DOMESTIC LEVERAGE
MEMBER STATE MOTIVES ON TURKEY JOINING THE EU

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Turkey’s bid to join the European Union is fraught with political tension and questions of identity, values and norms. In some ways, it is seen as on the central battlefield of Huntington’s clash of civilizations. It is also a matter of security and economic politics, with great geopolitical implications. This research explores why member states support or oppose Turkish membership in the EU.

This research investigates the Turkish membership policies of 15 EU member states from 1997 to 2006 and tests 32 hypotheses drawn from international relations theories and approaches. These include variables related to security, power, and wealth; identities, norms and values. In doing so it comes to some interesting conclusions and policy implications.

Contrary to common perception, it is not about security, economics or power politics between states, nor is it primarily about Turkey’s ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria of EU membership. By and large, the politics of Turkey’s bid to join the EU are not about Turkey at all. Instead, it is about the domestic politics of immigration in some member states and other member states’ own respect for human rights norms. The exception is Greece, which has a peculiar bilateral political dynamic with Turkey. Furthermore, this research finds that many more member states support Turkey than oppose its bid for membership.

In finding a parsimonious model of predicting member states’ policies, it develops policy options for Turkey to guide its difficult path for membership. Rather than attempting to be a security asset and valuable trading partner, Turkey needs to muck it up in member states’ domestic politics, where the real challenges lie. Of course, it needs to meet the criteria for membership, but at the same time it should not prematurely give in to Cypriot demands, despite the EU’s urging for it to do so.
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PREFACE

This dissertation found its origin in a question about what the Netherlands’ policy was on Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership in 2004, when it held the EU’s rotating presidency. I sought an answer to this question because I was about to perform the role of the Dutch Presidency before a group of High School students, each of whom were also playing the roles of EU member-state leaders. This was in a Model EU simulation hosted by the European Union Center of Excellence at the University of Pittsburgh in 2006, when I was just embarking on my doctoral studies at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs.

For the next few years, I was the guy who was talking and writing about the Netherlands, the EU and/or Turkey, in nearly all my papers and projects. I received a generous research fellowship grant from the same EU Center to interview Dutch decision- and opinion-makers, all in preparation for this grand single-case study that I was preparing. I lost count of the number of times I was asked: ‘Why on earth are you studying the Netherlands?’ or ‘Why does the Dutch case matter?’ Finally, in my proposal defense, I was strongly advised by my dissertation committee to broaden it out, include more countries – bigger countries – countries that really matter for EU decision-making. Despite being a little ruffled, because I wanted to believe that the Netherlands does matter, I took their advice.

I ended up taking a very big bite – fifteen countries at five different episodes – and, to my surprise, that bite took two years to chew on and another to digest. The product of this ingestion is the present dissertation, the core of which are chapters 5 – 9, which develop, in meticulously cited and obsessive detail, the dataset upon which the subsequent analyses rest. With equal compulsive zeal, I developed the thirty-two hypotheses that the dataset is used to test. This I did without my committee’s knowledge, else they would have wisely advised me to test many fewer hypotheses. The responsibility for this fanaticism rests on my shoulders alone, and my committee deserves no blame for my excesses.
I can, however, thank them for their advice and patience. Michael Brenner, my principal advisor, went beyond the call of duty in guiding me, even past his own term at the University of Pittsburgh. So too, Alberta Sbragia and John Keeler went well beyond the requirements of their high offices to serve on my committee. Nuno Themudo has also been of great help to me, both during coursework and afterward. Joseph Jupille and James Caporaso also gave me good advice (some of which I made the error of not heeding) during a workshop hosted by the University of Washington’s European Union Center of Excellence. I also want to thank Jacek Lubecki, my mentor for over a decade, who is primarily responsible for this choice of career.

Among my peers, I need to thank Behsat Ekici who entertained the innumerable questions that I had about his country and its politics, and generously helped me in many ways over the course of the program. So too, Steve Scheinert, Güneş Ertan, and Ekaterina Turkina-Oreshkina deserve many thanks for their scholarly and emotional support. I would also like to thank Cüneyt Gürer for his work and thoughts.

None of any of it would have been possible without the constant support of my wife, Violeta Garza, who saw me through the entire process with much more patience that I probably deserved. Also, my mother, Elisa Roberti, who painstakingly reviewed all the best chapters of this work, deserves much credit for making them as legible as they are. Finally, I would also thank my cat, Rumi, but he really did not do anything to help; he just stuck his face into mine far too frequently when I was on a productive train of thought.
INTRODUCTION

“If Turkey joins the EU... the victory at the Battle of Vienna will have been in vain.”


This, according to sound-byte reporting, is what European Commissioner Bolkestein said in a speech in September 2004, as the EU prepared to decide whether or not to begin accession negotiations with Turkey. The sentiment, often thrown at Bolkestein’s feet as part of anti-Turkish/anti-Islamic fearmongering, is not entirely fair. He said that a union of many nations was not stable and that, like the Austro-Hungarian Empire, this instability would lead to the breakup of the Union. Furthermore, he said that continued spread of Islam in Europe would mean that the victory at Vienna would have been in vain.

The misquote and the actual statement, however, both suggest that Turkey could do with accession what the Ottomans failed to do by force. The misquote leaves out the supposed method and the supposed purpose. Bolkenstein suggests that Turkey could destabilize the EU and migrating millions of Muslims into European countries would mean the destruction of European civilization through the spreading of the Muslim faith. By painting this picture of a clash between a conquering Islam and a civilized multi-national Europe, he fed a dramatic narrative with invaders and defenders, between Western civilization and the barbarians at the gates.

This implied narrative is, however, absurd. Accession is not conquest, nor is Europe under threat of becoming subject to an Islamic caliphate with a policy to change the religious beliefs of the Europeans. The “Islamization” of Europe presently does not amount to ten percent of the population anywhere in Western Europe. As absurd as the narrative is, its absurdity has not meant that it has been wanting for adherents. The drama of it has been its winning feature, even if it has been lacking in plausibility. As such, the narrative has been an effective vote-getter.
While Bolkestein’s Netherlands was not – at that particular time – preparing for elections, his political party, the right-wing liberal VVD, was in the midst of an internal struggle over Turkey and its bid for membership. This was also during the Netherlands’ tenure in the rotating Presidency of the EU, and Turkey topped the European Council’s agenda. The VVD’s foreign policy spokesman in Parliament, Geert Wilders, was at vehement odds with the party leadership on the question of opening accession negotiations with Ankara. The VVD had, in the general elections of 2002, been crushed by the flamboyant Pim Fortuyn who campaigned on limiting immigration and criticizing Muslim culture. Fortuyn’s assassination left a vacuum in a new political market, one in which it was possible to win votes by agitating against Muslim immigration. By splitting with the VVD in the early fall of 2004, Geert Wilders successfully began to fill that vacuum and would, in time, gain immense electoral success.

Geert Wilders’ success has not been alone in Europe. The Danish People’s Party is a forerunner. The Front National in France, the Northern League in Italy, the Freedom Party in Austria, Vlaams Blok/Belang in Belgium, the Sweden Democrats, and, more recently, the True Finns in Finland are also part of this phenomenon. All want stronger policies on immigration, especially immigration from Muslim countries. Opposition to Turkish membership in the EU is essentially a part of their overall narrative of defending their ‘civilized’ European countries against Muslim invasion.

Lest it be thought that this is only an attack on the supposedly misguided politics of the political right, the political left has also used biased political narratives. The left has embraced the idea of spreading Western liberal values, defeating the Clash of Civilizations, and thwarting racism and bigotry by embracing Turkey, regardless of Turkey’s own merits. At several turns, governments of the political left have taken the pose of a benevolent tutor. Yet, these tutors’ grading was based on their own narrative-driven aspirations rather than the student’s performance, while at the same time making the crux of their argument about accusing their domestic political counterparts of discrimination and prejudice. As such, it cannot be said that the domestic political process has been the means by which member states have decided their rational interests. The political discussion has not been materially rational– on either side of the argument. The debate has been ideational and instrumentally contrived.

This research is not, however, about political narrative; it is about the politics of Turkey joining the EU. The reason that the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ narrative leads off this introduction is because the findings point to the importance of that narrative in a particular set of member states.
Another finding is that this narrative is not a given. Public opinions and public policies in the member states have varied tremendously over short periods of time. As such, the narratives that drive public opinion are both factor and function in the domestic politics of these member states, and those domestic politics have ruled these member states’ policies regarding Turkey. They are the reason for Turkey’s troubled accession process.

In all, the political debates about Turkey have had little to do with Turkey. Turkey’s own progress, or occasional lack thereof, has not led the member states to be more or less supportive of its candidacy. The enlargement regime has not been the same for Turkey as it has been for other member states, despite the protestations of those who would (sometimes rightly) hold Turkey to account for its failings. The Copenhagen criteria of membership are not the only criteria by which Turkey has been judged, nor have the Copenhagen political criteria been fully required for Turkey’s advancement. Furthermore, in order to become a member, Turkey will – beyond doubt – have to make political concessions that are outside of the Copenhagen criteria for membership, on Cyprus, on the free movement of persons, and probably on its historical understanding of the mass killings of 1915.

In the broader terms of analyzing foreign policy, these domestic-political curiosities – minor parties who agitate against foreigners and their foreign ways – are left out of polite discussion about international relations. The dominant paradigm of international relations – rationalism – insists that foreign policies are decided on ‘hard’ rational grounds, not on xenophobic sentiment. Interests are supposed to be based on material things; not the functions of political narratives designed to obfuscate reality for political benefit. This rationale, furthermore, is based on what is good for the ‘self’, and that self is assumed to be the state as a unitary actor. If foreign policy, on the other hand, is the result of domestic politics – which are decided more on domestic policy than foreign policy – then it can, in no way, be said that foreign policy is the result of a unitary actor acting for rational purposes. At best, it is the result of an actor with a multiple-personality disorder acting in favor of the interests of the personality'djär'.

PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of this research has been to determine the factors that govern member-state policies regarding Turkish candidacy for membership. Like any such research it has the dual purpose of learning more about the case at hand and testing the theories that describe the social dynamics of the case. In terms of member-state behavior, much of this research has involved discovering how each member state’s policy toward Turkey’s candidacy has evolved over the course of a decade. Against this empirical record, a variety of plausible factors have been tested to determine what metatheoretical paradigm best explains the observed behavior.

Because it is a case where, to a large extent, policies on the same question are made at very similar intervals, on a high-stakes political question of foreign policy, the question of Turkey’s candidacy to join the EU is one that is both fruitful and rich for foreign policy analysis. There are fifteen member-state cases, analyzed at five episodes, at 2-to-3-year intervals. That yields 75 data points and the rare possibility for quantitatively assessing foreign policies on a relatively simple-to-categorize policy outcome. With this dataset, a large number of independent variables can be unleashed to determine if they are explanatory of the policies that the member states have expressed.

This dissertation can, essentially, be divided into three main sections. The first part consists of the first three chapters, which pose the analytical precepts – the ontologies and epistemologies – that drive this research. The first chapter poses the broad ontological understandings of what motivates states and nations. In doing so it presents the two competing metatheories of international relations: Rationalism and Constructivism.

In brief terms, rationalism is a metatheory drawn from the discipline of economics that combines the broad traditions of realism and liberalism as one paradigm in which states are unitary actors and act in pursuit of their material interests. These material interests are posed as being security, power and wealth. Constructivism is a paradigm drawn from the discipline of sociology that takes culture as the driving force of human events. Broadly speaking, constructivism argues that identity, norms, and values are what guide behavior.

What this chapter argues is that the current contest between these two metatheories has been analytically fruitless. Rationalism, in its ‘thin-theory’ form, is so expansive as to, essentially, not allow for any predictive power of interest definition. Its ‘thick-theory’ form is more rigorous, but it is still not conclusive about what, ontologically, constitutes a ‘material’ interest. This is particularly highlighted by constructivist critics of rationalism, who argue that security, power and wealth are
‘ideas all the way down’. Constructivists, in their turn, are also ‘fuzzy’ on what the boundaries of their theories are. Identities, norms and values can be taken as being expansive without limit, and cannot, therefore, rule out any forms of behavior.

The second chapter takes these metatheories and the six components – security, power and wealth for Rationalism and identity, norms and values for Constructivism – and derives 32 testable hypotheses from these overarching metatheories. For security, security from regional instability, terrorism, and crime is taken into account. For power, power at the global, regional and domestic levels are considered, and for wealth, wealth in terms of agriculture, trade, investment and employment is analyzed. In terms of identities, religion and religiosity as well as nationalism and cultural differences are tested for. For norms, the institutions of the enlargement regime and socialization are considered, and in terms of values member states are gauged by their own respect for civil and human rights as well as their own levels of corruption.

Chapter three describes the methodologies that are used to test these hypotheses. Independent variables such as military participation, terrorist incidents, degrees of external trade, population size, public opinion, the relative number of immigrants, trade surpluses, religion, anti-Muslim sentiment, and a corruption perception index, are used to test the hypotheses posed in the second chapter. With a few exceptions, quantitative measures of correlation (Pearson’s $R$) and proportional reduction of error (gamma) are used to test the mostly ratio-level variables, both in static terms (in average across time) and time-sensitive terms (taking change over time into account).

The second part presents the broad history of EU enlargement in chapter four, and the narrative histories of five separate episodes in which Turkey was on the agenda of the European Council. These five episodes are each contained in chapters five through nine. Chapter five considers the events leading up to the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997. At that time Turkey was treated differently from other applicant countries, but nevertheless invited to attend a conference for all countries “aspiring to accede to” the EU. Chapter six considers the developments leading to the Helsinki European Council in 1999 when Turkey was confirmed as a candidate for membership. Chapter seven considers the Copenhagen European Council of 2002, when on the sidelines of the signing of the ratification treaties that would enlarge the EU by ten countries, Turkey was denied for starting accession negotiations. Chapter eight describes how the Council came to a different decision in 2004 when, under the Dutch presidency, the member states agreed to start accession negotiations with Turkey starting in October 2005. In 2006, described in
chapter nine, however, the member states decided to freeze several chapters of negotiations in order to compel Turkey to open its harbors and airports to (Greek) Cypriot ships and airplanes.

What these chapters demonstrate is that the member states had varying policies toward Turkey’s candidacy for membership. Some, such as Italy and the United Kingdom, have been steady supporters, whereas others, such as Austria and Denmark have been fairly steady opponents. Most countries, however, changed their policies over the course of the five episodes. Countries such as the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Greece, and Luxembourg have opposed and supported Turkey, changing their policies with some frequency. The purpose of this empirical record has been to determine what the policies of the member states were in each of these episodes and provide the research with a dependent variable.

The third part is the analytical part of this research. The first of these chapters, chapter ten, summarizes the dependent variable as this was set in the preceding five chapters. It then tests the Rationalist hypotheses posed in chapter two. It tests twenty-one of the thirty-two hypotheses put forward in that chapter. It finds that there is significant support for the hypotheses related to domestic politics, and that the relationship between domestic politics of the countries with relatively large Turkish communities and the expressed policies is particularly significant. By comparison, the variables related to security, power at the global and regional levels, and wealth are less significant.

Chapter eleven, in turn, tests the eleven Constructivist hypotheses. It finds that perceptions of cultural differences significantly explain trends in member-state policies, but less so when measured across time. In this regard, it provides a less powerful explanation than the domestic politics of immigration do, and suggests that perceptions of cultural differences are a function of the domestic politics, rather than a leading factor in forming them. It also finds that human-rights and rule-of-law values have relatively significant predictive powers.

Notably, this chapter finds that religiosity is counterintuitive in its predictive value. Countries that have greater church attendance are more likely to be supportive of Turkey than countries with less church attendance do. As such, it is clearly not the case that the churches are convincing public opinion to oppose Turkey. Nor is it the pope, despite his opaque statements about Turkey. In that sense, the Christians are not the ones keeping Turkey out of the ‘Christian club’. That said, Catholic countries (Austria and Luxembourg notwithstanding) are more likely to be supportive of Turkey than Protestant countries are (the United Kingdom notwithstanding), yet with such striking exceptions to the rule that the rule is not a very good one. Further, it is also not evident that countries with higher levels of intolerance toward Muslims are more likely to oppose Turkey than
more tolerant countries are. As such, the common understanding of what has kept Turkey from having an easier road to membership is not demonstrably true.

Chapter twelve takes tally of the findings of the previous two chapters. It takes the domestic politics explanation – where those countries with relatively large Turkish communities – and analyzes what other variables are explanatory in the context of the domestic politics of these member states. In other words: what explains the other member states? What is found is that among the remaining member states, the countries with higher human rights standards are more likely to oppose Turkey than countries with lower human rights standards are. A partial exception is Greece, which – unsurprisingly – has a peculiar relationship with Turkey.

In this context, the chapter proposes a typology of member states with three categories: the politically-motivated countries, the habitual drivers, and the human-rights sticklers. Again, it treats Greece as an outlier from the typology because of its peculiar relationship with Turkey. The politically-motivated countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands) are the countries with relatively large Turkish communities living within their borders. In these countries it is the changes of government, between left and right, which generally explain the changes of policy. By-and-large, right-wing governments oppose Turkey whereas left-wing governments support Turkey.

The habitual drivers (Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) generally support Turkey, though some of them do not always get off the sidelines to make their views on Turkish membership heard. They are characterized by lower human rights standards than other member states. It is also noteworthy that public opinion in these countries is less informed about, or less interested in, Turkey’s candidacy, as more Eurobarometer respondents respond with ‘don’t know’ when asked about their preferences for future Turkish membership in the EU.

The human rights sticklers (Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden) are countries with high human rights standards that have a greater tendency to oppose Turkey than the other countries have, but are also more likely to be supportive when Turkey’s own human rights standards are improved. These countries were uniformly opposed to opening accession negotiations in 2002 and were uniformly supportive in 2004, after Turkey had made significant advances in human and civil rights standards.

Based on this typology and a country-by-country assessment of the driving factors of policy, the chapter finishes with a set of recommendations for Turkey to adopt in order to navigate its remaining road to membership. It does not pretend that accession will be easy for Turkey to achieve,
or even certain – regardless of Turkey’s efforts. Turkey should improve its human rights standards and complete the necessary reforms in adopting the *aquis communautaire* – the body of EU laws. Once these are implemented, it shall have to make certain painful concessions in order to win the ratifications of the accession treaties. It must come to an arrangement with Cyprus about the future of that divided island, one that ensures mutual recognition between these two countries. This will also, likely, involve an arrangement with Greece. Turkey should also negotiate some level of recognition about the events of 1915, generally called the Armenian Genocide. Without doing so, it will be very difficult to bring French socialists on board. The French socialists will doubtlessly have to be in power for France to ratify an accession treaty with Turkey, and the Armenian community has influence in that political party.

Finally, Turkey will, more than likely, have to offer the concession of permanent safeguards on the free movement of persons. This will probably be the only way in which the political right in the politically-motivated countries does not veto an accession treaty. With immigration being the well-spring of the anti-Turkish narrative, the prospect – realistic or not – of a flood of immigrant Turks will have to be taken off the table. While both unfair and humiliating, it is something that will be more likely to be overturned at a later point in time than it seems possible to ratify an accession treaty with all member states with the free movement of persons intact.
1.0 METATHEORY

International relations is a very broad field of study. Essentially, it studies how foreign policies are decided, and how all the different foreign policies affect the world, and how the interactions of those foreign policies create new factors in foreign policy-making. As the world becomes increasingly internationalized, foreign policies take more and more issues into consideration. Theory is necessary in order to make sense of everything. Because of the increasingly broader scope of foreign politics, it is also necessary to disentangle particular questions from the broader world of international relations and attempt to understand what dynamics are more relevant to any particular question, and what dynamics can be ignored.

As a social science, international relations, as a sub-set of political science, is mindful of the broader schools of thought in social science theory. The purpose of this chapter is to explore what has been written about the overarching approaches that international relations scholars have devised to support their theories about why states behave the way that they do. Social science, from its different disciplines, has developed certain frameworks of thinking about social phenomena. At the present juncture, the great debate among the social sciences, as they are manifested in international relations theory, is between the rationalist approaches coming out of the discipline of economics, and the constructivist approaches coming out of the discipline of sociology. This chapter first explores these approaches, from which the second chapter can propose theories and hypotheses to test the theoretical propositions.

Because any project such as this one cannot explore the whole broad scope of international relations theory, and because any one researcher or reader does not have infinite interests it is necessary to narrow in on particular questions. The particular question in this research – the case that shall be explored for its own sake as well as for what it teaches about foreign policy-making – is why states decide their policies regarding Turkey’s ambitions to join the European Union. This question fits into EU enlargement studies, which is a subset of EU studies and European politics. These, in turn, are part of foreign policy studies in general, which are subsets of
international relations and political science. All these disciplines, sub-disciplines, and sub-sub-disciplines have their existing bodies of work, with much overlapping and cross-fertilization. Just as it is beyond the scope of this project to encompass even a fraction of the totality of understanding, it is also impossible to review all that has been written on the matter. Below, however, is a quick outline of the state of EU-enlargement studies that will help place this research on the broader research map.

1.1 EU ENLARGEMENT STUDIES

In assessing the state of EU enlargement studies, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2005, p. 6) divided the different aspects thereof into four categories: the politics of applicant countries, the politics of member states, EU-level politics, and the impacts of enlargement. This particular project fits into the second category: the politics of member-states. The central question of this category is: what motivates member states to have certain positions on enlargement and not other positions? It is, however, understood that the third category, EU-level politics, is structured by the different alignments of the member-states, but that these also create the context in which member-states decide their policies. Decisions are a function of different arrangements of power, and power is inherently a relational concept. Furthermore, to the degree that member-states are governed by a rationalist logic of consequences, the fourth body of work is relevant for the decisions that member states make.

In Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s table (ibid., p. 7) that lists what sort of work had already been done, much of which was in their edited volume, they identify a void in two forms of analyses of member-state politics: cross-sectional comparisons between states, and longitudinal comparisons, looking at the behavior of states over time. This project seeks to diminish that void. While it is limited to looking at one particular candidate country, it is a country of significance and peculiarity, whose candidacy has captured many fears and imaginations in Europe.

That is not to say that there is a void in the above-mentioned literature as to why states make the decisions that they do. That body of work is so voluminous that there is no point in cataloging it here. What will be done, however, is an assessment in the metatheoretical foundations of theories on foreign-policy making.
As such, this chapter outlines the theoretical and philosophical grounding of the different hypotheses being tested in the present research. It broadly engages the theoretical and the metatheoretical understandings in order to provide this research with an intellectual scaffolding from which to draw hypotheses. In so doing it differentiates ‘mid-level theories’ from metatheories, also known as paradigms. The section below describes what is meant by metatheories, after which the pursuant sections will describe the the two dominant metatheories, before the next chapter explores different derived theories of foreign-policy making in the organizational context of the European Union.

1.2 METATHEORIES

Theories are ideas about why phenomena happen, attempting to explain them from one concept to the next. Metatheories are ideas about what sorts of concepts should be addressed by theories and why. Also, they identify the relevant actors of analysis and to what sort of stimuli these respond. There are two metatheories that have gained particular salience in political science, and especially so in the study of international relations. These are rationalism and constructivism.

1.2.1 Rationalism and Constructivism: an Overview

Rationalism is an overarching paradigm for the realist and liberal theories, which have been the theoretical/philosophical battle lines of many decades past. Both of these theories drew inspiration from economic theory and ontology, which emphasized scientific approaches and frameworks for analysis. Having adopted these approaches and frameworks, realism became neorealism and liberalism became neoliberalism, essentially jettisoning any room for culture and ideology. Both suggest that they are highly materialist and have a utilitarian and individualistic ontology at their core, with some variations depending on which scholar one reads. Central to the differences between them was a zero- or constant-sum logic vs. a positive-sum logic.

Where rationalism was inspired by economics, constructivism entered the political science debate out of sociology, calling everything that had been said neorealists and neoliberals into question. In doing so, constructivists undermined the notion that the materialist utilities or
rationalists were, in fact, material at all. They questioned if such material-sounding concepts as security, power and wealth were really materialistic, in the sense of pertaining to physical objects, or if they were functions of different mental maps.

Constructivism has claimed that materialist imperatives – security, power and wealth – are ‘ideas all the way down’, while rationalism explains behavior that is seemingly ideational or cultural as being a cover for ulterior materialist motives, i.e. politically acceptable behavior necessary for the pursuit of power. Ultimately, then, both rationalism and constructivism can explain the exact same observations. The difference is what sort of motivations lie unobserved within policy makers’ heads. Yet, this is analytically fruitless. If both theories can explain everything, they cannot teach anything.

Enter scholars trying to get back to making sense of why political leaders do what they do and these scholars are presented with unfathomable ontological and epistemological scaffoldings on which to hang their observations and ‘mid-level’ theories. Most of them embrace the paradigm they like and dismiss any protestations from other schools of thought without engaging the critiques. The best minds attempting to solve this conundrum give the struggling researchers the advice: don’t worry about the metatheories. They also advise the researchers avoid the route of the anthropologist, stamping around barefoot in the mud until the mud starts to make sense. Do not get too abstract; do not get too grounded. Think about what you’re doing, but not too much. Do not break your head on Habermas or poke your toes on twigs lodged in the muck.

The problem with the mid-level theories is that they come from different schools of thought and it is important to not finagle one theory to its detriment and so support another theory more generously conceived of. Another problem is the choice of how and what to analyze, as some paradigms, theories and metatheories, lend themselves more to explaining than others do.

1.2.2 So What?

If both paradigms are, then, too amorphous to make sense of, what is their utility and how does that pertain to this research? Their utility is in their primary orientations. They help guide the researcher in forming initial hypotheses: e.g. if one presumes the state as actor, and its interests as security from violent instability, what would be the state’s interest regarding Turkey and its prospect for membership. How might the force of that interest compare with that of a neighboring state? From

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1 Many thanks to Joseph Jupille for this metaphor.
the other side, e.g. if the people of state are more religious than that state, how might their identification with Turkey differ?

Conducting this broad exercise allows the researcher to focus in on the set of variables that, in a multivariate model, seem to best explain the behavior of the actors in question. Once that is done, further research within the context of those can help come to further insight in the social dynamics of the case and, hopefully, insight into broader realms of political activity. Along the way, the researcher is exposed to the raw data – politicians’ statements, their individual behavior, the relationship between political maneuvering and policy outcomes – that greater understanding can take place in order to guide that further research.

This research cannot go all the way to the end of this investigative road. It shall not discover the Higgs boson of human and political decision-making. As the following chapters will explain, its purpose is to find a limited set of variables that most helpfully explain the observed behavior in the case of Turkey and its bid for membership in the European Union. The findings of this research can then help guide future research toward, at least, a better explanation of the interaction between self-interested action and other-interested impulse.

To this end, this chapter reaches up to the ethereal plane of metatheory in order to outline where specific hypotheses that can explain the decisions that political leaders make can be drawn from. In the sections below those metatheories are outlined, whereby rationalism assumes that actors have interests, probably materialistic, which they pursue for their own gain and utility, and constructivism posits actors as having identities, norms and values, which they express and live by. Each section looks at five different elements: identification of actors; interests; cognitive limitations/maps; internal divisions; and room for dialogues and distinctions. Following these treatments of the metatheories, the chapter will consider where these metatheories overlap and where they differ from one another in order to suggest contrasting expectations. Once that is done, the pursuant chapter will deal with taking the expectations and identifying discrete hypotheses from them.
1.3 RATIONALISM

Rationalism is the school of thought that emerged from the discipline of economics and has been particularly dominant in international relations theory. It deals with rationality from the economics perspective – the rational actor model – which is materialistic, objective and individualistic. Rationalism’s general presumption is that actors have material self-interests, which center on security, power and wealth, which are pursued by means according to effectiveness and efficiency. Rationalism dismisses normative arguments as being explanatory in themselves. These are nothing more than the rhetoric that provides a cover for the real – material – motives of actors. In rationalism, norms are not internalized, values are strictly related to material gain, security and power, and identities are treated as given – only useful in the way actors are distinguished from one another.

The following paragraphs discuss rationalism’s precepts on individualism and interests (security, power, and wealth). They further treat the concept of bounded rationality and the internal divisions within the rationalist paradigm. Finally, it discusses on what fronts rationalism must be distinct from constructivism in order to be meaningful, and on what fronts there is conceptual overlap, creating a possibility for theoretical synthesis.

1.3.1 Actor Definition: Individualism

The rationalist approach requires a specified choice of the level and the unit of analysis. By definition, rationalism is about self-regard in a materialistic sense. The more narrowly the ‘self’ is defined, the purer and more true the degree to which the rational actor model is ontologically precise. The purest approach (barring an exploration into divided psychologies) is to define the actor as an individual human being. In the realm of politics, the narrow reading of individualism points toward analysis of individual politicians and their narrowly egoistic interests.

In the field of international relations, the individual actor, however, tends to refer to states. Because of the dense structure of political organization at the state level, individual politicians are placed into a dizzying array of fiduciary responsibilities. Because of this Byzantine maelstrom of interests, it is taken as far more parsimonious to assume the state as being a rational actor, with egoistic material interests, which are objectively identifiable.
Yet, it is worthwhile to, for a moment, contemplate the intra-state level of analysis of an individual political actor within the state system. A Foreign Minister, for example, represents his/her colleague ministers from the cabinet toward the Parliament, the nation toward other countries, his/her political party within a coalition government, particular constituencies within the political party, and any organized interests which have given him/her support for certain purposes. A Foreign Minister also has to represent the international level to the national level of politics. The politician’s art is to juggle all these fiduciary relationships between those principals/constituencies, for which he/she is the agent, and reap the surplus rewards for doing so. Rationalism would dictate that such actors align those interests and selectively (mis)represent them in order to wield a maximum of individual power within the political system.

In cases where the international level of politics is one of vitally high stakes – where mistakes can have fundamentally dangerous consequences of life, death and the destruction or usurpation of a political order – then there is little question that individual politicians must ‘hang together’, else they shall surely ‘hang separately’. This is the precept of the realist theory of international relations.

However, political decisions at the international level actually very rarely have those sorts of consequences in the estimable future. They concern trade treaties, the language in the charters of international organizations, or the invasion of some country that has previously been rendered harmless. This reality – that the overwhelming bulk of decisions made at the international level of analysis are not of vital importance to the continuation of the state or to the lives and limbs of its valuable citizens – means that it is less imperative for individual politicians to cooperate seamlessly. They may have significant interest in winning domestic conflicts, such that they might leverage the international political environment toward domestic political goals. This is the lesson of Robert Putnam’s logic of two-level games (1988).

One purpose of this research is to see if there is room to consider the domestic level of analysis to have greater explanatory power than the international level of analysis. If there is, then rationalism is not necessarily falsified. Yet, the central presumption of mainstream rationalist theorizing in international relations – that the state is the unitary rational actor – becomes questionable. It becomes more questionable when it can be shown that the domestic level of analysis proves to be more explanatory than the international level of analysis in questions that are high-stakes, even if they are not vital stakes.

This, not incidentally, is the purpose of the case study, beyond its other interesting qualities. The question of Turkey joining the European Union is a very serious question with tremendous
consequences. Should Turkey join the EU, it would mean a firmer relationship with very powerful ally in a very strategic location. Its sheer population size would unquestionably shift the balance of power in the EU’s institutions, and its relative poverty (in GDP/capita) and massive agricultural sector, would upset the economic balance of power and wealth in the Single Market. If, in the context of this question, member states nevertheless succumb to the press of their domestic politics, then international relations theory has some serious explaining to do.

Because theory is, by definition, an abstract understanding of a complex reality, allowances must be made against a demand for total reductionism to the individual human being or politician. Abstract aggregations to the political party, the government department, or to the state are more reasonable. Nevertheless, rational choice theory must be careful with this holism. Narrow self-regard is axiomatic within the paradigm, and therefore the self-definition is crucial. At the very least, the self-definition must be static, in that the actor definition, be it the individual, the state, or the organization – and, therefore, the unit of analysis – does not change over time, within the same research. More specifically, the rational actor model assumes that the unit of analysis treats itself as the unit of analysis with regard to its utilitarian calculus.

This research will generally follow the approach of assuming the state as the rational actor. It will certainly take the state as the unit of comparative analysis, looking at the behavior and the characteristics of 15 member states of the EU. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests that it is useful to unpack the state, given that domestic politics frequently determine the policies, rather than the objective interests of the state as a whole.

1.3.2 Interests: Security, Power, and Wealth

The hallmark of the rationalist approach is its concern for those things considered material, i.e. ‘real’ and ‘tangible’. The criticism from constructivism is that those things that are said to be material interests are, in fact, just as much ideas as shared identity, norms and values are. Perhaps that ‘real’-ness that rationalism hopes to get at is better defined by discussing ideas that are more imperative and of a higher order of importance than others are. Also, that the ideas are so broadly shared that they are – with few exceptions – universally accepted by all those in political power and with sufficient understanding of the world to make roughly accurate analyses.
This is closely related to the ontological/epistemological necessity for the interests being objective; interests cannot be subject to peculiar individual preferences. The real crux of the rationalist paradigm is, thus, not the material-ness of interests in terms of pertaining to control over physical things, but the broad purchase in being recognized as being imperative. This is where rationalism and constructivism must differentiate from one another: the degree to which recognition of the central imperatives of behavior is common to all actors within a social system. The more they are commonly recognized, the more interests are objective, and the more likely that rationalism can explain them. The less objective they are – the more interests are constructed by particular groups of people – the more constructivism will be necessary to explain behavior.

First among the objective interests of rationalism is the interest for continued survival of the actor in question. Nothing matters to one who has ceased to exist. Therefore, maintaining one’s existence has the highest order of importance. For the human being, death is a very real prospect. This is as true for the head of government as it is for the beggar in the street. Prevention of death and bodily harm is the foremost imperative of human beings, as is protecting one’s ability to make choices that protect one’s vital imperatives. For the state, the concept of ‘death’ is a greater abstraction, but territorial integrity, maintenance of the monopoly of the use of legitimate force, and freedom of action are conventional analytical proxies to human death, harm and freedom. All of this falls under the concept generally called ‘security’.

The ability to make choices that influence one’s environment, and other actors within that environment, is the overall object of political science, and is generally called ‘power’. Power, is, however, one of the most fluid and indefinable concepts. It depends heavily on context – the conditions of the environment and the relationships with other actors in that environment. Traditionally, in the realist paradigm (examined further below) of international relations, power has been examined through the lens of the ability to threaten the security of others and so coerce them to do one’s bidding. In the liberal paradigm, other forms of influence – by manipulating the rules of regimes or by the transfer of agreed-upon tokens of wealth – are also taken into account. Regardless of the precise details from these somewhat conflicting paradigms, this is the concept of power.

A particular form of power, acknowledged by all schools of political science, is the ability to build coalitions of support for mutual interests. In the study of international relations, this is

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2 This phrase is drawn from Weber (1922), as is much of the conceptualization of this section.
generally covered in studies on alliance formation. When ‘power’ is discussed below, it will refer to this ability to wield influence over others by forming such coalitions.

The form of influence resulting from the mastery of wealth is a highly abstracted form of power. It is also one that is highly quantifiable and intricate methods of tracking the flows and means of this type of influence have been developed, generally, by the study of economics and political economy. It results from counting the agreed-upon tokens of wealth, which are generally acceptable and highly fungible. Wealth is also measured in levels of economic activity. The growth of gross domestic product (GDP) generates more fungible influence for states (fiscal revenue), and since it is measured in the same units as revenues are, it is also a measure of well-being of states (the inadequacies of such measures for doing so notwithstanding).

Because of the widespread recognition of the imperative utilities of security, power and wealth, these are generally considered as more ‘real’ interests than other concepts that exist between the ears of people. In the alien language of constructivism, they may be intersubjective ideas ‘all the way down’, but they are exceptionally broadly recognized ideas, which gives them a force of a completely different order than other ideas, such as culture, religion, ‘soft power’ or other ‘fuzzy’ concepts based on conjecture. What is particularly salient here is that these imperative interests are functions of the structure. They are not functions of individual choice; any other actor, placed in the same situation, would behave in the same way.

1.3.3 Bounded Rationality

Bounded rationality – a concept introduced by Herbert Simon (1982) – accounts for humans’ imperfect capacities for calculating the different utilities of competing options. Homo Sapiens inability to be Homo Economicus has sometimes been used as a foil for the rational actor model. A related field of study is that of biased (as opposed to balanced) misperceptions, most notably done by Robert Jervis (1976). However, neither the theory of bounded rationality nor the concept of misperception undermines the idea that behavior results from individual actors consciously choosing to pursue their perceived self-interest (Gardner, 1985).

What these theories point out is that there are limitations on the ability of researchers to reverse-engineer what the reasons of decision-makers must have been. A researcher cannot always
know what misperceptions a political leader may have been subject to. Because rationalism requires objectivity — the notion, mentioned above, that any actor in a similar situation with the same information would make the same decision — it is very difficult to reproduce the exact same set of misperceptions. Some would say that it also makes the rational actor model less falsifiable, which is convenient both for those who want to cling to it and for those who want to dismiss it.

What is critical, here, is that the biases of bounded rationality and misperception are relatively constant and consistent with the interests of the rational actor model and not the functions of concepts alien to the imperatives of the paradigm. Misperceptions such as the overestimation of the nefariousness of one’s enemy simply heightens the already-present concern for security, whereas conception of a particular actor as an enemy due to a contrasting characteristic of identity (such as a difference of religion or ideology) is one that skews the conception. So too, the bias of risk aversion tends to shifts interests away from other interests back toward security, and from long-term interest to short-term interests. Risk aversion is a degree of preference for a less optimal outcome than for an uncertain outcome. It implies the costs one is willing to bear in order to have a higher level of certainty about what those outcomes will be.

Another form of rational hedging is the cognitive map — an actor’s conceptual orientation of the world (Monroe, 1991). Originating in psychological experiments on rats running around mazes, the idea of a cognitive map is a mental depiction of the social and physical environment, with a complex of routes, paths and relationships between concepts that translates information into decisions and actions (Tolman, 1948). *Homo sapiens* has a comprehensive and accurate map; *Homo sapiens* does not. Because *Homo sapiens*, like *Rattus norvegicus*, has an imperfect cognitive map and has learned some general solutions to some general problems, he regularly applies some general solutions to all problems, whereas *Homo economicus* would calculate the perfect solution to any problem. The willingness to live with the suboptimal outcomes because the cost of calculating every single solution to every single problem is simply too high is called satisficing. The cognitive map suggests a set of solutions that tend to work for a set of problems. The limitations in scope and specificity of one’s cognitive map, coupled with the lack of willingness to find a particular solution to a particular problem, essentially defines the degree to which one is a satisficer.

If cognitive maps are such that they are functions of different worldviews (e.g. religion, ideology, and culture), and the effects of those maps significantly bias decisions in certain ways, then

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³ So too, a researcher will frequently not have the all the information that a political leader may have had. So it may be the researcher who is subject to misperceptions.
the rational actor model runs into problems. To a very considerable degree, the rational actor's interests need to be objectively understandable and neutral with respect to culture or worldview. When push comes to shove, the actor will flee rather than drink the hemlock, even if his culture, his laws, and his own political philosophy tell him that drinking the hemlock is the appropriate thing to do.

The obscure boundary of the paradigm comes when power is derived from behaving appropriately in a cultural context, where influence is derived from managing and manipulating one's environment by demonstrating culturally appropriate behavior. If rationalism is true, the actor does not internalize the norms and values of a culture and these do not take the place of his objective interests. However, because the actor has every reason to maintain the illusion that he is driven by norms and values, in order to maintain trust, he has every interest to obscure his objective self-interests.

The other question is the environment. To what degree is culture the common cognitive map of a group of people, which reduces transaction costs and provides the solution to coordination games? And, to what degree is culture the function of identities, norms and values that do not have their origin in solutions to social cooperation problems. If rationalism is true, the former degree must heavily outweigh the latter. Again, the problem is one of measurement, as these things are largely unobservable.

1.3.4 Internal Divisions

Like any such broad approach, there are different schools of thought within rationalism. A major divide has been (neo)realism vis-à-vis (neo)liberalism, wherein the former posits a conceptual world of relative-gains logic, and the latter an absolute-gains logic. The difference is one easily explained with the old joke (origin unknown) of two campers encountering a bear. According to the absolute-gains logic, the two cooperate to drive off the bear, while according to the relative-gains logic, each camper attempts to escape the bear faster than his companion is able to. The result of this is that in the positive-gains rationality of the neoliberals, cooperation is both possible and likely, whereas in the relative-gains rationality of the neorealists, cooperation is rare and fleeting. In realism alliances hold only so long as it is useful for all members of the alliance in the face of a greater external threat, and conditions of continual distrust put continual strains on the ability of actors to act in concert.
A critical difference between liberalism and neoliberalism, which is critical for this research, is that the former considered internal characteristics of the state as factors in their behavior. The mainstay theory of liberalism was the democratic peace theory; that democracies do not choose to go to war with other democracies. As such, it used an internal characteristic of states as explanatory for their behavior toward one another, even if only to explain one particular form of behavior (going to war or not).

Neoliberalism, on the other hand, adopted what neorealism had also embraced: the idea that the imperatives of the international structure were far more important factors of behavior than internal characteristics were. By holding that internal characteristics made certain actors behave differently, opened liberalism to the charge that it was not a rationalist theory. Rationalism requires objectivism. Because rationalism holds that any given actor, with any given set of capabilities, placed in any given situation will have the same response as any other actor in that same situation, the internal characteristics of the actor cannot matter in a rationalist analysis.

While the differences between realism and neoliberalism have been the subject of many long debates, this project assumes that the neoliberals have won the internal debate of rationalism. This is so especially in the context of the European Union, where cooperation is manifestly possible and durable, and where there is a distinct lack of security tension between the powers of Europe. These two realizations put realism in a particularly unfavorable light. That is, however, not to say that, even within the European Union, actors are not concerned with the gains of others in comparison to their own. Those disparities, however, lead to continued bargaining and compromise, rather than a breakdown in bargaining in compromise.

The implication of this assumption of the absence of zero-sum logic is that this research does not pose hypotheses derived from theories of competition between states – only each state’s desire to improve itself without measurement against the degree to which other states improve themselves. That said, the analyses done are put in a comparative framework in the sense that those states who stand to gain less will be less likely to support Turkey for membership, even if they do stand to benefit some. In that regard, zero-sum logics can be inferred, even if they are not the theoretical origins of the analyses.

The neoliberal conception of regime theory, which theorizes about cooperative institutions, is one where there is comparable understanding and even overlapping terminology with constructivism and institutionalism. In this sense, neoliberalism is a rational choice theory that incorporates the idea that norms are factors in behavior. Norms are regularized modes of behavior,
intended to signal to others that one’s behavior will continue to be predictable, and agreements previously made will continue to be observed. Regimes are intervening variables between preferences and behavior/outcomes (Krasner 1983, p. 8). As such, neoliberalism is already a form of metatheoretical dialogue, which incorporates institutionalist elements within an overarching rationalist framework and ontological approach.

Another debate between rationalisms is the difference between thick- and thin-theory rationalism. Thick-theory rationalism is that which posits interests as specifically given – materialistic (or highly imperative and/or objective) – and also pursued effectively and efficiently. Thin-theory rationalism does not assume what the preferences may be, taking preference-formation as exogenous to the model, but concerns itself, instead, with the effective and efficient pursuit of those interest preferences. As such, thin-theory rationalists allow for non-rationalist interests, while maintaining the implications of the theory for the mechanics of conflict and cooperation, such as exemplified by game theory.

Table 1.1, grids the four combinations possible between these four divisions in the paradigm. All quadrants except the neoliberal-thick-theory rationalism box are shaded, as they will not be considered by this project. Thin-theory is dismissed as the purpose of this research is to understand the motives, not the strategies, of member states. Neo-realist thick theory is dismissed because its predictions are not-on-keeping with the fact of the perpetuation of the European Union⁴.

⁴ That is not to say that Realism is irrelevant in the study of, for example, South Asian politics, but the zero-sum logic no longer seems to be in evidence in Europe.
Table 1.1 Four Types of Rationalism According to Two Divisions in the Paradigm.

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<th>Thick-theory</th>
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<tr>
<td>Neoliberalism</td>
<td>Interests are materialistic and subject to a positive-sum logic.</td>
<td>Interests are exogenous and subject to a positive-sum logic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neorealism</td>
<td>Interests are materialistic and subject to a zero-sum logic.</td>
<td>Interests are exogenous and subject to a zero-sum logic.</td>
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1.3.5 Distinctions and Possibilities for Synthesis

It is useful to conceive of the reasonable boundaries of rational choice theory. In order to be an explanatory framework, it must have self-imposed limits, otherwise it excludes nothing and becomes non-falsifiable and useless. As mentioned above, the constructivist critique of ‘materialism’, including the social constructions of security, power, and wealth, is an inauthentic attack on rationalism. These concepts, while sometimes frayed at the edges (currencies gaining and losing value based on confidence, the ‘idea of state’ as a focus for security concerns, and the idea of ‘soft power’), nevertheless have sufficient common purchase – they are so thoroughly intersubjectively recognized – that they can be considered facts, even if they are socially constructed.

However, they do require some definition in order to be analytically useful. Wealth refers to the greater control over economic goods and services. Power refers to the influence one actor can have over the actions of other actors, and security refers to the protection an actor has against being (coercively) influenced by other actors. Barry Buzan (1991) highlights how one of these three, security, can be a slippery concept as it can include the idea of the state, held by both the inhabitants of the state and foreign actors, which can include character definitions of what kind of a state the state is. Rationalism can legitimately consider the cohesiveness of that state idea as a security concern, but the cultural or ideological makeup of the state is beyond the pale as a security concern under rationalism, insofar as these ideas do not diminish the state’s relevant freedom of action.

The existence of these concepts of wealth, power, and security as social facts, however, creates a need for definition and theoretical allotment in order to distinguish material rationalism
from constructivism, but at the same time it demonstrates that the two approaches do have some overlap, and that possibilities for theoretical dialogue are not non-existent, even at the ontological level.

Two particular fronts on which rationalism can have dialogue with constructivism are on the fields of norms and world-perception. Both of these arise from the fact of bounded rationality; the notion that human, state, and organizational actors have only limited ability to comprehend their environment and as a result of this they rely on forms of cognitive shorthand. One such form of cognitive shorthand is the reliance on norms of behavior, which is discussed by neoliberal regime theory, under the heading of institutionalism. Another is the factor of regular misperceptions creating regularly skewed perceptions of the world, as a subjective ‘life-world’ that is at variance with the objective world as it really is. What rationalism will, in both cases, require, however, is that adherence to norms and skewed perceptions of the world be common to any type actor in the same (or very similar) position.

1.4 CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism calls all of the above tenets of rationalism into question. According to this paradigm, politics (and, for that matter, the rest of social life) is largely made up of shared ideas, rather than physical material (Wendt, 1999). The reason for action in constructivism follows a sociological understanding of rationality. Political action by political actors depends greatly on their worldviews, or ‘life-world’ (Habermas 1981/1984). Actors act according to what seems both rational and appropriate to them in their biased perceptions of the social environment and their self-deﬁnitions, as they perceive themselves in relation to their environment.

The bumper-sticker difference between rationalism and constructivism is that the former operates according to the logic of consequences in objective world while the latter operates according to the logic of appropriateness in subjective worlds. This is not an especially novel distinction coming out of the wave of constructivism of the 1980s and 1990s. The Max Weber drew these distinctions as being zweckrational and wertrational, respectively (Weber, [1922]1968, p. 24-25) many decades prior. 

5 Weber also added logics of emotion and tradition.
Another bumpersticker statement is Alexander Wendt’s general notion that international politics is “…what states make of it” – not so much subject to imperatives as they are subject to cultures (Wendt 1992).

Yet, these bumper-sticker encapsulations of constructivism are insufficient. They incline the cursory reader to believe that constructivists posit the world of international politics subject to infinitely variable factors, adrift without anchors. Yet, while political cultures may be inconstant, they are not instantly and infinitely variable either. The normative frameworks of regimes can be more durable than the distributions of power or the organizational stipulations of the regimes out of which the normative frameworks developed (Ruggie 1982).

Life-worlds and their expressions in norms, values and identities, develop slowly over time (though great upheavals can also have dramatic and rapid life-world-altering effects). If constructivism posited that shared ideas were infinitely and instantly mutable, and, indeed subject to rapid change, then it would probably be impossible to build theories around them, because it would be impossible to make meaningful general statements about the state of political affairs. Positing cultural and sociological factors as (generally) slowly evolving is what makes them scientifically testable. If this were not so, one would be better off reading the newspaper than any academic tract in order to understand the political world. Conversely, if shared ideas were constants and shared by all significant actors in the political system, the understanding of the shared ideas would almost be irrelevant. A constant variable (which, then, would not be a variable) would not explain the developments in world politics. In order to be interesting, social variables have to be variable – across time and/or place/actor – but not infinitely and instantly so.

Unlike rationalism, constructivism has been less thoroughly examined and specified in studies of international relations. In order to compare and contrast constructivism with rationalism, it is useful to posit categories of comparison at the ontological level. First, the individualist aspect of rationalism is specified. In constructivism, identities and definitions of ‘self’ and ‘other(s)’ are not taken for granted. Second, rationalism takes interests as defined by the pursuit of imperative motivations. In constructivism, interests are functions of and, possibly, factors in, identities. Thirdly, notwithstanding the limitations of bounded rationality and misperceptions, rationalism also posits that cognitive maps are uncomplicated by biases of cultural mental maps, while in constructivism, worldviews and cultures are taken as exceptionally explanatory. Biases in perceptions do not simply reinforce objectives and/or material interests. Instead, they create peculiar motivations that give particular actors different motivations than other actors.
Unlike rationalism, which has been the subject of at least a century of internal divisions, the internal divisions of constructivism have not been sufficiently belabored so as to discern distinct schools of thought that have been at analytic war with one another to the degree that identifiable positions have emerged. The debate, rather, has been against rationalism and internecine struggles have mostly been at the level of individual scholars or aimed at the utility of positivist scientific approaches.

That said, in clear division within the broader school is methodological. Many constructivists oppose the positivist imposition of the scientific method (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986). Yet, that is a position that is at odds with the purpose of this research, and will, therefore, not be considered here to any reasonable extent. Many constructivists (e.g. Jepperson, Katzenstein, Wendt, Schimmelfennig) happily embrace the conventional epistemology of positing hypotheses and allowing empirical evidence to reject or fail to reject such hypotheses, and thus come to an increasingly more informed understanding of the mechanics of social interaction.

1.4.1 Actor Definition and Identities

Above, the actor definition of rationalism – the individual – was taken as given by the research agenda. If one is studying the behavior of states, then the individual state is generally the unit of analysis and therefore the actor. That actor takes itself as the point of reference, and the interests of other actors are not taken into account, except insofar as the interests of others are useful for the self. Additionally, identities are essentially treated as constants in rationalism, wherein the level of analysis of the particular theory defines the identity of the actor. Once so defined, the identity is constant and self-serving.

In constructivism, on the other hand, identities are variable. They are complex in that the actor being studied may have a different self-definition than the analyst’s definition of the unit of analysis. Actors may conceive of their identity as shared with other actors, and therefore act in solidarity with actors sharing that identity. This aspect of constructivism is particularly interesting in cases of irredentism and separatism, where the concepts of ‘the nation’ and ‘the state’ do not overlap, and people of overlapping identities of one sort may clash (sometimes violently) with members of the same identity, because their identity of another sort conflicts. It is also interesting in cases of concentric identities, where different levels of identity are present – Bavarian, German,
European – or they may be overlapping: simultaneously Dane and Christian; Italian and Christian; Italian and Muslim; Dane and Muslim. Understanding the politics of identity as a factor of behavior involves understanding what type of identity is most salient at a particular time in a particular context.

In terms of analytic specification, any selection of a unit of analysis is acceptable as long as the associated actor makes decisions, and as long as it is understood that the actor may have a different definition of identity than strictly as itself. The unit of analysis may feel solidarity with, or hostility toward, particular other units. The researcher, however, has to make useful decisions as to what actors to study, and what identity and solidarity/hostility definitions to assume, if those patterns of identity and self/other definitions are not the subjects or objects of empirical study.

1.4.2 Identities, Values and Norms as Interests

Because of a major focus of constructivism in international relations theory has been in agitation against the rationalist paradigm, much that has been written about identities, norms, and values has been in terms of attempting to prove that they matter, rather than specifying what, exactly, they are, and how they are, at least conceptually, distinct from one another. An overview of identities has already been offered above.

Norms come in different types and are recognized both in neoliberalism and constructivism. In neoliberalism, norms are strictly interpreted as patterns of, or constraints on, behavior. In thick-theory rationalism, only materialistic interests (security, power, and wealth) are valued because of their clearly utilitarian nature. Norms are thereby limited to being standards of behavior, the deviation from which will unsettle other actors in the system, possibly causing them to retaliate in ways that will bring costs to the norm-deviating actor.

In constructivism, norms are internalized and they become integral to the construction of preferences. Non-imperative social concerns (such as spreading democracy, human rights or maintaining the religious identity of a people) factor into the preferences of actors. Norms, in the sociologically standard use of the term, are collective expectations about the proper behavior for a given identity, rather than the expected behavior of actors. Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996) argue that norms can be “regulative”, which is the minimal way in which the rationalists use
them. However, they also argue that norms can be “constitutive” of identities, making it clear whom the actors in the political system are, and implying what they want.

Wendt (1999, p. 250) differentiates between norms/rules that are followed because of force, price and legitimacy: the first, essentially in his Hobbesian (realist) world, the second in his Lockean (neoliberalism), and the third in his Kantian (constructivist) world. While his constructivism covers all of these – as each dominant logic is the function of the culture of the epoch – it is necessary to separate out the Kantian norms, because the rationalist theories already have a claim on the other epochal cultures, and the point of this exercise is to draw distinctions.

When norms operate below the radar of consciousness, and they are not contested, they may simply be treated as solutions to cooperation problems that are so taken for granted that no one is thinking about them. They are, then, essentially objective. However, when norms are challenged – for example when they are contested because two cultures of norms clash, or because an ideology calls these norms into question – then they become analytically interesting.

In a constructivist paradigm, distinct from rationalism, contested norms are supported not because they are convenient or because they are negotiated or imposed, but because of their relationship with values. Frequently, they are connected to unspoken traditional values with norms dictating the way things are done because they have ‘always’ been done that way. When those norms are challenged, so are the culture and its values. However, sometimes the values – and even the alleged traditions – are recent constructions in which people are led to believe. One such example is the notion of America’s culture of self-reliance, when the actual originating culture of American colonialism and expansion is one of cooperation in the face of a challenging environment.

Values, on the other hand, are abstract notions that are held dear, and their disregard is eschewed, for their own sake. They are what give constructivist norms their legitimacy – because norms are closely related to values. Traditional or nationalistic norms and values are, in turn, inextricably related to identity and are valued because the identity is valued. The protection, or, indeed, the spread, of the values calls for action – not because the norms are so taken for granted that they operate under the cognitive radar, but because they are contested.

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6 The argument can be made that all norms and values are connected to identity, not just traditional and nationalistic ones.
1.4.3 Cognitive/Mental Maps

If culture is a significant factor in behavior, then different cultures will produce different cognitive maps and similar cultures will produce similar cognitive maps. By contrast, rational actor models operating under situations of bounded rationality, will not behave differently from one another. Any variation in behavior will be a function of the different environments or particular niches in the environment. In constructivism, then, the different cognitive maps as the functions of different cultures, create significantly different perceptions of the world, and – therefore – different understandings of what is rational and appropriate. These different understandings create different world views.

Habermas (1984) calls these ‘lifeworlds’, and constructivism posits that these mental maps have more than the logic of consequences built into them. It is not about rats finding food in an efficient manner, but a whole host of incentives that give an individual or state their meaning. If constructivism analytically useful, political cultures coalesce around different lifeworlds/mental maps: ideas about how the world works, broadly shared by members of the culture.

To a very great extent, the liberal paradigm – descended from the Enlightenment movement of the 18th Century – has been the dominant paradigm in the United States and the United Kingdom, and became more broadly shared in Europe and elsewhere after the Second World War, with the military defeat of a somewhat different paradigm, nationalism.

The basic philosophies of the liberal paradigm have been materialism, individualism and rationalism. It is not coincidental that these are also the tenets of the rationalist paradigm described above. They are, after all, the product of Anglo-American social science. Likewise, the western scientific method of learning has marched shoulder-to-shoulder with rationalism into the far-flung reaches of the globe, where the West has attempted to inspire (or impose on) non-Western people the adoption of Western ways.

Where rationalism and constructivism must part ways with this history, however, is where the question of ‘why?’ arises. If rationalism is true, then the West imposed all of this as an efficient means of extracting resources, exporting intra-European wars, and keeping the Western world safe from an invasion of outside threats. If constructivism is true, then the road to hell was paved, at least partly, with good intentions. The Western missionaries came to save the souls of the heathens

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7 This is not to suggest that the Enlightenment was absent in continental Europe, but there were very significant lapses in the embrace thereof.
because the heathens would be better off with their souls saved, not because saving another’s soul saved one’s own.

1.4.4 Internal Divisions: Epistemology

In constructivism, the main divide among constructivists is epistemological in that a significant faction views any embrace of what is called positivistic social science as an anathema to their way of learning about the social world. From their perspective, it is a surrender of their central finding, that the scientific method is part of the rejected false paradigm. Mainstream constructivists, however, accept the scientific method as an acceptable scientific practice. In any case, it is the way in which Western intellectuals in Western culture conduct their inquiries. As that is the case, then there should be nothing wrong with continuing to do so; doing in Rome as the Romans do. Especially as this is a research agenda that looks at Western culture, this research also adopts the Western scientific method.

More seriously, however: much of constructivism, in the purest sense, seems to neglect the Popperian revolution of science with Karl Popper’s 20th century appeal to see falsifiability as the criterion to validate science. This method of inquiry does not conclude that what ‘science’ finds must be true, without regard to other points of view. It suggests that those things found to be empirically false should be discarded from consideration. The truth can still depend on one’s point of view, but an honest scientist cannot make up his/her own facts where those facts are demonstrably false.

This may not lead toward the same level of understanding about the social world that physical sciences have attained in the physical world, because human beings, interacting in social environments, frequently behave differently from one individual to the next and can alter their behavior from one time period to the next. Humans have the ability to strategically adapt to their environment and create cognitive mental maps that help them understand that environment in the ways that the subjects of the natural sciences do not. Science is one of the means of doing so (even if many if not most policy makers ignore the lessons of science). Nevertheless, it is still very useful for at least defenestrating those ideas about the social world, as it has existed, which patently do not hold up to empirical reality. Doing so is still an advancement of learning, which increases the general knowledge of the social and political world. The use of the scientific method remains a very useful
tool in increasing general knowledge alongside more freestyle inquiries such as the other constructivists use, and those who embrace the humanities approaches.

1.4.5 Limits and Opportunities for Dialogue

As with rationalism, constructivism has within it the danger of swallowing up everything on order to explain anything. Doing so runs the risk of uselessness and there are even greater dangers for this with constructivism than there are for rationalism, because of the seemingly infinite malleability of its explanatory factors. Because constructivism allows itself to be so malleable – as culture can change and any individual can be assigned multiple labels of identity, each with their own behavioral implications – culture can easily be assigned to any form of behavior after-the-fact.

As such, constructivism is in dire need for specificity and predictions that exclude certain forms of behavior. This research is an attempt to do so, with several approaches stemming from the three supposed motives for behavior: identities, norms and values. Several frames of identity, as these seem to relate to the subject matter – religion, nationalism, and perceptions of cultural difference – are tested against the dependent variable. So too, norms take the form of regime rules and levels of socialization. Values are framed as embrace of human and civil rights and levels of corruption (ie. rule of law).

In doing so, it must also clearly distinguish itself from rationalism. If rationalism is adopted as a discourse that has great purchase and which most people use, then we might as well simply use rationalism and discard constructivism and the notion of discourses. That does not mean that there should not be opportunities for inter-paradigmatic dialogue. These are treated more fully below, but one particular avenue for such dialogue would be to think about how certain discourses are created instrumentally for the purpose of generating power: making people believe what one wants them to believe and making them believe they always believed it.

This is advanced as the idea of instrumental narratives that politicians and opinion leaders use to explain policy challenges to their audiences. These narratives are created in such a way that the audience will prefer to believe these politicians and opinion leaders over other politicians and opinion leaders, and so power shifts from one faction to another. The narratives do not necessarily win because of their adherence to verifiable reality, but due to their believability. Believability is
suggested to be more of a function of drama than of accuracy, though there are some limits on the
degree to which politicians and opinion leaders can skew the truth to their advantage.

This is, however, not the aim of the present research. This research attempts to discover
what realm of politics best explains state behavior in the case at hand. The metatheories of
rationalism and constructivism are used to inspire hypotheses that will help discover the most
parsimonious explanation for that behavior.

1.5 METATHEORETICAL DIALOGUE

At the present juncture, the great debate in international relations theory is a contradiction between
these two metatheories. While much work has been done to attempt to demonstrate the superiority
of one approach over the other – or the inadequacy of the other in favor of the one – many scholars
are attempting to bridge the divide between the two schools. One aspect of the debate, however,
that has proven to be highly problematic for completing the dialogue exists at the ontological level.
The purists on each side usually put this ontological argument forward. Some closer toward the
center argue that the ontologies of rationalism and constructivism may simply be irreconcilable, and
that the best approach is to simply move ahead with the “mid-level” theory and empirical
observation without getting hung up on the foundations of the theories (Fearon & Wendt 2002;
Jupille et al. 2003).

However, the purists on both sides have valid critiques of one another. Observing scientist
plod along empirically or at the mid-level, as if the contradictions do not matter, makes one wonder
if the human-rat analogies drawn by the above-mentioned murine psychologists are more poignant
than one should hope for⁸. Yet, a problem in the combining of, or establishing a dialogue between,
rationalism and constructivism is that they are, at their core, fundamentally contrasting approaches
to understanding the world, as well as contradictory approaches to learning about the world.
Drawing on the points made above, there are four main areas of distinction: actor definition and
identity, positing interests, cognitive imperfection and contrasting epistemologies. Any dialogue
between the theories would have to address these core differences.

⁸That is not to say that this research goes beyond that recommendation. It is an exercise in deductively positing
hypotheses in order to arrive at an inductively-based understanding of what motivations, together, best explain the case,
regardless of their paradigmatic origins.
A guide by Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (ibid.) offers a suggestion of four means by which scholars can move forward: competitively testing the metatheories, separating them by domains of applicability, using them in sequential orders, or by one of the metatheories incorporating the other. To a large degree, their suggestions have long been taken up by scholarship. Competitive testing has been the mainstay of the debate, and the domain of application is, really, a non-starter. Who decides what turf belongs to whom? Are high-stakes conflicts, such as those concerning security really more subject to the realpolitik of realism than they are to constructivism? How far down the ladder must one go in order to shift from one explanatory paradigm to another?

More interesting are their suggestions of sequencing and incorporation, but these are already commonplace approaches. Sequencing is either thin-theory rationalism (constructivist preference ordering, and rationalist goal-seeking), or institutionalism (the solution to rational bargain at t₁ becomes the institutional, and normative, context of the rational bargain at t₂). Incorporation of norms and rules into an overarching Rationalist paradigm is what neoliberalism is all about, while constructivism, as it has been written, already argues that rationalism is one of many possible discourses.

The way forward chosen by this research is to not care that the ontologies of different explanatory frameworks differ. The findings suggest that a combination of factors drawn from both paradigms work best to explain the case. It works in practice, even if it fails in (meta)theory. The solution must be to re-conceive of the metatheory if the metatheoretical distinctions fail to work, not the other way around.

1.6 METATHEORY AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

This research finds that the best explanatory framework for understanding the member-states’ policies regarding Turkey’s prospect for EU membership is a combination of domestic political factors coupled with levels of immigration and adherence to human rights standards. Where the member states had many Turkish immigrants, the decision to embrace or reject Turkey was based on the outcomes of domestic elections. In these countries, right-wing parties opposed Turkey and left-wing parties embraced Turkey. Where there were no such concerns over immigration, domestic political developments did not matter. Instead, it is the remaining member states’ own adherence to
human rights standards that best helps predict the policies toward Turkey they would embrace. It helps to consider Turkey’s own progress toward meeting the human rights standards of the Copenhagen criteria, but doing so has marginal added explanatory value.

Immigration politics is a factor that is deduced from the rationalist approach while relaxing the stipulation that the state is the unitary actor. Political parties desire power and campaigning against Turkish membership has proven to be a winning issue for right-wing parties. Once in power, these political parties have attempted to block, slow down and derail Turkey’s accession process. The same is not true of right-wing political parties in countries without large Turkish immigrant communities.

The more ‘hard-core’ rationalist imperatives – security, wealth and power at the regional and global levels – have marginal explanatory value, if any value whatsoever. From the constructivist side, the usual explanations – religious bigotry and/or the requirement that Turkey first adhere to European norms and values – prove not to have significant explanatory value. Instead, it is the member states’ own regard for human rights that is more explanatory, in the absence of domestic political motivations.

As the central hypotheses of the competing metatheories have proven to be inadequate to the task of explaining the case, it is necessary to scratch one’s head and consider what went wrong. Surely the many decades of metatheory-building have not been in vain, even if there has been no lack of mutual denouncement. What does this case suggest about a method for inter-paradigmatic dialogue?

The first recourse is to look closely at the case at hand and see what the evidence suggests. In the process of ‘soaking and poking’ into the material, what is very striking are the arguments used by the policy-makers. It does not take a consummate cynic to think that the politicians and opinion leaders use arguments selectively to pursue power. As such, it is quite rational for them to design their political rhetoric around the messages that will appeal to their audiences and propel them toward victorious elections. Doubtlessly, some of them believe, or come to believe, their own messages, and those messages frequently have arguments not based in material or objective interests.

The array of arguments aligned against Turkey: that Turkey is not a European country; that Turkey’s dominant religion makes it unsuitable as an EU member; that the cultural differences and/or historical memories are just too great, or that Turkey’s behavior with respect to Cyprus and human rights are commonplace in the rhetoric of Turkey’s opponents, yet none have their basis in
rationalism. Why would these arguments appeal to Europe’s electorates if the electorates were rational? Why should politicians be presumed to be rational if their electorates are not?

The answer, most likely, lies in bounded rationality or, more blatantly, ignorance. Members of the electorate are frequently uninformed about many of the basics of the case. Politicians and opinion leaders, who – themselves – are not always the most informed, seek to give them enough information to satisfice a need to feel sufficiently informed to have an opinion. This information, embedded in an explicit or implicit dramatic narrative, motivates audiences to arrive at opinions. If the politicians and opinion leaders are successful, the audience is swayed by the overall argument and this results in changes in public opinion and, thus, political fortunes.

This research cannot say which of Jupille et al.’s four categories of metatheoretical dialogue best provide a most useful framework for understanding. The answer is clearly not either rationalism or constructivism in a competitive testing model. The narratives and the emotions which they appeal to are not mere deviations from the overall model, nor are the politicians and opinion leaders slaves to their own discourses – they are their authors and they are instrumentally designed for the accumulation of power. This is simply one case, and cannot say that it represents one sequence or another, though the formation of narratives may be rationalist as an instrumental means to power, while their subsequent appeal might be a more cultural phenomenon, and thus constructivist.

The finding that member states’ high-stakes foreign policies are functions of their domestic politics (or their embrace of human rights) calls any domain of application separation between rationalism and constructivism into question. If the one domain of politics is leveraged (or mortgaged) in favor of the other, then it is difficult to say that one paradigm belongs in one domain and another belongs in the other.

Finally, subsumption is little more than a friendlier (or pedantic) version of either/or competitive testing. That said, subsumption of either type – rationalism within an overarching constructivist framework or vice versa – is probably the most useful way to proceed. What matters is that they provide useful hypotheses, and allowing a fruitful interaction of deductive and inductive research to take place so that the science is guided by the real world, rather than paradigmatic preferences.
2.0 THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES

The Metatheories described in the previous chapter, without elaboration, are poor predictors of the actual patterns of behavior of actors. They provide for competing frameworks of thinking, and the underlying ‘physics’, as it were, for building theories, but they do not directly provide a concrete understanding of what particular motives explain what particular types of actions. Furthermore, it is necessary to place the motivations and impulses into context in order to apply them toward understanding behavior. In order to use the physics of metatheory to understand the behavior of actors in international relations, it is necessary to introduce engineering to the physics, and understand how the motives and impulses of metatheory are applied in real-world settings.

This chapter uses the metatheoretical approaches discussed in the previous chapter to further explore the theoretical implications within the context of European Union politics concerning possible Turkish membership in the EU. It operationalizes the different theoretical approaches into testable hypotheses. Following the Popperian methodology described in the previous chapter, it is necessary to dismiss a host of plausible notions about why certain EU members might support Turkey and others might not.

It is, of course, impossible to hypothesize and test every possible variable that could conceivably explain why states behave the way that they do, nor is it likely that any single variable, even if derived from a plausible theory, could explain the entire range of behavior that states exhibit. Nevertheless, it is desirable to test as many as possible within reasonable margins. In order to bring structure to the inquiries to be made, this chapter takes the motivations and impulses, identified in the previous chapter, and derives theories that explain state behavior. The first half of the chapter looks at theories and hypotheses derived from Rationalism and the second half looks at theories and hypotheses derived from Constructivism.
2.1 RATIONALIST THEORIES

Rationalism posits security, power, and wealth, as the reasons that states do what they do, because these concepts capture facets of life that are considered to have a greater imperative for human action than notional identities, norms of behavior, or abstract values do. In order to apply these concepts to generalized motivations of state behavior, however, they must be conceptualized in more detail. In order to stay true to the metatheory of Rationalism, these conceptualizations must also be distinguished from non-Rationalist conceptions of security, power and wealth. Doing so is the purpose of this section of the chapter.

2.1 Security

For a long time, scholars of international relations theory have treated security as the overwhelming imperative in the anarchic world of self-helping actors. The precarious struggle for survival has been taken as eclipsing any secondary considerations, such as domestic politics, ideology or religion. Further, economics are only a useful lens to the degree that the economic structure helps fuel states’ means of conducting war. As such, the study of international relations has been dominated by attempts to understand why states go to war against one another, and how security from being conquered or coerced must be the foremost concern of statesmen and override all other national interests. What use is getting a leg up in an international treaty or possessing the exclusive rights to some other country’s exports, when a militarily stronger neighbor is going to take it all away?

2.1.1 Security from Coercion

Security from coercion is thus the classic frame of reference for understanding power in an anarchic system. Famously drawn from Thucydides’ *Melian dialogue*, the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must in order to survive. States use threats or actual violence to force their neighbors to behave as they are directed to. This traditional conception of security relations is derived from the writings of Kenneth Waltz (in particular 1979), for whom the international balance of power was determinative, and Stephen Walt (1987), for whom the balance of threat is determinative. The difference between the two is a subtle one, where the essential theory of the former considers concentrations of global power to invite balancing – countries seeking to enhance
their freedom from coercion by opposing the domination of the dominant global power through alliances with the lesser powers. Walt’s permutation on this idea is that countries balance against particular threats to their individual autonomy without regard to the global distribution of power.

While Waltz’ balance of power theory may explain the behavior of great powers, it is a difficult theory to apply to smaller countries, because if its central tenet were true, all countries would balance against the dominant global power, assuming they had the decision-making capacity to do so. In that regard, the balance of threat is more workable in the context of Europe. According to Walt’s Realist theory, states would balance against those other states that are most likely to dominate them because of a particular state’s aggregate abilities, proximity, offensive capabilities, or expressed aggressive intentions.

While Walt’s theory may well hold true in continents like Asia and in the Middle East, it is difficult to make the case for present-day Europe, where the development of offensive capabilities is lackluster and where expressed aggressive intentions toward one another is completely absent. Perhaps it is due to the United States’ maintenance of NATO and its continued military presence in Europe that has prevented John Mearsheimer’s (1990) predictions of a return to 19th and early 20th Century coercive European politics from coming true.

Regardless of why, it is taken as assumed that coercive politics are absent in Europe, aside from some prevention of humanitarian disasters and instability in the Balkans. One exception is Greece. In 1996 there was a very real specter of war with Turkey over two rocks in the Aegean Sea inhabited by goats. While it is certainly not inconceivable that Greece’s behavior on Turkey’s membership was strongly influenced by its stochastically hostile relationship with Turkey, it is inconceivable that Turkey forced Greece to support its membership on pain of invasion. As such, without prejudice for security from coercion being a real factor in foreign policy behavior, it is not treated as being explanatory of politics in the EU.

Assumed that direct coercion is obsolete in the West as it currently exists, and that colonialism is a political system of the past, the objective of security policy is maintaining a stable environment in which the threat of violence remains remote and resources have few troubles in flowing to European shores. As such, European countries have concerns for both regional and global stability. Threats to regional stability have come in the shape of civil wars in the Balkans, the (supposed) development of weapons of mass destruction in Iran and Iraq, and the support of massive terrorist operations out of Afghanistan. In addition to regional instability and terrorism,
another security concern is transnational crime, which undermines each state’s ability to monopolize the use of force within their borders and protect their citizens from harm.

Many have argued that tying Turkey closer to Europe is a security interest, because Turkey is an Islamic country. The reasoning is that a Turkey that is both Islamic and democratic, tied closely to Europe, provides a powerful symbol and creates an avenue for civilizational dialogue. Such a dialogue would, supposedly, diminish Islamist terrorism aimed at European countries and provide inspiration for other Middle Eastern countries to democratize. That may very well be the case, but that is an understanding of security that is wholly alien to security in the ‘material’ sense. In the material sense, Turkey would be a stabilizing factor in its sphere of influence, straddling the Balkans and the Northern Middle East. From the materialist security perspective, the argument would be that Turkey could leverage its troops, its counter-terrorism and law-enforcement capabilities, and its diplomats in order to help the member states enforce or negotiate solutions to, or prevention of, armed conflicts, terrorism, and/or transnational crime.

It is assumed that politically and administratively integrating Turkey into the EU makes Turkey more stable and predictable for European countries and more aligned with their general security interests. Furthermore, because Turkey has expressed its strong interest in joining the EU, European countries can extract security gains from Turkey, with its strong military, which is already integrated into NATO structures.

This understanding creates a general interest for European countries, but not, necessarily, one that creates an interest that distinguishes between the member states. Given that the member states are not unanimously supportive, the critical question is analyzing why certain member states would have a greater interest than other member states, from a cooperative security perspective. Why would the United Kingdom or Ireland have a greater interest in Turkey contributing to collective European security than, say, Denmark or Austria?

That is where three different security dimensions, separate from security from coercion, come in. These are security from regional instability, security from terrorism, and security from transnational crime. The following three sections will consider each dimension in turn, present an operational understanding of each dimension, and propose testable hypotheses.
2.1.1.2 Security from Instability

The first of these security threats usually results from certain states being unable to maintain control over their territories and/or engaging in such behavior that will threaten their respective regions with instability, either by way of refugees, irredentism, or the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. In these instances, the surrounding states and states with a global scope collaborate to stabilize the instable area. Examples are the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia. The Balkans has been subject to security missions because this area is geographically close to countries with the organizational wherewithal to mount an active cooperative mission (provided they are led by the United States). The Middle East invites involvement because it is where the oil comes from, and Central Asia has become a place where Western countries have intervened because it became a haven for terrorists with the intent to strike globally.\(^9\)

The mechanism for (re-)imposing order is usually by way of coercive diplomacy or cooperative military intervention. These are used to coerce the ‘rogue nation’ into adjusting its aberrant behavior or to impose security directly by putting security forces on the ground. For most countries, contributing to these missions is costly and each has an incentive to free-ride on the burden sharing, or, at least, to contribute less than their share. Conversely, the threat of instability impacts each of the countries in the security community to a different degree, giving them each a different cost and benefit balance to calculate. From rationalist assumptions, each country will contribute enough to allow the mission to be successful, given a certain expectation of how many forces will be necessary to achieve that goal, but not more than necessary to achieve that goal. As a part of this, there is a strategic calculus looking at the contributions of other countries, and attempting to induce them to incur more of the cost of deploying peace-keeping/enforcing forces.

In terms of numbers of soldiers, Turkey has the largest military in Europe aside from Russia. Furthermore, Turkey’s military is integrated into NATO and is thus already a part of the Euro-Atlantic security framework. Assuming that Turkey could chart its independent geopolitical orientation away from Europe, if it chose to do so, European countries have an incentive to persuade Turkey to keep its security orientation aligned with theirs. EU-membership is a way to offer Turkey something that it has expressed an interest in and simultaneously anchor it into a European orientation.

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\(^9\) These terrorists could, and have in the past, set up their activities in any country with limited internal monopolies on the use of force. As such, there is nothing special about Central Asia in this respect, aside from the customs of protective hospitality practiced by its inhabitants and their dominant religion.
The challenge in analyzing this theoretical motivation for member states in enlarging the EU with Turkey lies in identifying a proxy variable that captures the member states’ relative interests in maintaining collective security. One approach is simply looking at participants in the existing regional security framework – NATO – and seeing if NATO members are more likely to be supportive of Turkey than non-NATO members are. The problem with this hypothesis, is that NATO membership does not change much over time, with the same volatility as member states’ positions on Turkey change. It is, however, possible to look at the underlying likelihood of NATO members being more likely to support their fellow NATO member at any given instance than non-NATO members. The formal hypothesis is:

**Hs1:** NATO members are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than non-NATO members are.

Another approach is looking at variable levels of contribution to military missions in support of regional stability. Maintaining troops in instable places is costly in terms of lives and money. The more other countries share the burden of maintaining a secure regional environment, the less each member state has to provide in maintaining that secure environment. Turkey, as a significant military power integrated into NATO, has great potential to share those burdens. Assuming that Turkey is more likely to share those burdens if integrated into the EU, those who contribute more to multilateral security missions are more likely to have their costs of doing so diminished by Turkey taking on some of the burdens of maintaining that security, than those who contribute less to these missions. The hypothesis can be stated as follows:

**Hs2:** Those member states who contribute more to the missions that Turkey also contributes to are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who contribute less.

A valid critique of this proxy is that free-riders on multilateral security issues can still benefit from more Turkish participation in multilateral security missions and geopolitical alignment with Europe. However, those who abstain from such missions will not see a direct reduction in the share that they need to contribute to make the mission successful, as they probably have no intention of participating with or without Turkey’s participation. Another aspect to this is that co-participation in the field creates a greater mutual interest, as well as a greater immediate need for mutual reliance.
Because Turkey is not indifferent to each country’s level of support for its membership ambitions, countries that are co-participating in the field with Turkey can expect a variable degree of cooperation from Turkey depending on their position on Turkish membership in the European Council.

2.1.1.3 Security from Terrorism
In the time since the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, the threat of terrorist movements has become a much greater part of security studies. Terrorists kill people, destroy property, and attempt to force states to adopt different policies than they would otherwise do. As with the security from regional instability dimension, states’ responses to the threats are characterized by cooperation with other states that suffer from the same or similar terrorist threats. In addressing terrorist threats, states share intelligence information in order to locate, apprehend, or otherwise put a stop to terrorists as they plan or carry out their activities. Organizational integration is one mechanism for enhancing capabilities by reducing transaction costs in sharing intelligence and cooperating in counter-terror operations.

Terrorism is also a security threat to European countries. Quite aside from the idea that the symbolism of Turkish membership would diminish the threat from Islamist terrorists, Turkey is a state with significant counter-terrorism capabilities. Being a country that deals with terrorists of many stripes, it has developed intelligence-gathering capabilities that are likely to be unique among European countries. Political integration into the EU by way of membership is likely to foster greater alignment between Europe’s counter-terror needs and Turkey’s counter-terror capabilities, offering a real security incentive for European countries to enlarge the EU with Turkey’s membership.

The challenge, again, is identifying those countries that will have a greater incentive for enhancing their ability to prevent terrorist activities against their citizens and interests. Assuming that the past is prologue, those countries that have experienced more terrorist strikes in the past are more likely to have an incentive to want their counter-terror capabilities enhanced by enhancing cooperation with Turkey’s capabilities, than those who have suffered less from terrorism. The hypothesis can, therefore, be stated as follows:
Hs3: Those member states that have suffered from terrorism in the past more are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have suffered less.

2.1.1.4 Security from Transnational Crime

Another security aspect is the threat of transnational crime. Though not a purposeful attempt to coerce changes in state policies, transnational organized crime groups undermine states’ monopolies on the use of force within their borders. Their activities also harm citizens and the legitimate economy and tend to generate corruption. Like terrorists, transnational crime syndicates cause damage to citizens’ lives and property. Because these are covert non-state actors, such syndicates invite similar policy responses as terrorism does, by having states cooperate in sharing intelligence information in order to locate and apprehend criminals and intercept their contraband.

Turkish and Kurdish crime rings are a problem for many European countries. In Western Europe, such groups mainly make their money from drug smuggling – especially heroin – from Asia, through Turkey, to Europe, where the drugs are distributed (Cengiz, 2010, p. 72). Deaths induced by heroin use alone amount to ten times the amount of people killed annually in Europe over those killed due to terrorist strikes.

Integrating Turkey into the EU implies greater integration of Turkey into Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) structures, which would plausibly create greater capabilities to fight that sort of crime. Because Turkish organized crime groups (TOCs) traffic between Turkey and the Western European countries, it is very plausible that Turkish law enforcement capabilities, integrated through EU JHA structures, can be a considerable resource to European law enforcement. This resource would exist on both sides of the equation: assistance from Turkish law enforcement intelligence and capabilities for use in European countries, and assistance from European law enforcement in Turkey, stifling the flow of contraband into Europe through Turkey’s jurisdiction.

The added value to law enforcement against Turkish organized crime groups is not among the reasons mentioned publically by European leaders. That stands to reason from a political rhetoric point of view. Mentioning the existence of TOCs is not likely to endear public opinion among European voters to the idea of Turkish membership in the EU. So, while probably being a good reason for supporting Turkish membership, it is probably not a good political argument for doing so. The aim here, however, is not to gauge the effectiveness of pro/con arguments, but to gauge what actual motivations are plausibly behind member-state policies.
Once again, the challenge is differentiating the levels of threat from TOCs to EU member states. The threat from heroin is estimated by the end-result: heroin-induced deaths. In this context it is noteworthy that the number of drug-induced deaths related to heroin does not correlate with the relative sizes of the Turkish populations in those countries. That means that while it is undoubtedly true that TOCs do operate within the Turkish immigrant communities, and these groups are responsible for trafficking the overwhelming majority of heroin into Western Europe, the greater presence of those communities does not increase the number of people dying from heroin overdose or behavior related to the consumption of that drug. As such, these measures are not proxies for measuring Turkish immigration or the presence of Turkish immigrant communities. The hypothesis is stated as follows:

**Hs4: Those member states that suffer from more insecurity from the heroin trade are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have suffered less insecurity from the heroin trade.**

### 2.1.2 Power

Power refers to the ability to bring about desired effects that would otherwise not happen. Power is the seminal concept of political science, but it is an amorphous and contested concept. In the absence of the tools of coercion related to security policy, power becomes influence. In a rationalist framework – one that dismisses the idea that rational actors might be convinced, normatively persuaded, or subconsciously manipulated – influence comes from different sources. Aside from military and economic resources, which are dealt with separately, power comes in the form of being able to leverage allies and supporters against rivals and other opponents. This is the form of power that is discussed under this heading of rational interest.

A separate form of power would be mastery of a particular regime’s rules and resources, but that presupposes that different countries have different levels of institutional control or that the rules have the ability to influence a state’s decisions. Institutional controls are certainly avenues worthy of investigation in cases where outcomes, rather than preferences, are being investigated. In terms of rules – or norms – influencing a state’s preference ordering, the question departs from the materialist and unitary actor assumptions of rationalism. In terms of the costs and benefits of adhering to rules, these are the result of expectations of retaliation or acquiescence by other actors in
the system. Those other actors will react according to their own interests, rather than the normative value of the rules themselves.

In the context of enlarging international organizations – deciding whether or not to admit new member-states – power is enhanced or diminished by having new member states that agree on policy issues, rather than disagree on them. While the EU is a consensus regime, the consensus usually does reflect the will of the majority of member states, with reasonable accommodations for the minority of member states. Bringing in a new member state alters the existing balance if the new member state has policy preferences that are different from the pre-enlargement status quo.

The policy fields in which this concept of power can be analyzed offers three levels of analysis: influence in the world, influence in the organization, and influence in the domestic arena. The global level of analysis refers to EU-level policies that relate to the rest of the world, such as foreign and trade policy. The organizational level of analysis refers to EU-level policies that affect developments within the EU, such as institutional development, the budget, agriculture, and regional development.

In terms of framework of analysis, the global and organizational level are separated from one another only for ease of reference. The domestic level of analysis, on the other hand, is different in the sense that it unpacks the assumption of the state as a unitary actor, and, instead, takes the party or parties in power as the actor, and assumes that continuing to control the government is its dominant rational interest. Each of these levels of analysis will be considered separately, below.

2.1.2.1 Power at the Global Level

All states are constituents of the world as a whole and the world’s dynamics structure state interests. Those global dynamics are, however, very unwieldy to influence and can, realistically, only be attempted by great powers such as the United States, China, and other first-rank nations. While dynamics at the regional level are the only ones within the realistic reach of small- and medium-sized powers like the European countries, together, they can possibly wield influence as the whole EU, given that the EU represents the largest single market in the world.

For the EU and the member states, the global level of analysis considers the influence gained or lost in the world, with respect to the member states’ preferences for developments in the widest arena and attempts to use the EU as a conduit for those national preferences. In the question of Turkey joining the EU, the addition of Turkey would doubtlessly give the EU more weight in its potential to influence the world, and, as such, there is little reason to doubt that any member-state
would oppose a more powerful EU, provided the organization maintained the capacity to efficiently make decisions.

While there are doubtlessly nuances, all members are assumed to have an interest in a stronger EU that has greater weight in the world in order to pursue their collective interests. The suspicion that exists about the United Kingdom’s reluctance for a more powerful EU is exhibited in its frequent opposition toward deeper integration. This reluctance for a more powerful EU has, however, not been in evidence in terms of the United Kingdom’s policies on enlargement. In fact, if anything, it is accused of supporting enlargement in order to create a weaker European Union. The UK’s interest in maintaining a strong Western alliance by using the EU as an anchor for countries on Europe’s periphery would be a more charitable interpretation of the UK’s enlargement motivations.

Because this would, in theory, be an equal motivation for all the members equally, it is necessary to put this level of analysis into the perspective of relative interests, in a similar way to the different security perspectives previously considered. As such, the question is not one of size, but of orientation. How would an EU, with Turkey as a member, orient its policies differently than an EU without Turkey as a member would? Antagonists to Turkey’s membership have, for example, argued that Turkey would be a Trojan Horse for American interests, echoing similar debates in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the United Kingdom was in the process of becoming a member state.

### 2.1.2.2 Atlanticism vs. Continentalism

One theory, then, is that an EU enlarged by Turkey would have a more Atlanticist foreign and security policy than an EU without Turkey as a member. Though it is, here, categorized as a power-variable, the question of Atlanticism or Continentalism is one that is intimately connected to the question of security: Essentially, it is a question of where will the decisions about European security be made: Washington with Brussels’ (SHAPE – NATO headquarters) assistance or in Paris and Berlin with Brussels’ (EU/ESDP-headquarters) assistance.

It is, nevertheless, categorized as a power-variable, rather than a security variable because the question is one of geopolitical balancing. It decides who wields the power to determine Europe’s security rather than necessarily how effective that security is. As a question of balancing, it is, for France and Germany, a question of concentrating more power toward themselves, and for the other European countries a question of spreading their dependence among different centers of power.
For the United States, Turkish membership in the EU – for which it has in all instances advocated – is overwhelmingly a question of security. European antagonists of Turkish accession argue that Turkey would be an American Trojan Horse. It, therefore, stands to reason that countries that, themselves, embrace a more Atlanticist foreign policy would be more supportive of Turkish membership than those with a more continental or neutral foreign policy. The hypothesis derived from this theory is stated as follows:

\[ H_{pi} : \text{Those member states that exhibit a more Atlanticist foreign policy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have a more continental or neutral foreign policy.} \]

2.1.2.3 External Trade Policy

Another framework of considering the global level of analysis comes from the conception of the EU, not as a player in global geopolitics (foreign policy decisions are, after all, more likely to be determined by each member state individually, rather than in Brussels), but as a player in the global economy. In global economic fora, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the trade rounds sponsored by that organization, the EU has a far more powerful single voice than in discussions of foreign or security policy.

In previous enlargement rounds, enlargement has had profound effects upon the EEC/EU’s trade policy, in that the addition of member states with liberal trade policies have shifted the EEC/EU’s trade policy toward support for a more liberal world trading regime and the accession of more protectionist has made the EU, as a whole, more protectionist (Woolcock, 2005, p. 390).

Following this train of thought, it should be expected that member states that have trade policy preferences similar to Turkey’s are likely to have an interest in having Turkey on board as an ally in deciding the EU’s trade policy toward the world, than those countries with trade policies expected to be dissimilar to Turkey’s. If Turkey’s trade policy toward other countries is expected to be protectionist, then the protectionist member states ought to be in favor of Turkey joining, as having a populous member state on one’s side in the trade debate. Likewise, if it is to be expected if Turkey’s trade policy will be more liberal, then the liberal member states should be expected to be more in favor of Turkey’s membership than the protectionist member states. The global trade hypothesis is, therefore:
Hp2: Those member states that exhibit a trade policy similar to Turkey’s expected trade policy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have a trade policy at odds with Turkey’s expected trade policy.

2.1.2.4 Regional or Organizational Level
The second level, influence within the region, is different because it is one where small- and medium-sized states have a stake but can also have some level of influence. In the context of Europe, that influence is institutionalized within the European Union. In this respect, influence in the region is mostly absorbed by influence within the regional organization.

In the sense of being a question about organizational enlargement, the potential accession of Turkey poses several aspects of consideration: the dilution of power of each member state, the ability of the organization to make decisions, and the sort of decisions arrived at. Enlarging an organization is always a dilution of any given state’s own share of power within the organization. This supposition makes the question analytically stale, because it is not conceptually variable over time or variable between countries. All existing member-states will have their share of power diluted by the accession of a new member. It is therefore treated as irrelevant for this research.

2.1.2.5 Enlargement Policy
That does not mean that different countries do not have blanket preferences over enlargement. Some countries have a vision of the future wherein the EU is a larger entity, whereas others prefer a (supposedly) more manageable EU. That may or may not be related to that country’s preference toward the ability of the European Union to enact significant policies. Those with blanket preferences in favor of enlargement may not be particularly concerned over the nature or characteristics of any particular candidate. If countries are generally in favor of enlargement, regardless of the candidate, then it ought to be measurable when compared to the member-states’ past stance on enlargement toward Easter Europe. Because it is not discernable if the states that demonstrated reluctance with respect to enlargement opposed enlargement per se or simply preferred a slower schedule, the element of swiftness of enlargement will be added to the hypothesis. The hypothesis reads:
Hp3: Those member states that have exhibited preferences for swift enlargement to Eastern Europe are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have opposed swift enlargement.

2.1.2.6 Euroscepticism
Another angle is the organization’s decision-making capacity as a whole. Several countries, but predominantly the United Kingdom, have been labeled as Eurosceptic and having an interest in gumming up the works in Brussels. If it is the case that enlargement would complicate further integration or decision-making in Brussels – a commonly-held notion that has not always proved to be accurate – then countries that are more Eurosceptic would be expected to have a policy in favor of Turkey’s accession than those who are less Eurosceptic. The hypothesis related to this expectation reads:

Hp4: More Eurosceptic member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than less Eurosceptic member states.

If it is true that Euroscepticism drives enlargement policy, there is no reason to suspect that the nature and character of the particular candidate should matter. It is therefore also expected that Euroscepticism should correlate with the earlier preferences on enlargement; in other words that the variables identified for hypothesis Hp4 should covary with the variable identified for hypothesis Hp3.

2.1.2.7 Large vs. Small
The EU is a group of countries with very disparate member-state sizes. At present, Germany remains the largest member state with over 80 million inhabitants. By contrast, prior to the enlargement of 2004, Luxembourg was the smallest with around 0.4 million inhabitants. While the ratio of size to influence in the EU has always been modulated in favor of the smaller countries, in terms of voting strength in the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, that ratio has changed modestly over time as the institutions developed and different treaties made different arrangements.

As such, with respect for the future development of the European Union, it is conceivable that larger countries would have an interest in the bolstering of their (already considerable) weight in
the EU’s different institutions. More convincingly, the smaller countries might have a fear that the addition of yet another very large country would dilute their influence even further. An added large ally might help move the organization’s power toward the larger states and erode what influence the smaller countries, collectively, have. This theory is, however, problematic because the influence of each large member-state would also be eroded.

Another explanation for this hypothetical relationship is that larger states may have interests on a wider scope than smaller states do. The addition of Turkey would be a benefit at the global level where the larger powers have more concerns than the smaller powers do, because the larger countries have ambitions at that level that the smaller countries could never have. In other words, the large countries may believe that they gain global influence by having another medium-size power in the European Union, whereas smaller states, unable to influence broader events, may be resigned to more parochial interests that might suffer at the hands of Turkey as a member state.

Contrariwise, the relationship may be the reverse, in that the large countries would prefer to not have another large country to rival their own power, whereas the smaller countries would have more choice of which large country to follow. If this idea were more salient to the member states, the relationship of size to support would be negative. The large vs. small state hypothesis is:

**Hp5: Larger member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than smaller member states.**

### 2.1.2.8 The EU Budget

Another important division is that which exists between those who pay more into the EU budget than they receive and those who receive more money than they pay in. The calculation of the comparative fiscal interests in enlargement is one that is complicated, because it necessarily involves speculations about how policies and fiscal balances will develop in the future.

These speculations also need to involve strategic perspectives, because one thing is certain: there will be a policy changes in agricultural and structural policies prior to enlargement. If there is not a long-run strategic perspective, but only a short-term calculation on the costs and benefits of a large poor country joining the European Union, that calculus would advise both net-donors and net-recipients to attempt to prevent enlargement. After all, a large poor country is not likely to contribute much to the EU’s coffers under the current structure of that regime. Net-donors would have to provide more and net-recipients would receive less if Turkey were to join the current
redistributive regime. Because Turkish accession is not only supported by some but by most countries, it is already known that the short-term fiscal logic is not determinative of enlargement preferences. The fact of the 2004 enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe (also poor agricultural countries, if not all large ones) is also an indicator that, in the end, countries will allow such enlargements to take place, even if the short-term fiscal calculus indicates that they should not allow the enlargement.

In order to salvage a fiscal theory of enlargement, it is, therefore, necessary to conceive of a longer-term fiscal perspective that expects winners as well as losers. Having both generates variation in the independent variable that spans incentives and disincentives for allowing enlargement, rather than just different degrees of disincentive. Those longer-term perspectives are as follows.

On the one hand, there are the net-donors who will certainly look at the prospect of Turkey, a very large and poor country, with a measure of fiscal apprehension. Leaving the agricultural and structural policies of the late 1990s and early-to-mid 2000s unchanged, a country with very underdeveloped and agricultural regions, would be a major drain on EU resources. However, that prospect, as it did with the enlargement of the Central and Eastern European countries, also offers the political pressure to reform those policies so that they are less fiscally burdensome. That would be an incentive for net-donors to be in favor of enlargement.

However, provided that the net-recipients are able to prevent the frameworks of the redistributive policies from being dismantled altogether, the prospects grow less positive for the net-donors. With a large country like Turkey in the EU’s councils and the European Parliament, the beneficiaries of the EU’s redistributive policies are strengthened with a powerful ally. A larger voting bloc in favor of more redistribution from the net-donors to the net-recipients means that further into the future, the volume of redistribution could grow at the expense of the net-donors.

From the recipients’ perspective, the tables are nearly reversed. As mentioned, in the short term, the net-recipients are also likely to have to face cuts in the funds from which they have benefited. Furthermore, in the negotiations that will determine the financial perspectives after enlargement, they will face a great deal of pressure from the net-donors to change the policies in order to keep the fiscal damage within certain bounds, and, perhaps, even to change the policies from which the net-recipients have benefited for so long altogether. In the long term, however, the net recipients face prospects that are the mirror image of what the net-donors face. The net-recipients can expect to gain a large, and, therefore, powerful ally in the European councils and the European Parliament who will be able to assist them in expanding the volume of redistributed resources.
Assuming that the net-recipients are able to stave off fundamental changes to the redistributive policies, the trade-off, for the net-donors, is one of an immediate future in which they will be able to make more predictable gains against a future in which the losses are less predictable. Because the immediate future is more knowable, and because all the member states must agree on the package deal that reforms the redistributive policies before enlargement, it is assumed that member states have much more certainty about the near-future amendments to the redistribution regime, than they have about how deals will progress in the pursuant financial perspective after enlargement, and the financial perspectives thereafter. Contrariwise, the net-recipients face an immediate future in which they face more predictable losses against a future with less predictable gains.

If the tendencies, expected by bounded rationality, hold that certain costs with uncertain gains are to be preferred over certain gains with uncertain losses (not dissimilar to the concept of buying an insurance policy), then net-donors are expected to be less enthusiastic about enlargement toward a large poor country than net-recipients are. Unfortunately for this theory, however, the experience of the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated otherwise. Nevertheless, the hypothesis is as follows:

**Hp6: net-recipient states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than net-donor states are.**

If this were research about a candidate that was not both poor and agricultural, it would be useful to separate out the member states by how much they received from the agricultural policy versus the structural policy. If the candidate was relatively agricultural, but not poor, it would be expected that a similar country, like Denmark, would be supportive of the candidate. In contrast, if the candidate were poor but not agricultural, it would be useful to see if those countries that benefit much more from the structural policy than the agricultural policy, like Portugal, were more favorable towards enlargement. Given that Turkey has significantly underdeveloped regions and has a very large share of the population engaged in agriculture, doing separate analyses on each of the two redistributive policies is not a worthwhile avenue of investigation.
2.1.2.9 Power at the Domestic Level

The third level under consideration is the domestic realm. The principle behind this frame of reference is that those who are in power have an interest in remaining in power. Because the question of Turkish EU membership has become a very heated political issue in many European countries, some political parties have incorporated their position on Turkey as campaign rhetoric. A way to determine if domestic politics have played a crucial part in the decisions of member states regarding Turkey will be to establish if changes in their policies towards Turkey coincided with changes in their governments and/or public opinion.

This frame of analysis is fundamentally different from the previous analyses in three ways. First, while some may declare that the domestic political process is the process by which states arrive at their allegedly rational foreign policy decisions, there is clearly a distinction between the two. The notion that political actors make international- and European-level decisions in order to win domestic debates fundamentally undermines one of the key tenets of Rationalism in post-1950s International Relations theory; namely that the domestic characteristics of a state – other than its capabilities in relation to the capabilities of other states – do not determine a state’s behavior. Decisions must be objective in that they are functions of the imperatives of the structures, rather than functions characteristics of the agent.

Second, because of the above, this frame of analysis fudges on the actor definition imposed by Rationalism. Rather than taking the state as the unit of analysis, the actor becomes the party or parties in power. This actor, then, is engaged in one of Robert Putnam’s (1988, p. 434) two-level games, where the strength at one of two levels, foreign or domestic, is used to shore up weakness at the other level.

The third way in which the domestic level of analysis is problematic is if the political rhetoric is very non-rationalist (i.e. ideational). In such a case – as if frequently observed in regard to the politics of EU enlargement to Turkey – the whole premise of rational calculation based on imperatives is called into question. If political actors, speaking to domestic audiences, appeal to cultural differences, historical memories, or abstract ideals, rather than to the state’s objective material interests, then it implies that – at the very least – those political actors do not believe their audiences are materially rational. If the decision-makers are rational, and they fit their rhetoric to maximize their goal, then it must be assumed that the non-materialist rhetoric is effective. If that is so, then the audiences are less than materially rational. However, to the degree that the politicians
are swept up in their own narratives, and the audiences respond positively to that message, neither can be assumed to be rational according to the materialist assumptions of thick-theory Rationalism.

These three reservations notwithstanding, the maintenance of political power is a rational thing to do for political actors, and it is quite manifest that in the political debates between political parties, the issue of Turkey possibly becoming an EU member is a very contentious issue. Domestic politics as a factor in deciding policy also has the analytical virtue of being quite variable over time frames similar to the variation in the dependent variable.

The analysis of the domestic level is done using four frames: public opinion, political party ideology, political opportunism, and immigration politics. In order to thoroughly investigate the domestic realm, these four frames follow increasing degrees of analytical complexity. Where the frame of public opinion simply assumes that policy-makers do what their publics want them to do, the frame of political ideology assumes that political parties behave as they are expected to behave. This is more complex because it is understood that political parties have somewhat fixed constituencies and there is a reputational cost to nakedly pursuing the polls. Political opportunism suggests that politicians only appeal to the issue when it is clear that there is a political market for doing so. The frame of immigration politics understands that enlargement to Turkey is not an issue for all countries because for most European countries, Turkey is not seen predominantly as a source for undesirable immigrants. Only a handful of member states are destinations for many Turkish immigrants.

2.1.2.10 Public Opinion

European countries are democracies in which leaders are supposed to reflect the dominant desires of their constituents in the policies upon which they decide. The straightforward analysis, then, is whether or not public opinion simply influences policy directly. Do the countries where Turkish membership is the most unpopular oppose Turkish membership, while those countries where Turkish membership is the least unpopular support Turkish membership? Also, are changes in public opinion reflected in changes in government policy? The hypothesis encapsulating this idea is:

Hp7: Member states with public opinion more predominantly against Turkish membership are less likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with public opinion less predominantly against Turkish membership.
2.1.2.11 Political Party Ideology

Rudimentary knowledge of the interaction between public opinion and state policy, however, indicates that the matter is rarely so simple. Political parties frequently have particular constituencies and different coalitions mean different trade-offs can be made. Politics frequently follows a right-wing/centrist/left-wing spectrum, with coalitions also broadly following that pattern. The next-to-simplest way to frame the possible influence of domestic politics is to ask if mostly right-wing governments are more likely to be opposed to Turkey while mostly left-wing governments are more likely to be supportive of Turkey’s membership ambitions.

The reason for this direction is, mostly, the implicit connection to the immigration issue. Right-wing politics are frequently tougher on immigrants, whereas left-wing politics frequently draws on naturalized and second-generation immigrant votes. In the same vein, right-wing parties frequently draw on nativism or anti-Islamic sentiment, whereas left-wing parties gladly accuse their opponents of bigotry. Furthermore, Turkey being a (rapidly) developing country would more likely be the recipient of the EU’s redistributive policies, something that is more of an anathema to the right than it is to the left. The hypothesis for this question is as follows:

Hp8: Left-wing governments are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than right-wing governments are.

2.1.2.12 Political Opportunism

Another frame to use is to focus on the political struggle between a government and its domestic opposition. While seeming similar, this is a frame that is quite different from the ideology of the parties in and out of power. According to the ideological left-right frame, parties of different orientations have different assessments of social problems and policies that address those problems. The political struggle of ideology is about advancing the policies preferred by the ideology. According to the frame of political opportunism, parties are not necessarily wedded to an ideology (beyond rhetoric), but seek for opportunities to be in power. Enacting popular policies helps governments stay in power, and unpopular policies create opportunities for opposition parties to defeat sitting governments in elections. Given the heatedness of opinion on the matter of Turkey and the prospect of its membership in the EU, and the degree to which that prospect is generally
unpopular, it is worthwhile to investigate if the domestic political struggle, itself, explains member states’ policies, and their changes of policy.

The supposition is that in order to draw favorable distinctions between themselves and the parties in power, the main opposition parties criticize whatever unpopular policy the ruling party or coalition has adopted, in hopes of electoral advantage. When election results change governments, the existing policy is changed for the opposite position in order to stay true to the political rhetoric of the previous campaign.

This is labeled political opportunism because it reflects that policy is not necessarily made on the objective wisdom of the policy in question from the perspective of the state, but based on the ability for opposition parties to gain power by engaging in popular rhetoric, and implementing that rhetoric into policy in order to prevent defeat in the subsequent election. The hypothesis reads:

**Hp9:** When existing government policy is at odds with public opinion, significant changes in government pursuant to elections are more likely to result in policy changes than when existing policy is not at odds with public opinion.

### 2.1.2.13 Immigration Politics

It is a political fact of life that immigration is a political hot potato. Not a few European politicians have proven themselves capable of harnessing political power out of the immigration issue, either by agitating fears against immigrants or appealing to immigrants (naturalized immigrants and those of second the generation of immigrants) for votes. Further, many have labeled opponents of immigration as racist, xenophobic or Islamophobic. In contrast to this, others have used the immigration issue in order to stand up for women’s and homosexuals’ rights against what they argue is an oppressive Islam practiced by the immigrants from the Middle East, South Asia and Northern Africa.

The politics of the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU, and the belief that such membership would bring a new wave of migration from Turkey to current EU members, has been attached to the immigration debate in many EU member states. Presuming that the previous three hypotheses do not offer an easier explanation of why and when member states decide to support or oppose Turkey, it is useful to test for relationships between the policies regarding Turkey and various constructions of immigration politics.
It is manifest\textsuperscript{10}, however, that the debate over Turkey is not attached to all immigration debates in all member states in equal measure. For many European countries, the Turks are not the dominant immigrant group. The immigration debates in Spain and the United Kingdom, for example, have very little to do with Turks, because the Turks are only a small part of the immigrant communities into those countries. In Germany, Austria and the Netherlands, on the other hand, the Turks are the most numerous immigrant group.

Related to this is the identification of the Turks as Muslims, and therefore as a part of the debate on the supposed Islamification of Europe. In some countries with many Muslim immigrants (native Muslims notwithstanding), the Turks may be seen as another Muslim group, regardless of their distinct identity and prevalence in the immigrant community of that country. It is, therefore, useful to expand the analysis by also looking for effect of the number of Muslims in the population as having an effect on member-state policies on Turkey.

Yet, not all countries have the same concerns over immigration. In Portugal, Greece, and Finland, for example, few people consider immigration to be one of the major political concerns, whereas in Spain, the United Kingdom, and Denmark, many people believe that immigration is a top political concern facing their country. In countries where immigration is not a topic of heated political debate, the risk of more Turkish immigrants might not be a salient topic by which politicians can win votes.

Rationally, then, there would be a connection between policy and electoral politics in those countries where there are many Turks or Muslims, but also where immigration is seen as a problem requiring a policy response. Seeing immigration as a problem may be a function of the agenda-setting of political entrepreneurs, but if it is not seen as a problem, agitating against Turkish membership would not be effective either. The next chapter shall outline the precise methodology by which these variables will be taken into account. The hypotheses are as follows:

\textbf{Hp10: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative to total population, are more likely to oppose Turkish membership than member states with smaller immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations relative to total population, are.}

\textsuperscript{10} This will be demonstrated in chapter 10.
Hp11: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative to total population, are more likely to change their policies on Turkish membership more frequently than member states with smaller Muslim/Turkish populations relative to total population, are.

Hp12: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative to total population, are more likely to see a relationship between changes of government and policies on Turkish membership.

2.1.3 Wealth

The lens of wealth is an especially poignant frame for this analysis because the European Union is, at its core, still, a political-economic organization. The analysis, however, runs into an empirical brick wall. In weighing the benefits for member-state economies, national policy-makers are reliant on predictive analyses of what Turkish accession would mean for their economies. However, those predictions generally conclude that while the benefits to the Turkish economy would be considerable, the benefits to the European economies, while not non-existent, are still very small (e.g. Flam, 2005; Lejour & de Mooij, 2005).

Nevertheless, perhaps small percentages of change in GDP, one way or another, may be enough to convince policy-makers to support or oppose Turkish membership. This section outlines the avenues for investigating the gains and losses that European countries can expect relative to one another. The four different economic impacts investigated are trade in agriculture, trade overall, investment overall, and labor migration.

2.1.3.1 Agriculture

A large part of the economic question is subject to the fact that Turkey is already in a customs union with the EU, and Turkey’s trade is already oriented toward the Western Europe with a significant trade deficit. Incorporating Turkey into the EU would, however, allow for more trade in agricultural goods, because that sector of the economy is not covered by the customs union. Given that Turkey would then also be covered by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), whatever shape that policy might take at the time, European farmers would cease to have the CAP-advantage over Turkish
farmers, which would, presumably move the balance of trade in agricultural products in Turkey’s favor.

Not all agricultural products are the same, however. Turkey is a country with specific comparative advantages in agricultural output, as are each of the member states. Turkey is likely to be a competitor to some member states, but a good market and provider of necessary goods for others. The degree to which Turkey’s agricultural output is competitive vs. complementary with those of the member states will determine how attractive its addition to the single market in agricultural produce it is likely to be for member states. Countries, whose dominant agricultural imports match Turkey’s dominant agricultural exports and vice versa can be expected to benefit from Turkey entering the agricultural single market, whereas those who will compete with Turkey can be expected to suffer from competing with Turkey on an equal footing. The hypothesis that captures this question is:

Hw1: Member states with a complementary agricultural sector with Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a competitive agricultural sector with Turkey.

2.1.3.2 Trade and Investment

Because non-agricultural goods are already traded freely between Turkey and the member states of the EU (Cyprus notwithstanding), and investment is also free from constraint, determining the relative benefits (or costs) of trade and investment between member states and Turkey must follow a different form of analysis. Lejour and de Mooij (2005, p. 109) calculate that any trade diversion of member-state products in competition with Turkish products will mostly impact the new member states that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. As their policies toward Turkey are not being investigated by this research, this research will hold trade-diversion as a negligible effect.

Assuming that trade diversion from Western European countries will not be significant, the presumption is that existing bilateral relationships are likely to become more valuable. Trade and investment are two angles of inquiry and rely on the following rationale: countries with more voluminous bilateral trade relationships will benefit from lowered NTBs more than those with minimal trade with Turkey, and those with direct investment into Turkey will see their returns on investment increase. The hypotheses are as follows:
Hw2: Member states with greater volumes of trade with Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with smaller volumes of trade with Turkey.

Hw3: Member states with greater volumes of investment between that member state and Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with smaller volumes of investment in Turkey.

Frequently, however, national accounts give preference toward exports (which benefit producers) than imports (which benefit consumers), because imports decrease the trade surplus (or increase the trade deficit). Because producers have more direct influence in the political system (they are more concentrated, have more effective lobbies, and have narrower interests) than consumers do, their interests are likely to be more influential in policy-making than consumer-interests are.

A similar argument cannot really be made in regard to net investment flows and positions. Inward investments from Turkey to member states are a boon to member states, because it increases the opportunities for domestic entrepreneurs and workers. If that produces a longer-term outward flow to Turkey, it is because those investments are paying off, and they would generally only pay off if economic activity had increased as a result of those investments. Because of this, it seems worthwhile to look at the trade surplus/deficit with Turkey, but not the balance of investment flows that member states have with Turkey. The related hypothesis reads as follows:

Hw4: Member states with a trade surplus with Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a trade deficit with Turkey.

2.1.3.3 Migration and Employment
A third angle is labor migration coupled with the need for workers. In the 1960s and 1970s, countries with rapidly growing economies actively sought out Turkish (and other) migrants in order to provide the extra labor needed to keep those economies growing. Considering the expected relationship between EU membership and the free movement of workers, it is not unnatural that many expect that Turkey’s membership might bring more Turkish immigrants to the member states. Full membership in the EU, should it ever happen, is expected to (eventually) bring the freedom of movement for labor to Turkish citizens in the same way as it has for other members. Though some
have argued on the establishment of permanent safeguards on that freedom of movement, these
efforts seem unlikely to succeed. Though an argument can be made that economic development in
Turkey will strongly diminish the flow of migration, and perhaps even create a return migration at
some point, policy-makers assume that the desire of Turkish people to migrate from Turkey to
Western Europe will continue for the foreseeable future. Membership in the EU is assumed to make
that migration easier than it has been, and therefore the flow migration is likely to increase following
membership.

From the rationalist angle, enhancing the economic strength of one’s country means creating
a balance between rates of (un)employment and economic growth. For growing economies with low
rates of unemployment, the prospect of migrants should be a benefit, whereas for countries with
higher rates of unemployment or low rates of economic growth, the prospects of immigrants
increasing the unemployment rate and possibly receiving public benefits should be considered a
cost.

While rates of unemployment fluctuate year-by-year due to the regular business cycle, Turki sh
membership in the EU, and the migration that is generally expected to follow, is not
something that is expected to be a short-term prospect. Therefore, year-by-year changes in the
unemployment rate should not be expected to change the long-term interests. These countries will
further benefit from increasing levels of education in Turkey as Turkey develops. This factors that
Lejour and de Mooij identify as being relatively significant in calculating the benefits of Turkish
membership for European countries).

For countries with high levels of unemployment, on the other hand, their immigrant
communities are likely to be a disadvantage to the country. Unemployed immigrants are likely to be
a burden on the welfare programs of the member states, and countries with higher unemployment
can expect to receive fewer Turks with higher levels of education. Furthermore, assuming that
economic and social conditions in the member states in question remain preferable to those in
Turkey, those unemployed immigrants are likely to return to their homeland, especially after they
have established roots in the countries where they live. The hypothesis that relates to this question
is:

**Hw5:** Member states with low levels of unemployment are more likely to be
supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of
unemployment.
2.2 CONSTRUCTIVISM

The following section of the chapter concerns Constructivist theories of state behavior and what sort of motivations and impulses may, hypothetically, explain member-state policies regarding Turkey and potential Turkish membership. The first subsection describes the conceptual changes from the previous section, outlining the differences between Rationalism and Constructivism. The pursuant subsections detail each motivations and impulses arising from identity concepts, norms and values.

2.2.1 Transitioning from Rationalism to Constructivism

In the preceding paragraphs, the approach of identity has been limited to the assumption of the individual self as the object of reference for utility calculations. In all but the domestic politics frame, this ‘self’ has been defined as ‘the state’. The assumption of ‘the self’ as the individual, and therefore an egoistic concern for utility is the *sine qua non* of Rationalism. Without this assumption any theory of preference formation *cannot* be considered Rationalism in a meaningful sense.

In all of the Rationalist propositions, there have been two other relevant characteristics of the actor. The first of these concerns the assumed interests of the actor, which are for security, power and wealth, as detailed in the first half of this chapter. Security was considered first, because it is the prime imperative of the actor remaining an actor. The second was the actor’s ability to make independent decisions and control the actions of others, and the third was, essentially, in order to exist and thrive economically. Because these three concepts have such widespread purchase – they are intersubjectively recognized so broadly and so firmly that they are considered to be ‘material’, when, in fact, they are what Wendt (1999) calls ‘social things’. Security, power and wealth are not physically ‘real’ – they are reified; they are real only insofar as they can be counted upon to be steady reasons for actor behavior.

The third characteristic that was discussed was bounded rationality – the inability of the actor to know and evaluate all that the actor would need to know and evaluate in order to make perfect decisions in pursuit of its interests. The only aspect of bounded rationality that was discussed in the context of Rationalism was risk aversion, and the assumption that different cultural cognitive maps will not produce strikingly different outcomes in similar situations, preserving the objectivity
of Rationalism. According to Constructivism, bounded rationality is more than risk aversion. Cognitive maps are a function of culture. Different cognitive maps can also highlight imperatives other than those built around survival, power and wealth.

Even in the Western world, which is supposedly the home ground for Rationalism, the cognitive maps highlight the Western values of liberal democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and non-discrimination. The missionary zeal with which the West frequently attempts to export these values goes beyond the rationalized benefit to the West. While the spreading of such values is broadly considered good for the Western world, it is debatable if the policies that promote those values are actually worth their cost in a strictly cost/benefit (to the individual actor-self) calculus. The following sections consider the Constructivist aspects that shape interests and possibly explain the foreign policy decisions that have been made regarding Turkey and possible EU membership.

The challenge, then, of this section is to identify how identities, norms and values (other than the supposed materialistic ones) illuminate the politics of Turkish accession. Some, such as those connected to identity – i.e. religion and culture – are not difficult to identify, because their relevance leaps off the newspaper page as being why many in Europe reject Turkey. Norms are relevant in terms of how member states are expected to behave when deciding matters of enlargement vis-à-vis Turkey. In creating a regime that involves membership criteria, that candidate countries must meet, member states are agreeing that they will not upset the process for reasons other than those regarding the membership criteria. Values are relevant in terms of how enlargement supports the abstract values that member states value in and of themselves, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Because the enlargement regime involves candidate countries having to accept these values for themselves, these values are directly connected to the enlargement debate. The following sections will look at each of these angles in turn and posit hypotheses that can be tested against the empirical record.

### 2.2.2 Identity

In the context of Turkey joining the EU, identity is considered to be one of the dominant explanatory frames of why member states are hesitant about admitting Turkey. A large part of that may come from political leaders constructing Turkey as ‘the other’ and, therefore, being a bad fit for Europe. When they use the supposedly geographical definition, saying that Turkey cannot be a
member of the European Union because it is not a European country, it is highly doubtful that they are horribly concerned over continental contiguousness (especially in light of Cyprus not having been subject to the same reservation).

When others argue that Turkey is a bad fit because they did not experience the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment, they are making an argument of cultural or historical identity. Curiously, this is also an argument that did not prevent countries, such as Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, becoming members. As these countries were subject to the Ottoman Empire at the time of these historical/cultural movements of the early Modern Era in (Western) Europe, they could not have, supposedly, benefitted from the historical/cultural any more than the Turks have.

Yet, identity questions are frequently subject to mythmaking. This does not make the narrative any less potent, however. Public opinion polls clearly demonstrate that Turkey is in a category of its own when it comes to public support for membership among the peoples of the member states. An analytical problem, is how to distinguish between the member states in order to discern cultural variations among the member states which can explain their different policies regarding Turkey. The first section, below, will explain why historical memories are an inadequate frame of reference, even if some bring them up as being explanatory. The pursuant sections detail more fecund identity-related approaches. These approaches fall under the headings of religion, nationalism, and cultural differences.

2.2.2.1 Historical Memory

Historical memories consist of particular highlights in a nation’s history that frame a particular relationship between one nation and another. Frequently, these follow particular atrocities and brutal wars. For others, such as Greece, which has made EU accession (as well as other memberships in international organizations difficult) for Macedonia, the memory hearkens back to Alexander the Great and Philip of Macedon of the fourth century BCE. In this case, it is about an intellectual property-right dispute over latter country’s name. More generously speaking, names can imply territorial rights and foment irredentism, which are not unrealistic issues in the Balkans.

It is frequently cited that for Austria it is particularly difficult to support Turkey because of the historical memory of the Ottoman Seige of Vienna in the early Sixteenth Century. This two-week long seige, which ended in a victory for the defenders seems to have been more historically traumatizing than the four months-long Seige of Vienna in the late Fifteenth Century, by the Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus. This earlier seige resulted in a Hungarian victory and a five-year
subjection to the Hungarian throne. Yet, Austria is not deemed to have been opposed to Hungarian membership. Likewise, the Greeks suffered centuries of subjection to the Ottomans, and more recent wars and atrocities involving forced population swaps and an ongoing ethnic dispute over Cyprus. However, as the empirical record of chapters six, seven, and eight will demonstrate, Greece has been more supportive of Turkish membership than several other member states have been, its more recent and dramatic historical memory notwithstanding.

Given that historical memories of the Ottomans cannot account for the other member states, this is an impossible frame to impose on the question. The Turks did not besiege Copenhagen, nor did the Janissary Corps ever sack the Ducal Palace in Luxembourg. Nevertheless, Denmark and Luxembourg have been at least as adamant against Turkey’s membership as Austria has been. That is not to say that historical memories are irrelevant, but they are impossible to quantify and unlikely to explain most of the member states’ behavior, given the lack of such historical backgrounds. Therefore, no hypothesis will be posed or tested for this Constructivist concept.

2.2.2.2 Religion

The Muslim nature of Turkey’s population is frequently cited as a reason why many Europeans oppose Turkey’s bid for membership in the EU. However, proponents argue cite this same fact as a strong reason why Turkey should be included in the EU – because doing so would have symbolic value for the broader Muslim world that the West is not opposed to Islam or Muslims. They further accuse opponents of religious bigotry for their opposition to Turkey.

Both sides of the argument, then, contend that religious identity matters. However, can that explain why one member state supports Turkey while the other opposes Turkey? The fact that Turkey is a country with many Muslims cannot be denied, but that fact in itself is not a variable that can explain different and changing behavior among the member states. What remains is attempting to identify different identities among the member states which would make them more, or less, supportive of Turkey in order to assess the importance of religious differences. Unfortunately, similarities between religions are not quantifiable. It cannot be said that Catholics are twice as similar to Muslims as Protestants are. However, it may be that there is still something about Catholics that make them more or less likely to be supportive of Turkey than Protestants are. The Pope, certainly, has played a varying and opaque role in the politics of Turkish accession. This may have influenced the way Catholics push their political leaders to set their policies on Turkish membership.
Beyond thinking in terms of religious differences, there are certain beliefs and cultural values that are associated with the different dominant Christian religions. Max Weber (1930) used this divide as an overarching label for broader cultural concepts to explain historic economic performance. In that regard, the economizing puritan spirit of capitalism, which Weber identified as unique to Protestantism, would not be shared by Catholics or (Muslim) Turks. Catholics and Turks would be more alike to one another than to Protestants, meaning that Catholics would be less likely to define the Turks as ‘the other’ than Protestants would be. The hypothesis would then be as follows:

**Hi1:** Member states that are predominantly Catholic are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states that are predominantly Protestant.

Should the reverse be the case, then, perhaps, there is something about Catholicism that makes it inhospitable toward allowing Turkey to gain membership in that organization.

Another way of looking at religious origins of member-state policies is to measure the degree of religiosity. In terms of similarity of identity, it can be said that Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims are all more religious than atheists and agnostics are. Therefore, religiosity is one way to address religious differences. As such, the hypothetical statement is:

**Hi2:** Member states with a high level of religiosity are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a low level of religiosity are.

This hypothesis is counter-intuitive. The immediate idea is that religion, and therefore religious differences, should matter more to people with high levels of religiosity, whereas peoples with low levels of religiosity ought not to care as much. However, by the same token, religious people are more likely to have similar frameworks of thought to one another than non-religious people are to have with religious people. Given that Turkey is highly religious, albeit Muslim, religious Christians are more likely to have more in common, philosophically with Muslims than they are with atheists, agnostics and the religiously apathetic.

Finally, the question may not be about self-identification or support in recognition of a shared identity, but rather one about a negative identification of others. Anti-muslim sentiment may drive member states to oppose Turkish membership. If that idea is true, then it is quite possible that
Turkey’s exclusion is, indeed, due to a ‘Christian club’ not wanting to include non-Christian members. The hypothesis that encapsulates this idea is as follows:

Hi3: member states with lower levels of anti-Muslim sentiment are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of anti-Muslim sentiment.

2.2.2.3 Nationalism

A second form of identity is a nationalist one. In its most basic form, nationalism is frequently interpreted as being the love of one’s nation. It also implies a differentiation between members of a nation and non-members of a nation. While a nation is not the same as ‘country’ or ‘state’, these are, however, frequently associated with one another, especially in Europe where the nation-state has its, albeit imperfect, paradigmatic origins. The core if the idea is one that poses national differences between given groups of people, and that members of the nation belong together. In an exclusionist way, it also implies that non-members do not belong. The political implications, further, are that members of one’s nation should be self-governing and not governed, even partially, by members of another nation. The hypotheses is as follows:

Hi4: Countries with low levels of nationalism are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of nationalism.

2.2.2.4 Cultural Differences

In the context of the enlargement of a multi-national European Union, the question arises why Turkish membership should be considered particularly salient, while the accession of, for example, Bulgaria and Romania should not. One answer is the differences in scale, as Turkey is a vastly larger country than Romania and Bulgaria are. Furthermore, Turkey was, per capita, a little poorer than either of these two new member states were. Another answer is Turkey’s greater perceived cultural difference from Romania and Bulgaria.

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At first blush, however, the relative sizes between Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria have not changed and per-capita incomes of Turks have been catching up to those of Romanians and Bulgarians, while member-state public opinions increasingly differentiated between their support/opposition to Turkey and toward the 2007 entrants.
Another identity-related frame, then, is one that is frequently applied to analyses of Turkey’s bid to join the EU is that Turkey is too different, in broad cultural terms, to join the EU. This is one that distinguishes Turkey from other candidates that are considered to be more culturally compatible with the EU. In contrast to the nationalist frame, wherein the identity of the self is the critical factor, in this frame it is the identity of the ‘specific other’. Given that the question of Turkey joining the EU has offered a much more heated debate than the accessions of Bulgaria and Romania did, it is plausible that the Turkish identity, as perceived by others, is an identity that carries a more particular ‘other’-ness than the Bulgarian and Romanian identities do, when they are perceived by member-state Europeans.

Gürer (2008) has done extensive work on the causes of public opinion regarding Turkey’s candidacy to join the European Union. His findings point out that perceptions of cultural difference between the EU and Turkey explain hostile public opinion toward the prospect of Turkish membership. The relationship between public opinion and member-state policies are explored elsewhere in this research. The purpose here is to determine if stronger identification of Turkey’s ‘otherness’ leads to lower levels of support for Turkey’s membership.

There is also the question of the degree to which the saliency of cultural differences is itself variable over time. While the actual differences of cultures is not something that change much over time, the appreciation of those cultural differences may do so considerably. In addition to a consideration of cultural differences, it is necessary to test the saliency of those differences. As will be further explored in the following chapter, this is done by comparing the levels of difference in public support and opposition to other candidate countries as opposed to Turkey’s candidacy. If Turkey’s cultural differences with European countries is a structurally prohibitive characteristic for membership, because of deep popular opposition, then that should not be an ephemeral factor. The hypotheses that investigate these aspects of cultural differences between the EU member states and Turkey are the following:

**Hi5:** Countries whose populations identify cultural differences as being the reason Turkey should not be allowed to join by greater degrees are more likely to oppose Turkey for EU membership than those who do so to lesser degrees are.

**Hi6:** Countries whose populations consistently differentiate Turkey from other candidate countries less are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership.
than countries whose populations differentiate Turkey from other candidate countries more.

2.2.3 Norms

Regime theory is the idea that in order to make outcomes more predictable and differences of interests less likely to escalate into hostilities, states create institutions and regimes in order to coordinate interests and lower transaction costs (Keohane, 1984). Some literature on institutionalism and organizations (e.g. March & Olsen, 1989; 1998; Ostrom, 2005) suggests that the rules of organizations corral the preferences of actors in the institutional structure in such a way that the preferences are as much functions of the institutional rules as they are constrained by the rules. Though they may initially create coordination and lower transaction costs, eventually they create endogenous preferences.

In that regard, they start out, ostensibly, as the answer to a collective action problem among rational actors, but then they proceed to shape actor interests over time. The regimes alter original structures and therefore redefine actors and actor preferences. One preference that tends to be in the mix is regime maintenance, or rule-adherence for the sake of the rules and the more predictive environment those rules maintain. However, in order to make the influence of regimes distinguishable from the internalized interests, it is necessary to identify rule-following as being distinct from the pursuit of interests. Below are two theories and related hypotheses of how norms and norm-following influence member-state behavior regarding Turkey. The first addresses the content of the enlargement regime and the norms that constitute that regime, and the second addresses the idea of socialization into the broad normative framework of the EU.

2.2.3.1 The Copenhagen enlargement regime

At the June 1993 European Council meeting in Copenhagen, the leaders of the rebranded European Union established a set of criteria which applicant states had to meet before they would be permitted to join the EU. By doing so, member states essentially agreed that the candidate countries’ ability to meet the criteria would govern their accessions, rather than the political whims of the member states. The brief statement in the Presidency Conclusions, cited below, outlined what would be
transformed into an elaborate screening mechanism mostly under the control of the European Commission. The statement read as follows:

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

(European Council, 1993, art. 7 sec. A par. iii)

This statement has been commonly divided into three categories: the political, economic and administrative criteria of membership. The political criteria were constituted by the need for the candidate country to have established democratic institutions, the rule of law, and protections for minorities. The economic criteria were constituted by the need for a market economy that would not significantly suffer if it became a part of the single market. Finally, the administrative criteria have essentially been translated as adopting the different chapters of the *acquis communautaire* – the entirety of the EU’s body of laws. Frequently forgotten, however, was the next clause, which some have cited as a reason for delaying enlargement. This was called the ‘fourth criterion’, being:

*The Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.*

(ibid.)

This did not constitute a reform that the candidate country had to make, but, rather, a reform that the member states had to enact in order to prevent enlargement from making the EU’s institutions unwieldy and ineffective. Like the three earlier criteria, however, it did not constitute a lever intended to prevent enlargement, but an obligation for reforms to enable enlargement without compromising the integrity of the overall organization.

This regime, particularly the political criteria, enshrined liberal democratic values (see below), but also implied rules by which the member states were required to live. Because the regime required massive reforms on the part of the membership candidates, it implicitly promised membership at the end of the process. By doing so, it implicitly prohibits individual member states from preventing the accession of candidates that have met the criteria, provided that the Union has reformed itself in order to accept new members. Given that there is no mechanism by which the organization can enforce negotiating behavior within the European Council, other than pressure from other members of the Council, this rule is enforced by peer pressure alone.
This does not mean that the regime has been unchequered. Greece, for example, threatened to scuttle the whole effort of the Eastern enlargement if its demands regarding Cyprus were not met, and the Netherlands did the same in 2002 regarding the percentage by which the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund would adjust to inflation. In the end, however, the rule has been maintained, though some would argue that Romania and Bulgaria were admitted before they had actually met the rule-of-law criterion.

Frank Schimmelfennig (2005a; 2009) has argued that these rules have forced member states that were essentially opposed to enlargement for their own reasons to relent and permit the accession of countries that had demonstrated their merits under the Copenhagen regime. This process, which he calls ‘rhetorical entrapment’ indicates that member states who had acknowledged the Copenhagen regime by having previously appealed to the Copenhagen criteria as reasons why candidates could not (yet) become members, could no longer resist enlargement when those candidates had sufficiently reformed themselves. Doing so, Schimmelfennig argues, would expose those member states as hypocrites in the face of the regime and their own prior statements.

Testing the strength of this regime – and the norms associated with it – means assessing if member states are more likely to approve of Turkey’s advancement through the next stage of the accession process when it makes strong progress on the required reforms than when it makes slower progress on those reforms. The hypothesis is as follows:

\[H_{n1}: \text{Member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkey’s membership after Turkey has demonstrated more progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen criteria than when Turkey has demonstrated less progress.}\]

2.2.3.2 Socialization

Socialization is the process by which actors internalize norms of behavior and consider those norms of behavior appropriate. Because socialization is a process, it is considered to be related to time in the sense that longer exposure to a regime and its norms implies a higher likelihood that actors will behave according to the norms of the regime, and, as such, have their preferences converge.

In a regime without socialization – i.e. a regime as interpreted by Neoliberal theories – there need not be preference convergence. Institutions do not prevent differences of opinion; they prevent escalation of those differences into hostilities or other sub-optimal outcomes. Neoliberal theories highlight how regimes assist in arriving at outcomes that are Pareto efficient and reduce
transaction costs. However, sociological – or Constructivist – theories of institutionalism predict that the institutions themselves reform interests and even actors.

The variation in socialization is provided by the length of time within which the actor has inhabited the regime. Presumably, those actors who have been within the regime longer will behave more according to the norms of the regime and more alike to members who have been in the regime for a similar amount of time. This provides two separate hypotheses.

**Hn2**: Member states that have been members of the EU for similar amounts of time will exhibit behavior that is more similar to one another than to member states that have been members for significantly different lengths of time.

**Hn3**: Member states that have been member of the EU longer are more likely to have their support or opposition governed by Turkey’s level of progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria than member states that have been members for shorter periods of time.

### 2.2.4 Values

European leaders frequently state that the European Union is a community of values. These values connect to the ‘European’ identity, in that European countries are supposed to adhere to liberal democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, et al. At the same time, these European countries, and their political leaders, have also been advocates (some stronger than others) for spreading those values beyond Europe’s borders. As such, they are treated as universal values and not necessarily indicative of particular identities.

