Whoever steps away from the faith, nearly perishes to eternity. Who casts

⁹⁴⁵ “Za propovid proty pravoslavyya,” *Svoboda* January 8, 1914, 3. Not insignificantly, this report on developments in the *kray*—Russky Orthodox conversions, intimately connected with migrant remissions from the Americas—helped inflame ongoing American ethnic conflicts, which were themselves contributing to conversion movements there; to the news item, the Russky-Ukrainophile *Svoboda* attached the following editorial comment: “An attack on a priest that guarded his people against the wolves in sheep skins, [a task] ... for which you elevate a priest—this then is the token of the culture of you single-minded ones, gentlemen “Subcarpathians,” and your own doing!”

⁹⁴⁶ Toronsky, “Nezhoda mezhy Rusynamy v Amerytsi,” 156.

off the church, from that one God withdraws: he will not find salvation in a foreign faith, in a foreign church.” Metropolitan Andrei attributed conversion to lack of knowledge about the differences between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. “God forbid,” he exclaimed, “that there be anything more important for people, than that they would clearly understand their faith, remember well about it and solidly maintain it.” Ignorance might not have proven problematic in the *kray*, but the conditions of migration rendered *temnist* particularly harmful: “Christians, who do not know [the differences between Catholicism and Orthodoxy], may be secure to live and die in their own village: if they will live after the divine commandments and guard against sin, they will be saved by the mercy of God. But who goes out already into the world among a foreign people—when he does not know well all of these truths—will be exposed only to danger, which he could easily avoid.” In order to protect his migrant flock from that danger, the metropolitan hoped to explain the reason underlying the similarity of rite, with an appeal to history:

That the rite in the Orthodox Churches is so similar as in ours, this everyone knows; but rite is one thing, and the faith another.

These bishops at sometime together with pride and ignorance...offered up rebellion against the Vicar of Christ, maintained the eastern rite, but cast off the true Church, and afterward falsified the faith, fabricating for itself a teaching that directly opposed the truth and divine revelation. But they preserved the old rite. And from this it happens that among us and them there is one rite, although a different faith.

Our Greek and Greek-Slavic rite we have, but not only we Catholic-Rusyns, and Orthodox Catholics in Russia, but all other Orthodox families: the Serbs the Bulgarians, and the Synodal [i.e., Russian Orthodox] church.

“And who does not see,” he asked of his migrants, “that the faith is more important than rite?” Whereas rite constituted “form” and “clothing,” the “faith” underneath represented “that connection with God and the road to the kingdom of Heaven.”⁹⁴⁷

Other Greek Catholics attempted other methods of clarification. Father Melnytsky in Galicia reckoned the Latin Rite’s suspicion of Eastern rite Catholics’ propensity to schism as a self-fulfilling prophesy: by their very hostility toward Greek Catholics, Latin rite Catholics became the unwitting source of conversion. Thus, he saw as his task the articulation of the true relationship of rite and faith, over

⁹⁴⁷ Sheptytsky, *Pamyatka dlya ruskykh robotnykiv v angliyi, argetyni, brazyl'iyi, daniyi, kanadi, nimecheni, spoluch. derzhavakh, frantsyi, shchvaytsari i shvetsyi*, 42-45.

against characterizations by the Eastern rite's detractors. Latin rite Catholics were saying that Greek Catholics "always stink of schism, because they maintain the Eastern rite." But for Father Melnytsky, "our separateness lies not in our Eastern rite, which in full meaning is Catholic (because it was founded by Catholics themselves and therefore that Eastern rite is the external expression of their internal Catholic faith) but in our religious practices, terms, and customs, which...are unfamiliar to Latins..."⁹⁴⁸

Other Greek Catholic reformers focused upon the allegedly abused term, *pravoslavny*, in the Greek Catholic Divine Liturgy and other services. Many attempted to "take back" the term by referring to their adversaries not as *pravoslavny*, but rather as "schismatics," "agitators," "apostates," and other epithets. Others produced creative variations on "*pravoslavny*"—like "*tsaroslavny*" and "*synodoslavny*"—which highlighted perceived deficiencies of Russky Orthodox Christianity, including its supposed subjection to the Russian state. In an amusing case of this tactic, in a letter to his parish priest in the *kray*, one migrant "accidentally" began writing the word "*pravoslavny*" to identify his opponents, but halfway through writing the word, and suddenly "realizing" his mistake, he energetically crossed out "*pravo*," and wrote instead "*kryvoslavny*:" that is, not "ortho-dox," but "crooked-dox."

Still other Greek Catholics wished to do away the term "*pravoslavny*" altogether in liturgical practice. Substituting the term "*pravovirny*" ("right believing") provided a viable resolution to "*pravoslavny*"'s ambiguities; however, the proposition raised serious debate. By 1912, when the conversion movements had escalated in Galicia, some Greek Catholic priests in the Americas and Austria-Hungary had already begun substituting "*pravovirny*" for "*pravoslavny*." "During the Great Entrance in the liturgy," commented one Greek Catholic priest in Galicia, Father D. Yaremko, "some priests proclaim the words 'all you Orthodox Christians [*pravoslavni khrystiyany*],' in agreement with the *liturgikon*, but some [proclaim] 'all you right believing Christians [*pravovirny khrystiyany*].' Which is the more appropriate practice?"

⁹⁴⁸ Melnytsky, "De sydyt skhizma?," 104.

Noting the propensity of the term “*pravoslavny*” to cause confusion among the simple (*prosty*) people, Father Yaremko hoped to “clarify the matter” with an example from his own life:

On May 3 (Bright Tuesday) my son, a seventh grade *gymnasium* student, went to the local reading room. There he was asked about the meaning of the phrase “*pravoslavny*” in the liturgy, [a question] turning his attention to the fact that we are not Orthodox [*pravoslavni*], only “right believing” [*pravovirni*], and that all [priests] in America and some priests in Galicia use the phrase “*pravovirni*.” Regarding this instruction of my son about the significance of the saying, “*pravoslavny*,” in the Catholic and Orthodox Divine Liturgy, my son made the following observation: “If we were instructed that we ought to understand this saying like you, but we thought that, when the reverends say “*pravoslavni*,” [that it meant that] we are Orthodox [*pravoslavni*], we [would think that we] only differ slightly from the Russian Orthodox [*rossyski pravoslavni*]. We would better understand the saying “right believing Christians” [*pravovirni khrystian*].”

It makes sense that in the Americas, where conversion to the *Pravoslavny* (Orthodox) Church had proliferated for some twenty years, many (even if not “all”) Greek Catholic priests eschewed the term *pravoslavny* in favor of *pravovirny* in their liturgies. It is also telling that in 1910, some Greek Catholic priests in the *kray* had begun to sense enough pressure from remitted conversion movements to do likewise. Father Yaremko argued for a systematic revision in Greek Catholicism to meet these pressures: the replacement of *pravoslavny* in all Greek Catholic liturgies. His son’s experience constituted “proof that the people themselves request the use of the saying ‘*pravovirny*’ and that the use of the saying ‘*pravoslavny*’ may engender doubts among the people and mistrust of the priest.” Yaremko thus concluded that, “Because, therefore, the use in the Divine Liturgy of the saying: ‘and all *pravoslavni* Christians’ worsens many of the faithful, and that by that word, schismatic propaganda deceives our people, I think, that for the removal of worsening and misunderstanding, it would be advisable to replace the saying “*pravoslavni*” with the saying “*pravovirni*” or to advise some other course.”⁹⁴⁹

Other Greek Catholic reformers argued for switching the terms based upon other, theological reasons; the remitted conversions thus prompted significant theological-liturgical reevaluations of Greek Catholicism in the *kray*. In 1914, emphasizing external perceptions, a Father M. D. hoped to clarify matters by substituting “*pravovirny*” for “*pravoslavny*” and “Catholic faith” for “*pravoslavny* faith:”

⁹⁴⁹ Yaremko, “*Yak pomynaty virnykh na Velykim Vkhodi?*,” 419-20.

In reality, by this word “*pravoslavny*” in many places, and especially in the Divine liturgy, these schismatics themselves introduced deceit; they began to call themselves by that word, both here in the church Divine Liturgy and before the world, in opposition to Christian-Catholics; and under this name “*pravoslavny* Christian” the whole world understands and knows only the eastern schismatics... and when someone hears that name in our Greek Catholic church services, then that name leads the person into doubts...and error as to our faith. For someone to suffer on account of his own...helplessness in such error and confusion—this is such a sin on our part! Therefore, the word must be removed once and for all from the divine liturgy, and replaced instead by the name “*pravovirni* Christians.” This will... once and for all demonstrate to all the difference between our Christian Catholics and the schismatics.⁹⁵⁰

Another discussant in the 1914 *pravoslavny/pravovirny* debate, a Pl. Filyas, made a similar point when he argued that, just because Greek Catholics held legitimate claim to the term “*pravoslavny*,” it did not follow that Greek Catholics should retain the term in liturgical practice. As he explained,

No one denies the principle that the Catholic Church alone is and would have had full right to call itself “evangelical,” or “old catholic,” or “old believing,” because in her alone are gathered the gospel [*evanhelye*] and the faith of the old Catholics, and for that by these names [the Catholic Church] would not yield to either a schismatic or heretical religious community, which has appropriated [those terms] for themselves [i.e. Evangelical Protestants, Old Catholics, and Old Believers]. But all the same, no one will conclude that the church has an obligation to use those names in practice. No one denies, that the Mother of God [*Bohorodytsya*] is certainly the Mother of Christ [*Chrystorodytsya*]; however the Church prohibited the use of that word [at the Council of Ephesus in 431], when it saw that heretics wanted to take advantage of it for their godless purposes.⁹⁵¹

Father M.D., for his part, justified the proposed liturgical reform on still other, theological, grounds. While he certainly did not suggest that the Greek Catholic Church was not *pravoslavny*, and although he maintained that the “true disciples of Christ must be both *pravovirni* and *pravoslavni*,” his argument expounded upon the differences between the two terms, and the superiority of the former.

In an argument spanning analysis of the celebration of the Triumph of Orthodoxy feast day, old church rubrics, papal primacy, the Immaculate Conception, and scriptural proofs, he argued that “*pravovirny*” constituted the superior concept, which in turn, inherently connoted *pravoslavnye* (right worship), for the one who believed rightly would naturally worship rightly. The reverse was not true, however: apparent performance of the proper religious rite could not assure *pravovirya* (right belief). As

⁹⁵⁰ Fr. M. D., “Znov pro slovo ‘pravoslavny,’” *Nyva* 12, no. 1 (February 25, 1914): 43-44.

⁹⁵¹ Pl. Filyas, “Na temu: pravoslavny chy pravovirny,” *Nyva* 11, no. 8 (April 15, 1914): 193-94.

he explained, “The schismatics are only *pravoslavni*, and not *pravovirni*...” for “...not every apple with red skin, is healthy at the core; the skin may be beautiful to behold, but at the core it may be rotten.”

Lastly, Father M.D. highlighted political motivations and the “Russophile delusion.” While “The disciples of this word [*pravoslavny*] often revel that, by the word itself, we gain the East for Catholicism,” the reality was that the efforts of those with “faulty national and even political views,” were effacing “the difference between Catholicism and schism,” positing affinities with foreign *pravoslavni* individuals, and beginning “swiftly to unite our Greek Catholics with the ‘*pravoslavni*’ schismatics... to our detriment, to our great loss!” Father M.D. advocated attentive pastoral care for the unenlightened masses; in conjunction with the liturgical revision, he vowed, “We will not leave our faithful in any further ignorance, but rather elucidate the matter to them clearly, completely, sincerely, and warmly.”⁹⁵²

Regardless of the sophistication of their arguments, those who wished to replace “*pravoslavny*” with “*pravovirny*” encountered opposition, on the basis that the term rightly belonged to Catholics; pro-“*pravoslavny*” Greek Catholic loyalists argued that the masses simply needed better instruction.⁹⁵³ Retention of the term “*pravoslavny*,” according to existing church rubrics, appeared to be the favored course of the bishops, along with education, for both migrants and non-migrants alike; ultimately, they stopped short of advocating the removal of the ambiguous term from the liturgy. That course of action may simply have been a necessary evil: while retention of the term obviously contributed to persisting identifications with the Orthodox Church, potentially leading to conversion, its wholesale removal might immediately prompt a full-scale conversion movement. When the parish priest in the Lemko region village of Grab removed the term “*pravoslavny*” from the liturgy, for example, it contributed (along with clerical financial extortion, ethnonational hostilities, the arrival of missionary priests from Russia, and—naturally—transatlantic migration to and back from the Americas) to a conversion movement there.⁹⁵⁴

⁹⁵² D., “Znov pro slovo ‘pravoslavny’,” 42-44.

⁹⁵³ Yaremko, “*Yak pomynaty virnykh na Velykim Vkhodi?*,” 420.

⁹⁵⁴ William Birkbeck of England noted that Grab’s converting residents personally told him that this provided one reason for their gravitation toward conversion: Birkbeck, “Religious Persecution in Galicia (Austrian Poland).”

Russky Orthodox conversion movements prompted dramatic responses from Greek Catholics in both the Americas and the *kray*. Greek Catholics in Austria-Hungary played a key role in attempting to counter the American conversions, just as Greek Catholics in America sought to counter conversions in the *kray*. Comprehensive reforms took place in the *kray*: there, many reformers recognized the role of migration in the conversions on Austro-Hungarian territory, and they took measures to address migration and conversion directly. Others were more concerned with reforming religious practices and educational levels, specifically in the *kray*. Their recommendations targeted both ritual and higher order theological elements of Greek Catholicism. Even if not all of them realized it, reformers in Austria-Hungary responded to conversion movements in large part catalyzed by migrant religious remittances from the Americas. Thus, the reforms in the *kray* represent a significant modification of religious forms in a region of migratory origin, caused by influence from a region of migratory destination.

Insofar as individuals inclined to conversion resented them, Greek Catholic reform efforts intended to forestall conversions paradoxically joined the long and ever-expanding list of catalysts for conversion, in both Eastern Europe and the Americas. When the British Slavophile, William Birkbeck visited Galicia in 1912, he observed that, “new customs and ceremonies, abhorred by the people, are being introduced.”⁹⁵⁵ Latinization, he said, “has made great strides since I last saw the Ruthenian Uniate rite in Austria, just twenty years ago.” He pointed to the very practices introduced or emphasized to undercut Russky Orthodox conversions: devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, processions of the reserved Sacrament, and the cult of St. Josephat Kuntzevich.⁹⁵⁶ Ritual grievances fused with linguistic ones for Galicia’s converts. The incorporation of an unfamiliar dialect (identified as “Ukrainian” or “Rusky-Ukrainian”) into religious services further irked Lemko region inhabitants, who could no longer read easily from the Epistles or the Psalter. Changes to the Lord’s Prayer provoked particular

⁹⁵⁵ One has to wonder whether the arrival of this Englishman in these remote villages prompted surprise among Galicia’s Greek Catholic and converting Russky Orthodox residents at the global implications of their ethnoreligious decisions. Perhaps many thought little of it, as so many of them had engaged in globetrotting of their own, to and back from the Americas. For more on Birkbeck’s involvement in the Galician conversions and international tensions surrounding them, see [Chapter Ten](#).

⁹⁵⁶ Birkbeck, “Religious Persecution in Galicia (Austrian Poland),” 6-7.

consternation.⁹⁵⁷ Birkbeck claimed that a “good scholar in Little Russian dialects at Moscow,” with whom, a few weeks later, he shared the new rendering of “Thy will be done,” broke immediately into laughter, saying, “Well, I don't wonder that they object there to ‘*nekhái búde vólja Trojá*’: if I were arguing with you in little Russian, and lost my temper, and wished to say, ‘bother you, have your own way,’ those are the very words I should use.”⁹⁵⁸

Greek Catholic reform efforts, in response to conversions remitted from the Americas, had begun around the turn of the twentieth-century in Subcarpathia, and those efforts continued in both Subcarpathia and Galicia until the arrival of Russky Orthodox missionary priests in winter of 1911-12 from Russia; indeed, reforms continued even afterward, through the outbreak of war. After the fall of 1911, however, the most effective efforts to suppress Russky Orthodox conversion movements in Austria-Hungary issued from the state, in the form of arrests, fines, and treason trials: all of which catalyzed major international tensions, representing substantial causal factors in the origins of World War I.

⁹⁵⁷ He noted that of the “53 words which for nine centuries they have been accustomed to use in the Lord’s Prayer, 21 have been changed, and in 17 more, where the Slavonic text could not be altered, the spelling has been changed, so as to make the words look different to the wording of their authorised service books; so that only 15 words in the whole Prayer remain untampered with.”

⁹⁵⁸ Birkbeck, "Religious Persecution in Galicia (Austrian Poland)," 10-11.

10.0 THE GREAT WAR THAT BEGAN IN MINNEAPOLIS AND WILKES-BARRE

By 1914, Greek Catholic labor and agricultural migrants from Austria-Hungary had been converting to or affiliating with the Russky Orthodox Church for twenty-five years: in England, the United States, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, and the Russian Empire. For some fifteen years, they had remitted conversion movements to Austrian Galicia and Hungarian Subcarpathia through correspondence and remigration. In both halves of the Dual Monarchy, full-fledged conversion movements, catalyzed and nourished by transatlantic migration, had since 1901 aroused the fear and ire of Austro-Hungarian authorities, who perceived only “Tsarist” machinations, executed through “Ruthenian” peasants, clerics, and student activists who were, at best, dupes or, at worst, traitors. The conversions thus augured Russia’s alleged long-standing interest in the annexation of Galicia and Subcarpathia, a threat which had aroused diplomatic turmoil between Austria-Hungary’s, Russia’s, and Germany’s statesmen since the Hnylychky incident of 1881-82.

After 1907, a North American depression had pushed massive waves of remigrants—including many Russky Orthodox converts—back to their native Austro-Hungarian villages, where they galvanized existing conversion movements and provided the impetus for new ones. Beginning in the fall of 1911, more aggressive missionary activity emanating from the Russian Empire ignited and reignited conversion flare-ups in Austria-Hungary. This fresh round of conversions again excited Austro-Hungarian antipathies and suppression, protests from Russia, and interventions from Germany, though to a much greater degree and with more far-reaching consequences than ever before. Renewed Great Power hostilities, surrounding the conversions, arose as war was “in the air” and added to that turbulence. This chapter explains the significance of mass Russky Orthodox conversions to the origins of World War I,

through an analysis of the legal, diplomatic, and press disputes developing around the conversions in each of the Great Powers, shortly before the war began. It reiterates that transatlantic migration, more than any other factor, promoted Eastern Europe's inflammatory mass conversions, and it argues that the "American factor" continued to figure prominently in the post-1911 context. In a sense, Europe's Great War began in Minneapolis and Wilkes-Barre, and in other migratory destinations in the Americas to which converting Greek Catholics arrived, and from which they departed.

10.1 WAR AND CAUSATION: NEO-SLAVISM, PAN-RUSSIANISM, AND "NEW COURSE" RUSSOPHILES

Even the most casual student of the First World War will recall that the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand ostensibly sparked the international conflict. This mono-causal explanation, like any other, merits qualification, if not outright refutation, a daunting project toward which scholars have contributed innumerable volumes even from the earliest stages of the war. Analysts have highlighted as causal factors, among countless others: the imperialism of whichever Great Power(s) they might choose to impugn, domestic conditions prevailing in those empires, mutually reinforcing escalations in European arms races, a Byzantine system of interlocking international treaties, and most of all, the power vacuum emerging in the Balkans with the decline of Ottoman influence. This study's argument, that Greek Catholic-to-Rusky Orthodox conversions in Austro-Hungarian Galicia and Subcarpathia also contributed to hostilities between the major belligerent powers, jockeys for position in an already overcrowded field of theories on war origins. The emphasis upon transatlantic migration as the critical factor underlying those conversions and resulting Great Power conflicts, however, shifts the scope of investigation entirely.

Notwithstanding a handful of studies, historians have hardly attended to imperial conflicts over Galicia and Subcarpathia to the degree that they have emphasized conflicts over the Balkans as a catalyst for World War I. Most have therefore assessed Russia's war-time annexation of Galicia and partial

occupation of Subcarpathia (August 1914 – June 1915) as a tactical consequence of war, rather than as an extension of the war's causes; the war may have ended up in Galicia and Subcarpathia—so the thinking goes—but it began in Sarajevo. Yet before Gavrillo Princip fired his famous shots in June 1914, and certainly well before the Russian army invaded Austria-Hungary and “restored” the “native Russian lands” of Galicia to the Romanov Empire in October, Pan-Slavic irredentism, centered on Austrian Galicia and Hungarian Subcarpathia (not Serbia), exacerbated pre-war frictions between the Russian Empire, on the one hand, and the Austro-Hungarian and German Empires, on the other. Insofar as Austria-Hungary responded to the most troublesome pre-war manifestation of Pan-Slavism in Galicia and Subcarpathia—mass Russky Orthodox conversion movements among the Dual Monarchy's Greek Catholic citizenry—by staging two lengthy, and well-publicized treason trials, this “other” Eastern question vexed onlookers from other Great Powers, as well, especially in Britain and France, and even in the United States.

The celebrated treason trials of December 1913 - June 1914, which took place in each half of the Dual Monarchy, represented the culmination of several trends with roots as far back as the 1860s: (a) Russophilism in Galicia and Subcarpathia; and (b) Pan-Slavism/Russianism, based just across the border in the Russian Empire. Adherents of the latest iterations of these complementary movements—“new course” Russophiles and Neo-Slavists—adopted a more explicitly racial anti-German ideology and aggressively irredentist platform toward Austro-Hungarian territories in the years before the war. The political-institutional bases of Galician- and Subcarpathian-oriented Pan-Slavism/Russianism and Russophilism—the “cross-border politico-philanthropic” Galician Russky Benevolent Society led by Count V.A. Bobrinsky of the Imperial Russian Duma, the Russophile party in the Galician Diet, the village-based Kachkovsky Societies, the Galician religio-national boarding schools (*bursas*), seminaries and monasteries in Russia, and the various presses in Russia, Austrian Galicia, Hungarian Subcarpathia, and Bukovina—together with the activities of secular and clerical Russophile intelligentsias, all gave Austro-Hungarian and German statesmen and officials reason for great concern, especially as the

likelihood of war escalated after the fall of 1912.⁹⁵⁹ It is not without significance that Austro-Hungarian officials sought explanations for the espionage perpetrated by the period's most notorious traitor, Colonel Alfred Redl, not only in his homosexuality and his (purported) Jewishness, but also in his Galician, and therefore potentially Russophile, origins.⁹⁶⁰

It was, however, Russky ("Russian") Orthodox conversion movements among Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholics—the mass religious form of Pan-Slavism/Russianism and Russophilism—that immediately occasioned the two treason trials, which most inflamed international hostilities before the war. Pan-Slavists/Russianists and Russophiles directed their attentions toward religious conversions of the Galician and Subcarpathian Greek Catholic populace for two reasons. In the first place, many activists expressed a missionary zeal, based upon a belief in the religious superiority of Orthodoxy to Catholicism. Secondly, and more significantly for international imperial relations, the existence of "Russian" people, distinguishable by self-identification as "Russky Orthodox," in regions outside Imperial Russia could justify—for the Russian Empire itself and the broader world—annexation of the territories in which those people lived. As a corollary, Russky Orthodox conversions might also produce a docile populace, welcoming of a Russian occupation in Austria-Hungary, not as "invasion," but rather, "liberation" at the hands of a benevolent Tsar. The goals in Galicia and Subcarpathia therefore represented an implementation of the Pan-Slavist ideology undergirding Russia's aid to "fellow Slavs" in Serbia, before and after Austria-Hungary declared war on July 28, 1914.

Despite the simplifications of statesmen and presses in Germany and Austria-Hungary, the relationship of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Russianism to Russia's government in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century was a complicated one. Pan-Slavism did not represent the dominant current within Russian politics, foreign policy, or society. Many of Russia's statesmen—Foreign Minister Sazanov, for one—regarded the ideology as, at best, a nuisance and, at worst, a threat to international stability and

⁹⁵⁹ Von Hagen, *War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914-1918*, 7.

⁹⁶⁰ On Redl, see: Georg Markus, *Der Fall Redl* (Vienna: Amalthea, 1984); Alan Sked, "A Patriot for Whom? Colonel Redl and a Question of Identity," *History Today* 36, no. 7 (July 1986).

Russia's security. Still, prominent political figures, military officials, and ecclesiastical figures—some of whom also held important governmental positions—openly championed and secretly authorized Pan-Slavist activities and policies.

Moreover, efforts directed toward Greek Catholics in Galicia and Subcarpathia represented a more specific form of Pan-Slavism, altogether distinguishable, even, from Pan-Slavism. Pan-Slavism relied upon the presumption of common Slav identification, unifying otherwise distinct “Russians,” “Czechs,” “Poles,” “Serbs,” “Bulgarians,” and others. Galician and Subcarpathian efforts, however, proceeded upon the premise that Greek Catholics were not only “Slavs,” but fellow “Russians.” Thus, one could be a “Pan-Russian,” favoring the annexation of Austria-Hungary’s “Russian-inhabited” territories—as was powerful *uberprocurator* Konstantin Pobedonostsev—even while rejecting the more general ideology of Pan-Slavism. This Pan-Russianism, like Pan-Slavism, also remained the provenance of specific political and ecclesiastical figures in Russia; the ideology was influential enough, however, to catalyze intrusions into Austria-Hungary’s domestic affairs, prompting statesmen and presses there and in Germany to lump “Pan-Russianism” together with “Pan-Slavism” and generalize both across all of Russian politics and society.⁹⁶¹ Russia’s wartime occupation of Galicia and part of Subcarpathia, justified explicitly and officially by Pan-Russian rhetoric, only confirmed what Austro-Hungarian and German statesmen had long feared.

It is impossible to distinguish neatly between political and religious forms of Pan-Slavism/Pan-Russianism and Russophilism, as contemporary detractors and supporters both attempted to do: if the religious movements masked political motivations, so too did politicians articulate religious aims. Austria-Hungary and its ally, Germany, nevertheless interpreted the mass conversions as a purely political

⁹⁶¹ On Pan-Slavism, see: Frank L. Fadner, *Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia; Karazin to Danilevskii, 1800-1870* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1962); Hugo Hantsch, "Pan-Slavism, Austro-Slavism, Neo-Slavism: The All-Slav Congresses and the Nationality Problems of Austria - Hungary," *Austrian History Yearbook* 1(1965); Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology*, International Studies of the Committee on International Relations, University of Notre Dame (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953); Sándor Kostya and Anne Fay Atzel, *Pan-Slavism* (Astor, Fla.: Danubian Press, 1981); David MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism, 1875-1878* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967); Vysny, *Neo-Slavism and the Czechs: 1898-1914*; Walsh, "Pobedonostsev and Pan-Slavism."

movement: the ostensible fruits of incitements by statesmen from Russia and an especially insidious form of Russian imperialism. Austro-Hungarian officials certainly expressed anxieties that Russian Pan-Slavists' support of the Russophile intelligentsia, a minority but significant presence in Galicia's political economy, could upset a delicate balance; however, the threat of several hundred, or at most, several thousand Russophile elites paled when measured against the specter of *millions* of latent "Russians" among Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholic peasants, who might emerge as such via Orthodox conversion. Thus, although Austria-Hungary exercised relative religious tolerance and legally recognized Orthodoxy, the Empire justified suppression of the conversion movements, beginning in 1881-82 and continuing sporadically until the outbreak of war, with fines, beatings, prohibitions of assembly, quartering of troops in villages, military conscriptions, deportations, and treason trials. In turn, this "oppression" of "Russian" people only added fuel to Pan-Slavism/Russianism's irredentist hearths. It would only be possible to speculate how events might have unfolded, had war not interrupted the "natural" dialectics of this process, by suddenly advancing the oppositions to their extremes: full-scale Austro-Hungarian repression followed by Russian annexation and heavy-handed promotion of mass conversions.

