ON THE EDGE OF AL-QAIDA?
ASSESSING AL-QAIDA'S CHANGING ROLE IN TERRORIST ATTACKS AND PLOTS OVER TIME

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This dissertation investigates changes in the extent and nature of al-Qaida‘s involvement in *Salafist*-motivated terrorism over time. It makes use of an original, hand-coded dataset that examines relationships among individuals involved in terror events in order to build a formal network-based model of violent extremist organizations‘ membership. These designations serve as the basis for a procedure that estimates the extent of organizations‘ functional involvement in more than 500 completed terror attacks, as well as approximately 180 incomplete terror plots. According to these quantitative estimates, al-Qaida‘s role in Islamist terrorism is far less substantial than often assumed by the press and policy makers, but in order to more fully explore changes in the organization‘s pattern of involvement in terrorism, the study‘s quantitative findings also served as a metric for the selection of qualitative cases, which were examined using structured-focused comparison. This narrative assessment reinforced the conclusions of the quantitative estimate, and found that the quality and capability of al-Qaida‘s operatives has steadily declined over time, even as the depth of al-Qaida‘s involvement with so-called partner organizations has waned. Because al-Qaida is *not* the global Islamist juggernaut it is often portrayed to be, the United States‘ already well-designed counterterrorism strategy requires

minor amendment in order to better target the myriad terror groups that comprise the contemporary Islamist threat.

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1.0 CLASSIFYING AL-QAIDA

Effective organizations must evolve in response to shifts in their environment.[1] Given the tremendous changes to al-Qaida's strategic context that have occurred since 1998, when the organization first gained international notoriety for bombing two United States Embassies in Eastern Africa, it should come as no surprise that al-Qaida looks different today than it did more than a decade earlier. For example, in 2001, the U.S. deprived al-Qaida of its safe-haven in Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks, only to open a new front for Islamist extremism two years later by invading Iraq. As best demonstrated by the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed in 2003[2] and the death of Usama bin Laden in 2011,[3] al-Qaida has also lost senior leaders, but others have risen to take their place and have reshaped al-Qaida in the process.[4] In order to understand these changes, it is necessary to accurately classify the nature and extent of al-Qaida's involvement in plots and attacks over time. This task is the central focus of this study.

A number of scholars have made contributions that assist in the process. The first section following this introduction charts the evolution of terror-classification systems from simple two-

[1] Henry Mintzberg, *Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1983). For information on the need for adaptability in specific industries, see Robert G. Eccles and Dwight B. Crane, "Managing Through Networks in Investment Banking," *California Management Review*, (Fall, 1987) p. 183; and Judith R. Blau, "Paradoxical Consequences of Excess in Structural Complexity: A Study of a State Children's Psychiatric Hospital," *Sociology of Health and Illness*, Vol. 2 No. 3 (1980), p. 279-285.

[2] Terry Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," *The New Yorker*, September 13, 2010.

[3] "Phone call by Kuwaiti courier led to bin Laden," *Associated Press*, May 3, 2011.

[4] For example, Adnan G. el-Shukrijumah was unknown at the time of the 9/11 attacks, but by 2010 he had become prominent enough within bin Laden's organization that FBI agents stated that "He would be equated with being chief of (al-Qaida) operations." Special Agent Brian LeBlanc, quoted in "Rising Al-Qaeda leader spent youth in US: report," *Agence France Presse*, August 6, 2010.

tiered characterizations, to more nuanced three-tiered characterizations, to Bale's expansive six-tiered characterization, before concluding that the relative frequency of the patterns these systems describe remain unknown because none of the existing typologies have been broadly implemented. Typologists' failure to apply their classification systems is somewhat understandable, because practical data restrictions greatly complicate the process of studying terrorism through a wide lens. These obstacles are the subject of the second section, which outlines gaps and problems in existing datasets that attempt to address the breadth of Islamist terrorism. The third section describes how this study attempts to overcome these information gaps by using a novel adaptation of anthropological sampling method. Because methodological perspective *always* colors the collection and interpretation of data, the fourth section introduces Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA) and briefly discusses its interaction with the data sample, before the fifth section returns to questions of theory and draws on the existing terrorism literature to build an ontology of relationship types that clarifies the nature of al-Qaida's involvement in terror events. This perspective is then synthesized with aspects of network theory and the existing typological literature in order to offer a testable system that classifies the nature and scale of al-Qaida's involvement in terror attacks and plots. In order to explain the implementation of this typology, the sixth and final section outlines the contents and progression of this study's remaining chapters.

Before proceeding with an assessment of the existing literature, it is necessary to include a brief note on terminology. The vocabulary the scholarly community uses to discuss violence perpetrated in the name of Islam is inherently imprecise. Terms like extremist, Islamist, *jihadist, salafist,* terrorist, and insurgent are often used interchangeably, although it is possible (and often

appropriate) to draw finite definitional divisions between these and other similar terms.[5] Unfortunately, confusion endures because there are no unanimously accepted definitions of these and related terms.

Analysts often use the same word to reference wildly different ideas, resulting in a phenomenon that Kenney dubs ―conceptual lumping."[6] The term ―*jihad*" provides a useful illustration. According to strict translation from the original Arabic, ―*jihad*" is synonymous with generic struggle.[7] However, Islamic scholars have redefined the term depending on their political and cultural context, often to justify violence against political opponents on religious grounds.[8] Consequently, many analysts, especially those hailing from the West, interpret the term ―*jihad*" as a synonym for holy war, while many Muslims continue to define ―*jihad*" in more classical terms, as an internal struggle for piety that has virtually nothing to do with the conduct of religious violence against non-believers.[9] Given the stark differences between these definitions, it requires little imagination to envision the analytic ambiguities that arise when readers fail to understand which concept authors intended to reference when they used the term ―*jihad*."

On the other hand, scholars have also invented a wealth of conflicting terminology to describe identical concepts. The Welsh scholar Phil Williams provides one relevant example in his effort to catalogue the various types of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs). He lists warlords, militias, and paramilitary forces as classes of ―private military forces" previously

[5] Michael Kenney, ―Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy," National Institute of Justice, May 2009, pp. 27-29; available online: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226808.pdf.
[6] Ibid, p. 27.
[7] Karen Armstrong, *The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism*, (New York: Ballentine Books, 2000).
[8] For the evolution of the interpretation of *jihad* see Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, (New Haven, CT: Yale Univeristy Press, 2006), pp. 17-40. See also, Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America*, (New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 38-94.
[9] A.G. Noorani, *Islam & Jihad: Prejudice Versus Reality*, (New York: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 45-49.

described within the academic literature, but argues convincingly that there are negligible differences between these categories.[10] Indeed, the primary distinction between a warlord's forces and a militia seems to be the presence of a charismatic leader, namely the warlord. Because Williams ultimately states that "the distinction between militias and paramilitaries is not entirely clear," he suggests that these terms are nearly perfect synonyms, despite scholars' tendency to view "militias" and "paramilitaries" as distinct categories of analysis.[11] In short, this example highlights the excessively jargonistic nature of the literature on religious, political, and criminal violence by demonstrating that scholars in the field have an unfavorable tendency to draw pedantic and largely subjective delineations between equivalent terms.

This analysis attempts to occupy a middle ground between conceptual lumping and the sort of false differentiation Williams describe by explicitly defining the handful of pseudo-technical terms that are unavoidable in inquiries of this type. Though other analysts may offer competing definitions, the list below specifies how key terms should be interpreted within the context of this analysis.

- *Terrorism* is defined as the conduct or attempted conduct of violence against non-combatants, broadly defined to include government personnel and soldiers serving outside of active war-zones.[12]

- *Insurgency* is defined as the organized use of force in an effort to seize power and/or territory from an existing government.[13]

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[10] Phil Williams, "Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security," International Relations and Security Network, ETH Zurich, 2008, p. 9-11.
[11] Ibid, p. 11.
[12] This definition draws heavily on that offered by the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which defines non-combatants to include "military personnel and assets outside war zones and war-like settings," and which also explicitly recognizes that the dividing line between terrorism and other related forms of violence is subjective and difficult to determine. See, U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, *2010 Report on Terrorism*, April 30, 2011, p. 1; available online: http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2010_report_on_terrorism.pdf.
[13] This definition is based on Williams' synthesis of existing definitions offered by the U.S. Department of Defense. Although he neglects to provide citations for the directly quoted souces listed below, the publications he cites are *Joint Publication 3-24 – Counterinsurgency Operations*, which defines insurgency as the "organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority" (p. xi), and *Army Field Mannual 100-20 – Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, which states that "An insurgency is an organized, armed political struggle whose goal may be the

- *Jihad* is defined in accordance with the typical Western understanding of the concept, which equates *jihad* with holy war.[14] *Jihad* is intended to be understood as a broader concept than either terrorism or insurgency that often incorporates aspects of both.

- *Jihadists* are defined as those individuals who actively pursue holy war through direct or indirect involvement in terrorism and/or insurgency.

- *Salafism* is defined as a puritanical brand of Islam that seeks to emulate the religious practices of the earliest Muslims.[15] Because several *salafist* preachers believe that violence against civilians is an illegitimate means to advance their interpretation of Islam, *salafism* is not synonymous with terrorism or *jihad.* Put more simply, *salafism* is a religious ideology that has both violent and non-violent variants.[16]

- *Salafists* are defined as those individuals who practice *salafism*.

- *Islamists* are defined as adherents to fundamental interpretations of Islam that place particular emphasis on the imposition of Islamic religious law (*Sharia*). Unless modified with additional descriptors, this term is intended to broadly reference adherents of puritanical Islam.[17]

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seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and replacement of the existing government. In some cases, however, an insurgency's goals may be more limited. For example, the insurgency may intend to break away from government control and establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious territorial bounds. The insurgency may also only intend to extract limited political concessions unattainable through less violent means" (p. 2-0). The Joint Publication and Army Field Mannual can be respectively found at: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf and http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals/fm-100-20-military-operations-in-low-intensity-conflict.shtml.

[14] Although religious scholars disagree with this convention, a number of prominent scholars within the security community use *jihad* and holy war as interchangeable terms. For example, Simon and Benjamin explicitly define *jihad* as "Islamic holy war" (p. 5). Similarly, Fawas A. Gerges equates *jihad* to "armed struggle" (*The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 1). Finnaly, James JF Forest argues that *jihad* is a practice which "incorporates warfare with an individual effort to live a holy life," ("Training Camps and Other Centers of Learning," in James JF Forest (ed.), *Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, p. 70).

[15] Simon and Benjamin, p. 491.

[16] Kenney, pp. 27-29.

[17] Conceptions of the terms "Islamist" are exceptionally broad, but center around the themes encapsulated in the general definition provided by this analysis. For example, Benjamin and Simon define Islamists as those who believe in "a religious ideology that insists on the application of sharia law by the state" (p. 490). Kumar Ramakrishna argues that *salafists* become Islamists when they "see it as an *added* obligation to actively seek recourse to political power in order to impose their belief system on the society at large" (emphasis in the original, "The Making of the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist," in James JF Forest (ed.), *Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006, p. 229). Habeck makes a similar argument, stating that Islamists are adherents of a reformist vision of Islam "that calls for a revival of the religion and a 'return' of Islam to political power," while noting that Islamists hail from myriad "often antagonistic groups with differeing beliefs, goals, and methodologies for attaining their ends" (p. 4). Gerges uses the term "Islamist" as a perfect synonym for "Islamic militant" and traces the rise of contemporary Islamists to 1967 military losses Arab states suffered to Israel, after which Islamists "launched a frontal assault against the failed ideologies of nationalism, socialism, communism, and 'decadent' Western liberalism in a daring bid to overthrow Muslim rulers and establish

Finally, the definition of the term "al-Qaida" also merits explicit definition. Although analysts often use the word to reference both the broader Islamist extremist movement and regional affiliates of the organization Usama bin Laden founded,[18] this study does not. As the second chapter describes in detail, this study defines "al-Qaida" as the core group of supporters surrounding bin Laden and his successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Unless otherwise noted, regional organizations which include the term "al-Qaida" in their name, such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, should be understood as distinct entities.

1.1 THE EVOLUTION OF TERROR TYPOLOGIES

Efforts to differentiate between the nature and extent of al-Qaida's involvement in terrorism almost always come down to questions of categorization. The protracted and increasingly personal debate that Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman regarding the relative importance of "top down" and "bottom up" terrorist organizations provides a useful starting point. While Sageman advocated that 'leaderless' self-organizing *jihadists* are the foremost threat within the violent Islamist movement,[19] he acknowledged that formal, established *jihadist* groups still exist and pose a legitimate, if lesser, danger, which "will grow if vigilance is relaxed."[20] Hoffman, by contrast, acknowledged the existence of the local, largely autonomous ad hoc groups that worried Sageman, and even went so far as to state that "bin Laden and his

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Islmic States. Religion became their tool for political mobilization" (*Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy*, (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2006, p. 11).

[18] Michael Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Advantage,* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), p. 11.

[19] Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

[20] Marc Sageman, "The Reality of Grass-Roots Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* (July-August 2008), pp. 163-5.

lieutenants have engineered nothing short of a stunning transformation of Al Qaeda from the more or less unitary, near bureaucratic entity it once had been to something more akin to an ideology."[21] However, Hoffman still vociferously contended that formal terror organizations, most especially the core group of al-Qaida members surrounding bin Laden, represent the greater threat to global security.[22] Ultimately, the Hoffman-Sageman debate was over the relative dangers that hierarchical terror organizations and self-organizing *jihadist* groups present, but both men tacitly agreed that violent Islamists fell into one of these two categories.[23]

Other analysts made similar implicit divisions, which rather than emphasizing the distinction between grassroots *jihadists* and established terror groups, highlighted the differences between al-Qaida and regional groups, which have often (but not always) adopted names that suggest ties to bin Laden's organization, such al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Terrorism studies is an unforgivably jargonistic field, so vocabulary disputes abound, but the term "franchise model" is fairly widely used to describe this school of thinking.[24]

John Simpson, the BBC's longtime world affairs editor, traced the origins of this intellectual model to the immediate aftermath of 9/11, when Frank Gardner, another well-regarded BBC journalist with decades of experience in the Middle East, popularized the idea that

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[21] Bruce Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 27 (2004), p. 551.
[22] Bruce Hoffman, "The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden Still Matters," *Foreign Affairs* 87:3 (May-June 2008), pp. 133-8.
[23] Will McCants, "Smackdown! Sageman vs. Hoffman," Jihadica website, 8 June 2008, available at www.jihadica.com/smackdown-sageman-vs-hoffman/. Note: the colloquial title that McCants selected for his critique of the Hoffman-Sageman debate should not imply a lack of content. McCants is affiliated with the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, one of the leading research groups on the subject of Islamist extremism.
[24] For an example of the franchise metaphor's use by American policy makers, see, Alfred De Montesquiou, "Official: Al-Qaeda like a fast food franchise for terrorism," *USA Today*, June 7, 2009; available online: http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-06-07-al-qaeda_N.htm. Examples of the franchise metaphor's use to describe al-Qaida's relationship to specific groups includes: Emily Hunt, "Al-Qaeda's North African Franchise: The GSPC Regional Threat," (Policy Watch #1034), *The Washington Institute,* September 8, 2005; "The Endurance of Yemen's Al Qaeda Franchise," STRATFOR, November 2, 2010; and Camille Tawil, "How Bin Ladin's Death Will Affect Al-Qa'ida's Regional Franchises," *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, May 1, 2011.

―Just as you can buy the franchise for, say, a Holiday Inn or an Intercontinental hotel, so you can adopt the principles of Osama bin Laden and set up your own deadly group, murdering those you identify as the enemies of the faith - and anyone else, of course, who happens to be passing at the time."[25] This categorization suggests that the violent Islamist movement operates along hierarchical lines; al-Qaida sits alone at the top of the structure and functions like a _home office' that sets grand-strategy, while regional groups function like _independently owned outlets' that follow al-Qaida's dictates in exchange for immediate brand recognition, which enables the franchise to reap greater rewards than it would by operating an almost identical organization under its own distinct name. However, the self-organizing *jihadists* debated by Hoffman and Sageman completely escaped this typology.

Other scholars reconciled this omission by presenting three-tiered amalgamations of the Hoffman-Sageman characterization and the franchise model. For example, in 2010, Martha Crenshaw argued that the contemporary Islamist terror movement consists of: (1) a core group of leaders that ―provides ideological direction and guidance as well as some resources (mainly assistance with training and funding)," (2) a second-tier leadership consisting of ―affiliated or merged local organizations with their own interests in specific conflict zones"—groups analogous to Gardner's franchises—and members of the organization who serve as ―local leaders in Western countries," and (3) the sort of self-organizing *jihadists* that most-worried Sageman.[26] Ultimately, she sought to explain that Islamist terrorism is simultaneously organized from the ―top down" and the ―bottom up."

[25] John Simpson, ―Battling the al-Qaeda franchise," *BBC News*, October 3, 2005; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4304516.stm.
[26] Martha Crenshaw, ―Assessing the Al-Qa'ida Threat to the United States," *CTC Sentinel*, January 13, 2010; available online: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/assessing-the-al-qaida-threat-to-the-united-states.

Scott Helfstein and Dominic Wright, a pair of researchers at West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, attempted to recast Crenshaw's theory in more formal terms.[27] Their effort centered on distinguishing between her three levels based on the strength of ties. They re-appropriated terminology that sociologist Mark Granovetter first put forth in the 1970s to explain the important role that casual, weakly-tied acquaintances play in employment searches by expanding job-seekers' awareness of open positions beyond the few jobs about which seekers' close associates, who share a common pool of knowledge and frame of reference, have information.[28] According to Helfstein and Wright's revision of Crenshaw, Islamists with strong ties to al-Qaida's leaders, most especially Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, comprise al-Qaida's core. Islamists with weak ties to members of the core comprise al-Qaida's periphery, a broad category that includes members of local organizations like Somalia's al-Shabab and AQAP. Finally, violent Islamists who operate absent ties to al-Qaida are merely motivated by "Al Qaeda ideals of transnational *jihad*" and offer examples of self-organizing terrorism.[29] To restate Helfstein and Wright's typology in the simplest terms, the Islamist terror movement is a core-periphery-isolate structure with al-Qaida at its center.

However, theirs is not the only effort to reconcile the franchise model and the Hoffman-Sageman characterization. European researchers Javier Jordán, Fernando Mañas, and Nicola Horsburgh independently developed a competing, but similar, tripartite categorization. According to their vocabulary, the violent Islamist movement contains:

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[27] Scott Helfstein and Dominick Wright, "Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the Dimensions of Al Qaeda," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 34, No. 5 (2011), p. 369. According to the authors' own characterization of their work, Helfstein and Wright's typology draws heavily on a characterization of al-Qaida that Martha Crenshaw offered during Congressional testimony. She then restated her views in a piece written for West Point's Combatting Terrorism Center: Martha Crenshaw, "Assessing the Al-Qa'ida Threat to the United States," *CTC Sentinel*, January 13, 2010; available online: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/assessing-the-al-qaida-threat-to-the-united-states.

[28] Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 78, No. 6 (May 1973), pp. 1360-1380.

[29] Ibid.

1. *Grassroots Jihadist Networks (GJNs),* which Jordán and his co-authors define as ―a group of individuals that accepts the strategic objectives of the Global *Jihad* Movement (GJMV) and attempt to contribute to these from their country of residence," while lacking membership in the ―hierarchical structure of Al Qaeda or other associated GJMV organizations."[30] In short, groups that are broadly equivalent to the West Point researchers' isolates.

2. *Local cells*, which are led by members of al-Qaida or related groups, but which also contain many individuals who lack membership in ―the mother organization."[31] In other words, individuals with indirect, weak ties to the core.

3. *Full-fledged members of GJMV groups*, including operational commanders and members of ―hit squads," which benefit from the organization's full logistical support and are deployed to conduct a specific attack, as best illustrated by ―the pilots and hijackers of 9/11."[32] Given that ―ordering hits" seems to constitute a strong interaction, the individuals contained in this category would qualify as part of al-Qaida's core as described by Helfstein and Wright.

But why stop at three categories? Bale drew heavily on the work of Jordán and his co-authors as the basis for a five-tiered system that describes the nature of European terror groups' ties to al-Qaida. He argued that there are (1) ―hit teams" deployed to the West to conduct specific operations, (2) local cells with long-term objectives that were deliberately planted in the West by their parent organizations and which continue to receive periodic support from the parent organization, (3) local Western *jihadist* cells that formerly held close ties to foreign terror groups, but which re-formed independently without outside influence, (4) self-generating grassroots groups that hold direct or indirect connections to established terror groups or to other independent grassroots groups, and (5) self-generating grassroots groups that lack demonstrable connections to other components of the broader *jihadist* movement.[33] Yet, because Europe is

[30] Javier Jordán, Fernando M. Mañas, and Nicola Horsburgh, ―Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroots Jihadist Networks: The Madrid Bombings," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31 (2008), p. 18.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid, p. 19.
[33] Jeffrey M. Bale, ―Jihadist Cells and ‗I.E.D.' Capabilities in Europe: Assessing the Present and Future Threat to the West," *Monterey Institute of International Studies*, 2010, pp. 28, 62-63.

Bale's explicit focus, there is an implicit sixth category: the South Asian, South East Asian, Middle Eastern, and North African terror groups to which European cells are (or are not) connected.

While several of these typologies are sophisticated, they all suffer from the same failing: none have been broadly implemented. For all of their bickering about the relative dangers of self-organizing terrorism and formal *jihadist* groups, neither Hoffman nor Sageman ever formally estimate the frequency of either pattern. They were more concerned with stating which pattern is more potentially lethal than which pattern is more common. Simpson and Crenshaw discussed their typologies in purely theoretical terms and offered no supporting cases. Jordan, et al, and Bale discussed individual cases in the context of theory building, but their goal was to demonstrate that various categories exist in the real world, rather than to assess their prevalence. Helfstein and Wright offered the broadest take and considered two dozen incidents, but given that government bean-counters claim that Sunni Islamists have conducted upwards of 25,000 terrorist attacks, the West Point researchers' sample does not seem particularly representative.[34]

Why are narrow implementations problematic? The answer is, perhaps, best illustrated with a simple example drawn from outside terrorism. Consider a typology of human physiology that classifies people based on the number of limbs they possess. Owing to amputations and genetic abnormalities, the typology would need to include all values between zero and eight (in 2005, an eight-limbed girl was born in India, where she was worshipped as a reincarnated Hindu deity).[35] However, wide implementation of the typology would reveal that the vast majority of

[34] WITS, filtered by perpetrator and group type. Last accessed January 30, 2012.
[35] She had two sets of arms and legs as the result of subsuming a parasitic twin in the womb. Her parents named her Lakshmi in honor of the eight-limbed Hindu deity. For additional detail, see Bob Brown, ―GirlBorn With Eight Limbs Thrives in India," *ABC News*, June 13, 2008; available online: http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=5055673&page=1#.TyHNtvl-e-c.

people fall into the four-limbed category. Most of the possible values represent aberrant cases that, while interesting, do not accurately represent common patterns in human physiology.

To extend the metaphor, terrorism researchers run an extreme risk of studying quadruple amputees and eight-legged babies when they use single cases to explore the theoretical boundaries of *jihadist* terrorism. It simply is not clear that the findings of such studies are generalizable to the broader phenomenon. If cases hopes to represent general trends, or even they hope to highlight behavior that is unique but meaningful, then logic dictates that a broad empirical effort at categorization must precede case-based analyses, because it is impossible to determine how representative or unique a case may be without first examining the frequency of possible outcomes. Typology building done for its own sake is ultimately of questionable intellectual value, because broad-based testing is necessary to demonstrate that theoretical categorizations accurately characterize real-world outcomes.[36]

1.2 PRACTICAL BARRIERS FACED BY BROAD-BASED STUDIES OF JIHADIST TERRORISM

Unfortunately, a number of obstacles complicate the seemingly simple process of conducting this sort of badly needed empirical work, and data is first among them. As Helfstein and Wright correctly note, none of the currently available databases include comprehensive information on both successful terror attacks and failed plots.[37] Indeed, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and

[36] This opinion is essentially a restatement of the oft-stated conclusion that research should move from the exploratory, to the descriptive, to the explanatory. For a succinct discussion of this intellectual progression, see: Colin Robson, *Real World Research*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), pp. 41-42. For a more thorough discussion on the pitfalls of inquiries that proceed despite significant bias in their case selection, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 128-137. For a rebuttal to King, et al, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 22-25.
[37] Helfstein and Wright, p. 370.

Responses to Terrorism (START), the Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) maintained by the United States National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) *all* explicitly exclude plots that were foiled early-on, as well as plots that terrorists aborted of their own volition.[38] Thus, despite their impressive size, these resources greatly truncate the phenomenon of terrorism, and these databases are arguably the most complete sources of quantitative data available to researchers. Less comprehensive resources contain even greater omissions.

Moreover, these "big three" are of scant utility for analyzing terrorism at the organizational level, because WITS categorizes perpetrators only by broad type (e.g., "Secular/Political/Anarchist," "Islamic Extremist (Sunni)," and "Christian Extremist"), while the GTD and the RDWTI both use vague processes of attribution that are non-replicable and fraught with flaws. Specifically, in order to determine organizations' involvement in attacks, the GTD and the RDWTI use nearly identical methodologies that rely heavily on terror groups' own claims of responsibility. Regional and topical experts have the opportunity to object to these classifications, but they then impose entirely subjective assessments that fail to estimate the scale of organizations' involvement.

Consider the 2002 Bali bombings as an example that highlights the shortcomings of this approach. Both the GTD and the RDWTI state that al-Qaida claimed the attack and that members of Jemmah Islamiyyah (JI) were known or suspected to have participated in the

[38] National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), "Criteria: Methodology Utilized to Compile NCTC's Database of Terrorist Incidents," date unknown, available online: http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/wits_subpage_criteria.html; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), "Frequently Asked Questions," Global Terrorism Database (GTD), date unknown; available online: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/faq/. RAND Corporation, "Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents: Database Definitions," date unknown, available online: http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-incidents/about/definitions.html. All sites last accessed January 27, 2012.

bombing, but neither database stipulates how large a role the respective organizations played.[39] Without additional information, the roles of al-Qaida and JI seem equivalent—a finding disputed by several reputable analysts who have studied the Bali attacks.[40] Assessments of organizational involvement in terrorist events must estimate the extent of responsibility in order to provide true analytic value.

However, the ambiguities inherent to these databases extend well beyond these sorts of scaling issues; the vague processes used to determine organizational involvement in attacks can attribute responsibility to groups that may exist in name only. For example, numerous analysts—including those at START, the organization that maintains the GTD—question whether or not the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades (AHMB) actually exist, because the group has claimed high-profile attacks on three continents, as well as a U.S. power black-out that has been definitively disproven as an incident of terror.[41] Yet the GTD and the RDWTI both attribute responsibility for the 2004 Madrid attacks to the organization based solely on a single AHMB spokesman's claim of responsibility.[42] Thus, it is unwise to trust the existing databases'

[39] START, Global Terrorism Database, Incident Identification Numbers 200210120005 and 200210120004; RDWTI, "Incident Detail: Oct 12, 2002, Bali, Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)," available online: http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident_detail.php?id=13504.

[40] For a journalistic take on the 2002 Bali attacks, see: Sally Neighbor, *In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia*, (Sydney, Australia: Harper Collins, 2004). For a more academic treatment, see: Zachary Abuza, "Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Exploring the Linkages," Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), March 7, 2003.

[41] START, "Terrorist Organization Profile: Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades," date unknown, available online: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3903; Stephen Ulp, "Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades: Fraud or Dissimulation?" *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (March 2005); available online: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=280&tx_ttnews[backPid]=237&no_cache=1; "Group's Responsibility Claims Doubtful," *Associated Press*, July 22, 2005; available online: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,163395,00.html.

[42] RDWTI, "Incident Detail: Mar 11, 2004, Madrid, Spain, Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades," available online: http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/incident_detail.php?id=18518. GTD actually attributes 11 incidents to the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, but six of them took place on March 3, 2004 in Spain and are typically referenced by scholars as a single incident, namely the 2004 Madrid attacks, and another four of the 11 attacks took place in London on July 7, 2005 and are also typically referenced as a single incident, namely the 2005 London bombings or, alternately, the 7/7 attacks. This level of abstraction issue is not mentioned as a criticism in the body of the review, because to date no one has offered a reasonable solution. Questions regarding when to consider a string of bombings as a single

characterization of organizational involvement in attacks at face value, because many claims of responsibility are unreliable.

The impact of these failings is clear: much of the empirical literature on terrorism is falsely definitive because researchers implement these databases without fully considering their shortcomings. Ogen Goldman's effort to estimate the extent of terrorism's globalization offers a useful illustration. His study is theoretically sound; it attempted to gauge the accuracy of assertions that policy makers and the media frequently make regarding the increasingly transnational character of terrorism. The broad strokes of Goldman's methodological approach are similarly sound; he attempted to determine the share of terrorism that groups conduct outside of their _home turf' and then compared the results over time in order to highlight longitudinal trends. Using rigorous statistical methods, he found that terrorism has become *decreasingly* transnational. Therefore, at first blush, Goldman seemed debunk beliefs held by policy makers and the media, and seemed to put-to-bed the need for additional inquiries into the geographic scope of terror operations.

However, in reality, the inherent flaws of the existing databases, specifically the RDWTI, trickled-down to undermine an otherwise well-conceived and well-executed analysis. The database's sole emphasis on attacks dictated that Goldman likely truncated terrorism's transnational variance by ignoring incomplete plots, and because the data examined events only at the organizational level, Goldman was incapable of analyzing the sort of transnational interactions that occurred at the individual level when Indonesians traveled to Afghanistan to receive training, before conducting attacks back home. Moreover, the data's inclusion of ambiguous organizations like the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades may undermine Goldman's study

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incident, versus several distinct incidents, are inherent to the field of study. START, Global Terrorism Database. Incidents filtered by perpetrator.

entirely, because it remains to be seen how an organization that does not exist can have ‗home turf.' In addition to demonstrating that even basic questions regarding the geography of terrorism remain unanswered, this critique shows that inquiries based on typical approaches to quantitative data are just as incapable of accurately characterizing the breadth of terrorism as are the small-N qualitative approaches associated with the construction of unpopulated typologies.

A number of scholars have attempted to overcome such problems by constructing original datasets that focus on terrorists at the individual level. Unfortunately, these efforts fell victim to many of the same shortcomings as the preceding approaches. Several scholars have created datasets that examine the relationships that exist between the individuals involved in a single event or organization.[43] In theory, such inquiries enable analysts to characterize actors' structural role in a single event or organization, but it is rarely clear how the authors have bounded the inquiry, because they fail to specify how distant individuals must be from an event or organization before they cease to be included in the data. Moreover, as Bale highlights by postulating that the individual with the greatest number of contacts (highest degree centrality) may be an errand boy tasked with taking food orders from the cell's more important members, this approach sometimes conflates formal measures of centrality with importance.[44] And even when well-constructed, quantitative data collected at the individual level cannot, in and of itself, enable an inquiry to draw inferences regarding the broader phenomenon under study. Formal, structural analyses of individual terror events and groups are nothing more than quantified

[43] See, for example, Valdis E. Krebs, "Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells," *Connections,* Vol. 24, No. 3 (2002); available online: http://www.sfu.ca/~insna/Connections-Web/Volume24-3/Valdis.Krebs.web.pdf; Jose A. Rodriguez, "The March 11th Terrorist Network: In its Weakness Lies Its Strength," *EPP-LEA Working Paper,* University of Barcelona (December 2005); and Stuart Koschade, "A Social Network Analysis of Jemaah Islamiyah: The Applications to Counterterrorism and Intelligence," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 29, No. 6 (2006), pp. 559-575.
[44] Bale, p. 31.

single-case case studies and consequently face all of the same generalizability issues associated with small-N qualitative approaches.

Broader datasets are fairly rare, but suffer from the same classification issues that undermine the GTD and the RWDTI. The John Jay and ARTIS Transnational Terrorism (JJATT) Database,[45] which constitutes a limited public release of the data that Marc Sageman used to generate his controversial "leaderless" characterization of the Islamist terror movement,[46] and the terrorism resources maintained by the Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) at Carnegie Mellon University offer examples.[47] Within the JJATT data, individuals' group affiliation is "self-declared or assigned by (an) expert," but the codebook fails to mention what criteria are used to determine the veracity of the individuals' membership claims or the process that experts use to assess membership.[48] Thus, the process is vague, non-replicable, and may fall victim to deception by individuals who wish to exaggerate their ties to prominent *jihadist* groups. Given that slight shifts in the boundaries of terror groups can greatly affect how 'leaderless' various operational cells appear to be, it is also worth questioning the role that coders' pre-existing biases about the breadth of al-Qaida may have played in determining Sageman's conclusions. If the individuals who coded the JJATT data

[45] John Jay and ARTIS Transnational Terrorism Database is available online: http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/data.php.

[46] This supposition is based on the affiliations that Sageman and his frequent research partner, Scott Atran, hold with ARTIS. Both men are Senior Fellows; Sageman is the Director of Research, and Atran is the organization's overall Director. For information on ARTIS's staffing, see: http://artisresearch.com/.

[47] CASOS provides general information on its counterterrorism research online: http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/terrorism/index.php. Specific examples of the center's terrorism research include: Mathew Dombroski, Paul Fishbeck, and Kathleen Carley, "Estimating the Shape of Covert Networks," *Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. Conference held at the National Defense War College, Washington DC. Evidence Based Research, Track 3 , Vienna, VA*, (2003); Kathleen Carley, "Destabilizing Terror Networks," *Proceedings of the 8th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. Conference held at the National Defense War College, Washington DC. Evidence Based Research, Track 3, Vienna, VA (2003) and Kathleen Carley and Ju-Sung Lee, "Destabilizing Networks," Connections, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2001). These articles and full listing of CASOS' terror research is available online:* http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/terrorism/publications.php.

[48] ARTIS Research, "Nodes Codebook – Public," (2009); available online: http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/files/Nodes_CodeBook_Public_Version2.pdf.

started the project believing that ‗leaderless' cells were prevalent, then their subjective assessments of al-Qaida's membership may have been overly conservative and may have greatly contributed to Sageman's ultimate finding. Put most simply, overly subjective membership assessments can create self-fulfilling prophecies.

The CASOS data is slightly more explicit about its approach, yet fails to adequately address the issue of subjective coding. The CASOS data determines individuals' organizational affiliations based on media portrayals: if a news source states that someone is a member of a group, then the CASOS data accepts this assessment at face value.[49] However, this approach constitutes little more than an end-run around classification ambiguities; it places responsibility for determining individuals' group affiliations with journalists, who *never* specify how they classify terrorists. Ultimately, neither dataset provides well-reasoned judgments regarding membership in terrorist organizations.

Moreover, the JJATT and CASOS datasets fail to adequately address the completion issues raised by the big-three databases' exclusive focus on completed events. Although the JJATT data focuses on several failed plots, it includes only 92 total events, and many of these cases are drawn from ‗traditional' political terrorism, rather than the world of violent Islamist extremism.[50] It is also unclear how and why the authors of the JJATT data selected these events instead of others, so, to revive the physiology metaphor, the data's authors may have simply collected all of the eight-limbed babies into a single nursery. It is unclear how well the JJATT sample represents Islamist terrorism as a phenomenon.

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[49] Luke M. Gerdes, ―Codebook for Network Data on Individuals Involved with Terrorism and Counterterrorism," *Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer Science, Institute for Software Research, Technical Report CMU-ISR-08-136, October 10, 2008; available online:* http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/publications/papers.php.

[50] ARTIS Research, ―REL Codebook – Public," June 2009, available online: http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/files/Relations_Codebook_Public_Version2.pdf.

Finally, the public version of the data is exceptionally opaque. For reasons that remain unclear, the authors anonymized the information; the individuals included in the data are listed only by identification number, not by name, making it impossible to independently verify the data's accuracy or completeness, much less to replicate the author's coding decisions. It is, for example, impossible to use the data to create a list of events involving Usama bin Laden, and it is impossible to determine how the authors characterized relationships among the various participants in the 9/11 attacks.

JJATT's opacity also takes a second form; although Sageman's published work claims that his data made wide use of news articles and court documents,[51] none of the available literature specifies the scope and composition of the sources used to construct the JJATT data. The number of sources that the data contains and the frequency with which it cites different types of sources remain unclear. Although Sageman persistently claims to practice "science" in the study of terrorism,[52] anyone who uses his data must trust on faith that it reliably characterizes the Islamist terror movement.

Because the analysts at CASOS specify that their data drew on 202 media articles collected from Lexis-Nexis Academic, 45 documents drawn from "non-classified trial transcripts, excerpts from books, scientific articles, and texts from web pages,"[53] as well as numerous government sanctioning lists,[54] their dataset offers an alternative to the JJATT data

[51] Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 26-27. Although Sageman does not reference his work, the idea of applying network coding methodology to court transcripts originated with Malcolm K. Sparrow, "The application of network analysis to criminal intelligence: An assessment of the process," *Social Networks*, Vol. 13 (1991), pp. 251-274.
[52] See, for example, *Leaderless Jihad*, pp. xx-yy (all of chapter 2), and Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, "Does Osama Still Call the Shots? Debating the Containment of al Qaeda's Leadership," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2008; available online: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64460/marc-sageman-and-bruce-hoffman/does-osama-still-call-the-shots.
[53] Jana Diesner and Kathleen M. Carley, "Using Network Text Analysis to Detect the Organizational Structure of Covert Networks," *Proceedings of the NAACSOS 2004 Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, 2004.*
[54] Gerdes, p. 1.

that is comparable in size and largely avoids issues of source opacity.[55] However, the CASOS data has other unique characteristics that may make the dataset better suited to the study of pure network theory than to rigorous explorations of the nature of the Islamist terrorism.

In order to code the data, CASOS relied on AutoMap, a semi-automated text analysis program that determines the existence of relationships based on terms' proximity to each other in printed text.[56] The limitations created by this reliance on technology are best demonstrated by considering the manner in which AutoMap would process a simple declarative sentence:

"The United States lacks diplomatic relationships with Bhutan, Iran, and Cuba, but maintains close ties with Canada and Mexico."

An intuitive reading of the sentence reveals only two ties: one between the US and Canada, the other between the US and Mexico. By contrast, the number of relationships that AutoMap would find depends on a user-controlled variable known as "window size," which sets the maximum distance that can exist between related terms. At a window size of two, the term "United States" would be linked to the words "lacks" and "diplomatic." At a window size of five, "United States" would be linked to with "lacks," "diplomatic," "relationships," "with," and "Bhutan." In order to reach Canada and Mexico, the only two countries that the sentence specifies as American diplomatic partners, the window size would need to be set equal to the number of words included in the sentence—a coding scheme that would also cause AutoMap to find relationships between the US and the three countries it does not recognize, as well as

[55] The available literature does not list the number of events the CASOS dataset contains. Instead, the data is characterized in terms of agents and organizations and data on 3,029 individuals and 1,635 organizations. As JJATT data is characterized in terms of both events and agents/organizations, a size comparison is still possible. JJATT includes information on 2,158 individuals and approximately 1367 organizations. For a characterization of the CASOS data, see: Luke M. Gerdes and Kathleen Carley, "Learning What We Don't Know: An Estimation of the Accuracy of Media Sources Used in Network Analyses of Terror," *Paper Presented to the 29th Annual International Sunbelt Social Network Conference of the International Network for Social Network Analysis (INSNA), San Diego, CA*, 2009. For information on the size of JJATT data, see "Attributes.xls," available online: http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/jjatt/attributes.php.

[56] Jana Diesner and Kathleen M. Carley, "Using Network Text Analysis to Detect the Organizational Structure of Covert Networks," *Proceedings of the NAACSOS 2004 Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, 2004.*

relationships that the sentence does not describe among Bhutan, Iran, Cuba, Canada, and Mexico. There is no scientific means to determine an ‗accurate' window size; users must base their decision on experience or trial-and-error. Consequently, AutoMap's results are not deterministic; a number of different networks could be obtained from identical texts.[57]

Moreover, in order to obtain good results, users must provide the program with a substantial amount of additional information. At a minimum, AutoMap requires comprehensive delete lists (to remove superfluous terms like "and" or "the"), extensive thesauri (to allow the program to recognize equivalent terms and alternative spellings as the same concept), and attribute lists (to allow the program to associate terms like "United States" with a class of actors like "Countries").[58] Broad inquiries, especially those that take place in the ambiguity-ridden field of terrorism, are unlikely to have all of this necessary information at the outset of a study, and AutoMap's accuracy will decline accordingly, regardless of the window size used in coding. Ultimately, the program represents a substantial contribution to the bodies of work that address coding processes and semantic analysis, but AutoMap's information requirements and susceptibility to false positives makes its results less than ideal for the study empirical relationships.

1.3 THE MODIFIED SNOWBALL PROCESS FOR DATA COLLECTION

Clearly, it is necessary to create an original, hand-coded dataset of substantial size in order to study the breadth of the Islamist terror movement, but even this effort is doomed to imperfection. As the NCTC analysts who compile WITS make clear, Islamist terrorism is poorly

[57] Gerdes and Carley; see also, Kathleen Carley, Dave Columbus, Michael Bigrigg, and Frank Kunkel, "AutoMap User's Guide," *Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer Science, Institute for Software Research, Technical Report, CMU-ISR-11-108, 2011.*
[58] Ibid.

bounded and distinguishing it from related forms phenomena like insurgency and crime –can be more art than science."[59] Gaps in information are also unavoidable, and judgments regarding both the nature of events and the perpetrators involved frequently change over time. Consequently, substantial ambiguity is inherent to the subject matter and it is impossible for *any* terror dataset to provide truly comprehensive coverage.[60]

While they cannot eliminate these problems, structured data-collection efforts are necessary to mitigate these issues to the greatest extent possible. Anthropological methods used in the study of hard-to-reach populations like drug addicts and prostitutes offer a reasonable starting place because these research approaches have a proven track-record on subjects that rival terrorism in terms of inherent clandestineness and ambiguity. Specifically, the snowball sampling method, which earned its name from the image of a snowball gathering size and speed as it rolls downhill, offers a compelling logic that compliments the emphasis on person-to-person relationships that is part-and-parcel of studying terrorism at the individual level.

In traditional implementations of snowballing, researchers begin by interviewing a small handful of subjects who exist within the target population. These initial subjects then provide additional names of other members of the target population, who in turn provide more names. This process continues iteratively, until the researcher either obtains a statistically significant sample size or, more frequently, hits a wall and cannot obtain any new names. Thus, the method's underlying assumption is that members of a community, whether comprised of heroin addicts or astrophysicists, know each other. [61]

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[59] NCTC, –Criteria: Methodology Utilized to Compile NCTC's Database of Terrorist Incidents."
[60] Ibid.
[61] Snowball sampling is widely used across the social sciences; for information on the conduct of the methodology, see: R. Atkinson and J. Flint, —Accessing Hidden and Hard-to-Reach Populations: Snowball Research Strategies," *Social Research Update*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2001); S. Curtis, W. Gesler, G. Smith, and S. Washburn, —Approaches to Sampling and Case Selection in Qualitative Research: Examples in the Geography of Health," *Social Science and*

Unfortunately, characteristics of Islamist terrorism complicate snowball sampling's implementation in a traditional, interview-based format. Although Horgan argues rather convincingly that researchers can (and should) conduct first-hand interviews with active terrorists, all of the examples that he uses to support his argument are drawn from traditional political terrorism.[62] Violent Islamists' treatment of journalists elucidates that religious terrorists often view impartial interviewers as legitimate targets. For example, while seeking an interview with a radical cleric in Pakistan, the Wall Street Journal's Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and beheaded by Islamist militants in 2003. Similarly, in 2008, members of the Haqqani network in Afghanistan abducted British journalist David Rohde,[63] and in the southern Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group has kidnapped journalists on at least three separate occasions since 2000.[64] Though Rohde and the Abu Sayyaf victims were eventually returned to safety, it seems clear that efforts to interview active *jihadists* are inherently dangerous. Former *jihadists*, who left radical organizations of their own volition, and imprisoned *jihadists,* whose potential for harm is greatly mitigated by their incarceration, may serve as strong sources of information on the violent Islamist movement, and, indeed, Horgan has relied heavily on interviews with these populations when researching radical Islam instead of political terror, but ex-terrorists and prisoners are

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Medicine, Vol. 50, No. 7/8 (2000), pp. 1001-1014; V.M. Hendricks, P. Blanken, and N. Adriaans, *Snowball Sampling: A Pilot Study on Cocaine Use*, (Rotterdam: IVO, 1992); and C.A. McLean and C.M. Campbell, "Locating Research Informants in a Multi-Ethnic Community; Ethnic Identities, Social Networks, and Recruitment Methods," *Ethnicity and Health*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2003), pp. 41-61.

[62] John Horgan, "The Case for Firsthand Research," in Andrew Silke, ed., *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*, (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 30-56. See also, John Horgan, "Interviewing the Terrorists: Reflections on Fieldwork and Implications for Psychological Research," *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression,* (in press).

[63] Matthew Cole, "The David Rohde Puzzle," New York Magazine, January 22, 2009.

[64] For details on the various kidnappings, see: "Philippine military suspects Abu Sayyaf has 'leadership problem,'" *BBC Monitoring South Asia - Political*, June 22, 2008. "Abu Sayyaf strikes again, kidnaps trader in Jolo, Sulu," *Manila Times* (Philippines), January 31, 2008; Darwin T. Wee, "Business airs concern over rising criminality," *Businessworld* (Philippines), February 4, 2008. Hrvoje Hranjski, "Philippine court hands down terror convictions," *Associated Press Online*, January 23, 2009.

exceptionally difficult to access.[65] In combination, these factors dictate that traditional implementations of snowball sampling are less than ideally suited to provide broad coverage of the Islamist movement, though the method remains capable of providing detailed insight into small pockets of the phenomenon, particularly its less violent portions.

Therefore, this study adopted snowball sampling's logic, but implemented it in relation to the types of media, court, and government sources used in the construction of preceding datasets that study terrorism at the individual level, such as those produced by JJATT and CASOS. For example, the study's inquiry into the 2004 bombings of trains near Atocha Station in Madrid began with a single name: Jamal Zougam, a Moroccan convicted for his involvement in the bombing. A Lexis-Nexis search conducted on Zougam's name produced news articles that discussed a number of additional people, including the Madrid-based Islamic cleric Abu Dahdah and several others known or suspected of involvement in the Madrid attacks, such as Jamal Ahmidan, Serhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, and Abdennabi Kounjaa. Each of these new names served as an additional search term, which in turn resulted in more new names. The process was repeated with each successive wave of search terms, until the study either hit a dead end, where additional searches returned no relevant new names, or the study veered too far from the subject of attacks on civilians. When the process provided information on people involved in insurgencies, such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Chechnya, the study recorded the data, but did not use the criminals or insurgents as new search terms. For the visually minded, Figure 1.1 provides a graphic representation of the process.

[65] John Horgan, *Walking Away From Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2009).

Figure 1.1: Visualization of the Snowball Sampling Process Through Three Steps



However, because this study seeks to examine overall changes in al-Qaida's connection to *jihadist* attacks, a single starting point would be inappropriate. Instead, the study began with a dozen major completed attacks that occurred between 1998, when al-Qaida first debuted on the international security agenda with the bombing of United States embassies in East Africa, and the end of 2008. The study then worked each attack as an expanding snowball sample, in order to see how these attacks connected to each other, as well as to smaller, lesser-known attacks and failed plots.

Issues of journalistic accuracy dictate that it is just as important to include a diversity of source types as it is to begin from multiple starting points. Specifically, Maier's research on media accuracy suggests that between 41 and 60 percent of newspaper articles contain some sort

of factual mistake.[66] Therefore, although the breadth of coverage offered from media databases is truly impressive—Lexis-Nexis alone boasts more than five billion individual documents obtained from some 40,000 sources[67]— the snowball process attempted to mitigate the data ambiguity inherent to media sources by extending the pool of sources to include relevant court documents, available police reports, declassified and unclassified reports issued by federal agencies, relevant reports from international organizations like Interpol, and reports from select non-governmental organizations like the International Crisis Group. Additional streams of information were derived from site visits, which were conducted in more than a dozen countries, and interviews, which were conducted in a semi-structured format with 16 subjects drawn from the policy community, foreign law enforcement, foreign intelligence services, foreign court officials involved in terrorism trials, foreign academics involved in the study of terrorism, technical experts, and one reformed terrorist.[68] Although the academic literature on terrorism serves as a bountiful, perhaps even bloated, source of theory, the snowball process excluded academic journals as a source of data because their inclusion would introduce substantial entropy, by trusting that previous scholars faithfully and impartially reproduced data included

[66] Scott Maier, ―Getting It Right? Not in 59 Percent of Stories," *Newspaper Research Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter 2002).

[67] ―LexisNexis Fast Facts," available online: http://www.lexisnexis.com/media/fast-facts.aspx (accessed 19 Nov. 2008).

[68] The site visits and interviews were conducted between June and August of 2010 with support from the Smith Richardson World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship. Nations visited included the United Kingdom, Spain, Morocco, Kenya, Tanzania, India, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Initially, prospective interview subjects were approached via email, and additional subjects were then obtained via snowball sampling. However, response rates for interview requests were fairly low, in the neighborhood of 20 percent. In total, 21 interviews were conducted, but six of the subjects self-identified as possessing no useful knowledge on the topic of the interview, and their responses were consequently disregarded, leaving a final sample of 16 interviews. These low numbers dictate that the sample was non-representative and should ultimately be viewed as an opportunity sample. In terms of process, the interviews were conducted in English, which was a second language for 5 of the 16 interview subjects. In accordance with IRB protocols regarding the protection of subjects' right to privacy, subjects were allowed the opportunity to participate anonymously if they so desired, and 11 of the 16 subjects chose to remain un-named confidential informants. Similarly, interview subjects were allowed the opportunity to decline audio recording of the interview; 7 of the interview subjects availed themselves of this option. These subjects' responses were recorded as detailed notes, while the responses of the 9 remaining subjects were audio-recorded and then transcribed. Given that the interview subjects had expertise on specific events and issues, the survey instrument varied accordingly. One example can be found in Appendix B.

from their often un-cited sources,[69] and also because journals' inclusion in the data would run the severe risk of conflating authors' interpretive conclusions with accepted fact, a particularly pernicious problem given the wide diversity of views that exist on terrorism even among reputable scholars.[70]

This criticism of the academic literature should not imply that the primary documents listed above are free from flaws. Indeed, each category of sources contains its own inherent deficiencies and biases,[71] so data was triangulated from multiple independent sources whenever possible, but despite this effort it remains unclear how great the corrective effects of the primary documents were. Ultimately, all document-based research on terrorism, whether qualitative or quantitative in approach, suffers from an inescapable and unsolvable problem: it is never entirely clear if the patterns evident in the data stem from meaningful changes in the organizations under study, or if the patterns existed all along and were merely revealed because journalists, the courts, government analysts, and police began to devote additional attention to the organizations in question.

In an effort to avoid the source opacity that characterizes the JJATT data, figure 1.2 summarizes the relative frequency of the various types of sources included in the sample of roughly 3,200 documents yielded by the snowball sample. Media sources constitute the vast majority (81 percent) of the sources cited in the data, but as figure 1.3 demonstrates, news

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[69] For information on the pernicious effects that data entropy has on analysis, see: Robert M. Clark, *Intelligence Analysis: A Target Centric Approach*, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2004), pp. 107-108. For a critique of citation practices within the field of terrorism studies, see: Andrew Silke, "The Devil You Know," in Andrew Silke, ed., *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*, (London (UK): Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 57-71 (but most especially page 65).

[70] Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), p. 179. See also: Silke, pp. 57-71; Sageman, pp. 26-27; and Horgan, "Interviewing the Terrorists," p. 18.

[71] For a thorough discussion of the relative weight that scholars should attribute to police reports and court transcripts, see Carlo Morselli, *Inside Criminal Networks*, (New York: Springer, 2009), p. 44-45. He attributes particular weight to prosecutorial evidence in cases in which guilty verdicts have been returned.

sources account for less than half (46 percent) of the nearly 24,000 individual citations that constitute the main body of the dataset.[72] Though far fewer in number, each primary document was a comparatively rich source of data that yielded more citations than the far more numerous media articles.

Figure 1.2: Breakdown of Sources Resulting from the Modified Snowball Process



[72] Many individual citations contain multiple sources. If they were of different types (e.g. one source was a court document and the other was a news article), the benefit of the doubt went to the primary document, as it became clear during the course of coding some 24,000 interactions that the primary documents were invariably ‗closer' to the event they attempted to portray. Indeed, as it concerns court documents, the new coverage of a given event is often a second or third person recounting of evidence presented at trial. This conclusion raises questions regarding entropy within news sources that are beyond the scope of this inquiry, but which must ultimately be answered if terrorism scholars wish to produce truly objective datasets.

Figure 1.3: Breakdown of Citations Resulting from the Modified Snowball Process



While valuable, purely quantitative descriptions of the sources likely fall short in their efforts to elucidate the potential extent of source biases. Not all interactions included in the data are of equal analytic value, so quantitative descriptions at least partially conflating the quantity of data provided by various types of sources with that data's importance. Interactions that contain strong evidence of surprising, novel, and/or vital connections among violent Islamists are inherently more analytically valuable than interactions which merely strengthen or extend an already robust relationship that has existed for years. Anecdotal experience suggests that, with the exception of a handful of penetrating pieces of investigative journalism, domestic American news sources and news wires tended to yield the largest share of _routine' information, while foreign media publications provided the greatest number of surprises—a conclusion that may say

as much about these sources' reliability as their attention to local stories ignored by western news outlets writing for audiences thousands of miles removed from the event. Finally, primary documents provide the greatest level of detail, but the quantity of minute interactions that court documents contain can sometimes be so great as to be almost crippling. However, it is impossible to confirm these assessments, as no two analysts are likely to be in complete agreement regarding which pieces of data are important or surprising, and few people are likely to be willing to wade through more than 24,000 interactions to make such judgments. Thus, the potential impact that sources biases may have on any conclusions stemming from the data remains an open and ultimately unanswerable question.

Beyond ensuring coverage of a wide swath of sources, the primary benefit of the modified snowball process was to ensure that individuals received as even a research treatment as the underlying source material allows. As Malcolm Sparrow illustrated in his assessment of the implementation of network analysis in the field of criminal intelligence, investigators often create false patterns of individual centrality by focusing collection efforts on the people that they find most interesting, or the people that they suspect are the most important at the outset of the inquiry.[73] Consequently, purely intuitive collection efforts, as epitomized by many studies that utilize Analyst's Notebook, Palantir, and other visually-driven collection interfaces, run the severe risk of creating self-fulfilling prophecies that merely quantify the investigator's pre-existing biases by attributing quantitative scores of importance to actors who merely received a disproportionate share of the investigator's attention. When strictly implemented, the modified snowball process's iterative use of search terms ameliorates such tendencies by forcing researchers to devote equal attention to the fascinating and the mundane.

[73] Malcolm K. Sparrow, "The application of network analysis to criminal intelligence: An assessment of the process," *Social Networks*, Vol. 13 (1991), pp. 251-274.

However, the process mitigates only the collector's bias and does not address similar underlying issues in the source material itself. Because sources are inconsistent in the amount of detail they provide on individuals involved in terrorism, the data may still falsely attribute importance to the most discussed actors. Therefore, despite the breadth of the data's coverage, it is only questionably suited to answering questions of individual centrality (i.e., "who played the key logistical role in the Madrid bombings?") and is better suited to the study of general patterns that are not as heavily affected by unavoidable data omissions.

The standard rebuttal to such concerns draws on a slight misinterpretation of methodological research into the robustness of formal measures of centrality. For example, Carlo Morselli justified his use of formal centrality scores in "the identification of various types of key participants" in clandestine networks on the grounds that such measures "have proven to robust measures in view of missing data problems."[74] To support his assertion, he cited detailed empirical analyses of robustness conducted by a trio of methodological heavyweights, namely Steve Borgatti, Kathleen Carley, and David Krackhardt. However, Morselli over-generalized the results of their analysis.

Borgatti, et al, found that formal measures of centrality are robust in the face of *random* data errors in *random* networks.[75] Neither this analysis nor subsequent work has addressed the analytic impact of non-random omissions and errors, such as those that occur because sources bias coverage in the favor of individuals that police investigators or journalists find most interesting. Similarly, Carley's more recent work, conducted in partnership with Terrill Frantz and Marcelo Cataldo, found that a network's overall shape (topology) had a profound impact on

[74] Morselli, p. 48.
[75] Stephen P. Borgatti, Kathleen M. Carley, and David Krackhardt, "On the robustness of centrality measures under conditions of imperfect data," *Social Networks*, Vol. 28 (2006), pp. 124-136.

the sensitivity of centrality measures to missing data,[76] thereby indicating that claims of data robustness do not extend to the sort of non-random, functionally-organized clandestine networks that Morselli described. Finally, Morselli's own characterization of clandestine networks as lacking density (i.e., having low ratios between the actual ties in the network to the number of ties that would exist if all actors were tied to each other),[77] suggests that analyses of individual importance in "dark networks" may be problematic, because additional inquiries into the robustness of formal centrality measures found that such characterizations are *least* reliable in sparse networks.[78]

However, the analytic limits imposed by issues of source bias are not unique to Morselli's work, and, as his inquiry made extensive use of recorded telephone intercepts and other pools of detailed data not typically available to the public, these issues are less likely to be profound in his analysis than in work which draw on smaller pools of less reliable data, such as Valdis Krebs' widely-publicized (but questionably conducted) attempt to formally characterize relationships among the 9/11 hijackers using only press accounts published in the first six weeks after the 2001 attacks.[79] Nor are the source limitations discussed in regards to Morselli's work inherent only to quantitative analyses; indeed, they be even more problematic in qualitative assessments, where according to the pioneering philosopher of science Karl Popper, "uncritical" researchers have complete freedom to cherry-pick sources — to obtain what appears to be overwhelming evidence in favor of a theory which, if approached critically, would have been

[76] Terrill L. Frantz, Marcelo Cataldo, and Kathleen M. Carley, "Robustness of centrality measures under uncertainty: Examining the role of network topology," *Computational Mathematics and Organizational Theory*, Vol. 15 (2009), pp. 303-328.
[77] Morselli, pp. 47-48.
[78] Barbara Zemljic and Valentina Hlebec, "Reliability of measures of centrality and prominence," *Social Networks*, Vol. 27 (2005), pp. 73-88.
[79] Valdis Krebs, "Uncloaking Terrorist Networks," *First Monday*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (April 2002); available online: http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/941/863.

refuted."[80] Therefore, this process-oriented discussion of sources on terrorism ends where it began, with a disclaimer regarding the opacity inherent to clandestine topics:

Regardless of the process used to compile data, efforts to study terrorism at the individual-level will remain mired in a substantial amount of unavoidable ambiguity. The modified snowball process minimizes these issues; it does not eliminate them.

1.4 THE PERSPECTIVE OF DYNAMIC NETWORK ANALYSIS

While the roughly 24,000 interactions summarized above begin to hint at the size of the dataset that resulted from the modified snowball process, this description does not adequately describe the breadth of the data's coverage, because the figures provide no information on whom or what the data describes. A brief discussion of analytic methodology must necessarily precede such a summary, because methods are exceptionally uneven in their treatment of data, and different methods mandate different data collection criteria. Because network analysis is best understood as the formal quantitative study of the relationships that exist between entities,[81] this methodological perspective dovetails nicely with the emphasis on person-to-person interactions that is inherent to the modified snowball. Moreover, network analysis has the ability to provide the sort of continuous data necessary to accurately classify al-Qaida's involvement in Islamist terrorism. To be blunt: network analysis is well-suited to this analysis.

However, data criteria vary greatly between different types of network analysis. Social Network Analysis (SNA) is the most familiar member of this family of methods, and in its simplest incarnation, examines relationships within a single class of entities, such as individual people, small groups, large organizations, websites, nation states, or even ideas. In the jargon of

[80] Karl Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, Chapter 29, (1957).
[81] Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*, (Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 3; John Scott, *Social Network Analysis: A Handbook* (2nd Edition), (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2000), p. 2; David Knoke and Song Yan, *Social Network Analysis* (2nd Edition), #154 in the Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences Series, (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2008), p. 4.

the discipline, such networks are called one-mode networks because they contain data about only a single type of actor. The most accessible example is of interactions among a small group of people;[82] the binary data matrix and the graph below, which contain equivalent data, illustrate how simple network analysis begins to quantify the study of relationships and begins to demonstrate the method's collection requirements.

Figure 1.4: A Simple Agent x Agent Network

	Tom	Dick	Harry	Bob	James
Tom	--	1	0	1	1
Dick	1	--	0	0	0
Harry	0	0	--	1	1
Bob	1	0	1	--	0
James	1	0	1	0	--



But the complexity of the real world is far greater than that suggested by small, flat networks. Actors share connections not only with other actors, but also with events, organizations, beliefs, and knowledge, to name only a few items. Some social network analyses consider two-mode data, for example by examining actors' interaction with events, but this perspective struggles to accommodate a wider complement of interactions. Moreover, SNA often ignores the diversity of relationships and codes all interactions as identical, despite the

[82] Scott, p. 40.

obvious qualitative differences between, for example, family bonds and business interactions.[83] Some prominent studies, such as Krackhardt's work on the differences between advice networks and friendship networks inside entrepreneurial firms,[84] adopt a multi-relational perspective, but these efforts are the exception, not the rule, and even these studies typically confine themselves to no more than three classes of relationships. The vast majority of studies also tend to focus on small organizations, thereby ensuring near-perfect information, and typically consider only one point in time.[85] Ultimately, these factors dictate that SNA is less than ideally suited to the study of large, ambiguity-ridden, evolutionary phenomena like terrorism.

Enter Dynamic Network Analysis (DNA). This perspective comes closer to approximating the real world by explicitly considering large networks filled with multiple node classes. The method and its tools are flexible—they accommodate virtually any ontology the user can create—but, as Carley argues, people, organizations, events, knowledge, resources, roles, and locations are particularly relevant to the study of terrorism, because this array of node classes facilitates the analysis of a broad range of human, technological, and geographical interdependencies.[86] Moreover, DNA does not present a single "flat" network; instead, the

[83] Kathleen M. Carley, "Dynamic Network Analysis," in *Dynamic Social Network Modeling and Analysis: Workshop Summary and Papers*, (Washington, D.C.: National Academic Press, 2003), p. 134.
[84] David Krackhardt, "QAP Partialling as a Test of Spuriousness," *Social Networks*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1987), pp. 171-186; David Krackhardt and Martin Kilduff, "Structure, Culture, and Simmelian Ties in Entrepreneurial Firms," *Social Networks*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2002), pp. 279-290.
[85] Carley, "Dynamic Network Analysis," p. 134.
[86] This assessment is an extension of Krackhardt and Carley's work on the PCANS framework, which stressed Precedence, Commitment of resources, Assignment of individuals to tasks, Networks of relations among personnel, and Skills linking individuals to resources. Carley rebranded the framework along similar lines in her 2002 and 2003 publications, and the emphasis on geography stems from recent advancements in DNA tools, which now allow for the geospatial display of data. David Krackhardt and Kathleen M. Carley, "A PCANS Model of Structure in Organizations," in *Proceedings of the 1998 International Symposium on Command and Control Research and Technology*, Conference held June 1998, Monterrey, CA: Evidence Based Research, Vienna VA; Kathleen M. Carley, "Smart Agents and Organizations of the Future," in Leah Lievrouw and Sonia Livingston (eds.), *The Handbook of New Media,* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002), pp. 206-220; Carley, "Dynamic Network Analysis," p. 135; Il-Chul Moon and Kathleen M. Carley, "Modeling and Simulation of Terrorist Networks in Social and Geospatial Dimensions," *IEEE Intelligent Systems, Special Issue on Social Computing*, Vol. 22 (Sep/Oct 2007), pp. 40-49.

method represents interactions as a sequence of networks over time, which allows DNA to explore and formally model adaptation, which occurs as ―the set of networks linking people, knowledge, tasks, and other groups or organizations co-evolve."[87] In short, this study adopted DNA because the method's explicit emphasis on large networks and complexity makes it better suited to the study of terrorism than SNA.

The node classes described by Carley served as the basis for the scheme used to code the data collected via the modified snowball process, but additional attribute data was collected to enable the analysis to sub-divide the classes by type. Therefore, the breadth of the data can be described by summarizing the quantity of actors that fell into some of the larger sub-categories, though gluttons for punishment can indulge their desire to examine the details of the data by reviewing Appendixes C through F, which contain various types of attribute information on agents and events included in the snowball sample, and Appendix H, a data file that recounts each individual interaction, the evidence that supports the classification of each interaction, and the relevant sources for each interaction. Less masochistic readers can obtain an appreciation for the breadth of the data by examining Figures 1.5, which categorizes the people, relevant events, and non-terrorist organizations listed in the data. For reasons outlined in detail in the second chapter, it would be inappropriate to list the number of *jihadist* organizations as contained in the raw data.

[87] Carley, ―Dynamic Network Analysis," p. 136.

Figure 1.5: Breakdown of the People, Relevant Events and Non-Terrorist Organizations Listed in the Data



1.5 BEYOND THE SNOWBALL: SITUATING A CONTINUOUS ESTIMATION OF AL-QAIDA'S INVOLVMENT IN TERRORISM WITHIN THE EXISTING THEORETICAL LITERATURE

Merely building a broad-based sample of individuals involved in Islamist terrorism is not sufficient to ensure meaningful results. Because there are an infinite number of ways to interpret data, theory also plays a necessary role. Helfstein and Wright's attempt to determine operational differences among three levels of al-Qaida (the core, the periphery, and isolates) provides a useful starting point to discuss the role of theory in broad-based inquiries, because although this study includes only two dozen events drawn from the somewhat problematic JJATT data, it represents one of the broadest attempts to implement a classification system that categorizes relationships within the Islamist terror movement. Their work begins to highlight definitional ambiguities that problematize most inquiries into terrorism.

Helfstein and Wright's classification scheme hinges on differentiating between "strong," "weak," and "absent" ties to the highest echelons of al-Qaida's leadership, but they neglect to provide explicit definitions of these terms. They define cells with strong ties as those that are "tightly associated with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri," while cells with weak ties "loosely associate with Al Qaeda senior leadership."[1] However, such statements are of questionable utility because they akin to defining a "tall man" as someone who is "long-legged."

To their credit, Helfstein and Wright provide some examples to help conceptualize the differences between categories: the 9/11 hijackers have strong ties to al-Qaida, and the perpetrators of the 1995 Riyadh bombing, who purportedly trained in a bin Laden-funded camp, have weak ties to al-Qaida. But ultimately the authors ultimately describe their terms, rather than defining them. Without an explicit discussion of thresholds between categories, the authors' terms are ambiguous at best.

[1] Helfstein and Wright, p. 369.

An examination of the JJATT data that underlies Helfstein and Wright's inquiry does little to resolve the ambiguity. According to the JJATT codebook, relationships between individuals take four possible values:

0. To indicate the absence of a relationship
1. To indicate acquaintances and distant family ties
2. To indicate friends, moderately close family members, roommates, co-workers, and operational ties, such as those that exist between individuals who ~~w~~worked closely on a bombing together."
3. To indicate close friends, close family members, and ~~t~~tight knit operational cliques (who) would die for each other."[2]

Unfortunately, the distinctions between the categories are unclear. For example, the difference between individuals who worked closely on a bombing together and individuals that are members of the same tight-knit operational clique is imprecise and entirely subjective. The categorization scheme also conflates several types of distinct relationships. For example, while family ties and operational terror ties can overlap, there are an equal number of times when close family members are appalled by their kinsman's participation in *jihadist* terrorism;[3] therefore, it seems inaccurate to meld familial ties and operational ties into a single category. Finally, it remains unclear how this four-part typology of individual relationships interacts with the three-part typology that Helfstein and Wright used to classify attacks and plots, especially considering that a number of authors, including Bale and Jordán, et al, have argued that different members of the same operational cell often hold different types of relationships with al-Qaida. The definitional ambiguities inherent to the JJATT data and Helfstein and Wright's fuzzy conception of tie strength are ultimately additive and problematize the West Point researchers' findings.

[2] REL Codebook, p. 2.
[3] For example, the father of Umar Farouk Abdulmutalab, a Nigerian national who attempted to down a U.S.-flagged jetliner by detonating an explosive hidden in his underwear in December 2009, tried to warn the U.S. State Department that his son was dangerous and might attempt to attack American interests. "One boy's journey to jihad; A former London student, inspired by radical clerics, managed to slip through the intelligence net and launch a suicide mission that nearly brought carnage to America," *Sunday Times* (London), January 3, 2010.

Comparable issues plague other writers. According to Jordán, et al, the differences between GJNs, local cells, and GJMV groups hinge on the extent of participation of full-fledged members of terror groups. These full-fledged members do *not* participate in GJNs, but do comprise a portion of the membership of local cells, and entirely staff GJMV groups. However, because the authors never define the boundaries of membership, their argument becomes circular. Rather than clarifying the varying extent of established terror groups' involvement in attacks, their typology merely shifts the discussion to a debate about which individuals met the criteria necessary to be considered full-fledged members of GJMV groups.

Bale is considerably clearer and attempts to use functional criteria to distinguish between categories in his typology, but as his characterization draws heavily on the work of Jordán, et al, he does not entirely escape their definitional failings. Consider the unclear difference between "local *jihadist* cells organized, supported, and/or directed from abroad" and "self-generating European *jihadist* cells that are in *direct* contact with operatives from al-Qa'ida Central."[4] At what point does "direct contact" translate into a measure of support or direction from the parent organization, and without an explicit definition of the boundaries of the parent organization, how is it possible to determine which cells were self-generating and which cells were established to provide a foreign group with a 'local' presence? For all of its nuance, Bale's characterization still hinges on the contentious question of how to define al-Qaida. Clearly, a firm definition of group membership is a necessary component of any attempt to categorize the Islamist terror movement; the second chapter discusses how to do so at length.

Despite this definitional ambiguity, Bale's work represents a step forward, because he begins to resolve many of the conflation issues that undermine earlier attempts to categorize the violent Islamist movement. Unlike the JJATT data and Helfstein and Wright's inquiry, Bale's

[4] Bale, pp. 62-63. Emphasis in the original.

typology distinguishes between levels based less on subjective judgments of tie strength and more on comparatively clear differences in the type of connection. For example, Bale differentiates between locally-owned *jihadist* cells and self-generating cells largely on the basis of training: members of the former category received it from established foreign terror groups; members of the latter category did not. Thus, Bale begins to suggest that the many types of relationships that exist between Islamist terrorists must be considered independently in order to untangle the complexities of their interactions.

However, Bale's emphasis on the function of ties is incomplete because he discusses many interactions in vague terms. For example, his "connected self-generating European *jihadist* cells" often have "direct contact with operatives from al-Qa'ida Central,"[5] but he never specifies the nature of these direct links. Are they financial ties? Are they friendship bonds? Do they stem from worshipping at the same mosques as 'proper' members of al-Qaida? Consequently, it is necessary to consider additional theoretical perspectives in order to fully resolve the definitional ambiguities that problematize efforts to gauge the extent of established extremist groups' participation in terror events.

A number of analysts have obliquely discussed the types of links that exist between terrorists. For example, Richard Clarke, et al, spoke to the importance of family ties when they observed that a "complicated web of marriage alliances" exists between members of Jemmah Islamiyah, the Southeast Asian terror group best remembered for bombing Bali in 2002.[6] Memoirs penned by Omar Nasiri and Ed Husain, both of whom once participated directly in the

[5] Ibid.
[6] Richard A. Clarke, Glenn P. Aga, Roger W. Cressey, Stephen E. Flynn, Blake W. Mobley, Eric Rosenback, Steven Simon, William F. Wechsler, and Lee S. Wolosky, *Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action*, A Century Foundation Task Report, (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2004), p. 25.

Islamist movement, describe the importance of comradeship between terrorists,[7] and John Horgan's interview-based work on the psychology of terrorism draws similar, but more formal, conclusions regarding the primary role that affinity bonds play in adoption and maintenance of extremist beliefs.[8] However, Steve Coll's work demonstrates that animosity and outright enmity can also exist between Islamists. His history of South Asian terrorism suggests that Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian preacher who served as bin Laden's early mentor, was assassinated in 1989 by rivals within the Islamist movement,[9] and his account of the interactions between the Taliban and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Afghan warlord who has led the militant group Hezb-e-Islami for decades, paints a picture of an on-again-off-again relationship that makes a tumultuous teen romance seem comparatively stable.[10]

Beyond characterizations that highlight the existence of individual relationship types, the late Israeli scholar Ehud Sprinzak described several types of qualitatively distinct ties that exist between terrorists in his pre-9/11 work on the "long organizational chain" that supports Palestinian suicide terror.[11] Specifically, he spoke to the existence of planning ties by discussing the "target selection" and "intelligence gathering" that necessarily precede an attack, and he

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[7] Omar Nasiri, *Inside the Jihad: My Life With Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story*, (New York: Basic Books, 2006), and Ed Husain, *The Islamist: Why I Became and Islamic Fundamentalist, What I Saw Inside, and Why I Left*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2007).

[8] John Horgan, *Walking Away From Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 10, 41-44, and 65-66. Comparable findings on the importance of social constructs have also been made in regards to "traditional" political terrorism. See, for example: Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol. 20, No. 3 (2008).

[9] Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, (New York: Penguin, 2004), p. 204. See also: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), p. 56. (Hereafter the "9/11 Report").

[10] Coll. For additional information on Hekmatyar's enmity toward the Taliban in the mid-1990s, see: Kenneth J. Cooper, "Afghan leaders face toughest foe; Kabul pacifies 3 militias as fourth group makes major territorial gains," *Washington Post*, September 15, 1996. For information on Hekmatyar's warm feelings toward the Taliban in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, see: "Exiled Afghan warlord threatens to return if US sends ground troops," *Agence France Presse*, October 17, 2001; "Taliban ally warns US of long guerilla war," *Agence France Presse*, November 13, 2001; and Phil Reeves, "The threat of war: Fifteen killed in attack blamed on al-Qa'ida; Afghanistan," *The Independent* (London), February 1, 2003.

[11] Ehud Sprinzak, "Rational Fanatics," *Foreign Policy*, No. 122 (Sep/Oct 2000), p. 69.

noted the existence of logistical ties in his description of the individuals involved in the ―preparation of explosives" and ―transportation of the suicide bombers to the target area." Finally, Sprinzak's mention of ―physical and _spiritual' training," described both the ideological bonds that exist between adherents of the same worldview and the relationships formed through the shared instruction.[12]

However, the Australian scholar Clive Williams made the largest and most direct contribution to the discourse on relationship types among terrorists. He explicitly recognized that general terms like ―link" and ―tie" are far too vague, because they include ―anything serving to connect one part or thing with another."[13] When used to describe relationships within the *jihadist* movement, these terms will cause analysts to exaggerate al-Qaida's role in terrorism, because it is likely impossible to find *any* violent Islamist group that is not tied to al-Qaida in at least *some* fashion. He argued that six categories of links exist between groups and individuals involved in Islamist terrorism: (1) links related to ―funding for a spiritual leader's activities," (2) links from ―training in Afghanistan, Pakistan or elsewhere," (3) links from training ―at a local level," (4) financial links related to ―regional operational activities," (5) financial links related to ―logistic support, such as weapons and explosives," and (6) links that stem from direct operational partnerships.[14]

When abstracted and combined with the contributions of the scholars who discussed terrorists' relationships in more oblique terms, this framework yields a fairly comprehensive ontology for the study of interactions among violent Islamists:

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[12] Ibid.
[13] The Macquarie Dictionary, quoted in Clive Williams M.G., ―The Question of _Links' Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia," in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, eds., *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, (Singapore: World Scientific and the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 83.
[14] Clive Williams, pp. 83-84.

1. *Direct operational links* that occur between those who fight together (Williams 6),
2. *Logistical links* that occur through the provision of manpower and materiel (Williams 5; Sprinzak),
3. *Planning links* that occur through target selection and/or the conduct of surveillance (Sprinzak),
4. *Financial links* that occur through the direct provision of money (Williams 1,4, & 5),
5. *Training links* that occur through teaching and shared instruction (Williams 2 & 3; Sprinzak),
6. *Ideological links* that occur through explicit interactions of a spiritual or religious nature (Williams 1; Sprinzak; Horgan),
7. *Family links* that occur through shared bloodlines or marriage (Clarke, et al),
8. *Friendship links* that develop through mutual affinity (Nasiri, Husain, Horgan),
9. *Enmity links* that develop as the result of personal animus or competition (Coll).

Unfortunately, practical constraints preclude this ontology's implementation in its unadulterated form. Raw data on terrorism is of notoriously poor quality,[15] and, as Carlo Morselli's noted in his more general characterization of clandestine networks, it is often necessary to couch interactions in terms of uncertainty, because some sources, even official ones, merely allege that individuals shared a relationship or played a role in an event, without offering definitive evidence.[16]

Fahim Ansari's uncertain involvement in the 2008 Mumbai rampage is illustrative. Although Indian law enforcement argued that Ansari had "meticulously prepared" hand-drawn maps to enable the LeT attack team to maneuver through South Mumbai's hectic urban landscape,[17] an Indian court acquitted Ansari of any involvement in the attack,[18] and David

[15] Silke, pp. 59-68.
[16] Carlo Morselli, *Inside Criminal Networks*, (New York: Springer, 2009), pp. 44-45.
[17] Ashok T. Duraphe, Final Form/Report (Under Section 173 Cr.P.C.) In the Court of Addl. Ch. M.M., 37th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai, February 25, 2009.
[18] "Fahim Ansari's acquittal challenged," *Times of India*, October 4, 2011.

Headley, an American, has since pleaded guilty to conducting the bulk of the reconnaissance in preparation for the attack.[19] Still, as of the fall of 2011, Indian prosecutors hoped to pin charges on Ansari.[20] It remains unclear what role, if any, he played in the Mumbai attacks. Therefore, when the source material offers mutually exclusive portrayals of an individual's involvement, and when the source material is overt in specifying the speculative nature of an interaction, it is necessary to add an additional category:

10. *Uncertain links* that may or may not have taken place (Morselli).

Moreover, information on some specific link types is frustratingly sparse; open-sources are exceptionally inconsistent in their coverage of the individuals involved in clandestine financial transfers. For a small number of events, detailed information is available, and it is possible to follow money from person-to-person, but attack funding is more often attributed to a region, rather than a person or group. For example, the U.S. Treasury department describes how Ruben Omar Lavilla, one of the three men explicitly named as a participant in the 2004 bombing of SuperFerry 14 in the Philippines, channeled money from his "personal Arab contacts" to Filipino extremists,[21] but the open-source data never specifies the names or organizational affiliations of Lavilla's contacts in the Middle East. It is also worth noting that this analysis' specific emphasis on attacks and plots largely precluded the inclusion of more diffuse funding links, as epitomized by several crooked charities' contributions to al-Qaida's general operating fund.[22] Preliminary analyses conducted on the snowball sample demonstrated that these sorts of

[19] USA v. David Headley (Defendant), United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division (No. 09 CR 830-3), Plea Agreement, March 18, 2010.
[20] "Fahim Ansari's acquittal challenged."
[21] "Treasury Designates Seven Member of the Rajah Solaiman Movement," U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, June 16, 2008.
[22] See, for example, the case of Benevolence International Foundation (BIF): USA v. Enaam M. Arnaout, Plea Agreement (No. 02 CR 892), United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, February 11, 2003.

ambiguities were prevalent enough to preclude attack-finance ties from consistently serving as a stand-alone category of analysis.

In other instances, sources described links in exceptionally general terms. For example, in its description of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's activities in the mid-1990s, the 9/11 Commission Report mentions a meeting with Abu Hafs al-Masri, an Egyptian who all sources agree was one of bin Laden's top lieutenants:

> "KSM continued to travel among the worldwide jihadist community . . . visiting the Sudan, Yemen, Malaysia, and Brazil in 1995. No clear evidence connects him to terrorist activities in those locations. While in Sudan, he reportedly failed in his attempt to meet with Bin Ladin. But KSM did see Atef, who gave him a contact in Brazil."[23]

While it is clear that a meeting took place and that the interaction was vaguely operational in nature, it is unclear what the men discussed. If they considered a specific attack, the meeting may have dealt with planning. If Atef's Brazilian contact was a source of manpower or materiel to support one of KSM's myriad operations, the meeting may have also been logistical in nature. Similarly, the meeting may have been financial in nature, if Atef's Brazilian contact was a source of funds, or if Atef provided KSM with some money to facilitate his travel. Given that the data contains thousands of other similar examples, the boundaries between these types of ties were indistinct, making it impossible to consider them as separate categories of analysis in all situations.

Ultimately, theory had to yield to practicality and some of the link types had to be amalgamated to create an ontology robust enough to support formal methods. Therefore, when

[23] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), p. 148. (Hereafter "The 9/11 Report").

considering high-level questions such as responsibility for an attack, the analysis considered the following types of links:

1. *Functional links* formed through operational interactions, planning interactions, logistical interactions, and/or financial interactions.

2. *Training links* formed through shared teaching or instruction.

3. *Ideological links* formed through explicit interactions of a spiritual or religious nature.

4. *Family links* formed through shared bloodlines or marriage.

5. *Friendship links* formed through mutual affinity.

6. *Enmity links* formed through personal animus or competition.

7. *Uncertain links* that may or may not have taken place.

However, this necessary amalgamation does not come without cost. Some of the more nuanced characterizations vanish from the data, and the dedicated emphasis on attacks and plots likely precludes the data from fully describing "financial" members of al-Qaida, whose support shapes the organization, but who otherwise exist outside al-Qaida's locus of decision-making. That said, Jemaah Islamiyah's internal system of finance, which generates operating funds by taxing five percent of members' incomes, demonstrates that finance and membership are often intricately intertwined,[24] and because this study's ultimate aim is to characterize the extent of organizational involvement in terror events, there is a sound rationale for the potentially contentious amalgamation of financial and operational ties, as it is difficult to argue that individuals who provide money in direct support of an attack lack culpability for its outcome. Hopefully, as more information on terrorist finance trickles into the open source, the available

[24] International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003, p. 12.

data on money flows will become robust enough to allow for its analysis as a separate category of interaction and future analyses will be able to examine the nature of organizational involvement in terror events at a finer level of abstraction. In the interim, Figure 1.6 summarizes the frequency of various relationship types within the snowball data sample.

Figure 1.6: Frequency of Relationship Types within the Snowball Data Sample



With the definitional framework reasonably well-addressed, it is time to return to the issues of tie strength that have preoccupied terror theorists' attempts to classify the nature of al-Qaida's involvement in attacks and plots. Network theorists have offered several alternatives to non-replicable intuitive approaches, but unfortunately the nature of data on terrorism precludes most implementations. Granovetter, whose argument on the importance of weak ties first sparked the debate about how to quantify relationships, proposed that the strength of a tie

probably relates linearly to some "combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie."[25] However, he postponed questions of how to measure and index such variables "to future empirical studies."[26]

Given the rather weighty data requirements imposed by Granovetter's characterization, survey-based approaches have abounded.[27] While rigorous, they are well suited neither to large networks, in which tens of thousands surveys would be needed to quantify the various relationships between actors, nor to clandestine topics, in which the very possibility of distributing surveys to subjects becomes farcical. Consequently, other researchers, including Granovetter, have treated the issue by proxy and have adopted simple continuous measurements that determine tie strength by summing the frequency of interactions between two agents.[28] This approach suits the available open-source data on terrorism and serves as the foundation for this study's treatment of the strength of individual interactions.

However, a minor adjustment to Granovetter's approach was necessary to accommodate the dynamic network analysis perspective. In order to enable the analysis to highlight the severance of relationships, this study adopted a time-based additive approach. Specifically, all interactions were coded in simple binary terms and then summed across calendar year and link type. So, for example, if actor "A" passed bomb-making materials to actor "B" three times in

[25] Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 78, No. 6 (May 1973), p. 1361.
[26] Ibid.
[27] See, for example, Peter V. Marsden and Karen E. Campbell, "Measuring Tie Strength," *Social Forces*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (December 1984), pp. 482-501; Andrea Petróczi, Tamás Nepusz, and Fülöp Bazsó, "Measuring tie-strength in virtual social networks," *Connections*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2007), pp. 39-52; Noah E. Friedkin, "A Guttman Scale for the Strength of an Interpersonal Tie," *Social Networks*, Vol. 12 (1990), pp. 239-252; and Kevin B. Wright and Claude H. Miller, "A Measure of Weak-Tie/Strong-Tie Support Network Preference," *Communication Monographs*, Vol. 77, No. 4 (2010), pp. 500-517.
[28] Granovetter, p. 1371. See also, Mario Benassi, Arent Greve, and Julia Harkola, "Looking for a Network Organization: The Case of GESTO," *Journal of Market Focused Management*, Vol. 4 (1999), pp. 205-229.

2005, and also shared audio recordings of radical sermons with actor ~~B~~" twice in that same year, then in 2005, the pair's functional relationship would be of strength 3, and their ideological relationship of strength 2. The data on 2005 has no bearing on the following year; the pair's relationships in 2006 would be evaluated independently, though it remained possible to calculate cumulative relationship strengths through simple addition when merited by the project's analytic demands.

The primary benefits to this approach are that it allows relationships to change over time, as interactions vary in strength from year-to-year, while avoiding the ambiguity inherent to subjective descriptions of tie strength. The primary limitation to this approach is that the calendar year is a somewhat arbitrary dividing line that can artificially break a continual stream of interactions into two less profound annual estimates of a relationship. The resulting over-time characterizations must necessarily be interpreted in fuzzy terms.

How does this characterization of the intensity of relationships fit into a larger theoretical picture? Ultimately, this study's analytic framework synthesizes a Granovettric characterization of tie strength with the literature that Sprinzak, Williams, and other scholars have created to describe the nature of relationships, in order to modify Bale's nuanced system of classifying various levels of al-Qaida involvement. Bale already explicitly considered the nature and strength of ties, so the characterization outlined below merely draws on the other literatures to refine these distinctions. The largest difference between Bale's original characterization and this study's offering is a shift from the description of groups to a description of events. Because groups are tied to events (and events to groups), this change primarily constitutes a refocusing of perspective that more easily highlights organizational adaptation on the part of terrorists by making it possible for al-Qaida to interact with groups of actors in different ways on different

attacks, even within the same period of analysis. Put more simply, this accommodation paints a more nuanced picture by allowing organizations' roles to vary from event-to-event.

Temporarily setting aside definitional questions of how to divide between weak and strong involvement in events—a topic discussed in detail in the third chapter—various aspects of the network data allow al-Qaida's involvement in any attack to be classified in any of the following five categories:

1. Attacks and plots with _strong' functional and/or training links to the organization.
    a. Events that do *not* display functional links to al-Qaida and/or strong training links to al-Qaida are excluded from this category.
    b. The characterization of tie strength allows an additional narrowing of the field, by excluding those events with weak al-Qaida involvement.
    c. Geographical data, drawn from the dynamic network's event x location matrix, allows an additional narrowing of the field, by excluding events conducted by hit squads deployed to the West.
2. Attacks and plots conducted by al-Qaida "hit squads" deployed to the West.
    a. Events that do *not* display functional links to al-Qaida and/or strong training links to al-Qaida are excluded from this category.
    b. Additional events are excluded based on tie strength; this category excludes weakly-tied events.
    c. Non-Western events are excluded in order to distinguish this category from the previous one.
3. Attacks and plots with _weak' functional and/or training connections to al-Qaida.
    a. Events that do *not* display functional links to al-Qaida and/or training links to al-Qaida are excluded from this category.
    b. Additional events are excluded based on tie strength; this category excludes all strongly-tied events.
    c. This categorization does not include a geographic component.
4. Attacks and plots tied to individuals who formerly held strong ties to al-Qaida, but now operate independent of the organization.
    a. Determinations of tie strength enable differentiation by excluding events conducted by individuals that never held strong ties to al-Qaida.
    b. The annualized nature of the dynamic data makes it possible to determine "end dates" for individuals' involvement with al-Qaida; this information enables additional exclusions by removing all people with ongoing ties to al-Qaida from this category.

5. Attacks and plots with explicit ideological ties to al-Qaida.
    a. Events that display functional ties to al-Qaida and/or strong training links to al-Qaida are excluded from this category, leaving events that are primarily tied to al-Qaida through weak ideological bonds or through exceptionally uncertain links
6. Attacks and plots with no links to al-Qaida.
    a. Events that display links of any type to anyone who has ever held ties to al-Qaida are excluded from this category.

The *jihadists* that Bale describes as local cells planted in the West with long-term objectives are beyond the scope of this inquiry, because their stated mission is long-term logistical and financial support of the broader organization, rather than direct support of attacks. Similarly, it is important to note that the sixth category is not synonymous with the self-organization grassroots organizations described by Sageman and Jordan, et al, because this category includes attacks and plots conducted by recognized terror groups that merely lack demonstrable ties to bin Laden‘s organization. Indeed, as estimates provided by the third chapter demonstrate, many of these self-organizing groups more accurately fall within the fifth Baleian category.

1.6 FROM THEORY TO IMPLEMENTATION: AN OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

Because it is impossible to determine how al-Qaida is connected to an event without first explicitly defining the organization‘s boundaries, the second chapter discusses the need for a methodologically rigorous definition of terror groups, before describing a network-based grouping method that utilizes the snowball sample to offer one reasonable solution to the problems inherent to existing definitional approaches. This chapter closes by testing the output of the grouping model against expert characterizations of terror groups‘ membership. However, because reliable, full membership rosters for contemporary terror groups simply do not exist in

the open-source, this test offers only partial proof of concept for the membership model, not complete validation.

The third chapter, which is also methodological in nature, turns its attention to the question of implementation. This chapter explains how the analysis moves from individual-level characterizations of involvement in events to formal estimates of organizational involvement in terrorist events. The chapter then revisits the distinction between ―weak" and ―strong" involvement in attacks and describing a non-subjective means of differentiating between these levels. These findings then serve to classify the plots and attacks listed in the snowball data sample into the six-tiered, events-oriented Baleian typology outlined above. Therefore, this chapter contributes to the theoretical literature on terrorism by offering a broad estimation of the relative frequencies of patterns of al-Qaida involvement. Although the patterns that this chapter finds rely heavily on the membership model's definitions of organizational boundaries, the processes outlined could be applied to any membership list that an analyst chose to use; therefore, this chapter also makes a useful amendment to the methodological discourse on terrorism.

The findings of the third chapter serve as a metric that aids in the selection of representative cases, and the remaining topical chapters turn their attention toward issues of within-group variability and use case study to explore patterns of change over time within the categories of the Baleian typology. Toward that end, the fourth chapter discusses attacks and plots with strong links to al-Qaida that take place in the organization's back yard and examines patterns of training, finance, logistics, and operations among the individuals involved in three cases: (1) the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Eastern Africa, (2) the 2002 Mombasa attacks on Israeli-linked targets, and (3) a string of bombings conducted in Pakistan in 2004 under the

leadership of two men who ‗graduated' from one of al-Qaida's Waziristan-based camps immediately prior to the terror campaign. Broadly speaking, the comparison of these cases suggests that the scale of al-Qaida's operations and the quality of its operatives have decreased steadily over time. Similarly, the scale of support that bin Laden's organization has been able to offer operatives has decreased steadily, and even those individuals with strong ties to al-Qaida have had to either become more self-reliant or have had to partner with outside organizations in order to accomplish attacks.

The fifth chapter discusses hit squads deployed by al-Qaida to the West. It discusses five cases: (1) the 9/11 attacks of 2001; (2) a 2004 fertilizer-bomb plot against London, (3) the July 7, 2005, London bombings, which featured some of the same players as the 2004 plot; (4) the failed July 21, 2005, attack on London, which shared training ties to the previous attack; and (5) a 2009 plot against New York city's subway system conducted by three long-time residents of the United States shortly after they graduated from an al-Qaida training camp, which shared diffuse training ties to the two previous cases. However, as the events of 9/11 are well known and have been described in thorough detail elsewhere,[29] this case is considered primarily for comparative purposes. The results of this comparison demonstrate that similar patterns characterize both al-Qaida's Western and non-Western operations over time: the scale of hit squad attacks have decreased over time; the quality of hit squad operatives, as measured by the extent of their training, has similarly decreased over time, and it seems that the amount of financial and logistical support al-Qaida provides to these operatives has decreased substantially over time.

The sixth chapter turns its attention toward plots and attacks with weak connections to al-Qaida. It considers five cases drawn from Indonesia: (1) the 2002 Bali bombings, (2) the 2003

[29] See, for example: The 9/11 Report; *Ghost Wars*, and Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006).

bombing of the Jakarta Marriott, (3) the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta, (4) the 2005 Bali bombings, and (5) the 2009 near-simultaneous bombings of the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta. This chapter argues that relationships within the violent Islamist community have a certain evolutionary character, as evidenced by Noordin's gradual creation of a new independent terrorist organization. In terms of theory, this chapter has implications for the literature that describes the causes of organizational fracture among terror groups, as Noordin's experience demonstrates that splinters do not always form in sharp response to peace settlements or other events that cause an immediate rift between organizations' hard-line and moderate members.

The seventh chapter deals with plots and events involving individuals who formerly held close ties to al-Qaida, but who now operate independent of bin Laden's organization. Data fidelity precludes this chapter from fully adopting the events-based perspective utilized in other chapters; there for the chapter examines two cases at the organizational level: (1) al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and (2) al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. The findings of this section reinforce the evolutionary arguments put forth in the previous chapter, while simultaneously aiding in the creation of a theory that addresses why relationships among violent Islamists degrade over time. It seems that access to financial resources obtained from crime may be causally related to the extent of violent Islamists' functional independence from parent organizations.

The eighth chapter turns its attention to plots and attacks conducted by individuals with loose, non-functional ties to al-Qaida. Given the breadth of the topic, case selection is particularly challenging, so this study employed a double-binding constraint to ensure comparability of cases and discusses only those events that took place in the United States and

targeted military personnel. Three cases emerge: (1) the 2007 plot against Fort Dix in New Jersey, (2) the 2009 shooting at an Army recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, and (3) the 2009 shootings at Fort Hood in Texas. While such plots remain of concern, this chapter finds that both the threat that they pose and their connection to al-Qaida are typically exaggerated. Moreover, this chapter questions the extent of the role that online propaganda, which constitutes these plots' primary ties to al-Qaida, plays in the indoctrination process, as social ties to existing *jihadists* seemed to play a more dominant role.

Because the final Baleian category deals with attacks and plots that have no connection to al-Qaida, it is omitted from discussion on the grounds that it falls beyond the bounds of this study. Therefore, the ninth and final chapter offers some general conclusions and makes policy recommendations regarding how to best combat the threat posed by al-Qaida.

2.0 CUTTING THE PIECES OF THE *JIHADIST* JIGSAW PUZZLE: HOW TO DEFINE MEMBERSHIP IN ISLAMIST TERROR GROUPS USING IMPERFECT DATA AND WHY THE PROCESS IS IMPORTANT

Defining al-Qaida is difficult, but important. Unfortunately, no consensus exists regarding the nature of the organization. To some, al-Qaida is a finite group with a well-defined membership and explicit organizational boundaries. To others, al-Qaida is more of an ideology, to which any motivated individual can self-subscribe prior to undertaking violence aimed at furthering the Islamist cause.[1] Consequently, estimates of the number of individuals who have ever held membership in the organization range from "several hundred"[2] to at least 70,000.[3] Such disagreements matter because they are the root cause of substantial debate surrounding al-Qaida's role in various attacks, which in turn shapes policy arguments about how to best combat the threat of Islamist terrorism.

Following this introduction, this chapter contains three sections that explore the nature of membership in al-Qaida. The first section highlights the need for a formal, functional definition of al-Qaida by discussing the shortcomings associated with traditional criteria used to determine membership in Islamist terror groups. Network-based grouping methods and their applicability

[1] Michael Kenney, *From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Advantage,* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), p. 11; see also, Bruce Hoffman and Marc Sageman, "Does Osama Still Call the Shots?" *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2008; available online: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080701faresponse87415/marc-sageman-bruce-hoffman/does-osama-still-call-the-shots.html.

[2] Richard A. Clarke, Glenn P. Aga, Roger W. Cressey, Stephen E. Flynn, Blake W. Mobley, Eric Rosenback, Steven Simon, William F. Wechsler, and Lee S. Wolosky, *Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action*, A Century Foundation Task Report, (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2004), p. 15.

[3] Jack Boureston and Charles Mahaffey, "Al-Qaeda and Mass Casualty Terrorism: Assessing the Threat," *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 2, No. 10 (October 2003).

to the modeling of terrorist organizations are the subjects of the second section, which closes by outlining the procedures this analysis followed to create a formal model of al-Qaida membership. The third and final section turns its attention to results and compares the output of the formal grouping method against expert characterizations of membership, in order to address questions of model fit to the greatest extent allowed by the ambiguity-ridden subject matter.

2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF DEFINITIONS

Definitions matter because they shape policy. This statement is easily tested in the realm of counterterrorism by considering the implications of viewing al-Qaida in the widest possible terms: when analysts use ―al-Qaida" as a perfect synonym for the larger violent Islamist movement, it seems that the *jihadist* threat can be neutralized by eliminating a single organization that is responsible for virtually every attack. More finite definitions of the organization draw additional boundaries within the Islamist terror movement, thereby arguing that counterterrorism policy must combat multiple, distinct terror groups to mitigate the *jihadist* threat. Thus, determining if and where to draw the lines between terror organizations is more than an academic exercise in classification; it has practical implications that affect national and international security.

Unfortunately, there is no straightforward process for finding the boundaries of Islamist terror groups. The easiest solution is to simply rely on classifications found in existing descriptions of the *jihadist* threat.[4] However, because journalists and scholars are rarely explicit

[4] For example, the Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) has adopted this perspective in the construction of its counterterrorism database. Luke M. Gerdes, ―Codebook for Network Data on Individuals Involved with Terrorism and Counterterrorism," *Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer Science, Institute for Software Research, Technical Report CMU-ISR-08-136, October 10, 2008; available online:* http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/publications/papers.php.

about how they define al-Qaida or other terror groups, the secondary source-material on *jihadist* terrorism is replete with conflicting and irreconcilable accounts of organizations' membership.

The 2004 attacks on Madrid's commuter rail system offer a useful illustration. Scott Atran, an American scholar with extensive experience consulting on national security issues for the U.S. government, claims that the Madrid bombers worked independent of support from bin Laden's organization. "There isn't the slightest bit of evidence of any relationship with al-Qaida," Atran stated. "We've been looking at it closely for years and we've been briefed by everybody under the sun ... and nothing connects them."[5] Fernando Reinares, a Spanish scholar, disagrees and argues that the Madrid bombers had "international connections" with both al-Qaida and its affiliated organizations.[6] Jeffrey Bale's characterization of the attack includes the aspect of time; he argues that the Madrid bombers formerly held ties to al-Qaida, but reformed as an independent network prior to conducting the attacks.[7] Jose A. Rodriguez, a Spanish network analyst, takes arguments about al-Qaida's involvement in the Madrid attacks to their farthest extreme and argues that "the March 11th terrorist cell . . . is also linked to, and a part of, al Qaeda's much larger and more diffuse network."[8] Although these scholars debate the nature and extent of some participants' roles, there is a surprising level of consensus regarding the specific individuals involved in the attacks; therefore, the academic community's widely divergent conclusions about the extent of the Madrid bombers' affiliations with al-Qaida stem primarily

[5] Quoted in Paul Halimos and Mark Tran, "21 guilty, seven cleared over Madrid train bombings," *Guardian*, October 31, 2007; available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/31/spain.marktran. Atran's academic conclusions match the sentiments expressed in the quote. See, for example, Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod, Richard Davis, and Marc Sageman, "Terror Networks and Sacred Values: Synopsis of Report from Madrid – Morocco – Hamburg – Palestine – Israel – Syria," Delivered to NSC Staff, March 28, 2007; available online: http://sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/synopsis_atran-sageman_nsc_brief_28_march_2007.pdf.

[6] Fernando Reinares, "The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism," *Survival*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (April-May 2010), 83-104.

[7] Jeffrey M. Bale, "Jihadist Cells and 'I.E.D.' Capabilities in Europe: Assessing the Present and Future Threat to the West," *Monterey Institute of International Studies*, 2010.

[8] Jose A. Rodriguez, "The March 11th Terrorist Network: In Its Weakness Lies Its Strength," Working Papers EPP-LEA, Study Group on Power and Privilege, Department of Sociology, University of Barcelona, December 2005.

from irreconcilable views about where to bound al-Qaida as an organization. Given such discord, existing characterizations of membership cannot be trusted at face value.

Another approach to determining membership centers on compiling a list of followers who "made *bayat*" by swearing oaths of allegiance to a terrorist leader or a terrorist organization. While these oaths makes it possible, at least in some theoretical sense, to construct membership rosters for terror groups, such attempts require nearly perfect information, which is not available because terrorist organizations are, by their very nature, clandestine. Intelligence analysts working with highly classified data *might* be able to reconstruct such lists by analyzing the contents of computer hard drives seized during the capture of high-level terrorists, but even with the best data available, the task remains herculean and fraught with gaps.

In large part, this difficulty stems from organizational adaptation on the part of the terrorists. Egyptian Islamic *Jihad* (EIJ) suffered tremendous operational losses in the mid-1990s, when hundreds of members were arrested after the Egyptian intelligence service seized a copy of EIJ's membership roster during the arrest of a high-ranking leader.[9] As this incident is well known in Islamist circles, it presumably serves as a cautionary tale that makes *jihadists* leery of committing too much information to storage in physical or digital files.[10]

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[9] Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), pp. 209-210.

[10] At first blush, the experience of Mohammed Naem Noor Khan, a Pakistani computer engineer, seems to contradict this statement. He was characterized as a hub in al-Qaida's communications network at the time of his arrest in 2004, because his computer hard-drive contained contact information on several terrorists in South Asia and Britain. However, Pakistani authorities released Khan in 2007, without ever filing any charges against him. Knowledgeable observers, including former counterterrorism tsar Richard Clarke, have suggested that Khan was working with Pakistani authorities in a sting-operation against al-Qaida. Thus, while the wave of arrests that stemmed from information contained on Khan's hard drive demonstrates that computer records can serve as valuable "membership lists," Khan's example says little about terrorists' reticence to record information, as he was likely working at the authorities' behest. For early characterizations of Khan's role in al-Qaida, see: Doug Saunders, "Al-Qaeda raid in Pakistan led to arrests in London; British officials say information gathered is not enough to raise terror alert levels," *The Globe and Mail* (Canada), August 6, 2004; "Outisde view: Focus on Pakistan's jihadis," *United Press International*, August 9, 2004; "Naeem was top terror planner," *The Pakistan Newswire*, August 4, 2004. For an account of Khan's release, see: Habibullah Khan and Maddy Sauer, "Pakistan Computer Expert With Alleged Al Qaeda Ties Released," *ABC News*, August 21, 2007.

Beyond the information challenges associated with an oath-based approach, questions remain about its utility. Defining al-Qaida's membership based exclusively around the ideal of *bayat* would exclude several individuals intimately involved in the organization's operations, because a number of people participated in al-Qaida attacks without first swearing allegiance to bin Laden.[11] Most famously, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (KSM), the acknowledged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, delayed pledging loyalty to bin Laden for as long as possible. He did not take an oath until well after the September 11th attacks and only did so because members of al-Qaida's leadership convinced him that his refusal set a poor example for the organization's rank-and-file.[12] Yet, by any functional definition, KSM had been a member of the organization for years.

Nor is this pattern unique to al-Qaida. Yasin Syawal offers an example that demonstrates the disutility of *bayat* as a proxy for organizational membership in a Southeast Asian context. Syawal, an Indonesian, first became involved in *jihadist* violence in the mid-1980s, in Afghanistan, where he fought against the Soviets alongside several of the men who would go on to found al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).[13] He also married into the movement, by wedding the step-daughter of Abdullah Sungkar, who served as JI's *emir* from the organization's founding in 1993 until his death in 1999. By the late 1990s, Syawal had become involved in both attack-planning and terror training; he attended a 1999 meeting that discussed assassination targets,

[11] Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. 30.
[12] USA v. Zacarias Moussaoui (Defendant), United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division (Criminal No.: 01-455-A), Evidence Presented in Lieu of Testimony by KSM, date unknown; see also, Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), Unclassified, March 10, 2007.
[13] International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003.

including the president of Indonesia,[14] and he instructed recruits at Camp Hudiebiyah, a JI facility that operated on the remote southern Philippine island of Mindanao until it was over-run by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in July 2000.[15] But despite holding familial, operational, and training ties that bound him to JI, Syawal clung to a façade of independence and refused to swear fealty to Sungkar or his successors.[16] When viewed alongside KSM's complicated relationship to al-Qaida, Syawal's experience with JI demonstrates that *bayat* is a poor measure of membership for two of the world's best-known Islamist terror organizations. It is hardly an intellectual leap to assume that this pattern applies more broadly to the *jihadist* movement.

Moreover, a lack of enforcement mechanisms often problematizes oath-based definitions of terror groups. There are isolated examples of terror leaders imposing corporal punishments—even including execution—on wayward members,[17] but many groups have seen little need for a codified system of penalties, because oath-takers' religious devotion theoretically ensures compliance. According to information obtained from KSM after his 2003 capture, violations of *bayat* within al-Qaida ~~–~~were considered to be between the individual and God."[18] Consequently, individuals were free to be as insubordinate as allowed by their individual fears of divine retribution or subsequent re-evaluations of the justness of their organization's leadership. Indeed, this theological loophole allowed some prominent followers of bin Laden to operate virtually independently, despite their promise to heed the commands of al-Qaida's leadership.

[14] U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Snow announces designation of 10 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists," FDCH Federal Department and Agency Documents, September 5, 2003.
[15] International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003.
[16] Ibid, p. 14.
[17] Wright, pp. 242-246; see also, "London-based Islamists view death of Al-Qa'idah's Abu-Khabab al-Masri," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, August 5, 2008.
[18] USA v. Zacarias Moussaoui (Defendant), United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division (Criminal No.: 01-455-A), Evidence Presented in Lieu of Testimony by KSM, date unknown.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who led al-Qaida in Mesopotamia until his death in June 2006, offers a useful illustration. Despite making *bayat* to bin Laden in October 2004,[19] Zarqawi engaged in widespread violence against Iraqi Shiites throughout 2005.[20] These actions were in open defiance of al-Qaida's leadership, which felt that sectarian violence in Iraq created dissent among insurgents that was inimical to the organization's larger goal of defeating the American military. With no formal means to discipline Zarqawi, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian physician who long-served as bin Laden's second-in-command, could do little more than cajole the wayward Jordanian back into line with al-Qaida's polices. Toward that end, Zawahiri wrote a letter, later captured by American forces, that attempted to influence Zarqawi's behavior, but Zarqawi's supposed superior stopped well short of issuing commands.[21]

As an even more egregious example of the fallibility of *bayat*, consider Jamal Ahmed Mohamed al-Fadl. Sudanese by birth, al-Fadl fell-in with a radical crowd after moving to Brooklyn and attending the Farouq Mosque, where Omar Abdel Rahman, the Blind Sheikh, began leading services in 1987.[22] By 1988, al-Fadl had acquired terror training in Afghanistan, at Khalid Ibn Walid Camp, and the following year, he swore a formal oath of allegiance to al-Qaida's leadership. Al-Fadl rose fairly high in the organization; he reported directly to al-Qaida's *Shura* Council and ostensibly functioned as bin Laden's personal secretary during the dissident Saudi's sojourn to the Sudan. But al-Fadl felt undervalued. He embezzled $110,000 of al-Qaida funds because he was angry that his salary was lower than that of several EIJ members

[19] Dexter Filkins, "Wanted rebel vows loyalty to bin Laden, web sites say," *New York Times*, October 18, 2004; Mark MacKinnon, "Empty chairs, angry youths and ignominy," *Globe and Mail* (Canada), June 9, 2006.
[20] See, for example, Dexter Filkins, "On bus, bicycle, and foot, suicide bombers aim at Shiite holy day," *New York Times*, February 20, 2005; Sabrina Tavernise and Robert F. Worth, "Relentless rebel attacks test Shiite endurance," *New York Times*, September 19, 2005; and James Palmer, "Co-ordinated blasts kill at least 60 in Iraq; Latest bombings viewed as first wave of increased terror in run up to key vote," *Globe and Mail* (Canada), September 30, 2005.
[21] Dexter Filkins, "Top insurgent in Iraq adopts lower profile," *New York Times*, March 25, 2006.
[22] USA v. Usama bin Laden, et al (Defendants), United States District Court Southern District of New York (S(7) 98 Cr. 1023), Day 2 (February 6, 2001) and Day 6 (February 15, 2001) of testimony.

on bin Laden's payroll. When confronted, al-Fadl fled the Sudan, and in 1996, he walked into an American Embassy to offer his services as an informant. Al-Fadl ultimately became the U.S. Justice Department's star witness in the trial of the perpetrators of the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.[23] His formal pledge of loyalty precluded al-Fadl neither from stealing al-Qaida's funds nor from taking actions that condemned several of his brethren to life-long imprisonment.[24]

Such examples demonstrate that terror leaders' power stems from their ability to inspire, guide, and encourage followers, rather than from the sort of true command and control held by military officers in traditional state-based armies. Individual members' ability to re-interpret the context and meaning of their oaths of allegiance preclude lists of sworn followers from serving as a reliable proxy for functional membership in terrorist organizations, because these oaths fail to ensure compliance with organizational goals. In short, *bayat* can be fleeting.

2.2 NETWORK-BASED GROUPING METHODS

What means exist to overcome the inconsistencies the plague the secondary literature's characterization of organizational affiliations and the shortfalls of oath-based approaches to determining group membership? Formal, network-based models of group membership offer one reasonable solution. The difficulty lies in choosing the right grouping method.

Scholars have devised an almost limitless number of techniques and variations, which differ greatly in their ability to find accurate boundaries between terror groups. Many of the simplest, best-known methods are far too restrictive. For example, groupings known in network-

[23] Ibid, Day 2 (February 6, 2001) and Day 3 (February 7, 2001) of testimony.
[24] Specifically, Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Mohamed Sadeek Odeh, and Wadih el-Hage received life sentences. See, USA v. bin Laden, et al, sentencing hearing, October 18, 2001. For a briefer journalistic treatment of the case's outcome, see: Phil Hirschkorn, "Four embassy bombers get life," *CNN.com*, October 21, 2001; available online: http://edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/10/19/embassy.bombings/.

speak as ―cliques" have unrealistic membership requirements that clash with the even the most basic understanding of real-world organizations.

Cliques exist when all members share connections with each other, and the group is ―maximal" because it cannot be made larger by including another member. However, all members of large organizations are unlikely to know one another. It would be foolish to assume that all faculty members in a large university were personally acquainted, much less to assume that all members of a violent clandestine organization, which may deliberately isolate components of the organization in the name of operational security, were members of a single formal clique. Real-world organizations contain several overlapping cliques, as well as a number of other individuals who exist outside of these structures. Ultimately, cliques and the countless other clique-like measurements are ill-suited to determining the boundaries of Islamist terror groups.

Even the briefest comparison between the nature of the *jihadist* threat and the mathematical input requirements of potentially useful grouping algorithms allows the field of candidates to be narrowed considerably further, because the vast majority of non-clique-like grouping methods require *a-priori* knowledge of the number of groups that exist in the data. These algorithms are useful for predicting how members are likely to align in the event of an organizational fissure, by simulating the groupings that would likely result if an organization split into two, three, or four distinct components, but these methods are ill-suited to a broad study of membership among Islamist terrorists, because, for reasons illustrated below, the total number of groups involved in the *jihadist* movement remains unknown.

An accurate count of the number of Islamist terror groups remains exceptionally difficult to complete, because many groups that claim attacks may exist in name only. The best known

such group is undoubtedly the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, an ‗organization' that has claimed responsibility for attacks in Turkey, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, and Spain, as well as for a 2003 power black-out in the Northeast United States—a case in which authorities have ruled out any possibility of sabotage.[25] Knowledgeable observers almost unanimously agree that this group does not exist.[26] Instead, the al-Masri Brigades seem to be a ruse designed to panic Westerners into believing that extremists present a unified threat with global reach. If the organization's claims are accepted at face value, then several distinct terror groups would blend into one, resulting in a wildly inaccurate count.

Organizational mergers complicate estimates of the number of active terror organizations in a similar fashion. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), one of several organizations claiming regional partnerships with bin Laden's organization, offers an example. Despite the similarity of the organizations' names, the nature and depth of AQIM's relationship to al-Qaida remains ambiguous. Do the organizations share day-to-day operations? Are there sporadic and intermittent financial partnerships? Or, do these allegiances exist in name only, at a purely ideological level? Until such questions are satisfactorily answered in relation to al-Qaida's many regional ‗partners,' it would be irresponsible to implement any formal method that required the analyst to specify the number of divisions that the grouping process should find, because it remains unclear whether or not these groups are truly part of al-Qaida.

In practice, this restriction eliminates all but Newman's grouping process, the only grouping method that can find meaningful group divisions within large networks absent any

[25] "Group's Responsibility Claims Doubtful," *Associated Press*, July 22, 2005; available online: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,163395,00.html.

[26] See, for example: START, "Terrorist Organization Profile: Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades," date unknown, available online: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3903; Bryan Bender and Farah Stockman, "Officials: Group tying self to blasts may not be real," *Boston Globe,* March 13, 2004; Stephen Ulp, "Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades: Fraud or Dissimulation?" *Terrorism Focus*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (March 2005); available online: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=280&tx_ttnews[backPid]=237&no_cache=1

user-specified information on the number of groups that exist within the data.[27] Named for its discoverer, this method operates according to a simple underlying logic: individuals within a natural group will share more ties between each other than between non-members.[28] Consequently, the method centers on finding the individuals who play the largest role in binding together the network. These individuals score highest in a network measure known as betweenness, which scores the extent to which actors function as bridges that connect disparate sub-groups that would otherwise remain untied.[29]

After finding the individual with the highest betweenness, the Newman method simulates his removal, and then tests the fit of the simulated split against data that contains identical group divisions, but random patterns of links. When the value of this comparison, known as a modularity score, approaches zero, the simulated divisions perform no better than random data. When modularity approaches the theoretical maximum of one—in practice, scores above 0.7 are

[27] Although CONCOR grouping (CONvergence of iterated CORrelations) can also be conducted without any underlying knowledge of the number of organizations that exist within the data, this method is an improper choice for this analysis, because CONCOR groups actors based on structural equivalence. In plain language, CONCOR finds individuals who share similar patterns of ties and thus play similar roles within the network. Consequently, this method provides a measure of individuals' redundancy in the network and does not find boundaries between organizations within the data. Indeed, several CONCOR groups are likely to exist within the same organization. Because it assesses the role of interstitial individuals and allows for multiple membership, Davis and Carley's Fuzzy Overlapping Groups (FOG) algorithm has much appeal for this sort of analysis, but the original K-FOG algorithm requires users to specify the number of groups (K) in the data, and the alpha-FOG algorithm, which suggests the number of groups based on a user-specified error tolerance, is too computationally complex to be applied to large networks. Attempts to do so are beyond the calculative power of current technology. Consequently, efforts to implement alpha-FOG on the data derived from the snowball sampling process caused repeated computer crashes. Thus, Newman is the only grouping option available. For an accessible and fairly non-technical discussion of CONCOR and the broader topic of structural equivalence, see: John Scott, *Social Network Analysis: A Handbook*, 2nd Edition, (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 2001), pp. 124-138. For a more mathematical treatment, see: Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*, (Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 356-381. For information on FOG, see: George B. Davis and Kathleen M. Carley, "Clearing the FOG: Fuzzy Overlapping Groups for Social Networks," *Social Networks*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July 2008), pp. 201-212.

[28] M.E.J. Newman and M. Girvan, "Finding and Evaluating Community Structure in Networks," *Physics Review E*, Vol. 69 (2004).

[29] For a formal discussion on the calculation of betweenness, see: Wasserman and Faust, pp. 189-191.

rare—there is strong evidence that the simulated groupings are non-random and, therefore, meaningful.[30]

However, the Newman method does not stop after this first division; the process is iterative. It simulates the deletion of each node in sequence according to its betweenness scores, until the method has divided the network into a series of disconnected isolate nodes. Because the process produces modularity scores after each simulated removal, this method is able to find the most meaningful result, by finding the simulation that produces the highest modularity score. Thus, the final output is a single graph displaying the group divisions most likely to be meaningful.[31]

Just how probable are these ―most likely divisions"? The exact mathematical answer varies from case to case, but the Newman method performs with admirable accuracy. When benchmarked against real-world data, in which ethnographers observed and recorded group splits, and when tested against computer generated data, this process correctly classified about 90 percent of actors.[32] Consequently, the Newman method is well suited to the study of *jihadist* terrorism, because it offers an elegant method to find ‗natural' groups, without requiring the user to specify the number of divisions that exist within the data.

The trick of applying the method involves determining which sorts of relationships to include in the grouping analysis. Organizational theory argues that group membership choices are determined by a confluence of factors, including: friendship choices, family relationships, ideological affinities, operational overlaps, and financial interactions. In order to encompass this complexity, there is little sense in excluding any specific type of interaction, save enmity ties and ties exceptionally unlikely to have taken place, during the initial grouping.

[30] Newman and Girvan.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.

However, implementing the Newman grouping process in a multi-modal, multi-relational network is a somewhat more complicated process, because this method performs erratically when data is not in a uni-relational, one-mode format.[33] A substantial amount of data pre-processing must consequently be conducted prior to implementing the method. Unfortunately, standard approaches to data transformation carry significant analytic cost when applied to weighted data that scales the strength of relationships.

Analysts typically derive one-mode matrixes from two-mode data via a "folding" process that makes use of basic matrix multiplication.[34] To understand how this process works, consider the simple two-mode network depicted in figure 2.1, which shows four friends' participation in celebrations held on four major American holidays.[35]

[33] Kathleen M. Carley, personal communication via email, June 16, 2011.
[34] Wasserman and Faust, pp. 307-312. The example that follows, while original, is merely an illustration of the concepts outlined by this citation.
[35] Unless otherwise noted, all network graphics and all network measures presented in this analysis were generated using the Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA) developed by Kathleen M. Carley and the Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CASOS) at the Institute for Software Research in the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University. For an introduction to ORA, see: Kathleen M. Carley, Jeff Reminga, Jon Storrick, and Dave Columbus, "ORA User's Guide 2012," *Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer Science, Institute for Software Research, Technical Report CMU-ISR-12-105*, 2012.

Figure 2.1: Friends x Holiday Events

	July4th	Thanksgiving	Christmas	New Year's
Tom	1	1	0	0
Dick	0	0	1	1
Harry	1	0	1	0
Bob	1	0	0	1



It is possible to infer relationships among the friends based on their co-attendance of the same holiday events. As summarized by figure 2.2, the process begins by transposing the rows and columns in the original matrix.

Figure 2.2: Transpose of Friends x Holiday Events

	Tom	Dick	Harry	Bob
July4th	1	0	1	1
Thanksgiving	1	0	0	0
Christmas	0	1	1	0
New Year's	0	0	0	1

The original matrix is then multiplied with the transpose in order to restate the information as an agent x agent network, in which the diagonal values summarize the number of events in which each individual participated, and the remaining fields in the matrix contain binary relational data inferred from the friends' co-participation in events. Values of ~~"1"~~" indicate that an interaction took place; values of ~~"0"~~" indicate that one did not.

Figure 2.3: Derived Agent x Agent Network

Tom to Tom	(1*1)+(1*1)+(0*0)+(0*0)=2
Tom to Dick	(1*0)+(1*0)+(0*1)+(0*0)=0
Tom to Harry	(1*1)+(1*0)+(0*1)+(0*0)=1
Tom to Bob	(1*1)+(1*0)+(0*0)+(0*1)=1
Dick to Tom	(0*1)+(0*1)+(1*0)+(0*0)=0
Dick to Dick	(0*0)+(0*0)+(1*1)+(0*1)=2
Dick to Harry	(0*1)+(0*0)+(1*1)+(0*0)=1
Dick to Bob	(0*1)+(0*0)+(1*0)+(1*1)=1
Harry to Tom	(1*1)+(0*1)+(1*0)+(0*0)=1
Harry to Dick	(1*0)+(0*0)+(1*1)+(0*0)=1
Harry to Harry	(1*1)+(0*0)+(1*1)+(0*0)=2
Harry to Bob	(1*1)+(0*0)+(1*0)+(0*1)=1
Bob to Tom	(1*1)+(0*1)+(0*0)+(1*0)=1
Bob to Dick	(1*0)+(0*0)+(0*1)+(1*0)=0
Bob to Harry	(1*1)+(0*0)+(0*1)+(1*0)=1
Bob to Bob	(1*1)+(0*0)+(0*0)+(1*1)=2

	Tom	Dick	Harry	Bob
Tom	2	0	1	1
Dick	0	2	1	1
Harry	1	1	2	1
Bob	1	0	1	2



While this multiplicative process works well for binary data, folding creates significant distortions when applied to weighted data, such as that contained in the annualized snowball sample. Figure 2.4, which reprises the holiday example to consider weighted interactions, demonstrates that the arithmetic involved in the folding process produces agent x agent interactions of exaggerated scale when analysts apply the process to non-binary data.

Figure 2.4: Folding a Weighted Matrix

	Original Matrix			
	July4th	Thanksgiving	Christmas	New Year's
Tom	2	3	1	1
Dick	3	1	2	0
Harry	0	2	3	2
Bob	1	0	2	2

	Transpose			
	Tom	Dick	Harry	Bob
July4th	2	3	0	1
Thanksgiving	3	1	2	0
Christmas	1	2	3	2
New Year's	1	0	2	2

	Multiplication Process
Tom to Tom	(2*2) + (3*3) + (1*1) + (1*1) = 15
Tom to Dick	(2*3) + (3*1) + (1*2) + (1*0) = 11
Tom to Harry	(2*0) + (3*2) + (1*3) + (1*2) = 11
Tom to Bob	(2*1) + (3*0) + (1*2) + (1*2) = 6
Dick to Tom	(3*2) + (1*3) + (2*1) + (0*1) = 11
Dick to Dick	(3*3) + (1*1) + (2*2) + (0*0) = 14
Dick to Harry	(3*0) + (1*2) + (2*3) + (0*2) = 8
Dick to Bob	(3*1) + (1*0) + (2*2) + (0*2) = 7
Harry to Tom	(0*2) + (2*3) + (3*1) + (2*1) = 11
Harry to Dick	(0*3) + (2*1) + (3*2) + (2*0) = 8
Harry to Harry	(0*0) + (2*2) + (3*3) + (2*2) = 17
Harry to Bob	(0*1) + (2*0) + (3*2) + (2*2) = 10
Bob to Tom	(1*2) + (0*3) + (2*1) + (2*1) = 6
Bob to Dick	(1*3) + (0*1) + (2*2) + (2*0) = 7
Bob to Harry	(1*0) + (0*2) + (2*3) + (2*2) = 10
Bob to Bob	(1*1) + (0*0) + (2*2) + (2*2) = 9

	Weighted Agent x Agent Matrix			
	Tom	Dick	Harry	Bob
Tom	15	11	11	6
Dick	11	14	8	7
Harry	11	8	17	10
Bob	6	7	10	9

Researchers often resolve this problem by simply ignoring the weighting of the original two-mode matrix and treating the folding process as a Boolean operation that produces binarized one-mode matrixes, in which a value of 0 indicates the absence of a relationship between a pair of agents, and a value of 1 indicates the presence of a relationship of unknown strength between a pair of agents. While this binarization process standardizes results, it also obliterates any information that the original two-mode matrix contained on the strength of interactions. Moreover, multi-modal data containing three or more types of nodes has special characteristics that may undermine the fidelity of data ultimately obtained from the binarization process.

As an example, consider the simple network depicted in figure 2.5, which contains four agents (Tom, Dick, Harry, and Bob), one event (Thanksgiving), and one resource (food). Intuitively, it is clear that that the agent x event and agent x resource networks cannot be combined without first transforming each network into one-mode agent x agent data, because holidays and resources cannot be summed, as they are fundamentally different classes of nodes. However, if an analyst were to implement a Boolean approach to data transformation and obtain binarized agent x agent networks from the agent x event and agent x resource matrixes, before summing the pair of one-mode networks to create a composite matrix showing all ties between the individuals in the network, then the data processing would contain implicit judgments about the relative importance of interactions. Specifically, the final output would weight relationships between individuals like Tom and Harry, who share interactions across multiple modes, more heavily than interactions between individuals like Tom and Dick, who share a single stronger interaction within a single mode. Put most simply, a ―binarize and fold, then sum" approach to network transformation has tremendous potential to misstate information that the original matrix contained regarding the observed strength of relationships between agents.

Figure 2.5: Comparison of Binary and Weighted Foldings of Multi-Modal Data

	Thanksgiving	Food
Tom	5	2
Dick	4	0
Harry	1	1
Bob	0	2

Binary

Events	Tom	Dick	Harry	Bob
Tom	1	1	1	0
Dick	1	1	1	0
Harry	1	1	1	0
Bob	0	0	0	0

Resources	Tom	Dick	Harry	Bob
Tom	1	0	1	1
Dick	0	0	0	0
Harry	1	0	1	1
Bob	1	0	1	1

Sum	Tom	Dick	Harry	Bob
Tom	2	1	2	1
Dick	1	1	1	0
Harry	2	1	2	1
Bob	1	0	1	1

Weighted

Events	Tom	Dick	Harry	Bob
Tom	25	20	5	0
Dick	20	16	4	0
Harry	5	4	1	0
Bob	0	0	0	0

Resources	Tom	Dick	Harry	Bob
Tom	4	0	2	4
Dick	0	0	0	0
Harry	2	0	1	2
Bob	4	0	2	4

Sum	Tom	Dick	Harry	Bob
Tom	29	20	7	4
Dick	20	16	4	0
Harry	7	4	2	2
Bob	4	0	2	4

Researchers are left with few appealing options. They can either ignore the problem and use the questionable weightings that result from the ―binarize and fold, then sum" approach, or they can re-binarize the data, in which causes the final agent x agent network to be abstracted from the observed interactions by an additional step of data pre-processing—a step which obliterates any and all observed variations in relative tie strength contained in the original data. There are no hard and fast rules about how far removed from reality data can be before it loses its analytic value, so these processes may be appropriate to certain research questions, but it is also quite clear that data containing three or more modes becomes greatly distorted when processed using binary approaches to transformation.

As a final alternative, analysts can ignore the overly-large values that matrix multiplication produces when applied to weighted multi-modal data and use the agent x agent outputs "as is," on the logic that, while exaggerative, the resulting agent x agent interactions at least capture the notion of relative strength. However, this option is equally problematic, because the addition of these agent x agent networks amplifies the already exaggerative weight of interactions between individuals. As demonstrated by the bottom figure of right-hand column of figure 2.5, which contains the final weighted agent x agent matrix derived from the simple three-mode holiday network, ignoring the exaggerations inherent to the folding of multi-modal weighted data has a "rich get richer" effect, in which even minor differences in tie strength in the observed data produce drastically different values once transformed into a single agent x agent network.

Fortunately, another means of data transformation, referenced here as additive projection,[36] avoids the distortions inherent to the multiplicative processes that underlie both binary and weighted data folding. Additive projection determines the strength of agents' relationship in a one-mode agent x agent matrix by conducting a pair-wise comparison of the weighted interactions agents share in a two-mode network. The typical implementation of the process is best demonstrated by considering a simple network containing only two agents (Bob and Tom) and two events (Thanksgiving and Christmas). As Figure 2.6 demonstrates, the typical implementation of additive projection produces a directed network in which the strength

[36] Padrón, et al, and Opsahl use the term "projection" in a more general sense, to reference any means of deriving one-mode matrixes from multi-modal data. According to their lexicon, the previously described folding process would be one means of projection. Indeed, the term "multiplicative projection" would be an appropriate synonym for "data folding," but because the semantic difference between the terms "additive projection" and "multiplicative projection" is small enough to introduce substantial potential for confusion, this analysis references the process of inferring links by multiplying a matrix by its transpose only as "folding." For a more general discussion of data projection, see Benigno Padrón, Manuel Nogales, and Anna Traveset, "Alternative approaches of transforming bimodal into unimodal mutualistic networks: The usefulness of preserving weighted information," *Basic and Applied Ecology*, Vol 12 (2011), pp. 713-721; Tore Opsahl, "Triadic closure in two-mode networks: Redefining the global and local clustering coefficients," *Social Networks*, Vol. 34 (2012).

of the tie from Bob to Tom is valued at 5, and the strength of the tie from Tom to Bob is valued 6. These values were obtained by summing the number of times Bob appeared at the events involving Tom, and vice versa. Thus, additive projection can be formalized as:

$$w_{ij} = \sum_{k: m_{jk} > 0} m_{ik}$$

Where W_{ij} is the weight between node *i* and node *j* in the agent x agent matrix, and *k* represents the column number of the events on which *i* and *j* partnered in the original agent x event matrix, *M*.[37]

[37] Padrón, et al, present the same equation using alternative notion, p. 715. In his work on scientific collaboration networks, Newman offers a similar method, which weights interactions based on the total number of agents that partner on an event, such that partnerships are weaker when they contain large numbers of participants (e.g. collaborative academic articles involving nearly a dozen authors) and stronger when they contain smaller numbers of participants (e.g. collaborative academic articles involving only two authors). See, M.E.J. Newman, ―Scientific collaboration networks. II. Shortest Paths, weighted networks, and centrality," *Physical Review E*, Vol. 64 (2001), 016132.

Figure 2.6: Additive Projection

	Agent x Event	
	Thanksgiving	Christmas
Bob	2	3
Tom	4	2

	Additive Process
Bob to Bob	2 + 3 = 5
Bob to Tom	2 + 3 = 5
Tom to Bob	4 + 2 = 6
Tom to Tom	4 + 2 = 6

	Agent x Agent	
	Bob	Tom
Bob	5	5
Tom	6	6

Although this method has applications in the biological sciences—for example, Padrón, et al, use it to determine a directed species x species network based on shared food sources—standard additive projection is less than ideally suited for the analysis of interactions involving individual people. For example, to return to the example summarized in Figure 2.6, it seems illogical to infer that Bob interacted with Tom only twice at Thanksgiving, while Tom interacted with Bob four times.

Additive projection is even more problematic for networks derived from qualitative sources of information, because such sources rarely contain information on the exact period of agents‘ interaction. For example, news coverage of terrorism often states that two individuals participated in the same attack, but given the clandestine nature of such events, it is typically impossible to determine exactly *when* each terrorist made their individual contribution. Consequently, it is possible for individuals to have participated in the same event at different times, resulting in the sort of absence of interaction between co-participants in events that is

familiar to anyone who has ever arrived at a party five minutes after his or her friends left. The left-hand panel of figure 2.7 offers a visual illustration of this ―ships‖ in the night" scenario that expands on the example of Bob and Tom's holiday interactions and demonstrates that it would have been possible for the two men to share no interactions, even though both made multiple appearances at the celebration across five distinct time periods.

Figure 2.7: Recreating Minimum and Maximum Interactions When the Period of Agents' Interactions is Unknown—Bob and Tom at Thanksgiving



Thus, it seems clear that additive projection requires minor amendment to be of true utility in analyzing the majority of multi-modal data on human relationships, most especially when the data is derived from qualitative sources containing ambiguous information on the timing of interactions. The right-hand panel of figure 2.7 shows that when the period of agents' interactions with events is unknown, the maximum number of interactions between co-participants in an event is equal to the number of ties held by whichever agent has more ties to

the event. Put simply, in the absence of additional data that recorded each time-slice as an independent event—data that cannot be created if the original historical record failed to it—then Bob and Tom could not have interacted with each other more than three times at Thanksgiving, regardless of the respective length of their agent x event interactions.

When analysts seeks to examine worst (or best) case scenarios, it may be appropriate to consider these maximum values, but common sense dictates that when two individuals share observed ties to an event, the number of real-world interactions between those agents will fall somewhere between the minimum possible interactions—which is always zero—and the theoretical maximum described above. Because the median between any number and zero can be determined by dividing the original value by two, the average expected interactions between two agents who co-participated in an event can be determined by determining which agent held more ties to the event, and then dividing this value in half. A probabilistic estimate of the total number of agent x agent ties between two individuals in the network can then be obtained by summing these average values across all events in which the pair co-participated. To return to the example in Figure 2.6, this Median-Additive Projection Process (MAPP) would estimate Bob and Tom's relationship at 3.5 interactions (4/2 + 3/2 = 3.5), and, more generally, the process can be formalized as:

$$w_{ij} = \sum_{k:\, m_{ik}\,,\, m_{jk} > 0} \max(m_{ik}\,, m_{jk})/2$$

Thus, agent x agent matrixes derived from MAPP preserve realistic tie weights throughout the transformation from multi-modal to one-mode data. Moreover, MAPP-derived agent x agent matrixes generated from multiple two-mode matrixes can be summed to yield theoretically valid

estimations of the total number of ties shared between agents, in lieu of the distorted values obtained by summing binarized or weighted agent x agent networks derived from folding processes. In short, MAPP offers a data transformation process that is well-suited to the study of multi-modal terror networks derived from qualitative data, because the nature of the subject matter and the nature of the source material dictate that it is impossible to reconstruct the exact timing of agents' shared participation in events, shared access to resources, and shared membership in organizations.

Unfortunately, none of the out-of-the-box software packages available for the analysis of network data contain pre-programmed capabilities for additive projection, much less for original user-generated processes like MAPP. It was, therefore, necessary to program new code to generate MAPP-derived agent x agent networks from the multi-modal data. The "R" computer language was used to run a pair-wise MAPP comparison of all relevant two-mode interactions agents shared annually across all relationships types, excluding enmity ties and uncertain ties.[38] For each year in the data, this processing required $N^2 * I$ calculations, where N represents the number of agents in the network, and I represents the number of incidents (shared events, shared resources, and shared organizations) in the data.[39] The resulting weighted agent x agent networks were then summed with annualized hand-coded agent x agent matrixes in order to yield a weighted agent x agent network in which tie strength between actors is equal to the total number of interactions that they most likely shared in a given year.[40]

[38] R Core Team, *R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing*, (Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing, 2012), ISBN 3-900051-07-0; available online: http://www.R-project.org.
[39] The MAPP transformation allows for self-loops, in which an agent can interact with itself. The value of each agent's self-looped score in the final agent x agent matrix is equal to the total number of ties that agent held to all incidents included in the original multi-modal matrix, i.e. the agent's unnormalized degree in the original matrix.
[40] Because the hand-coded agent x agent networks are not symmetrical ($A \rightarrow B \neq B \rightarrow A$), it is vital to symetrize the hand-coded agent x agent networks by adding, so that the hand-coded link weight between two agents is equivalent to the total number of ties they share ($A \rightarrow B + B \rightarrow A$). If this step is not taken prior to utilizing the hand-coded data

Beyond the mathematics, theory plays a necessary role in the data preprocessing, because MAPPing some two-mode networks will infer interpersonal relationships where none actually exist. For example, if an agent x role network is MAPPed, then all individuals who share the same job-description become linked in the resulting agent x agent network, regardless of whether or not they ever partnered on a specific operation: all of the bomb-makers in al-Qaida, all of the bomb-makers in Jemaah Islamiyah, all of the bomb-makers in Lashkar-e-Toiba, and all of the bomb-makers in every other organization become part of a single clique. Similarly problematic results would be obtained by MAPPing agent x knowledge networks, and because the data is annualized, it would also be inappropriate to MAPP agent x location networks, since there is little reason to assume that someone who visited a city in January had any sort of meaningful interaction with an individual who visited the same city in July. Consequently, agent x role, agent x knowledge, and agent x location networks were excluded from the transformation process and played no role in determining the inferential links that underlie the grouping process.

Similarly, the MAPPing process must be conducted cautiously because events are not of comparable size. It is, for example, reasonable to infer that the dozen attendees of a small Super Bowl party knew each other, but it would be ludicrous to apply the projection technique to the game itself and imply that the tens-of-thousands of ticketholders that attended in person shared any kind of meaningful interpersonal relationship. Therefore, large-scale conflicts, like the Soviet-Afghan War, were excluded from MAPPing as applied to agent x event networks, since it seems exceptionally presumptive to assume that the thousands of *mujahideen* involved in this event all knew each other. General resources, such as "money" and "forged documents," were excluded on similar grounds from the projection process as applied to the agent x resource

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alongside the symmetrical networks generated by projecting agent x agent networks from two-mode data, then any resulting analyses of the unioned agent x agent network will be invalid.

networks, and large organizations with national and/or international membership, such as political parties and transnational NGOs, were excluded from the projection process as applied to the agent x organization networks.

However, co-participation in smaller events (e.g. attending the same social events or partnering on the same terror attack of limited scale), access to specific resources (e.g. the Mitsubishi van that Jemaah Islamiyah operatives used as the attack vehicle in the 2002 Bali bombing), and co-membership in smaller local organizations (e.g. co-ownership of businesses) served to infer relationships among the individuals included in the data. Moreover, the exclusions discussed above should not imply that it was impossible for relationships to exist among co-participants in large events, individuals who shared access to general resources, or individuals who co-participated in large non-*jihadist* organizations. These interactions were merely excluded from the process of inference, so, for example, when the data contained clear evidence of interactions between two participants in the Soviet-Afghan War, such ties were hand coded as agent x agent ties.

Once these projections were accomplished, the data transformation process ended by summing all of the agent x agent networks. The final output of all of this matrix addition was a network well-suited to Newman Grouping and which captures a probabilistic estimate of the weighted relationships that exist between the individuals included in the snowball sample. Given the ambiguities inherent to the subject matter and the uncertainties inherent to any attempt to reconstruct individual relationships using historical records, this estimative network is the most detailed and realistic depiction allowed by the source material.

Because of the complexities involved in the process, it is perhaps best illustrated with a visual example. Consider the sparse agent x agent network depicted in figure 2.8. These ties,

which have been restricted to binary values for the sake of simplicity, are very loosely based on real-world data surrounding the 2002 Bali attacks and represent the direct interactions coded by hand from the data. They serve as the baseline to which additional interactions will be added.

Figure 2.8: Sparse Agent x Agent Network Involving JI & AQ Members (Sample Only)

	AG	AI	AI	Amr	Ars	Dr.A	Dul	H	Im5	Jb	KSM	Lil	Mou	WM	Sy	YS	Zub	Zul	AM	MA
Abdul Ghoni																				
Abdul Jabar															1					
Ali Imron				1			1	1												
Amrozi				1																
Aris Munandar																				
Dr. Azahari																				
Dulmatin																				
Hambali									1											
Samudra																				
Jabarah											1									
KSM								1												
Lillie								1												
Moussaoui											1									
Syahrir																				
Wan Min																				
Yassin Sywal								1												
Zubair																				
Zulkifli														1						
Amine Mezbar																				
Mohd Altaf																				



Additional information regarding these actors‘ relationships can be obtained by MAPPing some of the two-mode matrixes contained in the data. Figure 2.9 contains sample data, also loosely based on events surrounding the 2002 Bali bombings, that depicts a binary agent x event network involving three events: (1) the 1999-2002 Ambon conflict, a large-scale insurgency in which several JI members participated, (2) a January 2002 planning meeting that several JI members attended in Thailand to discuss the upcoming Bali operation, and (3) the ―Second Wave" of the 9/11 attacks, an aborted airline-hijacking plot which was supposed to make use of South East Asian terrorists who would appear less suspicious to airport security personnel than men of Middle Eastern appearance. As the panels below depict, MAPPing the two-mode data without excluding the Ambon conflict, results in a far more connected graph, by (incorrectly) including all participants in the Ambon conflict in a single dense clique.

Figure 2.9: Agent x Event Network Involving JI & AQ Members (Sample Only)

	Ambon	Jan. Plan	2nd Wave
Abdul Ghoni			
Abdul Jabar	1		
Ali Imron	1		
Amrozi	1		
Aris Munandar	1		
Dr. Azahari		1	
Dulmatin			
Hambali	1	1	1
Samudra	1		
Jabarah		1	
KSM			1
Lillie			1
Moussaoui			1
Syahrir			
Wan Min		1	
Yassin Sywal	1		
Zubair			1
Zulkifli		1	
Amine Mezbar			
Mohd Altaf			

Large Scale Event Included





Large Scale Event Excluded





Still more applicable data can be obtained by MAPPing an agent x resource network, but this action is subject to the same potential pitfalls as the events data. Including overly general terms, like the generic "explosives" highlighted in red in the matrix depicted in figure 2.10, creates a falsely connected graph. Indeed, Amine Mezbar and Mohd Atlaf had nothing to do with the Jemaah Islamiyah; they respectively operated in Europe and South Asia in 2002 and merely had access to explosives. However, meaningful, accurate relationships can be inferred by including in the folding process specific resources, such as the Mitsubishi van that served as the bomb-truck in the Bali bombings and the Denpassar safehouse where the bomb for that attack was assembled.

Figure 2.10: Agent x Resource Network Involving JI & AQ Members (Sample Only)

	Mitsu	Explos	DenSafe
Abdul Ghoni			1
Abdul Jabar			
Ali Imron	1	1	
Amrozi	1		1
Aris Munandar			
Dr. Azahari		1	1
Dulmatin		1	1
Hambali		1	
Samudra	1		1
Jabarah		1	
KSM			
Lillie			
Moussaoui			
Syahrir			
Wan Min			
Yassin Sywal			
Zubair			
Zulkifli			
Amine Mezbar		1	
Mohd Altaf		1	

Large Scale Resource Included



Large Scale Resource Excluded



Similar examples could be drawn from agent x organization networks, but the need to restrict the folding process to small events, specific resources, and local organizations is best demonstrated by considering the final networks that result from the example outlined above. Figure 2.11 (below) contains two columns; the top row of each contains an identical copy of the sparse agent x agent network depicted in figure 2.8. The left hand column then contains the agent x agent matrix derived from co-participation in *all* events, followed by the agent x agent matrix derived from shared access to *all* resources. The bottom figure in the column represents the sum of the three networks above. The right hand column repeats this same pattern, except that the derived matrixes it presents respectively excluded the Ambon conflict and generic explosives.

Visual inspection of the bottom two graphs is sufficient to conclude that they are remarkably different, but some comparative statistics serve to drive home the point. Because both networks contain identical node sets, it is possible to run a Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) analysis, which is a special type of correlation test specifically designed to deal with the sorts of interdependence between variables that result from overlapping node sets.[41] This analysis produced a p-vale of 0.0000, indicating that the results are statistically significant at the most stringent level of analysis, but found that the two networks were only 69.5 percent correlated. A total of 62 different links would need to be deducted from the bottom left-hand graph in order to make it match its counterpart on the right. And these values stem from the exclusion of only two nodes, namely the Ambon conflict and generic explosives, from a small network of only 20 people. Clearly, determining what to include and exclude from the projection process is a non-trivial decision that greatly impacts the outcome of the analysis.

[41] David Krackhardt, "QAP Partialling as a Test of Spuriousness," *Social Networks*, Vol. 9 (1988), pp. 171-186; D.D. Dekker, D. Krackhardt, and T.A.B. Snijder, "Sensitivity of MRQAP Tests to Colinearity and Autocorrelation Conditions," *Psychometrika*, Vol. 72 (2007), pp. 563-581.

Figure 2.11: Comparative Matrix Addition



With the algebraic data transformations accomplished, the analysis returned to the task of grouping and conducted the Newman process. Table 2.1 summarizes the modularity scores of the resulting annual groupings. The left-hand chart presents average scores for all years since al-Qaida's inception in 1988 and 2010; the right-hand chart presents average scores for all years since al-Qaida first actively participated in a terrorist attack in 1993 and 2010. Although both results suggest that Newman groupings found meaningful divisions on average, the worrying low minimum score in the left-hand graph, as well as its lower mean score than the right-hand graph, suggest that the grouping process is not especially well-suited to years in which terror groups are not actively involved in attacks.

Table 2.1: Modularity Scores for the Newman Groupings Used to Determine Membership

1988-2010	
Mean	0.70133
Median	0.74626
Mode	N/A
Maximum	0.89505
Minimum	0.25082
Std. Dev.	0.17213

1993-2010	
Mean	0.75978
Median	0.79516
Mode	N/A
Maximum	0.89505
Minimum	0.50188
Std. Dev.	0.11919

Once the groups were determined, the next step was to match the computer-generated groupings to real-world organizations. Fortunately, the terrorism literature, for all its disagreements about the specific boundaries of terror organizations, is generally in consensus regarding organizations' named leaders. Thus, matching the simulated divisions to real-world organizations became a game of "find the *emir*," and, for example, individuals obtained al-Qaida membership' for a given year by virtue of inclusion in the same Newman group as Usama bin Laden. Figure 2.12 illustrates the process visually in relation to al-Qaida; Newman groups are

defined by color, with bin Laden's Newman group depicted in yellow-green. In order to better demonstrate the functionality of the approach, a handful of well-known al-Qaida members have been highlighted with a different node shape and labeled in order to make them more easily distinguishable. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the acknowledged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks; Mohammed Atta, the acknowledged field commander of the 9/11 attacks; and Abu Hafs al-Masry (a.k.a. Mohammed Atef), the alleged military chief of al-Qaida in 2001, all appear in bin Laden's Newman group.

Figure 2.12: Visual Illustration of the Initial Newman Grouping Process in 2001



However, it would be foolish to suggest that bin Laden's Newman group offers a comprehensive and unflawed definition of al-Qaida. Imperfections in the data, which are inevitable when working on clandestine subject matter, lead to the underestimation of ties between some individuals. Moreover, the best-hidden terrorists are likely to have escaped mention in the data altogether. The impact of these unavoidable data omissions is clear: bin Laden's Newman group is likely to exclude several important members of al-Qaida.

The nature of the grouping algorithm also problematizes the results, because the Newman method finds hard boundaries between groups. Links can exist between the divisions, but individuals cannot hold membership in multiple groups. This assumption contradicts the accepted wisdom on Islamist terrorism, because many prominent *jihadists* have held simultaneous membership in more than one terrorist organization. For example, numerous analysts concluded that Hambali, an Indonesian-born Islamist who gained notoriety for his involvement in a series of bombings and plots throughout southeast Asia, belonged to both Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qaida at the time of his capture in August 2003.[42] Similarly, numerous media outlets alleged that Illyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani militant involved in attacks against Indian targets and assassination attempts on former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, held membership in a branch of *Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami* (HUJI) as well as al-Qaida when he was killed by an American missile strike in early June 2011.[43] Such examples demonstrate that the Newman method's inability to allow individuals to hold multiple memberships greatly limits its applicability to contemporary Islamist terrorism.

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[42] See, for example, Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.1.87.03. Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin," available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI08703E.shtml; Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, (New York: Berkley Books, 2002), pp. 258-262; and Sally Neighbor, *In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia*, (Sydney, Australia: Harper Collins, 2004), p. 167.

[43] "Terror Quartet Plots al-Qaida Attacks," *United Press International*, February 23, 2011; Syed Saleem Shahzad, "Al-Qaeda's guerilla chief lays out strategy," *Asia Times Online*, October 15, 2009.

Finally, structural considerations may also problematize a model of al-Qaida premised on strict Newman groups. A number of analyses suggest that terror groups deliberately organize in formal cells to promote operational security.[44] As depicted in figure 2.13 (below), cellular networks occur when members of each cell are densely connected to each other, in non-overlapping clique-like structures, that have sparse connections to other cells, ideally through a single tie, so that in the event of a cell's compromise, its members can only inform on the same redundant handful of operatives, and not the broader network.[45] Thus, if al-Qaida follows this model, the organization is apt to contain a number of natural divisions, not just a single Newman group centered around bin Laden. Clearly, it is necessary to relax the formally determined boundaries of bin Laden's Newman group in order to produce a meaningful model of al-Qaida.

[44] The military explicitly characterizes terror groups' organization in cellular terms. See: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) Handbook No. 1, (August 15, 2007), p. 3-1. A number of academics implicitly suggest cellular structure by using the term "cell" to discuss sub-sets of terror groups. However, given the rarity of explicit definitions in the terrorism literature, this implicit characterization may result as much from a vocabulary dispute as a consensus regarding cellular structure. It sometimes seems that "cell" is used as a synonym for "group," rather than as a formal term that references a specific type of organization. For examples of academic literature that includes fairly clear characterizations of Islamist terrorism as a cellularly-organized phenomenon, see: Anthony H. Coredesman and Nawaf Obaid, "Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia: Asymmetric Threats and Islamist Extremists," *Center for Strategic and International Studies,* January 26, 2005; Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, "Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks," *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Fall 2008), pp. 7-44; Scott Helfstein and Dominick Wright, "Success, Lethality, and Cell Structure Across the Dimensions of Al Qaeda," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 34, No. 5 (2011), pp. 367-382.

[45] Terrill L. Frantz and Kathleen M. Carley, "A Formal Characterization of Cellular Networks, *CASOS Technical Report*, Carnegie Mellon University, September 2005.

Figure 2.13: A Stylized Cellular Network



Fortunately, a simple additive process addresses many of the issues created by applying the Newman method to data that contains information gaps, real-world membership overlaps, and the strong possibility of cellular networks. By adding all the individuals that share meaningful relationships with members of bin Laden's Newman group to the sample of ~~"al~~-Qaida members," a more expansive model of the terror organization emerges.

The logical underpinning of this process is exceptionally straightforward: because the limitations inherent to the study of terrorism dictate that even the most detailed research will unearth only a portion of the ties that actually exist between Islamists, it is sound to assume that any individual who shares a demonstrable pattern of functional ties to bin Laden's Newman group also shares other meaningful ties to the group that are merely hidden from observation. However, this proposed extension immediately raises two questions: Is the process expansive

enough to ensure a reasonably realistic representation of al-Qaida? And, is the process so expansive that it exaggerates al-Qaida's size?

The first question can be partially answered by briefly examining how the additive process mitigates the Newman method's unrealistic assumption of hard organizational boundaries and allows individuals to hold multiple memberships. For example, in 1999, Hambali falls into the same Newman group as Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, the named leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah, squarely making him a member of this organization. However, by virtue of Hambali's operational connections to individuals like Walid bin Attash (a.k.a. Khallad), a bin Laden confidant who helped to select the operatives responsible for the 9/11 Attacks,[46] the model also attributes al-Qaida membership to the Indonesian. Because individuals retain their original organizational affiliations alongside the memberships determined through this additive process, the relaxed model allows for a more realistic depiction of organizational overlap.

However, the problems created by cellular structure are only partially addressed by the additive process. If, in the graph below, component A,B,C,D,E represented a Newman group surrounding a terrorist leader, then the additive process would include only node F, leaving the rest of his cell out of the model.

[46] High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, Date Unknown, available online: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/.

Figure 2.14: Linked Cliques



At first blush, this example suggests that the simplest solution is to extend the additive process by another step, by including all those within two steps of the original Newman group. However, the theory of ―six degrees of separation" highlights the dangers of this approach.

This theory, popularized by a stage play and later a film of the same name, states that all currently living people are separated by no more than six intervening connections.[47] Ultimately, the idea found its best-known representation in ―The Kevin Bacon Game," in which players attempt to connect actors to the Hollywood legend in as few steps as possible by using shared appearances in films as links.[48] For example, Tom Hanks has a Bacon-distance of one because he starred alongside the game's namesake in Ron Howard's *Apollo 13*. Comedian Dan Aykroyd has a Bacon-distance of two, because Aykryod co-starred in *The Blues Brothers* alongside John Belushi, who also starred in *Animal House*, in which a very young Kevin Bacon played a small supporting role.

[47] Albert-Laszlo Barabasi provides a superb non-technical overview of the concept in *Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life*, (New York: Plume, 2003), pp. 25-40; See also, Duncan J. Watts *Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), pp. 69-100.

[48] A number of websites are dedicated to this game, most prominently ―The Oracle of Bacon" (http://oracleofbacon.org/) and ―The Kevin Bacon Game" (http://www.thekevinbacongame.com/).

At an intuitive level, it is fairly easy to see that when links are extended beyond a distance of one, the implied relationships are often meaningless, even when the participants work in a confined and specialized field, such as the film industry or Islamist terrorism. Just as there is no evidence to support a substantive working relationship between Bacon and Aykryod, there is no guarantee that al-Qaida members have meaningful ties with the associates of associates. The cliques depicted above *might* be part of a single organization that adopted a cellular structure, or they *might* be two distinct groups that share a single, one-off operational tie. Without information that provides additional context, it is impossible to tell. If the model were to automatically include such nodes in its definition of al-Qaida by extending the additive process to include actors two steps removed from the core Newman group, the risk of conflating the organization with the broader Islamist terror movement would increase exponentially.

A better solution to the dilemma created by cellular structure involves the use of multiple Newman groups. Although terror groups typically have a single acknowledge *emir*, he is rarely the only leader in the organization. For example, Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian physician turned *jihadist*, was acknowledged as bin Laden‘s number two from the time of Egyptian Islamic Jihad‘s formal merger with al-Qaida in 2001 until the dissident Saudi‘s death in 2011. These sorts of secondary leaders often fall within the named *emir's* Newman group, but when they do not, these secondary leaders offer additional starting points from which to construct broader models that take cellular structure into consideration when estimating membership in Islamist groups.

However, there is a trade-off. This process brings additional subjectivity into the model, because it is not always entirely clear who serves as an important secondary leader in a given organization. Consequently, it is incredibly important to use as additional starting points only

those secondary leaders for whom an overwhelming consensus exists regarding their role in the terrorist organization under study, lest the model create overly expansive groups. In combination with the preceding characterization of individuals who held simultaneous membership in more than one organization, this characterization suggests that a one-step extension of Newman grouping is necessary to ensure realistic modeling, but this accommodation insufficiently addresses the issue of cellular structure when conducted absent multiple, carefully-selected starting points.

But what about false positives? The primary danger of extending Newman groups is that the process labels individuals who only hold passing acquaintance with an organization as members of it. In order to address issues of over-expansiveness, this analysis turned to theory and limited the extension process based on link type. Although the original Newman grouping considers all types of relationships in an attempt to model the complexities of organizational membership, the additive process included only the functional ties defined in the previous chapter. The examples outlined below make clear that other types of relationships, such as family ties, ideological affiliations, and training links serve as insufficient criteria for inclusion in the estimate of group membership when considered in isolation. Their use outside of the Newman model's complex consideration of multiple intersecting ties would create an overly broad characterization of Islamist terror organizations.

There is some strong evidence that members of the same family often become involved in terrorism. Perhaps most famously, the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed more than 200 nightclub patrons at the popular Indonesian beach retreat, were largely the work of three

Indonesian brothers: Ali Ghufron (a.k.a. Mukhlas), Ali Imron, and Amrozi.[49] However, there is also ample evidence showing that family ties alone are insufficient to brand people as members of a terrorist organization. For example, bin Laden's eldest half-sibling (the dissident Saudi had no full siblings), Salem, lived a flamboyant life that directly opposed Usama's dour fundamentalism. Salem enjoyed champagne, fine food, women, and nightlife. He was even known to bribe his way onto barroom stages in order to indulge a passion for karaoke.[50] Similarly, the father of Umar Farouk Abdulmutalab—a Nigerian national who gained dubious renown as the "underwear bomber" in December 2009, when he attempted to down an American-flagged jetliner by detonating explosives hidden beneath his pants—was so opposed to Islamist terrorism that he visited an American Embassy in the hopes of convincing the State Department that his son posed a threat that required close monitoring.[51] If al-Qaida-linked families follow the pattern evident in the 2002 Bali attacks, rather than the patterns evidenced by Salem bin Laden or the senior Abdulmutalab, then their members will find their way into the sample by means of operational and financial ties to the core Newman group, rather than via kinship. Assuming that family ties *guarantee* membership in terrorist organizations would grant these groups unnatural size, because brothers are not necessarily brothers-in-arms.

When viewed in isolation, ideological connections play a similarly problematic role, since many individuals who developed an affinity for al-Qaida's extremist ideology never had any actual contact with members of the organization. Michael C. Finton, who is currently incarcerated for plotting to bomb government buildings in Springfield, IL, offers a useful

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[49] "Witness Interrogation Report of Amrozi," Detective Corps, State Police of Republic of Indonesia (Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), November 14, 2002.
[50] Steve Coll, *The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Centruy*, (New York: Penguin, 2008).
[51] "One boy's journey to jihad; A former London student, inspired by radical clerics, managed to slip through the intelligence net and launch a suicide mission that nearly brought carnage to America," *Sunday Times* (London), January 3, 2010.

illustration. In 2006, he demonstrated his fealty to bin Laden's ideals by swearing an oath of allegiance to a man he believed to be both his mentor in *jihadism* and an al-Qaida member, but who was actually an undercover federal agent. A couple of months later, Finton's loyalty was seemingly rewarded, when the same mentor handed him a remote-control detonator and the keys to what appeared to be a bomb-laden van—a vehicle that was actually filled with inert material. After parking the van next to a federal building, Finton repeatedly tried in vain to ignite the "bomb" and was promptly arrested for his attempts toward terrorism. Finton clearly desired to become a part of al-Qaida, but it would be dishonest to claim that he had any substantive connection to bin Laden's organization, since Finton's plot at no time involved even a single member of the organization.[52] Attributing such events to al-Qaida, or labeling individuals like Finton as "al-Qaida members" based on their affinity for extremism, creates a pointless tautology, in which it becomes impossible to disprove any violent *jihadists*' membership in al-Qaida, because participation in Islamist-motivated violence is the very metric used to determine membership. Indeed, as Clive Williams noted in his discussion of relationships among Islamist terrorists, it would be difficult to find any act of Sunni-motivated Islamist *jihad* that did not have at least a partial ideological overlap with al-Qaida's worldview.[53]

Aside from ideology, no interaction provides as much confusion about al-Qaida membership as training. The problem stems from the failure to distinguish between those trained by al-Qaida and those who attain true membership in the organization. According to the sworn testimony of former al-Qaida members, only the top-tier of graduates from bin Laden-affiliated

[52] USA v. Michael C. Finton (Defendant), United States District Court Central District of Illinois (Case No.: 09-3048-m), Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent Trevor S. Stalets, September 24, 2009.
[53] Clive Williams M.G., "The Question of 'Links' Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia," in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, eds., *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, (Singapore: World Scientific and the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 83.

training centers, such as Khaldun and Farouq camps, were admitted into the organization.[54] The remaining individuals were largely excluded from al-Qaida's operational network; most returned to their home countries and joined (or returned to) other less selective organizations.[55] Others founded new independent organizations,[56] and still more trainees undertook attacks absent any financial or logistical support from established terror groups.[57] While al-Qaida's standards of admittance likely declined as the pace of counterterrorism initiatives eliminated key members of the organization, and although practical participation in al-Qaida attacks remains a far more relevant metric for assessing organizational affiliation than formal membership rites, there is little reason to assume that every individual trained by al-Qaida became a member of the organization.

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[54] USA v. bin Laden, et al, Day 11 of testimony (February 27,2001).

[55] Dulmatin, an Indonesian who gained dubious renown for his involvement in a host of JI-linked attacks, including the 2002 Bali bombings, offers a useful illustration. In 1989 and 1990, he trained at Sada Camp under Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, a close confidant of bin Laden's who was so well-regarded among Islamists that a Filipino *jihadist* group later named itself in his honor. Despite this training, Dulmatin lacked any demonstrable financial or operational involvement with al-Qaida until ten years later, when he found himself on the al-Qaida's fringes owing to his participation in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings that Hambali, who held dual membership in al-Qaida and JI, directed and which JI conducted at bin Laden's behest. For information on Dulmatin's training in South Asian and participation in the Christmas Eve Bombings, see: International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003. (Hereafter "Damaged But Still Dangerous"). For information linking bin Laden to the Christmas Eve Bombings, see: Alan Sipress, "Bin Laden named in Asian terror plots," *Washington Post*, June 27, 2003. For information on Abdul Rasool Sayyaf's relationship with bin Laden, see Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, (New York: Penguin, 2004).

[56] For example, Aburajak Janjalani trained under Abdul Rasooy Sayyaf between 1988 and 1990, before returning to the Philippines and founding the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a radical Islamist organization that Janjalani named in honor of his mentor. For information on Janjalani's training, see: Damaged but Still Dangerous. For information on the founding of ASG and the etymology of the organization's name, see: Robert H. Reid, "Government says Abu Sayyaf links extend through Afghanistan to Middle East," *Associated Press Worldstream*, April 9, 1995.

[57] For example, Atta-ur Rahman and Shahzad Bajwa, two Pakistani militants arrested for a string of attacks conducted in Pakistan, trained in an al-Qaida linked camp in Waziristan in 2003. Rahman and Bajwa then went-on to conduct a string of attacks—many of them botched—in and around Karachi. Although the men claimed to operate under the organizational name of "Jundallah," this group never had more than half a dozen members, and seems to have received no operational or financial support from al-Qaida after Rahman and Bajwa left training. See: "Indictment of Jundullah men deferred till Oct. 6 in six terrorism cases," *Pakistan Newswire*, September 28, 2004; "ATC hears ranger mobile attack case," *Pakistan Newswire*, June 2, 2005; "Arrested Pakistani militants reveal plan of attacking US consulate, other target," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, July 20, 2004; Paul Haven, "AP: Arrests damage al-Qaida network," *Associated Press Online*, August 6, 2004.

Indeed, it is fairly standard practice for organizations operating in a host of occupational fields to train outsiders. For example, the United States Army War College, an institution dedicated to training high-level officers to become strategic thinkers, educates a host of foreign military officers alongside the college's American students. These international fellows remain part of their home governments' armed forces and never become members of the U.S. Army. There are few reasons to assume that terror groups operate according to a fundamentally different logic. Ultimately, training ties are insufficient to use in the extension of Newman groups because terror groups have no control over the actions of non-members once they leave training.

Finally, financial ties merit some specific discussion because of the context of this analysis. Although broad funding patterns are remarkably important to the function of terror groups, these patterns are not the explicit focus of this analysis. Its events-oriented approach precludes it from assessing any money streams that augment terror groups' general operating budgets, such as those that flowed between Benevolence International Foundation, a crooked charity based in suburban Chicago, and al-Qaida.[58] Instead, the financial ties included in the membership modeling process, and more generally in the network data sample, pertain to specific events. Consequently, the membership judgments that the model makes may place a handful of important funders outside of terror groups. Given that intuitive judgments of group membership often draw distinctions between members of the organizations and "linked" funders,[59] this pattern does not represent a deviation from accepted notions of membership,

[58] USA v. Enaam M. Arnaout, Plea Agreement (No. 02 CR 892), United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, February 11, 2003.

[59] For example, the terrorist sanctions list maintained by the United Nations security council characterizes Abd al Hamid Sulaiman Muhammad al-Mujil, the former executive director of the Saudi-based International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), as a funder of both al-Qaida and the Abu Sayyaf Group, rather than a member of either organization. The narrative summary that explains the reasons for his sanctioning state: "He provided donor funds directly to Al-Qaida and has been identified as a major fundraiser for the Abu Sayyaf Group. . . . Al-Mujil traveled

though, given the importance of money to all organizations, there is a sound logic for reconsidering the distinction between linked funders and members in subsequent analyses.

Figure 2.15 provides a visual illustration of the results obtained by extending the Newman groups according to the restrictions outlined above. Given the complexities of the data representation, this image emphasizes only two of the organizations included in the larger analysis: al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah. The image is colored by Newman grouping; the original group surrounding bin Laden is depicted in yellow-green, and the Newman group surrounding Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who served as JI's emir in 2001, is kelly-green. (Users of the visualization software have no control over the output's color scheme, so it was not possible to choose more contrasting colors). The triangles represent all individuals deemed to be al-Qaida members by the final modeling process; the squares represent all individuals deemed to be outside of al-Qaida by the final modeling process. Transparent nodes represent all individuals deemed to be JI members, and opaque nodes represent all individuals deemed to be outside JI.

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frequently to meet members of Usama bin Laden's organization." For additional details, see: Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.255.06. Abd al Hamid Sulaiman Muhammad al-Mujil," August 4, 2006; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI22506E.shtml.