The influence of the degrees of Turkey’s progress towards adoption of the liberal democratic values on state policies is tested by Hypothesis Hn1, above. Here, the frame is different in that the different degrees of member states’ full embrace of those values are tested. Not all European countries live up to the liberal democratic values themselves. Given that, these countries may not be as bothered by Turkey’s insufficient embrace of them than those who embrace the values more fully.
2.2.4.1 Shared Political Values

The ostensible political values – democracy, respect for the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities – are integral in the Copenhagen criteria of membership, cited above. Testament to the import of these values, the European Council in 1997 ruled that the political Copenhagen criteria needed to be met before candidate countries could begin the critical stage of the accession process: accession negotiations. This resulted in several of the candidate countries at the time not being invited to join the accession negotiations. Foremost among them were Turkey and Slovakia.

However at every instance, the member states differed with one another about the EU’s enlargement policy. Some favored a more open policy, whereas others embraced a stricter one. The degree to which the conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria has governed the member-state policies regarding Turkey is measured elsewhere. The hypothesis below tests to see if member states who were, themselves, less than ideal practitioners of the values articulated by the Copenhagen criteria, were more likely to give Turkey a pass. The idea is that those countries that are more alike to Turkey in their own adherence to the liberal democratic values will have a greater degree of tolerance for Turkey. The hypotheses that reflect this theory is stated as:

**Hv1:** Member states with lower levels of adherence to the values of liberal democracy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with higher levels of adherence to the values of liberal democracy are.

Another particular type of this pertains to rule-of-law issues, or the degree to which the political system is able to maintain it. Corruption is considered the force that erodes the rule of law. The theoretical assumption is that countries with less corruption will have less tolerance for a country with a high level of corruption like Turkey, as opposed to countries which also have higher levels of corruption. The hypotheses associated with this corruption frame of values is:

**Hv2:** Member states with lower levels of corruption are less likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with higher levels of corruption are.
2.3 SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT

The sections above outline a broad set of testable hypotheses. If theories are thoroughly considered and broadly tested general understandings of how social processes – in this case, foreign policy decision – work, then this chapter does not present theories, so much as it presents a ‘wealth of notions’. Yet, that is the state of research in the field of EU enlargement. In the context of EU enlargement studies, Frank Schimmelfennig’s research is an exception. His theory of rhetorical entrapment assumes preferences and explains how norms shape outcomes in collective decision-making, in the context of EU enlargement. However, he does not dig into what the preferences are and how they come about. Like so many rationalist studies, he takes them as given.

A roughly similar gap exists in the broader field of foreign policy-making. The most eminent political scientists discuss material interests, international normative regimes, and political cultures, but those very general approaches offer very little insight into what particular policies states will choose under complex circumstances. What particular costs and benefits are salient and which are not? How rule-bound are states in semi-anarchic systems? Are norms more than rhetoric?

The 32 separate hypotheses presented above represent a stab at a broad swath of the reasons that proponents, antagonists and analysts mention in regard to Turkey and European enlargement. Many of the hypotheses will be able to be discarded after testing against the empirical record. Some, hypotheses, however, cannot be falsified. None explain the whole range of phenomena.

Most imply unique variables, such as Atlanticist vs. continental or neutralist foreign policies, or amounts of heroin deaths. Others, such as progress on the political Copenhagen criteria or migration take different approaches to the different variables. Further, some variables imply different angles of variation. Some, like the domestic political change, terrorism, public opinion and the rule of law, offer much variation over time and across the different member states. Others offer significant variation across the member states, such as NATO-membership, external trade policy, religion, culture and migration, while they have little variation over time. A third group of variables vary over time, but not across the member states, such as turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria.

The methods used to analyze these variables are presented in the next chapter. Furthermore, it will separate out the structural aspects – those phenomena, represented by the variables that are essentially fixed over time – and the ephemeral aspects – those phenomena that change frequently but are more likely to be explanatory of episode-by-episode changes of policy. It will also lay out
how these separate frames can be combined in order to have a more complete understanding of the political dynamics of the promise, or threat, of Turkish membership in the European Union.
3.0 METHODOLOGY

The previous chapter posed 32 hypotheses to explain why member states of the EU might support or oppose Turkey for EU membership. This chapter describes the methodologies by which these hypotheses are tested. The first section describes the way in which the dependent variable is determined. The second section describes the different types of independent variables that are implied by the hypotheses and why there need to be different approaches toward measuring them. The third section outlines the methods used for measuring each of the independent variables and how they will be tested against the dependent variable. Finally, the fourth section will outline the method for bringing together the different explanatory variables into a more complete understanding of the politics surrounding the question of Turkish membership in the EU.

3.1 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable in this research is an EU member state’s negotiating position regarding Turkey’s bid for EU membership. The cases chosen are the 15 member-states that were members before the 2004 enlargement. The positions of each of these member states are analyzed at five separate points in time. These points in time represent episodes when crucial decisions regarding Turkey were on the European Council’s agenda.

The negotiating positions are not necessarily straightforward. The particular outcomes of European Council decisions are not, in themselves, dichotomous – they are not yes/no outcomes to discrete questions. The member states, both supporters and antagonists of Turkish membership, haggle over formulations in a document – the Presidency conclusions of European Council meetings – that all the member states can (more or less) live with. There is no ‘up-or-down’ vote, nor are the members’ positions officially recorded. The positions, therefore, are teased out by
analyzing statements to the press, and the assessments of journalists and analysts reporting on the political developments at each episode.

Despite not being discrete yes/no roll call votes, the member-state positions are still ones that are more versus less favorable toward Turkey’s stated interest. They are positions that promote or delay Turkey’s progress through the enlargement regime even as that regime adapts to Turkey’s candidacy. The sections below explain the classification system used in recording these negotiating positions, and the means by which the researcher has decided upon classifying a state as being in one category or another.

3.1.1 Categorizing

This research uses three categories: drivers, passengers, and brakeman. The first and last terms are taken from Schimmelfennig (2005a, p. 144), where drivers promote the advancement of the applicant/candidate state through the accession process, and brakemen attempt to slow down, stall or derail the process. This research has added ‘passengers’ to Schimmelfennig’s dichotomy in order to account for states that took a middle ground, appeared indifferent, or chose not to express their preferences publicly or in such a way as reporters or political sleuths could detect.

This set does not take intensity into account. Intensity is omitted because it is impossible to measure. Some countries may argue more vociferously than others, or for goals that are at greater odds with the mean position. Some countries know that their rank in the European pecking order is such that louder argument pays off, whereas others know that it is better to lie low over what their preferences are, and work diligently behind the scenes. There are also nuances related to the different facets of the enlargement debate which do not necessarily directly pertain to the speed at which the candidate is propelled or stalled through the regime, but with the future shape of its membership, the membership of other parties, or the shape of the European Union’s other institutions.
3.1.2 Case selection

The research has chosen to look at the 15 states that were members of the EU before the 2004 enlargement. As such, an analytical decision has been made to exclude the member states that joined in May 2004 from the analysis. It is, of course, not the case that their positions are less interesting, but preference is given to having a complete range over the five episodes. Regrettably also, these countries were not covered in the press to the same degree as the 15 member states of ’95-’04 (the “EU-15”) were covered.

Another analytical choice has been to look at five instances when important decisions concerning Turkey’s progress through the enlargement regime had to be made. These were in 1997, 1999, 2002, 2004 and 2006. They were not expressly chosen for being at two-year intervals (as the reader will note that the interval from 1999 to 2002 was three years), but the fact that they (mostly) are, has methodological advantages. As chapters five through nine will establish, there was considerable variation in the member-state preferences over time, demonstrating that significant changes of policy can occur over relatively short intervals.

3.1.3 Collecting data

The primary source materials for discerning the positions of the member states are news articles located in the Lexis-Nexis (Academic) database. These were mostly searched for among the articles published three months prior to the summit in question, because that was usually when member states articulated their positions. In some cases it was necessary to draw on articles from before those three months when there was scant news to be had on a particular member-state, or if the later articles referenced earlier statements that seemed to be relevant.

The researcher elected to gain more material at the expense of clinical rigorousness in gathering the articles. Some member states were simply easier to find material on than others, and some member states demonstrated a more complex story than others did. Some episodes also offered more detail than other episodes did. In all, the researcher trawled through several thousands of newspaper articles, analyses, and official documents in order to find the more than one thousand sources cited at the end of the five empirical chapters.
Another highly valuable resource for the chapters for 2002, 2004, and 2006 has been the work of Peter Ludlow, who has captured assessments of what happened at the European Council meetings and the events leading up to the decisions at those meetings. He did this with extensive interviews from insiders and drew on a wide assortment of journalistic accounts to generate his accounts.

A third source was from interviews done in the Netherlands with persons involved or closely associated with the Dutch decision in 2004, which was the exploratory case for this research. This gave tremendous insight into the Netherlands at that time, but has been of limited value for understanding the other member states at other times. It was nevertheless very helpful for understanding some of the complexities involved and the way in which a member state deals with the internal debates as well as the debates with other countries.

3.1.4 Classifying

Translating from news articles into a three-way variable is not a straightforward process. Frequently news articles make the categorization in their own texts by signifying certain countries as being on Turkey’s side and others as being against. Sometimes, the news articles are at odds with what a broader reading of the story supplies, and sometimes they are at odds with one another.

In order to get a complete picture, the material available in the news articles and in the Ludlow accounts has been turned into five episodic narratives with narrative accounts of each member state’s positions. In order to determine those positions, the narratives drew on public statements and accounts of how those states negotiated behind closed doors with respect to the draft Presidency Conclusions of the respective European Council meetings.

This required figuring out what the critical questions of the episode were and deriving member-states’ positions on those questions. Sometimes this also involved separating the explicit substance of a text from a broader debate, as in some instances these were not the same. Each empirical chapter will detail the critical question being decided at each summit. In shorthand, these are the questions below:
Luxembourg 1997: Can Turkey be treated the same as other applicants?

Helsinki 1999: Will Turkey be a ‘candidate’ for EU membership?

Copenhagen 2002: When can Turkey start accession negotiations?

Brussels 2004: Should an alternative to membership be made explicit?

Brussels 2006: How many negotiations chapters should be frozen if Turkey does not open its harbors and airports to Cypriot ships and airplanes?

Chapters five through nine fully explore these nuances and explain how and why each member state at each episode was classified.

The classification occurs by positive or negative answers to these questions. This is an analytical choice not without its ramifications. As made clearer later on, these questions were not necessarily the ones that were ‘supposed’ to have been asked. At the Luxembourg summit in 1997, the question that was being haggled over was whether or not Turkey could attend a conference for members and applicant countries. That question was answered positively. However, Turkey was still treated differently from the other applicant countries – even from Slovakia whose progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen criteria was also considered wanting. Further, the Presidency’s open criticism of Turkey as a country where torture occurs, and the offence the Turks’ took from being treated differently, has caused the Luxembourg summit to be cast in a negative light in terms of Turkey’s progress toward membership.

The Brussels summit of 2004 is another example where the supposed question and the essential question diverged. The question was supposedly about whether or not Turkey could start accession negotiations. Rather than fighting a rearguard action by arguing against the start of accession (which only Austria really attempted), the brakemen, instead, inserted language that made it clear that there were alternatives to full membership. Some attempted to put the phrase of ‘privileged partnership’ into the Presidency Conclusions.

These refinements are necessary in order to preserve the intent of the research by not becoming sidetracked by diplomatic nuance. The concept that this research is seeking to measure is the degree to which member states promoted or struggled against Turkey’s membership bid. Both the drivers and the brakemen were inventive in finding means to circumvent their opponents’
advancement or stalling tactics. By not taking those into account, the essence of what is being measured would be lost.

This is not without a cost, however. It is quite probable that if it were not the particular question of Cyprus that proved to be the bone of contention in 2006, Greece, which had a specific interest in the Cypriot question, may have remained supportive of Turkey’s progress through the accession negotiations. However, because it was about Cyprus, and Greece was strongly opposed to Turkey being let off the hook on that count, it is impossible to know for certain. Therefore, Greece was categorized as a brakeman, when it was not Turkey’s candidacy for full membership that Greece declared was the sticking point for them.

3.2 GENERAL MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGIES

The methodologies used to test the hypotheses identified in the previous chapter must fit the nature of the variables inherent in them. With 32 separate hypotheses, there are many different types of variable to test. These variables differ in the ways in which they vary and in their level of measurement (nominal, ordinal, interval, or ratio – see below). This section will account for the different types of variables, in what time frames they are measured and what methods are used to test them.

3.2.1 Type of variation

The ways in which they vary is actually defined by the way in which they do not vary. Some of them vary both over time and over case. These are the time-sensitive variables, and include co-deployment of military forces, terrorist strikes, threat of drugs, public opinion, and domestic politics. These not only vary across the time, but – importantly – also across the member states. There are also variables that vary across the member states, but are not particularly variable over time. These are time-fixed variables. They include NATO membership, foreign policy orientations, external trade policy preferences, population sizes, religion, culture, or the share of the population that is Turkish and/or practices the Muslim faith.
Finally, one of the variables varies over time, but not over the member states. This is Turkey’s progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen criteria. Ostensibly, this is what governs Turkey’s progress through the enlargement regime, and what states are supposed to be judging when they debate how to move forward. Essentially, this is a case-fixed variable. The table, below, presents these three categories. The pursuant subsections discuss the different types and what their analytical implications are.

**Table 3.1: The nature of variation of the different variables.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time-sensitive variables</th>
<th>Time-fixed variables</th>
<th>Case-fixed variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Participation in multilateral military missions</td>
<td>• NATO-membership</td>
<td>• Turkey’s progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Terrorism</td>
<td>• Foreign policy alignment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Heroin deaths</td>
<td>• External trade policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public opinion</td>
<td>• Enlargement policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Domestic Politics</td>
<td>• Euroscepticism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- left/center/right</td>
<td>• Population Size</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- change of power</td>
<td>• EU budget</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- change and migration</td>
<td>• Migration and unemployment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agricultural trade</td>
<td>• Religiosity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Trade</td>
<td>• Religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- volume</td>
<td>- Catholics &amp; Protestants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- balance</td>
<td>- religiosity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Investment volume</td>
<td>- anti-Islamic sentiment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Exhibiting Liberal democratic values</td>
<td>• Nationalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cultural differences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Immigrant population</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Muslim Population</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Turkish population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Degrees of socialization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Member-state values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Corruption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.1.1 Time-sensitive variables

As chapters five through nine will demonstrate, many member states held different policies on Turkey at different times. Within the span of a decade, some countries held contrary positions, from
one episode to the next, with some changing their policy from forceful support to forceful opposition and back again, or vice versa. While these policies have been extremely variable for some countries, only a few of the independent variables inherent in the hypotheses demonstrate such variation over the span of a decade and over the fifteen member states. These are the time-sensitive independent variables.

These variables, then, have the most *prima facie* likelihood of explaining member-state policies regarding Turkish membership because they tend to exhibit the same level of variation as the dependent variable does. That said, they offer very little prospect for understanding the longer-term political structure due to their ephemeral nature. For example, finding that changes in government are the most likely predictor for policy changes does not offer a prediction of how any particular country is likely to behave in the coming decade, given that it is difficult to predict changes in the future prospect of the political parties of each member state. It does, however, suggest where to look.

### 3.2.1.2 Time-fixed variables

As the table, above, demonstrates, the majority of the independent variables are of a nature that does not vary significantly over time. Given that lack of variation, these variables cannot explain why states change their positions over time. That does not necessarily mean that these variables are insignificant. It is clear that some countries have a much greater tendency to support Turkey and others have a much greater tendency to oppose the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU. The time-sensitive variables may not explain those tendencies; where the time-fixed variables possibly can. It does mean that the time-fixed variables must rely on either the time-sensitive variables or the case-fixed variable to explain the particular changes of position.

### 3.2.1.3 Case-fixed variables

Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria, which is the most-often reason for setting policy by the member-state leaders, does not vary among the member states, as it relates to just Turkey. Because it does not vary between the member states, it cannot explain why Germany may be supportive at the same time that France is not (or vice versa). It can only possibly explain why more member states were supportive in one episode than another.
3.2.2 Frames and Models of measurement

Due to the different natures of the time-sensitive and time-fixed variables, it is necessary to adopt two time-frames of measurement: the short run and the long run. The short-run refers to each member state’s expressed preferences at each of the five episodes. The long run takes the average of these short-run policies, establishing more of a trend that generates more degrees of variation than the short-run can.

3.2.2.1 The short run
The time-sensitive variables can be measured against the dependent variable in its original form – fifteen cases over five episodes. Because the coding for the dependent variable is a simple three-way variable – driver, passenger, brakeman – this limits the quantitative analytical methods to those which are designed to measure ordinal-level variables. The method chosen to assess the strength of the individual time-sensitive variables against the dependent variable is the ordinal proportional reduction of error measure, \( \gamma \). Gamma \( (\gamma) \) measures the degree to which knowing the independent variable helps the analyst predict the outcome of the dependent variable. The measure reflects the percentage by which errors are proportionally reduced over knowledge of the overall distributions in the independent and dependent variables.

Gamma \( (\gamma) \) measures ordinal-level variables against other ordinal-level variables. In this case, then, the independent variables must also be of an ordinal level. Because most of the independent variables are ratio-level variables in their original form, the method used to categorize them into ordinal categories will be to divide the 75 individual values from the 75 cases (15 countries x 5 episodes) into three categories by ranking. The lowest 25 values will be assigned to the lower category, the middle 25 into the medium category, and the top 25 values into the higher category. The Gamma scores have a potential range of –1 to 1, with 0 being no relationship, -1 being perfectly negative, and 1 being perfectly positive. Negative refers to an inverse relationship.

In addition to Gamma, the report will make use of time-series graphs in which changes over time in the dependent variable for each country is depicted alongside changes over time in the independent variables. Doing so helps the reader and researcher interpret the comparative changes over time.
3.2.2.2 The long run
Those independent variables, which do not change much over time but demonstrate significant variation between the member states, need to be assessed against the dependent variable in a way that removes time from the equation. This means transforming the dependent variable from expressed support at each episode to the mean level of support over the decade. The mean policy over the five different episodes is measured by coding every time that a country is a brakeman as 0, a passenger as 0.5, and driver as 1. Averaging these scores over the five episodes offers a ratio-level variable potentially between 0 and 1 (or 0% and 100%). This estimates the probability that each country is in support of Turkey’s membership bid at any given time.

Producing a ratio-level dependent variable allows tests to be done against the ratio-level independent variables. One straightforward measure is Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r), which is a measure that reflects the same scale and general interpretation as Gamma. Along with measuring the correlation coefficient, it is possible to draw scatterplots and regression lines to depict the variation graphically. Doing so provides a single-glance appreciation of the variation and the relationship between the two variables.

3.2.2.3 Exceptions
The ‘case-fixed’ variable is in an analytical classification of its own, because it does not compare the member states to one another. Instead, it sums up their policy-changes over time to compare those changes against Turkey’s progress toward putting the liberal democratic values of the political Copenhagen criteria into policy and enactment. Likewise, the tests of socialization look at the changes over time of different categories of member states. This is done to determine if member states behave similarly to one another because they may have similar degrees of socialization into the EU regime. All these hypotheses are tested by interpreting time-series graphs.

The third exception is the test of political opportunism. The impact of political opportunism – where opposition parties successfully challenge a party or coalition in power that has embraced an unpopular policy regarding Turkey and subsequently changes the policy. This hypothesis is tested by dividing the cases into different scenarios and counting which scenarios are the most prevalent.
3.2.3 Levels of measurement

The levels of measurement of the dependent and independent variables govern the sorts of analyses that can be used to assess the degree to which there is a potential relationship. As already mentioned, the assessments in the long run can use a ratio-level dependent variable. In the short run, however, the dependent variable is of an ordinal level. The independent variables come in levels that are necessitated by their natures. Some of the variables may also have different facets that allow for different types of measurement levels to be drawn from them. The attempt, however, is to use ratio-level variables where possible in order to use the greatest amount of variation possible to draw distinctions. Table 3.2, on the next page, presents the independent variables according to the two different levels of measurement.

These different levels of measurement in the independent variable also imply different types of measurement. Most analyses involve a ratio- or interval-level independent variable. Where the dependent variable is ordinal, as it is in the short-run model, then the independent variable is recoded into an ordinal-level variable. In a few cases, the dependent variable is of a ratio-level and the independent variable is of a nominal level. In those cases, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) will suffice to measure its relationship with the long-run dependent variable.

3.3 THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The independent variables are inherent to the hypotheses from which they are drawn. As such, this section will follow the same format as the previous chapter. Therefore, it is broken up into the six main categories of explanation drawn from the metatheories: security, power, wealth, identity, norms and values. Each subsection will take its hypotheses, derive the associated variables, and detail how each is measured and tested.
3.3.1 Security

This first set of hypotheses relate to the national security interests of the member states. They relate to each member’s integration into the trans-Atlantic security regime, participation in multilateral military missions, and threats of terrorism and transnational organized crime.

Table 3.2: The levels of measurement of the independent variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratio or interval level</th>
<th>Nominal or ordinal level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Long-run dependent variable</td>
<td>• Short-run dependent variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Co-deployment of military forces</td>
<td>• NATO-membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Terrorism</td>
<td>• Atlanticism vs. continentalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Heroin trade/deaths</td>
<td>• External trade policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Population size</td>
<td>• Enlargement policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EU budget</td>
<td>• Euroscepticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public opinion</td>
<td>• Domestic Politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Domestic politics</td>
<td>- change of power (political opportunism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- political ideology</td>
<td>• Socialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- immigration politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agricultural trade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Trade (volume/balance)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Investment (volume)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Migration and unemployment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Religion (Catholics vs. Protestants)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Religiosity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Anti-Muslim sentiment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Nationalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cultural differences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Number of immigrants, Muslims and Turks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Turkey’s progress toward the political Copenhagen criteria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Corruption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.1.1 NATO-Membership

**Hs1**: NATO members are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than non-NATO members are.

The variable that is derived from this hypothesis is fairly straightforward and does not require intricate measurement and calculation. It differentiates NATO-members from non-NATO members. The one complication is France, which is a member of NATO, but not integrated into the military command. As such, it is treated as a ‘half-in’, creating three categories: Members, France, and non-members, in an ordinal level variable. As an ordinal-level variable, in a long-run model, it is tested with a one-way ANOVA test. It is also considered by looking at a cross tabulation of the NATO members against France and the non-NATO members, ordered according to levels of long-run support for Turkish membership.

3.3.1.2 Multilateral Military Missions

**Hs2**: Those member states who contribute more to the missions that Turkey also contributes to are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who contribute less.

EU member states engaged in several major military missions during the episodes being analyzed. With the second-largest military (in terms of numbers of troops) in NATO after the United States, Turkey has had significant capabilities to put into the field. As such, Turkey has a great deal to offer to EU-member states in terms of burden sharing. Three of the missions occurred in cooperation with Turkish forces, and one (the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq) did not. At the time of the Copenhagen summit in 2002 it was, however, not yet known if Turkey would assist in the invasion or occupation. Indeed, there was much hope on the part of those supporting the United States that they would open a northern front through which the invasion could take place. The paragraphs below detail the time-frame and method of measurement, the implications of the level of measurement, and the means used to analyze this independent variable against the empirical record of member-state policies regarding Turkey.

Given the prospective understanding of the underlying theory – that member states support Turkey in the hopes of military burden-sharing benefits in the near future – the aim of this test is to
identify grounds for interest. The logic of the hypothesis is that those countries who expected to be engaged in the near future (the year following each summit) alongside Turkey had an interest in keeping friends with Turkey by supporting Ankara’s ambitions at the summit. That expectation is modeled by actual participation in missions together with Turkey in the year following each episode. The exception is 2002, when Turkish participation was hoped for but not, in the end, received. This makes the prospect of Turkish participation and/or assistance with Iraq relevant in 2002, but not in 2004 and 2006. The Iraq invasion will, therefore, be considered separately.

The measurement challenge is the construction of a testable variable that reflects the interest in Turkey’s participation, using member-state participation rates. That interest has to be measured relative to member-states’ capabilities and relative to other participants’ contributions. This implies a multifaceted computation of the independent variable based on particular a framing of capabilities and the contributions of other participating countries.

Different member states have different capabilities. Not only is there a vast difference between the military capabilities of Germany and Luxembourg, because of their different populations, but the degrees of militarization also differ. For example, Belgium and Greece are very comparable in population size, but in 1998 Greece had four times the amount of soldiers under arms. Belgium, on the other hand, has a very modern military while Greece made extensive use of conscript soldiers.

Because the multilateral missions, on which Turkey has cooperated with the EU member states, have been infantry-intensive affairs (as opposed to aerial and naval missions – Operation Active Endeavour notwithstanding), the simplest measure is based on numbers of soldiers assigned to a military mission. The numbers exclude soldiers stationed in countries far away from the theatre of operation, such as the German forces participating in the ISAF mission from remote Djibouti. Troops stationed in neighboring countries in support (such as troops in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in support of ISAF) are, however, included in the numbers.

Because of the widely different capabilities between the countries, it is necessary to measure troops in a proportion to a country’s capabilities. Those capabilities are also framed in terms of armies: the number of soldiers in a member-states’ army (as opposed to air forces, navies or strategic units). These numbers are taken from The Military Balance for each year after a decision episode, i.e. 1998, 2000, 2003, 2005, and 2007.
Each member state’s number of deployed troops to missions in which Turkey also participated (or where it was hoped they would do so, in reference to Iraq 2003) divided by the size of their army, only tells part of the story. Multilateral missions make each contribution a part of a larger multinational force. The rate of deployment ($t_{dc} = \frac{\text{troops deployed}}{\text{td}}$ divided by the size of a country’s army, $A_c$) must be considered against other countries’ deployment rates. Therefore, the troop deployment rates of each country participating in each multilateral mission in which Turkey is also participating is added together. This figure will provide the denominator, with the country in question’s troop deployment rate as the nominator, for the figure that offers each member state’s proportional troop deployment rate ($\alpha t_{dc}$). This figure is the number used in the independent variable that will test the hypothesis against the dependent variable. Because the independent variable is of a ratio level, and it is time-sensitive, the test is conducted by means of an ordinal reduction of error measurement, as per the method described above.

In order to not pre-judge the outcome of this test, the outliers (Greece and Luxembourg) have been removed from the dataset. In the case of Greece, this is for two reasons. First, it is understood that Greece has a unique military relationship with Turkey (antagonism) that is not shared by the other member states. Greece should not be expected to have similar military concerns as other member states do vis-à-vis Turkey. The second reason is the nature of Greece’s military, which remains a conscript-based military. This sort of military underrates the proportional troop deployment rate because any troops deployed are divided by the total amount of soldiers in that military’s army. Luxembourg has been removed for the opposite reason. Because of its extremely small army size, even in proportion to its citizen base (which is significantly smaller than its population size), the proportional troop deployment rate derived from the 26-59 troops it had in the field was quite large for such a small number of troops. Therefore, Luxembourg is also excluded as an outlier.
3.3.1.3 Terrorism

**Hs3:** Those member states that have suffered from terrorism in the past more are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have suffered less.

The terrorism hypothesis implies a number of possible variables that can be framed in different ways. The simplest test involves looking at the massive terrorist incidents that took place during the period in question: the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of September 11, 2001, the Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004, and the London Underground bombings of July 7, 2005. The former would not imply variation among the member states, given that they struck in the United States, while the latter two attacks struck Spain and the United Kingdom.

If the great catastrophic attacks were explanatory, there should have been a significant different between member-state behavior before and after these strikes. This is, however, not the case. The average level of support for Turkish membership among the member states before and after 2001 is negligible (0.60 vs. 0.62). So too, the Spanish and British policies, prior to the Madrid and London attacks respectively, were already supportive. It is conceivable that the attacks strengthened their determination, but they did not change their policies from one category to another.

In order to not summarily dismiss the hypothesis, it is necessary to frame the independent variables in ways that go beyond these three major attacks. Doing so presents certain methodological problems, but also some advantages. The first problem is one of operationalization: choosing what data to use to signify a level of threat. ‘Threat’, after all, is a subjective feeling that cannot be measured by available data. It is, therefore, necessary to choose a dataset that measures an objective proxy to the threat level. The proxy is ‘past terrorist incidents’, for which there are open-source databases available.

The chosen database is the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), based at the University of Maryland. This database is purported to be the most comprehensive dataset, which allows particular queries to be downloaded in spreadsheet format, allowing for easy data manipulation. The available data includes dates, countries, perpetrator, number of fatalities, and number of injuries. This data
presents the researcher with an array of possibilities, but also some limitations. The possibilities include the ability to adjust the time frame and the severity of the incident. It is also possible to measure the incidents in terms relative to population. Because there is little analytic cost in looking at several scenarios, adjusting for different levels of severity, different time frames, and either in absolute numbers or relative to population, thirty-two of these scenario analyses conducted.

The main limitation comes in the form of the inability of selecting by category of perpetrator or by purpose of action. The dataset includes (suspected) perpetrators, but not categories of such perpetrators or those perpetrators’ motives for action. Terrorists active in the EU-15 member states are extremely numerous and varied. At the one end the perpetrators include the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, which is alleged to have carried out the Madrid train and London underground attacks. At the other end of the spectrum the perpetrators of terrorism include the Arsonists for Social Cohesion. This group set alight a Ferrari and a Fiat in Athens one day in July 1998, in what may have been a rage against Italian automobiles. While there is a likelihood that the ‘Al-Qaeda Organization for Jihad in Sweden’ has more in common with the al-Masri Brigades, than it does with the Arsonists for Social Cohesion, in terms of motive, the Al-Qaeda Organization for Jihad in Sweden’s method and target of attack had much more in common with the Arsonists for Social Cohesion than with the attacks of the al-Masri Brigades.

Imputing motive from perpetrator is tricky and not included in the dataset. It is, therefore, not possible to separate Islamist terrorism from separatist terrorism from automotive terrorism. This makes it impossible to discern member-state motives for diminishing terrorism by supporting Turkey for EU membership. In terms of the symbolic nature of Turkey as a mostly Muslim country, while it might be possible to select every terrorist organization with an Arab-sounding name, it is not the case that every such organization is motivated by the Clash of Civilizations, anger at Western support for dictatorial regimes, or participation in the occupation of Iraq.

Even if it were possible to identify such motives, it is not clear that doing so would be theoretically desirable. Selecting for an Islamist motive presumes that it is the symbolism of enlarging to a mostly Muslim country through which most incidents of terrorism would be diminished. Again, using symbolism as the analytical frame assumes an ideational metatheoretical scaffolding, which does not suit the Rationalist imperative of focusing on a security motive of action.

From the Rationalist perspective, the integration of Turkey’s counter-terror assets is what offers the EU member states the added value in terms of diminishing the terrorist threats to their
security. Turkish counter-terror assets are aimed more at separatist threats, and more specifically at Kurdish separatist threats, than at Islamist threats. Al-Qaeda and al-Masri Brigades, together, account for 12 incidents in the member states (ten of which, together, make up the Madrid train and London underground bombings), whereas Kurdish groups account for 112 incidents inside the 15 member states in the period being assessed. Therefore, it is not useful to take an ‘Islamist motive’, whatever that may mean, as the most useful frame for analysis. Because of the above, separating out terrorism by motive does not seem useful. Instead, all motives of terrorism will be counted in the measurement of this variable, provided they meet three criteria, referenced below.

The methodological advantages offered by the terrorism dataset are in measuring severity and time specificity. In terms of severity, counting ‘incidents of terrorism’ is one way to measure the level of threat. This may be useful, but a garden-variety terrorist incident frequently involves a Molotov cocktail thrown at an ATM machine in a mid-size town somewhere in the country’s hinterland in which nobody is hurt or killed. The purpose of terrorism is usually to terrorize or to make a symbolic statement and not necessarily to kill or maim. Nevertheless, national governments are theoretically more likely to adjust their foreign policies in response to incidents that involve fatalities and injuries than those that impede someone’s ability to withdraw ahead of a visit the village grocer. Therefore, four levels of severity are assessed – incidents, fatal and/or injurious incidents, fatalities, and a weighed fatal and injurious composite.

The most encompassing of these, ‘incidents’, counts all incidents of terror included in the GTD database that meet three criteria of terrorism:

- The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
- There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
- The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e. the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).

This produces a total count of 1568 incidents between 1994 and 2006, ranging from the Molotov cocktails aimed at ATM machines to the Madrid and London bombings. The second level counts incidents that produced casualties of injury and/or death that also meet the three criteria of terrorism above. This produces a total count of 348 such incidents between the same years. The third level counts the fatalities in the above-mentioned incidents. This produces 409 people killed over the twelve-year time frame.
The fourth level of severity is drawn from a weighed composite of fatalities and injuries. Simply adding fatalities and injuries together would weigh the severity of the attacks severely in the directions of the injuries, given that injuries outnumber deaths by more than ten-to-one (4336 to 409). Assuming that a death is considered to be of a greater severity than an injury, the researcher has chosen to weigh the composite in a 1:10 scale, mirroring the frequency ratio, making ten injuries count as severely as one death. It is understood that this weighing is somewhat arbitrary, but it provides a standard for measuring the injured as well, and not ignoring them completely, except in incident counts.

The other methodological advantage from this dataset is that it includes dates and countries, allowing for both cross-national and cross-period analyses, which is also the format of the dependent variable. Because terrorist strikes are incidents in time, this introduces the ability to do time-series analyses, but also the challenge of selecting time frames. If terrorism explains behavior, then member-state governments should be expected to support Turkish membership more after an increase in incidents, or after particularly catastrophic ones. By the same token, that support would diminish as the threat has diminished.

The ability to do a time-series analysis, however, offers the challenge of choosing what sort of time frame to choose. Presumably, levels of threat diminish over time after an incident, if no other incidents occur. But how quickly does that happen? It is possible to introduce a cumulative time lag - counting incidents, deaths or casualties during a certain span of time prior to the time of comparison. For example, when France had to make a decision on Turkey in 1997, it had suffered 23 terrorist incidents that year, two of which produced a total of three injuries but no deaths. The previous year, however, it suffered 41 incidents, eight of which produced a total of seven deaths and 97 injuries. A cumulative time-lag of one year therefore puts the number at 64 incidents, ten of which produced with seven deaths and 100 injuries.

The analysis will take four time-lag frames into account. The first will look at only the year in question (1997, 1999, 2002, 2004 and 2006). The one-year cumulative time lag will look at that year and the year prior, as in the example above. The same is done for two-year and three-year cumulative time lags which will add the year in question and the two or three years prior, respectively. Because the two- and three-year time lags create measurements with overlapping years, it is understood that in these scenarios the variation over time will diminish as the years overlap. The four different levels of threat and the four degrees of time lag offer sixteen different scenarios to measure the level of threat in each country at each episode.
It is also necessary to mention levels of terrorism in terms relative to population. Larger countries attract more terrorism than smaller countries do. The largest five countries - Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain each suffered, on average, 19 incidents per year (between 1994 and 2006), while the smaller countries each suffered 2.7 incidents per year on average. Given that the population ratios between the largest five and the smallest ten is a factor of about 7.6 (the population of the average big country as opposed to the average small country), and that that ratio multiplied by the average amount of incidents in the small countries is in the ball-park of that of the small countries (2.7 x 7.5 = 20.52, in comparison to the large country’s 19 average incidents per year), there is an argument for proportionality.

Because large countries attract more terrorist attacks than small countries do, small countries are likely to ‘feel’ attacks more heavily than large countries are. The Al-Qaeda Organization for Jihad in Sweden throwing a Molotov cocktail at the Iraqi embassy is more likely to catch the attention of Stockholm than a Corsican separatist, throwing a Molotov cocktail at an ATM machine, is going to catch Paris’ attention. On the other hand, German people and leaders are not likely to consider the value of one person injured or killed as only one-tenth as shocking than the Swedish people and leaders are, simply because that is the respective proportions of their populations. Therefore, the analyses are conducted both in terms of absolute numbers as well as in terms relative to population.

Table 3.3: Thirty-two frames of analysis: (4 x 4 x 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of severity</th>
<th>Time-lags</th>
<th>Absolute/relative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• All incidents</td>
<td>• Same-year</td>
<td>• Absolute amounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Incidents with casualties</td>
<td>• Same + previous year</td>
<td>• Divided by population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deaths</td>
<td>• Same + previous two years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deaths + injuries/10</td>
<td>• Same + previous three years</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the sixteen scenarios, arising from the four different levels of severity and four different time frames, are carried out twice (for absolute and relative numbers) for a total of 32 sets of figures to test against the dependent variable. These methods all produce ratio-level variables, which are
tested against the dependent variable in the short run. Suiting testing mode to variables, the tests are
done by calculating proportional reductions in error for ordinal variables, $\text{Gamma} (\gamma)$.

### 3.3.1.4 Security from Transnational Crime

**Hs4:** Those member states that suffer more from the heroin trade are more likely to
be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have suffered less from the
heroin trade.

Transnational Crime related to Turkey, as a concept, is a far more complicated concept to measure
than terrorism is. Where terrorism is highly explicit, in the sense that it is attempting to attract
attention, transnational crime is highly covert. The (in)security impact of transnational crime also has
(even) more varied concepts of measurement: Transnational organized crime (TOC) groups are
involved in an array of different criminal trades: drugs, human trafficking, cigarette and arms
smuggling, extortion and racketeering, and the trade in nuclear materials. The challenge, therefore, is
finding a reasonable proxy. As the hypothesis suggests, heroin-induced deaths is taken as that proxy.

Of the above-mentioned activities in European countries, drugs are the TOC groups’ bread
and butter, accounting for the overwhelming lion’s share of Turkish TOC activities. Heroin is also
the main narcotic trafficked by these groups (Cengiz, 2010, p. 253). By measuring the threat of
TOCs by counting the number of deaths related to heroin, this research assumes that the safety of
citizens is the focus of the security concern and the number of deaths of those citizens measures of
the level of threat from the drugs. The data used for this analysis is from the European Monitoring
Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA). Their measure, drug-induced deaths
(EMCDDA standard definition, ‘Selection B’) is a subset of drug-related deaths, that counts the
deaths resulting from direct poisoning and resulting from mental and behavioral disorders due to
psychoactive substance use of narcotics.

Selection B is chosen in favor of ‘Selection D’ because this latter selection narrows the
definition and does not include data from Belgium, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Selection B, on the other hand, does not include data from Greece. The Greek
data can, however, be estimated. Other missing values in Selection B are estimated by using linear
trends from Selection B as well as comparison to available numbers in Selection D in order to arrive
at numbers to be used in the analysis. The statistical appendix (B) explains the means of estimating missing data.

Among the drug-induced deaths, the involvement of opiates (i.e. heroin and other opium-related drugs, such as Methadone and Buprenorphine) is particularly high. Regrettably, the data on the toxicology of the drug-induced deaths is very incomplete over the range of member states and years in question. In many cases, the toxicology of drug-induced deaths is simply unknown. Furthermore, in the toxicology reports, EU members use different definitions, leading to weaknesses in the comparability of data.

Thankfully, among the known cases, the ratio of drug-induced deaths related to opiates over all deaths with a known toxicology being related to opiates amounts to a fairly constant 88%. Given a low level of deviation from this average, with only one marked exception\textsuperscript{12}, the share of drug-induced deaths resulting from opiates is assumed to be constant among the member states. Removing the outlier from the set results in the increase of the average percentage of drug-induced deaths, with known toxicology, to 90%. Taking the toxicology as constant, the drug-induced deaths numbers (Selection B, multiplied by 0.9) is taken as the independent variable for this analysis.

Because the number of drug-induced deaths is a variable that varies over the course of a decade as well as between cases, it is possible to test the possible effect of this independent variable against the dependent variable in the short term. Because of the availability of year-by-year data, it can also be tested with time lags. In the case of this variable, it is desirable to introduce the time-lags, because there is doubtlessly a certain passage of time before changes in a policy problem finds an indirect solution such as incorporation of Turkey into the EU.

While it is possible to test both absolute numbers as well as numbers relative to population, this makes less sense than doing so does with terrorism. Drug deaths are not broadcast with the same shock as terrorist attacks are. It is not the case that each death is met by the whole population of a country with an equal amount of horror. This is partially a function of the nature of drug deaths, but also a function of the higher numbers of people dying from drugs than from terrorism. Furthermore, there is likely a bad stigma associated with the victims. Therefore, taking absolute numbers of persons dying from heroin becomes, essentially, a proxy for population size, which is already tested by a different hypothesis.

\textsuperscript{12} Belgium in 2004, where there was an unusual drop in the percentage of drug-induced deaths resulting from the use of opiates, down to 55%. These toxicology figure are from the 2009 DRD-1partii table from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).
The means of measurement is going to be similar to that for terrorism; drawing a gamma-ratio of the proportion of dependent-variable variation explained by the independent variable. The independent variable is computed into a three-category ordinal variable that take the lowest third, the medium third and the highest third as the categories, tested against the brakemen, passengers and drivers of each episode. This is also done with a two-year and three-year cumulative time lag. Doing so results in three gamma-ratios that will measure the proportional reduction in error that the independent variable provides.

### 3.3.2 Power

The following sections explain how the hypotheses that measure the possible explanatory effects of power-related variables. The first two, foreign policy orientation and external trade policy, explore the international level of analysis. The following four, being enlargement policy, stance on further integration, population size, and the EU’s redistributional policies, analyze the EU-level of politics. The final four consider domestic political variables.

#### 3.3.2.1 Atlanticism vs. Continentalism

**H1:** Those member states that exhibit a more Atlanticist foreign policy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have a more continental or neutral foreign policy.

The foreign policy tendencies of the EU member states – the degree to which they tilt toward agreement with the United States, or for a more independent European orientation – is one that is much qualitatively described in the literature. France and Germany are, by definition, numbered among the continental powers. The United Kingdom is manifestly Atlanticist.

Because Atlanticism or continentalism, as a concept, is closely aligned with security policy, there is a danger of a covariance with the NATO and multilateral missions variables. In practice, this is, however, not the case. For example, Finland and Sweden are neutral countries are not NATO members. Yet they have a strong preference for a European security arrangement that is led by the United States, rather than Brussels or the continental axis (Herolf & Huldt, 2002, p 77). So too,
Germany is a full-fledged member of NATO, but that does not mean that it is not a continental power.

The variable will be treated as a three-way ordinal variable. This means that it is considered a range with Atlanticism at one end and continentalism on the other, with an intermediate category between them for those countries that are not quite Atlanticist, but not continentals either. In order to determine where the countries are on the spectrum, a brief survey of the literature, especially on those cases that are not so widely understood, is assessed. Following the determination of categories, the methods of analysis are a one-way ANOVA test and a cross tabulation.

3.3.2.2 External Trade Policy

Hp2: Those member states that exhibit a trade policy similar to Turkey’s expected trade policy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have a trade policy at odds with Turkey’s expected trade policy.

Consideration of member states’ positions on global trade and the European Union’s external trade policy follows a similar method and analysis to the preceding hypothesis. However, because trade policy is more clear-cut than foreign and security policy, this hypothesis is not only tested against a categorization based in the literature, it is also tested against measures of volume and balance external trade for each member state.

Because it is beyond the analytical scope of this research to project what Turkey’s policy may be upon accession (should that ever happen), this assessment will look at degrees of preferred trade liberalism. Countries that support more liberal trade policies are assumed to have a similar stand on Turkey, one that is different from member states that oppose Turkish membership, provided that external trade policy is on members’ minds when they make their enlargement policy decisions. The purpose of the empirical test is to demonstrate a relationship, positive or negative, between external trade preferences and Turkish membership preferences.

The assessment of the support for a more protectionist or more liberal external trade policy is done in two ways. First, there is the assessment in Woolcock (2005), in which he categorizes the member states according to observed behavior in the EU’s councils. Like the assessments on NATO and Atlanticism vs. continentalism, above, this creates a three-way categorization between liberals, protectionists and member states that provide the swing-votes on particular questions. This
division of member states among the three categories is tested against the exhibited long-run policy on Turkey by means of a one-way ANOVA test and an appreciation of a table showing the different categories along both variables.

The second way is to measure against actual ratios of external over total trade. This is based on the presumption that a preference for more liberal external trade follows from a greater actual ratio of external trade. Those countries that do more of their trading with third countries (outside of the European Economic Area) are presumed to prefer a more liberal external trade policy. Calculating these ratios also involves calculating the same for Turkey. Turkey’s own side of the spectrum would suggest where its own preferences might lie.

3.3.2.3 Enlargement Policy

Hp3: Those member states that have exhibited preferences for swift enlargement to Eastern Europe are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have opposed swift enlargement.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, countries have a history of having a certain position on enlarging the EU that may not be applicant/candidate-specific. They may support Turkish membership because they generally prefer a European Union with more member states. Their policies on supporting Turkey for membership may not have anything to do with Turkey’s particular characteristics.

Measuring a member-state’s overall preferences for enlargement is done by comparing their record of supportiveness in the round of enlargement that brought in the Eastern European countries, Malta and Cyprus. Rather than going through an assessment process as detailed as the following chapters is beyond the pale of this research, and, instead the categorization provided by Schimmelfennig (2005a) is used.

Schimmelfennig provides a variable, like the one being used here, to differentiate between those in favor and opposed to enlargement. The difference is that Schimmelfennig uses two categories (drivers and brakemen), rather than three. He further differentiates based upon each member state’s stance on limited or inclusive enlargement, referring to either enlarging only to those candidates that had progressed more speedily toward meeting the criteria and were geographically
closer to most of the member states. The analysis here will ignore this second dimension, taking only the driver/brakeman dichotomy into account.

The lineup of drivers and brakemen is measured against the long-run policy preferences by way of a one-way ANOVA test, as well as an optical assessment of a cross tabulation.

3.3.2.4 Euroscepticism

Hp4: More Eurosceptic member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than less Eurosceptic member states.

It is frequently argued that those member states in favor of enlargement – and especially the enlargement to Turkey – have an agenda that seeks to erode the EU as an effective organization by making it too broad and unwieldy. This idea argues that enlargement preferences are fuelled by Euroscepticism from the member-state governments’ perspectives. Soetendorp (1997) offers an assessment of what countries are generally in favor of deeper integration in the EU, and which are more hesitant or opposed to further integration. The relationship between Soetendorp’s categorization and the policy on Turkey will be tested with a one-way ANOVA F-test and an assessment of a cross tabulation.

It is worthwhile to consider that the measure above does not measure popular attitudes toward European integration. It is a commonplace understanding that government policy and popular opinion do not frequently align on the point of integration. For example, Soetendorp finds that “Portugal takes a more cautious attitude” than Spain when it comes to tighter European integration, while its public opinion is among the most enthusiastic for a more rapidly integrating EU (ibid, p. 43; Eurobarometer). A similar situation is true for Greece. The reverse is true of Finland and, to a lesser extent, Germany.

3.3.2.5 Large vs. Small

Hp5: Larger member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than smaller member states.

This hypothesis is based off the idea that larger states will be more likely to support Turkey because Turkey, as a member, would have more similar interests to other large states in crafting the future of
the European Union. Because size in population is a ratio-level variable, and it is not one that offers much variation over time, it is possible to do a regression analysis and draw a scatterplot to see if there is any potential relationship between population size and policy.

3.3.2.6 The EU Budget

Hp6: net-recipient states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than net-donor states are.

This hypothesis suggests that member states that are net-recipients of the EU’s redistribution policies (the CAP and the Structural/Regional Policy) may have more favorable policies toward Turkish membership than net-donors. The logic is that Turkey, as a powerful member, due to its size, would help lock in those policies and prevent the net-donors from diminishing those policies in the future. The net-donors would have an interest in keeping Turkey out for exactly the same reason.

The data collected are the receipts from the EAGGF (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund) and the Regional Policy, minus total expenditures. This figure is divided by each member state’s GDP so as to measure the redistribution as a share of a member state’s annual economy. Data is collected for each year between 1995 and 2006. With the exception of Ireland, that share of GDP did not change drastically over time. This means that, like population size, a member-state’s net-status on the budget is a ratio-level variable that does not change by significant degrees over time, and should therefore be measured against a the long-run policy on Turkey. A scatterplot and regression analysis can give insight into the potential relationship between these two variables.

3.3.2.7 Public Opinion

Hp7: Member states with public opinion more predominantly against Turkish membership are less likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with public opinion less predominantly against Turkish membership.

Public opinion is a variable that can change significantly over the course of a decade. Therefore, it is useful to measure it against the short-run policy. It is also a ratio-level variable. The influence of public opinion is measured by an ordinal-level proportional reduction of error measure (gamma) and
by comparing graphs. The data is taken from Eurobarometer. While there have been numerous public opinion polls about Turkey, there are many complications in the data. Only Eurobarometer has systematically assessed public opinion among all the EU member states. They have also done so with the same question for several years.

Table 3.4 (below) shows in what years, and months, the question: "For each of the following countries, [incl. Turkey] are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future?" was asked. The best method is to set the nearest preceding date before each episode’s decision moment to measure the level of public support for Turkish membership. This is not desirable for the 2004 decision, however, as the nearest preceding survey question on Turkey was asked in November 2002, two years earlier. For 2004 it is necessary to use the June 2005 survey as the proxy for public opinion in late 2004.

**Table 3.4: Months of Eurobarometer surveys featuring the same question on Turkey.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>January</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>November</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>September</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>April</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because the answers to the survey questions allow three answers: ‘For’, ‘Against’, and ‘Don’t Know’, it is necessary to recalculate the variable in order to provide one number that measures the level of public support for Turkish membership. That measure will be the percentage ‘For’ minus the percentage ‘Against’. Doing this recalculation, and taking the lowest third, middle third, and highest third of the ‘For’ levels for each of the member states at each of the episodes, allows for conducting an ordinal proportional reduction of error test as has been done for several other variables.
To compute the gamma-measure, it is necessary to turn the ratio-level variable into an ordinal level variable. As has been done with other variables, such as terrorism and crime, this is done by taking the highest-third, middle-third, and lowest-third values for each of the data points and thus dividing them into three ordinal categories.

Because public opinion is a much-considered variable when thinking about Turkey, it is useful to look at changes over time, regardless of the outcome of the gamma-ratio. This is done by graphing the changes in public opinion against graphs of the member-state policies on Turkey. Doing so also has the benefit of getting a sense of public opinion in a descriptive sense. This allows the reader and the researcher to see if public opinion leads policy, or if the relationship is, in fact, the reverse; in other words, that the political rhetoric possibly moves public opinion, rather than the presumed direction of causality.

3.3.2.8 Political party ideology

**Hp8: Left-wing governments are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than Right-wing governments are.**

The challenge for testing this hypothesis is to offer a definition of what governments are right-wing, centrist, or left-wing governments. This implies a working definition of these terms and a measure that is valid across time and case. That working definition is drawn from Laver & Budge (1992), and the data is compiled by Volkens et al. (2010) in the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) database.

This data offers a scale between –100 (left) and +100 (right) for each political party in many states (including all the member states), and draws on political party manifestos ahead of each election. The data takes into account policy proposals/statements regarding: military policy, freedom and human rights, constitutionalism, political authority, free market economic policy, level of protectionism, economic orthodoxy, the welfare state, promotion of a national(ist) culture, traditional morality, law and order, promotion of peace, internationalism, democracy, anti-imperialism, market regulation, economic planning, education policy and stance on organized labor. As such, it is a very broad measure and not focused on a small set of criteria.

Drawing on this data, the ideology of governments is defined by the right-left scores of the ruling parties using the data for the most recent election prior to the decision in each episode. Coalitions are calculated by summing and averaging the scores of the constituent political parties,
using a weight depending on what share of the coalition is represented in the lower house of the national parliament. This precise calculation, its rationale, along with the determinations of how missing data is handled, is detailed in Statistical Appendix C.

In addition to the CMP data, which is not always complete, another analysis is drawn using the ParlGov data of Döring and Manow (2011). This data encompasses more political parties, including minor ones that have joined coalition governments as very junior member parties. The scoring of the left/right dimension is along an 11-point scale, from 0 to 10. Its score for political parties is, however, static across time, assuming that political parties do not shift their ideology or policy proposals.

The fit of these independent variable data with the dependent variable are first tested using the ordinal proportional reduction of error test used previously. That measure of government ideology that best the dependent variable is then tested by comparing its graphs to those of the dependent variable.

3.3.2.9 Political opportunism

Hp9: When existing government policy is at odds with public opinion, significant changes in government pursuant to elections are more likely to result in policy changes than when existing policy is not at odds with public opinion.

Because this is essentially a bivariate analysis, testing this hypothesis requires making two sets of distinctions: levels of public opinion and changes of government. Further, in contrast to the previous tests, this test considers changes of government and changes of policy. That means that the observations are no longer attributes of the cases at certain episodes, but rather attributes of cases between episodes, or intervals. Because it is also framed in a conditional sense – where the requisite condition for the hypothesis operating is that policy must be at odds with public opinion – a test of this hypothesis must be done while looking at only those cases where the condition is true.

This subset is where public opinion is at odds with the policy in the previous episode. Because the balance of public opinion is heavily toward the negative – there are only a handful of cases where the balance of public opinion is in Turkey’s favor and the policy is not that of a driver – that there is little point in looking too heavily at those cases where a favorable public opinion was at
odd with government policy. The analysis will, therefore, look at the cases where public opinion was negative and the government had embraced a driver policy.

Using this subset, each case is looked at to see what the fallout was from the contrast between policy and opinion. There are three developments that logically can fall within the domestic politics as an explanatory frame: 1) the driver government was replaced by government with a passenger or brakeman policy, 2) the sitting government changed its policy, and 3) the government managed to change public opinion (or public opinion changed for other reasons). Other possible developments are 4) that the sitting government stuck to its policy and weathered the political discontent with its policy, and 5) that the replacement government maintained the driver policy.

The test is seeing what the distribution of outcomes is. If outcomes 1, 2, and 3 are prevalent then it is possible that political opportunism explains some of the changes in policy. If, however, 4 or 5 are the prevalent outcomes, then there is little evidence that political opportunism played a role. Under scenario 4, where governments maintain their policies, it means that governments are either so secure in their positions that the chance of being removed is considered remote, or that they consider the benefit of the policy worth the risk of being replaced. In these cases, it is interesting to assess the degree to which a government could feel secure. In the last scenario, the opposition either did not make Turkey an election issue despite the chance that it would have been worthwhile campaign rhetoric. In that case, it is interesting to learn by what margins the election was won. If the margins were close, the benefits of the driver policy must be considered sufficiently worthwhile that the opposition would risk not winning the elections, or they would risk losing the elections for not having kept their word.

3.3.2.10 Immigration Politics

Hp10: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative to total population, are more likely to oppose Turkish membership than member states with smaller immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations relative to total population, are.

13 Incidentally, there are five cases where the balance of public opinion was in favor of Turkish membership and the government held a passenger policy, and one case (Sweden in 1997) where the government held a brakeman position despite a positive balance in public opinion.
Hp11: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative to total population, are more likely to change their policies on Turkish membership more frequently than member states with smaller Muslim/Turkish populations relative to total population, are.

Hp12: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative to total population, are more likely to see a relationship between changes of government and policies on Turkish membership.

Because immigration politics are frequently cited as reasons why states set their policies on Turkey, it is useful to test these related hypotheses with increasing complexity. The first, being the simplest, looks to see if the presence of large immigrant, Muslim or Turkish minorities tends to move policies toward one end of the spectrum, rather than the other. The idea is that the more such persons are present, the more the dominant/native population will want to prevent the large-scale immigration that the free movement of persons associated with EU membership might bring.

Because the relative numbers of immigrants, Muslims or Turks in the population is not something that changes dramatically over the course of a decade, this is tested against the long-run policy tendency. It will be tested by drawing a Pearson correlation between the share of Muslims or Turks in the population and depicted with a scatterplot and least-squares regression line. If the presence of large immigrant, Muslim or Turkish communities makes it more likely that a member-state will oppose Turkish membership, there ought to be a significant negative relationship.

Failing that, the next thing that is measured is if the presence of large immigrant, Muslim or Turkish populations makes a policy more volatile, as the policy becomes the subject of political gamesmanship. Rather than the long-run policy being the dependent variable, the policy volatility will stand in for the dependent variable. This volatility is be measured by counting the number of times that the policy changed, where a policy shift from brakeman to driver (or vice versa) is counted as 2 and a shift to or from passenger from a different policy counts as a shift of 1. If the presence of large immigrant, Muslim, or Turkish communities makes the politics more volatile, there ought to be a significant positive relationship.

The third of these tests requires a different approach, one that takes the short-run policies into account by re-introducing the evolution of policies over time. Rather than calculating the proportional reduction of error over time, however, a correlation is drawn between the policy change and political change over time for each member state. The test consists of seeing if these
correlations, per member state, change depending on the percentage of immigrants, Turks or Muslims in the member-state populations. If the hypothesis holds, there ought to be stronger correlations among those countries with large populations of Turks or Muslims and weaker (and/or counterintuitive) ones among those with smaller populations of Turks or Muslims.

The political change measured in the correlations is calculated by taking difference between an episode and the previous episode, according to the ParlGov measure of political ideology. The differences are measured with the ideological direction as well as made neutral, calculating the degree of change without the direction of political change. Doing both allows for the measurement of the importance of political ideology in predicting the policies.

The tests of these hypotheses each involve three categories of minority population: immigrants, Muslims and Turks. The percentage of immigrants in the population, for the statistical tests, is counted by taking the number of foreign citizens in each member state, divided by the whole population for all the years in which data is available and taking the average percentage for all those years. In that way, the number is not skewed by having it approximate either the beginning of the periods, or the end, and not being subject to particular cases of missing data. Because Luxembourg is such an outlier from this dataset, owing to a very small share of Luxembourg citizens in the population, Luxembourg will be omitted from the test with immigrants.

Muslims, who are not necessarily immigrants, but are frequently framed as ‘the’ immigrant population of many Western European countries, are not generally counted in census data. Instead, the tests here will use the stock by Kettani (2009).

The numbers of Turks in the member-state populations are estimated using the methods described in Statistical Appendix C. This method accounts for both the first and second generation of Turks. It has been important to also account for the second generation, given that the beginning of Turkish immigration began in the 1960s, and those who came at that time have had their children in their new homes. Many of these children have citizenships in the country of their birth, but are considered a part of the Turkish community. Because data on Greece is not compiled, Greece must be omitted from this analysis.
3.3.3 Wealth

The following sections describe the methodologies used to understand the influence, if any, purely economic factors had on the member states’ policies. The first of these relates to agriculture, the sector on which enlargement would likely have the greatest impact. Following agriculture, measures of trade and investment are considered, followed by the prospect of member states’ greater access to workers.

3.3.3.1 Agriculture

Hw1: Member states with a complementary agricultural sector with Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a competitive agricultural sector with Turkey.

Agriculture is considered a special wealth-related subject in the context of Turkey joining the EU, because it is the main set of traded commodities that is not subject to the EU-Turkey Customs Union. In other words, bringing Turkey into the EU would all but certainly drop the trade barriers against agricultural commodities and allow tremendous growth in trade in these goods. The same is not true of other commodities, because the Customs Union already allows for free trade in those goods.

Rather than measuring an existing trade relationship, it is necessary to estimate the potential trade relationship, but also the potential for trade diversion. The method here is to look at agricultural imports and exports for Turkey and the EU-15 member states, and see to what degree these are complementary or competitive with one another. Doing so involves drawing data on the top-20 (by value in 2000 US$) import and export commodities drawn from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for Turkey and each of the member states. The challenge is to convert the import and export values of the top-20 commodities into a single measure of agricultural complement.

The idea behind this measurement is that the degree to which the export and import profiles of the European member states are complementary with Turkey, the more they will have to gain from Turkey joining the EU. Conversely, the more their export and import profiles are in competition with Turkey, the more they will stand to lose if Turkey joins the EU, because their
exports will have compete with Turkish exports without the protection of the present trade barriers. Additionally, their demand for such agricultural imports will also have to compete with Turkish demand on an equal footing.

In order to create a single quantitative measure of agricultural complement, the following method is employed. Turkey’s top 20 agricultural commodity exports and top 20 agricultural commodity imports are compared with the top 20 such exports and imports of each of the member states. This is done in four ways, imports vs. imports, imports vs. exports, exports vs. imports and exports vs. exports. For every commodity classification that appears in both lists in each of these four match-ups, the corresponding values are summed with one another. All these summed values from each of the four lists are added together, the complements (imports vs. exports and exports vs. imports) positively and the competitors (exports vs. exports and imports vs. imports) negatively. Those sums are then divided by the GDPs of the member states.

The resulting values represent the degree to which the agricultural profiles of each of the member states is in competition or is complementary to that of Turkey, in proportion to each of the member-state economies. As such, these numbers reflect how much the member-states’ agricultural economies (both in terms of producers and consumers of agricultural products) would benefit from (or be harmed by) Turkey joining. If the politics of agricultural economics matter in the debate on Turkish membership, then those countries with strong positive values should tend to be supportive of Turkey joining the EU and those with strong negative values should tend to oppose Turkey joining the EU.

The numbers that result from these calculations are surprisingly variable over time. The trade in agricultural commodities is not a placid pastoral affair, but demonstrates significant hustle and bustle. In terms of explaining the dependent variable, this is promising, because of the variation over time in the dependent variable. Of course, it ought not to be expected that a government’s enlargement policy will be driven like a weathervane by the gales of its agricultural economics, even if its agricultural economics would be on its mind. For this reason, the analysis introduces the time-lags as have been done before. The different $\gamma$-rates are calculated for four different cumulative time-lag scenarios (0-, 1-, 2-, and 3-year cumulative time-lags).

An unfortunate Achilles heel in this analysis is that it does not account for domestic agricultural economies and the degree to which Turkish producers may out-compete domestic producers in the member states where they had previously been able to out-compete other foreign producers. Given the degree to which the agricultural economy in Europe is ‘Europeanized’ in that
products freely cross borders and a country can export the same category products that it exports to others, this problem is considered negligible. Unfortunately also, prior to 2000 the FAO combined the agricultural exports of Belgium and Luxembourg in their accounting. Because their post-2000 agricultural export/import profiles are significantly different from one another, and because of the variability in the profiles over time, it is impossible to extrapolate values for the years prior to 2000, and estimate the respective values. For this reason, Belgium and Luxembourg must be left out of the analysis.

3.3.3.2 Trade and investment

Hw2: Member states with greater volumes of trade with Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with smaller volumes of trade with Turkey.

Hw3: Member states with greater volumes of investment between that member state and Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with smaller volumes of investment in Turkey.

Hw4: Member states with a trade surplus with Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a trade deficit with Turkey.

The next hypotheses that consider the motive for wealth as explanatory for policy deal with trade and investment. There are three hypotheses connected to these two concepts and because they have many similar methodological aspects, they are treated together. Those common aspects are that they are both ratio-level variables and are fairly variable in the short term. This means that they are subject to similar means of assessment: ordinal proportional reduction of error, gamma, as used in many of the preceding analyses.

The trade variable is taken from the Correlates of War bilateral trade dataset (Barbieri, Keshk & Pollins, 2008), which includes import and export figures to and from each country in the world (with some small exceptions). For each member state, the total volume of trade (imports plus exports) is taken to and from Turkey. This figure is divided by GDP to put the numbers into a
relative framework. For the trade balance, the imports are subtracted from the exports and, again, divided by GDP.

The GDPs used to calculate the shares of the economies are from the OECD database, and are collected in base year (2000) US$ at constant exchange rates. The data from the Correlates of War dataset are at ‘current’ US$, with the data compiled in 2007. The 2007 GDP figures are calculated using deflator figures from the OECD, in order to match US$ of the GDP to the US$ of the Correlates of War data.

For investment, the data is drawn from the OECD database of foreign direct investment statistics. The two statistics used are the inward and outward flows of investment. The flows measure the increased amount invested during a year, whereas the positions measure the stock of extant investments. While and the inward and outward positions of investment are available after 2001, they are not available in the years prior to 2000. They cannot, therefore, be used to assess the policies of 1997 or 1999. Regrettably, the annual returns on investment flowing back into a country are not reported to the OECD’s database. Because of these limitations, only the annual flows of investments are tested against the policies.

The theoretical assumption is that countries with more of their investors’ money being invested in Turkey (represented by the inward flows investments, as the ‘inward’ represents inward to Turkey), will have a greater stake in Turkey joining the European Union than countries with less of such investment. The same works in reverse in that the more Turkey invests in European countries, the more those who have Turkey investing in them, will have to gain by facilitating Turkish membership in that this will presumably mean more investment in the future as the economies become further intertwined with similar regulatory regimes. It should be noted that the outward flows are small compared to the inward flows of investment, demonstrating that member-state investors are significantly more invested in Turkey than Turkish investors are in the member states, when judging capital in absolute amounts.

Because the numbers of trade with and investment in Turkey for each member state fluctuate significantly from year to year, trade is a variable that is best looked at in the short run, rather than the long run. Further, because multiple years can be taken into account, it is useful to use a model of analysis similar to what was used for analyzing the threat of terrorism – one that makes use of time lags in order to find a model that best fits the hypothesis.

Over the course of the decade being analyzed, trade with Turkey has grown tremendously, outpacing the macroeconomic (GDP) growth of the member states. For the average member state,
the volume of trade with Turkey in 2006 was comfortably more than twice that in 1997. Given this, one might expect member-states’ appreciation of the prospect of Turkism membership to have grown as well. A rudimentary knowledge of the history of the diplomacy teaches one that it was not the case that member states were twice as supportive of Turkish membership in 2006 than they were in 1997. Because the negotiating positions were determined in a strategic sense (in terms relative to their fellow EU members), it is also necessary to reassess the trade numbers in terms relative to the other member states for each episode.

Therefore, when categorizing the trade volumes and investment flows into the three ordinal categories used in the gamma tests, it is best to measure the categories by greatest third, smallest third, and middle third for each episode (and lagged years), rather than for the decade overall. This corrects for the across-the-board increases or broad fluctuations in the volumes and flows of trade and investments.

3.3.3.3 Migration and employment

**Hw5: Member states with low levels of unemployment are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of unemployment.**

The idea of this test is to capture the notion that countries with high rates of employment have an interest in attracting more workers in order to work in their economies. The converse probably paints a clearer picture that aligns closer with a common understanding of the problem: that countries with high rates of unemployment have an interest in keeping migrants from competing with the domestic unemployed for scarce jobs.

Because having Turkey join the EU would allow for more migrants from Turkey to EU member states under the freedom of movement for workers, having Turkey join the EU would likely promise an increase in migration until such time as Turkey’s own (presumed) economic growth would begin to pull Turkish migrants back to their home country.

Therefore, the expectation is that low rates of unemployment would predict more support (or less opposition) to Turkish membership. While this implies a simple test of a ratio-level variable (unemployment) that fluctuates over time against the short-run policies of the member states, there is the complication that the time-horizon for Turkish membership, and thus the promise (or threat)
of increased migration can be seen as something that should not necessarily be compared to the immediate employment situation, but the situation of employment over a longer previous period. For this reason, it is useful to allow for long time-lags to measure the ordinal proportional reduction of error rate, but also to average the level of unemployment over a long time against the long-run policy average in a regression model to see if levels of unemployment can help explain the policy tendency in the long run.

Another concept that is brought into the analysis is the idea that not all rates of unemployment are equal for all countries. Many policy makers and economists embrace the idea of a natural rate of unemployment, or, a level of unemployment that is still considered full employment because of certain structural tendencies in the workforce. The measure frequently applied is called the ‘non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment’ (NAIRU), above which inflation does not tend to occur despite expansionary fiscal or monetary policies. In addition to a test against the simple unemployment rate, an additional test against the NAIRU minus the unemployment rate is tested.

The idea here is that the degree to which unemployment rate is below the NAIRU is the degree to which more workers are needed to keep the economy running at full capacity. The greater the difference between the unemployment rate and the NAIRU, where the NAIRU is greater than the unemployment rate (so that NAIRU minus the unemployment rate is a positive number), the greater will be an economy’s demand for workers. On the other hand, where this number turns negative, where the unemployment rate is greater than the NAIRU, the less an economy will demand more workers and the more migrants will be competing with the domestic unemployed for those scarce jobs.

Subtracting from the NAIRU introduces a variable between the member states, in that not all economies have the same level of structural unemployment. The average NAIRU for Belgium over the 1996-2005 period, for example, was nearly twice that for Austria. Belgium may have, therefore, had a greater demand for workers than Austria, despite a higher rate of unemployment.

The NAIRU is drawn from the OECD, where the average 1996-2005 will be used to calculate all values. Because the OECD does not report the NAIRU for Luxembourg, Luxembourg is, regrettably, omitted from the analyses using this measure. The annual unemployment rates are taken from Eurostat.
3.3.4 Identity

This and the following headings focus on the constructivist hypotheses and the methods used to test them. The politics of identity are frequently cited as being influential determinants of member state policies. The following sections describe the methods used for testing the hypotheses related to this approach. The first of these, religion, looks at the different degrees of support from Catholic vs. Protestant countries, if religiosity and/or church attendance play a role, or if it is due to distaste for Islam. Secondly, the methods measuring the influence of rationalism are explained, followed by the influence of cultural differences.

3.3.4.1 Religion

Hi1: Member states that are predominantly Catholic are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states that are predominantly Protestant.

Hi2: Member states with a high level of religiosity are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a low level of religiosity are.

Hi3: member states with lower levels of anti-Muslim sentiment are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of anti-Muslim sentiment.

Test of religion are, by their long-run nature, potentially only explanatory of member-states’ long-run policies. The religious make-up of a state’s population generally does not change much from one year to the next, and religiosity only marginally so, especially in relative terms. Therefore, religion and religiosity are tested against the long-run policy tendencies of the member states. Because religion and religiosity are ratio-level variables, this allows for the tests to be done by way of simple linear regressions.

The World Values Survey (WVS) has done several waves of surveys throughout the past decades on a range of issues relating to people’s values. With respect to the EU-15 member states, nearly all states were covered in the 1999 survey, with the exception of Finland, which was surveyed
in 2000. These survey results are used to test these hypotheses related to religion, as well as many of the variables in the other Constructivist hypotheses.

The first hypothesis tests denominations against member-state policies. In the WVS question on religious denomination, the survey allowed for 86 different responses for all the surveyed countries of the world. For the EU-15 countries, this resulted in 12 reported denominations (including ‘other’). Because of the range of Protestant denominations, columns adding into ‘Protestant’ are ‘Free church/Non denominational church’, ‘Protestant’, and ‘Church of Sweden’.

In terms of proportions, all but Greece and the Netherlands had Protestants and Catholics, together, adding up to more than 92%. Greeks are 97.7% Orthodox, and the Dutch have a relatively high degree of Muslims (2.3%) and others (9.5%), but Protestants and Catholics, together, still make up 88.2% of the population. For this reason the religious denomination variable is calculated by subtracting the percentage of Protestants from the percentage of Catholics. This creates a variable that produces a positive relationship if the findings are in line with the hypothesis. This measure creates a relatively bifurcated population, as most European countries are either predominantly one or the other, with only Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom having large minorities of Protestants or Catholics.

Religiosity is measured in two ways. The first is by counting the percentage of people in each member state that self-identify as a ‘religious person’, and the second is by measuring church attendance. The question on church attendance is: “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” The variable measures the percentage of those persons who answered ‘more than once a week’, ‘once a week’ and ‘once a month’.

Because the hypothesis predicts a shared identity with Turks, who also strongly identifying themselves as religious people, it predicts a positive relationship. Contrariwise, there is the idea that people of a particular level of faith would be more inclined to identify members of a different faith as being more different from themselves. This idea expects the reverse – that the higher the level the religiosity, the less likely a country would be supportive of a predominantly Muslim country like Turkey should join the EU.

In terms of anti-Muslim sentiment, this concept is measured by the World Values Survey (WVS) question about the desirability of Muslims as neighbors. The measure used is the percentage of persons answering that question in the negative: Muslims were mentioned as a group that the respondent would not like to have as a neighbor. If the hypothesis holds true, then there ought to be a negative relationship between this independent variable and the long-run member-state policies.
3.3.4.2 Nationalism

Hi4: Countries with low levels of nationalism are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of nationalism.

This hypothesis requires measures of in-group identification. It supposes that the more members of a nation/country embrace their own identity, the less inclined they will be to admit others to the group of which they are a part, regardless of the nature of that group. That means that one indicator of nationalism is the degree to which they are proud of their identity as members of the nation. The opposite side of this is the fear of the loss of the national identity. In this frame of nationalism, the formation of a large multi-national Europe with (even) Turkey as a member, the national identity will essentially dissolve.

While ‘country’ and ‘nation’ are not the same concept, in popular discourse they are frequently taken as interchangeable. In the 1999 World Values Survey, respondents were asked to answer to what degree they were proud to be of their country. The first measure of in-group identification is the percentage of respondents in each member state who answered ‘Very Proud’. This answer was the highest degree in four categories (the others being ‘quite proud’, ‘not very proud’, and ‘not at all proud’). The hypothetical supposition is that the stronger the in-group identification of the constituents of the member-state, the more likely they will reject outsiders, like the Turks, into the European Union.

The second indicator for in-group identification is the defensive one – the degree to which the respondent feels that the identity of his nation is being eroded. The question, from the Eurobarometer surveys of 1997 and 2001, are as follows: “Regarding the building of Europe ... are you currently afraid of ... (our country) not really existing anymore?” The percentage of persons answering that they were afraid of losing their nation’s identity in the EU is taken as the independent variable representing the fear over the loss of national identity as a result of European unification. Because the question was asked in two separate Eurobarometer surveys, the average of the two percentages answering the question in the positive will represent the independent variable.
3.3.4.3 Cultural Differences

Hi5: Countries whose populations identify cultural differences as being the reason Turkey should not be allowed to join by greater degrees are more likely to oppose Turkey for EU membership than those who do so by lesser degrees are.

Hi6: Countries whose populations consistently differentiate Turkey from other candidate countries less are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than countries whose populations differentiate Turkey from other candidate countries more.

These hypotheses require more intricate thinking in terms of measurement. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Gürer (2008) identified perceptions of cultural differences as highly explanatory of public opinion regarding the desirability of Turkey becoming a member of the EU. The statistic used in his research was drawn from the Fall 2005 Eurobarometer survey. The question asked about agreement or disagreement with the statement “The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states are too significant to allow for this accession.” A simple correlation test between the answers to this question and the question from the same survey about the desirability of Turkey joining the EU in the future, at the member-state level of analysis results in a nearly perfect correlation ($r = -0.96$).

However, the influence of public opinion on member-state policies is tested for elsewhere in this research. The question here is if the survey results of the cultural differences question can improve upon the predictive value of member-state policies over the simple public approval of seeing Turkey join the EU at some point in the future. This is done by comparing the correlation coefficients between approval and the cultural differences against the public policy dependent variable. If the cultural differences question performs better than the standard question in the same survey, it might be a stronger frame of understanding than ephemeral public opinion is. If, however, it performs less adequately, then it may be an antecedent variable through public opinion, but not a more helpful frame of understanding.

The second hypothesis is trickier to assess, because comparing against other candidate countries runs the risk of missing variable biases. Among the other candidate countries, Bulgaria and Romania were generally the least favored candidates for EU membership. They are, however, generally seen as fully European countries, rather than countries with tenuous perceptions as such, like Turkey. Of course, Bulgaria and Romania are also smaller and less populous than Turkey is.
However, these size-related characteristics – as well as cultural differences – are not characteristics that change much, if at all, over time. If the differences in public opinion change a great deal over time, then those cannot be primarily caused by these static characteristics, but must be the function of time-variable characteristics.

The purpose of the test is to determine if there is a structural difference in public support between Turkey, on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Romania on the other. This is to see if the differences in public appreciation are constant or variable over time. If the differences are highly variable, then variables that are non-constant over time are the most likely to be explanatory. Because this may differ per member state (perhaps the differences are constant for Denmark and variable for Portugal, for example, because the structural factors are more important for Denmark than they are for Portugal), the analyses will be run per member state in time-series graphs. If the graphs show dramatically varying differences in public opinion, then they demonstrate fundamental limitations on the idea that cultural differences between Turkey and the member states are prohibitive of Turkish membership in the long run.

Measurement is done by subtracting each of the opposition percentages from the Eurobarometer survey data to both Bulgaria and Romania’s candidacy in public opinion from the percentages for Turkey. These differences are then graphed over time. The surveys overlap in the Eurobarometer surveys of January 1996, April 1997, April and November 1999, June 2000, January and November 2001, June and October 2005, and September 2006. That offers enough datapoints to establish trends in the comparative movement of public opinion on Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria to determine the variability of that public opinion and to assess if the differences are structural or ephemeral. These graphs are plotted against the member-state policies in order to determine if they help predict the dependent variable.

3.3.5 Norms

The following sections describe how the influences of norms are measured. The first of these frames is that of the political Copenhagen criteria, which enshrine the Western values of liberal democracy, meaning human and civil rights. The other normative frame is that of socialization, where the length of involvement in a regime is assumed to produce a convergence of behavior.
3.3.5.1 The political Copenhagen criteria

**Hn1:** Member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkey’s membership after Turkey has demonstrated more progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen criteria than when Turkey has demonstrated less progress.

The purpose in this analysis concerns Turkey’s speed of reforms. Unlike other analyses, it does not differentiate among the member states in terms of any of their attributes. This idea is derived from the overarching principle that the EU is a community with a liberal democratic character, and that only countries that share this character can join the EU. It also implies that Turkey’s membership prospects are fundamentally driven by its own ability to meet the membership criteria, rather than the particular interests of the member states deciding its fate.

The first thing is to assess is if there is significant variation in the sum of the dependent variable over time. That is, to determine if all the member-state policies, taken together at each episode, provide meaningful variation over the episodes. If they do not, and all the member states’ policies change are based on the particular calculations of each, then either Turkey has not made any progress that the member states might appreciate, or Turkey’s progress is irrelevant to them. Therefore, the first test is to see if the sum of policies follows a particular pattern. That pattern is the dependent variable for the subsequent tests determining if the pattern fits the changes in Turkey’s quantitatively demonstrable progress toward the Copenhagen criteria.

With sufficient variation in the dependent variable of all the EU-15 member states summed together, it is possible to test two published quantitative variables that measure the concepts that are encompassed by the Copenhagen criteria. In the short sentence in the Presidency Conclusions of the 1993 Copenhagen European Council, the stated political criteria were: the “stability of institutions guaranteeing:

- democracy,
- the rule of law,
- human rights and
- respect for and protection of minorities, ...” (European Council, 1993).

Beginning in 1998, when the Commission was tasked to report on candidates’ progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria, the Commission has had to report on the developments of different concepts that fall under these broad headings. In the reports on Turkey, the broader range of concepts have included military influence in politics, torture, treatment of prisoners, missing
persons, capital punishment, the effectiveness of the judiciary, corruption, freedom of the media, political stability, freedom of association (political parties and labor unions), freedom of assembly and speech (particularly in terms of the Kurdish language), political enfranchisement (in terms of Kurdish parties and the high electoral threshold), and freedom of religion.

A complication is that there are, essentially, two ways to conceive of the conditionality inherent in the accession process. One can be called the ‘minimal standards’ approach, and the other is the ‘encouragement’ approach. The former, which is more restrictive, will only permit Turkey to progress through the enlargement regime if it meets the minimal standards necessary to progress to the next stage. The latter, which is more permissive, permits Turkey to progress through the stages of enlargement regime when it demonstrates sufficient progress since the previous time, assuming that all the criteria will be completely met by the time that membership actually occurs.

In terms of the political criteria, the ‘minimal standards’ model demands that accession negotiations, which gauge progress according to the administrative criteria (aligning the candidate’s laws and regulations with all the chapters of the *aquis communautaire*), cannot begin before all the political criteria are fully met. The ‘encouragement’ model wants to see sufficient progress so that it can be assumed that the political criteria will be fully met at some point during the accession negotiations. While these different positions can, certainly, be articulated instrumentally by brakemen (minimal standards) and drivers (encouragement), without which either actually believe in their rhetoric, the liberal community hypothesis supposes that they do believe in the values.

The minimal standards model and the encouragement models require different frames of analysis. The latter requires the gauging of change, whereas the former needs to determine what the standards are and gauge if the candidate has met them. In terms of the minimal standards model, it is fortunate that the preceding set of enlargements give some precedents to compare Turkey’s progress to. In 1997, the European Council differentiated between the six front-runners in the race for membership and the candidates who were not yet deemed ready to start the accession negotiations. In 1999, these others were permitted to start the negotiations. Ostensibly, this was because these candidates were then also ready for the negotiations. The case of Slovakia is particularly instructive because in 1997 it was deemed not ready because of its lack of progress on the political front.

There are two broadly recognized quantitative measures of political and civil rights. These are the measures of political rights and civil liberties by Freedom House and the physical integrity and empowerment rights indices by the CIRI project (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010). Both generally
measure the broad set of concepts that are encompassed by the political Copenhagen criteria. The European Commission also closely gauges candidates’ progress toward meeting the criteria, and the annual Commission reports are cited by member-state leaders framing their rhetoric on the issue of the candidates’ progress toward meeting the criteria. However, the Commission’s reports are descriptive and qualitative in nature, rather than quantitative. That means that the Commission’s reports cannot directly be used to quantitatively test the hypotheses, but they can be used to assess the validity of the other measures.

The Freedom House indices measure political rights and civil liberties of all countries. Both are on 1-to-7 scales where a rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom. These ratings are calculated based on the methodological process described on the Freedom House website. Because political rights and civil liberties are both parts of the Copenhagen criteria, both will be summed to take a cumulative measure of Turkey’s progress toward the criteria in the encouragement model. This creates a potential range between 14 and 2. Because a higher score means a lower level of freedom, the measure is inverted to compare against the balance of member-state policies. The Freedom House data is generally in agreement with the findings of the Commission’s annual progress reports.

In terms of measuring the necessary level of progress to warrant accession negotiations, for the minimal standards model, Slovakia was deemed not to have met the minimal requirements when its Civil Liberties index was at 4 in 1997, but was approved when it had improved its Civil Liberties score to 2 by 1999. As such, a score of 3 is considered the minimum necessary score for the Civil Liberties index to warrant accession negotiations. Because the Civil Liberties index and the Political Rights index are in the same scale, the analytical assumption is made that a score of 3 is also the minimum requirement for the Political Rights index. No country engaged in accession negotiations had a worse score than 3 on either of the indices. Bulgaria maintained a Civil Liberties score of 3 from 1996 until 2001, well into its term negotiating the acquis, suggesting that it is not required to strengthen civil liberties institutions to the degree that they reach a score of 2.

The primary source material for the CIRI data comes from human rights reports from the US Department of State, with cross-references with Amnesty International reports in order to correct for any US government bias toward its allies. In terms of accuracy, the indicators generally accord with other measures of human rights and civil liberties. Among the Physical integrity rights

index, the measure of disappearances has improved from ‘0’ (frequent occurrences) in 1994 to ‘2’ (no occurrences) in 2006, with some starts and stops. In the annual reports by the Commission, missing persons or disappearances were not mentioned in the 2005 and 2006 reports. In 2003 and 2004, on the other hand, (where CIRI gives a score of 2), the Commission mentions that there were still reports of disappearances. In terms of torture, the CIRI data maintains a ‘0’ (frequent occurrences) throughout. The Commission reports ‘downward trends’ in the number of torture cases, but not that torture has been eradicated despite the ‘zero tolerance’ policy from the government regarding torture. While there are discrepancies between the Commission and the CIRI data, the CIRI data being more pessimistic about Turkey’s progress than the Commission, these are not to the degree that they contradict one another beyond a reasonable doubt.

For measuring progress according to the ‘encouragement’ model, the CIRI data are compiled into one score by adding all the component measures together. This provides a range between 0 and 30. Turkey’s scores range between 9 and 15. In terms of a ‘minimal standards model, it is necessary to identify the minimal score held by a negotiating candidate. For Slovakia, the Empowerment Rights index improved from 1997 to 1999 from an 11 to a 12, whereas the Physical Integrity index held steady at 7. In 2000 and 2003, Slovakia’s physical integrity index slid back to a 6, without its negotiations being suspended. For Bulgaria, its Physical Integrity score in 1999 was a 5 while its Empowerment index was 9. A year later the former slid down to a 4 and the latter to a 7 without negotiations being suspended. In 2005, Romania also had its Empowerment index slide down to a 7 without negotiations being suspended. For this reason, the Physical Integrity index minimum is assumed to be 4 and the Empowerment Rights index 7.

The graphical tests for the minimal standards approach for both the Freedom House and the CIRI Physical Integrity and Empowerment Rights indices measure deviations from the minimum, rather than absolute values. Furthermore, because the possible range of the Empowerment Rights index is twice that of the Physical Integrity index (as it uses double the indicators) for the CIRI measures, the deviation in the former is divided by two, so as to use the same scale.

Of the four tests, the result from the best of the four is used to test against the individual policies of each of the member states. Because the dependent variable is an ordinal level variable, a proportional reduction of error (gamma) test determines the degree to which the liberal community hypothesis explains member-state policies.
3.3.5.2 Socialization

Hn2: Member states that have been members of the EU for similar amounts of time will exhibit behavior that is more similar to one another than to member states that have been members for significantly different lengths of time.

Hn3: Member states that have been members of the EU longer are more likely to have their support or opposition governed by Turkey’s level of progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria than member states that have been members for shorter periods of time.

The simplest test of member states the similarity of policy behavior of the different groups by enlargement order is to draw graphs in which each of their policies are depicted together. This gives immediate ocular satisfaction of the question. If empirical evidence shows support for the first hypothesis, then there is room to compare the policies of the different groups against Turkey’s progress toward the Copenhagen criteria by the same method as described above.

3.3.6 Values

Finally, the last constructivist frame of analysis is that of values. States with more similar political values to Turkey are assumed to have a greater affinity for Turkey joining the EU, rather than the idea that Turkey must adjust its values to those of the member states. The section below describes the measurement of two types of political values; human rights and corruption.

3.3.6.1 Shared Political Values

Hv1: Member states with lower levels of adherence to the values of liberal democracy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with higher levels of adherence to the values of liberal democracy are.

Hv2: Member states with lower levels of corruption are less likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with higher levels of corruption.
In terms of values, the theory is that states that share values will be more open to the membership of states with like-minded values. In the case at hand, where the values articulated in the Copenhagen criteria – liberal democracy and the rule of law – are ostensible the stated values of the European Union, the degree to which the member-states have enacted the values is a reflection of the degree to which the political cultures of the member states embrace those values.

There are several variables already mentioned which can help measure the political values of the member states. These are the same as were tested for in the hypothesis (Hn1) related to Turkey’s progress toward the Copenhagen criteria. However, rather than testing the candidate’s embrace of the values, this frame tests the member states’ embrace of those values and to test the effect that this may have on their policies. The idea is that the countries that are not as strict with themselves on these values will be less strict with the candidate in question. The variables used are the Political Rights and Civil Liberties measures by Freedom House, and the Physical Integrity and Empowerment indices by the CIRI project. In terms of the second hypothesis of this theoretical frame is the independent variable is the corruption perception index. The idea, again, is that countries with higher levels of corruption will be less strict on permitting candidates with relatively high levels of corruption.

Because the measures drawn from Freedom House and the CIRI project are, essentially, interval-level data and available year-by-year, it is possible to do regression tests against the long-run policies as well as an ordinal level proportional reduction of error test against the short-run policies at each episode. They can, however, be put into different measures – one that simply measures member states’ own scores and another that measures the difference between each of the scores of the member states and Turkey’s score at the same time, during each episode.

To measure corruption, this research uses the widely-publicized Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International and the 2005 Eurobarometer survey question on Corruption. Due to Transparency International’s method of not using the same sources year-by-year, it is not proper to use its year-by-year statistics comparatively with one another. Instead, the CPI scores for the period in question (1997-2006) is averaged and measured against the long-run policy average of the member states.

Because corruption in a society is not something that changes dramatically year-by-year, it is not something that can be expected to influence a member state’s year-by-year behavior. At best it can be an underlying cause for a member-state’s (lack of) sympathy for a country like Turkey and its bid for EU membership.
4.0 THE HISTORY OF EU ENLARGEMENT

The enlargement of the European communities has been a developing process for many decades. The question of Turkey’s vocation as part of this process has a history nearly as long. This chapter outlines the history of the geographic expansion of the European Communities and European Union, in addition to the history Turkey’s membership prospects prior to the distinct episodes detailed in the next five chapters. The purpose of doing so is to provide an introduction and a context for the broad interests and structures have facilitated and hindered enlargement in the past, both with respect to Turkey and with respect to other applicant/candidate countries.

4.1 THE FOUNDING

With the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the European communities had six founding members – Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. After these foundations, the European communities expanded gradually in several waves. In 1973, after more than a decade of contentious politics, the EEC expanded with three new members, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The second wave in the 1980s brought in Greece (1981), followed by Spain and Portugal (1986), when they ceased to be ruled by military dictatorships. Eastern Germany was brought into the communities when the Cold War ended and Germany reunified in 1990. In 1995 the fourth wave enlarged what had by then become the European Union with Austria, Finland and Sweden, while the fifth wave of 2004 brought in Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007.
This short-hand history only marks when each of these countries were given voting rights in the European Councils and Parliament. Yet the overall geographical integration of Europe has many other layers, in many different forms, policies, and memberships, with the EU as only the most prominent level thereof. These other levels include the single currency, virtually introduced in 1999 and physically introduced in 2002. This monetary integration, at the time of writing, officially includes only 17 of the 27 EU members. The Schengen Agreement, establishing an area of no border controls originally between Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, now also includes non-EU members such as Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, but Ireland nor the United Kingdom have joined this open-borders regime. Furthermore, Denmark has unilaterally decided to reintroduce its border controls as their measure to combat illegal immigration and organized crime, creating yet another exception to the rule.

With regard to Turkey, it too has already participated in European integration. Since the 1963 signing of the Ankara Agreement, Turkey has been in an Associate Agreement with the EEC/EU, which provided for a regularization of political, trade, and security relationships. In 1995, this was expanded with the EU-Turkey Customs Union, which went into force in 1996. The Customs Union abolishes quotas and tariffs on manufactures and processed agricultural goods, (though not on unprocessed agricultural products), and provides for a framework to diminish non-tariff barriers to trade. This, along with its NATO membership, which has been the primary form of integration of military security policy in Europe, Turkey is already partially integrated into Europe's regime of cooperation on economic and security policies.

Although the geographic integration in Europe is very complex, with inclusions and exceptions across a broad spectrum of policy fields, EU membership involves the most prominent and thoroughgoing level of integration. It affords a member state a seat at the tables where most of the European decisions are made. The political, legal and administrative process leading to membership is also the most arduous process of reform requiring massive internal transformation and loss of nominal sovereignty with the greatest amount of scrutiny. In the vernacular: it is not a cakewalk, but thus far twenty-one countries have managed to join the six original members, while seven more are presently at some stage in the process to follow suit.

Studies of EEC/EU enlargement have had different frames of interest. Particularly the fifth enlargement wave has attracted a lot of academic attention. Due to the monumental size of the enlargement to 12 countries, the relative poverty of the new member states and the invasive nature of the necessary reforms, the fifth enlargement has been seen as being very different from the
previous rounds. Previous studies focused on why non-member states would want to become members, whereas studies about the fifth enlargement considered why the member states would wish to accept the incorporation of new member states.

That is not to imply that previous enlargement rounds were void of contention among the member states. The first round took more than a decade to complete, mostly because of France’s objections to British membership. The second round involved three countries that were much poorer than the existing members, with recent legacies of dictatorship and fears of immigration. The following round by contrast involved three rich countries, without much contention over their suitability to join. The sections below provide an overview of this history.

4.2 THE SIX AND THE SEVEN

In the 1950s, the founding members – Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – created three regimes of integration: one for coal and steel, another for nuclear power, and a third for economic and trade relations (the ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC respectively). While these plans included only these six countries, the idea of the early European federalists aimed at a far wider grouping attempting to attract all of the democracies of Europe (Kitzinger, 1960, p. 23).

The United Kingdom, however, felt that these plans went too far, while the Scandinavian countries were only willing to go as far as the British would go. When Charles de Gaulle became Prime Minister in 1958 and the President of France in 1959, the French plans altered considerably. The EEC became a more exclusive club. Rejecting the British suggestions for a Free Trade Area (FTA), de Gaulle pressured the Germans to choose between a French-led plan of deeper integration with a smaller group of states or a British-led FTA (Gilbert, 2003, p. 87). The Germans chose the former more from a geopolitical than an economic point of view (Moravcsik, 1999, p. 220). According to Stephen George (1998, p. 28), this choice was made due to Britain’s willingness to negotiate with the Soviets over Berlin, while de Gaulle promised to support West Germany’s position, if German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer would give up his predilections for the FTA for a deeply integrated Customs Union with the EEC.
Meanwhile, both Greece and Turkey, in June and July of 1959, respectively, applied for Association Agreements (AA). The idea of an AA had been put into the Treaty of Rome, with the United Kingdom in mind, but became a vehicle for third countries to engage in specifically negotiated agreements with the EEC. These agreements, aimed at deepening economic integration with geopolitical implications, also included eventual membership perspectives for applicants (Stathatos, 1979, p. 3).

As the EEC gathered steam and became an economic success, leaving the United Kingdom behind, London had to reconsider its position (George, 1998, p. 5). In response to the new trade relationships, the United Kingdom invited any non-EEC members of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC - the precursor to the OECD, which included all those countries receiving Marshall Plan aid, the United States and Canada) to join in a rival free trade area, which would be called the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Ultimately, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland signed onto the British plan. The ‘six’ of the EEC were rivaled by the ‘seven’. The EFTA was signed on January 4, 1960 at the Stockholm Convention, which chartered the EFTA. Below is a listing of participants with both organizations.

Table 4.1: The Memberships of the EEC and the EFTA.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Six (EEC)</th>
<th>The Seven (EFTA)</th>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>West Germany</td>
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<td>The United Kingdom</td>
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The EFTA’s success from a British point of view was, however, short-lived, as the EEC countries remained tied to the central economies, in terms of both production and consumers, while the EFTA countries were peripheral to this market network. Less than a year after the establishment of the EFTA Britain and Denmark attempted to negotiate an entry to the EEC.
4.3 THE FIRST WAVE

DENMARK, IRELAND, (NORWAY) & THE UNITED KINGDOM.

The first enlargement round began in 1961 with the membership applications of Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland, with the former two opting to switch sides from the EFTA to the EEC. Sweden, Austria and Switzerland soon followed suit, applying for associate status that same year, while Norway, after a domestic political delay, submitted its application for membership in April 1962. Portugal applied for associate status in June of that year (Tatham, 2009, p. 12).

Accession negotiations with the membership applicants began in 1962. The United Kingdom was willing to accept much of the Treaty of Rome, but also sought exclusion from certain features, accommodations for its Commonwealth relations, its agriculture, and arrangements for the EFTA countries (Gilbert, 2003, p. 97-98). The six were willing to sit at the negotiating table with the British, but they demanded more concessions on the Commonwealth and agriculture than the British could live with. These negotiations continued, haggling at detailed levels of minutiae for the rest of 1962 until de Gaulle called it quits in January 1963 (Dinan, 1999, p. 51; Gilbert, 2003, p. 99).

The common interpretation of de Gaulle’s motive thereto was that the British nuclear agreement with the United States made Britain dependent on the United States for its security, whereas de Gaulle was determined to erect an independent European security regime. In this context, the UK was seen as an American Trojan horse (Hoffmann, 1964, p. 11-14), a view that has, however, been called into question by Andrew Moravcsik (1999, p. 189). Moravcsik suggests economic motives, in particular those of French agriculture as being more salient (see also: Gilbert, 2003, p. 100). De Gaulle also peppered his remarks with notions of identity and norms, referring to Britain’s “very original habits and traditions” implying their incongruity with the norms and identities of the continent (Tatham, 2009, p. 13).

Rejected, the British had no economic choice but to further their cooperation with the EFTA countries, who also had little choice but to do likewise. As such, the EFTA was given new life, moving ahead with the creation of an industrial free trade area. Ireland also essentially became a part of the EFTA when it joined the UK in a bilateral free trade agreement (ibid., p. 14). In the meantime the EFTA expanded too. Finland joined as an Associate Member in 1961, while Iceland would join in 1970.

Even so, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Norway reapplied for EEC membership in 1967. Sweden also requested that discussions take place in order to determine how it
might best link itself to the EEC (ibid., 2009, p. 15). De Gaulle, nevertheless, maintained his original position about the United Kingdom, arguing that it would have to reform itself profoundly in order to fit in the EEC. He doubted that the British would ultimately be able or willing to do so, and he was unwilling to have the Community bend itself around so aberrant a potential member. Regarding the accession negotiations, de Gaulle wondered why the UK would want to “repeal” on clauses that one would have entirely accepted in advance?” (Nicholson & East, 1987, 52-53 – emph. added).

While Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands fully supported the United Kingdom’s application, it continued to be met by de Gaulle’s firm veto, with tacit support from Adenauer, putting, at least temporarily, an end to the matter (Schulte, 1997, p. 35). When de Gaulle resigned as president in 1969, France’s policy also changed, with his successor Georges Pompidou favoring UK membership, as did the new Chancellor in Bonn, Willy Brandt who succeeded Adenauer that same year (Tatham, 2009, p. 18). This development demonstrates the effect of domestic policy changes for foreign policy outcomes. At Pompidou’s urging, EEC heads of state and government met in The Hague in December 1969, where the door was opened for Denmark, Ireland, Norway, and the United Kingdom to pursue membership leading to accession negotiations with all four in June 1970 (George, 1998, p. 38).

Meanwhile, the Norwegian membership aspirations floundered on the issue of fishing. Despite having negotiated a three-year transition period for entry into the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and ten years for entry into the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), Norway’s eventual requirement to align (and limit) its fishing policies to those of the Union resulted in the rejection of the Accession Treaty in a national referendum. Agriculture, fishing, sovereignty and preservation of the Norwegian way of life were cited as the main reasons for the treaty’s failure (Tatham, 2009, p. 22).

4.4 THE SECOND WAVE

GREECE

Greece had already applied for membership in 1959 and signed an Association Agreement in 1961. This agreement, like the one that would be signed with Turkey two years later, envisioned a Customs Union, but also involved economic development assistance for Greece, and the gradual elimination
of restrictions on the free movement of goods (Tatham, 2009, p. 29). Like the Turkish AA, the Agreement explicitly stated that:

As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Greece(/Turkey) of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Greece(/Turkey) to the Community.

(‘Accord,’ 1961, Art. 72; ‘Agreement,’ 1963, Art. 28)

During the years after the AA’s signing, Greece and the EEC worked toward the harmonization of agricultural policies, financial assistance, and a customs union (Statthatos, 1979). The implementation of the AA was, however, suspended after the 1967 military coup in Greece.

Greece, like Turkey after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, experienced recurring military coups d’état. Prior to the Second World War, General Ioannis Metaxas had taken power after a deadlocked election in 1936. Metaxas died a few months after the Italian invasion, and a few months later Greece was occupied by the Germans. After the war and a civil war between cold-war proxy forces, the government fell into the elected hands of Field Marshall Alexander Papagos, whose death in 1955 resulted in the appointment of Constantine Karamanlis\(^\text{15}\) as Prime Minister of a reinstated civilian government. Outvoted in 1963, Karamanlis left office leading to the rise of George Papandreou\(^\text{16}\) who had served nearly a year as interim Prime Minister during the war. Papandreou’s term was, however, cut short by more, albeit bloodless, political turmoil. This turmoil, an election, and the alleged threat of a communist takeover, ended in a coup d'état on 21 April 1967 by a cadre of military officers, commonly known as ‘the Colonels’ (Clogg, 1979, p. 109-110). In response, the EEC suspended the Association Agreement, pending a return to democracy.

Characterized by flirtations with the façade of democracy, the Colonels themselves fell victim to an internal coup d’état by their military police commander, Dimitrios Ioannidis, who used a brutal crackdown on a student uprising to claim power in 1973. Ioannidis engaged Greece in nationalistic saber rattling against Turkey over disputed control of the Aegean continental shelf and organized a coup d’état in Cyprus. Mass killings on the island and Turkey’s retaliation to the provocations, resulted in the invasion of Cyprus.

Ioannidis’ response was to order a full invasion of the Turkish mainland, but his officers’ refusal to carry it out the order resulted in the fall of his dictatorship. His political and military allies

\(^{15}\) Uncle to the later Prime Minister Karamanlis of the same political party: New Democracy.

\(^{16}\) Father of the later Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and grandfather to the recent Prime Minister, also George Papandreou. Greek politics are decidedly a family affair.
also revolted and demanded a return to a civilian government under the former Prime Minister Karamanlis, who returned to Athens from his self-imposed exile on the French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s personal jet (ibid., p. 112-113).

After the collapse of the military regime in July 1974, the new Greek government withdrew from NATO’s integrated command, and held snap elections by November, keeping Karamanlis in power, supported by his New Democracy party. The following year, Karamanlis’ government communicated its intention to apply for full EEC membership, formally submitting its application in June.

The change in tone between the member states’ enthusiasm for Greece’s return to democracy and the idea of Greek membership in 1974 and 1975, compared to the Commission’s tone in 1976, when it offered its recommendation, is an exposé of ideals meeting reality. As William Wallace (1979, p. 22) notes, in 1974 Portugal and Spain were still ruled by military dictators, without any membership perspective. Yet by 1975 and 1976, they too experienced the fall of their regimes and proceeded to submit their membership applications to the EEC. The specter of the Iberian membership applications politicized the Greek application, due to the economic implications of the weight (i.e. threat) of the Spanish and Portuguese agricultural sectors. As such, the Commission was hesitant in its response to Greece’s application. Though it did recommend opening accession negotiations, it also lodged several reservations.

Among the reasons for its half-hearted response was its fear that the Community’s relationship with Greece would become unbalanced vis-à-vis its relationship with Turkey. It also took note of the relatively high share of the Greek workforce engaged in agriculture and anticipated that Greece’s low level of economic development would require substantial transfers of funds to Greece. It additionally addressed the need for further institutional development of the EEC itself, which enlargement only made more acute (Commission, 1976; Tatham, 2009, p. 30).

While the member-state governments had been eager to get the process underway, neither they nor the Greeks had yet fully accounted for the scope of necessary administrative adjustments needed. If governments were slow, domestic lobbies were even more so, especially in France and Italy. Since the prospect of Mediterranean agricultural competitors – not so much from Greece, as expected from Portugal and Spain – was an acute worry to them. To the members not sharing the same waters, Mediterranean competition and security concerns were less prominent. While the French and the Italians had material interests to be concerned with, the northern EEC countries had
ideological reasons to support the strengthening of democracy in Europe. These were balanced by concerns over the institutional coherence of the Community (Wallace, 1979, p. 25).

The British, meanwhile, were less concerned about the institutions than about commitment to democracy and NATO. Germany on the other hand, expected to pay for the lion’s share of the enlargement costs. This not only for Greece, but further down the path for Spain and Portugal as well. Furthermore, as Germany was already the primary destination of migrants, the Federal Republic only feared more to come.

These concerns, however, were balanced by their security concerns. Being on the Warsaw Pact frontier, shoring up NATO’s southern flank was a significant interest to the Germans (ibid, p.26). Greece had been a member of NATO since 1952, but had withdrawn itself from the unified command after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. London and Bonn were not going to allow Greece to have a free ride into the EEC, though they officially denied any connection between the two issues. France, which had withdrawn from NATO’s integrated command structure in 1958, had been satisfied with the Greek withdrawal and preferred to keep it that way (ibid, p. 27). When Greece rejoined the unified command in 1980, their EEC membership followed just a year later. It appears that the member-states overcame their other reservations with the security argument of maintaining a solid allied front in the Eastern Mediterranean (Tatham, 2009, p. 31).

To meet mass migration and competition concerns, the Accession Treaty, signed in 1979 and implemented in 1981, imposed a seven-year transition period on the free movement of workers, tomatoes and peaches, along with a general transition period of five years on other policies. In Greece’s case, a broad spectrum of factors played a role in the negotiations of the terms of its membership. These included security, solidifying democracy, trade, migration, shadows of future enlargements, etc. Yet while the member-states differed in their negotiating positions, the idea of Greek membership – once Greece had democratized and had reapplied for membership – the fact of future membership, never seemed to be in doubt; only the terms of membership were contested.

4.5 THE OTHER SECOND WAVE

SPAIN & PORTUGAL

Like Greece, Portugal and Spain were treated as serious applicants for Community membership after they ceased to be dictatorships in the mid-1970s. Portugal had been a founding member of the
EFTA, and had applied for EEC membership not long after Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom did. De Gaulle’s rejection of the United Kingdom put Portugal’s application in the same drawer, which saved the member states from having to explicitly answer Portugal’s application.

Though Spain had preferred a solution that would keep it out of both the EEC and the EFTA, developments induced it to choose between the Six and the Seven. In 1961 it initially opted for the Seven, but when Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, opted for the EEC, it decided to follow suit and also applied for an association17 with the EEC in February 1962 (Guirao, 1997, p. 110-111). The Commission acknowledged its receipt of the application a month later, upon which the matter was referred to the Council (Castiella, 1962; Couve de Murville, 1962).

Among the Permanent Representatives, the French ambassador raised the issue of the Spanish application. In his arguments, the Franco regime had expressed its willingness to evolve politically in order to make Spain’s future Community membership feasible. The measure was criticized by Italy and the Netherlands. The Italians opposed on economic grounds, while the Dutch representative argued that if the Spanish wanted economic arrangements, something might be done. However, association was a political act and any undertaking that this should ultimately lead to membership was in the present situation unthinkable. The Germans, on the other hand, suggested that exploratory talks were a possibility (Guirao, 1997, p. 118-119). Accordingly, the Spanish ambassador, Carlos de Miranda, was invited to resubmit, as long as ‘Association’ was not explicitly mentioned in the text of the application. In response, de Miranda sent a letter suggesting that developments in the Community and the implementation of economic reforms in Spain had made the time ripe for a conversation (de Miranda, 1964). The Commission replied that it was prepared to engage in such a conversation with Spain, in which the economic problems would have to be on the agenda (Spaak, 1964). A rejection of Association was thereby implied rather than explicit. The ‘conversation’, on the other hand, turned out differently and lead to a trade agreement signed in 1970.

Though the Estado Novo regime ruling Portugal at the time had been no less autocratic in its domestic governance than the Franco regime in Spain, Portugal was more integrated into Europe and the West in general than Spain had been. In addition to its EFTA membership, Portugal was a founding member of NATO and a recipient of Marshall Plan aid starting in 1950. This brought

17 Guirao (1997, p. 105-106) argues that the wording of the application were left vague by not referencing what sort of association was being implied – association or accession. The common understanding, however, is that Spain applied for an Association Agreement.
Portugal into a European framework of economic and monetary cooperation that Spain did not join until 1959 (Royo & Manuel, 2003 p. 3). Despite these multilateral relationships, Portugal still suffered from a level of international pariah status owing to its brutal colonial wars between 1961 and 1974 in addition to the dictatorial nature of its regime at the time (ibid, p. 9-10).

In the mid-1970s, the regimes of both Spain and Portugal – the underlying condition for exclusion – changed. Portugal was the first to do so. After years of bloody counterinsurgency warfare in Portugal's African colonies, a cadre of junior officers rose up against their political and military superiors, and – with popular support – overthrew the dictatorial regime. The “Revolution of the Carnations,” so-called for the flowers put into the guns of the soldiers, brought power to a new junta of military officers (the Movement of the Armed Forces - MFA) in April 1974 (Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 118). This junta prepared the country for elections one year after the coup. The Socialist Party (PS), led by the junta’s overseas negotiator Mário Soares, marginally won the 1975 elections. Soares’ government prepared a constitution and set the groundwork for another election to be held one year later. That following year, Soares and the PS won an even less decisive plurality, but they were able to move the country to support their application for Community membership in March 1977.

With the death of Spain’s dictator, Francisco Franco, in November 1975, Spain reformed into a democratic state despite some political violence and unrest. Under the leadership of Franco’s appointed successor, Juan Carlos de Borbón (crowned King Juan Carlos I), the reform policy of the government, Transición (1976-1982) instituted a gradual removal of the military from politics. A new constitution allowed multiparty elections, including the opportunity for the participation of the communist party. The new constitution also instituted a regionalism of nationalities maintained under a unitary state (Conversi, 2002). Multiparty elections were held in 1977, 1979 and 1982, and democracy survived despite an attempted coup d’état in February 1981. The 1982 elections further led to a peaceful transition of power from the party of Francisco Franco’s immediate successors to the democratically elected Social-Democratic Party (Spanish Socialist Workers Party – PSOE) (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

Spain followed Portugal in its request for membership, submitting its application in July 1977. Responding to the Council recommendations, the Commission published its opinion on Portugal’s application in May 1978, and on Spain’s in November of that same year. The Commission opined that negotiations ought to start as soon as possible for both applicants (Commission, 1978a;
Portugal began its accession negotiations in June of 1978 and negotiations with Spain started in February of the following year.

The accession process was not without controversies, however. In terms of their expected impacts on member-state economies, Portugal’s smaller size, both in terms of population and GDP, was expected to have less impact on the Community than that of Spain. Both economies, however, were much poorer than the average member-state. In 1978, the per capita income of Portugal was 37% that of the EEC average, while that of Spain was 54% of the Community average (World Bank, 2011). Yet both economies had been developing rapidly between 1960 and their revolutions in the mid-1970s (Guirao, 2006). Nevertheless, the degree to which they would be assets or competitors to member states depended on different economic factors. For example, in terms of agricultural products, Spain and Portugal were net-importers of meat and wheat, which was attractive for Northern European countries. They were, however, competitors in terms of the Mediterranean foodstuffs of Southern France and Italy, agitating French and Italian agricultural lobbies, but also those of industrial production (Duchêne, 1982, p. 28). Steel producers in the member states were worried about EEC development funds being used to help develop steel and textile factories in the new EEC members, which would then compete with those in the old member states (Wallace, 1979, p.32-33).

In terms of migrant labor, the Commission (1978a, art. 38; 1978b, art. 44) attempted to allay fears of mass migration by pointing out in its opinions that migration was a function of the demand for labor. Especially the opinion on Spain highlighted this perspective. The Commission advised safeguard measures in order to “avoid erratic movements of labour.” This, despite its opinion that Spanish migration was only a small share of overall migration and the economic downturn in the member states would provide less demand for workers and therefore less migration.

Regardless of the Commission’s enthusiasm, the time between application and accession was longer for Spain and Portugal than it had been for Greece. Greece had applied two years before the Iberians, but joined the EEC five years earlier before than they did. The Greek negotiation process, from open to close, took 34 months to complete. The same process took 37 months for Spain and 45 months for Portugal. The Portuguese delay had been partly due to internal EEC matters to be negotiated, which led to Spain catching up with Portugal’s lead (Tatham, 2009, p. 41).

Fearing Spanish agricultural competition and a decrease in subsidies to French farmers, France, under Giscard d’Estaing, delayed accession through obstruction of the negotiations. This changed when François Mitterand became president in 1982, and the budgetary question was
worked out in 1984 (Gilbert, 2003, p. 167-168). Greece was also quite willing to hold the Iberian enlargement hostage in return for certain financial benefits (ibid, p. 168; Tatham, 2009, p.43). Furthermore, the Commission identified the recession of the late 1970s as contributing to a hostile economic environment for accession, creating a need to update internal EEC decision-making structures (ibid, p. 39). Although Spain and Portugal did gain their membership in the end, their full integration (in terms of tariffs and free movement of persons) was held up by a seven-year transition periods and an additional ten years for Portuguese agricultural products (Gilbert 2003, p. 168).

4.6 MOROCCO

Despite having been dissuaded from doing so, King Hassan II of Morocco presented his membership application to the Community on July 8, 1987. The Commission reported, “The President of the Council [of foreign ministers] replied on 1 October, pointing out that the community wished to continue strengthening and extending its cooperation with Morocco, in view of the special nature of existing relations and joint interests” (Commission, 1988). This was rejection by omission. The member states rejected Morocco for membership for unspecified reasons. In all likelihood it was due to its bad human rights record, Morocco not being a democracy or, geographically at least, a European country. Any of these would have been sufficient for rejection (Tatham, 2009, p. 204).

4.7 THE OTHER GERMANY AND THE ‘DE FACTO’ ENLARGEMENT

After the end of the Cold War in 1989, the European Community effectively enlarged by the reunification of West and East Germany. The process which brought nearly 17 million citizens into the European Community happened in less than a year after the wall was broken in November 1989. This expansion of the EC essentially happened by German fiat rather than by the preferences of the other major member states. Within weeks, the Kohl government in Bonn had presented a ten-point plan for a federal unification between the West and the East – a plan which had not been
previously discussed with Paris or other European governments (Gilbert, 2003, p. 199; Moravcsik, 1999, p. 397, 400).

The weight of member-state opinion was against. Margaret Thatcher had already expressed her stance against German reunification to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Just prior to a meeting of the heads of state and government on 8-9 December, Mitterand also spoke with Gorbachev, attempting to prevent reunification, while the Dutch and the Italians expressed their disapproval at other occasions (Wiegrefe, 2010). The Strasbourg European Council in December 1989, nevertheless, rhetorically embraced the idea of German reunification, saying: “We seek the strengthening of the state of peace in Europe in which the German people will regain its unity through free self-determination” (European Council, 1989). But in all the important respects the enlargement to East Germany was a unilateral affair of the German Chancellery. While the European Council and the Commission found themselves in agreement, at least rhetorically, the ensuing enlargement process was not comparable to those for other countries, and thus provides few broader lessons for studying EC/EU enlargement.

4.8 THE OTHER EFTA COUNTRIES

With the Cold War over, and Moscow no longer needing to be assuaged of the geopolitical neutralities of Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, these four countries were also free to join what was by then becoming the European Union. Austria submitted its application in July 1989. Cyprus and Malta followed a year later. Sweden applied in June of 1990. In 1992, Finland (in March), Switzerland (May) and Norway (November) submitted theirs. Iceland would have applied, but for the EEC’s restrictions of the Common Fisheries Policy, Having applied, Switzerland withdrew its application after a referendum in December 1992 (Tatham, 2009, p. 62).

Although the EFTA applicants (Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden) all had technical complications that needed to be overcome, there were no political obstacles to contend with, save for the official neutrality positions of all but Norway. The Community had, however, learned to live with Ireland’s neutrality, and since the geopolitical situation had dramatically changed, the Commission judged that the Common Foreign and Security Policy would not be insurmountably affected by the addition of the neutrals. As such, the Commission published a positive opinion of all
these applicants, suggesting that negotiations could begin. These began in February 1993 (ibid, 62, 65).

As Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, together with the other EFTA countries, Iceland and Liechtenstein, had been incorporated into the European Economic Area. As such, they were already engaged in economic integration with the Community. Therefore, the transition to negotiating for membership in 1993 was an easy one, given that the EFTA applicants had already been adopted most aspects of the acquis communautaire (the body of EU legislation – at that time numbering 29 chapters) (ibid, 2009, p. 66).

Unlike the previous enlargement rounds, adopting Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden, was not a controversial issue for the member states. These were relatively small and rich countries that were already substantially integrated into the EU economy (Gilbert, 2003, p. 237). For these countries, the political question was not one of if the EU-12 (the EEC was renamed as the European Union in 1993) wanted them, but if they wanted the EU-12. All four of the applicants held referenda on membership in 1994. In Finland and Sweden, these were fairly close races (56.9% and 52% in favor, respectively. Austrians voted more positively (66.4%), while in Norway, the referendum on EU membership failed (to the tune of 52.5% against), despite substantial concessions by the EU on oil, gas and fish exploitation in Norwegian territorial waters. With popular approval, then, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU on January 1, 1995 (Granell, 1995; Tatham, 2009, p. 68).

4.9 MALTA & CYPRUS

Meanwhile, more applicants lined up to join. Other than Turkey, the first in line were two Mediterranean island states with relatively small populations – Cyprus and Malta. Both had long been connected to the European Community by way of Association Agreements. Malta had associated itself with the EC in 1970 followed by Cyprus a year later – one year before the Greek-backed coup d’état (partially described above) and the Turkish invasion of the island.

While the international community, including the EU member states, recognized the Greek Republic of Cyprus, they did not recognize the claim of sovereign independence by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). In order to maintain friendly relations with Turkey, the member states initially prevented the development of the Association with Cyprus. In 1977, after
seemingly positive contacts between the Cypriot President Makarios and the TRNC leader Denktash, the Community allowed the development of an Additional Protocol to the AA, allowing greater access of Cypriot products to member-state markets (Tsardanidis, 1984, p. 357-358). The Association, however, gradually developed toward a Customs Union in the late 1980s (Commission, 1993c, Art. 24).

In its opinion on Cyprus, the Commission first underlined, poetically, Cyprus’ European identity by referring to its two-thousand year long station as being “at the very fount of European Culture and Civilization” (ibid, Art. 44). It further mentioned that a political settlement would “reinforce” Cyprus’ European vocation and that “Cyprus’ integration with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement…” (ibid, Art. 45; Art. 47 – emph. added). Even though it suggested to contribute an “economic, social and political transition of Cyprus toward integration,” and wrote in hopeful terms about a settlement, the Commission also acknowledged that the possibility of failure existed and that the situation should be reassessed in January 1995 (ibid, Art. 49; 51). The Commission made no mention of accession negotiations.

Malta, was explicitly recognized as a European country with a democratic status and consistent respect for human rights, but the Commission still identified some economic and administrative complications. It also recognized that the two main political parties on the archipelago had different orientations toward EU membership, with the Nationalist Party (NP) being supportive of integration and the Maltese Labour Party (MLP) largely antagonistic. Nevertheless, the Commission recommended starting accession negotiations once Malta reformed its economic regulatory system (Commission, 1993b, Art 42-47). Both candidates were assured at the European Council meeting in Corfu on 24-25 June, 1994, that they would be included in the next enlargement phase (European Council, 1994, s. II B).

In addition to Malta, Cyprus and Turkey, the countries from Central and Eastern Europe had begun to submit their applications for membership. Recognizing that very substantial enlargement of the Union was on the horizon, the heads of state and government of the member states acknowledged the need for institutional reforms, which would have to be worked out in the context of an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 1996. Before that, the European Council of Cannes (1995) promised that negotiations with Malta and Cyprus could begin six months after the ICG, which, as it turned out, would culminate with the Treaty of Amsterdam in June 1997.

By that time, however, the government in Malta had changed back to the MLP. Within a month of being elected, the new government informed the Council of its suspension of the
accession process. While it still sought a certain measure of integration, full membership was not on its agenda and it preferred a relationship more suited to Malta’s specific needs (Tatham, 2009, p. 123).

At the Luxembourg Council in December 1997, the heads of state and government announced the start of negotiations which Cyprus would be conducting alongside Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic – called the ‘Luxembourg Six’ – whereby Cyprus joined this enlargement wave on an equal footing with the first-rank of Central and Eastern European countries. A fuller account of the Luxembourg episode is presented in the following chapter.

Meanwhile 1998 brought another political change to Malta. This time, the MLP ceded power the power it had gained only two years earlier back to the NP. This resulted in a renewed Maltese bid for membership. At Helsinki in December 1999, the Luxembourg six were joined by Malta, as well as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. The two Mediterranean countries, though having applied years sooner, were destined to join the following wave of enlargement.

### 4.10 THE BIG BANG

Just as the end of the Cold War offered the opportunity for realignment to East Germany and the EFTA countries, the same was true for the former communist and Soviet countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This development, and the subsequent debate on enlargement, created divisions between ‘deepeners’ and ‘wideners’. Starting in 1991 with Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, also known as the ‘Visegrád Group’\(^\text{18}\), the EU made ‘Europe Agreements,’ which were essentially the same as the Association Agreements. Two years later, in 1993, the three former Soviet republics on the Baltic Sea, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania also signed EAs, as did Bulgaria and Romania. Czech Rep., Slovakia, and Slovenia followed suit in 1994.

This policy option, however, was seen as favoring members who preferred deepening to widening, as the Agreements were a way of holding off the tide of applicants, while allowing them to be a part of a free trade area for industrial products, a structured political dialogue, and an assistance

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\(^{18}\) They were so named for a meeting among the three countries in February 1991 in the Hungarian town of Visegrád
program (Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 409-410). The Europe Agreements, unlike the Association Agreements with Greece and Turkey, did not promise membership in the future. Instead, they merely recognized that accession was the goal of the associated state, not necessarily of the EU or the member states. Despite this reservation, ratification of the first EAs by member-state parliaments, took a long time and were not fully ratified until 1994, at the same time as the later applicants, Bulgaria and Romania. According to Tatham (2009, p.77), this was a sign that the ‘Visegrád group’ would not enjoy a preferred relationship with the EU over the non-Visegrád countries.

The Maastricht treaty, which transformed the European Community into the European Union, also began to make explicit criteria of membership beyond being a nominally ‘European country’. At the Maastricht European Council, the heads of state and government made it clear that only democracies could be members of the EU (European Council, 1991, Art. 1.4). Before the ink of Maastricht was dry, the Commission drew up a document on what Maastricht meant for enlargement, stating that the European projects of the Single Market and a Common Foreign and Security Policy necessitated the demand of more political, economic and administrative conditions on applicants before accession could take place. Additionally, the Commission included a human rights provision, which had previously been articulated among the principles of EU members, but not explicitly as a condition of application (Commission, 1992, art. 8).

In preparation for the Copenhagen European Council of 1993, the Commission drafted a report with suggestions bearing on the expected enlargement to Eastern Europe. Two elements in this proposal were of particular importance. The first was the suggestion that “in order to offer concrete perspectives which the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe can work towards, the European Council should confirm, in a clear political message, its commitment to membership of the Union for Europe agreements signatories when they are able to satisfy the conditions required” (Commission, 1993a, Art. II1). This indicated an automatism that left accession within the ability of the candidate countries to become members, rather than at the pleasure of the member states to permit or deny them membership (Mayhew, 1998, p. 27).

The second important element was the statement of the three required conditions, which were political, economic and administrative in nature, with a fourth specified criterion, which consisted of the “Community’s capacity to absorb new members while maintaining the momentum of European integration” (Commission, 1993a, Art. III1). Both of these elements were adopted by the member states at the Copenhagen European Council in June. Since then the requirements for
membership have come to be known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, which were significant because they were essentially a compromise between the wideners and deepeners. Member states with pro-enlargement preferences accepted the promise of enlargement at the cost of a delay, while the members against enlargement, at least in the near term, gained time in which deeper integration (such as the single currency) could be implemented.

After Copenhagen, the membership applications for the CEECs began to come in. Hungary and Poland applied in 1994 (March and April, respectively). In 1995, Romania, Slovakia (both in June), Latvia (October), Estonia (November), Lithuania and Bulgaria (both in December) did so as well, with the Czech Republic and Slovenia as the last of the ten, submitting their applications in 1996 (January and June respectively). Though they applied at these different dates, they all received their Opinions from the Commission on the 15th of July, 1997, just after the the Treaty of the EU with the Copenhagen criteria was signed and amended in the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Treaty of Amsterdam was a start toward meeting the fourth criterion of preparing the EU’s institutions toward being able to accommodate the applicants as members.

In contrast to the previous opinions, which had been framed in terms of the applicants’ preparedness in the immediate or short term, the post-Copenhagen opinions were framed in terms of a five-year perspective derived from the requirements decided at the Copenhagen. In particular, a sine qua non for opening accession negotiations was reserved for the political criteria of membership (stable democratic institutions, human rights and respect for minorities) (Tatham, 2009, p. 91).

In this regard, the Commission made an example of Slovakia, which it deemed to have insufficiently stable institutions to merit the start of accession negotiations, in spite of the country’s greater preparedness in terms of the other criteria (Commission, 1997, p. 130). Slovakia was not the only candidate to be rejected for accession negotiations, however. The Commission recommended that Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania also needed internal reforms before being permitted to start accession negotiations. As mentioned above, the Luxembourg European Council approved accession negotiations only for the Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, in addition to Cyprus, which had been approved earlier.

The enlargement model that the Commission and the Council adopted in 1997 was called the ‘stadium’ model, whereby the EU would begin with a subset of countries, followed by the next set when they were ready. Two years later, at Helsinki, this decision was revised and negotiations were opened with all of the ‘candidates’ (aside from Turkey). This new enlargement model was called the ‘regatta’ option, allowing all the candidates to proceed at their own individual pace and
‘finish’ (i.e. become members) when they had fulfilled the criteria and completed the negotiations, regardless the pace at which other candidates were progressing (Tatham, 2009, p. 249-250).

The innovation that was adopted to make the regatta model possible was the implementation of annual reports monitoring the candidates’ progress. These were framed around the Copenhagen criteria, with separate sections for political, economic and administrative assessments, with the administrative criteria sectioned into the different chapters of the *acquis communautaire*. Compiling those reports also meant that the Commission had to do in-depth research into the candidate states and develop a method of gauging progress that was both accurate and applicable to all the candidate countries equally (Tatham, 2006, p. 248).

The regatta model proved to be an inaccurate description of the process about which the EU actually had to settle some internal matters, especially relating to voting weights and the Common Agricultural Policy, and how this policy would apply to the new member states. Only when these matters were settled, at Nice in 2001 and at Copenhagen in 2002 respectively, could Cyprus, the Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia become full members in May 1, 2004. Bulgaria and Romania had to wait for another three years to join at the start of 2007, when the EU enlarged to its current number of member states, 27.

### 4.11 TURKEY

The oddest of the membership hopefuls has been Turkey, the subject of this present research. Though previous applicants had to sometimes wait many years between application and membership, none have had to wait and strive as long as Turkey, nor have any of the others had as checkered a history with regard to political stability between their indication of wanting membership and the commencement of negotiations. Neither had any of the other candidates had been as populous, relatively poor, or as predominantly Islamic at a time when precisely that religious descriptor has become of particular political salience to western cultures.

Turkey’s membership perspective was given legal status at the signing of the Association Agreement in 1963, for which it had applied in 1959. Known as the ‘Ankara Agreement’, this treaty offered Turkey the same perspective as had been offered to its neighbor (and rival), Greece (see above). While the democratic requirement for membership was not yet explicit, Turkey had three
years before experienced a military coup which had seen its first democratically elected Prime Minister, along with his Foreign and Finance Ministers hanged by a military junta (Zürcher, 1993, p. 261).

The return to democracy, albeit with military tutelage, in October 1961, however, was not the end of military intervention in Turkey’s political affairs. The military would continue to play a role of ‘guaranteeing’ the state from political fragmentation or de-secularization. In addition to being a force that would be on the mind of any elected government, the military further intervened by dismissing the government by way of a memorandum in 1971 and by a coup d’État in 1980. The coup of 1980 further drafted a new constitution which gave the military an official political role through the National Security Council, and further limited the freedom of the press, the freedom of trade unions and individual rights. While the constitution did recognize individual rights, it also stipulated that these could be suspended for an assortment of reasons (ibid, p. 295).

Another complication to Turkey’s membership suitability, which has already been mentioned in the contexts of Greece and Cyprus, was the 1974 invasion of Cyprus, ordered by Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. The invasion was ostensibly in order to protect Cypriot citizens from mass killings being carried out by the Greece-backed militias. During the invasion, Turkey occupied around 40% of the geographic area of the island to protect a smaller minority of its citizens. While the invasion, essentially, solved the problem of mass killings, the political settlement left much to be desired. The broader international community recognized Greek Cyprus as the legitimate government, but the presence of Turkish troops, and Turkey’s geopolitical importance made it impossible to force a solution to even greater detriment of the Turkish Cypriots. Conversely, Greece’s entrenchment in the EU has allowed Greece to leverage other issues (such as the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe) for its vote in order to maintain Greek Cyprus’ advantages.

In 1987, the same year that Morocco applied and was rejected, Turkey applied for membership of what was still the European Community. In 1989 the Commission replied with an Opinion citing three reasons why accession negotiations should not be in a medium-term perspective. The first of these was the state of flux in which the Community found itself with the Single Market program underway and the preparations for the organizational reforms that would culminate at Maastricht. These the Commission expressed as follows, “…this reason alone is sufficient for the Commission to consider that it would be unwise, with regard both to the candidate countries and to the Member States, to envisage the Community becoming involved in new
accession negotiations before 1993 at the earliest, except in exceptional circumstances” (Commission, 1989, Art.4).

Both of the other two reasons for rejection concerned Turkey’s own lacking development toward membership suitability. In terms of political development, problems were cited with civil and minority rights in addition to the Cyprus situation (ibid, Art. 9). In terms of economic development, the third reason, the Commission mentioned structural disparities in industry and agriculture, macro-economic imbalances, high levels of trade protectionism and a low level of social protection. It further mentioned that if Turkey were to join, it would severely strain the Community’s own resources (ibid, Art. 8.1-8.2).

Despite these critiques, the Commission recommended that Turkey and the Community move forward with the implementation of a customs union, as had been provided for in the 1963 Association Agreement (ibid, Art. 13.1). The Council adopted this recommendation in February 1990. Due to delays in the European Parliament, where members objected to Turkey’s human rights record, the promised customs union was only implemented at the last possible moment under the pressure of making good on the member states’ promise. The customs union did not go into effect until January 31st, 1995 (Tatham, 2009. p. 146).

The following chapters record, in much closer detail, the developments of Turkey’s progress through the accession process. In order to give an overview here, it is helpful to consider the highlights of each episode:

4.11.1 1997 – Luxembourg

In the early part of the year, Turkey suffered another shock to its political system when the military once again sent the elected government a memorandum instructing it to resign. This intervention was not considered a de jure coup d’état as it did not put the military in direct control of daily governing. It was meant to be a driving force behind a change of government with greater adherence to state secularism. Accordingly a new coalition government was formed on June 30 that same year.

However, in a process wherein the stability of democratic institutions is a critical benchmark, it was not an auspicious start of the year for Turkey’s EU membership aspirations. Even though the European Commission stated in its recommendations for enlargement that Turkey should be allowed to participate in a conference for countries with perspectives on membership, the
Commission’s document also clearly put Turkey in a separate category from the other applicant countries. The Luxembourg European Council accepted the Commission’s recommendation with Turkey’s distinct status, while nevertheless shoring up the contested question of its status as a European country that could still, in principle, become a member at some point in the future. This was an issue of dispute among the heads of state and government at the beginning of the year, but was settled – at least at their level – by year’s end.

4.11.2 1999 – Helsinki

The Helsinki decision further separated Turkey from the other candidate countries, while rhetorically embracing Turkey. Turkey was left out by not starting accession negotiations with Ankara at the same time that it began accession negotiations with all the other candidates. Rhetorically, the heads of state and government made the point more emphatically that Turkey was a European country. That rhetoric did not, however, start any new enlargement processes.

Nevertheless, despite being nothing more than rhetoric, the Helsinki decision was seen as a positive turning point for Turkey’s membership prospects. It gave the government in Ankara the wind in the back to make necessary reforms on the political front which would, ultimately, help start accession negotiations in 2005 (Öniş, 2008).

The real turning point, however, was in Greek and German policy. The embarrassment of having been found to be harboring Abdullah Öcalan brought the necessary political change within the Greek cabinet to seek rapprochement with Ankara. Two devastating earthquakes brought around enough Greek public opinion in order to make that policy not politically suicidal. In Germany, with help from the domestic Turkish electorate, Gerhard Schröder came to power in Berlin, changing Germany into an advocate as opposed to an antagonist of Turkish membership. With Greece and Germany on board, the balance of opinion in the Council was strongly in Turkey’s favor.

4.11.3 2002 – Copenhagen

The Copenhagen decision postponed Turkey’s advancement through the accession process by denying its request to start accession negotiations and introducing an artificial timetable of two years,
after which its readiness to start negotiations, in political terms, would be gauged. While in the process of strong haggling over the precise details of the 2004 enlargement, and how agricultural funds would be distributed in a European Union of 25 member states, Turkey demanded to start the accession negotiations that ten of the candidates had just wrapped up. Ultimately, Turkey was left waiting with the concession that if Turkey met the political criteria in 2004, Turkey and the EU would start accession negotiations ‘without delay’.