Austria-Hungary issued its most serious response to the pre-war conversions in two well-publicized treason trials. Between December 29, 1913 and March 3, 1914 ninety-four defendants—mostly peasants, but also priests, journalists, and student activists—were tried in Maramorosh Sighet, in connection with Russky Orthodox conversion movements in Hungarian Subcarpathia, surrounding conversion centers in Velyki Luchky and Iza. Less than a week after the conclusion of that trial, a new one began in Lviv on March 9 and concluded June 6, 1914; the four defendants—two priests, a student activist, and a journalist—were tried in connection with conversions in Austrian Galicia, in the Lemko region and in Eastern Galicia's Zaluche. The Russky Orthodox priests on trial were singled out as ring-leaders in both cases. Born Austro-Hungarian citizens, they had converted from Greek Catholicism to the Russky Orthodox Church and migrated to Russia for seminary training. Once ordained as Russky Orthodox priests, they had returned to their native regions in fall and winter of 1911-12 to lead the conversion movements.

The most serious charge in both high-profile cases was state treason: a purely political movement masquerading as a religious one, Russophilism and Pan-Slavism had been using Russky Orthodox conversions to shift Greek Catholic allegiances from Emperor Franz Joseph to Tsar Nicholas II—manifested in prayers for the latter, rather than the former—and thereby facilitate the annexation of Galicia and Subcarpathia. Additionally, the courts alleged that activists were spying for Russia and conducting espionage.⁹⁶² Thus, the respective prosecutions at Marmorosh Sighet and Lviv exclusively emphasized old world culprits: Russophiles in Galicia and Subcarpathia and Pan-Slavists in Russia. In this way, from December of 1913 until the first week of June 1914, as Austro-Russian relations adopted a trajectory toward the war that would break out in August, Austria-Hungary conspicuously put Russian imperialism on trial in Habsburg courts. Germany, too, joined the fray, as the three belligerent imperial powers used Russky Orthodox conversion against each other in the courts of domestic and international public opinion.

In his preparations for a pastoral letter on the subject of Russky Orthodox conversion movements in Galicia before the war, the Greek Catholic Metropolitan of Lviv, Andrei (Sheptytsky), warned, “The neighboring state [Russia], preparing for an eventual war with our monarchy [Austria-Hungary], is preparing this terrain [Galicia] for itself with extraordinary urgency, with money and agents, by stirring the Rusky [Greek Catholic] people of our province against Austria. Decidedly it is incumbent upon us to set ourselves to work in order to battle forcefully against the spirit of heresy and the spirit of schism [Russky/Russian Orthodoxy]...”⁹⁶³ In 1914, Michal Gibor, a witness in the Lviv treason trial, testified that during his stay in the Bukovinan village of Waszkowce, which neighbored the Galician village of Zaluche, he heard from the villagers there “that on account of the arrest of the Orthodox priests, it will come to war with Russia.”⁹⁶⁴ Rumors in a remote Austro-Hungarian village—even the evaluation of an

⁹⁶² The same charges had been levied in the earlier Hnylychky and Iza trials.

⁹⁶³ A. Sheptytsky, “Projekty pasterkich listow dotyczacych prawoslawnej propagandy w Galicji, RHYA, fond 821, op. 150, d. 671, p. 15, 26, quoted in: Osadezy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawoslawia w Galicji*.

⁹⁶⁴ *Przegląd Prawosławny*. Waszkowce lay three miles south of Zaluche (Galicia), just across the river in Bukovina. There was an Orthodox parish there which the Greek Catholic residents of Zaluche began attending as early as 1903.

influential Greek Catholic metropolitan—are far from conclusive evidence for the importance of mass Galician and Subcarpathian Russky Orthodox conversions to the origins of World War I, but was this particular rumor really so outlandish?

10.2 INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The conversions, together with the repressions that they prompted, attracted sustained attention by the major statesmen of each of the European powers, which would soon become embroiled with one another in global conflict. The arrests of “agitators” and peasant converts, ultimately leading to the treason trials of 1913-14, commenced in fall of 1911 in Galicia and in spring of 1912 in Subcarpathia, ostensibly in response to the sudden arrival of home-grown convert Russky Orthodox priests returning from Russia. By mid-1912, European presses began disseminating news of these events to broader popular and governmental audiences. Mid-1912 also represents a turning point in relations between the Triple Entente and the Central Powers. Notwithstanding recent flare-ups (Austria-Hungary’s 1908 annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example), tensions between the Central Powers and the Triple Entente had ebbed by early-1912; from mid-1912 on, however, international hostilities steadily escalated. While historians have focused upon other factors, especially the first Balkan war of 1912-1913, the conflicts between statesmen as well as the propaganda campaigns surrounding Russky Orthodox mass conversions formed an integral factor in the decision making of statesmen on the path to world war.

A review of the international tensions over the conversions through the end of the first decade of the twentieth century provides the necessary backdrop for the 1911-14 hostilities. Austro-Hungarian statesmen had clearly long regarded Russky Orthodox conversions as treasonous actions of Austro-Hungarian citizens: the fruits of Russia’s intrigues, threatening the Monarchy’s territorial integrity and sociopolitical stability. The first movement in Austria-Hungary in the late-nineteenth century had occurred in the Galician village of Hnylychky in 1881-82, likely without influence from the Americas.

Austro-Hungarian officials justifiably suspected Russia of backing the movement, for the Russian government, at the behest of the powerful *uberprocurator* Constantine Pobedonostsev, did subsidize the movement's prominent Russophile leaders: Austro-Hungarian citizens Father Ioann Naumovych and Adolf Dobriansky. The ensuing treason trial proved diplomatically contentious, as the "Russian plan" to annex Galicia, Subcarpathia, and Bukovina—and Pobedonostsev's role therein—figured prominently in court testimony. Pobedonostsev asked both the Russian foreign minister of affairs and Tsar Alexander III to convey displeasure with the suppression of the conversions to the Austrian foreign ministry and Emperor Franz Joseph. Pobedonostsev (and Naumovych) also met with Germany's ambassadors and Count Herbert Bismarck, the German Kaiser's son, to request an intervention from his father. Germany's officials, however, warned Pobedonostsev of the "hazards of his policies" and recommended—without effect—that he cease his financial support.⁹⁶⁵

Biographer Robert Byrnes concluded that only the deaths of the major Russophile activists, together with a lack of results, led Pobedonostsev, by the early 1890s, to suspend direct state subsidies for Russophilism and Orthodox conversions in Austria-Hungary and, instead, redirect support for conversion to the Americas. Father Naumovych's 1889 article, positing the "essential" Orthodox faith of Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholic migrants "in America"—including those who would return to their "native land"—likely influenced Russia's reorientation across the Atlantic, as did the 1891-2 conversion of Father Alexis Toth's Minneapolis parish. Notwithstanding the likelihood that Russia's policy-makers perceived inherent value in new Russky Orthodox adherents throughout the world, the potential for the remittance of conversions to Galicia and Subcarpathia almost certainly accounts for the temporary shift away from Austria-Hungary to the Americas, as well as the nearly twenty-year gap separating the Hnylychky incident and the next round of East European conversions. High level policy makers in Russia never ceased "meddling" in Austro-Hungarian affairs through the promotion of conversion; they simply

⁹⁶⁵ Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev: His Life and His Thought*, 222-24.

adjusted strategies and refocused upon transatlantic migrants, in the hopes—remarkably well-founded, in hindsight—that the “American investment” would eventually pay dividends in Austria-Hungary.

Remigrating and corresponding migrants did begin spreading conversion in Austria-Hungary by the turn of the century. The first movement, in Becherov, Subcarpathia (1901), prompted repressions, charges of treason, and a major international counter-conversion effort known as the American Action. While primarily an initiative of Budapest, Vienna also sanctioned the Action, in the hopes that fostering Greek Catholic and Austro-Hungarian loyalties would forestall Orthodox conversion and pro-Russian orientations among potential remigrants. “Far-away America” thus provided an additional arena for Austria-Hungary’s standoff with Russia. In the meantime, the Austro-Hungarian government redoubled attempts to check Russia’s influence within Habsburg territories and suppressed migrant-inspired conversions elsewhere in Hungarian Subcarpathia (among remigrants from the United States in the vicinity of Iza and Velyki Luchky) and Austrian Galicia (in Zaluche, among kin and friends of migrants who converted in Canada), beginning 1903-04. The movements again drew the gendarmes in both regions, while the Subcarpathian conversions prompted a series of trials, 1904-06, charging that Iza’s converts “incited against the established authorities” and “linked their religious conversion with an expectation of changes in the political order.” As in the Hnylychky case over twenty years prior, the charges rested upon the specter of a “Russian plan” to annex Austro-Hungarian territories.⁹⁶⁶

⁹⁶⁶ The Iza indictment charged that converts had publically stated that, “with the arrival of the Orthodox priest, the Muscovite tsar will be their ruler; that rule by Hungary’s authorities according to Hungarian laws will end; that Hungary’s authorities will be replaced by those of Russia; that labor dues and taxes will not have to be paid; that the Muscovite tsar, our father, will chase out the Jews together with the Hungarian authorities; that the Muscovite tsar will take possession of the land and distribute it among Orthodox believers; and that if the Orthodox faith will spread to Poland [i.e., Galicia], then people there will also join Russia and have a better life, because they will have incited a rebellion against the lawful rights of His Majesty and certain institutions of the constitution.” Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 255, n. 55. The Iza conversions bore other interesting connections to that earlier case, as well. The Hnylychky trial had implicated (though not tried) Father Ioann Rakovsky (1815-1885), prominent Russophile and longtime Greek Catholic parson of Iza (1859-1885). In 1882, Habsburg authorities searched his home, his correspondence with defendants was presented at trial, and the Hungarian parliament discussed his involvement. The authorities considered Father Rakovsky’s influence instrumental in setting the stage for the Iza conversions, following his death. Additionally, the Aleksei and Georgii Gerovsky, grandsons and pupils of Adolph Dobriansky, defendant in the Hnylychky case, were arrested for their involvement at Iza in 1903. Ibid., 62, 255-56 n.43. “Rakovsky, Ivan” and “Gerovskii, Aleksei,” in Magocsi and Pop, *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*. The Gerovsky’s became involved in a number of the conversion

Between the conclusion of the Iza trials in 1906 and the arrival of missionaries from Russia in fall 1911, outward expressions of Russky Orthodox conversion diminished temporarily in Galicia and Subcarpathia, but hardly disappeared; at the same time, the North American economic depression (1907-11) dramatically increased the number of converts remigrating to Austria-Hungary. Hungary's authorities, especially Prime Minister Tisza, continued to track matters in the regions surrounding Velyki Luchky, Iza, and Becherov; in 1907, he learned that recalcitrant Iza residents visited a "Serbian priest" (i.e., an Orthodox one) in Budapest for baptisms or eschewed baptism altogether; they had also sent a delegation to Budapest to ask for an Orthodox priest.⁹⁶⁷ Between 1908 and 1911, Subcarpathia's incliners to Orthodoxy in Iza, Velyki Luchky, and surrounding areas continued to read publicly from the migrant Father Toth's pamphlet, *Where to Seek the Truth?*, which glorified Russia and the tsar. As late as August 25, 1911 (a few months before the arrival/return of Orthodox missionary Aleksei Kabaliuk from Russia), the Prime Minister continued his personal efforts to forestall "Russian" conversions.⁹⁶⁸ In 1908-09, the residents of Zaluche and Becherov initiated new attempts to construct Orthodox churches: the former with ideological and economic support from Bishop Antony (Khrapovitsky) of Volhynia, Russia, Count V.A. Bobrinsky's Galician Russky Benevolent Society, and Bukovina's Aleksei Gerovsky;⁹⁶⁹ and the latter with support from the Americas.⁹⁷⁰ Austro-Hungarian authorities also intervened when, in April 1910, 350 residents of Teliash, Konopty, and other nearby villages in Sokal county, Galicia, bordering the Russian Empire, appealed to Russia's Holy Synod to accept their conversions to Orthodoxy.⁹⁷¹

movements in both Austria and Hungary. They personally intervened in Iza and Zaluche, and published pro-Russky Orthodox newspapers which made their way also to Galicia's Lemko region.

⁹⁶⁷ Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*, 142.

⁹⁶⁸ Ibid., 149-52. On that day, Tisza sent a letter to the Serbian Orthodox synod at Sremski Karlovci, requesting the denial of a priest for Velyki Luchky.

⁹⁶⁹ In this way, (through Gerovsky) did the Zaluche case become connected to the Hnylychky case.

⁹⁷⁰ Zupina, "Z histórie Pravoslávnej cirkevnej obce Becherov."

⁹⁷¹ I have been unable to ascertain whether these 1910 declarations for conversion were prompted by remigrants from the Americas or contacts therewith. These villages lay right on the border with Russia, but as in the case of Zaluche (on the border with Orthodox Bukovina), it is entirely possible that it took transatlantic migration to turn the Russophilism spilling across the Austro-Russian border into a viable movement in Sokal county: migrants had been traveling from Sokal to Canada as early as 1896 and to Brazil during the period 1895-99.

In addition to these skirmishes in the East European battlefield, during the period 1906-1911, Russia and Austria-Hungary continued to vie with one another over the conversions on the “American battlefield,” as well. The Austrian government had a hand in appointing the first Greek Catholic bishop to the United States in 1907, with the aim of curtailing further Russky Orthodox defections. In the same year, Russia matched this maneuver with the installment of a new archbishop of North America, who pursued conversions energetically in both the Americas and in Austria-Hungary, through remittances. Also during this period (1909ff), Galicia’s Greek Catholic hierarchy began an investigation, eventually turned over to Austria’s authorities, uncovering signs of a critical mass of returning, converted migrants to Galicia, following the North American depression of 1907. And in 1909, Austria-Hungary’s Argentine consulate began complaining that Greek Catholics migrants there had “been exposed to the propaganda of ‘schism’ by the priest of the Russian embassy,” with the result that the Austrian government solicited Greek Catholic Basilians to counter Russia’s efforts there.⁹⁷²

Thus, prior to the arrival of Orthodox missionaries from Russia in 1911, Austria-Hungary and Russia had for thirty years vied with one another over the matter of Greek Catholic-to-Russky Orthodox conversion. The contest unfolded partly on Austro-Hungarian territory and partly in the Americas. Russia directed its attention across the Atlantic Ocean around 1890, followed by Austro-Hungarian countermeasures in the Americas by the turn of the century. During the decade 1901-11, new skirmishes over conversions within Austria-Hungary’s borders arose primarily because of the “American factor,” namely, remigration and migrant correspondence. It was against this backdrop, then—three decades of international tensions surrounding the conversions and two of those in which transatlantic migration

⁹⁷² Cludia Stefanetti Kojrowicz and Ursula Prutsch, "Apostoles y Azara: dos colonias polaca-rutenas en Argentina, visto por las autoridades argentinas y austro-hungaras," in *Emigracion Centroeuropa a America Latina*, ed. Josef Opatrny (Prague: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Nakladatelstvi Karolinum, 2003), 159. Although it would have occurred on a much smaller scale than from North America, it is also possible that this marked a period of increased remigration of converts from Argentina. One source has mentioned that Konstantin Izraztsov (priest of the Russian embassy in Argentina) assisted migrants who wished to return home during a pre-war period of economic crisis. (Leonard Kosichev, "El Rastro Ruso en America Latina: Templos Ortodoxos en la Argentina," *LaVoz de Rusia* (August 8, 2011), spanish.ruvr.ru/radio_broadcast/53074770/55019409.html.)

provided the critical catalyst—that the new initiatives of 1911-14, emanating from the Russian Empire and provoking hostilities with Austria-Hungary and Germany, arose.

10.3 THE “RUSSIAN” MISSIONARY PERIOD (1911-1914)

Partisans on either side of the international debate over Russky Orthodox conversions, after 1911, could agree that the mass character of the new movements in Austria-Hungary constituted a prerequisite for the ensuing arrests and treason trials. Accused “agitators”—homegrown missionaries returning from Russia beginning fall 1911—provoked the Austro-Hungarian gendarmes and government by allegedly inciting mass disturbances among the peasantry. At the 1913-14 Maramorosh Sighet trial, not only priest missionaries, student activists, and journalists, but also the converted peasants, themselves, stood trial. Ignoring the inclinations of the peasants, opponents of the conversion movements emphasized external factors, emanating from above (Austria-Hungary’s Russophile elite) or from outside Habsburg boundaries (Russia’s Pan-Slavists/Russianists). Earlier conversions and related disturbances in Austria-Hungary, however—so inextricably linked to transatlantic labor migration—provided the attractive, fertile ground in which missionaries (return) migrating from Russia could sow the seeds of full-fledged movements.

On August 2, 1911, representatives of the Russian Empire and the Russian Holy Synod met at Pochaiv monastery to discuss more aggressive measures to solidify a stable Russky Orthodox presence in Austria-Hungary, first in Galicia and then in Subcarpathia as well.⁹⁷³ Attending the meeting were Galician Russophiles, the personal secretary of Count V.A. Bobrinsky (Russian Duma member and chair of the Galician Russky Benevolent Society), and Bishops Evology of Chelm and Antony of Volhynia.⁹⁷⁴ The Galicians explained that: “...what was needed was that a large number of parishes declare their desire

⁹⁷³ Just across the border in Russia, Pochaiv had factored already in the conversions, functioning as a pilgrimage destination for Orthodox-inclining Austro-Hungarian Greek Catholics, as well as a publishing house for pro-Russky Orthodox literature, disseminated in Austria-Hungary.

⁹⁷⁴ According to Himka, the meeting had apparently been called by Bobrinsky.

to become Orthodox and that these parishes stand firm in their intention. They said that it would not be difficult to find 20-30 parishes ready to make a declaration for Orthodoxy, but without priests and proper infrastructure and preparations the parishes would withdraw their declarations after a few weeks of pressure. The results would be a mere demonstration, not the introduction of Orthodoxy.”⁹⁷⁵ Thus, these activists responded to widespread, pre-existing Russky Orthodox inclinations in Austria-Hungary. And although those inclinations had roots in the old country, they had been fostered especially through transatlantic migration.

The plan centered upon training and ordaining Austro-Hungarian citizens as Russky Orthodox priest-missionaries in Russia’s seminaries.⁹⁷⁶ As remigrants to their native Galician and Subcarpathian regions, they might avoid deportation more easily than Russian subjects. Several such seminarians were already prepared to deploy: they would receive 600 rubles for their first three months of service. Technically subordinate to the Patriarch of Constantinople, they were in actuality to operate under the jurisdiction of Russia’s bishops, a ploy designed to soften the movement’s immediate political threat and increase the likelihood of longevity and freer operations in Austria-Hungary. Subsidization of impressive churches with funding from Russian sources would also be necessary.

The missionaries began arriving in fall 1911. They came first to Galicia. Father Maksym Sandovych, originally of Zdynia, returned to his native Lemko region, and began missioning to nearby Grab, Wyszowatka, and other surrounding villages. Father Ignatii Hudyma traveled arrived to the village of Zaluche. Father Ivan Ilechko went to Teliash and Konopty. As for Subcarpathia, Father Aleksei Kabaliuk, originally of Yasen, returned to his native region in early 1912, initially to Mukachevo, where he ministered to the inhabitants of nearby Velyki Luchky, and then to Iza. In other words, save for perhaps Ivan Ilechko, all these missionaries arrived to regions in which existing inclinations for

⁹⁷⁵ Himka, "The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I," 485-86. Emphasis mine (the point being that the orientation preceded the missionary activity).

⁹⁷⁶ For reasons I have been unable to ascertain, the Galicians and Subcarpathians trained in two separate centers. Bishop Evlogy oversaw the training of the Subcarpathians in Chelm’s Jableczna monastery, while Bishop Antony of Volynia took on the Galicians at the seminary in Zhytomyr.

conversion existed, in large part due to correspondence or remigrant converts from the Americas. Missionary priests continued to return to their native Austria-Hungary 1912-14, even after the priests mentioned above had been arrested.⁹⁷⁷ All were ultimately arrested, some after fostering conversion movements and others before they had a chance to begin missionary efforts.

The 1912 arrests of well over a hundred peasant converts from some fourteen villages in the vicinity of Velyki Luchky and Iza, together with their pastor, Father Kabaliuk, occasioned the first of the 1913-14 treason trials, in Maramorosh Sighet.⁹⁷⁸ In Galicia, the spring 1912 arrests of Father Maksym Sandovych and Ignatii Hudyma in Zaluche—for promoting “Russian” propaganda and “spying” (specifically, measuring a bridge over the river Czeremosz, which marked Galicia’s border with Bukovina)—together with the arrests of journalist Semen Bendasiuk and student activist Vasyl Koldra, resulted in the 1914 Lviv treason trial. Those arrests occasioned international hostilities between some of the most powerful men in Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany.

10.4 WAR-MAKING, STATESMEN, AND THE PROPAGANDA OF MASS CONVERSIONS

In 1913, Hungary’s highest ranking statesman, Prime Minister Istvan Tisza—who had from the same office in 1904 characterized burgeoning Orthodoxy, remitted by migrants, as a “political movement incited from the outside” and hoped that “the leaders of this movement of *Lése majesté* and high treason will be immediately repudiated”—spearheaded the Hungarian campaign against the “new” outburst of Subcarpathian conversions in 1912. Together with Greek Catholic churchmen and statesmen in

⁹⁷⁷ They included, to Galicia: Father Kyprian Cymbala (to Lackie Wielkie, Zolochiv county), Father Ivan Solovii (to Lemko region), Father Heorhii Savechka (Soroka), and Father Duka (arrested at the border). And to Subcarpathia, Father Amfilochy (Vasili) Kamen, Mattei (Vasili) Vakarov, and one Father Serafim.

⁹⁷⁸ Father Kabaliuk was initially released. He fled Austria-Hungary in 1912 (for Russia, then the United States) before voluntarily returning in 1913 to face trial.

Budapest, he orchestrated and closely monitored the Maramorosh Sighet treason trial of 1913-14.⁹⁷⁹ Austrian authorities—the local Galician gendarmes and government, as well as Vienna’s highest-ranking statesmen—tracked the new outbursts of conversions associated with the arrival of missionaries from Russia to Galica, beginning fall 1911, as well.⁹⁸⁰ Austrian officials continued to demonstrate concern over the conversions throughout the treason trials, until the outbreak of war. In a January 19, 1914 report, the Austrian Governor of Galicia explained to the Habsburg Ministry of the Interior that, “Recently the agitation of the Russophile party...has become more lively...The schismatic propaganda is also gaining in strength; new Orthodox emissaries have appeared in the district...The continuing Russification of Galicia, aided by Orthodoxy, requires greater attention on the part of administrative officers if they are to be able to combat it.”⁹⁸¹ In mid-March of 1914, General Ritter Alexander von Krobotin, Austrian Minister of War, wrote to the Minister of the Interior warning of “nationalist Russian propaganda” masquerading as “material support for a suffering population,” “under the patronage of, or at any rate under the benign sufferance of the Russian government.” Krobotin considered the Russian-inspired activities among converting Greek Catholics significant enough to argue, “We should fight this propaganda by every means at our disposal.”⁹⁸²

Russian statesmen also became intensely interested in the treason trials. Other than the defendants, the central figure in both trials was Count V.A. Bobrinsky, prominent Pan-Slavist, Chairman of the Galician Russky Benevolent Society, and deputy of the Imperial Russian Duma. Known also for his Pan-Slavic objectives in the Balkans, Bobrinsky achieved worldwide notoriety for his activities

⁹⁷⁹ Danilec, "Vtoroy Maramorosh-Syhotsky protses protyv pravoslavnikh v Zakarpatye."

⁹⁸⁰ Austria’s state government ruled Galicia through the province’s regional government, dominated by Polish-identifiers. Hungary’s state government—specifically Prime Minister Tisza—more directly determined the actions directed against converts in Subcarpathia. In Galicia, however, regional authorities still reported to the state government in Vienna, which in turn was able to exerted limited forms of control over the arrests and trials in *both* Galicia and Hungary.

⁹⁸¹ VA, 604 MI ex 1914, cited in Zeman, *The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire, 1914-1918*, 6.

⁹⁸² VA, 2854 MI ex 1914, cited in Zeman, 13.

among Greek Catholics in Galicia and Subcarpathia.⁹⁸³ As the leader of the Galician Russky Benevolent Society, Bobrinsky had overseen the subsidization of the conversion efforts and facilitated the arrival of Russky Orthodox missionaries into both Galicia and Subcarpathia since 1911. In addition to orchestrating much of the Russian side of the propaganda campaign surrounding the conversion movements, he also personally testified at the first trial in Marmorosh Sighet, accompanied by two members of the Russian Duma and a journalist of a Russian newspaper.⁹⁸⁴

The prosecution in both trials argued that Bobrinsky was not a rogue politician, but rather that he had collaborated with the Russian Foreign Ministry and the secret police to conduct espionage in Austria-Hungary.⁹⁸⁵ The question of how much, if at all, Bobrinsky represented the Russian Empire's interests was not as straightforward as his detractors maintained, however. When a reporter in Budapest asked Bobrinsky "What is the relationship of the Galician Russky Society in Petersburg to the Russian government?" the Count replied cheekily, "None at all. Except perhaps that I, as chairman of the Society am always getting into a lot of trouble with our government!"⁹⁸⁶ Notwithstanding German and Austro-Hungarian impressions of state-sponsored Pan-Slavism, Pan-Slavists like Bobrinsky never obtained full control over Imperial Russia's state mechanisms before the war. Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergey Sazanov's moderate policies toward Galicia and Subcarpathia, as well as the Balkans, consistently drew fire from Pan-Slavists; Sazanov considered Bobrinsky's activism inconvenient for Russian international relations, and in early-1914, he attempted to dissuade the count from testifying at the Marmorosh Sighet trial.⁹⁸⁷

Nevertheless, without ever officially adopting Pan-Slavic policies, the Russian government did occasionally use Pan-Slavism to advance its imperial aims, in Serbia, for example, or during Russia's

⁹⁸³ On Bobrinsky's Pan-Slavism directed toward the Balkans, see: "How Germany Forced Russia: Notified Her Austria Would Invade Serbia, Bobrinsky Says," *New York Times* July 9, 1909.

⁹⁸⁴ Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*, 243.

⁹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 251.

⁹⁸⁶ Grabets, *K istorii Marmoroshskago protsessa: dielo 94*.

⁹⁸⁷ Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*.

annexation of Galicia in the first year of the war.⁹⁸⁸ Furthermore, as John-Paul Himka has observed, Bobrinsky could not have conducted such activities without tacit approval from the Russian government.⁹⁸⁹ Regardless of Sazanov's objections to Bobrinsky, the Russian embassy asked the Austro-Hungarian foreign office in Vienna in early-1914 to permit Bobrinsky to testify at Maramorosh-Sighet, without the threat of arrest; as the note warned, "It is evident that a new incident in the context of this affair will be very regrettable, because it will tend to hinder the improvement of relations between the two empires."⁹⁹⁰

In the wake of this request, an interchange ensued between the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, Prince N.A. Kudasev, and the Austro-Hungarian Counselor for Foreign Affairs Alexander Hoyos. The former explained that many Russians would disapprove of the prevention of Bobrinsky from testifying, as this would be seen as leading to a conviction of innocent peasants in Hungary. Hoyos retorted that Bobrinsky's presence, rather than his absence, would lead to the kind of incidents that the Russian Government wished to avoid; he also accused Russia of tolerating "religious fanatics" like Bobrinsky in order to divert attention from domestic problems and refused Kudasev's proposal that Bobrinsky not testify, in exchange for the assurance of a Hungarian acquittal.⁹⁹¹ At the same time, Otto Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian legate in St. Petersburg, informed Sazanov that the original request had been unfavorably received in Austria-Hungary, adding, "we know the intrigues of Count Bobrinsky and his followers in the territory of the Monarchy, and we will counteract it with all possible means."⁹⁹²

⁹⁸⁸ Vysny, *Neo-Slavism and the Czechs: 1898-1914.*, 20.