Figure 2.15: Visual Illustration of Final Membership Model in 2001



Thus, the final modeling process' estimation of al-Qaida includes the following six types of nodes included in the image above:

1. *Opaque yellow-green triangles:* all those individuals who were part of bin Laden's original Newman group, but who were not modeled as part of JI. Mohammed Atta, the acknowledged field commander of the 9/11 hijackers,[60] offers an example.

2. *Transparent yellow-green triangles:* all those individuals who were part of bin Laden's original Newman group, but who obtained JI membership via the extension process. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who interacted extensively with bin Laden's immediate supporters and South East Asian terrorists like Hambali offers an example.[61] However,

[60] Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10013 (Ramzi Bin al Shibh), United States Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 9, 2007; High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, Date Unknown, avaialble online: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/.
[61] For examples of KSM's interactions with JI, see: *9/11 Commission Report*, p. 151; USA v. Zacarias Moussaoui (Defendant), United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division (Criminal No.: 01-455-A), Evidence Presented in Lieu of Hambali's Testimony, date unknown; USA v. Zacarias Moussaoui (Defendant), United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division (Criminal No.: 01-455-A), Evidence

as bin Laden also offers an example, because he shared functional ties with Hambali and other JI members in 2001, it is important to note that extensions are reciprocal[62] and interstitial individuals can obtain memberships that are non-intuitive. Interpretation of these designations is largely a matter of perspective; individuals who hold strong subjectively-determined views on the subject of membership in terror groups are more likely to see such designations as errors, while structurally-minded researchers are more likely to argue that such designations unveil meaningful hidden patterns.

3. *Opaque triangles that are not yellow-green:* all those individuals who were added to al-Qaida via the extension process, but are not modeled as members of JI. Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who played a prominent role in the 1998 embassy bombings, and who in 2001 returned to East Africa at bin Laden's behest to prepare for the 2002 Mombasa bombings,[63] offers one example. Abdul Rahman Jabrah, a Kuwaiti-Canadian who participated in the 2003 bombing of residential compounds housing Westerners in Riyadh, offers another example.[64]

4. *Opaque squares of any color*: all those individuals who were excluded from both al-Qaida and JI. Examples include the red squares to the right of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, which represent the local support team, comprised primarily of first-time *jihadists* with no prior ties to terror groups, that Fazul had begun to assemble along the Kenyan coast by 2001.[65]

5. *Transparent squares of kelly-green:* all those individuals modeled as members of JI because they held membership in the Newman group of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who served as JI's *emir* in 2001.[66] Members of this group were not modeled as members of al-Qaida.

Presented in Lieu of KSM's Testimony, date unknown; and Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), Unclassified, March 10, 2007.

[62] This reciprocity is an artifact of the data. Ties are undirected (A→B=B→A), because the nature of the data precludes more finite determinations, as does the folding process used to infer agent x agent ties based on shared ties in two-mode networks.

[63] Nelly Lahoud draws extensively on a memoir that Fazul wrote in 2008 or 2009 in order to offer an _insiders' description of bin Laden's involvement in the 2002 Mombasa attacks. Unfortunately, Fazul's memoir is not yet publically available, making a first person reading impossible. See, Nelly Lahoud, ~~"B~~in Laden's Death Through the Lens of Al-Qa'ida's Confidential Secretary," *CTC Sentinel*, May 1, 2011.

[64] USA v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (Defendant), United States District Court Southern District of New York (Crim. No.: 02 Crim. 1560), Indictment, date unknown; USA v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (Defendant), United States District Court Southern District of New York (02 Cr. 1560 (BSJ)), Sentencing Memorandum, May 7, 2007.

[65] For information on Fazul's support team, see: "Arrested Preacher Linked to Attacks," *Associated Press*, April 5, 2003; Andrew England, "AP Exclusive: FBI's most wanted leader of al-Qaida cell indicted for U.S. embassy bombing escaped," *Associated Press*, June 10, 2004; "Statement Under Inquiry of Omar Said Omar," Recorded by Superintendant John Mulalulu, Kenya Anti-Terrorist Police Unit, n.d. (but almost certainly August, 2003), available from Appendix C-III of *Al-Qaida's (mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point.

[66] For a concise description of the timing of leadership changes among JI *emirs*, see: Devi Asmarani, "Another JI chief nabbed," *Straights Times* (Singapore), June 16, 2007. For more detailed information on Ba'asyir's ascendency to JI's highest position, see: Lely T. Djuhari, "Three terror suspects name Muslim cleric Bashir as alleged terror head; one links him to bin Laden," *Associated Press Worldstream*, June 26, 2003; "White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism," Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Singapore, January 7, 2003; International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network

Examples include JI bomb-maker Azahari Husin[67] and Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana, who Singaporean authorities characterized as the leader of JI's regional *shura* and a direct lieutenant of Hambali.[68]

6. *Transparent triangles of kelly-green:* All those individuals modeled as JI members because they held membership in the Ba'asyir's Newman group, and who were also modeled as members of al-Qaida via the extension process. Examples include Hambali, whose close relationship with al-Qaida is well-documented,[69] and Imam Samudra, who was heavily involved in the planning and orchestration of the 2000 bombings of Christian churches across Indonesia, an operation that, according to the sworn testimony of one of Samudra's many co-conspirators, was conducted at bin Laden's behest.[70]

While the image described above demonstrates much of the complexity inherent to attempts at formal modeling of clandestine organizations, it is important to note that the graphic offers only a single snap-shot that describes membership as modeled in 2001, rather than a comprehensive assessment of membership patterns over time. Since the data is annualized, the modeling process was conducted independently for every year in the data. Two useful analytical distinctions emerged from this approach.

First, each agent modeled as part of an organization has a clear "start date" that marks the beginning of his tenure in a terrorist group. In theory, this design should mitigate the sorts of conflation problems inherent to temporally flat models, which pose significant risks of false attribution by granting organizations credit (or blame) for attacks conducted by members before they joined the organization. For example, by considering the impact of time, the model should avoid attributing culpability for the 2002 abduction and murder of American diplomat Lawrence

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Operates," December 11, 2002; "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000.

[67] For information on Azahari's role as a JI bomb-maker, see: "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000; "Witness Interrogation Report of Imam Samudra," Detective Corps, The State Police of Republic of Indonesia (Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), January 23, 2003.

[68] Dan Murphy, "Filipino police uncover 1995 leads to Sept. 11 plot," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 14, 2002; "White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism," Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Singapore, January 7, 2003.

[69] See note 52.

[70] Alan Sipress, "Bin Laden named in Asian terror plots," Washington Post, June 27, 2003.

Foley to al-Qaida based on the participation of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,[71] because these events occurred before Zarqawi formed meaningful operational ties with bin Laden or his closest followers.[72] However, as discussed in greater detail in the section on testing the model, its timing distinctions have a somewhat fuzzy quality as a result of both terrorism's clandestine nature and this study's reliance on publically available data.

Second, many agents modeled as members of terror groups have clear "end dates" that mark their separation from an organization. This design choice theoretically enables the analysis to avoid falsely attributing attacks to individuals who broke with their parent organization, as the founders of Jemaah Islamiyah did in the early 1990s, when a leadership dispute within the decades-old Darul Islam movement caused several its more radical members to walk-out and form their own new organization.[73] However, the same issues alluded to in the previous paragraph make these determinations equally as hazy as the start dates. Longitudinally modeling the data ultimately did as much to highlight the ambiguities inherent to determining membership in terror groups as it did to resolve them.

Table 2.2 lists the 33 organizations that emerged in the data via the modeling process outlined above. Groups were determined to be merged when one organization subsumed the other in the final modeling process, or, in more formal notation, when Group A $\subseteq$ Group B. In the interests of total clarity, it is also important to specify that the term "organization" as used in the chart below is interchangeable with "extended Newman group." Consequently, the organizations listed below differ greatly in their capabilities and durability, but they all represent meaningful divisions in the data. Naming was a somewhat subjective process, especially

[71] Neil MacFarquhar, "Jordan sentences 8 militants, linked to al Qaeda, to death," *New York Times*, April 7, 2004.
[72] Dexter Filkins, "Wanted rebel vows loyalty to bin Laden, web sites say," *New York Times*, October 18, 2004; Mark MacKinnon, "Empty chairs, angry youths and ignominy," *Globe and Mail* (Canada), June 9, 2006.
[73] Nasir bin Abas, interview conducted August 2010, Jakarta, Indonesia.

considering that many recognized terror groups change their name over time,[74] but every effort was made to reference organizations by the names which are commonly used to describe them.

[74] For example, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, better known by its French-language acronym, GSPC, changed its name to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2007. U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007*, April 2008, p. 7.

Table 2.2: Modeled Organizations Included in the Data

Organization Name	Acronym/ Abbreviation	Organization Name	Acronym/ Abbreviation	Organization Name	Acronym/ Abbreviation
Abu Sayyaf Group	ASG	Islamic Group	IG	Palembang Group	Plbg
Asif Raza Commando Force	ARCF	Jaish-e-Mohammed	JeM	al-Qaida	AQ
Bayaat al-Imam	BaI	Jamaat al Muslimeen	JAM	al-Qaida in the Arabic Peninsula	AQAP
D-Company	D-Com	Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh	JIS	Rajah Solaiman Movement	RSM
Egyptian Islamic Jihad	EIJ	Jemaah Islamiyah	JI	Rawalpindi-9	Raw-9
Fatah al-Islam	FaI	Jundallah	Jund	Riyadus-Salakhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs	RSBM

Organization Name	Acronym/ Abbreviation	Organization Name	Acronym/ Abbreviation	Organization Name	Acronym/ Abbreviation
al-Fuqra	Fuqra	Laskar Jihad	LJ	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat/Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb	AQIM
Gujarat Revenge group	GRG	Laskhar-e-Taiba/Indian Mujahideen	LeT	Saudi Hizballah[75]	SdHzb
Haqqani Network	HN	Martyrs for Morocco	MfM	Sea of David	SoD
Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami	HUJI	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group/ Salafia Jihadia	GICM	al-Shabaab	Shbb
Hofstad Group	Hof	Pakistani Taliban	TTP	Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad (Indonesia)	TQJ

[75] Although Saudi Hizballah is a Shiite group, this analysis modeled the organization in order to assess the possibility of al-Qaida's involvement in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombings, an attack in which some observers still claim that bin Laden's organization played an unspecified role. For example, former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry stated in a 2007 interview that he believed al-Qaida was the driving force behind the Khobar bombing. See: "Perry: U.S. eyed Iran attack after bombing," *United Press International*, June 6, 2007.

Because the analysis focuses on terrorism against civilian targets, the list of modeled organizations excludes Iraqi insurgent groups, the Afghan Taliban, Algeria's Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and other similar organizations primarily engaged in force-on-force conflicts against state militaries and international military coalitions. However, the lines between insurgency and terrorism are rarely crystal clear, so it would be irresponsible for the analysis to exclude such organizations entirely. Consequently, the data contains partial information, taken at face value from the source material, on seven insurgent groups. Table 2.3 (below) lists these organizations:

Table 2.3: Un-modeled Insurgencies Included in the Data

Organization Name	**Acronym/ Abbreviation**	**Organization Name**	**Acronym/ Abbreviation**	**Organization Name**	**Acronym/ Abbreviation**
Afghan Taliban	(Tal)	Armed Islamic Group	(GIA)	Hezb e Islami Gulubbudin	(HIG)
Al-Qaida in Iraq	(AQI)	Free Aceh Movement	(GAM)	Lashkar-e-Jahangvi	(LeJ)
				Moro Islamic Liberation Front	(MILF)

Similarly, some terror groups exist on the edges of the global Sunni *jihadist* movement; they cooperate with al-Qaida and other groups in a limited capacity, but do not share their ideology or goals. Therefore, the data also contains partial information on two such organizations, namely HAMAS and Lebanese Hizballah, but as with the insurgent groups, the analysis does not formally model these organizations because they lie outside of this inquiry's stated focus. Although the individuals highlighted in figure 2.17 provide one illustration of the model's performance, broader testing is required in order to fully understand its applicability to the study of terror.

2.3 PROOF OF CONCEPT

Unfortunately, the same issues that necessitate the use of a formal grouping model make fully testing its accuracy impossible: The available information on individual *jihadists* is inconsistent in both quantity and detail; theoretical disagreements about how and where to bound organizations cause widely divergent estimates of groups‘ membership, and some *jihadists* deliberately exaggerate their organizational affiliations, while others attempt to obscure such ties in the name of operational security. The organizational affiliations that the vast majority of individuals involved in terrorism hold in the real world simply are not known. Therefore, the most this analysis can do is to offer proof of concept by comparing the results of the grouping process to well-regarded expert judgments.

Several features of the United Nations‘ terror sanctioning list make this resource a reasonable benchmark against which to compare. First, a series of ―narrative summaries of reasons for listing” accompany the UN designations, making it easy to see why an individual was sanctioned, as well as to understand the nature of his relationship to known terror groups.[76] Second, the list draws on pools of data collected by the international intelligence community, and although this access is indirect, the list‘s judgments are supported by information unavailable to the general public. Therefore, the list can be regarded as a high-quality source, and comparisons against it serve as a rigorous test of both the grouping process and the underlying open-source data. Finally, from a purely methodological standpoint, this study deliberately excluded the list from the snowball sampling process, to enable a blind comparison between the list‘s designations and the results of the Newman-based grouping process.

[76] These summaries are available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/individuals_associated_with_Al-Qaida.shtml.

However, the UN list is far from flawless. It does not aim to be comprehensive and, therefore, provides information on only a small percentage of the world's *jihadists*. Moreover, the nomination process that underlies the list is somewhat schizophrenic; because any of the UN's member states can add to the list, it does not represent a single unified consensus regarding the definition of terrorism or the boundaries of organizations.[77] Indeed, the extent and nature of countries' contributions to the list vary greatly. Italy, for example, seems to forward the name of every individual that the country convicts on terrorism charges, no matter how minor. Indonesia, by contrast, seems somewhat more lax, as the names of prominent *jihadists* like Noordin Mohd Top, who was regarded as South East Asia's most dangerous terrorist until his death in 2009,[78] are not mentioned in the UN sanctions documents. It remains unclear why the list highlights some of the violent Islamist movement's bit players, while excluding some of its stars.

Similarly, although the UN documents provide a superb reference for anyone interested in studying terrorism at the individual level, the depth of the narratives is limited. They discuss only selective aspects of the listee's involvement in terrorism, and, as evidenced by the fact that the narrative on bin Laden does not reference his death, the summaries are not updated to include events that transpire *after* the listee's initial inclusion. Consequently, much of the membership data embedded in the narrative summaries has a static feel, and it is often impossible to determine precisely when someone joined a terrorist organization. Because the list cannot entirely overcome the ambiguities inherent to terrorism as subject matter, despite benefitting

[77] Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, "H. Composition of the List," date unknown, available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/aq_sanctions_list.shtml.

[78] Seth Mydans, "A Terrorist Mastermind Whose Luck Ran Out," *New York Times*, September 17, 2009. For more detailed information on Top's role in Indonesian terror, see: For information on Noordin's role in Indonesian terrorism, see: International Crisis Group, "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks," ICG Asia Report No. 114, May 5, 2006; and International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base," ICG Asia Briefing No. 95, August 27, 2009.

from additional information not available to the general public, the size of the useable sample that can be derived from the list is significantly smaller than the list's overall size.

Of the 254 individuals the United Nations has sanctioned as Islamist terrorists, 79 are unambiguously described in time-specific terms as members of the terror organizations that the Newman-based grouping process attempted to model. The narrative summaries list specific membership start-dates for many; for example, the documents state: "Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan was recruited to join Al-Qaida in 1996 by Mohammed Saddiq Odeh in Mombasa, Kenya."[79] In the remaining cases, it was possible to infer a start-date with reasonable reliability based on the context of the narrative summary; for example, given that al-Qaida was founded in 1988,[80] it is possible to infer that Aly Soliman Massoud Abdul Sayed became a member of that organization around 1988, because the supporting UN narrative states that he "has been a member of Al-Qaida since the 1980s and joined Al-Qaida's military committee in the 1990s."[81]

The results of these qualitative judgments were then compared to the Newman-based grouping process' characterization of the same 79 individuals. This evaluation provides a reasonable estimate of the process' propensity for false negatives, but the nature of the subject matter makes the equally thorny possibility of false positives impossible to assess with any reliability. The data summarized by table 2.4 demonstrates that the grouping process placed individuals in the same organization as the UN's expert judgments over 78 percent of the time.

[79] Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.S.35.01. Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan," October 17, 2001; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI3501E.shtml.
[80] Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001,* (New York, NY: Penguin, 2004), p. 204.
[81] Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing:Q1.A.229.07. Aly Soliman Massoud Abdul Sayed," April 6, 2009, available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI22907E.shtml.

Table 2.4: Estimating the Accuracy of the Newman-based Grouping Process

	Count	Percent
Omitted from Sample	3	3.80
Never Assigned to Group Listed by UN	14	17.72
Matched Group Listed by UN	62	78.48
Total	**79**	**100.00**

However, 3 of the 17 errors (17.65 percent) result from data omissions and are thus better attributed to the snowball sampling method than the grouping process. Given that all of the individuals omitted from the sample are either minor terrorists or individuals who operate in parts of the world where open-source coverage is particularly opaque, these results generally speak to the reliability of the data acquisition process. Indeed, as the characterizations below show, the UN was able to tie only one of the three omitted individuals to a specific attack, despite the organization's superior access to information.

- Zaki Ezat Zaki Ahmed, who the UN narratives describe as a member of EIJ and al-Qaida wanted for crimes against Egypt. His name is not mentioned in reference to any specific events or locations.[82]

- Al Sayyid Ahmed Fathi Hussein Eliwah, who the UN narratives also describe as a member of EIJ and al-Qaida wanted for crimes against Egypt. As with Ahmed, Eliwah's name is not referenced in relation to specific events, though the UN documents do state that he trained in Afghanistan in the early 1990s.[83]

- Tayeb Nail, who the UN narratives describe as a member of the branch of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb commanded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. According to the

[82] Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing:Q1.A.193.05 Zaki Ezat Zaki Ahmed," September 29, 2005; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI19305E.shtml.
[83] Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing:Q1.A.195.05 Al Sayyid Ahmed Fathi Hussein Eliwah," September 29, 2005; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI19505E.shtml.

documents, Nail participated in an attack on a Mauritanian military base in 2005, as well as several kidnappings, and assorted profit-generating crimes.[84]

Data questions aside, placing individuals in the correct organization is only half of the battle; it is equally important to determine *when* they joined a terror group. Comparing the first year that the Newman-based process attributed group membership to individuals with the time-specific membership data obtained from the UN narratives offers a more detailed test of the model's performance. Table 2.5, which compares membership statistics at the organizational level and across time, demonstrates that the modeling process performed well across a host of organizations by reliably placing individuals in the appropriate group, but also shows that the timing of these comparisons is sometimes problematic. In order to highlight the grouping process to the greatest extent possible, the results do not include the five individuals omitted from the snowball sample.

[84] Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individual and entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.N.280.10 Tayeb Nail," April 22, 2010; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI28010E.shtml.

Table 2.5: Estimating the Accuracy of the Newman-based Grouping Process Over Time

	AQ		AQAP		ASG	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Perfect Match	8	18.18	1	12.50	0	0.00
Matched 1 Year Early/Late	8	18.18	5	62.50	2	100.00
Matched 2 Years Early/Late	5	11.36	0	0.00	0	0.00
Matched 3 Years Early/Late	4	9.09	0	0.00	0	0.00
Matched 4 or More Years Early/Late	13	29.55	0	0.00	0	0.00
Never Assigned to Group Listed by UN	6	13.64	2	25.00	0	0.00
Total Ever Matched	**38**	**86.36**	**6**	**75.00**	**2**	**100.00**

	EIJ		GSPC		HUJI	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Perfect Match	1	20.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Matched 1 Year Early/Late	2	40.00	0	0.00	1	100.00
Matched 2 Years Early/Late	1	20.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Matched 3 Years Early/Late	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Matched 4 or More Years Early/Late	0	0.00	1	50.00	0	0.00
Never Assigned to Group Listed by UN	1	20.00	1	50.00	0	0.00
Total Ever Matched	**4**	**80.00**	**1**	**50.00**	**1**	**100.00**

	JI		RSM		TTP	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
Perfect Match	1	9.09	0	0.00	0	0.00
Matched 1 Year Early/Late	2	18.18	0	0.00	1	100.00
Matched 2 Years Early/Late	1	9.09	0	0.00	0	0.00
Matched 3 Years Early/Late	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Matched 4 or More Years Early/Late	4	36.36	1	100.00	0	0.00
Never Assigned to Group Listed by UN	3	27.27	0	0.00	0	0.00
Total Ever Matched	**8**	**72.73**	**1**	**100.00**	**1**	**100.00**

However, much ambiguity surrounds these results. Given that the sample represented in figure 2.20 contained exceptionally sparse data on several of the included organizations, it is difficult to assume that the results are generalizable beyond al-Qaida, Jemaah Islamiyah, and

perhaps also al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. Within these organizations, false negatives were not an especially prominent problem; instead, attributions that took place four or more years removed from the UN characterization constituted the most worrisome issue. It remains unclear if these timing discrepancies stem from inconsistencies in the grouping process, from coverage issues stemming from the snowball data sampling process, from data omissions that are inherent to all open-source inquiries into terrorism (regardless of method), or, as is most likely, from some combination of these factors. Similarly, because reality remains unknown, it is not clear that the UN narratives' judgments are especially accurate. It is at least theoretically possible that the modeled membership estimates are more accurate, or that both characterizations are entirely wrong. Ultimately, ambiguity reigns supreme in all large-scale efforts to determine the precise nature and timing of individuals' membership in terror groups, but these results demonstrate broad congruence between the model's output and expert judgments.

Given this unavoidable uncertainty and the timing inconsistencies between the model and the UN narratives, this study's subsequent analyses treat membership designations in a somewhat soft manner. While it remains possible for individuals to sever connections and leave terror groups, gaps in involvement need to be fairly pronounced in order for determinations of severance to be valid. The analysis considers any actions that an individual takes within a year of the model's characterization of his departure from an organization as still attributable to this parent organization.

Why one year and not two, three, or four? The choice is ultimately subjective, but evidence suggests that hit squads typically arrive in the country to be attacked sometime within the calendar year prior to conducting an attack. For example, open-sources place Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, an African terrorist who played a principle role in the 2002 Mombasa attacks that

targeted an airliner and a hotel popular with Israeli tourists,[85] in Somalia conducting terror training as late as the autumn of 2001, suggesting that he did not begin his in-country preparations for the Kenyan attack until sometime in early 2002.[86] Similarly, Mohamed Atta, the acknowledged field commander of the 9/11 hijackers during their stay in the U.S. ahead of the 2001 attacks, arrived in America in the summer of 2000.[87] Thus, one year seems a large enough relaxation to encompass real-world interactions, while remaining small enough so as not to effectively render static the model's characterization of membership.

This final determination serves as an example of a broader pattern that this chapter has tried to highlight, namely that the Newman grouping process is not a purely deterministic approach to assigning individuals to terror groups. Human analysts must be in the loop at several phases between the collection of raw data and the final output. Therefore, as figure 2.16 summarizes visually, the process outlined by this chapter is semi-automated and combines the rigors of mechanistic formal modeling with determinations drawn from the theoretical literature on terrorism.

[85] These sources include a memoir, which Fazul left behind prior to his death, describing his experiences in al-Qaida that has yet to enter the public domain. For a brief secondary characterization of this document, see: Nelly Lahoud, "Bin Laden's Death Through the Lens of Al-Qa'ida's Confidential Secretary," *CTC Sentinel*, May 1, 2011.
[86] International Crisis Group, "Counter-terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?" ICG Africa Group Report No. 95, July 11, 2005.
[87] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), p. 224; Terry Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," *The New Yorker*, September 13, 2010.

Figure 2.16: From Raw Data to Final Grouping



3.0 ESTIMATING AL-QAIDA'S ROLE IN TERRORISM WITHIN THE BALEIAN TYPOLOGY

As the first chapter argued, most efforts to categorize terrorism have been overly theoretical in nature. Authors have devoted considerable effort to creating typologies that describe the breadth of al-Qaida's involvement in Islamist terror, but have done little in the way of wide implementation. Consequently, the relative frequency of al-Qaida's various patterns of involvement in terrorism remains unclear.

This chapter constitutes one effort toward this necessary broad-based empirical work, and discusses how network methodology is applied to the snowball data sample in an attempt to fill-in the Baleian typology outlined in the first chapter's literature review. Toward those ends, the chapter contains seven sections following this introduction. The first describes how this study generates a continuous variable that estimates the extent of organizations' involvement in terrorist events using a novel implementation of a formal measure known as degree centrality. The second section revisits the distinction between strong and weak ties and explicitly defines how and why this study differentiates between the two, before the third section turns its attention towards questions of geography and explicitly defines "the West" as a region, in order to enable the differentiation between events that are merely strongly tied to al-Qaida and those conducted by hit squads deployed to the West. The fourth section considers time and examines the conditions that must be met in order for this study to determine that an individual made a clear break with al-Qaida, which in turn makes it possible to distinguish between events conducted by the organization's active members and events conducted by its former members. The fifth

section discusses ideology and explains the conditions that must be met for this study to consider an event as ideologically-linked to al-Qaida. The sixth section briefly considers events that have no ties to al-Qaida, before the seventh section presents the relative frequency of the Baleian categories and discusses broad trends within each of them. Because the quantitative estimates presented by this chapter say little about variation within each of the categories, the trends outlined in the seventh section also serve as a metric to select the cases discussed in this study's remaining chapters.

3.1 IMPLEMENTING NETWORK MEASURES IN THE ASSESSMENT OF TERROR THREATS

Among the membership model's more useful implementations is the ability to estimate the extent and nature of organizations' involvement (or lack thereof) in terror incidents. This section outlines a measurement process that uses network tools to make replicable, non-subjective assessments of tie strength. Because functional links, as defined by the first chapter, constitute the most meaningful form of involvement in an attack, the process outlined below is applied to this relationship type in order to estimate the extent of al-Qaida's culpability for Islamist-motivated plots and attacks conducted between 1993, when the organization first played a demonstrable functional role in an attack, and 2010, the last year included in this assessment.

The process hinges on a formal network measure known as degree centrality. As typically implemented in a single-mode network, degree determines agents' importance based on the number of links they hold; the more links an agent has, the greater their centrality. Consequently, this measure provides a superb measure of direct influence in a network, because

agents have the greatest capacity to influence the individuals with which they share immediate relationships.[1]

However, the process of estimating functional organizational involvement in events is slightly more complex, because this technique involves implementing degree in a two-mode network that depicts agents and events, and which also scales actor's involvement by counting the total number of links he or she holds to an event over time. For any event in the data, it then becomes possible to express agents' role in the event as a ratio, by dividing the number of links an agent holds to the event over time—the agent's cumulative degree—by the total number of ties that all agents hold to the event over time. So, for example, if an agent "A" held 5 ties to an event, agent "B" held 3 ties to the same event, and all agents in the network held a combined total of 20 ties to that event, then the A's share of involvement would be 25 percent, and B's share of involvement would be 15 percent. Because percentages are additive, moving from the individual level to the organizational level then becomes a simple matter of arithmetic. To complete the example above, if the membership model classified A and B as members of the same organization, and no other members of their group held ties to the event under analysis, then the organization's share of involvement in the event would be 40 percent.

The only real trick of the process comes in dealing with individuals that hold multiple memberships. Because there is no *a-priori* reason to assume that dual members operated exclusively in the interests of one organization over another, the problem is easily resolved through simple division. If, for example, agent A held membership in both al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah, then the model would credit each organization with half of his share of involvement in the attack.

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[1] Wasserman and Faust, p. 100; See also, Linton C. Freeman, "Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification," *Social Networks*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1978/1979), pp. 215-239.

The primary advantage of this approach is its replicability, which mitigates the subjectivity inherent to qualitative determinations of the extent of al-Qaida's involvement in events. However, this advantage does not come without cost. Specifically, the method requires that the data contains substantial quantities of information on a given event in order to classify that event reliably. When this requirement is not met, small changes in the data cause disproportionate swings in the model's output.

Al-Qaida's involvement in the 2003 plot to attack Reunion Island, a French possession located in off of Africa's east coast in the Indian Ocean, offers a useful illustration. In April 2003, French police arrested Christian Ganczarski, a Polish-born German citizen who converted to Islam before training in bin Laden-funded Afghan camps and joining al-Qaida.[2] Based on the testimony of other terror suspects, French authorities accused Ganczarski of being ~~"o~~ne of the organizers and the financier" of a plot to bomb the French island using a ~~"b~~ooby-trapped car."[3] While his affiliation with al-Qaida clearly grants the organization some measure of culpability for the plot, data paucity may exaggerate that scale of this involvement, because the snowball sample contains only three interactions that relate directly to the Reunion Island operation. As two of these links belong to Ganczarski, the model estimates al-Qaida's involvement in the event at 66.67 percent. However, if all other variables were held constant and a single interaction was added that did not involve a member of bin Laden's organization, then al-Qaida's estimated involvement in the Reunion plot would drop to 50 percent. This sensitivity dictates that the model's estimates must be interpreted with a grain of salt for events that contain few known interactions.

[2] Gregory Viscusi, "German jailed for Djerba Synagogue bomb to appeal, lawyer says," *Bloomberg*, February 6, 2009; "German linked to Synagogue bomb arrested," *AP Online*, April 5, 2003.
[3] "French detain Tunisian terror suspect," *AP Online*, June 11, 2003.

However, it is worth noting that this weakness is not unique to this approach. Whether inquiries are quantitative or qualitative in nature, all attempts to study events about which little is known are remarkably sensitive to the revelation of new information. The mathematical nature of this approach may, therefore, ultimately be an advantage, because this method makes the scale of its sensitivity transparent in ways that purely narrative approaches cannot. Toward this transparency, Appendix G, which contains quantitative estimates of organizations‘ functional involvement in all terror events included in this analysis, lists the number of interactions specific to each event, so that readers can easily assess the reliability of each estimate.

Figure 3.1 offers a visualization of the output obtained from this estimation process and summarizes the extent of al-Qaida‘s functional involvement in 129 plots and attacks, which were drawn from the larger snowball sample, and in which bin Laden‘s organization played some functional role. The upper two charts depict this involvement in a static perspective that ranks results by score and provides a sense of overall patterns. The left-hand graph is a simple histogram, in which each line represents a plot or attack, and the right-hand graph shows the same information as a count of events by quartile. The lower two graphs repeat this format, but depict the information in an over-time perspective.

Figure 3.1: Continuous Estimation of al-Qaida's Involvement in Events



Minimum	2.08	Median	50.00
Maximum	100.00	Mode	50.00
Mean	57.12	Standard Deviation	31.53

3.2 FROM THE CONTINUOUS TO THE CATEGORICAL: DEFINING STRONG AND WEAK TIES

With the values and limitations of the estimates listed in figure 3.1 in mind, it is necessary to revisit lingering questions regarding the relative values of strong and weak ties. The statistical literature makes it clear that there is not an ideal means to divide continuous measurements into categorical variables. When used in outcome-oriented studies, such as those that tie the efficacy of medical treatment to body mass index or age, cut-points can be determined empirically by finding the group that has —the most significant relation with the

outcome," but when determinations are made based on data alone, as they must be here because this analysis takes place outside the context of regression, categories are by definition arbitrary.[4]

This unavoidable fact raises some specific concerns that must be explicitly addressed. Statisticians often question the legitimacy of arbitrary categorizations, because binning continuous variables mitigates the explanatory power of statistical regression by reducing the range of variation among observations.[5] However, as this analysis is concerned with classification rather than causation, the potential pitfall of data categorization lies less in the loss of data and more in the selection of a poorly justified cut-point. Indeed, given that data paucity often characterizes the available open-source information on terrorism, it would be somewhat disingenuous to claim that small, finite differences in al-Qaida's involvement in events were particularly meaningful; consequently, broad categorical characterizations are ultimately advantageous because they are more robust to data imperfections than continuous estimates. Put differently, newly revealed information will change continuous estimates, but is less likely to shift an event between the "weak" and "strong" categories.

Still, the issue of where to draw boundaries is non-trivial, because events near the cut-point are the exception to this conclusion. David Krackhardt noted such boundary-crossing as an explicit concern in his critique of Granovetter's hypothesis on the value of weak ties and argued that the treatment of middling values, which occur near the cut-point, play a substantial role in

[4] The statistical literature in medicine has arguably devoted the most attention to the categorization of continuous data, as studies often like to evaluate prognostic impacts on "high risk," "moderate risk," and "low risk" groups. J.N. Mandrekar, S.J. Mandrekar, and S.S. Cha "Cut-point Determination Methods in Survival Analysis Using SAS," *Proceedings of the 28th Annual SAS User's Group International*, 2003. For a longer treatment, see: Brent A. Williams, Jayawant N. Mandrekar, Sumitha J. Mandrekar, Stephen S. Cha, and Alfred F. Furth, "Finding Optimal Cut-points for Continuous Covariates with Binary and Time-to-Event Outcomes," *Department of Health Science Resaerch, Mayo Clinic*, Technical Report Series #79, June 2006.

[5] David L. Streiner, "Breaking Up is Hard to Do: The Heartbreak of Dichotomizing Continuous Data," *Canadian Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (April 2002), pp. 262-266.

determining the outcome of strong tie/weak tie analyses.[6] Thus, it is insufficient to merely justify the process of categorization at a theoretical level; detailed attention must be paid to determining exactly where to draw the line between strong and weak ties.

Sadly, the preceding literature offers little relevant guidance. Terrorism scholars offer no specific advice on where to draw boundaries between strong and weak ties when relationship strength is characterized using continuous measurements, and, as the first chapter's literature review made clear, network analysts typically employ inapplicable survey methods when treating the strong tie/weak tie debate as an issue of categorization. Therefore, common sense and simple mathematical measurements served as the ultimate arbiters of this analysis' differentiation.

A two-tiered categorization of ties is explicit to the weak tie/strong tie characterization, so the relevant question centers on where to situate the dividing line between categories, rather than how many categories to define. Three clear rationales emerge for setting the cut-point: (1) Use an absolute definition and set the cut-point to 50 percent, so that all events in which al-Qaida's involvement was at least half of the theoretically possible maximum are considered "strongly tied" to the group. (2) Use a relative definition and set the cut-point equal to al-Qaida's mean level of involvement in events, 58.77 percent, so that only those events in which al-Qaida's role was of above average strength qualify as "strongly tied" to the organization. (3) Use a relative definition and set the cut-point equal to al-Qaida's median level of involvement in

[6] Specifically, Krackhardt argues that because Granovetter's original argument hypothesizes a curvilinear predictive relationship between tie strength and access to information, there is an unknown point at which increasing the strength of the relationship decreases the tie-holders' access to new information. Therefore, how and where analysts locate ties along a continuum greatly impacts the final analysis. David Krackhardt, "The Strength of Strong Ties: The Importance of *Philos* in Organizational Theory," In N. Nohria and R. Eccles (eds.), *Networks and Organizations: Structures, Forms, and Action*, (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), pp. 216-217; available online: http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/krack/documents/pubs/1992/1992%20The%20Strength%20of%20Strong%20Ties.pdf.

events, in this case also 50 percent, so that an equal number of events fall into the ―weak" and ―strong" categories.

Because this analysis considers multiple organizations, the absolute value makes the most sense to use, lest the conception of ―strong" ties differ from organization to organization. A hypothetical example aptly illustrates the logic underlying this decision. Consider an organization that typically plays small supporting roles in attacks. Whether measured by mean or median, this organization's average involvement would be below 50 percent. For the sake of argument, assume both measures of average were 30 percent. Using either of the relative measures to determine if the organizations' ties to an event were ―strong" or ―weak" would then cause a conflicting characterization for events in which the organization partnered with al-Qaida. For example, if the hypothetical organization, al-Qaida, and a third group all played an equal role in an attack, the event would be strongly tied to the hypothetical group described above, but weakly tied to al-Qaida, even though each organization's involvement was 33.3 percent. Thus, absolute cut-points are necessary in order to allow fair cross-comparison, and this analysis considered all events in which al-Qaida's functional involvement was estimated at 50 percent or greater as ―strongly tied" to the organization, while all events in which al-Qaida's functional involvement was estimated at greater than zero, but less than 50 percent, were considered ―weakly tied" to the organization.

This determination yielded 56 plots and 34 attacks that were strongly linked to al-Qaida, as well as 17 plots and 22 attacks that were weakly linked to the organization. However, because the Baleian typology differentiates between events conducted by hit squads in the West and those that are merely strongly tied to bin Laden's organization, it is necessary to first consider the

impact of geography in order to determine into which category many of these events fall. Therefore, the next section turns its attention to defining "the West" as a region.

3.3 CONSIDERING GEOGRAPHY

Unfortunately, there is no unanimously agreed upon definition of "the West;" the region's boundaries have shifted over both time and context.[7] This reality introduces some subjectivity into this analysis' classification system, because different definitions of "the West" will greatly affect the relative frequencies of the first and second categories in the Baleian typology. It is, therefore, necessary to carefully evaluate the limitations of various definitional approaches.

Purely geographic definitions are too strict, because they exclude countries like Japan, South Korea, and Singapore, which have decidedly Western economies and Western-influenced political systems, despite their location in the geographic East. However, it would also be a fallacy to assume that economic development is a perfect synonym for Westernization. Indeed, the United Arab Emirates, which sits squarely in Islamists back yard by virtue of its proximity to Saudi Arabia, outranks the United Kingdom by nearly $3,500 in per capita GDP.[8] The extent of democracy is a similarly flawed measurement, because it privileges political representation over economic and cultural measures of Westernization. For example, according to the *Economist Intelligence Unit's* widely-cited Democracy Index, the otherwise-Westernized Singapore ranks 81st out of 167 countries and fails to even qualify as a "flawed democracy."[9] Some subjectivity is ultimately unavoidable, but because the Human Development Index (HDI) explicitly considers

[7] James Kurth, "Western Civilization, Our Tradition," *Intercollegiate Review*, Fall 2003/Spring 2004, pp. 5-13.
[8] World Development Indicators, The World Bank.
[9] "Democracy Index 2011," *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2011; available online: http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2011.

social and economic development, it provides the most intuitively satisfying (though arguably culturally-centric) conceptualization of what it means to be Western.

By and large, this study viewed an HDI ranking of "very high" as synonymous with being part of the West. However, five of the 47 nations with very high scores were excluded because they are heavily culturally influenced by Islam: the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Cyprus, and Qatar.[10] Difficult questions regarding how to treat many countries in Latin America, a region that some characterizations label as Western while others do not, were side-stepped, as none of the events determined to be strongly tied to al-Qaida occurred in this region. Table 3.1 lists all of the countries determined to be "Western" by the metric outlined above; countries where an al-Qaida hit-squad played a strong functional role in an attack or plot included in the snowball sample have been starred.

Table 3.1: "Western" Nations

Nations With an HDI Ranking of "Very High" and No Strong Islamic Influences			
Andorra	Estonia	Japan	Portugal
Argentina	Finland	South Korea	Singapore*
Australia*	France*	Latvia	Slovakia
Austria	Germany	Liechtenstein	Slovenia
Barbados	Greece	Lithuania	Spain
Belgium*	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	Luxembourg	Sweden
Canada	Hungary	Malta	Switzerland
Chile	Iceland	Netherlands	United Kingdom*
Croatia	Ireland	New Zealand	United States*
Czech Republic	Israel*	Norway*	
Denmark*	Italy	Poland	

[10] These determinations were made based on the CIA World Factbook's demographic breakdowns of religion in the countries. Specifically, the UAE is 96 percent Muslim; Bahrain is 81.2 percent Muslim, Brunei Darussalam is 67 percent Muslim, Cyprus is 18 percent Muslim, and Qatar is 77.5 percent Muslim. Although Croatia played a role in the Bosnian War of the mid-1990s (a conflict with strong religious overtones), the region's Muslim population is largely confined to Bosnia. According to the World Factbook, Croatia is only 1.3 percent Muslim, while Bosnia is 40 percent Muslim. Thus, there is no strong rationale for excluding Croatia from the list of Western countries. Moreover, none of the hit squad attacks occurred in Croatia, so its inclusion or exclusion have no immediate impact on this analysis.

Once used to filter an agent x event matrix depicting the 90 events strongly-tied to al-Qaida, these HDI scores classified 64 events in the first Baleian category and 26 events in the second Baleian category. In order to provide a sense of change over time, figures 3.2 through 3.4 list event totals by year for the first three divisions in the Baleian typology, while Appendix G, located at the end of the study, provides a full listing of the events that fall in each category. However, it is necessary to include a final note on interpretation before presenting these figures: caution is merited because these statistics say nothing about the size of events. The chart counts major events like the 9/11attacks in the same fashion as aborted plots, such as the strike against the 2000 Sydney Olympics that Hambali planned, but never executed,[11] or the 2000 plot against the Israeli Embassy in Canberra that was initiated and then later abandoned by Jack Roche, a British-born convert to Islam who received explosives training at an al-Qaida camp in Afghanistan and met with bin Laden.[12] Similarly, it is important to remember that this analysis attempted to exclude events conducted in the context of insurgency, so the counts are not representative of al-Qaida's total involvement in violence.

[11] "Fed: man denies links to plans for Olympic terror attack," *AAP Newsfeed*, December 3, 2002; Cameron Stewart and Colleen Egan, "A word from the wise - 'They approached me and said this man wants to make some attacks on things . . . And what do you want to do about it?' -- Sheik Mohammed Omran," *Weekend Australian*, October 18, 2003.

[12] Kate McGeown, "Jack Roche: The naïve militant," *BBC News*, June 1, 2004; Liza Kappelle and Karen Valenti, "Fed: Roche in court again over terror conspiracy," *AAP Newsfeed*, November 27, 2002.

Figure 3.2: Events in the First Category of the Baleian Typology

1. Attacks and plots with 'strong' functional links to al-Qaida		
Total Events: 64		
	Plots	Attacks
Unkn	3	0
1988	0	0
1989	0	0
1990	0	1
1991	0	0
1992	0	0
1993	0	1
1994	7	2
1995	2	0
1996	0	0
1997	0	0
1998	1	2
1999	0	1
2000	1	1
2001	2	0
2002	7	9
2003	9	6
2004	1	4
2005	0	0
2006	0	0
2007	0	0
2008	0	2
2009	0	1
2010	1	0
Total	34	30



Figure 3.3: Events in the Second Category of the Baleian Typology

2. Attacks and plots conducted by al-Qaida "hit squads" deployed to the West		
Total Events: 26		
	Plots	Attacks
Unkn	4	0
1988	0	0
1989	0	0
1990	0	0
1991	0	0
1992	0	0
1993	0	0
1994	0	0
1995	0	0
1996	0	0
1997	0	0
1998	0	0
1999	0	0
2000	1	0
2001	4	2
2002	5	0
2003	2	0
2004	1	0
2005	0	2
2006	1	0
2007	0	0
2008	1	0
2009	2	0
2010	1	0
Total	22	4



Figure 3.4: Events in the Third Category of the Baleian Typology

3. Attacks and plots with 'weak' functional connections to al-Qaida		
Total Events: 39		
	Plots	Attacks
Unkn	1	0
1988	0	0
1989	0	0
1990	0	0
1991	0	0
1992	0	0
1993	0	0
1994	1	1
1995	0	2
1996	0	0
1997	0	1
1998	0	0
1999	4	0
2000	1	3
2001	2	1
2002	3	4
2003	1	2
2004	2	7
2005	0	0
2006	0	0
2007	0	0
2008	2	1
2009	0	0
2010	0	0
Total	17	22



3.4 CONSIDERING TIME

In order to determine the quantity of events that fall into the fourth Baleian category, namely that containing attacks and plots tied to individuals who formerly held strong ties to al-Qaida and now operate independent of the organization, it is necessary to begin by considering the impact of time and find all those individuals in the data who made clear breaks with al-Qaida. This study defines a "clear break" as a minimum gap of two years since an individual last held modeled-membership in al-Qaida or trained in a bin Laden-funded camp. Although in the real world two years without contact represents a substantial enough separation to consider ties with al-Qaida broken, the ambiguities inherent to the open-source data on terrorism and the resulting fuzziness of the model's ability to time organizational affiliations dictate cautious interpretation of these alumni's role in terrorism. There is a possibility that some of the separations evident in the data are false and result because ties were well-hidden, rather than absent.

Consider Bilal Khazal as an example. His historical ties to al-Qaida are clear; he trained in Afghanistan circa 1998 and met with both Ayman al-Zawahiri and Usama bin Laden. Press reports even allege that CIA analysts described Khazal as an al-Qaida member.[13] However, Khazal vanished from the data after these initial interactions and did not reemerge until 2002, when he played a role in the funding, logistical support, and possibly also the planning of a bombing perpetrated against a McDonald's franchise in Lebanon.[14] Although the data contains no additional information on his interactions with members of bin Laden's organization in the four years between his training and the bombing, there is a strong chance that data paucity

[13] Sally Neighbor, "Dangerous liaisons in two countries tied by blood and radical Islam," *The Australian* (Australia), July 2, 2007; Mark Coultan and Ellen Connolly, "The baggage of Bilal Khazal; Insight," *Sydney Morning Herald* (Australia), June 4, 2004.

[14] Specifically, Khazal's name reemerged in connection with Mohammed Yehia Kaaki and Saleh Jamal, an Australian citizen of Australian descent. For details, see: "Australia to open way to extradite terrorist suspects to Lebanon," *Agence France Presse*, September 15, 2003; "Terror bombing financiers hiding in Sydney," *The Daily Telegraph* (Sydney), December 23, 2003; Catherine Taylor, "Botched McDonald's bomb plot exposed global chain," *The Australian*, September 22, 2003.

caused Khazal to seem falsely separated from al-Qaida. Consequently, cautious interpretation is again necessary, because the timing and duration of individuals' membership in al-Qaida is sensitive to new information.

With this caveat, al-Qaida's alumni were tied to a total of 61 events that do not otherwise involve active members of bin Laden's organization. Unfortunately, data restrictions preclude a more nuanced characterization that considers the strength of this involvement. The vast majority of these alumni events occur in regions characterized by poor media coverage and legal systems that lack transparency, making it impossible to obtain the detailed information necessary to reliably estimate the scale of former al-Qaida members' involvement in events.

Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam (a.k.a. Abu Usama al-Kini) offers an example. After training in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, he played a key logistical role in the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, by helping other members of the attack team to acquire vehicles, safe houses, and explosive detonators.[15] He then vanished to Pakistan and did not reemerge in an operational context until 2007, when he was involved in an assassination attempt on Benazir Bhutto, which failed to kill the Pakistani politician, but caused nearly 150 other deaths.[16] However, the available information on Msalam's role in this attack is limited to two passing comments made in the news media following his death in a drone strike in 2009:

(1) "Kini was also thought to have been behind an unsuccessful attempt on the life of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who was later killed in a separate attack, US officials said." (BBC News)[17]

[15] USA v. Usama bin Laden, et al (Defendants), United States District Court Southern District of New York (S(7) 98 Cr. 1023), Day 19 of testimony (March 19, 2001); Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998," (Declassified Summary of FBI Investigation Report), November 18, 1998.
[16] For casualty statistics on the attack, see: Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, April 15, 2010. For information on Msalam's involvement in the attack, see the two citations below.
[17] "Pakistan al-Qaeda leaders 'dead,'" *BBC News*, January 9, 2009.

(2) –Al-Kini was also linked to a failed assassination attempt on late Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto when she returned to Pakistan in October 2007. She was killed two months later in a gun and suicide attack in Rawalpindi." (Agence France Press)[18]

Moreover, the only other accounts that provide any detailed information on the participants in the 2007 attack implied that Qari Saifullah Akhtar, a HUJI leader arrested on terror charges in 2004 and then released under mysterious circumstances the following year,[19] bore responsibility for the attack. For example, the *Washington Post* stated:

–Qari Saifullah Akhtar, who has been in Pakistani police custody before, was arrested Monday in the eastern city of Lahore for alleged involvement in the October suicide bombing in Karachi that hit Bhutto's homecoming parade when she returned from exile, Interior Minister Hamid Nawaz said."[20]

Without additional information that is not currently in evidence, it would be unfair to draw detailed conclusions about the relative scale of Msalam and Akhtar's involvement, or to conclude that Msalam's ties to bin Laden's organization were ongoing. Therefore, figure 3.5, which lists the number of events that fall into the fourth Baleian category, provides a rough approximation of the role that al-Qaida's alumni play in terrorism, rather than a refined estimate.

[18] "Top al-Qaida operative in Pakistan set up major attacks: officials," *Agence France Presse*, January 9, 2009.
[19] "Top militant accused of bombing Benazir's Karachi rally arrested," *Hindustan Times*, February 27, 2008.
[20] "World in Brief," *Washington Post*, February 27, 2008.

Figure 3.5: Events in the Fourth Baleian Category

4. Attacks and plots tied to individuals who formerly held strong ties to al-Qaida, but now operate independent of the organization		
Total Events: 61		
	Plots	Attacks
Unkn	0	0
1988	0	0
1989	0	0
1990	0	0
1991	0	0
1992	0	0
1993	5	1
1994	0	1
1995	0	2
1996	0	0
1997	0	0
1998	0	0
1999	0	0
2000	1	2
2001	2	3
2002	1	1
2003	1	2
2004	2	0
2005	0	6
2006	0	2
2007	1	6
2008	1	8
2009	2	4
2010	6	1
Total	22	39



3.5 CONSIDERING IDEOLOGY

Clive Williams, whose analysis of the nature of relationships among violent Islamists contributed greatly to the ontology this analysis used to classify link types, provides an excellent starting point for the discussion of plots and events tied to al-Qaida via ideological and uncertain ties. Because links include ―anything serving to connect one part or thing with another,"[21] Williams concluded that it is difficult to find any *Salafist*-motivated event that is not connected to al-Qaida by at least some measure of diffuse ideological overlap. Consequently, bounding an inquiry into this class of events is exceptionally challenging.

In order to avoid conflating al-Qaida, as an organization, with the broader Islamist terror movement, this analysis included in this category only those events that demonstrate explicit ideological ties to bin Laden's organization or its members, as demonstrated by statements of support for the organization or its leaders, documented possession of propaganda materials produced by the organization or its members, or documented online viewing of propaganda materials produced by the organization or its members. However, two factors complicate this effort. First, open-sources rarely, if ever, contain full information on terrorists' reading and viewing habits. Consequently, the full extent of their adherence to al-Qaida's specific vision of *jihad* is often subject to debate.

Shahawar Matin Siraj, a 24 year-old native of Karachi, Pakistan, arrested for plotting to bomb New York's Herald Square in 2004, offers an example. As he was born into the Ismaili sect, a Shia group known for its secularism, he had no family history of Sunni extremism.[22] He

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[21] The Macquarie Dictionary, quoted in Clive Williams M.G., ―The Question of 'Links' Between Al Qaeda and Southeast Asia," in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, eds., *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, (Singapore: World Scientific and the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2003), p. 83.

[22] Amy Goodman, ―Police Entrapment in Terror Case? NYC Subway Bomb Plotter Says He Was Set Up By Paid NYPD Informant," an interview with Martin Stolar (Siraj's Attorney), January 10, 2007; available online: http://www.democracynow.org/2007/1/10/police_entrapment_in_terror_case_nyc

apparently became radicalized after immigrating illegally to the United States in 1999 and taking work in an Islamic bookshop, where he became an avid reader of fundamentalist literature.[23] Unfortunately, the record contains no information on the specific authors that he read. It is impossible to judge how great an impact al-Qaida ideologues had on his thoughts, because Siraj both praised and criticized bin Laden's organization. He reportedly told one undercover officer that bin Laden was "a talented brother and a great planner" whom he hoped had "planned something big for America,"[24] yet in conversations recorded by another informant, Siraj stated that al-Qaida planners' reliance on suicide bombers demonstrated a lack of talent[25] and argued that bombings should cause "No killing. Only economic problems."[26] Thus, labeling him as an "al-Qaida inspired terrorist" may overstate the case, but it is also easy to see how a lack of information on terrorists' specific reading habits or online activity could lead to an under-estimation of al-Qaida's ideological role in other cases.

A second related issue concerns the lack of nuance found in many estimations of al-Qaida's ideological role in terror plots. Observers, even those with access to detailed information on terrorists' personal histories, are often far too casual in their usage of al-Qaida's name. They often attribute a role to the organization where none exists, thereby causing the very type of conflation that this analysis hopes to avoid.

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[23] Craig Horowitz, "Anatomy of a Foiled Plot: Two would-be bombers of the Herald Square subway station find that three is a crowd," *New York Magazine*, May 21, 2005; available online: http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/features/10559/; John Kreiser, "The Cost of Cooperation," *CBS News*, September 10, 2009; available online: http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500690_162-2012224.html?pageNum=2&tag=contentMain;contentBody; Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007; and U.S. Department of Justice, "Shahawar Matin Siraj Sentenced to Thirty Years of Imprisonment for Conspiring to Place Explosives at teh 34th Street Subway Station in New York," January 8, 2007.

[24] Tom Hays, "Jurors Asked to Name Bomb Plot Mastermind," *Associated Press Online*, May 22, 2006.

[25] Rashbaum, "Terror Jury Hears Talk of Bombing Subway Stop."

[26] *Harper's Magazine* reproduced excerpts of the conversations recorded by the informant; see: "Band of Brothers," *Harper's Magazine*, October 2006; available online: http://harpers.org/archive/2006/10/0081216.

As an example, consider the 2007 plot against JFK airport. Following the arrest of the key perpetrators, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a statement emphasizing that the plotters ―attempted to enlist support from prominent international terrorist groups and leaders . . . . [including] Adnan El Shukrijumah, an al Qaeda leader."[27] However, the details of the case suggest that the plotters had no affinity for al-Qaida's Sunni vision of Islam, much less that they attempted to enlist the organization's logistical support.

Russell Defreitas, an American citizen of Guyanese birth who initiated the JFK plot, was apparently motivated by long-standing resentment over America's role in the Palestinian conflict and sympathized especially strongly with the plight of Hizballah, a Shia organization, in the 2006 Lebanon War.[28] Abdul Kadir, a former member of the Guyanese Parliament and the plot's other primary planner, had once used his elected position to spy for the benefit of Iran,[29] and felt spiritually obligated to follow *fatwas* (religious decrees) issued by the Shia clerics who rule that country.[30] He even sent two of his children to study Shia Islam in Tehran.[31] Given this information, it seems a stretch to conclude that al-Qaida's vision of a global Sunni theocracy held any particular appeal for these Shia-motivated plotters.

How then did Shukrijumah's name come-up in relation to the case? It seems that the plotters discussed him somewhat in passing. Because his father had been born in Guyana, Shukrijumah shared aspects of the plotters' ethno-national heritage,[32] and they held him in

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[27] U.S. Department of Justice, ―Abdul Kadir Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK," December 15, 2010.
[28] USA v. Russel Defreitas, Kareem Ibrahim, Abdul Kadir, and Abdel Nur (Defendants), United States District Court Eastern District of New York, Complaint of Robert Addonizio, June 1, 2007.
[29] U.S. Department of Justice, ―Abdul Kadir Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK," December 15, 2010.
[30] ―Abdul Kadir Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK."
[31] Letta Tayler, ―Profile of Abdul Kadir: Disbelief in His Hometown," *Newsday* (New York), June 4, 2007.
[32] ―Breaking News: Adnan el-Shukrijumah new head of al-Qaeda operations – FBI tells Associated Press," *Stabroek News* (Guyana), August 6, 2010; available online: http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/archives/08/06/breaking-news-adnan-el-shukrijumah-new-head-of-al-qaeda-operations-%E2%80%93-fbi-tells-associated-press/. For a

fawning adoration as an example of what motivated Guyanese Muslims can accomplish in *jihad*.[33] According to one law-enforcement official who held full access to the unedited recordings made by informants involved in the case against Defreitas and Kadir, Shukrijumah had ~~n~~no connection with the operation."[34] While definitive assessments cannot be made until the transcripts of the recorded conversations become publically available, it seems quite likely that the justice department overstated the extent of the JFK plotters' ideological overlap with al-Qaida when they suggested that the team led by Defreitas and Kadir actively sought the support of bin Laden's organization.

Unfortunately, the JFK case is somewhat unique in the level of detail available from open-sources. Researchers rarely have access to enough data to probe the accuracy of official characterization of events and must simply trust that the authorities are correct when they assert the existence of ideological links between a plot or attack and al-Qaida. An over-estimation of the organization's role in Islamist terrorism may consequently result. For all of the ambiguity inherent to estimating other aspects of al-Qaida's participation in terrorist events, determining the number of events with explicit ideological ties to the organization is likely the most difficult challenge of all. Therefore, figure 3.6, which lists the number of plots and attacks that display demonstrable explicit ideological ties to al-Qaida without otherwise involving active members of the organization or its alumni, should be interpreted with according cynicism.

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detailed account of the life of Adnan's father, Gulshair Shukrijumah, see: Joe Kaufman and Belia Rabinowitz, "~~F~~ather Knows Terrorism Best," *FrontPage Magazine*, October 27, 2003; available online from the Militant Islam Monitor: http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/4.

[33] Nicole Bode, et al, "~~C~~IA Tip Grounded Horror," *Daily News* (NY), June 5, 2007.

[34] Quoted in Bode, et al.

Figure 3.6: Events in the Fifth Baleian Category

5. Attacks and plots with explicit ideological ties to al-Qaida		
Total Events: 32		
	Plots	Attacks
Unkn	0	0
1988	0	0
1989	0	0
1990	0	3
1991	0	0
1992	0	0
1993	0	1
1994	0	0
1995	0	0
1996	0	0
1997	0	0
1998	0	2
1999	0	0
2000	1	0
2001	0	1
2002	0	0
2003	0	1
2004	0	1
2005	4	2
2006	2	0
2007	3	2
2008	0	1
2009	2	4
2010	1	1
Total	13	19



3.6 CONSIDERING THE REMAINDER

Methodologically speaking, it is fairly easy to determine the events that fall into the remaining typological category, which deals with events that display no links of any kind to al-Qaida. All plots and attacks that appear in the snowball sample, but do not fall into any of the preceding categories belong here. Because these events fall outside of this study's explicit focus on al-Qaida, they are not analyzed in any great detail. Figure 3.7 lists the plots and attacks that fall into this category by year.

Figure 3.7: Events in the Sixth Baleian Category

6. Attacks and plots with no links to al-Qaida		
Total Events: 246		
	Plots	Attacks
Unkn	0	0
1988	1	0
1989	0	1
1990	0	0
1991	1	2
1992	1	0
1993	1	8
1994	0	3
1995	2	2
1996	2	3
1997	2	1
1998	2	3
1999	1	7
2000	1	16
2001	7	4
2002	5	12
2003	6	22
2004	10	15
2005	6	14
2006	5	9
2007	3	15
2008	2	20
2009	1	19
2010	1	10
Total	60	186



3.7 TRENDS

Although this analysis does not conduct any detailed analysis of the events that fall into the sixth Baleian category, they provide an appropriate starting place for discussing overall trends in the data, because these events make it possible to scale the size of the other categories relative to the broader phenomenon of Islamist terrorism. Simple arithmetic dictates that dividing the number of events in each category by the total number of events in the sample will yield comparative ratios that describe the categories‘ relative frequencies. Moreover, if the snowball sample, which like all data samples is an incomplete approximation of a larger population, accurately represents the whole of Islamist terrorism, then these ratios describe the frequency with which these patterns exist in the real world. The upper graph in figure 3.9 provides a summary view that depicts these frequencies in a single static snapshot that captures all of the data, and the lower graphs in figure 3.9 provide a sense of how these patterns have shifted over time by presenting annualized totals. The middle figure shows raw numbers and clearly depicts fluctuations in overall scale, and the bottom figure repeats the information in percent terms, in order to depict annual changes in the relative frequency of each category in the Baleian typology.

Figure 3.8 Overall Trends in al-Qaida's Role in Islamist Terrorism



BaleCat1
Attacks and plots with 'strong' functional links to al-Qaida

BaleCat2
Attacks and plots conducted by al-Qaida "hit squads" deployed to the West

BaleCat3
Attacks and plots with 'weak' functional connections to al-Qaida

BaleCat4
Attacks and plots tied to individuals who formerly held strong ties to al-Qaida, but now operate independent of the organization

BaleCat5
Attacks and plots with explicit ideological ties to al-Qaida

BaleCat6
Attacks and plots with no links to al-Qaida

3.7.1 CATEGORY 1

The number of terror events in which al-Qaida has played a strong role and that took place outside the West has fluctuated greatly over time, and fell off sharply after 2004. As the paragraphs below outline in brief, these trends likely result from changes in al-Qaida's operational environment. Given that this analysis largely excludes events conducted outside the context of insurgency, it would be premature to conclude that the organization has ceased to play a strong role in operations conducted outside the West; instead, al-Qaida's non-Western activities may have simply changed in type, as circumstances have forced the organization to engage in irregular warfare against coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The first non-Western event in which al-Qaida played a strong role took place in 1990, when Abu Hafs al-Masry, a founding member of bin Laden's organization, orchestrated the murder of Rifaat al-Mahgoub, the speaker of the Egyptian parliament.[35] Aside from this largely individual role, al-Qaida's first strong organizational role in an event took place in 1993, when the organization played a role in an attack in Yemen on a hotel housing U.S. servicemen preparing to deploy to the humanitarian conflict in Somalia.[36] The following year, al-Qaida's activity spiked, largely as a result of the multi-national activities of Ramzi Yousef, who graduated from al-Qaida's Khaldan Camp,[37] before heading to the Philippines for the first time, where he met Aburajak Janjalani,[38] who was both the founder of ASG[39] and a disciple of Abdul

[35] Andrew Buncombe, "Bin Laden deputy killed in air strikes, claims US officials," *The Independent* (London), November 17, 2001.
[36] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), p. 59.
[37] Terry Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," *The New Yorker*, September 13, 2010.
[38] "Abdul Basit Balochi (Mahmoud Kareem), alias Ramzi Ahmed Yousef," *Washingtonpost.com*, September 12, 2007.
[39] Robert H. Reid, "Government says Abu Sayyaf links extend through Afghanistan to Middle East," *Associated Press Worldstream*, April 9, 1995.

Rasool Sayyaf,[40] an Afghan trainer whom bin Laden had funded since the mid-1980s[41] and with whom Yousef's uncle, KSM, forged exceptionally close bonds.[42]

Yousef was heavily involved in a host of daring plots in Manila in 1994 and 1995, granting al-Qaida a strong role in these events. He considered assassinating President Bill Clinton and Pope John Paul II during their respective visits to the Philippines,[43] and Yousef orchestrated the Bojinka plot, which sought to use timed, liquid-based explosive devices to simultaneously bring-down a dozen U.S.-flagged jetliners over the Pacific.[44] However, Yousef also attempted to bomb the Israeli embassy in Bangkok in 1994 (the plot only failed because his driver crashed the bomb-truck en route to the attack site) and played a leading role in an attack on a Shiite shrine in Iran.[45]

In 1996 and 1997, al-Qaida played no strong role in the conduct of attacks because of two factors. First, Ramzi Yousef was captured in Pakistan, when a student he was attempting to recruit into *jihad* turned-in the terrorist to obtain the multi-million dollar reward the U.S. State Department had offered for his capture.[46] Second, al-Qaida lost its sanctuary in the Sudan. Hassan al-Turabi, the nation's leader, bowed to Western pressure and formally expelled bin Laden. The dissident Saudi's financial resources were greatly depleted by the move, because it

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[40] International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003.
[41] Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, (New York: Penguin, 2004).
[42] McDermott.
[43] "Report: Bin Laden plotted to kill Clinton," *United Press International*, August 25, 1998; "Police in Philippines searching for Muslims in Yousef's cell," *Associated Press*, February 14, 1995; Robert H. Reid, "Philippines links Trade Center suspect to series of bizarre plots," *Associated Press*, March 27, 1995; James Bone and Alan Road, "Terror by degree," *The Times* (London), October 18, 1997.
[44] Chitra Ragavan, Nacy L. Bentrup, Ann M. Wakefield, Shelia Thalhimer, and Monica m. Ekman, "Tracing terror's roots," *U.S. News and World Report*, February 24, 2003; "Key World Trade bomb figure's trial set," *United Press International*, January 25, 1996; Dale L. Watson, "Prepared statement by Dale L. Watson, Section Chief, International Terrorism Operations Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information," *Federal News Service*, February 24, 1998.
[45] Reid, Bone and Rhode.
[46] Ragavan, et al; Greg Myre, "Police arrest friend of Yousef," *Associated Press*, February 10, 1995.

forced him to leave behind a host of businesses and properties in the greater Khartoum area.[47] Bin Laden found a new home in Afghanistan, but his initial relationship with the Taliban was shaky, and his organization did not yet have the same freedom of latitude it had enjoyed during the bulk of its time in the Sudan.[48] Effectively, 1996 and 1997 were lean years for al-Qaida as an organization.

The numbers partially belie the extent of al-Qaida's strong involvement in terror events outside the West over the next few years, because each of the organization's events was particularly large in scale. In 1998, al-Qaida conducted a pair of large attacks in East Africa, where it targeted U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.[49] That same year, the organization also plotted to use Stinger missiles against American targets in Saudi Arabia,[50] and owing to ties between Usama bin Laden and Omar al-Khatab, a principle planner of the 1999 Moscow bombings, which injured more than 200,[51] the model also attributes al-Qaida with a strong role in that Russian attack.

Similarly, in 2000, the organization attempted to bomb the U.S.S. The Sullivans when the ship was in port in Yemen, but the attack failed when the watercraft bearing the explosives sank under their weight. This failure served as a learning experience, because later that year, the organization conducted a successful attack on the U.S.S. Cole using identical maritime tactics.[52]

[47] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 9
[48] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 63.
[49] "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998."
[50] High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, Date Unknown, avaialble online: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/.
[51] "Campaign against terrorism: What became of his lieutenants?" *The Independent (London)*, November 26, 2001.
[52] United State of America v. Jamal Ahmed Mohamed Ali Al-Badawi and Fahd al-Quso, Defendants (Indictment S12 98 Cr. 1023), United States District Court Southern District of New York.

In 2001, the organization plotted against Israeli embassies in India, Azerbaijan, the Philippines, and Australia,[53] and considered attacking the Panama canal, before abandoning the idea.[54] The following year saw al-Qaida conduct more attacks in Eastern Africa, when members of the organization led attacks on a Mombasa hotel frequented by Israeli tourists and attempted to shoot-down an Israeli-owned jetliner as it departed Mombasa's airport.[55] Moreover, al-Qaida's prominent events for the year included an attack on U.S. Marines on Kuwait's Filika Island,[56]an attack against an historic synagogue in Tunisia,[57] attacks against Afghanistan's newly-formed government,[58] and a pair of additional maritime plots: one against the Limburgh, a French oil tanker operating in the waters around Yemen,[59] and the other against ships in the Strait of Hormuz.[60] Finally, in 2002, al-Qaida was strongly involved in the kidnapping and murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in Karachi; however, this event differed from al-Qaida's previous patterns in important ways. Rather than planning and executing the attack,

[53] Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), Unclassified, March 10, 2007 (Hereafter "KSM Tribunal"); Eric Shmitt, "Threat and Responses: Skirmish; U.S. Marine is killed in Kuwait as gunment strike training site," New York Times, October 9, 2002.
[54] Curt Anderson, "AP Exclusive: New al-Qaida leader knows US well," Associated Press, August 6, 2010; KSM Tribunal.
[55] "Statement Under Inquiry of Omar Said Omar," Recorded by Superintendant John Mulalulu, Kenya Anti-Terrorist Police Unit, n.d. (but almost certainly August, 2003), available from Appendix C-III of Al-Qaida's (mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point.
[56] KSM Tribunal; Eric Shmitt, "Threat and Responses: Skirmish; U.S. Marine is killed in Kuwait as gunment strike training site," New York Times, October 9, 2002.
[57] Mark Hosenball, Steve Tuttle, and Michael Isikoff, "A war yet to be won," *Newsweek*, September 9, 2002; Terry Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," *The New Yorker*, September 13, 2010; Pierre-Antoine Souchard, "Accused 9/11 plotter Mohammed faces a French trial," *Associated Press Online*, January 4, 2009.
[58] Phillip Robertson, "U.S. Airstrike near Asadabad," *Salon.com*, September 6, 2002; "Afghan government has 'undeniable evidence' of bomb plot," *Agence France Presse*, April 6, 2002.
[59] High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, Date Unknown, avaialble online: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/.
[60] Eric Lipton, "U.S. grand jury indicts a Briton, charging he supported terrorists," *New York Times*, October 7, 2004.

al-Qaida played a strong role in the attack because KSM reportedly purchased Pearl from the otherwise-independent kidnappers, before personally slitting the reporter's throat.[61]

In 2003, the number of non-Western terrorist events in which al-Qaida played a strong role remained near the peak values of 2002, owing largely to the impact of several events that occurred along the fuzzy line between insurgency and terrorism. As for plots, the organization considered shooting-down jetliners in Somalia,[62] as well as El-Al flights leaving Bangkok.[63] Al-Qaida also plotted against American targets in South Korea,[64] American interests in Pakistan, American diplomats in both Yemen and Saudi Arabia,[65] and several additional targets in East Africa.[66] The most prominent attacks were the bombing of housing compounds that catered to Westerners in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia,[67] and a series of bombings in Istanbul, Turkey, that targeted synagogues, a Western-owned bank, and the British consulate.[68] Moreover, al-Qaida members targeted civilians in several attacks that took place in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as the car-bombing of Shiites in Najaf[69] and the bombing of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad.[70] Finally,

[61] KSM Tribunal; Terry Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," *The New Yorker*, September 13, 2010; Al Goodman, "Spain convicts 3 on terror charges," *CNN.com*, May 29, 2007; Salman Masood and Talat Hussain, "Suspect in reporter's death is wanted in attacks on Musharraf," *New York Times*, May 29, 2004; Mazhar Abbas, "Militant to remain with police as Pakistan probes Pearl murder," *Agence France Presse*, February 25, 2002; "Pearl abduction mastermind identified in court by witness," *Agence France Presse*, March 6, 2002.
[62] High Value Detainee Biographies.
[63] KSM Tribunal; "Thwarted Attack Against El Al Flight," *Ha'aretz*, September 24, 2003
[64] KSM Tribunal; —AlQaeda scouted US terror targets in South Korea -- intelligence reports," *Agence France Presse*, December 16, 2003.
[65] High Value Detainee Biographies; Elaine Shannon, "Al-Qaeda Moneyman Caught," *Time*, May 1, 2003.
[66] Andrew England, "AP Exclusive: FBI's most wanted leader of al-Qaida cell indicted for U.S. embassy bombing escaped," *Associated Press*, June 10, 2004; Matthew Rosenberg, "AP Exclusive: Al-Qaida plotted to destroy U.S. Embassy in Kenya in June," *Associated Press*, October 24, 2003.
[67] High Value Detainee Biographies; "Saudi Bombing Deaths Rise," *BBC News*, May 13, 2003.
[68] Karl Vick, "Al-Qaida's Hand in Instanbul Plot," *Washington Post*, February 13, 2007.
[69] Edward Wong, "Iraqis report seizure of 2 aides to the most wanted militant," *New York Times*, January 25, 2005; "Najaf bombing kills Shiite leader, followers say," *CNN.com*, August 30, 2003.
[70] Jeffrey Gettleman, "Zarqawi's journey: From dropout to prisoner to an insurgent leader in Iraq," *New York Times*, July 13, 2004.

al-Qaida played a prominent role in a pair of assassination attempt on Pervez Musharraf, who then served as Pakistan's prime minister.[71]

The following year, 2004, saw a marked decline in the number of attacks on civilians in which al-Qaida played a strong role. Individuals who received training in al-Qaida camps in Waziristan conducted a series of smaller-scale attacks in Pakistan, including an attack on a state-sanctioned paramilitary force,[72] in which the model deemed al-Qaida played a strong role. Several additional attacks that straddle the line between insurgency and terrorism took place in Iraq, such as the kidnappings and beheadings of American businessman Nicholas Berg[73] and the suicide bombing of Ezzedine Salim, the president of the Iraqi governing council.[74] In North Africa, al-Qaida was strongly linked to the truck-bombing of an Algerian electrical facility,[75] and in Jordan, al-Qaida members were strongly involved in a plot to use chemical weapons.[76]

From 2005 through 2007, the data sample contains no events conducted outside the West in which al-Qaida played a strong role. Although the data on non-Western attacks in not particularly robust for 2008, it suggests that al-Qaida played a strong role in two attacks that year that again straddled the line between insurgency and terrorism. Specifically, the model states

[71] "Thumbnails of the four al-Qaida operatives suspected to have been killed in Paksitan attack," *Associated Press*, January 19, 2006; Glen Owen, "Five guns at his head . . . The Talibrum was seized, and back in Britain, the arrests began," *Mail on Sunday* (London), August 13, 2006.
[72] Paul Haven, "AP: Arrests damage al-Qaida network," *Associated Press Online*, August 6, 2004; "Indictment of Jundullah men deferred till Oct. 6 in six terrorism cases," *Pakistan Newswire*, September 28, 2004; "Witnesses examined in corps commander convoy attack trial," *Pakistan Newswire*, July 30, 2005.
[73] Dexter Filkins, "Iraq tape shows the decapitation of an American," *New York Times*, May 12, 2004.
[74] Ian Fischer, "Suicide bomber kills president of Iraqi council," *New York Times*, May 18, 2004.
[75] Craig S. Smith, "North Africa feared as staging ground for terror," *New York Times*, February 20, 2007.
[76] "Witness in terror plot tells court chemicals seized with defendants were explosives," *AP Worldstream*, June 15, 2005.

that al-Qaida members were strongly involved in the murder of a retired Pakistani general[77] and the kidnapping of Pakistani police officers and state bank officials.[78]

For the remaining two years in the data, the model attributes al-Qaida with a strong role in one non-Western event per yer. In 2009, members of bin Laden's organization were strongly linked to a suicide bombing that used a double-agent to target American intelligence personnel operating in Afghanistan.[79] Finally, in 2010, al-Qaida played an important role in a plot to conduct an armed rampage in European cities, using tactics that mirrored those that LeT adopted in its 2008 attack on hotels and other landmarks in southern Mumbai.[80]

Given that the American-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) began in 2001 and assumed massive dimensions by 2003, when the U.S. invaded Iraq, counterterrorism efforts offer a plausible, if somewhat obvious, explanation for the marked decline in al-Qaida activity that began circa 2004. Though the network data is quantitative in nature, the ambiguities inherent to both open-sources and the membership-modeling process dictate that it is ill-suited to regression; therefore, in order to more fully explore the nature and extent of changes to al-Qaida's operational capability, the fourth chapter will conduct three detailed case studies that explore the depth of training, operational capabilities, financial assistance, and logistical support al-Qaida made available to operatives involved in attacks that occurred at three different points in the organization's development. Specifically, the chapter will examine (1) the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, which occurred prior to the GWOT; (2) the 2002 bombings in

[77] USA v. Tahawwur Hussain Rana (Defendant), United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, Amended Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent Lorenzo Benedict, October 21, 2009.
[78] Pir Zubair Shah and Jane Perlez, "Taliban in Pakistan threaten to kill hostages unless 4 of their comrades are freed," *New York Times*, July 19, 2008.
[79] USA v. Hakimullah Mehsud (Defendant), United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent Thomas O. Krall, August 20, 2010; "Pakistan: US seeks Harakat chief for Khost CIA attack," *Daily Pak Banker*, January 6, 2010.
[80] Sami Yousafzai, Ron Moreau, and Christopher Dickey, "The New Bin Laden," *Newsweek*, October 23, 2010; Praveen Swami and Allan Hall, "Al-Qaeda plotted to take hostages in Mumbai-style attack on Britain," *Daily Telegraph* (London), October 29, 2010.

Mombasa, Kenya, which occurred during the early phase of the GWOT; and (3) a series of attacks that occurred in Pakistan in 2004, after the full effects of the GWOT had begun to impact bin Laden's organization.

3.7.2 CATEGORY 2

Al-Qaida has deployed hit squads to the West fairly consistently since the millennium. According to the model's formal determination, the Islamic Group under the leadership of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman bore responsibility for the 1993 World Trade Center Bombings.[81] Similarly, the model found that al-Qaida was weakly involved (14.29 percent) in the plot to bomb LAX in 1999, just ahead of the millennium, with stronger roles going to the GIA and agents of unknown organizational membership (42.86 percent for each of these groups).[82] Therefore, al-Qaida's first strong involvement in a hit squad attack on the West took place in 2000, when Iyam Farris, an Ohio-based truck-driver who also sent camping supplies to support al-Qaida's training operations in Afghanistan, plotted to attack a mall in Columbus, OH, before abandoning the plan.[83]

The following year saw a drastic increase, as measured by both quantity and scale of events, in al-Qaida's use of hit squad attacks against the West. Most notoriously, al-Qaida operatives attacked New York and Washington, DC, on September 11th.[84] However, in 2001,

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[81] For information on the 1993 attacks, see: Bruce Frankel, "Sheik indicted in bombing," *USA Today*, August 26, 1993; "Nosair possessed bomb plans, formula," *Washington Post*, May 28, 1993; Larry Neumeister, "Trade Center bombers resentenced to life terms," *Associated Press*, October 14, 1999; Malcolm Gladwell, "Sheik, 9 others, convicted in N.Y. bomb; 10 convicted in N.Y. conspiracy case, *Washington Post*, October 2, 1995; Brian Duffy and Ancel Martinez, "The tower bombing: Following the money," *U.S. News and World Report*, March 22, 1993.

[82] Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10016 (Zubaydah), United States Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 27, 2007; "Complaint; U.S. v. Ressam," NEFA Foundation. December 1999; available online: http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Ressam_Complaint.pdf; "Algerian suspected in terrorist plot pleads guilty," *Agence France Presse*, March 9, 2001; "Ressam targeted Los Angeles airport: US prosecutor," *Agence France Presse*, June 28, 2001.

[83] Jerry Seper, "Somali indicted in al Qaeda bomb plot," *Washington Times*, June 15, 2004; United States of America v. Iyam Faris (Plea agreement), United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 2003.

[84] 9/11 Commission Report.

KSM also plotted to poison U.S. water supplies,[85] and dispatched Richard Reid, who gained dubious renown as the failed "shoe bomber," to suicide-bomb an American-flagged jet as it traveled between Paris and the United States, using explosive devices hidden within his footwear.[86] Other al-Qaida members plotted to attack the U.S. Embassy in Pairs, and Kleine-Brogel Air Base in Belgium, before a series of arrests derailed their efforts.[87]

The following year, al-Qaida was strongly involved in six additional plots conducted by hit squads. KSM plotted to attack Heathrow Airport and other landmarks,[88] and Jose Padilla's much publicized arrest in Chicago unveiled a KSM-linked plot to "dirty bomb" the heartland by detonating a conventional explosive device wrapped inside of a layer of radioactive material.[89] Iyam Farris, the same operative involved in the Columbus plot, investigated the logistical requirements that would be needed to cut the cables supporting suspension bridges in New York City.[90] Other KSM-affiliated operatives supported un-named plots by attempting to smuggle explosives into New York via textile shipments,[91] and a fifth group linked to the infamous plotter explored operations against US Naval interests and shipping vessels operating in the Strait of Hormuz and Singapore.[92] Finally, a sixth group of operatives, many of whom were drawn from

[85] High Value Detainee Biographies.
[86] KSM Tribunal; USA v. Richard Colvin Reid (Defendant), United States District Court District of Massachusetts (Cr. No.: 02-10013-WGY), Sentencing Memorandum, January 17, 2003; Jason Bennetto, "Terror in London: Predicted bomb attack reveal intelligence gaps on al-Qa'ida," *The Independent* (London), July 8, 2005; Sue Leeman, "Man pleads guilty in U.K. shoe-bomb plot," *Associated Press Online*, February 28, 2005.
[87] Andrew Selsky, "Spain Probes Casablanca Blast Link: al-Qaeda Connection: Moroccan Suspects May Be Tied to Groups Behind Both Attacks," *National Post* (Canada), March 16, 2004; "Tunisian planned raid on air base: Targeted U.S. munitions in Belgium," *Calgary Herald* (Alberta, Canada), November 16, 2002; Paul Cherry, "Montreal man wants extradition," *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec), June 26, 2002.
[88] High Value Detainee Biographies.
[89] Deborah Sontag, "Terror suspects path from streets to Brig," *New York Times*, April 25, 2004; Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), Unclassified, March 10, 2007.
[90] KSM Tribunal; United States of America v. Iyam Faris (Plea agreement), United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 2003.
[91] High Value Detainee Biographies.
[92] "White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism," Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of Singapore, January 7, 2003.

Southeast Asia in the belief that their non-Middle Eastern appearance would be less likely to rouse suspicions in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, plotted to emulate the events of September 11, 2001, by hijacking jetliners and then crashing them into targets on America's West Coast.[93]

For 2003, the model attributes a strong role to al-Qaida for only two events: a plot to bomb French-owned Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean,[94] and a Baltimore-based plot to wreak havoc by detonating underground gasoline-storage containers.[95] However, in 2004, al-Qaida began a series of hit-squad attacks against the city of London that stretched through 2006. These events included an event widely known as the Crevice plot, in which a group of British-born Muslims, who had trained in al-Qaida camps, made preparations to bomb landmarks around the city using explosive devices constructed from nitrogen-based fertilizer, before a string of arrests, reportedly made after British intelligence intercepted a communique from the attack team's handlers abroad, disrupted the plot.[96] Two participants in the Cerivce plot who managed to escape arrest were then among the suicide-bombers who perpetrated the July 7, 2005, attacks on London's mass transit system,[97] and individuals who shared diffuse links to the July 7th bombers attempted a nearly identical attack 14 days later, on July 21, 2005.[98] Finally, in 2006, a third group of London-based plotters that had received training and planning help from al-Qaida were

[93] Ibid; High Value Detainee Biographies; Evidence Presented in Lieu of KSM's Testimony.
[94] "French detain Tunisian terror suspect," *AP Online*, June 11, 2003.
[95] High Value Detainee Biographies; see also, Deborah Scroggins, "The most wanted woman in the world," *Vogue*, March 2005.
[96] Jane Perlez and Elaine Sciolino, "5 Britons guilty in Bomb plot; Tied to 2005 London Attackers," *New York Times*, May 1, 2007.
[97] Alan Cowell, "Al Jazeera video links London Bombings to al Qaeda," *New York Times*, September 2, 2005; House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, Report No.: HC 1087, May 11, 2006.
[98] R v. Girma and Others, Royal Courts of Justice (Case No.: B3/2008/3988), Appeal, May 15, 2009; R v. Sherif and Others, Royal Courts of Justice (Case No.: 200801030), Appeal, November 11, 2008; Duncan Gardham, "Mystery bomb-maker 'linked three gangs,'" *Daily Telegraph* (London), September 9, 2008; Luke Harding and Rosie Cowan, "Pakistan militants linked to London attacks: Two bombers travelled together, documents show: Leader of plot also said to have visited Israel," *The Guardian* (London), July 19, 2005.

arrested as they made preparations to bomb transatlantic flights leaving Heathrow airport using liquid-based explosives.[99]

In the following year, al-Qaida was not strongly involved in any hit squad attacks on the West, but the model attributes al-Qaida with strong involvement in two plots that targeted Europe in 2008. In the first, suicide-bombers sought to attack the mass transit system in Barcelona, Spain.[100] In the the second, attackers planned to seek revenge against the Danish publishers of a series of cartoons that offended Muslims the world-over by offering satryrical depictions of the prophet Mohammed.[101]

Finally, in 2009 and 2010, the model attributes al-Qaida with a strong role in one plot each year. Specifically, in 2009, Al-Qaida deployed trainees to Queens, New York, to conduct bombings targeting the subway,[102] and in 2010, bin Laden‘s organization played a strong role in a nascent plot to target American stadiums. However, this effort toward terrorism was interrupted by arrests made during the course of the investigation into the previous plot against the Danish newspaper.[103]

While this narrative suggests that al-Qaida has been fairly consistent in its efforts to target the West by deploying hit squads, it is important to consider more than just the number of operations. The fifth chapter includes detailed case studies of the 9/11 attacks, the inter-related

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[99] Duncan Gardham, "Mystery bomb-maker 'linked three gangs,'" *Daily Telegraph* (London), September 9, 2008; Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, "Inside the terror plot that 'rivaled 9/11,'" *MSNBC.com*, September 8, 2009; Steve Bird, "Martyrdom video man thanked bin Laden for plane bomb inspiration," *The Times* (London), April 11, 2008; "Bomb materiels found buried in woods," *The Times* (London), April 16, 2008.
[100] Martin Hodgson, "Raids foiled Barcelona bomb plot, says judge," *Guardian* (London), January 24, 2008.
[101] USA v. David Headley (Defendant), United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division (No. 09 CR 830-3), Plea Agreement, March 18, 2010.
[102] Tom Hays and Matt Apuzzo, "US: NYC subway bomb plot linked to British cell," *Associated Press Online*, July 7, 2010; "Rising Al-Qaeda leader spent youth in US: report," *Agence France Presse*, August 6, 2010; Adam Goldman and Brett J. Blackledge, "AP Sources: al-Qaida's Afghan head contacted Zazi," *Associated Press*, October 14, 2009; USA v. Najibullah Zazi (Defendant), Affidavit in support of complaint and arrest, Garret Gumbinner, September 19, 2009.
[103] USA v. Raja Lahrasib Khan (Defendant), United States District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent David M. Glavach, March 25, 2010.

attempts to attack London in 2004 and 2005, and the 2009 plot against New York. These studies demonstrate that the sophistication of al-Qaida's hit squad attacks and the quality of the operatives involved have declined steadily over time. In short, the numbers described in the preceding sub-section do not tell the full story.

3.7.3 CATEGORY 3

Throughout its operational history, al-Qaida has had weak functional involvement in a number of terrorist events. Because al-Qaida has cooperated with a number of different regional organizations throught the course of this involvement, the events included in this category span a wide geographic area. Relevant events have taken place in the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and East Asia.

Al-Qaida's weak functional involvement in terror events began circa 1994, when individuals holding ties to both EIJ and al-Qaida conducted a failed attack on Cairo's Khan al-Khalili district, an area popular with Western tourists.[104] That same year, al-Qaida members were involved alongside accomplices of unknown membership in an attempt to obtain uranium for an unspecified WMD attack, presumably against Western targets.[105] Al-Qaida supported two additional EIJ attacks in 1995, namely the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad[106] and a failed assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak that took place during a state visit to Ethiopia.[107] Similarly, al-Qaida played a substantial (46.67 percent) role, though one that was

[104] "Suspected associates of Osama bin Laden to go on trial in Egypt," *Agence France Presse*, January 31, 1999; "Kuwaiti daily publishes interrogations of Al-Qa'idah intelligence chief," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, November 6, 2010.
[105] USA v. Usama bin Laden, et al, Day 4 of Testimony; Mike Robinson, "Islamic charity, director, charged with lying about terrorism," *Associated Press State and Local Wire*, April 30, 2002.
[106] Lawrence Wright, "The man behind Bin Laden," *New Yorker*, September 16, 2002.
[107] "Three suspects arrested in failed attempt to assassinate Mubarak," *Associated Press Worldstream*, August 2, 1995.

still weak according to the model's formal characterization, in the 1997 Luxor Massacre, in which gunmen slaughtered tourists visiting Egyptian archaeological sites.[108]

Al-Qaida was not weakly involved in any events in 1998, but when bin Laden's organization became active again in 1999, its focus moved beyond EIJ. The organization supported two plots by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). The first targeted sites frequented by U.S. Naval personnel in Singapore.[109] The second targeted Megawati, the Indonesian vice president, but both plots were abandoned for unknown reasons.[110] Beyond Southeast Asia, al-Qaida played a supporting role in 1999 in one plot against the United States, namely the LAX millennium plot, as well as in a second millennial plot that targeted Western hotels in Amman, Jordan.[111]

The following year, al-Qaida continued its support of Jemaah Islamiyah. Bin Laden's organization played a supporting role in three attacks and one plot conducted by the Southeast Asian organization. According to accomplice testimony, the 2000 Christmas Eve attacks, which targeted Christian churches in several cities across Indonesia in a string of nearly-simultaneous bombings, were undertake at bin Laden's behest, though JI planned and executed the attacks almost entirely on its own.[112] Similarly, al-Qaida played a a very minor role in a string of bombings that JI, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front[113]—an Islamist

[108] Melinda Henneberger, "A nation challenged: Italy; Men linked to al Qaeda rounded up at 2 mosques," *New York Times*, November 30, 2001; "World: Middle East: Bin Laden 'behind Luxor massacre," *BBC News*, May 13, 1999.
[109] Singapore White Paper.
[110] Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Indonesian Police Interview of Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000.
[111] High Value Detainee Biographies; see also, Kathy Gannon, "Camps, men tie bin Laden to plots; Investigators uncover details," *Austin-American Statesman* (Texas), March 5, 2000.
[112] Alan Sipress, "Bin Laden named in Asian terror plots," *Washington Post*, June 27, 2003; Verbatim Transcript of Open Session Combatant Status Review Tribunal for ISN 10019 (Hambali), U.S. Department of Defense (Unclassified), April 4, 2007.
[113] International Crisis Group, "Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process," ICG Asia Report No. 80, July 13, 2004; Maria Ressam, "September 11: The Asian blueprint," *CNN.com*, March 11, 2002; Dan Murphy, "Man 'most wanted' in Indonesia," *Christian Science Monitor*, April 30, 2002.

insurgent group fighting for an independent Muslim state in the Southern Philippines[114]—conducted in partnership in Metro Manila on Rizal Day, a Philippine national holiday commemorating one of the most prominent fighters in that country's struggle for independence from Spain. Al-Qaida's role in JI's bombing of the Philippine Ambassador's residence in Jakarta in early August was slightly more substantial,[115] and bin Laden's organization was approximately 1/3 culpable for a nascent plot against the Sydney Olympics that JI considered and then abandoned.[116]

A pattern of overlapping membership dictated that al-Qaida continued to play a role in JI operations in 2001 and 2002. Specifically, the model attributes al-Qaida with weak involvement in a pair of inter-related plots, which initially targeted Western diplomatic facilities in Manila, before the plotters switched their focus to similar facilities in Singapore, when the Philippine-based targets proved impractical.[117] According to the model, al-Qaida also played a supporting role in JI's 2001 bombing of the Atrium mall in Jakarta,[118] and in 2002, al-Qaida provided some vague support to JI-linked bombings and arsons that occurred in Indonesia and the southern Philippines,[119] as well as to a plot against Western embassies in Cambodia.[120] However, the

[114] –Rebels behead Philippine troops," *BBC News*, July 11, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6290302.stm.
[115] "Bali bomber links self to other bombing," *Associated Press Online*, September 1, 2003; Hrvoje Hranjski, "Philippine court hands down terror convictions," Associated Press Online, January 23, 2009; "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Ali Imron (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000.
[116] "Fed: man denies links to plans for Olympic terror attack," *AAP Newsfeed*, December 3, 2002; Cameron Stewart and Colleen Egan, "A word from the wise - 'They approached me and said this man wants to make some attacks on things . . . And what do you want to do about it?' -- Sheik Mohammed Omran," *Weekend Australian*, October 18, 2003.
[117] Ressam; Kimina Lyall, "Asian trek took al-Qa'ida cash to JI - War on Terror," *The Weekend Australian*, December 14, 2002; "Unmasking radical preachers," *Straits Times* (Singapore), February 10, 2002; Raymond Bonner and Jane Perlez, "Threats and Responses: Jakarta; Indonesia links Muslim group with terrorism," *New York Times*, October 17, 2002; "List of bombing plots linked to Hambali," *Agence France Presse*, August 15, 2003.
[118] "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000.
[119] International Crisis Group, "Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process," ICG Asia Report No. 80, July 13, 2004; International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003.

organizations‘ highest profile cooperation came in fall of the year, when al-Qaida provided some funding that earned the organization a minor role in JI‘s most notorious attack: the 2002 bombings in Bali, Indonesia, which killed more than 200 and remains Southeast Asia‘s deadliest terrorist attack.[121]

The durable pattern of al-Qaida support for JI operations continued in 2003. That year, bin Laden‘s organization played a weak, supporting role in the JI‘s 2003 bombing of J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta,[122] as well as a Hambali-led plot against western interests in Bangkok, Thailand.[123] Finally, al-Qaida may have helped a JI splinter conduct an attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004.[124]

However, al-Qaida‘s supporting role in attacks was by no means limited to JI operations. In 2003, al-Qaida played a weak role in a rocket attack on ISAF headquarters in Kabul, Afganistan—an attack that reportedly involved *Hezbi e Islami Gulubuddin* and the Taliban,[125] as well as individuals of unknown membership. Similarly, al-Qaida was weakly involved in several attacks that took place in and around Karachi in 2004,[126] as well as in a WMD plot against U.S. financial targets that same year.[127] Finally, the model attributes al-Qaida with a

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[120] "Courting the Cham; Cambodia and Islamism," *The Economist*, October 2, 2010; High Value Detainee Biographies.
[121] "Witness Interrogation Report of Ali Ghufron," Detective Corps, The State Police of Republic of Indonesia (Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), December 5, 2002.
[122] International Crisis Group, "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks," ICG Asia Report No. 114, May 5, 2006; Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10022 (Lillie), United States Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 20, 2007.
[123] "Hambali was 'plotting APEC attack,'" *CNN.com*, August 14,2003; "A dangerous man," *The Times* (London), August 16, 2003; Rob Taylor, "ASIA: Hambali accused of plotting foiled LA attack," *AAP Newsfeed*, February 10, 2006; "Thai authorities hunt missiles smuggled from Cambodia - dispatch," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, October 1, 2003.
[124] ―Bin Laden ‗funded‘ Australian embassy bombing,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 1, 2005.
[125] U.S. Department of Defense, "Defense Department Takes Custody of a High-Value Detainee," April 27, 2007; "Afghan peacekeepers say rocket attacks will not deter them," *Agence France Presse*, September 14, 2003; John Raedler, "Kabul peacekeepers on 'red alert,'" *CNN.com*, March 31, 2003.
[126] "Indictment of Jundullah men deferred till Oct. 6 in six terrorism cases," *Pakistan Newswire*, September 28, 2004.
[127] "UK terror charges: 8 in court," *CNN.com*, August 18, 2004.

weak role in the 2004 Madrid bombings, which targeted commuter rail lines and killed nearly 200.[128]

Although the model does not attribute al-Qaida with weak involvement in any attacks that took place between 2005 and 2007, it seems that bin Laden's organization saw a minor resurgence in its supportive role in 2008. That year, al-Qaida was involved in the planning of a nascent plot against the commuter rail system that runs between New York City and Long Island.[129] The model also suggests that al-Qaida may have played a weak role in Lashkar-e-Toiba's assault on southern Mumbai, though this estimate likely results from the data's annualized nature.

Specifically, David Headley, the American citizen who conducted the bulk of the surveillance in advance of the Mumbai assault, soured on LeT when the organization declined to support an additional operation he had begun to plan against the Danish publishers of the Mohammed cartoons. Headley then began working alongside Ilyas Kashmiri, a militant whom some knowledgeable observers speculated might be in line for to head al-Qaida after bin Laden's death, in furtherance of the Danish plot. Because both events took place in 2008, the model attributes Headley with functional membership in both LeT and al-Qaida for that year, which likely causes it to seem that al-Qaida played a role in the Mumbai attacks when none seems to have existed.

Finally, as the result of training one member of an otherwise independent attack team, al Qaida played a weak role in one final plot. It took place in Norway in 2010, when a multi-ethnic

[128] Keith B. Richburg, "Plot Leader In Madrid Sought Help of Al Qaeda; Spain Says Suspect Met With Operative," *Washington Post*, April 12, 2004; see also, Al Goodman, "Madrid suspect at al Qaeda trial," *CNN.com*, June 1, 2005; Mar Roman, "4 witnesses at Madrid terror trial say they spotted bomber on train," *Associated Press*, March 13, 2007

[129] USA v. Bryant Neal Vinas (Defendant), Sealed Pages of Transcript of Proceedings before Nicholas G. Garaufis, January 28, 2009.

attack-team comprised of immigrants from Iraq, the Uighur region of China, and Uzbekistan made preparations to use hydrogen peroxide-based explosives to target Oslo, only to have the plot unravel because one member of the team began working as a police informant.[130]

Given the wide range of organizations and regions included in this category, it is difficult to select representative cases. However, the largest number of events with weak functional links to al-Qaida occurred in Southeast Asia, which indicates that this region offers the best representation of events displaying weak al-Qaida involvement. Consequently, the sixth chapter explores the nature and extent of al-Qaida's role in five events that occurred in Indonesia between 2002 and 2009, in order to demonstrate how the organization's patterns of weak involvement have changed over time. Specifically, this chapter considers patterns of planning help, financial assistance, logistical support, and terror training in relation to the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, the 2005 Bali bombings, and the 2009 nearly-simultaneous bombing of the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta.

3.7.4 CATEGORY 4

The fourth Baleian category, which contains events tied to individuals who made clear breaks with bin Laden's organization, contains 61 events. Although a handful of these took place in the early 1990s, the vast bulk of events occurred between 2001 and 2010, and a pronounced increase began circa 2007, shortly after al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) established itself as an independent organization.

In terms of specifics, the majority of the early interactions took place in either New York or the Philippines. The model attributes al-Qaida alumni with a weak role in series of events

[130] Ian McDougall, Matt Apuzzo, and Adam Goldman, "Norway bomb arrests linked to US, British plots," *Associated Press*, July 8, 2010; Ian McDougall, "Norway 'bomb plot' underscores al-Qaida pitfalls," *Associated Press*, August 29, 2010.

perpetrated by members of the Islamic Group, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombings and a follow-on plot to attack other prominent landmarks around the city.[131] Similarly, given that Aburajak Janjalani, the founder of the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), left al-Qaida's Afghan camps in the early 1990s,[132] the model attributes alumni of bin Laden's organization with involvement in a pair of kidnappings that Janjalani helped to plan and execute in the Philippines in 1994 and 1995.[133]

The next events involving former members of al-Qaida take place in the early 2000s. The model attributed al-Qaida's alumni with a weak role in a 2000 plot to mount a gas-attack on the European parliament,[134] as well as a strong role in another gas-plot, this one in 2001 and directed against un-named French targets.[135] During this same period, the model attributes former members of al-Qaida with a measure of responsibility for two events JI conducted in Southeast Asia: a 2001 plot against an airbase in Singapore,[136] and the 2001 bombing of churches in East Jakarta.[137]

Similarly, the model attributes al-Qaida's alumni with a measure of responsibility for several more kidnapping perpetrated by ASG in 2000 and 2001. This characterization stems

[131] Malcolm Gladwell, "Sheik, 9 others, convicted in N.Y. bomb; 10 convicted in N.Y. conspiracy case," *Washington Post*, October 2, 1995; Eleanor Randolph and Pierre Thomas, "Bomb tapes put agents' role at issue; Clerics knowledge is also questioned," *Washington Post*, August 4, 1993; Malcolm Gladwell, "N.Y. bomb plotters sentenced to long terms; Sheik gets life," *Washington Post*, January 18, 1996.
[132] ~~D~~Damaged But Still Dangerous;" Robert H. Reid, "Government says Abu Sayyaf links extend through Afghanistan to Middle East," *Associated Press Worldstream*, April 9, 1995.
[133] TJ Burgonio, "Another Abu captive owns up to beheadings," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, February 26, 2002; Department of Justice, "Founding member of Abu Sayyaf Group Pleads Guilty to 1995 Hostage Taking Involving U.S. and Philippine Citizens," DOJ Press Release, July 28, 2010.
[134] Charles Bremmer and Daniel McGrory, "Bin Laden cell plotted French poison attack," *The Times* (London), November 30, 2001.
[135] Charles Bremmer and Daniel McGrory, "Bin Laden cell plotted French poison attack," *The Times* (London), November 30, 2001; Peter Finn and Sarah Delaney, "Al Qaeda's tracks deepend in Europe; Surveillance reveals more plots, links," *Washington Post*, October 22, 2001.
[136] Singapore White Paper.
[137] International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims," ICG Briefing Paper, October 10, 2001.

from the involvement of Aburajak Janjalani's younger brother, Khadafi,[138] who the model labled as a functional member of al-Qaida in the late 1980s because of his interactions with Mohamed Jamal Khalifa, one of bin Laden's brothers-in-law and a well-known financier of terrorism in his own right.[139]

In 2002, al-Qaida alumni were responsible for plots against the U.S. embassy in Rome and a McDonald's franchise in Lebannon, as well as two events that took place in 2003: the murder of British citizens working as teachers in Somalia,[140] and a plot to crash jetliners into Singapore's Changi Airport.[141] Beyond these releatively obscure events, former members of al-Qaida also played a weak role in the 2003 Casablanca attacks, in which suicide-bombers targeted a host of Jewish and Western-affiliated sites around the Moroccan city.[142] And the following year, al-Qaida alumni were involved in a second high-profile event: the 2004 plot against the Spanish courts, which hoped to target the trial of the surviving members of the attack-team that conducted the Madrid train bombings.[143]

Beginning in 2005, former members of al-Qaida played a role in a host of events conducted in North Africa by the *Salafist* Group for Preaching and Combat, an organization better known by its French-language acronym, GSPC, and then later as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Most prominently, these events included a 2005 plot to attack oil refineries

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[138] "New Philippine Muslim rebel group emerges," *BBC Monitoring South Asia - Political*, March 22, 2000; USA v. Janjalni, et al (Defendants), United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Criminal No.: 02-068 (JDB)), Indictment, June 11, 2001.
[139] "Philippines: Bin-Laden's brother-in-law offers to help release hostages," *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political*, September 28, 2001.
[140] International Crisis Group, "Counter-terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?" ICG Africa Group Report No. 95, July 11, 2005.
[141] Devi Asmarani, "Singapore JI head arrested on Bintan; Indonesian police hold man thought to be local terror network head and wanted over plot to crash jet into Changi Airport," *Straights Times* (Singapore), February 4, 2003.
[142] "The hydra bites; al-Qaeda," *The Economist*, March 20, 2004; "Five suspects in Morocco attacks have al-Qaeda links: Spanish judiciary," *Agence France Presse*, September 22, 2003; Elaine Sciolino, "Morocco Connection Is Emerging as Sleeper Threat in Terror War," *New York Times*, May 16, 2004.
[143] Maria Jesus Prades, "Judge jails three more suspects in alleged plot to blow up Spanish court," *Associated Press Worldstream*, November 8, 2004. Craig Whitlock, "In nuetral Switzerland, a rising radicalism; Islamic extremists newly seen as threat," *Washington Post*, July 20, 2006.

in North Africa,[144] a 2005 attack on a Mauritanian military camp,[145] and a 2007 suicide-attack on Algiers.[146]

Although al-Qaida alumni continued to participate in attacks in locations as diverse as Afghanistan,[147] Indonesia,[148] and Somalia,[149] former members of bin Laden's organization played their highest-profile role in a series of attacks involving AQAP, which formed as an organization when several inmates, who had been detained for their role in al-Qaida attacks, escaped from a Yemeni prison and began plotting events without the input of bin Laden's organization.[150] Specifically, former members of al-Qaida were involved in the 2007 suicide-bombing of Spanish tourists in Yemen,[151] a 2009 suicide-bombing that targeted Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, but failed to kill him;[152] the 2009 kidnapping of German and British nationals in Yemen,[153] the 2009 failed _underpants' bombing, which occurred on Christmas Day, when a Nigerian *jihadist* attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden beneath his clothes onboard a Detroit-bound international flight;[154] and a 2010 plot to remote-bomb American-owned cargo planes in flight.[155]

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[144] "Behind the Mauritanian coup," *Mideast Mirror*, August 12, 2005.
[145] Ibid.
[146] Craig Whitlock, "Suicide attacks mark turn in Algeria; Insurgents seen taking cues from global Al-Qaeda," *Washington Post*, April 13, 2007.
[147] "Two Afghans accused of spying publicly beheaded in Bajaur," *Pajwok Afghan News*, June 27, 2008.
[148] International Crisis Group, "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks," ICG Asia Report No. 114, May 5, 2006.
[149] Fred Mukinda, "Wanted terror suspect arrested in city swoop," *The Nation* (Nairobi), August 23, 2010; "Treasury targets Somali terrorists," U.S. Department of Treasury, November 20, 2008.
[150] "Yemen: Six al-Qaeda members killed," *Albawaba*, January 16, 2010; Dan McDougall, "The new Al-Qaeda chiefs bringing terror to the world; Former Guantanamo prisoners have moved to Yemen to rejoin the fight against the west," *Sunday Times* (London), January 3, 2010.
[151] "Yemen: 6 al-Qaida militants killed in airstrike," *MSNBC*, January 15, 2010; available online: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34880103/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/.
[152] Hamza Hendawi, "Atop Yemen al-Qaida, a militant who vows to hit US," *Associated Press Online*, November 3, 2010; Stephen Kurczy, "Five key members of Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP)," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 2, 2010; "One of Saudi Arabia's most wanted believed linked to bomb plot," *CNN.com*, October 31, 2010.
[153] "Yemen: 6 al-Qaida militants killed in airstrike."
[154] Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, "For al-Qaida, Detroit was just the cheapest flight," *Associated Press Online*, March 24, 2011; "Al-Qaida makes a move on troubled Nigeria," United Press International, June 17, 2010; USA V.

In an effort to shed light on the nature and extent of former al-Qaida members' involvement in Islamist terrorism, the seventh chapter examines the events involving AQAP and AQIM. Specifically, the chapter examines issues of attack planning, attack finance, attack logistics, and training in order to demonstrate the alumni's independence from al-Qaida. Moreover, the analysis posits that access to financial resources, in these cases revenue from smuggling and substantial ransoms obtained from kidnapping Westerners, enabled these organizations to operate without the benefit of al-Qaida's functional support.

3.7.5 CATEGORY 5

In total, 32 events fall into the fifth Baleian category, which contains events that hold explicit ideological links to al-Qaida but are not otherwise tied to the organization. A handful of these events, such as the 1990 murder of Rabbi Meyer Kahane by one of Sheikh Omar Obdel Rahman's followers and a hastily conducted bombing of a Grenwich Village gay bar by the same man, took place early in al-Qaida's history and were ideologically tied to bin Laden's organization because individuals outside of al-Qaida were influenced by radical clerics inside it. However, the majority of the events in this category occurred after 1998, when al-Qaida first rose to international prominence following the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa. Logically, this makes sense, as it is difficult for individuals to develop an ideological affinity for the beliefs of a group they do not know exists.

However, events to which to al-Qaida holds ideological ties without sharing any other sort of current or past functional relationship have been relatively infrequent. The organization was ideologically linked to one event in 2000, namely a plot to bomb the Christmas market in Strasbourg, France, as well as an attack on the Indian Parliament the following year. The model

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Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (Defendant), United States District Court Eastern District of Michigan (Cr. No.: 2:10-cr-20005), Indictment, December 15, 2010.

[155] Kruczy; "Bomb may have flown on passenger planes," CNN.com, October 31, 2010.

found no relevant events in 2002, while 2003 and 2004 each contained one additional event. Respectively, they were a 2003 suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, and the 2004 Leganes suicide, a massive blast that several of the men responsible for the 2004 Madrid train bombing conducted after attempting to phone Britain—likely to reach the radical clearic Abu Qatada—when police closed-in on the apartment the terrorists were using as a safehouse.[156]

In 2005, there were six events with explicit ideological links to al-Qaida. These events ranged widely in terms of both their nature and their location. For example, these events included the desecration of an Italian colonial cemetery, which was presumably Catholic, in Somalia; the bombing of Western hotels in Amman, Jordan; a nascent plot against Sydney's harbor bridge, which sought to emulate the tactics of 9/11 by flying a hijacked plane into the transportation artery; another suicide plot against un-named targets in the same Australian city; a nascent plot against a Christian school in East Java; and a plot to bomb U.S. piplelines and refineries, which a wanna-be mercenary named Michael Curtis Reynolds, who was upset about the Iraq War and aggrieved by the revocation of his passport, hoped to conduct for al-Qaida on a for-pay basis.[157]

The following year saw two unusual and entirely aspirational _plots' that displayed ideological ties to al-Qaida. Both were conducted by the Sea of David, a cultish religious sect that practiced a syncretic blend of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. Although they were so lacking in resources that they asked the FBI informant who posed as their al-Qaida contact to provide them with combat boots and other basic equipment; although they had no terror training

[156] Katrin Bennhold, "Main suspect in Spain blasts among dead," *New York Times*, April 5, 2004; Giles Tremlett and Owen Bowcott, –Madrid bomb suspects _phoned Britain before blowing themselves up,'" *The Guardian,* April 11, 2004; "Madrid bombings: The chief suspects," *Agence France Presse*, April 11, 2006.
[157] "Former Wilkes-Barre Man Convicted of Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al-Qaeda and Related Charges," United States Department of Justice, Press Release, July 13, 2007; Alfred Lubrano and John Shiffman, "Transcript reveals tangled plot involving allegations of terrorism," *Philadelphisa Inquirer* (Pennsylvania), February 13, 2006.

beyond exercise sessions that the group held in an abandoned warehouse; and although the group‘s unusual religious practices would have been anathema to bin Laden‘s brand of fundamentalism, the Sea of David plotters hoped to bomb FBI buildings in Florida and Chicago‘s Sears‘ Tower in al-Qaida‘s name. They believed that the two groups‘ shared hatred of the United States government was sufficient to ensure cooperation, and, like Reynolds, hoped to work for bin Laden‘s organization on a for-pay basis.[158]

In 2007, there were four additional events that fell into the fifth Baleian category, and like the events of 2005, these ranged widely in terms of context and location. Two occurred in Indonesia: an aborted plot to generate terror funds by robbing Chinese-owned businesses in Lampung, and a plot to bomb a Café in Bukittingi, which the suicide bomber abandoned at the last minute.[159] Two more events, both of them prominent, took place in Pakistan: the siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad,[160] and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi.[161] Finally, a fifth event took place in the United States: the plot against Fort Dix, New Jersey, a largely botched attempt at terrorism led by three Albanian-born brothers.[162]

The following year, 2008, was far less active. It saw only a single attack that fell into the fifth Baleian category, namely a suicide-attack conducted against an anti-Taliban tribal *jerga* that met in Afghanistan. However, 2009 was a fairly prolific year for al-Qaida inspired extremists operating in the United States. They were responsible for six total events. Three of them were

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[158] Scott Shane and Andrea Zarate, "F.B.I. killed plot in talking stage; A top aide says," *New York Times*, June 24, 2006. USA v. Narseal Batiste, et al (Defendants), United States District Court Southern District of Florida, Indictment (Case No.: 06-20373-CR-Lenard/Klein), June 22, 2006.
[159] International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Radicalization of the 'Palembang Group,'" ICG Asia Group Briefing No. 92, May 20, 2009.
[160] "Al-Qaeda operative praises Red Mosqe 'martyrs,'" *Agence France Presse*, July 31, 2007.
[161] Report of the the Untied Nations Commission of Inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, April 15, 2010.
[162] USA v. Mohamed Ibrahim Shnewer (Defendant), United States District Court District of New Jersey (Magistrate No.: 07-M-2045 (JS)), Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent John J. Ryan, May 7, 2007. "Five Radical Islamists Convicted of Conspiring to Kill Soldiers at Fort Dix," U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, December 22, 2008.

inter-related and were conducted by the same man: Abdul Hakim Mujahid Muhammad, an African-American convert to Islam and former gang member, who attempted to fire-bomb a Rabbi's home in Nashville, TN, and plotted to attack an army recruiting station in Florence, KY, before shooting two soldiers outside of another recruiting station in Little Rock, AR.[163] Another failed plot was conducted in Springfield, IL, by Michael C. Finton, another convert, who hoped to bomb federal buildings, but who never posed a meaningful threat, because his al-Qaida _ontact' was an undercover law enforcement officer.[164] A similar plot took place in Dallas, TX, where Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a Saudi student studying in the US, plotted to bomb the Fountain Place skyskrapper, only to learn that he was also the target of an FBI sting.[165] However, 2009 also saw a particularly deadly al-Qaida inspired event: the Fort Hood shooting, in which Nidal Malik Hasan, a Major serving in the Army medical corps as a psychiatrist, committed fratricide at a Texas Army post, killing thirteen people and wounding another 29, before members of the post's security detail disabled him.[166]

By comparison, 2010 was a light year; it contained only two attacks that fell into the fifth Baleian category. However, both of these continued the pattern of Western-based attacks evidenced in the pervious year. The first of these events was a plot against the Washington, D.C., Metro Rail, which like the Finton and Smadi's efforts was another law enforcement sting, this time aimed at Farooque Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Pakistani birth, who was

[163] Tammy Dragon, Letter to Judge Herb Wright Regarding Abdul Muhammad, Arkansas State Hospital, Division of Behavioral Services, July 20, 2010. R. Clint Gray, M.D., ―Opinion on Fitness to Proceed, Criminal Responsibility and Diagnosis of Defendant (Abdul Hakim Muhammad)," Arkansas Department of Human Services Division of Mental Health Services Arkansas State Hospital Forensic Report, examination conducted July 12, 2010.
[164] USA v. Michael C. Finton (Defendant), United States District Court Central District of Illinois (Case No.: 09-3048-m), Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent Trevor S. Stalets, September 24, 2009.
[165] USA v. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi (Defendant), United States District Court Northern District of Texas (Case No.: 3:09-MT-286), Criminal Complaint of FBI Agent Thomas D. Petrowski, September 24, 2009.
[166] Brooks Egerton, "Paths crossed and collided Al-Awlaki was Hasan family imam years before Fort Hood massacre," *Dallas Morning News*, November 29, 2009.

aggrieved by the war in Afghanistan.[167] The second event was the 2010 Stockholm bombing, in which Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, an Iraqi-born resident of Luton, England, attempted to target sites around Stockholm in retribution for a Swedish satirist's role in creating the infamous Muhammad cartoons. However, technical errors caused al-Abdaly's explosive devices to detonate early, killing him instead of his intended victims.[168]

Given that Western events account for the majority of events in the fifth Baleian category, there is a temptation to assume that al-Qaida's ideological message has some sort of special resonance with Western Muslims. However, such an assumption would be misplaced. Instead, the quality of data on events based in the West is typically of greater breadth and depth than that available on non-Western attacks. This condition, which owes in no small part to the preponderance of court documents available from trials of those indicted for Islamist-motivated terrorism, dictates that it is often possible to code Western *jihadists*' ideological ties with a level of specificity that cannot be achieved when studying extremists hailing from othe parts of the world.

These data limitations make it difficult to ascribe much meaning to quantitative characterizations of the fifth Baleian category. Therefore, the eighth chapter uses case study to explore the nature and extent of ties that al-Qaida holds to so-called al-Qaida inspired attacks. Specifically, the chapter examines the paths to radicalism, the extent of planning, the sources of financial support, the sources logistical supplies, and the extent of training for individuals involved in three events that were conducted in the United States by individuals with ideological

[167] Application for a warrant to seize personal property subject to civil forfeiture, Case No.: 1:10-sw-569 (Farooque Ahmed), United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia, October 26, 2010.
[168] Sam Jones, "Stockholm suicide bomber confronted by Luton mosque leaders," *Guardian Unlimited*, December 13, 2010; "Stockholm 'minutes' from suicide bomb catastrophe," *Press Association Mediapoint*, December 14, 2010; "Stockholm suspect Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly profiled," *BBC News*, December 13, 2010; available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11981228.

ties to al-Qaida. These events are: the 2007 plot against Fort Dix in New Jersey, the 2009 shooting at an Army recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas, and the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood in Texas.

With these broad trends in each category now established, the remainder of the analysis turns its attention to the cases singled-out by the preceding sections.

4.0 AL-QAIDA'S DEVOLVING CAPACITY TO WAGE TERRORISM IN THE NON-WESTERN WORLD

Because the frequency analysis conducted by the previous chapter does not consider the scale or nature of events, it is incapable of describing qualitative changes over time within each of the Baleian categories. Therefore, this chapters adopts the perspective of structured-focused comparison to in an attempt to assess how al-Qaida's involvement in events in the first Baleian category, which contains non-Western attacks and plots in which al-Qaida played a strong functional role, has shifted between 1998, when bin Laden's organization first gained widespread notoriety by bombing a pair of U.S. embassies in East Africa, and 2004, the last year before the quantitative model attributed a sharp drop-off in the organization's strong role in a non-Western attacks.

A number of analysts have argued that al-Qaida has shown tremendous adaptive capability during this period. For example, in 2004, Bruce Hoffman argued that the organization's leadership "engineered nothing short of a stunning transformation of Al Qaeda from the more or less unitary, near bureaucratic entity it one had been to something more akin to an ideology."[1] Similarly, in 2008, Reid Sawyer and Michael Foster, a pair of researchers affiliated with West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, concluded that "Al Qaeda is stronger and more resilient than at any time since 2001 due to its ability to adapt, innovate, and

[1] Bruce Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 27 (2004), p. 551.

reconfigure its resources in response to a hostile counterterrorism environment."[2] More recent assessments have seconded these opinions; for example, in 2011, Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institute stated that "Al Qaeda has always been a remarkably adaptive organization,"[3] and Norman Cigar, a Department of Defense Minerva Fellow at the Marine Corps University, concluded that "Al-Qaida is an adaptive organization and has exhibited the ability to learn from experience."[4]

While these authors are correct to note that the bin Laden's organization has fundamentally changed during the course of its history, evidence drawn from al-Qaida's non-Western operations suggests that their shared viewpoint misstates the nature of the organization's transformation. A comparison of the 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa, the 2002 Mombasa attacks on Israeli-linked targets, and a 2004 string of attacks conducted by a single operational group in-and-around Karachi suggest that al-Qaida's capabilities have devolved rather than adapted. The average quality of the organization's operatives has waned over time, and in each subsequent case, al-Qaida has been able to provide demonstrably less organizational-level support to the operatives acting in the organization's name. Consequently, al-Qaida's operatives have had to become more self-reliant to accomplish attacks, but the scale of their capabilities has declined in proportion to the extent of support they have received from al-Qaida.

This chapter contains four sections following this introduction. The first three discuss each of the cases mentioned above in succession, before the fourth offers some brief conclusions. In order to ensure even cross-comparison, each of the cases also follows the same internal

[2] Reid Sawyer and Michael Foster, "The Resurgent and Persistent Threat of al Qaeda," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, June 12, 2008; available online: http://ann.sagepub.com/content/618/1/197.full.pdf.
[3] Bruce Riedel, "AQaeda Smells Blood," *Brookings*, April 6, 2011; available online: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0406_yemen_al_qaeda_riedel.aspx.
[4] Norman Cigar, "AQaida, the Tribes, and the Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq's Unstable Triangle," Marine Corps University, Middle East Studies Occasional Papers, Number Two, September 2011, p. vii.

structure and contains subsections that assess the attack's planning, the attack's inter-related finances and logistics, and the training operatives underwent in preparation for the attack. A brief comparative summation then closes each case.

4.1 THE 1998 BOMBINGS OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSIES IN KENYA AND TANZANIA

On the morning of August 7, 1998, in Runda Estates, a comfortable suburb located north of Nairobi, Kenya,[5] three men made final preparations to attack the U.S. Embassy located in the city's downtown. Two of them, Jihad Mohammed Abdou Ali (a.k.a. Azzam) and Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-_Owhali, were young Saudis who were slated to die in the attack as suicide-bombers. The third man, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (a.k.a. Harun), a native of the Comoros Islands, served in a supervisory capacity; his job was to make certain that Ali and al-_Owhali followed through on the attack.[6]

Their plan was fairly simple. Fazul would guide the bombers from the safe house to the embassy by driving a lead-vehicle, a small white pick-up, through Nairobi's confusing streets. Ali and al-_Owhali would follow in a Toyota box-delivery truck that had been filled with approximately one ton of ground TNT and aluminum powder. When they reached the rear of the embassy, al-_Owhali would leap from the truck's passenger seat with pistol in hand and would force the gate guard to lower the barricade blocking the embassy compound's rear entrance, so that Ali could drive the truck as close to the building as possible before detonating, thereby ensuring maximum damage. If Ali was unable to trigger the explosion using the electric switch hidden in the cab of the vehicle, al-_Owhali was supposed to throw open the truck's rear door

[5] Observation based on a site visit to the house where the bomb was prepared.
[6] USA v. Usama bin Laden, et al (Defendants), United States District Court Southern District of New York (S(7) 98 Cr. 1023), Day 14 of testimony (January 8, 2001).

and use one of the several homemade grenades he carried with him to detonate the bomb manually.[7]

In practice, the plan nearly fell apart. Fazul led the team to the embassy without incident, but during the course of the ride from the safe house, al-_Owhali had removed his jacket, and since his pistol was hidden in a coat pocket, he leapt from the bomb-truck without his primary weapon. However, he was still able to scare away the gate guards by detonating one of the four pipe-bomb grenades he had stuffed into his belt. With the plan back on track, he then lowered the barricade, allowing Ali, who used al-_Owhali's left-behind pistol to fire wildly at the embassy from the driver's side window of the truck, to pass through the gate unimpeded. However, al-_Owhali was unable to reunite with Ali in the melee. The failed suicide-bomber escaped from the ensuing blast with minor injuries,[8] but 213 others were no so lucky and perished[9] when Ali's explosion reduced the embassy to a pile of rubble and scattered debris for nearly half a mile.[10] Nearly 5,000 more were injured.[11]

A similar scene unfolded 420 miles to the southeast, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In the city's Iala district, a working-class neighborhood of unpaved roads and cinder-block houses,[12] Hamden Khalif Allah Awad, an Egyptian who his compatriots had dubbed "Ahmed the German"

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[7] Ibid. For an estimate of the size of the bomb's explosive yield, see Larry E. Craig and Jade West, "A Decade of Terrorist Attacks," United States Senate Republican Policy Committee, October 2, 2001; available online: http://rpc.senate.gov/releases/1999/fr100201.htm.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of America at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998," (Declassified Summary of FBI Investigation Report), November 18, 1998; available online from PBS Frontline: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/summary.html.

[10] Specifically, the FBI recovered portions of the bomb-truck's rear axle 750 meters from the detonation site. USA v. bin Laden, et al, testimony of Special Agent Donald Sachleben, Day 16 of testimony (March 16, 2001).

[11] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), p. 70. (Hereafter "9/11 Commission Report.")

[12] Observation based on a site visit to the house where the bomb was prepared.

because of his fair hair and blue eyes,[13] readied himself to suicide-bomb a second American Embassy. His weapon, which was hidden inside of a Nissan refrigerator-truck that had been specially modified for the operation, [14] was similar to the Nairobi device in terms of size, but differed in construction and contained several cylinders of explosive gas in addition to its payload of TNT.[15] Moreover, unlike his counterpart in Kenya, Awad had no co-pilot or supervisor.

His only help that morning came from Khalfan Khamis Mohammed, a Tanzanian graduate of al-Qaida's Afghan training camps, who served as one of the attack team's local fixers, and who had been tasked by the operation's now-departed leadership to stay behind and serve as Awad's translator in the days immediately preceding the attack, since the suicide-bomber spoke no Swahili. Perhaps because Awad made his final approach to the embassy alone, his bombing was not as effective as the Nairobi attack. The gate guards prevented him from pulling his truck alongside the building as Ali had, and only 11 people, all of them Tanzanians, died when Awad detonated his weapon near the embassy's gate.[16]

Although al-_Owhali's blunder and Awad's lack of support very nearly caused these twin bombings to fail at the last minute, the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam attacks ultimately tell the story of an organizational success that was years in the making. Al-Qaida participated in every step of the long chain of events that preceded the events of August 7, 1998. High-level members of the organization were involved in the strategic and tactical planning of the attacks, the distribution of funds to support the attacks, the requisition of logistical supplies needed to conduct the attacks,

[13] USA v. bin Laden, et al, Testimony of Special Agent Stephen Gaudin, Day 14 of testimony (January 8, 2001). (Hereafter, "Gaudin testimony").
[14] USA v. bin Laden, et al, testimony of Special Agent Abigail Perkins, Day 19 of testimony (March 19, 2001). (Hereafter "Perkins testimony"). For details on the size of the Dar bomb, see Craig and West.
[15] Guadin Testimony.
[16] USA v. bin Laden, et al, Sentencing Hearing, Owens statement, October 18, 2001.

and the training of the key personnel involved in the attacks. A small handful of untrained locals served as low-level functionaries responsible for some of the unpleasant grunt work that preceded the attacks, but these individuals worked in ignorance of the impending bombings and were manipulated by members of bin Laden's organization. In short, the team responsible for the first attacks that garnered al-Qaida wide-spread international attention displayed aspects of formal hierarchical structure, rather than a diffuse network structure.

4.1.1 PLANNING

Al-Qaida began to conceptualize the embassy bombings as early as 1993, when bin Laden dispatched Ali Mohamed, a former Egyptian Army officer who had also served as an enlisted man in the U.S. Army since the 1980s,[17] to conduct surveillance of a series of targets in Nairobi that, according to Mohamed, were chosen ~~to~~ retaliate against the United States for its involvement in Somalia."[18] Mohamed sketched maps, took photographs, and even wrote a formal report describing the buildings that housed USAID's Kenyan offices, the U.S. Agricultural Office in Nairobi, and the American Embassy. In early 1994, when he dropped-off the dossiers in Khartoum, where al-Qaida was then based, Usama bin Laden and Ali al-Rashidi, an Egyptian who commanded the logistical support cell al-Qaida already had in place in East Africa and who was better known by his *nom de guerre* Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri,[19] reviewed the documents personally. Mohamed claims that while studying photos of the embassy compound bin Laden even pointed ~~to~~ where a truck could go as a suicide bomber."[20]

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[17] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 68.
[18] USA v. Ali Mohamed (Defendant), Allocution, United States District Court Southern District of New York, October 20, 2000. (Hereafter ―Mohamed Allocution.")
[19] For information on al-Banshiri's real name, see: Richard J. Shultz, Jr. and Ruth Margolies Beitler, "Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in al-Qaida Operations," MERIA Journal, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2004); http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue2/jv8n2a6.html. For information on al-Banshiri's role in East Africa, see: ―Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of America at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1988."
[20] Mohamed Allocution.

The strength of the East African cell also began to grow during this period. In addition to al-Banshiri, who was already living in Mwanza, Tanzania, under the name Adel Habib and who had married into a local family,[21] a handful of other al-Qaida members were already established in Nairobi. Bin Laden soon bolstered their numbers by dispatching an influx of new personnel to the region. For example, Wadih el-Hage, a Lebanese-born American citizen who converted to Islam from Catholicism as a teen and worked alongside bin Laden to provide logistical support to foreign *mujahideen* during the Soviet-Afghan War,[22] arrived in Nairobi in 1994 from Khartoum, where el-Hage had served as bin Laden's business secretary.[23] Similarly, Fazul Abdul Mohammed, who guided Ali and al-_Owhali to the embassy in 1998, first arrived in Kenya in 1994[24] and began working for el-Hage.[25]

While these interactions demonstrate that al-Qaida was enhancing its strategic capacity in East Africa in the mid-1990s, the evidence suggests that bin Laden's organization had not yet decided to attack the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Indeed, al-Qaida was still scouting other targets. In late 1994, during a meeting held in the back of el-Hage's Nairobi home, Muhammad Atef (a.k.a. Abu Hafs al-Masri), who was one of al-Qaida's founders[26] and a high-ranking member the organization's military committee,[27] instructed Ali Mohamed, the same

[21] For information on al-Banshiri's alias and family ties, see: USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 5. For his location in Tanzania, see: "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of America at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1988."
[22] For an excellent journalistic summary of el-Hage's life history, see: Oriana Zill, "A Portrait of Wadih el-Hage, Accused Terrorist," *PBS Frontline,* September 12, 2001; available online: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/elhage.html.
[23] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 6, Day 7, and Day 21 of testimony (February 15, February 20, and March 22, 2001).
[24] "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998."
[25] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 9 of testimony (February 21, 2001).
[26] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 2 of testimony (February 6, 2001).
[27] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 37 of testimony (May 1, 2001).

man who conducted the earlier surveillance on American interests in Nairobi, to reconnoiter –American, British, French, and Israeli targets in Senegal."[28]

Beyond its indecisiveness, al-Qaida's efforts in East Africa were stalled when the organization suffered a series of misfortunes that greatly hampered the organization's capabilities. In 1995, bin Laden's relationship with Hassan al-Turabi, the autocratic ruler of the Sudan, began to deteriorate, and al-Qaida lost its primary base of operations and suffered heavy financial losses when the organization was expelled from the Sudan the following year.[29] Abu Ubaida al-Banshiri, who continued to head al-Qaida's East African operations, also died in 1996, when he drowned in a ferry accident on Lake Victoria, thereby depriving the organization's East African contingent of its primary leader.[30] Early the following year, al-Qaida suffered its first known defection, when Madani al-Tayyib, who once sat on the organization's financial committee, turned himself in to Saudi authorities, sending the organization's leadership into a mild panic.[31] In short, these factors locked the organization into a holding pattern, and al-Qaida was unable to make much progress on its East African operations between 1995 and early 1997.

However, during this period, al-Qaida's leadership also made an important strategic decision that served to focus the organization's long-simmering disdain for America. Specifically, in 1996, bin Laden issued a *fatwa* (religious decree) that openly declared war on the United States. His rambling statement, which first appeared in a London-based Arabic newspaper, took particular offense to the deployment of American troops to protect Saudi Arabia from the Saddam Hussein regime. Bin Laden called the presence of non-Muslim soldiers in the

[28] Mohamed Allocution.
[29] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 68; Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), pp. 252-253.
[30] "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998."
[31] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 68.

birthplace of Islam —one of the worst catastrophes to befall Muslims since the death of the Prophet," and asked Muslims the world-over to join his followers –in their jihad against their enemies and yours, the Israelis and the Americans."[32] Thus, despite suffering setbacks, the organization had a clear long-term goal, namely eliminating American influence from the Muslim world.

This strategic policy soon trickled-down to the tactical level. In February 1997, Wadih el-Hage traveled to Afghanistan to meet with Atef and bin Laden. They instructed him to militarize al-Qaida's East African cell, which had previously served primarily in a logistical capacity that supported the broader organization. When el-Hage returned to Nairobi, preparations for the embassy bombings began in earnest. Initially, el-Hage played a leading role in organizing the attacks, but his involvement was short lived.[33]

The U.S. intelligence community had grown concerned that bin Laden was a financier of terrorism, and soon began to suspect that el-Hage was the dissident Saudi's emissary to Kenya. Within several weeks of el-Hage's return from Afghanistan, the FBI tapped his phones. The Bureau did not overhear any overt discussion of the forthcoming bombings, but el-Hage's conversations were suspicious enough to merit additional investigation, so agents conducted a search of el-Hage's Nairobi home in August of 1997. Although they found nothing that spoke directly to the embassy plot, the incident spooked el-Hage. He fled Kenya and returned to the United States alongside his American-born wife and their children, only to be subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury when he landed in New York. El-Hage protected the operation by lying through his teeth about the extent of his involvement in *jihad* and the nature of his

[32] The translation of bin Laden's *fatwa* which is quoted here is available from –Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans," in *Compilation of Usama bin Laden's Statements 1994-January 2004*, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), January 2004.
[33] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 37 of testimony (May 1, 2001).

relationship with bin Laden, but he was now effectively cut-off from the East African operation.[34] Consequently, another man played the lead role in the tactical planning of the embassy bombings.

According to the FBI, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (a.k.a. Saleh), an Egyptian who al-Qaida had dispatched to Mogadishu in 1993 to advise Somali warlords in their fight against U.N. Peacekeepers,[35] held overall authority for the East African bombings and was in close contact with bin Laden.[36] He delegated significant responsibility for the logistics of the attacks to Fazul,[37] K.K. Mohammed,[38] and Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan (a.k.a. Ahmed the Tall), a Kenyan native who had worked alongside Abdullah during the conflict in Somalia,[39] but Abdullah also seems to have micro-managed several aspects of the attacks' tactical details. For example, he set the attack for Friday morning, on the logic that observant Muslims would then be at the mosque for Friday prayers and thus would escape injury in the attack.[40]

His subordinates had little say in this or other matters, because Abdullah seems to have practiced strict "need to know" protocols; for example, al-Owhali, who road shotgun in the Nairobi bomb truck, was not told of the existence of the Tanzanian bombing-team or his specific

[34] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 36 and day 37 of testimony (April 30 and May 1, 2001). See also, Zill; and Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 404-405.
[35] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Testimony of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, Day 8 of testimony (February 21, 2001). (Hereafter, "Kherchtou testimony").
[36] "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998." See also, USA v. bin Laden, Testimony of Special Agent John Michael Anticev, Day 12 of testimony (February 28, 2001). (Hereafter "Anticev testimony").
[37] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 5 of testimony (February 14, 2001).
[38] The conclusion regarding the identity of K.K. Mohammed's associate is based on the fact that the witness, Chatwanda, stated that the associate spoke only Arabic, and no Swahili. The cost of the Iala house was 65,000 Tanzanian Shillings per month. The conversion to dollars was performed at the historical exchange rate that prevailed in June 1998, when the al-Qaida tenants took possession of the home. USA v. bin Laden, et al, Testimony of Mohamedi Selemani Chatwanda (real estate broker who located the Iala house for Khalfan), Day 18 of testimony (March 14, 2001).
[39] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 34 of testimony (April 25, 2001).
[40] Gaudin Testimony.

target in Kenya until August 3, only four days prior to the attack.[41] Then, shortly before Abdullah and the majority of al-Qaida's other personnel left the region in advance of the attacks,[42] the team-leader guided al-_Owhali though some last minute surveillance of the embassy in Nairobi, in order to ensure that the suicide-operative understood every detail of the plan.[43] From that point forward, Fazul, Ali, and al-_Owhali were essentially on their own in Nairobi, while Awad and K.K. Mohammed were in analogous circumstances in Dar es Salaam.

4.1.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

Al-Qaida's logistical presence in East Africa preceded even Ali Mohamed's first reconnaissance trip. As early as 1992, Khalid al-Fawwaz, who once headed the bin Laden-funded Abu Bakr Sadeek training camp outside Khost, Afghanistan, had set-up shop in Nairobi. He established a car business and import firm named Asma Limited, after his daughter, and used the business to generate income to support al-Qaida's East African operations. However, he also received regular transfusions of cash, which couriers dispatched by bin Laden delivered from Khartoum,[44] so Asma Limited was likely equal parts legitimate business and front operation to launder these funds.

However, al-Fawwaz's involvement with the East African support cell was cut short when Kenyan authorities arrested him and another al-Qaida member on vague charges of passport violations in late 1994. Given that Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri was able to secure their release by having a lawyer pay a $3,000 bribe to the police, it seems that the arresting officers may have just been fishing for a pay day. Regardless of its underlying reasons, the arrest

[41] Gaudin testimony.
[42] Anticev testimony.
[43] "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998."
[44] For information on al-Fawwaz's association with the Abu Bakr Sadeek camp and Asma Limited, see: Kherchtou testimony. For information on the timing of al-Fawwaz's early activities in Nairobi and his establishment of the car business, see: Mohamed Allocution.

spooked al-Fawwaz. He departed for the Sudan shortly thereafter,[45] and then ultimately made his way to London, where he was arrested on terrorism charges in late 1998.[46]

Wadih el-Hage, the same man who conveyed bin Laden's decision to militarize the East African cell, took al-Fawwaz's place. After arriving in Nairobi in 1994, el-Hage established Help Africa People, a charity which provided identification cards, and likely also employment, to several of al-Qaida's operatives in the region. Prior to his death, Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri served on the organization's board of directors.[47] Similarly, Fazul and Mohamed Odeh, a Jordanian graduate of al-Qaida's Afghan camps who served as yet another advisor to Somali warlords during the Mogadishu conflict before joining the embassy-bombing team in a logistical capacity,[48] were listed as officers of the charity.[49] Thus, a direct chain connected key members of the attack team to al-Qaida's earliest emissaries to East Africa, and the organization played a clear role in providing team members with a façade of legitimacy that justified these foreigners' presence in the region.

Al-Qaida also played a demonstrable role in generating the revenue streams that supported the attack-team. Following the model that it had established by creating al-Fawwaz's now defunct Asma Limited, al-Qaida founded a business that generated profits which supported the organization's East African operations.[50] Specifically, in 1997, Mohamed Odeh established a fishing business in Mombasa, Kenya, with donations he received from two sources: an unidentified charity, which was likely el-Hage's Help Africa People; and al-Haramain

[45] Kherchtou testimony.
[46] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 72 of testimony (July 2, 2001).
[47] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 6 of testimony (February 15, 2001).
[48] Anticev testimony.
[49] For information on Fazul's affiliation with the charity, see: USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 9 of testimony (February 21, 2001). For information on Odeh's affiliation, see: Anticev testimony.
[50] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 10 of testimony (February 16, 2001).

Foundation,[51] a Saudi-based charity that the U.S. Department of Treasury later sanctioned for its financial support of both al-Qaida[52] and militants involved in the Chechen *jihad*.[53]

With plausible covers for its operatives in place and a source of revenue secured, al-Qaida turned its attention toward the acquisition of the materiel necessary to conduct the bombings. Fazul and Khalfan Khamis Mohammed secured the safe houses where the bombs were later constructed. Fazul rented the house at 43 Runda Estates outside Nairobi in May 1998, for a cost of about 840 USD per month. However, because he was not a Kenyan citizen, Fazul was unable to sign the lease and asked Sikander Juma, a friend of his who was also the brother of the deceased al-Banshiri's wife, to serve as his proxy.[54] In June, in Dar es Salaam, K.K. Mohammed contacted a real estate broker who helped him to find the Iala house, which he and an associate—likely Awad, the suicide-operative in the Dar attack—rented for about 100 USD per month, paying the entire year's lease up-front in cash.[55]

These homes shared some similar characteristics. Both were removed from the city center and sat in sleepy, unassuming neighborhoods, and both were surrounded by high walls,

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[51] Matthew Rosenberg, "AP Exclusive: Al-Qaida continues to siphon money from Islamic charities to fund attacks despite U.S. ,Saudi crackdown," *Associated Press*, June 6, 2004.

[52] U.S. Department of the Treasury, ―Additional Al-Haramain Branches, Former Leader Designated by Treasury as Al Qaida Supporters Treasury Marks Latest Action in Joint Designation with Saudi Arabia," Office of Foreign Assets Control, June 2, 2004; available online: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js1703.aspx.

[53] USA v. Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc., et al (Defendants), Indictment, United States District Court for the District of Oregon (No. Cr 05-60008-HD), 2004.

[54] The Runda Estates property leased for 50,000 Kenyan Shillings per month. The conversion to dollars was performed at the exchange rate that prevailed on May 1, 1998, the first day that Fazul's lease took effect. USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Testimony of Tamarra Ratemo (landlord of the Runda Estates property), Day 16 of testimony (March 12, 2001).

[55] The conclusion regarding the identity of K.K. Mohammed's associate is based on the fact that the witness, Chatwanda, stated that the associate spoke only Arabic, and no Swahili. The cost of the Iala house was 65,000 Tanzanian Shillings per month. The conversion to dollars was performed at the historical exchange rate that prevailed in June 1998, when the al-Qaida tenants took possession of the home. USA v. bin Laden, et al, Testimony of Mohamedi Selemani Chatwanda (real estate broker who located the Iala house for Khalfan), Day 18 of testimony (March 14, 2001). (Hereafter ―Chatwanda testimony").

which served to conceal the plotters' actions for public view.[56] Indeed, K.K. Mohammed communicated his desire for a walled compound to the real estate broker who helped him to find the Iala house,[57] but given that burglaries and home invasions are worryingly commonplace in East Africa, there was nothing overtly suspicious about Mohammed's requirements. Even modest homes in Kenya and Tanzania boast high concrete walls, the tops of which are typically rimmed by razor wire or broken bottles cemented in place, to preclude prowlers from attempting to scale the barricade.[58] Thus, finding safe houses that met the attack teams' needs for privacy was not an especially difficult challenge.

After acquiring the safe houses, the team next secured the vehicles used to deliver the explosions to the embassies. In July, Swedan purchased the Nairobi bomb-truck, a Toyota Dyna, second-hand from an acquaintance who used the vehicle to haul livestock and feed to his poultry farm outside Mombasa. Swedan paid the equivalent of 10,000 USD for the vehicle, which was a curious price, since the owner had purchased the vehicle for approximately 3,100 USD only two months earlier. As Swedan never turned-up to fill-out the paperwork necessary to transfer the vehicle's title and registration, it seems obvious that he was willing to pay a substantial premium to avoid routing his purchase through official channels. Moreover, since Swedan initially attempted to pay the seller in U.S. currency, only to be rebuffed because the truck's owner was afraid the bills might be counterfeit,[59] it seems clear that the plotters had an additional source of revenue beyond Mohammed Odeh's fishing business. The record contains no specific

[56] "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998."
[57] Chatwanda Testimony.
[58] Observation based on site visits to Eastern Africa.
[59] As Swedan attempted to pay the seller of the truck using U.S. dollars, it was not necessary to convert the cost of the vehicle. However, the seller was unwilling to accept dollars, so Swedan had to run to the money changer to pay the purchase price in local currency. USA v. bin Laden, et al, Testimony of Said Salim Omar (seller of the Toyota truck), Day 16 of testimony (March 16, 2001).

transactions, but given that al-Fawwaz received cash from bin Laden via courier during his time in Nairobi, it is reasonable to speculate that Swedan obtained funds in an analogous manner.

These patterns largely repeated in Dar es Salaam, where later that July, Swedan was also involved in the purchase of the refrigerated Nissan truck that served as the delivery vehicle for the Tanzanian bomb. Alongside Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Tanzanian who served as a sort of local fixer, he negotiated to buy the truck for about 6,500 USD. The al-Qaida operatives again used some U.S. currency in the transaction, paying the seller a $500 deposit in American bills, which suggests that this purchase also received some measure of financial support from abroad. As in Nairobi, the al-Qaida operatives again failed to turn-up to fill-out the paperwork necessary to officially transfer ownership.[60]

However, the Dar truck differed from the Nairobi vehicle in at least one important way: it required modification to meet the operation's needs. Specifically, the team was not satisfied with the refrigerator truck's payload specifications. Swedan and Ghailani purchased it because it was apparently the only vehicle that they could acquire under anonymous circumstances, forcing the team to make-do.[61] Towards those ends, K.K. Mohammed posed as a fish wholesaler who needed to reinforce and subdivide the interior compartment of the truck to allow him to carry bins of different fish to market and paid a local welder a small fee to modify the vehicle to accommodate the weight and design of the bomb.[62]

However, the bomb-trucks were not the only vehicles that the attack teams needed in order to complete their operation. The operatives in Dar and Nairobi also used a pair of smaller

[60] USA v. bin Laden, et al, Testimony of Mohamed Zaida (seller of the Nissan truck), March 14, 2001; see also, Verbatim Transcript of Open Session Combatant Status Review Tribunal for ISN 10012 (Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani), U.S. Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 17, 2007. (Hereafter, ~~"G~~hailani Tribunal").
[61] Guadin Testimony.
[62] The welder did not identify K.K. Mohammed by name, but stated that his client spoke with an accent characteristic of Pemba, the small island near Zanzibar where K.K. Mohammed was raised. USA v. bin Laden, et al, Testimony of Julius Kisingo Cem (the welder who modified the truck), Day 18 of testimony (March 14, 2001).

passenger vehicles as fleet cars that team members could use to complete errands in support of the operation. In Dar, a white Suzuki Samurai, a small jeep-like SUV, filled this role. K.K. Mohammed bought it in June, even before he had secured the Iala house.[63] In Nairobi, the same white pick-up that Fazul drove as the lead-vehicle on the day of the bombings served as the team's fleet car. It seems that the small truck was repurposed rather than purchased specifically in preparation for the attack. Fahad Ally Msalam, a local Kenyan in his early 20s who assisted in the attacks' logistical preparations, had purchased the truck as his personal vehicle well before the operation began.[64]

The attackers' communication needs were similarly commonplace and were met using standard commercial technology. In Dar, Ghailani, the same man who assisted in the purchase of the bomb-truck, acquired a mobile phone that the Tanzanian group used to communicate with their counterparts in Kenya. Given that the last call made on the phone took place less than an hour prior to the coordinated strike on August 7, it seems fairly clear that Awad, the suicide-operative in the Dar es Salaam strike, received his final orders via this device.[65] Meanwhile, the Kenyan group communicated with individuals abroad by making collect calls from Runda Estates house. The bulk of these routed to Ahmed al-Hazza, a friend of al-ʿOwhali's who fought beside him in Afgahnistan.[66] It remains unclear if these calls were purely social in nature, but al-Hazza may have also served as a cut-out that communicated decisions made by al-Qaida's Afghanistan-based leadership to the Kenyan cell, which then relayed information to the Tanzanian group.

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[63] Perkins Testimony; see also, USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Closing statement of Assistant U.S. Attorney Kenneth Karas, Day 38 of testimony (May 2, 2001).
[64] "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998."
[65] Ghailaini Tribunal.
[66] USA v. bin Laden, et al, Testimony of Margo Hitpas, Day 23 of testimony (March 27, 2001).

Explosives, the most important resource in any bombing attack, are more difficult to trace. In 1996, in an apparent effort to demonstrate his value to al-Qaida, Fahad Ally Msalam, the same young Kenyan who donated his pick-up to the Nairobi operation, gave Mohamed Odeh, one of the Afghan veterans who spent time in Somalia, a block of TNT and a blasting cap. Msalam then bragged that such materials were easy to obtain in Tanzania, and although Odeh remained somewhat mistrustful of the eager youngster, he relayed information on the availability of explosives in East Africa to al-Qaida's higher-ups.[67] The organization's leadership must have approved, because in the latter part of the following year, Msalam was ordered to acquire larger quantities of TNT on al-Qaida's behalf. With the help of Ghailani, the same local fixer who helped Swedan purchase the refrigerator truck, Msalam paid cash to buy large quantities of TNT from a mining firm in Arusha, Tanzania. As the date of the attack approached, the pair augmented these supplies by purchasing the cylinders of oxygen and acetylene gas used in the Dar bomb from a commercial supplier,[68] which likely had few, if any, restrictions on the materials' sale, as they are widely used in construction welding. Msalam and K.K. Mohammed then spent the bulk of July shuttling these explosives and other supplies to the teams' safe houses in the fleet vehicles.[69]

It is also clear who played the attacks' most important logistical role: bomb-maker. Msalam, K.K. Mohammed, and other team members were involved in unskilled work, such as grinding TNT (the Dar team used a hand-cranked flour mill, which K.K. Mohammed cleaned and then presented to his sister as a gift),[70] but the skilled electrical work necessary to connect

[67] Anticev testimony.
[68] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QI.M.34.01 Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam," October 17, 2001; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI3401E.shtml.
[69] Perkins testimony.
[70] USA v. bin Laden, Stipulations made between parties in regards to Government Exhibit 1440, Day 18 of testimony (March 14, 2001; Perkins Testimony, Day 19 of Testimony (March 19, 2001).

the bombs various components was largely the work of one man, an Egyptian named Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah (a.k.a. Abdel Rahman), who once served as an explosives instructor at al-Qaida's Sadeek Camp near Khost, Afghanistan, and was also a veteran of al-Qaida's foray into Somalia in the early 1990s.[71] With some assistance from Fazul, Atwah built the Nairobi bomb during a ten-day period that concluded about two weeks prior to the bombing.[72] Atwah then traveled to Tanzania, where the attack team's less-skilled members had already loaded the refrigerator-truck with TNT and cylinders of gas, and completed the wiring of the Dar es Salaam bomb, before fleeing East Africa for Karachi.[73]

4.1.3 TRAINING

As with logistics, al-Qaida's training ties to the embassy bombings began years earlier. The attacks' tactical leader, Abdullah, held the longest ties to bin Laden's organization of any of the men directly involved in the operational phase of the attack. Following a brief career as a professional soccer player in Egypt, Abdullah became involved in Egyptian Islamic *Jihad*, and encountered several of the men who would later become al-Qaida members while fighting as a foreign *mujahid* during the later days of the Soviet-Afghan War. It is not clear whether or not Abdullah was a founding member of bin Laden's organization in 1988, but by 1991, Abduallah held a formal position with the new group, serving as the head of al-Qaida's media committee.[74] When the Somali conflict broke-out in the early 1990s, he was also among the men that bin

[71] For information on Atwah's name, aliases, and citizenship, see: U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons," Office of Foreign Assets Control, March 2, 2012; and USA v. bin Laden, et al, Indictment (S[9] 98 Cr. 1023 [LBS]), 2001. For information on Atwah's role in Sadeek Camp and time in Somalia, see: Anticev testimony.

[72] For the length of time it took to complete the bomb-building, see Gaudin testimony. For information on those involved in the bomb-building, see: Anticev testimony.

[73] Gaudin testimony.

[74] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 8 of testimony (February 21, 2001).

Laden dispatched to Mogadishu.[75] Therefore, Abdullah was already a well-seasoned *jihadist* by the time that he led the East African attack.

Two other members of the attack team had nearly comparable tenure in al-Qaida. Mohamed Odeh, whose fishing business provided some of the funding that underwrote al-Qaida's operational expenses in East Africa, formally joined al-Qaida in 1992, but his path to radicalism began six years earlier, via audio cassette. In 1986, while an engineering student at Far Eastern University in the Philippines, Odeh began listening to the recorded sermons of Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian preacher who served as one of bin Laden's early ideological mentors. Odeh had become fully radicalized by the time he was preparing to graduate four years later, and when his father wired him a thousand dollars to help with expenses in his final semester, Odeh instead used the money to fund his way to Afghanistan. He spent two months in basic training at al-Qaida's Farouq Camp and then briefly served as a medic on the front lines of the Afghan civil war, before obtaining more specialized training in urban assault tactics at al-Qaida's Jihad Wal Camp. In March 1992, Odeh swore *bayat* to bin Laden,[76] and then received a third stint of training, this time at Sadeek Camp, where the new al-Qaida member studied explosives under Atwah, the bomb-maker who wired both the Dar es Salaam and Nairobi bombs.[77] Thus, one of the attacks' key logistical supporters and the attacks' key technical expert had been part of bin Laden's organization for nearly as long the attacks' tactical leader.

Like Odeh, Fazul's experience with radicalism began at school and followed a similar timeline. While he was still a teenager living in the Comoros Islands, Fazul studied at a religious school funded by al-Haramain Foundation. Based on his scholastic and religious acumen, he then won a scholarship to study in Pakistan in the early 1990s, at which point al-Qaida formally

[75] Anticev testimony.
[76] Anticev testimony, Day 11 of the trial (February 27, 2001).
[77] Anticev, testimony, Day 12 of the trial (February 28, 2001).

recruited him.[78] Fazul underwent training in the organization's Afghan camps in 1992, alongside Jihad Ali, the driver of the Nairobi bomb-truck, and under the tutelage of Ali Mohamed, the former Egyptian army officer who conducted the early surveillance of American targets in Nairobi.[79]

These trainees' paths then diverged. Fazul returned to Africa in 1993 to help train the Somali fighters then targeting U.N. Peacekeepers in Mogadishu,[80] and later that same year, he began reporting to Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri,[81] the founding member of al-Qaida who served as the chief of the organization's East African operations until his untimely drowning. However, Fazul's involvement with Somali militants seems to have continued beyond the initial battle for Mogadishu, because el-Hage sent the Comorian *jihadist* to Somalia multiple times in 1995 under the guises of "relief work" for Help Africa People.[82] Thus, by the time preparations for the embassy bombings began in earnest, Fazul's experience rivaled that of attack team's other prominent members.

Meanwhile, Jihad Ali bounced back and forth between Afghanistan and his native Saudi Arabia. In 1997, while working as a medic of sorts in a bin Laden-affiliated guest house, Ali first encountered Mohammed al-Owhali, who would later ride shotgun when Ali drove the

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[78] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QI.M.33.01. Fazul Abdullah Mohammed," October 17, 2001; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI03301E.shtml. See also: Lawrence Joffe, "Fazul Abduallah Mohammed obituary," *The Guardian*, June 12, 2011; available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/12/fazul-abdullah-mohammed-obituary.

[79] Mohamed allocution.

[80] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: QI.M.33.01. Fazul Abdullah Mohammed," October 17, 2001; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI03301E.shtml. See also: Lawrence Joffe, "Fazul Abduallah Mohammed obituary," *The Guardian*, June 12, 2011; available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/12/fazul-abdullah-mohammed-obituary.

[81] "Bombings of the Embassies of the United States of American at Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania August 7, 1998."

[82] On September 16, 1998, el-Hage testified before a federal grand jury in the Southern District of New York. The transcript of his statements were then read into the 2001 trial record of the men charged for the embassy bombings. USA v. bin Laden, El-Hage testimony from 1998, Day 21 of testimony (March 22, 2001).

bomb-truck to the embassy in Nairobi. Al-_Owhali had recently graduated from al-Qaida's Khaldan Camp, before receiving permission from bin Laden to fight for the Taliban, which was then losing the battle for the Afghan capital of Kabul to their rivals in the Northern Alliance. Perhaps because he had contracted the tuberculosis that brought him to the guesthouse while fighting on the front lines, al-_Owhali was receptive when Ali told him that there were other, greater forms of *jihad,* such as martyrdom operations against the West.[83]

However, Ali was not merely a cheerleader or a nurse; he made an active attempt at *jihad* the following year. Alongside his cousin, Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda Al-Nasheri, who later played a key role in the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole,[84] Ali attempted (and failed) to smuggle Stinger missiles across the Saudi border, "for use against an unspecified military target."[85] Thus, Ali and al-_Owhali, who were both slated to die in the Nairobi attack, were also seasoned operatives who held practical, front-line experience in *jihad*.

Hamden Khalif Allah Awad, who served as the suicide-driver in the Tanzanian bombing, held comparable experience. By the time that al-_Owhali arrived in Afghanistan in 1997, Awad served as a trainer at the Jihad Wal Camp, another of the organization's training facilities near Khost. As he had with Ali, al-_Owhali formed a friendship with Awad.[86] Thus, all of the men who were supposed to die in the East African attacks were bound not only by their experience in al-Qaida, but also by affinity bonds.

K.K. Mohammed, who played an important logistical role in the Tanzanian blast and served as Awad's translator in the days immediately preceding the attack, also first became

[83] Gaudin testimony.
[84] United State of America v. Jamal Ahmed Mohamed Ali Al-Badawi and Fahd al-Quso, Defendants (Indictment S12 98 Cr. 1023), United States District Court Southern District of New York; Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10015 (Abd al-Rahim al-Nasheri), Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 14, 2007.
[85] High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, Date Unknown, available online: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/.
[86] Perkins testimony.

involved in al-Qaida in the mid-1990s. His path to radicalism began in 1990, when he was still a teenager. Although his family was not especially religious, Mohammed found solace in Islam when he moved from the tiny island of Pemba, which lies about 50 miles north of Zanzibar in the Indian Ocean, to urban Dar es Salaam to begin work in his brother's store. A mutual friend soon introduced the newly-devout Mohammed to Fahad All Msalam, who later served as the embassy bombings' other key logistical procurer, and who was then visiting Tanzania from his native Kenya. Msalam's religious zeal was apparently infectious; he convinced Mohammed that it was his duty to travel to Afghanistan to fight in support of the *mujahideen* who were fighting against other factions to establish a true Islamic state.[87] Consequently, in 1994, K.K. Mohammed obtained training in Manakando Camp, before returning to East African the following year and becoming yet another instructor in al-Qaida's burgeoning Somalian operation.[88]

Interestingly, for all his zeal, Msalam did not immediately follow Mohammed to Afghanistan. The aspiring Kenyan *jihadists* did not train until 1996, when he went through a basic course alongside Sheikh Ahmed Swedan, who had been recruited into al-Qaida earlier that year by Mohamed Odeh.[89] Thus, like the attacks' suicide-operatives and the team's tactical leaders, three of the men responsible for acquiring the materiel necessary to conduct the embassy bombings were graduates of al-Qaida's Afghan training facilities.

Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, who assisted in the procurement of the explosives and the Dar vehicle, offers the sole exception to this pattern. Prior to the bombings, he had spent no time in

[87] USA v. bin Laden, et al, Closing statement of defense attorney David Ruhnke, Day 41 of testimony (May 8, 2001).
[88] Perkins testimony.
[89] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.S.35.01. Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan," October 17, 2001; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI3501E.shtml.

the Afghan camps.[90] He seems to have been brought into the plot by K.K. Mohammed, the other Tanzanian involved in the plot, with whom he had apparently formed a friendship during their overlapping stints in Dar es Salaam.[91] However, as a reward for his assistance in the embassy bombings, Ghailani received training in Farouq Camp *after* the 1998 attacks, and then served as bin Laden's personal cook for a time, before receiving additional training in document forgery and beginning a career making false passports to facilitate al-Qaida operatives' clandestine travel.[92] He continued to serve in this capacity until he was captured in 2004.[93]

Ultimately, this evidence demonstrates that the vast bulk of the men involved in the embassy bombings had long association with al-Qaida. All but one of the key team members involved in the East African attacks had spent time in the organization's Afghan camps as either a student or an instructor, and several of the men had gained practical experience by fighting on the front lines of the Afghan civil war or by advising Somali clansmen during their confrontation with U.N. Peacekeepers during the early 1990s. In short, the attack team was comprised of seasoned *jihadists*.

4.1.4 SUMMATION

The patterns that existed within al-Qaida at the time of its first widely known attack can be stated succinctly. Although there was some fluidity in reporting relationships, as exhibited by the persistent personnel turnovers the organization experienced in Nairobi throughout the mid-1990s, al-Qaida was demonstrably hierarchical. High-ranking leaders planned at the strategic

[90] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing:QI.G.28.01. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani," October 17, 2001; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI02801E.shtml. (Hereafter "Ghailani listing").
[91] USA v. bin Laden, et al, Testimony of Abdallah Hamisi Shllm, Day 18 of trial (March 14, 2001).
[92] Ghailani listing; Verbatim Transcript of Open Session Combatant Status Review Tribunal for ISN 10012 (Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani), U.S. Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 17, 2007; High Value Detainee Biographies.
[93] "Outisde view: Focus on Pakistan's jihadis," *United Press International*, August 9, 2004; Paul Haven, "AP: Arrests damage al-Qaida network," *Associated Press Online*, August 6, 2004.

level by setting broad policies, as best demonstrated by bin Laden's 1996 declaration of war on the United States. These strategic leaders also made decisions on target selection; bin Laden and Abu Ubaidah al-Banshiri singled-out the American embassy in Nairobi as early as 1994. Once broad resources were in place, middle-managers handled the bulk of the tactical details. Until the FBI's probe scared him out of East Africa, el-Hage was responsible for some financial issues and for ensuring that the attack team appeared to have legitimate reasons to be in the country. Odeh and his fishing business were responsible for generating a substantial portion of the finances that supported the attack, and as demonstrated by his involvement with Swedan, Odeh also recruited on al-Qaida's behalf. Swedan and Fazul seem to have taken responsibility for spending the money Odeh generated and met the bulk of the attacks' materiel requirements, often by delegating tasks to to K.K. Mohammed, Msalam, and Ghailani. Abdullah planned how to use these resources at a tactical level and tightly managed information to ensure the security of the operation. Atwah then served as the operations' technical specialist and used his unique expertise to wire the explosive devices, before Ali, Awadh, and al-_Owhali served as the pointy end of al-Qaida's spear by filling (or, in al-_Owhali's case, attempting to fill) the role of suicide-operatives. With the sole exception of Ghailani, all of these men had been formally trained by bin Laden's organization. Thus, al-Qaida members were intimately involved in every aspect of the attack from its conceptual phase through its execution. However, this pattern would not repeat when al-Qaida conducted its next large-scale attack on East Africa by bombing Israeli-linked targets in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002.

4.2 THE 2002 MOMBASA ATTACKS

On the morning of November 26, 2002, two young men, Fumo Mohamed Fumo and Haruni Bamusa, readied themselves to die in a suicide-bombing. Both were Kenyans and neither had any previous experience in *jihad,* but their target, the Paradise Hotel, spoke to the Islamist beliefs the men had adopted. Because it was located in scenic Kikambala, a lush resort located along Kenya's Indian Ocean coast, and was just a short flight from Tel Aviv, the Paradise was popular with Israeli tourists seeking a tropical getaway. Thus, Fumo and Bamusa believed that striking the hotel constituted a blow against the people who had usurped territory that rightfully belonged to Palestinian Muslims. Armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles and a Tokarev pistol to ward-off security guards, the men drove an explosives-laden Mitsubishi Pajero SUV alongside the hotel and detonated the bomb just before 10.00am local time. The explosion killed 15 people, only three of whom were Israelis, and injured approximately 80 more.[94]

Minutes earlier, two other young, Kenyan *jihadists*, Issa Osman Issa and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, had launched a pair of shoulder-fired 9k32m Strela-2 surface-to-air missiles at a Boeing 757 departing from nearby Moi airport, but both missed their target. As the Tel Aviv-bound flight was operated by Israeli-owned Arkia Airlines, it seems clear that Issa and Nabhan shared the motivations of the hotel-bombers.[95] Had the attack on the airline gone according to plan,

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[94] International Crisis Group, "Counter-terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?" ICG Africa Group Report No. 95, July 11, 2005. (Hereafter "Losing Hearts and Minds"). "Statement Under Inquiry of Omar Said Omar," Recorded by Superintendent John Mulalulu, Kenya Anti-Terrorist Police Unit, date unknown (but almost certainly August, 2003), available from Appendix C-III of *Al-Qaida's (mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa*, Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point. (Hereafter "Omar statement.") "Qaida 'chameleon' seen behind bombings," *United Press International*, July 14, 2010.

[95] The missiles are also by the NATO designation SA-7b Grail. However, there is some debate regarding the identity of the men who fired them. Some sources attribute this role to Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, but as the Omar statement is closest to the event, its description of the assailants involved seems most likely to be accurate. For Issa and Nabhan's role, see the Omar Statement. For the make of the missiles, see "Qaida chameleon' seen behind bombings" and Stefan Tafrov (chairman), Report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1474 (2003), November 4, 2003, pp. 29-30. (Hereafter "Tafrov report").

about 200 passengers would have died,[96] to say nothing of casualties on the ground, and the 2003 attacks would have caused a loss of life comparable to the 1998 bombings.

As with the embassy attacks, al-Qaida's hand was evident in the near-simultaneous strikes on the Paradise Hotel and Arkia Airlines. High-ranking members of bin Laden's organization planned the attack, and it even involved some of the same operatives as the Nairobi bombing. For example, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who had guided the Nairobi-bombers through the city's hectic streets as they made their way to the American embassy, played a leading role in recruiting the 2003 attack team and financing its attack. However, the Mombasa-Kikambala attacks also differed from the 1998 bombings in significant ways. On average, the 2003 operatives did not benefit from the same degree of formal terror training as their predecessors in Nairobi in Dar es Salaam. Similarly, al-Qaida's organizational involvement in the finance of the 2003 operation was qualitatively different, and the Mombasa-Kikambala team did not benefit from the same type of al-Qaida-financed business that Mohamed Odeh ran to support the 1998 team. Though still clearly working at bin Laden's behest, the 2003 attack team was more independent and far less tied al-Qaida's hierarchy. In short, the organization's involvement in attacks was beginning to become more diffuse, even among those events in which al-Qaida played a strong role, and the quality of the operation suffered accordingly.

4.2.1 PLANNING

Al-Qaida began conceptualizing the Mombasa attacks shortly before 9/11. In September 2001, as the airline hijackers made their final preparations in America, al-Qaida's leadership in Afghanistan gathered in celebration. Bin Laden's 19 year-old son, Mohammed, was marrying the teenage daughter of Muhammad Atef, an influential Egyptian member of al-Qaida's military

[96] For information on the seating capacity of the Boeing 757, see: "Boeing Marks Completion of its 757 Commercial Airline Program," Boeing, October 28, 2004; available online: http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2004/q4/nr_041028g.html.

committee.[97] This event serves as a useful marker for the 2003 Mombasa attacks, because Fazul, who had been in hiding in South Asia since the embassy bombings, did not attend the wedding. Although bin Laden had invited him, the Comorian *jihadist* declined this honor because he believed it was more important for him to return to Africa to begin preparations for his next attack.[98] It is not clear exactly how far ahead of the wedding Fazul left Afghanistan, but he was gone no later than the end of summer in 2001.