4.11.4 2004 – Brussels

As had been promised in 2002, the 2004 European Council judged that the political criteria had sufficiently been met to warrant accession negotiations. These would, however, not commence until October of 2005, and only after Turkey signed the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement. The ‘without delay’ clause of 2002 was extended by ten months in order to not scare off voters from approving the Constitutional Treaty in referenda. The Additional Protocol would mean extending the free movement of goods between Turkey and all of the new member states, including (Greek) Cyprus.

4.11.5 2006 - Brussels

When the negotiations started in 2005, Turkey had signed the Additional Protocol, extending the Customs Union to all EU member states. However, it made an exception for (Greek) Cypriot ships and air traffic, meaning that these did not have access to Turkish harbors and airports. Their rationale was the failure of the EU to open itself to trade from Turkish Cyprus. After the Finnish Presidency failed to bring Turkey and Cyprus to an agreement, the dispute within the Council was about how to sanction Turkey for its failure to open itself to Greek Cypriot vessels. Finally, the agreed-upon formula was to suspend eight chapters of accession negotiations with Turkey and to not provisionally close any more chapters until Turkey opened its airports and harbors.
4.12 HISTORY’S LESSONS

This history presents several lessons that are relevant to this research. The first is that history is on the side of the applicants. Thus far, only three countries have applied for membership without ultimately becoming members. These are Norway, Switzerland, and Morocco. The former two countries did not become members due to their own decisions. Morocco was denied for reasons that were not made explicit, but were presumably due to at least three factors: not being a European country, not being a democracy, and not respecting human rights. These three ideational reasons can, however, easily be a shroud for European fears of further opening European doors to Morocco’s poor migrants with Islamic identities. As a very poor country, Morocco would no doubt also have been considered a heavy net loss to the European budget, while in terms of security and power, it had little to offer the EU or its member states in terms of strategic advantage.

Because history appears to be, with that one exception, on the side of the applicants, ‘no’ is not the same as ‘never’. In the first enlargement, the United Kingdom was able to secure entry by waiting for Charles de Gaulle to leave the scene. In the second enlargement, Greece, Portugal and Spain were able to become members because of long transition periods for French and Italian farmers to prepare for increased competition. The same was true of the CEECs, where the Common Agricultural Policy was reformed in order to assuage the net-donors to the EU budget that their wealth transfers to the new member states would not get out of hand. The threat of mass migration, which had been a concern during the second and most recent enlargement wave, did not occur, nor did it create permanent limitations on the freedom of movement for the citizens of the new member states.

That lesson, however, is only an interesting side note to the purpose of this research, which is to find explanations for member-state behavior. In terms of international security, German support for Greek accession was seemingly defined by Germany’s desire to shore up the southern European flank of NATO in the containment regime. France’s opposition to British membership was to a great extent concerned with maintaining its independence from the United States and preserving its dominant role in the Community. The reluctance of the French and Italian farmers did not prevent their governments from eventually accepting Spain and Portugal as members, and eventually they gained allies in the great agricultural debates of the 1990s and 2000s.

The questions of identity and related norms and values play into the requirements for application and have become important for the opening of accession negotiations. Morocco was,
presumably, denied entry for reasons of European identity. Turkey’s identity as a European country has been one of the major points of debate regarding that country’s candidacy. In terms of values, the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain was unthinkable while they continued to be dictatorships. Once they became democracies, their processes of accession went swiftly, despite the haggling over agricultural competition. During the process that led to the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement, Slovakia was denied accession negotiations precisely because of its faltering democratic record.

In the course of the evolving European Community/Union, the values (e.g. democracy, human rights, and good neighborly relations) have become increasingly supported by explicit rules. These were led by Commission opinions that were formalized by the European Council. These rules have become one of the points of disagreement between Turkey’s protagonists and antagonists, with the former arguing that Turkey should be treated the same as the states that joined in 2004 and 2007, with the latter arguing that Turkey has not met the necessary criteria. This is aside from the protagonists’ arguments that Turkey would be a valuable member and ally and the antagonists’ arguments that Turkey is ill suited as a member for reasons of religion, culture and geography. A major element in this research is to discover if those arguments cohere at all with member states’ reasoning.

Lastly, it is worthwhile to note the cases where member states changed their policies. While de Gaulle single handedly kept the door shut on the United Kingdom, this was quickly overturned when de Gaulle left the scene. Similarly, French opposition to Spain and Portugal evaporated when Mitterand replaced Giscard d’Estaing. By and large, however, policy changes due to domestic political changes are not in much evidence in this history of enlargement. This can be for one of two reasons: first, that domestic politics simply have not ruled enlargement decisions. It is not inconceivable that the enlargement processes mentioned above were simply not politically salient issues in domestic political contests in the member states. Second, it may be that the traditional focus of international relations theory has blinded many of the sources that recount the history of European enlargement.

This research finds that domestic political concerns assuredly played a role in the case of Turkey. It is beyond doubt that Turkish membership has become a salient political issue in certain member states. Notably, it has done so in states with large Turkish immigrant communities. The following chapters address the history of Turkey’s bid for membership in five separate episodes.
5.0 LUXEMBOURG, 1997

The first episode of the Turkish pursuit of candidacy for membership in the European Union concerns the events of 1997, culminating in the Luxembourg summit of 11 and 12 December of that year. The first section of the following chapter about the politics of 1997 looks at a broad chronological sequence of events, describing the major developments thereof. The second section looks at some specific issues of debate between the member states. The final section focuses on the positions of each of the member states as these were read in the journalistic record. For each of these, the positions of the member states are determined as being a driver, being a supported of Turkey’s bid for membership, a brakeman, being an opponent of Turkey’s bid for membership, or a passenger, a member state whose position was too obscure to determine, as they did not engage in the public debate.

5.1 THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1997 was a year that started off on the wrong foot for the Turkish pursuit of candidacy for membership in the European Union. In January, Denmark brought a case against Turkey before the European Commission of Human Rights, citing torture of Kurds of Danish nationality (Rath, 1997). On February 28th of that year, the Turkish National Security Council presented the Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, with a 20-point memorandum of warning that “activities of an archaic nature [meaning religious] against the regime won't be tolerated” (Couturier 1997). The memorandum was preceded by an incident involving the diverting of a “…column of tanks through Sincan, an Islamist suburb of Ankara whose mayor demanded, in a speech, the adoption of Islamic law (Barham, 1997b; Pope, 1997). The Erbakan government lasted until its resignation at the end of
June. At the same time the sitting president, Süleyman Demirel, invited Mesut Yılmaz (the leader of the Motherland Party ANAP) to form a new government.

Concerning the evolution of the member states’ positions, there were four episodes revealing sentiments that deserve to be mentioned: The first, a summit of EU and member-state leaders from the European People’s Party (EPP - by-and-large Christian Democrats) in early March. The second was a Foreign ministers meeting in mid-March. Third, was the publication of the Commission opinions on enlargement, and, fourth, the politicking prior to and during the European Council meeting in December, under the Luxembourg presidency. There were also particular issues of importance that are discussed following the chronological account of the different episodes. These are summarized as the persistent dispute over Cyprus, Greek-Turkish territorial conflicts, and the nature of the enlargement regime – including particularly the Copenhagen criteria.

5.1.1 EPP summit

In the beginning of March, a summit of political leaders from the member states and EU institutions from the European People’s Party produced an agreement that Turkey should have closer ties to Europe through the European Customs Union, but should not be offered candidacy for membership. Attendees included German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) John Bruton, Prime Minister of Luxembourg Jean-Claude Juncker, Austrian Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc DeHaene, European Commission President Jacques Santer, President of the European Parliament José María Gil-Robles, European Union of Christian Democrats president Wim van Welzen, and EPP-President (and former Belgian Prime Minister) Wilfried Martens. (Barber, 1997b; “Christdemokratische,” 1997; Klaassen, 1997b; Van Lierop 1997; Van der Velden, 1997a).

At this summit, there had been unanimous agreement that Turkey’s human rights record as well as its size were reasons to deny Turkey membership (Barber, 1997b). Chairman Martens, speaking on behalf of all, argued that it was “not acceptable” for Turkey to become a member of the EU. “We are creating a European Union. This is a European project,” he argued, indicating a closed European identity that excludes Turkey (Barber 1997b, emphasis according to Klaassen 1997b; Traynor & Nuttall, 1997).
Wolfgang Schüssel also cited economic reasons, such as high inflation and unemployment rates (“Christdemokratische,” 1997). Van Velzen was more explicit about excluding Turkey based on identity, saying: “The cultural, humanist and Christian values of Europe,” are different from those of Turkey; “Europe has its borders” (Barber 1997b; Van der Velden, 1997a – trans. mine). The Financial Times’ Lionel Barber (1997b) wrote “…they agreed unanimously that Turkey's human rights record, its size, and, implicitly, the Islamic strain in its society, made it impossible for the EU to contemplate admitting the country into a Union which is preparing to expand to Central and Eastern Europe around the year 2002.”

Furthermore, several participants of the summit cited the diplomatic pressure-tactics, not only implemented by Turkey, but also by the United States, as having retrograde effects on their inclinations to support Turkey for membership (Traynor & Nuttall, 1997; Van der Velden, 1997a). The tactics, on Turkey’s part, included threats to veto NATO enlargement to Eastern European countries.

This unanimous agreement, however, turned out to have a limited lifespan. Prime Minister Romano Prodi of Italy distanced himself from the EPP agreement within just a few days of the summit (Van Lambalgen 1997). The EPP-position of Bruton was also negated by the Taoiseach’s replacement by Bertie Ahern on June 26, following the June 6 elections in Ireland. Spain’s position remained somewhat unclear throughout the remainder of the year, sometimes being praised by the Turks for its support, and at other times expressing its opposition by citing Turkey’s human rights record (“Foreign minister on need,” 1997; Mortimer, 1997b; Sanz, 1997; Smith, 1997). Although generally speaking, Madrid seemed more favorable to Ankara’s membership ambitions than unfavorable. Luxembourg also recanted its EPP position that Turkey was not a European country, yet maintained that its human rights situation was sufficient reason to not invite it to accession negotiations (“Der Krieg wird,” 1997). For the remainder of 1997, Belgium failed to make the press concerning their stance on Turkey.

Apart from this, the participants at the EPP summit had not all been able to speak for their governments. Wolfgang Schüssel’s declaration of opposition to EU-membership for Turkey was contradicted later that year by statements from his chancellor, Viktor Klima, and president, Thomas Klestil, in support of Turkish membership to the EU (“Turkey recognizes,” 1997). So too, Helmut Kohl’s position was not necessarily the same as that of his coalition partner, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) (Barber, 1997c; De Graaf, 1997b; LaRoche, 1997; “Spanningen,” 1997; Van der Velden, 1997b; “Wijze mannen,” 1997). The German position during
the EPP summit had therefore been modified by Kinkel’s stance nearly two weeks later at the EU Foreign Ministers meeting in Apeldoorn (Netherlands) (Van der Velden, 1997b). Later in the year, Kohl would also express support for “eventual Turkish membership”, in his attempt to improve the German-Turkish relations that had soured after the summit (Atkins, 1997).

5.1.2 Apeldoorn

During the Dutch presidency in the first half of 1997, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van Mierlo (also the political leader of the center-left liberal D66 party), and his countryman, EU Commissioner of External Affairs Hans van den Broek (a former foreign minister and member of the Christian-democratic CDA), had to deal with the diplomatic crisis created by the statement of the EPP summit. Van Mierlo, having received an earful in Ankara after the EPP-summit, was determined that the Apeldoorn meeting of the EU Foreign Ministers would produce “movement” in the situation (Van Lambalgen, 1997 – trans. mine).

The main issue at Apeldoorn, with respect to Turkey’s bid for membership, was to clarify (and determine) the Council’s position on Turkey’s eligibility, especially when this had been contested at the EPP summit. At Apeldoorn, the foreign ministers decided that Turkey “could be reassured that it had a future in the West, saying they were ready to deepen economic and political cooperation and were leaving the door open to eventual EU membership” (Beurkle 1997). Separately, Malcolm Rifkind and Hervé de Charette, the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom and the foreign minister of France, respectively, declared to the press that they ‘insisted that Turkey’s EU ambitions must be judged on the same objective criteria as Central European states’ (ibid). De Charette added that “Turkey has the calling to become a member of the EU. That calling must be forcefully confirmed,” and that “we must judge based on objective criteria, not on religious or ethnic grounds” (Pijnappels, 1997 – trans. mine). Abel Matutes, the foreign minister of Spain, asserted that ”The EU is not a Christian club” (ibid).

According to van Mierlo, “The discussion is far from finished, but we have accepted the principle that Turkey must continue to have a perspective on the European Union.” However, there were still a “great many issues” for Turkey to address, and that Ankara had to demonstrate “a substantial improvement with regard to human rights. The general feeling exists that it can still take quite some time before it comes to a membership” (Coenraadts, et al. 1997 – trans. mine).
At Apeldoorn, the ministers also discussed the French proposal of a permanent European conference, which would be a forum for EU members (the EU-15), negotiating the EU membership perspectives of countries in general. The purpose of this conference was to prevent countries not selected for accession negotiations or official candidacy, feeling left out (Wynia 1997). Kinkel seemed to embrace this idea, arguing that it “…allows us to give those who aren't in the first wave the feeling that they are not being ignored” (Beurkle 1997). “The EU wants Turkey to remain on the track to Europe and not to be pushed into a siding,” Mr. Kinkel said. But, he added, “it is clear that Turkey does not now fulfill the conditions for membership” (ibid). Greece maintained its veto on the release of the financial assistance package, but did not explicitly reject the idea of including Turkey in such a conference (ibid).

Commenting on the results of the meeting in Apeldoorn, Turkish foreign minister Tansu Çiller said that she was extremely pleased, saying, “A new door has been opened” (Santing, 1997 – trans. mine). In this context, Çiller thanked the Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo in particular, as well as Italy, Spain, Britain, France, Finland and US President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for the support they extended to Turkey” (“Foreign minister ‘impressed’,” 1997). She also congratulated Greece for its position at the Apeldoorn meeting, especially for Greek foreign minister’s Pangalos’ statement that “Turkey, of course, belongs in Europe” (ibid, Weymouth, 1997).

A month and a half after Apeldoorn, the consensus between the member states held. It was reconfirmed in Luxembourg by the EU/Turkey Association Council, a forum consisting of member states and Turkey, which been brought into existence by the 1963 Association Agreement. At Luxembourg, the Association Council agrees on “Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership and the fact that Turkey will be judged by the same objective standards and criteria as other applicants” (Commission, 1997a). Accordingly the foreign ministers agreed on non-discrimination against Turkey with respect to the criteria by which it would be judged. However, the devil was in the political details. The European Council would still have to decide on the matter, and there were complicating issues such as Cyprus to be dealt with. Furthermore, Greece still blocked the financial package promised to Turkey on the commencement of the customs union.
5.1.3 Agenda 2000 – the Commission’s recommendation

The Madrid European Council (December 15–16, 1995) had determined that accession negotiations with candidate countries could begin six months after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which led to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The purpose of the IGC was to prepare the institutions of the EU for the prospect of enlargement. The Treaty of Amsterdam, completed at the Amsterdam European Council (June 16-17, 1997), paved the way for the Commission to offer its opinions on the applicants’ prospects for accession.\(^{19}\)

On July 15\(^{th}\), in response to Madrid and Apeldoorn, the European Commission published its opinions on the applications of the ten Eastern European states that had applied for membership between 1994 and 1996. (In 1993, the Commission had already published its opinion on the application of Cyprus, which had applied in 1990.\(^{20}\)) Within a set of documents collectively titled Agenda 2000, the Commission proposed that accession negotiations could begin with Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Cyprus, the so-called ‘Luxembourg Six’. At the same time, the opinion confirmed the consensus on the membership perspectives of the remaining Eastern European countries – the ‘pre-ins’ – Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, stating “that negotiations for accession to the European Union should be opened…as soon as it has made sufficient progress in satisfying the conditions of membership defined by the European Council in Copenhagen” (Commission, 1997c-g).

The Commission’s opinion on Turkey in 1989, had not contained such terminology, as it had been drafted well before the 1993 Copenhagen European Council (Commission, 1989). Nevertheless, the same package that contained the Commission’s opinions on the Eastern European countries, did include a statement on Turkey, reaffirming the position held at Apeldoorn, as well as the EC/Turkey Association Council decision of April 29, 1997, that “eligibility [for membership] and confirmed that Turkey will be judged by the same objective standards and criteria as other applicants” (Commission, 1997b). In an additional communication, the Commission recommended

\(^{19}\) The Treaty of Amsterdam did not clear all the hurdles for institutional amendment, which were left for the Treaty of Nice to sort out. It was, however, decided that the hurdles still to be overcome were not an impediment for beginning accession negotiations with the front-running candidates.

\(^{20}\) Both Malta and Cyprus applied for membership in 1990, with the Commission offering its opinions in 1993. Malta, however, froze its application after the Maltese Labour Party took power in 1996. It reapplied in 1998, after the Nationalist Party returned to power.
to the Council and the European Parliament a 12-point plan for deepening the relationship between
the EU and Turkey, and assisting the latter on its path toward membership (Commission, 1997a).

Despite the Commission’s affirmation of equal treatment of Turkey, it did not offer
prospects for accession negotiations, as had been explicitly included in the agreement on Bulgaria,
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia (Commission 1997b-l). It was for this reason that France
proposed the ‘European Conference’ for all countries with a European perspective. This conference
present would include the opportunity for a permanent dialogue between the EU and Turkey, in
addition to the Association Council’s objectives. However, the Commission was still divided on the
conference issue, with Commissioner Hans van den Broek arguing in favor of such a conference
including Turkey, and President Jacques Santer raising objections against it (Barber, 1997d).

The Commission’s texts did not explicitly compare Turkey to the other applicants in terms
of the degree to which they met the Copenhagen criteria. Each opinion in the Agenda 2000
documents essentially was a stand-alone opinion that did not regard the other opinions. However,
the text of each was fairly formulaic, allowing for comparison.

**Table 5.1:** Progress toward the Copenhagen criteria by each of the applicant countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Administrative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>√</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>√</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Commission, 1997b-l.
Table 5.1, above, shows the three different categories of criteria by which applicants were gauged. A
‘√’-mark indicates the Commission’s confidence in the applicant’s progress toward that criterion. A
‘–’ indicates that progress had been made, but more was necessary, and an ‘X’ indicates that the
applicant fell too far short of meeting the required goals.\(^\text{21}\)

This table shows that the main difference between the Luxembourg Six and the others is the
degree to which they meet the economic criteria, without failing the political criteria. Aside from
Estonia, where protections of for minorities were gauged as inadequate for the Russian-speaking
non-citizens, all of the countries the Commission suggested for starting accession negotiations with
met the political criteria. Lithuania was also considered to have met the political criteria, but fell
short on the economic front. Slovakia was judged to have an economy capable of withstanding the
pressures of the Single Market, but its political institutions were gauged to be insufficiently
democratic as the executive had usurped powers delegated to other branches of government and
there were insufficient protections of opposition parties and minorities.

The administrative criteria are the chapters of *acquis communautaire* These were (and are) the
subjects of the accession negotiations. The process of negotiations incrementally determines the
degree to which the applicant have adopted the necessary administrative procedures to operate
within the body of EU laws. As such, applicants are expected to modify their administrative
structures and procedures during the negotiations process and are not expected to meet them at the
outset of negotiations. However, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey were all judged to not have
transposed or taken on the essential elements of the *acquis* particularly as regarded the internal
market. As such, they were considered administratively underprepared to start the negotiations
process.

By this comparison, Turkey failed the political criterion and readiness to administratively
begin the negotiations process. It was, however, gauged to have made significant strides in terms of
its economy. According to the Commission, “the customs union has demonstrated the Turkish
economy’s ability to cope with the competitive challenge of free trade in manufactured goods…
However, macroeconomic instability continues to give cause for concern.” (Commission, 1997b).

The political criteria were particularly sticky for Turkey. This was where Turkey was seen to
be particularly lacking. On this criterion, the Commission (1997b, Art. IV) wrote:

\(^\text{21}\) With respect to the Eastern European countries who were actively gauged in the Commission opinions, comparison is
fairly straightforward, as the documents use largely the same wording for each. With respect to Turkey, however, as the
Commission did not publish an Opinion in the same format, the wording differs somewhat.
In political terms Turkey has a government and parliament resulting from multi-party, democratic elections and an administration capable of framing and applying legislation compatible with the acquis communautaire. Despite political recognition of the need for improvement and certain recent legislative changes, Turkey's record on upholding the rights of the individual and freedom of expression falls well short of standards in the EU. In combating terrorism in the south east, Turkey needs to exercise restraint, to make greater efforts to uphold the rule of law and human rights and to find a civil and not a military solution. Persistent cases of torture, disappearances and extra-judicial executions, notwithstanding repeated official statements of the government's commitment to ending such practices, put into question the extent to which the authorities are able to monitor and control the activities of the security forces.

Recent developments in the administration and the education system, while intended to strengthen secularism, nonetheless underline the particular role of the military in Turkish society. The National Security Council has a special role under the Constitution in the formulation and implementation of national security policy and the Council of Ministers is required to give priority to its decisions. There are ambiguities in the Turkish legal system with regard to civilian political control of the military.

In this respect especially torture had been highlighted by several European member-state officials as a reason to find Turkey’s unfit for EU starting the negotiations process. Jean-Claude Juncker, in particular, commented vociferously that ‘a country which practised torture could not sit down at the EU table’ (Barham, 1997h; see also: James, 1997c; Gillespie, 1997b; Walker 1997b).

As Chapter 11 will discuss in greater detail, Turkey’s civil and human rights protections were much less adequate than those of the other applicant states. In 1997, Turkey still had frequent occurrences of torture, disappearances, extrajudicial killings and political prisoners. That is not to suggest that the other applicants were faultless, as Juncker suggests that they are. Incidents of torture were also systemic in Bulgaria and Romania, and occurred incidentally not only in Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia, but also occasionally in Greece, Italy Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, Turkey had many more problems than the others did, especially regarding killings, disappearances and political prisoners (Cingranelli & Richards, 2010).

5.1.4 The road to Luxembourg

The final word on enlargement, however, rested with the European Council, rather than the Commission. Since the Commission had not proposed a framework for Turkey, the real debate hinged on whether or not to either explicitly offer Turkey a membership perspective and put it on a
similar, if not the same, track as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. A third option, between a perspective or no perspective, was in offering the half-way solution in the form of conference participation, whereby the specific mold in which to shape such a conference would no doubt be subject to further dispute.

In the meantime, the Yılmaz government in Ankara had also changed the focus of its efforts. Although disagreeing with the Commission’s decision to not invite Turkey to accession negotiations, or even equal treatment with the ‘pre-ins’, it seemed to have accepted the Commission’s differentiation between front-running and lagging candidates. Instead of making forceful attempts to demand acceptance into the negotiations process, it decided to adopt policies making it more acceptable to the Copenhagen criteria, such as improving its inflation-ridden economy and its ill-favored human rights record, as well as furthering its democratic progress (Atkins, 1997; Barham, 1997d, 1997e). Furthermore, Prime Minister Yılmaz sought rapprochement with Helmut Kohl, which seemed to at least soften the German Chancellor’s strong opposition to Turkish membership as this had been demonstrated at the EPP summit (Atkins, 1997; LaRoche 1997).

On October 6th, the EU foreign ministers met in Luxembourg, where France again proposed Turkey’s inclusion in a European Conference of countries with membership perspectives. Germany remained opposed (Docquiert, 1997a). When the ministers met again in Montdorf-les-Bains (also Luxembourg) on October 25th, and enlargement issues were discussed, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and the Netherlands supported Turkish participation in the European Conference to be held at Buckingham Palace in February of the next year, while Greece threatened with a veto and Germany opposed Turkey’s inclusion, though not explicitly with a veto (Bremner, 1997a; Donker, 1997; Ferrari, 1997; James, 1997a; Pijnappels & van Meteren, 1997; Smith, 1997; “Strijd over Turkije,” 1997; van Meteren, 1997; Walker, 1997a).

By November, however, Germany gave up its firm position of rejecting Turkish participation in the proposed European Conference, provided that EU enlargement would not be on the agenda (Berger, 1997a; “Bonn staat EU,” 1997; Buckley, 1997). Greece, on the other hand, maintained its opposition. Despite Germany’s relenting, Turkey still required, as far as its presence at the European Conference was concerned, a more positive sign from the European Council than what it considered to be nothing more than an opportunity for a “family photo”, with little significance (Barham 1997f).

Another source of discontentment for the Turks were the demands made by the ‘pre-ins’ and their allies among the member states (Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Greece) (Barber,
1997e, 1997f; “Het zijn geen rechtsstaten,” 1997; Walker, 1997a). These members had proposed a ‘regatta’ of enlargement, whereby the candidate countries (except Slovakia and Turkey) could progress toward membership, each at its own pace (Smith, 1997). This was contrasted by the model being proposed by the Commission, which was a ‘wave model’, wherein several candidates would enter at the same time. The regatta model, was intended to benefit those who had not been recommended by the Commission for accession negotiations, but did meet the political standards of the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey and Slovakia were not considered part of that group, owing to their failures on the political criteria. Thus, the proposed regatta model further differentiated Turkey from the other candidates by putting it behind even Bulgaria and Romania.

5.1.5 The Luxembourg European Council

The Luxembourg European Council on the 12th of December commenced with the following options: the Commission’s proposal to begin negotiations with six candidates, the German/Scandinavian compromise proposal to “screen” all the candidates (except Turkey, and perhaps also excluding Slovakia), while offering them financial assistance, the French proposal of the European Conference, and the Greek promise to veto the latter, unless Ankara would meet a list of conditions, including concessions over Cyprus and the Aegean territorial dispute.

The Foreign Ministers’ meeting immediately prior to the European Council had not been able to solve these problems, having left them for the heads of state and government. The foreign ministers has, however, agreed on offering some reassurances (such as 100mln ECU) to the Eastern European countries that would be ‘left behind’ by the accession negotiation process (Barber, 1997g; James, 1997b). Meanwhile, Ankara demanded more than a “family photo” conference at Buckingham Palace with Queen Elizabeth (Bremner 1997b; Mortimer, 1997b).

The Council decided against giving Turkey the same status as the ‘pre-ins’, though still including Slovakia. Although the latter also had problems meeting the political criteria, the Council argued that it had come closer to meeting them than Turkey had done. Council President, Jean-Claude Juncker articulated the distinction as: “There is no comparison possible between Turkey and the 11 other applicant countries. Nobody is tortured in these countries,” adding that “We cannot admit to the EU a country which has border disputes with another member state” (Bremner 1997b; Walker 1997b).
On the Wednesday preceding the summit, the mood between the Luxembourg Presidency and Turkey had already been soured over dinner between prime ministers Juncker and Yılmaz. Furthermore, during an interview on the first day of the summit, Juncker had expounded on several Turkish issues, such as torture, the military occupation of Northern Cyprus, and its provocations against Greece (Bogaerts & de Graaf, 1997). Relations between Turkey and the Luxembourg Presidency were not off to a good start for Turkish prospects.

During the summit, a Dutch diplomat complained, that of Turkey’s core allies – France, the United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands – only the latter had made a forceful argument to support Turkey’s inclusion in the process. Blair seemed to have lost his luster after a bruising clash between the UK and Germany/France over the former’s asserted right to be part of the Euro-X Committee\(^\text{22}\). France seemed to be internally stymied by disagreements between President Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (Bogaerts & de Graaf, 1997; de Jong 1997). As such, the Dutch diplomat argued, Greece was able to ‘hijack’ the summit, only relenting to Turkey’s inclusion into the European Conference if it met certain conditions, which implicitly included concessions over Cyprus and the territorial dispute in the Aegean Sea (James, 1997c; de Jong, 1997; Gillespie, 1997b).

Regardless, the summit ultimately offered Turkey a place at the European Conference, though without financial support, neither as a released financial package for the Customs Union, nor as a pre-accession assistance package such as participation in the PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) program, as had been offered to the Eastern European countries\(^\text{23}\). These financial incentives formed part of an ‘enhanced pre-accession strategy’ (European Council, 1997, cl.13-16).

More important than Turkey’s place at the European Conference, had been in the Presidency Conclusions’ clauses 11 and 12, describing the ‘process of accession and negotiation’. These paragraphs explicitly referred to “the ten Central and East European applicant States and Cyprus,” and not Turkey, as part of this process. Although this clause did not include Turkey, the conclusions did have the following separate section on Turkey:

**The Council confirms Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the European Union. Turkey will be judged on the basis of the same criteria as the other applicant States. While the political**

\(^{22}\) The Euro-X committee would decide on matters pertaining to the common currency, which Britain, Denmark and, for an unspecified time, Sweden would opt out of.

\(^{23}\) The Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) program was begun as an assistance program for Poland and Hungary, but expanded to include all ten Eastern European countries applying for membership.
and economic conditions allowing accession negotiations to be envisaged are not satisfied, the European Council considers that it is nevertheless important for a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field.

(European Council 1997, cl. 31)

According to this clause, the criteria for Turkey were to be the same as for the other applicants. This established a norm of non-discrimination regarding membership on anything except the Copenhagen criteria. This, likely, followed an overall societal norm of non-discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and religion, which is part of the Western political belief system. Therefore, the assessment of the political Copenhagen criteria ostensibly became even more important for the development of the European Union’s enlargement regime, as other discriminating factors were supposedly removed.

The Council’s conclusions suggest that the difference in treatment between Turkey and the ‘pre-ins’ – the countries that were not selected to begin accession negotiations with the EU, but were a part of the ‘single framework’ for the Central and Eastern European countries – were categorized differently on the implicit grounds that Turkey failed to meet the political Copenhagen criteria by a greater degree than the other applicants did. From the perspective of the Cingranelli & Richards (2010) comparative data on human rights, this was certainly the case, but the Council did not make its reasoning explicit, leaving room for doubt, and the belief that Turkey was being treated differently because of its religious, cultural and geographic distinctiveness.

The particular importance of the political criteria was established in clause 25 of the conclusions. These criteria were to be met at the start of negotiations, rather than by the time of accession. The clause reads:

**Compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of any accession negotiations. Economic criteria and the ability to fulfill the obligations arising from membership have been and must be assessed in a forward-looking, dynamic way.**

(European Council, 1997, c. 25)

This, essentially, established the provision that applicant states first needed to get their political system in order prior to beginning accession negotiations. The economic and administrative criteria would be allowed to develop in due course, as long as these criteria were met at the time of accession. This rule was, however, weakened by 2004, when Turkey’s advocates did not argue that Turkey fully complied with the political criteria, but that it ought to be judged in the ‘forward-looking dynamic way’, of assessing if Turkey could meet the political criteria by the time of actual accession, rather than the sooner moment of accession negotiations.
5.1.6 The Aftermath

After the summit, Yılmaz rejected the conditional offer of participation in the Conference. “There will not be a political dialogue between Turkey and the European Union,” he said at the end of a cabinet meeting in Ankara, also stating that he would end the political dialogue with the European Union and integrate Northern Cyprus into Turkey (James, 1997c; de Jong, 1997). Additionally, there were threats of boycotting goods from 12 EU countries, excluding France, Italy and the United Kingdom, which were excepted owing to what Turkey felt was their more positive stance toward its membership application (Barham, 1997h).

5.2 ISSUES

During the 1997 episode, there were several issues concerning Turkey that had been of particular consequence to the Luxembourg decision. The division of Cyprus, itself a candidate for EU membership, had been a tricky matter and would remain so during the following episodes. Another such issue had been the dispute between Greece and Turkey over territorial waters and two small, unpopulated islands in the Aegean Sea between the two countries. The third bone of contention was the proposed European Conference, which was taken as an alternative to offering Turkey the same status as the ‘pre-ins’ (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia). The following three sections will look at these issues in further detail, followed by the expressed positions of each of the fifteen member states.

5.2.1 Cyprus

EU-Turkey relations during 1997 were complicated by Cyprus’ candidacy for EU-membership along with the persistent hostile situation between its internationally-recognized Greek side and the ethnic Turkish side, which has only been recognized only by Turkey and a portion of Azerbaijan (the Nakhichevan exclave). A large garrison of 30,000-35,000 Turkish military troops has also been based there since the Turkish occupation in 1974. In 1995, Turkey had agreed to not block Cyprus joining the EU, provided Greece did not veto Turkey’s candidacy for the EU and the coming into force of
the EU-Turkey Customs Union. Greece, however, had kept a political card up its sleeve, which it had used by vetoing the release of an EU financial aid package for Turkey, while Turkey had maintained its support for the hard-line Rauf Denktash in Nicosia. Both then threatened to scupper expansion of NATO and the EU if their demands concerning Cyprus were not met (Barber 1997a).

1997 had begun in the context of the Greek-Cypriot government having placed an order for Russian S-300 ground-to-air missiles to which Turkey had responded with the reservation of the right to intervene militarily if the Greek-Cypriot south proceeded with its armament program (Barber 1996; Barham, 1997a; “Cabinet approves,” 1996). At the time this development in the Cyprus dispute had drawn considerable attention worldwide (Bertens, 1997).

On February 24th, the EU Foreign ministers, led by Berlin and Paris, indicated that accession negotiations between the EU and Cyprus needed to include Turkish-Cypriots. In response, Athens vetoed the GAERC (General Affairs and External Relations Council – Council of Ministers configuration) text, and threatened to suspend further Council discussion on the matter (Barber, 1997a). This situation grew worse after the EPP summit in Brussels, when Ankara threatened that a denial of its membership application would result in the cancellation of the Customs Union and the annexation of Northern Cyprus (Barham, 1997c). This threat was made under the Erbakan government and repeated by Deputy-Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit after the change of government in Ankara (Weymouth 1997). Though less adamant than the Greeks, the Greek-Cypriots voiced their understanding that reconciliation on the island and their own pursuit of membership had to occur simultaneously (de Graaf, 1997a; van Hasselt, 1997).

In September, the Yılmaz government in Ankara signaled its willingness to be more energetic with regard to meeting the Copenhagen criteria, and to be more flexible with regard to the territorial dispute with Greece, the Customs Union, and German fears concerning the threat of a flood of Turkish immigrant workers. Regarding Cyprus, however, a broad Turkish consensus held to its threat to not allow the placement of the Russian anti-air missiles on the island (Barham, 1997d).

During the European Council meeting, Greece gave up on its refusal to allow Turkish Cypriots into the Cypriot delegation for the accession negotiations. France, however, made it clear that it would not accept a divided island as an EU member (Mortimer 1997b). When Turkey was denied official candidacy and only permitted to attend the proposed European Conference, it cut off further political dialogue with the EU, and vowed to integrate Northern Cyprus if the EU went ahead with its plans to open membership negotiations with the internationally recognized Greek-
Cypriot government (James, 1997c; Mortimer, 1997a; 1997b; Gillespie, 1997b). By the end of the year, the Turkish Cypriots also ended dialogue with Greek Cyprus (“Bonn blijkt felst,” 1997).

The Greek insistence on Cypriot membership, left the EU with the dilemma of either delaying the Eastern enlargement or importing the Cyprus dispute. Ironically, External Relations Commissioner Hans van den Broek, who had been named ‘Van den Turk’ by his Greek detractors, argued that Turkey could not hold EU membership for Cyprus “hostage.” Berlin and London, meanwhile, argued that the EU ought not to a divided island into the EU (van Hasselt, 1997; Klaassen 1997a; van Lambalgen, 1997). As such, Turkey’s most powerful advocates, France and the UK, and its most powerful antagonist, Kohl’s Germany, agreed about the necessity of uniting Cyprus prior to accession. Even though the division among the member states over Turkish membership had no direct bearing on their position on Cyprus, it did become fuel for the brakemen arguing that Turkey was required to help by providing a solution for Cyprus before it could become a member itself.

5.2.2 The Aegean Sea Territorial Dispute

The hostilities surrounding Cyprus had also raised the temperature about another simmering Greek-Turkish dispute, concerning contested sovereignty claims of the territorial waters and airspace in and above the Aegean Sea between the two countries. The symbolic centerpiece of this dispute had been a set of uninhabited\footnote{With the exception of a small herd of goats, who do not claim either nationality.} islets together called Imia (in Greek) or Kardak (in Turkish), but more significantly, it concerned the rights of exploitation of underwater mineral resources.

In January 1996, just after Costas Simitis succeeded Andreas Papandreou as Prime Minister in Greece, several incidents caused uproar. First was a Greek government scheme to offer free accommodation on the barren islands to foreign tourists, which offended the Turks (Smith, 1996). Second, a Turkish ship ran aground on Imia/Kardak, and refused assistance from the Greek coast guard (“Turks and Greeks on alert,” 1996). In response, a Greek priest raised a Greek flag on one of the islet (Kalaitzidis, 2009). Making sport of these developments, two teams of Turkish journalists from different newspapers held a race to be the first to take down the Greek flag and replace it with a Turkish flag (Fakatselis, 1996). Greek soldiers, in turn, occupied the flagged island (taking down
the Turkish flag again, and replacing the Greek flag), followed by Turkish frogmen raising their flag on the other island ("Greece, Turkey in fight," 1996; "Tension between," 1996).

All of the above rapidly escalated to a naval standoff, which included a night-time crash of a Greek helicopter. Ultimately, the United States brokered a mutual withdrawal of naval forces. Multiple news sources argued that a great deal of the nationalistic enthusiasm had been the result of weak governments of both Athens and Ankara, playing to their home constituents (Bohlen, 1996; "Greece, Turkey," 1996; Hamilton, 1996; Kalaitzidis, 2009; Smith, 1996).

A not as widely reported source of tension over the Aegean territories was connected to the coming into force of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea – UNCLOS – in November 1994, which had formally extended the original 6 miles of territorial waters to 12 miles worldwide. On May 31st 1995, the Greek Parliament unanimously ratified UNCLOS, asserting its right to extend its territorial boundaries in accordance with the new international law. Turkey had not signed the treaty, and in response to the Greek ratification declared that any unilateral action on the Greek side would constitute a casus belli (Başlar, 2001, p. 9; “Cabinet granted,” 1995, Mann, 2001).

Following these incidents, the dispute lay dormant until the Greek government blocked the release of the financial package for Turkey as part of the Customs Union agreement. At the EU-Turkey Association Council, at the end of April 1997, Greece and Turkey announced their decision to appoint a panel of ‘wise men’ to look for a solution to the Aegean standoff. This was a shift in Greek policy, as earlier that month the ‘wise men’ committee suggestion by the Dutch foreign minister van Mierlo had been dismissed by the Greek foreign minister Pangalos (Bothof, 1997). Greece’s shift to agree with the ‘wise men’ option, rather than solely insist on arbitration by the International Court of Justice, had primarily been the result of German pressure (Barber, 1997c). The ‘wise men’ were requested to draw up a report with a non-binding recommendation by mid-June.

By July, the wise men’s report had been delayed until September. At that stage, Simitis’ policy was that no dialogue on the EU financial package could take place until Turkey withdrew its claims on Greek territory in the Aegean Sea, or submit them to the World Court (Mortimer & Hope, 1997). In September, the Yılmaz government signaled that it would have been interested in a negotiated settlement for the Aegean dispute, if their hands had not been tied by the Greek reluctance to negotiation as well as the Turkish establishment’s militant reluctance for any up-front concessions toward Greece (Barham, 1997d; Weymouth, 1997).
The possibility for reconciliation had not come any closer with a military standoff in October, involving the collision of two warships, one from Greece and the other from Turkey (Smith, 1997). However, a meeting of Simitis and Yılmaz on November 5th led to a modest advance. The Prime Ministers agreed that their officials should continue to meet in order to discuss the matter, and promised to revive NATO ideas for military confidence-building measures in the Aegean Sea. Later in November, this led to another modest shift in the Greek position. In order to release the financial package, Turkey would have to ‘say’ that it would go to the ICJ. This implied that the financial package might be released before the case actually came before the world court (Buchan 1997). Greece was supported in this position by the president of the European Commission, Jacques Santer (Barber, 1997g).

Other member states put Greece under pressure to relent on Turkey’s attendance at the European Conference, but they also agreed with Greece that a declaration from Turkey seeking international arbitration on the Aegean dispute would be helpful (Mortimer 1997b). Some countries, with Luxembourg in the lead, argued quite energetically that the EU “cannot admit to the EU a country which has border disputes with another member state,” (Walker, 1997b). On the eve of the Luxembourg summit, Greece’s future Foreign Minister George Papandreou vowed that he would “hold our ground,” on the insistence of international arbitration on the Aegean Sea (Barber, 1997g).

While the Luxembourg summit was ready to offer Turkey participation in the European Conference (see below), Greece continued to block this, until its demand of international arbitration found its way into the conditions for such an invitation, as follows:

[Participants in the Conference must share...] a commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

(European Council, 1997, c. 5)

With Turkey’s rejection of the European Conference invite, any prospect for solutions to the dispute in the near future were stillborn. The problems would also continue to remain unsolved throughout the next four episodes, though Greece’s policy change from being a brakeman to being an energetic driver in 1999, 2002 and 2004 would also mean that this issue was put on the back burner, while in 2006 the position would hinge on the Cyprus situation.
5.2.3 The European Conference proposal

Toward the end of the year, the particular issue of debate between the member states and Turkey concerned the French proposal, presented at the Apeldoorn meeting, by French foreign minister Hervé de Charette. This was to hold a European Conference for members and applicant states. The dispute was about the purpose of such a conference and who would participate. From the French and British perspective, the purpose would be to signal to Turkey that it would still be made explicit that Turkey was involved in the enlargement process.

The Commission decided to adopt this proposal into its Agenda 2000 document, stating “The Member States of the Union and all those European countries aspiring to membership and linked to it through an association agreement should be brought together in a single forum,” where they “would meet each year at the level of Heads of State or Government and the President of the Commission and, where necessary, ministerial level” (Commission, 1997b, p. 79). This formulation explicitly included Turkey as an associated country. The topics of discussion in the conference would be second and third pillar items, respectively Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).

This was a very inclusive approach that could be interpreted to not only include all associate countries with Europe and Association Agreements (EA & AA), in addition to the eleven Eastern European candidates as well as Turkey, but also a large swath of countries such as Algeria (AA-1976), Malta (AA-1971), Tunisia, which had signed an AA with the EU on March 1, 1998, and even the Palestinian Authority as it had signed an interim AA agreement on July 16th of that year (1997).

During late October, the Luxembourg Presidency suggested that the European Conference would include the 11 candidates (Turkey not being one of them), that these would share in a 70 billion ECU fund between 2000-2006, and that the EU would deal with each candidate separately, allowing each to advance toward membership at its own pace (James, 1997a). Turkey would also be invited, but in order to make its invitation seem less like a consolation prize without the financial assistance offered to them as well, Austria proposed the idea of also inviting Norway and Switzerland, neither of which had seemed interested in attending (van der Vaart, 1997).

By mid-November, Turkish officials signaled that they would welcome an invitation to the conference if it included a pre-accession strategy (implying a financial assistance program) to help Turkey prepare for entry (Barham, 1997f). The topics of discussion that would be permitted at the Conference were also contested by the brakemen, especially Chancellor Kohl, who argued that
enlargement policies should not be on the agenda. (“Türkei hat keine,” 1997; “Turkije vormt,” 1997). To this, Turkish Prime Minister Yılmaz responded that he would not be interested if this conference were to be nothing more than a “family photograph”, without a pre-accession financial package (the way that the pre-ins, including Slovakia were proposed to receive), relegating Turkey to a “third class” applicant, (Binyon, 1997; Mortimer, 1997b).

Prior to the Luxembourg summit, however, Germany relented this restricted agenda of the conference, indicating that all topics should be open for discussion (“Szenario,” 1997). During the summit, Greece too finally capitulated on Turkey’s participation in the conference, though in exchange it insisted on terms requiring Turkish concessions on the Aegean Sea and Cyprus issues that were formulated as follows:

The members of the Conference must share a common commitment to peace, security and good neighbourliness, respect for other countries' sovereignty, the principles upon which the European Union is founded, the integrity and inviolability of external borders and the principles of international law and a commitment to the settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means, in particular through the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Countries which endorse these principles and respect the right of any European country fulfilling the required criteria to accede to the European Union and sharing the Union's commitment to building a Europe free of the divisions and difficulties of the past will be invited to take part in the Conference.

(European Council, 1997, c. 5)

The drivers were convinced by German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel that since this text did not implicitly stipulate preconditions for Turkey’s participation, Turkey had been explicitly invited, about which Dutch foreign minister Hans van Mierlo admitted that the Presidency conclusions could be read in different ways (de Jong, 1997).

5.3 THE MEMBER-STATE POSITIONS

Below are the positions of the different member states, coded as ‘drivers’, ‘passengers, and ‘brakemen’, wherein the drivers attempted to at least include Turkey into the European Conference without pushing it into making premature concessions, while the ‘brakemen’ attempted to keep Turkey out or make the Conference conditions unpalatable for Turkey. It must be noted here that according to various sources more member states balked at the prospect of Turkey joining the European Union than they let on, but were content to let Greece exercise its veto so they could
maintain the strength of their own bilateral relations with Turkey. Therefore some of the ‘passengers’ might actually have been ‘brakemen’ had Greece not been so willing to unilaterally oppose Turkish participation in the European Conference.

5.3.1 Austria

Like other countries, Austria had a coalition government wherein the foreign minister held a different opinion than the prime minister. For Austria, this difference of opinion became clear when the Austrian Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schüssel (of the Austrian People’s Party – ÖVP) attending the EPP summit, argued that an offer of joining the EU to Turkey was at that point completely impossible, but that the EU should maintain a special relationship with Turkey (“Christdemokratische,” 1997). However, during a meeting in Vienna(,) between the Austrian Prime Minister Viktor Klima (of the Social Democratic Party of Austria – SPÖ) and the Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, Klima confirmed the earlier statement by the Austrian President, Thomas Klestil (ÖVP), that Austria would support Turkey for EU membership (“Turkey recognizes,” 1997).

For the remainder of the episode, the press reckoned Austria (as a whole) sometimes among the proponents and at other times among those nervous about the idea of Turkish membership (Barham, 1997g; Berger, 1997; Casanova, 1997; Ferrari, 1997; Mortimer, 1997b; “Szenario,” 1997). As such, Austria is considered to have been a ‘passenger’, during the 1997 episode, because of this lack of clarity in its overall preferences for Turkey’s membership. It can, however, be read as a case where the coalition was simply undecided on the matter and the social-democratic chancellor would express one preference and the Christian-democratic foreign minister another.

5.3.2 Belgium

The Belgian Prime Minister, Jean-Luc DeHaene had also been one of the attendees EPP-summit opposing Turkey membership (Barber, 1997b). For the remainder of the year, the journalistic record does not show the Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD&V) – Social Democratic (SP) coalition government taking any strong stance on the prospect of Turkish membership, one way or another. Given that, and how many of the other governments attending the EPP-summit reversed or moderated their opinions later, it cannot be taken for granted that the Belgian government decided
on a ‘brakeman’ in accordance with the supposed EPP preference. Therefore, Belgium is also coded as a ‘passenger’.

5.3.3 Denmark

In early 1997, Denmark brought suit before the European Commission on Human Rights against Turkey for torturing one of its citizens. Kemal Koc, an ethnic Kurd, had been visiting Turkey to attend his brother’s funeral, and had been arrested and held by the Turkish authorities on suspicion of involvement in the PKK. Danish pressure resulted in the release of Koc after 42 days of confinement. Examination by the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, based in Copenhagen, resulted in a determination that Koc had been tortured while in custody. Turkey rejected the accusation (Rath, 1997).

After Koc, another Danish citizen Ferit Suslu had also, allegedly, been tortured in Turkey. Referencing these two cases, Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen took Turkey to task over its human rights standards. After meeting with Bülent Ecevit in November, he told reporters that “the human-rights situation in Turkey is totally unacceptable and progress is needed” (“Denmark criticizes,” 1997).

On the issue of enlargement, Denmark advocated for the ‘Regatta’ model of enlargement, so that Latvia and Lithuania would not be left behind in the process when the enlargement would occur (Barber, 1997e; James, 1997a; Smith, 1997; Smyth, 1997; Walker, 1997a). This proposal would further distance Turkey from the Eastern European Pre-ins, as it would create procedural distinctions with all the Eastern European countries in a framework of negotiations, which Turkey would have been left out of. A particular aspect of this was Denmark’s advocacy for annually reviewing the Eastern Europeans’ progress toward the Copenhagen criteria without which Turkey would also be so gauged (Barber, 1997e).

Regarding the European conference, Pangalos was cited saying that Denmark, along with Sweden and his own country, Greece, remained opposed to including Turkey in the conference, even after the German change of heart (Martinez de Rituerto, 1997). For this, and the reasons above, Denmark is coded as a brakeman.
5.3.4 Finland

Finland’s position vis-à-vis Turkey was one of in-principle support, but serious concern over human rights. When Tansu Çiller, Turkey’s foreign minister under the Erbakan government, visited Helsinki lobbying for support of Turkey’s candidacy, she met with the Finnish foreign minister, Tarja Halonen. After the meeting, Halonen remarked to the press that “We see some obstacles, very very serious obstacles in this process; and these are, in my eyes, especially on the question of the human rights issue” (Oinonen, 1997).

The Turkish press, however, neglected to mention Halonen’s cool response to Çiller, reporting, instead, that “Halonen said her country approves of Turkey’s candidacy as a full member of the EU” and that according to Çiller, Halonen had insisted that Turkey would be judged by ‘identical’ criteria as the other applicants, stressing, “She said not similar but identical criteria” (“Foreign minister for "identical" criteria”,” 1997). After the Apeldoorn meeting, Çiller had praised several EU member states for their cooperative stance. Finland was among those she mentioned (Santing, 1997).

On the whole, it appears that Finland argued for a ‘strict but fair’ policy – Turkey could be welcomed as a member, provided that it could meet the Copenhagen criteria – especially the political criteria with an emphasis on human rights. Accordingly, Finland would neither discriminate against the membership prospects of Turkey, nor push it forward when the degree to which the republic met the Copenhagen criteria was deemed insufficient. In the debate over Turkey in 1997, Finland did not appear to be pushing Turkey’s candidacy forward, nor to be making efforts to hold it back either. As such, Finland is coded as another ‘passenger’.

5.3.5 France

In contrast to all the preceding countries, France was clearly a driver of the Turkish cause. Ankara recognized a favorable shift in French foreign policy with the presidency of Jacques Chirac (Baron & Bakchine, 1997). Following the EPP-summit, the French Foreign Minister, Hervé de Charette, argued that the European Union should make unequivocally clear that Turkey had a right to EU membership, with which he made the case for a European Convention for all applicant states, especially including Turkey (Favilla, 1997, Pijnappels, 1997; van der Velden, 1997b, Wynia, 1997).
In early April, de Charette joined Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo on a trip to Ankara to reassure the Turks that the EPP-summit would not determine the policy of the EU (“Van Mierlo wil,” 1997). This position was repeated all through October, November and early December, when the debates leading up to the Luxembourg summit took place, with France as the original proposer and largest advocate of a European Conference to include Turkey (Biedermann, 1997; Bremner, 1997a; Buckley, 1997; Docquiert, 1997; Franceschi, 1997; Lamy, 1997; LeMaitre, 1997; Lorieux, 1997; Pijnappels & van Meteren, 1997; “Strijd over Turkije,” 1997; Vernet, 1997).

At the Luxembourg summit, the Dutch press reported a tepid degree of French support for Turkey, while highlighting the more forceful Dutch argument (Bogaerts & de Graaf, 1997). This was blamed on the problems of cohabitation between the Gaullist president and the socialist prime minister. The French press, on the other hand, praised President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin for their ability to work together opening the door for enlargement without sacrificing French interests (de Bondt, 1997).

President Chirac argued that Turkey needed to be anchored in Europe and encouraged to succeed in its evolution toward democracy (Bresson, 1997). In the aftermath of the Luxembourg summit, the French joined the British in calling the rejection of Turkey’s request for accession a diplomatic mistake, while new French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, also expressed his disappointment to his Turkish counterpart over the Luxembourg decision on the margins of a NATO summit (“Turquie + Ankara,” 1997).

5.3.6 Germany

Germany was one of the main brakemen during the 1997 episode. Its policy toward Turkey was contested between the CDU (Christian Democrats) Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the FDP (Liberal Democrat) Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, with the former taking a harder line on Turkey, and the latter arguing for more ‘equal treatment’ of Turkey with the other applicants. Still, the crucial indicator for this episode of German policy toward Turkey was Germany’s argument concerning the European Conference.

The following paragraphs describe the ebb and flow of Germany’s difficult attempts to pursue its preference for holding Turkey at bay without alienating it to the point that it might abandon Europe altogether. Given the rocky relationship between Turkey and Germany during this
period, as well as Germany’s significant influence on European Council policies, the German case merits the extra attention given to it below.

In November 1996, during a state visit by the Turkish President, Süleyman Demirel, to Germany, the Turkish president had been the recipient of an earful on human rights from both Helmut Kohl and the Federal German President Roman Herzog, as well as from other German political leaders ("Demirel stösst," 1996; "Menschenrechts-," 1996). Meanwhile, Klaus Kinkel demanded that the European Parliament (and, implicitly, Greece) cease blocking the financial package of 350 million ECU promised to Turkey as part of the European Customs Union with Turkey signed in 1995 ("Kinkel für," 1996; "Demirel mit Kohl," 1996).

Early in 1997, Kinkel also expressed his concern that Europe’s treatment of Turkey might drive Ankara to ‘play the Islamic card’ and orient itself more toward its Middle Eastern neighbors rather than toward Europe, which had already been mentioned by the Islamist Prime Minister, Erbakan ("Kinkel besorgt," 1997).

At a January 1997 EU foreign ministers meeting in Rome, the Turkish Foreign Minister Çiller threatened to block NATO expansion if the EU would not grant it full membership. Of all the major powers, Germany, represented by Kinkel, argued that the EU would not accept membership for applicants having territorial disputes with other member-states, indicating the Aegean Sea dispute with Greece (Erzeren, 1997a; “EU sieht noch,” 1997).

Shortly thereafter, in an early February interview with the German weekly newspaper, ‘Welt am Sonntag,’ Kinkel argued that the enlargement of both the EU and NATO were “sensitive and complementary processes,” that should not be blocked by their respective member states, adding that Turkey would be an important ally as well as, “an important bridge,” between Europe and the Islamic and Asian world (“Kinkel mahnt,” 1997 – trans. mine; “Ws. Bonn...,” 1997). It was therefore in the interest of Europe to intensify mutual relations with Turkey, release the financial protocol, and offer it a reliable EU membership perspective (ibid). However, his statement did not indicate that the German government favored full membership for Turkey in the near future, nor its participation in the conference, as had started to be hinted at by France.

More strident against Turkey’s EU ambitions than his Foreign Minister, Helmut Kohl was seen as the prime engineer behind the EPP summit’s rebuff to Turkish hopes, a political maneuver that had also taken the German foreign ministry by surprise (Traynor & Nuttall, 1997). One of Kohl’s motivations thereto had supposedly been his annoyance with the Turkish threat to block the expansion of NATO, if Turkish membership perspective did not improve. Kohl had been quoted
saying that, “it is not known to me that Anatolia is a part of Europe,” (Erzeren, 1997d). “Europe stops where the Gothic cathedrals end,” he added, suggesting geographical and religious identity motives for excluding Turkey (van der Velden, 2002 – trans. mine).

At the Apeldoorn meeting, Kinkel maintained that “the EU wants Turkey to stay on track for Europe and does not get pushed onto a sidetrack,” and that Turkey’s application would be judged according to the same criteria as the other eleven candidates (“EU will Türkei,” 1997; Erzeren, 1997b – trans. mine). He also spoke favorably of the French proposal for a European Conference, saying that it “allows us to give those who aren’t in the first wave the feeling that they are not being ignored.” From his perspective, however, the conference was intended to mollify the disappointed Eastern European applicants that had not been selected for immediate accession negotiations, not to mollify Turkey. Citing concerns about human rights and Turkey’s handling of its Kurdish minority, he said that, “It is clear that Turkey does not now fulfill the conditions for membership” (Beurkle, 1997).

Soon after Apeldoorn, Kinkel traveled to Ankara to patch up the German-Turkish relationship (“Kinkel zu Gesprächen,” 1997). Prior to his departure, he offered an interview to FOCUS Magazin in which he declined to comment on the EPP-summit, but he did mention what would become the enduring FDP position: that “Turkey remains on track for Europe. Doubtlessly, it will not fulfill the membership criteria of the European Union for the foreseeable future” (Reitz, 1997 – trans. mine). In the Turkish news program ‘32. Gün’, he demonstrated greater willingness to express his disagreement with the position of the EPP, saying that viewing the EU as a ‘Christian club’ would create a dangerous split in a country (Germany) with three million Muslims. However, he also repeated his conviction that Turkey could not become a member state in the foreseeable future, because of human rights issues, the Kurdish question, Cyprus and the territorial conflict in the Aegean Sea (ibid; Erzeren, 1997c).

In late September, during a state visit by Mesut Yilmaz to Germany, Kohl voiced support for ‘eventual’ membership of Turkey in the EU (“Kohl,” 1997). At the time, this did not signal a fundamental shift in German policy, which still held off on Turkey’s inclusion in the proposed European Conference. At the end of October, Kinkel also still held this position, while Kohl did so too at a Franco-German summit in Paris on the 5th of November (de Graaf, 1997b; Vernet, 1997). Yet, following the EU foreign ministers meeting shortly afterwards, Kinkel signaled that he would be amenable to Turkey’s inclusion into the European Conference if all the other member states agreed it would be the right way forward (“EU unterstützt,” 1997; “Kinkel stimmt,” 1997; “Die
This indicated that Germany was coming around to the majority position of the member states in favor of inviting Turkey to the conference.

At the time, Germany could afford to appear warmer toward Turkey as long as the Greeks maintained their determination to veto Turkey’s inclusion to the conference (deFouloy, 1997). Also, Ankara had already signaled that it would not accept inclusion at the Conference merely to appear in the ‘family photograph’. The Turks demanded that their participation would have to be significant for its progress toward membership. The Chancellor, meanwhile, continued to insist on barring enlargement issues from the agenda of the conference (“Türkije vormt obstakel,” 1997). Additionally, Germany floated the idea of a ‘steering committee’ dedicated to guiding the ten east European candidates as well as Cyprus toward membership, implying the exclusion of Turkey from this selection (van der Vaart, 1997).

Yet, after the bilateral summit between Kohl and Jacques Chirac, Germany signaled a still more positive attitude toward Turkey. After this summit, France agreed to abandon attempts to weaken the proposed Growth & Stability Pact and to accept Germany’s candidate Wim Duisenberg of the Netherlands for the European Central Bank Presidency (Staunton, 1997). This strongly suggests a quid pro quo deal had been struck between the two leaders.

Just prior to the Luxembourg summit, Germany (represented by Kinkel) also relented on the choice of topics for the European Conference. He declared all issues, including enlargement, were open for discussion at that forum (“Szenario,” 1997). However, he stipulated that matters would not be discussed without a document drawn up four days prior to the summit, indicating that the German strategy was to “absolutely avoid the impression that concrete preparations were being made to begin accession negotiations” with Turkey (“Bonn blijkt,” 1997; “Bonn hart,” 1997; Pörtner, 1997 – trans. mine). A memo leaked to Der Spiegel, further advised that regular reports on Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria should be avoided as this would create false hope, and consequentially only harm EU-Turkish relations (ibid, 1997).

After the summit, Kohl and Kinkel both denied the idea that the EU had rejected Turkey. Kohl engaged in a fifteen-minute “lecture [to] the Turkish media” on how “he was Turkey’s greatest friend”, and if Turkey had only “set its human rights in order”, it would have had better prospects (Berger, 1997b – trans. mine). However, he acknowledged that Turkey’s human rights situation was not solely responsible for its rejection, when he added that, “a dramatic change in the number of Turks in Germany would not be tolerable to German public opinion nor to those in the rest of the European Union” (James, 1997c; Mortimer, 1997c). Meanwhile, the SPD spokesman on European
affairs, Günter Verheugen, of later fame, asserted that Turkey had spoken “irrationally, but that the EU had also made mistakes” (“Harte Reaktion,” 1997 – trans. mine). Despite Kohl and Kinkel’s words, Yılmaz was quite sure where to place the blame for Turkey’s failure to gain candidacy status (“Yılmaz gibt,” 1997).

According to Kinkel, Turkey had been made a fair offer, and the door was still “wide open”, should Turkey meet the same accession criteria as the other eleven candidates (“EU-Gipfel,” 1997 – trans. mine). Reacting to Turkish diplomatic tactics, he added that the EU was “not some kind of banana union that can have more and more squeezed out of it” (Barham, 1997g). To contradict the idea that Germany had rejected Turkish membership as a matter of principle, Kinkel asserted that, “Turkey belongs to Europe. We want them to join” (“Harte Reaktion,” 1997 – trans. mine; Erzeren, 1997e).

In the summary analysis of Germany’s policy toward Turkey in 1997, German interests had not been defined as being explicitly rejectionist of Turkish membership, as Kohl’s hand in the EPP summit might have suggested. Germany’s position, summed up between Kohl and Kinkel, was one of keeping Turkey within the European orbit, without having to offer it an immediate perspective on membership. The voiced reasons had been the degree to which Turkey had not met the Copenhagen criteria, the unresolved conflict over Cyprus and the ongoing territorial dispute between Greece and Turkey. While Germany would have preferred to not have offered Turkey participation in the European Conference, it had conveniently joined the majority, allowing Greece to threaten with a veto if the presidency conclusions were too thin on Turkish concessions that were beneficial to Greece. However, Greece, in the end, relented on its veto and it was, mostly, the Luxembourger rhetoric that aggravated Turkey to the point of rejection of what the presidency conclusions offered.

5.3.7 Greece

Of all the member states in 1997, Greece was the most outspoken of the brakemen. Ever since the a compensatory financial aid package had been offered to Turkey by the customs union treaty, Greece had blocked the release thereof as long as a territorial dispute persisted between these two countries. Greece would continue to use its right to veto the release of the financial package, as well as Turkey’s participation in the conference, as leverage to get concessions on the Aegean situation as
well as that of Cyprus. In spite of this, Greece never argued against the principle of Turkey joining
the EU.

Nevertheless, much of the rhetoric of Greece during this period caused considerable
tensions between Turkey and Greece, even if less than the year before. The height of this occurred
in late September, when during a statement to the Greek press, on the sidelines of the negotiations
over Cyprus, Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos argued that it was impossible to negotiate
with “the bandit, the murderer and the rapist,” and equated Turkey to “Hitler’s Germany.” In a
retort, Turkey’s minister of foreign affairs İsmail Cem called Pangalos a “psychopath.” The Greek
Foreign Ministry defended Pangalos’ statement, while the Turkish Foreign Ministry argued that
“The Greek nation does not deserve such a shame committed on its behalf and on its name”
(Lippman, 1997; Quinn, 1997; Reid, 1997).

For the greater part, the Greek position has already been made clear in the preceding
sections. Greece had no qualms recognizing Turkey as being a European country with a European
Union perspective. Following both the EPP meeting and a meeting with US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright, Foreign Minister Pangalos asserted that Turkey should not be rejected by the
EU, as it had an important part in European history, just as Greece did (“Athene,” 1997;
“Griekenland,” 1997; Smeenk, 1997). This declaration demonstrates how Greece’s motivations
differed from those of the Christian Democrats, whose opposition had been based on religious
identity, while Greece’s opposition would prove to be conditional. Those conditions – cooperation
on Cyprus, and international arbitration over the Aegean dispute - however, would prove to be
unpalatable to Turkey in 1997.

In the aftermath of the Luxembourg summit, the Greek Ambassador in Brussels, Pavlos
Apostolides, argued that “we have not closed the door on Turkey. But the Turks must understand
that they must behave differently, both internally as well as externally, if they want to move closer to
Europe. Internally, they must respect human rights. Externally, they must cooperate on a solution
for Cyprus and the territorial disputes with Greece, by a peaceful road and not with the threat of
military violence” (de Graaf, 1997c– trans. mine). Apostolides denied that the decision had been
made due to unilateral Greek action. “It was a decision of the Fifteen. It’s too crazy for words to
suggest that a small country like Greece can impose its will on to the others” (ibid – trans. mine).
Apostolides further argued that, in the long run, Greece would eventually be a proponent of Turkish
membership in the EU. Integration into Europe, he argued, is the best guarantee that Turkey will
behave less aggressively. The alternative is that Turkey will distance itself from Europe and behave more “irrationally” and thus more dangerously for Greece (ibid).

5.3.8 Ireland

The Irish position on Turkey was not particularly outspoken, save for Taoiseach John Bruton’s attendance at the EPP summit. While many of the other attendees of that conference were later drawn to recant their EPP position, Bruton’s government was turned out of office after the June General elections, which brought in Bertie Ahern, who continued to serve during the following four episodes of this study. Therefore it is unknown if Bruton would have recanted as the other EPP summiteers had done.

Only a few news articles mention the Irish position. On November 29, the Irish Times reported about a lobbying visit to Ireland by the Turkish State Minister for European Affairs, Prof. Dr. Sükrü Sina Gürel, who argued against Klaus Kinkel’s position that Turkey might join in the ‘unforeseeable future’, asserting that Turkey must have prospects in the foreseeable future. The Irish Times reported that this was also the position of the Irish government (Gillespie, 1997a).

At the Luxembourg summit, the Irish Times reported that the Irish government was “strongly with the includes” concerning the commitment made to both Turkey and the Eastern European Countries not selected for accession negotiations, to keep them in the enlargement process (Smyth, 1997). Ireland, however, did embrace the Commission’s distinction made at the time between the ‘Luxembourg-six’ countries and the other applicants.

Nicholas Rees of the International Affairs Committee at the Royal Irish Academy in Dublin also failed to highlight the Irish debate on Turkey in his annual account of Irish foreign policy (Rees, 1998). This indicates that Turkey’s prospects were not high on Ireland’s foreign policy agenda. Ireland did vote with the majority in favor of inviting Turkey to the European Conference, but on the whole, Ireland is judged to be a ‘passenger’ on the issue.

5.3.9 Italy

The Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi was the first EPP leader who recanted the anti-Turkish membership position at the March summit in Brussels (van Lambalgen, 1997). Not only was the
position recanted, but for the remainder of 1997 Italy was broadly seen as supportive of Turkish membership prospects and inclusion in the European Conference (Buckley, 1997; Mortimer, 1997b; Pijnappels & van Meteren, 1997; “Strijd,” 1997.)

At the October meeting of the foreign ministers in Montdorf-les-Bains, Lamberto Dini asserted that, “Turkey would become a member of the Union” (James, 1997a). At the Luxembourg summit, Italy again debated on Turkey’s behalf, joining the Dutch and French positiona (de Jong, 1997). After the summit, Dini argued that the summit’s conclusions had been insulting to Turkey and said he regretted that the Luxembourg presidency had chosen to side with Greece (“Turquie + Ankara,” 1997). In the aftermath Turkey threatened to boycott goods from all member states, save Italy, France and the United Kingdom, because they had been supportive of Turkey’s aspirations (Barham, 1997g) Thus, Italy is considered a driver of Turkish membership in 1997.

5.3.10 Luxembourg

In the second half of 1997, Luxembourg held the rotating presidency. As such, its statements need to be read, to a certain degree, from the position of representing all the member states. However, to some degree, Luxembourg also put its own stamp on its proposals and its statements, which were at odds with the balance of member-state opinions. Given the tone in which Luxembourg’s Prime Minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, conducted the face-to-face meetings with his Turkish counterpart, Yılmaz, and made his statements to the press (see below), Luxembourg is considered a brakeman.

Juncker was also present at the EPP summit, where he had been one of the most explicit heads of government, who had been cited saying that “Turkey's accession to EU must be viewed with significant caution” (“Christdemokratische,” 1997 – trans. mine). Between the March EPP summit and the Luxembourg summit in December, not much news was reported about Luxembourg’s own position on Turkey. However, in the week prior to the Luxembourg summit, Juncker, reportedly, had three difficult meetings with Yılmaz that soured the relationship between the two (Bogaerts & de Graaf, 1997; Walker, 1997b).

At the close of the summit, Juncker made an off-the-cuff remark to the BBC that was widely reported and created a rhetorical incident that infuriated Ankara. When asked about Turkey’s prospects, Juncker answered that “There is no comparison between Turkey and the 11 other
applicant countries. No one is tortured\textsuperscript{25} in those countries," (Bremner, 1997b; “EU-Gipfel,” 1997; “EU-Regierungschefs,” 1997). Other post-summit remarks that illustrate Juncker’s position are:

We cannot admit to the EU a country which has border disputes with another member state.

(Walker, 1997b)

Europe is saying 'No' to the entrance of Turkey without (Turkey) fulfilling the conditions all the applicants have to meet ... Human rights have to be respected everywhere. We are not a club of Christians, but we are a club where human rights have to be considered. We have our public opinion too, and we are accountable to them. Other applicants have taken steps to resolve their border disputes.

(ibid).

Europe is not a Christian club, but one with high standards.

(Gillespie, 1997b; James, 1997b)

At the table of the European Union there can be no countries in which people are tortured. Human rights are not a sensitive subject for poets. This has to do with real life. I receive people in my office, their relatives or they themselves were tortured. This issue has a face for me.

(Berger, 1997b; “Der Krieg,” 1997 – trans. mine; Gillespie, 1997b)

These remarks, were uncommonly blunt for an EU Presidency, and could hardly be considered representative of the other member states’ opinions (Bogaerts & De Graaf, 1997). Paris and London, for instance, were not pleased with these remarks, and the Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini argued that the Presidency had chosen to favor Greece over Turkey in the debate during the summit (Docquiert, 1997b; “Turquie + Ankara,” 1997).

Previously, during the Presidency’s preparation for the summit, however, Luxembourg’s social-democratic foreign minister, Jacques Poos, had sounded optimistic on the prospect of reaching a deal, while the other foreign ministers were less sanguine about such an outcome (van Meteren, 1997; “Strijd,” 1997)\textsuperscript{26}. The ‘wise man’ committee, proposed and agreed to, under the preceding Dutch presidency, also failed to make any headway during Luxembourg’s presidency. At the end of the summit, Poos also declared that Turkey would not be offered any further concessions, implying that Turkey had been offered any concessions to begin with (”EU-Regierungschefs,” 1997).

\textsuperscript{25} According to the CIRI reports, more torture has happened in the member and candidate countries than Juncker is suggesting in his remarks contrasting Turkey from the others.

\textsuperscript{26} 1997, incidentally was Jacques Poos’ third EU Presidency, having previously served in that capacity in 1991 and 1985. As such, it cannot be thought of as uninformed optimism on his part.
5.3.11 Netherlands

During 1997, the Netherlands was an outspoken driver of Turkish membership. Throughout its EU presidency during the first six months of the year, Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo, together with his fellow countryman Christian Democrat Hans van den Broek of the European Commission, continually attempted to reassure Turkey of the EU’s open-minded intentions toward its membership prospects.

After the EPP summit, Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok, declared that he was surprised by the EPP statement and that the Netherlands, and therewith the Presidency, did not support the exclusion of Turkey from EU membership (Coenraadts, 1997). Van Mierlo called the EPP statement “unwise” (van Lambalgen, 1997). Van Mierlo, in the Presidency capacity, was one of the diplomatic architects of the Apeldoorn meeting, in which France presented its proposal for a European Conference. In late March, van Mierlo also published an op-ed in the International Herald Tribune as well as the New York Times, wherein he stated:

One of the basic principles of the Union is that membership is open to every European country which meets the stated criteria. Turkey, for instance, has a long way to go before it meets the criteria for full membership. Yet I am firmly convinced that it is in Europe’s interest to keep the door open and help Turkey overcome its internal problems.

(Van Mierlo, 1997)

Van Mierlo further initiated a diplomatic attempt to solve the Aegean problem, in order to remove that obstacle from Greek-Turkish relations and therefore EU-Turkish relations (van der Velden, 1997b). At the Association council, the Dutch Presidency was asked to continue its role as honest broker (Barber, 1997c).

In October, at the Mondorf-les-Bains meeting of the foreign ministers, van Mierlo was one of the foreign ministers joining his Italian and French colleagues Lamberto Dini and Hubert Védrine in arguing that Turkish participation in the European Conference was “very much desired”, when this issue was still the subject of heated debate (“Strijd,” 1997). To a newspaper correspondent he said that Europe should “think thrice before sending negative signals to Turkey. This is playing with fire”, as Islamic fundamentalism is on the horizon and Turkey’s membership should be valued (de Graaf, 1997b; van Meteren, 1997 – trans. mine). When, in November, Germany signaled that it would not veto Turkish participation in the conference, Van Mierlo called it “a little bit of profit”, but was still worried over Greek intransigence (“Bonn staat,” 1997).
As mentioned before, the Netherlands, it seems, was the most outspoken proponent of Turkish participation in the conference without the Greek conditions. One Dutch diplomat complained that the Greeks had hijacked the Council and that it was futile for the Netherlands to be the only member state to speak in favor of Turkey, without strong French and Italian support. He complained that the neophyte Blair had been cowed into diminishing his support by his defeat over a different issue the previous day (Bogaerts & de Graaf, 1997; de Jong, 1997).

5.3.12 Portugal

At the EPP meeting, Portuguese opposition leader Marcelo Reblo de Sousa of the center-right Social Democratic Party (PDS) criticized the argument of the drivers that Turkey might veto NATO enlargement if it was kept out of the EU, pointing out that the EU should not give in to such blackmail (“Turkey accused,” 1997). “Human rights are very far from being respected in Turkey,” he added as counter-argument (Kinzer, 1997).

To show that Turkey’s accession may not have been of particular interest to Portugal, several articles (e.g. Berger 1997a; 1997b) mention how both Portugal and Spain lobbied on behalf of their allotments under the EU’s redistributive policies (the Regional Policy and the Common Agricultural Policy), with their concern that the eastward enlargement might threaten the amounts of money they would receive through those policies. By contrast, there is scant evidence of Portugal’s stance toward Turkey. It seems likely that the diplomatic effort to maintain the subsidies, as far as Lisbon was concerned, overshadowed any position it might have taken on Turkey.

After the Luxembourg summit, when Turkey expressed its displeasure with the decision and threatened to boycott imports from member states, Portugal was not mentioned among the exceptions of countries that were considered sympathetic - France, Italy and the United Kingdom (Barham, 1997g). Although this is not the clearest indication of Portugal’s ‘unsympathetic’ position, given the apparent silence from Portugal, it is assumed that Portugal did not have a public position on Turkey and that it was preoccupied with the pecuniary matters. Therefore, Portugal is considered a passenger in the debate over Turkey.
5.3.13 Spain

The position of Spain was ambivalent. Prime Minister Aznar was one of the attendees of the EPP summit, but Spain was also one of the countries mentioned by the Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller as being particularly cooperative after the Apeldoorn meeting (Santing, 1997). It should be added here that Greece had also been part of Çiller’s favorites in this regard as Greece did not have principled reservations, but conditional ones, and therefore did not intrinsically oppose the prospect of Turkey joining.

Yet, in a November interview in ‘El País’, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodor Pangalos identified Spain as one of those countries (along with Sweden and Denmark) that were still opposed to Turkish participation in the European Conference, even after Germany had relented (Martinez de Rituerto, 1997). Yet in an interview with the same newspaper less than two weeks later, Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz expressed his pleasant surprise about Aznar being cooperative, asserting that Spain had always been an ally in regard to Turkish integration in Europe. He further, highlighted Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales’ role during the Spanish EU Presidency of (2nd half of) 1995, which had resulted in the EU customs union with Turkey (Sanz, 1997).

In spite of the above-mentioned conflicting testimony of Spain’s position, the Spanish government was not eager to have Turkey as a EU member, but, along with other countries, it also seemed reluctant to send Turkey a negative message and risk a diplomatic fallout on other fronts (Mortimer, 1997b). Given this policy of ambivalence and a relative silence in the journalistic records, Spain is coded as a ‘passenger’.

5.3.14 Sweden

During the European Council at Luxembourg in October, Sweden joined Germany and Greece in maintaining that Turkey should be excluded from the European Conference (de Graaf, 1997b). As already mentioned under the Denmark heading, Sweden called for the annual review of all ten candidate countries, in order to continually assess their eligibility for membership, insisting that the enlargement process would be ‘inclusive and non-discriminatory’. This suggested that Turkey’s
eligibility for membership would be judged on its own merits, rather than possible prejudice of the member states to keep Turkey out, for reasons other than the Copenhagen criteria (Barber, 1997c).

Sweden’s policy of opposition to Turkey was muted, while its policy attention was focused on opting for the ‘regratta’ model of enlargement. This would benefit Latvia and Lithuania, rather than have them separated from those eastern European countries that were making greater headway in the process, such as Estonia. This regatta model, articulated by Sweden and Denmark, clearly envisioned 11 applicants taking part, thus excluding Turkey (but implicitly including Slovakia). In spite of its muted opposition, Sweden was cited as being against Turkey’s inclusion both as a member of the EU because of human rights concerns, and in the European Conference. However, Sweden allowed Germany and Greece do the dirty work of forcing the issue with Turkey (de Graaf, 1997b; Martinez de Rituerto, 1997; Weymouth, 1997). Therefore Sweden is considered a ‘brakeman’

5.3.15 The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom was one of the principal ‘drivers’ of Turkish participation in the European Conference, which was to take place the following year at Buckingham Palace. At every instance during the debates, the United Kingdom supported Turkey’s application, both under the Major government until May, and the Blair government thereafter.

In February, the UK joined the Americans in calling for a renewed offer to Turkey of participating in the enlargement process, which Germany preferred to forestall (Dale, 1997). After the EPP summit, London expressed its view that the Christian-democratic leaders had gone too far with their statement rejecting Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership, and that Turkey’s application should be “taken seriously” (Clarke, 1997). At Apeldoorn, the UK joined France in its European Conference proposal, contradicting Germany’s opposition thereto (“Turkije maakt,” 1997; Wynia, 1997).

Britain was, however, insistent that Turkey demonstrate its cooperation in solving the Cyprus dispute, with Doug Henderson, Foreign Office Minister for Europe, saying that “if they don’t co-operate on other things and don’t put pressure on [Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf] Denktash to get meaningfully into negotiations on Cyprus there’ll be a lot of people unhappy, including ourselves,” adding, “There has to be a carrot for Turkey to be co-operative on other issues,
principally to try and get some progress on Cyprus,” and, “We feel that joining this Europe Conference is a plum for them. It opens the way for other plums down the line” (Black, 1997).

In October, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook attempted to reign in Labour MEPs’ comments on human rights in Turkey. Cook had, however, articulated the same critical stance during the previous government while serving as shadow foreign secretary in the parliamentary shadow government of the Labor party. This caused rebellion among half of Labour’s MEPs. The move was intended to release the customs union financial package through the European Parliament (Hencke, 1997). For the remainder of the year and during the summit, the United Kingdom continued to press for Turkish inclusion in the conference, which it hoped would give Turkey “a realistic sense of hope that they are not being excluded” (Walker, 1997a – further evidence in Barham, 1997g; Binyon, 1997; Bremner, 1997a; Buckley, 1997; Mortimer, 1997b).

5.4 SUMMARY

Overall, 1997 seemed a bad year for Turkish prospects to participate in European integration, with Denmark’s indictment of human rights abuses, the military memorandum of February 28th, and a hostile declaration by powerful leaders of the largest political party group in the European Parliament. Fortunately for the Turks, many of those leaders later backed away from the EPP declaration that had offered the Turks ammunition to accuse Europe of being discriminatory against Turkey for its overwhelmingly Muslim population.

Citing unacceptable degrees in failing to meet the Copenhagen political criteria, as well as economic instability27, the Commission had made a distinction between Turkey and the other applicants who had not been chosen to begin accession negotiations in 1998. Among them was Slovakia, which was also designated as not having met the political criteria. The Luxembourg presidency conclusions determined that the political criteria needed to be met before accession negotiations could begin, thus establishing a rule for the enlargement regime. Given Estonia’s failure to fully provide citizenship rights to Russian speakers, however, suggested that there was nevertheless a sliding scale that was subject to political determination. Furthermore, the rhetoric of

27 The economic criteria were not critical for the rejection of candidate status or participation in accession negotiations.
equal treatment aside, the EU did distinguish between Slovakia and Turkey, bringing Slovakia into a pre-accession framework that Turkey was left out of, despite both failing to meet the political criteria.

Among the member states, Greece and Germany (in the ample shape of Helmut Kohl) proved to be the dominant brakemen, with other, less prominent, brakemen willing to allow Athens and Bonn to take the brunt of Ankara’s diplomatic ire. In the end, Germany relented about Turkish participation in the European Conference, while Greece had threatened to veto, unless its demands regarding Cyprus and the Aegean territorial dispute were met. In the end, Greece did not veto, but the rhetoric – coming mostly from the Luxembourg presidency – sufficiently angered the Turks that they rejected the conclusions.

The rhetoric aside, however, the Luxembourg conclusions did not withhold the recognition that the Helsinki conclusions offered in the form of official candidacy. The Luxembourg conclusions affirmed Turkey’s right to become a member of the EU, provided it meet the Copenhagen criteria, a stipulation that was not any less true in any of the conclusions of the subsequent episodes.
6.0 HELSINKI, 1999

The following episode concerns the second half of 1999. In October 1998 the Commission had begun publishing annual assessments of the applicant states, including Turkey, and their progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria. In response to these reports, the European Council had begun regularly putting enlargement questions on their agenda for the December Council meetings. As one of the applicants – an unusually large and attention-grabbing candidate – this also meant that the Council could not avoid responding to Turkey’s bid for membership.

This and the following chapters will lead off with a listing of political changes in the member states. Like the previous chapters, it will offer a narrative on the sequence of events, discuss the particular issues that were important at some greater length, and then analyze, case-by-case, the policies of each of the member states.

6.1 POLITICAL CHANGES

The member-state governments in 1999 were not all the same as they had been two years prior. The following bullets highlight the changes in the member-state governments:

- In Turkey, Bulent Ecevit, the Prime Minister who in 1974 had ordered the invasion of Cyprus, replaced Mesut Yilmaz as prime minister after the April 1999 elections. İsmail Cem remained as Foreign Minister.
- In late 1998, the German CDU/CSU-FDP government of Helmut Kohl and Klaus Kinkel was replaced by the Red-Green (SDP-Grünen) coalition of Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer.
- In Belgium Guy Verhofstad became prime minister after defeating Jean-Luc DeHaene’s Christian Democrats, with Louis Michel taking over foreign affairs from Erik Derycke.
This constituted a shift from a Christian-democratic government with socialist support to one dominated by liberals with socialist and green support.

- Romano Prodi’s government, which was in power in 1997, had fallen in 1998, leaving Massimo D’Alema as the Prime Minister. Lamberto Dini remained Foreign minister.
- In Greece, Costas Simitis remained in power as Prime Minister. However, Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos resigned and was replaced by George Papandreou in February of 1999, following the capture of Abdullah Öcalan (see below).
- In Luxembourg, there was a coalition change after the June elections, wherein Lydie Dolfer of the Democratic Party took over as Foreign (and Vice-Prime) Minister from Jacques Poos. Jean-Claude Juncker remained prime minister.
- The Dutch government was renewed after the 1998, with the right-liberal Jozias van Aartsen taking over from the center-left-liberal Hans van Mierlo as foreign minister.
- In Sweden, Anna Lindh took over as Foreign Minister in 1998 from Lena Hjelm-Wallén, both social democrats.
- The governments in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom remained essentially unchanged.

6.2 THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The crucial events of the latter half of 1999 were several key meetings, a catastrophic earthquake in Turkey and another earthquake in Greece. Furthermore, the annual publishing of the Commission’s opinion on Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria, and the political maneuvering between that publication and the year-end summit, were particularly crucial for the expression and evolution of member state policies.

6.2.1 Cologne

By the Spring of 1999, the German policy toward Turkey had changed. Rather than following the Kohl policy of holding Turkey off from participating in EU enlargement, the Schröder government,
in its capacity of the rotating presidency of the EU, proposed restarting the process at the June 3-4 Cologne European Council. The Presidency’s draft text included two Turkey-related passages: one, a renewed invitation to a European Conference for aspiring member states that had not been selected for accession negotiations, and another offered Turkey a renewed perspective on membership (van Lierop, 1999a; “Euro maakt,” 1999).

Coinciding with Cologne, Bülent Ecevit, the new prime minister in Ankara, sent a letter to Gerhard Schröder, indicating that Turkey understood the need to meet the Copenhagen criteria in order to join the European Union. This letter was well received and a majority of the member states communicated its intention to acknowledge Turkey as an official candidate at the Helsinki meeting of 11-12 December (LeMaitre, 1999a). Despite Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK pressing forward movement on the issue, Greece voiced its objection, thus essentially maintaining the 1997 stalemate (James, 1999; van Lierop, 1999a; Smythe, 1999a).

As in the 1997 episode, Greece was again the most outspoken opponent, while, again, silently joined by other member states, now also including Italy (“Turkije voorlopig,” 1999). In addition to Italy, the Scandinavian countries were also cited as being opponents of immediate candidacy, given the death sentence of Abdullah Öcalan (van der Velden, 1999b – the article does not name the countries specifically; more on Öcalan, below). Due to this opposition, Germany dropped the passages from the proposal and the Cologne Presidency conclusions did not mention Turkey or its progress toward membership (European Council, 1999a).

### 6.2.2 The Izmit earthquake

A crucial development for Turkey’s prospects occurred on August 17th at 3:00am, when an earthquake struck the city of İzmit near Istanbul. The earthquake, measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale, killed around 17,000 people according to official figures, but nearer to 45,000 according to other estimates (Ansal, et al, 1999; Barka, 1999; Marza, 2004). Numerous regional countries, including Romania, Israel, Azerbaijan, Russia, as well as the United States, assisted the relief effort as did some EU member-states such as France, Germany, UK, Austria, Spain, and Italy (Tang, 2000, p. 259). Most remarkable, however, was the prominent level of Greek aid and Greece’s ability to be on the scene rapidly, assisting in Istanbul (Hinrichs, 1999a).
Not long after the earthquake, when the horror over the number of dead and wounded had sunk in, Spain made the declaration that in the up-coming EU Foreign Ministers meeting in Saariselkä, it would suggest granting Turkey candidate status. While this was not an entirely different development, given the earlier majority opinion of the majority at Cologne, it was a clear sign that Spain’s position toward Turkey would be more forward-leaning that it had previously been (“España Quiere,” 1999; van ’T Klooster, 1999). Italy, while having been critical at Cologne, rapidly followed suit (“Aardbeving brengt,” 1999; “Busquin Afgekeurd,” 1999; “Quice Estudian,” 1999; Hinrichs, 1999a).

On August 31st, Greece (under pressure from the other member states) agreed to lift its veto on the financial package of €150 million plus EIB loans to help Ankara deal with the earthquake damage (Paalvast, 1999). This was still short of the €375 million that had been promised as compensation for the Customs Union. Yannos Kranidiotis, the Greek deputy foreign minister, stipulated that this aid needed to be linked specifically to post-earthquake reconstruction (Buchan, 1999). He also made it clear that Greece was not prepared to agree to candidacy status for Turkey, the way that other member states were prepared to be (Hinrichs, 1999a). On September 1st, Ankara signaled that the current attempt at candidacy would also be Turkey’s last. It would not countenance another rejection. This, along with the impact of the earthquake added pressure through sympathy (Buchan, 1999). Britain immediately reiterated its support to the chorus in favor of Turkey’s candidacy (Hinrichs, 1999a).

6.2.3 Saariselkä

On 4-5 September, the EU Foreign Ministers met informally in Saariselkä, in Finnish Lappland. The venue allowed the foreign ministers to poll one another on their respective positions concerning a Turkish candidacy. On September 5th, the Greek government indicated a shift of its policy toward supporting an official Turkish candidacy for membership (“Greece supports,” 1999). In doing so, it joined Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands (“Grecia entreabre,” 1999). Despite this support, Greece maintained that Turkey needed to participate in a solution to the conflicts over Cyprus and Imía (Ferrari, 1999a; de Jong, 1999). Sweden, however, maintained its position on Turkey, insisting on a road map of conditions that it should meet prior to being accepted as a candidate (“Ministers bieden,” 1999; Norman, 1999a; Paalvast, 1999). After the
meeting, the Finnish presidency invited İsmail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister on behalf of the Council to attend a formal meeting in Brussels on September 13th, in order to negotiate the way forward (Paalvast, 1999).

In a peculiar twist of fate, a second earthquake struck Greece two days after the informal meeting in Lappland, with the epicenter in the northern Athens district of Achames. The earthquake, reading 6.0 on the Richter scale, killed 143 people and left 2000 wounded. A Turkish aid team was the first international disaster assistance to arrive on the scene. Furthermore, the Greek embassy and its consulates in Turkey were overwhelmed with offers of blood and organ donations. The following day, the liberal Turkish newspaper Milliyet headlined with “Perastika Gitona,” (“get well, neighbor” – in Greek), thus expressing its sympathy with the victims (Güngör, 1999). The press made a great deal of the tragedy of both earthquakes, resulting in the political rapprochement between the two countries (Hinrichs, 1999b; Hope, 1999). Behind the scenes, however, the foreign ministers, George Papandreou and İsmail Cem, had already begun a bilateral dialogue, thawing their animosity prior to the earthquakes (van der Velden, 1999b). That said, the tragedies undoubtedly facilitated an improvement of public opinion in both countries towards each other, which gave the political leaderships more room to maneuver.

6.2.4 The Commission’s Opinion

The Prodi Commission, presided over by the former Italian prime minister Romano Prodi, took office on 13 September, with the German Günter Verheugen as Enlargement Commissioner, after a brief stint as minister of state in the department of foreign affairs from 1998 to 1999. At his inaugural speech to the European Parliament, Prodi spoke of the Commission’s desire to firmly reject the ‘Clash of Civilizations’, and instead embrace a “partnership of cultures” (Commission, 1999). Verheugen was very keen on developing good relations between the EU and Turkey, putting the motivation rather bluntly: “Turkey is strategically the most important of the applicant countries. It's a top priority for Europe and for the US that Turkey is firmly anchored in the family of western democracies.” However, he also warned that Turkey would have to meet the same criteria as other accession candidates, with an emphasis on democracy and human rights issues. “There is no rebate [concession] for political and strategic importance,” Verheugen pointed out referring to his rejection of the cultural/civilizational clash. “I don't see the EU as a Christian club. The criteria are not
religious. The criteria are democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and so on” (Wagstyl & Norman, 1999).

During his address to the European Parliament on October 6, Verheugen declared his suggestion of candidacy status for Turkey to the European Council, provided Turkey would improve its human rights record and annul the execution of the Kurdish militant leader of the PKK (Kurish Worker’s Party) Abdullah Öcalan (van Lierop, 1999b). Verheugen’s proposal, however, ran into a snag in the European Parliament, where the members of the European Parliament (MEPs) voted against the proposal citing Turkey’s “democratic deficit” as the reason for their lack of support. The German Hans-Gert Pöttering, leader of the EPP said the time was not ripe yet for accession, although he also wanted “a Europe of peace and stability in clear and good partnership with Turkey,” adding: “Turkey does have a European vocation. But if we grant Turkey this status today what in the future can we say to Russia or the Ukraine if we refuse them the same status?” (O’Sullivan, 1999).

On October 13th, the Commission nevertheless published a composite paper on enlargement describing the different situations of the candidates and the steps each of them should take. It stated that: “Turkey has expressed the wish to be a candidate country and should be considered as such,” and “Turkey should now be considered as a candidate country, although there is no question of opening negotiations at this stage.” (Commission, 1999b, p. 11, 40) More broadly, the composite paper advised the Council to adopt the ‘Regatta’ model of enlargement for all candidates, wherein each of them could progress at their own pace, rather than in groups of negotiating countries and non-negotiating countries. One could read this as meaning that Turkey would be subject to the same treatment as other countries. This was not the case, however, as the other countries would all begin accession negotiations, while the Commission made it clear that Turkey was not yet ready to begin such negotiations. There would remain a difference in treatment between Turkey and the others.

6.2.5 Tampere

At the meeting of EU leaders in Tampere, Finland on October 15-16, the status of Turkey was discussed in preparation for the Helsinki summit in December (“Schröder will in Tampere,” 1999). In this meeting the German chancellor aimed at having the European Council reach an agreement to
adopt Turkey as an official candidate for EU membership, thus taking the lead in supporting Turkey’s candidacy (“Demirel Calls,” 1999; Halisdemir, 1999a).

With the support of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer argued that with Greece giving up its veto, there should be no more significant resistance to the proposal to designate Turkey as an official candidate (“Schröder setzt sich,” 1999). Greece, however, still desired some concessions, while Sweden and Luxembourg continued to offer counter voices (“Asylfrage trennt,” 1999; “EU uneinig,” 1999; Kemmer, 1999; Kools, 1999; Middel, 1999c). At the conclusion of the meeting the Finnish presidency declared, in speaking to the press, that Turkey would be granted the candidacy status that it had been refused two years ago28, but that the Council still required “some positive signals from Turkey” (“EU leitet,” 1999 – trans. mine). The Tampere Presidency conclusions, themselves, did not mention Turkey, or its progress toward membership (European Council, 1999b).

6.2.6 Before the Helsinki summit

On the December 1st, Schröder met separately with the French and Spanish leaders Jacques Chirac and José Maria Aznar to discuss various issues, including the question of Turkey (Hehn, 1999; “Schröder Viaja,” 1999). They agreed on firming up Turkish candidacy, but left the particular decisions to the heads of state and government at the upcoming Helsinki summit. Other than a statement from the Spanish Foreign Minister Abel Matutes about how Turkish candidacy would benefit the stay of execution of Öcalan, the discussion had centered mainly on the Greco-Turkish dispute and the situation of Cyprus (“La UE Abrira,” 1999).

Meanwhile, the European Parliament, like other actors, highlighted the need for political reforms, prior to the commencement of negotiations, passing its own resolution concerning Turkey as follows:

[The European Parliament] takes note of Turkey's eligibility to apply for membership of the European Union; emphasises, however, that negotiations cannot be opened because Turkey is still nowhere near from meeting the political criteria of Copenhagen; insists that, as a candidate country, Turkey must make clear and verifiable progress in meeting those criteria, especially regarding human rights and the rights of minorities; a clear road map,

28 Which it had not, as there had been no such thing as ‘official candidacy’.
containing an overview of the measures to be taken by Turkey and the way in which the necessary reforms will be achieved, must therefore be developed;...

(European Parliament, 1999).

The European Parliament, like other actors, highlighted the need for political reforms, prior to the commencement of negotiations. The resolution had been approved by 265 votes in favor to 102 against. There were 73 abstentions. An amendment calling on Turkey to show “clear signs of progress” on human rights was approved by 322 votes with 133 against and 10 abstentions. In separate votes, the EU assembly approved economic aid for Turkey worth 150 million euros over three years. The parliament rejected an attempt by Danish deputy Pernille Frahm to block the aid because of the death sentence handed down to Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan (“EU Parliament recognizes,” 1999). Just after the European Parliament vote, Ecevit declared his intention to abolish the death penalty in Turkey. “It is clear that the capital punishment cannot go with EU membership,” Ecevit said, calling the two a “contradiction.” “God willing, we will overcome this contradiction soon,” he said (Hacaoğlu, 1999).

6.2.7 Helsinki

According to one source from anonymous interviews, the agreement was made within fifteen minutes without serious debate, given that the politics had been agreed upon prior to the summit. The presidency conclusions of the Helsinki European Council of 11-12 of December declared Turkey’s candidate status as official. The headline statement was:

**Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.**

(European Council, 1999c, par. 12)

However, as always, the devil is in the details. Also in the conclusions was the following paragraph, which qualified the conditions of membership:

The **European Council reaffirms the inclusive nature of the accession process, which now comprises 13 candidate States within a single framework. The candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing. They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European**
Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.

(European Council, 1999c, par. 4)

The inclusion of the ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’ clause has been seen as a natural condition of membership, but it was not a part of the specific political Copenhagen criteria. Given that the Cyprus and Aegean Sea disputes were disputes that needed to be settled by Turkey and Greece, and that the other candidate countries – with the critical exception of Cyprus – did not have such disputes with one another or with member states, this clause essentially erected a barrier for Turkey’s membership that did not exist for the other members. Coupled with Greece’s vociferous support for Cypriot membership, and its willingness to threaten with its unilateral veto, this clause meant that Turkey’s candidacy was not subject to the same rules, even if the stipulation for the peaceful settlement of disputes is or seems like a very reasonable one. Furthermore, Cyprus’ acceptance as a member in 2004 without which the division of the island was resolved suggests that the rule was not equally applied.

The EU’s leaders, however, were euphoric. The Council’s Secretary General (and foreign policy chief) Javier Solana and Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen directly boarded Chirac’s Presidential airplane to bring the good news to Ankara. That news had already been relayed to Prime Minister Ecevit by Schröder, and to President Süleyman Demirel by Chirac, while the Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen had telephoned the news in to US President Bill Clinton, who in turn, had also called Ecevit (Dausend, 1999). The Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok could not “envision a better finale to the millennium” than Turkey’s acceptance as a candidate (Kockelmans, 1999).

The EUphoria was, however, not shared by the Turks themselves, who had read the fine print about the requirements of resolving their problems with Cyprus and their border dispute with Greece. If they would fail to reach a negotiated resolution on the latter, they would be required to bring the case before the International Court of Justice (“Türkei reagiert zurückhaltend,” 1999). In effect, the deal for the Turks was only different from what had been determined at Luxembourg two years earlier was that they could now call themselves ‘candidates’ in stead of just a ‘country with a European destiny’. The Aegean dispute and the Cyprus situation still had to be solved by the January
2005 deadline. Given that Turkey’s position was for a negotiated settlement, and the positions of Greece and (Greek) Cyprus were for international arbitration, the additional timetable was only in the favor of the latter two.

From the perspective of relative gains, Turkey became even more distinct from the other candidates. The Helsinki European Council had decided that accession negotiations were set to begin with all of the Eastern European countries that had been left out by the Luxembourg summit in 1997, now joined by Malta, which had unfrozen its candidacy for membership. In that regard, the other countries were able to pull ahead faster, and participate in EU financial aid packages, which Turkey was not able to.

The primary difference was in the tone. At Luxembourg, Turkey had been grudgingly and provisionally accepted in the text, but publicly been called ‘torturers’ by Luxembourg’s prime minister. At Helsinki, Turkey was offered essentially the same deal, only now it was decorated with a ribbon that had ‘official candidacy’ written on it. Furthermore, the European leaders, as well as Bill Clinton, created an atmosphere of excitement, urging the Turks to consider this a great victory for Turkey. Much, if not all, of it was political theater (Peel, 1999). Nevertheless, in the end, Turkey accepted Helsinki where they had rejected Luxembourg. Subsequently, when Turkey’s ‘European-ness’ has been questioned, either on religious, cultural and/or geographic grounds, Turkey’s defenders have pointed to Helsinki and not Luxembourg or any of the EEC/EU’s other statements regarding Turkey.

6.3 ISSUES

During the 1999 episode, there were several issues that were of particular consequence for the Helsinki decision: the Öcalan affair, human rights concerns, and – again – the question of Cyprus and the Aegean. These issues are considered in the sections below.

6.3.1 Abdullah Öcalan & the PKK

In 1999, the case of the Kurdish militant political leader Abdullah Öcalan, who had been sentenced to death in Turkey, presented the EU member states with a conundrum. The question of the Kurds,
being the largest linguistic/cultural minority in Turkey, and the conflict with the Kurdish separatist movement, spearheaded by the terrorist PKK, was salient, given the protection of minorities as one of the political Copenhagen criteria. Öcalan’s case became particularly important with all the attention it received in the press with European leader urging Turkey’s disavowal of the death penalty in light of the severe crimes he had been convicted of. Many member states asserted that candidacy would be difficult, if not impossible, to envision for Turkey, should it execute Öcalan.

Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the separatist Kurdish guerilla movement PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party), and his band had been operating out of Syria. After his expulsion from Syria in 1998, they had moved to Russia, Italy and finally Kenya, where Turkish special forces caught him just after leaving the Greek embassy in Nairobi on February 15th 1999. His trial before a military court began on May 31st, and he was sentenced to the death penalty by a civilian court a month later. Following the trial, the PKK declared a unilateral cease-fire on September 1st (Boulton, 1999). The Turkish military also struck a conciliatory tone, arguing that the Kurds demanded cultural rights, rather than federalization along with some measure of autonomy from Ankara (ibid).

The Öcalan incidents caused a shake-up in the Greek government because its embassy in Kenya had harbored him prior to his capture, resulting in the resignation of Foreign Minister Pangalos and the interior and justice ministers. It also caused a further souring of stressed relations between Turkey and Italy when the latter had refused the former’s request for Öcalan’s extradition upon his arrest in Italy in 1989. Further, Germany also disappointed Ankara by giving in to pressure from Kurdish protestors, rescinding its arrest-warrant for Öcalan on charges of PKK terrorist attacks in Germany (Uwer, 1999).

On November 25th, just three weeks prior to the Helsinki summit, the Turkish court of appeal still upheld the execution order, about which the German ambassador in Ankara commented that if Öcalan were executed, “Turkey can forget about Helsinki” (Meixler, 1999 – trans. mine). Verheugen’s spokesman said: “We expect that this death penalty is not carried out. We would like to remind Turkey as well as other candidate countries that we expect them to withdraw the death penalty if they want to become member states” (Morris & Paterson, 1999).

At the same time, the Turkish government in Ankara was also under great domestic pressure to carry out the execution. In that regard, Öcalan’s lawyers vowing to take their case to the European Court of Human Rights gave the government some breathing space at least until after Helsinki. Furthermore, the execution – a penalty which Turkey had not carried out since 1984 –
required the assent of both the Parliament and the President, which kept the case in political rather than judicial hands, following a political timeline rather than a legal one.

The European governments, meanwhile, took the opportunity to pressure Turkey into not carrying out the execution. France, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Spain and Greece in particular took pains to urge Ankara not to put Öcalan to death (Bentley, 1999; “La UE Abrira,” 1999). Given the European pressure and the human-rights requirements of EU membership, Öcalan’s execution was stayed until the death penalty itself was abolished in 2002, when Öcalan’s sentence was commuted to life-long aggravated imprisonment on İmralı island in the Sea of Marmara.

6.3.2 Human Rights Concerns

On July 8th, The European Court of Human Rights condemned Turkey for 15 serious violations of fundamental human rights. Strasbourg’s judgments related to torture, the deaths of Kurds, and the violation of freedom of expression of journalists. These were all in connection with the conflict between the Turkish government and the Kurdish separatist movement (“Bonn pläidiert,” 1999). On September 6th, further, the President of the Turkish appeals court declared that the Constitution of 1980 (which had been written by the military, following the coup d’etat of that year) had “close to zero” legitimacy, and it required a major overhaul. While this was not a novel declaration by a Turkish judge, the difference this time was that Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit endorsed it and pledged reform (Boulton, 1999). This was a sign of prospective reform in accordance with the political Copenhagen criteria.

However, Turkey still had severe shortcomings. The Commission, which had begun its annual reports in 1998, still highlighted many human-rights failings. It related the reports of widespread existence of torture, disappearances and extra-judicial executions. Most cases of torture took place in police custody and the Commission judged the reports to be “so precisely documented that there [could be] no doubt about the responsibility of the police authorities” (Commission, 1998). It reported that enforcement of anti-torture laws were lax due to the ability of the administrative authorities to withhold permission for a trial to go forward and the light sentences imposed on officers even when these were found guilty of mistreatment of prisoners.

In 1999, the Commission reported that this situation had not substantially changed. It did, however, highlight some shifts in policy that seemed hopeful. A particular case coming out of the
western city of Manisa involving the torture of teenagers was selected for a retrial of police officers previously acquitted of torture.29 Further, the Constitutional Court annulled a legal provision permitting certain security officers to shoot forewarned fleeing suspects. Also, the Turkish parliament adopted a law redefining torture, ill treatment and abuse of power with the prospect of stiffer penalties for public officials and medical professionals drafting fake reports (Commission, 1999c, p. 11).

In addition to human rights concerns, the Commission also highlighted many civil rights concerns, most of which also related to Turkey’s reaction to Kurdish separatism. 1999 saw several of instances of civil rights transgressions. In February, the Turkish Constitutional Court had ordered the closure of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Mass Party (DKP) on grounds of promotion of separatism. In March, the minister of justice issued a communiqué to Governors to be zealous in identifying associations, foundations, publications, individuals and organizations that are likely to take initiatives in favor of Öcalan.

Aside from the campaign to thwart Kurdish separatism, or the political development of a Kurdish identity, Turkey’s ‘deep state’ establishment (mostly manifested in the top echelons of the military and judiciary) also sought to protect Turkish secularism from political Islam. The 1997 ‘post-modern’ coup has already been discussed in the previous chapter. In January 1998 the Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party had been banned in name of protecting the secular state. In May 1999, proceedings begun to likewise ban the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, also accused of seeking to undermine the secular state, which proceeded to court later in the year (Commission, 1999c, p. 8). Fazilet would eventually be banned in 2001 in time for the 2002 parliamentary elections.

6.3.3 Cyprus & the Aegean

Cyprus was back on the table again in 1999, taking up most of the debate concerning Turkey. The question was whether or not Cyprus could become a member of the Union while it remained divided between the Greek and Turkish communities. The challenge was to find a formulation that

29 The case, stemming from 1995, involved 15 teenagers and their teacher accused of throwing a Molotov cocktail at a hairdresser's salon, illicitly putting up political posters, and membership in DHKP/C, a Marxist-Leninist group internationally recognized as a terrorist organization. The torture victims were subjected to degrading treatment and torture such as being blindfolded, stripped naked, hosed with cold water and given electric shocks (“The Manisa trial,” 1997). Ultimately, in 2002, the accused officers would be convicted of torture and sentenced to 60-130 months in prison (Yıldız & McDermott, 2004).
would satisfy Athens without alienating Ankara. The British proposed that the lack of a negotiated settlement on the island’s division should not prevent Cyprus from accession to the European Union. This solution for Cyprus met Greece’s demand that Cyprus’ accession would not be delayed. France and the Netherlands opposed this formulation, considering it too much in Athens’ favor (Peel, 1999; de Vries, 1999).

When the negotiations briefly reached the level of the Heads of State and Government, the Dutch prime minister, Wim Kok, insisted that a divided country could never join the Union. However, Chirac’s supposed persuasion by Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis meant that “a deal could be done for Europe” and a divided Cyprus could join the European Union if the communities on the island, and their supporters in Greece and Turkey, failed to resolve the thirty year-old conflict (Peel, 1999). What this meant was that Greece and Cyprus would eventually have no incentive to compromise on Cyprus, given that the ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’ clause would force Turkey would be a precondition of membership for Turkey, but not for Cyprus. Greece, of course, was already a member and could threaten its influence over other matters in the Council – notably, the broader enlargement process – in order to ease the way in for Cyprus.

Regarding the Aegean Sea territorial dispute, both Portugal and Sweden supported the Greek position in bringing the case before the International Court of Justice (“Les Quinze,” 1999). In effect, this attempted to inculcate a time clock for Turkey to make a deal with Greece, otherwise the matter would wind up before the court in The Hague. Given that legal arbitration was already the Greek preference and Greece could fail to make a deal with Turkey, it meant that Turkey would have to calculate what outcome would be less harmful to its interests; conceding to Greek demands or allowing the Court to determine the outcome.

At the time of writing, the dispute remains unsolved, despite accession negotiations having begun. Negotiations between Greece and Turkey were halted in 2004 when Greece unilaterally pulled out of the talks. This happened following the change of government in Athens, which brought Costas Karamanlis of the New Democracy party to power. Since then, however, the Aegean Sea dispute has not been the topic of vociferous conversation with implications for Turkish membership.
6.4 THE MEMBER-STATE POSITIONS

The remainder of the chapter again looks at the specific positions of each of the member states. Again they are determined as being drivers, who were supporters of Turkey’s bid for membership, brakemen, who were antagonistic to progressing that bid for membership, and passengers, whose policies were too opaque to discern or indifferent on the matter.

6.4.1 Austria

During the early fall of 1999, Austria was in the throes of the parliamentary elections that brought Jörg Haider’s anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic FPÖ party to 27% of the vote, at second place after Chancellor Klima’s social-democratic SPÖ and ahead of Foreign Minister Schüssel’s ÖVP. The results of these elections, held on October 3rd, created an awkward coalition-making environment. Viktor Klima had made a commitment not to form a government with the FPÖ, while Wolfgang Schüssel had made the promise that if his party would end up in third place (which it did by some 400 votes), he and his party would not join a coalition government (Müller, 2000). Although the FPÖ campaign itself had not placed much emphasis on immigration issues, Jörg Haider’s past statements on foreigners and Islam, along with his perceived sympathy for Nazism (or at least Nazi labor policies), created an atmosphere of heightened concern.

Also, Austrian public opinion on the prospect of Turkey joining the EU was among the most vehemently opposed (62% against, trailing Greece with 69% and Luxembourg with 64%)(Eurobarometer, 2000). This made Turkey a tough issue for Chancellor Klima during his attempt to forge a coalition with Schüssel’s ÖVP, which he tried to keep out of the headlines (Blome, 1999b). This domestic political conundrum explains why very little was heard from Vienna about Turkey during the 1999 episode. For this reason Austria is considered a ‘passenger’ in 1999.

6.4.2 Belgium

In Belgium, the new Verhofstadt government took a more supportive role in the debates towards Turkey than that of his predecessor Jean-Luc DeHaene. At the Saariselkä meeting, Foreign Minister Louis Michel argued that Europe should open up to Turkey, but that Turkey also had to make
efforts to democratize the army’s role in politics and respect the Copenhagen criteria (“Ik wil niet,” 1999).

Both before and after the Helsinki summit, Belgium articulated reasons for its support. Just prior to the year-end meeting, Michel argued that Europe would miss a historical chance if it were to keep Turkey on the sidelines, and that the bar for its entry should be raised nor lowered for Turkey (“EU-staatshoofden,” 1999; “Greece says Finland,” 1999). After the summit, Guy Verhofstadt argued that the candidacy of Turkey represented a guarantee against it drifting off into Islamic fundamentalism (Bollenbach, 1999; Kockelmans, 1999). Arguing against the opposition to Turkish candidacy by European Christian-democrats stressing the loss of cultural identity, Louis Michel pointed out that Europe is “already multicultural,” (“Les democrates-chretiens,” 1999 – trans. mine).

Given the above, Belgium is considered a driver of Turkish membership prospects in 1999.

6.4.3 Denmark

During the 1999 episode, Denmark kept itself off the journalistic radar regarding the Turkish candidacy. It was sometimes grouped with other Scandinavian member states like Sweden and Finland insisting on human rights reforms and the annulment of Abdullah Öcalan’s death sentence (Binyon, 1999; van der Velden, 1999b). This in itself is no clear indication, since even Turkey’s own most ardent supporters of EU membership frequently referred to their country’s need to reform in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. During the 1999 episode Denmark is therefore considered a passenger.

6.4.4 Finland

In the role of the Presidency, Finland made the press far more than the other small (and Scandinavian) countries. Although it did so in a role of a low-key non-politicized ‘honest broker’, it did have its share in maintaining the pro-Turkish momentum that had begun at Cologne and paved the way for other countries to overcome the remaining opposition to Turkey’s bid for candidacy. At the very least, the Finnish Presidency was very tight-lipped about its pre-summit diplomacy to other member-states, in order to prevent multiple diplomatic initiatives possibly interfering with one another (de Vries, 1999).
As part of maintaining the momentum, Foreign Minister Halonen expressed at the outset of the presidency period her confidence that under the Finnish presidency talks with Turkey would continue (“Finnland; Jetzt,” 1999). In spite of its neutral position, it did receive criticism during the summer by the CDU opposition in the German Bundessrat accusing the Finnish Presidency of creating false expectations for Turkey when the candidacy might prove to be fruitless. (“Pflüger kritisiert,” 1999).

However, before, during and after the Saariselkä meeting in September, Finland’s role was reported as ambiguous. Finland was seen as part of the Scandinavian bloc that insisted on the observance of human rights norms (Middel, 1999a; van der Velden, 1999b). Yet, that perception did not make clear at what point in the process the Scandinavians would insisted when the Copenhagen criteria would need to be met: as a condition for candidacy status, for the start of accession negotiations, or by the time accession could conceivably happen. In this regard, only Sweden seemed to have taken the more strident position of compliance at the beginning of the process, while Finland was more permissive.

Finland was, nevertheless, quite clear that Abdullah Öcalan’s fate was directly connected to the acceptance of Turkey’s candidacy. Asked on Finnish television whether Mr. Öcalan's execution would end Turkey’s hopes of EU membership, the Finnish Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen replied: “I think that the possibility that Turkey could be accepted as a candidate (would be) over for a very long time” (Vipotnik, 1999). On the other hand, following the meeting, Halonen expressed the unanimity of the Fifteen in wanting to integrate Turkey into the European structures (Docquiert, 1999).

In 2004, the Finnish newspaper ‘Helsingin Sanomat’ published a previously undisclosed letter that Lipponen had written to Bülent Ecevit in 1999 at the time of the Helsinki summit. In the letter, Lipponen guaranteed that there would be no special conditions for Turkey. When asked about this letter by the Austrian Die Presse, Lipponen stressed that the Helsinki decision could not be reversed and that he had indeed promised to not require special conditions from Turkey. This, the Austrian newspaper wrote, would complicate efforts to impose permanent safeguards on immigration and agricultural subsidies, which were then being discussed (Leibl, 2004).

Distinguishing Finland’s policy between a passenger and a driver is empirically difficult. As Tiilikainen argues, it was a passenger by being neutral, i.e. by exhibiting the neutral disinterests of a passenger. Unlike the other passengers, however, Finland was in the role of the presidency, and in that role it capably performed the functions of enabling the pro-Turkey position to be expressed in
the Presidency Conclusions. The Irish Times’ Paul Gillespie reported that the Finnish presidency could take the major credit for the initiative and the delicate wording that phrased conditions of Turkey’s candidacy (Gillespie, 1999b).

Finland’s relatively neutral hosting was certainly in sharp contrast to both Luxembourg’s souring of the atmosphere two years prior, and Denmark’s use of its control over the conclusions text, three years later. It far more resembles the Dutch presidency, which adopted a ‘strict but fair’ policy, while working energetically behind the scenes to facilitate a decision in Turkey’s favor. It also resembles its own presidency in 2006, where its position as honest broker helped it to attempt to craft a solution to the Cyprus dispute, which would have helped Turkey’s candidacy, if that solution could have been realized at the time. This research will therefore respect Tiilikainen’s in-depth research in the matter, and designate Finland as a covert driver of Turkey’s candidacy aspirations.

6.4.5 France

In 1999, France continued to be a driver of Turkey’s membership prospects. Following the İzmit earthquake in August, President Chirac expressed his support for closer relations with Turkey (Hinrichs, 1999a). At the Saariselkä meeting in September, Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine countered Sweden’s insistence on Turkey meeting a list of preconditions prior to its candidacy, which resulted in Anna Lindh backing down from her Stockholm criteria (Paalvast, 1999). France’s position on enlargement in general also contrasted with those of other member states, who pressed for a concrete enlargement date for the other candidate countries, a move opposed by France as “inopportune” (“Bien qu’ils,” 1999; Middel, 1999a – trans. mine). This meant that France opposed creating an enlargement timeline that would further distinguish Turkey from the other candidates.

On the sidelines of the OSCE summit in Istanbul on the 17-19 November, Chirac, together with Schröder and Papandreou, expressed his continued support for granting Turkey candidacy status at Helsinki (“Diplomatisches Schulterklopfen,” 1999; Meixler). President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin met with Chancellor Schröder again on Tuesday, 30th November about various issues, whereby they also reaffirmed the offer of candidacy status to Turkey at Helsinki the following month, provided that some conditions were met (Hehn, 1999). After the Helsinki summit, Chirac was reported as being “delighted” with the result of Turkey’s full acceptance as a candidate with
equal rights and duties as other candidates. He added that, “Turkey, with its history, its geography and its ambitions is European” (Bollenbach, 1999 – trans. mine).

The press reports of France’s support were not unanimous, however. The Irish Times reported on October 18th that, according to “diplomatic sources...there were indications that the proposal to give Turkey candidate-member status [would] face French opposition at the Helsinki summit” (Smythe, 1999b). Given the singularity of this report, and the otherwise overwhelming journalistic reports of support from Paris, this article is not considered to accurately represent the interest of the French government. That said, once the summit was over, the Helsinki decision was met in France with a lot of criticism. Criticism came from the left because of human rights in Turkey and from the non-Gaullist right because of a undermining of European identity. Michelle Ariot-Marie, of the conservative Gaullist RPR party, on the other hand, defended the decision, arguing that the prospect of membership would anchor Turkey in modernity (“En France,” 1999).

6.4.6 Germany

With the formation of the Red-Green coalition of SPD-Grünen, the Federal government launched a change of orientation in German policy towards Turkey. At his first EU Foreign Ministers meeting the new foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, referred to Turkey as a candidate for EU membership, indicating this shift in German policy. It was also made a rule at the German Foreign Ministry, that “Turkey is an accession candidate” (Gnauck, 1999 – trans. mine). This, however, did not mean that Germany was distancing itself from the Copenhagen criteria.

At Cologne, Chancellor Schröder proposed two passages that, if adopted by the European Council, would have immediately rekindled the accession process for Turkey. With Greece opposing, Schröder opted to retract the proposed paragraphs altogether rather than offer a watered-down text (van Lierop, 1999a). Schröder clarified that the text did not imply an invitation to start accession negotiations, which could only begin if and when Turkey had met the political Copenhagen criteria (“Türkije voorlopig,” 1999).

In July, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Günter Verheugen (soon-to-be Enlargement Commissioner of the EU) reiterated the German position that Turkey ought to be named an official candidate for enlargement. Nevertheless, he also acknowledged that this was unlikely to happen at Helsinki and would not happen if Öcalan were to be executed (“Bonn plädiert,” 1999).
In July Joschka Fischer visited Turkey – the first German Foreign Minister’s visit to Ankara since his predecessor Klaus Kinkel’s visit two years prior. During his stay, Fischer highlighted the necessity for Turkey to meet the (political) Copenhagen criteria for the opening of accession negotiations. He particularly underlined the need for progress on human rights, the Kurds and Cyprus (“Schatten auf Fischers Besuch,” 1999). In September he argued that, “all interests are clear, that it is about a neighbor, whose drifting away can be in no one’s interest – not even Greece’s” (Weingärtner, 1999 – trans. mine).

A vexing matter in the Red-Green coalition was the sale of German Leopard II tanks to Ankara, supported by the SPD for its economic benefits, while the Greens opposed it in a matter of principle, fearing the tanks would be used against the Kurds (Leersch, 1999). This put the Turkish question front-and-center, especially in regards to its human and minority rights situation. Yet, while the Panzer question was a contentious one between the two governing parties (as well as between the CDU and CSU, incidentally – “Auch in der Union,” 1999), it did not impair the degree to which both desired candidacy status for Turkey at Helsinki.

Germany took particular care to frame Turkish membership as a process divorced from the question of religious identity. “Belonging to the Christian culture is not a condition for accession to the EU,” Verheugen said in mid-July (“Schreyer,” 1999). During his Turkey trip, Fischer also made clear that the EU was unmistakably a secular community of values in which there was room for atheists, Jews, Christians and Muslims. Implicit in his statement was the accusation that Kohl’s government had held the reverse opinion (Seidel, 1999a).

During this period, the political opposition in Germany – CDU, CSU, FDP – expressed their opposition to the policy of inviting Turkey to renew its membership bid (“Kritik an Fischers,” 1999; “Opposition gegen,” 1999; Seidel, 1999b). After Helsinki, the CDU and SCU decried the decision to grant Turkey candidacy status, arguing that it gave Turkey false hope, as it would never be able to meet the Copenhagen criteria (Blome, 1999c).

6.4.7 Greece

While Germany’s policy shifted from being a brakeman to a driver, Greece also shifted from being Turkey’s primary antagonist to one of the strongest drivers for its candidacy. The ‘earthquake diplomacy’ following the earthquakes in Turkey and Athens, allowed a warming of Greco-Turkish
relations due to popular sympathy for one another’s distress, and the mutual aid given in the earthquakes’ aftermaths (McLaren & Müftüler-Baç, 2003, p. 216, n. 10).

However, the desire to see a policy shift (by what countries?) in Turkey’s favor, had already been going on prior to the earthquakes (van der Velden, 1999b), whereby Greek-Turkish relations had (already) begun to thaw two months before the first earthquake during a meetings between the Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem and his Greek counterpart George Papandreou, resulting in their military cooperation - to some degree - during the NATO air campaign over Kosovo (Ferrari, 1999a; Gündoğdu, 2001). For the rest these bilateral discussions had concerned mostly trade, environment and cultural issues (Hinrichs, 1999a).

There had been several triggers to the earlier policy shift, of which the Öcalan debacle had been a major one. The diplomatic scandal of the discovery that the Greek had been harboring Öcalan, who was sought by Turkey for terrorist acts, had caused the resignation of the Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos and two other hard-line cabinet ministers. Pangalos was replaced with George Papandreou who, contrary to his father, the late Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, had more conciliatory policy ideas. Also, Greece needed to mend fences with the EU member states in order to further its case for joining the common currency (Ayman, 2002, p. 232-233).

While Greek relations with Turkey had been thawing before the earthquakes, Athens needed domestic support to put its policy shift into practice, which countered considerable opposition. A week prior to the İzmit earthquake Papandreou’s predecessor accused Papandreou of betraying Greek interests, while others were casting suspicions on Papandreou’s American citizenship (Kadritzke, 1999). The outpouring of public sympathy after the earthquake changed the outlook in both countries considerably, with the press leading the way. It allowed both Cem and Papandreou to claim being simply followers of public opinion, rather than being the initiators of the policy shifts (Buchan, 1999; Gündoğdu, 2001).

However, by early September, Greece made it known that it was not yet willing to retract its veto on Turkey’s candidacy status. In order to accept the candidacy, Papandreou demanded powerful concessions. Athens maintained that for Turkey to be considered a candidate Ankara would have to ensure the involvement of the Turkish Cypriots in the accession negotiations between Brussels and Nicosia, and the Aegean dispute would have to be taken to the International Court of Justice, of which the latter had been one of the concessions that had been unpalatable to Turkey before during the Luxembourg presidency two years earlier (Ferrari, 1999a). Greece also maintained
its veto on the €750 million loan from the EIB to Turkey, but was nevertheless persuaded to allow a €200 million financial aid package for disaster relief (Hinrichs, 1999a; Paalvast, 1999).

At the Saariselkä meeting, Greece signaled its policy reversal by no longer exercising its veto on Turkish candidacy, saying, “We are in favor of Turkey becoming a member of the European Union” (“Tauwetter zwischen,” 1999; Wielaard, 1999a). The Greek tone changed significantly after the Athens earthquake on September 7th, when this no-veto position shifted further to one of active support. “Greece not only wants to see Turkey in the EU, it wants to be pulling the cart of a European Turkey,” Papandreou said in an interview with the Guardian. “Contrary to popular belief, it is in Greece’s interest to see Turkey, at some point, in the EU, rather than having it in continual conflict and tension with the bloc and European standards” (Smith, H., 1999).

During a state visit to Greece by Gerhard Schröder in early October, Greek Prime Minister Simitis joined the Chancellor in expressing the desire for Turkey to become a member of the EU (“Schröder lobt,” 1999). However, at Tampere (15-16 October), Greece was still hesitant in the debate over granting Turkey candidacy status when Papandreou asserted that the discussion was about “a real candidacy, not a virtual candidacy,” whereby he also warned that major problems still needed to be overcome (“Demirel Calls,” 1999). In an 30 October interview with Die Welt, Papandreou expressed his appreciation of the Copenhagen criteria for central European countries, but that in the Balkans (implying Turkey as well), a broader set of criteria should be recognized – especially concerning relations between countries and respect for mutual borders, UN resolutions and the International Court of Justice. He also expressed that since Turkey joining the EU was not a question of ‘if’, but ‘when’, Turkey needed to be properly integrated with a clear framework to be set out in Helsinki, working toward a solution of problems such as Cyprus and the Aegean (Stausberg, 1999).

The shift in the Greek policy toward Turkey was not an easy one for Athens to make. Commenting on Greek-Turkish relations, Louis Michel, the Belgian Foreign Minister explained that the Greek leadership needed time to sell the policy change to the Greek public (“EU-staatshoofden,” 1999). Even after the thaw in relations following the earthquakes, 69% of the Greek public (down from 80% in 1997) still opposed Turkish membership in the EU, at that time still the highest level of public opposition to Turkish membership among EU member states (Eurobarometer, 1997; 1999). Again taking an unorthodox avenue for Greek diplomacy, Papandreou told EU foreign ministers that “no one supports Turkish EU candidate status as strongly as Greece,” but only on certain conditions (“Greece says Finland,” 1999).
Determining Greece’s status as a driver, a passenger or a brakeman is not easy to determine because of Greece’s particular stance. During the negotiations, Greece still insisted on the settlement of territorial disputes as well as the Cyprus issue, the same conditions that Turkey had balked at in 1997, but only begrudgingly accepted at the Helsinki summit. The difference was in the tone of the rhetoric and in the timing of the demanded concessions. According to the Greek reading of the Luxembourg conclusions, Turkey would have had to offer concessions prior to participation in the European Conference, whereas according to the Helsinki conclusions a settlement, either negotiated or arbitrated, would have to occur before 2004.

The main shift in Greek policy appears to be mostly rhetorical, yet by both Turkish and European leaders adopting a more welcoming attitude, this seems to have made a crucial difference in the interpretation of the two sets of presidency conclusions. Former Prime Minister Pangalos’ characterization of Turkey as ‘thieves, murderers and rapists’ was unacceptable, while Papandreou’s more soft-spoken approach, aided by the mutual sympathy after the earthquakes, made what was essentially the same deal easier for Turkey to swallow.

Given this different approach of political rhetoric, as well as the change of bargaining strategy that made Turkish membership in the EU an avenue for the pursuit of Greek interest in the Aegean as well as for Cyprus rather than a bargaining chip to be withheld, makes Greece definable as a driver, rather than a brakeman.

6.4.8 Ireland

Ireland was another country that mostly kept itself out of the Turkey debate. After Helsinki, the Irish Times reported that, “the Government welcomed the further progress made at the summit towards eventual EU membership for Turkey” (Rafter, 1999). Ireland’s Foreign Minister, David Andrews, called the Helsinki decision “a major achievement for the Finnish presidency”, and paid tribute to Simitis and Papandreou, for their statesmanship in trying to reconcile their country’s differences with Turkey (Gillespie, 1999a).

In the annual assessment of Nicholas Rees (of the International Affairs Committee at the Royal Irish Academy in Dublin) on Ireland’s foreign policy, the Turkish question was recognized, but nothing was mentioned regarding Ireland’s role in reaching the decision. Rees did report that the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern “warmly welcomed… the decision to include Turkey as a part of this
process,” but without mentioning the Irish part in the debates in the Council or in public about Turkey’s membership candidacy (Rees, 2000). A country welcoming of a fact after the fact does not mean that the country in question was a driver. Ireland failed to make the press prior to Helsinki, nor was it mentioned anywhere that it behaved in a fashion that enabled the result in Turkey’s favor.

Therefore, despite what appears to be Ireland’s post-Summit good will toward Turkey, it must be regarded as a passenger for not having contributed on Turkey’s behalf beyond not casting a veto in the Council.

6.4.9 Italy

At Cologne, Italy joined Greece in opposing the German proposals to re-invite Turkey to a European Conference and offer it candidate status (“Turkije voorlopig,” 1999). Earlier that year, a row had erupted between Ankara and Rome over the latter’s refusal to extradite Abdullah Öcalan after his November 12, 1998 arrest in Rome, and more so after his release to Kenya on January 16, 1999 (Meiler, 1999). Additionally, there was a statement made by the Italian prime minister Massimo D’Alema that boats and ships from Turkey carrying Kurdish illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers to the Italian Adriatic coast were not unlike the concurrent situation in Kosovo, where violent clashes between Serb forces and Kosovar-Albania separatists had begun a wave of refugees spilling across Serbia’s borders into Albania, Macedonia and beyond. The statement compounded the bilateral row (Kirişci, 2003, p. 95; Lavenex & Uçarer, 2003, p. 133).

However, following the İzmit earthquake, Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini was one of the EU member-state leaders who expressed his support for granting Turkey official candidacy prior to the Saariselkä meeting (“Aardbeving brengt,” 1999; “Busquin Afgekeurd,” 1999; “Quice Estudian,” 1999; Hinrichs, 1999a).

Meanwhile, the opposition leader Silvio Berlusconi (the former and later prime minister in 1994-1995 and 2001-2006), expressed his opposition to Turkey’s candidacy status during a December EPP meeting (“Berlusconi Afirma,” 1999). This was a position he would later fail to keep when he returned power, just as most of the leaders at the March 1997 EPP meeting detailed in the previous episode had done. This rhetoric on Berlusconi’s part did not change the official Italian policy, which in 1999 is judged to have been that of a driver, regardless of the earlier brakeman-like stance at Cologne and the other bilateral disputes.
At Tampere (15-16 October), Luxembourg was hesitant in the debate over granting Turkey candidacy status. The Premier, Jean-Claude Juncker, expressed to Die Welt his reservations of granting Turkey candidacy status. He said that the EU would regret not having a more thorough debate on where the borders of Europe should lie (“EU uneinig,” 1999; Ferrari, 1999). During the Tampere summit, Die Welt interviewed Juncker. During the interview, he argued that Turkey would have to meet the same conditions and requirements as the other candidate states, but that it was not at the stage of accession negotiations. He said that he wished that there had been “intensive and broad conversations about where exactly the European Borders are. Also to finally have clear conditions. We will one day regret that we did not have this exchange of views before the summit in Helsinki.” When pressed on his own vote that he expected to cast in Helsinki, Juncker replied, “I have nothing against candidacy status for Turkey. But we should not act as if we will have solve all problems with it” (Middel, 1999d – trans. mine).

After the Helsinki summit, Juncker declared that none of the Heads of State and Government had been able to “underwrite with both hands that Turkey would become a full member” (Middel, 1999e – trans. mine). It appears that Luxembourg was not going to veto Turkish candidacy, but it was not enthused about it either, and expressed its reservations about Turkish membership openly to the press. As such, Luxembourg is considered a brakeman.

### Netherlands

During the 1999 episode, the Netherlands was again a driver. At the Cologne summit, the Dutch junior minister for European affairs, Dick Benschop, stated that, “if we want to offer Turkey something, it has to be of a decent status” (van Lierop, 1999 – trans. mine). At the Saariselkä meeting, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Jozias van Aartsen, expressed his satisfaction with the shift in the Greek position (“Ministers bieden,” 1999; van der Velden, 1999a).

Prior to Helsinki, van Aartsen expected a tough discussion over Turkey, but not without setting great store on the prospect of Turkish candidacy. He also expressed that he was not in favor of the accession of a divided Cyprus, as accession would leave no more pressure on the Greek Cypriots to move toward reconciliation (Paalvast & Bergsma, 1999). Van Aartsen did admit to the
largely symbolic nature of Turkey’s official candidacy status, nevertheless considering it to be of great importance (Schampers, 1999).

During the summit itself, Prime Minister Wim Kok was the last opponent to allowing a divided Cyprus to join the EU. Despite his defeat on that point, he was still ‘lyrical’ over the victory of Turkey’s candidacy status saying, “A better end to the millennium is unthinkable.” Humorously referring to his own minor case of the flu, he said that, “this was a result to get better from” (Kockelmans, 1999 – trans. mine).

6.4.12 Portugal

In an interview with the German Focus Magazine, the Portuguese Prime Minister António Guterres expressed the safe opinion that Turkey ought to be treated the same as all other candidates, although he also expected that, given its ‘democratic deficit’, as well as its need to meet the economic criteria, there would be long transition periods (Herzog, 1999). This, in itself, at least indicates that Portugal was not a brakeman on cultural grounds – something that had already become a taboo opinion to express after 1997.