⁹⁸⁹ Himka, "The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I," 489. Given the participation of other Duma members in the trials, Sazanov's reaction, the storm in the Russian press, and Russian policy toward annexed Galicia after the outbreak of war, I cannot, however, agree with Himka that "what happened in the churches of Galicia was not much of an issue in St. Petersburg."

⁹⁹⁰ Österreich-Ungarns Außenpolitik, Bd. 7, Dok. 9225, S. 765, cited in Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*, 240. For some reason, the note was, for some reason, filed with the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 14, 1914, well after the conclusion of the trial (and just two weeks before the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.)

⁹⁹¹ Österreich-Ungarns Außenpolitik, Bd. 7, Dok. 9230, S. 767f, cited in *ibid.*

⁹⁹² Österreich-Ungarns Außenpolitik, Bd. 7, Dok. 9237, S. 772f, cited in *ibid.*, 240-41.

In spite of the resistance of leading statesmen in Austria-Hungary and some high-ranking government officials in Russia, Bobrinsky did eventually testify at Maramorosh Sighet. The Russian Imperial government's role in the Lviv trial also became a sticking point for Austro-Hungarian officials. When Bobrinsky could not testify as he wished, five other members of the Imperial Duma attended in his stead. When the Austro-Hungarian State Department received news that twelve more Duma members intended to attend the trial, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold (through Czerzin) conveyed to his Russian counterpart, Sazonov, that such a display of Russian governmental presence at the trial would not be appreciated.

Regardless of the degree to which Bobrinsky, his Duma cohorts, and other prominent Pan-Slavists represented the Russian government in their activities among Austria-Hungary's converting Greek Catholics, what is important is that Austro-Hungarian and German officials perceived that they did.⁹⁹³ In Austria-Hungary, statesmen had to measure Sazonov's denunciation of the behavior of the Duma members as "tactless and inopportune," against the behavior of the Tsar, himself.⁹⁹⁴ As Czernin reported to his superiors in Austria-Hungary, Nicholas II held an audience with Bobrinsky, following his return from Maramorosh-Sighet, on the matter of the trial and the Russky Orthodox conversion movements. At the conclusion of their meeting, the Tsar presented Bobrinsky with a sum of rubles and a portrait of himself as a mark of favor.⁹⁹⁵

As it turns out, German and Austro-Hungarian statesmen perceived accurately that efforts to convert Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholics were not merely issuing from independent statesmen and

⁹⁹³ One review of *Austria-Hungary and the War*, a publication of the Austro-Hungarian consul in Cleveland, took issue with the conflation of the activities of Bobrinsky, Bishops Evlogy and Antony, and the Galician Russky Benevolent Society, on the one hand, with the Russian government on the other, in the section entitled, "The Great Russian Propaganda in Galicia, Bukovina and the North-Eastern Districts of Hungary Before the War." He claimed that it was no more plausible that Pan-Slavists had caused the war than had Pan-Germanists. *American Political Science Review* vol. 9 (1914): 600.

⁹⁹⁴ Österreich-Ungarns Außenpolitik, Bd. 7, Dok. 9526, S. 1012, Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*, 257.

⁹⁹⁵ Österreich-Ungarns Außenpolitik, Bd. 7, Dok. 9529, S. 1014, cited in *ibid.*, 246.

organizations in Russia—they had the full, secret backing of some of Russia’s highest officials. In 1913, Bishop Antony of Volhynia held an audience with Tsar Nicholas II, during which the bishop reported that Greek Catholics in Galicia were inquiring about Russky Orthodox conversion and the acquisition of priests; only a clerical labor shortage prevented their formal conversion. When Tsar Nicholas II asked how much money it would take to subsidize the training and salaries of the necessary clergy, the bishop replied that it would take 65,000 rubles annually for 20-25 people. The tsar then forwarded the matter to the Minister of Finance, V.N. Kokovtsov. Ultimately, I.L. Goremykin, the leader of the tsar’s Council of Ministers oversaw the financing of the conversions, 1913-14. He personally (and secretly) designated 60,000 rubles from the imperial treasury for the promotion of Russky Orthodox conversions in Galicia.⁹⁹⁶

Furthermore, German and Austro-Hungarian statesmen were correct to perceive the attendance of members of the Russian imperial duma at the Lviv and Maramorosh Sighet trials as a sign of the Russian government’s support for Russky Orthodox conversions among Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics. In 1914, Russia’s ministry of finance directly and secretly financed the defense efforts in the Maramorosh Sighet and Lviv trials, with the tsar’s explicit approval, designating 12,000 rubles for the Subcarpathian trial and 30,000 rubles for the Galician one.⁹⁹⁷ It did so at a time when the conversions had clearly already become a source of international tensions. And Tsar Nicholas II not only monitored and approved the subsidization of the conversion movements in Subcarpathia and Galicia, he had been intervening in the matter for nearly two decades, by personally subsidizing those conversions among potential return migrants in the Americas.

⁹⁹⁶ “List Ministra Finansow P Barka do premiera Rzadu I. Goremykina, Petersburg, 10 marca 1914 r. poufnie, nr 417,” RGYA, fond 1276, op. 10, d. 855, p. 1, cited in Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*, 544. Osadczy obtained this information from a March 10 letter of the ministry of finance to Goremykin, just as the German-Russian press feud was heating up.

⁹⁹⁷ “List rosyjskiego ministra finansow P. Barka. Zaaprobowany przez cara 7 March 1914 r. w Carskim Siole,” RGYA, fond 565, op. 15, d. 1080, p. 50; and “List rosyjskiego mimnistra finansow P. Barka Zaaprobowany przez cara 7 maja 1914 r. w Liwadii, RGYA, fond 565, op. 15, d. 1080, p. 82,” cited in *ibid.*, 537. As the Maramorosh Sighet trial concluded March 2, 1914, it is possible that the funds approved by the tsar March 7 had originally been requested for the trial, but were now intended for a future appeal.

Austro-Hungarian statesmen were happy with the outcome of the Maramorosh-Sighet treason trial in a guilty verdict: Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza gloated to Imperial Foreign Minister Berchtold in a confidential telephone conversation that the testimony of “our confidants” had embarrassed Bobrinsky.⁹⁹⁸ The acquittal of all defendants in the Lviv treason trial, however, constituted “a political defeat for Austria in the struggle against pro-Russian irredentism.”⁹⁹⁹ The Austro-Hungarian diplomat Baron Andrian deemed the trial “a setback for the monarchy.” Not only Austro-Hungarian statesmen, but their counterparts in Germany found the conclusion of the Lviv trial disagreeable. In March, the Kaiser himself had ordered the German embassy in Vienna to provide more accurate information on “the Russian game” of agitation among Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics.¹⁰⁰⁰ In a June 9 report to German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, the German ambassador to Austria, Heinrich von Tschirschky, reported that he had remarked to Austrian Prime Minister Count Sturgkh upon the “unpleasant,” and “embarrassing” Lviv verdict, which licensed continuing Russophile activities. Tschirschky even inquired about holding a new trial, which could produce the desired verdict. He was informed that the inevitable negative public reaction to such governmental intervention, together with the logistics of restaging such an elaborate trial, precluded such a possibility.¹⁰⁰¹ Still, Austro-Hungarian officials did not consider the matter closed with the verdict of acquittal. Tschirschky also reported back to Germany that, after the trial, Austrian Prime Minister Sturgkh summoned the Galician governor to Vienna to advise him further regarding the Russophile movement.¹⁰⁰²

By the time that the treason trial in Lviv had concluded on June 6th, 1914, Austro-Hungarian and Russian statesmen, with additional input from German statesmen, had for months been wrangling continuously with each other over the very sensitive issue of Russky Orthodox conversions. The same

⁹⁹⁸ Österreich-Ungarns Außenpolitik, Bd. 7, Dok. 9312, S. 837, cited in Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*, 245.

⁹⁹⁹ *Dilo* (June 9, 1914), cited in *ibid.*, 257.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 246.

¹⁰⁰¹ PA AA Bonn, Österreich 94/Band 21, von Tschirschky an Bethmann-Hollweg, Wien 9. Juni 1914 and PA AA Bonn, Österreich 94/Band 21, von Tschirschky an Bethmann-Hollweg, Wien 10. Juni 1914, cited in *ibid.*, 257-58.

¹⁰⁰² PA AA Bonn, Österreich 94/Band 21, von Tschirschky an Bethmann-Hollweg, Wien 9. Juni 1914 and PA AA Bonn, Österreich 94/Band 21, von Tschirschky an Bethmann-Hollweg, Wien 10. Juni 1914, cited in *ibid.*, 257-58.

men also became key players in the July wrangling over Serbia, which ostensibly precipitated the war. The turmoil of the so-called “July Crisis,” however, should not be permitted to obscure the earlier crises surrounding these ethnoreligious conversions. On June 5, Austrian Foreign Minister Berchtold notified Prime Minister Sturgkh that, in the matter of “the fight of the pro-Russian and Orthodox agitation...It is no exaggeration when I say that our relations with Russia, which are of such great importance, will depend in the future on our success in preventing the Russification of the Ruthenes,¹⁰⁰³ which is being vigorously pursued on our territory...”¹⁰⁰⁴ Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand just three weeks later, Berchtold became Austria-Hungary’s principal war-maker.

Many of the key figures involved in the diplomatic controversies surrounding the conversions later became primary actors in the war planning of 1914’s July crisis.¹⁰⁰⁵ Of course, the same men had by then participated in myriad encounters with one another, over numerous other matters relevant to international relations—perhaps most famously regarding various crises in the Balkans (e.g., 1908 and 1912-13, and of course, June 28, 1914). However, several factors suggest that the conflicts over the conversions bore relatively greater import than did many other international issues in the decision-making of statesmen on the eve of war. First, these statesmen very frequently framed their concerns about the conversions explicitly in terms of international relations between Russia, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary (and, by extension, Germany) on the other. Secondly, the tensions over the conversions continued right up until Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s June 28th, 1914 assassination shifted the focus back to Serbia: the second treason trial of Russky Orthodox converts ended in the first week of June, and the

¹⁰⁰³ I.e., the conversion of Greek Catholics to the Russky Orthodox Church.

¹⁰⁰⁴ *Werwaltungsarchiv*, June 4, 1914, 2976 MP and 7262 MI ex 1914, cited in Z.A.B. Zeman, *The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire: 1914-1918: A Study in National and Social Revolution* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961): 12.

¹⁰⁰⁵ For excellent, succinct treatments of the influence of the major decision makers of each of the Great Powers upon the origins of World War I, see the chapters in: Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, eds., *The Origins of World War I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

assassination took place in the final week of that month. High-level statesmen representing all three of these Great Powers did not just cease considering the import of the conversions in the interim.

Lastly, while Serbian nationalism, in and of itself, caused anxieties among Austro-Hungarian statesmen, concerned with containing centrifugal “Slav” national movements within its borders, Russia’s official backing of Serbia lent the greatest sense of threat to those movements. Yet, fears of Russian Pan-Slavism did not rest upon the tsarist empire’s influence in the Balkans, alone. Austro-Hungarian and German statesmen worried, too, that Russia was building alliances with Romania, and with Romania’s “co-nationals” residing in Austro-Hungarian territories.¹⁰⁰⁶ Most tangibly, they were concerned with Russia’s unofficial—but entirely real—interventions among Austria-Hungary’s “Russians” in Galicia and Subcarpathia. Statesmen in both parts of the monarchy did, after all, orchestrate two well-publicized treason trials, in which the charges against Russky Orthodox converts consisted, among other things, of promoting Russian irredentism and spying for Russia; the latter charge, at the very least, carried with it the implication that the Russian Empire was actively promoting these conversions. In the middle of June, after both trials had concluded, Austro-Hungarian and German statesmen continued their attempts to counter the conversions, as manifestations of “Pan-Slav agitation” emanating from the Russian Empire.

On the other side of the coin, apart from strategic interests in the Balkans, Russia’s backing of Serbia in July 1914 was based partially—at least rhetorically—upon the defense of “fellow Slavs” there. Russian statesmen, with formal, if secret, financial backing from the Russian government, had also been supporting “fellow Slavs”—“fellow Russians,” even—with Austria-Hungary’s converting Greek Catholics, in the years and months immediately preceding the war. Thus, if it was Serbia which preoccupied Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian statesmen in July 1914 (and it was), the lessons and

¹⁰⁰⁶ Following the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sazanov to Romania and to “Romanians” in Hungary in June 1914, Otto (Ottokar) Czernin, ambassador to Romania, and also the legate in Russia during the flare-ups over the conversion movements, wrote to Austria’s Foreign Minister Berchtold on June 22, saying “Before our eyes in broad daylight, plain for all to see, the encirclement of the [Dual] Monarchy proceeds glaringly, with shameless effrontery, step by step... And we stand by with folded arms interestedly observing the carrying out of this onslaught.” Quoted in: Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, vol. 1, 531. Russia’s activities among Greek Catholics across the border demonstrated to Austro-Hungarian officials that not only was Russia “encircling,” it had begun “closing in,” as well.

resentments over Austria-Hungary's Russky Orthodox converts informed much of that July 1914 conversation regarding the Balkans, even if not explicitly so at that time. Serbia's threat to Austria-Hungary lay in "the Pan-Slav threat," which Russky Orthodox conversions had made apparent, and Austria-Hungary's threat to Serbia represented for Russia the potential for the same kind of aggression against "fellow-Slavs" and Russian interests, which the arrests and trials of converting Greek Catholics had clearly demonstrated.

What follows, then, is a summary of the key players in the war planning during the July Crisis of 1914, along with reiterations of their roles in the diplomatic tensions over Russky Orthodox conversion movements. This is not an attempt to suggest a direct line between their role in the conflicts over conversions and their decisions regarding the coming war; many and varied factors contributed to decision-making during the crisis. However, the manner in which these powerful political elites engaged the issue of the conversions did form an important context for their decisions regarding war.

Austria-Hungary's Common Ministerial Council, which functioned as its highest ruling organization, included the emperor (usually, including during the July crisis, represented by the minister of foreign affairs), the two prime ministers, the common minister of finance, and the minister of war. This council could and did summon other government officials as needed: for example, the chief of the general staff. Thus, Austria-Hungary's main players in the decision for war included its minister of foreign affairs, Leopold von Berchtold, prime ministers Count Carl Stürgkh and Istvan Tisza, minister of war, General Ritter Alexander von Krobatin, and minister of finance Ritter Leon von Bilinski, together with the chief of the general staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf. The foreign ministry chief of staff, Count Alexander Hoyos, also played an important role.¹⁰⁰⁷

Foreign Minister Berchtold—who in June of 1914 wrote to Austrian Prime Minister Stürgkh that Austria-Hungary's relations in the future with Russia would "depend upon preventing the Russification of

¹⁰⁰⁷ Tunstall, "Austria-Hungary." Although Emperor Franz Joseph technically served as the head of the Common Ministerial Council, and was required to give the final authorization for war, he did not attend any of the council meetings on the subject of declaring war (*ibid.*, 115-16.)

the Ruthenes”—in July of 1914 not only “commanded and managed the process” of the war planning, he did so as the most pro-war member of the so-called “war party,” other than Chief of Staff Conrad.¹⁰⁰⁸ Stürgkh, too, who had closely followed the treason trials in Lviv and in June 1914 summoned the Galician governor to Vienna to inform him further on Galicia’s Russophile movement, possessed veto power (which he did not exercise) in Austria-Hungary’s decision for war. His counterpart, Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza, had from 1901 to 1914 consistently and aggressively battled the conversion movements as Russian Pan-Slav machinations. His initial reluctance against the declaration of war in July 1914 stemmed not from pacifism, nor lack of enmity toward Serbia or Russia. Rather, he hesitated to incorporate even more unruly “Slavs” (some of the unruliest of which had been Subcarpathia’s Greek Catholics) into Hungary. Whatever his objections, he nevertheless eventually joined the overwhelming pro-war party.¹⁰⁰⁹

In spring of 1914, Berchtold’s Chief of Staff, Count Alexander Hoyos, had engaged in a heated exchange with Russia’s ambassador to Vienna, Prince N.A. Kudashev, over which eventuality would further “hinder the improvement of relations” between Russia and Austria-Hungary: Count Bobrinsky’s participation in the 1913-14 trial of Russky Orthodox converts or his prevention from doing so. On July 4-5, 1914 the same Hoyos—as war-minded as was his superior, Berchtold—undertook the “Hoyos mission” to Germany, in order to secure Germany’s backing for Austria-Hungary’s action against Serbia, should Russia decide to come to Serbia’s defense.¹⁰¹⁰ In March of 1914, Minister of War General Ritter Alexander von Krobatin had belligerently advised Austria-Hungary’s minister of the interior on the conversion movements, saying, “We should fight this propaganda by every means at our disposal.”¹⁰¹¹ In

¹⁰⁰⁸ Ibid., 117; Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 191.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Tunstall, "Austria-Hungary."

¹⁰¹⁰ Ibid., 135-36.

¹⁰¹¹ VA, 2854 MI ex 1914, cited in Zeman, *The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire, 1914-1918: A Study in National and Social Revolution*, 13.

July, he joined together with Austria-Hungary's most belligerently hawkish and war-minded decision-maker, Chief of the General Staff, Conrad von Hötzendorf, to urge immediate war against Serbia.¹⁰¹²

In Russia, the dynamics of war decision-making differed somewhat. There, "The tsar ultimately held the levers of government in his hands, delegating authority or seizing it, as his own sense of personal responsibility moved him."¹⁰¹³ Thus, the Russian empire's war planning policies, as with other state affairs, were based upon the tsar's will, stated explicitly, as well as upon the decisions of individual officials of the state, to whom he extended his "confidence."¹⁰¹⁴ Key war-planners in Russia therefore included Tsar Nicholas II and members of the Foreign Ministry, on the one hand, and General Staff and War Ministry, on the other. In Russia, the diplomatic corps and War Ministry often diverged from one another in their goals: the Foreign Ministry generally sought to maintain cordial relations between Russia and its neighbors, while the War Ministry, on the other hand, prepared for war with the "indivisible, unitary threat" constituted by the "Germanic empires" of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The tsar was free to follow either course as he saw fit. Tsar Nicholas's Council of Ministers for the July crisis thus included I.L. Goremykin (the council's leader, but essentially a mouthpiece for the tsar), minister of finance V.N. Kokovtsov, who enjoyed the tsar's special favor, Foreign Minister Sergei Sazanov, A.V. Krivoshein, and several generals: Sukhomlinov, Iu. N. Danilov, and Ianushkevich. Also deserving of mention here, though he did not wield influence in the actual decision-making, was Prince N.A. Kudashev, Russia's ambassador to Vienna.

On July 24, 1914, it was to Kudashev, who had shared strong words with Austria-Hungary's Alexander Hoyos over the Bobrinsky affair, which Austria-Hungary's Foreign Minister Berchtold conveyed the message that Austria-Hungary understood that Russia would take action, were Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia. It was the ministry of finance, under V.N. Kokovtsov, which had, in 1913,

¹⁰¹² Tunstall, "Austria-Hungary," 121.

¹⁰¹³ David Alan Rich, "Russia," in *The Origins of World War I*, ed. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 192.

¹⁰¹⁴ David MacLaren McDonald, *United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914* (Cambridge, Mass. 1992). cited in Rich, "Russia," 192.

secretly authorized the dispersal of some 60,000 rubles to aid Russky Orthodox mission in Galicia, even though those conversions were clearly the source of Austro-Russian tensions. Goremykin personally, secretly oversaw the financing of the Russky Orthodox mission in Galicia. It was Sazanov, who had, in previous months, had his hands full attempting to intervene in the Bobrinsky matter in Austria-Hungary, who guided the Council of Ministers which made the recommendation to the tsar for mobilization on July 30.¹⁰¹⁵ And the person with the final say in mobilization—Tsar Nicholas II—had for a decade and a half personally subsidized conversions among Greek Catholic migrants in the Americas, knowing the potential for the remittance of those conversions to Austria-Hungary. He had also, after Austro-Hungarian officials began arresting such converts in Galicia and Subcarpathia, secretly approved substantial funds for continued efforts there, including the defense efforts in the inflammatory Maramorosh Sighet and Lviv trials.

As for Germany's key players in the origins of the war, these included, first and foremost, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg, War Minister von Falkehayn, and chief of the General Staff von Moltke.¹⁰¹⁶ It is also worth mentioning the role of Heinrech von Tschirschky. Tschirschky, Germany's ambassador to Vienna, on June 9, 1914, had notified Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg of his own comments to Austrian Prime Minister Stürgkh regarding the “embarrassing” acquittal of Russky Orthodox activists at the Lviv treason trial, which countenanced further Russophile and Pan-Slavic activities. He even inquired about a new trial. On July 3rd, it was the same Tschirschky to whom Austria-Hungary's Foreign Minister Berchtold conveyed Austria-Hungary's intention to act against Serbia. While Tschirschky took a cautious approach, Kaiser Wilhelm II strongly disapproved and favored action. During the “Hoyos mission,” the Kaiser pledged “full German backing,” with the support of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg—both doing so with full cognizance and acceptance of the risk of war with

¹⁰¹⁵ Rich, "Russia," 219-20.

¹⁰¹⁶ Holger H. Herwig, "Germany," in *The Origins of World War I*, ed. Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 157.

Russia.¹⁰¹⁷ Just a few months earlier, the same Kaiser had, on March 24th, ordered his diplomatic corps to gather more information regarding the “Russian game” of agitation among Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics.

10.5 THE PRESS FEUD

Propaganda campaigns contributed further to the diplomatic tensions surrounding Russky Orthodox conversion movements and influenced both statesmen and broader publics in the Great Powers. At times, statesmen attempted to influence the press to convey their preferred interpretation of the role of the conversions in the intensifying international hostilities, and thereby prepare the populace for war; but the reverse was true, as well: war propaganda involving the conversions movements also helped prepare statesmen for war. This section considers the propaganda campaigns in each of the major belligerent powers—Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia—before detailing the response of the presses in Britain and the United States.

In both parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the respective parliaments enlisted the major presses to launch anti-Russian propaganda campaigns. While Austro-Russian relations had been improving at the beginning of 1912, by August of the same year, the Vienna correspondent for London’s *The Times* reported that the *Reichspost*, regarded as the mouthpiece of the Austrian government, had seen fit “to animadvert upon the alleged Russian Orthodox propaganda among the Ruthenes, or Little Russians, of Galicia,” as a matter of Austro-Russian international relations.”¹⁰¹⁸ Importantly, while most scholars have marked the 1912 deterioration of Austro-Russian (and German-Russian) relations with the

¹⁰¹⁷ Tunstall, "Austria-Hungary," 134-36.

¹⁰¹⁸ *The Times*, August 30, 1912, quoted in Saunders, "Britain and the Ukrainian Question (1912-1920)," 47.

outbreak of the Balkan War in October 1912, this contemporary commentator found the roots of that new contentiousness earlier in the year in the conversions of Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholics.¹⁰¹⁹

The Austro-Hungarian propaganda campaign escalated with the opening of the treason trials 1913-14. In 1920, a particularly tendentious analysis of the war's origins reported correctly that, "During both trials a constant agitation was kept up in the Austrian and Hungarian press against Russia."¹⁰²⁰ Vienna's *Reichspost* covered the Marmorosh Sighet trial, painting the conversions as Russian machinations, in lengthy articles beginning on December 29, 1913.¹⁰²¹ A *Novoye Vremya* article in Russia claimed that Viennese newspapers like *Neue Vater Presse* and *Reichspost* had obscured Hungary's circumvention of its own constitution, by singling out Count Bobrinsky and pontificating on the "Russian danger, promoting their outposts in the Carpathians."¹⁰²²

An anti-Russian propaganda campaign also unfolded in Germany, featuring the treason trials taking place in the courts of its closest ally, Austria-Hungary. Whether orchestrated by the government or issuing independently from various presses, German anti-Russian propaganda in the spring of 1914 characterized the conversions of Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholics as exemplary instances of Russian

¹⁰¹⁹ I have been unable to determine to what edition/month of the 1912 *Reichspost* the August 30 *Times* article was referring.

¹⁰²⁰ Goricar and Stowe, *The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue or How the World War was Brought About*. Austria-Hungary's various presses, given that they represented the interests of an extremely ethnically, religiously, and politically variegated populace, reported both favorably and unfavorably on the trials. In Hungary, for example, opinion was divided between Catholic support and Protestant denunciations. (See: Danilec, "Vtoroy Marmorosh-Syhotsky protsves protyv pravoslavnikh v Zakarpatye.") The former Hungarian Minister of Justice Geza Poloni criticized the Marmorosh-Sighet trial along with the "Croatian-treason" trial as a fiasco lacking evidence. Even *Novoye Vremya* noted that "The cruelty of the judicial sentence in the Marmorosh-Sighet trial struck not only the Russian, but even part of the Austro-Hungarian press." The presses which were understood to speak for the government, however, categorically denounced the conversions as manifestations of Russian imperialism, and in so doing joined papers like the Bukovinian *Czernowitzer Allg. Zig.* (Feb. 8, 1914), which wrote that the Russian government lay behind Bobrinsky's activities, and used "pan-Slavism" only when it advanced its political and diplomatic goals. (See: Grabets, *K istorii Marmoroshskago protsessa: dielo 94.*)

¹⁰²¹ That initial article referenced the mass conversions in Marmorosh, Ugocha, and Bereg counties, "rolling rubles," and even drew links to the "Pan-slavic agitator" Adolf Dobriensky, who had been charged in the Hnylychky trial of 1881-2. *Reichspost* (December 29, 1913), 5-6.

¹⁰²² Grabets, *K istorii Marmoroshskago protsessa: dielo 94.*

imperialism and Pan-Slavism: important conceptual counterparts to Russia's Balkan activities in a German ideational process, which Troy Paddock has termed "creating the Russian peril."¹⁰²³

On December 8, 1912, at the famous "war council," during which Germany allegedly made the decision for war, German Chief of Staff Count von Moltke argued to the Kaiser and the Reich's military chiefs that "the popularity of a war against Russia, as outlined by the Kaiser, should be better prepared." At that meeting, the Kaiser assented to the proposal that newspapers "enlighten the German people" regarding Germany's "great national interests" in the event of war. The German Chancellor was subsequently advised, "The people must not be in the position of asking themselves only at the outbreak of a great European war, what are the interests that Germany would be fighting for. The people ought rather to be accustomed to the idea of such a war beforehand." Apparently a couple of months had not provided sufficient time to achieve the desired aim of readying the populace for war, because on February 10, 1913, Moltke warned his Austrian counterpart, Chief of Staff Conrad to refrain—for the moment—from war with Serbia, until the people were prepared and enthusiastic to make sacrifices for a "European war" defined by "a struggle between Germandom and Slavdom." It would also have to appear to the German people that Russia, and not Austria, had provoked the conflict: as Moltke cautioned Conrad, "It would, however, be difficult to find an effective [rallying] slogan, if at the present moment a war were demanded by Austria for which there were no understanding among the German people."¹⁰²⁴

The search by German statesmen for just such a slogan persisted through spring of 1914, and it is worth considering whether or not mass Russky Orthodox conversions in Austria-Hungary satisfied the requirements for the justification—or pretext—for war which they sought. In 1920, former Austrian diplomat Joseph Goricar and American historian Lyman Beecher Stowe collaborated on a tendentious, anti-Central Powers text, entitled *The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue or How the World War was Brought About*, in which they claimed that, by 1914, as Austria-Hungary continued to enlist the Lviv and

¹⁰²³ Paddock, *Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the Public Sphere, and National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890-1914*.

¹⁰²⁴ Martin Gilbert, "Prelude to War," in *The First World War: A Complete History* (New York: H. Holt, 1994), 8-10. Mombauer, *Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War*, 151-2.