An accomplice of Fazul's, whom Kenyan police later arrested for his involvement in the Mombasa attacks, stated that the Comorian was "in charge of the whole operation,"[99] but he may have had help planning the attack at the strategic level. During the course of his Combatant Status Review Tribunal, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed claimed that he was responsible for 31 distinct terror plots and attacks, including "the bombing of the hotel in Mombasa that is frequented by Jewish travelers via El Al airlines," and "for launching a Russian-made SA-7 surface-to-air missile on El-Al or other Jewish airliner departing from Mombasa."[100] To restate the obvious, the man who masterminded 9/11 claimed that he also conceptualized the 2002 attacks on East Africa.

However, it may be unwise to accept KSM's confession at face value; some pundits posit that KSM assumed responsibility for several terrorist plots in which he lacked meaningful involvement in order to protect co-conspirators still at large, to send American investigators on a wild goose chase, or perhaps simply to placate his own massive ego.[101] Therefore, the full extent of KSM's involvement in the Mombasa operation is unknown, but no evidence has emerged

[97] Mark Hosenball, "Terror: The family business," *Newsweek*, August 12, 2002; "German Daily: Bin-Laden's sons have assumed command of Al-Qa'idah," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, July 30, 2002.
[98] Confidential informant in the employ of the U.S. Federal Government, interview conducted December 2011.
[99] Omar statement.
[100] Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), Unclassified, March 10, 2007.
[101] Katherine Schrader, "Al Qaida chief apparently did orchestrate some plots but less linked to others," *Associated Press*, March 16, 2007.

suggesting that he played an active role in the operation at the tactical level, and it is likely telling that he did not know that the target of the airport-attack was Arinka Airlines, not El-Al. At most, it seems that the KSM played a part at the strategic level and was one of the decision makers that selected Jewish interests in East Africa as a broad class of targets.

Beyond KSM's involvement, Abu Talha al-Sudani, who had been involved in al-Qaida since the early 1990s and who worked in a number of the businesses that bin Laden established during his time in the Sudan, may have played a substantial role in planning the Mombasa attacks. Specifically, in an autobiography that was briefly available on *jihadist* websites in 2008, Fazul claimed that bin Laden had granted Abu Talha a sort of supervisory role in the attack.[102] However, other participants in the attack labeled Abu Talha as the operation's paymaster.[103] Ultimately, it is clear that Abu Talha was a crucial member of the Mombasa team, but without additional information on the specific nature of the vague supervisory role that bin Laden granted him, it would be premature to conclude that Abu Talha oversaw the entire operation at a strategic level.

On the tactical side, much of the planning seems to have been accomplished by the men who actively conducted the attack. According to accomplice testimony, the suicide-bombers who attacked the hotel and the men who fired the rockets at the Israeli airliner all participated in surveillance, presumably of their respective targets. However, beyond these individuals, Fazul seems to have compartmentalized information in much the same manner as Abdullah had during the embassy bombings. For example, Omar Said Omar, who played an important logistical role in the Mombasa operation by hiring an escape boat that would take the surviving conspirators to Somalia after the attack's conclusion, knew only that ~~t~~here was a place which was to be

[102] Confidential informant in the employ of the U.S. Federal Government, interview conducted December 2011. The autobiography itself has yet to appear in translation in the open-source.
[103] Omar statement.

bombed," but held no information on the specific attack sites or the exact timing of the operation. Indeed, he did not learn the full details of the attack until after it concluded, when he received a phone call from the airport attackers following their failed mission.[104]

4.2.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

The money behind the attacks seems to have come from two sources: funds diverted from charity and crime. As with the 1998 attacks, it is likely that al-Haramain Foundation played a role in funding the Mombasa attacks. Specifically, the foundation distributed substantial funds to support the construction of three mosques in the region, but because Aboud Rogo, the local preacher designated as the recipient of the funds, was both a long-term associate of Fazul and a relative of the Comorian *jihadist* by marriage, it seems reasonable to assume that at least a portion of the funds were diverted to support the cost of the Mombasa operation.[105] Given al-Haramain's well-documented relationship with bin Laden's organization, these interactions demonstrate that al-Qaida likely provided some organizational-level support to the 2002 attacks.

An unusual arrest demonstrated the role that crime played in funding the attacks. A few months before the Mombasa attacks, Kenyan police detained a man for purchasing jewelry using a stolen credit card that he had acquired during a recent car-jacking. The arresting officers led their suspect back to his apartment in search of more stolen goods, or given the corruption that Kenyan police had demonstrated by accepting a bribe to free al-Qaida members from jail in 1994, they may have been in search of a quick bribe. But regardless of the police's motivation, they found a scene of chaos when they arrived at the apartment the suspect claimed was his home. Several women and one mentally handicapped man were inside, and they began a shouting match with the police. The suspect, whom the arresting officers had neglected to

[104] Omar statement.
[105] Rosenberg.

handcuff, took advantage of the momentary confusion; he slipped away and rapidly disappeared in the dense labyrinth of narrow alleyways that comprise Mombasa's older neighborhoods. Only later did the arresting officers realize that their robbery suspect was Fazul, who had appeared on the FBI's list of most wanted terrorists since the 1998 attacks.[106] Because jewelry purchased with a credit card is easily resold and converted into cash, this incident strongly suggests that a cycle of robbery (to acquire the cards) and fraud (to acquire items for resale) generated additional funds to support the 2002 Mombasa attacks, though the relative scale of Fazul's criminal exploits and al-Haramain's contributions are impossible to determine because currently available information does not describe these interactions in dollar terms.

This second pattern represented a substantial departure from the funding patterns evidenced during the 1998 embassy bombings. By the time of the Mombasa attacks, much of the financial and logistical infrastructure that al-Qaida held in East Africa during and mid 1990s had been dismantled. Like Khalid al-Fawwaz before him, Wadih el-Hage, who led the organization's support network, had been chased out of Nairobi a year prior to the 1998 bombings, and in the days immediately preceding those attacks, al-Qaida had removed its remaining personnel from the region. The investigation that followed the bombings precluded bin Laden's organization from reestablishing itself in the region in the same largely public manner it had in advance of the embassy bombings, by perverting el-Hage's charitable organization and Mohamed Odeh's fishing business to provide cover and financial support to al-Qaida's local operatives. Without this veil of legitimacy, bin Laden's organization was forced to assume substantially greater risk in order to generate local funds to support the Mombasa operation. Thus, crime was likely a financial tactic of last resort.

[106] Andrew England, "AP Exclusive: FBI's most wanted leader of al-Qaida cell indicted for U.S. embassy bombing escaped," *Associated Press*, June 10, 2004.

In addition to living expenses for the attack team's members,[107] the monies generated by Fazul's criminal exploits went towards the purchase of weapons from neighboring Somalia's expansive black market. The shoulder-fired rockets that the team used in the attempt on the Arkia Airlines flight traveled a circuitous route to end-up for sale in East Africa. The missiles were part of the weapons surplus left-over from the Cold War and were manufactured in the Soviet Union in 1978, before being sold to Yemen in a larger arms deal in 1994. The paperwork then becomes spotty, and the missiles arrived in Somalia either as the result of commercial arms dealers' smuggling efforts, or as part of a shipment that Yemen sold to the Government of Eritrea, which then consigned the weapons to Somali warlord Hussein Aideed in 1998. If the missiles followed the former route, then the attack team could have purchased them in one of Somalia's numerous arms bazaars, and if the missiles followed the latter route, then they may have been purchased directly from Aideed's clan, or may have been a gift of sorts, made to reward the support that al-Qaida had shown by advising the clan throughout the early and mid-1990s. Regardless of the specifics, the attack team smuggled the missiles across the porous Kenyan border via a maritime route in the summer of 2002, alongside a pair of Bulgarian-made launchers, which were disguised by a hastily-applied coat of blue and white paint.[108]

Detailed information on the source of the explosives used in the bombing of the Paradise Hotel has yet to emerge, but given the team's close association with Somalia and that country's preponderance of arms markets, it is reasonable to assume that the attack team simply purchased them in Mogadishu and smuggled them into Kenya via the same seaborne route as the missiles. Ultimately, none of the resources used in the Mombasa attack would have been particularly

[107] Omar statement.
[108] Tafrov report.

difficult for individuals with ample funding and long experience in Somalia to obtain from regional sources.

The final materiel resource used in the attack was the blue Mitsubishi SUV that served as the bomb-vehicle. It was acquired in much the same fashion as the vehicles used in the 1998 bombings. With money he acquired from Abu Talha, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, who also served as trigger-man in the Moi airport attack, bought the car second-hand for cash from a local seller.[109]

However, in terms of manpower, the 1998 and 2003 attacks differed substantially. While al-Qaida staffed embassy-bombing almost entirely with experienced *jihadists* recruiting from within the organization, al-Qaida assembled the Mombasa operation largely by recruiting novice *jihadists* from outside the organization. Personal ties were the primary mechanism used to draw inexperienced accomplices into the conspiracy.

Many of these links ran through blood and marriage. About a year before the 2002 attacks, Fazul moved to Lamu, in Kenya‘s costal district, and began working as an Islamic studies teacher under the alias of Abdul Karim.[110] Aboud Rogo, a preacher that Fazul first met sometime around 1997[111] and the same man who received al-Haramain funding, helped the Comorian terrorist to blend into the community by introducing him to extended family members. Fazul soon married Rogo‘s cousin, Amina Kubwa, and began living with her immediate family. These living arrangements proved conducive to recruiting; Amina‘s brother and father, both named Mohammed Kubwa, played supporting roles in the Mombasa attacks, as did Rogo.

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[109] Omar statement; "Kenyan police say 'key' suspect in Mombasa attack has Yemeni links," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, December 27, 2002; "Kenyan court releases vehicle seller held over anti-Israeli attack," *Agence France Presse*, December 18, 2002.
[110] Andrew England, ―Authorities Search for Terror Suspect,‖ *Associated Press*, March 20, 2003.
[111] Andrew England, "Investigators believe suspect in Nov. 28 attacks on Kenyan coast was connected to the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings," *Associated Press*, March 21, 2003.

Indeed, the data estimates that eight of the 14 individuals (57 percent) directly involved in Fazul's operational and financial network in 2002 also shared some sort of family connection.

Other members of the team were recruited through friendship and business ties. For example, Issa Osman Issa, an ethnic Somali with previous experience in that country's ethno-religious conflict and who served as the second triggerman in the Moi airport attack, drew Omar Said Omar, the logistical supporter who arranged the attack team's escape boat to Somalia, into *jihad* while the two worked side-by-side. The pair first met in Kenya, circa 1998, and began a financial partnership the following year, when they established a business wholesaling lobsters in Kismayo, Somalia. At that time, Issa began to discuss *jihad*, and ultimately convinced his business partner that Muslims had a duty to defend their religion. Following another move in November 2001, this time to Mogadishu, Issa introduced Omar to Fazul and Swedan. Thus, the Mombasa operation did not benefit from the long-term, battled-forged bonds to the same extent as the 1998 bombings, which involved numerous Afghan veterans. Those who provided logistical support to the 2002 attack were primarily locals who were drawn into the attack via Fazul's familial connections and diffuse friendship bonds, rather than pre-existing ties to al-Qaida.

Aside from the operation's leaders, Fazul and Abu Talha, there is one additional member of the team on-the-ground who may have had more durable ties to al-Qaida: Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan.[112] Another Kenyan, Nabhan would gain minor renown in later years as a member of the Somalia-based insurgent group al-Shabaab. While the open-source record is clear regarding his post-Mombasa involvement in terrorism, it is less so regarding his early history.

[112] "Statement Under Inquiry of Omar Said Omar."

Some sources claim that Nabhan played a role in the 1998 embassy attacks,[113] but this seems fairly unlikely, since his name does not appear in the entire 8,700-plus page transcript of the trial of the defendants responsible for this attack. Moreover, since Nabhan was born in 1981,[114] he would have been only about 17 years old at the time of the 1998 attacks, or roughly 15 years younger than the average age of the individuals directly linked to the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings.[115] Young terrorists are by no means unusual—Fahad was only in his early 20s during the 1998 operation—but when taken alongside Nabhan's apparent absence from the trial transcripts, this evidence suggests that any role he might have played in the 1998 bombings was minor, and he more likely made his debut as an operational terrorist in the 2002 attacks, though as the section on training discusses in greater detail, he did benefit from al-Qaida training during the late 1990s.

Ultimately, the differences between the pools of manpower used in the 1998 and 2002 attacks likely represent a devolution of organizational capacity forced on al-Qaida by changes in the organization's circumstance. Following the 1998 bombings and the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida's profile increased dramatically; it was far more difficult for known members of the organization to transit between countries, particularly after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 eliminated the organization's primary sanctuary. Consequently, al-Qaida may have relied heavily on local novices in Mombasa for the same reasons that the organization turned to crime to finance the 2002 operation: circumstances precluded the organization from establishing the infrastructure necessary to move large numbers of veteran members into the East African theater.

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[113] See, for example, "Counter-terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?" and "Al-Qaida vet 'takes over Somali jihadists,'" United Press International, March 11, 2010.
[114] "US troops raid Somali town controlled by fighters," Guardian Unlimited, September 14, 2009.
[115] This statistic was calculated using attribute data that listed individuals' dates of birth. For the two dozen people the data labels as direct operational or financial participants in the 1998 bombings, the year of birth was subtracted from 1998, before a mean value was calculated.

While information on the attack's logistical supporters is fairly clear, few details have emerged regarding the bomb-maker. There is no evidence that the Mombasa team benefited from the input of a specialized technician like Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah, who wired the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombs. Indeed, it seems likely that Fazul and Abu Talha built the bomb themselves.

Both men were certainly capable of the feat. Fazul had assisted Atwah in the construction of the Nairobi bomb, and Abu Talha was one of the handful of al-Qaida operatives that bin Laden dispatched to Lebanon in the early 1990s to receive explosives training with the Shia terror group Hizballah—a rare instance of cooperation among extremists from different branches of Islam.[116] If this speculative argument proves true, then members of the Mombasa attack team were forced to be more functionally diverse and more self-reliant that their predecessors in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Al-Qaida lacked the ability to utilize true technical experts and had to rely on generalists with broader bases of terrorist knowledge.

4.2.3 TRAINING

Given the nature of the manpower that al-Qaida used in the 2002 attack, it is not especially surprising that the bulk of the Mombasa team lacked training in Afghanistan. Beyond Fazul and Abu Talha, the two triggermen who fired on the jetliner departing Moi Airport had demonstrable *jihadist* experience. The evidence suggests that Issa was a veteran of the Mogadishu conflict,[117] where, given Somali tribesmen's well-documented penchant for firing Stingers at American helicopters,[118] he likely gained some experience with shoulder-fired rockets similar to the one he fired on November 26, 2002.

[116] USA vs. bin Laden, et al, Day 2 of testimony (February 6, 2001); 9/11 Commission Report, p. 61.
[117] Omar statement.
[118] Blackhawk Down.

Nabhan, meanwhile, seems to have benefitted from Afghan training, which, it is worth noting, seems to have taken place during the same time period as the East African embassy bombings, and therefore likely precluded his participation in those attacks. Specifically, he spent time in one of al-Qaida's camps in the Khost region in 1998, before briefly fighting alongside the Taliban in its struggle against the Northern Alliance. He may have received some explosives training during this period, and therefore may have had the skills necessary to assist in the construction of the bomb used to target the Paradise Hotel.[119] But regardless of the specifics of his training, it is clear that both he and Issa—the two individuals with the most active role in the airport-attack—were seasoned *jihadists* with comparable experience to the 1998 attackers.

However, this pattern of experience did not extend to the remainder of the attack-team. Neither of the martyrs who died in the Paradise Hotel bombing nor the team's remaining support-personnel seem to have possessed similar backgrounds. This stands in stark contrast to the 1998 embassy bombings, in which only a single member of the attack-team was a novice *jihadist*.

In order to mitigate the naïveté that characterized the bulk of the team, Fazul conducted his own mini-camp in Somalia. Working primarily inside the house that the team rented in Mogadishu in the fall of 2001, Fazul and Issa put the team's greener members through some basic paramilitary training and schooled recruits on basic marksmanship, using AK-47 rifles and handguns purchased from local arms markets. The team also had several hand grenades in its possession during its time in Somalia, but it is unclear how much, if any, training the recruits received with this or any other type of explosives.[120]

[119] "Kenyan paper profiles Al-Qa'idah terrorist Saleh Nabhan," *BBC Monitoring Africa - Political*, June 22, 2009.
[120] Omar statement.

Ultimately, these circumstances reinforce conclusions about the nature of specialization within the Mombasa attack team. While the men responsible for the 1998 embassy bombing were able to rely on the substantial organizational infrastructure that al-Qaida possessed in Afghanistan in the mid-to-late 1990s, the loss of sanctuary bin Laden's organization experienced with the U.S. invasion in the fall of 2001 forced the Mombasa team to be more autonomous, and the quality of training available to the team's greener members was briefer and more haphazard as a result. Realistically, the leaders of the Mombasa operation could neither import pre-trained operatives from South Asia, nor send their local supporters abroad because the Afghan camps had been lost, and the facilities that al-Qaida now maintains in Pakistan were yet to be established. It seems that the team was autonomous in terms of training for want of better options.

4.2.4 SUMMATION

Al-Qaida clearly supported the 2002 Mombasa attacks at an organizational level, and this event mirrored the 1998 embassy bombing in several important ways. Both were coordinated strikes that were planned and implemented over the course of several months. As demonstrated by Aboud Rogo's receipt of al-Haramain funding, it is also exceptionally likely that the 2002 attacks benefitted from one of the same types of organizational funding that supported the 1998 bombings. Similarly, KSM's possible involvement in the attacks' strategic planning and the relationship that existed between Fazul and bin Laden in the fall of 2001 strongly suggest that the highest echelons of al-Qaida's leadership initiated the Mombasa attacks, just as it had in regards to the embassy bombings.

However, this Mombasa attacks also deviated from the model of the 1998 attacks in important ways. While the embassy bombing-teams followed a hierarchical model of

organization and were staffed almost entirely by experienced personnel with specialized areas of expertise, the Mombasa team was flatter, less specialized, and less experienced. The leaders of the 2002 operation wore many different hats. As demonstrated by Fazul's involvement in credit card fraud and car-jackings, these leaders independently financed a portion of their operation, without the benefit of the same organizational infrastructure that went into the establishment of Odeh's fishing business in the late 1990s. Moreover, the leaders of the 2002 team served in a training capacity and conducted independent instructional courses instead of shipping recruits to study terrorism in South Asia.

Finally, there is the nature of the team itself. While the men involved in the embassy bombing were by and large seasoned operatives with long associations with al-Qaida, the Mombasa team contained a large number of novice *jihadists* who were recruited from the local population via friendship bonds and family ties, though on the day of the attack the job that required the most expertise, namely firing the rockets at the Israeli jetliner, fell to experienced men. But the use of green recruits as suicide bombers in the Paradise Hotel attack and the general lack of experience that typified the operatives who provided logistical support to the Mombasa operation demonstrate that the nature of al-Qaida's involvement in terrorism had changed dramatically between 1998 and 2002. The Mombasa attack team blended elements of formal organizational support with aspects of self-organizing network behavior, because a handful of seasoned operatives created, trained, and then supervised their own independent operational cell, rather than importing a full team of seasoned men as al-Qaida had in 1998.

The reasons underlying this structural shift were fairly obvious. Although al-Qaida had successfully conducted large-scale attacks on U.S. Embassies in East Africa in 1998 and on the U.S.S. Cole while the American warship was in port in Yemen in 2000, the threat posed by bin

Laden's organization remained misunderstood, even among most specialists, until the events of September 11, 2001, focused the full attention of the public and policy-makers on the threat posed by al-Qaida.[121] Following this shift in perception, bin Laden and his followers became truly notorious and received tremendous attention from the global counterterrorism community. The blended behavior exhibited by the Mombasa attack team represented an attempt to maintain the organization's strategic objectives, namely frightening Westerners into removing their influence from the domain Muslims sought to claim as their own, in a new and fundamentally different operating environment. However, the attack that resulted from these efforts suffered because al-Qaida was simply unable to bring the same sort of resources to bear in the East African theater in 2002 as the organization had been able to muster during the 1990s. Ultimately, al-Qaida's hierarchical structure was a victim of its own success. In 2004, the last year in which the quantitative model found a non-Western event in which al-Qaida played a strong functional role, this pattern again changed, and al-Qaida's involvement in terrorism became both more diffuse and demonstrably less dangerous.

[121] For example, Richard A. Clarke, who served as a counterterrorism official during George W. Bush's first term in office, stated that "most senior officials in the administration did not know the term (al-Qaida) when we briefed them in January 2001" (*Against all Enemies,* p. 31). Similarly, in his journalistic account of the events preceding the September 11 attacks, Lawrence Wright described how shortly after the millennium, the FBI's hierarchy "continued to view al-Qaeda as a distant and manageable threat" (*The Looming Tower,* p. 298). Finally, the 9/11 Commission painted a similar, though more nuanced picture, by noting that members of the intelligence community had circulated several specialized reports on bin Laden by the fall of 2001, but noting that the intelligence community failed to provide "an authoritative depiction of his organization's relationships with other governments, or the scale of the threat his orgnaiztaion posed to the United States" and explaining that neither the Clinton nor Bush administrations "fully understood just how many people al Qaeda might kill, and how soon it might do it" (pp. 342-343).

4.3 JUNDALLAH'S 2004 ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN

In 2004, a terrorist group calling itself Jundallah, or soldiers of god, conducted a series of terror strikes in-and-around Karachi, Pakistan.[122] Tactics varied from bombings to armed assaults, and targets included a Bible society, the city's Marina Club, a pair of Shiite religious sites, police targets around the city, and the Pakistan-American Cultural Center.[123] Although Jundallah claimed these attacks in its own name, the quantitative model attributed al-Qaida with a strong role in some of these events, because Jundallah's two leaders, Atta-ur Rahman and Shahzad Bajwa, had received training in one of al-Qaida's Waziristan-based facilities immediately prior to initiating their campaign of terror. Al-Qaida's trend toward diffuse functional involvement in terrorism, which began when al-Qaida blended unseasoned *jihadists* with experienced operatives during the Mombasa attacks, saw its next evolution in the events involving Jundallah, because instead of relying on an independent cell that operated under the supervision of a handful of experienced al-Qaida members, bin Laden's organization fomented *jihad* in 2004 by unleashing trainees of questionable competence to conduct attacks without any apparent organizational-level support from al-Qaida.

4.3.1 PLANNING

Jundallah's attacks cannot be studied with the same level of detail as the 1998 embassy bombings of the 2002 Mombasa attacks because comparable information resources, such as detailed court transcripts or co-conspirator confessions, are simply not available. However, the pace and nature of Jundallah's attacks says much about their planning. Rather than large,

[122] This organization should not be confused with the Iranian organization of the same name, which claims to fight for Sunni rights within the Shia state. For introductory information on Iranian Jundallah, see: "Profile: Iran's Jundullah militants," *BBC News*, June 20, 2010.
[123] "Indictment of Jundullah men deferred till Oct. 6 in six terrorism cases," *Pakistan Newswire*, September 28, 2004; "Arrested Pakistani militants reveal plan of attacking US consulate, other target," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, July 20, 2004; Paul Haven, "AP: Arrests damage al-Qaida network," *Associated Press Online*, August 6, 2004.

coordinated strikes that were planned over the course of months, Jundallah initiated a rapid series of smaller, less sophisticated attacks.

Indeed, Jundallah's initial actions were truly amateurish and required little specific planning. The organization's members hurled hand-grenades at a bible society located in Karachi's Sadar neighborhood in January 2004.[124] Two months later, in the Ferozabad area of Karachi, the group shot-up a van filled with members of a government-aligned paramilitary organization, killing two and wounding several others, [125] and in April, the Jundallah again targeted law enforcement, shooting dead five officers inside Karachi's Gulistan-e-Johar police station in an attack that was more reminiscent of gangland drive-bys than the timed, coordinated strikes that characterized al-Qaida's efforts in East Africa in 1998 and 2002.[126]

Later in the spring of 2004, the sophistication of Jundallah's attacks increased moderately, when the group car-bombed the Karachi Marina Club, but this advancement was not especially effective since the attack only killed one and injured nine.[127] However, Jundallah apparently learned from this failure. When the organization revisited the tactic of car-bombings in May, detailed planning was more evident and paid greater dividends for the organization. When Jundallah members simultaneously detonated a pair of explosive-laden vehicles in front of the Pakistan-American Cultural Center in Karachi, they managed to injure 37 people.

Moreover, this attack demonstrated that the group's strategic vision of *jihad* had evolved alongside its tactics. In accordance with al-Qaida's stated goals, Jundallah now targeted sites overtly linked to the West. Indeed, in 2004, the organization had also planned to storm the U.S.

[124] Ibid.
[125] "ATC hears ranger mobile attack case," *Pakistan Newswire*, June 2, 2005.
[126] "Indictment of Jundullah men deferred till Oct. 6 in six terrorism cases."
[127] Ibid.

Consulate in Karachi using light machine guns,[128] but before Jundallah could implement the plot, its evolution was cut short by a botched assassination attempt on the top-ranked general in Karachi, Ahsan Saleem Hayat.

On June 10th, Jundallah reverted back to its previous mode of attack and targeted Hayat's motorcade in a poorly organized armed assault. The general escaped unscathed, but 10 others died in the exchange of fire. Police later found the now-bloodstained van that the terrorists had stolen to make their get-away, and its owner was able to provide good descriptions of the thieves. Within two days of the failed attack, the authorities arrested Rahman, Bajwa, and their immediate accomplices. This action ostensibly eliminated the small organization the Pakistani extremists had founded.[129]

4.3.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

The unsophisticated nature of Jundallah's attacks dictates that they were inexpensive, and the wide availability of weapons in the region dictates that the supplies the attackers required were easy to obtain. Indeed, by the millennium, automatic rifles had become so prevalent in Pakistan that journalists began characterizing the country as a "Kalashnikov culture."[130] Estimates claim that some 2,000 families are involved in the small-scale production of guns in the Darra Adamkhel region of the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) alone, and only a fraction of these manufacturers sell their arms abroad.[131] Consequently, automatic rifles like those used in many of Jundallah's attacks sold for an average price of 280 USD in Pakistan circa

[128] "Arrested Pakistani militants reveal plan of attacking US consulate, other target," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, July 20, 2004.
[129] Paul Haven, "AP: Arrests damage al-Qaida network," *Associated Press Online*, August 6, 2004.
[130] Martin Regg Cohn, "Kalashnikov Culture: Talking Tough on Guns in Pakistan," *Toronto Star*, April 11, 2001; see also, Peter Wonacott, "For Middle Class Pakistanis, a Gun Is a Must-Have Accessory," *Wall Street Journal*, January 6, 2009; available online: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123120431026355961.html.
[131] Aamer Ahmed Khan, "Pakistan's flourishing arms bazaar," *BBC News*, June 21, 2006; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5066860.stm. See also, "Pakistan's illicit arms trade thrives," *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 16, 2007; available online: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/11/16/MNG4S3PBU.DTL.

2004,[132] and hand grenades can be purchased throughout South Asia for only a few dollars apiece.[133] Therefore, the logistical chains involved in Jundallah's attacks were far shorter than those supporting the 1998 and 2002 attacks in East Africa, and with the possible exception of the bombing of the Pakistan-American Cultural Center, the finance of Jundallah's attacks required little in the way of organizational support.

4.3.3 TRAINING

Al-Qaida's role in Jundalla's attacks is clearly evident in the training histories of the small Pakistani group's leaders. In November 2003, a few months before Jundallah's 2004 campaign of terror began, Rahman and Bajwa trained in South Waziristan, near the village of Shakai, at a facility al-Qaida had constructed on the land of a tribal leader named Edia Khan.[134] Evidence which emerged following the Rahman and Bajwa's arrest also linked the camp to Masrab Arochi, another of al-Qaida planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammad's many nephews,[135] and although the argument is speculative, it seems likely that Arochi instructed Rahman and Bajwa. Given that no evidence has emerged suggesting that al-Qaida played an active operational or financial role in Jundallah's largely amateurish attacks, it seems that bin Laden's organization provided the small Pakistani organization with minimal training, before sending its members out into the world to wreak unspecified havoc against the perceived enemies of Islam.

[132] Clair McEvoy, et al, *Small Arms Survey 2007,* (Graduate Institute of International Studies: Geneva, Switzerland: 2007), Annex 2. Available Kalashnikov Prices for Specific Countries and Periods, p. 278.
[133] Confidential informant in the employ of the U.S. military, interview conducted March 2012.
[134] "Indictment of Jundullah men deferred till Oct. 6 in six terrorism cases," *Pakistan Newswire*, September 28, 2004.
[135] Ibid; Sadaqat Jan, "Pakistan arrests 10 al-Qaida suspects," *Associated Press Online*, June 13, 2004.

4.3.4 SUMMATION

The diffuse role that al-Qaida played in the attacks that Jundallah conducted in 2004 did not spring from nowhere. Instead, the pattern was a continuation of the organizational behavior witnessed in Mombasa in 2002. While al-Qaida blended aspects of hierarchy with flat networks by tasking experienced operatives to build their own independent cell in East Africa in 2002, bin Laden's organization was farther removed from Jundallah's attacks in-and-around Karachi. No evidence has yet emerged suggesting that Jundallah benefitted from financial, logistical, or planning assistance from al-Qaida. Instead, al-Qaida trainers, likely Masrob Arochi, ideologically indoctrinated the Jundallah's leaders and taught them how to conduct *jihad* without outside assistance. Thus, between the 2002 Mombasa attacks and Jundallah's 2004 attacks in Pakistan, the nature of al-Qaida's involvement in terrorism morphed from a pattern of orchestrating *jihad,* by actively leading and supervising novice terrorists in the conduct of an operation, to a pattern of fomenting violence, by sending fresh trainees to conduct violence using their own independent resources and means. The danger presented by al-Qaida devolved proportionally, because these green trainees lacked the ability to conduct *jihad* on the same scale as al-Qaida's seasoned members had in earlier attacks.

4.4 CONCLUSION

These cases suggest that the means al-Qaida used to accomplish its strategic goals in the non-Western world changed dramatically between 1998, when the organization first gained widespread international attention with major attacks in East Africa, and 2004, when the quantitative model last attributed a major role in a non-Western terrorist event to the group. In the most general sense, these changes were transformative in nature. As summarized by table

4.1, bin Laden's organization progressed gradually from the direct conduct of attacks using a largely hierarchical model of structural organization to a diffuse network-based model, in which the organization trained and indoctrinated aspiring *jihadists* to conduct violence independently, without any demonstrable logistical or financial support from the main body of the organization.

Table 4.1: Al-Qaida's Declining Role in Terrorist Attacks and Plots Conducted Outside the West

1998 Bombings of United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Definite	AQ leaders involved in planning the strategic and tactial details of the attack
Finance	Definite	AQ provided all known financing
Logistics	Definite	AQ members and funds involved in the acquisition of all key resources
Training	Definite	All but one member of the attack team received AQ training prior to the attack

2002 Mombasa Attacks

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Partial	AQ leaders involved in strategic planning, but attack team responsible for tactical details
Finance	Partial	Attack also self-funded via crime
Logistics	Partial	Attack team acquired materiel indpendently, using AQ funds and possible AQ contacts; some manpower obtained via personal networks
Training	Partial	Attack team's leader received AQ training, but team members also trained in-house

Jundallah's 2004 Attacks on Pakistan

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Unlikely	No clear evidence of AQ involvement
Finance	Unlikely	Low-cost of attacks suggests self-finance
Logistics	Unlikely	Local availability of weapons/explosives suggests indpendent acquisition of materiel
Training	Partial	Jundallah's leadership received AQ training

However, it would be misleading to construe this evolution as evidence of successful adaptation, because these cases also demonstrate a steady pattern of declining organizational capacity. In 1998, bin Laden's group was able to support a full team of experienced operatives using quasi-legitimate means, as epitomized by the identification cards issued by el-Hage's charitable organization and the operational expenses partially paid for by Odeh's fishing business, but in 2002, al-Qaida made extensive use of novice *jihadists* to support the Mombasa attacks, and although the team likely still benefitted from some organizational funding, as demonstrated by Rogo's receipt of al-Haramain donations, Fazul was forced to turn to crime to augment the team's operating budget. By 2004, al-Qaida's involvement had become limited to a training role, and Jundallah's team contained no individuals with demonstrable previous experience in *jihad* and did not demonstrably benefit from any sort of additional support from al-Qaida at the organizational level. Therefore, it ultimately seems that al-Qaida's ability to conduct terrorist attacks in a non-Western context has devolved significantly since the Global War on Terrorism began circa 2001.

However, it would be premature to dismiss al-Qaida as a legitimate threat. This chapter considers only the organization's involvement in terrorist attacks on civilians and does not discuss al-Qaida's involvement in the related phenomenon of insurgency. It remains possible

that the organization's role in non-Western terrorism morphed because of a concurrent change in emphasis that privileged attacks on coalition troops in Iraq and Afghanistan over other forms of violence, but given that as of 2010, CIA director Leon Panetta estimated the total number of al-Qaida members in Afghanistan at no more than 50 or 100,[136] conclusions about the organizations' declining capabilities likely hold irrespective of a shift in al-Qaida's relative prioritization of insurgency and terrorism.

That said, conclusions regarding the organization's declining capacity may still be premature, because this chapter has not considered hit squad attacks conducted in the West. Consequently, the next chapter turns its attention to this subject.

[136] Evan Harris, "CIA: At most, 50-100 Al Qaeda in Afghanistan," *ABC News*, June 27, 2010; available online: http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2010/06/cia-at-most-50100-al-qaeda-in-afghanistan/.

5.0 ALL QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT? ASSESSING THE CHANGING CAPABILITIES OF AL-QAIDA HIT SQUADS DELPOYED TO THE WEST

The hit squads al-Qaida has deployed to the West mirror the organization's non-Western attack-teams in many ways. The evidence suggests that the quality of both classes of attackers has decreased substantially over time. Indeed, circa 2001, when coordinated strikes by al-Qaida hit squads successfully toppled the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon, the organization's Western attack-teams were well-organized and well-trained; many operatives held highly specialized skill-sets, and senior al-Qaida leaders oversaw and administered operations with a degree of professionalism and bureaucracy reminiscent of legitimate corporations. However, by the end of 2005, this relatively formal structure had been replaced by one-off instances of cooperation that were almost ad-hoc in nature. Given that this new pattern, which repeated again in 2009, was accompanied by a dramatic decrease in the caliber of al-Qaida's operatives, the extent and quality of their training, and their access to the organization's financial and logistical resources, it is difficult to support the oft-stated claim that al-Qaida is a successfully adaptive organization.[1]

[1] For examples of theorists who extol al-Qaida's adaptive ability, see: Bruce Hoffman, "The Changing Face of Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 27 (2004). Reid Sawyer and Michael Foster, "The Resurgent and Persistent Threat of al Qaeda," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, June 12, 2008; available online: http://ann.sagepub.com/content/618/1/197.full.pdf. Bruce Riedel, "AlQaeda Smells Blood," *Brookings*, April 6, 2011; available online: http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0406_yemen_al_qaeda_riedel.aspx. Norman Cigar, "Al-Qaida, the Tribes, and the Government: Lessons and Prospects for Iraq's Unstable Triangle," Marine Corps University, Middle East Studies Occasional Papers, Number Two, September 2011.

Although the evidence suggests that the rate of decline differed between al-Qaida's Western and non-Western attack teams, this chapter ultimately argues that the organization's shift toward flatter, less hierarchical structural forms was a failed experiment, not a successful adaptation. As al-Qaida moved toward a more networked structure, the organization's capabilities declined substantially. Today, al-Qaida is far less capable of conducting successful mass-casualty attacks in the West than was the case a decade ago.

This chapter contains six sections following this introduction. The first discusses the most notorious example of an al-Qaida hit squad attack conducted in the West, namely the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. The second section begins a three-part discussion of al-Qaida's attempts to attack London and assesses a 2004 plot to destroy several sites around the city using fertilizer-bombs. The third section continues this line of discussion by examining the July 7, 2005, suicide-attacks on the city's mass-transit system—an event related to the previous plot by shared personnel. The fourth section concludes the chapter's discussion of London-based attacks with a discussion of the failed suicide-bombings that took place on July 21, 2005—an event related to the earlier July attack through overlapping training and shared technical planning. In order to demonstrate that the trends evident in the latter 2005 attack extend into the contemporary period, the fifth section assess a failed 2009 plot to suicide-bomb the subway in New York City, before the sixth section offers some brief conclusions that speak to the need to amend the theoretical literature on al-Qaida. In an effort to ensure even cross-comparison, the topical sections of this chapter follow the same internal structure used in the previous chapter and respectively discuss each event's planning, inter-related logistics and finance, and training, before a brief summation compares the case to preceding events.

5.1 THE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, ATTACKS ON NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, D.C.

The events of September 11, 2001, are well known and require only the briefest recounting here. At Boston's Logan Airport, five hijackers—Mohammed Atta, Abdul Aziz al-Omari, Satam al-Suqami, Waleed al-Shehri, and Wail al-Shehri—boarded American Airlines flight 11, shortly before it departed for Los Angeles at 7.59am. Fifteen minutes later, another Los Angeles-bound plane, United Airlines Flight 175, also departed from Logan and carried another five hijackers: Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al-Shehri, Hamza al-Ghamdi, and Ahmed al-Ghamdi. Meanwhile, at Dulles International Airport outside Washington, D.C., a third Los Angeles-bound plane, namely American Airlines Flight 77, departed at 8.20am; onboard was a third group of hijackers: Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Khalid al-Mihdar, Majed Moqed, and Salem al-Hazmi. Finally, at 8.42am, United Airlines Flight 93 left the Newark airport bound for San Francisco; its passengers included a fourth group of hijackers: Ziad Jarrah, Saeed al-Ghamdi, Ahmed al-Haznawi, and Ahmed al-Nami.[2]

Using box-cutters and utility knives, the hijackers took-over all four flights and murdered the flight crews. Atta, al-Shehhi, Hanjour, and Jarrah placed themselves at the controls. At 8.46am, only four minutes after the Newark flight took-off, Atta piloted American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in Manhattan. Seventeen minutes later, al-Shehhi piloted United Airlines Flight 175 into the South Tower of the same building. Then, at 9.37am, Hanjour piloted American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon, and just before 10.00am, the South Tower of the World Trade Center collapsed. Only three minutes later,

[2] Federal Bureau of Investigation, "American Airlines Flight #11: Penttbomb 265A-NY-280350," (Law Enforcement Sensitive), April 19, 2002. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Investigative Summary: United Airlines Flight #175 Boeing 767," (Law Enforcement Sensitive), April 19, 2002. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Investigative Summary Penttbom: United Airlines Flight 93 256A-NY-280350," (Law Enforcement Sensitive), April 19, 2002. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), pp. 1-46. (Hereafter "9/11 Commission Report.")

Jarrah, who was likely bound for the White House, crashed United Airlines Flight 93 into a corn field outside Shanksville, PA, about 85 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, after passengers rose-up to confront the flight's other hijackers. Twenty-five minutes later, at 10.28am, the North Tower collapsed.[3] In addition to the hijackers, a total of 2996 people died in the 9/11 attacks,[4] and thousands more were injured. The coordinated strike remains the deadliest incident of non-state terrorism on record.[5]

Al-Qaida's role in the 9/11 attacks is beyond question. Despite conspiracy theorists' persistent efforts to introduce false debate,[6] official inquiries and rigorous independent investigations have provided overwhelming evidence demonstrating that al-Qaida conducted every phase of the attacks. To state the obvious: bin Laden's supporters acted as an organization to plan, finance, logistically support, and execute the 9/11 attacks. Rather than offering new evidence to support a conclusion that existing narratives have already proven beyond any shadow of a doubt, the paragraphs below offer a summary that serves as a benchmark against which to compare subsequent examples of al-Qaida hit squad attacks on the West. Essentially, it is necessary to understand the extent of organizational capability and formal structure that existed in al-Qaida at the highpoint that was 9/11 in order to scale the organizational devolution that occurred in subsequent years.

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[3] Ibid.
[4] A comprehensive list of victims is available online from Project 2,996: http://project2996.wordpress.com/we-remember/.
[5] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), "Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later," 2011; available online: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/BackgroundReport_10YearsSince9_11.pdf.
[6] For examples of baseless conspiracy theories related to 9/11, see: "The 9/11 Truth Movement," available online: 911truth.org; David Ray Griffin, *The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9/11*, (Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2004); and Alex Jones, *9-11 Descent into Tyranny: The New World Order's Dark Plans to Turn Earth inot a Prios Planet*, (Palm Desert, CA: Progressive Press, 2002).

5.1.1 PLANNING

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who claims to have managed "the 9/11 operation, from A to Z,"[7] first considered using jetliners as improvised cruise missiles circa 1995, while working with his nephew, Ramzi Yousef, on the Bojinka Plot,[8] an ambitious plan to simultaneously bomb a dozen American-flagged trans-Pacific flights using liquid-based explosives triggered by timed detonators. When Philippine authorities interrupted Bojinka by arresting a pair of co-conspirators who managed to start their Manila apartment on fire while mixing incendiary chemicals,[9] KSM began to believe that explosives were an unreliable means of attack, especially given that his nephew's explosives-based operation against the World Trade Center in 1993 had failed to bring-down the twin towers. KSM thought that perhaps planes could better serve as weapons in their own right, not just targets.[10]

He then envisioned an attack that would use commercial airliners as improvised cruise missiles, but the initial draft of this "planes operation" differed substantially from the attack that actually transpired in 2001. KSM's original plan called for the hijacking of 10 jetliners, nine of which suicide-pilots would crash into targets on both of the United States' coasts, including CIA's headquarters in suburban Virginia, the FBI's headquarters in Northwest Washington, D.C., a handful of nuclear plants around the country, and skyscrapers in both California and Washington state, as well as the sites struck on 9/11. KSM, who planned to be onboard the final plane, would then land and kill all of the adult men onboard, before delivering a speech to the

[7] Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed), Unclassified, March 10, 2007. (Hereafter "KSM Tribunal").
[8] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 153.
[9] Dale L. Watson, "Prepared statement by Dale L. Watson, Section Chief, International Terrorism Operations Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information," *Federal News Service*, February 24, 1998.
[10] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 153. See also: Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, (New York: Knopf, 2006), pp. 307-308.

global media condemning American policies in the Muslim world.[11] When KSM presented this idea to bin Laden and other high-ranking al-Qaida leaders in the 1996, their response was tepid; they believed the operation was overly complex and unrealistic.[12]

Then, in 1998, shortly after bin Laden demonstrated the depth of his commitment to battle the United States by ordering attack-teams to bomb American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the dissident Saudi began to reappraise KSM's ambitious plan. After speaking with Muhammad Atef, bin Laden scheduled a meeting with KSM in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and offered the planner the opportunity to join al-Qaida. Although KSM declined in an effort to preserve his independence—he did not formally swear *bayat* to bin Laden until after the 9/11 attacks—he did agree to move his family to Kandahar, so that he could begin working with al-Qaida to advance attacks against the United States.[13]

A watershed event in the planning of 9/11 occurred in the spring of the following year, when Atef and bin Laden formally decided to proceed with a scaled-down version of the planes operation. KSM then began working closely with the pair to refine the target list. According to KSM's version of events, the three of them were entirely responsible for these high-level planning decisions. The operation then remained a closely guarded secret; no other al-Qaida members were yet permitted a role.[14]

Later in 1999, KSM had to make a substantial adjustment to his plan, because two of the men bin Laden had hand-picked for the operation were unable to obtain visas to the United States. Consequently, KSM decided to split the operation and use the men who could not enter

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[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid, p. 153. See also: "Suspect reveals 9/11 planning," *BBC News*, September 22, 2003; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3128802.stm.
[13] USA v. Zacarias Moussaoui (Defendant), United States District Court Eastern District of Virginia Alexandria Division (Criminal No.: 01-455-A), Evidence Presented in Lieu of Testimony by KSM, date unknown. See also: KSM Tribunal.
[14] Evidence Presented in Lieu of Testimony by KSM.

the country to conduct simultaneous hijackings in East Asia. Although it relied on suicide-operatives instead of timed-detonators, this revision was strongly reminiscent of the Bojinka Plot. KSM planned for these hijackers to bomb the planes in mid-flight as they travelled across the Pacific, timing the explosions to coincide with crashes on the American east coast, in order ~~–to~~ maximize the psychological impact of the attack."[15]

However, in April or May of 2000, bin Laden vetoed the operation's East Asian portion. His decision, which emphasized the hierarchical nature of authority with al-Qaida prior to 9/11, mirrored his earlier concerns regarding KSM's initial 10-plane vision of the attack: a joint-strike on the United States and East Asia was simply too complicated. No reasonable means existed to coordinate the actions of attack-teams separated by 10 time zones.[16] With this decision, bin Laden effectively determined that the final scope of the operation would be limited to America's eastern seaboard.

As the planning of the operation moved from the strategic level to the tactical level, al-Qaida continued to be involved, and interactions continued to flow through a relatively hierarchical command structure. For example, in contrast to the flat organizational structures used in later attacks, some vital planning tasks were assigned to specialists who were not part of the final attack-team. Specifically, KSM tasked two men with aspects of reconnaissance: Dihren Barot, an Indian-born British citizen who adopted the nicknamed Abu Musa al-Hindi when he converted to Islam from Hinduism; and Walid bin Attash, a Yemeni who played a planning role in the U.S.S. Cole bombing and who was considered as a possible hijacker in the planes operation until visa problems removed him from consideration very early in the attack's planning. In August 2000, Barot reconnoitered targets in Washington, D.C., and in March of the

[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.

following year, he took a helicopter trip across Manhattan, conducted ground-level surveillance on several New York landmarks, and even shot video footage of the World Trade Center.[17] Attash, meanwhile, took a pair of flights on American-flagged jetliners in 1999 and 2000, so that he could report on airline security procedures.[18]

Finally, the hijackers became involved in planning the operational details of the attack in the final months preceding its execution. For example, Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah, who piloted three of the hijacked planes on 9/11, took cross-country reconnaissance flights in the spring of 2001. They traveled in first class, presumably to have the best possible view of cockpit operations and security procedures. Then, in the early summer, Jarrah and Hanjour paid to take specialized low-altitude instructional flights through the Hudson River corridor with pilot-trainers, so that the future hijackers would be as familiar with their routes to the World Trade Center as was possible.[19] Finally, in mid-August, Atta, Hanjour, and the muscle-hijacker al-Hazmi conducted a final round of trans-continental surveillance flights aboard Boeing 757s, the same model of plane the attack-teams targeted on September 11.[20]

Indeed, as the attacks approached the hijackers took responsibility for arguably the most important planning detail of the attack: the date of the strike. According to KSM, bin Laden twice pressured the attack-team to conduct the operation before the hijackers were fully prepared. Initially, bin Laden wanted the attacks conducted on May 12, 2001, exactly seven months after another squad of al-Qaida suicide-bombers attacked the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.

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[17] USA v. Dhiren Barot, et al (Defendants), Sealed Indictment, United States District Court Southern District of New York (05CRIM. 311), 2007; David Stringer, "Man to be sentenced in British Bomb plot," *Associated Press Online*, November 6, 2006.
[18] High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, Date Unknown, available online: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/.
[19] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 242. See also, "Hijackers conducted surveillance flights ahead of 9/11," *CNN.com*, September 27, 2002; available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2002-09-27/us/hijackers_1_hijackers-hazmi-attack-plan?_s=PM:US.
[20] Ibid, p. 248.

Then, in June or July, bin Laden heard that Ariel Sharon would be visiting the White House and urged the team to strike during the visit in the hopes of taking-out both the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Israel. However, on both occasions, KSM was able to persuade al-Qaida's *emir* that the hijackers were not yet ready, and ultimately delegated the authority to determine the exact timing of the attack to the hit squad's coordinator on-the-ground, Mohammed Atta.[21]

In mid-August, Atta set the date of the attack by contacting Ramzi Binalshib, his former roommate in Hamburg and the man that KSM appointed to serve as the communications intermediary between the hijackers in America and al-Qaida's leadership in South Asia. Because the hijackers planned to strike the Capitol building if any of their other targets in the Washington, D.C.-area proved too difficult to strike, Atta set the date to September 11 in order to make certain that Congress was back in session after its summer recess, so as to be able to inflict maximal damage.[22] Thus, even though the final timing of the attack was determined by the men on the ground, all information and planning decisions flowed through a clear chain of command.

5.1.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

Issues of money and materiel were just as tightly controlled by al-Qaida's leadership as the attack's planning. Indeed, bin Laden at times micro-managed decisions pertaining to the most important resource necessary to conduct the attack: manpower. He forced KSM to include personal favorites on the attack team, even when they were less than ideally suited to missions in the West. For example, shortly after giving the planes operation the go-ahead in 1999, bin Laden instructed KSM that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, two Saudis who had been involved with al-Qaida

[21] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 250.
[22] Ibid, p. 249. See also: Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10013 (Ramzi Bin al Shibh), United States Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 9, 2007. (Hereafter "Binalshibh tribunal").

since at least the mid-1990s, should be sent to the United States for pilot training,[23] even though neither of the pair spoke English. They would spend some time studying English in San Diego in January 2000, but the men simply had no aptitude for language, which prevented them from learning to fly and ultimately relegated the pair to _musde' roles in the planes operation.[24] Moreover, this micro-management of manpower was far from unusual; Walid bin Attash went so far as to suggest that bin Laden personally approved every member of the 2001 attack-team.[25]

While KSM was largely forced to accept the personnel he was given, he delegated final decisions regarding the implementation of manpower to Atta, who consulted with Binalshibh over the matter in early August, using coded language during a phone call, before determining the exact composition of the attack-teams. Atta then traveled to New Jersey and met with al-Hazmi, the bin Laden favorite who seems to have been granted a special role in the attack based more on his personal relationship with al-Qaida's *emir* than his qualifications, and then sent two of the muscle hijackers who had been under al-Hazmi's supervision to Miami to link-up with the other men who ultimately comprised their respective attack-teams.[26]

Beyond manpower decisions, other logistical issues were handled using al-Qaida's broad organizational capabilities. For example, by the late 1990s, the organization had established impressive document forgery capabilities. Rather than fashioning new documents from whole cloth, al-Qaida's forgers typically altered legitimate documents. Sometimes, this forgery involved switching pictures, so that individuals could travel under false names,[27] as Ramzi

[23] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 155.
[24] Ibid, pp. 217, 221-222.
[25] High Value Detainee Biographies.
[26] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 248.
[27] Ibid, p. 169.

Binalshibh did when he flew to Malaysia at KSM's direction in June 2001 to meet with members of the hijacking team.[28]

However, because the majority of al-Qaida's members were unknown to the international security community prior to 9/11, document forgery more often involved the addition and deletion of visas and immigration stamps in order to create false trails that obscured passport holders' travels to Afghanistan and other _red flag' locations.[29] Although the 9/11 hijackers traveled on their own, legitimate Saudi and Egyptian passports, the evidence suggests that forgers doctored many of these documents to contain false travel histories.[30] Thus, al-Qaida's organizational capabilities facilitated 9/11 not only by providing one of the attacks' key supporters with a false identity used in furtherance of the attacks, but also by increasing the pedigree of the travel documents the hijackers used to enter the United States.

Finally, the American-based attack-teams handled the remaining resource acquisitions necessary to complete the operation using standard consumer purchases. For example, in mid-August, the attackers bought the box-cutters and utility knives used in the hijacking from retail outlets, and later that month, Jarrah tried to buy aeronautical GPS units from a specialty shop catering to pilots. He wanted four units, no doubt to help guide each of the novice pilots to their intended targets, but for reasons that remain unclear, he was able to secure only one device, and was forced to purchase less-sophisticated aeronautical charts for the remaining pilots. The final logistical resources necessary to complete the attacks, namely the airline tickets for the targeted flights, were purchased by Atta and al-Hazmi between August 25 and September 5.[31]

[28] Ibid, p. 142.
[29] Ibid, p. 169.
[30] Ibid, p. 235.
[31] Ibid, p. 248-249.

Because the hijackers were entirely dependent on al-Qaida for funding, the organization played a crucial role every purchase made in furtherance of the 9/11 attacks. Money flowed to the attack-team through three channels. Prior to their arrival in the United States, the hijackers received some direct funding from al-Qaida. For example, in late 1999 or 2000, when Atta and the other Hamburg-based members of the attack team traveled back to Germany from Afghanistan, they each received approximately $5,000 to pay their travel expenses. Similarly, when the muscle hijackers traveled to Saudi Arabia to obtain travel documents in preparation for their entry into the United States, they each received about $2,000 in travel expenses, followed by another $10,000 payment, made through a combination of cash and traveler's checks, immediately before their departure for America.[32]

Although KSM provided some of these funds to the muscle hijackers before they left Pakistan, two Dubai-based paymasters made additional disbursements. The first was Ali al-Azia Ali (a.k.a. Ammar al-Baluchi), a nephew of KSM's who was also brother-in-law to Ramzi Yousef. Although he worked a profitable day-job for a computer wholesaler in Dubai's free trade zone, Ali had led a double-life since sometime in 1997, when he first volunteered his services to his uncle. His role in terrorism took-on larger dimensions circa 2000, when KSM sent him well-over $100,000 in cash via courier. These funds, which Ali reportedly kept stashed in a laundry bag in his home, were likely the source of some of the direct payments made to the hijackers.[33]

[32] John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, and Serena White, "Monograph on Terrorist Financing," National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, August 21, 2004, p. 132 (Appendix A). Available online: http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/index.htm

[33] Ibid, p. 134; High Value Detainee Biographies.

Ali's assistant in Dubai was Mustafa al-Hawsawi, a Saudi who had previously worked with KSM to generate *jihadist* propaganda.[34] It is not entirely clear why al-Hawsawi became involved in the 9/11 operation. The only explanation that has surfaced is somewhat surprising: Ali was apparently concerned that al-Qaida's demands on his time would negatively impact his performance at his computer job and asked his uncle to send some help. Sometime in the spring of 2001, KSM dispatched Hawsawi, apparently to fulfill his nephew's request. After May, Ali's role as logistical facilitator became secondary to his assistant's, and al-Hawsawi provided about $8,000 to the late-departing hijackers before they left the UAE for the United States.[35]

Similarly, al-Hawsawi made additional disbursements directly to the members of the attack-team when they travelled internationally in the run-up to the attack. For example, in June 2001, when Khalid al-Mihdhar traveled to Saudi Arabia via Dubai, al-Hawsawi provided the hijacker with nearly $5,000 in cash. Al-Mihdhar then used the funds to purchase travelers' checks in Saudi Arabia, before returning to the U.S. in early July.[36]

Beyond these in-person cash payments, the 9/11 attackers also received significant funds via wire transfer. Ali took the lead in these payments. Between April and September of 2000, Ali made six transfers totaling approximately $120,000 to the hijackers. The source of his funds was again the laundry bag of cash that KSM had provided earlier that year. Although al-Qaida had a documented history of transferring funds via *hawala*, an informal system of money transfer native to South Asia, all of Ali's transactions flowed through the legitimate banking system. Even when Ali transferred $70,000 in a single payment, the transactions were apparently lost in the huge sea of transfers made by Dubai's busy commercial interests. None the wire transfers

[34] High Value Detainee Biographies.
[35] Roth, et al, p. 136.
[36] Ibid.

raised any suspicion among members of the banking community in either Dubai or the United States.[37]

Binalshibh also made additional wire transfers to the hijackers in America. In total, he sent approximately $10,400 divided irregularly across four payments made between June and September of 2000. Like Ali, Binalshibh made all of these transfers via the legitimate banking system, though the sources of funds differed. Rather than Ali's bag of cash, Binalshibh obtained the monies from a bank account that he shared with al-Shehhi in Germany's Dresdner Bank.

It seems likely that the account had been filled via legitimate means. Until December 2000, al-Shehhi received a stipend from the UAE military to fund the education that he had abandoned in Germany.[38] Thus, it seems that, in small part, the 9/11 hijackers obtained funding by perverting legitimate sources of income.

Binalshibh also made two transfers totaling $10,000 to Zacarias Moussaoui, using funds that he obtained from al-Hawsawi, who presumably drew the money from Ali's bag of cash before wiring the funds from the UAE to Germany.[39] However, the extent to which these funds constituted an expenditure in furtherance of the 9/11 attacks is open to debate. KSM has insisted that he never intended for Moussaoui to take part in the September attacks; instead, Moussaoui was slated to pilot an aircraft during a second wave of attacks against America's West Coast scheduled for sometime in 2002. In an effort to circumvent airline security, KSM planned to use operatives that either held Western passports (Moussaoui was a French citizen) or that did not have a Middle Eastern appearance (KSM worked with Jemaah Islamiyah to select several East Asian hijackers from the organization's ranks). However, the attack was scrapped as infeasible

[37] Ibid, p. 135.
[38] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 162.
[39] Roth, et al, p. 136.

when airports implemented stricter security protocols in the aftermath of 9/11.[40] Though the difference may be excessively fussy, it seems that Binalshibh's transfers to Moussaoui supported this aborted "second wave" rather than the 9/11 attacks.

Beyond wire transfers, the hijackers received a smaller amount of money via deposits made into overseas bank accounts. Specifically, Hanjour received about $10,000 via two accounts he held with bank branches in the Middle East: one at the Saudi-British Bank in Saudi Arabia, and the other at Citibank in the UAE. Ali provided start-up funds for these accounts and replenished them on at least one occasion, after Hanjour drew them down by withdrawing funds via US-based ATMs.[41]

Similarly, Banihammad, one of the muscle hijackers onboard the flight that crashed into the south tower of the World Trade Center, opened a pair of accounts at the UAE's Standard Charter Bank. He deposited the equivalent of about $30,000 in local currency. Since Banihammadi had the money with him when he entered the UAE in June 2001, the funds presumably came directly from KSM. Al-Hawsawi was a co-signer on the accounts and bolstered Banihammadi's funds on at least one occasion, depositing nearly $5,000 into the accounts in August 2001. Like Hanjour, Banihammadi accessed these accounts via ATM, but he also had a Visa check-card linked directly to them; it was used to purchase two of the hijackers' plane tickets, as well as to pay a portion of the hotel expenses the hijackers incurred in the days immediately preceding the attacks.[42]

With the partial exception of Nawaf al-Hazmi, who spent about a month working as a gas station attendant for a wage of six dollars per hour, none of the 9/11 hijackers worked during their time in the United States, in either the licit or illicit economies. Similarly, except for the

[40] Ibid; High Value Detainee Biographies; Evidence Presented in Lieu of KSM's Testimony.
[41] Roth, et al, p. 138.
[42] Ibid.

student stipend that al-Shehhi drew from the UAE, none of the attackers received any monies from foreign governments. Finally, there is no evidence to support the oft-cited assertion[43] that a Madrid-based al-Qaida cell led by radical cleric Imad Barakat Yarkas (a.k.a. Abu Dahdah) provided any funding to the 9/11 hijackers.[44] Thus, it seems that the entire cost of the 9/11 attacks, which official inquiries estimate at between $400,000 and $500,000, was borne by the core of bin Laden's organization.[45]

Although investigators know a fair amount about al-Qaida's means of financial support circa 2001, they have been unable to identify any revenue streams that specifically funded the 9/11 attacks. Briefly, the organization's budget in the years immediately preceding 9/11 was approximately $30 million annually,[46] and these monies came almost entirely from the corruption of charitable donations. In some cases, most notably al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, entire charities were complicit in terrorist finance from the top down. In other instances, corrupt officers of charities acted at the local level to divert funds to al-Qaida. Similarly, imams of some radical mosques in the Middle East (and perhaps also elsewhere) diverted funds that congregants donated as *zakat*, a type of religious tithing obligatory for all devout Muslims. Because Islamic charitable contributions increase dramatically during the holy month of *Ramadan*, al-Qaida's funding was somewhat cyclical. This annual pattern required the organization to budget to a certain extent, but there is no evidence that it maintained large stores

[43] "Spanish authorities tie suspects to key figures in U.S. hijackings," CNN.com, November 20, 2001; James Auger," Suspected leader of Al-Qaida in Europe Denies Accusations in Spanish Court," World Market Analysis, April 27, 2005; Al Goodman, "Madrid charge for 9/11 suspect," CNN.com, May 6, 2005.
[44] Roth, et al, p. 132.
[45] Ibid, p. 143.
[46] Ibid, p. 20.

of surplus cash. Instead, al-Qaida's finances were largely hand-to-mouth, and money went out the door soon after coming-in.[47]

This reality stands in stark contrast to the enduring public conception that bin Laden, and by extension al-Qaida, held millions of dollars in savings. Although bin Laden's family remains among the wealthiest in the world,[48] the dissident Saudi lost his personal fortune years before the 9/11 attacks. The Saudi Government had forced his family to cut him off in 1994, and his remaining funds were lost two years later, when Hasan al-Turabi's government expropriated bin Laden's business interests in the Sudan after expelling al-Qaida from the country.[49] Similarly, despite persistent rumors of al-Qaida involvement in illicit enterprises, including narcotics trafficking and diamond smuggling,[50] official inquiries, which reviewed ~~s~~some of the most sensitive information held by the U.S. government," ultimately concluded that ~~s~~such theories cannot be substantiated."[51] Therefore, a fairly clear line, albeit a broken one, led from the systemic corruption of Islamic charities to the deaths caused by the 9/11 hijackers.

5.1.3 TRAINING

As with planning, logistics, and finance, al-Qaida, as an organization, was responsible for training the men responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Although several of the muscle hijackers had previous experience in *jihad*, they received additional specialized training in preparation for the 9/11 attacks. This stint of instruction began in the fall of 1999, when several men hand-picked by bin Laden attended what the 9/11 commission called, ~~a~~an elite training course at al Qaeda's

[47] Ibid, p. 19.
[48] For a superb history of the family's financial fortunes, see Steve Coll, *The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century*, (New York: Penguin, 2008).
[49] Roth, et al, p. 20. See also, Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), pp. 252-253.
[50] See, for example, Edward Harris, "AP Exclusive: Al-Qaida fugitives found diamonds, shelter in Liberia, U.N. court says," *Associated Press*, June 1, 2004; Edward Harris, "AP Enterprise: Al-Qaida bought diamonds ahead of Sept. 11 attacks, U.N. investigators told," *Associated Press*, August 7, 2004.
[51] Roth, et al, p. 19.

Mes Aynak camp in Afghanistan,"[52] but according to KSM this training was more of a slightly more rigorous version of the organization's standard boot camp, not a special training session for 9/11. Many Mes Aynak graduates would go-on to participate in prominent al-Qaida operations other than 9/11, including the U.S.S. Cole attack.[53]

For a handful of select graduates of the camp, more specialized training followed in Karachi, Pakistan, where KSM personally instructed trainees in preparation for the planes operation. During a two-week course, he taught the trainees much of what they would need to know to survive in the West. Topics included: rudimentary English, how to book travel reservations, and how to rent accommodations. Most tellingly, the training also included instruction about how to conduct surveillance onboard flights, and KSM used video game-based flight simulators to try to familiarize the trainees with the layout and function of different types of commercial planes.[54] However, visa problems precluded some of the graduates of these specialized training sessions from actually participating in the attacks. The final attack-team was not set until mid-to-late 2000, at which point the muscle hijackers received even more specialized training.

After acquiring the necessary travel documents, the men who would actively conduct the 9/11 attacks received instruction from Abu Turab al-Jordani, the son-in-law of Ayman al-Zawahiri and one of the few men who knew the full details of the planned attack.[55] Abu Turab's course emphasized specific techniques in close-quarters combat; he taught various means to neutralize armed opponents, in case the hijackers encountered any air marshals, and he instructed the men in weight-training, presumably so they would be strong enough to overpower most

[52] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 156.
[53] Ibid, pp. 156-157.
[54] Ibid, pp. 157-158. See also, Verbatim Transcript of Open Session Combat Status Review Tirbunal Hearing for ISN 10014 (Walid bin Attash), Unclassified, March 12, 2007.
[55] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 527, note 108.

airline passengers. KSM claims that Abu Turab went so far as to make the trainees butcher camels and sheep to increase the men's comfort and familiarity with knives.[56]

Now in possession of the semi-specialized skills necessary to take-over an airplane, the muscle hijackers progressed to their last stop before the United States: Dubai. In addition to his logistical and financial role, Ali gave the men one final shot of training on Western life before sending them onward. He guided them through the process of buying airline tickets. He taught them how to use traveler's checks, how to order at fast-food outlets, and how to wear Western-style clothing.[57] With these final interactions, the muscle hijackers were effectively trained—a process that involved al-Qaida at every turn.

Given the highly specialized knowledge required to pilot a plane, it is little surprise that the four men who assumed the controls on 9/11 followed a different training trajectory than the muscle hijackers. Three of the pilots, Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah, arrived in Pakistan in November 1999, from Hamburg, Germany, alongside Binalshibh. The foursome's original intent had been to fight as *mujahideen* in Chechnya, but an al-Qaida facilitator in Germany convinced the men that heightened border controls had made it too difficult to cross into Russian territory and directed the men to South Asia instead. After undergoing a standard vetting procedure, which included a questionnaire regarding the recruit's language skills and willingness to serve as a martyr, the men caught the eye of Muhammad Atef. They stood-out because of their familiarity with the West and fluency in English.[58] The men were soon introduced to bin Laden, who extended them an offer to serve as suicide-operatives, and after formally pledging

[56] Ibid, p. 235-236.
[57] Roth, et al, p. 137.
[58] The 9/11 Commission Report describes the standard vetting process and Atef's role therein on page 234. His role in identifying the Hamburg recruits is supposition based on this information.

their loyalty to al-Qaida, they were sent to Karachi to meet KSM. Shortly thereafter, they began to make preparations for pilot training.[59]

The most important step was obtaining travel documents. Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah entered the U.S. on tourist visas in late June and early July of 2000, and quickly settled into flight-training programs. Specifically, Atta and al-Shehhi studied at Huffman Aviation in Venice, Florida, while Jarrah studied at the Florida Flight Training Center (FFTC), another Venice-based instructional program. Binalshibh had intended to join him at the FFTC, but proved unable to obtain the necessary entrance visas, despite repeated attempts. Thus, given his close ties to the other three pilots, he settled into a logistical role almost by default and thereafter served as a go-between that facilitated contact between al-Qaida's leadership in South Asian and the American-based pilots.[60]

Meanwhile, Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah continued their training, and by mid-August, all three had passed basic flight exams. As they began to take the more advanced courses necessary to pilot multi-engine aircraft, Atta and al-Shehhi petitioned the State Department to convert their tourist visas to student visas and transferred to Jones Aviation, a school located about 20 miles north of Venince, in Sarasota, Florida. However, the men performed poorly at Jones; instructors remember them as exceptionally rude and overly aggressive. After failing a more advanced set of pilot examinations, they returned to Huffman for additional training. In the interim, Jarrah had traveled back to Germany to visit his girlfriend—one of several such trips he made during run-up to the attack—but soon returned to Florida and continued his training. By the end of November, Jarrah obtained his commercial pilot's license; Atta and al-Shehhi would follow suit

[59] Binalshibh tribunal; High Value Detainee Biographies.
[60] 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 224-227. See also, "The Pilot," *CBC News: The Fifth Estate*, January 19, 2005; available online: http://www.cbc.ca/fifth/thepilot/story.html.

a month later, and as 2000 drew to a close, all three men began training to fly large commercial jets at various flight simulation centers in Florida.[61]

Although al-Qaida did not provide this training directly, the organization's hand in the process was evident in Atta, al-Shehhi, and Jarrah's financial histories. The three used monies wired from Ali to pay for both these initial training sessions, as well as for a handful of subsequent training flights. For example, in addition to the instructor-assisted flights that the men made through the Hudson Valley Corridor in the summer of 2001, Atta and al-Shehhi also rented a single-engine plane in Decatur, Georgia, where they flew with a private instructor in January 2001.[62] Given the clear financial links between Ali and KSM, there is no question that al-Qaida financed every aspect of these three men's pilot training.

The fourth pilot, Hanjour, was a serendipitous find for al-Qaida. He followed a circuitous path to become a suicide-pilot. After briefly working for an Afghan _relief' agency as a teenager during the last days of the Soviet-Afghan War, Hanjour applied to a Saudi flight school, but was rejected. In 1996, he briefly studied at flight schools in Florida, California, and Arizona, only to return home unaccredited. He made a more serious attempt the following year, and obtained his commercial license in April 1999. However, he was apparently unable to find work, and after lying to his family about a new job with an Emirati airline, he returned to Afghanistan in the fall of 2000,[63] only to be discovered when Atef reviewed a pile of the standard screening questionnaires al-Qaida used to evaluate potential recruits.[64] Thus, circumstance provided a replacement for Binalshibh shortly after he failed to obtain the entrance visa necessary to train as a pilot in the United States, and with the exception of Hanjour, al-Qaida

[61] Ibid.
[62] 9/11 Commission Report, p. 229.
[63] Ibid, pp. 224-225.
[64] Ibid, p. 234.

was either directly or financially responsible for providing all of the direct participants in the 9/11 attacks with the skill sets necessary to conduct the hijackings.

5.1.4 SUMMATION

Although it is important to avoid hyperbole so that al-Qaida's members do not appear to have functioned with the ruthless efficiency of Professor Moriarty or a James Bond villain, it is clear that bin Laden's organization was both highly capable and well-organized circa 2001. As demonstrated by Ali and Hawsawi's roles as financiers, Barot and Attash's roles as conductors of surveillance, and the respective roles of the pilots and muscle hijackers on the day of the attack, operatives held specialized functions. They often received focused training in order to fulfill these roles, and a higher-level manager orchestrated and administrated over these specialists' actions. In the 9/11 attacks, KSM filled this position with significant assistance from Binalshibh, who served as his go-between with the attack-team in the United States. As best demonstrated by bin Laden's ability to impose his personnel decisions on KSM, top-level leaders held ultimate authority over the operation and closely managed several details of the operation. Although the field operatives held increasing autonomy as the operation neared execution—this fact is best demonstrated by the fact that Atta, not bin Laden, set the final date of the attack—authority within al-Qaida was carefully and clearly delegated. Moreover, as Atta's communications with Binalshibh demonstrate, communications continued to flow up a fairly clear chain-of-command throughout the operation.

None of these conclusions should suggest that al-Qaida operated absent dysfunction. Indeed, bin Laden decreased the efficacy of the attack-team by insisting that it include several individuals who lacked the language skills necessary to excel in an American-based operation. But on the whole, the organization operated as a reasonably efficient, fairly hierarchical

bureaucracy at the time of the 9/11 attacks. However, by 2004, when the organization began to deploy hit squads to attack London, this pattern would begin to devolve.

5.2 THE 2004 FERTILIZER BOMB PLOT AGAINST LONDON

In March 2004, British police made several arrests in London. The suspects, all men of Pakistani origin, were accused of plotting to attack sites around London using fertilizer bombs.[65] It soon became evident that the scope of their plot was international. Other arrests related to the plot were made in New York[66] and Canada.[67] Because the suspect detained in American soon began cooperating with the authorities, the full extent of al-Qaida's involvement in the plot rapidly became clear.[68]

While bin Laden's organization had conceptualized, staffed, and supported the 9/11 attacks in full, al-Qaida played a more limited, though still strong, role in the 2004 plot. In terms of specifics, al-Qaida lacked a substantial role the plot's staffing, because the attack-team came to al-Qaida ready-made, when a group of like-minded British extremists showed-up en masse at a South Asian training camp. Similarly, the idea for the attack seems to have originated with the plotters, who also orchestrated the attack's planning at the tactical level. However, bin Laden's organization provided the 2004 plotters with the skills and materiel necessary to conduct the

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[65] Sophie Goodchild, "Iraq and Terror: Five remanded on terrorism charges return to court this week," *Independent on Sunday*, April 11, 2004.
[66] R v. Omar Khyam and Others, Royal Courts of Justice (Case No.: 2007/02682 C5), Appeal, July 23, 2008. (Hereafter "Khyam appeal").
[67] "The Canadian Connection," *Globe and Mail* (Canada), May 1, 2007.
[68] Given that the cooperator, Mohammed Junaid Babar, served only about four-and-a-half years in prison before being released in December 2010, for providing "substantial" and "extraordinary" information to the FBI, some observers have speculated that he may have worked as a government informant prior to his arrest, but American authorities strenuously deny this allegation. Ravi Somaiya and William K. Rashbaum, "British Anger Over Release of Man Linked to Bombs," *New York Times*, February 15, 2011; available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/16/world/europe/16babar.html?_r=1. For the details of Babar's cooperation, see: USA v. Mohammed Junaid Babar (Defendant), Allocution, United States District Court Southern District of New York, June 3, 2004. (Hereafter "Babar allocution").

bombing, by training the attack-team at a Waziristan-based camp and by acquiring key supplies on the attack-team's behalf. Consequently, this case begins to suggest that al-Qaida's pattern of involvement in hit squad attacks on the West largely mirrored the diffusion and lack of direct control evident in non-Western attacks from 2002 forward.

However, the parallels between al-Qaida's Western and non-Western attacks are limited. Although the 2004 team ultimately failed to complete its operation, it would be incorrect to assert that the quality of al-Qaida's Western hit squads had depreciated between 2001 and 2004 to the same degree seen in the organization's operations in 1998 and 2002 in East Africa, because the 2004 plotters had all of the technical skills necessary to pull-off the attack. Therefore, this case suggests that the effects of the Global War on Terrorism were slower to take effect on al-Qaida's Western hit squads than on the organization's non-Western operations.

5.2.1 PLANNING

It is difficult to determine precisely when the fertilizer plot against London was first conceptualized, because long before mission-based planning began, Omar Khyam, the plot's central leader, had several formative interactions with *jihadists* and spent years assembling a social-circle comprised of like-minded extremists. This long path to *jihad* began in the early 1990s, when Khyam was about 11 year-old, and his father walked-out on the family. Although Khyam's household had previously been only nominally Muslim, the pressures of serving as ―the man of the house" led Khyam toward puritanical interpretations of morality. For example, he soon forbade his brother, Shujah Mahmood, who was five years Khyam's junior, from attending the local swimming pool for fear that he would see women clad only in bikinis.[69]

[69] ―Profile: Omar Khyam," *BBC News*, April 30, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149794.stm.

By 1998, when Khyam was 17, his religious devotion was overt. He prayed five times daily and began attending meetings of al-Muhajiroun, an organization that sought to establish an Islamic caliphate[70] and which has since been banned in Britain for advocating violence.[71] During these initial forays into fundamentalism, Khyam first met Waheed Mahmood, a 26 year-old British citizen of Pakistani descent who shared his affinity for al-Muhajiroun, and who would join Khyam's attack-team years later.[72]

Similarly, in 2000, a chance meeting during a religious lecture held at the Luton Mosque, about 25 miles north of London, caused Khyam to meet another of his future co-conspirators, namely Salahuddin Amin. Then about 25 years old, Amin was a somewhat unlikely *jihadist*. He had been born in London, but raised in Pakistan, before returning to the country of his birth at age 16 for post-secondary education, at which point he picked-up many of the local culture's _bad' habits. He drank alcohol, dated women, and played both cricket and soccer throughout his college years. Amin started to lean toward fundamentalism only in 1999, after becoming angry about the treatment of Muslims in Indian-dominated Kashmir.[73] Ultimately, it is clear that Amin, Khyam, and Mahmood shared a radical viewpoint by the turn of the millennium, but it is not clear that they had already begun to conceptualize a strike against London.

Khyam's personal history suggests that other, more recent additions to his circle of friends were made with the idea of waging a terrorist attack specifically in mind. In the summer of 2000, Khyam told his family that he was taking a school-related trip to France and then secretly journeyed to Pakistan instead. He spent three months receiving training from Kashmiri

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[70] "UK terror plot: The five found guilty yesterday: Portrait of an extremist cell," *The Guardian* (London), May 1, 2007.
[71] "UK to ban controversial Islamist group," *CNN.com*, January 10, 2010; available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-10/world/uk.islamist.ban_1_anjem-choudary-ban-british-muslim?_s=PM:WORLD.
[72] "Profile: Waheed Mahmood," *BBC News*, April 30, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149800.stm. See also: "The Canadian Connection."
[73] "UK terror plot: The five found guilty yesterday Portrait of an extremist cell." See also: "Profile: Salahuddin Amin," *BBC News*, April 30, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149790.stm.

militants before returning home.[74] A similar trip followed the next year, when Khyam headed-off to Afghanistan and spent a brief time with the Taliban.[75] He began to collect aspiring *jihadist* shortly after returning from this second trip.

Specifically, at another radical lecture held in 2002, Khyam encountered Anthony Garcia, a 22 year-old who had been born Rahman Benouis in Algeria. His family immigrated to Britain when Garcia was a child, and he changed his name in his teens in the hopes of advancing his male-modeling career. Like Amin, Garcia eschewed religion during his teenage years, preferring to spend his time drinking and club-hopping with his predominantly white friends, until he followed his older brother into Islam in 1998 or 1999.[76]

Also in 2002, one of Khyam's housemates introduced him to Mohammad Momin Khawaja,[77] a Canadian computer engineer of Pakistani origin who later used his mastery of electronics to build explosive-detonators for the British team.[78] The final addition to Khyam's circle of associates came the following year, when Khyam met Jawad Akbar, a Pakistani native who had lived in Italy at a child before moving to Britain with his family at age 8. Now about 20, Akbar studied mathematics and technical design at West London's Brunel University, while attending Islamist political groups in his spare time.[79] Thus, Khyam had assembled a collection of like-minded fundamentalists before ever formally associating with al-Qaida, and given their

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[74] "Timeline: Operation Crevice," *BBC News*, April 30, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6207348.stm.
[75] "The Canadian Connection."
[76] "Profile: Anthony Garcia," *BBC News*, April 30, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149798.stm.
[77] "UK fertiliser bomb plot," *BBC News*, date unknown; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457032/html/nn1page2.stm.
[78] "The Canadian Connection." See also, "Khawaja: The Canadian connection," *BBC News*, March 12, 2009; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6152440.stm.
[79] "Profile: Jawad Akbar," *BBC News*, April 30, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149788.stm.

ideological persuasion, it seems likely that this social-circle at least toying explored the idea of martyrdom during ‗casual' conversations about politics and religion.

Their interest in the subject became explicit in the early spring of 2003. By that time, the plotters had moved to Pakistan, and they re-assembled at the house where Waheed Mahmood had begun living in Gujar Khan, just outside of Indian-controlled Kashmir. The host suggested that they could contribute to *jihad* by bombing London, and after agreeing to the idea, he and his friends decided to advance the nascent plan by undertaking terror-training.[80] Thus, the plotters' decision to attack London seems to have caused them to fall into direct contact with al-Qaida, rather than the other way around, and Khyam's social circle shaped seems to have shaped its training to the mission, without the same type of active guidance that KSM and other senior members of bin Laden's organization provided to the 9/11 hijackers.

Moreover, the evidence suggests that the British team was entirely responsible for selecting the specific targets of the attack, because audio surveillance tapes made by British police in February 2004 recorded the plotters as they debated where to strike. Khyam favored bombing infrastructure targets in order to mitigate Londoners' access to critical supplies,[81] and given that Mahmood once worked for a contractor that maintained Britain's national gas and electric grids,[82] it seems likely that the team had the insider knowledge necessary to mount a legitimate strike on the country's utilities. Meanwhile, Akbar favored bombing ‗immoral' targets like dance clubs, because it would be easy to gain access by taking a low-level job at a

[80] ―UK fertiliser bomb plot."
[81] Quoted in ―London club ‗bombing plan' taped," *BBC News*, May 25, 2006; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5016274.stm.
[82] ―Profile: Waheed Mahmood."

club, and because, in his words, —thoseslags dancing around" deserved to die for their indecency.[83]

It remains unclear if the team ever reached a firm targeting decision before arrests broke-up the plot, but since these debates took place after the team came back from South Asia, they clearly lacked specific tactical instructions from al-Qaida's leadership. In short, the 2004 plot was conceived before the plotters trained with bin Laden's organization, and the details were planned at home, after the plotters returned from Pakistan. It seems probably that bin Laden's organization shaped aspects of the attack during the plotters' training, but this role was qualitatively different and far less pronounced than al-Qaida's tight control over the planning of the 9/11 attacks.

5.2.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

However, conclusions regarding the plotters' independent planning should not suggest that bin Laden's organization lacked an important role in the plot; the logistical support that Khyam's team received from al-Qaida demonstrates that London had become a priority target for the organization by 2003. This support began with Nashwan _Abd al-Razzaq _Abd al-Baqi (a.k.a. Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi),[84] a former major in the Iraqi army whose ties to al-Qaida extended to the organization's highest levels: prior to 9/11, he had served on al-Qaida's military committee, and he was so well-regarded within the organization that he was once personally tasked with Ayman al-Zawahiri's care and safe-keeping.[85] Al-Baqi's specific role in Khyam's plot was to direct Mohammed Junaid Babar, a Pakistani-born American citizen who procured

[83] Quoted in —London club _bombing plan' taped," *BBC News*, May 25, 2006; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5016274.stm.
[84] Jane Perlez and Elaine Sciolino, "5 Britons guilty in Bomb plot; Tied to 2005 London Attackers," *New York Times*, May 1, 2007.
[85] U.S. Department of Defense, Biographical Notes on _Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, April 2007; available online: http://www.defense.gov/news/Apr2007/d20070427hvd.pdf,

materiel for al-Qaida in South Asia, to obtain ammonium nitrate fertilizer and aluminum powder, two common ingredients in improvised explosive devices, in preparation for the London attack.[86] Although Babar was unable to locate the fertilizer, he obtained the aluminum powder without incident,[87] and British police later found it in the possession of Khyam, who apparently brought the material back to Britain in his luggage.[88] Thus, the evidence demonstrates that a clear trail links high-ranking members of al-Qaida to one of the bomb-plot's key materiel inputs.

Individuals affiliated with al-Baqi also seem to have played a secondary logistical role, by introducing Khyam to other like-minded Londoners, who then provided the team with logistical assistance. Specifically, Babar testified that al-Baqi gave orders to Mohammed Quayyum Khan (a.k.a. "Q"), a part-time cab driver based in near-by Luton, who was reportedly instrumental in bringing Omar Bakri Mohammed, the founder of al-Muhajiroun, to the Luton Mosque.[89] Given Khyam and Mahmood's one-time connection to Omar Bakri's organization, Quayyum Khan may have played an early role in their indoctrination into fundamentalist Islam.

It is, however, clearer that Quayyum Khan introduced Khyam to Mohammed Sidique Khan,[90] a teacher's aide in the London schools, who shared Khyam's radical views, and who would gain dubious renown in 2005 for suicide-bombing the London Underground.[91] Quayyum Khan claims to have known the pair only as the result of an unsuccessful effort to establish an

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[86] Babar allocution.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Khyam appeal.
[89] Ian Cobain and Jeevan Vasagar, "Free – the man accused of being an al-Qaida leader, aka 'Q,'" *The Guardian* (London), April 30, 2007; available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/may/01/politics.topstories3.
[90] Ibid. See also, Duncan Gardham, "Bomb plotters' al-Qa'eda 'link' still in Britain," *The Telegraph* (London), May 1, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1550210/Bomb-plotters-al-Qaeda-link-still-in-Britain.html.
[91] House of Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, Report No.: HC 1087, May 11, 2006. (Hereafter "House of Commons Report"). See also, Hamida Ghafour, "Probe of British bombers provided little comfort; Suspects' backgrounds seemed 'unexceptional,'" Globe and Mail (Canada), June 6, 2006, and Neville Dean, "The London Bombings - What we know so far," *Press Association*, July 19, 2005. For information on the icepacks, see: The Rt. Hon Lady Justice Hallet DBE, Coroner's Inquest into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005, Report under Rule 43 of the Coroner's Rules 1984, May 6, 2011. (Hereafter "Coroner's Report").

Islamic charity to benefit the needy in Pakistan, but the extent and nature of Sidique Khan's subsequent logistical interactions with Khyam belie this claim, though it is worth noting that British investigators were never able to pin any meaningful charges on Quayyum Khan.[92]

Specifically, in February 2004, Sidique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, a 22 year-old British citizen of Pakistani origin who Sidique Khan had come to know through camping trips and other _youth counseling' activities, and who would later serve as another of the suicide-bombers in the July 7, 2005, attacks on London,[93] ran errands around the city alongside Khyam. The trio's stops included an Internet café, where they downloaded *jihadist* propaganda, and a hardware store, where they presumably investigated the acquisition of supplies for the impending fertilizer bombing.[94] That same month, Sidique Khan was also present at a meeting that Khyam, Mahmood, and Akbar held with the Canadian technical expert, Khawaja.[95] In short, the evidence suggests that Sidique Khan and Tanweer logistically supported Khyam's bombing attempt.

With this pair's assistance, Khyam's team made significant progress toward conducting an attack. Garcia had acquired nearly half a ton of fertilizer,[96] which they stored in a storage unit that Akbar's step-cousin, Nabeel Hussain, unwittingly rented on Khyam's behalf.[97] Moreover, the team was still in possessing of the aluminum powder they had acquired from Babar. After receiving a telephone call from a suspicious employee at the storage unit, the police were able to surreptitiously replace the plotters' fertilizer with an inert substitute,[98] but, even if only briefly, Khaym's team had acquired the majority of the components necessary to build a large bomb.

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[92] Gardham, "Bomb plotters' al-Qa'eda _link' still in Britain."
[93] "Profile: Shehzad Tanweer," *BBC News*, July 6, 2006; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762313.stm.
[94] "The Canadian Connection."
[95] "The Canadian Connection." See also, "Khawaja: The Canadian connection."
[96] Khyam appeal. For Garcia's specific role, see: "UK fertiliser bomb plot."
[97] "Profile: Nabeel Hussain," *BBC News*, April 30, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149792.stm.
[98] "Chronology-The British fertilizer bomb plot," *Reuters*, April 30, 2007; available online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/04/30/us-britain-trial-chronology-idUSL2559097320070430.

Thus, the logistics of the operation ultimately demonstrate that this was a viable plot that posed a meaningful threat to London.

The record has remained silent on the plot's specific sources of funding, but assessing the cost of fertilizer demonstrates that the plot, while dangerous, required little, if any, financial support from abroad. Because different crops require different nourishment, the nitrogen content of commercially available fertilizers varies depending on purpose. Cost varies accordingly, but none of the options are particularly expensive.[99] Circa 2004, prices ranged between $160 per ton for fertilizer with a nitrogen concentration of 21 percent, to $250 per ton for fertilizer with a nitrogen concentration of 46 percent.[100] Thus, if the plotters opted for the more expensive, more concentrated fertilizer, they would have been able to purchase the key chemical component of their bomb for approximately $125. Given that the aluminum powder came to the team free of cost via Babar's efforts, and given that the team's other expenses, such as storage space, were minimal, the evidence suggests that the entire operation could have been conducted for under $1,000.

Even if this estimate is off by a factor of five, the plotters would have been able to pay for the attack on their own using savings and lines of credit. It is certainly possible that an al-Qaida leader handed the plotters a wad of cash before they departed Pakistan, but there is no reason to make *a priori* assumptions about al-Qaida's role in the plot's funding. Ultimately, the low cost of the operation dictates that the plotters were likely financially independent of al-Qaida or any other outside organization.

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[99] Interview with confidential informant working in the agricultural consulting industry, conducted February 2012, Moline, IL.

[100] Thomas Obreza, et al, "Nitrogen Fertilizer Sources: What does the future hold for citrus producers?" Soil and Water Science Department, Florida Cooperative Extension Service, Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida, February 2009; available online: http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/ss457. See also: Keith Oellig, Testimony before the Resources Subcommittee0020on Energy and Minerals, United States House of Representatives, November 17, 2005; available online from the Pennsylvania Farm Bureau: http://naturalresources.house.gov/UploadedFiles/OelligTestimony11.17.05.pdf.

5.2.3 TRAINING

As with aspects of the plot's logistics, al-Qaida's hand was evident in the team's training. When Khyam and Sidique Khan departed for Pakistan in 2003 (it is not clear if they traveled together or on separate occasions), Quayyum Khan, the British-based subordinate of al-Qaida leader Nashwan al-Baqi, reportedly arranged to have someone meet them at the airport in Karachi.[101] Moreover, in 2003, Mohammed Junaid Babar, the fixer who also worked for Nashwan al-Baqi, helped to establish a training facility in Malakand, Pakistan, where Khyam, Garcia, Mahmood, Amin, and Akbar trained after deciding to attack the United Kingdom during the planning meeting at Mahmood's home.[102]

They were soon joined by Khawaja and Sidique Khan, as well as Shujah Mahmood, Khyam's now 16 year-old brother, who was so naïve that he expected that *jihadist* training ~~w~~would be marshmallows and the whole camping thing," and so ill-prepared for the rigors of the experience that he spent every night in tears, literally crying for his mother.[103] Therefore, although Khyam had training ties to other organization by virtue of his earlier time in Kashmir and Afghanistan, and although Tanweer did not attend the Malakand camp, it is abundantly clear that al-Qaida provided the 2004 plotters with the knowledge necessary fulfill their vision of *jihad*.

5.2.4 SUMMATION

Although the 9/11 attacks were successful and the 2004 plot failed when police interrupted it, there are no grounds to conclude that Khyam's team was of appreciably lower quality than its predecessor. Shujah Mahmood, who British courts ultimately acquitted of all

[101] Gardham, ~~B~~omb plotters' al-Qa'eda _link' still in Britain."
[102] Ibid. See also, Perlez and Sciolino.
[103] Quoted in, ~~P~~rofile: Shujah Mahmood," *BBC News*, April 30, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6149796.stm.

terror charges,[104] was admittedly hapless, but then the limited language skills of several of the 9/11 hijackers demonstrate that they were poorly equipped for a mission in the West, and Khyam's associates also include a mathematician and a computer engineer. Simply put, Khyam's team had the technical skills and the materiel necessary to complete the attack. Rather than the sort of degradation of quality evidenced in the differences between the 1998 embassy bombing-team and the 2002 Mombasa team, the 2004 attempt to bomb London failed because alert staff members at the storage center where the team stashed their fertilizer became concerned and phoned the police, thereby initiating the chain of events that led to the plotters' arrest.[105]

While the quality of the teams used in the 2001 and 2004 operations did not degrade, the nature of their respective relationships to al-Qaida did. Al-Qaida provided direct logistical and training support to Khyam's team and thus remained strongly involved in the 2004 plot, but the extent of this role was less than in the 9/11 attacks. Khyam's attack-team demonstrated significant aspects of self-organization and attempted the attack without the same degree of high-level guidance bin Laden and KSM provided to the 9/11 hijackers by personally planning several aspects of the 2001 attack. Thus, Khaym's plot suggests that al-Qaida's control over its Western hit squad had begun to break down; al-Qaida was no longer the bureaucratic hierarchy that existed circa 2001.

Moreover, the nature of the 2004 plotter's relationship with al-Qaida was fundamentally different than that of their predecessors. Like the 1998 embassy-bombers, the 9/11 hijackers largely took direction from a hierarchical chain of command. The 2004 team, by comparison, seems to have viewed al-Qaida more as a means to an end. Khyam, who assembled and led the team, already had existing relationships with other extremist groups, by virtue of his time with

[104] Ibid.
[105] Chris Summers and Dominic Casciani, "Fertiliser bomb plot: The story," *BBC News,* April 30, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6153884.stm.

Kashmiri militants and the Taliban, so it seems a stretch to assert that he found the ideology of bin Laden and al-Qaida uniquely appealing. Moreover, the plot's key strategic decision, namely the resolution to attack the United Kingdom, seems to have taken place independent of al-Qaida's direct influence. Therefore, the relationship between Khyam's team and bin Laden's organization was ultimately somewhat akin to that between a contractor and a client. However, because Sidique Khan and Tanweer, both of whom escaped arrest when investigators dismissed them as minor hangers-on rather than dangerous terrorists,[106] went-on to complete a suicide-attack against London that was more closely linked to al-Qaida, this case also demonstrates that bin Laden's organization was capable of stubborn strategic resolve, even as the extent of al-Qaida's control over operatives waned.

5.3 THE JULY 7, 2005, LONDON BOMBINGS

A little after 7.30 on the morning of July 7, 2005, four young men entered the Luton railway station and boarded a train bound for London, about 30 miles to the south. Three of them, 30 year-old Mohammed Sidique Khan, 22 year-old Shehzad Tanweer, and 18 year-old Hasib Hussain, were British-born Muslims of Pakistani descent. The fourth man, 19 year-old Jermaine Lindsay, was a Jamaican-born British citizen of African descent, who converted to Islam only five years earlier. Because the men were dressed casually and carried backpacks, which later events would reveal were filled with explosive-devices and icepacks to keep the bombs cool, the four stood-out from the suit-wearing commuters that comprised the bulk of the

[106] Paul Murphy (Chairman), Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, March 30, 2006, pp. 13-15. (Hereafter "Intelligence and Security Committee Report"). See also, Duncan Gardham, "7/7 inquest: Mohammed Sidique Khan on MI5's radar before 9/11," *The Telegraph* (London), May 6, 2011; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8497204/77-inquest-Mohammed-Sidique-Khan-on-MI5s-radar-before-911.html. Alexandra Topping and Vikram Dodd, "MI 5 missed 7/7 ringleader despite links with earlier terror plot, inquest told," *The Guardian* (London), February 2, 2011; available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/02/mohammad-sidique-khan-july-7-inquest.

train‘s passengers, but not enough to cause alarm. Passengers would later state that the men looked like they were leaving town on a weekend camping trip.[107]

Because of delay on the line, the men did not reach King‘s Cross, the main train depot in London, until nearly an hour later, when CCTV cameras captured images of the four smiling happily, and witnesses reported that the men hugged on the platform before heading toward separate lines of the London Underground. At about 8.50am, three nearly simultaneous explosions took place. Tanweer was the first to attack; he detonated his bomb on a Circle Line train as it transited between Aldgate and Liverpool Stations, northeast of downtown London, killing himself and seven others, while wounding another 170. Sidique Khan, who was seated on another Circle Line train, detonated his bomb moments later, near Edgware Road station in Westminster, northwest of downtown, killing himself and six victims, as well as wounding nearly 165 people. Meanwhile, Lindsay bombed a third train on the Piccadilly Line as it traveled between King‘s Cross and Russell Square Station in Camden, just north of central London. Because Lindsay‘s train car was particularly crowded, his death toll was higher. In addition to himself, Lindsay killed 26 people and injured approximately 340.[108]

As his friends exploded, Hussain ambled out of King‘s Cross and onto nearby Euston Road. He used his mobile to make repeated calls to the other bombers, but to no avail. His next move suggests that he suffered technical difficulties; he reentered the station and bought a nine volt battery from a drugstore located on the main concourse. He then spent a few minutes in a nearby McDonalds, before catching a bus toward Euston Station, where he transferred to the No. 30 line, which was serviced by London‘s iconographic double-decker busses. At 9.47am, nearly

[107] House of Commons Report. See also, Hamida Ghafour, "Probe of British bombers provided little comfort; Suspects' backgrounds seemed 'unexceptional,'" Globe and Mail (Canada), June 6, 2006, and Neville Dean, "The London Bombings - What we know so far," *Press Association*, July 19, 2005. For information on the icepacks, see: Coroner‘s Report.
[108] House of Commons Report.

an hour after the train bombings, Hussain detonated his weapon from the upper deck of the bus, killing himself and 13 others, while wounding more than 110 people.[109] The explosion took place on the edge of Tavistock Square, an urban green-space that until the day of the bombings was best known for containing monuments to non-violence, including a statue of Mahatma Gandhi and a memorial to conscientious objectors to war.[110]

Given the logistical ties that Sidique Khan and Tanweer held to Khyam, it is hardly a stretch to suggest that the July 7 bombings were an extension of the 2004 plot. However, the nature al-Qaida's involvement in the two operations' differed slightly. Because an al-Qaida bomb-maker seems to have closely choreographed the technical details of the 2005 attack, Sidique Khan's team benefitted from more direct planning support that Khyam's. The situation was reversed when it came to logistics; the 2005 bombers acquired all of their supplies independently and did not benefit from the type of direct logistical support that Khyam received when Babar provided aluminum powder. In terms of finance, the two operations seem to have been similarly independent; there is little evidence to suggest that either attack-team benefitted from the sort of direct cash transfers that sustained the 9/11 hijackers. Similarly, both teams benefitted from comparable levels of al-Qaida training. Although the details of al-Qaida's involvement in Sidique Khan's attack were not identical to its role in Khyam's failed plot, bin Laden's organization played an analogous role in both operations. Ultimately, both the 2004 fertilizer bomb-plot and the July 7 bombings blended aspects of self-organizing terrorism with unambiguous organizational support from al-Qaida.

[109] Ibid.
[110] Observation made from a site visit.

5.3.1 PLANNING

Given the extent and nature of Sidique Khan and Tanweer's involvement in the failed 2004 plot, it is hardly a stretch to conclude that the 2005 bombings were a strategic extension of the decision to strike London made at Waheed Mahmood's home in the spring of 2003. Thus, it would be mistaken to attribute the conceptualization of the 2005 attack to al-Qaida, because it seems that Sidique Khan and Tanweer were like promising young athletes, who began playing on the varsity squad after injuries removed starting players from the line-up. In short, it seems that the men were merely carrying on where their friends had failed.

Even though the idea to attack London does not seem to have originated with al-Qaida, the organization's involvement in both operations demonstrates that attacking London had been a priority the terror group since at least 2003. To mix metaphors, al-Qaida's strategic involvement in the July 7 attack was somewhat akin to venture capitalism. The organization did not generate the goal, but provided substantial support to an objective that leaders believed would provide substantial returns.

Given this context, it seems most likely that specific operational planning for the July 7 attacks began in earnest following the demise of the fertilizer-bomb plot. In November 2004, a few months after the dust had settled from Khyam's arrest, Sidique Khan returned to Pakistan. This time, he brought Tanweer along; a CCTV camera in Karachi's airport even captured images of the pair as they deplaned from the same Turkish Airlines flight.[111] The contacts the pair made while abroad suggest that they made the trip in the hopes of acquiring the skill and knowledge necessary to succeed where Khyam's team had failed.

[111] Luke Harding and Rosie Cowan, "Pakistan militants linked to London attacks: Two bombers travelled together, documents show: Leader of plot also said to have visited Israel," The Guardian (London), July 19, 2005.

Sidique Khan and Tanweer's most telling interactions were with Abu Obaidah al-Masri, an innovative Egyptian bomb-maker who is credited with designing the types of detonators used in the July 7 attacks.[112] It is difficult to overstate the significance of this technical innovation; an official British inquiry into the bombings would later conclude that at the time of the attacks the design of the detonators "was unique in the UK and possibly worldwide."[113] Since members of the US intelligence community identified Abu Obaidah as one of al-Qaida's senior operational commanders and a close confidant of Ayman al-Zawahiri,[114] there is little doubt that bin Laden's organization created new technology in furtherance of the July 7 bombings. In short, even though al-Qaida did not come-up with the idea to bomb London, the organization was responsible for the most important technical aspect of the attacks' planning.

However, the evidence suggests that the suicide-operatives planned the tactical details of the attack on their own. For example, in December 2004, Jermaine Lindsay reconnoitered possible targets in London; he spent more than 40 minutes walking around King's Cross Station, before he met Hasib Hussain and two other friends for a day of "sightseeing," that included stops at attractions such as the Eye of London, the British Museum of Natural History, and the London Aquarium.[115] But since Lindsay and Hussain's friends were later acquitted of conspiring with the July 7 bombers, while being simultaneously convicted for conspiring to receive terror

[112] Duncan Gardham, "Airline bomb plot: investigation 'one of biggest since WW2,'" *The Telegraph* (London), September 8, 2009. Duncan Gardham, "Mystery bomb-maker 'linked three gangs,'" *Daily Telegraph* (London), September 9, 2008. Luke Harding and Rosie Cowan, "Pakistan militants linked to London attacks: Two bombers travelled together, documents show: Leader of plot also said to have visited Israel," *The Guardian* (London), July 19, 2005.
[113] Coroner's Report.
[114] Craig Whitlock and Munir Ladaa, "Al-Qaeda's New Leadership," *Washington Post*, 2006; available online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/terror/masri.html.
[115] Richard Edwards, "Trio 'scouted targets for July 7 bombers,'" *The Telegraph* (London), April 11, 2008; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1584716/Trio-scouted-targets-for-July-7-bombers.html.

training,[116] it is difficult to judge exactly who was involved in the reconnaissance work, and precisely when this process began.

The date of the final planning preparations is comparatively clearer. Nine days before the July 7 bombers launched their attack, they conducted a dry run of the operation. After analyzing footage obtained from more than 80,000 CCTV cameras, investigators unearthed images dating from June 29 of the team at both the Luton train station, from which they would depart on the morning of the bombings, and King's Cross in London. The obvious conclusion is that they were familiarizing themselves with the layout of King's Cross and investigating to see if any security measures had been put in place since Lindsay's earlier trip to the station.[117]

Despite the preparation evidenced by this reconnaissance trip, it is important not to overstate the quality of the tactical planning. None of the sites that the July 7 bombers targeted were critical pieces of infrastructure, and with the partial exception of Lindsay, none of the bombers struck particularly crowded locations. Consequently, Richard Barnes, who headed London's police board before serving as the city's deputy mayor, argued that bombers were ―totally incompetent."[118] If they had known what they were doing, Barnes believes they would have caused a much higher death toll and would have chosen ―strategic points in London that would have ground the city to a halt for months, rather than hours."[119] Ultimately, the potential impact of the new technology that al-Qaida created in advancement of the July 7 attacks was mitigated by flawed tactical planning.

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[116] Rachel Williams, ―7/7 bombers' friends jailed over terror training camp plans," *Guardian* (London), April 29, 2009; ―7 July bomber ‗phoned accused,'" *BBC News*, January 20, 2009; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7840285.stm.

[117] House of Commons Report. See also: ―London bombers staged ‗dummy run,'" *BBC News*, September 25, 2005; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4263176.stm. Neville Dean, "Suicide bombers staged 'dry run' before day of carnage," Press Association, September 20, 2005.

[118] Interview conducted June 2010, London.

[119] Ibid.

5.3.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

Because a great deal of information on the July 7 attack died with the suicide-bombers, it is impossible to fully reconstruct the finances underlying the attack. With this caveat, it seems that Sidique Khan used two means to provide for the bulk of his team's expenses. Some of the money came from Sidique Khan's legitimate income, which he obtained working as a well-liked teacher's aide as a primary school in Leeds.[120] However, a larger share of the money seems to have been obtained via bank fraud. Specifically, Sidique Khan borrowed the equivalent of about 18,000 USD in cash from HSBC Bank, with no intention of every repaying the debt.[121] Given that the attack was a low-cost affair—some media sources put the total expenditures as low as a 900 USD,[122] while open-source 'forensic' inquiries estimate the cost at the equivalent of about 13,000 USD[123]—Sidique Khan's funds likely met the needs of the attack without additional supplement. However, it is worth noting that the team may have had substantially greater financial resources at its disposal; a man who appears in the open-source record on as "Ausman," and who purportedly trained with Sidique Khan and Tanweer in 2004, obtained the equivalent of 41,000 USD in fraudulent loans, by posing as the owner of a construction firm,[124] but it is not known how much, if any, of these funds went towards the July 7 operation.

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[120] Michael Buchanan, "London bombs cost just hundreds," *BBC News*, January 3, 2006; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4576346.stm.

[121] In the interest of consistency, all monetary figures in this analysis are quoted in U.S. dollars. The conversion from pounds to dollars was made at the exchange rate that prevailed in July 2005. Duncan Gardham, "July 7 plot trial shown bombers meeting at McDonald's," *The Telegraph* (London), April 21, 2008; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1896850/July-7-plot-trial-shown-bombers-meeting-at-McDonalds.html.

[122] For lower-tier estimates of the attacks' cost, see: Buchanan; and Kiran Randawah, "7/7 bombings cost only pounds 500 to carry out," *Evening Standard* (London), January 3, 2006.

[123] Specifically, the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) estimated the cost of the attack at £7,240. See: Sujoyini Mandal, "Financial Investigation and Counter Terrorism: Case Study: 7 July 2005, London Bombings," 2006; available online: http://www.pipvtr.com/pipvtr/files/LONDON%20CT%20FINANCE%20CASE%20STUDY.pdf.

[124] Gardham, "July 7 plot trial shown bombers meeting at McDonald's."

Saudi authorities posited a third (and less likely) possible source of funding: direct transfers from al-Qaida. Younis Mohammed Ibrahim al-Hayari and Abdel Karim al-Mejati, a pair of Moroccan *jihadists* who died in separate gunfights with the Saudi police in 2005, purportedly transferred money to the bombing-team in the months preceding the attacks.[125] Even if this allegation proves true—it is worth noting that none of the official British inquiries into these attacks make matching claims—then the financial patterns of the July 7 attacks still differed significantly from those witnessed in the 9/11 attacks, because the British team received fewer transfers and provided some of their own funding, while the 9/11 hijackers were entirely dependent on disbursements from al-Qaida paymasters. In short, any role that al-Qaida played in funding Sidique Khan's attack was limited.

While the extent of al-Qaida's role in financial role in the July 7 attacks is still open to a modicum of debate, it is clear that the organization played no role in assembling the bombing-team. Like Khyam before him, Sidique Khan presented bin Laden's organization with a ready-made attack-team, assembled from individuals with whom he had previous association. He met all of the other bombers before he and Tanweer departed for South Asia and began planning the attack in earnest. Moreover, Sidique Khan's relationships also likely predate his training with Khyam in 2003, though the timeline is less clear regarding this second point in relation to Hussain and Lindsay.

Sidique Khan's relationship with Tanweer had the longest histroy. Shiv Malik, a BBC journalist who conducted extensive interviews with Sidique Khan's surviving relatives, asserts that the pair ~~–ar~~e thought to have known each other since childhood."[126] By 2001, the

[125] Toby Harden and Andrew Alderson, "UK terrorists got cash from Saudi Arabia before 7/7," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), August 7, 2005.
[126] Shiv Malik, ~~–M~~y brother the bomber," *Prospect*, June 30, 2007; available online: http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2007/06/mybrotherthebomber/.

relationship also had a functional dimension, because Sidique Khan, who had been using the basement of Leeds' Hardy Street Mosque as a youth center and gymnasium, moved his Islamic outreach program into empty attic space above the Tanweer family's fish-and-chip shop following a dispute with the Mosque's board of trustees.[127] Given that Sidique Khan was concurrently involved in recruiting young Muslims from the Manchester area to serve as *mujahideen* in Afghanistan—his partners in this endeavor would later suicide-bomb a tavern in Tel Aviv[128]— Tanweer's role in the youth center's relocation demonstrates that he was likely actively involved in *jihadist* recruiting approximately four years prior to the 2005 attacks.

Sidique Khan's relationship with Hasib Hussain, the Tavistock bus-bomber, dated to no later than 2003 and also flowed through Tanweer. Hussain's older brother, Imran, regularly played cricket with Tanweer—they even had a game the day before the 2005 bombing—and younger brother Hasib sometimes joined them. Thus, Hussain had known Tanweer since childhood, and after Tanweer made introductions to Sidique Khan, Hussain began to take part in the pair's _youth outreach' activities. Moreover, Sidique Khan began to visit the Hussain family home regularly. However, the family asserts that Sidique Khan was somewhat covert in his radicalization of Hussain. Imran was present during many of Sidique Khan's visits and asserts that ~~he~~ was doing all of that brainwashing and not uttering a word about it," though Imran's characterization may simply be an attempt to distance himself from his brother's radicalism.[129] Regardless, it is clear that Hussain found his way into *jihad* because of interactions that he had on the cricket field and in his family's living room, rather than as the result of al-Qaida's direct influence.

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[127] Ibid.
[128] ~~7~~/7 bomber linked to Israel pair," *BBC News*, July 9, 2006; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/5161390.stm.
[129] Dave Higgins, "Bus bomber 'must have been brainwashed,' say family, *Press Association*, August 2, 2005.

The nature of Jermaine Lindsay's relationship with Sidique Khan remains somewhat enigmatic. Unlike the other bombers, Lindsay was not from Leeds. Since immigrating to Britain with his mother as a toddler, he had lived in Huddersfield, about 20 miles to the southeast. Moreover, Lindsay was a Jamaican of African descent and had not converted to Islam until 2000.[130] Consequently, he was not part of the same Pakistani community as the other bombers and lacked the overlapping friendship circles evident in Hussain's recruitment. Instead, a radical preacher named Abdullah al-Faisal seems to have introduced Lindsay to Sidique Khan.[131]

Al-Faisal shared many aspects of Lindsay's background. For example, both were black, both were Jamaican-born, and both were converts from Christianity. Consequently, Lindsay found al-Faisal's message, which included exhortations to kill all non-Muslims,[132] uniquely appealing, especially after Lindsay's mother moved abroad in 2002 and left her son feeling abandoned and alone.[133] Although al-Faisal was jailed in 2003 on charges of inciting murder,[134] he preached twice in Leeds before his detention.[135] Given Sidique Khan's prominence among that city's Islamists, it is hardly far-fetched to conclude that their paths crossed. Therefore, if al-Faisal introduced Lindsay to Sidique Khan, it occurred no later than 2003—about a year before the specific planning of the July 7 attacks began. Even if al-Faisal lacked a role in the introductions, Lindsay's relationship to Khan can still be dated to this period, because, in 2003, Lindsay and his pregnant wife relocated to the Leeds area from Huddersfield, and he then

[130] "Profile: Germaine Lindsay," *BBC News*, May 11, 2006; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4762591.stm.
[131] Malik; see also: "Profile: Germaine Lindsay."
[132] "Profile: Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal," *BBC News*, May 25, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6692243.stm.
[133] "Profile: Germaine Lindsay."
[134] R v. el-Faisal, Appeal, Supreme Court of Judicature, Royal Courts of Justice, March 4, 2004.
[135] Malik.

became a fixture in the youth center that the other July 7 bombers frequented.[136] While it is clear that Sidique Khan had a long history of involvement in radical Islam, it ultimately seems that he had recruited the other bombes to his cause before he began operating in close association with al-Qaida.

Beyond manpower, Sidique Khan's team was also independent of bin Laden's organization in the acquisition of materials. The bombers began collecting supplies as early as February 2005, when Hasib Hussain and Shehzad Tanweer purchased 5 liter drums of "Growth Technology Liquid Oxygen," a hydrogen peroxide-based solvent used to clean hydroponic systems, from a pair of specialized horticulture stores in York.[137] By early April, the team had acquired its first safe house, and in late May, Jermaine Lindsay used a false name to sub-let an apartment at 18 Alexandra Grove, a dwelling that soon became the team's primary bomb-factory.[138]

Because police found all four of the suicide-bombers' fingerprints in the Alexandra Grove apartment, it seems clear that bomb-making was a team affair. Moreover, the police also found a few electric hotplates, an assortment of pots and pans, and four respirators, which were necessary because the explosives-manufacturing process produced fumes so caustic that they bubbled paint inside the apartment and killed shrubbery outside the window used as a vent. When viewed in sum, the evidence suggests that the men likely took turns stirring the pot to boil-down the Liquid Oxygen to explosive concentrations.[139]

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[136] David Sapstead and Duncan Gardham, "Lost years of the 'nice boy' who killed 25," *Daily Telegraph* (London), July 16, 2005; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1494120/Lost-years-of-the-nice-boy-who-killed-25.html.
[137] Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005, Testimony of DC Richard Reynolds, February 1, 2011. Specifically, see evidentiary document INQ10097-4.
[138] Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005,Testimony of Colonel Peter Francis Mahoney, February 1, 2011.
[139] Testimony of Colonel Peter Francis Mahoney, February 1, 2011.

However, Sidique Khan seems to have played a leading role in the bomb-making process. Handwriting analysis showed that he was the one who wrote the recipe that described the correct quantity of chemicals to mix with organic filler material (the bombers chose black pepper) in order to produce an incendiary explosion.[140] He also likely had some outside advice; investigators determined that Sidique Khan used a disposable cell phone to make several calls to Pakistan during the explosives-manufacturing phase of the team's preparations.[141] The logical inference is that he spoke to master bomb-maker Abu Obaidah about the technical details of the process. Even with this guidance, it is clear that the July 7 team conducted the most important logistical task necessary to complete the bombing, namely the construction of explosive devices, with a high degree of independence.

5.3.3 TRAINING

Al-Qaida's clearest role in the July 7 bombings came in the instruction of the attack-team. It seems clear that Abu Obaidah not only planned the technical aspects of the attack, but also that he trained Sidique Khan and Tanweer in bomb-making. And if Abu Obaidah was ultimately the recipient of the calls Sidique Khan made from his burner phone during the bomb-making process, as the context of the evidence suggests, then this training extended well after the July 7 bombers left Pakistan.

Moreover, Hasib Hussain, the Tavistock bus-bomber, also likely trained alongside Tanweer and Sidique Khan. When his compatriots arrived in Pakistan in the fall of 2004, Hussain had already been in the country for about three months.[142] There is no direct evidence

[140] Ibid.
[141] Coroner's Report.
[142] "Pakistan agencies pinpoint visits of London blast suspects," *BBC Monitoring South Asia - Political*, July 18, 2005.

that he joined his friends at the same training camp,[143] but given the trio's preexisting ties, it seems reasonable to assume that the men would have made every effort to train together.

While the evidence of Hussain's direct training ties to al-Qaida is mildly speculative, it is clear that Lindsay had no comparable experience. The open-source record contains no evidence that he ever trained abroad. Ultimately, it is darkly ironic that the least experienced member of the July 7 team was the most successful suicide attacker; half of the attack's 52 fatalities resulted from Lindsay's bomb.

5.3.4 SUMMATION

It is difficult to gauge the quality of the attack-team in comparison to its predecessor. Gone are the mathematician and computer engineer that were present in 2004, but then again, also gone are hapless individual like Shujah Mahmood. Indeed, until their involvement in radical Islam, the July 7 bombers' lacked outstanding features. In its official inquiry into the bombings, the British House of Commons best summarized the four's backgrounds, calling them ―largely unexceptional" and noting that with the partial exception of the convert Lindsay, ―Little distinguishes their formative experiences from those of many others of the same generation, ethnic origin and social background." In short, it seems that average men comprised the July 7 attack-team.

However, the team had some experience in *jihad.* Tanweer and Sidique Khan not only trained abroad, but also participated in Khyam's failed attack in 2004. Though a newcomer in comparison to this pair, Hussain also likely trained with al-Qaida. Therefore, even though Lindsay lacked formal instruction in terrorism, the team's training ties to al-Qaida dictate that bin Laden's organization played a strong role in the bombing, especially when viewed alongside Abu Obaidah al-Masri's involvement in the technical planning of the attack.

[143] Malik.

Yet, it would inaccurate to state that al-Qaida directed this operation with the same degree of hierarchical control that the organization exhibited in the 9/11 attacks. Overlaps in personnel suggest that this plot was an extension of Khyam's self-conceived plot to bomb London, rather than a _new' idea conceptualized by al-Qaida leaders. Though the *slight* possibility of al-Qaida funding remains, it is clear that Sidique Khan's team self-financed the majority of the attack, and lacked even the small amount of direct logistical support that Khyam's team received, much less the comprehensive backing that al-Qaida provided to the 9/11 hijackers. However, the July 7 bombers received a greater degree of technical planning assistance than Khyam's team, while both groups of plotters were responsible for (poorly) planning the tactical details of their operations. Therefore, the details of al-Qaida's involvement in the plots differ, but the scale of the organization's involvement in these events was broadly equivalent.

Ultimately, both Khyam and Sidique Khan's teams self-organized several aspects of their attack, while simultaneously benefitting from aspects of organizational support provided by al-Qaida. Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that the July 7 bombings would never have come to fruition without both of these structural components: Sidique Khan's informal, pre-existing relationships provided the operation with manpower and local knowledge, while al-Qaida provided organizational resources in the forms of technical expertise and training. While this blended structure might suggest an impressive organizational adaptation if viewed in isolation, subsequent events serve to demonstrate that the July 7 bombings are better viewed as a point on devolutionary timeline, because later al-Qaida-linked hit squads that targeted the West continued to lack access to al-Qaida's financial and logistical resources, and were comprised of low-caliber personnel, who on average received less training and had less experience than their predecessors.

5.4 THE JULY 21, 2005, FAILED BOMBING OF LONDON

As Londoners attempted to return to normal life in the aftermath of the July 7 bombings, another attack-team prepared to strike the city. On July 21, 2005, just 14 days after Sidique Khan's bombing, a group of young Muslims, most of them East Africans who had lived in Britain for years, targeted five sites around London, four of which again involved the city's mass transit system. Specifically, Yasin Hassan Omar, a 24 year-old Somali who first arrived in Britain thirteen years earlier as a refugee,[144] attempted to detonate a hydrogen peroxide-based explosive device, hidden inside of a backpack, on a train at the Warren Street station of the London Underground, fairly near the terminal where Hasib Hussain had transferred to the Tavistock Square-bound bus on the morning of July 7.[145]

Two of Omar's co-conspirators made almost identical bombing attempts on other trains. CCTV cameras captured images of Ramzi Mohammed,[146] a 24 year-old Somali who fled to Britain via Kenya in 1998 to escape Somalia's civil war,[147] as he attempted to suicide-bomb a train at the Stockwell station, in the heart of inner London.[148] Meanwhile, Hussein Osman, a 28 year-old Ethiopian, whose real name was Hamdi Adus Isaac and who had adopted the name Osman in the hopes of achieving refugee status when he arrived in Britain in the 1990s,[149] attempted to detonate a bomb while onboard a train at the station in Shepherd's Bush, a bustling residential neighborhood in West London.

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[144] "Bombings police search seized car," *BBC News*, July 26, 2005; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4716535.stm.
[145] R v. Girma and Others, Royal Courts of Justice (Case No.: B3/2008/3988), Appeal, May 15, 2009; R v. Sherif and Others, Royal Courts of Justice (Case No.: 200801030), Appeal, November 11, 2008.
[146] "Court shown dramatic 21 July film," *BBC News*, January 24, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6291943.stm.
[147] "Profile: Ramzi Mohammed," *BBC News*, July 9, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm.
[148] R v. Girma and Others; R v. Sherif and Others.
[149] "Profile: Hussein Osman," *BBC News*, July 9, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm.

As in the July 7 attack, this group of plotters also sought to target London's famous double-decker busses. Muktar Said Ibrahim, a 27 year-old Eritrean-born British citizen, who had been living in England since 1992,[150] tried to suicide-bomb the No. 26 bus in Hackney, in the northeast corner of inner London.[151]

The fifth and most enigmatic member of the July 21 team seems to have gotten cold feet and abandoned his bomb in the brush of Little Wormwood Scrubs, an urban green-space located in West London.[152] This bomber called himself Manfor Kwaku Asiedu and was about 32 years old, but the details of his background are exceptionally difficult to pin-down, because he used multiple false identities. His attorney claims the bomber's real name is Sumaila Abubakhari, but when the bomber arrived in Britain in late 2003, he used a passport bearing the name Georges Nanak Marquye. After losing this document in a house fire, the bomber assumed the name Asiedu as a matter of practicality and convenience; he needed an identity, and the real Asiedu had previously lived at the same address, before being involuntarily confined to a psychiatric hospital, placing him in a position where he was unlikely to learn of the identity theft.[153] Like his identity, Asiedu's reasons for abandoning the attack at the last minute remain unclear, because he was heavily involved in other stages of the operation, most notably the acquisition of materials.

The vagaries of Asiedu's involvement notwithstanding, the attack-team attempted a coordinated strike. Their bombs were intended to detonate between 12.30pm and 1.00pm,

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[150] "Bombings police search seized car," *BBC News*, July 26, 2005; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4716535.stm.
[151] R v. Girma and Others; R v. Sherif and Others.
[152] Ibid.
[153] "Profile: Manfo Kwaku Asiedu," *BBC News*, November 9, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634913.stm.

during London's busy lunch hour,[154] and while the detonators successfully exploded, the mix of hydrogen peroxide and chapatti flour that constituted the main explosive charge of the bomb failed to ignite.[155] London was saved from another dramatic loss of life only by the poor chemistry skills of the members of the July 21 team; they failed to concentrate the hydrogen peroxide-mixture to the level necessary to make it explosive.[156]

Although British officials initially stressed that "July 7 and July 21 seem not be related,"[157] the currently available evidence demonstrates that these two attacks were linked by planning and training ties. More specifically, the two groups of attackers adopted identical methodologies because they shared links to Abu Obaidah al-Masri. But despite this prominent similarity, there are also substantial differences between the two attack-teams. Most glaringly, only a single member of the July 21 team trained abroad, though other members of the team received some exceptionally rudimentary experience from British-based training. Moreover, the July 21 team's general lack of experience showed; the group was sometimes buffoonish in its efforts toward terrorism. Therefore, although the attacks of July 7 and July 21 were separated by only two weeks, and although both events shared ties to al-Qaida, tremendous gaps existed in the quality of the respective attack-teams. Ultimately, the latter event marks the point at which the devolutionary trends that began in the aftermath of 9/11 overwhelmed al-Qaida's efforts to attack the West using hit squads. From this attack forward, the odds that al-Qaida will successfully conduct a true mass-casualty attack in the West have been substantially reduced, though not completely eliminated.

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[154] R v. Ibrahim and Others, Royal Courts of Justice (Case No.: 2007/04146/B5), Appeal, April 23, 2008.
[155] R v. Girma and Others.
[156] R v. Ibrahim and Others.
[157] Counterterrorism official quoted in, Sebastian Rotella, "Who Guided London's Attackers?" *Los Angeles Times*, March 6, 2006.

5.4.1 PLANNING

It is difficult to pin-down the planning details of the July 21 attacks, primarily because the operation's key members lied persistently during their trial. For example, Ibrahim repeated claimed that the team never intended to detonate the bombs. According to his account, the entire operation was an elaborate hoax designed to protest Britain's participation in the Iraq War. Ibrahim never wavered from this story, even after prosecutors noted that there would have been no need for the team to use viable explosive materials, like concentrated hydrogen peroxide, if the weapons were not intended to detonate.[158] Owing to the ambiguities created by the bombers' deliberate attempts at deception, many facets of the operation remain somewhat obscure.

For example, it remains unclear when the July 21 team first conceptualized the idea to bomb Britain. Unlike Sidique Khan and Tanweer, none of the July 21 bombers had any overt links to Khyam's failed 2004 attack; therefore, the July 21 attack does not seem to have been a continuation of this earlier plot. However, this should not suggest that the July 21 attack was entirely independent of the earlier operations, because in the fall of 2004, Ibrahim was in Pakistan at the same time as Sidique Khan and Tanweer. Given that the bombs used on July 7 and July 21 shared the same unique detonator design and that the two attacks were the first known usages of hydrogen peroxide-based bombs in the United Kingdom, it is almost certain that Abu Obaidah, the enigmatic al-Qaida bomb-maker, planned the technical details of both attacks.[159] Ultimately, it seems that the two July 2005 attacks on London were independently inspired, before coming together in Pakistan under Abu Obaidah.

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[158] R v. Ibrahim and Others.

[159] Duncan Gardham, "Airline bomb plot: investigation one of biggest since WW2," *The Telegraph* (London), September 8, 2009. Duncan Gardham, "Mystery bomb-maker 'linked three gangs,'" *Daily Telegraph* (London), September 9, 2008. Luke Harding and Rosie Cowan, "Pakistan militants linked to London attacks: Two bombers travelled together, documents show: Leader of plot also said to have visited Israel," *The Guardian* (London), July 19, 2005. "21 July suspect linked to 7/7,'" *BBC News*, March 23, 2007; available online:

The tactical planning of the July 21 attack is similarly ambiguous. No information has emerged regarding if and when the bombers conducted specific surveillance on the transportation sites they attacked. However, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the July 21 bombings were *not* a simple copy-cat attack. Ibrahim's team clearly began planning its strike well ahead of the July 7 bombings, because its members began to amass bombing materials in the spring of 2005, several months before Sidique Khan's attack.

Moreover, the July 21 bombers apparently lacked any advanced knowledge of the timing of Sidique Khan's attack. They apparently learned of the event from the same source as the rest of London: the news. Ibrahim's team may have adjusted their plans after witnessing the details of the July 7 attack, but the only planning detail that is crystal clear in relation to the failed July 21 attacks is that the bombers had decided to target London long before July 7.[160]

5.4.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

The manpower necessary to conduct the bombing was assembled long before a specific plot ever began. Ibrahim, who played the most important role in the plot, found his way to radical Islam in the late 1990s, after spending his youth pursuing a life of petty crime and drug use. In 1996, he was part of a gang that British prosecutors convicted of a series of knife-point robberies. Ibrahim was exceptionally angry that, as the only member of the gang older than 18, his five year sentence was harsher than those handed-down to his co-defendants. Friends speculate that this bitterness made him an easy mark for prison *jihadists*, who apparently recruited Ibrahim to their cause, because when he emerged from detention on an early parole in

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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6484317.stm. "21/7: Was it linked to 7/7?" *BBC News*, July 11, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6249118.stm.

[160] Duncan Gardham, "Bomb plot Muslims were under police surveillance, court told," *The Telegraph* (London), January 16, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1539639/Bomb-plot-Muslims-were-under-police-surveillance-court-told.html.

1998, he had become a fundamentalist, who wore traditional Muslim headdress and facial hair.[161]

He began attending radical mosques, and was reportedly a devoted follower of Abu Hamza al-Masri, the hook-handed preacher who presided over London's infamous Finsbury Park Mosque in the late 1990s.[162] Ibrahim soon fell under the influence of Atilla Ahmet, who served as Abu Hamza's deputy imam, and Mohammed Hamid, a former crack addict and occasional member of the Finsbury Park congregation, who became radicalized during his recovery and frequently preached on the street at London's Speaker's Corner. More specifically, by 2003, Ibrahim had become a regular attendee of the fundamentalist study sessions Hamid conducted at his East London home, where Ahmet served as a frequent guest-lecturer. It was through this group that Ibrahim formed relationships with four of the other men involved in the failed July 21 bombing.[163]

Ramzi Mohammed and Hussein Osman were already members of the study-circle when Ibrahim began attending.[164] Although a native of Somalia, Mohammed was only nominally Muslim when he arrived to Britain with his family in 1998. He drank and chased women as a teenager, but developed a more serious interest in Islam circa 2003, reportedly after hearing Hamid preach at Speaker's Corner,[165] and soon began attending the street-preacher's study

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[161] Valentine Low and Ben Leapman, "From schoolboy to a bus bomber," *Evening Standard* (London), July 27, 2005.
[162] Kevin Sullivan and Karla Adam, "Trial Opens in London Transit Bombing Plot," *Washington Post*, January 16, 2007; available online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/15/AR2007011501264.html. "They heard Hamza's sermons," *The Telegraph* (London), January 16, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1539641/They-heard-Hamzas-sermons.html.
[163] Dominic Casciani, "Top extremist recruiter is jailed," *BBC News*, February 26, 2008; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7231492.stm.
[164] Ibid.
[165] "Profile: Ramzi Mohammed," *BBC News*, July 9, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634955.stm.

sessions.[166] Osman's path to radicalization followed a similar trajectory; as a teenager, he was a devotee of hip-hop music and favored himself a ladies' man.[167] Circa 2000, he and Adel Yahya, a high school friend who would later help the bombing-team acquire chemicals, developed a deeper interest in religion,[168] and the pair soon began attending services at Finsbury Park mosque,[169] and then Hamid's study sessions.[170]

In time, Yassin Omar also joined this group.[171] However, his involvement with radical Islam seems to have predated that of his co-conspirators, because Omar was drawn to fundamentalism while still an impressionable high school student. Although a Somali, he was raised by white, Christian foster parents after arriving in Britain, but his guardians state that he was "not comfortable with boundaries and rules" that they set.[172] Former high school classmates stated that Omar had supported Palestinian causes since he first arrived in Britain.[173] Thus, it seems that some combination of teenage rebellion and preexisting affinity for Islamic causes combined to push him toward radicalism, and by 2000 Omar ideologically supported the Taliban.[174] Concurrently, Omar began attending Finsbury Park mosque, and eventually fell into Hamid and Atillah's orbit.[175]

The depth of Hamid's involvement in the team's recruitment seems difficult to overstate. His ties to Ibrahim, in particular, were exceptionally close. The men were even arrested together

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[166] Casciani, "Top extremist recruiter is jailed."
[167] "The four guilty July 21 bombers," *The Telegraph* (London), July 10, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1557000/The-four-guilty-July-21-bombers.html.
[168] "Profile: Hussain Osman," *BBC News*, July 9, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634923.stm.
[169] "They heard Hamza's Sermons."
[170] Casciani, "Top extremist recruiter is jailed."
[171] Ibid.
[172] Quoted in, "Profile: Yassin Omar," *BBC News*, July 9, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634917.stm.
[173] Chris Summers, "Defendants 'attracted to Islam,'" *BBC News*, January 17, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6272847.stm.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Ibid. See also, Casciani, and "They heard Hamza's sermons."

in October 2004, when Hamid became aggressive to pedestrians passing by the Islamic bookstand that the pair ran on London's Oxford Street. After insulting the police officer dispatched to the scene, Hamid claimed to have a bomb in his possession and refused to provide police with his real name, instead referring to himself as "Osama bin London."[176]

While this event serves to demonstrate the depth of the bond that existed between Ibrahim and Hamid, it also demonstrates the flamboyance with which the plotters sometimes voiced their support for radical Islam. It was not a single isolated incident. In the spring of 2005, during a Friday prayer session, Omar got into a screaming match with an imam who preached that Palestinian suicide bombings were a violation of Islam.[177] Equally telling were the claims made by Hamid's preaching partner, Ahmet, who reportedly bragged widely that he was "the number one al-Qaida [member] in Europe,"[178] and who once told TV reporters that he loved bin Laden "more than himself," before stating that the casualties of the 9/11 attacks were a "drop in the ocean." Indeed, he was so proud of these performances that he burned copies of the interviews to DVD and distributed them to friends and family.[179] In short, the plotters and their associates were indiscrete in voicing their support for al-Qaida.

Despite Ahmet's claims to the contrary, his personal history suggests that he lacked any direct interactions with the organization's operational leaders. A Londoner born of Turkish-Cypriot heritage, Ahmet went by "Alan" and made his living as a youth-league soccer coach throughout the bulk of the 1990s. Moreover, he was nominally Christian until 1998, when he

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[176] Duncan Gardham, "'Suspect dubbed himself Osama bin London.'" *The Telegraph* (London), October 10, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1565744/Suspect-dubbed-himself-Osama-bin-London.html.

[177] "Profile: Yassin Omar."

[178] "'Terror camp plot' trial begins,'" *BBC News*, October 10, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7037525.stm.

[179] Quoted in "Profiles: The terror gang members," *The Independent* (London), February 26, 2008; available online: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/profiles-the-terror-gang-members-787469.html.

converted to Islam.[180] The record contains no evidence that he trained abroad or interacted operationally with members of bin Laden's organization. In short, it is clear that Ahmet was a committed Islamist, but it remains to be proven that he held membership in al-Qaida, much less that he was the organization's top European member. Consequently, the currently available evidence suggests that it would be exaggerative to attribute bin Laden's organization with a direct role in the recruitment of the July 21 bombers.

The only member of the team who lacked known ties to Ahmet and Hamid was Asiedu. The evidence is somewhat vague regarding his recruitment, but since he did not enter Britain until 2003, it seems that he was a later edition to the bombing team. Because Asiedu made his living as a handyman at the Finchley Mosque, where Ibrahim and Omar sometimes worshipped, the pair appears to have directly recruited the Ghanaian. Within a few weeks of the trio's first interaction, Asiedu was invited to move into 58 Curtis House, the eighth-floor, government-subsidized apartment where Omar lived in the north London borough of Enfield.[181]

While the absence of a detailed open-source history of Ahmet's life dictates that a modicum of ambiguity continues to surround al-Qaida's role in procuring manpower for the July 21 bombings, it is exceptionally clear that bombers acquired the materiel necessary to conduct the attack on their own. Given Ibrahim's interactions with Abu Obaidah, it is unsurprising that the July 21 team's acquisitions followed a similar trajectory to those of Sidique Khan's team, though Ibrahim's group was at times less discrete in their purchases. The process of acquiring supplies began with Adel Yahya, the same 23 year-old Ethiopian whom Yasin Omar had

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[180] Ibid.

[181] For the details of Asiedu's recruitment, see Matthew Moore and Duncan Gardham, "July 21 'fifth bomber' jailed for 33 years," *The Telegraph* (London), November 20, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1569913/July-21-fifth-bomber-jailed-for-33-years.html. For the details of Omar's apartment, see: "Profile: Yassin Omar," *BBC News*, July 9, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634917.stm.

befriended in high school. Yahya made a pair of trips to cosmetics suppliers in May and June of 2005, in order to investigate the best source of hydrogen peroxide. After speaking with store owners, he pegged hair bleach as the best choice, and the team soon began making purchases.[182]

By the time that Sidique Khan's team struck in early July, Ibrahim's team had acquired 443 liters—more than 115 gallons—of beauty products that contained 18 percent hydrogen peroxide. The vast bulk of the purchases were made by Asiedu, though other team members often accompanied him to the stores. Moreover, it seems he always frequented the same sellers; court documents stipulate that all of the chemicals were obtained "from three shops in north London."[183] If these repeat purchases did not raise eyebrows—Asiedu reportedly tried to divert suspicion by claiming that he was a decorator who needed the supplies to bleach wood[184]—store owners should have been concerned when Asiedu and Ibrahim inquired during the course of one shopping trip about the possibility of buying hydrogen peroxide that was already concentrated to 60 or 70 percent.[185] In short, the July 21 team was as indiscreet in its acquisitions as it was about publically voicing its support for al-Qaida.

After acquiring the supplies, the July 21 followed manufacturing procedures that were almost identical to those employed by the Sidique Khan's team. At 58 Curtis House, the July 21 team converted a basic kitchen into a bomb factory[186] and used saucepans and electric stoves to boil-down their hair-care products in an effort to concentrate the peroxide to 70 percent, before mixing it with combustible organic material. In lieu of the black pepper Sidique Khan's team

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[182] Profile: Adel Yahya," *BBC News*, November 13, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6634965.stm.
[183] R v. Ibrahim and others.
[184] "Profile: Mafo Kwaku Asiedu."
[185] Ibid.
[186] Duncan Gardham, "Terrorists turned kitchen into bomb factory," *Telegraph* (London), February 3, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1541473/Terrorists-turned-kitchen-into-bomb-factory.html.

had used, the July 21 bombers chose chapatti flour,[187] which Ramzi Mohammed and Hussein Osman purchased on July 18.[188]

The police found fingerprints and other clues that proved that all of the July 21 bombers were involved in the manufacturing process, though a note containing instructions for an experiment to test the concentration of peroxide was found in Ibrahim's handwriting, suggesting that he may have led the bomb-making process.[189] In short, the means employed by the two London teams were almost indistinguishable, but this is hardly surprising given that they shared the same technical planner in Abu Obaidah al-Masri.

Why then did one team succeed where they other failed? The different material inputs that the two teams selected made no difference. Hydrogen peroxide concentrated from hair-care products is just as explosive as hydrogen peroxide concentrated from horticultural solvents, and the organic composition of chapatti flour versus ground pepper had no effect on the viability of the two teams' bombs.[190] Instead, the July 21 team's bombs failed to detonate because they were poor chemists. Ibrahim miscalculated during an experiment to determine the concentration of hydrogen peroxide, leaving the team's chemical product 12 percent shy of the threshold necessary to ensure detonation.[191] Given that he reportedly failed the General Certificate of Secondary Education in Maths, a standardized accreditation test given to British high school students, he may have been less than ideally suited to serve as the team's bomb-maker.[192] Some combination of ignorance and simple human error ultimately undermined the July 21 attack.

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[187] R v. Ibrahim and Others.
[188] "Timeline: 21 July bomb plot."
[189] Ibid.
[190] Chris Summers and Dominic Casciani, "Bomb would have been 'devastating,'" *BBC News*, July 9, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6687311.stm.
[191] R v. Ibrahim and Others.
[192] "21/7 bombers failed to kill dozens as 'mastermind' could not do maths," *Evening Standard* (London), July 9, 2007; available online: http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/217-bombers-failed-to-kill-dozens-as-mastermind-could-not-do-maths-6596420.html.

5.4.3 TRAINING

As with the July 7 attacks, al-Qaida's most direct role in the July 21 bombings took the form of training. In addition to planning the technical details of the failed attack, Abu Obaidah appears to have trained Ibrahim in bomb-making.[193] However, al-Qaida's involvement in the training of the July 21 bombers was less substantial than in both Khyam's 2004 plot and Sidique Khan's 2005 attack, because Ibrahim was the only member of his team who has been definitively linked to bin Laden's organization.

Other issues also mitigated the extent of al-Qaida's training ties to the July 21 attacks. For example, Ibrahim had vague training ties to other violent Islamists; he claimed to have trained with *jihadists* in the Sudan in 2003, though no one has been able to independently verify with whom.[194] More tellingly, Ibrahim's team self-trained in ways that previous attack-squads had not.

Like much of the recruitment and radicalization process, this training ran through Hamid. In May 2004, he took Ibrahim, Omar, Mohammed, Yahya, Osman, his young son, and several other men to the Lake District, in England's northwest corner, for what the Metropolitan Police Department called "military-style exercising."[195] Police photographed the men as they spent a couple of days drilling to prepare for *jihad*, but the value of this training is open to question, because it occurred without weapons. One member of the surveillance team testified that the men held "branches or sticks as though they were carrying rifles."[196]

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[193] See note 95.
[194] "Timeline: 21 July bomb plot," *BBC News*, July 10, 2007; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6251294.stm.
[195] Metropolitan Police Department, "Operation Overamp: R v Hamid and others," Directorate of Public Affairs, date unknown. For information on the participation of Osman's son, see: "Wife 'knew about 21/7 bomb plot,'" *BBC News*, February 27, 2008; available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7267055.stm.
[196] Quoted in Duncan Gardham, "July 21 bombers 'trained at Cumbria camp,'" *The Telegraph* (London), October 16, 2007; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1566281/July-21-bombers-trained-at-Cumbria-camp.html.

Prior to the July 21 bombings, Hamid conducted at least two more training sessions in the region. The attack team did not participate in these to the same extent as they had the May 2004 trip, but Ibrahim did attend the final camping trip of that year, which was held in mid-August.[197] While Hamid continued to train aspiring *jihadists* even after the capture of the July 21 bombers, the single session of unarmed drilling that occurred in May 2004 constituted the only known training for four of the plot's participants.[198] Moreover, Asiedu had no demonstrable involvement in training of any type. Consequently, it is fair to conclude not only that al-Qaida played a substantially smaller role in preparing the July 21 bombers than it had in Khyam and Sidique Khan's operations, but also that the July 21 team was substantially less prepared for *jihad* that its predecessors.

5.4.4 SUMMATION

Although clearly linked to both Sidique Khan's bombing on July 7 and al-Qaida bomb-maker Abu Obaidah al-Masri, the July 21 differed substantially from previous attacks. Al-Qaida's involvement was less significant, and the quality of Ibrahim's team was demonstrably lower. Indeed, if not for the seriousness of their goals, the July 21 bombers would have had more in common with the Keystone Cops than with battle-hardened extremists: the bombers botched basic calculations during the explosives-manufacturing process; they trained with tree-branches in lieu of proper weapons; they were anything but covert and loudly proclaimed their allegiance to bin Laden; and they attracted tremendous attention to themselves while acquiring supplies by asking shopkeepers about the purchase of highly-concentrated hydrogen peroxide. Ultimately, the most surprising detail of the July 21 attack is that it nearly succeeded.

[197] "Top extremist recruiter is jailed."
[198] Ibid.

While the gap in quality and preparation between this attack-team and previous al-Qaida hit squads is self-evident and profound, the problems endemic to the July 21 bombers did not spring from nowhere. Instead, they represented an admittedly large step in a downward progression from the specialized, fairly well-trained operatives that participated in the 9/11 attacks and the highly-educated, technically-skilled members of Omar Khyam's team, to the average men who perpetrated the July 7 bombings. In short, although the devolutionary patterns were slower to take shape among al-Qaida's Western hit squads than its non-Western attackers, by 2004 bin Laden's organization had hit a new low by supporting Ibrahim's ill-equipped, poorly staffed operation. Moreover, subsequent evidence suggests that patterns evident in al-Qaida's relationship with the failed July 21 bombing were not an aberrant incident involving an otherwise successfully adaptive organization, because they repeated in 2009, when al-Qaida supported Najibullah Zazi, the leader of another largely inept hit squad, in his attempt to attack New York.

5.5 THE 2009 PLOT AGAINST NEW YORK'S MASS TRANSIT SYSTEM

In 2009, Najibullah Zazi, a 24 year-old Afghan-American immigrant, plotted to attack New York City's subway system with the help of two high school friends:[199] Adis Medunjanin, a naturalized U.S. citizen of Bosnian birth who first came to New York at the age of 10 in 1994,[200] and Zarien Ahmedzay, an Afghan-born American citizen who also arrived in the country in the 1990s.[201] The men planned to simultaneously suicide-bomb three locations using homemade

[199] USA v. Najibullah Zazi (Defendant), Allocution, United States District Court Eastern District of New York (Docket No.: 09 CR 663[S-1]), February 22, 2010. (Hereafter "Zazi allocution").
[200] Susan Candiotti, "Two New Yorkers questioned in Zazi investigation, attorney say," *CNN Justice,* October 9, 2009; available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-09/justice/us.terror.probe_1_najibullah-zazi-ahmad-wais-afzali-zarein-ahmedzay?_s=PM:CRIME.
[201] Although the full transcript of Ahmedzay's allocution remains sealed, the *New York Post* printed his statement to Judge Steven M. Gold; see: "Zarien Ahmedzay's statement when he pleaded guilty to terrorist charges," *New York*

hydrogen peroxide-based explosives that they would carry onboard subway trains hidden inside of backpacks. However, the plot unraveled when Zazi fell under FBI surveillance and the attack team was forced to abandon their bombing just a few days prior to their planned mid-September strike.[202]

As the details of the case emerged, it became clear that Zazi, Medunjanin, and Ahmedzay comprised an al-Qaida hit squad that had been sent to attack New York using tactics that mirrored those of the London bombers. However, the American team was far from capable. Although its members received training from al-Qaida, its quality was not particularly high, and the plotters received no demonstrable logistical or financial support from bin Laden's organization after returning to the U.S. Consequently, the attempt on New York constituted a minor threat that demonstrates the limited, but legitimate, danger that unsupported hit squads pose to the West.

5.5.1 PLANNING

At a strategic level, al-Qaida had been attempting to recruit a New York-based *jihadist* to attack the city since at least 2007 or 2008. For example, Bryant Neal Vinas, a native of Queens who converted to Islam in 2004,[203] left the United States in the fall of 2007 with the intention of joining the Afghan *jihad* and fighting against coalition forces in South Asia, but al-Qaida soon

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Post, April 23, 2010; available online: http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/zarein_ahmedzay_statement_when_he_ECm9fYgzMCuq9JTvBApBjN/1. (Hereafter "Ahmedzay statement"). See also, U.S. Department of Justice, "Zarein Ahmedzay Pleads Guilty to Terror Violations in Connection with Al-Qaeda New York Subway Plot," Office of Public Affairs, April 23, 2010. Details of Ahmedzay's birth and citizenship can be found in Edith Honan, "Second man pleads guilty in plot to bomb NY subway," *Reuters*, April 23, 2010; available online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/23/us-usa-security-zazi-idUSTRE63M4AY20100423.

[202] Zazi allocution; Ahmedzay statement.

[203] Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, "A young American's journey into Al Qaeda," *Los Angeles Times*, July 24, 2009.

recruited him with the intention of attacking his home state.[204] The al-Qaida operatives with whom Vinas conspired included:

- Rashid Rauf,[205] a British citizen[206] and disciple of master bomb-maker Abu Obaidah al-Masri;[207]

- Abu Yahya al-Libi,[208] a radical Libyan cleric who became a prominent al-Qaida spokesman[209] after he and three other prisoners escaped from detention at America's Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan in July 2005;[210] and

- Mustafa Abu al-Yazid,[211] an Egyptian extremist whose involvement in *jihad* dates to at least 1981, when he took part in the assassination of Anwar Sadat, and whose involvement with al-Qaida dates to the early 1990s, when he served as an accountant for some of bin Laden's Khartoum-based businesses.[212]

Even as Vinas participated in attacks on coalition troops, these leaders probed him for information on the commuter rail line that runs between New York City and Long Island, a piece of transportation infrastructure that Vinas knew well because he had ridden it countless times as

[204] USA v. John Doe (Defendant), Corrected Final Transcript of Criminal Cause for Motion to Close Courtroom Before the Honorable Nicholas G. Garaufis United States District Judge (08-CR-823 [NGG]), United States District Court Eastern District of New York, January 28, 2009. Note: "John Doe" clearly identifies himself as Vinas. The court asks: "Are you Bryant Neal Vinas?" and the defendant replies, "Yes, sir." Given that the defendant also allocates to his crimes against the United States, this document is hereafter referenced as the "Vinas allocution."
[205] Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, "American's odyssey to al Qaeda's heart," *CNN.com*, July 30, 2009.
[206] "Pakistan: Afghan al-Qaida link to plot," *Guardian Unlimited*, August 11, 2006.
[207] "Qaeda planner of London bombings dead: US official," *Agence France Presse*, April 9, 2008.
[208] Robertson and Cruickshank.
[209] For information on Abu Yahya's frequent role as an al-Qaida spokesman, see: "Al-Qaeda operative praises Red Mosque 'martyrs,'" *Agence France Presse*, July 31, 2007; "Senior Al-Qaeda militant eulogizes slain companion: report," *Agence France Presse*, March 3, 2008; "Al Qa'idah leader urgers Uighurs to launch jihad against China," *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political*, October 8, 2009; "Al-Qaeda calls for revenge over death of moneyman," *Agence France Presse*, July 30, 2010; "Maghreb branch of Al-Qa'idah said planning suicide attacks in Spain," *BBC Monitoring Europe - Political*, September 16, 2010; and "Qaeda wants revenge over Pakistani held by US," *Agence France Presse*, December 15, 2010.
[210] Michael Moss and Squad Mekhennet, "Rising leader for next phase of al Qaeda's war," *New York Times*, April 4, 2008.
[211] Robertson and Cruickshank.
[212] Adam Goldman and Brett J. Blackledge, "AP Sources: al-Qaida's Afghan head contacted Zazi," *Associated Press*, October 14, 2009.

a commuter.[213] However, this initial plan was cut short when coalition troops captured Vinas in November 2008.[214]

Because Zazi's 2009 plot also involved at least one of the same planners and also aimed at New York City, it was essentially a continuation of the Vinas plot. Specifically, Zazi and his coconspirators met with Rauf and two other al-Qaida planners, Saleh al-Somali and Adnan G. el Shukrijumah, in September 2008,[215] shortly before Vinas' capture. Given that some media sources also allege that Vinas and Zazi co-attended at least one planning meeting with unnamed al-Qaida leaders,[216] the circumstantial evidence suggests that two New York-based plots were linked rather closely.

Moreover, Zazi, Medunjanin, and Ahmedzay closely followed Vinas' path to al-Qaida. Like their predecessor, the trio of aspiring *jihadists* arrived in Pakistan in the hopes of fighting as insurgents for the Taliban and had to be actively recruited to al-Qaida. Zazi and his friends became convinced that they could best serve the *Salafist* cause by committing suicide-attacks in the West only after spending significant time with Rauf, al-Somali, and al-Shukrijumah.[217] Thus, in stark contrast to the self-conceived British plots, al-Qaida planners were the driving force that initiated these interlinked plots against New York. Zazi and his friends would likely have served the Taliban analogously to enlisted infantrymen if not for the influence of bin Laden's organization.

However, it is important not to overstate the extent of al-Qaida's organizational involvement in the planning of the 2009 subway plot. Some scholars, most notably Bruce

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[213] Vinas allocution.
[214] Rotella and Meyer.
[215] USA v. Adis Medunjanin, Abid Nasser, Adnan el Shukrijumah, Tariq Ur Rehman, and FNU LNU, United States District Court Eastern District of New York (Cr. No.: 10-019 (S-3) (RJD)), Superseding Indictment, 2010.
[216] Sebastian Rotella, ―U.S. sees homegrown Muslim extremism as rising threat," *Los Angeles Times*, December 7, 2009; available online: http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/07/nation/la-na-us-radicalization7-2009dec07/2.
[217] Zazi allocution; Ahmedzay allocution.

Hoffman, have assumed that bin Laden personally signed-off on the Zazi operation.[218] Available open-source information contains no explicit evidence to support this claim. There are no demonstrable direct links between the planners of the 2009 plot and bin Laden, and given that at the time of the plot's planning, bin Laden communicated only intermittently through couriers in a deliberate attempt to isolate himself from al-Qaida's senior and mid-level members in the name of operational security,[219] it would have been logistically challenging, if not entirely infeasible, for the dissident Saudi to have directed the attack.

Moreover, since Hoffman's assessment of bin Laden's role in the Zazi plot appeared in an article titled "The Leaderless Jihad's Leader," Hoffman seemed more concerned with mocking Sageman's competing (and equally problematic) "leaderless" characterization of *Salafist* terrorism than with conducting impartial analysis. To be blunt, Hoffman viewed the available evidence through rose colored lenses in an attempt to justify his long-held beliefs about the primacy of bin Laden's role in the global *jihad.* Al-Qaida clearly played an organizational role in the planning of the attack, but conclusions attributing a direct role to the highest echelons of the organization are premature and likely exaggerate the extent of hierarchy that existed within al-Qaida circa 2008. The planning of the Zazi plot cannot be traced beyond Rauf, al-Somali, and el-Shukrijumah.

Even more importantly, these operatives' shared role did not extend beyond high-level strategy; instead, al-Qaida relied on Zazi, Medunjanin, and Ahmedzay's knowledge of New York to plan the attack at a tactical level. Indeed, the men who recruited the trio to serve as suicide-bombers lacked the local knowledge necessary to effectively target the city. With the

[218] Bruce Hoffman, "The Leaderless Jihad's Leader: Why Osama Bin Laden Mattered," *Foreign Affairs*, May 13, 2011.
[219] Patricia Zengerle and Alister Bull, "Bin Laden was found at luxury Pakistan compound," *Reuters*, May 2, 2011; see also, "Phone call by Kuwaiti courier led to bin Laden," *Associated Press*, May 3, 2011.

possible exception of el-Shukrijumah, who lived in Brooklyn for a few years in his very early childhood, when his father served as an assistant imam at Brooklyn's Farooque Mosque under the Blind Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman,[220] there is no evidence to suggest that the al-Qaida men who initiated the plot had spent any significant time in the five boroughs. Ahmedzay even claims that the strategists took a special interest in him because he had particularly detailed knowledge of the city, obtained from years spent working as a cab driver, and was thus in an ideal position to plan the practical details of the operation. Ultimately, the al-Qaida strategists offered little specific guidance to the American recruits and simply told them —to hit well-known structures and to maximize the number of casualties."[221]

Toward those ends, Ahmedzay reconnoitered several targets after the attack-team returned from training in South Asia in early 2009. Then, without any apparent input from al-Qaida leaders abroad, he and Zazi made the decision to target the subway.[222] Their reasoning was simple: they wanted to conduct the attack by the end of *Ramadan*, which concluded on September 21, 2009, and they believed that Zazi, who played the role of bomb-maker, simply did not have time enough to manufacture sufficient quantities of explosives to allow the team to target a larger structure without altering the schedule of their attack.[223] Thus, al-Qaida provided a general strategic vision, but the Queens-based plotters exercised tremendous latitude at the tactical level and used their local knowledge to select specific targets. Much, if not all, of the detailed planning was the work of Zazi, Medunjanin, and Ahmedzay, rather than established members of al-Qaida.

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[220] Curt Anderson, "AP Exclusive: New al-Qaida leader knows US well," *Associated Press*, August 6, 2010.
[221] Ahmedzay allocution.
[222] Ibid.
[223] —Zarein Ahmedzay Pleads Guilty to Terror Violations in Connection with Al-Qaeda New York Subway Plot."

5.5.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

For reasons that remain unclear, the three American plotters split-up when they returned to the United States in January 2009. Ahmedzay and Medunjanin returned to Queens, but Zazi left New York for Aurora, Colorado, a suburb of Denver where his aunt and uncle were already living, and took work driving a van for an airport shuttle service. None of the available court documents mention that he or any of the other plotters received cash payments from any of the al-Qaida leaders they met, so it seems that Zazi, relied primarily, if not entirely, on his meager earnings from the limo company to purchase the chemicals he used to concoct explosives. As he paid no living expenses while at his aunt and uncle's home (they eventually threw Zazi out for failure to pay rent), and because the supplies used in the construction of the bomb were all inexpensive,[224] the lack of financial support from al-Qaida did not represent a substantial barrier for the attack team to overcome. The bombing was ultimately well within the American team members' independent means.

In terms of specifics, Zazi acquired the precursor chemicals necessary to manufacture explosives from beauty supply warehouses located near his Colorado home. He obtained six 16 oz. bottles of Clairol's "Liquid Developer Clairoxide," a hydrogen peroxide-based hair lightening product, in late July. About a month later, he purchased a dozen 32 oz. bottles of a similar product, namely "Ms. Kay 40 Volume Liquid Developer," from the same retailer and was captured on the store's security cameras on both occasions.[225] As a young, heavily-bearded Afghan, Zazi was hardly the stereotypical buyer of large quantities of hair bleach, and the store's

[224] USA v. Najibullah Zazi (Defendant), Memorandum of Law in Support of the Government's Motion for a Permanent Order of Detention (09-CR-663 [RJD]), United States District Court Eastern District of New York, submitted by Jeffrey W. Knox, September 24, 2009. (Hereafter "Zazi detention memo").
[225] Ibid.

employees took notice of his unusual purchases. When they asked why he needed so much hydrogen peroxide, he reportedly quipped that he ―had a lot of girlfriends."[226]

Perhaps leery of attracting more suspicion, Zazi obtained additional materials through straw purchases. In July, an individual who court documents have yet to identify by name ―purchased a one-gallon container of a product containing 20% hydrogen peroxide" and ―an eight ounce bottle of acetone."[227] A second accomplice purchased another acetone-based product in early September, and a third man bought 32 oz. bottles of another brand of peroxide-based hair product, namely ―Ion Sensitive Scalp Developer," three times for Zazi in July and August.[228]

By examining the going prices of these products, it is easy to obtain a fairly accurate idea of just how affordable homemade explosives are. Acetone, which manicurists use to remove nail polish, sells in beauty stores for about $2.19 per 8 oz. bottle.[229] Similarly, online retailers list the Clairoxide developer at between $2.35[230] and $5.95[231] per 16 oz. bottle. Though the 32 oz. bottle of Ms. Kay developer is of identical concentration and is twice the size, it sells for comparable prices and can be obtained for $4.95 per bottle.[232] Nor is the Ion product prohibitively priced; it sells for around $5.49 per 32 oz. bottle.[233] Therefore, on average, the precursor chemicals that Zazi required sold for about 22 cents per ounce, and all of the chemicals that the plotters are known to have purchased could have been obtained for approximately $140.

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[226] ―Terror suspect stocked up beauty supplies," *CNN Justice*, September 24, 2009; available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-24/justice/terror.indictment_1_mohammed-wali-zazi-najibullah-zazi-ahmad-wais-afzali?_s=PM:CRIME.
[227] Zazi detention memo.
[228] Ibid.
[229] ―Beauty Secrets Pure Acetone Manicurist Solvent 8 oz.," available from sallybeauty.com.
[230] ―Clairol Clairoxide 40 Volume Clear Liquid Developer," available from fouryoursalon.com.
[231] ―CLAIROL Professional 40 Clairoxide Maximum Lift 40 Volume Clear Developer 16 oz/473 ml," available from hairproducts.com.
[232] ―Ms. Kay 40 Volume Liquid Developer (32 oz)," available from frendsbeautysupply.com.
[233] ―Ion Sensitive Scalp 40 Volume Crème Developer 32 oz.," available from sallybeauty.com.

Beyond hydrogen peroxide and acetone, industrial-strength acid was the only remaining ingredient that Zazi needed to manufacture explosives. However, it seems that he had planned to obtain this ingredient after meeting-up with his co-conspirators in Queens. On September 8, just one day before he began the long drive from Denver to New York, he searched the Internet for home improvement merchants located in Flushing, Queens. After locating a store, he scoured its retail webpage for a product that would meet his needs, ultimately settling on "Klean Strip Green Safer Muriatic Acid," a product that was supposed to produce fewer fumes and be safer to handle than conventional acids.[234] Given that this product retails online for about $28 per gallon,[235] it would not have added much to the cost of the operation.

Indeed, the plotters' likely spent far more on everyday items, like transportation costs and lodging, than they did on explosives. For example, Zazi twice rented motel rooms with kitchenettes in order to concentrate the hydrogen peroxide content of the hair supplies by boiling them, and in early September, he spent money on a rental car and gasoline to transport his homemade explosives cross-country from Denver to New York.[236] Since the supplies purchased by Zazi's co-conspirators in New York included only the backpacks the plotters were to use to conceal the bombs, some batteries, an electronic scale, and a few other commonly-available items,[237] the total cost of the operation could have been no higher than a couple of thousand dollars. Given this low cost, it is exceptionally likely that the 2009 attack-team received no financial or logistical assistance from bin Laden's organization. Indeed, Zazi claims to have

[234] Zazi detention memo.
[235] "Gkgm 75006 1g Safe Muriatic Acid," available online: http://www.thehardwarecity.com/products/Gkgm75006-1g-Safe-Muratic-Acid/6273999.
[236] Zazi detention memo.
[237] Ibid.

donated money and computers to al-Qaida during his initial training,[238] suggesting that the recruits supplied al-Qaida with funding, rather than the other way around.

5.5.3 TRAINING

The same is not, however, true of the American plotters' training. Zazi, Medunjanin, and Ahmedzay knew nothing about the conduct of terrorism prior to their recruitment by al-Qaida. During the course of small arms training, which took place in Waziristan in the fall of 2008, Rauf and the other al-Qaida members convinced the trio of New Yorkers to abandon their initial intentions toward insurgency and to attack the United States at the behest of bin Laden's organization. Once this initial training concluded, Medunjanin returned to New York, while Zazi and Ahmedzay visited with family members in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[239]

The plan was for the two remaining New Yorkers to return to Waziristan for some additional specialized instruction in explosives, but Ahmedzay got cold feet and never made the trip.[240] Zazi lacked his friend's compunction and spent another month in Waziristan under the tutelage of al-Qaida bomb-makers.[241] The nature of this instruction placed him in the same intellectual lineage as the London bombers before him.

However, the path was somewhat convoluted. After training Siddiqui Khan in 2005,[242] Abu Obaidah worked closely with Rashid Rauf, one of the men who recruited Zazi and his friends to attack Manhattan at al-Qaida's behest, in another London-based plot, which sought to use liquid-based explosives to down trans-Atlantic jetliners departing Heathrow. Abu Obaidah

[238] Zazi allocution.
[239] Ibid; Ahmedzay statement
[240] Ahmedzay statement.
[241] Zazi allocution.
[242] Duncan Gardham, "Mystery bomb-maker 'linked three gangs,'" *Daily Telegraph* (London), September 9, 2008; Luke Harding and Rosie Cowan, "Pakistan militants linked to London attacks: Two bombers travelled together, documents show: Leader of plot also said to have visited Israel," *The Guardian* (London), July 19, 2005.

then died of a long-lingering hepatitis infection sometime in the spring of 2008,[243] roughly nine months before Zazi's explosives training. However, given the Egyptian bomb-maker's previous association with Rauf and the similarities between Zazi's plot and Siddiqui Khan's attack, it seems exceptionally likely that Rauf transmitted Abu Obaidah's knowledge to Zazi.

Court documents also suggest that Ferid Imam, an Ethiopian-born Canadian citizen,[244] may have played a role in Zazi's bomb-training. Prosecutors filed a superseding indictment in July 2010 that charged Imam with providing material support to terrorism and aiding and abetting Zazi, Medunjanin, and Ahmedzay ~~in~~ receiving military-type training" on behalf of al-Qaida.[245] Given that Imam was in the process of finishing an advanced degree in biochemistry at the University of Manitoba when he and two classmates pulled-up stakes and departed for the Afghan *jihad* in 2007,[246] he certainly had the knowledge necessary to teach Zazi the basic scientific techniques involved in the manufacture of explosives. However, currently available documents neglect to specify the exact nature of Imam's role in the subway plot.

Regardless of who trained him, it seems clear that Zazi was a poor student. In general, his scholastic aptitude was questionable. Zazi failed to graduate high-school[247] and spent his entire professional career in unskilled jobs, such as selling coffee from a cart in southern Manhattan and driving a shuttle van at the Denver airport,[248] neither of which did anything to

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[243] "Qaeda planner of London bombings dead: US official," *Agence France Presse*, April 9, 2008.
[244] INTERPOL, ~~I~~mam, Ferid Ahmed," date unknown; available online: http://www.interpol.int/@en/Wanted-Persons/%28wanted_id%29/2011-17152.
[245] USA v. Ferid Imam, et al (Defendants), Superseding indictment (Cr. No. 10-019 [S-3] [RJD]), United States District Court Eastern District of New York, July 7, 2010.
[246] Warren Richey, "Canadian charged with helping Najibullah Zazi in New York bomb plot," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 15, 2011; available online: http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0315/Canadian-charged-with-helping-Najibullah-Zazi-in-New-York-bomb-plot. ~~T~~error charges laid against former Winnipeggers," *CBC News* (Canada), March 15, 2011; available online: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2011/03/15/mb-terrorism-charges-winnipeg.html.
[247] Zazi allocution.
[248] Michael Wilson, ~~F~~rom Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect," *New York Times*, September 25, 2009; available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html?pagewanted=all.

hone the chemistry skills necessary to manufacture explosives. His specific mastery of bomb-making techniques was similarly debatable. Although Zazi obtained hands-on experience in bomb-making while Waziristan, and although he possessed a digital copy of the bomb-making manual al-Qaida had used to train him, he sent frantic email messages—all of which apparently went unanswered—to his contacts abroad seeking information on the ~~–c~~orrect mixtures of ingredients to make explosives."[249] Zazi did not know how much combustible organic material, namely flour and butterfat (ghee), to add to the concoction. In short, there were some clear holes in Zazi's training. He was hardly a master bomb-maker and may simply have lacked the intellectual capacity to produce explosives on his own.

5.5.4 SUMMATION

Though Zazi's team was far less flamboyant than Ibrahim's, the two groups had much in common. Both teams seem to have undertaken their own tactical-level planning; both teams seem to have been self-sufficient in terms of finance, and both teams had explicit training ties to al-Qaida. Although Abu Obaidah's death precluded the teams from sharing the same trainer, Rauf's ties to Abu Obaidah and subsequent involvement in Zazi's instruction even place both attacks in the same specific training lineage

Similarly, the same criticisms apply to both the July 21 attack-team and the attack team which Zazi led in 2009. Ibrahim and Zazi both possessed educational backgrounds suggesting their intellectual capabilities were below average, and neither man had an employment history suggesting that they had developed practical skills in chemistry. It seems somewhat surprising that al-Qaida selected them to play crucial roles in the organization's larger strategy against the West. Clearly, al-Qaida had either abandoned or simply chose to ignored the screening questionnaires Atef once used to evaluate the 9/11 hijackers.

[249] Zazi detention memo.

