*OVER*POPULATION OR *OVER* POPULATION?
A BURKEAN ANALYSIS OF TRANSFORMATIONS AND CONTINUITIES IN THE RHETORIC OF "HUMAN POPULATION GROWTH" AT THE UNITED NATIONS (1974-2004)

by

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Despite the prominence of the issue across time, scholarly accounts of population rhetoric remain limited. Those analyses that do respond to this current of public argument focus overwhelmingly on actors such as Paul Ehrlich and R. Thomas Malthus, and on extreme instantiations of population rhetoric and policy, such as eugenics and China's one-child policy. Missing in this body of scholarship is a sustained treatment of population rhetoric on a global stage, as it has occurred at United Nations conferences for over 30 years. This under-appreciated body of texts yields a global vision of population. Beyond the reductionist approaches to population that draw scorn from scholars, activists, and policymakers alike, the consensus documents produced at Bucharest (1974), Mexico City (1984), Cairo (1994), and the follow-ups to Cairo (1999 and 2004) take into consideration the complex web of factors that feed into population and that are fed by population. By employing a model of rhetorical criticism that focuses on a "close reading" of the final consensus documents produced by each conference, this study charts both the transformations of public argument across time while also paying special attention to the continuities in these texts. This project aims to benefit multiple scholarly communities, including environmental studies, international relations, public argument, and rhetorical theory and criticism, as well as to policymakers, NGOs, and activists focused on population issues. I consider whether it is meaningful to continue to talk about "population" as an issue separate from a web of interconnected factors, and whether we are in fact beyond discussions of

*over*population to the point where we have moved past and are thus *over* population. Alongside this topical question, this project opens the conversation as to whether UN conference documents, and related documents, constitute a unique rhetorical genre, and if so, what some characteristics of this genre might be.

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PREFACE

Individual successes are almost always the result of the support, encouragement, and efforts of countless others, and this project is no exception. It has been a grueling seven years since arriving on Pitt's campus, but through all the highs and lows, an incredible set of family, friends, and mentors has helped me to reach the finish line.

I first want to thank my advisor, Gordon Mitchell, for his support, encouragement, and belief in my abilities. Thanks also to John Lyne, Lara Putnam, and Barbara Warnick, for their excellent involvement and engagement with my scholarship-in-progress, and for Lyne and Warnick, for helping me to develop and hone, in the context of the Rhetorical Process class, my skills as a teacher. Thanks also to the rest of the department's faculty, and to outstanding individuals including Mary Hamler, Brandi McClain, and Peg Chalus, without whose dedication and efforts behind the scenes none of us would be able to succeed.

Thanks to my family, who showed patience as my doctoral efforts stretched across a longer than expected period of time, and never wavered in their support, doing everything in their power to make this achievement possible. Given my more extensive thanks in my MA thesis acknowledgments, I feel that just about anything that I could include here would merely be repetition. This moment represents the culmination of a long educational journey, and I know that it is only because of your encouragement, from elementary school to graduate school, that I

was able to develop a love for learning and teaching, and that I found the drive and belief to achieve my educational goals. And again, though not family, the amazing mentorship of Anne Sullivan, Karla Leeper, Matt Gerber, and Martin Medhurst will never be forgotten, as each of them changed my life in profoundly positive ways.

While it will be impossible to name them all, thank you to all of our Pitt graduate students. When I made my initial visit to Pitt while considering where I wanted to go for doctoral work, the graduate students explained to me what amazing solidarity the students had, and my time in the program continually affirmed that claim. I look forward to continuing to work with these colleagues and friends throughout my time in the academy. Thanks in particular to Damien Pfister and Carly Woods, who welcomed me and hosted me during my initial visit, and provided incredible support throughout the entire process, to Autumn Boyer, with whom I had the good fortune to grow and develop as a teacher as her fellow TA in Rhetorical Process and continued to grow as a friend afterward, as well as to Joe Sery, Takuzo Konishi, Steve Llano, Kelly Congdon, and Cate Morrison. Special thanks to John Rief, whose incredible support as friend, fellow graduate student and debate coach, and willingness to put up with all the rants and highs and lows is truly appreciated. While he was not a Pitt graduate student, I also want to thank Dave Cisneros, who has remained an amazing friend and colleague ever since our days as graduate students and debate coaches at Baylor. Also thanks to Kevin and Danielle Bowers, who were pillars of support while in Pittsburgh, and remain so today.

Finally, I would like to thank everyone at James Madison University for supporting me these last three years as I arrived and pushed to finish my degree while fulfilling the expectations of my faculty appointment at my new home. Everyone in my school and college showed continual support, demonstrating that they cared without making me feel pressure to finish

before I was able. The university as a whole also provided amazing support, especially the programs facilitated by the Center for Faculty Innovation. Without their writing “lockdowns” prior to and during this past spring semester, I would not have been able to summon the last burst of energy to finish.

Again, I wish I could provide more individual thanks, but I hope that all of you will know how none of this would have ever been possible without you!

1.0 POPULATION AS PUBLIC ARGUMENT

I wish I could offer you some sugarcoated solutions, but I'm afraid the time for them is long gone. A cancer is an uncontrolled multiplication of cells; the population explosion is an uncontrolled multiplication of people. Treating only the symptoms of cancer may make the victim more comfortable at first, but eventually he dies—often horribly. A similar fate awaits our world with a population explosion if only the symptoms are treated. We must shift our efforts from treatment of the symptoms to the cutting out of the cancer. The operation will demand many apparently brutal and heartless decisions. The pain may be intense. But the disease is so far advanced that only with radical surgery does the patient have a chance of survival.[1]

-Dr. Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (1968)

The Cairo Programme of Action helped governments to move away from a narrow focus on family planning to a new concept of sexual and reproductive health throughout the life cycle. The Cairo agenda changed the international debate about population from human numbers to human beings. It put the focus squarely where it should be—on improving human lives. Investing in individuals, broadening their opportunities and enabling them to realize their potential as human beings is the key to sustained economic growth and sustainable human development.[2]

- Thoraya Obaid, Executive Director, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (2004)

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[1] Paul R. Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968), 166-67. After much deliberation, I decided not to insert *(sic)* or place problematic terminology under erasure, including gendered language, as well as language describing developing countries that is not universally accepted. As a rhetorician, I cannot dismiss these concerns as being "just words." Instead, I trust in the reader to engage the text actively on these questions, knowing that I do not personally endorse such language myself, but have no interest to "scar" (or, in the words of Kenneth Burke, "inflict symbolic wounds" on) the original text to prove it beyond the shadow of a doubt.

[2] Thoraya Obaid, "Opening Statement at the European Population Forum," *ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms Cairo. Official Outcomes of the ICPD at Ten Review* (New York: UNFPA, 2005), 31.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Ever since Thomas Robert Malthus' famous 1798 publication, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, human population growth has been an enduring topic of political controversy, yet its political framing has varied considerably.[3] Particularly (though not exclusively) in the United States (US) and other developed countries, Paul Ehrlich's 1968 *The Population Bomb* generated significant anxiety and concern about the growth of human population worldwide and accompanying questions relating to consumption patterns.[4] However, in the 1970s and 1980s, population lost steam in public arguments about environmental quality and international relations. As one body of population experts noted in the early 1990s: "Over the past two decades, a mix of national and international complacency in regard to the urgency of population issues had resulted in millions of unwanted births in many developing countries, threatening to

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[3] Thomas Robert Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society. With Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers* (London: printed for J. Johnson, 1798).

[4] I focus primarily on Paul Ehrlich in this section. However, this choice raises two problems. First, while I suspect that Ehrlich had an international influence (rather than merely in the US or in the "developed West,") there are not definitive bodies of literature that attest to such influence. Second, any attempt to draw an overarching history of population rhetoric in the Twentieth Century is somewhat arbitrary, as the web of influencing texts makes defining a particular "starting" or "defining" moment incredibly difficult. In an attempt to combine both of these issues, I do point to another text, published in the 1940s, that both predicts and prefigures many of Ehrlich's claims, and is also documented as an "international bestseller":

> William Vogt, director of the conservation section of the Pan American Union and later research director at Planned Parenthood of America, articulated this relationship between overpopulation and environmental disaster in his influential *Road to Survival*, published in 1948. Vogt framed his neo-Malthusian argument around the environmental consequences of global overpopulation. He warned that without addressing the problem of overpopulation, international peace was impossible and that the world would face environmental disaster on an unprecedented scale. Translated into nine languages, *Road to Survival* became an international best seller.

Donald T. Critchlow, "Editor's Note," *Journal of Policy History* 12, no. 1 (2000): v. For a feminist critique of the classic "Environmental Impact=Population x Affluence (Consumption) x Technology," utilized by Ehrlich and many other demographers and population writers, see H. Patricia Hynes, "Taking Population out of the Equation: Reformulating I=PAT," in *Dangerous Intersections: Feminist Perspectives on Population, Environment, and Development*, ed. Jael Silliman and Ynestra King (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1999), 39-73.

overtake their hope of achieving sustainable development and alleviating poverty."[5] While a number of explanations for complacency could be furnished, a few in particular stand out. First, and in particular with regard to developed countries such as the US, the apocalyptic scenarios envisioned by Malthus and Ehrlich seemed to have been proven false, draining urgency from the policy issue.[6] Second, the ways in which (over)population rhetoric had typically been framed made it easily susceptible to misanthropic and patriarchal agendas.[7] Third, and especially (though not exclusively) in developing countries, the interplay among the Catholic Church, third

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[5] United Nations Expert Group on Population Policies and Programmes, "Recommendations of the Expert Group Meeting on Population Policies and Programmes," United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/recommendations/expert/5.html (accessed September 7, 2008). Rhetorically, the notion of "unwanted births" may create additional fodder for those skeptical or critical of a pro-family planning worldview. In the debates leading up to the 2008 presidential election in the United States, then presidential candidate Barack Obama chose the term "unintended" rather than "unwanted," but it is unclear whether that shift did more to satisfy those holding a conservative outlook on population issues.

[6] For an analysis of Paul Ehrlich's rhetorical strategy, see Craig Waddell, "Perils of a Modern Cassandra: Rhetorical Aspects of Public Indifference to the Population Explosion," *Social Epistemology* 8, no. 3 (July 1994): 221-237. For Ehrlich's response to Waddell's essay, see Paul Ehrlich, "Perils of a Modern Cassandra: Some Personal Comments," *Social Epistemology* 8, no. 3 (July 1994): 239-240. Waddell traces a problem with Ehrlich's rhetoric in *The Population Bomb* that is separate from the apocalyptic quality as well as its potentially misanthropic implications. He argues that one reason for Ehrlich's rhetorical failure is that, from the outset, he attacks, rather than endears himself to, his audience, suggesting that his entire point might end up falling on deaf ears. Ehrlich, in his response, concedes the "ambivalence" in the reception to his book, noting that we still have far to go on the population issue, but also suggests reasons why his book was likely helpful in moving in the right direction. Ehrlich, "Personal Comments," 239.

[7] For historical work that traces the longer trajectory of issues of reproduction and how it has been configured as problem, see Betsy Hartmann, *Reproductive Rights and Wrongs: The Global Politics of Population Control & Contraceptive Choice* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987); Adele Clarke, *Disciplining Reproduction: Modernity, American Life Sciences, and "The Problems of Sex"* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998); Lisa Forman Cody, *Birthing the Nation: Sex, Science, and the Conception of Eighteenth-Century Britons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Mary Elizabeth Fissell, *Vernacular Bodies: The Politics of Reproduction in Early Modern England* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Rebecca Kukla, *Mass Hysteria: Medicine, Culture, and Mothers' Bodies* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). I use the term "(over)population" for two primary reasons: following the dissertation title, I use this neologism to open space for the multiple meanings of *over* in relation to population, and second, in the public argument regarding population, the question of whether we are, or will become overpopulated represents a central point of stasis. Also, unfortunately, in many ways, "misanthropy" is an incomplete identifier for this aspect of my account. Misanthropy suggests being against all humans, when in fact, much of the historical argument on population is directed against particular groups of humans—for instance, women, people in developing countries, the poor, racial and ethnic minorities, and "others"—rather than the entirety of the human race.

world nationalism, and religious conservatism combined to exert a powerful strain of pronatalism, thus crowding out space for rhetoric that would seek to manage population growth.

In my dissertation, I analyze thirty years (1974-2004) of international, United Nations (UN)-sponsored public argument on population. While scholars have treated Cold War-era population discourses, in both the US and the international arena, Cairo was proclaimed to be a watershed rhetorical event in the post-Cold War context. Building on the 1992 Rio Conference (known formally as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development) that popularized the phrase "sustainable development" to describe a newly articulated synergy between environmental protection and economic development, scholars, activists, and participants alike have claimed that Cairo substantially redefined the issue of population. They argue that, rather than focusing primarily on quantitative projections and apocalyptic predictions, Cairo focused instead on qualitative, social criteria for understanding the contours of the policy arguments surrounding population. If "sustainable development" had been the lasting mark left by Rio, these advocates proclaim "reproductive health" and "reproductive rights" to be the legacies of Cairo.[8]

This introductory chapter frames my study of public argument on population growth in the following steps. First, I review extant scholarly work on the population issue. Second, I establish the mode of investigation by which I perform my study. Finally, I preview the artifacts

[8] As indicated later this chapter, in the discussion of the texts that I analyze in this project, as well as in chapter five, in the discussion of future research trajectories, my goal in this project is not to perform a close textual analysis on the claims of these pundits alongside my close read of each conference text. Instead, I focus my energy in this dissertation on the latter, which is in and of itself a formidable task. I believe that the claims that I do cite from pundits are sufficient for identifying the goal posts- whether or not these texts actually indicate a radical shift from the 1974 and 1984 texts during the 1994 conference. As future research, however, I believe that a more sustained treatment of the rhetoric of these critics, activists, and pundits would be valuable, especially in providing more text from which we may discern motives for why they are so keen on drawing such a sharp distinction.

and case studies that support this project, providing research questions and the organizing structure that frames the inquiry in the following pages.

1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

1.2.1 Population as a Policy Issue

As previewed previously, three primary sets of factors haunted the issue of (over)population in the period leading up to Cairo, especially though certainly not exclusively in the US.[9] First, the early advocates of overpopulation theory, including Ehrlich and even Malthus, made such dire predictions that, when such prophecies proved to be (at least in some senses) incorrect, many audiences began to discount the population issue's general policy relevance. Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* is a rhetorical exemplar of the potential pitfalls associated with making specific, short-term, alarmist predictions that do not stand up in the court of history.[10] In that work, Ehrlich predicted that the 1970s would be the pivotal decade wherein millions of people would die and countless others would suffer because of the world's rapidly growing population. When the '70s came and went without the apocalyptic results he had suggested, many people felt as though he had "cried wolf" and were reluctant to believe him or others that there was a

[9] The disappearance of population rhetoric in the US has been particularly vivid: “The years surrounding 1970 marked the coming of age of the modern environmental movement. As that movement enters its fourth decade, perhaps the most striking change is the virtual abandonment by national environmental groups of U.S. population stabilization as an actively pursued goal.” Roy Howard Beck and Leon J. Kolankiewicz, "The Environmental Movement's Retreat from Advocating U.S. Population Stabilization (1970-1998): A First Draft of History," *Journal of Policy History* 12, no. 1 (2000): 123, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_policy_history/v012/12.1beck.html (Accessed September 5, 2008).

[10] Ehrlich, *The Population Bomb*. To be fair, Ehrlich and others have advanced the claim that it was precisely because he and others sounded the alarm that the worst-case scenarios did not occur.

population problem. In fact, pointing to the declining fertility rates in Western Europe (for instance, in France), commentators now argue that we are at risk of not even achieving replacement fertility rates. For them, if there is a "population" problem, it is that we need to stimulate reproduction levels (at least in key countries), and certainly not that we are spiraling upward in numbers.[11] Garrett Hardin, author of the famous essay on the "tragedy of the commons," marshals a rhetorical critique of Ehrlich's choice to adopt Hugh Moore's phrase "the population bomb" that helps us to see what one of the main issues might in fact have been. While Hardin shares Ehrlich's views of the serious problems generated by human overpopulation, he explains, "the title of Ehrlich's book does get one's attention, but the image of a bomb is arguably too vivid. It suggests a sudden, critical, explosive event—an event that is (for better or worse) soon over. But the growth of population is chronic, slow (by the standards of news media), and (apparently) never-stopping. Population growth is not a crisis but a crunch."[12] Therefore, the early framing of (over)population as apocalyptic crisis left many people, especially in the US and other developed countries, skeptical as to whether any problem existed at all.[13]

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[11] These differential accounts of the nature of a "population" problem, with many countries sensing overpopulation, while a number of others expressing concern about underpopulation, suggest that even defining "population" or "(over)population" requires a geographic and geopolitical awareness that can address the nuances between the situations, for instance, in Western Europe on the one hand and Africa on the other.

[12] Garrett Hardin, *Living within Limits: Ecology, Economics, and Population Taboos* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 248. Despite Hardin's concerns with Ehrlich's metaphor of the bomb, Hardin represents a modern day Malthusian in his insistence of the problems of overpopulation, and his insistence that the population agenda be addressed, even if it appears misanthropic (for instance, in arguments that advocate restricting immigration as a means of addressing population issues).

[13] While many voices outside the disciplinary domain of demography have arisen against the most heavily quantitative of approaches to understanding "population" and "populations," some elements of the demographic community, especially in interdisciplinary forums, have begun to recognize, explicitly, the status of such quantitative discourse, and to begin to challenge it. See, for instance, Simon Szreter, Hania Sholkamy, and A. Dharmalingam, eds., *Categories and Contexts: Anthropological and Historical Studies in Critical Demography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

The second overarching reason for the "stalling out" of the population issue prior to Cairo is that traditional (over)population arguments have raised uncomfortable questions that could quickly become misanthropic and even anti-anthropic in nature. Even in the days of Malthus, the poor were configured as a "problem." Since then, developing countries, racial and ethnic minorities, and women have all been cast as "problems" or "objects" to be manipulated in order to fix global population growth.[14] Synthesizing the combined implications of all of these moments of misanthropy, Ronald Walter Greene notes:

> Malthus continues to haunt our future as the principle of population continues to define who we are in the present. The governing of procreation through the building of the population apparatus functions as an "othering machine" that differentiates each one of us around the norms and social categories of modern, healthy, and white. While contributing to the differentiation of populations by allowing the act of reproduction to function as a form of cultural distinction, the population apparatus also territorializes us into a geography of scarcity. In order

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[14] For instance, in 1996 a conflict broke out within the ranks of the Sierra Club over whether or not to take a stance on (im)migration policy as a component of its concern about population issues. A number of Sierra Club activists wanted to include statements to the effect that a lack of control over (im)migration risks amplifying environmental degradation generally and population growth specifically. However, dissent emerged around the issue of whether the Sierra Club wanted to join the philosophical ranks with a largely xenophobic anti-immigration movement in the United States. Ultimately, the Sierra Club decided not to include statements about (im)migration in its policy positions. See John A. Baden and Douglas S. Noonan, "Migrating Species," *National Review* 49, no. 11 (June 16, 1997): 40-42, EBSCOhost Database (accessed September 5, 2008). Similarly, Garrett Hardin argues forcefully that emphasizing global solutions to the issue of (over)population cannot come at the expense of refusing to take a stand on vexing social questions like immigration policy. See his *Living within Limits*. I use the phrasing "(im)migration," rather than "immigration," to reflect Kent Ono and John Sloop's critique of the term:

> Throughout this book, we use migration to refer to migration generally and use "immigration" and "emigration" only to register their appearance in the discourse we examined. We prefer "migration" because "immigration" and "emigration" tend to imply the narcissistic view of the already-landed citizen. These terms make sense in a logic system that privileges the perspective of the destination to which one is coming and from which one is leaving.

Kent Ono and John Sloop, *Shifting Borders: Rhetoric, Immigration, and California's Proposition 187* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2002), 185.

> to generate forms of mobility that promise an escape from this geography of scarcity, the population apparatus offers the government of our reproductive behaviors. The danger made possible by the population apparatus is that this very promise of mobility works to reproduce the “satanic geography” of a Malthusian world by coding some populations as worthy of prosperity while pushing others into ever more brutal forms of scarcity with nothing more than a contraceptive.[15]

Third, the Catholic Church, third world nationalism, and religious conservatism have combined to form a strong pronatalist sentiment that makes any public argument over population difficult if not impossible. Uniting these factors is a strong negative reaction and opposition to condoms and birth control and family planning techniques and technologies, and a related, strongly pronatalist worldview. Generally, such a position also draws upon a conservative understanding of gender roles that would seek to confine, rather than expand, rights and opportunities for girls and women. One area of overlap between the US and international factors in this area can be found in what is popularly referred to as the "gag rule," first instituted during Ronald Reagan's presidency. This policy appeased the Catholic Church and religious conservatives, particularly in the US, by refusing to provide any US monetary assistance to organizations that provided information about or abortion services.

The history of public argument on (over)population, in terms of the false doomsaying and the accompanying misanthropy and logics of otherization, as well as the united coalitions opposing birth control and women's rights internationally, produces a number of possible

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[15] Ronald Walter Greene, *Malthusian Worlds: U.S. Leadership and the Governing of the Population Crisis* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 243.

trajectories.[16] One is to dismiss the issue altogether, both as a fraud and as a dangerous tool for subjugating particular populations. In Kenneth Burke's terms, this approach would represent the expression of a deeply tragic frame. As he explains, we can understand the difference in emphasis by whether the other person is labeled as a villain or as merely mistaken:

> Hence, it is an act for you to attempt changing your attitudes, or the attitudes of others. Our philosophers, poets, and scientists act in the code of names by which they simplify or interpret reality. These names shape our relations with our fellows. They prepare us *for* some functions and *against* others, *for* or *against* the persons representing these functions. The names go further: they suggest *how* you shall be for or against. Call a man a villain, and you have the choice of either attacking or cringing. Call him mistaken, and you invite yourself to attempt setting him right. Contemporary exasperations make us prefer the tragic (sometimes melodramatic) names of "villain" and "hero" to the comic names of "tricked" and "intelligent." The choice must be weighed with reference to the results we would obtain, and to the resistances involved.[17]

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[16] While Microsoft Word does not recognize the term "otherization," it has become a term of art, not only in academic circles, but for international relations practitioners as well:

> "We've really started to knock down that sense of otherization," said Rashad Hussain, a White House lawyer who also serves as liaison to the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Hussain defined the rather esoteric term "otherization" as a sense that many Muslims had during the Bush years that their value or danger to society was viewed solely through the prism of terrorism.

Josh Gerstein, "Aide: Obama Fighting Muslims' 'Otherization'," Politico (April 28, 2010), http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0410/Aide_Obama_fighting_Muslims_otherization.html (accessed July 24, 2010).

[17] Kenneth Burke, *Attitudes toward History*, 3rd Ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), 4-5.

Following Tarla Rai Peterson, I prefer to think about comic perspectives that might enable (over)population rhetoric to be something other than it has been in the past.[18] This view recasts Ehrlich and Malthus' ill-fated predictions of doom, along with the coalition of international opposition to family planning and birth control, as constraints contributing to the "rhetorical situation" that invited response by the international community, and more specifically, the UN.[19] Such a frame enables a rhetorical appreciation of the set of public arguments surrounding population, one that foregrounds the contingent nature of rhetorical action—its potential to change that which may seem static or ossified from a tragic perspective.

If one takes the path of contingency, aware of Aristotle's understanding of rhetoric as the realm of that which could be otherwise, it becomes appropriate to evaluate the rhetorical action taken at Cairo, in order to analyze whether it was, in the words of Lloyd Bitzer, a "fitting response" to the rhetorical exigence.[20] Catherine S. Pierce, in writing on the significance of the Cairo conference, argues, "one of the key features of the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), which was held September 1994 in Cairo,

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[18] Tarla Rai Peterson, *Sharing the Earth: The Rhetoric of Sustainable Development* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997). In particular, she argues for a comic, rather than tragic, framing/reading of the history of "sustainable development" as a concept. I contextualize her effort as part of a larger critical approach that attempts to transcend a strand of critical practice that might be described as "debunking" or the "hermeneutics of suspicion." See Paul Schiff Berman, "Telling a Less Suspicious Story: Notes toward a Non-Skeptical Approach to Legal/Cultural Analysis," *Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities* 13 (2001): 95-139, Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 6, 2008); Timothy Bewes, *Cynicism and Postmodernity* (London: Verso, 1997); Kenneth Burke, *Counter-Statement* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968): vii-viii; ———, *Attitudes toward History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984): 166-175; ———, *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973): 168-190.

[19] Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 1, no. 1 (1968): 1-14. While I have some reservations about Bitzer's framework, I believe that the vocabulary he introduces with regard to the rhetorical situation is useful in understanding the challenge faced at these conferences.

[20] Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, I. 1357a12. This framing of the realm of rhetoric is also consistent with John Poulakos' sophistic definition of rhetoric: "Rhetoric is the art which seeks to capture in opportune moments that which is appropriate and attempts to suggest that which is possible." John Poulakos, "Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric," *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, Vol. 16, no. 1 (1983): 36. While in this passage I consider the rhetorical situation in specific relation to the Cairo conference, my analysis in chapters 3 and 4 indicates that each of those conferences had their own rhetorical situations that, while similar, deserve independent analysis.

was its inclusiveness. It brought together diverse groups; it expanded the dialogue on population concerns; and it sought, and indeed, identified, 'common ground.'"[21] In this passage, Pierce identifies a number of reasons why Cairo could be claimed as a turning point in the history of the public arguments relating to (over)population. First, Pierce argues for the inclusiveness of the conference. For instance, she and other commentators on Cairo argue that an unprecedented range of actors were invited and chose to participate in the entire ICPD process, including many non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Second, Pierce suggests that the dialogue was "expanded," not only in the number and range of participants, but also in the number and range of issues brought to the table. Instead of confining the discussion to instrumental calculations of fertility rates and contraceptive use and availability, she and other Cairo advocates postulate that, in 1994, for the first time, a broader range of issues were introduced and debated. The resulting Programme of Action included three primary pillars: "universal education," "reducing infant, child and maternal mortality," and "ensuring universal access by 2015 to reproductive health care, including family planning, assisted childbirth and prevention of sexually transmitted infections including HIV."[22] Notice too that the way these issues are framed does not depend on any type of apocalyptic predictions in order to justify action. For these issues, the impetus is more systemic and ongoing rather than globe-threatening and directed toward fears of future

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[21] Catherine S. Pierce, "The United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) and Research on Population and the Environment," in *Human Population, Biodiversity and Protected Areas: Science and Policy Issues: Report of a Workshop, April 20-21, 1995, Washington, D.C.*, ed. Victoria Dompka (Washington, D.C.: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1996), http://www.aaas.org/international/ehn/biod/pierce.htm (accessed September 5, 2008).

[22] United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), "ICPD & the MDGs: Master Plans for Development," http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/ (accessed September 7, 2008). As I discuss in Chapters 2 and 5, this parsing down of the main arguments in the Programme of Action, is misleading, as ultimately many more threads are interwoven into the document, such that it is much more complex than merely the interaction of these three vectors. Moreover, these three pillars are not usually among the most referenced and/or celebrated components of the Programme of Action.

consequences.[23] Finally, Pierce notes the interest in pursuing "common ground," which allowed less finger-pointing (such as North vs. South or continent vs. continent) and produced a more holistic vision that was amenable to reception by wider audiences.[24] Other analysts point to similar aspects of the Cairo conference. For instance, Carmen Barroso argues that the Cairo Programme of Action is significant in that it "defined a new paradigm for programs and policies on population and development in which respect for people's dignity and rights is of tantamount importance."[25] As a rhetorical scholar, I am interested in these attempts at memorializing the conference and its resulting Programme of Action as topoi and rhetorical claims, rather than givens. From this perspective, after looking at predecessors to Cairo and follow-ups to Cairo, I will be in a better position to judge the accuracy of such claims to novelty.

In any case, rather than emerging from whole cloth, Cairo deliberations were stitched together by conferees pulling together multiple contextual threads. Thus, some of the concerns that had caused the rhetoric of (over)population to recede and even disappear, such as misanthropy and false apocalypticism, and the influence of an international pronatalist ideology, arguably generated some of these threads, rather than merely existing as random scenic elements. In regard to misanthropy, many have suggested that Cairo was groundbreaking in its attempts to separate itself from a patriarchal history of (over)population framing. As the Sierra Club claims in its analysis of the Cairo conference, the long-standing controversy over population growth—

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[23] Similarly, Chris J. Cuomo argues that there is an important difference between declared war and undeclared, ongoing war, which is similar to the systemic vs. possible distinction I draw here. Chris J. Cuomo, "War is Not Just an Event: Reflections on the Significance of Everyday Violence," *Hypatia* 11(4), 1996, 30-45. http://www.jstor.org/pss/3810390.

[24] Which audiences are meant to receive the Programme of Action, as opposed to those whose interaction with the arguments with the text is at least once removed, is a broader question that I engage in Chapter 2.

[25] Carmen Barroso, "A Decade of Action: International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994)," *Women's Health Journal* 2004, no. 1 (Jan-March 2004): 3-6, Contemporary Women's Issues Database (accessed July 24, 2011).

"pitting women's rights advocates against environmental advances"—was substantially reconfigured in Cairo, as conference participants worked "to re-define how we address both the problems and solutions to population growth."[26] Discussing some of the overarching problems with (over)population rhetoric, Meredith Marshall argues that Cairo's primary significance lay in its shift from quantitative to qualitative criteria for policy success. As a result, "The Cairo Programme of Action sets aside the traditional focus of creating numerical demographic quotas in favor of goals which will improve the overall quality of life, especially for women and children," which "allowed the document to enshrine and respect international human rights."[27] Marshall contextualizes the changes in emphasis in Cairo in relation to a longer history of (over)population arguments. Such a diachronic understanding of the conference's alleged significance, both in terms of its de-emphasis of traditional quantitative pursuits (in the spirit of Malthus and Ehrlich) and in its (purportedly) new focus on qualitative, social criteria for improving the population situation, helps to frame the Cairo conference in relation to previous articulations of (over)population concerns. I approach the texts in which these claims to novelty are advanced as artifacts worthy of rhetorical analysis in their own right. Such analysis includes both the descriptive component of attempting to understand how these claims operate in relation to the conference texts and to the broader context of both these claims and of the conference documents, as well as a normative entailment as to whether these claims pass muster as historically accurate and whether they are useful in advancing the public argument on population. The critical space afforded by this approach enables an appreciation of the

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[26] Sierra Club, "The Cairo Consensus," http://www.sierraclub.org/population/conference/ (accessed September 7, 2008).

[27] Meredith Marshall, "United Nations Conference on Population and Development: The Road to a New Reality for Reproductive Health," *Emory International Law Review* 10 (1996): 441-492, Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 6, 2008).

intertextual dynamics between the approved consensus documents and the threads of contextual artifacts that seek to make sense of and contextualize these documents in a larger scene.[28] Just as the claims about the texts as well as the conference documents themselves occur in a broader historical scene, so too is the present study embedded in a broader scene of scholarly efforts to understand public arguments about population.

One of the most extensive attempts to trace public arguments over population can be found in Ron Greene's *Malthusian Worlds*. As he notes, the question of population has been articulated in terms of a number of agendas, and hence framed in very different ways.[29] In the early Twentieth Century, population discussions were deployed within an economic development frame, suggesting that developing countries (and less affluent populations domestically) would improve their chances of achieving economic growth by restraining population growth.[30] As the Cold War intensified, the framing shifted to a question of security, as restless poor populations were seen as ripe for conversion to the Communist cause, and therefore population control was seen as a method of stabilizing the political peace in countries and improving the lot of the democratic "West" as against the communist "East." Finally, starting with Paul Ehrlich's *Population Bomb*, and intensifying particularly at the end of the Cold War,

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[28] Again, as indicated earlier this chapter, I see these claims as part of the context, rather than as constituting another set of texts for analysis, though again, I see such an undertaking as a valuable future project.

[29] Though Greene positions these frames historically and sequentially, I think they tend to function in less time-restrictive ways. Just as Burke recognized that magic, religion, and science were not necessarily frames in a linear, temporal structure, but rather always potentially put forth as topoi, available at any given point in time, so too is such a corrective necessary for Greene's formulation. "Rather than thinking of magic, religion, and science as three distinctly successive *stages* in the world's history, the author would now use a mode of analysis that dealt with all three as aspects of motivation 'forever born anew' in the resources of language as such." Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change*, 3rd Ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), lix. Thus, even in contemporary contexts, a reader might find a compilation of security, economic, and environmental rhetoric,co-existing rather than charted as a history.

[30] Greene maps out how, for each international framing, there was a related shift in US domestic discourse. Since my focus in this project is on the international argument, rather than the domestic US argument, I limit my summary of these arguments to the international frame, despite the excellent work he has done to show the interconnections between domestic and international population arguments.

the next major framing strategy located population as a question bearing on the integrity of the biosphere.[31] In this context, population growth risks the viability of the planet's limited resources. Though each of these frames has its own set of defining characteristics, they all share the legacy of Malthus insofar as each of these frames grounds the problem of population in quantitative terms. In this overriding meta-frame, the primary objective is to reduce the number of people on the planet.[32]

In addition to the work of Ron Greene, which is primarily focused on the long trajectory of population arguments but makes some preliminary observations about the implications of the Cairo meeting, there are a handful of other analyses that have focused extensively on the importance of the Cairo conference.[33] For instance, Jyoti Shankar Singh, ICPD Executive

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[31] While global warming is increasingly being linked with population, helping to mark the resurgence of "population" rhetoric (such as Thomas Friedman's *Hot, Flat, and Crowded*), Al Gore's book *An Inconvenient Truth* (the counterpart to the popular documentary) only mentions "population" a total of 9 times, and 2 of those references are not regarding the situation of human population growth/"overpopulation." Albert Gore and Melcher Media, *An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergence of Global Warming and What We Can Do About It* (Illustrated Ed.) (Rodale: 2006).In order to find the number of references, I utilized the search feature of Google Books (on July 24, 2010), which offers scholars another way to enter the difficult terrain of cluster-agon analysis on lengthy texts. Interestingly, Gore makes repeated reference to the "population explosion," which both harkens back to Ehrlich and retains the same rhetorical pitfalls that Hardin pointed out about Ehrlich's metaphor (as described earlier this chapter). Perhaps it also suggests that the frustration over Ehrlich's false doomsaying has faded significantly in the intervening decades. Of course, once again, I do not want to frame resources like those of Gore as speaking to a universal, unmarked public. Instead, while his global warming work has had international influence, his first and primary set of audiences hail from the United States and other developed countries.

[32] Greene, *Malthusian Worlds*. To be fair, particularly in the "Green Malthusians," there is a recognition that over-consumption plays a fundamental role, in addition to raw numbers of people.

[33] Greene, *Malthusian Worlds*. Though I only discuss Singh and Salfon extensively here, there are a number of other scholars who have examined and interpreted the Cairo conference. See John F. Kantner and Andrew Kantner, *The Struggle for International Consensus on Population and Development* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Catholic Voices, *Catholics and Cairo: A Common Language* (Washington, DC: Catholic Voices, 1999); Paula Abrams, "Population Control and Sustainability: It's the Same Old Song but with a Different Meaning," *Environmental Law* 27 (Winter, 1997): 1111-1135, Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 7, 2008); R.L. Cliquet and Kristiaan Thienpont, *Population and Development: A Message from the Cairo Conference* (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995); Rishona Fleishman, "The Battle against Reproductive Rights: The Impact of the Catholic Church on Abortion Law in Both International and Domestic Arenas," *Emory International Law Review* 14 (Spring, 2000): 277-314, Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 7, 2008); Robert M. Hardaway, "Environmental Malthusianism: Integrating Population and Environmental Policy," *Environmental Law* 27 (Winter, 1997), 1209-1242, Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 7, 2008); Kimberly A. Johns, "Reproductive Rights of Women: Construction and Reality in International and United States Law," *Cardozo Women's Law Journal* 5

Coordinator, wrote an analysis that detailed the main issues of the conference and its importance.[34] This work is remarkably valuable, as it lays out the specifics of the conference in a way that only a conference organizer could. Singh combines a scenic/historical approach that foregrounds discussion of decisive contextual moments alongside analysis that closely traces the specific textual gains and conflicts at each conference and across the series of conferences. Beyond description, Singh is frank about major points of conflict that occurred at each conference and between conferences, and he is also willing to make predictive and normative claims about how the population vision might and should develop as we move ahead.

The other significant scholarship that attempts to interpret the meaning of the Cairo conference is a recent book by Saul Halfon.[35] Halfon is primarily interested in understanding two elements of Cairo: first, the notion of the "Cairo consensus" and on what terms such a consensus was formed, and second, the role of technical planning and argumentation as part of the conference's interests. While Halfon's analysis is critical to understanding the importance of Cairo, he is interested in a set of questions similar to but with a differing focus from my own. As he explains in his preface:

(1998), 1-32, Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 7, 2008); Stanley Johnson and International Conference on Population and Development, *The Politics of Population: The International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo 1994* (London: Earthscan, 1995); Kristi Uhrinek, "Mending Broken Promises: Analyzing the Legality of U.S. Withdrawal of United Nations Population Fund Appropriations and the Need for Binding UN Commitments," *The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law* 32 (Summer, 2004), 861-889, Lexis/Nexis Database (accessed September 7, 2008); United Nations Population Fund, *Coming Up Short: Struggling to Implement the Cairo Programme of Action* (New York: United Nations Population Fund, 1997). Also, for scholarship that interprets Bucharest, Mexico City, and Cairo together, see United Nations, *Population Consensus at Cairo, Mexico City and Bucharest: An Analytical Comparison*, New York, 1995.

[34] Jyoti Shankar Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population: The International Conference on Population and Development* (London: Earthscan, 1998).

[35] Saul E. Halfon, *The Cairo Consensus: Demographic Surveys, Women's Empowerment, and Regime Change in Population Policy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007). Halfon's background is in Science and Technology Studies.

> Thus, alongside the very public debate on "the population problem" I began to discover another arena of conflict, that of "population policy." This parallel world of population thought and action refocused my attention, though never completely, from public discourse to bureaucratic, professional, and institutional practice. It is here that rhetoric becomes action and where broad fears and concerns must be translated into the specific programs of organizations and nations. It is an arena where conflict and debate must become agreement and consensus.[36]

Halfon openly indicates a desire to move away from “public discourse” and “rhetoric,” suggesting an important demarcation from the focus of my own study. Nonetheless, his focus on argument, deliberation, and the role of the technical sphere, as well as his interest in how efforts toward consensus and agreement provide particular rhetorical constraints all point toward an analysis that veers in a separate direction from my own without ever completely separating.

Having now reviewed relevant literature that has engaged the history of population as public argument and the Cairo conference in particular, I next consult relevant scholarship in the field of international relations. This should bring into sharper relief the distinctiveness and heuristic value of a critical approach that foregrounds rhetoric and argument as main features of analysis.

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[36] Halfon, *Cairo Consensus*, xvi.

1.2.2 Argument, Rhetoric, and International Relations

Traditional theories of international relations (IR), predominantly realist or neo-realist in orientation, understand the international arena to be driven largely by the actions of nation-states, which are guided primarily by national and material interests. Part of this paradigm entails a rejection of the importance of communication and argument as central factors in international relations. In fact, "realists" tend to view communication as "cheap talk"—at the very least insincere, at most, dangerously deceptive.[37] As Rodger Payne notes, "realists have long expressed very cynical views about the form and function of political communication and public debate."[38]

A number of theorists have produced challenges to this realist framework, pointing out the socially constructed and therefore malleable/contingent nature of interests while also expanding the range of notable actors. While perhaps the most famous is constructivism, another notable such set of theories comprise the "communicative turn" in IR.[39] Drawing upon the resources of communication and argumentation (and, to a lesser extent, those of rhetoric), such work has broadened our understanding of the international arena, in a number of directions. First, it has pushed the concept of actor from primarily nation-state to include social movements,

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[37] For more on the relationship between international relations studies and rhetorically and argumentation-driven scholarship, see Gordon R. Mitchell, "Rhetoric in International Relations: More than 'Cheap Talk,'" in *The Sage Handbook of Rhetoric* , ed. Andrea A. Lunsford et al. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2008): 247-263.

[38] Rodger A. Payne, "Neorealists as Critical Theorists: The Purpose of Foreign Policy Debate," *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 3 (2007): 505.

[39] Payne, "Neorealists as Critical Theorists." For additional IR theorists whose work could be termed either part of the "communicative turn" or part of the "social constructivist" movement in IR theory, see David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); R. Charli Carpenter, *Innocent Women and Children: Gender, Norms and the Protection of Civilians* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006); Neta Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

NGOs, and international institutions. Second, it has provided an alternate set of explanations that shed light on the contingent, constructed nature of foreign policy stances, and thus their ability to be challenged and changed. Third, it has provided much more nuance to our understanding of the mechanisms of change in international affairs, moving beyond weapons and money to include diplomacy, communicative networks, and other strategies. Indeed, some of these scholars have even pushed the "hard cases" as they relate to international relations. Payne has pointed to the way in which the most ardent defenders of (neo) realism, in their attempts to change the terms of foreign policy debates, betray their own assumptions about the irrelevance of communication and argument in IR, while Marc Lynch argues for the possibility for meaningful interaction between the West and Islam in a post-9/11 international atmosphere.[40]

There have been significant studies relating to the communicative turn and international argumentation by IR theorists and political scientists, and, much less frequently, by communication scholars studying argument and rhetoric.[41] Most notably, Thomas Risse broadens the conversation between realists and social constructivists by arguing for a third logic of international actions, "the logic of arguing," thereby bridging traditional IR analysis with public argument scholarship.[42] Similarly, Gordon Mitchell's review essay on public argument-

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[40] Marc Lynch, "Transnational Dialogue in an Age of Terror," *Global Society* 19 (2005): 5-28; Payne, "Neorealists as Critical Theorists." See also Marc Lynch, *State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity* (New York City: Columbia University Press, 1999).

[41] This is not, however, to suggest a complete absence of such work. For instance, see Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1996); Francis A. Beer and Christ'l de Landtsheer, *Metaphorical World Politics* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2004); Ray T. Donahue and Michael H. Prosser, *Diplomatic Discourse: International Conflict at the United Nations—Addresses and Analysis* (Greenwich, CT: Ablex Pub. Corp., 1997); Alexander Ostrower, *Language, Law, and Diplomacy: A Study of Linguistic Diversity in Official International Relations and International Law* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965); Michael H. Prosser, *Sow the Wind, Reap the Whirlwind: Heads of State Address the United Nations* (New York: Morrow, 1970).

[42] Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!' Communicative Action in World Politics," *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (2000): 1-39.

driven security studies charts a number of promising works that attempt to give nuance and depth to the study of international relations with the tools offered by public argument analysis.[43]

One of the most notable drawbacks of this current scholarship, however, is the way in which it conceptually distinguishes the work of argument and rhetoric. By relying closely on Jürgen Habermas, many communication and argument-friendly IR scholars, such as Risse, inherit Habermas' characterization of rhetoric as strategic action. From this category mistake follows the false argument-rhetoric dichotomy that privileges the former and demonizes the latter.[44] How is this distinction typically couched, and what might be a more productive relationship between argument and rhetoric?

The double helix of DNA represents a useful metaphor for considering the relationship between argumentation theory and rhetorical analysis. Each has a different tendency and particular corresponding features, but it is misleading to consider them as ever being wholly separate. Attempts to create brick walls in place of porous borders typically end up caricaturing one or both the process. With that being said, I turn first to some preliminary distinctions between studies of argument and rhetoric, and then turn to an example particularly relevant to the current project, Thomas Risse's division of rhetoric and argument in his essay "Let's Argue!" Examining his explanations both helps to show some tendencies of argumentation while also highlighting the dangers of over-selling or caricaturing one school in relation to the other.

What are some of the points of comparison and contrast between studies of rhetoric on one hand and of argumentation on the other? Predominantly, analysis of rhetoric has historically focused on speeches or other finished texts. In contrast, argumentation scholars have tended to be

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[43] Gordon R. Mitchell, "Public Argument-Driven Security Studies," *Argumentation & Advocacy* 39, no. 1 (2002): 57-71.

[44] Risse, "'Let's Argue!'"

focused more on argumentative exchanges, a form of dialectic captured representatively by the idea of Socratic dialogues, or on arguments as products, meant to be considered for their propositional logic, reasoning, and evidence. Rhetoric, following the vision of Cicero, studies the use of the five canons: arrangement, invention, style, delivery, and memory. In contrast, many studies of argument focus more narrowly on invention, as that is where arguments (narrowly considered) are produced, worked, and re-worked. For many argumentation theorists, questions such as style and delivery are, if not irrelevant, very unimportant in relation to the content of the arguments themselves. Similarly, while most rhetorical analysis seeks to understand how all three types of artistic proofs operate, including *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*, the descriptive and normative focus of argumentation theory is on *logos*. In traditional argumentation theory, the focus is on the "force of the better argument," and factors outside of *logos* are, at a minimum, distractions, and, at worst, distortions of the quest for shared truth.

Aside from tendencies of scholarship, rhetorical analysis and argumentation theory as traditions draw from different major thinkers and carve out niches in distinctive parts of the academy. Rhetoricians draw heavily on the classics, including the work of the Sophists, Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. In the Twentieth Century, they place Kenneth Burke, among others, centrally in relation to the contemporary rhetorical scene. Argumentation theorists, on the other hand, draw from different sources. For instance, some of the main Twentieth Century influences include Stephen Toulmin, Chaim Perelman, and Habermas. One representative anecdote of these similar but divergent threads relates to the role of Burke and Perelman in each scholarly community. Kenneth Burke, who offers many tools to think through both rhetoric and argumentation, is taken up and utilized frequently by rhetoricians while remaining largely (or at a minimum relatively) absent in argumentation scholarship, while Chaim

Perelman and Lucy Olbrechts-Tyteca's *The New Rhetoric*, despite its title, is received prominently by argumentation theorists while significantly under-utilized by rhetoricians. Similarly, these differences in emphasis also create different academic spaces for each approach. Rhetoricians tend to be housed in departments of speech communication/communication studies and in English/rhetoric and composition programs, while argumentation theorists tend to be located in philosophy and informal logic programs, as well as, in some cases, in departments of speech communication/communication studies. Contemporary rhetorical scholarship tends to be produced overwhelmingly in the United States, while argumentation theory has a much broader home, including in Canada and Europe. While both argumentation theorists and critics and rhetorical scholars have created similar taxonomies of product, procedure, and process, argumentation theory tends to focus more on product (particular arguments that need to be analyzed for their propositional logic) and procedure (creating ideal situations for argumentative exchanges to occur), while rhetorical analysis tends, in addition to those two types of concerns, to focus more on process, looking, for instance, at political campaigns across time, or the rhetoric of particular presidents or of the presidency as a whole. Also, while both are focused on scene and text, rhetoricians are more likely to focus on audience, situation, and the elements of Bitzer's "rhetorical situation" (such as exigence), while argumentation theorists are likely to be interested in the logic and reasoning involved in particular acts of communication ("arguments") and in creating procedures (such as those involved in the Pragma-dialectical school) that maximize the opportunity to reach consensus by moving progressively from disorder and disagreement to a state of consensus and harmony among actors. Having charted some general trajectories of each approach, I turn now to one particular case, that sheds light on how this argumentation-rhetoric relationship implicates scholarship in other disciplines, in this case, international relations.

Thomas Risse's "Let's Argue!" combines a foundation of IR with a well-developed theory of argumentation. From the outset, Risse encodes a theory of argumentation, as a process whereby "human actors engage in truth seeking with the aim of reaching a mutual understand- ing based on a reasoned consensus (*versta ̈ndigungsorientiertes Handeln*), challeng- ing the validity claims involved in any communication."[45] Citing Habermas, a reader quickly notes the primary features of his vision of argument: "reasoned consensus," "argumentative rationality," "truth-seeking," in pursuit of a "logic of arguing" that has the potential to "tackle empirical questions in world politics."[46] While the elements of this particular rationality carve out a unique space in IR theory from other predominant paradigms, this theory indicates a clear preference for reason (logic, *logos*, in contrast to *pathos* and *ethos*), for viewing argument, following Wenzel, primarily as "product" and "procedure," and, following Aristotle, an approach to knowledge and communication that can be more properly characterized as dialectic rather than rhetoric. The choice of texts is also telling, as the work of Habermas indicates a particular theory of communication that is, at best, highly skeptical of rhetoric. For instance, Risse's primary argument about the problematic nature of rhetoric is as follows:

> [A]ctors engaging in rhetoric are not prepared to change their own beliefs or to be persuaded themselves by the ''better argument.'' If everybody in a communicative situation engages in rhetoric— the speaker, the target, and the audience—they can argue strategically until they are all blue in the face and still not change anyone's mind.[47]

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[45] Risse, "'Let's Argue!'" 1-2.