Marmorosh Sighet treason trials in its anti-Russian propaganda, “it was thought necessary, by the German Foreign Office, to open an anti-Russian agitation simultaneously in Germany, and what was said there in the very days when the political trials in Austria-Hungary were coming to a close was little short of an unofficial declaration of war against Russia. The campaign was opened by the *Kölnische Zeitung* on the eve of the day on which the verdict in the Marmaros-Sziget [sic.] trial was expected.”¹⁰²⁵ Had the German Foreign Office really “timed” the release of an inflammatory, anti-Russian propaganda campaign, intended to prepare the populace for war, to coincide with the verdict in the Hungarian trial of Russky Orthodox converts (or for that matter, with the opening of the Lviv treason trial of conversion activists, a week later)?

As the Marmorosh Sighet trial entered its third month in February of 1914, the *Kölnische Zeitung* had decried Russia’s ambitions in Austria-Hungary, arguing that a Ukrainian national movement undercut the basis of Russian irredentism and Pan-Slavism toward Galicia and Subcarpathia.¹⁰²⁶ The newspaper compared the situation of “Ruthenians” in Hungary to “their countrymen in Galicia.” Among both peoples, socioeconomic conditions prompted a desire to improve their lot, and there was a time when both groups of “Ruthenians” had looked to “Mother” Russia as “the great liberator.” Russia had capitalized upon this perception and used the ruble to promote conversions to Orthodoxy on Austro-Hungarian territory, because “Russia was for [‘Ruthenians’] a religious concept, not a national one.” While in Galicia, most “Ruthenians” had come out of the Russophile era, rejected even the name “Ruthenian” for “Ukrainian,” and become “mortal enemies of the Russian Pan-Slavist,” “Ruthenians” in Hungary still slumbered. If the “Hungarians” were to consider this development in Galicia, the *Kölnische Zeitung* argued, there would be no need to worry that “their [i.e., Hungary’s] Ruthenians commit treason in Russia's favor, [for] soon, too, will their Ruthenians also achieve Ukrainian national consciousness and thus make enemies of Moscow, just as their countrymen in Galicia.” In other words, notwithstanding the

¹⁰²⁵ Goricar and Stowe, *The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue or How the World War was Brought About*, 196.

¹⁰²⁶ No. 154, 1914, quoted in Grabets, *K istorii Marmoroshskago protsesssa: dielo 94*. The paper was regarded at the time as the mouthpiece of the German government, though the situation was more complex than this.

rather disingenuous rhetorical claim that Hungary need not worry, the February *Kölnische Zeitung* article argued that the existence of Ukrainians in Galicia—and “soon-to-be” Ukrainians in Subcarpathia—negated Russia’s ethnoreligious claims that these people were actually Orthodox Russians and thereby undercut any justification for Russia’s purported aim of annexation of these Austro-Hungarian territories.¹⁰²⁷ The subtext of hostility toward Russian imperialism, as manifested in Russky Orthodox conversions, is unmistakable.

The same semi-official newspaper did run an article on March 2, 1914, in which Richard Ullrich, the newspaper’s correspondent in St. Petersburg, claimed that Russia would, by 1917, have settled its internal problems, paving the way for its “expansionist aspirations” toward Persia, Turkey, and—especially—Russia’s western frontier (i.e., including Subcarpathia, Bukovina, and especially Galicia). The article claimed that the Russians were openly “arming for war against Germany” and urged Germans to dispense with their heretofore “conciliatory attitude” toward a Russia which could soon overpower them. On the following day, even as another German newspaper reprinted the *Kölnische Zeitung* article under the heading “The Coming War with Russia,” the Marmorosh Sighet verdict (guilty) was indeed announced, just as *The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue* claimed.¹⁰²⁸

Some historical debate surrounds the relationship of the German government to the *Kölnische Zeitung* article and its aftermath: an episode in pre-war German-Russian hostilities important enough to receive scholarly attention in its own right as “the *Kölnische Zeitung* controversy,” “the *Kölnische Zeitung* affair,” or “the German-Russian press feud.”¹⁰²⁹ Scholars have disagreed whether or not the government orchestrated the March 2nd article and the ensuing storm of anti-Russian sentiments expressed in the German press. Regardless of whether or not the German government initiated the

¹⁰²⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁸ *Germania* (March 3, 1914) cited in Fischer, *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914*, 376.

¹⁰²⁹ See *ibid.*, 370-88; Paddock, *Creating the Russian Peril: Education, the Public Sphere, and National Identity in Imperial Germany, 1890-1914*, 167-79; Wernecke, *Der Wille zur Weltgeltung: Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit im Kaiserreich am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges*, 244-87. See also Paddock, “Still Stuck at Sevastopol: The Depiction of Russia during the Russo- Japanese War and the Beginning of the First World War in the German Press,” 370-71.

campaign, it was widely believed in Germany, Russia, and elsewhere among the Great Powers that it had done so, despite a semi-official denial of involvement.¹⁰³⁰ Not only did the widespread anti-Russian propaganda serve to “enlighten the German people” of their interests in a war with Russia, in the aftermath of the article, a German-Russian press war erupted in which the conversions of Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics occupied a conspicuous position. The press feud subsided—or rather, deescalated to simmering—only several weeks before Gavrillo Princip’s June 28th assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand returned Russo-German and Russo-Austro-Hungarian relations to a rolling boil.

As for the timing of the infamous March 2 *Kölnische Zeitung* article, the newspaper’s editorial staff had received Ullrich’s article on February 24, and it is entirely possible that the approaching verdict in the Marmorosh Sighet trial occasioned the delay in publishing the piece. It certainly would not have detracted from the force of an article on Russian imperialism and war preparations, if the next day it was “proven,” by a verdict of treason, levied upon Russky Orthodox converts in Austria-Hungary, that Russia had been doing just what the newspaper had alleged earlier in 1914: conducting espionage for the purpose of territorial expansion into Austro-Hungarian Galicia and Subcarpathia. The evidence for intentional synchronization of the article’s release with the Marmorosh Sighet verdict is, however, thin and only circumstantial; what is certain, though, is that the conversions in Austria-Hungary played a critical role in the ensuing German-Russian press war, not to mention the accompanying Austro-Russian press tensions. For large and influential segments of the German press, its readers, and statesmen, the conversions of Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics exemplified Russian pan-Slavic aggression.

For German-identifying Slavophobes, Pan-Slavism represented an explicitly anti-German movement that had captured the government in Russia and which, therefore, threatened not only Austria-Hungary, but Germanism writ large. German newspapers echoed the sentiments of statesmen like Chief

¹⁰³⁰ For an important response in England, for example, see "What Does it Mean?," *The Times* March 10, 1914.

of Staff Moltke, who warned of the coming confrontation between Slavdom and Germandom.¹⁰³¹ The *Tagliche Rundschau*, for example, charged that “on the banks of the Neva [i.e., in St. Petersburg], they have encouraged the dangerous Pan-Slavist agitation, the purpose of which is the destruction of the Danubian Monarchy and the weakening of German power.”¹⁰³² The vast majority of studies which have considered Pan-Slavism as a factor in pre-war German-Russian tensions have focused nearly exclusively on the various crises in the Balkans and Russia’s support of Serbia’s interests against those of both Austria-Hungary and Germany. The state of the literature can be explained by the importance given to Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination, especially in its role in German encouragement of an Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia. As one German newspaper wrote following the assassination, “For us other Germans, it is a question of knowing whether the dike which checks the inundation of the Slavic flood is still solid. But the superintendent of the dikes has just been killed.”¹⁰³³

What is of critical importance, however, is that in the eyes of many citizens of Germany, Austria-Hungary superintended multiple dikes restraining the “Slavic flood,” and the archduke’s assassination only represented, as one German newspaper put it, the “*last* fruit of Russian incitements against Austria.”¹⁰³⁴ For critics in Germany, therefore, the encroachments into Austro-Hungarian Galicia and Subcarpathia via Russky Orthodox conversion constituted prior, continuing, and no less substantial manifestations of those Russian incitements. A body of evidence for Russian imperialism—comprised significantly of the conversions in Austria-Hungary—provided the foundation necessary to allow the German government, press, and populace to convince one another that Princip’s bullets represented the definitive sign of war-provoking, anti-German Russian imperialism.

¹⁰³¹ The German Chancellor quite publically made a speech to the Reichstag on April 21, 1913 on a future war between Teutons and Slavs, though he was trying to dissociate the government from such arguments. See: Mommsen, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Wilhelmian Germany, 1897-1914," 397.

¹⁰³² Late June or early July, cited in Scott, *Five Weeks: The Surge of Public Opinion on the Eve of the Great War*, 104.

¹⁰³³ *Ibid.*, 106.

¹⁰³⁴ *Vossische Zeitung*, no date given, cited in Scott, *Five Weeks*, 104. Emphasis mine.

Three days after the March 2 *Kölnische Zeitung* article (and two days after the Maramorosh Sighet verdict), the *Frankfurter Zeitung*'s contributions to the escalating press feud included the accusation that, "The Ruthenian trial has provided an example of the tireless secret: Russia's spread of animosity and hatred in the countries in which they have an interest."¹⁰³⁵ In the article, "The Ruble is Rolling," the *Vossische Zeitung* alleged that "The Russian ruble is rolling in Galicia, northern Bukovina, and northern Hungary. Over the Neva, they are denying it." Arguing, as the *Kölnische Zeitung* had earlier in the year, that Russia exploited the lack of a Ukrainian national movement in Subcarpathia to promote Russian identification among the uneducated Greek Catholic peasants, the article continued, "We draw attention to the Russification of Hungarian Ruthenians, as they still do not have an intelligentsia. The Ukrainian movement in Galicia creates nationalists, but [the Ukrainian movement] cannot penetrate into Hungary, because of the resistance of Magyar governments. Russian propaganda was able to use this state of affairs for its own purposes and create unrest in northern Hungary."¹⁰³⁶ Throughout March and into April, the same newspaper continued to expound upon the theme of Russky Orthodox conversions in Austria-Hungary as evidence of Russian imperialism under titles like "Russia at Austria-Hungary's Border" and "Russian Espionage."¹⁰³⁷ The latter article contended that "spies from Russia have almost over-flooded Europe." It was partly due to these articles and others like them that "The so-called Russian danger began to be accepted as a fact of life in public as well as in high governmental quarters, in particular by the General Staff."¹⁰³⁸ Perhaps the most compelling connection between the spring propaganda campaign in Germany, the Russky Orthodox conversions, and the Wilhelmian government is

¹⁰³⁵ March 5, 1914, quoted in Wernecke, *Der Wille zur Weltgeltung: Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit im Kaiserreich am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges*, 265.

¹⁰³⁶ No. 97, 1914, quoted in Grabets, *K istorii Maramoroshskago protsesssa: dielo 94..* (Late February or early March.)

¹⁰³⁷ See for example: No. 161 (March 29, 1914), No. 173 (April 4, 1914), No. 185 (April 12, 1914) cited in Wernecke, *Der Wille zur Weltgeltung: Außenpolitik und Öffentlichkeit im Kaiserreich am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges*, 265.

¹⁰³⁸ Mommsen, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Wilhelmian Germany, 1897-1914," 400.

the order from the Kaiser himself to the German embassy in Vienna to provide more accurate information on “the Russian game” of agitation among Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics.¹⁰³⁹

Austro-Hungarian presses also drew explicit connections between the conversions and the Russian aggression alleged in the March 2 *Kölnische Zeitung* article. On March 4th, Vienna’s *Reichspost* positioned its report on the Marmorosh Sighet verdict immediately after a report on Russian-German relations and the Balkans.¹⁰⁴⁰ March 5th’s *Reichspost* morning edition contained an item on St. Petersburg’s response to the March 2 *Kölnische Zeitung* article, as well as further coverage on Count Bobrinsky; the evening edition contained a piece on an organization of priest-spies working for the Russian General Staff to conduct espionage in Galicia.¹⁰⁴¹ In early March, inflammatory articles like “Die Kriegsteimmung in Russland” (“The War Mood in Russia”) and “Russland und Oesterreich-Ungarn” (“Russia and Austria-Hungary”) continued to run alongside articles like “Die Russophile Agitation in Galizien” (“Russophile Agitation in Galicia”), which treated the conversions, the “Russian Panslavist” Bobrinsky, the treason trials, and Russian designs on Galicia, Bukovina, and northern Hungary.¹⁰⁴² On March 9, *Reichspost* led with a lengthy article on the ongoing German-Russian press feud, then introduced the opening of the Lviv treason trial of Russky Orthodox activists for conversion, or as they were called, “Graf Bobrinskis Agenten in Galizien” (“Count Bobrinsky’s Agents in Galicia”).¹⁰⁴³ Throughout March and June, *Reichspost* continued to juxtapose articles in the same editions on the Lviv trial, Bobrinsky, and German-Russian/Austro-Russian relations.¹⁰⁴⁴

¹⁰³⁹ Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*, 246. The Kaiser appears to have issued the order on March 24, 1914, after the conclusion of the Marmorosh Sighet trial and during the one in Lviv. This also occurred right in the middle of the propaganda campaign, which the Wilhelminian government had publically repudiated (mildly).

¹⁰⁴⁰ “Telegramme. Die Urteilsbegründung von Marmaros-Szigeth,” *Reichspost* (March 4, 1914, morning ed.), 5.

¹⁰⁴¹ (March 5, 1914, morning ed.), 7, 9; Die Russischen Priesterseminarien in Galizien-Espinoageorganisationen: Dufderung eines verzweigten Espionageneks” (March 5, 1914, evening ed.), 2-3.

¹⁰⁴² See for example *Reichspost* (March 7, 1914, morning ed.), 2; (March 8, 1914, morning ed.), 2,3.

¹⁰⁴³ *Reichspost* (March 9, 1914, morning ed.), 1, 5. See also March 10, 1914 (morning ed), p. 3, 12-13, in which the first part of an article on the Lviv trial appears to have been positioned intentionally next to coverage of the German Russian conflict.

¹⁰⁴⁴ See, for example: March 12, 1914 (p. 13); March 13, 1914 (morning ed.) (p. 4, 11); March 17, 1914 (morning), p. 4. As another example of such propaganda in Austro-Hungarian, in one of his early-June writings in the Austrian press regarding the possibility of an Austro-Russian war, the Austrian historian Henryk Friejung wrote that the two

The increasing and expanding hostility in the German and Austrian presses following March 2 developed in conversation with equally hostile interlocutors in Russia, as propagandists there, like their German counterparts, enlisted the treason trials for political aims. *Novoye Vremya*, with a circulation of 150,000 between 1911 and 1914, was one of the Russian Empire's most widely read newspapers, the views of which expressed, in the 1914 estimation of one British reader, "a shrewd compromise between official views and public opinion." Its international audience included Russian politicians (Tsar Nicholas II read what he called "our most serious and our principal" newspaper daily) and citizens, Russophiles and anti-Russophiles in Austria-Hungary, and statesmen of other foreign countries.¹⁰⁴⁵ The newspaper was well-known in both Germany and Austria-Hungary for promoting anti-Germanism and Pan-Slavism, and increasingly as a mouthpiece for the government's accession to those principles.¹⁰⁴⁶ Although the degree of hostility which *Novoye Vremya* exhibited toward Germany and Austria-Hungary wavered over the course of its publication, the daily consistently advocated the Russian Empire's membership in the Triple Entente, and according to Lieven, "in the six months prior to the war the paper was at its worst in its baiting of Vienna and in the hypocritical and pseudosentimental articles with which it backed Bobrinsky's campaign on behalf of the Ruthenes."¹⁰⁴⁷ Importantly, Semen Bendasiuk, one of the four defendants in the Lviv trial, served as a correspondent for *Novoye Vremya*.

empires were engaged in "a struggle among themselves from the Balkans to Galicia." As he explained, in connection with its Constantinopolitan aspirations, Russia entertained designs on the Carpathian regions, because, in the event of Russia's acquisition of Constantinople, Galicia would provide a "glacis" to the "protective rampart" of Carpathians. (A glacis is "a bank of earth in front of the counterscarp or covered way of a fort, having an easy slope toward the field or open country.") For this reason, then, had Russia, at the behest of the Pan-Slavists, "measured out a relentless attack," characterized by Russification and Orthodox conversions of Austria-Hungary's Greek Catholics. Dr. Friedjung nevertheless attempted to argue that, despite Russia's imperialism, only small portions of Galician society had been influenced—and those won over by bribery—and that the outcome of a potential war would not be affected by "the current political intrigue in Galicia." *Przegląd Prawosławny*.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War*, 131. The British observation was made by H.W. Williams in his *Russia of the Russians* (London, 1914), 107.

¹⁰⁴⁶ The March 2nd *Kölnische Zeitung* article, for example, singled out *Novoye Vremya* not only for its anti-Germanism but also as "the biggest and most influential paper in Russia." See: Fischer, *War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914*, 374. Also see Paddock.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War*, 133. In Lieven's opinion, "Bobrinsky's major intervention in foreign affairs, namely the Galicia-Russia Society [i.e., the Galician Russky Benevolent Society] which he founded to oppose Austrian persecution of Ruthenes, was if anything still less defensible. As the Austrian

Not only committed Pan-Slavists, but broader segments of Russian society and government reacted negatively to Austria-Hungary's treatment of its citizens who were converting to the Russky Orthodox Church; Germany's antipathy toward Russia, based partly on its own reading of the conversions also provoked corresponding anti-German hostilities in the Russian press. Pan-Slavists in St. Petersburg issued a resolution in which they condemned the Subcarpathian trial and Austria-Hungary for convicting the defendants "for striving to preserve their nation and return to the Orthodox faith of their ancestors." The resolution further bristled that, "This verdict has clearly expressed how the Austro-Hungarian authorities deal with our Russky brothers abroad, which is a deliberate challenge to public opinion of Imperial Rus¹⁰⁴⁸ and represents an unprecedented assault on Russian national self-consciousness."¹⁰⁴⁹ In the midst of the *Kölnische Zeitung* affair, Count von Pourtales, the German ambassador in St. Petersburg, singled out tensions over the Balkans when he reported to the German foreign office on March 21, 1914 that he was "aware at every turn, what profound bitterness the Bosnian crisis and the events of the past year have left in all parties [in Russia]." But he also emphasized that the Maramorosh-Sighet trial contributed its part "to help increase this resentment."¹⁰⁵⁰

10.6 THE FEUD SPILLS WESTWARD

Even if British diplomats had not been reading about the Russky Orthodox conversions in Austria-Hungary in *Novoye Vremya* (which they were), they would have learned of them and their

foreign minister, Berchtold, rightly complained, for all its failings Vienna was a good deal more tolerant towards its minority nationalities, even including Slavs, than was Petersburg" (ibid., 129).

¹⁰⁴⁸ That is, imperial Russia, as opposed to "*podarymy Rus*"—Russia under the yoke, which pan-Slavists in Russia and Russophiles in Austria-Hungary used to describe Galicia and Subcarpathia.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Grabets, *K istorii Maramoroshskago protsessa: dielo 94*.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Botschafter Graf von Pourtales an das Auswärtige Amt, St. Petersburg 21.3.1914. In: Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914. Sammlung der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes. Im Auftrag des Auswärtigen Amtes herausgegeben von J. Lepsius, A. Mendelsohn Bartholdy, F. Thimme. Berlin O. J., B39, Dok. 15855, S. 570f, cited in Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*, 266-67.

significance for Austro-Russian relations in London's own *The Times*. Count Bobrinsky, who orchestrated much of the anti-Austro-Hungarian campaign in the Russian, Galician, and Bukovinan Russophile presses, also attempted to influence the British public and diplomatic opinion regarding the conversions. In April of 1912, following the arrests of key figures in the Galician and Subcarpathian conversions, *The Times* published a letter from Bobrinsky, under the title "Religious Persecution in Galicia."

In it, Bobrinsky wrote that, "During the last few months we find in the Russian newspapers mention of a new and strong religious movement among the Russian peasants in Galicia (Austria) and in the east of Hungary." (He neglected to mention that it was due in large part to his own efforts that the conversions were flourishing and such newspapers were covering them.) He located the source of the conversions in the resistance of the masses to Greek Catholic liturgical reforms (as he put it, the efforts of the Greek Catholic Metropolitan Count Sheptytsky "to Polonize and Romanize his Russian flock" in Galicia), and the attempts of Hungarian-oriented Greek Catholic priests and hierarchs to Magyarize the Byzantine rite in Subcarpathia. Austria-Hungary had not only prevented Orthodox bishops in the Dual Monarchy from supplying priests to the converts, the Empire had also undermined convert appeals to both the Synod of Russia and the Russian bishop in America. Converts from the village of Grab had been fined and forced to appear several hundred miles away at the county seat in Jaslo. As Bobrinsky related, "'Come back to the Uniate Church' say the police, 'and we will trouble you no more; when your children begin to die of the frost and fatigue you will be sure to yield.' But these Russian mountaineers will not yield." He concluded with an invitation for the British writer, W.H. Birkbeck, to visit the region to report on conditions for himself. Lest he be mistaken for a private Russian citizen, he signed his report, "Count Vladimir Bobrinsky, Member of the Imperial Russian Duma."¹⁰⁵¹

Reports on the conversions in Britain were not as uniform as they were in each of the Russophile, German, or Austro-Hungarian presses. Two weeks after Count Bobrinsky's letter appeared in *The Times*,

¹⁰⁵¹ Count Vladimir Bobrinsky, "Religious Persecution in Galicia: History of the Struggle," *The Times* April 10, 1912.

a Vladimir Stepankovsky countered in the same publication that, "There are no Russians in Galicia."¹⁰⁵² In December of 1912, Birkbeck accepted the invitations of Bobrinsky, Stepankovsky, and Sapieha to visit Galicia.¹⁰⁵³ He agreed with Bobrinsky as to the "Russian-ness" of Galicia's Greek Catholic peasantry and attributed the source of the conversions to Polonization. To support his argument further, Birkbeck referred to hostilities between Latin Catholics and Greek Catholics in America, saying, "The action of the Uniate ecclesiastical authorities, and not any propaganda from the neighboring Russian Empire, is the cause of the Orthodox movement. This would seem proved by the fact that 40,000 Galician emigrants in America have joined the Orthodox Church to save themselves from Latinization."¹⁰⁵⁴ (Of course, contrary to Birkbeck's assertion, those conversions in the Americas were also intimately connected to influence from the Russian Empire.) Yet another author contended against Birkbeck that Metropolitan Andrei (Sheptytsky) was not introducing new religious customs, but rather discontinuing "new customs and ceremonies which under the influence of Orthodox Russian emissaries were being introduced into a few Uniate churches by some of [Sheptytsky's] clergy who chose to declare themselves Russians by nationality [i.e., Russophiles]." The same author believed that "this intricate little-Russian problem is one of the two or three in Europe which after the liquidation of the Oriental question [the wars in the Balkans] may turn out to be the very backbone of international politics in the near future."¹⁰⁵⁵

As for British diplomats, Sir Fairfax Cartwright, who later notified the British Foreign Office that in Galicia, "an Austro-Russian war" was considered "inevitable," explained to the Foreign Office in June 1912 that Bobrinsky's correspondence in *The Times* was a "Galician ploy," and further, that "the ensuing controversy is likely to have a most unfavourable effect on the relations between this country [Austria]

¹⁰⁵² Vladimir Stepankovsky, "Religious Persecution in Galicia," *The Times* April 29, 1912.

¹⁰⁵³ Birkbeck had, since July of 1988 maintained close ties to the Holy Synod's *uberprocurator*, Constantine Pobedonostsev. He was an avowed Slavophile. See: Michael Hughes, "The English Slavophile: W.J. Birkbeck and Russia," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 8, no. 3 (July 2004): 680-706.

¹⁰⁵⁴ W.J. Birbeck, "Religious Persecution in Galicia," *The Times* December 3, 1912.

¹⁰⁵⁵ "Religious Persecution in Galicia: Little-Russians and Poles," *The Times* December 27, 1912.

and Russia, which as it is leave much to be desired.”¹⁰⁵⁶ The British Foreign office, in April 1914, also received a pamphlet from Stepankovsky, who characterized the conversions as a Russian-inspired ploy, but as Saunders noted, “in 1914 Britain had to keep on good terms with the Russian Empire. Although an official minuted that Stepankovsky’s account of Bobrinsky’s subversive activities in Galicia was ‘in the main correct’, he held that the work as a whole was ‘hardly worth acknowledging...It is a violent anti-Russian diatribe.’”¹⁰⁵⁷ It should be said lastly of British officials that they, as in Germany, recognized that Pan-Slavism did not represent a phenomenon limited solely to the Balkans. According to Saunders, “Although Galicia was far removed, geographically, from the changes which were taking place in the lands of the Porte [i.e., the Balkans], for some British commentators it belonged to the same spectrum of problems. Ottoman decline had always raised the prospect of an enlarged Russian sphere of influence, and if the tsarist regime were operating a forward policy in Galicia, it might also be doing so further south. As a link in the chain which extended from St. Petersburg to the Balkans,” Greek Catholic converts to the Russky Orthodox Church “were worth taking seriously.”¹⁰⁵⁸

Press coverage in the Americas, associated with the conversions in Austria-Hungary, divides into two categories: publications produced within migrant communities from Austria-Hungary, and those directed toward mainstream America. News of the Maramorosh Sighet trial and its background reached broader American audiences in a series of detailed reports, which appeared in the *New York Times* between 1913 and 1914. As American readers learned, “Great political interest has been aroused throughout Europe,” by the trial, “conceived on a large scale.” The proceedings were the result of the winter events of 1912-1913, “when relations with Russia were strained and Russian spies and emissaries swarmed in the [Dual] monarchy...Mistaking the Ruthenian movement for a dangerous political propaganda in favor of annexation by Russia, it had all the agitators preaching conversion to Orthodoxy

¹⁰⁵⁶ FO 371/1575 (not foliated), file 9807, quoted in Saunders, "Britain and the Ukrainian Question (1912-1920)," 57. FO 371/1298, fos. 172-6, quoted in *ibid.*, 56-57.

¹⁰⁵⁷ FO 371/1899, fo. 112 quoted in *ibid.*, 57.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Saunders, 48-49. I have elided Saunders’s use of the term “Ukrainians.”

arrested as Russian agents.” The *New York Times* reported further that Count Bobrinsky, identified as the “President of the Russian Constitutional Conservative Party in the Duma and leader of the Pan-Slavic movement in Russia,” had allegedly attempted to entice the peasantry from their allegiance to Austria-Hungary and draw them toward Russia, paid a certain Duliskovics (a government informant and the prosecution’s chief witness) the equivalent of \$1,000 “to induce a deputy of the lower house of the Hungarian Parliament to interpolate the Government on the position of the Ruthenians,” and averred that “Russia will not demobilize her army until the Russian flag floats over the Carpathian Mountains.”¹⁰⁵⁹

The various migrant presses, most notably the Russophile and pro-Orthodox *Svit*, the Rusynophile and pro-Greek Catholic *Amerikansky Russky Viestnik*, and the Rusky-Ukrainophile and pro-Greek Catholic *Svoboda*, generally reproduced the interpretations of their respective old world ideological media counterparts (it is possible to cluster *Svit* together with the Galician *Prykarpatska Rus*, *Halychanyn*, and *Lemko* and the Russian *Novoye Vremya*, for instance, while *Svoboda*’s interpretations corresponded with that of the Galician *Dilo*). These American publications, however, editorialized on the old world conversions with their American audience in mind. *Svit*, for example, argued that the virtuousness and tenaciousness of Russky Orthodox converts “persecuted” in Austria-Hungary ought to galvanize the American migrant community to a unified and Orthodox “American Rus,” conceptually unified with Galician, Subcarpathian, and, of course, Imperial Rus (the Russian Empire). Naturally, *Svoboda* wrote instead of “paid agitators” who deceived the “Ukrainian” people of Austria-Hungary at the behest of Russia—then portrayed those agitators as essential coequals with Rusynophile Greek Catholics from

¹⁰⁵⁹ “Hungarian Treason Trial: Dramatic Appearance of Count Bobrinsky at Marmoros Sziget,” *New York Times* February 22, 1914; “Defends Accused Slavs: Leader of Movement in Russia to Testify at Ruthenians’ Trial,” *New York Times* February 5, 1914; “94 Are Accused of High Treason: Hungarian Government Scared by Religious Propaganda of Ruthenians,” *New York Times* December 29, 1913; “Tells of Pan-Slav Boast: Witness Says Bobrinsky Predicted Victory Over Austria,” *New York Times* February 7, 1914. The *New York Times* had first introduced Bobrinsky to an American audience in 1909, when the paper ran a brief report on Bobrinsky’s charges that Germany was forcing Russia’s hand in the Balkans. “Resentment against Germany,” Bobrinsky had then been reported as saying, “is profound.” “How Germany Forced Russia: Notified Her Austria Would Invade Serbia, Bobrinsky Says.” The only evidence I have been able to find for American governmental cognizance of this kind of rhetoric occurs well after the fact, in the 1918 congressional investigation of “Brewing and Liquor Interests and German Propaganda,” in which “The Great Conspiracy” is cited in an extended bibliography of pro-German literature with the note, “This book charges Russia and Great Britain with a conspiracy to wage a war of conquest.” *Brewing and Liquor Interests and German Propaganda*, S. Res. 307, vol. 2, 1919, p. 1416.