In combination with the organization‘s apparent inability to provide attack-teams with much, if anything, in the way of financial or logistical support, these personnel quality issues have greatly mitigated the scale of the threat posed by hit squads. While it would be premature to dismiss the possibility of a resurgence in al-Qaida‘s capabilities, the quality of the hit squads al-Qaida has deployed to the West have devolved substantially in the decade following 9/11. The security threat that such attack-teams pose today is an order of magnitude smaller than it was at the height of al-Qaida‘s prowess in 2001.

5.6 CONCLUSION

When viewed in tandem with the non-Western cases discussed in the previous chapter, the five events discussed above suggest that al-Qaida was not a successfully adaptive organization between 2001 and 2009. Table 5.1 demonstrates that, at the organizational level, both the extent and nature of al-Qaida‘s involvement in Western hit squad attacks declined over time. Circa 2001, when al-Qaida conducted the 9/11 attacks, the organization tightly controlled virtually every aspect of attacks on the West, but as event progressed through the various attempts on London, bin Laden‘s organization became increasingly more distant from events. By the time that Najibullah Zazi and his associates attempted to bomb the New York City subway in 2009, al-Qaida‘s role was limited to the provision of training and a measure of strategic guidance.

Table 5.1: Al-Qaida's Declining Role in Hit Squad Attacks

September 11, 2001, Attacks New York and Washington, D.C.

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Definite	AQ members involved at all levels of planning
Finance	Definite	AQ provided all known financing
Logistics	Definite	AQ members and funds involved in the acquisition of all key resources
Training	Definite	All members of the attack teams received specialized AQ training prior to the attack

2004 Fertilizer Bomb Plot Against London

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Partial	AQ shaped attack's strategic goals, but lacked clear role in tactical planning
Finance	Unlikely	Low cost of attack sugests self-finance
Logistics	Partial	AQ provided aluminum powder; manpower acquired via Khyam's personal network
Training	Definite	All members of the attack team received training in South Asia

July 7, 2005, London Bombings

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Partial	AQ provided technical planning; attack likely a strategic continuation of fertlizer plot
Finance	Unlikely	Attack self-funded via crime and participants' savings
Logistics	Unlikely	Attackers independently acquired all peroxide; manpower acquired via Siddique Khan's personal network
Training	Definite	All but one member of the attack team received AQ training prior to the attack

July 21, 2005, Failed Bombing of London

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Partial	AQ provided technical planning, other details unknown
Finance	Unlikely	Low-cost of attack suggests self-finance
Logistics	Unlikely	Attackers independently acquired all peroxide; manpower obtained via Hamid and Ibrahim's ideological network
Training	Partial	Bomb-maker received training from AQ

2009 Plot Against New York's Mass Transit System

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Partial	Strategic shaping, but no clear tactical component
Finance	Unlikely	Attack self-funded via participants' savings
Logistics	Unlikely	Attackers independently acquired all peroxide
Training	Definite	All members of the attack team received training in South Asia

Similar trends were also evident at the individual level. The quality of al-Qaida‘s personnel, their training, their access to logistical resources, and their access to external funding all devolved rather than evolved. Admittedly, the organization‘s many attempts to utilize outsiders and novice *jihadists* in the years after 2001 suggest that al-Qaida attempted to compensate for the tremendous attention it received from the global security community in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks by consciously shifting from a hierarchical bureaucratic structure to a flatter, less formal structure, but a preponderance of evidence demonstrates that a concomitant decline in the organization‘s ability to recruit, train, and support quality personnel also took place. Indeed, the post-9/11 hit squads made numerous and often egregious mistakes, such as: Sidique Khan‘s poor tactical planning, Hamid, Ahmet, and Omar‘s flamboyant support of radical Islam, Ibrahim‘s inability to perform basic math, and Zazi‘s inability to remember his training, despite owning a copy of al-Qaida‘s bomb-making manual. Consequently, al-Qaida is aptly

described as an experimental organization, but the many theorists who extol the group‘s ability to successfully innovate and reorganize greatly overstate the case.

While this conclusion strongly suggests that the probability that al-Qaida will conduct a successful mass-casualty attack is substantially lower than it was a decade ago, this finding applies only to those events in which the organization played a strong functional role. In order to fully evaluate the scale of the threat the organization poses, it is necessary to examine instances in which al-Qaida has acted almost via proxy, by supporting attacks and plots primarily conducted by other organizations. Consequently, the next chapter examines terrorist events to which bin Laden‘s organization has been weakly linked.

6.0 ENTREPRENEURSHIP, EVOLUTION, AND THE FLUCTUATION OF RELATIONSHIPS AMONG TERRORISTS WITH WEAK FUNCTIONAL TIES TO AL-QAIDA

Analysts often discuss al-Qaida's relationships with other terrorist organizations in terms of grand strategy. For example, in 2011, Barak Mendelsohn argued that al-Qaida sought to expand "on a much broader geographic scale" by establishing "a public and permanent presence in the form of [regional] branches carrying the al-Qaeda name."[1] Similarly, Bill Braniff and Assaf Moghadam, of West Point's Combatting Terrorism Center, argued in 2011 that al-Qaida deliberately completed a structural transition into "a multi-polar organization with a central hub in North Waziristan and a small number of autonomous regional nodes."[2]

These authors are correct in suggesting that al-Qaida plans for the future; however, they likely overstate the extent of the organization's control over the nature of its relationships with other terror groups. This chapter, which explores over-time patterns among events that display weak functional ties to al-Qaida, suggests that changes to inter-organizational relationships are exceptionally incremental and reflect gradual evolutionary trends, rather than discrete strategic decisions about the nature and extent of cooperation. As evidence of this pattern, this chapter considers five cases involving al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah: (1) the 2002 Bali bombings, (2) the 2003 bombing of the Jakarta Marriott hotel, (3) the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy

[1] Barak Mendelsohn, "Al Qaeda's Franchising Strategy," *Survival*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (June-July 2011), pp. 19-25.
[2] Bill Braniff and Assaf Moghadam, "Towards Global Jihadism: Al-Qaeda's Strategic, Ideological, and Structural Adaptations since 9/11," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2011); available online: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/braniff-towards-global-jihadism/html.

in Jakarta, (4) the 2005 Bali bombings, and (5) the 2009 near-simultaneous bombings of the Jakarta Marriott and the Ritz-Carlton hotels. When viewed in sequence, these cases demonstrate that al-Qaida held the greatest strategic influence over Southeast Asian terror at the time of the 2002 Bali bombings, but this influence degraded steadily and incrementally over time, as Hambali and other key operatives that bound JI to al-Qaida were lost, and as the influence of Noordin Mohd Top gradually rose, until he became regarded as Southeast Asia's most dangerous terrorist and began operating largely independent of both al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah.[3]

Following this introduction, this chapter contains eight sections. Since this chapter focuses extensively on Noordin, the first section briefly outlines his background and early involvement in terrorism. The second through sixth sections then discuss each of the cases mentioned above in sequence, before the seventh section presents some network measurements that offer additional evidence demonstrating that the charismatic leadership of Noordin and his primary partner, the bomb-making expert Azahari bin Husin, held-together the loose network responsible for conducting the best-known Islamist-motivated terror attacks perpetrated in Indonesia after the 2002 Bali bombings. Finally, the eighth section offers some broad conclusions regarding the nature and extent of al-Qaida's involvement in events displaying weak functional ties to the organization. In order to ensure even comparison, each of the qualitative cases also follow the same internal structure and contain sub-sections discussing the attack's planning, logistics and finance, and training, as well as a brief summation that compares the event to preceding cases.

[3] For the characterization of Noordin as Southeast Asia's most dangerous terrorist, see: Seth Mydans, ―A Terrorist Mastermind Whose Luck Ran Out," *New York Times*, September 17, 2009.

6.1 BACKGROUND

Noordin's involvement with Islamist terrorism began not with al-Qaida, but with Jemaah Islamiyah. His first affiliation was ideological; while a master's student at Malaysia Technical University in the mid-1990s, Noordin began taking religious classes at Luqmanul Hakiem Pesantren, an Islamic school in Johor, Malaysia, that functioned analogously to more-familiar South Asian *madrassas*. The school was run by veteran members of JI; for example, Ali Ghufron (a.k.a. Mukhlas), of Bali-bombing infamy, served as the school's headmaster. By 1998, Noordin had become a full-fledged member of JI, and when the organization decided that Luqmanul might draw-in more local students if it were headed by a Malaysian, he took-over Ali Ghufron's directorship, at least in name.[4]

Noordin's formal terror training, little of it that there was, also took place within Jemaah Islamiyah. Unlike many of JI's other high-ranking members, Noordin did not participate in the Soviet-Afghan War, nor train in an al-Qaida camp. Instead, he completed a short, two week course at Camp Hudiabiyah, a JI training facility that was located on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao in territory controlled by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an Islamist insurgent group that had a long-standing cooperative relationship with JI.[5] Given this scant training and his role as Luqmanul's headmaster, it is little surprise that Noordin's initial role in the organization was primarily logistical and ideological in nature.

However, when the Malaysian government cracked-down on extremists following the 9/11 attacks, Noodin's circumstances began to change. He and many other individuals affiliated with Luqmanul were forced to flee to Indonesia. By mid-2002, several of them, including Noordin, were living in Bukittinggi, on the island of Sumatra, where they ran a small repair shop

[4] International Crisis Group, "Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks," ICG Asia Report No. 114, May 5, 2006. (Hereafter, "Noordin's Networks.")
[5] Nasir bin Abas, interview conducted August 2010, Jakarta, Indonesia.

together. The group soon grew to include the bomb-maker Azahari Husin, another Malaysian, who Noordin had first met years earlier when the two had overlapping stints at Malaysia Technical University, where Azahari once taught classes in statistics and housing policy.[6] Operationally speaking, the two men would brush past al-Qaida in the course of the 2002 Bali bombings, before initiating a more direct relationship with bin Laden's organization that briefly spiked in 2003, and then gradually degraded during the course of Noordin's multi-year campaign of terror.

6.2 THE 2002 BALI BOMBINGS: NOORDIN'S FIRST BRUSH WITH AL-QAIDA

Just after 11.00pm, on October 10, 2002, a young Indonesian named Iqbal detonated a backpack filled with explosives inside Paddy's Pub, a nightclub popular with Australian tourists located in Kuta's busy commercial district on the island of Bali, killing himself and a handful of patrons in the process. The survivors immediately fled into the street, where a powerful 1,000kg car-bomb laid waiting hidden inside of a white Mitsubishi van. Dulmatin, an Indonesian graduate of al-Qaida's Afghan camps, used a cell phone to trigger the massive device just a few seconds later, causing the bulk of the coordinated attack's 202 fatalities. At the gates of the U.S. Consulate in Denpassar, located several miles away from the other attack sites, Idris, another Indonesian with experience in Afghanistan, remotely-triggered a third bomb, hidden inside of a backpack that had purportedly been filled with excrement to inflict "moral damage." However, this final explosion injured only a single gate guard and caused some minor property damage.[7]

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[6] Ibid.

[7] For an official count of the victims of the Bali attack and several official photos of the aftermath, see: Australian Federal Police, "Bali bombings 2202," date unknown, available online: http://web.archive.org/web/20060618005353/http://afp.gov.au/international/operations/previous_operations/bali_bombings_2002. For a superb journalist summary of the attack, see: Sally Neighbor, *In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia*, (Sydney, Australia: Harper Collins, 2004).

A number of sources have alleged that al-Qaida played an important role in these bombings. For example, American government sources claim that KSM played an as-yet unspecified part in planning the attack,[8] and media outlets publicized a claim of responsibility that al-Qaida made in the attack's aftermath.[9] However, evidence drawn primarily from first-person accounts of the terrorists involved in the Bali attacks demonstrates that al-Qaida's role in the 2002 Bali bombing was less substantial. Bin Laden's organization played a strategic role, as members of al-Qaida helped to shape JI's grand vision of *jihad*, and bin Laden likely provided one stream of revenue that supported the attacks, but given that the attackers had two other substantial pools of funding from which to draw, it remains impossible to definitively prove that the dissident Saudi's money directly funded the Bali blast. Al-Qaida did, however, play a demonstrable indirect role, by training several of the operation's key participants years earlier, during the tail-end of the Soviet-Afghan War. Given these ties, this attack was weakly tied to bin Laden's organization according to the strict formal cut-points used in the classification analysis, but was strongly tied to Jemaah Islamiyah.

Noordin's role in the Bali bombings was even less substantial. Like al-Qaida, he helped to shape the grand strategy that motivated the Bali bombings, but his role in their specific planning was negligible, if it existed at all. Similarly, he played no role in the attack's funding, logistics, or operations. As the Bali bombings represented his first demonstrable active involvement in a terrorist event, his initial interaction with al-Qaida was truly fleeting.

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[8] Verbatim Transcript for Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10024 (Khalid Sheikh Mohammed); see also, Maria Ressa, "Philippines: U.S. missed 9/11 clues years ago," CNN.com, July 26, 2003.

[9] Specifically, al-Qaida claimed to have targeted "nightclubs and whorehouses" in Bali because they were part of a "Jewish-Crusader alliance." For additional details, see: "Sari Club: Al Qaeda admits Bali blasts on Web," *CNN World*, November 7, 2002; available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2002-11-07/world/bali.bombings.qaeda_1_jewish-crusader-alliance-nightclubs-and-whorehouses-bali-bomb?_s=PM:asiapcf.

6.2.1 PLANNING

The idea of bombing nightclubs that cater to Westerners seems to have originated at a meeting that Hambali held in Bangkok, Thailand, in early 2002. However, the evidence suggests that these early discussions took place primarily at the strategic level. The meeting's participants agreed to focus on ―soft targets," like bars and nightclubs, but had not yet singled-out Bali as their first target, much less selected Paddy's Pub and the Sari Club as specific attack sites. As Noordin took part in these discussions, he helped to set the grand strategy that led to the Bali bombings.[10] Al-Qaida's analogous role stemmed from the attendance and participation of Mohamed Mansour Jabarah,[11] a Kuwaiti-born Canadian citizen who swore *bayat* to bin Laden in 2001 and held exceptionally close ties to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.[12]

An additional strategic refinement to the soft-target strategy took place in May, when another meeting was held, this time in Solo, Indonesia, at the home of Dulmatin,[13] a Jemaah Islamiyah member who had been involved in radical Islam since training in al-Qaida's Sada Camp on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan in the late 1980s.[14] The four-man meeting was headed by Ali Ghufron, who had mentored Noordin at Luqmanul, and was attended by Ali Imron, who was one of Ghufron's younger brothers; Imam Samudra, who alongside

[10] The exact timing of this meeting is in minor dispute; it is referenced as having occurred in both January and February. Raymond Bonner, "Threats and Responses: Southeast Asia; Qaeda meeting in Thailand reportedly plotted attacks on tourists," *New York Times*, November 8, 2002; Four Corners, "The Bali Confessions: Chronology," *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, 2011.
[11] Bonner. Hambali and Jabarah also met in Butterworth, Malaysia, in early 2002. See: Kimina Lyall, "Trail cold on Asia's most wanted - TERROR HITS HOME," *The Australian*, November 12, 2002.
[12] Jabarah's brother, who died in shootout with Saudi authorities in the aftermath of al-Qaida's 2003 Riyadh bombings, and Jabarah's childhood friend, Anas al Kandari, who died during the conduct of the 2002, KSM-planned assault on U.S. Marines at Filika island, in Kuwait, also serve to demonstrate the depth of Jabarah's ties to al-Qaida. USA v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (Defendant), United States District Court Southern District of New York (Crim. No.: 02 Crim. 1560), Indictment, date unknown; USA v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah (Defendant), United States District Court Southern District of New York (02 Cr. 1560 (BSJ)), Sentencing Memorandum, May 7, 2007.
[13] "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Imam Samudra (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000. (Hereafter, ―Samudra Interview").
[14] International Crisis Group, "Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous," ICG Asia Report No. 63, August 26, 2003. (Hereafter, ―Damaged But Still Dangerous.")

Hambali had served as a sort of field commander during JI's 2000 bombing of Christian churches across Indonesia on Christmas Eve; and Dulmatin, the host. Specifically, the men discussed how the Christmas Eve bombings had been poorly received by Indonesia's Muslim community, and decided that the next attack should specifically target —America and its allies."[15] Neither Noordin, nor any al-Qaida men were present and, thus, played no role in this strategic refinement.

This gathering's conclusions were then validated by JI's *emir*, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, at a third strategic-level meeting. At Ba'asyir's home in Solo, Indonesia, Ghufron, Imron, and Samudra gathered again, and were joined by Ba'asyir and two other high-ranking members of Jemaah Islamiyah. The Christmas Eve bombings were again criticized as ineffective, and Ba'asyir instructed the men to proceed against Westerners as they had previously decided.[16] While this event irrefutably links JI's highest leader to the attack, it also demonstrates the small, marginal role that Noordin, as an individual, and al-Qaida, as an organization, played in planning JI's largest attack to date, because neither he nor any of bin Laden's representatives were present at this gathering.

Finally, specific planning for the attack began in August, when Ghufron and Samudra met at another JI member's home in Solo. At this meeting, Ali Ghufron suggested Bali as the target, and Samudra agreed. Ghufron then suggested that Samudra should lead the operation on the ground, no doubt because of the experience he had gained by coordinating the Christmas Eve bombings, and Samudra agreed to the arrangement.[17] From this point forward, Samudra took the lead at the tactical level, and would manage issues of materiel and attack site-selection, while Ghufron continued to support the bombing at a more strategic level, and provided Samudra with

[15] Samudra Interview.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.

the resources he needed to accomplish specific tasks. Both men would be involved in staffing decisions about which personnel to involve in the attack.

Toward fulfilling his role as field-commander, Samudra convened a more tactically-oriented meeting later that month in Paleban, Indonesia. While sitting inside the car of Amrozi, another of Ali Ghufron's brothers, Samudra assigned specific tasks to the men present. Amrozi would be the attack's primary logistical procurer; his most important task would be to secure explosives. Idris, another veteran of the Soviet-Afghan War and a graduate of bin Laden-affiliated Afghan training camps,[18] would assist Amrozi and was tasked with taking care of the attacks more mundane logistical needs, like transportation and accommodations in Bali. Dulmatin, the al-Qaida-trained extremist who hosted one of the earlier strategic level meetings, would serve as bomb-maker. The men convened again a few days later in Solo's Klewer market, and reaffirmed these roles. Thus, the primary team responsible for the Bali attack was set by late August 2002, and it included neither Noordin, nor any al-Qaida members.[19]

The four participants in the late-August meetings soon departed for Bali, where the remaining tactical planning for the attack took place. Masykur Abdul Kadir, a Balinese Muslim who served as the team's local fixer, drove Samudra, Amrozi, Idris, and Dulmatin around the island in early September 2002, to scout potential attack-sites. They were joined by two additional men: Ali Imron, who was another of Ali Ghufron's brothers, and Utomo Pamungkas

[18] Specifically, Idris graduated' from Sada Camp in 1987. While this precedes al-Qaida's founding by about a year, Sada Camp's chief trainer, Abdul Rasooly Sayyaf, began receiving money from bin Laden as early as 1986. For information on Idris's training in Afghanistan, see: "Damaged But Still Dangerous." For information on the timing and extent of bin Laden's funding to Sayyaf, see: Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 153-154.

[19] "Witness Interrogation Report of Imam Samudra," Detective Corps, The State Police of Republic of Indonesia (Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), January 23, 2003. (Hereafter, "Samudra Interrogation.")

(a.k.a. Mubarok),[20] who was another veteran of the Christmas Eve Bombings.[21] Following this initial scouting, a more detailed survey of the targets was conducted by Agus Hidayat, a young Indonesian who Samudra brought onto the attack team.[22] With the targets selected, Ali Ghufron arrived in Bali a few days later, and received a _tour' of Paddy's Pub and the Sari Club from Idris.[23] Thus, the specific attack sites had been chosen, scouted, and approved at the strategic level about a month before the attack took place.

Beyond his early role in setting JI's grand strategy, Noordin's only role in this attack's planning was passing and brief; it happened largely by accident. In September, after target-selection had been accomplished, Noordin and Dr. Azahari Hussin, his longtime friend and operational partner, traveled from Bukittinggi and showed-up unannounced and unexpected at Ghufron's home in Solo. Given that Azahari was an experienced bomb-maker, who purportedly helped to build some of the devices used in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings,[24] Ghufron took advantage of the situation and briefed his unexpected houseguests on the operation. Azahari went-on to assist in the design and construction of the bombs, but Noordin received no specific tasking. It is reasonable to speculate that he offered his advice on the plot, but his role does not seem to have gone any farther.[25]

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[20] Summary of Bali Persons of Interest in the 2002 Bali Bombings, Australian Federal Police, Date Unknown. (Hereafter, "Bali POIs.")
[21] "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Ali Imron (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000.
[22] International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," December 11, 2002 (Hereafter, "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates"); Eric Ellis, "Countdown to a bombing," *Globe and Mail* (Canada), May 12, 2003.
[23] "Witness Interrogation Report of Ali Ghufron," Detective Corps, The State Police of Republic of Indonesia (Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), December 5, 2002. (Hereafter, "Ghufron Interrogation.")
[24] "Malaysian authorities worried over Jemaah Islamiyah fugitives," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 23, 2004.
[25] Ghufron Interrogation.

6.2.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

The money to conduct the 2002 Bali attacks came from three sources: Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Hambali, and crime. Ba'asyir's contribution was the earliest of the three. During the strategic meeting that took place at his home in Solo, JI's *emir* handed Ghufron the equivalent of several thousand U.S. dollars, but the funds were split across three currencies: about $6,000 was in U.S. bills; an amount equivalent to approximately 9,700 USD was in Singaporean dollars, and the equivalent of another roughly 4,000 USD was in Malaysian Ringgit.[26] The available information does not stipulate how Ba'asyir obtained the money in the first place, but given his position within the organization, and given that JI taxed its members' incomes at a rate of five percent as a type of membership dues,[27] it is reasonable to speculate that these monies came from the organization's internal revenue stream.

Hambali's contribution was roughly equivalent in size; he provided Ghufron with $25,000 late in the summer of 2002. The source of the funds has never been definitively proven, but Ghufron believed that the money "originated from Afghanistan and might be from Syihk [sic] Usama Bin Laden."[28] Thus, at first blush, it seems that reasonably strong circumstantial evidence suggests that al-Qaida played a role in funding the 2002 Bali bombings.

Finally, a robbery conducted in Banten in on August 22 provided approximately $40,000 of additional funding.[29] Using guns provided by Samudra, Agus Hidayat, who also conducted some surveillance in support of the Bali operation, led a small team in the armed robbery of "Elita Gold Jewelers," a Chinese-owned business that the attackers justified targeting on the

[26] Samudra Interview.
[27] "Damaged But Still Dangerous," p. 12.
[28] Ghufron Interrogation. For information on the timing of Ghufron's payments to Samudra, see: Samudra Interrogation.
[29] Ellis quotes the figure at $60,000, but as he was writing in a Canadian paper, it seems logical to assume his figure was in Canadian currency. The 40,000 USD figure stems from the conversion of Ellis original value at the US-Canadian exchange rate that prevailed in 2002, at the time of the robbery.

grounds that the store's non-Muslim owners were a pollutant that poisoned Indonesia's Islamic culture.[30] Thus, the total funds available for the 2002 Bali attacks seems to have been in the neighborhood of $110,000.

During his later interrogation by police, Ghufron was kind enough to provide a rough list of expenditures incurred during the course of the Bali operation, but his totals do not square with the amount of money that was placed at attack team's disposal. Ghufron's budget included:[31]

- Approximately $3,300 for the purchase of explosives;
- Approximately $5,500 for the purchase of automobiles;
- Approximately $1,700 for the purchase of motor-scooters (a necessity for navigating some sections of Kuta's tourist district that are too crowded for cars to pass easily);
- Approximately $6,600 for housing accommodations and communications equipment; and
- Approximately $6,600 that Ghufron held aside, though it remains unclear if these monies represented a contingency fund, or if he simply skimmed a few thousand dollars for his own use.

As these line items total to only $23,700, they could have been covered by any one of the three revenue streams that purportedly funded the attack. Ghufron claims the remaining money, some $86,000 if the revenue estimates are accurate, went to support the insurgency that Islamists were then fighting against Christians on the island of Ambon, in the eastern portion of the Indonesian archipelago.[32] Thus, while the transfer that likely took place between bin Laden (or his emissaries), Hambali, and Ghufron shows demonstrable financial ties between JI and al-Qaida, the fungible nature of money and the fairly low cost of the Bali operation dictate that it is unclear how much, if any, of al-Qaida's money went toward the 2002 bombing.

[30] "How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates." See also, Bali POIs.
[31] The Ghufron Interrogation provided the figures in Indonesian Rupiah; they have been converted at the US-Indonesian exchange rate that prevailed in late summer, 2002.
[32] Ibid.

Nor did al-Qaida play any demonstrable role in the procurement of supplies. Amrozi ultimately took the lead in this regard. He acquired the explosives used in the attack from Silvester Tendean, the somewhat corrupt owner of chemical supply outlet in Surbaya, Indonesia, who filed false invoices to hide the purchase of nitrogen-based fertilizer simply because Amrozi bribed him to do so.[33] Amrozi also acquired the Mitsubishi van that served as the attack's bomb-vehicle, buying it second-hand and then personally modifying it to support the weight of the 1,000kg bomb,[34] before Utomo Pamungkas transported it to Bali via ferry in early October.[35] Other members of the attack team on the ground in Bali purchased motor-scooters and some communications equipment, so it is safe to conclude that all of the requisitioning necessary to complete the Bali bombings took place entirely within Jemaah Islamiyah.

Manpower, the final logistical resource needed to complete the attack, was obtained in two ways. Ali Ghufron recruited most of the key members from within JI's existing infrastructure. As demonstrated by the inclusion of his brothers Ali Imron and Amrozi, as well as the inclusion of his long-time associates Imam Samudra, Idris, and Utomo Pamungkas, Ghufron drew heavily on personal ties to build the attack team.

Samudra completed the recruiting process. In the year prior to the attack, he worked as a teacher in Malimping, Indonesia, and used his position to draw some of his students into *jihad.* For example, Agus Hidayat, who conducted some surveillance of the Bali targets and led the group responsible for the gold store robbery, and Iqbal, who also participated in the robbery before being selected to serve as the operation's martyr, had both studied under Samudra and had

[33] Martin Chulov, "Hambali's finger on the trigger - Terror hits home," *The Weekend Australian*, November 9, 2002; Bali POIs; "Witness Interrogation Report of Amrozi," Detective Corps, State Police of Republic of Indonesia (Report No.: LP591/XII/2000), February 24, 2003.
[34] Chulov; "The Bali bombing plotters," *BBC News*, March 10, 2010; Bali POIs; Ellis.
[35] Bali POIs.

no other apparent ties to JI.[36] Suffice it to say, neither Noordin nor al-Qaida played an apparent role in staffing the Bali operation.

6.2.3 TRAINING

Al-Qaida's operational role in the 2002 Bali bombings was indirect and stems primarily from training. Several members of the attack team trained in Afghanistan in camps linked to bin Laden, but many of these interactions took place a decade or more earlier. For example, although Ghufron and Idris trained in a bin Laden-funded camp, their training began circa 1986, roughly two years before al-Qaida's formal establishment.[37] Dulmatin, Samudra, Utomo Pamunkas, and Imron's training was slightly more recent and was more directly attributable to al-Qaida as an organization, because they studied in Afghan camps at various points between 1989 and 1991.[38] Neither Masykur, who served as the attacker's local connection in Bali; Amrozi, who assumed responsibility for many of the attack's logistical needs; Agus Hidayat, the young disciple of Samudra's who assisted in the surveillance of the attack sites and led the team that robbed the gold store in Banten; nor Iqbal, the operation's martyr, had formal training of any type. Azahari, who assisted Dulmatin in making the explosive devices used in the Bali attacks, offers the closest connection between al-Qaida and the 2002 bombings, because he trained in Afghanistan circa 2000.[39]

[36] ~~"H~~How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates;" Ellis.
[37] ~~"D~~amaged But Still Dangerous."
[38] Ibid.
[39] "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Ali Ghufron (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000; see also: "Malaysian authorities worried over Jemaah Islamiyah fugitives," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 23, 2004; Jasbant Singh, "With Hambali caught, search for top Southeast Asian terrorist turns to bespectacled Malaysian bomber," *Associated Press Worldstream*, August 15, 2003.

6.2.4 SUMMATION

Notwithstanding al-Qaida's claims of responsibility, the 2002 Bali bombings were weakly tied to bin Laden's organization and strongly tied to Jemaah Islamiyah. As demonstrated by Mohammed Mansour Jabarah's participation in Hambali's early strategic meetings, al-Qaida helped to shape the grand strategy that guided the attack, but the organization's lack of demonstrable participation in any subsequent meetings, most especially those that discussed the specifics of the Bali operation, suggests that the *real* planning for 2002 bombing was conducted within Jemaah Islamiyah. Al-Qaida's financial ties to JI are fairly well established at the organizational level by the $25,000 transfer that passed from bin Laden to Hambali made to Ghufron; however, it is not clear that these funds directly supported the Bali blasts, because the size of the other revenue streams at Ghufron's disposal far exceeded the reported cost of the operation, even if the itemized budget that he provided to investigators far understated the attack's total cost. Training constitutes al-Qaida's most direct role in the attack, but given that many of these interactions were historical and occurred more than a decade prior to the bombing, it is difficult to state that they constitute evidence of al-Qaida's organizational involvement in the same way that near-term training ties do in regards to the hit-squad attacks discussed in the fifth chapter. Put more simply, organizations at some point lose control over the people they that they train. This same logic applies to estimations of al-Qaida's role in the most active portion of the attack, the triggering of the explosive devices. Indeed, the only individual who sacrificed his life in the conduct of the attacks seems to have never left Indonesia.

Noordin's role in the bombing was similarly weak. He also helped to formulate the strategy that guided the attack, but his role in the specific planning was negligible. He played no part in the attack's finance or logistics, and he did not participate in its operational phase. Thus,

as it regards the Bali bombings, Noordin's overlap with al-Qaida was exceptionally weak. They participated together only in the vague strategic phase of the attack, but their respective involvements were otherwise confined to different spheres, with Noordin playing an exceptionally minute role in planning, and al-Qaida playing a larger, though somewhat vague, role in the attack's finance and a historical role training several of the Bali operatives. However, this pattern would not repeat the following year, when Noordin led the team that bombed the Jakarta Marriott hotel in August of 2003.

6.3 THE 2003 JAKARTA MARRIOTT BOMBING

On August 5, 2003, Asmar Latin Sani drove a mini-van into the horseshoe-shaped driveway of the Jakarta Marriott, but his vehicle was so laden with explosives that it struggled up the slight incline that separated the hotel's elevated entrance from the street. The van's difficulty was substantial enough to draw the attention of the hotel's security guards, several of whom began to approach the suspicious vehicle. Asmar then panicked and detonated his bomb before the truck was fully in position.[40] A dozen people died in the blast, and another 150 were injured.[41] However, knowledgeable observers speculate that the damage would have been on the scale of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which destroyed a federal building, if Asmar had driven alongside the lobby before triggering the explosion.[42]

This event represented Noordin's first strong operational role in a terrorist attack; he effectively functioned as JI's field commander during the bombing. Although Noordin seems to have planned the attack without much assistance from JI's senior leadership, he received their

[40] "Noordin's Networks." See also, "Al Qaeda 'trained' Jakarta bombers," *CNN.com*, August 9, 2003; Joe Cochrane with Peter Janssen, "Illusions of security," *Newsweek*, August 18, 2003.
[41] "Indonesia considers measures after attack," *Reuters*, August 14, 2003.
[42] Sources quoted in Cochrane and Janssen.

direct operational and logistical support, thereby demonstrating that the broader organization played an incredibly strong role in the attack. Al-Qaida's role was substantially weaker. The organization provided some, but not all, of the attack's funding, and does not seem to have shaped the attack's planning in the same indirect way implied by Jabarah's participation in the first strategy meeting that preceded the 2002 Bali bombings.

6.3.1 PLANNING

Noordin exhibited a fair amount of independence in his attack planning. Without the apparent input of higher-ranking JI leaders, he recruited his own team, drawing heavily on Luqmanul Hakiem's pool of alumni, with whom he was intimately familiar from his time as the school's headmaster. Azahari, whose bomb-making skills had been demonstrated in the Bali attacks, worked alongside Noordin and doubtlessly assisted with the technical details,[43] of which Noordin was likely ignorant as a result of the exceptionally short duration of his formal training. Although some sources hypothesize Hambali's involvement in the Marriott Bombing's planning,[44] JI's larger organization does not seem to have imposed the same level of managerial control as it did in the Bali bombings. A protracted series of grand strategy meetings with the organization's senior leadership did not precede the 2003 attack, which is not entirely surprising as many JI members had been on the run since the Indonesian authorities made the organization a primary target of investigation in the aftermath of Bali. Whatever the reasons, the locus of decision making was far smaller in the 2003 bombing than in the previous year's attack.

Consequently, there was not much division of labor in the detailed tactical planning that took place once the attack team decided to focus its efforts on Jakarta. Team members split-up to examine specific targets. Working alongside Mohamed Ikhwan (a.k.a. Ismail), a Luqmanul

[43] –Noordin's Networks."
[44] "Hambali was 'plotting APEC attack,'" *CNN.com*, August 14, 2003.

alumnus that had been recruited into the plot, Azahari conducted initial surveillance on the hotel and a local Citibank branch. Meanwhile, Noordin and Masrizal bin Ali Umar (a.k.a. Tohir), another Luqmanul alumnus, conducted surveillance on the American International School and the Australian International School. Ultimately, the hotel won-out as the target because Noordin believed it provided the greatest brand recognition, and because it was deemed to have relatively lax security, making it more accessible than the other potential targets.[45]

6.3.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

Explosives, the most crucial logistical requirement of any bombing campaign, had already been acquired when Noordin and Azahari began to conceptualize the bombing. Following the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, JI found itself with a surplus, and placed the excess materials in storage with a member named Toni Togar. However, the investigation that followed the Bali blasts unnerved him, and he was no longer willing to store the explosives. He called Noordin to tell him he was planning to throw them out, so, in a *jihadist* twist on supply-side economics, the existence of excess explosives caused the demand for a bombing, and Noordin designed the Jakarta operation to prevent the surplus material from going to waste. After receiving the explosives from Togar, who shipped them to an intermediary as unaccompanied luggage on an inter-city bus, Noordin turned his attention towards the requisition of the remaining supplies.[46]

He tasked Asmar and Masrizal to rent a house in Jakarta and to purchase a van for the explosion. Both were easily accomplished, and at moderate cost. They acquired the van, a

[45] ~~–~~Noordin's Networks."
[46] Ibid.

Toyota Kijang, second-hand from a local business man, for a cost of approximately $3,000.[47] Information on the cost of accommodations has been lost to history, but if the expenses Ghufron incurred during the Bali operation are representative, then Noordin's team would have been able to acquire space to live and work for around $6,600. Given the _free' explosives, this places the total cost of the attack just below $10,000.

Money to support these expenses came from many of the same sources as they had in the 2002 Bali bombings. In a turn of events reminiscent of the gold store robbery, Noordin's immediate team provided a substantial share of the money for the attack through crime. In May 2003, Toni Togar, who was apparently less worried about being arrested for armed robbery than for possession of explosives, held-up a bank in Medan, and the ill-gotten funds went toward the bombing's expenses, though the size of Togar's haul remains unclear.[48]

However, the plot's finances also involved the larger networks of both al-Qaida and JI. Ali al-Azia Ali (a.k.a. Ammar al-Baluchi), who also handled cash disbursements and logistical issues for the 9/11 attacks at the direction of his uncle KSM, provided the Marriott bombers with approximately 50,000 USD. The transfer occurred through a convoluted series of cut-outs. Hambali dispatched his younger brother, Rusman Gun-Gun Gunawan, then a religious student in Pakistan, to collect the funds from Ali and deliver them to Bangkok. Mohammed Nazir bin Lep (a.k.a. Lillie), who traveled with Gun-Gun to Thailand, facilitated contact with another man, Mohd Farik bin Amin (a.k.a. Zubair), who had been slated to participate as a suicide attacker in the aborted follow-on plot to the 9/11 attacks that would have targeted buildings on America's

[47] The source lists the amount as 25.75 million Indonesian Ringgit. The conversion to USD was made at exchange rates that prevailed in August 2003. _Al-Qaeda singles out Australia: report," *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 12, 2003; available online: http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/12/1060588349256.html.
[48] _Noordin's Networks."

west coast.[49] From Zubair, the money eventually found its way to Mohamed Ikhwan (a.k.a. Ismail), the same Luqmanul alumnus who participated in surveillance in support of the attack. He picked-up the cash, now wrapped in paper bundles, from an un-named man in nearby Dumai, Indonesia.[50] Although circuitous, the money's path shows that Noordin's budding autonomy was still limited at the time of the 2003 Marriott Bombings; he was operationally independent, but his funding network involved members of al-Qaida's core, stand-alone members of JI, and Hambali, who held simultaneous membership in both organizations.[51]

6.3.3 TRAINING

Beyond Azahari's experience in the Afghan camps and Noordin's short training course in the southern Philippines, little information has emerged regarding how and where the members of the 2003 bombing team learned their trade as terrorists. Masrizal, who helped procure the Toyota van and the team's safe house, spent a year at Camp Hudiabiyah between 1998 and 1999.[52] Although the radical beliefs of Asmar, the operation's martyr, and Toni Togar, who provided the explosives and helped to finance the attack through crime, can be traced to the years the men spent al-Mukim Islamic Boarding School, a *pesantren* run by Ba'asyir,[53] nothing is known about their training history. However, since suicide-driving and armed robbery are not particularly specialized skillsets, the men simply may not have required any specialized instruction in order to contribute to *jihad*.

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[49] Verbatim Transcript of Open Session Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10021 (Mohd Farik bin Amin), U.S. Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 13, 2007.
[50] "Noordin's Networks."
[51] For characterizations of Hambali as a dual JI/AQ member that are not provided by this analysis' formal model, see, for example: Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.1.87.03. Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin," available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI08703E.shtml; Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, (New York: Berkley Books, 2002), pp. 258-262; and Sally Neighbor, *In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia*, (Sydney, Australia: Harper Collins, 2004), p. 167.
[52] "Another alleged terrorist goes on trial for deadly hotel bombing," *Agence France Presse*, May 6, 2004.
[53] "Noordin's Networks."

6.3.4 SUMMATION

As was the case with the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 Jakarta Marriott attack was strongly connected to Jemaah Islamiyah and weakly tied to al-Qaida. Unlike the Bali bombings, this attack was strongly tied to Noordin, who, in turn, remained strongly tied to JI. Although Noordin displayed a fair amount of independence in the planning and recruitment phase of the operation, he still staffed his operation with individuals with long-standing ties to the organization, as demonstrated by his reliance on the alumni of Luqmanul and al-Mukim. Moreover, a past JI attack, specifically the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, filled the long pole in Noordin‘s logistical tent by giving him immediate, cost-free access to the most crucial resource necessary to conduct a bombing.

The plots‘ finances were, however, more of a blend between self-reliance and organizational support. Noordin benefitted directly from Toni Togar‘s exploits in armed robbery, as well as from money that can be traced directly back to al-Qaida through a circuitous chain of intermediaries involving members of both JI and bin Laden‘s organization. The little information that exists regarding the attack team‘s training history suggests that al-Qaida‘s role was largely absent, except of course in regards to the bomb-maker Azahari. But given that bomb-making is *the* key skillset necessary to complete attacks like the Marriott bombing, this role should not be entirely dismissed. However, it is also remains unknown how much of the expertise that Azahari brought to bear in the 2003 attack stemmed from his time in Afghanistan, and how much of it resulted from practical experienced gained during previous attacks. In the end, it seems fair state that al-Qaida was not crucially involved in the training of the 2003 bombing‘s operatives.

As regards Noordin's interactions with al-Qaida, they were of a qualitatively different type than in the 2002 bombing. Rather than ships passing in the night, Noordin and al-Qaida were now moored in the same harbor. He benefitted directly from monies provided by the same paymaster who wired funds to the 9/11 hijackers, placing Noordin in reasonably close financial proximity to the core of bin Laden's organization. However, the Malaysian mastermind was otherwise independent of al-Qaida. Thus, the overall extent of Noordin's relationship with al-Qaida remained weak, but was far closer to the cut-point between weak and strong than had been the case a year earlier in 2002. However, as the following discussion of the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta will show, this pattern was just as ephemeral as the one that characterized Noordin's organizational affiliations at the time of the 2002 Bali bombings. Noordin's evolution was beginning to take a decidedly entrepreneurial path.

6.4 THE 2004 BOMBING OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY IN JAKARTA

The 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta unfolded in almost identical fashion to the previous year's attack on the Marriott hotel. On September 9, 2004, Heri Golun, a young man with no previous experience in *jihad*, drove up to the fortress-like building's gates in a van and detonated the powerful explosive device hidden within. No one inside the building was hurt, but nine people on the street died in the blast, most of them locally-hired security guards. An additional 150 people were injured, and the property damage was massive. The nearby Greek and Chinese embassies were partially gutted, and office buildings several blocks away suffered broken windows.[54]

[54] "Target Australia: Jakarta bomb kills 11," *Sydney Morning Herald*, September 9, 2004; Paul Dillon, "Blast rocks Jakarta near Australian Embassy," *USA Today*, September 8, 2004; Simon Jeffery and Mark Oliver, "Australian embassy bomb kills nine," *The Guardian* (London), September 9, 2004.

Despite the operational similarities between the embassy bombing and the previous year's attack, the 2004 bombing represented a devolution in Noordin's relationship with al-Qaida and Jemaah Islamiyah. His relationships with both organizations waned. Al-Qaida's financial ties to this attack are far less clear, and Noordin's operational team contained a number of individuals with no previous connections to JI. Indeed, he drew team members and resources from a diverse collection of formal organizations, and also included a number of rookie *jihadists,* who had no previous experience in terrorism. However, it would also be a mistake to state that Noordin had complete operational independence from JI at the time of the embassy bombing. He continued to rely on the organization for some of his logistical needs and also to indoctrinate the individuals selected to serve as suicide-bombers. Therefore, 2004 was a period of transition, during which Noordin would make strides toward independence, while remaining strongly tied to JI.

6.4.1 PLANNING

In planning this attack, Noordin relied on experienced *jihadists* to fill several key roles. His stalwart companion Azahari Husin continued to serve as chief bomb-maker and assisted in the technical aspects of planning. Similarly, Agus Hidayat, the Samudra disciple who conducted surveillance in support of the 2002 Bali bombings and led the team responsible for the gold-store robbery, was tasked with procuring explosives.[55] However, Noordin also began to look beyond the ranks of JI. Usman bin Sef (a.k.a. Fahim), an Afghan veteran and a JI leader in Eastern Java, and Iwan Dharmawan (a.k.a. Rois), an Islamist with no previous involvement with JI, assumed the job of recruiting. Working through personal relationships, they placed Noordin in contact with a pool of new recruits who existed entirely outside of JI. The widespread use of these green

[55] International Crisis Group, "Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing," ICG Asia Report No. 92, February 22, 2005. (Hereafter, "Recycling Militants in Indonesia.")

recruits in the embassy bombing would constitute a substantial strategic change from the previous year's attack on the Marriott.

Surprisingly, Noordin seems to have delegated much of the tactical level planning. Rois was tasked with conducting surveillance on the embassy—it remains unclear whether or not the team ever even considered any other targets—and Azahari was in charge of planning the team's escape route.[56] Thus, Noordin led at a strategic level, rather than micro-managing every aspect of the attack.

6.4.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

In contrast to the 2003 hotel attack, which Noordin easily staffed with long-time friends and associates, manpower presented a substantial logistical hurdle in the 2004 embassy bombing. Noordin overcame this challenge and gained access to a new pool of recruits via two intermediaries. The first was Iwan.

Noordin met Iwan through Bagus Budi Pranoto (a.k.a. Urwa or Urwah), a veteran JI member whose involvement with the organization dates to at least 1998, when he took part in planning meeting alongside JI luminaries like Utomo Pamungkas, Ali Imron, and quite likely Noordin.[57] During the course of a conversation with Noordin about the need to find more fighters committed to *jihad*, Bagus suggested that a friend of his, Iwan Dharmawan, might be able to help.

Noordin was immediately enamored of Iwan's Islamist pedigree. Iwan held vague connections to Darul Islam, the Islamist insurgency that had spawned JI in the early 1990s. He was also an alumnus of *jihadist* training camps based in the Southern Philippines, and, like his

[56] Ibid.
[57] "Indictment on the case against Abu Bakar Ba'asyir," Indonesian Police Interview of Ali Imron (No. Pol.: BP/01/I/2003/Dit-I), December 25, 2000.

friend Bagus, Iwan was an alumnus of *Universitas an-Nur*, an Islamic college of sorts favored by many Indonesian extremists. After being welcomed into Noordin's budding organization, Iwan became an important recruiter in his own right, by tapping into his own friendship and family networks. He drew Kang Jaya, his uncle by marriage and an experienced Darul Islam member, into the plot, as well as another former student of *Universita an-Nur*.[58]

However, Noordin's manpower issues were not entirely resolved by Iwan's contributions. To obtain new recruits, he also relied on a second intermediary, Usman (a.k.a Fahim). He drew recruits into Noordin's network in much the same manner as Iwan had, by using personal connections. The primary difference in their two patterns is that Usman seems to have at least partially relied on deception.

Specifically, he contacted a friend and former Afghan alum to inquire if his son would be interested in learning to program computer viruses that would wreak havoc on the United States. Although the son, Heri Golun, stated that he would prefer to fight in the conflict simmering between Christians and Muslims in Indonesia's Sulawesi province, he reluctantly agreed. However, when he turned up, he and another young man, presumably recruited under similar pretenses, were introduced to Noordin and Azahari, who soon began to groom Heri to become the suicide-driver in the embassy bombing.[59]

Thus, Iwan and Usman solved Noordin's manpower issues, and the attack team was an amalgam that contained Noordin's long-time supporters and new recruits drawn from Iwan and Usman's personal networks. Indeed, 10 of the 15 men (66.7 percent) who held direct operational or financial links to the 2004 attacks were rookies in their first year of demonstrable active involvement in violent *jihad*. For point of comparison, consider the 2003 Marriott attacks, which

[58] ~~–~~Recycling Militants in Indonesia."
[59] Noordin's Networks, p. 6.

were conducted by a team that included 23.1 percent rookies—less than one-third the rate of the Australian embassy bombing team.

Moreover, the 2004 team was not just inexperienced, they were also exceptionally young. The differences between the suicide bomber involved in the 2003 and 2004 attacks are illustrative. Noordin selected Asmar Latin Sani to serve as the _martyr' in the Marriott bombings. At 28 years of age and as a 1995 graduate of Ba'asyir's *pesantren,* Asmar was well-steeped in Islamist theology and had long association with JI.[60] Heri Golun, who Noordin selected to die in the attack on the Australian embassy, lacked comparable credentials. The evidence suggests that he was barely out of high-school when he died.[61]

Ultimately, the composition of Noordin's 2004 attack-team strongly suggests that he had drifted even farther from the control of JI's central leadership, a pattern no doubt amplified by the fact that Hambali, who had funneled JI's organizational resources to Noordin in the previous year's attack, had been arrested in Thailand in August 2003, less than a week after the execution of the Marriott bombing, as the result of an independent line of investigation that tracked Hambali's efforts to implement attacks in Phnom Penh and Bangkok, rather than as a direct result of his support for Noordin.[62]

Beyond manpower, explosives were the other logistical resource most vital to the attack. Noordin's team seems to have cobbled together a large quantity from several smaller sources. Usman also helped with this aspect of the attack. He funneled 25 kilograms of potassium chlorate, 10 kilograms of sulfur, and 30 kilograms of TNT to Noordin shortly after introducing

[60] See note 40.
[61] –Recycling Militants in Indonesia."
[62] "Hambali was 'plotting APEC attack.'" See also, Rob Taylor, "ASIA: Hambali accused of plotting foiled LA attack," *AAP Newsfeed*, February 10, 2006; Uamdao Noikorn, "Hambali lived quietly in one-room blue apartment on Buddhist temple city's outskirts," *Associated Press Worldstream*, August 15, 2003; Ellen Nakashima and Alan Sipress, "Tips, traced call led to capture of Al Qaeda suspect; Hambali tracked through 4 countries," *Washington Post*, August 16, 2003; Nirmal Ghosh, "Money row led to capture of Hambali, says news report," *Straits Times* (Singapore), August 18, 2003.

him to Heri. Members of the insurgent group KOMPAK, which fought against Christians in Sulawesi, provided additional supplies.

These logistical ties ran through a militant known only as Usman the Mouse. He visited Surabaya in April 2004 in connection with a commercial trading company that he ran, and was introduced to Noordin by a mutual friend. Unable to fill his need for explosives from existing sources, Noordin asked the Mouse if he would be willing to serve as his intermediary to KOMPAK's leadership. The Mouse agreed, and KOMPAK soon began to funnel supplies to Noordin. At a minimum, the Malaysian militant received 10 kilograms of TNT and a supply of detonation cord from the Mouse, before Noordin's relationship with KOMPAK soured, amid concerns from that organization's leadership that Noordin was usurping their authority.[63]

Beyond explosives, information is sparse regarding the acquisition of the other supplies that Noordin's team required to complete the 2004 bombing. However, as the previous discussions of the 2002 Bali bombings and the 2003 Marriott bombing showed, safe houses, automobiles, and communications equipment were readily and cheaply available. There is no reason to assume that Noordin's team experienced any great difficulty acquiring such resources in advance of the embassy bombing.

The sources of money that Noordin used to pay for this attack remain somewhat of a mystery. It is possible that he was able to carry-over some leftover funds from the 2003 attack, but given that Noordin asked his friends in KOMPAK to find some young men willing to commit robbery in support of *jihad* shortly before his relationship with the organization went bad,[64] it seems likely that Noordin's coffers were low.

[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.

Iwan posited another source of funds: al-Qaida. Following his arrest, he told police that Azahari received bundles of Australian dollars via courier. When Iwan inquired about their source, he was told that they came from bin Laden.[65]

The provenance of this information is, however, debatable. Iwan knew only what Azahari told him, so there is no assurance that this information was the truth. Moreover, the methods that the Indonesian police used to extract the information likely included physical punishment, so it is quite possible that Iwan simply told them what they wanted to hear in order to stop the pain. Thus, the source of the money behind the embassy bombing remains ambiguous, but if Iwan's claim proves true, it would require a re-evaluation of Noordin's entire relationship with al-Qaida, because this information would demonstrate that the arrest of Hambali, who served as the primary link between Noordin's network and bin Laden's organization, did not sever Noordin's financial ties to al-Qaida.

6.4.3 TRAINING

Rather than JI or al-Qaida, Noordin's untested recruits received in-house training from other participants in the plot. Some of this was fairly formal in nature. For example, Iwan and his uncle, Kang Jaya, operated a short-lived training camp at Cisolok, Indonesia, where some members of the team received instruction that echoed Iwan and Kang's own earlier experiences in the southern Philippines.[66] Similarly, Azahari instructed Heri, the operation's martyr, in a month-long bomb-making course, before he and two other potential suicide-bombers spent several weeks being ideologically 'ripened' at a *pesantren* located in Cikampek by Baharudin Soleh (a.k.a. Abdul Hadi), an old friend of Noordin's and a graduate of Ba'asyir's religious

[65] "Bin Laden 'funded' Australian embassy bombing," *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 1, 2005.
[66] "Recycling Militants in Indonesia."

school.[67] However, Noordin and Azahari also had a direct role in this ripening process; in the days immediately preceding the attack, Heri moved-in with the duo and even slept in the same room as Azahari and Noordin, so that he could receive last-minute religious instruction.[68] Finally, Iwan also conducted some vital last minute training; he taught Heri to drive in the days just before the attack. Otherwise, the operation's martyr would have been unable to deliver the bomb to the gate of the embassy—an anecdote that says a great deal about the general naivety that characterized many members of Noordin's 2004 team.

Thus, in 2004, the training infrastructure on which Noordin drew was, like his network itself, a blend of old and new. Noordin's team still had historical training ties to al-Qaida via Azahari's time in Afghanistan, as well as historical ties to the camps JI had run in the southern Philippines in the late 1990s. However, the green recruits received a mix of ideological instruction from individuals with long-standing ties to JI and some in-house training, much of it conducted under the instruction of Iwan and Kang, who never considered themselves members of JI. Although Noordin's training apparatus was becoming increasingly distinct from JI's, he remained partially reliant on the organization's existing infrastructure.

6.4.4 SUMMATION

Ultimately, 2004 seems to have been a period of transition for Noordin's network. It had lost an important conduit to al-Qaida with the arrest of Hambali, but the ultimate impact of his absence is difficult to judge in light of the claims of bin Laden-linked funding that Iwan made after his arrest. Absent additional evidence to support these assertions, it therefore seems that both the embassy bombing, as an event, and the attack team surrounding Noordin, as an organization, had weak ties to al-Qaida.

[67] ~~–~~Noordin's Networks," p. 10.
[68] Ibid.

Noordin was still strongly tied to JI in 2004; he relied on members of the organization to indoctrinate his suicide bombers and to provide some of the explosives used in the attack. Yet, at the same time, Noordin's planning seems to have taken place entirely outside of JI's larger command structure, and he was increasingly reliant on individuals who lacked previous association with JI, including members of KOMPAK, members of Darul Islam, and several individuals with no previous experience in *jihad.* At the time of the 2004 attack on the Australian embassy in Jakarta, Noordin's network was not yet fully independent, but the group seems to have had one foot out of JI's door. This budding autonomy would increase moderately by the following year, when Noordin conducted his next major attack, the 2005 Bali bombings, and first adopted a new organizational moniker, Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad (TQJ).

6.5 THE 2005 BALI BOMBINGS

On the evening of October 1, 2005, three suicide-bombers, Aip Hidayat, Misno, and Salik Firdaus, walked into cafes on the island of Bali during the busy dinner rush and detonated explosive hidden inside backpacks, killing themselves and two dozen victims. One of the targets, Raja Bar and Grill, sat in Kuta, on the edge of the same busy tourist district where Paddy's Pub and the Sari Club had been located. The other bomb-site was Jimbarong beach, near the Four Seasons Hotel and the southwestern tip of Bali, where tourists liked to gather at the waterside *warang*, a sort of open-air food court popular throughout Indonesia, to eat and watch the sunset.[69]

[69] Much of the contextual information is based on a site visit to Bali. For the names of the attackers, see: Noordin's Networks. For a description of the damage and casualties, see: "Bali bomb attacks claim 26 lives," *BBC News*, October 2, 2005; "Bali bombs were suicide attacks," *BBC News*, October 2, 2005; Raymond Bonner and Jane Perlez, "Bali Bombings Kill at Least 25 in Tourist Spots," *New York Times*, October 2, 2005.

Noordin would later claim responsibility for the attack, stating in the process that he was the head of a new organization, Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad for the Malay Island Group.[70] Given that similar phraseology appears in the Arabic-language names of al-Qaida in Iraq and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula,[71] and given that Noordin concurrently adopted the pseudonym –Aiman" in homage to Ayman al-Zawahiri,[72] the Malaysian *jihadist* was making powerful claims about the extent of his international connections. Simply put, Noordin claimed to head al-Qaida's Southeast Asian branch. While the evidence demonstrates that Noordin was largely independent of JI by the time of the 2005 Bali bombings, it seems that he exaggerated his connections to al-Qaida. Ultimately, Noordin's connections to bin Laden's organization had become primarily ideological by the time of the second Bali bombings, while his ties to JI remained vaguely operational in nature, but were now largely historical.

6.5.1 PLANNING

The planning patterns of the 2005 attack differed little from those of the previous year. Noordin and Azahari filled their familiar roles and again initiated the attack without obtaining permission from JI's titular leaders. However, Noordin could no longer rely on Iwan or Usman (Fahim) to serve as recruiters and logisticians, because the men had been arrested in separate incidents the previous year.[73]

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[70] The spelling of the name is subject to disagreement; it also sometimes appears as –Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad." Noordin's Networks; –Bali bomber _heads new group,'" *BBC News*, January 30, 2006; available online: http://www.seasite.niu.edu/indonesian/islam/BBC%20NEWS%20%20Asia-Pacific%20%20Bali%20bomber%20%27heads%20new%20group%27.htm.

[71] AQI uses the name –Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn." AQAP uses the name –Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab." Differences in spelling between these organizations and Noordin's group are easily attributable to transliteration inconsistencies that stem from placing an Arabic name into the Bahasa language. United States Department of Treasury, –Specially Designated Nationals List," September 15, 2011; available online: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx.

[72] –Noordin's Networks."

[73] Usman's arrest actually predated the Australian embassy bombing, but does not seem to have affected the pace of operations. For details, see: "Detained terror suspect helped plan Bali blasts, Indonesian police say," *Agence France Presse*, July 12, 2004. Iwan's arrest came in the aftermath of the embassy bombing. For details, see: John Aglionby, "Four arrested over Australia embassy bomb," *The Guardian* (London), November 25, 2004.

Subur Sugiarto, who had been involved in JI activities in central Java since at least 2003, would partially fill their roles. He served as both a logistical procurer, who helped Noordin to obtain money and materiel through crime, and a recruiter, who used personal ties to draw a number of individuals with no previous *jihadist* experience in into the attack team.[74] Mohammad Cholily, a JI member who had been active in the organization since the late 1990s, but who remained unknown to Azahari and Noordin until May 2005, also assisted in the logistics, by obtaining explosives.[75] Thus, as it had been during the embassy bombing, Noordin's attack team was a mix of established JI members who had grown dissatisfied with the organization's perceived lack of action and novice *jihadists* who had no previous experience.

In terms of planning, the most obvious difference between the second Bali bombings and Noordin's previous attacks occurred at the tactical level. While Noordin's 2003 and 2004 attacks used large vehicle-born explosive devices, the 2005 bombing used man-portable explosive devices. One of the more interesting possibilities is that this change represented a deliberate shift in tactics, made because the 2003 and 2004 bombings expended significant quantities of resources, but failed to achieve significant casualties.

However, the reasons behind this tactical shift, as well as many of the 2005 attacks' other tactical details, are likely to remain unknown, since those in the best position to provide information all died before they could be taken into custody. For example, the Bali suicide-bombers perished during the course of the operation. Azahari died alongside two of his bomb-making students in a November 2005 confrontation with Indonesian police,[76] and in September 2009, Noordin died in a gun battle in Solo, Indonesia, alongside five of his remaining disciples,

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[74] "Noordin's Networks."
[75] "Militants jailed for role in 2005 Bali bombings," *Global Insight*, September 7, 2006; Stephen Fitzpatrick, "Bomb expert gets 18 years over Bali," *The Australian* (Australia), September 8, 2006.
[76] "'Bali bomb maker' believed dead," *BBC News*, November 10, 2005; Amy Chew, "Azahari Dead," *New Straits Times* (Malaysia), November 10, 2005.

including Bagus Budi Pranoto, the associate who introduced Noordin to the key recruiter in the 2004 embassy bombings.[77]

The organizational structure that Noordin employed has rendered the accounts of the remaining team members virtually useless. According to Mohammad Cholily, who has been in police custody since November 2005, Noordin practiced strict segregation between different portions of the attack team. Although Cholily interacted closely with Azahari, effectively serving as the master bomb-maker's apprentice, he never even met the three martyrs. Azahari repeatedly told the inquisitive Cholily that he had no need to know anything about them, since the suicide-bombers did not affect his portion of the mission.[78] Given this strict adherence to ~~"n~~need to know" practices and the deaths of the team's remaining key members, it seems that substantial ambiguity will continue to surround many of the particulars of the attack's planning.

6.5.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

With the 2004 arrests of team members Usman and Iwan, to say nothing of Heri's death by suicide in the embassy attack, Noordin faced many of the same manpower issues in the second Bali attack that he had in the previous year. He solved them in similar fashion, by relying on an intermediary to recruit on his behalf using personal connections. Specifically, Subur Sugiarto brought several friends with no previous experience in *jihad* into the group, and a large percentage of the 2005 team was consequently comprised of rookie *jihadists.*[79] Though the levels were not quite as high as they had been on the embassy-bombing team, a total of five of the nine individuals with direct links to the 2005 attacks (55.6 percent of the team) were rookie *jihadists* in their first year of demonstrable active involvement in terrorism.

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[77] "DNA tests in Indonesia confirm death of terrorist Noordin Top," *Asian News International*, September 19, 2009; International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh," ICG Asia Report No. 189, April 20, 2010.
[78] ~~"I~~want to die, says Bali bombing suspect," *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 16, 2006; available online: http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/i-want-to-die-says-bali-bombing-suspect/2006/05/16/1147545326359.html.
[79] ~~"N~~Noordin's Networks."

Beyond satisfying his need for manpower, the rookies met Noordin's logistical needs in another way; they helped him to obtain vital communications gear by robbing a mobile phone shop.[80] Although it is unclear whether or not the robbery also garnered any cash for Noordin's network, it is reasonable to speculate that the team resold some of the stolen electronics in order to generate partial funding for the 2005 Bali bombings, especially considering that the record has remained mute regarding other financial transactions that may have supported the attack. If Noordin received any support from abroad or any direct transfers from JI's leadership, they have remained hidden. At the very least, he was, as had long been, partially financially independent.

The record has also been largely silent on the subject of the attack's remaining key resource: explosives. Open-source accounts of the attack stipulate that Mohamed Cholily provided the explosives, but they provide no additional information on where he obtained the materials or from whom.[81] Given Noordin's falling-out with KOMPAK and the arrest of Usman (Fahim), it seems unlikely that the 2005 attack-team relied on the same suppliers as the embassy-bombing team had, unless of course the explosive devices used in the second Bali attack were fashioned from surplus materials. It is perhaps telling that the explosive power of the bombs used in this attack were an order of magnitude smaller than the van-bombs used in the 2004 embassy bombing and the 2003 Marriott bombing, but as discussed in regards to planning, the decision to use smaller man-portable devices could also just as easily have been dictated by tactics as by the availability of materials. Additional research into the source and quantity of explosives at the 2005 attack team's disposal would be incredibly valuable, as it would clarify the otherwise ambiguous nature of Noordin's operational relationship with JI and other organizations at the time of the second Bali bombing.

[80] Ibid.
[81] "Militants jailed for role in 2005 Bali bombings."

6.5.3 TRAINING

While much about the logistics and finance of the 2005 attack remain unknown, Noordin's involvement in training is clear. Instead of relying on a third party to train his cadets, as he had in the previous year's embassy attacks, Noordin played a hands-on role with Subir's friends. Working in the cramped space above the Selera Restaurant in Semarang, Noordin taught four recruits to become suicide bombers. Three of them would martyr themselves in the second Bali bombings, but the fourth man, Anif Solchanudin, was denied this _honor,' because he was a veteran of the sectarian conflict in Ambon between Christians and Muslims. Noordin felt Anif's expertise could be better used by training other recruits. So long as Noordin continued to favor suicide attacks, he would apparently always be in need of new recruits, because he seemed to see them as the most expendable martyrs.[82]

Similarly, Azahari continued to provide the network with in-house training in bomb-making. Cholily served as his apprentice during the run-up to the bombings, but he was not Azahari's only student. Gempur Budi Angkoro (a.k.a. Jabir), who was first-cousin to JI luminary Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi,[83] also trained under Azahari during this period, but received few chances to implement his craft. He was killed in a police raid in early 2006, after which investigators found in Gempur's rented home a bomb similar to the explosive devices used in the second Bali bombing, strongly suggesting that the preparations for the 2005 attack served to provide him with hands-on training, as well as suggesting that Gempur's death may have

[82] Noordin's Networks, p. 18.
[83] Al-Ghozi participated in a host of plots and bombings, including the 2000 bombing of Manila's commuter rail (the Rizal Day bombings), and a pair of inter-related plots against embassies in Manila and Singapore. For additional information, see: Dan Murphy, "Filipino police uncover 1995 leads to Sept. 11 plot," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 14, 2002; "Philippines warns of plans to repeat 2000 New Year's Eve bombings," *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political*, December 27, 2006; Hvroje Hranjski, "Philippine court hands down terror convictions," *Associated Press Online*, January 23, 2009; Kimina Lyall, "Asian trek took al-Qa'ida cash to JI - War on Terror," *The Weekend Australian*, December 14, 2002.

interrupted an additional plot by Noordin's network.[84] Fortunately, Gempur's death, Cholily's arrest, and the death of the two apprentices who perished alongside Azahari in November 2005 seem to have largely extinguished Azahari's training legacy.

6.5.4 SUMMATION

When viewed in total, the evidence suggests that although there was likely some overlap with JI in 2005, nearly all of the conditions for Noordin's independence were set by this time. His newly named organization, TQJ, was not reliant on the larger JI network for bomb-making expertise and preferred instead to rely on Azahari Husin, Noordin's friend and confidant of many years. Because Noordin was willing to work with novice *jihadists* and in fact seemed to prefer to use them as suicide-operatives rather than _wasting' seasoned veterans, TQJ required few durable members.

Nor was the new organization dependent on JI's larger training structure, or, for that matter, al-Qaida's training resources. Instead, Noordin ran independent camps. As required by the situation, he and Azahari were willing to work with members of organizations other than JI, or to assume a hands-on role.

Finally, TQJ does not seem to have relied on JI's larger structure or al-Qaida _donations' to provide funding. TQJ's repeated involvement in robberies demonstrates that it was willing to steal the cash and sometimes also the equipment needed to conduct operations. However, it is difficult to be especially firm in this conclusion because of the tremendous ambiguity that surrounds so many aspects of the second Bali bombings.

Ultimately, in 2005, a complex web of personal connections, ideological affiliations, and past functional ties still existed between members of Noordin's network and other *jihadist* terror

[84] Benteng Reges, _Bomb similar to explosive of Bali 2005 attack found," *Asia News*, March 5, 2006; available online: http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Bomb-similar-to-explosive-of-Bali-2005-attack-found-6056.html.

groups, but it seems that by this time TQJ was likely an independent organization, rather than an al-Qaida cell or a branch of Jemaah Islamiyah. Although the personnel losses that TQJ suffered in the immediate aftermath of the 2005 attack greatly affected the organization's capabilities, its independence remained largely unchanged by the time of its next and final attack, the near-simultaneous bombings of Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta in 2009.

6.6 THE 2009 BOMBING OF THE JAKARTA MARRIOTT AND RITZ-CARLTON HOTELS

On the morning of July 17, 2009, a pair of suicide-bombers attacked two western-owned luxury hotels in Jakarta: the J.W. Marriott, which had also been the target of Noordin's 2003 van-bombing, and the Ritz-Carlton, located less than two-hundred yards away. As they had in the second Bali bombings, the terrorists relied on man-portable explosive devices, rather than vehicle-bombs, and both attackers targeted areas where guests were most likely to congregate. Specifically, the Marriott bomb was detonated in the hotel's second-floor restaurant, where westerners were known to frequently hold breakfast meetings, and the Ritz bomb was detonated in the hotel's main lobby. The explosions were nearly simultaneous, occurring just a few minutes apart, but killed only nine people and injured just a few dozen more.[85]

Broadly speaking, this attack repeated many of the patterns established in 2005. The weapons used were virtually identical. Noordin's organization remained largely independent in terms of planning and training, but likely received some logistical assistance from JI. Moreover, the 2009 team continued to rely heavily on novice *jihadists*, and demonstrated no clear functional ties to al-Qaida. However, owing to the organizational losses that TQJ suffered in the

[85] Patrick Barta and Reuben Carter, "Police Say Bombers Sought Higher Toll," *Wall Street Journal*, July 25, 2009; "Fatal blasts hit Jakarta hotels," *BBC News*, July 17, 2009; Lee Glendinning and Matthew Weaver, "Eight dead as bombers target western-owned Jakarta hotels," *The Guardian* (London), July 17, 2009; Chris Johnson, "Australian official feared dead in blasts," *The Age* (Australia), July 17, 2009; "Unexploded bomb found after Jakarta hotel bombings kill at least 9," *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 17, 2009.

immediate aftermath of the 2005 bombings, there was little continuity between the 2009 hotel attack and the second Bali bombing in terms of specific personnel.

6.6.1 PLANNING

In terms of planning, the 2009 attack represents an evolution of the second Bali bombing. Noordin again played the part of grand strategist and delegated a number of important tasks to other members of the team. A man known only as Ibrohim played a particularly important role.

He effectively functioned as TQJ's ―inside man" and conducted the bulk of the reconnaissance necessary to plan the operation. Four years earlier, in 2005, Ibrohim had left a higher-paid position to take a job working in the flower shop located in the Ritz-Carlton's lobby.[86] Because the Marriott apparently contracted with this florist, Ibrohim's vantage point allowed him to conduct long-term surveillance on both hotels.[87] Consequently, he seems to have taken the lead on planning many of the attack's tactical details, with Noordin acting in more of an advisory capacity.

The attack's technical details were the responsibility of TQJ's new bomb-maker, Eko Joko Sarjono. The evidence suggests that he was drawn into the network via personal connections to one of Noordin's long-time supporters. Specifically, Eko was a high-school friend of Air Setyawan, who police had briefly arrested ahead of the 2004 embassy bombings on strong suspicion of ties to Noordin's organization, but were forced to release a few months later, when the tight-lipped suspect refused to divulge any details that could be used as evidence of his participation in *jihad.* Moreover, events that took place in the aftermath of the attack suggest that Air and Eko shared a particularly close bond. Not only were the men friends since high-school and partners on the 2009 Marriott/Ritz-Carlton attack; the pair's operational relationship

[86] International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base," ICG Asia Briefing No. 95, August 27, 2009.
[87] "Indonesia: Police identify men killed in Central Java as Ibrohim," *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political*, August 12, 2009.

continued after the hotel bombing. They actually died in the same police encounter, which took place on August 8, when officers raided the house Air and Eko were using as a bomb-factory in an affluent Jakarta suburb.

Nor was Noordin actively involved in recruiting for the 2009 bombings. Because Indonesian *jihadists* then regarded him as an ~~a~~ll-star," Noordin's prestige certainly granted him an indirect role in recruiting, as would-be *jihadists* must have jumped at the opportunity to work alongside a luminary figure, but Ibrohim used personal connections to find the team's primary recruiter. His brother-in-law, an Islamic cleric named Syaifudin Jaelani, played the largest role in securing manpower for the operation; he used his position of authority and influence to recruit naïve young men with no previous experience in *jihad* to serve as suicide-bombers.[88]

At a tactical level, the 2009 attack represented a slight planning refinement to the second Bali bombing. Both attacks relied on suicide-bombers carrying backpack-bombs to simultaneously target multiple attack-sites, but in the 2009 bombings, Noordin's team tried to increase the death toll by adding an additional component. Specifically, the attackers wired a timed device, hidden in a room on one of the Marriott's upper floors, to detonate a few minutes ahead of the planned suicide attacks, on the logic that the hotel's guests, and possibly also those at the nearby Ritz, would empty into the lobby after the initial explosion, thereby placing more potential victims in proximity to the suicide-attackers. However, the plan failed and the attack's death-toll was low, because the timed device never went-off.[89]

[88] "Malaysia: National police to cooperate with Indonesia to arrest Noordin Top," *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific - Political,* August 18, 2009.
[89] Barta and Carter.

6.6.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

In the 2009 bombings, manpower was again a crucial logistical need, which Syaifudin met by perverting his role as an Islamic cleric. From his congregation, he drew the two young men that would go-on to serve as martyrs in the hotel bombings: 18 year-old Dani Dwi Pertama, and 28 year-old Nana Ikhwan Maulana. After grooming them ideologically, Syaifudin then introduced the young men to his brother-in-law, Ibrohim.[90]

As a result of these recruitment patterns, the 2009 bombings, like TQJ's previous two attacks, relied heavily on novice *jihadists*. Of the 14 individuals who had direct operational or financial ties to the attacks, 9 men (64.3 percent) were rookies with no previous demonstrable involvement in violent extremism. Moreover, at least one of the 2009 bombers seems to have been incredibly naïve. One official involved in the investigation of the hotel attacks claimed that mess left behind in the bathroom of the Marriott hotel room used to stage the attacks' final preparations made it clear that Dani, the young suicide bomber who targeted the Marriott, was so unsophisticated that he did not understand how to use the room's Western-style toilet.[91]

Beyond manpower, the record has remained silent on many of the logistical details of the attack. For example, there is scant information on the source of the explosives. Because police later discovered a large cache of materials in the back yard of Noordin's father-in-law, Baharudin Latif (a.k.a. Baridin),[92] it is reasonable to suspect that Noordin used family connections to secure explosives. However, there is no information on how or where Baharudin obtained the materials, but given that he held independent connections dating to the late 1990s to

[90] "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base."
[91] Confidential informant, interview conducted August 2010 in Jakarta, Indonesia.
[92] "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base."

Bagus Budi Pranoto, who played an important role in the 2004 embassy bombing,[93] it is reasonable to speculate that Baharudin's stash was a surplus left-over from the 2004 attack.

Regardless of the ultimate source of Noordin's explosives, many of the 2009 operation's more mundane logistical needs were met by Amir Ibrahim (a.k.a. Amir Abdillah). For example, he rented the Marriott hotel room used to stage the final preparations for the attack—the same room where police would later find the time-bomb that failed to explode. Though this contribution suggests a fairly small role in the attack, he was a full member of the attack team and held substantial knowledge about his co-conspirators. For example, the August 8 showdown that resulted in Air and Eko's deaths followed Amir's arrest by only three days, strongly suggesting that he provided the intelligence that led police to his compatriots' door.[94]

Funding for the attack seems to have come from abroad and flowed through a convoluted set of overlapping relationships. Specifically, Saefudin Zuhri, who was distantly related to Noordin through marriage—the two men apparently wed first cousins[95]—arranged a meeting between the infamous terrorist and Muhamad Jibril Abdurahman (a.k.a. Muhamad Ricky Ardan bin Mohammad Iqbal), an Indonesian with long-standing, multi-faceted ties to terrorism. Abdurahman was the son of Muhammad Iqbal,[96] a radical preacher whose influence radicalized prominent JI members including Hambali and Yazid Sufaat.[97] Moreover, Abdurahman had spent time in Pakistan alongside Hambali's younger brother, Rusman Gun Gun Gunawan, and once

[93] Ibid.
[94] "Malaysia: National police to cooperate with Indonesia to arrest Noordin Top," and "Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base."
[95] Ali Kotarumalos, "Indonesia: Terror chief's relative gets 8 years," *Associated Press*, April 20, 2010.
[96] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.295.11 Muhammad Jibril Abdul Rahman," August 12, 2011; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI29511E.shtml. (Hereafter, "Abdulrahman Listing.")
[97] "Unmasking radical preachers," *Straits Times* (Singapore), February 10, 2002.

held financial ties to Imam Samudra, the field commander of the first Bali bombings.[98] However, it remains unclear whether or not Noordin and Abdurahman had a previous relationship, and the meeting that Zuhri brokered may have been the pair's first direct interaction. With the relationship established (or reinforced), Abdurahman then arranged for Ali Muhammad bin Abdullah, a contact in Saudi Arabia who is sometimes also referenced as Abdurahman's brother, to transmit 10,000 USD to Noordin.[99]

Despite the Saudi connection, it remains to be proven that al-Qaida played any direct role in the funding of the 2009 hotel bombing. However, Abdurahman's ties to the organization raise the possibility of its involvement. While studying in Pakistan, he purportedly interacted with members of al-Qaida and the Taliban, and given that in 2003 his classmate, Gunawan, held direct links to KSM's nephew, Ali al-Azia Ali (a.k.a. Ammar al-Baluchi), these assertions seem exceptionally credible. However, Abdurahman's later interactions with bin Laden's organization are somewhat speculative. He reportedly returned to Pakistan at least briefly in 2007, and renewed these connections,[100] but detailed evidence on the specifics of these interactions with al-Qaida has yet to emerge. Therefore, it would be premature to conclude that bin Laden's organization orchestrated the attack's funding, especially if the alleged family ties between Abdurahman and Ali Muhammad bin Abdullah prove true. That said, al-Qaida's financial role in the 2009 attacks remains an intriguing possibility that merits additional investigation as new evidence emerges into the open-source.

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[98] Abdulrahman Listing.
[99] The Abdulrahman Listing specifies only that his foreign contact was his brother, but lists no name, while media portrayals list the Saudi contact by name, but do not specify that he held a family ties to Abdurahman. See, for example: Dicky Christanto, ―Jibril, Ali cooperated in funding hotel bombings," *Jakarta Post*, September 2, 2009; available online: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/09/02/jibril-ali-cooperated-funding-hotel-bombings.html.
[100] Abdulrahman Listing.

6.6.3 TRAINING

Beyond the influence that he exerted from the pulpit, Syaifudin Jaelani appears to have played a role in the ideological component of the training that preceded the 2009 attack. Specifically, his role seems to have been to _ripen' prospective suicide-bombers, whom he groomed for *jihad* under the guise of youth counseling. For example, in the months preceding the attacks, he took Dani, the Marriott bomber, and a handful of other teenage boys on otherwise unsupervised camping trips southeast of Jakarta.[101]

At a more technical level, Azahari still dominated the training of the operation's bomb-makers, despite his death. The Indonesian police assert that Eko's bomb-designs were entirely based on the schematics that Azahari had created for the backpack-bombs used in the 2005 Bali attacks.[102] Because the record does not specify that Eko ever trained directly under Azahari, the bomb-maker in the 2009 attacks may have been somewhat akin to a home cook who tries to recreate a restaurant-chef's recipes by following a cookbook, without the benefit of the tacit knowledge that instructors pass-on through hands-on tutorials. The attendant drop-off in experience inherent to this type of training may go a long way toward explaining why the time-bomb left on the Marriott's upper floors failed. Unless additional information emerges suggesting that Eko studied bomb-making more formally with individuals outside of TQJ, it seems safe to conclude that neither al-Qaida nor JI played a direct training role in the 2009 hotel bombings.

[101] Stephen Fitzpatrick, "Preacher groomed boys for jihad," *The Australian*, August 12, 2009.
[102] Berni Moestafa and Bambang Djanuarto, "Jakarta Hotel Bombers Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah, Police Say," *Bloomberg*, July 19, 2009; available online: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aslTMQuj6g4U.

6.6.4 SUMMATION

As in the 2005 Bali bombing, TQJ seems to have functioned largely independently in the 2009 hotel attacks. There is no clear evidence that al-Qaida orchestrated the attack‘s funding, nor is there any clear evidence that any active members of the attack team ever received training in an al-Qaida camp. Given the ambiguity that surrounds many aspects of the attack, it is difficult to be overly firm in these conclusions, but it seems that bin Laden‘s organization was, at best, weakly tied to the 2009 hotel attacks.

JI‘s role in the attacks is slightly more complex. Several members of the attack team, most notably Noordin, held historical membership in the organization, and in the absence of other explanations, the most likely source of explosives used in the 2009 attack was a surplus that JI stored with Noordin‘s father-in-law. Effectively, it seems that these logistical supplies followed Baharudin Latif from JI into TQJ. However, JI played no direct role in training the 2009 team; its members either relied on the organization‘s existing knowledge resources, as epitomized by Eko‘s use of Azahari‘s bomb-designs, or they received instruction from other members of TQJ, as demonstrated by Syaifudin Jaelani‘s involvement in the ripening process. Ultimately, it seems that the 2009 attack was also weakly tied to JI.

6.7 NETWORK MEASURES

Because this chapter considers a series of events that not only occupy the same Baleian category populated by events in which al-Qaida played a weak functional role, but which also consistently involve some common actors, namely Noordin and Azahari, this chapter‘s cases are similar enough to ensure that formal comparisons between the networks that perpetrated the events under analysis meet the standards of construct validity. These quantitative measurements,

which are outlined in the section below, tell the same story as the qualitative narrative and demonstrate that although that Noordin and Azahari were of no particular structural importance in the network that perpetrated the 2002 Bali bombings, the networks which conducted the 2003 bombing of the Jakarta Marriott, the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, the 2005 bombings in Jimbarong Beach and Kuta on Bali, and the 2009 bombings of the Jakarta Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels were structurally dependent on these men. Put more simply, the 2002 Bali bombings would have taken place with or without Noordin and Azahari, but the networks which perpetrated every well-known Islamist-motivated terror attack in Indonesia from 2003 to 2009 would never have existed without the pair.

The simplest way to view the events in this chapter is as a single-mode network depicting the entire period of analysis as a single snap-shot. Figure 6.1 offers a visualization of a static agent x agent network containing functional connections between individuals involved in the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 Jakarta Marriott bombing, the 2004 Australian Embassy bombings, the 2005 Bali bombings, and the 2009 bombings of the Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Hotels.[103] Visual interpretation of this graph makes two things immediately apparent. First, the information surrounding Indonesian extremism is imperfect, because the presence of two isolate nodes demonstrates that nothing is known about some Indonesian *jihadists'* relationships or the nature of their involvement in violence, other than that they played some vague functional role in one of the same attacks as Noordin. Consequently, it is clear that the values of any measures derived from the network depicted in Figure 6.1 would change with

[103] Because participation in the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2003 bombing of the Jakarta Marriott, the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, the 2005 bombings in Jimbarong Beach and Kuta on Bali, and the 2009 bombings of the Jakarta Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels served as the selection criteria for inclusion in this network, it would be inappropriate to include in the network ties inferred from participation in these events. Indeed, doing so would create perfect cliques for each event, because every participant would be linked to every other. Therefore, the agent x agent connections displayed in Figure 6.1 and analyzed in subsequent graphs exclude such ties.

perfect information. With the significant caveats implicit to this finding, the second conclusion that can be obtained from visual interpretation of the graph is that Noordin and Azahari, who have been highlighted in blue, play important roles in binding the network together.

Figure 6.1: Agent x Agent Network Depicting Relationships Between Individuals Involved in Terror Attacks Involving Noordin Mohd Top, 2002-2009



Formal measures of centrality offer a means to quantify the extent of this importance. Figure 6.2 summarizes betweenness, closeness, and total degree scores for the same flat agent x agent network depicted above. Owing to discussions in the second and third chapters, betweenness and degree are familiar concepts, but as this analysis has not previously discussed closeness, this measurement merits a brief definitional note. Closeness offers an index

measurement of the geodesic distance between an actor and all other nodes in the graph. Consequently, it serves as a measurement of reachability; those with high closeness scores can most easily reach (and be reached by) other members of the network. 104

The graphs in Figure 6.2 demonstrate that although other agents hold more ties than Noordin and Azahari, and although other agents are far more reachable than Noordin and Azahari—a factor largely attributable to the pair's relatively light involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings and consequent isolation from many of that attack's participants—the pair scored exceptionally high in betweenness. Noordin ranked first in this measurement, while Azahari ranked fourth, coming in behind Ali Ghufron and Imam Samudra, whose shared organizational duties in the 2002 Bali bombings, the attack with the largest network of participants, granted them high betweenness scores, despite their lack of participation in any subsequent attacks. Thus, even when the period of Noordin's functional involvement in terrorism is viewed in a static, one-mode perspective, it is clear that Noordin and Azahari held Indonesia's community of Islamist terrorist together throughout the bulk of the first decade of the new millennium.

[104] Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*, (Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 184-185. See also, Linton C. Freeman, "Centrality in Social Networks Conceptual Clarification," *Social Networks*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1978/1979), pp. 215-239.

Figure 6.2: Centrality Scores for Individuals Involved in Terror Attacks Involving Noordin Mohd Top, 2002-2009



Introducing a two-mode perspective drives home the importance of Noordin and Azahari‘s shared role in linking prominent Indonesian-based terror attacks between 2002 and 2009. Figure 6.3 contains two panels. The upper one shows agents‘ known connections to attacks; the lower panel shows the same information, only with Noordin and Azahari removed from the network. If not for this pair, the 2005 Bali bombings and the 2009 bombings of the Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels would have been entirely disconnected from the remaining attacks, and the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta would have been connected only though Agus Hidayat, a disciple of Imam Samudra‘s who participated in the gold store robbery that supported the 2002 Bali bombings and who helped to secure explosives in support of the 2004 attack. The obvious conclusion is that Noordin and Azahari were the primary architects of the broader campaign of terror that took place in Indonesia in the years following the first Bali bombings.

Figure 6.3: Agent x Event Networks Depicting Prominent Terror Attacks in Indonesia, 2002-2009



While the preceding assessments demonstrate Noordin and Azahari's strategic role in orchestrating terror attacks in Indonesia in the 2000s, they say little about the nature of the pair's involvement organizing the teams responsible for each attack individually. This aspect of Noordin and Azahari's leadership is perhaps best demonstrated by examining fragmentation, a measurement that examines both the percentage of disconnected nodes that exist in a given network and the relative cohesion of the connected components.[105] Figure 6.4 summarizes a simulation-based approach to estimating Azahari and Noordin's role in organizing each of the attacks discussed in this chapter. The graphs compare fragmentation scores for agent x agent networks depicting functional relationships among each attacks' known participants. The blue bars depict scores for the complete network as it appears in the data. The maroon bars depict scores that would have resulted if Noordin and Azahari had not participated in the attacks. Finally, the green bar represents a special case, depicting the score that would have resulted if Ibrohim, the florist who conducted much of the tactical planning of the 2009 bombings of the Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels, had not participated in Noordin's final attack.

[105] Stephen P. Borgatti, "The Key Player Problem," in *Dynamic Social Network Modeling and Analysis: Workshop Summary and Papers*, (Washington, D.C.: National Academic Press, 2003), p. 242.

Figure 6.4: Fragmentation Scores



Like the other formal network measures presented in this section, fragmentation scores provide a quantitative estimate that mirrors previously presented qualitative interpretations. The numbers demonstrate that Noordin and Azahari's removal from the 2002 Bali bombings would have done little to fracture the network responsible for that attack—hardly a surprising finding given that Noordin's role was limited to participation in a single early strategy meeting and that Azahari became involved in the attack's tactical details almost by accident, when the pair arrived at Ali Ghufron's house unannounced and unexpected. However, Noordin and Azahari were lynchpins that held together the network that perpetrated the 2003 Jakarta Marriott bombing, as demonstrated by the roughly 300 percent increase in fragmentation that resulted from their simulated removal from that network. Though the numbers are not quite as profound for the 2004 Australian Embassy bombings and the 2005 Bali bombings, the pattern is the same: the respective attack networks would have been 1.5 times more fragmented without Noordin and Azahari's participation. It seems clear that the networks responsible for these attacks would have lacked the structure necessary to act as a team without the pair's leadership.

However, at a tactical level, this is not true of the 2009 bombing of the Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels. Although Noordin served as a bridge that tied this event to earlier attacks, he was far less structurally important to the 2009 attack network than he had been to previous teams in 2003, 2004, and 2005. Instead, Ibrohim, the florist who had been observed the hotels since taking work in a flower shop in the lobby of the Marriott in 2005 and was thus in the best position to plan tactical details, held the attack team together. Azahari was dead by the time of the 2009 attacks and was thus irrelevant to the attack team's structure; Noordin's removal would have barely impacted the attack team's structural cohesion, but the team would have been nearly 50 percent more fragmented without Ibrohim. Thus, the evidence suggests that near the

end of his life, Noordin was becoming increasingly willing to allow others to assume tactical responsibility for attacks, while simultaneously positioning himself to design grand strategy.

6.8 CONCLUSION

Like most durable organizations, al-Qaida certainly plans for the future. However, the five cases discussed in this chapter demonstrate that minor evolutionary shifts play at least as large a role as high-level strategic visions in determining the nature of inter-organizational cooperation within the broader *jihadist* movement. Beginning in 2003, Noordin began a journey toward organizational independence that would take roughly two years to complete. By viewing his attacks in sequence, it becomes clear that TQJ's emergence as an independent organization that served as al-Qaida's ideological standard bearer in Southeast Asia was the result of Noordin's incrementally increasing entrepreneurialism, rather than any sort of strategic vision orchestrated by al-Qaida. Indeed, by the time that he claimed to be working in al-Qaida's name, his functional connections to bin Laden's organization had reached their nadir. Therefore, as summarized by table 6.1, the events in which Noordin participated suggest that al-Qaida's regional partnerships may largely exist in name only.

Table 6.1: Al-Qaida's Declining Role in Events Involving Noordin Mohd Top

2002 Bali Bombings

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Partial	Strategic shaping, but no clear tactical component
Finance	Partial	Attack also self-funded via crime and JI membership dues
Logistics	Unlikely	JI independently acquired materiel for attack; manpower drawn from JI's membership
Training	Definite	Several of the bombers received AQ training in Afghanistan

2003 Jakarta Marriott Bombing

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Unlikely	Noordin and Azahari led the attack's strategic and tactical planning
Finance	Partial	Attack also self-funded via crime
Logistics	Unlikely	Explosives acquired from JI surplus; manpower drawn from Luqmanul's alumni network
Training	Partial	Azahari was AQ trained, but little information available on attackers training histories

2004 Bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Unlikely	Noordin and Azahari led the attack's strategic and tactical planning
Finance	Unlikely	Claims of AQ involvment lack credibility in light of Hambali's capture
Logistics	Unlikely	Explosives provided by JI and KOMPAK; manpower obtained via Iwan and Usman
Training	Historical	Azahari was AQ trained, but new recruits received no training from AQ

2005 Bali Bombings

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Unlikely	Noordin and Azahari led the attack's strategic and tactical planning
Finance	Unlikely	Attack partially self-financed via crime
Logistics	Unlikely	Some materiel obtained via robbery; manpower obtained via Subur's personal network
Training	Historical	Azahari was AQ trained, but new recruits trained in-house

2009 Bombing of the Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Hotels

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Unlikely	Noordin and Ibrahim led the attack's strategic and tactical planning
Finance	Possible	Interactions may flow through Abdurahman's contacts in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
Logistics	Unlikely	Explosives possibly obtained from surplus remaining after 2004 Jakarta bombings; some manpower obtained via Syaifudin's ideological network
Training	Unlikely	New recruits received some in-house training; bomb-making likely relied on manuals penned by Azahari prior to his death

These conclusions suggest that the theories of organizational cooperation advanced by Mendelsohn, Braniff, and Moghadam need to be revised to include the perspective of the al-Qaida‘s prospective collaborators alongside al-Qaida‘s strategic aims. Put more simply, theory must recognize that organizational cooperation is a two-way street that requires the consent of both parties. Unfortunately, neither Noordin nor his primary operational partner, Azahari Husin, can be questioned regarding their reasons for choosing to operate under al-Qaida‘s name, as both men died before they could be taken into custody. Consequently, this chapter cannot offer an empirically-based revision to existing theory, but at a minimum, future studies should rigorously explore three possible causal mechanisms that lead independent organizations to adopt al-

Qaida's name: (1) organizations may choose to operate under al-Qaida's banner because they fully adhere to the organization's ideological vision; (2) organizations may choose to operate under al-Qaida's banner because they receive greater media attention and notoriety than they would if they operated under their original name; and (3) organizations may choose to operate under al-Qaida's banner because they receive some sort of tangible rewards from bin Laden's organization for doing so, such as better access to al-Qaida's training infrastructure, logistical resources, or operational funds.

Beyond theories of cooperation within the violent Islamist movement, this chapter's conclusions also have broader implications for the literature that discusses the formation of splinter groups. The history of political extremism is replete with cases in which a radical splinter group formed because the main body of a terrorist organization entered into a peace agreement with the existing state authorities. Ireland offers the clearest illustration: the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) gave birth to the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) in 1994, when a minority faction objected to a cease-fire with the British government, and in 1997, the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) formed when another break-away faction of PIRA members opposed the organization's pledge to pursue independence only through democracy and non-violence.[106] Noordin's example suggests that this literature needs to be amended to make clear that splinters can also form gradually, as the result of a budding leader's entrepreneurialism. However, additional broad-based research is necessary to determine the relative prevalence of the patterns suggested by Noordin's experience.

[106] U.S. Department of State, "2010 Country Reports on Terrorism: Foreign Terrorist Organizations" (Chapter 6), Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, August 18, 2011; available online: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170264.htm. See also, David McKittrick, "Sinn Fein ready to accept Mitchell principles," *The Independent* (London), May 21, 1996; available online: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/sinn-fein-ready-to-accept-mitchell-principles-1348380.html.

In combination with the preceding two chapters‘ discussion of events that display strong functional ties to al-Qaida, this evaluation concludes this study‘s inquiry into al-Qaida‘s direct, active involvement in Islamist terrorism. Subsequent chapters turns their attention towards more diffuse forms of involvement, an assessment that begins by examining events perpetrated by former members of bin Laden‘s organization.

7.0 AL-QAIDA'S ALUMNI: THE HISTORICAL NATURE OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BIN LADEN'S ORGANIZATION AND ITS REGIONAL AFFILIATES

A handful of prominent academics continue to argue that al-Qaida continued to maintain hierarchical control over the violent Islamist movement throughout the organization's history. For example, writing in 2011, Hoffman implicitly attributed the organization with a functional role in regional operations by arguing that, "Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and perhaps parts of North Africa remain key operational areas where al Qaeda's strength has yet to dissipate."[1] Similarly, analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) have argued that al-Qaida's regional affiliates currently show greater coordination than ever before.[2] Indeed, in 2011, they continued to describe the organization as "a terrorist 'Hydra' with global reach," whose appeal to some segments of the Muslim population continued to widen.[3]

Yet others theorists and some members of the intelligence community are incredibly skeptical of such assertions. Writing in 2011, Fawas Gerges labeled such assessments "unconvincing" and argued that the statements about al-Qaida's role in regional operations were

[1] Bruce Hoffman, "Bin Laden's Death Shatters Conventional Wisdom," *The National Interest*, May 2, 2011; available online: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/bin-ladens-death-shatters-conventional-wisdom-5249.
[2] Rick "Ozzie" Nelson, quoted in Din Temple-Raston, "Al-Qaida, Affiliates Show Greater Coordination," *National Public Radio*, November 11, 2010; available online: http://www.kqed.org/news/story/2010/11/11/38130/alqaida_affiliates_show_greater_coordination?source=npr&category=world.
[3] Rick "Ozzie" Nelson, Thams M. Sanderson, Amrit Bagia, Ben Bodurian, and David A. Gordan, "A Threat Transformed: Al Qaeda and Associated Movements in 2011," *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, February 2011, p. 24; available online: http://csis.org/files/publication/110203_Nelson_AThreatTransformed_web.pdf.

—based more on risk assessment and speculation than hard facts."[4] Even more damningly, a senior intelligence official with knowledge of the treasure-trove of documents captured from the Abbottabad compound where bin Laden was killed claimed the dissident Saudi had become largely marginalized by the time of his death, arguing that in latter years Islamists viewed bin Laden —like the cranky old uncle" whose opinion was heard out of respect, and then promptly ignored.[5]

In short, the nature of al-Qaida's interactions with regional affiliates remains an open question, because there is no consensus among reputable analysts. However, this analysis presents evidence that broadly refutes assertions that al-Qaida currently controls or directs the actions of its regional affiliates. Indeed, case studies of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) suggest that the relationships between the core of bin Laden's organization and its regional affiliates have waned over time. Several members of AQIM and AQAP once held enough functional ties to the highest echelons of al-Qaida's leadership to be considered members of bin Laden's organization in their own right, but some combination of time, distance, and, in some cases, incarceration broke these bonds. A measure of ideological congruity exists between these regional groups and al-Qaida—it seems especially profound in the case of AQAP—but the operating environments that exist in the Sahara and Yemen suggest that there are scant reasons to suspect that bin Laden's organization contributes to the logistics or finance or AQIM or AQAP. Indeed, these organizations' financial and logistical independence offers one likely explanation for AQIM and AQAP's increasing

[4] Fawaz A. Gerges, —AQa'eda in the Arabian Peninsula: Does It Pose a Threat to Yemen and the West?" *Institute for Social Police and Understanding*, February 2011, p. 16; available online: http://ispu.org/pdfs/514_ISPU_Report_al-Qaeda_Yemen_Gerges_WEB.pdf.

[5] Saeed Shah, —Aend, bin Laden wasn't running al Qaida, officials say," *McClatchy Newspapers*, June 28, 2011; available online: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/28/116666/at-end-bin-laden-wasnt-running.html?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter&utm_term=news.

functional distance from al-Qaida. Historical training relationships ultimately constitute the strongest links between these groups and al-Qaida.

This chapter contains three sections following this introduction. The first two each discuss one of the regional affiliates mentioned above, before the third section offers some brief conclusions. The internal structure of the cases also follows the same format as previous chapters and contains break-outs on planning, finance and logistics, and training, followed by brief comparative summations. However, data limitations preclude this chapter from adopting the events-oriented perspective that dominates the other qualitative chapters of this analysis; the open-source record simply does not contain enough information on individual attacks conducted by AQIM and AQAP to allow the organizations to be studied with the same level of granularity. Consequently, this chapter‘s level of analysis is the organization, not the event. Because many facets of the analysis must also be made by proxy, this chapter‘s conclusions are less robust than those offered by the other, more detailed chapters.

7.1 AL-QAIDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB

AQIM has deep roots in Algeria‘s insurgency. In the late 1980s, the Algerian government introduced political reforms that allowed for a multi-party system, but when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a religiously-inspired political party, gained worrying levels of support in the early 1990s, the military delayed and then ultimately cancelled parliamentary elections to preclude what the nation‘s ruling elites feared would be an extremist take-over of the government. A military crack-down on FIS ensued, and when the organization‘s supporters

fought back, the situation quickly escalated into a wide-spread insurgency.[6] Within this context, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) emerged in the early 1990s; the organization's expressed goal was to overthrow Algeria's secular government and impose Sharia law.[7] However, by the late 1990s, the tide had turned against the Islamist group, when the military regained territory,[8] and a civil concord granted pardons to thousands of former insurgents, thereby depleting GIA's ranks.[9]

However, hardliners refused to lay-down their arms, and the GIA continued to widely target civilians in an attempt to perpetuate the conflict. In disagreement with this tactic, Hassan Hattab formed a splinter-group in 1998 that was dedicated to attacking government targets; he dubbed the new organization the *Salafist* Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).[10] By 2003, Hattab proved too moderate for his followers, who ousted him in favor of Nabil Sahrawi, an adherent to the *Salafist* vision of global Sunni theocracy. With this leadership change, the GSPC abandoned Hattab's prohibition on civilian attacks—in practice, the organization never adhered to this principle—and attempted to forge closer ties to al-Qaida.[11] Sahrawi's death the following year prevented him from realizing a partnership with bin Laden's organization,[12] but in 2006, his successor, Abdelmalik Droukdal, announced that the GSPC had 'merged' with al-Qaida and would henceforth be known as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[13]

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[6] CIA, "Africa: Algeria," *The World Factbook*, April 3, 2012; available online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html. See also: "Algeria profile," *BBC News*, January 10, 2012; available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14118856.
[7] Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Terrorist Organizations" in *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*, U.S. Department of State, August 5, 2010; available online: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm.
[8] "Africa: Algeria."
[9] "Algeria profile."
[10] Algerian Salafi founder Hattab calls for laying down arms," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, October 18, 2005.
[11] Ibid; Pamela Sampson, "AP Enterprise: Algerian group moves to establish stronger al-Qaida ties," *Associated Press Worldstream*, March 9, 2004.
[12] "Algeria kills militant leader," *United Press International*, June 20, 2004; "Algerian armed Islamist leader killed by armed forces: report," *Agence France Presse*, June 20, 2004.
[13] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.D.232.07 Abelmalik Droukdel," August 27, 2007; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI23207E.shtml.

However, a great deal of evidence belies this apparent unity. Bin Laden's organization seems to lack a direct role in AQIM's planning, though a small handful of events suggest that al-Qaida may have influenced the strategic trajectory of the North African organization. Yet, AQIM is entirely independent in terms of finance and logistics, and it seems that training ties between the two organizations have become largely historical. A small number of AQIM members once held demonstrable membership in al-Qaida, but these relationships have waned. Therefore, the evidence strongly suggests that despite AQIM's name change, any ongoing functional ties between the organization and al-Qaida are exceptionally weak.

7.1.1 PLANNING

The available evidence is hardly conclusive, but it suggests that AQIM's planning decisions flow through a fairly hierarchical structure. According to Abdelmalek Droukdal, who has served at the organization's titular *emir* since 2004,[14] major strategic decisions are made by "an advice council and senate" that first conducts after-action reviews of previous attacks, before setting new objectives.[15] According to Droukdal's version of events, decisions then flow downward to regional commanders who head divisions known as *katibats*, the boundaries of which roughly align with the six military districts established by the Algerian government.[16]

Statements offered by Wolfgang Ebner, an Austrian tourist who witnessed AQIM first-hand after the organization kidnapped him from the Sahara in March 2008, suggest that the organization's hierarchical structure extends with the *katibats*. Ebner describes small attack-

[14] "Algerian Salafi founder Hattab calls for laying down arms," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, October 18, 2005.

[15] "An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal," *New York Times*, July 1, 2008; available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?pagewanted=all.

[16] "Terrorist Salafi Group Reportedly Set Up New Structures in Algeria," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, March 27, 2006. It is important to note that these military districts are *not* synonymous with the government's internal administrative divisions, because Algeria contains 48 provinces, and it remains unclear how the military structure overlays with these political distinctions. For information on the country's provinces, see: Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Algeria," February 15, 2012; available online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ag.html.

teams that exist at the bottom-end of ―a completely hierarchical system," and which follow orders issued by ―The leader of AQIM in the mountains of Algeria."[17] However, the United Nations has suggested that senior leaders of the organization are often intimately involved in the tactical planning of attacks. For example, in April 2007, Droukdal, who began his career as a bomb-maker, allegedly personally supervised car-bombings that targeted government and police facilities in Algiers.[18] Thus, despite the organization's apparent hierarchy, AQIM's senior leaders seem prone to micro-managing events on the ground.

A measure of dysfunction has also mitigated the clarity of AQIM's command structure. Circa 2004, Mokhtar Belmokhtar (a.k.a. Khalid Abu al-Abbas), who has commanded a *katibat* in south-Saharan Algeria since the mid-1990s,[19] began to operate with increasing disregard for AQIM's central leadership. The reasons for Belmokhtar's disobedience were clear: because his Saharan operations provided the bulk of AQIM's financial revenue, he believed that he should have been named the organization's *emir*[20] when Nabil Sahrawi's death in June 2004 vacated the position.[21] Belmokhtar's split with AQIM's leadership was profound enough that some regional media outlets began referring to him as a ―former leader" of the organization,[22] and in 2011,

[17] A published interview with Ebner and his fellow Austrian hostage, Andrea Kloiber, originally appeared in German. The quotation is a translation of his original comments. For full information in the original German, see: ―Die sehen Osterreich als muslimishes Land" (They see Austria as a Muslim Country), *The Standard* (Austria), November 7, 2008; available online: http://www.algeria-watch.org/de/artikel/2008/itv_ex_geiseln.htm

[18] ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.D.232.07. Abdelmalek Droukdel."

[19] Belmokhtar conducted an interview in Arabic with Nouakchott News, a Mauritanian paper, in the fall of 2011. The news outlet has since posted versions of the interview in both Arabic and French online. For the original, see: ―Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass, alias Belaouar: L'armee de Ould Abdel Aziz au Mali n'a jamais ete un obstacle devant nous pour arriver a nos objectifs en Mauitanie," *Agence Noukchott d'Information*, November 2011; available online: http://www.ani.mr/?menuLink=9bf31c7ff062936a96d3c8bd1f8f2ff3&idNews=15829. See also: Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ―Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.B.136.03. Mokhtar Belmokhtar," November 11, 2003; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI13603E.shtml.

[20] "Algerian jihadists seek to expand," *United Press International*, June 18, 2009.

[21] For information on the timing of Sahrawi's death, see: "Algeria kills militant leader" and "Algerian armed Islamist leader killed by armed forces: report."

[22] "Algerian 'terrorist' Belmokhtar spotted in northern Mali," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, October 28, 2004.

Belmokhtar admitted that he had had, in his words, "a dispute of diversity" with AQIM's leadership.[23]

However, he stressed that the disagreement was conducted with "Islamic manners and ethics and mutual respect,"[24] and his split with the organization was never complete, because the disgruntled commander continued to cooperate with AQIM-proper when it was to his benefit.[25] Though the information is of debatable provenance because it comes from within the organization, Belmokhtar's recent comments stress that the organization is now fully unified.[26] On balance, Belmokhtar's on-again-off-again relationship with Droukdal's central committee suggests that regional leaders direct the actions of attack-teams, without seeking approval from their supposed superiors within the AQIM hierarchy.

This conclusion has fairly clear implications for the nature of the broader organization: AQIM seems more like a collection of loosely affiliated sub-regional groups than like a single cohesive organization. Internally, *katibats* likely have the sort of hierarchical structure described by AQIM's former captives, but each of these geographic divisions seems to function as a regional commander's personal fiefdom. It seems that the organization's central leadership rules by consensus and influence, rather than autocratic decree. Put differently, the evidence suggests that AQIM is more of an umbrella organization, in which the *emir* and the central committee are somewhat constrained in their ability to plan organization-wide strategy and operations.

AQIM's international components further muddy the waters of the organization's already murky command structure and planning apparatus. In addition to its Algerian-based *katibats*,

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[23] "Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass."
[24] Ibid.
[25] "Algerian jihadists seek to expand." "Six more German tourists missing in Algerian desert: diplomats," *Agence France Presse*, April 1, 2003; "Ransom demands received for 31 Europeans missing in Algeria: press," *Agence France Presse*, May 11, 2003; "Spanish daily details how Al-Qa'idah collects ransoms in Mali," *BBC Monitoring Europe - Political*, February 9, 2010; "Behind the Mauritanian coup," *Mideast Mirror*, August 12, 2005.
[26] "Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass."

AQIM also seems to maintain a small European presence. For example, in the early 2000s, the Italian government imprisoned several alleged members of the organization on charges of document forgery and provision of material support to terrorism.[27] However, Droukdal disavowed these operatives by stating that European governments' collective claim to have detained members of his organization ~~is~~ a lie, and deception, and injustice."[28] While he went-on to claim that AQIM had other sympathizers based ~~in~~ Europe and elsewhere,"[29] and although AQIM has been linked to a small handful of failed plots in Europe,[30] the organization has yet to successfully complete an attack outside of North Africa. Thus, AQIM's overseas presence is likely quite small, and it remains unclear to whom, if anyone, AQIM members abroad report.

The bulk of the organization's capabilities outside of Algeria exist in the border regions of the country's Saharan neighbors. Specifically, AQIM operatives have frequently stashed kidnapping victims in Northern Mali to place them beyond the reach of Algerian authorities.[31] In 2005 and 2008, AQIM also conducted attacks on Mauritanian military outposts,[32] and in 2008,

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[27] See, for example: Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ~~N~~Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.60.02. Mohamed Ben Belgacem Ben Abdallah al-Aouadi," April 24, 2002; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI06002E.shtml. Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, ~~N~~Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.E.64.02. Sami Ben Khamis Ben Saleh Elsseid," April 24, 2002; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI06402E.shtml.

[28] ~~"~~An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal."

[29] Ibid.

[30] For example, the perpetrators of a bizarre plot to attack London using Ricin—a plot that was much publicized at the time of the plotters' arrests, but which later review revealed was largely aspirational—held links to Nabil Sahrawi. Kim Senguputa and Jason Bennetto, "Ricin plot: Police made 100 arrests to smash al-qa'ida network; The most active group had sent thousands of members to train in," *The Independent* (London), April 14, 2005. See also, Sean O'Neill, "Was ricin the last act of terror cell?" *The Times* (London), April 15, 2005; Severin Carrell and Raymond Whitaker, "Special Report: Terror in the UK - Ricin the plot that never was; A deadly poison said to be at the heart of a terrorist conspiracy," *Indpendent on Sunday* (London), April 17, 2005.

[31] "Algerian armed Islamist group rejects general amnesty - paper," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, January 8, 2005; "Algerian 'terrorist' Belmokhtar spotted in northern Mali," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, October 28, 2004.

[32] "Mauritania claims proof of Algerian radical group behind attack," *Agence France Presse*, June 10, 2005; "Algerian Islamist group leader reveals details of his life, military operations," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, September 14, 2006; "Website statement claims Al-Qaeda link to Mauritanian ambush," *Agence France Presse*, September 18, 2008.

the organization kidnapped a pair of Canadian diplomats in Niger.[33] The robustness of AQIM's non-Algerian operations is, however, subject to debate, because the incidents in Mauritania and Niger may have indicated that the organization conducts brief cross-border raids, rather than maintaining sustainable capabilities outside of Algeria. Moreover, if AQIM does possess divisions in non-Algerian portions of the Sahara, the nature of their reporting relationships with Droukdal's central committee, or, for that matter, their relationship to any of the organization's more-established regional leaders, is unknown. Given these uncertainties, as well as the fact that *all* of the men reported to be high-level AQIM leaders have been Algerian,[34] it would be somewhat disingenuous to characterize the group as a true regional concern. Although AQIM's name references the whole of the Islamic Maghreb, the organization is primarily Algerian.

Moreover, the nature of the organization's strategic relationship to al-Qaida and its broader global agenda remain ambiguous. According to Belmokhtar, he has been in communication on AQIM's behalf with high-ranking members of bin Laden's organization since sometime in 2000,[35] and Droukdal claims that in 2004 he began trading emails with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,[36] the Jordanian *jihadist* who led al-Qaida in Iraq's insurgency against coalition

[33] Geoffrey York, "Deep in the Sahara, Fowler's abductor creates safe haven for terrorist kidnappings; 'The Untouchable' ringleader has powerful government and al-Qaeda links in Mali," *Globe and Mail* (Canada), October 14, 2009; "Spanish daily details how Al-Qa'idah collects ransoms in Mali," *BBC Monitoring Europe - Political*, February 9, 2010.

[34] For example, Hassan Hatab, who founded the organization, was born in Beni Mourad, Algeria. Nabil Sahrawi, who replaced Hatab as AQIM's top leader circa 2003, originally hailed from Constantie, Algeria. Meanwhile, Droukdal, who took over as *emir* following Sahrawi's death in 2004, is a native of Meftah, Algeria, while Mokthar Belmokhtar, who provides the bulk of the organization's finances via his smuggling and kidnapping operations is from Ghradieh, Algeria, and Ammari Saifi, an important AQIM regional commander, hails from Kef Rih, Algeria. For information on Hatab's birth, see: "Algerian Salafi founder Hattab calls for laying down arms," *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, October 18, 2005. For information on Sahrawi's birth, see: "Algeria: GSPC leader Hattab replaced by man 'close' to Al-Qa'idah," *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, October 10, 2003. For information on Droukdal's birth, see: "Treasury Designates AQIM Emir," U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 4, 2007. For information on Belmokhtar's birth, see: "Behind the Mauritanian coup," *Mideast Mirror*, August 12, 2005. Finally, for information on Saifi's birth, see: Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons," U.S. Department of the Treasury, February 10, 2010.

[35] "Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass."

[36] "An Interview With Abdelmalek Droukdal."

forces until his death in 2006.[37] Later that year, AQIM, formally changed its name from "the *Salafist* Group for Preaching and Combat" to reflect an allegiance with bin Laden's organization[38] and has since made several statements that mirror al-Qaida's stridently anti-American rhetoric.[39] Thus, the two organizations' strategic objectives at least partially overlap, but it would be premature to conclude that a true operational merger has taken place, because the nature of AQIM's attacks has remained largely consistent throughout the organization's history.

By and large, AQIM has undertaken armed assaults against Algerian government targets[40] and conducted profit-motivated kidnappings.[41] In recent years, the organization has begun to bargain hostages for the release of group members held in Algerian and Malian prisons in lieu of cash payments,[42] but three incidents merit closer examination because they set precedents that may indicate AQIM has become more closely engaged with bin Laden's organization. Ultimately, the evidence suggests that links between the two organizations require

[37] Joel Roberts, "What's next after Zarqawi's death? Leaders call terror chief's death a victory, but say violence may not abate," *CBS News*, June 8, 2006; Mark MacKinnon, "A severe blow to al-Qaeda; Twin 225-kilogram bombs bring an end to three-year U.S. hunt for Iraq's most-wanted insurgent," *Globe and Mail* (Canada), June 9, 2006.
[38] "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.D.232.07 Abelmalik Droukdel."
[39] See for example, "Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass," and "Al Qaida's Committee in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Claim of Responsibility for the Killing of the American Christopher Leggett," translation available from the NEFA Foundation, June 24, 2009; available online: http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefaaqimleggett0609.pdf.
[40] Boubker Belkadi, "Algerian army pursues crackdown on Muslim extremists, nine die," *Agence France Presse*, February 1, 2000; "Eighteen dead in ambush of Algerian security patrol: report," *Agence France Presse*, January 5, 2005; "Algerian Salafi group attacks army unit, rejects amnesty offer," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, January 8, 2005; "Algerian armed Islamist group rejects general amnesty - paper," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, January 8, 2005; "Algerian peace charter helps more than 2,000: president," *Agence France Presse*, April 8, 2006; "Algerian forces kill suspected militants in reprisal for ambush," *Agence France Presse*, April 9, 2006; "Algerian authorities abort arms deal - paper," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, April 1, 2009.
[41] "Desert bandits suspects after 31 tourists vanish," *Ottawa Citizen*, April 22, 2003; Hassane Meftahi, "Helicopters and camels used to search for nearly two dozen tourists vanished in Sahara," *Associated Press Worldstream*, April 3, 2003; "Fears grow for 11 European tourists missing in Sahara," *Agence France Presse*, March 30, 2003; "Ransom demands received for 31 Europeans missing in Algeria: press," *Agence France Presse*, May 11, 2003; "Spanish daily details how Al-Qa'idah collects ransoms in Mali," *BBC Monitoring Europe - Political*, February 9, 2010.
[42] See, for example: "Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): The Mujahideen's Demand to Release the French Hostage," translation available from the NEFA Foundation, January 10, 2010; available online: http://nefafoundation.org//file/AQIMHostages0110.pdf.

careful monitoring, but it would be premature to conclude that AQIM takes formal direction from al-Qaida.

The first incident occurred in 2007, when AQIM conducted its first known martyrdom operation by suicide-bombing a pair of government targets in Algiers. Many analysts hailed this event as evidence that AQIM had begun to take its cues directly from bin Laden's organization,[43] and indeed AQIM has since made regular use of suicide-bombings as a means of attack. Exact counts vary by source, but range in the neighborhood of 15 incidents.[44]

However, other Algerian organizations perpetrated suicide-attacks long before AQIM claimed to have ties to bin Laden's organization. For example, in 1995, the GIA—the organization from which AQIM ultimately descended—suicide-bombed a police station in Algiers,[45] and in 1998 suicide-bombers killed half a dozen civilians in Medea Province.[46] Thus, it would be inaccurate to infer that al-Qaida necessarily brought this tactic to AQIM, because a limited tradition of suicide-bombing already independently existed in Algeria. Moreover, since 2007, the bulk of AQIM's operations have continued to utilize other modes of attack, so it remains to be proven that the nature of the North African organization's strategy and tactics have fundamentally changed since it formally affiliated with al-Qaida.

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[43] Craig Whitlock, "Suicide attacks mark turn in Algeria; Insurgents seen taking cues from global Al-Qaeda," *Washington Post*, April 13, 2007.

[44] For example, START estimates the total attacks at 16, but concludes its coverage at the end of 2010, while Roggio estimates the number at 15, but extends his coverage through August 2011. For details, see: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database (GTD), available online: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search. Results filtered by country (Algeria) and Attack Type (Suicide). Last accessed April 2, 2012. Bill Roggio, "Suicide bombers kill 18 in attack on Algerian military academy," *The Long War Journal*, August 26, 2011; available online: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/08/suicide_bombers_kill_6.php.

[45] Given that the attack occurred long ago in a distant location, English-language media accounts of it are somewhat rare. For one example, see: "Urgent," *Agence France Presse*, February 13, 1995. For a brief secondary account of the event, see: Carlos Echeverria Jesus, "Radical Islam in the Maghreb," Open University-UNED, Madrid, 2005; available online: http://www.fpri.org/pubs/200510.echeverria.radicalislammaghreb.pdf.

[46] "Algeria: Six Civilians Killed in Medea Province," *BBC News*, October 31, 1998.

The second precedent-setting event occurred in 2009, when AQIM attempted to exchange the hostage Edwin Dyer, an Englishman, for Abu Qatada, an al-Qaida-affiliated Islamist cleric held in Britain on terror charges.[47] Although AQIM has typically treated hostages as a valuable commodity worth protecting—Belmokhtar once even brought-in a physician to treat a hostage's injuries[48]—the organization ultimately executed Dyer when the British government refused to negotiate.[49] This event constitutes a worrying example, but since other Western hostages have since been released when AQIM's ransom demands were met,[50] the Dyer execution hardly represented a sea-change in AQIM's treatment of abductees. Put differently, the Dyer execution seems to have represented an aberrant event rather than a tipping-point in the nature of AQIM kidnappings.

The final precedent-setting event also took place in 2009, when AQIM killed Christopher Legget, an American teacher, in an ambush-style shooting in Mauritania.[51] The organization cited Legget's "Christianization activities" as the reason for the killing,[52] thereby demonstrating that AQIM is willing to back-up its rhetoric regarding America's participation in a Zionist-Crusader alliance. However, it is necessary to consider the scale of this action. The shooting was conducted by three men, who operated without much, if any, support from AQIM's broader

[47] "Al Qaida's Committee in the Islamic Maghreb: A Communiqué Regarding the British Hostage," translation available from the NEFA Foundation, May 20, 2009; available online: http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefaaqimbritishhostage0509.pdf. "Al Qaida's Committee in the Islamic Maghreb: A Statement Regarding the Killing of British Hostage Edwin Dyer," translation available from the NEFA Foundation; available online: http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefaaqim0609.pdf.
[48] "Spanish daily details how Al-Qa'idah collects ransoms in Mali," *BBC Monitoring Europe - Political*, February 9, 2010.
[49] "A Statement Regarding the Killing of British Hostage Edwin Dyer."
[50] For example, in 2010, a pair of Spanish aid workers, who were kidnapped from the Sahara the previous year, were allowed to return home after Mauritania released an AQIM member. Tracy Rucinski and Mathieu Bonkoungou, "Freed al Qaeda hostages arrive back in Spain," *Reuters*, August 23, 2010; available online: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/24/idUSLDE67M1V2.
[51] "Christopher Leggett killing: Mauritania death penalty," *BBC News,* March 16, 2011; available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12750853.
[52] "Al Qaida's Committee in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): Claim of Responsibility for the Killing of the American Christopher Leggett," translation available from the NEFA Foundation, June 24, 2009; available online: http://nefafoundation.org//file/FeaturedDocs/nefaaqimleggett0609.pdf.

organization.[53] Moreover, none of the currently available evidence suggests that bin Laden's organization played any role in the attack. A single murder carried out by operatives working in isolation is a far cry from a coordinated, multi-organizational assault on American interests in the region.

These events may suggest that AQIM has begun to adopt al-Qaida's strategic objectives, but this trend ultimately seems limited, because the bulk of AQIM's attacks continue to follow historical patterns. In short, AQIM seems to plan the majority of its attacks not to advance a pan-Islamist agenda, but instead to bloody the nose of the Algerian government, to achieve small specific goals such as hostage exchanges, or to obtain financial reward. Assertions that AQIM has fully merged with al-Qaida, or that members of bin Laden's organization play a direct role in the planning of AQIM attacks, likely overstate the case.

7.1.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

Nor does al-Qaida have a demonstrable role in AQIM's logistics. For example, AQIM staffs the kidnapping gangs that comprise its best known and most active component without assistance. Former hostages claim that the most junior members of the attack-teams are teenage boys, many of whom hail from the Western Sahara. Even their hostages characterize these boys as victims, who were abandoned by families that were unable to provide for their care.[54] Thus, AQIM acquires some of its personnel by serving as a surrogate family that provides shelter and sustenance to the disenfranchised, but lest the organization seem benevolent, it is important to note that former captives have also spoken about vague "sexual problems" among these boys,[55] which suggests that some of AQIM's more predatory members likely treat their younger subordinates as playthings that can be molested at will.

[53] "Christopher Leggett killing: Mauritania death penalty."
[54] "Die sehen Osterreich als muslimishes Land."
[55] Ibid.

Beyond the teenagers, the kidnapping gangs also contain several older men who former hostages describe as "mercenaries." Victims allege that senior kidnappers were primarily interested in generating revenue to support families living in their home villages.[56] Therefore, like the teenage boys, these attackers' primary motivation for participation seems to be economic, rather than ideological.[57]

This trend is also evident in a third group that participates in AQIM kidnappings: the Toureg tribe, an ethnic group that controls territory in the Sahara stretching from Eastern Morocco to Western Libya.[58] According to the North African media, Belmokhtar married into this ethnic group,[59] and several of his new kinsmen then began to work indirectly in the interests of AQIM. Without the organization's advanced consent, they abducted tourists from the desert and then attempted to sell their victims to Belmokhtar. Edwin Dyer, the British hostage that AQIM executed when the British government refused to release Abu Qatada, was reportedly abducted this way.[60] Similarly, the Touregs accidentally killed a group of Saudis falconers during a botched speculative-kidnapping in late 2009.[61] While the Touregs seem to have functioned more as AQIM's outside business partners than dedicated members of the organization, their example serves to reinforce the role that economic concerns play in staffing AQIM operations.

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[56] Ibid.
[57] Rosenthal has documented similar profit-driven motives among Philippine terrorists. She argues that terror groups often become involved in crime because "opportunities for financial gain (can become) so great that they subsume ideological motives" and states that for profit terrorists' "grand strategic vision is to create lawless regions with acquiescent populations so they can maximize profit." Justine A. Rosenthal, "For-Profit Terrorism: The Rise of Armed Entrepreneurs," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 30, No. 6 (June 2008), pp. 481-498.
[58] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "The Transatlantic Cocaine Market," April 2011, p. 37; available online: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Transatlantic_cocaine_market.pdf.
[59] "Algerian armed Islamist group rejects general amnesty - paper," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, January 8, 2005; "Killed Saudis were meant to be abducted for Al-Qa'idah - sources," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, December 30, 2009.
[60] "Algerian jihadists seek to expand."
[61] "Killed Saudis were meant to be abducted for Al-Qa'idah – sources."

However, it would be somewhat disingenuous to suggest that radical ideology lacks a role in the organization, because a fourth and final contingent of members seems to have been directly recruited from religious schools operating in North Africa. AQIM's former hostages described several of their captors as exceptionally devout twenty-somethings, who prayed regularly and were so unwilling to cast their eyes upon Western women that they always turned their gaze away from the _indecency' of their female captives.[62] Unfortunately, it remains impossible to scale the relative roles that economics and religion play in AQIM's recruitment strategy, because both factors likely motivate many members, and because the total size of the organization remains unknown.[63] But regardless of the breakdown, it seems clear that al-Qaida lacks a direct role, since even AQIM's most devout members hail from local sources.

AQIM's persistent participation in kidnapping also speaks to the organization's financial independence. The exact amount of revenue AQIM has derived from kidnapping remains unknown, but David S. Cohen, the U.S. Treasury Department's Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, approximated the value at —tens of millions of dollars" as of the fall of 2011.[64] Moreover, AQIM also reaps proceeds from other forms of crime. For example, the organization frequently extorts money from the Algerian citizenry by taxing travelers for passage through illegal road blocks,[65] and AQIM has a well-documented history of informally taxing goods smuggled through the Sahara.[66]

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[62] —Die sehen Osterreich als muslimishes Land."
[63] —The Transatlantic Cocaine Market."
[64] David S. Cohen, —Remarks by Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen at Treasury's Counter-Terrorist Financing Symposium," United States Department of the Treasury, September 8, 2011; available online: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1293.aspx.
[65] "Algeria: Two armed civilians killed in bogus roadblock in east of country," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, December 15, 2001. —New Video Shows AQIM Attack Using False Road Block," *CBS News*, November 14, 2008; available online: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-502684_162-4604373-502684.html.
[66] —The Transatlantic Cocaine Market," p. 37. See also: "Al-Arabiya reports on Algerian Al-Qa'idah's links with Sahara drugs mafia," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, July 14, 2009; and "Behind the Mauritanian coup."

Some sources allege that AQIM has also become actively involved in smuggling of a host of illicit commodities, most notably arms and tobacco.[67] Purportedly, Belmokhtar's role in cigarette trafficking had become so widespread that by 2003, he was known regionally as the "Marlborough Godfather."[68] Along similar lines, there are persistent allegations that portions of AQIM have also become involved in narcotics trafficking,[69] though the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime remains skeptical that that the Sahara has become a drug-smuggling route, stating flatly that "there have been few seizures to support this claim."[70] Moreover, Belmokhtar, the AQIM member whose name surfaces most often in regards to narcotics, unequivocally denies his participation in this trade, stating that "the illegitimacy of drugs or trafficking of it . . . even to the land of the *Kuffar* (nonbelievers) is from the most obvious *haram* (prohibition) in the *Sharia* (religious law) of Allah Almighty."[71] Thus, even though the data on AQIM's role in the drug trade is exceptionally speculative, the organization's many other criminal pursuits dictate that some *katibats* function largely as criminal enterprises, rather than hardcore violent Islamist cells bent on the destruction of the West.

Moreover, AQIM's illicit exploits say a great deal about the nature of the organization's logistical relationship to al-Qaida. Belmokhtar's Saharan smuggling concerns and the group's broader participation in profit-motivated kidnappings provide not only revenue ample enough to ensure the organization's financial independence, but also the criminal contacts necessary to ensure independent access to weapons. In short, there is little reason to assume that AQIM relies on bin Laden's organization for any sort of financial or logistical assistance.

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[67] David Sharrock, "'Pimpernel of the Sahara' brokered release of other tourists; The suspect Mokhtar Belmokhtar," *The Times* (London), June 4, 2009.
[68] "Ransom demands received for 31 Europeans missing in Algeria: press, *Agence France Presse*," May 11, 2003.
[69] See, for example: Sharrock; "Sicilian, Colombian, Russian mafia in league with Al-Qa'idah Maghreb - paper," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, July 11, 2009; and "Algerian paper views links between Al-Qa'idah, drug trade in Sahel region," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, February 7, 2010.
[70] "The Transatlantic Cocaine Market," p. 36.
[71] "Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass."

7.1.3 TRAINING

Beyond AQIM's vague ideological overlap with al-Qaida, training ties offer the clearest evidence of a relationship between the organizations. For example, the United Nations alleges that European-based members of the GSPC, the forerunner to AQIM, funneled recruits to bin Laden-affiliated camps in the late 1990s.[72] Similarly, detainees captured by American forces have admitted that an "Algerian Center" existed within al-Qaida's Khaldan Camp at that time.[73]

However, the evidence suggests that the vast majority of these ties have become historical, while others were always somewhat indirect. Italian authorities dismantled GSPC's European operations with a wave of arrests in 2001,[74] to say nothing of Droukdal's disavowal of those operatives. Moreover, many of the Algerians who trained at Khaldan never returned to their home country and instead worked for al-Qaida in either South Asia[75] or Bosnia.[76] Therefore, although training ties clearly exist between al-Qaida and AQIM, they are neither particularly strong nor especially current.

Belmokhtar, AQIM's most notable al-Qaida trainee, offer a complimentary example that also demonstrates that the training relationship between AQIM and al-Qaida has likely waned.

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[72] See, for example: Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.C.70.02. Yassine Chekkouri," September 3, 2002; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI07002E.shtml; and Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.B.62.02. Mohamed Aouani," April 24, 2002; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI06202E.shtml.

[73] Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Gunatanamo Bay, Cuba, "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of Abdelrahman, Adelrazak Ali," United States Department of Defense, July 27, 2005. Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Gunatanamo Bay, Cuba, "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of Bel Bacha, Ahmed Bin Saleh," March 29, 2005.

[74] "Italian network was recruiting for bin Laden: police," *Agence France Presse*, November 30, 2001.

[75] See, for example, Bel Bacha.

[76] See, for example: Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Gunatanamo Bay, Cuba, "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of Belkacem, Bensayah," December 28, 2005. Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Gunatanamo Bay, Cuba, "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of Boumediene, Lakhdar," December 14, 2007.

According to an account he provided to the Algerian media, Belmokhtar trained in al-Qaida's Jihad Wal and Khaldan Camps in 1991, and then spent an additional year operating in Afghanistan alongside members of bin Laden's organization, before returning to Algeria sometime in 1993, and taking-up arms on behalf of the insurgent group GIA.[77] Circa 1994, his superiors in this organization tasked him to make contact with his former colleagues in al-Qaida, who had since relocated to the Sudan,[78] but whether as the result of the difficulties bin Laden's organization subsequently faced when its relationship with Hassan al-Turabi deteriorated, or as the result of turmoil that accompanied the split within GIA that led to the foundation of the GSPC, Belmokhtar apparently lost contact with al-Qaida for about half a decade. He claims that his first attempt "to unite the ranks of [Algerian] *mujahidin* with [their] brothers in Al-Qaeda" took place in 2000.[79] Thus, Belmokhtar's own statements regarding his personal history suggest that AQIM's training relationship with al-Qaida devolved over time, despite the unity implied by the North African group's 2006 name change.

Iraq may provide a partial exception to this conclusion. The Sinjar Records, comprised of documents captured from Islamist insurgents in October 2007, contained country-of-origin data on 595 foreign-fighters in Iraq, 49 of whom (8.1 percent) hailed from Algeria.[80] However, the strength of the relationship between violent Islamists operating in Iraq and bin Laden's organization is subject to debate, because prominent leaders in Iraq displayed tremendous operational independence, even when they operated under al-Qaida's banner. For example,

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[77] "Algerian Islamist group leader reveals details of his life, military operations," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, September 14, 2006; Geoffrey York, "Deep in the Sahara, Fowler's abductor creates safe haven for terrorist kidnappings; 'The Untouchable' ringleader has powerful government and al-Qaeda links in Mali," *Globe and Mail* (Canada), October 14, 2009.
[78] Ibid.
[79] "Entretien exclusif avec Khaled Abou al-Abass."
[80] Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, "Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records," *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, 2008; available online: http://tarpley.net/docs/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf.

although Abu Musab al-Zarqawi swore formal allegiance to bin Laden in 2004,[81] the Jordanian openly ignored al-Qaida's efforts to sew unity among the diverse elements of the Iraqi insurgency, when he undertook a prolonged campaign of violence against Iraqi Shiities that detracted from al-Qaida's larger organizational goal of expelling coalition forces from the region.[82] Thus, it would be premature to conclude that Iraqi groups who provided Algerian insurgents with training and experience were part-and-parcel of bin Laden's organization, and since the record has remained silent on the fate of the 49 men mentioned in the Sinjar Records, it would also be foolish to assume that all Algerian participants in the Iraqi *jihad* eluded death and capture to return home. A handful of Algerians may have received some meaningful training from bin Laden's organization in Iraq, but context suggests that any such interactions were few in number.

Moreover, AQIM has always had several sources of training other than al-Qaida's camps. A number of AQIM members received formal military training from the very government the organization opposes, by serving as conscripts in the Algerian military.[83] Some AQIM members even served in elite units; for example, Ammari Saifi, who was arrested in 2004 for his participation the kidnapping of European hostages from the Sahara,[84] earned the nickname "Abderrezak al-Para" because he once served as a paratrooper.[85] Given that Algeria's civil

[81] Dexter Filkins, "Wanted rebel vows loyalty to bin Laden, web sites say," *New York Times*, October 18, 2004; Mark MacKinnon, "Empty chairs, angry youths and ignominy," *Globe and Mail* (Canada), June 9, 2006.
[82] See, for example, Dexter Filkins, "On bus, bicycle, and foot, suicide bombers aim at Shiite holy day," *New York Times*, February 20, 2005; Sabrina Tavernise and Robert F. Worth, "Relentless rebel attacks test Shiite endurance," *New York Times*, September 19, 2005; and James Palmer, "Co-ordinated blasts kill at least 60 in Iraq; Latest bombings viewed as first wave of increased terror in run up to key vote," *Globe and Mail* (Canada), September 30, 2005; Dexter Filkins, "Top insurgent in Iraq adopts lower profile," *New York Times*, March 25, 2006.
[83] Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Gunatanamo Bay, Cuba, "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of Bel Bacha, Ahmed Bin Saleh," March 29, 2005.
[84] "Germany: Algerian terrorist caught," *CNN.com*, May 18, 2004. Interestingly, Saifi reportedly renounced *jihad* while serving prison time on the same charges. For details, see: "Algerian 'terrorist' chief apologizes for past actions in letter from jail," *BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political*, May 11, 2009.
[85] Craig S. Smith, "U.S. training African forces to uproot terrorists," *New York Times*, May 11, 2004.

conflict has simmered for decades, other members of the organization have benefitted from training and practical experience derived from serving on the front lines with the insurgent forces that oppose the government. Ultimately, it is unclear how large a percentage of AQIM's membership received instruction from various sources, but the context suggests that there is little reason to assume strong or continuing training ties to bin Laden's organization.

7.1.4 SUMMATION

The evidence demonstrates that there is some manner of relationships between al-Qaida and AQIM. Aspects of this relationship are surface-level and primarily ideological, as best demonstrated by AQIM's name change in 2006. A handful of precedent-setting events demonstrate that the nature of the two groups' interactions requires continuous monitoring, but contrary to popular belief, the most substantive interactions between the groups are historical in nature. Individuals like Belmokhtar once held enough ties to bin Laden's organization to be considered members of al-Qaida, but these relationships have clearly faded over time. In Belmokhtar's case, the causes of this decline also seem fairly self-evident. The multi-million dollar revenues that he derives from kidnapping, illegal road blocks, cigarette smuggling, and perhaps even narcotics trafficking, have made him self-sustaining. He has the money to recruit, arm, and maintain a fighting-force without relying on material support from AQIM's central committee, much less bin Laden's organization. In short, Belmokhtar's money allows him to operate with as much independence as he chooses.

7.2 AL-QAIDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

For point of comparison, it is useful to evaluate AQIM alongside another of al-Qaida's regional affiliates, namely al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). However, establishing AQAP's founding date is somewhat difficult, because the core of bin Laden's group has also conducted operations in the Arabian region. Most notably, in 2000, several al-Qaida members orchestrated a suicide-bombing against the U.S.S. Cole while the ship was in port at Aden, Yemen.[86] However, 2007 marks a useful distinction between the organizations, because that year, two recently-escaped convicts, whose relationship with al-Qaida was interrupted by their time in prison, announced the formation of a new al-Qaida cell operating in Yemen.[87] The following year, this new endeavor received al-Qaida's official blessing, when Ayman al-Zawahiri issued a statement describing the *emir* of the regional group as al-Qaida's top emissary in Yemen,[88] and AQAP adopted its current name in January 2009, when the Yemeni group announced a merger' with its Saudi Arabian counterpart,[89] which had become largely defunct following a prolonged series of raids by the Kingdom's police and intelligence services.[90] Given this context, it appears at first blush that AQAP is part and parcel of al-Qaida.

However, the evidence suggests that AQAP exhibits the same sort of waning relationship to bin Laden's organization as AQIM. Members of the Yemeni organization were once clearly members of al-Qaida, but there is scant evidence to suggest that these individuals continue to

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[86] High Value Detainee Biographies, U.S. Department of Defense, Date Unknown, available online: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/detainee_affairs/. Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10015 (Abd al-Rahim al-Nasheri), Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 14, 2007.
[87] Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Designations of AQAP Leaders Qasim al-Rimi and Nayif al-Qahtani," U.S. Department of State, May 11, 2010; available online: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/143206.htm. See also: Stephen Kurczy, "Five key members of Al Qaeda in Yemen (AQAP)," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 2, 2010.
[88] Kurczy.
[89] "Yemen and Saudi al-Qaeda arms merge: New al-Qaeda group vows to carry out attacks across the Arabian peninsula," *Aljazeera*, January 28, 2009; available online: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/01/200912811514298086 6.html.
[90] "Saudi Arabia puts 50 Al Qaeda suspects on trial," *Reuters*, April 8, 2012.

hold functional ties to bin Laden's group. Owing largely to involvement in the same sort of criminal activities that typified AQIM's experience in the Sahara, AQAP is currently financially self-reliant, though the organization does continue to receive revenue from other means. Similarly, Yemen's general lawlessness and thriving arms markets ensure that the organization has independent access to the weaponry necessary to conduct terror attacks. Definitive statements regarding al-Qaida's participation (or non-participation) in the planning of AQAP attacks are impossible to make because tremendous ambiguity surrounds this aspect of AQAP, but when viewed alongside the organization's financial and logistical independence, there is little reason to assume that bin Laden's organization plays any direct role in setting the tactics or strategies employed by AQAP. There is clear ideological congruity between al-Qaida and AQAP, but a historical training relationship ultimately offers the strongest functional tie between the two organizations.

7.2.1 PLANNING

Little is definitively known about AQAP's internal planning structure. Official characterizations stress key leaders' roles within an organizational hierarchy. For example, Nasir al-Wahishi, a Yemeni with strong historical ties to bin Laden, is invariably listed as AQAP's top leader, while Said al-Shihri, a Saudi who was once detained at Guantanamo Bay, is invariably listed as al-Wahishi's chief deputy.[91] Similarly, the United Nations alleges that Qasim al-Rimi, another Yemeni with historical ties to bin Laden's organization, serves as AQAP's senior leader

[91] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.274.10 Nasir Abd-al-Karim Abdullah al-Wahishi," January 19, 2010; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI27410E.shtml. See also, Philip J. Crowley, "Designations of Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Senior Leaders," United States Department of State, January 19, 2010; available online: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/01/135364.htm.

for terrorist operations,"[92] while two men have at various times been cited as AQAP's chief ideologue: Ibrahim al-Rubaish,[93] another Saudi veteran of Guantanamo Bay;[94] and Anwar al-Awlaki, a now deceased[95] American-born preacher of Yemeni descent, who pledged loyalty to al-Wahishi in 2008 or 2009,[96] and who used his fluency in English to appeal to young Muslims in the West by issuing radical statements on a host of social media platforms.[97]

However, the true extent of hierarchy within AQAP is subject to debate, because the loss of individuals hailed as "key operatives" has done little to hinder the organization's operational capabilities. For example, in June 2009, Yemeni authorities announced the arrest of Hassan Hussein bin Alwan with much fanfare, claiming that the detainee was AQAP's "biggest and most influential" financier and that his arrest would be "instrumental in understanding the system

[92] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.282.10. Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi," May 11, 2010; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI28210E.shtml.

[93] Specifically, al-Rubaish offered a detailed statement describing the reasons why AQAP was justified in attempting to assassinate Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayif. An English language translation of al-Rubaish's comments is available online from Islamic Awakening: http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/why-muhammad-ibn-naif-shaykh-ibrahim-al-28847/. Based on this pronouncement, analysts at the Jamestown Foundation concluded that, as of 2009, he served as AQAP's *Mufti*. For additional information, see: Murad Batal al-Shishani, "Ibrahim al-Rubaish: New Religious Ideologue of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia Calls for Revival of Assassination Tactic," *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 7 No. 36 (November 2009), available online: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35771.

[94] Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Gunatanamo Bay, Cuba, "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of Arbaysh, Ibrahim Sulayman Muhammad," January 20, 2006.

[95] Al-Awlaki died alongside another American: Samir Khan, a former blogger who effectively wrote his way into AQAP and edited the organization's English-language magazine, *Inspire*. For details of the missile strike that killed the men, see: "AQaeda's Anwar al-Awlaki killed in Yemen," *CBS News*, September 30, 2011; available online: http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20113732.html and Jennifer Griffin and Justin Fishel, "Two U.S.-Born Terrorists Killed in CIA-Led Drone Strike," *Fox News*, September 30, 2011; available online: http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/09/30/us-born-terror-boss-anwar-al-awlaki-killed/. For information on Khan's activities prior to his death, see: Michael Moss, "An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers," *New York Times*, October 15, 2007.

[96] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.283.10. Anwar Nasser Abdulla al-Aulaqi," July 20, 2010; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI28310E.shtml.

[97] "Obituary: Anwar al-Awlaki," *BBC News Middle East*, September 30, 2011; available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11658920. See also, Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, "Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen," *New York Times*, September 30, 2011.

of global terrorism financing."[98] Although Alwan purportedly knew all of AQAP's secrets, no massive round-up of Yemeni terror suspects followed in the wake of his capture, and AQAP managed to stage an innovative, though ultimately unsuccessful, attack on a US-flagged jetliner only six months later, when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian student indoctrinated by al-Awlaki, attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underpants while onboard a Detroit-bound flight on Christmas day.[99]

These events may indicate that the Yemenis merely oversold Alwan's value to AQAP, but it is equally probable that the organization is decentralized to the point that tactical-level leaders operate in smaller, largely autonomous structures that interface only sporadically with AQAP's official hierarchy.[100] In short, the currently available data on AQAP's planning structure is inconclusive, and any definitive pronouncements regarding its nature would be both biased and premature. All that can be definitively stated regarding al-Qaida's role in AQAP planning is that American-centric operations like the failed underpants bombing show that the organizations share the same strategic and ideological goals.

7.2.2 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

Yemen's cash culture makes it exceptionally difficult to track the exact sources of AQAP's funding. Less than four percent of Yemenis have a bank account of any type, so nearly all of the funds that support AQAP are handled, quite literally, in bags of cash. Tracking illicit

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[98] Yemeni authorities quoted in Ahmed al-Haj, "Hassan Hussein Bin Alwan, Al Qaeda's Biggest Financier in Saudi Arabia, Arrested in Yemen," *Huffington Post*, June 14, 2009; available online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/14/hassan-hussein-bin-alwan-_n_215403.html.

[99] "One boy's journey to jihad; A former London student, inspired by radical clerics, managed to slip through the intelligence net and launch a suicide mission that nearly brought carnage to America," *Sunday Times* (London), January 3, 2010. See also: Nasser al-Aulaqi (Plantiff) v. Barrack H. Obama, Robert M. Gates, and Leon E. Panetta (Defendants), United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Civ. A. No. 10-cv-1469 (JDB)), Opposition to Plantiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, September 25, 2010.

[100] Drawing on different evidence, Barak Barfi reached a similar conclusion in his assessment of AQAP. See: Barak Barfi, "Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Yemen," *New American Foundation*, pp. 5-6; available online: http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Barfi.pdf.

transfers from account-to-account is a difficult task even in countries that fully participate in the modern banking system, but in Yemen's largely traditional economy, the task is truly herculean.[101]

With the substantial caveat implicit to the circumstances described above, much of AQAP's money seems to come from Saudi Arabia. Charitable donations account for one revenue stream, because although Saudi authorities have curtailed religious organizations' ability to collect cash payments from anonymous donors, the practice has not been entirely eliminated. Violent Islamist groups continue to collect money from wealthy individuals, especially during the *hajj*, when an influx of religious pilgrims brings Muslims from the world-over into Saudi Arabia.[102] While this pattern is broadly reminiscent of al-Qaida's diversion of *zakat* funds, there is little reason to assume that bin Laden's organization plays a direct role. Instead, AQAP members seem to collect on their own behalf, before shuttling the money across the porous border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.[103]

Indeed, despite efforts by Saudi authorities to construct a physical barrier between the two countries, the border remains a veritable smugglers' paradise, and illicit cross-border enterprises constitute a likely second source of revenue for AQAP. For example, in 2008, media reports claimed that "thousands of Yemenis and Africans are believed to have been leaking through the borders to Saudi Arabia daily."[104] Thus, migrant smuggling is a large and lucrative business on the Arabian Peninsula. If the trade is as ample as media sources suggest, it seems somewhat inevitable that AQAP would become involved. The lure of easy money is, after all, difficult to turn down, especially for an organization that already operates illicitly.

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[101] Ulf Laessing, "Fight vs al Qaeda funding faces tough obstacle: cash," *Reuters*, November 10, 2010; available online: http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/11/10/idINIndia-52814020101110.
[102] Ibid.
[103] "Al Qaida says it fund raiser killed by Yemeni forces," *Xinhua News*, March 14, 2010.
[104] Mohammed al-Kibsi, "Saudi authorities erect barriers on Yemeni border," *Yemen Observer*, January 12, 2008.

However, Yemen's illicit markets are hardly limited to human smuggling. Arms seizures are a near-daily occurrence on the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen,[105] and each year Yemeni smugglers also traffic an estimated $1.75 million worth of *qat*, a leaf that is widely chewed throughout the Arabian Peninsula and portions of East Africa for its mild amphetamine-like effects, into Saudi Arabia, where *qat* is banned.[106] Consequently, AQAP is not only able to bring cash donations into Yemen without difficulty, but also likely reaps a share of income by participating in the region's thriving smuggling trade or informally taxing those who do.

Beyond charitable donations and illicit commerce, AQAP earns money through a third revenue stream: kidnapping for ransom. For example, in November 2011, three French hostages, who were abducted three-and-a-half months earlier by gunmen affiliated with high-ranking AQAP member Fahd al-Qusso, were released after their abductors received an undisclosed amount of money from an undisclosed source. Given that the kidnappers' original ransom demand was for $12 million,[107] it seems reasonable to infer that final payment was at least in the seven figure range. Thus, even a single kidnapping provides AQAP with a fairly sizeable operating budget, though it is worth noting that the organization more often seems interested in making a statement by killing Western captives than by ransoming them back to their home countries.[108]

Questions of intent aside, attributing responsibility for kidnappings to AQAP is often exceptionally difficult, because abductions are disturbingly common in Yemen. Tribes routinely

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[105] "Arms smugglers use satellite phones to make deals in KSA," *The Saudi Gazette*, February 22, 2012; available online: http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=20120222118089.
[106] Brian Whitaker, "Saudi security barrier stirs anger in Yemen," *The Guardian*, February 16, 2004; available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/feb/17/saudiarabia.yemen.
[107] "Three French hostages freed in Yemen head for home," *Agence France Presse*, November 13, 2011.
[108] See, for example: "Foreign workers: Yemen says 3 female hostages killed," *CNN.com*, June 15, 2009; available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-15/world/yemen.hostages_1_houthi-rebels-yemeni-government-saba?_s=PM:WORLD; "Nine foreign hostages killed in Yemen," *The National* (UAE), June 15, 2009; available online: http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/nine-foreign-hostages-killed-in-yemen.

kidnap foreigners and Yemenis alike in order to force concessions from the government or regional rivals.[109] Exact statistics remain elusive, but in 2010, AKE Limited, a British insurance underwriter that keeps careful tabs on the situation because the firm is among the world's leading providers of kidnapping and ransom insurance, estimated that one to two foreigners and three to four Yemeni nationals were kidnapped per month.[110] Given this volume, and the fact that tribal elements are often involved in events alongside AQAP members,[111] it remains unclear exactly how much income the terror group derives from this source. But regardless of the ambiguities, it seems clear that AQAP's many revenue streams grant the organization financial independence from bin Laden's organization.

Similarly, Yemen's robust illicit arms markets dictate that AQAP can meet all of its weapons needs through local sources. Experts on the region's culture argue that weapons ownership is "a matter of honor" among Yemenis;[112] consequently, gun ownership rates in the country are the highest in the region. A house-to-house study conducted in 2009 estimated that private citizens owned roughly 8 million small arms,[113] and given that Yemen's population is just under 25 million,[114] there is one privately-owned gun for roughly every 3.125 people in the country, to say nothing of the worryingly large arms stockpiles maintained by the Yemeni

[109] For an account of the process based on first-person descriptions, see: Suryatapa Bhattacharya, "American woman kidnapped in Yemen tells of her ordeal," *The National* (UAE), May 31, 2010; available online: http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/american-woman-kidnapped-in-yemen-tells-of-her-ordeal#page2.
[110] AKE Group, "Kidnap Report: Q2 2010 Hotspots, 2010. AKE Group, "Kidnap Report: Q4 2010 Hotspots," 2010.
[111] See, for example: "Swiss woman kidnapped in western Yemen," *BBC News*, March 16, 2012; available online: http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17399703. "Three Filipino sailors kidnapped in Yemen," *Manila Times*, March 21, 2012; available online: http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/news/breaking-news/19754-three-filipino-sailors-kidnapped-in-yemen.
[112] Mordechai Kedar, "Fertile Ground for Al Qaeda," *New York Times*, September 18, 2008; available online: http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/yemen/.
[113] Abdulsalam al-Dar al-Hakimi, *Small Arms in Yemen*, Sheba Center, 2010; available online: http://www.shebacss.com/en/publications.php?action=viewPub&id=45. For a more accessible summary of al-Hakimi's work, see: David Arnold, "Yemen has Guns Galore, Protestors Refuse to Use," *Voice of America News*, November 4, 2011; available online: http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Yemen-Experiments-With-Right-to-Bear-Arms--133255713.html.
[114] CIA, "Middle East: Yemen," *The World Factbook*, March 12, 2012; available online: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html.

government.[115] In recent years, when rebel campaigns and mass protests have gripped Yemen, the government has attempted to mitigate the availability of weapons in an effort toward self-preservation, but these efforts have failed almost completely. Guns of all varieties remain cheaply and easily available; merchants now simply tend to sell weapons from their homes rather than in open market stalls.[116] Thus, the average Yemeni faces about as many challenges in acquiring the materiel necessary to conduct a terrorist attack as the average Americans faces in obtaining auto parts—a circumstance which allows AQAP to remain logistically independent of bin Laden's organization.

7.2.3 TRAINING

As with AQIM, the clearest evidence of non-ideological ties between bin Laden's organization and AQAP lies in the training histories of some of the organization's prominent leaders. For example, Nasir al-Wahishi, who has served as the organization's titular *emir* since co-founding a Yemen-based terror cell in al-Qaida's name in 2007,[117] first formed ties to al-Qaida in 1995, when he was only 19 years-old. After studying briefly in a Yemeni religious school, al-Wahishi departed for Afghanistan in the hopes of helping to establish a "true' Islamic

[115] According to diplomatic cables reproduced by the British media, Yemen purchased some $95 million in arms from a single Serbian supplier in 2009. As this transaction constitutes only one portion of the country's total weapons expenditure, the U.S. Department of State was concerned that the surplus might find its way to Yemen's thriving black market. For details, see: "US embassy cables: US fears Yemen arms purchases could end up on the black market," *The Guardian*, December 5, 2010; available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/241318.

[116] "Special Report: Yemeni arms bazaars move underground," *United Press International*, February 15, 2010; available online: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/02/15/Yemeni-arms-bazaars-move-underground/UPI-50061266250861/. See also, Taha Tawashi, "Arms markets crucial," *The Saudi Gazette*, November 9, 2009; available online: http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2009110953990.

[117] Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Designations of AQAP Leaders Qasim al-Rimi and Nayif al-Qahtani," U.S. Department of State, May 11, 2010; available online: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/143206.htm. See also: Kurczy.

state. He soon became bin Laden's personal secretary and held this position until leaving Afghanistan circa 2001.[118]

However, al-Wahishi's direct ties to al-Qaida ended only two years later, when he was arrested in Iran and deported to Yemen, where he served time in prison on terror charges.[119] His career in terrorism then reignited in February 2006, when he and 22 other prisoners tunneled out of the prison using homemade shovels constructed from broomsticks and fan blades.[120] Al-Wahishi has since had some ideological interactions with bin Laden's organization; for example, Ayman al-Zawahiri formally recognized the escapee as al-Qaida's highest-ranking representative in Yemen during a statement made in November 2008.[121] However, there has been no evidence that active members of bin Laden's organization played a direct role in any of the attacks which al-Wahishi helped to plan after his escape, such as a suicide-attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa in September 2008,[122] a pair of suicide-bombings against South Korean tourists in March 2009, the kidnapping of nine foreign nationals in June 2009 (three of whom were later executed), and a

[118] Robert F. Worth, "Is Yemen the Next Afghanistan?" *New York Times*, July 6, 2010; available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/magazine/11Yemen-t.html?pagewanted=all. Information on al-Wahishi's age at the time of his first interaction with al-Qaida was obtained by reconciling his date-of-birth with Worth's accounts of al-Wahishi's activities abroad. For al-Wahishi's biographical details, see: Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Recent OFAC Actions," United States Treasury Department, January 19, 2010; available online: http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20100119.aspx. See also: INTERPOL, "AL-WAHISHI, NASIR 'ABD-AL-KARIM 'ABDULLAH," January 19, 2010; available online: http://interpol.int/en/UN/%28un_id%29/2012-2761.

[119] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.274.10 Nasir 'Abd-al-Karim 'Abdullah al-Wahishi," January 19, 2010; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI27410E.shtml.

[120] For the technical details of the escape, see: Henry Schuster, "Soccer balls, broomsticks aid Yemen jailbreak," *CNN.com*, February 28, 2006; available online: http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/02/27/yemen.tunnel/. For information linking al-Wahayshi to the escape, see: "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.274.10 Nasir 'Abd-al-Karim 'Abdullah al-Wahishi."

[121] Kurczy.

[122] "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.274.10 Nasir 'Abd-al-Karim 'Abdullah al-Wahishi,"

suicide-bombing that attempted (and failed) to kill Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayif in August 2009.[123]

Qasim al-Rimi offers an almost identical example. In the early 2000s, he played a role in al-Qaida's attempt to bomb the French oil-tanker Limburg, though the exact nature of his involvement remains somewhat unclear.[124] Then, in 2005, al-Rimi was sentenced to prison for plotting to assassinate the US Ambassador to Yemen,[125] but he too was able to reignite his terrorist career after escaping in the same 2006 jailbreak that freed al-Wahishi.[126] Indeed, al-Rimi joined his compatriot in announcing the foundation of an al-Qaida cell in Yemen,[127] before planning a string of independent attacks that included the suicide-bombing of Spanish tourists in 2007, [128] the kidnapping of British and German nationals in 2009,[129] and the failed suicide-operation against Prince Nayif.[130]

Nor are the pair unique. They were joined in the escape by Jamal al-Badawi,[131] an extremist who first trained with al-Qaida in 1998, and who was arrested in 2004,[132] for his playing a key logistical role in the U.S.S. Cole bombing by acquiring important resources, such as the safe-house where the explosives were prepared and the attack-boat used to deliver the

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[123] Ibid.
[124] Hamza Hendawi, "Atop Yemen al-Qaida, a militant who vows to hit US," *Associated Press Online*, November 3, 2010.
[125] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.282.10. Qasim Yahya Mahdi al-Rimi," May 11, 2010; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI28210E.shtml.
[126] Ibid; "Yemen: Six al-Qaeda members killed," *Albawaba*, January 16, 2010.
[127] Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Designations of AQAP Leaders Qasim al-Rimi and Nayif al-Qahtani," U.S. Department of State, May 11, 2010; available online: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/143206.htm.
[128] Hendawi.
[129] "Yemen: 6 al-Qaida militants killed in airstrike," *MSNBC*, January 15, 2010; available online: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34880103/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/.
[130] Hendawi.
[131] Barbara Starr and Terry Frieden, "Second terrorist ID'd in Yemen jailbreak," *CNN.com*, February 8, 2006.
[132] "Yemen detains two of main suspects in Cole bombing," *Agence France Presse*, March 19, 2004.

suicide-bombers to the warship.[133] Although al-Badawi then turned himself into authorities in 2007, he was released to unmonitored house arrest only a few weeks later, after pledging his loyalty to the president of Yemen.[134] This soft-confinement seems to have done little to restrict al-Badawi's involvement in terrorism, because as of September 2008, he was rumored to be in contact with al-Wahishi.[135]

However, this information should not suggest that all of AQAP's al-Qaida-trained members participated in the 2006 jailbreak. For example, the man named as al-Wahishi's chief deputy, Said al-Shihri, came into the organization via detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.[136] Al-Shihri's involvement in terrorism began sometime in 2001, when he left his home in Riyadh for Afghanistan. After training in urban warfare at al-Qaida's "Libyan Camp" near Kabul, al-Shihri played the role of logistical facilitator, by helping to smuggle other Saudis into Afghanistan from neighboring Iran, and provided some low-level funding to bin Laden's organization by diverting small charitable donations to al-Qaida.[137] Al-Shihri was wounded and captured in the early days of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan; he subsequently spent time at Guantanamo Bay, before being repatriated to Saudi Arabia, where he was released from detention in February 2008. Shortly thereafter, he crossed into Yemen and formed ties to al-

[133] USA v. Jamal Ahmed Mohamed Ali Al-Badawi and Fahd al-Quso (Defendants), Indictment (S12 98 Cr. 1023), United States District Court Southern District of New York, 2003. Verbatim Transcript of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing for ISN 10015 (Abd al-Rahim al-Nasheri), Department of Defense (Unclassified), March 14, 2007.
[134] "USS Cole plotter freed by Yemen," *BBC News*, October 27, 2007.
[135] Dan McDougall, "The new Al-Qaeda chiefs bringing terror to the world; Former Guantanamo prisoners have moved to Yemen to rejoin the fight against the west," *Sunday Times* (London), January 3, 2010.
[136] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.275.10 Said Ali al-Shihri," January 19, 2010; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI27510E.shtml.
[137] Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of Sa id Ali Jabar al Khathim al Shihri," June 16, 2005. Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of al Shihri, Sa id Ali Jabir al Khathim," March 31, 2006.

Wahishi and al-Badawi.[138] At last reporting, al-Shihri's role in AQAP included "identifying targets; recruiting new members; assisting with training and attack planning; and tasking others in the preparation of attacks."[139] However, there is no clear evidence to suggest that he has rekindled his contacts with members of al-Qaida's core group.

The personal history of Ibrahim al-Rubaish, the AQAP ideologue, largely mirrors al-Shihri's. In 2001, at the age of 22, al-Rubaish departed Saudi Arabia for Afghanistan, where he hoped to obtain the training necessary to allow him to fight the Russian forces oppressing Chechen Muslims. He spent time learning basic marksmanship skills at al-Qaida's Farouq Camp, but his training was apparently cut short when the camp's instructors evacuated it in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Al-Rubaish then spent a short time on the front lines in Tora Bora, where elements of al-Qaida and the Taliban battled the Northern Alliance, before Pakistani forces captured him in late 2001 as he attempted to flee the region when the American invasion began in full.[140] After being transferred to American custody, al-Rubaish eventually ended-up in Guantanamo Bay, but was released into the custody of Saudi authorities in December 2006.[141] It remains unclear when—and why—the Saudis released al-Rubaish, but he found his way into Yemen and AQAP by 2008.

As with AQIM, additional AQAP members have more diffuse instructional ties to bin Laden's organization that stem from participation in the Iraqi insurgency. According to the Sinjar Records, 49 of the 595 people included in the documents (8.1 percent) hailed from

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[138] McDougall.
[139] Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals and Entities, "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing: Q1.A.275.10 Said Ali al-Shihri," January 19, 2010; available online: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQI27510E.shtml.
[140] "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the Case of Arbaysh, Ibrahim Sulayman Muhammad." See also: Combatant Status Review Board, Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal – Detainee Ibrahim Sulayman Muhammad Al Rubaysh," Department of Defense (Unclassified), August 8, 2004.
[141] Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants, "Consolidated Chronological List of GTMO Detainees Released, Transferred, or Deceased," Department of Defense (Unclassified), October 9, 2008.

Yemen.[142] As in the Algerian case, it would be presumptive to assume that all of these men interacted with members of bin Laden's organization and then survived the conflict to return to Yemen, but there is additional contextual evidence suggesting that veterans of the Iraqi conflict provided AQAP with new skills.

Members of the Yemeni security community allege that the sophistication of the September 2008 suicide-bombing on the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa demonstrated that the terrorists responsible for the attack trained in Iraq, where similar coordinated strikes had become commonplace. On the morning of the bombing, one group of attackers, armed with AK-47s and rocket propelled grenades, engaged the Yemeni guards who manned a checkpoint outside the embassy, so that a second car, which carried the suicide-bombers, could make it through the embassy's outer security perimeter. However, the coordination was hardly flawless. A second ring of concrete barricades prevented the bombers from breaching the compound, and in order to avoid capture, they were forced to detonate their weapons before additional security personnel could respond. Consequently, the attack killed only ten victims, all of them Yemeni, and most of them drawn from the embassy's security detail.[143]

While the similarities between this strike and attacks in Iraq are somewhat compelling, they are not conclusive. The embassy attack may have simply drawn planning inspiration from the Iraqi insurgency. Therefore, until definitive evidence emerges showing that these or other AQAP attackers have returned from Iraq bearing new skills, it would be premature to

[142] Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, "AQ Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records," *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, 2008; available online: http://tarpley.net/docs/CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf.

[143] Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, "Deadly Training Ground: Are Al Qaeda fighters returning from Iraq to launch new attacks against U.S. targets?" *Newsweek*, September 17, 2008; Ellen Knickmeyer, "Attack Against U.S. Embassy in Yemen Blamed on Al-Qaeda," *Washington Post*, September 18, 2008; available online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/09/17/AR2008091700317.html.

definitively conclude that AQAP has received a direct training benefit from the insurgency, though such ties seem probable.

Finally, other members of AQAP lack any demonstrable training ties to bin Laden's organization or its Iraqi affiliate. According to regional media reports, AQAP now reportedly runs its own camps in Southern Yemen,[144] and other recruits likely benefit from experience gained though service in the Yemeni military. For example, in the summer of 2010, the Yemeni army summarily suspended some 800 soldiers without pay,[145] and regional experts have opined that these disenfranchised troops ~~c~~ould make an excellent talent pool for AQAP to target in future recruitment campaigns."[146] However, the number of AQAP recruits which have since been drawn from this pool remains unknown. Therefore, while it is clear that several high-ranking AQAP leaders benefitted directly from al-Qaida training and, indeed, once held active membership in bin Laden's organization, it remains impossible to determine what percentage of AQAP members hold training ties to al-Qaida.

7.2.4 SUMMATION

On balance, the evidence suggests that AQIM and AQAP are exceptionally similar in their ties to bin Laden's organization. Members of both the North African and Yemen-based groups once held active ties to al-Qaida, but these bonds faded over time and the regional groups began (or continued) independent operations. In AQAP's case, the severance of functional ties is far sharper, because four of the group's highest-ranking operational leaders, as well as one of AQAP's primary ideologues, re-emerged into *jihad* only after prolonged detention in either Yemeni prison or American military custody.

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[144] "Yemen: Six al-Qaeda members killed," *Albawaba*, January 16, 2010.
[145] Mohammed bin Sallam, ~~"2~~1 killed in confrontations in Abyan," *Yemen Times,* August 23, 2010.
[146] W. Andrew Terrill, *The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security*, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011, p. 60.

Moreover, both organizations share aspects of al-Qaida‘s ideology and attendant strategic aims, though the ideological parallels between bin Laden‘s organization and AQAP are far clearer than those between al-Qaida and AQIM. Indeed, while many of AQIM‘s attacks seem designed with economic concerns largely, if not entirely, in mind, events such as the 2008 attack on the American embassy in Sanaa and the following year‘s failed underpants bombing demonstrate that al-Qaida‘s religiously-motivated brand of anti-Americanism continues to drive many of AQAP‘s actions. Ultimately, the varying extent of AQIM and AQAP‘s ideological congruity with bin Laden‘s organization constitutes the primary difference in the two regional organizations‘ respective relationships with al-Qaida.

Ideological differences aside, it seems that exceptionally similar reasons underlie AQIM and AQAP‘s waning functional relationships with bin Laden‘s organization. Both regional groups participate extensively in criminal activities and thus have independent access to substantial revenue streams. Consequently, there is little reason to suspect that al-Qaida provides money to either organization, which prevents bin Laden‘s organization from exerting influence by pulling AQIM and AQAP‘s respective purse strings. And along similar lines, the criminal contacts that AQIM and AQAP hold as a result of their participation in smuggling, as well as the generally lawless climates of Yemen and the South Sahara, provide both organizations with independent access to arms and explosives. Thus, they are not dependent on bin Laden‘s organization to provide the materiel necessary to conduct terrorism.