[46] Risse, "'Let's Argue!'" 1-2.

[47] Risse, "'Let's Argue!'" 8.

This distinction is puzzling. Both argumentation theory as well as rhetorical theory contain a theory of self-risk, and both normatively suggest that, at least most of the time, an individual should enter into a situation, whether it be communicative, argumentative, or rhetorical, with the idea that, as a result of listening and engaging others, that she/he might change her/his mind.[48]

Positions such as those expressed by Risse, regarding the troublesome nature of rhetoric, ultimately reduce the effectiveness and usefulness of public argument studies, as the field of rhetoric offers a powerful conceptual apparatus for both scholars and practitioners alike. In particular, the utility of rhetorical tools in analyzing texts closely, providing a sophisticated understanding of audience, thinking through different types of appeal, and considering the expectations and functions of different genres of public address, just to name a few, are all critical vocabularies that get lost or at the very least under-appreciated when rhetoric becomes the devil term alongside argument.[49] Without wishing to isolate argumentation studies with a

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[48] Wayne Brockriede, "Arguers as Lovers," *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 5, no. 1 (1972): 1-11; Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, *Decision by Debate* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1963); Douglas Ehninger, "Argument as Method: Its Nature, Its Limitations and Its Uses," *Speech Monographs* 37, no. 2 (1970): 101-110; Jim W. Corder, "Argument as Emergence, Rhetoric as Love," *Rhetoric Review* 4, No. 1 (1985): 16-32. For more on the relationship(s) between argumentation theory and rhetoric, see, for instance, Erik W. Doxtader, "The Entwinement of Argument and Rhetoric: A Dialectical Reading of Habermas' Theory of Communicative Action," *Argumentation & Advocacy* 27 (1991): 51-63; Christian Kock, "Choice is Not True or False: The Domain of Rhetorical Argumentation," *Argumentation* 23, no. 1 (2009): 61-80; Scott Jacobs, "Nonfallacious Rhetorical Strategies: Lyndon Johnson's Daisy Ad," *Argumentation* 20, no. 4 (2006): 421-442; David W. Shepard, "Rhetoric and Formal Argument," Western Speech 30, no. 4 (1966): 241-247.

[49] When I indicate the notion of rhetorical genres, I consider two levels at which genre operates. First, Aristotle sets up three basic genres that he considers to be exhaustive of types of rhetoric: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic. Thus, in one sense, understanding genre at this foundational level enables a critic to understand features of a text that might otherwise go unnoticed or remain a mystery. However, I also believe that genre analysis can be more particular. Scholars have examined, for instance, the genre considerations for inaugural addresses, public apologies, and declarations of war, to name just a few. Rhetorical artifacts in IR also contain important generic features. As Matt Gerber notes, public diplomacy itself can be considered as a genre. Matthew G. Gerber, "On the Consideration of 'Public Diplomacy' as a Rhetorical Genre," *Contemporary Argumentation & Debate* 29,(2008): 118-133. In this dissertation, I draw heavily on Kenneth Burke's "dialectic of constitutions" to consider the similarities and contrasts between constitutions on the one hand and UN conference texts on the other. Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969). I believe that such a

straw person, many argumentation theorists follow what Wenzel calls the "logical," "argument as product" model to such a degree that they forget, following Brockriede and Ehninger, that arguers are making the arguments. Such an over-emphasis on the product and situation (act and scene), without any comparable focus on agent or audience, can be corrected with an emphasis on the traditional tools of rhetoric.[50] Fortunately, some scholars who regularly combine such analyses have pointed to this shortcoming.[51]

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comparative analysis enables us to better understand some of the features that characterize the genre of international conference texts.

[50] In this dissertation, there are a number of terms that I deploy in similar but ultimately distinct ways. While my interest in restoring rhetoric to public argument analysis, especially in IR, leads to the numerous distinctions in this section regarding rhetoric and argument. Nevertheless, I see many similarities between and among terms including, for instance, rhetoric, argument (and "public argument"), debate, persuasion, and deliberation. While I think that there are conceptual differences between and among these terms, I am less interested in proving the existence of clear distinctions than in showing the salience of these terms in relation to population. Numerous rhetoricians and argumentation theorists have devoted entire articles and books to these questions, so it is clearly a weighty project in and of itself. As defaults, I will primarily refer to rhetoric, as it is my own area of expertise, public argument, as controversies in publics (of various scales) generate the texts for my rhetorical analysis, and communication, as it is the broad umbrella term covering my discipline. Since I observe some important differences between rhetoric and deliberation, I often keep these as a phrase, "rhetoric and deliberation," recognizing that, even with their different tendencies, they are still highly similar. If at times I do go beyond rhetoric, public argument, communication, and deliberation to deploy different terms, it is because I find that those cousins are more appropriate for a particular context.

[51] Mitchell, "Public Argument-Driven Security Studies." Mitchell also provides a well-developed distinction between rhetoric and argument, especially in light of their utility for IR:

> Risse's distinction between rhetoric and argument does not find much support in rhetorical theory, where reductive approaches that treat rhetoric as strategic manipulation are criticized roundly for their conceptual thinness. Thicker descriptions position rhetoric as a practical art of using dialogue to coordinate action when interlocutors at loggerheads are forced to act in situations marked by uncertainty, or when collective decisions must be made before all the relevant facts are in. Public argument-driven security studies might fruitfully explore how these insights could help differentiate bargaining (purely strategic communication undertaken for instrumental purposes); arguing (dialogue oriented toward mutual understanding); and rhetoric (the communicative search for joint agreement on necessary actions in light of imperfect conditions). Such differentiation could enhance the descriptive power of IR theories by adding texture to the argument/rhetoric binary some approaches use to explain communicative action in international politics.

Mitchell, "Public Argument-Driven Security Studies," 62. In putting forth the pentad as a critical tool to understand motives, Burke argues, "any complete statement about motives will offer *some kind of* answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose). . . . Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), xv. He goes on throughout the Grammar to suggest that particular texts establish ratios among those five components, such that one might feature primarily the scene as opposed to the audience. I utilize the pentad in order to consider the ways in which these texts are constructed.

In addition to the valuable critical tools offered by rhetoric and argument for the study of international relations, the realm of international relations also provides a rich set of artifacts and case studies that, to date, have remained understudied and under-theorized by rhetoric and argument scholars. Before discussing my specific artifacts and case studies in depth, I turn next to the possibilities offered by examining international institutions, international conferences, and other, non-Western case studies as a shift in perspective for rhetoricians and argumentation theorists.

Although the range of objects of study in the international arena is potentially limitless, this study focuses in part on artifacts relating to international institutions, and more narrowly, the UN. Transnational social movements, NGOs, and inter-state relations have all received substantial attention from analysts deploying a communication perspective. Yet the communicative dimensions of international institutions, and particularly the UN, remain understudied, save for a few, including and especially communication scholars Patricia Riley, Thomas Hollihan, and James F. Klumpp.[52] This group has contributed some of the most extensive analyses to date on the role of argumentation in the work of the UN. In particular, their most recent work creates a significant agenda for those who study argument. Drawing heavily on the work of Habermas, they argue, "the UN might serve to provide a common lifeworld for international deliberations."[53] To establish the importance of the UN as site of argument, they make three important claims: first, that this "lifeworld" can "help the arguers to identify their

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[52] Patricia Riley, Thomas Hollihan and James F. Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously as a Site for Public Arguments: Does the UN Have a Role in the 21st Century?" in *Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation*, ed. Frans H. van Eemeren, et al. (Amsterdam: Sic Sat, 2007): 1165-1172; Patricia Riley, James F. Klumpp, and Thomas A. Hollihan, "Democratizing the Lifeworld of the 21st Century: Evaluating New Democratic Sites for Argument," in *Argumentation and Values: Proceedings of the Ninth SCA/AFA Conference on Argumentation*, ed. Sally Jackson : 254-260. Also, see Patricia Riley and Peter R. Monge, "Communication in the Global Community," *Communication Research* 25, no. 4 (1998): 355-358.

[53] Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously," 1167.

shared interests, common concerns, and points of divergent interests," even when results are not readily forthcoming; second, UN debates help shape the public agenda and give life to arguments in other public spheres; and finally, "the UN offers at least the promise or potential for collective action."[54]

In addition to these positive arguments on behalf of studying the UN as site of debate and argument, other factors suggest important "negative" reasons for engaging in such inquiry. Not only are significant international issues of the day debated and decided at the UN, but it is also a venue often decried as ineffectual or irrelevant by IR neo(realists). For (neo)realists, the UN represents the height of naïveté among those who subscribe to a communicative, as opposed to materialist, militaristic, and/or interest-based understanding of IR. They point to the UN's near irrelevance in major international crises, as well as its susceptibility to be taken over by the already powerful nation-states. In fact, Timothy Luke (not a realist, but a scholar of realist discourses) goes so far as to argue that the public image of the UN as perpetually ineffectual fuels the legitimacy of the nation-state as the primary agent in international affairs.[55]

Despite the alleged and real shortcomings of the UN as agent in international affairs, there are many important reasons for studying this institution, in addition to those offered by Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp. First, analyzing the UN, as opposed to the US or other major nation-states, can help to denaturalize and internationalize our assumptions about argument and international relations. Currently, to the extent that foreign policy, for instance, is read rhetorically, the overwhelming object of study is that of US foreign policy. As Kelly A. Clancy

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[54] Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously," 1167.

[55] Timothy W. Luke, "Discourses of Disintegration/Texts of Transformation: Re-Reading Realism in the New World Order," *Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy* XVIII (1993): 229-253. Notably, as Benedict Anderson explains, the nation-state is also a fiction, but like a dead metaphor, its status as fiction is less readily apparent. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, New Ed. (London:Verso, 2006).

(2007) notes in a review of *Metaphorical World Politics*, scholarship "would be enhanced by inclusion of . . . studies of rhetoric that occurs in non-American foreign policy discourse, as well as in international venues such as the United Nations."[56] Such a claim, coupled with Clancy's observation of the departure from "the norm" in the two chapters that focus on non-US foreign policy, sets an important research agenda for scholars studying the intersection(s) of argument and rhetoric, foreign policy, and IR.[57] Second, as Riley, Hollihan, Klumpp note, in an era of globalization, the nation-state is wavering in importance, while the salience of international deliberation moves to the forefront.[58]

For those who have taken such justifications seriously and invested in scholarship of the UN, there tend to be certain tendencies that over-represent portions of UN business to the exclusion of other, highly relevant work that it performs. To the extent that the UN is studied, there are two specific sub-topics that occupy the majority of this literature: security issues (most notably those relating to the Security Council), and human rights violations (such as the discussion in the work of Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp).[59]

Instead of continuing to over-represent those twin strands, I believe that the topic of UN conferences is both under-represented in the literature and ripe for the types of issues it raises.

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[56] Kelly A. Clancy, "Metaphorical World Politics," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 10, no. 1 (2007): 144. This sentiment is echoed in relation to similar scholarly projects. For instance, see Mohammed Auwal's review of *Post-Realism*: "[T]he major problem with the book relates to its coverage. All cases and writers examined are Anglo-American. This in essence makes the volume's post-realist critique unrealistic, which is contradictory to its claims. The post-realists' critique of realism remains imprisoned within the Eurocentric tunnel vision of world history and politics—a myopia that goes without questioning." Mohammed Auwal, "Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations (Book)," *Discourse & Society* 9, no. 3 (1998): 430.

[57] Importantly, while I attempt to move beyond US-centered scholarship in the current project, there are still many residual traces in my writing in this project that reveal the deeply ingrained "norming" suggested by these authors. However, while not a clean break, my sense is that, to depart from the American study as the unmarked norm, we have to start somewhere, as imperfect as any such beginning may be.

[58] Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously."

[59] For example, see David Zarefsky, “Making the Case for War: Colin Powell at the United Nations,” *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 10(2), 2007, 275-302. Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously."

Especially on the part of public argument and rhetoric scholars, this topic has been severely under-studied. In *Sharing the Earth,* Tarla Rai Peterson notes the potential for grandstanding at such conferences (as a part of her discussion of the Rio conference).[60] Beyond Peterson, very few rhetoricians or public argument scholars have studied UN conferences. Interestingly, Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp's vision for a more effective UN—one that occurs more in the public spotlight and can draw in participation by non-governmental representatives—becomes a possibility in the world of these conferences.[61] Also, while critics can relatively easily assess whether a rhetorical campaign for military involvement or to address human rights violations was a success or failure (to the degree that causality can ever be asserted), the rhetorical work achieved in international institutions requires more nuance on the part of the critic. Instead of producing easy claims to "success" or "failure," the critic must, as Schechter notes, consider the role of UN conferences in terms of their ability to give presence to certain issues while also reframing, redefining, or reinterpreting such issues.[62] These are quintessentially communicative issues, warranting rhetorical study of UN conferences.

In terms of the topic of (over)population in particular, UN-sponsored conferences are not notable primarily for their instrumental effectiveness (any basic research reveals that population and development goals, and the financing to implement them, consistently fall short, despite these conferences), but rather because of the way in which they highlight certain features of the issue and define and/or interpret it in a particular way. In this sense, the Cairo conference, in

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[60] Peterson, *Sharing the Earth*.

[61] Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously."

[62] Michael G. Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences* (London: Routledge, 2005). Also, for work that references the role of the UN in agenda setting, see Jutta M. Joachim, *Agenda Setting, the UN, and NGOs: Gender Violence and Reproductive Rights* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007). And, the concept of "presence" is pivotal in rhetorical theory. See, for instance, Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 115-120.

particular, was memorialized, rightly or wrongly, as critical for its redefinition of the argumentative context surrounding the population issue. According to such advocates, no longer were the primary issues those of environmentalists like Paul Ehrlich, such as "carrying capacity" and the biosphere. Instead, advocates claim that the argument became reinvented as dealing generally with the newfound mission of sustainable development and specifically with reproductive health/rights—thus fusing human social concerns with environmental ones.[63]

Recent scholarship in international relations and communication illustrates how a focus on the UN as a deliberative forum has potential to elucidate aspects of international politics that may not be apparent from traditional realist perspectives. In the next section, I preview the artifacts to be examined in the subsequent chapters.

1.3 ARTIFACTS/OBJECTS OF STUDY

For as long as rhetoric has been practiced, analyzed, and studied, the proper scope of rhetoric has been debated. Aristotle, ever the classifier, circumscribed the scope or realm of rhetoric by noting that rhetoric dealt with *doxa*, or those matters of public concern that were contingent and thus "could be otherwise." As rhetoric consolidated into "rhetorical criticism"—a more formal critical method in the Twentieth Century, the scope question again jumped to the forefront. Early on, many of the artifacts for analysis were great moments in public address, such as presidential speeches. When Edwin Black published *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method*, he opened the

[63] This coupling of environmental and social justice claims is becoming increasingly important. For instance, see Phaedra C. Pezzullo, *Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of Pollution, Travel, and Environmental Justice* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2007).

door for an opening of method and also, at least potentially, of artifacts to be examined using this method.[64] However, relatively recently, in a wholesale critique of the rhetoric of science, Dilip Gaonkar challenged the ongoing expansion of artifact domains, especially for an enterprise that was, according to him, first and foremost, productive, rather than interpretive/critical, and thus had too "thin" of a vocabulary to be particularly enlightening (especially outside the domain of traditional public oratory).[65]

Despite Gaonkar's claims, less traditional texts, ranging from those in the domain of "the rhetoric of science," to those driven by media considerations (ushered in long ago with Benson and Medhurst's *Rhetorical Dimensions in Media*), all of these objects have increasingly been recognized as falling within the legitimate scope of inquiry for rhetorical criticism, thanks in large part to the efforts of Lloyd Bitzer and Edwin Black with their *Prospects of Rhetoric*.[66] This scope expansion paves the way for the present study, which explores artifacts with characteristics that differ from sole-orator public addresses that served as the focus for many early studies in rhetorical criticism.

There are a number of documents that I will use to situate my analysis. First, I examine the 1994 Cairo Conference, with its resulting official document, the Programme of Action. [67] Second, I examine the 1974 Bucharest Conference and the 1984 Mexico City Conference. For

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[64] Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method* (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

[65] Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, "The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science," in Southern Communication Journal 58 (Summer 1993): 258-295. For commentaries on and challenges to Gaonkar's article, see, for instance, Alan G. Gross and William M. Keith, eds., *Rhetorical Hermeneutics: Invention and Interpretation in the Age of Science* (State University of New York Press, 1996).

[66] Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black, eds., *The Prospect of Rhetoric: Report of the National Developmental Project, Sponsored by Speech Communication Association* (Prentice-Hall, 1971).

[67] United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), "Report of the ICPD (94/10/18)," http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html (accessed September 7, 2008).

these conferences, each has an accompanying official conference document. Finally, in order to chart the ongoing continuities and transformations in public argument regarding population, I examine the publications produced for the ICPD+5 follow-up (in 1999) and the ICPD+10 follow-up (in 2004). [68] For each artifact, my approach is as a rhetorical critic engaging in a "close reading" strategy, as described below.

Given the long history of population rhetoric, and in particular international population rhetoric, why do these five texts earn inclusion while other texts remain excluded? In some ways, developing a precise set of criteria of inclusion/exclusion in this regard can be tricky. Thomas Malthus sounded the first modern siren call on population at the end of the 18th Century. As Matthew Connelly notes in *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population*, the 19th Century witnessed numerous formulations of population as an issue of international, rather than national or local, concern. In the Twentieth Century, prior to the formation of the UN in 1945, international conferences had already occurred on the topic of population, such as the World Population Conference of 1927 and the World Population Congress of 1931.[69]

In order both to avoid merely repeating the excellent work already done by Matthew Connelly, among others, and in order to limit scope to provide adequate depth for my project, I focus on international conferences sponsored by the UN on the topic of human population

[68] For each official document analyzed (1974, 1984, 1994, 1999, 2004), I used the online Wordle service (www.wordle.net), which visually displays selections of text, with the largest words representing the most frequently used terms. One can also specify number of words in order to discover the top terms. It was rather rare when the top 20 or top 10 corresponded closely with my key terms, clusters, or agons, but it helped to provide another context for understanding the internal dimensions of the text. All of the Wordle results are included in the Appendix section of this document.

[69] Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2008).

growth.[70] Other than routine follow-up efforts, there have been five major UN-Sponsored conferences on population: Rome (1954), Belgrade (1965), Bucharest (1974), Mexico City (1984), and Cairo (1994). However, there is an important difference between Rome/Belgrade and the rest. As Ronald Walter Greene notes:

> One of the key differences between the Bucharest Conference and the two previous population conferences held under the auspices of the United Nations was that it was the first population conference attended by official representatives of the member states. The first two conferences served to legitimate the production of demographic and family planning knowledges and were primarily attended by experts in those fields. A second difference between Bucharest and the Rome and Belgrade Conferences was that the United Nations had committed itself to the production of a World Population Plan of Action.[71]

This passage is pertinent to the selection of texts in a number of ways. First, it differentiates conferences based on participants. While Rome and Belgrade were both UN-sponsored conferences, they were there primarily for experts to gather and discuss family planning and demography. Starting with Bucharest, and continuing with Mexico City and Cairo, state officials (and, later, NGOs and other parties as well) were also part of the conferences.[72]

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[70] While ICPD+5 and ICPD+10 do not meet these criteria in a narrow sense, see chapter 4 for an explanation and justification of their inclusion in this project.

[71] Ronald Walter Greene, *Malthusian Worlds: U.S. Leadership and the Governing of the Population Crisis* (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1999), 81.

[72] Greene is not alone in this distinction of population conferences. Michael G. Schechter also explains his reason for limiting the scope of population conferences, following a similar parsing strategy as Greene:

> It should also be noted that names of conferences can be a bit deceiving. For example, while the first World Population Conference was organized by the UN in 1954, its purpose was to exchange scientific information and it was viewed as an "eminently academic conference." The second World Population Conference was organized in 1965 by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population (IUSSP) and the UN; most of its participants were experts in the field. It was only the third World

Second, this passage distinguishes the goals of these conferences. Whereas Rome and Belgrade were primarily interested in "legitimat[ing] the production of demographic and family planning knowledges," Bucharest began the trend of focusing on "formulating an international population policy." In various forms, this quest for a coherent international population policy has been the norm ever since Bucharest, including at Mexico City, Cairo, and its relevant follow-ups.

These selection criteria necessarily limit out other important artifacts that provide context for Cairo. For instance, while Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb* was incredibly important, particularly though not exclusively for audiences in the US, it does not qualify here as a conference text. Furthermore, the texts produced by international and non-governmental organizations (other than conferences), such as the Population Council, established in 1952 and acting as a powerful rhetorical resource for population advocacy efforts, would similarly be limited out by this set of criteria.[73] Similarly, examining the intersection between decolonization and population rhetoric, while vital, strays afield from the limits that I impose to guide the study, though it is significant in the role it plays as context and scene.

Guided by this scope criterion, I critique texts that meet the following selection criteria: eligible texts are those final approved documents from UN-sponsored intergovernmental conferences, attended by representatives of member states (the conferences may include other participants as well, but they must, at a minimum, be attended by member states in order to

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> Population Conference, held in 1974, that was intergovernmental in nature, i.e., where the representatives from different countries were representatives of those countries' governments. All the UN global conferences discussed in depth in this volume are intergovernmental in nature, although non-governmental ones were often convened at almost the same time in nearby venues.

Michael G. Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences* (London: Routledge, 2005), 5-6.

[73] Population Council, "About the Council," http://www.popcouncil.org/about/index.html (Accessed July 1, 2009). While these external texts are not the focus of my study, they remain important elements of the context, or following Kenneth Burke, the “scene” that informs the terrain of public argument over population.

qualify), for the purposes of creating, modifying, or otherwise revising international population policies or goals for such policies. This would include Bucharest, Mexico City, Cairo, ICPD+5, and ICPD+10.[74]

1.4 RHETORICAL CRITICISM AS MODE OF INVESTIGATION AND WORLDVIEW

Much like the city of Pittsburgh is shaped by the confluence of its famous rivers, my approach to the rhetorical analysis of public argument utilizes what Rueckert, speaking of Burke's method, once called "all that there is to use." This particular confluence conjoins rhetorical criticism, close reading, approaching rhetoric dialectically through time, and an adaptation of cluster-agon analysis. Throughout, I incorporate the insights of Kenneth Burke, including, for instance, those relating to the pentad and motives/motivation.

1.4.1 The Art of Rhetorical Criticism

First and foremost, I approach the artifacts in this study as a rhetorical critic analyzing public arguments.[75] In one of the foundational essays for rhetorical criticism, Herbert Wichelns argues,

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[74] Again, see chapter 4 for an explanation of the inclusion of ICPD+5 and ICPD+10.

[75] Though I do not specifically elaborate here on what I mean by public argument analysis, I understand at least one version of it to be closely tied to public deliberation theory. For instance, see John Gastil and Peter Levine, eds., *The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic Engagement in the 21st Century* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2005), James Bohman, *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); John S. Dryzek, *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). For some exemplars of public argument analysis, see William W. Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell, *Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006); Gordon R. Mitchell, *Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics*

"rhetorical criticism . . . is not concerned with permanence, nor yet with beauty. It is concerned with effect. It regards a speech as a communication to a specific audience, and holds its business to be the analysis and appreciation of the orator's method of imparting . . . ideas to . . . hearers."[76] Elsewhere, he notes, "rhetorical criticism lies at the boundary of politics (in the broadest sense) and literature; its atmosphere is that of the public life, its tools are those of literature, its concern is with the idea of the people as influenced by their leaders."[77] Correctives have been made to this basic account, including a restoration of the aesthetic dimension to rhetoric, understanding rhetoric more expansively than just as speeches, and moving beyond a narrow standard of effects as the criterion of rhetorical effectiveness.[78] Nevertheless, Wichelns helped to carve out a role

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in Missile Defense Advocacy (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2000); Gordon R. Mitchell, "Public Argument-Driven Security Studies"; Mitchell and McTigue, "The US Obesity 'Epidemic.'"

[76] Herbert A. Wichelns, "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," in *Readings in Rhetorical Criticism*, ed. Carl R. Burgchardt (State College, PA: Strata Publishing, Inc., 2000), 23.

[77] Wichelns, "Literary Criticism of Oratory," 27.

[78] For one of the primary works that supplied these correctives, under the banner of attacking "Neo-Aristotlean criticism," see Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). Also, David Zarefsky points to the dangers involved in misunderstanding what Wichelns meant by "effects":

> It was easy to misunderstand this advice. 'Effect' suggests an empirical phenomenon, so the task of the rhetorical critic might be thought to be determining what the effects of a speech were. This was a usually futile quest that often produced bad scholarship. Single speeches rarely have discernible effects; they work together with many other causal forces and as part of the broad social and cultural frame in which they are embedded. Moreover, the science of measuring effects of messages on audience attitudes and behavior is inexact at best... It seems unlikely that this is what Wichelns was trying to encourage. His concern, after all, was with criticism, not empirical measurement. Focusing criticism on effects meant that the questions critics were to ask were about the relationship between the text and its possible effects. What does the text reveal about the effects its author might have been seeking? How does the construction of the text invite certain reactions and discourage others? What frame of reference does the text assume and how does this compare with the frame attributed to the audience? What role might this specific text play in a more comprehensive campaign to modify attitudes or behavior? Who are the various possible audiences for the speech? These are examples of critical questions that relate to effects. They involve interpretation and judgment, not measurement. They are answerable not by empirical observation but by reasoned argument. The critic’s task is to make claims on a reader’s judgment and to support those claims by argument, and this is as true of rhetorical criticism as of any other kind (Brockriede).

David Zarefsky, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Rhetorical Criticism: Reflections on Rhetorical Criticism," in *Rhetoric Review* 25, no. 4 (2006): 384.

for rhetorical criticism that stood apart from other, already well-established disciplines such as literature, history, and political science.

Looking back at the development of rhetorical criticism in the Twentieth Century, Richard Leo Enos argues, "work in rhetorical criticism has helped us to better understand the nature of discourse, assess the merits of expressed views, and, in a very real sense, situate discourse within its social contexts. I believe that this last area—understanding discourse within its situational and cultural contexts—may indeed be the single greatest contribution of rhetorical criticism."[79] Expanding on this notion of understanding discourse in context, and arguing forcefully for the significance of rhetorical criticism, not as method, but as a "mode of investigation," Martin J. Medhurst explains:

> I now consider rhetorical criticism to be a mode of investigation rather than a method of analysis. I try to think about public affairs from a rhetorical point of view, to use the resources of rhetoric to reveal matters sometimes far beyond the realm of rhetoric proper. Rhetoric is a mode of analytical thinking that helps the critic ask important questions and explore significant dimensions of public culture—dimensions that our friends in history, political science, and sociology often miss. Rhetoric is a way of teaching that approaches knowledge not as a set of theoretical principles to be understood but as a set of problems, grounded in a historical context, to be analyzed, interpreted, and judged with respect to the kind

[79] Richard Leo Enos, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Rhetorical Criticism. Introduction: The Inclusiveness of Rhetorical Criticism," *Rhetoric Review* 25, no. 4 (2006): 357.

> of action required. Rhetoric is both a strategic and a productive art directly related to leadership in public contexts.[80]

How best does one approach a set of problems in order to see their historical context and analyze, interpret, and judge them? In the next section, I argue that the school of rhetorical criticism that offers the best approach, in general, but also specifically with regard to the set of artifacts I explore, is "close reading."

1.4.2 Approaching Artifacts Through "Close Reading"

As a school or approach to rhetorical criticism, "close reading" (also sometimes referred to as "textual analysis" or "close textual analysis") has earned a prominent status, and has seen among its adherents such luminaries as G. P. Mohrmann, Michael Leff, and Martin J. Medhurst, to name just a few. In an article assessing the legacy of Mohrmann, Leff explains the essential core of close textual criticism:

> The motive for textual criticism . . . is to divert attention away from theoretical constructions and to focus on the rhetorical action embodied in particular discourses. Consequently, the enterprise begins with a severely empirical orientation; the critic must attend to the elements contained within the text itself. The empirical contents of a text, however, are in no way equivalent to the symbolic action that marks a work as a rhetorical discourse. Texts simply do not yield up their own rhetorical interpretation. Critics must move from what is given in the text to something that they themselves produce—an account of the

[80] Martin J. Medhurst, "Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Rhetorical Criticism. Thirty Years Later: A Critic's Tale," *Rhetoric Review* 25, no. 4 (2006): 381.

> rhetorical dynamics implicit within it. At minimum, this act of interpretation requires a means to justify the identification of significant features in the text and to explain the interactions among those features. Since this process necessarily entails principles or categories "not native to the original," it requires an exercise of judgment at some level of abstraction, and it eventuates in something we might call theoretical understanding of the particular case.[81]

Leff explains three significant attributes of this model of criticism: first, it eschews theory in favor of an intensive engagement with the text; second, it starts as a strongly empirical search but transcends the particulars to provide a "rhetorical interpretation" of "the symbolic action that marks a work as a rhetorical discourse"; and third, such an interpretive strategy is capable of theorization, but only as it emerges organically from the close read of the text. Similarly, Stephen E. Lucas, in his analysis of the Declaration of Independence, reflects the attitude of a close reader: "This essay seeks to illuminate that artistry by probing the discourse microscopically—at the level of the sentence, phrase, word, and syllable."[82]

One specific critical upshot in utilizing a close reading strategy is that it makes points of "stasis" more easily recognizable as they operate in a text. Raymond Nadeau defines stasis as a "main issue" in a dispute, and more specifically as "a point in controversy which acts as a focus or center for opposing contentions" that helps to sort primary from secondary sites of disagreement."[83] Beyond its utility for the critic analyzing controversy, stasis theory also helps

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[81] Michael Leff, "Textual Criticism: The Legacy of G.P. Mohrmann," in Carl R. Burgchardt, ed., *Readings in Rhetorical Criticism*, 2nd. Ed. (State College, PA: Strata Publishing, Inc.), 547.

[82] Stephen E. Lucas, "The Stylistic Artistry of the Declaration of Indepdendence," in Carl R. Burgchardt, ed., *Readings in Rhetorical Criticism*, 2nd. Ed. (State College, PA: Strata Publishing, Inc.), 564.

[83] Raymond E. Nadeau, "Hermogenes on 'Stock Issues' in Deliberative Speaking," in *Readings in Argumentation*, ed. Jerry M. Anderson and Paul J.Dovre (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), 142.

the rhetor. Hanns Hohmann argues that stasis theory holds "a central place in the rhetorical theory of invention," as it helps the rhetor in "identifying the central issues in given controversies, and in finding the appropriate argumentative topics useful in addressing these issues."[84] In other words, using the tools of stasis theory helps to sort out "pivot points" in any given public controversy from other, relatively minor arguments.[85]

Rhetorical scholar Lawrence Prelli provides additional structure to stasis theory by adopting Cicero's fourfold typology: "In Topica, he [Cicero] explained that the general stasis questions—'Is it?' 'What is it?' 'Of what sort is it' and 'Is action required?'—constituted methods of invention and judgment in philosophical and other disputes."[86] Beyond its largely

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[84] Hanns Hohmann, "Stasis," in *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 741.

[85] Though stasis theory largely became identified with forensic and judicial rhetoric (as Hohmann and others have noted), it has continued to be a source of scholarly investigation for rhetoricians, including for its possible applications to other genres (such as deliberative). See James G. Backes, "Aristotle's Theory of Stasis in Forensic and Deliberative Speech in the Rhetoric," *Central States Speech Journal* 12 (1960): 6-8; Jeffrey Carroll, "Essence, Stasis, and Dialectic: Ways That Key Terms Can Mean," *Rhetoric Review* 23, no. 2 (2004): 156-170; Otto Alvin Loeb Dieter, "Stasis," *Speech Monographs* 17, no. 4 (1950): 345-369; Jeanne R. Fahnestock and Marie J. Secor, "Grounds for Argument: Stasis Theory and the Topoi," in *Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation*, edited by David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars, and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1983) : 135-142; Alan G. Gross, "Why Hermagoras Still Matters: The Fourth Stasis and Interdisciplinarity," *Rhetoric Review* 23, no. 2 (2004): 141-155; Susan L. Kline, "Toward a Contemporary Linguistic Interpretation of the Concept of Stasis," *Journal of the American Forensic Association* 16 (1979): 95-103; Thomas F. Mader, "The Inherent Need to Analyze Stasis," *Journal of the American Forensic Association* 4 (1967): 13-20; Ray Nadeau, "Some Aristotlean and Stoic Influences on the Theory of Stases," *Speech Monographs* 26, no. 4 (1959): 248-254; Ray Nadeau, "Hermogenes on Stases: A Manual for Declamation," *Speech Monographs* 31, no. 4 (1964): 366-369; Ray Nadeau, "Hermogenes on Stases: The Theory of Stases," *Speech Monographs* 26, no. 4 (1964): 369-373; Ray Nadeau, "Hermogenes on Stases: The History of Stases: Hermagoras to Minucian," *Speech Monographs* 31, no. 4 (1964): 373-381; Ray Nadeau, "Hermogenes on Stases: The Theory," *Speech Monographs* 31, no. 4 (1964): 382-386; Ray Nadeau, "Hermogenes on Stases: The Text," *Speech Monographs* 31, no. 4 (1964): 387-388; Robert P. Newman, "Analysis and Issues—a Study of Doctrine," in *Readings in Argumentation*, ed. Jerry M. Anderson and Paul J. Dovre (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), 166-181; George L. Pullman, "Deliberate Rhetoric and Forensic Stasis: Reconsidering the Scope and Function of an Ancient Rhetorical Heuristic in the Aftermath of the Thomas/Hill Controversy," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 25 (1995): 223-230; K.A. Raign, "Teaching Stones to Talk: Using Stasis Theory to Teach Students the Art of Dialectic," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 24, no. 3/4 (1994): 88-95; Wayne N. Thompson, "Stasis in Aristotle's Rhetoric," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 58, no. 2 (1979): 134-141; Liu Yameng, "Aristotle and the Stasis Theory: A Reexamination," *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (1991): 53-59.

[86] Lawrence Prelli, "Stasis and the Problem of Incommensurate Communication: The Case of Spousal Violence Research," in *Rhetoric and Incommensurability*, ed. Randy Allen Harris (West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press, 2005), 300. For other applications of stasis theory to particular controversies, see Vivian I. Dicks, "Courtroom

unproblematic role in judicial rhetoric, Prelli argues for the relevance and utility of stasis theory in the deliberative arena as well. Extending that insight, I use close reading in this study to uncover, in reference to points of stasis, the ways in which population became (re)defined and (re)interpreted through three decades of UN-sponsored efforts on population.[87] Given the history of population as public argument, all of these stasis questions (including is it and what is it) were in play at these conferences, and I hope to understand their significance in remolding and remaking the issue along these lines.

As I read these texts, I differentiate between two different senses of "stasis." On the one hand, I identify formal/procedural points of stasis. Following the analysis by Lawrence Prelli and others, these points of stasis recur in every controversy, including such key points/questions as is there a problem, what is the problem, of what kind is the problem, and what action should be taken to address the problem.[88] Following the work of Robert Newman and others, these formal/procedural points are particularly apt for the generic designation of "stock issues" in a

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Controversy: A Stasis/Stock Issues Analysis of the Angela Davis Trial," *Journal of the American Forensic Association* 13 (1976): 77-83; R. Pepper Dill, "An Analysis of Stasis in James H. Thornwell's Sermon, 'The Rights and Duties of Masters'," *Journal of Communication & Religion* 11, no. 2 (1988): 19-24; Andrew C. Hansen, "The Stasis in Counter-Statement: 'Applications of the Terminology' as Attempted Reconciliation of the Formal and the Rhetorical," *Rhetoric Review* 20, no. 3/4 (2001): 293-313; Edward A. Hinck and Andrew J. Rist, "Stasis and the Development of Hierarchies for the Resolution of Topicality," in *Argument in Transition: Proceedings of the Third Summer Conference on Argumentation*, edited by David Zarefsky, Malcolm O. Sillars, and Jack Rhodes (Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association, 1983): 800-811; Michael R. Kramer and Kathryn M. Olson, "The Strategic Potential of Sequencing Apologia Stases: President Clinton's Self-Defense in the Monica Lewinsky Scandal," *Western Journal of Communication* 66, no. 3 (2002): 347-368; Charles Marsh, "The Syllogism of Apologia: Rhetorical Stasis Theory and Crisis Communication," *Public Relations Review* 32, no. 1 (2006): 41-46; James F. Stratman, "A Reflection On 'Risk Communication, Metacommunication, and Rhetorical Stases in the Aspen-EPA Superfund Controversy,'" *Journal of Business & Technical Communication* 21, no. 1 (2007): 23-26; James F. Stratman and Carolyn Boykin, "Risk Communication, Metacommunication, and Rhetorical Stases in the Aspen-EPA Superfund Controversy," *Journal of Business & Technical Communication* 9, no. 1 (1995): 37-41.

[87] Indeed, the notion of stasis helps to center a discussion of the role of definition and framing in public policy argument. See Edward Schiappa, *Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning* (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003); Donald A. Schön and Martin Rein, *Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractable Policy Controversies* (New York: BasicBooks, 1994).

[88] Lawrence Prelli, "Stasis and the Problem of Incommensurate Communication."

controversy.[89] Beyond such formally designated points of stasis, however, there are more specific, content-specific/substantive points of stasis that are particular to individual controversies. For instance, a critical point of stasis in the debate about abortion rests on the question of when life begins, while the debate over gun control often involves a contested reading of the Second Amendment. While each content-specific/substantive point of stasis can be categorized into formal/procedural categories, the critic better understands the "pivot points" of a rhetorical text by enumerating both formal and content-specific points of stasis. In addition to utilizing rhetorical criticism and close reading, including a deciphering of relevant points of stasis, my approach also suggests the importance of interpreting rhetoric across time. I engage this part of my mode of investigation in the next section.

1.4.3 Dialectical Approach to Rhetoric in Time

The concept pair of synchronism/diachronism comes from the field of linguistics, particularly the work of Ferdinand de Saussure. Reacting to the dominant trend in linguistics that examined the development of language patterns from a chronological/historical (diachronic) perspective, Saussure advocated the alternative of structuralism, an approach to the study of language that positions components of language as a structure existing at one point in time (in other words, from a synchronic point of view).[90]

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[89] Robert P. Newman, "Analysis and Issues—a Study of Doctrine."

[90] For an analysis that both traces these concepts in the work of Saussure, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Jean Piaget, with a set of applications to the practice of rhetorical criticism, see Barbara Warnick, "Structuralism vs. Phenomenology: Implications for Rhetorical Criticism," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 65, no. 3 (1979): 250-261.

Structuralism's influence has extended outward beyond linguistics, into debates regarding biblical exegesis, and for our purposes, into rhetorical criticism and theory.[91] Barbara Warnick argues that synchronic approaches, as opposed to diachronic ones, produce very different types of rhetorical criticism.[92] Perhaps the most sustained discussion of the synchronic/diachronic pair, however, comes from Michael Calvin McGee's landmark essay on ideographic analysis.[93] McGee argues that one can best understand ideology by surveying the ideographs of a political culture. An ideograph, according to McGee, is "an ordinary language term found in political discourse . . . a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal."[94]

McGee claims that we can study ideographs in two distinct yet interrelated ways: diachronic and synchronic examination. A diachronic survey would chart the historical transformations of a given ideograph, such as "freedom of speech," in order to understand the different ways it has been used across time. McGee argues that such an approach allows the critic to develop a grammar of the ideograph. To understand the rhetoric(al force) of an ideograph, however, one must concentrate on its synchronic dimensions, understanding any particular ideograph in relation to other related ideographs at a given point in time.[95]

McGee's synchronic critical approach continues to play out in the work of his intellectual lineage, including Celeste Condit and John Lucaites, Kevin DeLuca, Marouf Hasian, and most

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[91] For instance, see Johannes Cornelis de Moor, *Synchronic or Diachronic? A Debate on Method in Old Testament Exegesis* (New York: E.J. Brill, 1995).

[92] Warnick, "Structuralism vs. Phenomenology."

[93] Michael Calvin McGee, "The 'Ideograph': A Link between Rhetoric and Ideology," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 66, no. 1 (1980): 1-16. I want to make clear that I do not envision my project as being an ideographic analysis. Though not opposed to McGee's framework, the other conceptual tools developed in this section are more appropriate for analysis of these conferences.

[94] McGee, "The 'Ideograph'": 15.

[95] McGee, "The 'Ideograph'": 12.

recently, Davi Johnson.[96] In another vein, Thomas Farrell discusses Ernest Bormann's fantasy theme analysis that traces "the diachronic development of issues and 'story-line' frames in contemporary political controversy."[97] Speaking more generally, in tracing the scholarly trend to sharpen focus on context and history (which he situates as being a response to McGee's call for more synchronic and diachronic studies), John Murphy notes, "Regardless of the theoretical assumptions that might separate scholars, the importance of the past as a source of invention for political rhetoric infuses current criticism."[98]

Ultimately, this distinction (synchronic versus diachronic) is rather artificial, as high quality scholarship tends both toward synchronic and diachronic analysis. Therefore, while it is useful to understand the *tendency* of any particular scholarship, and whether it is *primarily* diachronic or *primarily* synchronic, we must remember that this functions more as a both/and than as an either/or.[99] As Warnick notes, "A rigid separation of the diachronic and synchronic perspectives would fail to account for the development of the system, and the two methods must be used together if developmental influences are to be considered at all."[100] Extending this concept to the work of rhetorical criticism, Warnick, citing Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, explains, the dialectical perspective" in criticism is "a style of criticism that focuses on the rhetorical work as

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[96] Celeste Michelle Condit and John Louis Lucaites, *Crafting Equality: America's Anglo-African Word* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Kevin Michael DeLuca, *Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism* (New York: Guilford Press, 1999); Kevin DeLuca, "Articulation Theory: A Discursive Grounding for Rhetorical Practice," *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 32, no. 4 (1999): 334-348; Marouf Hasian Jr, "Authenticity, Public Memories, and the Problematics of Post-Holocaust Remembrances: A Rhetorical Analysis of the Wikomirski Affair," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 91, no. 3 (2005): 231-263; Davi Johnson, "Mapping the Meme: A Geographical Approach to Materialist Rhetorical Criticism," *Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies* 4, no. 1 (2007): 27-50.

[97] Thomas B. Farrell, "Critical Models in the Analysis of Discourse," *Western Journal of Speech Communication* 44, no. 4 (1980): 300-314.

[98] John M. Murphy, "History, Culture, and Political Rhetoric," *Rhetoric Review* 20, no. 1/2 (2001): 47.

[99] I draw my understanding of “tendencies” in a text from Kenneth Burke. *Counter-Statement*.

[100] Warnick, "Structuralism vs. Phenomenology": 258.

it emerges from the complex of historical events which brought it into existence and views discourse as a joint venture in meaning shared by rhetor and audience and directed toward some future project."[101]

My study of these UN-sponsored population conferences can be understood through the lens of this "dialectical perspective." I look at the particular structure and web of relevant concepts for each framing of the argument at each point in time (1974, 1984, 1994, 1999, 2004), but also across time, to chart both temporal transformations and continuities in the rhetoric of population.[102]

My dialectical approach, with its focus on diachronic tracing, delivers two significant critical returns. First, Ron Greene's work suggests that the issue of (over)population *in particular* has been significantly reframed at multiple points throughout its history (for instance, in terms of development, security, and green politics).[103] My approach zeroes in on these inflection points while also analyzing some of the (purportedly) newest iterations, including reproductive health and reproductive rights. Second, my study investigates the ways in which meaning moved and/or remained stable across time, from Bucharest to the ICPD follow-up conferences. While Risse suggests that argumentative exchanges drive change, his approach focuses on the ways that individual opinions shift as argumentative exchanges unfold.[104] My mode of investigation combines the strengths of rhetorical criticism with public argument analysis, using the attendant

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[101] Warnick, "Structuralism vs. Phenomenology": 258.

[102] Furthermore, my decision to break up the linear time unfolding by starting with Cairo aids in this critical endeavor by exposing temporal dimensions that otherwise might be taken for granted. For instance, creating one linear, chronological ordering suggests a strong possibility for an evolutionary, progressive understanding of history generally or the specific history of particular issues being examined. Such framings ignore the possibility of circling back to prior points, jumping ahead to something new without taking the steps in between, and other temporal disruptions.

[103] Greene, *Malthusian Worlds*.

[104] Risse, "'Let's Argue!'"

three-fold sense, argument as product, argument as process, and argument as method, to elucidate transformations in the argumentative terrain through time.[105] In order to shape these acts of rhetorical criticism, I deploy a Burkean approach,, including and particularly with his focus on cluster-agon analysis, as a concrete reading strategy for engaging and unpacking these rather dense documents (or, in the language of Leff, the means to start the encounter with the empirical dimensions of the text).

1.4.4 Cluster-Agon Analysis

Kenneth Burke developed numerous critical tools for deciphering what is "going on" in a text. Early on, these tools were geared primarily toward literary analysis (such as his work in *Counter-Statement*), but as he continued to observe similarities between the world of literature and the world of rhetoric, his focus widened.[106] While most famous for the concept of the pentad, another critical part of Burke's analysis is the cluster-agon method of analysis. John Lynch explains that a statistical spirit drives such inquiry:

> According to Burke, any given literary or rhetorical work "contains a set of implicit equations. He [the rhetor, male or female] uses 'associated clusters.' And you may, by examining his [or her] work, find 'what goes with what' in these

[105] See, for instance, Wayne Brockriede, "Arguers as Lovers," *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 5, no. 1 (1972): 1-11; Douglas Ehninger, "Argument as Method: Its Nature, Its Limitations and Its Uses," *Speech Monographs* 37, no. 2 (1970): 101-110. Also, see Joseph W. Wenzel, "Three Perspectives on Argument: Rhetoric, Dialectic, Logic," in *Perspectives in Argumentation: Essays in Honor of Wayne Brockriede*, ed. Janice Schuetz and Robert Trapp (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1990), 9-26. Wenzel discusses argument as product, as process, and as procedure.

[106] Burke, *Counter-Statement*.

> clusters—what kinds of acts and images and personalities and situations go with his notions of heroism, villainy, consolation, despair, etc."[107]

Lynch points out that it is a mistake to view cluster-agon analysis as being primarily a tool to understand the rhetor's private "symbolic autobiography" (as has been the prominent tendency in Rueckert and others), since this "overly restricts the use of the method." Instead, Lynch argues that we can understand the public content of rhetoric via the cluster-agon method, since "all symbolic action has a public component."[108] Beyond generally deciphering "what is going on" in a text, Sonja K. Foss explains that cluster-agon helps to uncover meaning, as "the critic is able to locate the conflict or opposition in the principles and images of the discourse."[109]

In a sense, cluster-agon analysis resembles content analysis, as it undertakes a hybrid quantitative-qualitative excavation of texts in order to understand, in a broad sense, "how the symbols function for the rhetor."[110] William Rueckert and Carol Berthold were among the first to try to systematically lay out the analytical moves entailed in the cluster-agon technique.[111] Building on their work and more recent attempts to utilize the method, Lynch explains the four-step analysis involved in cluster-agon criticism (see Table 1). [112]

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[107] John A. Lynch, "Race and Radical Renamings: Using Cluster Agon Method to Assess the Radical Potential of 'European American' as a Substitute for 'White,'" *The KB Journal* 2 (2006), http://www.kbjournal.org/lynch (accessed September 7, 2008).

[108] Lynch, "Race and Radical Renamings."

[109] Sonja K. Foss, "Women Priests in the Episcopal Church: A Cluster Analysis of Establishment Rhetoric," *Religious Communication Today* 7 (1984): 3.

[110] Foss, "Women Priests," 3.

[111] Carol A. Berthold, "Kenneth Burke's Cluster-Agon Method: Its Development and an Application," *Central States Speech Journal* 27 (1976): 302-309; William H. Rueckert, *Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1963).

[112] Lynch, "Race and Radical Renamings."

Table 1. Cluster-Agon Analysis

Steps	Details
1. "identify the important or key terms of the study"	Select these "either a priori or through an organic reading of the text"
2. "identif[y] terms that appear in the same context as the key term(s)"	After identifying, the critic "ranks them according to frequency of appearance and the intensity or power of the term."
3. "identif[y] clusters, 'the verbal combinations and equations in which the speaker tends to associate a key term with other terms."	Can locate such associations by "conjunction, the attribution of cause-effect relationships between terms, the consistent use of imagery associated with the key term, proximity, and an indirect relationship through a third term."
4. "identif[y] agons, those terms in opposition to the key term that provide symbolic conflict."	Can locate these in "some form of 'contraposition,' which includes direct opposition and negation, description of a potential competition between terms, imagery portraying opposition or struggle, indirect opposition vis a vis a third term, and enumeration. Enumeration refers to times when terms are placed side-by-side, and either through explicit identification or through the context of the comments, the speaker identifies the terms as distinct and potentially opposing."