Subcarpathia who had, in the Americas, run afoul of their Rusky-Ukrainophile coreligionists from Galicia.¹⁰⁶⁰

Both *Svit* and *Svoboda* also intervened directly in the East European conversions, by collecting competing subsidies from their migrant audiences. *Svit* economically aided the converts put on trial in Maramorosh Sighet and Lviv, and regularly ran requests for donations to Russophile societies dedicated to spreading the Rusky Orthodox idea in Galicia. The propaganda campaigns among the American migrant press thus influenced the East European conversions, and subsequently, the Great Powers' responses to them in two ways: first, by influencing migrants, many of whom returned to Austria-Hungary, either in the direction of Rusky Orthodox conversion or Greek Catholic loyalty, and secondly, by subsidizing the conversion and counter-movements across the Atlantic Ocean.

10.7 THE PERSISTING INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAS

The respective prosecutions in the 1913-14 treason trials presented multiple pieces of evidence to support the charge of high treason. Defendants had allegedly traveled back and forth to Russia: some on pilgrimages to monasteries; some to undertake seminary training in preparation for return to Austria-Hungary as Rusky Orthodox priest-missionaries; still others to meet with Pan-Slavic activists. Defendants had imported pamphlets, newspapers, and books from Russia or Bukovina. Purportedly, they had corresponded with Russia's statesmen to coordinate conversion efforts, as well as to provide tactical information about strategic military targets in Austria-Hungary. The prosecutors, together with Austro-Hungarian and German statesmen and propaganda campaigns, focused exclusively upon these "old world" transgressions and either missed—or conveniently forgot—transatlantic migration as the primary

¹⁰⁶⁰ See, for example, "Za propovid proty pravoslavyya," 3.

catalyst for the mass conversions. By extension, they also ignored the real source of major international tensions shortly before the war.¹⁰⁶¹

This study has demonstrated that, in the two-and-a-half decades before the 1913-1914 treason trials, labor migration between Austria-Hungary and the Americas formed a critical component in East European conversions and thus provided the trials' *raison d'être*. While Austro-Hungarian governmental representatives like Berchtold, Prime Ministers Sturgkh and Tisza, and Chief of Staff Conrad, and subsequently Austro-Hungarian and German presses, focused upon the 1911-12 arrival of missionaries from Russia in the escalation of conversions, it was in fact several years earlier that conversion movements had been suddenly invigorated through massive remigration, following the economic depression in North America after 1907. Together with the financial, institutional, and ideological assistance beginning to flow from Russia directly into Galicia and Subcarpathia, the formidable waves of migrants returning together could more effectively provide mutual support and resist political and religious pressures threatening to curtail mass movements. It was *this* state of affairs—a critical mass of returned, converted transatlantic migrants—which elicited the winter 1911-12 dispatch of missionaries from Russia and fostered actual conversion movements once the missionaries arrived.

The “American factor” did not decline in significance once the new missionary period began. To the contrary, in the two-and-a-half years immediately preceding the outbreak of war, key aspects of transatlantic labor migration—economic and cultural remittances of returning and corresponding migrants—continued to support conversions in Austria-Hungary, even as the role of “the American middleman” evolved in response to shifting European circumstances. An analysis of purported “old

¹⁰⁶¹ Austria-Hungary's government officials were clearly aware of the “American factor,” even if they may have minimized it altogether in the 1913-14 treason trials. The threat of Russky Orthodox conversion spreading from the Americas to Austria-Hungary had, of course, prompted the government's “American action” at the turn of the century. Furthermore, as in the earlier Iza trials of 1904-06, the prosecution at Maramorosh Sighet explicitly cited the public reading of Father Toth's *Where to Seek the Truth?* as evidence against the defendants (though it is unclear whether they identified this text at trial as emanating from the Americas). It is virtually certain that Austria-Hungary's government officials knew that transatlantic migration played a role—even if only historical—in the 1911-14 conversions, as it had in earlier movements. The fact that whatever they *did* know could not have helped their case—given the difficulty of proving that Russia had been indirectly promoting the alleged treasonous actions in Austria-Hungary via the Americas—likely accounts for the absence of the “American factor” in the prosecution's case.

country” sources of conversion—“Russian” missionaries, rubles, organizations, presses, and international correspondence—reveals their “new world” dimensions.

Opponents of Russky Orthodox conversions charged that clerics who missioned to Galicia, in fall and winter 1911-12, acted as paid agents in the service of Russia. These priests did, in fact, receive stipends from sources in Russia, but Father Maksym Sandovych of Galicia testified that, in addition to contributions from converts in the Lemko region and his wife’s dowry, he also accepted a daily stipend of ten crowns “from America,” for his work in Lemko region villages like Grab and Wyszowatka. In addition, Father Sandovych’s brother, Nikolai, testified that upon Maksym’s return from Russia, he loaned his sibling two hundred crowns for his marriage to a Russian citizen. It is entirely possible and even likely that Nikolai had the means to do so thanks to his temporary migrations for work in the United States. As Nikolai explained to the jury, he “could not say much about the matter” of Galicia’s conversion movements, because he had been in migration “in America” for some six years, “once for four years, and the second time for two.” What Nikolai did not mention was that he had also been instrumental in the subsidization of his brother’s missionary work, through his contacts in the United States. In a December 17, 1911 letter, confiscated by Grab’s Greek Catholic priest and forwarded to the bishop of Przemyśl, the remigrant Nikolai wrote from Galicia on behalf of Father Sandovych to solicit donations from the migrant Ioann Pahar, in Hartshorne, Oklahoma, to construct a new Orthodox church in Grab, where Pahar’s wife had begun attending Father Sandovych’s services.¹⁰⁶²

¹⁰⁶² Maksym Sandovych and Nikolai Sandovych, "Letter to Ioann Pahar," in *ABGK* (December 17, 1911), 281-82.



Мученики за ъбру Православную и Русь Святую. (Подсудимые сидят: С. Ю. Вендасевъ, священномученикъ о. Максимъ Т. Сандовичъ, святш. И. Гудима, В. Колдра).

Figure 10. Accused “agitators” for Orthodoxy on trial for treason in Lviv, Galicia. Numerous returned migrants testified at the trial. For his missionary efforts in converting Greek Catholics, Father Maksym Sandovych (second from left) received a subsidy of ten crowns per day “from America.”

The photo appeared in an American migrant publication, the *Russko-Amerikanskii Pravoslavnyi Kalendar'* (1915)

Father Alexei Kabaliuk, the key defendant in the Maramorosh Sighet trial, also received funds from Russia, directly from Count Bobrinsky. The count himself admitted at the Maramorosh Sighet trial that he had given Father Kabaliuk two hundred rubles—though not to promote Russky Orthodox Christianity in Subcarpathia; rather he had subsidized the priestmonk’s 1913 migration to the United States. A native of Subcarpathia, Father Kabaliuk had, after pilgrimages to monasteries in the Russian Empire (ca. 1905) and the Holy Land (1908), converted to Russky Orthodox Christianity on Mt. Athos in Greece (1909), returned to his Subcarpathian region of origin in 1910, completed seminary studies in Jableczna Monastery in the Russian Empire (1910-1911), and re-migrated to Subcarpathia in early 1912

to conduct missionary work. Arrested by Hungarian authorities, released, and facing arrest yet again, he fled in mid-1912 to Jableczna, where he met Count Bobrinsky, before traveling to Moscow in 1913. There, Archbishop Platon, the visiting bishop of the Russky Orthodox Church of North America, persuaded Father Kabaliuk to migrate to the United States, where he ministered to convert parishes, including one in Pittsburgh, and from which he exhorted his convert flock in Subcarpathia through correspondence.¹⁰⁶³ Receiving news of Hungary's raids, mass arrests, and pending trial of Subcarpathian peasant converts, the peripatetic priestmonk returned yet again to Hungary and presented himself to authorities. At trial, the accused Father Kabaliuk testified vividly that persisting transatlantic affective ties prompted his voluntary remigration: "I have traveled three parts of the earth, and I was in America, when I found out about the accusation and immediately hastened home, since love pulled me back to my native land. If the flock suffers, the place of the shepherd is among the suffering."¹⁰⁶⁴



Всеч. о. Алексій Кабальюкъ съ Секретарями Об-ва Взаимопомощи (въ бытность его въ Вилкесъ Барре, Па., 1912 года).

Figure 11. Hieromonk Alexei Kabaliuk of Subcarpathia, Russia, and Mt. Athos, during his 1912-13 sojourn in the United States. The leader of the Russky Orthodox conversion movements in the Subcarpathian region surrounding the villages of Iza and Velyki Luchky, in the spring of 1912, poses for a photograph in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania later in that same year, with officers of the U.S. Russky Orthodox Mutual Aid Society, which over ten years earlier donated \$600 for a Russky Orthodox Church in Becherov, Subcarpathia, thus unleashing Hungary's "American Action." (*Russko-Amerikansky Pravoslavny Kalendar*, 1921)

¹⁰⁶³ "Alexei Kabaliuk" in Magoesi and Pop, *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Grabets, *K istorii Maramoroshskago protsessa: dielo 94*.

Activist defendants in both trials continued to receive money and other support from the Americas even after their arrests. On June 28, 1913, Archbishop Platon published an appeal for contributions in *Svit*, the foremost Russky Orthodox newspaper in the Americas. He exhorted, “In Galicia and Hungary—two martyr states—...Russky people are now being martyred in Christian Austria for the sake of the Orthodox faith which they love so well.” He asked that readers “aid our suffering brothers who are enslaved in Austria,” and indicated that, in order to jumpstart a fund, he had donated \$100 of his own money. In a November 14, 1913 follow-up (about a month before the Maramorosh Sighet trial began), the archbishop expressed his displeasure that only \$400 had been collected—not nearly enough to counter “Austria’s endeavor to use all means at her command in extinguishing the bright light of Orthodox faith among the miserable children of holy Rus, living in foreign slavery,” especially since Father Kabaliuk, “whom we all know” had returned from the United States to face arrest in Subcarpathia. In Maramorosh Sighet, Archbishop Platon contended, the prison was “overcrowded with martyrs for the cause of our Orthodox faith,” whose “sad eyes are turned upon political and Orthodox Rus [i.e., the Russian Empire], in expectation that Thou, O God, wouldst send succor and comfort to these my beloved children in Christ.”

Conversion movements in Eastern Europe continued to influence movements in the Americas, reciprocally, even as war approached: the archbishop also used his November 1913 *Svit* appeal for donations to the cause in Austria-Hungary, for example, as an opportunity to solicit assistance for new measures in the continuing conversion efforts among migrants in the Americas. With the creation of the Society for the Propagation of the Orthodox Faith and its new bi-monthly journal, the archbishop summoned converted migrant communities in the Americas to

render effective service not only to our fellow-Russky people in Galicia and Hungary, who are suffering for the cause of our faith and from starvation, but also to our suffering fellow-countrymen in America. The Russky element in the United States is increased almost daily by immigrants from the old country. There can be no doubt that all of these are Orthodox at heart, though they mistakenly regard themselves as Greek Catholics. We shall, of course, assist them in becoming Orthodox.

He concluded by urging greater charity for the cause of conversion in both Austria-Hungary and the Americas and indicated that he had donated another \$100, himself. Thus, in a remarkable testament to the transnational dynamics of conversion, the archbishop advocated new assistance from the Americas to address recent East European developments; in turn, he used those developments to galvanize his migrant constituency to redouble their contributions to a venture that had supported the East European movements for years: proselytization among fellow, potentially returning, migrants.

By postcard, the exonerated defendants in the Lviv trial thanked the editor of *Svit*, and by extension, the migrant community in the Americas, for their economic and spiritual support.¹⁰⁶⁵ After the trials concluded, money continued to flow from the Americas. In April of 1914, F ather Kabaliuk, convicted at Maramorosh Sighet and in jail in Debrecen, Hungary, requested 300 dollars (1,430 crowns) from Archbishop Platon, who eagerly agreed and again exhorted *Svit*'s migrant readers to send donations and prayers to a fellow, persecuted Russky Orthodox in their region of migratory origin.¹⁰⁶⁶




Figure 12: Postcard sent by defendants in the Lviv trial (together with other Russophile-Orthodoxophile signatories), dated May 25, 1914, to editor of the U.S. publication *Svit*, which coordinated the American fund-raising efforts for the “martyrs for Holy Rus” in Austria-Hungary

¹⁰⁶⁵ *Svit* (June 25, 1914)

¹⁰⁶⁶ *Svit* (April 8, 1914).

The prosecutions in the Austro-Hungarian treason trials attributed great significance to the influx of pro-Rusky Orthodox literature funded by Russian sources like the Galician-Rusky Benevolent Society (such as *Halychanyn*, *Prykarpatska Rus*, and *Lemko* in Galicia), several presses in Austrian Bukovina (associated with the Gerovsky brothers), and pamphlets originating in Pochaiv monastery, Russia.¹⁰⁶⁷ Austro-Hungarian authorities confiscated many such publications and referenced them at trial. Organizations in the Americas, however, together with their publications, such as the Rusky Orthodox Mutual Aid Society (publisher of *Svit*) and the Society for the Propagation of the Orthodox Faith, actively fostered conversions in Eastern Europe, both before and during the Russian missionary period—not only by sponsoring collections and encouraging proselytization, but also through the dissemination of “American” publications throughout Austria-Hungary.¹⁰⁶⁸ Russophile-Orthodoxophile publications like *Svit*, *Pravda*, and *Postup* regularly arrived from the Americas to homes in both Subcarpathia and Galicia, as well as to Galician reading rooms. In the 1913-1914 Maramorosh Sighet trial, prosecutors singled out decidedly pro-Russian passages in *Where to Seek the Truth?*, which defendants had allegedly distributed and read in public since 1903. Of course, this “Russian propaganda” originated actually in the United States, where Father Alexis Toth had originally written and published the pamphlet.

Even the Russian-subsidized literature published in the old country carried influences from the Americas to potential converts in Austria-Hungary. In the April 13, 1912 edition of *Russkaya Pravda* (published in Bukovina and confiscated by the Greek Catholic priest in Grab), the article “From American Rus,” reported that Rusky Orthodox activists in the Americas had sent a resolution which “protested against all persecutions of Rusky people and the Orthodox faith in Austria” to the Ministry of Austria,

¹⁰⁶⁷ As a contemporary pro-German organization in the United States charged, “Both the ‘Orthodox missionary’ propaganda and the frankly political ‘Pan-Slav’ agitation of the two Bobrinski journals were but two air-shafts, by which the secret Russian political intrigue could ventilate its design. Beneath the surface of things there existed a much more serious machinery. A regular conspiracy for the overthrow of the Austro-Hungarian rule in Galicia and converting it into a Russian ‘Government,’ was actively at work.” (Szarski and DeWalsh, *The Great Conspiracy* 18.)

¹⁰⁶⁸ ROMAS had participated in the first substantial remitted subsidy from the Americas to Eastern Europe for Rusky Orthodox conversions, in the 1901 case of Becherov, Hungary.

the governor of Galicia, the Galician Duma, and a Galician Greek Catholic bishop.¹⁰⁶⁹ The article also mentioned the founding of the Society for the Propaganda of the Orthodox Faith and noted its dedication to “the strengthening and spread of Orthodoxy among Uniates in America, as well as the collection of aid for the Orthodox faith in Austria and Hungary.” Commending this goal, the Bukovinan publication nevertheless championed the formation of a new society, targeted even more specifically toward potential remigrants in the Americas:

For some years have many people from Hungarian Rus and from Western Galicia (the Lemko region) been going to America. From almost every village people go to work and afterward return home again. For those people it is necessary to form a brotherhood society. Those people are bringing “germinal Orthodoxy” to their village in the old country. It is true that already such has been happening, but [a new society] is finally necessary, in order that *each and every worker would return already from America to the old country as confirmed Orthodox Christians.*¹⁰⁷⁰

According to the article, the lack of conversion movements in certain regions of Subcarpathia experiencing mass migration was attributable to the fact that migrants simply had not yet returned to those regions: “There are villages in Hungarian Rus where there is no one to work the field, because all the people are in America—and there is no Orthodoxy!” Clearly, this 1912 Bukovinan newspaper—supported by funds from Russia, confiscated in a Galician village, and cited at the 1913-14 treason trials as evidence of a Russian-backed conspiracy—shared the perspective of the current study: that Russky Orthodox conversions in Austria-Hungary were inextricably linked to transatlantic migration, even during the Russian missionary period.

Prosecutors of Russky Orthodox converts and activists also attempted to impugn them by pointing to their correspondence with Russian statesmen, especially Count Bobrinsky, to coordinate the conversion efforts and share tactical information regarding strategic military targets in Austria-Hungary; yet far more influential in the East European conversions were other international correspondences:

¹⁰⁶⁹ In *ABGK*, syg. 437, 369. The “Galician Greek Catholic bishop” was Metropolitan Andrei (Sheptytsky).

¹⁰⁷⁰ In *ABGK*, syg. 437, 369. Emphasis in original.

letters, which converting migrants in the Americas sent to kin and friends in Austria-Hungary, even during the Russian missionary period.¹⁰⁷¹

The village of Grab laid at the center of the conversion movements in Galicia's Lemko region. It is therefore instructive to consider three letters from the United States confiscated by Grab's Greek Catholic priest in early-1912: that is, at the height of the missionary work conducted by Father Sandovych, recently returned from Russia.¹⁰⁷² On January 24, 1912, the migrant Simon Turchik of Yonkers, New York wrote on behalf of migrant converts in the Americas to Grab's inhabitants, to encourage Russky Orthodox conversion.¹⁰⁷³ As Turchick claimed, with "tears streaming" from their eyes had migrants in the Americas learned that "rascal papal Polish Jesuits," accompanied by the gendarmes' bayonets, prevented Grab's converts the right of religious assembly. Turchick enlisted consanguinity—saying that, "in our veins flows the same blood, and we are sons of our fathers and great grandfathers"—and common village, parish, and confessional identifications to affirm transatlantic mutuality between migrants and his "dear brothers and sisters in the village of Grab," many of whom had themselves remigrated from the Americas. Between those in "Galician Rus" and "American Rus," he perceived only unity, based upon their common referent in the one, ancient "Holy Rus." "We, who migrated here to America," wrote Turchik, "are of that same village and that same parish and that same Orthodox faith...Well you are *bogatyry*¹⁰⁷⁴ because you are children of one Rus." Turchik consistently wed nationality to religion, as he invoked heroic forefathers like Father Ioann Naumovych and the Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnytsky: defenders of "Holy Orthodoxy" and "Holy Rus."

¹⁰⁷¹ This chapter has already referenced some important examples of correspondence from the Americas: for example, between Father Kabaliuk in the United States and his flock remaining in Subcarpathia, between Father Kabaliuk in Austria-Hungary and the Russky Orthodox Archbishop of North America, and between the Sandovych brothers in Galicia and migrants in the Americas.

¹⁰⁷² While the local Greek Catholic priest had been aware of a pre-existing Russky Orthodox movement there before Father Maksym Sandovych's arrival in fall 1911, it was Father Sandovych's activities that escalated his surveillance of the movement, in conjunction with his bishop's requests. Father Kisielevsky's activities did not go unnoticed by Russky Orthodox adherents. Nikolai Sandovych complained in his testimony in the Lviv trial that the priest controlled the post. My thanks to Hanna Lassowsky for assistance translating these letters.

¹⁰⁷³ Turchik, "Letter to the residents of Grab, dated January 24, 1912," Syg. 437, 273-77.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Mythic heroes of ancient Rus.

Imploring Grab's residents to prevent the triumph of the cursed Poles and Ukrainians, who were "spitting on and dishonoring our history," Turchick exhorted,

We only ask you not to let your spirits sink. Do not be afraid if you have to go to prison. They will let you go and will not do anything to you, because we follow Jesus Christ and his instruction, and nothing can happen to the one who holds onto Christ and follows him and our Holy Orthodox church. And when it seems like the enemies are winning, either the cursed Ukrainians or the Polish dogs, cry out, you honest gentlemen, that you are *gentlemen*, and that you are the head of your community, because this is the Holy Land of your fathers and great grandfathers. So Brothers, try, and your names will be written in the golden book.

Practical steps he recommended included founding pro-Russky Orthodox reading rooms and contacting the North American Russky Orthodox archbishop to solicit economic aid from migrant communities for the construction of a church in Grab:

Believe me that, in a short time, we will gather donations; just cry out, and our American Rus will come to your aid. And soon in Grab you can shine as a star with the triple-bar Orthodox Cross. Just send a request to our *Vladyka* Platon... We will work enthusiastically for you...We are very interested in your intentions, that you would stand up fearlessly enough to your fight with the enemies of our people, so that not one Russky man [in the Americas] would regret to give a last cent to support the holy work.

Turchyk indicated that he, himself, had already sent "about 20 dollars" at the end of 1911 as a subsidy for Grab's reading room.

A month later, on February 24th, 1912, the labor migrant Andrew Watsman wrote from Miners Mills, Pennsylvania to his family in Grab.¹⁰⁷⁵ In the letter, Watsman interwove family concerns, weather reports, labor conditions, and attempts to influence his family's migration practices together with news of religious developments in the Americas and assertions of the value of Russky Orthodox conversion for those who now resided in Grab. In shaky script (a consequence of his "squished finger," which prevented him from working since the Christmas holidays), Watsman queried,

And [what is happening] in Grab? We received an Orthodox priest [in America] and I write to you so you would not deny the Orthodox faith, because [the Catholics] are converting you into Ukrainians and then, in a couple of years, into Poles.¹⁰⁷⁶ And you

¹⁰⁷⁵ ABGK 437, pp. 201-203a

¹⁰⁷⁶ In other words, first into Greek Catholics and then into Roman Catholics: this "slippery slope" argument was a favorite of Russky Orthodox activists. William Birkbeck reported strikingly similar language uttered by Grab's residents during his 1912 visit; he quoted one as saying, "We were always Russians and Orthodox, and so were our

will then realize for yourself about your Russky faith— this will happen soon, because you know that already Poles are now removing crosses from Russky churches and replacing them with Polish ones in Galicia.¹⁰⁷⁷ And I ask you not to be angry with me, because I am writing quickly, I am writing truth. And I am asking that you write me about which men have joined the Orthodox faith, and which joined with their wives, and which are not joining. And I am asking you to write to me about who went out from America and who came to America and I am asking you to send Yoseph to the doctor so that he would not go to America now, because there will be a *shtraykh* and for what reason [would Yoseph come], in order to go on *shtraykh*.¹⁰⁷⁸

This concluding passage is telling: thanks to Watsman’s stream-of-consciousness prose, one would have to cut him off in mid-thought to sever the clear tie between labor migration and transnational Russky Orthodox conversions, still prevailing in the Russian missionary period.



Figure 13: Confiscated pro-Russky Orthodox letter from the labor migrant, Andrew Watsman, in Miners Mills, Pennsylvania to John Watsman in Grab, Galicia (dated February 4, 1912)

fathers and forefathers before us; we know now that Ukrainism is a bridge to make Poles of us, and that the Unia is a trap to turn us into Papists (*Katoliki*): we have left the Unia forever, and they may fine us and rob us of our cattle, or even hang us and cut us up, but we will never go back to it.” (Birkbeck, "Religious Persecution in Galicia (Austrian Poland.)," 12.)

¹⁰⁷⁷ Replacing triple-bar Orthodox crosses with single-bar Catholic ones.

¹⁰⁷⁸ “Strike.” Migrants frequently peppered their speech to non-migrants with English words, often without defining them. It is probable that by the time of Watsman’s letter, transatlantic migration had been underway for long enough for English words—like *shtraykh*, *mayn* (“mine”) and *bahs* (“boss”)—to have become a part of non-migrant vocabularies.

As a final example, a third letter from the same time period poignantly demonstrates how the idiosyncrasies of a particular labor migrant's experience could shape the spread of the Russky Orthodox idea to Austria-Hungary, even during the Russian missionary period. On February 20th, 1912, the migrant miner Yoseph Vanyga wrote from Ansonia, Connecticut to his widowed sister-in-law in Grab.¹⁰⁷⁹ In the first part of his correspondence, Vanyga reported the details of his brother's death in a mine accident: "But as to how brother was covered with dirt, there were four covered only shallowly, but not brother Andrei." He expressed concern about sentiments articulated by his brother's widow in a previous letter, that she lived "in misery" in Grab, while Vanyga knew "only luxury" in America. He refuted her misconception,¹⁰⁸⁰ by arguing that his standard of living in migration remained modest, and furthermore, that as one of the men "covered only shallowly" in the mine collapse, he continued to suffer from survivor's guilt, as it were.¹⁰⁸¹ Whether out of this guilt or a more basic sense of familial responsibility, Vanyga had been dutifully attending to his brothers affairs. Having settled the matter of Andrei's debts and promising to send money to his sister-in-law for shoes, Vanyga turned his attention to the souls of Andrei's widow and "orphans," and in so doing attested to persisting influence of the Americas during the Russian missionary period: "Please write," he asked, "how is the Orthodox Church there, how many people go to the Orthodox Church, and who is going with their wives. And if you are not going yourself, send your children to the Orthodox Church. Do not listen to anyone who tells you not to go, because that church is our native mother. Please write who are known [for going to the Orthodox Church] and who is protesting the most against the Orthodox Church. The people who are going to the Orthodox Church will live forever with the Lord."

¹⁰⁷⁹ *ABGK*, syg. 437, 278-279.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Non-Migrants frequently displayed this misconception, not least of all due to the exaggerated stories of success circulated by corresponding and returning migrants.

¹⁰⁸¹ Vanyga did not use this specific term. "Survivor's guilt" is today classified as a symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder.

At the 1914 treason trial in Lviv, a prosecutor questioned the villager Teodor Szewchuk regarding a slide show of illuminated images, which Vasyl Koldra, a student activist and one of the defendants, had displayed in the Galician village of Zdynia. When the prosecutor asked what the witness thought personally of the images, which Koldra had projected on a wall, he hoped to elicit testimony of their politically insurrectional character. Szewchuk, however, thought for a moment before responding, “I myself thought that Koldra did not show those images well. It would have been better on a bed sheet. This is how they are shown in New York, where I saw many such presentations.” The court erupted in laughter.¹⁰⁸² Whether he had completely misunderstood the intent behind the question or comprehended all too well and deftly sidestepped it, Szewchuk’s *non sequitur* illustrates the fact that returned migrants from the Americas participated personally in the Galician and Subcarpathian treason trials. Moreover, their substantial participation confirms that the most important factor in transnational-izing the conversions before 1911—return and cyclical migrants—continued to operate forcefully during the Russian missionary period which so inflamed international tensions.