Full evidence on the regional groups‘ training histories remains elusive, making it impossible to know how large a share of AQIM and AQAP‘s respective memberships benefitted directly from al-Qaida training. However, it is clear that both regional groups have other training sources at their disposal, and as these groups continue to mature, it seems likely that they will

become increasingly self-reliant in terms of training. Indeed, AQAP already has an independent camp in South Yemen, and given that AQIM continues to participate in an insurgency against the Algerian and (to a lesser degree) Mauritanian governments, it seems likely that the group maintains similar facilities, though the open-source record remains mute on the specific details. These facts dictate that if and when the current generations of AQIM and AQAP leaders are removed from power, there is little reason to assume that these regional groups will continue to hold any non-ideological ties to bin Laden‘s organization.

7.3 CONCLUSION

It is difficult to be overly firm in any assessment of AQIM or AQAP, because even in comparison to other Islamist terror groups, this pair of organizations operates in environments characterized by the absence of the sort of reliable individual-level data necessary to understand the intricacies of events and organizations. While this reality creates a significant caveat to this chapter‘s findings, the open source record currently contains little evidence to support the findings of Hoffman, the analysts at CSIS, and other theorists who argue that al-Qaida‘s functional relevance to its regional affiliates is substantial or increasing. Instead, the evidence presented by this chapter, which table 7.1 summarizes, broadly supports Gerges assertion regarding the alarmist nature of conclusions positing the existence of ongoing, widespread functional linkages between al-Qaida and regional organizations that have adopted its name. Although AQIM and AQAP share some of al-Qaida‘s strategic goals, both organizations seem financial and logistically independent. The closest associations between al-Qaida and these regional groups are historical in nature and stem from historical training ties that members of AQIM and AQAP shared with bin Laden‘s organization.

Table 7.1: Al-Qaida's Relationship With Prominent Regional Terror Organizations

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Indirect	Some strategic influence, no evidence of direct participation
Finance	Unlikely	AQIM self-funded via crime
Logistics	Unlikely	AQIM recieves access to weapons via criminal contacts
Training	Historical	Belmokhtar's example demonstrates the existence of some non-current ties; little evidence suggesting new AQIM members train in South Asia

Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Planning	Unknown	Substantial overlap in strategic goals, but little available information decision-making within AQAP
Finance	Unlikely	AQAP self-funded via donations and crime
Logistics	Unlikely	AQAP receives access to weapons via criminal contacts and Yemen's robust arms market
Training	Historical	Several AQAP leaders were once AQ members; little evidence suggesting new AQAP members train in South Asia

However, this chapter does more than simply weigh-in on the debate regarding the extent of al-Qaida's control over the broader Islamist terror movement. This assessment also hypothesizes that regional organizations' access to financial and logistical resources is a primary determinant of the extent of their functional partnership with al-Qaida. Given that this analysis is qualitative in nature and examines only two cases, the results are somewhat speculative in nature, but suggest that organizations' access to independent revenue streams, especially highly lucrative pools of money obtained through criminal means, is inversely related to the extent of their partnership with al-Qaida. Thus, this analysis also has clear implications for future research, because as more information trickles into the open-source, it may become possible to test the

range of this theory by considering organizations other than AQIM and AQAP. Similarly, the revelation of new information may make it possible to utilize rigorous formal methods that are capable of scaling the impact of resource access on the extent of partnership.

While these findings indicate that al-Qaida‘s indirect influence over the broader Islamist terror movement will continue to fade as counterterrorism initiatives remove more and more former members of the organization from active participation in violence, this evaluation is incomplete because it does not consider forms of indirect influence other than historical ties. In an effort to rectify this shortcoming, the following chapter turns its attention toward what is potentially al-Qaida‘s most dangerous form of indirect influence: ideological inspiration of independent acts of terror.

8.0 ASSESSING THE THREAT THAT TERRORISTS WITH NON-FUNCTIONAL TIES TO AL-QAIDA POSE TO THE AMERICAN MILITARY AT HOME

The sheer breadth of Islamist extremism as an ideological phenomenon makes bounding an inquiry into al-Qaida's inspirational role exceptionally challenging. Rather than selecting cases using random choice or following the worryingly common practice of opportunity sampling, which implicitly assumes that the cases about which the most is known accurately represent an otherwise clandestine phenomenon, this chapter ensured fair cross-comparison by employing additional theoretical constraints. Specifically, it examines only those events that (1) took place within the United States, and (2) targeted U.S. military personnel. The cases that emerge within the period under study[1] are the 2007 plot against Fort Dix in New Jersey, the 2009 shooting at an Army recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, and the 2009 shootings at Fort Hood in Texas.

With the obvious caveat that the generalizability of this assessment may not extend beyond al-Qaida's role in attacking service members stationed in the American homeland, these cases suggest that although events with weak non-functional ties to al-Qaida remain of concern, both the threat that they pose and their connections to bin Laden's organization are typically exaggerated. The oft-cited influence of online *jihadist* propaganda remains an important factor

[1] As this analysis considers attacks that took place before the end of 2010, a 2011 bomb-plot by Jason Naser Abdo, an AWOL soldier who also sought to target Fort Hood, falls outside of the this study by a year. For an outline of the events involving Naser Abdo, see: Peter Finn and Alice Fordham, "Naser Abdo, AWOL soldier, charged in Fort Hood bomb plot," *Washington Post*, July 29, 2011; available online: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/awol-soldier-naser-abdo-charged-in-fort-hood-bomb-plot/2011/07/29/gIQAFKAUhI_story.html.

in the radicalization process and accounts many of these plots' diffuse, non-functional connections to al-Qaida, but the consumption of Internet propaganda seems to harden radical viewpoints, rather than causing them, because the evidence suggests that Islamists typically begin viewing extremist web pages *after* adopting *jihadists'* creed. This analysis posits that first-person social interactions with existing extremists, who often lack meaningful connections to al-Qaida, likely play the greatest role in triggering radicalization. Given the small sample size employed by this chapter, the results require additional research to validate, but these findings generally support previous findings regarding the sociological nature of radical indoctrination,[2] while suggesting that theories which posit the existence of a direct causal relationship between the viewing of online propaganda and participation in violent *jihad* require amendment.[3]

Four sections follow this introduction; each of the first three discusses one of the cases listed above, before the fourth offers some broader theoretical conclusions. Broadly speaking, the topical sections also follow the same now-familiar internal structure used in previous chapters and include sub-sections that discuss: the nature and extent of planning that took place prior to the event's execution (or attempted execution); the logistical and financial support that the event received; and the nature and extent of the plotters' training. However, this chapter's explicit focus on ideology requires a slight deviation from the standard format. Each section also includes a break-out that provides detailed background information on the plotters in order to

[2] See, for example, Javier Jordan, "Jihadist Radicalization Processes in Spain: Sociopolitical Analysis at Three Levels," *Revista de Psicologia Social*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May 2009), pp. 197-216; Paul R. Baines, Nicholas J. O'Shaughnessy, Kevin Moloney, et al, "The Dark Side of Political Marketing: Islamist Propaganda, Reversal Theory, and British Muslims," *European Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 44, No. 3-4 (2010), pp. 478-495; John Horgan, *Walking Away From Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 10, 41-44, and 65-66.

[3] See, for example: Sven Eiffler, "Jihadist Propaganda on the Internet: Impact and Challenges for the Security Community," *NATO Science for Peace and Security Studies*, Vol. 67 (2010); available online: http://www.booksonline.iospress.nl/Content/View.aspx?piid=18158. Gabriel Weimann, "Al Qa'ida's Extensive Use of the Internet," *CTC Sentinel*, January 15, 2008; available online: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida%E2%80%99s-extensive-use-of-the-internet; Sajjan M. Gohel, "The Internet and its Role in Terrorist Recruitment and Operational Planning," *CTC Sentinel,* December 3, 2009; available online: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-internet-and-its-role-in-terrorist-recruitment-and-operational-planning.

establish their state-of-mind prior to participation in terrorism, as well as a break-out that examines how the plotters‘ ideological views changed during the radicalization process. Finally, each section closes with a brief comparative summation.

8.1 THE FORT DIX SIX

In early May 2007, the Department of Justice announced the arrest of six men in relation to a plot against Fort Dix, an Army installation southwest of Trenton, New Jersey. Five of the men plotted ―to kill as many soldiers as possible in an armed assault" on the post, and the sixth supplied them with illegal weapons.[4] From the very beginning, it was clear that the men operated in isolation, without the benefit of operational or logistical support from al-Qaida or any other Islamist terror group. They attempted to prepare for the attack by self-training and attempted to use personal connections to fulfill their need for weapons. Consequently, the plotters‘ efforts were amateurish unrealistic. Their only connection to al-Qaida, or, for that matter, any other established terror group, came via the Internet. The plotters were avid viewers of online *jihadist* videos, but this propaganda seems to have played only a secondary role in the plotter‘s indoctrination. First-person interactions, both among the group‘s members and with existing extremists from outside the group, seem to have played the larger role in their radicalization.

8.1.1 BACKGROUND

In January 2006, the investigation into the Fort Dix plot began in an unusual location: a Circuit City in Mt. Laurel, New Jersey. A young clerk named Brian Morganstern viewed some worrying footage in the process of converting a customer‘s hand-shot 8mm film to DVD. The

[4] Christopher J. Christie, ―Five Radical Islamists Charged with Planning Attack on Fort Dix Army Base in New Jersey," United States Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney, District of New Jersey, May 8, 2007.

tape showed a group of young men dressed in fatigues, who fired pistols and semi-automatic rifles as they conversed excitedly in a language that Morganstern did not recognize (it turned out to be Albanian). When the clerk picked-out words like "*jihad*" and "*Allahu akbar*," he became concerned and brought the tape to the attention of local police, who in turn informed the FBI.[5] A federal investigation ensued; it soon began to center on group of immigrant men in their 20s, many of whom had been friends since attending high-school together in Cherry Hill, a New Jersey community just out Philadelphia.

Three of the men on the tape were brothers. Dritan, Eljvir, and Shain Duka had come to America from the former Yugoslavia as toddlers. In October 1984, when Dritan was 5, Eljvir was 3, and baby-brother Shain was barely 1, the family entered the US illegally through Mexico and settled briefly in Texas. However, the Dukas were destined for the New York area, where dozens of members of their large extended family resided. They spent enough in Brooklyn's ethnic Albanian community for the brothers to pick-up New York accents, before moving to New Jersey when the boys were in their teens.[6]

After the move, the younger two brothers attended Cherry Hill West High School. Their ties to two of the other Fort Dix plotters likely date to this period, because Eljvir and Shain's time at Cherry Hill West overlapped with the enrollment of Mohamad Shnewer, a Jordanian immigrant whose family ran a local convenience store, and Serdar Tatar, a Turkish immigrant whose father ran a pizza shop near Fort Dix.[7] Like the Duka brothers, Shnewer and Tatar spent

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[5] Hannity & Colmes, "Exclusive! Brian Morgenstern Breaks His Silence on Blowing the Whistle on the Ft. Dix 6," Transcription of Interview with Brian Morgenstern, May 30, 2007; available online: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,276414,00.html. See also, "Fort Dix tipster shrugs off 'hero' title," *CNN.com*, May 29, 2007; available online: http://articles.cnn.com/2007-05-29/us/fort.tipster_1_real-heroes-fort-dix-military-personnel?_s=PM:US.

[6] John Appezzato, "Father of Fort Dix Suspects Arrested on Immigration Charges," *Star-Ledger*, May 10, 2007; Amanda Ripley, "The Fort Dix Conspiracy," *Time*, December 6, 2007.

[7] Kareem Fahim and Andrea Elliott, "In Large Immigrant Family, Religion Guided 3 Held in Fort Dix Plot," *New York Times*, May 10, 2007.

the bulk of their lives in the U.S. Shnewer's family had immigrated in 1987, when he was 2,[8] and Tatar's family had come to the country in 1992, when he was about 9.[9]

Argon Abdullahu, the logistical supporter arrested in connection with the Fort Dix plot, also had a relationship with the Dukas that dated to his teens. Another ethnic Albanian born in the former Yugoslavia, Abdullahu had immigrated as a refugee from Kosovo in 1999, when he was 16 years old. It is unclear whether or not he attended Cherry Hill West, but Abdullahu developed a friendship with the Dukas during the course of pick-up games of basketball and soccer.[10] The fact that all of the boys spoke Albanian could not have hurt their relationship.

8.1.2 RADICALIZATION

Information on the radicalization of the Fort Dix plotters is somewhat vague, but the available data suggests that it was a gradual process that began sometime after the plotters left high school. Indeed, the Duka brothers were anything but radical when they arrived in New Jersey. They seemed to work hard at assimilating. Dritan once played a small role in an episode of *Law and Order*; Eljvir acted in a rock video, and Shain appeared in a commercial for the World Wrestling Federation.[11] It seems that the boys were somewhat obsessed with being as American as possible.

This pattern continued when the two younger Dukas entered Cherry Hill West. Eljvir went by the name "Elvis" in high school, and the brothers were regulars at the keg parties that broke-out whenever anyone's parents left town. The Dukas were also avid basketball fans, and although they did not play on the school's varsity team, they regularly participated in pick-up games in local parks. They also tried to promote themselves as Brooklyn tough-guys, rather than

[8] George Anastasia, "A Radical Shift in Reputation for 6 Men," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 13, 2007.
[9] Fahim and Elliott.
[10] Geoff Mulvihill, "Man Sentenced in Fort Dix Plot Case," *Associated Press*, March 31, 2008; Troy Graham, "Gun Supplier to Fort Dix 5 Is Sentenced," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 1, 2008.
[11] Ripley.

Islamist radicals, by telling fanciful stories about street-fighting during their time in New York. Thus, like many teens—especially those in Jersey—the Dukas spent their childhood trying to look cool.[12]

Little is known about the remaining plotters' early views on radical Islam, but nothing suggests that they were born into extremism. The Shnewer family's convenience store doubled as a *halal* butcher shop,[13] so it seems likely that the family was at least moderately devout, but Shnewer followed Islamic guidelines only selectively in his day-to-day life. He refused to eat foods that came into contact with pork, but while working at a local restaurant, he served alcohol to customers and did not break from work to pray.[14] Tartar's background was even more secular; his father self-described as "not a religious person" and later openly chastised his son for making religion the focal point of his life.[15]

As for Abdullahu, a great deal of mystery surrounds his background. The Duka brothers believed he had served as a sniper in the Kosovo conflict,[16] suggesting that he held radical views even before he immigrated to the United States. However, given that Abdullahu was only 16 at the time of his arrival in New Jersey, he would have been only 14 or 15 when the Kosovo conflict broke-out in 1998.[17] It is not impossible that he was an exceptionally youthful sniper, but it seems somewhat unlikely. Moreover, Abdullahu's attorney later vociferously and

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[12] Jason Laughlin, "Suspects in Terror Case Fought Hard to Fit In," *Courier-Post* (Cherry Hill, NJ), May 14, 2007.
[13] Anastasia.
[14] Fahim and Elliott.
[15] Quoted in Fahim and Elliott.
[16] USA v. Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer (Defendant), Criminal Complaint FBI Special Agent John J. Ryan (Magistrate No. 07-M-2045[JS]), United States District Court of New Jersey, May 7, 2007. (Hereafter "Ryan complaint").
[17] For general background on the timing and causes of the Kosovo conflict, see: "NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo," *NATO*, date unknown; available online: http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm#B.

categorically denied that his client was ever a belligerent in the Kosovo conflict.[18] In all likelihood, the Dukas believed a fiction put forth by a teenage boy trying desperately to fit into an unfamiliar environment by impressing his new friends with tall-tales of military glory. As additional information discussed in relation to the plot's logistics will make clearer, there is scant evidence to suggest that Abdullahu was *ever* a radical Muslim, even during the course of his involvement in the Fort Dix plot, and though likely not a sniper, he was apparently a life-long gun enthusiast.

Meanwhile, the Dukas' indoctrination into radical Islam seems to have begun at home. Members of New York's Albanian community, of which the Duka family was part, claim that one of the brothers' uncles became radicalized while serving prison time in the early 1990s and passed his new views onto his nephews.[19] Thereafter, the brothers became more outwardly devout. In the years after high school, they stopped drinking; they grew beards; they began attending mosque regularly.[20] In religious ceremonies not sanctioned by the state, Eljvir and Dritain married 15 year-old brides. Eljvir's wife was one of Shnewer's five sisters; Dritain's was an American-born convert to Islam.[21] Religion had become the focus of the brothers' lives.

A concomitant change took place in Tatar and Shnewer, as rifts developed between the young men and their respective families. Tatar's father attributed his son's radicalism to the Duka's influence. When his son brought one of the brothers by the pizzeria that the Tatar family owned and operated, Tatar's father told him "I don't like this kid. I don't want you together."[22] But Tatar ignored his father; he continued to associate with the Dukas and was soon beyond his

[18] Joe Ryan, "Lawyer: Ft. Dix Suspect Not a Sniper, Had No Role in Plot," *Star-Ledger* (New Jersey), May 15, 2007.
[19] Kareem Fahim and Andrea Elliott, "In Large Immigrant Family, Religion Guided 3 Held in Fort Dix Plot," *New York Times*, May 10, 2007.
[20] Ripley.
[21] Ripley.
[22] Fahim and Elliott.

family‘s control. In 2005, his father‘s persistent criticism of his burgeoning religious views caused Tatar quit the pizza shop, where he had worked as a driver making frequent deliveries to Fort Dix. He moved to nearby Philadelphia and began working at a 7-Eleven franchise, but according to the Russian-born Muslim convert that Tatar married shortly after the move, he attended the mosque only infrequently.[23] Thus, it seems that once separated from the Dukas by geography, Tatar‘s radicalism may have waned.

The evidence is unclear, but Shnewer seems to have travelled a similar path to fundamentalism, and it is likely that the Dukas played a role in the transformation. Shnewer‘s family portrays him as immature and impressionable. Even after graduating high school, he apparently favored children‘s programing on the Nickelodeon network and spent long hours playing video games. His mother stated he was ―like a baby.”[24] In combination with Shnewer‘s affinity bonds to the Dukas, which date to high school, and his familial ties to the brothers, which stem from Eljvir‘s marriage to Shnewer‘s teenage sister, these characterizations suggest that Shnewer was likely influenced by the brothers‘ worldview. Though the argument is speculative, network effects offer a moderately-compelling explanation for Shnewer‘s radicalization.

The timing of Shewer‘s radicalization is, however, clearer. After graduating from Cherry Hill West in 2003, he enrolled in classes at a nearby Camden Community College and continued to work in the family‘s store. But he soon dropped out of school, ostensibly so that he could work more in order to help the family pay a pair of burdensome mortgages. Although he continued to live at home until his arrest, Shnewer‘s relationship with his father became increasingly strained and rather than continuing to work in the family business, Shnewer began

[23] Ibid.
[24] Quoted in Ripley.

driving a cab at nights in nearby Philadelphia.[25] According to his mother, Shnewer did little besides work, sleep, and pray in the year preceding his arrest.[26] Family friends began describing Shnewer as ―lost," and his father complained that ―in this country, you can't tell your own son what to do."[27] Thus, by 2006, Shnewer had, like Tatar, shed his family's values.

The evidence suggests that from this point forward the five key plotters' views on radicalism co-evolved, as the men fed off of each other's beliefs, but the now radicalized Shnewer seems to have taken the lead. The authorities were ideally positioned to document this evolution, because a pair of informants witnessed the plotters' ideological hardening first-hand. In March 2006, Mahmoud Omar, an Egyptian immigrant who worked as a car salesman and once served time on charges of bank fraud, began hanging around the Shnewer family's shop at the bureau's direction. He seemed lonely and made conversation with anyone who would listen. Although he was in his 30s, he soon made friends with the 22 year-old Shnewer, who in turn introduced Omar to Tatar and the Dukas. The six often discussed politics and religion as they shot pool together.[28]

By late April, Shnewer trusted Omar enough to initiate a conversation about ―something that can lead to prison" and began to discuss terrorism in detail.[29] Moreover, the young taxi driver shared his large collection of *jihadist* videos, which he had downloaded to his laptop, with the informant. According to federal documents, the clips included the video wills of two of the 9/11 hijackers and ―images of Osama Bin Laden and other Islamic extremists making various speeches in which the speakers call the viewer to join the jihadist movement."[30]

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[25] Anastasia.
[26] Fahim and Elliott.
[27] Anastasia.
[28] Ripley. See also, Ryan complaint.
[29] Quoted in the Ryan complaint.
[30] Ryan complaint.

Similarly, in July, the plotters screened *jihadist* videos for Besnik Bakalli, an Albanian immigrant in his mid-30s, who served as the FBI's second informant and gained entry into the group on the pretense that he was a recently-divorced man with a violent past and a desire to martyr himself in a suicide-bombing.[31] Wearing grins so pronounced as to merit mention in the FBI's official complaint, Shnewer and the Dukas showed Bakalli footage of insurgent attacks on American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.[32]

These interactions took place several months *after* the 'training' video first brought the Fort Dix plotters to the authorities' attention. Although it is not known precisely when the men began downloading their collection of videos, the plotters first documented (virtual) ideological ties to al-Qaida took place after the plotters were already demonstrably radicalized. In light of the Dukas' reported interactions with their fundamentalist ex-convict uncle and Tatar's father's description of the brothers' role in his son's ideological transformation, it seems likely that the plotters began to watch *jihadist* videos because they were already fans of violence in the name of Islam. Thus, al-Qaida's propaganda may have helped to maintain and harden the plotters' views, but casual arguments suggesting that videos triggered the plotters' extremism seem exaggerative.

8.1.3 PLANNING

As August 2007 dawned, the plotters began to conceptualize how to implement their conception of violent Islam at a local level. Shnewer took the lead in planning, but from the very beginning, the plotters' aspirations far outstripped their capabilities and resources. The plot that ultimately took shape was amateurish and probably would not have caused much in the way of damage if it had been implemented before the authorities disrupted the attempt at *jihad*.

[31] John Meyer, "Ft. Dix Six' Informants in Hot Seat Too," *Los Angeles Times*, October 19, 2008.
[32] Ryan complaint. According to press accounts, Eljvir also maintained a stash of similar videos on his computer. For details, see: "Attorneys make final arguments in US terrorism case," *Guardian*, December 17, 2008.

Shnewer selected Fort Dix as a target because he believed that Tatar knew the post ~~like~~ the palm of his hand" from delivering pizzas to quarters housing.[33] This inside knowledge would allow the team to find ~~a~~areas where there are 100-200 individuals," which teams of ~~6~~-7 persons" could attack using mortars, automatic rifles, and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs).[34] In Shnewer's vision, the Dukas would finance the attack, because Eljvir and Dritan had ~~a~~ lot of money,"[35] presumably from the roofing business that they ran out of Eljvir's home,[36] but Shnewer also planned to contribute and had ~~b~~een saving money for this plan for some time."[37]

However, Shnewer also considered targets other than Fort Dix and conducted some preliminary surveillance of these targets. In August, with the informant Omar in tow, Shnewer made trips to an army installation at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; an Air Force Base in Dover, Delaware; and a Coast Guard building in Philadelphia. Fort Dix ultimately won-out over these other possible targets in late November 2006, when Tatar swiped a delivery map of the post from his father's pizzeria.

This action represented Tatar's first meaningful commitment to the Fort Dix endeavor. He had participated in the early pool-hall discussions of religion and politics, but of the five key participants, he displayed the least outward commitment to *jihad* and had not been part of the earlier screening of *jihadist* videos. Tatar was clearly on the fence regarding his participation in terrorism, because just a few days before turning the map over to Shnewer, Tatar contacted the Philadelphia Police Department and reported to detectives that ~~h~~e had been approached by an

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[33] Surveillance recordings quoted in the Ryan complaint.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] The Dukas used three different company names: Qadr Inc., Colonial Roofing, and National Roofing. However, as all three businesses were roofing companies and all three list Eljvir's home as their mailing address, it seems likely that they were a single concern. ―Frt Dix Six: Eljvir Duka," *CBS News*, available online: http://www.cbsnews.com/2316-100_162-2786025-4.html.
[37] Surveillance recordings quoted in the Ryan complaint.

individual who had pressured him to acquire maps of Fort Dix."[38] He was even explicit that he ~~–w~~as fearful that the incident was terrorism-related."[39] Although the police placed a phone call to the FBI in Tatar's presence, the incident somehow galvanized young Turkish immigrant's commitment to the plot, and he took the only documented planning action that was not initiated by Shnewer by providing the map to his co-conspirators. However, it remains unclear why Tatar believed that it was safe to proceed after alerting authorities to the broad outlines of the plot.

8.1.4 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

Questions of the teams' planning skills aside, weapons were a bit of a problem. As Shnewer told one of the informants during a recorded conversation, the team would have to purchase weapons ~~–f~~rom the street as you cannot buy a machine gun from a store."[40] The Dukas took the lead on overcoming this logistical hurdle. In mid-August, Bakalli recorded a conversation with Dritain, Eljvir, and Shain, in which the eldest Duka brother stated that he was in search of two or three fully-automatic Kalishnikovs. By December 2006, the brothers had acquired a magnum .357 revolver, a shotgun, and ~~–a~~ small automatic weapon" on the black market. By January, the team's arsenal had grown to include a 9mm handgun and a semi-automatic assault rifle.[41]

Many of these weapons, as well as a supply of ammunition, were provided by Abdullahu, who simply lent the team some items from the gun cabinet he kept at home. Because the Dukas were all undocumented aliens, they were incapable of legally purchasing arms and had to rely on loans and straw purchases to acquire items that they could not find (or perhaps could not afford)

[38] Ryan complaint.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.

on the black market.[42] At first blush, Abdullahu's role in these acquisitions suggests that he was a key participant in the Fort Dix plot. However, he did not attend any of the planning meetings and seems to have become involved only out of a sense of obligation to the Dukas. Abdullahu was clearly aware of his friends' statements about the necessity of *jihad*, but ultimately dismissed their tough talk as idle boasting—a decision that seems rash in retrospect, but which probably made a great deal of sense given that he and the Dukas had a long history of sharing exaggerated stories in a bid to impress one another. Therefore, Abdullah seems to have been a somewhat unwitting (and somewhat foolish) accomplice, rather than a dedicated member of the attack-team.

Unsatisfied with the quantity of arms that Abdullahu could provide, the Dukas continued their efforts to acquire weapons right up until their arrest. The manner in which they went about the process says a great deal about the team's capabilities or, more aptly, lack thereof. During a chance encounter at a convenience store, the brothers happened upon an FBI agent who had been part of a surveillance team that watched the plotters as they shot targets at a gun range. The Dukas immediately recognized the man, and instead of being spooked by the encounter, assumed that the agent was a gun enthusiast and asked him for help in acquiring automatic weapons.[43]

Specifically, they wanted to buy Russian-made AK-47s, because they believed these weapons to be superior to the Chinese-made model. Dritan later attempted to buy a Kalishnakov from a man in Camden, New Jersey, but backed-out of the deal at the last minute because he believed the seller was a federal agent. It remains unclear if this event stemmed from convenience store run-in, but in mid-March Dritan made another attempt to purchase heavier

[42] Mulvihill; Graham. See also, Michael A. Hammer, Jr., Letter to Richard Coughlin Re: Plea Agreement with Agron Abdullahu, October 22, 2007, and Joe Ryan, "Lawyer: Ft. Dix Suspect Not a Sniper, Had No Role in Plot," *Star-Ledger* (New Jersey), May 15, 2007.
[43] Ryan complaint.

weaponry, including RPGs and M-16 automatic rifles, this time through a fictitious source that the informant Omar supposedly knew from his native Egypt. Clearly, the plotters wanted to acquire as much fire-power as they could; they simply had no realistic idea how to go about doing so.[44]

8.1.5 TRAINING

The team's training regimen fit the same amateurish patterns as the Duka's efforts toward weapons acquisition and consisted entirely of weekend trips to the Poconos and small-scale paintball games played in the New Jersey woods. The first of these outings, which sparked the investigation when footage of it made its way to Circuit City, took place months before Schnewer began to formulate a specific plan and may have been more of a recreational get-away than a dedicated training mission. In addition to the scene at the firing range, the tape showed the Dukas and their friends ―skiinghiking, and joking around."[45] Given the timing and context of this outing, it is difficult to argue that the first Pocono trip constituted meaningful preparation for *jihad*. The initial shooting session was probably less of a training tool and more a means to enable the plotters to become comfortable with the idea of an attack. Or, as the Dukas later claimed, it may have simply been vacation footage of young men who enjoyed shooting.[46]

In February 2007, the plotters made another trip that was a far clearer example of terror training. Absent Tatar, the plotters returned to the Poconos, with the informant Omar and Abdullahu in tow. They practiced shooting shotguns, small caliber rifles, and handguns at a state game land near Gouldsboro, Pennsylvania. Abduallahu played the role of firearms instructor; several of the other men were so inexperienced with guns that they did not even know how to

[44] Ibid.
[45] Ripley.
[46] Ibid.

properly shoulder a weapon. It remains unclear how much the men were able to learn, because Abduallahu left early. According to his rendition of events, he did so because he could not stomach his friends' persistent discussion of violence.[47]

However, this outing also helped to reinforce the plotters' ideological commitment to *jihad.* Absent the early departing Abduallau, the remaining men spent the evenings engaged in group social activities that likely helped to desensitize the team to violence. Specifically, they "relaxed" by watching terror training and Islamist propaganda videos, and reportedly chuckled at the image of a Marine who lost his arm in an IED attack.[48]

The team's final training exercises before the arrest were truly hapless. In late February, Eljvir and Shain played paintball with the informant Omar in the woods near Eljvir's house. They played again in mid-March, around the same time that Dritan ordered the weapons, and this time included the Duka's pre-teen brother in the game. The FBI argues that the excursions constituted "tactical training,"[49] but this characterization seems overly ambitious. While a number of police and military units have used paintball to help simulate a live-fire experience,[50] it remains to be seen how games involving only three or four players, one of whom was a young boy, could have realistically prepared the plotters to ambush the groups of 100 to 200 soldiers specified in their original plan. At best, the games were confidence building measures that bolstered the Duka's morale, but, like most civilian paintball experiences, the games may have been little more than an exercise in fantasy.

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[47] Ryan complaint.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid.
[50] See, for example, Alex Abraham, "Paintballs simulate bullets at urban assault course," South Dakota National Guard Public Affairs Office, June 16, 2008; available online: http://www.nationalguard.mil/features/SDGC/news/080616-Story-Units.pdf. "New Agent Training," Federal Bureau of Investigation; available online: http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/training/sat. Dana Bartholomew, "Cops use paintball to learn ambush skills," *Contra Costa Times* (California), January 19, 2010; available online: http://www.contracostatimes.com/california/ci_19779990.

8.1.6 SUMMATION

Ultimately, al-Qaida‘s role in inspiring the Fort Dix plot seems secondary. The *jihadist* videos that the plotters watched enthusiastically were certainly a contributing factor, but the direct influence that the Dukas‘ radicalized uncle exerted on his nephews seems to have been the trigger that pushed the brothers toward fundamentalism, and, in turn, their influence pushed the somewhat reluctant Tatar, and possibly also the impressionable and immature Shnewer, down the same path. Moreover, the plotters often viewed *jihadist* propaganda as a group, so it is difficult to separate the videos‘ influence from that of the social interactions that surrounded the viewing experience. In short, the Fort Dix plotters were largely self-radicalized as the result of reciprocal friendship ties, and al-Qaida‘s links to the plot were only of the most diffuse and indirect type imaginable.

While the plotters clearly desired to commit violence in the name of Islam, they lacked the resources and training necessary to act on this inspiration. None of the plotters had the contacts necessary to obtain the weapons that they needed to implement their plan. They borrowed weapons from a friend and relied on a fictitious supplier created by a government informant, who gave the plotters just enough rope to hang themselves through self-incrimination. Consequently, by the time of their arrests, they had acquired few guns, most of which were ill-suited to an armed assault because they had a low capacity for ammunition. Moreover, none of the available materials suggests that the plotters obtained the multiple magazines that would have been necessary to enable the sort of rapid reloading necessary to maintain a high enough rate of fire to meet their stated goal of killing a hundred or more troops. Given that the plotters‘ training consisted of a pair of trips to the Poconos and a pair of half-hearted paintball games, it seems that they lacked not only the materiel to implement Shnewer‘s plan, but also the necessary skills.

The plan itself was also far from perfect. Even with the map that Tatar provided, it remains unclear how the plotters could have accessed the post. Had they attempted to enter the installation on the pretense of a pizza delivery, as their plan suggested they might, they would likely have been discovered at the gate, because it is standard practice for the Army to search all visitors' vehicles, event those of familiar delivery people. Ultimately, the Fort Dix plotters were amateur terrorists, whose aspirations far outstripped their abilities.

However, this should not suggest that they were entirely harmless. Despite their difficulties in planning, logistics, and training, the Fort Dix plotters would likely have caused casualties, probably among the post's gate guards, if government efforts had not undermined their attack. The simple truth is that people are easy to kill, especially if the attacker is willing to die in the process. The point is that the Fort Dix plotters would never have met their original goals, not that they would have been unable to achieve some level of violence. Thus, despite the plotters' almost total incompetence, this case illustrates the inherent dangers of radical ideologies, because even the least capable terrorists can cause minor damage.

8.2 THE 2009 LITTLE ROCK SHOOTINGS: AL-QAIDA IN THE ARABIAN OZARKS?

Abdul Hakim Mujahid Muhammad, an African-American convert to Islam who was 24 years old at the time of his 2009 arrest, offers a case in point demonstrating the limited threat posed by incompetent *jihadists*. On June 1, police in Little Rock, Arkansas, responded to a 911 call. Shots had been fired at a U.S. Army Recruiting station. Two soldiers were down with multiple gunshot wounds; one man was dead and another was critically wounded.[51] Surviving witnesses described the assailant as "a black male, driving a black Ford Explorer Sport Track,"

[51] Detective Tommy Hudson, "Officer's Report: Arrest of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad," Little Rock Police Department, June 1, 2009.

and the officers on scene immediately broadcast this description on a city-wide alert.[52] A few miles away, near the Interstate, patrol officers conducted a felony stop on a vehicle matching the bulletin. The driver, Muhammad, surrendered without incident, but had a loaded revolver and a well-stocked ammunition belt on his person. Based on this evidence, Police obtained quickly obtained a search warrant for the vehicle, where they discovered additional ammunition, Molotov cocktails, and the assault rifle used in the shooting. At Muhammad's home, they found *jihadist* propaganda and materials used in the construction of crude liquid-based explosive devices.[53] In short, the police caught Muhammad red-handed.

When the case went to trial a few months later, he decided to plead guilty. In a letter to the presiding judge, Muhammad justified his actions as legitimate ~~a~~according to Islamic Laws and the Islamic Religion."[54] Moreover, he claimed to be ~~a~~ffiliated with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula" and argued that the shooting ~~w~~as a Jihadi Attack [sic] on infidel forces. That didn't go as plan [sic]."[55] These claims implied that one of the few *jihadist* groups with ongoing active ties to the core of bin Laden's organization had used an American citizen to execute an attack on the American military in the middle of the American heartland.

However, the evidence suggests that Muhammad greatly exaggerated his ties to the global *jihadist* community. Despite unequivocally supporting militant ideology, Muhammad seems to have lacked meaningful operational, financial, or training ties to any violent Islamist group. Ultimately, the Little Rock shooting was the culmination of a poorly conceived, poorly executed campaign of terror conducted in isolation by a single man of questionable competency,

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[52] R. Clint Gray, M.D., ~~O~~pinion on Fitness to Proceed, Criminal Responsibility and Diagnosis of Defendant (Abdul Hakim Muhammad)," Arkansas Department of Human Services Division of Mental Health Services Arkansas State Hospital Forensic Report, examination conducted July 12, 2010.
[53] Hudson; Gray.
[54] Abdul Hakim Mujahid Muhammad, ~~T~~o Judge Wright Jr, From Abdul Hakim Muhammad," January 12, 2010. Copy filed with the Sixth Judicial Circuit Forth Division, January 14, 2010.
[55] Ibid.

who found Islamist ideology broadly appealing and would have fought on behalf of any Islamist terror group that would have taken him.

8.2.1 BACKGROUND

Muhammad was born Carlos Bledsoe in Memphis, Tennessee, and raised in a Baptist household, but his behavior in high school demonstrated that Muhammad was never particularly devout in his original faith. He received several suspensions from school for fighting, was a member of the M.O.B. gang,[56] and was arrested on at least one occasion for an incident involving brass knuckles.[57] However, he managed not only to graduate, but also to be accepted to college.

Muhammad spent a year and a half at Tennessee State, in Nashville, before a self-described ―two blunt a day" marijuana habit and pattern of binge drinking ended his scholastic career.[58] It seems that he may also have continued his involvement in gang violence during this period, because in 2004, police in Knoxville, Tennessee, arrested a 19 year-old Muhammad and three friends for possession of marijuana and possession of illegal weapons, including an SKS automatic rifle and a sawed-off shotgun. Muhammad's later statements to the press indicate that several of the weapons were intended for re-sale. After his conviction, he received a plea deal that stipulated he would receive 14 years in prison on the original charges if convicted of another crime, no matter how minor, so he endeavored to change his life.[59]

[56] Kristinia Goetz, ―Muslim who shot soldier in Arkansas says he wanted to cause more death," *Knoxville News Sentinel,* November 13, 2010.
[57] Gray.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Goetz.

8.2.2 RADICALIZATION

Toward this goal of self-improvement, Muhammad began a process of religious exploration that set his path toward radicalism in motion. Although Islam ultimately proved to be his salvation from substance abuse and gang life, it was not the first religion he explored. He evaluated Christianity, but abandoned the religion of his birth because he found the concept of the holy trinity incomprehensible. He explored Orthodox Judaism, but felt that synagogues were excluding him because of his race. However, he found a warm welcome at a Nashville mosque, where according to Muhammad's later recollection, the ~~b~~brothers shouted _Allahu Akbar (god is great)" when he mentioned he might be interested in their religion and embraced him like he was a ~~l~~long lost brother."[60] Although the record does not speak to Muhammad's online habits at the time of these religious explorations, it seems fairly clear that first-person social interactions greatly shaped his religious destiny.

After formally converting to Islam in December 2004, Muhammad stopped using drugs and alcohol and began to study his new religion more seriously. His progression from convert to Islamist radical seems to have then proceeded over the course of a few years. After dropping out of college, he worked a series of menial jobs, including a yearlong stint as a bellman at the Opryland Hotel and a lengthy period as a temp assigned to various warehouses.[61] In 2007, a little over two years after his conversion, Muhammad, who had now legally changed his name to reflect his new faith,[62] packed-up and moved to Yemen to pursue Islamic studies. Though clearly devout at this point, his family alleges that he was not yet radical; just before departing

[60] Quoted in Goetz.
[61] Gray
[62] Goetz.

for Yemen, Muhammad apparently told his sister not to worry because he was "not one of those Muslims."[63]

He spent more than two years abroad, supporting himself with a series of itinerant jobs teaching English, purportedly in camps for Afghan refugees, and married a local woman in February 2009.[64] About two months later, Yemeni authorities stopped him at a roadside checkpoint and arrested him because his travel documents were in disarray. Muhammad had no visa to be in the country and carried both a fake Somali passport, which he had acquired in hopes of joining forces with *jihadist* groups operating on the Horn of Africa, and his now-expired American passport.[65]

In short, the documents in Muhammad's possession at the time of his arrest demonstrate that he transformed from a hard-partying, gang-affiliated college drop-out to an aspiring *mujahid* within the span of five years. It is hardly a stretch to suggest that first-person contact with some of Yemen's more fundamentalist mosques helped to harden his ideological devotion to *jihad*, but, as the section on training discusses in more detail, it would be presumptive to assume that Muhammad had much, if any, direct contact with known violent extremists. It is, however, worth noting that Muhammad claims to have met several *jihadists* while briefly incarcerated in Yemeni prison after the passport dust-up.[66] If true, these assertions, which seem plausible, suggest that a man already suffering from the symptoms of Islamist radicalism may have been injected with one final shot of religious extremism before returning to the United States.

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[63] Sister's recollection, quoted in James Dao, "A Muslim Son, a Murder Trial and Many Questions," *New York Times*, February 16, 2010.
[64] James Dao, "Suspect's Lawyer Outlines Defense in Killing of Soldier," *New York Times*, June 4, 2009.
[65] Gray.
[66] Dao, "A Muslim Son, a Murder Trial and Many Questions."

8.2.3 PLANNING

Yemeni authorities held Muhammad for about two and half months following his arrest, before deporting him back to the United States. According to his own account, he began to conceptualize his *jihad* during this detention. From the very beginning, he wanted to target "different Army recruiting centers and Jewish organizations" because of "what they're doing in Palestine . . . years of killing Muslims."[67] Muhammad envisioned a multi-city *jihad* that would target "Little Rock, Memphis, Nashville, Florence, KY, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and D.C."[68] However, he made no immediate efforts to implement this grand vision upon returning to the U.S. and instead spent about three months living quietly with his parents in Memphis, before moving to Little Rock in April to take a job with his father's tour-bus company.

Once in Arkansas, Muhammad did little more in the way of planning and nothing in the way of target-surveillance. The Army Recruiting Center in Little Rock was not his initial target; instead, Muhammad wanted to attack out-of-state. His sole planning activity consisted of a single online research session, during which he found the addresses of two targets: the home of an orthodox rabbi in Nashville, Tennessee, which he selected to retaliate for Israel's conduct in the Palestinian conflict; and an Army Recruiting Center in Florence, Kentucky, which he selected to get back at the United States for, in his own words, "pissing on the Koran."[69] He did, however, put a small amount of thought into tactical considerations and selected the Florence site over other potential targets because it was near an Interstate and the Ohio border, which Muhammad believed would facilitate his get-away by, respectively, enabling him to flee the

[67] Quoted in Gray.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Quoted in Gray.

scene rapidly and precluding any local law enforcement from crossing jurisdictional lines to follow him.[70]

8.2.4 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

Muhammad's materiel preparations for *jihad* began in earnest after his move to Arkansas. He used the meager earnings from his job to slowly acquire ammunition and second-hand weapons. He deliberately avoided retail purchases because he was concerned that the FBI might be tracking him, and he was likely knowledgeable about how to acquire guns on the black market from his involvement in illicit weapons sales during his time in the M.O.B. gang. However, shortly before the Little Rock shooting, Muhammad decided to buy a .22 caliber rifle over the counter from Walmart in order to test how closely the federal government was monitoring his movements. When he was able to walk out of the super-store unmolested, he decided he could proceed with an attack because "The FBI had not put a hold or checked."[71]

Given that his other weapon of choice was the Molotov cocktail, Muhammad's additional logistical needs, beyond his vehicle, were commonly available items: glass bottles, gasoline and oil to fill them, and cloth rags to serve as primitive wicks. Indeed, other than the purchase of guns, the greatest expense that Muhammad incurred during the course of the operation was the cost of the fuel that he burned by driving to designated attack sites out-of-state. After his capture, Muhammad would even lament that he might have been able to accomplish more, if gas had not been nearly four dollars per gallon.[72] Clearly, a *jihadist* who purchased small-caliber weapons from Walmart and worried about the cost of a tank of gasoline did not benefit from any outside financial or logistical support.

[70] Gray.
[71] Quoted in Gray.
[72] Gray.

8.2.5 TRAINING

Despite Muhammad's claim to have held some vague ties to violent Yemeni Islamist groups, his training was as haphazard as his planning and his logistical preparation. Muhammad claims that "people from the US embassy" interviewed him during his detention abroad, because he had "literature, contact, cell, videos, and people's numbers on [his] phone that were wanted in Saudi Arabia."[73] However, if Muhammad's contacts with *jihadists* were as significant as he claims, it seems unlikely that the government of Yemen, which human rights organizations have repeatedly accused of arbitrarily detaining and torturing terror suspects,[74] would have released Muhammad so swiftly, or that the U.S. government, which has prosecuted several other American citizens on conspiracy charges for receiving terror training abroad,[75] would have taken no legal action against him upon his return to American soil. It seems that Muhammad exaggerated the significance of his interactions with foreign extremists. Evidence irrefutably demonstrating that he had received any sort of formal training in Yemen or elsewhere would be truly surprising.

On the domestic side, Muhammad's only other training took place in the weeks immediately preceding the attack, when he shot targets at a handful of deserted construction sites near his home in Little Rock. Like his limited planning exercise, these practice sessions seem to have been solo affairs. There is absolutely no evidence that any organization or individual

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[73] Ibid.

[74] See, for example, Sisters' Arab Forum for Human Rights, "The Status of Torture in Yemen: Second Parallel Report by Yemeni Civil Society Organizations on Yemen's Compliance with the Convention against All Forms of Torture and Other Forms of Inhuman and Degrading Treatment," Submitted to the 43rd CAT Session, October 12, 2009; available online: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/ngos/SAF_Yemen43.pdf. Human Rights Watch, "Yemen," in *World Report 2010*; available online: http://www.hrw.org/en/node/87738.

[75] Examples include the Lackawanna Six and the Virginia Jihad Group. For the details of the respective prosecutions, see, USA v. Goba, et al, Criminal Complaint of Edward J. Needham, United States District Court for the Western District of New York, September 13, 2002; and USA v. Ali al-Timmi, Indictment (Criminal No. 1:04cr), United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, September 2004.

helped Muhammad to prepare for his *jihad*.[76] To be blunt: Muhammad's escapades made the Fort Dix plotters' training experience in the Poconos seem comparatively rigorous.

8.2.6 OPERATIONS

Given his almost complete lack of preparation and training, it is not surprising that Muhammad's efforts in *jihad* were ultimately haphazard and amateurish. Indeed, they were largely impromptu affairs. He did little more than mix a batch of Molotov cocktails and load his weapons into his vehicle before setting-off down the highway in pursuit of Islamic vengeance.[77]

Muhammad's first attempt at violence was to firebomb the rabbi's house in Nashville, but the attack, which took place just a few hours before the Little Rock shooting, was an utter failure. Because Muhammad had conducted no reconnaissance, he did not know that the home's windows were made of Plexiglas, so when he hurled a Molotov cocktail against one, the bomb bounced harmlessly into the yard without damaging the house. Muhammad hurried quickly from the scene in order to avoid capture and proceeded to his second pre-determined target, but his lack of preparation caught-up with him again in Kentucky. Muhammad was unable to stage an attack in Florence because the recruiting center was closed; the would-be terrorist had apparently neglected to determine the center's schedule of operation.[78]

Crestfallen, Muhammad returned home to Little Rock to plan for another attack, when, by happenstance, he spotted ~~–t~~wo guys in Army fatigues smoking" in a parking lot and decided on a spur-of-the-moment attack. Using tactics that echoed his gang background rather than time spent in a desert training camp, Muhammad drove casually through the parking lot, as if looking for a space, and used an SKS assault rifle to conduct a drive-by on the unsuspecting soldiers. He

[76] Gray.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Gray; Hudson.

panicked in the get-away and got lost in some nearby road construction; police captured Muhammad before he even reached the Interstate.[79]

8.2.7 SUMMATION

Given Muhammad's near-continual incompetence, he paints the picture of an imitator who sought to replicate the sort of violence committed by well-known Islamist terror groups, rather than the AQAP-trained *mujahid* he claimed to be in his letter to the judge who presided over his criminal case. Muhammad's failed attempt to enter Somalia and his repeated claims of affiliation with prominent Middle Eastern terror groups demonstrate that he subscribed to a broadly defined *Salafist* ideology, but despite his best efforts, it seems he never made any significant end-roads into the terrorist community.

At best Muhammad's connections to established *jihadists* were vague, loose, and non-operational; at worst, these connections were entirely imagined. Indeed, Muhammad's father believed that his son made-up the AQAP connections in the hopes that they would anger the judge presiding over his case enough to impose the death penalty, thereby martyring the incompetent gunman.[80] Regardless of any relationships that Muhammad formed in Yemen, it is clear that he did not benefit from formal training, outside financial assistance, or any sort of logistical support in the immediate run-up to the attacks. Muhammad also conducted the little planning that preceded the attack on his own.

As no information is available on his Internet activity, it is impossible to assess the role that online propaganda may have played in his early indoctrination, but it seems clear that his first-hand experience at the Nashville mosque brought him into Islam, while his first-hand experience living in fundamentalist-influenced Yemen hardened Muhammad's ideology.

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[79] Ibid.

[80] James Dao, ―Man Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting," *New York Times*, January 21, 2010.

Though the difference may be excessively fussy, he is, therefore, most aptly characterized as a homegrown AQAP-inspired terrorist, rather than a homegrown al-Qaida inspired terrorist. But regardless of how observers choose to classify Muhammad's organizational aspirations, his ineptitude should dominate any descriptions.

Ultimately, Muhammad's case demonstrates just how easy it is to conduct rudimentary terror attacks. Working in isolation, a man who forensic psychiatrists would later describe as ~~"at~~ the low end of the Average range of intelligence" was able to attempt three separate attacks in the course of a single day.[81] Two of them failed completely, and the third caused few casualties. However, the shooting in Little Rock still killed one American serviceman and severely wounded another. Had Muhammad been even passably competent as a terrorist, he could have inflicted substantial loss of life and damage to property.

Despite Muhammad's failings, it seems clear in retrospect that federal law enforcement erred in its treatment of him, because events demonstrate that the young deportee should have been placed under the type of surveillance that he feared after returning from Yemen. Muhammad's specific attack was likely preventable, but other such rudimentary assaults are not, because few members of the radicalized Muslim community are likely to pass through similar deportation controls. So long as American society remains open, radical ideologies will continue to constitute a diffuse security threat, because Muhammad's peers need not have any operational, financial, logistical, or training ties to organizations like al-Qaida, nor any particular aptitude for planning or familiarity with the arts of war, in order to take-up arms in furtherance of their perception of the Islamist cause. While the Fort Dix plotters' amateurish efforts toward *jihad* and Muhammad's bumbling attacks both suggest that the scale of this threat is almost negligible, the final case in this chapter demonstrates that individuals with loose, non-operational

[81] Gray.

connections to existing *jihadist* groups can cause moderate damage if they are competent in their planning and preparation.

8.3 THE 2009 FORT HOOD SHOOTING

On November 5, 2009, Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army major and a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry, shot and killed 13 people and wounded another 32. Most of his victims were fellow soldiers. Like Muhammad, Hasan acted alone, without the benefit of outside logistical, financial, training, or planning support. Also like Muhammad, Hasan held ideological ties to AQAP. Although many of these interactions involved online activity, Hasan's interactions with foreign Islamists were both more detailed and more personal than the online activities of the Fort Dix plotters. Specifically, he exchanged emails with Anwar al-Awlaki, a Yemeni-American cleric who served as AQAP's mouthpiece until his death in 2011.[82] While these exchanges demonstrate that the Internet figured prominently in Hasan's connections to the broader *jihadist* movement, the full context of his ideological history suggests that even in this case, first-person social interactions played the larger role in radicalization.

8.3.1 BACKGROUND

The evidence suggests that Hasan spent his childhood in a largely secular household, rather than a hotbed of Islamist sentiment. In 1970, Hasan was born in Alexandria, Virginia, to Muslim parents who made their living as restaurateurs after immigrating to the United States from a small Palestinian town outside Jerusalem. By the time Hasan entered high school in the mid-1980s, his parents owned and operated the Capitol Restaurant, a greasy spoon in Roanoke, Virginia, that the local paper remembered fondly as "a blue-collar beer hall" where "patrons

[82] Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert T. Worth, "Two Year Man Hunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen," *New York Times*, September 30, 2011.

enjoyed greasy blue-plate specials and sipped on Old Milwaukees in the worn wooden booths while a jukebox played Motown."[83] The family later parlayed the success of the Capitol into a series of other ventures, including a hot dog stand, a grocery, and a Mediterranean-themed restaurant known for its selection of imported beers. The local Imam does not remember the Hasans, suggesting that they attended the mosque infrequently, and Nidal lacked fluency in Arabic, suggesting that the family spoke English even at home. In combination with the family's consistent willingness to profit from alcohol, it seems clear that Hasan was raised in a household that emphasized assimilation and material success more than strict Koranic values.[84]

If Hasan held any radical views that diverged from the values suggested by his parents' behavior, they remained well-disguised behind a veil of anonymity throughout his youth. His high school classmates remember him as bright and laid-back, but not particularly involved. Hasan took advanced placement classes, but did not participate in any clubs or sports. Against the wishes of his parents, he enlisted in the Army immediately after graduating in 1988, and then underwent basic training at Fort Sam Houston, in Texas, before landing at Fort Irwin, in San Bernardino County, California, and enrolling part time at nearby Barstow Community College. Hasan made no impressions, positively or negatively, on the school's faculty; his transcripts show that he made high grades, but none of the teachers still on staff at the time of Hasan's 2009 shooting remembered him.[85]

In 1990, Hasan, who was still in uniform, moved back to Roanoke, presumably to be close to his family, and transferred to Virginia Western Community College. He continued his

[83] Laurence Hammack, Amanda Codispoti, and Tonia Moxley, "Fort Hood Shooting Suspect Hasan Left Few Impressions in the Schools He Attended," *The Roanoke Times*, November 7, 2009; available online: http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/wb/225422.
[84] Ibid. For information on Hasan's lack of fluency in Arabic, see: Brooks Egerton, "Imam's e-mails to Fort Hood suspect Hasan tame compared to online rhetoric," November 29, 2009.
[85] Ibid

pattern of anonymity and scholastic achievement, graduating *summa cum laude* with an Associate's Degree in science in 1992, but failing to make a lasting impression on anyone at the school. Hasan then advanced to Virginia Tech, where in 1995, he earned a Bachelor's of Science in biochemistry, graduating with honors, but again failing to participate in any activities outside the classroom. In short, Hasan was not an Islamist firebrand in his youth; instead, the future terrorist was a bookworm who blended quietly into the background.[86]

8.3.2 RADICALIZATION

Hasan's extremism began to manifest publically in the early 2000s, during his medical residency. In 1997, he received an officer's commission, and based on the strength of his earlier academic achievements, the Army decided to send him to medical school at the highly-selective Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (USUHS), in Bethesda, Maryland. When Hasan graduated in 2003, he began an internship in Psychiatry at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, and according to statements that a fellow intern made to investigators after the shooting, "Hasan openly questioned whether he could engage in combat against other Muslims" during the early part of this program.[87] One of his supervisors became so concerned about Hasan's views that he attempted to convince the young doctor to leave the military on two different occasions during his third year in the program, bluntly telling Hasan that he should "just say goodbye" because he and the military just did not fit. The same officer even helped Hasan to explore

[86] Laurence Hammack, Amanda Codispoti, and Tonia Moxley, "Fort Hood Shooting Suspect Hasan Left Few Impressions in the Schools He Attended," *The Roanoke Times*, November 7, 2009; available online: http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/wb/225422. See also, Mark Owczarski, "Nidal Malik Hasan's Connection with Virginia Tech," *Virginia Tech News*, November 6, 2009. As the Owczarski account is based on Virginia Tech's in-house records, it seems to offer the most authoritative account of Hasan's academic progression and areas of study. Other accounts list Hasan's year of graduation as 1992 and claim that he studied engineering, rather than biochemistry. See, for example, Joseph I. Lieberman (Chairman) and Susan M. Collins (Ranking Member), "A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons From the U.S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack," U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C., February 2011. (Hereafter "A Ticking Time Bomb").

[87] "A Ticking Time Bomb," p. 28.

whether or not he qualified for conscientious objector status, but this effort to find a back-door out of the military failed.[88]

Then, in 2006, during the final year of Hasan's residency at Walter Reed, his radicalism reached alarming levels during his presentation at "Grand Rounds," a formal meeting at which residents must present a detailed scholarly talk on a psychiatric issue in order to graduate. Hasan's presentation consisted of little more than Koranic references and did not cite any medical or psychological literature.[89] Among the more worrying aspects of the presentation was Hasan's emphasis on the idea of Abrogation, a theological perspective that Islamists use to ignore inconvenient portions of the Koran by arguing that the Prophet Mohammed's later revelations supersede earlier teachings.[90] Consequently, Hasan concluded that "peaceful verses [of the Koran] no longer apply,"[91] and "Fighting to establish an Islamic State to please God, even by force, is condoned by the Islam."[92] Hasan's supervisors forced some revisions, yet owning to a lack of established academic criteria for evaluating Grand Rounds presentations and amid concerns that failing a Muslim might be perceived as politically incorrect, the review committee ultimately signed-off on this non-clinical project and pushed the budding extremist through the program.[93]

After graduating from his residency, Hasan received a post-doctoral fellowship at USUHS, during which he exhibited behavior that demonstrated that his extremist views had solidified. He applied for the position in order to avoid a combat deployment to a Muslim

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[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] For a brief discussion of the theory and practice of Abrogation, see: David Bukay, "Peace or Jihad? Abrogation in Islam," *Middle East Quarterly*, Fall 2007, pp. 3-11; available online: http://www.meforum.org/1754/peace-or-jihad-abrogation-in-islam.
[91] Nidal Malik Hasan, *The Koranic World View as It Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military*, "Example: Jihad-rule of Abrogation."
[92] Hasan, "Conclusions."
[93] "A Ticking Time Bomb," p. 31. See also, Togo Dennis West, Jr. and Vern Clark (co-chairs), "Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood," Report of the DoD Independent Review, January 2010, pp. 9-10.

country, and was accepted for the worst of reasons: Hasan was the only Army applicant for the position, and the program's director was concerned that leaving the fellowship vacant would result in its elimination the following year. Thus, Hasan's advancement said more about bureaucratic politics within the Army than it did about his promise as a mental health professional.

Indeed, Hasan seemed more concerned with advancing Islamist theology than providing psychiatric care. According to Hasan's co-fellows, who were officers drawn from other branches of the military, he displayed "fixed radical beliefs about fundamentalist Islam" and shared them "at every possible opportunity."[94] For example, during an August 2007 meeting, Hasan gave a presentation which argued that "U.S. Military operations are a war against Islam rather than based on non-religious security considerations."[95] Audience members were so offended that they broke the norms of academic politeness and shouted their objections at the podium, forcing the moderator of the panel to stop the presentation two minutes after it began.

Rather than an isolated incident, this presentation was indicative of broader patterns. In another classroom setting, Hasan argued in defense of suicide-bombers and stated that his faith as a Muslim took precedence over the patriotic oaths that he swore as an Army officer. Finally, in June 2008, Hasan began a research project, which he couched in more clinical language than his previous 'studies,' that sought to measure the extent of Islamist sympathies among Muslim soldiers. The project included a survey that a Senate investigation later described as "slanted to favor the violent Islamist extremist views that he had previously expressed," and in an ominous foreshadowing of events to come, Hasan listed concerns over "fratricide by Muslim-American

[94] Quoted in "A Ticking Time Bomb," p. 29.
[95] Ibid, p. 29.

servicememebers [sic]" as his project's central motivation.[96] In short, Hasan was no longer the quiet, studious young man that he had been when he graduated from Virginia Tech. By 2007, he had become a dedicated Islamist who believed that his religious beliefs trumped all other obligations.

What caused Hasan to change so drastically? The available evidence suggests that a combination of innate susceptibility and traumatic personal losses made Hasan uniquely vulnerable to radical influences. According to family members, Hasan was deeply sensitive. His uncle recounted that Hasan once tried to save a baby bird, by placing it in his mouth so that it could eat pre-masticated food, and that when his efforts failed, Hasan ~~m~~ourned for two or three months, dug a grave for it (the bird) and visited it."[97] Similarly, Hasan chose psychiatry as his medical specialty because he had difficulty with the sight of blood, and actually fainted the first time he observed child birth as a medical student.[98] Thus, it seems that Hasan was ill-equipped to deal with emotional trauma.

However, he received a pair of crippling emotional blows during medical school. In 1998, Hasan's father died of a massive heart attack at age 52, and in 2001, his mother, only age 49, followed her husband into the grave.[99] Hasan turned to the Koran for comfort and delved into books on Islam instead of interacting with friends.[100] Islam is not inherently violent, so Hasan's renewed interest in his religion did not necessarily presage his involvement in terrorist violence; instead, chance intervened by placing the Army officer in contact with a radical preacher during a period of increased emotional vulnerability.

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[96] Ibid.
[97] Rafiq Hamad quoted in James C. McKinley, Jr. and James Dao, "~~F~~ort Hood Gunman Gave Signals Before His Rampage," *New York Times*, November 8, 2009.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Hammack, et al.
[100] McKinley and Dao. See also, James Dao, "~~S~~uspect Was _Mortified' About Deployment," *New York Times*, November 5, 2009.

Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American preacher who later gained fame as an AQAP ideologue, came to northern Virginia in January 2001, and assumed the position of Imam at the Dar al-Hijra Mosque in Falls Church, where Hasan often worshipped. By that time, al-Awlaki had already begun to preach interpretations that appealed to Islamists. Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, two of the terrorists onboard American Airlines Flight 77 when it crashed into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, had frequented al-Awlaki's sermons during their brief stint in San Diego in early 2000, when the preacher still worked at the Rabat Mosque in the city's near-suburbs. Similarly, in March of 2001, al-Hazmi, who was now located on the east coast, began to attend services at Dar al-Hijra and brought with him Hani Hanjour, another of the Pentagon-bound hijackers.[101] Although the FBI doubts that al-Awlaki had direct knowledge of the 9/11 attacks,[102] the preacher's repeated interactions with the hijackers suggest that his beliefs were already ideologically congruent with al-Qaida's worldview. Therefore, it seems safe to assume that Hasan came in direct, first-person contact with radical ideology when al-Awlaki presided over the funeral services of the Army officer's mother in 2001.[103] Ultimately, the evidence suggests that fate created a perfect storm that initiated Hasan's radicalism by placing the exceptionally sensitive and increasingly devout Army officer in contact with an influential radical ideologue during a period of extreme emotional crisis.

The first-person interactions that Hasan had with soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan in his capacity as an Army psychiatrist then cemented the views that al-Awlaki had planted. According to family members, Hasan was "mortified" by the stories of violence against

[101] Philip Sherwell and Alex Spillius, "Fort Hood Shooting: Texas Army Killer Linked to September 11 Terrorists," *The Telegraph*, November 7, 2009; available online: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/6521758/Fort-Hood-shooting-Texas-army-killer-linked-to-September-11-terrorists.html. For additional information on the al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar's association with the Rabat Mosque near San Diego, see: The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 220.
[102] "Obituary: Anwar al-Awlaki," *BBC News Middle East*, September 30, 2011; available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11658920.
[103] Sherwell and Spillius.

Muslims that traumatized soldiers recounted during clinical sessions.[104] One fellow officer at Fort Hood, where Hasan was posted after completing his USUHS fellowship in 2008, claimed that the doctor even petitioned the Army to prosecute some of his patients for war crimes based on revelations they made during confidential counseling sessions.[105] Even if such claims are exaggerated, it seems clear that Hasan's job afforded him the opportunity to cherry-pick and re-interpret evidence that supported the biased vision of American-Muslim relations that al-Awlaki previously helped to instill.

Moreover, al-Awlaki continued to wield influence over Hasan via the Internet, but the preacher followed a circuitous route to online prominence. Spooked by an FBI inquiry into his activities that followed in the wake of 9/11, al-Awlaki fled the US for London in 2002. In Britain, he conducted a series of lectures for crowds of young Muslims, but without any viable means of financial self-support in Britain, al-Awlaki returned to his ancestral home of Yemen in 2004, and began lecturing at al-Imam University, a radical Sunni institution headed by Abdul-Majid al-Zindani, a cleric who appears on U.S. terrorist sanctioning lists and who once tutored the "American Taliban," John Walker Lindh. Beginning in 2006, al-Awlaki spent 18 months in a Yemeni prison in connection with a plot to kidnap an American military attaché. When he emerged, he hid among his tribe, the Awaliq, and began distributing his radical message using a wide range of media, including audio CDs, booklets, and a worryingly popular Facebook page. By the time that Hasan neared completion of his USUHS fellowship, al-Awlaki had become one of the violent Islamist movement's most prominent spokesmen, in no small part because he

[104] James Dao, "Suspect Was 'Mortified' About Deployment," *New York Times*, November 5, 2009.
[105] Brooks Egerton, "Fort Hood Captain: Hasan Wanted Patients to Face War Crimes Charges," *Dallas Morning News*, November 17, 2009; available online: http://www.dallasnews.com/news/20091117-Fort-Hood-captain-Hasan-wanted-9439.ece.

frequently disseminated his message in English, thereby making it accessible to non-Arabic speakers like Hasan.[106]

The timeline of Hasan's actions suggest that the Army doctor was an avid reader of al-Awlaki's online posts. For example, in early December 2008, al-Awlaki issued a statement condemning any Muslim who would seek a religious ruling "that would allow him to serve in the armies of the disbelievers and fight against his brothers."[107] Hasan emailed the radical cleric a few days later. It was the pair's first known contact since their shared time in the D.C. area, but over the next six months Hasan and al-Awlaki traded an additional 17 messages. In one of the most worrying, Hassan alluded to his intent to conduct a suicide-attack, telling al-Awlaki that "he couldn't wait to join him in the discussions they would have over non-alcoholic wine in the afterlife."[108] Then, in mid-July 2009, al-Awlaki offered a harsh rebuke to Muslim soldiers serving in the American military in an online post stating that "the blame should be placed on the soldier who is willing to follow orders . . . who sells his religion for a few dollars."[109] Two weeks later, Hasan purchased the handgun he used in the Fort Hood shooting.

Ultimately, Hasan's path to radicalism did traverse the Internet, but as with the Fort Dix plotters, his online radical ties seem to have taken place *after* he already subscribed to a militant interpretation of Islam. His first-person interactions with al-Awlaki and then with battle-fatigued psychiatric patients fostered and cemented Hasan's belief system, before al-Awlaki's online posts and email messages gave it a more specific shape. While Hasan's history demonstrates that he had direct contact with radical Islam, it is necessary to close this section with an

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[106] "Obituary: Anwar al-Awlaki." See also, Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, "Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen," *New York Times*, September 30, 2011.
[107] Quoted in Brooks Egerton, "Imam's e-mails to Fort Hood suspect Hasan tame compared to online rhetoric," November 29, 2009.
[108] Quoted in Brian Ross, "Major Hasan's E-Mail: I Can't Wait To Join You in Afterlife," *ABC News*, November 19, 2009.
[109] Quoted in Brooks Egerton, "Imam's e-mails to Fort Hood suspect Hasan tame compared to online rhetoric," November 29, 2009.

important clarification regarding the extent of Hasan's ties to known terrorists: The evidence has demonstrated only that he attended the same mosque as two of the 9/11 hijackers, not that he ever had any direct interactions with them. Hasan's ideological relationship with al-Awlaki constituted the Army major's only demonstrable interactions with an established *jihadist*.

8.3.3 PLANNING

While the timing of Hasan's actions relative to al-Awlaki's published statements suggests that the Army major unquestioningly followed the cleric's broad decrees, it remains to be seen that al-Awlaki provided any specific guidance regarding the conduct of the Fort Hood shooting. However, it is difficult to have complete confidence in this assessment, as the full contents of the pairs' email exchanges have never been publically released. Therefore, with this caveat, it seems that Hasan planned the operation in isolation, and, based on the timing of al-Awlaki's polemic against Muslims serving in the American military, that Hasan first began to conceive of the operation sometime in mid-July, about two and a half months before the shooting took place.

It is difficult, and perhaps even unnecessary, to assess any specific reconnaissance that Hasan conducted on the attack-site between this mid-summer inspiration and the date of the shooting in early November, because his was an insider attack. He clearly knew the location exceptionally well. The shooting took place at an Army processing facility through which all troops leaving for (or returning from) active deployments must pass in order to receive medical treatment and where Hasan, as one of Fort Hood's physicians, worked frequently.[110] Thus, Hasan was intimately familiar with the facility's layout and traffic flow and likely had no need to conduct any additional surveillance in specific preparation for his attack. Needless to say, no

[110] Zucchino, "Police officers describe Fort Hood gunfight," *Los Angeles Times*, October 21, 2010; "Prosecution to Rest in Ft. Hood Massacre Trial," *Associated Press*, November 5, 2010.

members of outside terror groups played a role in helping the Army doctor to familiarize himself with the processing center.

8.3.4 FINANCE AND LOGISTICS

The logistics of Hasan's attack took place in similar isolation. He had no need for outside funding, because his operation required only the purchase of a handgun and ammunition—items that were easily within the budget of the major's $92,000 per year income. Indeed, financial ties between Hasan and the global *jihadist* movement ran in the other direction, albeit indirectly. Hasan lived exceptionally modestly in an off-post apartment so that he could make significant *zakat* (Islamic tithing) contributions; estimates claim that he donated approximately one-third of his annual income to Islamic charities, many of which held implicit financial ties to terror groups.[111]

As regards the choosing of specific supplies, Hasan was methodical and selective. On August 1, about two weeks after al-Awlaki's condemnation of Muslim-American soldiers, Hasan entered "Guns Galore" in Killeen, Texas, and sought the advice of salesmen and customers to find "the most high-tech handgun" on the market. He then purchased an FN Five-Seven semi-automatic pistol, because of its light weight and 30 round capacity ammunition clip, as well as an expensive laser sight to make the weapon easier to aim.[112] At some point prior to the attack—the timing of the event is unknown—Hasan also acquired a Smith and Wesson .357 magnum revolver, which police found on his person, loaded but unfired, in the aftermath of the attack.[113]

In the several weeks preceding the attack, the major slowly stockpiled both ammunition and spare magazines, so that he could reload quickly on the day of the attack by simply

[111] Ross.
[112] David Zucchino, "Suspect in Ft. Hood Rampage Sought High-Tech Gun, Salesman Says," *Los Angeles Times*, October 21, 2010; "Prosecution Wraps Up in Fort Hood Hearing," *United Press International*, October 21, 2010.
[113] Chris Cuomo, Emily Friedman, Sarah Netter, and Richard Espositio, "Alleged Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Malik Hasan Was 'Calm,' Methodical During Massacre," *ABC News*, November 6, 2009.

swapping-out empty clips for pre-loaded replacements.[114] The pace of his acquisitions suggests that Hasan wanted to avoid raising suspicion by purchasing too many items at once. In short, it seems that from his choice of gun to the manner in which he bought bullets, everything Hasan did was in careful preparation for a shooting spree.

8.3.5 TRAINING

Like the Fort Dix plotters and Muhammad, Hasan self-trained by shooting at a firing range. However, the major was more methodical in his preparation. In lieu of intermittent trips to the Poconos or impromptu practice sessions at abandoned construction sites, Hasan visited the range more than once a week for roughly two months.[115] Moreover, as a former enlisted soldier and a current Army officer, Hasan benefitted from experience that was the plotters discussed in the previous cases never had. Simply put, Hasan may not have needed much in the way of training beyond what he had already learned from the very organization he was about to attack.

8.3.6 OPERATIONS

On November 5, the attack began a little after 1.30pm, when Hasan, who had been quietly sitting at a table in the middle of the processing center, rose and shouted ―Allahu Akbar (god is great),‖ before firing at a crowd of soldiers who had queued awaiting medical examination. Witnesses described his actions as cool and methodical; Hasan passed-up several opportunities to shoot civilians and instead concentrated his fire on those in uniform. Indeed, the only civilian to die in the attack was a civilian psychiatrist, who charged Hasan in an attempt to disarm him.[116] The extra rounds and magazines Hasan had purchased allowed him to reload so

[114] David Zucchino, ―Suspect in Ft. Hood Rampage Sought High-Tech Gun, Salesman Says,‖ *Los Angeles Times*, October 21, 2010; ―Prosecution Wraps Up in Fort Hood Hearing,‖ *United Press International*, October 21, 2010.
[115] David Zucchino, ―Suspect in Ft. Hood Rampage Sought High-Tech Gun, Salesman Says,‖ *Los Angeles Times*, October 21, 2010; ―Prosecution Wraps Up in Fort Hood Hearing,‖ *United Press International*, October 21, 2010.
[116] Zucchino, ―Police officers describe Fort Hood gunfight,‖ *Los Angeles Times*, October 21, 2010; ―Prosecution to Rest in Ft. Hood Massacre Trial.‖

swiftly that his rate of fire was almost continuous; one staff sergeant, who was waiting to receive an anthrax vaccination-booster in another room of the processing facility when the shooting began, initially though that someone had opened fire with an M16.[117]

When Hasan left the processing facility in search of more targets, he encountered two members of Fort Hood's civilian police department, who felled him in an exchange of fire that left both officers wounded and the gunman paralyzed from the chest down. According to a count of the spent bullet casings found at the scene, Hasan fired 214 rounds during his 10-minute rampage, and when police searched the crippled attacker, they found an additional 177 rounds in extra magazines, as well as the loaded .357 magnum revolver. Thus, Hasan would have been able to cause several more casualties, if police had not halted his fratricidal attack.[118]

8.3.7 SUMMATION

Like the preceding discussion of the 2009 Little Rock shootings, Hasan's case suggests that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula has begun to play an especially worrying role in the promulgation of radical ideology among homegrown American Islamists. It was to this organization, rather than the core group of al-Qaida, that Hasan held ties. Although these links were direct, personal, and comparatively strong, the currently available evidence suggests that they were entirely of a non-operational character. Al-Awlaki fomented the shooting by inspiring Hasan, but the radical preacher does not seem to have directed the major's actions. To be blunt, it seems that Hasan planned the specifics of the event in isolation. Moreover, Hasan took care of his own logistics and finance, as well as the little training that he required beyond the knowledge he already possessed from his time in uniform. Thus, like the Little Rock shooting, Hasan's

[117] KWTX, a CBS affiliate based in Waco, Texas, maintains excerpts from the Hasan hearing. The M16 reference is drawn the testimony of Staff Sergeant Michael Davis on October 19, 2010. For additional information, see: "Hasan Hearing: Tuesday Oct. 19, 2010," *KWTX.com*; available online: http://www.kwtx.com/news/misc/105303923.html.
[118] Zucchino, "Police officers describe Fort Hood gunfight," *Los Angeles Times*, October 21, 2010; "Prosecution to Rest in Ft. Hood Massacre Trial."

rampage is also best described as an AQAP-inspired attack, albeit one that was planned and executed with considerably greater skill.

The Fort Hood shooting is also similar to the Little Rock attack in another important way: both were ultimately preventable. Hasan's superiors at USUHS and Walter Reed share some culpability for his attack, because although Hasan consistently ranked in the lowest 25 percent of his residency and fellowship programs, he received positive performance reviews that stressed the value of his "research" into Islamist extremism. Not only did these assessments facilitate Hasan's promotion from captain to major—the promotion that landed the Army doctor at Fort hood—they also had the second-order effect of discouraging federal investigators assigned to a San Diego-based Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) from adequately investigating Hasan's background when they became aware of his email exchange with al-Awlaki, who had been on the FBI's radar since the preacher's association with the 9/11 hijackers first came to light in 2002. Based on the Army's official assessment of Hasan, investigators concluded that his communications must be part of legitimate research on terrorism, and closed their inquiry in a single day.[119] Had they conducted even the most cursory examination of Hasan's finances, they would have had cause for concern, because this inquiry would have revealed his association with Islamist "charities."[120] Therefore, hasty police work also contributed to the failure.

However, Hasan's attack differs from the Little Rock shooting in another very key way: in terms of impact. The Fort Hood shooting ultimately demonstrates the extent of damage that *jihadists* whose only ties to existing terror groups are ideological in nature can cause. Despite struggling during portions of his medical training, Hasan's overall pattern of scholastic achievement demonstrates that he was exceptionally bright, if perhaps a touch unstable. Thus,

[119] "A Ticking Time Bomb," pp. 35-39.
[120] Ross.

his planning and careful preparations are quite likely near the high-end of what any aspiring *jihadist* could initiate without substantive assistance from an outside group.

Similarly, as an American citizen and a resident of Texas (a state with notoriously liberal gun laws), Hasan did not face the same logistical hurdles that plagued the weapons-acquisition efforts undertaken by the Duka brothers, who as undocumented immigrants had no ability to purchase arms on the legitimate market. Therefore, Hasan's case also offers an example of logistical conditions that are nearly ideal for *jihadists*. The major could have acquired virtually any pistol or rifle on the market with relative ease.

His level of training was also reasonably high. As a former Army enlisted man and a serving Army officer, Hasan had received professional firearms instruction at various points in his military career. Nothing suggests that Hasan was an expert marksman, but his weapons proficiency was far higher than levels self-trained terrorists would be likely to obtain on their own.

Finally, Hasan's nearly six figure income demonstrates that he could have met the financial and logistical requirements of a much larger attack with relative ease, especially if he had been willing to bankrupt himself in the process, because, after all, martyrs have little need of material things. Therefore, the relatively unsophisticated nature of his attack cannot be written-off to financial constraints as could be done in relation to Muhammad's amateurish efforts at *jihad*. Put differently, Hasan's method of attack is likely indicative of broader trends not only because the Fort Dix plotters and the Little Rock shooter employed (or attempted to employ) similar approaches, but also because Hasan's finances did not constrain him to this approach.

More destructive scenarios than the Fort Hood shooting remain a possibility, but given that a smart, well-financed, reasonably well-trained *jihadist* with fairly broad access to weapons

was able to cause only moderate casualties, it seems unlikely that other terrorists operating without organizational support will fare much better. Hasan's case, therefore, suggests that homegrown terrorists with loose non-functional connections to established radical groups remain a threat, but a limited one. It seems that al-Qaida (or AQAP) inspired terrorists are fairly unlikely to cause more than two or three dozen serious casualties in any single attack. To be blunt: homegrown Islamist terrorism does not even come close to representing an existential threat to the United States.

Finally, beyond threat assessments, Hasan's experience says a great deal about the role that first-hand interactions play in the indoctrination process, especially when this case is viewed alongside this chapter's other two cases. Although the Internet played an important role in radicalization in at least two of the three cases, timing is everything. Both Hassan and the Fort Dix plotters seem to have consumed the bulk of their online *jihadist* propaganda *after* they already subscribed to radical ideologies, much the way that new golfers often begin to watch PGA events on television in the hopes of emulating tour professionals. While this consumption almost certainly helped to harden these *jihadists'* radical views, first-person interactions with other existing fundamentalists seem to have been the initial trigger in both cases, as demonstrated by Hasan's interaction with al-Awlaki in Virginia in 2001, and the Duka brothers' purported interactions with their radicalized ex-convict uncle and their subsequent influence over the other Fort Dix plotters. Though the open-source record has remained mute on Muhammad's consumption of online propaganda, the Little Rock case also demonstrates the importance of first-person interactions, because the social treatment he respectively received from Jewish and Muslim congregations ultimately determined which religion he selected, and his time in fundamentalist-influenced Yemen changed him from a devout Muslim into a radical Islamist.

8.4 CONCLUSION

Although it may be inappropriate to draw conclusions about the overall extent of al-Qaida's ideological role in the global violent Islamist movement based solely on three cases, the similarities between the events discussed in this chapter make it possible to draw reasonable conclusions about the nature of the al-Qaida's involvement in plots and attacks conducted by ~~"~~homegrown" American *jihadists*. As table 8.1 summarizes, al-Qaida has had a small and often indirect ideological role in such attacks, but has not played a demonstrable functional role.

Table 8.1: Al-Qaida's Role in Plots and Attacks by Homegrown American *Jihadists*

2007 Fort Dix Plot

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Ideology	Partial	Dukas also likely influenced by prison-radicalized uncle
Planning	Unlikely	Plotters planned all aspects of attack independently
Finance	Unlikely	Plotters self-financed the attack with personal savings
Logistics	Unlikely	Plotters indpendently acquired weapons via personal connections and black market
Training	Unlikely	Plotters 'trained' independently

2009 Little Rock Shootings

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Ideology	Indirect	Muhammad was AQAP-inspired
Planning	Unlikely	Muhammad planned all aspects of attack indpendently (and badly)
Finance	Unlikely	Muhammad self-financed the attack with personal savings
Logistics	Unlikely	Muhammad independently acquired weapons via black market and legitimate purchases
Training	Unlikely	Muhammad 'trained' independently

2009 Fort Hood Shooting

Nature of AQ Involvement	*Extent of AQ Involvement*	*Notes*
Ideology	Indirect	Hasan was AQAP-inspired
Planning	Unlikely	Hasan planned all aspects of attack indpendently, with strategic inspiration from al-Awlaki
Finance	Unlikely	Hasan self-financed the attack with personal savings
Logistics	Unlikely	Hasan acquired weapons via legitimate purchases
Training	Unlikely	Hasan received U.S. Army training and practiced shooting skills independently

Moreover, the theoretical implications of these cases are fairly clear and help to resolve the existing debate regarding the nature of the Internet's role in the radicalization process. While these cases demonstrate that online *jihadist* propaganda remains a worrying phenomenon because it helps to harden radical viewpoints, the evidence suggests that theories which argue that the consumption of online propaganda leads to the adoption of radical views are deeply flawed. Indeed, it seems that such arguments may have reversed the direction of causality, because several of the individuals included in these cases began to view large quantities of propaganda only *after* becoming radicalized. Repeated interactions with individuals who already held radical views seem to have played the largest role in the indoctrination process, suggesting that radicalization is a socio-cultural process that requires first-person involvement, rather than virtual participation.

However, the limited scope of this inquiry dictates that additional research is required both to establish the frequency of these patterns and to measure the scale of interactions between variables. Given that it seems unlikely that all radicals follow the same trajectory in their adoption of extremist viewpoints, additional research must also assess the existence and regularity of other pathways to radicalization. Ultimately, this chapter raises as many questions as it answers.

9.0 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

At the broadest level, this analysis has shown that al-Qaida's involvement in Islamist-motivated terror devolved in the decade following the 9/11 attacks. The modified snowball data, the Newman-based modeling process, and the Baleian typology combined to demonstrate that after 2001 the number of plots and attacks in which al-Qaida played a strong functional role spiked briefly in 2002 and 2003, before falling in 2004. By 2005, al-Qaida was strongly involved in only a small handful of annual Islamist-motivated terror attacks and plots, and as of 2010, the organization had not regained a more prominent role. Al-Qaida's weak functional involvement in events followed a similar pattern, and tailed-off dramatically after reaching a high in 2004. In recent years, former members of al-Qaida have conducted an increasingly large share of the total number of Islamist-motivated terror plots and attacks, owing in no small part to the efforts of AQAP. Indeed, al-Qaida's alumni were responsible for roughly 30 percent of the terror events included in the snowball sample in 2010. Meanwhile, the share of "al-Qaida inspired" plots and attacks has never been especially large and has comprised more than 10 percent of the total events in a given year. Since the middle of the decade, a majority of Islamist-motivated terror events have not involved bin Laden's organization in any way. Thus, the numbers suggest that today's al-Qaida is far from the global terrorist juggernaut that some observers assume it to be.

As table 9.1 summarizes, the nature of al-Qaida's involvement in terror attacks has also degraded substantially over time. The quality and capability of attack-teams closely associated with the organization are far lower today than they were in the late-1990s and early-2000s, when al-Qaida respectively bombed U.S. Embassies in East Africa and conducted the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. Regardless of whether attacks and plots were conducted on al-Qaida's "home turf" or in the Western world, the teams responsible for these events have become progressively less trained, while simultaneously receiving decreased access to al-Qaida's financial and logistical resources. Given these circumstances, it is unsurprising that the amount of support al-Qaida has been able to offer to partner organizations has also waned tremendously. For example, Jemaah Islamiyah's experience suggests that organizations that once received limited operational and financial backing from bin Laden's organization now operate without the benefit of al-Qaida's strategic, tactical, logistical, or financial support. The evidence suggests that by the mid-2000s, even the historical training relationship that existed between JI and bin Laden's organization had dissipated.

However, the data also suggests that there is some variance in the nature of regional organizations' respective relationships to al-Qaida. Neither AQIM nor AQAP appear to have ever benefited from the type of financial support that JI formerly enjoyed, yet the training relationship between these organizations and al-Qaida, while still historical, continues to influence AQIM and AQAP to a greater extent that JI, quite likely because these organizations have yet to fully experience the sorts of effects that JI suffered when counterterrorism initiatives eliminated Hambali, Azahari Husin, and other prominent individuals with al-Qaida ties. Still, it is important not to overstate the case: although regional organizations' adoption of names featuring the term "al-Qaida" implies tremendous unity with bin Laden's organization, the

evidence ultimately suggests that al-Qaida's functional ties to its regional affiliates have actually waned in recent years. Thus, both quantitative and qualitative methodologies point toward the same conclusion: although the threat posed by violent Islamists continues to merit the sustained attention of the global security community, the fight against al-Qaida as an organization has been largely won.

Table 9.1: Summarizing al-Qaida's Involvement in Terrorism Within the Baleian Typology

Event	**Nature of al-Qaida Involvement**				**Category**
	Planning	*Finance*	*Logistics*	*Training*	
1998 East Africa	Definite	Definite	Definite	Definite	BaleCat1: Attacks and plots with strong functional and/or training links to al-Qaida
2002 Mombasa	Partial	Partial	Partial	Partial	
2004 Jundallah	Unlikely	Unlikely	Unlikely	Partial	
9/11	Definite	Definite	Definite	Definite	BaleCat2: Attacks and plots conducted by al-Qaida "hit squads" deployed to the West
2004 London	Partial	Unlikely	Partial	Definite	
7/7 London	Partial	Unlikely	Unlikely	Definite	
21/7 London	Partial	Unlikely	Unlikely	Partial	
2009 NYC	Partial	Unlikely	Unlikely	Definite	
2002 Bali	Partial	Partial	Unlikely	Definite	BaleCat3: Attacks and plots with weak functional and/or training connections to al-Qaida
2003 Marriott	Unlikely	Partial	Unlikely	Partial	
2004 Embassy	Unlikely	Unlikely	Unlikely	Historical	
2005 Bali	Unlikely	Unlikely	Unlikely	Historical	
2009 Marriott/Ritz	Unlikely	Possible	Unlikely	Unlikely	
AQIM Events	Indirect	Unlikely	Unlikely	Historical	BaleCat4: Attacks and plots tied to individuals who formlerly held strong ties to al-Qaida, but now operate independent of the organization
AQAP Events	Unknown	Unlikely	Unlikely	Historical	
2007 Fort Dix	Unlikely	Unlikely	Unlikely	Unlikely	BaleCat5: Attacks and plots with explicit ideological ties to al-Qaida
2009 Little Rock	Unlikely	Unlikely	Unlikely	Unlikely	
2009 Fort Hood	Unlikely	Unlikely	Unlikely	Unlikely	

These macro-level conclusions have implications for both terrorism research and counterterrorism policy; the three sections following this introduction examine these subjects in detail. The first section discusses the implications this analysis has to the theoretical discourse on Islamist-motivated terrorism and posits that contemporary Islamist terrorism is best understood as a multi-polar threat. The second section discusses the implications this analysis has for future research on Islamist terrorism and summarizes how the methodological contributions of this analysis may benefit subsequent researchers. Finally, the third section turns its attention towards policy and offers several specific recommendations to augment the already well-designed counterterrorism strategy the Obama administration unveiled in June 2011.

9.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORETICAL DISCOURSE ON ISLAMIST-MOTIVATED TERRORISM

The most important theoretical contribution of this analysis is to refute the hypothesis that al-Qaida‘s central leadership continued to direct global terrorist operations even after the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) came into full swing. Although the proposition that al-Qaida exhibited a strong measure of control over the Islamist terror movement experienced a degree of intellectual resurgence when American authorities discovered documents related to several terror plots at the Abbottabad compound where bin Laden was killed in 2011, a detailed review of the organization‘s involvement in plots and attacks clearly demonstrates al-Qaida‘s waning involvement in the tactical planning of events. Moreover, al-Qaida‘s ability to provide attack-teams with high-caliber training has been tremendously constrained, and the organization‘s role in the funding and logistical support of attacks has evaporated almost completely. Simply put, the evidence suggests that al-Qaida‘s functional role in terrorism has been greatly curtailed, and

that those *jihadists* who continue to operate as part of bin Laden's organization are less capable, less experienced, less trained, and less able to access al-Qaida's ever-shrinking financial and logistical resources than their predecessors in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It would be premature to dismiss the possibility of al-Qaida's resurgence, but it seems that the organization which surrounded bin Laden until his death in 2011 has been largely defeated.

The fact that that the dissident Saudi possessed documents regarding past attacks does not constitue evidence that he or his top lieutenants played prominent roles in these events' planning, preparation, or finance. Indeed, many analysts with access to the Abbottabad documents suggest that they demonstrate that al-Qaida members increasingly ignored bin Laden in the years preceding his death. It will be quite some time before the full truth of the matter can is definitively established, because it will take years for the Abbottabad documents find their way into the open-source, and still more time before the expert community reaches a meaningful consensus regarding their interpretation. Thus, definitive pronouncements on either side of the debate regarding al-Qaida's role in directing the Islamist terrorism are premature, but with this substantial caveat, the currently available evidence simply does not support the view that bin Laden or al-Qaida continued to lead the Islamist terror movement in any capacity beyond a vague ideological role.

However, these criticisms of the al-Qaida-centric view of Islamist terrorism should not be interpreted as support for a leaderless characterization of the *jihadist* threat. Only about seven percent of the attacks and plots included in the snowball sample were categorized at "al-Qaida inspired," and although there has been a significant upward trend in the frequency of such attacks since 2005, the absolute number remains low. Indeed, the maximum number of "al-Qaida inspired" attacks conducted in a single year never exceeded half a dozen. Moreover, al-Qaida's

inspiration role within the broader violent Islamist movement is subject to question, because the examples of Abdul Hakim Muhammad and Nidal Hasan, who respectively conducted the 2009 Little Rock shooting and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, demonstrate that many individuals drew religious motivation from members of regional groups like AQAP, rather than from members of bin Laden's organization. In short, the evidence suggests that al-Qaida's oft-cited ideological role in terrorism may also be exaggerated.[1129]

There are also tremendous problems with the quality of leaderless attacks. Though it may be premature to generalize to an entire phenomenon based on only three cases, the examples offered by Muhammad and the Fort Dix plotters suggest that many *jihadists* who act without organizational support or training are exceptionally hapless. Hasan's example, meanwhile, suggests that even bright, well-funded terrorists can cause only moderate damage when they act in isolation. More lethal scenarios remain a possibility, but it seems clear that _inspired' terrorists who act in isolation are not the preeminent extremist threat facing the United States. Ultimately, leaderless theories of *jihad* and theories which argue that al-Qaida somehow controls the Islamist terror movement are equally flawed.

Rather than merely critiquing existing theories that attempt to explain the breadth of the *jihadist* threat, this analysis offers its own explanation and theorizes that the contemporary Islamist terror movement is multi-polar. It contains a diverse collection of functionally autonomous organizations that make independent decisions on strategy and tactics, and that have independent access to substantial logistical and financial resources. Some training partnerships have existed between these independent organizations and al-Qaida in the past, and though the

[1129] In her work on Islamists terrorism in Europe, Alison Pargeter independently reached a similar conclusion, arguing that although ~~it~~ is widely assumed that these Islamists are somehow linked to or share the same ideology as Al-Qa'ida and Osama Bin Laden . . . . in many cases these links and perceived aspirations are often more tenuous than is suggested and the particularities of the various groups and movements are regularly overlooked." *The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe,* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), p. vii.

evidence of ongoing training ties is shaky, they may continue to the present at a low frequency. However, to the limited extent that regional terror groups hold functional ties to al-Qaida, devolutionary trends characterize the long-term relationships. Fewer and fewer al-Qaida trainees and former al-Qaida members remain active after each successive counterterrorism strike, and regional organizations' independent access to considerable financial, logistical, and training resources mitigates these groups' need for access to al-Qaida's steadily waning organizational assets.

Moreover, this analysis posits an explanation for the extent of organizations' independence. AQIM's experience in the Sahara and AQAP's brief history in Yemen both suggest that the extent of regional terror groups' engagement with al-Qaida is inversely causally related to their access to financial resources. Given that both AQIM and AQAP seem to derive the vast majority of their revenue through crime, there is some evidence to support an even more specific theory positing an inverse causal relationship between regional organizations' involvement in crime and the extent of their functional partnership with al-Qaida. Because Noordin Mohd Top also relied heavily on criminal means of fundraising as he began to operate with increasing independence from Jemaah Islamiyah's titular leadership, this theory may be more broadly generalizable to groups beyond al-Qaida. Involvement in crime likely plays a significant role in determining the extent of fractures within the Islamist terror movement, by granting entrepreneurially-inclined *jihadists* the financial freedom and independent access to weapons necessary to conduct operations without support from a parent organization. However, the inchoate nature of open-source data on terrorist finance in North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and Southeast Asia dictates that this theory is speculative in nature and requires additional testing.

Beyond macro-level theoretical interpretations, this analysis also weighs in on a pair of smaller debates within the existing literature on terrorism. First, theories which describe the formation of splinter groups in terms of sharp, acrimonious splits require amendment. While cases including the history of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and its successor organizations demonstrate that new groups often form as the result of pronounced intra-organizational fractures, Noordin Mohd Top's experience shows that gradual processes can also characterize the formation of new groups. Indeed, the organization that Noordin led, namely Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad in Indonesia, emerged slowly from Jemaah Islamiyah over the course of several years, as Noordin acted with increasing independence and autonomy in each attack that he conducted between 2003 and his death in 2009.

Finally, this analysis contributes not only to theories of group formation and terrorist finance, but also to the literature which studies the process of radicalization. Specifically, case studies of the 2007 Fort Dix plot, the 2009 Little Rock shooting, and the 2009 Fort Hood massacre refute the hypothesis that online *jihadist* propaganda causes its viewers to adopt extremist views. As other theorists have previously argued, network effects seem to be the primary cause of radicalization, because the evidence suggests that the men responsible for the three efforts against American military facilities described above became radicalized as the result of first-person interactions with individuals who already adhered to extremist viewpoints. Moreover, this analysis partially reconciles this socio-cultural view of radicalization with the literature regarding the dangers of online propaganda by positing that repeated viewings of *jihadist* Internet content hardens and reinforces views initially established via person-to-person interactions. Though the argument is somewhat speculative, it also seems reasonable to infer

that repeated viewings of violent Islamist web-pages play an important role in desensitizing aspiring *jihadists* to the gory realities of terrorism prior to the conduct of attacks.

9.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY

Given that both the quantitative and qualitative portions of this assessment are based exclusively on open-source data, a pool of information that is by its very nature is both incomplete and potentially inaccurate, this study‘s implications for additional research can be summarized incredibly succinctly: the theories generated by this analysis require additional testing as more data and additional cases materialize. However, the methodological contributions of this analysis speak to the means that can be used to analyze any new data that emerges on al-Qaida‘s role in Islamist terrorism.

First and foremost, the modified snowball sampling method provides a rigorous and replicable means to acquire large pools of data on any clandestine topic and should be of value to researchers of both quantitative and qualitative persuasions, because regardless of the methodology researchers use, terrorism must ultimately be investigated at the individual level in order to obtain the detailed information necessary to accurately assess organizations‘ roles in terrorism. The ontology of relationship types, which this study generated by reviewing the broader literature on terrorism and clandestine networks, is also useful for researchers hailing from different methodological traditions, because it provides a systematic means to reconcile the conflation that results when analysts neglect to consider the nature of interactions between violent Islamists. Put differently, the ontology is both comprehensive enough and specific enough to allow researchers to differentiate meaningful functional ties from affinity bonds that exist between friends, family members, and adherents of the same worldview.

Similarly, the Baleian typology provides a system of classification useful for operationalizing a multi-relational characterization of the Islamist terror movement. By distinguishing events in which al-Qaida played a strong functional role from events in which the organization played a weaker supporting role, events perpetrated by former members of al-Qaida, and events to which the organization is tied only by ideology, this typology can help mitigate analysts' all-too-common tendency to describe events and organizations as vaguely ~~"~~al-Qaida linked." Although this analysis implemented a system of quantitative measurements to classify events, the typology may also be of use to researchers who view evidence in qualitative terms, as it can be easily modified to accommodate softer forms of evidence. Indeed, Bale relied exclusively on narrative in order to locate a case in his original typology, on which this analysis drew heavily to create a more comprehensive system of classification.

Finally, quantitatively-minded researchers may also find utility in several of the processes used within this analysis. The Meadian-Additive Projection Process (MAPP) has clear applications beyond terrorism research. It would be appropriate to MAPP virtually any multi-modal network dataset derived from the historical record, because most such datasets contain the sort of ambiguous dates of interaction that routinely problematize information on violent Islamists.

The network-based processes this analysis used to determine the extent of organizations' involvement in terror events and the Newman-based grouping method this analysis used to determine the boundaries of Islamist terror groups may also prove useful to scholars studying terrorism from a quantitative perspective. However, both of these methodologies require tremendous amounts of reliable data to produce meaningful outputs; any results obtained from their use should be interpreted with extreme caution if this precondition is not met. The

grouping method suffers from a second even more daunting limitation that plagues *all* efforts to assign terrorists to specific organizations: membership characterizations remain impossible to test, because even within the terror groups, few—if any—people actually know where the boundaries of these organizations lie. Consequently, while this study's Newman-based method for assigning group membership is far more rigorous and replicable than previous studies' highly subjective "this guy feels like an al-Qaida member" approach, evaluation methods that specifically address grouping tests among clandestine organizations constitute one especially rich area for future research in the broader methodological community.

9.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

Given the clandestine and amorphous nature of the violent Islamist movement, counterterrorism officials do not have the luxury of waiting for complete evidence before enacting policies to mitigate the threat of *jihadist* terrorism. Therefore, this analysis uses its tentative conclusions to inform policy recommendations aimed at enhancing the already well-designed National Strategy for Counterterrorism released by the Obama administration in June 2011. The subsections below discuss these recommendations as they apply to seven specific goals the strategy outlines in its overarching plan to disrupt, degrade, and dismantle the threat posed by Islamist terrorsim.[1130]

9.3.1 PROTECT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, HOMELAND, AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism brackets much of its discussion of protecting the homeland in terms of "hardening" the country. The document's discussion of the need to build a "culture of preparedness and resiliency" correctly stresses that the hardening process is as

[1130] Office of the President of the United States, "National Strategy for Counterterrorism," June 2011, p. 8; available online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf.

much about the nation's need to recognize that terrorism can never be completely eliminated as it is about building bunker-like infrastructure.[1131] However, the cases included in this analysis suggest that physical security measures are among the most effective uses of money and resources to mitigate the threat of Islamist terrorism.

For example, low-cost concrete walls and security bollards can virtually eliminate the threat that vehicle-based bombs pose to key buildings. In the 1998 embassy bombings, the Nairobi attack was effective because Hamden Awad (a.k.a. Ahmed the German) was able to drive the bomb-truck alongside the building before detonating, while the Dar es Salaam bomb was far less lethal because the Tanzanian security guards heroically stopped the vehicle at the gate at the expense of their own lives. Similarly, the 2003 Marriott bombing failed to destroy the hotel because the security guards' reactions cause Asmar Latin Sani to detonate his weapon before he was able to place the weapon alongside the building. These cases not only speak to the specific value of well-trained security personnel, but also to the more general conclusion that measures which keep vehicles even a short distance from key facilities greatly reduce the potential for casualties.

Moreover, a pair of additional examples speak to the specific value of barricades. The perpetrators of the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, failed to meet their desired goal of leveling the embassy because the bomb-vehicle was unable to pass through the building's fortified security gate. Similarly, the 2008 attack on the United States embassy in Sana'a, Yemen, failed to kill even a single American because a concrete barricade prevented the suicide-bombers from entering the compound. In short, public buildings can improve their security from terror by erecting inexpensive concrete walls and security bollards, which skilled architects should be able to unobtrusively incorporate into both new and old designs. Indeed,

[1131] Ibid.

government buildings have made far wider use of such barricades since the violent Islamist threat first rose to prominence in the late 1990s, but privately-owned structures have been slow to follow suit. Therefore, this study ultimately recommends that office towers, high-rise apartment buildings, prominent hotels, and other similar structures build the sort of security barricades that have become commonplace among federal buildings.

However, it would be foolish to suggest that this simple improvement provides flawless security. Security barricades are impractical for many buildings located in dense urban areas; for example, short of the impractical solution of closing the streets, it is difficult to imagine how to prevent large vehicles from pulling alongside many of the skyscrapers in downtown Manhattan or Chicago‘s Loop. Moreover, one reasonable explanation for Noordin‘s transition from large vehicle-bombs, such as those used in the 2003 Marriott attack and the 2004 Australian embassy attack, to smaller man-portable explosive devices, such as those used in the 2005 Bali bombings and the 2009 Marriott-Ritz bombings, is as a response to physical security measures that mitigated the lethality of car-bombings. Thus, not only are there areas where security barricades cannot be installed, but their construction may simply cause terrorists to adopt other means to attack the same targets.

To an extent, physical security improvements can be undertaken iteratively, in response to changes in terrorists‘ tactics. However, this strategy has clear limitations, because when taken to its logical extreme, physical security measures assume Orwellian dimensions, in which protection from terrorism takes precedence over freedom of movement. Therefore, unobtrusive measures, like security barricades to prevent car-bombings, should be as widely implemented among large privately-owned structures as they have among government buildings, but the most that the physical hardening of targets can hope to achieve is to mitigate terrorists‘ ability to

employ specific and especially dangerous tactics. Put differently, physical security measures can force terrorists toward less efficient means of attack, but can do little to reduce the overall likelihood of terrorism.

9.3.2 PREVENT TERRORIST DEVELOPMENT, ACQUISITION, AND USE OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

The importance of preventing terrorists from acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is difficult to overstate, because, as Allison noted in his assessment of nuclear terrorism, WMD offer the only means by which terrorism can become an existential threat to Western society.[1132] However, the cases included in this analysis suggest that efforts at securitization need to take a broader approach. Obvious solutions, such as monitoring the whereabouts of weapons scientists and securing global stockpiles of chemical and nuclear weapons, remain important, but because violent Islamists have made repeated attempts to transform mundane items into weapons that threaten hundreds of lives instead of hundreds of thousands, it is equally necessary to monitor everyday items that can be converted to lethal purpose.

Within the last 12 months, federal regulators have made some positive strides in this direction. In August 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced new reporting requirements for nitrogen-based fertilizers, which constituted the primary explosive component in Ramzi Yousef‘s 1993 World Trade Center bombing, several of Noordin Mohd Top‘s attacks in Southeast Asia, Omar Khyam‘s failed plot against London in 2004, and numerous improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan—to say nothing of ammonium-nitrates‘ use by terrorists motivated by ideologies other than Islamist extremism, such as Timothy McVeigh, who used a mixture of fuel oil and fertilizer to bomb the Murrah Federal

[1132] Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*, (New York: Times Books, 2004).

building in Oklahoma City in April 1995.[1133] The proposed regulations, which were still under review at the time of this writing, would require merchants to register fertilizer sales of 25 pounds or more, a threshold that regulators deemed meaningful because explosives experts claim that a bomb capable of leveling an average single-family home could be manufactured from just 25 pounds of fertilizer.[1134] Implementation of this reporting system represents an important step, but because terrorists will still be able to amass chemical stockpiles by either making several small purchases in lieu of a single large one, or by smuggling fertilizer into the United States from neighboring countries, this system will mitigate, not solve, the threat posed by nitrogen-based fertilizer.

Moreover, other household materials can be repurposed toward destructive intent. A host of attacks, including the London bombings of July 7, 2005; the failed attempt on the same city 14 days later; and Najibullah Zazi's plot against the New York City subway system in 2009, all demonstrate that hydrogen peroxide has also been a favorite base-chemical among Islamist bomb-makers. Although federal regulators have worked to secure concentrated variants of the chemical, which the food safety and agricultural industries use in a host of disinfecting applications, merchants are not currently required to report the sale of hydrogen peroxide in concentrations below 35 percent.[1135] There are small hints that the FBI has used provisions of

[1133] Andrew Seidman, "Homeland Security plans to regulate bomb fertilizer," *Los Angeles Times*, August 2, 2011; available online: http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/02/nation/la-na-ammonium-nitrate-20110803. See also, "Pakistan fertilizer fuels Afghan insurgents' bombs," *Associated Press*, September 2, 2011; available online from *The National* (UAE): http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/pakistani-fertiliser-fuels-afghan-insurgents-bombs.

[1134] Ibid. See also, Department of Homeland Security, "Ammonium Nitrate Security Program, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking," September 14, 2011; available online: http://www.dhs.gov/files/laws/gc_1288878991345.shtm.

[1135] Department of Homeland Security, "Appendix to Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards; Final Rule," *Federal Register*, November 20, 2007; available online: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_appendixafinalrule.pdf.

the Patriot Act to surreptitiously monitor retail purchases of hydrogen peroxide at lower concentrations,[1136] but the specifics of the operation—if one exists at all—remain unclear.

In lieu of clandestine programs, policy makers should consider implementing a transparent nation-wide system to monitor retail sales of hydrogen peroxide. Because the chemical has applications that stretch across a wide assortment of industries, ranging from horticulture to hair-dressing,[1137] the same sort of monitoring system DHS has designed to monitor fertilizer sales at comparatively specialized farm-supply retailers is likely unworkable. Given the diversity of hydrogen peroxide's uses, monitoring efforts must reference other systems which have been designed to monitor chemicals of concern that are sold in small quantities at a wide assortment of retail outlets.

Consequently, efforts to stop the production of methamphetamine may offer a useable model. The Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (CMEA) included several provisions to regulate the retail sale of pseudoephedrine and other chemicals that are commonly available in over-the-counter medications, but which "cooks" can also convert into methamphetamine using fairly simple chemical processes. On the customer's side of the equation, CMEA limits the amount of pseudoephedrine that anyone can purchase in a single day, as well as in any given month. Meanwhile, CMEA requires retailers to place products containing pseudoephedrine "out of direct customer access," to maintain detailed logbooks registering sales, and to validate customers' government-issued identification documents prior to

[1136] Josh Gerstein, "Mueller hints FBI used PATRIOT Act to track hydrogen peroxide purchases," *Politico*, February 17, 2011; available online: http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0211/Mueller_hints_FBI_used_PATRIOT_Act_to_track_hydrogen_peroxide_purchases.html.

[1137] American Chemical Council, "Fact Sheet: Q&A Regarding Hydrogen Peroxide," date unknown; available online: http://www.americanchemistry.com/ProductsTechnology/Hydrogen-Peroxide/QA-Regarding-Hydrogen-Peroxide.pdf.

completing any sale.[1138] In short, the law effectively balances consumers‘ legitimate need for pseudoephedrine-based products with the risks inherent to drug-production.

Given that consumers have similar legitimate needs for products containing large amounts of hydrogen peroxide, and given that both cold medication and hydrogen peroxide-based products are sold in retail outlets ranging from tiny neighborhood convenience stores to massive big-box stores, it seems exceptionally feasible for legislators to implement a CMEA-like law to address the threat posed by hydrogen peroxide. Moreover, as CMEA contains financial penalties for retailers who violate the legislation, the effort to monitor pseudoephedrine is largely self-financing.[1139] Thus, there is little reason to expect that a well-planned effort to monitor hydrogen peroxide would impose an additional burden on the already strained federal budget.

However, it is important to note that monitoring regimes are, by their very nature, imperfect. They make it more difficult, but not impossible, to obtain substances. Fortunately, the transparent nature of the systems offers an ancillary benefit: publicity. If people are aware that items are closely monitored, it is reasonable to assume that individuals will be dissuaded from attempting such products‘ illicit acquisition and will devote increasing attention to alternative materials, which may be more poorly suited to lethal purpose. In short, the publicity inherent to monitoring regimes will likely help force terrorists toward the difficult task of innovation.

In turn, the likelihood that monitoring regimes will cause *jihadists* to adopt new means of attacks speaks to two additional recommendations, both of which must involve industry as well

[1138] Office of Diversion Control, ―Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005 (Title VII of Public Law 109-177),‖ Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, July 10, 2007; available online: http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/meth/q_a.htm#7_procure.

[1139] Specifically, individual fines can range up to $250,000 and organizational fines can range up to $500,000. Attorney General of North Dakota, ―Retailer‘s Guide to State and Federal laws combating Methamphetamine,‖ April 26, 2007; available online: http://www.ag.state.nd.us/methwatch/methwatch2006/combatmethact.pdf.

as government. The first recommendation is to conduct a more proactive review of unrestricted commercial goods which terrorists could repurpose for use in attacks. Aspects of this review have already been conducted within the government,[1140] but many top chemists and engineers work in academia and industry, where the pay is typically higher. Including civilian researchers' input would significantly broaden the pool of expertise and would allow regulators to compile a more comprehensive list of things that *could* be used to conduct an attack, in lieu of the current list, which is more reactive and focuses primarily on items that have already been used. However, it also seems likely that including civilian researchers' input might help to winnow the monitoring lists by removing from consideration any substances that effectively serve as false positives and constitute incredibly improbable means of attack. Put most simply, subjecting monitoring lists to outside review would strengthen the monitoring process by adding rigor.

The second recommendation is to push for technical solutions that will confound terrorists' efforts toward repurposing commonly available chemicals. To an extent, this effort has also already begun. For example, in 2008, the manufacturer Honeywell International debuted a nitrogen-based fertilizer specially designed to remain inert even when mixed with fuel oil.[1141] The discussion of specific chemical processes is beyond the scope of this inquiry, but it hardly seems a stretch to suggest that American industry has the capacity to create similarly non-explosive alternatives to hydrogen peroxide and many other potentially lethal products. While encouraging such innovations should be a relatively simple affair because such products would likely generate a windfall of cash for patent-holders in safety conscious America, there are clear limits to the advances technical solutions can offer. It is, for example, difficult to envision the invention of an inert alternative to the gasoline Abdul Hakim Muhammad used in the Molotov

[1140] See, for example: "Appendix to Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards; Final Rule."
[1141] "Company creates hard-to-ignite fertilizer to foil bomb-makers," *Associated Press*, September 23, 2008; available online via the webcite archive: http://www.webcitation.org/5xGXduu1Y.

cocktail he hurled during his failed attempt to firebomb a rabbi's home in Nashville, Tennessee. Thus, all efforts to mitigate the threat of Islamist terrorism by securing dual-use goods are ultimately imperfect.

One other policy change that would mitigate terrorists' access to weapons within the United States is politically infeasible: gun control. The NRA Foundation vociferously defends unregulated gun ownership on second amendment grounds.[1142] Given that the organization ranks among the top-ten tax-exempt organizations (501c) in terms of political spending in the current election cycle—its total contributions are more than $340,000 and climbing[1143]—any efforts to change gun policy, even in the name of counterterrorism policy, are unlikely to meet with success. Indeed, attempts to resurrect the Federal Assault Weapons Ban (AWB), which prohibited the manufacture of some types of semi-automatic rifles for civilian use between 1994 and 2004, have *all* failed even to reach the floor of Congress for a vote.[1144] Efforts at gun control simply burn political capital that is better spent improving other aspects of counterterrorism policy.

Moreover, the efficacy of gun control measures remains problematic because they do a poor job of defining terms like "assault weapon" and cannot address the weapons-acquisition efforts of first-time terrorists with clean criminal records. For example, although Nidal Hasan

[1142] The NRA Foundation, "About," date unknown; available online: http://www.nrafoundation.org/about/.
[1143] Center for Responsive Politics, "2012 Outside Spending, by Groups," April 16, 2012; available online: http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=A. Note: given that the 2012 election cycle is ongoing, both the NRA's total expenditures and rank among 501c organizations may change.
[1144] See, for example: House Resolution 2038, Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement Protection Act of 2003, 2003; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.2038:. House Resolution 3831, To extend the sunset on the assault weapons ban for 10 years, 2004; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.3831:. House Resolution 5099, To reinstate the repealed criminal provisions relating to assault weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices, 2004; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:H.R.5099:. House Resolution 1312, Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement Protection Act of 2005, 2005; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:H.R.1312:. House Resolution 1022, Assault Weapons Ban and Law Enforcement Protection Act of 2007, 2007; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:H.R.1022:. House Resolution 6257, Assault Weapons Ban Reauthorization Act of 2008, 2008; available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:H.R.6257:.

made use of high-capacity magazines that would have been prohibited by the AWB during the Fort Hood shooting,[1145] the act would have done nothing to prohibit him from purchasing the gun used in the attack. As a fairly standard semi-automatic pistol, it would not have qualified as an assault weapon, and because Hasan had never been convicted of a felony—indeed, he was a serving officer in the United States Army at the time of the Fort Hood shooting—there would have been no grounds to preclude him from buying any legally-available gun he wanted.

Similarly, although gun control measures may reduce the total number of new weapons in production, these initiatives do little to stop terrorists who are willing to result to illicit means to obtain arms. For example, the Duka brothers and Abdul Hakim Muhammad respectively acquired weapons through straw purchases and the black market. Thus, it remains to be seen how anything short of an unrealistic and unwanted total ban on guns could have prevented the Fort Hood shooter, the Little Rock shooter, or the Fort Dix plotters' attempts to gain weapons. In combination with the political climate of the United States, these considerations preclude this analysis from recommending additional gun control measures as a viable means of reducing the risk Islamist terrorism poses to the United States.

9.3.3 ELIMINATE SAFEHAVENS

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is correct to prioritize efforts to eliminate physical sanctuaries which permit terrorists "to travel, train, and engage in plotting."[1146] Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that repeated first-person interactions are necessary to transmit the tacit knowledge needed to successfully replicate many tasks that are vital to terrorists, thereby making the physical spaces where such interactions occur among *jihadists'* most valuable

[1145] Specifically, the AWB prohibited the sale of any ammunition feeding devices which held more than 10 rounds. See: Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Sec. 110103 (Ban of Large Capacity Ammunition Feeding Devices), sub-paragraph b (Definition of Large Capacity Ammunition Feeding Device); available online: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c103:1:./temp/~c103SJ9kia:e644150:.

[1146] National Strategy for Counterterrorism, p. 9.

resources. Bomb-making provides the clearest example. Even after receiving some brief training abroad, Muktar Said Ibrahim and Najibullah Zazi, who respectively served as bomb-makers in the failed attack on London's mass transit system on July 21, 2005, and the disrupted plot against the New York City subway system in 2009, were unable to successfully follow written instructions regarding the manufacture of hydrogen peroxide-based explosives.[1147] Assuming that written instructions were the only training resource available, it seems likely that aspiring bomb-makers who lack the pair's experience in South Asia would fare even worse.[1148] The existence of Internet training resources demonstrate that it is at least theoretically possible for novice *jihadists* to acquire the information necessary to conduct an attack without visiting a

[1147] There are numerous examples that highlight the importance of tacit knowledge to the successful completion of technical undertakings like bomb-making. Gormley describes the difficulty non-state actors face in acquiring the tacit knowledge necessary to build weapons that are widely avaialbe even to impoverished militaries in his discussion of the difficulties faced by Bruce Simpson, a New Zealand-based engineer, when he attempt (and failed) to construct a cruise missile using commercially available components. Collins discusses the importance of tacit knowledge in the conduct of experiements in material sciences by highlighting the difficulties western researchers working in the late 1990s faced in replicating a test of the resonance characteristics of sapphire originally conducted by Soviet scientists 20 years earlier. Finally, Vogel discusses the importance of tacit knowledge to the field of biotechnology and argues that the threat of bioweapons may be exaggerated because the open dissemination of explicit knowledge of biotechnology does not, in and of itself, enable would-be proliferators to establish bioweapons programs, without the participation of an individual already steeped in the field's tacit expertise by virtue of participation in biotechnology's community of scientific practice. Dennis M. Gormley, *Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institue Press, 2008), pp. 85-89. See also, Dennis M. Gormley, "Silent Retreat: The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons," *The Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 14 No. 2 (July 2008), pp. 200-201; available online: http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo10/doc/Gormley_SilentRetreat.pdf. H.M. Collins, "Tacit Knowledge, Trust and the Q of Sapphire," *Social Studies of Science*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (February 2001), pp. 71-85. Kathleen M. Vogel, "Framing biosecurity: an alternative to the biotech revolution model?" *Science and Public Policy*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (February 2008), pp. 45-54. For additional examples of the importance of tacit knowledge and a more thorough review of the literature on tacit knowledge, see: Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, "Barriers to Bioweapons: Intangible Obstacles to Proliferation," *International Security*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Spring 2012), pp. 80-114.

[1148] Kenney draws similar conclusions in his assessment of organizational learning among violent Islamists in Britain and Spain. He is generally skeptical regarding the value terrorists derive from written instructions and other forms of explicit knowledge, because the dissemination of explicit knowledge via webpages and other technical means has not enabled violent extremists to acquire the practical knowledge necessary to conduct successful attacks. Indeed, Kenney takes the argument one step farther and criticizes the content of the hands-on training terrorists typically receive, because there are often profound gaps in the expertise students acquire during the process, as evidenced by the prevalence of "mistakes and poor tradecraft" (p. 5) among terrorists. Michael Kenney, "Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy," National Institute of Justice, May 2009; available online: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226808.pdf.

terrorist safehaven,[1149] but Ibrahim and Zazi's examples ultimately suggest that reducing the amount of physical space available to terrorists will effectively reduce the amount of knowledge at the disposal of future generations of violent Islamists.

Moreover, the national strategy identifies several of the regions on which counterterrorism initiatives must focus if they are to eliminate *jihadist* safehavens: South Asia, Central Asia, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, the Sahara, Indonesia, the Philippines, et al. Indeed, it very nearly seems that any developing country with a large Muslim population has substantial potential to serve as a safehaven for violent Islamists. Thus, it is somewhat unrealistic to expect that American counterterrorism initiatives can and should address the still imperfectly understood social, cultural, and economic conditions that cause states to become *jihadist* safehavens. Efforts to do so constitute nothing short of a call to remake at least one-third of the globe.

There are also tremendous problems with viewing terrorists' need for physical operating space at the regional or national levels, because the evidence suggests that terror training facilities require only a small, impermanent footprint. For example, although the content of the July 21 bombers' instruction was somewhat laughable, they prepared for *jihad* at a temporary "camp" established inside of a British national park. Similarly, Noordin conducted aspects of the 2005 Bali bombers' training in the cramped loft-space above a restaurant. The history of America's right-wing militias shows the privately-held lands in developed nations can also be

[1149] Indeed, Weimann suggests that terrorists' ability to post tactical information (much of which is admittedly dangerous) to the Internet is synonymous with online training. Specifically, he states that in addition to serving as a "tool for indoctrination and recruitment" the Internet can serve "as a location for virtual training camps" (p. 110). While his research into the content of terrorist webpages is incredibly detailed, he ultimately fails to examine how this online presence translates into the real world and does not, for example, show that large numbers of successful bombers learned their trade via online training classes. See, Gabriel Weimann, "Virtual Training Camps: Terrorists' Use of the Internet," in James J.F. Forest (ed.), *Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World*, (Oxford, UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), pp. 110-132.

used in preparation for violence against the state,[1150] and *jihadists* have shown periodic interest in purchasing land for similar purposes, as best demonstrated by the efforts that three ideological followers of Abu Hamza al-Masri made to establish a terrorist training center near Bly, Oregon, circa 1999.[1151] In short, even if it were practicable to eliminate the Muslim world's ungoverned regions, terrorists would continue to find physical operating space, because much as the balloon effect dictates that "successful" initiatives against narcotics production merely squeeze drug crops from large open fields into smaller hidden enclaves and neighboring countries,[1152] terror training will not disappear as traditional safehavens evaporate. Instead, terrorists will simply shift their instructional efforts to new, smaller locations.

Because terror groups face inherent costs and difficulties each time they are forced to move, eliminating established training bases remains a sound policy suggestion, despite its innate limitations. However, the largest security benefits can likely be obtained by combining this policy with one that focuses on removing the individuals who serve as the primary repositories of terrorist knowledge, namely trainers and bomb-makers.[1153] Indeed, the efficacy of Noordin's attack-network declined precipitously after the elimination of master bomb-maker Azahari bin

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[1150] See, for example: Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Project Megiddo," October 20, 1999, pp. 21-23; available online: http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps3578/www.fbi.gov/library/megiddo/megiddo.pdf. Kevin Johnson, "As Okla. City date nears, militias seen as gathering strength," *USA Today*, April 16, 2010; available online: http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-04-16-militia-movement-on-the-rise_N.htm.

[1151] USA v. Oussama Kassir (Defendant), United States District Court District of Southern New York, Complaint of FBI Agent Michael S. Butsch, May 5, 2004. "Terror suspects face possible abuse, court told," *Guardian Unlimited*, July 11, 2006; Don Van Natta, Jr., et al, "British seeking cleric's top aide in July 7 attack," *New York Times*, July 21, 2005.

[1152] See, for example, Frank O. Mora, "Victims of the Balloon Effect: Drug Trafficking in the U.S. Policy in Brazil and the Southern Cone of Latin America," *Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies,* Vol. 21 No. 2 (1996), pp. 115-122. For the application of the balloon effect to areas beyond narcotics production (e.g. money laundering), see: Phil Williams, "Warning Indicators, Terrorist Finances, and Terrorist Adaptation," *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 4 No. 1 (January 2005); available online: http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Jan/williamsJan05.html.

[1153] Jackson, et al, independently reached similar conclusions in their assessment of organizational learning among both Islamist and non-Islamist terror groups. Their policy recommendations included the suggestion that counterterrorism efforts should "identify and target terrorist groups' 'learning leadership.'" Brian A. Jackson, with John C. Baker, et al, *Aptitude for Destruction: Organiztaional Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: RAND, 2004), p. 52.

Husin, as demonstrated by the fact that the time-bomb the 2009 Marriott attackers hid on the hotel's upper floors failed to detonate. Similarly, it seems likely that al-Qaida's campaign of hydrogen peroxide-based bombings could have been entirely avoided if the enigmatic bomb-maker Abu Obaidah al-Masri had been killed prior to the 2005 July bombings. Thus, decapitation campaigns that focus on members of terror groups who hold specialized knowledge, rather than on titular heads of organizations, can maximize the damage to terror groups' capabilities by forcing *jihadists* to continually re-learn and re-invent the skills necessary to succeed in terrorism. In short, the capture and killing of highly skilled terrorists should take just as great a priority as the elimination of the spaces in which they train new recruits.

However, this recommendation is not a silver bullet, since much of the technical and military knowledge to succeed in terrorism can be diverted from legitimate sources. For example, Ali Mohamed, who conducted both training and surveillance on al-Qaida's behalf in preparation for the 1998 embassy bombings, learned his skills while serving as an officer in the Egyptian Army and later as an enlisted man in the United States Army. Similarly, Yazid Sufaat, a Malaysian member of JI who worked on al-Qaida's behalf in a failed bid to create chemical weapons,[1154] learned his technical skills at the California State University in Sacramento, from which he graduated with a degree in biochemistry in 1987.[1155] Given that future members of the Islamist movement are likely to enter it holding similar skills, the removal of terror groups' key intellectual nodes should be viewed as an ongoing and iterative process, but one that can never entirely purge the *jihadist* movement of the knowledge necessary to successfully conduct terrorist attacks.

[1154] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004), p. 151.

[1155] Maria Ressa, ~~–~~Reports: Al Qaeda operative sought anthrax," *CNN.com*, October 10, 2003; available online: http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/10/10/alqaeda.anthrax/.

9.3.4 DEGRADE LINKS BETWEEN AL-QAIDA AND ITS AFFILIATES AND ADHERENTS

The recommendations that the National Strategy for Counterterrorism makes in regards to severing links between al-Qaida and the rest of the Islamist terror movement constitute the weakest portion of the report's generally strong policy plan. Analytic error lies at the root of the problem. Because the document neglects to realize that a host of different relationships types may (or may not) connect bin Laden's organization to regional Islamist terror groups, the strategy inevitably discusses these relationships in exaggerative terms, stressing that "Al-Qa'ida senior leaders in Pakistan continue to leverage local and regional affiliates and adherents worldwide through formal and informal alliances to advance their global agenda."[1156]

This overly al-Qaida-centric view of the violent Islamist threat has worrying policy implications. Placing al-Qaida at the movement's rhetorical center fails to adequately recognize that the independent organizations typically referenced as al-Qaida affiliates are dangers in their own right. Indeed, the evidence suggests that there is little reason to suspect that AQIM or AQAP, two of al-Qaida's best known regional affiliates, receive any meaningful support from bin Laden's organization, and since historical training ties constitute AQIM and AQAP's primary non-ideological connection to al-Qaida, it seems that the relationship between these groups becomes more distant each time a counterterrorism strikes removes a former al-Qaida member or former al-Qaida trainee. Therefore, continual targeting of the organization bin Laden founded will do little, if anything, to mitigate these regional groups' access to the resources necessary to conduct terrorism. Simply put, the threat regional terror groups pose to the United States is determined more by their financial and logistical capacity than by the extent of their connection to al-Qaida.

[1156] National Strategy for Counterterrorism, p. 9.

If the threat of Islamist terrorism is, as this study's conclusions strongly suggest, a multi-polar phenomenon, then counterterrorism strategy must evolve beyond its almost single-minded focus on al-Qaida. Part of this necessary adjustment is rhetorical in nature. When scholars and government officials use terms like "al-Qaida linked" and "al-Qaida inspired" haphazardly, they often attribute bin Laden's organization with ownership over people and events with which it has had little to no actual involvement. The term "al-Qaida affiliate" is also often misleading, as the evidence suggests that the extent of regional terror groups' functional involvement with al-Qaida is often miniscule, despite these groups' decision to name themselves in reference to bin Laden's organization. It seems clear that a shift toward more neutral vocabulary is necessary. Terms like "Islamist-motivated" need to be used in lieu of the largely inaccurate references to bin Laden's organization, but if analysts insist on continuing to describe people, groups, and events as "al-Qaida linked," then an explicit and detailed discussion of the nature and depth of the relationship must accompany such references—a task that can be accomplished using the multi-relational ontology outlined in this study.

Concerns over the language currently used to describe the violent Islamist threat are more than pedantic objections. Making continual reference to al-Qaida in descriptions of the *jihadist* movement supports and advances the narrative violent Islamists want the world to believe, namely that they are part of a single unified front with vast resources, rather than members of distinct organizations whose ability to target the West is frequently constrained by their local access to weapons, personnel, and money. In other words, analysts propagandize on al-Qaida's behalf when then describe unrelated portions of the violent Islamist movement as "linked" to bin Laden's organization. Moreover, this worryingly common practice confuses the security picture,

by making it seem that a diverse threat can be stopped by eliminating a single, now largely defunct, organization based in South Asia.

Therefore, a concomitant shift in counterterrorism strategy must accompany changes to the language used to describe the violent Islamist threat. Policy makers need to explicitly recognize that defeating al-Qaida is *not* synonymous with eliminating the threat posed by *jihadists*. Many of the same strategies that have proven effective against al-Qaida, including decapitation strategies that focus on key nodes within the organization and efforts to eliminate the means the organization has historically used to access key resources, should now be applied to other terror groups. However, the types of costly and potentially counterproductive ground wars the United States implemented to combat al-Qaida must be avoided, as the nation has neither the will nor the resources to enter into another decade of large-scale armed conflict.

Thus, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism is correct to suggest that a ―whole-of government" approach is the most appropriate means to combat the threat posed by Isalmist terrorism,[1157] but it is important to explicitly stress that the military's role in counterterrorism should be limited. Given its experience in lethal operations such as drone attacks and Special Forces raids, the Armed Forces should take the lead in eliminating the small number of established violent terrorists who can only be dealt with using kinetic means. Intelligence, law enforcement, and the courts must play the dominant roles in the far-larger analytic and prosecutorial aspects of counterterrorism, as continuing to use the military as the primary means to deal with the terrorist threat falsely elevates the violent Islamist threat to the status of a peer competitor to the United States and detracts from the military's ability to secure the nation against traditional state-based threats, which other portions of the government lack the means

[1157] National Strategy for Counterterrorism, p. 7.

and ability to combat.[1158] However, as the next two sections discuss in greater detail, cooperative multi-national approaches are also vital to counterterrorism.

9.3.5 COUNTER AL-QAIDA IDEOLOGY AND ITS RESONANCE AND DIMINISH SPECIFIC DRIVERS OF VIOLENCE THAT AL-QAIDA EXPLOITS

The National Strategy for Counterterrorism couches its discourse on counter-radicalization in terms of social, economic, and political development. The crux of the strategy's argument is that by advancing universal human rights (as subjectively defined by the West), applying focused economic aid, and expanding individual political rights through the advancement of democracy, the United States will be able to alleviate the broad factors which underlie the appeal of radicalism.[1159] Such sentiments are popular with policy makers at the highest levels of both political parties; for example, in 2002, George W. Bush argued that "We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror,"[1160] and while campaigning in 2007, Barak Obama vowed to "roll back the tide of hopelessness that gives rise to hate," by making "poverty reduction a key part of helping other nations reduce anarchy."[1161] However, the empirical evidence supporting such propositions is shaky.

[1158] The suggestion that the military's role in counterterrorism should be smaller than those played by other portions of government has been widely voiced. For a small, non-representative sample of the relevant citations, see: Paul B. Stares and Mona Yacoubian, "Unconventional Approaches to and Unconventional Threat: A Counter-Epidemic Strategy," in *Mapping the Jihadist Threat: The War on Terror Since 9/11*, a publication by the Aspen Institute, (June 2006); article available online: http://www.usip.org/files/stares_yacoubian_threat.pdf; Geraint Hughes, *The Military's Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies*, The Letort Papers, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011); available online: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1066.pdf. Bruno S. Frey, *Dealing With Terrorism: Stick or Carrot?* (Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar, 2004).

[1159] National Strategy for Counterterrorism, pp. 5-6 ("Adhering to U.S. Core Values"), 9-10.

[1160] George W. Bush, "Speech before the United Nations Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico," (March 22, 2002); available online: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/march02/bush_3-22.html. The Bush Administration also repeated these sentiments again in the 2002 National Security Strategy, which is available online: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. See, especially, pages 17-23.

[1161] Barak Hussein Obama, "Remarks of Senator Obama: The War We Need to Win," A Speech Before the Wilson Center (August 1, 2007); available online: http://www.barackobama.com/2007/08/01/the_war_we_need_to_win.php.

Admittedly, a host of academics support the viewpoint espoused by Presidents Bush and Obama. For example, following the 9/11 attacks, Richard Sokolosky and Joseph McMillian, both of the National Defense University, wrote an op-ed for the New York Times, which stated that US could improve national security by providing the Islamic world with "the kind of foreign aid that helps strengthen civil society, provides food and development help, and finances programs for education and health."[1162] Similarly, in 2003, Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, both of the RAND Corporation, concluded that social and economic development can reduce terrorist recruitment and shrink the size of terrorists' support networks, especially when development initiatives are designed in consultation with community members, so that programs can meet local needs, and these programs are implemented impartially, to prevent dominant socio-cultural groups from advancing themselves at the expense of the politically weak.[1163] Since that time, this viewpoint has become popular; in 2004 Joseph Nye, the Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, called on the U.S. to use soft power (i.e. non-military aspects of national power) to mitigate support for terrorism by providing masses of disenfranchised Muslims with "such things as jobs, education, health care and dignity as they practice their faith,"[1164] and in 2006 Paul B. Stares and Mona Yacobian, both of the U.S. Institute of Peace, argued for social and economic reforms designed to create jobs that will "help to ease popular disaffection, particularly among the (Middle East) region's disproportionately young population."[1165]

Yet, a number of the terrorists featured in this analysis came from comfortable backgrounds and were well-educated. Most famously, Usama bin Laden was a member of one

[1162] Richard Sokolsky and Joseph McMillian, "Foreign Aid in Our Own Defense," *New York Times* (February 12, 2002); available online: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CEFDC113CF931A25751C0A9649C8B63.
[1163] Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, *Terrorism and Development,* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003).
[1164] Joseph S. Nye, Jr, "A Dollop of Decent American Values; Why 'Soft Power' Matters in Fighting Terrorism," *Washington Post* (March 30, 2004), p. A19.
[1165] Stares and Yacoubian.

of the wealthiest families in Saudi Arabia. It is similarly well-known that Ayman al-Zawahiri hails from a prominent Egyptian family and holds a medical degree. Moreover, Azahari bin Husin earned a PhD in housing policy, taught classes at Malaysia Technical University, and wrote text books on statistical method, while Yazid Sufaat was a biochemist.

Critics may assert that these individuals are among a small handful of exceptions that prove the broader rule, but a number of statistically-minded researchers conducted broader inquiries that concluded that a nexus between the lack of development and terrorism does *not* exist.[1166] There are construct validity problems with many of the variables included in these analyses,[1167] but their conclusions still serve to highlight that the true relationships between development and terrorism is unknown. It seems likely that the long-term results of the ongoing Arab Spring are likely to resolve this debate, but since the democratic reforms stemming from this movement are still in their infancy, it would be absurd to draw any conclusions, positively or negatively, regarding their impact to the region's stability or its citizens' propensity to participate in the violent Islamist movement.

Moreover, religion also holds a special appeal for many people that secular considerations are unlikely to replace. Indeed, true *Salafists* argue that democracy is an affront to their religion, because it attempts to replace god's perfect law, namely *Sharia*, with man's self-serving innovations.[1168] Thus, there is a substantial likelihood that, at least in the short term, efforts to replicate Western political systems in the Islamic world will exacerbate the likelihood

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[1166] Examples include: Alan B. Krueger, *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pp. 23-52; Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malecova, "Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 119-144; and Alberto Abadie, "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 50-56.

[1167] Luke M. Gerdes, "Constructing Terror: How Issues of Construct Validity Undermine the Utility of Terror Databases and Statistical Analyses of Terrorism," *Paper Presented to the 50th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, NY*, February 2009.

[1168] Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).

that those on edge of violent extremism will trend toward violent organizations because, somewhat paradoxically, efforts at democratization alienate such fence-sitters from the political discourse.

Given that a global pro-development, pro-democracy agenda is one of the few issues on which the two major political parties are in complete agreement, it is a foregone conclusion that American will continue to attempt to advance western economic and political systems in the Islamic world. However, this effort cannot take place in a cultural vacuum that ignores local religious and cultural traditions. Aside from the rather obvious recommendation that foreign leaders must play significant roles in efforts to design political structures that are well-adapted to individual countries' circumstances,[1169] the United States must find ways to partner with individuals whose religious views explicitly eschew violence, but nonetheless remain inherently appealing to individuals on the fringes of radical Islam.[1170]

A number of *Salafist* preachers fit this bill. They agree with violent Sunni Islamists' stated desire to create an Islamic caliphate where they can live in strict emulation of the Prophet Mohammed, but also argue that it is illegitimate to use violence in this pursuit, except under very specific conditions that do *not* include the killing of civilians or the targeting of governments that preside over Muslim-majority countries.[1171] Thus, the U.S. would be well-advised to give voice to these non-violent *Salafis*, as their message is far more likely to resonate with those currently

[1169] This line of reasoning pre-dates the emergence of the Islamist threat. See, for example, Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is—and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy*, No. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 75-88.
[1170] Robert Lambert's research into violent Islam in London independently reached similar conclusions. Specifically, he argues in favor of partnerships "with Muslim groups conventionally deemped to be subversive to democracy" on the logic that non-violent Islamists are in the best position to understand and discredit the ideological arguments of violent Islamists. Robert Lambert, "Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London Counterterrorism Case Study," *Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (January 2008), pp. 31-35.
[1171] For discussion of the factors which distinguish non-violent *Salafis* from their more blood-thirsty brethren, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 29 (2006), pp. 207-238. See also, International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix," ICG Asia Report No. 83, September 13, 2004; available online: http://www.seasite.niu.edu/indonesian/islam/83_indonesia_backgrounder_why_salafism_and_terrorism_don_t_mix_web.pdf.

considering *jihad* than is secular democracy. After all, the ideological distance between violent *Salafism* and non-violent *Salafism* is far shorter than the distance between violent *Salafism* and the norms of Western political discourse.

But as with most things, the devil of this recommendation lies in the details. Because *jihadist* fence-sitters typically hold stridently anti-American views, the United States cannot play an overt role in the support of non-violent *Salafi* ideologues, lest these preachers' religious authority become tainted via affiliation with a country prospective Islamists see as their mortal enemy. Indirect, even clandestine, avenues of support must be adopted, and America's Muslim partner-nations may ultimately be better positioned to exert this type of influence.

9.3.6 BUILD ENDURING COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIPS AND CAPABILITIES

The ideological considerations discussed in the previous section and the multi-polar nature of Islamist terrorism both dictate that the United States must work cooperatively with a wide assortment of nations in order to effectively combat the terrorist threat. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism explicitly recognizes this need, stating that "Foreign partners are essential to the success of our CT efforts."[1172] However, the policy document glosses over the difficult topic of foreign partners' widely divergent capabilities and speaks only of vague needs to expand governance and strengthen the rule of law.[1173]

This characterization greatly understates the degree of difficulty associated with these recommendations. Many of the nations in the best position to confront Islamist terror groups lie in the developing world. Owing to their poverty, these nations' militaries, intelligence services, and law enforcement communities are typically underpaid, under-staffed, under-equipped, and

[1172] National Strategy for Counterterrorism, p. 9.
[1173] Ibid.

under-trained. Systemic corruption frequently results and subsequently undermines a host of policy initiatives, including counterterrorism.

The Nairobi police's dealings with Khalid al-Fawwaz, the al-Qaida member who played a key role in the organizations' logistical efforts in East Africa in the early 1990s, offer an archetypical example of the difficulties inherent to partnering with corrupt organizations. Al-Fawwaz and a compatriot were arrested on vague charges in 1994, and then released a few days later, after an attorney paid a bribe equivalent to several thousand dollars to the police. Had the police been as concerned with investigating their detainees as they were with lining their pockets, they might have uncovered al-Qaida's activities in East Africa years prior to the 1998 embassy bombings.

Yet, countries like Kenya cannot be abandoned in the fight against terrorism. Indeed, Kenya's large Muslim population and proximity to Somalia make it a key counterterrorism ally, but until the country's corruption problems are resolved, the efficacy of Kenyan law enforcement is subject to question, as amply demonstrated by the fact that Kenyan cops briefly held the notorious Comorian terrorist Fazul Abdullah Mohammed in custody ahead of the 2002 Mombasa attacks, only to lose him in a bizarre escape. Given that Kenya is by no means unique in its level of corruption, there are substantial practical limitations to the vague efforts at global capacity building outlined by the National Strategy for Counterterrorism.

The United States simply lacks the resources necessary to build counterterrorism capabilities across the whole of the developing world, especially given the current economic climate. It is valid to suggest that counterterrorism could be improved by providing training assistance and limited amounts of equipment to foreign police, intelligence services, and militaries, but given that global partnerships are necessary to manage the threat posed by Islamist

terrorism, it would be unrealistic for the United States to expect to achieve true capacity building by acting in isolation. Therefore, efforts to build counterterrorism coalitions must be two-tiered. The United States must convince other wealthy, fully-developed nations to work not only as direct partners in counterterrorism, but also as partners in the provision of training and material support to the less-capable developing nations that play such a vital role in combating terrorism. The scale of the challenge is so great that efforts to elicit support from the developed world need to look beyond America's most obvious partners, such as Britain, Australia, and Canada, and must include secondary powers, such as the Scandinavian countries. In other words, it will take a fairly broad financial coalition to build a truly inclusive counterterrorism coalition.

9.3.7 DEPRIVE TERRORISTS OF THEIR ENABLING MEANS

As it does in regards other aspects of the violent Islamist threat, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism offers sound, but ultimately incomplete, strategies to combat terrorist finance. Specifically, the strategy emphasizes that *jihadists* receive funding from donations collected primarily in the Gulf region, the exploitation of local economies, and kidnapping for ransom.[1174] All of these elements are vital, but the evidence strongly suggests that terrorists will continue to have the ability to finance attacks even if all of these major funding sources are eliminated.

The first mitigating factor is the low cost of most terror attacks. Although the 9/11 attacks cost somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000, the upper estimate for the cost of the July 7, 2005, London bombings was $8,500. Zazi's 2009 attempt on the New York City subway likely cost no more than a few thousand dollars; the 2009 Little Rock shootings were financed on a shoe-string budget using only the wages earned from a low-paying job with a tour-bus company, and even the massive 2002 Bali bombings were less than $25,000. It will remain impossible to stop terrorists from saving or otherwise acquiring the fairly small sums of money

[1174] National Strategy for Counterterrorism, p. 10.

necessary to conduct the type of attacks which have become commonplace in the decade since 9/11, particularly if the attackers plan to use suicide-tactics. After all, those who plan to die as _martyrs' have no reason to avoid ruining their credit and bankrupting themselves in order to conduct an operation.

Moreover, small-scale crimes play an under-recognized role in the finance of terrorism. Although the cases discussed in this analysis were not selected with crime in mind, revenue generated by illegal means other than kidnapping featured prominently across the categories of the Baleian typology, suggesting that criminal finance is an incredibly common feature of the contemporary *jihadist* threat. Fazul's participation in robbery and credit card fraud to support the 2002 Mombasa attacks and Siddique Khan's fraudulent obtainment of bank loans to finance the July 7, 2005, London bombings demonstrate that events strongly tied to al-Qaida have benefitted from criminal finance, regardless of if the events occurred inside or outside of the West. Similarly, Noordin's accomplices in Indonesia robbed banks and stores to support operations including the 2002 Bali bombings, the 2004 Australian embassy bombing, and the 2005 Bali bombings. Clearly, the proceeds of crime also supported events weakly tied to al-Qaida. AQIM's exploits in smuggling show that the same conclusion applies to former members of bin Laden's organization, and although all of the individuals this analysis discussed in relation to al-Qaida-inspired attacks financed their attacks using personal savings, it is fairly easy to find other examples which demonstrate that *jihadists* who lack functional ties to established terror groups also frequently self-finance through crime. For example, in 2005, police in California captured a small group of extremists who followed the teachings of Kevin James, an inmate at California's Folsom prison who invented his own Islamist theology,[1175] after they robbed several

[1175] Strictly speaking, James and his followers were not inspired by al-Qaida. James produced a theological manifesto based on his own interpretation of the Koran and Islamic scholarship. Bin Laden's name does not appear

gas stations in-and-around Los Angeles to generate funds for attacks they were planning against military and Jewish targets in southern California.[1176] In short, there is strong evidence demonstrating that terrorist finance is intimately tied to moderately-organized crime.

Given that police already make tremendous efforts to eliminate crime for its own sake, there is little sense in making the bland recommendation to increase anti-crime initiatives in the name of counterterrorism, especially considering the limitations imposed by the current budgetary climate. Thus, efforts to mitigate terrorists' access to criminally-generated funds must be about doing more with currently available resources. The most realistic solution is ultimately a simple one: increase awareness at all levels of American and international law-enforcement regarding the nexus between terrorism and criminal-finance. If police officers the world over know that some suspects who appear to be petty criminals are actually terrorists who committed their crime in an effort to generate funding for an attack, then investigators are more likely to pursue lines of inquiry that may head-off prospective attacks early in their development.[1177]

However, the utility of this recommendation is still likely limited, because even police who are fully aware of links between crime and terrorism must first catch those responsible for the crimes for this knowledge to be of any use—an especially difficult challenge considering that

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in this document, though it is worth noting that James heavily sites Ibn Tamiyyah, a 12th century theorist who also appears frequently in al-Qaida's theological pronouncements. Ultimately, James and al-Qaida independently arrived at similar conclusions after reviewing overlapping sources. For the specifics of James's beliefs, see: Kevin James, The JIS Protocol, 1997 (revised 2002); available online: http://nefafoundation.org/file/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_James_JISManifesto.pdf.

[1176] "Second man involved in domestic terrorism plot targeting military, Jewish facilities sentenced to prison," U.S. Department of Justice, Press Release, July 21, 2008; USA v. Kevin James, et al (Defendants), United States District Court Central District of California, Grand Jury Indictment, October 2007.

[1177] Hamm's research, which considered patterns of criminal involvement among terrorists subscribing to a host of religious and political ideologies, reached similar conclusions. Specifically, he argued that "the most successful method of both detecting and prosecuting cases of terrorism is through the pursuit of conventional criminal investigations. . . . the best practices of investigators should be directed to crimes that facilitate the operation of complex organizations . . . . (because) all terrorist organizations require money, material, trainsportation, identity documents, communication systems, and safe havens to accomplish their aims." Mark S. Hamm, "Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research and Prevention," Final Report Submitted to the National Institute of Justice, Washington, D.C, September 2005; available online: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211203.pdf.

only a tiny share of the billions of small crimes committed around the world each year will be linked to terror. In short, *jihadists*' increasing involvement in crime dictates that the finance of terrorism is a fairly intractable problem.

9.4 THE LIMITS OF COUNTERTERRORISM

Although the recommendations offered by this analysis touch on several diverse domains, they are share a common trait: all of them can mitigate, rather than solve, the threat of Islamist terrorism. Indeed, perfect solutions to the problem of terrorism do not exist, especially not in open societies that prize freedom of movement, freedom of speech, and other personal liberties that extremists can pervert to advance their illegitimate ends. Therefore, this analysis closes by echoing a conclusion reached by virtually every serious inquiry into terrorism, namely that some level of non-state violence against civilians is unavoidable. Americans must recognize that although Islamist terrorism can be greatly curtailed, it can never be entirely defeated.

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APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE

Note: This questionnaire was administered to Richard Barnes, the Deputy Mayor of London and the former deputy chairman of London's Metropolitan Police Authority, on the subject of the July 2005 London Bombings.

1. Prior to 2005, what threats did the city construe as the primary dangers to London in terms of security?

2. Has this perception changed since 2005?

3. Where did terrorism rank among these threats prior to 2005?

4. Do you believe that the ranking of terrorism among security threats to London has changed since 2005? How?

5. Prior to 2005, what, if any, specific terror groups or ideologies were of greatest concern to the city of London?

6. How much information on Islamist groups did law enforcement or intelligence communicate to the city of London government prior to the 2005 attacks?

7. The next section deals with some of your individual beliefs about terrorism. Prior to the 2005 attacks, how did you personally perceive the threat that terrorism posed to London?

8. Prior to 2005, what were your personal views about the relative dangers posed by the threats the City of London faced?

9. What organizations, if any, do you think bear responsibility for the actions of the 2005 bombers? Why?

10. The report that you chaired focuses quite a bit on communications technology in the response to disaster. Can you comment on the status of the updates you recommended?

11. Specifically, can you discuss the –Connect Project"?

12. The report that you chaired did not discuss much about preventive measures, and how they could mitigate the potential impact of attacks. Are there any improvements to physical security for mass transit, public buildings, land marks, etc. that you would recommend be implemented in the name of anti-terrorism?

13. How effective is London's CCTV network at preventing attacks?

14. How effective is CCTV for determining responsibility for attacks after the fact, as an investigative tool?

15. Where do you strike the balance between security and privacy?

16. Do you think that there are any other lessons that my questions haven't touched on, that you believe should be learned from 7/7?

APPENDIX B: AGENTS AND ALIASES

A Note on Interpretation: The lack of clear naming conventions for those involved with violent Islamism makes it impossible to list the individuals included in the dataset alphabetically. Several individuals are more widely known by their alias than their real name; the Indonesian extremist Hambali, whose given name is Nurjaman Riduan bin Isamuddin, offers one example. Those searching for him under the letter ―H" would have a great difficulty finding him if he were listed under his given name, and vice versa. Conversely, other individuals are known to Western observers by their given name, rather than an alias, which may be more popular among the subject's Islamist peers. There are also individuals who are widely referenced by multiple aliases; for example, some analysts prefer to reference Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, the Comorian extremist who played a key role in the 1998 embassy bombings and the 2002 Mombassa attacks, as ―Fazul," while others prefer ―Harun" or ―Harun Fazul." In other cases, an individual's given name is entirely unknown, as is the case with the Egyptian bomb-maker Abu Obaidah al-Masri, the man who trained several individuals involved in attacks on London in the mid-2000s.

Aliases are also difficult because there are few rules regarding their assignment. Some names resonate with Islamist extremists because of their prominence in the history of the Muslim religion; consequently, a number of individuals adopt the name in an effort to demonstrate their piety. Moreover, Muslim parents often adopt a new pseudonym with the birth of their first child. ―Abu," meaning ―father of," and ―Um," meaning ―mother of" are often prefixed to the name of the child in order to create a non-distinct, culturally derived nickname. Given the commonality of the name ―Mohammed," one shudders to think how many Muslim men have adopted ―Abu Mohammed" as a pseudonym. However, at other times, an ―Abu name" is adopted as an alias in its own right, without reference to the parenting of a child. In concert, these factors dictate cautious interpretation of the data; several different individuals may use the same alias. Context is incredibly important in determining whether or not two people with the same name are actually distinct agents.

Adding yet another level of complexity to the seemingly simple task of alphabetizing names is the problem of transliteration. There are no hard-and-fast rules about how to spell Arabic-language names in English. Although the name ―Mohammed" has a single spelling in the original Arabic (محمد), the name can also come into English as ―Muhammad" or ―Mohamed." Other letters, such as *jeem* (ج), come into English quite differently depending on the translator's regional accent. Egyptians pronounce *jeem* as a ―G," while speakers hailing form the Levant

typically pronounce the same letter as ―J.‖ Since most transliterations are based on the translator‘s attempt to use the Roman alphabet to emulate the sound of the word in the original language, the translator‘s accent ultimately determines spelling.

In combination with the extensive practice of aliasing and the ambiguity inherent to data on the subject of terrorism, these factors dictate that the choice and spelling of the primary name used to reference individuals in the data is somewhat arbitrary. They are provided in this appendix to make the data ―human readable,‖ and in lieu of an impossible alphabetical listing, the individuals listed below are ordered according to their unique identification number. Gaps in the sequencing of identification numbers are meaningless, as the numbers merely provide a unique identifier on which to reconcile the various names used to reference agents. Those searching for specific individuals are advised to conduct a ―control f‖ search on the desired term. It may also be necessary to conduct searches on alternate spellings, and it is worth mentioning that ―control f‖ searches process hyphenated and un-hyphenated terms differently.

Finally, space limitations preclude a recounting of the thousands of sources used to reconcile names and aliases. As the list of aliases was generated by deductive observation of the sources listed in Appendix H, which lists the interactions associated with each individual in the data, a reasonable approximation of the sourcing underlying the alias list can be derived from that appendix.