Cluster-agon analysis provides a concrete reading strategy to unpack UN population conference documents.[113] However, a few adaptations are needed to tailor the analytical tool to the artifacts examined in my case studies. Rather than viewing these changes as shortcomings, either of the method or of its fit to the texts, these modifications offer insights that might prove useful for other rhetorical critics as well. The first major difference between Burke's sense of

[113] Significantly, R. Charli Carpenter's work suggests that IR scholarship is already realizing the value of scholarship that engages in such quantitative-qualitative hybrid reading strategies in order to produce high-quality interpretive analysis. In addition to the movement in IR scholarship to embrace such approaches, academic approaches to the international issue of human population growth, and even more particularly, to UN conferences on population growth, have also experimented with such strategies. Matthew Connelly's *Fatal Misconception* engages in some very informal textual analysis, in something resembling my own cluster-agon work:

> Because of the failed push for population control, the WPPA did not give strong backing for family planning services. The principle of national sovereignty was explicitly recognized no fewer than five times. The "international community," on the other hand, was given just two priority assignments: reducing mortality and boosting food production. As for nongovernmental organizations, many delegates displayed open hostility. NGOs, mentioned only once in the final document, were directed to work "within the framework of national laws, policies, and regulations." (315)

While this helps to model a way of meaningfully engaging these texts and while it illustrates the value of international conference documents on population as sites for close textual analysis, Connelly's narrative focus differs from the textually-driven approach taken by this study.

cluster-agon and my own is that Burke is very focused on the individual rhetor and, beyond that, the psychology of the rhetor. Berthold notes that this method is valuable because it allows us to analyze "the motives and characters of speakers," and that it can "enable one to gain an objective picture of the rhetoric of a given speaker."[114] While this is a valuable framework for analyzing the rhetoric of individual agents, it is less useful when it comes to analyzing group-produced documents where the personality and the character of the author(s) are deemphasized.[115] Instead, as Lynch notes, we can and should use cluster-agon in ways that understand public content rather than biography. In this sense, adapting cluster-agon outward from individual agent-based actually offers critics another tool for a broad range of texts in which there are many and/or unnamed authors. The second major difference relates to the search for agons in a text. As consensus documents, largely devoid of explicit controversy, the “agons” in these conference documents are much less clear than would be found in standard, adversarial political discourse. The “enemy” is not clear and, given the precariousness of support (financial and otherwise) for implementing the vision of the documents, these texts seem hesitant about engaging in *kategoria*, or accusations against any specific actors. Therefore, searching for agons in this case is necessarily indirect, and with rare exceptions, requires reading by implication rather than more directly. At points during the analysis, I suggest where an agon is being expressed, but just as powerfully, the question of what agons are implied but absent and why opens another venue for valuable scholarship. The third major difference relates to critical objective. As noted above, Burke's framework has been used to try to discern the character/psychology of the author (such

[114] Berthold, "Kenneth Burke's Cluster-Agon Method": 302, 309.

[115] In this vein, Foss' piece on the "establishment rhetoric" of the Episcopal Church is a valuable tool, as it shows that cluster-agon analysis does not rely on the personality of the rhetors but can instead elucidate an array of rhetoric organized by topic/theme rather than by agent. This possibility is also anticipated by Berthold's “Kenneth Burke’s Cluster-Agon Method,” which claims, "the method provides a way of comparing the rhetoric of several speakers," indicating the possibility of transcending the individual rhetor in cluster-agon analysis.

as his analysis of Coleridge). Many population conference documents are group-authored reports, each reflecting the work of many contributors, making it difficult to discern sole-author-centric qualities such as "the motives and characters of speakers." In many ways, as suggested above, this move is a productive one insofar as it pushes cluster-agon analysis beyond individual rhetors. For my study, I adapt in light of this by deploying cluster-agon reading to assist in my acts of rhetorical criticism that ultimately help to interpret, understand, and judge the rhetoric of these documents. By assessing the changing (and stable) cluster-agon emphases across time, my reading strategy highlights shifts away from and continuities with previous iterations of public argument over population.[116] Featuring both shifts and continuities yields critical returns, as I am able to both observe the malleability of population rhetoric across time, thus discrediting the idea that population rhetoric can only ever be one way, while also pushing back on the idea that population rhetoric, or really, any rhetoric, is always in flux. The latter tendency over-estimates the amount of novelty in each instantiation, while the former approach lends a fixed ontological status to something that, as Aristotle notes, is capable of being otherwise.

1.5 CHAPTER ORGANIZATION AND PREVIEW

Perhaps the most straightforward approach to working through these conferences, on first look, is to arrange them chronologically: Bucharest (1974), Mexico City (1984), Cairo (1994),

[116] In offering alternative directions for cluster-agon analysis, Berthold notes, "Cluster-agon analysis might also be employed as a precise method of discovering key term relationships in the rhetoric of a social movement." See Berthold, "Kenneth Burke's Cluster-Agon Method." This critical move parallels McGee's notion that "social movement" can be indicative of a shift in collective meaning rather than merely marking the presence of a protest group bringing voice to bear on social problems. Michael Calvin McGee, "'Social Movement': Phenomenon or Meaning?" *Central States Speech Journal* 31 (1980): 233-244; Michael Calvin McGee, "Social Movement as Meaning," *Central States Speech Journal* 34 (1983): 74-77.

ICPD+5 (1999), ICPD+10 (2004). However, I have chosen to alter this organizational pattern, such that I start with Cairo in Chapter 2, then turn to Bucharest and Mexico City in Chapter 3, and then reach ICPD+5 and ICPD+10 in Chapter 4. This ordering might appear counterintuitive, but I do it for two primary reasons. First, one of the most important questions I pursue, as one of the "big picture" questions of the entire dissertation, is whether claims in support of Cairo's novelty/paradigm change are warranted. Thus, by starting with Cairo, it then is much easier to view the claims of Cairo with regard to its past and future. Second, the rhetorical framing of these conferences, from the perspective of temporality and chrono-logics, is rooted in a progressive, evolutionary telos. By arranging the chapters in a strictly linear order, then, the dissertation already presumes the framing that I seek to interrogate. If the texts do indeed end up being progressive, this pattern does not preclude a reader from making that interpretive move, but if they are not, only my arrangement precludes a reader from understanding the movement across time without "stacking the deck" against them.

1.5.1 Chapter Two: The Craft of Cairo

Preparations for the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development began as early as 1991, the year that the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) agreed on the need and goals for the conference. In particular, when the resolution authorizing the Cairo conference passed, the enabling provisions of the resolution also formed six expert groups to help plan this landmark event. One of these expert groups, the Expert Group on Population Policies and Programmes, framed the question of quantitative population targets in a way that affirmed existing precedent (endorsing "the ultimate, internationally accepted goal . . . the stabilization of global population within the shortest period possible"), rather than emphasizing a

sharp break from it.[117] This goal of "stabilization" implies a quantitative vision of numerical limits to carrying capacity, thereby reaffirming the quantitative, Malthusian sense of global limits. Such an approach appears at odds with the efforts of the Cairo conference, especially with regard to how it has been memorialized, by participants, scholars, and activists (as chronicled earlier in this chapter). More in line with the approach of Cairo is the group's emphasis on integrating an array of different factors as the only sustainable approach to population. Specifically, the Expert Group Meeting on Population Policies and Programmes recommended all of the following as part of their vision of achieving "comprehensive population and development policies":

> While population limitation objectives were best made explicit and operationally defined in terms of quantitative targets, the participants noted that it might be better, in some instances, to integrate such goals with broader social and economic development strategies. Policies that complemented population limitation measures should be included in explicit population policies. Those might include interventions such as raising the minimum legal age at marriage, introducing literacy and educational programmes for women, encouraging young girls to stay in school longer, mobilizing non-governmental organizations for family planning campaigns, encouraging the private and commercial sector to play a more active role in population matters and so forth. Availability of contraceptive methods was a crucial element in a comprehensive population

[117] United Nations Expert Group on Population Policies and Programmes. "Recommendations." As I suggest throughout the dissertation, this move foreshadows the rhetorical role and prevalence of precedent in UN population conference texts.

policy. When appropriate, local production of contraceptives should be fully supported.[118]

My investigation of the Cairo conference, and more specifically, its official Programme of Action, will be guided by the following research questions:

- As the tensions in these expert group passages already suggest, what is the relationship between the Programme of Action and quantitative/demographic approaches to population?
- How does the Programme of Action conceptualize the relationship between development and demographics (or, more generally, "population")?
- In calling for communication to carry out its goals, how does the Programme of Action conceive of the types of approach and types of knowledge that it will seek to employ and secure?
- To what degree does the document explicitly reference controversies, either that were present at the conference, or that shape the scene/context of the conference's efforts?
- How does the Programme of Action balance particular calls with more universal calls?
- How does the Programme of Action make space for participation by non-governmental actors?
- How does the Cairo conference manage the perennial rhetorical challenge of *kairos* (timeliness and appropriateness)?

[118] United Nations Expert Group on Population Policies and Programmes. "Recommendations."

1.5.2 Chapter Three: The Early Years: Foil or Precursor?

As noted earlier in this chapter, there were two major UN population conferences leading up to Cairo. In 1974, the World Population Conference was held in Bucharest. In 1984, Mexico City hosted the International Conference on Population. By examining these conferences I will both understand them on their own terms and also build further context to examine and interrogate the claims of novelty surrounding the 1994 ICPD. Specifically, I will consult the key work products from these conferences, Bucharest's "World Population Plan of Action" (1974) and Mexico City's "Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the World Population Plan of Action" (1984), as I pursue the following research questions:

- How does the rise of the Group of ’77 and the NIEO influence the way in which the Bucharest and Mexico City conferences treat the relationship between demographics and development?
- How do Bucharest and Mexico City imagine geographies of population?
- How are appeals to sovereignty and international action negotiated at Bucharest and Mexico City?
- How are rhetoric, argument, communication, and deliberation referenced or insinuated in these two conferences?
- In what ways do these texts preview (or diverge from) the key themes embodied in the ICPD Programme of Action?
- What is the relationship between Reagan’s “Mexico City policy” and the text of the Mexico City document?

1.5.3 Chapter Four: Reaffirmation or Reconfiguration?

As part of the follow-up to the Cairo conference, there were efforts in 1999 (ICPD +5) and in 2004 (ICPD+10), to evaluate the progress being made toward the goals detailed in the Cairo Programme of Action. Each five-year evaluation produced documents with formal findings: "Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development" (1999, ICPD+5) and *ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms Cairo. Official Outcomes of the ICPD at Ten Review* (2004, ICPD+10). I will examine the work produced by each follow-up session with the following research questions in mind:

- What are the major reflexive judgments made about the benefits and shortcomings of the Cairo conference?
- How pervasive is the language of "sustainable development" in these follow-up documents, now that significant time has passed since the Rio conference where the term was popularized?
- How do these documents consider the appropriateness of sharing of responsibilities between the public and private sectors?
- How do appeals to precedent function in these documents?
- In what ways do these documents contain neoliberal assumptions?
- How do “advocacy,” “civil society,” and “strategy” get configured in these texts?

1.5.4 Chapter Five: Conclusion

In chapter 5, I will summarize the key themes and findings from my study. I will return to the research questions that drove the study to see what types of preliminary conclusions one might

draw. I will utilize my analysis, particularly from Chapters 2 and 3, to weigh in authoritatively on whether or not the claims of novelty and paradigm change are warranted and, if they not, what the significance of such a falsehood might be. Additionally, I will speculate on future research in the area of population rhetoric and public argument, and what types of new and ongoing research questions this study suggests. I will also make some preliminary observations about possibilities in the future direction of the public argument on population. Finally, I will suggest some relevant theoretical findings and ongoing questions suggested by this project.

1.6 CONCLUSION

This dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding of a long-standing controversy: population growth (at times articulated as "overpopulation"). Though Rio started the pairing of environmental and economic concerns, it was not until Cairo, according to numerous scholars, activists, and policymakers, that environmental advocates linked environmental and public health issues. Given the range of issues that population implicates, including environmental degradation, state control over fertility and reproduction, women's rights, and public health, the academic study of population continues to be timely, with implications across multidisciplinary horizons.

The groundwork laid in this chapter positions us now to turn to each major historical moment being surveyed, starting in Cairo in 1994, moving back to Bucharest in 1974 and Mexico City in 1984, and concluding with a five-year commemoration in 1999 and a largely decentralized ten-year review of the Cairo conference in 2004. At each point of historical analysis, I aim to elucidate key rhetorical features of the public argument as it was presented at

that particular point in time. Rather than attempt to chart every aspect of every conference, my goal is to utilize the unique tools offered by rhetorical criticism and theory and public argument analysis in order to provide a product that tells us not only about the rhetoric of these conferences for rhetoric's sake, but about features of these conferences that, like Medhurst noted previously in this chapter, may be missed by scholars and practitioners approaching the artifacts from another perspective or "mode of investigation." As such, I position some of my findings as an attempt to contribute to conversations and debates in other contexts, such as IR, the UN, and demographics/population. Along the way, I also consider what can be successfully articulated as connections and relationships between and among these conferences, and whether the current, evolutionary framing of these conferences across time, gels with the close textual read offered in each chapter and with the cumulative analysis offered in the concluding chapter.

2.0 THE CRAFT OF CAIRO

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the early months of 1994, the world community completed preparations for a large-scale, intergovernmental, United Nations (UN)-sponsored conference on population. Perhaps the most notable element of the international "scene" was that it was situated in a post-Cold War context. As Jyoti Shankar Singh notes: "The ICPD [International Conference on Population and Development] process benefited from several political developments in the early 1990s. The end of the Cold War meant that the East-West issues, some of which created tensions and difficulties at both Bucharest and Mexico City, would not be a major factor in the discussions and negotiations leading up to Cairo."[1] The fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in a newfound sense of optimism and hope about the possibilities of international relations, leading some to go so far as to describe the moment as "the end of history."[2] In this spirit, even the Israel-Palestine question (a recurring, disabling point of controversy at all UN discussions, but particularly those including components relating to migration) was downplayed in favor of focusing on the task at hand. That task was to commit the international community and its constituent elements to a new

[1] Jyoti Shankar Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population: The International Conference on Population and Development* (London: Earthscan, 1998), 27-28.

[2] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* (Summer 1989), http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm (accessed July 25, 2010) and Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 2006).

"Programme of Action." Rather than merely fine-tuning earlier efforts, Cairo conferees were authorized to and charged with the duty of charting a new course for population activities. Furthermore, this charge was broad in scope: "The 1994 Conference was explicitly given a broader mandate on development issues than previous population conferences, reflecting the growing awareness that population, poverty, patterns of production and consumption and the environment are so closely interconnected that none of them can be considered in isolation."[3] Thus, the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo, Egypt in 1994, was tasked with a bold mission and a broad mandate, with a backdrop of a near-euphoric global sensibility toward international cooperation.[4]

This chapter examines the Programme of Action of the ICPD, agreed to in Cairo, in order to understand its primary rhetorical features as a public argument (or, in other words, how it operates) and to interpret the vision on human population it advanced (or, in other words, to examine the substance of its claims).[5] I focus my analysis on the dynamics of the text itself,

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[3] United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), "Report of the ICPD (94/10/18)." http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html (Accessed December 27, 2008), Para 1.5.

[4] Admittedly, the international geopolitical situation was far from idyllic. The War in Bosnia spanned the period 1992-1995, and in 1993, images of dead US (United States) soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia traumatized the American public and called into question the will of the US to play the role of superpower, insofar as that may entail humanitarian intervention (such fatigue continued with images of instability during US involvement in Haiti in 1994). On the media-politics nexus of the Mogadishu event, see, for instance, Jacqueline E. Sharkey, "When Pictures Drive Foreign Policy," *American Journalism Review* (December 1993), http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=1579 (accessed July 25, 2010). Additionally, the Rwandan genocide occurred in early 1994. Nevertheless, there were tangible signs of hope, such as the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the Israel-Jordan peace treaty in 1994 (though Oslo eventually fell apart, this was not until after Cairo, following Rabin's death in 1995). Throughout the 1990s, despite many events such as the War in Kosovo, the future of international relations (IR) looked uncertain, and, at least potentially, hopeful. On September 11, 2001, a new era began, whose chapter cannot yet be fully written, but clearly stands in sharp contrast to the euphoria of the 1990s. The post-9/11 IR climate might more closely represent what Samuel Huntington, one of Fukuyama's main interlocutors, has called "the clash of civilizations."

[5] "Report of the ICPD."

rather than weighing factors extrinsic to the text.[6] The following pages provide a "close reading," a primarily internal and textually-driven rhetorical analysis of the final conference document. By fleshing out the primary and most important characteristics of the Cairo text, I will then be in a better position to consider this effort in regard to its predecessors, Bucharest and Mexico City (Chapter 3), as well as its successors, ICPD+5 and ICPD+10 (Chapter 4). Before embarking on such analysis, however, I begin with a short historical overview surrounding the Cairo conference itself.

2.2 CAIRO: SETTING THE SCENE

With the approval of Resolution 47/176 on December 22, 1992 by the General Assembly of the UN, formal preparations began for the 1994 ICPD.[7] Supported by a confluence of factors working in its favor (including, as noted above, the end of the Cold War), the site of the conference proved particularly opportune as well:

> Convening the meeting in Cairo turned out to be a felicitous choice: as a moderate Muslim state, it was able to reassure the Vatican and prevent most other Muslim governments from boycotting the conference for fears of the positions that the USA might take.[8]

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[6] Recall from Chapter 1 that my intent in the current project is to provide a close reading of the official conference texts, rather than of the multiple external texts that also bear on this public argument (such as, for instance, the acts of memorializing Cairo and/or the other related conferences).

[7] Michael G. Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences* (London: Routledge, 2005), 134. Though formal approval occurred in 1992, the preparations began even earlier, in 1989, as Singh explains. *Creating a New Consensus on Population*, 22.

[8] Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences*,134.

In the broadest sense, the conference was devoted to "the theme of population, sustained economic growth and sustainable development."[9] Again, the opportune timing of the conference is notable: just two years earlier, in 1992, the UN had convened the Rio Conference, of which the most lasting buzz-term was and continues to be "sustainable development." Therefore, the Cairo attendees were well positioned to make arguments that advanced economic development, but that also viewed economic development as one part of a larger whole, which included, among other components, the environment and natural resources. Also, the conference was set to occur just one year before the Beijing conference, giving Cairo participants a unique opportunity to engage questions such as women's rights, educating girls on par with boys, and eliminating discriminating based on sex and/or gender, both discrimination enshrined in law as well as "de facto" discrimination.

As Michael Schechter notes, there were notable reasons both for hope and for doubt emerging from the conference's outcomes. On the one hand, the Programme of Action was a success: "No voices were raised against the Program of Action as a whole and the fact that the Vatican limited its reservations to parts of the Program of Action was considered quite a triumph."[10] Thus, spectators and participants were able to proclaim that a *consensus*, rather than merely a majority or super majority, had been attained.[11] The rhetorical force of such a claim is powerful: just as a 9-0 Supreme Court decision makes an undivided statement, unlikely to be challenged or overturned, so too does a consensus spell overwhelming agreement on the part of

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[9] Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences*, 135.

[10] Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences*, 138.

[11] Of course, its status as a consensus document could also be marshaled by opponents as a definitive sign of just how off course the international community had gone.

all (or almost all) of the international community.[12] On the other hand, a concern voiced in the document, and borne out in the immediate aftermath of the conference, relates to the financing of the policies and programs: "donor commitments have consistently fallen short."[13] While we may choose to attribute these shortfalls to rocky economic times, there have been many periods of time, between 1994 and the present, in which we have witnessed sufficient global economic growth (and, for instance, US economic growth) that could have easily covered (and even far exceeded) the amounts to meet donor commitments.

While there are a variety of ways of approaching the Cairo conference and its outcomes, my primary concern is textual and internal, that is, with the rhetorical outcomes of the conference (in particular the final, agreed-upon Programme), and this is best expressed by means of close rhetorical analysis of the final conference Programme of Action. One contextual element that overshadowed much of the conference itself, however, was the topic of abortion. The Vatican chose to make a set of public arguments in order to challenge any and every passage in the text that could be seen as promoting or allowing for abortion. This decision led international observers and the media to focus on this one issue, and even give air time to blatant lies about the issue (such as, for instance, that the conference was attempting to create an international right to abortions), to the exclusion of the rest of the conference work.[14] The danger with following such

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[12] However, a rhetorical perspective also warrants backing off of the triumph of achieving consensus. While consensus is a powerful outcome, it also suggests that "the debate is over"/"there is no debate here." Such a closing of deliberation makes efforts at dissent particularly difficult, as people begin to assume the consensus point of view as fact/knowledge rather than as an argument. In this sense, such closing of the debate is similar to a dead metaphor where its status as metaphor has been lost. None of this is to suggest that there is necessarily anything substantively dangerous about the "Cairo Consensus," but rather to point out that the form of the argument contains particular entailments that may be problematic from the perspective of deliberation.

[13] Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences*, 138.

[14] In this sense, the theatrics of the Vatican in attempting to monopolize the discussion surrounding Cairo are very similar to the efforts by US President Reagan's administration to obscure and obfuscate all other action that took place at the 1984 Mexico City conference.

tracts of analysis as a critic far removed from the conference itself is that such an approach misses all of the other important rhetorical work done by the text itself, it ignores its long-term implications (after the dust had settled regarding the abortion issue), and it engages in the exact strategy of reading that I argue against throughout this dissertation. Instead of finding one phrase in one page and using it to create and define the fight, we would be better served, as scholars and citizens, by engaging in more of a close reading of a text as a whole (a theme to which I return in Chapter 5).

2.3 THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION (1994)

2.3.1 Navigating the Text

In the following two sections, I provide both a brief description of the structure of the Programme of Action (form) as well as a short account its primary argument/point of view (content/substance).

2.3.1.1 Structure of the Text

The Programme of Action of the ICPD, the official document produced by the Cairo conference, is composed of sixteen chapters. Other than the opening two chapters (the former being a preamble, the latter being a chapter on the "Principles" underlying the document), the other chapters are organized in a recurring pattern: "Basis for action," "Objectives," and "Actions." In many cases, there are significant sub-sections in each chapter. Where those occur, each sub-section contains this same "basis for action-objectives-actions" feature. Chapters 13-15

are different from Chapters 3-12 insofar as they more explicitly detail roles for agents (national, international, and "partnership with non-governmental sector," respectively). Chapter 16, "Follow-up to the Conference," details "activities" to be taken at the national, sub-regional, regional, and international level to ensure that progress is being made toward the goals of the Programme of Action. The Cairo Programme of Action, then, is a formidable rhetorical artifact, with over 42,000 words.

Table 2. Top 20 Terms, Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo)[15]

Top 20 Terms: Frequency (Rank Indicated by Number)
1. Development
2. Population
3. Countries
4. Health
5. International
6. Programmes
7. Women
8. Governments
9. Including
10. Reproductive
11. Education
12. Services
13. Economic
14. Action
15. National
16. Social
17. Organizations
18. Family
19. Levels
20. People

[15] www.wordle.net. Wordle allows a user to select how many terms to see at a time. For instance, selecting "1" will show only the most prominent term in the text. Using this method, I expanded the number, one at a time, until I had a list, in order, of the top 20 terms in the document. This analysis was performed on May 14, 2009. There are significant limits, despite the utility of Wordle. For instance, it is not capable of "stemming" (http://www.wordle.net/faq). As a default, Wordle screens out "Stop Words" (and, the, etc…) (http://www.wordle.net/faq), which in this case, is actually very useful. Also, as a default, Wordle treats words as separate. It is possible to combine words using a tilde, but given that these documents have, at a minimum, around 10,000 words, this is not very practical, and assumes in advance what I would be looking for in any case. For a visual representation, not only of the top 20 terms, but of the entire document, see Appendix A.

2.3.1.2 Crafting a Point of View

Given that, by a conservative estimate, there are at least 243 action clauses in the Programme of Action, and furthermore, that many of those clauses contain numerous formal or informal sub-clauses, it would be impossible and counter-productive to catalog the full range of recommendations or policies advocated or ruled out by the document. However, there are some important broad themes that can help to characterize the essence of the document.

The major argument of the document, especially in terms of demographic trends, seems to be this: on the whole, people will, under optimal conditions, pursue small and sustainable family sizes. The best way to achieve demographic goals, then, is to create conditions where such actions are possible (such as education, economic opportunities, health services), and to fulfill "unmet needs" (for instance, of contraceptives). In its most explicit discussion of demographic goals in the entire document, the Programme of Action argues, based on past population activities, that the best approach is to empower people to do the right thing: "The success of population education and family-planning programmes in a variety of settings demonstrates that informed individuals everywhere can and will act responsibly in the light of their own needs and those of their families and communities."[16] This same section goes on to discourage coercion, incentive/disincentive programs, as well as any program that would anchor demographic goals on "targets or quotas for the recruitment of clients."[17]

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[16] "Report of the ICPD," Para 7.12. As Singh notes, the decision to maintain "individuals" was an important decision at the conference. At Bucharest and Mexico City, there were references to "couples and individuals" in terms of reproductive freedoms, but at Cairo, some parties wanted to make it refer only to "couples." However, partly based on the power of precedent, those parties that wanted to maintain the phrasing "couples and individuals" (and other references to "individuals" in the document) were victorious. Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population*.

[17] "Report of the ICPD," Para 7.12. While the document discourages and opposes incentive/disincentive schemes for demographic goals, it does advocate the use of incentives for other social goals suggested in the document (see 9.5, 11.8).

Beyond this important demographic argument, the document suggests a range of different types of actions, including: policy change, international cooperation, monetary/financial support, attitude change, behavior change, raising awareness, increasing political commitment, mobilizing public opinion, improving knowledge, increasing research, speaking out, supporting existing international agreements and conventions, as well as more nebulous "shoulds." In general, then, it is less useful to understand the document primarily in terms of specific actions or policies recommended than to grasp the basic attitude conveyed by the document. That attitude appears to be characterized by a weaving of an ever more intricate web that appreciates complexity and opposes reductionist approaches. Essentially, this document indicates that the simple formulas of Malthus, simple demographic approaches, simple incentive/disincentive schemes, and other reductive approaches cannot account for the complexity of involved factors. To borrow from social scientific communication theory, this approach might be characterized as something similar to a systems-level, "cybernetic" approach.[18] In this worldview, it makes sense that there are so many references in the document to interconnections, interrelationships, intersectoral linkages, interlinages, and the need for integrated actions, incorporating multiple sectors, and linkages in policies and approaches. For instance, in the beginning of the document, it points to the importance of addressing "broad issues of and interrelationships between population, sustained economic growth and sustainable development, and advances in the education, economic status and empowerment of women" and "fundamental population, health, education and development challenges."[19]

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[18] Stephen W. Littlejohn and Karen A. Foss, *Theories of Human Communication*, 8th Ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005).

[19] "Report of the ICPD," Paras 1.5, 1.4.

As important as what types of actions should be taken, and what underlying approach characterizes such recommendations, the document also emphasizes the importance of *how* one makes these changes. The underlying approach here is that we should work to maximize participation of involved organizations, individuals, and groups.[20] In addition to devoting an entire chapter to involving non-governmental organizations, the document also regularly references how important it is to consult groups as policies and actions are being devised and implemented, and how in many cases groups should participate as early as the formulation stage and as late as the evaluation stage. Thus calls for participation, involvement, collaboration, consultation, and incorporating (user/gender) perspectives appear regularly in the document. Thus, rather than confining actions to population experts and/or governmental agents, the document suggests a role for all elements of society:

> Implementation of effective population policies in the context of sustainable development, including reproductive health and family-planning programmes, require new forms of participation by various actors at all levels in the policy-making process.[21]

Rhetorically, this overall vision faces at least one major concern: how to deal with other approaches that it finds to be troublesome or counterproductive. In calling attention to more problematic ways of envisioning and acting on population concerns, the document faces particular rhetorical challenges. Both not wanting to demonize potential allies, and because of the specific way that international opinion on population is constructed in the document ("The

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[20] While I characterize "participation" here as a means to particular ends, the document also, in numerous places, suggests participation as an end itself. Most significantly, it calls for the full participation of women (see, for instance, 1.7).

[21] "Report of the ICPD," Para 3.27.

world as a whole has changed in ways that create important new opportunities for addressing population and development issues. Among the most significant are the major shifts in attitude among the world's people and their leaders in regard to reproductive health, family planning and population growth"), the document works more in elaborating on agons and problems as scene, rather than on the agents of those problems.[22] In this way, it attempts an almost agent-less description of problems, both to prevent alienation and to claim that everybody is in support of the right direction but they have just been unable (for instance, due to a lack of resources) or conditioned by factors beyond their control (such as having to engage in structural adjustment) that have, as of yet, not allowed them to act more forcefully. Alternately, such statements may be framed almost as a quasi-hypothetical: we are not saying that this has happened before, but in any case, we should make sure that it does not happen now or in the future. In the next section, I chart a number of other rhetorical trajectories linked to the Programme of Action.

2.3.2 Rhetorical Analysis

If earlier public arguments surrounding population were considered too simplistic (such as those of Malthus), Cairo's Programme of Action runs the risk of being so complicated and multi-layered that it risks losing a clear "residual message," a theme to which I return later this chapter.[23] Despite the array of possible vectors for analysis, given this multi-layered, dense, and complex document (as explained above), I isolate seven themes that both help us better understand the document and the topic of population (as manifested at this point in its rhetorical

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[22] "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.8.

[23] I include this term from a pedagogical context: Stephen E. Lucas' popular public speaking textbook, *The Art of Public Speaking*, 8th Ed., (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 100.

history), as well as provide cross-pollinating insight for scholars of rhetoric and IR. These seven themes, which I explore in order, relate to the situating of development and demographic rhetoric in terms of each other, the conceptual entailments of particular calls for "communication," the complex rhetorical quandary facing the Cairo conferees, the way in which controversy becomes sanitized in the final argument-as-product, the re-working of the universal-particular dialectic, the enlistment of agents for a participatory politics of population, and finally, considering elements of kairos (and to prepon) at Cairo, and, more narrowly, in the Programme of Action. In this analysis, I draw both from Table 2 and Table 3, to see terms and clusters of importance, both from an exclusively quantitative perspective, as well as by my own selection of qualitatively important key terms.

Table 3. Notable Terms & Phrases, International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo)[24]

Notable Term/Phrase	Frequency
Development[25]	400
-"population and development"	123
-"sustainable development"	80
-"sustained economic growth in the context of sustainable development"	12
-"sustained economic growth and sustainable development"	7
-"right to development"	4
Health (including healthy, healthier, health-care, health-delivery, child health)	332
-reproductive health, reproductive health-care	126
-sexual health	27
Reproductive rights	8
-"decide freely and responsibly"	4
-'"reproductive rights and responsibilities"	2

[24] For each conference, I include two tables: one that reports the results of Wordle's "top 20 terms" analysis, and the second that reflects my sense of "notable terms & phrases" from the text. Including the latter table helps to a) counter-balance the risks of solely quantitative data (the top 20) with an interpretive, human sense of what matters, and b) provide a sense of some of the associated clusters and agons surrounding key terms. Those terms that appear as a dash under a broad term indicate that they were both counted under the umbrella term (for instance, "population and development" references are part of the 400 references, and then there are specifically 123 references to the phrase "population and development."

[25] In order to standardize my counting procedures and maintain a uniform counting standard, I chose to make one overall count. Except where otherwise explicitly noted, these totals include: references in the table of contents, chapter titles, section headings, in the text itself, and formal capitalized references and proper nouns (for instance, to names of other documents, declarations, and/or conferences).

Table 3 Continued.

Sex/Gender	
-woman, woman's, women, women's	234
-man, man's, men, men's	53
-gender	51
-sex	16
-girl	43
-boy	7
-male	16
-female	14
Non-governmental	89
Education (including educate, educated, educational, educators, educating)	199
-"information, education and communication"	23
Interrelationship (includes interrelated, interrelate, interrelations, interrelationships, interdependence)	25
Future generations	11
-future children	1

2.3.2.1 Negotiating the Development-Demographics Dialectic

Cairo's vision represents a strong level of depth and "thickness" in its notion of development. This trend is especially apparent in Cairo's configuration of development and demographics in the areas of "sustainable development," "population and development," the "right to development," "health" (and more particularly, "sexual health" and "reproductive health"), "reproductive rights," "sex" and "gender," and "education."[26]

"Sustainable Development"

One of the most important clusters for "development" occurs in the phrase "sustainable development." Coming shortly after the 1992 Rio conference credited with popularizing the term, this is not particularly surprising. However, attaching development to sustainability

[26] In addition to these major clusters, there are also a number of less significant but important clusters, including: human development, human resource development, skill development, cultural, economic, and social development. There are also a number of themes that figure into these clusters and associations, including poverty eradication, migration, children and youth, women, rural development, the importance of participation in development and development planning, and the interrelationships among development, population, the environment, health, education, and human rights. "Report of the ICPD."

recognizes that development is not merely economic (or even just social), but also necessarily related to environmental (and a host of other) factors. In addition to the frequent reference to "sustainable development," two similar phrases help to further contextualize the term: "sustained economic growth and sustainable development," and "sustained economic growth in the context of sustainable development." Both of these phrases promote the importance of economic development to achieve other goals (primarily population but also other concerns), yet also meld the economic growth emphasis with an environmental responsibility theme.

"Population and Development" and "The Right to Development"[27]

In addition to these references to the emphasis on sustainable development, development is also frequently paired with population as a co-equal term: "population and development." This phrasing places the terms population and development on an equal plane. Such a rhetorical shift indicates the importance of addressing both population and development with equal importance, rather than solving one first in order to resolve the other. Alongside "sustainable development" and "population and development," another critically important cluster is the phrase "right to development." Much as the document emphasizes the importance of reproductive rights, it also suggests the right to development, and the ultimate preferred goal for development: improved "quality of life." Such an alignment seems to support Tarla Rai Peterson's claim that the melding of two distinct terms (in her case, "sustainable development;" in mine, "population and

[27] As important as it is to note what is included in this new frame, we must first think in terms of what is missing from this frame that has been present in previous (over)population discourses. While questions related to the health of the biosphere and other environmental risks are not omitted, they fit much more with what Murray Bookchin terms "social ecology" (as opposed to previous frames of population discourse, which were in their most recent form more aligned with the "deep ecologists"). Numbers and target ranges did not disappear from these conference reports; rather, in every instance where they were included, they were "bookshelved" with claims about the primary importance of qualitative, social factors in addressing the problems of population. For an example of Bookchin's social ecology perspective, as well as his criticism of population rhetoric from such a perspective, see Murray Bookchin, *Re-Enchanting Humanity: A Defense of the Human Spirit against Antihumanism, Misanthropy, Mysticism*, and Primitivism (London: Cassell, 1995).

development") generates a rich set of possible crystallizations (in the words of the rhetorical lexicon, such moments represent powerful opportunities for invention).

"Health" and "Reproductive Rights"

"Health" represents an emergent component of development and population discourse at Cairo. Two of the Programme of Action's 16 chapters feature the term "health" as part of their titles. Though references to "health" in population discourse are not new, Cairo frames health in terms of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" (and, since "reproductive rights" are seen as representing the protection of the capacity to seek and attain reproductive and sexual health, it too is a key component of the health rhetoric at Cairo, as I discuss next). Thus, many scholars, politicians, and activists who have discussed Cairo note as its landmark features the elevation of "reproductive health" and "reproductive rights" to central pillars in the population discussion, as noted in chapter 1. Frequently, the document makes references to "reproductive health care, which includes family planning and sexual health." There are even 6 references to "reproductive health"/"reproductive health-care" in the table of contents, chapter titles, and section headings, but no similar references for "sexual health" (suggesting its potentially more sensitive/controversial role in the document). Beyond the focus on sexual and reproductive health, and a large number of references to "primary health"/"primary health care," almost all of the other significant clusters for "health" relate to specific subgroups in the population. The most prominent relate to women's health, girl's (the document often refers to as "the girl child") health, maternal and child health, and infant/child/youth/adolescent health. When combined with the next feature, "reproductive rights," we see a unique configuration of the communal and the individual that suggests the need for a re-conceptualization of many critiques of "rights" rhetoric.

"Reproductive rights," as a recurrent theme is critical to understanding the Programme of Action. From a quantitative perspective, the term is featured relatively minimally: only 8 total references. However, while not constantly featured in the text, its importance to the overall vision of the text cannot be denied. As the following passage suggests, reproductive rights safeguard the promotion of reproductive health:

> [R]eproductive rights embrace certain human rights that are already recognized in national laws, international human rights documents and other consensus documents. These rights rest on the recognition of the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive health. It also includes their right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, coercion and violence, as expressed in human rights documents. In the exercise of this right, they should take into account the needs of their living and future children and their responsibilities towards the community. The promotion of the responsible exercise of these rights for all people should be the fundamental basis for government- and community-supported policies and programmes in the area of reproductive health, including family planning. As part of their commitment, full attention should be given to the promotion of mutually respectful and equitable gender relations and particularly to meeting the educational and service needs of adolescents to enable them to deal in a positive and responsible way with their sexuality.[28]

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[28] "Report of the ICPD," Para 7.3.

Why do these appeals to health matter, and are they altered in rhetorically meaningful ways when they are coupled with appeals to rights? As Kenneth Burke notes in his essay on terministic screens, the linguistic frames we select to describe a set of phenomena both focus and limit our understanding of such phenomena.[29] The increasing use of the frame of "health" to shape the contours of public policy debates can be seen as just such a screen, both enabling the policy controversy to operate in new ways, while simultaneously constraining it. Therefore, as the international debate relating to (over)population enmeshes with reproductive health and reproductive rights, we need to understand the unique features of the health frame, in terms of the vocabulary associated with it, the rhetorical entailments of that vocabulary, and how the health frame changes the context of the (over)population debate.

In the context of public argument on public health matters, the word choices made by interlocutors structure ensuing communication in powerful ways.[30] Though precise definitions of the phrase "public health" remain elusive, one of the central assumptions is that health problems are not only the result of individual choices and genetics, but also have an important social/cultural/environmental dimension. In this sense, "public health" goes beyond a narrow focus on medical diagnosis to include an examination of systematic factors that perpetuate health problems. For instance, economic conditions (such as poverty) become important in a systematic analysis of public health issues. Additionally, the health frame, as part of the broader genre of scientific discourse, includes both qualitative and quantitative indices in its analysis of the problem at hand. In the case of obesity discussions, the alarming quantitative analysis (rapid

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[29] Kenneth Burke, "Terministic Screens," in *Language as Symbolic Action* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1966).

[30] Gordon R. Mitchell and Kathleen M. McTigue, "The US Obesity 'Epidemic': Metaphor, Method, or Madness?," *Social Epistemology* 21, no. 4 (2007): 391-423.

increase in the numbers/percentage of overweight youths/adults) is coupled with a qualitative analysis of the "health risks and economic consequences of overweight and obesity."[31]

The implications of the health frame depend on at least two factors: the way in which the frame becomes situated in public discourse, and the other issues to which it becomes linked. In terms of the situating of the health frame in public discourse, it is important to understand that "health" becomes split into multiple types of utterance. For instance, Gordon Mitchell and Kathleen McTigue note that there are both metaphorical and literal uses of the notion of an "epidemic."[32] Similarly, Susan Sontag famously traces the way in which disease both functions *as* metaphor *and* how it becomes described by means of other metaphors.[33] This leads to the second factor that helps to determine the implications of using the health frame. In her analysis of how AIDS has become linked to a military metaphor, Sontag shows the troubling implications of this linkage.[34] Similarly, those skeptical of claims of an obesity epidemic are concerned about the linkage of escalating body weight trends with a morality-based agenda insofar as it creates the possibility for scapegoating.[35] Regardless of the type of utterance and the other agendas to which it becomes linked, the framing of an issue in terms of health, and especially as a "public health" issue (with all of its systematic, holistic connotations) places it squarely on the agenda for government response.

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[31] Mitchell and McTigue, "The US Obesity 'Epidemic'": 393-394.

[32] Mitchell and McTigue, "The US Obesity 'Epidemic.'"

[33] Susan Sontag, *Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors* (New York: Doubleday), 1990.

[34] Sontag, *Illness as Metaphor*.

[35] Mitchell and McTigue, "The US Obesity 'Epidemic'": 399. For more on scapegoating, see, for instance, Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change*.

One of the central features of the use of the health frame in relation to population discourse is the fusion of reproductive health and reproductive rights.[36] Typically, in this most recent framing of (over)population rhetoric, both reproductive health and reproductive rights are centrally featured terms. This creates a complex interplay between individualist and community-centered rhetoric. On the one hand, "public health" (in the form of "reproductive health") typically centers on the importance of viewing health issues from a community-centered perspective. Rights discourse (in this case, "reproductive rights"), as Mary Ann Glendon, Amitai Etzioni, and many others (most notably, the Communitarians) note, is identified centrally by its attachment to individualist concerns.[37] Thus, either of these frames, viewed in isolation, would

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[36] The concepts of reproductive rights and reproductive health have had long-term staying power in public discourse. See Barbara A. Anderson, *Reproductive Health: Women and Men's Shared Responsibility* (Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartless Publishers, 2005); Wendy Chavkin and Ellen Chesler, *Where Human Rights Begin: Health, Sexuality, and Women in the New Millenium* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005); Shepard Forman and Romita Ghosh, *Promoting Reproductive Health: Investing in Health for Development* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

[37] Mary Ann Glendon, *Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse* (New York: Free Press, 1991) and Amitai Etzioni, *The Spirit of Community: The Reinvention of American Society* (New York: Touchstone, 1993). Notably, most of this Communitarian rhetoric limits itself to the US. Given that these documents elaborate international rights claims, it would be interesting to consider the role of a globalized Communitarian discourse. More generally, I am mindful that many scholars have critiqued notions of "rights" from a variety of perspectives. Nevertheless, I tend to support Ofelia Schutte, in her study of Latin American philosophy, in the argument that such critiques exhibit privilege in comparison to those for whom basic rights are not even necessarily guaranteed:

> A word of warning is in order given the transition period affecting cultural studies today, in particular, the shift from modern to postmodern views of social reality and culture. With only a few exceptions, Latin American philosophy of the sort to be studied in this work tends to be strongly modernist in orientation. This is not surprising, since basic concepts of freedom and justice still requiring implementation in various parts of the continent depend on the notion of an independent, individual subject who is the bearer of various rights and responsibilities in the sociopolitical arena. In the West, the postmodern deconstruction of the subject and of the discourse and logic of identity has often functioned as a critical tool against dominant normative discourses. In particular, postmodernism has helped to open up new conceptual spaces for the introduction of gender and racially diversified perspectives on cultural values in technologically advanced societies. But societies on the way to development cannot dispense so easily with concepts such as those of the subject, consciousness, or identity, for these are needed in order to establish and protect elementary legal and human rights, which cannot always be taken for granted. Postmodern theory is most compatible with the production of art, literature, and film in Latin America, whereas at present the social and political fabric of the various societies in the region is still in need of modern and high modern discourse in order to guarantee certain basic rights and services for variously defined communities and groups as well as individuals.

imply a concomitant set of commitments in relation to the individual-community binary. However, when they are fused, something new is created. For instance, one of the important clustered terms for "reproductive rights" is the idea of responsibility, cutting against the claims by many communitarians, such as Mary Ann Glendon and Etzioni, who claim that the proliferation of “rights” discourses necessarily compete with or even remove considerations of community, and, in this case, responsibility. Instead, this right and responsibility can be combined and clustered as the ability to "decide freely and responsibly," taking into account others (an implicit nod to responsibility), and "the responsible exercise of these rights." These terms are also clustered in the phrasing of "reproductive rights and responsibilities."[38] This idea of a fusion between rights (individualist) and responsibilities (communitarian) has important policy implications, particularly in relation to the history of (over)population rhetoric is useful here. Given the history of fears of coercion in relation to reducing population (exemplified most clearly by China's one-child policy), an exclusive focus on the needs of the community would likely be associated with coercive, authoritarian state measures. Combining the two offers a new possibility, one in which government policy provides possibilities that individuals have to pursue/choose on their own (for instance, availability of contraceptives and reproductive education opportunities and, as noted above, the fulfillment of “unmet needs”). Such a conceptual fusion maintains the legitimacy of a state/community presence without the fears of top-down control over individual bodies as well as the body politic.

Ofelia Schutte, *Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993), 5.

[38] "Report of the ICPD," Paras 5.5, 7.36 Subsection B.

"Sex" and "Gender" [39]

The Programme of Action contains an extensive focus on sex and gender. Importantly, many references point to the importance of men taking more responsibility and educational efforts being directed toward men (in terms of, for instance, reproductive health and attitudes toward women). Beyond the quantitative power of gender and sex in the Programme of Action, it also figures centrally into the main claims of the conference. For instance, Principle 4 of Chapter 2 notes:

> Advancing gender equality and the empowerment of women, and the elimination of all kinds of violence against women, and ensuring women's ability to control their own fertility, are cornerstones of population and development-related programmes. The human rights of women and the girl child are an inalienable, intergral and indivisible part of universal human rights. The full and equal participation of women in civil, cultural, economic, political and social life, at the national, regional and international levels, and the eradication of all forms of discrimination on grounds of sex, are priority objectives of the international community.[40]

Therefore, instead of merely listing the empowerment of women as one factor among many in the population and development equation, the Programme of Action places sex and gender concerns front and center (though again, given the enormous range of other factors that it cites as

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[39] I recognize that, in connecting sex and gender, I am continuing the sex/gender conflation that has been heavily scrutinized. However, as suggested in chapter 5, I do this partially because of the document's own confusion on this distinction, and also because, as a result of this confusion, I think lumping all the various threads together helps to bear light on the importance of these issues in the document.

[40] "Report of the ICPD," Chapter 2, Principle 4.

contributing to the “population and development” equation, even this theme risks getting under-played or dissipated).

Unfortunately, in addition to the risk of being missed in the broad web of factors brought into interrelation in this text, the vision of sex/gender, as offered by the document, should be regarded with caution. Most importantly, the document fluctuates between, conflates, and equivocates in its use of the terms “sex” and “gender.” According to most academic treatments of this distinction, “sex” refers to differences rooted in biology, and thus reported as “male” and “female,” whereas “gender” indicates more socially constructed differences, and thus demarcated as “men” and “women.” Thus, “women should not seek employment outside the home” is a statement first and foremost about “gender,” while “we need to improve our admissions process because, right now, only 40% of our incoming class is female” is a statement about “sex.” In the world of population specifically, a clear vision about these two categories is especially important, as the biological body is involved in the discussion, as well as the socially constructed notions about the body.

“Education”

Finally, “education” is integrated as a central component of development, with a primary and multi-directional relevance, in the Programme of Action. Education serves a variety of functions from the perspective of the Cairo conference. Importantly, education is seen as a means to further many of the other primary goals, including development, reproductive health, gender/sex equity. Also, education represents one of the strategies for building support for the worldview and programmes of this document, as the reference to the cluster "information, education and communication" is used when discussing how public attitudes can be cultivated in favor of the recommendations of this Programme of Action (a theme to which I return in the next

section). Finally, education is called into service as one of the best methods for achieving the demographic goals of the document:

> The relationship between education and demographic and social changes is one of interdependence. There is a close and complex relationship among education, marriage age, fertility, mortality, mobility and activity. The increase in the education of women and girls contributes to greater empowerment of women, to a postponement of the age of marriage and to a reduction in the size of families. When mothers are better educated, their children's survival rate tends to increase. Broader access to education is also a factor in internal migration and the composition of the working population.[41]

As suggested in this passage, many of the calls for improvements in education are geared specifically toward women and girls.

Wither "Population?"

Finally, given the overall focus of the document, and its widely divergent and multifaceted approaches and recommendations, one might ask whether the "population" component of the discussion still serves any usefulness. That is, if the discussion previously framed under the umbrella term "population" is more usefully considered in the spheres of education, women's rights, health, and other related factors, and if improvement of those factors would necessarily fix any population/demographic "problem," is there any reason to continue to have "population" as a separate set of public arguments? While I engage this question more fully in chapter five, I want to point to at least two reasons, in the context of the 1994 Cairo Programme of Action, that suggest on the part of conference participants a justification for

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[41] "Report of the ICPD," Para 11.3.

maintaining a focus on "population" at any level. First, the document makes suggestions as to why, though many of the goals could be achieved without a specific focus on population, the overall work is strengthened by focusing on both population and development:

> While . . . success can be facilitated by developments in the overall social and economic context, and by success in other development efforts, population and development are intrinsically interrelated and progress in any component can catalyse improvement in others. The many facets of population relate to many facets of development.[42]

Similarly, one of the objectives of the document is "To incorporate population concerns in all relevant national development strategies, plan, policies and programmes."[43] Thus, far from trying to dissolve population into an array of other concerns, the Cairo document advocates for the importance of continuing to maintain a focus on population specifically, alongside a number of other concerns. The second, and rather ironic reason for maintaining a focus on "population" specifically is that the quantitative language of demography infuses the document. For instance, early in chapter one, the document suggests, "the world's nations by their actions or inactions will choose from among a range of alternative demographic futures."[44] The document then breaks down low, medium, and high global population projections, and argues, "implementation of the goals and objectives contained in the present 20-year Programme of Action" are vital in ensuring "world population growth during this period and beyond at levels below the United Nations medium projection."[45] Similarly, the document argues for "the crucial contribution that

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[42] "Report of the ICPD," Para 13.2.