The mass constituency of the conversion movements, Austro-Hungarian peasants, made their presence known in the two treason trials. In Maramorosh Sighet, dozens of them sat on the judgment bench, themselves accused of treason. In Lviv, hundreds of peasants were called upon either to defend or impugn the actions of the four activist defendants. In both trials, peasant witnesses testified regarding the influence of the Americas in the Galician or Subcarpathian conversions. At the Lviv trial, at least fifteen witnesses, and likely more, had in recent years returned from laboring in the Americas. The relative dearth of testimony from actual returned migrants at Maramorosh Sighet, far from revealing the Americas as an insignificant factor there, stemmed rather from the fact that converts had remigrated to the Americas to evade the proceedings. As the prosecutor complained, “Nineteen of the defendants...escaped the court, and still ‘have not been found.’ They could not wait for the trial and went to work in America.”¹⁰⁸³

¹⁰⁸² *Przegląd Prawosławny*.

¹⁰⁸³ Grabets, *K istorii Maramoroshskago protsessa: dielo 94*.

At the Lviv trial, Pantelejmon Stach, a villager from Grab, stated that Father Maksym Sandovych had arrived to his village only after Stach had returned “from America.” Had Stach converted “under the influence of Father Sandovych?” “No,” he explained, “I already went to the Orthodox Church in America. I returned to Grab and here I went to several divine services conducted by Reverend Sandovych. Sandovych never proselytized Orthodoxy, and neither did he conduct agitation for Russia. He always prayed for Emperor Franz Joseph.”¹⁰⁸⁴

The defendants’ and peasant witnesses’ testimony at Lviv confirms that Father Sandovych had arrived in Grab in the fall of 1911 in response to an appeal from a segment of that village, which had already made a decision to establish a Russky Orthodox parish. Prior to Father Sandovych’s arrival, at least five factors had informed that decision: (a) pre-existing orientations toward Russky Orthodox Christianity in the region; (b) the promotion of those same orientations by transatlantic labor migration; (c) hostilities for various reasons directed toward Greek Catholic priests; (d) the unresponsiveness of Austro-Hungarian governmental and Greek Catholic religious authorities to parishioner grievances; and (e) disdain for ritual innovations. As the defendant Koldra explained to the court, “Among conservative Lemkos, until now lives an old tradition of Orthodoxy, which is invigorated by massive emigration to America, where men encounter Orthodoxy. Russky priests tried to put this tradition to sleep in the Lemko region.¹⁰⁸⁵ Unfortunately, from eastern Galicia came Ukrainian priests, and they began to struggle with Orthodoxy by nefarious means. It irritated people and provoked a reaction.” The conflicts between Greek Catholic priests and their parishioners in the Lemko region resulted from clerical “provocative misdeeds” and adopted a national form; as Koldra explained, “There were cases in which such priests would not admit Lemkos to church, saying that “we do not admit Russkys.” In other instances, economic conflicts colored these national ones, as in the case of a priest who “took money from the post, which came from America for Lemkos, and claimed it for himself. He received as a consequence the loud

¹⁰⁸⁴ *Przegląd Prawosławny*.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Here, it is likely that that Koldra meant to refer to the essential “Russky-ness” of these priests, rather than their conscious identification as such: in other words, these priests tried to “put Orthodoxy to sleep” because they were, themselves, “sleeping” Russky people.

protests of the farmers.”¹⁰⁸⁶ The local Austro-Hungarian government authorities and Greek Catholic hierarchy, by refusing to remove these priests, did their part to ensure that such tensions would persist.

In Grab, the Greek Catholic priest Father Kisielewsky had committed the offenses of identifying as a Ukrainian, introducing liturgical changes, and swindling the people of 12,000 crowns. When the local prefect delayed Father Kisielewsky’s removal, the people finally acted upon their pre-existing inclinations toward Orthodoxy. Defending Father Sandovych, Orthodox witnesses from Grab Iwan Rudanyecz, Michael Kotyrka, Michael Walko, Jan Lyzak, Joseph Lyzak, and Gregorz Frycko all stated that already in America they went to the Orthodox Church, “because there it is not necessary to pay.” But in Grab, they converted formally to Orthodoxy, “compelled by the conduct of Father Kisielewsky who ‘murdered’ them.” Grab resident Iwan Uram also stated that he was already Orthodox while in migration in America, but that he converted to Orthodoxy because of the activity of Father Kisielewsky. “If I went to Father Sandovych,” Uram continued, “then in his sermons he spoke only about what is in the Gospel. And at the time of the Divine Liturgy he prayed for Emperor Franz and his army.” When he was asked whether anyone had paid him for Orthodoxy, he responded, “They often speak to us about rubles, but I never saw one ruble with my own eyes.”¹⁰⁸⁷

In their attempt to negate Russian influence in the conversions, lawyers for the accused in both treason trials featured the role of “America” as a key component in their arguments. In Maramorosh Sighet, one lawyer refuted the political basis and Russian origin of the conversions by citing the global economic underpinnings of transatlantic labor migration: the cause was “the poverty of the population, compelling them to emigrate to America, where Uhro-Rusyns come into contact with the Orthodox and realize that against their will were they torn from the faith of their ancestors. Returning [to Subcarpathia], they are trying to return legally to Orthodoxy, but the local authorities and clergy are setting up obstacles.

¹⁰⁸⁶ *Przegląd Prawosławny*.

¹⁰⁸⁷ *Ibid.* Birkbeck also mentioned having spoken to many converted remigrants from both the United States and Canada during his 1912 visit to Grab and other Lemko region and Galician villages.

The law on freedom of religion exists only on paper.”¹⁰⁸⁸ In Lviv, the defense lawyer argued that his clients bore no responsibility for the conversions, and blamed, rather, the interaction of transatlantic labor migration and relations with Rusky-Ukrainophile Greek Catholic priests: “As proven from this trial, Orthodoxy spreads in the Lemko region automatically, without the contribution of Bobrinsky, and then through the massive exodus of Lemkos to America and the consequence of a lack of tact from the side of the Ukrainian clergy.”¹⁰⁸⁹

The residents of the village of Grab reached a breaking point after national, ritual, and economic antagonisms toward the unscrupulous Rusky-Ukrainophile priest unleashed the potential for conversion, latent among migrants, who had flirted with or formally converted to Orthodoxy in the Americas, and their fellow non-migrant villagers, whose inclinations toward Orthodoxy were aided by migrant influence. Clearly in the case of Grab, both transatlantic labor migration and the local dynamics of a clergy-parish relationship were at play, but if the offending priest, Father Kisielewsky, could have illuminated which issue had been more influential, he did not do so at the 1914 Lviv trial: like many of his parishioners, he had migrated—or more accurately, fled—to the Americas.¹⁰⁹⁰

10.8 LITTLE PEOPLE, GREAT WAR

It is a well-known and often-repeated vignette from American lore, that on December 2, 1862, upon meeting the abolitionist and novelist Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, President Abraham Lincoln reportedly exclaimed, “So you're the little woman who wrote the book that made this great war!” Of course, the great war in question was that waged between Confederates and Yankees, not

¹⁰⁸⁸ Grabets, *K istorii Maramoroshskago protsessa: dielo 94*.

¹⁰⁸⁹ *Przegląd Prawosławny*.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*, 246.223. From the United States, Father Kisielwesky repaid his debts to the villagers in Grab, an especially idiosyncratic form of economic remissions to a region of migratory origin.

between the Allies and the Central Powers. And as it turns out, the salutation attributed to President Lincoln is apocryphal—he very likely never uttered those words. The earliest source of Lincoln’s quotation is a biography written and published in 1911 by Harriet Beecher Stowe’s descendants: her son Charles Edward and grandson Lyman Beecher.¹⁰⁹¹ As Daniel Vollaro has argued, Harriet Beecher Stowe’s son and grandson likely felt compelled to “situate Harriet's abolitionism within Lincoln's,” the sixteenth American president having become by 1911 a "transcendental signifier in American culture and history." Furthermore, “The long-term durability of Lincoln's greeting as an anecdote in literary studies and Stowe scholarship can perhaps be explained in part by the desire among many contemporary intellectuals to make literature a lever of social or political change.”¹⁰⁹²

Nine years after Lyman Beecher Stowe coauthored with his father the biography of his grandmother, Harriet Beecher Stowe, he would collaborate with a former Austro-Hungarian statesman, Joseph Goricar, to produce the volume, *The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue or How the World War Was Brought About*, which attributed partial causation of World War I to Austro-Hungarian and German propaganda, surrounding the two “monster” treason trials of Russky Orthodox converts in Maramorosh Sighet and Lviv. As that 1920 text contended,

During both trials a constant agitation was kept up in the Austrian and Hungarian press against Russia. The papers constantly referred to the “sinister” influence of Russia. In Austria-Hungary they spoke of the “rolling ruble” that finds its way into the pockets of Austro-Hungarian citizens for the purpose of agitation, etc. While this new movement against Russia was raging in Austria-Hungary, it was thought necessary, by the German Foreign Office, to open an anti-Russian agitation simultaneously in Germany, and what was said there in the very days when the political trials in Austria-Hungary were coming to a close was little short of an unofficial declaration of war against Russia. The campaign was opened by the *Kolnische Zeitung* on the eve of the day on which the verdict in the Marmaros-Sziget [*sic.*] trial was expected.¹⁰⁹³

It was, in fact, this passage which first alerted me to the possibility of the treason trials’ significance in the origins of World War I. However, if, with dubious factual support, a 1911 text bearing Lyman Beecher

¹⁰⁹¹ Daniel R. Vollaro, "Lincoln, Stowe, and the 'Little Woman/Great War' Story: The Making, and Breaking, of a Great American Anecdote," *Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association* 30, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 33.

¹⁰⁹² *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁰⁹³ Goricar and Stowe, *The Inside Story of Austro-German Intrigue or How the World War was Brought About*, 197.

Stowe's name attributed a significant causal role to one "little woman's" piece of literature in the great war of 1861-1865, could a 1920 text—and an obviously tendentious one, at that—also co-authored by Stowe have gone too far in positing ethnoreligious conversion movements as a catalyst for the Great War of 1914-1918?¹⁰⁹⁴ Further, has the current study overstepped in its suggestion that, because those East European conversion movements depended largely upon transatlantic migration, everyday migrant laborers and farmers—"little people"—in the Americas predicated imperial Great Power conflicts underlying the Great War?

What is clear is that global labor dynamics led to mass migration of Greek Catholics from Austria-Hungary to the Americas beginning in the 1870s. At the same time that national, racial, and religious barriers to social integration in regions of migratory destination helped transnationalize migrants already predisposed to remigration, a host of factors promoted conversions of migrants from Greek Catholicism to Russky Orthodox Christianity: pre-existing Old World orientations, ethnoreligious tensions in new world Catholicism, Russia and Austria-Hungary's imperial and religio-national battle for migrant souls in the Americas, and the idiosyncrasies of communal and individual circumstances. Consequently, as early as the last decade of the nineteenth century, returning migrants began spreading Russky Orthodox movements within Austria-Hungary. The multi-continental movements then continued to influence one another reciprocally across international borders and the Atlantic Ocean, even as Russia began more directly promoting conversions within Austria-Hungary after the fall of 1911. As one Galician Greek Catholic priest stated quite plainly near the beginning of the Russian missionary period, in a report to his bishop, "The source of schism in the Lemko region is America."¹⁰⁹⁵ The same could be said for Subcarpathia and Eastern Galicia.

To ignore the American factor in these conversions would mean succumbing to the same blind-spot from which the respective prosecutions in the Maramorosh Sighet and Lviv treason trials suffered—

¹⁰⁹⁴ One scholar has referred to this tract, with some justification, as "worthless Pan-Slav propaganda." (See: Paul W. Schroeder, "American Books on Austria-Hungary," *Austrian History Yearbook* 2(1966): 173.) Despite the text's blatant prejudice, however, it has proven to be of great worth in stimulating my own thinking.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Zhuk, "Letter to Bp. Konstantyn," 126.

not to mention the representatives of the belligerent Great Powers who employed the trials as political footballs. Neither prosecution directly engaged defense arguments that transatlantic labor migration catalyzed the Austro-Hungarian conversion movements, but the prosecutions might be forgiven this oversight. They could have pointed out that for years Russia had been energetically promoting Russky Orthodox conversion in the Americas too, with the intention of indirectly spreading conversions to Austria-Hungary via return migration; however, the sheer logistics of proving so convoluted an argument—not least of all due to difficulties in gaining access to and assimilating countless documents in multiple languages in Austrian, Hungarian, Russian, United States, Canadian, Brazilian, and Argentinean state and church archives—would have been daunting and, frankly, untenable at the time.¹⁰⁹⁶

Still, some Austro-Hungarian diplomats clearly attributed significance to the American factor in the East European conversions—and in pre-war causation. *Austria-Hungary and the War*, published shortly after the war began by the Austro-Hungarian consul in Cleveland, Ohio (USA), considered Russia's activities in Galicia, Subcarpathia, and Hungary—especially its promotion of Russky Orthodox conversions—a major component of its preparations for war and territorial acquisition. Further, the book claimed that, “As in the case of Galicia and Bukovina, so in Hungary's case a considerable part of the Russian propaganda against Hungarian Ruthenians was carried on by way of America.” It went on to explain that the work of the Russian Orthodox Church in America, in service of the Russian government had won converts, and “these renegades were used as go-betweens by the Russians to persuade their friends and relatives in Hungary to follow suit.” The passage concluded with an argument which will, by now, be familiar: “Little do the people of the United States know that their country has thus unwillingly and unconsciously also supplemented a few sparks which helped to ignite the firebrand of Europe's war.”¹⁰⁹⁷

¹⁰⁹⁶ It has hardly been an easy task today!

¹⁰⁹⁷ He added, “The Russian bear has been rampaging here [in America] on the wayside, as he does all over the rest of the globe.” (p. 159).

Whether statesmen and propagandists who mutually antagonized one another over the issue of the conversions in Austria-Hungary might be forgiven their neglect of the American factor, on the other hand, likely depends upon which Great Power(s) one wishes to blame for the war. To be fair, the events of the war itself suggest that the fears, which statesmen and propagandists on either side of the conversion issue expressed toward each other, were not entirely irrational. Without arguing teleologically that post-July 1914 events conclusively prove the state of pre-war tensions, as characterized in this chapter, it would be unwise to ignore the manner in which developments in Galicia and Subcarpathia, beginning July 29th—the day of Russian mobilization, following Austria-Hungary’s invasion of Serbia on the 28th—represent escalations and practical implementations of pre-war hostilities surrounding Russky Orthodox conversions.

Russia found confirmation of its pre-war accusations of Austro-Hungarian religio-national oppression of the Dual Monarchy’s purportedly Russian and Orthodox citizenry in the harsh, occupation-like measures, which Austria-Hungary adopted toward Russophiles between July 29th and October 2nd, the date marking Russia’s invasion of Galicia. The closing of Russophile and Pan-Slavic institutions, the cataloguing, surveillance, and arrests of known Russophiles, and the atrocities committed against suspected Russophiles at the Talerhof internment camp (including the summary execution of Father Maksym Sandovych, one of the key defendants in the Lviv trial) did not occur because Austria-Hungary just suddenly, with the outbreak of war, considered them enemy threats—they had been regarded as such in the preceding months and years.¹⁰⁹⁸

Similarly, it would be extremely difficult to argue that pre-war Austro-Hungarian and German statesmen and presses exaggerated the possibility that Pan-Slavic/Pan-Russianist goals of annexing Galicia and Subcarpathia might capture the government of Russia (or had already done so), especially

¹⁰⁹⁸ Representatives of the Eastern rite on either side of the Russky Orthodox conversions were in fact subject to such harsh treatment. Whether they called themselves “Rusky” or “Russky,” Austro-Hungarian military officials mistook Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox religionists alike for Russians, and treated them accordingly. For treatments of these war-time occupation policies in Galicia, see: Von Hagen, *War in a European Borderland: Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914-1918*; A. Iu. Bakhturina, *Politika rossiiskoi Imperii v Vostochnoi Galiitsii v gody Pervoi mirovoi voiny* (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 2000).

given that “reuniting” “the Russian people from Carpathians to Kamchatka” became “a consensus shared by imperial bureaucrats in the foreign, defense, and interior ministries, but also with liberal and conservative nationalists in the Duma and the press,” at the very outset of war.¹⁰⁹⁹ It would be even more difficult when considering that Russia literally invaded and annexed Galicia on October 2nd and subsequently occupied a small part of Subcarpathia. Not only did the irredentist aims purportedly espoused by Count V.A. Bobrinsky and his Pan-Slavic and Russophile cohorts come to pass in Galicia, he and his cousin, Governor-General Count Georgy Bobrinsky directly administered their implementation for the benefit of “our liberated Russian brothers” (not to mention the detriment of those suspected of anti-Russian sympathies). Whereas Orthodoxy had been enlisted to pave the way for political Russophilism before the war, Russia’s annexation of Galicia now facilitated further Orthodox conversions during the period of occupation.

In his popular history of World War I, Martin Gilbert described preconditions for the “Prelude to War” in the following way:

Nations felt aggrieved, unsatisfied, endangered, or confident. Newspapers stimulated the sense of danger and deprivation. Governments beat the drums of racism, patriotism and military prowess. While the deserts and swamps of distant continents seemed to offer prospects of expansion, the competition of rival powers made even a railway across a desert seem a provocation. No single rivalry or disputed place or region caused the war: yet all rivalries and disputes combined to create and whip up the moods and opportunities that made war first thinkable, then possible, and finally desirable.¹¹⁰⁰

It is only in a sense of cumulative causation that the Great War began in Sarajevo when on June 28, 1914, Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand. It is in this cumulative sense that the Great War started on the battlefields of the First Balkan War of 1912-1913. The Great War commenced in meeting rooms where European diplomats signed multiple alliances pitting empires together against one another.

This study has argued that Russky Orthodox conversions in Austria-Hungary, which depended heavily upon mass labor migration between Austria-Hungary and the Americas, produced one pre-war

¹⁰⁹⁹ Hagen, *War in a European Borderland*, 34.

¹¹⁰⁰ Gilbert, "Prelude to War," 9-10.

Great Power rivalry—and one more substantial than many others. It is in the cumulative sense, then, that the Great War also began at a monastery in Pochaiv, during an August 3, 1911 meeting of some of the Russian Empire’s clergymen and statesman. The war originated in the houses and fields of Greek Catholic villagers in Galicia and Subcarpathia, when they “returned” to their “ancestral Russky faith.” And yes, the Great War began in the railroad yards and the saw and flour mills of Minnesota, in the anthracite coal fields of Pennsylvania, in the plains and cities of Canada, and in the sugar cane and rice fields of Brazil and Argentina.

11.0 CONCLUSION

This study has argued that the everyday ethnoreligious decisions and behaviors of laboring migrants in the Americas had a profound effect upon international relations and the origins of World War I. Toward that aim, it has appealed to theories of transnational migration, race/ethnicity/nationhood, and religious conversion. While this study has benefited from previous insights issuing from within those disciplines, its findings represent contributions and challenges, as well.

“Transnational Conversions” represents a call for “conversions” also within transnationalism studies. Greek Catholic and converting Russky Orthodox migrants engaged in transnational migration in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, with dramatic historical impacts. Referencing an outdated conception of “uprooted” and “once-and-for-all” emigration/immigration, the vanguard wave of theorists of transnationalism argued that transnationalism represented a novel phenomenon—not just a novel category—which emerged among post-1965 migration waves to the United States. The current study represents a contribution to the few existing studies of “old transnationalism,” by redressing the misconception that transnationalism represents a recent phenomenon. Migrant transnationalism, the tendency of migrants to retain multi-stranded ties between regions of origin and destination, dated at least as far back as the late-nineteenth century and the era of mass industrial transatlantic migration. It is critical for scholars of transnationalism, particular scholars of the contemporary iterations of that phenomenon, to integrate these historical findings into the general toolkit of the discipline, rather than relegating them to the periphery.

Doing so will augment critiques of the focus upon the “nation-state” as the unit of analysis, which has prevailed in studies of *transnationalism*. Without necessarily calling for a rechristening of the

discipline, this analysis of transnationalism in an age of empires supports existing calls for the employment of more accurate concepts like translocalism, transregionalism, or transculturalism. The consideration of transnationalism in this earlier era also holds potential insights for a key question in studies of contemporary migrants: the relationship between transnationalism and assimilation/acculturation/integration. While a study of assimilation lies beyond the scope of the current study, the debate over whether transnationalism is antithetical to—or an integral part of—acculturation can benefit greatly from longitudinal studies which take transatlantic migration in the late-nineteenth century as their starting point.

In addition, while bi-polar studies of transnationalism (i.e., those which focus on two regions only) still have their place, multi-regional approaches are more appropriate for some phenomena. My personal history with this research bears this out. In conceiving this project, I had hoped initially to focus solely on transnationalism between two regions: Galicia and the United States. I found very quickly, however, that because the conversion and counter-conversion movements in multiple regions mutually influenced one another, any story I attempted to tell would not only be incomplete, but also skewed without the incorporation of the Canadian, Argentine, Brazilian, Argentine, Subcarpathian, Bukovinian, Russian, and even English and Serbian contexts.

This study has also provided a contribution to the study of transnational religion. It builds upon the work of scholars who have argued that religion, as an integral form of identification among many migrants, deserves due consideration in a discipline which purports to analyze the forms of identification which arise through transnational migration. Not only did transnational migration influence the ethnoreligious practices of migrants and non-migrants, those practices shaped the contours of transnationalism. As this study has shown, some migrants established and maintained ties between regions of migratory origin and destination largely for ethnoreligious purposes. In the case of these migrants, the most socially significant forms of social and economic remittances were those dedicated to promoting or countering Russky Orthodox conversion movements.

The way in which those “conversions” actually unfolded also challenges traditional notions of conversion, both in general and in the context of “exclusivist” religious forms: not just Christianity, but Orthodox and Catholic Christianity. Many of the transnational migrants who form the subject of this study—who retained ties between the *regions* where they had been, where they were now, and where they would be—also perceived continuities between the *religions* which they had practiced, which they were now practicing, and which they would practice in the future. That those religious shifts/continuities frequently occurred concurrently with migratory shifts/continuities suggests fruitful opportunities for research on relationships between migration and conversion.

Lastly, this study demonstrates that transnationalism mattered and *matters*, not only to scholars of transnationalism and migration studies, and not only to historians. There are few claims to significance which can match the notion set forth in this study that migrant transnationalism contributed to the origins of a world war. Transnational migration studies has emerged as an interdisciplinary field, comprised of practitioners of anthropology, sociology, history, and cultural studies; yet it remains primarily the provenance of the specialists who practice it. “Transnational Conversions” makes a forceful argument for the global significance of the discipline, and the incorporation of its insights into broader academic discourse.

This study also contributes also to the study of race, ethnicity, and nationhood, insofar its integration of those discourses in multiple regions calls into question many of the presuppositions latent among scholars who appeal to those categories. If race, ethnicity, and nationhood constitute perspectives *on* the world, rather than things *in* the world, such perspectives varied in the multiple regions in which migrants encountered them. While the North American context may have taught Greek Catholic and converting Russky Orthodox migrants lessons in their un-assimilable “non-whiteness,” states in South America appealed conversely to the “whitening” potential of such migrants. Migrants who returned from these regions as Russky Orthodox converts to their regions of migratory origin found themselves embroiled in very different discourses regarding their essential “Russian,” “Russky,” “Rusyn,” “Ukrainian,” or “Hungarian” character. Many had also transplanted those ethnonational discourses before

their departure to the Americas, where they underwent modifications, for remittance yet again to the old country.

Perhaps the most important contribution which this study makes to the study of race, ethnicity, and nationhood is its categorical refusal to employ ethnonyms to refer to people for whom, at least according to the social sciences methodologies available, such identifications are indeterminable. Awkward constructions notwithstanding—"people who identified as Poles," "partisans of the Ukrainian national cause," etc.—an appreciation for indeterminacy is critical for a study of these people, and for the study of other, supposed "peoples." I have not argued that these migrants were *not* essentially "Ukrainians," "Russians," "Rusyns," or some other essential ethnicity/nationality/race, but I have certainly proceeded methodologically as if they were not. This study has demonstrated that, given the complexities, the conditioned-ness, and the malleability of these identifications, this was the only choice. That insight lends a great deal of support to Jeremy King's arguments against "ethnicism," and suggests that other historians would do well to consider whether terms like "Ukrainians," "Russians," "Rusyns," "Poles," "Jews," "Germans," "French," "Chinese," etc., obscure more than they illuminate.

"Transnational Conversions" also represents a contribution to religious studies, in at least five respects: it (a) calls for more substantial integration of the insights of transnationalism studies into studies of religion; (b) advances the fields of Eastern Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Roman Catholic history; (c) challenges prevailing notions of religious conversion; (d) emphasizes the interrelationship of religion and race/ethnicity/nationhood; and (e) posits the world-historical significance of everyday religion.

I have dealt above with the first point about transnational religion. On the second point, as a study in religious history, it contributes to the study of Eastern Orthodox, as well as Greek Catholic and, more broadly, Roman Catholic Christianity. The study of Greek Catholicism, in particular, necessarily entails the consideration of eastern and western Christianity together. This is a contribution to that project: I have attempted to address not only the Russky Orthodox conversion movements, but also the Greek Catholic counter-responses, including internal reforms, prompted by those movements. More significantly, histories of these religious traditions must adopt a more transnational perspective. This

study has demonstrated, for example, that a study of Orthodox and Catholic Christianity in the United States is stunningly deficient without reference to Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism in Austria-Hungary; perhaps more surprisingly, the reverse is also true. More narrowly, this study represents an advance in the study of these particular conversion movements, especially in its integration of all of the relevant, mutually influential regions.

That these “converts” overwhelmingly did not perceive themselves as such provides an important challenge to prevailing theories of conversion, also. Neither the dramatic, once and for all, conception of conversion nor processual approaches, increasingly favored by theorists of conversion, adequately describes the overwhelming majority of the conversions this study has analyzed. “Converts” understood themselves, rather, as “returning,” to what they “always were”—that is, if they perceived any change at all. Identifications as “Orthodox”—for those who had identified themselves as such before converting—and as “Greek Catholic”—for others who had previously understood themselves as such—continued to coexist alongside, or simply supersede, potential new forms of identification. Yet another important point that this study makes is that these were not merely religious, but ethnoreligious conversions—something I have attempted to convey by always using the phrase “Russky Orthodox conversion,” rather than merely “Orthodox conversion.” For many, the conversions were not only—or, for some, even primarily—religious. I have also attempted to integrate psychological approaches to conversion within an analysis of the conversions as a mass movement. As mass conversions, they not only unfolded in large numbers, they produced structural changes in the ethnoreligious communities in which they occurred. Finally, as with transnationalism studies, one of the major contributions of this study is the argument that religion—everyday religion, for that matter—held great significance in the origins of world war.

As for that argument—the boldest in this study—the idea that religious conversions among transatlantic labor migrants in the Americas became a causal factor for the Great War represents an advance in the study of World War I origins, as part of the “cultural turn” in World War I history since the 1970s. The argument for the role of transatlantic labor migration in war origins is itself, entirely novel, and together with the emphasis upon ethnoreligious conversion, it is worth taking seriously, given

the major import for international relations, attributed to these issues by key decision-makers and war makers in the months and weeks preceding the July Crisis of 1914. I have not argued that the conversion of a laboring migrant in Minneapolis, or in Wilkes-Barre, Wostok, Tres Capones, or Sao Paulo *caused* World War I, in the sense that they alone caused the war—this is nonsense. Of course the Balkan crisis provided a causal factor in the war. Of course the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand did also. But so too did converting migrants in the Americas: if they were not the primary cause, the degree of international hostilities they generated suggests they nevertheless represented a major one.

As noted earlier in this study, Father Alexis Toronsky in 1894 advised the audience of the Galician periodical he edited, *Dushpastyr*, that Father Gregory Hrushka, the editor of *Svoboda*, published in the United States, had been promoting the idea that Greek Catholicism and Russky Orthodox Christianity were one and the same. Father Toronsky cautioned,

And still for us here in the “Old Country” such a precept, widespread in America, can be dangerous, because many return from America to their familial place, and some of them remain for good, and others go again to America. When such an American, imbued with a spirit of indifferentism will return, and begins to spread it among our people, it will create much misery, because our people have some inclination to indifferentism. They do not want to be without faith and without church, but some (namely Lemko) easily forsake the divine services in church, when a priest does not impress upon them that they ought properly to go to church; most act in this way, when not far away is some city, where people go on about their affairs.