As already mentioned, Portugal did support the Greeks at Helsinki to have the Aegean Sea dispute brought to the International Court of Justice (“Les Quinze,” 1999). Portugal’s Foreign Minister Jaime Gama asserted that no special conditions should be required of Turkey that exceeded the EU’s normal standards of respect for human rights and democracy (Wielaard, 1999b). This was simply an assertion of the governing enlargement regime rather than a statement of Portugal’s support or antagonism toward the prospect of Turkish membership.

After the Helsinki summit and prior to taking over the rotating EU Presidency in January, Guterres mentioned that Portugal was in favor of Turkish membership, so long as it respected human and minority rights. As a reason for integrating Turkey into the Union, he cited the impediment of the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. As a social democrat himself, he also asserted that Portugal’s position was not based on ideological grounds to warrant support from either socialist or conservative politicians. He noted that the French and Spanish prime ministers Jacques Chirac and José Maria Aznar, both conservatives, were in favor of the candidacy (“UE-Portugal,” 1999 – trans. mine). Implicit in the remark was that socialists were perceived as being more likely to be in favor of Turkey joining the Union, a perception he sought to correct. However,
given that he is making this argument after the Helsinki summit and just before Portugal’s presidency, this cannot be considered a particularly clear statement of Portuguese support. In the role of the presidency, Portugal would be expected to embrace the majority voice of the Council, at least during its tenure in the role.

Meanwhile, at home, Portuguese political opposition voiced by Paulo Portas of the Christian Democratic CDS-PP party opposed Turkish candidacy, arguing that Turkey “lacks the same bases of civilization as other European countries,” which indicates that it was an issue of political difference within Portugal at that time (“Les democrates-chretiens,” 1999 – trans. mine).

From the limited available material on Portugal’s position in 1999, it is clear that Lisbon was not particularly antagonistic toward Turkey’s prospects, nor was it an outspoken supporter. It had joined the Greeks and the Swedes on the Aegean question, but otherwise reiterated the need for Turkey to adopt the Copenhagen criteria for membership, highlighting that doing so would prevent the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. As such, Portugal is considered a Passenger; it accepted Turkey’s candidacy as the will of the majority of the member states, but did not actively argue on Turkey’s behalf.

6.4.13 Spain

During this episode, Spain is considered a driver of Turkish membership. At Cologne in June, Spain declared its strong support for Turkish candidacy for European Union membership (“Aznar Confia,” 1999). Not long after Cologne, during a state visit to Athens, Ramon de Miguel, the Spanish Secretary of state for Foreign and European Affairs, spoke with George Papandreou, asserting a position in favor of Turkish membership. To show that he did not do so unconditionally, de Miguel added the stipulation that Turkey should “contribute to a reduction in the tensions with Greece and allow the Northern Cypriot community to participate in Cyprus’ accession negotiations with the EU” (“España Apoya Grecia,” 1999). The Spanish Foreign Minister, Abel Matutes, stated a similar position before the foreign affairs committee of the Spanish Congress (“España Confia,” 1999). During the summer, a broad group of Spanish institutions, governmental and otherwise, lobbied Turkey not to execute Öcalan (“Aznar Manifiesta,” 1999; Gobierno y Partidos,” 1999; “Movilizacion,” 1999).
As mentioned before, following the earthquake, Abel Matutes declared that he would press for the adoption of Turkey as an official candidate of the EU at Saariselkä. According to a Spanish Foreign Ministry spokesman, official candidacy status would make it easier to release EU financial aid of €650 million to Turkey, which could be put to use for the earthquake victims ("España Quiere," 1999; van ‘T Klooster, 1999). Spain also made the case for Turkey by suggesting that with its official candidacy and tens of thousands of earthquake victims on its hands, it would be increasingly indefensible of Greece to maintain its veto on the financial package.

In early December, a week prior to Helsinki, during several bilateral and trilateral meetings with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, Spanish Prime Minister Aznar agreed with his partners on granting Turkey candidacy status ("Jospin Garantiza," 1999; “Schröder Espera,” 1999; “Schröder Viaja a Madrid,” 1999; “Schröder y Aznar,” 1999). That same week, the after the foreign ministers’ meeting, Matutes again expressed his support for Turkish candidacy by pointing out that it would save Öcalan’s life, since the European Union prohibited capital punishment and Turkey would have to spare him in order to become a member ("La UE Abrira," 1999). This indicates a certain reversal of policy. Previously the argument had been made that the death sentence had to be undone prior to candidacy, whereas here Matutes saw candidacy preceding an official stay of execution.

At the summit itself, Aznar argued for the candidacy status for Turkey under the same criteria set for other candidate countries. When the summit had concluded, and Turkey had been recognized as a candidate, Aznar declared it a “great step forward” ("Aznar se Falicita,” 1999 – trans. mine). In speaking with the press, Matutes recalled Spain’s traditional support of Turkey (which, actually, had been muted during the previous episode), but pointed out that Turkey “still has a long way to go,” in modernizing their institutions and adopting the acquis, in compliance with the Copenhagen criteria ("España Considera,” 1999 – trans. mine).

Back home, the Aznar government was supported in the Turkish decision by the main opposition Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) leader, Joaquin Almunia. However, Aznar caught flack from the other opposition party, the United Left (communists, etc.), who characterized the inclusion of Turkey, with its human rights problems, as the creation of a political “Frankenstein Monster” ("Almunia Avisa,” 1999; “Aznar Niega,” 1999).
Sweden proved to be the most outspoken brakeman in 1999. Sweden’s proposed policy was that Turkey had to get its political house in order before it should be offered candidacy status. Its Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, made her country’s position on Turkey loud and clear when at the Saariselkä meeting in September she proposed a road map, which would include a perspective on bringing the Turkish legal system into line with EU-norms, ratification of the UN Human Rights Convention, abolition of capital punishment, observance of minority rights and a dialogue with the Kurds (“Ankara Breaks,” 1999; Hinrichs, 1999c; Middel, 1999b; Paalvast, 1999; “Tauwetter,” 1999). These were all in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria. However, Lindh’s road map went further to also include an obligation for Ankara to strengthen its dialogues with neighboring countries and accept a mission of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to monitor Turkey’s treatment of its ethnic minorities (“Greece backs,” 1999) At Lindh’s insistence that Turkey would have to meet the requirements of her road map prior to being offered candidacy status (“Ministers bieden,” 1999).

Due to Sweden having adopted this tough line on Turkey, the Financial Times dubbed Sweden ‘Turkey’s newest foe’ (Norman, 1999a). According to the Financial Times, Sweden’s proposed strict road map of conditions “reflected the strong support for human rights in Sweden and the Stockholm parliament.” This insistence on reforms prior to candidacy, which would “pose a formidable obstacle” to the granting of candidacy by the Helsinki meeting in December, were required by Lindh as a “down payment” for further reforms required during the candidacy period.

A month later, by the time the European Commission had published its recommendation and the heads of state and government were meeting in Tampere, Sweden had not yet given up its opposition. “Sweden is strictly against granting Turkey candidacy status,” Anna Lindh declared (Middel, 1999c – trans. mine). Yet, Sweden was alone as the only vocal opponent of the candidacy (“Demirel Calls,” 1999). After the Tampere meeting, with Greece and Germany having become proponents of Turkish candidacy, Sweden was left with Luxembourg as its only ally. By then it had already been known that Sweden was not going to exercise a unilateral veto on the matter (Blome 1999a). By December, Sweden had given up its opposition to the candidacy as well as its proposed road map of strict conditions (Bouwman, 1999; Norman, 1999b; “Turkije waarschuwt,” 1999). Stockholm did, however, support Greece’s arguments at the summit on the question of Cyprus (“Les Quinze,” 1999).
As before, and in the episodes to follow, the United Kingdom was one of Turkey’s most stalwart advocates, and drivers of its membership ambitions. The British Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, publicly called for Turkey to be designated a candidate prior to the Saariselkä meeting in September (“Britain says,” 1999; “EU must treat,” 1999; Hinrichs, 1999a; Smith, J. 1999). The UK was, however, careful to stress that its support of Turkey’s candidacy should in no way be interpreted as a weakening of the membership criteria (“EU-Aussenminister,” 1999). It was also among the chorus of countries urging Turkey not to execute Abdullah Öcalan (Cordon, 1999).

Prior to Tampere in October, Cook allowed it to circulate, especially in Ankara, that the UK stood in support of the EU Commission’s opinion that Turkey should be designated a candidate country (“Britain Expresses,” 1999). At the Tampere summit itself, Tony Blair spoke in support, affirming that, “there will be an agreement in Helsinki that Turkey should be considered as a candidate country” (“Demirel Calls,” 1999; Halisdemir, 1999a).

After Tampere, meeting with Papandreou in London, Cook declared:

Speaking for Britain, we believe that it would be right to recognise Turkey as a candidate for membership of the European Union... It is right to do so because we would be supporting and encouraging the very progressive forces in Turkey who look to Europe for their aspirations and their orientation... However, a decision to recognise Turkey as a candidate for membership of the European Union is by no means a final decision in that process. It will only be the first decision in a long path and it will not be possible to progress down that path until Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria on human rights, democracy, recognition of minorities.

(Hickman, 1999).

At this same Anglo-Greek meeting, however, Cook also assured Papandreou that the UK would support the accession of a still-divided Cyprus, if that situation had not been solved by the time of Cyprus’ joining of the EU as a member (“Greece Hails,” 1999).

Prior to the Helsinki summit, in remarks to the House of Commons, Cook said that Britain would prefer Turkey to improve its human rights record and democratic standards - as would be expected from any other candidate. Cook also said that the British government would do whatever it could to see Turkey included among the candidates, adding that by doing so the EU would give encouragement to the democratic institutions in Turkey which, he said, “were working hard to achieve improvements in Turkey” (Halisdemir, 1999b).
At the Helsinki summit itself, Tony Blair received far more criticism from the media over the Anglo-French ‘guerre du bœuf’, an ongoing trade war over British beef exports, than over his policy on Turkey’s EU membership (Percival & Blair, 1999). At home too, few articles did more than mention the Turkish matter at the bottom of the tabloids, lambasting Blair over the beef and his inability to charm the French, indicating that at least according to the media; Turkish membership of the EU seemed of little concern in the Kingdom’s domestic opinion.

6.5 AFTERMATH

The irony of the ‘candidacy status’ is that it was a label without any concrete benefits for Turkey. Nor was there authentically such a thing as an ‘official candidacy status’ prior to the Helsinki conclusions. The term candidate does not appear in the Luxembourg Presidency conclusions (Council, 1997). In the conclusions of the Cardiff European Council (15-16 June 1998), the word ‘candidate’ is used four times, all in relation to enlargement. Of these, the most poignant is in paragraph 64, which reads:

**The European Council welcomes the Commission’s confirmation that it will submit at the end of 1998 its first regular reports on each candidate’s progress towards accession. In the case of Turkey, reports will be based on Article 28 of the Association Agreement and the conclusions of the Luxembourg European Council.**

(European Council, 1998a)

In this regard, Turkey is implicitly left out of the category of ‘candidates’. The conclusions of the Vienna European Council (11-12 December) also use to word candidate in several instances. It did not explicitly exclude Turkey from the category, but certainly not implicitly including Turkey either (European Council, 1998b). As such, the language was slowly brought into the conclusions, with, probably, much behind-the-scenes haggling, but without there being official categories of candidate and applicant beforehand.

In essence, Turkey had been given a rhetorical emblem in lieu of any concrete concessions or admissions on the part of the member states. Prior to Helsinki, Turkey’s ‘right’ to be treated the same as other applicant states had already been acknowledged by the European Council on several occasions – most notably in the Presidency conclusions of the ill-received Luxembourg summit, two years prior, in which Turkey’s ‘European destiny’ – and thus its status as a ‘European country’ – had already been unequivocally recognized (Dausend, 1999). As such, the cynical apologist for the
language might assert that Turkey was, indeed, being treated the same as other ‘applicants’ with the caveat that all the other countries were no longer ‘applicants’, but ‘candidates’ – the category of ‘applicant’ prior to Helsinki being populated by only one country: Turkey.

That said, the recognition of Turkey’s then-official candidacy at Helsinki had tremendous rhetorical value. In later episodes, where Turkey’s status as a European country would be called into question, proponents continually referred back to the Helsinki conclusions. This official-but-only-rhetorical recognition, as well as the more amiable treatment of Turkey in 1999 in juxtaposition to the previous episode, created a political impetus within Turkey itself that enabled its government to push through the necessary reforms toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria (Öniş, 2003).
The third episode researched here is the second half of 2002. While some actors in 2002 (and since) still openly questioned the central fact of the 1999 Helsinki decision, that Turkey had been fully accepted as candidate for EU membership, the main issue in 2002 concerned process more than substance or goal. It concerned Turkey’s push to start accession negotiations with the EU in 2003. The member states, however, decided against the start of immediate negotiations with Turkey, opting instead to review the matter two years later. As such, it was not a question of ‘if’ but one of ‘when’ a decision would have to be made about the start of accession negotiations.

Within this context, there were different positions and policy formulations for the process going forward from 2002. One option, completely unpalatable for the great majority of the member states, was that the process be halted altogether and Turkey’s candidacy rescinded. The arguments thereto saw Turkey as a bad fit for Europe, partly because it was Muslim, and partly because its deplored human rights record that it could never realistically fix.

A seemingly kinder formulation of this rejection had been to advocate for a ‘privileged partnership’ of some sort, whereby Turkey would be offered some unspecified level of integration with Europe, without actually allowing it to sit at the decision-making table of the EU. This option would mean a reversal of the Helsinki and even Luxembourg decisions in which Turkey’s eligibility for full membership of the EU had been established. Also, given Turkey’s participation in the customs union, and other forms of cooperation with the EU, it would be difficult to discern how a privileged partnership would be different from what was already in effect.

A second option was for the Council to adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach, that allowed Turkey to catch up with the Copenhagen criteria at its own pace, while the Council gauged its progress periodically in order to determine when it had met the criteria and merited negotiations. In that respect, it would remain debatable to what degree Turkey would have to meet the criteria in order to deserve negotiations.
A third option was to set a date at which the Council would decide if Turkey had (sufficiently) met the political Copenhagen criteria to begin the negotiations. Variations on this option were in the dates when Turkey’s progress would be gauged and when those negotiations would begin if Turkey were judged to have sufficiently advanced toward meeting the criteria.

A fourth option was to begin negotiations as soon as organizationally possible without any prior gauging of Turkey’s progress. Turkey, the United States, and their member-state allies advocated for such negotiations to begin in 2003, the very next year. This option would essentially scrap the political Copenhagen criteria as a requirement for negotiations to start altogether, since the Commission and most observers could still easily see problems in Turkey’s progress toward meeting the political criteria of human rights and adequate protection of minorities.

In preparation for Copenhagen, the dispute settled around the Franco-German plan to gauge Turkey’s readiness again in December 2004 and, depending on how well Turkey had met the political Copenhagen criteria by then, begin negotiations in 2005. Ankara, supported by Washington, argued for accession negotiations to begin in 2003, while Madrid and London agreed a date earlier than 2005 (Broekhuizen & Van Oostrum, 2002).

7.1 POLITICAL CHANGES

In the three years since the explicit acceptance of Turkey’s membership candidacy in 1999, the following political changes took place in Turkey and in the member states.

- In late 2002, Turkey was in the midst of elections, which the moderate Islamist AKP party handily won with 34% of the vote. Because of the 10% threshold, only the runners-up – the incumbent CHP party – also won representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. This mechanism gave AKP an absolute majority of 68% over CHP’s 32%. As such, in mid-November Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit ceded the prime ministership to Abdullah Gül, who stood in for AKP’s authentic leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In the Foreign Ministry, İsmail Cem resigned in July, leaving the post to Şükrü Sina Gürel. After the elections, Yaşar Yakış was took over as foreign minister until such time as Erdoğan could become Prime Minister and Gül became foreign minister.
• In Austria, just after the 1999 elections and a difficult coalition-formation process, Wolfgang Schüssel formed a coalition government between his own conservative Christian-democrat ÖVP and the right-wing FPÖ of Jörg Haider. In the summer and fall of 2002, however, political turmoil returned, leading to elections in November. A new government was not formed until February. Schlüssel remained Chancellor and Benita Ferrero-Waldner remained Foreign Minister throughout this period.

• In 2001, the Danish Folketing (parliament) elections of 2001 brought a change of government from the Social Democrat-led government of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen to the Venstre-led coalition of Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Incidentally, Venstre translates as “left”, though they are, in fact, a right-wing liberal party. The coalition was joined by the Conservative People’s Party and supported in the parliament by the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party.

• In Finland, the government of social democrat Paavo Lipponen did not change save for the election of its Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen as President in 2000. She was succeeded by Erkki Tuomioja, who assumed office that same year.

• In France, Jacques Chirac was reelected in May of 2002, upon which his defeated rival Lionel Jospin retired from politics. In the June 2002 Legislative elections, Chirac’s center-right UMP won the vote decisively, allowing its members to form a cabinet consisting of Jean-Pierre Raffarin as Prime Minister and Dominique de Villepin taking over as Foreign Minister from Hubert Védrine.

• Germany headed for elections in late September. These elections renewed the governing mandate for the red-green coalition of Schröder-Fischer.

• In Ireland, republican Brian Cowen took over as Foreign Secretary from his fellow party-member David Andrews.

• In Italy, the 2001 parliamentary elections brought Silvio Berlusconi’s ‘House of Freedoms’ alliance to power and installed him as Prime Minister. In January 2002, Berlusconi also appointed himself as Foreign Minister, handing off the portfolio to Franco Frattini in November.

• The Netherlands had a turbulent political year in the run-up to the May 2002 elections, with the anti-immigrant political newcomer Pim Fortuyn winning 26 seats (an exceptional result in the previously glacial politics of the Netherlands), before he was assassinated on May 6th.
The electoral outcome allowed the first Christian Democrat-led cabinet of Jan Peter Balkenende to take over from Labor Prime Minister Wim Kok in July 2002 and appoint Christian Democrat Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as Foreign Minister. The coalition fell apart 87 days later with new elections slated for January 2003.

- In Portugal, the May 2002 elections brought José Manuel Barroso (later President of the European Commission), leader of the Social Democratic PSD in as Prime Minister, replacing the Socialist (PS) António Guterres. António Martins da Cruz took office as Foreign Minister.
- Under the Aznar government, Minister of Foreign Affairs Abel Matutes was replaced by Josep Piqué in 2000, who was replaced by Ana de Palacio (sister of the then-serving EU Commissioner for energy and transport, Loyola de Palacio) in July 2002.
- In the UK, Jack Straw took over as Foreign Secretary from Robin Cook.

The governments in Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Sweden remained essentially unchanged.

7.2 THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Like in 1999, the diplomacy about enlargement decisions was scheduled for the year-end European Council meeting. However, leading into December, a number of occasions prompted European leaders to publicly discuss Turkey’s prospects. The first was the mid-year European Council in Seville, followed by Turkey enacting a package of reforms aimed at sufficiently meeting the political criteria. In early October this package and other developments were gauged by the European Commission, which offered the member states its opinion on the process going forward. Pursuant to the publication of the Commission’s report, the European Council met in Brussels to haggle over political differences regarding the Common Agricultural Policy and how to bring the Eastern European countries, Malta and Cyprus into this regime. Turkey was not the headline decision, but it was nevertheless a forum at which Turkey was discussed by the heads of state and government.

Following this, the former French President and sitting President of the European Convention on the Future of Europe, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing stirred the pot by pronouncing his opinion that Turkey ought not to become a member of the EU because of its geography. This gave European leaders cause to object to his public statement. It was also followed by the Turkish
elections and a charm offensive by Turkey’s new Islamist leaders, in which they visited European capitals, lobbying on Turkey’s behalf.

As was usually the case prior to European summits, the French and German leaders met in order to come to a common position prior to the meeting at which they would, essentially, decide what the common European position would be, given their combined weight in the Council. This also gave occasion for last minute wrangling and haggling prior to the European Council’s meeting. Finally, the European Council meeting in Copenhagen produced the common result which would delay a decision on Turkey for another two years, at which point the EU would begin accession negotiations ‘without delay’ if Turkey were judged to be ready for doing so in 2004.

7.2.1 Seville

During the EU summit of Seville on June 21-22, held under the Spanish presidency, it was decided that Turkey would be on the agenda of the Copenhagen summit in December. The conclusions thereto read as follows:

The implementation of the required political and economic reforms will bring forward Turkey’s prospects of accession in accordance with the same principles and criteria as are applied to the other candidate countries. New decisions could be taken in Copenhagen on the next stage of Turkey’s candidature in the light of developments in the situation between the Seville and Copenhagen European Councils, on the basis of the regular report to be submitted by the Commission in October 2002…

(European Council, 2002a, par. 25)

At the close of the Seville summit, Spain’s foreign minister Josep Piqué declared that the EU wished for accession negotiations to begin “as soon as possible” (Middel & Ridderbusch, 2002). Irritated, Schröder commented that Turkey was not ready for accession negotiations, and that “the chance for a binding timetable does not exist” (“EU will gemeinsame,” 2002; “Gipfel lässt,” 2002 – trans. mine).

Turkish President Sezer, on the other hand, joined Spain in saying: “we expect that by the end of the year a date for the start of negotiations will be set.” When the negotiations are delayed to an uncertain future, “it will create frustration in the [Turkish] people and damage the credibility of Europe” (Ridderbusch, 2002a). The soon-to-be President of the Council, Anders Fogh Rasmussen declared that “We can set a date for the start of negotiations when Turkey meets the criteria,” which
sounded more conciliatory than the German reaction, but was in fact more diplomacy than a substantive concession ("Problem-Kandidat," 2002 – trans. mine).

7.2.2 Turkish reform package

The Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit suffered from ill health in the summer of 2002. His government, nevertheless, pushed through some of the necessary reforms for meeting the political criteria, such as the abolition of the death penalty and allowing the Kurdish language(s) to be used in electronic media (Fischer, 2002). In August, the Turkish parliament ratified a reform package. The most symbolically significant reform was the abolition of the peacetime use of the death penalty, while it also lifted a ban on education and broadcasting in Kurdish and allowed more freedom of expression and assembly for non-Muslim minorities (Jews, Greeks and Armenians). After the ratification, Ecevit claimed that “now no one can say anymore that Turkey does not deserve full membership” in the EU. “Now Turkey is freer, more democratic and more European” ("Türkisches Parlament," 2002 – trans. mine).

The German government reacted by indicating that it would support Turkish rapprochement with the EU. Denmark called the reform package “good progress” (Gottschlich, 2002 – trans. mine). The abolition of the death penalty was also welcomed by Greece, Spain and Sweden. Belgium preferred to wait for the Commission’s verdict before offering an opinion ("Europeos consideran," 2002). In spite of the apparent approval of most member states, however, none of them said anything about inviting Turkey for accession negotiations or setting a date. The Commission was also reserved, saying that, “so far the reforms exist only on paper. When people actually benefit from it, then we shall believe what we read” ("Türkei; Was die Sterne sagen," 2002).

7.2.3 Commission Report and Recommendations

On October 9, the Commission published its progress report and recommendations on Turkey. Although it expressed its approval of the reforms that had been pushed through legislation in August, it also noted that these were not enough to meet the political criteria.

Through constitutional reform and a series of legislative packages Turkey has made noticeable progress towards meeting the Copenhagen political criteria, as well as moving
The Commission noted that while the reforms had been passed on paper, it would still require verification of actual implementation. Furthermore, it still required more changes, such as lifting the states of emergency in two provinces in the Southeast, curbing the power of the military power, more far-reaching protections against torture of prisoners and the release of people imprisoned for expressing non-violent opinions (Commission, 2002, sec. 5). In order to stimulate the process, the Commission recommended enhanced support and resources for pre-accession preparations and extending the Customs Union. However, it did not recommend negotiations or a timetable, leaving such matters up to the member states to decide.

In short, the implicit message of the Commission was that Turkey was not yet ready for negotiations. Germany, however, put forward the idea of a compromise solution between the drivers and the Commission (as well as, implicitly, the brakemen), which was to set a date at which a date to start negotiations would be set. Schröder also mentioned setting a date for negotiations to begin to Anders Fogh Rasmussen at a meeting in Hannover in late October (“Schröder macht,” 2002). More likely, however, was the ‘date for a date’ formulation, a proposal that was supported by Great Britain and Greece, while Luxembourg, Austria and the Scandinavian countries were more skeptical (“Brüssel irritiert,” 2002; “Schröder will Türkei,” 2002).

7.2.4 Brussels

The Brussels Summit on 24-25 October, was the scene of rigorous haggling over the text on Turkey. Berlusconi and Schröder in particular took up the Turkish cause, warmly endorsed by Greek Prime Minister Simitis, while France and the United Kingdom were also clearly in the driver camp at Brussels. The Commission, however, was particularly irritated by Berlin’s seemingly new policy, given the seeming change-of-heart between Schröder’s pre-election policy and post-election policy (see below). At the outset of the summit, Commission President Romano Prodi argued that Turkey was still far from meeting the Copenhagen criteria, and therefore was not yet eligible for a date at which to start accession negotiations (“Brüssel irritiert,” 2002). He argued (unsuccessfully) for the removal of any references to negotiations. Austrian Chancellor Schüssel, Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende and Swedish Prime Minister Persson also argued for a slower pace than Turkey’s drivers
Due to the efforts of the Commission and the brakemen, the results of the Brussels summit did not set a date for the opening of negotiations (Ridderbusch, 2002d). Enough members saw this as a bridge too far, given the Commission’s opinion. Therefore, the issue remained unresolved before Copenhagen. Yet by the statement “The Council is invited to prepare in time for the Copenhagen European Council the elements for deciding on the next stage of Turkey’s candidature,” the option was still left open (European Council, 2002b).

7.2.5 Giscard d’Estaing

On November 7th, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, had a noteworthy interview with Le Monde, during which he argued against Turkey ever becoming a member of the European Union. His assertion was largely based on a geographic argument, whereby he emphasized that 95% of Turkey, including the capital, lay outside of Europe. He deplored the paucity of the debate about the prospect of EU enlargement to Turkey and had decided to broaden the debate beyond the Turkish electorate. He also accused the advocates of Turkish accession (primarily the UK) of being motivated by hostility to European integration. Instead, he supposed, the advocates preferred a free trade area of continental Europe and the Middle East. The consequence of Turkish membership, he said, would be ‘the end of Europe’ (Leparmetier & Zecchini, 2002b).

Giscard d’Estaing’s interview and outspoken statement of opposition based on geography, but also on future integration, cultural and religious differences and history, provided European leaders with a cause to respond. The Danish Presidency reiterated that Turkey “may become a member in the same way as other candidates” and, “when Turkey has fulfilled the political criteria, accession negotiations can begin, and when it has satisfied all the criteria, it may become a member” (“En lançant,” 2002 – trans. mine; Roustel, 2002; “Turkije kan lid worden,” 2002).

Jean-Pierre Raffarin, France’s Prime Minister, dismissed Giscard d’Estaing’s opinion as a personal one, not reflecting the policy of France or the European countries as a whole (“Raffarin: la position,” 2002). Jacques Chirac’s office also let it be known that the President maintained his “conviction that Turkey had its place in Europe insofar as it adheres to the Copenhagen criteria”
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer also voiced his opposition to this opinion by saying, “I'll have none of it; blocking the door for Turkey or walling it off” (Middel, 2002b – trans. mine). Giscard d'Estaing’s arguments were apparently not picked up by any of the EU member governments, even though some had been clearly critical of Turkish membership and continued to be actively hesitant taking a next step in the accession process (de Barochez, 2002a).

7.2.6 Turkish Elections and Erdoğan’s Charm Offensive

On November 3rd, Turkey held its elections for the Grand National Assembly wherein the electorate awarded an outright majority of seats to the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had not been eligible to become Prime Ministership owing to his 1998 prison sentence for citing a poem that was not in keeping with Kemalism, the basic secular ideology of the Turkish Republic. Instead he nominated his deputy, Abdullah Gül, as prime minister until 2003, when a legal change made it possible for Erdoğan to take the post.

This restriction in 2002, however, did not prevent Erdoğan from acting as the unofficial Turkish leader. Toward the end of November, he made a tour to some of the European capitals, starting with Rome – Turkey’s ‘best friend in Europe’ (Ludlow, 2004, p. 253). Athens, the second port of call, also warmly welcomed the unofficial leader of Turkey. In his mission to feel out the members of the Council, he discovered that Italy, Greece, Belgium, the UK, Ireland, Portugal and Spain were all firm drivers of Turkey’s cause and that Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden were more skeptical, while the Commission was also not very forthcoming with support. This left the remaining three member states – Germany, Denmark and France – not yet committed to a clear stance as the key ‘swing states’ on the Council (ibid).

In Berlin, Erdoğan learned of the German ambivalence toward Turkey’s preference for a date to start negotiations (Ludlow, 2004 p. 254). As the national section below will illustrate, Germany was walking a tightrope between domestic pre-election politics on one side and its authentic preferences for an acceleration of the Turkish accession process coupled with its rapprochement with Washington on the other. Schröder ended the deadlock when he expressed Germany’s support for a date for the start of negotiations proper as a way for the EU to send Turkey a positive signal (“Schröder will ‘Signal’,” 2002). Yet, whether this would get enough support
from the other member states was highly doubtful. After meeting with Schröder and Fischer in Berlin, Erdoğan expressed his willingness to accept the ‘date for a date’ option (Antonaros, 2002b; “Erdoğan signalisiert,” 2002).

On his final visit, to Paris, Jacques Chirac welcomed him on the steps of the Elysée Palace, a gesture normally reserved for heads of state or government (Mamarbachi, 2002). The cordiality with which he was received had also been due to his expressed commitment to push for more energetic reforms toward the Copenhagen criteria, especially of a ‘zero tolerance’ policy on torture, one of the major issues that had plagued Turkey’s membership prospects (Sulser & Biegala, 2002). Chirac, personally supportive of Turkey, despite his party’s hostility toward that position, was also keen on maintaining France’s position of European consensus-builder together with Germany. Pushing too hard for Turkey’s cause would undermine its authority in this respect and also create more political problems domestically. In the French domestic debate on Turkey, Chirac invoked the European norms and values (read: political Copenhagen criteria) as the community values that could bind Turkey to Europe, as opposed to the historical and religious identities that would inevitably separate the two. This rhetoric implied that Turkey’s progress toward accession would also have to be governed by the pace at which Turkey actually progressed toward meeting the political criteria.

Denmark, on the other hand, seemed to have had the preferences of a brakeman, which were either shrouded in, or authentically concerned with, the Copenhagen criteria. In its role of formal consensus-builder due to its half-month tenure in the EU presidency, Denmark worked closely with the Commission in holding Turkey to account for its progress toward meeting the political criteria by pointing out that it had not met them. As the Danish proposals for Copenhagen materialized, Rasmussen found himself at odds with Schröder on Turkey as well as on other issues, such as the future funding of the Common Agricultural Policy and what effects the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe would have thereon (Parenthoen, 2002; “Schröder hält EU-Erweiterungskosten,” 2002). In order to outflank Rasmussen, Schröder decided with Chirac to revive the Franco-German axis of European leadership.

7.2.7 Franco-German Pre-Summit Agreement

At a December 4 bilateral pre-summit (before Copenhagen) meeting between Germany and France in Storkow (Germany), Schröder sought to convince Chirac to support the date for negotiations, or
at the least, the ‘date for a date’ option (Parenthoen, 2002). The idea was that if Berlin and Paris could have an agreement, supported by London and Rome, Luxembourg and Vienna would relent (Blome & Middel, 2002; “Schröder und Chirac,” 2002).

Prior to the meeting, both had determined that there should be a ‘clear signal’ for Turkey, whereby that they had agreed to come to a common position at Copenhagen. (“Berlin und Paris,” 2002). However, while they aimed at coming to a common position, their preferences differed. Chirac, according to a ‘usually well-informed source’ preferred a date for negotiations to begin some time in 2008, if any date was to be set at all (Ludlow, 2004, p. 255). Germany preferred to set a date, but only when Turkey’s progress was considered adequate (Scally, 2002). This position also implies a date when the Turkey’s progress would have to be gauged. Meanwhile, they also had a financial package for the Common Agricultural Policy to come to an agreement on.

After the bilateral meeting, the two leaders remained cryptic about its outcome, except by hinting at consensus, and asserting that Turkey would receive that ‘clear signal’ (“Geteiltes Echo auf deutsch-französische,” 2002). However, soon there were mixed messages leaking to the press. Some reported that they were intent on a specific date for the start of actual negotiations, set on 1 July 2005 (Beeston, 2002; Black, 2002b; 2002c; Dempsey & Guha, 2002; “Türkei kann auf,” 2002). Others declared that the Franco-German negotiations had failed to arrive at a consensus, and that the Germans had prematurely claimed success in the press (Hooper & Traynor, 2002).

Prior to the Copenhagen summit, Fischer put out to the press that a large majority of member states intended to offer Turkey a date for accession negotiations. This was contradictory to statements made by the Danish Presidency asserting that Turkey would not be given any dates (Boulton, Dempsey & Hoyos, 2002; Lucas, 2002; “Mehrheit der EU-Staaten,” 2002). However, the Council would still have to gauge whether or not it had met the political criteria in mid or late 2004 to determine if it was eligible for such negotiations to begin (“Berlin und Paris wollen Datum,” 2002; “Chirac bestätigt,” 2002; Parenthoen & Goulliaud, 2002; “Türkei soll bedingtes,” 2002; “Verhandlungen,” 2002). This formulation would meet the needs of both Turkey and the brakemen by offering Turkey a firm date and the brakemen the assurance that Turkey would have to meet the political criteria fully before the negotiations could begin.
7.2.8 Pre-summit wrangling

Prior to the Copenhagen summit, Turkey, the participants as well as the United States all put forward their arguments in the press, over the telephone, and at the pre-summit foreign ministers meeting. Ankara rejected the Franco-German proposal, Washington picked up the telephone to Berlin insisting on Turkey getting a better deal, while other parties also made their positions known to one another and the press.

In response to the Franco-German position, Erdoğan reversed his earlier acceptance of the ‘date for a date’ position, publicly arguing that negotiations proper should begin in 2003, rather than 2005. In his argument to the Turkish press, Erdoğan suggested that Osama bin Laden would be pleased with this division between Christians and Muslims (Ankara lehnt,” 2002; “Erdoğan rejette,” 2002; Middel, 2002e). Gül also made it clear that anything less than a date for accession negotiations would be difficult to explain to the Turkish public as anything other than a rejection of Turkey based on its faith (“La Turquie réclame,” 2002; “Türkei besteht,” 2002). Furthermore, he indicated that the Franco-German proposal was designed to delay Turkey and was an act of bad faith on the part of Berlin and Paris. It also made the Turkish press that Ankara considered turning down German and French tenders, especially those for military hardware (Curta, 2002).

During a bilateral summit in Rome between Italy and Greece on December 6, Berlusconi and Simitis said that the Franco-German proposal was inadequate, and that negotiations should start no later than January of 2004, a formulation which, according to Berlusconi, was also supported by Spain and the United Kingdom (“L'Italie et la Grèce,” 2002). Meanwhile, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, also rejecting the Franco-German formulation, reiterated the Commission’s position that Turkey would first have to meet the Copenhagen political criteria before negotiations could commence. “There will be no date given at Copenhagen,” he told the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag (Kaserer, 2002; “Rasmussen gegen Datum,” 2002).

7.2.9 The Copenhagen Summit

One the sidelines of the 12-13 December summit, prior to when decisions had to be made, Gül and Erdoğan met with Schröder and Chirac for a last-minute lobby on behalf of the earlier negotiation
date. In this effort they explicitly put Cyprus on the table (“La Turquie veut,” 2002). This, however, did not shift the Franco-German consensus.

Rasmussen had the initiative in drafting the presidency conclusions. In his draft, which he communicated orally to the heads of state and government during the working dinner on the 12th, the idea was that the Council would decide in December 2004 if Turkey merited accession negotiations, pursuant to the Commission’s annual progress report (Ludlow, 2004, p. 311). As Ludlow argues, this was not much of a ‘clear signal’, given that this would be done regardless of any decision coming out of the Copenhagen Council, as a review of the Commission’s reports was an annual affair. In reality, if it offered any signal, it was that the Council would ignore Turkey’s ambitions in 2003. During this dinner, the tone about Turkey was very critical in which Chirac was among the most negative.

The following morning, when the written draft was being reviewed, Blair and Berlusconi took the offensive in an attempt to bring their colleagues about (ibid). One strategy thereto was to convince the others that the December 2004 date should be the latest point at which the Council should decide about Turkey, and that the matter could be taken up at an earlier time. The brakemen were not persuaded, arguing that the December 2004 date for deciding on negotiations was as far as they would go. Chirac, tired of the issue, as they had already spent two hours debating Turkey, did not comment.

During the lunch, however, Chirac brought the matter up again, arguing that the Council should reassure Ankara that the process would not be without end. Surprised by Chirac’s about-face, Berlusconi inquired what had changed since that morning, to which Chirac replied the difference was that this position had, in the meantime, been agreed to between the German Chancellor and himself (ibid, p.312). It was, in fact, Germany’s insistence that the phrase ‘without delay’ should be added to the draft so that the negotiations would not be stalled after the 2004 decision.

In the final conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, the indicative clause, pertaining to Turkey’s progress towards EU membership, read as follows:

The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.

(European Council, 2002c, par. 19).

In short, the final decision was to essentially opt for the ‘date for a date’ option, whereby another date would follow ‘without delay’ after a positive finding by the Council in December 2004. That the
rendezvous date – December 2004 – was destined to occur under the Dutch presidency was not by accident, according to one high-level member of the Dutch foreign ministry. Given the right-wing direction that the first and second Balkenende cabinets had taken in the Netherlands in 2002, it likely that the brakemen had ultimately agreed to the 2004 date because it would then take place under a brakeman presidency. If this was indeed the brakemen’s aim, their plan miscarried as the next chapter will detail.

Press reports about the summit mostly described the main diplomatic clash between the hard and the soft drivers – with Italy and the UK as the most prominent among the former – and the Franco-German axis as their opponents (Blitz & Graham, 2002; Dempsey, 2002e; Staunton, 2002; “Türkei setzt,” 2002). However, while in the entire constellation of opinions none of the brakemen happened to be large countries. They were nevertheless numerous and together made up a significant bloc, with Denmark, controlling the draft of the presidency conclusions, prominently among them.

Since France and Germany took up the fight against the hard drivers, the council rallied around the soft-driver position – i.e. the ‘rendezvous date’ – if it were to come to any consensus at all. What is more, this allowed France and Germany to present themselves as those who were the hard-nosed bargainers on behalf of the Copenhagen enlargement regime, with the hard drivers being soft on the rules, and the brakemen being intolerant or even bigoted. Schröder and Chirac also showed that the United States and Turkey had not been able to bully them at a delicate time in the broader scheme of international diplomacy (Webster & Watson, 2002). This was particularly advantageous for both leaders in their domestic politics.

7.2.10 Aftermath

Though the conclusions were a very modest victory for Turkey’s proponents, Turkey itself was not pleased with the results. It had pushed for a time-table that would have commenced negotiations as soon as possible. Prime Minister Gül responded with calling the European Council discriminatory in not treating Turkey the same way that it had treated other candidate countries (“Accord pour,” 2002). In particular Gül blamed Chirac for preventing an earlier date (“Türkei weist,” 2002).

Chirac and Schröder, however, calmed Gül & Erdoğan’s ire, by convincing them that the result was a compromise solution that kept Turkey in the process, which was better than what would
have happened if the brakemen had had their way (“Turkey swallows its disappointment,” 2002). Tony Blair also put on a brave face, saying “This is the first time that a firm date has really been given for Turkey” (Blitz, 2002).

Many of the heads of state and government, on the other hand, referred to Turkey’s (and the United States’) “bullying tactics”, as partially responsible for the meager results. Particularly Jacques Chirac is said to have been irritated by this, when he told his colleagues at the Council table to not give in to the “Turkish extortion” (Dempsey & Graham, 2002b; Lauber, 2002). He was also quoted as lecturing Abdullah Gül, saying that, “It is not enough to accept European law, one must also be polite and civilized” (Ridderbusch, 2002d – trans. mine). Juncker remarked that “blackmail is not part of the Acquis Communautaire.” He further complained that “Turkey’s tone was unbearable,” which, to him, demonstrated that Turkey was not ready for membership. Even Berlusconi, one of the most outspoken drivers acknowledged that “many did not appreciate the pressure,” that Turkey exercised on the member states (Dubois & Quatremer, 2002; “EU jetzt,” 2002 – trans. mine).

7.3 ISSUES

In 2002, three particular issues were present in the broader context within which the debate about Turkey took place. The first of these was, again, the Cyprus situation. Concurrent with the discussions about timing a date-for-a-date, discussions between the Cypriot communities were taking place at Copenhagen and in the run up to the European Council meeting. Secondly, the enlargement of NATO was discussed, where Turkey threatened to hold up NATO enlargement if it were not treated more favorably by the EU member states, in a similar fashion as Greece threatened to hold up EU enlargement if Cyprus did not get more favorable treatment than the member states were inclined to give it. Finally, the looming invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies created a security debate around the membership question. The United States, which hoped to have a northern front from which to invade Iraq, was keen to assist Turkey in getting an earlier date from the member states.
7.3.1 Cyprus

Concurrent with the diplomacy about Turkish accession, the related issue of the Cyprus dispute was being addressed during the EU summits. European leaders, especially Gerhard Schröder and his Greek colleague Costas Simitis supported Turkey’s EU membership aspiration, but frequently also mentioned that progress on Cyprus would go a long way toward making the Council agree to a date for negotiations to begin. However, other than Greece, the other fourteen member states were careful to make explicit that the decision on Turkey was not related to the negotiations about Cyprus (Zecchini, 2002d).

Joscka Fischer declared that there was “no conditionality” between a solution to Cyprus and progress toward Turkish membership, but “everything depends on everything else” (Sulser, Biegala & Plichta, 2002 – trans. mine). In Copenhagen, at a parallel venue, the United Nations facilitated talks between the Cypriot leaders. However Rauf Denktash, president of the TRNC (the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which was only recognized by Turkey), was hampered in his participation due to health problems and the talks ended without fruitful result (Buters, 2002).

In a letter to Rasmussen, however, Gül hinted that if the Council would offer Turkey a date, it would create a positive environment in which the Cyprus problem might more easily be solved (Lucas, 2002). The scene was set where three connected issues, Cyprus, NATO, and Turkey’s date for accessions, could be solved in one stroke in Copenhagen (Boulton, Dempsey, Hadjipapas & Hope 2002; Wintour & Smith, 2002). However, most member states preferred a solution to the stalemated conflict before being rewarding Turkey with negotiations for membership in the Union. Meanwhile, Denktash rejected a UN plan designed to reunite the divided island, and the hopes for a solution were dashed.

7.3.2 NATO – EU relations

Turkey’s membership in NATO allowed it a certain degree of leverage with the EU, a card it had already played in 1999, when it threatened to scupper NATO enlargement if the EU/NATO member states were not more forthcoming on its bid for EU membership and concessions
concerning Cyprus (see Chapter 5). Until December 2001, Turkey had vetoed any EU/WEU\textsuperscript{30} use of NATO assets, with the argument that EU-member Greece would drive the EU/WEU to partiality in the event of any hostilities between the two NATO “allies”.

This deadlock with Turkey was initially solved by a US/UK initiative involving two concessions. First, Turkey would be consulted on all EU/WEU decisions where Turkey’s interests were involved, and second, it was agreed that EU military forces would not intervene in conflicts between NATO and EU members. Though it seemed like an elegant compromise, this proposal antagonized Greece, and thus a Turkish veto on the deal was replaced by a Greek veto (Çayhan, 2003, p. 47-48; Ridderbusch, 2002a).

At Seville, the summit at the end of Spain’s presidency during the first half of 2002, the EU/NATO conundrum was framed in the light of the Greek-Turkish disputes. In an attempt to solve them, the Council offered Turkey a timetable for accession negotiations, but when Turkey did not respond to some concessions made by Greece, the Council’s offer was withdrawn again (van Lierop & Paalvast). Greece, seeing its demands not met, blocked the EU/NATO agreement with its veto. This, in turn, prevented the EU from taking over the NATO peaceforce ‘Amber Fox’ mission in Macedonia at the end of October (“Gipfel lässt,” 2002).

\subsection*{7.3.3 United States & Iraq}

In late 2002, broader diplomatic circles were concerned with possible action against Iraq, as the United States was demanding WMD (weapons of mass destruction) disarmament, while Iraq opaquely disclaimed the possession of such weapons. The American military strategy sought to use Turkish territory as a front to invade Iraq. To obtain Turkey’s willingness, Washington argued forcefully to the EU leaders that Turkey should be given a date for negotiations. This pressure annoyed several of the EU leaders, notably Jacques Chirac and Berlusconi, both already proponents of Turkey (“La Turquie a ‘la capacité’,” 2002).

In its persuasive endeavors, Washington also leaned on Denmark’s Anders Fogh Rasmussen in particular, but he too chafed under the pressure and said he responded that the decision would be a European decision, not an American decision (Gelie & Bocev, 2002). To show that not all

\textsuperscript{30} The Western European Union (WEU) was a European framework for military cooperation existing since 1954 that was gradually absorbed into the EU.
countries were put off by the American interference, Denis MacShane, the British Europe Minister, responded to complaints of American lobbying by putting it in a different perspective: “The Europeans are always quick to lecture the United States on what it should do in terms of strategic decisions,” he said. “I have no problem with Americans making their point of view on Europe known to us” (Vinocur, 2002).

After the decision, lacking the wanted date, the White House still congratulated Turkey (on the European decision, thus framing it as a victory for Turkey (“Les Etats-Unis se félicitent,” 2002). Yet the pressure exerted by the United States had not exactly been new to the EU. European leaders had also chafed under the pressure from Washington in both 1997 and 1999, and would do so again in 2004 and 2006. Therefore, the pressure from the United States cannot explain the varying European policies on Turkey, even if it was – doubtlessly – on the minds of the European leaders, for good or ill.

In many respects the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003 split the EU member states in their policies. France and Germany, in particular, were loud antagonists – Gerhard Schröder won reelection based on his opposition to the war. In contrast to France and Germany’s position, other European countries were supportive of the United States’ policies on Iraq. In January, eight European leaders signed what became known as the ‘gang of eight letter’, expressing their support. If this signified a distinction between the Atlanticist countries and the continentals, it clearly did not correlate with the member-states’ policies vis-à-vis Turkey. Germany, for instance, was a soft driver of Turkey’s membership ambitions.

### 7.4 The Member-State Positions

Categorizing member states as driver/passenger/brakeman in 2002 leaves much to interpretation. In that year, there were, essentially, three explicit policy proposals on the table. One option was to end the process altogether and opt for a ‘privileged partnership’. However, while this may have been the preference of one or two member states in 2002, it was not actively articulated even by the most stalwart brakemen.

The most explicit proposal from the brakeman side of the argument was the ‘wait-and-see’ approach, by which negotiations could start at some time in the future, once the Commission and
the Council deemed that Turkey had fulfilled the political Copenhagen criteria. The most forward-leaning approach, articulated by Turkey and the United States was for an ‘early start’ of negotiations in 2003. This was also the position of the Italian and British governments, which argued for December 2004 to be the latest date at which negotiations should start. The third proposal was for a ‘rendezvous date’, which was a date at a specific time in the future when the Council would decide on opening accession negotiations or not.

While, in a three-choice decision it would be easy to consider those opting for the ‘wait and see’ approach as brakemen, for the ‘early start’ as drivers, and for the ‘rendezvous date’ option as passengers, this would mistake adopted strategies for the actual preferences of the member states. It would also misunderstand the nature by which the Council would come to its conclusions. The ‘rendezvous date’ proposal was one hammered out between the French and the Germans, with the Germans advocating for the more favorable terms for Turkey and France wanting a longer time horizon. The ‘rendezvous date’ proposal would be the most that the drivers could get, given the large number of countries supporting the ‘wait and see’ policy, as proposed by the Commission and the advocated by the Danish presidency.

As such, the advocates for the ‘early start’ and ‘rendezvous date’ options are all considered drivers. The distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ drivers serves the purpose of illustration. These distinctions are not taken up in the analyses of the later chapters in this research. The one exception to the rule is France, which is categorized as a ‘passenger’ to indicate its middle position, not because it was passive. This will be further detailed in the section on France, below.

Nevertheless, ‘rendezvous date’ option was still a considerable disappointment for Turkey. This was especially so since this date would not be until after the fifth enlargement, which would expand the veto-holding members from fifteen to twenty-five, one of whom would be Greek Cyprus. Nevertheless, it was a timeline with a medium-term perspective on accession negotiations as well as a firm commitment that Turkey would not be left behind indefinitely, regardless of its merits.

7.4.1 Austria

The Austrian government proved to be an outspoken brakeman during the 2002 episode. During this episode, however, Austria experienced a breakdown in the governing coalition of ÖVP –FPÖ (conservative Christian democrat - far-right liberal), due to turmoil within the FPÖ. This turmoil
began with a proposed tax reform being delayed due to the summer floods. Jörg Haider, the governor of the Austrian state Carinthia and former FPÖ-leader, had initiated the tax cuts to lower and middle incomes, whereas the Vice-Chancellor and serving FPÖ-leader Susanne Riess-Passer supported the government’s proposed delay of the tax cuts (“Austrian far-right,” 2002). Additionally, Riess-Passer supported withholding the party’s veto on the forthcoming EU enlargement, whereas the Haider faction desired to keep the unilateral veto option on the table (“FP in crisis,” 2002). The crisis in the party caused the resignation of Riess-Passer and her colleagues in the government, bringing about elections to be held in November.

The November elections resulted in considerable gains for Chancellor Schüssel’s ÖVP and great losses for the FPÖ. Pursuant to the elections, the political system engaged in three months of coalition negotiations with other parties, finally resolving to form another ÖVP-FPÖ coalition in 2003, though by then with a significantly different power balance between the two parties.

With regard to Turkey, there are several incidents that demonstrate the orientation of the government dealing with the 2002 issues of the EU. In the summer, prior to the political turmoil described above, the Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem paid a visit to Berlin, where the Austrian Ambassador Marius Calligaris made the comment to the German daily General-Anzeiger that Ankara was playing a “risky game” by making its case for a date as powerfully as it did. He argued that Turkey was setting itself up for frustration and disappointment by raising such expectations (Güsten, 2002).

Much later, after the pre-summit foreign ministers meeting in Brussels, when most countries seemed to be rallying around the Franco-German proposal, Austria dissented from this proposal in the press, arguing that the proposed process was too fast (“Turquie: le sommet,” 2002). According to one news report Austria was “deeply” opposed to giving any date to Turkey (Dempsey, 2002b) Ludlow argued that Austria had been Turkey’s most stalwart opponent at the Copenhagen summit itself (Ludlow 2004, p. 311).

Apart from these specific indications Austria’s position, the press frequently numbered Austria among other brakeman countries (e.g. Black, 2002a; Black & White, 2002; Blome & Middel, 2002; Bocev, 2002; Dempsey, 2002d; Dempsey & Graham, 2002b; Egurbide & Yarnoz, 2002; Fuller, 2002b; “La Turquie s’invite,” 2002; Modoux, 2002; Peel, 2002; “Türkei kann auf,” 2002; “Türkei setzt,” 2002; Zecchini, 2002c, 2002d).
7.4.2 Belgium

Belgium was a ‘driver’, supportive of an earlier date for accession negotiations. Nevertheless, it began the season with less enthusiasm for Turkey. After the reform package, which abolished the death penalty, among other things, the Belgian Foreign Ministry was hesitant to make a declarative statement on the matter, pending a full understanding of the content of the legislation (“Europeos consideran,” 2002). According to the Dutch daily Financieel Dagblad, Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstad opposed giving Turkey a date to begin negotiations, although he did express his firm support for Turkish membership, by saying that refusing eventual membership to a country, because it was not yet prepared to meet the criteria, would be too much of a sanction (“Brede instemming,” 2002).

In October and November, the Belgian position seemed to slightly warm up to Turkey’s cause. Upon the electoral victory of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey, Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel invited AKP leader Erdoğan to “implement his pro-European intentions and continue the implementation of constitutional reforms in view of satisfying the Copenhagen criteria” (“Le monde veut,” 2002 – trans. mine). In a mid-November speech about the EU at the College of Europe in Bruges, Verhofstadt said there was a false debate about this because “some people are dreaming of a monocultural Europe, the Europe of Christian values” (van Lierop & de Horde, 2002 – trans. mine). In the Belgian prime minister’s opinion, the question whether Turkey could join the EU had already been answered positively at the Helsinki summit in 1999. Setting a date for the start of negotiations was, in his opinion, up to the Turks (Buleke, 2002).

On December 6, having met with Yaşar Yakış, the new Turkish Foreign Minister, Louis Michel declared that Belgium would propose both an evaluation date and a date for negotiations to begin in 2004. “Having an assessment in 2004 and to also begin negotiations in 2004 would likely be more encouraging toward Turkey” (“UE-Turquie,” 2002). “The Franco-German position is positive,” he said, “but we would like to express a more pro-active position” (ibid, Akinci, 2002; de Barochez, 2002b; Zecchini, 2002c – trans. mine). In a cabinet decision, the Belgian government decided to support a date at “for example, the end of 2003,” especially if Turkey would join the European position on Cyprus (Middel, 2002c).

In contrast to Austria, which used the pre-summit foreign ministers meeting in Brussels to dissent on behalf of the brakeman position, Belgium complained that the process was too slow and that actual negotiations should commence mid-2004 (“Turquie: le sommet,” 2002). Ludlow and
numerous news articles number Belgium among the group of countries that supported Turkey for either the ‘early start’ or the ‘rendezvous date’ option (Black & White, 2002; Dempsey, 2002b; 2002c; Dubois & Quatremer, 2002; Gelie, 2002; Gelie & Bocev, 2002; Ludlow, 2004, p. 254; “Mehrheit der EU-Staaten,” 2002; Quatremer, 2002; Staunton, 2002; Webster & Watson, 2002; Zecchini, 2002d).

7.4.3 Denmark

During its presidency in the second half of 2002, Denmark was determined that enlargement would be the main focus, particularly of the Copenhagen summit. However, while it was determined to solve the remaining dilemmas of the fifth enlargement to Eastern Europe, it was not inclined to move Turkey’s candidacy forward. In embracing the ‘wait and see’ approach of the Commission, Denmark proved to be a brakeman.

This assessment was not beyond dispute, however. Several sources, including a confidential interview with a Dutch diplomat, identified Denmark as being in favor of Turkey. The majority of the news articles cited here as well, including the Ludlow account, mark Denmark as not being opposed to the principle that Turkey might join at some point. However, the Danes were adamant that Turkey should not be given a date to begin accession negotiations before it had met the Copenhagen criteria, and Denmark very resistant to adopt a rendezvous date. The articles contradicting this finding are mentioned below, but their weaknesses are also pointed out.

Although Denmark had to play the part of consensus-broker in its role of the presidency, with regard to the Turkish case it frequently clashed with where the major countries wanted to go. During its preparation for Copenhagen, Denmark’s constant refrain on Turkey reverberated the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ that needed to be unbending in the face of other interests. One Danish diplomat, also thinking along these lines, expressed fear that political interests, presumably those in Turkey’s favor, would weaken the Council’s resolve to hold Turkey to the Copenhagen standard (Sulser & Biegala, 2002).

Accordingly, the Danish drafts for the presidency conclusions always articulated the most reserved position with regard to Turkey. Along with the Commission, Denmark held that though Turkey had made respectable progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria on paper, it still had to be implemented in practice. Though Turkey should be treated the same as other candidates, it had
not met the political criteria and should therefore not be given a date to begin accession negotiations.

In a June interview with Der Spiegel, Rasmussen was asked about Denmark wanting a preliminary decision on the accession of Turkey, to which he replied that, “I don’t believe Turkey is that far yet. As a candidate they must be treated the same as other candidates. That means: negotiations must begin immediately when they have met the political criteria” (Ertel & Schreiber, 2002 – trans. mine). This response supported the idea of the negotiation beginning ‘without delay’, except that the Turks would have to wait until they met the political criteria before setting a predetermined date.

In July, Denmark’s ambassador to Berlin, Christian Hoppe, remarked that Turkey still had a great deal to do before it could think of accession negotiations (Güsten, 2002). That is not to say that the Danes were unimpressed with Turkey’s progress. The Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller called the reform package “good progress” (Gottschlich, 2002). However, their assessment was that it was insufficient. On November 9th, responding to Giscard d’Estaing’s interview in Le Monde, Rasmussen reiterated that Turkey should be treated the same as the other candidates but that Turkey’s progress did not yet merit a date for accession negotiations (Leparmentier & Zecchini, 2002).

In the growing rift between Rasmussen and Schröder, as already hinted at, the Chancellor was not pleased with the draft conclusions as they were taking shape in Copenhagen. Because of Schröder’s displeasure on Turkey as well as the financial package starting to take shape, the chancellor circumvented Rasmussen by taking matters straight to Chirac, with whom he agreed on a rendezvous date for Turkey. Rasmussen, in turn, rejected the Franco-German common position, maintaining that Turkey should not be given any date until it had fulfilled all the political criteria. He thus rejected any dates and (inaccurately, as it turned out) affirmed that none would be offered at Copenhagen (Kaserer, 2002).

Throughout the episode Denmark remained particularly firm about not offering Turkey a date, rendezvous or otherwise, and used its control over the text of the presidency conclusions to avoid naming any date, despite heavy pressure from the larger EU members as well as from Washington and Ankara (Ludlow, 2004, p. 258). Prior to the summit, Rasmussen received a phone call from President Bush, who argued on Turkey’s behalf on strategic grounds. Rasmussen said he shared Bush’s concern over the possibility of Turkey sliding into fundamentalism, but maintained that a country can only join the European Union when it meets the political criteria set out at
Copenhagen in 1993 (van Lierop, 2002). Like others, the Danish leadership was annoyed by the American interference. Referring to the phonecall, Per Stig Møller asserted, “that the important thing for Turkey is not what Americans think, but what Europeans decide” (Gelie & Bocev, 2002 – trans. mine).

According to Ludlow, there was a certain amount of misunderstanding about Rasmussen’s position. There was a “tendency of the Anglo-Americans to assume that he was ‘one of us’” (Ludlow, 2004, p. 258). As will be described below, this misperception was also true of the Financial Times, despite Rasmussen’s repeated assertions that he was not intending to offer Turkey any dates. At Copenhagen, when Turkey’s allies in the Council received their drafts of the presidency conclusions just before the summit, the draft stated that the Council would not gauge Turkey’s progress until December 2004 after that year’s regular report by the Commission. While this accommodated the rendezvous date idea, it did so negatively by excluding the possibility for an earlier review rather than simply advocating for negotiations to start as soon as Turkey met the political criteria. Ludlow wrote that “The Presidency’s message was in other words heavily conditional, dateless and devoid of anything that could be described as genuinely novel” (ibid, p. 311). It was dateless in the sense that it did not offer a date for accession negotiations to begin if Turkey was found to have met the political criteria.

The German foreign minister suggested that the negotiations should begin ‘without delay’ after the 2004 Council decision, Rasmussen opposed this amendment, being profoundly sceptical about the wisdom of it (ibid, 312). He argued that it would destroy the conditionality contained in the Presidency draft. Rasmussen only reluctantly acquiesced after a tactful explanation from Jacques Chirac, supported by Blair and Berlusconi, on how Turkey’s obligations were well understood in Ankara, and the conditionality was sufficiently implied.

In summary, while Rasmussen held out the carrot of a nebulous ‘positive signal’, neither he nor his foreign policy team ever advocated for a positive signal to be put into the conclusions. The draft conclusions were not reflective of the balance of interests among the member states, and none of the major member states. In that regard, Denmark behaved no differently than the brakemen, despite its role as consensus-broker.

As already mentioned, several articles in the Financial Times challenged the findings of the paragraphs above. Leyla Boulton and Judy Dempsey (2002) mention Denmark as backing Britain together with Greece in favor of a rendezvous date, probably in 2003. Boulton & Parker, (2002) on the same day (November 9th), also list Denmark among these same countries, along with Germany
as wanting to send Turkey a ‘positive signal’. This ‘positive signal’ had indeed been the phrase used by Denmark (as read in e.g. Black & White, 2002; Buters, 2002; Fuller, 2002a), but it had never been actually backed by a date to start negotiations, not even by a date to set such a date.

In an article of her own on November 20th, Dempsey (2002b) maintained the driver interpretation by writing that Denmark supported offering Turkey a date. Three weeks later, however, in Boulton, Dempsey and Hoyos (2002), Rasmussen, after having met with Erdoğan in Copenhagen, was cited as saying “As far as a date for the start of the accession negotiations is concerned, my answer is clear: Turkey can get a date if and when Turkey fulfils the political criteria.” Thereby, at least two of these three reporters contradicted their own previous account of Denmark’s position. Curiously, the Financial Times, with Judy Dempsey again as a co-author, in an article on December 4th (Daniel & Dempsey, 2002), maintained the conviction that Denmark was a driver, by naming Denmark among a group of other drivers (Britain, Greece, Spain and Italy).

Other articles supporting the classification of Denmark as a brakeman were: Fuller, 2002b, Gelie, 2002, and “Mehrheit der EU-Staaten,” 2002, Webster & Watson, 2002.

7.4.4 Finland

In 2002, Finland adopted a much more critical stance vis-à-vis Turkey than previously and is here numbered among the brakemen. According to the press reports cited below this mostly due to Turkey’s human rights record. During a state visit to Germany in early November, Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen took a different position than the German government, when the question of Turkey was raised at a press conference. Regarding the date, Lipponen argued that “it is still too early” and that there were other ways in which to signal support for Turkey’s accession ambitions, while he “wished for a real debate about what sort of Europe was desired and where the borders are” (Hollstein, 2002 – trans. mine).

After an early December bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Costas Simitis of Greece, Lipponen agreed with sending Turkey a ‘positive signal’ by supporting its reforms and Turkey’s ‘European perspective’. However, according to Agence France-Presse, he added that, “the Finnish government doubted that one can fix a date for the start of accession negotiations” at the Copenhagen summit (“Athènes et Helsinki,” 2002 – trans. mine). The Spanish news agency Agencia EFE, on the other hand, also reporting on the bilateral meeting with Simitis in two related articles,
mentioned Lipponen and Simitis as agreeing on a date for negotiations to be set at Copenhagen ("Lipponen y Simitis," 2002; "Ministro griego," 2002). Due to the direct quote in the AFP article, which is more generally supported by the remainder of the Finnish press’ assessment it can be concluded that Agencia EFE had probably reported the event inaccurately, especially since Finland was frequently mentioned among the brakemen countries in other news reports (Dempsey, 2002d; Modoux, 2002; Ludlow, 2004, p. 254; “Türkei kann auf,” 2002). Other articles name ‘the Scandinavian countries’ as being brakemen, en bloc, without mentioning Finland (or Sweden) by name (Fuller, 2002b; Zecchini, 2002d).

7.4.5 France

France’s position in the debate is the most difficult to discern. There was a vigorous domestic debate about the issue. Giscard d’Estaing’s opposition to Turkey’s membership ambitions has already been mentioned, but his was far from the only voice from the mainstream French right to oppose Turkey’s membership ambitions or to call Turkey’s ‘fit’ in the EU into question. Alain Juppé, prime minister until May of that year, for instance, saw Turkey as a bad fit on cultural grounds, while Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, argued for a thorough debate about Europe’s identity and frontiers (Ludlow, 2004, p. 255).

The French left, on the other hand, opposed exclusion of Turkey on neither cultural nor religious grounds, but on human rights. One exception, socialist Hubert Védrine – de Villepin’s predecessor, who had been on board for Turkey during his own tenure as Foreign Minister during the 1997 and 1999 episodes – argued that Europe had to end somewhere, and thus a geographic rationale for excluding Turkey seemed justifiable (Barotte, 2002; Dely, Guiral & Schneider, 2002; “Droite et gauche,” 2002; Zerrouky, 2002). Most socialists, however, articulated a policy of strict adherence to the Copenhagen criteria for membership (“Turquie: Les Leaders,” 2002). However, in the wake of Chirac’s overwhelming electoral victory in the presidential elections and his party’s onslaught in the parliamentary elections, it was the right that called the shots in French policy making.

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31 This assessment need not delve into the opinions of the non-mainstream French right, which were vitriolic on the subject of Turkey joining the EU.
The question of Turkey remained out of the press for a while until late October, when the issue of Turkish accession and the French policy toward that prospect became salient. At the Brussels summit, Chirac had distanced himself from Berlin and London by agreeing with the Commission’s position that the progress made in Turkey did not yet merit the beginning of negotiations. “All the Europeans are impressed with the progress recently made by Turkey, particularly in the field of human rights, but they are obliged to note that, as yet, the progress is insufficient,” he said, adding: “From there, it is very difficult to set dates.” Nevertheless he argued that something could still be done to fix the “hopes and ambitions” of Turkey (Boehm, 2002; Dubois, Majerczak & Quatremer, 2002 – trans. mine).

After the Turkish elections in early November, which brought Gül and Erdoğan to power, the French government was cautious about what the new leadership in Turkey would bring. “We will be attentive to the actions of the new government,” French Prime Minister Raffarin told Les Echos (“Les Européens dispose,” 2002). By late November, the foreign ministry articulated a policy in line with the European Commission: that Turkey would start accession negotiations once it met the political criteria, but that there was no date for this to happen (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2002).

Chirac meanwhile asserted that Turkey had “its full place” in Europe, thus countering many of the right-wing voices in French political circles. “While one can discuss from a strictly geographical perspective,” he said regarding Turkish EU membership aspirations, “one cannot have such a discussion about history and civilization” (de Barochez, 2002a; “Jacques Chirac,” 2002 – trans. mine; Zecchini, 2002b). Chirac also took particular issue with the religious argument, addressing the supposed threat of 65 million Muslim Turks invading Europe as soon as Turkey had become a member of the EU. “Is there talk of 60 million French Christians?” he asked rhetorically (Merchet, 2002 – trans. mine). At the NATO summit soon thereafter, Chirac reiterated that Turkey had a place in Europe. He explicitly opposed the view that Turkey’s dominant religion made it ineligible for membership, arguing for a more secular interpretation of the question. Instead of religion being the defining characteristic, he argued that Turkey should have its place in Europe from a political, economic, social and strategic point of view, (“Sommet de l’OTAN,” 2002).

As of November 27, nearly two weeks before the Copenhagen summit, Chirac declared that his government was still undecided about a date, though he indicated that he was working toward a European consensus on the issue (“La France privilégie,” 2002; Leclercq, 2002; Manoli, 2002).
Chirac also emphasized the importance of the Copenhagen criteria in determining Turkey’s progress (Mamarbachi, 2002; “La Turquie a plaidé,” 2002).

In early December, Dominique de Villepin, held a foreign policy speech in Marseille, in which his headline phrase was that the European commitment to Turkey could not be questioned (Parenthoen, 2002; Tréan, 2002). His aides later explained this to La Croix as implying France’s interest in having the Copenhagen European Council set a date for the start of accession negotiations (“Villepin veut confirmer,” 2002).

The Franco-German pre-summit has already been detailed. At this meeting Chirac and Schröder agreed to push for actual negotiations to begin in July 2005, following the 2004 Commission’s assessment of Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria (Dempsey & Guha, 2002). This seems to have been a concession on France’s part, by which it became more of a driver than its actual preferences had dictated.

Nevertheless, while clearly not unsupportive of Turkey’s ambitions, sources around Chirac argued that he would not allow negotiations to start by the first half of 2004 (“Frankreich uneins,” 2002). Regarding this question of timing, Chirac said that he understood Turkey’s desire for a date to open accession negotiations, but that the procedures of the Copenhagen criteria dictated when such negotiations could begin (“La Turquie a toute,” 2002).

During the Copenhagen summit itself, Ludlow (2004, p. 311) names Chirac as the ‘most brutal’ of Turkey’s critics. Even so, Chirac seemed to move back and forth depending on the precise formulations. For example, when he had come to an agreement on the matter with Schröder, he adopted the December 2004 date that he had, as mentioned above, previously dismissed (ibid., p. 312). It may be clear that Gül and Erdoğan did not think of Chirac as their ally after the summit (“Tension entre Paris et Ankara,” 2002). More than likely, however, this public displeasure on the part of the Turks suited Chirac’s domestic politics just fine.

Chirac’s position left his prime minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, in a predicament as a majority their center-right UMP members vehemently opposed Turkish membership. At the same time, Raffarin had to maintain a united front of the the French executive, as was common practice in French politics. Even under the uneasy Chirac-Jospin cohabitation, which had resigned in May that year, the President and the Prime Minister had always attempted to speak with one voice on diplomatic matters (Tabard, 2002).

In many instances, Chirac and members of his government took very critical –sometimes even brutal, to quote Ludlow – stances vis-à-vis Turkey, arguing for longer timetables when Turkey
and its allies argued to shorten them. According to well-placed sources, the date Chirac seemed to have in mind for the beginning of negotiations was in 2008, rather than 2004 (Ludlow, 2004, p. 255; Modoux, 2002). If there were no more to the story, France would certainly have to be numbered among the brakemen, but as has already been pointed out, Chirac had, in spite of domestic aversion, not played a particularly ill-disposed role in the debates. As one EU diplomat put it, “Chirac... is not hostile to Turkey. But... he will be a tough negotiator” (Boulton, Dempsey & Hoyos, 2002).

It was Jacques Chirac who brokered the ‘rendezvous date’ with Germany, as opposed to the ‘wait-and-see’ approach put forward by the Commission and the Presidency. This may still not warrant calling France a ‘driver’, especially when its position is compared to that of the 1997 and 1999 debates. More than likely, though impossible to prove using press reports, France’s stance during the 2002 episode was strategic, in that it was highly critical to placate domestic pressure but nevertheless yielding toward Germany as all the other major European countries (The UK, Spain, Germany, Italy) were drivers. Perhaps France’s position needs to be analyzed with an even broader set of interests. For instance, the fact that France ‘lightened up’ on Turkey between the 12th of December and the 13th, suggests that some deal had been made with Germany. It is, however, beyond the scope of this research to determine what exchanges were made in return for France’s flip on Turkey.

Because France was difficult to place in either the driver or the brakeman category, it will be counted as a passenger, though this should not be mistaken for a passive position.

7.4.6 Germany

Germany’s position during the 2002 episode appeared to vary, at least in terms of what it expressed in the press. The two concurrent developments that seemed to relate to Germany’s position were its closely-fought bundestag elections and its relationship with the United States during the run-up to the Iraq War. During this episode, Germany’s position seemed to shift from that of a passenger to that of an outspoken driver. Then, if shifted policy to appear like a moderate driver, as it was building the Council’s consensus together with France. In the final analysis, Germany needs to be considered a driver as it adopted a pragmatic position with which France could agree and get a result that was more beneficial for Turkey than the common position of the Commission and the Danish
presidency, and also more positive for Turkey than the French preference. The following paragraphs
detail Germany’s evolving positions and analyse the reasons around which the rhetoric evolved.

As already mentioned, at the end of the Seville summit, Schröder doubted the possibility for
a binding timetable being offered at Copenhagen, a position that was ascribed to the impending
Bundestag elections by the Berliner Zeitung (“Problem-Kandidat Türkei,” 2002). In other words,
Schröder offering the same level of support for Turkey as he had three years earlier was seen as
hurting the SPD’s electoral prospects.

In early July, İsmail Cem traveled to Berlin to discuss Turkey’s enlargement perspectives
with Joschka Fischer. At their meeting, Fischer assured Cem of Germany’s support, but that
progress towards negotiations was in Ankara’s own hands. He also said that it would be up to the
Commission to gauge Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria (“Fischer
unterstützt Türkei,” 2002). As such, while Fischer was expressing his good will toward Turkey, he
also stressed that the results in Copenhagen would be a function of Turkey’s own policy adjustments
toward meeting the criteria.

In August, after Turkey had ratified its reforms, abolishing the death penalty and allowing
education and broadcasts in Kurdish, Joschka Fischer declared that the reforms were a positive
signal for Turkey and Europe. Interior Minister Otto Schily said that the ratification was very
important for relations between the EU and Turkey (“Türkei bringt,” 2002). The state secretary of
foreign affairs, Guntar Pleuger, said that, “the Turkish reform package was unthinkable four years
ago. It is an important step toward Europe. A target date may, on the one hand, contribute to
dynamism, but on the other hand, if it is not feasible, it will create great frustration” (Ridderbusch,
2002b – trans. mine). In other words, Germany did not wish to commit its political capital to
Turkey’s cause, leaving it up to Turkey to advance on its own merits, rather than on its political
connections.

Meanwhile, Edmund Stoiber, the CSU (The Bavarian Christian Social Union) candidate for
Chancellor during that year, also made it clear that he would not shift the CDU/CSU position on
Turkey when his party was re-elected. His stated grounds for opposing Turkey were based in cultural
and religious differences and were not going to be shifted by Turkey’s progress toward meeting the
Copenhagen criteria. In an interview with Die Welt, Stoiber’s ally and coalition partner Wolfgang
Schäuble, deputy chairman of CDU (Christian democrats) – defined the CDU/CSU position on the
EU as a community of destiny and identity, in which countries that were only partially in Europe
could not be full members. Given Turkey’s importance, he advocated for the closest possible
partnership and dialogue instead of membership. Interestingly, Schäuble did mention that because of the promise of membership made in the sixties, there were expectations in Turkey that one could not unilaterally terminate (Schuster, 2002).

Nevertheless, it was clear that a CDU/CSU-led government would turn Germany into a brakeman. It was less clear whether or not the SPD/Grünen, were going to drive Turkey’s case as enthusiastically as they had done three years prior, given the unpopularity of Turkey’s candidacy in Germany. According to their pre-election rhetoric, both seemed comfortable with letting Turkey take care of its own prospects, rather than actively pushing its case forward with the other member states. Prior to the Bundestag election they mostly exhibited the behavior of a passenger.

The German election results of September 22\textsuperscript{nd} were close. The SPD/Greens coalition won the elections, commanding a popular-vote lead of less than 600,000 votes, losing 39 seats from their majority in the Bundestag. The chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Turkish national assembly hailed the results as “good news for Turkey” (“Geteiltes Echo,” 2002). It is beyond doubt that had Schröder not picked up the cause of opposing the Iraq war in his election campaign, Edmund Stoiber would have become Chancellor. Many observers remarked how it was the first time that Germany had allowed its foreign policy to be usurped by its domestic politics.

The end of the election did not, however, mean that the CDU/CSU ceased their critique of Schröder’s policy regarding Turkey. Both Stoiber and Schäuble maintained their criticism of Turkey’s EU membership. ‘Is it a good idea for Turkey to give up its own roots and identity?’ Schäuble asked, also remarking that Turkey did not share ‘historical memories’ with Europe (Outshoorn, 2002 – trans. mine). Meanwhile Stoiber suggested a free trade area between Turkey and the EU (which, in the form of the customs union had already been in practice since 1996). CSU chairman Michael Glos, together with Peter Hinze and Friedbert Pflüger\textsuperscript{32}, criticized the government’s position, based on demographic, economic, cultural and religious arguments against Turkish membership (“Glos gegen Beitritt ,” 2002; “Innenpolitischer Streit,” 2002). The future Chancellor Angela Merkel, at the time chairwoman of CDU, also shared this position (“Union erteilt,” 2002).

The FDP (Free Democratic Party, right-wing liberals) leader Guido Westerwelle argued against a date for accession negotiations based on the Copenhagen criteria, stressing that Turkey

\textsuperscript{32} At the time, Peter Hinze served as spokesman of the CDU/CSU delegation in the European Parliament, and Friedbert Pflüger was the CDU Chairman of the EU affairs committee in the Bundestag.
could not become a member of the EU as long as people were still tortured in Turkish jails ("Schröder trifft Chef," 2002; "Westerwelle begrüßt," 2002).

After Schröder’s re-election, the Federal government came under American pressure to repair the damaged relationship by Schröder’s anti Iraq war campaign, whereby support for Turkish accession was considered one way for Berlin to mend the frayed ties with Washington (Frankenfeld, 2002; Ridderbusch, 2002c; Schuster, 2002b).

After the publication of the Commission’s report, which did not advise beginning accession negotiations or setting a date, Fischer assured the Turkish foreign minister, Şükrü Sina Gürel, that Germany supported Turkey’s reforms as well as its EU membership (Fischer reist,” 2002). He called again for a “positive signal” and even mentioned the possibility of a date to set a timeline for the beginning of accession negotiations. Sources in the German government called it “hypocrisy not to give Turkey even a long-term date for the start of accession negotiations” (Blome & Middel, 2002; Ridderbusch, 2002c – trans. mine).

At the Brussels Summit, during wranglings over the presidency text, which commended Turkey for its progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria, Commission President Romano Prodi attempted to weaken the reference to ‘the opening of negotiations’. In response, Schröder strongly insisted, that this reference should not be stricken, and that the pro-Turkey language should even be strengthened with a more concrete framework of how the process should progress in the future (Ludlow, 2004, p. 194-195).

Sources in the EU Commission noted Schröder and Fischer’s apparent reversal from their pre-election policy of not forcing the Turkish issue. Since their policy was at odds with the Commission’s recommendation, these sources expressed their annoyance at Berlin’s new stance ("Brüssel irritiert,” 2002; Middel 2002c). This was also personally poignant, because Schröder and Fischer’s former colleague, Günter Verheugen, was the enlargement commissioner under whose authority the Commission’s recommendation had been written.

Despite the Commission’s ire, Germany began arguing for the rendezvous date. While the government sources themselves argued that Turkey had “a claim for a date” to begin negotiations, the Chancellor was then apparently seeking agreement among the member states for the ‘rendezvous date’ option that consequently also included a date for the actual negotiations to begin, if Turkey met the criteria (Middel, 2002a).

On November 13 (four weeks prior to the summit), Schröder took it a step further by arguing for an actual date to begin negotiations, rather than just the rendezvous date option. He
called for making it clear to Turkey that the “door to Europe is open,” and that it was possible for the Copenhagen summit to name a date for negotiations (“Bundesregierung will Türkei,” 2002 – trans. mine). Schröder also said that the member states would have to learn how the new AKP government was planning to live up to its commitments to the EU.

This rhetorical position shifted again upon Erdoğan’s visit to Berlin on the 19th of that month, when it seems that Germany had reverted to embracing the ‘rendezvous date’ as the EU policy of choice. In statements made after the meeting between the German and the Turkish leaders, Fischer said that while he was determined to send Turkey a “positive signal”, he could not say if they were going to be able to as far as Erdoğan would like (“Erdoğan signalisiert,” 2002 – trans. mine). On the 28th of November, the Schröder government reiterated its support for the compromise ‘rendezvous date’ option, with the first date in the beginning of 2004 at the earliest. It turned out to be not enough for Erdoğan, who complained that Berlin was the only European capital (that he had visited) where he had been denied a firm date for accession negotiations to begin (Middel, 2002d).

Germany and France were both determined to rebuild their shared leadership of the EU, and thus prepared for a pre-summit meeting, where knowing the French reservations, Schröder hoped to convince Chirac to adopt the ‘rendezvous date’ option as their common Franco-German position (Parenthoen, 2002). At the Franco-German summit, detailed above, Germany agreed with France that they would have a common position on Turkey at Copenhagen. What exactly that common position would be, they kept to themselves, but it soon leaked out that they had agreed on a timetable of starting negotiations in July 2005, provided that the Commission’s review on Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria, would warrant it (Dempsey & Guha, 2002). After the meeting Fischer said that, “it will be decisive, whether an Islamic country can go the way of democracy, social justice and a market economy or not. … It is unclear if this will succeed. Failure will give rise to new potential for terrorist threats. If Turkey succeeds, it will be the biggest success in the fight against international terrorism” (Scally, 2002).

Between the Franco-German meeting and the Copenhagen summit proper, Germany also took the effort to point out to the press that an overwhelming majority of states supported offering Turkey ‘a date’. In one source, Fischer is quoted as saying ‘double digits’, meaning ten or more member states (Boulton, Dempsey, Hadipapas & Hope, 2002; “Cumbre de Copenhague,” 2002). This turned out to be a bit optimistic, but it nevertheless created a public image.

At the summit itself, Germany’s role in the debate did not get much attention in the news reports, while the opinions of the hard drivers (Blair and Berlusconi) and the hard brakemen
(Schüssel and Balkenende) made their way to the press so much the more. It was, nevertheless, Fischer’s motion that amended the presidency draft to read that the negotiations should begin ‘without delay’ after an assessment of Turkey’s progress in December 2004 (Ludlow, 2004, p. 312). As such, it can be surmised that Germany had pushed its preferences not so much in the open debates with the member states at the Council table, as in separate consultation with France behind the scenes.

Afterwards, questions were asked about why Schröder and Fischer had apparently shifted their policy toward Turkey’s ambitions from one that was passive to one that was more welcoming. One explanation – one that they rejected themselves – was that they were reacting to pressure from Washington (“Glos gegen,” 2002; “Innenpolitischer Streit,” 2002; Leersch, 2002a). To this charge of Germany adjusting its policy due to American pressure, Fischer responded by saying, “We have absolutely no concessions to make. If the door is closed on Turkey, the civilian forces and the modernizers will fall. Also, it is not certain that Turkey will ultimately be willing to share sovereignty as an EU member. If the Federal Government would follow the advice of the opposition, the nationalists and Islamists will rub their hands together” (“Fischer hält,” 2002 – trans. mine).

A more convincing explanation was that Schröder and Fischer authentically desired to give Turkey at least a rendezvous date for negotiations to begin and that their previous ambiguity was to deprive their domestic political opponents of campaign fodder. Once the elections were over, they were free to enact their authentic preferences. Their timing appeared to be correct. Once Fischer and Schröder had shifted their rhetoric in Turkey’s favor, the CDU brought the Turkish question into their (successful) campaigns for the state elections in Lower Saxony and Hesse (Leersch, 2002b). At the same time, Schröder used a major Bundestag address on the economy to warn the opposition to not treat the issue of Turkey as a short-term political issue (Simonian & Thiele, 2002).

In sum, Schröder and Fischer proved to be skillful drivers of Turkey’s cause. Outright verbal support might have cost them the Bundestag election, in which case Germany would have most certainly become the most powerful brakeman. Even after the elections, Berlin faced challenges. The brakemen were more numerous at Copenhagen than they had been at Helsinki and even Luxembourg, while France’s enthusiasm for the Turkish cause was clearly less energetic than it had previously been. Washington and Ankara’s outspoken pressure was probably not helpful either in winning support among the EU members. When Germany became more outright about its support of Turkey, this was seen in the press and domestically as bending to Washington’s will in apology for its stance on Iraq. Before long, Germany embraced the ‘rendezvous date’ option, and was thereafter
cast as the driver’s antagonist, rather than being one of them. As such, they were able to push forward their driver agenda without being identified alongside Italy and the United Kingdom as drivers without reservations.

7.4.7 Greece

In the 2002 episode, Greece was one of Turkey’s most stalwart drivers. Indicating that it sought a time schedule for negotiations with Turkey shortly before the publication of the Commission report on October 10th, it maintained this position thereafter as well. In a radio interview, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs George Papandreou supported Turkey’s call for a date to start accession talks with the EU. “I believe Turkey must be sent a positive message from (the EU summit in) Copenhagen” (Hope, 2002). It was reported that Greece declared its support in order to smooth the way for Cyprus’ accession in 2004. Visiting Berlin on November 8, Simitis discussed the question of Turkey with Schröder and while both agreed on sending Turkey a positive signal, Simitis argued that there were multiple ways of doing so (‘Schröder sagt,” 2002). Supposedly, this was meant to be beneficial in the Council as well as on the Cypriot front.

Evidence of Greece’s driver policy towards Turkey were repeated throughout this period. One was apparent when Prime Minister Costas Simitis clearly endorsed Schröder’s insistence to strengthen the favorable language on Turkey at Brussels (Ludlow, 2004, p. 195). Following the publication of Giscard d’Estaing’s interview, Costas Simitis immediately expressed his repudiation by stating that the EU would be committing a “serious error,” if it spurned Turkey’s ambitions (“Expanding horizons,” 2002).

To show that this cordiality was mutual, Athens was the second member-state capital (after Rome) visited by Erdoğan after the Turkish elections in early November. It was also the first state visit from a Turkish leader (albeit an unofficial leader) in over a decade, during which Simitis expressed his support, but also conveyed that Turkey ought to “make a gesture,” regarding Cyprus (Boulton & Hope, 2002). He also stated that “in principle, we are for a date for Turkey,” whereby ‘in principle’ seemed to imply a positive outcome for Greece of the Cyprus negotiations, which were to occur simultaneously with the diplomatic process of Copenhagen, where it would also be concluded (Antonaros, 2002a).
Despite its strong advocacy of Turkey’s membership ambitions, Greece had not relaxed its guard vis-à-vis Turkey as a military threat. In an interview with the Financial Times, Yannos Papantoniou, Greece’s defense minister, noted that the disputes of Cyprus and the Aegean Sea were still very much alive and that rhetoric from certain Turkish politicians and military leaders continued to be of a “fairly aggressive nature” (Simkins, 2002). Even so, Papantoniou maintained that his country’s support for Turkey’s membership in the EU was the cornerstone of Greece’s détente policy toward its neighbor. Not only would it improve the bilateral relations, Papantoniou argued further, the accession process, would also transform Turkey internally into a more democratic actor, which would, supposedly, make Turkey a less imminent threat.

Between the Brussels and Copenhagen summits, the press reports and possibly their diplomatic sources as well, were imprecise about Greece’s exact policy preferences concerning either the actual negotiations date or the date-for-a-date ‘rendezvous’ clause, which were distinctly different policy options (e.g. Black, 2002a; Boulton & Dempsey, 2002; Broekhuizen, 2002).

A week prior to the Copenhagen summit, Greece expressed its desire to have accession negotiations proper begin in either 2004 or 2005, even after the Franco-German common position advocating otherwise (“Ankara lehnt,” 2002; “La Turquie s’en tient,” 2002; Ludlow, 2004, p. 257; “Mehrheit in der EU,” 2002 “Türkei-Frage,” 2002). On December 6, Simitis, joining Berlusconi in Rome, again argued for negotiations to start in 2004, because a date in the not-too-distant future would encourage the Turks to implement the necessary reforms (“Ankara lehnt,” 2002; Black, 2002c).

Just before the summit, Papandreou published an argument in Turkey’s favor, arguing that “a belief in an enlarged Europe acting as a catalyst for peace and economic development that has prompted Greece to reconcile our historic divisions with Turkey and support our neighbor’s EU aspirations. … To deny Turkey a European future on the grounds of religion is to deny the existing diversity in Europe” (Fuller, 2002a).

At the summit itself, Greece was one of the ‘hard drivers’, along with Italy and the UK in pushing for a more advanced timetable than the French and Germans were proposing (Dempsey, 2002c; Dempsey & Graham, 2002a; Dubois, 2002; Egurbide & Yarnoz, 2002; Gelie & Bocev, 2002; “Griechenland will,” 2002; Ludlow, 2004, p. 254; Staunton, 2002; “Talking Turkey,” 2002; Vinocur, 2002; Webster & Watson, 2002; Zecchini, 2002d).

However, while Greece was supportive of pushing the dates forward, at the same time it wished to prevent developments without political conditions that would give Greece, as a member
of the Council, political leverage on issues such as EU-NATO relations and Cyprus (Middel, 2002c). The clear, if not main, reason for Greece’s support was its opportunity to solve the Cyprus situation diplomatically, since Turkey had the possibility of making gains in Europe by putting pressure on Denktash, president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for cooperation (Sulser & Biegala, 2002).


7.4.8 Ireland

As in the previous episodes, the press did not comment frequently on the Irish position. Articles in the Financial Times conflicted somewhat in the remainder of the records. Nevertheless, the analysis, below, indicates that Ireland was among the drivers.

During Erdoğan’s European tour, he stopped in Dublin on November 21st, where he met with the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, who “assured Mr Erdogan that Ireland will be as helpful as possible in terms of Turkey's EU candidature.” When asked about this meeting, Erdoğan responded: “We asked for Ireland's help for a date for the EU, with negotiations on Cyprus and the European Security and Defence Policy.” To the question if Ahern had pledged Irish support for an accession date for Turkey he replied, “Yes” (Crosby, 2002).

On November 25, Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen (who later became Taoiseach) met with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell. When the two discussed Turkey, Powell urged Cowen to support Turkey’s appeal for a date to begin negotiations at the Copenhagen summit. According to the press, Cowen responded by telling Powell that Ireland welcomed Turkey’s commitment to deal with the human rights issues in relation to its quest for EU membership and that his country would propose for the Copenhagen summit to send a positive signal to Turkey to welcome its efforts preparing for membership negotiations (O'Clery, 2002).
According to Minister Cowen’s written statement to the Irish Parliament, Cowen had, upon Powell’s urge to support a negotiation date for Turkey, “explained” the Copenhagen criteria to the Secretary, and had assured him “…that Ireland would be as helpful as possible in regard to Turkey's desire to begin accession negotiations, subject to the necessary criteria being fully met” (Ireland, 2002e). This same rhetoric would be repeated throughout all the parliamentary debates of that year (Ireland 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; 2002d; 2002e).

As with most EU member states concerning Turkey, Ireland too wrestled with domestic opposition. Immediately prior to the Copenhagen summit, during a Fine Gael (centre-right) partisan debate on Turkey, its leader, Enda Kenny (who would also later become Taoiseach), argued against offering Turkey a date for accession negotiations, based on human rights. “Turkey is a divided country in many ways,” he said. “There are instances of people being terrorised and murdered that would not fit with the Copenhagen criteria. In Turkey, the mentality ranges from a Middle Ages/11th-century outlook to an outlook in the leadership that is very modern” (Brennock, 2002). This statement was made when Ahern and Cowen announced their intention to support a date for accession negotiations, though it had also been stipulated that date would be conditional on Turkey meeting the requisite Copenhagen (political) criteria. The Labour and Green parties were less opposed, arguing that while Turkey should be required to meet the criteria, it should not be excluded based on religious or ethnic background.

As such, the Ahern government, personified by Minister Cowen, continually spoke of Turkey’s need to abide by the Copenhagen criteria – to the extend that the Financial Times classified Ireland as one of those countries that were very skeptical of Turkey owing to its human rights record, and therefore not among the drivers (Dempsey, 2002b; 2002d). The Irish press (cited above), The Guardian (Black & White, 2002) and the Ludlow account (2004, p. 254), however, note that Ireland was among those advocating strongly for an advanced schedule when they were behind the closed doors. Perhaps this meant that the Irish leaders simply assumed that the political Copenhagen criteria would be met by the advanced appointed time, or that the criteria were of secondary importance to them in the broader balance of interests and mostly important just for public consumption.
7.4.9 Italy

In 2002, Italy was the most unambiguous and outspoken driver of Turkey’s interests in the European Council. Though it is a continuation of the pro-Turkey policy of the previous episodes, one curious deviation of this stability deserves to be mentioned. In 1999, at a European People’s Party summit, Berlusconi, as the leader of the Forza Italia party, had expressed his opposition to Turkish candidacy (“Berlusconi Aferma,” 1999). In 2002, nothing remained of this rhetorical position when the same Berlusconi opened debate on Turkey at the Brussels summit by arguing for more positive language that what the Danish text read. The clause “Turkey has taken important steps toward meeting the Copenhagen political criteria,” was amended to read: “The European Council welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey toward meeting the Copenhagen political criteria” by Berlusconi’s intervention (Ludlow, 2004, p. 194).

Italy’s cordiality had not been unnoticed. During his tour of European capitals, Erdoğan’s first port of call was Rome, where Italy was named Turkey’s ‘best friend in Europe’ (ibid, p. 253). That November and early the following month, Berlusconi joined his Greek colleague Simitis in arguing for an early date – January 2004 – to begin negotiations (“Ankara lehnt,” 2002; Black, 2002c; Ludlow, 2004, p. 257; “Mehrheit,” 2002; Staunton, 2002).

Berlusconi’s argument for an advanced date, set before the enlargement in May 2004, was ostensibly to encourage reconciliation on Cyprus, before the island could, as a member, veto negotiations with Turkey, should the two sides of the island still be at odds with one another by then (“Türkei-Frage,” 2002). Joined by the UK and Spain, Italy maintained this position even after the Franco-German common position proposed a ‘date for a date’ in 2004 with negotiations commencing no sooner than 2005 (“Ankara lehnt,” 2002).

At Copenhagen, Italy was an even more outspoken advocate for Turkey than the United Kingdom (Ludlow, 2004, p. 311). Berlusconi suggested at one point that, “the EU will become a superpower” once Ankara joined (Blitz, 2002). Quite a few articles (de Barochez, 2002a; Boulton & Dempsey 2002; Dempsey, 2002d; “La Turquie s’invite,” 2002) list Italy’s allegiance to the United States as the prime reason for its support of Turkey.

Other articles that list Italy as a driver are: Beste, Deupmann & Knaup, 2002; Black, 2002a; 2002d; Black & White, 2002; Blome & Middel, 2002; Broekhuizen, 2002; Crosby, 2002; Daniel & Dempsey, 2002; Dempsey, 2002a; 2002b; 2002c; Dempsey & Graham, 2002b; Dubois, 2002; Fuller, 2002a; Gelic, 2002; Gelic & Bocev, 2002; Gonzalez, 2002c; Hearst, 2002; “Italien hat Vorbehalte,”
In 2002, Luxembourg maintained its brakeman policy in regard to Turkey. Luxembourg’s prime minister, Jean-Claude Juncker, claimed as early as July that the Copenhagen summit would not be about Turkey (Alexander, 2002). The most telling occasion when Juncker attempted to speak on Luxembourg’s policy was after a meeting with Erdoğan on November 29. “Luxembourg’s commitment is very clear,” Juncker said to the press, as he launched into something fairly opaque:

Relations between the EU and Turkey have to be purified from hypocrisy. I mean this: we are fifteen countries that will make a decision in Copenhagen. We hope to make a decision based on compromise among these fifteen member countries. We think that this decision has a distinguishing feature than the decision taken in Helsinki and it has to be based on that decision. Copenhagen should be beyond Helsinki for us. And, this means confirmation of Turkey’s place in Europe without any ground for hesitations. We have to agree on the formula of ‘beyond Helsinki’ in Copenhagen and we have to have similar views on certain political issues. These issues have to have a clear and comprehensible formula.

This formula should be a result which is in line with expectations of [the] Turkish people and satisfy [the] public of fifteen EU member countries. Also, we should encourage [the] Turkish government to abide by every effort to adjust to Copenhagen criteria in a way to meet [the] expectations of [the] Turkish people. We know that it is not possible to totally fulfil all these conditions before starting the negotiations. But, first of all, progress has to be recorded in respect to human rights and similar issues.

(“EU-Turkey ties,” 2002)

This researcher reads this to be a roundabout way of saying that, as far as Juncker was concerned, Turkey could, in principle, become a member, and that the member states were going to offer Turkey something more than what it received at Helsinki in 1999. Yet, he believed there should be more progress with respect to the political criteria for the EU to go any further than Turkey had offered only rhetorically so far. After the Copenhagen summit, Jean-Claude Juncker insisted again that negotiations with Turkey could not begin if Ankara did not improve, highlighting especially the Turkish record on torture (“Synthèse,” 2002).
While the international press did not frequently report on its policy, Luxembourg was consistently mentioned among the hard-line brakemen, whose preferences clearly sided with the Commission and the Presidency, or more opposed still. Articles that mention Luxembourg as being antagonistic to Turkey’s ambitions to have an early date for negotiations are Black & White, 2002; Blome & Middel, 2002; Dempsey, 2002a; Egurbide & Yarnoz, 2002; Gonzalez, 2002b; Kemmer, 2002; “La Turquie s'invite,” 2002; Middel, 2002c; Modoux, 2002; “Schröder will Türkei,” 2002; “Türkei setzt die EU,” 2002.

7.4.11 Netherlands

In contrast to the previous two episodes, when the Netherlands was a driver of Turkey’s membership ambitions, in 2002, the Netherlands was among the brakemen. The Dutch position was that in Copenhagen, Turkey hear that it should be gauged at some future time for meeting the membership criteria. This position did not include any date or concession beyond the determination that this re-evaluation should take place at some time before the big-bang enlargement (Broekhuizen & Van Oostrum, 2002; van der Velden, 2002c). The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer outlined the official Dutch position on Turkey in a September 20 letter to parliament. Anticipating the Commission’s progress report, he wrote that the Turkish reform package was “welcomed,” and “Turkey should be encouraged to forcefully move the amendment process forward and to implement the reforms” (Netherlands 2002a – trans, mine). Following the publication of the Commission’s strategy document and progress reports on enlargement, the minister outlined the Dutch government’s policy on Turkey further by arguing that since Turkey had not met the political membership criteria, the Dutch government agreed with the Commission that “no date for starting negotiations should be named” (Netherlands 2002b – trans, mine).

At the Brussels summit, Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende joined his Austrian and Swedish colleagues Wolfgang Schüssel and Göran Persson in urging the council toward greater caution than the pro-Turkey language being recommended by Gerhard Schröder (Ludlow, 2004, p. 195).

During the Dutch parliamentary debate on October 30th, the prime minister made it clear that it was not the object of the government’s policy to send Turkey a “discouraging or negative signal” (Netherlands, 2002c – trans. mine). However, further policy on the matter largely depended
on the outcome of the Turkish elections. He also mentioned that there was talk in Brussels about a ‘rendezvous clause’, but that the Netherlands was not supportive of this or any date for negotiations to begin.

The prime minister, again reporting to the parliament on December 4, said that before Erdoğan’s visit to the Netherlands on 29 November, the Netherlands had been informed of the ‘rendezvous date’ proposal by several other member states, but that for the Netherlands it was inconceivable that negotiations would be allowed to begin without Turkey first meeting the political criteria (Netherlands 2002d). Just prior to the summit, however, the prime minister indicated to the parliament that the Netherlands would be willing to go along with the ‘rendezvous date’ option, though not without reiterating the inconceivability of negotiations beginning before the political criteria were met (Netherlands (2002e).

Prior to Copenhagen, de Hoop Scheffer told the NRC Handelsblad that the Dutch negotiating position was that Turkey would only receive a date for negotiation after a future examination of its progress toward the criteria – essentially the ‘wait and see’ approach. He complained that the Franco-German position (the rendezvous date policy) was gaining ‘significant support’ among the member states (Van der Velden, 2002).

Ludlow’s account of the summit mentions the Dutch delegation with respect to Turkey infrequently, but on all occasions as very hesitant and urging caution against being too indulgent toward Turkey (Ludlow, 2004, p. 254, 311). On the 13th of December, when the presidency’s draft was being reviewed, Balkenende argued in favor of the existing draft, which called for a firm date on December 2004, without the additional ‘at the latest’ as was suggested by Berlusconi (Ludlow, 2004, p. 311-312).

The Dutch leaders explained at home, that by siding with this option they had prevented France and Germany from offering a date-certain for negotiations to begin (“Politiek vreest,” 2002). Interviewed by the Dutch press, Balkenende expressed his satisfaction with the summit results, saying that, “we wanted to emphasize the fact that Turkey must first comply with the political criteria for membership,” in which Balkenende still found “serious shortcomings” (de Jong, 2002b – trans. mine).

When they reported to parliament on the findings of the European Council, de Hoop Scheffer reiterated the Netherlands’ policy regarding Turkey. He argued that pursuant to the Helsinki decision, Turkey was to be considered a candidate like any other candidate member state, and therefore had to fulfill the political criteria. While some said that the Helsinki decision should be
overturned, this was not the opinion of the Dutch government, which saw Turkey, despite its admirable recent progress, nowhere near any level of fulfilling the political criteria, whereby Balkenende mentioned in particular capital punishment, the rights of minorities, and the role of the military (Netherlands, 2002f).

Like the statement of the Irish Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Irish parliament, the Dutch foreign minister’s statements highlighted the central role of the Copenhagen criteria. However, in contrast to his Irish colleague, de Hoop Scheffer took a firm stand against Turkey’s wish for a negotiation date, while Ireland supported that wish. To the extent that either country was not simply hiding its authentic preferences behind the Copenhagen criteria and the political values embedded in them, Ireland adopted a carrot policy and the Netherlands that of a stick

Other articles that mention the Netherlands’ policy orientation among the brakemen are:

7.4.12 Portugal

Though not the most outspoken (or, leastways, reported on) advocate, Portugal was a driver of Turkey’s membership ambitions. It was frequently mentioned as being in the camp of member states that lobbied their colleagues for an early and fixed date for accession negotiations to begin.

In an interview with Le Figaro, Portugal’s Prime Minister José Manuel Barroso spoke against erecting religious barriers against candidate countries to the EU. Instead, he argued that the EU should be supportive of countries like Turkey, where men and women, in principle, have the same rights. He saw the EU in need of examples showing the West’s ability to work together with Islamic cultures. Offering Turkey a date would be an encouragement that had been long overdue. However, he also maintained that ultimately becoming a member would be up to Turkey and its ability to reform itself to the Copenhagen criteria standards (Kovacs, 2002).

When the Franco-German proposal for a rendezvous date was launched, Portugal was, according to the December 6 edition of the Berliner Zeitung, one of the first countries to rally around it (“Türkei kann auf,” 2002). Though the Berliner Zeitung took this as meaning that Portugal
was a brakeman, like Denmark and Sweden were, the bulk of press articles, took Portugal as being supportive of Turkey. This was especially so in reports dated after December 6, when the positions taken by the member states had become less ambiguous. Examples of these articles are: Black & White, 2002; Broekhuizen, 2002; Dempsey, 2002c; Dubois, 2002; Gelie, 2002; Gelie & Bocev, 2002; Gonzalez, 2002c; Ludlow, 2004, p. 254; “Portugal calls,” 2002; Staunton, 2002; “Türkei-Frage,” 2002; Vinocur, 2002; Webster & Watson, 2002).

7.4.13 Spain

At the end of its presidency in the first half of 2002, the Spanish State Secretary for European Affairs, Ramon de Miguel, rejected the idea of a date to begin accession negotiations with Turkey. He said that this was about principles that they all adhered to (“Verheugen warnt,” 2002). As of October, Spain’s foreign minister, Ana Palacio, was also pessimistic about the ability to fix a date for negotiations (Gonzalez, 2002a). Prime Minister Aznar, however, was determined to send a strong favorable signal to Turkey.

After the legislative election in Turkey producing a positive outcome for its EU ambitions, Ana Palacio issued a statement, saying that the AK Party were verifiably moderate Islamists, and that for her there was no obstacle for the European integration of a moderate Islamic country like Turkey and that the EU was not a Christian club (“Espana cree Turquia,” 2002; “Gobierno y partidos,” 2002; “Le monde,” 2002). She also clarified that Turkey would have to meet the same criteria as other candidate countries to warrant membership.

The Spanish foreign ministry still had concerns about what the newly elected government in Turkey would be able or willing to achieve. This left several unknowns, such as the future of human rights reforms, how the military would react to an Islamist government, and how moderate that Islamist government would prove to be (Egurbide & Yarnoz, 2002).

During a state visit to Spain, German President Johannes Rau argued that Turkey had a very long way to go before it could become a member of the EU, to which Aznar responded that Turkey, like any other candidate country, would have to adhere to the same membership criteria, despite its different size and population (read: religion) (“Rau dice Turquia,” 2002).

During the press conference following Erdoğan’s hour-long meeting with Aznar, the Spanish Prime Minister asserted again that Turkey would have to adhere to the same membership
criteria as other candidate countries. Erdoğan expressed his satisfaction with the meeting and said that he and all his advisers were very glad with Aznar’s reactions to their requests of Spain’s support for a negotiations date (“Aznar defiende,” 2002; “Aznar subraya,” 2002). Talking to reporters afterward, Erdoğan said: “Of course Spain and Aznar’s government will help us in this matter. The past positive relations between the two countries are the best guarantee that it will,” (Sanz, 2002 – trans. mine).

After the NATO summit in Prague in late November, where Aznar met with Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac, he stated that Spain would support a date for accession negotiations to begin, reiterating that Turkey would have to comply with the Copenhagen criteria in the same way that other candidate did (Montes & Gonzalez, 2002; Zecchini, 2002b). This point of view was repeated in more or less similar phrasing throughout this period.

After a foreign ministers’ meeting prior to the Copenhagen summit, Palacio said that the European Council should set a date for negotiations with Turkey to begin (“Espana pide trato,” 2002). She said that Spain was aware of “the moment of great historic responsibility and the reunification of Europe is not going to stop. It will not be left in the lurch by issues that are, ultimately, minor issues” (“Palacio convencida,” 2002 – trans mine). She also mentioned that such negotiations should be conducted under the same conditions as with any other country. Furthermore, she proposed, in contrast to the Franco-German rendezvous date option, that Turkey should begin negotiations as soon as the political Copenhagen criteria were met, and not at some artificial later date (“Cumbre de Copenhague,” 2002; Suntafe, 2002).

Concurrent with the Copenhagen summit, Aznar, together with Silvio Berlusconi, prevented the adoption of a declaration on March 7th by the European People’s Party in support of a ‘privileged partnership’ (as opposed to membership) with Turkey, proposed by German Christian Democrats (Gonzalez, 2002b) However, their counter-attempt to force a declaration by the same party to support starting negotiations by the end of 2004 failed.

Aznar also defended the proposal to start early accession negotiations at the Copenhagen European Council meeting (Broekhuizen & Van Oostrum, 2002; Ludlow, 2004, p. 254). After the summit, Palacio defended the result of the ‘rendezvous date’ as a “reasonable” solution that would give Ankara eighteen months to reform the Turkish administration and (Turkish) society, which was “a term very optimistic, but achievable,” she said (Gonzalez, 2002c – trans. mine).

As with Italy quite a few articles listed Spain’s allegiance to the United States as a prime reason for its support of Turkey (Aljarilla, 2002; de Barochez, 2002a; Boulton & Dempsey 2002;
Dempsey, 2002d; Egurbide & Yarnoz, 2002; “La Turquie s’invite,” 2002). Some articles (such as such as Daniel & Dempsey, 2002) mentioned Spain’s support, being subject to Turkey meeting the political criteria and/or providing a solution for Cyprus. Another article (Dempsey & Graham, 2002) claimed that public opinion at home had required Aznar to pipe down his support for an early date for Turkey.


Spain was clearly a driver, as it advocated, for an early and fixed date for negotiations to begin in 2004. As with other drivers (and brakemen), the necessity of Turkey to meet the political Copenhagen criteria was essential, but to Spain the timing thereof should depend on when Turkey had met the criteria instead of setting an artificial timetable as was proposed by France and Germany. This part of the Spanish argument did not differ from how it was put by the Commission and the brakemen, except that Spain, by foreseeing a date in 2004 (possibly even as early as in January of that year), attested to its confidence that Turkey would have met the criteria by then.

7.4.14 Sweden

In 2002 Sweden was, again, considered among the brakemen, particularly because of to its concerns about offering Turkey a date before it had demonstrated compliance with the political Copenhagen criteria.

In June, during debate in the Swedish parliament, Foreign Minister Anna Lindh stated that, “Turkey cannot go farther in the [accession] process if it does not credibly show that it takes human rights seriously” (“La Suède déplore,” 2002; “Les droits,” 2002 – trans. mine). She, however, did not reject Turkey’s EU candidacy, especially because doing so would strengthen Turkish forces that opposed democracy and reform, but being a candidate, she argued, meant that Turkey had to comply with continuous monitoring. Answering criticism from the former-communist Left Party,
for having endorsed placing the PKK on the European list of terrorist organizations, Lindh replied
that Swedish opposition on that account would have damaged its reputation with Turkey and made
it less effective in mobilizing public opinion toward greater respect for human rights (ibid).

In one telling news item appearing after a late-November meeting between the Swedish
Prime Minister, Göran Persson and Erdoğan, when the two appeared before the press, Persson
announced before answering questions, that he did not “want to say anything right now about EU’s
giving an exact date to start accession talks with Turkey.” When Erdoğan was asked if he got any
support for a negotiation date during his meeting with Persson, he said, “you must ask this question
to him” (“Turkey: Erdogan,” 2004) Responding accordingly, Persson replied that the problem of
Turkey’s candidacy stemmed from its implementation of the Copenhagen criteria, which was
important for getting such a date. Persson further said that he would discuss the proposed Turkish
reform programmes with other EU member countries. Concerning the required reforms, he
particularly stressed the plight of the Kurds in Turkey as being critical to Turkey’s implementation of
the political criteria (ibid)

One way in which Sweden did come onto the radar was over a process dispute. As Gül and
Erdoğan tried lobbying Chirac and Schröder during the Copenhagen summit, Persson declared that
the decision of the fifteen member states was “no longer negotiable” (“Turquie: la décision,” 2002).
Persson was clearly annoyed at the lobbying effort, as though it were to be decided by France and
Germany and not by all fifteen member states. Furthermore, Persson argued that it was impossible
to compromise on the Copenhagen criteria and the Cyprus situation. “We must be extremely clear,”
he said, “there is no possibility of bargaining with the Copenhagen criteria. They must be met.
Cyprus is another political problem. We must solve these two problems, but they are not linked”

On the whole, Sweden’s position was cited as being ideological with regard to the political
membership criteria. One example thereof was Anna Lindh’s opinion that the new AKP leadership
would, due to its personal experience with political persecution, be serious about implementing the
necessary reforms to meet the criteria (Boulton, 2002b). However, in three articles (Dempsey 2002b;
2002d; “Talking Turkey,” 2002) Sweden was mentioned together with Ireland, which behind the
closed doors of the Council, proved to be a driver, rather than a brakeman. Other articles that
mention Sweden’s caution about giving Turkey a timeline or concrete prospect of membership
negotiations were Black 2002a, Boulton & Dempsey, 2002, Dempsey, 2002a, Fuller, 2002b,
Zecchini, 2002c.
7.4.15 United Kingdom

The British position on Turkey was again and unequivocally a stalwart driver on Turkey’s behalf. In Mid-October, British Foreign Minister Jack Straw held a foreign policy speech about Turkey and the reasons for the United Kingdom’s support for its membership before the German-British Forum in London. There, he argued that Turkey’s accession to the EU would benefit Britain and the rest of Europe in the war on terror. “Turkey is a key member of NATO and a vital ally in the campaign against terrorism,” he said and pointed out that Turkey had made “significant progress” towards meeting the necessary political criteria for starting negotiations (Adams, 2002a).

In November, after the Turkish elections, Britain communicated that it would accept a rendezvous date, as it understood that its member-state partners wanted to see Turkey advance more toward the political criteria. “Much depends on the next steps in Turkey,” a British diplomat said. “Turkey has made significant progress. That should be recognised. Let us see how the new government takes shape” (Boulton & Dempsey, 2002).

One week prior to the Copenhagen summit, Jack Straw said that giving Turkey a firm date to begin formal European Union accession talks was “now a matter of obligation”, adding that what happened to Turkey would be “of huge importance to the stability not just of Europe but of much of the rest of the world” (Dempsey & Guha, 2002). This was echoed by the Minister for Europe, his fellow countryman Denis MacShane, who said that, “Europe must offer a firm and proximate date for Turkey to begin the process of negotiations, which will be long and arduous” (Adams, 2002b).

At Copenhagen, Tony Blair suggested that the December 2004 date should be mentioned as ‘the latest’ date at which the European Council should make its decision regarding the opening of negotiations. This would leave the door open for an earlier date, if the Commission (and the member states) shifted their assessments in Turkey’s favor (Ludlow, 2004, p. 311). He argued that since the Commission’s review of Turkey’s progress was already an annual event, there should be no reason not to decide about an earlier date if Turkey had met the political criteria by the 2003 report. When Fischer proposed the amendment of starting negotiations ‘without delay’, Blair joined Berlusconi and Chirac in supporting the amendment, thus wearing down Rasmussen’s resolve to not have any date and preserve what the Dane thought to be a greater respect for the conditionality regimen (ibid, 312).

While the majority of the British press were framing the outcome of the summit as a failure, Blair attempted to put a positive spin on the matter by saying, “The deal might not live up to
Turkey's expectations, but for 40 years Turkey has been waiting for a firm date and this is a firm date. It’s important to emphasise that it is not a question of whether negotiations are opened with Turkey: if the tests are passed by Turkey, they will open” (Blitz, 2002).

8.0 BRUSSELS, 2004

On May 1, 2004 the EU was enlarged by the 10 new member states Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The episode of the latter half was also, ostensibly, about enlargement with the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia. In 2002, two years earlier, it had been decided that starting accession negotiations with Turkey, without delay, depended upon the report and recommendation of the Commission and the agreement of the European Council. The Commission was roundly expected to give a positive verdict on Turkey’s progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen criteria.

Because the Council had continually reiterated that Turkey’s membership prospects depended on its own progress toward the political criteria, and that this progress would be measured by the Commission, the brakemen were left with three options: to contest the Commission’s findings, to question the premise of membership, or to derail the enlargement procedure by changing the rules of enlargement.

A few did question the Commission’s report, but none of these had seats in the Council, while those who opposed the idea of Turkey’s membership on a priori grounds – such as culture, religion, poverty or size – had four decades of EC/EU promises to contend with. The rallying cry of the brakemen thus became for changing the enlargement process. The Austrians, and the Danes to a lesser degree, began to earnestly propose a ‘privileged partnership’, a formulation that had already gained traction among the German Christian Democrats.

The idea sounded innocent enough: ‘just in case the negotiations failed and membership would not work out, here is an alternative that still keeps Turkey involved with Europe.’ What it, however, implied was that a named alternative to membership would give the Council the precedent formulation for a predestined negative outcome of the negotiations. The regime, as it stood, led to full membership at the pace set by Turkey’s ability to reform, but an alternative outcome placed the control over the completion of the process more in Brussels’ hands than in Ankara’s. The French
right, with the exception of Jacques Chirac, also supported this idea. Yet, given the overwhelming weight in favor of the drivers in 2004, the privileged partnership proposal was a non-starter.

Additionally, there was debate about the terms of the membership. Would Turkish workers eventually be allowed the same freedom of movement that other EU citizens enjoyed? Would Turkey be able to participate in the agricultural and regional policies? Another debate was over the timing and rules of the negotiations, while the relations with Cyprus and the ability to suspend the negotiations process were also bones of contention, around which brakemen could chip away at Turkey’s progress toward membership.

8.1 POLITICAL CHANGES

Between 2002 and 2004, several changes had taken place in the domestic politics of the member states. Because the analyses in the later chapters will only test against policy changes in the fifteen members that formed the European Union prior to 2004, the political backgrounds of the leaders of the ten new member states will not be offered here, and their policy positions will only be summarized at the end of this chapter, rather than thoroughly analyzed along side the older member states.

- In Turkey, the AKP remained in power, though Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had become Prime Minister and Abdullah Gül assumed the foreign minister’s office.
- In Austria, during the previous episode, political unrest within the coalition-member FPÖ party led to elections in that same year. In February 2003, the conservative Christian democratic ÖVP and far right FPÖ had renewed their coalition, though now with the ÖVP taking a stronger role than it had under the previous coalition. Schlüssel (ÖVP) remained Chancellor but Benita Ferrero-Waldner (ÖVP) had vacated her position as Foreign Minister when she was nominated as Austria’s Commissioner in the European Commission. Her foreign ministry position was taken up by Ursula Plassnik, a close ÖVP ally of the Chancellor.
- In Finland, elections in 2003 replaced the SDP-Centre coalition led by Paavo Lipponen with a Centre-SDP coalition led by Anneli Jäätteenmäki. Jäätteenmäki, however, resigned two
months later, allowing Matti Vanhanen to become the Prime Minister. Erkki Tuomioja (SDP) remained Foreign Minister throughout the entire period. As such, there was no significant political change from the Lipponen government in 2002 to that of Vanhanen in 2004.

- In Greece, elections in March of 2004 replaced the centre-left PASOK government of Kostas Simitis and George Papandreou with the centre-right New Democracy government of Kostas Karamanlis, who chose Petros Molyviatis as his Foreign Minister.

- In Luxembourg, elections brought the Luxembourg Socialist Workers Party (LSAP) into coalition with Juncker’s Christian Democrats. The LSAP’s leader, Jean Asselborn took the position of Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

- In the Netherlands, the first Balkenende cabinet had fallen apart during the previous episode. In 2003 elections brought a new coalition, with the previously governing Christian democrat CDA and right-wing liberal VVD parties taking a stronger share of parliament. The six-member-strong center-left D66 brought the coalition to a slim majority of seats. Jan Peter Balkenende of CDA remained prime minister, while Ben Bot, of the same party, succeeded Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as foreign minister.

- In Portugal, Barroso was named as the new President of the European Commission, leaving the government of Portugal to Pedro Santana Lopes. António Monteiro, a career diplomat, had taken office in July 2004.

- In Spain, the March 2004 elections – three days after the March 11 Madrid train bombings – replaced the government of the center-right José María Aznar with that of the social democratic José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Miguel Ángel Moratinos became minister of foreign affairs.

- In Sweden, Göran Persson remained Prime Minister and there were no elections. Sadly, the Foreign Minister Anna Lindh was assassinated in 2003, and her post was inherited by Laila Freivalds.

In Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom no significant or note-worthy changes took place in their governments between 2002 and 2004.

Like the previous chapters, the first section of this chapter shall discuss the broad sequence of events and look at the particular debating points as they developed, because the negotiations in 2004 were more detail oriented than they had been previously or were in 2006. The following
section will consider a few particular issues that related to the debate on Turkey. First is a revisit of the Cyprus issue; the second relates to Armenians and their demand for recognition of the Genocide. Third is the draft Constitutional Treaty, which several member states had decided to put before their citizens in referenda.

8.2 THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

In 2004, the member states essentially allowed the Commission to lead the process, in that they withheld public comment prior to the publication of the annual report on Turkey's progress. The one member state that did solely leave matters to the Commission was the Netherlands, which held the rotating Presidency in the latter half of 2004. The Dutch foreign ministry and the prime minister's office collaborated closely with the commission, even while other parts of the Dutch government, both in the cabinet and in the parliament, had to decide the Dutch policy preferences.

Meanwhile, the German opposition attempted to appeal to like minded Christian-democratic parties to block Turkey's process accession and the Turks offended European sensibilities by suggesting criminalizing adultery. When the Commission offered its report and recommendation, it suggested several requirements of Turkey and procedural mechanisms for the negotiations. With a cautiously positive report from the Commission, the member-state politics came into full action, with many eyes on the French president, Jacques Chirac.

In the final weeks, the Dutch presidency determined its own policy. It also decided the means by which the technical issues could be dealt with and Turkey's opponents marginalized. Nothing was, however, certain prior to the summit in Brussels where the final decision to open negotiations was made.

8.2.1 The Dutch Presidency

According to a confidential source, the Dutch foreign ministry suspected that it was no accident that the Dutch presided over the decision on opening negotiations. Given the vehemence of the Dutch brakemanship at Copenhagen in 2002, it can be presumed that putting a brakeman in charge of the process had indeed been by design. As this paragraph and other sections on the Netherlands and its
the Netherlands was no longer a brakeman, but had become an energetic, but artful, driver of Turkey’s cause.

The Dutch position as a driver was not uncontroversial within the Netherlands or even within the governing coalition. There were not a few powerful ministers in the Dutch cabinet who were against accession negotiations with Turkey. As such, individual diplomats lobbying in Turkey’s favor had to first win over the Presidency before it could help win over the member states. The Dutch cabinet itself did not come to a decision on its own preferred policy until November. Foremost among these diplomats was EU Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen, who was charged with enlargement policies. He made it clear to the Dutch cabinet that the Commission could propose long transition periods before Turkish migrants would enjoy the right of free movement within the EU’s borders. In a reaction to this, the Turkish ambassador in the Netherlands communicated that Ankara would accept such transition periods in exchange for a positive outcome to start negotiations at the summit in December (Ludlow, 2005, p. 11; Wynia, 2005).

Commission President Romano Prodi meanwhile suggested keeping close relations between the Commission and the Dutch cabinet, particularly between Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and Foreign Minister Berhard Bot on one side, and Prodi and Verheugen on the other. With these avenues of close consultation, the Commission would cooperate closely with the presidency in putting forward a positive report and recommendation that would ease into the presidency’s diplomatic track with the member states. As such, the presidency would be assured that its concerns and the views of the member states would be integrated into the, ostensibly, neutral report of the Commission (ibid).

Although Balkenende and Bot had room to maneuver in their capacity of the presidency at the EU level, the Dutch national position on Turkey still had to be determined before they could make any controversial moves (Ludlow, 2005, p. 12). According to the Copenhagen conclusions of two years prior, the European Council would make an evaluation of Turkey’s readiness for negotiations in 2004, based on the report and recommendation of the Commission. Knowing that this report would not be published until October, Balkenende and Bot used the formal rules of enlargement to foil the culturally grounded arguments against Turkey, and freeze any discussions about Turkey’s suitability as a future member that were not grounded in the political Copenhagen criteria. This allowed the presidency team to behave as a driver under the guise of a ‘strict but fair’ policy. The clearest exhibit of this is in Balkenende’s Presidency speech before the European Parliament in Strasbourg on July 21:
In December, too, the European Council is to consider whether Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria for human rights and democracy. If so, membership negotiations will be opened with Turkey as well. The decision must be arrived at honestly, under the ground rules to which we previously, in 2002, firmly committed ourselves. That means strict application of the criteria laid down, but without inventing any new criteria. We must not allow ourselves to be guided by fear, e.g. of Islam. Raising barriers to any particular religion does not fit in with Europe’s shared values. Our opposition should be directed not against religions but against people and groups misusing their religion to get their way by force. Islam is not the problem. Muslims, Christians and people of other beliefs can live together perfectly well. The problem is not religion but misuse of religion to sow hatred and intolerance and to repress women. The decision concerning Turkey does nonetheless greatly concern and trouble many people. The Presidency wants to make possible a well-founded decision, which gains all-round endorsement and will also hold firm in future.

(Balkenende, 2004)

This approach, which here is called ‘strict but fair’ left the decision on the starting of negotiations with the Commission, which was widely assumed to be preparing a positive recommendation. Given the open lines of communication between Balkenende and Bot on the one hand, and Prodi and Verheugen on the other, the presidency’s neutrality toward whatever the Commission would decide was a veneer for a driver policy.

8.2.2 Merkel’s letter

After the electoral defeat of Edmund Stoiber of CSU (Christian democrats) in 2002, Angela Merkel, Chairwoman of the CDU as well as Helmut Kohl’s protégée, was able to make herself the leader of the conservative opposition in the Bundestag. In 2004 she also took up the mantle of leading the opposition to Turkey’s membership prospects on behalf of the German Christian Democrats. As such, she advocated for derailing the process by proposing a ‘privileged partnership’ rather than full membership in the Union (Dempsey, 2004).

This privileged partnership was a formulation that had already seen some use in EPP circles in the previous episode. Then it had been thwarted by Silvio Berlusconi and José María Aznar. Angela Merkel, however, pushed it again with her conservative allies in Europe, gaining success at the EPP level with support from the centre-right French UMP.

In her attempt to garner support at the heads-of-government level, she sent letters to the other conservative European leaders. Prominent recipients of the letter were Silvio Berlusconi, Wolfgang Schüssel, French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Jean Claude Juncker, Jan Peter
Balkenende, Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Lopes, Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis and Estonian Prime Minister Juhan Parts (“German Merkel,” 2004; Halusa, 2004a).

The attempt largely fell on deaf ears. Even the long-time opponent of Turkish membership, Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg, argued that it was too late for that discussion (“Deutsche CDU-Spitze,” 2004; Molitor, 2004). The initial reaction of the Austrian Chancellor was lukewarm, with a spokeswoman saying that the privileged partnership was “one way of thinking” (Ultsch, 2004a – trans, mine). At the time, he preferred to await the Commission’s recommendation of October 6. When the Commission found in Turkey’s favor, Schüssel only belatedly embraced the privileged partnership formulation.

8.2.3 Adultery

Early in September, the ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) floated the idea of reinstituting the criminalization of adultery, a provision that had been abolished by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1996 for reasons of gender equality (Akinci, 2004a). AKP’s proposal had been inserted into the penal code reform being proposed in order to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, on other issues. Arguing on behalf of the proposal, Erdoğan said, “we want to preserve family values. If the family crumbles, the country will collapse” (ibid – trans. mine). Gül, meanwhile, argued that the proposed law on adultery ought not to overshadow Turkey’s other reforms and that every country should have its own laws to preserve its values (“Le projet,” 2004 – trans. mine).

The commissioner for enlargement issues, Günter Verheugen, kept the controversy from his public statements, choosing instead to first raise the matter bilaterally with Turkey. This he did during a trip to Ankara by advising that the Turkish government to withdraw its support for the provision (Bouilhet, 2004a). Meanwhile, Verheugen’s colleague, Franz Fischler – the agriculture commissioner from Austria – decided to weigh in on the adultery matter to the press on the sidelines of a meeting of agriculture ministers, saying, “we will analyze the consequences of our decision for the Union” (ibid – trans mine). Alongside this comment about the adultery law, he warned that Turkish accession would bring additional costs to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and that the prospect of Turkish accession would raise a “wave of referenda” on the matter in the member states. Olli Rehn, the incoming Enlargement Commissioner from Finland said that the adultery legislation was considered against European judicial practice and would certainly
become an obstacle if Turkey would actively pursue it (Staunton, 2004a). After his meeting with Erdoğan, Verheugen waived off the adultery matter, saying that he could not imagine that it was a serious proposal, even calling it a joke (Akinci, 2004b; “Fin de la visite,” 2004).

On September 13 Foreign Ministers Karel de Gucht (Belgium), Miguel Ángel Moratinos (Spain), Laila Frevalds (Sweden) and Jack Straw (UK), all from sympathetic governments, called the adultery law a serious problem for Turkey’s membership ambitions (“Le projet,” 2004; “Turks move,” 2004). Subsequently, the Turkish government quietly withdrew the proposal the following day, when debate on the matter was scheduled in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Akinci, 2004c).

8.2.4 The Commission

The European Commission’s published its recommendation on Turkey, along with its annual report on October 6. As the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council of two years earlier had determined that 2004 was the year when Turkey would be gauged, “on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission,” this particular report and recommendation carried particular weight (European Council, 2002c, par. 19). While the implicit supposition was that the Commission was a neutral arbitor, the veneer was particularly thin. While the report could be seen as strictly empirical, the recommendation could not.

The recommendation had to politically interpret what the rule for accession negotiations should be. It had been decided in the past that the candidate countries had to fully comply with the political Copenhagen criteria before accession negotiations could begin. This had been the verbatim decision at the Luxembourg Council:

**Compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of any accession negotiations. Economic criteria and the ability to fulfill the obligations arising from membership have been and must be assessed in a forward-looking, dynamic way.**

(European Council, 1997, c. 25)

As such, the rule was clear – the economic and administrative criteria would be gauged in terms of the candidate’s ability to comply with the criteria by the time of accession, while the political criteria had to be complied with prior to starting accession negotiations.

By any reasonable standards Turkey failed to meet those criteria. While Turkey’s reforms and advances toward the meeting the political criteria were remarkable, cases of torture were still
widespread and imprisonment of political prisoners was routine. Human rights conditions in all the member states were not perfect, nor were the candidate countries pure models of liberal democratic governance when they began their accession negotiations in 1997 and 1999. However, they had all been much closer to the ideal than Turkey was in 2004. A positive recommendation was, thus, not a reflection of an empirical reality; it was the reflection of a political choice between encouraging Turkey to reform further or effectively punishing Turkey for its failure to develop to required standards, despite its impressive achievements.

This controversy was not lost on the College of Commissioners when several members of the Commission publicly expressed severe doubts about Turkey. Fischler’s earlier comments about the adultery law and the costs to the CAP have already been mentioned. Following those comments Fischler sent his colleague commissioners a nine-page letter, in which he described Turkey as “far more oriental than European”, warned about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey and doubted its “long-term secular and democratic credentials”. According to him, Turkey’s membership would be “a recipe for failure,” (Browne, 2004a). Respecting religion, he wrote that “despite Ataturk’s legacy, secularism is not engrained in Turkish culture, Islam enjoys public preference, and secularism has to be and will continue to have to be (imperfectly) enforced. While there is formal freedom of religion, there are implementation difficulties and lack of representation on religious minorities in the state apparatus” (Staunton, 2004a). In addition to the religious and cultural arguments, he also mentioned human and social rights standards that Turkey did not, in his estimation, meet. Referring back to the matter connected to his portfolio, Fischler argued that applying the Common Agricultural Policy to Turkey would be more expensive than the total cost of extending it to all of the 10 member-states that had joined the EU that year (ibid).

The Dutch Commissioner Frits Bolkestein (Internal Market) also made his position on Turkey’s EU membership explicit. In a speech at the Dutch University of Leiden on September 7, part of which had appeared in the Dutch NRC Handelsblad (Bolkestein, 2004a) and Die Welt (Bolkestein, 2004b) three weeks later, he argued that if the EU continued to expand, it would become like the Austro-Hungarian Empire and fall apart. In terms of the 2004 enlargement, his argument was after-the-fact. It was, however, still a poignant remark with regard to Turkey. As related in the introduction, the headline statement he made was when he said that if Turkey joined

33 More of this will be detailed in chapter 11. However, Turkey’s failure to meet the political Copenhagen criteria can be read in the Commission’s Regular Report (2004), and in independent analyses such as those of Freedom House, the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Datase (CIRI), or the POLITY IV database of democratic governance.
the EU “the liberation of Vienna in 1683 would have been in vain” (Boland, Buck & Dombey, 2004). His argument was that that if the EU were to become a union of diverse peoples like the Habsburg Empire, then it ought to expect the same fate. He further said that the EU would simply be unable to sustain its current agricultural and regional policy and would implode, if Turkey were to join the membership (Gow & MacAskill, 2004). After the speech, Bolkestein’s spokesman attempted to convince journalists that Bolkestein, “honestly”, did “not oppose the accession of Turkey to the EU” (Boland, Buck & Dombey, 2004).

Fischler and Bolkestein were not the only brakemen commissioners. Jacques Barrot (France – Regional Policy), Loyola de Palacio (Spain - Energy and Transport), Markos Kyprianou (Cyprus – Health and Consumer Protection), and Viviane Reding (Luxembourg – Education and Culture) were also considered to have deep doubts about Turkey’s membership prospects (ibid; Ricard, 2004). In the end, however, the College of Commissioners voted in favor of a positive recommendation with only one dissenting voice – Bolkestein’s. The recommendation’s crucial statement was formulated as follows:

**In view of the overall progress of reforms... the Commission considers that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened.**

(Commission, 2004, p. 3 – ital. mine)

By inserting the word ‘sufficiently’, they either interpreted the political criteria in a dynamic way, in that Turkey would not have to fully meet the political criteria until accession could be at hand, or they simply lowered the bar for what was adequate.

Nevertheless, the Commission’s document was not without some tough prerequisites. In general, it highlighted that Turkey was a special case requiring a different approach than other candidate countries. More specifically it included the following requirements that are further explored below:

- **Recognition that the negotiations were “an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand”** (par. 2-3).
- **Six additional reform measures requiring implementation** (par. 3).
- **The continuing problems between Turkey and Cyprus** (par. 4).
- **The emergency brake clause** (par. 6).

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34 A man whose Sisyphean travails are humorously described in Eppink, 2007
The consideration of “long transition periods” or “permanent safeguards” on the free movement of persons from Turkey to EU member states, and of the implementation of structural and agricultural policies (par. 7).

(ibid.)

Each of these questions was brought into the debate in the last few months leading up to the December summit, and became the substance of the different opinions. In order to unpack their meaning, the following sections explain them in more detail.

8.2.4.1 Open-ended process

The key phrase in the document relating to the ‘open-ended process’ was the following:

This is an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand. Regardless of the outcome of the negotiations or the subsequent ratification process, the relations between the EU and Turkey must ensure that Turkey remains fully anchored in European structures.

