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Cosmic confusions: Not supporting versus supporting not

Norton, JD (2010) Cosmic confusions: Not supporting versus supporting not. Philosophy of Science, 77 (4). 501 - 523. ISSN 0031-8248

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Abstract

Bayesian probabilistic explication of inductive inference conflates neutrality of supporting evidence for some hypothesis H ("not supporting H") with disfavoring evidence ("supporting not-H"). This expressive inadequacy leads to spurious results that are artifacts of a poor choice of inductive logic. I illustrate how such artifacts have arisen in simple inductive inferences in cosmology. In the inductive disjunctive fallacy, neutral support for many possibilities is spuriously converted into strong support for their disjunction. The Bayesian "doomsday argument" is shown to rely entirely on a similar artifact. Copyright 2010 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.


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Details

Item Type: Article
Status: Published
Creators/Authors:
CreatorsEmailPitt UsernameORCID
Norton, JDjdnorton@pitt.eduJDNORTON
Centers: University Centers > Center for Philosophy of Science
Date: 1 January 2010
Date Type: Publication
Access Restriction: No restriction; Release the ETD for access worldwide immediately.
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophy of Science
Volume: 77
Number: 4
Page Range: 501 - 523
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1086/661504
Institution: University of Pittsburgh
Schools and Programs: Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > History and Philosophy of Science
Refereed: Yes
ISSN: 0031-8248
Date Deposited: 12 Jul 2012 14:18
Last Modified: 02 Feb 2019 15:56
URI: http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12546

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