The editorial which had upset Father Toronsky so greatly appeared in a November 1, 1893, edition of *Svoboda*. It entirely possible—in fact, likely—that Father Toronsky also read in that same issue an article, detailing the sojourn of a very different sort of migrant, in recent months. The same edition reported that in October of 1893, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, already at the age of thirty the presumptive successor to Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary, arrived in New York City after a brief stay in Chicago, in the course of a journey around the globe. In New York, reported *Svoboda*, both the civil and military government greeted the archduke cordially.

Over twenty years later, on July 2 and July 9 of 1914, Franz Ferdinand's name (this time along with a photograph) again graced *Svoboda's* front page, though now in connection with the far less cordial greeting the archduke received in Sarajevo on June 28th of that year, at the hands of his assassin, Gavrillo Princip. In the following month, *Svoboda's* August 6, 1914 edition led with a story recounted on front pages around the world: the article, "The Great European War Has Begun," detailed the now-familiar chain of events, for which the most immediate ostensible cause was Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination: Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to a Serbia it blamed for tolerating terrorist groups like Princip's Black Hand; Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia; Russia's military mobilization to defend its ally Serbia; Germany's declaration of war on Russia in accordance with its treaty with Austria-Hungary; and Germany's invasion of Belgium, Luxembourg, and France, which were bound by treaty to Russia. Britain's declaration of war against Germany would appear only in the subsequent edition of *Svoboda*, but the August 6th edition did reprint parts of a story published earlier in the year in London's *The Times* (and communicated by telegraph to the *New York American* which also published the article). *Svoboda* quoted *The Times* article as follows:

The Serbian question is not the only point of contention between Russia and Austria-Hungary. The Rusky (Ruthene) or Little-Rusky [*malorusky*] question is *exactly the same* in importance. Twenty-five million Rusyns (Ruthenians) or Little-Rusky people live in the northwest provinces of Russia, and four-and-a-half million Little-Rusky people live in Galicia and in northeast Hungary.

The majority of these Austro-Hungarian Rusyns are members of the Greek Catholic Church (Uniates).

Vienna (that is the Austrian government) in past years spread the propaganda of the Uniate Church among Rusyns in Russia, and Russia responded to this by spreading propaganda among Rusyns in Austria-Hungary.

This is a political game under a religious cloak.¹¹⁰¹

"Clearly," editorialized *Svoboda*, "the Ukrainian matter plays a very important role in the current war."¹¹⁰² This early-August 1914 issue of *Svoboda* attributed great international significance to a phenomenon only dimly perceived two decades earlier in Galicia's *Dushpastyr* by Father Toronsky:

¹¹⁰¹ Emphasis mine.

¹¹⁰² By 1914, *Svoboda* had adopted a clearly Ukrainophile orientation. Thus, according to *Svoboda*, anything having to do with "Rusky" or "Ruthenian" people—so called by others—actually dealt with "Ukrainians."

conversions of sojourning Greek Catholic transatlantic labor migrants to the Russky Orthodox Church. It is an irony of history that an American migrant periodical's 1893 report on the archduke's sojourn in America also contained one of the earliest reports to reach a broader Austro-Hungarian audience of what would become a causal factor in the outbreak of the Great War over twenty years later: a factor which Franz Ferdinand's assassination would initially overshadow and, in lion's share of World War I historiography produced ever since, almost completely obscure.

APPENDIX A

MAPS




Figure 14. Migration and Greek Catholic-to-Rusky Orthodox Conversions (1890-1914)



Figure 15. Conversion Centers in Austria-Hungary




Figure 16. Migrations and Conversion: Austria-Hungary




Figure 17. Lemko Region Conversions

APPENDIX B

A NOTE ON SOURCES

This study relies upon a combination of research in secondary sources, as well upon my own archival research in United States and East European archives, including a number of materials which have never been published. Sources which most explicitly reveal the character of and motivations for conversions to the Russky Orthodox Church and resistance to such conversions on the level of everyday life include: (a) correspondence between migrants; (b) interviews conducted with lay people (converts and non-converts; migrants and non-migrants) in Galicia; (c) testimony given by lay people in property dispute cases in the Americas (by converts and non-converts); (d) testimony given by returned migrants in East European treason trials; (e) reports from various elite sources (Greek Catholic village priests in Eastern Europe, Greek Catholic and Russky Orthodox missionary priests in the Americas, hierarchs, and journalistic and editorial commentators in the American migrant and East European ethnic presses).¹¹⁰³

I conducted research in the personal archives of the Greek Catholic bishop of Przemyśl, located in the State Historical Archives (Przemyśl, Poland), almost all of which are unpublished.¹¹⁰⁴ As the remittance of conversion movements from the Americas escalated after the turn of the century, the bishop

¹¹⁰³ The presses contain both “elite” and “non-elite” data. In some cases, the presses constitute the organ of a particular religious institution (*Svit*, for example was under the direction of Russky Orthodox Archbishop of North America). However, even presses like *Svit* ran correspondence (for example, letters to the editor) from “non-elite” sources in Russky Orthodox parishes.

¹¹⁰⁴ Archiwum Państwowe w Przemyślu, Akta Archiwum Greckokatolickiego Biskupstwa w Przemyślu, (1551-1946),” (In this study, referred to as *ABGK*).

(Konstantyn Chekhovych) launched a targeted investigation of the relationship between migration and conversion from Greek Catholicism to the Russky Orthodox Church, beginning in 1908. He requested and obtained detailed reports from parish priests regarding who was “in migration,” when they had migrated, where they now lived (specific towns/parishes in the Americas, sometimes multiple locations if the migrant had moved upon arrival), if they had returned and when, and whether or not they had converted (usually, whether they had “conducted religious practices in a schismatic parish”) and were encouraging others to do so. The bishop received these reports from Greek Catholic priests both in the Americas and Eastern Europe; he also made voluminous notations on their contents. Some reports also contained confiscated letters, postcards, and literature sent between migrants in the Americas and those still in Eastern Europe, which explicitly promoted conversion. This correspondence obtained from an East European archive naturally flowed from the Americas to Eastern Europe; it compliments migrant correspondence relevant to the conversion and counter-conversion movements which flowed in the opposite direction (Eastern Europe to the Americas), much of which appeared in the migrant presses in the Americas, and included appeals for economic and spiritual remittances, as well as political assistance as Habsburg and Greek Catholic authorities attempted to counter conversion efforts. I was also able to consult previously unpublished letters, written to the bishop of Przemyśl, by the first Greek Catholic bishop in the United States, Soter Ortynsky. These provide important insight into the collaborative, ocean-spanning effort, in order to combat the conversions.¹¹⁰⁵

Ecclesiastical and secular inquiries into these conversions also permitted everyday people—who were in some cases illiterate and did not leave written records of their own—to relate their conversion and counter-conversion experiences in their own words. In some cases in Galicia, the local Greek Catholic priests and deanery councils conducted interviews with suspected converts and produced transcripts of

¹¹⁰⁵ These are contained, especially, in *ABGK*, syg. 444. I have also been able to incorporate Bishop Soter’s letters to Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky of Lviv, recently published in: Ortynsky, *Vychodets z Drohobychynny Stefan-Soter Ortynsky - Pershyj Epyskop Ukrainskoi Diaspory v SHA*.

their explanations for or denials of conversion while in migration.¹¹⁰⁶ Transcripts from the 1913-14 treason trials in Lviv and Maramorosh Sighet include additional testimony from converted, returned migrants.¹¹⁰⁷ In the United States and Canada, tensions between converts and non-converts within parishes often resulted in property disputes. The particular methods which the civil courts used to determine to whom the property belonged (methods which today would likely be found unconstitutional), permitted lawyers and judges to ask questions of everyday people that amount to variations on the questions: “In what ways were you religious?” “Why were you religious in those ways?” “In what ways did race, ethnicity, and nationhood interact with your religious ideas and behaviors?” I have been able to consult some of these trials in their original form and reproduced in secondary works. A few of the existing secondary works have explored the governmental archives (German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Russian), regarding the matter of the conversions in Austria-Hungary.¹¹⁰⁸

Various migrant and ethnic presses also provide crucial data on these conversions in Austria-Hungary and the Americas. A wide array of publications of various religious, ethnic/national, and political orientations proliferated in the United States, beginning around 1890, then later in Canada, Brazil, and Argentina. Many of these publications were connected with religious and/or ethnonational

¹¹⁰⁶ Housed in *ABGK*.

¹¹⁰⁷ The testimony from the Lviv trial was reported in several contemporary publications, including the Galician periodicals *Slovo Polskie* and *Dilo*, the Russian newspaper *Novoe Vremya*, and in the American publication *Svit*. Klaus Bachmann used the Rusky-Ukrainophile *Dilo*'s coverage of the trial. Both for ease of access and because it reproduced the primary language of most of the proceedings, I have used the Polonophile *Slowo Polskie*, as republished between 2004 – 2006 in *Przegląd Prawosławny* 6, no. 228 (2004) – 7, no. 253 (2006). For the archival sources, see Issue 6, no. 228. All issues are available through *Przegląd Prawosławny*'s online archive at <http://www.pporthodoxia.com.pl/archiwum.php>. For the Maramorosh Sighet trial, I have relied upon the excerpts from contemporary publications recorded in: Grabets, *K istorii Maramoroshskago protsesssa: dielo 94*. This is also available in the *Biblioteka* (“History of Orthodoxy section”) at <http://wap.ierej.ru>: (<http://wap.ierej.ru/index.php?act=51&met=read&t=96&PHPSESSID=93847e7417cd91b05e211615bf43e0c7>).

¹¹⁰⁸ I have referenced these works already in the section on origins of World War I. The most extensive treatment of the German and Austro-Hungarian governmental archives is Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Russland: Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Russland (1907-1914)*. Other works dealing with these archives include: Danilec, *Pravoslavna Tserkva na Zakarpatti u Pershy Polovyni XX Stolittya*; Himka, “The Propagation of Orthodoxy in Galicia on the Eve of World War I.”; Mayer, *The Rusyns of Hungary: Political and Social Developments (1860-1910)*; Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*; Dyrud, “The Rusin Question in Eastern Europe and America, 1890-World War I”; Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*. John-Paul Himka has also graciously provided me with his unpublished notes on the Austrian archives. The best source employing the Russian Empire’s governmental archives is: Osadczy, *Swieta Rus: Rozwoj i Oddziaływanie Idei Prawosławia w Galicji*.

organizations. The most important periodicals published in the United States include the Greek Catholic, Rusynophile *Amerikansky Russky Viestnik*, the (eventually) Greek Catholic, Rusky-Ukrainophile *Svoboda*, and the Russophile-Orthodoxophile *Svit*, as well as *Pravda* and *Postup*.¹¹⁰⁹ The migrant presses published in the United States are excellent sources on the conversions in all relevant regions under consideration, as they reported on developments there and printed transatlantic correspondence. They also attest in numerous ways to the transnational character of their migrant constituency—they recorded many anecdotal instances of return, multiple, and second-stage migrations elsewhere in the Americas or to the Russian Empire. These periodicals also published much correspondence between regions of migratory origin and migrants in the Americas. Additionally, they contain important evidence regarding the experience of racial prejudice in the Americas.

Sending region issues, organized by county or even specific villages, occupied just as—or more—prominent a role in the migrant press as did developments in the Americas. (The newspapers sometimes drew a distinction between “news from the homeland” and “news from the *new* homeland”). Particularly important news from regions of migratory origin centered upon the developing Greek Catholic-to-Rusky Orthodox movements there. Religiously and nationally oriented American migrant publications had a stake in the conversions—they reported on them not only due to migrant interest, but also because the individuals and organizations behind the reporting sought to promote their own agenda and bolster their position in the American context. American Greek Catholic publications, for instance, portrayed the East European conversions as the result of subversive Russian tsarist propaganda, and therefore religiously spurious. Rusky Orthodox publications, on the other hand, used the motif of a persecuted homeland church (“*Podiarmy Rus*”—“Rus under the yoke”) to edify converts in the Americas (“American Rus”) encountering their own difficulties. Evidence of direct connections between migrants in America and those involved in conversion movements is also evident in the American migrant presses,

¹¹⁰⁹ The *Amerikansky Russky Viestnik* and *Svit* have been collected in *The Carpatho-Ruthenian Microfilm Project*, available on microfilm in the University of Pittsburgh’s archival holdings, while archived issues of *Svoboda* are available online: <http://www.svoboda-news.com/arxiv.htm>.

which reported on collections and benefit events held in American parishes for the participants in the East European conversion movements.

I have also conducted substantial research in Galician Greek Catholic periodicals, housed in Biblioteka Stephanyka, in Lviv, Ukraine, including: *Nyva*, *Tserkovniy Vostok*, *Dushpastyr*, *Prykarpatska Rus*, *Halychanyn*, and *Emigrant*.¹¹¹⁰ These publications testify to the particular interest which Greek Catholics took in “their” migrants to and back from the Americas, especially their conversions to the Russky Orthodox Church. Numerous articles at the time attempted to explain the reasons for the American conversions and their spread to Eastern Europe. In these periodicals, too, various parties debated what to do about the conversions on both sides of the Atlantic, often proposing and commenting upon direct transatlantic action to be taken by individuals, migrant societies, and the Greek Catholic hierarchy. *Emigrant*, in particular, the organ of the migrant aid organization, the Society of St. Raphael, was devoted entirely to assisting migrants and chronicling their experience—that assistance largely included promoting (a) Greek Catholic loyalty (over against Russky Orthodox conversion), and (b) what today might be called transnationalism (the sending of remittances to Greek Catholic churches, religious charities, and their family in their East European villages of origin, and the retention of land by migrants in those villages, in order to encourage their return).

The content of the immigrant and ethnic presses of both America and Eastern Europe demands critical scrutiny. Those responsible for the publications had their own agendas, which may or may not have coincided with that of their readership. Some individuals understood themselves as ethnoreligious entrepreneurs, who saw in their leadership roles a means of improving their social and economic status in the community.¹¹¹¹ The readership of these publications included not only the literate, but those who listened to articles read aloud in communal contexts, especially in the various reading rooms (e.g., the

¹¹¹⁰ For publications in Hungary, I have relied upon materials reprinted in the Galician periodicals and in the American migrant periodicals, as well as in various secondary literature.

¹¹¹¹ There is some support for the idea of “ethnic entrepreneurship” in the masthead of the most popular turn-of-the-century Greek Catholic immigrant publication, which advertised that: “The AMERIKANSKY RUSSKY VIESTNIK is read in the United States by 20,000 greek kat. Russians and by many Russians from other religious sects. Advertisers who wish to reach this people, must advertise in the AMER. RUSSKY VIESTNIK.”

Prosvita and Kachkovsky societies), which proliferated in both Austria-Hungary and the Americas. Of course, just because people were reading (or listening) to these materials does not demonstrate that they agreed with what was written. Constant admonitions to ethnic or religious consciousness, for instance, likely indicate that activists sometimes found ethno-religious ethnic consciousness wanting among their readership. Yet, the press recorded many of the thoughts and behaviors of the ethnic and religious rank-and-file (in letters to the editor and in articles). Furthermore, many exhibited behaviors (conversions from Greek Catholicism to Russian Orthodoxy or resistance to such movements) and at times articulated their own motivations for their actions (for instance, in interviews conducted as part of clerical interrogations) which provide important context for the ideas expressed in the various presses.

Another important source is the confessional and polemical publications which were issued during the period 1890-1914. These texts themselves represented transnational resources. Most famously, the migrant priest Father Alexis Toth published his pro-Russian Orthodox and anti-Greek Catholic pamphlet, *Where to Seek the Truth?*, in the United States and Vienna; it subsequently circulated in the Americas and in East European regions of migratory origin, and became a frequent subject of concern for both Greek Catholic and Habsburg authorities. A Greek Catholic priest published a polemical response, *Where to Find the Truth*, in Lviv, Ukraine and later in Philadelphia, USA, for a migrant audience. I have also been able to locate some responses to this pamphlet in the Subcarpathian context. Some of these are housed at the archives of the Byzantine Catholic Archeparchy in Pittsburgh. Additionally, an important source book is the collection of letters, essays, and sermons of Father Alexis Toth, compiled in English translation.¹¹¹²

I have incorporated a number of other materials from my research in American newspapers (like the *New York Times*) and various proselytizing religious tracts and booklets published in Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Americas. As noted previously, this study also incorporates articles printed in German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian periodicals regarding the conversions, reprinted in various secondary

¹¹¹² George Soldatow, ed. *Archpriest Alexis Toth: Letters, Articles, Papers and Sermons*, 4 vols. (Minnesota: AARDM Press, 1978-1988).

works, and also available online, as with, for example, *Reichspost*.¹¹¹³ Additionally, several scholars—Father Ivan Kaszczak, Serge Cipko, and Robert Zecker have all graciously shared drafts of their forthcoming monographs with me.¹¹¹⁴

¹¹¹³ Editions of *Reichspost*, dating back to 1894, are available through the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek's digital archive, ANNO: Historische österreichische Zeitungen und Zeitschriften: <http://anno.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/anno?aid=rpt>.

¹¹¹⁴ Cipko, *Ukrainians in Argentina, 1897-1950: The Making of a Community*; Kaszczak, *Bishop Soter Stephen Ortynsky: 1866-1916*; Zecker, *Race and America's Immigrant Press*.

APPENDIX C

A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY

Partly out of mindfulness of the critiques “ethnicism” and “groupism,” and partly because the use of ethnonyms to describe the people under consideration obscures the dynamics of these identifications, I have chosen to avoid the use of any essentialist ethnonyms to describe the people under consideration (except when those terms appear in primary source quotations).¹¹¹⁵ It is problematic to speak of “Ukrainians” before people actually called themselves that and explicitly associated a number of cultural and political characteristics with that term of self-identification. Even then, it is dubious practice, unless

¹¹¹⁵ This is hardly the first study to note the indeterminacy of ethnonational identity, which prevailed among many of the people with which the current study is concerned. In fact, in response to this ambiguity, some historians adopted a constructivist approach to ethnicity and nationhood, even before the early-1980s—the date usually given to mark the modernist turn in nationalism studies. Paul Robert Magocsi’s *The Shaping of National Identity*, for example, posited in 1978 that “Rusyn,” “Ukrainian,” and “Russian” forms of identification competed with one another for the allegiance of the people of Subcarpathia. Magocsi, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus’, 1848-1948*. Keith Dyrud articulated similar arguments about constructed nationalities. Dyrud prefaced his study of the conversions in the United States by positing the inherent teleology in the tendency of some historians to consider Rusynophilism a “mistaken” identification among people who were actually “Ukrainians,” simply because it compromised Ukrainian identification and statehood. Dyrud, *The Quest for the Rusyn Soul: the Politics of Religion and Culture in Eastern Europe and in America, 1890-World War I*. See also: Dyrud, “The Rusin Question in Eastern Europe and America, 1890-World War I”. Myron Kuropas, in his book entitled *The Ukrainian Americans, nevertheless carefully avoided speaking of his subjects as “Ukrainians” during a period when these migrants from Austria-Hungary were gradually joining different ethnonational “streams.”* Kuropas, *The Ukrainian Americans: Roots and Aspirations, 1884-1954*. All of these studies, however, have employed one ethnonym or another as a means of designating a starting point, from which divergent ethnonational identifications emerged. Magocsi and Dyrud studied “Rusyns,” who became “Ukrainians,” “Russians,” “Carpatho-Russians,” “Carpatho-Rusyns,” and the like; Kuropas studied “Ruthenians” who flowed into these various ethnonational “streams.” While these scholars have astutely observed the constructed nature of ethnonational identity, it is impossible, from a social sciences perspective, to establish any essential starting point, whatsoever.

one simply means a “citizen” of a state (Ukraine—which did not exist at the time).¹¹¹⁶ To be clear, this study does determine whether these people were or were not of a particular race/ethnicity/nationality. In this, its approach is very similar to the manner in which the discipline of religious studies has dealt with the existence of God or gods: religious studies proceeds methodologically as if God does not exist, but it cannot ultimately demonstrate the nonexistence of God. In the same way, just as it is impossible, using social science methodologies, to determine what someone’s essential ethnicity or nationality *is*, it is equally impossible, using the same tools, to demonstrate the nonexistence of a particular ethnicity or nationality.

While I do not employ these essentialist ethnonational terms, myself, a major focus of this study is the manner in which primary actors did. For the sake of clarity, then, a survey is in order. The terms applied to the people under consideration have most often included: “Ukrainians,” “Rusyns,” “Russians,” “Carpatho-Russians,” and “Carpatho-Rusyns.”¹¹¹⁷ At the turn of the twentieth century, the term, “Ruthenian,” also carried currency with many outsiders (e.g., with German and Austro-Hungarian policy-makers and presses, and at the Vatican). A number of other terms also referred to smaller ethnonational groupings, supposedly “within” those larger groupings: “Lemkos,” “Boikos,” “Hutsuls,” “Rusnaks,” and others.¹¹¹⁸ To this survey of descriptors, one could also add terms of derision prevalent in various migratory regions: “Huns,” “Bohunks,” “Hunkies,” “*Ruso*,” “*katsup*,” etc. As for what these people called themselves, some used the term *Rusyny*, for which the corollary adjective was *Rusky* (as in “Rusky people,” “Rusky faith,” etc.). Some of them, however, called themselves *Russky* people (two “s”s). Some people during the period under consideration began referring to themselves also as “Ukrainians” (*Ukraintsy*), at times during the transition adopting the hybrid descriptor “Rusky-Ukrainian” (*Rusky-*

¹¹¹⁶ Where I do refer to someone rarely as “Russian,” I mean to indicate a “citizen of the Russian empire.” Where I refer to a phenomenon as “Russian,” I mean to indicate that its source lay in the Russian empire. By the same token, by terms like “German statesmen,” I mean only to indicate statesmen of the German empire, not German ethnicity.

¹¹¹⁷ Many of these people also assimilated into other ethnic identifications: “Hungarian,” “Slovak,” “Polish,” etc.

¹¹¹⁸ The people whom some outsiders called “Lemkos” are very important to this study. Russophilism and Russky Orthodox conversions movements were widespread in the Lemko region and among its migrants. The ethnonym *Lemko* refers to the frequent use of the interjection, “*lem*” (only) in the “Lemko dialect,” rather than *tilky*, used by Greek Catholics in other regions of Galicia.

Ukrainsky). Others used no ethnonational term of self-description at all, instead preferring a purely religious designation (e.g., “Orthodox” or “Greek Catholic”). Still others simply used county or village names to identify themselves, and some were simply *tuteshni*—“the people from here.”

For related reasons, this study also does not identify the language(s) which these migrants spoke. Again, some would variously have identified their language as “R usky,” “Ukrainian,” “Rusky-Ukrainian,” or “Rusky.” Others would have said simply that they spoke *po-nashomu*—“according to our own.” Because language has been so closely tied to ethnonational identifications, designating their language by one name or another would lead to the same obfuscation as designating the people by an ethnonym. I have, however, for the sake of clarity and utility to researchers, identified the language of modern-day, secondary works, notwithstanding some of the political entanglements this involves.¹¹¹⁹

In this study, I have chosen to refer to people primarily by the terms “Greek Catholic” and “Rusky Orthodox.” In some senses, this practice solves the problem of ethnicism, but it carries its own baggage, as well. One problem is that these terms also contain ethnonational implications. “Greek Catholic” implied, for many, the religion of the “Rusky” (one “s”) or “Rusky-Ukrainian” people. “Rusky Orthodox” also contained within it the notion of “Rusky” people. I have chosen in this study to simply transliterate “*Rusky*” as “Rusky” (two “s”s), rather than translate the term as “Russian,” as it is often rendered.¹¹²⁰ This is because while “Rusky” did mean for many people something having to do with the Russian Empire, for others it did not. “Rusky” was, for some, a term meaning “the Rus people” (the people of Rus). For others, it did not mean anything significantly different than “Rusky” (one “s”). Because of the significance of the term, not only have I rendered it as “Rusky,” I have also attempted to refer as consistently as possible to “Rusky Orthodox,” rather than simply “Orthodox” people and phenomena. I have also retained “Rusky” to refer to institutions and people which, during the period

¹¹¹⁹ Some would say, for example, that some of the works cited in this study were composed in “Rusyn,” while others would say instead that these were written in “Ukrainian.” Where I have identified the language of modern-day works, I do not mean to indicate any ethnonational preference.

¹¹²⁰ Although “*Rusyn*,” was the nominative form in use, I have chosen not to use this designation for two reasons: first, it runs the risk of confusion with modern-day Rusyn ethnonational movements, and secondly, it was the “Rusky/Rusky” ambiguity which was paramount, not the “*Rusyn/Rosianyn* (Russian)” pairing.

under consideration, translated their titles into English using “Russian” (e.g., the “Russky Orthodox Church of North America” and “Russky Orthodox Archbishop Platon of America”), as well as to institutions and people in and from the Russian Empire (e.g., the “Galician Russky Benevolent Society” and the “Russky Orthodox Holy Synod”). While this might appear awkward at first, I have found it necessary in order to retain the terminological consistency which prevailed at the time (converts in Galicia were designating themselves by the same name, “Russky,” as the Orthodox Church in Russia), while at the same time avoiding prejudicing the question of orientation toward the Russian Empire.

I contend that these ethnoreligious terms—Russky Orthodox and Greek Catholic—are, despite their limitations, superior to purely ethnic or national terms, because most readers—save, perhaps, some nationalists—are accustomed to thinking of religious identification in non-essentialist terms. Most will understand religious identification as a matter of choice—whether made by the individual or made for them by someone else.¹¹²¹ Another issue arises, however: the ambiguous nature of religious identification among these people. As this study makes clear, many of the people to whom I refer as “Greek Catholics” never called themselves that. Furthermore, many of the people to whom I refer as “Russky Orthodox” after they “converted” continued to refer to themselves primarily as “Greek Catholic.” As for “official” designations, Austria-Hungary officially considered them Greek Catholics, but parties in the Russian Empire sometimes designated them as Russky Orthodox. It is frankly impossible in many cases to conclude ultimately whether a Greek Catholic who merely attended a Russky Orthodox parish in the Americas was Greek Catholic or Russky Orthodox. It is similarly difficult to say whether someone who expressed a desire to convert in Austria-Hungary but was prevented from doing so legally was “actually” Greek Catholic or Russky Orthodox. Referring to these people as “Greek Catholic” and “Russky Orthodox” may therefore result in unintentional obfuscation. To clarify, when I use these terms to

¹¹²¹ Yet another thing this study cannot prove or disprove.

identify certain people, I do not do so to indicate, necessarily, that they identified themselves as such. Some did, some did not, and some did at some times and not at others.¹¹²²

Several geographic terms also deserve mention. This study has reproduced the frequent usage among migrants and non-migrants to refer to regions of origin as “the *kray*,” literally, “the country.” This could translate as “the old country,” or “the native land,” but other constructions serves this purpose (“*stary kray*,” as opposed to “*novy kray*”—“the new world;” and “*ridny kray*”—“native” or “familial land”). Because migrants’ understandings of their “place” with respect to regions of migratory origin and destination are so critical to this study, it is important to retain this emic term.