Table 10.1 Listing of Agents and Aliases

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00001	FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED	FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMED | ABDALLA FAZUL | ABDALLAH FAZUL | ABDALLAH MOHAMMED FAZUL | ABU AISHA | ABU LUQMAN | ABU SEIF AL SUDANI | FADEL ABDALLAH MOHAMMED ALI | FADHIL HAROUN | FADIL ABDALLAH MUHAMAD | FAZHL ABDULLAH | FAZHL KHAN | FAZUL ABDALLA | FAZUL ABDILAHI MOHAMMED | FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMED | FAZUL ADBALLAH | FAZUL MOHAMMED | FOUAD MOHAMMED | HAROON | HAROON FAZUL | HARUN | HARUN | HARUN FAZHL | HARUN FAZUL | HARU AL QAMAR | HARUN AL KAMARI | ABDUL KARIM
Ag00005	ADEL ABDEL BARY	ABBAS | ABDEL BARY | ABU DIA | ADEL | ADEL MOHAMMED ABDUL ALMAGID ABDEL BARY | ADEL ABDEL BARRY | ADEL ABDEL AL BARI
Ag00006	ABDULLAH AHMED ABDULLAH	ABU MARIAM | ABU MOHAMED AL-MASRI | SALEH | ABU MOHAMMED EL MASRY | ABDULLAH AHMED ABDULLAH EL ALFI
Ag00009	ABU UBAIDAH AL BANSHIRI	ALI AL-RASHIDI | AADIL HABIB | JALAL | ADEL HABIB | SHEIK ABU BANSHIRI | KARIM | ADEL HADIB | ABU UBAYDA
Ag00013	AHMED KHALFAN GHAILANI	"AHMED THE TANZANIAN" | "FOOPIE" | "FUPI" | ABU BAKR | ABU BAKR AHMAD | ABU KHABAR | ABUBAKAR AHMED | ABUBAKAR K. AHMED | ABUBAKAR KHALFAN AHMED | ABUBAKARY K. AHMED | ABUBAKARY KHALFAN AHMED GHAILANI | ABUBAKARY KHALFAN AHMED GHAILANI | AHMAD AL TANZANI | AHMAD KHALAFAN GHILANI | AHMED GHAILANI | AHMED KHALFAN | AHMED KHALFAN AHMED | AHMED KHALFAN ALI | AHMED, A. | FUPI | MAHAFUDH ABUBAKAR AHMED ABDALLAH HUSSEIN | SHARIFF OMAR MOHAMMED | HAYTHAM AL-KINI

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00014	AHMED MOHAMED HAMED ALI	ABU FATIMA | ABU ISLAM | ABU ISLAM AL SURIR | ABU ISLAM AL-SURIR | ABU KHADIIJAH | AHMAD AL-MASRI | AHMED AHMED | AHMED HAMED | AHMED HEMED | AHMED MOHAMMED ABDUREHMAN | AHMED MOHAMMED ALI | AHMED SHIEB | AHMED THE EGYPTIAN | AHMED THE EGYPTIAN | HAMED ALI | SHUAIB | SHUAIB | SHUAIT | ABU ISALM MASRY | ABU ISALM MASRY THE YOUNGER | ABU ISLAM SALIN AL SURIR | AHMED AL SAGHIR | AHMED MOHAMMED HAMED ALI
Ag00015	RIFA'I AHMAD TAHA MUSA	ABD-AL-HAI AHMAD ABD-AL-WAHAB | 'ABD-AL-'IZ | ABU YASIR | AHMED REFAI TAHA | 'ISSAM 'ALI MUHAMMAD 'ABD ALLAH | RIFA'I AHMAD TAHA MUSA | SALAH 'ALI AL-KAMEL | THABIT 'IZ | RIFAI AHMED TAHA
Ag00016	HAMDEN KHALIF ALLAH AWAD	AHMED THE GERMAN | AHMED ABDALLAH | HAMDAN KHALIF ALAL | HAMDEN KHALIF AL AWAD
Ag00019	ZAKARIA	
Ag00023	ANAS AL LIBY	ANAS AL SEBAI | NAZIH AL RAGHIE | ANAS AL-LIBY | ANAS AL-LIBI | NAZIH AL-RAGHIE | NAZIH ABDUL HAMED AL-RAGHIE | ANAS AL-SABAI
Ag00024	OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN AL OMAIRAH	
Ag00025	IBRAHIM MOHAMMED KHALIL	
Ag00026	MUHSIN AL-FADHLI	
Ag00027	MUHAMMAD AL-HAMATI	MUHSIN FADHIL `AYYID AL FADHLI | MUHSIN FADIL AYID ASHUR AL FADHLI | ABU SAMIA
Ag00028	ABD AL-AZIZ AL-MASRI	ALI SAYYID MUHAMED MUSTAFA AL-BAKRI
Ag00030	AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI	DR. ABDEL MOEZ AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI | ABDEL MOEZ | ABDEL MUAZ | ABU MOHAMMED | ABU MOHAMMED NUR AL-DEEN | DR. ABDEL MOEZ | DR. ABDEL OMEZ | DR. AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI | NUR | THE DOCTOR | USTAZ | DR. AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI | AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI | AHMAD FUAD SALIM | AIMAN MUHAMMAD RABI AL-ZAWAHIRI | ABU MUAZ EL MASRY | AIMAN MUHAMMED RABI AL-ZAWAHIRI
Ag00031	JIHAD MOHAMMED ABDOU ALI	ABU OBAIDA | AZZAM | AZZAM | JIHAD ALI | JIHAD MOHAMMAD ALI AL MAKKI | JIHAD MUHAMMED AL HARAZI | JIHAD MUHAMMAD ABU ALI
Ag00032	NUR AL-DIN AL-DIBISKI	SALEM NOR ELDIN AMOHAMED AL-DABSKI | SALIM NUR AL-DIN AL-DABSKI | SALIM NUR AL-DIN AL-DABASKI | ABDALLAH RAJAB | ABDULLAH RAGAB | ABU AL-WARD | `ABD AL-WARD | ABU AL-WURUD | ABU NAIM
Ag00033	ABD ALLAH MOHAMED RAGAB ABDEL RAHMAN	
Ag00034	`ALI SULAYMAN MAS'UD `ABD AL-SAYYID	ALY SOLIMAN MASSOUD ABDUL SAYED | MOHAMED OSMAN | IBN AL-QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYAH | IBN AL-QAYYIM | IBN EL QAIM | AL-ZAWL
Ag00048	CO-CONSPIRATOR 2	CO-CONSIRATOR 2
Ag00049	CO-CONSPIRATOR 5	CO-CONSIRATOR 5
Ag00050	CO-CONSPIRATOR 1	
Ag00051	CO-CONSPIRATOR 3	
Ag00052	CO-CONSPIRATOR 4	
Ag00053	CO-CONSPIRATOR 6	
Ag00090	SADDIQ AL MAHDI	SADIQ AL-MAHDI
Ag00091	FAHID MOHAMMED ALLY MSALAM	FAHAD M. ALLY | FAHID MOHAMMED ALI MSALAM | FAHID MUHAMAD ALI SALEM | MOHAMMED ALLY MSALAM | USAMA AL-KINI | FAHAD ALLY MSALAM | FAHID MOHAMMED ALLY | FAHID MOHAMMED ALI MUSALAAM | FAHAD | FAHAD MOHAMMED ALLY | ALLY | ABU USAMA AL-KINI | AZMARAY | LION

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00121	MOHAMED BELKALEM	
Ag00122	SUHAYL FATILLOEVICH BURANOV	SUKHAIL FATILLOEVICH BURANOV | SUHAIL BURANOV | MANSUR BURANOV | SOHAIL MANSUR | SUHAIL MANSUR | ABU HUZAIFA
Ag00124	IBRAHIM DAOUD ABU ABDULLA	
Ag00125	IBRAHIM EIDAROUS	ABU ABDULLAH | DAOUD | IBRAHIM | IBRAHIM HUSSEIN ABDELHADI EIDAROUS | IBRAHIM HUSSEIN ABDEL HADI EIDAROUS | IBRAHIM HUSSEIN ABDELHADI EIDAROUS | MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM
Ag00165	KHALFAN KHAMIS MOHAMED	K.K. MOHAMED | KHALFAN KHAMIS | KHALFAN MOHAMED | ZAHRAN NASSOR MAULID | KHAMIS
Ag00166	KHALID AL FAWWAZ	ABU OMAR | HAMAD | KHALED ABDUL RAHMAN HAMAD AL FAWWAZ | KHALID ABD AL-RAHMAN HAMD AL-FAWAZ | KHALED AL-FAUWAZ | KHALED A. AL-FAUWAZ | KHALID AL-FAWWAZ | KHALID AL FAWWAZ | KHALED AL FAWWAZ | KHALED AL-FAWWAZ | KHALID ABDULRAHMAN H. AL FAWAZ | ABU OMAR AL SEBAI | KHALID FOAD | HAMAD AL FAUWAS | KHALID AL-FAWWAZ
Ag00181	MAMDOUH MAHMUD SALIM	ABU HAJER | ABU HAJER AL IRAQI | ABU IBRAHIM AL IRAQI HAJER | MAMDOUH SALIM | ABU IBRAHIM | SHEIK ABU HAJER | ABU HAJIR (MAHMOUD SALIM)
Ag00199	MOHAMED RASHED DAOUD AL-'OWHALI	ABDUL JABBAR ALI ABDEL-LATIF | KHALID SALIM SALEH BIN RASHED | MOATH | MOHAMED AL-'OWHALI | MOHAMED RASHED DAOUD AL-'OWHALI | MOHAMED RASHED DAOUD AL-_OWHALI | MOHAMED RASHED DAOUD AL'OWHALI | MOHAMMED RASHED DAOUD AL-OWHALI | KHALID SALEH | MOHAMMED AKBAR | KHALID SALIM SALEH | BIN RASHID | ABDUL JABAR ALI ABDUL LAHIT | MOWAT | KHALID SALIM
Ag00200	MOHAMED SADEEK ODEH	ABDULBASIT AWADH MBARAK ASSAYID | ABDULLBAST AWADAH | ABU MOATH | HYDAR | MARWAN | MOHAMED ODEH | NOURELDINE | ABU YASSER | ABU BASIT AWAD | ABDUL BASSIT | MOHAMMED SADEEQ ODEH | MOHAMED SADEEQ ODEH | MOHAMMED SADIQ HOWAIDA | MUHAMMED SADIQ ODEH
Ag00208	ABU HAFS AL MASRY	ABU FATIMA | ABU HAFS | ABU HAFS AL MASRY AL KHABIR | ABU HAFS AL MASRY EL KHABIR | ABU HAFS EL KHABIR | ABU HAFS EL MASRY | ABU HAFS EL MASRY AL KHABIR | ABU HAFS EL MASRY EL KHABIR | ABU KHADIJA | SHEIKH TAYSIR ABDULLAH | TAYSIR | MUHAMMAD ATEF | MUHAMMAD ATIF | SUBHI ABU SITTA | MOHAMED ATIF | ABU HAHS AL-MASRI | SHEIK ABU HAFS | KHAEIK ABU FATIM | TAYSIR EL MASRY | ABU HAFS AL KHABIR | MOHAMED ATEF | SOBHI ABD AL AZIZ MOHAMED EL GOHARY ABU SINNA
Ag00209	MUHSIN MUSA MATWALLI ATWAH	ABDEL RAHMAN | ABDUL RAHMAN | ABDUL RAHMAN AL-MUHAJIR | MOHAMMED K.A. AL-NAMER | ABDU RACHMAN | MUHSIN MOUSSA MATWALLI ATWAH DEWEDAR
Ag00210	MUSTAFA MOHAMED FADHIL	ABU JIHAD | HASSAN ALI | HUSSEIN | KHALID | MUSTAFA ALI ELBISHY | MUSTAFA FADHL | MUSTAFA MOHAMMED | ABD AL WAKIL AL MASRI | ABU ANIS | ABU YUSSRR | NU MAN | ABU AL-NUBI | HUSSAIN
Ag00244	SAIF AL ADEL	SAIF | SAIF AL ADEL | SAYF AL-ADL | SAIF AL-'ADL | MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM MAKKAWI | IBRAHIM AL-MADANI | OMAR AL-SOMALI
Ag00253	SHEIK OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN	BLIND SHEIK | OMAR AHMED ALI
Ag00254	SHEIKH AHMED SALIM SWEDAN	AHMED ALLY | SHEIKH BAHAMADI | SHEIKH AHMAD SALEM SUWEIDAN | SHEIKH AHMED SALEM SWEDAN | SHEIKH SWEDAN | SHEIKH BAHAMADI | AHMED ALLY | BAHAMAD | SHEIK BAHAMAD | AHMED THE TALL | AHMED TAWHIL | AHMED SHEIKH ADEN | TAWHILI | SHEIKH AHMED SWEDAN | SHEIK AHMED SALIM SWEDAN | SKEIK BAHAMAD | SHEIK | AHMAD TAWHIL | SHAYKH AHMAD SALIM SUWAYDAN

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00272	USAMA BIN LADEN	ABDALLAH | ABDUL HAY | ABU ABDULLAH | AL QAQA | HAJJ | MUJAHID SHAYKH | SHAYKH USAMAH BIN-LADIN | THE CONTRACTOR | THE DIRECTOR | THE SUPERVISOR | USAMA BIN LADEN | USAMAH BIN-MUHAMMAD BIN-LADIN | USAMA BIN MUHAMMAD BIN AWAD BIN LADIN | OSAMA BIN MUHAMMAD BIN AWAD BIN LADIN | OSAMA BIN LADIN | OSAMA BIN LADEN | USAMA BIN LADEN | USAMA BIN LADIN | ABU ABDALLAH BIN LADEN | SHAYKH ABDULLA | SHEIK USAMA | ABU ABDALLAH | SHEIK ABDALLAH | USAMA MUHAMMED AWAD BIN LADEN
Ag00275	WADIH EL HAGE	ABD AL SABBUR | ABDALLAH LUBNANI | ABDUS SABBUR | ABU ABDULLAH AL LUBNANI | ABU ABDULLAH LUBNANI | NORMAN | TANZANITE | THE MANAGER | WA'DA NORMAN | WADIA | WADI EL-HAGE | ABU ABDULLAH | WADIH EL-HAGE
Ag00279	JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED AL-FADL	ABU BAKR SUDANI | JAMAL AL-FADL | ABU BAKR AL SUDANI | ABU KASTANI | ABU KAZAM | JAMAL AL FADHL
Ag00280	MUSTAFA SHALABI	
Ag00281	ABU SHALEED AL-FALASTINI	
Ag00282	ABU NOFAL AL SAUDI	
Ag00283	ISSAWI ABU HASSAN	
Ag00284	ABU FEDA EL MASRY	
Ag00285	ABU JAFFAR	
Ag00286	SALEM EL MASRY	SALEM AL MASRY | SALEM EL AL MASRY
Ag00287	HAYDAR DOSARI	
Ag00288	ABU KHEIR EL MASRY	
Ag00289	ABU AYOUB AL IRAQI	AYOUB AL IRAQI
Ag00290	YASIN (BROTHER OF ABU AYUB)	
Ag00291	ABU FARAJ AL YEMENI	ABU FARAJ
Ag00293	DOCTOR ABDEL MUNIM AL KHABIR	DR. ABDEL KHABIR
Ag00294	ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE	MADANI AL TAYYIB | ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE MADANI AL TAYYAB | ABU FADHL MAKKEE | ABU FAHDL AL MAKKEE | ABUD FADHL AL MAKKEE | MEDANI
Ag00295	SHEIKH SAYYID EL MASRY	SHEIKH SAYYID | SAYYID EL MASRY
Ag00296	QARICEPT AL JIZAERI	
Ag00297	SAIF AL LIBY	
Ag00298	ABU BURHAN AL IRAQI	ABU BURHAN
Ag00299	HASSAN DAHIR AWEYS	SHEIK HASSAN | SHEIKH HASSAN DAHIR AWEYS ALI | SHAYKH HASSAN DAHIR AWES | HASSAN DAHIR AWEIS
Ag00300	ABU HAFS AL MANSOURI	
Ag00301	ABU KHALEED AL MADANI	
Ag00302	ABU HAMMAM AL SAUDI	
Ag00303	ABU QUTADA	ABU QATADA | OMAR MAHMOUD MOHAMMED OTHMAN | ABU QATADA AL-FILISTINI | ABU UMR TAKFIRI | ABU ISMAIL | ABU OMAR ABU UMAR | AL-SAMMAN UTHMAN | ABU UMAR UMAR | UMAR UTHMAN | OMAR MAHMOUD UTHMAN | OMAH ABU OMAR | ABU QOTADAH | UTHMAN OMAR MAHMOUD
Ag00304	SA'ID YUSIF ALI ABU AZIZAH	SAID YOUSSEF ALI ABU AZIZA | SA'ID YUSIF ALI ABU AZIZAT | SA'ID YUSIF ABU AZIZ | SA'UD ABU AZIZ | ABU THERAB | ABU THURAB | ABU TURAB | ABDUL HAMID | ABD AL-HAMID | ABDEL HAMEED | ABUDULA MEED
Ag00305	ABU YASSER AL JAZAIRI	ABU YASSER AL SIRIR

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00306	ABU ABD AL SABBUR	
Ag00307	ABU UBAIDAH AL IRAQI	
Ag00308	ABU FADL AL IRAQI	
Ag00309	ALI HAROUN	ABU HASSAN AL SUDANI
Ag00310	ABDEL MAHMABABO	
Ag00311	OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR	OMAR AL-BASHIR
Ag00312	DR. SHARIF AL DIN ALI MUKHTAR	SHARIF AL DIN ALI MUKHTAR | SHARIF AL DEEN
Ag00313	MOHAMED BAYAZID	ABU RIDA AL SURI | ABU RIDA | ABU RIDA SURI
Ag00314	ABU HASSAN EL MASRY	
Ag00315	DR. MUBARAK AL DOORI	MUBARAK AL DURI | MUBARAK ABDUL-RAZAK | DR. MOUBARAK ALI AL DURI
Ag00316	AL QUBASHI THE SUDANI	AL QUBASHI AL SUDANI
Ag00317	SADEEK	
Ag00318	FARJAHM	
Ag00319	IBN AL TAMIYEH	IBN TAYMIYYA, TAQI AL-DIN | IBN TAYMIYYA
Ag00320	ABU TALHA AL SUDANI	ABU TALHA THE SUDANI | TALHA AL SUDANI | ABU TALHA AL-SUDANI | TARIQ ABDULLAH | ABDULHAMAN
Ag00321	ABU MOHAMED AL YEMENI	
Ag00322	MOHAMED AL NALFI	MOHAMED A NALFI | MOHAMMED SUDA AL NALFI
Ag00323	AHMED ABDEL RAHMAN HAMADABI	
Ag00324	SHEIKH NOMANI	
Ag00325	ABU JAFFER EL MASRY	
Ag00326	ABDUL BASET HAMZA	MUQADEM ABDUL BASET HAMZA | MUQADEM ABDUL BASIT HAMZA
Ag00327	AMIN ABDEL MAROUF	AL AMIN ABDEL MAROUF
Ag00328	ABU TALAL EL MASRY	
Ag00329	ABU YASSER EL MASRY	
Ag00330	ABU JAFFAR AL LIBY	
Ag00332	HAMZALLAH AL LIBY	HAMAS AL LIBY | HAMZALLA AL LIBY | HAMZA AL LIBY
Ag00333	ABU ABDEL QADER AL LIBY	
Ag00334	MUTWAKAL	
Ag00335	SAIF ISLAMI JANNUBI	
Ag00336	ABU KHALIL AL MADANI	
Ag00337	ABU HABIB AL TUNISI	
Ag00338	ABU MAHDI AL SAUDI	
Ag00339	ABU KHADIJA AL IRAQI	
Ag00340	USAMA AZMARAI	AL ASSAD | AZMARAI | THE LION | USAMA AZAMUARI | OSAMA AZMARAI
Ag00341	ABU DIJANA AL YEMENI	ABDALLAH A YEMENI | ABU ABDULLAH AL YEMENI | ABU DIJANA | ABU DIJANA ABDALLAH AL YEMENI
Ag00342	DR. ABDALLAH IZZELDINE	IZZILDINE
Ag00343	ABDALLAH AZZAM	ABDULLAH AZZAM | ABDULLAH YUSUF AZZAM | ABDALA AZZAM
Ag00344	ABDEL RAHMAN SOMALI	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00345	ABDOUH AL MUKHLAFI	
Ag00346	ABU AHMED EL MASRY	ABU UBAIDAH | ABU UBAIDAH, THE ANIMAL DOCTOR
Ag00347	ABU AKRAM URDANI	ABU AKRAM | ABU AHRAM AL URDANI
Ag00348	ABU ALI SUDANI	ABU ALI AL SUDANI
Ag00349	ABU HABIB AL PAKISTANI	
Ag00350	ABU KHABUIB AL SUDANI	
Ag00351	SHEIK BAILALA	
Ag00352	ABU MOHAMED AL SURI	
Ag00353	ABU MUSAB AL SUDANI	
Ag00354	ABU MUSAB AL SAUDI	
Ag00355	MUSTAFA SETMARIAM NASAR	ABU MUSAB | MUSTAFA SETMARIAM ASNAN | MUSTAFA SETMARIAM | MUSTAPHA SETMARIAN NASAR | MUSTAFA SETMARIAN NASAR | ABU MUSAB AL SURI | MOHAMED SETMARIAN NASAR
Ag00356	ABU MUSAB REUTER	
Ag00357	ABU NEAM	
Ag00358	ABU QUAIDBA EL MASRY	
Ag00359	AFAD MAKKEE	
Ag00360	AHMED ALI LOOTAH	
Ag00361	APRIL BRIGHTSKY RAY	MRS. WADIH EL HAGE | UM ABDULLAH
Ag00362	DR. ABDULLAH MOHAMED YUSEF	ABDULLAH MOHAMED YUSEF
Ag00363	IBN AL MUBARAK AL SHARQAWI	IBN MUBARAK
Ag00364	IHSAN EL MADANI	
Ag00365	KHALID ALI WALEED	
Ag00366	KHALIFA AL MUSCAT OMANI	KHALIFA AL OMANI
Ag00367	MOHAMED AL KHEIR	
Ag00368	MOHAMED JARA AL NABI	
Ag00369	MOHAMED SHABANA	MOHAMMED SHABANA
Ag00370	MOTASSEM SADEEK ABU SASHL	
Ag00371	MRS. JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED AL-FADAL (SUDANESE WIFE)	
Ag00372	DR. MOTRIF AL SADEEK	
Ag00373	OMAR AL MAKKEE	
Ag00374	SAID BIN LADEN	
Ag00375	SHEIK ARAFA	
Ag00376	SAAD AL SHARIF	ABU MOHAMED EL MASRY | ABU MOHAMED EL MASRY SAAD AL SHARIF | ABU MOHAMED SAID SHARIF | ABU SAAD AL SHARIF ABU MOHAMED SAUDI | SAAD SHARIF | SAYYID SHAIKH AL-SHARIF
Ag00377	ABU ISHEM MADANI	
Ag00378	AZERI (JAMAL AL-FADL'S BROTHER)	
Ag00379	ESSAM AL RIDI	ABU TAREQ | ABU TARAK EL MASRY
Ag00380	ABU JAFFER	
Ag00381	ABU AL DARDAA	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00382	ASHIF MOHAMED JUMA	ASHIF JUMA | POPU | POPO
Ag00383	FATIMA JUMA	
Ag00384	MOHAMED ASHRIF JUMA	
Ag00385	SETUNA JUMA	
Ag00386	TAHERA JUMA	
Ag00387	SHAMINA JUMA	
Ag00388	MANIRA JUMA	
Ag00389	SIKANDER JUMA	ASHIF HUSSEIN MOHAMMED JUMA | ASHFAK HUSSEIN
Ag00390	2ND BORN OF ESSAM AL RIDI	
Ag00391	KHALID SIDO	
Ag00392	ABU MUSABAL SURRE OMAR ABDEL HAKEEM	
Ag00393	ABU UBADDA	
Ag00394	AZMARAI ALSUI	
Ag00395	DAUGHTER OF ESSAM AL RIDI (1ST BORN)	
Ag00396	LOAY	
Ag00397	MOATAZ AL HALLAK	
Ag00398	MOHAMMED KARAMA	MOHAMED KARAMA SALIM
Ag00399	MOHAMMED NAJIBULLAH	
Ag00400	MRS. ESSAM AL RIDI	
Ag00401	SHEIK ABDUL RASOOL SAYYAF	ABDUL RASUL SAYYAF
Ag00402	JOHN RAY	
Ag00403	ABU JANDAL	
Ag00404	ABU MALIK	
Ag00405	AHMED SKEIK	
Ag00406	RASHAD KHALIFA	
Ag00407	MOHAMMED KASSEM	
Ag00408	ABDEL MEJID	
Ag00409	ADAM MOHAMED NOOR	
Ag00410	ABU AMJED	
Ag00411	IBRAHIM (BROTHER OF JAMAL AL-FADL)	
Ag00412	ABOUHALIMA	ABOUOHALIMA
Ag00413	ABU FARAJIMNI	
Ag00414	ABU IBRAHIM AL IRAQI	
Ag00415	ABU IBRAHIM IRATI	
Ag00416	ABU ISRA AL IRAQI	
Ag00417	ABU MAT EGYPTIAN	
Ag00418	ABU TAMIM LIBY	
Ag00419	ASADALLAH AL SINDI	
Ag00420	BASHEER	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00421	BUSHRA YASIN	
Ag00422	DITAR ABU MAHIS	
Ag00423	DR. OMAR ABDEL MAROUF	
Ag00424	FADL AL SHAHIDEEN	
Ag00425	FAISAL (COUSIN OF JAMAL AL-FADL)	
Ag00426	IBN SALAM	
Ag00427	MOQADEM SALAH ABDEL AL MOBRUK	
Ag00428	MOTASEM AL SAUDI	
Ag00429	MUBARAK EL DOORY	
Ag00430	SADEEK ALI MOHAMED	
Ag00431	SAFAR AL HAWALI	SHEIKH SAFAR ABDEL ALHAWARI | SHEIK SAFAR AL HAWALI
Ag00432	SALMAN AL AUDA	SHEIK SALMAN AL AWDAH
Ag00434	SHEIKH FAZHIL UR RAHMAN	
Ag00435	USAMA LUBNANI	
Ag00436	YASIN (BROTHER OF ABU AYOUB AL IRAQI)	
Ag00437	ZINDANI	
Ag00438	L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU	ABU ZAID MAGHREBI | ABU TALAL | YOUSEF MZUNKO | YOUSEF THE WHITE
Ag00439	ANSWAR SHABAN	ANWAR SHABAN | AMUR SHABAN
Ag00440	ABU ISALM MASRY	ISLAM | ABU ISALM MASRY THE OLDER | ABU ISLAM AL KHABIR | SAIF AL ISLAM | SAIF AL ISLAM EL MASRY
Ag00441	ABU RACHMAN AL MUHAJER	ABU EL MUHAJER | ABU RACHMAN ABU HAJER
Ag00442	SHEIK ALATI	
Ag00443	MRS. SALEH	
Ag00444	FARAJ ABU EL MASRY	
Ag00446	ABU SURIR	
Ag00447	MUNTASSER AL JAZIRI	
Ag00448	MRS. L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU	
Ag00449	ALI MOHAMED	BAKHBOLA | BILI BILI | HAYDARA | ABU MOHAMED AL AMRIKI | ABU MOHAMED THE AMERICAN | ALI MOHAMMED | ALI MUHAMMAD | ABU MOHAMED AL-AMRIKI | ABU OMAR | ABU OSAMA | AHMAD BAHA ADAM | ALI ABDELSAOUD MUSTAFA | ALI TAYMOUR | ALI ABDELSAOUD MUSTAFA MOHAMED | ALI ABUALACOUD MOHAMED | ALI NASSER | BAKHBOULA | JEFF | OMAR | TAYMOUR | ABU MOHAMMED AMRIKI
Ag00451	ABU MADYAN EL MASRY	
Ag00452	ABU RIFA AL LIBY	
Ag00453	ABU AL ALKALI	
Ag00454	SALEM AL-IRAQI	SALEM THE IRAQI
Ag00455	SULIMAN (SON OF NAWAWI)	
Ag00456	ABU KHALID AL NUBI	ABU KHALEENUBI | MUSTAFA | ABU JIHAD AL NUBI | ABU KHALID EL MASRY | ABU KHALID ANUBI | ABU JIHAD
Ag00457	MRS. ABU UBAIDAH AL BANSHIRI (EGYPTIAN WIFE)	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00458	ABU SAID AL MASRY	ABU SAID MASRY
Ag00459	ABU MOHAMMED MAHEJAN	
Ag00460	MRS. ABU RACHMAN AL MUHAJER	
Ag00461	SAFIR ALADA	
Ag00462	MRS. ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE	
Ag00463	ABU KHEIR AL YEMENI	ABU AL KHERYEMENI
Ag00464	ABU AMMAR AL SURI	
Ag00465	SAAD	
Ag00466	MOHAMMED KARAMA	TAWFIQ
Ag00467	ABU DERDAA	
Ag00468	DR. MONTESSUR	
Ag00469	FIRST BORN OF L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU	
Ag00470	SHEIK JIHAD EL MASRY	POSSIBLY THE SAME AS ABU KHALID AL NUBI?
Ag00471	ABU SALAAMA	
Ag00472	ABDOUH ABDALLAH AL YEMENI	POSSIBLY THE SAME AS ABU DIJANA AL YEMENI?
Ag00473	ABU BADEN EL MASRY	
Ag00474	ABU MUATH	
Ag00475	ABU DAUD	
Ag00476	MAK DAUD	
Ag00477	ABU ISMAL	
Ag00478	ABU SARA	
Ag00479	ABDEL KADIM	
Ag00480	AHMED HASSAN (I)	AHMAD HASSAN
Ag00481	AHMED HASSAN (II)	
Ag00482	ABU JAMAL AMRIK	ABU JAMAL
Ag00483	AHMED TIK	
Ag00484	ABU HARAD EL MASRY	
Ag00485	KIBARUA MJITTA	KIBARUA MIKIIR MJITTA
Ag00486	ABU UBAIDAH (OF SADEEK CAMP)	
Ag00487	ABU THOMAMA	
Ag00488	MOHAMED SAHAL	
Ag00489	ALI MANI	
Ag00490	MEENA	
Ag00491	OMAR (ODEH'S BROTHER-IN-LAW)	
Ag00492	SKEIK SAFA	
Ag00493	ABDUL RACHMAN AL HOWARI	
Ag00494	ABU SAYYID AL KIRDI	
Ag00495	BILAL (COUSIN OF JIHAD ALI)	
Ag00496	ABDUL JAFAR	
Ag00497	AHMED AL HAZZA	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00498	FATHER OF OWHALI	
Ag00499	MOHAMED BIN AWADH BIN LADEN	
Ag00500	OMAR BIN AWADH BIN LADEN	
Ag00501	ABDULLAH BIN AWDAH BIN LADEN	
Ag00502	1ST DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	
Ag00503	1ST DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	
Ag00504	3RD DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	
Ag00505	AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	
Ag00506	DAUGHTER OF AL-MADUDI FAMILY	
Ag00507	ABDULAZIZ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00508	ABDULLAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00509	AETEDAL BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00510	AHMAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00511	ALI BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00512	AYSHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00513	BAKR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00514	EMAN BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00515	FATIMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00516	FOWZIYAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00517	GHALIB BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00518	HAIDER BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00519	HASSAN BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00520	HUDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00521	IBRAHIM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00522	ILHAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00523	ISSA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00524	KHALED BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00525	KHALIL BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00526	MAHROUS BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00527	MALAK BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00528	MARIAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00529	MOHAMMAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00530	MUNA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00531	MUNEERA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00532	NAJIAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00533	NOUR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00534	OMAR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00535	RAEDAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00536	RAJA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00537	RANDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00538	RUQQUEIYA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00539	SAAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00540	SAHAR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00541	SALEH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00542	SALEHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00543	SALEM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00544	SALMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00545	SAMIAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00546	SANA'A BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00547	SEEMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00548	SHAFIQ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00549	SHEIKHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00550	SU'ADD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00551	TAREQ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00552	TAYYEBA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00553	THABIT BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00554	WAFA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00555	YAHYA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00556	YASIR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00557	YESLAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00558	ZEENAT BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00559	ZUBAIDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	
Ag00560	UM AYSHA	
Ag00561	FATIMAH AHMED MOHSEN BAHARETH	
Ag00562	ALIA AL-GHANEM	
Ag00563	UM ABDULAZIZ	
Ag00564	UM ALI	
Ag00565	UM YESLAM	
Ag00566	SAID SALEM OMAR	
Ag00567	TAMARRA RATEMO	
Ag00568	MOHAMED ZAIDI	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00569	JULIUS KISINGO CEM	
Ag00570	ABDULWAHDI AHMED SALUM	
Ag00571	USAMA BIN HUSSEIN	
Ag00572	ANNIS BIN HUSSEIN	
Ag00573	MOHAMED K. MOHAMED	
Ag00574	FATIMA FADHIL	
Ag00575	ANIS FADHIL	
Ag00576	USA FADHIL	
Ag00577	ABDALLAH HAMISI SHLLM	
Ag00578	ABDUL HALLEK	
Ag00579	ABU AHMED AL HARBI	
Ag00580	ABU MARWAN	
Ag00581	ABU RAFA	
Ag00582	ADELKA	
Ag00583	ALI (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	
Ag00584	BAHARI (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	
Ag00585	FATUMA MOHAMED	
Ag00586	HADYEA RUBEYA	
Ag00587	HAJI JUMA	
Ag00588	HASAN (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	
Ag00589	ISMAEL (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	
Ag00590	KALAL	
Ag00591	KASSUM JUMA	
Ag00592	MARIUM	
Ag00593	MASSELIM MASSELIM	
Ag00594	MOHAMED MUSLIM SALUM	
Ag00595	MR. CHAUDRY	M.M. CHAUDHRI
Ag00596	MRS. FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED	
Ag00597	MUMIN IBRAHIM	
Ag00598	NASSOR MOHAMED	
Ag00599	RAHMA AHMED KHAMIS	
Ag00600	RASHID SALEH HAMED	
Ag00601	RAYA JUMA	
Ag00602	RUBAYA MOHAMED	
Ag00603	SALIM CHICHI	SALIM CHICHIR
Ag00604	SALMA MOHAMMED	
Ag00605	SALUM MUSLIM	
Ag00606	SULIMAN (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	
Ag00607	TARIQ HAMDI	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00608	ZIYAD KHALEEL	
Ag00609	ZUHURU MOHAMED	ZUHURA MOHAMED
Ag00610	IHAB MOHAMED ALI	NAWAWI | IHAB ALI | ABU AL TAYAR | YOSEF KENANA | ABU SULIMAN | JOSEPH KENANA | ABU JAFFAR AL TAYAR | ABU SULEIMAN
Ag00611	KHALID ABDUL RACHMAN	
Ag00612	JALAL FOUD	
Ag00613	ELEMIGY ABDELDAIM	
Ag00614	MOHAMED ALI MURAWEH SAL ODEH	
Ag00615	DENAL CASMIRI	
Ag00616	DR. JOSEPH MISOI	
Ag00617	DR. EL SAYED TILIB	DR. SAID TALEB
Ag00618	SAMIR RAHMAN MOHAMED	
Ag00619	ABU AL MUTAZ	
Ag00620	SHEIK ISHAQ	SHEIK GABO
Ag00621	EZALADEN ABDEL RAHMAN MOHAMED	
Ag00622	SHEIK SULEIMAN SILL	
Ag00623	DAVID MATWAH	
Ag00624	ALI OMAR MOHAMED	ALI GAB
Ag00625	ABDULLAH EL ZUBEIDY	
Ag00626	ADAN A. HASSAN	
Ag00627	SIMON (WADIH EL HAGE'S FRIEND)	
Ag00628	AHMAD YOUNES	AHMED YOUNAS
Ag00629	MARION BROWN	
Ag00630	YUMICO ABUEILEN	
Ag00631	BADR ABUEILEN	
Ag00632	NASSER ABUEILEN	
Ag00633	KHALID ABUEILEN	
Ag00634	SUMA ABUEILEN	
Ag00635	ATEF ABUEILEN	
Ag00636	SULIMAN ALI	
Ag00637	KHAMIS MOHAMED KHALFAN	
Ag00638	RUBEYA KHAMIS MOHAMED	
Ag00639	OMAR NASSOR SALIM	
Ag00640	SULEIMAN ABDALLAH	
Ag00641	MSELLEM SHINEY MSELLEM	
Ag00642	MUSALAM	
Ag00643	MRS. JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED AL-FADAL (AMERICAN WIFE)	
Ag00644	JAMAL ZOUGAM	ANGEL OF DEATH
Ag00645	SALAHEDDINE BENYAICH	ABU MUHGEN | ABU MUGHEN | SALAHEDINE BENYAICH | SALAHEDDIN BENYAICH

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00646	ABDELAZIZ BENYAICH	ABDELAZIZ BENLAICH
Ag00647	MOHAMMED AL-GERBOUZI	MOHAMMED AL-GARBUZI | MOHAMMED GARBOUZE | MOHAMMED EL GUERBOUZI | MUHAMMAD AL-GERBOUZI
Ag00648	ABU DAHDAH	IMAD EDDIN BARAKAT YARKAS | BARAKAT YARKAS
Ag00649	ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI	KHALAILAH | AHMED FADEE II AL-KHALAYLAH | AHMAD FADIL NAZZALI ABU AL-MU'TAZ
Ag00650	MOHAMMED FIZAZI	MOHAMMED FAZAZI | MOHAMMED EL FAZAZI | MOHAMED AL-FAZAZI | ABOU MARIAM
Ag00651	ABDULAK AL MAGREBI	
Ag00652	MOHAMED CHAOUI	MOHAMMAD SHAWI
Ag00653	SAID CHEDADI	
Ag00654	ALI AMROUS	
Ag00655	SARHANE BEN ABDELMAJID FAKHET	EL TUNECINO | SERHAN BEN ABDELMAJID FAKHET | SERHANE ABDELMAJID FAKHET
Ag00656	AMER AZIZI	OTHMAN AL ANDULUSI | AMER EL AZIZI | AMERI AZIZI
Ag00657	MONEIR MAHMOUD ALY EL-MESSERY	
Ag00658	JAMAL AHMIDAN	EL CHINO | MOWGLI | YOUSSEF BEN SALAH
Ag00659	MOHAMMED ATTA	MOHAMED ATTA | MOHAMED EL-AMIR | MUHAMMAD ATTA | MEHAN ATTA | MOHAMMAD EL AMIR | MOHAMED EL SAYED | MOHAMED ELSAYED | MUHAMMAD MUHAMMAD AL AMIR AWAG AL SAYYID ATTA | MUHAMMAD MUHAMMAD AL-AMIR AWAD AL SAYAD
Ag00660	TARIQ IBN ZIYAD	
Ag00661	MOHAMED BEKKALI	MOHAMED BAKKALI | MOHAMMED BEKKALI | BEKKS
Ag00662	VINAY KOHLY	
Ag00663	SUREH KOMAR	SURECH KUMAR | SURESH KUMAR
Ag00664	FAISAL ALLUCH	FAISAL ULLAC | FAISAL ALLOUCH
Ag00665	KHALID OULAD	KHALID OULAD AKCHA | KHALED OULAD AKCHA
Ag00666	NAIMA OULAD	NAIMA OULAD AKCHA
Ag00667	BASEL GHAYOUN	BASET GHAYOUN | BASEL GHALYOUN | BASET OHAYOUN
Ag00668	HAMID AHMIDAN	
Ag00669	ABD AL-HADI AL-IRAQI	NASHWAN ABD AL RAZZAQ ABD AL BAQI | NASHWAN AL RAMER ABDULRAZZAQ
Ag00670	FOUAD EL MORABIT ANGHAR	FOUAD EL MORABIT AMGHAR | FOUAD ALMORABIT | FOUAD EL MORABIT | AUGHAR FOUAD EL MORABIT | FOUD EL MORABIT ANGHAR
Ag00671	MUHANNAD ALMALLAH DABAS	ALMALLAH DABAS MUHAMMAD | MOHANNAD ALMALLAH DABAS | MOUHANNAD ALMALLAH DABAS | ALMALLAH DABAS MOUHAMMAD | MUHAMMAD ALMALLAH DABAS
Ag00672	SAID BERRAJ	
Ag00673	MOHAMMED OULAD AKCHA	MOHAMED OULAD AKCHA
Ag00674	RACHID OULAD AKCHA	
Ag00675	ABDENNABI KOUNJAA	ABDALLAH | EL BARBAS
Ag00676	JOSE EMILIO SUAREZ TRASHORRAS	SUAREZ TRASHORRAS
Ag00677	RAFA ZOUHIER	RAFA ZUHER | RAFA ZOHUIER | EL BUGA | WHEELS
Ag00678	OTMAN EL GNAOUT	OTHMAN EL GNAOUI | OTMAN EL-GNAOUI

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00679	ABDELILAH EL FADUAL EL AKIL	ABDELILAH EL FADWAL EL AKIL | ABDELILAH EL FADUAL EL ALIL | ABDELILAH EL-FADOAUL EL-AKIL
Ag00680	RACHID AGLIF	EL CONEJO | THE RABBIT
Ag00681	YOUSSEF BELHADJ	THE AFGHAN | ABU DUHAN AL-AFGHANI | ABU DUJAN AL-AFGHANI | YUSSUF BELHADJ
Ag00682	ABDELMAJID BOUCHAR	THE ZEBRA | EL GAMO | THE DEER
Ag00683	HASSAN EL HASKI	ABU HAMZA | HASSAN AL HASKI
Ag00684	RABEI OSMAN SAYED AHMED	MOHAMED THE EGYPTIAN | RABEI OSMAN EL-SAYED AHMED | RABEI OUSMANE SAYED AHMED | MUHAMMAD THE EGYPTIAN | RABEI OSMAN
Ag00685	MOHAMED LARBI BEN SELLAM	
Ag00686	BRAHIM MOUSSATEN	IBRAHIM MOUSSATEN
Ag00687	MOHAMED MOUSSATEN	
Ag00688	RAMZI BINALSHIBH	RAMZI BIN AL SHIBH | RAMZI MOHAMED ABDULLAH BINALSHEIDAH | RAMZI MOHAMMED ABDULLAH BINALSHIBH | RAMZI MOHAMMED ABDELLAH OMAR | RAMZI OMAR | RAMZI BIN AL-SHIBH | RAMZI MOHAMED ABDULLAH BINALSHIBH
Ag00689	MOHAMMED AL HADI CHEDADI	MOHAMED CHEDADI | MOHAMED EL HADI CHEDADI
Ag00690	ABDERRAHIM ZBAKH	ABDERRAHIM ZBAKN | THE CHEMIST | CHEMICAL ALI
Ag00691	FARID OULD ALI	FARID OULAD
Ag00692	MALAK ANDALUSI	
Ag00693	AICHA ACHAB	AICHA ZOUGAM
Ag00694	ALI ZOUGAM	
Ag00696	ZAKI BEKKALI	
Ag00697	MOHAMMED BEKKALI, SR.	
Ag00698	CHARAFA BEKKALI	
Ag00699	ABDEL HALIM	
Ag00700	ABDULATIF MERROUN	ABDELLATIF MERROUN
Ag00701	JAMAL BENYAICH	
Ag00702	ALICE BENYAICH	
Ag00703	DAVID COURTAILLER	
Ag00704	JEROME COURTAILLER	JERMOE COURTELLIER | SELKMAN
Ag00705	ABDELKRIM MEJJATI	
Ag00706	BEN SALAWI	
Ag00707	ABDELOUAHID BERRAK	ABDELWAHID BERRAK | ABDELWAHID BERRAK
Ag00708	ANTONIO TORO CASTRO	
Ag00709	WALID ALTARAKI	
Ag00710	MOHAMAD BADR DDIN AKKAD	MOHAMAD BADR DDIN AL-AKKAD | MOHAMAD BADR EDDIN AKKAD
Ag00711	ZINEB (JAMAL ZOUGAM'S SISTER)	
Ag00712	SAMIRA (JAMAL ZOUGAM'S SISTER)	
Ag00713	ABDELILAH EL-FUAD	FADUAL AQILI | ABDELILAH EL FOUAD | ABDELILAH EL FUAD
Ag00714	RACHID ADLI	
Ag00715	MRS. SARHANE BEN ABDELMAJID FAKHET	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00716	MUSTAFA MAYMOUNI	MOUSTAFA MAYMOUNI
Ag00717	ABDILAH FIZAZI	ABDILAH EL FAZAZI
Ag00718	ABDELHALIM FIZAZI	ABDELHALIM EL FAZAZI
Ag00719	ASSIYA FIZAZI	ASSIYA EL FAZAZI
Ag00720	EL GITANILLO	LITTLE GYPSY | GABRIEL M | GABRIEL M.V.
Ag00721	ALLEKEMA LAMARI	ALLEKAMA LAMARI
Ag00722	CARMEN MARIA TORO CASTRO	
Ag00723	MOHAMED BELHADJ	ABU DUJAN AL-AFGHANI?
Ag00724	MOHAMED AFALAH	MOHAMED ALFALAH
Ag00725	OUHNANE DAOUD	DAOUD OUHNANE | DAOUD OUHMANE
Ag00726	ADRI RIFAAT ANOUAR	ASRI RIFAT ANOUAR
Ag00727	ABDELATIF MOURAFIK	MALEK THE ANDALUSIAN | MALEK THE NORTH AFRICAN
Ag00728	DRISS CHEBLI	
Ag00729	MOHAMED BELFATMI	
Ag00730	NOUREDINE NFIA	ABU MOUAD
Ag00731	KHALID MAJATI	
Ag00732	AZIZA AL-GERBOUZI	
Ag00733	SAID BAHAJI	
Ag00734	TAYSSIR ALLUNI	TAYSIR ALONY | TAYSSIR ALOUNI | ABU MUSAB
Ag00735	FARID HILALI	SHAKUR | SHUKRI
Ag00736	MUHAMED GALEB KALAJE ZOUAYDI	ABU TALHA | MUHAMMED GALEB KALAJE ZOUAYDI | MOHAMED GHALEB KALAJE ZOUAYDI | ABU THALA | MUHAMMAD GALEB KALAJE ZOUAYDI | ABU TALJHA | ABOU TALHA
Ag00737	BASSAM DALATI SATUT	BASSAN DALATI SATUT | ABU ABDO | BASSAM DALATI | BASSAN DALATI SATUT
Ag00738	ABU ABDUL RAHMAN	EL CALVO | THE BALD ONE
Ag00739	ABU ZUBAYDAH	ZAIN AL-ABIDEEN MUHAMAD ASAN | ABU ZUBAIDAH | ZAIN AL-ABIDIN MUHAMMAD HUSAIN | ABU ZUBAIDA | ZEINULABIDEEN MUHAMMED HUSEIN ABU ZUBEIDAH | ABD AL-HADI AL-WAHAB | ZAYN AL-ABIDIN MUHAMMAD HUSAYN | ZAYN AL-ABIDIN MUHAMMAD HUSSEIN | TARIQ | ABU ZUBEIDA | MOHAMMED ABU ZUBAYDAH | ABOU ZOUBEIDA
Ag00740	MOHAMED BAHAIAH	ABU KHALED
Ag00741	MOHAMMED HAYDAR ZAMMAR	MOHAMMED HAIDAR ZAMMAR | MOHAMED HEIDAR ZAMMAR
Ag00742	MAMOUN DARKAZANLI	
Ag00743	LUIS JOSE GALAN GONZALEZ	YUSUF GALAN | LUIS JOSE GALAN | JOSE GALAN GONZALEZ
Ag00744	JASEM MAHBOULE	ABU MOHAMAD | JASEM MABHOULE | ABU MOHAMED
Ag00745	OSAMA DARRA	ABU THABET | ABU BASHIR | OUSAMA DARRA
Ag00746	MOHAMED NEEDL ACAID	NIDAL
Ag00747	AHMAD RAGHAD MARDINI DAKICHL	ABU AMER
Ag00748	MOHAMED ARABI SHEHIMI	MUHAMMAD ARABI SHEHIMI
Ag00749	MOHAMED ZAHER ASADE	ZAHER
Ag00750	ANWAR ADNAN MOHAMED SALAH	CHEIJ SALH | SHEIK SALAH | ABU SALEH | ANWAR ADNAN AHMAD SALAH | ANWAR ADNAN MOHAMED SALEH

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00751	MOHAMED BOUALEM KHOUNI	ABDALLAH | MOHAMED BOUALEM KHNOUNI | MOHAMMED KHOUNI BOUALEM | MOHAMED BOUALEM KHNOUNI | MOHAMED BOUALEM KHOUNI | MOHAMED KHOUNI BOUALEM
Ag00752	MOHAMED BENSAKHRIA	MOHAMMED BENSAKHRIA
Ag00753	GHASOUB AL-ABRASH AL-GHALYOUN	ABU MUSAB | GHASOUB AL-ABRASH GALYOUN | GHUSUP
Ag00754	AHMED BRAHIM	
Ag00755	NABIL NANAKLI KOSAIBATI	NABIL NANAKLI
Ag00756	SHEIK MOHAMMED OMRAN	ABU AL-SHAYKH (POSSIBLE)
Ag00757	BILAL KHAZAL	BELAL KHAZAL | BILAL KHAZAAL | ABU AL SHAYKH
Ag00758	MOHAMED KHAIR AL-SAQQ	ABU AL DARDA | MUHAMMAD KHAIR AL-SAQQ | ABU ALARDA | MOHAMED KHAIR AL SAGD | MOHAMED KHAIR AL SAGD
Ag00759	ABDALRAHMAN ALARNAOT	ABDALRAHMAN ALARNAOT ABU-ALJER | ABU OBEID
Ag00760	PARLINDUNGAN SIREGAR	PARLIN | SALEH SIREGAR | SALEH PARLINDUNGAN SIREGAR | PARLIN SIREGAR | PARLIN SIREGAR
Ag00761	NAJIB CHAIB MOHAMED	NAJIB | SHAYKH NAJIB | MOHAMED NAJIB CHAIB
Ag00762	ABU ABDULRAHMAN	FRANK BESSON DELILE
Ag00763	SID AHMED BOUDJELLA	SIDLI
Ag00764	MOURAD KADDAR	HAMID CHATAR | MOURAD KADDER
Ag00765	MARIA LUISA MARTIN	
Ag00766	ABU RACHED	
Ag00767	SAID MANSOUR	
Ag00768	ABU SUUD	
Ag00769	ZEIN AL-ABIDINE MOHAMED HASSAN	SHEIKH SALAH
Ag00770	ABDULLA KHAYATA KATAN	ABDULLA KHAYATA KATTAN | ABU IBRAHIM | KHAYATA KATTAN
Ag00771	AHMED KOSHAGI KELANI	
Ag00772	ABU WALID	
Ag00773	ABU AL HARETH	
Ag00774	DJAMEL BEGHAL	DJAMEL BEGAL | JAMAL BEGHAL
Ag00775	ABDELGHANI MZOUDI	
Ag00776	ROBERT RICHARD ANTOINE-PIERRE	ABOU ABDERRAHMANE | LHAJ | PIERRE ROBERT
Ag00777	MUHSEN KHAYBER	ABDUL RAHIM | ABDUL-MAJID AL-LIBI
Ag00778	ABDENNABID CHEDADI	
Ag00779	RAHMA AHMIDAN	
Ag00780	MUSTAFA AHMIDAN	
Ag00781	JABER AHMIDAN	
Ag00782	YUSSEF AHMIDAN	
Ag00783	HICHAM AHMIDAN	
Ag00784	MOHAMED BOUHARRAT	
Ag00785	SAED EL HARRAK	
Ag00786	NASREDDINE BOUSBAA	
Ag00787	EMILIO LLANO ALVAREZ	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00788	IVAN GRANADOS PENA	
Ag00789	JAVIER GONZALEZ PENA	THE DYNAMITE | JAVIER GONZALEZ DIAZ
Ag00790	ANTONIO IVAN REIS PALACIO	
Ag00791	SERGIO ALVAREZ SANCHEZ	
Ag00792	RAUL GONZALEZ PELEAZ	RAUL GONZALES PELAEZ
Ag00793	GHAZI BIDEL	
Ag00794	YAHIA RAGHEH	YAHIA PAYUMI
Ag00795	MOUTAZ ALMALLAH	MOUTAZ ALMALLAH DABAS
Ag00796	PILAR M.V.	
Ag00797	MIGUEL ANGEL M.V.	
Ag00798	SOUFIANE RAIFAK	
Ag00799	LOFTI SBAI	
Ag00800	MOHAMMAD AFZAAL	
Ag00801	SHAHZAD ALI GUJAR	SHAZAD ALI GUTJAR
Ag00802	RACHID MOHAMED KADDUR	
Ag00803	RACHID BENDOUDA	RACHID EL GORDO
Ag00804	JAOUAD EL BOUZROUTI	
Ag00805	MIMOUN BELHADJ	
Ag00806	RUBEN IGLESIAS	
Ag00807	OMAR NAKHCHA	
Ag00808	ABDELILAH HRIZ	
Ag00809	MOHAMED EL-IDRISSI	MOHAMED EL IDRISSI
Ag00810	SAMIR TAHTAH	
Ag00811	SAFIA BELHADJ	
Ag00812	ALLAL MOUSSATEN	
Ag00813	AHMED RESSAM	REDA
Ag00814	OMAR DEGHAYES	
Ag00815	GONZALO LOPEZ GONZALEZ	
Ag00816	MAHMOUD SLIMANE AOUN	GABY EID SEMAAN
Ag00817	MOHAMMED LAMARI	
Ag00818	TELDJA LAMARI	
Ag00819	ZACARIYA ESSABAR	ZAKARYA ESSABAR | ZAKARIYA ESSABAR
Ag00820	HASAM ALHUSEIN	
Ag00821	WAHID KOSHAGI KELANI	
Ag00822	SADIK MERIZAK	
Ag00823	PRINCE MOHAMMED AL-FAISAL AL-SAUD	
Ag00824	PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL AL-SAUD	
Ag00825	SAMER DABBAS	
Ag00826	REDA SEYAM	
Ag00827	SALEH ABDULAZIZ AL-FAHHAD	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00828	ABDULRAHMAN AL-FAHHAD	
Ag00829	ATMANE RESALI	ATMANE RESALL
Ag00830	HABIBA MOHAMED	
Ag00831	CARMEN FERNANDEZ	
Ag00832	ASMA ZAFRA	
Ag00833	NAJAT FADAL	
Ag00834	MARIAM GARCIA	
Ag00835	MOHAMED BELAZIZ	MOHAMMED BELAZZIZ
Ag00836	YASIN SEDDIKI	
Ag00837	HAKIM ZERZOUR	
Ag00838	MAJID SAHOUANE	ABDERRAHMAN | ABDELMAJID | MADJID SAHOUANE | MAJAD SAHOUANE
Ag00839	ABDERRAMAN KHOUNI	
Ag00840	HOCINE KHOUNI	
Ag00841	MOHAMMED ACHRAF	MOHAMED ACHRAF | KAMEL SAADI | ABDERRAHMAN TAHIRI | MUHAMMAD AL-ASHRAF | ABDERRAHMANE TAHIRI
Ag00842	REDA CHERIF	
Ag00843	DJAMEL SEDDIKI	DJAMEL SEDDIQI | DJAMEL SEDIKI
Ag00844	NIZAR TRABELSI	NIZAR TRABLISI | NIZAR BEN ABDELAZIZ TRABELSI
Ag00845	ESSID SAMI BEN KHEMAIS	SABER | ISEED SAMI BIN-KAMAI
Ag00846	MOHAMED BOUKIRI	
Ag00847	ABDELKADER TCHAREK	
Ag00848	NABIL SAYADI	ABU ZEINAB
Ag00849	HAZAR AL-DABBAS	
Ag00850	PIRJO BRAHIM	
Ag00851	NORA BRAHIM	
Ag00852	ABU KHALEB	
Ag00853	MAHER KHAZAL	
Ag00854	KAMAL HADID CHAAR	ABU NOUR
Ag00855	SYLVIE BEGHAL	
Ag00856	BAGHDAD MEZIANE	
Ag00857	BRAHIM BENMERZOUGA	
Ag00858	KAMEL DAOUDI	
Ag00859	AZZEDIN JOURNAZI	
Ag00860	MUSTAPHA ABUSHIMA	
Ag00861	WEDAD AHMED	
Ag00862	ABDULLAH BANDASSER	ABDELHAQ BENTASSIR | MOUL SEBBAT | ABDELHAK | ABDELLAHK BENTASSIR | MOUL SEBAT
Ag00864	SAYER BEDER	SAYER BEDER MEJADER | EL SAYED BEDER MEGAHED
Ag00865	NOUREDINE YENADI	NOUREDINE DJENADI
Ag00866	ABDELKADER AMARA	
Ag00867	MOHAMMAD CHOUDRY ASLAM	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00868	MOHAMMAD NAEEM NOOR KHAN	ABU TALHA | NAEEM NOOR KHAN | MOHAMMED NAEEM NOOR KHAN
Ag00869	AMJAD FAROOQI	AMJAD HUSSAIN FAROOQI
Ag00870	ADNAN ASLAM	
Ag00871	ABDELAZIZ HOUARI MELLAS	
Ag00872	MOSTAFA AZTOUT	
Ag00873	BELGACEM BELLIL	BELLIL BELGACEM
Ag00874	NASSREDDINE BEN LAIDNE AMRI	NASREDDINE BEN LAID AMRI
Ag00875	DJILALI BOUSSIRI	
Ag00876	ABDELAZIZ EL MERABIT	
Ag00877	ABDELKRIM LEBCHINA	
Ag00878	HAMMAD LAHSINI	
Ag00879	TAHA SEGHROUCHNI	
Ag00880	ZOHAIR KHADIRI	ZOHAIB KHADIRI
Ag00881	OTMAN EL MOUIB	
Ag00882	KAMAL AHBAR	
Ag00883	TAREK HAMED HAMU	
Ag00884	ZOHRA ZEWAWI	
Ag00885	TAHER DEGHAYES	
Ag00886	AMANI DEGHAYES	
Ag00887	MOHAMMED BOUYERI	MOHAMMED B.
Ag00888	SAMIR AZZOUZ	
Ag00889	ABDELADIM AKOUDAD	
Ag00890	MOHAMMED SALAMEH	MOHAMED AMINE SALAMEH | MOHAMED SALAMEH | MOHAMMED A. SALAMEH
Ag00891	AMINE MEZBAR	ADEL TOBBICHI | J.P.D. STRAEBLER | MATHIEU MILJADI PRAJASEMITA
Ag00892	SAMIR KISHK	KISHK SAMIR
Ag00893	ABU DOHA	THE DOCTOR | AMAR MAKHLULIF | RACHID KEFFLOUS | HAYDAR ABU DOHA | DR HAIDER | DIDIER AJUELOS
Ag00894	LASED BEN HENI	AL AS'AD BEN HENI
Ag00895	MOKHTAR BOUCHOUCHA	AL-MOKHTAR BEN MOHAMED BEN AL-MOKHTAR BOUCHOUCHA | MOKHTAR BUSHUSHA
Ag00896	TAREK CHARAABI	TAREK BEN AL-BECHIR BEN AMARA AL-CHARAABI | TAREK SHARAAB
Ag00897	MOHAMMED BEN BELGACEM AOUADI	MOHAMED BEN BELKACEM AOUADI | BELGACEM MOHAMED BEN AOUADI | MOHAMED BELKALEM
Ag00898	ABDELKADIR ES-SAYED	ABDELKADIR ES SAYED | MAHMOUD ES-SAYED ABDELKADER | ABU SALEH | ABDELKADER MAHMOUD ES SAYED
Ag00899	SALIM BOUKHARI	
Ag00900	LAMINE MARONI	KARUNI | LAMINE KARUNI
Ag00901	AEUROBI BEANDALI	
Ag00902	SAMAIR KARIMOU	
Ag00903	FOUHAD SABOUR	
Ag00904	TAREK MAAROUFI	TAREK BEN HABIB BEN AL-TOUMI MAAROUFI

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00905	ESSOUSSI LAAROUSSI	
Ag00906	EMAD ABDELWAHID AHMED ALWAN	ABU MOHAMED | ABU MOHAMMED EL-YEMENI | IMAD ABDELWAHID AHMED ALWAN
Ag00907	AMMARI SAIFI	ABDERREZAK AL-PARA | ALBADA | ABOU HAIDARA | EL-OURASSI | ABDERREZAK | EL PARA | ABDEREZAK ZAIMECHE | ABDERREZAK ZAIMECHE | ABDERREZAK LE PARA | ABDUL RASAK AMMANE ABU HAIDRA | ABDALARAK | AMARI SAIFI | SAIFI AMMARI
Ag00908	RIADH JELASSI	JELASSI RIADH | RIADH BEN BELKASSEM BEN MOHAMED JELASSI
Ag00909	ABU IMAD	
Ag00910	YASSINE CHEKKOURI	
Ag00911	NABIL BENATTIA	NABIL BEN ATTIA | NABIL BEN MOHAMED BEN ALI ATTIA
Ag00912	ABDEL HALIM HAFED REMADNA	ABDELHALIM HAFED REMADNA | ABDELHALIM REMADNA
Ag00913	MEHDI KHAMMOUN	MEHDI KAMMOUN | MEHDI BEN MOHAMED BEN MOHAMED KAMMOUN
Ag00914	ADEL BEN SOLTANE	ADEL BEN AL-AZHAR BEN YOUSSEF BEN SOLTANE
Ag00915	LAZHAR BEN MOHAMMED TLILI	AL-AZHAR BEN AMMAR BEN ABADALLAH TLILI
Ag00916	MANSOUR THAER	
Ag00917	HABIB WADDANI	
Ag00918	MOHAMMED YEHIA KAAKI	
Ag00919	SALEH JAMAL	
Ag00920	FARID BELARIBI	
Ag00921	JOHAN BONTE	JOHANN BONTE
Ag00922	RACHID BENMESSAHEL	
Ag00923	ABDELKRIF LEFKIR	ABDELKRIM LEFKIR
Ag00924	RACHID JALIL	ABOU ANAS | ABU ANAS
Ag00925	YASSINE LAHNECH	ABOU IBRAHIM | ABU IBRAHIM
Ag00926	MOHAMED EL OMARI	ABOU ZOUHEIR | ABOU ZOUBEIR | ABU ZUBIR | MOHAMMED EL OMARI | MOHAMMED EL ARBAOUI
Ag00927	ABU MUSA AL-HINDI	ISSA AL-HINDI | BILAL | ABU EISA AL-HINDI | DHIREN BAROT | ISSA AL-BRITANI | ISSA THE INDIAN | ISSA AL-BRITANI | ISSA THE BRITON | ISSA AL BRITANI
Ag00928	AHMED OMAR SAEED SHEIKH	AHMED OMAR SHEIKH | SHEIKH OMAR | MOHAMMAD BASHIR | OMAR SHEIKH
Ag00929	ABU FARAJ AL-LIBBI	ABU FARAJ AL-LIBI | ABU FARAJ FARJ AL LIBI | ABU FARAJ FARJ | DR TAUFEEQ
Ag00930	QARI SAIFULLAH AKHTAR	
Ag00931	BABAR AHMAD	
Ag00932	MOHAMMED MASOOD AZHAR ALVI	MAULANA MASOOD AZHAR | MASUD AZHAR | MASOOD AZHAR | WALI ADAM ISAH | WALI ADAM ESAH
Ag00933	FAZLUR REHMAN-KHALIL	FAZLUR REHMAN KHALIL | MAULANA FAZLUR REHMAN KHALIL | SHEIKH FAZLUR REHMAN KHALIL | MAULANA FAZLUL RAHMAN KHALIL
Ag00934	HAFIZ SAEED	HAFIZ MUHAMMAD SAEED | HAFIZ MOHAMMAD SAYEED SAYEED
Ag00935	HAMEEDULLAH NIAZI	HAMEEDULLAH KHAN NIAZI
Ag00936	ADIL	IMRAN
Ag00937	KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED	KSM | ABDUL MAJID | MUKHTAR
Ag00938	MOHAMMED SOHAIL	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00939	HASHIM QADEER	MOHAMMAD HASHIM QADEER | ARIF
Ag00940	MOHAMED MRABET FAHSI	
Ag00941	MOUNIR MRABET FAHSI	
Ag00942	MOHAMED SAID HSSISNI	
Ag00943	HASSAN MOURDOUDE	
Ag00944	MUSTAFA FAWZI AIT OUDRISS	
Ag00945	MUSTAPHA ES SATTY	
Ag00946	ABDELHAK BOUDINA	
Ag00947	MHAMED HADDAD	
Ag00948	DRISS HADDAD	
Ag00949	HASSAN HADDAD	
Ag00950	MOHAMED HADDAD	
Ag00951	MAHAMAD TIAZOUNIE	
Ag00952	ABDENBI LEBCHINA	
Ag00953	MAHAMAD SULEYMAN	
Ag00954	SAMIR SULEYMAN	
Ag00955	MUSTAPHA MOHAMED RIZK	
Ag00956	MOHAMED KAFARNA	
Ag00957	OMAR SALWA	
Ag00958	ZIANI MAHDI	
Ag00959	MOURAD YALA	ABU ANAS | MOURAT YALA
Ag00960	REDOUAN AL-ISSAR	ABU KHALED
Ag00961	ISMAIL AKHNIKH	ISMAEL A. | ISMAIL A.
Ag00962	JASON WALTERS	JASON W.
Ag00963	MARAD J.	
Ag00964	NADIR ADARRAF	
Ag00965	LABIDINE AOURGHE	ZINE LABIDINE AOURGHE
Ag00966	MOHAMED BOUGHABA	MOHAMED FAHMI BOUGHABE
Ag00967	MOHAMED EL BOUSKLAOUI	
Ag00968	YOUSEF ETTOUMI	
Ag00969	ZAKARIA TAYBI	
Ag00970	AHMED HAMDI	
Ag00971	RASHID BOUSSANA	RACHID BOUSANA
Ag00972	MOHAMED EL MORABIT	MUHAMMAD AL-MORABIT
Ag00973	NOUREDINE EL FAHTNI	NOUREDINE EL-FAHTNI | NOURIDDIN EL-FATMI | NOURIDDIN EL FATMI | FOUAD
Ag00974	JERMAINE WALTERS	
Ag00975	EL-SAYYID NOSAIR	EL SAYYID NOSAIR | EL SAYYID A. NOSAIR | SAYYID NOSAIR
Ag00976	NIDAL AYYAD	NIDAL A. AYYAD | WIDAL AYYAD | NIDALY AYYAD | WIDAL AYYAD
Ag00977	MAHMOUD ABOUHALIMA	MAHMUD ABOUHALIMA
Ag00978	IBRAHIM ELGABROWNY	IBRAHIM EL-GABROWNY

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag00979	AHMAD AJAJ	MOHAMMAD AHMAD AJAJ | KHURRAM KHAN
Ag00980	RAMZI YOUSEF	RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF | ABDUL BASIT BALOCHI | MAHMOUD KAREEM | ABDUL BASIT | AZAN MUHAMMAD | KHURRAM KHAN | RASHED | KAMAL IBRAHAM | NAJI HADDAD | AMALDO FORLANI | ADAM ALI QASAM | DR PAUL VIJAY | DR ADEL SABAH | MUHAMMED ALI BALOCH
Ag00981	ABDUL MURAD	ABDUL HAKIM MURAD | ABDUL HAKIM ALI HASHIM MURAD | ABDULHAKIM MURAD | ALI MURAD
Ag00982	BILAL ALKAISI	
Ag00983	ABDELGHANI RABIA	MOHAMMED BERKOUS
Ag00984	FAIZA BENNOUNA	
Ag00985	ABDELLAH BOUABDELLAH	
Ag00986	MOKHTAR HAOUARI	MOKHTAR HAOURI
Ag00987	RABAH KADRE	KADRE | TOUFIK | RABAH KADRI
Ag00988	KAMEL BOURGASS	
Ag00989	NABIL SAHRAWI	ABU IBRAHIM MUSTAFA | NABIL SAHRAOUI | MUSTAPHA ABOU IBRAHIM
Ag00990	SAAJID BADAT	SAJID BADAT
Ag00991	BURAWI EL WAHIR	
Ag00992	ABDESSATTAR DAHMAN	DAHMANE ABD AL-SATTAR | KARIM TOUZANI
Ag00993	ADEL TEBOURSKI	
Ag00994	MOHAMED ZITLI	MOHAMED SLITI | MOHAMMED AMOR SLITI | AMOR BEN MOHAMED SLITI
Ag00995	AHMED ELLATTAH	
Ag00996	MOKHTAR BELMOKHTAR	KHALED ABOU EL ABBAS | EL AOUAR | THE ONE-EYED | MUKHTAR BILMUKHTAR | BELAOUVER | MARLBORO GODFATHER | KHALED ABOU ABBAS | LAOUAR ONE-EYED MAN | ABOU EL-ABBES KHALED BELMOKHTAR
Ag00997	EL-ZAHRANI	KHALID SAEED AHMAD AL ZAHRANI (?)
Ag00998	ABOU CHIHAB	
Ag00999	MOHAMED DJABER	
Ag01000	YASSER SAYYAF	ABOU YASSER SAYYAF | KETOUF MOULOUD
Ag01001	IBRAHIM GHUREIKA	IBRAHIM ABI ISAAC
Ag01002	HASSAN HATTAB	ABOU HAMZA
Ag01003	NUREDDIN GHUREIKA	
Ag01004	BILAL (GSPC)	
Ag01006	ASSEM AL-TIBSI	
Ag01007	YEHIA (GSPC)	
Ag01008	AL-BASHIR AL-GHARBI	
Ag01009	ABU DAJANA (GSPC)	ABOU DAJANA

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01010	ABDELMALIK DAROUKEDEL	ABOU MOUSAAB ABDELOUADOUD | ABDELMALEK DROUKDEL | ABDELMAKEK DROUKDEL | ABOU MOSSAAB ABDELWADOUD | ABDELMALEK DROUKDAL | ABDELMALEK DROUKADAL | ABDELMALEK DARDAKIL | ABDELMALEK DROKDAL | ABDELMALEK DOURKDAL | ABDELMALEK DROUGDEL | ABDELMALEK DROUKBEL | ABDELMALEK DERDOUKAL | ABDEL MALEK DEROUDEL | ABDEL MALEK DROUKDEL | ABDELMALIK DROUKDAL | `ABD AL-MALIK DRUKDAL | `ABD AL-MALIK DURIKDAL | `ABD-AL-MALIK DROKDAL | ABD-AL-MALIK DRIDQAL | ABDELOUADOUR DROUKDEL | ABU-MUS'AB ABD-AL-WADUD | ABDELMALEK DROUKDEL | ABOU MOSSAAB ABDELOUADOUD | ABU MUSAB ABDELOUDOUD | ABU MUSSAAB ABDELOUADODUD | ABU MUS'AB ABDELOUADOUD | ABU MOSSAB ABDELOUADOUD
Ag01011	EL CHERIF GOUSMI	
Ag01012	ABDELAZIZ ABBI	OUKACHA EL PARA | OKACHA EL-PARA | ABI ABDELAZIZ | A. ABDELAZIZ
Ag01013	REDOUAN CHEKKOURI	
Ag01014	YOUNES CHEKKOURI	
Ag01015	ABDEL HAMID SHAARI	
Ag01016	OMAR SHAABANI	ABU JAFFA | ABOU JAFFA | ABU JAFAR AL-JAZIRI
Ag01017	SAID ATMANI	KARIM SAID ATMANI
Ag01018	ABDULSALAM ALI ALI ABDULRAHMAN	
Ag01019	MEVLUET TAR	
Ag01020	RAMEZ SULTAN	MOHAMED RAMEZ SULTAN
Ag01021	OTHMAN KAAKI	
Ag01022	MOHAMMED OMAR JAMAL	OMAR JAMAL
Ag01023	AHMED JAMAL	
Ag01024	HAITHAM MULHEM	
Ag01025	MICHAEL KANAAN	
Ag01026	WASIM EL-ASAAD	
Ag01027	RABEEH MAWAS	
Ag01028	SHEIK ABDUL ZOUD	SHEIKH ABDUL SALAM ZOUD | SHEIKH ABDUS SALAAM MOHAMMED ZOUD
Ag01029	WILLIE BRIGITTE	SALA HUDIN | WILLIE VIRGILLE BRIGITTE | WILLY BRIGITTE
Ag01030	MAMDOUH HABIB	AHMAD HABIB
Ag01031	FAHEEM KHALID LODHI	ABU HAMZA | ABU HAMZA (LET) | ROGER | SAM PRAVEEN
Ag01032	IZHAR UL-HAQUE	
Ag01033	NABIL BOUNOUR	
Ag01034	AZNIRI FILALI	
Ag01035	AHMED ZEBBAR	
Ag01036	YUSSEF FIKRI	YOUSSEF FIKRI | SHEIKH AL-AFGHAN
Ag01037	HASSAN TAOUSI	HASSAN TAOUSSI | HASSAN TAWSSI
Ag01038	MILOUDI ZAKARIA	
Ag01039	ABDELKRIM CHADLI	
Ag01040	OMAR HADDOUCHI	
Ag01041	ABDUL AZIZ JALIL	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01042	OMAR ABDUR REHMAN	
Ag01043	MOHAMMED ZIA UL HAQ	ZIA UL HAQ
Ag01044	NADEEM TARMOHAMED	
Ag01045	MOHAMMED NAVEED BHATTI	
Ag01046	QUAISIR SHAFFI	QAISAR SHAFFI | QUAISAR SHAFFI
Ag01047	JUNADE FEROZE	
Ag01048	ATTA-UR RAHMAN	IBRAHIM | ATAUR REHMAN
Ag01049	SHAHZAD BAJWA	SHAHZAD AHMED BAJWA
Ag01050	MASRAB AROCHI	
Ag01051	EDA KHAN	EDIA KHAN
Ag01052	FEROZ IBRAHIM	
Ag01053	ZUBAIR ISMAIL	
Ag01054	SALMAN SAQUIB	
Ag01055	FAHD NASIM	FAHAD NASEEM
Ag01056	SHEIKH ADIL	
Ag01057	MOHAMMAD ASLAM	
Ag01058	SADIA OMAR SHEIKH	
Ag01059	AHMED SAEED SHEIKH	
Ag01060	IMTIAZ SIDDIQE	IMTIAZ SIDDIQUI
Ag01061	AFTAB ANSARI	FARHAN MALIK
Ag01062	MAZHARUL ISLAM	MOHAMMAD OMAR CHOTO | DHOBI
Ag01063	FAZAL KARIM	
Ag01064	ATTAUR REHMAN	NAEEM BOKHARI | NAEEM BUKHARI
Ag01065	LIAQUAT HUSSEIN	
Ag01066	MAULANA TAHIR ASHRAFI	
Ag01067	KHALID KHAWAJA	
Ag01068	ZAHEERUL ISLAM ABBASI	
Ag01069	WAQAR HUSSAIN KHAN	
Ag01070	AHMED ABDULLAH MANI	
Ag01071	RAMAY S ZAMZAM	RAMA ZAMZAM
Ag01072	IMAN HASAN YAMAR	
Ag01073	OMAR FAROUK	UMAR FAROUK
Ag01074	MAZEN MOKHTAR	
Ag01075	SHAMIL BASAYEV	
Ag01076	SYED R. MASWOOD	
Ag01077	YASER AL JHANI	
Ag01078	HASSAN ABUJIHAAD	PAUL R. HALL
Ag01079	DERRICK SHAREEF	TALIB ABU SALAM IBN SHAREEF
Ag01080	PIR SAIFULLAH KHALID	MAULANA PIR SAIFULLAH KHALID | SAIFULLAH KHALID
Ag01081	MUFTI RASHEED AHMAD	MAULANA MUFTI RASHEED AHMAD

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01082	MUFTI NIZAMUDDIN SHAMZAI	MAULANA MUFTI NIZAMUDDIN SHAMZAI
Ag01083	SHER ALI SHAH	MAULANA SHER ALI SHAH
Ag01084	ABDUR RAZZAK FAROOQI	MAULANA ABDUR RAZZAK FAROOQI
Ag01085	AZIZUR REHMAN	MAULANA AZIZUR REHMAN | SHEIKH AZIZUR REHMAN
Ag01086	DIN MOHAMMAD	MAULANA DIN MOHAMMAD
Ag01087	MOHAMMAD NASRULLAH	MAULANA MOHAMMAD NASRULLAH
Ag01088	ASADULLAH FAROOQ	MAULANA ASADULLAH FAROOQ
Ag01089	MANSOOR AHMAD	MAULANA MANSOOR AHMAD
Ag01090	GHAZI BABA	SHAHBAZ KHAN | VICTORIOUS ONE | ABU JIHADI | SHANAWAZ KHAN
Ag01091	MUHAMMAD AFZAL	MOHAMMAD AFZAL
Ag01092	TABASSUM AFZAL	
Ag01093	MOHAMMAD NAEEM	
Ag01094	SAEEDUR REHMAN	
Ag01095	MUHAMMAD SOHAIL	
Ag01096	MOHAMMAD AJMAL AMIR KASAB	AJMAL AMIR KAMAL | AZAM AMIR QASAB | MOHAMMAD AJMAL AMIR QASAB | AJMAL AMIR KASAB | AJMAL KASAB | AJMAL QASAB
Ag01097	ABDUL WAHID KASHMIRI	MAULANA ABDUL WAHID KASHMIRI
Ag01098	ABDULLAH (FROM ANANTNAG-ISLAMABAD)	
Ag01099	HAJI MOHAMMAD AZAM	
Ag01100	MUZAMMIL BUTT	YOUSAF | YUSUF MUZAMMIL
Ag01101	MOHAMMAD UMAIR	MOHAMMED UMER MADANI
Ag01102	FAISAL DAR	
Ag01103	CHOUDHRY ABDULLAH KHALID CHOHAN	
Ag01104	RAFIQ AKHTAR	
Ag01105	AFTAB HUSSAIN	
Ag01106	CHOUDHRY YOUSAF	
Ag01107	MOHAMMAD SHRIF BALGHARI	
Ag01108	RAJA MOHAMMAD IRSHAD	
Ag01109	MASOOD LONE	
Ag01110	MEMOONA SAEED	
Ag01111	YAHYA MUJAHID	MUHAMMAD YAHYA MUJAHID
Ag01112	KHALID BASHIR	
Ag01113	HAFIZ ABDUR REHMAN MAKKI	
Ag01114	HAJI MOHAMMAD ASHRAF	
Ag01115	ABU AHMED AL HASHIM	
Ag01116	MOHAMMAD SARWAR	
Ag01117	ABU USAMA	
Ag01118	BASHIR ALI WANI	
Ag01119	SYED MOHAMMED ALI	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01120	MOHAMMAD AKRAM NIAZI	
Ag01121	ZIA IKRAM NIAZI	
Ag01122	RIZWAN NIAZI	
Ag01123	HAMAD NIAZI	
Ag01124	SULEMAN SAQIB	
Ag01125	MOHAMED ANOUAR ZAOUDI	
Ag01126	ISSA BEN OTHMAN	
Ag01127	KHADIJA PODD	VIRGINIA FAHSI
Ag01128	ABDOL GHAFFAR HASHEMI	
Ag01129	NAOUFEL	ABDELADIM AKOUAD | NAOUFEL AKOUDAD
Ag01130	ABDELKRIM BENSMAIL	ABDELKRIM BENESMAIL | ABDELKRIM BESMAIL
Ag01131	MOHAMED AMINE AKLI	MOHAMMED AMINE AKLI
Ag01132	BACHIR BELHAKEM	BACHIR BELHAKEN
Ag01133	MAJID MCHMACHA	MAGID MCHMACHA
Ag01134	EDDEBDOUBI TAOUFIK	
Ag01135	MOUAD DOUAS	
Ag01136	MUSTAFA FARJANI	
Ag01137	BAANOU ABDULLAH	
Ag01138	SAID AFIF	
Ag01139	MOKHATAR SIAH	
Ag01140	DJAMEL MERABET	
Ag01141	KAMARA BIRAHIMA DIADIE	
Ag01142	BALDOMERO LARA SANCHEZ	
Ag01143	SMAIL LATRECH	
Ag01144	AHMED MOHAMED AHMED	
Ag01145	ALI OMAR	JELLOUL
Ag01146	MEDHI	MEHDI
Ag01147	MASLOHI ALI	HASSAN L. | MOHAMMED
Ag01148	AMROUCH EL H.	
Ag01149	RACHID BELKACEM	ABU FADEL
Ag01150	BISLAN I.	
Ag01151	INGRID WALTERS	
Ag01152	CARL WALTERS	
Ag01153	MALIKA CHABI	
Ag01154	MOHAMMAD EL SHERSHABY	
Ag01155	SOUMAYA SAHLA	
Ag01156	ADNAN KONSTANTINE	
Ag01157	SIDDIG IBRAHIM SIDDIG ALI	SIDDIG SIDDIG-ALI | SIDDIG ALI
Ag01158	CLEMENT RODNEY HAMPTON-EL	DR. RASHID | CLEMENT HAMPTON-EL | ABDUL RASHID ABDULLAH | RASHEED
Ag01159	ABDO MOHAMMED HAGGAG	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01160	AMIR ABDELGANI	
Ag01161	FARES KHALLAFALLA	FARES KHALAFALLAH | FARES KHALAFALLA
Ag01162	TARIG ELHASSAN	TARIG EL-HASSAN
Ag01163	FADIL ABDELGANI	FADIL ABDELGHANI
Ag01164	MOHAMMED SALEH	MOHAMMED SALAH
Ag01165	VICTOR ALVAREZ	MOHAMMED THE SPANISH
Ag01166	MATARAWY MOHAMMED SAID SALEH	WAHID | WAHID SALEH
Ag01167	EARL GANT	ABDUL RASHID | ABDUL JALIL
Ag01168	MARIANNE ABOUHALIMA	
Ag01169	MOHAMED ABOUHALIMA	MOHAMED ABOUHAHIMA | MOHAMMED ABOUHALIMA
Ag01170	ABDEL-RAHMAN JOSEPH AYYAD	
Ag01171	RESIQ AYYAD	
Ag01172	ABDUL AYYAD	
Ag01173	ABDO YASSIN	
Ag01174	IBRAHIM AHMAD SULEIMAN	
Ag01175	EYAD MAHMOUD ISMOIL	IYAD MAHMOUD ISMAIL NAJEM
Ag01176	MOHAMMAD ABUKHDEIR	
Ag01177	OMAR OBAID	
Ag01178	EDWIN ANGELES	
Ag01179	MUSTAFA AHMAD AL-HAWSAWI	MUSTAFA AHMAD ADIN AL-HUSAWI | HASIM ABD-AL RAHMAN | ZAHIR | AYYUB | MUHAMMAD ADNAN
Ag01180	MOHAMAD JAMAL KHALIFA	MOHAMMAD JAMAL KHALIFA | JAMAL MOHAMMED KHALIFA | ABU BARAA
Ag01181	ALICE YABO	JAMEELAH
Ag01182	NORALYN ZARAGOSA	
Ag01183	ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN	ABDUL RAHMAN SAID YASIN | ABOUD YASIN | ABDUL RAHMAN S. TAHA | ABDUL RAHMAN S. TAHER
Ag01184	WALI KHAN	WALI KHAN AMIN SHAH | USAMA ASMURAI
Ag01185	ISTIAQUE PARKER	
Ag01186	FAZEL OMAR	
Ag01187	ADEL ATTAYYAB	ADEL AT-TAYYEB
Ag01188	BAHAUDDIN	
Ag01189	IBRAHIM RASUL	
Ag01190	FAZLULLAH HAMIDI	
Ag01191	SALEEM ABDEL RAHIM	
Ag01192	TARIQ RANA	
Ag01193	ABDUL SHAKUR	ADBUL SHAKOOR | ABDUL SHAKOOR
Ag01194	MAHAUD AFFIF ABDEJALIL	
Ag01195	NEDAL SALEH ODEH	ABU TURAB
Ag01196	MOHAMMAD JUBRAN	ABU RASHID
Ag01197	AHMAD JUBRAN	ABU DAUD
Ag01198	WALID ISMOIL	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01199	MUHAMMAD ABDUL KARIM	
Ag01200	MOHAMMAD SABRI SELAMAH ABUSWEIRAH	
Ag01201	AHAMAD ABD BIN MASRIE	
Ag01202	HASSAN AL DDEN HASAN ALI	
Ag01203	HADI YOUSEF ALGHOUL	HEDI YOUSEF ALGHOUL
Ag01204	HASSAN AL-HIND	
Ag01205	FUAD JARDAN	
Ag01206	KHALID HASSAN	
Ag01207	FHAD AOUD	
Ag01208	AHMAD ABED MASRIE	
Ag01209	MUSTAFA FARAH	
Ag01210	KHALIL HUSSEIN	
Ag01211	HAMBALI	RIDUAN ISAMUDDIN | RIDUAN BIN ISOMUDDIN | NURJAMAN RIDUAN BIN ISAMUDDIN | AZMAN | NURJAMAN RIDUAN ISAMUDDIN
Ag01212	FATHUR ROMAN AL-GHOZI	MIKE THE BOMBMAKER | MIKE | ALIH RANDY | FATHURROHMAN AL GHOZI
Ag01213	FAIZ BIN ABU BAKAR BAFANA	FAIZ BAFANA | FAIZ BIN ABUBAKAR BAFANA
Ag01214	MUKHLIS YUNOS	MUKLIS YUNOS | SAIFULLA YUNOS | SAIFFULAH YUNOS | MOKLIS | HADJI ONOS | SAIFULLA MOKLIS YUNOS | SAIFULLAH MUKHLIS YUNOS
Ag01215	AHMED SATTAR	AHMED ABDEL SATTAR
Ag01216	ABUBKR ALY	
Ag01217	SAAID IBRAHIM	SAAD IBRAHIM
Ag01218	RACHID AHMED ZOUAOUI	
Ag01219	ABDEL MESKINI	ABDEL GHANI MESKINI | ABDELGHANI MESKINI
Ag01220	SAMIR AIT MOHAMED	
Ag01221	ABDELMADJID DAHOUMANE	ABDELMAJID ROUGI | LE ROUQUIN
Ag01222	MUSTAFA LABSI	
Ag01223	FATEH KAMEL	
Ag01224	MOHAMMED SUMIR	
Ag01225	HASAN ZUMERI	
Ag01226	RABAH CHEHAJ-BIAS	
Ag01227	KARIM KADOURI	
Ag01228	SLIMANE KHALFAOUI	
Ag01229	MIROUANE BEN AHMED	
Ag01230	AHMED BELHOUD	
Ag01231	MOHAMED MERBAH	
Ag01232	ABDELLAH ABDELHAFID	
Ag01233	MOURAD IDIR ABES	
Ag01234	GHALEM BELHADJ	
Ag01235	KARIM BENAMGHAR	
Ag01236	SALAH MOULLEF	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01237	HAKIM ZIEM	
Ag01238	SOFIANE LAHAMAR HASSIM ZIEM	
Ag01239	DAVID AISSA KHALEF	DAVID KHALEF
Ag01240	MOULOUD SIHALI	OMAR NAITATMANE | RIBERRO
Ag01241	ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI	MUSTAFA KAMEL MUSTAFA
Ag01242	MOHAMMED MEGUERBA	
Ag01243	MOHAMMAD SIDIQUE KHAN	IBRAHIM | MOHAMMED SADIQUE KHAN
Ag01244	SHEHZAD TANWEER	KHAKHA
Ag01245	JERMAINE LINDSAY	GERMAINE LINDSAY | LINDSEY GERMAINE | JAMAL
Ag01246	VALERIE TRAVERSO	
Ag01247	NAGAT CHAFFE	
Ag01248	OMAR DJEDID	
Ag01249	OMAR NAITATMANE	
Ag01250	SIDALI FEDDAG	
Ag01251	MUSTAPHA TALEB	
Ag01252	MUHAMMAD AL-TAYYIB	
Ag01253	SHAYKH ABD-AL-SAMAD AHMAD	MUFTI ABD-AL-SAMAD
Ag01254	RICHARD REID	RICHARD C. REID | RICHARD COLVIN REID | ABDUL-RAHEEM | ABU IBRAHIM ABDUL RAHEEM
Ag01255	NOUREDDINNE MOULEFF	
Ag01256	MOHAMMED BADAT	
Ag01257	ZUBEDA BADAT	
Ag01258	MALIKA EL AROUD	
Ag01259	YOUCEF AOUNI	YOUSSEF EL-AOUNI
Ag01260	YASSER AL-SIRI	
Ag01261	ABDERAHMANE AMEROUD	
Ag01262	MEHREZ AZOUZ	
Ag01264	KHELLAF HAMAM	
Ag01265	IBRAHIM KEITA	
Ag01267	ABDELKRIM EL HADOUTI	
Ag01268	ABID HAMMADOU	ABDELHAMID ABOU ZEID | ABIB HAMMADOU | ABDELHAMID ABU ZEID
Ag01269	SALIM EL-AFGHANI	SALIM THE AFGHAN
Ag01270	SIDI OULD SIDNA	
Ag01271	MOHAMED OULD CHABARNOU	
Ag01272	MAAROUF OULD HAIBA	
Ag01273	ABD-LEKHDIME	
Ag01274	ABDEL AZIZ	
Ag01275	KHATAB MOURAD	ABDELBER ABOU OMAR
Ag01276	ABDELHAMID SADAOUI	ABDELHAMID SAADAOUI | ABOU YAHIA
Ag01277	MOHAMED BELMOKHTAR	
Ag01278	ABOU ISHAK IBRAHIM	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01279	ASSEM ABOU SAID	
Ag01280	ABOU DOUJANA (GSPC)	
Ag01281	ABDELHAKIM (GSPC)	
Ag01282	BACHIR ABOU AL BARRA	
Ag01283	ABOU MOHAMED AL JINKI	
Ag01284	ALI DIX	SID ALI RACHID | ALI DIS | ALI ABU DAHDAH
Ag01285	HAROUN EL ACHAACHI	NOUR MOHAMED
Ag01286	ABOU-OUSSAMA	ABOU OUSSAMA ELMERDASSI | ZAOUIDI BELKACEM
Ag01287	YAHIA ABOU AMAR	
Ag01288	ABOU DEHDEH	
Ag01289	ABDEL ZAID ESSOUFFI	
Ag01290	HAMID ZAID ESSOUFFI	HAMID ESSOUFI
Ag01291	EL-HADJ	
Ag01292	AHMED ABOU AL-BARAA	AHMED ZARABIB
Ag01293	ADEL MECHAT	
Ag01294	OMAR SAITI	
Ag01295	KARIM BOUTRI	
Ag01296	IYAD AG GHALI	
Ag01297	BABA ULD SHEIKH	
Ag01298	MOHAMED RACHED	
Ag01299	ANTAR ZOUABRI	
Ag01300	ABOU KHALED	
Ag01301	ABDELMADJID DICHOU	ABOU MASAB | ABOU MOUSSAAB
Ag01302	AHMED CHABI	
Ag01303	MUSTAPHA EL YAZID	
Ag01304	SAADAOUI LYES	HOUDAIFA
Ag01305	ABOU HAYFEM	
Ag01306	NOREDINE SKODARLI	
Ag01307	S.H.	
Ag01308	M.G.	
Ag01309	C.W.	
Ag01310	R.R.C.	
Ag01311	Y.A.	
Ag01312	ATIYAH ABD AL-RAHMAN	
Ag01313	ANOUR MAJRAR	
Ag01314	LASSAD SASSI	
Ag01315	MUHAMMAD BENHEDI MSAHEL	
Ag01316	SAMI SAYOUD	
Ag01317	ABDELLATIF ZEHRAOUI	
Ag01319	ARMAN AHMED AL-HISSINI	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01320	HASSAN MUSTAFA OSAMA NASR	ABU OMAR
Ag01321	MOHAMED GAME	
Ag01322	IGNAOUA HABIB	
Ag01323	ABU HAFS THE MAURITANIAN	MAHFOUZ OULD AL-WALID | KHALID AL-SHANQITI | ABU HAFS MAURICNI
Ag01324	LUCIA GARAFALO	
Ag01325	ABDEL HAKIM TIZEGHA	
Ag01326	BOUABIDE CHAMCHI	
Ag01327	YAMIN RACHEK	
Ag01328	BRAHIM MAHDI	
Ag01330	IHAB DAFEH	
Ag01331	KHALED OMAR MINAWI	
Ag01332	ABDULLAH AL-MUTHADI	
Ag01333	ABDUL RAKIB HASAN	
Ag01334	ALI JAMAL	
Ag01335	MELANIE BROWN	KHADIJA
Ag01336	ABU SALAH	
Ag01337	SAMIR	
Ag01338	MAMADOU NDAW	
Ag01339	MUSTAFA CHEIKHO	
Ag01340	MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH HASAN ABU-AL-KHAYR	ABDALLAH AL-HALABI | 'ABDALLAH AL-HALABI AL-MADANI | ABDALLAH AL-MAKKI | ABDALLAH EL HALABI | ABDULLAH AL-HALABI | ABU 'ABDALLAH AL-HALABI | ABU ABDALLAH AL-MADANI | MOHAMMED ABDULLAH HASSAN ABUL-KHAIR | MUHAMMAD BIN- 'ABDULLAH BIN-HAMD ABU-AL-KHAYR | MUHANNAD AL-JADDAWI
Ag01341	VICTORIA BRIGITTE	
Ag01342	CHRISTIAN BRIGITTE	
Ag01344	MAHA HABIB	
Ag01345	MUHAMMAD ARIF BIN NAHARUDIN	ARIF NAHARUDIN
Ag01346	SAJID (LET)	
Ag01347	STEVEN CAI	
Ag01348	INAM UL-HAQUE	
Ag01349	IKRAM UL-HAQUE	
Ag01350	MOHAMED DAMIR	MOHAMED DMIR
Ag01351	AHMED AL-RAFIKI	
Ag01352	ABDELMALEK BOUZGARENE	ABDELMALEK BOUZGARNE
Ag01353	YOUSSEF ADAD	
Ag01354	ABDELAZIZ FIKRI	
Ag01355	MOHAMED BENHAMOU	
Ag01356	ISAM ZAMZANI	
Ag01357	ADIL ACHIR	
Ag01358	MOHAMMED HAMOUMI	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01359	MOHAMMED MABROUK	
Ag01360	BENDAOUD DMIR	
Ag01361	BRAHIM HAMDI	
Ag01362	HICHAM DARBANI	
Ag01363	SALAHEDDINE DEBICHE	
Ag01364	MOHAMED JERMOUNI	
Ag01365	MOURAD LAMNAOUAR	
Ag01366	SALEH ZARLI	
Ag01367	ABDERRAZAK FAOUZI	
Ag01368	KAMAL HANOUICHI	
Ag01369	BOUCHAIB GUERMACH	
Ag01370	LAKBIR KOUTOUBI	
Ag01371	BOUCHAIB MGHADER	
Ag01372	OMAR MAAROUF	
Ag01373	LAARBI DAQIQ	
Ag01374	ABDERRAHMAN MAJDOUBI	
Ag01375	RACHID AMRINE	
Ag01376	MILOUD MANDOUR	
Ag01377	MUSTAPHA LAKRIMI	
Ag01378	HOUSSEIN BERGHACHI	
Ag01379	YAZID AJREF	
Ag01380	MOURAD SAROUF	
Ag01381	MOHAMED JOK	
Ag01382	YOUSEF JALIL	
Ag01384	ABDELRAZAQ RTIWI	
Ag01385	ABDELKADER EL ARBAOUI	
Ag01386	AMNA EL ARBAOUI	
Ag01387	MUSTAFA EL ARBAOUI	
Ag01388	OMAR ALTIMIMI	
Ag01389	YOUNIS TSOULI	IRAHABI7
Ag01390	WASEEM MUGHAL	
Ag01391	TARIQ AL-DAOUR	
Ag01392	MOHAMMED FEROZE	
Ag01394	HAROON ASWAT	HAROON RASHID ASWAT
Ag01395	FARIS AL-ZAHRANI	
Ag01396	YAQOOB SAEED	
Ag01397	UZAIR AHMED	
Ag01398	SHOAIB SIDDIQUI	
Ag01399	DANISH INAM	
Ag01400	NAJEEBULLAH	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01401	KHURRAM SAIFULLAH	
Ag01402	SHAHZAD MUKHTAR	
Ag01403	AKMAL WAHEED	
Ag01404	ARSHAD WAHEED	
Ag01405	RAO KHLAID	
Ag01406	MOHAMMAD SHOAIB	
Ag01407	ADNAN SHAH	
Ag01408	ABDUL WAHEED	
Ag01409	JEHAN ARA	
Ag01410	ABDUL HASAB	
Ag01411	GUL HASAN	ALI HAIDER
Ag01412	HASAMUL SANI	
Ag01413	TAHIR YULDASH	QARI TAHIR JAN | YULDASHEV TOHIR
Ag01414	ABDULLAH AL-HAJ	
Ag01415	DAWAR KHAN	
Ag01416	RIAZ BASRA	
Ag01417	USAMA KHALID	
Ag01418	KHALID FAROUK	
Ag01419	SUBIRA FAROUK	
Ag01420	AMAL KHALIFA	
Ag01421	ABDUL BASIT	
Ag01422	SHARIF MUHAMMAD	
Ag01423	ABU OMAR AS-SEYF	
Ag01424	MAGOMED YEVLOYEV	MAGAS | ALI TAZIYEV | MAGOMED KHASHIYEV
Ag01425	ELINA ERSENOYEVA	
Ag01426	MARIE SCHULTZ	
Ag01427	ISHAQ RIND	
Ag01428	ZAKIUR REHMAN LAKHVI	ABU WAHEED IRSHAD AHMAD | ZAKI-UR-REHMAN | ZAKIR UR-REHMAN | ZAKI- UR- REHMAN | CHACHU | UNCLE
Ag01429	HAFIZ AZIZUR REHMAN	
Ag01430	ABU ABDUR RAHMAN SAREEHI	
Ag01431	ABU ANAS	
Ag01432	MOHAMMAD QASIM	
Ag01433	ABDUL QADEER KHAMOSH	
Ag01434	HAFIZ TAHIR MAHMOOD ASHRAFI	
Ag01435	ARSHAD MOHAMMED HANIF ANSARI	
Ag01436	SYED MOHAMMED HANIF RAHIM	
Ag01437	FAMIDA RAHIM	
Ag01438	FARHEEN RAHIM	
Ag01439	NASIR MEHMOOD AHWAN	
Ag01440	MOHAMMED (JEM)	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01441	HAMZA (JEM)	
Ag01442	HAIDER (JEM)	
Ag01443	RANA (JEM)	
Ag01444	RAJA (JEM)	
Ag01445	AR GEELANI	
Ag01446	SHAUKAT HUSSAIN GURU	SHAUKAT HUSSAIN
Ag01447	AFSANA	NAVJOT SANDHU | AFSAN GURU
Ag01448	SUBHASH MALHOTRA	
Ag01449	VIRENDRA PAL	
Ag01450	TARIQ AHMED	TARIQ (JEM)
Ag01451	SAIFUL ISLAM	
Ag01452	ABU KASHA	
Ag01453	ABU ZAID	
Ag01454	ABDUL REHMAN DEDAR	
Ag01455	KHURSHID AHMED PARREY	
Ag01456	SEHRAI BABA	
Ag01457	GHALIB AFZAL	
Ag01458	YAHYA	
Ag01459	ISMAIL KHAN	ABU ISMAIL
Ag01460	FAHEEM ANSARI	FAHIM ANSARI | FAHIM ARSHAD MOHAMMAD YUSUF ANSARI
Ag01461	SABAUDDIN SHAIKH	SABAUDDIN AHMED | SABAUDDIN AHMAD | SABAUDDIN AHMED SHABBIR AHMED SHAIKH
Ag01462	HAMMAD AMIN SADIQ	
Ag01463	DAVID HEADLEY	DAVID COLEMAN HEADLEY | DAOOD GILANI
Ag01464	ABU AL QAMA	MAZHAR IQBAL | UMAR
Ag01465	ZARAR SHAH	ZARRAR SHAH | ABDUL WAJID | RANA MUZMAL | YOUSAF
Ag01466	SHAHID JAMIL RIAZ	SHAH JAMIL RIAZ
Ag01467	JAMIL AHMED	
Ag01468	MUHAMMED YOUNAS ANJAM	YOUNAS ANJUM
Ag01469	SAMIR ALI	
Ag01471	ILLYAS KASHMIRI	MOHAMMAD ILYAS KASHMIRI
Ag01472	ATEEQ CHAUHAN	
Ag01473	SHAMSHAD AHMAD SALFI	
Ag01474	ABDULLAH MUNTAZIR	
Ag01475	ZAFFAR IQBAL	
Ag01476	TALHA SAEED	
Ag01477	FAWAD (COUSIN OF SULEMAN SAQIB)	
Ag01478	ADIL SHEIKH	
Ag01479	SOUBHI KINIC	SOUBI KUNI
Ag01480	NAUREDDINE SALIN ABDOUMALOU	NOURREDINE SALIM

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01481	MOHAMED HAMID	
Ag01482	ABDELLAH HAWARI	
Ag01483	RACHID MOHAMED MOHAMED	
Ag01484	MOHAMED LEUSSADI	
Ag01485	SADE ASDE	
Ag01486	SALAH GHOULAM	
Ag01487	HADJ BOURGIBA	
Ag01488	ALI IBRAHIM	
Ag01489	MOHAMMED ADJIMI	
Ag01490	FARID GHRIEB	
Ag01491	MEHREZ BEN MAHDOUD	
Ag01492	DIBALI ABDELLAH	ADDILA MIMON
Ag01493	AFIF MEJRI	
Ag01494	YACINE AHMED NACER	
Ag01495	ALI EL HEIT	
Ag01496	RABAH BOURAS	
Ag01497	LAMINE AHMED NACER	
Ag01498	FARID AIDER	
Ag01499	ANTONIO (SPANISH ARMS TRAFFICKER)	
Ag01500	EMAD SALEM	
Ag01501	ASHRAF MOHAMMED	
Ag01502	AHMED YOUSIF MOHAMED	AHMED YOUSEF
Ag01503	SIRAJ EL'DIN YOUSIF	SIRAJ EL-DIN
Ag01504	SHEIK MUBARAK SHAH JILANI	SHEIK MUBARAK ALI GILANI | SHEIK MUBARIK ALI SHAH GILANI
Ag01505	JAMES WILLIAMS	
Ag01506	STEPHEN PASTER	
Ag01507	WARITH DEEN UMAR	
Ag01508	JOSE PADILLA	IBRAHIM | ABU ABDULLAH THE PUERTO RICAN | ABU ABDULLAH AL MUJAHIR
Ag01509	JOHN WALKER LINDH	ABDUL HAMID | SULAYMAN FARIS | SULEYMAN AL-LINDH
Ag01511	LT. GEN. JAVED NASIR	
Ag01512	YAHYA ABU UBAIDAH MUHAMMAD	KARL DEXTER TAYLOR
Ag01513	ELSIE HAMPTON-EL	
Ag01514	LEON HOLLAND	ABDUL MALIK SHABAZZ
Ag01515	LAMONT HOLDER	MASSOUD SHAHEED
Ag01516	ABD AL-AZIZ UDA	
Ag01517	KHIDR ALI	
Ag01518	GLENN NEVILLE FORD	
Ag01519	CABA JOSE HARRIS	
Ag01520	ROBERT JUNIOR WESLEY	
Ag01521	TYRONE JUNIOR COLE	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01522	MUSTAFA ABDU RASHID	
Ag01523	TRACI ELAINE UPSHUR	
Ag01524	VINCENTE PIERRE	
Ag01525	ABDUL JABBAR	
Ag01526	ABDUS-SALAAM	
Ag01527	KAREN ANN MILLS SWEENEY	
Ag01528	LINDA LEE SANCHEZ	
Ag01529	YOUSEF AYYAD	
Ag01530	EVONNE GRAVES	
Ag01531	HASAB ELRASOUL BABEKIR	
Ag01532	OSMAN EL-SHEIKH	
Ag01533	SAEED AKMAN	SAID AHMED
Ag01534	ADEL ANNON	
Ag01535	EDITH GESMUNDO	
Ag01536	JOVENAL BRUNO	JUVENAL BRUNO
Ag01537	ABURAJAK ABUBAKAR JANJALANI	ABUBAKAR JANJALANI | ABDURAJAK ABUBAKAR JANJALANI
Ag01538	KHADAFI MONTANO JANJALANI	KHADAFI JANJALANI | ABU MUKTAR
Ag01540	ISAM MOHAMMED ABDUL HADI	
Ag01541	MOHAMMED ISMAEL DEIB	
Ag01542	NABIL NASSER AL-RIYAMI	
Ag01543	WAIL RACHEL AL-KAATIB	
Ag01544	ASERAF ABDUL ALZOURI RAHMAN	
Ag01545	ENAAM M. ARNAOUT	ABU MAHMOUD | ABDEL SAMIA
Ag01546	SHEIK ADIL ABDUL GALIL BATARGY	
Ag01547	ABUBAKAR SHARIFADA	
Ag01548	ZAKARIA M. SHIKH	
Ag01549	NORALWIZAH LEE	NORALWIZAH LEE ABDULLAH | NORALIZA ABDULLAH
Ag01550	OMAR AL-FARUQ	MAHMUD ADMAD ASSAGAF | OMAR AL-FAROUQ | UMAR FARUQ | MOHAMMED ASSEGAF
Ag01551	GOLIYAH ASSAGAF	
Ag01552	HANUN ASSAGAF	
Ag01553	MIRA AGUSTINA	
Ag01554	MAHMOUD AFIF ABDELJALIL	
Ag01555	KHALID AL-MIDHAR	KHALID ALMIHDHAR | SANNAN AL-MAKKI | KHALID BIN MUHAMMAD | 'ADDALLAH AL-MIHDHAR | KHALID MOHAMMAD AL-SAQAF
Ag01556	NAWAF AL-HAZMI	NAWAF ALHAZMI | NAWAF AL HAZMI | NAWAF M.S. AL HAZMI
Ag01557	ABED SHEIKH MOHAMMED	
Ag01558	ZAHED SHEIKH MOHAMMED	ZAHID SHEIKH MOHAMMED
Ag01559	AREF SHEIKH MOHAMMED	
Ag01560	ABDULLAH BIN KHALID AL-THANI	SHEIKH ABDALLAH BIN KHALID BIN HAMAD AL THANI

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01561	AHMAD AL-HAMWI	ABU OMAR
Ag01562	YAZID SUFAAT	
Ag01563	MUHAMMAD IQBAL	ABU JIBRAIL | ABU JIBRIL | FIKIRUDDIN MUQTI | MOHAMED IBAL BIN ABDURRAHMAN | MOHAMMAD IQBAL ABDUL RAHMAN | MOHAMAD IQBAL ABDURRAHMAN
Ag01564	CHOMEL SUFAAT	
Ag01565	MUHAMMAD SOBRI	
Ag01566	ABU BAKAR BASHIR	ABU BAKAR BAASYIR | ABU BAKAR BA'ASYIR | ABDUS SOMAD
Ag01567	SHAHRIL HAT	
Ag01568	MADAM FATIMAH ZAHARA	
Ag01569	ISMAEL LUMINGKIT ALI	
Ag01570	ABDULRAHMAN ESPINA	
Ag01571	ISMAEL NACAN	
Ag01572	ABDUL MANNAN MUKSAN	
Ag01573	ALEEM SHUAIB ABIDIN	
Ag01574	MOHAMED MANSOUR JABARA	MOHAMAD MANSOUR JABARAH | MOHAMMED MANSOUR JABARAH | SAMMY | ABU HAFS AL KUWAITI
Ag01576	ALI IMRON	
Ag01577	WAN MIN WAN MAT	
Ag01578	AMROZI	AMROZI NURHASYIM | AMROZI BIN NURHASYIM | M ROZI | ROZI
Ag01579	MUHAMMAD ZAKARIA	
Ag01580	ALI AL-AZIA ALI	AMMAR AL-BALUCHI | AMIR BALUCHI | ALI ABD AL-AZIZ ALI | ALI ABDUL AZIZ ALI | ISAM MANSUR
Ag01581	KANKAN ABDUL QADIR	KAN KAN
Ag01582	MARIYANI	
Ag01583	ZUBAIR MOHAMAD	
Ag01584	AZAHARI HUSIN	DR. AZAHARI BIN HUSIN | ADAM
Ag01585	SALMAH ABDULLAH	
Ag01586	ABDUL SAID	
Ag01587	ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI	ZACARIOUS MOUSSAOUI | ZACHARIAS MOUSSAOUI | ABU KHALED AL SAHRAWI | SHAQUIL
Ag01588	RUSMAN GUNAWAN	GUN GUN RUSMAN GUNAWAN | ABDUL HADI
Ag01589	HAMBALI'S CAMBODIAN WIFE	
Ag01590	ARIFIN BIN ALI	
Ag01591	HOQUE SINDIK	
Ag01592	MOHAMMED NAZIR BIN LEP	LI-LI | LILLIE | BASHIR BIN LEP | BASHIR BIN LAP
Ag01593	ABID KHAR	
Ag01594	BASHIR MEHMOOD	
Ag01595	SHAYKH MOHAMED MOKHTAR	
Ag01596	SAPAE-ING BASOR	
Ag01597	ESAM MOHAMID KHIRD ALI	
Ag01598	ABDUL AZI HAJI CHIMING	ABDUL AZIZ HAJICHEMING
Ag01599	MUHAMMAD YALALUDIN	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
	MADING	
Ag01600	SMAN ISMAEL	
Ag01601	IBRAHIM (JI IN CAMBODIA)	
Ag01602	ROUSHA YASSER	
Ag01603	KHORIYAHAN	
Ag01604	AZZAM (JI)	
Ag01605	TAUFIQ RIFQI	TAUFIK REFKE | TAUFIK RIFKI
Ag01606	ABDUL GHONI	UMAR WAYAN | UMAR BESAR | HASYIM ABDUL GHANI | UMAR | WAYAN
Ag01607	IQBAL UZZAMAN	IQBAL UZZAMAN
Ag01608	DELIAR NOER	
Ag01609	AL GABRE MAHMUD	
Ag01610	ABDUL JABAR	SOLEH
Ag01611	OMAR OPIK LASAL	
Ag01613	AGUNG BIYADI	
Ag01617	JA'FAR BIN MISTOOKI	JAFAR BIN MISTUKI | JA'AFAR BIN MISTOOKI | JA'AFAR | SAAD
Ag01618	HASHIM BIN ABAS	HASIM BIN ABBAS | HASHIM | HASYIM BIN ABBAS
Ag01619	IMAM SAMUDRA	ABDUL AZIZ | ABDURRAHMAN | FATIH | FAT | KUDAMA | ABU UMAR | HERI | FAIZ YUNSHAR | HENDRI
Ag01620	YASSIN SYWAL	YASSIN SYAWAL | SALIM YASIN | ABDUL HADI YASIN ABU SETA | MAHMUD MAHMUD MUBAROK | MUHAMMAD SYAWAL | LAODE IDA | ABU MUAMAR | MAHMUD | MOCHTAR YASIN MAHMUD | MUHAMAD MUBAROK
Ag01621	JULKIPLI SALIM Y SALAMUDDIN	JULKIPLI SALIM | KIPLI SALI | SALIM Y SALAMUDDIN JULKIPLI
Ag01622	SOLAMAIN ESMAEL	
Ag01623	ARIS MUNANDAR	
Ag01624	AGUS DWIKARNA	AGUS DWI KARNA
Ag01625	HUSSAIN RAMOS	COSAIN RAMOS | ABU ALI | CUSAIN RAMOS
Ag01626	ANTONIO REYES	TONY OF TANKE
Ag01627	ABDULLAH SUNGKAR	ABDUL HALIM
Ag01631	ZAINURI AL-GHOZI	
Ag01632	ALI GHUFRON	MUCHLAS | GUFRON | ALI GUFRON | MUKHLAS | HUDA BIN ABDUL HAQ
Ag01633	MOHAMBEDOU OULD SLAHI	MOHAMEDOU OULD SLAHI | ABU MUSAB
Ag01634	MR. MAURITANIA	
Ag01635	KHALIL DEEK	
Ag01636	MOURAD IKHLEF	
Ag01637	MUHAMMAD AHMED AL-AHDAL	
Ag01638	AHMED MUHAMMAD AMIN	
Ag01639	GHULAM MUSTAFA RAMA	
Ag01640	IMAM KAMEL DIN	
Ag01641	NICOLAS BELLONI	
Ag01642	MOHAMED YACINE AKNOUCHE	
Ag01643	JAMES UJAAMA	EARNEST JAMES UJAAMA

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01644	YASIN HASSAN OMAR	YASSIN OMAR | YASSIN HASSAN OMAR
Ag01645	ATILLA AHMET	ABU ABDULLAH
Ag01646	MOHAMMED ANSWAR	
Ag01647	BASHIR AHMED	
Ag01648	HASIB HUSSAIN	HASIB MIR HUSSAIN
Ag01649	HASINA KHAN	
Ag01650	MAGDY EL-NASHAR	MAGDY MAHMOUD MUSTAFA EL-NASHAR
Ag01651	MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN	
Ag01652	MANZIA HUSSAIN	
Ag01653	IMRAN HUSSAIN	
Ag01654	MOHAMMED JUNAID BABAR	
Ag01655	OMAR KHYAM	OMAR KHYAM
Ag01656	ANTHONY GARCIA	RAHMAN ADAM
Ag01657	WAHEED MAHMOOD	
Ag01658	JAWAD AKBAR	
Ag01659	SALAHUDDIN AMIN	
Ag01660	SHUJAH MAHMOOD	
Ag01661	NABEEL HUSSAIN	
Ag01662	ZEESHAN SIDDIQI	
Ag01663	OSAMA NAZIR	USAMA BIN WAHEED
Ag01664	HUSSEIN OSMAN	
Ag01665	MOHAMMAD MOMIN KHAWAJA	
Ag01666	SHERAFIYAH	SAMANTHA
Ag01667	ALI AYED AL-SHAMRANI	
Ag01668	ABU ZUBAIR AL-HAILI	ZUBAYR AL-HA'ILI | THE BEAR | ZOUHAIR HILAL MOHAMED TABITI
Ag01669	KHALID BIN ODEH BIN MOHAMMED AL-HARBI	ABU SULAIMAN AL-MAKKI | ABU SUALAIMAN AL-MAKKI | ABI SULAIMAN AL-MAKKI | ABU SULEIMAN AL-MAKKI | KHALED AWDEH AL-HARBI
Ag01670	FAHD AL-QUSO	ABU HATHAYFAH AL-ADANI | FAHD AL-QASAA | ABU HAZIFA | FAHD MOHAMMED AHMED AL-QUSO | ABU HUTHAIFAH AL-YEMENI | ABU AL-BARA' | FAHD MOHAMMED AHMED AL-AWLAQI | HUTHAIFAH AL-YEMENI | ABU HUTHAIFAH AL-ABU AL-BARA'
Ag01672	SAYYID QUTUB	SAYID QUTB
Ag01673	AHMED AL ANI	
Ag01674	ABDELBAKI	
Ag01675	ABDELKADER HAKIMI	
Ag01676	ABDERREHMANE AMLKI ZAKERAHMAN	
Ag01677	ABDUL FATAH ZAMMAR	
Ag01678	ABDUL HADI AL-IRAQI	
Ag01679	ABU ANZAR	
Ag01680	ABU MOHAMMED AL MAQDARI	
Ag01681	ABU TALAL AL-QASIMY	TALAAT FOUAD QASSEM | EBRAHIM JACOB EZAT

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01682	AHMAD EL-ITTAH	
Ag01683	AHMED ELOMAR	
Ag01684	AICHA ARBAWI	
Ag01685	AMIR LAARAJ	
Ag01686	ASIF REZA KHAN	ASIF RAZA KHAN
Ag01687	AWATES MASWOOD	
Ag01688	AZAM CHEEMA	
Ag01689	CAROL SANTIAGO	
Ag01690	CHEJ SALAH	ANWAR ADNAN MOHAMED SALEK
Ag01691	DEDI SETIONO	EDDY | EDDY SETIONO | ABBAS | UTHMAN
Ag01692	FARIDA PATEL	
Ag01693	FEIZ MOHAMED	SHEIK FEIZ
Ag01694	GEMMA CRUZ-ARANETA	
Ag01696	GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR	GULUBBUDIN HEKMATIAR | GULUBBUDIN HEKMATYAR | GULBUDIN HEKMETYAR | GOLBODDIN HIKMETYAR | GULBUDDIN KHEKMATIYAR
Ag01698	HAFIZ MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH BAHAWALPURI	
Ag01699	HAMZAR HAZIZ	
Ag01700	HASAN AL-TURABI	
Ag01701	HASSAN OULAD AKCHA	
Ag01702	JACK ROCHE	PAUL GEORGE HOLLAND
Ag01703	JAFFAR UMAR THALIB	
Ag01704	ABDELKARIM MEJJATI	ABDEL KARIM AL-MEJATI | KARIM AL-MAJATI | ABDELKRIM MEJATI
Ag01705	MAHMOUD JAMAL	
Ag01706	MAULVI SALEEMULLAH KHAN	
Ag01707	MOHAMED KHAMIS MOHAMED	
Ag01709	MOHAMMAD SALEEM	
Ag01710	MOHAMMED ABDULLAH	
Ag01711	MOSSAAB KHATIR	
Ag01712	MUFTI MOHAMMED JAMIL	
Ag01713	MULLAH KREKAR	FATEH NAJMEDDIN FARAJ
Ag01714	MULLAH OMAR	MULLAH MOHAMMAD OMAR | AMIRUL MOMINEEN | COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL | MOLA OMAR
Ag01715	MUSTAFA (SUSPECT IN CASABLANCA BOMBINGS)	
Ag01716	NASIR ABBAS	MOH. NASIR BIN ABBAS
Ag01717	NAZIR AHMED TAUNSVI	
Ag01718	NORA YABO	
Ag01719	OMAR KHAN SHARIF	
Ag01720	OUSSAMA KASSIR	ABU ABDULLAH | ABU KHADIJA
Ag01721	RACHID AHMIDAN	
Ag01722	REGINA KREIS	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01723	ROBERT PIERRE	
Ag01724	TAHIR PERVAIZ	
Ag01725	YAHIA DJOUADI ABOU AMMAR	YAHIA DJOUADI ABOU AMMAR
Ag01727	ABDERRAHMANE AMEUROUD	
Ag01728	ABDUL HAQQ BAKER	
Ag01729	ABDUL RAHMAN ABU ABDUL NASSER AL-AASSEMI	
Ag01730	ARIF TAJIK	
Ag01731	ASIM UZMANI	
Ag01732	AZAM TARIQ	
Ag01733	DJAMAL ZITOUNI	
Ag01734	EDWARD FILTON	
Ag01735	GHIAS HUSSEIN	
Ag01736	HAFIZ DUR MOHAMMED	
Ag01737	IBRAHIM ABU UTHMAN	
Ag01738	IFTIKAR ALI	
Ag01739	ISMAIL MULLA	
Ag01740	MARWAN AL-SHEHHI	MARWAN AL SHEHHI | MARWAN YUSIF MUHAMMAD RASHID AL-SHEHI | MARWAN YUSIF MUHAMMAD RASHID LAKRAB AL-SHIHHI | ABU ABDULLAH
Ag01741	MAULANA YOUSUF BINNORI	
Ag01742	MOHAMMAD AMJID KHAN	
Ag01743	MOHAMMAD UZAIR	
Ag01744	MYSTERY PAKISTANI	
Ag01745	QARI AHMAD	
Ag01746	QARI GHULAM MURTAZA	
Ag01747	RACHID RAMDA	
Ag01749	SHEIKH MOHAMMED ADEEL	
Ag01750	SUHIR A. AHMAD	
Ag01751	ZAFAR IQBAL	
Ag01752	SHAKER AL-ABSSI	
Ag01753	CHERIE MARIA STULTZ	
Ag01754	JOSHUA PADILLA	
Ag01755	MUHAMMED JAVED	
Ag01756	SHAMIA'A	
Ag01757	HUSSEIN PADILLA	
Ag01758	HASSAN PADILLA	
Ag01759	MRS. ABDULATIF MERROUN	
Ag01760	ABDUL AZIZ AL OMARI	ABDULAZIZ ALOMARI
Ag01761	SATAM AL SUQAMI	
Ag01762	WALI AL SHEHRI	WAIL M. ALSHEHRI
Ag01763	WALEED AL SHEHRI	WALEED M. ALSHEHRI

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01764	FAYEZ BENIHAMMAD	FAYEZ AHMAD | FAYEZ RASHID AHMED | BANIHAMMAD FAYEZ | RASID AHMED HASSEN ALQADI | ABU DHABI BANIHAMMAD | AHMED FAYEZ | FAEZ AHMED | BANIHAMMAD FAYEZ ABU DHABI BANIHAMMAD
Ag01765	MOHAND AL SHEHRI	MOHAMMED ALSHEHHI | MOHAMD ALSHEHRI | MOHALD ALSHEHRI
Ag01766	AHMED AL GHAMDI	AHMED SALAH ALGHAMDI
Ag01767	HAMZA AL GHAMDI	HAMZA AL-GHAMDI | HAMZA GHAMDI | HAMZAH ALGHAMDI
Ag01768	MAJED MOQED	MAJED M.GH MOQED | MAJED MASHAAN MOQED
Ag01769	HANI HANJOUR	HANI SALEH HANJOUR | HANI SALEH | HANI SALEH H. HANJOUR
Ag01770	SALEM AL HAZMI	
Ag01771	SAEED AL GHAMDI	ABDUL RAHMAN SAED ALGHAMDI | ALI S ALGHAMDI | AL-GAMDI | SAAD M.S. AL GHAMDI | SADDA AL GHAMDI | SAHEED AL-GHAMDI | SEED AL GHAMDI
Ag01772	AHMED ABDULLAH ALNAMI	AHMED AL NAMI | AHMED ALNAMI | ALI AHMED ALNAMI | AHMED A. AL-NAMI | AHMED AL- NAWI | AHMED AL NAZMI
Ag01773	AHMAD AL HAZNAWI	AHMED IBRAHIM A. AL HAZNAWI | AHMED ALHAZNAWI
Ag01774	ZIAD JARRAH	ZAID JARRAHI | ZAID SAMR JARRAH | ZIAD S. JARRAH | ZIAD JARRAH JARRAT | ZIAD SAMIR JARRAHI
Ag01775	KHALED MOHAMMED AL-ALI	
Ag01776	MOHAMMED BIN USAMA BIN LADEN	
Ag01777	SAAD BIN USAMA BIN LADEN	SAAD BIN LADEN | SA'AD BIN LADEN | SAD BIN LADEN | SA'AD MUHAMMAD AWAD ABUD MUHAMMAD AWAD | MUHAMMAD 'AWAD ADBUD SA'AD MUHAMMAD BAABOOD ABDUL RAHMAN AL-KAHTANE BIN MUHAMMAD AWAD ABBUD
Ag01778	HAMZA BIN USAMA BIN LADEN	
Ag01780	OMAR AL-KHATAB	
Ag01781	ALI MAHMUD	
Ag01782	ABOUD ROGO	ABOUD ROGO MOHAMMED
Ag01783	MOHAMED KUBWA	KUBWA MOHAMMED
Ag01784	KARIM (MOMBASA ATTACKS)	
Ag01785	SAID SAGGAR AHMED	
Ag01786	AMINA MOHAMMED KUBWA	
Ag01787	ADNAN G. EL SHUKRIJUMAH	ADNAN SHUKRIJUMAH | ADNAN EL SHUKRIJUMAH | HAMAD | ADNAN G. EL SHUKRI JUMAH | ABU ARIF | JA'FAR AL-TAYAR | JAFFAR AL-TAYYAR | JAFAR TAYAR | JAAFAR AL-TAYYAR | ABU JAFFAR AL TAYAR
Ag01788	ADERRAUF JDEY	ABDERRAOUF JDEY | AL RAUF BIN AL HABIB BIN YOUSEF AL-JIDDI | FAROUQ AL-TUNISI
Ag01789	AMER EL-MAATI	
Ag01790	ADAM GADAHN	ADAM PERLMAN | AZZAM AL-AMRIKI
Ag01791	SALEH ALI SALEH NABHAN	SWALEH NABHAN
Ag01792	HALIMA BADROUDINE FAZUL HUSSEINE	
Ag01793	HASHI HUSSEIN FARAH	
Ag01794	UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALAB	
Ag01795	OMAR AWADH OMAR	ABU SAHAL
Ag01796	HUSSEIN HASSAN AGADE	
Ag01797	ISSA OSMAN ISSA	ISA USMAN ISA | ABDULLAH BUR | ABDULLAH ATTO | ABDALA

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
		SUDANI | AFADEY
Ag01798	FUMO MOHAMED FUMO	
Ag01799	SALIM SAMIR BA'AMER	
Ag01800	AHMED HAJJI	
Ag01801	DABBAS BIN MOHAMMED AL-DABBASY	
Ag01802	MOHAMMED ALI SALEH NABHAN	
Ag01803	NASSEM	
Ag01804	MUNIRA	
Ag01805	ALI SAGGAR	
Ag01806	HANIYA	
Ag01807	OMAR SAID OMAR	AHMED ALI MOHAMED
Ag01809	SULEIMAN ABDALLA SALIM HEMED	ISSA | SULEIMAN AHMED SALIM HEMED | ISSA TANZANIA
Ag01810	SALMIN MOHAMMED KHAMIS	
Ag01811	FAISAL ALI NASSOR	FAIZAL ALI NASSOR
Ag01812	OMAR FAROOQ	
Ag01813	MOHAMMED ILLYAS	QARI JAMIL | QARI ILYAS | M ILYAS
Ag01814	ANNELIESE BAHAJI	
Ag01815	NESE KUL	
Ag01816	MOUNIR EL-MOTASSADEQ	MOUNIR EL MOTASSADEQ
Ag01817	HAMZA RABIA	HAMZA RABI'A
Ag01818	KUBWA MOHAMMED	
Ag01819	SWALHA KUBWA	
Ag01820	AAFIA SIDDIQUI	
Ag01821	CHARLES TAYLOR	
Ag01822	AISHA NABHAN	
Ag01823	SHEIKH MUKHTAR ABDIRAHMAN ABU-ZUBEYR	
Ag01824	OMAR HAMMAMI	OMAR SHAFIK HAMMAMI | ABU MANSOUR AL-AMRIKI | FAROUK
Ag01825	AL-AMIN KIMATHI	KIMATHI
Ag01826	BILAL EL BERJAWI	HALWAY CARPET | OMAR YUSUF | BILAL BERJAWI
Ag01827	OMAR BADRUDIN	
Ag01828	WALLA ELDIN ABDEL RAHMAN	
Ag01829	SAKRIH MOHAMMED	
Ag01830	HASSAN AGADE	
Ag01831	FARIDAH HAMUBU	
Ag01832	FATUMA SAIDI ABUDULLAR	
Ag01833	EDRISA ISSA LUYIMA	
Ag01834	EDRISA NSUBUGA	
Ag01835	HARUNA HASSAN LUYIMA	
Ag01836	MOHAMOOD MUGISHA	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01837	HAMID MOHAMED SULEIMAN	
Ag01838	YAHYA SULEIMAN MBUTHIA	
Ag01839	HABIB SULEIMAN NJOROGE	
Ag01840	HUSSEIN HASSAN AGADE	
Ag01841	HASSAN FROM SOMALIA	
Ag01842	KASULE	
Ag01843	IDRIS MAGONDU	
Ag01844	MUSTAFA ABU AL YAZID	MUSTAFA ABUL-YAZID | MUSTAFA ABU AL-YAZEED | MUSTAFA ABU AL-YAZID | SHEIKH SAID | SHEIKH SA'ID AL-MASRI | MUSTAPHA AHMED MOHAMED OSMAN ABU EL YAZEED
Ag01845	INTIKHAB AHMED ABBASI	
Ag01846	MOHAMMAD KABIR ABBOTABAD	
Ag01847	ABID KHAN	
Ag01848	ZAFARALI	
Ag01849	QAMAR ZAMAN	
Ag01850	MOHAMMAD ISHAQUE	
Ag01852	SHAMSUL HAQ	SHAMASUL HAQ | MOHAMMAD RIZWAN | M RIZWAN
Ag01853	ABU GHARIB AL-MAKKI KAMAL SALIM ATTIYA AL-FUDLI AL-HADHLI	
Ag01854	RAO SHAUKAT	RAO SHAKIR ALI
Ag01855	MURSALEEN	
Ag01856	FAHAD MUNIR	MITHOO
Ag01860	MUHAMMAD ASIF ALI	
Ag01861	ABDUL REHMAN (HUJI)	
Ag01862	MUREED AHMAD	
Ag01863	DR. USMAN/AQEEL	DR. USMAN | AQEEL
Ag01864	ATTAULLAH KHAN	
Ag01865	FAISAL AHMED KHAN	
Ag01866	DR ABDUL RAZZAQ	
Ag01867	ZEESHAN JALIL	KHIZAR
Ag01868	MOHAMMAD SARFARAZ	MOHAMMAD KHAN | M SARFRAZ
Ag01869	MOHAMMAD NAEEM SHAKIR	ZUBAIR | M NAEEM SHAKIR
Ag01870	MOHAMMAD NADEEM	BABU SALAHUDDIN | M NADEEM
Ag01871	MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI	
Ag01872	ISMAT SIDDIQUI	
Ag01873	FOWZIA SIDDIQUI	
Ag01874	MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUI	
Ag01875	SUHEIL LAHER	
Ag01876	MOHAMAD AKRA	
Ag01877	MOHAMMAD AMJAD KHAN	
Ag01878	AHMED KHAN	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag01879	MIRIAM KHAN	
Ag01880	SULIEMAN KHAN	
Ag01881	MAJID KHAN	
Ag01882	UZAIR PARACHA	
Ag01883	ALI SHINAWY	
Ag01884	HAMDI MOUSSA	
Ag01885	MOHAMMAD SAAD	
Ag01886	WALID BIN ATTASH	TAWFIQ ATTASH | KHALLAD | TAFIQ MUHAMMED SALEH BIN ROSHAYD BIN ATTASH | SILVER | KHALID BIN ATTASH
Ag01887	GOULED HASSAN DOURAD	
Ag01888	MUSA ALI SAID AL SAID AL UMARI	
Ag01889	ANWAR HAMDAN MUHAMMAD AL NUR	
Ag01890	NAJIBULLAH ZAZI	
Ag01891	ZURAH ADBU AHMED	
Ag01892	MAHMOUD TALEB	
Ag01893	IYMAN FARIS	MOHAMMED RAUF | IYAM FARRIS
Ag01894	ABDUL RAOUF HAWAS	
Ag01896	QAMAR MOHAMMAD AYUB	
Ag01897	YUSUF POLAT	
Ag01898	LOUAI SAKKA	
Ag01988	HABIB AKTAS	
Ag01989	BAKI YIGIT	
Ag01990	GURCAN BAC	
Ag01991	FEVZI YITIZ	
Ag01992	ADNAN ERSOZ	
Ag01993	MESUT CABUK	
Ag01994	GOKHAN ELALTUNTAS	
Ag01995	FERIDUN UGURLU	
Ag01996	ILYAS KUNCAK	
Ag01997	HARUN ILHAN	
Ag01998	IBRAHIM KUS	
Ag01999	AZAD EKINCI	
Ag02000	SEYIT ERTUL	
Ag02001	HAMED OBYSI	
Ag02002	SERVET YITIZ	
Ag02003	IMAD MUGHNIYEH	MUGHANIYAH
Ag02004	JAMAL AHMED MOHA MED ALI AL-BADAWI	ABU ABED MOHAMED AL-BADAWI | GAMAL AHMED BADAWI | ABU ABDERRAHMAN | JAMEL AHMED MOHAMMED ALI AL-BADAWI | JAMAL MUHSIN AL-TALI | ABU ABDUL RAHMAN AL-BADAWI | ABU ABDUL RAHMAN AL-ADANI | JAMAL MOHAMMAD AHMAD

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02005	ABDUL RAHIM MOHAMMED HUSSEIN ABDA AL-NASHERI	MOHAMMED OMAR HARAZI | ABU BILAL AL-MAKI | MULLAH BILAL | NASHERI | ABDA HUSSEIN MOHAMMED | BILAL | ABD AL-RAHIM HUSSEIN MUHAMMAD ABDU | KHALID AL-SAFANI | MUHAMMED OMAR AL-HARAZI
Ag02006	IBRAHIM AL-THAWAR	NIBRASS
Ag02007	HASSAN AWADH AL-KHAMRI	HASAN AL-TA-EFI | HASAN
Ag02008	MOHD FARIK BIN AMIN	ZUBAIR | ZAID
Ag02009	SULIEMAN ABU GHAITH	SULAYMAN BU GHAYTH | SULAIMAN JASSEM SULAIMAN ALI ABO GHAITH
Ag02010	MUHAMMAD AL-QAHTANI	ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-JANUBI | MUHAMMAD MANI' AHMAD SHA'LAN AL-QAHTANI
Ag02011	SAIFULLAH PARACHA	
Ag02012	IBN AL-KHATTAB	OMAR IBN AL KHATTAB | HABIB ABDEL RAHMAN KHATAB
Ag02013	HASSAN ATTASH	
Ag02014	MUHAMMAD ATTASH	
Ag02015	ALI ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-FAQASI AL-GHAMDI	ALI ABD AL RAHMAN AL FAQASI AL GHAMDI | ABU BAKR AL-AZDI
Ag02016	TURKI NASSER AL-DANDANI	
Ag02017	KHALED MOHAMMAD BIN MUSLIM AL-ARAWI AL-JUHANI	
Ag02018	MOHAMMED OTHMAN ABDULLAH AL-WALIDI AL-SHEHRI	
Ag02019	HANI SAEED AHMAD AL ABDUL-KARIM AL-GHAMDI	SAEED ABDULLAH SAEED AL GHAMDI (?)
Ag02020	JUBRAN ALI AHMAD HAKAMI KHABRANI	
Ag02021	KHALED BIN IBRAHIM MAHMOUD BAGHDADI	
Ag02022	MEHMAS BIN MOHAMMED MEHMAS AL-HAWASHLEH AL-DOSARI	
Ag02023	MOHAMMED BIN SHADHAF ALI AL-MAHZOUM AL-SHEHRI	
Ag02024	HAZEM MOHAMMED SAEED KASHMIRI	
Ag02025	MAJED ABDULLAH SA'AD BIN OKAIL	
Ag02026	BANDAR BIN ABDUL-RAHMAN MENAWER AL-RAHIMI AL-MUTAIRI	
Ag02027	ABDUL-KARIM MOHAMMED JUBRAN YAZJI	
Ag02028	ABDULLAH FARRES BIN JUFAIN AL-RAHIMI AL-MUTAIRI	
Ag02030	AMMAR AL-WAELI	
Ag02031	QASIM MOHAMED (AIAI)	
Ag02032	MOHAMED AL KAHTANI	MOHAMED MANI AHMAD AL KAHTANI
Ag02033	YOUNIS KHALIS	
Ag02034	AHMED SHAH MASSOUD	AHMED SHAH MASSOD | AHMED SHAH MASOUD | AHMED SHAH MASOOD
Ag02035	ABU BARA AL YEMENI	
Ag02036	SALAH AL DIN	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02037	AYSEL SENGUEN	
Ag02038	KHALID AL-MASRI	
Ag02040	KHADR ABU HOSHAR	KHADAR ABU HOSHAR
Ag02041	RAED HIJAZI	ABU AHMED THE MORTARMAN | ABU AHMED THE AMERICAN | RI'AD (RAED) MUHAMMAD HASAN MUHAMMAD HIJAZI
Ag02042	MOHAMAD KAMAL ELZAHABI	
Ag02043	SAAD HIJAZI	
Ag02044	HUSSEIN TURI	
Ag02045	OSAMA SUMAR	
Ag02046	MOHAMMED HIJAZI	
Ag02047	MOHDAR ABDULLAH	
Ag02048	KHALLAM (CALIFORNIA)	
Ag02049	FAHAD AL THUMAIRY	
Ag02050	OMAR AL BAYOUMI	
Ag02051	OSAMA AWADALLAH	
Ag02052	OMAR BAKARBASHAT	
Ag02053	ANWAR AULAQI	
Ag02054	YAZEED AL SALMI	
Ag02055	EYAD AL RABABAH	
Ag02056	SULAYMAN AL ALWAN	
Ag02057	MUSHABIB AL HAMLAN	
Ag02058	SAUD AL RASHID	
Ag02059	ZUHAIR AL THUBAITI	
Ag02060	QUTAYBAH AL NAJDI	
Ag02061	SAEED AL BALUCHI	
Ag02062	ABU TURAB AL JORDANI	ABU TURAB AL-URDANI
Ag02063	ABD AL RAHIM GHULUM RABBANI	ABU RAHMAH
Ag02064	ABDULLAH SINDHI	
Ag02065	AWS AL MADANI	
Ag02066	ABDEL KARIM AL NASSER	ABDELKARIM HUSSEIN MOHAMED AL-NASSER
Ag02067	AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL	ABU OMRAN | AHMAD IBRAHIM AL-MUGHASSIL
Ag02068	ALI AL-HOURI	ALI SAED BIN ALI EL-HOURI | ALI SAED BIN ALI EL-HOORIE
Ag02069	HANI AL-SAYEGH	
Ag02070	IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB	IBRAHIM SALIH MOHAMMED AL-YACOUB
Ag02071	MUSTAFA AL-QASSAB	
Ag02072	SA'ED AL-BAHAR	
Ag02073	ABDALLAH AL-JARASH	
Ag02074	HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS	
Ag02075	ALI AL-MARHOUN	
Ag02076	SALEH RAMADAN	
Ag02077	MUSTAFA MU'ALEM	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02078	AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI	
Ag02079	FADEL AL-ALAWE	
Ag02080	JOHN DOE (HIZBALLAH)	
Ag02081	ADEL RAFEEA	
Ag02082	IBRAHIM MAIDIN	HAJI IBRAHIM BIN HAJI MAIDIN | ABU HALIL
Ag02083	OTHMAN MOHAMED	OTHMAN BIN MOHAMED
Ag02084	MAS SELAMAT BIN KASTARI	
Ag02085	KHALIM JAFFAR	MOHAMED KHALIM BIN JAFFAR | KHALIM BIN JAFFAR
Ag02086	AB WAHAB BIN AHMAD	
Ag02087	SYED IBRAHIM	
Ag02088	MOHAMMAD ASLAM BIN YAR ALI KHAN	ASLAM
Ag02089	FATHI ABU BAKAR BAFANA	FATHI
Ag02090	ADNAN BIN MUSA	ADNAN
Ag02091	MOHAMED NAZIR MOHMMED UTHMAN	NAZIR
Ag02092	SABAH	
Ag02093	ANDREW GERARD	ALI RIDHAA BIN ABDULLAH
Ag02094	HALIM BIN HUSSAIN	HALIM | HALIM BIN HUSSEIN
Ag02095	TENGKU ISMUHADI	
Ag02096	DIDIN ROSMAN	IQBAL (JI-BANDUNG)
Ag02097	TAUFIK ABDUL HALIM	DANI
Ag02098	ABDULLAH ANSHORI	ABU FAITH | ABU FATIH | IBNU THOYIB
Ag02099	IRFAN AWWAS SURYAHARDY	
Ag02100	MURSALIN DAHLAN	
Ag02101	FUAD AMSYARI	
Ag02102	ENJANG BASTAMAN	JABIR | UJANG | SYAHID JABIR
Ag02103	ZULKIFLI MARZUKI	ZULKEPLI MARZUKI | AWANG IBRAHIM
Ag02104	DAUD BEUREUEH	
Ag02105	HASAN DI TIRO	
Ag02106	ABU HASBI GEUDONG	
Ag02107	CHADIJAH GEUDONG	
Ag02108	MUCHTAR GEUDONG	
Ag02109	FAUZI GEUDONG	FAUZI HASBI
Ag02110	SYAFRIE SJAMSUDDIN	
Ag02111	ABU HURAERAH	ABU HURAIRAH
Ag02112	AKIM HAKIMUDDIN	ASEP | SUHEB | AKIM (JI-BANDUNG) | AKIM AKIMUDDIN
Ag02113	HENDROPRIYONO	
Ag02114	LIGADINSYAH	LINGGA
Ag02115	FADLI	AKIM
Ag02116	EDI SUGIARTO	
Ag02117	POLEM	HERIANTO | ISWANDI

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02118	RAMLI	
Ag02119	BASUKI	IQBAL BIN NGATMO
Ag02120	MOHAMMED FAWAZI	
Ag02121	SYAHRIR	
Ag02122	UMAR (JI-BANDUNG)	
Ag02123	HAJI ACENG SUHERI	HAJI ACENG
Ag02124	AGUS KURNIAWAN	
Ag02125	RONY MILYAR	
Ag02126	WAWAN	
Ag02127	DEDI MULYADI	
Ag02128	HOLIS	UDIN
Ag02129	YOYO	
Ag02130	RAJA HUSAIN	TEUKU IDRIS | IDRIS | IDRIS ACHENESE
Ag02131	ABDUL AZIZ KAHAR MUZAKKAR	KAHAR MUZAKKAR | QAHHAR MUDZAKKAR
Ag02132	HARIS FADILLAH	ABU DZAR
Ag02133	KYAI SALEH AS'AD	
Ag02134	ABDUL RAUF	SAM BIN JAHRUDDIN | RAUF | SAM FROM PORIS
Ag02135	YUDI/ANDRI	ANDRI | OCTAVIA | ANDRI OCTAVIA | ANDRI OKTAVIA
Ag02136	AGUS HIDAYAT	ANDI HIDAYAT | AGUS AMIN | ANDI | AMIN
Ag02138	IQBAL (BALI BOMBER)	ARMASAN | LACONG | ARNASAN
Ag02139	APRIANTO	ENDANG
Ag02140	PUJATA	
Ag02141	IKHWAN FAUZI	
Ag02142	FATURRAHMAN	
Ag02143	ZULKIFLI BIN ABDUL HIR	ZULKIFLI BIN ABDUL | ZULKIFLI BIN HIR | MARWAN | MUSA | ZULKIFLI ABDHIR | HULAGU | HOLAGU | LAGU | KULON | MUSA ABDUL | MUSA ABDUL HIR | ABDUL HIR BIN ZULKIFLI | ABDULHIR BIN HIR | BIN ABDUL HIR ZULKIFLI | ZULKIFLI HUD | COMMANDER MAROHOMALLEGEDLY | ZULKIFLI ABDUL HIR
Ag02144	ZULKARNAEN	ARIS SUMARSONO | PAK DAUD
Ag02145	THORIQUDIN	ABU RUSDAN | HAMZAH
Ag02146	MUSTOPA	PRANATA YUHDA | MUSTOFA | NASRUDDIN
Ag02147	MUSTAQIM	QOMARUDDIN BIN ZAIMUN | ABU YUSUF
Ag02148	MUSTAFA MASHUR	
Ag02149	MUHAMMAD SAUWKI AL-ISTAMBULI	
Ag02150	AJENGAN MASDUKI	
Ag02151	SALAHUDIN	SOLAHUDIN
Ag02152	HABIB	
Ag02153	ACHMAD ROIHAN	SAAD
Ag02154	MOHAMMED FAIQ HAFIDZ	
Ag02155	MOHAMED QITAL	
Ag02156	AHMAD SAJULI	UYONG

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02157	SYUNON	
Ag02158	MUCHLIANSYAH	SOLIHIN
Ag02159	ASEP DANU	
Ag02160	FIRDAUS	AHMAD AZZAM | NYONG ALI
Ag02161	ZUHRONI	NUIM
Ag02162	FARIHIN AHMAD	FARIHIN
Ag02163	ARKAM/ARQOM	HARIS | AZMI
Ag02165	UTOMO PAMUNGKAS	MUBAROK | MUBARROK
Ag02166	DULMATIN	DUL MATIN | JOKO PITONO | YAHYA IBRAHIM | TGK. HAMZAH
Ag02167	USAID	ZAINAL ARIFIN | SUWARSO | SAKLO
Ag02168	MUCHTAR DAENG	ABU URWAH | ILYAS
Ag02169	KAHAR MUSTAFA	
Ag02170	SYARIFUDDIN	ABU JAMIAH
Ag02171	BASYIR	ABU MUKHLISUN
Ag02172	MOH. JAUHARI BIN ABDULLAH	
Ag02173	DADANG SURATMAN	ABU YUSUF | DADAN
Ag02175	SUHEIMI	
Ag02176	JAMSARI	
Ag02177	ABDUL RAZAK	FAROUK
Ag02178	MUHAMMAD TAUFIQURRAHMAN	AKRAM | SAMSUDIN | SHAMSUDDIN | SYAMSUDIN
Ag02179	ABAS BIN LATIF	ABBAS (FATHER OF HASHIM)
Ag02180	SARJIYO	SAWWAD | SAWAD | SARDJIYO | SARJIO
Ag02181	MUHAJIR	IDRIS
Ag02182	ACHMAD DAHLAN	
Ag02183	MUCHLIANSYAH	
Ag02184	HAJI MOH. FALEH OF KUDUS	
Ag02185	HAJI DANU MUH	
Ag02186	ABDUL ROCHIM	
Ag02187	JAMALUDDIN	
Ag02188	ZAINI ZAKARIA	ZAINI
Ag02189	ZAMZURI	
Ag02190	HENRY BIN MANSOUR	AMRAN | ANDI | AMRAN BIN MANSOOR | AMRAN MANSOR
Ag02191	FATURAHMAN DAEMUGADING	FATUL MUIN
Ag02192	ZAITUN RASMIN	
Ag02193	AGUNG HAMID	
Ag02194	HISBULLAH RASYID	HIZBULLAH RASHID
Ag02195	ANTHON	
Ag02196	ILHAM RIYADI	
Ag02197	MANSUR	
Ag02199	DAHLAN	ASEP JAJA

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02200	ASHAR DAENG SALAM	
Ag02201	SALAMAT HAYSIM	SALAMAT HASHIM
Ag02202	SARDJONO GABRIEL	
Ag02203	SYAIFUL GABRIEL	
Ag02204	MACHMUDI HARIONO	YUSUF
Ag02205	FAHIM	
Ag02206	SURYADI MAS'UD	
Ag02207	HASTA	
Ag02208	IMAM HANAFI	
Ag02209	SOLAHUDIN AL-AYUBI	
Ag02210	USTADZ YUNUS	YUNUS
Ag02211	USTADZ AZHARI DIPOKUSUMO	
Ag02212	FARIDA BIN ABBAS	
Ag02213	WAHYUDIN	
Ag02214	FERIAL MUCHLIS ABDUL HALIM	FERRY | FERIAL MUCHLIS
Ag02215	ISNAIRIN BINTI ABDUL ROSYID	
Ag02216	ASADULLAH	YAHYA | AHMAD RIYADI
Ag02217	YOYOK	DANU
Ag02218	ZULFIKAR	
Ag02219	ABDULLAH (DI)	
Ag02220	EDY RIANTO	AMIR
Ag02221	NAIMAN	
Ag02222	EDY TAUFIK	
Ag02223	SUHENDI	
Ag02224	ROJAK	
Ag02225	MUSTAQIM (AMIN)	
Ag02226	MATORI ABDUL JALIL	
Ag02227	ZULKIFAR	PIKAR
Ag02228	TAJUL ARIFIN	
Ag02229	NOORDIN MOHD TOP	NOOR DIN MOHAMED TOP | NOORDIN MUH TOP | NOORDIN MAT TOP | NOORDIN DIN MOCH TOP
Ag02230	KANG JAJA	AQDAM
Ag02231	NURUDIN	ZAID BUTONG
Ag02232	IWAN/ROIS	ROIS | IWAN DHARMAWAN | IWAN DARMAWAN
Ag02233	MIA IBRAHIM	
Ag02234	USTADZ HERI HAFIDZIN	HERI HAFIDIN | HAFIDIN
Ag02235	ASEP/DARWIN	
Ag02236	DIDIN RAIDIN	
Ag02237	SARKONI	
Ag02238	HARIS (FATHER OF UYOK)	
Ag02239	HENRI GOLUN	AGUN FROM SUKABUMI | HERI GOLUNG

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02240	APUY	EPUL
Ag02241	UYOK	
Ag02242	FATHURROBI/HARUN	
Ag02243	OMAN ROCHMAN	AMAN ABDURRAHMAN | USTAD AMAN
Ag02244	HASAN (JI)	
Ag02245	GEMPUR BUDI ANGKORO	JABIR | GEMPUR
Ag02246	CHANDRA	
Ag02247	MOHAMED IKHWAN	ISMAIL (JI)
Ag02248	SURAMTO	DENI | MUHAMMAD FAIZ | MOH. FAIZ | DENY SURAMTO | UST ZIAD | TORIQ FROM SOLO
Ag02249	IRUN HIDAYAT	IRUN
Ag02251	MOHAMED RAIS	
Ag02252	TONI TOGAR	INDRAWARMAN | INDRA WARMAN
Ag02253	RIAU	
Ag02254	MASRIZAL BIN ALI UMAR	TOHIR | MAS'UD
Ag02255	SARDONA SILIWANGI	
Ag02256	MOHAMED IHSAN	JHONI HENDRAW | GEMBROT | IDRIS | JHONI HENDRAWAN | JONI HENDRAWAN
Ag02257	ASMAR LATIN SANI	
Ag02258	ABU DUJANA	YUSRON MAHMUDI | AINUL BAHRI
Ag02259	QOTADAH	BASYIR
Ag02260	SEF/FAHIM	
Ag02261	SON HADI	
Ag02262	KHUMAIDI	
Ag02263	HENRI SIGU SAMBOJA	ILYASA | HERI SIGU SAMBOJA | AL-ANSHORI
Ag02264	ACHMAD HASAN	
Ag02265	ADUNG	SUNARTO BIN KARTODIHARJO
Ag02266	SYAIFUDDIN UMAR	ABU FIDA
Ag02267	BAGUS BUDI PRANOTO	URWAH | URWA
Ag02268	LUFTI HAIDAROH	UBEID NGRUKI | UBEID | LUTFI HUDAEROH | UBAID
Ag02269	HERI/UMAR	
Ag02270	MUNFIATUN	
Ag02271	SAPTONO	
Ag02272	WIWIT	
Ag02273	AWAL PURNOMO	
Ag02274	AGUS AHMAD	
Ag02275	ROSIHIN NOOR	
Ag02276	IWAN SAJAI	
Ag02277	LIS	
Ag02278	ENGKOS KOSASIH	PAK KAMAL
Ag02279	BAHARUDIN SOLEH	ABDUL HADI
Ag02280	DIDI/RIJUL	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02281	KOMARUDIN	FURJAM
Ag02282	HERNIANTO	RONI
Ag02283	MAKAFRI	
Ag02284	MOH NAJIB	
Ag02285	HERLAMBANG	
Ag02286	SAIFUL	
Ag02287	WIBOWO	
Ag02288	MUSAFAK	
Ag02289	ABDULLAH SUNATA	
Ag02290	ABDUL MALIK	
Ag02291	ACENG KURINA	
Ag02292	ALI ZEIN	
Ag02293	ABDUL ROHIM	ABDUL RAHIM | ABDUL RAHIM BA'ASYIR
Ag02294	PURNAMA PURTA	USMAN | TIKUS | MOUSE
Ag02295	ENCENG KURINA	ARHAM | ARNOLD
Ag02296	HARI KUNCORO	BAHAR
Ag02297	UMAR PATEK	OMAR PATEK
Ag02298	HILMAN	
Ag02299	UMAR (WAIMURAT CAMP)	
Ag02300	ALI (WAIMURAT CAMP)	
Ag02301	SALMAN	
Ag02302	MOHAMED SAIFUDDIN	
Ag02303	DANI CHANDRA	
Ag02304	IQBAL HUSEINI	REZA
Ag02305	IMAM BUKHORI	
Ag02306	JOKO HARUN	
Ag02307	SALIK FIRDAUS	
Ag02309	ABDUL AZIZ (PEKALONGAN)	
Ag02310	MISRO	
Ag02311	SUBUR SUGIARTO	
Ag02312	ANIF SOLCHANUDIN	
Ag02313	AIP HIDAYAT	
Ag02315	JUNAEDI	
Ag02316	MAKMURI	
Ag02317	EKO HADI PRASETYO	
Ag02318	PURYANTO	
Ag02319	FIRMANSYAH	
Ag02320	HAMZA BAYA	
Ag02321	MUJAROT	
Ag02322	SIROJUL	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02323	IMAN SUSANTO	
Ag02324	MASYKUR ABDUL KADIR	MASYKUR
Ag02325	SUKASTOPO	
Ag02326	SOFYAN	
Ag02327	ILHAM	
Ag02328	BAHARUDIN LATIF	BARIDIN
Ag02329	SAIFUDDIN ZUHRI	SYAIFUDDIN ZUHRI | SABIT | SUGENG | SAEFUDDIN ZUHRI | ABU LUBABA
Ag02330	ARINA RAHMAH	ARINA
Ag02332	ANI SUGANDI	ANIS SUGANDI
Ag02333	ABDUR ROHIM BIN THOYIB	ABU HUSNA
Ag02334	ZARKASIH	NUAIM | MBAH
Ag02335	ALI MASYHUDI	
Ag02336	MOHAMED HASSAN BIN SAYNUDIN	FAJAR TASLIM
Ag02337	TAUFIK AHMAD	ABU ARINAH
Ag02338	SAYUTI	
Ag02339	ABDURRAHMAN TAIB	
Ag02340	SUKARSO ABDILLAH	
Ag02341	HELMI HANAFI	
Ag02342	YUDO HASTOYO	YUDO
Ag02343	AGUSTIWARMAN	
Ag02344	HERI PURWANTO	
Ag02345	SUGIARTO	
Ag02346	WAHYUDI	
Ag02347	SULTHON QOLBI	ASADOLLAH | ARSYAD | USTAD ABUM
Ag02348	YOSI	
Ag02349	OLOAN MARTUA HARAHAP	
Ag02350	TIMOTIUS	
Ag02351	IWAN	
Ag02352	KI AGUS MUHAMMAD TONI	
Ag02353	IBROHIM	
Ag02354	AMIR IBRAHIM	AMIR ABDILLAH
Ag02355	AIR SETYAWAN	AHER | AHER SETYAWAN | AHER SETIAWAN | AIR SETIAWAN
Ag02356	EKO JOKO SARJONO	EKO PEYANG | EKO JOKO SANTOSO
Ag02357	DANI DWI PERTAMA	
Ag02358	NANA IKHWAN MAULANA	
Ag02359	SYAIFUDIN JAELANI	
Ag02360	MUJAHRI	
Ag02361	IWAN HERDIANSYAH	
Ag02362	ALI MUHAMMAD	
Ag02363	MOHAMAD SJAHRIR	MOHAMED SYAHRIR | AING

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02364	MISTAM HUSAMUDIN	AJI | ARIO SUDARSO
Ag02365	MOHAMAD JIBRIL	
Ag02366	UMAR BURHANUDDIN	
Ag02367	RINA	
Ag02368	PARMIN	
Ag02369	AHMAD JAELANI	
Ag02370	SUCIHANI	
Ag02371	ERY	
Ag02372	AHMAD ISROFIL	
Ag02373	ABU MUHAMMAD AL-MAQDISI	
Ag02374	NIKO/JUNDI	RIDWAN
Ag02375	HASAN NOOR	HASAN NUR | BLACKBERRY
Ag02376	SIBGHO/MUS'AB	
Ag02377	ISMET KAKIKI	
Ag02378	KAMALUDIN BIN KHASAN	
Ag02379	GEMA AWAL RAMADHAN	AHMAD | ABU HEIDIR
Ag02380	HALAWI MAKMUN	
Ag02381	YUDI ZULFAHRI	BAROK
Ag02382	MOH. SOFYAN TSAURI	SOFYAN
Ag02383	ABU NUR	
Ag02384	TGK. AHMAD	ANDRE
Ag02385	ALI ARAFAH	
Ag02386	TGK. MUSLIM ATTAHIRI	
Ag02387	MUCHTAR IBRAHIM	
Ag02388	TAUFIK MARZUKI	ABU SAYYAF | TAUFIK | ALEX
Ag02389	AZWANI/ABU MATANG	ABU MUS'AB
Ag02390	AZWAR/ABU RECONG	
Ag02391	MUNIR/ABU RIMBA	ABU UTEN
Ag02392	MUHSIN/IMAM MUDA	ABU IPON | ACONK
Ag02393	MUHIBUDDIN	
Ag02394	MUKHLIS (SOFYAN'S TRAINEE)	
Ag02395	MUHAMMAD TOAT	
Ag02396	AHMAD SAYID MAULANA	
Ag02397	JOKO SULISTYO	ZAINUDIN
Ag02398	AULIA SYAHIDAH	
Ag02399	MASYKUR RAHMAT	
Ag02400	BAYU SENO	RAKHMAT | TONO
Ag02401	PANDU WICAKSONO WIDYANPUTRO	PANDU
Ag02402	YUSUF ARIFIN	
Ag02403	ALI FROM ACEH	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02404	USMAN/GITO	
Ag02405	ENAL TA'O	
Ag02406	ILYAS (GAM)	
Ag02407	RASYID RIDHO	ABDUL ROSYID
Ag02408	AFIF ABDUL MAJID	
Ag02409	MUSTAQIM MUZAYYIN	
Ag02410	HARIS AMIR FALAH	
Ag02411	HARIYADI USMAN	
Ag02412	SYARIF USMAN	
Ag02413	SUMARNO	
Ag02414	MOHAMED AMIN MUSA	
Ag02415	SILVESTER TENDEAN	
Ag02416	YAHYA GOBA	
Ag02417	SAHIM ALWAN	
Ag02418	SHAFAL MOSED	
Ag02419	YASEIN TAHER	
Ag02420	FAYSAL GALAB	
Ag02421	JABER ELBANEH	
Ag02422	MUKTAR AL-BAKRI	
Ag02423	MOHAMMED ALBANNA	
Ag02424	KAMAL DERWISH	
Ag02425	ABU ALI AL-HARITHI	ALI QAED SUNIAN AL-HARITHI
Ag02426	MOHAMED HAMDI AL-AHDAL	ABU ISSAM AL-MAKI | MOHAMMAD HAMDI MOHAMMAD SADIQ AL-AHDAL
Ag02427	BANDAR BIN ABDURRAHMAN AL-GHAMDI	
Ag02428	AHMED BILAL	
Ag02429	MUHAMMAD BILAL	
Ag02430	PATRICE LUMUMBA FORD	
Ag02431	JEFFREY BATTLE	AHMAD ALI | ~~A~~BU ISA
Ag02432	HABIS AL SAOUB	HABIS ABULLAH AL SAOUB
Ag02433	KHALED ALI STEITIYE	
Ag02434	MAHER HAWASH	MIKE HAWASH
Ag02435	OCTOBER LEWIS	
Ag02436	JUMA AL-DOSARI	JUMA MOHAMMED ABDUL LATIF AL-DOSARI
Ag02437	BINYAM AHMED MUHAMMAD	
Ag02438	ADHAM AMIN HASSOUN	ABU SAYYAF
Ag02439	MOHAMED HESHAM YOUSSEF	ABU TURAB
Ag02440	KIFAH WAEL JAYYOUSI	ABU MOHAMED
Ag02441	KASSEM DAHER	ABU ZURR | MAHMOUD
Ag02443	ALI AL-TIMMI	ALI TIMIMI
Ag02444	MASOUD KHAN	MASOUD AHMAD KHAN

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02445	RANDALL ROYER	RANDALL TODD ROYER | ISMAIL ROYER
Ag02446	YONG KWON	YONG KI KWON
Ag02447	MUHAMMAD AATIQUE	MUHAMMED AATIQUE
Ag02448	KHWAJA HASAN	
Ag02449	DONALD SURRATT	DONALD T. SURRAT
Ag02450	HAMMAD ABDUR-RAHEEM	
Ag02451	CALIPH ABDUR-RAHEEM	CALIPH BASHA | CALIPH BASHA ABDUR-RAHEEM
Ag02452	SEIFULLAH CHAPMAN	
Ag02453	NURADIN M. ABDI	
Ag02454	JAMES ELSHAFAY	
Ag02455	SHAHWAR MARTIN SIRAJ	SHAHAWAR MATIN SIRAJ
Ag02456	YASSIN MUHIDDIN AREF	
Ag02457	MOHAMMED MOSHARREF HOSSAIN	
Ag02458	KEVIN JAMES	SHAKYH SHAHAAB MURSHID | ABDUL-WAHID ASH-SHEENA | AS-SUDAANI | ASH-SHAFI'E | ASH SHAYK SUDANI | SHABAB MURSHID ABDUL-WAHID SUDANI | SHIBAB JAMES | ABDUL WAHID | SHABAB MURSHID | SHABAB JAMES
Ag02459	LEVAR WASHINGTON	ABDUR REHMAN | NUMAIR | SHABAB NUMIR ABD RAHMAN | NUMAIR ABD RAHMAN ASH-SHEENA | EMIR
Ag02460	GREGORY PATTERSON	BILAL
Ag02461	HAMMAD SAMANA	
Ag02462	MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS	
Ag02463	SHANNEN ROSSMILLER	
Ag02464	SYED HARIS AHMED	TURAB | THANDYMAZAQ
Ag02465	EHSANUL ISLAM SADEQUEE	SHIFA | ABOO KHUBAYB ALMUWAHHID AND KHUBZ
Ag02466	FAHIM AHMAD	
Ag02467	AZDI ORNANI	
Ag02468	AABID HUSSEIN KHAN	
Ag02469	ZUBAIR AHMED	
Ag02470	MIRSAD BEKTASEVIC	
Ag02471	NARSEAL BATISTE	BROTHER NAZ | PRINCE MANNA
Ag02472	PATRICK ABRAHAM	BROTHER PAT
Ag02473	STANLEY GRANT PHANOR	BROTHER SUNNI
Ag02474	NAUDIMAR HERRERA	BROTHER NAUDY
Ag02475	BURSON AUGUSTIN	BROTHER B
Ag02476	ROTHSCHILD AUGUSTINE	BROTHER ROT
Ag02477	LYGLENSON LEMORIN	BROTHER LEVI | BROTHER LEVI-EL
Ag02478	ASSAD SARWAR	ASSAD ALI SARWAR
Ag02479	ABDULLA AHMED ALI	AHMED ALI KHAN | ABDULA AHMED ALI | AHMED ABDULLAH ALI | ABDULLAH ALI AHMED KHAN
Ag02480	TANVIR HUSSAIN	
Ag02481	ARAFAT KHAN	ARAFAT WAHEED KHAN | WAHEED ARAFAT KHAN
Ag02482	IBRAHIM SAVANT	OLIVER

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02483	WAHEED ZAMAN	
Ag02484	UMAR ISLAM	BRIAN YOUNG
Ag02485	DONALD STEWART-WHYTE	
Ag02486	MOHAMMED GULZAR	ALTAF RAVAT
Ag02487	MUKTAR SAID IBRAHIM	MUKTAR IBRAHIM | IBRAHIM MUKTAR SAID
Ag02488	RASHID RAUF	IBRAHIM | NOTE: RASHID RAUF AND MAITUR REHMAN ARE NOT THE SAME PERSON, DESPITE EARLY REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY
Ag02489	RAMZI MOHAMED	
Ag02490	ADEL YAHYA	
Ag02491	MANFO ASIEDU	SUMAILA ABUBAKARI
Ag02492	ABDUL SHERIF	
Ag02493	SIRAJ ALI	SIRAJ YASSIN ABDULLAH ALI
Ag02494	MUHEDIN ALI	
Ag02495	YESHIEMBERT GIRMA	YESHI
Ag02496	WAHBI MOHAMMED	
Ag02497	ISMIL ABDURAHMAN	
Ag02498	ABDULLAH EL-FAISAL	TREVOR WILLIAM FOREST | SHEIKH FAISAL | SHEIK FAISAL | IMAM AL-JAMAIKEE | ABDALLAH AL FAISAL
Ag02499	ESAYAS GIRMA	
Ag02500	MULUMEBET GIRMA	
Ag02501	MOHAMED KABASHI	
Ag02502	ABDUL MUHAMMAD	CARLOS BLEDSOE | ABDULHAKIM MUHAMMAD
Ag02503	ADIS MEDUNJANIN	MUHAMMAD
Ag02504	ZAREIN AHMEDZAY	OMAR
Ag02505	ALI SALEH KAHLAH AL-MARRI	ABDUL-RAHMAN AL-QATARI
Ag02506	JEHAD SERWAN MOSTAFA	
Ag02507	AMINA FARAH ALI	
Ag02508	HAWO MOHAMED HASSAN	
Ag02509	MOHAMUD ABDI YUSUF	SHEIKH HASSAN | HASSAN DHUNKAAL | MOHAMOUD YUSUF DHUNKAAL
Ag02510	DUANE MOHAMED DIRIYE	DUWANE MAXAMED DIRIIYE | DUANE DIRIE | DUANE MOHAMED DIRIYE
Ag02511	ABDI MAHDI HUSSEIN	ABDI HUSSEIN | KHALIIF
Ag02512	SHEIKH SAAID	
Ag02513	ABID NASSER	
Ag02514	TARIQ UR REHMAN	
Ag02515	SALEH AL-SOMALI	ABDUL HAFIDH | ABDUL HAFEEZ | NOTE: FNU LNU IS AN ACRONYM: FIRST NAME UNKNOWN, LAST NAME UNKNOWN
Ag02517	ADEN HASHI AYROW	ADEN HASHI AYRO | ADEN HASHI 'AYRO
Ag02518	MOHAMED IBRAHIM AHMED	TALHA
Ag02519	MOHAMAD SHNEWER	
Ag02520	DRITAN DUKA	DISTAN DUKA | ANTHONY DUKA | TONY DUKA
Ag02521	ELJVIR DUKA	ELVIS DUKA | SULAYMAN

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02522	SHAIN DUKA	
Ag02523	SERDAR TATAR	
Ag02524	AGRON ABDULLAHU	
Ag02525	ZENAB ARMANDPISHEH	
Ag02526	OMAR BAKRI MOHAMMED	
Ag02527	ABU MUNTHIR	
Ag02528	ZABI UL-TAIFI	
Ag02529	RUSSELL DEFREITAS	MOHAMMED
Ag02530	KAREEM IBRAHIM	AMIR KAREEM | WINSTON KINGSTON
Ag02531	ABDUL KADIR	AUBREY MICHAEL SEAFORTH
Ag02532	ABDEL NUR	COMPTON EVERSLEY
Ag02533	ABU BAKR (JAM)	
Ag02534	SHEIK MOHAMED ABDIRAHMAN KARIYE	
Ag02535	IBRAHIM AL-HAMDI (LET)	
Ag02536	MICHAEL C. FINTON	TALIB ISLAM
Ag02537	HOSAM MAHER HUSEIN SMADI	
Ag02538	BRYANT NEAL VINAS	IBRAHIM | BASHIR AL-AMERIKI | BEN YAMEEN AL-KANADEE
Ag02539	RAJA LAHRASIB KHAN	
Ag02540	KHALID ALI-M ALDAWSARI	
Ag02541	SYED HASHMI	FAHAD
Ag02542	HAMID HAYAT	
Ag02543	UMER HAYAT	
Ag02544	KHALID OUAZZANI	
Ag02545	AHMED OMAR ABU ALI	
Ag02546	FAROOQUE AHMED	
Ag02547	CHRISTOPHER PAUL	ABDUL | ABDUL MALEK | ABDUL MALIK | ABDUL MELIK | ABDULMALED | ABDEL MALEK | ABDUL MALEK KENYATTA | PAUL KENYATTA LAWS | PAUL LAWS
Ag02548	KHALIFA LNU	
Ag02549	RAHMAT ABDUL HIR	RAHMAT ABDHIR | SEAN KASEM | SEAN KALIMIN | ROY KALIMIN | SALAM A. JABAR
Ag02550	MINAH BINTI AOGIS ABD AZIZ	MAK
Ag02551	ABDUL BASIT USMAN	ABDULBASIT USMAN | USMAN | AHMAD AKMAD BATABOL USMAN | BASIT USMAN | ABDULBASIT
Ag02552	MOHAMMED ABDULLAH WARSAME	ABU MARYAM
Ag02553	AHMED FARAZ KHAN	
Ag02554	FATUMA	
Ag02555	MUKHTAR ROOBOW ALI	ABU MANSUR | MUKHTAR ROBOW | MUKHTAR ALI RUBU | MUKHTAR ABDULLAHI ALI | MUJAHID MUKHTAR ROBOW ALI | SHAYKH MUKHTAR ROBO ALI | ABU MANSUR | ABU MANSOUR
Ag02556	HARUNI BAMUSA	HARUN BAMUSA | SAID
Ag02557	HASSAN SAID OMAR	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02558	MOHAMED MWAKUZA KUZA	ABDULMALIK | MOHAMED MWAKUUUZA KUZA
Ag02559	HALIMA	
Ag02560	SAUDA	
Ag02561	SAMIR SAID SLAIM BA'AMIR	SAMIR SALIM
Ag02562	MOHAMED ALI 'ISSE YUSUF	MOHAMED ABDI 'ISSE YUSUF
Ag02563	IBRAHIM "AL-AFGHANI"	
Ag02564	JAAMA ALI ISMA'IL	KUTIYE
Ag02565	DA'UD SALA IIDLE	
Ag02566	FARHAN ABDULLE MOHAMED	
Ag02567	HALIMA ABDI ISSA YUSUF	
Ag02568	YAYAN	
Ag02569	ABDUL RASYID	
Ag02570	CHANDRA NASRULLAH	
Ag02571	NIK ADLI BIN NIK AZIS	
Ag02572	TAMZIL LINRUNG	
Ag02573	ABU FATAH	
Ag02574	SALIMULLAH	
Ag02575	TASRIFAH KHUSUSIATI	
Ag02576	FURQON	
Ag02577	MAHMUD (JI - BATAM)	
Ag02578	TARMIZI	
Ag02579	MUKTIB	
Ag02580	SUKRI	
Ag02581	NASRI	
Ag02582	ALI FAUZI	M FAUZI
Ag02583	YASIR	
Ag02584	IFANA	
Ag02585	UMAR KECIL	
Ag02586	MURTAJAB	
Ag02587	HALIMAH	
Ag02588	HJ AFIAH	
Ag02589	HM KOZIN	
Ag02590	JARAF SHODIQ	
Ag02591	AMIN JABIR	
Ag02592	TAFISR	
Ag02593	TASRIFAH	
Ag02594	SUMIAH	
Ag02595	NAIMAH	
Ag02596	H NUR HASYIM	
Ag02597	HJ TARIYEM	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02598	SITI ROHMA	
Ag02599	JULIA MAHENDRA	
Ag02600	ASTUTI	
Ag02601	KHOIRIANA KHUSUSIATI	
Ag02602	HAULA BINTI AMROZI	
Ag02603	BILAL/SAEED	
Ag02604	AITEZAZ SHAH	
Ag02605	SHER ZEHMAN	
Ag02606	HUSNAIN GUL	
Ag02607	MOHAMAD RAFAQAT	RAFAQAT
Ag02608	RASHEED AHMED	
Ag02609	NASRULLAH ABDULLAH	
Ag02610	BAITULLAH MEHSUD	EMIR SAHIB
Ag02611	MAULVI SAHIB	
Ag02612	BRIGADIER EJZA SHAH	
Ag02613	NAZIR (MUMBAI ATTACK)	ABU UMER
Ag02614	SHOAIB (MUMBAI ATTACK)	ABU SOHEB | ABU SAHEB
Ag02616	JAVED (MUMBAI ATTACKS)	ABU ALI
Ag02617	IMRAN BABAR	ABU AAKASHA | BABAR IMRAN | ABU AKASHA
Ag02618	MAHMOUD MOHAMMED BAHAZIQ	ABU ABD AL-AZIZ | ABU ABD AL-'AZIZ | BAHAZIQ MAHMOUD | SHAYK SAHIB | MAHMOUD MOHAMMAD AHMED BAHAZIQ
Ag02620	HAFIZ ARSHAD	ABU ABDAR REHMAN | HAFU ARSHAD | HAYAJI
Ag02621	ABDEL REHMAN CHHOTA	ABU ABDAR REHMAN | ABDUR REHMAN | SAKIB
Ag02622	FAHAD ULLAH	FAHADULLA
Ag02623	NASER (MUMBAI ATTACKS)	ABU UMAR
Ag02626	ABU MUFTI SAEED	
Ag02627	ABU ABDURREHMAN	
Ag02628	ABU MAAVIA	
Ag02629	ABU ANIS (LET)	
Ag02630	ABU BASHIR (LET)	
Ag02631	ABU HANJLA PATHAN	
Ag02632	ABU SARIA	
Ag02633	ABU SAIF-UR-REHMAN	
Ag02634	ABU IMRAN	
Ag02635	HAKIM SAHEB	
Ag02636	KAAHFA	ABU KAFA | ABU KAHFA
Ag02637	SHAHID GHAFOOR	
Ag02638	TAHAWWUR HUSSAIN RANA	
Ag02639	ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED	PASHA | MAJOR | ABDUR RAHMAN
Ag02640	MAJOR HAROON ASIQ	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02641	ABU YAHYA AL-LIBI	HASAN QAIID | YUNIS AL-SAHRAWI | MUHAMMAD HASAN AL-LIBI | HASAN QAYID
Ag02642	BURHANUDDIN RABBANI	
Ag02653	AL-HAJ MURAD EBRAHIM	AL-HAJ MURAD | KAGI | KAGI MURAD
Ag02654	BENJIE MIDTIMBANG	
Ag02655	JOHN MACK	
Ag02656	ABDULLAH MACAAPAR	
Ag02657	ALIM ABDULAZIZ MIMBANTAS	ABU WIDAD
Ag02658	GHAZALI JAFAAR	
Ag02659	SHEIKH OMAR PASIGAN	
Ag02660	SAMIR HASHIM	
Ag02661	SOLAMAIN PANGALIAN	ALEEM SULAIMAN PANGALIAN | SULAIMAN PANGALIAN | COMMANDER PANGALIAN
Ag02662	OKASHA	
Ag02663	NASRULLAH (JI)	
Ag02664	ILYAS/HANIF	
Ag02665	SAID (JI)	
Ag02666	ANWAR (JI)	
Ag02667	ABDURROHMAN	
Ag02668	MUSTHOFA	
Ag02669	MUADZ	
Ag02670	HAZAH	
Ag02671	IBU SIRIN	
Ag02672	ZUBEIR	
Ag02673	ABU FARHAN	
Ag02674	ZAID	
Ag02675	HUDAIFAH	
Ag02676	MACAANGCOS MIMBANTAS	
Ag02677	AMIR PAUTE	
Ag02678	ZAINAL PAX	
Ag02679	SALMAN MORO	
Ag02680	USTADZ SAID	
Ag02681	OSAMA ARA	
Ag02682	MOHAMMAD GUINDOLONGAN	
Ag02683	JULKIPLI	ZOL | JOL | ZULKIFLI | GUL KIPLI | JUL | GEOL | JABBAR | BADRUDIN | BRO
Ag02684	HAMDAN	HAMJA | HAMZAH
Ag02685	NOOR MOHAMMAD UMUG	MUHAMMAD NOOR UMOG | USTADZ MUHAMMAD NOOR UMOG | ABU MUSLIM ALGHAZIE
Ag02686	HAJI AKHMAD	
Ag02687	SULAIMAN	
Ag02688	HADJI ABDUL SASAMU	
Ag02689	USTADZ BAEM SAMUYA	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02690	NASRUDDIN SULYANG	
Ag02691	ESMAEL AKMAD	
Ag02692	TOHAMI BAGUNDANG	
Ag02693	ESMAEL MAMALANGKAS	
Ag02694	IDAR	
Ag02695	JIMMY BALULAO	
Ag02696	GUINDATU MAMINTAL DULANG	
Ag02697	NASRUDDIN IBRAHIM	
Ag02698	DONGDONG PIDTUKASAN	
Ag02699	REX MOHIR	
Ag02700	MORI ALI USMAN	
Ag02701	TONG ABBAS	
Ag02702	BILAL ABDULLAH	
Ag02703	SHEIKH AMAD AL-KUBAISI	
Ag02704	SABEEL AHMED	
Ag02705	KAFEEL AHMED	
Ag02706	MOHAMMED HANEEF	
Ag02707	MOHAMMED ASHA	
Ag02708	ADAM KHATIB	OSMAN ADAM KHATIB
Ag02709	COSSAR ALI	
Ag02800	MEHRAN HUSSAIN	
Ag02801	MOHAMMED AL GHABRA	
Ag02802	SADIQ SHEIKH	MOHAMMED SADIQ ISRAR SHEIKH
Ag02804	AMIR RAZA	AMIR RAZA KHAN | AMIR REZA KHAN
Ag02805	ABU RASHID	
Ag02806	AFZAL USMANI	AFZAL MUTALIB USMANI
Ag02807	ARIF SHEIKH	MOHAMMED ARIF SHEIKH
Ag02808	MOHAMMED ZAKIR SHEIKH	MOHAMMED ZAKIR SHEIKH
Ag02809	MOHAMMED ANSAR SHEIKH	SHEIKH MOHAMMED ANSAR
Ag02811	ROSHAN KHAN	
Ag02812	AMEER RAZAQ	
Ag02813	ASIF RAZAQ	
Ag02814	ATIF AMEEN	ATIQ | MOHAMMAD ATIF AMEEN
Ag02815	RIYAZ BHATKAL	RIYAZ SHABANDARI | DILAWAR IQBAL | SHARUKH KHAN
Ag02816	ABDUS SUBHAN QURESHI	TAUQEER | ALTAF SUBHAN QURESHI
Ag02817	FAISAL SHAIKH	FAISAL SHEIKH | ABU AAMEEN | SAMEER
Ag02818	MAULANA ABDUL HALIM	
Ag02819	SAMEER SADIQ	
Ag02820	MUFTI ABU BASHAR	
Ag02821	MOHAMMED SAIF	MOHAMMAD SAIF