[43] "Report of the ICPD," Para 13.4, Subsection A.

[44] "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.4.

[45] "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.4.

early stabilization of the world population would make towards the achievement of sustainable development."[46] Finally, the document provides as one objective "to facilitate the demographic transition as soon as possible in countries where there is an imbalance between demographic rates and social, economic and environmental goals . . . This process will contribute to the stabilization of the world population."[47] This is ironic given the memorializing of the Cairo conference in particular as a break from such quantitative, demographic analysis (as indicated, for instance, by the passages cited in chapter 1).

Having now examined how development and demographics are cast in the Programme of Action, I turn next to a discussion of significant conceptual cross currents in the document, as expressed in recurring phrases such as “information, education and communication activities.”

2.3.2.2 Conceptual Entailments of Calls for “Communication”

While this issue is common to all five texts explored in this dissertation project, Cairo is particularly prominent, for it is in the Programme of Action that terms suggesting a rhetorically informed approach to the issue of population (rhetoric, persuasion, argument, debate, and similar terms) are avoided, and we are instead left with neologisms and the appearance of “communication” references that only partially fill the void. This is not simply an issue of refusing to use the terminology that I, as a rhetorician, would prefer to see. It is noteworthy, as indicated in Chapter 1, that in the field of IR, not only scholars but also (as these documents suggest) practitioners appear to have some residual distrust of the term “rhetoric.” However, in the US and around the world, the word “rhetoric” as a term is largely misunderstood or not

[46] "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.11.

[47] "Report of the ICPD," Para 6.3.

familiar at all. Even then, replacements like "persuasion," a much more universally recognized term, would be suitable to the task. In fact, the documents could even use the umbrella term "communication" in such a way that indicated a particular conception that included components related to rhetoric and persuasion. Therefore, my critique is not a clamoring for the term "rhetoric" solely for the sake of seeing the term on paper. Rather, my concern is the documents' refusal to see the tasks called for in the recommendations for action, which invite (and at times demand) the global community's participation, as essentially concerned with the types of knowledge about which rhetoric has something to say. Instead, as I suggest below, the entailments of "communication," as represented in these texts generally and in the Cairo Programme of Action, become flattened and in important ways misguided. This moment of "ships passing in the night" leads to a "global" (figurative-academic) confusion over categories of knowledge. While not precisely the "social knowledge" described by Thomas Farrell, a type of common knowledge to which Aristotle thought you must appeal in the art of rhetoric, many of the activities for which the Programme of Action calls refer to knowledge that inhabits more of the province of *doxa* than *episteme*.[48]

Cairo's Programme of Action demonstrates some degree of reflexivity in its acknowledgment of the need for communication strategies to promote its goal, but it falls short conceptually by miscategorizing the types of knowledge claims involved. As suggested above, the term "rhetoric," as well as many of its cousins, does not appear at all in any of the five documents, but again, I am not concerned first and foremost with the writers' use of my

[48] Thomas B. Farrell, "Knowledge, Consensus, and Rhetorical Theory," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 62, no. 1 (1976): 1-14.

terminology.[49] Instead, the most frequent phrase employed by the Programme of Action to suggest the role of communication in advancing its goals and recommendations is "information, education and communication" (often abbreviated in the IR and UN literature as IEC). Without ever being explicitly defined, a definition by contextual inference suggests that these “IEC” activities aim to accomplish the sort of work that we would typically refer to as the role of rhetoric. For instance, the document calls for “information, education, and communication activities” in areas like increasing acceptance for education for girls, or IEC activities for sharing family responsibilities in a more gender-equitable fashion within the family. In each case, we must consider what the nature of the “problem” is that IEC is designed to solve or ameliorate. For instance, when calling for accepting education for girls, is the implication that those who do not currently accept the idea are suffering from a deficit of information? When we call for gender equity in a family is the idea that men are unaware that women have other things to do besides housework? My sense is that we would say “no” on both accounts. Instead, when we say that we want more acceptance for girls to receive education, we are indicating that communication as persuasion needs to occur to move those who are opposed to at least less opposed, and those who are ambivalent to become supportive. And it seems similar with gender equity in the family. What is at stake here is a conceptual division between informational knowledge and *doxa*. If these problems existed in the realm of informational knowledge (perhaps the closest equivalent would be Aristotle’s classification of *episteme*, roughly translated as scientific knowledge), the implication would be that, on the whole, people are completely unaware, for instance, that there are arguments for gender equality in familial responsibilities or in sexual equality in educational

[49] However, it is worth considering that this complete absence of "rhetoric" may be suggestive of a) a continuation of the Platonic distrust of rhetoric and sophistry, and/or b) evidence that not only IR scholars but also IR practitioners have artificially limited out rhetoric from other aspects like argument, communication, and education activities.

opportunities. Thus, what is not needed is a "syringe" with all of the bits of data that, upon reception and decoding, will transform the perspectives of those who do not already hold such attitudes and/or embody such attitudes in their daily practices.[50] Instead, such activities fall distinctly within, what Chaim Perelman once called the "realm of rhetoric," which, among other things, includes suasory activities aimed to maintain or modify particular *doxa* (popular opinion).[51] Similarly, as Aristotle says that rhetoric relates to that category of knowledge that is contingent and could be otherwise, the types of issues on which the Programme of Action calls for "information" exist in the vast expanse of knowledge characterized by the ancient Greek tradition of *dissoi logoi*, literally translating as "different words," but suggesting that, on most issues, there are (at least) two perspectives.[52] By reading more closely, then, it becomes clear

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[50] This concern bears implications for the literature on public understanding of science. In particular, those accounts which tend to operate on a "deficit model" tend to oversimplify and sidestep the tasks facing any attempt to account for science in "extra-scientific" communities. It also represents a valuable analogy between the nature of the conference calls and the response of target communities. For more on public understanding of science and the deficit model, see, for instance, Alan G. Gross, "The Roles of Rhetoric in the Public Understanding of Science," Public Understanding of Science 3, no. 1 (1994): 3-23, and Patrick Sturgis and Nick Allum, "Science in Society: Re-Evaluating the Deficit Model of Public Attitudes," Public Understanding of Science 13, no. 1 (2004): 55-74.

[51] Chaim Perelman, *The Realm of Rhetoric* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press). Perelman is an excellent figure in which we can begin to think about convergence between rhetorical and argumentation theory. Many argumentation theorists are quick to draw from *The New Rhetoric* because, apart from the first few sections (and despite its title), the remainder (and majority overall) of the text is devoted to specific argument schemes and strategies. I believe that *The Realm of Rhetoric*, in addition to those initial framing sections in *The New Rhetoric*, help us to better understand Perelman both in terms of argumentation theory and rhetorical theory, rather than merely one or the other.

[52] For more on *dissoi logoi*, see, for instance, Michael Billig, *Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Such an understanding of the types of information and communication involved links with Risse's discussion of "cheap talk" and the "logic of arguing." In the current form, many of the calls and recommendations in this text, especially for societal change such as gender equality in education and employment, risk coming across to target audiences as "cheap talk" in the sense suggested used in IR: communication that is "cheap" insofar as it risks nothing for the person sending it and asks for changes only on the part of the audience. This perspective is the one that Risse unfortunately terms "rhetorical," but it really is neither pro-argument nor pro-rhetoric. Instead, by appearing to represent no "self-risk" to the parties initiating the calls for change (ie delegates to the conference) people in local communities might remain unconvinced (and thus, for instance, decline to interrogate gender roles in their communities). While problematic, the document also at times positions communication as a means of opening participation, which could conceivably match the vision of "argument" offered by Risse.

that IEC, in its clustering with recommendations, suggests the realm of *doxa*, but in its framing, comes across as operating in the realm of *episteme*.[53]

Not only do IEC activities ultimately work to convince people to change attitudes and behaviors, but they also serving as a prerequisite for public participation:

> Effective information, education and communication are prerequisites for sustainable human development and pave the way for attitudinal and behavioural change. Indeed, this begins with the recognition that decisions must be made freely, responsibly and in an informed manner, on the number and spacing of children and in all other aspects of daily life, including sexual and reproductive behaviour. Greater public knowledge and commitment in a democratic setting create a climate conducive to responsible and informed decisions and behaviour. Most important, they also pave the way for democratic public discussion and thereby make possible strong political commitment and popular support for needed action at the local, national and international levels.[54]

Pointing to what Joseph Wenzel describes as "argument as procedure" and "argument as process," and what Douglas Ehninger describes as "argument as method," the Programme

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[53] In addition to considering the conceptual entailments of "communication" and "information," we would also be aided by assessing the force of the term "education." As Mitchell and Kirk note, in applying the work of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca to the controversies surrounding presidential libraries, "education" differs from "propaganda" in marked ways. They explain, "According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, education involves the epideictic transmission of commonly accepted values to audiences predisposed to embrace community norms and traditions, whereas propaganda operates in the realm of the contingent, where uncertain or incomplete knowledge creates conditions ripe for controversy." (214-215) While conference delegates may believe in the values enshrined in the Cairo Programme of Action to such a degree that there is no uncertainty, the people out in the world see many of these matters (for instance, birth control, education, reproductive health and rights) as more fittingly in the realm of the contingent and the controversial. For instance, people who do not think that girls should receive an education will not respond to "information, education, and communication activities" insofar as they do not already embrace the norms in the Programme of Action, but will rather see them as propaganda and will have to be persuaded on the level of propaganda (and rhetoric), not information, education, or communication.

[54] "Report of the ICPD," Para 11.12.

addresses the importance of debates, on all levels, to create progress on the issues raised by the Cairo Conference. In writing on the importance of various "information, education and communication" technologies, the document notes:

> They can help ensure that the vast majority of the world's people are involved in debates at the local, national and global levels about demographic changes and sustainable human development, economic and social inequities, the importance of empowering women, reproductive health and family planning, health promotion, ageing populations, rapid urbanization and migration.[55]

Furthermore, the document also suggests specific rhetorically-oriented situations that call for oratorical action on the part of leaders: "Leaders at all levels of the society must speak out and act forcefully against patterns of gender discrimination within the family, based on preference for sons."[56] Here, then, is another paradox. The document categorizes problems of *doxa* as problems of information and education, but at the same time, appears to recognize, to a greater degree than either Bucharest or Mexico City, that the potential influence of its recommendations and calls will ultimately depend on public advocacy and effective rhetorical strategies. This paradox, along with companion threads, combines to form an overarching rhetorical quandary for Cairo conferees (and, by extension, their peers from each of the other conferences).

2.3.2.3 Negotiating the Rhetorical Quandary

Cairo, as well as its companion conferences, faces a multifaceted rhetorical quandary. First, with a state-centered system of international relations, the UN cannot enforce policy,

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[55] "Report of the ICPD," Para 11.14.

[56] "Report of the ICPD," Para 4.17.

outside of limited capabilities in situations of warfare and genocide. Therefore, to the degree that any of their recommendations take hold, it is not because anybody was required to do so, but rather because of the rhetorical effectiveness of the crafted argument. Second, in order to generate this kind of rhetorical support internationally, the conferees are generally in a better position to use arguments that appear scientific, rational, and fact-based (i.e. IEC and my claims about *episteme*), and thus by presenting stable, clear findings. This type of appeal has been described as "anti-rhetoric" insofar as appeals that appear non-rhetorical (or that even openly disavow their status as rhetoric) function persuasively as well.[57] However, as explained in the previous section, the best hope for responding to the relevant exigencies rests in the realm of *doxa*, contingency, and rhetoric. Conferees thus end up weighing the potential for funding, acceptance of the Programme of Action, and instrumental achievement, against the recognition of the social, argumentation-oriented nature of the problems being considered and the support for creating appropriate solutions. Thus they appear to use the apparent opposite of rhetoric (solid, stable, scientific truths) in relation to problems that are ultimately tied fundamentally to rhetoric.

Third, and again in order to negotiate the rhetorical situation, conferees end up presenting what appears to be a finished product, ready for acceptance and implementation. However, the Programme of Action, if taken seriously, is at best a precursor to improving the population problem, since democratic deliberation and participation will ultimately be required, not just to implement the vision of the conference, but to create meaning and internalize a vision of population that resonates with the needs of communities of all scales (an understanding of the nature of the document that is openly expressed in the document). Fourth and finally, conferees

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[57] Michael C. McGee and John R. Lyne, "What Are Nice Folks Like You Doing in a Place Like This?: Some Entailments of Treating Epistemic Claims Rhetorically," in *The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences: Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs*, ed. John S. Nelson, et al. (Madison: University of Wisconsin): 381-406.

must negotiate a dialectic that, on the one hand, asserts that debate is over and the population controversy is closed, and on the other hand, making calls for action while realizing that there are still significant points of disagreement about, or at least different perspectives regarding, public argument over population. Shutting the door completely closed means that the only role for public deliberation and participation is to implement what has already been universally agreed upon and resolved, and faces the recalcitrance that there are still many, such as a prominent portion of the Catholic Church, that still has concerns over the promotion of birth control. Leaving the door completely open, however, casts doubts on the ability of one conference to put forth any clear recommendations because all elements of the issue are still on the table for debate, deliberation, dialogue, endorsement, and/or revision. This tension of openness and closure is best seen in recent years with the Intelligent Design controversy, wherein scientists and educators largely respond rhetorically with the idea that there is no controversy, that everyone who knows science knows that evolution is beyond question, whereas ID advocates promote, as an intrinsic good, keeping the rhetorical space open for debate, discussion, and deliberation. Such dialectical tension is also now expressed in the global warming controversy, where assertions of consensus and unanimity that 1) global warming is happening, and 2) global warming is anthropogenic are debated, with warming advocates frequently asserting but not entirely succeeding at achieving closure on these questions. One way in which the document works to minimize the appearance of any disagreement is by sanitizing controversy and thus minimizing the role for argument (which, in terms of the dilemma articulated above, suggests more of an endorsement of the "debate is over" position).[58]

[58] Notably, the efforts at "sanitizing controversy" do more to cloud the situation than to advance it since such efforts obscure our ability to see that argument is at stake. For instance, the following conditions, enumerated by Risse as one Habermasian vision of argumentation, all are *apparently* absent from the scene:

One defining aspect of these conference documents, which helps to understand them as a genre, and which separates them from the genre of legal decisions, is that they do not engage in explicit refutation. Perhaps in an extreme situation of Aristotle's enthymeme, the reader must supply all of the interlocutors who may posit counter-points against the claims of the document. While there was clearly controversy and refutation in the debates and deliberations that led to this document, and while there was controversy and debate in the scene surrounding the document, before, during, and after it was produced (in other words, in argument as procedure and argument as process), the document itself ("argument" as product) appears sanitized of any controversy, leading to a spirit of glee, perhaps triumphalism, about the "consensus" (implying unanimity and a lack of division) achieved at Cairo. Indeed, participants, activists, and scholars, all point with great satisfaction to the achievement of *consensus* at Cairo. Given this sanitation, can we say that the document, by its own construction, engages in "argumentation" in any meaningful sense of the term? In "Rhetorical Criticism as Argument," Wayne Brockriede enumerates the basic conditions necessary to consider something as an "argument":

> By "argument" I mean the process whereby a person reasons his way from one idea to the choice of another idea. This concept of argument implies five generic characteristics: (1) an inferential leap from existing beliefs to the adoption of a

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> Arguing implies that actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their understanding of a situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action. Argumentative rationality also implies that the participants in a discourse are open to being persuaded by the better argument and that relationships of power and social hierarchies recede in the background. Argumentative and deliberative behavior is as goal oriented as strategic interaction, but the goal is not to attain one's fixed preferences, but to seek a reasoned consensus. Actors' interests, preferences, and the perceptions of the situation are no longer fixed, but subject to discursive challenges. Where argumentative rationality prevails, actors do not seek to maximize or to satisfy their given interests and preferences, but to challenge and to justify the validity claims inherent in them—and they are prepared to change their views of the world or even their interests in light of the better argument.

Risse, "'Let's Argue!'" 7.

> new belief or the reinforcement of an old one; (2) a perceived rationale to justify that leap; (3) a choice among two or more competing claims; (4) a regulation of uncertainty in relation to the selected claim—since someone has made an inferential leap, certainty can be neither zero nor total; and (5) a willingness to risk a confrontation of that claim with one's peers.[59]

In light of this definition of "argument," can we define the Programme of Action as engaging in this model of "argument"? Based on the formal text of the Programme of Action, it would appear not. First, there is, because of the sanitizing of any element of controversy, no "inferential leap" and, by the way it is written, it appears that "certainty" is "total." There are theoretically "choices" among "competing claims," but there appear to be no coherent, viable arguments against the claims made by the document, thus offering no genuine choice. Finally, and reflective of the writing as sanitizing that occurs, it appears that there is no "risking" behavior, given the style of the document.

One specific strategy that the Cairo Programme of Action employs to make its claims appear uncontroversial is through the strategic use of precedent. In legal decisions, one of the most important aspects of the written decision is the use of precedent to justify the decision at hand. From a rhetorical perspective, the use of precedent is selective and driven by persuasive considerations. It is not a technical procedure of merely letting the facts (or in this case, the precedents) speak for themselves. Instead, precedents get packaged into a well (or in some cases, not so well) constructed argument. As Kenneth Burke explains:

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[59] Wayne Brockriede, "Rhetorical Criticism as Argument," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech* 60 (1974): 166.

> [A]fter a few decades when a sufficient number and *variety* of precedents had been amassed, the Court could ground its choice of "mandatory" decisions in a corresponding choice of precedents, by selecting the particular kind of precedent that best substantiated, or rationalized, the favored decision. Reference to precedent could thus *function* as reference to the extra-Constitutional scene; but in *appearance* such decisions were purely *internal* to the traditions of Constitutional law.[60]

While consensus-driven, international conference documents are in many ways different from legal decisions (many more authors involved, the sense of "judgment" is very different, legal rhetoric is typically understood as forensic rhetoric, while conference documents tend, on the whole, to be more representative of deliberative rhetoric), the reliance on precedent provides a common link between the two.[61] Throughout the Cairo Programme of Action, many references are made to other conference documents, as well as a number of important international protocols, agreements, and documents. The use of precedent in conference documents serves at least two important rhetorical functions (both of which are shared in the use of precedent for judicial purposes). First, prudent use of precedent bolsters the credibility (ethos) of the document

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[60] Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, 379.

[61] This distinction among deliberative, forensic, and epideictic is challenged, in the context of United Nations argument, by Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp. They argue:

> Our call here is for a rather dramatic rethinking of argumentative debate processes. The Aristotlean emphasis on deliberation to select action is supplanted by a moral deliberation that is productive of common values that can guide behavior. Different principles of argumentation follow from the altered goal of deliberation. The process is a texture of argument that shares, in Aristotlean terms, epideictic and even some forensic characteristics. We wish to affirm, however, that an argument is productive that generates a basis for judgments of legitimacy and will become increasingly powerful as legitimacy of action is affirmed as an expectation of international behavior.

Patricia Riley, Thomas Hollihan, and James F. Klumpp, "On Taking the UN Seriously as a Site for Public Arguments: Does the UN Have a Role in the 21st Century?" in *Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation* (Amsterdam: Sic Sat, 2007), edited by Frans H. van Eemeren, et al., 1169.

at hand. By placing the current document in connection with other well-established conferences and documents, the document's credibility is heightened, as it is seen to be building upon a rich foundation rather than coming out of nowhere. Second, the use of precedent safeguards against allegations that the current document is trying to create some new, controversial claim. For instance, in the context of both conference and legal rhetoric, one of the most important allegations against which authors would seek to safeguard is the claim that new rights are being manufactured/created in the document.[62] Toward the end of the preamble, the Programme of Action makes clear that it is not creating something new but rather affirming what has already been agreed upon: "While the International Conference on Population and Development does not create any new international human rights, it affirms the application of universally recognized human rights standards to all aspects of population programmes."[63] Precedent also carries some of the same structural, behind-the-scenes functions for conferences as it does for legal reasoning. As Singh notes, one of the enduring conflicts from Bucharest onward has been the phrase "couples and individuals," as in, for instance, "All couples and individuals have the basic right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so."[64] A number of cultural and religious conservatives have continually objected to the "and individuals" clause, believing that issues relating to reproduction and sexuality should be limited to married couples. As Singh explains, however, the fact that this argument had already been won prior to Cairo (namely, at Bucharest) made it easier to keep it as is, rather than to entertain seriously a major change.

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[62] For more on this point, see Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population*.

[63] "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.15.

[64] "Report of the ICPD," Chapter 2, Principle 8.

Despite the uncontroversial appearance, many opponents were quick to attack, in significant ways, the new "Cairo consensus." For instance, as Frances Kissling notes, the Vatican ratcheted up its opposition to birth control as a result of the framing of "reproductive health as a human right":

> [A]t the 1994 conference, . . . the UN for the first time framed the right to reproductive health as a human right. The shift was unwelcome news inside the Vatican—where the conservative Pope John Paul II had begun to dismantle some of the reforms of the '60s—and it hardened the church's resolve. Suddenly, opposition to contraception became almost as high a priority as battling abortion. . . . Even US bishops, who had pretty much ignored contraception for 20 years, began a fresh effort to persuade American Catholics.[65]

Patricia Roberts-Miller, in *Deliberate Conflict*, challenges the emphasis on overly polite, consensual models of argument, at least to the extent that they are not contextualized as representing particular theories of argument. In her framework, the liberal model of deliberation is one of the most dispassionate, rational, and least agonistic, forms of argument. In this context, the Programme of Action, if read in a vacuum, seems even more sterile than the liberal model. Of course, the irony of this, as explained by numerous commentators, is that Cairo as a conference both was and is controversial, to the point of agonism, giving an odd perspective by incongruity between the textual evidence of the conference (as represented in the Programme of

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[65] Frances Kissling, "Close Your Eyes and Think of Rome," *Mother Jones* (May/June 2010), http://motherjones.com/print/53181 (accessed July 22, 2010). While Kissling emphasizes a sharp division between the Catholic Church and the Cairo Conference, many others, including Singh, Schechter, as well as Catholic Voices, have pointed to points of convergence, rather than divergence, between the church and the conference. See Catholic Voices, *Catholics and Cairo: A Common Language* (Washington, DC: Catholic Voices, 1999).

Action) and the "scene" of the conference (such as a media circus around the myth that the conference was trying to create an international "right to abortion").

Finally, in order to further bolster its uncontroversial nature, and because of the genre of these international texts, there is very little direct citation of evidence to support broad based claims, such as "experience shows X" or "history has demonstrated that X."[66] In some ways, this could be classified as an example of the classic begging the question fallacy. However, in begging the question, the arguer is assuming the conclusion that they need to prove. Here, the arguer (or, since it is not a person, the text) is assuming the evidence that fits their conclusion. The closest parallel to this in the fallacy literature is a little discussed fallacy known as "proof surrogate." In proof surrogate, the arguer uses broad claims like "everybody knows" or "we all believe this, don't we" rather than actually supply evidence to demonstrate those claims. This classification seems vital, given how frequently such claims are made in contemporary discourse, especially in politics. However, rhetoricians and argumentation theorists have been slow to utilize such an analytically useful concept. Even if it is classified as a special case of the begging the question fallacy, it is still analytically distinct and deserves more treatment from the rhetoric and argumentation scholarly communities.

These indications that suggest a lack of possibility of/for argumentation, as the texts are configured, again indicate the possibility that, in order to generate resources and actions in a timely manner, there was an interest in attempting to demonstrate closure on any remaining

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[66] As I suggest throughout this dissertation, some elements of these conference texts are most profitably understood as elements of the genre. It could be argued that the lack of citations to support something like "history has demonstrated that X" might be just one of these generic constraints. However, even if this is the case, it still merits an interrogation of the element of the genre, since certain components of genre may be more or less enriching. As one (albeit extreme) example, even though one defining characteristic of war rhetoric is dehumanize the enemy (sometimes even in racist ways), a rhetorical critic can both understand the way in which it figures into genre and provide a negative judgment in rejecting such dehumanizing rhetoric.

points of controversy. Unfortunately, Burkean recalcitrance, on issues such as religion, made such closure impossible, despite claims that unanimity had created the “Cairo Consensus.” Besides side-stepping particular points of controversy, the Programme of Action gains much rhetorical purchase by (re-) configuring the universal-particular dialectic.

2.3.2.4 The Universal-Particular Dialectic

Michael Leff argues that all rhetoric is about configuring the universal-particular dialectic, and the ICPD Programme of Action is no exception, as it focuses heavily on reworking the universal-particular dialectic in population and development issues. In many of its goals, the document stresses the need to meet X goal "for all people." However, in addition to these obviously universal declarations, and usually following directly after them, the document reintroduces and highlights particulars for special emphasis. For instance, Principle 10 of the document opens, "Everyone has the right to education, which shall be directed to the full development of human resources, and human dignity and potential, with particular attention to women and the girl child."[67] In this way, the document makes a universal call and then indicates particular cases meriting special attention. In this example, and in many cases in the document, the universal ("everyone") is noted, but then the particular ("with particular attention to women and the girl child") is included, gesturing to the international community that, while these issues deserve treatment for all, particular parties have unique needs that require additional emphasis. In fact, one of the most interesting, repeated uses of this "universal plus particular" framing strategy is the call addressed to countries of the world: "All countries should recognize their

[67] "Report of the ICPD," Chapter 2, Principle 10.

common but differentiated responsibilities."[68] This statement, or its very similar counterpart, "shared but differentiated responsibilities," can be found in a number of places in the document, and indicates an awareness of the difficulties posed by purely universal or purely particular rhetorical directives. The most perplexing, or at the very least, most complicated, reworking of universal-particular comes in terms of respecting individual cultures but also pressing forward on items of universal recognition. For instance, the document suggests that actions on population and development should, "with full respect for various religious and ethical values and cultural backgrounds of each country's peoples, adhere to basic human rights recognized by the international community."[69] In some ways, this may be relatively insignificant language. However, in cultural situations in which gender, racial, or ethnic dynamics are hotly contested, the document appears to uphold simultaneously what may be (at least potentially) contradictory visions: fully respecting values and cultures of every country's peoples, and also upholding international visions of human rights.[70] This idea of simultaneously promoting potentially contradictory values mirrors Burke's observations about constitutions being able to create "generalized wishes":

> A constitution may, for instance, propound a set of generalized rights or duties, and all these may be considered as a grand promissory unity, a *panspermia* in which they all exist together in perfect peace and amity. Yet when, in the realm of the practical, a given case comes before the courts, you promptly find that this *merger* or *balance* or *equilibrium* among the Constitutional clauses becomes

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[68] "Report of the ICPD," Chapter 2, Principle 15.

[69] "Report of the ICPD," Para 14.3.

[70] Along with the discussion of precedents in this chapter, I provide more analysis of the similarities between Burke's constitutions and international conference documents in chapter 5.

> transformed into a *conflict* among the clauses—and to satisfy the promise contained in one clause, you must forego the promise contained in another.[71]

Again, by reworking the universal-particular dialectic, the document again elides controversy by assuming that, for instance, there is no conflict between religious and ethical and cultural values, and international human rights.

While the document mutes and downplays controversy, it does suggest that public participation is both a method of setting the agenda for ongoing population policy and communication, as well as a means of implementing specific, particular goals. Though still incomplete, and falling prey to similar problems suggested above, the text's treatment of public deliberation and participation, and of deliberative democracy, in pursuit of the conference goals, is promising.

2.3.2.5 Participatory Population Politics

The Cairo Programme of Action envisions public participation on two levels: the agents called to action in the document utilizing participatory procedures and processes to engage broader publics, and these actors recruiting organizations that can then engage in participatory politics. Therefore, it would be fair to say that the ICPD envisions an array of agents, even an army, to carry out its recommendations and to achieve its goals. Also, the document actively courts non-governmental organizations to play fundamental roles in population and development activities. Chapter 15, "Partnership with the Non-Governmental Sector," is, as the title suggests, devoted entirely to the role of non-governmental organizations. Furthermore, the title of the chapter positions the role of NGOs as "partners" rather than some more diminished,

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[71] Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, 349.

hierarchically-determined role. Furthermore, the document envisions a role that starts at the initial formulation role all the way through programme evaluation:

> To address the challenges of population and development effectively, broad and effective partnership is essential between Governments and non-governmental organizations (comprising not-for-profit groups and organizations at the local, national and international levels) to assist in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of population and development objectives and activities.[72]

In this passage, the Programme of Action calls for participation by an array of actors throughout society. Reflecting a post-Cold War environment, major Cold War powers (such as the United States and Russia) have no notable opposition to a bottom-up approach to policymaking, even when that policy may spillover into transnational and international effects. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to encourage parties in the USSR to "rise up" and use a bottom-up approach to take hold of society, while no doubt parties in the USSR would have been happy for a domestic uprising in the West. However, in those contexts, neither party was particularly thrilled about a destabilized, networked, and decentralized set of actors involved in policymaking in the public sphere in their own countries. Potentially anticipating the ascent of the Internet and information forces in society that would make a traditional, top-down transmission model unsustainable, major powers were happy to encourage NGOs, and moreover all possible parties at the local, national, and international level, to seize power to change the structure and policymaking of society.

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[72] "Report of the ICPD," 15.1.

2.3.2.6 Assessing Cairo's *Kairos*

Depending on the theorist, *kairos* and *to prepon*, opportune timing and appropriateness, are either two distinct concepts, or both are components of *kairos*. In some articulations, *kairos* is seen as being appropriate to the conventions as they are already assembled, while in more radical formulations, *kairos* involves the daring rhetor who we could only understand in retrospect as being kairotic.[73] In contrast to traditional understandings of *kairos* that understand *kairos*, in relation to rhetoric, as being the ability of a rhetor to seize an a situation at the opportune moment, or with opportune timing, in order to create the optimal conditions for rhetorical success, I suggest that *kairos* may be as driven by the realm of the symbolic as by the realm of the material. In response to Lloyd Bitzer's claim in "The Rhetorical Situation" that rhetorical situations necessarily referred to material situations, and could not be "cooked up" through discourse alone, Richard Vatz pointed to the ways in which rhetors could in fact create and shape, rather than merely put forth a "fitting response" to rhetorical situations.[74] In a similar vein, I want to argue that *kairos*, or the opportune moment, can be constructed and then fulfilled by the speaker. For instance, civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr. and others, needed to create a sense of urgency in order to generate momentum for change, and thus spoke such tropes as "the fierce urgency of now." After creating the conditions wherein the timing was now opportune, they could then aim to respond to the moment of *kairos* that they had created. Similarly, John F. Kennedy's call for being the first to put a human on the moon first created the exigence, or the opportune timing, and then answered the call rhetorically.

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[73] Carolyn R. Miller, "Foreword," and Phillip Sipiora, "Introduction: The Ancient Concept of *Kairos*," in *Rhetoric and Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis*, Eds. Phillip Sipiora and James S. Baumlin (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2002).

[74] In gesturing toward "cooked up," I allude to Plato's conceptualization of rhetoric as mere "cookery."

To a greater extent than Bucharest or Mexico City, Cairo's Programme of Action, as a very reflexive document, aims to create a sense of opportunity, timing, and urgency, which it then hopes to fulfill through the course of the document. Both because of the point in history when the conference occurred, and because its population efforts did not exist in a vacuum, the document needed to address history, both in the broad sense of its moment in history and the history of UN population efforts. Consistent with the timing of the conference, occurring against the backdrop of newly hopeful post-Cold War international scene, it is no surprise that the attitude of possibility and optimism prevails in the document. For instance, the very first sentence of the preamble notes that the Cairo Conference "occurs at a defining moment in the history of international cooperation."[75] Similarly, the document claims that the 1994 conference represents "the last opportunity in the twentieth century for the international community to collectively address the critical challenges and interrelationships between population and development."[76] In the intervening years since the conference, the near-euphoria associated with the possibilities of a new international relations structure have faded, but one detects in the document an understanding of the possibilities that existed, even if only momentarily. In fact, this very moment of hope appeared to undermine the *realpolitik* vision of international relations that insisted on self-interest and constant danger, and of individual nation-states, in conflict with other nation-states, as being the only, or at least primary, actors. Beyond the specifics of the moment, however, the self-reflective understanding of the Cairo Conference's moment in a larger history carries important rhetorical functions.

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[75] "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.1.

[76] "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.15.

Rhetorically, Cairo had to walk a fine line in its treatment of the past- for instance, in terms of progress achieved and problems remaining. Since most international observers would recognize Cairo as being part of a broader trajectory that included Bucharest and Mexico City, Cairo needed to acknowledge the successes of the 1974 and 1984 conferences, but still provide justification for its own necessity. Additionally, the rhetorical task became more difficult because, to over-sell the accomplishments of prior conferences would present, in the words of Kenneth Burke, a problem of "recalcitrance," as efforts to curb poverty, accelerate development, reduce health problems, and other similar efforts, had not been able to downplay, significantly reduce, or eliminate the ongoing, systemic prominence of these problems.[77]

The overarching narrative of the preamble helps to provide clues for how Cairo was to deal with this dilemma. Early in the preamble, the document notes "significant progress in many fields," but also concedes the ongoing problems facing the international community.[78] One of the ways that it attempts to shield previous conferences from blame for these ongoing problems is to make the argument that things have changed in substantial ways that require new approaches (which, of course, the participants at Bucharest and Mexico City could not have foreseen). Thus, even before promoting the "significant progress," the document notes how "the world has undergone far-reaching changes in the past two decades."[79] Beyond arguing based on a change of situation, the document also attempts to contextualize the current state of affairs on some middle point of a continuum, rather than as overall success or overall failure: "Much has been

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[77] Kenneth Burke, *Permanence and Change*, 3rd Ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984). See, for instance, 255.

[78] "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.2.

[79] "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.2.

achieved . . . but more needs to be done."[80] Nevertheless, the document does suggest significant positive changes in the intervening years since Bucharest and Mexico City, despite not naming them explicitly:

> [C]onsiderable changes . . . have taken place during the past two decades, particularly with the greater awareness of the magnitude, diversity and urgency of unmet needs. Countries that formerly attached minimal importance to population issues now recognize them at the core of their development challenge. International migration and AIDS, for instance, formerly matters of marginal concern to a few countries, are currently high-priority issues in a large number of countries.[81]

In addition to situating itself in time and history, the document also has to deal with the persistently rhetorical concern of propriety or appropriateness. Interestingly, one of the important adjectives enlisted by the document and meant to guide activities carried out in the name of this Programme of Action, "appropriate," maps onto fundamentally rhetorical concerns. Aristotle's understanding of rhetoric as "an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion," implies that certain strategies of persuasion are inappropriate for some contexts.[82] In fact, some people have traced, in classical and contemporary contexts, a "rhetoric of propriety" and questions of "appropriateness" have always been significant for rhetoricians.[83] While the ICPD Programme of Action is more explicitly concerned about appropriateness insofar as

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[80] "Report of the ICPD," Para 1.2.

[81] "Report of the ICPD," Para 14.1. Significantly, Bucharest and Mexico City are each only mentioned once, with one reference each in the endnotes.

[82] Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, I. 1355a1.

[83] For instance, see John D. Schaeffer, review of Stephen J. McKenna's *Adam Smith: The Rhetoric of Propriety*, *Style*, Winter 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2342/is_4_40/ai_n27100733/?tag=content;col1 (Accessed July 1, 2009).

programs should seek to avoid offending particular cultures' values, the principle is the same, and the awareness of "cultural propriety" also becomes, for the document, a moment of "rhetorical propriety." In the document, some variant on "appropriate" (appropriate, appropriately, inappropriate) appears exactly 100 times. Again, such an implicit understanding of the conditions for rhetorical appropriateness and effectiveness suggests the ways in which these documents would present themselves much more powerfully if they admitted of rhetoric, even if not calling it by its precise name.

Propriety also relates to the style of the document. While never attempting to present itself as fully antirhetorical, the "style" of the document's rhetoric (or, more to the point, the apparent lack thereof), is indicative of a sense of propriety, related to a plain style that may help one to understand the rhetoric of conference/international documents more generally.[84] Apart from some language in the preamble and the principles, there are very few rhetorical flourishes, few clear uses of metaphor, alliteration, or other stylized features that, in traditional public address, as well as in rhetoric and composition, become the defining rhetorical points of interest.

In addition to the other varying uses of time and history in the document and the efforts to configure propriety, one of the most rhetorically effective uses is to point toward experiences in the past to show what does/does not work. Because of the already lengthy nature of the document, it would be out of place for a document of this type to cite specific studies (as it is, the procession of conference/document citing is cumbersome enough). Therefore, when the document references something like "history/experience shows", these claims have strong authoritative power, because they are not specifically refutable. For instance, in talking about the

[84] As I suggest later, these characteristics may help to sketch a vision of the defining characteristics of a rhetorical genre.

importance of improving the status of women for population success, the document argues: "Experience shows that population and development programmes are most effective when steps have simultaneously been taken to improve the status of women."[85] I do not mean to suggest that these claims are necessarily false or should be suspected as such, but rather point to the way in which evidentiary support becomes assumed and taken for granted rather than demonstrated. As suggested above, this type of rhetorical approach may be both evidence of a part of the genre, while also an expression of the "proof surrogate" fallacy.

The possibility of a new, different rhetorical genre, as suggested by this text (and those explored in Chapters 3 and 4) is important for a few reasons. First, as Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp note, the nation-state's significance, vis a vis the international community, is waning. Thus, we are likely to see an ever greater number of internationally-produced (and likely UN-related) texts, for which our traditional tools of rhetorical analysis are currently poorly suited. Second, just as rhetoricians of science have taken on the task of understanding different components of scientific text as unique genres, so too does this offer a more systematic approach to understanding these documents without merely pointing out that they are rhetorical even if they appear not to be. The latter observation, while important, is unlikely to be a significant breakthrough for rhetoricians or argumentation theorists, and, insofar as it may be perceived as a moment of critical "debunking," is likely to have a limited effect by broader audiences.

2.3.2.7 Searching for a 'Residual Message'

While there are many attractive elements to the comprehensive vision provided in these documents, and most especially, in the Programme of Action, a fully proportionalized rhetorical

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[85] "Report of the ICPD," Para 4.1.

account of these texts must also examine potential weaknesses or limitations of the comprehensiveness of the document. In Stephen Lucas' widely adopted public speaking textbook, he suggests the importance of having a clear "residual message" in one's speech: "Another way to think of the central idea is as your *residual* message—what you want your audience to remember after they have forgotten everything else in the speech."[86] In other words, one needs to have a clear and memorable position that, when stripped of linking details and parallel aspects, is both remembered and appreciated by audiences. For all of the many weaknesses of Malthus and Ehrlich, the residual messages in their positions are inescapably obvious. My claim is not that all rhetorical documents must be capable of being reduced to 10-second sound bites, but they must have some memorable core or else they risk being forgotten or lost in the minds and actions of their audiences. The sheer length of the Cairo document is not necessarily a problem, but that its basic bottom line is the interconnectedness of countless sectors—from health to education to the environment, as but a few examples—makes it hard to isolate a consistent, substantive message that can be carried forward, remembered, and even strategically deployed in future contexts and situations.[87]

This is particularly true given the contemporary information scene. As Richard A. Lanham notes:

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[86] Stephen E. Lucas, *The Art of Public Speaking*, 8th Ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 100.

[87] On the other hand, in a refutation to Jamieson's claims about eloquence in the age of advanced media, Obama's success with a decidedly anti-soundbite type of speaking style, especially early in his 2008 presidential campaign, indicates that this may not be of paramount importance. Such an example, though, is likely to still be thought of isolated and an aberration, given the frequency of contemporary audiences having a short attention-span, which, has Lanham notes, is in many ways now a tool of survival. Furthermore, this lack of a residual message risks misunderstandings in the public argument. For instance, the complexity of the Cairo Programme of Action, and the lack of a clear message that could be used by any number of actors, ended up creating a void in which individual NGOs, scholars, politicians, and activists created their own, potentially misleading, residual messages, such as the claims to novelty examined as part of this dissertation.

> So, we live in an "information economy." But information is not in short supply in the new information economy. We're drowning in it. What we lack is the human attention needed to make sense of it all. It will be easier to find our place in the new regime if we think of it as an economics of attention. Attention is the commodity in short supply. . . . The devices that regulate attention are stylistic devices. Attracting attention is what style is all about. If attention is now at the center of the economy rather than stuff, then so is style. It moves from the periphery to the center. Style and substance trade places.[88]

In gesturing for the need to understand style and attention as central rather than peripheral, Lanham explicitly references rhetoric as the domain where the attention economy most significantly takes place. He argues:

> "Rhetoric" has not always been a synonym for humbug. For most of Western history, it has meant the body of doctrine that teaches people how to speak and write and, thus, act effectively in public life. Usually defined as "the art of persuasion," it might as well have been called "the economics of attention." It tells us how to allocate our central scarce resource, to invite people to attend to what we would like them to attend to. Rhetoric has been the central repository of wisdom on how we make sense of and use information since the Greeks first invented it sometime in the middle of the last millennium before Christ.[89]

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[88] Richard A. Lanham, *The Economics of Attention: Style and Substance in the Age of Information* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), xi-xii. For an application of this set of concerns for the business world, see Thomas H. Davenport and John C. Beck, *The Attention Economy: Understanding the New Currency of Business* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001).

[89] Lanham, *The Economics of Attention*, xii-xiii.

One might object by arguing that this "attention economy" is pertinent first and foremost to the public and private spheres, but that these conference texts represent the technical sphere, and thus the situation is different. Even in the technical sphere, scientists, politicians, bureaucrats, strategists, and countless other actors are equally bombarded with information, such that, like the rhetoric of science, even technical sphere actors need a "style" to convert information from raw substance to usable information. Also, as I suggest throughout this project, I am unconvinced that these texts, and more generally the conferences from which they emerge, are clearly disconnected from the public sphere.

While my observations are rooted in the disciplinary domain of rhetoric, my analysis converges with, for instance, scholars primarily focused on the topical area of the Cairo conference, as well as scholars from the disciplinary domain of demography, who have similar interests in and reservations about the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development. Though their critique goes beyond the lack of a clear rhetorical residual message, and extends to the ways in which a broadened agenda harms the effort to prioritize goals in the context of finite resources, their concern about the broad expansion of the population agenda intersects with my concern regarding a lack of clear residual message. As John F. Kantner and Andrew Kantner argue, "international population assistance has become increasingly unfocused, lacking in sensibly articulated priorities, and overly broad in conception."[90] Furthermore, they claim, "[b]esides being broad in conception, the Programme of Action does not prioritize these goals or specify achievement outcomes."[91]

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[90] John F. Kantner and Andrew Kantner, *The Struggle for International Consensus on Population and Development* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 153.

[91] Kantner and Kantner, *The Struggle for International Consensus*, 138.

2.4 CONCLUSION

The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo, Egypt, represented an important moment in the history of international public argument relating to population (even if not representing something truly novel or different) . Regardless of any material, tangible efforts made as a result of the conference, the rhetorically significant aspects of the document are worthy of scholarly attention. For instance, the document places the rhetorical frames of "development" and "demographics" in a unique dialectical tension, refusing to assert causality or sequencing between the two. The Programme of Action also attempts to marshal "objective" knowledge while at the same time implicating human deliberation and decision-making on contingent issues, thereby creating a particular rhetorical quandary for the conferees. Since Cairo exists mid-stream between past and future rhetorics of population, the text utilizes components of the Burkean pentad to suggest exigencies without particular agents being responsible, while also rhetorically downplaying the degree of controversy in the conference's vision by presenting its claims as facts and/or uncontroversial premises and conclusions.

As noted in Chapter 1, participants, scholars, and activists have all made grand proclamations regarding the significance of the meeting (and, as the Vatican example from earlier in the chapter demonstrates, many critics too have made Cairo a defining moment in history). Having now examined the text itself, through a close read of the document's contents and its rhetorically notable features, we are well-positioned to consider both the predecessors to Cairo (Bucharest in 1974 and Mexico City in 1984), as well as the follow ups to the Cairo process (ICPD+5 in 1999 and ICPD+10 in 2004). In one sense, I have arranged the chapters such that Cairo becomes like a Janus-faced moment, looking both back and forward in it time, rather than as another step along the purportedly linear development of UN rhetoric about population.

Thus, in Chapter 3, I look back toward Bucharest and Mexico City, while in Chapter 4, I look forward to ICPD+5 and ICPD+10. It is with such a perspective that I will be best situated to address how Cairo fits into the history of international public argument on population, as well as to investigate whether it was really a “paradigm changer. In addition, after having examined all five moments, I will better understand each document’s significant rhetorical features on their own, individual terms, as well as the significant rhetorical dynamics common to all and those that are significant in reference to each other.

3.0 THE EARLY YEARS: FOIL OR PRECURSOR?

3.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I examine two conferences of particular importance for the issue of human population growth: the Bucharest Conference of 1974 and the Mexico City Conference of 1984. My interest in these conferences in two-fold: first, to understand these texts on their own terms, and for themselves, and second, to understand these texts in relation to the 1994 Cairo conference (though, as my analysis indicates, in this current project, I tend toward the latter, seeing these texts in relation to the ICPD Programme of Action). In order to analyze these conferences, both on their own terms, and cumulatively, I first turn to the official document produced by the Bucharest Conference, the "World Population Plan of Action" (1974).[1] After providing context for the Bucharest Conference generally and this document specifically, I then perform a rhetorical criticism of the text. After this section, I will turn to the Mexico City Conference. To guide this analysis, I will again look at the primary document produced by the conference, "Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the World Population Plan of Action" (1984). Just as with the World Population Plan of Action, I will perform a rhetorical criticism of the text. Following the section on Mexico City, I will provide an analysis that

[1] United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), "World Population Plan of Action," http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/bkg/wppa.html (Accessed November 15, 2008).

combines Bucharest and Mexico City. As part of this synthetic analysis, I will, among other vectors of interpretation, look for evidence of the preliminary markers of the key rhetorical benchmarks of Cairo (as indicated by Chapter 2), such as "reproductive rights," "reproductive health," "women's rights," “sustainability,” and a holistic sense of population policy being intertwined with broader policy changes. Finally, I will conclude the chapter by transitioning to chapter 4, the analysis of the ICPD+5 (1999) and ICPD+10 (2004).

3.2 THE WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE (BUCHAREST, 1974)

As explained in Chapter 1, the 1974 conference was neither the first international conference on population nor even the first United Nations-sponsored conference on population. As Schechter notes, "The World Population Conference . . . was actually the third such conference sponsored by the UN, but the first that meets the criteria adopted herein (and elsewhere) as a UN global conference."[2] Notably, and relatively hidden from a purely internal analysis of the final conference text, is the way in which the vision of Bucharest was substantially contested along developed-developing country lines. As Greene explains, the "Group of 77" played a significant and decisive role challenging the United States in conceptualizing the work of the Bucharest conference:

> [T]he "Group of 77," a coalition of African, Asian, and Latin American countries who . . . began to demand a new set of economic relationships between the First and Third Worlds . . . The Group of 77 did not conceptualize their development

[2] Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences*, 42.

