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A HOLISTIC REDUNDANCY- AND INCENTIVE-BASED FRAMEWORK TO IMPROVE CONTENT AVAILABILITY IN PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS

Herrera-Ruiz, Octavio (2012) A HOLISTIC REDUNDANCY- AND INCENTIVE-BASED FRAMEWORK TO IMPROVE CONTENT AVAILABILITY IN PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology has emerged as an important alternative to the traditional client-server communication paradigm to build large-scale distributed systems. P2P enables the creation, dissemination and access to information at low cost and without the need of dedicated coordinating entities. However, existing P2P systems fail to provide high-levels of content availability, which limit their applicability and adoption. This dissertation takes a holistic approach to device mechanisms to improve content availability in large-scale P2P systems.
Content availability in P2P can be impacted by hardware failures and churn. Hardware failures, in the form of disk or node failures, render information inaccessible. Churn, an inherent property of P2P, is the collective effect of the users’ uncoordinated behavior, which occurs when a large percentage of nodes join and leave frequently. Such a behavior reduces content availability significantly. Mitigating the combined effect of hardware failures and churn on content availability in P2P requires new and innovative solutions that go beyond those applied in existing distributed systems. To addresses this challenge, the thesis proposes two complementary, low cost mechanisms, whereby nodes self-organize to overcome failures and improve content availability. The first mechanism is a low complexity and highly flexible hybrid redundancy scheme, referred to as Proactive Repair (PR). The second mechanism is an incentive-based scheme that promotes cooperation and enforces fair exchange of resources among peers. These mechanisms provide the basis for the development of distributed self-organizing algorithms to automate PR and, through incentives, maximize their effectiveness in realistic P2P environments.
Our proposed solution is evaluated using a combination of analytical and experimental methods. The analytical models are developed to determine the availability and repair cost properties of PR. The results indicate that PR’s repair cost outperforms other redundancy schemes. The experimental analysis was carried out using simulation and the development of a testbed. The simulation results confirm that PR improves content availability in P2P. The proposed mechanisms are implemented and tested using a DHT-based P2P application environment. The experimental results indicate that the incentive-based mechanism can promote fair exchange of resources and limits the impact of uncooperative behaviors such as “free-riding”.


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Details

Item Type: University of Pittsburgh ETD
Status: Unpublished
Creators/Authors:
CreatorsEmailPitt UsernameORCID
Herrera-Ruiz, Octavioochst@pitt.eduOCHST
ETD Committee:
TitleMemberEmail AddressPitt UsernameORCID
Committee ChairZnati, Taiebznati@pitt.eduZNATI
Committee MemberKrishnamurthy, Prashantprashant@sis.pitt.edu PRASHK
Committee MemberMosse, Danielmosse@pitt.eduMOSSE
Committee MemberTipper, Daviddtipper@sis.pitt.eduDTIPPER
Committee MemberWeiss, Martin B.H.mbw@Pitt.eduMBW
Date: 21 May 2012
Date Type: Publication
Defense Date: 9 December 2011
Approval Date: 21 May 2012
Submission Date: 16 April 2012
Access Restriction: No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately.
Number of Pages: 180
Institution: University of Pittsburgh
Schools and Programs: School of Information Sciences > Telecommunications
Degree: PhD - Doctor of Philosophy
Thesis Type: Doctoral Dissertation
Refereed: Yes
Uncontrolled Keywords: P2P, Availability, Redundancy, Incentives
Date Deposited: 21 May 2012 12:31
Last Modified: 15 Nov 2016 13:57
URI: http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11977

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  • A HOLISTIC REDUNDANCY- AND INCENTIVE-BASED FRAMEWORK TO IMPROVE CONTENT AVAILABILITY IN PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS. (deposited 21 May 2012 12:31) [Currently Displayed]

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