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02822	MOHAMMED ZEESHAN	
Ag02823	SAQIB NISAR	SAQIB NISSAR
Ag02824	MOHAMMED SHAKEEL	MOHAMMAD SHAKEEL
Ag02825	ZIA-UR-REHMAN	
Ag02826	MUJAHID SALIM	
Ag02827	RASOOL KHAN	
Ag02828	MAULANA NASEERUDIN NASIR	
Ag02829	ANAS AL KANDARI	
Ag02830	ABDUL RAHMAN JABARAH	ABDUL-RAHMAN MANSOUR JABARAH
Ag02831	AHMED SAHAGI	
Ag02832	ANWAR AL-AWLAKI	ANWAR AL-AULAQI | IMAM ANWAR | SHEIKH ANWAR | ANWAR NASSER ABDULLA AL-AULAQI
Ag02833	NASSER AL-AULAQI	
Ag02835	AHMED MUHAMMED DHAKANE	ABDI GALL | DHAKHANE ABDIFATAH MOHAMED | WILLIAMS MARK | MARK WILLIAMS | AHMAN MOHAMMED DHAKHANE | TSA WANE DHAKHANE | ABDIGAL | ALI WARSAME | AWIL JAMA | ABDIFATAH MOHAMED
Ag02836	ADANI LNU	
Ag02837	MOHAMMED EREG	IDRIS
Ag02838	ABDRIZAK LNU	AL QAEDA
Ag02839	HASSAN YARE	
Ag02840	ABDELLAH BENYAICH	ABDULLAH BENYAICH | ABDALLAH BENLAICH
Ag02841	AQEEL ABDUL-AZIZ AI'AQEEL	AQUEEL AL-AQUEEL
Ag02842	SALEH ABDULLAH KAMEL	
Ag02843	OMAR ABDULLAH KAMEL	
Ag02844	ADEL ABDUL JALIL BATTERJEE	SHEIK ADIL ABDUL GALIL BATARGY | ADEL ABDUL JALIL IBRAHIM BATTERJEE
Ag02845	SULAIMAN ABDULAZIZ AL-RAJHI	
Ag02846	SALEH ABDULAZAIA AL-RAJHI	
Ag02847	KHALID BIN MAHFOUZ	
Ag02848	KALEDA BIN MAHFOUZ	
Ag02849	YOUSSEF NADA	
Ag02850	ALI GHALIB HIMMAT	
Ag02851	YOUSSEF AL-QARDAWI	
Ag02852	ABDEL FATTAH ABU GHADDA	
Ag02853	AHMED HUBER	ALBERT FRIEDRICH ARMAND HUBER
Ag02854	AHMED NASREDDIN	
Ag02855	SOLIMAN AL-BUTHE	SOLIMAN HAMD AL-BUTHE | SULIMAN HAMD SULEIMAN AL-BUTHE
Ag02856	PIROUZ SEDAGHATY	PETE SEDA | PEROUZ SEDA GHATY | ABU YUNUS
Ag02857	MARAT AVLARIGOV	
Ag02858	CHAMSOUDIN AVLARIGOV	
Ag02859	MUNIB ZAHARIGAC	
Ag02860	HAROUN ABED	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02861	MUBARAK HAMED	
Ag02862	AHMED MUSTAFA	
Ag02863	KHALID AL-SUDANEE	
Ag02864	MARK DELI SILJANDER	
Ag02865	ABDEL AZIM EL-SIDDIG	
Ag02866	RABIH HADDAD	
Ag02867	KHALED SMAILI	
Ag02868	USAMA HAMDAN	
Ag02869	HAYTHAM MAGHAWRI	
Ag02870	MOHAMMED EL-MEZAIN	
Ag02871	MOHAMMED IBRAHIM SULAIMAN	
Ag02872	JAFFAR AHMAD ABDULLAH MAKKI	
Ag02873	ABDUL AZIZ ABBAKAR MUHAMAD	
Ag02874	KHALID AHMAD JUMAH AL-SUDANI	
Ag02875	IBRAHIM BUISIR	
Ag02876	AHMED SANTOS	HILARION SANTOS | HILARION DEL ROSARIO SANTOS
Ag02877	ABU HAMZA ABU HAMID AL-LUZONI	
Ag02878	HANNAH SANTOS	
Ag02879	NURUMIJA AMDAL	
Ag02880	MURSIDI BALAO	
Ag02881	ISMAEL IDIRIS	
Ag02882	MALIK MIMUDDIN	
Ag02883	ANNE ANOVER	
Ag02884	BODOT ABDULLAH	
Ag02885	RUBEN OMAR LAVILLA	RUBEN PESTANO LAVILLA, JR. | OMAR LAVILLA | REUBEN LAVILLA | AHMAD OMAR SHARIEF | SHAYKH OMAR LOBILLA | OMAR LABELLA | REYMUND LAVILLA | MILE D. LAVILLA | MIKE DE LAVILLA | ABDULLAH MUDDARIS | RAMO LAVILLA
Ag02886	REDENDO CAIN DELLOSA	REDENDO DELLOSA Y CAIN | REDENDO CAIN JABIL DELLOSA | HAKID AKMAL | HABIL AKMAD DELLOSA | HABIL AHMAD DELLOSA | REENDO CAIN DELLOS | AHMAD DELLOSA | ABU LLONGGO | ABU ILONGGO | ABU MUADZ | BRANDON BERUSA | ARNULFO ALVARADO
Ag02887	YUSUF LEDESMA	
Ag02889	JAINAL ANTEL SALI, JR.	JAMAL SALI | ABU SULAYMAN | ABU SOLAIMAN | ABU SOLAYMAN | APONG SOLAIMAN | APUNG | THE ENGINEER
Ag02890	MOHAMMAD BARRIENTOS	
Ag02891	ANGELO RAMIREZ TRINIDAD	ANGELO TRINIDAD Y RAMIREZ | KHALIL TRINIDAD | KHULIL TRINIDAD | ABU KHALIL TRINIDAD | CALIB TRINIDAD | KALIB TRINIDAD | ADRIAN TOMAS
Ag02892	PIO ABOGNE DE VERA	PIO DE VERA Y ABOGNE | PIO ABOGUE DE VERA | PIO ABAGNE DE VERA | LEO M. OBOGNE | ISMAEL DE VERA | ISMAIL DE VERA | ESMAEL DE VERA | MANEX | TITO ART

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02893	FELICIANO SEMBORIO DELOS REYES, JR.	FELICIANO DE LOS REYES | FELECIANO SEMBORIO DELOS REYES | FELECIANO DELOS REYES Y SEMBERIO | FELICIANO ABUBAKAR DE LOS REYES | USTADZ ABUBAKAR DELOS REYES | ABUBAKAR REYES | USTADZ ABUBAKAR ABDILLAH | ABUBAKAR ABDILLAH | ABDUL ABDILLAH | JORGE CASTRO
Ag02894	RICARDO PEREZ AYERAS	RICARDO ABDULKARIM AYERAS | RICARDO ABDULKAREEM AYERAS | RICKY AYERAS | ABDUL KAREEM AYERAS | ABDUL KAREM AYERAS | ABDUL KARIM AYERAS | ABDUL KARIM AYERS | KHALIL AYERAS | ISAAC JAY GALANG PEREZ | JAY PEREZ | ABDUL MUJIB
Ag02895	DINNO AMOR ROSALEJOS PAREJA	DINO AMOR ROSALEJOS-PAREJA | DINNO ROSALEJOS PAREJA | KHALIL PAREJA | KAHLIL PAREJA | KHALIL PAREJA AMINAH | JOHNNY PAREJA
Ag02896	ISNILON HAPILON	ISNILON TOTONI HAPILON | HAPILUN, ISNILON | HAPILUN, ISNILUN | SALAHUDIN | ABU MUSAB | TUAN ISNILON | ESNILON HAPILON | THE DEPUTY
Ag02897	RADULAN SAHIRON	SAHIRON, RADULLAN | SAHIRUN, RADULAN | SAJIRUN, RADULAN | COMMANDER PUTOL | RADULAN SAJIRON
Ag02898	CHHOTA SAJID	SAJID | MOHAMMAD SAJID
Ag02899	RIYAZ ISMAIL SHAHBANDRI	
Ag02900	DR SHAHNAWAZ	
Ag02901	ASADULLAH AKHTAR	ASADULLAH KHAN
Ag02902	RAHIL SHEIKH	RAHIL ABDUL SHEIKH | RAHIL ATAUR-REHMAN SHEIKH
Ag02903	AHAD SABET	
Ag02904	FARUQ AL-TUNISI	ABU FARUQ AL-TUNISI
Ag02905	FAISAL SHAHZAD	
Ag02906	HAKIMULLAH MEHSUD	ZULFIQAR
Ag02907	HUMAM KHALIL ABU MULAL AL-BALAWI	ABU DUJANAH AL KHURASANI
Ag02908	ABDELRAZZAK	
Ag02909	MOSOUD ELBARA	
Ag02910	ASIF CHUTO	
Ag02911	MUFTI OBAID	
Ag02912	MUHAMMAD ALI MEMON	
Ag02913	ARIFA	
Ag02914	HABIBA	
Ag02915	JUMA NAMANGANI	JUMABAY KHOJIYEV
Ag02916	SHERALY AKBOTOEV	
Ag02917	ABDUL QAHAR	
Ag02918	HUSSAIN (IMU)	
Ag02919	MOHAMMED KHALID	
Ag02920	ABDUL AZIZ AL-GHAMDI	ABU WALID
Ag02921	NURPASHI KULAYEV	
Ag02922	IZNAUR KODZOYEV	
Ag02923	MAGOMED AUSHEV	
Ag02924	VLADIMIR KHODOV	
Ag02925	KHANPASHI KULAYEV	
Ag02926	ARSEN MERZHOYEV	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02927	MAIRBEK SHAIBEKKHANOV	
Ag02928	ABU UMAR (LET)	
Ag02929	ABU QASIM	
Ag02930	SHAFAQAT IQBAL MIR	
Ag02931	SHABBIR AHMED	
Ag02932	DAWOOD IBRAHIM	DAWOOD EBRAHIM | SHEIKH DAWOOD HASSAN | DAWOOD IBRAHIM KASKAR | ABDUL HAMID ABDUL AZIZ | ANIS IBRAHIM | AZIZ DILIP | DAUD HASAN SHAIKH IBRAHIM KASKAR | DAUD IBRAHIM MEMON | DAUD IBRAHIM MEMON KASKAR | DAUDHASAN SHAIKH IBRAHIM KASKAR | DAWOOD HASAN IBRAHIM KASKAR | DAWOOD HASSAN | DAWOOD HASSAN SHEIKH | DAWOOD IBRAHIM MEMON | DAWOOD SABRI | DOWOOD HASSAN SHAIKH IBRAHIM | HIZRAT | IBRAHIM SHAIKH MOHD ANIS | KASKAR DAWOOD HASAN | SHAIKH DAUD HASAN | SHAIKH ISMAIL ABDUL | SHAIKH MOHD ISMAIL ABDUL REHMAN | SHEIKH DAWOOD HASSAN | SHEIKH IBRAHIM
Ag02933	ABDUL KARIM TUNDA	TUNDA
Ag02934	SAJID MIR	SAJID MAJID
Ag02935	COLONEL R SADATULLAH	
Ag02936	MAJOR GENERAL SAHAB	
Ag02937	MOHD ALTAF	
Ag02938	MOHD ABDU MATIN ABDUL BASIT	
Ag02939	SHEIKH MOHD MUZZAMIL JAMIL AHMED	
Ag02940	ZAHIR AHMED BASHIR AHMED SHAIKH	
Ag02941	SAYED KHWAJA YUNUS KHWAJA AYUB	
Ag02942	IRFAN REHMAN KHAN	
Ag02943	MOHAMED HAMID (ENGLAND)	
Ag02944	KIBLEY DA COSTA	
Ag02945	MUHAMMAD AL-FIGARI	
Ag02946	KADAR AHMED	
Ag02947	MOUSSA BROWN	
Ag02948	SALOUM JOH	
Ag02949	SALEH AL QUUWAYE	
Ag02950	ZAID AL AMER	
Ag02951	EMAD ELMUBARAK Y ALI	
Ag02952	HASH MI	
Ag02953	MOHAMMAD ANEES	
Ag02954	ABDUL KAREEM JASSIM BIDAWI	
Ag02955	HALEEM JASSIM BIDAWI	
Ag02956	JAMAAL JALOUD Y HATO	
Ag02957	IBRAHIM ABID	
Ag02958	NAJIM NASSER Y TAHER	
Ag02959	COMMANDER ROBOT	GALIB ANDANG
Ag02960	HECTOR JANJALANI	ABU ESCOBAR

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag02961	JULISAM HARUM	
Ag02962	ABDUL MARAYIN	
Ag02963	ABDULHAKIM EDRIS	ABDULMUKIM EDRIS | MUKIM EDRIS | HAMIL HAMJA AJILUL | ALEX | RYAN
Ag02964	USTAJ AHMAN HALIFA	
Ag02965	HUSIN SAMIL	
Ag02966	FAWAZ ZI AJJUR	AJOOR
Ag02967	ALBADER PARAD	
Ag02969	JUL AKRAM HADJAIL	
Ag02970	ARULA ABUBAKAR	
Ag02971	MUJIB SUSUKAN	MUNJIB SUSUKAN
Ag02972	BROTHER OF MUJIB SUSUKAN	
Ag02973	LAKANDULA	
Ag02974	BEN ISMI	MARSAN
Ag02975	LANDASAN UMAR	
Ag02976	ITING AGA	
Ag02977	HASHIM	
Ag02978	USTADZ UMBRA JUMDAIL	USTADZ | DOCTOR ABU PULA | DR. ABU
Ag02979	MUHAMMAD AMIN AJIJON	
Ag02980	COMMANDER GLOBAL	NADZMIE SAABDULLAH | NADZMIE SAABDULLA | ABDULAN MADJI
Ag02981	ALTON LADJAALAM	AL
Ag02982	KEFFREY JINNUI	
Ag02983	AJID HALIK	
Ag02984	HAMDA SAMAC	
Ag02985	COMMANDER KOSOVO	ALHAMZER LIMBONG
Ag02986	HAFTI DAIS	KA LANDO
Ag02987	SALIP ABDULLAH MASDAL	COMMANDER SUKARNO HABIB HASHIM
Ag02988	MADHATTA HAIPE	COMMANDER HAIPE
Ag02989	JATIB USMAN	COMMANDER MILIKAN
Ag02990	PULAH ALIH	
Ag02991	FAIZAL MUTIA	
Ag02992	ALDREN AMIL	
Ag02993	USTADZ SALIM TADO	
Ag02994	PULA	
Ag02995	NUR HASSAN JAMIRI	
Ag02996	REYNALDO APILADO	
Ag02997	HTIMIL HARON	
Ag02998	ALLAN SABUDIN	
Ag02999	MUAMAR ASTALI	
Ag03000	ADONG SALAHUDDIN	
Ag03001	JEROME MUSTAKIM	BERANG

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03002	BURRONG RASUL BARRO	ABU MOHAMMAD
Ag03003	MUJIBAR ALIH AMON	BONGBONG | KHATAB | PAPPONG | APPONG
Ag03004	BASARUN AROK	BASARUN AHADUK
Ag03005	JUMADAIL ARAD	
Ag03006	KARIM JULDANI	
Ag03007	ALBASHIR ADJILI	
Ag03008	ROWENA AKSAN	
Ag03009	NURSIMA ANNUDDEN	
Ag03010	RABIA ASIRI	
Ag03011	MARWINA SALASAIN	
Ag03012	MADRIMAR	
Ag03013	MIDSFAR AKSAN	
Ag03014	ALVIN BAGADI	
Ag03015	ALHASBY MISAYA	
Ag03016	MUBIN SAKANDAL	ABDURAJAK
Ag03017	TING JUMDAEL	
Ag03018	MAGDAR JUMDAEL	
Ag03019	ARMINDA JUMDAEL	
Ag03020	DARUL	
Ag03021	SALLAM	
Ag03022	JULMILLUN	
Ag03023	SADDAM PARAD	
Ag03024	MUNIR ARBISON	
Ag03025	COCOY TULAWIE	
Ag03026	MOAMIL ASKALI	
Ag03027	JULHAN ALIHUDDIN	
Ag03028	SULAIMAN MUIN	
Ag03029	HADJI NAHRIM AKMAD	
Ag03030	YASIR IGASAN	ABU ALIH
Ag03031	MARCIAL JABAROT	
Ag03032	NADZMIR AMIRUL	ABU KUDAMA
Ag03033	JAITUN TIMUAL	
Ag03034	COMMANDER KIRRIH	
Ag03035	TETENG MANDANGAN	
Ag03036	JANATIN MADJAKIN	JING AMILUL | ASALUL MADJAKAN
Ag03037	NURHASSAN JAMIRI	
Ag03038	COMMANDER TOTO SANTAWAR	
Ag03039	HAJAL	
Ag03040	COMMANDER JAVIER	
Ag03041	HAMSIRAJI MARUSI SALI	JOSE RAMIREZ | TIBERKIS

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03042	ALDAM TILAO	ABU SABAYA | ABU CATADA | ABU AHMAD SALAYUDDIN
Ag03043	SHAMSUL BAHARI	
Ag03044	AHMAD HASAN	AGUNG SUNTORO
Ag03045	IWAN MUTHO	
Ag03046	MOHAMMAD CHOLILY	YAHYA ANTONY
Ag03047	DWI WIDYARTO	
Ag03048	ALIAS OSMAN	
Ag03049	ANSORI	
Ag03050	ACHMAD BASIR	
Ag03051	BUDI DARMAWAN	ARMAN | AGUS PURYANTO
Ag03052	TEDI SURYA	TEDDY | RENO | TEDI
Ag03053	AHMED MAAZ	
Ag03054	MUHAMMAD RAZI	
Ag03055	AMIN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	
Ag03056	AKHWAN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	
Ag03057	FIRDOUS (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	
Ag03058	MOHAMMAD SYAIFUDIN	SAIFUDDIN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)
Ag03059	ILHAM SOFYANDI	ELHAM (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)
Ag03060	FURQON ABDULLAH	FURQAN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)
Ag03061	DAOUD (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	
Ag03062	ANWAR (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	
Ag03063	MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN MOHAMED YUNOS	
Ag03064	ACHMAD KANDAI	
Ag03065	NATSIR/RISTAN	
Ag03066	DATUK RAJO AMEH	
Ag03067	BASIT USMAN	
Ag03068	GUIDAY MUNTASIR	
Ag03069	RICO ABURVA	
Ag03070	IMAM LAMAI	
Ag03071	ABDUL SAKIM SALI	COMMANDER KIDLAT
Ag03072	AL POZE	
Ag03073	JOLING	
Ag03074	ELMER AMBRAN	ELMER ENURAN
Ag03075	USTADZ USMAN COLANO	
Ag03076	JAYBE OFRASIO	
Ag03077	ROHMAT	
Ag03078	ALI AL-KHUDAIR	
Ag03079	AHMAD AL-KHALIDI	
Ag03080	NASSER AL-FAHD	
Ag03081	KAHLED JEHANI	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03082	ZUBAYR AL-RIMI	SULTAN JUBRAN SULTAN AL-QAHTANI
Ag03083	YOSIF SALIH FAHD ALA'YEERI	
Ag03084	ABDULLAH BIN IBRAHIM BIN ABDULLAH ALSHABRAMI	
Ag03085	YUSUF ABDULLAH	
Ag03086	HILAL JABER EL ASSIR	
Ag03087	AHMED ELMOULLA BILLAL	
Ag03089	JAMILUDDIN NASIR	
Ag03090	SADAQAT KHAN	MOHAMMAD SADIQ | SADAKAT
Ag03091	REHAN ALAM	
Ag03092	MUSHARRAT HUSSAIN	SYED MOSSARAF HOSSAIN | BOBBY
Ag03093	HUSRAT ALAM	
Ag03094	SHAKIB AKHTAR	
Ag03095	ADIL HASSAN	
Ag03096	MOHAMMED SABIR	MD SABIR
Ag03097	RAJENDRA VRAJLAL ANADKAT	
Ag03098	SHEIKH OBAIDULLAH	
Ag03099	IDRIS MOHAMMAD ZAHID	
Ag03100	ABDUL KAREEM MOOSA	
Ag03101	NOOR ABU ILAHI	
Ag03102	WALID JINNAH	
Ag03103	MAHFOOZ ALAM	
Ag03104	DAWOOD ALI AHMED	ABU ANAS
Ag03105	EZAZ AHMED	DEEPAK
Ag03106	JAMIR SHAYKH	JAMEER
Ag03107	SOHAIL SHAYKH	SOHAIL SHEIKH
Ag03108	TANVIR ANSARI	
Ag03109	ABED AWAD	
Ag03110	FIROZ LATIF GHASWALA	ABDULLAH | FIROZE GHASWALLA
Ag03111	MOHAMMED IQBAL (LET)	ABU HAMZA
Ag03112	MOHAMMED ALI CHHIPA	UBEDULLAH | MOHAMMED CHIPPA | MOHAMMED ALI
Ag03113	ASIF ABDUL KHAN	JUNAID | ASIF KHAN BASHIR KHAN
Ag03114	NOMAN SHEIKH	
Ag03115	ABU HURERA	
Ag03116	RIZWAN DAWRE	RIZWAN AHMED DAVRE
Ag03117	MUZAMMIL SHAIKH	
Ag03118	EHTESHAM SIDDIQUI	
Ag03119	FAIYAZ KAGZI	
Ag03120	MOHAMMED NAVED	
Ag03121	KAMALUDDIN ANSARI	KAMAL ANSARI
Ag03122	ABU UMAID	ABU OSAMA | ABU SALEM

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03123	SALIM (LET)	
Ag03124	MANISHA CHAVAN	
Ag03125	ZAMEER SHEIKH	
Ag03126	MIRZA HIMAYAT INAYAT BAIG	
Ag03127	LAL BABA MOHAMMED HUSSAIN FAREED	BILAL
Ag03128	MOHAMMAD AHMED ZARAR SIDDIBAPPA	YASIN BHATKAL | AHMED SIDDIBAPPA
Ag03129	MOHSIN CHAUDHARY	
Ag03130	IKRAM	IKRAMULLAH
Ag03131	ABOUSFIAN ABDELRAZIK	
Ag03132	AHMED ABDI AW-MOHAMED	AHMED ABDI AW MOHAMMED | MUKTAR ABDULRAHIM ABUZUBAIR | SHAYKH MUKHTAR | ABU ZUBEYR | GODANI | GODANE
Ag03133	AHMAD ROFIQ RIDHO	
Ag03134	JOKO TRI PRIYANTO	
Ag03135	MUSTAGHFIRIN	
Ag03136	SOLAHUDDIN	
Ag03137	FADLI SADAMA	
Ag03138	AYMAN AL-BALAWI	
Ag03139	MARUTO	
Ag03140	SUSILO	
Ag03141	PUTRI MUNAROH	
Ag03142	HAWIN MURTADLO	
Ag03143	MOHAMMED AZAM GHAURI	
Ag03144	ABU ABDALLAH AL-SHAMI	
Ag03145	ABU NASIR AL-QAHTANI	NAYIF BIN-MUHAMMAD AL-QAHTANI
Ag03146	MUHAMMAD AHMAD	
Ag03147	ABDALLAH AL-SADIQ	ABD-AL-HAKIM BELHAJ
Ag03148	KHALID AL-SHARIF	ABU-HAZIM
Ag03149	ABU-AL-MUNDHIR	SAMI AL-SA'DI | ABU-AL-MUNDHIR AL-SA'IDI
Ag03150	SHAYKH MIFTAH AL-DUWWADI	ABD-AL-GHAFFAR
Ag03151	ABD-AL-WAHAB QAYID IDRIS	
Ag03152	MUSTAFA QANFID	ABU-AL-ZUBAYR
Ag03153	IBN AL-SHAYKH AL-LIBI	ALI MUHAMMAD 'ABD-AL-'AZIZ AL-FAKHRI
Ag03154	ABU LAITH AL-LIBI	
Ag03155	UMBRA KATO	COMMANDER AMERIL UMBRA KATO
Ag03156	SALIP ALOY ALSREE	
Ag03157	LATIP JAMAT	
Ag03158	NASSER MACABATO	
Ag03159	IMAM ABUBAKAR	
Ag03160	WANING ABDUSALAM	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03161	SAIDAMEN ALICK	
Ag03162	ADZMIE	
Ag03163	ABUNAWAS	
Ag03164	ABDULRAHMAN MACAPAAR	COMMANDER BRAVO
Ag03165	PLATON BLAH	SAMSUDIN DEMAALO | COMMANDER PLATON BLAH
Ag03166	KULE MAMAGONG	USTADZ KULE
Ag03167	DAUD SARIP	
Ag03168	BIZNAR SALAHUDDIN	
Ag03169	ATTI LINTUNGAN	USTADZ ATTI
Ag03170	ZAHIDE ABDUL	ZABIRI ABDUL | BEDZ
Ag03171	USMAN AL MAJAD	
Ag03172	KASANADEL PIGKAWALAN	
Ag03173	USI AMPATUAN	
Ag03174	NAYANG TIMAN	
Ag03175	DATUKALAN MONTOK SAMAD	
Ag03176	TUMALAO BUTUAN	
Ag03177	MANAMPAN	
Ag03178	TOLNI SALIK	
Ag03179	KUMANDER NASER	
Ag03180	BAY	
Ag03181	AKA KEDIE	
Ag03182	WAHAB UPAO	
Ag03183	MOHAMAD BAEHAQI	LATIF | SALMAN | TATOH
Ag03184	ASNAN SAWAJAAN	
Ag03185	ABRAHAM IBNO	
Ag03186	ANSAR YUSOP	
Ag03187	ABRAL ABDUSALAM	
Ag03188	GUINGONA SAMAL	
Ag03189	SMAWTIN BASILAN	
Ag03190	EDGAR MALAYDAN	
Ag03191	ARIF QADIR	
Ag03192	SHADAAB	
Ag03193	SHEHZAAD	
Ag03194	SALMAN AHMED	CHHOTU | SALMAN
Ag03195	ARIZ KHAN	
Ag03196	MOHAMMAD KHAN	
Ag03197	HAMID SHEIKH	
Ag03198	SHAHRUKH	
Ag03199	ABDUL SATTAR	JAINUDDIN
Ag03200	QAYAMUDDIN KAPADIA	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03201	IQBAL BHATKAL	
Ag03202	SALEH MUHAMMAD AL-AOOFI	
Ag03203	ABDULAZIZ AL-MOQRIN	
Ag03204	OMAR AHMED ABDULLAH ALI	
Ag03205	MIKAEL DAVUD	
Ag03206	DAVID JAKOBSEN	
Ag03207	SHAWAN SADEK SAEED BUJAK BUJAK	
Ag03208	AHMAD/ISMAIL	
Ag03209	ABI PAMANAY	
Ag03210	ABDULRAHMAN SAMUEL	
Ag03211	JOHER IBRAHIM	
Ag03212	MUJAHID IBRAHIM	
Ag03213	ABU TAHER	
Ag03214	ALSHEED ALLING ALBANI	
Ag03215	ABDUL BAKI	
Ag03216	BARAHAMA SALI	
Ag03271	SHEIK MIYAR HAMZA	
Ag03272	FARDOSA ABDULLAHI	
Ag03273	ASGHAR MUKADAM	
Ag03274	SHAHNAWAZ QURESHI	
Ag03275	SHOAIB GHANSAR	
Ag03276	ABDUL GANI TURK	
Ag03277	YAKUB MEMON	YAKUB ABDUL RAZAK MEMON
Ag03278	ESSA MEMON	
Ag03279	YUSUF MEMON	
Ag03280	RUBINA MEMON	
Ag03281	IBRAHIM (TIGER) MEMON	ABDUL RAZZAK MEMON | TIGER MEMON
Ag03282	IMTIAZ GHAVTE	
Ag03283	NASIM BARMARE	
Ag03284	FAROOQ PAWLE	
Ag03285	BASHIR KHAIRULLA	
Ag03286	ZAKIR HUSSAIN SHAIKH	
Ag03287	FEROZ MALLIK	
Ag03288	ABDUL AKHTAR KHAN	
Ag03289	DAWOOD MOHAMMAD PHANSE	
Ag03290	ANIS IBRAHIM	ANEES IBRAHIM
Ag03291	NAIBUDDIN	
Ag03292	MOHAMMED SHARIF	
Ag03293	AYUB MEMON	
Ag03294	ANEES MEMON	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03295	TANVIR SHEIKH	
Ag03296	SANJAY KUMAR	
Ag03297	ABDUL JAVED	
Ag03298	ABU SALEM	
Ag03299	IQBAL SHEIKH KASKAR	
Ag03300	EZAZ PATHAN	
Ag03301	ATUL KANITAL SHAH	
Ag03302	ASHOK BHANSALI	
Ag03303	AFTAB BATKI	
Ag03304	ABU JINDAL	
Ag03305	AHMED SIDDIQUI	AHMED SIDIQI
Ag03306	SHAHAB DASHTI	
Ag03307	RAMI MAKANESI	
Ag03308	NAAMEN MEZICHE	
Ag03309	GAFUR JUMDAIL	
Ag03310	NAIZ KHAN	
Ag03311	ABU MUHAMMAD HAMZA	
Ag03312	SALEM SAAD BIN SUWEID	
Ag03313	YASIR FRIEHAT	
Ag03314	MUHAMMAD DEMES	
Ag03315	MUHAMMAD AMIN	
Ag03316	ALI KHALED AL-JABOURI	
Ag03317	MUHAMMAD HASSAN AL-SAMARAI	
Ag03318	UMAR BAZIYANI	
Ag03319	MAHMOOD ABDEL AZIZ AL-HARAMI AL-JANABI	
Ag03320	FADHIL AL-KURDI	ABU UBAYDA
Ag03321	MARWAN HADID AL-SURI	ABU MARWAN (IRAQ INSURGENCY) | ABU MARWAN
Ag03322	SAMI MUHAMMAD ALI SAID AL-JAAF	OMAR AL-KURDI
Ag03323	HASAM HAMAD ABDULLAH MUHSIN AL-DULAIMI	
Ag03324	HASSAN IBRAHIM	
Ag03325	ABU TALHA (IRAQ INSURGENCY)	
Ag03326	SABHAN AHMAD RAMADAN	AGHA ABU SAAD
Ag03327	AZMI AL-JAYOUSI	
Ag03328	MOHAMMED SHARKAWA	
Ag03329	KHAMIS FARHAN KHALAF ABD AL-FAHDAWI	
Ag03330	ABU AZZAM	
Ag03331	BILAL MAHMUD AWAD SHEBAH	ABU UBAYDAH
Ag03332	ABU SUFIAN	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03333	SERGEI MALYSCHEW	
Ag03334	MUHAMMAD G	
Ag03335	MUHAMMAD WASFI	
Ag03336	ABU MOHAMMED AL-MAQDISI	
Ag03337	HUTHAIFA AZZAM	
Ag03338	SHEIK HARITH AL-DARI	
Ag03339	ABDULLAH RASHID AL-BAGHDADI	
Ag03340	ABU ABDUL-RAHMAN AL-IRAQI	
Ag03341	ABU HAMZA AL-MUHAJER	
Ag03342	NASIR AL-WAHAYSHI	NASIR AL-WUHAYSHI | NASIR AL-WAHISHI | ABU BASIR | ABU BASIR AL-YAMANI (OR YEMENI) | NASIR _ABD-AL-KARIM _ABDULLAH AL-WAHISHI
Ag03343	QASSEM AL-REMI	QASIM AL-RAYMI | ABU HURAYRAH AL-SANA'ANI | QASSIM AL-RAIMI | QASIM YAHYA MAHDI AL-RIMI
Ag03344	SAID AL-SHEHRI	SAID ALI AL-SHIHRI | ABU SUFYAN AL-AZDI AL-SHAHRI | SAEED AL-SHIHRI
Ag03345	NASIR AL-BAHRI	
Ag03346	MUHAMMAD HASSAN AL-SIHLI	
Ag03347	ABDELRAHMAN AL-SIHLI	
Ag03348	ABDULLAH AL-SIHLI	
Ag03349	MUHAMMAD HAMID HUSSEIN	
Ag03350	ALI HUSSEIN ALI AL-SHAMARI	
Ag03351	RAWAD JASSEM MOHAMMED ABED	
Ag03352	SAFAA MOHAMMED ALI	
Ag03353	SAJIDA MUBARAK ATROUS AL-RISHAWI	
Ag03354	MUBARAK ATROUS AL-RISHAWI	
Ag03355	NIDAL HASAN	NIDAL MALIK HASAN
Ag03356	AYED AL-SHABWANI	
Ag03358	SALEH AL-TEYS	
Ag03359	IBRAHIM HASSAN AL-ASIRI	IBRAHIM HASSAN TALI AL-ASIRI
Ag03360	ABDULLAH AL-ASIRI	
Ag03361	JABIR AL-FAYFI	ABU JAAFAR AL-ANSARI
Ag03362	MIDHAT MURSI AL-SAYID UMAR	SHEIKH ABU KHABAB AL-MASRI | MEDHAT MURSI AL-SAYED | ABU KHABAB | MADDAT MURSI AL-SAYYID UMAR
Ag03363	ABU MOHAMMED IBRAHIM BIN ABI AL-FARAJ AL-MASRI	ABU MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM BIN ABI AL FARAJ AL MASRI
Ag03364	ABD AL-WAHAB AL-MASRI	ABDUL WAHHAB AL MASRI
Ag03365	ABU ISLAM AL-MASRI	ABU ISLAM AL-MASRI
Ag03366	KHALID HABIB	
Ag03367	MAHMOUD MAHDI ZEIDAN	
Ag03368	TAYIP RAUF	
Ag03369	MATIUR REHMAN	
Ag03370	MAROOF RAUF	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03371	TAHIR MASOOD	
Ag03372	KUSHMIR NESIRWAN	
Ag03373	ABDUL RAHIM AYUB	ABDULRAHIM AYUB
Ag03374	ABDUL RAHMAN AYUB	ABDULRAHMAN AYUB
Ag03375	RABIYAH HUTCHINSON	ROBYN MARY HUTCHINSON
Ag03376	MUSTAFA HAMID	ABU AL WALID AL-MASRI | MUSTAFA MUHAMMAD `ATIYA HAMID | MUSTAFA ATIYA | ABU WALID AL-MISRI | ABU AL-WALID AL-MASRI | ABU AL-WALID | HASHIM AL-MAKKI
Ag03377	AFIFA ROCHE	
Ag03378	JOHN MUSA	
Ag03379	AZMAN HASHIM	
Ag03380	JACK THOMAS	JIHAD JACK | JOSEPH TERRENCE THOMAS
Ag03381	MARYATI IDRIS	
Ag03382	AISYAH BARAJA	
Ag03383	ZULFAH BASHIR	
Ag03384	MOHAMMED AYUB	
Ag03385	ABDULLAH AYUB	
Ag03386	MUHAMMAD RAB'A AL-SA YID AL-BAHTIYTI	MUHAMMAD MAHMUD RABI' AL-ZAYD AL-BAHTITI | MUHAMMAD MAHMUD AL-BAHTITI | MUHAMMAD RABI' AL-SA'ID AL-HATITI | MUHAMMAD RABI' AL-BAHTITI | ABU DUJANA AL-MASRI
Ag03387	ALI SALEH HUSAIN	ABU DAHHAK | 'ALI SALIH HUSAYN AL-DHAHAK AL-TABUKI | ALI SALEH HUSAIN AL-TABUKI 'ALI SALIH HUSAYN 'ULA'LAH 'ALI SALIH HUSAYN | ALA'LAH DHAHHAK AL-TABUKI | ABU DHAHAK AL-YEMENI
Ag03388	AHMED KHADR	AHMED SAID KHADR | AHMAD SAEED KHADR | AHMED SAID KHEDR | AHMED SAID AL KADER | ABDUL REHMAN KHADR AL-KANADI | SHAIKH SAID ABDUL REHMAN | AL-KANADI | ABU ABD AL-RAHMAN
Ag03389	KHALID ABDULLAH	
Ag03390	OMAR KHADR	
Ag03391	ABDUL RAHMAN KHADR	
Ag03392	RAHMAH CHIEKHO	
Ag03393	KHALED CHIEKHO	
Ag03394	MAREK SAMULSKI	
Ag03395	YOUNIS MOHAMMED IBRAHIM AL-HAYARI	
Ag03396	SAUD AL-OTAIBI	SA'UD AL-UTAYBI
Ag03397	OMAR BALADJAM	
Ag03398	MOHAMED ALI ELOMAR	
Ag03399	MIRSAD MULAHALILOVIC	
Ag03400	KHALED SHARROUF	
Ag03401	MAZEN TOUMA	
Ag03402	MOUSTAFA CHEIKHO	ABU ASAD
Ag03403	ABDUL RAKIB HASAN	
Ag03404	ABDUL NACER BENBRIKA	ABU BAKR

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03405	AHMED MEHRI	ABDULLAH MEHRI
Ag03406	EZZIT RAAD	
Ag03407	AIMEN JOUD	
Ag03408	FADAL SAYADI	
Ag03409	AMER JADDARA	
Ag03410	AHMED RAAD	
Ag03411	SHANT KENT	
Ag03412	HANY TAHA	
Ag03413	MUSTAFA AYUB	
Ag03414	AMINAH AYUB	
Ag03415	UMNYA AL ZAWAHIRI	
Ag03416	HEBA AL ZAWAHIRI	
Ag03417	MOHAMMED AL ZAWAHIRI	MUHAMMAD AL-ZAWAHIRI
Ag03418	HUSSEIN AL ZAWAHIRI	
Ag03419	KAMAL HABIB	
Ag03420	AZZA NOWAIR	
Ag03421	ISAM AL-QAMARI	
Ag03422	KHALED ISLAMBOULI	MOHAMMED AHMED SHAWKI AL ISLAMBOLLY
Ag03423	SAYYID IMAM	DR SAYYID IMAM AL-SHARIF | SAYYID IMAM AL-SHARIF | ABD-AL-QADIR ABD-AL-AZIZ | DR. FADL | DR. FADHL EL MASRY | DR. FADHL | SAYYED IMAM SHERIF | DOCTOR FADHL
Ag03424	FATIMA AL ZAWAHIRI	
Ag03425	NABILA AL ZAWAHIRI	
Ag03426	KHADIGA AL ZAWAHIRI	
Ag03427	UMAYMA AL ZAWAHIRI	
Ag03428	MOHAMMED BIN AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI	
Ag03429	AISHA AL ZAWAHIRI	
Ag03430	ISMAIL NASSIR	
Ag03431	AHMAD SALAMA MABRUK	NAJIB | ABU FARAJ AL MASRI | ABU-A -FARAJ AL-ASRI | NASR FAHMI NASR | MUHAMMAD SALAH | ABU-IBRAHIM | MURJAN MUSTAFA SALIM AL-JAWHARI | 'ISA | SAMI | MAHMUD | IBRAHIM AL-AYDARUSI | NASR FAHMI NASR HASSANNEIN
Ag03432	MAHMUD HISHAM AL-HENNAWI	
Ag03433	AHMAD IBRAHIM AL-NAGAR	AHMAD AL-NAJJAR | AHMAD RAJAB FAWDAH
Ag03434	AHMED ISMAIL	
Ag03435	SARWAT SHEHATA	
Ag03436	ADEL ABDEL QODDUS	
Ag03437	HASSAN ZEMIRI	
Ag03438	ABDEL-GHANI ALI JAWHAR	
Ag03439	TAREK MERHI	
Ag03440	OSAMA AL-SHEHABI	
Ag03441	MOHAMMED SHAWKI ISLAMBOULI	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03442	ADNAN AL-SAYEGH	
Ag03443	OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN AL-GHAMDI	
Ag03444	FAHD SALEH SULAIMAN AL-JATILI	
Ag03445	MOHAMMAD AL-DUKHI	
Ag03446	WAEL ABU JABER	
Ag03447	RACHMAT PUJIPRABOWO	BEJO
Ag03448	USMAN BIN SEF	PAHIM
Ag03449	SABTURANI	ROSLAN | ANWAR
Ag03450	KARIM KHADR	
Ag03451	ABU OBAIDAH AL-MASRI	ABU UBAIDA AL-MASRI
Ag03452	MULLAH ABDUL RAHIM	
Ag03453	FAQIR MOHAMMAD	COMMANDER FAQIR
Ag03454	ABDUR REHMAN (KARWAN-E-NIAMATULLAH)	
Ag03455	NIAMATULLAH	
Ag03456	MAULVI OMAR	
Ag03457	FATEH MOHAMMAD	
Ag03458	RAFIUDDIN	
Ag03459	ANWAR (TTP)	
Ag03460	QARI ZIAUR REHMAN	
Ag03461	WALI UR REHMAN	
Ag03462	NEK MOHAMMED	
Ag03463	QARI HUSSEIN	QARI HUSSAIN | QARI HUSSAIN MEHSUD | USTAD-E-FIDAYEEN
Ag03464	AAZAM TARIQ	
Ag03465	REHMATULLAH	
Ag03466	ABDULLAH MEHSUD	
Ag03467	SHAKIR ULLAH SHAKIR	
Ag03468	SHARQAWI ABDU ALI AL-HAJJ	RIYADH THE FACILITATOR
Ag03469	MOHAMMAD OMAR ABDEL-RAHMAN	ASADULLAH | LION OF GOD
Ag03470	AHMAD ABDEL-RAHMAN	SEIF ALLAH | GOD'S SWORD
Ag03471	ASSAD ABDEL RAHMAN	ASSAD ULLAH
Ag03472	ABD AL AZIZ AL-JAMAL	ABU-KHALID | ABU KHALID
Ag03473	IBRAHIM MUHAMMAD SALIH AL-BANNA	
Ag03474	ABD-AL-MUN'IM AL-BADAWI	ABU-AYYUB AL-MISRI | SHARIF HAZZA | ABU-AYYUB AL-MASRI | SHAYKH ABU HAMZA AL-MUHAJIR | SHEIKH ABU HAMZA AL-MUHAJER | ABDEL MONEIM EZZEDDINE ALI AL-BADAWI
Ag03475	MAHMUD AL-DIB	
Ag03476	KHALID BAKIR	
Ag03477	IBRAHIM KARIM	
Ag03478	HASAN ABADI	
Ag03479	KHALIL NUR-AL-DIN	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03480	YUSUF MUHAMMADAYN	
Ag03481	CHIEFTAIN DARDIRI	
Ag03482	MUHAMMAD UMAYR AL-AWLAQI	
Ag03483	ABDULLAH HAMAS AL FILISTINI	
Ag03484	ABU SULAYMAN JAZAIRI	
Ag03485	ZAIN UL ABU QASIM	QASIM HAMZA
Ag03486	ABDULLAH AZZAM AL SAUDI	
Ag03487	ABU ZUBAIR AL MASRI	
Ag03488	ABDUR REHMAN WAZIR	
Ag03489	ZANJIR WAZIR	
Ag03490	ABDUL SALAM	
Ag03491	ABU WAFA AL SAUDI	
Ag03492	ABDUL KHALIQ HAQQANI	
Ag03493	ABU HARIS	ABU HARIS ABDUL HAKIM | ABU HARRIS
Ag03494	ABU HAMZA	HAMZA ARABI
Ag03495	ABU JIHAD AL MASRI	MOHAMMAD HASAN KHALIL AL-HAKIM
Ag03499	ABDUL RAUF NASSIB	
Ag03500	MUHAMMAD SHARAF	
Ag03501	MUS'AB SHARAF	
Ag03502	QAED SALEM SUNIAN AL-HARTHI	ABU ALI
Ag03503	MUNIR AHMED ABDULLAH AL-SAUDA	
Ag03504	SALEH HUSSEIN ALI AL-ZONO	
Ag03505	AOUSSAN AHMED AL-TIRIHI	
Ag03506	ADEL NASSER AL-SAUDA	
Ag03507	KAMAL DARWISH	
Ag03508	MUHAMMAD SHOAIB	
Ag03509	MEHMOOH KHALIB	
Ag03510	IMRAN CHEEMA	
Ag03511	MAHROOF MIRZA	MAROOF AHMED MIRZA
Ag03512	AQEELUR REHMAN ABBASSI	
Ag03513	MUHAMMAD TARIQ	
Ag03514	QADEER MALIK	MALIK QADEER
Ag03515	ABDUL HAFEZ AHMED	
Ag03516	MUHAMMAD AYUB ELAHI	MOHAMMAD AYUD ELAHI BIBI
Ag03517	ROSHAN JAMAL KHAN	
Ag03518	NAZIMUDDIN ZALALOV	YAHYO | NAZIMUMDDIN ZALALOVE | NAZIMUDDIN | NAJMIDDIN KAMOLITDINOVIC JALOLOV | NAJMIDDIN KAMOLITDINOVICH JALOLOV | NAZHMIDDIN ZHALALOV | NAJMIDDIN JALALOV | NAJMIDDIN JALOLOV | NAZHMIDDIN ZHALOLOV | NAZHMUDDIN KAMOLDINOVICH ZHALOLOV | ABU YAHYA MUHAMMAD FATIH | ABDURAKHMON | YAKH'YO | NAJMIDDIN KAMILIDINOVICH ZHANOV
Ag03519	ABU AHMED AL-KUWAITI	SHEIKH ABU AHMED | IBRAHIM SAEED AHMED

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03520	HASSAN GHUL	
Ag03521	MUHAMMAD ALI QASIM	ABU SOHAIB AL MAKKI
Ag03522	JALALUDDIN HAQQANI	HAQANI JALLALOUDDINE | JALALUDDIN HAQANI | JALLALOUDDIN HAQQANI | JALLALOUDDINE HAQANI
Ag03523	MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM	
Ag03524	MUHAMMAD HAQQANI	
Ag03525	QARI ZAFAR	
Ag03526	MUHAMMAD BEG	
Ag03527	MULLAH ABDULLAH	
Ag03528	SIRAJUDDIN HAQQANI	SIRAJ HAQQANI | SERAJUDDIN HAQANI | SIRAJ HAQANI | SARAJ HAQANI | KHALIFA
Ag03530	SALAHUDDIN	
Ag03531	FAROUQ	
Ag03532	NASIRUDDIN HAQQANI	NASEER HAQQANI | DR. NASEER HAQQANI | NASSIR HAQQANI NASHIR HAQQANI | NASERUDDIN | DR. ALIM GHAIR
Ag03533	KHALIL AL-RAHMAN HAQQANI	KHALIL UR RAHMAN HAQQANI | KHALEEL HAQQANI | KHALIL AHMAD HAQQANI | KHALIL AHMED HAQQANI
Ag03534	SAID JAN 'ABD AL-SALAM	SA'ID JAN 'ABD-AL-SALAM | QAZI 'ABDALLAH | QAZI ABDULLAH | IBRAHIM WALID | DILAWAR KHAN ZAIN KHAN | QASI SA'ID JAN | SAID JHAN | FARHAN KHAN | AZIZ CAIRO | NANGIALI
Ag03535	HOMAYOUN	HUMAYUN
Ag03536	BADRUDDIN HAQQANI	
Ag03537	ABDULLAH FARHAD	
Ag03538	DARIM SEDGAI	
Ag03539	COL. IMAM	SULTAN AMIR TARAR
Ag03540	ABU TAYEB	
Ag03541	MR. C	
Ag03542	HASSAN ALMREI	HASSAN AHMED AL MEREI | HASSAN AL MREI | HASSAN ALMERI | HASSAN EL MREI | HASSAN ALMRIE | HASSAN EL MERIEI
Ag03543	NABIL ALMARABH	
Ag03544	AHMED AL KAYSEE	
Ag03545	MAHMOUD JABALLAH	NAWWAF HAIZAN | ABU AHMED | ABU ABDEL-RAHMAN | BILAL | BELLAL | MOHAMED EL SAID GABALLAH SAID | MAHMOUD SAID | ABU ABDEL RAHMAN EL ASMAR AND SAMEER GAMAL | ALI GAMAL
Ag03546	THIRWAT SHEHATA	KHALID YASEEN MOHAMMED MAHMOUD | MUHAMMAD ALI | THARWAT SALAH SHAHATA | MOHAMMED ALI | THIRWAT SHEHATA | THIRWAT SALAH SHIHATA | THIRWAT SALAH SHAHATTA | SHEHATA | THRAWAT SALAH SHEHATA ABD ALLAH | THARWAT SALAH SHIHATA
Ag03547	MOHAMAD ZEKI MAHJOUB	MAHGOUB | MAHMOUB | MOHAMMED HASAN | MAHMOUD SHAKER | ABU IBRAHIM | MOHAMMA SHAKR | MOHAMED MAHMOUD MAHGOUB | MOHAMED ZAKI MOHAMED MAHGOUB | MUHAMMAD ZAKI MUHAMMAD MAHJUB | MOHAMMED MAGOUB
Ag03548	ESSAM MOHAMED HAFEZ MARZOUK	ISSAM MOHAMED HAFEZ MARZOUK | MARZUQ | ISSAM MARBUK | AMR HAMED | ADNAN | ABU THIR | ESSAM MARZOUK
Ag03549	HANI YUSEF AL SEBAI	HANI YUSEF AL SAYYID AL SEBAI | ABU KARIM | HANI AL-SAYYID AL-SEBAI
Ag03550	IBRAHIM ALLAM	IBRAHIM ISMAEL ALLAM | AALAM | ABED AL-RAHMAN | ABDEL HAMAED

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03551	ABU YASSER	IZZAT | EZZAT ABU YASSER | BARAKAT FAHIM ALI MOHAMED
Ag03552	MUSTAFA MOHAMED KRER	ABU FADL | ABU AL FADL | ABU DUNYA | ABU DUNIA | ABU JASEM
Ag03553	HASSAN FARHAT	ABDUL JABER | ABU KHALID | HASSAN FARAHAT
Ag03554	MOHAMED HARKAT	MOHAMMED M. MOHAMMED S. AL QAHTANI | ABU MUSLIM | ABU MUSLIMA | MOHAMMAD ADNANI | MOHAMMED HARKAT
Ag03555	PACHA WAZIR	HADJE WAZIR
Ag03556	ABU MESSAB AL SHEHRE	
Ag03557	KAMEL AGIZA	ABDEL HAMID | ABD-AL-HAMID | ABDEL HAMEED | AHMED HUSSEIN MOUSTAFA KAMEL AGIZA | AHAMAD HUSAYN | UJAYZAK | KAMAL UJAYZAH | AHMED HUSSEIN MUSTAFA KAMEL EGAIZAH | AHMAD HUSAYN KAMIL AGIZA
Ag03558	IHAB SAQR	
Ag03559	SAEED RASOUL SOBRAHATOLLAH MUHAMMAD	
Ag03560	MASOUD RASOUL	
Ag03561	AL-MUGHIRA AL GAZA'IRI	AL-MUGHIRA AL-GHAZIRI
Ag03562	GHARIB	
Ag03563	SHAHWALI	
Ag03564	DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV	
Ag03565	GHAIRAT BAHEER	
Ag03566	AMANULLAH	
Ag03567	NOOR MOHAMMED	
Ag03568	MUSTAFA HAMZA	ABU HAZEM | MOSTAPHA HAMZA | IBRAHIM
Ag03569	METHAT AHMED ABDELRAHMAN	
Ag03570	MOHSIN GHALAIN	MOHSSIN GHAILAN
Ag03571	MOHAMMED KAMEL MOSTAFA	MUSTAPHA HAMZA | MOHAMMED MUSTAFA KAMEL
Ag03572	ABU HASSAN	
Ag03573	AHMED ABDEL SATTAR	
Ag03574	SHEIK SALAH HASHIM	
Ag03575	SOFID HASSAN ADDULKANI AZIK	FAISAL | SAFWAT HASSAN ABDEL-GHANI
Ag03576	AL-ARAB TSADIK HASSIN MOHAMMED	AL-ARABI SADIQ MOHAMMED
Ag03577	ABDULKERIM ALNAZI ABDLURAZI	
Ag03578	SHERIF ABDEL-RAHMAN TEWFIK EL-MADANI	
Ag03579	HUSSEIN AHMED SHAHAF ALI	SIRAJ MOHAMMED | HUSSEIN AHMED SHAHIT | SIRRAJ
Ag03580	EZET YASSIN	
Ag03581	HAMZA MUSTAFA KAMEL	
Ag03582	MOHAMED CHIADMI	
Ag03583	ABDUL CHIADMI	
Ag03584	KHALID JEBARI	
Ag03585	MALIK NASSAR HARHRA	
Ag03586	SHAHID BUTT	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03587	SARMAD AHMED	
Ag03588	GHULAM HUSSEIN	
Ag03589	SHAZ NABI	
Ag03590	AYAD HUSSEIN	
Ag03591	YASSER MOSTAFA KAMEL	
Ag03592	MUAMIN ALI	
Ag03593	KARIM ABDULLAH	
Ag03594	MAJAD MAHMOUD	
Ag03595	SULEIMAN FLAIFIL	
Ag03596	MUHAMMAD FLAIFIL	
Ag03597	MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH RIBA'A	
Ag03598	MUHAMMAD GAYEZ SABAH	MOHAMMED JAEZ
Ag03599	NASSER KHAMIS AL-MALLAHI	
Ag03600	KHALED MUSSAED	
Ag03601	YOUNIS ELIAN ABU JARIR	
Ag03602	OSAMA ABDEL-GHANI AL-NAKHLAWI	OSAMA ABDELGHANI AL-NIKHLAWI
Ag03603	IYAD AL-FALESTINI	
Ag03604	SALEM SHANOUB	
Ag03605	MOHAMMED ABDALLAH ELIAN	
Ag03606	HASSAN AL-ARAYSHI	
Ag03607	TALEB MURTADA	
Ag03608	ARAFAT OUDA ALI	
Ag03609	AHMED MOHAMMED AL-KOREIMI	
Ag03610	MOHAMMED ABDELAZIZ NAFEI	
Ag03611	ATALLAH AL-KORM	
Ag03612	YUSRI MOHAREB	
Ag03613	AYMAN MOHAREB	
Ag03614	TAMER NUSSEIRAT	
Ag03615	HASSAN RAFAAT AHMED BASHANDI	
Ag03616	MOHAMED SOBHI ALI JIDAN	
Ag03617	GAMAL SOBHI ALI JIDAN	
Ag03618	AKRAM MOHAMMED FAWZI	
Ag03619	TAREK AHMED AL-SAYED	
Ag03620	REDA SAYED AHMED	
Ag03621	ASHRAF SAIED YOUSSEF	
Ag03622	EHAB YOUSRI YASSIN	
Ag03623	GAMAL AHMED ABDEL AAL	
Ag03624	ASHRAF SAEED YOUSSEF	
Ag03625	NEGAT YASSIN	
Ag03626	IMAN IBRAHIM KHAMIS	

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03627	MOHAMMED YOUSRI YASSIN	
Ag03628	SABER FARHAT ABU EL-ELA	
Ag03629	MAHMOUD ABI EL-ELA	
Ag03630	MOHAMED SALEM ABDEL-NABI	
Ag03631	ISMAIL ABDALLAH	
Ag03632	HAFEZ ABDEL HAKIM	
Ag03633	TAHA YEHIA SAYYED	TAHA YAHYA HUSAYN SAYYID HUSAYN | ABU KHALID
Ag03634	GURUKANTH DESAI	
Ag03635	OMAR SHARIF LATIF	
Ag03636	ABDUL MALIK MIAH	
Ag03637	MOHAMMED MOKSUDUR RAHMAN CHOWDHURY	
Ag03638	SHAH MOHAMMED LUTFAR RAHMAN	
Ag03639	NAZAM HUSSAIN	
Ag03640	USMAN KHAN	
Ag03641	MOHIBUR RAHMAN	
Ag03642	ABUL BOSHER MOHAMMED SHAHJAHAN	
Ag03643	TAIMOUR ABDULWAHAB AL-ABDALY	
Ag03644	EZEDDEN AL KHALEDI	
Ag03645	ABU OMAR AL-BAGHDADI	
Ag03646	MONA AL-ABDALY	
Ag03647	MUHARIB ABDUL LATIF AL-JUBOURI	
Ag03648	ABU NIZAR	
Ag03649	HASNA ALI YEHYE HUSSAIN	
Ag03650	WATHI AL-JASSEM	
Ag03651	ABRAR SAEED AHMED	
Ag03652	ABU UNAYS AL SAUDI	
Ag03653	MOHAMED ELLIAS S/O MOHAMED KHAN	ELLIAS
Ag03654	CHRISTIAN GANCZARSKI	
Ag03655	WALID NOUAR	
Ag03656	NIZAR NOUAR	
Ag03657	BELGACEM NOUAR	
Ag03658	ASIF MOHAMMED HANIF	
Ag03659	FRITZ MARTIN GELOWICZ	
Ag03660	KARIM MEHDI	
Ag03661	TOLGA D.	
Ag03662	DANIEL MARTIN SCHNEIDER	
Ag03663	ADEM YILMAZ	
Ag03664	ATTILA SELEK	
Ag03665	BILAL BIN MARWAN	MULLAH BILAL

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	KNOWN ALIASES
Ag03666	SALIM AHMED HAMDAN	SALIM AHMAD SALIM HAMDAN
Ag03667	YOUSUF AL-SHAHRI	YOUSEF MOHAMMED AL-SHIHRI
Ag03668	RAYED ABDULLAHI AL-HARBI	
Ag03669	YOUNIS AL-MAURITANI	ABD AL-RAHMAN OULD MUHAMMAD AL-HUSAYN OULD MUHAMMAD SALIM

APPENDIX C: MODELED MEMBERSHIP OVER TIME

A Note on Interpretation: The difficulty of displaying more than two decades worth of membership data in a readable format required some accommodations, including the use of diminutive font and abbreviations. The letter ―x" indicates that, for a given year, an individual did not appear in the data used to model membership. The number ―0" indicates that, for a given year, an individual did appear in that data, but the modeling process failed to locate them in a named organization. The majority of the abbreviations used to represent organizations are both intuitive and widely used; however, as a handful are non-standard, readers are encouraged to review the list below, which includes all abbreviations used to reference organizations, prior to viewing the table containing information on agents' modeled membership. Finally, because of the blurry lines that exist between insurgency and terror, this appendix also includes information on a handful of organizations that were beyond the scope of this inquiry's effort to model Sunni Islamist-motivated terror groups. Data on unmodeled organizations was taken at face value from the original data, and parentheses are used to clearly distinguish these unmodeled characterizations from the characterizations derived from the formal membership model. For example, whenever the raw data explicitly referenced someone as a member of the Taliban—an unmodeled organization—they appear in the table below as ―(Tal)."

Table 10.2 List of Organizational Acronyms and Abbreviations

Organization Name	Acronym/ Abbreviation	Organization Name	Acronym/ Abbreviation	Organization Name	Acronym/ Abbreviation
Abu Sayyaf Group	ASG	Gujarat Revenge group	GRG	Laskar Jihad	LJ
Afghan Taliban	(Tal)	HAMAS	(HAM)	Laskhar-e-Taiba/Indian Mujahideen	LeT
al-Fuqra	Fuqra	Haqqani Network	HN	Martyrs for Morocco	MfM
al-Qaida	AQ	Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami	HUJI	Moro Islamic Liberation Front	(MILF)
Al-Qaida in Iraq	(AQI)	Hezb e Islami Gulubbudin	(HIG)	Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group/ Salafia Jihadia	GICM
al-Qaida in the Arabic Peninsula	AQAP	Hizballah	(Hizb)	Pakistani Taliban	TTP
al-Shabaab	Shbb	Hofstad Group	Hof	Palembang Group	Plbg
Armed Islamic Group	(GIA)	Islamic Group	IG	Rajah Solaiman Movement	RSM
Asif Raza Commando Force	ARCF	Jaish-e-Mohammed	JeM	Rawalpindi-9	Raw-9
Bayaat al-Imam	BaI	Jamaat al Muslimeen	JAM	Riyadus-Salakhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs	RSBM
D-Company	D-Com	Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh	JIS	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat/Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb	AQIM
Egyptian Islamic Jihad	EIJ	Jemaah Islamiyah	JI	Saudi Hizballah	SdHzb
Fatah al-Islam	FaI	Jundallah	Jund	Sea of David	SoD
Free Aceh Movement	(GAM)	Lashkar-e-Jahangvi	(LeJ)	Tanzim Qoidatul Jihad	TQJ

Table 10.3 Modeled Membership Over Time

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00001	FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	0	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	0	0	0	0	0
Ag00005	ADEL ABDEL BARY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	EIJ	AQ; EIJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00006	ABDULLAH AHMED ABDULLAH	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	AQ	x	EIJ	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00009	ABU UBAIDAH AL BANSHIRI	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00013	AHMED KHALFAN GHAILANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ	x	0	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00014	AHMED MOHAMED HAMED ALI	x	x	x	EIJ	EIJ	AQ	AQ	0	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00015	RIFA'I AHMAD TAHA MUSA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	AQ; EIJ	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00016	HAMDEN KHALIF ALLAH AWAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00019	ZAKARIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00023	ANAS AL LIBY	x	x	x	x	EIJ	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00024	OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN AL OMAIRAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00025	IBRAHIM MOHAMMED KHALIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00026	MUHSIN AL-FADHLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00027	MUHAMMAD AL-HAMATI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00028	ABD AL-AZIZ AL-MASRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00030	AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI	x	AQ	AQ	x	AQ	AQ	AQ; EIJ	AQ; EIJ	EIJ	AQ; EIJ	AQ; EIJ	0	AQ	AQ; JI	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ; LeT	x	AQ	x	x
Ag00031	JIHAD MOHAMMED ABDOU ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00032	NUR AL-DIN AL-DIBISKI	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00033	ABD ALLAH MOHAMED RAGAB ABDEL RAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00034	`ALI SULAYMAN MAS'UD `ABD AL-SAYYID	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00048	CO-CONSPIRATOR 2	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00049	CO-CONSPIRATOR 5	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00050	CO-CONSPIRATOR 1	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00051	CO-CONSPIRATOR 3	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00052	CO-CONSPIRATOR 4	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00053	CO-CONSPIRATOR 6	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00090	SADDIQ AL MAHDI	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00091	FAHID MOHAMMED ALLY MSALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI	HUJI; Raw-9	0	x
Ag00121	MOHAMED BELKALEM	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	0	0	x	0	x	x
Ag00122	SUHAYL FATILLOEVICH BURANOV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	x	x	x
Ag00124	IBRAHIM DAOUD ABU ABDULLA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00125	IBRAHIM EIDAROUS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	EIJ	AQ; EIJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00165	KHALFAN KHAMIS MOHAMED	x	x	0	0	x	x	0	0	0	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00166	KHALID AL FAWWAZ	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00181	MAMDOUH MAHMUD SALIM	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00199	MOHAMED RASHED DAOUD AL-'OWHALI	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (Tal)	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00200	MOHAMED SADEEK ODEH	0	x	0	EIJ	EIJ	AQ	AQ	x	0	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00208	ABU HAFS AL MASRY	x	AQ	0	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	0	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ; EIJ	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00209	MUHSIN MUSA MATWALLI ATWAH	x	x	x	x	EIJ	AQ	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00210	MUSTAFA MOHAMED FADHIL	x	x	x	x	EIJ	AQ	0	0	EIJ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00244	SAIF AL ADEL	x	x	x	AQ	EIJ	AQ	x	x	EIJ	0	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; HUJI
Ag00253	SHEIK OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN	AQ	IG	IG	IG	IG	IG	IG	IG	EIJ	AQ	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00254	SHEIKH AHMED SALIM SWEDAN	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	0	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	0	x
Ag00272	USAMA BIN LADEN	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ	AQ; IG; (MILF)	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ; EIJ	AQ; EIJ; (Tal)	AQ; EIJ; (Tal)	AQ; EIJ; JI; (Tal)	AQ; AQIM; JI; (Tal)	AQ; JI; (Tal)	AQ; JI; (Tal)	AQ	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	AQ; HUJI	AQ; LeT	AQ; FaI	AQ	AQ	AQ
Ag00275	WADIH EL HAGE	EIJ	0	AQ	AQ; IG	AQ	AQ	AQ	0	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ; EIJ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00279	JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED AL-FADL	EIJ	AQ; IG	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	EIJ	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00280	MUSTAFA SHALABI	EIJ	x	IG	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00281	ABU SHALEED AL-FALASTINI	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00282	ABU NOFAL AL SAUDI	x	AQ	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00283	ISSAWI ABU HASSAN	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00284	ABU FEDA EL MASRY	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00285	ABU JAFFAR	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00286	SALEM EL MASRY	x	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00287	HAYDAR DOSARI	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00288	ABU KHEIR EL MASRY	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00289	ABU AYOUB AL IRAQI	EIJ	AQ	AQ	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00290	YASIN (BROTHER OF ABU AYUB)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00291	ABU FARAJ AL YEMENI	x	AQ	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00293	DOCTOR ABDEL MUNIM AL KHABIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00294	ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	0	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00295	SHEIKH SAYYID EL MASRY	x	AQ	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00296	QARICEPT AL JIZAERI	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00297	SAIF AL LIBY	x	AQ	x	x	EIJ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00298	ABU BURHAN AL IRAQI	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00299	HASSAN DAHIR AWEYS	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Shbb	x	x
Ag00300	ABU HAFS AL MANSOURI	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00301	ABU KHALEED AL MADANI	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00302	ABU HAMMAM AL SAUDI	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00303	ABU QUTADA	x	AQ	0	0	x	0	x	0	x	0	AQ; EIJ	0	0	0	0	0	x	0	x	x	0	x	x
Ag00304	SA'ID YUSIF ALI ABU AZIZAH	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00305	ABU YASSER AL JAZAIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00306	ABU ABD AL SABBUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00307	ABU UBAIDAH AL IRAQI	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00308	ABU FADL AL IRAQI	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00309	ALI HAROUN	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00310	ABDEL MAHMABABO	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00311	OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00312	DR. SHARIF AL DIN ALI MUKHTAR	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00313	MOHAMED BAYAZID	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00314	ABU HASSAN EL MASRY	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00315	DR. MUBARAK AL DOORI	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00316	AL QUBASHI THE SUDANI	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00317	SADEEK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00318	FARJAHM	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00319	IBN AL TAMIYEH	x	AQ	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00320	ABU TALHA AL SUDANI	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	0	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag00321	ABU MOHAMED AL YEMENI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00322	MOHAMED AL NALFI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00323	AHMED ABDEL RAHMAN HAMADABI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00324	SHEIKH NOMANI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00325	ABU JAFFER EL MASRY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00326	ABDUL BASET HAMZA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00327	AMIN ABDEL MAROUF	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00328	ABU TALAL EL MASRY	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00329	ABU YASSER EL MASRY	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00330	ABU JAFFAR AL LIBY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00332	HAMZALLAH AL LIBY	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00333	ABU ABDEL QADER AL LIBY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00334	MUTWAKAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00335	SAIF ISLAMI JANNUBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00336	ABU KHALIL AL MADANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00337	ABU HABIB AL TUNISI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00338	ABU MAHDI AL SAUDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00339	ABU KHADIJA AL IRAQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00340	USAMA AZMARAI	x	AQ	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00341	ABU DIJANA AL YEMENI	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00342	DR. ABDALLAH IZZELDINE	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00343	ABDALLAH AZZAM	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag00344	ABDEL RAHMAN SOMALI	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00345	ABDOUH AL MUKHLAFI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00346	ABU AHMED EL MASRY	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	EIJ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00347	ABU AKRAM URDANI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00348	ABU ALI SUDANI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00349	ABU HABIB AL PAKISTANI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00350	ABU KHABUIB AL SUDANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00351	SHEIK BAILALA	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00352	ABU MOHAMED AL SURI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00353	ABU MUSAB AL SUDANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00354	ABU MUSAB AL SAUDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00355	MUSTAFA SETMARIAM NASAR	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00356	ABU MUSAB REUTER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00357	ABU NEAM	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00358	ABU QUAIDBA EL MASRY	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00359	AFAD MAKKEE	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00360	AHMED ALI LOOTAH	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00361	APRIL BRIGHTSKY RAY	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00362	DR. ABDULLAH MOHAMED YUSEF	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00363	IBN AL MUBARAK AL SHARQAWI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00364	IHSAN EL MADANI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00365	KHALID ALI WALEED	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00366	KHALIFA AL MUSCAT OMANI	x	AQ	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00367	MOHAMED AL KHEIR	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00368	MOHAMED JARA AL NABI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00369	MOHAMED SHABANA	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00370	MOTASSEM SADEEK ABU SASHL	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00371	MRS. JAMAL AL-FADAL (SUDANESE WIFE)	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00372	DR. MOTRIF AL SADEEK	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00373	OMAR AL MAKKEE	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00374	SAID BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00375	SHEIK ARAFA	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00376	SAAD AL SHARIF	x	AQ	x	x	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00377	ABU ISHEM MADANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00378	AZERI (JAMAL AL-FADL'S BROTHER)	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00379	ESSAM AL RIDI	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00380	ABU JAFFER	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00381	ABU AL DARDAA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00382	ASHIF MOHAMED JUMA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	EIJ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00383	FATIMA JUMA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00384	MOHAMED ASHRIF JUMA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00385	SETUNA JUMA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00386	TAHERA JUMA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00387	SHAMINA JUMA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00388	MANIRA JUMA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00389	SIKANDER JUMA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	EIJ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00390	2ND BORN OF ESSAM AL RIDI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00391	KHALID SIDO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00392	ABU MUSABAL SURRE OMAR ABDEL HAKEEM	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00393	ABU UBADDA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00394	AZMARAI ALSUI	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00395	DAUGHTER OF ESSAM AL RIDI (1ST BORN)	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00396	LOAY	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00397	MOATAZ AL HALLAK	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00398	MOHAMMED KARAMA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00399	MOHAMMED NAJIBULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00400	MRS. ESSAM AL RIDI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00401	SHEIK ABDUL RASOOL SAYYAF	AQ	0	0	EIJ	IG	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00402	JOHN RAY	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00403	ABU JANDAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00404	ABU MALIK	x	0	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00405	AHMED SKEIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00406	RASHAD KHALIFA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00407	MOHAMMED KASSEM	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00408	ABDEL MEJID	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00409	ADAM MOHAMED NOOR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00410	ABU AMJED	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00411	IBRAHIM (BROTHER OF JAMAL AL-FADL)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00412	ABOUHALIMA	EIJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00413	ABU FARAJIMNI	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00414	ABU IBRAHIM AL IRAQI	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00415	ABU IBRAHIM IRATI	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00416	ABU ISRA AL IRAQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00417	ABU MAT EGYPTIAN	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00418	ABU TAMIM LIBY	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00419	ASADALLAH AL SINDI	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00420	BASHEER	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00421	BUSHRA YASIN	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00422	DITAR ABU MAHIS	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00423	DR. OMAR ABDEL MAROUF	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00424	FADL AL SHAHIDEEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00425	FAISAL (COUSIN OF JAMAL AL-FADL)	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00426	IBN SALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00427	MOQADEM SALAH ABDEL AL MOBRUK	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00428	MOTASEM AL SAUDI	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00429	MUBARAK EL DOORY	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00430	SADEEK ALI MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00431	SAFAR AL HAWALI	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00432	SALMAN AL AUDA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00434	SHEIKH FAZHIL UR RAHMAN	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00435	USAMA LUBNANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00436	YASIN (BROTHER OF ABU AYOUB AL IRAQI)	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00437	ZINDANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00438	L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU	x	0	0	AQ; EIJ	EIJ	AQ	AQ	0	EIJ	AQ	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00439	ANSWAR SHABAN	x	x	0	x	x	IG	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00440	ABU ISALM MASRY	x	0	x	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	EIJ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00441	ABU RACHMAN AL MUHAJER	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00442	SHEIK ALATI	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00443	MRS. SALEH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00444	FARAJ ABU EL MASRY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00446	ABU SURIR	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00447	MUNTASSER AL JAZIRI	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00448	MRS. L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU	x	x	x	x	EIJ	AQ	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00449	ALI MOHAMED	x	IG	x	AQ	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ; EIJ	0	AQ	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00451	ABU MADYAN EL MASRY	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00452	ABU RIFA AL LIBY	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00453	ABU AL ALKALI	x	x	x	x	EIJ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00454	SALEM AL-IRAQI	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00455	SULIMAN (SON OF NAWAWI)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00456	ABU KHALID AL NUBI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	0	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00457	MRS. ABU UBAIDAH AL BANSHIRI (EGYPTIAN WIFE)	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00458	ABU SAID AL MASRY	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00459	ABU MOHAMMED MAHEJAN	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00460	MRS. ABU RACHMAN AL MUHAJER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00461	SAFIR ALADA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00462	MRS. ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00463	ABU KHEIR AL YEMENI	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00464	ABU AMMAR AL SURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00465	SAAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00466	MOHAMMED KARAMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00467	ABU DERDAA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00468	DR. MONTESSUR	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00469	FIRST BORN OF L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00470	SHEIK JIHAD EL MASRY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00471	ABU SALAAMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00472	ABDOUH ABDALLAH AL YEMENI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00473	ABU BADEN EL MASRY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00474	ABU MUATH	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00475	ABU DAUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00476	MAK DAUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00477	ABU ISMAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00478	ABU SARA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00479	ABDEL KADIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00480	AHMED HASSAN (I)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	EIJ	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00481	AHMED HASSAN (II)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00482	ABU JAMAL AMRIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00483	AHMED TIK	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00484	ABU HARAD EL MASRY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00485	KIBARUA MJITTA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00486	ABU UBAIDAH (OF SADEEK CAMP)	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00487	ABU THOMAMA	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00488	MOHAMED SAHAL	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00489	ALI MANI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00490	MEENA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00491	OMAR (ODEH'S BROTHER-IN-LAW)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00492	SKEIK SAFA	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00493	ABDUL RACHMAN AL HOWARI	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00494	ABU SAYYID AL KIRDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00495	BILAL (COUSIN OF JIHAD ALI)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00496	ABDUL JAFAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00497	AHMED AL HAZZA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(Tal)	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00498	FATHER OF OWHALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00499	MOHAMED BIN AWADH BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00500	OMAR BIN AWADH BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00501	ABDULLAH BIN AWDAH BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00502	1ST DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00503	1ST DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00504	3RD DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00505	AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00506	DAUGHTER OF AL-MADUDI FAMILY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00507	ABDULAZIZ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00508	ABDULLAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00509	AETEDAL BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00510	AHMAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00511	ALI BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00512	AYSHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00513	BAKR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00514	EMAN BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00515	FATIMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00516	FOWZIYAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00517	GHALIB BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00518	HAIDER BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00519	HASSAN BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00520	HUDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00521	IBRAHIM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00522	ILHAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00523	ISSA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00524	KHALED BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00525	KHALIL BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00526	MAHROUS BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00527	MALAK BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00528	MARIAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00529	MOHAMMAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00530	MUNA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00531	MUNEERA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00532	NAJIAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00533	NOUR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00534	OMAR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00535	RAEDAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00536	RAJA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00537	RANDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00538	RUQQUEIYA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00539	SAAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00540	SAHAR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00541	SALEH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00542	SALEHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00543	SALEM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00544	SALMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00545	SAMIAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00546	SANA'A BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00547	SEEMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00548	SHAFIQ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00549	SHEIKHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00550	SU'ADD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00551	TAREQ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00552	TAYYEBA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00553	THABIT BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00554	WAFA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00555	YAHYA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00556	YASIR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00557	YESLAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00558	ZEENAT BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00559	ZUBAIDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00560	UM AYSHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00561	FATIMAH AHMED MOHSEN BAHARETH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00562	ALIA AL-GHANEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00563	UM ABDULAZIZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00564	UM ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00565	UM YESLAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00566	SAID SALEM OMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00567	TAMARRA RATEMO	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00568	MOHAMED ZAIDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00569	JULIUS KISINGO CEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00570	ABDULWAHDI AHMED SALUM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00571	USAMA BIN HUSSEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00572	ANNIS BIN HUSSEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00573	MOHAMED K. MOHAMED	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00574	FATIMA FADHIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00575	ANIS FADHIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00576	USA FADHIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00577	ABDALLAH HAMISI SHLLM	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00578	ABDUL HALLEK	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00579	ABU AHMED AL HARBI	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00580	ABU MARWAN	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00581	ABU RAFA	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00582	ADELKA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00583	ALI (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00584	BAHARI (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00585	FATUMA MOHAMED	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00586	HADYEA RUBEYA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00587	HAJI JUMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00588	HASAN (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00589	ISMAEL (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00590	KALAL	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00591	KASSUM JUMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00592	MARIUM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00593	MASSELIM MASSELIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00594	MOHAMED MUSLIM SALUM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00595	MR. CHAUDRY	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00596	MRS. FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00597	MUMIN IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00598	NASSOR MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00599	RAHMA AHMED KHAMIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00600	RASHID SALEH HAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00601	RAYA JUMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00602	RUBAYA MOHAMED	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00603	SALIM CHICHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00604	SALMA MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00605	SALUM MUSLIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00606	SULIMAN (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00607	TARIQ HAMDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00608	ZIYAD KHALEEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00609	ZUHURU MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00610	IHAB MOHAMED ALI	x	x	x	EIJ	AQ	AQ	0	x	0	AQ	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00611	KHALID ABDUL RACHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00612	JALAL FOUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00613	ELEMIGY ABDELDAIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00614	MOHAMED ALI MURAWEH SAL ODEH	0	x	0	x	0	0	x	x	EIJ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00615	DENAL CASMIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00616	DR. JOSEPH MISOI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00617	DR. EL SAYED TILIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00618	SAMIR RAHMAN MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00619	ABU AL MUTAZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00620	SHEIK ISHAQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00621	EZALADEN ABDEL RAHMAN MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00622	SHEIK SULEIMAN SILL	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00623	DAVID MATWAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00624	ALI OMAR MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00625	ABDULLAH EL ZUBEIDY	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00626	ADAN A. HASSAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00627	SIMON (WADIH EL HAGE'S FRIEND)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00628	AHMAD YOUNES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00629	MARION BROWN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00630	YUMICO ABUEILEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00631	BADR ABUEILEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00632	NASSER ABUEILEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00633	KHALID ABUEILEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00634	SUMA ABUEILEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00635	ATEF ABUEILEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00636	SULIMAN ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00637	KHAMIS MOHAMED KHALFAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00638	RUBEYA KHAMIS MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00639	OMAR NASSOR SALIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00640	SULEIMAN ABDALLAH	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00641	MSELLEM SHINEY MSELLEM	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00642	MUSALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00643	MRS. JAMAL AL-FADAL (AMERICAN WIFE)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00644	JAMAL ZOUGAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	0	0	x	GIC M	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00645	SALAHEDDINE BENYAICH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00646	ABDELAZIZ BENYAICH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	0	x	0	0	GIC M	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag00647	MOHAMMED AL-GERBOUZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	GIC M	0	0	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00648	ABU DAHDAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	AQ	0	GIC M	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00649	ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI	0	x	x	x	x	BaI	BaI	BaI	x	x	0	JI	0	AQ	0	AQ	AQ; (AQ I)	(AQ I)	AQ; (AQ I)	x	0	x	x
Ag00650	MOHAMMED FIZAZI	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00651	ABDULAK AL MAGREBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00652	MOHAMED CHAOUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00653	SAID CHEDADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00654	ALI AMROUS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00655	SARHANE BEN ABDELMAJID FAKHET	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	0	0	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00656	AMER AZIZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	AQ	0	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00657	MONEIR MAHMOUD ALY EL-MESSERY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00658	JAMAL AHMIDAN	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00659	MOHAMMED ATTA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	AQ	AQ	AQ; LeT	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00660	TARIQ IBN ZIYAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00661	MOHAMED BEKKALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00662	VINAY KOHLY	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00663	SUREH KOMAR	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00664	FAISAL ALLUCH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00665	KHALID OULAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00666	NAIMA OULAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00667	BASEL GHAYOUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00668	HAMID AHMIDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00669	ABD AL-HADI AL-IRAQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00670	FOUAD EL MORABIT ANGHAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00671	MUHANNAD ALMALLAH DABAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	Mf M	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00672	SAID BERRAJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00673	MOHAMMED OULAD AKCHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00674	RACHID OULAD AKCHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00675	ABDENNABI KOUNJAA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00676	JOSE EMILIO SUAREZ TRASHORRAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00677	RAFA ZOUHIER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00678	OTMAN EL GNAOUT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00679	ABDELILAH EL FADUAL EL AKIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00680	RACHID AGLIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00681	YOUSSEF BELHADJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00682	ABDELMAJID BOUCHAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00683	HASSAN EL HASKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00684	RABEI OSMAN SAYED AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	AQ; Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00685	MOHAMED LARBI BEN SELLAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00686	BRAHIM MOUSSATEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	0	x	0	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00687	MOHAMED MOUSSATEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00688	RAMZI BINALSHIBH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	AQ	AQ	AQ; JI	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00689	MOHAMMED AL HADI CHEDADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00690	ABDERRAHIM ZBAKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00691	FARID OULD ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00692	MALAK ANDALUSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00693	AICHA ACHAB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00694	ALI ZOUGAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00696	ZAKI BEKKALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00697	MOHAMMED BEKKALI, SR.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00698	CHARAFA BEKKALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00699	ABDEL HALIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00700	ABDULATIF MERROUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00701	JAMAL BENYAICH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00702	ALICE BENYAICH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00703	DAVID COURTAILLER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00704	JEROME COURTAILLER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00705	ABDELKRIM MEJJATI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00706	BEN SALAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00707	ABDELOUAHI D BERRAK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00708	ANTONIO TORO CASTRO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00709	WALID ALTARAKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00710	MOHAMAD BADR DDIN AKKAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00711	ZINEB (JAMAL ZOUGAM'S SISTER)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00712	SAMIRA (JAMAL ZOUGAM'S SISTER)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00713	ABDELILAH EL-FUAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00714	RACHID ADLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00715	MRS. SARHANE BEN ABDELMAJID FAKHET	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00716	MUSTAFA MAYMOUNI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00717	ABDILAH FIZAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00718	ABDELHALIM FIZAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00719	ASSIYA FIZAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00720	EL GITANILLO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00721	ALLEKEMA LAMARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(GI A)	x	x	x	x	0	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00722	CARMEN MARIA TORO CASTRO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00723	MOHAMED BELHADJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00724	MOHAMED AFALAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00725	OUHNANE DAOUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00726	ADRI RIFAAT ANOUAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00727	ABDELATIF MOURAFIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00728	DRISS CHEBLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	GIC M	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag00729	MOHAMED BELFATMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00730	NOUREDINE NFIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00731	KHALID MAJATI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00732	AZIZA AL-GERBOUZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00733	SAID BAHAJI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00734	TAYSSIR ALLUNI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00735	FARID HILALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	0	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag00736	MUHAMED GALEB KALAJE ZOUAYDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	AQ	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00737	BASSAM DALATI SATUT	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x
Ag00738	ABU ABDUL RAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00739	ABU ZUBAYDAH	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	AQ	AQ	0	AQ; EIJ	AQ; JI	AQ	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00740	MOHAMED BAHAIAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00741	MOHAMMED HAYDAR ZAMMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00742	MAMOUN DARKAZANLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	0	AQ	AQ; HUJI
Ag00743	LUIS JOSE GALAN GONZALEZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00744	JASEM MAHBOULE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00745	OSAMA DARRA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00746	MOHAMED NEEDL ACAID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00747	AHMAD RAGHAD MARDINI DAKICHL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00748	MOHAMED ARABI SHEHIMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00749	MOHAMED ZAHER ASADE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00750	ANWAR ADNAN MOHAMED SALAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00751	MOHAMED BOUALEM KHOUNI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00752	MOHAMED BENSAKHRIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00753	GHASOUB AL-ABRASH AL-GHALYOUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00754	AHMED BRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00755	NABIL NANAKLI KOSAIBATI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00756	SHEIK MOHAMMED OMRAN	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00757	BILAL KHAZAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00758	MOHAMED KHAIR AL-SAQQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00759	ABDALRAHMAN ALARNAOT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00760	PARLINDUNGAN SIREGAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00761	NAJIB CHAIB MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00762	ABU ABDULRAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00763	SID AHMED BOUDJELLA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00764	MOURAD KADDAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00765	MARIA LUISA MARTIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00766	ABU RACHED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00767	SAID MANSOUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(GIA)	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00768	ABU SUUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00769	ZEIN AL-ABIDINE MOHAMED HASSAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00770	ABDULLA KHAYATA KATAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00771	AHMED KOSHAGI KELANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00772	ABU WALID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00773	ABU AL HARETH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00774	DJAMEL BEGHAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	AQ; EIJ	0	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00775	ABDELGHANI MZOUDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00776	ROBERT RICHARD ANTOINE-PIERRE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	GICM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00777	MUHSEN KHAYBER	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GICM	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00778	ABDENNABID CHEDADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00779	RAHMA AHMIDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00780	MUSTAFA AHMIDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00781	JABER AHMIDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00782	YUSSEF AHMIDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00783	HICHAM AHMIDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00784	MOHAMED BOUHARRAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00785	SAED EL HARRAK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00786	NASREDDINE BOUSBAA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00787	EMILIO LLANO ALVAREZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00788	IVAN GRANADOS PENA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00789	JAVIER GONZALEZ PENA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00790	ANTONIO IVAN REIS PALACIO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00791	SERGIO ALVAREZ SANCHEZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00792	RAUL GONZALEZ PELEAZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00793	GHAZI BIDEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00794	YAHIA RAGHEH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00795	MOUTAZ ALMALLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00796	PILAR M.V.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00797	MIGUEL ANGEL M.V.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00798	SOUFIANE RAIFAK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00799	LOFTI SBAI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00800	MOHAMMAD AFZAAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00801	SHAHZAD ALI GUJAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00802	RACHID MOHAMED KADDUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00803	RACHID BENDOUDA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00804	JAOUAD EL BOUZROUTI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00805	MIMOUN BELHADJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00806	RUBEN IGLESIAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00807	OMAR NAKHCHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00808	ABDELILAH HRIZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00809	MOHAMED EL-IDRISSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00810	SAMIR TAHTAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	0	x	0	x	x	x
Ag00811	SAFIA BELHADJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00812	ALLAL MOUSSATEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00813	AHMED RESSAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	0	(GI A)	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00814	OMAR DEGHAYES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00815	GONZALO LOPEZ GONZALEZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00816	MAHMOUD SLIMANE AOUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00817	MOHAMMED LAMARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00818	TELDJA LAMARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00819	ZACARIYA ESSABAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00820	HASAM ALHUSEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00821	WAHID KOSHAGI KELANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00822	SADIK MERIZAK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag00823	PRINCE MOHAMMED AL-FAISAL AL-SAUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00824	PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL AL-SAUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00825	SAMER DABBAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag00826	REDA SEYAM	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	JI	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00827	SALEH ABDULAZIZ AL-FAHHAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00828	ABDULRAHMAN AL-FAHHAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00829	ATMANE RESALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00830	HABIBA MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00831	CARMEN FERNANDEZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00832	ASMA ZAFRA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00833	NAJAT FADAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00834	MARIAM GARCIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00835	MOHAMED BELAZIZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00836	YASIN SEDDIKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00837	HAKIM ZERZOUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00838	MAJID SAHOUANE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00839	ABDERRAMAN KHOUNI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00840	HOCINE KHOUNI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00841	MOHAMMED ACHRAF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00842	REDA CHERIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00843	DJAMEL SEDDIKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00844	NIZAR TRABELSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00845	ESSID SAMI BEN KHEMAIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	0	AQ	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00846	MOHAMED BOUKIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag00847	ABDELKADER TCHAREK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00848	NABIL SAYADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00849	HAZAR AL-DABBAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00850	PIRJO BRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00851	NORA BRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00852	ABU KHALEB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00853	MAHER KHAZAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00854	KAMAL HADID CHAAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00855	SYLVIE BEGHAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00856	BAGHDAD MEZIANE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00857	BRAHIM BENMERZOUGA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00858	KAMEL DAOUDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00859	AZZEDIN JOURNAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00860	MUSTAPHA ABUSHIMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00861	WEDAD AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00862	ABDULLAH BANDASSER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GICM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00864	SAYER BEDER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00865	NOUREDINE YENADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00866	ABDELKADER AMARA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00867	MOHAMMAD CHOUDRY ASLAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; MfM	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00868	MOHAMMAD NAEEM NOOR KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag00869	AMJAD FAROOQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (LeJ)	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00870	ADNAN ASLAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00871	ABDELAZIZ HOUARI MELLAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00872	MOSTAFA AZTOUT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00873	BELGACEM BELLIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00874	NASSREDDINE BEN LAIDNE AMRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag00875	DJILALI BOUSSIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag00876	ABDELAZIZ EL MERABIT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00877	ABDELKRIM LEBCHINA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00878	HAMMAD LAHSINI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00879	TAHA SEGHROUCHNI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag00880	ZOHAIR KHADIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag00881	OTMAN EL MOUIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00882	KAMAL AHBAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag00883	TAREK HAMED HAMU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00884	ZOHRA ZEWAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00885	TAHER DEGHAYES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00886	AMANI DEGHAYES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00887	MOHAMMED BOUYERI	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Hof	Hof	JI; Hof	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00888	SAMIR AZZOUZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M; Hof	Hof	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00889	ABDELADIM AKOUDAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00890	MOHAMMED SALAMEH	0	IG	IG	IG	IG	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00891	AMINE MEZBAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00892	SAMIR KISHK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00893	ABU DOHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00894	LASED BEN HENI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00895	MOKHTAR BOUCHOUCHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00896	TAREK CHARAABI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00897	MOHAMMED BEN BELGACEM AOUADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00898	ABDELKADIR ES-SAYED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	0	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00899	SALIM BOUKHARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00900	LAMINE MARONI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00901	AEUROBI BEANDALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00902	SAMAIR KARIMOU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00903	FOUHAD SABOUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00904	TAREK MAAROUFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00905	ESSOUSSI LAAROUSSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00906	EMAD ABDELWAHID AHMED ALWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00907	AMMARI SAIFI	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	AQIM	AQIM	0	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag00908	RIADH JELASSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00909	ABU IMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00910	YASSINE CHEKKOURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00911	NABIL BENATTIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00912	ABDEL HALIM HAFED REMADNA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00913	MEHDI KHAMMOUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00914	ADEL BEN SOLTANE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00915	LAZHAR BEN MOHAMMED TLILI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00916	MANSOUR THAER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00917	HABIB WADDANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00918	MOHAMMED YEHIA KAAKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00919	SALEH JAMAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00920	FARID BELARIBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00921	JOHAN BONTE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00922	RACHID BENMESSAHEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00923	ABDELKRIF LEFKIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00924	RACHID JALIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag00925	YASSINE LAHNECH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00926	MOHAMED EL OMARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00927	ABU MUSA AL-HINDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	JI	0	AQ	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00928	AHMED OMAR SAEED SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	0	0	AQ; LeT	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00929	ABU FARAJ AL-LIBBI	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	AQ	AQ	0	0	JI	AQ	x	0	AQ; (HIG); (Tal)	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00930	QARI SAIFULLAH AKHTAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	HUJI	HUJI; Raw-9	x	x
Ag00931	BABAR AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(Tal)	x	x	(Tal)	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00932	MOHAMMED MASOOD AZHAR ALVI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	TTP	x	x	x
Ag00933	FAZLUR REHMAN-KHALIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00934	HAFIZ SAEED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	LeT	0	LeT	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag00935	HAMEEDULLAH NIAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00936	ADIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00937	KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED	AQ	0	0	EIJ	IG	IG	AQ	0	AQ; JI	AQ	AQ; EIJ	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00938	MOHAMMED SOHAIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00939	HASHIM QADEER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00940	MOHAMED MRABET FAHSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	x	x	0	0
Ag00941	MOUNIR MRABET FAHSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00942	MOHAMED SAID HSSISNI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00943	HASSAN MOURDOUDE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00944	MUSTAFA FAWZI AIT OUDRISS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00945	MUSTAPHA ES SATTY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00946	ABDELHAK BOUDINA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00947	MHAMED HADDAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00948	DRISS HADDAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00949	HASSAN HADDAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00950	MOHAMED HADDAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00951	MAHAMAD TIAZOUNIE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00952	ABDENBI LEBCHINA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00953	MAHAMAD SULEYMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00954	SAMIR SULEYMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00955	MUSTAPHA MOHAMED RIZK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00956	MOHAMED KAFARNA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00957	OMAR SALWA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00958	ZIANI MAHDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00959	MOURAD YALA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00960	REDOUAN AL-ISSAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Hof	Hof	Hof	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00961	ISMAIL AKHNIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Hof	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00962	JASON WALTERS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	Hof	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00963	MARAD J.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00964	NADIR ADARRAF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00965	LABIDINE AOURGHE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00966	MOHAMED BOUGHABA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00967	MOHAMED EL BOUSKLAOUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00968	YOUSEF ETTOUMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00969	ZAKARIA TAYBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00970	AHMED HAMDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00971	RASHID BOUSSANA	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00972	MOHAMED EL MORABIT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00973	NOUREDINE EL FAHTNI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	Hof	Hof	Hof	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00974	JERMAINE WALTERS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00975	EL-SAYYID NOSAIR	0	IG	IG	IG	0	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00976	NIDAL AYYAD	x	IG	x	IG	0	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00977	MAHMOUD ABOUHALIMA	0	IG	IG	AQ; IG	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00978	IBRAHIM ELGABROWN Y	x	x	x	AQ; IG	0	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00979	AHMAD AJAJ	x	x	x	x	IG	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00980	RAMZI YOUSEF	x	AQ; IG	0	0	ASG ; IG	IG	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00981	ABDUL MURAD	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00982	BILAL ALKAISI	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00983	ABDELGHANI RABIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00984	FAIZA BENNOUNA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00985	ABDELLAH BOUABDELLA H	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00986	MOKHTAR HAOUARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	(GI A)	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00987	RABAH KADRE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQI M	AQI M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag00988	KAMEL BOURGASS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ; AQIM	AQIM	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00989	NABIL SAHRAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	AQ; AQIM	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00990	SAAJID BADAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	JI	0	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00991	BURAWI EL WAHIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00992	ABDESSATTAR DAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00993	ADEL TEBOURSKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag00994	MOHAMED ZITLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00995	AHMED ELLATTAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00996	MOKHTAR BELMOKHTAR	x	x	x	EIJ	0	(GIA)	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	AQIM	AQIM	AQIM	AQIM	AQIM	AQIM	AQIM	AQIM
Ag00997	EL-ZAHRANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00998	ABOU CHIHAB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag00999	MOHAMED DJABER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01000	YASSER SAYYAF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01001	IBRAHIM GHUREIKA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01002	HASSAN HATTAB	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	AQIM	AQIM	AQIM	x	AQIM	0	x	0	x	0	AQ	x	x
Ag01003	NUREDDIN GHUREIKA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01004	BILAL (GSPC)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01006	ASSEM AL-TIBSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01007	YEHIA (GSPC)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01008	AL-BASHIR AL-GHARBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01009	ABU DAJANA (GSPC)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01010	ABDELMALIK DAROUKEDEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; AQIM	x	x	AQIM	AQIM	x	x
Ag01011	EL CHERIF GOUSMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01012	ABDELAZIZ ABBI	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01013	REDOUAN CHEKKOURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01014	YOUNES CHEKKOURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01015	ABDEL HAMID SHAARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01016	OMAR SHAABANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01017	SAID ATMANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	IG	0	0	0	0	(GIA)	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01018	ABDULSALAM ALI ALI ABDULRAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01019	MEVLUET TAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01020	RAMEZ SULTAN	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01021	OTHMAN KAAKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01022	MOHAMMED OMAR JAMAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01023	AHMED JAMAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag01024	HAITHAM MULHEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01025	MICHAEL KANAAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01026	WASIM EL-ASAAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01027	RABEEH MAWAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01028	SHEIK ABDUL ZOUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01029	WILLIE BRIGITTE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	(Tal)	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01030	MAMDOUH HABIB	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01031	FAHEEM KHALID LODHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	0	0	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag01032	IZHAR UL-HAQUE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	0	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01033	NABIL BOUNOUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01034	AZNIRI FILALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01035	AHMED ZEBBAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01036	YUSSEF FIKRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	GIC M	x	x	0	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01037	HASSAN TAOUSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01038	MILOUDI ZAKARIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01039	ABDELKRIM CHADLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01040	OMAR HADDOUCHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01041	ABDUL AZIZ JALIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01042	OMAR ABDUR REHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01043	MOHAMMED ZIA UL HAQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01044	NADEEM TARMOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01045	MOHAMMED NAVEED BHATTI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01046	QUAISIR SHAFFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01047	JUNADE FEROZE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01048	ATTA-UR RAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	AQ; Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01049	SHAHZAD BAJWA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	AQ; Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01050	MASRAB AROCHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01051	EDA KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01052	FEROZ IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01053	ZUBAIR ISMAIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01054	SALMAN SAQUIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01055	FAHD NASIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01056	SHEIKH ADIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01057	MOHAMMAD ASLAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01058	SADIA OMAR SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01059	AHMED SAEED SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01060	IMTIAZ SIDDIQE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01061	AFTAB ANSARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	LeT	ARC F	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01062	MAZHARUL ISLAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (LeJ)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01063	FAZAL KARIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (LeJ)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01064	ATTAUR REHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (LeJ)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01065	LIAQUAT HUSSEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01066	MAULANA TAHIR ASHRAFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; FaI	0	x	x
Ag01067	KHALID KHAWAJA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01068	ZAHEERUL ISLAM ABBASI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01069	WAQAR HUSSAIN KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0
Ag01070	AHMED ABDULLAH MANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0
Ag01071	RAMAY S ZAMZAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0
Ag01072	IMAN HASAN YAMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0
Ag01073	OMAR FAROUK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0
Ag01074	MAZEN MOKHTAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01075	SHAMIL BASAYEV	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	RSBM	x	RSBM	RSBM	x	RSBM	RSBM	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01076	SYED R. MASWOOD	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01077	YASER AL JHANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01078	HASSAN ABUJIHAAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x
Ag01079	DERRICK SHAREEF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01080	PIR SAIFULLAH KHALID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01081	MUFTI RASHEED AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01082	MUFTI NIZAMUDDIN SHAMZAI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	0	0	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01083	SHER ALI SHAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01084	ABDUR RAZZAK FAROOQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01085	AZIZUR REHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01086	DIN MOHAMMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01087	MOHAMMAD NASRULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01088	ASADULLAH FAROOQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01089	MANSOOR AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01090	GHAZI BABA	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01091	MUHAMMAD AFZAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01092	TABASSUM AFZAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01093	MOHAMMAD NAEEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01094	SAEEDUR REHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01095	MUHAMMAD SOHAIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(Tal)	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01096	MOHAMMAD AJMAL AMIR KASAB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag01097	ABDUL WAHID KASHMIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01098	ABDULLAH (FROM ANANTNAG-ISLAMABAD)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01099	HAJI MOHAMMAD AZAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01100	MUZAMMIL BUTT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag01101	MOHAMMAD UMAIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01102	FAISAL DAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01103	CHOUDHRY ABDULLAH KHALID CHOHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01104	RAFIQ AKHTAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01105	AFTAB HUSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01106	CHOUDHRY YOUSAF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01107	MOHAMMAD SHRIF BALGHARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01108	RAJA MOHAMMAD IRSHAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01109	MASOOD LONE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01110	MEMOONA SAEED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01111	YAHYA MUJAHID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01112	KHALID BASHIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01113	HAFIZ ABDUR REHMAN MAKKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01114	HAJI MOHAMMAD ASHRAF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01115	ABU AHMED AL HASHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01116	MOHAMMAD SARWAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01117	ABU USAMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01118	BASHIR ALI WANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01119	SYED MOHAMMED ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01120	MOHAMMAD AKRAM NIAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01121	ZIA IKRAM NIAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01122	RIZWAN NIAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01123	HAMAD NIAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01124	SULEMAN SAQIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01125	MOHAMED ANOUAR ZAOUDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01126	ISSA BEN OTHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01127	KHADIJA PODD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01128	ABDOL GHAFFAR HASHEMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01129	NAOUFEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M; Hof	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01130	ABDELKRIM BENSMAIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(GI A)	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01131	MOHAMED AMINE AKLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(GI A)	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01132	BACHIR BELHAKEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(GI A)	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01133	MAJID MCHMACHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01134	EDDEBDOUBI TAOUFIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01135	MOUAD DOUAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01136	MUSTAFA FARJANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01137	BAANOU ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01138	SAID AFIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01139	MOKHATAR SIAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01140	DJAMEL MERABET	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01141	KAMARA BIRAHIMA DIADIE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01142	BALDOMERO LARA SANCHEZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01143	SMAIL LATRECH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01144	AHMED MOHAMED AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01145	ALI OMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01146	MEDHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01147	MASLOHI ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01148	AMROUCH EL H.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01149	RACHID BELKACEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Hof	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01150	BISLAN I.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01151	INGRID WALTERS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01152	CARL WALTERS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01153	MALIKA CHABI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01154	MOHAMMAD EL SHERSHABY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Hof	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01155	SOUMAYA SAHLA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01156	ADNAN KONSTANTINE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01157	SIDDIG IBRAHIM SIDDIG ALI	x	x	x	IG	IG	IG	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01158	CLEMENT RODNEY HAMPTON-EL	x	IG	IG	IG	IG	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01159	ABDO MOHAMMED HAGGAG	x	x	x	x	IG	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01160	AMIR ABDELGANI	x	x	x	x	IG	IG	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01161	FARES KHALLAFALLA	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01162	TARIG ELHASSAN	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01163	FADIL ABDELGANI	x	x	x	x	IG	IG	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01164	MOHAMMED SALEH	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01165	VICTOR ALVAREZ	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01166	MATARAWY MOHAMMED SAID SALEH	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01167	EARL GANT	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01168	MARIANNE ABOUHALIMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01169	MOHAMED ABOUHALIMA	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01170	ABDEL-RAHMAN JOSEPH AYYAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01171	RESIQ AYYAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01172	ABDUL AYYAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01173	ABDO YASSIN	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01174	IBRAHIM AHMAD SULEIMAN	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01175	EYAD MAHMOUD ISMOIL	x	0	x	0	IG	IG	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01176	MOHAMMAD ABUKHDEIR	x	x	x	x	IG	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01177	OMAR OBAID	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01178	EDWIN ANGELES	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	0	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01179	MUSTAFA AHMAD AL-HAWSAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01180	MOHAMAD JAMAL KHALIFA	AQ	0	0	0	0	0	0	IG	0	x	0	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01181	ALICE YABO	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01182	NORALYN ZARAGOSA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01183	ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN	x	x	x	x	0	IG	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01184	WALI KHAN	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01185	ISTIAQUE PARKER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01186	FAZEL OMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01187	ADEL ATTAYYAB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01188	BAHAUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01189	IBRAHIM RASUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01190	FAZLULLAH HAMIDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01191	SALEEM ABDEL RAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01192	TARIQ RANA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01193	ABDUL SHAKUR	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01194	MAHAUD AFFIF ABDEJALIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01195	NEDAL SALEH ODEH	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	(GI A)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01196	MOHAMMAD JUBRAN	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	(GI A)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01197	AHMAD JUBRAN	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	(GI A)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01198	WALID ISMOIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01199	MUHAMMAD ABDUL KARIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01200	MOHAMMAD SABRI SELAMAH ABUSWEIRAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01201	AHAMAD ABD BIN MASRIE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01202	HASSAN AL DDEN HASAN ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01203	HADI YOUSEF ALGHOUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01204	HASSAN AL-HIND	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01205	FUAD JARDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01206	KHALID HASSAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01207	FHAD AOUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01208	AHMAD ABED MASRIE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01209	MUSTAFA FARAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01210	KHALIL HUSSEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01211	HAMBALI	AQ	AQ; IG	0	EIJ	0	x	x	0	AQ; JI	JI	AQ; EIJ; JI	AQ; JI	AQ; ASG ; JI	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	AQ; JI; (MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01212	FATHUR ROMAN AL-GHOZI	0	0	0	EIJ	x	0	0	JI	JI	0	0	x	ASG ; JI; (MI LF)	JI	JI	0	x	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01213	FAIZ BIN ABU BAKAR BAFANA	x	0	x	EIJ	0	0	x	JI	x	0	0	AQ; JI	AQ; ASG ; JI	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01214	MUKHLIS YUNOS	x	(MI LF)	x	(MI LF)	(MI LF)	(MI LF)	(MI LF)	(MI LF)	JI; (MI LF)	(MI LF)	(MI LF)	(MI LF)	ASG ; JI	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01215	AHMED SATTAR	x	x	x	IG	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01216	ABUBKR ALY	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01217	SAAID IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01218	RACHID AHMED ZOUAOUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01219	ABDEL MESKINI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01220	SAMIR AIT MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01221	ABDELMADJID DAHOUMANE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01222	MUSTAFA LABSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01223	FATEH KAMEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	0	x	0	(GIA)	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01224	MOHAMMED SUMIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01225	HASAN ZUMERI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01226	RABAH CHEHAJ-BIAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01227	KARIM KADOURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01228	SLIMANE KHALFAOUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01229	MIROUANE BEN AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01230	AHMED BELHOUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01231	MOHAMED MERBAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01232	ABDELLAH ABDELHAFID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01233	MOURAD IDIR ABES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01234	GHALEM BELHADJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01235	KARIM BENAMGHAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01236	SALAH MOULLEF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01237	HAKIM ZIEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01238	SOFIANE LAHAMAR HASSIM ZIEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01239	DAVID AISSA KHALEF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01240	MOULOUD SIHALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01241	ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	0	0	(Tal)	AQIM; (Tal)	AQIM	0	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01242	MOHAMMED MEGUERBA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	AQ; AQIM	AQIM; (Tal)	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01243	MOHAMMAD SIDIQUE KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01244	SHEHZAD TANWEER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01245	JERMAINE LINDSAY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01246	VALERIE TRAVERSO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01247	NAGAT CHAFFE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01248	OMAR DJEDID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01249	OMAR NAITATMANE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01250	SIDALI FEDDAG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01251	MUSTAPHA TALEB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01252	MUHAMMAD AL-TAYYIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01253	SHAYKH ABD-AL-SAMAD AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01254	RICHARD REID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01255	NOUREDDINNE MOULEFF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01256	MOHAMMED BADAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01257	ZUBEDA BADAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01258	MALIKA EL AROUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01259	YOUCEF AOUNI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01260	YASSER AL-SIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01261	ABDERAHMANE AMEROUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01262	MEHREZ AZOUZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01264	KHELLAF HAMAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01265	IBRAHIM KEITA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01267	ABDELKRIM EL HADOUTI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01268	ABID HAMMADOU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	AQIM	AQIM	AQIM
Ag01269	SALIM EL-AFGHANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01270	SIDI OULD SIDNA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x
Ag01271	MOHAMED OULD CHABARNOU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x
Ag01272	MAAROUF OULD HAIBA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01273	ABD-LEKHDIME	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01274	ABDEL AZIZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01275	KHATAB MOURAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01276	ABDELHAMID SADAOUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x
Ag01277	MOHAMED BELMOKHTAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01278	ABOU ISHAK IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01279	ASSEM ABOU SAID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01280	ABOU DOUJANA (GSPC)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01281	ABDELHAKIM (GSPC)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01282	BACHIR ABOU AL BARRA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01283	ABOU MOHAMED AL JINKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01284	ALI DIX	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x
Ag01285	HAROUN EL ACHAACHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01286	ABOU-OUSSAMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	AQIM; (GIA)	x	x
Ag01287	YAHIA ABOU AMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x
Ag01288	ABOU DEHDEH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x
Ag01289	ABDEL ZAID ESSOUFFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x
Ag01290	HAMID ZAID ESSOUFFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x
Ag01291	EL-HADJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x
Ag01292	AHMED ABOU AL-BARAA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01293	ADEL MECHAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01294	OMAR SAITI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01295	KARIM BOUTRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01296	IYAD AG GHALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01297	BABA ULD SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01298	MOHAMED RACHED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01299	ANTAR ZOUABRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01300	ABOU KHALED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01301	ABDELMADJID DICHOU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01302	AHMED CHABI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01303	MUSTAPHA EL YAZID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01304	SAADAOUI LYES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01305	ABOU HAYFEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01306	NOREDINE SKODARLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01307	S.H.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01308	M.G.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01309	C.W.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01310	R.R.C.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01311	Y.A.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01312	ATIYAH ABD AL-RAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01313	ANOUR MAJRAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01314	LASSAD SASSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag01315	MUHAMMAD BENHEDI MSAHEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01316	SAMI SAYOUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag01317	ABDELLATIF ZEHRAOUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag01319	ARMAN AHMED AL-HISSINI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01320	HASSAN MUSTAFA OSAMA NASR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01321	MOHAMED GAME	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag01322	IGNAOUA HABIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag01323	ABU HAFS THE MAURITANIAN	x	AQ; IG	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; HUJI
Ag01324	LUCIA GARAFALO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01325	ABDEL HAKIM TIZEGHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01326	BOUABIDE CHAMCHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01327	YAMIN RACHEK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01328	BRAHIM MAHDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01330	IHAB DAFEH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01331	KHALED OMAR MINAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01332	ABDULLAH AL-MUTHADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01333	ABDUL RAKIB HASAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01334	ALI JAMAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01335	MELANIE BROWN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01336	ABU SALAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01337	SAMIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01338	MAMADOU NDAW	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01339	MUSTAFA CHEIKHO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01340	MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH HASAN ABU-AL-KHAYR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01341	VICTORIA BRIGITTE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01342	CHRISTIAN BRIGITTE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01344	MAHA HABIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01345	MUHAMMAD ARIF BIN NAHARUDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	0	JI	0	0	LeT	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01346	SAJID (LET)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01347	STEVEN CAI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01348	INAM UL-HAQUE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01349	IKRAM UL-HAQUE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01350	MOHAMED DAMIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	0	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01351	AHMED AL-RAFIKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01352	ABDELMALEK BOUZGARENE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01353	YOUSSEF ADAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01354	ABDELAZIZ FIKRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01355	MOHAMED BENHAMOU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01356	ISAM ZAMZANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01357	ADIL ACHIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01358	MOHAMMED HAMOUMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01359	MOHAMMED MABROUK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01360	BENDAOUD DMIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01361	BRAHIM HAMDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01362	HICHAM DARBANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01363	SALAHEDDINE DEBICHE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01364	MOHAMED JERMOUNI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01365	MOURAD LAMNAOUAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01366	SALEH ZARLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01367	ABDERRAZAK FAOUZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01368	KAMAL HANOUICHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01369	BOUCHAIB GUERMACH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01370	LAKBIR KOUTOUBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01371	BOUCHAIB MGHADER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01372	OMAR MAAROUF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01373	LAARBI DAQIQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01374	ABDERRAHM AN MAJDOUBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01375	RACHID AMRINE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01376	MILOUD MANDOUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01377	MUSTAPHA LAKRIMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01378	HOUSSEIN BERGHACHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01379	YAZID AJREF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01380	MOURAD SAROUF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01381	MOHAMED JOK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01382	YOUSEF JALIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01384	ABDELRAZAQ RTIWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01385	ABDELKADER EL ARBAOUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01386	AMNA EL ARBAOUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01387	MUSTAFA EL ARBAOUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01388	OMAR ALTIMIMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01389	YOUNIS TSOULI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01390	WASEEM MUGHAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01391	TARIQ AL-DAOUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01392	MOHAMMED FEROZE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01394	HAROON ASWAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01395	FARIS AL-ZAHRANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01396	YAQOOB SAEED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01397	UZAIR AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01398	SHOAIB SIDDIQUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01399	DANISH INAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01400	NAJEEBULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01401	KHURRAM SAIFULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01402	SHAHZAD MUKHTAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01403	AKMAL WAHEED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01404	ARSHAD WAHEED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01405	RAO KHLAID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01406	MOHAMMAD SHOAIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01407	ADNAN SHAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01408	ABDUL WAHEED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01409	JEHAN ARA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01410	ABDUL HASAB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01411	GUL HASAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(LeJ)	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01412	HASAMUL SANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01413	TAHIR YULDASH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01414	ABDULLAH AL-HAJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01415	DAWAR KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01416	RIAZ BASRA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01417	USAMA KHALID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01418	KHALID FAROUK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0
Ag01419	SUBIRA FAROUK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01420	AMAL KHALIFA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01421	ABDUL BASIT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01422	SHARIF MUHAMMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01423	ABU OMAR AS-SEYF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSB M	0	RSB M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01424	MAGOMED YEVLOYEV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	RSB M	x	x	x	RSB M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01425	ELINA ERSENOYEVA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSB M	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01426	MARIE SCHULTZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01427	ISHAQ RIND	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01428	ZAKIUR REHMAN LAKHVI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	LeT	AQ	x	LeT	x	LeT	x	x
Ag01429	HAFIZ AZIZUR REHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01430	ABU ABDUR RAHMAN SAREEHI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01431	ABU ANAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01432	MOHAMMAD QASIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag01433	ABDUL QADEER KHAMOSH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01434	HAFIZ TAHIR MAHMOOD ASHRAFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01435	ARSHAD MOHAMMED HANIF ANSARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GR G	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01436	SYED MOHAMMED HANIF RAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GRG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01437	FAMIDA RAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GRG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01438	FARHEEN RAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GRG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01439	NASIR MEHMOOD AHWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01440	MOHAMMED (JEM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01441	HAMZA (JEM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01442	HAIDER (JEM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01443	RANA (JEM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01444	RAJA (JEM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01445	AR GEELANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01446	SHAUKAT HUSSAIN GURU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01447	AFSANA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01448	SUBHASH MALHOTRA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01449	VIRENDRA PAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01450	TARIQ AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01451	SAIFUL ISLAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01452	ABU KASHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01453	ABU ZAID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01454	ABDUL REHMAN DEDAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01455	KHURSHID AHMED PARREY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01456	SEHRAI BABA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01457	GHALIB AFZAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01458	YAHYA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag01459	ISMAIL KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag01460	FAHEEM ANSARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01461	SABAUDDIN SHAIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01462	HAMMAD AMIN SADIQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	x
Ag01463	DAVID HEADLEY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	0	0	AQ; LeT	AQ	x
Ag01464	ABU AL QAMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	0	LeT	0	0
Ag01465	ZARAR SHAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	x
Ag01466	SHAHID JAMIL RIAZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	x
Ag01467	JAMIL AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	x
Ag01468	MUHAMMED YOUNAS ANJAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	x
Ag01469	SAMIR ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag01471	ILLYAS KASHMIRI	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	HUJI	HUJI	HUJI	AQ; HUJI	HUJI	AQ; HUJI	HUJI	HUJI	AQ	AQ; TTP	AQ; HUJI
Ag01472	ATEEQ CHAUHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01473	SHAMSHAD AHMAD SALFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01474	ABDULLAH MUNTAZIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01475	ZAFFAR IQBAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01476	TALHA SAEED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01477	FAWAD (COUSIN OF SULEMAN SAQIB)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01478	ADIL SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01479	SOUBHI KINIC	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(GIA)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01480	NAUREDDINE SALIN ABDOUMALOU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(GIA)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01481	MOHAMED HAMID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01482	ABDELLAH HAWARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01483	RACHID MOHAMED MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01484	MOHAMED LEUSSADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01485	SADE ASDE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01486	SALAH GHOULAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01487	HADJ BOURGIBA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01488	ALI IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01489	MOHAMMED ADJIMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01490	FARID GHRIEB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01491	MEHREZ BEN MAHDOUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01492	DIBALI ABDELLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01493	AFIF MEJRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01494	YACINE AHMED NACER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01495	ALI EL HEIT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01496	RABAH BOURAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01497	LAMINE AHMED NACER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01498	FARID AIDER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01499	ANTONIO (SPANISH ARMS TRAFFICKER)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01500	EMAD SALEM	x	x	x	IG	0	IG	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01501	ASHRAF MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01502	AHMED YOUSIF MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01503	SIRAJ EL'DIN YOUSIF	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01504	SHEIK MUBARAK SHAH JILANI	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01505	JAMES WILLIAMS	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01506	STEPHEN PASTER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01507	WARITH DEEN UMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01508	JOSE PADILLA	x	x	0	0	0	0	x	0	0	EIJ	0	0	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01509	JOHN WALKER LINDH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (Tal)	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag01511	LT. GEN. JAVED NASIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01512	YAHYA ABU UBAIDAH MUHAMMAD	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01513	ELSIE HAMPTON-EL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01514	LEON HOLLAND	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01515	LAMONT HOLDER	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01516	ABD AL-AZIZ UDA	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01517	KHIDR ALI	x	x	x	Fuqra	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01518	GLENN NEVILLE FORD	x	x	x	Fuqra	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01519	CABA JOSE HARRIS	x	x	x	Fuqra	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01520	ROBERT JUNIOR WESLEY	x	x	x	Fuqra	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01521	TYRONE JUNIOR COLE	x	x	x	Fuqra	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01522	MUSTAFA ABDU RASHID	x	x	x	Fuqra	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01523	TRACI ELAINE UPSHUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01524	VINCENTE PIERRE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01525	ABDUL JABBAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01526	ABDUS-SALAAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01527	KAREN ANN MILLS SWEENEY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01528	LINDA LEE SANCHEZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01529	YOUSEF AYYAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01530	EVONNE GRAVES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01531	HASAB ELRASOUL BABEKIR	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01532	OSMAN EL-SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01533	SAEED AKMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01534	ADEL ANNON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01535	EDITH GESMUNDO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01536	JOVENAL BRUNO	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01537	ABURAJAK ABUBAKAR JANJALANI	AQ	0	0	ASG	ASG ; IG	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01538	KHADAFI MONTANO JANJALANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	x	ASG	ASG	ASG ; JI	x	x	x	x
Ag01540	ISAM MOHAMMED ABDUL HADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01541	MOHAMMED ISMAEL DEIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01542	NABIL NASSER AL-RIYAMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01543	WAIL RACHEL AL-KAATIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01544	ASERAF ABDUL ALZOURI RAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01545	ENAAM M. ARNAOUT	x	AQ; IG; (HIG)	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01546	SHEIK ADIL ABDUL GALIL BATARGY	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01547	ABUBAKAR SHARIFADA	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01548	ZAKARIA M. SHIKH	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01549	NORALWIZAH LEE	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01550	OMAR AL-FARUQ	AQ	x	x	x	0	0	0	AQ; (MI LF)	x	0	0	0	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	JI	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01551	GOLIYAH ASSAGAF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01552	HANUN ASSAGAF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01553	MIRA AGUSTINA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01554	MAHMOUD AFIF ABDELJALIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01555	KHALID AL-MIDHAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01556	NAWAF AL-HAZMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01557	ABED SHEIKH MOHAMMED	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01558	ZAHED SHEIKH MOHAMMED	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01559	AREF SHEIKH MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01560	ABDULLAH BIN KHALID AL-THANI	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01561	AHMAD AL-HAMWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01562	YAZID SUFAAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01563	MUHAMMAD IQBAL	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	JI	x	0	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01564	CHOMEL SUFAAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01565	MUHAMMAD SOBRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01566	ABU BAKAR BASHIR	AQ	0	0	EIJ	0	JI	JI	JI	JI	JI	AQ; EIJ; JI	JI	AQ; JI	JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	0	JI	JI	0	0
Ag01567	SHAHRIL HAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01568	MADAM FATIMAH ZAHARA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01569	ISMAEL LUMINGKIT ALI	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01570	ABDULRAHMAN ESPINA	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01571	ISMAEL NACAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01572	ABDUL MANNAN MUKSAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01573	ALEEM SHUAIB ABIDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01574	MOHAMED MANSOUR JABARA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ; JI; (Tal)	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01576	ALI IMRON	x	0	0	EIJ	x	JI	x	x	x	x	0	0	AQ; ASG; JI	JI	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01577	WAN MIN WAN MAT	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	0	JI	0	x	x	0	x	AQ; JI	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01578	AMROZI	x	0	x	x	0	x	JI	JI	JI	JI	JI	0	AQ; ASG; JI	JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01579	MUHAMMAD ZAKARIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01580	ALI AL-AZIA ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	0	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01581	KANKAN ABDUL QADIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01582	MARIYANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01583	ZUBAIR MOHAMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01584	AZAHARI HUSIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	JI	JI	AQ; JI	JI	AQ; JI	JI	JI	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01585	SALMAH ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01586	ABDUL SAID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01587	ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ; EIJ	x	0	x	AQ; JI	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01588	RUSMAN GUNAWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	JI	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01589	HAMBALI'S CAMBODIAN WIFE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01590	ARIFIN BIN ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01591	HOQUE SINDIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01592	MOHAMMED NAZIR BIN LEP	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ; JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01593	ABID KHAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01594	BASHIR MEHMOOD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01595	SHAYKH MOHAMED MOKHTAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01596	SAPAE-ING BASOR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01597	ESAM MOHAMID KHIRD ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01598	ABDUL AZI HAJI CHIMING	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01599	MUHAMMAD YALALUDIN MADING	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01600	SMAN ISMAEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01601	IBRAHIM (JI IN CAMBODIA)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01602	ROUSHA YASSER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01603	KHORIYAHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01604	AZZAM (JI)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01605	TAUFIQ RIFQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01606	ABDUL GHONI	x	0	x	EIJ	0	0	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	JI	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01607	IQBAL UZZAMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01608	DELIAR NOER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01609	AL GABRE MAHMUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01610	ABDUL JABAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ; ASG ; JI	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01611	OMAR OPIK LASAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01613	AGUNG BIYADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01617	JA'FAR BIN MISTOOKI	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	JI	JI	JI	JI	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01618	HASHIM BIN ABAS	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01619	IMAM SAMUDRA	0	x	0	EIJ	x	x	x	JI	JI	JI	JI	0	AQ; JI	JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01620	YASSIN SYWAL	AQ	0	0	EIJ	0	0	0	0	x	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01621	JULKIPLI SALIM Y SALAMUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01622	SOLAMAIN ESMAEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01623	ARIS MUNANDAR	x	0	x	EIJ	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	JI	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01624	AGUS DWIKARNA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	LJ	JI	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01625	HUSSAIN RAMOS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01626	ANTONIO REYES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01627	ABDULLAH SUNGKAR	AQ	x	x	EIJ	0	JI	JI	JI	JI	JI	AQ; EIJ; JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01631	ZAINURI AL-GHOZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01632	ALI GHUFRON	0	0	x	0	0	JI	JI	JI	JI	JI	JI	0	AQ; JI	JI	AQ; JI	x	x	TQJ	AQ	x	0	x	x
Ag01633	MOHAMBEDOU OULD SLAHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01634	MR. MAURITANIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01635	KHALIL DEEK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01636	MOURAD IKHLEF	x	x	x	x	x	(GIA)	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01637	MUHAMMAD AHMED AL-AHDAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01638	AHMED MUHAMMAD AMIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01639	GHULAM MUSTAFA RAMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01640	IMAM KAMEL DIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01641	NICOLAS BELLONI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01642	MOHAMED YACINE AKNOUCHE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01643	JAMES UJAAMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01644	YASIN HASSAN OMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01645	ATILLA AHMET	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01646	MOHAMMED ANSWAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01647	BASHIR AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01648	HASIB HUSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01649	HASINA KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01650	MAGDY EL-NASHAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01651	MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01652	MANZIA HUSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01653	IMRAN HUSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01654	MOHAMMED JUNAID BABAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQIM	AQIM	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01655	OMAR KHYAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	AQIM; (Tal)	AQIM	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01656	ANTHONY GARCIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01657	WAHEED MAHMOOD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	AQIM	AQIM	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01658	JAWAD AKBAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01659	SALAHUDDIN AMIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01660	SHUJAH MAHMOOD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01661	NABEEL HUSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01662	ZEESHAN SIDDIQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01663	OSAMA NAZIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	Raw-9	Raw-9
Ag01664	HUSSEIN OSMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01665	MOHAMMAD MOMIN KHAWAJA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01666	SHERAFIYAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01667	ALI AYED AL-SHAMRANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01668	ABU ZUBAIR AL-HAILI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	0	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01669	KHALID BIN ODEH BIN MOHAMMED AL-HARBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01670	FAHD AL-QUSO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	0	x	AQ AP	x	x	AQ AP	x
Ag01672	SAYYID QUTUB	EIJ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01673	AHMED AL ANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01674	ABDELBAKI	x	x	x	x	x	(GIA)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01675	ABDELKADER HAKIMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GICM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01676	ABDERREHMANE AMLKI ZAKERAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01677	ABDUL FATAH ZAMMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01678	ABDUL HADI AL-IRAQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01679	ABU ANZAR	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01680	ABU MOHAMMED AL MAQDARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01681	ABU TALAL AL-QASIMY	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01682	AHMAD EL-ITTAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01683	AHMED ELOMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01684	AICHA ARBAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01685	AMIR LAARAJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01686	ASIF REZA KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01687	AWATES MASWOOD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01688	AZAM CHEEMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	0	AQ	LeT	LeT	x	LeT	x	x
Ag01689	CAROL SANTIAGO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01690	CHEJ SALAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01691	DEDI SETIONO	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	AQ; ASG ; JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01692	FARIDA PATEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01693	FEIZ MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01694	GEMMA CRUZ-ARANETA	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01696	GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR	0	AQ; (HIG)	IG; (HI G)	x	(HIG)	x	(HI G)	(HI G)	(HI G)	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (HI G)	AQ; (HI G); (Tal)	0	x	x	x	HN; (HI G)	x	x
Ag01698	HAFIZ MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH BAHAWALPUR I	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01699	HAMZAR HAZIZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01700	HASAN AL-TURABI	x	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01701	HASSAN OULAD AKCHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Mf M	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01702	JACK ROCHE	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	JI	JI	AQ; JI	0	x	0	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01703	JAFFAR UMAR THALIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	JI	JI	x	0	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01704	ABDELKARIM MEJJATI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	GIC M	x	x	x	x	GIC M	Mf M	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01705	MAHMOUD JAMAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01706	MAULVI SALEEMULLAH KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01707	MOHAMED KHAMIS MOHAMED	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01709	MOHAMMAD SALEEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01710	MOHAMMED ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01711	MOSSAAB KHATIR	x	x	x	x	(GIA)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01712	MUFTI MOHAMMED JAMIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01713	MULLAH KREKAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01714	MULLAH OMAR	x	IG	IG	0	0	0	x	x	x	AQ; (Tal)	(Tal)	0	0	0	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x
Ag01715	MUSTAFA (SUSPECT IN CASABLANCA BOMBINGS)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01716	NASIR ABBAS	0	0	x	x	x	x	JI	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01717	NAZIR AHMED TAUNSVI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01718	NORA YABO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01719	OMAR KHAN SHARIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01720	OUSSAMA KASSIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01721	RACHID AHMIDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01722	REGINA KREIS	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01723	ROBERT PIERRE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01724	TAHIR PERVAIZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01725	YAHIA DJOUADI ABOU AMMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	x
Ag01727	ABDERRAHMANE AMEUROUD	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01728	ABDUL HAQQ BAKER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01729	ABDUL RAHMAN ABU ABDUL NASSER AL-AASSEMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag01730	ARIF TAJIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01731	ASIM UZMANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01732	AZAM TARIQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01733	DJAMAL ZITOUNI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	(GIA)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01734	EDWARD FILTON	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01735	GHIAS HUSSEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01736	HAFIZ DUR MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01737	IBRAHIM ABU UTHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag01738	IFTIKAR ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag01739	ISMAIL MULLA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01740	MARWAN AL-SHEHHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01741	MAULANA YOUSUF BINNORI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01742	MOHAMMAD AMJID KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag01743	MOHAMMAD UZAIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jund	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01744	MYSTERY PAKISTANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01745	QARI AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01746	QARI GHULAM MURTAZA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01747	RACHID RAMDA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01749	SHEIKH MOHAMMED ADEEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01750	SUHIR A. AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01751	ZAFAR IQBAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01752	SHAKER AL-ABSSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	AQ; FaI	x	x	x
Ag01753	CHERIE MARIA STULTZ	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01754	JOSHUA PADILLA	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01755	MUHAMMED JAVED	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01756	SHAMIA'A	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01757	HUSSEIN PADILLA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01758	HASSAN PADILLA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01759	MRS. ABDULATIF MERROUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01760	ABDUL AZIZ AL OMARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01761	SATAM AL SUQAMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01762	WALI AL SHEHRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01763	WALEED AL SHEHRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01764	FAYEZ BENIHAMMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01765	MOHAND AL SHEHRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01766	AHMED AL GHAMDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01767	HAMZA AL GHAMDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01768	MAJED MOQED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01769	HANI HANJOUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01770	SALEM AL HAZMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01771	SAEED AL GHAMDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01772	AHMED ABDULLAH ALNAMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01773	AHMAD AL HAZNAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01774	ZIAD JARRAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01775	KHALED MOHAMMED AL-ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01776	MOHAMMED BIN USAMA BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01777	SAAD BIN USAMA BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01778	HAMZA BIN USAMA BIN LADEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01780	OMAR AL-KHATAB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01781	ALI MAHMUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01782	ABOUD ROGO	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01783	MOHAMED KUBWA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01784	KARIM (MOMBASA ATTACKS)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01785	SAID SAGGAR AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01786	AMINA MOHAMMED KUBWA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01787	ADNAN G. EL SHUKRIJUMAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	0	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ; HUJI
Ag01788	ADERRAUF JDEY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01789	AMER EL-MAATI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01790	ADAM GADAHN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	AQ	x	AQ; LeT	x	x	x	0
Ag01791	SALEH ALI SALEH NABHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	AQ	AQ	x	x	0	x	x	0	x
Ag01792	HALIMA BADROUDINE FAZUL HUSSEINE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag01793	HASHI HUSSEIN FARAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01794	UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALAB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	AQAP	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01795	OMAR AWADH OMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01796	HUSSEIN HASSAN AGADE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01797	ISSA OSMAN ISSA	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	Shbb	x	x	0
Ag01798	FUMO MOHAMED FUMO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01799	SALIM SAMIR BA'AMER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01800	AHMED HAJJI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01801	DABBAS BIN MOHAMMED AL-DABBASY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01802	MOHAMMED ALI SALEH NABHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01803	NASSEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01804	MUNIRA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01805	ALI SAGGAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01806	HANIYA	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01807	OMAR SAID OMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	0	0	AQ	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01809	SULEIMAN ABDALLA SALIM HEMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	0	0	0	AQ	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01810	SALMIN MOHAMMED KHAMIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01811	FAISAL ALI NASSOR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01812	OMAR FAROOQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI	HUJI; Raw-9	x	x
Ag01813	MOHAMMED ILLYAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	Raw-9	Raw-9
Ag01814	ANNELIESE BAHAJI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01815	NESE KUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01816	MOUNIR EL-MOTASSADEQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	0	AQ	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01817	HAMZA RABIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01818	KUBWA MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01819	SWALHA KUBWA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01820	AAFIA SIDDIQUI	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	0	x	0
Ag01821	CHARLES TAYLOR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01822	AISHA NABHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01823	SHEIKH MUKHTAR ABDIRAHMAN ABU-ZUBEYR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01824	OMAR HAMMAMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag01825	AL-AMIN KIMATHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01826	BILAL EL BERJAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01827	OMAR BADRUDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01828	WALLA ELDIN ABDEL RAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01829	SAKRIH MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01830	HASSAN AGADE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01831	FARIDAH HAMUBU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01832	FATUMA SAIDI ABUDULLAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01833	EDRISA ISSA LUYIMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01834	EDRISA NSUBUGA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01835	HARUNA HASSAN LUYIMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01836	MOHAMOOD MUGISHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01837	HAMID MOHAMED SULEIMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01838	YAHYA SULEIMAN MBUTHIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01839	HABIB SULEIMAN NJOROGE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01840	HUSSEIN HASSAN AGADE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0
Ag01841	HASSAN FROM SOMALIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01842	KASULE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01843	IDRIS MAGONDU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag01844	MUSTAFA ABU AL YAZID	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	AQ; HUJI; Raw-9	AQ	0
Ag01845	INTIKHAB AHMED ABBASI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01846	MOHAMMAD KABIR ABBOTABAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01847	ABID KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01848	ZAFARALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01849	QAMAR ZAMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01850	MOHAMMAD ISHAQUE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01852	SHAMSUL HAQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	Raw-9	Raw-9
Ag01853	ABU GHARIB AL-MAKKI K.S.A. AL-FUDLI AL-HADHLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	x	x
Ag01854	RAO SHAUKAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	x	x
Ag01855	MURSALEEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9; (LeJ)	x	x
Ag01856	FAHAD MUNIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9; (LeJ)	x	x
Ag01860	MUHAMMAD ASIF ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01861	ABDUL REHMAN (HUJI)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01862	MUREED AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01863	DR. USMAN/AQEEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9; (LeJ)	0	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01864	ATTAULLAH KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	0	0	x
Ag01865	FAISAL AHMED KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	Raw-9	Raw-9
Ag01866	DR ABDUL RAZZAQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	Raw-9	Raw-9
Ag01867	ZEESHAN JALIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	Raw-9	Raw-9
Ag01868	MOHAMMAD SARFARAZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	Raw-9	Raw-9
Ag01869	MOHAMMAD NAEEM SHAKIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	Raw-9	Raw-9
Ag01870	MOHAMMAD NADEEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	Raw-9	Raw-9
Ag01871	MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01872	ISMAT SIDDIQUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01873	FOWZIA SIDDIQUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01874	MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01875	SUHEIL LAHER	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01876	MOHAMAD AKRA	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01877	MOHAMMAD AMJAD KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01878	AHMED KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag01879	MIRIAM KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01880	SULIEMAN KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01881	MAJID KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01882	UZAIR PARACHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01883	ALI SHINAWY	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01884	HAMDI MOUSSA	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01885	MOHAMMAD SAAD	x	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01886	WALID BIN ATTASH	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ; EIJ	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01887	GOULED HASSAN DOURAD	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01888	MUSA ALI SAID AL SAID AL UMARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01889	ANWAR HAMDAN MUHAMMAD AL NUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01890	NAJIBULLAH ZAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x
Ag01891	ZURAH ADBU AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01892	MAHMOUD TALEB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	AQ; FaI	x	x	x
Ag01893	IYMAN FARIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01894	ABDUL RAOUF HAWAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01896	QAMAR MOHAMMAD AYUB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01897	YUSUF POLAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01898	LOUAI SAKKA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01988	HABIB AKTAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSBM	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01989	BAKI YIGIT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01990	GURCAN BAC	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01991	FEVZI YITIZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01992	ADNAN ERSOZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag01993	MESUT CABUK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01994	GOKHAN ELALTUNTAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01995	FERIDUN UGURLU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01996	ILYAS KUNCAK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01997	HARUN ILHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01998	IBRAHIM KUS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag01999	AZAD EKINCI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02000	SEYIT ERTUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02001	HAMED OBYSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02002	SERVET YITIZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02003	IMAD MUGHNIYEH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (Hizb)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02004	JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED ALI AL-BADAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	0	x	AQ AP	0	AQ; AQ AP	x	x
Ag02005	ABDUL RAHIM MO. HUSSEIN ABDA AL-NASHERI	x	x	x	x	IG	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02006	IBRAHIM AL-THAWAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02007	HASSAN AWADH AL-KHAMRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02008	MOHD FARIK BIN AMIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ; JI	JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02009	SULIEMAN ABU GHAITH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02010	MUHAMMAD AL-QAHTANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02011	SAIFULLAH PARACHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02012	IBN AL-KHATTAB	x	AQ; IG	IG	0	0	x	x	0	0	0	x	RSB M	RSB M	RSB M	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02013	HASSAN ATTASH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02014	MUHAMMAD ATTASH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02015	ALI ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-FAQASI AL-GHAMDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02016	TURKI NASSER AL-DANDANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02017	KHALED MO. BIN MUSLIM AL-ARAWI AL-JUHANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02018	MO. OTHMAN ABDULLAH AL-WALIDI AL-SHEHRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02019	HANI SAEED AHMAD AL ABDUL-KARIM AL-GHAMDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02020	JUBRAN ALI AHMAD HAKAMI KHABRANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02021	KHALED BIN IBRAHIM MAHMOUD BAGHDADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02022	MEHMAS MO. MEHMAS AL-HAWASHLEH AL-DOSARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02023	MO. BIN SHADHAF ALI AL-MAHZOUM AL-SHEHRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02024	HAZEM MOHAMMED SAEED KASHMIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02025	MAJED ABDULLAH SA'AD BIN OKAIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02026	BANDAR BIN ABDUL-RAHMAN M.R. AL-MUTAIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02027	ABDUL-KARIM MOHAMMED JUBRAN YAZJI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02028	ABDULLAH FARRES BIN J.R. AL-MUTAIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02030	AMMAR AL-WAELI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP	x	AQ AP	AQ AP
Ag02031	QASIM MOHAMED (AIAI)	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02032	MOHAMED AL KAHTANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02033	YOUNIS KHALIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02034	AHMED SHAH MASSOUD	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02035	ABU BARA AL YEMENI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02036	SALAH AL DIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02037	AYSEL SENGUEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02038	KHALID AL-MASRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02040	KHADR ABU HOSHAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	0	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02041	RAED HIJAZI	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	0	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02042	MOHAMAD KAMAL ELZAHABI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02043	SAAD HIJAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02044	HUSSEIN TURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02045	OSAMA SUMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02046	MOHAMMED HIJAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02047	MOHDAR ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02048	KHALLAM (CALIFORNIA)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02049	FAHAD AL THUMAIRY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02050	OMAR AL BAYOUMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02051	OSAMA AWADALLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02052	OMAR BAKARBASHA T	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02053	ANWAR AULAQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02054	YAZEED AL SALMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02055	EYAD AL RABABAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02056	SULAYMAN AL ALWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02057	MUSHABIB AL HAMLAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02058	SAUD AL RASHID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02059	ZUHAIR AL THUBAITI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02060	QUTAYBAH AL NAJDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02061	SAEED AL BALUCHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02062	ABU TURAB AL JORDANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02063	ABD AL RAHIM GHULUM RABBANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02064	ABDULLAH SINDHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02065	AWS AL MADANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02066	ABDEL KARIM AL NASSER	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02067	AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02068	ALI AL-HOURI	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02069	HANI AL-SAYEGH	SdH zb	x	SdH zb	x	x	SdH zb	x	x	SdH zb	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02070	IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB	SdH zb; (Hiz b)	SdH zb; (Hiz b)	x	SdH zb; (Hiz b)	x	SdH zb; (Hiz b)	x	x	SdH zb; (Hiz b)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02071	MUSTAFA AL-QASSAB	SdH zb	x	x	x	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	x	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02072	SA'ED AL-BAHAR	x	SdH zb; (Hiz b)	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02073	ABDALLAH AL-JARASH	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	SdH zb	x	x	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02074	HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS	x	x	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	x	x	x	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02075	ALI AL-MARHOUN	x	x	x	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02076	SALEH RAMADAN	x	x	x	x	SdH zb	x	SdH zb	SdH zb	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02077	MUSTAFA MU'ALEM	x	x	x	x	SdH zb	x	SdH zb	SdH zb	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02078	AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI	x	0	x	x	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02079	FADEL AL-ALAWE	x	x	x	x	SdH zb	x	x	SdH zb	SdH zb	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02080	JOHN DOE (HIZBALLAH)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	SdH zb; (Hiz b)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02081	ADEL RAFEEA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02082	IBRAHIM MAIDIN	0	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02083	OTHMAN MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02084	MAS SELAMAT BIN KASTARI	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	0	0	JI	0	x	x	x	x	0	0	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02085	KHALIM JAFFAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ; JI	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02086	AB WAHAB BIN AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02087	SYED IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02088	MOHAMMAD ASLAM BIN YAR ALI KHAN	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02089	FATHI ABU BAKAR BAFANA	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02090	ADNAN BIN MUSA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02091	MOHAMED NAZIR MOHMMED UTHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02092	SABAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02093	ANDREW GERARD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02094	HALIM BIN HUSSAIN	x	x	x	EIJ	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02095	TENGKU ISMUHADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02096	DIDIN ROSMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02097	TAUFIK ABDUL HALIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02098	ABDULLAH ANSHORI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02099	IRFAN AWWAS SURYAHARDY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02100	MURSALIN DAHLAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02101	FUAD AMSYARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02102	ENJANG BASTAMAN	0	0	0	EIJ	0	x	x	AQ	x	x	0	x	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02103	ZULKIFLI MARZUKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	x	AQ; JI	JI	JI	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x
Ag02104	DAUD BEUREUEH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02105	HASAN DI TIRO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02106	ABU HASBI GEUDONG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02107	CHADIJAH GEUDONG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02108	MUCHTAR GEUDONG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02109	FAUZI GEUDONG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02110	SYAFRIE SJAMSUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02111	ABU HURAERAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI; (MILF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02112	AKIM HAKIMUDDIN	x	0	0	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02113	HENDROPRIYONO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02114	LIGADINSYAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI; (GAM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02115	FADLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI; (GAM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02116	EDI SUGIARTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI; (GAM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02117	POLEM	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02118	RAMLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02119	BASUKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02120	MOHAMMED FAWAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02121	SYAHRIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02122	UMAR (JI-BANDUNG)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02123	HAJI ACENG SUHERI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02124	AGUS KURNIAWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02125	RONY MILYAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02126	WAWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02127	DEDI MULYADI	x	0	0	EIJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02128	HOLIS	x	0	0	EIJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02129	YOYO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02130	RAJA HUSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02131	ABDUL AZIZ KAHAR MUZAKKAR	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02132	HARIS FADILLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02133	KYAI SALEH AS‘AD	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02134	ABDUL RAUF	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	JI	0	0	x	x	x	JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02135	YUDI/ANDRI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	JI	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02136	AGUS HIDAYAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	AQ; JI	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02138	IQBAL (BALI BOMBER)	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02139	APRIANTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02140	PUJATA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02141	IKHWAN FAUZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02142	FATURRAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02143	ZULKIFLI BIN ABDUL HIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	JI	x	0	x	x	0	0	x	ASG	x
Ag02144	ZULKARNAEN	0	0	x	x	0	0	JI	0	JI	x	0	0	JI	JI	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02145	THORIQUDIN	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	0	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02146	MUSTOPA	0	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	0	0	0	0	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02147	MUSTAQIM	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	JI	x	0	0
Ag02148	MUSTAFA MASHUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02149	MUHAMMAD SAUWKI AL-ISTAMBULI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02150	AJENGAN MASDUKI	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02151	SALAHUDIN	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	JI	x	x	x	ASG ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02152	HABIB	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	JI	x	x	x	ASG ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02153	ACHMAD ROIHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02154	MOHAMMED FAIQ HAFIDZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02155	MOHAMED QITAL	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02156	AHMAD SAJULI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02157	SYUNON	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02158	MUCHLIANSYAH	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02159	ASEP DANU	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02160	FIRDAUS	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02161	ZUHRONI	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02162	FARIHIN AHMAD	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02163	ARKAM/ARQOM	0	0	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	0	x	x	JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02165	UTOMO PAMUNGKAS	x	0	0	EIJ	x	x	JI	0	x	0	0	0	AQ; ASG ; JI	JI	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02166	DULMATIN	x	0	0	EIJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; ASG ; JI	JI	AQ; JI	(MI LF)	x	AS G	x	AS G; JI	JI	ASG	0
Ag02167	USAID	x	0	0	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02168	MUCHTAR DAENG	x	0	0	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02169	KAHAR MUSTAFA	x	0	0	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02170	SYARIFUDDIN	x	0	0	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02171	BASYIR	x	0	0	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02172	MOH. JAUHARI BIN ABDULLAH	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02173	DADANG SURATMAN	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02175	SUHEIMI	x	x	x	EIJ	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02176	JAMSARI	x	x	x	EIJ	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02177	ABDUL RAZAK	x	x	x	EIJ	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02178	MUHAMMAD TAUFIQURRA HMAN	x	x	x	EIJ	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	0	AQ; JI	x	x	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02179	ABAS BIN LATIF	x	x	x	EIJ	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02180	SARJIYO	x	x	x	EIJ	0	0	x	AQ	JI	0	0	x	AQ; ASG ; JI	JI	AQ; JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02181	MUHAJIR	x	x	x	EIJ	0	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	AQ; JI	JI	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02182	ACHMAD DAHLAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02183	MUCHLIANSYAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02184	HAJI MOH. FALEH OF KUDUS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02185	HAJI DANU MUH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02186	ABDUL ROCHIM	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02187	JAMALUDDIN	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02188	ZAINI ZAKARIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02189	ZAMZURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02190	HENRY BIN MANSOUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	AQ; JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02191	FATURAHMAN DAEMUGADING	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02192	ZAITUN RASMIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02193	AGUNG HAMID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02194	HISBULLAH RASYID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02195	ANTHON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02196	ILHAM RIYADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02197	MANSUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02199	DAHLAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	0	x	x	JI	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02200	ASHAR DAENG SALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02201	SALAMAT HAYSIM	x	x	x	x	x	JI; (MI LF)	x	JI; (MI LF)	x	x	x	x	ASG ; JI; (MI LF)	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02202	SARDJONO GABRIEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02203	SYAIFUL GABRIEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02204	MACHMUDI HARIONO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02205	FAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02206	SURYADI MAS'UD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	LJ	0	JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02207	HASTA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02208	IMAM HANAFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02209	SOLAHUDIN AL-AYUBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02210	USTADZ YUNUS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02211	USTADZ AZHARI DIPOKUSUMO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02212	FARIDA BIN ABBAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02213	WAHYUDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02214	FERIAL MUCHLIS ABDUL HALIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02215	ISNAIRIN BINTI ABDUL ROSYID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02216	ASADULLAH	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	LJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02217	YOYOK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02218	ZULFIKAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02219	ABDULLAH (DI)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02220	EDY RIANTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02221	NAIMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02222	EDY TAUFIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02223	SUHENDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02224	ROJAK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02225	MUSTAQIM (AMIN)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02226	MATORI ABDUL JALIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02227	ZULKIFAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02228	TAJUL ARIFIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02229	NOORDIN MOHD TOP	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	0	JI	0	0	JI	JI	JI	JI	TQJ	AQ	TQJ ; Plbg	JI	TQJ	x
Ag02230	KANG JAJA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	JI	0	0	x	JI	x	x	x	JI	x	0
Ag02231	NURUDIN	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02232	IWAN/ROIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	JI	x	x	x	JI	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02233	MIA IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02234	USTADZ HERI HAFIDZIN	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02235	ASEP/DARWIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	JI	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02236	DIDIN RAIDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02237	SARKONI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02238	HARIS (FATHER OF UYOK)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02239	HENRI GOLUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02240	APUY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02241	UYOK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02242	FATHURROBI/ HARUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02243	OMAN ROCHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	0	0	0	0	0
Ag02244	HASAN (JI)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02245	GEMPUR BUDI ANGKORO	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	JI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	JI	TQJ	0	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02246	CHANDRA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02247	MOHAMED IKHWAN	x	x	x	0	0	JI	JI	JI	JI	0	JI	x	x	x	0	JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02248	SURAMTO	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	JI	0	0	x	x	0	0	0	0	JI	x	x	JI	x	x	0
Ag02249	IRUN HIDAYAT	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02251	MOHAMED RAIS	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	JI	JI	0	JI	0	x	JI	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02252	TONI TOGAR	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02253	RIAU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02254	MASRIZAL BIN ALI UMAR	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	JI	0	0	x	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02255	SARDONA SILIWANGI	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	JI	0	0	x	x	0	0	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02256	MOHAMED IHSAN	x	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ; JI	JI	AQ; JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02257	ASMAR LATIN SANI	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02258	ABU DUJANA	AQ	x	IG	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02259	QOTADAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	JI	0	0	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02260	SEF/FAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	JI	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02261	SON HADI	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	JI	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02262	KHUMAIDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02263	HENRI SIGU SAMBOJA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02264	ACHMAD HASAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02265	ADUNG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02266	SYAIFUDDIN UMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02267	BAGUS BUDI PRANOTO	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	JI	0	0	TQJ ; Plbg	JI	TQJ	x
Ag02268	LUFTI HAIDAROH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	x	0	0	0	JI	JI	x	0	JI	JI	0	0
Ag02269	HERI/UMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02270	MUNFIATUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02271	SAPTONO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02272	WIWIT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02273	AWAL PURNOMO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02274	AGUS AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02275	ROSIHIN NOOR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02276	IWAN SAJAI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02277	LIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02278	ENGKOS KOSASIH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02279	BAHARUDIN SOLEH	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	JI	TQJ	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02280	DIDI/RIJUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02281	KOMARUDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02282	HERNIANTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02283	MAKAFRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02284	MOH NAJIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02285	HERLAMBANG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02286	SAIFUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02287	WIBOWO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02288	MUSAFAK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02289	ABDULLAH SUNATA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	JI	JI	JI	0	JI	0	x	0	x	0	0
Ag02290	ABDUL MALIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02291	ACENG KURINA	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02292	ALI ZEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02293	ABDUL ROHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02294	PURNAMA PURTA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02295	ENCENG KURINA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	x	x	x	0	JI	0	x	x	0	0	0
Ag02296	HARI KUNCORO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	(MI LF)	JI; (MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02297	UMAR PATEK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	AS G	x	JI	x	ASG	x
Ag02298	HILMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02299	UMAR (WAIMURAT CAMP)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02300	ALI (WAIMURAT CAMP)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02301	SALMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02302	MOHAMED SAIFUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02303	DANI CHANDRA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02304	IQBAL HUSEINI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02305	IMAM BUKHORI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02306	JOKO HARUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02307	SALIK FIRDAUS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02309	ABDUL AZIZ (PEKALONGAN)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02310	MISRO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02311	SUBUR SUGIARTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02312	ANIF SOLCHANUDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02313	AIP HIDAYAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02315	JUNAEDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02316	MAKMURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02317	EKO HADI PRASETYO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02318	PURYANTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02319	FIRMANSYAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02320	HAMZA BAYA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02321	MUJAROT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02322	SIROJUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02323	IMAN SUSANTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02324	MASYKUR ABDUL KADIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02325	SUKASTOPO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02326	SOFYAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02327	ILHAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02328	BAHARUDIN LATIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag02329	SAIFUDDIN ZUHRI	0	0	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	Plbg	x	TQJ	x
Ag02330	ARINA RAHMAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	0	x
Ag02332	ANI SUGANDI	0	0	0	EIJ	0	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	Plbg	x	x	x	x
Ag02333	ABDUR ROHIM BIN THOYIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02334	ZARKASIH	0	0	0	EIJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02335	ALI MASYHUDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	Plbg	Plbg	0	x	x
Ag02336	MOHAMED HASSAN BIN SAYNUDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	JI	0	0	x	Plbg	Plbg	0	x	x
Ag02337	TAUFIK AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02338	SAYUTI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02339	ABDURRAHMAN TAIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	Plbg	Plbg	0	x	x
Ag02340	SUKARSO ABDILLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	Plbg	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02341	HELMI HANAFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02342	YUDO HASTOYO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02343	AGUSTIWARMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	Plbg	Plbg	0	x	x
Ag02344	HERI PURWANTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Plbg	Plbg	0	x	x
Ag02345	SUGIARTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Plbg	Plbg	0	x	x
Ag02346	WAHYUDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	Plbg	Plbg	0	x	x
Ag02347	SULTHON QOLBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LJ	JI	JI	JI	0	0	0	Plbg	Plbg	x	x	x
Ag02348	YOSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Plbg	x	x	x	x
Ag02349	OLOAN MARTUA HARAHAP	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Plbg	x	x	x	x
Ag02350	TIMOTIUS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Plbg	x	x	x	x
Ag02351	IWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Plbg	x	x	x	x
Ag02352	KI AGUS MUHAMMAD TONI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Plbg	Plbg	0	x	x
Ag02353	IBROHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	TQJ	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02354	AMIR IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag02355	AIR SETYAWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag02356	EKO JOKO SARJONO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag02357	DANI DWI PERTAMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	TQJ	x
Ag02358	NANA IKHWAN MAULANA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag02359	SYAIFUDIN JAELANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	TQJ	x
Ag02360	MUJAHRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag02361	IWAN HERDIANSYAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag02362	ALI MUHAMMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag02363	MOHAMAD SJAHRIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag02364	MISTAM HUSAMUDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Plbg	x	TQJ	x
Ag02365	MOHAMAD JIBRIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag02366	UMAR BURHANUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02367	RINA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x
Ag02368	PARMIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	x	0	0	0	0	x	JI	x	x	JI	x	x
Ag02369	AHMAD JAELANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02370	SUCIHANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02371	ERY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02372	AHMAD ISROFIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02373	ABU MUHAMMAD AL-MAQDISI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02374	NIKO/JUNDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	JI	x	x	0
Ag02375	HASAN NOOR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	0
Ag02376	SIBGHO/MUS'AB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x
Ag02377	ISMET KAKIKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0
Ag02378	KAMALUDIN BIN KHASAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	JI	JI	x	x
Ag02379	GEMA AWAL RAMADHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02380	HALAWI MAKMUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02381	YUDI ZULFAHRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	0	0
Ag02382	MOH. SOFYAN TSAURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	JI	JI	0	0
Ag02383	ABU NUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02384	TGK. AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02385	ALI ARAFAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02386	TGK. MUSLIM ATTAHIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x
Ag02387	MUCHTAR IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x
Ag02388	TAUFIK MARZUKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0
Ag02389	AZWANI/ABU MATANG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0
Ag02390	AZWAR/ABU RECONG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0
Ag02391	MUNIR/ABU RIMBA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0
Ag02392	MUHSIN/IMAM MUDA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02393	MUHIBUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0
Ag02394	MUKHLIS (SOFYAN'S TRAINEE)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0
Ag02395	MUHAMMAD TOAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag02396	AHMAD SAYID MAULANA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	0	x
Ag02397	JOKO SULISTYO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	0	0
Ag02398	AULIA SYAHIDAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02399	MASYKUR RAHMAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02400	BAYU SENO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02401	PANDU WICAKSONO WIDYANPUTRO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02402	YUSUF ARIFIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02403	ALI FROM ACEH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02404	USMAN/GITO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02405	ENAL TA'O	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	JI	0	0