> problems as essentially population problems but instead as the residual hangover of colonialism . . . In preparation for the Bucharest Conference a set of preliminary meetings were held on a regional basis in an effort to formulate a draft of the World Population Plan of Action. At these meetings there was little opposition to the basic reasoning of the U.S. wing of the population apparatus that the growth in population was the primary reason for the failure of development programs and family planning should be institutionalized in an effort to directly reduce the rate of population growth. . . However, as the Conference unfolded it became clear that the Group of 77 would block the preferences of the United States . . . the dominant organization of the elements within the population apparatus was ambushed at the Bucharest Conference. A new articulation of the population apparatus was in the making.[3]

In this page, Greene only alludes to "a new articulation." While I unwrap this new formulation throughout this chapter, its essence relates to the relationship between population goals (expressed specifically in terms of figures such as fertility rates) and economic and social development (and, as noted in this passage from Greene, geopolitical issues such as colonialism). From the perspective of demographers, primarily those residing in the United States or other parts of the developed world, population growth rates needed to be managed as a pre-condition for facilitating and strengthening economic and social development. In stark contrast, the Group

[3] Greene, *Malthusian Worlds*, 80-82. For more on the "Group of 77" and the "New International Economic Order" (NIEO), see, for instance, Karl P Sauvant and Hajo Hasenpflug, *The New International Economic Order: Confrontation or Cooperation between North and South?* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977); Karl P Sauvant, *The Group of 77: Evolution, Structure, Organization* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1981); ———, *Changing Priorities on the International Agenda: The New International Economic Order* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981); and Odette Jankowitsch and Karl P. Sauvant, *The Third World without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries* (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1978). Notably in addition to the other factors that united to challenge the basic assumptions of (over)population, this passage indicates the importance of decolonization rhetorically for developing countries in suggesting an alternate genealogy of causality.

of 77 argued forcefully that development must occur before, or at a minimum, concurrently with, population management, rather than as a postscript to it. As part of this shift in articulation, the notion of quantitative, demographic goals receded into the background, to the chagrin of delegates representing the United States, as Connelly explains:

> [I]n a decisive vote, a majority of delegates rejected a U.S. proposal that the WPPA [World Population Plan of Action] recommend reducing the average size of families. But the coalition included many who would have supported goals for establishing voluntary family planning services, as opposed to population control. Nevertheless, the Americans continued pressing for a plank that would set targets for reducing the rate of population growth by 1985. The final result—"rammed down the throats of substantial opposition," as Notestein put it—just recognized that some countries had set population targets and invited others to consider doing the same.[4]

Now, having provided a basic backdrop of some significant historical and contextual factors surrounding and impacting the Bucharest Conference, I turn next to its primary textual product: the World Population Plan of Action.

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[4] Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 315. I find Connelly's distinction between "population control" and "family planning services," a distinction that becomes a central topos in his book, to be troubling. Overwhelmingly, most contemporary advocates for "population control" have articulated such concerns in connection with calls for "family planning services" (notwithstanding high-profile foils like China's one-child policy and attempts by some to utilize population control to advance eugenic, racist, xenophobic, or sexist agendas). Without denying that some have viewed "control" as a strategy of top-down administration, such coercive strategies are, in my read, the exception more so than the rule.

3.3 THE WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION (1974)

3.3.1 Key Features of the Text

The World Population Plan of Action "weighs in" at approximately 11,000 words. The Plan opens with a short preamble (just 59 words), in the form of a legislative resolution (present participle statements, concluded with an action verb and some claim of decision). It proceeds with a lengthy "background to the plan," (just under 20% of the overall document), then directs our attention to the "principles and objectives of the plan" (just over 10% of the document). After these preliminaries, the document delves into a lengthy section entitled "recommendations for action." Constituting more than 50% of the document, the recommendations fall into three broad categories: "population goals and policies" (the longest sub-section of the three), "socio-economic policies," (by far the shortest, despite the centering of development in this text) and "promotion of knowledge and policies" (about half the length of the "population goals and policies section).[5] The document concludes with "recommendations for implementation." Comprising approximately 10% of the document, this section is divided into three sections (of which the middle section, on international co-operation, is about twice as long as each of the other two sections, despite the limited role that the document envisions for international action): "role of national governments," "role of international co-operation," and "monitoring, review and appraisal."

Why is this structure important? While some analyses may point merely to the functionality of such an arrangement, a rhetorically informed perspective offers an appreciation

[5] This "Recommendations for Action" section also includes one endnote of 7 words, not counted in any of the overall counts.

of the role of form and not merely content or function.[6] Following Kenneth Burke's discussion of the pentad, I would argue that the document opens, in the preamble, background, and principles and objectives sections, by laying out the current "scene," including a discussion of the current ills and why they cannot be fixed without a new series of actions, while also providing the overarching "purpose" for this episode of dramatism.[7] It then proceeds, in the "recommendations for action" section, to offer the "act," as well as some indications of the "agents" and the "agency." In the "recommendations for implementation," the document continues with its description of "agent" and "agency."[8] Particularly given this structure, and also with the many references to "policies," "action," "plan," and "programmes" (8, 9, 10, and 11, respectively, in the top 20 frequency analysis, depicted in Table 2 above), it is clear that this plan is best considered in the broad Aristotlean genre of deliberative rhetoric (as opposed to forensic or epideictic rhetoric), since it deals with what actions should be taken for the future.[9]

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[6] For the vital role that form and genre play in understanding rhetoric and public argument, see, for instance, Aram A. Aghazarian and Herbert W. Simons, *Form, Genre, and the Study of Political Discourse* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1986); Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Form and Genre: Shaping Rhetorical Action* (Falls Church, VA: The Speech Communication Association, 1978); ———, *Deeds Done in Words: Presidential Rhetoric and the Genres of Governance* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990); ———, *Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008).

[7] Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969).

[8] As I have already alluded, in Chapter 1, to the close relationship between stasis theory and "stock issues" analysis in debate, and given my interest in achieving reunification between debate and rhetoric/argument theory, I believe that each of these elements of the Burkean scene contain counterparts in the language of stock issues. For instance, the portion of the "scene" that describes current ills approximates "harms" and "significance," while the aspect of scene that explains why a new series of actions are needed is the equivalent of "inherency." The "act" approximates a debate "plan" (and, in old debate theory language, issues like "agents" and "agency" would have been subsumed under different "planks" of the plan). While "purpose" does not have as clear of an analogue, one might consider the debate "resolution" to serve both as the "scene" upon which the debate occurs and also the "purpose" for the debate.

[9] However, as explained in Chapter 2, these texts also share many similarities with judicial decisions, thus suggesting an overlap between these texts and forensic rhetoric. Also, as indicated by the passage cited, also in Chapter 2, from Riley, Hollihan, and Klumpp, UN texts challenge the tidy distinctions between and among deliberative, forensic, and epideictic rhetoric.

When considering audience, we as critics should proceed with caution. As noted in the exclusion/inclusion criteria in Chapter 1, this conference, unlike its predecessors, was not meant as a purely technocratic, expertise-driven exercise. Therefore, it would be incorrect to understand this communication as occurring in an inwardly-focused expert enclave. However, on the other extreme, it is not a document well suited for broad public consumption. Coming in at over 10,000 words, and consisting primarily of logical appeals, devoid of rhetorical style or artistry (such as metaphor, parallelism, or alliteration), few people in the "general public" are likely a) to seek out this document, or b) to invest the time to engage in a close read of the text. Seeking some middle ground, we should understand the primary, explicitly identified audience of this document to be governments and "the international community." To a lesser extent, stakeholders representing international agencies working on population-related efforts, as well as NGOs, would also have some interest. However, as I detail, particularly in Chapters 1 and 5, many of the broader stakeholders (such as NGO representatives) on these debates have appeared not to follow the intricacies of these final conference texts very closely. Such a "deferral of the text," as Gaonkar and Leff have discussed, then, not only afflicts scholars, but also activists and policymakers. Such a reading strategy, which is premised on a skimming model, neglects the intricacies of the text, such as the most frequently invoked terms and themes (see Table 2) and notable terms and phrases that help to open interpretive possibilities for the document (see Table 3).

Table 4. Top 20 Terms, World Population Plan of Action (Bucharest)[10]

Top 20 Terms: Frequency (Rank Indicated by Number)
1. Population 2. Countries 3. Development 4. International 5. Social 6. Economic 7. National 8. Policies 9. Action 10. Family 11. Plan 12. Programmes 13. Nations 14. United 15. Developing 16. World 17. Human 18. Governments 19. Socio-economic 20. Mortality

3.3.2 Rhetorical Analysis

While contextual and historical work can help to illuminate what might be missed with a purely textual analysis (such as, for instance, the pivotal role played by the Group of 77 and the NIEO, as well as the oblique, indirect references to the situation with Israel and the Palestinians), there are many valuable critical benefits to be derived from an internal reading of the text. Prior to asking questions about the effects of or influence of the document, only a close read of the text

[10] www.wordle.net. Wordle allows a user to select how many terms to see at a time. For instance, selecting "1" will show only the most prominent term in the text. Using this method, I expanded the number, one at a time, until I had a list, in order, of the top 20 terms in the document. This analysis was performed on May 14, 2009. There are significant limits, despite the utility of Wordle. For instance, it is not capable of "stemming" (http://www.wordle.net/faq). As a default, Wordle screens out "Stop Words" (and, the, etc…) (http://www.wordle.net/faq), which in this case, is actually very useful. Also, as a default, Wordle treats words as separate. It is possible to combine words using a tilde, but given that these documents have, at a minimum, around 10,000 words, this is not very practical, and assumes in advance what I would be looking for in any case. Thus, #14, "United," probably refers to "United Nations," but does not read as such to Wordle (at least not without manual alteration of every instance in the text). For a visual representation, not only of the top 20 terms, but of the entire document, see Appendix A.

itself traces an intricate, in-depth thematic analysis, a "mapping" of the key components and how they interact, and a featuring of the key vocabulary (significant terms and phrases) in the document. Also, as the passage from David Zarefsky in Chapter 1 indicated, when rhetoricians talk about effects of discourse (most famously, in the passage by Herbert Wichelns), they are not asking about empirical measurements showing clear causality, but instead are asking about key features of the text that may indicate a vision of the audience, strategies devised in the hope of swaying an audience, and other similar types of questions. Also, even when discussing influence, as my overall project suggests, and as I discuss most pointedly in Chapter 5, being un- or under-informed about the specifics of the text can lead to an impoverished analysis of both the document and its importance/influence. Therefore, in the remainder of this section, I perform a rhetorical criticism of the World Population Plan of Action.

Table 5. Notable Terms & Phrases, World Population Conference (Bucharest)

Notable Term/Phrase	Frequency
Development/developmental[11]	82
-socio-economic	29
-culture, cultural, socio-cultural	11
Developing [countries/regions]	33
Developed [countries/regions]	24
Quality of life	8
Interrelationship, interrelationships, interrelations	8
Progress	9
Right, rights, freedom, freedoms	34
Co-operation (such as "international co-operation), co-operate	17
Sovereignty, sovereign	5

The "World Population Plan of Action" features a number of key terms, clusters, and agons.[12] In my reading, there are at least seven critical key terms that are worthy of analysis:

[11] For the purposes of this count, I excluded uses of the term "development" when it was used in a different context, such as "development of indicators" or "development of policies," as that is a substantially different referent than socio-economic development in international relations theory. Similarly, for "developing" and "developed," I only counted references to regions or countries, not to phrases such as calls for "developing guidelines." Also, in some cases, "developed" is used to describe "less developed" countries or regions, so the reader should not assume that a reference to "developed" refers necessarily to a "developed" country.

“development” (with clusters such as socio-economic and culture), "quality of life," "interrelationship," "progress," "human rights"/"fundamental freedoms," "international co-operation," and "sovereignty."[13] Table 3 shows the frequency of each set of terms. Reading this table against Table 2 produces a tension, in that the terms selected for Table 3 are not necessarily those featured most frequently (Table 2). As I explain in Chapter 1, one of the major potential mistakes of over-doing cluster-agon criticism is that, in some cases, the most important terms (in terms of understanding and interpreting the text) are not the most frequent, and vice versa.[14] Therefore, I have chosen these seven sets of terms because they tell us something about the state of the public argument over population, and also because they enable us to peer into the rhetorical strategy of the text. Rather than detailing each of these sets of terms individually, I turn next to an assessment of three critical vectors for rhetorical analysis, and utilize these notable terms and phrases as part of such analysis. These three vectors include “putting the development horse before the demographic cart,” about the modification of the relationship between demography and development at Bucharest, “re-viewing the geopolitical landscape,” relating to the ways in which the World Population Plan of Action adds complexity to the geographical and geopolitical factors affecting the question of population, and finally “securing sovereignty,” which discusses the role of nation-states and the international community, as expressed in the

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[12] "World Population Plan of Action."

[13] Importantly, as a quick comparison with Table 2 will indicate, these terms do not map, in any exact way, with the most frequently used terms, though there are important bridges and links. Judging terms that are important to unlock a text, even if they do not appear most frequently, is one of the important correctives required for anyone committed to cluster-agon analysis.

[14] Similarly, in many cases, the placement/arrangement of certain portions of the text says as much or more about a term/phrase’s importance than its frequency. For instance, terms that track prominently in the “preamble” of a document are likely to contain an elevated interpretive status, as compared to terms that might be buried in the middle of the text.

document. My analysis begins with a discussion of the re-working of the demographics-development relationship, or dialectic, in the World Population Plan of Action.

3.3.2.1 Putting the Development Horse Before the Demographic Cart

> The consideration of population problems cannot be reduced to the analysis of population trends only. It must also be borne in mind that the present situation of the developing countries originates in the unequal processes of socio-economic development which have divided peoples since the beginning of the modern era. This inequity still exists and is intensified by lack of equity in international economic relations with consequent disparity in levels of living.[15]

As Greene and Connelly have extensively documented, one of the early manifestations of "population control" assumed that demographic stability (namely, reducing fertility) must precede development, especially in an economic sense. Thus, many developing countries were told by demographers and leaders in developed countries that their best hope for achieving a "demographic transition," and thus to experience prosperity and growth, was to stabilize population rates first. Many participants and observers of the Bucharest process assumed that this conference would continue with that same "demographics, then development" logic. However, as noted by Greene and Connelly, earlier this chapter, developing countries, and in particular the "Group of 77" and those supporting the New International Economic Order, arose at Bucharest to contest this logic sharply and offer a different vision of the relationship between demographics and development.

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[15] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 4.

While at times the tone of the World Population Plan of Action sounds moderate and only attempts to stress the complex relationship between demographics and development ("the interrelationship between population situations and socio-economic development" [Preamble]), at other times the document asserts a more thorough reversal of the equation.[16] In this more aggressive formulation, the argument appears to be that development is a prerequisite, or a foundation, for demographic stability. For instance, the first paragraph of the document states, "The basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above all, socio-economic transformation."

This shift is significant, both for the issue of population, and from a rhetorical perspective. In terms of population, Bucharest was the beginning of the end of relatively tidy, seamless, linear calculations about demographic possibilities. While Bucharest already adds complexity, it itself looks straightforward in comparison to its successors, as each new document continues to ramp up its anti-reductionist posture by adding an ever greater series of variables that systematically affect the population question (including, for instance, as I argued in Chapter 2, the shift to a systems-level or cybernetic approach). This shift is rhetorically significant because, on most controversial, enduring public policy questions, we have come to assume incremental shifts in the tenor of the public argument. Rarely do major reversals and shifts come about in single episodes. Moreover, in those episodes when such shifts do occur, they usually occur because the new formulation makes a successful and pointed criticism of the earlier formulation. The form of the international conference document, however, is much less

[16] The more moderate version, of the complex interrelationships among demographics, development, and a range of other factors, ultimately prevails, as explained in Chapter 2, and also as I indicate when examining Mexico City, as well as ICPD + 5 and + 10.

agonistic.[17] As Greene and Connelly note, the atmosphere of the conference (argument as process and procedure) was no doubt contentious and agonistic, if not antagonistic, the final document (argument as product) positioned itself as an uncontroversial conclusion borne out of uncontroversial premises (which I analyzed in chapter 2 under the notion of "sanitizing controversy").[18]

In addition to re-shaping population, the Bucharest text also re-configures the terms of development. Rather than conceptualizing development as an exclusively economic issue, the clustering tendencies of the document reveal a more holistic understanding of development. For instance, one of the most frequent clusters is "socio-economic," such as "socio-economic development."[19] Already, such a configuration assumes that development is not merely about the modes of production and increasing the GDP, but also includes the social development of a population. While not as frequent, development is also clustered with "culture" and "cultural," as well as at times, "socio-cultural." Again, these are non-economic frames to interpret the question of development. Moreover, in a move that anticipates the theme of sustainability, prevalent especially at the 1992 Rio conference, and also at the 1994 Cairo population conference (as analyzed in Chapter 2), the World Population Plan of Action clusters "social, economic, and environmental factors" and foreshadowing the ideograph of the 1992 Rio conference, a version of "sustainable development" ("for the achievement of sustained development").[20] This approach

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[17] Again, as also suggested in Chapter 2 and throughout, these types of characteristics indicate elements of a genre.

[18] Joseph W. Wenzel, "Three Perspectives on Argument: Rhetoric, Dialectic, Logic," in Janice Schuetz and Robert Trapp, eds., *Perspectives in Argumentation: Essays in Honor of Wayne Brockriede* (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1990), 9-26.

[19] For instance, the expression of "due regard . . . for rapid socio-economic development," is featured prominently in the Preamble, both in Clauses 1 and 2, of the "World Population Plan of Action."

[20] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 1.

to development, as something much bigger and more diverse than just economics, creates an asymmetry in relation to the earlier logic. While in many ways the Bucharest text mirrors and reverses the old demographic-development equation, it refuses to take the old focus of developed countries, which was overwhelmingly economic, and instead adds nuance and depth to the idea of development (though, of course, embracing the economic component of development as well).

If the World Population Plan of Action's emphasis on modifying the demography-development dialectic re-shapes the terms of the public debate, in what ways does this modification affect some of the most long-standing topoi of population? Traditionally, population advocacy is driven by a concern for life in terms of quantity. Therefore, in this tendency, such efforts have promoted sanctity of life and size of populations. In contrast to this numerical vision of the lifeworld, the WPPA responds forcefully, though implicitly, by promoting "quality of life." The text promotes "quality of life" in the opening clause of its preamble. [21] Moreover, beyond the arrangement and placement of this term in such a central, opening location, "quality of life" figures prominently into the vision of the document:

> The principal aim of social, economic and cultural development, of which population goals are integral parts, is to improve levels of living and the quality of life of the people. Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Man's knowledge and ability to master himself and his environment will continue to grow. Mankind's future can be made infinitely bright.[22]

Again, passages such as this one re-work development (as social, economic and cultural), emphasize a part/whole relation in which population is a part and development is the whole, and

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[21] "World Population Plan of Action," Preamble, Clause 1.

[22] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 14, Subsection A.

foreground people and life, not just in quantity, but quality. It also expresses a form of eco-optimism that, again implicitly, stands in stark contrast to the eco-pessimism that traditionally characterizes population rhetoric (such as Garrett Hardin and Paul Ehrlich). This optimism is spread throughout the document, in its numerous calls for making "progress," not just in relation to particular, instrumental goals developed in the document, but also for humanity.[23] While coercion has rarely been advocated openly as part of population advocacy, its role in the history of population efforts is undeniable. Therefore, while re-working development, the WPPA also expresses support for rights and freedoms as part of its overall vision for "population": early in the "Background to the Plan," the document expresses support for "the promotion of economic development, quality of life, human rights and fundamental freedoms."[24] While some of the references to freedoms and rights are references to other agreements and documents, such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, many of the references are normative claims about how population rhetoric/policy should proceed. These markers, again fencing with an unnamed opponent only known by reference to the scene surrounding the WPPA, reflect an awareness of the risks of abridging rights in favor of faster demographic results.[25]

Finally, though the document, by virtues of its primary players, as well as its particular moment in history, invests significant efforts in demonstrating the primacy of "development" as the key to unlock and resolve a variety of interlocking problems, at times the WPPA

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[23] For more on the specific intellectual history of the idea/term "progress," see Richard Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric* (Davis, CA: Hermagoras Press, 1985) and Charles Van Doren, *The Idea of Progress* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967).

[24] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 1. As addressed in Chapter 2, these texts ultimately create a rights rhetoric that appears to transcend some of the typical limitations associated with "rights talk" (as Glendon terms it), by embracing individual and community simultaneously, rather than picking one or the other.

[25] My intent with such language as "fencing with an unnamed opponent" is to direct attention to the odd ways in which rhetorical foils are used (implicitly and explicitly) to build, sustain, oppose, and/or re-direct population rhetoric. I discuss this theme at length in Chapter 5.

foreshadows its conference progeny by promoting the idea of complexity and interrelationships in the area of population (as detailed, for instance, in Chapter 2). For instance, even in the preamble, “interrelationship” is already invoked.[26] This advocacy of complexity and interrelationships appears throughout the document (though somewhat subdued/tempered by the emphasis on development as an overarching solution). One of the primary "general objectives" of the World Population Plan of Action calls for such an interrelated approach:

> To advance national and international understanding of the complex relations among the problems of population, resources, environment and development, and to promote a unified analytical approach to the study of these interrelationships and to relevant policies.[27]

Again, as expressed above, the WPPA in particular fluctuates between making the “soft case” for re-orienting population efforts (population cannot be a precursor to development and other social and cultural factors) and going for the “hard case” (development should attain the “God term” status that demography once held, and population, social, and cultural factors are ultimately and best resolved by recourse to development). As we move closer to Cairo, as examined in Chapter 2, the “hard case” will increasingly give way to the “soft case,” thus beginning to dissolve this tension between, on the one hand, a view that sees a web of factors, where claims to linear causality are dubious at best, and on the other hand, a perspective that situates development as a/the linear cause, with population and other issues as its effects.

These efforts to re-deploy the rhetoric of “development” in the World Population Plan of Action (and, more generally, though less obviously and explicitly, in all five texts), in contrast to

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[26] "World Population Plan of Action," Preamble, Clause 2.

[27] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 15, Subsection B.

its decidedly developed/expert origins, deserve closer scholarly attention. In recent years, critiques of "development" have been mounting in IR literature, especially in relation to development's problematic effects on the global South. For instance, the edited collection *The Post-Development Reader* and Arturo Escobar's *Encountering Development* stand out as two exemplars of such critiques.[28] Much like "population" rhetoric, "development" rhetoric has now been so maligned that one possibility, that has been advocated, is to drop such rhetoric altogether (in a move strikingly similar to many calls to stop producing rhetorics of "population" and "overpopulation"). However, much like Peterson noted the ambiguities in and alternate potentialities for the term "sustainable development," another possibility, seized by some, has been to try to reinvent and recraft "development" rhetoric and discourses in order to challenge and change their essential trajectories.[29] Such a strategy is on display with the documents examined in this project, especially when one considers that, from Bucharest to ICPD+10, some of the most prominent participants in structuring and producing these documents have been representatives of developing countries and NGOs from the global South. This, to me, is a deeply rhetorical approach, in the sense of rhetoric as contingent and involving that which could be otherwise.

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[28] Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, Eds. *The Post-Development Reader* (London: Zed Books, 1997); Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). Also, see Richard B. Norgaard, *Development Betrayed: The End of Progress and a Coevolutionary Revisioning of the Future* (London: Routledge, 1994) and Neil Smith, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space*, 3rd ed. (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 2008).

[29] Tarla Rai Peterson, *Sharing the Earth: The Rhetoric of Sustainable Development* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1997). For one such effort at re-casting "development" discourse from within, see Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999). Also, see Martha C. Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Martha C. Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds., *The Quality of Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), Amartya Sen, *Resources, Values and Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), and Martha Nussbaum, *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

While one of the World Population Plan of Action's most important rhetorical components is the manner in which it re-structures the demography-development dialectic, its rhetorical significance extends beyond this particular component. In the next section, I look at the way in which, by virtue of the participation and power of the Group of 77, the story of geopolitics is told very differently in the 1974 text.

3.3.2.2 Blame-Shifting

Most accounts of human population growth, whether configured as a "problem" or not, take into account the geographical and geopolitical issues relating to population, such as the different situations in developed and developing countries. However, given that many intergovernmental and expert-written documents prior to Bucharest were influenced heavily by the logic of or directly authored by developed countries, the account from the global "South," prior to Bucharest, had been relatively limited. As many scholars, including those writing in the area of geopolitics, have noted, such a perspective has typically represented an idealistic "view from nowhere," wherein the particular perspective of those, primarily in the global "North," was assumed to represent a universal perspective on geopolitics.[30] However, in the World Population Plan of Action, in large part due to the influence exerted by the Group of 77, a more complete account is provided. Notably, the developed-developing country dynamic is not always depicted antagonistically. At times, the document expresses common challenges facing developed and developing countries alike. At other times, the document marshals statistical evidence to suggest

[30] As Gearóid Ó Tuathail explains, "The ideal of an abstract, universal position, a position beyond race, class, gender, history, and geography, is termed a 'view from nowhere' by Bordo, after Thomas Nagel's book of the same name. See Suan Bordo, 'Feminism, Post-Modernism and Gender-Skepticism,' in *Feminism/Post-modernism*, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 137; and Thomas Nagel, *The View from Nowhere* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)." *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (London: Routledge, 1996), 211.

that certain problems affect developed or developing countries differently. However, at times the document does offer fairly pointed words for the responsibilities and burdens faced by developed countries. For instance, in noting differential consumption, the document argues "[r]ecognizing that per capita use of world resources is much higher in the developed than in the developing countries, the developed countries are urged to adopt appropriate policies in population, consumption and investment, bearing in mind the need for fundamental improvement in international equity."[31]

Similarly, thought not developed to the same degree as it is in Mexico City and its followers, the geopolitical perspective enshrined in the WPPA expounds forcefully about colonialism and other forms of geopolitical inequality as driving factors inhibiting progress on development and population:

> True development cannot take place in the absence of national independence and liberation. Alien and colonial domination, foreign occupation, wars of aggression, racial discrimination, apartheid and neo-colonialism in all its forms continue to be among the greatest obstacles to the full emancipation and progress of the developing countries and all the people involved. Co-operation among nations on the basis of national sovereignty is essential for development. Development also requires recognition of the dignity of the individual, appreciation for the human person and his self-determination, as well as the elimination of discrimination in all its forms.[32]

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[31] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 19.

[32] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 14b.

Though “agons” are relatively rare in a consensus document like this one, this paragraph stands out as one of the rare, most direct and agon-istic passages in the World Population Plan of Action. This passage also reverses a presumption in international relations: whereas, in the past, developing countries were able to be blamed for not achieving development goals (for instance, as Greene notes, for having fertility rates that undermine economic progress), in this new articulation, significant blame gets shifted to external factors, such as colonialism, war, and systemic discrimination.

While the WPPA contains a vision for worldwide action, its primary focal point for emphasis, in terms of *who* should be in charge of enacting the goals of the plan, is the state. In the next section, then, I describe the ways in which the document engages in significant efforts to “secure sovereignty.”

3.3.2.3 Securing Sovereignty

While any internationally produced document aims to enable some type of international action (and, similarly, to disable other types of international action), how such advocacy squares with positions regarding the status of state sovereignty tends to vary considerably. In some instances, an international text can set out to enable and activate international action by emphasizing international cooperation and allowing sovereignty, while ever-present, to recede to the background. Alternately, an international text can exist primarily to safeguard a state’s sovereignty. In this case, the document takes on more of a self-restraining status, wherein it exists to limit its own influence. Obviously, between these two extremes, there are many possibilities along the continuum. Nevertheless, when speaking in terms of tendencies, the WPPA clearly falls primarily in the realm of sovereignty protection, rather than proactively encouraging a strong international role.

"Sovereignty," as a topos, significantly structures the World Population Plan of Action.[33] At the very beginning of the section on "Principles and Objectives of the Plan," the document notes:

> This Plan of Action is based on a number of principles which underlie its objectives and are observed in its formulation. The formulation and implementation of population policies is the sovereign right of each nation. This right is to be exercised in accordance with national objectives and needs and without external interference, taking into account universal solidarity in order to improve the Quality of life of the peoples of the world. The main responsibility for national population policies and programmes lies with national authorities. However, international co-operation should play an important role in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.[34]

Thus, while the document creates space for international efforts, its primary point of reference rests with the importance of sovereign decisions by individual states. Similarly, though the text is lukewarm, at best, in the importance it assigns population or demographic efforts, it

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[33] Claims to "sovereignty," understood from a rhetorical perspective, can have a number of possible trajectories. For instance, writing in reference to the problem of genocide, Ben Voth and Aaron Noland argue:

> The inevitability of genocide is arguably a function of an international legal system bounded by a pre-eminence of sovereignty for states over and against the sovereignty of human individuals. The current privilege of states rights, like the American era that struggled with civil rights of the 1960s, obviates our discourse of community regarding the present victims of genocide. Ultimately, the young white northern outsiders of Michael Schwerner and Goodman had to join the indigenous James Chaney in the human struggle against regimes of violence bolstered by states rights in order to disrupt the institutional violence of the South. Until the nation began to empathize with the struggles of individual civil rights activists in the South, it was not possible to overcome the blockade of states rights rhetoric that protected Jim Crowe practices. Ethnic tensions like those in the civil rights era of the United States permeate the entire globe. Without dedicated activism and critique, the progress of human dignity will be slowed and the stubborn hold of intimidating violence will remain.

Ben Voth & Aaron Noland, "Argumentation and the International Problem of Genocide," *Contemporary Argumentation and Debate*, 2007, 28: 40.

[34] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 14.

opens the door, via sovereignty, for individual countries to pursue particular population goals as they see fit:

> In the light of the principles of this Plan of Action, countries which consider their birth-rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to consider setting quantitative goals and implementing policies that may lead to the attainment of such goals by 1985. Nothing herein should interfere with the sovereignty of any Government to adopt or not to adopt such quantitative goals.[35]

Nevertheless, while the text is organized around sovereignty and the primacy of the nation-state, the document, as an international conference document, indicates a number of legitimate roles that the international community might play in advancing the goals of the document.[36] The WPPA contains an entire section devoted to the "Role of international co-operation." Among the many suggestions it provides for particular aspects of such cooperation, it notes the pivotal importance of international cooperation in achieving conference goals:

> International co-operation, based on the peaceful coexistence of States having different social systems, should play a supportive role in achieving the goals of the Plan of Action. This supportive role could take the form of direct assistance, technical or financial, in response to national and regional requests and be additional to economic development assistance, or the form of other activities, such as monitoring progress, undertaking comparative research in the area of

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[35] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 37.

[36] If the document did not envision any appropriate roles for the international community, there would be a strong rhetorical paradox as to why the participants wrote a document in the first place. That is, each UN document must create its own legitimacy, rhetorically, for its existence. A document that said in effect “this document says that we as the international community have no legitimate role to play” would seem highly suspect. Even in such a scenario, though, and likely in terms of the WPPA, even a weakly worded text might prevent and take the place of one that others might have written that would have been worded more strongly.

> population, resources and consumption, and furthering the exchange among countries of information and policy experiences in the field of population and consumption. Assistance should be provided on the basis of respect for sovereignty of the recipient country and its national policy.[37]

A rhetorical perspective highlights how appeals to sovereignty carry multiple possible entailments. On the one hand, appeals to "sovereignty" can be used as shields to prevent international action on pressing geopolitical issues (such as genocide and humanitarian crises). On the other hand, without structured and significant safeguards for sovereignty, many potential participants are likely to stay out of the process, for fear that they will lose decision-making and control, particularly in regard to what may or may not happen in their own countries. Nevertheless, to a much greater degree than any of its followers, the World Population Plan of Action emphasizes the overwhelming centrality of the state in addressing the goals of the document, and places the international community as a distant second actor, there to provide financial, technical, informational, technological, and other forms of instance when requested and supported by host countries.

3.3.3 Rhetoric: Missing in Action?

How, in light of Gaonkar's arguments against globalizing rhetoric (presented in Chapter 1), do we make light of texts such as the World Population Plan of Action, and the other conference texts in this project, with regard to these critiques of scope? In some ways, these documents seem radically outside the domain of rhetoric. Whereas Edwin Black and Michael

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[37] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 100.

Leff looked at great rhetorical exemplars to discover more about the conditions of rhetoric, and those exemplars usually exemplified the height of artistic and stylistic technique, these documents appear, in contrast, to be bland and devoid of style (such as metaphor, alliteration, and parallelism). Whereas Abraham Lincoln, as Leff has explained, masterfully used his opponents as villains/agons to develop his own position rhetorically, there are very few "villains" in these texts, and to the extent that there are various discrete elements that could be combined to form an "enemy," they are never constructed as such. While most rhetoric is performed by a particular person or set of persons, in this case, the rhetoric (in the form of the final approved text as argument as product) is never "performed" (beyond being approved and published, in paper form and online), and there is no clearly discernable "author." While legal decisions may be relatively dry at times, they almost always contain explicit acts of logical refutation, an apparent cornerstone of rhetoric, but in these texts, the refutation is almost entirely conducted indirectly, by inference, and assuming knowledge of an external scene (an extreme version of the enthymeme, to be sure). There is very little imagery, and apart from the sheer volume of data (notably, most of which is not backed up with formal citations, making it difficult to refute), the attempts, in the words of Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, to give "presence" to these issues is also relatively weak.[38] In so many ways then, this is either a) not a set of artifacts most productively classified under the heading of "rhetoric," or b) a massive failure, from any rhetorically informed judgment. While each claim is understandable, I find both suggestions incorrect. Despite the challenges that have been made to the "globalizing" of rhetoric, these texts deserve consideration as rhetoric. Most importantly, they deal with the most fundamentally

[38] Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 115-120.

rhetorical of conditions: uncertain knowledge, contingency, and a need to take political action despite imperfect information. While not having the same "jump off the page" power as a declaration of war or a state of the union address, these texts are fundamentally deliberative in genre, and, though obscured and incredibly understated, they contain appeals based on ethos, pathos, and logos. Therefore, I argue that these texts exist within the scope of rhetoric, and that as rhetoricians, we have the opportunity to engage in new set of timely, significant artifacts by seeing the rhetorical element in a broader range of artifacts. With regard to whether these texts represent rhetorical successes or failures, I would suggest that they can only be understood on their own terms, which means that we must consider form and genre, and adapt standards accordingly. Rhetoric is fundamentally situational, contextual, and audience-driven, so it seems particularly out of place to judge any rhetorical text by simple, universal standards. Perhaps as a precursor to any final judgment, some sense of the unique formal requirements/expectations of the UN conference document would be warranted. Like standard scientific prose, rhetorical flourishes are outside of the norm and likely to be frowned upon. In particular, appeals to character or emotion are likely to be less significant than the presentation of data and the formation of relatively straightforward logical analysis. Like political resolutions, the document typically starts with a preamble. The conventions of length are closer to a government report or a legal decision than to a short political oration. Developing a set of standards for the form or genre of international conference documents, such as those produced by the United Nations, not only challenges conventional evaluations or judgments of these texts, but also provides a valuable heuristic with which to approach a whole range of artifacts that, as noted in chapter one, are currently understudied by rhetoricians and public argument scholars. Thus, instead of

viewing this artifact as another mistaken instance of "globalizing rhetoric," it is more profitably understood as keying in on another moment of "rhetoric gone global."

In considering the notion of rhetorical form, especially in relation to these conference documents, we would do well to remember Kenneth Burke's discussion about the role of "Constitutions":

> Constitutions are of primary importance in suggesting what coordinates one will think by. That is, one cannot "guaranty" a people any rights which future conditions themselves make impracticable; and whatever the limits and resources of liberty in the future may be, if they are there, they need no Constitutional guaranty; but Constitutions are important in singling out certain directives for special attention, and thus in bringing them more clearly to men's consciousness.[39]

This sense of a Constitution as directing attention/consciousness toward particular issues and directives provides a common link with the texts/artifacts examined in this project. As expressed in Chapter 2, this analogy to Burke's constitutions is validated with the similarities of text as providing "generalized wishes" and creating the basis upon which future decisions will rhetorically attempt to capture the status of "following precedent."

However, despite the many similarities between these UN conference documents and Burke's Constitutions, there are also important differences. Most significantly, if one were to imagine a Constitution as the most highly generalized statement on a continuum, and national laws on the other end of the continuum, as very specific, enforceable claims specifying

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[39] Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 367. See note in Chapter 1 regarding the importance of considering rhetorical genres, and explaining the relationship between rhetorical genre, and in particular UN conference documents, and the theory of constitutions put forth by Burke. This is also a theme that I develop and continue to explore in Chapter 5.

permissible and impermissible, or required or forbidden, actions, then the conference documents fall somewhere in between. In one sense, the documents have the kind of (relatively and/or apparently) timeless rhetoric that suggests their similarity to constitutions. On the other hand, these documents also make very specific calls for action, which align their likeness more closely to laws. Of course, lacking sovereign authority, these calls to action are unenforceable outside of the rhetorical force of their arguments. In working toward developing a set of characteristics that help to define the genre of these documents, I argue that we would be well served in watching how other, non-traditional texts have made arguments in favor of their inclusion in the realm of rhetoric. Perhaps the most salient can be found in the rhetoric of science literature.

In working toward an understanding of international document as form, the insights of the rhetoric of science are especially useful. Unlike classic public address, which surveys eloquence and highly stylized rhetoric, such as may be found in the speeches of Lincoln or Obama, these documents, much like scientific and technical reports, appear largely arhetorical. Beyond a standard preamble, these documents appear largely as a laundry list of goals, objectives, and actions. The prose is relatively dry, and one strains to find metaphor, alliteration, or other highly stylized rhetorical devices. Nevertheless, these documents deserve consideration from the perspective of rhetoric and argument.[40] First, ever since Plato, texts that appear or proclaim themselves as either arhetorical or even antirhetorical are often some of the most powerful. Second, given the importance and regularity with which documents like these texts are being produced, and the symbolic and material effects of their words, we would do a disservice not to study them. Third, much as the rhetoric of science helped to uncover a subtle but

[40] Also, see Robert L. Scott, "A Rhetoric of Facts: Arthur Larson's Stance as a Persuader," *Communication Monographs* 35, no. 2 (June 1968): 109-121.

important set of rhetorical strategies in apparently (and purportedly) arhetorical documents, so too can the same be realized by studying international diplomatic documents. Finally, unlike scientific documents, these documents are not explicitly in denial that their purpose is to persuade. While grounding themselves in detailed analysis of the situation, these documents exist for the purpose of attempting to secure assent and eventually action.

Unlike scientific documents that, by and large, aim to be objective, dispassionate, and free of normative or prescriptive claims, the WPPA expressly aims toward the adoption of new policies and approaches to development and population. Therefore, it is informative to assess the degree to which the document textually recognizes, supports, and/or encourages rhetoric and/or deliberation about the issues under discussion, or on behalf of the plan itself. In one sense, this is a near-universal consideration for international texts, as very few ever have any authority beyond the power of persuasion to try to influence individuals, communities, or nations, with either indirect or direct action. However, the question of reproduction, due to fears of community and state-based coercion, especially requires a strong sense of rhetoric in order to achieve success. In the "Principles and Objectives of the Plan," paragraph 15(g) notes as one of the "general objectives . . . for this Plan of Action": "To promote the development and implementation of population policies where necessary, including improvement in the communication of the purposes and goals of those policies to the public and the promotion of popular participation in their formulation and implementation."[41] This stress on communication and popular participation, not just in the implementation of already-decided upon policy, but also helping in preliminary stages such as policy formulation, demonstrates an awareness of the uniquely rhetorical set of challenges faced in addressing the problems posed in the World Population Plan

[41] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 15, Subsection G.

of Action. This type of language repeats throughout the document. More specifically, the consultation and involvement of women in socio-economic and population policy is given particularly high value: "Women should be actively involved both as individuals and through political and non-governmental organizations, at every stage and every level in the planning and implementation of development programmes, including population policies."[42] Furthermore, participation and involvement is not only valued in creating development and population policies, but also in day to day activities in societies. For instance, paragraph 32 lists a variety of "development goals [that] generally have an effect on the socio-economic context of reproductive decisions that tends to moderate fertility levels," including "The promotion of social justice, social mobility and social development, particularly by means of a wide participation of the population in development and a more equitable distribution of income, land, social services and amenities."[43] Furthermore, an entire subsection of "Recommendations for Action," "Promotion of knowledge and policies," argues for the need "to elicit the co-operation and participation of all concerned in the formulation and implementation of these policies."[44] In the research subset of this "Promotion" area, the Plan calls for research to provide "understanding and improving the motivations of people to participate in the formulation and implementation of population programmes; study of education and communication aspects of population policy."[45] Clearly, there is an implicit recognition in the text of the need for rhetoric and deliberation, and thus, following Wenzel, Leff, and others, these documents both call for argument/rhetoric as product, procedure, and process, while simultaneously, performatively representing each of the

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[42] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 41, Subsection B.

[43] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 32; Para 32, Subsection C.

[44] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 71.

[45] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 78, Subsection F.

"three p's." Each conference document puts forth a series of arguments and claims (argument as product), follows generic constraints (preamble, reasons for recommendations, and recommendations, for instance) and implicitly follows suit as well (citing relevant precedent), thus indicating argument as procedure, and indicates an awareness of the public argument as something that has a history and series of exchanges, as well as a complex set of geographical and geopolitical coordinates, thus suggesting a recognition of argument as process. All of these points of intersection with rhetoric and argument suggest that, far from being outside the domain of rhetoric, that these texts are thoroughly rhetorical but merely require a different set of tools and concepts to understand, appreciate, and evaluate them.

Having now described and interpreted the official document of the Bucharest Conference, the World Population Plan of Action, I turn next to a discussion of the historical and rhetorical transition from Bucharest to Mexico City, the next UN population conference, which occurred in 1984.

3.3.4 Transitioning from Bucharest to Mexico City

As we turn to the 1984 Mexico City Conference, we see two different trajectories develop. On the one hand, the actual conference text, as well as the overall conference consensus, continued to endorse the vision offered at Bucharest. As Riad Tabbarah notes:

> The International Conference on Population held in Mexico City in 1984, i.e., Bucharest +10, followed, in its recommendations, the outline and concepts found in the World Population Plan of Action. Indeed, the rules of engagement at that conference were explicit: the purpose of the recommendations was the "further

implementation of the World Population Plan of Action." As a result, innovations were kept to a minimum.[46]

However, the other major trajectory is based on the actions taken by Ronald Reagan's administration on behalf of the United States.[47] At Mexico City, he pushed for a number of changes to the population agenda (many representing reversals from the United States' own previous population positions). In the next section, I set up the history of the Mexico City conference, both from an international perspective as well as with special regard for Reagan's maneuvers in Mexico City. I then analyze the official conference text by means of rhetorical criticism.

3.4 THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION (MEXICO CITY, 1984)

The stated goal of the Mexico City International Conference on Population, as per the 1981 proposal for the conference by ECOSOC, was "to appraise the implementation of the World Population Plan of Action adopted at the 1974 Bucharest World Population Conference."[48] In many ways, the dynamics of North-South relations had shifted since Bucharest: "Compared with

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[46] Riad Tabbarah, "ICPD+10 or Bucharest +30?" Keynote Address, March 25, 2004, http://www.un.org/esa/population/cpd/cpd2004/Tabbarahspeech.doc (accessed November 15, 2008).

[47] Again, I recognize that comments like this one reflect, as discussed in Chapter 1, the way that scholarly treatment of international events tends to privilege US issues and thus normalize a very particular view of international relations as if it were a universal view (in similar to the "view from nowhere" discussed earlier this chapter). However, given most narratives surrounding the international effects of Reagan's actions, this might be a valuable exception. Furthermore, the argument I ultimately suggest is that we lose too much by focusing our understanding of the conference on Reagan's actions, and would be better served doing a close read of the international, consensus-based text.

[48] Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences*, 95.

Bucharest, this time there was a great deal of support among economically less developed countries for such a conference . . . On the other hand, many developed countries were not so keen and the Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries preferred that the Bucharest consensus not be disturbed in any way. Countries' reservations explain why the conference agenda was focused on the Bucharest Plan of Action and on furthering its implementation."[49]

Despite the actual objectives for and accomplishments from the Mexico City conference, most observers remember this conference for the actions of Ronald Reagan's Administration. Reagan had two primary objectives at Mexico City: condemning abortion as it related to family planning, and redefining the role of economic growth and free markets in relation to the population question. With regard to the former, Reagan, "with the active support of the Vatican, lobbied heavily against initiatives to define abortion as a legally enforceable universal human right and indeed made clear, even before the conference, that it was no longer going to provide funds to any organization that underwrote abortions."[50] Though the "Mexico City Policy" actually refers to a broad set of principles espoused by the United States in 1984, the standard circulation of this trope in public discourse signals its opposition to abortion. In other writings, this Mexico City Policy is also known as the Global Gag Rule. Such a rule has gone back and forth since Reagan, as Bill Clinton removed it at the start of his administration, George W. Bush re-enacted it at the start of his administration in 2001, and Barack Obama rescinded the policy at the start of his administration in 2009.[51] In terms of redefining population and economic growth, Greene explains how "[t]he Reagan administration was attempting to attach the population

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[49] Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences*, 96-97.

[50] Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences*, 98.

[51] For information on Reagan's imposition of the gag rule as well as Clinton's act in lifting it, see Greene, *Malthusian Worlds*.

apparatus to this neoliberal accumulation strategy just as the Group of 77 attempted to link the population apparatus to the New International Economic Order in 1974."[52] Schechter elaborates on the specifics of this "neoliberal accumulation strategy": "The US administration took the position that the best way to reduce population growth was to accelerate economic growth; family planning programs were deemed not to be up to the task . . . they went on and suggested that, based on past experience, there was a clear recipe to achieve rapid economic growth that could *assist* in controlling population growth. That was reliance on markets and entrepreneurial initiative."[53] Connelly explains the jolt that these twin positions caused in Mexico City:

> The U.S. statement at Mexico City was a startling turnaround . . . Its two feet were planted firmly in the two sides of Reagan's ruling coalition—social conservatives and Wall Street Republicans—and by surrounding the pro-life thrust with free-market rhetoric, it threw critics off balance. In the heady atmosphere of a United Nations conference, where most attendees were committed to spending large sums to persuade poor people to have fewer children, it seemed like an outrageous provocation to suggest that "population growth is, of itself, a neutral phenomenon" and that "more people do not necessarily mean less growth." It rankled to hear the United States—once the world's leading worrier—argue that population growth had provoked an "overreaction." Rather than focus on the hidden agenda, many opponents followed the waving of the invisible hand. The debate about the "voodoo demographics" of the Reagan administration distracted attention from the revival

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[52] Greene, *Malthusian Worlds*, 211.

[53] Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences*, 98-99.

of hard-core population control in Asia as well as the pressure put on African states to follow suit.[54]

Therefore, largely because of the stir that was caused by Reagan and his representatives at Mexico City, the elements of the "Mexico City Policy" have received much of the treatment from this conference. However, such explorations, whether they occur in scholarly works (such as Schechter, Connelly, or Greene), or in popular media, ignore the textual accomplishments of the conference as a whole: the final conference document, "Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the World Population Plan of Action" (1984).[55] As I mentioned in Chapter 1, studies of international and foreign policy rhetoric that continue to place the rhetoric of the United States on a pedestal ignore the contributions made by the rest of the conference attendees. Also, and again with reference to Chapter 1 I want to push beyond Tarla Rai Peterson's claim of the risks of rhetorical grandstanding at these conferences to show that the final textual consensus of the conference represents significant rhetorical invention and production. Therefore, in the next section, I perform a close reading of this final conference document, in order to understand its most salient features, from the perspectives of rhetoric and public argument.

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[54] Connelly, *Fatal Misconception*, 354.

[55] United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), "Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the World Population Plan of Action," http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/bkg/mexrecs.html (Accessed November 15, 2008).

3.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION (1984)

3.5.1 Positioning Itself in Relation to the WPPA

Before discussing the key features of this text and engaging in rhetorical analysis, I want to address the issue of how Bucharest and the World Population Plan of Action are referenced in this 1984 document. As per the preamble of "Recommendations," the primary tendency in relation to the World Population Plan of Action is to continue to support it:

> During the years since the United Nations World Population Conference in 1974, the World Conference Plan of Action has served as a guide to action in the field of population for Governments, for international organizations and for non-governmental organizations. The consensus of Bucharest has facilitated international co-operation and helped to bring population issues to the forefront. The principles and objectives of the Plan have shown themselves to remain valid and are reaffirmed.[56]

Two phrases in particular stand out from this preamble: first, the remembrance of Bucharest as a moment of international "consensus," and second, the idea that the primary purposes of the "Recommendations" document is based on a "reaffirm[ation]" of the 1974 Conference. This latter tone, of reaffirmation, represents the primary textual marker of reference to its predecessor. In fact, variations of "reaffirm" ("reaffirm," "reaffirmed," "reaffirmation") appear six times in the text, indicating the notion of continuity with rather than sharp break from the 1974 text. To the

[56] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 1.

extent that anything is explicitly questioned in regard to Bucharest, it is based on a) changing conditions ("the demographic, social, economic and political conditions of the world have changed considerably") and/or b) a notion of refinement ("as foreseen at Bucharest, some of the goals and recommendations of the Plan now call for complementing and further refinement . . . there is still a great need for continuation and acceleration in these efforts to realize those goals, as they have been refined at Mexico City in August 1984").[57] Therefore, much like at Cairo, as explained in Chapter 2, this document too generates its timeliness and relevance, but not by throwing previous population efforts “under the bus.”