Of the two major Austro-Hungarian regions I have identified—Galicia and Subcarpathia—only one represented a formally recognized political unit (Galicia). I use “Subcarpathia” to refer to: “the territory in the upper Tisza/Tysa River valley along the southern slopes and foothills of the Carpathian Mountains...in the pre-World War I Hungarian Kingdom, that is, in what is today northeastern Slovakia as well as the Transcarpathian oblast of Ukraine.”¹¹²³ The term is not without its political implications—it is preferred by contemporary adherents of the Rusyn revival, over the term “Transcarpathia” (*Zakarpattia*), which is preferred by Ukrainophiles (as in “Ukraine beyond the Carpathians”).¹¹²⁴ I have chosen the term because it was in use, 1890-1914, whereas “Transcarpathia” was not. As for Galicia’s subregions, in this study, I refer to the “Lemko region” and “eastern Galicia.” In this study, the Lemko region

refers to an area encompassing about 250 villages...The territory itself is only about 25 to 50 kilometers wide and is bordered along its entire length in the south by the crests of the Carpathian Mountains, which coincide with the present-day Polish-Slovak border. In the west, the Lemko Region begins near the Tatra mountain range and stretches eastward for about 140 kilometers.¹¹²⁵

¹¹²² I have also included a glossary for some key terminology (both English and in foreign languages) in this study.

¹¹²³ “Subcarpathian Rus’,” in Magocsi and Pop, *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*.

¹¹²⁴ Other terms which have been employed include Subcarpathian Rus (*Prykarpatska Rus*), “Hungarian Rus” (*Madyarska Rus*), and “Rus under the yoke” (*Podyarma Rus*).

¹¹²⁵ Paul Robert Magocsi, “Lemko Region,” in Magocsi and Pop, *Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and Culture*.

The Lemko region also did not exist as an official political unit, but it was a term used by contemporaries (*Lemkivschyna, Lemkovyna, Lemikivsczyzna*). I will not enter here into the debates regarding its boundaries—the above demarcations represent a rough guideline for the region I mean to indicate. A final problem with “Lemko region” is that it is based upon an ethnonym: “the region of the Lemkos.” Naturally, my usage of the term should not be taken to mean that I understand these people as (or not as) “Lemkos.” I use “eastern Galicia” to refer to the counties along Austria-Hungary’s eastern border with Russia (e.g., Zbarazh and Brody counties), as well as on the southeastern border of the Austrian province of Bukovina (e.g., Sniatyn county).

Migrants and non-migrants used the term “America” to refer variously to: the United States, North America, the Americas, or any individual region within the Americas. Brazil, Canada, or Argentina, by themselves, could be “America,” just as much as the United States. In quotations, I have rendered “*Ameryka*” simply as “America,” though if there is a clear referent, I make this known in my emendations. The reader should nevertheless recall that when a migrant said that he or she returned “from America” (*z Ameryki*), or a contemporary commentator said so, without further information, the particular “America” from which he or she returned may remain unclear. For the sake of clarity, I myself avoid using the term “America,” either to refer generally to the Americas or more specifically to the United States. I use the term “the Americas” to refer collectively to the United States, Canada, Brazil, and Argentina. Otherwise, I refer to these individual regions specifically. However, constructions like “the American factor” and “the American conversions” (which I have generally placed in quotation marks) refer to “the factor of the Americas” and “the conversions in the Americas,” rather than referring solely to the United States.

APPENDIX D

PRE-1914 ETHNORELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATIONS AMONG GREEK CATHOLICS AND RUSSKY ORTHODOX IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Table 1. Pre-1914 Ethnoreligious Identifications among Greek Catholics and Russky Orthodox in Austria-Hungary

Orientation	Location	(Select) Terms of Self-identification	(Select) External Terms of Ascription	Religious identification
Rusynophile	Subcarpathia (Hungary)	Rusky/Rusyn	Ruthenian/Ruthene Little Russian	Greek Catholic
Rusky-Ukrainophile	Galicia (Austria)	Rusky/Rusyn Rusky-Ukrainian Ukrainian	Ruthenian/Ruthene Little Russian Mazeppist Ukrainophile	Greek Catholic
Magyarophile	Subcarpathia	Rusky/Rusyn Magyar	Ruthenian/Ruthene Little Russian Magyarone/Magyarophile	Greek Catholic
Russophile	Subcarpathia Galicia (Lemko region and Eastern borderlands w/Russia)	Rusky <i>Tverdy</i> (zealous)	Ruthenian/Ruthene Little Russian Russian (<i>rossysky</i>) Russophile Moscophile <i>catsup</i>	Greek Catholic <i>or</i> Rusky/Russian Orthodox

APPENDIX E

GLOSSARY

America:

Used variously by people in the current study to refer to “the Americas” or various regions of the Americas: “the United States,” “Canada,” “Brazil,” “Argentina,” “North America,” “South America,” or individual regions therein.

American Action:

A religio-governmental response initiated by churchmen and statesmen in Hungary, ca. 1900-1907 (approved also through Vienna) which sought to counter conversion movements remitted to Subcarpathia from the United States, by targeting them at their source. The initiative sent priests, an apostolic visitator, and attempted to secure a bishop for Greek Catholics in the United States. These individuals were to act as paid agents and informants for the Hungarian state, and foster Hungarian loyalty among potentially returning Greek Catholic migrants.

Apostolic Visitator:

In the Catholic Church, an individual conducting a short-term, canonical visit to a Catholic region for information-gathering purposes. In this study, a Greek Catholic emissary of the Vatican to church missions in the Americas, with limited powers.

Biskup, ksendz, pope, batiushka:

Terms which Russky Orthodox partisans used to distinguish the Greek Catholic clergy and hierarchy from their own. The terms also pejoratively identified Greek Catholics with their Latin Catholic counterparts. *Biskup* means “bishop.” *Ksendz* means “priest.” Greek Catholic loyalists used the term *sviaschennyk* to refer to a Greek Catholic priest (they reserved *ksendz* for Latin Rite Catholics). The Russky Orthodox counterparts are, for bishop, “*Vladyka*,” for priest “*batiushka*.” Greek Catholics referred to a Russky Orthodox cleric pejoratively as “*pope*” or “*batiushka*.” They sometimes referred to Russky Orthodox converts more generally as “*katsup*” (a pejorative for “Russians”).

Conversion:

Generally regarded as a substantial shift in religious identification, in this study, the term functions as shorthand for an array of practices and beliefs, among Greek Catholics who may have affiliated only nominally with the Russky Orthodox Church or may have made formal declarations of conversion. Many of these “converts” did not conceive of their conversion *either*

as a radical break or a gradual process of transformation. Instead, many understood themselves as “returning” to what their ancestors—or even they—had “always been.” Or they acknowledged no change at all. “Mass conversion” is not only a matter of numbers, but one of structural transformations, as well. The term “ethnoreligious conversion” highlights the fact that the conversions under consideration in this study were not only, nor even, in some cases, primarily religious: they were inextricably intertwined with discourses of race, ethnicity, and nationhood.

Greek Catholic Church:

In this study, comprised of formerly Eastern Orthodox churches which eventually joined the Roman Catholic Church via the Unia agreements of Brest (1596) and Uzhorod (1646). (There were other “Greek Catholic” churches in existence during the period under consideration in this study, which joined according to different Unia agreements.) Habsburg Empress Maria Theresa coined the term “Greek Catholic” to refer to these “Uniate” churches, indicating their “Greek,” Byzantine rite (not ethnicity) and, theoretically, their parity with Latin rite Catholicism, within the Roman Catholic Church. Following mass conversions among Greek Catholics to the Russky Orthodox Church in the Americas, the Russky Orthodox Church and its partisans also embraced the term “Greek Catholic” as one of self-identification (i.e., the “Russky Orthodox Greek Catholic Church”). Russky Orthodox adherents sometimes pejoratively used the term “Uniate” to differentiate Greek Catholic loyalists from themselves.

Ethnicism/Groupism:

Ethnicism is the tendency of historians—even those who have embraced constructivist approaches to “nation”—to refer to ethnic “groups” by ethnonyms, during periods when they exhibited no discernible signs of ethnic consciousness. Historian Jeremy King used the term as a methodological application of sociologist Rogers Brubaker’s cognitive approach to ethnicity and his insights into “groupism:” the tendency to treat ethnicity as a matter of bounded, clearly-delineated groups and a thing *in* the world, rather than a perspective *on* the world.

Kray:

Literally, “country.” Used by migrants and non-migrants alike to refer to one’s native region. Sometimes appears in the constructs *stary kray* (the old country), *ridny kray* (the native land), and *novy kray* (the new world). The boundaries and location of the *kray* could be ambivalent. To a Galician, it might refer to Galicia. To someone from the Lemko region of Galicia, it might mean only that region. For some, it could mean all of Eastern Europe, and in some cases, parts of Austria-Hungary (e.g., Galicia, Subcarpathia, and Bukovina) and Russia, together.

Magyarophile:

Someone in or from Subcarpathia who consciously identified him or herself a “Magyar” (Hungarian) and/or spoke the “Magyar” language (a “Magyarone”). Often regarded as the product of state-sponsored Magyarization, which made “Magyar” the language of Hungary’s social elite. The dominant orientation among Subcarpathia’s Greek Catholic clerical intelligentsia.

Pan-Slavism:

An ideology that “Slavs” formed one people group. Pan-Slavists in Russia argued that many “Slavs” living outside Russia’s borders (e.g., in Austria-Hungary and the Americas) belonged to the same race/ethnicity/nationality as “Slavs” within the Russian Empire. Pan-Slavists in the current study argued not only that Austria-Hungary’s Greek Catholics were “fellow-Slavs” (as they did, for example, with people in Serbia), but that they were “fellow-Russians” (fellow *Russky* people). Pan-Slavism functioned as a basis for irredentism toward territories identified as

inhabited by “Slavs” or “Russians” outside the boundaries of the Russian Empire (e.g., Austrian Galicia and Bukovina and Hungarian Subcarpathia.)

Pravoslavny:

“Orthodox.” A term used by Rusky Orthodox and Greek Catholic partisans, alike. Many Rusky Orthodox Christians used the term consciously as one of differentiation from “Greek Catholic,” while others did not. While many Greek Catholics used the term to differentiate the Rusky Orthodox from themselves, others used it as one of self-identification. The term appeared as one of self-identification in both Rusky Orthodox and Greek Catholic liturgies. In light of its ambiguities, some Greek Catholic partisans sought to replace the term in their liturgies with “*pravovirny*” (right believing).

Rusky-Ukrainophile:

Someone (generally in or from Austrian Galicia) who consciously identified him or herself as part of the “Rusky,” “Rusky-Ukrainian,” or simply “Ukrainian,” people. Between 1890-1914, “Ukrainian” gradually replaced “Rusky” among adherents of this orientation. It is distinguished from “Rusky,” spelled with two “s”s.

Russophile:

Someone (generally in or from Austrian Galicia or Bukovina, or Hungarian Subcarpathia), who consciously identified him or herself as a member of the “Rusky” people, generally over against a Rusky-Ukrainophile orientation. For some, this indicated a cultural and/or political orientation toward the Russian Empire (and direct connections with Pan-Slavists based there), for others, toward historic Kievan Rus, and for others, something more indeterminate, like “what we have always called ourselves.” It is distinguished from “Rusky,” spelled with one “s.” Rusky-Ukrainophiles argued that Russophiles exploited the similarity of the two terms. “New-course” Russophiles (*novokursnyky*) adopted a more aggressively political and irredentist platform in the early-twentieth century. Rusky-Ukrainophiles also called them “Moscophiles.”

Rusynophile:

Someone (generally in or from Subcarpathia) who consciously identified themselves as a “Rusyn,” generally over against either a Russophile or Rusky-Ukrainophile orientation. The term “Ukrainian” made much less headway in Subcarpathia than in Galicia (where individuals also for a time referred to themselves as “Rusyn”), during the period under consideration.

Rusky Orthodox Church:

Often rendered “Russian Orthodox Church” in English. A term used to describe the global church in communion with the Orthodox Church in the Russian Empire. In this study, many people identified as “Rusky Orthodox converts” formally joined the Rusky Orthodox Church, while others did not. Not all converts exhibited an orientation toward Russia.

Social remittances:

In an effort to move beyond exclusively economic approaches to remittances, Peggy Levitt has coined the term “social remittances,” to describe: “the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from host- to sending-country communities” as a result of migrant transnationalism. One of her central projects has been to determine how “ideas and practices are transformed in the host country [the region of migratory destination] and transmitted back to sending communities [the region of migratory origin] such that new cultural products emerge and challenge the lives of those who stay behind.” Social remittances have flowed back and forth between regions such that both are altered in a dialectic exchange.

Temnist:

Literally “darkness.” Often used by Greek Catholic partisans to refer to the “ignorance” of the people, upon which Russky Orthodox partisans allegedly capitalized. Russky Orthodox partisans often argued the reverse about their Greek Catholic and Latin Catholic counterparts.

Transnationalism:

The tendency of some migrants to establish multiple connections between their regions of migratory origin and destination, through correspondence, remigration(s), and social and economic remittances. Such migrants have lived their lives oriented simultaneously toward both regions, as the result of which, developments in both (or multiple) regions have mutually influenced one another in dialectic fashion.

APPENDIX F

TIMELINE OF MASS MIGRATION AND GREEK CATHOLIC CONVERSIONS TO RUSSKY ORTHODOX CHURCH (1870S-1914)

1870s *Migration of Greek Catholics between Austria-Hungary and United States begins*

1880s

- 1881 Hnylychky movement (Eastern Galicia, Austria)
- 1882 Hnylychky treason trial (Lviv, Galicia)
- 1889 G.C. migrants attend Greek Orthodox parish in Manchester (Liverpool, England)

1890s *Mass migration between Austria-Hungary and Canada, Brazil, and Argentina begins*

- 1891 Minneapolis movement (Minnesota, USA)
- 1894 Wilkes-Barre movement (Pennsylvania, USA)
- 1894-97 North American economic depression, mass remigration to Austria-Hungary
- 1897 Rabbit Hill movement (Alberta, Canada)
- 1894ff Dozens of movements in U.S.A. and Canada

1900s *Remigration of converts accelerates*

- 1900 Săcel movement (Eastern Subcarpathia, Hungary)
- 1900 Sushno movement (Northern Galicia, Austria)
- 1901 Becherov movement (Northeastern Subcarpathia, Hungary)
- 1901 Hungary's "American Action" begins
- 1903 Iza and Velyki Luchky movements (Eastern Subcarpathia, Hungary)
- Zaluche movement (Eastern Galicia, Austria)
- 1904-06 Political trials of Iza residents
- 1906 Tres Capones movement (Misiones, Argentina)
- 1907 1st G.C. bishop arrives in U.S.A.
New R.O. archbishop for North America arrives
- 1907-11 North American economic depression, mass remigration to Austria-Hungary
- 1908 R.O. missionaries arrive to G.C. communities in Brazil
Austria-Hungary annexes Bosnia-Herzegovina
Assassination of Galician Lieutenant
Prague Neo-Slav congress
Revival of Zaluche movement

- 1909ff Becherov and Zaluche residents attempt to build Orthodox church
G.C. investigation into the matter of “remigrants and schism” in Galicia’s
Lemko region

1910s

- 1910 Teliash movement (Eastern Galicia, Austria)
- 1911 Pochaiv meeting of Galicia’s and Russia’s statesmen, churchmen, and activists
Arrival of Orthodox missionaries from Russia to Eastern Galicia and Lemko region
Grab and Wyszowatka movement
Arrests of villagers and Orthodox priests begin
- 1912 Movements spread through Lemko region
Arrests of Fathers Sandovych, Hudyma, Kabaliuk, and others
Second Balkan War
First G.C. bishop for Canada arrives
Father Kabaliuk flees to U.S.A.
- 1913 Father Kabaliuk returns to Austria-Hungary
Marmorosh Sighet treason trial of converts begins
- 1914 Conclusion of Marmorosh Sighet trial
Lviv treason trial of conversion activists
Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand
War I begins
Russia annexes Galicia and occupies part of Subcarpathia
Numerous R.O. conversions in occupied territories

APPENDIX G

SURVEY OF ECONOMIC REMITTANCES TO A GALICIAN VILLAGE

A survey of one Galician village during the period under consideration provides a useful model of typical relationships between migration and remittances. In 1913, Father Ilya Klyvak, a Greek Catholic priest and administrator of the village of Yaseniv-Pil'nyi in Galicia, provided a detailed reckoning of migration from and back to his village, together with the migrant remittances of which he was aware.¹¹²⁶ As of March 17, 1913, a total of 121 persons had emigrated: to Canada (90), the United States (5), Brazil (14), Argentina (9), Germany (2), and Vienna (1). Of all of those, two persons had returned again, and two had gone for a second journey to Canada in 1912. Of the ninety in Canada, seventy-four had migrated temporarily, fourteen (comprised of three families) for good, and one whose migration intentions were unknown. Three families comprised the fourteen migrants to Brazil. Of Argentina's nine, a family of five had emigrated for good, and the other four individuals temporarily.

The emigration movement had begun in the village in 1898, when Ivan Slyvka left permanently with his wife and children for Canada, where they reportedly became "very wealthy." Ivan Kravchuk left in 1900 with his family, also for good, followed by one more person in 1903. Migrations to Canada continued in 1905 (4 people), 1906 (12 people), 1907 (8 people), 1908 (5 people), 1909 (10 people), 1910 (17 people), 1911 (13 people), 1912 (23 people, of which two were returnees making a second emigration), and 1913 (12 people). Migration to Brazil and Argentina began in 1909 and had continued through 1913, due to the agitation of "agents" and despite warnings in *Emigrant* that "evil will come to

¹¹²⁶ "Emigranstky rukh odnoho nashoho sela," *Emigrant* 3, no. 3 (May 1913): 72-75.

you there.” One person migrated temporarily to Argentina in 1909. In 1911, a family of five emigrated permanently to Brazil. In 1912, another family of five went to Brazil for good, and three individuals temporarily to Argentina. In 1913, one family of five migrated to Argentina, and a family of four went to Brazil.

Father Klyvak explained that family ties shaped the village’s migration patterns. By their example and through “agitating” letters, family members acted as *de facto* emigration agents; as he put it, “those emigrants, who remained beyond the borders of their native land, gradually influenced their relatives.” A member of the Kravchuk family had migrated temporarily to Canada in each of the years 1908, 1910, and 1911. Stephan Oleksyuk migrated temporarily to Canada in 1907, followed by his brother Andrei in 1912. Three Knyhynytsky brothers had emigrated to Canada in 1907, 1909, and 1912; they had been preceded by three other members of the Knyhynytsky clan. Ivan Slyvka migrated to Canada and later sent for his wife, Mariya, followed by another member of his family, Teodozy. It happened in the same way for the Abramyko's, Danylyuko's, Beleychuk's, Uhryniuk's, and others.

Father Klyvak also provided an account of economic remittances from migrants to the village (of which he was aware). Between 1905 and 1913, “our emigrants” had sent 46,070 crowns to their families, of which: 42,880 came from temporary migrants in Canada and 1,380 from those who had settled there permanently; migrants in the United States during the same period had remitted 1,819 crowns, and from Germany came 600 crowns. While “almost all” of the 16 who had settled permanently in Canada sent money, none from Argentina or Brazil did. There were 35 who migrated for temporary jobs (one in Germany, one in the United States, and the rest in Canada) that remitted no money, of which the village had no news, and of which people said that “they died.” Father Klyvak also provided a list of individual remittances (see Table 2). Father Klyvak concluded, expressing his belief that the accounting demonstrated the utility of temporary migrant labor to “our people,” especially when undertaken by sober and moral individuals, employed in a viable occupation.

Table 2. *Economic Remittances to a Galician Greek Catholic village*

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates of remittances</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Total Remittances</i>
Ivan Shkarapada	United States	April 1911-	Cement factory	650 crowns
Mykola Chyzhevsky	Montreal	1912-	Not provided	400 crowns
Yatsko Bashuk	Jeil Stor, Saskatchewan (?)	1910-	Not provided	3,400 crowns
Teod Nykyphoruk	Canada	1908-	Silver mine	2200 crowns
Dmytro Bilooky	Cobalt, Ontario ¹¹²⁷	1909-1912	Silver mine	1,400 crowns
Stephan Benchuk	Canada (returned to Yasenev Pilny)	1907-1912	Not provided	5,500 crowns
Yak Nestyuk	Latching Locs, Quebec (?)	1901-	Wire factory	1,000 crowns
N. Tychynsky	Canada	1911-	Road work	1,080 crowns
Danylo Karaban	St. Schearer, Montreal	1907-	Cartwright	4,000 crowns
Hryn Mykhalyik	Sudbury, Ontario ¹¹²⁸	1909-	Not provided	1,000 crowns
Yurko Nykyforuk	Espanola, Ontario ¹¹²⁹	1910	Not provided	3,200 crowns
Fedir Kamyanetsky	Winnipeg	1906-	Not provided	2,400 crowns (+ bought a field and paid the debt)
Anna Knyhynytska	New York	1910-	Servant	800 crowns

In addition to the money which migrants remitted to their family members, migrants also sent money to their own village parishes, for various reasons. Various solicitors in the old country requested and received funds from migrant communities for the construction of churches or the rebuilding of ones that had burned.¹¹³⁰ Additionally, numerous Greek Catholic priests reported that migrants remitted money to them for the performance of religious services in their absence. In 1909, one such priest, Father Myron Chyrpansky, whose parishioners were suspected of having attended Russky Orthodox churches in

¹¹²⁷ Nicknamed “Silver City,” migrants came in large numbers to Cobalt after silver was discovered there in 1903. Between 1903 and 1909, the population increased from less than 100 to over 10,000.

<http://www.historiccobalt.ca/index.php/en/history>

¹¹²⁸ The largest city in Northern Ontario.

¹¹²⁹ Founded in the early 1900s as a company town for the Spanish River Pulp and Paper company.

¹¹³⁰ See, for example, “Yz Staroho Krayu: Publichnoe Blahodarenie,” *Amerykansky Russky Viesnik* October 12, 1911, which listed the individual donors who together donated 1,060 crowns to rebuild a burned church in a Subcarpathian village. The letter of gratitude also asked that, though they might be far from their church and native land, they not forget about it and pray for it every day.

the Americas, cited their economic remittances to the village church—in the amount 5,000 crowns—as evidence of their loyalty to their Greek Catholic rite.¹¹³¹

A Father I. Kmytskevych reported that he had accounted for all the remittances, which passed through his hands until his tenure as pastor of the village of Fraha, Galicia ended in 1913.¹¹³² For akathist services and Divine Liturgies, most migrants remitted 2-4 crowns, while some “*dzhentelmen*” sent 5-10 crowns. The 129 total emigrants from Fraha had sent 469 crowns for Divine Liturgies and for akathists, and for the church itself, 1,120 crowns.¹¹³³ The priest noted that these figures did not include the money which migrants donated through family members for liturgical services, nor remittances that migrants mailed directly to family members. The figure also excluded remittances for the village’s reading room and *gymnasium*. He added that almost no one had sent any money since November of 1911, because of the severe economic downturn in America.¹¹³⁴ Those who returned from America, he said, seemed to have undergone a change, for on Sundays and holy days they were “splendidly dressed.” Of the several migrants who did not send remittances, he had heard from other villagers that some were squandering their money on “drinks around the *hauzakh* [houses].” The cost of the returned voyage constrained them to remain in America, but the priest hoped to be able to provide them with correction when they returned one day.¹¹³⁵

¹¹³¹ "Protocol with Fr. Myron Chyrpansky," syg. 4929, 138-139.

¹¹³² "Vaha perepysky dushpastyriv z nashymy pereselntsyamy," *Emigrant* 3, no. 2 (March 1913). Ebaugh and Chafetz, in their study of communities in Houston, also found that migrants remitted money to religious institutions in regions of origin for the celebration of religious rites there. Ebaugh and Chafetz, *Religion across Borders: Transnational Immigrant Networks*, xii.

¹¹³³ Migrants had also sent via the pastor’s office: 5,286 crowns to families and for steam liner tickets; and for personal savings 36,475 crowns. Transatlantic remittances mediated by the priest thus totaled 43,651 crowns. Together with the remittances from the neighboring town of Pidbiria, the grand total came to 58,586 crowns. He noted that he held the migrants’ savings books in his possession and would return them upon request.

¹¹³⁴ The editor commented, however, that as of the time of publication of this issue of *Emigrant* (March 1913), migrants had begun finding work in America.

¹¹³⁵ "Vaha perepysky dushpastyriv z nashymy pereselntsyamy."

APPENDIX H

A LETTER FROM HELL

Between 1908 and 1914, the Brazilian government endeavor to build a railroad through the Amazon region, to connect Sao Paulo and Rio Grand, establish infrastructure to promote economic growth, and “tame” and whiten “savage” lands inhabited by indigenous peoples. During the period, perhaps 18,500 Greek Catholics came from Austria-Hungary, most as temporary labor migrants, establishing communities in Huaran, Campinas, Jahuar, and Ereshim. Some encountered indigenous peoples violently resistant to their arrival.¹¹³⁶ In 1910, Galicia’s *Narodny Holos* published a “Letter from Hell,” by Dmytro Budzynsky, originally from Vasylev, Galicia, which summed up the terrible working and living conditions to which some migrants of the period were subjected.¹¹³⁷ “The heart is wounded and tears flow,” the periodical’s editor lamented, for “unhappy are our people:” “agents” had led migrants into the “terrible hell” of Brazil. Budzynsky reported that, upon arriving in Hamburg, Germany on September 5, 1909, he learned many "Ukrainians" had boarded headed to Brazil. An agent had told them

¹¹³⁶ *O. Boruszenko* Os Ucravianos – Curitiba: Boletim informativo da Casa Romario Martins: 1995, №108, v.22, p. 12; “Zakreska Ya. Brazylyiska Ukraina Zblyzka,” *Dzvin* no. 2-3 (1993): 143, both cited in Maryna Bondarenko, “Ukrainska Diaspora v Brazylivii.”

¹¹³⁷ The letter, undated, was originally published without change in *Narodny Holos* 59 (1911). *Narodny Holos*’s editor’s introduction, along with the full text of the letter, was subsequently reprinted without change in Dmytro Budzynsky, “Lyst pro peklo,” *Emigrant* 1, no. 4 and 5 (April 1911): 36-39.

of good work with the Madeira-Mamore construction company building a railroad through the Amazon.¹¹³⁸

The agent assured Budzynsky of a favorable climate, and the latter joined the company of 350 men, among which 80-90 were “Rusko-Ukrainian:” mostly from Galicia, and most leaving wives behind temporarily. Arriving in Brazil, the company took a boat up the Amazon and Madeira rivers, accompanied by Madeira-Mamore company men and the military. After a twelve-day journey deep into Brazil’s interior, they arrived at the town of Porto Vello. There, they met 300 of their fellow countrymen, among them many “Bukovinan and Galician Rusyns,” who had arrived earlier. The reality of Brazil hardly lived up to the agent’s promises. At their destination, they suffered from great hunger, a lack of clean water, an “unhealthy climate for Europeans,” and terrible disease and sickness, chiefly malaria and yellow “*frýbra*.”¹¹³⁹

Moreover, the company reneged on the contract and used hunger to compel the migrants to accept a lower rate of pay. Budzynsky conveyed a sense of total helplessness: “There was no salvation anywhere, because we found ourselves in an ancient forest, among whose trunks a civilized man had never walked. Here, Indians greeted us with arrows from their bows, as did savage beasts like: tigers, jaguars, and giant vipers, crocodiles with their bellowing, and different birds with their striking chirping. There was no road here, only the river, and the army prevented us from going near it, in order that we not escape by that method. Here we see that we are all of us condemned to perdition.” Driven to despair, the workers finally made their escape, traveling by some kind of vehicle for three hours, then on foot for three days through the forest. People died along the way for lack of water and hunger. They made huts from the leaves of palm trees and two men stood guard to watch for the attacks of either the “Indians” or savage beasts. Though they suffered greatly from disease, “There were neither any doctors nor any nearby hospitals.” Of the 650 total men, very few remained alive, having died from hunger, disease,

¹¹³⁸ Ibid., 36-37.

¹¹³⁹ Ibid., 37-38.

thirst, or the arrows of the “Indians.” They approached the Austro-Hungarian consul in Manaus, who gave them little assistance, telling them only that they could look for work in southern Brazil.¹¹⁴⁰

¹¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

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