(ibid, p. 2-3 – underline added)

This was a significant shift in terminology from “…a country destined to join the Union,” as it had appeared in the Helsinki conclusions, and was explicitly recalled in the Copenhagen conclusions (European Council, 1999, par. 12). The word ‘destined’ did not appear in the Commission’s recommendation. By stating that the process was an open-ended one, the Commission implied that outcomes other than full membership for Turkey were possible. The clause, referred to as the ‘Merkel-clause’ in Verheugen’s staff, threw a bone to those who preferred an outcome other than full membership (Beste et al., 2004).

In large October, the ‘open-ended process’ clause received critical support from Jacques Chirac. The French president suggested that there were three ways in which the process could be played out. The first, for which he expressed his personal preference, was that Turkey would meet all the requirements and an accession treaty would eventually be ratified – in France by way of a referendum. The second option would be applicable if the negotiations failed and the process would be interrupted.

The third possibility was that the process might fail because of problems in the essential foundations of the relationship, which Chirac expressed as follows: “When in three, four or five years, one realizes that we have done things but there are still obstacles that cannot be overcome. You will have to find another solution, that is to say, the creation of a sufficiently strong relationship consistent with our ambitions for peace and cooperation without integration into the European
Union” (“Chirac: l’adhésion,” 2004; “Jacques Chirac,” 2004 – trans. mine). In short, then there could be a mutual agreement to create a strong bond short of membership, which was the idea of a ‘privileged partnership’ that the German Christian democrats had been promoting.

8.2.4.2 Six additional reform measures

In order to be seen to have sufficiently complied with the political criteria, the Commission judged that six more reforms needed to occur. These were reforms in the:

- Law on Associations
- Penal Code
- Law on Intermediate Courts of Appeal
- Code of Criminal Procedure
- Legislation establishing the judicial police
- Law on execution of punishments and measures

(Commission, 2004, p. 3)

By the time the Council met, these six pieces of legislation had been adopted by the Turkish legislature. This had, however, been overlooked by the Presidency, whose draft text at the Brussels summit still urged Turkey to adopt these measures. The Dutch received an earful from the Turkish leadership on this count. In the Council, however, the amendments to the conclusions were made without further argument (Ludlow, 2005, 42-43).

8.2.4.3 Turkey & Cyprus

In its report, the Commission mostly praised Turkey for its efforts to support the UN-brokered solution to the continuing separation of the island. However, the fact that Cyprus had become EU member state that year, had weakened Turkey’s bargaining position, of which it was reminded by the Commission when it was invited to sign the following additional protocol of the Ankara Agreement:

The Commission expects a positive reply from Turkey to the draft protocol on the necessary adaptations transmitted in July 2004. Moreover, it should be noted that any accession negotiations are held in the framework of an Intergovernmental Conference consisting of all Member States of the EU.

(Commission, 2004, par. 4)

The second sentence reminded Turkey that each of the negotiating chapters required a positive vote from the Republic of Cyprus, given that the procedure of an intergovernmental conference (IGC) was one that required unanimity. Further, the Commission noted that “Cypriot vessels or vessels
having landed in Cyprus are still not allowed in Turkish ports” (par. 15). Both of these points touched on the delicate issue of Turkey’s reluctance to recognize the Greek Cypriot government.

Nearly a week after the publication of the Commission’s report and recommendation, the foreign ministers met in Luxembourg to discuss the results, when Cyprus emphasized its right to unilaterally veto the opening of negotiations if Turkey did not meet its demands (Dombey & Hadjipapas, 2004; Staunton 2004b). In Nicosia, Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos said his country's right to veto “was a weapon we have in our hands,” arguing that it should at least lead to a reduction of the 36,000 Turkish troops stationed on the island (Dombey & Hadjipapas, 2004).

In response to the general Cypriot argument, the Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gül, ruled out any recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and said that if that would lead to Greek and Cypriot vetoes in December, “they would have to consider the consequences to themselves” (Zapf, 2004 – trans. mine). With respect to a solution for the island, the only way forward, according to Gül, was the Annan plan, and Turkey had already done its share by promoting that solution, and it was unfair to require any more from Ankara.

8.2.4.4 Emergency Brake

The ‘safety’ or ‘emergency brake’ clause was another provision in the Commission’s recommendation. It was an explicit statement that through continued monitoring of Turkey’s political situation, the Commission could recommend a suspension of the negotiations in case there was “a serious and persistent breach of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law” (Commission, 2004, par. 6). Referring to this clause, Dutch Foreign Minister Ben Bot said in an interview that it would allow the EU to suspend negotiations in case of radical changes in Turkey, and that it was mainly a precautionary measure that the Union would hopefully not need to apply (“La Présidence,” 2004).

In the previous enlargement rounds to Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean island states, the explicitly mentioned conditionality clause referred to the suspension of financial assistance on the basis of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, not to the suspension of negotiations. Still, despite the absence of explicit language, the negotiations with the Eastern and Mediterranean countries could have been suspended just as easily, and, as such, the clause was not so much a different approach in a legal sense but in terminology. This rendered the Presidency’s embracing of the phrase more as fodder for domestic consumption to reassure the constituents that the train was not unstoppable (Ludlow, 2005, p. 23). Furthermore, given that negotiation chapters had to be
opened and closed by an agreement of the member states in an IGC, any one of them could hit an emergency brake by voting against the opening or closing of negotiations chapters, which made the explicit provision of an emergency brake clause largely redundant (ibid, p. 14).

8.2.4.5 Permanent Safeguards

In the previous enlargement round, the EU had imposed transition periods on the new member states, allowing them to become members well before their citizens could enjoy freedom of movement throughout the Union. The same was true of the Structural and Common Agricultural Policy, which they were slowly phased into, rather than able to fully enjoy once they had become members in May 2004.

A few member states, including Denmark and Austria, pushed for a permanent safeguard clause enabling countries to prevent Turkey’s 70 million people from having the full right to live and work in other states (Browne, 2004c). Essentially, this was a provision whereby Turkey would be allowed a place at the decision-making table, but at the same time be a permanently unique member of the Union with respect to the migration rights of its citizens. Since the widespread perception of the prospect of mass migration from Turkey to the Western European states was one of the major issues – if not the predominant one – that concerned public opinion in Western Europe, the introduction (or possibility) of permanent safeguards on the free movement of persons was a way to assuage that fear. Permanent safeguards on the agricultural and structural policies also were a way to dampen fears of the fiscal “implosion” that Turkey joining the Union would create in the EU’s budget. At the same time, however, the freedom of movement of persons had always been a cornerstone element of the European Union and denying that right on a permanent basis to the citizens of one member state would be a serious transgression of Europe’s non-discrimination norms.

8.2.5 Timing

Not long after the publication of the Commission’s report and recommendation, the precise timing of when to start negotiations became the next main issue of debate. The Copenhagen conclusions of two years prior had stated that after the 2004 European Council decision, accession negotiations would start ‘without delay’ when Turkey had been gauged to have met the political criteria.
However, with a looming set of referenda to be held in several member states over the concurrently proposed Constitutional Treaty of the EU, nervousness over Turkey’s accession threatened to become its public Achilles heel, to the detriment of the treaty. As such, there were some voices in favor of a delay to the start of negotiations until after the referenda had been held. Particularly Jacques Chirac requested such a delay as France was one of the member states where a referendum would be held, while the British were eager to agree with the delay in order to capture the opening of negotiations for their own tenure in the presidency in late 2005, rather than leaving it to Luxembourg in the first half of that year (Ludlow, 2005, p. 28; Zapf, 2004).

The debate over the timing was not, however, an indicator of which members were brakemen or drivers. Firm drivers, like the United Kingdom and Germany, lobbied for a later date, somewhere in the fall of 2005. By contrast, Luxembourg, which in the past had been a stalwart brakeman, argued for an earlier start of negotiations (“Un Consensus,” 2004).

8.2.6 The Presidency’s Approach

Barely two weeks before the summit, after the Dutch government had finally made its policy on Turkey, the presidency began lobbying the member states (Ludlow, 2005, p. 15). While already quite aware of the diversity of positions, the Presidency had not yet created a draft with which all the member states – and Turkey – would agree.

Of all the member states (25 at that time), only a few had strong reservations – France, Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, and Greece (Ludlow, 2005, p. 16). There were also elements over which the Turks had concerns. The Dutch strategy was to appease the French and the Danes, put pressure on the Cypriots, and to isolate the Austrians. A mistake, confidentially acknowledged by a member of the Presidency team, was to take the Turks’ position for granted.

The Greeks, on the other hand, made it known to the presidency that they would be willing to abandon the Cypriots at the Council, if the presidency would be willing to include the persisting territorial dispute in the Aegean Sea in its draft. By making it more of a multilateral affair, it would warrant arbitration by the International Court of Justice, as the Greek had wanted all along, instead of keeping it a strictly bilateral issue between Greece and Turkey, as the Turks insisted it should be.

As it turned out, the Presidency’s draft reiterated much of the earlier Copenhagen Council conclusions – particularly concerning the clause ‘destined to join the Union’, which was a far cry
from the ‘open-ended process’/third option being talked about in Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Copenhagen (ibid, p. 19). In this respect, the draft was more sensitive to the Turkish view than the Commission’s recommendation had been, especially because it also reiterated the phrase ‘without delay’ for the timing of the start of negotiations.

The draft also deviated from the Commission’s recommendation by suggesting a different emergency brake procedure, whereby the negotiations could be suspended ‘on the request of at least one third of the member states’ (ibid, p. 23). This contrasted to the Commission’s requirement for a qualified majority vote, which would create a higher threshold for a coalition of brakemen to cross. Again, this was mostly a dispute over rhetoric as the format of the discussions allowed each member to prevent the opening or closing of any or all of the negotiations chapters.

Regarding Cyprus, the Presidency welcomed Turkey’s decision to sign the Additional Protocol, though that had not yet been made firm with the Turks. Another calculated presumption on the Presidency’s part concerned the Aegean Sea dispute, by a clause that “…welcomed Turkey’s commitment to good neighborly relations and its readiness to continue to work with member states towards the resolution of remaining border disputes, in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in the United Nations Charter” (ibid, p. 21). The mention of ‘… with member states’ (plural) was the critical term, making the business multilateral rather than bilateral. During the pre-summit haggling, Greece also attempted to include a reference to the settling of disputes by way of the International Court of Justice – an element that was not included in the final text (ibid, p. 27).

At the outset of December, the representatives in Brussels failed to come to any agreement on the presidency draft put forward by Ben Bot and the Dutch Foreign Ministry. The Germans and the British found it too tough on Turkey, while the French and the Austrians desired a more binding and detailed text (Bouilhet, 2004c). There were also calls for a different process to be used for Croatia rather than Turkey, but that was rejected by the Presidency out of hand (Ludlow, 2005, p. 29)\(^{35}\).

During the pre-summit discussions it became clear that the start of negotiations would be postponed until after the French referendum on the EU Constitution, in order to not complicate that question more than necessary. Still, there were three particular clauses that remained subject to debate: that of the open-ended process, yes or no, the installation of a permanent safeguard clause

\(^{35}\) These calls were led by Italy, which was a firm friend of Turkey, but did not want to see Croatia held back by a process designed for Turkey, which would undoubtedly slow the process for Croatia.
for the free movement of persons, and access to Turkish airports and harbors for Cypriot airplanes and ships.

The main contention between the member states was about the statement in the Commission’s recommendation, that the negotiations should be “an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand”. Particularly Turkey’s allies, Germany and the UK, took issue with the clause reappearing in the Presidency draft, while the Danish representative defended it, arguing that it only stated the obvious. The French, on the other hand, desired to make more of the phrase, by explicitly mentioning alternatives to membership and the possibility of outright failure. The Presidency, however, halted the debate on the matter, leaving it for the heads of state and government to discuss it further at the summit (ibid, p. 33).

The Presidency’s design for dealing with the controversy would be to keep the phrase ‘open-ended’, but supplement it with a preceding statement that the shared objective of the negotiations remained accession. It also added a third clause to the paragraph indicating that, if the negotiations failed, Turkey should be “fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond” (European Council, 2004, Art. 23 (4)). While the phrasing ‘privileged partnership’ had been specifically avoided, these clauses offered the Austrians and the French, something for their constituencies at home. Using personal shuttle diplomacy to broker the deal just three days before the summit, Balkenende secured the blessings of both Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder on the compromise (Ludlow, 2005, p. 34). In regard to the safeguard clauses, the process in Coreper strengthened the text in the direction of the French and Austrian position to make the outcome of the process more likely to produce a Turkish membership that did not enjoy all the same rights that other member states did (ibid, p. 31).

At the Foreign Ministers meeting on December 8, however, much of the Council balked at the plural nature of the safeguards clause. Ireland and Sweden argued that the safeguard clauses should only refer to the free movement of persons, whereas the Commission’s recommendation, which had been taken over by the Presidency, also proposed safeguard clauses for the structural and agricultural policies. They were joined by Cyprus, Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Slovakia, and, surprisingly, Austria, while Finland, Italy, Poland and the UK opposed any permanent safeguard clauses whatsoever (ibid, p. 31-32). The Presidency was, however, adamant that the safeguard clauses, plural, remain in the draft.
8.2.7 The Parliament and the EPP Summit

On November 30, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament defeated five hundred amendments to the central text, including those aiming at proposing the privileged partnership (Bouilhet, 2004b). The draft report for the Parliament’s consideration by Dutch committee member Camiel Eurlings on December 14 included an ‘open process’ clause, but no explicit alternative for membership. It also required recognition of Cyprus, but suggested that negotiations should start “without unnecessary delay” (“Un Consensus,” 2004). The report garnered 407 votes in favor, to 262 voting against, with the bulk of the yes-votes coming from socialist, green and liberal parties. The fact that many Christian democrats voted (anonymously) in favor of the full membership as the goal, was considered a stinging defeat for the EPP-leadership of German Christian democrat Hans-Gert Pöttering (“EU-Parlament öffnet,” 2004). Support for the ‘open-ended’ clause, however, signaled that the negotiations should in no way be seen as an unstoppable train toward membership.

After the defeat of the privileged partnership clause in the European Parliament, and the realization that such a clause would also be defeated in the European Council, the European People’s Party, rallied around a new phrase that would become salient in the brakeman’s lexicon – ‘absorption capacity’. On Thursday the 16th of December, the leaders of the European Peoples Party, of whom the Austrian chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel and CDU/CSU leaders – Merkel and Stoiber, met in Meise, outside of Brussels. However, drivers from conservative circles were also sufficiently present to prevent any decision making that would be too much at odds with the consensus forming in the Council (Blasius, 2004). Though the opponents of Turkish membership in the EPP deputized Schüssel to press for the privileged partnership, it was clear that the Council was dominated by drivers, and that such a motion would be stillborn (Winter & Bergius, 2004).

Beside highlighting the ‘fourth criterion’, the European Union’s so-called “capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration,” the following seven-point resolution, recognizing preceding decisions, was adopted as well.

- Continue and deepen the decades old cooperation and partnership with Turkey.
- Expect that Turkey will sign the protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara agreement.
• Have a political instrument to ensure that negotiations can be put on hold, suspended or broken off if serious problems arise regarding the Union’s fundamental values or if important targets along the way are not met.

• It is essential that member states remain masters of the whole process, underling that a strong monitoring system should be maintained during the whole process.

• Ensure the complete fulfilment and implementation of the Copenhagen criteria.

• New accession negotiations with candidate countries can only be concluded after the establishment of the Financial Framework for the period from 2014.

• Reaffirm the open-endedness of the negotiation process, but should the negotiations fail, Turkey will be firmly anchored in the European structures.

(European People’s Party, 2004)

By and large, there was nothing in this document that had not already been suggested in the Presidency draft. Here too, any mention of the privileged partnership was absent, but so was any explicit statement that the goal of the accession negotiations was, in fact, accession.

In addition to this EPP meeting, leaders of the liberal ALDE group (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) also met in Brussels prior to the European Council meeting. It was attended by, among others, Guy Verhofstad, Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Matti Vanhanen, who commented afterward on the requirement of Turkey to sign the additional protocol of the Ankara Agreement and what this would signify concerning legal recognition of the Greek government in Cyprus. Their individual statements will be dealt with in more detail in the member-state sections below.

8.2.8 The Brussels Summit

The Brussels summit took place on the 16th and 17th of December. The Peter Ludlow (2005) account, supplemented by Syp Wynia’s (2005) detailed article in Elsevier, relates a tale of diplomatic derring-do, with behind-the-scenes negotiations happening during the proceedings. According to Ludlow, the discussion on Turkey began peaceably enough, despite Austrian Chancellor Schüssel’s tenacity and Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson having his toes stepped on by the Presidency. During the working dinner, Austria was the lone voice arguing for the prospect of the privileged partnership, about which it remained isolated among the member states, the Danes demurring (“Les collègues,” 2004).

The real trouble began by the Council’s assumption that if the Council agreed to the opening of accession negotiations, Erdoğan would have no trouble extending the additional protocol of the
Ankara Agreement to all of the 25 member states (i.e. including Cyprus) before those negotiations actually began. This presumption was disturbed when Balkenende brought the ‘good’ news to Erdoğan, and the Turkish Prime Minister balked at it, irritated by the fact that Balkenende had taken the issue to the press before discussing it with the Turkish delegation. The uncomfortable dispute between the Presidency and Turkey over Cyprus was, however, solved by the late-night ingenuity of diplomatic staffers, yet several other matters remained stuck in the Turks’ craw – the Aegean border dispute, the permanent safeguards, and the resolution passed in the European Parliament, which the Turks took as ‘humiliating’.

To solve these issues, the Presidency sought the assistance of Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac. These were to put pressure on Greece’s prime minister, Kostas Karamanlis to accept some subtle changes in the text to imply that the border dispute remained a bilateral affair. Furthermore, they requested Karamanlis’ presence during a meeting with the president of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos. However, when Papadopoulos joined them, he protested against the strongarming and threatened to veto everything. At this juncture Chirac, making good on a promise to the Presidency, came into action and successfully pressured Papadopoulos to stand down. This, however, did not fully mollify the Turkish leaders who threatened to fly back to Ankara. They in turn were dissuaded from doing so by Blair, Schröder and Berlusconi, though the Turkish delegation wanted it to be made clear that signing the additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement was not the same as recognizing Cyprus (also: Laitner & Minder, 2004).

The dispute over the permanent safeguard clauses was solved by the Presidency introducing the supposed clarification that these clauses “…are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures” (European Council, 2004, par. 7). This formula suggested that when Turkey should become a member, the safeguard clauses would not (necessarily) mean that Turkey would permanently be a second-class member whose citizens would not enjoy the same the freedom of movement that other EU citizens did. However, what the clauses will actually prove to mean, should Turkey ever become a member of the EU, is anyone’s guess.

Much of the summit was conducted in small groups or bilateral meetings, rather than full Council sessions (Ludlow, 2005, p. 2). In this process, the Presidency found particular allies in Blair and Schröder in its efforts to secure an agreement by the Turks to the aspects of the framed consensus that was emerging (Bouilhet, 2004d; “Les Vingt-Cinq,” 2004). With respect to Cyprus, Jacques Chirac proved to be particularly deft at encouraging the Cypriot president to acquiesce to
the great majority of member states, even to the degree that Papadopoulos reaffirmed the consensus, even when Erdoğan provoked him during the final session.

8.3 ISSUES

In 2004, three issues were closely connected to the politics of opening accession negotiations. As before, and since, Turkey’s relationship with Cyprus was a sticking point. Another issue that became more salient than it had previously been was that of the Armenians and the 1915 Armenian Genocide. Finally, the expected implications of the start of negotiations with Turkey on the outcome of several ratification referenda on the Constitutional Treaty were a complicating factor on the timing of the start of those negotiations.

8.3.1 Cyprus

In the early months of 2004, a plan to settle the dispute had been worked out by the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, under the guidance of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. His efforts resulted in the Annan peace plan that was put to the inhabitants of the island by referenda in April. Both communities voted on the plan, with strikingly different outcomes, but with equally high turnout figures (88% for the Greek Cypriots and 87% for the Turkish Cypriots).

The Turkish Cypriots approved the plan by a margin of 65% in favor to 35% against, whereas the Greek Cypriots rejected it with 76% in favor to 24% against, by which the peace plan was rejected. Little more than a week later, the still-divided island became a member of the European Union. Furthermore, the leader of the campaign to reject the plan, the Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos, then took his seat at the European Council table. Moreover a November 7th poll found that 52% of Greek Cypriots desired that their president would unilaterally veto the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey (Ludlow, 2005, p. 17).

While the outcome of the referendum and Greek Cyprus’ accession was a bitter result for the Turkish Cypriots, Ankara had, in a way, demonstrated that it was not Turkey (or its troops) that stood in the way of a solution to the island’s problems. Nevertheless, a Greek Cypriot government had become a veto-holding member of the EU. In its recommendation, the European Commission
recognized that Turkey had been and continued to be actively supporting efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem, in particular by agreeing to the solution put forward in the peace plan of the UN Secretary General (Commission, 2004, par. 4).

Regarding Cyprus’ own position on Turkey, Papadopoulos had stated throughout the summer and early fall that he would not exercise a unilateral veto on Turkey. However, in November, after a strategy session with Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, he said that he would not rule out using the Cypriot veto in the European Council if Ankara denied the recognition of the Greek Cypriot government (Bouilhet, 2004c; “La Présidence,” 2004; Lepartmentier, 2004; Nerbollier, 2004).

Responding to this ultimatum, Erdoğan ruled out any concessions on the matter before December 17th, arguing that the Cyprus situation was not a matter for the EU, but of the United Nations (Rivais, 2004). The outstanding issue, however, was that the Commission required Turkey to sign an additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement (concerning customs and migration laws between Turkey and EU member states) to take account of the accession of the ten new member states, including Cyprus. This amendment to the EU-Turkey Custom Union required Turkey to open its airports and harbors to flights and ships from Greek Cyprus, and – arguably – implied its official recognition of the Greek Cypriot government. The Commission also stated that it expected a positive reply from Turkey to the draft protocol on the necessary adaptations transmitted in July 2004 and that accession negotiations would be held in the framework of an Intergovernmental Conference consisting of all Member States of the EU (Commission, 2004, par. 4). This, again, reminded Turkey that Cyprus would be at the table and therefore be in a position to unilaterally veto the opening and closing of each of the 32 chapters of the acquis communautaire during the negotiation process. When Erdoğan insisted at the end of the summit that his country did not recognize the Greek government of Cyprus, the member states balked at his behavior, but did not overturn their conclusion to open negotiations (Wynia, 2005).

Thus the summit ended without a Turkish signature to the additional protocol, by which its recognition of Cyprus would have been implied, though there was both a requirement by the EU and a promise from Turkey to sign the document before negotiations would begin in 2005 (Bouilhet, 2004c). Immediately upon hearing the news of a concession regarding Cyprus, at least a concession that might take place before the negotiations began, Erdoğan was lambasted at home by the Turkish press and the domestic opposition (ibid). Oguz Demiralp, at that time the head of the Turkish mission in Brussels, would indeed sign the additional protocol in June 2005. However,
reservations remained in the text, which would become the sticking point between the EU and Turkey in the 2006 episode, detailed in the next chapter.

8.3.2 Armenians

During this period, Armenian communities in Europe lobbied extensively to make Turkey’s recognition of the 1915 genocide a precondition for membership and/or the start of negotiations. The Armenian diaspora population is particularly large in France (see table 8.1) and is particularly concentrated in Marseilles. Having both relatively and absolutely the largest population of this ethnic group in Western Europe, the issue was (and remains) particularly relevant to French politics ("Négociations d'adhésion," 2004; Rama, 2004). For example, during a visit to Jean-Claude Gaudin, the UMP mayor of Marseilles, Chirac was personally pressed to push for the necessity of Turkey recognizing the genocide over a bowl of bouillabaisse at Gaudin’s home ("Des députés UMP," 2004).

**Table 8.1:** The Armenian and Turkish diasporas in the fifteen member states.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>217,000</td>
<td>2.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
<td>161,000</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
<td>381,000</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>2,280,000</td>
<td>2.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>352,000</td>
<td>2.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>0.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Armeniandiaspora.com (retrieved: January 27, 2012), and own estimates, see Statistical Appendix C. (Considering the first source as promoting the political interests of the Armenian Diaspora, and the difficulties of gathering such numbers, these should numbers should not be treated as demographic fact.)*
It must be noted that, in comparison to the numbers of Turkish immigrants in European countries, the relative sizes of the Armenian Diaspora are negligible, with the exception of France. In France, the populations of Armenians and Turks are very similar in size, with an advantage to the Armenians. That said, given the earlier migration of Armenians and the incorporation of Armenia into the Soviet Union, ethnic Armenians are assumed to be much more likely to have citizenship, and therefore voting rights, in the member states than ethnic Turks are.

The issue of the Genocide, however, touched a raw nerve in Europe. Much of the rhetoric justifying the European Union’s political construction has been aimed at seeing European political integration as the solution to the centuries of warfare that culminated in the Holocaust of World War II. By denying the Armenian genocide, the Turks put themselves into a similar category as Holocaust-deniers. Yet, admission to one’s contested history, or whether or not the tragedies of 1915 should legally be considered genocide, does not appear in the formal rules of EU enlargement or the Copenhagen criteria. From the Turkish perspective, if Europe was to live up to its word on treating Turkey the same as any other candidate for membership, as the Turks argued, the Armenian issue ought not play a role, and Turkey should not be pressured into the acknowledgement that genocide was committed in its Ottoman history.

Nevertheless, at the summit, Jacques Chirac warned Turkey that it ought to recognize the genocide anyway, saying that “The whole history of European integration is the history of dialogue, respect for others and recognition of the mistakes we have made in the past,” and, “The working memory [travail de mémoire], which is only natural today in the minds of Europeans, should be considered an unavoidable necessity,...” (“Génocide arménien,” 2004 – trans. mine). As such, Chirac warned that the French electorate would likely make recognition of the genocide an unofficial membership criterion if or when an accession treaty would be put to referendum.

### 8.3.3 The Constitutional Treaty

In June 2004 the intention to establish a constitutional treaty for the European Union reached a pinnacle when its draft was issued, in which former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had a leading role as chairman of the convention charged with its preparation. In a September interview with the International Herald Tribune, Giscard d’Estaing held that the adoption of the treaty would make Turkish accession practically impossible, owing to the ‘double-majority voting’ mechanism
introduced into the draft, which required both a majority of 55%\textsuperscript{36} in the Council and that the countries voting in favor represented at least 65% of the EU’s population. This system put greater emphasis on population size, and thus gave more power to populous Turkey than the other member states would likely be willing to countenance (Bennhold, 2004).

According to Ana Palacio, the former Foreign Minister of Spain, this “proposal was not tabled in innocence,” suggesting that Giscard d’Estaing, who had so strongly opposed Turkey’s EU aspirations in 2002, had designed the mechanism intentionally to torpedo Turkey’s membership. “Having been a member of the convention, I know what I’m saying,” she added (ibid). Giscard d’Estaing neither confirmed nor denied this accusation.

In 2004, however, the real problem to the proposed Constitutional Treaty was its timing with the concurrent debates on when to start negotiations with Turkey. Turkey’s allies worried about what effect this might have on the referenda about the treaty that were to be held in eight member states, starting in 2005. This was particularly salient in France, where the leaders feared (and the opposition hoped) that the ‘threat’ of Turkey in the EU would incline the electorate to oppose the Treaty more than it would do otherwise. In an attempt to forestall this prospect, the French leaders proposed a separate referendum on Turkey and tried to delay the start of negotiations with Turkey until after the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty had taken place.

A fuller account of this can be found in the paragraph on France, below, but in the referendum held there on May 29 2005, it would turn out that 55% would vote against the Constitutional Treaty with a turnout of 69%. According to the post-referendum public Flash Eurobarometer (2005a) survey, only 6% of the no-voters had cited opposition to Turkey as one of the reasons why they had voted against the Treaty. This finding was, however, belied by the leading global research company Ipsos exit poll, in addition to other post-election polls (cited in Ivaldi, 2006), the outcome of which suggests that the issue of Turkey had been of considerable influence. The opposition to the treaty had evidently successfully exploited the issue of Turkey in order to sink the referendum. Had the French leadership been prescient, they might have decided to not have held the referendum or would have taken even greater care to separate the two issues.

Following the French referendum, the Dutch electorate also faced a constitutional referendum in 2005, whereby pre-referendum polls showed mixed messages about the influence of the Turkish ‘threat’ on the outcome thereof. In the government sponsored national public news

\textsuperscript{36} Or 72% when acting without the initiative of the Commission
broadcaster poll (cited in Nijeboer, 2005) explicitly on the question of Turkey becoming a member playing a role, 68% responded with no to 22% yes. Like the French case, the Flash Eurobarometer (2005b) on the Dutch referendum also suggested that the Turkish issue had less bearing on voting intentions, as only 3% of the no-voting respondents gave ‘does not want Turkey in the European Union’ as one of the reasons for voting ‘no’. This finding, like the Flash Barometer on France was belied by Dutch independent pollster Maurice de Hond (2005), whose panel polling, held after the referendum, found between 40% and 44% of no-voters suggesting antagonism toward Turkish accession as one of the main reasons for their no-vote. On June 1 2005, three days after the French referendum, which negative results may have had a bearing on the outcome in the Netherlands, the Dutch voters rejected the treaty even more than the French had, with 61% voting no to 39% yes in a turnout of 62%.

However, in 2004, the pro-treaty Dutch leaders were still confident that the Constitutional Treaty would be approved by the referendum and did not pay attention at the time to the Turkish aspect. While they went along with the strategy to push back the referendum date, there is little doubt that this was done more to acquiescence to French demands than to safeguard their own referendum.

In Spain and Luxembourg, where referenda were also held in 2005, the treaty was accepted. Public opinion in Spain has generally been positive toward Turkish accession37, while in Luxembourg 17% of no-voting respondents saw Turkey as a contributing reason for their vote, at least according to the Flash Barometer (2005c). In regard to opposition to Turkey arising out of concerns for the adoption of the Treaty, only France clearly allowed its position to be swayed. It proposed a separate referendum on Turkey and lobbied for the delay of the accession negotiations.

Austria, a brakeman, ratified the treaty by Parliamentary act, while Denmark Portugal, Poland, Ireland and the UK also had referenda scheduled that were indefinitely postponed after the failures in France and the Netherlands. By contrast, Tony Blair had hoped to use the start of the negotiations with Turkey as a launching pad from which to begin his own campaign on behalf of the Constitutional Treaty in the British referendum (Adams, 2004).

While much of the above may be interesting for its own sake, it threatens, by this jump into the future, to confuse the hypothetical causal pattern. In 2004, the European leaders were deciding their policies on Turkey, still unaffected by public voting results of 2005. In France, the leadership

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37 In Spain’s Flash Barometer, the question on Turkey was not asked.
was clearly becoming concerned over the connections being made between the Constitutional Treaty and Turkey, and together with other domestic political concerns, adjusted their policy on Turkey accordingly. Hindsight demonstrates that doing so did not have the hoped-for effect of rescuing the treaty.

In the Netherlands there is little evidence that the treaty’s proponents in the government or the opposition took its fate into account when deciding their policy on Turkey. However, the emerging policy on Turkey had the unforeseen effect of unleashing a particular parliamentary actor, right-wing politician Geert Wilders, who later engaged in the campaign to defeat the Constitutional Treaty and stir up even more public antagonism to Turkey’s accession in the EU. But, as said, that was unforeseen in 2004.

8.4 THE MEMBER-STATE POSITIONS

In 2004, the main question before the Council was whether or not to start the accession negotiations. At Copenhagen in 2002 it had been decided that negotiations would begin ‘without delay’ when, based on the findings of the European Commission in 2004, Turkey had met the political criteria for membership. One of the main arguments used by the drivers was that the European Council had to keep its word to Turkey. Given that the Commission came with a positive assessment and recommendation in October, brakemen had to either renege on the promises of Helsinki and Copenhagen, dispute the findings of the Commission, or alter the terms of the process.

In the European Parliament there was certainly debate about the Commission’s assessment, but none of the member-state brakemen embraced this tactic. None of the heads of state or government argued that Turkey’s candidacy ought to be disqualified on prior grounds of its European-ness. As such, reneging on Copenhagen or disputing the Commission’s empirical findings was off the table for the member-state government. Instead, those who opposed Turkey did so by attempting to alter the terms.

In many respects, like the previous episodes, the identification of brakemen vs. drivers is not easily made, given that there were nuances in the positions. In regard to the discrete question at hand – whether or not to start negotiations – there was only one member state threatening to halt the process altogether, which was Cyprus. Cyprus, however, aimed at forcing Turkey to recognize
the Greek government of Cyprus, than at questioning the principle of Turkey’s EU membership suitability. The other brakemen, meanwhile, opted to alter the terms of the process, in which the privileged partnership was re-cast as an acknowledgement that the negotiations were to be an open-ended process, leading to either full membership or to something else. Another element of the altered terms was the introduction of safeguard clauses – especially with the intention to install them permanently.

With respect to the timing of the negotiation, and the danger of blending the issue of Turkey into the issue of the Constitutional Treaty in the upcoming referenda on the latter, even some stalwart drivers were convinced of the wiser course of starting the negotiations in the latter half of 2005. While this move would abrogate the ‘without delay’ clause, for which the drivers had fought hard at Copenhagen, it was seen more as a means of not diminishing the chance of the Constitutional Treaty passing the referenda than means of derailing Turkey’s prospect for membership.

8.4.1 Austria

In the 2004 episode, Austria was, again, the most stalwart brakeman against Turkey’s membership ambitions among the EU-15. Domestically, Austria’s public opinion was also the most dead set against Turkish membership, exceeding or equaling even that of the Cypriots, who would have happily seen their president unilaterally veto the entire prospect. Furthermore, Jörg Haider’s right-wing FPÖ threatened to bring down the center-right ÖVP-FPÖ coalition government if Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel supported accession negotiations with Turkey (Browne, 2004b; Traynor & Henley, 2004).

Incidentally, Jörg Haider, himself, presented a curious case, because while his views were outspoken against immigration and Islamic compatibility with western values, he paradoxically expressed his personal support of Turkey’s ambitions for EU membership. He argued that Turkish membership was a matter of security policy. However, he was clearly isolated about this support among his party, who were puzzled over these seemingly mixed messages (“Haider soll,” 2004; Lugmayr, 2004; Reichstein et al., 2004; Smonig, 2004).

Meanwhile, the opposition of Social Democrats (SPÖ) also began to take the brakeman position, even to the point of trying to tie the Chancellor’s hands to a veto at the Council. Their
motion to that effect, however, failed in the National Council, Austria’s lower house (Dannhauser, 2004). The SPÖ-leader in Parliament argued that negotiations should only be opened if membership was ruled out, and would only concern a looser connection, such as under the European Economic Area (Höhler, 2004).

Between breakmen pressures at home, and near-isolation among the member states, Chancellor Schüssel opted to not veto the negotiations, but to argue that they were “with an open aim,” i.e. with the possibility of a ‘privileged partnership’ (Boland & Dombey, 2004a; “French PM says,” 2004; “Les collègues,” 2004). Receiving a great deal of support from the German Christian Democrats and center-right UMP members in France, Austria was the outspoken advocate for the privileged partnership option at the heads of government level (“EU blijft verdeeld,” 2004; Ludlow, 2005, p. 16).

At home, Schüssel was also supported by members of his cabinet when he expressed his doubts about Turkey’s prospect for full membership during the summer and early fall. Austria’s foreign minister Benita Ferrero-Waldner had done so even earlier in June, when she said: “Turkey today is not yet ready for joining the EU,” adding that “…the EU today is not yet ready for such a step either ... given that we have just completed the biggest enlargement in the Union’s history” (Dombey & Hope, 2004). Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grasser said in September, “Turkey’s membership of the EU would not be helpful. I am amazed that in the debate going on in Europe that practically no one has the courage to say that openly” (Browne, 2004b; Staunton, 2004a). Upon assuming the position of foreign minister in October, Ursula Plassnik (ÖVP) said that the negotiations should be open-ended, without any guarantees of accession, also underlining the absorption capacity of the EU, but leaving the last word to the (Austrian) Parliament (“Le chancelier autrichien,” 2004; Ultsch, 2004b).

At the foreign ministers meeting following the publication of the Commission’s recommendation, the Austrian delegation argued for the privileged partnership and suggested that it was too soon to start the negotiations. They further urged for a delay of the negotiations until the impact of Turkish membership on the EU’s institutions had been investigated. This, essentially, revived the ‘fourth criterion’ of the EU’s ability to institutionally absorb new members, also known as the absorption capacity (Staunton 2004b).

Like Chirac (see below), Schüssel promised the Austrian population a referendum on the accession of Turkey (“L’UE et la Turquie,” 2004). “In the event of a positive result of the [accession] negotiations, the people shall be consulted before accession [of Turkey]” he told the
press, adding that, “at the end of the process, the Austrian people shall have the last word, and not only the Parliament… I think that it is an important decision in a democracy like Austria” (“Le chancelier autrichien,” 2004 – trans. mine). Heinz Fischer, the Austrian President of the Social-Democratic party, suggested a Europe-wide referendum on the subject (“L’Autriche souhaite,” 2004). This was a softer approach than Schüssel’s (or Chirac’s), since a positive outcome would be more likely in a Europe-wide referendum, than in only those countries where opposition to Turkish membership was the strongest.

In the diplomatic run-up to the December summit, Austria, together with Denmark, pushed for the permanent safeguards on the free movement of workers (Bouilhet, 2004c; Browne, 2004c). Advocating for the privileged partnership, Schüssel was delegated by the EPP summit to be the conservatives’ spokesman in the Council. However, becoming aware of the degree to which his voice was alone, Schüssel soon backed down from being too insistent on explicit mention of alternative outcomes to full membership.


8.4.2 Belgium

In 2004, Belgium was again among the drivers of Turkey’s membership prospects. However, this position altered temporarily when the Turkish ruling AKP floated the proposed law on adultery. Belgium’s foreign minister, Karel de Gucht, strongly condemned it and considered its direction toward Islamic legislation “out of keeping with European values” and thus “a serious problem” for Turkey’s integration into the EU (“Belgian minister condemns,” 2004). As detailed above, other drivers – Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom - joined Belgium in its public criticism of the adultery ban.

In early November, in an interview with the Dutch opinion magazine Elsevier, de Gucht waxed poetic about Turkey, arguing how “the perspective of accession has unleashed a dynamism that was previously absent. Look at the modernization of the country, or to the changed treatment
of the Kurds. I know there is a difference between the adopted legislation and the implementation, but between Martin Luther King and the equal treatment of blacks in America took a whole generation. I am in favor of the accession of Turkey, even if I understand that full integration will not be easy. We must learn from our mistakes” (Camps, 2004 – trans. mine).

On the first of December, at a bilateral summit meeting between Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt and his German colleague Gerhard Schröder in Berlin, both leaders expressed their support for accession negotiations to begin the following year and their opposition to the privileged partnership idea. Speaking to the press, Verhofstadt said, “We do not need a new form of privileged partnership. We need normal negotiations with Turkey” (“Deutschland und Belgien,” 2004 – trans. mine).

At the pre-summit foreign ministers meeting, Belgium argued against the permanent safeguard clause preventing the free movement of workers, arguing that such a clause would relegate Turkey to a second-class status in the EU (Mahony, 2004). At the ALDE group meeting, preceeding the summit, Verhofstad commented on Rasmussen’s assertion that Turkey would have to sign the additional protocol of the Ankara Agreement before negotiations could begin (see below). According to Verhofstad it was more important to learn that Turkey had the intention of signing without worrying about when exactly this would have to take place (“Rasmussen veut,” 2004).

During the summit itself, Verhofstad did not make the news much. Wynia (2005) reports that, together with Tony Blair, he quieted down on the safeguards after the Swedish prime minister Persson made too much of a case for it, and it was clear that the brakemen were going to remain firm on the issue.

Other articles that list Belgium as being a driver are: “Germany, Italy,” 2004; “Les dirigeants,” 2004; “Les eurodéputés,” 2004; Ludlow, 2005, p. 6; Staunton, 2004c. Articles that list Belgium as divided are “Human rights,” 2004 and Traynor & Henley, 2004. Both implicitly mixing public opinion into the analyses of where the member states stood, rather than focusing specifically on the negotiating position of their governments. Gow & MacAskill (2004) mention Belgium as “resistant” toward Turkey, along with both France and Germany, but the inclusion of the latter suggests that this may have been skewed due to the adultery ban issue, as the article was published in early September, when that issue was still in the headlines.
8.4.3 Denmark

No longer carrying the presidency, Denmark made less news about its position vis-à-vis Turkey’s membership prospects less than it had two years before, and the reports that did reach the press were somewhat contradictory. On the whole, however, given the greater weight of articles in support of Denmark’s position as antagonistic to Turkey’s interests, such as its embrace, along with Austria, of the ‘privileged partnership’ option (Bergsma & van de Poll, 2004; “Développement UE-Turquie,” 2004; van Rooij, 2004; “Un Consensus,” 2004) and the permanent safeguard on the free movement of workers (Bouilhet, 2004e; Browne, 2004c), Denmark must be categorized as brakeman.

According to Ludlow, however, while Austria’s position was staunchly unwavering in its brakeman position, the Presidency believed that Denmark’s could be appeased by the insistence on a very strict application of the Copenhagen criteria (Ludlow, 2005, p. 17). This notion was also supported by a poll conducted among Danish members of Parliament, wherein 77 or the 127 members polled, supported Turkish membership, provided that Turkey met the membership criteria (“77 députés danois,” 2004). Furthermore, once the Commission had published its report and recommendation, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen told the Danish daily newspaper Berlingske Tidende, that if the Commission judged the conditions for starting negotiations as met, negotiations should begin. However, he did argue for the emergency brake procedure in case developments in Turkey took a wrong turn (“Danemark: ‘oui,’” 2004).

After a meeting of the ALDE group leaders, just prior to the summit, Rasmussen told reporters that Turkey should have to sign the additional protocol of the Ankara Agreement, which would amount to the legal recognition of Cyprus (“Rasmussen veut,” 2004; “Solana fordert,” 2004). At the summit itself, he said that there should be no double standards with respect to the conditions for the entry of new members (“Erdoğan más,” 2004). On the other hand, several reporters noted that, at the same time, Denmark was still among those countries pushing for something other than full membership (Bergsma & van Lierop, 2004; Browne, Hurst & Watson, 2004; Dirks & Lanting, 2004). As far as some public opinion was concerned, protestors in Copenhagen covered the city’s signature statue, the Little Mermaid, with a black burkha and a sign around her neck reading “Turkey in the EU?” (Hurst & Browne, 2004).

The reports about Denmark’s brakemanship were not unanimous, however. Boland & Dombey (2004b), mention Denmark as a country that, although it did have reservations concerning
Turkey’s human rights, it was prepared to move ahead as long as Turkey maintained the reforms. That said, the following day, the same journalists (Boland, Dombey & Parker, 2004), identified Denmark as arguing for permanent safeguard clauses on farm subsidies, regional aid and the free movement of workers.


8.4.4 Finland

Like many of the smaller countries, Finland made minimal international news on the issue, but the evidence available points clearly toward a driver position.

In June, the former Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen wrote a letter-to-the-editor in the Financial Times concerning the enlargement that had just occurred, whereby he argued that, “at this stage the promise of membership should not be extended to more countries.” He preceded this main point, however by acknowledging that “the coming enlargement by Bulgaria and Romania, the western Balkans and, eventually, Turkey, presents a great but positive challenge,” suggesting that he was not opposed to Turkish membership, but that his concern was more aimed at countries on the eastern rim of Europe, such as Ukraine, about which he advocated for an enhanced neighborhood policy rather than a full EU membership (Lipponen, 2004).

In a mid-October interview with Der Spiegel, the Finnish foreign minister Erkki Tuomioja, said, “When the Copenhagen criteria were first drawn up in 1993, it was unimaginable that Turkey would ever be able to join. Turkey, however, quickly made itself master of the membership perspective, and I am wholly on its side” (“Spielball,” 2004 – trans. mine). When asked about the proposed national referenda about Turkey’s membership, Tuomioja argued that they were only the playthings of domestic political interests, and that it was irresponsible to make such questions the subject of referenda. Responding to suggestions that the Commission had made a decision that was not being accepted, and whether or not the recommendation had come too soon, Tuomioja answered that “the Commission’s report has satisfied all the requirements of the member states. Now we do not dare go back to zero and revisit the fundamental decision” (ibid).
In November, after a summit between the Finnish President Tarja Halonen and Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, and the Bulgarian president Georgi Purvanov, the question of Turkey was also discussed about which Halonen stated that, just as before, Finland’s attitude to Turkey’s accession was very positive. If a positive decision for beginning negotiations with Turkey or any other country was taken, the specific features of each state should be born in mind, she said, as well as the fact that each of them has its own different approach and process towards accession, whereby Turkey has made considerable progress in recent years (“Bulgarian, Finnish,” 2004).

At the ALDE group leaders meeting, Vanhanen distanced himself from Rasmussen’s point that Turkey should sign the additional protocol before negotiations could begin, joining Verhofstads more permissive approach. “The position of Finland is that the signature is not part of the criteria [for EU membership],” he said, “but, of course, Turkey will not become a member of the EU without resolving the question of its relations with Cyprus” (“Rasmussen veut,” 2004 – trans mine; “Solana fordert,” 2004).

At the pre-summit foreign ministers meeting, Finland joined Belgium and others opposing the permanent safeguard clause against the free movement of workers (Ludlow, 2005, p. 31-32; Mahony, 2004). Finland also opposed any alternatives to membership that were mentioned in the conclusions (“Türkei-Gipfel,” 2004). Other articles that list Finland as being a driver are: “Human rights record,” 2004, “Latvian, Finnish,” 2004, “Les dirigeants,” 2004; “Les eurodéputés,” 2004, and Traynor & Henley, 2004).

8.4.5 France

In 2004, France was as difficult to categorize as it had been in 2002. President Chirac repeatedly expressed himself in favor of negotiations and their goal of full membership. Domestically, however, his own party vigorously opposed this policy and he received little political cover from the left. As a result, the French position on Turkey was pulled away from the President’s expressed personal preferences and into the outright brakeman camp. Given this complexity, it is worthwhile thoroughly dissecting the French position.

In April, UMP members of the European Parliament had voted with other conservative members of the EPP in favor of an amendment that called for a privileged partnership rather than full membership (Barthelemy, 2004). The amendment failed, but one week later, the whole UMP
party came out against Turkey at the launch of its 2004 European Parliament election campaign (de Bresson, 2004). Alain Juppé – the UMP’s president – explicitly called for privileged partnerships, not only with Turkey, but also with the countries of the Maghreb (Northwest Africa) and the southern former-Soviet bloc, at the risk of antagonizing Jacques Chirac (“L'UMP contre,” 2004; Masson, 2004; Zemmour, 2004).

Chirac, however, maintained his own driver preference. At the end of April, he gave a rare press conference marking the upcoming accession of the Eastern European countries. With respect to Turkey, he stated that it was his “deep conviction, which I know is not shared by everyone, [that] Turkey has a European vocation… It is a country closely tied to European civilization… If it is rejected on ethnic or religious grounds, it would play into the hands of those who want to put Islam and the West into opposition [with one another]” (Fulda, 2004a – trans. mine).

In June, at a NATO conference in Istanbul, Chirac called the march of Turkey toward membership both “desirable” and “irreversible” (de Barochez, 2004a – trans. mine). Nevertheless, he also reminded people (especially US President George Bush, who had continued to put pressure on the EU to accept Turkey) that asking the EU to adopt Turkey was like asking the United States to adopt Mexico. In August, Chirac reiterated his position on Turkey, saying, “In the world of tomorrow, the interest of the Union, like Turkey, is to take a common path” (“Les réticences,” 2004 – trans. mine).

Cutting at least one domestic opponent short, Alain Juppé found himself convicted on corruption charges that summer. When it became clear that the sitting minister of finance, Nicolas Sarkozy, would be elected to replace him in November, the already existing political conflict between Sarkozy and Chirac widened. The President would clearly not be able to count on Sarkozy’s support regarding Turkey (Waintraub, 2004).

In September, Chirac and the other UMP leaders were concerned about a possible negative spillover effect of the unpopular issue of Turkish accession on the referendum about the Constitutional Treaty for the European Union. The UMP supported the Constitution and the President, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, and Sarkozy all had their personal prestige tied to its fate (Tabard, 2004). With Sarkozy opposed to Turkey, the President in favor, and Raffarin vacillating in between, the UMP was split on how to manage the issue of Turkey in light of the effect it might have on the Constitutional referendum.

From the left, Laurent Fabius – the former Socialist Prime Minister – in opposing the draft constitution lamented that while Chirac supported the European project in the same spirit as
Mitterand had done, he had clearly forgotten the institutional and geographic boundaries of Europe, thus taking a swipe at Chirac for his support for Turkish accession (Sauvage, 2004). On the whole, however, the left was at least nominally in favor of Turkish accession, provided that it met the criteria, though some also stressed that Turkey should recognize the Armenian genocide (“La Turquie divise,” 2004).

On September 23rd, the Wall Street Journal published an interview with Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, in which he was said to ‘demur’ on Turkey’s EU bid (Carreyrou & Bilefsky, 2004). Although he said that, “we don’t think we should tell Turkey that the doors of Europe are forever closed to it,” he did question if Erdoğan’s successors would be as willing to make the reforms as Erdoğan had been. Ultimately, Raffarin argued, it was not up to the Turkish leaders, but Turkish society to embrace Europe’s human-rights values. “Do we want the river of Islam to enter the riverbed of secularism?” Raffarin asked, rhetorically.

Despite his explicit statement that he opposed shutting the door on Turkey, the interview was broadly taken as critical of Turkey’s accession process. While the article’s authors characterized Raffarin’s position as ‘demurring’, the French press (e.g. Dumoulin, 2004; Fulda, 2004b; “La visite d’Erdogan,” 2004) characterized it as being at odds with the President, and rooted in the Prime Minister’s alleged belief that Muslims were incompatible with the EU or its values. Alluding to the latter Foreign Minister Michel Barnier, attending the UN General Assembly, reiterated that religion was not a part of the Copenhagen criteria. “The dominant religion of this or that country is not, and has never been, a criteria for membership,” he said (“La religion,” 2004 – trans. mine).

With Raffarin publicly expressing doubts about Turkey’s accession to the EU, the field was opened for Sarkozy to demand a referendum on the subject in a Sunday television program. “It is not because it is a Muslim country,” he told his interviewers, “but because Turkey represents the equivalent of the accession of the ten new countries from Eastern Europe together” (“Nicolas Sarkozy,” 2004 – trans. mine). A day later, Barnier supported Sarkozy’s suggestion. “As this is a very important decision,” he told the Assembly of French Citizens Abroad, meeting in Paris, “I offer my personal opinion, [that the accession of Turkey] should be [treated] as it was done with the United Kingdom, a referendum when the time [for accession] comes” (“Michel Barnier … referendum,” 2004). A day later again, Barnier made it clear that he, himself, favored Turkish accession. “The benefits for us and for Turkey outweigh the difficulties we may encounter,” he said. “Geopolitical risks, including those of this great country tilting away from Europe, are immense if the process were to be blocked (“Michel Barnier … l’adhésion,” 2004 – trans. mine).
During a UMP meeting in Argenteuil at the end of September, Raffarin also spoke in support of Sarkozy’s suggestion of a French referendum on the accession of Turkey (“France L'UMP,” 2004; “Raffarin pour,” 2004). François Hollande of the PS, meanwhile, criticized Raffarin for bringing up the ‘rivers’ of Islam and secularism, but also suggested that all future enlargements should be subject to a French referendum (“Le chef du PS,” 2004). As such, political pressure in favor of a French national referendum on Turkey was mounting.

According to inside sources, Chirac was far from pleased with Sarkozy forcing his hand by the proposed referendum, though Sarkozy had warned him in advance about what he was going to say on television (Schneider & Guiral, 2004). Meanwhile, Michel Barnier was sent to do an interview with Le Monde, in which he berated the press for misunderstanding Raffarin’s statement in the Wall Street Journal, whereby he again stressed again his support for eventual Turkish membership as well as the idea of a referendum, which, in any case, would still be a long time coming (Ceaux & Jakubyszyn, 2004).

After a meeting with Gerhard Schröder in Strasbourg on October 1st, Chirac again stressed his support for Turkey, seeing, “the prospect of entrenching democracy and peace throughout the European continent in the broadest sense [to be in our interest] in order to avoid the mistakes and violence of the past” (“Chirac pour,” 2004 – trans. mine). At the same time, encountering so much pressure for a referendum on Turkey’s accession at home, he announced that there ought to be a referendum when negotiations had been completed, which, to his estimate, would take ten to fifteen years (“Chirac, Schröder d’accord,” 2004). Recognizing and expressing his support for the revision to the French constitution that would allow for the French public to vote on EU enlargements, he added that it should not be binding for Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania (“Chirac pour,” 2004). Turkish officials, meanwhile, said that each country ratified treaties in their own way, and a French referendum was not one of particular concern to them. The promise of a referendum was, in their opinion, merely a matter of French domestic politics (“La Turquie minimise,” 2004; Semo, 2004).

After the Commission had published its report and recommendation, Jean-Louis Debré (UMP), the Speaker of the National Assembly, announced a debate without vote on the matter of opening negotiations with Turkey. Fifty UMP deputies called for a debate and a vote, doubtlessly intending to stop Turkey’s accession process, in its tracks then and there, but Raffarin denied them this. “The debate will take place,” the Prime Minister attempted to reassure them. “It will take place in Parliament and it will be held in the country,” but he did not want the process shut down before it even started, saying “The debate deserves to get to the bottom of things. Should European
humanism systematically push Turkey into fundamentalism? Has humanism slammed the door?” (de Barochez, 2004b – trans mine).

Some leading lights in the Socialist Party, meanwhile, sought to maintain the connection between Turkey and the Constitutional Treaty, the latter of which they opposed. Still led by Laurent Fabius, they argued that the European construction was undemocratic, and Turkey’s progress toward accession was an example of this. As such, they argued in favor of a parliamentary debate, with a vote, on the matter (Quino, 2004). Fabius and his faction, however, did not speak for the entire PS, as former Minister of European affairs Pierre Moscovici and Martine Aubry (mayor of Lille and the daughter of Jacques Delors, former president of the European Commission), opposed their argument, saying that a debate without vote was quite legitimate and the agitation against Turkey was a matter of demagoguery (ibid & Valbay, 2004).

The dispute of the parliamentary debate with or without a vote, triggered a discussion about the French constitution, when the President underlined his ‘domaine reserve’ with regard to foreign policy, while his antagonists – many from his own UMP – argued that parliament had the right to debate and vote on any drafts or proposals issued by EU institutions. Speaking to French television during an October state visit to China, Chirac assured his audience that France was entirely free to use its veto with regard to Turkish accession and that parliament would be informed, listened to and consulted, before and after the European summit meeting on December 17th, “in the spirit and letter of our constitution” (“Adhésion de la Turquie,” 2004; du Limbert, 2004). In effect, Chirac thus stressed his presidential powers, both in terms of maintaining his ‘domaine reserve’ in foreign policy and his ability to exercise the veto in the European Council. In his loyalty to the President, Debré too stressed that “diplomacy is not for parliament; it is for the government.”

During the parliamentary debate itself, which took place on October 14, the Prime Minister asserted that Turkey was not ready for membership, nor was Europe ready to accept Turkey as such. However, unlike many of the other speakers who followed him, Raffarin again invited the French not to prematurely answer with a “non” without a long debate (“Développement Adhésion,” 2004). The prime minister also upheld that parliament would not vote on the matter after the debate, arguing that it was the president not the legislature who negotiates treaties, (“Turquie: débat,” 2004). He also reassured his audience that the French people would have the last word about it in a referendum (“Raffarin: demande,” 2004).

In the ensuing debate in the National Assembly, Bernard Accoyer, the leader of the UMP, argued on behalf of the privileged partnership (“Accoyer defend,” 2004). Jean-Marc Ayrault, the
leader of the PS, on the other hand, argued that though Turkey did not at that time meet the conditions for membership, it nevertheless had the ‘legitimate right’ to accession negotiations. He further used the opportunity to criticize the UMP and the president about leading France into a crisis of confidence about the EU (“Ayrault: il ne peut,” 2004). Demonstrating the divisions among the socialists, Laurent Fabius, though not physically present in the debate, haunted the corridors of the Assembly building with his argument that Turkey had not met the democratic criteria, had not recognized the Armenian genocide, still mistreated minorities, and was not part of Europe geographically (“Fabius énumère,” 2004). The communists meanwhile called the whole thing a diversion from the real issue, which was the Constitutional Treaty (“Le débat,” 2004).

While the parliamentary debate did not force Chirac’s hand by way of a vote, he shifted his position, by talking about the possibility of Turkey not reaching full membership. After a meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan, followed by a Franco-German summit in late October, Jacques Chirac announced his position that, while “the results are not a foregone conclusion.” Full membership remained the final goal, which he believed to be in the interests of both France and Europe, but that it was necessary for Turkey to adapt to the European Union, and not the other way around. He also said that although it was his “dearest wish” that negotiations with Ankara would lead to the accession of Turkey, the process of meeting all of the criteria would take “fifteen years at the least,” (“Chirac: l’adhésion,” 2004 – trans. mine). Turkey joining the EU would further be “in the interests of peace, security and democracy in the world and our region” (de Barochez, 2004c; “Chirac et Schröder,” 2004 – trans. mine). With this formulation he had maintained his preferred driver policy, while, with its prediction of a lengthy process that would not automatically lead to full membership, he also offered the UMP something that they might be able to live with, given his personal preferences.

Especially the prediction of the lengthy process gave the French opponents some air. After all, Turkey might fail to meet all the criteria (including the administrative criteria to be addressed in the negotiations), or choose another path at some point in the future in the meantime. Furthermore, there was the prospect of a referendum in France prior to actual accession (de Bresson & Marion, 2004). Yet Chirac’s subtle shifts nor the parliamentary debate did not prevent a symbolic vote of ‘Non’ in a public demonstration, organized by Armenian activists and attended by 250 deputies from UMP, UDF and PS, outside the National assembly building (“Adhésion Turquie,” 2004).

After meeting with Jan Peter Balkenende in early November, Chirac was asked about Turkey during the post-summit press conference. He answered that his position was already known, and
that if Turkey were to adopt all the European values, both Europe and Turkey would be strengthened by Turkish membership in the Union. However, he again raised the possibility of Turkey’s inability to complete the process. “If [Turkey] does not accept [all the reforms], because it cannot or does not want to, then there will be a breakdown in negotiations” (“Point de presse,” 2004).

In the meantime, behind the scenes in Coreper, the French delegation managed to tighten the presidency’s language in the draft conclusions, with regard to the continuous monitoring of Turkey’s adherence to the political criteria. Also, by mentioning the ‘open-ended process’ if negotiations should fail, that there should be another means of keeping Turkey politically close to Europe (Ludlow, 2005, p. 5; 25, 33-34). During November, French officials also started lobbying for a later date to begin the negotiations (Sonumut, 2004).

Three days prior to the summit, Foreign Minister Michel Barnier argued for pressuring Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide, saying: “France will pose this question. I think Turkey as a big country has a duty to remember” (Mahony, 2004). He add that, “I believe that when the time comes, Turkey should come to terms with its past, be reconciled with its own history and recognize this tragedy.” His use of the innocent term ‘tragedy’, however, won him criticism from the Armenian group CDCA (Comité de Défense de la Cause Arménienne), for not calling it ‘genocide’ (“Des Arméniens,” 2004). As far as Cyprus was concerned, however, Barnier joined the Presidency in believing that the recognition of its Greek-Cypriot government was not a legal prerequisite for launching negotiations, but that it would be necessary if Turkey were to eventually become a full member (“Un Consensus,” 2004).

By the time the Brussels Summit took place, on 16 and 17 December, the positions of the political parties had become settled with the UMP (Chirac notwithstanding) together with the UDF and the Front Nationale dead-set against Turkey joining the EU. The PS meanwhile expressed a position essentially similar to that of the president (in favor of negotiations and the open-endedness of the process, while additionally demanding the recognition of the Armenian Genocide. The communists were in favor of Turkey’s membership provided that its democratization had sufficiently progressed by the time it entered the EU, while the greens were unconditionally on board with Turkey joining the Union (“La position des parties,” 2004).

As a final pre-summit communication, Chirac released a taped interview on French National TV channel TF1 on December 15 – the eve of the summit – addressing the issue of Turkey. In it he posed the question if France had more to gain by accepting Turkish membership than to lose by
rejecting it. His own answer was “yes, if.” Yes, if Turkey met all the necessary conditions before joining the EU (“Turquie: le plaidoyer,” 2004). This televised communiqué was taken with gratitude in the Turkish press, and considered “remarkable” by Erdoğan (Nükte, 2004).

Chirac’s maneuvers at the summit itself have already been mentioned. They were further evidence of his own commitment to Turkey, despite France’s overall souring toward it. After the summit, Raffarin defended the president’s position in front of the UMP deputies to the National Assembly, arguing “Yes to a Turkish entry into the Union in time, if she meets the accession criteria of the European Union… because if the conditions are met, it would be in the interests of France and Europe” (Forcari & Lebegue, 2004; Vial, 2004 – trans. mine).

Despite Jacques Chirac’s outspoken support for opening negotiations and eventual Turkish membership along with his personal pressure behind the scenes of the Council to prevent a unilateral Cypriot veto, he also paved the way for French brakemanship on three particular fronts. On the first he promised the French electorate a referendum on Turkey at some unspecified point in the future before an actual accession treaty would be signed. Secondly he argued for a later negotiations date. Both of these first two measures aimed at forestalling the defeat of the proposed Constitutional Treaty by the French electorate in the next year’s referendum. Lastly, he had his share in the documented acknowledgement of a third option besides full membership and the rejection thereof in the Presidency Conclusions.

Despite these three issues and his sovereignty as president over foreign policy, it is clear that he was politically forced to bend on the issue of Turkey. Because one man’s idiosyncratic behavior is not the purpose of this research, the acknowledgement that the pro-Turkish preferences of the president were at odds with the remainder of the French government and certainly with public opinion, will have to suffice here.

Therefore, while Chirac appears to have authentically been a driver, the policies to which he conceded were clearly along the same line as those of the brakemen. The timing issue was of little consequence, other than a minor annoyance to the Turks. The ‘third option’, however, was in fact a veiled privileged partnership. But much more importantly, the prospect of a unilateral French veto of Turkish accession by way of a failed referendum – even if this would happen at some time in the nebulous future or not happen at all, is a profound threat to the process ever resulting in a full membership for Turkey. Not only because France could suggest having a referendum on the matter, but also because others, like Austria, where public opinion was even more opposed to the prospect of Turkish membership could institute the same. Such referenda would make at least a decade of
negotiations and the accomplishment of all the political reforms of the criteria subject to the public whim of one day. The prospect of a veto by referendum in the distant future could also easily discourage Turkey from making further progress. In sum, President Jacques Chirac’s personal predilections aside, the French maneuvers domestically and its amendments to the presidency’s text made the outcome far less in Turkey’s favor. For these reasons, France is categorized as a brakeman.

8.4.6 Germany

In Germany, the Red-Green Schröder-Fischer coalition maintained the driver policy of 1999 and 2002, while the opposition Christian Democrats advocated for the privileged partnership.

In September, Fischer made the argument that “a European Turkey is indispensable for the war against international terror: “… if we slam the door to Europe on that country, we strengthen the forces opposed to democracy and western values. And then it becomes dangerous for us!” (“Fischer: Türkei,” 2004). Meanwhile, the political opposition led by the Christian democrats, strongly advocated against Turkey. The Bavarian minister president and former Chancellor candidate, Edmund Stoiber, called starting negotiations a “problem and loss for the Union,” (“Gehört die Türkei,” 2004 – trans. mine). Chairman of the CDU/CSU coalition in the Bundestag, Wolfgang Schäuble, argued that if Turkey would become a member, the EU would be unable to act in foreign and security affairs (“Union und FDP,” 2004). The CDU Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the European Parliament, Elmar Brok, argued that a positive recommendation was incomprehensible because torture still occurred in Turkey (“Gehört die Türkei,” 2004). The CDU was not fully unanimous in this, however, with the former defense minister under Helmut Kohl, Volker Rühe and Ruprecht Polenz, a CDU foreign policy specialist active in European-Middle Eastern as well as Atlantic dialogue projects, in addition to the CDU mayor of Hamburg Ole von Beust, rejected the mainline of the CDU’s opposition to Turkey (Middel, 2004b).

Unanimity was also absent on the social-democratic side of the political aisle. Martin Schulz, the leader of the social democrats in the European Parliament, noted that there were significant deficiencies in Verheugen’s expected report (ibid). The domestic policy spokesman for the SPD in the Bundestag, Dieter Wiefelspütz, said there were serious reservations among the backbenchers about supporting Turkey. Rainer Wend, the chairman of the economic committee said that the issue was not popular with the SPD’s base, and former SPD parliamentary leader, and enlargement critic,
Hans-Ulrich Klose, complained that raising the issue opened one to accusations of being racist and Islamophobic ("Verheugen kündigt," 2004).

This lack of unanimity aside, the social democrats accused Angela Merkel of playing political games with the issue with her privileged partnership proposal. The SPD spokesperson on foreign policy issues, Gert Weisskirchen, said that, “Merkel means, with her Turkey politics, to create nationalistic resonance in Germany,” accusing her of populist politics and inciting hatred (Güsten, 2004 – trans. mine; Wania, 2004).

Guido Westerwelle of the secular right-wing FDP joined CDU in criticizing Commissioner Verheugen’s forthcoming progress report for being “prematurely established and painted on one side,” suggesting that the report did not offer a fair assessment of Turkey’s true progress toward the criteria (“Union begehrt,” 2004). He felt that Turkey was “neither economically or constitutionally ready for accession, and the EU is not capable of absorbing” Turkey, though he clarified that if the European Council made a binding agreement to start negotiations, any future government of which the FDP would be a part, would honor it (Dausend & Halusa, 2004 – trans. mine). Should it come to negotiations, they should be open ended, the FDP-leader argued, whereby the EU should consider the consequences of Turkish membership or a rejection when Turkey had fulfilled the criteria, because an Islamic fundamentalization of Turkey was not in Europe’s interest.

Beste et al. (2004) argue that both Schröder (SPD) and Merkel (CDU), attempted to stifle debate on Turkey in order to maintain party-discipline within their factions. As a result many of the complexities and potential problems with Turkish membership were barely discussed or kept on a simple level. Discussions about the potential impact on the German economy and the actual human and women’s rights situation in Turkey were kept under the table in the SPD, while in the CDU the discussion mainly circled around the privileged partnership as a way to not flatly say ‘no’ to prevent alienating the growing domestic Turkish population, while still playing to the domestic audience, which was opposed to Turkish membership.

After Angela Merkel had taken the debate to the European level by attempting to involve other conservative European leaders in her September letter, Schröder responded in an address to the German-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, saying, “if the Commission confirms that the criteria are met, the European Union must keep its word” (“Berlin und Brüssel,” 2004).

When Verheugen, after a meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan in Brussels, said that he saw no further obstacles to starting accession negotiations, Joschka Fischer, attending the United Nations, welcomed Verheugen’s statement, yet referring to the length of the reform process, which
would take at least ten or fifteen years ("EU macht," 2004; "Fischer rechnet," 2004). Angela Merkel, however, responded by declaring that she would redouble her efforts to stop the start of accession negotiations, and should they begin, they ought to consider a privileged partnership, not full membership (Gack, 2004).

In a meeting with Erdogan, a few days before the publication of the Commission’s recommendation in October, Schröder assured him that Germany would give Turkey “no problems” during the Brussel’s summit in December and that, “Turkey has always been a reliable partner for Germany and NATO… I expect a positive vote, and Germany will emphatically support this. We are for the start of negotiations with the purpose of accession – and no other” (Klau, Zapf & Mertins, 2004a; 2004b – trans. mine; “Verheugen kündigt,” 2004; Wania, 2004). He also said that Turkish accession would also “strengthen its political weight,” and show that Islam, modernity and democracy do not contradict each other. Turkey would be an example of this to other Islamic countries.

Once the Commission’s recommendation and report had been published, the Christian Democrats suggested collecting signatures for a petition against Turkish membership and in favor of a privileged partnership. CSU-leader Michael Glos based the idea on an anti-dual citizenship campaign by Hessian Prime Minister Roland Koch in 1999, which had won Koch headline attention and electoral success (Klemm, 2004). For this tactic, they were heavily berated by the parliamentary leader of the Grünen, Claudia Roth, who accused Merkel's proposal of being “a heinous example of the depravity of the political culture in the CDU/CSU… and should be understood as a campaign against German Turks,” and to maintain party cohesion within the CDU ("Union erwägt," 2004 – trans. mine). Fischer called the suggestion irresponsible (Kröter & Pries, 2004). Members of Merkel's own CDU also criticized the measure. Friedbert Pflüger, the Foreign policy spokesman in the Bundestag, advised against a petition, and Elmar Brok, the leader of the CDU in the European Parliament, said the proposal gave him a stomachache (Klemm, 2004).

Westerwelle also opposed the idea, suggesting that it was purely a means of motivating the CDU/CSU’s political base and called on Merkel not to force the matter, because it would risk a change in the continuity of the fundamental principles of Germany’s foreign policy (Eintracht, 2004; Kröter & Pries, 2004). The FDP’s General Secretary, Cornelia Pieper denounced the idea as “irresponsible populism” (“Unterschriftenaaktion,” 2004). Under the barrage of criticism within the CDU/CSU and among the other political parties, Merkel had retreated on her suggestion by mid-October (“Neufassung Deutsche,” 2004; “Union verzichtet,” 2004). Under this barrage of criticism
from all sides, Merkel withdrew her suggestion by mid-October (“Neufassung Deutsche,” 2004; “Union verzichtet,” 2004).

Gerhard Schröder, meanwhile, acknowledged the risk of overburdening the European Union, but said that this threat was outweighed by the potential of increased security, the possibility of stabilizing Turkey, and providing a model for other Islamic countries (Eintracht, 2004; “Union erwägt,” 2004). Fischer also highlighted the risk of what might happen if Turkey were turned away in December. “In the decade before us, there are no alternatives [to accepting Turkey, considering] the question of the future of the Mediterranean, the Near East and the core issue of security for us all,” by which he suggested that if the accession should fail, and situations in the Mediterranean, the Near East, and everyone’s security were to worsen, the CDU/CSU would be to blame (“EU-Türkei,” 2004). This stance of the German government did not go unrecognised in Ankara. Visiting Berlin, Abdullah Gül acknowledged that “Germany was among the countries that are the strongest supporters of Turkey,” (“Réticences françaises,” 2004).

Objecting to increased criticism of German support for Turkey’s membership, Fischer pointed out in the Bundestag that the opposition of the CDU/CSU and the FDP was only of a recent nature, while CDU/CSU had supported Turkey for forty years. He thereby recalled that Walter Hallstein, first President of the European Commission and a CDU member, had welcomed the idea in 1963 that one day Turkey would be a member of the EEC and that even Michael Glos of the CSU, Merkel’s partner in suggesting the petition, had supported the idea of full membership when Helmut Kohl had been Chancellor in 1997 (Weiland, 2004). A ‘no’ to Turkey was “extremely shortsighted and against the security interests of [Germany] and Europe,” while there were sufficient safeguards built into the process to take away the anxiety of the opposition (“Hitzische Debatte,” 2004 – trans. mine). In summary, he left no doubt that the Federal government would support the opening of negotiations.

November saw little public debate on the issue, except when Eberhardt Sinner (CSU), the Bavarian Minister for Europe stated that a study examining the feasibility of Turkey’s EU membership, commissioned by the Federal Finance Minister, Hans Eichel (SPD), had been held back because it contradicted governments’ arguments (Middel & Halusa, 2004). The study had, reportedly, found that the government’s three main arguments – that the accession of Turkey would prevent a ‘Clash of Civilizations’, that the failure to permit full membership would cause Turkey to backslide on the human rights front, and that Turkish accession would be like a D-Day assault in the War on Terror – were all deeply flawed. Wolfgang Schäuble pursued a similar argument, saying that
the integration of Turkey into the Union would make further European integration impossible, thus compromising the entire political integration process (Wichert, 2004).

The debate was picked up again at the beginning of December, when Schröder sought support for Turkey’s membership prospects in bilateral meetings with his EU colleagues. At the bilateral German-Belgian summit, Schröder agreed with Verhofstad that the negotiations should be about membership, “and not about anything less than that” (“Deutschland und Belgien,” 2004 – trans. mine). During a meeting with Jacques Chirac in Lübeck, Schröder reiterated that the negotiations had only one goal, which was membership (Winter & Pries, 2004 – trans. mine).

In other statements made before the summit, Schröder and Fischer both continued to underline that the purpose of the negotiations was membership. “The goal is accession and that goal will not be mitigated,” Schröder vowed (“EU-Türkei Schröder,” 2004; Volkery, 2004 – trans. mine). Fischer added, “any dilution of this objective I would consider a dismantling of the preceding reform processes leading in Turkey” (ibid). They did not seem to see an inconsistency between this, and the ‘open-ended’ nature of the process that had apparently been slipped into their views as well, which was clear when Schröder, after having spoken with Jan Peter Balkenende, said that “We are figuring with ten or fifteen years, and the end is open,” while Fischer said that the negotiations would not automatically lead to membership. As such, they implicitly embraced the wording of the open-ended process, so long as alternatives to membership did not have a name.

Meanwhile, Edmund Stoiber upped the ante, arguing that Turkish membership would increase the threat of terror, and that a CDU/CSU-led federal government would work, with partners such as France, to prevent Turkey from becoming a member (Proissl, 2004). In the Bundestag, in a motion titled ‘Don’t Hide the Problems with Turkey’, the Christian Democratic faction warned of increased gang crime and the threats of islamization and terrorism, if Turkey were to become a member (“Erdogan greift,” 2004). Angela Merkel declared that Turkey could be an election issue in 2006, and if the Christian democrats were victorious (which they were) they would prevent Turkish accession (which, to date, they have not) (Graw & Fiedler, 2004; Günsche, 2004; “Türkei-Beitritt,” 2004). Nevertheless, the red-green majority supported the government’s position on Turkey, and a motion by the CDU/CSU to propose the privileged partnership failed (“Beitrittsgespräche,” 2004).

At the summit itself, Schröder played several roles. The first was to broker a deal in advance, coming to agreement with France on the mention of an open-ended process and the prospect of securing the ‘strongest possible bond’ with Europe, should the negotiations fail (Ludlow, 2005, p.
Secondly, Schröder played a behind-the-scenes role during the summit. This involved being at hand when pressure was being put on the Greeks and the Cypriots, and keeping Erdoğan from leaving the summit prematurely in protest (Ludlow, 2005, 45).

Nevertheless, Germany had reportedly joined Austria, France, and Denmark in defending the idea of keeping safeguards permanently (Bouilhet, 2004e). Germany had also been a party to the decision to delay the start of negotiations until October of the following year. Ludlow (2005, p. 29) suggests that this was agreed to in light of the French concerns over the influence the negotiations might otherwise have on the referendum about the Constitutional treaty, and not out of preferences related to Germany’s own interests. For the remainder, Schröder had kept the debate simple. He was in favor of negotiations and keeping the CDU formulation of ‘privileged partnership’ out of the conclusions.

8.4.7 Greece

In 2004, Greece also maintained its previous driver policy with the caveat of promoting its own interests regarding the dispute in the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus dispute. While public opinion strongly opposed Turkey’s EU membership, the government itself was an avid advocate and was an asset to the drivers when it came to curtailing Cypriot objections (de Hen, 2004; Traynor & Henley, 2004).

When the Commission’s recommendation was published, a government spokesman commented: “We believe that a European Turkey is not only good for the Turkish people, but also for the stability, security and welfare of our region” (van Wetten, 2004 – trans. mine). Other articles also mention Greece’s welcome of the positive recommendation (e.g. van Lierop, 2004; Welgraven, 2004). Only a few days later, the Greek President, Konstantinos Stephanopoulos, publicly weighed in on the matter, though not without some reference to the regional conflicts. “Obviously, Greece must help Turkey to become a European country, which is in the interest of the EU and Greece... but we must also remind them of their obligations vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus,” he said during the annual commemoration of the historic 1571 battle of Lepanto (“Ankara doit,” 2004 – trans. mine). Referring to the patriarchate in Istanbul, the president’s spokesman also brought up the issue of Greek sovereignty in the Aegean Sea. On the matter of negotiations, however, Greece favored a green light.
Yet, Greece was willing to use the matter in order to extract concessions. At the foreign ministers meeting on October 12, it supported Cyprus’ demands for a reduction in Turkish troops stationed on the island, permission for Cypriot-flagged ships to dock at Turkish ports, and an end to Turkish vetoes on Cyprus’ bid to join the OECD and OSCE, though Greek officials made it clear they would not countenance a Cypriot veto on Turkey in December (Dombey & Hadjipapas, 2004). Meanwhile, hostile encounters between Greek and Turkish ships in the disputed waters around the islets of Imia/Kardak in October and September heightened the realization that a solution needed to be found, and that the December summit was an ideal venue to pressure Turkey on this issue (Ludlow, 2005, p. 20).

In November, after a state visit to Cyprus, Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis, asserted that “The possible accession of Turkey will depend not only on convergence with the constitutional and political norms of the EU, but also its foreign policy and particularly its attitude vis-à-vis Cyprus” (“La Présidence,” 2004 – trans. mine). As such, Karamanlis stated that Turkey would have to recognize Cyprus before accession negotiations could begin. Nevertheless, he also urged Cyprus’ President Papadopoulos to rule out a unilateral veto (Boland, Hadjipapas & Hope, 2004).

Before the summit, during a presidency visit to Athens, Karamanlis urged Balkenende to adopt the phrase “unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations,” to the Presidency conclusions (Ludlow, 2005, p. 27). In keeping with its position as a driver, Greece also argued against the permanent safeguard clauses at the pre-summit foreign ministers meeting (Ludlow, 2005, p. 31-32; Mahony, 2004).

The events at the summit itself have already been described. It is, however, worth noting that when decisions had to be made, Karamanlis backed down from his earlier insistence to make the territorial dispute a multilateral affair, though he refused to discuss the Cyprus situation without the Cypriot president in the room (Ludlow, 2005, p. 44). He further attempted to maintain the early start of negotiations. When he tried to reinstate an earlier date for negotiations to begin in the debate of the council, he was firmly shut down by Jacques Chirac (Peel, 2004).

Ireland also continued its driver policy for Turkey, albeit without much attention from the media, which made it useful to sift through the parliamentary debates to obtain some insight into the positions of its political parties.

In April, while Ireland still held the rotating Presidency, the Joint Committee of European Affairs of the Oireachtas (Irish parliament) hosted a delegation from the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and legislators were able to express their positions on Turkey. Michael Mulcahy of the centrist ruling party Fianna Fáil expressed his strong support for Turkey, but still had human rights concerns. Pat Carey (also of Fianna Fáil) underlined these concerns, though not without first mentioning how much he had once enjoyed a holiday in Turkey. More seriously, the committee chairman, Gay Mitchell of center-right Fine Gael, commented on the positive prospects of greater immigration from Turkey, considering Europe’s declining population and the need to meet pension costs in the future. Mitchell further suggested to the Turkish delegation that rather than highlighting its progress toward the Copenhagen criteria, the Turkish argument ought to be focussed on the positive aspects of Turkey’s EU membership (Ireland, 2004a).

In July, the Joint Committee asked Deputy Dick Roche (Fianna Fáil), the Minister of State, for an update on Turkey. His answer in regard to Ireland’s position was non-committal: “I do not know what will be the European Commission findings but decisions will be made during the Dutch Presidency and we will have them towards the end of the year. I anticipate that if the decision is to open negotiations, there will be a relatively long lead time” (Ireland, 2004b). When Roche was questioned again on the matter in September, due to the before mentioned public statements on Turkey by Dutch European Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, he replied that Bolkestein’s personal opinions were not shared by the Irish government and that, “the Irish Government view has always been that if a country meets the Copenhagen criteria, it is entitled to have an objective appraisal of its position” (Ireland, 2004c).

During the parliamentary debate following the publication of the Commission’s report and recommendation in October, contrary voices took the floor. Though Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern (Fianna Fáil; no relation to the Taoiseach) welcomed the report, some brakemen members of parliament thought it important to state their cases, such as Senator Ann Ormonde (also of Fianna Fáil), who expressed her strong reservations about Turkey, concerning, “human rights, honour killings, discrimination, education and equality of opportunity in employment.” In her address to
Ahern, she expressed her preference of the Commission’s use of the phrase ‘open-ended process’ (Ireland, 2004d).

In response Ahern reiterated the government’s previous position, saying that, “the Commission has laid out a map for the accession of Turkey. It will be reasonably lengthy, but provided that Turkey meets the criteria over the period set out by the Commission, it will become a member,” thus affirming as a fait accompli that the whole question hinged on Turkey’s progress toward the criteria. This failed to win over some members. Senator Derek McDowell (Labour) articulated his reasoning against extending membership to Turkey not in terms of the political, economic, or administrative Copenhagen criteria, but in the Union’s ability to attain an ‘ever closer union’. “It is questionable if this project is possible in the context of a country that is so different, far away and un-European,” he said. “The important question is whether it is a European country and what will be the effect of its accession on other member states.” The sitting chairman, Deputy Sean Haughey (Fianna Fáil) agreed with McDowell, expressing his “doubts as to whether a predominantly Muslim country can become part of the democracy that is the EU.” Michael Mulcahey, who had expressed his support for Turkey in April, then agreed with Haughey, saying that, “the question of Turkey’s accession is as much about culture and identity as about meeting criteria” (ibid).

McDowell also observed that, “there is a perception that Ireland has taken issue with Turkish accession in the past.” However, “following a conversation which took place only six months ago between the Taoiseach and [Erdoğan], there seems to be less scepticism.” It was therefore his recommendation that, “the committee should exert its influence on this issue sooner rather than later,” ostensibly to reverse the government’s supposed slide toward being uncritical driver (ibid).

When Deputy Noel Treacy, the newly installed Minister of State, reiterated the government’s position in October by ‘explaining’ the process, he too encountered disagreement. Deputy Aengus Ó Snodaigh (Sinn Féin) cautioned the minister to not allow Turkey to start negotiations before it had fully complied with the Copenhagen criteria and had addressed its occupation of Cyprus (Ireland, 2004e).

The matter was taken up again in early November when the Committee decided to vote on its own recommendation on Turkey. Deputy Haughey, who had made the motion, not only called into question the degree to which Turkey met the criteria, but also “whether Muslims can integrate and conform and whether the moderates can prevail over the increasing number of
fundamentalists,” and “whether Turkey is a European country at all” (Ireland, 2004f). After having listened to a presentation by the Irish Institute of European Affairs citing substantial reform in the field of democracy and human rights in Turkey, the issue was again debated in Parliament though this time more to question the representative of the institute than to declare substantive positions (Ireland, 2004g).

On December 8, a week before the summit, the Joint Committee again sat down with Noel Treacy to hear the government’s position on Turkey, before voting on the matter. During the exchange, Treacy said he expected an agreement by the EU member states to open negotiations in the second half of 2005, though he did not explicitly reiterate the government’s own position. To questions about the Turkish-Cypriot difficulties, the Minister of State replied that, “it is the Government’s wish that we can move forward, albeit in a measured, practical, planned, positive and progressive way; that in doing so we will move everyone forward together and help Turkey in its relationship with Cyprus, and that under the umbrella of enlargement of the European Union, we can improve the situation to everyone’s benefit. That is the goal of the European Union which Ireland fully supports” (Ireland, 2004h).

The final product of the Joint Committee’s efforts was a report that, according to Noel Tracy’s, strengthened the Taoiseach’s position, “by having the considered input of [the] committee” (Ireland, 2004i). It called on EU leaders to open accession negotiations with Turkey, but also warned that Ankara had a long way to go before fulfilling all the union’s membership criteria (Beesley, 2004).

At the summit, Ireland played a minor role, but was numbered among Turkey’s champions for an early start of negotiations (Staunton, 2004c; Traynor & Henley, 2004). It opposed the idea of permanent safeguards, such as that for the free movement of persons, which would have relegated Turkey to a second-class member (Ludlow, 2005, p. 31) It also joined Sweden, Germany and the UK in objecting to the presidency’s phrase ‘European community of values’, considering it not germane to the question of Turkey’s future membership (ibid, p. 26). Ireland spoke against using a general framework to govern Turkey’s accession rather than one specifically designed for Turkey, fearing that doing so would hold back Croatia’s accession by tethering it to a general framework including Turkey (ibid, p. 29, n. 37).

After the summit, the Taoiseach welcomed the agreement as an important message to Muslims, including Ireland’s 25,000-strong Islamic community, saying that they belonged in Europe. “We are now embarked on a process that will lead to Turkey’s membership of the EU,” he said
(Staunton, 2004d). However, Erdoğan’s parting comment vis-à-vis Cyprus was, in Ahern’s opinion quite unnecessary and had left him with a bitter aftertaste (Gonzalez & Cruz, 2004).


8.4.9 Italy

Though the issue of Turkey heated up in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, it did not get much attention from the media in Italy. Even Berlusconi’s stance on it was hard to find in the international newspapers. In the Ludlow account, Italy’s position was not mentioned much either. It would be beyond the scope of this research to delve into the reasons why Italy seemed so little in the picture about it. Nevertheless, in the available sources Rome was counted ubiquitously as a strong driver of Turkey’s membership prospects.

In September, prior to the publication of the Commission’s report and recommendation, Italy’s foreign minister, Franco Frattini called for a positive decision on negotiations at the summit in December, saying “Italy hopes that the Heads of State and Government of the Union may take a positive decision for Turkey in December” (“UE: l'Italic pour,” 2004 – trans. mine). Still, Italy was not entirely without some disagreement on the matter. During the negotiations over the draft conclusions in Coreper, Rocco Cangelosi, Italy’s permanent representative, led the charge against the Presidency’s plan to introduce a general framework for negotiations that had been designed to govern not only Turkey’s accession process, but also that of other candidates. Again, the diplomatic sparring over this issue was not between the drivers and brakemen of Turkey’s progress, but between those who wanted a general framework and those who did not want this mechanism to hold back Croatia’s accession (Ludlow, 2005, p. 29).

At the summit, Italy joined the chorus against the permanent safeguards (Ludlow, 2005, p. 31-32). Regarding Cyprus, Berlusconi had argued during the earlier discussions on Cyprus that Turkey ought to simply recognize Cyprus and have the issue done with (ibid, p. 40). When the debates heated up and Erdoğan threatened to depart for Ankara prematurely, Berlusconi joined the delegation of European leaders that went to his room on the seventh floor of the Council building and managed to dissuade him from doing so (ibid, p. 45).
After the summit, Berlusconi made a brief statement about Turkey to the press. Unlike other European leaders, who had cautioned about (or sought reassurance in) the long time it would take for Turkey to complete the negotiations, Berlusconi hoped that Turkey could become a member “in the shortest possible time” (“CDU streitet,” 2004).


**8.4.10 Luxembourg**

In 2004, Luxembourg proved to be a surprising case. In previous episodes, the Grand Duchy – represented by Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker – had been a firm brakeman. This changed in the course of late 2004, when Luxembourg made an about-face and became a driver of Turkey’s membership ambitions.

In September, sources still mentioned Luxembourg as a brakeman (Bowley, 2004a; Traynor & Henley, 2004). According to a September article in Die Welt, Juncker had joined the chorus of leaders calling for an open-ended process, implying that the negotiations would not necessarily lead to full membership (Middel 2004a). Nevertheless, he also said that it was too late for a discussion about the privileged partnership that Angela Merkel had been attempting to promote (“Deutsche CDU-Spitze,” 2004). In another article Juncker said that Turkish membership should not be realized quickly (“French PM says,” 2004; Halusa, 2004a).

In a strange October turnaround, Juncker suddenly supported a quick start of negotiations (“Germany and Italy,” 2004; “Juncker souhaite,” 2004). When asked by Le Monde about when negotiations with Turkey should begin, he answered that a mandate for negotiations could be drawn up in a matter of months (Courtois, Elkrief & Séguillon, 2004). According to the Turkish Daily News Juncker expressed his support for Turkish membership. Juncker had telephoned Erdoğan mid-October, offering April 26, 2005 as a date to commence the accession negotiations, which would then take place under the Luxembourg Presidency in the first half of 2005 (“Judge receives,” 2004).
After a bilateral summit between Erdoğan and Juncker, in mid-November, Juncker reiterated to the press that he believed the membership negotiations with Turkey would commence in the first half of 2005, under the Luxembourg presidency (“Les négociations,” 2004; Sonumut, 2004). He further said that there would be no provision for any other status for Turkey than full membership, and that he opposed any plan for an alternative form of partnership between Turkey and the EU. Additionally, he said that the reforms achieved by Turkey particularly in the previous two years and the political will it had demonstrated to meet the Copenhagen political criteria could not be ignored, in view of which a decision should be made to commence the negotiations in 2005. A precise date however would still have to be determined, given that Jacques Chirac – with whom he had spoken for two hours earlier that day – was still ambivalent about it. When asked about the Cyprus affair, Juncker said that Turkey had met its obligations in that respect to the EU, even though the dispute had remained unresolved between Turkey and Greece. Concerning the privileged partnership proposal, he said, “if partnership means only political and not institutional relations, then that would mean a lack of respect for Turkey” (“Fight over Date,” 2004). This statement he strengthened by saying: “The EU will remain incomplete without Turkey and will only be completed with Turkey's accession” (“Press Freedom,” 2004; “Religion not a Barrier,” 2004)

When pressed by Die Welt on his change of heart, with respect to his earlier position, Juncker said, “I have simply changed my mind… Turkey has achieved great progress. The entire country is gripped by a strong will to reform. It would not be good for us, nor for the Turks, if this desire would wane. On human rights issues Turkey has moved significantly in the European direction. Also, the government in Ankara has freed itself from military rule… I was against granting Turkey membership status in 1997 because I was worried about the EU enlarging too much.” (Halusa, 2004b; “Juncker,” 2004 – trans. mine).

Prior to the summit, however, Juncker’s enthusiasm seemed to have slackened somewhat when he was quoted as saying, “No one is very enthusiastic [about Turkey], but no one has the heart to say it.” (Evans-Pritchard, 2004; Riegert, 2004). At the summit he declared that, though critical public opinion should not be ignored, it should not set aside forty years of history between the EEC/EU and Turkey either (“Beitrittsgespräche,” 2004).

During the closing ceremonies of the summit, Erdoğan’s parting shots at Cyprus seem to have antagonized the Luxembourgers, about which its foreign minister, Jean Asselborn, said afterwards, “the provocative way in which [Erdoğan] spoke of Cyprus at the final reception was unacceptable… It is about time Turkish politicians realized that we are not carpet traders.” Juncker
commented that, “at some moments, the debate with Turkey had been hardly tolerable” (“Luxembourg ministers,” 2004; “Les Vingt-Cinq,” 2004)

As mentioned above, some articles in 2004 still listed Luxembourg as a brakeman (e.g. Bowley, 2004a; “Human rights record,” 2004; Traynor & Henley, 2004), but they were thin on detail or seemed outdated. The Guardian and the International Herald Tribune hardly expanded on Luxembourg’s position, while two of their articles were written in September and were evidently based on statements made by Luxembourg officials in previous episodes. Articles that further mention Luxembourg as being favorable toward beginning accession negotiations are: “Entretien Chirac-Juncker,” 2004; “Développement UE-Turquie,” 2004; “French president,” 2004; “Germany, Italy,” 2004.

8.4.11 Netherlands

The position of the Netherlands presented an interesting case because of the domestic deadlock it had to deal with before coming to its decision, which also had an impact on the performance of the Dutch leaders during their presidency in the council. Much of the following account is the result of interviews with Dutch leaders, legislators and diplomats, rather than what is usually only found in newspapers and other forms of documentation, such as the Ludlow account. Beyond the personal interest of the researcher, Ludlow (2005, p. 53) also recognized the ‘Dutch-Dutch dimension’ (by which he means the debate over Turkey within the Netherlands and even within the Dutch cabinet) and its particular influence on shaping the Presidency’s behavior.

In all, the Netherlands proved to be a reluctant but effective driver for Turkey, owing to the influences of certain individual actors in the Dutch decision-making system. The Netherlands’ policy decision was, however, one that was closely fought and might have easily turned out the other way had any amount of factors been different. The paragraphs above that have dealt with the Netherlands’ behavior in the role of the Presidency, the internal ‘Dutch-Dutch dimension’ have been left out, but it will now be dealt with.

The final decision turned out to be highly political in the domestic realm, and took a long time to arrive at. It also represented an about-face for what was, mostly, the same government which had been such a staunch brakeman at Copenhagen. Between the events of 2002 and 2004, government elections saw the return of the two major coalition partners of the previous
government, the Christian-democrat CDA and the right-wing-liberal VVD. Instead of the anti-EU and anti-Turkey LPF as their former (smaller but still significant) third coalition partner, they were joined by the pro-EU and pro-Turkey, but politically rather weak, social liberal D66, with only four seats in Parliament.

Though it had long been certain that Turkey would be on the year-end European Council’s agenda, Turkey was not explicitly mentioned in the 2003 coalition agreement. This felt left the decisions for the cabinet, where Turkey’s friends were a distinct minority among the ministers. In addition to the political change in the coalition, there was another particular development that became crucial for the opportunity of a policy shift in Turkey’s favor. In January, the sitting foreign minister, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer became Secretary-General of NATO, vacating his post at the foreign ministry.

In his place, Jan Peter Balkenende appointed Bernard Bot – the long-serving permanent representative for the Netherlands in Brussels. Prior to his post in Brussels, Bot had also served as the Dutch ambassador in Ankara for two years in the 1980s. In choosing Bot, Balkenende certainly chose someone who was thoroughly knowledgeable about the EU and could help lead the presidency. Yet Bot was not a neutral choice. While he was certainly chosen for his long-standing and intricate familiarity with the EU and its workings, he was also an outspoken proponent of Turkish membership (Wynia, 2004a).

Yet, even with Bot, the VVD ministers and a good number of CDA ministers still opposed starting accession negotiations. These internal divisions within CDA and also VVD also existed in Parliamentary factions, in the parties generally, and with their voters. Two-thirds of VVD voters were opposed, but a slight majority of CDA voters supported opening negotiations (de Hond, 2004).

Significantly, however, Bot allowed a group of diplomats within the foreign ministry who had, for at least a year prior to Bot’s appointment, been generating means by which to successfully move the domestic and European debate more in Turkey’s favor. That said, according to Ludlow (2004, p. 6; 2005, p. 11), the crucial individual in determining the direction remained the Prime Minister, whose personal preferences on the matter remained opaque. To venture any possible description of Balkenende as a driver from personal conviction might only be possible by reverse-engineering the analysis from the outcome. His public statements, such as his speech to the European Parliament, cited above, had been strictly related to the process, not the substance. If a description can be the result of personal estimations, it should be noted that none of the political
leaders interviewed in the course of this research, neither within the cabinet’s chambers nor in other discussions, were able to cite him as anything other than a neutral chairman over the ministerial council. As such, the prime minister was able to remain above the fray, while allowing himself to maintain the ‘strict but fair’ policy rhetoric, while his lieutenants – Bot chief among them – maneuvered energetically on Turkey’s behalf.

In preparation for the decision, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Ministry commissioned several advisory reports. In July, the Advisory Council for International Affairs (AIV) – a foreign policy advisory body – argued that negotiations should begin. Its report, however, made several caveats, such as the requirement that the Cyprus situation would have to be solved prior to accession, though not necessarily before negotiations could begin and that Turkey should be held to some specific points of action based on the political Copenhagen criteria\(^38\) (AIV, 2004, p. 24-25). In August, the Scientific Council on Government Policy (WRR) presented the conclusion of its inquiry into the Prime Minister’s question if Turkey’s dominant religion could create a barrier to its membership prospects. It, unsurprisingly, replied that this was not the case, due to the secular basis of the European Union’s institution (WRR, 2004).

Though debate over the matter was played out on several levels, not only in different levels of government, but also in the media, public fora, and within the party constituencies, the actual decisions were made in the cabinet and parliament, which is where this analysis will place its focus. Interestingly enough, as the paragraphs below will make clear, the dynamic of the debate in the cabinet differed from that in Parliament. In both, the split between drivers and brakemen manifested itself initially within the political parties rather than among them, while the cabinet ministers appeared to be less induced to maintain party discipline than members of parliament were.

The division in parliament between support and rejection of negotiations first occurred within the political parties themselves until the factions decided to on unified courses of action. The debates within CDA and VVD, to come to some consensus were very heated. Following the 2002 murder of a Dutch politician, Pim Fortuyn, who had rapidly gained much support for his strong criticism of Muslim immigration, public opinion against Turkey’s EU membership had flared up considerably, which was also apparent in the decreased support for political parties who opposed draconian limits on immigration, and/or were part of the political status quo of the 1990s. While the CDA had initially been supportive of Turkish accession, this policy became increasingly problematic.

\(^{38}\) These ‘points of action’ did not perfectly overlap with the six additional measures suggested by the Commission.
with a considerable decrease in popularity among its members and the electorate (“Emoties en ratio,” 2004; Van Straaten, 2004). That a slim majority of voters still supported negotiations in 2004 was likely the result of the ‘strict but fair’ approach of the CDA leadership in the cabinet.

According to participants and descriptions of Dutch European policy making, policy on Europe is generally set by those ministers with a European portfolio: the prime minister, the foreign minister, and the ministers of agriculture, finance and economic affairs. Among these, there appeared to have been an equal balance between drivers and brakemen, with Bernard Bot and Laurens Jan Brinkhorst (Economic Affairs) of D66 clearly as drivers and Gerrit Zalm (Finance) of VVD and Cees Veerman (Agriculture) of CDA as the brakemen. It might have tipped the scales to the driver’s side if Balkenende had been personally involved in the debate on Turkey’s behalf, which according to the interviews not been the case. Atzo Nicolaï, the State Secretary for European Affairs (VVD) did not have a vote in the cabinet, but seems to have been a driver (van de Poll, 2004).

Outside the core of the European policy ministers in the cabinet, a majority of brakemen manifested itself. These included Johan Remkes (Interior – VVD), Piet-Hein Donner (Justice – CDA), Karla Peijs (Traffic and Water – CDA), Rita Verdonk (Immigration and Integration – VVD), and Hans Hoogervorst (Health, Welfare and Sport – VVD) (Koele & Peeperkorn, 2004; Moerland, 2004; Wynia, 2004b). This, in all, put the drivers in the minority. Thom de Graaf (Minister of Governmental Renewal – D66) can be presumed to have been a driver.

The crucial development that seemed to have tipped the scales in the other direction occurred when Minister of Economic Affairs Laurens Jan Brinkhorst (D66) succeeded in convincing his CDA colleague Cees Veerman (Agriculture) to vote for the drivers’ side, despite his reservations about Turkey belonging in the Union. This was rather surprising as Brinkhorst belonged to the smaller and relatively uninfluential coalition party and Veerman to largest with the greatest influence. Perhaps the explanation can be found in the friendly relationship the two had developed, possibly owing to Brinkhorst’s former tenure as Minister of Agriculture in the previous cabinet (Kok II), and thus Veerman’s predecessor in that function. With Veerman on board, and thus the majority of the European policy ministers, the drivers were able to push their policy through the cabinet as a whole.

The cabinet communicated this position to Parliament on November 23. It was voted in favor there too the day after, although parliament required that Turkey adopted the six pieces of legislation identified by the Commission, and reiterated that Turkey should be subject to continuous monitoring of its progress toward the political criteria (Ludlow, 2005, p. 14). This mandate paved
the way for Bot and Balkenende to take a more full-throated case to the other member states in their capacity of the rotating Presidency, as described earlier in the chapter.

Yet, the parliamentary side was not without its interesting developments. The Christian democrats in Parliament had become increasingly critical of the driver policy (van Oostrum, 2004). Throughout the months leading up to the decision, a curious pattern had emerged. While the cabinet ministers of the CDA moved toward the driver position, the CDA parliament members moved in the opposite direction, ultimately voting against opening accession negotiations, despite the support for negotiations from ‘their’ people in the cabinet. In parliament, the highest-profile driver was Senator René van der Linden (in a legislative system where members of the upper house do not tend to have high profiles at all).

Following the CDA vote in the lower house, the faction leader, Maxime Verhagen and the foreign policy spokesman, Jan Jacob van Dijk, made increasingly critical remarks. One week before the summit CDA faction leader Verhagen and van Dijk (2004) published an op-ed in one of the leading Dutch newspapers, the Volkskrant, arguing that the heads of state and government had weakened the political criteria in order to allow accession negotiations with Turkey. They supported the idea that the process should lead to full membership if Turkey could prove itself to be like the Netherlands, Belgium or Sweden, but while torture persisted and Christians were unable to form congregations and build churches, Turkey had, in their opinion, not met the Copenhagen criteria, and should therefore not be permitted to start accession negotiations.

The reverse was true for the VVD. Where the VVD members of the cabinet were opposed to opening negotiations, in the parliament (both houses), the faction, in the end, advocated in Turkey’s favor. However, arriving at that position was a very painful one. The faction leader, Jozias van Aartsen – who had been the Foreign Minister in the second Kok government and a supporter of the driver position in 1999 – advocated for the driver position, while the foreign policy spokesman, Geert Wilders, vehemently opposed opening negotiations, or permitting Turkey to ever become a member. A slim majority of the faction supported the leader. When it was required of Wilders to speak on that majority’s behalf in his capacity as spokesman, he flatly refused and threatened to leave the party, and take his seat with him. Neither van Aartsen nor Wilders were willing to budge, and in September Geert Wilders indeed left the party to form a single-member
With Wilders gone, the VVD faction lent its support to the driver policy. Hans van Baalen, Wilders’ replacement as foreign policy spokesman, argued the matter poetically: “When we cross the Bosporus with the EU,” he said, “we must not do it with weak knees, but with granite guarantees that Turkey fulfills the political criteria at the moment of accession” (van den Boogaart, 2004).

The third coalition partner, D66, with its four seats, along with the left-wing parties of the opposition supported the government, while the smaller Christian parties and the remnants of the LPF joined the CDA in voting against (Peeperkorn, 2004). Much like the SPD in Germany, the Dutch left has tended to receive a great deal more support from the Turkish community of Dutch citizens. The LPF remained true to its anti-immigrant position, arguing that Turkish membership would necessarily bring more immigration. The smaller Christian parties – CU and SGP – held their position on cultural grounds, arguing that Europe must have (Christian) borders.

8.4.12 Portugal

A noteworthy development in Portugal in 2004 was the appointment of its Prime Minister, José Manuel Barroso as the new President of the European Commission. He was replaced by Prime Minister, Pedro Santana Lopes, who had previously been the mayor of Lisbon. With Barroso’s departure from Portuguese politics, Santana Lopes also took over as the leader of the conservative Social Democratic Party. His government maintained the driver policy of his predecessor, frequently referring to the Commission and its recommendation as its guide on the matter.

When France had declared its intention to hold a referendum on Turkey’s EU membership, press questions circulated about which other countries might follow suit. After meeting with Santana Lopes and President Jorge Sampaio, in early October, Barroso made a statement about the question of referenda on Turkey. Diplomatically supporting the French President’s recent decision to do so, he said “it would be a mistake,” if the member states ruled in favour of Turkey's accession to the European Union, “against the will of the European people.” “The Turkish issue is very serious. This is why it is crucial that a final decision is taken based on the support lent by the European people” (Bastos, 2004). With that caveat, Barroso expressed his personal support for Turkish accession.

The entire episode was covered extensively in the press, but the insider account is written by Bibi de Vries (2006), van Aartsen’s erstwhile deputy.
In late October, after a bilateral meeting between Santana Lopes and Gerhard Schröder, they too expressed their agreement on Turkey, both taking the Commission’s recommendations to open negotiations as their guideline (“Berlin et Lisbonne,” 2004; “Gobiernos seguirán,” 2004; “Portuguese, German leaders,” 2004). Afterward, Portugal’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, António Monteiro confirmed this position, adding that talks could start as soon as Turkey had completed the political reforms required by the EU, presumably referring to the six pieces of legislation enumerated by the Commission. He further argued that Turkey, a country of nearly 20 million Muslims, was of economic and cultural significance to the EU and its accession would improve the international status of both the EU and NATO. However, he also said that the start of talks would not necessarily lead to Turkey’s EU membership, and that Turkey had to show its sincerity by taking all of the necessary measures (“Portugal supports,” 2004).

During an early November visit from Abdullah Gül, Monteiro declared his government’s intention to “follow the recommendation of the European Commission.” He added that they would “follow the rules established by the European Union itself,” and so “we will decide on 17 December to set a date for the start of negotiations” (“Ankara est confiant,” 2004 – trans. mine).

On the first day of the summit, Monteiro was interviewed on the Portuguese radio, RDP Antena 1, on the matter of Turkey. “We have a very firm position in this case,” he declared. “We follow the recommendation of the commission’s report, which is very clear and says that Turkey is in a position for the negotiation process to start. Therefore Portugal is in favor, in the exact terms proposed by the commission. Our idea is that what we should propose to Turkey should be the same as what is proposed to all other candidates. There cannot be any discrimination against Turkey, but there is a need to observe the conditions proposed by the commission and which have been accepted by Turkey itself” (“Portugal backs,” 2004).

Portugal’s role at the summit itself was muted to the point where they failed to reach the media or Ludlow’s radar, with the exception that Lisbon was among those who objected to the idea of permanent safeguards as far as the free movement of persons was concerned (Ludlow, 2005, p. 31). After the summit, Santana Lopes ruled out a Portuguese referendum on Turkey because according to him, Turkey was not a controversial issue in Portugal, since it was a tolerant country that endorsed multiculturalism and was open to the prospect of the accession of more countries to the EU (de Sousa, 2004). Other mentions that support Portugal’s status as a driver are: “Human rights,” 2004; Les dirigeants,” 2004; Ludlow, 2005, p. 6; Nerbollier, 2004; Traynor & Henley, 2004.
8.4.13 Spain

The 2004 elections, which had been directly preceded by the March 11 Madrid train bombings, took José María Aznar of the conservative Partido Popular (People’s Party) from power and brought the government to José Luis Zapatero and his social democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Socialist Workers Party). The new government not only maintained the driver policy, but gave Turkey even more enthusiastic support. Turkey had not been a bone of contention between his party and Aznar’s People’s Party (Cruz, 2004; Kahl, 2004). The press also recognized that Zapatero was not going to shift its policy. Prior to the publication of the Commission’s report, the Spanish national daily newspaper El País wrote that both Zapatero and his foreign minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos were confident that the recommendation and report would be positive and that negotiations would be opened (“Abrir la puerta,” 2004).

At the UN General Assembly meeting in September Zapatero introduced his phrase – ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ – which was his retort to Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’, that saw people's cultural and religious identities as the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world. This was still a year before he would institute the thus-named international initiative against extremism, co-sponsored by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the 59th General Assembly of the United Nations.

During the September contention about Turkey’s proposed adultery law, Moratinos was publicly protested against it, expressing his hope that it would not be adopted because it would send a negative signal to the EU member states about Turkey’s membership ambitions. He, nevertheless, reiterated Spain’s support for Turkey, both in terms of its entry into the EU and as a positive vote for negotiations in December (“Projet de loi,” 2004).

Zapatero’s support for the start of negotiations had also been repeatedly mentioned in the media. In early October, he gave an interview during a state visit to Portugal for an Iberian summit, in which he again declared his support for Turkey, but also noted that it “would need time to join the Union, and would have to meet all the requirements” (“Zapatero quiere,” 2004). He also made clear that Spain would not, like France, propose a referendum on the issue (“Cumbre ratifica,” 2004). On October 5, the day prior to the publication of the Commission’s report and recommendation, Moratinos phoned his colleague, Abdullah Gül, assuring his counterpart of Spain’s support. “It is better to have Turkey inside than outside [the EU], but [Ankara] must meet the membership criteria,” he said afterward (“Chirac pone la nota,” 2004; “Nouvelle manifestation,”
Soon thereafter, the Spanish State Secretary for European Affairs Alberto Navarro said that the European leaders should offer Turkey a date for negotiations “without delay” (“French PM says,” 2004). Referring to Turkey’s predominantly Muslim population and its place in the region, Navarro added that Turkey could help the EU to have an important role in maintaining peace there. On October 29 on the occasion of the signing of the Constitutional Treaty in Rome, during which occasion Zapatero met with Erdoğan. In their meeting Zapatero again promised Spain’s support for Turkey at the Brussels’ summit (“Zapatero reiteró,” 2004).

When asked about Turkey’s prospects in a November interview with Der Spiegel, Zapatero answered that he saw Turkey eventually joining the European Union. In a follow-up on what the Muslim Turks had in common with the historical, cultural and political values of Europe, he answered that, “The Turks also want to be European citizens. And the European identity is grounded in our idea of a community of citizens, the values of the Enlightenment and reason. That is why we respect diversity in religion, culture and language” (Zuber & Ihlau, 2004 – trans. mine).

During the preparations for the summit, Carlos Bastarreche, the Spanish representative to the EU, argued that the Presidency text should be pared down in length, and that Turkey should be given a clear and unambiguous message that the Union was ready for negotiations (Ludlow, 2005, p. 29). Less than two weeks before the summit, on the occasion of the League of Arab States embracing Zapatero’s ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ initiative, Moratinos stressed that Spain’s active support for Turkey was part of the Alliance project to which he added that “the EU was not ‘a Christian club.’” (“Liga Arabe,” 2004).

Before traveling to Brussels for the summit, Zapatero appeared before Spain’s parliamentary inquiry into the March 11 attacks and said that the Alliance of Civilizations initiative was expressly a counter-terrorism project, also aimed at crossing the religious divide, to which the engagement of Turkey by supporting its EU membership ambitions, would be the expedient step to take (“Zapatero propondrá,” 2004). Regarding the timing, Spain expressed its preference to have the negotiations start as soon as possible, it did not seek to make it a case and get into a conflict with Chirac about it (Cruz, 2004).

At the summit, Zapatero’s role was, like that of his Portuguese counterpart, muted by the haggling between the Presidency, the Turks and the ‘Big Three’ going on behind closed doors. Yet, during the debate over the permanent safeguard clauses, Zapatero took a firm stand opposing them (Yáñez, 2004). After the summit, Zapatero called the decision to open negotiations an “important step” for the proposed reconstruction of the EU by “extending the principles of a model of


8.4.14 Sweden

In a surprising turnaround, Sweden changed its policy from that of a brakeman in 2002 and before to a driver in 2004, though not entirely without a few reservations.

In February, during an official two-day visit to Turkey, Prime Minister Göran Persson discussed Turkish membership ambitions with Erdoğan. During the press conference afterward, Erdoğan answered a Swedish journalist to the question of what Sweden could do to support Turkey in its EU bid. “We’ve discussed this issue in detail,” he said. “This is a process and Sweden supports us from the beginning. I hope Sweden's support will also continue in this process. We are becoming a family; we expect support in December” (“Turkish, Swedish premiers,” 2004)

Persson, for his part, said he was pleased about the start of negotiations on Cyprus, stressing the constructive role Erdoğan had played therein. Expressing his appreciation of Turkey’s attitude and program to fulfil the necessary criteria to start accession talks, he also said that Sweden was a strong advocate of the EU enlargement process and that it would support Turkey in the EU’s decision about the start of negotiations and its fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. In spite of all these praises however, he also noted that due to Turkish human rights issues, that were very important to Sweden, it was not possible for his country to “automatically accept Turkey as a EU member”, to which he added that much depended on the Commission recommendations (ibid).

During the events surrounding the proposed adultery ban in September, Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds called the proposal “very unfortunate,” joining other drivers - Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom, as well as Günter Verheugen, in criticizing the measure (“Turks move,” 2004). On October 5, the day before the Commission published its report and recommendation, Freivalds was visiting Turkey at the invitation of Abdullah Gül. The Anatolia news agency (cited by the BBC:
“Swedish foreign minister,” 2004), reported her as saying: “We pursue projects about women’s and human rights in Turkey… we have come to Turkey to examine on which stage these projects are… There will be many recommendations in the progress report. However, we consider that the report will be positive. We are also expecting positive results from the meetings, which will be held in December. Sweden supports Turkey's accession to the EU. Surely, there are different views in the European society. Turkey is a very big country but there are several reservations of the European society because Turkey's reform process is still continuing. However, I would like to consider the issue in long term and I think reforms will advance in long term.”

The day after the publication of the Commission's report, she welcomed its recommendation, saying, “We wish the negotiations to start soon,” to which she added, “Sweden is deeply convinced that Turkey belongs in the EU,” and, “Turkey should now continue its path, and show that it can change” (“Elargissement de l'UE,” 2004; “La Suède souhaite,” 2004 – trans. mine; “Turkish, Sweden,” 2004). Visiting Jacques Chirac at the Elysée palace in Mid-October, Göran Persson said that it was “quite right,” that Turkey should become a member of the European Union, although he stipulated that Turkey should still be required to meet the human rights criteria and safeguard minority rights for the Kurds. However, he also added that once negotiations had begun, the goal should be the accession of Turkey, and not some privileged partnership (“Persson: la Suède,” 2004 – trans. mine).

In the days prior to the summit, Sweden argued against imposing special rules and restrictions on Turkey, about which Freivalds reasoned that, “there should be general rules for the future about the framework within which negotiations on EU membership can be conducted and which offer the possibility of introducing special conditions. This is a way of extending the issue so that it covers more than Turkey” (“Sweden opposes,” 2004). Sweden also joined Finland, Sweden and Belgium in opposing the permanent safeguard clauses, arguing that such a clause would relegate Turkey to a second-class status (Mahony, 2004).

At the summit, Persson declared that since Turkey had fulfilled all the conditions to start negotiations, it now had the right to do so (“Beitrittsgespräche,” 2004). On Swedish radio, Persson was quoted as saying that the European Union should open membership talks with Turkey because the Turks deserved the chance of EU membership. He dismissed calls for Ankara to recognize Cyprus in return for a green light to start EU membership talks (“Swedish PM: Turks,” 2004). When he found little support from his allies, Blair and Verhofstad for his argument to have the mention of permanent safeguards stripped from the Presidency’s text, he backed off and dropped the matter.

Other articles that mention Sweden as a driver are: Boland & Dombey, 2004b, Bouilhet, 2004c, “Human Rights,” 2004, “Les dirigeants,” 2004, “Les eurodéputés,” 2004, Ludlow, 2005, p. 6, Traynor & Henley, 2004, while the only report contradicting this came from Benoit, Milne, & Parker, stating that Sweden had been under political pressure domestically to vote against the negotiations, but the narrative above attests to the fact that they had not given in to that pressure.

8.4.15 United Kingdom

In 2004, the United Kingdom carried on its driver policy. During his airing of concerns over the threat of Turkish membership, Austrian Commissioner to the EU Franz Fischler, said that Britain and the US were among the loudest advocates for Turkish membership, but that their motives were questionable. “Their concern is the preservation of the Western alliance and the dual membership - as far as possible - of the EU and NATO with a view to preserving NATO's relevance. Whether Turkey's accession weakens the Union's political project is not their primary concern, and may even be on their wish list,” he said (Staunton, 2004a).

Following the publication of the Commission’s report and recommendation, Denis MacShane, the minister for Europe, made it clear that Britain would oppose the Commission’s move to impose the permanent safeguards on Turkish workers migrating to other areas of the EU, considering it particularly unacceptable at a time when negotiations had not even started yet and were projected to last at least until 2015. He would rather cross that bridge when they got to it, he said, where Turkey should be allowed to open accession talks in good faith and on the same basis as any other country. Adding more weight to his argument against the permanent safeguards, he said: “By 2020 Europe's ageing population may be such that people will want young, educated Turks to work in the rest of the EU… the Turkey which joins then will be a very different country and the process of the entry negotiations should promote as radical a reform process as that initiated by Ataturk” (Gow, 2004).

Later Prime Minister Tony Blair commented that, “Turkey is a key NATO ally - we want her as an EU partner too… I look forward to a decision by the European Council in December to start negotiations without delay” (Boland & Dombey, 2004a). Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said, on his
way to Ankara for talks, that Turkey had undergone remarkable changes and that EU must now deliver its side of the bargain (Gow & Smith, 2004). In an interview with the German newspaper Bild a few days later, he stressed the importance of a stable and democratic Turkey in the EU and considered its membership “a huge win for Europe”. The European Union would be larger, more diverse and more dynamic with Turkey (cited in “Blair unterstützt,” 2004; Thornhill, 2004).

When copies of the Dutch Presidency draft were leaked to the press, Blair commented on the requirement of Turkey to recognize Cyprus, even though it was rather tacitly put, asserting that Turkey should not face more hurdles than any other prospective member. The country was not actually asking for special favors, but for the same treatment, he pointed out during a Downing Street news conference. There should be no more obstacles put in its way than were already posed upon by the Copenhagen criteria (Bowley, 2004b). At about this time, the British government put together its own draft of the presidency conclusions expressed in a way that was more to its liking (Ludlow, 2005, p. 34).

Days before the summit, the Guardian reported that Downing Street was expected to propose some ‘sweeteners’ on Turkey in order to make the deal more attractive to some of the more critical drivers (Watt, 2004). One concession was the agreement with the French proposal to delay the start of accession negotiations until later in the next year, which ‘coincidentally’ would put the start of negotiations under the British presidency during the last six months of that year, instead of under Luxembourg, as Jean-Claude Juncker had hoped for, during the first six months. Another concession was to rewrite the rules of the EU to ensure that Turkey would not be able to dominate it the EU with its weight of population in the EU’s councils and in the European Parliament. A third concession consisted of Blair’s proposal for a ‘get out’ clause, which would hold out the prospect of refusing entry to an aspiring member. Given that the emergency brake mechanism had already been discussed and Chirac had been speaking about a ‘third option’ for some time, this was not a novel idea.

A source leaking these proposed concessions told the Guardian that the new clauses would only be agreed to by Britain if they were dressed up in positive language that would not include the ‘privileged partnership’. A day later, an article in The Times rephrased this by stating that Britain might accept some formula (called “a matter of words” by officials) that would allow for some form of a half-way house into membership, as long as it was not construed to permanently bar Turkey from full membership (Maddox, 2004).
A senior British official, cited anonymously by the Financial Times, however, made clear that London wanted to minimize the number of safeguards and restrictions on Turkey’s membership and avoid half-hearted language in the communiqué (Adams, 2004). Nevertheless, true to the first proposed ‘concession’, the United Kingdom agreed with the desire to see the accession negotiations start at a later date than the ‘without delay’ formulation had implied previously. It either understood Chirac’s preference for a delay until after the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty, and/or earnestly desired to be in the presidency at the outset of those negotiations (Ludlow, 2005, p. 28). Yet, London was still among those who rejected the idea of permanent safeguards on the free movement of persons, which would have relegated to a second-class member (ibid, p. 31).

At the summit, Blair moved the alternative draft conclusion drawn up by his government, but the Dutch made it clear that their own draft, which included the Franco-German understanding of membership as the goal, be it with an open-ended process coupled with the clause ‘ensuring that the candidate state concerned is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond,’ was preferred. Facing apparently unchallenged Dutch stubbornness on this account, Blair relented (ibid, p. 38).

On the matter of Cyprus, Blair did not find anything disturbing in the formula of the additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement that the Dutch had come up with. Ludlow suggests this was an oversight on the British part and that he should have been cognizant that the Turks would be most upset with this language and that he should have warned his colleagues that it would lead to acrimony. When it did, he was part of the team that put pressure on Papadopoulos and kept Erdoğan and Gül from flying back to Ankara (ibid, p. 44-45). In conference with the Turks, Blair insisted on Erdoğan working directly with the Dutch in order to find the right phrasing to make the deal acceptable for most parties (ibid, p. 46). His own contribution to the deal was suggesting that he, Balkenende, Chirac and Schröder would all stress in the press conferences after the summit, that signing the protocol was not the same as recognising Cyprus. In the end the formulation that suited all parties was finally drawn up by Turkish, Dutch and British diplomats working in a huddle. After the summit, Tony Blair called it “an immensely significant day for Europe,” and a sign of the fundamental principle that “the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country does not mean it should be barred from the EU” (Laitner & Minder, 2004).

The UK’s position on Turkey as a driver was further confirmed in numerous other articles, of which the following are a sample: “Abrir la puerta,” 2004; Bennhold, 2004, Bouilhet, 2004c, Bowley, 2004a, Browne, 2004b; 2004d, Cruz, 2004, Dempsey, 2004, Dombey, Laitner & Parker,
2004, Gow & McCaskill, 2004, “Human Rights,” 2004, “Les eurodéputés,” 2004; Staunton, 2004c, Traynor & Henley, 2004. The one exception to the UK’s driver-like policy statements was during the events surrounding the proposed adultery ban in September; Foreign Secretary Jack Straw joined other drivers to criticize it, arguing that the proposal “would create difficulties for Turkey” (“Projet de loi,” 2004; “Turks move,” 2004). However, the UK was far from the only driver to criticize the proposal.

8.4.16 The New Member States

As mentioned before, the EU-15, analysed in this and previous chapters, were no longer the only members of the EU in 2004. Eight countries from Central and Eastern Europe and the two Mediterranean island countries had joined on May 1. Although their positions have been left out for reasons explained above, a few comments may serve to complete the overview of this period.

Cyprus and its position has already been mentioned. The other new member states had not been given much attention in the press nor were they given the same level of attention in the Ludlow account, as the longer-standing members were. Of course these countries still had their positions regarding Turkey, and a small number of news articles mention them (with the exception of Malta). Although these articles did not always agree with one another, they all agreed that especially Poland and the Czech Republic were firm supporters (“Chirac pone,” 2004; “Les dirigeants,” 2004; Staunton, 2004c). Slovenia and the Baltic countries - Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – were also identified as drivers (“Les dirigeants,” 2004).

There was, however, disagreement about Hungary and Slovakia. Agence France-Presse (“Les dirigeants,” 2004) reported them as being drivers, while the Irish Times (Staunton 2004d) considered them brakemen. The Guardian (“Human Rights,” 2004) listed Slovakia and Hungary as drivers, even though the latter was not supported by Hungarian public opinion. The Financial Times (Dombey & Hadjipapas, 2004) reported that Slovakia, especially its three governing Christian-democratic parties, expressed concerns over Turkey, arguing that Turkey should not be treated more favorably than they had been, referring to their own failure to be allowed to start accession negotiations in 1997. Ironically, Turkey had been treated similarly that year, though Slovakia had enjoyed better treatment with financial support, which Turkey had been left without. In summa, it is the safest to say that the press was not yet sure what to make of these new member states.
2006, one year into accession negotiations, was rough for Turkey. The debate in the European Union was much narrower than it had been before, in that it focused on the issue of Turkey’s troubled relationship with Cyprus, while the debate about Turkey’s suitability for membership as a European country was very limited to discussions for an alternative. It had some major outspoken antagonists to deal with in Edmund Stoiber, the German Christian Social Union chairman of Bavaria and Nicolas Sarkozy, then still the Interior Minister of France. While Angela Merkel, the new Chancellor of Germany, also shared their views, she was bound by a coalition agreement with the Social democrats whose views on Turkey remained what they had been under Schröder’s leadership.

While the Commission identified a slowing of Turkey’s reform process toward the still unfulfilled political Copenhagen criteria – of democratization, human and minority rights – the critical and narrow debate about the Turkish accession process was overwhelmingly focused on Turkey’s maintenance of closed harbors and airports to Cypriot planes and ships, which transgressed the agreement of two years earlier. Among the agreements in 2004 had been that Turkey would ratify the additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which would extend the EU-Turkey Customs Union to all the new member states, including (Greek) Cyprus. Turkey did so, with the caveat that it would not open its airports and harbors to the Cypriots.

Among the brakemen, outrage over Turkey’s broken promise fueled the argument to halt the accession negotiations, if not to derail the process altogether. Meanwhile, the gentlemen’s agreement that the EU would lift the decades-old embargo on Northern Cyprus also went unfulfilled, after the failed referendum on the UN-sponsored ‘Annan-plan’ to settle the legal-political impasse between the two Cypriot communities, and Greek Cyprus’ maintenance of a veto threat on all attempts to open the EU to Northern Cyprus.

The main thrust of the 2006 episode was an attempt by the Finnish presidency to broker some deal that would settle the impasse. For the other member states, the debate concerned what sort of sanctions to impose on Turkey’s accession negotiations process when and if the Finns failed
to broker a deal. Meanwhile, other issues, such as Turkey’s recognition of the Armenian Genocide or a Turkish law condemning ‘insults to Turkishness’ made the news, but did not feature prominently in the political debates, other than the Armenian issue in France alone.

Despite the Finnish effort, both parties remained intransigent in their positions, neither being willing to offer unilateral concessions. With that effort having failed, the member states were left with a decision on how to punish Turkey, given that any individual brakeman could hold up the accession negotiations, and Cyprus was more than willing to do so. By year’s end, the Foreign Ministers opted for the Commission’s recommendation to freeze eight negotiations chapters that it considered to be related to the customs union, a decision that was fairly easily embraced by the heads of state and government.

9.1 POLITICAL CHANGES

Before embarking on a closer analysis of the developments, it is again necessary to map out the political landscape of this period. Between 2004 and 2006, several changes had taken place in the domestic politics of the member states.

- In Austria federal elections were held (in Austria) on 1 October 2006, resulting in a handover of power from the ÖVP/BZÖ\(^{40}\) coalition to a new coalition consisting of the Social Democratic SPÖ and ÖVP with Alfred Gusenbauer taking over as Chancellor. This handover, however, did not take place until January 2007.

- In France, Jean-Pierre Raffarin had resigned as prime minister after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty in the 2005 referendum. Jacques Chirac appointed Dominique de Villepin to take up that post. Michel Barnier was removed from the office of Foreign Minister, making place for Philippe Douste-Blazy. Chirac remained the President. Nicolas Sarkozy returned as Minister of the Interior in the cabinet of his political rival, de Villepin.

\(^{40}\) After the events of the summer of 2004, Jörg Haider and his allies in the Schüssel government broke away from the FPÖ in April 2005 in order to form the BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria). The coalition thus became one consisting of the ÖVP and BZÖ.
• Germany held elections in September 2005, resulting in a Grand Coalition of CDU/CSU and the SPD with Angela Merkel (CDU) serving as Chancellor. Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) took the post of Foreign Minister.

• In Italy Romano Prodi returned as Prime Minister in May 2006, after elections in April gave his Union coalition a majority in the Chamber of Deputies and a razor-thin plurality over Berlusconi’s House of Freedoms in the Senate. The former Prime Minister, Massimo D'Alema, was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.

• In the Netherlands a cabinet crisis in June 2006, caused by a refusal of D66 to maintain its confidence in Minister of Immigration Rita Verdonk, led to the fall of the second Balkenende cabinet. Early elections were called for November 22, while a minority cabinet (Balkenende III) reliant on CDA and VVD continued as interim government. The November elections resulted in a CDA-PvdA(Labor) coalition after a formation process of two and a half months later. Jan Peter Balkenende remained prime minister and Ben Bot remained minister of foreign affairs throughout.

• In Portugal, after months of perceived instability under the prime ministership of Pedro Santana Lopes, President Jorge Sampaio called for new legislative elections. The February elections brought the Socialist Party back in power under the leadership of José Sócrates. Freitas do Amaral served as Foreign Minister until July 2006, after which he resigned, leaving the post to Francisco Pinto Balsemão.

• Sweden held elections in September 2006 and brought a new cabinet of a center-right wing alliance of parties led by Fredrick Reinfeldt’s Moderate Party with a slim majority in the Riksdag (Parliament). Reinfeldt’s cabinet returned Carl Bildt as minister of foreign affairs. It also established the position of Minister of European Union Affairs, which was filled by Cecilia Malmström.

The governments in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, and the United Kingdom essentially remained the same. In Turkey, the AKP remained in power, with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as Prime Minister and Abdullah Gül in the foreign minister’s office.
9.2 THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

As mentioned above, the real crux of the matter in 2006 concerned access to Turkish airspace, airports and harbors for Cypriot planes and ships. The previous episode of 2004 had ended with a promise by Turkey to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, extending the EU-Turkey Customs Union to all the new member states, which implicitly included the Republic of Cyprus. At the time, political discussion about the protocol had been diplomatically phrased to free Turkey from the idea that the ratification of the protocol signified recognition of the Greek government on the island. When Turkey had signed the protocol on July 29 2005, it had added a signing declaration in which it explicitly excluded Cyprus, stating that, “the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol is not the original partnership State established in 1960,” and that, “Turkey will continue to regard the Greek Cypriot authorities as exercising authority, control and jurisdiction only in the territory south of the buffer zone, and [they] do not represent the Turkish Cypriot people and will treat the acts performed by them accordingly” (Turkey, 2005). At the end of the declaration, Turkey indicated that it had “…thus fulfilled all its responsibilities for launching the accession negotiations with the EU.”

The European Council, answering Turkey’s challenge on September 21 of that same year, disagreed, stating that, “the European Community and its Member States make clear that this declaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol,” and that, “the Council will ensure a follow-up on the progress made on all these issues in 2006” (European Council, 2005). The scene was set for a diplomatic impasse between the European Council and Turkey.

During the first six months of the year, there was little development in the positions of the member states in the Council. The process was mostly in the hands of the Commission, which was conducting a screening of Turkey’s administrative system to provide a knowledge base with respect to the negotiating chapters (Ludlow, 2005, p. 8-9). This screening was intended to gauge what amendments would have to be made in order for Turkey to comply with the acquis communautaire, consisting of 35 chapters, of which only the chapter on Science and Research had been opened and provisionally closed in June.
9.2.1 Train Crash

The matter was taken off the backburner in late March 2006 when the Finnish Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, a former advisor to Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen, warned that the talks were headed toward a “train crash”, over Turkey’s refusal to ratify the additional protocol and open its airports and harbors to Cypriot planes and ships. “The Commission is working to avoid a train crash at the end of the year,” he said. “The Finnish presidency will have to use all its diplomatic skills, inherited from the period of neutrality policy, to avoid this train crash,” timing the critical moment to happen after the annual report on Turkey’s progress and under the Finnish presidency (Taylor & Grajewski, 2006; Watt & Gow, 2006 – emph. mine).

One aspect of the impasse about the protocol, which largely went unrecognized during the more heated debate over Turkey in general, was the position of the Turkish Cypriots. While Turkey maintained a unilateral embargo on Cypriot shipping and overflight, the EU maintained a multilateral embargo toward the unrecognized portion of the island under Turkish Cypriot control. Throughout, the European Commission’s position was that the two embargoes were not legally equivalent. According to the Commission, Turkey was legally bound to open its harbors, airports, and airspace to Cypriot shipping and flights, under the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, while the EU was bound by little more than a gentleman’s agreement, which it was unable to uphold, owing to the veto threats of the Republic of Cyprus and Greece (Smyth, 2006a).

9.2.2 The June Summit

The European Council met in Brussels on June 15 and 16 2006, then still under the Austrian Presidency. Dealing with the enlargement part of the agenda, the presidency conclusions included paragraphs for both Turkey and Croatia, the only two candidates at that time engaged in accession negotiations. In preparation for the summit, the Austrians had drawn up a document revealing a tougher stance on Turkey than on Croatia, as it included additional ‘contractual obligations’ for Turkey to comply with, referring to the additional protocol. Austria, as a long-standing brakeman, was not alone in insisting upon the tough language. In the preparatory diplomacy on the formulation of the conclusions, the Spanish permanent representative, Carlos Basterreche, even sought to strengthen the severity of the Austrian version, while the French sought to make the mention of the
In the end, most of the paragraphs in the conclusions were identical for both countries, except that the one for Turkey called for the fulfillment of its obligations under the Association Agreement and the additional protocol, which meant the opening of Turkey’s harbors and airports to Cypriot shipping, and, indeed, recalling the declaration of the previous September. This put Turkey on notice that by the end of the year, the European Council would “follow up on the progress made on all the relevant issues included in the above mentioned Declaration” (European Council, 2006a, par. 54). Effectively, this gave Turkey the ultimate choice to either allow Cypriot-flagged planes and ships to land and dock, or to forget about any progress toward its EU membership aspirations, since the suspension of negotiations, provided for under the ‘Emergency Brake’ procedure inculcated in the 2004 Conclusions, was not ruled out (“L’UE et la Turquie,” 2006).