Furthermore, the 1984 text engages in the heavy use of precedent in order to build and maintain its ethos. In addition to continuously referencing, summarizing, and reaffirming the Bucharest conference, the Mexico City text also references numerous other United Nations and intergovernmental documents to marshal credibility and authority. Paragraph 11 opens by suggesting, "The Plan and the following recommendations for its further implementation should be considered within the framework of other intergovernmental strategies and plans."[58] After providing a laundry list of important UN documents, the document then claims that, in addition to those already listed, "the following declarations, plans of action and other relevant texts that have emanated from intergovernmental meetings must be stressed because of their relevance to the objectives of the World Population Plan of Action."[59] It then goes on to list 18 additional references, with subheadings "a" through "r." Thus, much like a legal decision aims to enhance

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[57] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 2. Beyond the references to the World Population Plan of Action of 1974, one of the central rhetorical features of these conferences, and in fact all of the conference documents, is a reliance on the concept (common in legal rhetoric) of precedent in order to provide a sense of authority and continuity with past actions. This theme will be developed at the end of this chapter, as well as in chapter 5.

[58] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 11.

[59] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 11.

its legitimacy and authority by embedding itself within a long history of concurring precedents and opinions, so too does this UN artifact build its credibility by means of association with other international agreements and documents.[60]

3.5.2 Key Features of the Text

Longer than the original World Population Plan of Action, "Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the World Population Plan of Action" contains just over 15,000 words. While sharing many structural similarities with its predecessor, "Recommendations" contains organizational modifications. Unlike the WPAA, the Preamble for "Recommendations" is significantly longer (11 paragraphs, many with extensive sub-clauses, for a total of 2,773 words, almost 20% of the document). Between the preamble and the recommendations, there is a short, substantive section entitled "Peace, Security and Population" (just 1 paragraph, 97 words). After this brief section, there is an extensive "Recommendations for Action" section, followed by a brief "Recommendations for Implementation" section. The "Recommendations for Action" (9,681 words, or almost 65% of the document as a whole) is divided into five main sub-sections (though many sub-sections themselves have extensive sub-structures): "Socio-economic development, the environment and population" (1 paragraph), "The role and the status of women" (3 paragraphs), "Development of population policies" (1 paragraph), "Population goals and policies" (14 paragraphs), and "Promotion of knowledge and policy" (3 paragraphs). The "Recommendations for Implementation" (1,288 words, or under 10% of overall document) is divided into three primary sections (which mirror the WPPA precisely): "Role of national

[60] Notably, in some ways, this is a self-legitimizing effort, as many of the other international agreements and documents are themselves products of work performed by the United Nations.

Governments," "Role of international co-operation," and "Monitoring, review and appraisal." Since there are not separate sections for basis for action or principles and objectives, each section of recommendations is preceded by on average, one paragraph, that lays out the "scene" in which the "acts" (recommendations) are meant to be understood.

Table 6. Top 20 Terms, Recommendations for the Further Implementation of the World Population Plan of Action (Mexico City)[61]

Top 20 Terms: Frequency (Rank Indicated by Number)
1. Population
2. Countries
3. Governments
4. Development
5. International
6. Recommendation
7. Action
8. World
9. Plan
10. Policies
11. Programmes
12. Nations
13. Social
14. United
15. Women
16. Economic
17. Family
18. Health
19. Urged
20. Developing

3.5.3 Rhetorical Analysis

Though there are many key terms from which to choose (for instance, see Table 6), I utilize eight key terms/threads to help center my rhetorical analysis: intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, women (status of and discrimination against), peace/security,

[61] See note on Bucharest "top 20" for information and limits about Wordle. This Wordle finding was conducted May 14, 2009. For a visual representation, not only of the top 20 terms, but of the entire document, see Appendix B.

environment/ecology, health, the family, rights/human rights, and education/information dissemination and the public (as presented in Table 7). While some of these terms/threads are closely related and overlapping, they offer important clues into the relevant topoi and points of stasis of the Mexico City Conference. Rather than charting each of these terms individually, I weave the threads into four vectors of rhetorical analysis: the subtle reconciliation of the development/demographics and national/international dialectics, the ways in which Mexico City expands the round table (both in terms of actor-involvement and issue-breadth), how Mexico City assembles the pieces of the puzzle (such as women, environment, health) in a way that anticipates the Cairo Programme of Action, and the ways in which communication and public involvement and participation continues to expand at Mexico City. First, I turn to the re-figuring of the dialectics of demographics/development and national/international at Mexico City.

Table 7. Notable Terms & Phrases, International Conference on Population (Mexico City)

Notable Term/Phrase	Frequency
Non-governmental organizations	23
Intergovernmental organizations	14
International organizations	8
International agencies	2
Women/women's	64
Status of women	9
Discrimination against women	2
Environment, environmental	12
Health	53
Family, families, familial	72
Right, rights, freedom, freedoms	54

3.5.3.1 Recalibrating Key Dialectics

The World Population Conference struck a relatively ambitious, hard line on at least two fundamental dialectics related to population rhetoric: development/demographics and national/international. As argued earlier in this chapter, the World Population Plan of Action endorsed a vision in which development was a precursor and the whole, whereas demographics

was more likely an effect of development, or at most, a part of the whole. Similarly, while acting as an international point of consensus, the WPPA charted a course for population policy in which, overwhelmingly, power and control centered on the nation-state, giving the international community a backseat (beyond its potential to provide assistance, when [and only when] requested by individual countries). As a consensus document, confrontational rhetoric remains always at a minimum. Therefore, rather than openly argue for a shift in the emphasis or tendency in each dialectic, the "Recommendations" document makes subtle shifts on each question that serve as stepping stones for an even more ambitious shift in Cairo (as analyzed in Chapter 2).

First, the document works to subtly renegotiate the relationship articulated at Bucharest between demographics and development. As a document existing to reaffirm the WPPA, the Mexico City "Recommendations" text quotes and cites passages that indicate the hard-line view expressed at Bucharest in which, for instance, development had to come first, population concerns were subsumed by development concerns, and other related formulations. However, even while reaffirming Bucharest, the Mexico City text is able to soften the division between demographics and development and indicate, instead of a linear relationship in either direction, that the two are best understood as mutually informing and affecting each other, and thus for equal importance to be attached to each. For instance, the first recommendation of the entire text reads:

> Considering that social and economic development is a central factor in the solution of population and interrelated problems and that population factors are very important in development plans and strategies and have a major impact on the attainment of development objectives, national development policies, plans and programmes, as well as international development strategies, should be

> formulated on the basis of an integrated approach that takes into account the interrelationships between population, resources, environment and development. In this context, national and international efforts should give priority to action programmes integrating population and development.[62]

In this passage, the "softer" version of the argument is given priority, in which each are "very important" and "central factor(s)" for the other, and thus only "an integrated approach" is appropriate to the complexity of this relationship.

Second, unlike the 1974 document, which envisioned an international role but was significantly invested in the primacy of national sovereignty, the 1984 document begins to provide a series of transitions that both acknowledge sovereignty and open the door for international efforts. The recognition of the importance of international actors, especially for financing, is readily acknowledged:

> The international community should play an important role in the further implementation of the World Population Plan of Action. For this purpose, among other things, adequate and substantial international measures of support and assistance should be provided by developed countries, other donor countries and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.[63]

Nevertheless, while not intended as exclusive, the primary calls in the 1984 document are still for actions to be taken at the national level:

> Many of the following recommendations are addressed to Governments. This is not meant to preclude the efforts or initiative of international organizations, non-

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[62] Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 1.

[63] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 79.

> governmental organizations, private institutions or organizations, or families and individuals where their efforts can make an effective contribution to overall population or development goals on the basis of strict respect for sovereignty and national legislation in force.[64]

Thus, while still tied strongly to the vision of the Bucharest conference, Mexico City makes significant transitions in re-negotiating the significant dialectics of development-demographics and national-international.

Why, then, were these shifts made, after being just ten years out from Bucharest? First, while the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and 'Group of 77' still existed in 1984, their geopolitical power had receded in the intervening years, resulting in a diminished role for a hard-line voice from the global "South." While the NIEO and 'Group of 77' exerted a pervasive influence on the conference and on the textual proceeding at Bucharest, they clearly exerted less clout in Mexico City. The NIEO is referenced only twice in the 1984 text: once in the laundry list of previous agreements with which the present document is affiliated, and once in noting "the bearing that international migration may have on the process of establishing a New International Economic Order."[65] Though never explicitly repudiating the NIEO or its importance, the near-complete textual disappearance of any reference to an idea so pivotal to the 1974 text indicates a definite shift. What effects did this geopolitical shift have on the two aforementioned dialectics? The NIEO and 'Group of 77' acted as significant advocates, as argued earlier in this chapter by Greene and Connelly, for reversing (or at a minimum complicating) the relationship between demographics and development. Similarly, in voicing concerns over colonialism and neo-

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[64] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 13.

[65] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 28.

colonialism by developed countries in the global North, the countries argued strongly for a protection of state sovereignty to ensure a minimum of outside interference, and to constrain the international community's role to assist only upon request. Beyond this historical shift, the modification of these dialectics acts rhetorically to anticipate the shift, started in Bucharest, and fulfilled in Cairo, of an anti-reductionist paradigm of complexity and holism, as detailed in Chapter 2. As argued earlier in this chapter, merely reversing the causality of demographics and development ignored the systems-level possibility that, rather than being a relationship of linear causality, these two factors were probably implicated, along with a host of other factors, in a web or network of relationships. Similarly, in tandem with the mantra that "it takes a village," Mexico City began to anticipate the move in Cairo to the vision of the web/network, not just in terms of "causality," but also in the broad range of actors. In the next section, I follow up more on the question of expanding ranges of issues and actors, by discussing the growing "round table" at Mexico City.

3.5.3.2 Expanding the Round Table

Part of the development of population policy and rhetoric as it "comes of age" is the recognition that breadth is as important as depth when addressing the question of population (a vision realized most significantly in Cairo, as discussed in Chapter 2). That is, a failure to consider a horizontally broad range of issues, and to engage the broadest corps of participants, is likely to translate into a failure to meet goals, however narrowly or broadly they may be defined. Therefore, in the transition from Bucharest and Mexico City, it is difficult not to notice the ways in which the "round table," not only of participants, but also issues, is expanded. While I discuss the expansion of issues, particularly as they tend to pre-figure and anticipate Cairo, in the next section, here I analyze the recruitment of ever-greater numbers of participants, both directly,

from the document itself, and also indirectly, insofar as the document encourages actors in its audience to engage a network of participants as well.

By far, the most significant, and most discussed, expansion of participation, seen at Mexico City and then, to an even greater degree, at Cairo (as seen in Chapter 2), comes from calls for involvement by international, intergovernmental, and most critically, non-governmental organizations. As indicated in Table 7, the “Recommendations” text contains 23 references to “non-governmental,” whereas the same phrase appears only 7 times in the 1974 World Population Plan of Action. Beyond the quantitative importance, these terms are also important qualitatively in the text. Though paragraph 13 specifies "many of the following recommendations are addressed to Governments," there are 17 occasions in which the action statement is addressed to Governments, international/intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and/or other regional, national, or international bodies, as co-functioning units. Clearly, then, the 1984 document envisions non-governmental organizations as playing a vital role in population policy. Furthermore, while a number of references to non-governmental organizations are stand-alone references, it is also clustered on a number of occasions with women's organizations. In these situations, the statement suggests something to the effect of 'non-governmental organizations, and in particular women's organizations,' indicating a special sensitivity and awareness of the potentially dynamic role that women's non-governmental organizations might play in achieving the goals of Bucharest and Mexico City (also foreshadowing the trend, explained in Chapter 2, of the re-negotiation of the universal-particular dialectic).

Building on a theme initiated at Bucharest, and anticipating a major thematic thread in the Cairo Programme of Action, the “Recommendations” document praises the family and

enlists its participation to achieve the goals of Bucharest and Mexico City. While many of the 72 references to a variant of “family” (as noted in Table 5) occur in the context of the phrase “family planning,” the family is also articulated in terms of a number of other important terms and concepts. Most significantly is the recognition of the importance of the family in society. In a section titled "Reproduction and the family," the document exalts the role of the family in society and the necessity for understanding its role in terms of population efforts:

> The World Population Plan of Action recognizes the family, in its many forms, as the basic unit of society and recommends that it should be given legal protection and that measures should be taken to protect both the rights of spouses and the rights of children in the case of the termination or dissolution of marriage and the right of individuals to enter marriage only with their free and full consent (paragraph 39). It also recommends that all children, regardless of the circumstances of their parentage, should enjoy equal legal and social status and the full support of both parents (paragraph 40). The family is the main institution through which social, economic and cultural change affects fertility. While the family has undergone and continues to undergo fundamental changes in its structure and function, the family continues to be recognized as the proper setting for mutual love, support and companionship of spouses, as the primary determinant of the survival of children born into it, as the first agent of the socialization of future generations, and in many societies as the only supporting institution for the aged. The family is also an important agent of social, political and cultural change. Therefore, in the design and implementation of fertility

> policies, Governments must respect individual rights while at the same time giving full recognition to the important role of the family.[66]

Thus, in the range of actors that the document highlights as agents of change and population action, including individuals, communities, governments, non-governmental organizations, and the international community, "the family" as a unit is also considered absolutely essential to any successful attempt to address population. This move to expand the round table decentralizes activity on behalf of population efforts, while also enlarging the scope of expertise and ethos, that is, who is qualified to take action in support of population goals. While “expanding the round table” includes actual participants, expanding the table also refers to the expanding range of substantive issues brought under the umbrella of “population and development.” Such an umbrella actualizes in a state of high holism in the Cairo text (as seen in Chapter 2), but in the next section, I show that many of the pieces of the puzzle that will formulate the Cairo Programme of Action are put into place at Mexico City, thus anticipating its successor in ways that most moments of rhetorical memorializing of Cairo (as seen in Chapter 1) tend to forget or suppress.

3.5.3.3 Previewing the Puzzle

As indicated in Chapter 1, activist and academic treatments of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development argue forcefully for its novelty and its “sharp break” from a long, problematic history of population argument and policy. While rhetorically effective in drawing in an audience, as any claim to novelty is, one of my major arguments in this dissertation is that such claims are dubious, at best, when held up against a close textual

[66] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 24. As Singh explains, this appeal to the significance of the family was, at least in part, a move made to placate conservatives.

comparison, starting at Bucharest, continuing through Mexico City, and arriving at Cairo.[67] Indeed, while the proclamations of a "new day" are plentiful, at times there is a clearer recognition that the threads for the tapestry of Cairo were cultivated long before the meeting in Egypt. Even the United Nations, in a document titled *Population Consensus at Cairo, Mexico City and Bucharest: An Analytical Comparison* (1995), suggests, at least at some points, this recognition of Cairo as continuation rather than coining an entirely new era:

> In the light of the above, it seems well justified to conclude that if so much progress could be achieved at Cairo, it was undoubtedly because the International Conference on Population and Development and its preparatory process could rely and build upon a set of firmly agreed principles and precedent-setting language negotiated at the Bucharest and Mexico City Conferences. From that perspective, the contribution of the Programme of Action stands out not as an isolated landmark but rather as a highly important and timely incremental step on the road that began at Bucharest in 1974.[68]

Sadly, these types of sober reflection on Cairo, understood intertextually and with reference to Bucharest and Mexico City, are much less common than those that proclaim Cairo as a proverbial "game changer" in the realm of population policy and argument.[69] In this section,

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[67] As indicated in Chapter 1, while my primary emphasis, especially in Chapters 2-4, is descriptive and understanding-oriented, I am interested in the normative question of whether Cairo "lived up to its billing." In Chapter 5, as I provide an evaluation and judgment of the conferences, I detail a number of scholarly implications of this mismatch between advertisement and actuality. One of these implications is that "close reading" represents a normative standard rather than just a methodological approach.

[68] United Nations, *Population Consensus at Cairo, Mexico City and Bucharest: An Analytical Comparison* (New York: United Nations, 1995), 7.

[69] Again, as indicated in the above footnote, Chapter 1 sets out as a standard whether or not the proclaimed novelty of the Cairo conference and its Programme of Action is warranted. While my primary analysis on this point occurs in Chapter 5, the sequencing of 1974 and 1984 right after Chapter 2's criticism of the Cairo conference seems an appropriate marker at which to appraise similarities and differences across these three moments in time. Also, while I offer a number of criteria and implications for interpreting and evaluating this claimed and actual

then, I trace some of the themes that appear at Mexico City that would become developed more comprehensively in 1994. Specifically, I discuss the role of "women" and issues impacting women, in relation to population and development, in the "Recommendations" text. Next, I examine the ways in which "health" becomes configured at Mexico City, as well as the "environment" and "ecological issues" are featured in ways that anticipate the ICPD's focus on "sustainability" and "sustainable development." Finally, I examine the special section in "Recommendations" devoted to international security and peace issues as a representative anecdote of the type of comprehensive holism foreshadowed at Mexico City and brought to fruition in Cairo.

One of the primary claims advanced by advocates of Cairo, on behalf of its supposed 'novelty,' is that Cairo's Programme of Action expressed a newfound recognition of the importance of involving women and issues facing women in policies and rhetoric surrounding population and development. However, a close read of Cairo's predecessors, and in particular, the Mexico City "Recommendations" document, casts significant doubt on the veracity of such claims. While not expressed as comprehensively as the Cairo Programme of Action, "Recommendations" devotes significant text to the role of women in population and development. Moreover, these are not passing platitudes, but rather in-depth discussions of topics such as the "status of women" (which actually has its own sub-section, "The role and the

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relationship, I also believe that "close reading" exists not only as a strategy of rhetorical criticism, but also as a politically responsible approach and normative goal. Stan Katz, in analyzing the Tea Party's refusal to interrogate the textual and historical discrepancies between the goals and assumptions of the Declaration of Independence, argues for the importance of close reading: "All democracies contest their history. But we owe it to the founders and framers to argue in a more nuanced and historically sensitive manner. I carry a copy of the Constitution in my jacket pocket, too, but it may not say the same thing that yours does. That is what we need to discuss." Stan Katz, "When in the Course of the Tea Party . . .," *The Chronicle of Higher Education Brainstorm Blog*, July 5, 2010, http://chronicle.com/blogs/brainstorm/when-in-the-course-of-the-tea-party/25294 (Accessed January 6, 2012). Thus, I would argue that "close reading" constitutes an important end in and of itself, rather than merely a means to some other goal.

status of women," within the extensive "Recommendations for Action" section) and "discrimination against women." Additionally, the document recognizes the importance of international agreements to advance the status of women, and thus calls for member states to ratify the Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). In all, there are 64 references to "women" or "women's" in this draft (to give a sense of comparison, there are 23 references to women in the 1974 World Population Plan of Action, though the 1974 document is significantly shorter than the 1984 document, about 11,000 to about 15,000 words).[70] This might seem like an odd marker, but it serves as a reminder that the focus on women in Cairo's International Conference on Population and Development Programme of Action, while articulated in some novel and different ways, was not at all new. Though the specific phrases "reproductive rights" and "reproductive health" are not contained in the 1984 text, and are generally suggested as additional evidence of Cairo's novelty, the document focuses extensively on rights, including women's rights, and, as I discuss next, the focus on health, and issues that are de facto reproductive health issues are given significant consideration at Mexico City.

In all, there are 53 references to health in the document. Frequently, this term is clustered with children's and mother's health, and is also frequently tied to primary health care. Again, in a vacuum, this may seem like an odd concept to trace, but given that "health" becomes another argument in favor of the novelty of the Cairo conference, we see once again a sense of continuity in the movement toward Cairo, rather than an innovation from nowhere in Cairo.

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[70] As noted in Chapter 2, in order to maintain a uniform counting standard, these totals include (unless otherwise explicitly noted): references in the table of contents, chapter titles, section headings, in the text itself, as well as proper nouns (for instance, other declarations or conferences).

The third major foreshadowing thread relates to the areas of environment and ecology. In addition to quantitative markers of the importance of these topics (see Table 7), the 1984 "Recommendations" text makes reference to the need for environmental sustainability: "To achieve the goals of development, the formulation of national population goals and policies must take into account the need to contribute to an economic development which is environmentally sustainable over the long run and which protects the ecological balance."[71] Though the phrase "sustainable development" was not popularized until the 1992 Rio conference, the foreshadowing in this text, in 1984, suggests that, much like the purported novelty of the themes in Cairo, the novelty of "sustainability" may too be overstated. Again, the location of environmental questions in the organization of the text is salient. The first two subsets in the "Recommendations for Action" section are, first, "Socio-economic development, the environment and population," and second, "The role and the status of women." This movement of the environment to the forefront of concerns helps to differentiate it from the 1974 document, in which there are also twelve references to the environment.

While not one of the overriding themes of Cairo, Mexico City's decision to place a special section on international peace and security represents a foreshadowing, not so much of the specific topic, but of the sensibility of antireductionism, complexity, interconnections, and holism. Quantitatively, key terms such as peace and security in international relations appear relatively infrequently. Instead of valuing it from a quantitative perspective, the qualitative importance of this set of key terms can be seen in the role that it plays in the overall document. In this sense, the organization of the document is particularly telling: the first section in the document is the preamble, and the third section contains the recommendations for action. In

[71] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 8.

between these two sections, though, resides a section titled "Peace, Security and Population." Though only one paragraph, it is worth quoting at length, for its awareness of the linkages among socio-economic issues, population, and national and international security problems:

> Being aware of the existing close links between peace and development, it is of great importance for the world community to work ceaselessly to promote, among nations, peace, security, disarmament and co-operation, which are indispensable for the achievement of the goals of humane population policies and for economic and social development. Creating the conditions for real peace and security would permit an allocation of resources to social and economic rather than to military programmes, which would greatly help to attain the goals and objectives of the World Population Plan of Action.[72]

Contrast such a clearly marked statement of importance with just one sentence in the World Population Plan of Action, buried in paragraph 100: "International co-operation, based on the peaceful coexistence of States having different social systems, should play a supportive role in achieving the goals of the Plan of Action."[73] Given that both of these conferences took place in the context of Cold War relations, it marks a clear development in the awareness of the comprehensive/interrelationship-filled analysis of population that, ten years later, peace and security are made an important priority for addressing population problems (as a subset of broader social and economic concerns, of course).

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[72] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 12.

[73] "World Population Plan of Action," Para 100.

3.5.3.4 Carving Space for Communication and Deliberation

As indicated earlier this chapter, even in the World Population Plan of Action, the document recognized the importance of communication and public involvement, though the emphasis on these issues was relatively minimal, and the phrasing was at times awkward. In Mexico City, the focus on communication (increasingly framed textually as dissemination of education and information) and public participation (as a whole or in particular subsets) is heightened, though, as I discuss in Chapter 2 and 4, it attains significantly more nuance at Cairo and its follow-up efforts (+5 and +10). Though not as intricate or as developed as it is in the Cairo Programme of Action, the 1984 text demonstrates an awareness of the importance of rhetoric in order to achieve its goals. While many of its references to communication are still to providing "information," there are important exceptions, where a more robust role for rhetoric and awareness-raising is prescribed. Some of these references are relatively minor. For instance, in noting the need for an informed public, the document suggests:

> Governments which have adopted or intend to adopt national fertility goals should translate these goals into specific policies and operational steps that are clearly understood by the citizens.[74]

Similarly, in the context of some specific primary health care measures, the document suggests, “All available communication channels should be used to promote these techniques."[75]

While some envisioned "communication" roles are minor, others are promoted as more significant. For instance, the document favors:

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[74] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 32.

[75] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 19.

> [E]ncourag[ing] community education to change prevailing attitudes which countenance pregnancy and childbearing at young ages, recognizing that pregnancy occurring in adolescent girls, whether married or unmarried, has adverse effects on the morbidity and mortality of both mother and child.[76]

Similarly, elsewhere in the document, "Governments are urged to promote and support breast-feeding."[77] In the same way, "Governments are urged to initiate or strengthen preventive action programmes to reduce the consumption of tobacco, alcohol, drugs and other products potentially dangerous to health."[78] Additionally, the document notes, "the experience of the past 10 years suggests that Governments can do more to assist people in making their reproductive decisions in a responsible way."[79] The document also suggests a public, communicative role in relation to migration specifically:

> Countries of origin and receiving countries should undertake information and education activities to increase the awareness of migrants regarding their legal position and rights and to provide realistic assessments of the situation of migrants, including the availability of job opportunities.[80]

Another aspect of such a public role for migration activities is to prevent prejudice and discrimination toward migrants:

> Governments of countries of origin and of receiving countries should encourage and promote the widest dissemination, inter alia, through the mass media, of

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[76] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 18, Subsection G.

[77] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 20.

[78] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 23.

[79] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Para 26.

[80] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 50.

> information aimed at promoting public understanding of and preventing any activity prejudicial to the contribution of documented migrant workers to economic development and cultural interchange.[81]

Finally, in some cases, there is a sense of a vitally robust role for rhetoric and deliberation in the document. For instance, the document recommends "involv[ing] communities more actively in the planning and development of population programmes."[82] In addition to governments assuming such roles, the text recognizes that other actors can also assume such responsibilities:

> Governments, with the assistance, as appropriate, of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, should continue to explore innovative methods for spreading awareness of demographic factors and for fostering the active involvement and participation of the public in population policies and programmes and to intensify training of national personnel who are engaged in information, education and communication activities (including the management and planning of those activities), in developing integrated communication activities and education strategies, utilizing mass media and community-level and interpersonal communication techniques.[83]

The document also makes use of high-profile leaders to play roles in achieving the document's goals. They are promoted as being able to create awareness and support action:

> Members of parliament, the scientific community, the mass media, and others in influential positions are invited, in their respective areas of competence, to create

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[81] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 51.

[82] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 77, Subsection D.

[83] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 74.

> an awareness of population and development issues and to support appropriate ways of dealing with these issues.[84]

Other than the second to last passage, promoting "innovative methods," all of the other designated roles for communication, rhetoric, and awareness are unidirectional: governments and other organizations are encouraged to use whatever channels are available to transmit already finished information from point A to point B. Even that "innovative methods" passage is vague as to the role envisioned for the public. Most of the passage speaks to spreading awareness and training personnel to enact (pre-figured) policies, so it is difficult to conceptualize a significantly more robust role for public participation. Unfortunately, as explained in Chapter 2, this approach attempts to speed action by asserting closure, but in doing so, reduces the role for the public and citizens to shape the discussion on problems, solutions, and optimal strategies for addressing these potential exigencies.

While most of the calls for communication and involvement are limited in scope and vision, one of the first, that calls for "community education" to "change prevailing attitudes" represents one of the rare exceptions, following Chapter 2, when the solution to many of the problems is framed openly as one that involves first and foremost changing attitudes and opinions, rather than simply putting forth a linear transmission model in place for disseminating already formalized and finalized information.

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[84] "Recommendations for the Further Implementation," Rec 85; also see Rec 86.

3.5.4 Re-Reading Mexico City

Lost in Ronald Reagan's strategies of agitation and discord at the Mexico City conference were many critical elements. First, as noted in the introduction to the conference, the international consensus had shifted, such that family planning, which had been controversial in the 1974 setting, especially with developing countries, was now widely accepted and advocated (only to then be re-questioned by the leadership of the United States). Second, despite all the focus on Reagan's "gag rule" and his suspicion of any problematic relation between demographics and economic growth (if anything, he saw the relationship as "neutral" or perhaps even positive), the real achievements, from a textual perspective, indicated a different significance altogether. Even if one disagrees with Tabbarah (quoted in the next section) that Cairo (or more precisely, the ICPD process) represented the culmination of efforts began at Bucharest, it would be difficult not to notice the multitude of ways in which the Mexico City conference anticipated and began all of what was supposedly novel and path-shattering about the Cairo agreement. Though the terms "reproductive health" and "reproductive rights" are not featured in the 1984 text, the vital points of emphasis in the Programme of Action, from women's rights to health to environmental sustainability to the many other facets, were all contained in critical ways in 1984. Given Kenneth Burke's "paradox of substance," one may be able to say that the Programme of Action both was and was not contained in the Mexico City text.[85] Thus, far from introducing elements into the public argument that might have complicated subsequent rhetorical efforts to galvanize action on the population issue, the Mexico City document

[85] Kenneth Burke, *A Grammar of Motives*, 21-23.

appeared to put all the elements in place that would lead to the highly popular Programme of Action in 1994 and thus tended to anticipate, rather than complicate, such efforts.

3.6 CONCLUSION: READING BUCHAREST AND MEXICO CITY TOGETHER, AND LOOKING AHEAD

Riad Tabbarah, Director of the Center for Development Studies and Projects (MADMA) in Beirut, Lebanon, delivered the keynote address at the ICPD+10 conference in New York in 2004. The title of the address, "ICPD+10 or Bucharest+30?" is telling, because Tabbarah's point is that the 2004 meeting was as much a continuation of Bucharest (and Mexico City) as it was of Cairo. Tabbarah specifically differentiates United Nations-led population efforts into a number of stages. Stage one was the earliest work of technical experts in the formation and formal development of demography as an area of study. This covered the first two conferences, those that preceded Bucharest and were attended mostly by scientific experts, rather than by representatives of member states. Stage two commenced with the planning for and enactment of the Bucharest Conference in 1974, and, as Tabbarah notes, the 1974 Plan of Action was characterized by two primary, significant achievements:

> The first important document of this second phase in international thinking on population was undoubtedly the World Population Plan of Action. Of all the contributions it made I should like to throw light on only two questions the Plan

answered, namely: what is the scope of the field of population and what is the nature of population policies.[86]

Thus, far from the cold quantitative logic of Malthus, so popularly conjured up in contemporary public discussions of population, Bucharest (and Mexico City) was more of a precursor of Cairo than a foil against which Cairo would set itself. This is not to say that every critical concept embodied in the Bucharest or Mexico City text survived intact at Cairo, but rather than Bucharest's and Mexico City's tendency and orientation was more aligned in the fundamentally same direction as Cairo, rather than being sharply divergent or opposed to it.

What an attentive, close reader finds in the documents of Bucharest and Mexico City is not a set of texts laced with apocalyptic demographic projections, misanthropic commentary, opposition to birth control and family planning, and such overriding focus on quantitative criteria that qualitative social criteria are ultimately displaced or absent entirely. Though there are other historical trajectories that population arguments have taken that have followed these routes, as Ehrlich arguably represents and Greene and Conelly analyze at length, such trajectories were not those assumed by the international community in its intergovernmental, textual productions. Unless they were targeting some other unspecified foil, the enthusiasts for and advocates of Cairo, who were so critical of the past arguments about population, would seem to have been addressing a past including Bucharest and Mexico City. However, at least from the texts deliberated upon, agreed upon, and distributed as the formal results of these two conferences, such "dangerous," "harmful," and/or "unproductive" arguments were not in force, if even present at all.

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[86] Riad Tabbarah, "ICPD+10 or Bucharest +30?" Interestingly, Tabbarah's formulation here aligns very closely with my own analysis of points of stasis, as it is concerned with the scope and nature of population issues and policies.

In chapter four, I leap ahead in order to turn to the two major follow-ups to the ICPD: ICPD+5 (1999) and ICPD+10 (2004). In the final chapter of the Cairo ICPD Programme of Action, "Follow-up to the Conference," the document suggests the need for follow-up activities on the national, subregional, regional, and international levels. As part of its recommendations for international follow-up, it notes:

> The General Assembly is the highest intergovernmental mechanism for the formulation and appraisal of policy on matters relating to the follow-up to this Conference. To ensure effective follow-up to the Conference, as well as to enhance intergovernmental decision-making capacity for the integration of population and development issues, the Assembly should organize a regular review of the implementation of the present Programme of Action. In fulfilling this task, the Assembly should consider the timing, format and organizational aspects of such a review.[87]

Two major follow-ups were initiated in the first ten years after Cairo, ICPD+5 in 1999, and ICPD+10 in 2004. In the next chapter, I analyze the official document produced by each set of efforts in order to trace ongoing points of similarity and difference from their predecessors.

[87] "Report of the ICPD," Para 16.21.

4.0 REAFFIRMATION OR RECONFIGURATION?

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Despite the renewed optimism generated by the Cairo conference in 1994, the pivotal question regarding its potential was posed by the Programme of Action itself:

> The significance of the International Conference on Population and Development will depend on the willingness of Governments, local communities, the non-governmental sector, the international community and all other concerned organizations and individuals to turn the recommendations of the Conference into action.[1]

No less important, from the perspective of rhetoric, was what types of continuities and transformations would occur in the public arguments as they continued to unfold across time.

Fortunately, these are not, in the shallow sense of the word, merely "rhetorical questions."[2] Following the Programme of Action's call to monitor the progress of its recommendations and goals, the United Nations has produced official documents at regular intervals to evaluate progress, which simultaneously offer us a glimpse into and an ability to

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[1] United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), "Report of the ICPD (94/10/18)," http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/offeng/poa.html (Accessed December 27, 2008), Para 16.1.

[2] Ed Black plays on the dual meaning of "rhetorical questions" to provide a more robust role for the study of rhetoric. Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Questions: Studies of Public Discourse* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).

chart the ongoing public argument. The first major interval at which the UN took stock of the accomplishments and shortcomings of international progress toward the Programme of Action was 1999, five years after the Cairo conference. With General Assembly "Resolution 52/188. Population and development," the membership of the United Nations "*Decides* to convene a special session for a duration of three days from 30 June to 2 July 1999, at the highest possible level of participation, in order to review and appraise the implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development."[3] The eventual result of this special session was the document "Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development."[4] This conference, and its resulting document, is often referred with the shorthand of ICPD+5 or ICPD at 5 (and also sometimes Cairo+5 or Cairo at 5). The next major review of the progress toward the Programme of Action occurred in 2004, five years after the first review and ten years after the Cairo conference. Unlike Bucharest, Mexico City, and Cairo, it was not a separate conference, and unlike ICPD+5, its major work did not occur at a special session of the United Nations. Instead, a number of UN regional commissions convened and produced "official outcomes," which were combined to form the publication *ICPD at Ten: The World Affirms Cairo*.[5] While the primary work of ICPD+10/ICPD at Ten did not occur in the General Assembly, the GA did commemorate the 10 year anniversary:

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[3] United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 52/188," http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/icpd5/ga5res.htm (Accessed June 3, 2009).

[4] United Nations Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the Twenty-first Special Session of the General Assembly, "Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development," United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN), http://www.un.org/popin/unpopcom/32ndsess/gass/215a1e.pdf (Accessed June 30, 2009), 1999.

[5] United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), *ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms Cairo. Official Outcomes of the ICPD at Ten Review* (New York: UNFPA, 2005).

> In December 2003, the General Assembly adopted decision 58/529, entitled "Commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the International Conference on Population and Development." By this decision, the Assembly decided to devote one day, during its fifty-ninth session in 2004, to the Commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of the International Conference on Population and Development. The Commemoration was held on 14 October 2004, and provided an opportunity for Member States of the United Nations to make statements and to re-affirm their commitment to the Cairo Programme of Action.[6]

As noted in Chapter 1, my primary focus is on the agreed-upon texts of each conference, so my analysis in this chapter is centered on the documents included in the 2005 publication *ICPD at Ten: The World Affirms Cairo*.

As with my analysis in Chapters 2 and 3, my approach involves engaging in rhetorical criticism of each official conference outcome. I aim, through rhetorical analysis, to understand each document, both in its own right as well as in comparison to the texts that preceded and proceeded it. Also, as with before, I am primarily interested in understanding the internal features of the documents. In this chapter, I turn first to ICPD+5 and the "Key Actions" document, then proceed to ICPD+10 and the *ICPD at Ten* publication. After considering each document on its own, I then turn to comparative analysis of how the reports relate to each other.

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[6] United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/note.cfm (accessed June 3, 2009).

4.2 ICPD+5 (UN, 1999)

As with its predecessors, one of the keys to encouraging widespread participation in ICPD+5 was to reassure 1994 participants, and other involved constituencies, that there would not be any paradigm-smashing at +5 that would radically re-work the "Cairo Consensus:"

> In order to allay the concerns of several countries that the proposed special session might reopen some of the issues settled at the Cairo Conference, the General Assembly resolution reaffirmed that the special session will be undertaken 'on the basis of and with full respect for the Programme of Action; and that there will be no renegotiation of the existing agreements contained therein'.[7]

Much like Mexico City then (as discussed in Chapter 2), key players preferred that the +5 process follow established precedent rather than charting new terrain. The result, according to Singh, was significant (even more so than anything at ICPD+10):

> The 1998-1999 review and appraisal, which culminated in the Twenty-First Special Session of the General Assembly, remains to date the most significant updating of the ICPD Programme of Action. The ICPD Programme of Action and the Key Actions taken together reflect the current international consensus on population and development issues. There was no comparable international event

[7] Jyoti Shankar Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, Reproductive Rights and Women's Empowerment*, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 159. This closure simultaneously increases participation but also prevents the opportunity to re-formulate any parts, major or minor, of the 'Cairo consensus,'' that may very well need re-negotiation.

during the ICPD+10 review period; and none is foreseen for the ICPD+15 review.[8]

Without doubting Singh's expertise, and recognizing his particularly pivotal role in ongoing UN deliberation regarding population, my chapter treats this statement about ICPD+5's importance as a claim in need of analysis, rather than taking it at face value as an historical truth. Therefore, in the next section, I turn to the "Key Actions" text, the approved result of the ICPD+5 process, to discover, from an internal, textually-oriented perspective, in what ways, if at all, the Key Actions can be said to be "significant" in its "updating of the ICPD Programme of Action."

4.3 KEY ACTIONS FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT (1999)

4.3.1 Key Features of the Text

From a procedural point of view, the points of stasis remain largely the same in relation to the Cairo Programme of Action. There is no fundamentally altered stance on whether there is a problem, what the problem is, of what kind/quality it is, and if/what kind of action should be taken. If anything, the shift is more from a stasis-setting moment at Cairo to a stasis-refining or

[8] Jyoti Shankar Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, Reproductive Rights and Women's Empowerment*, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 159. Again, there is a tension between these two statements offered by Singh: if everyone agreed not to make any major changes, how could the results be significant and important?

implementation of the vision of Cairo. Calls for monitoring and implementation suggest more of an emphasis on technical matters relating to population rather than agenda-setting claims meant to (re-) shape and/or (re-) define the public argument about population. In terms of the substantive points of stasis, there is also little that is novel. Perhaps most significantly, the recognition of resource shortfalls leads this document to push for creative financing options, including a variety of partnership concepts, as well as short-term assistance that will "build capacity" and "improve self-reliance" so that individual countries will fend for themselves.

While much of the substance remains the same, higher priority is afforded to some issues in the 1999 texts. For instance, in recognition of the escalating nature of the issue, HIV/AIDS becomes a prominently featured term in the 1999 document. There are 23 references to "HIV/AIDS," another 12 to "HIV," another 2 to "AIDS," and 4 to the UN agency in charge of coordinating efforts, "UNAIDS." Again, this is not absent in previous documents, but there is a recognition in the 1999 text that more focus is needed. The situation is regularly classified in the document as a "pandemic," and the document calls for urgent, increased attention to the issue:

> Since the HIV/AIDS pandemic is having a more severe impact than was originally projected, special attention should be given to providing promptly the necessary resources as has been called for in the Programme of Action for the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases and HIV. Particular attention should be given to vulnerable populations, especially children and young people. All countries affected by the pandemic must continue to make efforts to mobilize domestic resources from all sources in order to combat it. The international community is called upon to assist developing countries and countries with economies in transition in their efforts. Additionally, Governments and the donor

> community should intensify efforts to provide resources for care and support of those affected by HIV/AIDS and for specialized prevention needs.[9]

Second, this text specifically challenges two sets of "agons" facing the international community in its attempt at improving the population and development outlook: debt and structural adjustment programmes. As explained in Chapter 1, agons are rarely featured in this rhetorical genre, so the featuring of these agons implies a significant degree of concern to the point of being willing to challenge some potential partners to the process. Though debt or a variant only occurs 5 times in the text, it attains more prominence in this document than in prior conferences. The text refers to "the debt burden" and also contains an extended passage arguing for strategies to relieve debt in order to pursue the goals embraced by the ICPD process:

> Consideration should also be given to more efficient and coordinated mechanisms to address the debt problem, including the reduction of the burden of external debt through various measures such as debt cancellation and debt swaps for population, health and other social sector investment to promote sustainable development.[10]

Structural adjustment programmes are also addressed in the document as a primary agon. While the text does not outright reject the use of these programmes, it contains some strong language about their design and their possible effects. The document points to "the adverse impact of structural adjustment policies" and, by implicit suggestion, indicates a problematic history of

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[9] "Key Actions," Para 97. For a snapshot of the importance of "pandemic" as a rhetorical label, see the World Health Organization's delays in calling the "swine flu" outbreak a "pandemic."

[10] "Key Actions," Para 16; Para 100.

structural adjustment programmes, calling for "ensuring that structural adjustment programmes are responsive to social, economic and environmental concerns."[11]

Table 8. Top 20 Terms, Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (UN)[12]

Top 20 Terms: Frequency (Rank Indicated by Number)
1. Health
2. Including
3. Countries
4. Reproductive
5. Governments
6. Services
7. International
8. Women
9. Action
10. Development
11. Programme
12. Population
13. Sexual
14. Programmes
15. Ensure
16. Rights
17. Appropriate
18. Education
19. United
20. Human

4.3.2 Rhetorical Analysis

To begin my analysis of the 1999 follow-up on Cairo's Programme of Action, I turn to an analysis of three primary thematic threads that help to unpack the document's contents: precedents and memorials, re-configuring the private-public dialectic, and "advocacy" and "civil society" as the newest markers of "communication" (and, potentially implicitly, rhetoric) in UN population conference documents.

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[11] "Key Actions," Para 57, Subsection D; Para 16.

[12] See comments after table 2 (chapter 2), for explanation of Wordle. This analysis was performed May 25, 2009. For a visual representation, not only of the top 20 terms, but of the entire document, see Appendix D.

Table 9. Notable Terms & Phrases, ICPD + 5 (UN)

Notable Term/Phrase	Frequency
Civil Society	26
Partner, Partners, Partnership, Partnerships	11
Indicator, indicators -Benchmark indicator	15 2
Gender	38
Enable, enables, enabling -Self-reliance	10 1
Capacity, capacity-building	12
Integrate, integrates, integrated, integration	6
Adolescent, adolescents -Youth, youths -Child, children -boy, boys -girl, girls TOTAL	27 17 35 2 26 121

4.3.2.1 Precedents and Memorials

"Key Actions" both enmeshes itself with other international conference work and thus validates itself via precedent, while also actively memorializing the Cairo conference. First, I analyze the ways in which "Key Actions" articulates itself, and Cairo, in relation to other high profile international conference work, and in the process, ends up citing them as precedent.

Cairo's Programme of Action had linked itself to a number of other high-profile international, United Nations-sponsored conferences. Without the same degree of specificity (every conference was not named on its own), the "Key Actions" document continues this support for envisioning the efforts toward the Programme of Action within a broader international context:

> The International Conference on Population and Development and its implementation must be seen as being closely related to the outcome and coordinated follow-up to the other major United Nations conferences held in the

> 1990s. Progress in the implementation of the Programme of Action should be supportive of and consistent with the integrated follow up to all major United Nations conferences and summits.[13]

Second, ICPD+5's text actively (self-)memorializes the Cairo conference. Though it does not reference Bucharest or Mexico City, it both refers regularly to the 1994 conference and praises it significantly as well. There are, in all, 76 references either to "Cairo," "the International Conference on Population and Development," "the Programme of Action," or "the Conference." In some ways, this makes sense, given that the role of the document is to assess the progress toward the goals and objectives outlined in the 1994 Programme of Action. As such, its name is "Key actions for the further implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development," and its primary role is to reinforce and to support, rather than to deviate from or change course from, the 1994 conference. Indeed, not only does the "Key actions" document support and reinforce the 1994 conference, it actively (self-) memorializes the importance of the 1994 conference: "The Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development . . . marked the beginning of a new era in population and development."[14] Again, as I examine throughout this dissertation, the conferences themselves, in addition to scholars and activists writing about Cairo, insist on defining is as a paradigm changer or, in this quotation, a "new era."

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[13] "Key Actions," Para 4.

[14] "Key Actions," Para 1. Again, this points to the oddity of the foil being employed. If even the UN, and in all likelihood largely the same people who participated in pre-Cairo conferences (such as Singh), calling this "the beginning of a new era" begs the question of why, for the UN and population "experts" worldwide, opening space for Cairo requires a significant act of forgetting of Bucharest and Mexico City. This also suggests that at least some of the language employed to refer to the past cannot simply be referencing back to earlier, non-UN advocates like Malthus and Ehrlich.

4.3.2.2 Re-Configuring the Private-Public Dialectic

As Henry Giroux argues, our current, globalized moment in history is characterized by a tendency toward themes of privatization and neoliberalism. Given this strong "tendency," as Burke might call it, it is unsurprising that these texts, in particular the latter ones (+5 and +10), are structured, at least partially, by these comprehensive worldviews.[15] To be fair, while the document strongly encourages more utilization of the private sector, it is also emphatic that private resources cannot be used to supplant the primary responsibilities of the public sector. Nevertheless, the structuring worldview, speaking through the text, represents a set of neoliberal tendencies. Thus, consistent with the neoliberal focus on individual, rather than community or governmental action, the document places significant emphasis on "enabling" and developing "self-reliance." The document encourages enabling women, men, countries, and adolescents to achieve their goals. The document also calls for actions that would provide an "enabling environment."[16] In addition to the focus on enabling individuals and individual countries to act on their own, the document also encourages a focus on developing self-reliance. Though self-reliance is only mentioned once in the document, it is referenced in the context of enabling as well:

> The international community and the private sector should also take the necessary measures, particularly in the transfer of technology, as appropriate, to enable countries, in particular developing countries, to produce, store and distribute safe

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[15] I choose "worldview," rather than "ideology," because of the baggage that the latter carries, as I discuss in Chapter 5 on my discussion of the hermeneutics of suspicion and critical, scholarly perspective. I do not envision "privatization" to be sufficiently comprehensive to be referred to as a "worldview," but I do think that neoliberalism has become sufficiently developed to be labeled as "worldview."

[16] "Key Actions," Para 16, 78.

> and effective contraceptives and other supplies essential for reproductive health services in order to strengthen the self-reliance of those countries.[17]

Though this is not new to this particular document, it does reflect both the attitude of the times and, potentially, the facing of the realities of consistent shortfalls of financial resources to implement the actions and recommendations of the Programme of Action. This to me, though not "falsifiable," represents a more productive, less cynical read of motives for the calls toward privatization and neoliberalism: the persistent reality of underachievement in the financial commitments to implement population and development goals required a shift to strategies more likely to allow the goals to be met, despite the risks that such strategies incur. Though "self-reliance" is only captured once in the text, a similar term, capacity/capacity-building, occurs in some variant 12 times. Some of the clusters associated with capacity include national capacity, capacity-building, institutional capacity, programme management capacity, and other uses of capacity.[18] Rhetorically, the notion of capacity, along with self-reliance and enabling, function similarly to calls for individual action and responsibility within a country. Just as the "give a person a fish, feed them for a today, teach a person to fish, feed them for a lifetime" mantra guides thinking with regard to a domestic environment, the calls for "self-reliance," "enabling" (presumably enabling so that they can do it on their own), and building "capacity" all signal an analogue in which individual countries fulfill the role of individuals in a country, who must take responsibility for their own actions rather than depend on the institution (national government, or, in this case, international community) to take care of their well-being for them. In the next section, I chart the continuing transformation of the enunciated role for "communication"

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[17] "Key Actions," Para 60.

[18] "Key Actions," Paras 11, 54, 81; Paras 21, 23, 55; Paras 46, 83; Para 57, Subsection C; Paras 25, 38, 46.

(perhaps, but not necessarily, including rhetoric) and “participation,” in particular, with shifts toward “advocacy” and “civil society.”

4.3.2.3 “Advocacy” and “Civil Society”

"Key Actions," like its predecessors, assigns an important role for communication activities (which may, or may not, include rhetoric and deliberation). The 1999 document, in keeping with the vision of Cairo, continues to recognize the importance of engaging and “persuading” (again, as described in chapters 2 and 3, without ever using such terminology) all actors in order to meet conference objectives: "The Programme of Action recognized that greater public knowledge, understanding and commitment at all levels, from the individual to the international, are vital to the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action" (36).[19] The 1999 document also makes several references to the need for "advocacy" efforts. For instance, in a subsection on "Advocacy for gender equality and equity," the document suggests:

> Governments, parliamentarians, community and religious leaders, family members, media representatives, educators and other relevant groups should actively promote gender equality and equity. These groups should develop and strengthen their strategies to change negative and discriminatory attitudes and practices towards women and the girl child. All leaders at the highest levels of policy- and decision-making should speak out in support of gender equality and

[19] "Key Actions."

