Norton, JD
(2011)
Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory.
In:
Philosophy of Statistics.
UNSPECIFIED, 391 - 439.
ISBN 9780444518620
Abstract
Proponents of Bayesian confirmation theory believe that they have the solution to a significant, recalcitrant problem in philosophy of science. It is the identification of the logic that governs its inductive bearing in science. The core ideas shared by all versions of Bayesian confirmation theory are, at a good first approximation, that a scientist's beliefs are or should conform to a probability measure; and that the incorporation of new evidence is through conditionalization using Bayes' theorem. The theory reduces the often-nebulous notion of logic of induction to a single, unambiguous calculus, the probability calculus. Second, the theory has proven to be spacious, with a remarkable ability to absorb, systematize and vindicate what elsewhere appear as independent evidential truisms. Third is its most important virtue, an assurance of consistency. The challenge to a Bayesian analysis is to find a way of capturing these last informal thoughts in a more precise analysis. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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