9.2.3 The Presidency’s approach.

In late June, a few days before the Finns took over the rotating presidency, Finland’s foreign minister, Erkki Tuomioja, sent a letter to his member-state colleagues, outlining his approach on General Affairs and External Relations issues, such as EU enlargement, about which he wrote:

The Council's general debate on enlargement will... include a discussion on the union's absorption capacity on which the Commission has been invited to prepare a report. It is important that the discussion will not lead to new criteria for enlargement nor to a withdrawal from the commitments previously given by the EU... As for Turkey and Croatia, the accession negotiations will be brought forward in accordance with the agreed principles. In late autumn, the Union will examine the 2006 Commission Progress Reports.  

(Tuomioja, 2006)

This told recipients that the Finnish presidency was willing to entertain the debate on the absorption capacity of the EU, but that this should not be used instrumentally as an excuse to prevent Turkey’s accession, or change its membership requirements.

In August, the Commission proposed to have the United Nations run the Northern Cypriot ports, such as Famagusta. Goods could then be shipped with UN paperwork and customs declarations, rather than those of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, making them legally acceptable to international trade. The new arrangements would, presumably give Turkey enough of a
concession to lift its ban on Greek Cypriot ships and planes (Castle, 2006a). The Commission also proposed referring the matter to the European Court of Justice. However, given broad expectations that it would lose such a case there, Ankara did not respond.

Meanwhile, the presidency and the Commission began to readdress their approach. Having used the expression of a ‘train wreck’ as a prospect for Turkey’s accession process for months, without the desired effect on Turkey, the need for a ‘Plan B’ arose. A Plan B would allow the process to at least to “muddle through” until presidential and parliamentary elections had taken place in Turkey the next year (Boland, Dombey & Parker, 2006). The Commission realized that in the run-up to these elections, the Turkish leaders would be effectively unable to compromise on Cyprus for fear of a domestic political trouncing over the issue. Ali Babacan, Turkish minister of economic affairs and EU negotiator had made it clear: “Turkey is not going to do anything unilaterally on ports and airports,” further saying that a breakdown of negotiations would be “devastating” not just for Turkey’s prospects, “but also for the future of the world” (Dombey & Parker, 2006).

The play for time, either to get past Turkish elections or to send the matter to a European or the International Court of Justice, was firmly rejected by the Greek Cypriots, who called the idea “…categorically a non-starter… Our government is not in the business of giving Turkey extra time for free” (ibid). While a legal option would likely have favored the Greek Cypriots, the Republic of Cyprus was hesitant to take that route because taking the matter to either court would be time-consuming and would diffuse the moment’s pressure on Turkey to give in to the EU’s demands (Boland, Dombey & Parker, 2006).

The political negotiations with the Turks fell to the Finnish Presidency and began in earnest when in early September it communicated to Turkey that the impasse over Cyprus could cause a delay in the negotiations. In this communication Tuomioja pointed out that Turkey had to comply with the legal commitments resulting from the expanding borders of the customs union with the addition of the new member states, including Cyprus. Ankara, for its part, expected that the chapters dealing with the provisions of the customs union might be suspended, but Tuomioja indicated that an amicable solution might be worked out (“EU droht Türkei,” 2006; Watt, 2006). Those negotiations, however, were conducted in the context of other developments in the European Parliament and the Commission, as described below.
9.2.4 The European Parliament

Camiel Eurlings, the Dutch MEP who carried the Turkish accession issue as Rapporteur, spoke of “insufficient progress” in his draft report that was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the parliament’s foreign affairs committee on September 4 (“Europarliament,” 2006). In addition to not having ratified and implemented the additional protocol to the Ankara Agreement to open airports and harbors to Cypriot shipping, the report mentioned “persistent shortcomings” on other political criteria issues such as the freedom of expression and religion and the rights of minorities, women and unions (“Veel kritiek,” 2006 – trans. mine).

The most controversial issue dealt with in the draft report, however, was that of the Armenian Genocide. Eurlings’ original draft included the opinion that the recognition thereof had to be “unavoidable” because a country must come to terms with its past. French socialists took this even a step further by an amendment to make the recognition a requirement of membership (Dijkstra, 2006a; Hekking, 2006; Jongsma, 2006; “Strasbourg juge,” 2006; “Turkije geïrriteerd,” 2006).

The report was discussed and adopted in Plenary Session on September 27, in which it deplored the condemnation of Hrant Dink, the Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor who was prosecuted for advocating recognition of the Armenian Genocide, under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code. The requirement for recognizing the Armenian Genocide was, however, scrapped in the final draft (Dijkstra, 2006b; Kranenburg, 2006a). Rather than requiring recognition of the Armenian Genocide, it stressed that Turkey’s recognition of the alleged genocide was “indispensable for a country on the road to membership.” It also expressed its disappointment that Turkey was not yet permitting Cypriot vessels to dock at its harbors and planes to fly over its airspace (European Parliament, 2006, pars. 11, 56, & 58).

While parties differed on where the process should lead, there was broad consensus on Turkey’s need to step up its democratic and liberal reforms, admit Cypriot ships and planes, and recognize the Armenian genocide. Even Turkey’s allies in the Parliament, such as Joost Lagendijk – the Dutch Chairman of the EU-Turkey parliamentary delegation – called for more action (“Veel kritiek,” 2006). Responding to the critical debate in Parliament, Louis Michel (European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid), speaking on behalf of his colleague Olli Rehn, said that the November report was not going to be “a story for children,” but “as much as Turkey needs Europe to modernize and democratize, Europe needs Turkey, especially on sensitive
issues such as security, peace and dialogue among civilizations” (“Parlement Européen,” 2006 – trans. mine). He also reminded the European Parliament that recognition of the Armenian Genocide had never been part of the Copenhagen criteria.

9.2.5 The European People’s Party

In late September, the EPP – ever the bastion of European Brakemanship toward Turkey – met in Lyon for a “summer university” attended by center-right political and economic policymakers, during which Turkey was a dominant issue of discussion. At this seminar the German Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, politically associated with the centre-right CDU, presented a document suggesting that non-member states could be chosen to participate with the EU in either one of four integration options:

1) the European Economic Area, like Norway;
2) an “enlarged association” which temporarily or permanently excluded the free movement of workers;
3) a “differentiated integration”, with no fixed outcome; and finally
4) a “privileged partnership” which obliged the EU to clarify at the outset that there would be no membership perspective in the future

(“La Famille,” 2006).

In other words, the Foundation was attempting to get the ‘privileged partnership’ instituted by European People’s Party, thus solidifying it as a future option for Turkey.

At this meeting, however, Carl Bildt – Sweden’s foreign minister – who had just returned from Istanbul, which he described in glowing terms, told the gathering in Lyon, “I know that one day we shall reach the limits of the Europe of the Treaty of Rome, but we are not there yet… I urge caution: drawing lines on a big map of the east of Europe is a dangerous exercise” (ibid – trans. mine). Agreeing with Bildt was the Secretary-General of the European Automobile Manufacturers Association, Ivan Hodac, who said that Europe deserved a Nobel Prize in irresponsibility for its treatment of Turkey.

9.2.6 October haggling

During October, the broad parameters of the Finnish proposal became clearer, in which Turkey was required to allow Cypriot ships and planes into its harbors and airports, as per the additional
In return, international traffic to Northern Cyprus under United Nations supervision would be permitted through the port of Famagusta, provided that Turkish military forces were withdrawn from the port area (Leibl, 2006).

The Greek Cypriots rejected this idea of concessions to Turkey on Northern Cyprus, as making such concessions to Turkey undermined the legitimacy of the EU, they argued. The government of Cyprus was, however, willing to talk about it if Varosha, formerly a famous but now abandoned seaside resort of south of Famagusta proper, would be ceded to Greek Cyprus. If the UN Annan Plan to resolve the Cyprus dispute had been adopted, Varosha would already have been returned to the Greek side and opened to Greek Cypriot settlement, but Greek-Cypriot voters had rejected the plan in 2004 (“Decades,” 2006; “Gül” 2006; Proissl & Schmid, 2006). Solidifying their position in 2006, the Greek-Cypriot government made it clear that it would not accept any plan that did not return the town to its former inhabitants (Smyth, 2006a).

In response, the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat declared that ceding Varosha to Greek Cyprus in order to clear the way for Turkish accession to the EU was not an acceptable solution (“Les Chypriotes,” 2006). Given that the Varosha concession had been a part of the Annan plan, meant that either the entire Cyprus situation would have to be solved together with the opening of Turkish harbors and airports, or the solution to the Cypriot shipping and flights problem would take Varosha off the table of a future settlement of the Cyprus situation (“Decades,” 2006). During the presidency-brokered negotiations, the Greek Cypriots remained unwilling to recognize the Turkish Cypriots as legitimate interlocutors, thus making a solution to the overall Cyprus situation unattainable (Ferenczi & Shihab, 2006).

The Turks, meanwhile pressured into making a choice between pursuing the accession negotiations and their interests in Northern Cyprus, called the tactics used by Cyprus and the EU “blackmail”. Speaking to a Turkish-Cypriot audience in North Nicosia, Gül affirmed that Turkey would not allow itself to be blackmailed by the EU. The matter should be taken up at the UN, he argued, because with the accession of Greek Cyprus, the EU has “lost its neutrality by including only the Greek Cypriots” (Shihab, 2006). As such, Turkey simply took the Varosha issue as a new provocation on Cyprus’ part and rejected it (Dombey, 2006a).

Nevertheless, all sides declared the desire to see the negotiations over the impasse succeed. The president of (Greek) Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, suggested that while the Republic of Cyprus earnestly did not want an end to accession negotiations with Turkey, it was still adamant that a resolution to the impasse needed to be found that would give its ships and planes the right to dock
and land in Turkey ("Chypre n'entrave," 2006). Erdoğan, however, was not optimistic that the deal, offered by the Finnish presidency, was workable. “We can negotiate the plan,” he said, “but it is not very reasonable… The EU must honor its commitments and lift the sanctions [on Turkish Cyprus]. Until this is done, nobody should expect anything from us” ("Le Premier ministre turc émet," 2006a – trans. mine).

Even though Olli Rehn used the ‘train wreck’ phrase again in October, when he urged Turkey to “relaunch the reform process with full determination and meet its obligations on Cyprus,” he also said that to speak of a “crisis” with Ankara was “exaggerated”. Still, he called for the situation to be solved in what would perhaps be the last chance to do so for years to come. German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier chimed in, saying, “One should not consider a ‘Plan B’,” given that ‘Plan B’ referred to some sanction on the negotiations, if not freezing them altogether ("Turquie: l'UE adoucit," 2006 – trans. mine).

By November, the last-ditch efforts to come to an agreement before the Commission report was due to be published, had failed, with different parties pointing the blame in different directions. On November 3, Tuomioja declared that the Presidency’s attempt to negotiate a settlement to the impasse before the publication of the Commission’s report had also failed. “We were ready to organize in Finland a round of talks between the Presidency and all parties involved,” he said. “Unfortunately, this has not been possible before the November 8 publication of the Commission report on Turkey, but of course we continue to work to find a solution” ("Decades of division,” 2006; Ferenczi & Shihab, 2006; “Poursuite des négociations,” 2006 – trans. mine).

### 9.2.7 The Commission’s report

When the EU Commission published its progress report on November 8, the Michael Leigh, director-general of DG Enlargement, who had already presaged the report a few days prior, said that the speed of Turkey’s reforms had indisputably been tempered (Bouwman & Kranenburg, 2006). Officials within the Commission had already begun to debate on how many chapters ought to be closed should the negotiations fail to offer a solution to the impasse, during which the positions of the Commissioners essentially reflected those of their countries. Olli Rehn (Enlargement – Finland) and Barroso (Commission President – Portugal) argued for three chapters linked to trade, while Jacques Barrot (Transport – France), Benita Ferrero-Waldner (External Relations – Austria), Markos
Kyprianou (Health and Consumer Protection – Cyprus) and Stavros Dimas (Environment – Greece) suggested much stronger measures (Bounds & Dombey, 2006).

Unlike the previous years, including 2005, the report omitted general evaluation paragraphs at the end of the political criteria sections, which had previously offered overall assessments. Instead, the reader had to conclude from each of the separate sections on democracy, human rights, and regional issues, specific measure by specific measure, how Turkey had fared. Concerning the impasse over Cyprus, the Commission did not explicitly recommend a suspension of accession negotiations by the ‘emergency brake’ procedure. Still, in order to maintain the pressure, it anticipated a recommendation on how to move forward, which it would publish before the European Council meeting. The report, however, stated the case with regard to Turkey’s requirement to implement the protocol as follows:

Moreover, under its declaration of 21 September 2005, the EU expects full, nondiscriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport. The EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006. The declaration also stressed that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process and underlined the importance it attaches to the normalisation of relations between Turkey and all EU Member States, as soon as possible.

(Commission, 2006a, p. 24)

This paragraph did not explicitly state that the Commission recommended the use of the ‘emergency brake’ procedure for the suspension of negotiations, but made clear that the situation would be evaluated before the end of the year, with the strong implication that this would happen before the European Council meeting (“Bruxelles diffère,” 2006; Kranenburg, 2006b).

The Commission did not express any criticism in the report itself, but summarized its position in the associated strategy paper that covered all the ongoing enlargement candidates and applicants. Regarding Cyprus and the additional protocol, the strategy paper stated that the Commission would make relevant recommendations ahead of the December European Council, if Turkey had not fulfilled its obligations by then (Commission, 2006b, p. 11). The absence of a clear recommendation in either document was a deliberate omission in order to buy the presidency time to find a diplomatic solution (Ludlow, 2006b, p. 14). As Olli Rehn said in a press statement, that the publication of the report was not the moment to make a recommendation on how to move forward, lest it would “disrupt the efforts” of the Finnish Presidency (Ferenczi, 2006a; “Bruxelles diffère,” 2006 – trans. mine).
The member states did not explicitly differ in opinion with the Commission’s findings, nor with its opinion that a solution would have to be found by which Turkish harbors and airports would be opened to Cypriot vessels. Even the British, always Turkey’s most stalwart supporters, called on Turkey to take the necessary steps to avoid a suspension of negotiations ("Bruxelles diffère,” 2006). Angela Merkel, meanwhile, identified the report as being “unambiguous”, saying that Turkey had to fulfill its commitments by the end of the year or face the consequences ("Merkel somme Ankara,” 2006). “It will not be possible to just continue like this,” she warned in Berlin (Ferenczi, 2006a – trans. mine).

The report was hailed in Nicosia and Athens, with Cypriot Foreign Minister George Lillikas saying, “We are pleased because [the report] said that Turkey must fulfill its obligations towards Cyprus” ("Bruxelles diffère,” 2006 – trans. mine). Speaking several days later, when the ‘what next’ question had begun to arise, Lillikas argued that Cyprus favored a partial suspension of the negotiations if the harbors and airports were not opened. “There are two extreme positions today,” he said, “One school of thought says that we should suspend only relevant sections [pertaining to the EU-Turkey customs union], while others are for a total freeze. We do not support either one or the other of these ideas” ("Chypre pour,” 2006 – trans. mine). He did not, however, spell out exactly the formula that he himself was advocating for.

Erdoğan, on the other hand, remained defiant, cautioning the EU to not expect Turkey to open its ports so long as there was no end to the isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus ("Bruxelles diffère,” 2006; Marchand, 2006a). Abdullah Gül did not directly comment in his response to the report on the Cyprus issue, though he said, “We are aware of our shortcomings, but we believe in the continuity of the process, and we are firmly determined to make Turkey a more democratic country, which applies the best European standards” ("Pas de suspension,” 2006; Marchand, 2006a – trans. mine). The Turkish Foreign Ministry nevertheless made it clear that it rejected any link between the accession negotiations and the impasse over Cyprus.

9.2.8 November Haggling

Negotiations about Cyprus continued after the publication of the Commission’s progress report. It was politically clearly a very delicate matter for Turkey, especially with its upcoming presidential and legislative elections in 2007, which gave the AKP government an incentive to be unbending toward
Cyprus and the EU (Ferenczi, 2006a). Despite their firmness on the subject, allegations circulated in the Turkish press that Ankara had offered some concessions, though this was denied by Gül. “We consider Cyprus as a national issue. We’ve done everything we can to protect the Turkish Cypriot people,” he said before the Turkish parliamentary committee on budget and planning. “Taking into consideration all these developments, I am really surprised at these allegations that Turkey had made concessions on Cyprus. If we had made concessions, we would have said yes to everything.” He found the allegations particularly surprising as, in his words, the Finns, “have not submitted their documents. They themselves could not tell me their proposals” (“Le ministre turc,” 2006 – trans. mine).

At a mid-November Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels, there was downbeat assessment on the likelihood of a breakthrough. Cyprus’ foreign minister Lillikas said he no longer held out hope the deadlock could be broken by compromise between Cyprus and Turkey. He advocated for strong measures on Turkey, considering it was not enough to suspend talks on a limited number of topics. Austria’s Ursula Plassnik also called for a complete “time out” from the negotiations. By contrast, both the United Kingdom and France argued for the continuation of negotiations, though not without freezing a few chapters (Bilefsky, 2006; Dombey 2006b). French Foreign Secretary Catherine Colonna said: “If there is no progress, the negotiations will not continue as if nothing had happened” (“Türkei droht,” 2006).

A critical factor among the member states, however, was that the issue was heating up in Germany. While the impasse over Cypriot shipping continued in November, Chancellor Angela Merkel made it clear that Turkey would have to give in or face consequences for its continued refusal to implement the protocol. Her own CDU/CSU constituency – especially in the person of Bavarian Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber – was calling for a complete suspension of negotiations (see below).

The Turks, on the other hand, had dismissed the notion that a failure on their part to unilaterally open their harbors and airports to Cypriot ships and airplanes would lead to a suspension. Erdoğan disputed the idea that the negotiations were headed for a train-wreck, saying, “Suspensions, ruptures, trains stopping at stations, such things are impossible… Our efforts will continue. Even a country like Great Britain waited 11 years before it became a full member” (“Erdogan exclut,” 2006 – trans. mine). Speaking at a different occasion in Brussels, Babacan argued that a suspension of negotiations would not only have consequences for his country, but also for the
EU and the whole region. Responding to this, Olli Rehn said that Turkey should not overestimate its strategic importance, especially if it did not keep its promises (Hostettler, 2006a).

On November 21, the presidency upped the ante by reminding Turkey that the deadline for them to change their policy about Cyprus would be around December 6 when the Commission was expected to issue its recommendation. This was also in connection with the December Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels less than a week later, during which Vanhanen had determined the question would be dealt with by the foreign ministers, rather than leaving it to the heads of state and government to decide (“Ankara n’a plus,” 2006; “Le 6 décembre,” 2006; Bottolier-Depois, 2006a). The message to Turkey was clear: It would have to open its airports and harbors to Cypriot shipping, or the EU would suspend at least a portion of the negotiating chapters (Pantförder, 2006). Vanhanen further expressed his preference to keep the issue off the agenda for the European Council proper, leaving it instead to the foreign ministers to decide. Tactically, this was slightly more favorable to Turkey, because in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting Germany would be represented by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, whose position on Turkey was far more permissive than that of the Chancellor.

When the Finns made it clear to the Turks that they were facing a deadline, Gül responded that issues like Cyprus could not be solved by blackmail or setting deadlines (Bilefsky, 2006). Furthermore, he argued that the accession negotiations were a technical administrative process that was unrelated to the political process of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Cypriots meanwhile had not needed Vanhanen’s reminder of a deadline. Underlining the idea of a revived UN-track, Turkish-Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat reinvited the United Nations to begin negotiations between the two Cypriot communities in January 2007. After meeting with Kofi Annan in Geneva on November 20, Talat told reporters that the plan developed in 2004 by the UN to put an end to the division of the island remained the basis of any solution. Like Gül, he stressed that the Cyprus problem should be resolved through the UN and not the European Union (EU) because – with Cyprus as a member, the EU could not be impartial (“Ankara n’a plus,” 2006).

During the last weekend of November the foreign ministers of the Mediterranean EU members met in Tampere, Finland, in proximity to the concurrent negotiations between the presidency, Turkey and the Cypriots. On the sidelines, the Turks expressed themselves optimistically about a solution for the impasse, but the Cypriots were pessimistic (“Chypre pessimiste,” 2006; “Le Premier ministre turc pense,” 2006b). By the end of the talks, no solution was found. The Turks continued to refuse to open their airports and harbors to Greek Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots refused

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to lift their veto on the continued isolation of Turkish Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots refused to allow Varosha to be handed over to Greek Cyprus. Even though Talat maintained that Varosha could be part of an overall solution to the conflict, he feared that by returning it then, the interest of the Greek side to a total solution would be diminished even further, since it would at that stage only have been a one-sided gesture. Furthermore, Greek Cyprus’ offer to allow Turkish Cypriot wares to be traded with the EU by way of Southern Cyprus was rejected by Talat on the grounds that Turkish Cypriot trucks would then incur higher transportations costs and taxes levied in the South (Hillenbrand, 2006).

Visibly disappointed, Tuomioja announced the end of his separate discussions with Gül and Lillikas, concluding that the conditions were not met for an agreement during the Finnish presidency. “At this stage circumstances do not permit that an agreement could be reached during the Finnish presidency,” Tuomioja had said speaking in Helsinki (Dirks, 2006; “EU drops bid,” 2006; Hillenbrand, 2006; Hostettler, 2006b). Though he did not see this as “a rupture between Turkey and the EU”, he said that consequences would be inevitable, without further speculating on the particulars thereof (“UE: un gel,” 2006 – trans. mine; Hostettler, 2006b).

Only one day later, however, on the 28\textsuperscript{th} of November, there was a surprising turnaround in the prospects when Vanhanen suddenly announced a new round of negotiations, which he would start himself by flying to Ankara later that week (“Vanhanen spricht,” 2006). Simultaneously, news about a coincidence that could also influence the current state of affairs came out of an entirely unexpected corner: Pope Benedict XVI was going to pay a visit to Turkey.

9.2.9 A Papal Visit

It was also on November 28 that Pope Benedict traveled to Istanbul and met with Erdoğan on a mission of reconciliation with the Turks. The pope, in his previous incarnation as Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, publicly held the position that Turkey joining the European Union was a mistake because of its cultural and religious differences (de Ravinel, 2004) He had, during a lecture at the University of Regensburg in Germany on September 12, further incited antagonism from Muslims by including certain quotations from a Byzantine Emperor who had disparaged Islam’s erstwhile conversion methods (Marchand, 2006b).
In Turkey, there had been domestic agitation against the Pope’s coming, including conspiracy theories on collusion between the pope and Angela Merkel creating a scandal that would keep Turkey out of the EU for good. Some, predictably, compared Pope Benedict XVI to Hitler and Mussolini. These opinions, however, did not extend to public officials (Seibert, 2006). Prior to his arrival, there were heated concerns about how the pope might genuflect when visiting the Hagia Sophia, or what it would mean if he visited the Blue Mosque (Traynor, 2006a). Out of precaution, Benedict XVI exchanged his standard Pope Mobile for an armor-plated car, given the expected hostilities. The Vatican would confirm nor deny the bulletproof vest under Benedict’s robes.

When the Pope had indicated that he would indeed visit the Blue Mosque in a conciliatory gesture toward Islam, Erdoğan agreed to “find time” to meet with him at Ankara’s airport before the prime minister departed for the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia (Owen, 2006a). When they met, Erdoğan questioned the pontiff on Turkey’s EU membership prospects, about which Erdoğan declared afterwards that the Pope had said, “we're not political, but we wish for Turkey to join the EU.” Vatican officials suggested the Pope had told the Prime Minister that that the Vatican did not have the power or competence to intervene but “viewed positively and encouraged” the process of Turkish entry into the EU “on the basis of common values and principles” (Gerçek, 2006; Owen, 2006b; Samir, 2006; Traynor, 2006b).

9.2.10 The Commission’s recommendation

On November 29, the day after Erdoğan’s tête-à-pape and a week before it had been expected, the Commission published its recommendations for moving forward with the negotiations (Ludlow, 2006b, p. 4) It also included a block on opening the following eight chapters that dealt specifically with the Customs Union:

- Chapter 1) free movement of goods,
- Chapter 3) right of establishment and freedom to provide services,
- Chapter 9) financial services,
- Chapter 11) agriculture and rural development,
- Chapter 13) fisheries,
- Chapter 14) transport policy,
- Chapter 29) customs union, and
- Chapter 30) external relations.
The Commission recommended further that no more negotiating chapters should be provisionally closed until Turkey was judged to have lived up to its commitments of the additional protocol (Commission, 2006c). Commenting on the recommendation, Olli Rehn said there would be no train crash, but a slowing down of the still moving train because it was not acceptable that Turkey had not fulfilled its obligations (Berger, 2006). The presidency embraced the proposal, considering it “a good basis for discussion,” as Vanhanen said in a statement. According to another source, cited in the AFP, Vanhanen made it clear that it had always been Finland’s main objective to keep the negotiations going and avoid a complete or large suspension of chapters (“Turquie: la présidence,” 2006 – trans. mine).

From the sidelines of the NATO summit in Riga, the European leaders also commented on the Commission’s proposal to freeze the eight chapters. Blair, who had spoken with Erdoğan, felt it was a mistake to put such a heavy penalty on Turkey, for which he feared it would turn its back on Europe. He and the leaders of Spain, Italy and Sweden wanted no more than three chapters closed (Boland & Parker, 2006). Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero of Spain urged leaders to keep the prospect of full membership open to Ankara, rather than changing it into a privileged partnership (Kanter, 2006a).

Angela Merkel, on the other hand, felt that the Commission had sent Turkey a strong signal in which she was joined by Jacques Chirac (“Coup de froid,” 2006; “Blair met,” 2006; “Merkel approuve,” 2006). This was not a surprise since both had previously advocated for freezing more than ten chapters (Boland & Parker, 2006). One source even said that France had wanted as many as seventeen of them blocked (Berger, 2006).

Greece embraced the recommendation, while Cyprus, though absent at Riga because it was not a NATO member, declared the Commission’s proposal too weak and threatened to use its veto power to hold up the negotiations altogether. “We believe that they [the EU] are not putting any pressure on Turkey to fulfill its obligations,” Papadopoulos said (“Athènes incite,” 2006; “Zypern droht,” 2006 – trans. mine).

Turkey denounced it as unacceptable. Erdoğan, making use of the occasion at the NATO summit, confronted the leaders of the member states with his indignation, but failed to find much support there. During separate conversations with Chirac and Prodi he was told that the Commission had had little choice but to make such a recommendation. According to diplomats, Prodi had been apologetic about it, whereas the exchange between Chirac and Erdoğan had been restrained (Boland & Parker, 2006; Bouilhet, 2006a). By the time that Erdoğan had returned to
Ankara, his indignation had changed into resignation when he said that though the freeze would cause a little slowing of the process, it was not stopped, while Turkey had stuck to its guns about its rejection of any concession over Cyprus (“Erdogan minimise,” 2006; Leante, 2006).

9.2.11 Down-to-the-Wire Diplomacy

After Tampere and Riga, the Turks and the Presidency resumed talks. In a statement before flying to Ankara, Vanhanen said:

In recent months, the Finnish Presidency pursued intensive discussions with a desire to find a solution that would have allowed us to continue the accession process of Turkey without interruption. On Monday, the Presidency came to the conclusion that no agreement could be reached under the present circumstances. Turkey is obliged to implement the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on the Customs Union. As stated by the Declaration of the European Union in September 2005, the opening of accession negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on Turkey's fulfillment of its contractual obligations.

At present, Turkey has not fulfilled its obligations vis-à-vis the Additional Protocol. The General Affairs Council on 11 December will decide how this affects the process of Turkey's accession to the EU. The Commission submitted a recommendation to this end. The Presidency considers that this recommendation is a sound basis for discussion in the Council. The decision to adopt December 11 should reflect the feeling of waiting for EU candidate countries fulfill their obligations. This should ensure the continuation of the accession process and allow them to be normalized when the conditions were satisfied.

I go to Ankara on Friday 1 December to discuss the situation with Prime Minister Erdogan.

(Vanhanen, 2006 – trans. mine)

It had been Vanhanen’s mission to see if Turkey could not be persuaded, in a last attempt that was not without some external political pressure, to offer unilateral concessions to Cypriot flights and shipping. He had more or less counted on previous experience when pressure on Turkey had come down to the wire at the European Council summit in 2004 and Erdogan had signed the Protocol in the end.

To some degree, however, the threats and deadlines were merely rhetorical. The ‘freezing' of chapters was nothing more than a decision not to open them. As of December 2006, only the chapter on Science and Research, which had not required any aligning, had already been opened and provisionally closed. None of other chapters had yet been opened. Opening a chapter was
something the Cypriots could, in any case, unilaterally prevent. In that regard, nothing was being ‘decided’ by the Foreign Minister’s Council, so much as recognized (Graw, 2006a).

The recommendations were therefore no more than a political theater that was, in many regards, beneficial to Erdoğan politically at home. With Turkish public opinion toward EU membership souring, standing tall for the Turkish Cypriots demonstrated proud resolve on the prime minister’s part. Conversely, with the public opinion in many of the member states deeply skeptical, this also showed critical resolve on their part toward Turkey. As such, Vanhanen did not get satisfaction with still ten days before the Foreign Minister’s meeting. Speaking to a joint press conference after their meeting, Vanhanen stressed that the proposed freeze would only be a temporary setback (‘Le PM finlandais,” 2006).

Germany, meanwhile, still advocating for a tougher approach, suggested an eighteen-month deadline for Turkey to comply with the additional protocol afterall. What exactly would be the consequence if Turkey failed to do so by then was left to circumspection, but it was implied to be a full suspension of all the negotiations. According to the German-edition of the Financial Times, this approach was embraced by France, Cyprus, Greece and Portugal (Proissl & Hollinger, 2006).

The Commission disagreed with the eighteen-month deadline, about which Rehn remarked, “we do not need new political psychodrama.” So too Britain, Sweden and Finland opposed Merkel’s suggestion.41 A Finnish diplomat was quoted as saying, “We don’t think there should be an additional clause. The Turks already feel strongly punished by the Commission’s proposal as it is” (Buck, et. al, 2006; Proissl & Hollinger, 2006). George Lillikas expressed his support for the measure, saying that, “without clear dates, Turkey would have “no incentive to fulfill its obligations” (“Chypre salue l'idée,” 2006 – trans. mine).

9.2.12 Franco-German-Polish summit

On December 5, Angela Merkel and Jacques Chirac invited the Polish President, Lech Kaczynski, to join them for a pre-summit meeting in Saarland (Germany), after the two had met there informally to discuss Merkel’s proposal of an eighteen-month deadline for Turkey (Buck, et. al, 2006; “Top voor Pools,” 2006). The triangular summit, called the ‘Weimar Triangle’, after the first meeting of the three countries in Weimar (Germany) in 1991, was primarily held about an acrimonious gas vs.

41 Proissl & Hollinger, 2006, mention ‘the Scandinavian countries’, but this, presumably, did not include Denmark.
meat dispute between Poland and Russia, and a Russo-German plan to build a gas pipeline circumventing Poland, but also touched the impasse between Turkey and Cyprus. Before this summit, French diplomats had suggested that France supported Merkel’s ‘rendezvous date’ proposal for Turkey, which made it rather remarkable that it had apparently been dropped quietly after the summit (Graw, 2006b; Kohl, 2006; “Première triangulaire,” 2006). Some reports suggested that another opportunity to hold Turkey to account would present itself again after the Commission’s 2007 report (Bennhold, 2006a; Bocev, 2006; “Paris et Berlin,” 2006).

During the post-summit news conference Merkel said that they did not want to set any kind of ultimatum and insisted that Germany had not sharpened its position. Yet, as expectations had not been met, there ought to be consequences (Bennhold, 2006a). Chirac reiterated his support for the German position, though, according to Ludlow (2006, p. 15), it had been he who had talked Merkel out of a harder line during the summit. In other words, Chirac had declared, a priori, that he agreed with the Chancellor, but then made sure, after the fact, that what he was agreeing to was something that he would agree to.

During the same conference Kaczynski declared that his country’s support for Turkey’s EU membership had not changed (Scally, 2006). Turkey’s accession was “close to the heart of Poland,” and while “the standards should certainly be observed, this also counted for the European Union,” by which he reminded the EU of its own promises to Turkey about Northern Cyprus (“Paris et Berlin,” 2006 – trans. mine). Chirac characterized Poland’s position as being in agreement with the Franco-German position. According to an anonymous French functionary, cited in the Dutch daily Financieele Dagblad, France and Germany had wanted to set a hard date for Turkey, but under pressure from other member states, they had decided to not set timelines and opt for a more permissive approach (“Merkel ziet,” 2006).

9.2.13 A Turkish Offer

On December 7, less than a week before the foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels – and mere hours before the matter was discussed in Coreper, an unofficial Turkish offer emerged (Kranenburg, 2006c). Though the details varied in the news reports, the core of it seemed to have been that Turkey would provisionally open one major port to Cypriot ships in return for the prevention of freezing the previously-mentioned eight negotiations chapters (“Ankara fait,” 2006; “Ankara
Erkki Tuomioja, to whom Abdullah Gül had made the offer, called it at least a starting point for a deal, though he too did not elaborate on the details, neither to the press nor to the member-state ambassadors in Brussels (Dijkstra, 2006c; “La Finlande,” 2006; Kanter, 2006b; Smyth, 2006d). However, according to the Turkish media the Gül offered to open one major Turkish seaport and one of its airports, without specifying which, to Cypriot ships and planes. This would be in return for keeping the negotiations going along with the opening of Famagusta’s harbor and Ercan airport in Northern Cyprus to international traffic for a trial period of twelve months, during which it was hoped that a solution to the continuing division on the island could be found (“Ankara fait,” 2006; Smyth, 2006c).

The Presidency welcomed the offer as a positive gesture, but said the details were still unclear and would have to be put in writing before they could be taken into consideration (“EU-landen verdeeld,” 2006; “La Finande,” 2006; Ingenrieth & Seibert, 2006). A day later, when no clarification seemed to be forthcoming, Tuomioja toughened his earlier remarks by saying that only an “unconditional opening” would lead to a reconsideration of the slow-down in the accession negotiations, while Vanhanen stressed that not enough had been said by Ankara to base any decision on (“Türkei bietet,” 2006; “Vorstoß der Türkei,” 2006).

The Turkish foreign ministry meanwhile declined to publicly confirm or deny that it had even made the offer (“La Turquie n’en,” 2006; “Türkei knüpft,” 2006). Within Turkey itself, the proposal was openly opposed by Yaşar Büyükanit, the chief of the Turkish general staff, who stated in the Turkish daily newspaper Hürriyet that the military had not been consulted about the proposal and, as such, did not constitute an official offer from the Turkish state, while opposition and even outrage also came from other circles in Turkish society (“Le chef de l’armée,” 2006).

Addressing the call for clarity in black and white, an anonymous senior Turkish official explained to the Agence France-Presse that proposals in writing might be exploited by members of the EU who were a priori opposed to the accession of Turkey, because it would enable them to prevent the talks “by extracting some terms and playing them up.” “The goal of oral communication is to reach an agreement without losing time to the vocabulary,” the official added (“Ankara ne mettra,” 2006 – trans. mine). This argument was, however, lost on the Finns who needed clarity and the offer in writing so it could be sent to the member states. When they failed to obtain this
December 8, the presidency declared that the offer was not substantial enough to stave off the matter being dealt with by the foreign ministers (“UE La présidence,” 2006).

Nicosia, at any rate, firmly rejected any such deal (“Chypre rejette,” 2006; “Nicosie s’oppose,” 2006). Greece declared the offer to simply be a repackaged old formula that had already been rejected (“Ankara sur Chypre,” 2006). France, the Netherlands, and the German Chancellor joined Greece and Cyprus in calling for at least a freeze of the eight negotiations chapters without further delay (“EU-landen verdeeld,” 2006; “Turks compromis,” 2006; “Turks gebaar,” 2006).

9.2.14 Foreign Ministers Meeting

On December 11, when the foreign ministers met in Brussels to decide on how to proceed about Turkey, the International Herald Tribune published an op-ed written by Adbullah Gül. In his appeal, he mentioned that, “the European Union is about to make a decision that has the ominous potential to redefine the course of Turkey-EU relations.” However, nowhere in his article did he explicitly mention Cyprus and the question over which the ministers would be wrangling, focussing instead on the referenda that had been previously promised by certain countries to their citizens about Turkey’s accession to the EU. He reminded his readers of the weight of the matter by saying that, “a formidable project that transcends the borders of the Continent in its full political, economic, cultural, and strategic implications. It is, if you like, a high calling responding to the most persistent challenges of our times.” Implicitly hinting at the Cypriot impasse he advised that, “EU decision makers should consider all of the issues on the merits. Pressuring Turkey to fulfill unilateral conditions while ignoring other obligations carries the risk of derailing the process, and … [losing] sight of the big picture” (Gül, 2006).

Despite Gül’s appeal, the foreign ministers decided that if Turkey was not going to fully relent over Cypriot shipping, they would adopt the Commission’s recommendation and advise the European Council to do so as well. Within chambers, however, the ministers still haggled over the amount of chapters to freeze, with the drivers (named as: United Kingdom, Sweden and Spain) arguing for fewer and the brakemen (named as: Cyprus, Greece, France, Netherlands and Austria) for more (Dijkstra, 2006d; Hekking & van Oostrum, 2006a). According to Ben Bot (Netherlands), who later spoke with the press, the scene inside the Council had been akin to a bazaar with the
ministers bargaining over the precise amount of chapters as if they were low priced merchandise (Dijkstra, 2006d).

Afterwards the Council’s press release stated its conclusions as follows:

As concerns Turkey, the Council decided in particular to suspend negotiations on eight chapters relevant to Turkey's restrictions with regard to the Republic of Cyprus, and will not close the other chapters until Turkey fulfils its commitments under the additional protocol to the EU-Turkey association agreement, which extended the EU-Turkey customs union to the ten member states, including Cyprus, that joined the EU in May 2004.

(European Council, 2006, p. 2)

This was a bitter pill for Turkey. Yet, while it had not been explicitly stated in the Commission’s press release, the Council made it explicit that other chapters than the designated eight relating to the EU-Turkey Customs Union were to be opened as normal in the following statement:

The Council emphasised that chapters for which technical preparations have been completed will be opened in accordance with established procedures.

(ibid)

This was, implicitly, a message to Cyprus to not exercise its right in the context of the Intergovernmental Conference, to unilaterally veto the opening of any chapter that was not connected to the Customs Union. This, however, went unnoticed in the press. What did strike journalistic observers, however, was the lack of any timeline by which Turkey would be called to comply with the additional protocol (Bennhold, 2006b). Given that Chirac and Merkel had already stepped away from this at their Saarland summit, this was not a particular surprise.

One element that had found its way onto an otherwise empty single page headed ‘Other Business’ touched the future of the divided island. Indicating that the Northern Cypriots had not been forgotten, the Council stated that:

The Council agreed that the presidency should publish a statement on efforts towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue under UN auspices.

(ibid, p. 14)

This was a consolation for Turkey, and suggested that the EU would attempt to rectify the economic isolation of Northern Cyprus. Placing this text separate from the sections about Turkey, or, indeed, enlargement in general, was supposed to indicate that there was no linkage between Turkey’s legal obligation to open itself to Cypriot trade and travelers and the EU’s moral responsibility to cease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots (Dijkstra, 2006d). The problem remains, however, that pretending that it is an issue unrelated to the question of Turkish membership,
suggests that this is an impasse between EU members, which cannot be resolved because one member state insists on isolating a large segment of the population over which it claims sovereignty, rather than an impasse between an EU member and a candidate country, where the EU member is holding up the candidate’s progress, because of that situation.

Once it was done, there seemed to be a sense of relief among the foreign ministers about the compromise they had reached between breaking off negotiations and letting Turkey get away with not meeting the set requirements. After the meeting, French Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy said: “We believe today that the Commission’s position is a balance that does not lead to a rupture with Turkey, but sends a clear signal to Turkey’s obligation to fulfill its commitments concerning the customs union” (“L’UE ‘punit’,” 2006 – trans. mine). Britain’s Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett said, “I’m sorry to disappoint you. There will be no train crash… The train is in fact still firmly on the track,” suggesting that some members were hoping to use the Cypriot-Turkish dispute as an excuse to derail the Turkish accession process (Bennhold, 2006b).

Erdoğan, however, denounced the foreign ministers’ position as an “injustice” when he spoke to the AKP parliamentary group of the Turkish Grand National Assembly: “Despite all our good will, the decision of the Council is an unfortunate injustice to Turkey,” he said, adding, “Relations between Turkey and the EU are subject to a severe test.” He also stressed that his government would go ahead with the same determination in the process of reforms needed to meet European standards (“UE-Ralentissement,” 2006).

From London, Tony Blair also denounced the Council’s decision, saying it would be a great strategic error for Europe to turn its back on Turkey and that he supported Turkey's admission wholeheartedly (“Tourner,” 2006). Even so, he noted that the news was not as bad as it might have been since “some of those that want to see a halt to this process have not been successful in doing that.” “I hope we regain the momentum,” he concluded (“Prime minister’s,” 2006). More dramatically, from Nicosia, Tassos Papadopoulos declared: “Turkey should realize that it cannot push its way into the EU as it did with Cyprus in 1974” (Borowiec, 2006b).

9.2.15 The European Council

“It will not become a Turkey summit,” Tuomioja had happily declared about the upcoming meeting of the EU leaders in Brussels on December 14-15, after the foreign ministers had dealt with the
issue of Turkey at the GAERC meeting (van Rooij, 2006). Since the immediate controversy over Turkey had essentially already been settled by the foreign ministers, it would take a powerful head of state or government who disagreed with his/her foreign minister to take up the matter once more. Angela Merkel did not do so, relenting instead to the GAERC’s consensus (“EU-Gipfel,” 2006).

The European Council, however, still had some matters to discuss on enlargement in general that also concerned Turkey. Up until then the Finns had kept their hand largely to themselves, having disseminated the draft conclusions no earlier than the beginning of December for the Antici, the permanent representatives and the foreign ministers to mull over. By December 8, one of the Antici declared that the permanent representatives had arrived at a “new consensus on enlargement” (Ludlow, 2006b, p. 4-5). Much of what the Finns had put forward left the process intact, except that the phrase “integration capacity is not a new criterion,” which had been in the Presidency draft of December 7 did not reappear in the December 9 draft (ibid, p. 11-12).

Unlike previous European Council meetings on enlargement, there was not much dissention over the presidency’s draft text, which had steered very close to the Commission’s strategy paper. Both Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and his Belgian colleague, Guy Verhofstadt, attempted to make institutional reforms to the EU a precondition for enlargement – meaning that the EU would have to reform before it could further enlarge – but their calls were twice rejected by their colleagues (Ludlow, 2006b, p. 6, 11). Regarding Turkey and enlargement in general, the European Council had little to alter.

9.3 ISSUES

Much of what has been written above has spelled out the rancorous diplomacy about and toward Turkey, especially regarding the Cypriot shipping issue. The relatively undramatic debate about enlargement in general, however, belied the shifts that took place and the importance those shifts will have for Turkey going forward. The following paragraphs detail what happened in the enlargement debate and what that might mean in the future. The pursuant paragraphs will also deal with the issue of Turkish Penal Code Article 301, making it illegal to insult Turkishness, and the threat it posed on Turkey’s continued reform toward fully complying with the political Copenhagen criteria.
9.3.1 The General Enlargement Debate

After the massive accession of ten countries in 2004 and another two countries, Bulgaria and Romania to join in 2007, it was seen by many that the European Union had done a great deal of enlargement and that it would need some time to adjust itself before it should think of further enlargement. Furthermore, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty left the EU with the Treaty of Nice as the governing compact on issues such as the relative weights of power given to the different member states in the EU’s institutions. Nice had only provided the EU with an agreement on how power should be divided among the 25+2. Before the EU could enlarge again, they would have to devise a new treaty to govern the institutional amendments necessary to integrate new members.

The June European Council had decided that a debate on enlargement in general would be on the agenda for the December meeting of the heads of state and government. Specifically, the concern was to stipulate:

> …the Union's capacity to absorb new members and further ways of improving the quality of the enlargement process on the basis of the positive experiences accumulated so far. It recalls in this connection that the pace of enlargement must take the Union's absorption capacity into account. The Commission is invited to provide a special report on all relevant aspects pertaining to the Union's absorption capacity, at the same time as it presents its annual progress reports on enlargement and the pre-accession process. 

(European Council, 2006a, par. 53)

‘Absorption capacity’ and ‘enlargement fatigue’ had become the new code words for reasons why certain member states might not be allowed to join. Given Turkey’s size and relatively low GDP/capita, it was evident that the prospective impact it would have on the EU’s finances, policies and institutional politics was profound.

Regarding the European Council’s desire to have a debate on EU enlargement in general, and its ‘absorption capacity’ in particular, the Commission’s November Strategy Paper replied to the June Council’s request for a definition of the term and the promise to rate future members according to their prospected impact on the Union’s functioning. It also offered a brief, and positive, history of enlargement and related institutional reform. Its definition of the factors involved was:

> The EU’s absorption capacity, or rather integration capacity, is determined by the development of the EU's policies and institutions, and by the transformation of applicants into well-prepared Member States.

(Commission 2006b, p. 17)
The second element of this statement – “transformation of applicants into well-prepared Member States” – was governed by the candidate countries’ own abilities to transform themselves in compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, especially with regard to their administrative reforms, which were led by the process of accession negotiations. As such, it only really fell into the category of being a factor in the ‘absorption capacity’ to the degree that the evaluation and negotiations process accurately and constructively facilitated the candidate countries to reform themselves.

The first element – the development of the EU’s policies and institutions – however, was entirely different in the practical sense. To some degree there was a technical aspect in determining the impact of newly acceding countries on the EU’s policies and institutions. Ultimately, however, it would be a matter of political choice whether or not the Union and its member states would be willing to admit new members. The Commission’s role would be limited to offering the Council and the European Parliament accession impact assessments of new candidate countries, which was stated by the Commission as follows:

The capacity of would-be members to accede to the Union is rigorously assessed by the Commission on the basis of strict conditionality. Integration capacity is about whether the EU can take in new members at a given moment or in a given period, without jeopardizing the political and policy objectives established by the Treaties. Hence, it is first and foremost a functional concept. The Commission will in the future prepare impact assessments at all key stages of the accession process. Where such assessments are made, the specific characteristics of each country will be taken into account. (ibid)

Essentially this threw the debate back to the European Council, which had to decide how that impact should be measured along the lines of acceptability and, linked to this question, to what degree the Union’s institutions and purposes should be allowed to increase its capacity by absorbing new members. From a certain point of view, this was the Commission refusing to be complicit in the desire of some brakemen to instrumentally erect institutional barriers to enlargement.

Part of this debate, however, was also what had been frequently termed ‘defining Europe’s boundaries’. According to an earlier draft that had been seen by the press, the Commission had added that: the “EU is defined by its values rather than by fixed geographical limits,” to which the Commissioner for Transport Jacques Barrot (France) objected (Bounds & Dombey, 2006; Smyth, 2006b). This addition appears to have been omitted in the Commission’s final paper, in exchange for the following definition:

The term ‘European’ combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to European identity. The shared experience of ideas, values, and historical
interaction cannot be condensed into a simple timeless formula and is subject to review by each succeeding generation.

(Commission 2006b, p. 18)

Thus, geography, history, and culture were re-included into the idea of Europe, ideas that – brakemen would argue – could easily be invoked to exclude Turkey, insofar as they should wish to reawaken an official debate of Turkey’s identity as a European country. At the same time, this formula was a direct admonition to those who would have preferred permanently fixed European boundaries in order to exclude certain candidates or future applicants. Brakemen, however, could find some solace in the pursuant paragraph:

The legal basis of the enlargement is Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, which states that “Any European State which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to become a member of the Union”. However, this treaty provision does not mean that all European countries must apply, or that the EU must accept all applications. The European Union is defined first and foremost by its values.

(ibid)

In this statement the Commission left implicit what those values ought to be, if they were not simply the values of democracy, rule of law, and the human and minority rights enshrined in the Copenhagen criteria. Yet, it did make explicit further on in the paper that the EU would honour existing commitments made towards countries already in the process, though it would be cautious about assuming any new commitments in the future, which made clear that for any use of ‘absorption capacity’ as a foil to reject Turkey, brakemen would not have a friend in the Commission (ibid, p. 3).

In line with the Commission’s proposals, the European Council determined that there would be no pre-set dates for accession anymore, whereby new members could join when their individual accession process had been fully completed. Much of this was in retrospect of the decisions about Bulgaria and Romania, whom, many felt, were going to become members before they had fully been reformed (“Zusammenfassung,” 2006). However, the proposal was not about Bulgaria and Romania, as the decision about their accession could not be reversed, but about new and current applicants – with Turkey as the elephant in the room. With respect to accession dates, this meant that Croatia could advance toward membership without having to wait for Turkey to catch up, and that Turkey would no longer be helped forward by being in the same class as Croatia (or any other future candidate).

This decision of the European Council was seen as a victory for the brakemen of EU enlargement in general, especially those opposing the rapid expansion thereof. Among them were
Germany (Merkel), France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, who were also seen as brakemen of enlargement to Turkey in particular, whereas those identified as drivers of enlargement in general—the United Kingdom and Sweden in the forefront—had emerged as Turkey’s champions as well (Drewes, 2006; Hostettler, 2006c; “Zusammenfassung,” 2006). To that extent, the general debate on enlargement bled over onto the debate on Turkey in particular, and vice versa.

The debate about the ‘fourth criterion’ of Copenhagen— the capacity of the Union to absorb new Member States while maintaining the momentum of the European integration process—remained unresolved. Matti Vanhanen declared at the conclusion that there would be “no new criteria,” and that “the door was open,” to new and current candidates. This was contradicted by Angela Merkel when she said that “absorption capacity” would be the central criterion going forward. “We know that we cannot accept every country wanting to join,” she declared (“Zusammenfassung,” 2006 – trans. mine). In other words, the fourth criterion, could be interpreted as a means of excluding countries by brakemen and by the drivers as a spur for reforming the Union allowing it to encompass new members.

The fourth criterion was not new as it had already been explicitly included in the 1993 Copenhagen conclusions. To that extent, Vanhanen had been correct. However, in the previous enlargement rounds, countries had not been refused entry based on the grounds of ‘absorption capacity’ and the Union had evolved in order to accommodate new member states. By saying that not every country wanting to join could be accepted, Merkel argued that this did not only pertain to future candidates, while she also implied that the Union should prefer to keep applicants out rather than reform the EU’s institutions to accommodate them. Since she probably did not mean that countries like Moldova and Macedonia would be too much for the EU to swallow, it seems likely that she was referring to Turkey or Ukraine in her statement.

9.3.2 Insults to Turkishness

Much was said in 2006 about Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which made it an imprisonable offense to insult ‘Turkishness’, the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the government, the judicial institutions, the military, or other security institutions of the Turkish state. The sentences for such slanders were made even more severe for those who committed them
outside of Turkey. Ironically, the article, which had taken effect in June 2005, had been part of the Penal Code reforms that had helped Turkey win the start of accession negotiations in 2004.

Those who were brought up on charges included several high-profile Turks, such as authors Orhan Pamuk (who later received a Nobel Prize), Elif Shafak and Perihan Mağden and the Turkish-Armenian editor Hrant Dink (who was murdered in 2007 by Turkish nationalists) and resulted in much protests abroad. Joost Lagendijk, the Dutch MEP who chaired the EU-Turkey Parliamentary delegation, appeared as a witness for the defense of Shafak and was, himself, briefly charged for violating the article (Birch, 2006). Shafak’s case was thrown out of court in late-September (Freely, 2006). The cases against Pamuk, Dink and Mağden were dropped in January, February and July respectively, though Dink had charges brought up against him again in May, for which he was convicted and sentenced to six-months imprisonment (“Turkish court,” 2006).

In spite of international pressure, the prosecutions continued during the run-up to the European Council meeting. The Commission (2006a, p. 9) noted that the application of the law in Turkey’s judicial process had been inconsistent with European human rights standards, and that, “although this article includes a provision that expression of thought intended to criticise should not constitute a crime, it has repeatedly been used to prosecute non violent opinions expressed by journalists, writers, publishers, academics and human rights activists” (ibid., p. 14). As such, the Commission judged that the Penal Code needed to be “brought into line with the relevant European standards” (ibid., p. 15).

The AKP government was clearly willing to amend the law, especially since Erdoğan, himself, had been imprisoned in 1998-1999 under a similar law. Meeting with representatives of Turkey’s trade unions and other NGO’s in early November, he said in response to questions asked about the article, “We are ready for proposals to make Article 301 more concrete if there are problems stemming from it being vague...We are studying several options to avoid any violation of freedoms that was not intended by the makers of the law” (“Erdogan dit envisager,” 2006; “Government mulls,” 2006). In all, it was a fairly tepid response, but would give Erdoğan political room to maneuver.
9.4 THE MEMBER-STATE POSITIONS

The 2006 episode was different from the four preceding episodes in that critical debate was not taking place among the member states, except during the discussions about the number of chapters to freeze, but among Turkey, Cyprus and the Finnish Presidency about the impasse over Cypriot shipping. The other member states, therefore, had a reason or excuse to remain relatively uninvolved, allowing the negotiations to run their course without their interverence. While it might have been feasible for a strong brakeman to play the role of a spoiler and derail the negotiations with external rhetoric, none who could command a European-level stage stepped forward to take on that role.

9.4.1 Austria

Austria was again one of the most vocal brakemen in 2006. Endowed with the rotating Presidency in the first half of 2006, it was expected that it might want to use its position in favor of Croatia and against Turkey with regard to enlargement. Yet with both countries still in the screening phase, there was little for Austria to do but allow the Commission to do its work. Ludlow’s December 2005 expectations for the Austrian presidency predicted restrictions on Austria’s influence on Turkey’s process, not only due to the screening phase, but also because the only matter on the negotiations table would, by the end of their term, be the potential passing of a few completely uncontroversial and unproblematic chapters of Turkey’s accession negotiations (Ludlow, 2005, p. 8-9).

In June, however, Austria was, then, the author of the tough text at the European Council meeting (Ludlow, 2006a, p. 60-61). As has been mentioned above, this text used nearly identical language in two separate paragraphs for the two negotiating candidates, with the distinctions in the text being much tougher language for Turkey than for Croatia. In Austria’s defense, however, Turkey was also a tougher case than Croatia, given impasse over Cyprus. Also, in the context of the raising of the of ‘absorption capacity’ concept, France found a willing ally in Austria, even if it was bound by its duty in the Presidency to be more even-handed (Avril & Bouilhet, 2006; Smyth, 2006b).

In the months following Austria’s presidency, its political scene heated up with campaigns for legislative elections to be held on October 1. The issue of Turkey was a significant bone of
contention between the ruling Christian Democratic ÖVP of Wolfgang Schüssel and the right-wing FPÖ, which had split from its members in the cabinet over the issue. Even former members of the FPÖ, who had remained with the government after joining the conservative liberal BZÖ, accused Schüssel and his ÖVP foreign ministers (Ferrero-Waldner succeeded by Plassnik) of allowing the start of negotiations with Turkey (Kern, 2006).

To make matters worse for Turkey, it did not find much solace from Austria’s left either. Given the general hostility of Austrian public opinion toward Turkish EU membership, the SPÖ did not make Turkey a campaign issue. Instead the Social Democrats advocated for slower enlargement in order to consolidate the recent additions and prevent the EU from being little more than a free trade zone. The Grünen, meanwhile, supported a decision on Turkey that would allow accession after the ten-to-fifteen years it would take for the prospect to realistically materialize. Finally, the former SPÖ MEP Hans-Peter Martin made no secret about opposing Turkish membership (“Zu viele,” 2006). On October 1st, Alfred Gusenbauer’s SPÖ won the election by a slim margin, with Schüssel’s ÖVP as the only realistic option for a coalition. The resulting SPÖ-ÖVP coalition government was not sworn in until January 8th of 2007, leaving Schüssel’s ÖVP- BZÖ government in a caretaker capacity.

In November, the Commission’s progress report arrived in the College of Commissioners. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Austria’s Commissioner (External Relations), and former minister of foreign affairs, argued for a firm line on Turkey and to clearly distinguish it from Croatia, which was the parallel interest of her country’s government (Bounds & Dombey, 2006; Smyth, 2006b).

When the progress report, in turn, arrived before the foreign ministers, Austria’s serving foreign minister, Ursula Plassnik, called for a “breathing pause” in the negotiations if a breakthrough in the shipping impasse did not succeed by the end of December (EU-Außenminister uneins,” 2006b; Fischer, M., 2006; Hostettler, 2006a; “Plassnik pour,” 2006; “Türkei droht,” 2006; “Zypern-Frage,” 2006). In this, she did not see any good in freezing certain chapters, but rather in putting the whole process in “the freezer”, which made the Austrians join the Cypriots in pushing for a wholesale suspension of the negotiations process if Turkey would not relent on the issue (Ludlow, 2006b, p. 15). However, when the Commission’s formula of eight frozen chapters had later been adopted, the Austrians, including Plassnik, embraced it, calling it a wise and sensible decision. “This is a massive slowing down and breathing space in the negotiations,” she said, pleased with the results. “We have averted a crisis at the summit and found a consensus on how to assess the situation.” It was not about an ultimatum, she added, but, “it must be clear, there can be no
reduction in the implementation of the obligations” (“Acht Verhandlungs-Kapitel,” 2006; Bennhold, 2006b; Ingenrieth & Seibert, 2006).


### 9.4.2 Belgium

During the 2006 episode, Belgium was scarcely in the news concerning Turkey. However, a few instances demonstrated its policy as remaining that of a driver.

After the European Council in June, a diplomat in Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt’s entourage declared in the French newspaper Le Figaro, “we have always supported, without ambiguity, the candidacy of Turkey” (Avril & Bouilhet, 2006 – trans. mine). While the French pushed for explicit recognition of the ‘absorption capacity’ as a condition for enlargement during the same occasion, a ‘Belgian leader’, who remained anonymous told the same newspaper that “absorption capacity is an old criterion pulled out of the closet, which means nothing,” and that “France has always had problems creating coalitions with smaller countries. On enlargement Belgium is disagrees with France” (*ibid.*, – trans. mine).

At the end of October, Belgian Foreign Minister Karel de Gucht traveled to Ankara to assure the Turks of his country’s support for the continuation of the accession negotiations (Lannoo, 2006). Following the publication of the Commission’s report and the subsequent foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels, Karel de Gucht said that to stop the negotiations would be a disaster with great consequences for the role the EU played worldwide (“Europa zwaar,” 2006).

The clearest statement about Belgium’s position, however, was made in an op-ed written by de Gucht and published in the Dutch daily Trouw, in which he wrote how the debates in the EU about its values, cultures, boundaries (of Europe) and absorption capacity, naturally generated mixed feelings about Turkey. Nevertheless, he also stressed, that the Belgian liberal-socialist coalitions of Guy Verhofstad had always favored enlargement and given Turkey the benefit of the doubt about its ability to fit in, due to its geographical location and democratic secular identity, which was unique in the Muslim world (de Gucht, 2006).
He further argued that not while Turkey had to certainly fulfill its promise to open its ports to Cyprus, that the EU should also fulfill the promises it had made, which de Gucht did not enumerate, but likely regarded the Northern Cypriots and a continuation of the process without derailments. This was, however, an after-the-fact statement as it was published two days after the November Foreign Minister’s meeting had already decided on freezing the before mentioned eight chapters.

At the European Council, Verhofstadt, together with Balkenende, made a push to realize institutional integration concurrently with geographic integration (deepening and widening), but after speaking with Tony Blair, the matter was dropped (“EU maakt,” 2006; Ludlow, 2006, p. 6, 11). Another article in which Belgium was identified as a driver was: van Oostrum, 2006b.

9.4.3 Denmark

In 2006, Denmark had a peculiar row with Turkey. With the Danish cartoon controversy of the previous year still fresh in the memory, a new free speech/media dispute erupted concerning Roj TV – a Kurdish-language satellite television station broadcasting from Denmark. Ankara accused the station of being tied to the PKK and inciting its viewers to participate in a three-day violent protest in the southeast of Turkey in April (Schleifer, 2006). In response to the official protest by Turkey against the Danish government and an avalanche of Turkish hate mail received by the same, the Danish Ambassador to Turkey, Christian Hoppe made it clear that the accusations against Roj TV would be dealt with by the Danish court system, but that the Danish government was not allowed to meddle in the workings thereof (Altayli, 2006). The Turkish press however seemed hardly sensitive to this argument and continued its verbal attack on the Danish government.

Bilateral diplomacy was not particularly helped when Turkey’s negotiator and minister of economic affairs, Ali Babacan, on a tour of European capitals, was searched by Danish customs officials upon his arrival at the Copenhagen airport when he had been there to meet with the Danish leadership. Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller later apologized for the incident, calling it “unfortunate”. Babacan downplayed it by saying that it must have stemmed from a technical delay and lack of communication between the units involved. Incidentally, a similar incident happened a week later in Washington, when Gen. Ergin Saygün, the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff
was also searched upon entering the White House, for which the US also apologized later ("Anavatan deputy," 2006; "US Apologizes," 2006).

In early September, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen visited Cyprus for a two-day visit with Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos to discuss several issues, among which the island's problems. After their meeting, Rasmussen called on Turkey to open itself to Cypriot traffic and warned that if it did not comply with a full and unconditional implementation of the additional protocol, there could be serious consequences for the opening of negotiations on a number of chapters ("Le Danemark," 2006). Such an approach and rhetoric, at the forefront of Finland's turn to seek a rapprochement between Nicosia and Ankara, can hardly be considered the action of a driver or passenger of Turkey's cause.

After the publication of the Commission’s report, Anders Fogh Rasmussen told reporters that “it is deeply worrying to note that Turkey is creating obstacles for itself in its negotiations with the EU,” by refusing to respect the customs union protocol, Rasmussen told reporters. “We consider this protocol to be an entirely decisive condition for further progress in the negotiations between the EU and Turkey,” he added ("EU politicians," 2006).

When the Commission’s recommendations emerged at the end of November, Rasmussen indicated that he was open to the idea of a partial suspension, in contrast to Blair and Zapatero, who said that sending any negative messages to Turkey would be a “serious mistake” ("Leaders split," 2006). He further said that the EU had to “send a very clear signal” to Turkey that it must live up to its promises on Cyprus and speed up the slow pace of its reforms. His argument was that it was Turkey that had to adapt to the EU and not the other way around ("EU might suspend," 2006).

Responding to the same question at the NATO summit in Riga, Rasmussen told the Danish Daily Politiken, I have not yet seen the Commission's proposal, but it goes without saying that the fact that there are a number of problems must have consequences for Turkey.” “I agree that we must hold Turkey firmly to a European line. But we also have to send out a very clear signal that there are a number of very clear conditions. It is Turkey that must fall into line with the EU - and not vice versa. And we are not breaking off the process if we do this. We are simply slowing down the process” (Wind-Friis & Lauritzen, 2006).

Between the time of Riga and the deciding foreign ministers’ council, the drivers felt that freezing three chapters sent a sufficiently ‘clear signal’ to Turkey to motivate it to sanction it for its failure to fully adopt the additional protocol. While this, in itself, may be insufficient to categorize Denmark as a brakeman, it is clear that Denmark had not become a driver. Rasmussen embraced the
eight chapters option. It was the opinion of the Danish journalists that Rasmussen’s overall comments put him in the brakeman category, even if the Prime Minister was not as strident as Cyprus, France, Austria and Greece. The daily newspaper General-Anzeiger of Bonn, on the other hand, put Rasmussen on the same line as the Greek and the French, in the way consequences should be demanded if the Turks would not fulfill their obligations (“EU setzt Gespräche,” 2006).

Ironically, the Turkish Press, which had so taken him to task earlier in the year, cited Rasmussen as less of a brakeman for two reasons. The first one because he had said, after the meeting of ALDE-group leaders, that no line should be drawn across Europe and that the EU should be open for European countries that fulfill the necessary criteria (“Sarkozy says,” 2006). This may very well have been said in the context of enlargement in general and not about Turkey in particular. Denmark had certainly been a driver of enlargement quite aside from its approach to Turkey, which had been an exception in other aspects of EU enlargement before. The second reason was because Rasmussen expressed his support for the EU’s possible move to launch direct trade with Turkish Cypriots in the Turkish Daily News (“Turkish press yesterday,” 2006).

Despite the last-minute conciliatory gestures on Denmark’s part, Copenhagen’s overall approach to Turkey – its early punitive rhetoric as well as the timing of the Nicosia visit – in addition to the opinion of the Danish journalists, it is safe to categorize Denmark as a brakeman, even if Denmark kept itself relatively low-key and did not make a public call for more than eight chapters to be closed or a wholesale suspension of the negotiations.

9.4.4 Finland

Assessing Finland’s position is a tricky undertaking, since it assumed the EU Presidency during the last six months of 2006 and had been as such Turkey’s main interlocutor during the ongoing impasse over the Cypriot shipping problem. This meant that the Finns had to not only represent the Union, which included Cyprus, in the EU membership negotiations with the Turks, but also act as mediator between the Turks and the Cypriots, while the Finns were of course also in close cooperation with the European Commission, Olli Rehn in particular.

Due to this role, a different method of assessment has to be used, whereby it is necessary to look at the degree to which the actor attempted to make a deal workable so that the process could move forward. Also, to what degree the opposite party recognized the presidency as an honest
broker. In that regard, the Finns proved to be drivers, because they were recognized for attempting to arrive at a workable deal for both parties, which included Turkey. The Finns spent a great deal of time and energy and attempted to solve in six months what had been, in essence, a thirty-two year problem, which the United Nations had also failed to solve two years previously. Had the Finns been brakemen, they would not have taken on the burden beyond a pretense, and could easily have simply allowed the process to fail. Had they been passengers they could have done a good deal less and have left it up to the parties to find a solution. Instead, the Finns’ indefatigable attempts to solve the problems, did not go unnoticed by their Turkish counterparts Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül who repeatedly commented on the Finn’s good and honest intentions, the Turkish leaders also recognized the impossible of convincing the Cypriots, who had not shown up to a Finnish invite to bring the two parties together (Ferenczi & Shihab, 2006). Much of the timeline account above has already detailed many of the presidency’s activities in attempting to broker a deal to allow the accession process to continue unabated or constrained. This section, by contrast, assesses some of the public rhetoric used by the Finns in the course of their presidency.

As has been mentioned before, the September debate about Turkey was also taken to the European Parliament. In response to the highly critical manner in which the subject was discussed there, Finland’s minister for foreign trade and development, Paula Lehtomäki, reminded the members of the European Parliament that all candidates deserved equal treatment, and that a solution to the Cyprus problem needed to be found under the aegis of the United Nations (“Parlement Européen,” 2006). The UN (aside from the International Court of Justice) was the preferred forum of the Turks, whereas the Cypriots preferred the EU, given that they had membership there. The UN-brokered deal had, furthermore, been accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and rejected by the Greek Cypriots in 2004.

When Finnish Foreign Minister Tuomioja spoke on the subject of EU enlargement at the University of Helsinki on the 5th of October, he praised Turkey for playing a constructive role in moderating the dialogue between the West and the Islamic world. He saw Turkey and the EU benefitting from integration and political and cultural development at all levels strengthened. He further argued that neither Turkey nor Croatia should have new accession criteria imposed on them under the pretext of ‘enlargement fatigue’. “Do not make enlargement a scapegoat for domestic problems of slow economic growth or high unemployment,” he said. “According to all economic studies, the recent enlargement in 2004 stimulated economic growth.” Speaking about the threat to
suspend negotiations, he said that it was in everyone’s interest to continue negotiations and to assist both Turkey and Croatia in meeting all the accession criteria (“La Turquie a un rôle,” 2006).

At the end of November, when the Tampere negotiations had failed to find a solution in the conflict over Cyprus, Tuomioja said that in spite of the cordialities between the Finnish presidency and the Turks, that the EU member states could not simply continue as if nothing had happened and that there needed to be consequences for Turkey’s unwillingness to compromise (“Stoiber fordert schärfere,” 2006). Abdullah Gül however assessed the problem differently, drawing an implicit distinction between the accession negotiations, which had been characterized as a technical process, and the Cyprus situation, which he characterized as a political problem that could be solved under the auspices of the UN together with the goodwill of the Finnish presidency, about which he added his appreciation (“Echec des dernières,” 2006).

When the Commission published its recommendations, Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen expressed in a communiqué that the Presidency considered the recommendations a solid basis for discussion, while sources inside the Finnish government called them a “reasonable proposal”, but that “Finland has always kept the principal objective of maintaining negotiations and avoiding a complete suspension or a suspension of a large number of chapters” (Bouilhet, 2006a; “Turquie: la présidence,” 2006 – trans. mine). After the Foreign Ministers had come to their conclusion that the EU would freeze eight chapters, about which Tuomioja pointed out that it was not the same as a suspension, and that no one had questioned Turkey’s eligibility for membership once it had met all the criteria (Bouilhet, 2006b). In other words, while the negotiations might still fail, Turkey would not be derailed or set upon a path toward a ‘privileged partnership’ because of any factors other than its own ability to meet the Copenhagen criteria.


9.4.5 France

While Chirac’s personal preference for Turkish accession in the longue durée occasionally shone through, by and large France was widely considered to be on the side of the brakemen. 2006 was
Chirac’s last year in office and the rising popularity of his Nicolas Sarkozy, whose outspoken opposition to Turkey was already propelling him toward the Presidency, strengthened the government’s opposition to Turkey. Sarkozy, then minister of the interior, was all but officially nominated by the ruling UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire), France’s mainstream right-wing party.

The Socialists were meanwhile plagued by inner splits about Turkey and a willingness to give in to Armenian desires. Among the PS (Parti Socialiste) members these internal differences on Turkey were accentuated by the struggle of its three major nominees for the presidential candidacy, during which Laurent Fabius advocated for the privileged partnership, Ségolène Royal for a French referendum on Turkey’s accession and Dominique Strauss-Kahn against a suspension of accession negotiations, lest Turkey decide to ‘switch sides’ away from Europe, while the party also had a wing that attempted to appeal to the Armenian minority.

The debate about Turkish accession became even directly related to the debate about the Armenian Genocide, officially recognized by France in 2001, when the PS introduced a bill in April 2006 to make the denial thereof an offence, punishable by up to a year imprisonment and a €45,000 fine. In open debate, Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy (UMP), argued against the bill, finding it a hostile gesture to Turkish people and negatively affecting France’s position, not only in Turkey, but in the entire region surrounding it, while it was better to leave the ‘memory work’ of such a delicate nature to the Turks themselves. He was severely berated for it by his own party, the centrist democratic UDF, and PS deputies, who even accused him of being blackmailed or bought off by the Turks. Upon his argument that Turkey was a valuable economic trading-partner benefitting many French businesses, even his own party members cried “c’est scandaleux!” (France, 2006).

Before Chirac paid a state visit to the Armenian capital Yerevan in late September, an interview with him appeared in the monthly Nouvelles d’Arménie Magazine, an ethnic Armenian magazine published in Paris, in which he stated that Turkey would be required to acknowledge the Armenian Genocide in order to become a member of the EU, “in the spirit of European integration”. According to the president, Europe was “primarily an effort of reconciliation, peace, respect and openness to others” that “always and everywhere led to an ‘effort of memory.’” Even if it would be a long and difficult process, he had confidence in Turkey’s ability to carry out this “duty

42 Chirac, in this instance, refers to ‘effort de mémoire’. Previously, the President and Douste-Blazy had referred to ‘travail de mémoire’, or ‘memory work’: engaging the past by way of a subjective understanding.
of memory to its end”, because the issue was “the very spirit of European integration” (“Chirac lie implicitement,” 2006 – trans. mine). Chirac, however, reiterated that it was “essential” that Turkey remained anchored in the West.

After the visit with President Kocharyan of Armenia in Yerevan, at the post-summit press conference, Chirac again stressed the necessity for Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide. “Every country grows by acknowledging its dramas and errors,” he said, citing Germany’s acknowledgement of the Holocaust as an example, adding that “Turkey would do well, considering its history, its deep tradition, its culture, which is also a humanistic culture, to draw the consequences” (“Chirac: la Turquie,” 2006 – trans. mine).

When asked if he supported the bill pending in the National Assembly to penalize the Armenian genocide denial, Chirac reminded the audience that France had already officially recognized the Armenian Genocide in 2001 and that French law condemned incitement to discrimination, hatred and racial violence. “The rest,” he said, “is more polemics than judicial reality”, by which he seemed to dismiss the bill as political grandstanding (“Présidence de la République,” 2006 – trans. mine). About the introduction of the Armenian Genocide recognition as at least an informal condition of EU membership, Chirac was hailed by the Armenian sympathizers in the National Assembly, who saw it as a great breakthrough, though the President’s aides were at pains to explain later that there had been no policy shift on the part of the President, suggesting that the president meant it as a moral responsibility rather than an official condition of membership (Goulliaud, 2006; Nougayrède, 2006).

When the National Assembly adopted the controversial bill on October 12, the outrage in Turkey was extensive, with calls to boycott all French products. EU Commission President Barroso reacted by saying that the Commission would “of course comply with all decisions taken by the French Parliament,” though he added that he did not think it would be beneficial to the relationship between the EU and Turkey (“UE-Turquie: des relations,” 2006 – trans. mine). Upon the bill’s passage Chirac telephoned Erdoğan to apologize for the decision of the French National Assembly and to let him know that he understood his feelings and shared them (“Le president français,” 2006).

Meanwhile, the Cypriot-shipping impasse was dominating the overall debate on Turkey’s accession in France. Responding to the Commission’s November 8 report, Douste-Blazy suggested consequences for Turkey if it failed to meet its obligations according to the Additional Protocol. “If

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43 At the time of editing (in February 2012) it has only recently been adopted by the Senate but still faces legal challenges.
Turkey still does not recognize the 25 member states, of course including Cyprus, at the end of the year then it seems necessary to revise the timetable for Turkey's accession to the European Union,” he told the National Assembly. “Today, it is clear that Turkey still does not open its ports and airports to ships and aircraft from Cyprus. It is obvious that Turkey today does not meet its obligations” (“Revoir le calendrier,” 2006).

At the mid-November foreign ministers meeting, France sided with the United Kingdom in embracing the option of freezing a certain amount of chapters rather than suspending the negotiations altogether, which was the view of the Cypriots and the Austrians (Boland & Dombey, 2006; Dombey 2006b). After the failure of the late-November Tampere meeting to find a solution for the impasse, followed by the publication of the Commission’s recommendations a day later, Douste-Blazy said on the sidelines of the NATO meeting in Riga that a slowdown in the negotiations would probably be unavoidable as long as Turkey did not fulfill its obligations (“UE: un gel partiel,” 2006).

During a later interview with Radio France Douste-Blazy said that, “we must draw all the consequences of this refusal of the Turks.” “The European Union must respond to Turkey’s refusal to implement the customs union with Cyprus by being firm on our demands,” he stressed, saying, “it is inevitable that the pace of negotiations should be influenced so long as Turkey has not fulfilled its obligations”. The Foreign Minister further articulated the need “to be firm and at the same time well to ensure that the entire negotiation process may resume as soon as the obligations of the Customs Union are met by Turkey” (“Union douanière,” 2006 – trans. mine).

Chirac, also speaking about the matter on the sidelines in Riga, expressed his support for the Commission’s recommendation for the freezing of eight chapters, explaining to Erdoğan that the Commission did not have any other choice (Bouilhet, 2006a; Bresson et al, 2006; “Bruxelles appelle,” 2006; “L'UE affiche,” – trans. mine). According to the French daily Libération, one Commission official had said that if the Commission had not recommended the eight frozen chapters, Chirac and Merkel would have set the tone at the European Council summit, which may very well have lead to freezing more than eight chapters (Quatremer, 2006). Some reports mentioned that Chirac had even suggested freezing seventeen rather than eight of them (Berger, 2006; Docquiert, 2006b). Others reported that he had joined Germany in calling for more than ten (Boland & Parker, 2006; “Coup de froid,” 2006).

After having expressed his support for the German position at Riga, the President began hearing news of hardening rhetoric coming across the Rhine (see below). Chirac’s spokesman
maintained that France and Germany shared the same position (Proissl & Hollinger, 2006). Subsequent events suggest that the chancellor was going further toward the hard brakeman position than Chirac was comfortable with, and Chirac’s spokesman covered an ambiguity as to which Germany, exactly, France was in agreement with, given the divergence of views within Berlin. The outcome of the December 5 Franco-German-Polish summit stripped the eighteen-month deadline from the argument, which Merkel had been articulating, urging instead for a Commission report that would have been published regardless (see above). Ludlow (2006b, p. 15) reports that Chirac had been instrumental in pulling Merkel back from a firmer line suggests that the president was at heart still in the driver camp, even though the rest of his government clearly was not.

When the news of the before-mentioned Turkish back-channel overture for a solution to the impasse circulated several days before the foreign ministers’ meeting of December 11, the French foreign ministry asked for a confirmation thereof as well as a written clarification with the terms being offered from Ankara (“Türkei bietet,” 2006). None emerged before the said meeting. Although Douste-Blazy made it known afterwards that nobody wanted to break off discussions he still strongly supported the outcome of freezing the eight negotiation chapters (Bouilhet, 2006b). Nicolas Sarkozy also hailed the outcome, arguing that Turkey had to understand that if it wanted to be part of the EU, it had to adapt to its values and recognize all of its members. “Recognizing all the states that constitute the EU is not a prerequisite, it is a principle, an absolute necessity,” he said (“Nicolas Sarkozy,” 2006 – trans. mine).

After the heads of state and government had also endorsed the Foreign Ministers’ decision at the year-end summit, Jacques Chirac defended it by saying that since Turkey had been unable or unwilling to meet its commitments it was only natural that, without condemnation or drawing firm conclusions, the EU should take steps to encourage a return to compliance with European rules as quickly as possible, particularly those relating to trade relations with Cyprus. Speaking for himself, he claimed that he had always been in favor of negotiations, knowing full well that they would be long and difficult. Not being able to know the eventual results he still hoped that these negotiations would continue until they had led to an agreement (“Chirac justifie,” 2006; Ferenczi, 2006b – trans. mine).

9.4.6 Germany

In 2006, Germany was a difficult country to gauge as far as its position on Turkey was concerned, despite the outspoken preferences of the chancellor. The 2005 federal elections had led to a Grand Coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD with Christian-democrat Angela Merkel as Germany’s new Chancellor. Both personally and as the leader of her party, she had never hidden her opposition to Turkish membership and a preference for the privileged partnership option. Yet, as Chancellor she had to respect the will of the coalition, as well as previously made decisions. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the SPD Foreign Minister, on the other hand, was in favor of Turkish membership, which had created a fault line between the two coalition partners (Höhler, 2006; “Merkel weiter,” 2006). This fault line had to be plastered over and carefully worded to encompass both points of view for a coalition agreement. It read as follows:

Germany has a special interest in closer relations with Turkey and in binding the country to the European Union.

The negotiations on launched 3 October 2005 with the aim of accession are an open-ended process that does not establish an automatism and the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. This presents economically, demographically and culturally an extraordinary challenge. Against this background, we welcome the reform efforts initiated in Turkey. We want to support the forces that promote the democratic, constitutional and economic development of Turkey, with which we are also closely linked to NATO.

The negotiating mandate, and the declaration of the European Community and its member states of 21 September, contained conditions, including the absorption capacity of the EU which must be strictly adhered to. Thereto belongs accordingly the Copenhagen criteria, also the exercise of fundamental freedoms including the freedom of religion. Should the EU not be capable of absorbing [Turkey] or Turkey not be able to comply with all the obligations of membership, Turkey must develop its privileged partnership with the EU to be bound as closely as possible to the European structures.

(“Gemeinsam für Deutschland,” 2005 – trans. mine)

This coalition agreement anticipated the presidency conclusions of the December 17, 2004 Brussels summit. Much of the CDU text had been adopted, with Merkel’s long-favored privileged partnership explicitly stated, yet with the concession to Steinmeier’s SPD that the objective of the process was full membership. By explicitly mentioning the 21 September declaration it also explicitly recognized the Cypriot shipping issue as a critical problem that would have to be dealt with. The coalition agreement in effect indicated that Germany still preferred to keep the process on track, rather than – as many CDU constituents would have preferred – to derail it. It also highlighted that
the recognition that absorption capacity might prevent Turkey’s accession, though there is no discussion of what conditions would limit that capacity.

This agreement still put Angela Merkel in a precarious position, as she would be watched with Argus eyes for any action on her part that might still be directed at pursuing her own preference for derailing Turkey’s accession process. Given this tension, she frequently had to explain that she had two distinct roles to fulfill: one as the Chancellor, who had to maintain a policy in accordance with the coalition agreement and, the other, as the chairwoman of the CDU/CSU, who preferred the privileged partnership. By the same token, because of her position as Chancellor and the fact that all eyes were upon her, she possessed the metaphorical megaphone. By contrast, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, whose position on Turkey was more driver-like, had the benefit to able to operate more under the radar and maintain his own preference during his actions among the foreign ministers, though it came with a smaller degree of influence on the overarching rhetorical aspect of the debate. If his actions were too far out of step with those of the Chancellor he might have to face her unilateral ability to pull the question of Turkey into the European Council, rather than leave it up to a foreign ministers’ decision.

Delivering the keynote address at the International Bertelsmann Forum on world economy in Berlin on September 22, Angela Merkel made some remarkable statements about the EU’s relationship with Turkey. For one she called for a clear definition of Europe’s boundaries, without which she saw Europe struggling in the future to survive in a rapidly changing world. In that context, she expressed her doubts that deepening could continue while the EU continued to enlarge. To address this, not only recommended that the EU should not make new membership commitments but also look at that the negotiating candidates.

For those conducting negotiations the criteria must be met. These criteria include the absorption capacity of the existing European Union; that is how we, at least, understand the Copenhagen criteria. We have started accession negotiations with Turkey – I want to address that specifically. It is also there that it is necessary that all criteria be fulfilled. I do not want to expand on that, but we have a catchphrase that concerns us; that catchphrase is Cyprus. A solution must be brought to this question, if the criteria and requirements of the European Union are to count for everyone.

(Merkel, 2006)

In this paragraph she highlighted the problems being faced by the process of Turkey’s candidacy, without which she highlighted any of Turkey’s promises. Furthermore, she leaves inspecific what particular limitations would mean that the EU’s absorption capacity would be insufficient to
accommodate Turkey as a member. She also does not specify what criteria would fail to count for everyone regarding Cyprus.

Meanwhile, Schröder and Fischer, who had retired to private life but still continued to advocate on Turkey’s behalf from the sidelines, returned to the fray of the political debate more directly. Speaking on October 2 at the launch of the French edition of Foreign Policy Magazine, Schröder repeated his support for Turkish accession to the EU, seeing “no reasonable alternative,” to membership because a “stable Turkey is in the interest of the European Union” ("Plaidoyer de Schröder," 2006 – trans. mine). On that same day Fischer published an op-ed article in Le Figaro, following another in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on September 27, arguing in both that in light of the then-recent Lebanon crisis, Europe needed to define a grand strategy for the Middle East, in which Turkey would necessarily have to be included, while he found it astonishing that, Europe was going in the opposite direction by antagonizing the Turks. In the articles, he recalled the promise Europe had made to open trade with Northern Cyprus, which would make it possible for Turkey to do the same with Southern Cyprus (Fischer, J., 2006).

Also at the beginning of October, Angela Merkel traveled to Turkey on an official state visit. In anticipation of her visit she had let it be known that she expected a “clear signal” from Turkey to Cyprus (Volkery, 2006). At the joint press conference with Erdoğan, she said that, “the Cyprus issue is a necessary condition. The issue must be settled for the continuation of talks” ("Angela Merkel en Turquie,” 2006; “Merkel presse Ankara,” 2006 – trans. mine). “I hope we solve this difficult problem,” she assured reporters (“Merkel drängt,” 2006 – trans. mine).

She also promised that the negotiations – which she officially would be heading in her upcoming role of the EU presidency in 2007 – would be “fair and open-ended.” “What is promised will also continue,” she said, adding, “we are reliable partners” (Vieregg, 2006 – trans. mine). In front of an audience of Turkish businesspeople, she again explained her dual position, in which she was personally dedicated to the concept of a privileged partnership as head of the CDU, but as Chancellor she was bound by what the EU had agreed with Turkey. “I adhere to the principle - *pacta sunt servanda,*” that a responsible government complies with its treaties (“Merkel estime,” 2006; Müller, 2006; Schellenberger, 2006 – trans. mine). The Turkish audience gave a thundering applause, but this message had a double meaning. One of the Chancellor’s central messages on her trip was to push Turkey on the Cyprus issue, wherein Turkey was also called to live up to its (as yet unratified) treaty with the EU. Responding to a much-used criticism of the EU – that it constantly invented
new hurdles for Turkey to meet – she simply denied it by declaring that this was not the case and affirmed that Germany would not “make additional problems” (ibid – trans. mine).

On November 6, just ahead of the publication of the Commission’s report, Merkel gave an interview with the Süddeutsche Zeitung, in which she raised the question of Cyprus and Turkey, saying:

I hope very much that the meeting cancelled with the Finnish Presidency on the Cyprus question will not be Turkey's final word on this matter. We need implementation of the Ankara Protocol guaranteeing free trade with Cyprus. Otherwise a very, very serious situation will arise with regard to the continuation of the accession negotiations. I urge that Turkey do everything it can to avoid putting itself and the European Union in such a complicated situation.

(Kornelius, S. & Schwennicke, 2006)

Pressed to clarify what the consequences would be if Turkey would did not comply, she offered no specifics other than that “The EU would not be able to continue on this basis. Turkey needs to know that there will be no nod of approval if there is no movement with regard to the Ankara Protocol” (ibid). When she was asked about how a third hat, that of presiding over the EU the following year, beside the two she was already wearing as Chancellor and CDU Chairwoman, would complicate matters vis-à-vis Turkey, she dismissed the idea that the different roles would offer complications, seeing at least two of them as quite compatible with one another, since in the process much would be left to the Commission. From reports following this interview, as well as from clarifications issued by Merkel’s staff, there should be a suspension of the negotiations altogether as far as she was concerned if Turkey did not open its ports to Cyprus (“Bondskanselier waarschuwt,” 2006; Calla, 2006).

At around that same time, on the eve of a meeting between Vanhanen and Merkel on November 7, the Turkish question provided a wedge in the grand coalition that fed in the German press. One of its main instigators of this wedge, Minister-President of Bavaria, Edmund Stoiber (CSU), argued that the accession negotiations should be frozen, as Turkey was “violating the treaties” by refusing to implement the additional protocol (“Stoiber: Gespräche,” 2006). Even if the impasse were solved, Stoiber opined, there ought to be no question of membership, whatever the conditions. “Turkey is not a European country and therefore can not join the EU,” he said. To this end, he called for a meeting in Munich with the Federal Government and the EU Commission, in order to freeze the ongoing negotiations and to prevent the opening of new chapters (“Streit um EU-Beitritt,” 2006; “Uneinigkeit,” 2006).
From the other side of the coalition government, sentiments were significantly different. The Chairman of the SPD, Minister-President of Rhineland-Palatinate Kurt Beck, argued that an interruption of talks would be a serious mistake. “We are at the beginning of negotiations and not at the end of a road that will decide whether Turkey can join,” Beck said. “We talk about stages, and if [these are] not achieved, you have to continue your efforts to reach them” (“Türkeifrage,” 2006 – trans. mine).

Frank-Walter Steinmeier, supported by the SPD vice chancellor, Franz Münterfering, acknowledged the tough report. Yet, as they felt that success of the negotiations was desirable, he still hoped that a fair compromise to the impasse could be found, in which Turkey would open itself to Cyprus and the EU would do the same with Northern Cyprus (“Stoiber: Gespräche,” 2006). The report should therefore be seen as an encouragement for Turkey to brave the path forward and not as the means to bring about the failure of negotiations, reinforcing the impression that Turkey was not welcome in the EU (“Türkeifrage,” 2006). He further welcomed Erdoğan’s statements regarding Article 301 as demonstrating that Turkey was open to further change.

As such, there were stark differences between the CDU/CSU approach on the one hand and SPD on the other. Münterfering, nevertheless, maintained that there was no crisis in the coalition. Germany was only negotiating a constructive approach and even though the issue was a difficult one, it did not constitute a conflict in the coalition. Turkey needed to do its homework, he argued, but it also deserved a fair chance at membership (“Münterfering,” 2006; “Türkeiffrage,” 2006; “Uneinigkeit,” 2006).

After having met with Matti Vanhanen, the Chancellor, expressed the middle ground, calling on Turkey to respect its commitments and implement the additional protocol before the end of the year (“Brüssel will Türkei,” 2006). Steinmeier, in mid-November, used the same language, saying that he was aiming to avoid an ‘escalation’ between Europe and Turkey (Fischer, M., 2006). For the time being, then, the coalition agreed that Turkey should offer the unilateral concession of fully implementing the additional protocol. The disagreement was on what should happen if Turkey did not comply.

At the CDU Conference in Dresden, held on November 27-28, Merkel – winning reelection as CDU party chairwoman on the first of the two days – maintained that Europe was not a Christian club, but a club with fundamental values (Développement Allemagne,” 2006 – trans. mine). The following day, Stoiber maintained his anti-Turkish stance, saying, “in my view, no more chapters can be opened until Turkey has fulfilled its obligations.” He also reiterated his fundamental position,
saying “Turkey is not a European country, and whoever admits [Turkey], will change the character of Europe, and I do not want that. That is why I say ‘no’” (“Stoiber fordert wegen,” 2006a – trans. mine).

After the breakdown in negotiations at Tampere, the question of what to do with Turkey became the point on which drives and brakement diverged. According to the Financial Times (Boland & Parker, 2006), Germany had joined France in advocating for the freezing of more than ten chapters. However, when the Commission’s recommendation to freeze eight was published, Merkel, attending the NATO summit in Riga, initially responded favorably, calling it a “strong signal” to Ankara (Jach, 2006; “l’Europe divisée,” 2006; “Merkel approuve,” 2006). This did not seem to be enough for Edmund Stoiber, when he argued that Turkey needed clear guidance from the EU about what was and what was not acceptable in a European Partnership. It cannot be “that Turkey wants to be newly admitted into the European family, but will not accept the family member Cyprus,” he argued (“Stoiber fordert schärfere,” 2006b – trans. mine). Elmar Brok in the European Parliament also argued against the Commission’s soft approach toward Turkey (ibid).

In the Bundestag, further, Christian Democrats also demanded stronger measures, such as the opening of no new chapters and at least semi-annual reviews of Turkey’s progress toward meeting the EU’s demands. The Commission’s recommendation for freezing eight chapters was called such a weak response, that it might even be considered a reward for Turkey’s delaying tactics. Andreas Schockenhoff, the Vice-Chairman of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag, called the Commission’s proposal “inadequate, ineffective [and] unreliable” (Jach, 2006 – trans. mine). This earned him a personal phone call from the Chancellor calling him to account for his criticism of the Commission’s recommendation after she had already endorsed it. Schockenhoff defended himself by saying that his stated position had been the internally-agreed position of his Bundestag faction for the preceding six weeks.

After her more favorable statements about the recommendations at Riga, and her argument with Schockenhoff Angela Merkel also hardened her language. She indicated that the Commission had not gone far enough and she advocated for more oversight on the process by the member states, adopting the objectives of her fellow party members in the Budestag. Furthermore, she advocated for a stronger review clause, by which the Council could reassess Turkey’s progress after eighteen months (Berger, 2006). Steinmeier’s position, meanwhile, diverged from where the Chancellor was going. He regretted the confrontation with Turkey and felt that the Commission’s recommendations were reasonable and responsible, and they offered the assurance that there would
be no breakdown in the negotiations, (Proissl & Zapf, 2006). As such, he supported the Commission’s position of the eight chapters, which were insufficiently strict for the Chancellor.

Between the Riga NATO summit and the Franco-German-Polish summit, Angela Merkel received support for her review clause from other member states, in which she wanted the European Council to put the whole negotiations process on ice if Turkey had not met its Ankara Agreement obligation to open its ports to Cyprus. The german edition of the Financial Times Deutschland reported these as being France, Cyprus, Greece and, surprisingly, Portugal. The Financial Times Deutschland also reported that Steinmeier was not on board with her proposal (Proissl & Hollinger, 2006). The rather sharply contradicting views within the coalition, and Merkel’s apparent shifting on the issue between her dual role as Chancellor and party leader led to the press to characterizing German foreign policy as being adrift in domestic politics – a cardinal sin in German foreign policy making – one that in recent years had become a virtue honored in the breach. That her position shifted again after the triangular Weimar summit did not set this critique to rest.

The foreign minister, for his part, was also culpable of undermining the single voice of the German government. When the back-channel Turkish offer emerged Frank-Walter Steinmeier was quick to suggest that this looked to be positive and “a cautious willingness of Turkey to make a concession” (“Türkei bietet,” 2006; “Türkei knüpft,” 2006 – trans. mine). He was also the source of more tension when on December 9 it leaked that Der Spiegel would publish an interview with Steinmeier two days later, in which he claimed to have warned the chancellor about her engagement in what he called an “unmeasured reaction” against Ankara; that if Turkey turned away from Europe it would be a serious strategic loss for the EU (Beste & von Hammerstein, 2006). The news about the interview immediately led to a storm of public criticism. Responding to the phrase “unmeasured reaction,” Volker Kauder, the faction leader of the CDU in the Bundestag, called it “completely unnecessary,” and sending Turkey “false signals” (König, 2006 – trans. mine). Schockenhoff, Kauder’s deputy, called on the Foreign Minister to not take a fundamentally different position than the Chancellor (Lachmann, 2006; “Offener Koalitionsstreit,” 2006; “Unterschiedliche Signale,”).

Beyond the frustration over the tone between the chancellor and the foreign minister, the SPD and CDU leaders in the Bundestag took up debate on the substance. Peter Struck – the SPD leader in the lower house – reminded his CDU colleagues that there was no majority for their

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44 Which, given the exchange between Merkel and Schockenhoff less than two weeks before, was ironic.
preferred privileged partnership. Struck’s deputy, Walter Kolbow, referring to Turkey’s apparent overture, argued that since Turkey had shifted, the EU foreign ministers should continue with the negotiations, to which Matthias Wissman, the CDU Chairman of the Europe Committee, responded that Turkey had not even said if it was going to ratify the full additional protocol and that negotiations should only continue if and when Turkey unequivocally committed itself to the ratification (Dausend, 2006 – trans. mine). In the midst of this coalition squabble, Wolfgang Schäuble, the interior minister at the time, argued that “the negotiations must not fail,” though he also defended the privileged partnership concept (“Scharfe Töne,” 2006 – trans. mine).

The Foreign Ministers (GAERC) meeting in Brussels on December 11 had seemingly settled the matter as far as the presidency was concerned. Addressing the differences within the coalition, Steinmeier acknowledged them to be “substantive”, but arguing his own case, he advocated for a “sense of proportion” regarding the impasse with Turkey. “That which has grown over many years, we shall not destroy in a matter of days,” he declared (“EU-Außenminister,” 2006a – trans. mine). Edmund Stoiber disagreed, saying, “a clearer answer to Turkey’s breach of treaty would have been preferable” (“Erdogan wirft,” 2006). Rebuking Steinmeier for his post-GAERC meeting advice to the chancellor about not destroying the EU-Turkey relationship, Volker Kauder told him that Merkel “did not need any advice” about Turkey (Bennhold, 2006b).

At the European Council meeting proper, Merkel went along with the other EU-leaders to accept the GAERC consensus on Turkey, though she warned that during the German Presidency, there would be a role for “other forms of cooperation than membership” (“EU-Gipfel,” 2006 – trans. mine). Steinmeier, again, saw matters differently. Preluding what the German priorities were to be regarding Turkey, he confirmed that the door to negotiations was not closed, and the EU might open two to four new negotiation chapters during Germany’s tenure (“L’Allemagne révèle,” 2006).

Given the differences between the German Foreign Ministry and the Chancellery on Turkey, it is a tricky matter to gauge where Germany, as a whole, stood in the debate. Many articles that gave overviews of the member states put Germany in the brakeman camp. Given that the foreign minister maintained the same position as the Commission – which, in essence, was in the political center of the debate – and Chancellor Merkel had emerged as the main advocate for a tougher approach on Turkey, it is impossible to maintain the argument that Germany was a passenger, and it was certainly not a driver of Turkey’s membership ambitions. It must therefore be concluded that, on balance, Germany was a brakeman. Articles that came to the same conclusion were: Bilefsky & Dempsey, 2006; Bouilhet, 2006b, Bresson et al, 2006; “EU-landen,” 2006, Fischer, J., 2006; Missé,
In 2006, the relationship between Ankara and Athens cooled dramatically as compared to the previous years, mainly due to the specific impasse over Cyprus. While the Greeks never wavered in their desire to eventually see Turkey become a member of the EU, the Cypriot issue, touched an issue particularly close to their perceived core national interests and prompted them to use their vote against Turkey if necessary. Unlike the majority of the other brakemen, who appear to have used the Cyprus issue as the instrument for slowing or stopping Turkey’s progress, the Greeks used the threat of slowing down Turkey’s progress as an instrument in pursuit of Cyprus’ shipping interests. It is likely the case that Greek domestic politics made doing anything else untenable, just as in Ankara it was politically untenable to open trade with Greek Cyprus while the EU remained closed to Northern Cyprus. This caveat aside, Greece cannot be considered anything other than a brakeman in 2006.

When Athens Mayor Dora Bakoyannis took the office of foreign minister in February, she was greeted with enthusiasm in the Turkish press (“Bilgehan sees,” 2006). According Mehmet Ali Birand, a notable opinion leader and columnist for the Turkish Daily News (the English-language version of the secular-nationalist Hürriyet), she was “one of the few Greek politicians who knows us well,” and brought hope that “she might help bring back some of the sparkle from the Papandreou era” (Birand, 2006). The international press thought so too, seeing Bakoyannis as having an easier manner with the Turks than her conservative predecessor, Pètros Molyviatis (“L’ambitieuse Dora,” 2006; Kunz, 2006). These expectations, however, would prove to be somewhat premature.

Though most of her comments were dressed up with cordiality towards Turkey, they were seldom without forgetting Greece’s interests. When on March 1 Tassos Papadopoulos, president of the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus, met with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the Greek Foreign Ministry declared it a positive step (“La rencontre,” 2006). Two days later, however, the Austrian Die Presse published an interview with Bakoyannis, in which she called the Annan Plan “history”. Given that the Greek Cypriots had rejected the peace plan in 2004, there was no use in discussing the it any further, despite Greece having seen more positive than negative in the plan. During the
rest of the interview she declared Greece’s continued to support for Turkey on its way toward the EU, though not without full implementation of the additional protocol. When asked about Turkey’s Europeanness, Bakoyannis responded: “The question is not, if Turkey is European enough today, but if Turkey is European at the end of the road… Of course, Turkey still has some domestic and foreign policy changes to make” (Ultsch, 2006 – trans. mine).

Her rhetoric on the Annan Plan disappointed the Turkish press. They quickly interpreted her as being more hawkish than her predecessor (Aktar, 2006). Bakoyannis’ declarations on the plan as being dead were a signal that reconciliation between the Cypriots would not happen along the lines that had been proposed by the UN two years prior, but some formula which would be more in tune with Papadopoulos’ harder line.

After meeting with Abdullah Gül on the sidelines of the March 10-11 foreign ministers meeting in Salzburg, she declared that while Turkey was not ready for “a common market,” Greece was “always in favor of a European perspective for Turkey. We are neighbors and it is in the interest of Greece to have a European Turkey on our borders… We reviewed our bilateral relations and I had the opportunity to tell [Gül] once again that Greece has shown that it is working on stability in the region, and that [Greece] is in favor of a European perspective for Turkey, which in the end will depend on its attitude” (“Turquie et UE,” 2006 – trans. mine).

On May 23, two Greek F-16s intercepted a sortie of Turkish fighter planes flying in or near Greek airspace over the Greek island of Karpathos. The ensuing mock dogfight caused a collision between a Greek and a Turkish F-16, resulting in the death of the Greek pilot. After communications between the Greek and Turkish foreign ministries, the Greek foreign ministry spokesman said, the two ministers had expressed their sorrow about the incident, and agreed on the fact that it would “not affect the ambition of both countries to improve their relations” (“Collision F-16,” 2006 – trans. mine). Ten days later, however, another fatal incident took place in the Aegean Sea, when a Turkish-operated cargo ship colliding with a Greek tanker. Despite diplomatic attempts to plaster it over again, the Aegean skies were said to be darkening (Borowiec, 2006a).

These darkening skies manifested themselves during the impasse over Cypriot shipping and Turkey’s accession negotiations. After the Commission’s screening reports had been completed, Greece, together with Cyprus, vetoed the opening of negotiations chapters (other than Science & Research) in order to pressure Turkey into opening its airports and harbors. “I wouldn't call it a veto,” A Greek diplomat told the Irish Times. “It is more a consideration. We must go slowly as we want Turkey to honor its commitments,” he said adding that both states would not allow any new
chapters to be opened before November 8th when the Commission’s annual report on Turkey was
due (Smyth, 2006a).

In October, the Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman warned Turkey about the annual report
and the slow pace of reform in Turkey it was bound to mention. He reiterated that Ankara should
fulfill its commitment under the additional protocol by opening its airports and harbors to Cypriot
vessels (“Athènes… réformes,” 2006). Speaking to the Greek Parliament at the outset of November,
Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis said that if Turkey really wanted to advance toward Europe, it
should be aware of its commitments toward the 25 member states and even though it was
recognized that there had been some reforms, Ankara had not made any significant steps to fulfill all
of its obligations to the EU (“Athènes… obligations,” 2006). Referring to the Greek Orthodox
community in Turkey, he argued that Ankara had made insufficient progress as far as minority rights
and religious freedoms were concerned and its refusal to recognize one of the EU member states
was a paradox that could not continue endlessly.

Following the recommendations, Karamanlis said at Riga that Ankara had to meet all its
obligations to the EU and the Commission’s recommendation was a “basis for further talks and
mine). In that pursuit, Athens was ready to wield far more stick than carrot. In the meantime Greece
had also joined other member states that looked at freezing ten chapters rather than the
recommended eight. Still, after the Brussels foreign ministers meeting of December 11, Dora
Bakogianni expressed her satisfaction with the decision to close eight of them, saying, “it is
important that there is a consistent and clear message toward Ankara from the 25” member states

As brakemen went, Athens was far less strident than others, as it was clearly still interested in
keeping Turkey on the track toward eventual accession. It would, however, not countenance
Turkey’s continued policy toward Cyprus, and would have preferred a slightly tougher sanction on
its negotiations than the Commission recommended. For this reason it is considered a brakeman.
Other articles that support this reading of Greece’s policy are: Boland & Dombey, 2006, Bounds &
Dombey, 2006; Buck, et. al., 2006; “Decades of division,” 2006; Dijkstra, 2006d; “EU-landen,” 2006,
As had been the case in the previous episodes, Ireland’s position on Turkey barely made the news in 2006. From what could be found in the press and in the parliamentary record, the Irish appeared to have been passively supportive of Turkey’s progress, though also critical of both Turkey and the EU in the way conditions were met.

In mid-June, during the Austrian presidency, Irish Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern corrected Austrian Chancellor Schüssel’s statement that absorption capacity was, and had been, a condition of membership. It was not a condition, Ahern enigmatically pointed out, but a “concept” that had to be taken into account (Brennock, 2006). In other words, it was not a hard rule that could definitively keep Turkey out, as it lacked firm definition.

Especially the Cyprus conflict received much criticism from the political right wing. When the Finnish ambassador Seppo Kauppila spoke to the Irish Joint Committee on European Affairs at the outset of the Finnish presidency, Fine Gael Deputy Bernard Allen, asked the ambassador how the EU could “continue to deal with that enlargement in a realistic way while such an affront is being visited upon one of our member states?” (Ireland, 2006a). Deputy Allen later that month asked the minister of state for European affairs, Noel Treacy (of the ruling Fianna Fáil party), in parliament, if there was “any indication that the ongoing cancer in the negotiations will be excised” (Ireland, 2006b – emph. mine). Allen’s opinion was shared by Fianna Fáil Deputy Paschal Mooney, who called it “scandalous” that no ship under the Cypriot flag was accepted in a Turkish port and requested an Irish lead in opposing it at the European Union level. The Minister of State assured them both that the Irish position on Turkey, demanding full implementation of the additional protocol, had been made absolutely clear, though he was also pleased about the attempts of the UN to bring about renewed dialogue between the two parties (ibid).

The Irish government, though not uncritical about the Cyprus impasse, was apparently not ready to abandon its support for Turkey’s accession over the matter and did not forget to remind the EU of its own commitments to Turkey. In a written answer to parliament questions about the status of EU accession negotiations the Foreign Minister Dermot Ahern replied:

*While the negotiations with Turkey raise particularly difficult issues, it is important that the Union should abide by the commitments given to Turkey by successive European Councils. It is also essential that Turkey should fulfil its obligations, including the implementation of the Ankara Protocol. Ireland has made it clear that, while we do not see Turkish recognition of the Republic of Cyprus as a condition for accession negotiations,*
will be an absolute requirement for eventual Turkish membership of the Union. Meanwhile, it is vitally important that Turkey should normalise its relations with Cyprus as required by the Ankara Protocol.

(Ireland, 2006c)

On the same day however, replying to a question asked about the Irish position on the economic implications for Cyprus brought on by the unilateral and punitive restrictions imposed on it by Turkey, Dermot Ahern replied that Ireland “fully supported the efforts by the [Finnish] presidency and hope that they will lead to a solution” (Ireland, 2006d). The statement suggests that although Ireland expressed its concern with the shipping impasse, it was going to allow itself to be led by the Presidency for further developments at the EU level.

Before the publication of the Commission’s report Turkey’s minister of economic affairs, Ali Babacan, visited Dublin on his European tour, attempting to convince his audiences that Turkey would make a “real global power” of the EU. Seemingly unimpressed with the prospect, Irish legislators gave him an earful on a host of Turkey’s less-promising qualities, ranging from human (and particularly women’s) rights to free speech, with the Kurds and the Armenian Genocide in between. Noel Treacy further told him that the Irish Government was “disappointed” about the pace in which progress was made in the negotiations with Turkey and he called on Ankara to lift its current ban on Cypriot vessels and aircraft (de Bréadun, 2006).

Dermot Ahern, also meeting with Ali Babacan, rebuffed the Turkish Minister’s entreaties for Irish support and pointed out that as an EU candidate, Turkey was in no position to disrespect EU-member Cyprus (Purcell, 2006). Reporting on the conversation to the Dáil (Irish parliament), Ahern wrote: “I impressed upon [Babacan] the importance we attach to the resolution of this issue so as to prevent the accession negotiations from being adversely affected” (Ireland, 2006c).

Taoiseach Bertie Ahern also made some statements distinguishing his government’s position from that of the “pro-Turkey lobby”. Answering questions on the subject in the Dáil in early December – before the determinative foreign ministers’ meeting of December 11 – he said, “I have been sympathetic in recent years towards President Papadopoulos, who has been under much pressure. It is not just another issue in Cyprus, it is enormously important for the Cypriot people.” Papadopoulos’ position “as he sees it and as we supported during the Irish presidency is that if Europe does not stand by one of its own members, which is the issue, [Papadopoulos] will take a tough line” (O’Halloran, 2006). Expressing his expectation that the matter would be referred to the European Council, rather than be dealt with by the foreign ministers, he said, “The European pro-
Turkey lobby will take its line to smooth a way of continuing the process. We are in for a lively session on this issue,” distinguishing Ireland from that lobby (Ireland, 2006f).

This prediction however would not come true, since the Foreign Ministers meeting did deal with the lively issue, which was a reasons why the European Council would turn out not be lively at all. After the latter, the Irish Times reported about the support given by the Taoiseach to the outcome of the eight suspended chapters as Turkey’s penalty for failing to open up its ports to Cyprus (Hennessy, 2006).

Ireland is another country that is difficult to gauge. Much of the rhetorical pushback against Turkey, on Cyprus’ behalf, makes it clear that Ireland was not a driver. Yet, while its rhetoric was brakemanlike, as its focus on one side of the issue – Turkish openness to Cyprus– was severe, there is no evidence that Ireland advocated for anything more than what the Commission recommended and the presidency embraced. What is more, that rhetoric did not go beyond the Irish shores, except to Turkish ears. Likewise, the annual review of Irish foreign policy in the Irish Studies in International Affairs journal names the issue of Turkey and the Cypriot-shipping conundrum on several occasions, but does not identify an Irish position (Rees, 2007). Since Ireland appeared to have been neither a driver nor a brakeman, it must be concluded that it was a passenger.

9.4.9 Italy

In 2006, Italy proved to be a tactical driver of Turkey’s membership ambitions. Prime Minister, Romano Prodi was much subtler in his approach toward the process than his predecessor (and successor) Silvio Berlusconi had been. This was especially the case at the end of November and early December, when his approach seemed to be one of depoliticizing the matter, which would allow the negotiations process to continue out of the limelight and away from the big clashes at the level of the heads of state and government.

Ali Babacan, visiting Rome on his European tour in late September, met with his Italian counterpart, Minister of European Affairs and International Trade Emma Bonino, as well as the prime minister and Foreign Minister Massimo D’Alema. At the after-meeting press conference D’Alema spoke on the issue of Cyprus: “The issue of Cyprus must be resolved. All airports and seaports must be opened to Greek-Cypriot vehicles. At the same time, the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots must be ended. Italy wishes for a solid solution in Cyprus. We support consensus between
the two communities in Cyprus.” D’Alema further told the press corps that Italy supported Turkey’s overall EU process: “Supporting Turkey is part of our national policy. By taking into consideration reforms made recently in Turkey, we intend to continue with this policy.” In that light he added that, “Turkey must go on with reforms in providing political freedoms and freedom of expression. The rights of minorities must be recognized by Turkey. Italy does not want to see any crisis in Turkey-EU negotiations” (“Turkish minister,” 2006).

In another display of friendly relations between the two countries, at the end of October the Italian ambassador to Turkey, Carlo Marsili officially announced a set of high-level diplomatic encounters between Italy and Turkey. Foreign Minister D’Alema’s was to visit Turkey in the coming days, Gül was to participate in a Turkish-Italian Dialogue Forum in Rome in November and Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was to visit Italy in January, while Romano Prodi was set to visit Turkey that same month. Commenting on Italy’s policy vis-à-vis Turkish accession to the EU, Marsili repeated D’Alema’s statements about his country’s full support for Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, to which he added Italy’s disagreement with the privileged partnership proposal. “If a problem occurs in Turkish-EU relations, Italy will strengthen its ties with Turkey even more,” he said cordially. Speaking on the matter of Cyprus, Marsili said both Turkey and Europe had to fulfill their obligations, though he said there was no link between the opening of ports and ending of the Turkish Cypriot isolation. “We have always insisted that direct trade is vital to Turkish Cypriots. We are still committed,” he said (“Marsili says Prodi,” 2006).

On the verge of the publication of the Commission’s report, Romano Prodi warned about an inevitable suspension of EU accession talks if it would turn out to be “absolutely negative”, though he hoped it would not be. Considering the very complexity of the negotiations, he thought they should not be conducted in haste, lest they should result in failure, but they should certainly not stop either, as some of the other EU member states recommended, because it was still a great historical challenge to pursue (Barber & Peel, 2006; “Prodi droht Türkei,” 2006).

Later in November, after the report but before the recommendation, Prodi was asked about his thoughts on Turkey in an interview with Le Figaro. His response was non-committal but modestly positive for Turkey, echoing the earlier statement:

The Turkish question has become a domestic political issue in Europe. To achieve a membership of Turkey, must take its time. If you go too fast, you will fail. This also relates to the Cyprus issue. The only way to avoid failure is to be aware it will take the time necessary to bring the negotiation to its successful conclusion.

(Rousselin & Heuze, 2006 – trans. mine)
Here Prodi suggested that member-state motivations went beyond the specific issue of Turkey and finding solutions to the policy problem at hand. Instead, he identified member-state domestic politics as being at stake.

Once the recommendations had been unveiled, Erdoğan communicated his response – “unacceptable” – by way of a ‘private’ conversation with Romano Prodi at Riga (Castle, 2006b). In return the Italian leader told him that he was sorry, but that “it was difficult to do otherwise” (Bouilhet, 2006a – trans. mine). The Italian newspaper ‘Corriere della Sera’ published a fairly detailed account of the exchange between the Turkish and Italian Prime Ministers. It tells of Prodi patiently bringing their discussion back to specifics, with frequent appeals for realism, after a lengthy ‘tirade’ [sfogo] by Erdoğan. It characterizes Prodi’s approach as one of tactical ‘firefighting’, as contrasted to the blanket support of the British, which in Prodi’s opinion, would undermine the Commission’s balanced approach and probably cause the breakdown of the negotiations. This approach, the article suggests, created the space for the negotiations to continue on a ‘depoliticized’ and ‘technical’ level (“E Prodi rassicura,” 2006 – trans. BBC). D’Alema, meanwhile said, “the proposal of the Commission is fairly balanced, containing the signal that we want to continue the negotiations with Turkey (ibid; Leante, 2006; “L’UE affiche,” – trans. mine). This was, again, a significant contrast to the British and Spanish responses to the recommendations, which criticized the Commission’s stance as being too tough (Docquiert, 2006b).

During an early December visit to Athens, Prodi declared in a press conference after meeting with his Greek colleague Karamanlis, that “keeping doors open” was the common perspective on Turkey among the EU member states. The number of chapters to be opened or closed by the European Commission was again “a technical matter” and by giving priority to its conclusions, Prodi considered himself released of the “struggle” to make decisions about “one chapter more or less” (“Prodi: EU’s doors,” 2006). In response to the 18-month timeframe proposed by Angela Merkel at that time, Prodi replied that he proposal could even be useful for Turkey, if it gave Ankara time for its elections to pass, and therefore room to maneuver on the Cyprus issue. He was, however, against any new conditions being imposed on Turkey’s candidacy (“German-French coalition,” 2006).

When the news of the Turkish offer emerged, Prodi called the proposal “a step forward,” (“Türkei bietet,” 2006). According to multiple news sources, Italy had been one of the member states that had preferred freezing three chapters rather than eight (Boland & Parker, 2006; Weingärtner & Hillenbrand, 2006). Other sources that called Italy a driver of Turkey’s ambitions

9.4.10 Luxembourg

In 2006, Luxembourg was, again, on the brakeman side of the balance, though it had made a point more than once of not wishing to undermine Turkey’s candidacy altogether.

At the mid-November foreign Ministers meeting Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn, meeting with his EU colleagues, made no secret about his view on the Cyprus conflict when he said, “If Turkey does not budge on Cyprus, we cannot continue as if nothing has happened” (Docquiert, 2006a – trans. mine). Apart from excluding a permanent discontinuation, he remained vague about what, precisely, he was suggesting, a partial or complete suspension of negotiations (“Plassnik pour,” 2006).

On November 24, the Stuttgarter Zeitung published an interview with Jean-Claude Juncker. Regarding Turkey, he said that while…

…most people in our part of Europe cannot imagine Turkey as an EU member, it would have been a big mistake not to open accession negotiations with Turkey. Anything else in the eyes of the Turks and many others would have been seen as a European refusal to imagine a common future with Turkey. I must remark that the negotiations with Turkey are a lengthy process. Turkey must change itself fundamentally in order to be ready for accession. Turkey must also know that this phase is an open process. It is not an empty formality. Only at the end of this negotiations path will there finally be a decision about the possibility of accession. That means that it is up to Turkey to prove that it is ‘fit for Europe’.

(“Viele Polen,” 2006 – trans. mine)

With this statement Juncker defended the driver position Luxembourg had taken two years prior, as has been described in the previous episode, but that there was still strict conditionality in the membership prospects. If Turkey did not adjust, the negotiations would fail.

After the late-November breakdown of negotiations at Tampere, Asselborn commented on Turkey along those same lines. He said that nobody wanted to cut off the negotiations, but that they should maybe be put on the backburner, again without specifying if he wanted a freeze of all or only some of the negotiating chapters (Bottolier-Depois, 2006b).

Upon Asselborn’s arrival in Brussels for the December foreign ministers’ meeting, he declared: “Today it is not just Turkey that is at stake in the debates, but also the credibility of the
EU. We must show that the EU is not just an amalgam of national interests,” suggesting that the EU should stand together, rather than simply offer a lowest-common-denominator outcome (“Turquie: les 25,” 2006 – trans. mine). With ‘credibility of the EU’ he implied that the EU should take a tougher stand against Turkey about the Cyprus issue; not letting it get away with its unwillingness to open its ports, though at the same time he also said again that the EU could not “close the door completely” (“La UE, dividida,” 2006 – trans. mine). After the meeting, Asselborn declared that he and his colleagues did not want to let the matter wind up at the European Council and that nobody wanted another Turkey summit (“Acht Verhandlungs-Kapitel,” 2006; “La UE, dividida,” 2006).

The citations above can be subject to different interpretations, but by and large, reporters viewed Luxembourg more as a brakeman than anything else. Though Luxembourg did not wish to create a break with Turkey, and did not advocate for a privileged partnership, it repeatedly argued for a firmer handling of Turkey in the form of a tougher sanction for its failure to enact the additional protocol. Other articles that categorized Luxembourg as a brakeman are: “l’Europe divisée,” 2006, “Ministri EU,” 2006; Proissl, Schmid & Ehrlich, 2006.

9.4.11 Netherlands

The Netherlands proved to be a brakeman in 2006. During the year its policy on Turkey was very much dominated by the concurrent campaigns for the November 22 elections for the Tweede Kamer (lower house of parliament). In this context, there was a divide between the foreign ministry’s preferred policy on Turkey, which was more permissive of Turkey’s position on Cyprus, and that of dominant members of Parliament, who inserted get-tough-on-Turkey rhetoric into the campaigns. The elections were necessary because of the failure of the CDA-VVD-D66 coalition. The resignation of the cabinet that had taken place at the end of June, resulting from the loss of confidence by the minor social-liberal coalition party D66, put the cabinet, including Foreign Minister Ben Bot, in a ‘demissionary’ status – making the cabinet unable to make controversial decisions. It should be noted here that the Netherlands had already taken a brakeman tone toward enlargement in general before this occurred (Avril & Bouilhet, 2006; “EU-lidstaten twijfelen,” 2006).

After the European Parliament’s draft report on Turkey, drawn up by Camiel Eurlings, had been adopted in the European Parliament’s foreign relations committee, the Dutch foreign ministry appealed to the European Parliament’s “common sense” and to amend the sections about the
Armenian Genocide ("Turkije geïrriteerd," 2006). This allowed the debate over the Armenian Genocide to enter into Dutch politics, with parliamentary elections on the way, whereby both the Christian Democrats (CDA) and the Labor party (PvdA) removed Turkish candidates from their lists for not recognizing the events of 1915 as genocide. The relatively smaller centrist Christian Union (CU) even proposed an amendment to make Armenian Genocide denial a criminal offense, as France had introduced that same year (Plasterk, 2006).

In parliamentary debate, the Turkish issue had been avoided until October, when Mat Herben, the leader of the remnants of the late Pim Fortuyn’s party, motioned for government inquiries into Turkey’s willingness to opt for a privileged partnership rather than membership, if necessary in exchange for substantial compensation (Netherlands, 2002a). The CU meanwhile attempted to provoke their Christian competitors of the CDA into reopening the debate on the suitability of Turkey as a EU membership candidate, but Jan Jacob van Dijk, CDA’s foreign affairs spokesman, did not take the bait, considering such a debate ill timed at that stage, though still bound to arise at the end of the negotiations. The Cyprus issue was closer at hand, about which van Dijk and his faction suggested a suspension of negotiations until Turkey complied with the Ankara Protocol (Netherlands, 2002b).

Picking up on the Armenian Genocide debate in mid-October, Mark Rutte, the new leader of the right-wing liberal VVD, called on Turkey to stop prosecuting those who affirmed the Genocide. “If Turkey wants to become a member of the European Union,” he said, “it must never again prosecute someone who wishes to raise the question of the Armenian genocide of 1915” ("Rutte (VVD): Turkije," 2006 – trans. mine). Though he did not go as far as making the recognition itself an official condition for membership, he did see the freedom to express opinions on the matter, as well as Turkey’s official recognition of Cyprus before January 1, 2007 as a “hard condition”.

When Ben Bot called for ten rather than eight chapters to be frozen after the publication of the Commission’s recommendations (“EU-Außenminister,” 2006a; Weingärtner & Hillenbrand, 2006). This did not go far enough for the parliament. VVD foreign affairs spokesman Hans van Baalen motioned to halt negotiations altogether as long as Turkey did not comply with the additional protocol. In order to be even-handed, van Baalen’s motion suggested allowing EU trade through the ‘occupied’ Northern Cypriot port of Famagusta. Prior to debate with the foreign minister, the Dutch daily Financieele Dagblad reported the motion as having the support of CDA, VVD, PvdA (Labor) and the Socialist Party, a clear majority of the house (“Merkel ziet,” 2006). On December 7,
however, the motion was defeated when neither CDA nor PvdA supported it. This unexpected turn about was evidently brought on by some last moment’s deeper reflection on the consequences. Bot, van Dijk, and PvdA spokesman Frans Timmermans reasoned that the motion would force the Foreign Minister to unilaterally veto further accession negotiations with Turkey, which would have been a stronger stance than even Cyprus had been taking (“Bot Voelt,” 2006; Netherlands, 2006c). Explaining his vote, Timmermans argued, that a hard veto would isolate the Netherlands among the member states (Netherlands, 2002d). With the motion having failed, Bot was sent to Brussels with his earlier proposal, demanding ten frozen chapters rather than the Commission’s eight, with Chapters 7 (Intellectual Property Law) and 22 (Regional Policy) as the two additional chapters to be frozen.

The decisive foreign ministers meeting failed to adopt the Dutch proposal to also freeze chapters 7 and 22. Afterward, Bot reminded the press that since any member state could veto the unilateral opening of any chapter, the Netherlands could still prevent the two chapters from being opened if and when it chose to do so (Hekking & van Oostrum, 2006). Later, the Irish Times reported that the Netherlands, together with France, might indeed attempt to prevent the opening of any negotiations chapters before Christmas (Smythe, 2006d).


9.4.12 Portugal

As before, Portugal made little press in 2006 about its position on Turkey, but apart from two Financial Times articles, it was described as a driver.

In early November, after meeting with Portuguese State Secretary for EU Affairs Manuel Lobo Antunes, Ali Babacan announced that Portugal had once more reiterated its support to Turkey's EU membership, while Antunes declared that his country was optimistic about Turkey’s prospect to become an EU member one day and that problems faced during the negotiations could be overcome by compromises. Referring to the Cyprus problem he added that, “everybody should get on the same ship and take responsibilities” (“Portugal reiterates,” 2006).
In early December, just before the Foreign Ministers’ meeting, Prime Minister José Socrates invited Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to visit Lisbon in 2007 in order to discuss the accession negotiations and boost bilateral relations in preparation for Portugal’s assumption of the rotating Presidency later that year. In his message, he said that Portugal had always maintained a clear position regarding negotiations for the accession of Turkey to the EU and that Portugal would continue to defend clear and honest negotiations between the two sides, with the objective of completing the political and economic criteria defined in the process (“Primeiro ministro,” 2006 – trans. mine).

Ahead of the foreign ministers’ meeting, Luís Amado, Portugal’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, was cited among the member states desiring a decrease in the recommended number of chapters to be suspended (Bottolier-Depois, 2006c).

As mentioned above, the only disparity in the classification of Portugal as a driver could be found in the two Financial Times articles, one in its British edition and the other in the German version (Buck, et. al., 2006 and Proissl & Hollinger, 2006, respectively). These numbered Portugal, together with Cyprus and Greece, among the member states that had embraced the Franco-German approach toward Turkey, which proposed an eighteen-month deadline. The articles did not state why Portugal was numbered among them. Articles that numbered Portugal among the drivers were: “Cancilleres europeos,” 2006, “EU-Außenminister ringen,” 2006; “EU must make,” 2006; Ludlow, 2006b, p. 17, “Portuguese foreign minister,” 2006).

9.4.13 Spain

Despite Spain’s argument for tougher wording in the Presidency conclusions of the June European Council, Spain was a firm driver of Turkey’s ambitions in 2006 (Ludlow, 2006a, p. 61).

In mid-October, Prime Minister Zapatero traveled to Turkey to speak with Erdoğan about the ‘Alliance of Civilizations’, his 2005 initiative to stimulate international action against terrorism and broader cooperation between the West and the Middle East. In his address after meeting with his Turkish counterpart, he called the entry of Turkey into the EU an unavoidable objective, which could not be mitigated by the difficulties of negotiations. In that context, he avoided reporters’ questions about the Commission’s report and the issue of Cypriot shipping (Egurbide, 2006).

During his trip, Zapatero gave an interview to the French daily Le Figaro, in which he reaffirmed his support for Turkey in the EU. When he was asked why, he answered: “Because I
have confidence in the European project. Had this not been the case, Europe would not be here! …

Europe cannot stay quietly in his corner. We must prepare for the future beyond our borders.
Otherwise we will not be a middle power in the world of tomorrow” (Rousselin & Cambon, 2006).

What he hinted at was that Europe enlarging to Turkey would make Europe more of a power on the
world stage, while failing to do so will diminish its power and authority, being eclipsed by China and
the United States.

Meanwhile the Spanish government sent their Secretary of State for Europe, Alberto
Navarro, to attend the mid-November foreign ministers’ meeting, during which he said: “Spain
strongly supports the accession of Turkey. We think that Turkey is a European country and an ally,
and will] no doubt also help stabilize the Middle East, so we want the negotiations to progress
forward and succeed” (“España defiende,” 2006).

On the sidelines of the Mediterranean conference in Tampere and the Finnish-led
negotiations between Turkey and Cyprus, Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos declared that
Turkey should become a full member of the EU, thus implicitly dismissing talk of the privileged
partnership option (“Conferencia Euromed,” 2006). Two days later, responding to the
Commission’s recommendation to freeze eight chapters, Zapatero said, “we must leave the door
mine). He further called on the EU negotiators and Ankara to make “the maximum effort” to avoid
a crisis (Boland & Parker, 2006).

Almost immediately at the onset of the December foreign ministers’ meeting Moratinos
urged his colleagues to minimize sanctions on Turkey and warned that the decisions they were about
to make were of strategic importance and should not be rushed. Adding that all diplomatic efforts
had to be exerted to find a solution that would satisfy all parties involved, he called for a “last”
attempt to avoid a crisis (“Cancilleres europeos,” 2006 – trans. mine). Later he made Spain’s position
on the question clear when he called his country “a faithful supporter” of “a modern Turkey”
joining the European Union (Missé, 2006b).

After the meeting, Moratinos joined the chorus that publicly explained the ministers’
decision to freeze eight chapters, whereby he stressed the importance of the double signal it sent, as
there would be “no train crash”, but “a slowdown”. Even so, according to Weingärtner &
Hillenbrand (2006), Spain had been among the member states that had preferred to freeze three
chapters, rather than eight (also: Boland & Parker, 2006).

9.4.14 Sweden

In 2006, with the outspoken advocacy of its foreign minister, Carl Bildt, Sweden was, for a second episode, a driver of Turkey’s EU cause.

Bildt’s pro-Turkey speech in the EPP lions’ den of anti-Turkish sentiments in Lyon has already been recounted above. In addition to speaking likewise at other gatherings as well, Bildt authored several op-ed articles to plead Turkey’s cause. In one of these, titled “Open wide Europe’s doors,” which appeared in the International Herald Tribune on the same day that the Commission published its progress report, he sharply criticized both the concept and the wording of ‘absorption capacity’ and warned about the dangers posed by what he called a Huntingtonian clash of civilizations. His answer to the threats of political conflicts, terrorism or nuclear proliferation, in addition to the civilizational clash, was to develop (or stave off the reduction of) soft power, because “at the end of the day peace is built by thoughts and by ballots more than by tanks and by bullets.” The eventual membership of Turkey in the European Union was thereby of considerable strategic interest, not only because of the modernization of Turkey, but also because “it would have a profoundly positive impact on the prospects for stability in the entire region of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea”, adding “important elements of economic dynamism, demographic vigour and cultural diversity that could only enrich our common European efforts” (Bildt, 2006a).

Referring to the impasse over Cypriot shipping, he reminded his readers that a solution was not failing because of Turkey, but because the Greek Cypriot leadership had refused to accept the plan by the UN secretary general that had been supported by the European Union. As such, he put the onus of the solution on the Greek Cypriots, rather than on Turkey (ibid).

Nearly a month later, when the Commission published its recommendation to freeze eight chapters, Stockholm felt the proposal was too harsh. Carl Bildt’s responded that there was “a clear risk that if you brake too hard, it will be difficult to regain speed.” He and his country feared that
While the tough rhetoric on Turkey was heating up in Germany in early December, Carl Bildt again took to writing. Together with Urmas Paet, the foreign minister of Estonia, he published an op-ed in Die Welt, arguing on Turkey’s behalf. Opening their article with a plea for a European Union that was looking outward rather than inward, and noting the successes of the different enlargement rounds to poor and/or undemocratic countries, they listed reasons why Turkey ought to be considered an asset to the EU. Apart from the economic (e.g. by a facilitated flow of oil supplies to Europe) and geopolitical advantages, the EU would also benefit from Turkey’s assistance in combating terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal migration. Most important, they judged, was the symbolic value of Turkish accession vis-à-vis the Clash of Civilizations, and the spread of prosperous and stable democracy (Bildt & Paet, 2006).

Getting to the impasse at hand, they argued that while Turkey had to open its harbors and airports to Cypriot shipping, the EU should, in return, end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots in return. Even if there was no formal link between the two concerns, they were connected in terms of political reality. They further argued that reunification of the island could only be solved by tying Turkey closer to Europe, whereas a rejection of Turkey carried the risk of a permanent division of Cyprus. Praising the Finnish presidency for its efforts to broker a solution, they called on European leaders to take their responsibility and get out of the dead-end street by ensuring Turkey’s continued path toward democratic reform, prosperity and stability (ibid).

Between the publication of the Commission’s recommendations and the foreign ministers’ meeting, Bildt traveled to Ankara to stand in solidarity with the Turks. “We are both convinced of the need to retain the strategic perspective for Turkey and the EU,” he told the Turks, adding, “Whatever happens we must have a continuation of the negotiating process” (Bennhold, 2006a).

During the foreign ministers’ meeting, Bildt remained the last holdout for a more permissive approach toward Turkey. According to Ludlow’s account (2006b, p. 16), Bildt’s main argument was not about the amount of chapters to be frozen, but an adjustment of the EU’s policy toward Northern Cyprus. Although he found himself isolated on this account, it did win him an amendment to the text of the conclusions in which the EU would make “efforts towards a comprehensive
settlement of the Cyprus issue under UN auspices” (European Council, 2006, p. 14). Additionally, Bildt won a declaration on opening EU markets to Northern Cyprus, though this would not appear until January 2007, and would not lead to a substantial opening of trade with Northern Cyprus.


9.4.15 United Kingdom

Once again, the United Kingdom was viewed as one of Turkey’s main drivers, even if the British were less tactical than the Italians and less outspoken than the Swedes (or, at least, than Carl Bildt).

The issue did not receive much attention in Britain until late September when the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Carey and Cardinal Cormac Murphy O’Connor, the Catholic primate of England and Wales, questioned Turkey’s suitability for joining the EU, echoing the Pope’s Regensburg speech, which had been held on the 20th of that same month (McGarry, 2006).

When it became clear in early October that the Commission was preparing a rather critical report, while the impasse over Cyprus was far from being solved, Tony Blair and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan met at Downing Street to discuss formulae for solving the impasse, which included the plan to open Famagusta in exchange for the return of Varosha to the Greek Cypriots (MacAskill & Gow, 2006). Although the two leaders did not offer statements to the press, the meeting had apparently not led to discord between them since Blair’s spokesman maintained afterwards that, “Turkish membership in the EU is firmly in the EU's interest, to help with the fight against terrorism, human trafficking, organized crime and drugs” (“Erdogan wins,” 2006).