> equity, including empowerment of women and protection of the girl child and young women.[20]

Similarly, the document notes, "Governments, civil society and the United Nations system should advocate for the human rights of women and the girl child."[21] Advocacy is also paired with a popular phrase from the Cairo document, "information, education and communication":

> Advocacy and information, education and communication campaigns developed with communities and supported from the highest levels of Government should promote informed, responsible and safer sexual behaviour and practices, mutual respect and gender equity in sexual relationships.[22]

While in chapter 2 I argued that "IEC" suggested a category mistake in knowledge between *episteme* and *doxa* (and education and propaganda), the notion of "advocacy," with its legal and persuasive connotations, represents more of a turn to rhetoric and *doxa*, and begins to transcend the idea of population argument as mere "information" and "education" activities. Advocacy suggests that these issues (such as responsible sexual behavior and equity) are those that can only be "won" through the process of argumentation.

The 1999 text also reflects an understanding of the extra-legislative role that politicians can play in advocating for the efforts of the Programme of Action:

> Parliamentarians/members of national legislatures are invited to ensure legislative reform and expanded awareness-raising necessary for implementing the Programme of Action. They are encouraged to be advocates for the implementation of the Programme of Action, including through the allocation, as

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[20] "Key Actions," Para 49.

[21] "Key Actions," Para 41.

[22] "Key Actions," Para 68.

> appropriate, of financial resources. There should be regular exchanges of experiences among parliamentarians at the subregional, regional, interregional and international levels, where appropriate.[23]

While Bucharest, Mexico City, and Cairo had all envisioned an important role for "awareness" or "awareness-raising," it is only here in the "Key Actions" document that the international community goes one step farther by stressing the linkage between awareness and advocacy. We frequently associate a link between awareness and advocacy (and thus, of the realm of rhetoric) when, for instance, a health campaign aims to raise awareness and consciousness in order to generate public support, financial or otherwise.

The text understands the link between public advocacy on behalf of the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action and increased financial and resource commitments toward meeting those goals as well:

> With full regard to their respective jurisdiction and mandates, legislators and other decision makers are encouraged to undertake measures to increase support for achieving the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action through legislation, advocacy and expanded awareness-raising and resource mobilization. Advocacy efforts should be increased at all levels, both national and international, to ensure that the resource goals are met.[24]

Significantly, while all of the ICPD objectives are important and stressed, financial resource mobilization clearly represents the most immediately sought after rhetorical goal from the

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[23] "Key Actions," Para 87.

[24] "Key Actions," Para 96.

document, especially because many elements of the Programme of Action are largely uncontroversial, and only fail to be enacted because of a lack of funds.[25]

While “advocacy” is one way in which the +5 text continues to complicate its concepts lurking around the rhetorical arena, the document also refines the role of non-governmental organizations, public participation, and, as emphasized in this text, “civil society.”

Building on the ICPD Programme of Action's recognition of the need to involve the broadest range of possible actors in mobilizing around the issues of population and development, the ICPD+5 "Key Actions" document continually calls for the involvement and active interaction of "civil society" in implementing and pushing forward the agenda initiated at Cairo. Of all the conferences already examined (Bucharest, Mexico City, Cairo), ICPD+5 is the first to use this term. One might be tempted to associate this term as merely another synonym for "non-governmental organizations," a phrase gradually increasing throughout each conference and achieving full potential in the 1994 Programme of Action. However, clues from "Key Actions" suggest that the definition includes but is broader than "non-governmental organizations": "civil society, including non governmental organizations, donors and the United Nations system" and "civil society, including non governmental organizations and the private sector."[26] While the clusters suggest some lack of precision regarding what exactly constitutes "civil society," the only clear clustering scheme is that civil society is exclusive of Government. The document provides both descriptive statements about what civil society is doing in relation to the ICPD Programme of Action ("many civil society organizations are contributing to the formulation and

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[25] I recognize that this claim that many parts are uncontroversial may appear in tension with my other, previous claims about the role of controversy and *doxa*, for instance, in addressing the concerns. However, many parts, like reducing infant mortality and mother mortality are things that everyone can support at least in principle, even if they do not assist with the financial needs to help to reduce those problems.

[26] "Key Actions," Para 52; Para 22.

implementation of policies, programmes and projects on their own or in partnerships with governmental and intergovernmental organizations as well as the private sector") and normative claims about what the role of civil society should be:

> Governments, civil society at the national level and the United Nations system should work towards enhancing and strengthening their collaboration and cooperation with a view to fostering an enabling environment for partnerships for the implementation of the Programme of Action. Governments and civil society organizations should develop systems for greater transparency and information-sharing so as to improve their accountability. Governments are encouraged to recognize and support the important and complementary role that civil society at the national level can play towards changing attitudes and actions for further implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development. [27]

In this passage, the document suggests that, apart from the rhetorical opportunities held by national and local leaders, members of civil society too can rhetorically engage publics in "changing attitudes and actions," thus decentralizing the space for rhetoric and expanding the range of viable rhetors. "Civil society" also suggests the problem, discussed in Chapter 2, with claiming too much "closure." Recognizing a controversy as at least partially open allows deliberation and dialogue to get a better sense of the problem and potential solutions, while creating more of a feeling that people will "buy in" to the results, since they had ownership in the process. Conversely, though, if conference participants, or other leaders, declare and decree the

[27] "Key Actions," Para 9; Paras 78-79.

full nature of the problems and the solutions, there is little impetus and motivation, or “buy in,” for society to participate in pursuit of goals.

A second, related but distinct key term, is partner/partnership. However, in addition to calling for partnerships with civil society, the document also calls for other partnerships. In addition to the in-text references, one section is titled "Partnerships and collaborations." The document assigns an important role to partnerships: "Achieving the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action will require sufficient domestic and external resources, committed government action and effective, transparent partnerships."[28] Partnerships also call for a broader range of actors than just traditional NGOs: "Governments should immediately develop, in full partnership with youth, parents, families, educators and health-care providers, youth-specific HIV education and treatment projects, with special emphasis on developing peer-education programmes," and both Governments and civil society organizations are urged to engage in partnerships with other parties beyond each other:

> Governments and civil society organizations, where appropriate, are encouraged to design innovative approaches and build partnerships with, among others, the media, the commercial sector, religious leaders, local community groups and leaders as well as youth, which can serve as effective advocates for the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action.[29]

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[28] "Key Actions," Para 11.

[29] "Key Actions," Para 68; Para 82.

4.3.3 From ICPD+5 to ICPD+10

> In recommending the key actions contained in the present document, Governments affirm their renewed and sustained commitment to the principles, goals and objectives of the Programme of Action. Governments and civil society at the national level, in partnership with the international community, should join in efforts to ensure that the goals and objectives of the International Conference on Population and Development are accomplished as soon as possible, with special attention to those that should be met within the 20 year time-frame of the Programme of Action.[30]

Beyond calls for increased commitment, financial and otherwise, the "Key Actions" document, as this passage suggests, is primarily a reaffirmation and restatement of the most important elements of the 1994 Programme of Action. Though continuing to make subtle changes and updates, one sees no major revision or change of course in this document. Without any fundamental alteration or revision, the Programme of Action was set to continue to be reviewed and revisited on a regular basis, and its next major review occurred in the lead-up to the tenth anniversary of Cairo in 2004.

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[30] "Key Actions," Para 14.

4.4 ICPD+10 (UN, 2004)

Given that another 10 years had passed, one might ask why a global conference was not convened, since there had been one in 1974, 1984, and 1994. Unfortunately, this is an issue that cannot be resolved through exclusive recourse to the text itself. Fortunately, though, Singh's insider status helps to provide a set of historical-contextual-geopolitical reasons for this change:

> On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Cairo, the United Nations did not organize a global conference to review progress towards the implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action. The US administration had changed in 2001 and its representatives at various UN meetings began challenging several aspects of the consensus reached on reproductive health and reproductive rights at Cairo, particularly on the subject of abortion. In this attempt, it very often received the support of the Holy See and a few other countries. On the other side, there was very little desire on the part of a large group of countries (including those from Western Europe) to support the idea of holding a global conference where attempts could be made to reopen or redefine some of the major elements of the hard-won Cairo consensus. Some of the donor countries were also concerned about the possible allocation of millions of dollars for organizing such an event as also of the staff time and attention (including hiring of additional staff) needed over a period of two to three years.[31]

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[31] Jyoti Shankar Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, Reproductive Rights and Women's Empowerment*, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 170. Again, much like with Intelligent Design and global warming, these concerns reflect the concern involved when settled agreement ("closure") was re-opened for discussion and argument.

Singh chronicles a series of disagreements and complications that prevented more widespread agreement during this process. For instance, even a resolution to provide renewed support for the Millennium Development Goals, the Programme of Action, and Key Actions, "in order to satisfy those that had first expressed some reservations at Cairo and restated them at the meeting of the Commission [on Population and Development], refers to the reports of the ICPD and the Key Actions for Further Implementation 'in their entirety', the point being that these reports as issued by the United Nations contain all the statements and reservations made at the two events."[32]

Nevertheless, despite a number of stumbling blocks, the commemoration and reaffirmation occurred:

> The General Assembly commemorated the tenth anniversary of the IPCD on 24 October 2004. The Assembly heard around 70 statements, many of them delivered by ministers or deputy ministers on behalf of their governments. These reiterated the commitments of the governments concerned to the ICPD Programme of Action and the action taken by them to implement the Programme of Action in the context of their own situation and requirements.[33]

As Singh notes, "In commemoration of the 10th anniversary of ICPD, the Assembly also adopted a commemorate resolution, but the resolution does not deal with any substantive themes or issues."[34]

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[32] Jyoti Shankar Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, Reproductive Rights and Women's Empowerment*, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 173.

[33] Jyoti Shankar Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, Reproductive Rights and Women's Empowerment*, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 173.

[34] Jyoti Shankar Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, Reproductive Rights and Women's Empowerment*, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 173.

Armed with this historical-contextual work providing the scene for the ICPD+10 process, I turn next to a more internally, text-driven account of the ten-year review.

4.5 ICPD AT TEN: THE WORLD REAFFIRMS CAIRO (2004)

4.5.1 Key Features of the Text

Though bearing a publication date of 2005, the text *ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms Cairo. Official Outcomes of the ICPD at Ten Review* (2005) is the official publication representing the 2004 ICPD+10 efforts.[35] The document is actually a compilation of, as noted in its title, "official outcomes" representing the ICPD+10 process. This includes meetings of the United Nations Commission on Population and Development, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and League of Arab States. The official outcomes of those meetings, reproduced in the publication, were produced between 2002 and 2004, rather than in one grand conference. As noted in the Foreword:

> This collection of declarations, resolutions and agreements, adopted by regional and global inter-governmental bodies during 2002-2004, serves as a mid-point appraisal and a record of progress toward achieving the goals of the twenty-year

[35] *ICPD at Ten*.

ICPD Programme of Action and the ICPD+5 *Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development*.[36]

This organizational structure bears very little resemblance to the documents analyzed in chapter 2, 3, and the beginning of this chapter. Instead of one overarching, programmatic statement, there are at least 12 discrete texts within a text. The length of these texts-within-texts also varies, ranging from under one page to approximately 21 pages. Also, while in chapter 2 I noted that the general criteria for textual inclusion required that it be an international, intergovernmental conference, this document ends up not matching such criteria very well.

4.5.1.1 Why It Merits Inclusion as a "Text"

Why, then, does this text (or, to be precise, compilation of texts), merit inclusion in the document? First, as a matter of necessity, since there have been no international, intergovernmental UN population conferences recently (since Cairo), analyzing efforts such as the ICPD+10 process is the only way to chart ongoing continuities and transformations of the public argument. Second, in some ways, understanding Bucharest, Mexico City, and Cairo as documents that were produced in one set of high-profile meetings is misleading. For example, a full draft of the Cairo Programme of Action existed long before delegations ever arrived in Egypt. Thus, in some ways, considering these conferences as "snapshot" events has always been a bit of a stretch.[37] Third, the structure of "ICPD at Ten" is, in many ways, indicative of an

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[36] *ICPD at Ten*, V.

[37] Similarly, as the example of ICPD+5 suggests, each of these documents draws upon prior work by regional meetings and other international meetings:

> The present document draws on the results and findings of intergovernmental reviews under the auspices of the United Nations, including the annual and quinquennial review and appraisal by the

emerging and important trend with regard to United Nations conferences. As Schechter notes, especially because of the costs of hosting mega-conferences, the trend has been to move away from these large meetings in favor of more feasible alternatives. In this sense, a number of regional meetings, compiled for the international community and brought together by an official commemoration of the 10th anniversary in the United Nations General Assembly, may offer a glimpse into future international conferences and international action on pressing global issues. Having now introduced and justified the text(s) under consideration, I turn now to a rhetorical analysis of the ICPD+10 efforts.

> Commission on Population and Development and meetings and reports of the United Nations regional commissions regarding progress made and constraints faced in the implementation of the Programme of Action.

"Key Texts," 13.

Table 10. Top 20* Terms, *ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms Cairo* (UN)[38]

Top 20* Terms: Frequency (Rank Indicated by Number)
1. Development
2. Population
3. Action
4. International
5. Health
6. Programme
7. Reproductive
8. ICPD
9. Implementation
10. Economic
11. Countries
12. Conference
13. Goals
14. Page*
15. Commission
16. Including
17. Social
18. Cairo
19. Policies
20. Poverty
21. Programmes

4.5.2 Rhetorical Analysis

There are many key terms that overlap with those from ICPD+5, the original Programme of Action, and even its predecessors, so instead of surveying all possibilities (and thus creating redundancy), I focus on three central thematic vectors of analysis: the document's simultaneous movements toward diffusion while displaying powerful message discipline, the continuing

[38] See comments after table 2 (chapter 2), for explanation of Wordle. This analysis was performed May 27, 2009. When I manually moved text from the pdf version of the document to a word version, to facilitate analysis such as Wordle, I added the word "page" by page numbers in order to preserve original document pagination. Because of this addition on my part, "Page" comes in as #14 in the document's frequency. Because of this distortion, I actually included the top 21, rather than just the top 20. For a visual representation, not only of the top 21 terms, but of the entire document, see Appendix E.

movement toward a neoliberal worldview/perspective, and a discussion of “strategy” in reference to Habermas’ characterization of rhetoric as strategic action.

Table 11. Notable Terms & Phrases, ICPD + 10 (UN)

Notable Term/Phrase	Frequency
Millennium Declaration, Millennium Development Goals, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), millennium development goal, millennium development goals	38
Poverty	67
-poverty eradication/eradicate poverty	4
-extreme poverty	5
-poverty reduction/reduction of poverty	15
Well-being	6
Quality of life	6
Access	42
Enable, enables, enabling	14
-enabling environments	6
Integration, reintegration, integrating, integrate[39]	24
Incorporation, incorporating, incorporate	8
Inclusion	2
Linkages	3
Human capital	3

4.5.2.1 Message Control

The ICPD+10 documents represent an increasing diffusion of actors, agreements, and actions to achieve the relevant goals. While the Programme of Action, the 1999 "Key Actions," and the "Millennium Development Goals" are the primary "precedents" upon which each "official outcomes" document rests and which each "official outcomes" document "reaffirms," there are a number of regional and other international efforts that are given recognition in the ICPD+10 efforts. Even Fréchette, in commemorating the ICPD, links it with other international, UN-based efforts: "our commemoration here today should contribute to preparations for the important events planned for the next year: the ten-year reviews of both the Beijing and

[39] Some of these references are about integrating sectors (health, education, development, population, etc…), but in this case, integration and reintegration also at times refer to issues relating to migration.

Copenhagen conferences and the five-year review of the Millennium Declaration."[40] The declaration of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa is both a review of the ICPD and the Dakar/Ngor Declaration of 1992.[41] It also supports the "New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)."[42] The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean also references regional population agreements such as the Latin American and Caribbean Consensus on Population of Development from 1993 and the "Latin American and Caribbean Regional Plan of Action on Population and Development" from 1994.[43] The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific examines the implementation of both the ICPD as well as the Bali Declaration on Population and Sustainable Development of 1992.[44] All of these linkages with other international and regional efforts indicate a diffusion of efforts and a decentralization from the international mega-conference to other, more regional and local efforts.

Though *ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms Cairo* is actually a collection of documents, rather than one discrete text, the various texts do a generally strong job of staying "on message" with each other. For instance, they all attempt to send the message about the necessary connection between implementing the ICPD and achieving the MDGs. Similarly, each gives increased priority to poverty and HIV/AIDS, and continues to promote a strong role for partnerships of various sorts. Had this message coordination and discipline not occurred, we would most likely consider each document in complete isolation from the others, rather than as

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[40] *ICPD at Ten*, X.

[41] *ICPD at Ten*, 16.

[42] *ICPD at Ten*, 17.

[43] *ICPD at Ten*, 63.

[44] *ICPD at Ten*, 70.

texts within a larger text. Such a shift of perspective would have made the ICPD+10 effort, at least from a textual perspective, generally ineffective and incoherent. It would have also called into question whether or not there was a global issue anymore, and thus whether it merited UN action in the first place. I now turn to a more extended analysis of “message control” in relation to the MDGs, and the ways that the MDGs influence the foci of the +10 text.

One of the most significant differences between the ICPD+5 document and the ICPD+10 document (which are otherwise highly similar) relates to the presence of an event that occurred in between 1999 and 2004. In 2000, the United Nations held its Millennium Summit, out of which were produced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).[45] Having these important international agreements as a backdrop, the 2004 conference had to both negotiate the relationship between the ICPD process and the MDGs as well as argue for the continued relevance of the ICPD in a world with the MDGs. The document ended up dealing with both of these issues by means of working through the second issue: why should we still concern ourselves with the Cairo Programme of Action now that the international community has set the agenda with the Millennium Development Goals? Despite the different locations of various regional meetings, the "message control" was on point with regard to the answer to this question. The Economic Commission for Africa's Declaration notes:

> [T]he Millennium Development Goals cannot be achieved unless further action is taken to ensure the full implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development and of the "Key

[45] These events are so important that the 2005 publication includes, as its only appendix, a brief description of the Millennium Development Goals as they relate to the goals of the ICPD.

Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development."[46]

Similarly, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean observes: "the implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action and the Key Actions for Further Implementation of the ICPD Programme of Action is essential for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals."[47] The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and League of Arab States' Declaration contains similar language: "the goals of the ICPD Programmed (sic) of Action and the Millennium Development Goals are complementary and interrelated, and . . . realization of the former is fundamental to achieving the latter."[48] The Millennium Summit and Millennium Development goals are also clustered with a frequent passage—"internationally agreed development goals"—though, from the particular phrasing, this latter phrase seems to include but not be exhausted by the goals set at the Millennium Summit.[49]

As a result of this linkage with the Millennium Development Goals, there is a sharp focus on efforts to reduce and eliminate poverty. There are approximately 65 references to "poverty" in the 2004 document (in comparison, there are 19 references in the 1999 ICPD+5 "Key Actions"). Many of these references are clustered around the idea of "poverty eradication," and a number of others make the reference to ending "extreme poverty." This makes sense in the context of the MDGs: "The overarching millennium development goal of the United Nations Millennium

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[46] *ICPD at Ten*, 18.

[47] *ICPD at Ten*, 45.

[48] *ICPD at Ten*, 93.

[49] *ICPD at Ten*. While the claim is continually asserted, there is little in the way of warrants about what specifically in the Programme of Action is vital to the MDGs and cannot be done exclusively through the MDG process as well or better than continuing both sets of efforts.

Declaration is the eradication of extreme poverty."[50] Like many of these important terms, "poverty" was never absent in previous population texts such as Bucharest, Mexico City, and Cairo. Instead, the prominence afforded efforts to address and eliminate poverty are given greater priority in the 2004 document because of the recent Millennium Summit. Indeed, whereas the phrase "population and development" had, in the course of the conference texts, become more and more commonplace, in the 2004 document policies to address poverty appear to gain equal footing with these other pillars with such phrasing as " population, development and poverty reduction policies."[51]

Though not at all new to +10, and in fact directly traceable to Bucharest, well-being and quality of life are championed in the document. These reflect a designation of importance to qualitative indicators of human happiness and well-being as critical goals for the Programme of Action and its implementation. The conclusion to the Foreword provides the importance of these goals: "As we look back over the past decade and look forward to the next ten years, the message of Cairo-putting people first and investing in people-remains a guide as we strive to reduce poverty and improve human well-being."[52] Similarly, Fréchette, in a statement published as the Introduction to the text, concludes remarks with the message: "As we look ahead, I urge you to overcome your remaining differences on sensitive issues, reaffirm your full commitment to the ICPD Programme of Action, and intensify our common work towards a world of development and well-being for all."[53] In each of these passages, the emphasis on well-being is critical to the

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[50] *ICPD at Ten*, 72.

[51] *ICPD at Ten*, 86.

[52] *ICPD at Ten*, VI.

[53] *ICPD at Ten*, X. Notably, in relation to my analysis on sanitizing controversy from Chapter 2, this is one of the only textual traces in which the author(s) recognize that some components of the ICPD are controversial and thus represent “sensitive issues” on which there continue to exist “differences.”

overall aim of the conference. In promoting "quality of life," there is, again, a link between well-being, quality of life, and efforts to address and eliminate poverty: "Population, development and poverty are closely interrelated and achieving sustained economic growth and a balance between population, resources and the environment is essential for sustainable development, eradication of poverty and improving the quality of life of current and future generations."[54] In addition to these primary terms, there are also subsets supporting the same theme, with claims about the need to improve "daily lives" and to allow for "upward social mobility."[55]

4.5.2.2 Trending toward Neoliberalism

Consistent with the neoliberal trend toward self-dependence and self-sufficiency, first addressed earlier this chapter, the document places significant emphasis on "access." There are 42 references to some variant of "access" (access, accessibility, accessible) in the document. These references get clustered with "quality," both in the sense that people need access to high-quality services and information, and that, in addition to access, quality is another important component. The references are also clustered with "comprehensive," in noting the need to have access to comprehensive services.[56] Calls for access are also made particularly with regard to vulnerable and marginalized sub-groups in the population. While there is much to be appreciated and lauded in calls for enhancing access, the risk is that it becomes some correlate of the "equality of opportunity, not result" type of thinking endemic to present-day U.S. social policies.

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[54] *ICPD at Ten*, 71.

[55] *ICPD at Ten*, X; 20, 52.

[56] "Comprehensive" plays an important role throughout the document, including but not limited to its linkage with access, and could be considered a separate key term.

In this sense, a necessary component becomes mistaken for a sufficient component, risking a further disadvantaging of both individuals and sub-groups in a population.

Carrying a similar emphasis toward promoting individual (self and country) responsibility and self-sufficiency, the document continues the trend from 1999 by promoting the idea of "enabling." The document contains 14 references to some variant of enabling, including 6 that call for creating/supporting "enabling environments," 1 that calls for enabling governments, and 7 that call for enabling individuals, including in particular women and young people.[57] Again, the lure of all of these types of identifiers is that they create a sense of agency and choice. The danger is that, instead of providing services, goods, realized opportunities, they end up stopping at potential opportunities, access, and enabling situations that might potentially lead to services, goods, or realized opportunities.[58]

Finally, in a move signaling the tendency of a neoliberal worldview to view everything, including humans, in terms of a monetary idiom, the 2004 text makes three references to the need to develop "human capital."[59] Rhetorically, this is an interesting choice of terms, since capital is usually considered in terms of financial, monetary capital, or in terms of natural, resource-based capital. Though not an altogether new term, it reflects either an understanding of humans as resources or an attempt to put humans back into development (or perhaps some combination of both). The document links "human capital" with development and women:

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[57] *ICPD at Ten*, 17, 36, 52, 70, 86, 89; 95; 18, 31, 33, 33, 70, 108, 109; 108; 109.

[58] Much like the 1999 text, there are also many references to "capacity" and "capacity-building," consistent with the theme addressed here.

[59] Some environmentalists have attempted to use "human capital" in a positive deployment. For instance, see Paul Hawken, Amory Lovins, and L. Hunter Lovins, *Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next Industrial Revolution* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1999).

> Improvement of human capital is fundamental to development and women, who comprise half the population, remain disadvantaged and marginalized in accessing social and economic opportunities, participating in the development process and assuming political and administrative responsibilities.[60]

It is also linked to decision-making ability:

> Emphasize human capital formation and infrastructural development as a strategy for promoting informed decision-making, paying special attention to inequalities and disparities in access to education, health, employment and microcredit.[61]

4.5.2.3 "Strategy": Revisiting Habermas

In the +5 text, there is a shift to embracing "advocacy." In +10, the role of "strategy" becomes enlarged. While, according to Habermas, rhetoric represents "strategic action," in the context of this text, strategy is stripped of such pejorative attachments.[62] Though "advocacy" represented a step forward in +5, a new phrase in the 2004 text, "behaviour change communication (BCC)," suggests a step back.[63] For instance, on the positive side, the document explains, "Many countries in the region have introduced advocacy and communication as one of the integral components in their development programmes, by recognizing the importance of these components as a basis for creating awareness, generating participation, making informed

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[60] *ICPD at Ten*, 71.

[61] *ICPD at Ten*, 72-73.

[62] Similarly, the Dutch school of argumentation, pragma-dialectics, classifies rhetoric as "strategic maneuvering."

[63] *ICPD at Ten*, 80. Also, while "advocacy" was a step forward, the language of "Information, education and communication activities" (IEC), in addition to appearing regularly in the Programme of Action, also occurred frequently in the +5 "Key Actions" document.

decisions and resolving conflict."[64] However, on the flip side, the document is less promising, as it suggests:

> Governments, in cooperation with civil society organizations and the private sector, where appropriate, are urged to: 1. Strengthen population information, advocacy and BCC programmes at all levels to increase awareness of priority issues such as population, sustainable development, poverty reduction, migration, ageing, gender, reproductive health, including the needs of adolescents, HIV/AIDS and resource mobilization.[65]

The clustering of BCC with "interventions" and the language above, while in some ways promising, still represent an awkward categorization of knowledge claims whose genesis, I argue, resides in the failure, and perhaps refusal, to engage in the consideration of, for the purposes of population advocacy, communication as rhetoric (as argued in Chapter 2).

4.6 READING ICPD+5 AND ICPD+10 TOGETHER

While much valuable analysis can be gleaned by discussing each text in isolation, since these documents represent very similar purposes, there are themes that stretch across the two documents. In particular, I examine four: a veering toward what G. Thomas Goodnight has articulated as the technical sphere, promising seeds of gender nuancing, a question of whether the document is reflexive in the thick sense of being “self-risking,” and an examination of the

[64] *ICPD at Ten*, 85.

[65] *ICPD at Ten*, 86.

receding role of “sustainable development” while “demographics” and “the apocalypse” make subtle returns.

4.6.1 Veering toward the Technical *Sphere*

G. Thomas Goodnight proposed a threefold distinction of the public, private, and technical spheres of argument. In some ways, the borders linking these spheres have always been relatively porous. Nevertheless, the importance of distinguishing public sphere communication and argument from technical sphere communication remains important. If we consider this public-technical divide less from the perspective of separate spheres and more in terms of a continuum, we can understand the shift from the Cairo conference to the ICPD+5 and ICPD+10. From the perspective of "spheres," the 1994 Cairo Programme of Action may appear largely to follow technical sphere reasoning. However, it also stood out as a publicly produced and consumed document expressing the sentiments of large portions of the international community (as exemplified by the amount of attention it received, then and since then, from scholarly, NGO, and activist communities). From the perspective of a continuum, we might more fairly place the Programme of Action in some moderate location, neither wholly public nor wholly technical, but containing elements of both. In comparison to the Programme of Action's location on such a continuum, the 1999 ICPD+5 "Key Actions" falls more closely in the direction of the technical. In some ways this is understandable, since it did not set out to break new ground in the public argument, but rather to appraise and to recommend how to continue forward in the pursuit of already agreed-upon goals. There are a number of textual hints and clues that suggest a substantially technical orientation to the 1999 document, including the calls for developing and utilizing indicators to monitor progress, recommendations for improving data collection and

analysis and dissemination, numerous suggestions for additional research and study in order to improve understanding, calls for the documentation and exchange of positive experiences, and in general an orientation geared primarily toward information and implementation. As one extended anecdote of this focus, I turn to the document's emphasis of "indicators."

As a document ostensibly created in order to gauge the progress (or lack thereof) in pursuit of the goals and actions of the ICPD Programme of Action, one of the primary areas of emphasis is in developing instruments to be able to measure such progress. One key term that appears repeatedly throughout the document is "indicator/indicators." That is, the document seeks to select and utilize indicators that will allow them to monitor the progress of the Programme of Action. In all, there are 15 references to indicator/indicators in the text, including one section titled "Data Systems, including Indicators." One strategy of promoting indicators is to be able to find out information about particular subsets of the population: in numerous references, the document seeks to develop and use indicators in order to break down pertinent information by age and by gender.[66] In addition to utilizing already agreed upon and already existing indicators in order to produce new information, the document also endorses locating and agreeing upon new indicators. For instance, the document calls for developing indicators on reproductive health:

> Increased efforts are needed by the United Nations system, with support from the international community, to develop and agree on common key indicators on reproductive health programmes, including, inter alia, family planning, maternal health, sexual health, sexually transmitted diseases, HIV/AIDS, and information,

[66] For instance, see "Key Actions," Para 37.

education and communication for appropriate consideration in the relevant intergovernmental process.[67]

In two places, the text references a clustering phrase: "benchmark indicator."[68]

Similarly, the +10 text is also substantially geared toward technical argumentation and reasoning. The ninth most frequently used term in the text is "implementation," so it is understandable that the document's purpose is to ensure action rather than develop the rhetorical vision that will serve as the precursor to action. For instance, as with the "Key Actions" document, there is ample attention given to the need to improve data and systems for gathering and analyzing data. Also, the language surrounding utilizing and developing new indicators is likewise strong. In this document, there is also emphasis on using research and data in order to ground "evidence-based" action.[69] The emphasis on capacity-building is also largely geared toward developing a data infrastructure.

4.6.2 Gender

Though, as I noted in reference to earlier conference documents, some elementary confusions, such as sex/gender conflation, enter into what otherwise might be considered gender-progressive documents, the +5 and +10 texts each contribute nuances to the IR gender discussion.

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[67] "Key Actions," Para 55.

[68] "Key Actions," Paras 64, 70.

[69] Rhetoricians have critiqued this idea of “evidence-based” because it assumes that evidence itself makes an argument. This is similar to the broader problem in scientific communities when scientists make claims like “the data speaks for itself.” On the other hand, “evidence-based” can be encouraging insofar as it opens spot for deliberation, argumentation, reason-giving, and providing the opportunity for the best argument to be victorious, rather than making decisions based on blind appeal to expertise or authority, for instance.

Not unexpectedly, given the heightened focus at Cairo in 1994, "gender" remains a critical key term in the 1999 text. "Gender" is referenced 38 times in the document, including in three section headings: "Gender equality, equity and the empowerment of women," "Gender perspective in programmes and policies," and "Advocacy for gender equality and equity." The first phrase, "gender equality, equity, and the empowerment of women," is a much-repeated phrase in the document (much like "sustained economic growth and sustainable development" was for the 1994 Cairo document). Gender is also clustered with a number of other important terms and phrases, including gender gap, gender-sensitive, gender-based, gender perspective, and gender mainstreaming. Importantly, gender perspective and gender mainstreaming are new to the 1999 document (though the concerns they embody were arguably an implicit element of the 1994 Programme of Action):

> A gender perspective should be adopted in all processes of policy formulation and implementation and in the delivery of services, especially in sexual and reproductive health, including family planning. In this regard, the institutional capacity and expertise of staff in Government, civil society, including non governmental organizations, and the United Nations system should be strengthened in order to promote gender mainstreaming. This should be done by sharing tools, methodologies and lessons learned in order to develop and strengthen their capacity and institutionalize effective strategies for gender-based analysis and gender mainstreaming. This includes the development and availability of gender-disaggregated data and appropriate indicators for monitoring progress at the national level.[70]

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[70] "Key Actions," Para 46.

"Key terms" also provides an important discussion of men's roles and responsibilities. Consistent with the importance given to gender issues, especially at Cairo, there continues to be an awareness of the need to involve men in the gender approaches to population and development. In the "Key Actions" document, there are important recommendations relating to improvement of gender understandings for men:

> All leaders at all levels, as well as parents and educators, should promote positive male role models that facilitate boys to become gender-sensitive adults and enable men to support, promote and respect women's sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights, recognizing the inherent dignity of all human beings. Men should take responsibility for their own reproductive and sexual behaviour and health. Research should be undertaken on men's sexuality, their masculinity and their reproductive behaviour.[71]

In addition to these broad-based statements regarding developing more gender-sensitive, responsible men, the document also provides specific lists of "roles and responsibilities" to be emphasized:

> Promote men's understanding of their roles and responsibilities with regard to respecting the human rights of women; protecting women's health, including supporting their partners' access to sexual and reproductive health services; preventing unwanted pregnancy; reducing maternal mortality and morbidity; reducing transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS; sharing household and child-rearing responsibilities; and promoting the elimination of harmful practices, such as female genital mutilation, and sexual

[71] "Key Actions," Para 50.

and other gender-based violence, ensuring that girls and women are free from coercion and violence.[72]

While not new to this round of documents, it nevertheless remains an important marker showing the awareness of the multi-faceted nature of efforts to combat gender equity and equality.

4.6.3 Reflexivity and Self-Risk

To borrow an analogy from theater, when somebody decides to In updating a classic play, a playwright might choose to follow the original very closely, keeping it mostly the same, making only casting and, potentially, updates to reflect the current time and place. Alternately, she/he can modify some important element of the play that substantially or perhaps even fundamentally changes the play's meaning in its new form. Arguably, both Mexico City and Cairo chose the latter. Based on the analysis provided above, however, ICPD+5 and ICPD+10 chose the former, providing only cosmetic updates and alterations to the text.[73] Apart from the changed international context of the Millennium Summit and Millennium Development Goals, there is very little that has fundamentally changed from the 1994 Programme of Action to the 2004 ICPD+10 efforts. In the absence of major changes, my synthetic read of these two moments

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[72] "Key Actions," Para 52, Subsection G. “Promote,” while not perfect, at least stands apart from “information” and “education” in its implicit suggestion that these things must be “promoted” up against less desirable worldviews. However, awareness and understanding quickly return, for instance, in 62c: "Support public health education to create awareness of the risks of pregnancy, labour and delivery and to increase the understanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of family members, including men, as well as of civil society and Governments, in promoting and protecting maternal health."

[73] Another useful analogy, closer to the realm of communication studies, comes from debate practice. In debate, if a policy problem can be fixed without major action, the negative could, at least in the past, offer an argument of "minor repair." As Vance Trefethen explains: "A 'minor repair' is a Negative strategy that is simpler than offering a counterplan. It consists of a simple suggestion of a minor, insignificant improvement that could be made in the status quo, without adopting the proposition, that would solve the Affirmative harms." *Strategic Debate: Reason, Argumentation, and Strategy for Winning Scholastic Debates* (Monument, CO: Trading Minds Ministry Publications, 2004), 97.

in tandem generates two important discussions: the reflexivity (or lack thereof) of these documents in relation to the Programme of Action, and the continuing viability (or lack thereof) of "sustainable development" as a guiding marker in the follow-ups to Cairo. The following analysis considers how these topics frame understanding of popular discourse.

First, as indicated above, the 1999 and 2004 texts are reflexive in terms of their connections with the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development. In fact, both of them exist expressly as follow-ups to the Cairo conference. The language of support, reaffirmation, and recommitment to the Programme of Action fills these two texts (much as Mexico City supported Bucharest and Cairo affirmed Bucharest and Mexico City). In one sense, then, these documents might appropriately be labeled "reflexive." In this reflexiveness, each document sensitively negotiates the rhetorical dilemmas incurred by assessing the progress toward the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action. As with the Cairo Programme of Action, the 1999 "Key Actions" document has to walk a fine line between overselling and underselling progress, so that it can acknowledge progress, shortcomings, and provide both hope and caution moving ahead. Therefore, in the preamble, the document sets out both a set of accomplishments and a set of setbacks/challenges to the implementation:

> The five-year review of progress shows that the implementation of the recommendations of the Programme of Action has shown positive results. Many countries have taken steps to integrate population concerns into their development strategies. . . The Conference’s broad-based definition of reproductive health is being accepted by an increasing number of countries. . . there is greater accessibility to family planning and that more and more couples and individuals are able to choose the number and spacing of their children. . . However, for some

> countries and regions, progress has been limited, and in some cases setbacks have occurred. Women and the girl child continue to face discrimination. The human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) pandemic has led to rises in mortality in many countries. . . Adolescents remain particularly vulnerable to reproductive and sexual risks. Millions of couples and individuals still lack access to reproductive health information and services. . . The impact of the financial crises in countries of Asia and elsewhere . . . is affecting the health and well-being of individuals and limiting progress in implementing the Programme of Action.[74]

The ICPD+10 efforts also must negotiate a difficult rhetorical task of promoting progress and urgency with regard to efforts remaining. Fréchette attempts to walk this fine line in a statement to the General Assembly on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Cairo conference:

> Today, countries throughout the world continue to use the ICPD Programme in forging the strategies and policies with which they hope to address population issues and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. And they are making substantial progress, building on the achievements of earlier decades. The world is beginning to see the end of rapid population growth . . . These and other gains are profound and far-reaching, as they involve some of the most basic and intimate human experiences . . . Yet any satisfaction we may feel at the expansion of rights and freedoms involving population issues must be tempered by an acute awareness of the unfinished agenda, the fact that parts of the world are not sharing

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[74] "Key Actions," Paras 9-10.

> in this progress, and the daunting challenges that have emerged in the meantime.. . . And we have yet to achieve universal access to vitally needed reproductive health services and family planning . . . Instead, too many women and girls go without, leading to unplanned or mistimed births . . . It is only a little more than a generation since the international community collectively started addressing population and development issues. While much has been achieved and much has been learned, there have also been shortfalls and gaps. In the coming years and decades we can and must go much further.[75]

By emphasizing tangible, specific points of progress and areas where progress has not been achieved, and by contextualizing the efforts in context—"it is only a little more than a generation since the international community collectively started addressing population and development issue" (another way of framing time and history)—the document is able to suggest both reasons for hope and reasons for urgency addressing "the unfinished agenda." Throughout the document, the most common language used to address this dilemma is to talk about "accelerating" or "intensifying" the implementation of the Programme of Action.

While these efforts at unpacking time within the course of a text, as Michael Leff has suggested, is of great importance, a more fundamental question remains: to what degree does this reflexiveness entail a more basic element of “self-risking,” (in the sense that Brockriede uses it, in Chapter 2) that there could be significant, or even fundamental, errors in the approach of the ICPD process? There are no major admissions of error, shortsightedness, or any other indicators that would admit of any real error on the part of the 1994 Programme of Action. Even the creative and subtle language of Mexico City and Cairo, in trying to make some significant

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[75] *ICPD at Ten*, VIII-X.

modifications by noting how things have changed and time has passed do not really even appear. At most, the enhanced importance and priority accorded to HIV/AIDS is the closest thing to a significant shift in the documents. While some other issues are given relatively more or less priority and frequency than they possessed in the 1994 text, it would be hard to point to major points at which these 2 texts changed course in meaningful ways. In one sense, that would be unfair and unlikely, as both are expressly follow-up documents. On the other hand, Mexico City was seen as a follow-up to Bucharest yet still helped to change the emphasis in important ways that would eventually enable shifts at Cairo, and Cairo, as a follow-up to both Mexico City and Bucharest (despite its claim to having a "broader mandate") still made important adjustments and course corrections.

4.6.4 Sustainability, Demography, and Apocalypticism

While explicit shifts from Cairo to +5 to+10 are minimal, some foregrounding and background is critically significant. In particular, I trace three such changes: the receding of “sustainable development” as an ecologically-packed concept, the subtle reintroduction of logics of demography, and small but significant traces of apocalypticism in the texts (in particular, in the +10 text).

It is pertinent to question the ongoing relevance, or lack thereof, of the phrase "sustainable development" in these follow-up efforts. In the 1994 Programme of Action, it was not unexpected or coincidental that the language of "sustainable development" was pervasive, given that the 1992 Rio conference, widely credited with popularizing the term, had occurred just two year earlier. However, with the passing of time, it remained an open question how vital the language of "sustainable development" would remain. In the ICPD+5 "Key Actions" document,

there are only 6 references to "sustainable development." In the ICPD+10 document, there are 13 references, but two of those are proper nouns referring to a 1992 declaration. In the 2004 document in particular, one sees some variance in the language of sustainability, one that is increasingly divorced from environmental concerns. For instance, references to variants such as "sustainable and equitable development," "sustainable growth and development, within the context of the Millennium Development Goals," "sustained economic growth and sustainable human development," and "sustained economic growth and social development."[76] As a point of reference, the Cairo Programme of Action contained 80 references to "sustainable development" (of which 3 were proper nouns). Despite Peterson's claim about the potential offered by the inexact meanings of "sustainable development," the term's reference value appears to have waned, either because it has become readily accepted (or maybe readily rejected) or because alternatives have been sought and/or pursued.[77] If it has receded, this seems to be yet another frame shift, following Greene, in which the question of population becomes detached from the question of the environment.

Though relatively subtle, these texts also accelerate a set of logics of demography (though, as suggested in Chapter 2, the demographic logics have actually increased in presence from Bucharest to Mexico City to Cairo, rather than, as almost all of the political and scholarly "pundits" argue, falling away). The 1999 text shares important similarities with the Programme of Action in terms of its discussion of demographic projections and possibilities. It again discourages quotas to achieve demographic goals. It again suggests that "stabilization" of world population can assist in attaining the other goals of the Programme of Action. However, perhaps

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[76] *ICPD at Ten*, 17; 17; 31; 46.

[77] Tarla Rai Peterson, *Sharing the Earth: The Rhetoric of Sustainable Development* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1997).

to a better degree than the previous documents, it notes the widely divergent demographic situations, not across time, but in space: "The majority of the world's countries are converging in a pattern of low birth and death rates, but since these countries are proceeding at different speeds, the emerging picture is that of a world facing increasingly diverse demographic situations."[78] This geopolitical awareness reflects the situation described in Chapter 1, in which public argument about population seems so disjointed because of the conflicting rhetoric of "dangerously low fertility rates" (in developed countries such as France), and "ever-rising global population" (not so much in terms of rates but in terms of absolute volume).

Finally, these documents, and in particular, the +10 text, in a very subtle way, appear to reintroduce some of the apocalyptic envisioning present in earlier instantiations of population argument, though with a different focus. In the appendix, with its focus on the Millennium Development Goals, the very last appendix item reads as follows:

> Between 2000 and 2015 nearly 1.5 billion young men and women will join the 20-24 age group. They, and hundreds of millions of teenagers, will be looking for work. If they have jobs they will drive economic growth; if not they will fuel political instability.[79]

In some ways, this line of reasoning is substantially similar to the famous policy debate “card” by Walter Russell Mead, in 1992, that warns:

> But what if it can't? What if the global economy stagnates -- or even shrinks? In that case, we will face a new period of international conflict: South against North, rich against poor. Russia, China, India -- these countries with their billions of

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[78] "Key Actions," Para 8.

[79] *ICPD at Ten*, 110. In some ways, this prediction may be playing out in terms of movements like the Arab Spring.

> people and their nuclear weapons will pose a much greater danger to the world than Germany and Japan did in the 30's.[80]

Though seemingly innocent enough, the threat is clear: either economic growth or international instability, especially in the global South. While not as strong or as eloquent as Ehrlich's Chicken Little claims (or this classic "Mead in '92" passage), it does seem to reignite a certain strain of doomsaying in order to attempt to encourage progress on the ICPD.

Having now considered these two texts in tandem, I finish by concluding this chapter and previewing chapter 5.

4.7 CONCLUSION

Like Tabbarah, Louise Fréchette, then Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, explained in a speech to the General Assembly on October 14, 2004 (included as the introduction to *ICPD at Ten: The World Reaffirms Cairo*) that ICPD+10's genealogy reaches back before Cairo to Mexico City and even Bucharest:

> Three decades ago in Bucharest, the World Population Conference overcame political differences to adopt a ground-breaking, comprehensive plan of action. That plan gave the world its first template for integrating population concerns into economic and social development, and established the basic principles guiding population programmes today. Ten years later in Mexico City, despite serious disagreements on some questions, the International Conference on Population

[80] Walter Russell Mead, *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Summer 1992.

> adopted additional recommendations that recognized the need for wider access to family planning, and underscored the importance of issues such as the needs of adolescents and the role of men. And then, of course, ten years ago, the world's efforts to address the intertwined challenges of population and development took another major step forward.[81]

Therefore, in order to understand and chart the continuities and transformations of public argument regarding population, we must understand conferences both from a "snapshot" perspective that captures each document in its own right, as well as from a diachronic, longitudinal perspective that spans across history and across multiple snapshots (or, to follow the metaphor, perhaps more of a video reel) to give a richer perspective on rhetoric and public argument. It is in this spirit that I have examined ICPD+5 and ICPD+10 in this chapter, both as significant declarations of international agreement and commitment on their own, and as additional train stations in the long journey of international argument on population matters. While each document possesses important textual attributes, my primary claim is that, viewed in context, these documents end up largely reproducing the agreements of Cairo rather than charting significant new territory or changing course. Perhaps from this vertical, across time perspective, the most noteworthy moment surrounding these two conferences is actually an event external to both: the Millennium Summit, and its resulting Millennium Development Goals, which in their substantial overlap with the goals and objectives of the Programme of Action, required an argument for the ongoing relevance of the stream of public argument from Bucharest onward.

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[81] *ICPD at Ten*, VIII. Again, following my discussion of "sanitizing controversy" in Chapter 2, this passage indicates that Bucharest participants "overcame political differences," and that Mexico City participants acted "despite serious disagreements on some questions." These statements reflect the dissonance between an apparently uncontroversial argument as product and the clearly controversial argument as procedure and argument as process.

Having now examined the five UN population texts spanning this thirty year period (1974-2004) I turn in Chapter 5 to a brief postscript and prediction of where international argument relating to population issues may be heading, then consider some of the theoretical issues, both those opened in Chapter 1 and those raised by the textual analysis in Chapters 2-4.

5.0 POPULATION, RHETORIC, AND PUBLIC ARGUMENT: LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD

In this chapter, I reflect on the findings of this project, especially with relation to the case studies examined in chapters 2-4. I am now in a position to trace the broad arc of UN population efforts across time, so I examine findings both diachronically from across the 30-year period, as well as synchronically in relation to each conference. After summarizing the key findings, I turn next to a postscript relating to the ICPD process and the future of "population" policy, rhetoric, and public argument. I ask what might be next for UN population efforts, for population advocacy more generally. In addition, I discuss some vectors for future research that can help to round out and provide additional breadth and depth to the current analysis. Finally, I speculate on some important theoretical reflections and insights generated by this study. Such reflections spread across methodological, topical, and critical terrains. I begin by summarizing the efforts of chapters 2-4.

5.1 THREE DECADES OF UN POPULATION EFFORTS

In chapter 2, I considered the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo. After charting out the basic argument of the text, that if given the opportunity and provided the appropriate resources, people throughout the world will make the right choices that

will provide for a better population future, I turned to rhetorical analysis of the text. I examined the ways in which the Programme of Action manages dialectics such as development-demographics and universal-particular. I traced the ways in which particular framings of communication activities under-theorized the types of roles for communication that would be able to meet the stated goals of the document. I looked at the rhetorical quandary faced by participants, as they simultaneously attempted to present stable findings while also encouraging audiences to participate in social knowledge production and formulation of optimal policy choices. I also considered the tension between articulating the full complexity of the population problem, on one hand, and on the other, providing a clear "residual message" which would be capable of producing the change in the world that would meet the conference's objectives.

In chapter 3, I examined the World Population Conference (Bucharest, 1974), and the International Conference on Population (Mexico City, 1984). The Bucharest Conference was notable in that it reversed the common sense of population discourse insofar as it suggested that development, not demographics, must be addressed first in order to achieve both. In a related move, the text was able to shift blame for the population problem from developing countries to developed countries, for instance, because of their control of the international economic order and because of colonialism. Rather paradoxically, the 1974 international document ultimately acted to restrain international action, and instead, to secure the space for sovereignty and for states to be the center of population policy activity. Following on the analysis from chapter 2, I analyzed how particular communication frames both enabled and constrained action toward achieving the conference's goals. The Mexico City conference, despite its frequent reduction to the grandstanding of Ronald Reagan's US presidential administration, both supported the Bucharest vision while adding significantly to it. The Mexico City text softened the

development-demographics divide by suggesting that both needed to be addressed simultaneously and in coordination, and also did more to balance the opportunities for national and international action. The 1984 conference also expanded the role for a wide range of actors, such as NGOs, while expanding the issues typically associated with "population" to include themes such as health and the environment. In many ways, this expansion of factors significantly previewed the complexity enshrined in the Cairo text. As before, I also looked toward the ways in which communication and deliberation were both supported and limited.

In chapter 4, I examined two follow-up efforts to the Cairo conference: ICPD+5 (1999) and ICPD+10 (2004). The 1999 document relied significantly on the strategic use of precedents to constitute its authority, and also actively memorialized the efforts of the Cairo conference. Potentially because of the limited success at achieving financial goals, ICPD+5 envisioned a bigger role for private, as opposed to public, institutions. While the focus on communication and participation retained some similarities with its predecessors, the 1999 text also added in new terms, advocacy and civil society, to continue to hone its approach for achieving the vision of the document. ICPD+10, as a decentralized set of findings from separate regional meetings, was able to coordinate message control well, unifying and expressing a continued rationale for the process initiated at Cairo (even in light of the newly created MDGs). Building on the tendency toward privatization suggested by the 1999 text, ICPD+10 created a vision that could be described as neoliberal in nature. Also, in contrast to the typically negative connotations of "strategy" (for instance, in argumentation theory), the 2004 text uses strategy to articulate an understanding of communication that resonates with some aspects of a rhetorical approach to communication. Both the 1999 and 2004 texts largely just reaffirmed the message of Cairo. Instead of breaking new ground, they focused on data collection and implementation, representing what Goodnight

has termed the technical sphere. As with terms used to indicate communication, the vision of sex and gender in these two texts both provided more sophistication than their predecessors while still suffering from important shortcomings. In agreeing with the Cairo vision, these texts made much less of a change than Mexico City did after Bucharest or Cairo did after Mexico City. Finally, I looked at the changing role of sustainability in these texts, the upswing of demographic rhetoric, following Cairo, in ICPD+5 and ICPD+10, and the subtle return of apocalyptic rhetoric in these texts.

Having now provided a brief summary of the major findings in chapters 2-4, I turn next a short postscript relating to the future of the ICPD and international public argument over population, along with suggestions for future research, then turn to some preliminary theoretical findings from this project.

5.2 POSTSCRIPT AND POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As established in the Cairo Programme of Action and emphasized in ICPD+5 and ICPD+10, the Programme of Action was designed to cover a 20 year period, from 1994 to 2014. Thus, in the summer of 2009, there was another review of the progress and implementation, known as "ICPD+15: Accelerating Implementation of the Cairo Consensus."[1] Like its predecessors, this conference occured at a moment in history with several other significant events running parallel, including one of the worst economic crises in recent history, as well as several other important political issues. All of these events both strained and provided opportunities for revisiting the

[1] United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), http://www.unfpa.org/icpd/15/index.cfm (Accessed June 8, 2009).

agenda set at Cairo, as well as for examining the rhetorical strategies of international efforts, and especially those of the United Nations. Though it is beyond the scope of this current project, examining the ongoing continuities and transformations in rhetoric and public argument, as manifested in the ICPD+15 process, constitutes a valuable vector for additional research.

Beyond the 2009 efforts to examine the progress and implementation of the ICPD, it remains an open question what will happen in 2014 when the 20-year window closes. Similarly, the Millennium Development Goals have a target date of 2015 for achievement. Another critical trajectory for research will be to watch how rhetorical strategies and public arguments are negotiated in the lead up to and in the 2014-2015 period. Barring some significant global economic turnaround with a companion major investment in the ICPD and MDG efforts, the goals of Cairo and the Millennium Summit are unlikely to be met, even if progress has been made. Moreover, as Thoraya Ahmed Obaid, Executive Director of the United Nations Population Fund, notes, the current economic climate provides severe risks of backsliding in commitments and progress toward these goals, potentially wiping out the gains that have been made since 1994 and 2000, respectively.[2] Moreover, as Jyoti Shankar Singh notes, another global population conference is unlikely, especially in the current international economic climate.[3] Even with the possibility of another conference being unclear, and probably unlikely, Singh expresses the urgency of continuing the focus on the work at hand:

> I believe that while we must push towards accomplishing as much of the ICPD and MDG agenda as we can by 2015, we should already begin to work at

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[2] Thoraya Ahmed Obaid, March 30, 2009, http://www.unfpa.org/public/News/pid/2371 (Accessed July 1, 2009).

[3] Singh, *Creating a New Consensus*, 2009, 217.

> international, regional and national levels on renewing and strengthening the international consensus on population beyond 2015.[4]

Apart from the very specific efforts at the United Nations to address these issues, what does the future hold for "population" as a vector of public argument? Even tentative answers to this question are integrally connected to the definition one provides for what "population" means as public argument. There will always be Malthusians and Hardins and Ehrlichs, who continue to see (over)population in terms of quantitative, demographic topoi. However, because of the many troublesome historic connections that such rhetoric opens, it is unlikely to attain great prominence, especially with an international audience. Nevertheless, apart from the Garrett Hardins of the world, there are likely to continue to be overtures about global population numbers. In fact, this link is now featured most prominently in the intersection of population and global warming. There is, as of now, a groundswell of popular press-oriented books which frame overpopulation in quantitative, crisis terms. For instance, Thomas Friedman, in a recent popular press book, *Hot, Flat, and Crowded*, suggests that the combination of high population numbers, high consumption, and finite resources necessitates significant action. Similarly, Jeffrey Sachs, in another recent popular press book, *Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet*, revitalizes the topos of "crowded" that shares ties with the neo-Malthusianism of Ehrlich's *Population Bomb*.

Apart from this narrow view of population, the future of population conceived somewhat more broadly is virtually guaranteed. The need for family planning, sexual and reproductive health, more respect for and investment in girls and women is unlikely to fade, despite each

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[4] Jyoti Shankar Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population: The Politics of Reproductive Health, Reproductive Rights and Women's Empowerment*, Revised 2nd Ed. (London: Earthscan, 2009), 217-218.

being charged with a significant degree of controversy. The degree to which these essential activities need to be framed under the category "population" as an umbrella term is much less clear. It seems that, now that we have so many sectors and vectors associated with population, that it might be completely possible to act in those areas (with, for instance, the goals laid out by the MDGs), without any reference to "population" as such whatsoever. Thus the question as to whether we are *over* population, in the sense of being finished with that framing as a useful way of addressing the most pressing concerns for the global community is an open one.

In terms of future research trajectories, in addition to tracing the continuing unfolding of the ICPD process and the MDGs, and following the popular resurgence of population rhetoric (by authors such as Friedman and Sachs), another valuable area for research would be to go back and evaluate these 5 historical moments with an eye toward more external, rather than internal, concerns. Though it was beyond the scope of the current project, future research could explore the reception of these conferences and their documents, in the media and elsewhere. Combining the present "close reading," internalist account with a more externalist account would help to round out conclusions about the rhetoric and public argument surrounding population. Just as Burke provided both a grammar of motives and a rhetoric of motives, in which the former was primarily internal and textually-driven, and the latter was more externally conscious, so too would the next stage of this process be to add depth to these readings by, at a minimum, enriching the historical-contextual framing of each case study.

In the next section, I provide a set of theoretical reflections and insights provided by this project.

5.3 THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS AND INSIGHTS

In the sections that follow, I provide a series of reflections, including about the way in which I engaged this project, as well as what might study can tell us about population rhetoric and the practice of rhetorical criticism. First, I reflect on the artifacts I studied and on the modes of investigation that I utilized. Second, I suggest the implications of the current study for international relations theory and practice. Third, I provide a critical judgment and evaluation of the texts that collectively represent 30 years of UN population rhetoric. Fourth, I draw on Burke to consider the ambiguity of incipience and the role of UN conference documents. Fifth, I provide a rebuttal to Gaonkar, and argue for the importance of rhetoric *gone global*. Sixth, I consider the notion of biomimicry, and how some environmental texts can assume/perform the form that mirrors the content of their arguments, while in other cases, an attempt at biomimicry is likely to fail. Seventh, I evaluate the claims that memorialize Cairo as a paradigm changer. Eighth, I suggest the need for a greater amount of "close reading" in order to challenge the prevalence, in population literature as well as more broadly, of unwarranted foils and problematic fallacies. Finally, I make an appeal, both to those engaged in population rhetoric and policy, as well as to rhetoricians, to shift and re-think our critical perspective so that our insights and praxis can extend beyond demonization and debunking.

5.3.1 Reflections on Artifacts and Modes of Investigation

First, especially in the scholarly communities dedicated to rhetoric, public address, and public argument, texts from the United Nations (as well as other international diplomatic artifacts) remain drastically understudied. Apart from the Security Council and human rights

disputes, the only two areas covered with any frequency in these literature bases, there is hardly any discussion of this vital area. Especially in this highly globalized and interconnected world, we need to expand our repertoire of texts beyond those that are uttered by high-profile United States citizens and/or in the United States.[5] Perhaps to a greater degree than other areas of study, rhetoricians have, on the whole, been slower to expand their scholarly attention beyond the U.S. borders.

Second, after utilizing Burke's cluster-agon analysis as a primary reading strategy in this project, I believe that, in reflection, there are both benefits and drawbacks for this approach for rhetorical critics. In particular, I see two major benefits. First, cluster-agon's similarities with some versions of content analysis are significant in that they help to collapse largely artificial distinctions between quantitative and interpretive analysis/scholarship. While these two strands are clearly modes of investigation whose tendency leans in different directions, they can also be mutually reinforcing. In this project, I was able to both investigate and dissect each text with an anchor in the quantitative data underlying each text, and then combine such data with a qualitative and interpretive approach in order to fortify conclusions when the two pointed in the same direction and round out my analysis when they differed. A second major benefit of cluster-agon as a strategy of approaching rhetorical criticism is that it helps to break apart and understand large documents in a way that a more open-ended reading may not. Though Burke's own use of cluster-agon was largely limited to short poems and stories, and while most of those who have used the approach have similarly focused on relatively short documents, the promise of cluster-agon suggests its utility for large documents, from scientific and governmental reports

[5] One excellent resource that rhetoricians have is www.americanrhetoric.com. However, we lack an appropriate global counterpart, thereby further encouraging the trend to focus our efforts on studying great US speakers, past and present.

to conference texts to books. While open-ended reading approaches can be excellent for 3-4 page speeches, 70-100 page documents require a more structured approach. Especially in an age where information accessibility is leading to enormous quantities of textual material, rhetorical critics should seek whatever tools help to provide initial signs and clues that can then be investigated without strict recourse to any particular method.

While there are important benefits to this approach, my experience in this project also leads me to point out at least two important drawbacks. First, counting and charting words, frequencies, their clusters, and related critical tasks can quickly overshadow interpretive analysis. At some points, my more quantitatively-driven assessment of some aspects of these texts made me feel like I was counting my way through, rather than bringing the true interpretive tools of humanistic inquiry to bear upon, the texts. In some ways, this is just an issue for which additional practice and honing of critical approach can shore up, but it is a constant temptation when straddling quantitative and interpretive frameworks as a critic. The second major drawback of cluster-agon may be aptly captured by the commonplace "appearances may be deceiving." Just because a term occurs with great frequency in a text does not mean that it is the most telling "key" to unlocking the text's rhetorical magic, and vice versa, a term or phrase may appear only once but be the turning point that best reveals the rhetorical savvy of the text. Again, both practice in the use of this method, and more importantly, combining it with other lines of analysis helps to serve as a corrective against such a risk.

Third, while my uses of stasis theory ultimately ended up being rather limited, I have some reflections on its use in rhetorical criticism. Originally, I had intended to utilize stasis theory as the centerpiece of my analysis of these texts. However, as I continued to consider each text, I noticed that the fundamental similarities, in terms of the points of stasis, made this tool

much less decisive. For instance, as conference texts, the documents all suggest that there is a problem, immediately making the “is it?” line of stasis reasoning moot. The decision to ultimately move stasis theory to the background is very much in the spirit of the close reading school of rhetorical criticism, where a central tenet is that theory and approach should be found that fits and helps us to understand the text, rather than imposed uncritically on any range of texts. Despite its limited utility for my project, I have three initial insights about its role and utility. First, scholars who study rhetoric and public argument need to continue the project of recovery and expansion for the utility of stasis theory. On the whole, stasis theory has been too tied, and in many ways reduced, to the arena of forensic rhetoric. While it has generated important insights for forensic rhetoric, the utility of stasis theory for deliberative rhetoric is also exciting and understudied. Second, we need to continue to work to develop a more robust vocabulary for discussing points of stasis. As Robert Newman points out in his critique of "stock issues" as a synonym for stasis points, he suggests that it is so straightforward that it does not really tell us anything new.[6] While Lawrence Prelli's charting of every possible permutation of stasis may be going overboard by overly schematizing the issue, most of the language we currently have for describing stasis is relatively thin. [7] In this project, I attempted to begin this process by proposing a division between procedural and substantive points of stasis, but much more work remains to be done in this area. Third, stasis theory should be more readily accepted as a valuable heuristic, especially in IR, for both scholars and practitioners. Finding such "stock issues" can help to break controversies into their component parts in order to allow scholars to

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[6] Robert P. Newman, "Analysis and Issues—a Study of Doctrine," in *Readings in Argumentation*, edited by Jerry M. Anderson and Paul J. Dovre (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1968), 166-181.

[7] Lawrence Prelli, "Stasis and the Problem of Incommensurate Communication: The Case of Spousal Violence Research," in *Rhetoric and Incommensurability*, edited by Randy Allen Harris (West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press, 2005).

develop better understanding and, possibly, also open the doors of rhetorical invention for parties actively engaged in these controversies. Such argumentative labor holds the potential to intervene against claims that major international disputes are intractable, or, more broadly, incommensurable. Finally, stasis theory provides the most "value added" in situations in which the procedural and substantive points of stasis are shifting, rather than relatively continuous (or even static). One of the main reasons why the stasis analysis was not more prominent in each chapter was that, consistent with the "memorializing" argument I make throughout this document, the substantive shifts were quite minimal, and the procedural shifts were nearly non-existent. For this genre of rhetoric, then, stasis may not be the optimal entry point for analysis, though in my own case, it helped to serve as a precursor for the analysis that I would later formalize, much as cluster-agon analysis did as well. Neither held the central roles as reading strategies that I had originally foreseen and intended, but both served as prerequisites for successful rhetorical criticism.

5.3.2 Re-Considering International Relations Theory and Practice

In recent years (intensifying, in particular, in the 1990s), international relations (IR) theory has been increasingly challenged by postmodern and poststructural critiques. Instead of challenging from that angle, this project provides a number of challenges, both for IR scholars, as well as practitioners of IR, borne out of classical considerations, stretching back to the Sophists, for such fundamental notions as rhetoric.

In particular, I suggest at least four preliminary lessons for IR scholarship. First, IR literature would be strengthened by putting an end to the artificial and limiting distinction between argument and rhetoric. Though many IR scholars have been quick to appreciate the

essentially argument-driven and deliberative nature of international politics, their residual distrust for the realms of rhetoric ends up limiting the insights that they can provide. Second, this project carries important insights, positive and negative, for efforts to import gender analysis and feminist analysis into IR. On the positive end, one sees in these conference texts an ever-greater awareness and sense of responsibility for integrating concerns relating to gender issues, as well as providing special attention to particular issues facing women and girls. In fact, in the most recent texts, one sees them even drawing on IR scholarly terms such as "gender mainstreaming" and "gender perspective" as significant parts of their reviews and calls for implementation. This suggests that, even in a topic arena that had formerly been, at least arguably, hostile to women's interests and gender analysis, there are possibilities for change. On the negative end, despite the calls for attention to gender and sex in these documents, there are repeated, elementary confusions and conflations between sex and gender. Given that the efforts to resist such conflation have been ongoing for many years now, this suggests that more attention and advocacy must be made to differentiate the two. Third, unlike Security Council actions or human rights case studies, documents like those examined in the current study may be the best venue for rethinking the relationship between lack of sovereign authority and rhetorical force. Beyond very limited situations, no international organization, and especially the United Nations, has the ability to take action in a way that interferes with or impedes state sovereignty. Therefore, to the extent that any action is taken based on UN recommendations or calls, it is due to the rhetorical effectiveness of their calls to action and the marshalling of the better argument in favor of their position. Again, such reflection also draws attention back to the importance of the value of such documents for analysis by rhetoricians and public argument scholars. Fourth, for all of the many criticisms of the United Nations, and in particular its charged ineffectiveness, the current project

helps to suggest an important, if underappreciated, benefit that it provides. Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss suggest that the United Nations may in fact have an important role in policy that usually goes unacknowledged:

> [T]he universal UN system has made solid use of its unique legitimacy and helped initiate steps toward the formulation of coherent global policies. While the policy glass is more than half full, when key member states turn recalcitrant, clearly the implementation one is close to empty. That remains the fundamental reality of global governance in a statecentric world.[8]

This statement by Thakur and Weiss is supported by the current project, and helps to provide a more proportional evaluation of the importance of the United Nations. While they do not naively or idealistically place the importance of the UN on a pedestal, they also avoid the realist trap of assigning minimal value to all international actors outside of states. Especially in the context of the ICPD process, it would be hard to miss out on the importance of NGOs in helping to set the global agenda.[9] While Thankur and Weiss are clear that states have the ability to undermine important aspects of UN governance, they also demonstrate an appreciate for the important roles that the United Nations can play in shifting global opinion and supporting particular sets of policies.

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[8] Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss, "United Nations 'Policy': An Argument with Three Illustrations," *International Studies Perspectives* (2009), 33.

[9] With regard to the NGO role in terms of ICPD specifically, see Jutta M. Joachim, *Agenda Setting, the UN, and NGOs: Gender Violence and Reproductive Rights* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007).

5.3.3 Judging 30 Years of UN Population Rhetoric

Rhetoricians typically are engaged in at least one of two tasks: attempting to interpret a text better, to understand how it works and share that knowledge, as well as providing a judgment about the quality of the rhetoric. As noted in Chapter 1, in the passage by Zarefsky, this does not require amassing polling data from after a speech occurs. However, as Edwin Black notes, in *Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method*, the act of judgment is critical to the performance of an act of rhetorical criticism. Thus, while I have largely attempted to describe, interpret, and unpack these documents, to understand their key rhetorical features as public argument, in this section I more aggressively put forth a judgment on the rhetorical savvy, or lack thereof, of these texts. Notably, any judgment, like all rhetoric, must be situational and contextual. Therefore, I approach this judgment with the understanding, as described in chapter 3, that these texts constitute a different genre, and thus it would be unreasonable to apply the standards to these texts that one might apply, for instance, to Abraham Lincoln or John F. Kennedy.

5.3.3.1 The Ambiguity of Incipience

As Kenneth Burke explained in both *A Grammar of Motives* and *A Rhetoric of Motives*, "the notion of an attitude or incipient act is ambiguous; an attitude of sympathy, for instance, may either lead into an overt act of kindness, or it may serve 'liberally' as the *substitute* for an act of kindness."[10] Without wishing to reproduce the millenia-old rhetoric-action dichotomy, this essential ambiguity of attitudes as incipient action bears importance on the importance of international conference documents considered as rhetorical artifacts. One may very well argue,

[10] Kenneth Burke, *A Rhetoric of Motives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969), 90.

following Schechter's claim about the ability for UN conferences to carry an agenda-setting, issue-definition-type "soft" function, that these conference texts are incipient actions insofar as they raise awareness and consciousness about these issues and open the opportunity for meaningful action to be taken to address the issues.[11] However, Burke's passage also raises the alternate possibility. It may be the case that these conferences, and their resulting documents, represent the substitute for action, particularly when those with the most resources to devote to these issues (including developed countries and donor organizations) can feel that they have accomplished something simply by making a verbal commitment and scoring a high-reward, low-risk public relations victory in the process. In some ways, this is a question that will best be born out in the unfolding of history, as action on behalf of these goals, whether material, rhetorical, or some combination, may help to judge the quality of "incipience" in this instance. However, as noted above, providing awareness and consciousness and the right arguments in favor of a position is no guarantee of success, especially given the extremely complicated intersection of events that constitute international relations as well as domestic activities.

5.3.3.2 Hopeful Possibilities for Rhetoric, IR, and Global Governance

In his now (in)famous piece challenging the rhetoric of science, “The Idea of Rhetoric in the Rhetoric of Science,” Dilip Gaonkar posed a series of vexing questions for rhetoricians generally, and rhetoricians of science in particular. Amongst other challenges, Gaonkar questioned whether there was any “value added” in acts of criticism that were apparently from a “rhetorical” perspective, or if the ‘R’ word, and its related vocabulary, could be omitted entirely without any value lost. While many challenges and refutations were offered, rhetoricians often

[11] Michael G. Schechter, *United Nations Global Conferences* (London: Routledge, 2005).

seem on the defensive when attempting to interpret artifacts that are outside the traditional domains of oratory and public address instead of embracing the opportunity. The current project enables criticism that provides benefits for both those inside and outside the academic realm of rhetoric. For rhetoricians, the study of UN conference texts provides a new body of texts to study, with new genre considerations to formalize. For IR theorists and practitioners, the value added of a rhetorical approach to these texts generates new depth to terms like "communication" and illuminates tensions and quandaries that provide both challenges and opportunities for the construction of future conference texts and, more generally, international diplomatic texts. Gaonkar's insights seem to suggest that we are going where we are not wanted, and thus ignoring "No Trespassing" signs. However, the work of scholars such as Risse, and of IR practitioners such as Singh, suggests that the doors are open and a diverse range of voices are welcome and encouraged. As long as we avoid merely reducing their study and practice to a projection of our own disciplinary concerns, we can produce insights that contain value beyond the walls of our discipline. Rather than lamenting the dangers caused by globalizing rhetoric, I argue that it is more productive to consider the possibilities and opportunities of cross-pollinating scholarship whose value goes in both directions, helping IR, global governance, as rhetorical theory and criticism.

5.3.3.3 Biomimicry and Rhetorical Form

In some situations, successful pro-environmental rhetoric is simultaneously capable of mimicking the processes of nature (to perform its message) and be most instrumentally successful while doing it (as opposed merely to expressing oneself or constituting a community). For instance, Alison Aurelia Fisher argues persuasively that eco-comedy, and the use of the comic, rather than tragic or melodramatic frame (with its emphasis on guilt and sacrifice), is both

more sustainable, and better mirrors the process of nature itself.[12] In this situation, then, the rhetor who would adopt the form of nature as the form of their rhetoric would be simultaneously successful. In this case, the paths of the two forms are convergent. However, are there situations in which a rhetor (or, more generally, a piece of rhetoric) might mirror the form of nature (again, to perform the message), but as a result of that biomimicry, end up resulting in instrumental rhetorical failure?

In a column for the *New York Times* in August of 2009, Thomas L. Friedman argued, following the title of his piece, that we needed to start "Connecting Nature's Dots":

> We're trying to deal with a whole array of integrated problems—climate change, energy, biodiversity loss, poverty alleviation and the need to grow enough food to feed the planet—separately. The poverty fighters resent the climate-change folks; climate folks hold summits without reference to biodiversity; the food advocates resist the biodiversity protectors. They all need to go on safari together. . . . In short . . . we need to make sure that our policy solutions are as integrated as nature itself. Today, they are not.

Friedman's passage is fascinating, not only in the advice that it provides for environmentalists and policymakers, but also in the ways in which the form of argument is related to the substance being advanced by the argument. That is, our policy should mirror, or mimic, the ways of nature. Such an insight is reflected in the burgeoning literature on biomimicry, which suggests a broad range of human experience in which we as humans would be better served mirroring the processes of nature as opposed to being negligent of or resistant against them.

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[12]Alison Aurelia Fisher, "Roasting on Earth: A Rhetorical Analysis of Eco-Comedy" (PhD diss., Southern Illinois University Carbondale, 2009).

Beyond the insights offered by Fisher and Friedman, I wonder if there is another possible combination between substance and form, one that might combine to be rhetorically ineffective? For instance, in the five documents that I analyzed in this dissertation, the length varied from between 10,000 to 40,000 words. Of that text, most of it is dry, technical reporting (in the way in which a scientific report or government report might be). Furthermore, expressed especially well at Cairo, the "solution" to understanding "population" is to understand that it is linked with, well, everything. Integration, connection, and systems-level approaches guide this vision. Indeed, trying to suggest one master variable, or one major chain of causality, or anything that might otherwise allow the casual (or even committed) reader to hone in on the most important point, is, it seems, not possible, and even if it were, counter-productive to the message of complexity, or in the current technological parlance, "the cloud" of relevant factors. Clearly, nature itself (if it can even be spoken of singularly) resists and defies any easy explanations, and continues to prove more complex than we have previously calculated. Thus, the rhetorical message, that complexity demands complexity of response, mirrors nature well, where attempts to produce even "simple" changes both require and result in a complex network of factors, influences, and consequences.

Insofar as the form of these documents, then, represent bewildering complexity, and find their counterpart in the complexity of nature itself, does that necessarily suggest that they are likely to be rhetorically effective? Or does our embrace of "the cloud" come at too high a price, of making our vision and our advocacy cloudy? At a bare minimum, this project would suggest that there is no guarantee or sure bet that rhetorical biomimicry is likely to be successful. However, this dissertation's analysis suggests that the prospects for success may be even more dubious. My arguments about a lack of "residual message," or of a conflict with the "economics of attention," suggest that texts and arguments that are this complicated and nuanced are likely to

be ineffective, as most readers are unlikely to even try to read them, and if they do, there is no guarantee that the reader will take the toll of performing "close reads." Thus, it is hard to judge the rhetoric of these conference texts, even with a modified set of genre standards, as any kind of a success. However, in their performance of nature's interconnections, they are arguably very laudable. This suggests that, rather hoping that rhetorical biomimicry will be successful or unsuccessful across the board, we need to be sensitive to what particular aspects of nature are being mirrored, and in that analysis, will be better to judge the situation and context to determine the likely rhetorical effectiveness of the message.

5.3.4 Memorializing Cairo

Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the rhetoric surrounding these conferences, such as the passages from scholars, activists, and others from Chapter 1, is the way that Cairo in particular is memorialized. Most recollections of the value of the conference memorialize it for two major accomplishments: being a sharp break from previous arguments about population (ostensibly, this would include Bucharest and Mexico City), and being a sharp break from the quantitative/demographic logic that has largely guided analyses and arguments surrounding (over)population.[13] Without intending merely to "debunk" or "demystify" such accounts, they both deserve additional scrutiny, particularly in light of the observations afforded by this project. First, does the Cairo Programme of Action actually represent a sharp break from previous

[13] As John Muckelbauer explains (in trying to negotiate classical rhetorical concepts like invention in light of postmodern theory), such a frame of memorializing, in its representation of the "relationship between the twin concepts of tradition and innovation," offers a false dichotomy, either of which force an essentially "negative" move by the critic: "The two most prevalent models of this relation [between tradition and innovation] are 1) invention as an absolute break from the past and 2) invention as necessarily complicit with the past." John Muckelbauer, *The Future of Invention: Rhetoric, Postmodernism, and the Problem of Change* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008), xv.

population arguments? Especially insofar as the history of UN conferences on population in particular is concerned, this appears to be an unwarranted claim. While some of the themes are more heavily emphasized or framed in updated ways, the seeds of most all of the arguments in the Cairo Programme of Action can be located in the Bucharest and Mexico City documents.[14] Second, is the Cairo Programme of Action in fact a sharp break from quantitative/demographic logics of population? Again, to be a "break," the previous arguments would have had to have embraced such logics, and again, at least as far as UN conferences go, neither Bucharest and Mexico City did. Even more interestingly, in some ways the Programme of Action represents the most demographically-inclined of the three documents. The preamble opens by charting potential global "demographic futures," and notes throughout the additional problems and strains resulting from global population growth and overpopulation. At a minimum, this puts it in line with Bucharest and Mexico City, as both of them had some degree of these similar attributes, but they were also, on the whole, decidedly more suspicious of an agenda that placed population ahead of (or even on equal footing with) development and social concerns.

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[14] While I have concerns about the claimed "novelty" of Cairo, in support of the notion of *dissoi logoi*, I also want to sketch a brief possible response that would at least partially validate the claims to novelty. For more on the notion of *dissoi logoi*, see, for instance, Michael Billig, *Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). First, even if many of the themes were already substantially pre-figured, the people at the negotiating table were different. To a greater degree than previous conferences, even Bucharest and Mexico City, non-governmental organizations and other civil society actors were welcome participants in the ICPD process. Jyoti Shankar Singh, *Creating a New Consensus on Population: The International Conference on Population and Development* (London: Earthscan, 1998). Second, while the themes may have already been in place, there may be an argument that the unique tapestry of involving all the issues in particular *new* proportions may be worthy of a claim to novelty. In this vein, even the ongoing demographic discussion in Cairo may not be a negation of its possible novelty:

> A motive, when genuinely transcended, is not dropped, but transformed. It is redeemed not by subtraction, but by inclusion in a new fellowship. It is thus not repressed, but expressed, yet expressed with a difference: for its "nature" has been "graced."

Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, 314.

If indeed the memorializing, constructed by a wide range of actors, from scholars to participants to activists, among others, cannot be sustained in reference to the textual components of these conferences, who cares? What possible problems arise from what might at most be categorized as a minor historical inaccuracy? While some might minimize the impact of this slippage, I believe that there a re a number of problematic implications that follow from this framing error.

First, by circumventing the role and rhetorical development of Bucharest and Mexico City (and by allowing attention to be distracted by, for instance, Reagan's efforts at Mexico City, rather than on the textual outcomes of the conference), we lose out on valuable lessons from those conferences generally but more particularly to their textual, rhetorical outcomes. For instance, if it is true that there are extensive similarities between the earlier texts and the text of the Programme of Action, and if the effectiveness of those texts has been limited, as suggested even in the Cairo text, then understanding the limits of the predecessors might offer information that could help Cairo participants and advocates, and their successors, in achieving more success than that achieved by Bucharest and Mexico City. If, for instance, the dense nature of the earlier conference texts, offering so many recommendations that they become too diffuse to have one coherent message, and Cairo advocates, in seeking to be "new," and thus glazing over rather than carefully studying the primary historical antecedents, did the same, then we could see why the rhetorical limitations in the earlier texts might have been transferred, largely unreflectively, to the later text(s).

Second, suggestions of new hope created by a new vision and plan of action for population have the function of condemning previous population efforts. This is because, rhetorically, in advocating for "new" over "old," the implication is that there had to be either

some serious problems with the old, or at best, it no longer fit with the current times. Otherwise, there would be no need to chart a new path. John F. Kantner and Andrew Kantner, in writing on the policy and donor problems created by the Cairo Programme of Action, note that the degree of demonization of pre-Cairo efforts has become troublesome:

> The past decade has been a destabilizing time for supporters of international population assistance. Western feminists and advocacy-oriented non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have harshly criticized the legitimacy of pre-Cairo family planning programs. While these criticisms have certainly not been wholly unjustified, they have also tended to project unfair characterizations of much pre-Cairo family planning effort.[15]

These "unfair characterizations," in addition to distorting the historical record, also complicate efforts at creating a profitable conversation between population advocates and environmentalists. I offer one short story to illustrate this problem. At my current institution, there is an active network of student environmental advocacy efforts. I had the good fortune to hear from one of our more active students recently. Talking with him, as well as some of my colleagues, he related to us how shocked and saddened he was that one of the major national/international environmental organizations was moving toward taking an official advocacy position with regard to population. He detailed his efforts at sending an angry letter warning of the problematic implications of such a move. As he did not know that my dissertation was about population, I stayed quiet and listened to his criticisms of "population" as an object for advocacy. He talked about the implications for developed and developing countries, how race, sex, and gender are

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[15] John F. Kantner and Andrew Kantner, *The Struggle for International Consensus on Population and Development* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

targeted in population efforts, and continued on with the standard *topoi* of those who oppose the idea that we should advocate for addressing (over)population. Every time we continue to dwell on a narrative that marks out an "evil" history behind population efforts, we make it more difficult to make proportional responses that can reject some but not all parts of population advocacy and thus potentially accept other parts. And, as this student's narrative suggests, now that almost 20 years have passed, for those who oppose population advocacy, Cairo is as much the problem as Bucharest and eugenics. By oversimplifying, and just outright mis-reading, the history of population advocacy efforts, especially those of the last 40 years, we forget, as indicated in Chapter 1, that population advocacy, like rhetoric itself, is capable, as Aristotle notes, of being otherwise and thus able to be modified, improved, and changed.

Third, and very similar to the previous point, proclamations of novelty, with the implication that everything that came before was flawed, functions rhetorically to infer that either "there is no debate" or "the time for debate is over" about whether historical figures and actions acted in progressive or evil ways, with good or ill intentions, and with positive or negative outcomes. Rather than opening the past, a rhetorically constructed object, in order to read carefully into particular episodes and actors, these claims sweep a wide range of efforts and moments under the rug as all representing ineffective and/or dangerous efforts. Thus, to suggest that particular groups, individuals, or campaigns, achieved positive outcomes, or at least had the best of intentions, is to invite criticism because the weight of these claims of novelty appear to contradict what appears to be an official, authoritative history, and thus deemed to fall outside the realm of legitimate debate by scholars, policy analysts, and activists, for instance.

Fourth, while these claims "close the debate" in some ways, they also (re-)open debates that are potentially problematic. For instance, in claiming that things like "reproductive rights,"

"reproductive health," and "sexual health," are new to UN population advocacy, rather than based strongly on precedent from prior conference, such advocates allow opponents, not only of those efforts, but of all population advocacy, to wreak havoc. For instance, representatives from the Vatican, and social and religious conservatives from around the world, turned international public perception of the Cairo conference into being about "reproductive rights" as a Trojan horse for abortion rights. Needless to say, any close reading of Bucharest and Mexico City made it clear that a) reproductive rights were a natural outgrowth of already agreed upon, consensus documents, and that b) abortion rights had not been advocated before in the texts and were not being advocated here. By clamoring for a claim to novelty, however, population advocates opened the door for efforts to block the Cairo proceedings. Similarly, as Singh notes, though the phrase "couples and individuals," in regard to right to and access to birth control, among other things, had already been debated and had already "won" the day, Cairo became an opportunity to re-open the debate and to attempt to roll back precedent and consensus. While not fully because of the framing of novelty, the rhetorical exigence of justifying the "new" approach ended up at loggerheads with the defense of already achieved and still relevant goals.

Fifth, while the idea of "close reading" is used in this project primarily as a mode of investigation, I also believe that "close reading" stands as a normative principle by which we can judge texts that attempt to "read" or make use of other texts. Just as I earlier pointed to the way in which the Tea Party's refusal to engage in close reading of the Declaration of Independence and Constitution creates basic confusions that ultimately inhibit democratic participation and advocacy, I believe that too much in the relatively recent (at least 40 years) history of population advocacy has been limited by a refusal to engage the relevant texts closely. With the sheer quantity of documents produced, even at the UN alone, the temptation for scholars,

policymakers, NGO activists, and others, is to focus on press releases and executive summaries rather than to engage the core of the texts. While such an approach is at some degree inevitable, when the short hand being used to make authoritative claims about the history of an entire branch of advocacy comes into direct tension with the results of a close reading of the primary texts, we should demand, not only from scholars, but also from pundits and commentators, a return to the text in order to prevent such errors. One type of error created relates to the problem of analysts and observers creating a phantom foil against which to build up the novelty of Cairo, as I discuss in the next section.

5.3.5 Guarding Against Foils and Fallacies

The image of the ghost/spectre is increasingly deployed, in popular culture and in scholarship, leading some to refer to a new branch of study called "hauntology" (following partially on the lead of Jacques Derrida in *Spectres of Marx*). More specifically, this project in particular includes many intersections with the spectre. Greene argues that Malthus still "haunts" us, while Nicholas Eberstadt, writing for the American Enterprise Institute, argues, "A demographic spectre is haunting authoritative and influential circles in both the United States and the international community. This spectre is the supposed imperative to 'stabilise human population."[16] My argument about the presence of the spectre is different. I claim that, to the degree that there is a spectre, it is because we are jousting with a phantom foil. That is, in order to justify the novelty of the entire UN approach to population, and more specifically, the Cairo International Conference on Population Development's Programme of Action approach, three

[16] Nicholas Eberstadt, *Too Many People?* (London: International Policy Network, July 2007), 3, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070712_Too_Many_People.pdf (accessed July 25, 2010).

phantoms must be continually resurrected: first, the image of the evil, plotting eugenicists (see, for instance, Connelly), Malthus and his neo-Malthusian enforcers (see Greene), and narratives of coercion, sterilization, and sinister motives, ranging in circumference from the local to the global.[17]

In addition to this area of constantly reinvoking the phantom, an implicit ghost lurks with regard to pre-Cairo international population rhetoric and policy. The most recent international population rhetoric and policy prior to Cairo, of any major prominence, came in the form of the 1974 Bucharest conference and the 1984 Mexico City conference, so every time that someone pronounces Cairo as starting a "new paradigm" or "redefining" population, the argument by implication is that Bucharest and Mexico City enshrined old, Malthusian forms of population apocalypticism. However, such an argument is only tenable in light of a refusal to engage in a close read of either the WPPA or the "Recommendations for Further Implementation" documents themselves. [18]

Instead of being so concerned about setting up a harsh foil, so that an activist or scholar can attempt to make a forced choice between that foil and the activist or scholar's own preferred

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[17] While some of my analysis opens the possibility that opponents of population advocacy, at least in terms of its problematic history, are using Malthus/Malthusiansim/Neo-Malthusianism as their foil, not prior UN conferences. However, as I suggest here, and earlier in the dissertation, this distinction, if correct, requires massively better explanation by those who adopt it. What we have, time after time, are indications that Cairo is "new," and presuming that the writer knows of the UN efforts (and in some cases, the UN, or official representatives at UN conferences are the authors), the most reasonable interpretation is that they see Cairo as new, not only in relation to Malthus, but in relation to Bucharest and Mexico City as well. If that is not the intent, they have an analytical and political task to fulfill in making those distinctions clearer, as it impacts a number of important types of audiences.

[18] Such foils end up routinely violating the most basic argument fallacies. For instance, and especially in relation to the history of (over)population, foils quickly resemble little more than ad hominem attacks, and foils tend toward creating straw person and reductio ad absurdums. When these tendencies do not bear out, we see false dichotomies in which only 2 and exactly 2 choices are forced upon readers. While this relates to public arguments such as (over)population, it also recurs far too frequently in our scholarly discourse. For instance, in maintaining forced choices, we talk about rhetoric either as epistemology or as aesthetics, as ideological or material, as (Neo)Aristotlean or not, and on and on. In most of those scholarly debates, a reasonable third party is likely to find value in both perspectives and see that one can even embrace both positions simultaneously.

rhetoric or program or philosophy, we would do much better following a Burkean approach that allows for proportionality of motives rather than a simplistic essentializing of motives:

> As for the glosses of the interpretive strategy in general, they would be of this sort: For one thing, they would concern a distinction between what I should call an essentializing mode of interpretation and a mode that stresses proportion of ingredients. . . . This essentializing strategy is linked with a normal ideal of science: to 'explain the complex in terms of the simple.' This ideal almost vows one to select one or another motive from a cluster and interpret the others in terms of it. . . . Now, I don't see how you can possibly explain the complex in terms of the simple without having your very success used as a charge against you. When you get through, all that your opponent need say is: 'But you have explained the complex in terms of the simple—and the simple is precisely what the complex is not.'[19]

Especially in light of the substance of the Cairo texts, and its predecessors and successors, that we need an orientation that embraces complexity and interrelations, rather than linear causality and singular lines of focus, support by "advocates" of Cairo for an essentializing reading strategy of motives seems ironic, to say the least. Besides, though, the ideological hurdle that must be cleared to convince a critic, or even a deliberating citizen or NGO activist, to engage in proportional readings of motives, rather than essentializing ones, there is the additional demand of "close reading," which, sadly, appears to have gotten lost in creating talking points about "pre-

[19] Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, 3rd Ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), 261-262.

Cairo population rhetoric/policy." In this sense, the "close reading" argument within rhetorical criticism may actually serve as a microcosm of a well-needed societal debate.

While biomimicry, or attempting to achieve mimesis by harmonizing one's rhetorical strategy with the strategies of nature may be unsuccessful on this specific set of issues (population), the complexity and interrelations in nature may serve perfectly as a metaphor for approaching criticism, whether as an academic or citizen or concerned political activist. Moreover, this holistic approach to criticism can also help to counteract dominant tendencies in scholarship on rhetoric and public argument generally, and scholarship and popular discourse on population specifically. In this next section, I argue for re-thinking critical perspective from a rhetorical point of view. Such a mode of scholarship would require a willingness to transcend demystification, debunking, and the hermeneutics of suspicion as the primary engines for critical telos, and replace such "negative" impulses with a more neutral, or even rehabilitating critical perspective, following in the footsteps of scholars like Kenneth Burke.

5.3.6 Re-Thinking Critical Perspective

We need to rethink critical perspective. If the individuals most affected by historically problematic ideas such as "development" and "population control" are willing to invest in and attempt to re-chart the paths of such rhetoric, rather than simply abandon and condemn it, should not rhetoricians be willing to do the same in analyzing the rhetoric of subjects generally looked down upon? Surveying some of the landmark works on population, for instance, from Ron Greene to Matthew Connelly to many others pursuing similar arguments, there is an ongoing effort to vilify and crucify the rhetoric (and the individuals creating such rhetoric), rather than to

provide a more proportional response.[20] Indeed, the critical challenge offered up by Kenneth Burke, in relation to the toxic rhetoric of Adolf Hitler, appears unthinkable in the present moment:

> The appearance of *Mein Kampf* in unexpurgated translation has called forth far too many vandalistic comments. There are other ways of burning books than on the pyre—and the favorite method of the hasty reviewer is to deprive himself and his readers by inattention. I maintain that it is thoroughly vandalistic for the reviewer to content himself with the mere inflicting of a few symbolic wounds upon this book and its author, of an intensity varying with the resources of the reviewer and the time at his disposal. Hitler's "Battle" is exasperating, even nauseating; yet the fact remains: If the reviewer but knocks off a few adverse attitudinizings and calls it a day, with a guaranty in advance that his article will have a favorable reception among the decent members of our population, he is contributing more to our gratification than to our enlightenment.[21]

Unlike the situation Burke describes, what is at stake is not a single text by a single author, but rather an entire collection of rhetoric united by issue, and to a lesser degree, stance on that issue. Also, I do not wish to insinuate that Greene, Connelly, or any other critics who have

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[20] The examples of polemic by those who are suspicious of or completely opposed to population advocacy are numerous. Without cataloging such examples in any exhaustive way, one example stands out clearly as an attempt at vilification and crucifixion, and it comes from Greene: "The intersection of Malthus with biological forms of state racism contributed to the conceptual work necessary for modernity to build the railroad tracks to Auschwitz. *Malthusian Worlds*, 50. Such hyperbole adds little, as one could easily imagine Nazi genocide without ever having had any kind of Malthusianism in Western intellectual history, but instead functions more as an ad hominem attack on Malthus and (neo-)Malthusians. Such sloppy polemic mirrors Ben Stein, in his movie advocating for Intelligent Design, where he visits the camps at Dachau and reflects on how the seeds for that terrible moment in human history could be traced back to the writings of Charles Darwin. In both cases, the claims are far-fetched and difficult to sustain, and both have the additional effect of blocking debate (people do not generally like to engage in debate with others when they are pre-emptively accused of advocating genocidal philosophies).

[21] Kenneth Burke, *The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1973), 191.

condemned the rhetoric of population control or overpopulation have been hasty or inattentive to their task at hand. To the contrary, each work is thoroughly researched and well composed and argued. Instead, what I find to be "substantially" (following another strain of Burke) the same between the "reviewers" challenged by Burke and these anti-population authors is that they do tend to focus on the "inflicting" of "symbolic wounds" and "adverse attitudinizings" on the side of the topic that now, overwhelmingly on the left and right, "will have a favorable reception." Insofar as this occurs, we end up learning more about the attitudes of the authors writing such texts than we do about the rhetoric, artifacts, and texts supposedly under study by such authors. While critics can and should be on the lookout for ideologically problematic arguments and rhetoric, if this becomes the sole or primary task, a disservice has been done, as the internal dynamics of the texts themselves disappear. Especially for arguments with long historical trajectories, there is something in the (as Burke calls it) "word magic" that makes such lines of reasoning appealing and sustainable across time. Even with a more activist bent, by spending more time engaging and learning from the texts from within, rather than distancing ourselves from without, we stand a better chance of suggesting remedies or defenses against such claims, and potentially find ways to reclaim or shift the rhetoric in a new, more hopeful, direction.

Not only is this an opportunity, and perhaps even an imperative, for rhetoricians, it is also vital for those studying and practicing population policy and rhetoric, as Nicholas Kristof explains in his review of Connelly's *Fatal Misconception*:

> In "Fatal Misconception," Matthew Connelly . . . carefully assembles a century's worth of mistakes, arrogance, racism, sexism and incompetence in what the jacket copy calls a "withering critique" of "a humanitarian movement gone terribly awry." . . . Critics of family planning programs will seize gleefully upon this

> book, and that's unfortunate, because two propositions are both correct: first, population planners have made grievous mistakes and were inexcusably quiet for too long about forced sterilization in countries like India and China; and second, those same planners have learned from past mistakes and today are fighting poverty and saving vast numbers of lives in developing countries. "Fatal Misconception" is to population policy what William Easterly's "White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good" (2006) was to foreign aid: a useful, important but ultimately unbalanced corrective to smug self-satisfaction among humanitarians. Connelly scrupulously displays a hundred years of family planners' dirty laundry, but without adequately emphasizing that we are far better off for their efforts. One could write a withering history of medicine, focusing on doctors' infecting patients when they weren't bleeding them, but doctors are pretty handy people to have around today. And so are family planners. . . . It's certainly fair of Connelly to dredge up the forced sterilizations, the casual disregard for injuries caused by IUDs, the racism and sexism and all the rest—but we also need to remember that all that is history. The family planning movement has corrected itself, and today it saves the lives of women in poor countries and is central to efforts to reduce poverty worldwide. If we allow that past to tarnish today's efforts by family planning organizations, women in poor countries will be doubly hurt.

Based on my read of the history of population efforts, as well as the texts that I have examined in this study, I fully agree with Kristof's arguments here about the content, but he is also pointing to an important issue with regard to critical perspective. In one sense, for population specifically,

we need to adopt more of what Burke has termed a "proportional" reading, as opposed to an "essentializing" read, in order to account for the depth and complexity of different actors and their purposes. More generally, though, the scholarly problem to which Kristof points is one that is a major focus of this entire project. Moreover, just as family planning is over-critiqued for its negatives, and systematically under-appreciated for its benefits, so too is "rhetoric," in the vernacular, and in scholarly circles, attacked for all the ways that it can go wrong (the constant classroom discussion where asking students to think of places where rhetoric has been used toward dangerous ends invariably leads to a discussion of Hitler's instrumentally powerful but offensive, unethical rhetoric), but not always given credit for the fact that, while rhetoric can be a curse, it can also be a cure. It is in this sense that the invitational rhetoric people get it wrong.[22] It is not that rhetoric cannot be used toward destructive ends, or that it cannot operate in mischievous ways (a review of the Encomium to Helen demonstrates that such an argument far pre-dated the proposal for an invitational rhetoric), but what gets under-appreciated is the ways in which rhetoric has been a primary liberating mechanism for much of progressive social activism throughout human history, and without the resources of rhetoric, there are no ways to counter those who would use rhetoric for the worst of ends. Therefore, if our engagement is serious, we need to embrace a critical voice that seeks to understand, rather than, in the words of Kenneth Burke, to "waylay" with a "brickbat," for we have too many bats out being swung and the room is small enough that someone will get hurt.

[22] For an introduction to invitational rhetoric, see, for instance, Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin, "Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric," *Communication Monographs* 62 (1995): 2-18.

APPENDIX A

WORDLE OF PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT (CAIRO, 1994)[23]

Figure 1: Cairo, 1994

[23] Created May 14, 2009, on www.wordle.net.

APPENDIX B

WORDLE OF WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION (BUCHAREST, 1974)[24]

Figure 2: Bucharest, 1974

[24] Created November 15, 2008, on www.wordle.net.

APPENDIX C

WORDLE OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION (MEXICO CITY, 1984)[25]



Figure 3: Mexico City, 1984

[25] Created November 15, 2008, on www.wordle.net.

APPENDIX D

WORDLE OF KEY ACTIONS FOR THE FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT (1999)[26]

Figure 4: ICPD+5, 1999

[26] Created May 25, 2009, on www.wordle.net.

APPENDIX E

WORDLE OF IPCD AT 10: THE WORLD REAFFIRMS CAIRO (2004)[27]

Figure 5: ICPD+10, 2004

[27] Created May 27, 2009, on www.wordle.net.

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