Soon after the Commission’s report was published, the United Kingdom made it clear that if negotiations chapters were to be frozen, the number of frozen chapters ought to be limited to three (Kranenburg, 2006b). When it became clear that the Commission recommended freezing eight chapters, Blair expressed disagreement with the Commission, accusing it of making a major strategic mistake for Europe by sending Turkey a wrong signal (Watt & Traynor, 2006). He reiterated this
position at the Riga summit, when he said that it would be a mistake to punish Turkey because it could lead to the country turning its back on Europe (Boland & Parker, 2006).

Ahead of the foreign ministers’ meeting, the United Kingdom argued for freezing three chapters rather than eight. British Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett authored an op-ed in Sabah, a Turkish daily newspaper, on December 10, in which she described Turkey as “the strategic choice of Europe” and warned her EU colleagues that pushing it away would make the EU “much poorer, weaker and less secure” (“EU braces,” 2006). After the meeting, Beckett said to the press, “I’m sorry to disappoint you. There will be no train crash. […] The train is in fact still firmly on the track,” to which she again added that Turkey’s entry into the Union was of strategic importance to both the EU and Turkey (Bennhold, 2006b).

When the heads of state and government had also endorsed the partial suspension of Turkey’s entry negotiations, Tony Blair set off for Turkey on a diplomatic mission aimed at reassuring the Turks about their continued prospects for joining the European Union, or as aides explained it, Blair was eager to reassure a wounded Turkey that Europe was not turning its back on a predominantly Muslim country (“Blair heads,” 2006).

10.0 TESTING RATIONALIST HYPOTHESES

This chapter first summarizes the dependent variable as drawn from the previous five chapters. Following that brief summary, it tests each of the rationalist hypotheses proposed in the second chapter.

Table 10.1: Member State Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10.1  I. DEPENDENT VARIABLE DESCRIPTION.

The findings of the preceding chapters are summarized in Table 10.1, above. This table shows the position of each government at each of the five episodes, according to the driver-passenger-brakeman typology. While being a good summary, it is preferable to frame the data in certain ways in order to note some patterns. Because many of the analyses below consider the long-term tendencies, it is useful to note two things about the data above. The first pattern that is useful to note is that some countries adopt a certain policy more often than other policies, and the second thing is to note the variation in their policies over time.

Table 10.2: the average policy over the five episodes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member State</th>
<th>Average Policy</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.61</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.34</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first pattern will be the dependent variable for the long-run analyses. As described in the third chapter, the dependent variable is derived by taking the average policy over the five episodes by counting each time a brakeman policy is adopted as 0, a passenger policy as 0.5, and a driver policy
as 1. This implies that the policies are treated as cardinal, rather than ordinal. The outcome of this calculation is presented in Table 10.2, above. Despite a skew toward the driver-side of the spectrum, and a fat tail toward brakeman end, this distribution is considered sufficiently normal to not reject the utility of ANOVA analyses.

Though tangential to the purpose of the study, it is interesting to note that the average policy among the member states is 0.61. In other words, the member states are generally more supportive of EU membership for Turkey than they are opposed. This contrasts a popular notion that ‘the Europeans’ are opposed to Turkey becoming a member, at least insofar as their governments are concerned. The second pattern is in terms of the variation in the policies; to what degree does each member state tend to deviate from its average policy? This is measured by the standard deviation from the mean.

Descriptively, these figures show that there are some countries that have fairly consistent policies on Turkey, either in favor of membership or opposed. (These are the countries that have a standard deviation from their average policy that is 0.34 or less.) There is also a set of members that have changed their positions significantly over the decade in question. (These are the countries that have a standard deviation from their average policy that is more than 0.34.)

Table 10.3: Member-state tendencies regarding their support or opposition to Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fairly consistent brakemen</th>
<th>Swing votes</th>
<th>(Fairly) consistent drivers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Austria</td>
<td>• Finland</td>
<td>• Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Denmark</td>
<td>• France</td>
<td>• Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Luxembourg</td>
<td>• Germany</td>
<td>• Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greece</td>
<td>• Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Netherlands</td>
<td>• Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sweden</td>
<td>• United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among this second set are France and Germany, the two most influential members of the EU member states. These are supplemented by Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In terms of standard deviation, Luxembourg might also be counted among the ‘swing votes’, though it is worthwhile to note that Luxembourg’s single deviation from its strong tendency of being a brakeman (0.2) was in 2004, when it unexpectedly changed its position from brakeman to driver.
Despite this uncharacteristic change-of-heart, it will be numbered among the brakemen. Consistent drivers are Italy and the United Kingdom, and they are usually joined by Belgium, Portugal and Spain, and occasionally by Ireland. The fairly consistent brakemen are Austria, Denmark. These tendencies are further depicted above (in Table 10.3).

The highlight of this description is that a large group of countries, including the most influential ones, does not show a consistent policy pattern. They are ‘swing votes’, in that their average position is no lower than 0.4 and no higher than 0.7, but neither do they tend to express a passenger policy. In fact, they rarely take up the passenger position (exceptions are Finland in 1997 and France in 2002). Instead, the passenger position was more often taken up by the countries that tended to usually be either among the brakemen (Austria in 1997 and 1999, and Denmark in 1999) or drivers (Belgium in 1997, Ireland in 1997, 1999, and 2006, Portugal in 1997 and 1999, and Spain in 1997).

That means that while there are doubtlessly still underlying structures, Turkey’s membership fate is not predetermined by an overwhelming political structure either for or against its membership. It also means that the time-fixed variables can only modestly explain what has transpired and that the bulk of the explanation must come from the time-sensitive variables. The sections below will demonstrate how the bulk of the hypotheses identified in Chapter 2 can be rejected (or, more accurately, that the null can fail to be rejected).

10.2 THE RATIONALIST HYPOTHESES

The remainder and bulk of this chapter shall consider the rationalist hypotheses posed in Chapter 2 according to the methodologies described in Chapter 3. They are divided into three sections. The first describes the hypotheses relating to the rational demand for security. Do NATO members tend to argue a different position than non-NATO members do? What might be the relative benefits member states might see from having Turkey as a stalwart ally in terms of its contributions to multilateral military missions? Can the different levels of threat from terrorists or from the heroin trade explain the members’ different stances on Turkey?

Following the assessment of the hypotheses relating to Security, the following section considers the hypotheses relating to power. The concepts of power are, in turn, also divided into
three sub-sections, each dealing with a different level of analysis. The first is the global level and what relative benefits Turkey’s membership might offer from the perspective the EU looking out at the world. The second is the regional/organizational level. For which members would Turkey be an ally and for which would its membership strengthen the opposite side in the intra-European disputes over such things as the alignment of the EU’s foreign policy or its external trade policy? The third sub-section looks at the domestic level. What are the differing levels of public opinion? Do countries with many immigrants, Muslims or domestic Turks behave differently than those without, in terms of their policies and their changes of policies? Are political parties a better lens for analyzing the policies?

Finally, the third section looks at hypotheses related to wealth. What are the purely economic rationales in a comparative context? What countries stand to gain or lose in terms of the EU opening its agricultural markets more to Turkish produce and Turkish consumers? What are the different levels of trade and investment? Perhaps the threat or promise of migrant Turkish labor helps explain member-state policies regarding Turkey.

10.3 SECURITY

The following sections measure the degree to which the security-related hypotheses help explain member-state policies regarding Turkey. The first section considers membership in the transatlantic security regime of NATO. The second looks at participation in multilateral military missions. The second and third sections consider the transnational threats of terrorism and crime.

10.3.1.1 NATO Membership

Hs1: NATO members are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than non-NATO members are.

The NATO-dimension is one that measures a time-fixed variable against the long-run policies of the member states. Of the fifteen member states being analyzed, ten are full members of NATO, four are non-members, and France is a member without being integrated into the NATO command
structure. The following table, depicts the member states and their corresponding levels of support, with the members higher up in the table being more supportive than those lower down.

**Table 10.4**: NATO-membership and long-run levels of support for Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Support</th>
<th>NATO Members</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Non-NATO Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Italy, UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Belgium, Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Finland, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Germany, Greece, Neth.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Finland, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While there is certainly a cadre of NATO-members that is highly supportive of Turkey, Turkey’s most stalwart opponents, Denmark and Luxembourg, are also members of that organization. Among the non-members, for that matter, they show more modest approaches toward Turkey, with Austria and Sweden at the less-supportive end and Finland and Ireland at the more supportive end.

In numbers, the average level of support from the NATO members is 0.67, while that of the non-members is an even 0.5. Because the member states that are most antagonistic toward the idea of Turkish membership (Denmark and Luxembourg) are, however, NATO members, this difference in averages is not significant, as the F-score in the ANOVA test only comes to 1.072 – well below a degree that would imply a causal relationship. The null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between NATO membership and enlargement policy on Turkey cannot be rejected. Therefore, hypothesis Hs1 will not be accepted.
10.3.1.2 Multilateral Military Missions

**Hs2:** Those member states who contribute more to the missions that Turkey also contributes to are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who contribute less.

The EU-15 participated in three multilateral military missions together with Turkey. These were acronymmed SFOR/Althea, KFOR, and OEF/ISAF. SFOR was the NATO-led mission to secure and stabilize Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina after the wars of the early and mid-1990s in those countries. In 2004, SFOR was handed over to the EU under EUFOR’s Operation Althea. KFOR was the NATO-led mission to stabilize Kosovo after its breakaway war with Serbia. OEF and ISAF were the US/NATO-led missions to defeat the Taliban and create security in Afghanistan.

All of the EU-15 member states participated in at least one these missions during at least four of the episodes being analyzed. The only countries that were not deployed together with Turkey in all five episodes were Sweden and Ireland, who were not yet deployed in the Balkans in 1998. Other multilateral missions were associated with these NATO-led missions. UN missions such as UNMIBH, which involved mostly Civilian Police officers. The numbers for these associated missions are included if they were non-observers in the same country as the mission was taking place in.

**Table 10.5:** Cross-tab Levels of Deployment by Episode-by-episode Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low-level Co-deployment</th>
<th>Medium-level Co-deployment</th>
<th>High-level Co-deployment</th>
<th>totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brakemen</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passengers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>γ = 0.013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.5, above, cross-tabulates the levels of co-participation with the policies on Turkish membership, in each episode. It shows a distribution without much direction (γ = 0.013), in that the nine cells are generally populated as one would expect from any random distribution based on the totals. Based on a proportional reduction of error, one only improves one’s guess of what a member
state’s policy was over the blanket assumption that any given country was a driver (as, at any given moment, 53% of member states were) by 1.3%.

Speaking more descriptively, from a cross-tabulation that lists the countries with the years in the different cells, it shows that the picture is indeed muddled. Countries that have served in the field with Turkey the most – Italy, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands – have strikingly different orientations with regard to membership. Italy and the United Kingdom have been Turkey’s stalwart defenders, while Denmark has been Turkey’s most steady opponent. The Netherlands, whose troops, proportionally, have been co-deployed with the Turks the most, have been either Turkey’s strong allies (1997, 1999, 2004) or very much opposed to Turkey’s progress through the enlargement regime (2002, 2006).

**Table 10.6: Cross-tab of Levels of Co-deployment and Member states’ Episodic Policies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low-level co-deployment</th>
<th>Medium-level co-deployment</th>
<th>High-level co-deployment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal (1999)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain (2002)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden (2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 10.1: Co-deployment of Troops and Policies Regarding Turkish Membership
Contrariwise, those countries that have been deployed the least – Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Austria, also have a mixed record. Austria, of course, has tended to oppose Turkey frequently, while the Iberians have tended to be supportive. Ireland has been supportive on two occasions, but has mostly been silent on the question of Turkish membership when it has come to the public debate. France and Sweden have varied considerably in both co-deployment and support for membership, but without any discernable pattern between the two measures. Germany, which (1997 aside) has mostly done its part in terms of troops has been either opposed or supportive of Turkey, depending on what year is being assessed, again, without a clear pattern.

The time-series graphs (Figure 10.1) do not demonstrate support for the hypothesis. In these figures, the blue lines represent the proportional troop-deployment rates in % of troops deployed on multilateral missions in proportion to each contributing nation’s army size. The red lines represent the policies on Turkey. Denmark, Luxembourg, and Sweden have graphs that seem to show a similar pattern between the proportional troop deployment rate and their policies on Turkey. Austria and Finland, on the other hand, shows the reverse, that when co-deployment increased, their appetite for Turkish membership were at their lowest. For the rest, there does not look to be a relationship between troop deployment and enlargement policy for Turkey.

The removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and the subsequent occupation of that country by the United States and its ‘coalition of the willing’ has not yet been mentioned. This very high-profile event is clearly another significant military-security development during the same decade that is being investigated by this research. What sets it apart from the SFOR, KFOR and OEF/ISAF missions is that France, Germany, Belgium, Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, Greece, and Austria did not participate in that effort. Denmark, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, on the other hand, did participate in the Multinational Force that occupied Iraq (MNF-Iraq) after the invasion.

Given that the 2002 decision took place in the context of the contentious politics of the run-up to that event, it is worth looking at this conflict, despite its significantly different character than the other missions because of the heated divisions among the member states over the justification for and wisdom of the Iraq war. It is also significantly different because Turkey did not participate, nor did the Turks allow the invasion force to use its territory to open a northern front, save for the use of its airspace to deploy paratroopers. By the time of the Copenhagen European Council in 2002, however, Turkey had not yet decided on its policy vis-à-vis the Iraq war, or if Ankara would permit the United States to use its territory. This included the Turks themselves, as there was an
intense struggle within the recently elected government with the AKP-leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pushing for an opening of the front, and interim Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, seeking to send a signal of support to the EU-members that opposed the military effort on Iraq (Kapsis, 2006).

From an objective-rationalist point of view, then, those countries that had an interest in assisting the United States, either out of a security interest in Iraq or from the perspective of maintaining strong relations with the United States, also had an interest in Turkey’s assistance, either in supplying troops, or by permitting a northern front. Certainly, the United States put a great amount of diplomatic effort into convincing the Turks to do so, and pressuring the EU-15, and especially the Danes who held the rotating presidency, to accept Turkey’s demand for accession negotiations to begin.

From the perspective of how the MNF-Iraq participants among the EU-15 stood on allowing Turkey to move forward with accession negotiations, as opposed to the non-participants, the lineup does not offer a valuable predictor variable. While the larger participants of the MNF-Iraq (Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, as well as Portugal) were strong supporters of Turkey’s ambitions, Denmark and the Netherlands – who were no less eager contributors to the mission in Iraq – were clearly against opening accession negotiations with Turkey. The same is true on the non-participant side. While Belgium, Germany and Ireland were supportive of Turkey, Luxembourg, Sweden and Finland were not. France was in the middle ground, acting as the broker on Turkey, while taking a clear stand against the war in Iraq.

Table 10.7: Participation in the Occupation of Iraq and Policies Regarding Turkish Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2002</th>
<th>MNF-Iraq Participants</th>
<th>MNF-Iraq Non-Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brakemen</td>
<td>• Denmark</td>
<td>• Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Netherlands</td>
<td>• Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td></td>
<td>• France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers</td>
<td>• Italy</td>
<td>• Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Portugal</td>
<td>• Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Spain</td>
<td>• Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• UK</td>
<td>• Ireland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The several test to discern a relationship between military missions and member states’ policy regarding Turkey have failed to demonstrate any link between the two variables. A cross-tabulation calculating a gamma measure offers a negligible reduction in error as compared to a random distribution. So too, the time-series analyses fail to find any pattern over changes in policy that would reflect changes in troop deployments in multilateral missions. Looking at the Iraq war likewise failed to help discern the drivers from the brakemen. Given the hypothesis’ failure in these tests to garner any support, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

10.3.1.3 Terrorism

Hs3: Those member states that have suffered from terrorism in the past more are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have suffered less.

The analytical method described in Chapter 3 yields 32 different ways of looking at the level of threat from terrorism in the fifteen EU member states. Some counted strikes, others fatal and injurious incidents, deaths and a weighted composite of deaths and injuries. Each of these can be put in absolute and relative terms and in four time-lag scenarios. Below are the γ-rates that have been calculated for each of these scenarios. The findings of these tests are listed in Table 10.8 for the absolute numbers and Table 10.9 for the relative numbers.

Of these different γ-rates, the model counting terrorist incidents with a cumulative time-lag of one year and counting deaths with a cumulative time-lag of three years both produce a γ-rate of γ = 0.48. This indicates that guessing at a member state’s policy based on each of those two calculations improves one’s chance of guessing correctly by 48%. These are not inconsiderable.

Table 10.8: γ-rates for levels of severity and degrees of time-lag, absolute numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Absolute numbers</th>
<th>Time lag 0</th>
<th>Time lag 1</th>
<th>Time lag 2</th>
<th>Time lag 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatal and Injurious Incidents</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty composite</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10.9: $\gamma$-rates for levels of severity and degrees of time-lag, relative numbers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative to population</th>
<th>Time lag 0</th>
<th>Time lag 1</th>
<th>Time lag 2</th>
<th>Time lag 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatal and Injuries</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualty composite</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By comparison, using those same numbers in proportion to population yielded less impressive reductions in error. The figures looking at the incidents in a one-year time lag and the casualty composite in one-year and three-year time lag model, yielded result in the 0.40s. As such, the relative numbers models tend to be less adequate for predicting policies vis-à-vis Turkey than the absolute numbers. What is, at least, certain is that higher incidence of terrorism does not dissuade a member state from supporting Turkey for EU membership, as all of the $\gamma$-rates in all of the scenarios are positive.

Because the $\gamma$-rates in the absolute numbers scenario provided higher reductions in error, the relative numbers will be dismissed from further analysis. Among the $\gamma$-rates in the absolute numbers table, the 1-year time lag incidents and the 3-year time lag deaths proved to have the higher values. Because the 3-year time lag represents more autocorrelation, and, therefore, less variation over time, the 1-year time lag will be used to conduct a graphic/ocular time-series analysis in the same fashion as was done for the multilateral military missions variable. These graphs are depicted below.

In the graphs, note that for countries with many incidents of terrorism (France, Germany, Greece and Spain) the scale has been multiplied by ten, and Italy and the United Kingdom have been scaled by two, as compared to the other member states. The graphs, which depict the change of policy together with the annually changing number of terrorist incidents (regardless of severity), have a fairly high degree of compatibility with one another for a number of member states. When considered with a one-year time lag - where the year of the decision and the year prior are considered - changes in the amount of terrorist incidents seem to explain changes in policy for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands.
Figure 10.2: Terrorist Incidents (right y-axis, blue) and Policy (left y-axis, red)
More generally, as in not being precise about the exact number of years prior to decisions, understanding that policy solutions to social problems have a variable response rates, a few graphs can be seen as having terrorism explain policy regarding Turkey. France, generally, sees support for Turkey diminish after the threat of terrorism has diminished. France had more terrorist incidents in the late 1990s than it did in the 2000s, when the policy on Turkey membership began to turn toward one of antagonism. Germany, on the other hand, experienced a significant reduction in the annual amount of terrorist strikes in the 1990s. In the years prior to the policy change, Germany had significantly more terrorist incidents (1994: 79, 1995: 148, 1996: 49), many of which were incidents directly related to Turkey due to the Kurdish separatist movement. The annual number of incidents had already diminished markedly, as shown in the graph, by the time the policy had changed.

In the context of long-term policy, taking the average amount incidents of terrorism per year and correlating that with the average policy, the correlation coefficient is $r = 0.31$. Compared with the proportional reduction of error by 48%, this means that taking the developments of terrorist incidents over time produces greater predictive ability than simply measuring the average. However, there are some clear limitations. Finland, Luxembourg and Portugal did not have any incidents of terrorism as defined by the three criteria of terrorism referred to in the third chapter. As such, terrorism cannot explain their policy changes. In the cases of Italy and the United Kingdom, the policies did not change, despite marked changes in the amount of terrorist strikes. As such, changes in the threat of terrorism cannot explain member-state policies on Turkey for these countries.

Changing levels of terrorist threat, however, can help to somewhat explain countries like Austria, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands. For these countries, higher levels of terrorist incidents do coincide with higher levels of support. Over the broad range, however, this hypothesis is far from explaining the behavior of all member states at all episodes. It would need to be coupled with other variables in order to get a more complete understanding of the factors that could explain member-state policies regarding Turkey’s membership ambitions.

10.3.1.4 Security from Transnational Crime

Hs4: Those member states that suffer more from the heroin trade are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have suffered less from the heroin trade.
The threat of transnational crime emanating out of, or through, Turkey, as measured by the threats arising from the trade and use of heroin, demonstrate a tendency at direct odds with the expectations of the hypothesis. In terms of comparing the average tendency of member states to support Turkey against the average number of drug-induced deaths per million in the years 1995-2006, there is a correlation coefficient of $r = -0.48$. Graph 10.1 shows the scatter plot and regression line associated with this measurement.

To the degree, then, that drug related deaths predicts member-state positions regarding Turkey, it is a negative relationship. More deaths tends to strongly coincide with lower levels of support for Turkish membership. From the perspective of solutions to the policy problem of Turkish transnational crime syndicates bringing heroin to the member states, it is clearly not the case that the promise of greater capacity to cooperate on solutions to the policy problem encourages member states to be more supportive. The contrary is true. Gürer (2008) suggests that fear of crime is a contributing factor to negative public perceptions about Turkish membership in countries that have many Turkish immigrants. This may begin to explain why the coefficient found in the test above is negative.

Graph 10.1: Drug-related deaths

![Graph 10.1: Drug-related deaths](image)

Figure 10.3: Drug-related Deaths.
Regarding the test of this hypothesis in a time-sensitive format, by calculating the proportional reduction of error it shows that the relationship is less significant. Table 10.10, below, shows proportional reduction of error rates that the number of deaths from heroin, relative to population, has a gamma-ratio of \( \gamma = 0.34 \). As with the correlation coefficient above, the proportional reduction of error is negative, in that those countries with more heroin-induced deaths are slightly less likely to support Turkey than those countries with fewer victims of that drug.

**Table 10.10: \( \gamma \)-rates for the opiate-induced deaths variable**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative to population</th>
<th>Time lag 0</th>
<th>Time lag 1</th>
<th>Time lag 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opiate-related drug-induced deaths</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While there is a medium strength correlation, the direction of the correlation and the reduction of error is one that is contrary to the expectations of the hypothesis. Certainly, then, the hypothesis must be rejected.

### 10.4 POWER

The following sections measure the degree to which the power-related hypotheses help explain member-state policies regarding Turkey. The first two look at power at the international level, the following three consider the EU-level of analysis, and the final four analyze the domestic level of analysis.

#### 10.4.1 Power at the international level

This sub-section considers two power-related concepts at the international level. The first hypothesis tests to see of countries with an Atlanticist foreign policy persuasion have a different appreciation of the prospect of Turkish membership than the members with a continentalist foreign
policy persuasion do. Afterwards, the second hypothesis considers member-state positions on trade with third countries.

### 10.4.1.1 Atlanticism vs. continentalism

**Hp1: Those member states that exhibit a more Atlanticist foreign policy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have a more continental or neutral foreign policy.**

Much like the assessment of NATO, this is an ordinal-level independent variable measured against the long-run tendency of member-state supportiveness. As mentioned in the chapter on methodology, the Atlanticism vs. continentalism variable is treated as a three-way ordinal variable, with the Atlanticists on the high end of the variable, the continentals at the low end, and a category for intermediate states between them. Pursuant to the literature (e.g. Coolsaet, 2009; Ferreira-Pereira, 2007; Foradori & Rosa, 2008; Frain, 1997; Hampson, 2000; Howorth, 2002; 2003; Keohane, 2001; Lee-Ohlsson, 2009; Mouritzen, 2006; Rynning, 2003; Rieker, 2004), the following table represents the member states according to their place in the categories, in a similar manner as Table 10.4 above.

A few amendments have however been made to what the literature survey would suggest. While most of the sources referenced for Spain (Frain, 1997; Howorth, 2002), treat Spain as orienting toward the continent rather than toward the United States, the reverse categorization was made due to Spain’s close alliance with the United States during the Aznar period. Knowing of Spain’s strong support for Turkey, this determination has been made to offer the benefit of the doubt to the hypothesis. The same was done for Italy, which the literature suggests has been fairly schizophrenic between the Foreign and Defense Ministries. Again, the Berlusconi regime’s support of the United States during the decade, and Italy’s similar stance on Turkey are the reasons for this.

In the table, rather than showing a strong positive relationship between the independent and the dependent variable, the pattern resembles an H-pattern, with strong supporters and opponents of Turkey’s membership in both the Atlanticist and continental camps. Nevertheless, the intermediates/neutrals tend toward the middle-range, aside from Austria. While the Atlanticists are, on average 17% more supportive than the continentals, that difference in averages does not take into account the greater spread in policy preferences among the Atlanticists with Denmark on the one end and the UK and Italy on the other.
Table 10.11: Atlanticism vs. Continentalism and Long-run Level of Support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Support</th>
<th>Continents</th>
<th>Intermediates/Neutrals</th>
<th>Atlanticists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy, UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Finland, Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Germany, Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, that advantage completely dissipates when Spain and Italy are categorized as the literature suggests that they ought to be. Furthermore, the F-value in the ANOVA test only comes out to 1.0636. As such, the null-hypothesis cannot be rejected.

10.4.1.2 External Trade

**Hp2: Those member states that exhibit a trade policy similar to Turkey’s expected trade policy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have a trade policy at odds with Turkey’s expected trade policy.**

Similarly as before, the external trade preferences are a three-way categorical variable measured against the long-run policy preferences on Turkish membership. The data is taken from Woolcock’s (2005) assessment of member states’ positions on deciding how open the EU will be in its trade policy with the world outside its borders and economic area. Those who advocate for freer trade are liberals; those who argue against are protectionist. Five of the member states take an in-between position, swinging their vote depending on their particular interest at each juncture. The table below depicts where the member states are on both the category as well as their long-run level of support for Turkey.
The results from this table show that many of the protectionists are in favor of Turkish membership, with only France at the medium long-run level of support. Both the swing-voting states and the liberals exhibit broad ranges from brakemen to drivers, with the liberals at both extremes of the policy spectrum. Though the average level of support from the protectionists (0.8) is markedly higher than that for the liberals (0.57), the average support of the liberals remains in the more positive half of the spectrum; only slightly lower than the average level of support from all the member states (0.61). The F-value in the ANOVA test comes out to 1.3169, which does not rise to a level of significance.

If it were true that seeking allies on the EU’s external trade policy was a major consideration for a member state’s enlargement preferences, then in this distribution one could see that Italy, Spain and Portugal might desire Turkey as an ally in helping them maintain Europe’s protectionist policies. It would not explain why Liberals like the United Kingdom, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands would support Turkey more often than they did not. Given these facts, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that trade preferences and the member states preferences on Turkish membership are not related.

Table 10.12: External Trade Preferences and the Long-run Level of Support for Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Support</th>
<th>Protectionists</th>
<th>Swing-votes</th>
<th>Liberals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Germany,</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In contradiction to the external trade policy preferences as Woolcock typifies them, when measuring against the actual degrees of external trade the relationship between the degree of external trade and the levels of support for Turkey return a significant and positive relationship. Countries with greater degrees of external trade – the share of trade done with countries outside of the European Economic Area over overall trade – are more likely to be supportive of Turkey than those whose trade is more within the European Economic Area (EEA).

Graph 10.2 shows the scatterplot and regression line of the relationship. The correlation coefficient between the two variables is at an impressive $r = 0.59$, one of the highest correlation coefficients found in the course of this research. It should, however, be noted that the range of the variation in the independent variable ranges from 10% (Luxembourg) and 24% (Greece) of trade being trade outside of the EEA. The stalwart drivers of Turkey’s membership ambitions, Italy and the United Kingdom both have external trade as 22% of the total (putting them on the same place in the plot), with Belgium close by also at 22%. The habitual brakemen, Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden are in the lower-left hand corner with external trade shares of 10%-16%. The odd-members-out are Portugal and Ireland, which have tended to be positive toward Turkey despite having relatively small shares of their trade being with countries outside of the EEA.

**Graph 10.2: External Trade**

![Graph 10.2: External Trade](image)

**Figure 10.4: External Trade**
Another thing that becomes clear in an examination of the data is that there is very little variation in the independent variable over time. Countries that tend to have larger shares of external trade tend to stay that way, and those that have less also tend to stay that way throughout the twelve years for which measures were taken (1994-2006). As such, this variable cannot explain why states might change their position over time. In fact, tracking the independent variable over time and calculating the proportional reduction of error reduces the statistical relationship from $r = 0.59$ to $\gamma = 0.44$. In comparison to other measures in this chapter and the next, $\gamma = 0.44$ is still noteworthy, but it shows that considering external trade over time reduces its power of prediction over a simple correlation between the case-averages of both the independent and dependent variables.

This relationship is only theoretically significant, however, if it means that the external traders could hope to gain an ally in the EU’s councils and parliament with Turkey’s accession. Turkey’s own ratio of external trade to internal trade is exactly the same as the European average of 17%. This does not suggest that Turkey would go either one way or another in its external trade preferences. Much of its external trade is (also not unlike Europe) with neighboring countries that supply energy resources. So, while there is certainly an interesting relationship between the two variables, it is difficult to make sense of in light of the indeterminate nature of Turkey’s future preferences. The hypothesis cannot be rejected, because it is clear that countries that trade more with partners outside of the EEA clearly show a preference for Turkish membership, while those who trade less with such partners have a disinclination toward Turkey. However, it does leave question marks that will have to be dealt with.

10.4.2 Power at the regional or organizational level

Having considered the international level of analysis, the following four sections regard the EU-level of analysis, measuring to what degree previous enlargement policies explain enlargement preferences regarding Turkey, whether Eurosceptic countries are more likely to want to widen the EU in order to prevent deepening the EU, to what degree population sizes may influence the policy, and if there is a difference between net-donors and net-recipients from the EU budget.
10.4.2.1 Enlargement Policy

Hp3: Those member states that have exhibited preferences for swift enlargement to Eastern Europe are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than those who have opposed swift enlargement.

If all enlargements were equal, it should be expected that enlargement policy would be set depending on member states’ preferences for a larger Union, or, conversely, for a European Union without more members. That same weighing of preferences ought to match the preferences expressed in member states’ preferences on the enlargement round that brought ten and two new members into the EU.

As the first ten new member states of Central and Eastern Europe (and the Mediterranean) were in the process of joining as Turkey was also starting the process, there is not an excessive time-lag effect that might indicate that member states changed their minds on enlargement. Any difference between the member states’ policies regarding the new member states and those regarding Turkey should reflect member states’ opinions particularly regarding Turkey as different from the other candidates.

**Table 10.13: Previous Enlargement Preferences and Long-run Level of Support for Turkey**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Support</th>
<th>Brakemen</th>
<th>Drivers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Spain, Belgium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Germany, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10.13 shows how the brakemen and drivers in the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement in regard to their policies on Turkey. It shows a curious pattern. Aside from the United Kingdom and Luxembourg as outliers, the brakemen in the enlargement process toward Central and Eastern Europe were markedly more supportive of Turkey than the drivers of that enlargement process. In fact, the average level of support for Turkish enlargement by the countries that had previously been brakemen was 0.18 more than for the drivers of that round. Though the ANOVA test results in an F-score of 1.5919, which is higher than the previous tests have been (though still not to the level of being significant), the results point in an opposite direction than the hypothesis would predict. The hypothesis must, therefore, be rejected. It cannot be said that general preferences on enlargement determined member states’ support for Turkey.

10.4.2.2 Euroscepticism

Hp4: More Eurosceptic member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than less Eurosceptic member states.

Below is the table that compares tendencies in government policy toward deeper European integration. Soetendorp’s (1999) typology is used as the independent variable.

Table 10.14: Integration Preferences and Long-run Level of Support for Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Support</th>
<th>Deepeners</th>
<th>Swing-votes</th>
<th>Non-Deepeners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>Belgium, Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Finland, Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Germany, Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table demonstrates no support for the theory that the member states that are reluctant or hostile toward deeper integration are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership. Certainly the United Kingdom and Portugal fit the mold of being advocates for Turkey and hesitant on deeper integration, but the opposition is held only by Luxembourg. Contrariwise, the quadrant that hold the enthusiasts for deeper integration and Turkish membership is well-populated: Italy, Belgium, Spain, Finland and Ireland. This is something that the hypothesis would predict against. With an F-score in the ANOVA test of 0.4941, the hypothesis is rejected.

10.4.2.3 Large vs. Small

Hp5: Larger member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than smaller member states.

In international politics, as in EU politics, size tends to matter. Population size against the long-run Turkey policy produces a noteworthy result. In terms of policy regarding Turkey’s membership ambitions, it is noteworthy that the large countries (Germany, France, The United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) have an average likelihood to support Turkey that is 0.54 more than the average smaller country is likely to be supportive. However, that assessment needs to be tempered by the realization that Germany and France, the two most populous member states, are, on their own, only 6% more likely to be supportive than the smaller countries are. The high big-country average support level is due to Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, which have been highly supportive of Turkish membership. Among the smaller countries, there is a broad range between the small brakemen, like Luxembourg, Denmark and Austria against the drivers, like Belgium, Portugal, and Finland.
Figure 10.5: Population Size

Graph 10.3 (Figure 10.5), above, depicts the scatterplot of the policies by population size with a regression line. What is clearly evident is that the regression line has very large residuals remaining and that it poorly predicts how a member state will argue for or against Turkey purely based on a member state’s population size. The correlation coefficient is $r = 0.42$, which is not inconsiderable, relative to other correlation coefficients found in this research. The clear limitation of this hypothesis, however, is its static nature over time. It will be worthwhile to test this variable in conjunction with independent variables that provide variation over time in multivariate models.

10.4.2.4 The EU Budget

Hypothesis 6: net-recipient states are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than net-donor states are.

This hypothesis is grounded in the idea that net-recipients want to remain net-recipients, and if they have another net-recipient among their ranks – especially a large one that can make itself heard –
they will have an easier time doing so. This logic is contrary to the one that believes that net-recipients ought to be worried about having to share the limited funds available. To the degree that there is a motive that is tied to such a redistribution of resources, it is certainly the case that the net-recipients are, on average, more likely to be supportive of Turkey than the net-donors. The average long-run level of support from the net-recipients (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) is 0.75 as opposed to 0.56 for the net-donors. In terms of correlation, the relationship has a correlation coefficient of $r = 0.21$, which is a weak correlation.

Graph 10.4 (Figure 10.6), on the next page, depicts a scatterplot of the policies by distribution on the budget. The data was taken from the reports of the European Court of Auditors (1995-2006). The graph shows that a foursome of net-donors inhabits the brakeman area in the lower-left quadrant of the plot, while the net-recipients all inhabit the upper-right quadrant. These two sets fit the hypothesis. However, there are six member states that are both generally supportive of Turkey and net-donors. In particular the United Kingdom, Italy and Belgium inhabit a space close to the upper-left corner. The Netherlands and Germany, both major net-donors, also have the tendency to be supportive more than they are antagonistic toward Turkey. France, a net-donor - but only barely – inhabits the 0.5 mark on the long-run policy measure.

The regression line that depicts the sum of least squares has a modest inclining slope, but has very large residuals, suggesting that there is not a significant relationship between the two variables. Given this, the null hypothesis – that there is no relationship between the EU budget and Turkey policy – cannot be rejected. However, this finding does not mean that no lessons can be drawn. The main void on the plot is in the lower-right quadrant, where the net-recipient brakemen ought to be if there were any. What this demonstrates, at least, is that net-recipients do not fear having to share the EU’s wealth with a larger poorer country more than they have other reasons for deciding their policy.
Having rejected most of the previous hypotheses aside from the one that looks at member-state size, the following sections consider political variables at the domestic level of analysis, namely: public opinion, political ideology of the government in power, political change and political change couple with immigration politics. These hypotheses, contrary to the central assumptions of international relations theory, prove to be much more powerful in predicting member states’ policies.
10.4.3.1 Public Opinion

Hp7: Member states with public opinion more predominantly against Turkish membership are less likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with public opinion less predominantly against Turkish membership.

While there have been numerous public opinion polls about Turkey, there are many complications in the data. Only Eurobarometer has systematically assessed public opinion among all the EU member states. They have also done so for several years, but not all that correspond with the episodes analyzed in this research. Table 10.15 shows in what years, and months, the question: “For each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future?” was asked. Given that 2002 and 2004 are not featured, it is necessary to allow the nearest preceding date to measure the level of public support for Turkish membership for any moment of decision in each of the five episodes. The exception must be the 2004 decision, as the nearest preceding survey question on Turkey was asked in November 2001, three years earlier. For 2004, then, it is necessary to use the June 2005 survey as the proxy for public opinion in late 2004.

Table 10.15: Months of Eurobarometer Surveys Featuring the Same Question on Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public opinion on Turkey was asked in several Eurobarometer surveys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measuring the proportional reduction in error, when also taking the independent variable as an ordinal-level variable (using the lowest-third, middle-third, and top-third as the categories, as done
before), produces a gamma ratio of $\gamma = 0.39$. That means that public opinion produces slightly less than 40% of the variation in member-state policies.

However, a correlation between the long-run policy and the average public opinion measure produces a Pearson correlation coefficient of $r = 0.54$, which indicates a medium to strong level of correlation. That means that countries that generally have low public opinion support for Turkish membership also tend to have brakeman policies. There are few clear outliers (though Sweden seems a bit out of the norm, given a generally positive public disposition toward Turkey coupled with a generally brakemanlike policy), suggesting that the trend holds, but there is still room to investigate other variables.

However, the relationship between policy and public opinion this begs the question of which variable is actually the independent variable and which is the dependent variable? Do the policymakers follow public opinion, or do they shape public opinion with their political rhetoric? Because public opinion is very frequently cited as the reason for the reluctance of the member states to support Turkey, it is worthwhile to explore this variable a bit closer by way of comparison graphs.

In the graphs below (Figure 10.7), it should be noted that the scale of the left y-axis for public opinion runs between +0.3 (meaning that 30% more respondents were in favor than they were against) and −0.9 (meaning that 90% more respondents were against Turkish membership than were in favor of it). The thin horizontal line marks where the break-even point of public opinion, where Turkey has equal numbers of supporters as opponents among the respondents.

The average level of public support, over the range of observation, both across time and across case, is −0.2, meaning that, generally, opponents outnumber supporters by 20% of the population. This means that the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU is deeply unpopular in most EU countries. This is contrasted by the fact that most countries at most times have been supportive of Turkey, counter to what public opinion would suggest they should be.

Gauging the fit between public opinion and policy depends on the supposed coefficient – how much should public opinion have to change in order to expect a change in policy? This can easily be different for different cases depending on how sensitive a state’s politics are to its public opinion. However, the hypothesis predicts a positive relationship quite separate from the size of the coefficient. Given this, it is still possible to make some observations of the independent variable compared to the dependent variable. The two variables need to move in tandem, or, at least, changes in policy should follow changes in public opinion. The following paragraphs detail the cases that support the hypothesis, that do not contradict the hypothesis, and those that do contradict the
Figure 10.7: Public Opinion (right y-axis, blue) and Policy on Turkey (left y-axis, red).
Table 10.16: Cases that Support, Contradict and are Neutral Toward Hypothesis Hp7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Contradiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• France,</td>
<td>• Belgium,</td>
<td>• Austria,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ireland,</td>
<td>• Denmark,</td>
<td>• Finland,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Portugal,</td>
<td>• Luxembourg,</td>
<td>• Germany,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Spain,</td>
<td>• Netherlands,</td>
<td>• Greece,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• United Kingdom</td>
<td>• Sweden</td>
<td>• Italy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

hypothesis. Table 10.16, above, offers an overview. The cases that lend support to the hypothesis are: France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. France's public opinion gradually soured toward Turkey, as did its policy. Ireland’s public opinion has been very supportive, and in 2002, when public opinion spiked, Ireland’s policy also changed from a passenger policy to a driver policy. The downturn of public opinion anticipated the return to a passenger policy by a couple of years. Portugal has had relatively high levels of public support for Turkish membership in the EU, and its policy came to reflect that starting in 2002.

Spain has had the highest level of public support out of all of the member states, and its policy (1997 excepted) has reflected this. The oddity, however, is that Spain’s policy shift from passenger to driver occurred concurrent with a slight downturn in public opinion. Overall, Spain’s public opinion has also declined since the late 1990s, but this does appear to be sufficient to have caused a change in policy. That is also not surprising in comparison to other member-states’ public opinions regarding Turkey, given that Spain’s public support for Turkish membership remained well above the average. With the marginal exception of September 2006, this public opinion has even remained positive in that more people were supportive of Turkish membership than were opposed. The United Kingdom’s public opinion has been relatively upbeat about Turkey, as has its policy. This policy was maintained in 2006, despite a marked decline in public support in that year, possibly in response to the London underground attacks.

Several of the member states show a pattern that does not contradict or lend support to the hypothesis. These are Belgium, Denmark, and Sweden. Belgium’s public opinion has remained largely flat on the issue, while the policy moved from one of being a passenger in 1997 and a driver thereafter. It does not contradict the hypothesis, but neither does it lend support. For Denmark,
there is also not much change in public opinion. While there is a lapse in Denmark’s strong opposition to Turkey in 1999, that is not accompanied by an upswing in public opinion. In fact, there is a very slight downturn just before the 1999 episode, which is followed by a slight increase in public favor. When Denmark’s policy turns back against Turkey, this is concurrent with a slight downturn again, but not markedly below the level of 1999. Comparing Denmark to Belgium, it is further noteworthy that Denmark’s public opinion on Turkey is, on average, only one percentage point different than Belgium’s, while their policies are in opposition to one another.

Luxembourgers have a low opinion of Turkey joining the EU, and this is reflected in their government’s policy. However, in 2004 the government shifted its policy in favor, despite a significant concurrent downturn (from -0.29 to –0.50 between November 2002 and June 2005). Something else must explain Luxembourg’s momentary change of heart regarding Turkey. The Netherlands’s policy regarding Turkey only very generally follows public opinion in that public opinion is more supportive (or less antagonistic) in the early years, 1997 and 1999, and then soured (somewhat) later on in 2002, 2004 and 2006. In 2004, however, when the Netherlands’ policy changed from antagonism to support, in their role of the rotating EU presidency, public opinion had not changed. If anything, it declined 2% between November 2002 and June 2005.

In the case of Sweden, based on the graph, a case can be made that policy followed the change in public opinion, in that the brakeman policy occurred when public opinion toward Turkey was declining, and it moved toward a driver policy when public opinion markedly improved. However, this does not explain the case in comparison to other cases. Why should Sweden, with relatively high levels of public support in the brakeman years (1997, 1999, and 2002) should have embraced a brakeman policy, while others, with drastically lower levels of public support (e.g. Belgium, Finland, Germany, and Greece).

The cases that outright contradict expectations are Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece, and Italy. Austria’s dramatic rise in public antagonism toward Turkish membership follows Austria’s policy change by at least a year. This means that it is not the case that Austria’s political elite followed their public toward a brakeman position. If anything, it suggests that the reverse, that the political leadership moving public opinion against Turkey, is possible. It is, however, the only case where this is clearly plausible.

Finland, bizarrely, seems to only improve its policy toward Turkey when public opinion is moving in the opposite direction, if modestly so. Furthermore, the public opinion downturn in 2006 did not dissuade Finland from remaining supportive during its presidency of the EU. Germany’s
case is also odd in light of the hypothesis. Germany’s public opinion soured toward Turkey at the same time that the Schröder/Fischer government dramatically shifted Germany’s orientation. Public opposition to Turkey only diminished (somewhat) a couple of years later. The continuation of the earlier downward trend of public opinion did, however, anticipate Germany’s policy shift in 2006, but it did not affect Germany’s policy in 2004, which had remained strongly supportive.

In the case of Greece, there is a concurrent spike in public support for Turkey and a positive shift in policy in 1999. This is doubtlessly due to the İzmit and Athens earthquakes and the subsequent mutual relief efforts. In April 1999 public opinion was still icy –0.63, this rose to –0.43 that Fall, and –0.14 the following June. The policy, however, had already shifted before the earthquake with the capture of Abdullah Öcalan and the replacement of Theodoros Pangalos with George Papandreou as Foreign Minister. In this case, then, the shift in policy preceded the shift in public opinion, and public opinion cannot, therefore, explain the shift in policy. Italy maintained a positive policy toward Turkey throughout, despite growing unease in the body politic, with the public opinion nadir occurring in 2005 (-0.3) and 2006 (-0.35), with no effect on policy.

Given this seemingly random allocation of cases that support, do not support or contradict, and those that outright contradict, there is no basis for rejecting the null hypothesis. If public opinion has any impact on member-state policies, it does not do so directly. Likewise, the reverse – that policy drives public opinion is also not demonstrated. It appears to be plausible in the case of Austria, but not in any other case. In the Greek case, the 1999 change in public opinion may have been the result of the policy shift, but the policy shift was announced after the earthquakes. It seems much more plausible that the earthquakes’ aftermaths had more to do with public opinion than policy-makers convincing the Greek populace to reconsider their views. In any case, public opinion soured again long before the 2006 policy shift back toward a brakeman policy.

In summary, the story here is not that public opinion does not matter. It is doubtlessly the case that if public opinion were not so opposed to Turkish membership, it would be easier for the member-state governments to support Turkey. In light of the average level of public support for driver policies, it is quite surprising that so many countries are as supportive as they are. The next sections will explore the domestic political dimensions of this problem further.
10.4.3.2 Political party ideology

Hp8: Left-wing governments are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than right-wing governments are.

Testing the proportional reduction of error of the ideologies of governing parties against their policies regarding Turkey demonstrates a poor fit for the CMP data (despite the hedges in favor of the hypothesis), but a fair ratio for the ParlGov data (see Table 10.17, below).

If the independent variable is going to be explanatory of the dependent variable, and, thus, the general political ideology of governments driving their policies on Turkey, then, the ParlGov data is going to be the best reflector of that general political ideology. Further exploration of the political dimension, below, will, therefore, be based on this data, rather than the CMP dataset. That exploration is done by graph comparisons, similar to what is done above.

**Table 10.17:** $\gamma$-rates for Coalition Ideology Against Turkish Membership Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ParlGov</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The set of graphs, Figure 10.8 below, displays the calculated ideologies of government parties against the member-state policies on Turkey. It should be noted that because the ParlGov data assigns higher values the more a political party has a right-wing ideology, and the hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between right-wingedness and support for Turkey, the independent variable graph will be upside-down, with lower values at the top and higher values at the bottom.

Table 10.18, lists the hypothesis-supporting cases as well as the hypothesis-neutral and contradicting cases. Again, the neutral cases demonstrate a policy pattern that is simply not explained by the independent variable, whereas the contradictory cases show the opposite of expectations. Six of the member-states’ policies are explained by the political party outlooks of their governments. Seven are neutral and two are outright contradictory. That is a poor showing for the hypothesis, but it is a closer cut than simply looking at public opinion. Below are some observations on the interesting cases.
Figure 10.8: Coalition Ideology (right y-axis, blue) and Policy (left y-axis, red)
Table 10.18: Cases that support, contradict and are neutral toward hypothesis Hp8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support</th>
<th>No relationship</th>
<th>Contradiction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The open-and-shut cases are Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and France – countries that have been crucial in swinging the Council decision one way or another. Denmark also seems to largely be explained by this variable. Belgium is contradictory, but this can be understood as a social liberalism-conservatism dimension to its politics that is not quite captured by the traditional socio-economic left-right scale. Certainly, the policy changed when the social liberal VLD took the leadership role from the Christian Democrats.

Finland experienced very limited fluctuation in the political outlook of its government. The successive governments of Social Democrat Paavo Lipponen until 2003 were solidly centrist, and the first coalition of Matti Vanhanen also included the Social Democrats, keeping on Lipponen’s foreign minister. Against this limited political fluctuation, however, Finland’s policy varied significantly, moving from passenger to driver under the Finnish Presidency in 1999, to a brakeman policy in 2002. In 2004 and under second Finnish Presidency of 2006, Finland again embraced a driver policy, without significant shift in political outlook.

Though supportive of the hypothesis, the French case is peculiar. While the Jospin government, with Chirac as president, was very strongly in favor of moving Turkey’s candidacy forward, Chirac’s association with the RPR, and the weight parity between the presidency and the legislature that this method of calculation imposes, pulls the right-left graph downward. A reading of the history of Jacques Chirac’s personal support for Turkey’s membership bid (albeit on a long time-horizon) suggests that political ideology would be more likely to explain policy had the President not have been a peculiar actor in the system. But for his idiosyncratic influence, the counterfactual may well have been that with any other right-wing President (such as his predecessor, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, or his successor, Nicolas Sarkozy, both of whom made their views on Turkey abundantly
clear), France’s policy toward Turkey would probably not have been equally supportive as it was under Chirac.

Luxembourg is a curious case. The first cabinet of the Christian-Democratic Jean-Claude Juncker, which was joined by Labor, felt no hesitation using the pulpit of the EU presidency to antagonize the Turks in 1997. Yet, later on, in 2004, when a Christian-democrat & labor coalition returns, Luxembourg becomes supportive. Yet that same government turned away from Turkey again in 2006.

The Netherlands’ changes in policy and politics mostly support the theory. The purple governments of Wim Kok fully supported the prospect of Turkish membership in 1997 and 1999. Balkenende’s first and third governments changed course and articulated strong brakeman positions. The curious case of 2004, during his second government, seems to belie the hypothesis, however. The only political change was the shrunken D66 party (representing only six members of parliament) having joined that coalition. Yet, knowing the internal politics of the cabinet makes it clear that D66 minister Jan Laurens Brinkhorst was a particularly strategic and persuasive actor within the cabinet. Though a clear counterfactual, it is not conceivable that without Brinkhorst’s presence in the cabinet, The Hague would have been supportive of Turkish membership at that critical juncture.

Portugal mostly contradicts the hypothesis. The Socialist government of António Guterres was indifferent toward Turkey, twice adopting a passenger policy. Representing a rightward turn in the government, José Manuel Barroso’s PSD, however, twice embraced the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU. José Socrates’ Socialist government maintained the driver policy. Sweden, likewise, is contradictory. Sporting a solidly left-wing government throughout the decade until the eleventh hour, Sweden was mostly antagonistic toward offering Turkey a clear membership perspective. Göran Persson’s SAP government surprisingly took a different turn in 2004, adopting an energetic driver policy; one that was maintained by Fredrik Reinfeld’s thoroughly right-wing government.

As the political ideologies of ruling political parties explain less than half of the cases in question, the hypothesis cannot stand on its own in being explanatory of the variation in member-state policies on Turkey. However, together with other variables in multivariate models it helps explain the member state policies.
10.4.3.3 Political opportunism

Hp9: When existing government policy is at odds with public opinion, significant changes in government pursuant to elections are more likely to result in policy changes than when existing policy is not at odds with public opinion.

This test is conducted by looking at those cases where government policy was at odds with the balance of public opinion. These balances were also used in the test that compared public opinion directly to policy. This analysis, then, looks at the cases that were not explained by that hypothesis.

What was made clear in that previous analysis was that public opinion tended much more to the negative, while many member states embraced a driver policy. These are then the cases that need explaining. These cases are assessed by what happened in by the time of the pursuant episode. These outcomes consist of 5 categories: 1) change of government and change of policy, 2) change of policy by the sitting government, 3) change of public opinion toward greater alignment with the policy, 4) the sitting government maintaining the unpopular policy, and 5) a new government maintaining the unpopular policy. The hypothesis expects that scenarios 4 and 5 will rarely occur.

Identifying the cases that contrast with the expectations of Hp7 requires looking at those cases where Turkey’s prospect of membership was met with deep unpopularity. The proportional reduction of error test that tested public opinion against policy already divided the balance of public opinion into three categories of equal populations. These were, essentially, 1) support or ambivalence (where the percentage of respondents against Turkish membership in the EU subtracted from the percentage of respondents in favor resulted in a figure of equal to or more than –0.12), 2) very unpopular (between –0.12 and –0.33), and 3) deeply unpopular (equal to or less than –0.33).

There are eight cases where governments supported Turkey despite that policy being ‘deeply unpopular’, and there were 11 cases where governments did the same despite that policy being ‘very unpopular’. These nineteen cases provide the population for this test. The cases and their aftermaths are displayed in Table 10.19, below. The first eight are the cases where the prospect of Turkish membership was deeply unpopular, and the next 11 are where that prospect was very unpopular. Because there is only one case in which a government held a brakeman position despite public opinion that had a positive balance toward Turkish membership, this type of scenario will not be analyzed.
Table 10.19: Cases & Outcomes of Driver Policies Despite Adverse Public Opinions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Change of Policy?</th>
<th>Change of Government?</th>
<th>Improvement of public opinion?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland, 2004-2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France, 1999-2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, 1999-2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, 2004-2006</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, 1999-2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, 2002-2004</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece, 2004-2006</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg 2004-2006</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium, 1999-2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium, 2002-2004</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium, 2004-2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland, 1999-2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France, 1997-1999</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, 2002-2004</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy, 1999-2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy, 2002-2004</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy, 2004-2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands, 1999-2002</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Marginal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands, 2004-2006</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The identification of cases and outcomes in the table above is used to divide the outcomes into Table 10.20 below. This table categorizes the outcomes into the five different scenarios of change of government and change of policy, change of policy by sitting government, improvement of public opinion, maintaining policy by sitting government and maintaining policy by new government. The distribution of outcomes in the table above does not show that the political fallout from a policy with adverse public opinion was markedly greater in scenarios 1, 2, and 3 than 4 and 5. What is striking is the large number of cases where the sitting government maintained its policy.
Table 10.20: Five Scenarios of Driver Policies Under Adverse Conditions of Public Opinion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Very Unpopular</th>
<th>Deeply Unpopular</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3) Improvement of public opinion</td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany 1999-2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One explanation that remains in keeping with the hypothesis is if many of these governments did not face imminent elections. That is the case for all of the cases in scenario 4, save Belgium 2002 (which faced elections in May 2003), and Greece 1999 (which faced elections in April 2000). So, in these cases the governments may have counted on the political amnesia of their constituents to help them survive the subsequent election.

What this does not explain, however, is why these governments ran the risk of being replaced in the first place, if political dominance was their political goal. Six governments were replaced within the interval after the episode in which they embraced the unpopular policy. That is not significantly worse than the six governments out of the 20 cases where the governments embraced popular discontent with brakeman policies, which also were replaced within the space of an episode. Given this, it is not clear that governments that had unpopular policies on Turkey fared any better than governments that appealed to that same sort of opinion by enacting brakeman policies.

This test is regrettably inconclusive. There is little evidence that unpopular policies regarding Turkey made it more likely for a government to be defeated by the time of the next episode than
policies that embraced appealed to the public opposition to Turkish membership. A significant number of governments defied public opinion, though only a few of them faced elections in their immediate future. There are also a number of aberrant cases where a new government did not change the policy, even where it would have been very popular to do so. As such, it cannot be said that public opinions drive policies through the democratic process of replacing governments that enact unpopular policies, but it can also not be said that there is absolutely no effect. For the time being, it is necessary to leave question marks behind the hypothesis and return to it when other hypotheses have been tested in order to see if there is room for government change in a multivariate analysis.

10.4.3.4 Immigration politics

Analyzing the effects of immigration politics on policies regarding Turkish membership assesses three related hypotheses, looking at three proportions of the member-state populations. The idea is that the more immigrants, Muslims and/or Turks a country has, the more the native citizens will be motivated to oppose Turkish membership for fear of more immigrants from that country should it become a member. EU membership, after all, implies free movement of persons. The first hypothesis tests the proportions of immigrants, Muslims and Turks in the populations directly against the long-run policy on Turkish membership, expecting a negative correlations. The idea, after all, is that the larger the minority communities in question, the lower the support for Turkish membership.

**Hp10:** Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative to total population, are more likely to oppose Turkish membership than member states with smaller immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations relative to total population, are.

The first aspect of this first hypothesis, measuring the percentage of immigrants in the population against the long-run policy finds the expected negative correlation, but not one that is particularly strong, namely $r = -0.34$. Graph 10.5 (Figure 10.9), on the following page, shows a scatterplot and a regression line that demonstrates how far apart the member states are with regard to these two variables. Because of its outlier status, Luxembourg (has been omitted from the graph and the correlation.
There is particular divergence in the policies of the high-immigrant countries – those countries that have immigrant populations of more than 8%. Belgium has been highly supportive of Turkey, Germany has either strongly supported or strongly opposed Turkish membership, and Austria has strongly opposed Turkey. Luxembourg would be in the category with Austria, but was omitted owing to the fact that with an immigrant population of 34%, it would skew the graph and the regression out of proportion. On the other hand, among the low-immigrant countries, those countries with less than 3% immigrant populations, there is relatively high support for Turkey. These are Italy, Finland and Portugal. Between the extremes of the high-immigrant and low-immigrant countries, there is anything from Denmark on the most brakeman side of the policy spectrum to the United Kingdom on the most driver end. Both have very comparable levels of immigration (4.9% and 4.6%, respectively). As such, there is very little empirical support for the hypothesis that countries with larger immigrant communities are much more likely to oppose Turkey. The hypothesis with respect to immigrants must therefore be viewed with much skepticism.

The second aspect of the first hypothesis – counting Muslims – fares worse. Correlating the estimated Muslim population with the long-run policy offers a correlation of $r = -0.20$, showing very
weak, albeit negative correlation. Graph 10.6 (Figure 10.10), below, shows the scatterplot and regression line between the percentage of Muslims in the population and the long-run policy.

![Graph 10.6: Muslims](image)

**Figure 10.10: Muslims**

About half of the member states fit neatly on the regression line. Portugal, Finland and Ireland, all with few Muslims in their populations tend to have critical but generally supportive policies. Greece and Germany, with nearly identical shares of Muslims, have demonstrated identical policies: supportive in 1999, 2002 and 2004, but strongly opposing in 1997 and 2006. The Netherlands had the same policy average in the long run but with a larger Muslim population (particularly Moroccans). France with the largest Muslim population, estimated at 9.77% has been somewhat more critical than the others.

These are, however, offset by the strong drivers: Italy Spain, the United Kingdom and Belgium. These have anywhere from 1.75% Muslims to 6.11%, but all have been very supportive. They are even more offset by the brakemen, Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark, whose Muslim populations are comparatively modest in size, though not negligible. Given this spread, it cannot be said that knowing the amount of Muslims in the population is an accurate predictor for what sort of policy a member state is likely to have. The Muslim aspect of the Hp10 must, therefore, be rejected.
To the degree that the policy concerns the presence of people unlike the general native populations, it is less about Muslims than it is about immigrants or Turks (see below).

The third aspect of the first hypothesis demonstrates the same correlation as the first, namely $r = -0.34$. Graph 10.7 (Figure 10.11) depicts the scatterplot of the relationship between the long-run policy and the proportional sizes of the member states’ Turkish communities. Because of the missing data, the graph omits Greece.

![Graph 10.7: Turks](image)

**Figure 10.11: Turks**

While the countries with the larger communities do tend to have brakeman policies more often than those with fewer Turks, the deviations the regression line are striking. Particularly, Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden and France have policies on the brakeman side of the equation, despite not having very large populations of Turks the way that Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium have. Austria fits the hypothesis well, but Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium do not.

In the upper left-hand corner are those supportive countries that are fairly or always supportive and have very few Turks, as the hypothesis would predict. While this has a stronger relationship than measuring the share of Muslims, like the correlation with the proportion of immigrants, this relationship is not particularly strong. There are a large number of cases that are left
unexplained. The null hypothesis, therefore, cannot be rejected. As a whole, then, hypothesis Hp10 cannot be accepted. While the correlations all show the expected direction, the spread in the variation does not indicate a strong relationship between the proportion of immigrants, Muslims or Turks to predict even the average level of support for Turkish membership. There is, however, food for further thought. Might certain the countries with many Turks or immigrants have more volatile politics, or might certain political parties appeal to the immigrant or Turkish populations?

**Hp11: Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative to total population, are more likely to change their policies on Turkish membership more frequently than member states with smaller Muslim/Turkish populations relative to total population, are.**

The next hypothesis, Hp11, tests to see if the proportional sizes of the same minority groupings, immigrants, Muslims and Turks, can help predict the degree to which the policies will be volatile. The idea is that the larger the number if immigrants, Muslims or Turks, the more the policy will be subject to domestic politics, with those politics swinging the policies back and forth depending on election outcomes.

In simply calculating the correlations, the tests for immigrants and Muslims come to nothing. The correlation between the former and policy volatility is \( r = -0.05 \), and the latter and policy volatility is \( r = 0.003 \). Nothing further need be said about either. With respect to the number of Turks in the population, however, the correlation (\( r = 0.33 \)) comes back stronger than for immigrants and Muslims, but still not at an impressive level. This warrants at least a look at the scatterplot to look at the variation. This scatterplot is depicted in Graph 10.7 to the right. Again, because of the missing data, the graph omits Greece. Spain and Portugal have neither many Turks nor much volatility, which is why they overlap in the graph.
The unexpected outliers in this model are Finland and Luxembourg on the high end, with a great deal of policy volatility and Belgium and Austria at the low end. Given the relative low numbers of Turks, the hypothesis would not expect Finland and Luxembourg to have changed their policies as much, or Belgium and Austria so little, if the immigration politics related to Turks led to volatile policies. In the case of Finland and Luxembourg that points to another factor at work in explaining their changes of policy, whereas with Austria and Belgium it may mean that changes government did not occur much or lead to large changes in policy. Thankfully, the test following hypothesis, Hp12, sheds more light on these cases.

**Hp12:** Member states with larger immigrant/Muslim/Turkish populations, relative to total population, are more likely to see a relationship between changes of government and policies on Turkish membership.

The third hypothesis testing the possible influence of immigration politics shows an interesting set of correlations. The idea behind this is that when there are many immigrants, Muslims or Turks in the population, immigration politics are more likely to play a role. That role is manifested in the
policy being more likely to change when the government changes, rather than governments changing their policy for other reasons.

The hypothesis is tested by calculating a correlation between the changes of government and the changes of policy for each member state, and seeing if there is a difference in those correlations based on the proportion of immigrants, Muslims and Turks in the population. Because neither Italy or the United Kingdom varied their policies during the episodes analyzed, and the United Kingdom did not have any political change, the correlation calculations of their policies and politics both return with errors. In Italy’s case, this can simply be set at 0 without complication. In the case of the United Kingdom, the result is also set to 0, because it was observed that the Conservative opposition agreed with the Government regarding its Turkey policy. Therefore, had any governmental change occurred, no change of policy is expected to have taken place.

A factor that can usefully be included in the measurement is to include the direction of government and policy changes in the difference. At that point, not only is change of government measured, but also the direction of change in government of policy. As hypothesis Hp8, which measured government ideology against the short-run policy returned a fairly high proportional reduction of error, suggesting that knowing the type of government improves the prediction of the policy it will embrace by 48%, it is interesting to note if knowing the amount of immigrants, Muslims or Turks in their populations in addition to the government ideology helps predict the policies even more.

Table 10.21 below lists the strength of the correlations between the proportion of immigrants, Muslims and Turks in the population of each country and the strength of the correlation between changes of government and changes of policy. When the changes are measured only for degree, and not with the direction of change inculcated into the correlation, only the correlation between the proportion of Turks in the populations and the correlation between governments and policy has a strong showing. When the direction of change in both policy and politics is accounted for, the correlations strengthen across the board, but, again, knowing the proportion of Turks in the population demonstrates the strongest relationship.

Table 10.21: Immigrants, Muslims and Turks and the Correlations with Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Correlation (r)</th>
<th>% Immigrants</th>
<th>% Muslims</th>
<th>% Turks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Without direction</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With direction</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This indicates that knowing the proportion of Turks in the population significantly helps predict if policy changes will co-occur with political changes. Given that the correlation is negative indicates this indicates that in countries with proportionally large Turkish communities (such as Germany, Austria and the Netherlands), rightward shifts in government are very likely to produce shifts in policy toward opposition to Turkish membership. In other words, right-wing governments succeeding left wing governments are very likely to shift the policy against Turkey’s membership, when there are large Turkish communities. Vice versa, left-wing governments succeeding right-wing governments are very likely to shift the policy in favor of Turkey’s membership, when there are large Turkish communities. This relationship is much less likely to exist in member states where there are not large Turkish communities (such as Finland, Portugal, Spain and Italy).

![Graph 10.9: Turks & Politics](image)

**Figure 10.13: Turks & Politics**

The relationship is depicted in Graph 10.9 (Figure 10.13). It shows a scatterplot where the points are more clustered around the regression line than many of the preceding scatterplot graphs. Typical of the relationship between the proportion of Turks and the correlation between changes in government and policy are those cases that are closest to the regression line. These are, at the one end, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. These are the countries with the largest Turkish
communities. In these, the shifts of policy have closely aligned with the changes of government. Further, the changes of government to the right produced changes to brakeman policies, and when the governments changed toward the left, the changes in policy went in a driver direction.

At the other end of the regression line are Finland and Italy. Both of these have few Turks. Italy has not had any shifts of policy despite significant changes in government. Finland has had very significant changes in policy, but these did not co-occur with the changes of government. If anything, they changed in directions counter to the expectation. Sweden has a modest size Turkish community, and its single driver-direction policy shift did not occur at the same time as its right-wing direction change in government.

Significantly above the regression line are Ireland, Portugal and Belgium. Belgium, which has a significantly large Turkish community, experienced a political shift alongside a shift in policy. However, it was counter to the expectation of the hypothesis, because the more (secular) center-right-wing VLD-led coalition embraced a driver policy, whereas the Christian Democrat-led (conservative) center-slightly-less-right-wing government had not expressed a strong policy for or against Turkey’s membership ambitions in 1997. This is easily understood from a liberal-conservative point of view, where this is distinct from the broader left-right spectrum which takes socio-economic issues into account.

Ireland and Portugal, neither of whom have large Turkish communities, had only modest shifts in policy. When the policy shifts occurred in tandem with shifts in government, they sometimes happened under right-wing governments. Significantly below the regression line are France, Spain, Luxembourg and Denmark. In the French, Luxembourger and Danish cases, the correlations between policies and governments largely occurred as one would expect, but with fewer Turks in the population. In Spain, with no Turks to speak of, the policy shift from passenger to driver occurred while under a right-wing government, and the left-wing government maintained the driver policy.

Given that a Pearson correlation coefficient of $r = -0.68$ is nothing to laugh at in the social sciences, this particular hypothesis deserves a closer look. It seems to strongly explain the policies of countries of countries with large Turkish communities. It, however, begs the question: what causes policy shifts in countries without a significant number of Turks? That question will be taken up in Chapter 11.
Having concluded the section on the rational calculation of power costs and benefits, the following sections consider those aspects of the question that look at greater or less wealth for the member states, resulting from the expectation of Turkish membership. The first aspect that is considered is the trade in agricultural commodities, given that since the implementation of the EU-Turkey Customs Union, agriculture remains the main economic sector that has not been liberalized between the EU and Turkey. Thus, membership and inclusion into the European agricultural regime, whatever that might be in the future, is likely to have the greatest impact in this sector of the economy.

The second aspect that is explored is that of trade and investment. Given the lowering of non-tariff barriers with Turkey and Turkey’s adoption of European standards and regulations, opportunities for trade and for investment should increase. Those countries that already have significant bilateral trade with Turkey should benefit more than those with less trade, and those countries with greater investment relationships should also benefit more than those without.

10.5.1.1 Agriculture

**Hw1: Member states with a complementary agricultural sector with Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a competitive agricultural sector with Turkey.**

This hypothesis is tested by looking at the agricultural import and export profiles of Turkey compared with those of the EU-15 member states. The test considers the top 20 agricultural commodities by value in US$(2000). It adds the imports and exports positively where these are in complement to one another (Turkey imports a top-20 commodity that the given EU country imports and vice versa) and negatively where both Turkey are exporting or importing those commodities. The sum of all of these values, divided by GDP (in US$ 2000), provides a figure that rates the degree to which the agricultural trade profiles are complementary (when positive) or competitive (when negative).

These values, representing the degree to which member states will benefit from or be harmed by open trade in agricultural commodities with Turkey, have only very modest predictive
power. The $\gamma$-rates are offered in the following table. The best-case scenario, where the year of the episode in question and the preceding year are taken into account, offers a $\gamma$-rate of 0.18, meaning that taking agriculture into account improves one’s predictive capacity over the policies by 18% over a random distribution based on a nameless distribution. In comparison to the other hypotheses tested in this chapter, this is too modest to warrant further investigation.

**Table 10.22: $\gamma$-rates for Trade of Agricultural Commodities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cumulative time lags</th>
<th>Time lag 0</th>
<th>Time lag 1</th>
<th>Time lag 2</th>
<th>Time lag 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compatibility in the trade of</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agricultural commodities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is nevertheless interesting to look at the implications of the distribution. On average, Turkey is more competitive than complementary with the agricultural trade profiles of the EU-15 member states. The average balance in the computed measure is over the member states over all the years (1994 – 2006) is – 0.3% of GDP.

The few member states that would tend to benefit from opening agricultural trade with Turkey were France, Finland and Sweden, with France prospectively benefiting the most by considerable degrees. France could benefit from importing prepared foods and exporting cattle, soybean cake, and prepared chocolates. Among those whose agricultural sectors would suffer the most are Portugal, the Netherlands, and Ireland, with the Portugal facing the stiffest competition from Turkey in terms of exporting the products that Turkey also exports and importing the same products that Turkey imports. In particular Portuguese soybeans, maize and beef would find competition with Turkish soybeans, maize and beef.

In terms of policy, France has not been more supportive of Turkey than Portugal has, nor has Sweden been more supportive than Ireland. Finland and the Netherlands have both exhibited many changes of policy over time, despite being in opposite line-ups on the agricultural import/export profiles. For this reason, as supported by the quantitative test, agricultural economics do little to explain member-state policies, and the null-hypothesis cannot, therefore, be rejected.
10.5.1.2 Trade and investment

**Hw2:** Member states with greater volumes of trade with Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with smaller volumes of trade with Turkey.

**Hw3:** Member states with greater volumes of investment between that member state and Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with smaller volumes of investment in Turkey.

**Hw4:** Member states with a trade surplus with Turkey are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a trade deficit with Turkey.

The first trade hypothesis is tested by taking the volume of trade with Turkey relative to GDP of each member state and comparing these with one another and with their respective policies on Turkey. The idea is that those countries with the greatest volume of trade with Turkey have the greatest interest in Turkish membership because to the degree that these proportional volumes of trade are a benefit to the member states, Turkish membership would increase that value by making that trade easier and therefore more valuable.

From the more hard-nosed perspective of relative gains and balances reflected in the second trade hypothesis, the greater the trade balance in a member state’s favor, the more that member state stands to gain. The idea is that membership would induce Turkey has to adjust itself to the Single Market, to which the member states are, themselves, already adjusted. The member states would, therefore, benefit because of Turkey having to make the terms of trade more favorable to the member states, and the greater the surplus of trade, the greater the benefit for the member state.

The third hypothesis in this line-up, which looks at investments, argues that the greater the flow of investments between Turkey and each member state, the more that member state has a stake in Turkey, and the more it will be willing to support Turkey’s membership. Becoming a member of the EU would subject Turkey’s economy to the same rules and regulations as govern European economies. While some of those rules and regulations might reduce returns on investment, many of them strengthen the security of those investments in terms of strengthening the investors’ rights over their investments and the returns on their investments. They also clarify the regulatory
environments and make them subject to more predictable changes, thus reducing transaction costs of having radically different regulatory environments. The results of the proportional reduction of error tests, for each of the hypotheses under three different time-lag scenarios are given in Table 10.23, below.

Table 10.23: γ -rates for Trade and Investment Volumes and Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cumulative time lags</th>
<th>Time lag 0</th>
<th>Time lag 1</th>
<th>Time lag 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade volume</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment volume</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is immediately striking is the lack of explanatory value the trade volumes and balances and the investment balance have. None of these hypotheses have much explanatory power in comparison to many of the hypotheses tested above. As such, there is no case to be made that European countries support or oppose Turkey based upon how much trade is done with Turkey or invested in Turkey. All three hypotheses are, therefore, rejected.

10.5.1.3 Migration and employment

Hw5: Member states with low levels of unemployment are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of unemployment.

The results from the proportional reduction of error test of policy by unemployment offers a very striking result. The test-results are given in Table 10.24 Below.

Table 10.24: γ -rates for Unemployment and Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment Rate (Ur)</th>
<th>Time-lag 0</th>
<th>Time-lag 1</th>
<th>Time-lag 2</th>
<th>Time-lag 3</th>
<th>Time-lag 4</th>
<th>Time-lag 5</th>
<th>Time-lag 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAIRU – Ur</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of the relationship between the simple unemployment rates against the policies on Turkey, the proportional reductions of error are modest, with the exception of the cumulative 6-year time lag, which attempts to predict the policy by positing the average unemployment rate the episode year and the previous six years. In this regard, the variation over time is extremely modest. Testing with the control for the ‘natural’ rate of unemployment (NAIRU) provides proportional reductions of error that are negligible, in that these do nothing to help predict policies.

However, what is very telling against the hypothesis is that the $\gamma$-rates are all positive, while the test is against unemployment. If the hypothesis were correct, low levels of unemployment would make member states more likely to support Turkey. This would be because they would then possibly have more workers, whereas high-unemployment countries would prefer the migrants stay home for fear that they would compete against their domestic unemployed for the few jobs available. However, because the $\gamma$-rates are positive against unemployment, it is clear that to the degree that there is a relationship, it is one that moves in the opposite direction of expectations. In fact, if anything, the countries with higher unemployment rates – of which Spain, Greece and Finland are the best examples – were generally more positive toward Turkey than those countries with comparatively low levels of unemployment – of which Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark and Austria are the exemplars.

In order to further illustrate the relationship between the average unemployment level and the long-run policy, Graph 10.10 shows the scatterplot and regression line. The correlation coefficient for the long-run policy and the average rate of unemployment over the period assessed showed a surprisingly strong result of $r = 0.54$. Considering the unexpected direction of the relationship, it can certainly be said that the hypothesis that higher levels of unemployment lead member-states to oppose Turkey needs to be rejected. However, because it is so contrary to the theoretical relationship, it begs the question of why the reverse appears to be more explanatory than the hypothesis is. What seems the most likely case is that the high unemployment countries have not historically been the destination of Turkish immigration. Therefore, it is not generally feared that more Turks will migrate to those countries in search of jobs.
SUMMARY OF THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL HYPOTHESES

The rational actor model hypotheses have, in univariate tests performed poorly in explaining member-state policies on EU enlargement to Turkey. Variables relating to security in military or crime-fighting terms did not demonstrate any correlation with member-states’ policies regarding Turkish membership in the EU. Military cooperation, ‘drugs and thugs’, and NATO-membership, had no predictive value in helping one predict which countries might be supportive of, or in opposition to, Turkey. In terms of counter-terror interests, however, it was found that countries suffering from greater threats from terrorism were somewhat more willing to support Turkey. This might, at least partially, explain member-state policies. As such, there is a case for using the threat of terrorism as a variable to test for in multivariate models, which will be introduced in pursuant chapters.

With regard to interest in enhancing member-state influence at the international level or within the EU, there was no basis for believing that any of the related variables had any influence. Countries more frequently aligned with the United States (Atlanticism), more inclined toward
protectionist external trade policies, more in favor of enlargement generally, or interested in
gumming up the works of deeper integration demonstrated very little more inclination toward
supporting Turkey than their opposites on those issues did. While large countries were significantly
more likely to support Turkey than the smaller countries were, just as net-recipients of the EU
budget were, these variables do little to explain the variation in policies over time. In terms of the
economic interests of the member states, these were very poor predictors of member-state policies.
Measures of agricultural compatibility, trade, and investment had negligible levels of correlation with
the policies. The exception on the economic indicators was unemployment at 5- to 6-year time lags.
In this case, however, the statistical relationship was precisely contrary to the expectations of the
related hypothesis.

In terms of domestic politics, however, there is a more worthwhile tale to tell. While blanket
public opinion was a decent predictor of the tendencies in member-state policies, it can be shown
that it was not necessarily a cause of policies. In the striking case of Austria, for example, the policy
was a better predictor of public opinion than vice-versa, suggesting the Austrian policy-makers
helped turn their constituents against Turkey, rather than the policy-makers following the will of
their people. Finland, curiously, tended to set policies in Turkey’s favor when the polls were down
and against Turkey when the polls were up.

Testing against the political ideology of governments provided a better predictor of member-
state policies. Right-wing governments tended to be less supportive of Turkey than left-wing
governments. It was much clearer, however, that countries where there are many Turks in the
population, were much easier to predict in terms of government ideology and policy outcomes than
countries where there were fewer Turks in the population. There is tenuous support for the idea that
governments and oppositions might have used the Turkey to maintain or take power.

The most significant finding, then, was the one that predicts policy changes pursuant to
changes in government in countries with large Turkish communities. This, essentially, multivariate
approach proportionally reduced errors over random predictions by 68%. That is significant, but still
an incomplete story. It is incomplete, because it does nothing to predict the behavior of the
countries without large numbers of Turks. The United Kingdom and Luxembourg both have
relatively few Turks, but their policies could barely be more different from one another. The same is
true of, say, Italy versus Finland. Where the one is constant, the other is highly varied over time.

The purpose of the following chapter is to see if the Constructivist variables identified in the
second chapter have greater predictive powers than the rationalist hypotheses do. At the end of that
chapter, the ANOVA F-scores, correlation coefficients, and proportional reduction of error rates will be compared in a table to see which variables are worthwhile pursuing in multivariate models. Seeking and testing those multivariate models of explanation is the purpose of the twelfth chapter.
11.0 TESTING CONSTRUCTIVIST HYPOTHESES

Where the previous chapter summarized the dependent variable and assessed the rationalist hypotheses, this chapter considers the constructivist hypotheses, likewise testing each in turn. The sections are divided into those dealing with identities, norms and values. The hypotheses dealing with identity look at religion, nationalism and cultural differences. Hypotheses looking at norms consider the Copenhagen enlargement regime and different degrees of socialization of the member states. The hypotheses concerning values look at the different degrees to which the member states embrace the values embraced by the political Copenhagen criteria.

In the chapter’s conclusion, the results of all the hypothesis tests from this and the previous chapter are summarized. The hypotheses that were not rejected are carried over into the next chapter, Chapter 12, which looks at multivariate models that use multiple variables to create a broader picture.

11.1 IDENTITY

The following sections consider different types of identity. The first section looks at religion and the degree to which the content and degree of religious identities of the member states help explain their policies on Turkish membership. By contrast, the third hypothesis looks at religious out-grouping of Muslims, to see if countries where the people have greater fear or distaste for Muslims have a greater tendency toward opposing Turkish membership in the EU. The following section concerns nationalism, which is, in essence a measure of self-identification. The last section on identity looks at cultural differences, which, in essence, is a measure of other-identification.
11.1.1.1 Religion

Hi1: Member states that are predominantly Catholic are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states that are predominantly Protestant.

Hi2: Member states with a high level of religiosity are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with a low level of religiosity are.

Hi3: member states with lower levels of anti-Muslim sentiment are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of anti-Muslim sentiment.

Religious denomination, Catholic vs. Protestant is a poor predictor of a member state’s likely position on Turkey. Given that there is a strong cadre of Catholic member-state supporters of Turkey, which include Italy, Spain, Belgium and Portugal, the regression line is slightly positive (see Graph 11.1, on the next page). However, at the same time, there are some very stalwart opponents in the Catholic camp as well, namely Austria and Luxembourg. On the Protestant side, the United Kingdom is clearly the most supportive of Turkey, while Denmark is the least supportive of Turkey’s membership ambitions. Overall, the correlation coefficient for the relationship between the two variables is $r = 0.22$, suggesting a weak relationship where Catholic member states are only slightly more likely to support Turkey than protestant member states are.

It is further interesting to note that Germany and the Netherlands, countries that have very large minority denominations (in Germany the Catholics are in the minority, whereas in the Netherlands the Protestant and Catholic populations are close to parity, with a slight numerical advantage to Catholics), the average policies are not particularly in the driver or brakeman camp. Instead, they are drivers 60% of the time, and brakemen 40% of the time.

Given the relatively consistent positions of the bulk of Catholic member states regarding Turkey’s membership, any role the varying and opaque pronouncements of the Vatican may have had on the matter can also be read as being relatively inconsequential for Turkey’s membership ambitions.
Religiosity is the other religious measure, and the hypothesis posits that countries with higher degrees of religiosity will be more inclined to support Turkey for EU membership, because Turkey is also a very religious country. As Graph 11.2 makes clear, however, there is no relationship between a member-state population’s level of self-identified religiosity and a member-state’s policy regarding Turkey. This also means that the reverse of the hypothesis is also not true – that a more religious nation is more likely to identify the Turks as being religiously different, and therefore incompatible with the European ‘Christian Club’.

In terms of religiosity as a function of church attendance, however, the relationship is not as non-existent. Graph 11.3 shows the scatter plot and regression line. Generally speaking, countries where people attend church more do show greater support for Turkish membership, as the regression line is an upward-sloping one. The correlation coefficient, for that matter, is $\rho = 0.30$, suggesting that the relationship has a medium strength to it, but that it is far from being a solid indicator.
The third hypothesis related to religious identity considers the out-group religious identity of Muslims. This posits that countries where fewer people would like to have Muslims as neighbors are less likely to be supportive of Turkey as a member state. Graph 11.4 shows the strength of the relationship. The regression line is virtually flat (and even slightly inclining), with very little tendency of the data points to scatter close to the line.

Given the failure of all three of these variables to produce results that strongly support the hypotheses – in the case of denominations to have results that coalesce closely around the regression line, and in the cases of religiosity and anti-Muslim sentiment to have such coalescing or a relationship that strongly indicates a direction – it is fitting to conclude that there is not an apparent relationship between religion and member-state policies. As such, there is little evidence that the identity sharing between people of faith, or the Catholic-Protestant divide in Europe is explanatory of member-state policies. Further, there is no evidence that protection of the ‘Christian club’ is the reason for excluding predominantly Muslim Turkey.
11.1.1.2 Nationalism

**H4**: Countries with low levels of nationalism are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with high levels of nationalism are.

This hypothesis is tested with two indicators. The first is the percentage of respondents in a member state who declare themselves to be ‘very proud’ to be of their nationality. This measure of national pride performs very poorly in predicting member-state policies regarding Turkey. Graph 11.5 shows the scatter plot and regression line of this independent variable against the long-run policies.

With a correlation coefficient of $r = -0.02$ and a nearly flat the regression line, national pride has no predictive capacity in determining what countries may be more or less supportive of Turkey’s membership in the EU. The three stalwart opponents, Luxembourg, Austria and Denmark are in the middle of the pack when it comes to national pride, as are, roughly, Turkey’s most consistent supporters, Italy and the United Kingdom. As such, it cannot be said that nationalism in terms of ‘pride in country’ has any influence on the desire to see Turkey excluded from the EU.

**Figures 11.5 & 11.6: Pride in and Fear for Loss of Nationality**

The idea that fear of the loss of national identity may fuel opposition to Turkey is also empirically groundless. The correlation coefficient is for these two variables is $r = -0.08$, enjoying very little more support than the precious measure of national identity does. The scatter plot and regression
line of these two variables is given in Graph 11.6. Again, the citizens of the stalwart brakemen are not exceptionally more fearful of losing their identity than the average member state. The British are the most fearful of losing their national identity to the EU, while the Italians are the least fearful of losing themselves in the EU. As such, it does not appear that nationalism, measured according to these indicators, has any predictive capacity for member-state policies, and the hypothesis must be rejected.

### 11.1.1.3 Cultural differences

**Hi5**: Countries whose populations identify cultural differences as being the reason Turkey should not be allowed to join by greater degrees are more likely to oppose Turkey for EU membership than those who do so to lesser degrees are.

**Hi6**: Countries whose populations consistently differentiate Turkey from other candidate countries less are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than countries whose populations differentiate Turkey from other candidate countries more.

The hypotheses regarding cultural differences pose the idea that the Turkey’s out-group status, due to the cultural differences between its people and that of the member states inlines member-state leaders to oppose Turkey’s candidacy. The first of these shows statistical support. Member states in which respondents strongly identify Turkey as being too culturally different to be allowed to join the EU are more likely to oppose Turkey in the European Council. The correlation coefficient is $r = -0.52$, indicating that there is a medium-to-strong predictive capacity between the answers to the survey results and member-state policies regarding Turkey.

Not strangely, this measure co-varies ($r = -0.96$) nearly perfectly with public support for Turkey’s membership as measured earlier. That suggests that there is certainly some cultural-identity effect at work in public opinion. However, the correlation coefficient between straight public opinion on being for or against Turkish membership (as has already been measured) correlates slightly better with member-state policies ($r = 0.54$) than the answers to the survey question on cultural differences do. This indicates that regarding the perceptions of cultural differences is not quite as good a predictor as the generic public opinion is about Turkey’s membership prospects is. As such, the idea that Turkey and the EU are not culturally compatible is likely no more than an
antecedent variable to raw public opinion (which has shown itself to be very variable over time), rather than a clearer lens into the policy maker’s cultural soul.

Assessing the second hypothesis, which looks at public opinion over time, comparing Turkey to Bulgaria and Romania, produces interesting results. Using the comparison with Bulgaria and Romania essentially removes popular ‘enlargement fatigue’ from the omitted variables when assessing public opposition for Turkey’s membership. If the respondent’s opposition is due to enlargement fatigue, then the respondent ought not to be any more in favor of Romanian or Bulgarian membership than he or she is toward Turkish membership. It does not, however, control for the fact that while Romania and Bulgaria are smaller countries than Turkey, though Romania is a medium-large size country by European standards. Nevertheless, those factors would be constant factors and not variable over time; in the same way that the cultural differences are.

The picture that emerges from a time-series comparison between public opposition to Romanian and Bulgarian memberships as opposed to public opposition to Turkish membership is that there is not a constant difference over time. In fact, for many countries, opposition to Turkish membership is roughly on par with that of Bulgaria and Romania in the earlier years (1996-2001), but then opinion significantly turns against Turkey in the later years (2005-2006). This is not due to improvements in opinion regarding Bulgaria and Romania. If anything, public opinion toward the candidacies of these countries, even in the years immediately prior to their accessions, worsened in comparison to the earlier years. The difference is the significant drop in public support for Turkish membership.

This pattern is not, however, the same across all member states. The graphs below demonstrate the changes of different levels of public opposition to the candidacies of Turkey as opposed to Bulgaria and Romania. The differences in public opposition axis is turned upside-down, so as to graph the comparison to the policies in a positive fashion. The higher on the axis, the more favorable public opinion is toward Turkey as compared to Romania and Bulgaria. The 0-line marks where public opinion against Turkey would be on par with the other candidates.

What the graphs make clear is that the lines for the differences with Bulgaria and Romania differ minimally compared to one another. In that sense, it demonstrates that the measures do not reflect particular dynamics concerning either of the other two candidate countries. The changes in opposition are overwhelmingly due to changes in regard to public opinion against Turkey’s candidacy.
Figure 11.7: Public Opinion (right y-axis, blue) and Policy (left y-axis, red).
The analytically important finding is that some countries show very striking changes whereas others do not. If the cultural differences explained opposition to Turkey, there ought to be fewer cases where public opposition was relatively close to opposition to Bulgaria and Romania and fewer cases where changes in opposition were as dramatic as they were. Table 11.1, on the next page, makes this distinction clearer.

Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom – countries that have generally been favorable toward Turkey in terms of their policies – demonstrate relatively little differentiation between Turkey’s bid for membership and that of Bulgaria and Romania, and have demonstrated relative consistency in their levels of differentiating Turkey from the other two candidates over time. On average, they had a 4.5% greater opposition to Turkey than they did for Bulgaria/Romania. Further, on average, the standard distribution of the differences was about 5.3%. Among them, the Netherlands was the closest toward having both a high degree of variation and a high degree of differentiation between Romania/Bulgaria and Turkey. It is worthwhile to note that the Netherlands’ policy was also highly variable. In clearer words: the publics of these countries did not particularly favor Bulgaria and Romania over Turkey, nor did this significantly change over time.

Denmark, Finland, France, Greece and Luxembourg, on the other hand, showed high degrees of average differentiation between Bulgaria and Romania, but public opposition to Turkey also changed a great deal over time. That Greeks should consider Turkey markedly different from Romania and Bulgaria should come as no surprise, given Greece’s history and tensions with Turkey. Public opinion toward Turkey shifted considerably after the 1999 earthquakes, and soured somewhat afterwards, but not quite to the level that before the calamities. France joins this category due to the sharp change between the earlier years (1996-2001) and the degree to which opinion soured in the later years (2005-2006). It differentiated between Turkey and Romania/Bulgaria rather modestly (5% difference) early on, and then sharply (24% difference) in 2005-2006. Luxembourg, Finland and Denmark show similar trends – modest-to-high degrees of differentiation in the early years and then very striking degrees in the last two.

Italy and Sweden are the only ones that show the independent variable that the theory of cultural differences would expect – constant and high degrees of differentiation. If the lens of Turkey’s other-ness were the prime explanatory factor, then the public should have consistently perceived great differences between Turkey on the one hand and Bulgaria and Romania on the other. Further contrary to the theory, however, Italy was a consistent supporter of Turkey’s
membership and Sweden changed its position drastically from a brakeman in 1997, 1999 and 2004 to a driver in 2004 and 2006, when the trends in public opinion would have expected the reverse.

**Table 11.1:** Changes of Public Opinion and Degrees of Difference with Bulgaria and Romania.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degrees of change over time</th>
<th>Level of difference in public opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Level of difference in public opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Austria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, Austria and Germany present the greatest puzzles in light of the theory of cultural differences. Both had public opinions in the early years that were generally more favorable toward Turkey than they were toward Romania and Bulgaria. That changed significantly in 2005 and 2006 when Austrians and Germans generally soured on the accession of all three countries, but even more so against Turkey than against Bulgaria and Romania. If the hypothesis had been valid, then there ought not to have been such changes and they certainly should not have favored Turkey more than Bulgaria or Romania in the earlier years.

Aside from the top-left-hand corner, that holds most of Turkey’s allies in the Council, the other three boxes do not show much of a pattern between the habitual drivers or brakemen. While Austria and Germany are both countries with a lot of Turks the same is true of the Netherlands, Belgium, and – to a lesser degree – Sweden. Italy and Sweden have nothing else in common with one another. The lower-right-hand box, holds two of Turkey’s most staunch opponents in the Council (Denmark and Luxembourg), but also France, Greece and Finland, all of which have, at times, been strong drivers of Turkey’s cause, even if they have also taken the brakeman side.
In all, it is clear that public opinion and (in 2005 anyways) perceptions of cultural differences have some impact on member-state policies, the policies and public opinion are too variable over time to be able to say that implicit designation of Turkey as an out-group identity is at the root of member-states’ policies. Therefore, the second hypothesis cannot be accepted as explanatory of the member-state policies.

There is doubtlessly something at work when it comes to European peoples identifying the Turks as an out-group. However, the Europeans’ own in-group identities as religious members of their faiths or as nationalists has no bearing on member-state policies. Further, identifying Turks as an out-group has not been consistent over time. Public opinion regarding Turkey, and differentiating Turkey from Bulgaria and Romania, only became particularly acute after November 2001.

Incidentally, the Fall 2001 survey (which captures October-November), was conducted after the 9/11 terrorist strikes, and did not show an immediate rise in public opposition to Turkey. In fact, there was a 3% drop in straight opposition to Turkey and an only 0.7% rise in the differentiation between Turkey and Bulgaria and Romania. This does not suggest an immediate reaction to the terrorist strikes, but perhaps a broader and slower development of an out-group identity to which the Turks were allocated. In any case, it shows that the identities, or, at least, an appreciation of out-group identities by the public, is not a fixed phenomenon, and is therefore not directly a function of cultural differences, but, at most, the changing saliency of those differences.

11.2 NORMS

The analyses below consider other constructivist theories and their derived hypotheses. The first set considers the weight given to the EU’s norms. First hypothesis tested in this set is the norm of playing by the EU’s own rules – the Copenhagen enlargement regime. The second is to discern if different levels of socialization has produced different policy outcomes.
11.2.1.1 The political Copenhagen criteria

Hn1: Member states are more likely to be supportive of Turkey’s membership after Turkey has demonstrated more progress toward meeting the political Copenhagen criteria than when Turkey has demonstrated less progress.

In essence, the Copenhagen enlargement regime is a restriction on the member states that is supposed to prevent them from disallowing the accession of a candidate that meets the Copenhagen criteria. In determining if Turkey’s own progress has been effective in moving its case for membership forward in the European Council, it has first been necessary to determine if the sum of policies at each episode shows significant variation over time. In other words, has the Council, as a whole, demonstrated changing policies in aggregate that might reflect Turkey’s different degrees of progress?

The empirical answer to this question is ‘yes’. In the change from 1997 to 1999, all countries that changed their policies changed their policies in a positive direction. In the change from 1999 to 2002, only two countries modestly changed their positions (Portugal and Ireland from passenger to driver), while countries modestly changed their policies and two significantly changed their policies. This represents a significant shift toward brakeman policies during that interval. From 2002 to 2004 there was a reversal in that four countries (Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Sweden) reversed their positions in Turkey’s favor from brakeman to driver positions. Against this, only one country (France) modestly shifted from a passenger to a brakeman position. The tide reversed again from 2004 to 2006, when four countries (Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) reversed their driver positions to brakeman positions and one country (Ireland) ceased its active support for Turkey.

In that sense, the variation in the cumulative dependent variable per episode intervals is this: 1997, 2002 and 2006 the countries were nearly evenly split between the drivers and the brakemen. In 1999 and 2004, on the other hand, the drivers vastly outnumbered the brakemen. In 2004, the drivers outnumbered the brakemen 4.5-to-1, and in 2006 4-to-1. This means that if Turkey’s behavior influenced the member states across the board by making impressive strides toward the Copenhagen criteria, they would have done so in the 1997-1999 interval and the 2002-2004 interval. By contrast, they would have disappointed the member states in the 1999-2002 interval and the 2004-2006 interval. If Turkey’s degree of progress toward the Copenhagen criteria is a significant factor in how the Council votes on its membership prospects, variables that capture that progress...
need to align with that down-up-down-up-down/wave-like pattern over the episodes. This is done in a graph for easy visual comparison. The graphs, below, are scaled in order to comfortably encompass the range of actual values, rather than the range of potential values.

According to both of the graphs on the next page, a curious picture emerges. According to the Freedom House indices of political rights and civil liberties, the first two episode intervals saw a marked improvement in the balance of member-state policies while Turkey’s progress toward the criteria was stagnant, and a downturn in the balance of member-state policies concurrent with Turkey’s most significant improvement in its progress toward the criteria. This is precisely contrary to the liberal community hypothesis. However, from 2002 to 2004, there is a strong upsurge in the balance of member-state support for Turkey concurrent with an improvement of Turkey’s civil liberties and political rights, and a marked downturn in the balance of member-state policies when Turkey’s progress toward the criteria is stagnant. These last two intervals are in line with the hypothesis.

According to the CIRI measures, the relationship is even more muddled, and actually contradictory at every stage. From 1997 to 1999 there is a decline in Turkey’s measures of its liberal democracy, while the balance of member state policies improve. The reverse is true in the following interval where Turkey is making strides to return to its previous levels with the return of democracy, the abolition of the death penalty, and other positive developments, but the member states reject Turkey’s bid to begin accession negotiations. When that bid fails, Turkey’s scores according to CIRI plummet, when an overwhelming majority of member-states vote in favor of opening accession negotiations. After another drastic downturn in 2005, but a very strong recovery in 2006, the member states freeze several of the negotiating chapters. This particular data is wholly contrary to the hypothesis, but is probably best explained by inadequacies in the data, especially as it contrasts with the Freedom House data and, qualitatively, with the European Commission’s annual reports.

In the Freedom House data, measuring the Political Rights index (dark blue line) and the Civil Liberties index (light blue line), against the balance of member-state policies, there is no improvement of either score that explains the significant improvement in the balance of member-state policies from 1997 to 1999. In 2002, while conditions improved for both measures, the Civil Rights index still lagged under the minimal standards, explaining why the balance of member-state policies was too modestly in Turkey’s favor to open accession negotiations.
By 2004, however, civil rights had improved to the minimal degree and accession negotiations were opened. Given that they did not improve afterward helps explain member-state disappointment and a significant decline in the balance of policies. However, strictly analytically, if the minimal standards are adequate, it does not explain such a souring of policies. The 1997-1999 interval is unexplained, except that the minimal standards did not necessarily have to be met in 1999 in order to warrant candidacy.

By contrast, again, the picture is more complicated using the CIRI data. The Physical Integrity index (dark blue line) generally improves over the course of the episodes, which is generally consistent with the Freedom House data and the European Commission’s findings. However, it
never meets the minimal criteria previously imposed on other candidates. Quite the contrary picture emerges from the Empowerment Rights index, which is generally declining in trend, with more than minimal scores until 1999, and only twice meeting the minimal level in 2002 and again in 2006. It is curious, then, that the balance of member-state policies moves is stark contrast to the Empowerment Rights index.

With the Freedom House data, measured according to the minimal standards approach being the best fit out of the four tests, this is the best model for disaggregating the balance of policies, and comparing with the policy developments of the individual member states, to see how well this model predicts member-state behavior. Testing this means combining both the Political Rights and the Civil Liberties score back into one quantitative variable. Rather than summing the scores, the two scores are combined by summing the deviations from the minimal standard. When tested against the individual policies of the member states, the changes in Turkey’s liberal democracy score, however, produces very poor results for predictive power. On the whole, it returns a proportional reduction of error score of $\gamma = 0.11$, meaning that it improves the prediction by only 11%.

Analytically, the real puzzle is why member states in 1999 drastically changed their positions from negative to positive without which Turkey’s democracy and human rights situation dramatically improved. The particular countries that significantly changed their policies in Turkey’s favor were Greece and Germany, while Finland and Spain became vocal on Turkey’s behalf and Denmark ceased to be particularly outspoken against Turkey’s membership ambitions. Otherwise, no countries were more negative in 1999 than they were in 1997.

From the point of view of encouragement, the following interval is also puzzling. Turkey made great strides in improving its domestic political and human rights environment, but were not rewarded for their efforts by the member states. Finland and the Netherlands changed from being outspoken supporters to outspoken opponents. Austria and Denmark also became outspoken opponents, while on the other side Ireland and Portugal joined the driver camp. Critically, France’s enthusiasm for Turkey’s membership waned.

This change is understandable from a ‘minimal standards’ point-of-view, as Turkey had made great strides but did not yet sufficiently satisfy the criteria. The rule had been made that to warrant accession negotiations, the minimal standards needed to be met, while these minimal standards were not required for candidacy. That, however, makes the 1997 decision all the more puzzling in contrast to 1999. If candidacy did not require minimal standards, why, then, were so
many member states opposed to putting Turkey in the same category as other candidate countries in 1997? Furthermore, if Turkey was deemed to have met the minimal standards in 2004, and had not retrograded by 2006, why did the member states turn against Turkey to the degree that they did?

Given these puzzles and the low proportional reduction of error rate, it is difficult not to conclude that Turkey’s progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria is not determinative of Turkey’s progress toward membership. This finding is also contrary to the rhetoric of member states that adopt brakemen positions in name of Turkey’s lack of progress as well as that of member states encouraging Turkey to push forward their domestic reforms. In the case of Turkey, then, the liberal community hypothesis cannot be supported.

These results also question the idea that rhetorical entrapment silences brakemen when the candidate performs well and drivers when the candidate performs poorly. In the empirical record, both made their views known loudly, and, other than in 1997, passengers policies – the expected behavior of a rhetorically entrapped actor – were quite rare. Because 1997 was, essentially, the outset of the process, it does not count. Afterward, there were only six out of sixty cases of passenger policies. While rhetorical entrapment may explain why a member state did not veto, it cannot explain why brakemen would become full-throated drivers and vice versa, which seven of the fifteen member states did at least once, including both France and Germany.

11.2.1.2 Socialization

**Hn2:** Member states that have been members of the EU for similar amounts of time will exhibit behavior that is more similar to one another than to member states that have been members for significantly different lengths of time.

**Hn3:** Member states that have been member of the EU longer are more likely to have their support or opposition governed by Turkey’s level of progress toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria than member states that have been members for shorter periods of time.

The concept of socialization captures the idea that actors that have been participants in a regime will internalize the norms of the regime. Given that socialization is a gradual process, the explanatory variable is, essentially, the length of time that a member state has been a member. Because the EEC/EU grew gradually with several waves of enlargements, it is simple to see if members of the
same waves behaved more or less more similar to one another than to members of other enlargement waves.

The four groups are: the founding members, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the first wave of accession countries: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, the second wave Greece, Portugal and Spain, and the third wave, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. It is also possible to differentiate Portugal and Spain from Greece, given that Greece joined five years before the Iberian members did. The Graph set below shows the policies of the member states in their different groups by enlargement order.

The graphs on the next page (Figure 11.10) quickly dispel the idea that members of the different waves of joining the EEC/EU have similar behavior. The first graph, showing the founding member states, shows a confused zig-zag of policies among precisely the members that ought to have been socialized the longest. Their average level of support, using the (−1,0,1) scale across each episode) was 0.27, suggesting that on average the founding members were only a touch more favorable towards Turkey than they were opposed, and had a standard deviation in their policies of 0.9.

The second group includes the United Kingdom, one of Turkey’s stalwart supporters and Denmark, Turkey’s most consistent antagonist. Ireland, on the other hand, is the member whose policies have most closely aligned with the Turkey’s developments toward the Copenhagen criteria. Their average level of support was 0.2, suggesting that they were also just slightly more in favor of Turkey than they were against, but, with a standard deviation of 0.8 it is also clear that their support was quite varied.

The third group, including Greece, Portugal and Spain, show the greatest commonality of all the groups, especially between Portugal and Spain. Their average level of support was 0.53 with a standard deviation of 0.74. This means that they were, on average, twice as favorable as the founding members and the members of the first enlargement wave, but only slightly less varied in their policies – mostly owing to Greece opposition in 1997 and 2006.

Finally, the post-Cold War enlargement group, including Austria, Finland and Sweden also shows a little commonality between Sweden and Finland in 2002, 2004 and 2006, and all three commonly opposed Turkey in 2002. However, given their short-term membership in the EU, there ought to have been the least amount of socialization among them. Their average level of support was −0.13, meaning that they were slightly more opposed than supportive, but with a standard
deviation of 0.91 it is clear that they were no more consistent in their policies than any of the earlier groups.

Given that there is nothing to suppose that longer socialization brings similar policies, and the fact that Turkey’s advance toward the Copenhagen criteria is a poor predictor across the board, there is no evidence to support the second hypothesis that predicts that the founding members ought to be the most aligned with the norm of supporting Turkey in line with its advancements toward meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Both hypotheses are rejected.

These two analyses conclude the measurements of the effects of norms on the process. Adherence to the norm of not disallowing a member that meets, or progresses toward, the Copenhagen criteria to progress through the enlargement regime does not help predict member-state behavior. That is not to suggest that Turkey need not worry about meeting the criteria in order
to become a member of the EU. It will doubtlessly have to meet them in order to become a member.

The findings, here, however, do question Schimmelfennig’s theory that the brakemen were entrapped by their own rhetoric and thus permitted Turkey to become a candidate in 1999 and start accession negotiations in 2005. The brakemen were not entrapped; they were outvoted. At best, rhetorical entrapment suggests that they ought not exercise a veto over the process. Yet, the norm against the unilateral veto is not a part of the Copenhagen enlargement regime; it is a part of the overarching norm embedded in the Luxembourg Compromise that pressures member states to only veto proposals that would harm interests of a ‘particular importance’ to them.

Further, if norms strengthen as a result of socialization, it is not clear that socialization has affected more regularized behavior among the member states that have been in the regime the longest. The founding members do not demonstrate any more common behavior than any of the other member states do. The greatest similarity of policy was found among the different groups was found among the Mediterranean members of the third wave, but that is largely led by similarities between Portugal and Spain, which may be explained by many different reasons, given the many commonality of characteristics between them.

The next section considers values. This is treated differently from norms, even the analyses will look at similar concepts and measures. The distinction is about the degree to which values are shared between Turkey and the different member states, or the degree by which the values matter for public opinion.

11.3 VALUES

The third Constructivist angle is values. Values are shared beliefs, and in the European Union, the belief in liberal democracy and the rule of law is, ostensibly, the shared belief that is supposed to hold the community together. As has already been mentioned in the assessment of norms, it is the adherence to the values of liberal democracy and the rule of law that makes a country suitable to be a member. However, the member states exhibit adherence to those values to varying degrees. Some countries are more strict with themselves on, or have fewer temptations to diverge from, these values. The following hypotheses test the notion that those countries who are stricter will be less
likely to admit a Turkey that is lagging in their embrace of the community values, while countries that have a more problematic record will be more lenient with Turkey.

11.3.1.1 Shared political values

Hv1: Member states with lower levels of adherence to the values of liberal democracy are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with higher levels of adherence to the values of liberal democracy are.

Hv2: Member states with lower levels of corruption are less likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than member states with higher levels of corruption are.

The tests of shared political values return partially significant results. The Freedom House civil liberties score has some explanatory power ($r = 0.46$) when using the values of 2001 and earlier against the long-run policy average. After 2001, all member states (save Greece) enjoyed scores of 1 for civil liberties. Given that Freedom House political rights score for all member states was a 1 during all the years in question, there is no variation to test, and that score cannot have any explanatory value.

The CIRI data also produces some results. While the empowerment index score measured either as member-state values ($r = -0.01$) or as difference-with-Turkey values ($r = -0.02$) does not show any explanatory power, the physical integrity index does. When measured as a difference-with-Turkey value – taking the member state score and subtracting the score for Turkey, and drawing an 12-year (1994-2006) average – there is a correlation of $r = -0.44$. That is slightly improved ($r = -0.45$) when just measuring only against the member-state score without measuring the difference with Turkey’s score.

This suggests that there is at least some correlation between the physical integrity indices of the member states and their policies regarding Turkey. The correlation is negative in the sense that the higher the physical integrity index score, the less likely that member state is to be supportive of Turkey, the way in which the hypothesis expects. However, it is not clearly so that it is the similarity of values with Turkey that is the operative part. If that had been the case, the correlation of the ‘differences with’ score would have been stronger than the absolute score. Instead, it seems like it has more to do with member-states’ own compulsion to consider the Copenhagen criteria as the important factors.
In this context it is noteworthy to observe that there is a relatively strong correlation between the answers to the Eurobarometer survey question about the importance of human rights and principles of democracy as criteria of EU membership. While overwhelming majorities (90%+) in all member states answer that upholding human rights and the principles of democracy are important criteria for membership, there is interesting variation in the number of people who answer this question positively (Most who do not declare it important answer that they are unsure; only 1%-2% answer that these things are not important). The answers to these question correlate (r = -0.40) with the physical integrity indices, suggesting that there may be some greater strength in the support for human rights as membership criteria in member states that, themselves, have stronger human rights practices. (Incidentally, the correlation between these survey answers and the long-run policy on Turkey is also r = -0.40.)

Graph 11.7 (Figure 11.11) above, shows the scatter plot and regression line of the physical integrity against long-run policy relationship. It is clear that there are significant outstanding residuals. Clearly Austria’s level of support is much lower than its physical integrity index would suggest (According to CIRI, torture and extrajudicial killings are not unheard of in Austria), and Belgium seems to have be supportive of Turkey despite clear differences between Turkey’s human rights record and its own.
When analyzed with accounting for episode-by-episode changes in both physical integrity scores and the short-run policies of the member states, the resulting proportional reduction in error returns a $\gamma = -0.54$. A limitation to this model is that the independent variable has insufficient variation to offer a medium value between the lower category and higher category. Of the seventy-five cases, here are three cases of scores of 5, ten cases of 6, 31 cases of 7 and another 31 perfect scores of 8. re-categorizing the 5s and 6s into the lower category, taking 7s as the medium category and 8s as the upper category reduces the measure of fit to $\gamma = -0.39$, which is not inconsiderable in comparison to many of the measures seen in this research.

What these figures suggest is that when it comes to the types of human rights identified by the physical integrity index (disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political prisoners and cases of torture), those member states that have better human records are less likely to be supportive of Turkey than countries with somewhat tarnished human rights records. Specifically in terms of the hypothesis, however, it is not so much Turkey’s own performance that seems to play into it, as measuring the differences with Turkey does not seem to improve the measures over simply the member-states’ own performance. Essentially, this is due to the fact that the member states did not generally become much more positive toward Turkey as it improved its own record, as was already demonstrated above. Taking only Turkey’s Physical Integrity index scores against the member states’ short run policies reduces the error over random guessing by only 16% ($\gamma = 0.16$).

The second hypothesis, regarding corruption, also produces a relevant result. The correlation coefficient is $r = -0.49$, showing that, in general terms, countries with higher scores (lower levels of corruption) are less likely to support Turkey for membership. Graph 11.8, (Figure 11.12), above shows this relationship in the form of a scatter plot and regression line. In comparison to many of these scatter plots, the residuals are much fewer. The main outlier is the United Kingdom, whose corruption index is higher (lower corruption) than the average driver.

In regard to helping predict the member states’ short-run policies, the test also produces medium-to-strong results. Measuring against the prediction of the hypothesis, taking differences between the CPIs of each of the member states and those of Turkey produces a proportional reduction of error of $\gamma = -0.39$. Taking the differences out of the equation, and simply assessing against the CPIs of the member states improves the predictive value to $\gamma = -0.46$. This, again, suggests that to the degree that perceptions of corruption are indicative of policies, it is not the case that it is revulsion over Turkish corruption that is leading, but perceptions of corruption in the home country.
This finding, along with the finding of the statistical relationship with the Physical Integrity index, shows that it there may be a case for a values effect. It is also the case that the Physical Integrity Index and the CPI between them show a high correlation of $r = 0.71$. Freedom House’s Civil Liberties index of 2001 also correlates highly with the Physical Integrity Index ($r = -0.65$) and the CPI ($r = -0.73$)\(^{45}\).

11.4 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES

With all the hypotheses tested in turn, the following Table 11.2 shows the results of each in the different metrics of assessment, and whether or not the hypothesis is accepted for further analysis or rejected. Of these, a few reflected results that warrant a further look.

Among the security-related hypotheses, terrorism is worth considering further, but NATO membership and participation in multilateral military missions proved not to have any explanatory value. The threat from transnational crime, as measured in heroin deaths seems significant but in a contrary direction to the to the expectations of the hypothesis. In the assessments of power, external trade policy returned a surprisingly high level of correlation. This was surprising as it is not altogether clear that those countries that trade more in the broader world would necessarily benefit from Turkey’s membership, given that Turkey trades just as much in the external economy as the average European does. While still not insignificant, it is clear that assessing the predictive power of external trade over time does not improve the predictive capacity of the variable, as the short-term assessment is not as strong as the long-term assessment.

Among the other non-domestic power-related variables, only population size returned at an interesting level of correlation. It is clear that larger countries do tend to be more supportive than smaller countries do. This cannot, however, have any explanatory value in terms of why member states change their policies over time. Theoretically, it is also problematic at the organizational level of analysis, because it is questionable if the large states really gain from having another large partner with whom they must share power.

\(^{45}\) The coefficients are negative because lower values on the Civil Liberties index indicate greater protection of civil liberties.
Table 11.2: Summary of Rationalist Hypothesis-testing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis (Construct)</th>
<th>ANOVA</th>
<th>Pearson's R</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Reject?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hs1 NATO membership</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hs2 Military missions</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hs3 Terrorism</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hs4 Transnational crime</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp1 Atlanticism vs. continentalism</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp2 External trade policy</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp3 Enlargement policy</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp4 Euroscepticism</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp5 Large vs. small</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp6 The EU budget</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp7 Public opinion</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp8 Political party ideology</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp9 Political opportunism</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp10 Immigration politics – oppose</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp11 Immigration politics – frequency of change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hp12 Immigration politics – relationship between changes of government and policy</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hw1 Agricultural trade</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hw2 Volume of trade</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hw3 Volume of investment</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hw4 Trade surplus</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hw5 Migration and unemployment</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tests of the significance of domestic power relations were all fairly strong, suggesting that the domestic arena has great explanatory potential. In particular, countries with many domestic Turks seemed to have much greater correlation between changes in government and changes in policy, whereas countries with fewer domestic Turks either had more steady policies or their policies did not correlate with the changes in government as strongly. The domestic angle is clearly the strongest contestant for further investigation. The one caveat is that it does little to explain why the countries
with few domestic Turks decided their policies. After all, some had very steady and supportive politics, such as Italy and the United Kingdom, while others, such as Luxembourg and Sweden were much more likely to oppose. Finland is an example where there was much change in policy without which this is explained by the changes in government. Nor does Finland have many domestic Turks.

The hypotheses relating to wealth faired particularly poorly. It is not at all evident that concerns over the agricultural sector or the possibility of strengthening trading and investment relations help explain why member states may be supportive or antagonistic to Turkey’s membership ambitions. The only hypothesis that approached significance was that concerning unemployment. However, that relationship showed that member states with tendencies toward high unemployment rates tended to be more supportive of Turkey than countries with low average unemployment rates. From the perspective of a need for workers in the economy, this is contrary to the expectation of the hypothesis.

The constructivist hypotheses also had mixed results. These are listed in Table 11.3 on the next page. Among the identity-related hypotheses only the identification of cultural differences with Turkey returned a significant result. The others, relating to religion, religious intolerance, and nationalism, fared poorly. The factor recognizing cultural differences should quickly be tempered by the knowledge that it correlates near perfectly with general public opinion about Turkey. Where that correlation is imperfect, the general question about respondents’ enlargement preferences performed better in explaining member-state policies, suggesting that cultural differences may be more rationalization than rationale.

A very significant finding (significant because of its statistical insignificance) was that Turkey’s progress toward the political Copenhagen criteria (or lack thereof) did not explain member-state policies. This is significant, because the enlargement regime prescribes – and policy-makers take many pains to assert it as such – that Turkey’s progress toward meeting these criteria are the only factor that really matters. However, while the sum of member-state policies varied widely over time, the variation did not align at all with Turkey’s actual progress toward becoming a more liberal democratic country.

Far more significant than Turkey’s progress toward being a liberal democratic country were the member states own records along the same measures. Countries with imperfect records on torture, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political prisoners and – measured separately – corruption, were far more likely to be supportive of Turkey. In that sense, similarities of political
culture (or deviations from the liberal democratic norms and values) were fairly explanatory of member-state policies.

**Table 11.3: Summary of Constructivist Hypothesis-testing.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis (Construct)</th>
<th>ANOVA</th>
<th>Pearson's R</th>
<th>Gamma (γ)</th>
<th>Reject?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hi1 Catholics vs. Protestants</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi2 Religiosity (church attendance)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi3 Anti-Muslim sentiment</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi4 Nationalism</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi5 Cultural differences</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi6 Differentiation with other candidate countries</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-0.27(Bulg)</td>
<td>-0.27(Rom)</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hn1 Political Copenhagen criteria</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hn2 Socialization: similar time</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hn3 Socialization: norm-governed policies.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hv1 Liberal democratic values</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hv2 Corruption</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>Not Rejected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The immediate overall conclusion that can be drawn from the lists in the preceding tables is that very few of the theoretically suggested independent variables produce predictions that perform better than improving proportionally predictions more than 50% over random guessing. Those that come closest are related to terrorism, public opinion, domestic politics and the politics of immigration on the rationalist side and political values on the constructivist side.

The following chapter pulls these results together in testing if multivariate approaches can help put together a comprehensive picture. With that done, Chapter 12 also reviews country-by-country what the implications of this research are, and what it may mean for Turkey’s winding path toward membership, should it choose to persist.
The previous chapters have taken the empirical record of member-state positions on Turkey’s progress toward membership and tested the variation of these positions against 32 different theoretical reasons – drawn from two metatheoretical paradigms – for which they might make their policies. Very few of these hypotheses explained more than a third of the variation in the policies, and fewer still could explain more than half of that variation. The first purpose of this chapter is to bring the variables from the best-performing hypotheses and puzzle together a multivariate understanding of what drives member-state governments.

Doing so involves testing well-performing hypotheses against the population not explained by the best-performing theory from the previous chapters. This theory is that the domestic politics of, essentially, past-tense Turkish immigration, has governed member state policy making on Turkey. This theory explains why some countries are almost perfectly explained by their domestic political changes and others are not. Countries that have relatively large Turkish communities show high degrees of correlation between domestic political change and policy change, while countries that do not have many Turks do not tend to have their policies on Turkey change with their political winds. While this worthwhile finding explains most of the key countries (including France and Germany) it leaves most of the countries unexplained. The challenge is, then, to identify that hypothesis that best explains the remaining countries.

The first portion of this chapter further explains the differentiation between the ‘politically motivated’ members, and those whose policies need to be explained by other factors. It describes which member states are in this category and why.

The second portion describes the variation found in the remaining group of states and how this variation is analyzed. It proceeds to test those hypotheses that were found to have at least some explanatory power in the previous chapters against the remaining population. Those that show a marked increase in the two measures of association that have already been used will be held to be explanatory of the remaining cases.
The third section details what these findings mean in both theoretical and particular terms. What are the implications of these findings for the metatheories discussed in the first chapter? What do the different categories of state mean for understanding the enlargement process for Turkey? From there, it considers each member state in turn, exploring what the findings mean for understanding each member state’s approach to Turkish membership.

The fourth and final section summarizes the above and, based in the findings of this research, suggests approaches Turkey may use in navigating the politics of the European member states going forward. Membership in the EU is far from guaranteed, but, even with all the difficulties, it is not an impossible prospect. The barriers to Turkish membership in the EU are very high, but they are not fixed insurmountable structures. It is suggested that with the domestic politics of immigration determining the policy decisions in the key countries, it is imperative for Turkey to alter those domestic debates if it is to prevent these countries mounting sufficient opposition to the process to derail the process altogether.

12.1 THE POLITICS OF PAST-TENSE TURKISH IMMIGRATION

Among the sets of hypotheses analyzed in the previous chapters, those relating to domestic politics demonstrated the strongest relationships between the suggested independent variables and the dependent variable. The explanatory power of the domestic-politics lens improved the more it was seen through the lens of Turkish immigration and changes in government by the ideological direction of the coalition parties. Analytically, then, this is already a multivariate analysis that couples the relative number of Turks in the population with governing party ideology to explain the member-state policies in question.

Essentially, this is about the politics of Turkish immigration in the past tense. In the countries where this factor is salient, a large part of the Turkish community is of the first generation that came in the 1960s and 1970s, and the second generation of immigrants – their children. These communities are already established and many have acquired, or were born with, citizenship of the member states in which they reside. The further in-flow of Turkish citizens is fairly small compared to the stock of Turks of both generations already in these member states. Most of the growth rate of these Turkish communities is not determined by immigration, but by the natural growth rate.
Table 12.1, below, lists the countries in declining order of the percentage of Turks in the population. It also shows the Pearson correlation between changes in political party or coalition ideology and changes in the policy adopted. Austria, France and Germany are near-perfect examples. The Netherlands and Denmark also show very strong correlation coefficients in the expected direction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% Turks</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.49%</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.95%</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.70%</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Belgium and Sweden’s reverse direction, on the other hand are surprising. For Belgium this can be understood in light of what the ParlGov ideology measure reflects and what parties the measures stand for (see below). For the remainder, the score is either low or in a contrary direction. Given this finding, it is helpful to differentiate among the member states between those where politics are highly explanatory of policy and those where politics are not. Though each member state is detailed more extensively later in the chapter, it is worthwhile to recount the changes in the politics, to understand the political ideology numbers in less abstract terms.
In Germany, when the CDU and FDP were in power under the Kohl government, Germany was opposed to Turkish membership. Under the SPD-Grünen coalition of Gerhard Schröder, Germany strongly supported Turkey’s ambitions. This again changed under Angela Merkel’s Chancellorship, even while in coalition with the SPD. In Austria, the SPÖ-ÖVP government was relatively silent and ambivalent on Turkey, but the ÖVP-FPÖ government was vehemently opposed. In this respect, the countries with the largest share of Turks in the population are the best examples of the relationship between politics and policy.

In the Netherlands, the PvdA-VVD-D66 coalition of Wim Kok explicitly favored Turkey. The rump of the Balkenende I (CDA-VVD) government in late 2002 that was left after the LPF party had been ousted opposed Turkey. Balkenende II (CDA-VVD-D66) supported Turkey but opposed Turkey again when D66 quit the coalition in 2006. While D66 was a very small party, there can be no doubt that under the counterfactual case of D66 not having been in the government in 2004, there would not have been support for Turkey in The Hague. The D66 ministers – especially Jan Laurens Brinkhorst – were instrumental in pushing the Cabinet into the driver camp.

In Belgium, too, the policy changed from passenger to driver when the Verhofstad’s liberal VLD took over as the largest party in the coalition, having defeated DeHaene’s Christian-democratic CVP. While the ParlGov measure of ideology gives VLD a slightly more right-wing score, it is quite clear that on this issue, VLD had a different policy agenda than CVP did. This is why the correlation coefficient for the Belgian case is relatively low and in the opposite direction of what is expected by the hypothesis.

For Denmark, the case is not as clear. The Social-Democratic-led coalition of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen was opposed to Turkey in 1997, but took a passenger position in 1999. The right-wing coalition of his successor, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, was a consistent brakeman. For France, there is certainly evidence of domestic politics being explanatory, with the caveat that Jacques Chirac was personally supportive of Turkey, while his party was vehemently opposed. This made for strong French support when Chirac and the Socialist Party were in cohabitation, but the driver policy could not hold when the Socialists lost the government.

In Sweden, by contrast, there is no relationship between domestic political change and policy change, as the policy change took place under the government of Göran Persson. Also, in the United Kingdom there has not been a hint that the Conservatives would have set a different policy from what the Labour party did. For the rest of the member states the only other government change leading to policy change was in Luxembourg when in 2004 the social-democratic SDAP
joined Jean-Claude Juncker’s Christian-democratic CSV in coalition. However, that same
government changed the policy back to a brakeman position two years later.

In order to pursue further inquiry into what variable or variables may explain those countries
where the politics of Turkish immigration do not play such a clear role, it is necessary to divide the
population into two groups – those where these domestic politics play a role and those where they
do not. The former group consists of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and
France. While the pure numbers raise question marks behind the choice to include Belgium, and
why to include France and not Sweden, these choices are for the following reasons:

Belgium is included because of its relative large number of Turks and because the change of
government, if not the ParlGov score, shows that Belgium’s policy changed when Verhofstad’s
VLD came to power and removed the Christian Democrats. France is included for the same
reasons, though more so on the side of the relationship between politics and policy than that of the
relative number of Turks. Furthermore, while the percentage of Turks in France (0.58%) is fewer
than in Sweden (0.7%), that percentage still represents nearly a half-million people. The Turkish
community is further part of a very large Muslim immigrant population, which tends to be
associated with the Turks in the minds of the native French populace. Sweden is excluded because
there does not seem to be a domestic political motivation behind the policy aimed at stifling Turkish
immigration. Sweden’s change in policy did not change when the government changed, despite
having relatively more Turks than France.

Something also needs to be said about the figures for Ireland and Portugal, which both score
0.8 in the correlation between changes in government and changes in policy. For Ireland, this
statistic arises because of a minute change in the representative seats in parliament at the same time
as a policy shift from passenger to driver. In this case, after the 2002 elections, the share of coalition
between Fianna Fáil and the Progressive Democrats seats shifted slightly in favor of the latter (77-
to-4 to 81-to-8). The coalition did not, however, change between 2004 and 2006, when Ireland
returned to a passenger policy on Turkey. As such, the coefficient belies the actual relationship.
Regarding Portugal, a policy shift toward Turkey (also from passenger to driver) did take place after
the Social Democratic Party of José Manuel Barroso took power in 2002. That policy, however,
remained in place in 2006 when the Socialist Party returned to power. This does not, realistically,
constitute a relationship between political and policy change in the same way as it does in Germany
and Austria. Further, Portugal and Ireland have analytically negligible Turkish populations.
As such, the politically explained countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands – are differentiated from the rest of the countries. The politics of Turkish are highly explanatory of the changes in policy that took place in this group. In the others, other motivations or impulses need to be found in order to explain them. This is the purpose of the next section of this chapter.

12.2 DETERMINING COMPLEMENTARY FACTORS

If domestic politics are taken as explanatory of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and France, what remains is to explain the variation in the remaining nine members. However, when looking at that remaining variation of policies, the picture is far more skewed than the distribution among the fifteen member states is. The only strong brakeman left is Luxembourg, whereas the drivers dominate the population. Table 12.2 characterizes the remaining members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brakemen</th>
<th>Varying</th>
<th>Drivers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Luxembourg</td>
<td>• Finland</td>
<td>• Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Greece</td>
<td>• Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sweden</td>
<td>• Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The member-state specific sections later in the chapter will assess Luxembourg as the remaining brakeman. The middle category is not typified by a lack of positions – only Finland, once, took a passenger stance – but by the observation that their policies shift from brakeman to driver (or vice versa) without domestic politics being an explanation. In this particular line-up, the two Scandinavian countries might be considered to have more similar policies to one another while Greece is much more likely to have an explanation peculiar to Greece. However, it is not necessarily
the case that Finland and Sweden had similar policies. While their policies in 2002, 2004, and 2006 were the same, Finland took a passenger stance in 1997 and a driver stance in 1999, while Sweden was a brakeman in both instances. Finland was second to the Netherlands in having a volatile policy (three policy shifts, two from one side to the other), while Sweden changed its policy only once.

In the driver box there are the UK and Italy, who have consistently supported Turkey. In the UK’s case, there was no political change, while in the Italian case there were significant changes in government, but a constant policy regarding Turkey. Ireland, Portugal, and Spain have mostly been supportive or, at times, taken passenger positions. Broadly speaking, all three started off as passengers, either because they did not make their voices heard, or their voices were not listened to amid the fray between the more powerful and outspoken members. Spain became a driver in 1999 and Portugal and Ireland followed suit in 2002. In 2006, Ireland, again, did not express its preferences loud enough to be heard, to the degree that it had strong preferences one way or another, which was not particularly evident.

Aside from the hypotheses related to domestic politics, there are six other hypotheses that rose to interesting levels of correlation. These are security from terrorism, external trade, population size, religious identity, cultural differences, liberal democratic values and corruption. The key to finding which of these helps explain the remaining variation lies in seeing if they correlate stronger with the remaining member-state policy profiles than they did with the countries with domestic political concerns in the mix.

The simplest means of doing so is to recalculate the correlation coefficients and proportional reductions in error with the six politically-motivated member states removed from the population. Taking note of the changes in measurements helps determine if there is added value from these hypotheses in explaining the remaining members. If the measures markedly increase, it indicates that these hypotheses help explain member state behavior in the absence of the overriding concern for a country’s domestic politics. The paragraphs below detail the findings of each recalculation, the numbers for which are summarized in Table 12.3.

12.2.1 Terrorism

In terms of terrorism, it is true that Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom have suffered more under terrorism than Sweden, Finland and Luxembourg have. However, Portugal has been
relatively free of terrorism, but has still been supportive. Also, regarding Spain and Ireland, their threat from terrorism was greater in years when they held passenger positions. Further, without any terrorist incidents, Finland’s policy volatility and Luxembourg’s single episode (2004) of embracing a driver policy cannot be explained at all.

In terms of measurement, when taking the politically motivated countries out of the population, the correlation between incidents of terrorism (with a 1-year time lag) and policies improves from $r = 0.31$ to $r = 0.36$. In terms of predicting across episodes, however, the proportional reduction of error measure, gamma, decreases from $\gamma = 0.48$ to $\gamma = 0.37$. As such, it is a difficult case to make for the threat of terrorism being a prime motivator for the remaining countries. The variable does not yield added value when removing the politically motivated countries, and should, therefore, be discarded from further consideration.

12.2.2 External Trade

The mysterious factor of external trade remains measurably significant, but the removal of the politically-motivated countries does not shift the measures much. The correlation coefficient improves from $r = 0.59$ to $r = 0.60$, while gamma reduces from $\gamma = 0.44$ to $\gamma = 0.42$. While it is clearly the case that free-trader members do seem to support Turkey more than protectionist members do, this is not particularly a characteristic that improves with time, or, at least, taking episodes into account. Furthermore, it continues to suffer theoretically from the idea that the free traders cannot predict that Turkey will have similar external-trade policy interests once it becomes a member, given that its degree of trade outside of the European Economic Area is on par with the average European country.

12.2.3 Large vs. Small

The other puzzling factor, population size, does show a marked increase. With Germany and France out of the picture, Italy the United Kingdom and Spain are at the big-country end of the size spectrum, with Luxembourg at the other. The Pearson coefficient rises from $r = 0.42$ to $r = 0.79$. Because relative population size did not differ much over the course of the episodes, there is no
cause for measuring the proportional reduction of error. Relative population size cannot explain change over time.

In absence of the countries with a domestic political rationale, then, large countries were much more eager to have Turkey join their ranks than the smaller ones were. This was so, despite the fact that they would have to share power within the organization. Given that it is France and Germany that are excluded, this is not surprising. With France and Germany already as the leading two countries in European integration, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom can easily have an interest in diluting the primary influence of the Franco-German alliance by adding another large partner. France and Germany’s own policy patterns, however, suggests that they were not necessarily opposed to Turkey on these grounds.

This is good news for Turkey’s membership ambitions, considering the relative (though not proportional) greater influence of the larger member states. The smaller member states may have a greater tendency to oppose Turkey, for fear of being drowned out by yet another large member state, but they will be at greater pains to stop the accession, should that become imminent. However, since population size is not a factor that can be affected, it is not something that ought to be treated as particularly meaningful.

12.2.4 Religious Identity

With the politically motivated countries removed from the population, it is not conceptually impossible that the religious identities of the member states would help explain member-state behavior more. However, that is not demonstrably the case. The correlation coefficient between church attendance and policy reduces slightly from $r = 0.30$ to $r = 0.28$, leaving the question essentially closed. While more religious countries (in terms of churchgoing) still tend to be more supportive of Turkey, this is not something that is more relevant outside of the domestic political angle.

It is, however, once again meaningful to point out that opposition to Turkey is not because Europe is Christian. Nor, as it has already been observed, is it because Turks are Muslims and many European countries have bigoted populations. People’s unwillingness to have Muslim neighbors is no more significant among the remaining nine countries than it was among all fifteen. Therefore, the factor of religious identity can be removed from further consideration. If anything, greater religiosity
slightly predicts greater support for Turkey, but this is not improved with the removal of the politically-motivated countries and has no added value for understanding the remaining member states.

12.2.5 Cultural Differences

The same is true of cultural differences as a rationale for rejecting Turkey. While the correlation is still relatively strong, it reduces from $r = -0.52$ to $r = -0.42$ in terms of the relationship between popular opinion rejecting Turkey on cultural grounds and the policies of the governments representing those publics. The negative figures indicate the more that the cultural differences rationale is supported, the less likely a country is going to be a driver, as the hypothesis expects. Without any added value, however, there is no case for cultural differences being particularly explanatory of the remaining countries.

12.2.6 Liberal Democratic Values

By contrast, liberal democratic values, as measured by the CIRI physical integrity index, improve the degree to which member-state policies are predictable when the politically-motivated countries are removed from the population. The correlation coefficient improves from $r = -0.45$ to $r = -0.68$. This improvement also holds for the assessment across the episodes, with the proportional reduction of error rate increasing from $\gamma = -0.54$ to $\gamma = -0.68$. Again, the negatives are expected by the hypothesis – the higher the index score, the more the liberal democratic values are enacted into member states’ own policies regarding human rights the less likely they are to embrace a Turkey where the human rights situation is not perfect.

This suggests that among the remaining countries, the countries with records of strict adherence to human rights – Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden – were much more likely to oppose Turkey’s progress through the enlargement process, while those with more faults in that field – Greece, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – were not as sanctimonious in regard to Turkey’s record. The improved explanatory power over time is the result of last-episode declines in Finland and Sweden’s human rights records, when their policies were more positive toward Turkey than they had been earlier on.
12.2.7  Corruption

The degree to which member states maintain a stricter rule of law remains fairly high. The measurement of the corruption perception index, which has higher values for countries with less corruption, slips a little in terms of the correlation coefficient, reducing from $r = -0.49$ to $r = -0.38$. However, the predictions across the episodes hold steady at $\gamma = -0.46$. As such, there’s no additional explanation from the degree to which the remaining member states adhere to the rule of law than there was before the politically-motivated member states were removed. It does, however, show that even in the absence of domestic politics, countries with strong rule-of-law institutions have a distaste for adding a country with rule-of-law problems such as Turkey to the EU’s membership.

12.2.8  Summary of added findings

The recomputed measures of association and prediction, $r$ and $\gamma$, between these independent variables and the dependent variable are listed in Table 12.3, below. Among all the independent variables, only population size and the physical integrity index are shown to have added explanatory value over the dependent variable. Factors or motives related to terrorism, external trade, religiosity, cultural differences, and corruption do not seem to weigh in any more for the remaining member states than they did for the whole EU-15 range of member states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis (Construct)</th>
<th>Pearson’s $R$</th>
<th>Gamma ($\gamma$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU-15</td>
<td>9 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External trade</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population size</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural differences</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical integrity</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In regard to population size, this is not a factor that conceivably has a direct relationship. Only by imputing different interests of large countries compared to small countries can one really posit why this relationship appears to be significant. It is, however, worth noting because, to the degree that larger member states have greater influence on the European Council’s decisions, it is good news for Turkey going forward. The United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain can protect Turkey’s interests in the Council in more ways than Greece, Luxembourg and Sweden can harm them.

The findings of the values approach are more theoretically interesting, however. The measures improved in explanatory power both across averages and when taking episodic change into account, improving the correlation coefficient from $r = -0.45$ to an impressive $r = -0.68$, and the proportional reduction in error to $\gamma = -0.68$. This suggests that human rights are not an unimportant factor in this story, but the way in which the factor is expressed is different from what is commonly understood. It is clear that it is not so much Turkey’s progress on the human-rights front that matters as it is member-states’ own performance in protecting human rights.

**Graph 12.1: Physical Integrity**

![Graph 12.1: Physical Integrity](image)

**Figure 12.1: Physical Integrity**
What this tautologically implies is that the political Copenhagen criteria matter to those countries for whom the political Copenhagen criteria matter. Among the remaining nine member states, the countries that scored better-than-average are Luxembourg, Finland, Sweden and Ireland. Ireland, while a driver in 2002 and 2004, took passenger positions in 1997, 1999 and 2006, making it, overall, a lackluster driver.

In contrast to these are Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, all of whom had somewhat tarnished records. Among these, Greece was the least supportive of Turkey. Portugal, the best performing of this group was also the least enthusiastic of its support for Turkey, not joining the ranks of the drivers until 2002. This relationship against the average is depicted in Graph 12.1 to the right. As per the stronger relationship, the regression line shows a steeper decline that the corresponding graph (Graph 11.7) in the previous chapter did.

However, it is a step too far to say that Turkey’s progress toward the Copenhagen criteria explains the members in the lower-right-hand corner of the graph. Finland’s policy toward Turkey had changed from passenger to that of a driver in 1999 when improvements in Turkey had taken place, but it soured in 2002 without the human rights situation in Turkey having markedly deteriorated. Sweden and Luxembourg, on the other hand, did not change their positions to drivers in 1999 or 2002 after those improvements in Turkey happened, and Luxembourg soured on Turkey in 2006 without which Turkey’s situation deteriorated. This can perhaps be understood from the perspective of the minimal standards model, whereby Turkey had to progress to a certain level before all of them decided to be supportive. This happened in 2004, after which Turkey had progressed to a higher degree, though not as strongly as it did between 1997 and 1999.

It is, however, the case that taking the difference between each member state’s physical integrity score and that of Turkey improves the proportional reduction of error from $\gamma = -0.68$ to $\gamma = -0.73$. Taking Turkey’s progress alone against the policies of the remaining member states yields a gamma of $\gamma = 0.51^{46}$. This suggests that the member-states’ own levels reveal more about their policies than Turkey’s progress does, but that there is some added value to taking Turkey’s progress into account. In more descriptive terms, Turkey’s stalwart allies – who tend to have lower Physical Integrity scores – support Turkey regardless of Turkey’s human rights record. When Turkey progresses toward meeting the political criteria, by improving its human rights record, those

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46 This is a positive number because as Turkey’s score improves, so does its general approval by the member states. The other gamma rates are negative because, as the numbers in the independent variable increase, the less likely a member state is to be supportive.
countries with higher human rights standards (Finland, Luxembourg, and Sweden) also tend to come around and decide to be more supportive. These countries are, however, much fewer in number.

What this means is that the three variables, domestic political change, the number of Turks, and the physical integrity index – together – explain most of the variation in the overall population. Essentially, what is explained by these variables is why countries oppose Turkey, not so much why they are supportive. While the laundry list of rationalist hypotheses proposed many reasons for supporting Turkey – burden sharing in military missions, cooperation in counter terrorism and crime fighting, economic benefits in terms of trade and finance – none of these proved to be predictive of why member states might be supportive of Turkey. Nevertheless, most countries were supportive of Turkey, with the brakemen usually in the minority. That suggests that, to the degree that member states are utility-driven rational actors, they are supportive for a broader set of reasons than the reasons that some of them are opposed. Occam’s razor points toward the reasons for opposing Turkey, rather than the reasons for supporting Turkey.

12.2.9 Typology

The headline finding is that there are, essentially, three categories of countries and one outlier. The three categories are the politically-motivated countries, the habitual drivers, and the sticklers. The outlier is Greece. The following table, 12.4, shows the distribution over the typology.

**Table 12.4: The typology of member-states in their approaches toward Turkish membership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politically Motivated</th>
<th>Habitual Drivers</th>
<th>Sticklers</th>
<th>Greece</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Austria</td>
<td>• Ireland</td>
<td>• Finland</td>
<td>• Greece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Belgium</td>
<td>• Italy</td>
<td>• Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Denmark</td>
<td>• Portugal</td>
<td>• Sweden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• France</td>
<td>• Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Germany</td>
<td>• UK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first of these categories – the politically-motivated countries – is the most significant in terms of Turkey’s membership prospects in the future. It consists of the six countries where the question of Turkish membership is linked to the politics of (Turkish) immigration. In these countries, the outcomes of elections help understand how a country will align itself in the debate over Turkey. This group consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France and the Netherlands. With Germany and France included in this group, it is essentially the main group which Turkey has to win over in order to progress through the enlargement process.

The second group – the habitual drivers – is made up of countries that have generally positive attitudes toward Turkey joining the EU. It consists of Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. These countries support Turkey in the European Council and prevent the brakemen from shutting the process down. They are characterized by their lack of immigration politics related to Turkish immigrants. This is because Turks did not move to those countries en masse in the 1960s and 1970s, the way they did to the countries in the first group of states. These countries, with, perhaps, the exception of Ireland, are not as concerned with Turkey’s human-rights record, because their own human-rights records are also not spotless.

In terms of public opinion, it is also noteworthy that many more respondents from these countries reply with ‘don’t know’ in the Eurobarometer surveys about Turkey’s future membership. In the 2006 Standard Eurobarometer question about the desirability of future membership for Turkey, on average, 22% of respondents (from 15% of Italians to 30% of Portuguese respondents) reply with ‘don’t know’, whereas among the respondents from the other two categories, 7% of respondents do so (from 4% of Belgians to 11% of Swedes). When asked if respondents would support or oppose Turkey provided Turkey met all the membership requirements (asked in a Special Eurobarometer also in 2006), the number of ‘don’t know’ replies declined by 2% among politically-motivated and stickler countries, whereas among the habitual drivers, that rate increased by 3%. This suggests that in the habitual driver countries, as opposed to the other countries, the populace has not been groomed by the political class on what to think, yea or nay, or, conversely, that it is not an issue that the voting publics care about, and so politicians are not going to use the matter as part of their political campaigns against one another. Whatever the reason, the difference is marked.

The third group of countries – the sticklers – consists of three small member states with high human rights standards. They are Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden. These are countries that are generally sheltered from the sort of security risks that lure many states into transgressing human rights standards. As such, they have little tolerance for Turkey’s faults and realities, while countries
like the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy are more accustomed these, and, therefore, probably more understanding of Turkey’s challenges. That, or these other countries do not believe in the human rights values to the same degree that Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden do and are, therefore, not as worried about Turkey not having a stellar human rights record.

This typology leaves out Greece. Greece does not fit comfortably into any of the categories. Its policies regarding Turkey have not been determined by its domestic politics, nor does Greece have a human rights record on par with Finland, Luxembourg or Sweden. Greece also does not have a policy as permissive of Turkey as the second group of countries. Greece’s more specific record on Turkey is discussed in further detail below. Suffice to say here is that it does not fit neatly into the preceding categories, due to the peculiar bilateral relationships between Greece and Turkey.

In a typology of this type, it is very tempting to draw a table that puts political motivations on one axis and human rights on the other, allowing some members to be motivated by both or neither. While Greece can easily be put into the ‘neither’ field, it would share that field with the members of the second group – the five habitual drivers – despite Greece still being very different from them. The five habitual drivers never opposed Turkey’s advancement, whereas Greece has twice been a very vocal brakeman, willing to go to more extraordinary lengths to seek its preferences.

The opposite side of this table would be trickier still. Denmark and the Netherlands are both countries that have been put into the politically-motivated category. They also share the attribute of having very good human rights records. Their policy patterns are, however, very different. The Netherlands, despite its exceptional human rights record, has been much more supportive of Turkey than Denmark has. Dutch policy can be almost perfectly explained by domestic politics, and therefore, for the Netherlands, it is not necessary to introduce a second variable. In terms of Denmark, a case can be made that human rights do matter, which may be why Denmark has been so reluctant to embrace Turkey’s progress through the system. Furthermore, it may explain why the left in Denmark was hesitant of embracing the Turks in 1997, and non-committal in 1999. However, immigration is seen as a more important issue in Denmark than many other countries, and Turks are a dominant immigrant group in Denmark. Therefore, Turkish membership may be too hot an issue.
in Denmark for the left to be willing to touch, and they beg off doing so by naming human rights concerns.\footnote{According to successive Eurobarometer surveys, an average of 25\% of Danish respondents names immigration as the most important issue facing their country. Aside from Spain and the United Kingdom, this percentage is much higher than for other member states. Because Turkey is not an origin of immigrants for Spain and the United Kingdom, the immigration issue does not touch Turkish membership politics in those countries the same way it does for Denmark.}

### 12.3  GENERAL & SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS

This section details the findings of this research that help explain the tendencies of each member state and what this may mean for Turkey’s enlargement process going forward. First, however, it draws general implications for understanding the politics of Turkish accession. This involves revisiting the metatheories presented in the first chapter. After wrestling with those approaches, and what the findings above and in the previous chapters means for those approaches, it lists what this research implies for each member state in turn. While the typology, above, does give a very broad understanding of the member states, each, nevertheless, has its own story to tell, and there are unique nuances to all of them.

#### 12.3.1  Metatheoretical Implications

The immediate implication of the findings, and the typology above, is that different countries require different approaches in terms of understanding their policy behavior as well as how to affect their future behavior. This first implication is dealt with more extensively in the remainder of this section, where each country is analyzed in turn. Another implication is of a theoretical, or, rather, metatheoretical nature. In assessing the series of hypotheses and how well they explained (or did not explain) member state behavior, both metatheories – rationalism and constructivism – are bloodied by their brawl with the empirical evidence.

In terms of rationalism, what is found is that states are not unitary rational actors. With the predictive power of the domestic political angle, it is difficult to usefully maintain the analytical fiction that states are unitary actors. The defensive position that domestic politics is the process by
which states determine their rational interests – that politics is simply the internal calculus of the actor’s rationale – is unsustainable. It hinges on the supposition that the countries’ purpose is to enhance their interests. This would imply that for the countries whose policies have changed frequently – of which the Netherlands, Finland, and Luxembourg are the exemplars – would be subject to changing external stimuli. These are, however, not in evidence.

Given the absence of explanatory external rationales, the domestic pursuit of power is the remaining rationalist lens. From this angle, rationalism holds up in that politicians, in their pursuit of power within the domestic political market, have selected a political product for which there is demand. In countries with proportionally large Turkish communities, some politicians can win votes by agitating against Turkish membership in the EU, while others can win by accusing their opponents of bigotry. In countries without large Turkish communities, this is not as much of a winning issue, because their electorates do not think of Turkey as an origin of immigrants.

This calls into question the material rationalism of these electorates. Do voters think of the material interests of their countries when they vote for politicians promising to keep Turkey out of the EU? EU Membership implies the free movement of persons. It is certainly plausible that those countries that already have large Turkish communities will draw more Turkish immigrants than those without large Turkish communities will. Migrants are more likely to move to countries where there is already a community of similar people who can help the newcomers integrate. What remains unknown is if those added immigrants will be a cost or a benefit to the country, and what, exactly, the free movement of persons of EU membership will do to migration rates.

It is rational for those electorates to support politicians who agitate against Turkish membership, as opposed to any other issue they care about, if the new immigrants will be a detriment to the country or the voters personally, and if Turkey, as an EU member enjoying open borders with the EU, will push more migrants into these countries. These two conditions contain many unknowable prospective elements, but the future economic and social conditions in Turkey and in the member state in question are the main factors.

Given that many of the countries with large Turkish populations tend to have relatively low unemployment rates and aging populations, and that Turkey is a rapidly growing economy (meaning that it will quite possibly be an increasing tug on migrants to return), it is not at all certain that these countries have more to lose than to gain from Turkish membership – especially if membership will help Turkey develop socially and economically. Improved social and economic conditions in Turkey would mean a draw on poorer and less educated former migrants to return to a country where more
people speak their language and do not discriminate against their culture. It would also mean that new immigrants from Turkey might be more educated, if the reforms Turkey must undergo to meet the standards of the acquis communautaire help develop Turkey’s education system. By the same token, if those reforms help Turkey address its corruption problem, Turkey joining the EU will be an asset in many other ways (Lejour & de Mooij, 2005, p. 114).

These considerations are, however, not a part of the domestic political debates between politicians and the public. That Turkey, as an EU member, would bring a flood of migrants and that these would a detriment to the voters’ countries is an assumption loudly voiced by antagonists and scarcely objected to by the proponents of Turkish membership. Given that the bulk of antagonists’ rhetoric is founded on religious and cultural differences, and the bulk of proponents’ argumentation is based on the premise that the antagonists are bigoted, the debate is far removed from being a rational discussion about material interests. The rationalism is only explanatory insofar as politicians are pursuing their own interests (political power) with effective means (inciting fear of Muslim immigrants, or the fear of having bigots in power). It is not explanatory at the state-level, because the material interests of the member states do not align with the policies they express. If national and material interests were explanatory, Denmark would be the poster-child of the drivers, rather than the most stalwart brakeman.\footnote{Denmark has the greatest proportional participation rate in multilateral military missions, the worst drug problem, and a strongly Atlanticist foreign policy. Further, it has a pro-enlargement and Eurosceptic EU policy, low unemployment rates, and its industrialists lobby (ineffectively) on Turkey’s behalf, suggesting that Denmark does not stand to suffer economically from Turkish membership (Jung, 2010, p. 4).}

Constructivism does not fare much better. Schimmelfennig’s liberal community hypothesis only really works in terms of the member states who best embody the liberal democratic values are opposed to Turkish membership, only if the domestic politics do not get in the way first. It has little to do with Turkey’s own progress toward these values. This is in contradiction to many member states’ statements on the conditionality of the political Copenhagen criteria. Corruption statistics, in terms of countries with more corruption being less antagonistic to Turkey than countries with stronger rule-of-law institutions, returned a fairly strong correlation, but this did not hold up quite as strongly over time. It also did not become more powerful an explanation when controlling for domestic politics.

Religious identities suggest that more religious countries have a slight preference for Turkey to become a member. As such, it is not a clash of Christians vs. Muslims, nor is anti-Islamic fervor
explanatory. Belgians are the least likely to want Muslim neighbors and Swedes the least likely to voice objections to Muslim neighbors. Nevertheless, Belgium has been much more supportive of Turkish membership than Sweden has. While there is more support for Turkey from Catholic-dominant countries than Protestant-dominant countries, this relationship is weak and has some very clear outliers (the United Kingdom on the Protestant side and Austria and Luxembourg on the Catholic side).

National pride nor the fear of losing one’s national identity have predictive power, and cultural differences seem more like an after-the-fact rationalization of wanting to keep Turkey out, rather than the leading reason for doing so. Leastways, the differences between wanting to keep Turkey out, as opposed to Romania and Bulgaria are inconstant, whereas culture is not something that changes year-by-year. Finally, countries with the longest socialization in the European Community/Union have the greatest variation in their policies, demonstrating that they are not more norm-driven than the more-recent members are. If anything, perhaps Finland helped Turkey in its progress toward membership during Finland’s tenure in the 1999 EU presidency precisely because it was in its first time at the helm. In that role, it may not have felt it would have been proper to thwart the will of the majority the way that Denmark attempted to do three years later. As such, the Constructivist hypotheses did not perform any more strongly than the rationalist hypotheses did.

Essentially, what these findings mean is that the politics of the EU being joined by Turkey have very little to do with Turkey itself. The three dominant factors relating to the policy-making – the number of domestic Turks, domestic political change, and member state’s own embrace of human rights – are all domestic characteristics of the member states. These findings point in a direction that Kenneth Waltz would call ‘reductionism’. Others might call it ‘navel-gazing’. What this broadly means is that some of the Turkish critiques of the process – those who say that the EU will find obstructions to Turkey’s entry no matter what Turkey does – are not wholly without merit.

That does not mean that it is hopeless for Turkey to affect its own membership fate. It does, however, suggest that becoming a member of the EU is going to be a stiff task and will require an unconventional approach. The direction of opinion polls do not look good for Turkey, and with flagging public support for the difficult process within Turkey’s own population, it may very well be that it is not an effort worth making. Nevertheless, the final section in this research will outline what Turkey might do to navigate the maze of the member-state politics and policies. That
recommendation will be based, in large part, on the paragraphs, below, which assess the situation in each member state.

Incorporated into these analyses are the differences between the answers to the September 2006 standard Eurobarometer survey question on the desirability of future Turkish membership and the answers to a conditional question in the July 2006 Special Eurobarometer on enlargement. This conditional question was: “Once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, would you be… to the accession of Turkey to the European Union?” The difference in the ‘against’ figures implies that a certain amount of people would prefer not to see Turkey join the EU in the future, but if Turkey would be able to comply with the Copenhagen criteria, they would not oppose accession.

It is worthwhile to mention that the two Eurobarometer polls surveyed different people, as they were two separate surveys. Results where the percentage answering in favor of Turkey in the standard question and against Turkey in the conditional question are held to be sampling errors. It does not seem conceivable that 3% of Portuguese respondents would only support Turkish membership if Turkey does not meet the criteria. The differences may also reflect changing opinions over the six months between the surveys. The standard question on possible future Turkish membership was not asked in the spring Standard Eurobarometer of 2006.

12.3.2 Austria

Table 12.5: Austria’s Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPÖ-ÖVP</td>
<td>SPÖ-ÖVP</td>
<td>ÖVP-FPÖ</td>
<td>ÖVP-FPÖ</td>
<td>ÖVP-BZÖ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Austrian opposition to Turkish membership is often dismissed as resulting from the historical memory of the 16th and 17th Century defenses against Ottoman onslaughts. Because of this, Austria is frequently cited as the member state most opposed to Turkish membership in the EU, explaining its status as having the most hostile public opinion. Indeed, in the Eurobarometer polls of January 1996 and April 1996, Austria’s public opinion was more negative than the average European country, but it was not the most negative. As of November 2001, public opposition to Turkish
membership stood at 55%. By June 2005, this had grown to 80%. While opposition to Romanian and Bulgarian membership also grew markedly (from 65% and 59% to 73% and 68%, respectively), these single-digit changes do not equal the 25% growth of public opposition to Turkey.

In this respect, it is worth mentioning that Austria’s range of public opinion data on the prospect of Turkish membership in the EU is also the most volatile with a standard deviation far higher than any other of the EU-15 member states, and three times as high as the average member state. What the time-series graphs (see in particular Graph Set 10.3) also showed was how Austria’s public opposition to Turkish membership grew manifestly after the 1999 parliamentary election that brought Jörg Haidar’s FPÖ to the governing coalition, after which is also when the policy changed.

What this demonstrates is that Austrian public opinion has been very variable. If it were simply the result of deep-seated historical memories from Siege of Vienna, it would not be that volatile. Instead, it seems more plausible that the changes in public opinion covary with policy, because both are the result of the politics of immigration. Austria has the second-largest proportional Turkish population among the member states, and many Austrians feel immigration is the one of the most important issues facing their country.

The critical lower-house elections of 1999, which brought the FPÖ to power by the next episode, was not so much decided by the FPÖ’s choice to highlight its well-known stance on immigration in the campaign. That stance did not need highlighting. According to post-election polls a large plurality of FPÖ voters named opposition to the status quo and immigration concerns as the reasons for their vote (Müller, 2000; Plasser, Ulram & Sommer, 1999).

Once the FPÖ had joined the government in 2000, they lost their opposition to the status quo as a campaign issue for the 2002 elections. In government, they turned toward tightening immigration and asylum policies and making citizenship classes obligatory for new immigrants. However, it was the ÖVP, whose Interior Minister Ernst Strasser had been the initiative-taker in the tougher migration policies, that managed to capitalize on anti-immigration sentiment in 2002 (Luther, 2003). What this means is that with opposition to the status quo off the table as a campaign issue, the FPÖ had immigration left, and opposition to Turkey was caught up in that rhetoric. The ÖVP, was also earning its anti-immigration credentials, which allowed it to trounce their coalition partners in 2002.

Going forward, it seems unlikely that Austria will turn toward a driver policy, if and when Turkey resurfaces on the European Council’s agenda, despite an SPÖ-led government. As long as public opinion remains opposed to Turkey at the level of the most recent (2008) Eurobarometer
poll of 85% opposed, the political left will not commit political suicide by embracing Turkey. Likewise, as of 2006, when Eurobarometer polled on both the desire to see new members in the future and support for Turkish membership if Turkey fulfilled all the membership criteria, there was marginal difference (6%) between those who preferred never to see Turkey become a member and those who opposed Turkish membership even if they were to fulfill all the membership requirements.

While Austria is unlikely to provide the unilateral veto of Turkey’s membership within the context of the European Council or in accession negotiations, a future government essentially would have to renege on Wolfgang Schüssel’s 2004 promise to hold a referendum before signing an accession treaty with Turkey. While Austria’s public opinion has proven to be relatively volatile on the issue, it is essentially unfathomable that such a referendum would ever return a result in Turkey’s favor.

12.3.3 Belgium

Table 12.6: Belgium’s Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVP-SP-</td>
<td>SP-PS-PSC</td>
<td>VLD-PRL/FDF-</td>
<td>VLD-MR-</td>
<td>VLD-MR-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS-PSC</td>
<td></td>
<td>SP-PS-Ecolo-Agalev</td>
<td>SP-PS-Ecolo-Agalev</td>
<td>PS-SP.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VLD-PRL/FDF-</td>
<td>VLD-MR-</td>
<td>PS-SP.a</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SP-PS-Ecolo-Agalev</td>
<td>SP-PS-Ecolo-Agalev</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Belgium is another country with a large Turkish community. While its record of support for Turkey is nearly continuous, with the exception of the first episode, it is nevertheless easily fathomable that Belgium could move into the brakeman column should the issue of Turkey come up on the European Council’s agenda when a Christian-democrat-led government is in power. Like many countries, a majority of Belgians oppose Turkish membership, and that majority has grown since 1999.

Like Austria, there is only a marginal difference between those answering the standard Eurobarometer question and the Special Eurobarometer question. Opposers reduce with 6% (61% to 55%) and proponents increase with 9% (34%-43%), with 2% fewer don’t-knows (4% to 2%). As such, there is fuel for political entrepreneurs to make an issue of Turkey, provided that the population will consider Turkey to be a salient issue in their politics. As immigration is the runner up
as one of the two major problems facing Belgium, according to Belgian respondents to the 2011 Standard Eurobarometer, and has been growing since 2008, it will not be difficult for Belgian politicians to point at Turkish membership as a threat for future immigration into Belgium in order to win votes.

12.3.4 Denmark

Table 12.7: Denmark’s Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Brakeman</th>
<th>Passenger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Social Democrats Radikale Venstre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Social Democrats Radikale Venstre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Venstre Conservatives (Danish People’s Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Venstre Conservatives (Danish People’s Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Venstre Conservatives (Danish People’s Party)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Possibly because of Denmark’s reputation as a loyal American ally with a forward-leaning Atlanticist foreign policy, and a strongly pro-enlargement policy regarding the Eastern European countries, Denmark has frequently been misunderstood as being on the driver side of the Turkey debate, though the actual record clearly bears out the reverse. During its presidency in 2002, several sources assumed Denmark to be ‘on board’ with the drivers because of its outspoken support for the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. On Turkey, this was, however, not the case. Denmark was opposed and attempted to use its presidency to skew the debate in favor of the brakemen.

In Denmark, both factors underlying member-state positions may be at work. Denmark has a fairly sizeable Turkish community, and the politics of immigration is clearly a very strong issue on the Danish right. Furthermore, Denmark has a strong human rights record, like Luxembourg and the other Scandinavian member states. As such, Turkey is unlikely to find a left-wing government, such as the new Social-Democrat-led government of Helle Thorning-Schmidt, supportive of Turkey’s progress toward membership until Turkey further addresses its human rights standards. During the 2006 episode, Thorning-Schmidt supported the then-Prime Minister’s brakeman position on a hard 18-month ultimatum for Turkey to open its ports to Cypriot shipping (Jung, 2010, p. 4).
In the vein of human rights standards, Denmark is exceptional in the degree to which respondents answered differently in the two Eurobarometer surveys of 2006. When asked if they would like to see Turkey join the EU in the future 66% opposed Turkey joining. However, when asked if they would support Turkey joining, if it complied with the membership criteria, only 44% declared themselves opposed. Support grew from 26% to 50%. This suggests that Turkey can promote its case in Denmark if it works to comply more with the political Copenhagen criteria. This is, however, unlikely to matter for any government being supported by the Danish People’s Party or based on a strong mandate to stifle immigration.

12.3.5 Finland

Table 12.8: Finland’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phys. Int. Finland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys. Int. Turkey</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys. Int. Difference</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Finland is the first country in this alphabetical lineup to have a relatively small Turkish community. As such, it is not expected to have a domestic-political rationale for deciding its policy. Finland does, however, have high human rights standards and it is, therefore, expected to be a member of the ‘sticklers’ club. Compared to the other two members of this group, Luxembourg and Sweden, however, it has had a more positive policy regarding Turkey than would have been expected.

Probably the first factor that suggests itself in explaining Finland’s policies is the fact that in the 1999 and 2006 episodes Finland held the rotating presidency. That said, the presidency is not an easy lens to use. There is debate about whether or not the rotating presidency induces a member state to set aside its narrow interests in favor of the collective good, or if the presidency is simply an avenue through which a member state can more effectively pursue its interests. It is not clearly the case that the presidency induces member states to support Turkey. Luxembourg and Denmark used their positions in the presidency to sway events toward the brakeman position. In the Netherlands, by contrast, the drivers within the Dutch government used the presidency to facilitate the internal
Dutch decision as well as pressure Austria and Cyprus to not scuttle the opening of accession negotiations.

However, in light of the fact that Finland held the presidency for first time in 1999 and Sweden and Luxembourg were the only outspoken brakemen on the Council, it seems unlikely that Finland would have used the presidency to sway the European Council’s common position toward that of this small minority of states. In 2006 (and 2004), Turkey had improved its human rights record (and Finland’s had slipped in its own score in 2003, 2005 and 2006). Given that Sweden and Luxembourg also supported Turkey in 2004, Finland is not was outlier from this category in 2004.

In 2006, when it, again, held the presidency, the bone of contention was clearly the dispute over Cyprus and Turkey opening its airports and harbors to Cypriot shipping. The Finns attempted everything within their power to bring the two parties into agreement and solve the problem. In this, they received high marks from the Turkish leadership. Had the Finns been opposed to Turkey’s membership prospects, it could have easily stood back and allowed the train to derail itself.

Going forward, Turkey is likely to keep Finnish support provided it improves the recent declines in its human rights record, and implicitly suggest that Finland’s own political prisoner problem is not without blemish.

12.3.6 France

Table 12.9: France’s Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Driver</td>
<td>Passenger</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
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<td>Chirac – PS</td>
<td>Chirac - UMP</td>
<td>Chirac – UMP</td>
<td>Chirac – UMP</td>
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</table>

France is a particularly critical case for the Turks, and its vote will be a very difficult one (or two) to win over. France’s influence in the EU is undeniable, as is the degree to which its domestic politics matter. Turkey had the good fortune that the former President, Jacques Chirac was personally supportive of Turkey, even if he only envisioned Turkey’s membership as a possibility in the

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49 The CIRI data show Finland had political prisoners, probably relating to the punitive measures against conscientious objectors to military conscription.
He was, however, unwilling to spend the necessary political capital to attempt to force his party into alignment with him, if this had even been possible given the nationalist challenge on the French right. The Parti Socialiste of Lionel Jospin happily collaborated with Chirac on Turkey, but her more open stance on Turkey may have been what cost Ségolène Royal the presidency in 2007. Having been out of power for a decade, the PS is unlikely to decide to fall on its sword (again) over Turkey.

Opinion polls show that Turkey has a very rough road ahead with France. French public opinion has a rigidly negative view on Turkey that has changed little between 1996 and 2008, except in a downward trend. The slight silver lining in the French case is that there is a 15 percentage-point spread between those who oppose Turkey joining in the future and those who still oppose Turkey if Turkey meets all the membership conditions. Despite that relatively large difference, a majority of 54% is still opposed to Turkey even if it meets all the conditions.

Given these numbers, it is imperative that Chirac’s promise of a referendum on Turkish accession be avoided. Thankfully, this promise, which had been codified into the French constitution, has already been partially rescinded. The Constitution, as it currently stands, allows the legislature to override the referendum requirement for accession treaties, provided that three-fifths of both houses agree to not hold that referendum.

The preferred policy of the French president will clearly be key for France’s position on Turkey. For his presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy made opposition to Turkey a firm plank of his election campaign. With French public opinion clearly opposed to Turkey’s membership, it is unlikely that the nominee of the Parti Socialiste is going to express explicit support for Turkey. François Hollande – the current presidential nominee of the PS – has in the past expressed the necessity for Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide. However, he has written that the negotiations should continue fairly (Hollande, 2011).

One option that Turkey does hold with respect to France is that, in addition to a large Turkish community, France also has a large Armenian community with inroads into the PS. If Turkey were to put some form of a negotiated recognition of the Armenian Genocide on the table, and the Socialists were able to put that feather in their cap, it may prove to be a way in which the Socialists can move the policy toward, at least, acquiescing to Turkish membership.
12.3.7 Germany

Table 12.10: Germany’s Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Driver</th>
<th>Driver</th>
<th>Brakeman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>CDU/CSU-CDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>CDU/CSU-CDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>CDU/CSU-CDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>CDU/CSU-CDU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>CDU/CSU-FDP</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>SPD-Grünen</td>
<td>CDU/CSU-CDU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like France, Germany’s position on Turkey will be key for any future prospects of membership. With the largest Turkish minority, Germany’s policy regarding those prospects is highly political and has been perfectly correlated with the changes of government. Public opinion regarding Turkish membership is even more opposed than France’s public opinion, and it is less ‘soft’, regarding the membership criteria. There is a 9% spread between those regularly opposed (78%), and those opposed even under the proposition that Turkey has fulfilled all the membership requirements (69%). As with Belgium, further, the immigration issue has been increasing in its saliency as a policy problem.

In Germany, the silver lining is that the larger number of Turks means that they represent a larger constituency for Germany’s left-wing parties. Unlike the French socialist nominee, the German social democrats have not abandoned their support for Turkey or embraced Angela Merkel’s proposal for a ‘privileged partnership’. Also, unlike in France, Germany’s public opinion has been more volatile, in that it has, in the past, been much less opposed to Turkish membership than in the most recent surveys. Conceivably, then, that public opinion can change again in the future. Of course, it has a long way to go, given the level of 77% opposed in the Eurobarometer of April 2008.

With these margins, it is not a winning proposition for the SPD to put up a full-throated defense of Turkey, if the Christian Democrats continue to make the issue a core plank in their election platforms. With 21% of German respondents naming immigration as one of the two most important issues facing Germany (this makes it runner up to ‘the economic situation’ with 36%), the Christian Democrats have an interest in keeping this issue alive as long as the SPD is unwilling to change its own preferred policy. The SPD’s only rational response is to change the subject and not confront the CDU on the premises of their preferred policy.
12.3.8 Greece

Table 12.11: Greece’s Policy on Turkey and the Dominant Contested Topics.

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>“Candidate”</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
<td>Cypriot shipping</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Without domestic politics or a high regard for its own human rights situation, Greece is the only country that seems to change its position based on its troubled relationship with Turkey and the problem of Cyprus. Unlike the habitual drivers, Greece has vociferously opposed Turkey during two episodes, while full-throatedly supporting Turkey in 1999, 2002, and 2004. Unlike the countries with large Turkish immigrant minorities, Greece’s policies have not changed with the changing domestic politics.

In 1997, Turkey and Greece were still very much at odds with one another, having nearly clashed militarily a year before over two uninhabited islets in the Eastern Aegean Sea. After the embarrassment of having been found harboring Turkey’s most-wanted terrorist, and the change in public opinion, subsequent to two devastating earthquakes, Greece changed its position to facilitate Turkey’s progress through the enlargement regime. The one sticking point, however, has been Cyprus. Even during those episodes where Greece was supportive of Turkey’s right to, in principle, join the European Union, Greece has consistently held that Turkey must make concessions regarding Cyprus. With the issue of Cypriot access to Turkish harbors and airports center stage in 2006, Greece switched again to the brakeman side of the debate.

In this regard, unless matters change, Turkey’s best prospect for winning Greek (and Greek-Cypriot) acquiescence is to hold onto the Cyprus card. While Cyprus, with Greek support, will seek to maintain the chill on the frozen negotiating chapters until Turkey opens its airports and harbors to Cypriot shipping, the actual process of adopting the measures of the *aquis communautaire* is fully within Turkey’s control. Given that, it is probably the best strategy to maintain the denial of entry on Cypriot vessels until the moment at which Turkey has fulfilled all the requirements of membership. This would prevent Greece and Cyprus from drawing out the process while demanding decreasingly reasonable concessions on Ankara’s part.
12.3.9 Ireland

Table 12.12: Ireland’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores.

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Phys. Int. Difference</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the habitual drivers, Ireland is the least habitual in that it supported Turkey in 2002 and in 2004, but mostly kept its position out of the headlines in the other three episodes. Ireland does not have very many Turks, nor was there significant political change during the episodes in question. Of the ‘habitual drivers’, however, it has the best human rights score according to the CIRI Physical Integrity Index. On average it has scored about the same as Sweden, without Sweden’s opposition to Turkey. In this regard, it is categorized according to the dependent variable.

Despite being a habitual driver, then, human rights may matter. However, the changing levels of its own Physical Integrity Index, or the difference between its own and Turkey’s actually poorly predict its changing level of support. In neither of the intervals where Ireland’s policy grew toward Turkey or drifted away, neither frame of the independent variable predicts the change.

In terms of the future, Ireland is unlikely to become a brakeman, even though public opinion has been souring toward Turkey (from 23% against in 1999 and 2001 to 42% against in the 2008 Standard Eurobarometer). The public opinion swing in Turkey’s favor, if Turkey meets all the criteria, is a significant one from 46% against to 32% against in the 2006 Standard and Special Eurobarometer surveys. Furthermore, Irish public opinion is not particularly polarized on this issue, with 29% responding ‘don’t know’ to the Standard Eurobarometer question in 2008. In 2006, this uncertainty was not decreased in the Special Eurobarometer question (28%) as compared to the Standard Eurobarometer question (25%).

Notwithstanding the opinions of one deputy, the Fine Gael party’s official position in is favor of Turkish membership, provided it meets the requisite criteria. As such, Turkey’s membership prospects have not become a controversial issue in Irish politics.
12.3.10 Italy

Table 12.13: Italy’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores.

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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</table>

Italy is a much more clear-cut member of the habitual drivers club, having supported Turkey at every instance, regardless of its politics. As a country with very few Turks and a lower-than-average human-rights record in terms of the CIRI Physical Integrity Index, the model consisting of the three independent variables outlined above predicts that Italy would be supportive of Turkey, as there is not a domestic nervousness of a flood of Turkish immigrants, nor are the Italians sticklers in terms of human rights.

All that said, Italy does have a growing Turkish population, and concern over immigration has also been growing in Italy. Possibly as a result, public opinion on Turkey has also grown more negative, with opposition to Turkish membership having grown from 45% in 1999 and 2001 to 58% in 2008. The spread between the Standard Eurobarometer question and the Special Eurobarometer question is 11%, suggesting that opposition would diminish somewhat with the adoption of the membership criteria.

Politically, the Northern League has expressed its opposition to Turkish membership, though Silvio Berlusconi managed to overrule them in the coalition. With the future of Italian politics uncertain, it is unknown to what degree the Northern League or any other political parties will be willing to capitalize on the majority opposition to Turkish membership as a plank in an election campaign. Concern over immigration has risen sharply in recent years, with 27% of Italian respondents naming immigration as one of two top political concerns for Italy, after the economic situation and unemployment.
12.3.11 Luxembourg

**Table 12.14:** Luxembourg’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
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<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
</tr>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phys. Int. Difference</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
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In the way that Italy is the poster-child for the habitual drivers, Luxembourg is the model ‘stickler’. With a perfect human rights record, as measured by the CIRI Physical Integrity Index, and with few Turks in the large immigrant population, Luxembourg is easily categorized. Along with Denmark and Austria, Luxembourg has also been in the brakemen crowd.

The one exception is in 2004, when it surprisingly took a driver position in regard to the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. One explanation is that this followed elections with more permissive social democrats having formed the government with Jean-Claude Juncker’s Christian democrats. That does not, however, explain the return to brakemanship in the following episode, as the coalition endured. Another possible explanation is that had the negotiations started according to Juncker’s plans in 2004, they would have done so under Grand Duchy’s auspices in the rotating presidency in Spring 2005. That plan was however delayed, and the British presided over the start of accession negotiations.

The most plausible explanation is that Turkey had, in fact, improved its human rights record in the years leading up to 2004, but had failed to improve on this record in the years since 2004. In 2005 Turkey faltered in terms of extrajudicial killings – going from ‘occasional’ to ‘frequent’ killings – and regained its ‘occasional’ status in 2006, but no improvement on other fronts.

As long as Turkey does not improve its record, Luxembourg will doubtlessly remain a brakeman. Though even with the adoption of all the membership criteria, Luxembourgers are only a little less inclined to oppose Turkey. Opposition reduced only 8% (from 77% opposed to 69%) in the condition Special Eurobarometer survey question as opposed to the Standard Eurobarometer question. Further, as long as Luxembourg maintains its own adherence to the values of human rights, it will not be open to the charge of hypocrisy in the same way as other countries might be.
Nevertheless, as one of the smallest countries in the EU, Luxembourg is very unlikely to exert a unilateral veto on Turkish accession.

12.3.12 Netherlands

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>PvdA-VVD-D66</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12.15: the Netherlands’ Policy on Turkey and its Coalition Parties Over the Episodes.

While the Netherlands has a human rights score equal to that of Luxembourg, its policy is clearly set by its domestic politics. With a large Turkish minority, this is unsurprising. That said, the main political parties on the right (CDA and VVD) are far from firm in their opposition to Turkey, and leading figures from both have been very supportive of Turkey on different occasions. As such, the critical political struggles for Dutch policy are within these two parties.

Within the CDA the struggle on either side of the factional divide has been on human rights grounds. One side, which previously was headed by the Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, and his Foreign Minister, Ben Bot, advocated for a carrot-side approach to Turkey. If Turkey were to be encouraged with progress toward membership, it would doubtlessly embrace the western values of liberal democracy. The other side coalesced around Maxime Verhagen, formerly the Parliamentary leader of the CDA, then Foreign Minister after Ben Bot and currently the Deputy Prime Minister in the Rutte cabinet. This side embraces the stick-side approach, denying Turkey progress through the regime until it addresses the Cyprus situation as well as human rights and corruption.

The VVD has struggled more with the issue, but, instead, its dichotomy has coalesced around an Atlanticist foreign policy oriented toward the United States on the driver side and an anti-immigration stance on the brakeman side. Devastated by an anti-Muslim immigration argument from Pim Fortuyn’s party in 2002 and Geert Wilders’ party in the 2006 elections, it has been at pains to chart its own course between its liberal and its own anti-immigration faction. Mark Rutte, the political leader of the VVD, and current Prime Minister, implicitly took the liberal side of the debate as he defeated the virulent anti-immigration wing of his party, but during the 2006 election campaign, he clearly took the brakeman side as the stand-off over Cypriot shipping unfolded.
then, the position has emerged been that Turkey might be a suitable member if Turkey could ever meet the criteria – something VVD candidates say they doubt will ever happen.

Like in other countries, immigration is a top political issue for The Hague. With as many Turks as the Netherlands has, Turkey’s membership is likely to continue to be associated with the threat of more (Muslim) immigration. Public opinion toward Turkey has soured with 41% opposing membership in November 2001 and 55% doing so in April 2008. As with Denmark, however, there is a significant swing of 15% (from 57% opposed down to 42%, and reducing uncertainty by 5%) between the Standard Eurobarometer question and the conditional question in the Special Eurobarometer question of 2006. This suggests that the adoption of the criteria is of more importance to the Dutch than for many other members.

12.3.13 Portugal

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Table 12.16: Portugal’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores.

Without a Turkish immigrant community of significant numbers, and an ‘occasional’ mistreatment of prisoners problem, Portugal is expected to be a habitual driver. It was, however, slow to make itself heard as it adopted passenger positions in 1997 and 1999. Afterward, it embraced the driver position.

While any such theory of translating the CIRI Physical Integrity Index to policies regarding Turkey runs into the problem of nebulously connecting cause and effect through a chain of events, it works out rather well in the case of both Portugal and Ireland. Among the habitual drivers, Ireland has the highest average Physical Integrity Index rating over the years from 1994 to 2006. Ireland was also less supportive of Turkey than the others – supporting Turkey two out of three times. Portugal, with the second-highest rating was also less supportive of Turkey than the remaining habitual drivers were, actively supporting only three out of five times.
Going forward, Portugal is not a country that Turkey shall have to target in order to shore up its chances of accession. Opposition in Portuguese public opinion, while higher in 2008 than in previous years, remains relatively low at 41%. Like in many of the habitual drivers, there are many (22%) undecided respondents (those who checked ‘don’t know’). By and large, the Turkey issue is not a hot potato in Portugal.

12.3.14 Spain

Table 12.17: Spain’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores.

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<tbody>
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<td>Driver</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>

Like Portugal, Spain is a habitual driver, though it began supporting Turkey several years before Portugal and Ireland did. Like Portugal and Ireland, Spain does not have a significant Turkish immigrant population, nor does it have a spotless human rights record. As such, Spain adds to the overall trends found in this research. Instead, Spain has allowed its policy to be driven by broader concerns, probably related to geopolitics. Spain’s past Prime Minister, José Luis Zapatero, has also made it an explicit point of cooperation with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to advocate for an ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ in direct contradiction to Samuel Huntington’s thesis that Islamic countries and Christian countries cannot easily coexist.

Like in most countries, public opinion in Spain has gradually moved away from Turkey, but in Spain’s case the level of opposition is very low, with only 32% of respondents in April 2008 voicing opposition to Turkey. Also, like in Portugal, 22% of respondents did not state an opinion. As such, the prospect of Turkish membership is not a controversial one in Spain, and Turkey should put its efforts elsewhere, if it wants to navigate a path towards membership.
12.3.15 Sweden

Table 12.18: Sweden’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores.

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Brakeman</td>
<td>Driver</td>
<td>Driver</td>
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<td>7</td>
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</table>

While Sweden has a proportionally larger Turkish community than France does, and though it has not been void of human rights problems, Sweden is, nevertheless, considered one of the ‘sticklers’.

While Sweden does have a large immigrant population, many being Kurds who fled the turmoil and persecution in the 1980s and 1990s, this does not appear to have created a political dynamic that made changes in politics determinative of changes in policy. While not an absent issue, immigration does not top the list of significant political problems in Sweden. Many more Swedes identify the health care system, crime and unemployment as top priorities, and immigration tends to fall in with issues such as education and the environment.

The single change of policy occurred under the government of Göran Persson. This may have been because of a difference of political vision between the former Foreign Minister, Anna Lindh, and that of her successor, Laila Freivalds, who took the post after Lindh’s assassination. In 2002, Lindh mentioned that human rights would have to be much improved in Turkey, and the Prime Minister highlighted the plight of the Kurds. In 2004, Persson and Freivalds expressed their appreciation for the improvement of human rights in Turkey, which they said was very important to Sweden.

Swedish public opinion, on the whole, has been relatively positive toward Turkish membership, with a very different pattern than many of the other member states. In 2008 46% of Swedish respondent supported Turkish membership, while 45% opposed it. If Turkey meets all the criteria, public opinion opposition declines by 9%, but support increases by 14%, with the difference coming out of the ‘don’t know’ column.

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According to CIRI, there have been occasional reports of torture and in 1997 the score on extrajudicial killings was lowered to ‘occasional’.
With Swedish public opinion relatively supportive, and the question not being politically controversial (the right-wing government of Fredrik Reinfeldt did not change the policy), Sweden seems likely to remain supportive of Turkey. That is, unless Turkey’s own human rights situation does not improve or deteriorates.

12.3.16 United Kingdom

**Table 12.19:** the United Kingdom’s Policy on Turkey and the Physical Integrity scores

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The United Kingdom’s policy on enlargement in general is frequently considered to be a function of its purported desire to gum up the works in Brussels and transform the EU into little more than a large free trade area. In the comparative analyses, however, Euroscepticism and general support for enlargement have been poor predictors of member states’ support for Turkey. If it were generally true that Eurosceptic countries who favored enlargement generally also favored enlargement to Turkey, then Sweden and Denmark would also have been drivers of Turkey’s membership. Sweden, however, is only a late comer to the drivers club and Denmark has been Turkey’s most stalwart antagonist.

While it is without doubt the case that the United Kingdom is generally opposed to ‘deepening’ Europe, this, alone, is not a sufficient condition for support of Turkey. More than likely, the United Kingdom’s primary motives are geopolitical. However, to a large extent, the findings of this research have become an exercise in finding the reasons why countries do not support Turkey, the absence of which factors indicate that countries tend to be supportive, for any broad assortment of reasons.

Like Italy (a country not set against the deepening of Europe), the United Kingdom has consistently spoken on Turkey’s behalf in the European Council. With a numerically insignificant Turkish immigrant community and a spotty human rights record, the UK easily fits into the habitual
drivers category. As such, it does not have overriding domestic-political concerns for the ‘threat’ of Turkish immigration, nor does it have an overriding distaste for allowing a country with low human rights standards into the club.

While it has not, yet, been tested, political change in the United Kingdom is unlikely to change the supportive policy. The Conservatives did not make it a campaign issue to oppose the Labour government of Tony Blair on its support for Turkey. That having been said, Britons have become more opposed to Turkish membership, with opposition in the first three episodes having been in the low 30% in 2006 and 49% in 2008. Popular support for Turkey has also been fairly weak, with a relatively large share (16% in 2008) of respondents not expressing an opinion on the matter, something characteristic of the habitual drivers. There is 13% spread between the opposing respondents in the Standard Eurobarometer and the Special Eurobarometer, suggesting a medium level of change if Turkey meets all the membership criteria.

For the future, it is very unlikely that the United Kingdom will grow to be a problem for Turkey in its pursuit of its membership ambitions.

12.4 NAVIGATING THE FUTURE

The previous paragraphs, outlining each of the member states, offered limited perspectives on where the member states seem to be going with their policies on Turkey. This section offers a political strategy for Turkey to navigate the difficult streets of European politics toward the destination of membership. This strategy is offered making use of the typology, above, and the other findings of this research.

Because the EU is now a union of 27 member states, and likely to grow with the imminent accession of Croatia, and the probable accessions of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Albania, Serbia and Kosovo by the time Turkey’s process is at a critical stage, it is necessary to also offer some perspective on how these countries will likely argue on Turkey’s case. Most of these countries, are likely to be a part of the habitual drivers group. They, mostly, do not have large Turkish minorities couple with domestic concerns over immigration. They also, mostly, do not have human rights standards at the level of Finland, Luxembourg, or Sweden. The exception, here, is likely to be Iceland. That is not to say that some of them will not have nationalist backlashes against Turkey. In
particular, in the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovakia, there are strong public opinions against Turkish membership. However, these are not likely to be as troublesome as the member states with strong domestic political concerns, especially Austria, France and Germany.

Cyprus is, of course, a very special case. Turkey occupies a very large portion of the island with some 30,000 troops, supporting a separatist government. As such, Cyprus is best considered in a similar light as Greece – a country with a very difficult bilateral relationship with Turkey, whose enlargement policies will be oriented on the specific problems of that relationship.

For many of the habitual drivers the outlook is such that these will not likely be the 'battleground' member states. While public opinion is generally growing more negative toward Turkey, their politics are such that, while supportive policies may be unpopular, they are not of the highest order of importance to voters, and bucking popular preference will not mean political suicide for the political parties in power.

This is also somewhat the case for the sticklers. Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden are not driven to set their policies on Turkey by their domestic politics. Finland, in particular, seems to have changed its policies against the directions of changing public opinion. What is noteworthy about this group of countries is that they are small and, when the moment was decisive (in 2004), they were all supportive of Turkey's progress. This suggests that when the decisions come to sign or not sign an accession treaty, it is unlikely that these countries will provide the prohibitive roadblocks.

Greece, being in a category of its own due to its difficult bilateral relationship with Turkey, is most likely to be driven by developments related to its security and its specific interests in the Aegean and concerning Cyprus. As mentioned above, Cyprus also fits this category. As such, while the negotiating positions of the domestically-driven countries will concern their overall tone toward Turkey (for a domestic audience) and the specifics of the future safeguards on the free movement of persons and/or an alternative to full membership, Cyprus and Greece will be using the enlargement process as a carrot and stick to negotiate more favorable resolutions to the Cyprus problem and maritime territorial disputes.

This means that there are four particular issues on which Turkey should focus its efforts: The domestic politics of the six domestically-driven member states, the particular disputes with Greece and Cyprus, completing administrative and legal reforms in adopting the *acquis communautaire* and developing higher standards of human rights developments. These shall be dealt with, below, in increasing orders of importance for accession.
12.4.1 Human Rights

The findings of this research have shown that Turkey’s human rights concerns are not of the first order of importance in determining member-state policies, despite the contrary assertions of many of the member-state leaders. Turkey’s strongest efforts toward meeting the political Copenhagen criteria, ahead of the European Council of Copenhagen in 2002, were not met with enthusiastic support from the member states. Instead, support had declined from the previous episode. In particular, support declined in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, while support improved only in Ireland and Portugal.

That said, the question at hand in 2002 was different than it was in 1999. In 1999 the question was one of making Turkey’s candidacy explicit. To a large degree, this was simply a symbolic gesture, whereas in 2002 the question was one about the actual start of accession negotiations. Nevertheless, the changing policies in the member states were mostly due to domestic politics within those countries, and not the result of changes in Turkey or the changing question before the European Council.

That is not to say that human-rights improvements, and developments toward the political Copenhagen criteria in general will not help Turkey in its accession process. Most importantly, these improvements are benefits in themselves and do not need an instrumentalist rationale to support them. However, from the instrumentalist perspective, they are likely to help most in a handful of smaller countries, but also in France. In France as well as Denmark, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands, there are significant decreases in public opposition to Turkish membership if Turkey is seen to have fulfilled the criteria of membership, which are largely seen in terms of the political criteria. Aside from France, these are also countries that have good human rights records of their own.

The odd member states out, here, are Luxembourg and Sweden, that are, after all, supposed to be members of the sticklers club, for whom human rights matter. In Luxembourg, this is strangely curious, as there is only a 7%-8% spread between the percentages of support/opposition in the Standard and the Special Eurobarometer surveys. In Sweden, there is a significant positive shift in the support-for percentage (14%), but a smaller decrease (9%) in public opposition. The difference comes from the undecided respondents. However, Luxembourg is small and Swedish public opinion is generally more positive.
Human rights improvements will, therefore, be important for France, Denmark and the Netherlands. All three of these countries are members of the domestic politics group, and marked improvements in the human rights situation in Turkey will deprive the political forces arrayed against Turkish membership of a talking point that seems to matter in those countries.

Another aspect, here, is that the political Copenhagen criteria concern the minority rights of the Kurds. An improvement in the plight of the Kurds, which is related to Turkey’s security problems in Southeastern Turkey, also touches the real sore spot with many of the brakemen. While statistics are very elusive, it is the general understanding that many of the Turkish immigrants are, in fact, from this particular community. Improving the protection of minority rights of the Kurds and improving the economic and security situation in Southeast Turkey will relieve migration pressures toward Western Europe. Further, it is generally understood that these migrants are also the least educated and provide the least human capital in terms of the economic benefits to the countries to which they migrate.

12.4.2 Greece and Cyprus

Turkey’s differences with Greece on maritime borders and, more importantly, the division of Cyprus, are a particular roadblock to Turkey’s accession. At this stage, several negotiating chapters have been frozen until Turkey opens its harbors and airports to Cypriot ships and airplanes. A solution to this problem must come ahead of accession, as both Greece and Cyprus are not shy of threatening or using a veto, regardless of the diplomatic pressure from the other member states.

Despite the common position of the European Council that these problems – in particular that of the shipping issue – must be solved before accession negotiations can be unfrozen, there is some danger in prematurely offering concessions on this front. This stems from two facts: the first being the manifestly negative public opinions in both Cyprus and Greece, and, secondly, the largely symbolic nature of the frozen chapters. Together, they suggest that Turkey ought to not make premature unilateral concessions on the particular problem of Cypriot shipping or on the bilateral problems in general.

The negative public opinions, in themselves, pressure Athens and (Greek) Nicosia to bargain hard with Turkey and exact as many concessions from the Turks as possible. Because the reforms within Turkey (see below) require political capital, it would be counterproductive for the
government in Ankara to ‘sell out’ the Turkish Cypriots by offering unilateral concessions to the Greek Cypriots. As such, it is in Turkey’s interest to not prematurely offer the necessary concessions for the opening of the frozen negotiating chapters.

The frozen negotiating chapters are, largely, symbolic in that accession negotiations concern the member states agreeing that Turkey’s reforms sufficiently meet the legal and administrative requirements of the *acquis communautaire* – the entirety of common EU laws. However, the actual process of reforming those institutions lies entirely within Turkey’s power. These are largely technical in nature and only political to the degree that the member states are willing to raise inauthentic objections to the technicalities. As such, the process of sitting at the table with the member states and engaging in ‘negotiations’ is not where the real action is. The real action is in Ankara and its ability to make the necessary reforms. So long as Ankara is actually making the reforms, the negotiations are simply a political decision that can be subject to a final deal.

The key, then, is in making sure that as many chapters are opened/unfrozen and closed in as few instances as possible. That way, Greece and Cyprus cannot force Turkey into incrementally making concession after concession for the opening and closing of each of the remaining chapters. Doing so would (further) sap domestic support within Turkey for making the necessary reforms.

With respect to the other member states, it is a problem that the public narrative about Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus is frequently one-sided. To the degree that most people in the member states know anything about the Cyprus situation it is that Turkey occupies a large part of the island. Turkey could increase pressure on Greek Cyprus by more effectively providing balance to this one-sided story. This would, essentially, be an added part of the public diplomacy strategy discussed below.

### 12.4.3 Accession Negotiations

As mentioned in the previous section, the accession negotiations, themselves, are largely symbolic in nature though they provide avenues for the brakemen to slow down the accession process. However, the actual reforms are entirely within Ankara’s ability to implement. In that regard, Ankara sets its pace within the confines of its own domestic political and administrative realm.

As such, it is up to Ankara to make the necessary legal and administrative reforms ahead of the time at which maneuvering the political hurdles with the member states will be at hand. In doing
this, the European Commission, which writes the annual reports, can be a useful ally in being able to offer the technical testimony to the degree that Turkey has adopted the *acquis communautaire*. With that testimony, the brakemen shall be at greater pains to contradict the technical facts in order to prevent the closing of the negotiations chapters.

Implementing the necessary reforms in order to adopt the *acquis* requires substantial political capital in order to overcome the bureaucratic, political, and societal resistance that such reforms inevitably raise. In order to husband that political capital, Turkey ought to avoid offering premature concessions at the European or bilateral level, such as those relating to Cyprus. If the government is seen as ‘selling out’ the Turkish Cypriots, or its other interest ahead of time, it will likely have more troubles reforming, say, its intellectual property laws. In a similar vein, with Turkish public opinion far from uniform on joining the EU, the reforms ought to primarily be packaged as measures that benefit Turkey, or the domestic stakeholders of the policy areas within which the reforms must take place.

### 12.4.4 Member-state Domestic Politics

Ultimately, however, it will come down to each of the member states having to, individually, ratify accession treaties with Turkey, if Turkey is to become a member. Some member-state governments will force those accession treaties through their legislatures, despite their unpopularity. Others will be less willing to swim against the tide of public opinion. As the previous chapters attest, Turkey has nearly always enjoyed support from a majority of the member states. There are only a handful of countries that may pose particular problems in signing these accession treaties or agreeing to close the negotiations process. Greece and Cyprus are among this number, but most of them will be the countries that have substantial Turkish immigrant communities. In these countries, there is significant, if not prohibitive, domestic opposition to Turkey ever becoming a member, regardless of its adoption of the criteria of membership. Furthermore, the trends of public opinion in these countries do not, presently, favor Turkey – opinion is bad and getting worse.

Domestic political problems call for solutions based in the domestic political realm. Thus far, Turkey appears to have done more work at trying to appeal to governments at the geostrategic level. For many years, Turkey has been a loyal NATO ally. In recent years, they have diversified their foreign-policy portfolio. This has manifested itself in a more cooperative foreign policy with Iran
and a more antagonistic relationship with Israel. In some sense, this can be seen as showing Europe
the carrot and stick of Turkey’s geostrategic value. This has seemingly convinced the habitual drivers
and the United States. However, Turkey’s geostrategic value is of less importance to politicians whose
greatest threat is from domestic political upsets. That greater threat comes from populist right-wing
politicians who are able to put the mainstream right- and left-wing parties on the defensive on an
issue with little start-off popularity. If these countries – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany and the Netherlands – are to also be won over, and persuaded to close accession
negotiations and ratify accession treaties, that domestic political threat will have to be minimized.

While many will object to a foreign country meddling in their own country’s politics, this is
not any more objectionable than one country unilaterally determining another country’s fate by way
of referendum or parliamentary resolution. That having been said, it is worthwhile to be mindful of
potential blowback from ham-fisted attempts to manipulate. Also, this is general advice and country-
specific political strategies by those knowledgeable about political campaign laws and norms in those
countries naturally supersede the advice given here.

With this in mind, it will not be possible for Turkey to join the EU without which the
domestic politics of the critical member states change, and, with current trends, that will not happen
unless some agent induces those domestic politics to change. Without injecting itself into the
domestic politics of these countries, Turkey will fail to become a member of the EU. If Turkey
attempts to make its own case for membership directly to the voting publics, it risks diplomatic
tensions with leaders who are elected in spite of Turkey’s efforts. Given Turkey’s strength at the
geostrategic level, any displeasure from governments annoyed at Turkey’s campaign practices are
likely to be of a fleeting nature. In short, Turkey has little to lose from making an attempt to
influence public opinion in the member states where such opinion is a particular political problem.

Such a political campaign for a realigning of Turkey’s image in these countries should consist
of three parts: providing information, message control, and offering painful concessions. The first
two of these are aspects of public diplomacy – directly influencing public opinion. The last part is
also aimed at the public, but ought to happen at the very last stage of the process in order to
maintain support on Turkey’s domestic front until such time as the last hurdles – closing accession
negotiations and ratifying accession treaties - need to be cleared.

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12.4.5 Providing Information

Broadly speaking, the debate over Turkey within these countries is mostly fuelled by anti-immigration sentiment. Actors on the political right have equated the Turkish membership with an inevitable flood of immigration. Connected to this are the suppositions of Turkey’s cultural/religious incompatibility with the EU. Given the inconstant nature of public opinion, this looks to be more a function of political rhetoric, rather than a structural factor in determining peoples’ willingness to accept Turkey. Nevertheless, perceptions of culture need to be addressed, if only to deflate the efficacy of the political antagonists’ rhetoric. Many (though certainly not all) of those who hold negative opinions about Turkey also have profound misconceptions about this country. Turkey is not, for example, a country where adulterers are legally stoned, thieves dismembered or Christians beheaded under some brutal conception of Shari’a law. Perceptions that most Turkish men have multiple wives, whom they regularly beat, are commonplace in Europe (Traynor & Henley, 2004).

As Reiner Hülsse (2006), a constructivist scholar of European identity, suggests, Turkey is in need of a policy that starts to alter Turkey’s image in the minds of the countries where Turkey is politically opposed. Rather than a country that reacts emotionally to setbacks, engages in vociferous defense against such issues as the Armenian Genocide, and a ‘managed’ civil society, Turkey ought to reshape its image into a country that is not very different from the mainstream European country. In light of the set of countries where opposition to Turkey is the most politically viable, Turkey ought to create an image that is more like them. In light of the sovereign debt crises, it is not, presently, a winning strategy to pose Turkey to be more like the Southern European countries, even if those are, in fact, the most similar to Turkey. Instead, Turkey should profile itself as a country with a strong growing economy, a vibrant modern society, with a government that is eager to adopt Western political values.

In this context it is worthwhile to be mindful that for every example of Europe-like conditions in Turkey drawn from Western Turkey, there are corresponding examples of not-Europe-like conditions in Eastern Turkey. It would be useful for Turkey to ‘play up’ the West, but

51 That is not to suggest that Turkey does not have a very real violence-against-women problem. However, there should be an honest discussion about what rejection of EU membership will mean. Is public opinion in member states honestly concerned about improving women’s rights, or are they using it as a talking point to support their opinions about keeping Turkey out of the EU?
also to acknowledge the East when pressed to do so. Correspondingly, pointing out regional variations of conditions in many European countries, such as in Italy (North and South), Germany (East and West), and in Europe as a whole (Northwest vs. South and East), understanding that the divergence in Turkey is of far greater scale than is the case in the counterexamples.

The point, however, is to acknowledge that problems exist in the Southeast and other spheres of development, but that the requirements of membership and the developments resulting from those requirements are the surest means by which to ameliorate those problems. It will be useful to point out the benefits that the perspective of membership has had on Turkey, and that by rejecting Turkey, member states are essentially complicit in the reasons for which public opinion (supposedly) holds Turkey in such low esteem.

The purpose of building this positive narrative is to change the narrative from that of Turkey’s antagonists – where Turkey is the source of the Muslim barbarians seeking to plunder European welfare states. This narrative appeals to the public’s desire to defend itself. The narrative that suits Turkey better is one where the publics of the member states are made to feel good about themselves as guides and examples for Turkey. Such a narrative would highlight Turkey’s recent past as having long been attracted to European society and values, as having made difficult but earnest strides toward adopting those esteemed values, and having benefited from European example.

The point, here, is not to suggest specifics on how to change the narrative, but to suggest that Turkey needs to be actively engaged in public diplomacy in order to do so. It should be ready and willing to actively contradict the narratives of Turkey’s political antagonists in the six critical member states with informational campaigns that change the inaccurate stereotypes that many people in Europe still have about Turkey. In so doing, it should also acknowledge that Turkey still has faults – as so many countries (including the six member states in question) do – but that they are working hard to correct those faults. The narrative should be of that of the honest prodigal son, rather than the wastrel outsider seeking enrichment from Europe’s plenty.

12.4.6 Message Control

Of course, as a proud country, many in Turkey will balk at the narrative of the prodigal son – not to mention the painful concessions that will likely have to be made. The prodigal-son narrative is demeaning and the concessions that will be required are unfair. The narrative is also not necessarily a
true one. To suggest that Turkey would not have made political, economic and societal reforms without the Copenhagen criteria's ‘enlightened’ guidance is absurd. However, if Turkey wishes to appeal to European public opinion, those bitter pills will likely have to be swallowed. It will be up to the Turkish leaders to decide if EU membership is worth having to swallow their pride, knowing that there are no guarantees that they will be sufficient to win membership.

Part of this swallowing will also entail curtailing the negative messages that tend to accompany the process from the side of Turkey and its allies. Turkey can also help itself by altering the way in which its own political community and that of its allies communicates Turkey’s image. The dominant change in its own approach that would work in its favor is to take Hülsse’s advice to ‘play it cool’, in terms of how it responds to criticism. The best change its allies can make is to drop the charges of racism and discuss the issues openly and factually.

Hülsse’s advice for being “Cool Turkey” is to cease the angry responses when the European Council delivers less than was hoped for, or when European leaders make negative statements. To a large extent, Turkey’s leaders have already adopted this. While the AKP leaders responded vociferously to the setbacks in 1997 and 2002, they have since taken setbacks in stride – politely disagreeing with the public statements of leaders like Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel. Failing to do so feeds into the perception of Turkey as a traditionalistic and nationalistic culture that cannot abide even reasonable criticism, and, in short, of ‘being pushy’. In many cases, it is entirely warranted for Turks to feel slighted. Many of the charges laid at their feet – such as its ‘non-European’ geography, the Armenian Genocide, or its occupation of Northern Cyprus – have nothing to do with the criteria of membership. Expressing indignation at these things is, not, however, productive in the pursuit of membership.

Also, it does not do well to highlight the European-ness of the Ottoman history. The debate should not be about history. The historic narrative is already too polluted with imagery of the Siege of Vienna and misunderstandings about the Ottoman past. Instead, the frame should be about Turkey as a rapidly modernizing country with a bright future. The improvement of human and civic rights should be highlighted. Also, it should be about how it is (presently and in the foreseeable future) governed by a political party that in many ways is similar to Christian Democrats – sometimes a little sanctimonious but in practice quite pragmatic. The rapidly growing economy should, especially, be highlighted in terms of the prospect of being a draw for return migration.

One particular image that needs to be discarded from Turkey’s allies’ political rhetoric is the metaphor of Turkey as a ‘bridge’ to the Middle East. The ‘bridge’ is a metaphor that appeals to
foreign policy idealists – who see Ankara as a desirable intermediary between the Western World and the countries of the Middle East. However, for those people who are led to oppose Turkey because they fear the prospect of immigration from the Middle East, a bridge, over which people cross to get from one side to the other, is precisely the wrong image. To them it is not a bridge ‘to’ the Middle East, but a bridge ‘from’ the Middle East, carrying hordes of poor and needy immigrants.

Obviously, this is not what the metaphor is attempting to communicate, but it is a metaphor that appeals to the wrong crowd in the right way, but to the necessary crowd in the wrong way. Foreign policy idealists are not those who need to be convinced. It is the people who have fears of more immigration who need to be persuaded that Turkey is not a threat. The metaphors of political discourse need to be shaped around those who need to be persuaded, not around those who are already on board.

Controlling the message is also valid advice for Turkey’s allies. The political left’s accusations of the political right being racist do nothing to diminish the fears of immigration that those who vote for the right have. Accusations of racism only perpetuate the marriage between the debate over Turkey and the debate over immigration. Instead, those two debates must be divorced from one another. Turkey should cease to be framed as a ‘Muslim country’ altogether, because that frame only highlights one particular cultural facet about a very multifaceted country. If an identity card must be played, it should be how Turkey is not an Arab country and how it is very different from the Arab world.

Turkey can also work with the business communities in the member states, who, by-and-large, are more positive toward the prospect of Turkish membership. The business community can help shape the debate about Turkey away from the debate about immigration. In many cases, such as in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands, the business community has control over the old liberal right, but this bastion has given way to the populist right. The business community can, perhaps, help craft an agreement between the old liberal right and the mainstream left to sideline the populist right by staging the political debate around other issues during political campaigns. The left could compensate for what the liberal right may lose in the campaign (by not agitating against Turkey) in the coalition agreements after elections. Furthermore, the business community can more actively campaign on Turkey’s behalf by highlighting the economic benefits Turkey’s membership promises.

In addition to Turkey’s allies in the political left and in the business communities, a third ally that needs to be curtailed is the United States. Especially during the 2002, 2004, and 2006 episodes,
America’s ‘soft power’ political capital was in the red. Nevertheless, it loudly advocated its position on Turkey’s behalf, which only strengthened Turkey’s antagonists. In 2002, they misread Denmark (as did many), and in 2004 they preached at the Dutch government, which surreptitiously had already joined the choir. The same was true of Jacques Chirac, who – despite his personal support for Turkey – felt called to rebuke the Americans for their intrusion. If it does nothing else, the United States could best pursue its interest to see Turkey further ensconced in the Western community of countries by keeping quiet on the matter in public, and shoring up support for Turkey in the Eastern European countries where it enjoys more influence.

12.4.7 Concessions

Beyond public diplomacy and message control, it is also very likely that Turkey shall have to make three particular concessions. The first, which has already been discussed, regards Cyprus. Turkey shall have to come to a modus vivendi with Greek Cyprus and allow its ships and airplanes to dock in and land on Turkish harbors and airports. Hopefully, it can do this at the same time that it helps facilitate a solution to the continuing division on the island and is able to withdraw its troops. As mentioned already, it is not strategic to do this too soon, so as to prevent the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots from demanding more concessions than are necessary.

The other two that will likely be necessary concern the Armenian Genocide and permanent limitations on the free movement of persons. Both of these will be odious to Turks: acknowledgement of genocide, because it has nothing to do with the requisites of membership and curtailing the free movement of persons because it is quite unfair that Turkish citizens will be second-class citizens of the EU.

The case of the Armenian Genocide will probably be necessary for France. France has the largest Armenian community in the EU, which has leverage in the Parti Socialiste. However, the precise language of any recognition should be discretely negotiated directly with Armenian leaders in the Parti Socialiste, rather with Yerevan or any other representatives or the Armenian community. The immediate aim of the concession concerns gaining support for Turkish membership from the left in France, presuming that the left will be in power at a time when Turkey will make its final bid for ratification of the accession treaty in France. If the left is not in power and the right is expected
to either block ratification or put it to referendum, then there is little point in making a push for membership.

More important, however, will be a concession on the free movement of persons. In the final analysis, the greatest part of what unnerves domestic public opinion about Turkey joining the EU is the prospect of a flood of new immigrants from Turkey. While past impacts of membership on immigration was always much less than had been feared – in the case of Greece, Spain, Portugal and the Eastern European Countries, where actual migration flows were much less than had been prognosticated – it may be that Turkey shall have to put permanent safeguards on the free movement of persons on the table.

As immigration is the primary concern, offering a limitation on the number of Turkish citizens able to migrate into Europe should take the migration issue off the table. Once Turkey is a member, it should be able to renegotiate the terms at a time when the migration issue may be less of a concern, when Turkey is demonstrated to be an EU member in good standing, and when Turkey has the leverage in the Council to log-roll the free movement of Turkish persons with other issues to be decided. Again, because this will have to be a concession in order to win support, it should only be offered if doing so will win the support of the requisite member states to close the negotiations and ratify the accession treaties. It should also not be offered prematurely so that the member states could demand other, even more unpalatable, concessions from Turkey.
13.0 CONCLUSION

The introduction to this dissertation began with a quote from a Dutch European Commissioner referencing a 17th century battle between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire. He indicated that if Muslim immigration were not diminished, the victory of the Christian forces at Vienna would have been for naught, essentially comparing the immigration of Muslim people with violent invasion and brutal conquest. He made these remarks in the context of a pending decision of the European Council, under the Dutch Presidency, of the EU beginning accession negotiations with Turkey. They push the narrative of a clash of civilizations between Muslims and Christians. It suggests that this clash goes back many centuries, and that the question of Turkish membership, tied to the problems of immigration, are a part of this supposed perennial struggle between the Christian/civilized West and the Muslim (read: uncivilized) Turks.

The astute reader will note that this research did not test for narratives. It drew hypotheses from two broad metatheoretical paradigms of international relations and tested these against the empirical record of member-state positions on Turkey joining the EU. In other words, it sought to broadly locate where the most parsimonious explanation, derived from theory, could be found. The clash of competing narratives, however, helped cement the findings together into a fuller understanding of the case.

13.1 FINDINGS

The first thing that is immediately apparent from the variation in the policies on Turkey is that many states changed their policies significantly over time. France began as a strong supporter, and gradually turned into an opponent of Turkish membership in the EU. Greece and Germany, on the other hand, started out as strong opponents, became strong supporters, and then eventually returned
to policies attempting to slow down or derail Turkey’s progress through the enlargement regime. Other countries, such as the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg changed their policies radically over time.

Because so many of these countries have changed their policies so drastically, the changes can only be explained by at least one variable that introduces significant change over time. This is not the case for the common notions of why Turkey has been kept at arm’s length, like religion or historical memories of the Battle of Vienna. The same is true for why some embrace Turkey, such as political loyalty to the United States or a desire to hollow out the EU by enlarging it beyond its supposed absorption capacity. As such, variables that differ per member state, but not significantly over time, cannot – alone – explain the policies.

In testing the hypotheses derived from the overarching metatheories of international relations, what was found is that, out of the 32 tested hypotheses, the most parsimonious multivariate explanation for member-state behavior comes down to two assertions, based off three variables. The two assertions are as follows:

- Member states with large numbers of Turks are much more likely to have their policies change at the same time that their domestic politics change.
- Member states without large numbers of Turks are more likely to support Turkey if their own human rights standards are relatively lower, and are more likely to oppose Turkey if their human rights standards are relatively higher.

This second of these two is strengthened slightly when taking the difference between the member state’s human rights standards and Turkey’s human rights standards into account. However, the added value is marginal and is not particularly illustrative in cross-country comparisons.

The interpretation of these empirical findings is that where Turks are a dominant immigrant group, Turkey is considered a source for immigration, and the prospect of Turkish membership is cast in the light of more immigration from Turkey in the future. It is observed that the political right tends to propose policies that strongly limit immigration and compel the integration of culturally different people. By contrast, the political left tends to oppose such policies and is more likely to stand for immigrants’ cultural rights. Therefore, it is theoretically assumed that, given the presupposed relationship between Turkish membership and the prospect of more immigration from Turkey, the political right will oppose Turkish membership and the political left will be more supportive. This assumption is borne out by the analyses of the empirical record. Governments of
the (center)right have tended to oppose Turkish membership and governments of the (center)left have tended to support Turkish membership – but only in these six countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

In their political message-making, right-wing politicians have used the language of cultural and religious differences to explain their opposition to Turkey. They have also raised the prospect that membership would imply a massive increase in immigration from Turkey to their countries. In reaction to this, left-wing politicians have used accusations of bigotry to denounce their political opponents on the right. To the degree that this has affected public opinion, the left has been losing the battle for public opinion and the right has been winning. Public opinion has become increasingly negative toward the prospect of Turkish membership, and, in 2005, respondents with negative opinions attributed their opinions to cultural differences between Europe and Turkey.

This strongly suggests that right-wing politicians, at some point, saw an opportunity to capitalize on an unpopular issue – Turkish membership – and make it even more unpopular. This shift in public opinion suggests that left-wing politicians have been ineffective in making Turkey’s case. They have used ad hominem attacks and metaphorical language (‘a bridge to the Middle East’) that has communicated the wrong message to the electorate. Bridges, after all, are what people use to go from one side of something to the other side. If immigration was the dominant frame, then that bridge is more likely to have been interpreted as the avenue by which more immigrants come to Europe’s neighborhoods, rather than the means by which Europe can influence events in the Middle East.

What is also important to note is that the question of Turkey is not determined by religious factors, on which the Clash of Civilizations theory hinges. Countries with higher levels of religiosity by self-identification are no more likely to oppose Turkey than countries that are less religious. In terms of church attendance, countries where people go to church more often are, in fact, somewhat more likely to be supportive of Turkey than countries where church attendance is less frequent. Also, the changing policies and public opinions suggest that none of this is as permanent a feature as countries’ religious identities are. As such, it is not the case that opposition to Turkey is based on some structural clash of civilizations.

The clash of civilizations is a public narrative that became salient in the 2000s, possibly as an indirect result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The effect is assumed to have been indirect, because the decline in public support for Turkey was not immediately measurable in opinion surveys in the immediate aftermath of the attacks. The prospect of Turkish membership
polled roughly as well (or as badly) as the prospect of Bulgarian and Romanian membership did in October-November 2001. The clash of civilizations frame became a public narrative only after opinion-makers decided to make it a stronger public narrative.

By contrast, support for Turkey is directly a function of the material interests of states. Variables related to security – either in the form of a power block (NATO), in the form of regional or global stability, or security from terrorism or transnational crime (drugs) – do not explain different levels of member-state support very well. Global and regional power interests or economic interests also poorly explain the policies regarding Turkey, with the strange exceptions of population size and external trade policy.

In terms of relative power, it appears that the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, the large and medium-size countries that are slightly smaller than Germany and France, were much more likely to support Turkey than either Germany and France or the smaller countries were. That said, size did not determine the policies of Germany and France, given that their policies changed over time, but their relative weight in population size did not, nor does it explain the erratic policies of some smaller countries, like the Netherlands, Finland and Luxembourg.

A similar observation is made in regard to external trade policy preferences. Those countries that generally support a more liberal external trade policy between the EU and third countries, also tend to support Turkish membership more. However, that is not a time-sensitive variable, nor does it necessarily make sense in a rationalist understanding. It is unknown what sort of external trade preferences Turkey would have, should it become an EU member.

Domestic politics did not, however, explain variation over time in the remaining nine countries. The remaining countries were broadly supportive of Turkey, unless they had very high human rights standards (such as Sweden, Finland and Luxembourg), in which case they supported Turkey only when it seemed evident that Turkey was on the road toward improving its own human rights record. Turkey’s bid for membership did not awaken tough political struggles between the mainstream political parties, and, for many of them, did not really entice public opinion to think particularly hard on the matter, insofar as the high amount of ‘don’t know’ responses on surveys suggests apathy.

Given that the countries with relatively large Turkish communities form the main roadblock to Turkey’s membership, it is useful to expand on the social workings that underlie the domestic political struggles between left and right. This is where the competing narratives enter into the
picture. However, it is useful to first highlight the problems this research poses for the competition between the grand metatheoretical paradigms that underlie international relations theories.

### 13.2 (META)THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

This research poses a theoretical problem for the international relations literature, which strongly tends to look for explanations of foreign-policy behavior in the international realm of politics, and not in the domestic realm of politics. However, in testing many of the supposed reasons for foreign policy behavior, few of these returned anything but minimal explanatory power for the observed policies. For rationalism, the pursuit of security, wealth, and power at the global and regional levels did not explain member-state behavior. Most of the constructivist hypotheses related to identities, norms, and values, likewise failed to produce strong results. The strongest of the constructivist hypotheses was one where the human rights record of the member states in question was measured\(^{52}\). This trend was further strengthened when Turkey’s own human rights record was taken into account, though this added factor offered only marginal explanatory added-value. Mostly, it is about member states’ own respect for human rights and only secondarily about Turkey’s human rights. This suggests that advances in human rights matter to those countries for whom human rights are important, in the absence of domestic political imperatives.

Countries without those domestic political imperatives and with relatively mediocre respect for human rights were generally supportive of Turkey. It is assumed that, for them, the broad foreign policy benefits of bringing Turkey into the fold were determinative of their policies toward integrating Turkey as a member. Yet, this suggests that the international-level interests are secondary to the domestic political interests. States only support Turkey when there are not domestic political imperatives to prevent them from doing so.

International relations theory could accommodate the import of domestic politics if the question of Turkey were a low-stakes issue at the international level. This is, however, not the case. Turkey is a strong and very strategically located country. It has a large and mostly modern military. It has diplomatic relations with third countries that Europe could benefit from. It is becoming the

\(^{52}\) Actually, it was the level of corruption that was the most explanatory over the whole range of member states, but this weakened in the multivariate model, whereas the human-rights variable strengthened in the multivariate model.
thoroughfare for Caspian, Iranian and Iraqi energy resources, which would diminish Europe’s
dependence on Russian pipelines. Further integration of intelligence and law enforcement
institutions can help with Europe’s terrorism and organized crime problems. Turkey is also a rapidly
growing economy and membership can open Turkey’s agricultural market and further reduce non-
tariff barriers to goods covered by the existing Customs Union.

Likewise, from the constructivist angle, it would be a harder case for anti-Western opinion
leaders in the Middle East to make a case for innate European anti-Islamic prejudices if the EU were
to admit Turkey as a member. The Clash of Civilizations theory would be ‘defeated’ by a European
‘Alliance of Civilizations.’ This would undermine the central narrative of Islamist terrorism regarding
Europe and the West. With the Arab Spring still unfolding at the time of writing, the model of a
democratic Turkey, where modern Islamist politics are not feared for enacting a theocracy, has
potential benefits to spread western democratic values to the countries on the southern and eastern
shores of the Mediterranean and beyond.

From both metatheoretical approaches, the question of Turkey is a high-stakes issue, and if
domestic politics more adequately explains member-states’ policies toward Turkey, then
international relations theory has a very serious ‘missing variable bias.’ If domestic politics trump
foreign policy interests in deciding policy regarding Turkey, it is a very problematic case for
international relations theory, which generally assumes that one need not look inside states for
explanations of behavior between states.

It is also problematic for those who want rationalism to trump constructivism or vice versa,
because variables from both realms are, together, explanatory of the case. It is rational for politicians
to seek power, and to use the most effective means available for them to do so. However, it strains
that paradigm when those means rely on narratives of cultural and religious differences. By the same
token, constructivism cannot stand on its own either. The cultural variables, aside from corruption
and human rights, explain very little without which they have power-seeking politicians interpreting
the relationships between culture and religion on the one hand and immigrants and Turkish
membership on the other.
Because of the above limitations of international relations theory, it is necessary for there to be metatheoretical cement between rationalism and constructivism that operates at the domestic level. This is not the place, nor does this author have the wisdom, to produce a full paradigmatic understanding or deductive empirical test of such cement here. Yet it is useful to provide an interpretation of the analyses of the preceding chapters coupled with a sense of the underlying logic that is the result of having been immersed in this material for the past couple of years. The adoption, or creation, of such metatheory and an empirical test can usefully be done in future research.

That sense of the underlying logic is that – coming out of the politics of immigration, where politicians of the right broadly oppose both Turkish membership and more immigration, and politicians of the left, broadly, support Turkish membership and immigrant rights – politicians have engaged in political story-telling. The stories they have told, which are narratives that make selective use of history and frames of identity, culture, and religion – have intended to create intellectually parsimonious dramas that paint the politicians as defenders of the norms and values of their societies.

From the right, the narrative has been that the right-wing politicians are the defenders of Western/Christian civilization from a non-Western/Muslim threat. Hearkening back to the sieges and battles of Vienna, where the Ottoman Turkish menace was militarily defeated, they suggest, as Frits Bolkestein does, that the Islamization of Europe means the undermining of European civilization. It draws on the theory of the clash of civilizations wherein different cultures inexorably come into conflict with one another because these cultures (supposedly) have inherently different values and desires. They paint their left-wing political rivals as having embraced the non-Western barbarians with naïve ideas that a multicultural society can be a harmonious society, when the narrative suggests that this is impossible.

From the left, the narrative has been that the left-wing politicians are the defenders of the liberal/Enlightenment tradition that assumes that all people want to live free from oppression in harmonious social-democratic societies. The narrative projects the view of the EU and its Copenhagen criteria as means of spreading this liberal/Enlightenment tradition to the farthest reaches of the globe with Eastern Europe and the opposite shores of the Dardanelles as the next logical place where Western values will be adopted. The politicians of the right, who are
(supposedly) racists and religious bigots, are stifling this grand ideological plan and need to be exposed as such.

In using this narrative, Turkey’s left-wing allies have done Turkey few favors, because, like the right-wing narrative, the left-wing narrative is predicated on Turkey’s differences with European countries, rather than its similarities with European countries or its differences from other Middle Eastern and Northern African countries. The left-wing narrative, essentially also, lumps all Muslims together and portrays them as a people who can benefit from Western tutelage. So, instead of disputing the narrative, Turkey’s proponents have fed into the overall narrative of Turkey as the ‘Muslim other’ against which Europe’s Southeastern borders are culturally and religiously defined. Further, by projecting the idea that embracing Turkey as a member state could diminish Islamist terrorism by providing for a ‘good Muslim’ example, this narrative reiterates the relationship between Muslims and terrorism, while, Islamist terrorism has not emanated from Turkey at all.

By embracing this narrative, Turkey’s allies have attempted to score political points by accusing their domestic political opponents as being prejudiced against Muslims. In doing so, they have undermined Turkey’s case for membership by making religion Turkey’s defining characteristic, and reiterating the relationship between that religion and terrorism. As such, they have essentially worked against Turkey’s interests, by reproducing parts of the right wing’s narrative in order to score political points at home: something that, thus far, does not seem to have worked much in their favor.

Both these narratives make selective use of fact and fiction to create dramatic stories that their audiences, the electorates, will embrace. They are designed to win votes, not to provide honest intellectual foundations for thoughtful policy. As such, they highlight compelling drama over accurate complexity. That is not to say that these politicians do not believe the stories they tell; it is quite easy for them to make themselves believe what they are saying. There is, most likely, a spectrum between true believers and cynical manipulators along which politicians of both stripes can be arrayed. However, it remains that the complexity of reality is glossed over in order to facilitate political advancement at the ballot box.

In terms of the political effectiveness of these narratives, it seems that the narrative of the political right has been more effective than that of the left in the countries with large Turkish communities. This is evident in the right’s more aggressive use of rejection of Turkish membership in the EU in their election campaigns, compared to the left’s tepid defensiveness about their preferred policy. With public opinion more against Turkey than in favor of its membership, the right
has been able to capitalize and move public opinion further into the ‘oppose’ column. The left, on the other hand, has preferred to highlight other policy issues in their campaign platforms. At most, they will accuse their domestic political opponents of inciting nationalism and mumble something about Turkey’s human rights; preferring to change the subject.

13.4 POLICY PROPOSALS

With these findings and derived suppositions about political narratives in hand, it is worthwhile to close out the research with policy implications and ideas for future research. The previous chapter listed recommendations to Turkey for navigating the precarious future of its bid for membership, should it choose to continue on that path. It suggested providing information, message control and painful concessions. Below are added public diplomacy suggestions based on the ideas of narratives presented above.

Because the countries with relatively large Turkish communities are the primary opponents of Turkish membership when their right wings are in power, it is the structure of political incentives within these countries that need to be addressed. As long as the political right can win votes by agitating against Turkish membership in enough of these countries, they have a great incentive to block Turkish accession. In order to overcome that, Turkey will have to wade into the domestic politics of these countries in order to change the incentive structures of the right-wing politicians. This can probably not be done without Turkey having to offer the concession of permanent safeguards on the free movement of persons from Turkey, in addition to other concessions involving Cyprus and the Armenian Genocide. It is not suggested that these concessions are fair, but they are most likely going to be necessary.

Most of these concessions are recommended for the endgame of the accession process. In order to both maintain domestic control in Turkey and prevent more concessions than are strictly necessary, Turkey should not make these concessions prematurely. In the meanwhile, however, it is necessary to change the direction of public opinion and doing so means adjusting the poorly performing narratives of Turkey’s allies in the six member states where the domestic politics matter.

Because the left-wing political class, by-and-large, would prefer to talk about other issues, it is incumbent upon Turkey – operating through its Foreign Ministry and Ministry of European
Union Affairs – to help its allies craft a winning political message. In doing so, they need to properly identify those who need to be convinced. Broadly speaking, the liberal political message of the EU, bringing enlightenment to foreign shores through the Copenhagen criteria, is a narrative that only works on those who are already convinced. Also, the *ad hominem* accusations of bigotry offend those who have honest concerns over immigration while doing nothing to expand the base of people who support Turkey for membership. Turkey and its allies need to use arguments that expand its base of supporters, not narratives that preach to the choir.

In the same vein as the existing left- and right-wing narratives are dramatic simplifications of reality that use partial facts and emotions (such as hope and fear) instrumentally, Turkey and its allies should consider crafting a narrative that also makes use of both selective factual and emotional content. Yet, unlike the existing left-wing narrative, which does not provide a useful counter-narrative to the right-wing narrative, the new narrative should also include a powerful narrative that contradicts the existing right-wing narrative. This counter-narrative should highlight both Turkey’s secularism and modernity. In so doing, it ought to highlight those aspects of Turkey that are most similar to Europe. It should convey facts about Turkey that are contrary to stereotypical understandings of Arab culture and countries, so as to draw distinctions between Turkey and the broader Middle East. These may seem very basic, but it would be worthwhile to highlight facts such as the fact that Turkey uses the Latin alphabet, just as Europeans do; that it operates according to Western-derived law and not Shari’a law; that women are forbidden to wear the headscarf in public buildings. Regardless of how basic these facts are these are often unknown to people in Europe.

In addition to a counter-narrative that contradicts the core elements of the existing narrative, it is useful to craft a positive message that plays on the primary concerns that people in the member states have. According to Gürer (2008), the four main factors of negative public opinion toward Turkey were: ‘concerns about identity’, ‘future enlargement’, ‘economic expectations’, and ‘crime.’

Though this research did not find a significant effect of ‘fear of loss of identity’ at the member state level of analysis, this does not mean that it is insignificant at the individual level of analysis. Turkey cannot address the loss of distinct national identity in European member-states. However, the identification of Turkey as part of a nearly indistinguishable larger group of immigrants can be addressed. This also plays into the counter-narrative by which Turkey has defining features other than the religion of most of its citizens.

A useful means of addressing identity concerns is by differentiating Turks from other Middle Easterners and other Muslims. In many of the countries in which there are significant Turkish
communities, Turks are not the only immigrant communities who practice Islam. In many cases, these are North African Arab immigrants from the Maghreb, such as Algeria and Morocco. Not only should the message communicate distinctions between Turkey and these other countries from where Muslim immigrants come, but also the differing types of behavior of the immigrant communities. For example, in the Netherlands, the message could indicate the significantly lower crime rate of Turkish youth compared to Moroccan youth. This is not an innocent message, however, as it will essentially alienate these other immigrant communities.

This recommendation regarding crime plays into one of the factors Gürer identifies as being an explanatory variable for opposition to Turkish membership in public opinion. The more a person fears crime, the more they reject the prospect of Turkey joining the EU. If Turks can be disconnected from crime in the message, then public opinion may cease to regard the prospect of Turkish membership with an increase of crime in their environs. In addition to differentiating between Turkish immigrants and other immigrant communities in their contribution toward the overall crime rate, it can be highlighted that integration of Turkey into EU law-enforcement institutions can help minimize crime related to Turkish immigrants.

The other factors identified by Gürer were ‘future enlargement’ and ‘economic expectations.’ Enlargement to Turkey certainly cannot address concerns over future enlargement, however, it can address economic expectations – especially in light of its recent rapid growth as compared to that of many of the member states. By profiling Turkey as a growing economy, with which European countries have mutually beneficial trade relations, it provides the message of Turkey as an economic gain to Europe, rather than an economic cost as many people presume.
13.5 FUTURE RESEARCH

These are little more than off-the-cuff ideas for approaches toward influencing public opinion in Europe toward more open policies toward Turkey’s membership ambitions. There is more research that can be done to more fully understand public opinion and political dynamics in the member states that this research does not have the space to address. Public diplomacy policies should be well researched and tailored for each member state and the peculiarities of their individual political discourse cultures.

What this research does show is that domestic political dynamics are critical for deciding Turkey’s enlargement prospects. Given the level of public opposition that currently exists, it will be impossible for Turkey to ‘earn’ membership on its own merits, either by fully meeting the Copenhagen criteria or by making itself strategically invaluable. That is an unfortunate reality, but a reality nonetheless.

For the study of international relations, it remains a very interesting case. Future research can investigate the power of domestic politics and political narrative to shape foreign policy decisions. This case demonstrates that domestic political imperatives can trump even high-stakes foreign policy imperatives. While politicians have, at many times, done unpopular things for what they consider to be the greater good, this case is not an example of that. It defies the rational unitary-actor model of the state. Instead, the politician or political party is the more useful level of analysis for understanding policy.

Such research can also attempt to further investigate the relationship between rational cost and benefit structures of domestic political actors and their ability to weave political narratives. This cuts at a metatheoretical problem that many have sought to solve. Jupille, Caporaso & Checkel (2003) argue that the two metatheories may be “ontologically irreconcilable.” They contrast the paradigmatic positions as arguing that for rationalists the political world consists of “self-interested agents engaged in strategic choices,” whereas the constructivist political world consists of “other-regarding agents engaged in deliberative dynamics” (p. 16).

They do not suggest a full synthesis of the two metatheories, arguing that the foundational differences between them are too great. Therefore, they suggest four models by which rationalism
and constructivism can be brought into dialogue with one another. The first model is ‘competitive testing’, which is not so much a model of combination, but one that attempts to determine which approach explains more of the variation in the dependent variable. This is the conventional model used by adherents of one theory/approach to demonstrate the power of their theory/approach compared to that of other theories/approaches. This research found both metatheories to be inadequate to the task of explanation, whereas a combination of variables, drawn from both metatheories, produced better results.

The second approach they offer is one of a separation by ‘domain of application,’ which suggests that rationalism and constructivism have different spheres of influence (e.g. that rationalism may explain more high-stakes interactions whereas constructivism and institutional routines explain low-stakes interactions). This research also contradicted this particular division. The politics of Turkish membership are high-stakes games, yet they appear to be subject to many constructivist elements.

The third model is ‘sequencing’, which suggests a temporal domain of application, where one theory explains a first step in a process and the other theory explains a second step. The fourth model is ‘incorporation’ (subsumption) wherein one theoretical approach is simply a subset of, or derived from, the other. This latter approach seems to be the most adequate in this case, one that combines rational calculation within an imperfectly intersubjective understanding of the social environment, which is a constructivist ontology.

In this case, political narratives erect competing understandings of the world and voters choose which is the most compelling. They do not choose based on which interpretation yields them the biggest pay-off, but which narrative they find speaks both to their imperfect understanding of the world as well as their desire for a dramatic story in which they are the ‘good guy’ and not infrequently the victim. Politicians craft or spin their narratives based on their rational calculations of power. They see a marketplace for their dramatic narratives in which they can win voter approval by offering voters what the voters seem to want, not by what a rational calculus says they should need. These politicians may believe their own messages, but their messages do not tend to do themselves a disservice.

53 Jupille et al. offer the example of constructivism explaining preference formation and rationalism explaining the pursuit of preferences, which is nothing more than Thin-Theory Rationalism
13.6 SUMMARY

This research has collected the recent history of the diplomatic back-and-forth of Turkey’s progress towards EU membership. This history has been analyzed with respect to common understandings of what motivations drive government policy on Turkey’s membership prospects. The findings of this research point out that a re-think is necessary at the theoretical level and at the policy level. On the theoretical side, it is necessary to take domestic politics seriously, and to understand what motivates changes of government, because changes of government help explain changes of policy in the most influential member states. Where the winning political arguments are not based in materialist costs or benefits, but in ideational narratives, it is counterproductive to continue to believe that domestic politics are the means by which states arrive at their rationalist optimal interests from a material cost-benefit analysis. In a political market where narratives win voters, politicians will seek their political fortunes offering public what electorates want to hear.

This resounds on the policy side. From Turkey’s perspective, where the Turkish foreign ministry has been at pains to explain Turkey’s value to member states’ theoretical material interests – that Turkey is a geostrategically valuable partner, that it has a growing economy of consumers, that its cooperation in the field of counter-terror and law enforcement can diminish these non-state threats, and so forth, has paid off only with the countries that do not have overriding concerns elsewhere in their spectrum of interests. In a large number of countries – including Germany and France – domestic political advantages provide a strong rationale for domestic political operatives to prefer the advantages of domestic political support to strengthening bilateral and multilateral relationships with Turkey. Until the narratives change, or the subject ceases to be salient, policies should not be expected to change.
APPENDIX A: DRUG DEATHS

The available data from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) on drug-induced deaths in the EU-15 member states is an incomplete set among the episodes. To correct for this, the available data, in both Selections B and D, is used to arrive at estimate numbers that are less subject to outliers in the existing Selection B data. The differences between Selections B and D come from the origins of the data. Selection B data come from general mortality registries, whereas Selection D data come from special registries, usually forensic or police. Table A.1 shows the available data from Selection B. The missing data points have been shaded.

Table A.1: Number of Drug-Induced Deaths from Opiates, ‘Selection B’.
Of those with missing values above, a complete set of Selection D data exists for Austria, Greece, Italy, and Spain, but not for Belgium or Portugal. For the latter two, then, it is necessary to estimate the missing values solely based on the existing values. The missing value for Finland is estimated by drawing a trend from the later 11 data points. In the case of Belgium this is done by way of interpolating the values for 1998, and 2000 through 2003, and extrapolating for 2005 and beyond. In the case of Portugal, this is done by extrapolating backwards from 2002-2009 to 1995-2001. Also, because there are only three missing values in the first three years, and the Selection D data is greatly at odds with the Selection B data, there is little harm is simply extrapolating. Doing all of the above provides the following data with the estimates in table A.2.

For Greece, Italy and Spain there is Selection D data available, making sole reliance on interpolated and extrapolated numbers unnecessary. Because it is assumed that the trends visible in the Selection D data are going to be the same as they would be in the Selection B, were that data available, the trends in Selection D are transferred to the data used in this analysis, adjusting the numbers according to the average factoral difference between Selections B and D. Below are the numbers, Selection B, D, and the estimated numbers used for this analysis for each of these countries.

For Italy, there are missing numbers for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. As Table B.3, below, shows, there are differences between the Selection B and the Selection D data. The Selection B data tends to be higher in 1995 and 2003, but is usually lower than the Selection D counts. An estimating trend has been calculated to the multiplier of the D to the B data, and the results of the estimated trend have been used as multipliers for the Selection D numbers with respect to the missing values. The estimated numbers are listed below.

Table A.2: Estimated Number of Drug-Induced Deaths for Belgium and Portugal.

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<td>Austria</td>
<td>94ε</td>
<td>103ε</td>
<td>112ε</td>
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<td>84</td>
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<td>137</td>
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<td>117ε</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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Table A.3: Estimated Number of Drug-Induced Deaths for Italy

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<td>Selection B</td>
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<td>1369</td>
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<td>1068</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>530</td>
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<td>Selection D</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>1566</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>1002</td>
<td>1016</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>517</td>
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<td>551</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimates</td>
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<td>1369</td>
<td>1097</td>
<td>1068</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>468ε</td>
<td>586ε</td>
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Spain’s missing data is from the earlier years, rather than the later years. Also, the difference between the Selection B and selection D data has decreased over time, with the earlier numbers (for years 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2004) differing significantly more than the more recent years, 2005 and since (including 2007, 2008, and 2009). The means of estimating is the same as for Italy, computing a trend for the difference multiplier for the missing years and multiplying that number by the Selection D data. The table below offers the resulting numbers.

Table A.4: Estimated Number of Drug-Induced Deaths for Spain

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<td>Selection B</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>598ε</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection D</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimates</td>
<td>1262ε</td>
<td>1227ε</td>
<td>976ε</td>
<td>775ε</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>598ε</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Greece, on the other hand, does not have any Selection B data to draw from, but there is a complete set of Selection D data. In order to keep numbers that can be compared across cases, it is necessary to multiply the Selection D data by a multiplier that will put it into a similar range as that of the other member states. This multiplier is calculated by taking the average multiplier of all the known cases of Selection B and D data for all 30 countries in the EMCDDA dataset. These averages are also calculated for each year to test for heteroscedasticity. It is noted that there does not seem to be a trend that makes that average multiplier grow or diminish over time, so the average multiplier (1.144) will be applied to the Greek Selection D data to compute an estimate for the missing Selection B data. The estimates are shown in the table below.
Table A.5: Estimated Number of Drug-Induced Deaths for Greece

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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection D</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>304</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimates</td>
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<td>254ε</td>
<td>265ε</td>
<td>303ε</td>
<td>348ε</td>
<td>367ε</td>
<td>296ε</td>
<td>248ε</td>
<td>292ε</td>
<td>372ε</td>
<td>289ε</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With these estimates made, the known data is supplemented with the estimated data into Table A.6, which shall be used in the analysis of the effects of drug-related deaths from heroin on the likelihood that a member state shall be supportive of, or antagonistic to, Turkish membership in the EU.

Table A.6: Estimated Number of Drug-Induced Deaths Recorded in the EU-15

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>112ε</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>167</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>137</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>117ε</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>103ε</td>
<td>96ε</td>
<td>89ε</td>
<td>83ε</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>69ε</td>
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<tr>
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<td>243</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>240</td>
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<td>224</td>
<td>222</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>254ε</td>
<td>265ε</td>
<td>280ε</td>
<td>303ε</td>
<td>348ε</td>
<td>367ε</td>
<td>296ε</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1068</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>468ε</td>
<td>586ε</td>
<td>582ε</td>
<td>487ε</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21ε</td>
<td>20ε</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>110</td>
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<tr>
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<td>28ε</td>
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<td>26ε</td>
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<td>24ε</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1262ε</td>
<td>1227ε</td>
<td>976ε</td>
<td>775ε</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>598ε</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>579</td>
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<td>1258</td>
<td>1455</td>
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<td>1707</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>1596</td>
<td>1691</td>
<td>1812</td>
<td>1800</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
This appendix details the use of the data in Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) database in order to craft a variable to use in the analysis of Hypothesis Hp8, concerning the politics of ruling parties. The idea is that left-wing parties are more likely to be supportive of Turkish membership than right-wing parties are. The CMP database has ratio-level values measuring the left-vs-rightness of party manifestos. Like many datasets, the CMP database has missing values. The exercise in this appendix is threefold: 1) to explain how the scores of coalition governments are measured, 2) how the scores are affected by the time delay between the most recent election and the moment of decision, and 3) estimating the values of the missing data.

In terms of measurement, the CMP database offers a score of right/left political agenda, into which a host of policy proposals from party manifestos are measured. The measure is a ratio-level variable that runs a spectrum from –100 (extreme left) to +100 (extreme right). The decisions on Turkey, however, rarely occur just after an election that brings (or returns) parties to power. The general rule of identifying a right-left value to assign to a government making a decision regarding the Turkish accession process will be to take the scores from the parties of the most recent election.

As most European governments are coalition governments, it is necessary to create a means by which to calculate a government’s right-left score based on the right-left scores of the constituent parties of that coalition government. Because it is rarely the case that two parties have equal weight in the government, the scores of the constituent parties will be weighed by their share of seats in the directly-elected, or lower, house of their parliament. This may create a complication for those governments that have peculiar relationships with their upper houses, but in this research it is assumed that the lower houses more accurately reflect the weight of power in the coalition. In regard to minority governments, when these are formally supported by a party outside of the coalition - like that of Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s second cabinet – that supporting party will be included in the calculation of the governments’ right-left score. If there is no such formal support,
and the legislative alliances shift depending on the legislation in question, then only the coalition parties will be counted and weighed.

In terms of timing, manifestos are generally written ahead of elections in order to give the members of the political parties a platform on which to campaign. As such, there is variation over time for each political party as they re-formulate their policy proposals to meet the strategic campaign and policy needs at each election, rather than those positions (and their measures) being fixed across time. In a few of these cases, the decisions have to be made concurrent with an election. These are the tricky cases where a campaign occurs while a government that has been incumbent for its term of office makes a decision while its replacement government is being formed. The sitting government will have been formed on a mandate of the manifestos on which it ran before its term of office, which will generally have been several years prior to the decision. In these cases, the method of measurement will be to still take the scored from the most recent (or concurrent) election and assign them to the parties, weighed by the results of the election that brought the sitting government to power.

Regrettably, the CMP database does not have a score for all parties in every election. There are missing values for Austrian parties for the 2006 elections, the French RPR (the party of Jacques Chirac before he created the UMP), Greek parties after 2000. Luxembourg parties for the 2004 elections, and Dutch parties for the elections of 2006. The general estimate for those missing values is the most recent prior score for that party. The necessary exceptions to that rule are determined as follows:

In addition to the Austrian missing values after 2002, there is a missing value for the BZÖ party that assumed the coalition role of the FPÖ after that party split up into two factions. Because the BZÖ was not formed until 2005 when the Jörg Haider faction of the FPÖ split from the main party to create the BZÖ, it had never produced a manifesto separate from that of the FPÖ. In this case, the left-right estimator for the BZÖ will be that of the FPÖ in 1999. This is done because the governing members of the FPÖ were seen to have betrayed the spirit of the FPÖ of 1999, and the BZÖ attempted to return to the message that had brought them success in that earlier election. The ‘straying’ of the FPÖ is also evident in the numbers. In 1999 it scored 25, but in 2002 it scored a 6.

The BZÖ part of the coalition that governed in 2006 will therefore be counted as 25. In terms of the hypothesis, this runs a greater danger of a type I error (a false positive), because the higher left-right score pulls the overall coalition rightward. Given that in 2006 (as in 2002 and 2004)
Austria was a brakeman, it supports the hypothesis. It, therefore, makes it more difficult to reject the hypothesis.

France also has missing data in terms of not having Jacques Chirac’s RPR party represented in the CMP data. The values for the RPR will be extrapolated from the later values of Jacques Chirac’s UMP party. Further, the 29 left-wing deputies from diverse political parties that supported the Jospin government in 1997 will be not be counted for weighing, given that they do not have a right-left score. Given that they represent 5% of the National Assembly (which is counted as 0.5 of the cohabited government) this is considered a marginal loss of accuracy.

France is also an exceptional case because it is a presidential system wherein the President has sweeping foreign policy powers. Sometimes, as was the case in 1997 and 1999, the party in power of the government and the party in the power of the Presidency are not the same and a situation called ‘cohabitation’ exists. In this case, the weight accorded to the President (using the values for his political party) will be 0.5 and the parties in the cabinet will, collectively, be accorded the other half. That second half will, however, be further weighed according to each party’s share of the seats controlled in the National Assembly.

What is surprising in the French data is that Chirac’s UMP (and, thus, the RPR as well) is considered a left-of-center party. The data assigns a right-left value of –8.5 in 2002 and –12 in 2007, indicating that the scoring of the manifestos of that party considers Jacques Chirac and the UMP to be somewhat left-wing when compared to international political parties’ standards. This is odd considering that Jacques Chirac and his parties have long been the standard bearers of the moderate French right.

For Ireland, a scoring for the Progressive Democrats’ (PD) manifestos are missing from the CMP data. As they were a small portion of the coalition with the Fianna Fáil governments of Bertie Ahern (numbering 4 out of 81 coalition deputies in 1997 and 1999, and 8 out of 89 in 2002, 2004 and 2006), they will not be accounted for.

With Italy, the missing data problem is greater, as the political party system shifts among groups of small, and frequently personal, parties. The four government parties in 1997 have not all been scored by the CMP data nor the ParlGov data. Thankfully, the ParlGov data scores the entire coalition at 2.6. The CMP data, on the other hand, only scores the senior part – the PDS (Democratic Party of the Left), and the FdV (Greens), leaving out the personal parties of Romano Prodi and Lamberto Dini. Regrettably, the weighed scores for the PDS and the FdV will have to suffice for drawing the coalition’s average score. For the government that held power in 2006 (the
second Prodi cabinet), there is similarly a large grouping if different political parties for which each have not been scored by the CMP data. Thankfully, many of the constituent parties of this coalition have been assigned the score of 17.1, which will be assigned to those coalition parties for which there is no separate score.

For the Netherlands in 2002, the LPF has not been scored by the CMP data. Because by the time the decision regarding Turkey was made the cabinet had fallen, and the LPF ministers were no longer in position, the LPF will not be taken into account when calculating the coalition government’s score.
APPENDIX C: DEMOGRAPHY

Because the Turkish populations in the EU-15 countries are very much seen as a factor in the decisions of member states with respect to Turkish membership in the EU, it has been necessary to estimate the Turkish populations in these countries. However, the legal integration (naturalization of citizenship) of the first generation and the coming of age of the second and third generations has made reporting on the numbers of people in the Turkish community very problematic. Different EU-members also have different means of conducting surveys, censuses, and registering their population with respect to identifying national or cultural identities. Eurostat, the Directorate-General of the European Commission for statistical information, does not report on the cultural or citizenship identities of second-generation immigrant populations. Other databases, such as that of the OECD, offer data on citizenship numbers (while omitting some countries and some years for other countries), but also no numbers on the second-generation or third-generation Turks.

Because it is of great interest to this research to have a decent estimate of Turkish populations, it is necessary to go to some lengths to generate numbers for the Turkish communities in each of the member-states. As arriving at the second-generation of Turks is difficult enough, only the number of first- and second-generation Turks will be counted as the Turkish community for each member state. This will, regrettably, underestimate the numbers in the Turkish communities in those countries with immigration going back the guest-worker programs in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Germany, Belgium, France, Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands.

The operational definition for first-generation Turkish immigrants, when compiling the data is ‘persons born in Turkey’, rather than Turkish citizens, because the latter number would exclude naturalized citizens of the member states. For the second-generation, the databases frequently refer to that number as the ‘second generation’, or to ‘ancestry’ or ‘children of parents born in Turkey’. Full year-on-year numbers of first and second-generation Turkish immigrants are available from statistical databases for Belgium (available from NPData), Denmark (StatBank), and the Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek). From Statistik Austria, the first-generation numbers are
available from between and including 2002-2011. The preceding (1995-2001) first-generation numbers are estimated by linear extrapolation. Official estimates for the second-generation Turks are available for 2001 and 2011. The remaining second generation numbers are estimated using interpolation and extrapolation of the ratio of second-generation over second and first generation numbers from those years (0.33 and 0.38, respectively) and then multiplied by the first-generation numbers.

The paragraphs below explain the estimation methods used to arrive at numbers for Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom. It also explains why the available numbers for Greece are inadequate for the analyses. Because each uses a different method to arrive at estimate numbers for the first- and, where applicable, second-generation Turkish immigrants it is worthwhile to take these numbers with some caution in terms of the comparative analyses in this research. They are nevertheless used because inaccuracies are unlikely to shift the numbers to the degree that they will be so dramatically off in the scale of national populations that they will significantly skew the results.

The aggregate estimates of Turkish populations, both in absolute and relative to member-state population, living in all the fifteen member states are gathered in Tables C.11 and C.12 at the end of this appendix.

Finland

The number of Turkish immigrants for Finland are estimated by an annual cumulative calculation of the net-migration from Turkey. This is an estimate, because it is assumed that the people immigrating from and emigrating to Turkey are, in fact, Turks. These numbers, from Tilastokeskus (Statistics Finland), start in 1987 when the net-migration is that of 20 people from Turkey into Finland (25 in, 5 out). In order to arrive at the second generation, these first-generation numbers are multiplied by the birth rate of children born to fathers (the amount of children born each year to male Turks/the amount of Turks in the population) derived from the French data )see below). These numbers are then cumulatively calculated per year. This makes the (hopefully not too heroic) assumption that Turkish males in Finland have the same birth rate as Turkish males in France (see below). This birth rate (average = 3.8%) is not too distant from the birth rate found for ‘Live-born children with foreign citizenship’ in Germany between 2007 and 2009 (3.3%), or that of ‘children
born to women born in Turkey’ over 1st generation population in Denmark in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 (3.4%). This suggests that the male 3.8% birth rate assumption is not outlandish.

**France**

For France, numbers of Turkish-born persons living in France are available from the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Économiques (INSEE) for 1999 and 2005-2007. This leaves the necessity for arriving at numbers for the second generation of Turks. Fortunately, year-on-year numbers on children born to people (men or women) who were born in Turkey are available. Therefore, the second generation is calculated by summing the year-on-year numbers of births to Turkish fathers. Because the first wave of immigration involved more men than women, and these men did have children during that period, the figure of children born to men born in Turkey is considered a preferable estimator than children born to women born in Turkey. These numbers are available starting in 1966, with the first figure being 88 births (as opposed to 63 born to women born in Turkey).

The sum of all the births to Turkish fathers in the year in question and all preceding years is considered the second generation of Turkish immigrants in any given year. The numbers generated by this method offer a ratio of second generation over first and second generation (1995: 0.40 – 2008: 0.45) that is very similar to that of Denmark (1995: 0.37 – 2008: 0.45) and the Netherlands (1995: 0.38 – 2008: 0.48), though higher than that of Belgium (1995: 0.1 – 2008: 0.26), possibly owing to Belgium’s moratorium on immigration for economic reasons in the 1980s. Using the method described, the numbers for the second generation of Turks in France are estimated as follows:

**Table C.1: Estimated Number of Second-generation Turkish Immigrants Living in France.**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99,588ε</td>
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<td>112,138ε</td>
<td>118,863ε</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>141,138ε</td>
<td>149,272ε</td>
<td>157,634ε</td>
<td>166,223ε</td>
<td>175,040ε</td>
<td>184,085ε</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Germany

For Germany, the Statistischen Bundesamt offers micro-census (survey) data estimates for the first and second generation for 2005-2009, from which the numbers for the preceding years have been extrapolated, offering the numbers in the Table C.2:

Table C.2: Estimated Number of First and Second-generation Turkish Immigrants in Germany.

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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>2,279,674ε</td>
<td>2,493,000</td>
<td>2,495,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Greece

The Turks living in Greece are of an entirely different sort than elsewhere in the EU-15 in that they are not immigrants. As a part of the former Ottoman Empire, Greece has many persons of Turkish identity living within its territory, despite a history of forced population movements in the early 20th century. Many of these are concentrated in Western Thrace, near the Turkish border, and on the Dodecanese islands. Due to fears of irredentism, the Greek government does not officially recognize Turks as a distinct identity, nor does it count ethnicities in its census. Further, the historical and present natures of the communities defy simple categorization, owing to the complication of definitions (Madianou, 2005).

Thus, estimates of the size of the Turkish minority vary significantly. As it is the largest concentration, many attempts at counting have focused on Western Thrace, where in 1990 between 120,000 and 130,000 were estimated in that region alone (Whitman, 1990). Estimates published in 1999 range from 80,000 to 120,000, with experts considering the lower range to be more accurate, and the Greek authorities and the Turkish community claiming more than 120,000 (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The decline may be due to official encouragement for ethnic Turks to relocate elsewhere in Greece, meaning that the decline in Western Thrace would be offset by growing numbers elsewhere.
The safest methodological policy is to omit Greece from analyses dealing with demographic data on their domestic Turkish population. This is especially the case with regard to migration politics, as the Greek Turks are not immigrants; they are the ‘leftovers’, as it were, of the Ottoman Empire.

Ireland

The Central Statistics Office Ireland does not record nationalities other than EU-members or Americans. Turks are not required to register themselves with the embassy upon arrival, and Embassy staff estimates to interviewed members of the Turkish community vary widely (between 650 according to the Embassy in 2006 to 2000-3000 according to the community (Lacey, 2007). According to Eurostat there were 645 Turks in Ireland as of 2009 and 710 in 2010. Presuming that these people probably did not all arrive in 2009 (according the immigration numbers, 72 arrived and 40 departed in 2008), these numbers will be extrapolated over the preceding years. Doing so has, in mathematical theory, the first Turks arriving in 2000. Because of the assumed late start-date of immigration of Turks to Ireland, no second-generation Turks are assumed.

Italy

Italy is another country with minimal records on its amount of Turkish immigrants. Eurostat and ISTAT, the Italian national statistics institute, report on Turkish citizens living in Italy for the years 1999-2009, but not the amount of people of Turkish birth or parentage. Because of this omission, it is necessary to make some estimate of the amount of Italian citizens of Turkish birth and their children. In order to estimate the number of Turks of non-Turkish citizenship living in Italy, to supplement the Turkish citizens living in Italy, several calculations must be made.

First, it is necessary to extrapolate the amount of Turkish citizens living in Italy from the years for which this information is available to the preceding years. According to the numbers available, there was a relatively steadily rate of growth of Turkish citizens living in Italy from 1999 to 2002. In 2003 that rate of growth accelerated dramatically, decreasing in the late 2000s, but still much higher than the prior years. Table C.3 offers the numbers and growth rates of Turks in Italy.
Table C.3: Turkish Citizens Living in Italy; Rate of Growth from the Preceding Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1999</th>
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<th>2001</th>
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<td>6,277</td>
<td>6,402</td>
<td>6,784</td>
<td>7,183</td>
<td>9,130</td>
<td>11,077</td>
<td>13,532</td>
<td>14,562</td>
<td>16,225</td>
<td>17,651</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td>6.2%ε</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is assumed that the years 1999-2002 represent a more likely picture of the migration flow of the preceding years. Therefore, these numbers will be used to extrapolate the numbers of Turkish citizens living in Italy in the preceding years. Doing this extrapolation figures that Turks began their migration to Italy in 1980.

Table C.4: Estimated number of Turkish citizens living in Italy in years prior to 1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 ε</td>
<td>307 ε</td>
<td>617 ε</td>
<td>927 ε</td>
<td>1237 ε</td>
<td>1547 ε</td>
<td>1857 ε</td>
<td>2167 ε</td>
<td>2477 ε</td>
<td>2787 ε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3097 ε</td>
<td>3407 ε</td>
<td>3717 ε</td>
<td>4027 ε</td>
<td>4337 ε</td>
<td>4647 ε</td>
<td>4957 ε</td>
<td>5267 ε</td>
<td>5577 ε</td>
<td>5887 ε</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, it is necessary to estimate the amount of Turks acquiring Italian citizenship. For 2008 and 2009, Eurostat reports 299 and 273 Turkish citizens acquiring Italian citizenship, respectively. Because 2008 and 2009 are too close together to establish a valid trend line, the assumption is made that the average between them is a constant for what they measure, rather than a point along a decreasing trend. Given that the number of Turkish citizens living in Italy increased significantly (by 8%), it is certainly not the case that there is an exodus of Turks from Italy.

Italian law specifies that a foreigner must live in Italy for ten years prior to an application for citizenship. Therefore, number of citizenship acquisitions (299+273) is divided by the amount of Turkish citizens living in Italy ten years prior (5,887+6,277). This offers a rate of 4.7%. This rate is applied to the Turkish citizens in all the years between 1980 and 2009. These numbers are added together to estimate the number of 1st generation Turkish immigrants receiving Italian citizenship ten years after arrival. E.g. 4.7% multiplied by the 307 estimated Turkish citizens who arrived in 1980, estimates that 14 Turks received for citizenship in 1990. Understandably, not all of the 307 Turks estimated to have arrived in 1980 would have been there the whole ten years, as there is also an outflow of Turkish citizens from Italy, but the ten-year residency period is also not the only road to citizenship.
The number of first-generation Italian citizens of Turkish birth for the years between 1995 and 2006 are, therefore, estimated as follows:

**Table C.5:** Estimated number of Italian citizens of Turkish birth living in Italy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>305ε</td>
<td>407ε</td>
<td>523ε</td>
<td>655ε</td>
<td>800ε</td>
<td>1,135ε</td>
<td>1,324ε</td>
<td>1,528ε</td>
<td>1,747ε</td>
<td>1,980ε</td>
<td>2,228ε</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because many of the second-generation of Turkish immigrants are presumed to remain Turkish citizens, and applying a birth rate to the estimated number of Italian citizens of Turkish birth yields negligible results, an estimate for the second generation will be omitted. Using the above estimations, the estimated population of persons with a Turkish identity, living in Italy, is in the table, below, together with the percentage of the overall Italian population. Checking this number with the single figure from the 2001 census shows the estimate for the 1st generation (persons born in Turkey) as underestimating the figure by 230 persons (a 3% error). Given that this discrepancy, over a total Italian population in 2001 of 57 million, is negligible, the single figure for 2001 will be corrected, but the numbers otherwise will remain as estimated.

**Table C.6:** Estimated number of people with a Turkish identity living in Italy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>5,262ε</td>
<td>5,674ε</td>
<td>6,100ε</td>
<td>6,541ε</td>
<td>7,077ε</td>
<td>7,362ε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>8,149 (7,919ε)</td>
<td>8,507ε</td>
<td>10,658ε</td>
<td>12,824ε</td>
<td>14,339ε</td>
<td>15,760ε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite inflating the citizenship numbers with the estimated numbers of Turks with Italian citizenship, by the above-explained method, the estimated number of Turks is still a very low percentage in comparison to those countries that are known to have attracted more Turkish immigration, such as Germany and Austria, (3% in 2006), the Netherlands and Belgium (2%, in 2006), or Denmark (1%). It should be mentioned, however, that the Turkish population in Italy is growing very rapidly. Note that these numbers do not take into consideration any rate of deaths.
Because of the recent arrival of the immigrants, and the strong tendency for immigrants to be young, few are assumed to have died.

**Luxembourg**

Yet another country with limited statistics on the Turkish community is Luxembourg. According to the Luxembourg decennial census of 2001, there were 290 people of Turkish birth living in Luxembourg, 207 of whom were Turkish citizens. According to the 1991 census there were 190 persons of Turkish citizenship living in Luxembourg. That census did not count people by country of birth. The results of the 2011 Census have not been published at the time of writing.

It is worthwhile to take some caution in extrapolating the change in numbers of Turkish citizens onto the numbers of 1st generation Turkish immigrants. The change in Turkish citizens from 1991 to 2001 (190-207) is minimal for a ten-year period. The numbers in other countries show that the numbers of Turkish citizens can remain roughly the same or even decline, while the 1st generation of Turkish immigrants grows, so long as naturalization of previously Turkish citizens exceeds the net-migration of Turkish citizens. This is, indeed, what happens during the period in question in the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium. Therefore, while there may be a minimal difference between the numbers of Turkish citizens in Luxembourg, this does not necessarily mean that the amount of citizens of Luxembourg born in Turkey is not increasing at a considerably greater rate. It is, therefore, deemed preferable to disregard the annualized rate of increase of the number of Turkish citizens between 1991 and 2001 (0.9%), for estimating the number of 1st generation Turkish immigrants.

Fortunately, Eurostat provides naturalization data and numbers on the inflow and outflow of Turkish citizens for 2002-2009 and 1999-2009 respectively. The naturalization numbers are supplemented for the years 1999-2001 with OECD data. These figures allow the number of Turkish citizens and Luxembourgers of Turkish birth to be calculated, understanding that there will be some discrepancy owing to complications of citizenship laws between Turkey and Luxembourg. For those years that net-migration and naturalization numbers are unavailable, a linear extrapolation

---

54 Acquiring citizenship in Luxembourg requires one to renounce one’s former citizenship, but that renunciation may not have to be recognized in Turkey. This discrepancy is probably diminished by the assumption that Naturalized Turkish Luxembourgers that have not renounced their Turkish citizenship in Turkey will not likely inform the Luxembourgeois census bureau that they are Turkish citizens.
from following four years is used, in order to estimate these figures. This process calculates and estimates the following numbers:

**Table C.7: Estimated Number of Persons of Turkish Birth Living in Luxembourg.**

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>201ε</td>
<td>210ε</td>
<td>220ε</td>
<td>231ε</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That, however, leaves the second generation of Turkish immigrants to be estimated. Because longer trends are unavailable, the ratios of first- to second-generation should not be assumed to be similar to that of Luxembourg’s neighbors. In fact, longer-term migration data is available for other nationalities, and these figures paint a certain picture. The striking amount of Portuguese immigrants arriving in the 1970s (5,783 by 1970; 29,309 by 1981, as opposed to persons from Asia; 579 by 1981, and 1,612 by 1991, of which only 190 were Turks), suggests that the Portuguese immigrant community, and to a lesser extend the Spanish (2,155 in 1970; 2,073 in 1981) fulfilled Luxembourg’s guest-worker needs, in contrast to that of neighboring Germany and the Netherlands, where Turks provided much more of the labor. Therefore, assuming few Turks arriving in the 1960s and the 1970s and only 190 by the end of the 1980s, it is safe to assume that the second generation is not very numerous.

With 190 Turkish citizens in Luxembourg in 1991, out of 1,612 from Asia overall, the starting number for calculating a growing second generation will be 70 (190/1,612 = 0.12; 0.12*579 = 70). Using the same birth rate found in France, that number offers an estimated second generation in the table below. A combined first and second generation Turkish population and percentage of the overall Luxembourg population also found in Table C.8 below.
Table C.8: Estimated number of people with a Turkish identity living in Luxembourg.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86ε</td>
<td>94ε</td>
<td>102ε</td>
<td>111ε</td>
<td>121ε</td>
<td>131ε</td>
<td>142ε</td>
<td>153ε</td>
<td>166ε</td>
<td>179ε</td>
<td>193ε</td>
<td>208ε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>287ε</td>
<td>304ε</td>
<td>322ε</td>
<td>342ε</td>
<td>367ε</td>
<td>402ε</td>
<td>432ε</td>
<td>453ε</td>
<td>495ε</td>
<td>529ε</td>
<td>568ε</td>
<td>583ε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.07%ε</td>
<td>.07%ε</td>
<td>.08%ε</td>
<td>.08%ε</td>
<td>.09%ε</td>
<td>.09%ε</td>
<td>.10%ε</td>
<td>.10%ε</td>
<td>.11%ε</td>
<td>.12%ε</td>
<td>.12%ε</td>
<td>.12%ε</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the addition of the expected second-generation Turkish immigrants, the number of people with a Turkish background in Luxembourg is still very modest, even in comparison to Luxembourg’s small population size. Like Italy, the above numbers do not take deaths into account, for the same reason.

Spain

For Spain, Eurostat reports both persons by country of birth (1999-2010) and by citizenship (1998-2010) for people from Turkey. Given that Spain has not been a country where significant numbers of Turks have migrated to for many decades, it is assumed that there is no need to pursue figures for a second generation of Turkish immigrants to Spain. In the numbers, however, there is an odd discrepancy, with more Turkish citizens than persons born in Turkey being reported in 2001. Barring the possibility that several hundred persons born in Spain, having acquired Turkish citizenship, re-emigrated to Spain in 2001 and swiftly departed the following year, it is presumed that these numbers were transposed. As such, these numbers will be substituted, and the number of persons born in Turkey will be used in the analyses of this research. Numbers for the years prior to 1999 will be extrapolated from the available data, though the negative number that this method provides for 1995 will be discarded.

Portugal

Portugal is a country of few Turks. Eurostat reports numbers of Turkish citizens for the years 1998-2003 and 2007-2010. Turkish-born persons residing in Portugal are counted for 2002 and 2009, with those numbers only 5 and 10 greater than the amounts of Turkish citizens for those years,
respectively. This indicates that very few of the very few persons born in Turkey living in Portugal adopt Portuguese citizenship. The gaps will be filled by interpolation and extrapolation, but given how few numbers of these persons there are in Portugal the numbers essentially shrink to all-but-nothing in comparison to the Portuguese population.

Sweden

The Turkish population of Sweden is another number that will require some estimation to approximate. In contrast to Luxembourg, there is more information available. The number of persons living in Sweden born in Turkey is available from 1999 from the Statistiska centralbyråns and the OECD. The numbers for the preceding years can be extrapolated. However, unlike Luxembourg and Italy, Sweden is a country that enjoyed many Turkish guest-workers in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, it also has a substantial population of second-generation Turkish immigrants.

Westin (2003, p. 990) reports that in 2000, 44% of Turks living in Sweden were born in Sweden. That is a ratio very comparable to those of the Netherlands and Denmark, though over the course of the late 1990s and 2000s, those ratios of the second-generation to overall Turkish population increased steadily by, on average 0.65 percentage points per year. This increase will be applied to the Swedish ratio of second generation to overall population in order to estimate the second-generation population for the years in question. These numbers – percentage and estimated second-generation populations – are given in the table below:

Table C.9: Estimated number of second-generation Turkish persons in Sweden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>40.7%ε</td>
<td>41.4%ε</td>
<td>42.0%ε</td>
<td>42.7%ε</td>
<td>43.3%ε</td>
<td>44.0%ε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>26,499ε</td>
<td>27,495ε</td>
<td>28,491ε</td>
<td>29,487ε</td>
<td>31,409</td>
<td>31,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>18,219ε</td>
<td>19,420ε</td>
<td>20,670ε</td>
<td>21,971ε</td>
<td>24,033ε</td>
<td>25,060ε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>44.7%ε</td>
<td>45.3%ε</td>
<td>46.0%ε</td>
<td>46.6%ε</td>
<td>47.3%ε</td>
<td>47.9%ε</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>32,453</td>
<td>33,094</td>
<td>34,083</td>
<td>34,965</td>
<td>35,853</td>
<td>37,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>26,181ε</td>
<td>27,410ε</td>
<td>28,981ε</td>
<td>30,520ε</td>
<td>32,125ε</td>
<td>34,128ε</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**United Kingdom**

As immigrants from Turkey are only a small subset of total immigration into the United Kingdom, reporting on persons born in Turkey (and Turkish citizens) in the UK is sporadic in the data available from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), Eurostat and the OECD. There are, however, enough numbers for persons born in Turkey to make reasonable extrapolations and interpolations. Though the United Kingdom did not bring Turks into its borders through guest-worker programs, the UK nevertheless had a 1960s influx of Turks from Cyprus. This influx increased in the 1970s and 1980s following the violent events on the island, and the economic isolation of Northern Cyprus after the Turkish invasion of 1974. These Turkish Cypriots afterwards invited mainland Turks to Britain as guest workers, thus acting in a similar manner as the official guest-worker programs of the northwestern European countries.

As such, the Turkish community is long-standing in a similar manner as the countries with Turkish guest workers, and second-generation Turkish immigrants are assumed to be present. Their numbers will be estimated in the same manner as was done for the second generation of Turks in Sweden, estimating by way of a multiplier derived from a presumed share of the second generation out of the whole. Because the mass migration began in the 1960, in the same way as that for Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, a ratio taken from the average of those countries (44.1%) will be applied to the persons born in Turkey, with the same rate of increase of that ratio applied over the span of years in question, centered on 2002. This produces the following numbers in the same format as for Sweden, above:

**Table C.10: Estimated percentage of second-generation Turks in the UK**

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39,238</td>
<td>41,976</td>
<td>44,713</td>
<td>45,448</td>
<td>50,927</td>
<td>49,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25,649</td>
<td>28,195</td>
<td>30,857</td>
<td>32,219</td>
<td>37,083</td>
<td>36,834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55,664</td>
<td>58,401</td>
<td>69,876</td>
<td>61,343</td>
<td>66,614</td>
<td>74,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42,748</td>
<td>46,054</td>
<td>56,576</td>
<td>50,992</td>
<td>56,846</td>
<td>64,826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Following the methods of calculation and estimation above, the populations of Turks among the EU-15 member countries, except for Greece, are as follows:

**Table C.11:** Estimated number of first and second-generation Turks in the EU-15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>179,000</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>217,000</td>
<td>235,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>146,000</td>
<td>161,000</td>
<td>177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>52,000</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>302,000</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>381,000</td>
<td>413,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,573,000</td>
<td>2,543,000</td>
<td>2,422,000</td>
<td>2,280,000</td>
<td>2,495,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>331,000</td>
<td>352,000</td>
<td>364,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>71,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>76,000</td>
<td>88,000</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>112,000</td>
<td>139,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table C.12:** Estimated percentage of first and second-generation Turks in the EU-15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
<td>2.24%</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
<td>2.66%</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
<td>1.23%</td>
<td>1.42%</td>
<td>1.55%</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.82%</td>
<td>0.88%</td>
<td>0.97%</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
<td>1.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.06%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>0.12%</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
<td>0.57%</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
<td>2.94%</td>
<td>2.76%</td>
<td>3.03%</td>
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