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02406	ILYAS (GAM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02407	RASYID RIDHO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02408	AFIF ABDUL MAJID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02409	MUSTAQIM MUZAYYIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02410	HARIS AMIR FALAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0
Ag02411	HARIYADI USMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0
Ag02412	SYARIF USMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0
Ag02413	SUMARNO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02414	MOHAMED AMIN MUSA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02415	SILVESTER TENDEAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02416	YAHYA GOBA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02417	SAHIM ALWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02418	SHAFAL MOSED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02419	YASEIN TAHER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02420	FAYSAL GALAB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02421	JABER ELBANEH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	0	x	AQ AP	x	x	x	0
Ag02422	MUKTAR AL-BAKRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02423	MOHAMMED ALBANNA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02424	KAMAL DERWISH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02425	ABU ALI AL-HARITHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02426	MOHAMED HAMDI AL-AHDAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02427	BANDAR BIN ABDURRAHMAN AL-GHAMDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02428	AHMED BILAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02429	MUHAMMAD BILAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02430	PATRICE LUMUMBA FORD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02431	JEFFREY BATTLE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02432	HABIS AL SAOUB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02433	KHALED ALI STEITIYE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02434	MAHER HAWASH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02435	OCTOBER LEWIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02436	JUMA AL-DOSARI	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02437	BINYAM AHMED MUHAMMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (Tal)	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02438	ADHAM AMIN HASSOUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	EIJ	EIJ	0	RSBM	RSBM	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02439	MOHAMED HESHAM YOUSSEF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	EIJ	0	0	AQ	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02440	KIFAH WAEL JAYYOUSI	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02441	KASSEM DAHER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	EIJ	EIJ	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02443	ALI AL-TIMMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	LeT	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02444	MASOUD KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02445	RANDALL ROYER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	0	LeT	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02446	YONG KWON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	LeT	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02447	MUHAMMAD AATIQUE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02448	KHWAJA HASAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02449	DONALD SURRATT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02450	HAMMAD ABDUR-RAHEEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	LeT	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02451	CALIPH ABDUR-RAHEEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	LeT	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02452	SEIFULLAH CHAPMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	LeT	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02453	NURADIN M. ABDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02454	JAMES ELSHAFAY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02455	SHAHWAR MARTIN SIRAJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02456	YASSIN MUHIDDIN AREF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02457	MOHAMMED MOSHARREF HOSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02458	KEVIN JAMES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	JIS	JIS	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02459	LEVAR WASHINGTON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JIS	JIS	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02460	GREGORY PATTERSON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JIS	JIS	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02461	HAMMAD SAMANA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JIS	JIS	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02462	MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02463	SHANNEN ROSSMILLER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02464	SYED HARIS AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02465	EHSANUL ISLAM SADEQUEE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02466	FAHIM AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02467	AZDI ORNANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02468	AABID HUSSEIN KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02469	ZUBAIR AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02470	MIRSAD BEKTASEVIC	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02471	NARSEAL BATISTE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	SoD	SoD	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02472	PATRICK ABRAHAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	SoD	SoD	x	x	x	x
Ag02473	STANLEY GRANT PHANOR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	SoD	SoD	x	x	x	x
Ag02474	NAUDIMAR HERRERA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	SoD	SoD	x	x	x	x
Ag02475	BURSON AUGUSTIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	SoD	SoD	x	x	x	x
Ag02476	ROTHSCHILD AUGUSTINE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	SoD	SoD	x	x	x	x
Ag02477	LYGLENSON LEMORIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	SoD	SoD	x	x	x	x
Ag02478	ASSAD SARWAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x
Ag02479	ABDULLA AHMED ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x
Ag02480	TANVIR HUSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x
Ag02481	ARAFAT KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x
Ag02482	IBRAHIM SAVANT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x
Ag02483	WAHEED ZAMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x
Ag02484	UMAR ISLAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02485	DONALD STEWART-WHYTE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x
Ag02486	MOHAMMED GULZAR	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	x
Ag02487	MUKTAR SAID IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02488	RASHID RAUF	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	AQ	0	AQ	x	x
Ag02489	RAMZI MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02490	ADEL YAHYA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02491	MANFO ASIEDU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02492	ABDUL SHERIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02493	SIRAJ ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02494	MUHEDIN ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02495	YESHIEMBERT GIRMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02496	WAHBI MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02497	ISMIL ABDURAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02498	ABDULLAH EL-FAISAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQIM	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02499	ESAYAS GIRMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02500	MULUMEBET GIRMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02501	MOHAMED KABASHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02502	ABDUL MUHAMMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x
Ag02503	ADIS MEDUNJANIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	0
Ag02504	ZAREIN AHMEDZAY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	0
Ag02505	ALI SALEH KAHLAH AL-MARRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02506	JEHAD SERWAN MOSTAFA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02507	AMINA FARAH ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02508	HAWO MOHAMED HASSAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02509	MOHAMUD ABDI YUSUF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x
Ag02510	DUANE MOHAMED DIRIYE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02511	ABDI MAHDI HUSSEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x
Ag02512	SHEIKH SAAID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02513	ABID NASSER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x
Ag02514	TARIQ UR REHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag02515	SALEH AL-SOMALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x
Ag02517	ADEN HASHI AYROW	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	0	0	AQ	Shbb	Shbb	x	x
Ag02518	MOHAMED IBRAHIM AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag02519	MOHAMAD SHNEWER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x
Ag02520	DRITAN DUKA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x
Ag02521	ELJVIR DUKA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x
Ag02522	SHAIN DUKA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x
Ag02523	SERDAR TATAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x
Ag02524	AGRON ABDULLAHU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02525	ZENAB ARMANDPISHEH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02526	OMAR BAKRI MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02527	ABU MUNTHIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02528	ZABI UL-TAIFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag02529	RUSSELL DEFREITAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JAM	JAM	x	x	x
Ag02530	KAREEM IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JAM	x	x	x
Ag02531	ABDUL KADIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JAM	x	x	x
Ag02532	ABDEL NUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JAM	x	x	x
Ag02533	ABU BAKR (JAM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JAM	x	x	x
Ag02534	SHEIK MOHAMED ABDIRAHMAN KARIYE	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02535	IBRAHIM AL-HAMDI (LET)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	LeT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02536	MICHAEL C. FINTON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x
Ag02537	HOSAM MAHER HUSEIN SMADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02538	BRYANT NEAL VINAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ; HUJI; Raw-9	x	x
Ag02539	RAJA LAHRASIB KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	HUJI	HUJI	HUJI	AQ; HUJI	HUJI	AQ; HUJI	HUJI	HUJI	AQ	AQ	AQ; HUJI
Ag02540	KHALID ALI-M ALDAWSARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02541	SYED HASHMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02542	HAMID HAYAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02543	UMER HAYAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02544	KHALID OUAZZANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02545	AHMED OMAR ABU ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02546	FAROOQUE AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02547	CHRISTOPHER PAUL	x	x	0	EIJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02548	KHALIFA LNU	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02549	RAHMAT ABDUL HIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02550	MINAH BINTI AOGIS ABD AZIZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02551	ABDUL BASIT USMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	ASG ; JI	x	AQ; JI; (MILF)	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	ASG
Ag02552	MOHAMMED ABDULLAH WARSAME	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(Tal)	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02553	AHMED FARAZ KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag02554	FATUMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02555	MUKHTAR ROOBOW ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	Shbb	x	x	x
Ag02556	HARUNI BAMUSA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02557	HASSAN SAID OMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02558	MOHAMED MWAKUZA KUZA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	AQ	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02559	HALIMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02560	SAUDA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02561	SAMIR SAID SLAIM BA'AMIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02562	MOHAMED ALI 'ISSE YUSUF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02563	IBRAHIM "AL-AFGHANI"	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02564	JAAMA ALI ISMA'IL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02565	DA'UD SALA IIDLE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02566	FARHAN ABDULLE MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02567	HALIMA ABDI ISSA YUSUF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02568	YAYAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag02569	ABDUL RASYID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02570	CHANDRA NASRULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02571	NIK ADLI BIN NIK AZIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02572	TAMZIL LINRUNG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02573	ABU FATAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02574	SALIMULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02575	TASRIFAH KHUSUSIATI	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02576	FURQON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02577	MAHMUD (JI - BATAM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02578	TARMIZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02579	MUKTIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02580	SUKRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02581	NASRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02582	ALI FAUZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02583	YASIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	ASG ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02584	IFANA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02585	UMAR KECIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02586	MURTAJAB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02587	HALIMAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02588	HJ AFIAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02589	HM KOZIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02590	JARAF SHODIQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02591	AMIN JABIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02592	TAFISR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02593	TASRIFAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02594	SUMIAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02595	NAIMAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02596	H NUR HASYIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02597	HJ TARIYEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02598	SITI ROHMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02599	JULIA MAHENDRA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02600	ASTUTI	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02601	KHOIRIANA KHUSUSIATI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02602	HAULA BINTI AMROZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02603	BILAL/SAEED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	x	x	x
Ag02604	AITEZAZ SHAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	0	x	x
Ag02605	SHER ZEHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	x	x	x
Ag02606	HUSNAIN GUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	0	x	x
Ag02607	MOHAMAD RAFAQAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	0	x	x
Ag02608	RASHEED AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	x	x	x
Ag02609	NASRULLAH ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	x	x	x
Ag02610	BAITULLAH MEHSUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	TTP	AQ; TTP	TTP	x
Ag02611	MAULVI SAHIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02612	BRIGADIER EJZA SHAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02613	NAZIR (MUMBAI ATTACK)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02614	SHOAIB (MUMBAI ATTACK)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02616	JAVED (MUMBAI ATTACKS)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02617	IMRAN BABAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02618	MAHMOUD MOHAMMED BAHAZIQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02620	HAFIZ ARSHAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02621	ABDEL REHMAN CHHOTA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02622	FAHAD ULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02623	NASER (MUMBAI ATTACKS)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02626	ABU MUFTI SAEED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02627	ABU ABDURREHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02628	ABU MAAVIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02629	ABU ANIS (LET)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02630	ABU BASHIR (LET)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02631	ABU HANJLA PATHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02632	ABU SARIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02633	ABU SAIF-UR-REHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02634	ABU IMRAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02635	HAKIM SAHEB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02636	KAAHFA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02637	SHAHID GHAFOOR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02638	TAHAWWUR HUSSAIN RANA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	LeT	AQ	x
Ag02639	ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; LeT	AQ	x
Ag02640	MAJOR HAROON ASIQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x
Ag02641	ABU YAHYA AL-LIBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	TTP	AQ	0	0
Ag02642	BURHANUDDIN RABBANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02653	AL-HAJ MURAD EBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	(MILF)	x	(MILF)	x	x	x	x	x	(MILF)	x
Ag02654	BENJIE MIDTIMBANG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02655	JOHN MACK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02656	ABDULLAH MACAAPAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02657	ALIM ABDULAZIZ MIMBANTAS	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02658	GHAZALI JAFAAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag02659	SHEIKH OMAR PASIGAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02660	SAMIR HASHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02661	SOLAMAIN PANGALIAN	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	JI	0	0	0	ASG ; JI; (MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x
Ag02662	OKASHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02663	NASRULLAH (JI)	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02664	ILYAS/HANIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02665	SAID (JI)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02666	ANWAR (JI)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02667	ABDURROHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02668	MUSTHOFA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02669	MUADZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02670	HAZAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02671	IBU SIRIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02672	ZUBEIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02673	ABU FARHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02674	ZAID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02675	HUDAIFAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02676	MACAANGCOS MIMBANTAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02677	AMIR PAUTE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02678	ZAINAL PAX	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02679	SALMAN MORO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02680	USTADZ SAID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02681	OSAMA ARA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02682	MOHAMMAD GUINDOLONGAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02683	JULKIPLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02684	HAMDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02685	NOOR MOHAMMAD UMUG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02686	HAJI AKHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02687	SULAIMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02688	HADJI ABDUL SASAMU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02689	USTADZ BAEM SAMUYA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02690	NASRUDDIN SULYANG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02691	ESMAEL AKMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MILF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02692	TOHAMI BAGUNDANG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MILF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02693	ESMAEL MAMALANGKAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MILF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02694	IDAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02695	JIMMY BALULAO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02696	GUINDATU MAMINTAL DULANG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02697	NASRUDDIN IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02698	DONGDONG PIDTUKASAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02699	REX MOHIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02700	MORI ALI USMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02701	TONG ABBAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02702	BILAL ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02703	SHEIKH AMAD AL-KUBAISI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02704	SABEEL AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x
Ag02705	KAFEEL AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x
Ag02706	MOHAMMED HANEEF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02707	MOHAMMED ASHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02708	ADAM KHATIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02709	COSSAR ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02800	MEHRAN HUSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x
Ag02801	MOHAMMED AL GHABRA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x
Ag02802	SADIQ SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	LeT	x	LeT	x	LeT	LeT	LeT	LeT	x	x
Ag02804	AMIR RAZA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x	LeT	LeT	x	x	x
Ag02805	ABU RASHID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag02806	AFZAL USMANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	LeT	LeT	LeT	x	x
Ag02807	ARIF SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	LeT	LeT	LeT	x	x
Ag02808	MOHAMMED ZAKIR SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	LeT	LeT	LeT	x	x
Ag02809	MOHAMMED ANSAR SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	LeT	LeT	LeT	x	x
Ag02811	ROSHAN KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	LeT	LeT	LeT	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02812	AMEER RAZAQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	LeT	LeT	LeT	x	x
Ag02813	ASIF RAZAQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02814	ATIF AMEEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	LeT	LeT	LeT	LeT	x	x
Ag02815	RIYAZ BHATKAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	LeT	LeT	LeT	x	0
Ag02816	ABDUS SUBHAN QURESHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	LeT	x	x	x	LeT	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag02817	FAISAL SHAIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	0	AQ	LeT	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag02818	MAULANA ABDUL HALIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HUJI	HUJI	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02819	SAMEER SADIQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02820	MUFTI ABU BASHAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02821	MOHAMMED SAIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	x
Ag02822	MOHAMMED ZEESHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	x
Ag02823	SAQIB NISAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02824	MOHAMMED SHAKEEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02825	ZIA-UR-REHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02826	MUJAHID SALIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02827	RASOOL KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02828	MAULANA NASEERUDIN NASIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02829	ANAS AL KANDARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02830	ABDUL RAHMAN JABARAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02831	AHMED SAHAGI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02832	ANWAR AL-AWLAKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	0	LeT	0	AQ AP	AQ AP	AQ AP
Ag02833	NASSER AL-AULAQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02835	AHMED MUHAMMED DHAKANE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x
Ag02836	ADANI LNU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02837	MOHAMMED EREG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02838	ABDRIZAK LNU	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02839	HASSAN YARE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag02840	ABDELLAH BENYAICH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02841	AQEEL ABDUL-AZIZ AI'AQEEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02842	SALEH ABDULLAH KAMEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02843	OMAR ABDULLAH KAMEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02844	ADEL ABDUL JALIL BATTERJEE	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02845	SULAIMAN ABDULAZIZ AL-RAJHI	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02846	SALEH ABDULAZAIA AL-RAJHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02847	KHALID BIN MAHFOUZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02848	KALEDA BIN MAHFOUZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02849	YOUSSEF NADA	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02850	ALI GHALIB HIMMAT	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02851	YOUSSEF AL-QARDAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02852	ABDEL FATTAH ABU GHADDA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02853	AHMED HUBER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02854	AHMED NASREDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02855	SOLIMAN AL-BUTHE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02856	PIROUZ SEDAGHATY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02857	MARAT AVLARIGOV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSBM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02858	CHAMSOUDIN AVLARIGOV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02859	MUNIB ZAHARIGAC	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02860	HAROUN ABED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02861	MUBARAK HAMED	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	x
Ag02862	AHMED MUSTAFA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02863	KHALID AL-SUDANEE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02864	MARK DELI SILJANDER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02865	ABDEL AZIM EL-SIDDIG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02866	RABIH HADDAD	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	AQ	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02867	KHALED SMAILI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02868	USAMA HAMDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(HAM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02869	HAYTHAM MAGHAWRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(HAM)	(HAM)	(HAM)	x	x	(HAM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02870	MOHAMMED EL-MEZAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(HAM)	(HAM)	(HAM)	x	0	(HAM)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02871	MOHAMMED IBRAHIM SULAIMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02872	JAFFAR AHMAD ABDULLAH MAKKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02873	ABDUL AZIZ ABBAKAR MUHAMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02874	KHALID AHMAD JUMAH AL-SUDANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02875	IBRAHIM BUISIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02876	AHMED SANTOS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	RSM	ASG	ASG	RSM	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02877	ABU HAMZA ABU HAMID AL-LUZONI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02878	HANNAH SANTOS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02879	NURUMIJA AMDAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02880	MURSIDI BALAO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02881	ISMAEL IDIRIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02882	MALIK MIMUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02883	ANNE ANOVER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02884	BODOT ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02885	RUBEN OMAR LAVILLA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	ASG	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02886	REDENDO CAIN DELLOSA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	ASG	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02887	YUSUF LEDESMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	RSM	ASG	ASG	RSM	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02889	JAINAL ANTEL SALI, JR.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	ASG	0	ASG	0	ASG; JI	x	x	x
Ag02890	MOHAMMAD BARRIENTOS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02891	ANGELO RAMIREZ TRINIDAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02892	PIO ABOGNE DE VERA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02893	FELICIANO SEMBORIO DELOS REYES, JR.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02894	RICARDO PEREZ AYERAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02895	DINNO AMOR ROSALEJOS PAREJA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	RSM	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02896	ISNILON HAPILON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02897	RADULAN SAHIRON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	ASG	x	0	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	ASG
Ag02898	CHHOTA SAJID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02899	RIYAZ ISMAIL SHAHBANDRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02900	DR SHAHNAWAZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	0
Ag02901	ASADULLAH AKHTAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02902	RAHIL SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	LeT	LeT	x	0	x	x
Ag02903	AHAD SABET	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02904	FARUQ AL-TUNISI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02905	FAISAL SHAHZAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	AQ	TTP
Ag02906	HAKIMULLAH MEHSUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	TTP	TTP	TTP
Ag02907	HUMAM KHALIL ABU MULAL AL-BALAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	x
Ag02908	ABDELRAZZAK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02909	MOSOUD ELBARA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQIM	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02910	ASIF CHUTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02911	MUFTI OBAID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02912	MUHAMMAD ALI MEMON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02913	ARIFA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02914	HABIBA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02915	JUMA NAMANGANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	(Tal)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02916	SHERALY AKBOTOEV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02917	ABDUL QAHAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02918	HUSSAIN (IMU)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02919	MOHAMMED KHALID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02920	ABDUL AZIZ AL-GHAMDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSBM	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02921	NURPASHI KULAYEV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSBM	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02922	IZNAUR KODZOYEV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSBM	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02923	MAGOMED AUSHEV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSBM	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02924	VLADIMIR KHODOV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSBM	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02925	KHANPASHI KULAYEV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSBM	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02926	ARSEN MERZHOYEV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSBM	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02927	MAIRBEK SHAIBEKKHANOV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	RSBM	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02928	ABU UMAR (LET)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02929	ABU QASIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02930	SHAFAQAT IQBAL MIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02931	SHABBIR AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag02932	DAWOOD IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02933	ABDUL KARIM TUNDA	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	x	0	0
Ag02934	SAJID MIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02935	COLONEL R SADATULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02936	MAJOR GENERAL SAHAB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag02937	MOHD ALTAF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02938	MOHD ABDU MATIN ABDUL BASIT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02939	SHEIKH MOHD MUZZAMIL JAMIL AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02940	ZAHIR AHMED BASHIR AHMED SHAIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02941	SAYED KHWAJA YUNUS KHWAJA AYUB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02942	IRFAN REHMAN KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02943	MOHAMED HAMID (ENGLAND)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02944	KIBLEY DA COSTA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02945	MUHAMMAD AL-FIGARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02946	KADAR AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02947	MOUSSA BROWN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02948	SALOUM JOH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag02949	SALEH AL QUUWAYE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02950	ZAID AL AMER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02951	EMAD ELMUBARAK Y ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02952	HASH MI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02953	MOHAMMAD ANEES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02954	ABDUL KAREEM JASSIM BIDAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02955	HALEEM JASSIM BIDAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02956	JAMAAL JALOUD Y HATO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02957	IBRAHIM ABID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02958	NAJIM NASSER Y TAHER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02959	COMMANDER ROBOT	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	0	0	x	AS G	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02960	HECTOR JANJALANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	ASG ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02961	JULISAM HARUM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02962	ABDUL MARAYIN	x	x	x	ASG	ASG ; IG	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02963	ABDULHAKIM EDRIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02964	USTAJ AHMAN HALIFA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02965	HUSIN SAMIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	ASG	x	ASG	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02966	FAWAZ ZI AJJUR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02967	ALBADER PARAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AS G; JI	ASG ; JI	ASG	AS G
Ag02969	JUL AKRAM HADJAIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02970	ARULA ABUBAKAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02971	MUJIB SUSUKAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02972	BROTHER OF MUJIB SUSUKAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02973	LAKANDULA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02974	BEN ISMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02975	LANDASAN UMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02976	ITING AGA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02977	HASHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02978	USTADZ UMBRA JUMDAIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG; JI	ASG; JI	ASG	ASG
Ag02979	MUHAMMAD AMIN AJIJON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02980	COMMANDER GLOBAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02981	ALTON LADJAALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02982	KEFFREY JINNUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02983	AJID HALIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02984	HAMDA SAMAC	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02985	COMMANDER KOSOVO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	ASG	ASG	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02986	HAFTI DAIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02987	SALIP ABDULLAH MASDAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	ASG	ASG	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02988	MADHATTA HAIPE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag02989	JATIB USMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02990	PULAH ALIH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02991	FAIZAL MUTIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02992	ALDREN AMIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02993	USTADZ SALIM TADO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02994	PULA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag02995	NUR HASSAN JAMIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag02996	REYNALDO APILADO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02997	HTIMIL HARON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02998	ALLAN SABUDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag02999	MUAMAR ASTALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03000	ADONG SALAHUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03001	JEROME MUSTAKIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03002	BURRONG RASUL BARRO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03003	MUJIBAR ALIH AMON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03004	BASARUN AROK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG
Ag03005	JUMADAIL ARAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03006	KARIM JULDANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03007	ALBASHIR ADJILI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03008	ROWENA AKSAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03009	NURSIMA ANNUDDEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03010	RABIA ASIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03011	MARWINA SALASAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03012	MADRIMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03013	MIDSFAR AKSAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03014	ALVIN BAGADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03015	ALHASBY MISAYA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03016	MUBIN SAKANDAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03017	TING JUMDAEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03018	MAGDAR JUMDAEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03019	ARMINDA JUMDAEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03020	DARUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03021	SALLAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03022	JULMILLUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03023	SADDAM PARAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03024	MUNIR ARBISON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03025	COCOY TULAWIE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03026	MOAMIL ASKALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03027	JULHAN ALIHUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03028	SULAIMAN MUIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03029	HADJI NAHRIM AKMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03030	YASIR IGASAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x
Ag03031	MARCIAL JABAROT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x
Ag03032	NADZMIR AMIRUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x
Ag03033	JAITUN TIMUAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag03034	COMMANDER KIRRIH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03035	TETENG MANDANGAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag03036	JANATIN MADJAKIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG ; JI	AS G	x	x	x
Ag03037	NURHASSAN JAMIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AS G	x	x	x
Ag03038	COMMANDER TOTO SANTAWAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03039	HAJAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03040	COMMANDER JAVIER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03041	HAMSIRAJI MARUSI SALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03042	ALDAM TILAO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03043	SHAMSUL BAHARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03044	AHMAD HASAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03045	IWAN MUTHO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03046	MOHAMMAD CHOLILY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03047	DWI WIDYARTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03048	ALIAS OSMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03049	ANSORI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03050	ACHMAD BASIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03051	BUDI DARMAWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03052	TEDI SURYA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag03053	AHMED MAAZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03054	MUHAMMAD RAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03055	AMIN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03056	AKHWAN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03057	FIRDOUS (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03058	MOHAMMAD SYAIFUDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03059	ILHAM SOFYANDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03060	FURQON ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03061	DAOUD (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03062	ANWAR (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03063	MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN MOHAMED YUNOS	x	x	x	x	x	JI	JI	JI	JI	0	JI	JI	AQ	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03064	ACHMAD KANDAI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03065	NATSIR/RISTAN	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03066	DATUK RAJO AMEH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03067	BASIT USMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03068	GUIDAY MUNTASIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03069	RICO ABURVA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03070	IMAM LAMAI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03071	ABDUL SAKIM SALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03072	AL POZE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03073	JOLING	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03074	ELMER AMBRAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03075	USTADZ USMAN COLANO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03076	JAYBE OFRASIO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03077	ROHMAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03078	ALI AL-KHUDAIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03079	AHMAD AL-KHALIDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03080	NASSER AL-FAHD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03081	KAHLED JEHANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03082	ZUBAYR AL-RIMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03083	YOSIF SALIH FAHD ALA'YEERI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03084	ABDULLAH BIN IBRAHIM ALSHABRAMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03085	YUSUF ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03086	HILAL JABER EL ASSIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03087	AHMED ELMOULLA BILLAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03089	JAMILUDDIN NASIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	ARC F	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03090	SADAQAT KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	ARC F	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	0	x
Ag03091	REHAN ALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ARC F	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03092	MUSHARRAT HUSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ARC F	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03093	HUSRAT ALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ARC F	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03094	SHAKIB AKHTAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ARC F	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03095	ADIL HASSAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ARC F	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03096	MOHAMMED SABIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	ARC F	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03097	RAJENDRA VRAJLAL ANADKAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03098	SHEIKH OBAIDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03099	IDRIS MOHAMMAD ZAHID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ARC F	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03100	ABDUL KAREEM MOOSA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03101	NOOR ABU ILAHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03102	WALID JINNAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03103	MAHFOOZ ALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03104	DAWOOD ALI AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03105	EZAZ AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03106	JAMIR SHAYKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	LeT	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag03107	SOHAIL SHAYKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	LeT	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag03108	TANVIR ANSARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	LeT	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag03109	ABED AWAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	FaI	x	x
Ag03110	FIROZ LATIF GHASWALA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03111	MOHAMMED IQBAL (LET)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03112	MOHAMMED ALI CHHIPA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03113	ASIF ABDUL KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag03114	NOMAN SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03115	ABU HURERA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag03116	RIZWAN DAWRE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03117	MUZAMMIL SHAIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag03118	EHTESHAM SIDDIQUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag03119	FAIYAZ KAGZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	x	x	x	0
Ag03120	MOHAMMED NAVED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag03121	KAMALUDDIN ANSARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag03122	ABU UMAID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag03123	SALIM (LET)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag03124	MANISHA CHAVAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03125	ZAMEER SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03126	MIRZA HIMAYAT INAYAT BAIG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0
Ag03127	LAL BABA MOHAMMED HUSSAIN FAREED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03128	MOHAMMAD AHMED ZARAR SIDDIBAPPA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03129	MOHSIN CHAUDHARY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03130	IKRAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	x	x	x
Ag03131	ABOUSFIAN ABDELRAZIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03132	AHMED ABDI AW-MOHAMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag03133	AHMAD ROFIQ RIDHO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	TQJ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03134	JOKO TRI PRIYANTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03135	MUSTAGHFIRIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03136	SOLAHUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03137	FADLI SADAMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03138	AYMAN AL-BALAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03139	MARUTO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag03140	SUSILO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03141	PUTRI MUNAROH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TQJ	x
Ag03142	HAWIN MURTADLO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag03143	MOHAMMED AZAM GHAURI	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03144	ABU ABDALLAH AL-SHAMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x
Ag03145	ABU NASIR AL-QAHTANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03146	MUHAMMAD AHMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03147	ABDALLAH AL-SADIQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag03148	KHALID AL-SHARIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag03149	ABU-AL-MUNDHIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03150	SHAYKH MIFTAH AL-DUWWADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03151	ABD-AL-WAHAB QAYID IDRIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03152	MUSTAFA QANFID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03153	IBN AL-SHAYKH AL-LIBI	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03154	ABU LAITH AL-LIBI	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x
Ag03155	UMBRA KATO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MILF)	0	0
Ag03156	SALIP ALOY ALSREE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03157	LATIP JAMAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03158	NASSER MACABATO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03159	IMAM ABUBAKAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03160	WANING ABDUSALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0
Ag03161	SAIDAMEN ALICK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03162	ADZMIE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03163	ABUNAWAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03164	ABDULRAHMAN MACAPAAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MILF)	0	x
Ag03165	PLATON BLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x
Ag03166	KULE MAMAGONG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI; (MILF)	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03167	DAUD SARIP	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI; (MI LF)	x	x	x	x
Ag03168	BIZNAR SALAHUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI; (MI LF)	x	x	x	x
Ag03169	ATTI LINTUNGAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI; (MI LF)	x	x	x	x
Ag03170	ZAHIDE ABDUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI; (MI LF)	x	x	x	x
Ag03171	USMAN AL MAJAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI; (MI LF)	x	x	x	x
Ag03172	KASANADEL PIGKAWALAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x
Ag03173	USI AMPATUAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x
Ag03174	NAYANG TIMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x
Ag03175	DATUKALAN MONTOK SAMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x
Ag03176	TUMALAO BUTUAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x
Ag03177	MANAMPAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(MI LF)	x	x
Ag03178	TOLNI SALIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03179	KUMANDER NASER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03180	BAY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03181	AKA KEDIE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag03182	WAHAB UPAO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag03183	MOHAMAD BAEHAQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	JI	x	0	x	x
Ag03184	ASNAN SAWAJAAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag03185	ABRAHAM IBNO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03186	ANSAR YUSOP	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03187	ABRAL ABDUSALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03188	GUINGONA SAMAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03189	SMAWTIN BASILAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x
Ag03190	EDGAR MALAYDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03191	ARIF QADIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag03192	SHADAAB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03193	SHEHZAAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag03194	SALMAN AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	LeT	x	0
Ag03195	ARIZ KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag03196	MOHAMMAD KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag03197	HAMID SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag03198	SHAHRUKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag03199	ABDUL SATTAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	0	x
Ag03200	QAYAMUDDIN KAPADIA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x
Ag03201	IQBAL BHATKAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03202	SALEH MUHAMMAD AL-AOOFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03203	ABDULAZIZ AL-MOQRIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03204	OMAR AHMED ABDULLAH ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03205	MIKAEL DAVUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	0

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03206	DAVID JAKOBSEN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0
Ag03207	SHAWAN SADEK SAEED BUJAK BUJAK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0
Ag03208	AHMAD/ISMAIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03209	ABI PAMANAY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03210	ABDULRAHMAN SAMUEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG
Ag03211	JOHER IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG
Ag03212	MUJAHID IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG
Ag03213	ABU TAHER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03214	ALSHEED ALLING ALBANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03215	ABDUL BAKI	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03216	BARAHAMA SALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03271	SHEIK MIYAR HAMZA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03272	FARDOSA ABDULLAHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03273	ASGHAR MUKADAM	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03274	SHAHNAWAZ QURESHI	x	x	x	x	EIJ	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03275	SHOAIB GHANSAR	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03276	ABDUL GANI TURK	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03277	YAKUB MEMON	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03278	ESSA MEMON	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03279	YUSUF MEMON	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03280	RUBINA MEMON	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03281	IBRAHIM (TIGER) MEMON	x	x	x	x	D-Com	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x
Ag03282	IMTIAZ GHAVTE	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03283	NASIM BARMARE	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03284	FAROOQ PAWLE	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03285	BASHIR KHAIRULLA	x	x	x	x	D-Com	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03286	ZAKIR HUSSAIN SHAIKH	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03287	FEROZ MALLIK	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03288	ABDUL AKHTAR KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03289	DAWOOD MOHAMMAD PHANSE	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03290	ANIS IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03291	NAIBUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03292	MOHAMMED SHARIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03293	AYUB MEMON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x
Ag03294	ANEES MEMON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x
Ag03295	TANVIR SHEIKH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03296	SANJAY KUMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03297	ABDUL JAVED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03298	ABU SALEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03299	IQBAL SHEIKH KASKAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03300	EZAZ PATHAN	x	x	x	x	x	D-Com	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03301	ATUL KANITAL SHAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03302	ASHOK BHANSALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03303	AFTAB BATKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03304	ABU JINDAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03305	AHMED SIDDIQUI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ; HUJI
Ag03306	SHAHAB DASHTI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; HUJI
Ag03307	RAMI MAKANESI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; HUJI
Ag03308	NAAMEN MEZICHE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ; HUJI
Ag03309	GAFUR JUMDAIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	ASG	ASG	0
Ag03310	NAIZ KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03311	ABU MUHAMMAD HAMZA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03312	SALEM SAAD BIN SUWEID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03313	YASIR FRIEHAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03314	MUHAMMAD DEMES	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03315	MUHAMMAD AMIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03316	ALI KHALED AL-JABOURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03317	MUHAMMAD HASSAN AL-SAMARAI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03318	UMAR BAZIYANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03319	MAHMOOD ABDEL AZIZ AL-HARAMI AL-JANABI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03320	FADHIL AL-KURDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (AQ I)	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03321	MARWAN HADID AL-SURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x
Ag03322	SAMI MUHAMMAD ALI SAID AL-JAAF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03323	HASAM HAMAD ABDULLAH MUHSIN AL-DULAIMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(AQ I)	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03324	HASSAN IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (AQ I)	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03325	ABU TALHA (IRAQ INSURGENCY)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(AQ I)	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03326	SABHAN AHMAD RAMADAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(AQ I)	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03327	AZMI AL-JAYOUSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03328	MOHAMMED SHARKAWA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(AQ I)	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03329	KHAMIS FARHAN KHALAF ABD AL-FAHDAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(AQ I)	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03330	ABU AZZAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(AQ I)	x	x
Ag03331	BILAL MAHMUD AWAD SHEBAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(AQ I)	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03332	ABU SUFIAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03333	SERGEI MALYSCHEW	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03334	MUHAMMAD G	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03335	MUHAMMAD WASFI	x	IG	x	x	x	BaI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03336	ABU MOHAMMED AL-MAQDISI	x	x	x	x	x	BaI	BaI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03337	HUTHAIFA AZZAM	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03338	SHEIK HARITH AL-DARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03339	ABDULLAH RASHID AL-BAGHDADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03340	ABU ABDUL-RAHMAN AL-IRAQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (AQ I)	x	x	x	x
Ag03341	ABU HAMZA AL-MUHAJER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03342	NASIR AL-WAHAYSHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP	AQ AP	AQ; AQ AP	AQ AP	AQ AP
Ag03343	QASSEM AL-REMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	AQ AP	AQ AP	x	AQ AP	AQ AP
Ag03344	SAID AL-SHEHRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; AQ AP	0	x
Ag03345	NASIR AL-BAHRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ; EIJ	AQ	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03346	MUHAMMAD HASSAN AL-SIHLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03347	ABDELRAHMAN AL-SIHLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03348	ABDULLAH AL-SIHLI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03349	MUHAMMAD HAMID HUSSEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03350	ALI HUSSEIN ALI AL-SHAMARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03351	RAWAD JASSEM MOHAMMED ABED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03352	SAFAA MOHAMMED ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03353	SAJIDA MUBARAK ATROUS AL-RISHAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03354	MUBARAK ATROUS AL-RISHAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03355	NIDAL HASAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP	AQ AP	x
Ag03356	AYED AL-SHABWANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP
Ag03358	SALEH AL-TEYS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP
Ag03359	IBRAHIM HASSAN AL-ASIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP	x	x	AQ AP	AQ AP
Ag03360	ABDULLAH AL-ASIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP	x	x	AQ AP	x
Ag03361	JABIR AL-FAYFI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	AQ AP
Ag03362	MIDHAT MURSI AL-SAYID UMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x
Ag03363	ABU MO. IBRAHIM BIN ABI AL-FARAJ AL-MASRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x
Ag03364	ABD AL-WAHAB AL-MASRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03365	ABU ISLAM AL-MASRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x
Ag03366	KHALID HABIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	HUJI; Raw-9	x	x
Ag03367	MAHMOUD MAHDI ZEIDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03368	TAYIP RAUF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag03369	MATIUR REHMAN	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ; (LeJ)	x	x	x	x
Ag03370	MAROOF RAUF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x
Ag03371	TAHIR MASOOD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03372	KUSHMIR NESIRWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	JI	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03373	ABDUL RAHIM AYUB	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	0	0	x	JI	0	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03374	ABDUL RAHMAN AYUB	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03375	RABIYAH HUTCHINSON	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03376	MUSTAFA HAMID	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	AQ; EIJ; (Tal)	x	AQ	AQ; (Tal)	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03377	AFIFA ROCHE	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03378	JOHN MUSA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03379	AZMAN HASHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	JI	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03380	JACK THOMAS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03381	MARYATI IDRIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03382	AISYAH BARAJA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03383	ZULFAH BASHIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03384	MOHAMMED AYUB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03385	ABDULLAH AYUB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03386	MUHAMMAD RAB'A AL-SA YID AL-BAHTIYTI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03387	ALI SALEH HUSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03388	AHMED KHADR	AQ	IG	IG	0	0	0	0	AQ; EIJ	EIJ	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03389	KHALID ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03390	OMAR KHADR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03391	ABDUL RAHMAN KHADR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03392	RAHMAH CHIEKHO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03393	KHALED CHIEKHO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03394	MAREK SAMULSKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03395	YOUNIS MOHAMMED IBRAHIM AL-HAYARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03396	SAUD AL-OTAIBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03397	OMAR BALADJAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03398	MOHAMED ALI ELOMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03399	MIRSAD MULAHALILOVIC	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03400	KHALED SHARROUF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03401	MAZEN TOUMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03402	MOUSTAFA CHEIKHO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	LeT	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03403	ABDUL RAKIB HASAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03404	ABDUL NACER BENBRIKA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03405	AHMED MEHRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03406	EZZIT RAAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03407	AIMEN JOUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03408	FADAL SAYADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03409	AMER JADDARA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03410	AHMED RAAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03411	SHANT KENT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03412	HANY TAHA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03413	MUSTAFA AYUB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03414	AMINAH AYUB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03415	UMNYA AL ZAWAHIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03416	HEBA AL ZAWAHIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03417	MOHAMMED AL ZAWAHIRI	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03418	HUSSEIN AL ZAWAHIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03419	KAMAL HABIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03420	AZZA NOWAIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03421	ISAM AL-QAMARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03422	KHALED ISLAMBOULI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03423	SAYYID IMAM	EIJ	AQ	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03424	FATIMA AL ZAWAHIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03425	NABILA AL ZAWAHIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03426	KHADIGA AL ZAWAHIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03427	UMAYMA AL ZAWAHIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03428	MOHAMMED BIN AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03429	AISHA AL ZAWAHIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03430	ISMAIL NASSIR	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03431	AHMAD SALAMA MABRUK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	EIJ	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03432	MAHMUD HISHAM AL-HENNAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03433	AHMAD IBRAHIM AL-NAGAR	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	EIJ	x	EIJ	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03434	AHMED ISMAIL	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03435	SARWAT SHEHATA	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03436	ADEL ABDEL QODDUS	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03437	HASSAN ZEMIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03438	ABDEL-GHANI ALI JAWHAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	FaI	x	x
Ag03439	TAREK MERHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	FaI	x	x
Ag03440	OSAMA AL-SHEHABI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	FaI	x	x
Ag03441	MOHAMMED SHAWKI ISLAMBOULI	0	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03442	ADNAN AL-SAYEGH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03443	OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN AL-GHAMDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0
Ag03444	FAHD SALEH SULAIMAN AL-JATILI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03445	MOHAMMAD AL-DUKHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	FaI	x	x
Ag03446	WAEL ABU JABER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	FaI	x	x
Ag03447	RACHMAT PUJIPRABOWO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03448	USMAN BIN SEF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03449	SABTURANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03450	KARIM KHADR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03451	ABU OBAIDAH AL-MASRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	AQ	x	0	x	x
Ag03452	MULLAH ABDUL RAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag03453	FAQIR MOHAMMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	TTP	AQ; TTP	TTP	0
Ag03454	ABDUR REHMAN (KARWAN-E-NIAMATULLAH)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03455	NIAMATULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag03456	MAULVI OMAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	TTP	x
Ag03457	FATEH MOHAMMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	0	0
Ag03458	RAFIUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	x	x
Ag03459	ANWAR (TTP)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	x	x
Ag03460	QARI ZIAUR REHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag03461	WALI UR REHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	x
Ag03462	NEK MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(Tal)	(Tal)	(Tal)	AQ; (Tal)	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03463	QARI HUSSEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	TTP	TTP
Ag03464	AAZAM TARIQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	x
Ag03465	REHMATULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	TTP	0
Ag03466	ABDULLAH MEHSUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(Tal)	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ	0	x	x	0	x	x	x
Ag03467	SHAKIR ULLAH SHAKIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03468	SHARQAWI ABDU ALI AL-HAJJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03469	MOHAMMAD OMAR ABDEL-RAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03470	AHMAD ABDEL-RAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03471	ASSAD ABDEL RAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03472	ABD AL AZIZ AL-JAMAL	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03473	IBRAHIM MUHAMMAD SALIH AL-BANNA	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	EIJ	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	JI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ag03474	ABD-AL-MUN'IM AL-BADAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	JI	0	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (AQI)	x	AQ; (AQI)	x	TTP; (AQI)
Ag03475	MAHMUD AL-DIB	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	EIJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03476	KHALID BAKIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03477	IBRAHIM KARIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03478	HASAN ABADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03479	KHALIL NUR-AL-DIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03480	YUSUF MUHAMMADAYN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03481	CHIEFTAIN DARDIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	JI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ag03482	MUHAMMAD UMAYR AL-AWLAQI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03483	ABDULLAH HAMAS AL FILISTINI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03484	ABU SULAYMAN JAZAIRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag03485	ZAIN UL ABU QASIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	x	x
Ag03486	ABDULLAH AZZAM AL SAUDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (Tal)	x	x
Ag03487	ABU ZUBAIR AL MASRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x
Ag03488	ABDUR REHMAN WAZIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ	x	x	AQ	x	x	(HIG)	x	x
Ag03489	ZANJIR WAZIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN; (HIG)	x	x
Ag03490	ABDUL SALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(HIG)	x	x
Ag03491	ABU WAFA AL SAUDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x
Ag03492	ABDUL KHALIQ HAQQANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	x	0	x	x
Ag03493	ABU HARIS	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	HN	x	HN	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03494	ABU HAMZA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	x	x
Ag03495	ABU JIHAD AL MASRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	x
Ag03499	ABDUL RAUF NASSIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	0	x	AQ AP	x	x	x	x
Ag03500	MUHAMMAD SHARAF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03501	MUS'AB SHARAF	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03502	QAED SALEM SUNIAN AL-HARTHI	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03503	MUNIR AHMED ABDULLAH AL-SAUDA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03504	SALEH HUSSEIN ALI AL-ZONO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03505	AOUSSAN AHMED AL-TIRIHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03506	ADEL NASSER AL-SAUDA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03507	KAMAL DARWISH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03508	MUHAMMAD SHOAIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ; TTP	x	x
Ag03509	MEHMOOH KHALIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ; TTP	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03510	IMRAN CHEEMA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	AQ; TTP	x	x
Ag03511	MAHROOF MIRZA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	x	x
Ag03512	AQEELUR REHMAN ABBASSI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	x	x
Ag03513	MUHAMMAD TARIQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	x	x
Ag03514	QADEER MALIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	x	x
Ag03515	ABDUL HAFEZ AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	x	x
Ag03516	MUHAMMAD AYUB ELAHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	x	x
Ag03517	ROSHAN JAMAL KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; TTP	x	x
Ag03518	NAZIMUDDIN ZALALOV	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	0	x	AQ; TTP	x
Ag03519	ABU AHMED AL-KUWAITI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	AQ
Ag03520	HASSAN GHUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03521	MUHAMMAD ALI QASIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03522	JALALUDDIN HAQQANI	x	IG; (HIG)	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	(Tal)	x	x	x	AQ; (Tal)	x	x	0	x	x	x	HN	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03523	MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(Tal)	x	x	x	AQ; (Tal)	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03524	MUHAMMAD HAQQANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN; (Tal)
Ag03525	QARI ZAFAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	TTP
Ag03526	MUHAMMAD BEG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	x	x
Ag03527	MULLAH ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	x	x
Ag03528	SIRAJUDDIN HAQQANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	HN	HN	HN	HN	x
Ag03530	SALAHUDDIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	x	x
Ag03531	FAROUQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	x	x
Ag03532	NASIRUDDIN HAQQANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	HN	HN	HN	HN	HN
Ag03533	KHALIL AL-RAHMAN HAQQANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN; (Tal)	x
Ag03534	SAID JAN 'ABD AL-SALAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03535	HOMAYOUN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	x	x
Ag03536	BADRUDDIN HAQQANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03537	ABDULLAH FARHAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	x	x
Ag03538	DARIM SEDGAI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN	x	x
Ag03539	COL. IMAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03540	ABU TAYEB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN; (Tal)	x	x
Ag03541	MR. C	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	HN; (Tal)	x	x
Ag03542	HASSAN ALMREI	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03543	NABIL ALMARABH	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03544	AHMED AL KAYSEE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03545	MAHMOUD JABALLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	EIJ	AQ; EIJ	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03546	THIRWAT SHEHATA	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	EIJ	EIJ	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03547	MOHAMAD ZEKI MAHJOUB	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	EIJ	EIJ	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03548	ESSAM MOHAMED HAFEZ MARZOUK	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	EIJ	EIJ	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03549	HANI YUSEF AL SEBAI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	EIJ	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03550	IBRAHIM ALLAM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03551	ABU YASSER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03552	MUSTAFA MOHAMED KRER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03553	HASSAN FARHAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	0	x	x	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03554	MOHAMED HARKAT	x	x	0	x	0	0	x	AQ	0	(GIA)	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03555	PACHA WAZIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03556	ABU MESSAB AL SHEHRE	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03557	KAMEL AGIZA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03558	IHAB SAQR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03559	SAEED RASOUL SOBRAHATOL LAH MUHAMMAD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03560	MASOUD RASOUL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03561	AL-MUGHIRA AL GAZA'IRI	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	AQ; (MILF)	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03562	GHARIB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03563	SHAHWALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03564	DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03565	GHAIRAT BAHEER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03566	AMANULLAH	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03567	NOOR MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(HIG)	(Tal)	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03568	MUSTAFA HAMZA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	0	AQ; EIJ	x	0	0	x	x	x	0	x	AQ; LeT	x	x	x	x
Ag03569	METHAT AHMED ABDELRAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03570	MOHSIN GHALAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03571	MOHAMMED KAMEL MOSTAFA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03572	ABU HASSAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03573	AHMED ABDEL SATTAR	x	x	IG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03574	SHEIK SALAH HASHIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03575	SOFID HASSAN ADDULKANI AZIK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03576	AL-ARAB TSADIK HASSIN MOHAMMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03577	ABDULKERIM ALNAZI ABDLURAZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03578	SHERIF ABDEL-RAHMAN TEWFIK EL-MADANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03579	HUSSEIN AHMED SHAHAF ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03580	EZET YASSIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	EIJ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03581	HAMZA MUSTAFA KAMEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03582	MOHAMED CHIADMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03583	ABDUL CHIADMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03584	KHALID JEBARI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03585	MALIK NASSAR HARHRA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03586	SHAHID BUTT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03587	SARMAD AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03588	GHULAM HUSSEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03589	SHAZ NABI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03590	AYAD HUSSEIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03591	YASSER MOSTAFA KAMEL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03592	MUAMIN ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03593	KARIM ABDULLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03594	MAJAD MAHMOUD	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03595	SULEIMAN FLAIFIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03596	MUHAMMAD FLAIFIL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03597	MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH RIBA'A	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03598	MUHAMMAD GAYEZ SABAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03599	NASSER KHAMIS AL-MALLAHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03600	KHALED MUSSAED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03601	YOUNIS ELIAN ABU JARIR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03602	OSAMA ABDEL-GHANI AL-NAKHLAWI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03603	IYAD AL-FALESTINI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03604	SALEM SHANOUB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03605	MOHAMMED ABDALLAH ELIAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03606	HASSAN AL-ARAYSHI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03607	TALEB MURTADA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03608	ARAFAT OUDA ALI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03609	AHMED MOHAMMED AL-KOREIMI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03610	MOHAMMED ABDELAZIZ NAFEI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03611	ATALLAH AL-KORM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03612	YUSRI MOHAREB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03613	AYMAN MOHAREB	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03614	TAMER NUSSEIRAT	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x
Ag03615	HASSAN RAFAAT AHMED BASHANDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03616	MOHAMED SOBHI ALI JIDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03617	GAMAL SOBHI ALI JIDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03618	AKRAM MOHAMMED FAWZI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03619	TAREK AHMED AL-SAYED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03620	REDA SAYED AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03621	ASHRAF SAIED YOUSSEF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03622	EHAB YOUSRI YASSIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03623	GAMAL AHMED ABDEL AAL	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03624	ASHRAF SAEED YOUSSEF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03625	NEGAT YASSIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03626	IMAN IBRAHIM KHAMIS	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03627	MOHAMMED YOUSRI YASSIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03628	SABER FARHAT ABU EL-ELA	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03629	MAHMOUD ABI EL-ELA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03630	MOHAMED SALEM ABDEL-NABI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03631	ISMAIL ABDALLAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03632	HAFEZ ABDEL HAKIM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03633	TAHA YEHIA SAYYED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03634	GURUKANTH DESAI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP
Ag03635	OMAR SHARIF LATIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP
Ag03636	ABDUL MALIK MIAH	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP
Ag03637	MOHAMMED MOKSUDUR RAHMAN CHOWDHURY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP
Ag03638	SHAH MOHAMMED LUTFAR RAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03639	NAZAM HUSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP
Ag03640	USMAN KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP
Ag03641	MOHIBUR RAHMAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP
Ag03642	ABUL BOSHER MOHAMMED SHAHJAHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ AP
Ag03643	TAIMOUR ABDULWAHAB AL-ABDALY	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	0	x	x	0	TTP
Ag03644	EZEDDEN AL KHALEDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	TTP
Ag03645	ABU OMAR AL-BAGHDADI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(AQI)	AQ	x	TTP
Ag03646	MONA AL-ABDALY	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03647	MUHARIB ABDUL LATIF AL-JUBOURI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	(AQI)	(AQI)	x	x	x
Ag03648	ABU NIZAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; (AQI)	x	x
Ag03649	HASNA ALI YEHYE HUSSAIN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03650	WATHI AL-JASSEM	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0
Ag03651	ABRAR SAEED AHMED	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03652	ABU UNAYS AL SAUDI	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03653	MOHAMED ELLIAS S/O MOHAMED KHAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ; JI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03654	CHRISTIAN GANCZARSKI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03655	WALID NOUAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03656	NIZAR NOUAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03657	BELGACEM NOUAR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03658	ASIF MOHAMMED HANIF	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03659	FRITZ MARTIN GELOWICZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	AQ	0	x	x	x
Ag03660	KARIM MEHDI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03661	TOLGA D.	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	0	x	x	x
Ag03662	DANIEL MARTIN SCHNEIDER	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x
Ag03663	ADEM YILMAZ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	0	x	x	x
Ag03664	ATTILA SELEK	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x

ID No.	NAME	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Ag03665	BILAL BIN MARWAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03666	SALIM AHMED HAMDAN	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	AQ	AQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Ag03667	YOUSUF AL-SHAHRI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0
Ag03668	RAYED ABDULLAHI AL-HARBI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x
Ag03669	YOUNIS AL-MAURITANI	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x

APPENDIX D: AGENT ATTRIBUTES

Note on Interpretation: All dates listed in this appendix are in *yyyymmdd* format. Because of the ambiguity inherent to the subject matter, these dates should be interpreted as approximate. Often times, dates of birth are listed only to the year, e.g. 1977. In such instances, the date was set to the midpoint of the calendar year; thus, 1977 becomes 19770702. Similarly, when the data listed dates only to the month, e.g. November 1977, attribute values were set to the midpoint of the month, e.g. 19771115. As with the alias list, space precludes a full recounting of the thousands of sources used to compile the attributes listed in the table below, but as the information was obtained through deductive observation of the sources listed in Appendix H, which lists the interactions associated with each individual in the data, a reasonable approximation of the sourcing underlying the attribute data can be derived from that appendix.

Table 10.4 Agent Attributes

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00001	FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED	Male	19720825	19740225	Moroni, Comoros Islands	0	Comoros	Kenya (False)	West Africa
Ag00005	ADEL ABDEL BARY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00006	ABDULLAH AHMED ABDULLAH	Male	19630702	0	Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00009	ABU UBAIDAH AL BANSHIRI	Male	19500501	0	Cairo, Egypt	0	Egypt	Netherlands	North Africa
Ag00013	AHMED KHALFAN GHAILANI	Male	19740314	0	Zanzibar, Tanzania	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00014	AHMED MOHAMED HAMED ALI	Male	19650702	19700801	Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00015	RIFA'I AHMAD TAHA MUSA	Male	19540624	19740413	Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00016	HAMDEN KHALIF ALLAH AWAD	Male	19700813	19740414	Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00019	ZAKARIA	Male	0	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00023	ANAS AL LIBY	Male	19640330	0	Tripoli, Libya	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00024	OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN AL OMAIRAH	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00025	IBRAHIM MOHAMMED KHALIL	Male	19760702	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00026	MUHSIN AL-FADHLI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00027	MUHAMMAD AL-HAMATI	Male	19810424	0	0	0	Kuwait	0	Middle East
Ag00028	ABD AL-AZIZ AL-MASRI	Male	19660418	0	Bani Suwayf, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00030	AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI	Male	19510619	0	Giza, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00031	JIHAD MOHAMMED ABDOU ALI	Male	19740319	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00032	NUR AL-DIN AL-DIBISKI	Male	19630702	0	Tripoli, Libya	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00033	ABD ALLAH MOHAMED RAGAB ABDEL RAHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00034	`ALI SULAYMAN MAS'UD `ABD AL-SAYYID	Male	19690702	0	Tripoli, Libya	0	Libya	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00048	CO-CONSPIRATOR 2	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00049	CO-CONSPIRATOR 5	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00050	CO-CONSPIRATOR 1	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00051	CO-CONSPIRATOR 3	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00052	CO-CONSPIRATOR 4	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00053	CO-CONSPIRATOR 6	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00090	SADDIQ AL MAHDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00091	FAHID MOHAMMED ALLY MSALAM	Male	19760219	0	Mombasa, Kenya	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag00121	MOHAMED BELKALEM	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00122	SUHAYL FATILLOEVICH BURANOV	Male	19831011	0	Tashkent, Uzbekistan	0	Uzbekistan	0	Central Asia
Ag00124	IBRAHIM DAOUD ABU ABDULLA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00125	IBRAHIM EIDAROUS	Male	19570702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00165	KHALFAN KHAMIS MOHAMED	Male	19730725	0	Kidimini, Zanzibar, Tanzania	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00166	KHALID AL FAWWAZ	Male	19620825	19620824	Kuwait	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00181	MAMDOUH MAHMUD SALIM	Male	19580702	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00199	MOHAMED RASHED DAOUD AL-'OWHALI	Male	19770118	19770702	Liverpool, England	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00200	MOHAMED SADEEK ODEH	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag00208	ABU HAFS AL MASRY	Male	19510702	19560702; 19440702	Alexandria, Egypt	Menoufya, Egypt	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00209	MUHSIN MUSA MATWALLI ATWAH	Male	19640619	0	Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00210	MUSTAFA MOHAMED FADHIL	Male	19760623	0	Cairo, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00244	SAIF AL ADEL	Male	19630702	0	Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00253	SHEIK OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN	Male	19380702	0	Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00254	SHEIKH AHMED SALIM SWEDAN	Male	19690409	19600409	Mombasa, Kenya	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag00272	USAMA BIN LADEN	Male	19570630	19580702	Jeddah, Saudi Arabia	Yemen	Saudi Arabia (Revoked April 1994)	0	Middle East
Ag00275	WADIH EL HAGE	Male	19600725	0	Sidon, Lebanon	0	USA (Granted in 1989)	0	North America
Ag00279	JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED AL-FADL	Male	19630702	0	Ruffa City, Sudan	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00280	MUSTAFA SHALABI	Male	19520702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00281	ABU SHALEED AL-FALASTINI	Male	0	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00282	ABU NOFAL AL SAUDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00283	ISSAWI ABU HASSAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00284	ABU FEDA EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00285	ABU JAFFAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00286	SALEM EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00287	HAYDAR DOSARI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00288	ABU KHEIR EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00289	ABU AYOUB AL IRAQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00290	YASIN (BROTHER OF ABU AYUB)	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00291	ABU FARAJ AL YEMENI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag00293	DOCTOR ABDEL MUNIM AL KHABIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00294	ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE	Male	0	0	Mecca, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00295	SHEIKH SAYYID EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00296	QARICEPT AL JIZAERI	Male	0	0	0	0	Nigeria	0	West Africa

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Ag00297	SAIF AL LIBY	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00298	ABU BURHAN AL IRAQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00299	HASSAN DAHIR AWEYS	Male	19350702	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag00300	ABU HAFS AL MANSOURI	Male	0	0	Mansour, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00301	ABU KHALEED AL MADANI	Male	0	0	Madina, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00302	ABU HAMMAM AL SAUDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00303	ABU QUTADA	Male	16901230	19601213	Bethlehem, West Bank	0	Palestine	Jordan	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00304	SA'ID YUSIF ALI ABU AZIZAH	Male	19580702	0	Tripoli, Libya	0	Libya	Saudi Arabia	North Africa
Ag00305	ABU YASSER AL JAZAIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Nigeria	0	West Africa
Ag00306	ABU ABD AL SABBUR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00307	ABU UBAIDAH AL IRAQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00308	ABU FADL AL IRAQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00309	ALI HAROUN	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00310	ABDEL MAHMABABO	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00311	OMAR HASSAN AHMAD AL BASHIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00312	DR. SHARIF AL DIN ALI MUKHTAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00313	MOHAMED BAYAZID	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	USA	Middle East
Ag00314	ABU HASSAN EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00315	DR. MUBARAK AL DOORI	Male	0	0	Iraq	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag00316	AL QUBASHI THE SUDANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00317	SADEEK	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00318	FARJAHM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00319	IBN AL TAMIYEH	Male	12630702	0	Harran, Syria	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00320	ABU TALHA AL SUDANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00321	ABU MOHAMED AL YEMENI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag00322	MOHAMED AL NALFI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00323	AHMED ABDEL RAHMAN HAMADABI	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00324	SHEIKH NOMANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iran	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00325	ABU JAFFER EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00326	ABDUL BASET HAMZA	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00327	AMIN ABDEL MAROUF	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00328	ABU TALAL EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00329	ABU YASSER EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00330	ABU JAFFAR AL LIBY	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00332	HAMZALLAH AL LIBY	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00333	ABU ABDEL QADER AL LIBY	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00334	MUTWAKAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00335	SAIF ISLAMI JANNUBI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag00336	ABU KHALIL AL MADANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00337	ABU HABIB AL TUNISI	Male	0	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00338	ABU MAHDI AL SAUDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00339	ABU KHADIJA AL IRAQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Israel	Germany	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00340	USAMA AZMARAI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00341	ABU DIJANA AL YEMENI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag00342	DR. ABDALLAH IZZELDINE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00343	ABDALLAH AZZAM	Male	19410702	0	Jenin, Palestine	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag00344	ABDEL RAHMAN SOMALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag00345	ABDOUH AL MUKHLAFI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag00346	ABU AHMED EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00347	ABU AKRAM URDANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag00348	ABU ALI SUDANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00349	ABU HABIB AL PAKISTANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00350	ABU KHABUIB AL SUDANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00351	SHEIK BAILALA	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag00352	ABU MOHAMED AL SURI	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00353	ABU MUSAB AL SUDANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00354	ABU MUSAB AL SAUDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00355	MUSTAFA SETMARIAM NASAR	Male	19580702	0	Syria	0	Syria	Spain	Middle East
Ag00356	ABU MUSAB REUTER	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00357	ABU NEAM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00358	ABU QUAIDBA EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00359	AFAD MAKKEE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00360	AHMED ALI LOOTAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00361	APRIL BRIGHTSKY RAY	Female	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag00362	DR. ABDULLAH MOHAMED YUSEF	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00363	IBN AL MUBARAK AL SHARQAWI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00364	IHSAN EL MADANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00365	KHALID ALI WALEED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00366	KHALIFA AL MUSCAT OMANI	Male	0	0	Muscat, Oman	0	Oman	0	Middle East
Ag00367	MOHAMED AL KHEIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00368	MOHAMED JARA AL NABI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00369	MOHAMED SHABANA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00370	MOTASSEM SADEEK ABU SASHL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00371	MRS. JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED AL-FADAL (SUDANESE WIFE)	Female	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00372	DR. MOTRIF AL SADEEK	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00373	OMAR AL MAKKEE	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00374	SAID BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00375	SHEIK ARAFA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00376	SAAD AL SHARIF	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00377	ABU ISHEM MADANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00378	AZERI (JAMAL AL-FADL'S BROTHER)	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00379	ESSAM AL RIDI	Male	19580702	0	Cairo, Egypt	0	USA	0	North America
Ag00380	ABU JAFFER	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00381	ABU AL DARDAA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00382	ASHIF MOHAMED JUMA	Male	19650422	0	Maswa City, Tanzania	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00383	FATIMA JUMA	Female	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00384	MOHAMED ASHRIF JUMA	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00385	SETUNA JUMA	Female	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00386	TAHERA JUMA	Female	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00387	SHAMINA JUMA	Female	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00388	MANIRA JUMA	Female	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00389	SIKANDER JUMA	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00390	2ND BORN OF ESSAM AL RIDI	Unknown	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag00391	KHALID SIDO	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00392	ABU MUSABAL SURRE OMAR ABDEL HAKEEM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00393	ABU UBADDA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00394	AZMARAI ALSUI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00395	DAUGHTER OF ESSAM AL RIDI (1ST BORN)	Female	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00396	LOAY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00397	MOATAZ AL HALLAK	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00398	MOHAMMED KARAMA	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag00399	MOHAMMED NAJIBULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag00400	MRS. ESSAM AL RIDI	Female	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag00401	SHEIK ABDUL RASOOL SAYYAF	Male	0	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag00402	JOHN RAY	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00403	ABU JANDAL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00404	ABU MALIK	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag00405	AHMED SKEIK	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00406	RASHAD KHALIFA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00407	MOHAMMED KASSEM	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00408	ABDEL MEJID	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00409	ADAM MOHAMED NOOR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00410	ABU AMJED	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00411	IBRAHIM (BROTHER OF JAMAL AL-FADL)	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00412	ABOUHALIMA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00413	ABU FARAJIMNI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00414	ABU IBRAHIM AL IRAQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00415	ABU IBRAHIM IRATI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00416	ABU ISRA AL IRAQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00417	ABU MAT EGYPTIAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00418	ABU TAMIM LIBY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00419	ASADALLAH AL SINDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00420	BASHEER	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00421	BUSHRA YASIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00422	DITAR ABU MAHIS	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00423	DR. OMAR ABDEL MAROUF	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00424	FADL AL SHAHIDEEN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00425	FAISAL (COUSIN OF JAMAL AL-FADL)	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00426	IBN SALAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00427	MOQADEM SALAH ABDEL AL MOBRUK	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00428	MOTASEM AL SAUDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00429	MUBARAK EL DOORY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00430	SADEEK ALI MOHAMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00431	SAFAR AL HAWALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00432	SALMAN AL AUDA	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00434	SHEIKH FAZHIL UR RAHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00435	USAMA LUBNANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag00436	YASIN (BROTHER OF ABU AYOUB AL IRAQI)	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00437	ZINDANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00438	L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU	Male	19640515	0	Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00439	ANSWAR SHABAN	Male	0	0	Egypt	0	Egpyt	0	North Africa
Ag00440	ABU ISALM MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00441	ABU RACHMAN AL MUHAJER	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00442	SHEIK ALATI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00443	MRS. SALEH	Female	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00444	FARAJ ABU EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00446	ABU SURIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00447	MUNTASSER AL JAZIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Nigeria	0	West Africa
Ag00448	MRS. L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU	Female	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00449	ALI MOHAMED	Male	19520702	0	Kafr El Sheikh, Egypt	0	Egypt	USA	North Africa
Ag00451	ABU MADYAN EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00452	ABU RIFA AL LIBY	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00453	ABU AL ALKALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00454	SALEM AL-IRAQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00455	SULIMAN (SON OF NAWAWI)	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00456	ABU KHALID AL NUBI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00457	MRS. ABU UBAIDAH AL BANSHIRI (EGYPTIAN WIFE)	Female	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00458	ABU SAID AL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00459	ABU MOHAMMED MAHEJAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00460	MRS. ABU RACHMAN AL MUHAJER	Female	0	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag00461	SAFIR ALADA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00462	MRS. ABU FADHL AL MAKKEE	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00463	ABU KHEIR AL YEMENI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag00464	ABU AMMAR AL SURI	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00465	SAAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00466	MOHAMMED KARAMA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00467	ABU DERDAA	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00468	DR. MONTESSUR	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00469	FIRST BORN OF L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00470	SHEIK JIHAD EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00471	ABU SALAAMA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00472	ABDOUH ABDALLAH AL YEMENI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag00473	ABU BADEN EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00474	ABU MUATH	Male	0	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag00475	ABU DAUD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

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Ag00476	MAK DAUD	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00477	ABU ISMAL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00478	ABU SARA	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00479	ABDEL KADIM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00480	AHMED HASSAN (I)	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00481	AHMED HASSAN (II)	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00482	ABU JAMAL AMRIK	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

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Ag00483	AHMED TIK	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00484	ABU HARAD EL MASRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00485	KIBARUA MJITTA	Male	19570702	0	Kenya	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag00486	ABU UBAIDAH (OF SADEEK CAMP)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00487	ABU THOMAMA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00488	MOHAMED SAHAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag00489	ALI MANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa

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Ag00490	MEENA	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00491	OMAR (ODEH'S BROTHER-IN-LAW)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00492	SKEIK SAFA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00493	ABDUL RACHMAN AL HOWARI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00494	ABU SAYYID AL KIRDI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00495	BILAL (COUSIN OF JIHAD ALI)	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00496	ABDUL JAFAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

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Ag00497	AHMED AL HAZZA	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag00498	FATHER OF OWHALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00499	MOHAMED BIN AWADH BIN LADEN	Male	19080702	0	Doan, Yemen	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00500	OMAR BIN AWADH BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	Doan, Yemen	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag00501	ABDULLAH BIN AWDAH BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00502	1ST DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00503	1ST DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00504	3RD DAUGHTER OF AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00505	AWDAH BIN ABOUD BIN LADEN	Male	18750702	0	Rakiyah, Yemen	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00506	DAUGHTER OF AL-MADUDI FAMILY	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00507	ABDULAZIZ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	19540702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00508	ABDULLAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00509	AETEDAL BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00510	AHMAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00511	ALI BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00512	AYSHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	19430702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00513	BAKR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	19470702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00514	EMAN BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00515	FATIMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00516	FOWZIYAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00517	GHALIB BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

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Ag00518	HAIDER BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00519	HASSAN BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00520	HUDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00521	IBRAHIM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00522	ILHAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00523	ISSA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00524	KHALED BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

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Ag00525	KHALIL BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00526	MAHROUS BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00527	MALAK BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00528	MARIAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00529	MOHAMMAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00530	MUNA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00531	MUNEERA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00532	NAJIAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00533	NOUR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00534	OMAR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00535	RAEDAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00536	RAJA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00537	RANDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00538	RUQQUEIYA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00539	SAAD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00540	SAHAR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00541	SALEH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00542	SALEHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00543	SALEM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	19440702	19450702	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00544	SALMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00545	SAMIAH BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00546	SANA'A BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00547	SEEMA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00548	SHAFIQ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00549	SHEIKHA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00550	SU'ADD BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00551	TAREQ BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00552	TAYYEBA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00553	THABIT BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00554	WAFA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00555	YAHYA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00556	YASIR BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00557	YESLAM BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Male	19501019	0	Mecca, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00558	ZEENAT BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag00559	ZUBAIDA BIN MOHAMED BIN LADEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00560	UM AYSHA	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00561	FATIMAH AHMED MOHSEN BAHARETH	Female	19240702	0	Mecca, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabi	0	Middle East
Ag00562	ALIA AL-GHANEM	Female	19420702	0	Latakia, Syria	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00563	UM ABDULAZIZ	Female	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00564	UM ALI	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00565	UM YESLAM	Female	0	0	0	0	Iran	0	Middle East
Ag00566	SAID SALEM OMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00567	TAMARRA RATEMO	Female	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag00568	MOHAMED ZAIDI	Male	0	0	Dar es Salaam, Tanzania	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00569	JULIUS KISINGO CEM	Male	0	0	Dar es Salaam, Tanzania	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00570	ABDULWAHDI AHMED SALUM	Male	0	0	Pemba, Tanzania	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00571	USAMA BIN HUSSEIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00572	ANNIS BIN HUSSEIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00573	MOHAMED K. MOHAMED	Male	0	0	Tanzania	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00574	FATIMA FADHIL	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00575	ANIS FADHIL	Male	19940702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00576	USA FADHIL	Female	19970702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00577	ABDALLAH HAMISI SHLLM	Male	0	0	Olay, Tanzania	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00578	ABDUL HALLEK	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00579	ABU AHMED AL HARBI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00580	ABU MARWAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00581	ABU RAFA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00582	ADELKA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00583	ALI (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00584	BAHARI (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00585	FATUMA MOHAMED	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00586	HADYEA RUBEYA	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00587	HAJI JUMA	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00588	HASAN (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00589	ISMAEL (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00590	KALAL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00591	KASSUM JUMA	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00592	MARIUM	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00593	MASSELIM MASSELIM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00594	MOHAMED MUSLIM SALUM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00595	MR. CHAUDRY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00596	MRS. FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00597	MUMIN IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00598	NASSOR MOHAMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00599	RAHMA AHMED KHAMIS	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00600	RASHID SALEH HAMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00601	RAYA JUMA	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00602	RUBAYA MOHAMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00603	SALIM CHICHI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00604	SALMA MOHAMMED	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00605	SALUM MUSLIM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00606	SULIMAN (FRIEND OF KK MOHAMED)	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00607	TARIQ HAMDI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00608	ZIYAD KHALEEL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00609	ZUHURU MOHAMED	Female	19770702	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00610	IHAB MOHAMED ALI	Male	19690702	19700702	0	0	Egypt	USA	North Africa
Ag00611	KHALID ABDUL RACHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00612	JALAL FOUD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00613	ELEMIGY ABDELDAIM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00614	MOHAMED ALI MURAWEH SAL ODEH	Male	19390209	0	Haifa, Israel	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag00615	DENAL CASMIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00616	DR. JOSEPH MISOI	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag00617	DR. EL SAYED TILIB	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00618	SAMIR RAHMAN MOHAMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00619	ABU AL MUTAZ	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag00620	SHEIK ISHAQ	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00621	EZALADEN ABDEL RAHMAN MOHAMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag00622	SHEIK SULEIMAN SILL	Male	19290702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00623	DAVID MATWAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00624	ALI OMAR MOHAMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00625	ABDULLAH EL ZUBEIDY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00626	ADAN A. HASSAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00627	SIMON (WADIH EL HAGE'S FRIEND)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00628	AHMAD YOUNES	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00629	MARION BROWN	Female	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00630	YUMICO ABUEILEN	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00631	BADR ABUEILEN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00632	NASSER ABUEILEN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00633	KHALID ABUEILEN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00634	SUMA ABUEILEN	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00635	ATEF ABUEILEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Qatar	0	Middle East
Ag00636	SULIMAN ALI	Male	19960310	0	Nairobi, Kenya	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00637	KHAMIS MOHAMED KHALFAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00638	RUBEYA KHAMIS MOHAMED	Male	19720702	0	Zanzibar, Tanzania	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00639	OMAR NASSOR SALIM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00640	SULEIMAN ABDALLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00641	MSELLEM SHINEY MSELLEM	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag00642	MUSALAM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00643	MRS. JAMAL AHMED MOHAMED AL-FADAL (AMERICAN WIFE)	Female	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00644	JAMAL ZOUGAM	Male	19731005	19740702	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00645	SALAHEDDINE BENYAICH	Male	0	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00646	ABDELAZIZ BENYAICH	Male	19660702	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	France	North Africa
Ag00647	MOHAMMED AL-GERBOUZI	Male	19600702	0	Larache, Morocco	0	Britain	0	West Europe
Ag00648	ABU DAHDAH	Male	19630702	0	Aleppo, Syria	0	Spain	Syria	West Europe
Ag00649	ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI	Male	19661020	0	Zarqa, Jordan	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag00650	MOHAMMED FIZAZI	Male	19470702	19480702	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00651	ABDULAK AL MAGREBI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00652	MOHAMED CHAOUI	Male	19690702	19700702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00653	SAID CHEDADI	Male	0	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00654	ALI AMROUS	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00655	SARHANE BEN ABDELMAJID FAKHET	Male	19690702	19680702	Tunis, Tunisia	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00656	AMER AZIZI	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00657	MONEIR MAHMOUD ALY EL-MESSERY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00658	JAMAL AHMIDAN	Male	19710702	0	Tetouan, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00659	MOHAMMED ATTA	Male	19680901	0	Kafr el-Sheikh, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00660	TARIQ IBN ZIYAD	Male	06890702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00661	MOHAMED BEKKALI	Male	19730702	19720702	Tetuan, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00662	VINAY KOHLY	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag00663	SUREH KOMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag00664	FAISAL ALLUCH	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00665	KHALID OULAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00666	NAIMA OULAD	Female	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00667	BASEL GHAYOUN	Male	19800225	0	Syria	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00668	HAMID AHMIDAN	Male	19771120	19780702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00669	ABD AL-HADI AL-IRAQI	Male	19610702	0	Mosul, Iraq	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00670	FOUAD EL MORABIT ANGHAR	Male	19730903	19750702	Nador, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00671	MUHANNAD ALMALLAH DABAS	Male	19640225	19640702	Syria	0	Syria	Spain	Middle East

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Ag00672	SAID BERRAJ	Male	19730702	19750702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00673	MOHAMMED OULAD AKCHA	Male	19760702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00674	RACHID OULAD AKCHA	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00675	ABDENNABI KOUNJAA	Male	19760702	0	Tetouan, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00676	JOSE EMILIO SUAREZ TRASHORRAS	Male	19761210	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00677	RAFA ZOUHIER	Male	19790615	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00678	OTMAN EL GNAOUT	Male	19750425	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

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Ag00679	ABDELILAH EL FADUAL EL AKIL	Male	19691026	19690702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00680	RACHID AGLIF	Male	19791119	19800702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00681	YOUSSEF BELHADJ	Male	19760527	19770702	Touzine, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00682	ABDELMAJID BOUCHAR	Male	19830109	19830702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00683	HASSAN EL HASKI	Male	19630805	19630702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00684	RABEI OSMAN SAYED AHMED	Male	19710722	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00685	MOHAMED LARBI BEN SELLAM	Male	19770610	19770702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00686	BRAHIM MOUSSATEN	Male	19831112	19840702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00687	MOHAMED MOUSSATEN	Male	19840925	19850702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00688	RAMZI BINALSHIBH	Male	19720501	19730816	Ghayl Bawazir, Yemen	Khartoum, Sudan	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag00689	MOHAMMED AL HADI CHEDADI	Male	19660702	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00690	ABDERRAHIM ZBAKH	Male	19720702	19710702; 19810702	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00691	FARID OULD ALI	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00692	MALAK ANDALUSI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00693	AICHA ACHAB	Female	19520702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00694	ALI ZOUGAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00696	ZAKI BEKKALI	Male	19660702	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00697	MOHAMMED BEKKALI, SR.	Male	19470702	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00698	CHARAFA BEKKALI	Female	0	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00699	ABDEL HALIM	Male	0	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00700	ABDULATIF MERROUN	Male	19620702	0	Morocco	0	UK	Morocco	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00701	JAMAL BENYAICH	Male	0	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00702	ALICE BENYAICH	Female	0	0	0	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag00703	DAVID COURTAILLER	Male	19760702	0	ST.-PIERRE-EN-FAUCIGNY, France	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag00704	JEROME COURTAILLER	Male	19750702	0	ST.-PIERRE-EN-FAUCIGNY, France	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag00705	ABDELKRIM MEJJATI	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00706	BEN SALAWI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00707	ABDELOUAHID BERRAK	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00708	ANTONIO TORO CASTRO	Male	19770613	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00709	WALID ALTARAKI	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00710	MOHAMAD BADR DDIN AKKAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00711	ZINEB (JAMAL ZOUGAM'S SISTER)	Female	19770702	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00712	SAMIRA (JAMAL ZOUGAM'S SISTER)	Female	19790702	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00713	ABDELILAH EL-FUAD	Male	19760702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00714	RACHID ADLI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00715	MRS. SARHANE BEN ABDELMAJID FAKHET	Female	19870702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00716	MUSTAFA MAYMOUNI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00717	ABDILAH FIZAZI	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00718	ABDELHALIM FIZAZI	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00719	ASSIYA FIZAZI	Female	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00720	EL GITANILLO	Male	19900702	19870702	Aviles, Spain	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00721	ALLEKEMA LAMARI	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00722	CARMEN MARIA TORO CASTRO	Female	19810817	19810702	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00723	MOHAMED BELHADJ	Male	19800702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00724	MOHAMED AFALAH	Male	19760702	19770702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00725	OUHNANE DAOUD	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00726	ADRI RIFAAT ANOUAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00727	ABDELATIF MOURAFIK	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00728	DRISS CHEBLI	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00729	MOHAMED BELFATMI	Male	19760702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00730	NOUREDINE NFIA	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00731	KHALID MAJATI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00732	AZIZA AL-GERBOUZI	Female	19610702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00733	SAID BAHAJI	Male	19750715	19750702	Haselunne, Lower Saxony, Germany	0	Germany	Morocco	West Europe
Ag00734	TAYSSIR ALLUNI	Male	19470702	19550702	Syria	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00735	FARID HILALI	Male	19690702	19670702	Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00736	MUHAMED GALEB KALAJE ZOUAYDI	Male	19610702	0	Aleppo, Syria	0	Spain	Syria	West Europe
Ag00737	BASSAM DALATI SATUT	Male	19600702	0	Aleppo, Syria	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00738	ABU ABDUL RAHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00739	ABU ZUBAYDAH	Male	19710312	0	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag00740	MOHAMED BAHAIAH	Male	19630406	0	Aleppo, Syria	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00741	MOHAMMED HAYDAR ZAMMAR	Male	19610702	0	Aleppo, Syria	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag00742	MAMOUN DARKAZANLI	Male	19580804	0	Aleppo, Syria	0	Germany	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00743	LUIS JOSE GALAN GONZALEZ	Male	19640702	0	Madrid, Spain	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00744	JASEM MAHBOULE	Male	0	0	Syria	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00745	OSAMA DARRA	Male	0	0	Syria	0	Syria	Algerian	Middle East
Ag00746	MOHAMED NEEDL ACAID	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00747	AHMAD RAGHAD MARDINI DAKICHL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00748	MOHAMED ARABI SHEHIMI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00749	MOHAMED ZAHER ASADE	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00750	ANWAR ADNAN MOHAMED SALAH	Male	0	0	Palestine	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag00751	MOHAMED BOUALEM KHOUNI	Male	19690702	0	Kabyle, Algeria	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00752	MOHAMED BENSAKHRIA	Male	19670702	19680702	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00753	GHASOUB AL-ABRASH AL-GHALYOUN	Male	19660702	0	Syria	0	Spain	Syria	West Europe
Ag00754	AHMED BRAHIM	Male	19450702	0	Algeria	0	Spain	Algeria	West Europe
Ag00755	NABIL NANAKLI KOSAIBATI	Male	0	0	Syria	0	Spain	Syria	West Europe
Ag00756	SHEIK MOHAMMED OMRAN	Male	0	0	Jordan	0	Australia	0	Australia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00757	BILAL KHAZAL	Male	19700702	0	Lebanon	0	Australia	Lebanon	Australia
Ag00758	MOHAMED KHAIR AL-SAQQ	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00759	ABDALRAHMAN ALARNAOT	Male	0	0	Syria	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00760	PARLINDUNGAN SIREGAR	Male	19570425	19670425	Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag00761	NAJIB CHAIB MOHAMED	Male	19670702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00762	ABU ABDULRAHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00763	SID AHMED BOUDJELLA	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00764	MOURAD KADDAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00765	MARIA LUISA MARTIN	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00766	ABU RACHED	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00767	SAID MANSOUR	Male	0	0	0	0	Denmark	Morocco	West Europe
Ag00768	ABU SUUD	Male	0	0	0	0	Denmark	0	West Europe
Ag00769	ZEIN AL-ABIDINE MOHAMED HASSAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00770	ABDULLA KHAYATA KATAN	Male	19760702	0	Syria	0	Spain	0	West Europe

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Ag00771	AHMED KOSHAGI KELANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00772	ABU WALID	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00773	ABU AL HARETH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00774	DJAMEL BEGHAL	Male	19650702	0	Algeria	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag00775	ABDELGHANI MZOUDI	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00776	ROBERT RICHARD ANTOINE-PIERRE	Male	19720702	0	France	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag00777	MUHSEN KHAYBER	Male	19700702	0	Larache, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00778	ABDENNABID CHEDADI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00779	RAHMA AHMIDAN	Female	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00780	MUSTAFA AHMIDAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00781	JABER AHMIDAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00782	YUSSEF AHMIDAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00783	HICHAM AHMIDAN	Male	19800702	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00784	MOHAMED BOUHARRAT	Male	19790511	19800702	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

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Ag00785	SAED EL HARRAK	Male	19730410	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00786	NASREDDINE BOUSBAA	Male	19610519	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00787	EMILIO LLANO ALVAREZ	Male	19601215	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00788	IVAN GRANADOS PENA	Male	19820823	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00789	JAVIER GONZALEZ PENA	Male	19520914	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00790	ANTONIO IVAN REIS PALACIO	Male	19820823	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00791	SERGIO ALVAREZ SANCHEZ	Male	19810509	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00792	RAUL GONZALEZ PELEAZ	Male	19760801	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00793	GHAZI BIDEL	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00794	YAHIA RAGHEH	Male	19830702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00795	MOUTAZ ALMALLAH	Male	19660702	0	Damascus, Syria	0	Britain	Spain	West Europe
Ag00796	PILAR M.V.	Female	0	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00797	MIGUEL ANGEL M.V.	Male	0	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00798	SOUFIANE RAIFAK	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00799	LOFTI SBAI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00800	MOHAMMAD AFZAAL	Male	19650702	0	Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00801	SHAHZAD ALI GUJAR	Male	19710702	0	Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00802	RACHID MOHAMED KADDUR	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00803	RACHID BENDOUDA	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00804	JAOUAD EL BOUZROUTI	Male	19840702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00805	MIMOUN BELHADJ	Male	19850702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00806	RUBEN IGLESIAS	Male	0	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00807	OMAR NAKHCHA	Male	19830702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00808	ABDELILAH HRIZ	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00809	MOHAMED EL-IDRISSI	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00810	SAMIR TAHTAH	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00811	SAFIA BELHADJ	Female	19630702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00812	ALLAL MOUSSATEN	Male	19620702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00813	AHMED RESSAM	Male	19670509	0	Algeria	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00814	OMAR DEGHAYES	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00815	GONZALO LOPEZ GONZALEZ	Male	19760702	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00816	MAHMOUD SLIMANE AOUN	Male	19600702	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag00817	MOHAMMED LAMARI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00818	TELDJA LAMARI	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00819	ZACARIYA ESSABAR	Male	19770413	19770403	Essaouria, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00820	HASAM ALHUSEIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00821	WAHID KOSHAGI KELANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00822	SADIK MERIZAK	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00823	PRINCE MOHAMMED AL-FAISAL AL-SAUD	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabi	0	Middle East
Ag00824	PRINCE TURKI AL-FAISAL AL-SAUD	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabi	0	Middle East
Ag00825	SAMER DABBAS	Male	19770702	0	Aleppo, Syria	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00826	REDA SEYAM	Male	19600702	0	Egypt	0	Germany	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00827	SALEH ABDULAZIZ AL-FAHHAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabi	0	Middle East
Ag00828	ABDULRAHMAN AL-FAHHAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabi	0	Middle East
Ag00829	ATMANE RESALI	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00830	HABIBA MOHAMED	Female	0	0	Cueta, Spain	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00831	CARMEN FERNANDEZ	Female	0	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00832	ASMA ZAFRA	Female	0	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00833	NAJAT FADAL	Female	19740702	0	Cueta, Spain	0	Spain	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00834	MARIAM GARCIA	Female	19670702	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag00835	MOHAMED BELAZIZ	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00836	YASIN SEDDIKI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00837	HAKIM ZERZOUR	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00838	MAJID SAHOUANE	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00839	ABDERRAMAN KHOUNI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00840	HOCINE KHOUNI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00841	MOHAMMED ACHRAF	Male	19750702	19730702	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00842	REDA CHERIF	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00843	DJAMEL SEDDIKI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00844	NIZAR TRABELSI	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00845	ESSID SAMI BEN KHEMAIS	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00846	MOHAMED BOUKIRI	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00847	ABDELKADER TCHAREK	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00848	NABIL SAYADI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00849	HAZAR AL-DABBAS	Female	19660702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00850	PIRJO BRAHIM	Female	0	0	Finland	0	Finland	0	West Europe
Ag00851	NORA BRAHIM	Female	19880702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00852	ABU KHALEB	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00853	MAHER KHAZAL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00854	KAMAL HADID CHAAR	Male	19600702	0	Aleppo, Syria	0	Spain	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00855	SYLVIE BEGHAL	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00856	BAGHDAD MEZIANE	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00857	BRAHIM BENMERZOUGA	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00858	KAMEL DAOUDI	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00859	AZZEDIN JOURNAZI	Male	0	0	Libya	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00860	MUSTAPHA ABUSHIMA	Male	19670702	0	0	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe
Ag00861	WEDAD AHMED	Female	19600702	0	0	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00862	ABDULLAH BANDASSER	Male	0	0	Fez, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00864	SAYER BEDER	Male	19480702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00865	NOUREDINE YENADI	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00866	ABDELKADER AMARA	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00867	MOHAMMAD CHOUDRY ASLAM	Male	19600702	0	Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00868	MOHAMMAD NAEEM NOOR KHAN	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00869	AMJAD FAROOQI	Male	19720702	0	Toba Tek Singh district, Punjab Province, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00870	ADNAN ASLAM	Male	19800702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00871	ABDELAZIZ HOUARI MELLAS	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00872	MOSTAFA AZTOUT	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00873	BELGACEM BELLIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00874	NASSREDDINE BEN LAIDNE AMRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00875	DJILALI BOUSSIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00876	ABDELAZIZ EL MERABIT	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00877	ABDELKRIM LEBCHINA	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00878	HAMMAD LAHSINI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00879	TAHA SEGHROUCHNI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00880	ZOHAIR KHADIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00881	OTMAN EL MOUIB	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00882	KAMAL AHBAR	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00883	TAREK HAMED HAMU	Male	19790702	0	Cueta, Spain	0	Spain	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00884	ZOHRA ZEWAWI	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00885	TAHER DEGHAYES	Male	19670702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00886	AMANI DEGHAYES	Female	19750702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00887	MOHAMMED BOUYERI	Male	19780702	0	Amsterdam	0	Netherlands	Morocco	West Europe
Ag00888	SAMIR AZZOUZ	Male	19860702	0	0	0	Netherlands	0	West Europe
Ag00889	ABDELADIM AKOUDAD	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00890	MOHAMMED SALAMEH	Male	19670702	19680702	Palestine	0	Jordan	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00891	AMINE MEZBAR	Male	19680702	0	Constantine , Algeria	0	Canada	Algeria	North America
Ag00892	SAMIR KISHK	Male	19550514	0	Gharbia, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00893	ABU DOHA	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00894	LASED BEN HENI	Male	19690205	0	Tripoli, Libya	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00895	MOKHTAR BOUCHOUCHA	Male	19691013	0	Tunisia	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00896	TAREK CHARAABI	Male	19700331	0	Tunisia	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00897	MOHAMMED BEN BELGACEM AOUADI	Male	19741211	0	Tunisia	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00898	ABDELKADIR ES-SAYED	Male	19620702	19610702	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00899	SALIM BOUKHARI	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00900	LAMINE MARONI	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00901	AEUROBI BEANDALI	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00902	SAMAIR KARIMOU	Male	19690702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00903	FOUHAD SABOUR	Male	19670702	0	0	0	Algeria	France	North Africa
Ag00904	TAREK MAAROUFI	Male	19651123	19620702	Ghardimaou, Tunisia	Ghar el-dimaa, Tunisia	Belgium	Tunisia	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00905	ESSOUSSI LAAROUSSI	Male	0	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00906	EMAD ABDELWAHID AHMED ALWAN	Male	19650702	0	Yemen	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag00907	AMMARI SAIFI	Male	19680101	0	Kef Rih, Algeria	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00908	RIADH JELASSI	Male	19701215	0	Al-Mohamedia, Tunisia	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00909	ABU IMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00910	YASSINE CHEKKOURI	Male	19661006	19670702	Safi, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00911	NABIL BENATTIA	Male	19660511	19670702	Tunis, Tunisia	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00912	ABDEL HALIM HAFED REMADNA	Male	19660402	19670702	Bistra, Algeria	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00913	MEHDI KHAMMOUN	Male	19680403	0	Tunis, Tunisia	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00914	ADEL BEN SOLTANE	Male	19700714	0	Tunis, Tunisia	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00915	LAZHAR BEN MOHAMMED TLILI	Male	19690326	0	Tunis, Tunisia	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00916	MANSOUR THAER	Male	19740321	19760702	Baghdad, Iraq	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag00917	HABIB WADDANI	Male	19700610	0	Tunis, Tunisia	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag00918	MOHAMMED YEHIA KAAKI	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00919	SALEH JAMAL	Male	19750702	19750702	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag00920	FARID BELARIBI	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00921	JOHAN BONTE	Male	19820702	0	0	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag00922	RACHID BENMESSAHEL	Male	19710702	0	0	0	France	Algeria	West Europe
Ag00923	ABDELKRIF LEFKIR	Male	19710702	0	0	0	France	Algeria	West Europe
Ag00924	RACHID JALIL	Male	19750702	0	Carriere Thomas, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00925	YASSINE LAHNECH	Male	19810702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00926	MOHAMED EL OMARI	Male	19790702	19810517	Carriere Thomas, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00927	ABU MUSA AL-HINDI	Male	19720702	0	India	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe
Ag00928	AHMED OMAR SAEED SHEIKH	Male	19730702	0	London, England	0	United Kingdom	Pakistan	West Europe
Ag00929	ABU FARAJ AL-LIBBI	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag00930	QARI SAIFULLAH AKHTAR	Male	0	0	Chishtian, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00931	BABAR AHMAD	Male	19740702	0	0	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe
Ag00932	MOHAMMED MASOOD AZHAR ALVI	Male	19680710	19680610	Bahawalpur, Punjab Province, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00933	FAZLUR REHMAN-KHALIL	Male	0	0	Dera Ismail Khan, North West Frontier Province, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00934	HAFIZ SAEED	Male	19500702	0	Punjab, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00935	HAMEEDULLAH NIAZI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00936	ADIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00937	KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED	Male	19650314	19650401	Badawiya neighborhood, Fahaheel, Kuwait	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag00938	MOHAMMED SOHAIL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00939	HASHIM QADEER	Male	19700702	0	Ahmed Pur Sharqia, Punjab Province, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00940	MOHAMED MRABET FAHSI	Male	19680702	0	0	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe
Ag00941	MOUNIR MRABET FAHSI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00942	MOHAMED SAID HSSISNI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00943	HASSAN MOURDOUDE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00944	MUSTAFA FAWZI AIT OUDRISS	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00945	MUSTAPHA ES SATTY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00946	ABDELHAK BOUDINA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00947	MHAMED HADDAD	Male	19640702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00948	DRISS HADDAD	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00949	HASSAN HADDAD	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00950	MOHAMED HADDAD	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00951	MAHAMAD TIAZOUNIE	Male	19720702	0	Rome, Italy	0	Italy	Syria	West Europe
Ag00952	ABDENBI LEBCHINA	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00953	MAHAMAD SULEYMAN	Male	19590702	0	Jeser, Syria	0	Syria	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00954	SAMIR SULEYMAN	Male	19740702	0	Jeser, Syria	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag00955	MUSTAPHA MOHAMED RIZK	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00956	MOHAMED KAFARNA	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag00957	OMAR SALWA	Male	19760702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00958	ZIANI MAHDI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00959	MOURAD YALA	Male	19600702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00960	REDOUAN AL-ISSAR	Male	19610702	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00961	ISMAIL AKHNIKH	Male	19820702	19830702	Amsterdam, Netherlands	0	Netherlands	0	West Europe
Ag00962	JASON WALTERS	Male	19850702	19860702	0	0	USA	Netherlands	North America
Ag00963	MARAD J.	Male	19830702	0	Chechnya, Russia	0	Russia	0	East Europe
Ag00964	NADIR ADARRAF	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00965	LABIDINE AOURGHE	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00966	MOHAMED BOUGHABA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00967	MOHAMED EL BOUSKLAOUI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00968	YOUSEF ETTOUMI	Male	19780702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00969	ZAKARIA TAYBI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00970	AHMED HAMDI	Male	19790702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00971	RASHID BOUSSANA	Male	19780702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00972	MOHAMED EL MORABIT	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00973	NOUREDINE EL FAHTNI	Male	19830702	0	Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag00974	JERMAINE WALTERS	Male	19870702	0	0	0	USA	Netherlands	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00975	EL-SAYYID NOSAIR	Male	19560702	0	Sinai Peninsula, Egypt	0	Egypt	USA (from 1989)	North Africa
Ag00976	NIDAL AYYAD	Male	19680702	0	Kuwait	0	United States (as of 1991)	0	North America
Ag00977	MAHMOUD ABOUHALIMA	Male	19600702	0	Egypt	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag00978	IBRAHIM ELGABROWNY	Male	19510702	0	Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag00979	AHMAD AJAJ	Male	19660702	0	Jerusalem	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag00980	RAMZI YOUSEF	Male	19680427	19690702	Kuwait	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00981	ABDUL MURAD	Male	19680702	0	Kuwait	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00982	BILAL ALKAISI	Male	19660702	0	Jordan	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag00983	ABDELGHANI RABIA	Male	19750702	19720702	0	0	Algeria	France	North Africa
Ag00984	FAIZA BENNOUNA	Female	19810702	0	Netherlands	0	Netherlands	0	West Europe
Ag00985	ABDELLAH BOUABDELLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag00986	MOKHTAR HAOUARI	Male	19690702	0	Algeria	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag00987	RABAH KADRE	Male	19670702	0	0	0	Algeria	France	North Africa
Ag00988	KAMEL BOURGASS	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00989	NABIL SAHRAWI	Male	19640702	0	Constantine, Algeria	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00990	SAAJID BADAT	Male	19800702	0	Gloucester, England	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe
Ag00991	BURAWI EL WAHIR	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00992	ABDESSATTAR DAHMAN	Male	19620702	0	Tunisia	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00993	ADEL TEBOURSKI	Male	19630702	19640702	Algeria	Tunisia	France	Tunisia	West Europe
Ag00994	MOHAMED ZITLI	Male	19600702	0	Algeria	0	Belgium	Algeria	West Europe
Ag00995	AHMED ELLATTAH	Male	19670702	0	Morocco	0	Belgium	Morocco	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag00996	MOKHTAR BELMOKHTAR	Male	19720601	0	Ghradieh, Algeria	Ghardaia, Algeria	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag00997	EL-ZAHRANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabi	0	Middle East
Ag00998	ABOU CHIHAB	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabi	0	Middle East
Ag00999	MOHAMED DJABER	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabi	0	Middle East
Ag01000	YASSER SAYYAF	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01001	IBRAHIM GHUREIKA	Male	0	0	Ghradieh, Algeria	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01002	HASSAN HATTAB	Male	19670702	0	Beni Mourad, Algeria	Rouiba, Algeria	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01003	NUREDDIN GHUREIKA	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01004	BILAL (GSPC)	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01006	ASSEM AL-TIBSI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01007	YEHIA (GSPC)	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01008	AL-BASHIR AL-GHARBI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01009	ABU DAJANA (GSPC)	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01010	ABDELMALIK DAROUKEDEL	Male	19700420	0	Meftah, Algeria	Khemis El Khechna, Algeria	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01011	EL CHERIF GOUSMI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01012	ABDELAZIZ ABBI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01013	REDOUAN CHEKKOURI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01014	YOUNES CHEKKOURI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01015	ABDEL HAMID SHAARI	Male	0	0	Libya	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01016	OMAR SHAABANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01017	SAID ATMANI	Male	19670702	0	Morocco	0	Morocco	Bosnia	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01018	ABDULSALAM ALI ALI ABDULRAHMAN	Male	19600702	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag01019	MEVLUET TAR	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag01020	RAMEZ SULTAN	Male	19610702	0	0	0	Australia	Lebanon	Australia
Ag01021	OTHMAN KAAKI	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag01022	MOHAMMED OMAR JAMAL	Male	19840702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01023	AHMED JAMAL	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01024	HAITHAM MULHEM	Male	0	0	Lebanon	0	Australia	0	Australia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01025	MICHAEL KANAAN	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01026	WASIM EL-ASAAD	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01027	RABEEH MAWAS	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01028	SHEIK ABDUL ZOUD	Male	0	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01029	WILLIE BRIGITTE	Male	19680702	19690702	Guadaloupe	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag01030	MAMDOUH HABIB	Male	19560702	0	Egypt	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01031	FAHEEM KHALID LODHI	Male	19700702	0	Pakistan	0	Australia (as of 2000)	0	Australia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01032	IZHAR UL-HAQUE	Male	19830702	0	Pakistan	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01033	NABIL BOUNOUR	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01034	AZNIRI FILALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01035	AHMED ZEBBAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01036	YUSSEF FIKRI	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01037	HASSAN TAOUSI	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01038	MILOUDI ZAKARIA	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01039	ABDELKRIM CHADLI	Male	19600702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01040	OMAR HADDOUCHI	Male	19610702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01041	ABDUL AZIZ JALIL	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Britain	0	West Europe
Ag01042	OMAR ABDUR REHMAN	Male	19840702	0	0	0	Britain	0	West Europe
Ag01043	MOHAMMED ZIA UL HAQ	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Britain	0	West Europe
Ag01044	NADEEM TARMOHAMED	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Britain	0	West Europe
Ag01045	MOHAMMED NAVEED BHATTI	Male	19800702	0	0	0	Britain	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01046	QUAISIR SHAFFI	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Britain	0	West Europe
Ag01047	JUNADE FEROZE	Male	19760702	0	Blackburn, England	0	Britain	0	West Europe
Ag01048	ATTA-UR RAHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01049	SHAHZAD BAJWA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01050	MASRAB AROCHI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01051	EDA KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01052	FEROZ IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	South Africa	0	South Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01053	ZUBAIR ISMAIL	Male	0	0	0	0	South Africa	0	South Africa
Ag01054	SALMAN SAQUIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01055	FAHD NASIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01056	SHEIKH ADIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01057	MOHAMMAD ASLAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01058	SADIA OMAR SHEIKH	Female	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01059	AHMED SAEED SHEIKH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01060	IMTIAZ SIDDIQE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01061	AFTAB ANSARI	Male	19650702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag01062	MAZHARUL ISLAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01063	FAZAL KARIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01064	ATTAUR REHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01065	LIAQUAT HUSSEIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01066	MAULANA TAHIR ASHRAFI	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01067	KHALID KHAWAJA	Male	19520702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01068	ZAHEERUL ISLAM ABBASI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01069	WAQAR HUSSAIN KHAN	Male	19880702	0	0	0	United States	0	North America
Ag01070	AHMED ABDULLAH MANI	Male	19900702	0	Virginia, USA	0	United States	0	North America
Ag01071	RAMAY S ZAMZAM	Male	19880702	0	Egypt	0	United States	0	North America
Ag01072	IMAN HASAN YAMAR	Male	19930702	0	0	0	United States	0	North America
Ag01073	OMAR FAROUK	Male	19860702	0	0	0	United States	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01074	MAZEN MOKHTAR	Male	19680702	0	0	0	United States	0	North America
Ag01075	SHAMIL BASAYEV	Male	19650702	0	Vedeno, Chechnya	0	Chechnya	0	East Europe
Ag01076	SYED R. MASWOOD	Male	19630702	0	Bangladesh	0	United States	0	North America
Ag01077	YASER AL JHANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01078	HASSAN ABUJIHAAD	Male	19760702	0	California	0	United States	0	North America
Ag01079	DERRICK SHAREEF	Male	19840702	0	Rockford, IL	0	United States	0	North America
Ag01080	PIR SAIFULLAH KHALID	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01081	MUFTI RASHEED AHMAD	Male	19310702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01082	MUFTI NIZAMUDDIN SHAMZAI	Male	19290702	19340702	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01083	SHER ALI SHAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01084	ABDUR RAZZAK FAROOQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01085	AZIZUR REHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01086	DIN MOHAMMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01087	MOHAMMAD NASRULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01088	ASADULLAH FAROOQ	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01089	MANSOOR AHMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01090	GHAZI BABA	Male	19610702	0	Bahawalpur , Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01091	MUHAMMAD AFZAL	Male	0	0	Kashmir	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01092	TABASSUM AFZAL	Female	19710702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01093	MOHAMMAD NAEEM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01094	SAEEDUR REHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01095	MUHAMMAD SOHAIL	Male	19870702	0	Swat, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01096	MOHAMMAD AJMAL AMIR KASAB	Male	19870913	0	Fardikot District, Punjab Province, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01097	ABDUL WAHID KASHMIRI	Male	19460702	0	Kolti District, Kashmir, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01098	ABDULLAH (FROM ANANTNAG-ISLAMABAD)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01099	HAJI MOHAMMAD AZAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01100	MUZAMMIL BUTT	Male	0	0	Gujranwala, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01101	MOHAMMAD UMAIR	Male	0	0	Madhubani, India	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01102	FAISAL DAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01103	CHOUDHRY ABDULLAH KHALID CHOHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01104	RAFIQ AKHTAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01105	AFTAB HUSSAIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01106	CHOUDHRY YOUSAF	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01107	MOHAMMAD SHRIF BALGHARI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01108	RAJA MOHAMMAD IRSHAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01109	MASOOD LONE	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01110	MEMOONA SAEED	Female	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01111	YAHYA MUJAHID	Male	19610702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01112	KHALID BASHIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01113	HAFIZ ABDUR REHMAN MAKKI	Male	19480702	0	Bahawalpur, Punjab province, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01114	HAJI MOHAMMAD ASHRAF	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01115	ABU AHMED AL HASHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01116	MOHAMMAD SARWAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01117	ABU USAMA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01118	BASHIR ALI WANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01119	SYED MOHAMMED ALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01120	MOHAMMAD AKRAM NIAZI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01121	ZIA IKRAM NIAZI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01122	RIZWAN NIAZI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01123	HAMAD NIAZI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01124	SULEMAN SAQIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01125	MOHAMED ANOUAR ZAOUDI	Male	19770702	0	Tangier, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01126	ISSA BEN OTHMAN	Male	19770702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01127	KHADIJA PODD	Female	19670702	0	0	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe
Ag01128	ABDOL GHAFFAR HASHEMI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	Netherlands	North Africa
Ag01129	NAOUFEL	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01130	ABDELKRIM BENSMAIL	Male	19630702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01131	MOHAMED AMINE AKLI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01132	BACHIR BELHAKEM	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01133	MAJID MCHMACHA	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01134	EDDEBDOUBI TAOUFIK	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01135	MOUAD DOUAS	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01136	MUSTAFA FARJANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01137	BAANOU ABDULLAH	Male	19850702	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag01138	SAID AFIF	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01139	MOKHATAR SIAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01140	DJAMEL MERABET	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01141	KAMARA BIRAHIMA DIADIE	Male	0	0	0	0	Mauritania	0	North Africa
Ag01142	BALDOMERO LARA SANCHEZ	Male	0	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag01143	SMAIL LATRECH	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01144	AHMED MOHAMED AHMED	Male	0	0	Cueta, Spain	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag01145	ALI OMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01146	MEDHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01147	MASLOHI ALI	Male	19570701	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01148	AMROUCH EL H.	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01149	RACHID BELKACEM	Male	19730702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01150	BISLAN I.	Male	19800702	0	Chechnya	0	Russia	0	East Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01151	INGRID WALTERS	Female	0	0	0	0	Netherlands	0	West Europe
Ag01152	CARL WALTERS	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01153	MALIKA CHABI	Female	19880702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01154	MOHAMMAD EL SHERSHABY	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01155	SOUMAYA SAHLA	Female	19830702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01156	ADNAN KONSTANTINE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01157	SIDDIG IBRAHIM SIDDIG ALI	Male	19620702	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01158	CLEMENT RODNEY HAMPTON-EL	Male	19380702	0	United States	0	United States	0	North America
Ag01159	ABDO MOHAMMED HAGGAG	Male	19690702	0	Cairo, Egypt	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01160	AMIR ABDELGANI	Male	19600702	19610702	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01161	FARES KHALLAFALLA	Male	19620702	19630702	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01162	TARIG ELHASSAN	Male	19550702	19560702	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01163	FADIL ABDELGANI	Male	19630702	19630702	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01164	MOHAMMED SALEH	Male	19560702	19570702	0	0	Jordan	United States	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01165	VICTOR ALVAREZ	Male	19660702	19670702	Puerto Rico	0	United States	0	North America
Ag01166	MATARAWY MOHAMMED SAID SALEH	Male	19570702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01167	EARL GANT	Male	19660702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01168	MARIANNE ABOUHALIMA	Female	19640702	0	Germany	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01169	MOHAMED ABOUHALIMA	Male	19640702	0	Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01170	ABDEL-RAHMAN JOSEPH AYYAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01171	RESIQ AYYAD	Male	19760702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01172	ABDUL AYYAD	Male	19790702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01173	ABDO YASSIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01174	IBRAHIM AHMAD SULEIMAN	Male	19640702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01175	EYAD MAHMOUD ISMOIL	Male	19710702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01176	MOHAMMAD ABUKHDEIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01177	OMAR OBAID	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01178	EDWIN ANGELES	Male	19670702	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01179	MUSTAFA AHMAD AL-HAWSAWI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01180	MOHAMAD JAMAL KHALIFA	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag01181	ALICE YABO	Female	0	0	Mindanao, Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01182	NORALYN ZARAGOSA	Female	0	0	Bulacan, Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01183	ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN	Male	19600410	0	Bloomington, Indiana	0	United States	Iraq	North America
Ag01184	WALI KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag01185	ISTIAQUE PARKER	Male	0	0	0	0	South Africa	0	South Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01186	FAZEL OMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01187	ADEL ATTAYYAB	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01188	BAHAUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01189	IBRAHIM RASUL	Male	0	0	0	0	Iran	0	Middle East
Ag01190	FAZLULLAH HAMIDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01191	SALEEM ABDEL RAHIM	Male	0	0	Syria	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01192	TARIQ RANA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01193	ABDUL SHAKUR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01194	MAHAUD AFFIF ABDEJALIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag01195	NEDAL SALEH ODEH	Male	0	0	0	0	Kuwait	0	Middle East
Ag01196	MOHAMMAD JUBRAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	Palestine	Middle East
Ag01197	AHMAD JUBRAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	Palestine	Middle East
Ag01198	WALID ISMOIL	Male	19680702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01199	MUHAMMAD ABDUL KARIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01200	MOHAMMAD SABRI SELAMAH ABUSWEIRAH	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag01201	AHAMAD ABD BIN MASRIE	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag01202	HASSAN AL DDEN HASAN ALI	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag01203	HADI YOUSEF ALGHOUL	Male	19670702	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag01204	HASSAN AL-HIND	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01205	FUAD JARDAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01206	KHALID HASSAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01207	FHAD AOUD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01208	AHMAD ABED MASRIE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01209	MUSTAFA FARAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01210	KHALIL HUSSEIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01211	HAMBALI	Male	19640404	19660702	Sukamanah, West Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01212	FATHUR ROMAN AL-GHOZI	Male	19710702	0	Maduin, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01213	FAIZ BIN ABU BAKAR BAFANA	Male	19620101	19630702	Singapore	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01214	MUKHLIS YUNOS	Male	19660707	0	LANAO DEL SUR, Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01215	AHMED SATTAR	Male	19600702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01216	ABUBKR ALY	Male	0	0	Sudan	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01217	SAAID IBRAHIM	Male	19790702	0	Ethiopia	Eritrea	Netherlands	0	West Europe
Ag01218	RACHID AHMED ZOUAOUI	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01219	ABDEL MESKINI	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01220	SAMIR AIT MOHAMED	Male	19690702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01221	ABDELMADJID DAHOUMANE	Male	19670702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01222	MUSTAFA LABSI	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01223	FATEH KAMEL	Male	19600702	0	0	0	Algeria	Canada	North Africa
Ag01224	MOHAMMED SUMIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01225	HASAN ZUMERI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01226	RABAH CHEHAJ-BIAS	Male	19810702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01227	KARIM KADOURI	Male	19690702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01228	SLIMANE KHALFAOUI	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01229	MIROUANE BEN AHMED	Male	19730702	0	0	0	France	Algeria	West Europe
Ag01230	AHMED BELHOUD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01231	MOHAMED MERBAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01232	ABDELLAH ABDELHAFID	Male	19690702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01233	MOURAD IDIR ABES	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01234	GHALEM BELHADJ	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01235	KARIM BENAMGHAR	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01236	SALAH MOULLEF	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01237	HAKIM ZIEM	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01238	SOFIANE LAHAMAR HASSIM ZIEM	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01239	DAVID AISSA KHALEF	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01240	MOULOUD SIHALI	Male	19770702	19760702	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01241	ABU HAMZA AL-MASRI	Male	19590702	0	Egypt	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01242	MOHAMMED MEGUERBA	Male	19740702	0	Belcourt, Algeria	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01243	MOHAMMAD SIDIQUE KHAN	Male	19741020	0	Leeds, England	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01244	SHEHZAD TANWEER	Male	19821215	0	Leeds, England	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01245	JERMAINE LINDSAY	Male	19850923	0	Jamacia	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01246	VALERIE TRAVERSO	Female	0	0	United Kingdom	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe
Ag01247	NAGAT CHAFFE	Female	19400702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01248	OMAR DJEDID	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01249	OMAR NAITATMANE	Male	0	0	0	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag01250	SIDALI FEDDAG	Male	19850702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01251	MUSTAPHA TALEB	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01252	MUHAMMAD AL-TAYYIB	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01253	SHAYKH ABD-AL-SAMAD AHMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01254	RICHARD REID	Male	19730702	0	London	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe
Ag01255	NOUREDDINNE MOULEFF	Male	19670702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01256	MOHAMMED BADAT	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01257	ZUBEDA BADAT	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01258	MALIKA EL AROUD	Female	19600702	0	Tanger, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01259	YOUCEF AOUNI	Male	19740702	0	Morocco	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag01260	YASSER AL-SIRI	Male	19630702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01261	ABDERAHMANE AMEROUD	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01262	MEHREZ AZOUZ	Male	19670702	0	0	0	Algeria	France	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01264	KHELLAF HAMAM	Male	19680702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01265	IBRAHIM KEITA	Male	19670702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01267	ABDELKRIM EL HADOUTI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01268	ABID HAMMADOU	Male	19460702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01269	SALIM EL-AFGHANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01270	SIDI OULD SIDNA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01271	MOHAMED OULD CHABARNOU	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01272	MAAROUF OULD HAIBA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01273	ABD-LEKHDIME	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01274	ABDEL AZIZ	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01275	KHATAB MOURAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01276	ABDELHAMID SADAOUI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01277	MOHAMED BELMOKHTAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01278	ABOU ISHAK IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01279	ASSEM ABOU SAID	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01280	ABOU DOUJANA (GSPC)	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01281	ABDELHAKIM (GSPC)	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01282	BACHIR ABOU AL BARRA	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01283	ABOU MOHAMED AL JINKI	Male	0	0	0	0	Mauritania	0	North Africa
Ag01284	ALI DIX	Male	19730702	0	Lakhdaria, Algeria	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01285	HAROUN EL ACHAACHI	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01286	ABOU-OUSSAMA	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01287	YAHIA ABOU AMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01288	ABOU DEHDEH	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01289	ABDEL ZAID ESSOUFFI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01290	HAMID ZAID ESSOUFFI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01291	EL-HADJ	Male	0	0	0	0	Nigeria	0	West Africa
Ag01292	AHMED ABOU AL-BARAA	Male	19630702	0	Budadu, Algeria	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01293	ADEL MECHAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01294	OMAR SAITI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01295	KARIM BOUTRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01296	IYAD AG GHALI	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Mali	0	West Africa
Ag01297	BABA ULD SHEIKH	Male	0	0	0	0	Mali	0	West Africa
Ag01298	MOHAMED RACHED	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01299	ANTAR ZOUABRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01300	ABOU KHALED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01301	ABDELMADJID DICHOU	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01302	AHMED CHABI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01303	MUSTAPHA EL YAZID	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01304	SAADAOUI LYES	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01305	ABOU HAYFEM	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01306	NOREDINE SKODARLI	Male	0	0	Kadara, Algeria	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01307	S.H.	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01308	M.G.	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01309	C.W.	Female	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01310	R.R.C.	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01311	Y.A.	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01312	ATIYAH ABD AL-RAHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag01313	ANOUR MAJRAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01314	LASSAD SASSI	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag01315	MUHAMMAD BENHEDI MSAHEL	Male	0	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag01316	SAMI SAYOUD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01317	ABDELLATIF ZEHRAOUI	Male	19780702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01319	ARMAN AHMED AL-HISSINI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01320	HASSAN MUSTAFA OSAMA NASR	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01321	MOHAMED GAME	Male	19740702	0	Libya	0	Libya	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01322	IGNAOUA HABIB	Male	19610702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01323	ABU HAFS THE MAURITANIAN	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Mauritania	0	North Africa
Ag01324	LUCIA GARAFALO	Female	19640702	0	0	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag01325	ABDEL HAKIM TIZEGHA	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01326	BOUABIDE CHAMCHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01327	YAMIN RACHEK	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01328	BRAHIM MAHDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01330	IHAB DAFEH	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01331	KHALED OMAR MINAWI	Male	0	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag01332	ABDULLAH AL-MUTHADI	Male	0	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag01333	ABDUL RAKIB HASAN	Male	19690702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01334	ALI JAMAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01335	MELANIE BROWN	Female	19770524	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01336	ABU SALAH	Male	0	0	Chechnya, Russia	0	Russia	0	East Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01337	SAMIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01338	MAMADOU NDAW	Male	0	0	0	0	Senegal	0	West Africa
Ag01339	MUSTAFA CHEIKHO	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01340	MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH HASAN ABU-AL-KHAYR	Male	19750619	19750618	Al-Madinah al-Munawwarah. Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01341	VICTORIA BRIGITTE	Female	0	0	0	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag01342	CHRISTIAN BRIGITTE	Male	0	0	0	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag01344	MAHA HABIB	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01345	MUHAMMAD ARIF BIN NAHARUDIN	Male	19830702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag01346	SAJID (LET)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01347	STEVEN CAI	Male	0	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01348	INAM UL-HAQUE	Male	0	0	Pakistan	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01349	IKRAM UL-HAQUE	Male	19760702	0	Pakistan	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01350	MOHAMED DAMIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01351	AHMED AL-RAFIKI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01352	ABDELMALEK BOUZGARENE	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01353	YOUSSEF ADAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01354	ABDELAZIZ FIKRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01355	MOHAMED BENHAMOU	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01356	ISAM ZAMZANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01357	ADIL ACHIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01358	MOHAMMED HAMOUMI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01359	MOHAMMED MABROUK	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01360	BENDAOUD DMIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01361	BRAHIM HAMDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01362	HICHAM DARBANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01363	SALAHEDDINE DEBICHE	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01364	MOHAMED JERMOUNI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01365	MOURAD LAMNAOUAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01366	SALEH ZARLI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01367	ABDERRAZAK FAOUZI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01368	KAMAL HANOUICHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01369	BOUCHAIB GUERMACH	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01370	LAKBIR KOUTOUBI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01371	BOUCHAIB MGHADER	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01372	OMAR MAAROUF	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01373	LAARBI DAQIQ	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01374	ABDERRAHMAN MAJDOUBI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01375	RACHID AMRINE	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01376	MILOUD MANDOUR	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01377	MUSTAPHA LAKRIMI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01378	HOUSSEIN BERGHACHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01379	YAZID AJREF	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01380	MOURAD SAROUF	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01381	MOHAMED JOK	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01382	YOUSEF JALIL	Male	19820702	0	Carriere Thomas, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01384	ABDELRAZAQ RTIWI	Male	0	0	Carriere Thomas, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01385	ABDELKADER EL ARBAOUI	Male	0	0	Carriere Thomas, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01386	AMNA EL ARBAOUI	Female	0	0	Carriere Thomas, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01387	MUSTAFA EL ARBAOUI	Male	19840702	0	Carriere Thomas, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01388	OMAR ALTIMIMI	Male	19700702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01389	YOUNIS TSOULI	Male	19840702	0	0	0	Morocco	UK	North Africa
Ag01390	WASEEM MUGHAL	Male	19830702	0	0	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe
Ag01391	TARIQ AL-DAOUR	Male	19860702	0	0	0	United Arab Emirates	0	Middle East
Ag01392	MOHAMMED FEROZE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01394	HAROON ASWAT	Male	19740702	0	Dewsbury, England	0	United Kingdom	0	West Europe
Ag01395	FARIS AL-ZAHRANI	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01396	YAQOOB SAEED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01397	UZAIR AHMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01398	SHOAIB SIDDIQUI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01399	DANISH INAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01400	NAJEEBULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01401	KHURRAM SAIFULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01402	SHAHZAD MUKHTAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01403	AKMAL WAHEED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01404	ARSHAD WAHEED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01405	RAO KHLAID	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01406	MOHAMMAD SHOAIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01407	ADNAN SHAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01408	ABDUL WAHEED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01409	JEHAN ARA	Female	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01410	ABDUL HASAB	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01411	GUL HASAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01412	HASAMUL SANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01413	TAHIR YULDASH	Male	0	0	Namangan, Uzbekistan	0	Uzbekistan	0	Central Asia
Ag01414	ABDULLAH AL-HAJ	Male	0	0	Zarqa, Jordan	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag01415	DAWAR KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01416	RIAZ BASRA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01417	USAMA KHALID	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01418	KHALID FAROUK	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01419	SUBIRA FAROUK	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01420	AMAL KHALIFA	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01421	ABDUL BASIT	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01422	SHARIF MUHAMMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01423	ABU OMAR AS-SEYF	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01424	MAGOMED YEVLOYEV	Male	19770702	0	Ingushetia, Russia	0	Chechnya	Russia	East Europe
Ag01425	ELINA ERSENOYEVA	Female	0	0	0	0	Russia	0	East Europe
Ag01426	MARIE SCHULTZ	Female	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01427	ISHAQ RIND	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01428	ZAKIUR REHMAN LAKHVI	Male	19601230	0	Okara District, Punjab Province	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01429	HAFIZ AZIZUR REHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01430	ABU ABDUR RAHMAN SAREEHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01431	ABU ANAS	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01432	MOHAMMAD QASIM	Male	19870702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01433	ABDUL QADEER KHAMOSH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01434	HAFIZ TAHIR MAHMOOD ASHRAFI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01435	ARSHAD MOHAMMED HANIF ANSARI	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag01436	SYED MOHAMMED HANIF RAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag01437	FAMIDA RAHIM	Female	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01438	FARHEEN RAHIM	Female	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag01439	NASIR MEHMOOD AHWAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01440	MOHAMMED (JEM)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01441	HAMZA (JEM)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01442	HAIDER (JEM)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01443	RANA (JEM)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01444	RAJA (JEM)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01445	AR GEELANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01446	SHAUKAT HUSSAIN GURU	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01447	AFSANA	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01448	SUBHASH MALHOTRA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01449	VIRENDRA PAL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01450	TARIQ AHMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01451	SAIFUL ISLAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01452	ABU KASHA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01453	ABU ZAID	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01454	ABDUL REHMAN DEDAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01455	KHURSHID AHMED PARREY	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01456	SEHRAI BABA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01457	GHALIB AFZAL	Male	19990702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01458	YAHYA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01459	ISMAIL KHAN	Male	19830702	0	Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01460	FAHEEM ANSARI	Male	19740702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag01461	SABAUDDIN SHAIKH	Male	19850702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag01462	HAMMAD AMIN SADIQ	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01463	DAVID HEADLEY	Male	19600702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01464	ABU AL QAMA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01465	ZARAR SHAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01466	SHAHID JAMIL RIAZ	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01467	JAMIL AHMED	Male	0	0	Battgram, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01468	MUHAMMED YOUNAS ANJAM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01469	SAMIR ALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01471	ILLYAS KASHMIRI	Male	19640210	0	Bimbur, Kashmir, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01472	ATEEQ CHAUHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01473	SHAMSHAD AHMAD SALFI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01474	ABDULLAH MUNTAZIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01475	ZAFFAR IQBAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01476	TALHA SAEED	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01477	FAWAD (COUSIN OF SULEMAN SAQIB)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01478	ADIL SHEIKH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01479	SOUBHI KINIC	Male	0	0	0	0	Algerian	0	North Africa
Ag01480	NAUREDDINE SALIN ABDOUMALOU	Male	0	0	0	0	Algerian	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01481	MOHAMED HAMID	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01482	ABDELLAH HAWARI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01483	RACHID MOHAMED MOHAMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01484	MOHAMED LEUSSADI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01485	SADE ASDE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01486	SALAH GHOULAM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01487	HADJ BOURGIBA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01488	ALI IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01489	MOHAMMED ADJIMI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01490	FARID GHRIEB	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01491	MEHREZ BEN MAHDOUD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01492	DIBALI ABDELLAH	Male	19850702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01493	AFIF MEJRI	Male	19630702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01494	YACINE AHMED NACER	Male	19710702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01495	ALI EL HEIT	Male	19700702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01496	RABAH BOURAS	Male	19620702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01497	LAMINE AHMED NACER	Male	19710702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01498	FARID AIDER	Male	19650702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01499	ANTONIO (SPANISH ARMS TRAFFICKER)	Male	0	0	0	0	Spain	0	West Europe
Ag01500	EMAD SALEM	Male	19500702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01501	ASHRAF MOHAMMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01502	AHMED YOUSIF MOHAMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01503	SIRAJ EL'DIN YOUSIF	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01504	SHEIK MUBARAK SHAH JILANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01505	JAMES WILLIAMS	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01506	STEPHEN PASTER	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01507	WARITH DEEN UMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01508	JOSE PADILLA	Male	19710702	0	Brooklyn, NY	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01509	JOHN WALKER LINDH	Male	19810702	0	Silver Spring, MD	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01511	LT. GEN. JAVED NASIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01512	YAHYA ABU UBAIDAH MUHAMMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01513	ELSIE HAMPTON-EL	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01514	LEON HOLLAND	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01515	LAMONT HOLDER	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01516	ABD AL-AZIZ UDA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01517	KHIDR ALI	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag01518	GLENN NEVILLE FORD	Male	19520702	0	0	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag01519	CABA JOSE HARRIS	Male	19550702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01520	ROBERT JUNIOR WESLEY	Male	19430702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01521	TYRONE JUNIOR COLE	Male	19590702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01522	MUSTAFA ABDU RASHID	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01523	TRACI ELAINE UPSHUR	Female	19650702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01524	VINCENTE PIERRE	Male	19580702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01525	ABDUL JABBAR	Male	19760702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01526	ABDUS-SALAAM	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01527	KAREN ANN MILLS SWEENEY	Female	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01528	LINDA LEE SANCHEZ	Female	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01529	YOUSEF AYYAD	Male	19730702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01530	EVONNE GRAVES	Female	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01531	HASAB ELRASOUL BABEKIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01532	OSMAN EL-SHEIKH	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01533	SAEED AKMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01534	ADEL ANNON	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	Pakistan	Middle East
Ag01535	EDITH GESMUNDO	Female	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01536	JOVENAL BRUNO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01537	ABURAJAK ABUBAKAR JANJALANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01538	KHADAFI MONTANO JANJALANI	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01540	ISAM MOHAMMED ABDUL HADI	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag01541	MOHAMMED ISMAEL DEIB	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag01542	NABIL NASSER AL-RIYAMI	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Oman	0	Middle East
Ag01543	WAIL RACHEL AL-KAATIB	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag01544	ASERAF ABDUL ALZOURI RAHMAN	Male	19670702	0	0	0	UAE	0	Middle East
Ag01545	ENAAM M. ARNAOUT	Male	19630702	0	Syria	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01546	SHEIK ADIL ABDUL GALIL BATARGY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01547	ABUBAKAR SHARIFADA	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01548	ZAKARIA M. SHIKH	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag01549	NORALWIZAH LEE	Female	19700702	0	Sabah, Malaysia	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01550	OMAR AL-FARUQ	Male	19710524	0	Kuwait	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag01551	GOLIYAH ASSAGAF	Male	20000702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01552	HANUN ASSAGAF	Male	20010702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01553	MIRA AGUSTINA	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01554	MAHMOUD AFIF ABDELJALIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag01555	KHALID AL-MIDHAR	Male	19750516	0	Mecca, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01556	NAWAF AL-HAZMI	Male	19760809	19760808; 19760909	Mecca, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01557	ABED SHEIKH MOHAMMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01558	ZAHED SHEIKH MOHAMMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01559	AREF SHEIKH MOHAMMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01560	ABDULLAH BIN KHALID AL-THANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Qatar	0	Middle East
Ag01561	AHMAD AL-HAMWI	Male	0	0	Syria	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01562	YAZID SUFAAT	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01563	MUHAMMAD IQBAL	Male	19570817	0	Tirpas-Selong village, East Lombok, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01564	CHOMEL SUFAAT	Female	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01565	MUHAMMAD SOBRI	Male	19570702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01566	ABU BAKAR BASHIR	Male	19380702	0	Jombang, East Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01567	SHAHRIL HAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01568	MADAM FATIMAH ZAHARA	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01569	ISMAEL LUMINGKIT ALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01570	ABDULRAHMAN ESPINA	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01571	ISMAEL NACAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01572	ABDUL MANNAN MUKSAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01573	ALEEM SHUAIB ABIDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01574	MOHAMED MANSOUR JABARA	Male	0	0	Kuwait	0	Canada	Kuwait	North America
Ag01576	ALI IMRON	Male	19670702	0	Lamongan, East Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01577	WAN MIN WAN MAT	Male	19600923	0	Malaysia	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01578	AMROZI	Male	19620705	0	Lamongan, East Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01579	MUHAMMAD ZAKARIA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01580	ALI AL-AZIA ALI	Male	19770702	0	Baluchistan	0	Pakistan	Kuwait	South Asia
Ag01581	KANKAN ABDUL QADIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01582	MARIYANI	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01583	ZUBAIR MOHAMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01584	AZAHARI HUSIN	Male	19570702	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01585	SALMAH ABDULLAH	Female	19630702	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01586	ABDUL SAID	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01587	ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI	Male	19680530	0	France	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag01588	RUSMAN GUNAWAN	Male	19760702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01589	HAMBALI'S CAMBODIAN WIFE	Female	0	0	0	0	Cambodia	0	East Asia
Ag01590	ARIFIN BIN ALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag01591	HOQUE SINDIK	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Bangladesh	0	South Asia
Ag01592	MOHAMMED NAZIR BIN LEP	Male	0	0	Malaysia	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01593	ABID KHAR	Male	19800702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01594	BASHIR MEHMOOD	Male	19800702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01595	SHAYKH MOHAMED MOKHTAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01596	SAPAE-ING BASOR	Male	0	0	0	0	Cambodia	0	East Asia
Ag01597	ESAM MOHAMID KHIRD ALI	Male	19640702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01598	ABDUL AZI HAJI CHIMING	Male	19690702	0	0	0	Thailand	0	East Asia
Ag01599	MUHAMMAD YALALUDIN MADING	Male	19630702	0	0	0	Thailand	0	East Asia
Ag01600	SMAN ISMAEL	Male	0	0	0	0	Cambodia	0	East Asia
Ag01601	IBRAHIM (JI IN CAMBODIA)	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01602	ROUSHA YASSER	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01603	KHORIYAHAN	Female	0	0	Maduin, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01604	AZZAM (JI)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01605	TAUFIQ RIFQI	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01606	ABDUL GHONI	Male	19690702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01607	IQBAL UZZAMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01608	DELIAR NOER	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01609	AL GABRE MAHMUD	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01610	ABDUL JABAR	Male	19700702	0	Jakarta, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01611	OMAR OPIK LASAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01613	AGUNG BIYADI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01617	JA'FAR BIN MISTOOKI	Male	19600702	19620702	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag01618	HASHIM BIN ABAS	Male	19610702	19620702	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag01619	IMAM SAMUDRA	Male	19700114	19700115	Tasikmalaya, West Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01620	YASSIN SYWAL	Male	19720702	0	Makassar, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01621	JULKIPLI SALIM Y SALAMUDDIN	Male	19670620	0	TULAY, JOLO SULU, Philippines	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01622	SOLAMAIN ESMAEL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01623	ARIS MUNANDAR	Male	19660702	0	Sambi, Boyolani, Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01624	AGUS DWIKARNA	Male	19640811	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01625	HUSSAIN RAMOS	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01626	ANTONIO REYES	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01627	ABDULLAH SUNGKAR	Male	19370702	0	Makassar, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01631	ZAINURI AL-GHOZI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01632	ALI GHUFRON	Male	19600202	19650702	Lamongan, East Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01633	MOHAMBEDOU OULD SLAHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Mauritania	0	North Africa
Ag01634	MR. MAURITANIA	Male	0	0	0	0	Mauritania	0	North Africa
Ag01635	KHALIL DEEK	Male	0	0	Jordan	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01636	MOURAD IKHLEF	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01637	MUHAMMAD AHMED AL-AHDAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01638	AHMED MUHAMMAD AMIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag01639	GHULAM MUSTAFA RAMA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01640	IMAM KAMEL DIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01641	NICOLAS BELLONI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01642	MOHAMED YACINE AKNOUCHE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01643	JAMES UJAAMA	Male	19660702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01644	YASIN HASSAN OMAR	Male	19810702	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01645	ATILLA AHMET	Male	19640702	0	0	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01646	MOHAMMED ANSWAR	Male	19860702	0	0	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01647	BASHIR AHMED	Male	19400702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01648	HASIB HUSSAIN	Male	19860916	0	Leeds, England	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01649	HASINA KHAN	Female	19770702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01650	MAGDY EL-NASHAR	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01651	MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01652	MANZIA HUSSAIN	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01653	IMRAN HUSSAIN	Female	19800702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01654	MOHAMMED JUNAID BABAR	Male	19760702	0	Lahore, Pakistan	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01655	OMAR KHYAM	Male	19820702	0	Crawley, West Sussex, England	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01656	ANTHONY GARCIA	Male	19830702	0	Algeria	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01657	WAHEED MAHMOOD	Male	19720702	0	Crawley, West Sussex, England	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01658	JAWAD AKBAR	Male	19840702	0	Crawley, West Sussex, England	0	England	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01659	SALAHUDDIN AMIN	Male	19750702	0	London, England	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01660	SHUJAH MAHMOOD	Male	19870702	0	Crawley, West Sussex, England	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01661	NABEEL HUSSAIN	Male	19850702	0	Horley, Surrey, England	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag01662	ZEESHAN SIDDIQI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01663	OSAMA NAZIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01664	HUSSEIN OSMAN	Male	19800702	0	0	0	Ethiopia	0	East Africa
Ag01665	MOHAMMAD MOMIN KHAWAJA	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Canada	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01666	SHERAFIYAH	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01667	ALI AYED AL-SHAMRANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01668	ABU ZUBAIR AL-HAILI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01669	KHALID BIN ODEH BIN MOHAMMED AL-HARBI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01670	FAHD AL-QUSO	Male	19741112	0	Yemen	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag01672	SAYYID QUTUB	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01673	AHMED AL ANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01674	ABDELBAKI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01675	ABDELKADER HAKIMI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01676	ABDERREHMANE AMLKI ZAKERAHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01677	ABDUL FATAH ZAMMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag01678	ABDUL HADI AL-IRAQI	Male	19600702	0	Kurdistan, Iraq	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag01679	ABU ANZAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag01680	ABU MOHAMMED AL MAQDARI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01681	ABU TALAL AL-QASIMY	Male	19570702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01682	AHMAD EL-ITTAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01683	AHMED ELOMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01684	AICHA ARBAWI	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01685	AMIR LAARAJ	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01686	ASIF REZA KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag01687	AWATES MASWOOD	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01688	AZAM CHEEMA	Male	19530702	0	Faisalabad, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01689	CAROL SANTIAGO	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01690	CHEJ SALAH	Male	19580702	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag01691	DEDI SETIONO	Male	0	0	Bogor, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01692	FARIDA PATEL	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01693	FEIZ MOHAMED	Male	19700702	0	Sydney, Australia	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01694	GEMMA CRUZ-ARANETA	Female	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01696	GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR	Male	19490801	0	Kunduz Provice, Afghanistan	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag01698	HAFIZ MOHAMMAD ABDULLAH BAHAWALPURI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01699	HAMZAR HAZIZ	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag01700	HASAN AL-TURABI	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01701	HASSAN OULAD AKCHA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01702	JACK ROCHE	Male	19530702	0	Britain	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag01703	JAFFAR UMAR THALIB	Male	19620702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01704	ABDELKARIM MEJJATI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01705	MAHMOUD JAMAL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01706	MAULVI SALEEMULLAH KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01707	MOHAMED KHAMIS MOHAMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Tanzania	0	East Africa
Ag01709	MOHAMMAD SALEEM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01710	MOHAMMED ABDULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01711	MOSSAAB KHATIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01712	MUFTI MOHAMMED JAMIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01713	MULLAH KREKAR	Male	19570702	0	0	0	Iraq	Norway	Middle East
Ag01714	MULLAH OMAR	Male	19590702	0	Singesar, Afgahnistan	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag01715	MUSTAFA (SUSPECT IN CASABLANCA BOMBINGS)	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01716	NASIR ABBAS	Male	19700702	0	Singapore	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag01717	NAZIR AHMED TAUNSVI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01718	NORA YABO	Female	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01719	OMAR KHAN SHARIF	Male	0	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag01720	OUSSAMA KASSIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Sweden	0	West Europe
Ag01721	RACHID AHMIDAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01722	REGINA KREIS	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01723	ROBERT PIERRE	Male	0	0	0	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag01724	TAHIR PERVAIZ	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01725	YAHIA DJOUADI ABOU AMMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01727	ABDERRAHMANE AMEUROUD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01728	ABDUL HAQQ BAKER	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01729	ABDUL RAHMAN ABU ABDUL NASSER AL-AASSEMI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01730	ARIF TAJIK	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01731	ASIM UZMANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01732	AZAM TARIQ	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01733	DJAMAL ZITOUNI	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01734	EDWARD FILTON	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01735	GHIAS HUSSEIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01736	HAFIZ DUR MOHAMMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01737	IBRAHIM ABU UTHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01738	IFTIKAR ALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01739	ISMAIL MULLA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01740	MARWAN AL-SHEHHI	Male	19780509	0	Ras al Khaimah, UAE	0	UAE	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01741	MAULANA YOUSUF BINNORI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01742	MOHAMMAD AMJID KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01743	MOHAMMAD UZAIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01744	MYSTERY PAKISTANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01745	QARI AHMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01746	QARI GHULAM MURTAZA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01747	RACHID RAMDA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01749	SHEIKH MOHAMMED ADEEL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01750	SUHIR A. AHMAD	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01751	ZAFAR IQBAL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01752	SHAKER AL-ABSSI	Male	19550702	0	Jericho, West Bank, Palestine	0	Palestine	Lebanon	Middle East
Ag01753	CHERIE MARIA STULTZ	Female	19680702	0	Jamacia	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01754	JOSHUA PADILLA	Male	19900702	0	USA	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01755	MUHAMMED JAVED	Male	0	0	Pakistan	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01756	SHAMIA'A	Female	19800702	0	Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01757	HUSSEIN PADILLA	Male	20000702	0	Cairo, Egypt	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01758	HASSAN PADILLA	Male	20020702	0	Tanta, Egypt	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01759	MRS. ABDULATIF MERROUN	Female	0	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag01760	ABDUL AZIZ AL OMARI	Male	19721224	19790528	Asir Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01761	SATAM AL SUQAMI	Male	19760628	0	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01762	WALI AL SHEHRI	Male	19680901	0	Asir Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01763	WALEED AL SHEHRI	Male	19740913	19760101; 19760303; 19770708; 19781220; 19790511; 19791105	Asir Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01764	FAYEZ BENIHAMMAD	Male	19770319	0	Khorfakkan, UAE	0	UAE	0	Middle East
Ag01765	MOHAND AL SHEHRI	Male	19790507	0	Asir Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01766	AHMED AL GHAMDI	Male	0	0	al Bahah region, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01767	HAMZA AL GHAMDI	Male	19801118	0	Ajandam, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01768	MAJED MOQED	Male	19770618	0	Annakhil, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01769	HANI HANJOUR	Male	19720830	0	Ta'if, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01770	SALEM AL HAZMI	Male	19810202	0	Mecca, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01771	SAEED AL GHAMDI	Male	19791121	0	al Bahah region, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01772	AHMED ABDULLAH ALNAMI	Male	19771207	0	Jeddah, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01773	AHMAD AL HAZNAWI	Male	19801011	0	al Bahah region, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01774	ZIAD JARRAH	Male	19750511	0	Mazarra, Lebanon	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag01775	KHALED MOHAMMED AL-ALI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01776	MOHAMMED BIN USAMA BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01777	SAAD BIN USAMA BIN LADEN	Male	19820702	19810702	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag01778	HAMZA BIN USAMA BIN LADEN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01780	OMAR AL-KHATAB	Male	0	0	0	0	Chechnya	0	East Europe
Ag01781	ALI MAHMUD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01782	ABOUD ROGO	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01783	MOHAMED KUBWA	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01784	KARIM (MOMBASA ATTACKS)	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01785	SAID SAGGAR AHMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01786	AMINA MOHAMMED KUBWA	Female	19890702	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01787	ADNAN G. EL SHUKRIJUMAH	Male	19750804	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Guyana	Saudi Arabia	South America/Carribbean
Ag01788	ADERRAUF JDEY	Male	19760702	0	Tunisia	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag01789	AMER EL-MAATI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01790	ADAM GADAHN	Male	19780901	0	Riverside County, CA	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01791	SALEH ALI SALEH NABHAN	Male	19810702	19790702	Mombasa, Kenya	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01792	HALIMA BADROUDINE FAZUL HUSSEINE	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01793	HASHI HUSSEIN FARAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01794	UMAR FAROUK ABDULMUTALAB	Male	19870702	0	0	0	Nigeria	0	West Africa
Ag01795	OMAR AWADH OMAR	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01796	HUSSEIN HASSAN AGADE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01797	ISSA OSMAN ISSA	Male	19730702	0	Malindi, Kenya	0	Kenya	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01798	FUMO MOHAMED FUMO	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01799	SALIM SAMIR BA'AMER	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01800	AHMED HAJJI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag01801	DABBAS BIN MOHAMMED AL-DABBASY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01802	MOHAMMED ALI SALEH NABHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01803	NASSEM	Female	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01804	MUNIRA	Female	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01805	ALI SAGGAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01806	HANIYA	Female	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01807	OMAR SAID OMAR	Male	19710702	0	Mombasa, Kenya	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01809	SULEIMAN ABDALLA SALIM HEMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01810	SALMIN MOHAMMED KHAMIS	Female	19760702	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01811	FAISAL ALI NASSOR	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01812	OMAR FAROOQ	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01813	MOHAMMED ILLYAS	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01814	ANNELIESE BAHAJI	Female	0	0	0	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag01815	NESE KUL	Female	0	0	0	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag01816	MOUNIR EL-MOTASSADEQ	Male	19750702	0	Marrakesh, Morocco	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag01817	HAMZA RABIA	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01818	KUBWA MOHAMMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01819	SWALHA KUBWA	Female	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01820	AAFIA SIDDIQUI	Female	19720702	0	Karachi, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01821	CHARLES TAYLOR	Male	0	0	0	0	Liberia	0	West Africa
Ag01822	AISHA NABHAN	Female	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01823	SHEIKH MUKHTAR ABDIRAHMAN ABU-ZUBEYR	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag01824	OMAR HAMMAMI	Male	19840702	0	Alabama, USA	0	USA	0	North America
Ag01825	AL-AMIN KIMATHI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01826	BILAL EL BERJAWI	Male	19840928	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01827	OMAR BADRUDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01828	WALLA ELDIN ABDEL RAHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01829	SAKRIH MOHAMMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01830	HASSAN AGADE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01831	FARIDAH HAMUBU	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01832	FATUMA SAIDI ABUDULLAR	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01833	EDRISA ISSA LUYIMA	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Uganda	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01834	EDRISA NSUBUGA	Male	19800702	0	0	0	Uganda	0	East Africa
Ag01835	HARUNA HASSAN LUYIMA	Male	19830702	0	0	0	Uganda	0	East Africa
Ag01836	MOHAMOOD MUGISHA	Male	0	0	0	0	Uganda	0	East Africa
Ag01837	HAMID MOHAMED SULEIMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01838	YAHYA SULEIMAN MBUTHIA	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01839	HABIB SULEIMAN NJOROGE	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag01840	HUSSEIN HASSAN AGADE	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01841	HASSAN FROM SOMALIA	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag01842	KASULE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01843	IDRIS MAGONDU	Male	0	0	0	0	Uganda	0	East Africa
Ag01844	MUSTAFA ABU AL YAZID	Male	19560702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag01845	INTIKHAB AHMED ABBASI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01846	MOHAMMAD KABIR ABBOTABAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01847	ABID KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01848	ZAFARALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01849	QAMAR ZAMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01850	MOHAMMAD ISHAQUE	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01852	SHAMSUL HAQ	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01853	ABU GHARIB AL-MAKKI KAMAL SALIM ATTIYA AL-FUDLI AL-HADHLI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01854	RAO SHAUKAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01855	MURSALEEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01856	FAHAD MUNIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01860	MUHAMMAD ASIF ALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01861	ABDUL REHMAN (HUJI)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01862	MUREED AHMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01863	DR. USMAN/AQEEL	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01864	ATTAULLAH KHAN	Male	19850702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01865	FAISAL AHMED KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01866	DR ABDUL RAZZAQ	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01867	ZEESHAN JALIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01868	MOHAMMAD SARFARAZ	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01869	MOHAMMAD NAEEM SHAKIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01870	MOHAMMAD NADEEM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01871	MOHAMMED SIDDIQUI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01872	ISMAT SIDDIQUI	Female	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01873	FOWZIA SIDDIQUI	Female	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01874	MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01875	SUHEIL LAHER	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01876	MOHAMAD AKRA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01877	MOHAMMAD AMJAD KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01878	AHMED KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01879	MIRIAM KHAN	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01880	SULIEMAN KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01881	MAJID KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01882	UZAIR PARACHA	Male	19800702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01883	ALI SHINAWY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01884	HAMDI MOUSSA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01885	MOHAMMAD SAAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01886	WALID BIN ATTASH	Male	19790702	0	Yemen	0	Yemen	Saudi Arabia	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01887	GOULED HASSAN DOURAD	Male	19740702	0	Mogadishu, Somalia	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag01888	MUSA ALI SAID AL SAID AL UMARI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01889	ANWAR HAMDAN MUHAMMAD AL NUR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01890	NAJIBULLAH ZAZI	Male	19850702	0	Paktia, Afghanistan	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag01891	ZURAH ADBU AHMED	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag01892	MAHMOUD TALEB	Male	0	0	Gaza	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag01893	IYMAN FARIS	Male	19690604	0	Kashmir	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01894	ABDUL RAOUF HAWAS	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag01896	QAMAR MOHAMMAD AYUB	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag01897	YUSUF POLAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag01898	LOUAI SAKKA	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag01988	HABIB AKTAS	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag01989	BAKI YIGIT	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag01990	GURCAN BAC	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01991	FEVZI YITIZ	Male	0	0	Van, Turkey	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag01992	ADNAN ERSOZ	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag01993	MESUT CABUK	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag01994	GOKHAN ELALTUNTAS	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag01995	FERIDUN UGURLU	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag01996	ILYAS KUNCAK	Male	19560702	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag01997	HARUN ILHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag01998	IBRAHIM KUS	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag01999	AZAD EKINCI	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag02000	SEYIT ERTUL	Male	0	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag02001	HAMED OBYSI	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag02002	SERVET YITIZ	Male	0	0	Van, Turkey	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag02003	IMAD MUGHNIYEH	Male	0	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag02004	JAMAL AHMED MOHA MED ALI AL-BADAWI	Male	19600722	19601023	Al-Shargian, Makiris, Yemen	0	Yemen	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02005	ABDUL RAHIM MOHAMMED HUSSEIN ABDA AL-NASHERI	Male	19650105	0	Mecca, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02006	IBRAHIM AL-THAWAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02007	HASSAN AWADH AL-KHAMRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02008	MOHD FARIK BIN AMIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02009	SULIEMAN ABU GHAITH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02010	MUHAMMAD AL-QAHTANI	Male	19790702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02011	SAIFULLAH PARACHA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02012	IBN AL-KHATTAB	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	Jordan	Middle East
Ag02013	HASSAN ATTASH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02014	MUHAMMAD ATTASH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02015	ALI ABD AL-RAHMAN AL-FAQASI AL-GHAMDI	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02016	TURKI NASSER AL-DANDANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02017	KHALED MOHAMMAD BIN MUSLIM AL-ARAWI AL-JUHANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02018	MOHAMMED OTHMAN ABDULLAH AL-WALIDI AL-SHEHRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02019	HANI SAEED AHMAD AL ABDUL-KARIM AL-GHAMDI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02020	JUBRAN ALI AHMAD HAKAMI KHABRANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02021	KHALED BIN IBRAHIM MAHMOUD BAGHDADI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02022	MEHMAS BIN MOHAMMED MEHMAS AL-HAWASHLEH AL-DOSARI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02023	MOHAMMED BIN SHADHAF ALI AL-MAHZOUM AL-SHEHRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02024	HAZEM MOHAMMED SAEED KASHMIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02025	MAJED ABDULLAH SA'AD BIN OKAIL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02026	BANDAR BIN ABDUL-RAHMAN MENAWER AL-RAHIMI AL-MUTAIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02027	ABDUL-KARIM MOHAMMED JUBRAN YAZJI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02028	ABDULLAH FARRES BIN JUFAIN AL-RAHIMI AL-MUTAIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02030	AMMAR AL-WAELI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag02031	QASIM MOHAMED (AIAI)	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02032	MOHAMED AL KAHTANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02033	YOUNIS KHALIS	Male	0	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02034	AHMED SHAH MASSOUD	Male	0	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag02035	ABU BARA AL YEMENI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag02036	SALAH AL DIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02037	AYSEL SENGUEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag02038	KHALID AL-MASRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt?	0	North Africa
Ag02040	KHADR ABU HOSHAR	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag02041	RAED HIJAZI	Male	19700702	0	California	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02042	MOHAMAD KAMAL ELZAHABI	Male	19630702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02043	SAAD HIJAZI	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02044	HUSSEIN TURI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag02045	OSAMA SUMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag02046	MOHAMMED HIJAZI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02047	MOHDAR ABDULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02048	KHALLAM (CALIFORNIA)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

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Ag02049	FAHAD AL THUMAIRY	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02050	OMAR AL BAYOUMI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02051	OSAMA AWADALLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag02052	OMAR BAKARBASHAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02053	ANWAR AULAQI	Male	0	0	New Mexico, USA	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02054	YAZEED AL SALMI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02055	EYAD AL RABABAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02056	SULAYMAN AL ALWAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02057	MUSHABIB AL HAMLAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02058	SAUD AL RASHID	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02059	ZUHAIR AL THUBAITI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02060	QUTAYBAH AL NAJDI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02061	SAEED AL BALUCHI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02062	ABU TURAB AL JORDANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02063	ABD AL RAHIM GHULUM RABBANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02064	ABDULLAH SINDHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02065	AWS AL MADANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02066	ABDEL KARIM AL NASSER	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02067	AHMED AL-MUGHASSIL	Male	19670627	0	Qatif Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02068	ALI AL-HOURI	Male	19650710	0	El Dibabiya, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02069	HANI AL-SAYEGH	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

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Ag02070	IBRAHIM AL-YACOUB	Male	19661016	0	Tarut, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02071	MUSTAFA AL-QASSAB	Male	0	0	Qatif Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02072	SA‘ED AL-BAHAR	Male	0	0	Qatif Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02073	ABDALLAH AL-JARASH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02074	HUSSEIN AL-MUGHIS	Male	0	0	Qatif Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02075	ALI AL-MARHOUN	Male	0	0	Qatif Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02076	SALEH RAMADAN	Male	0	0	Qatif Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02077	MUSTAFA MU‘ALEM	Male	0	0	Qatif Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02078	AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI	Male	19000517	19020924	Khomein, Iran	0	Iran	0	Middle East
Ag02079	FADEL AL-ALAWE	Male	0	0	Qatif Province, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02080	JOHN DOE (HIZBALLAH)	Male	0	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag02081	ADEL RAFEEA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02082	IBRAHIM MAIDIN	Male	19510702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag02083	OTHMAN MOHAMED	Male	19600702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02084	MAS SELAMAT BIN KASTARI	Male	19610702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag02085	KHALIM JAFFAR	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag02086	AB WAHAB BIN AHMAD	Male	19610702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag02087	SYED IBRAHIM	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag02088	MOHAMMAD ASLAM BIN YAR ALI KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag02089	FATHI ABU BAKAR BAFANA	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag02090	ADNAN BIN MUSA	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02091	MOHAMED NAZIR MOHMMED UTHMAN	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag02092	SABAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02093	ANDREW GERARD	Male	16980702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag02094	HALIM BIN HUSSAIN	Male	19610702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag02095	TENGKU ISMUHADI	Male	0	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02096	DIDIN ROSMAN	Male	19580702	0	Pesar Ucing, Garut, West Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02097	TAUFIK ABDUL HALIM	Male	19760702	0	Muar Johor, Malaysia	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia

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Ag02098	ABDULLAH ANSHORI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02099	IRFAN AWWAS SURYAHARDY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02100	MURSALIN DAHLAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02101	FUAD AMSYARI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02102	ENJANG BASTAMAN	Male	19620702	0	Banjarsari, Ciamis, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02103	ZULKIFLI MARZUKI	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02104	DAUD BEUREUEH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02105	HASAN DI TIRO	Male	0	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02106	ABU HASBI GEUDONG	Male	0	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02107	CHADIJAH GEUDONG	Female	0	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02108	MUCHTAR GEUDONG	Male	0	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02109	FAUZI GEUDONG	Male	0	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02110	SYAFRIE SJAMSUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02111	ABU HURAERAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02112	AKIM HAKIMUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02113	HENDROPRIYONO	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02114	LIGADINSYAH	Male	19620702	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02115	FADLI	Male	0	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02116	EDI SUGIARTO	Male	19550822	0	Medan, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02117	POLEM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02118	RAMLI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02119	BASUKI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02120	MOHAMMED FAWAZI	Male	0	0	Lombok, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02121	SYAHRIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02122	UMAR (JI-BANDUNG)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02123	HAJI ACENG SUHERI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02124	AGUS KURNIAWAN	Male	19780809	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02125	RONY MILYAR	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02126	WAWAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02127	DEDI MULYADI	Male	19690702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02128	HOLIS	Male	0	0	Taskimalaya, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02129	YOYO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02130	RAJA HUSAIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02131	ABDUL AZIZ KAHAR MUZAKKAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02132	HARIS FADILLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02133	KYAI SALEH AS‘AD	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02134	ABDUL RAUF	Male	19810702	0	Cipodoh, Tangerang, West Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02135	YUDI/ANDRI	Male	19800702	0	Sukamanah, Malimping, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02136	AGUS HIDAYAT	Male	0	0	Sukamanah, Malimping, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02138	IQBAL (BALI BOMBER)	Male	19800702	0	Sukamanah, Malimping, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02139	APRIANTO	Male	0	0	Kasemen, Serang, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02140	PUJATA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02141	IKHWAN FAUZI	Male	0	0	Kasemen, Serang, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02142	FATURRAHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02143	ZULKIFLI BIN ABDUL HIR	Male	19660105	0	Muar, Johor, Malaysia	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02144	ZULKARNAEN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02145	THORIQUDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02146	MUSTOPA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02147	MUSTAQIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02148	MUSTAFA MASHUR	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag02149	MUHAMMAD SAUWKI AL-ISTAMBULI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag02150	AJENGAN MASDUKI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02151	SALAHUDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02152	HABIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02153	ACHMAD ROIHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02154	MOHAMMED FAIQ HAFIDZ	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02155	MOHAMED QITAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02156	AHMAD SAJULI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02157	SYUNON	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02158	MUCHLIANSYAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02159	ASEP DANU	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02160	FIRDAUS	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02161	ZUHRONI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02162	FARIHIN AHMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02163	ARKAM/ARQOM	Male	19600702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02165	UTOMO PAMUNGKAS	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02166	DULMATIN	Male	19700606	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02167	USAID	Male	0	0	Karanganyar, Solo, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02168	MUCHTAR DAENG	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02169	KAHAR MUSTAFA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02170	SYARIFUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02171	BASYIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02172	MOH. JAUHARI BIN ABDULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02173	DADANG SURATMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02175	SUHEIMI	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02176	JAMSARI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02177	ABDUL RAZAK	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02178	MUHAMMAD TAUFIQURRAHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02179	ABAS BIN LATIF	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02180	SARJIYO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02181	MUHAJIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02182	ACHMAD DAHLAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02183	MUCHLIANSYAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02184	HAJI MOH. FALEH OF KUDUS	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02185	HAJI DANU MUH	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02186	ABDUL ROCHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02187	JAMALUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02188	ZAINI ZAKARIA	Male	19680702	0	Kelantan, Malaysia	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02189	ZAMZURI	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02190	HENRY BIN MANSOUR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02191	FATURAHMAN DAEMUGADING	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02192	ZAITUN RASMIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02193	AGUNG HAMID	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02194	HISBULLAH RASYID	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02195	ANTHON	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02196	ILHAM RIYADI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02197	MANSUR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02199	DAHLAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02200	ASHAR DAENG SALAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02201	SALAMAT HAYSIM	Male	19420702	0	Cotabato Region, Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02202	SARDJONO GABRIEL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02203	SYAIFUL GABRIEL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02204	MACHMUDI HARIONO	Male	19760702	0	Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02205	FAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02206	SURYADI MAS‘UD	Male	19720702	0	Makassar, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02207	HASTA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02208	IMAM HANAFI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02209	SOLAHUDIN AL-AYUBI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02210	USTADZ YUNUS	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02211	USTADZ AZHARI DIPOKUSUMO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02212	FARIDA BIN ABBAS	Female	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02213	WAHYUDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02214	FERIAL MUCHLIS ABDUL HALIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02215	ISNAIRIN BINTI ABDUL ROSYID	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02216	ASADULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02217	YOYOK	Male	0	0	Ring Condet, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02218	ZULFIKAR	Male	0	0	Tanjung Priok, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02219	ABDULLAH (DI)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02220	EDY RIANTO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02221	NAIMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02222	EDY TAUFIK	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02223	SUHENDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02224	ROJAK	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02225	MUSTAQIM (AMIN)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02226	MATORI ABDUL JALIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02227	ZULKIFAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02228	TAJUL ARIFIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02229	NOORDIN MOHD TOP	Male	19680811	0	Johor, Malaysia	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02230	KANG JAJA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02231	NURUDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02232	IWAN/ROIS	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02233	MIA IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02234	USTADZ HERI HAFIDZIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02235	ASEP/DARWIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02236	DIDIN RAIDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02237	SARKONI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02238	HARIS (FATHER OF UYOK)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02239	HENRI GOLUN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02240	APUY	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02241	UYOK	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02242	FATHURROBI/HARUN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02243	OMAN ROCHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02244	HASAN (JI)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02245	GEMPUR BUDI ANGKORO	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02246	CHANDRA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02247	MOHAMED IKHWAN	Male	19810702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02248	SURAMTO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02249	IRUN HIDAYAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02251	MOHAMED RAIS	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02252	TONI TOGAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02253	RIAU	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02254	MASRIZAL BIN ALI UMAR	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02255	SARDONA SILIWANGI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02256	MOHAMED IHSAN	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02257	ASMAR LATIN SANI	Male	19750702	0	West Sumatra, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02258	ABU DUJANA	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02259	QOTADAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02260	SEF/FAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02261	SON HADI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02262	KHUMAIDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02263	HENRI SIGU SAMBOJA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02264	ACHMAD HASAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02265	ADUNG	Male	19590702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02266	SYAIFUDDIN UMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02267	BAGUS BUDI PRANOTO	Male	19781102	0	Kudus, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02268	LUFTI HAIDAROH	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02269	HERI/UMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02270	MUNFIATUN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02271	SAPTONO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02272	WIWIT	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02273	AWAL PURNOMO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02274	AGUS AHMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02275	ROSIHIN NOOR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02276	IWAN SAJAI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02277	LIS	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02278	ENGKOS KOSASIH	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02279	BAHARUDIN SOLEH	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02280	DIDI/RIJUL	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02281	KOMARUDIN	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02282	HERNIANTO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02283	MAKAFRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02284	MOH NAJIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02285	HERLAMBANG	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02286	SAIFUL	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02287	WIBOWO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02288	MUSAFAK	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02289	ABDULLAH SUNATA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02290	ABDUL MALIK	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02291	ACENG KURINA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02292	ALI ZEIN	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02293	ABDUL ROHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02294	PURNAMA PURTA	Male	19810702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02295	ENCENG KURINA	Male	19720702	0	Bandung, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02296	HARI KUNCORO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02297	UMAR PATEK	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02298	HILMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02299	UMAR (WAIMURAT CAMP)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02300	ALI (WAIMURAT CAMP)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02301	SALMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02302	MOHAMED SAIFUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02303	DANI CHANDRA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02304	IQBAL HUSEINI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02305	IMAM BUKHORI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02306	JOKO HARUN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02307	SALIK FIRDAUS	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02309	ABDUL AZIZ (PEKALONGAN)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02310	MISRO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02311	SUBUR SUGIARTO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02312	ANIF SOLCHANUDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02313	AIP HIDAYAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02315	JUNAEDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02316	MAKMURI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02317	EKO HADI PRASETYO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02318	PURYANTO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02319	FIRMANSYAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02320	HAMZA BAYA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02321	MUJAROT	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02322	SIROJUL	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02323	IMAN SUSANTO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02324	MASYKUR ABDUL KADIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02325	SUKASTOPO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02326	SOFYAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02327	ILHAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02328	BAHARUDIN LATIF	Male	19510702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02329	SAIFUDDIN ZUHRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02330	ARINA RAHMAH	Female	19850702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02332	ANI SUGANDI	Male	19660702	0	South Sumatra, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02333	ABDUR ROHIM BIN THOYIB	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02334	ZARKASIH	Male	19620702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02335	ALI MASYHUDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02336	MOHAMED HASSAN BIN SAYNUDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02337	TAUFIK AHMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02338	SAYUTI	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02339	ABDURRAHMAN TAIB	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02340	SUKARSO ABDILLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02341	HELMI HANAFI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02342	YUDO HASTOYO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02343	AGUSTIWARMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02344	HERI PURWANTO	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02345	SUGIARTO	Male	19850702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02346	WAHYUDI	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02347	SULTHON QOLBI	Male	0	0	Madura, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02348	YOSI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02349	OLOAN MARTUA HARAHAP	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02350	TIMOTIUS	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02351	IWAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02352	KI AGUS MUHAMMAD TONI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02353	IBROHIM	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02354	AMIR IBRAHIM	Male	19760702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02355	AIR SETYAWAN	Male	19810702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02356	EKO JOKO SARJONO	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02357	DANI DWI PERTAMA	Male	19910702	0	Bogor, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02358	NANA IKHWAN MAULANA	Male	19810702	0	Pandeglang, Banten, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02359	SYAIFUDIN JAELANI	Male	19770702	0	Kuningan, Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02360	MUJAHRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02361	IWAN HERDIANSYAH	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02362	ALI MUHAMMAD	Male	19580702	0	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	0	Saudi Arabai	0	Middle East
Ag02363	MOHAMAD SJAHRIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02364	MISTAM HUSAMUDIN	Male	0	0	Purbalingga, Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02365	MOHAMAD JIBRIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02366	UMAR BURHANUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02367	RINA	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02368	PARMIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02369	AHMAD JAELANI	Male	0	0	Kuningan, Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02370	SUCIHANI	Female	0	0	Kuningan, Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02371	ERY	Female	0	0	Kuningan, Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02372	AHMAD ISROFIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02373	ABU MUHAMMAD AL-MAQDISI	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag02374	NIKO/JUNDI	Male	0	0	Cibubur, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02375	HASAN NOOR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02376	SIBGHO/MUS'AB	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02377	ISMET KAKIKI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02378	KAMALUDIN BIN KHASAN	Male	19810702	0	Majalengka, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02379	GEMA AWAL RAMADHAN	Male	0	0	Medan, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02380	HALAWI MAKMUN	Male	0	0	Bogor, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02381	YUDI ZULFAHRI	Male	19830702	0	Keutapang, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02382	MOH. SOFYAN TSAURI	Male	0	0	Cirebon, Java, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02383	ABU NUR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02384	TGK. AHMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02385	ALI ARAFAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02386	TGK. MUSLIM ATTAHIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02387	MUCHTAR IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02388	TAUFIK MARZUKI	Male	0	0	Pidie, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02389	AZWANI/ABU MATANG	Male	0	0	Bireun, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02390	AZWAR/ABU RECONG	Male	0	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02391	MUNIR/ABU RIMBA	Male	19850702	0	Aceh Besar, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02392	MUHSIN/IMAM MUDA	Male	0	0	Pidie, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02393	MUHIBUDDIN	Male	0	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02394	MUKHLIS (SOFYAN'S TRAINEE)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02395	MUHAMMAD TOAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02396	AHMAD SAYID MAULANA	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02397	JOKO SULISTYO	Male	0	0	Boyolali, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02398	AULIA SYAHIDAH	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02399	MASYKUR RAHMAT	Male	19890702	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02400	BAYU SENO	Male	0	0	Solo, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02401	PANDU WICAKSONO WIDYANPUTRO	Male	0	0	Solo, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02402	YUSUF ARIFIN	Male	0	0	Lampung, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02403	ALI FROM ACEH	Male	0	0	Aceh, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02404	USMAN/GITO	Male	0	0	Lampung, Indonesia	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02405	ENAL TA'O	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02406	ILYAS (GAM)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02407	RASYID RIDHO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02408	AFIF ABDUL MAJID	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02409	MUSTAQIM MUZAYYIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02410	HARIS AMIR FALAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02411	HARIYADI USMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02412	SYARIF USMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02413	SUMARNO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02414	MOHAMED AMIN MUSA	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02415	SILVESTER TENDEAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02416	YAHYA GOBA	Male	19770130	0	USA	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02417	SAHIM ALWAN	Male	19721209	0	USA	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02418	SHAFAL MOSED	Male	19780611	0	USA	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02419	YASEIN TAHER	Male	19771209	0	USA	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02420	FAYSAL GALAB	Male	19760326	0	USA	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02421	JABER ELBANEH	Male	19670702	0	Yemen	0	Yemen	USA	Middle East
Ag02422	MUKTAR AL-BAKRI	Male	19800420	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02423	MOHAMMED ALBANNA	Male	19510702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02424	KAMAL DERWISH	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02425	ABU ALI AL-HARITHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag02426	MOHAMED HAMDI AL-AHDAL	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabai	0	Middle East
Ag02427	BANDAR BIN ABDURRAHMAN AL-GHAMDI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02428	AHMED BILAL	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02429	MUHAMMAD BILAL	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02430	PATRICE LUMUMBA FORD	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02431	JEFFREY BATTLE	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02432	HABIS AL SAOUB	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag02433	KHALED ALI STEITIYE	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02434	MAHER HAWASH	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02435	OCTOBER LEWIS	Female	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02436	JUMA AL-DOSARI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02437	BINYAM AHMED MUHAMMAD	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Ethiopia	0	East Africa
Ag02438	ADHAM AMIN HASSOUN	Male	19620702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02439	MOHAMED HESHAM YOUSSEF	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02440	KIFAH WAEL JAYYOUSI	Male	19620702	0	Jordan	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02441	KASSEM DAHER	Male	0	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02443	ALI AL-TIMMI	Male	19640702	0	Washington, D.C.-metro area	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02444	MASOUD KHAN	Male	19720702	0	Pakistan	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02445	RANDALL ROYER	Male	19730702	0	St. Louis, MO	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02446	YONG KWON	Male	19760702	0	South Korea	0	USA	South Korea	North America
Ag02447	MUHAMMAD AATIQUE	Male	19730702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02448	KHWAJA HASAN	Male	19760702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02449	DONALD SURRATT	Male	19730702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02450	HAMMAD ABDUR-RAHEEM	Male	19690702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02451	CALIPH ABDUR-RAHEEM	Male	19750702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02452	SEIFULLAH CHAPMAN	Male	0	0	California	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02453	NURADIN M. ABDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02454	JAMES ELSHAFAY	Male	19850702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02455	SHAHWAR MARTIN SIRAJ	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02456	YASSIN MUHIDDIN AREF	Male	19700702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02457	MOHAMMED MOSHARREF HOSSAIN	Male	19550702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02458	KEVIN JAMES	Male	19760702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02459	LEVAR WASHINGTON	Male	19800702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02460	GREGORY PATTERSON	Male	19840702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02461	HAMMAD SAMANA	Male	19840702	0	0	0	Pakistan	USA	South Asia
Ag02462	MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS	Male	19580702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02463	SHANNEN ROSSMILLER	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02464	SYED HARIS AHMED	Male	19840702	0	Pakistan	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02465	EHSANUL ISLAM SADEQUEE	Male	19860702	0	Virginia, USA	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02466	FAHIM AHMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02467	AZDI ORNANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02468	AABID HUSSEIN KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02469	ZUBAIR AHMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02470	MIRSAD BEKTASEVIC	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02471	NARSEAL BATISTE	Male	19740702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02472	PATRICK ABRAHAM	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Haiti	0	South America/Carribbean
Ag02473	STANLEY GRANT PHANOR	Male	19750702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02474	NAUDIMAR HERRERA	Male	19840702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02475	BURSON AUGUSTIN	Male	19850702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02476	ROTHSCHILD AUGUSTINE	Male	19840702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02477	LYGLENSON LEMORIN	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Haiti	0	South America/Carribbean

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02478	ASSAD SARWAR	Male	19800524	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02479	ABDULLA AHMED ALI	Male	19801010	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02480	TANVIR HUSSAIN	Male	19810221	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02481	ARAFAT KHAN	Male	19810518	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02482	IBRAHIM SAVANT	Male	19801219	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02483	WAHEED ZAMAN	Male	19840527	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02484	UMAR ISLAM	Male	19780423	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02485	DONALD STEWART-WHYTE	Male	19870702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02486	MOHAMMED GULZAR	Male	19820702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02487	MUKTAR SAID IBRAHIM	Male	19780702	0	Eritrea	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02488	RASHID RAUF	Male	19810702	19770702	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02489	RAMZI MOHAMED	Male	19820702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02490	ADEL YAHYA	Male	19820702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02491	MANFO ASIEDU	Male	19730702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02492	ABDUL SHERIF	Male	19770702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02493	SIRAJ ALI	Male	19750702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02494	MUHEDIN ALI	Male	19780702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02495	YESHIEMBERT GIRMA	Female	19760702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02496	WAHBI MOHAMMED	Male	19830702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02497	ISMIL ABDURAHMAN	Male	19820702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02498	ABDULLAH EL-FAISAL	Male	19640702	0	Jamacia	0	Jamacia	0	South America/Carribbean

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02499	ESAYAS GIRMA	Male	19850702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02500	MULUMEBET GIRMA	Female	19840702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02501	MOHAMED KABASHI	Male	19820702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02502	ABDUL MUHAMMAD	Male	19850709	0	Memphis, TN	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02503	ADIS MEDUNJANIN	Male	19850702	0	Bosnia	0	Bosnia	0	East Europe
Ag02504	ZAREIN AHMEDZAY	Male	19860702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02505	ALI SALEH KAHLAH AL-MARRI	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	Qatar	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02506	JEHAD SERWAN MOSTAFA	Male	19880702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02507	AMINA FARAH ALI	Male	19770702	0	Somalia	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02508	HAWO MOHAMED HASSAN	Male	19470702	0	Somalia	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02509	MOHAMUD ABDI YUSUF	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02510	DUANE MOHAMED DIRIYE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02511	ABDI MAHDI HUSSEIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02512	SHEIKH SAAID	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02513	ABID NASSER	Male	19860702	0	Peshawar, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02514	TARIQ UR REHMAN	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02515	SALEH AL-SOMALI	Male	19690702	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02517	ADEN HASHI AYROW	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02518	MOHAMED IBRAHIM AHMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Eritrea	0	East Africa
Ag02519	MOHAMAD SHNEWER	Male	19850702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02520	DRITAN DUKA	Male	19780702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02521	ELJVIR DUKA	Male	19830702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02522	SHAIN DUKA	Male	19810702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02523	SERDAR TATAR	Male	19830702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02524	AGRON ABDULLAHU	Male	19820702	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02525	ZENAB ARMANDPISHEH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02526	OMAR BAKRI MOHAMMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02527	ABU MUNTHIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02528	ZABI UL-TAIFI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02529	RUSSELL DEFREITAS	Male	19440702	0	Guyana	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02530	KAREEM IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Guyana	Trinidad	South America/Carribbean
Ag02531	ABDUL KADIR	Male	19520702	0	0	0	Trinidad	0	South America/Carribbean
Ag02532	ABDEL NUR	Male	19500702	0	0	0	Guyana	0	South America/Carribbean
Ag02533	ABU BAKR (JAM)	Male	0	0	0	0	Trinidad	0	South America/Carribbean
Ag02534	SHEIK MOHAMED ABDIRAHMAN KARIYE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02535	IBRAHIM AL-HAMDI (LET)	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag02536	MICHAEL C. FINTON	Male	19800702	0	Decatur, IL	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02537	HOSAM MAHER HUSEIN SMADI	Male	19900605	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag02538	BRYANT NEAL VINAS	Male	19830702	0	Long Island, NY	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02539	RAJA LAHRASIB KHAN	Male	19540702	0	Pakistan	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02540	KHALID ALI-M ALDAWSARI	Male	19900424	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02541	SYED HASHMI	Male	19800702	0	Pakistan	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02542	HAMID HAYAT	Male	19830702	0	Pakistan	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02543	UMER HAYAT	Male	19580702	0	Pakistan	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02544	KHALID OUAZZANI	Male	19771217	0	Morocco	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02545	AHMED OMAR ABU ALI	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02546	FAROOQUE AHMED	Male	19760702	0	Pakistan	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02547	CHRISTOPHER PAUL	Male	19640702	0	Columbus, Ohio	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02548	KHALIFA LNU	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02549	RAHMAT ABDUL HIR	Male	19640702	0	Malaysia	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02550	MINAH BINTI AOGIS ABD AZIZ	Female	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02551	ABDUL BASIT USMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02552	MOHAMMED ABDULLAH WARSAME	Male	19730812	0	Mogadishu, Somalia	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag02553	AHMED FARAZ KHAN	Male	19840702	0	Bannu, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02554	FATUMA	Female	19850702	0	Lamu, Kenya	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag02555	MUKHTAR ROOBOW ALI	Male	19691010	0	Xudur, Somalia	0	Somalia	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02556	HARUNI BAMUSA	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag02557	HASSAN SAID OMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Kenya	0	East Africa
Ag02558	MOHAMED MWAKUZA KUZA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02559	HALIMA	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02560	SAUDA	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02561	SAMIR SAID SLAIM BA'AMIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02562	MOHAMED ALI 'ISSE YUSUF	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02563	IBRAHIM "AL-AFGHANI"	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02564	JAAMA ALI ISMA'IL	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02565	DA'UD SALA IIDLE	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02566	FARHAN ABDULLE MOHAMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02567	HALIMA ABDI ISSA YUSUF	Female	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02568	YAYAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02569	ABDUL RASYID	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02570	CHANDRA NASRULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02571	NIK ADLI BIN NIK AZIS	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02572	TAMZIL LINRUNG	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02573	ABU FATAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Thailand	0	East Asia
Ag02574	SALIMULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Burma	0	East Asia
Ag02575	TASRIFAH KHUSUSIATI	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02576	FURQON	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02577	MAHMUD (JI - BATAM)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02578	TARMIZI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02579	MUKTIB	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02580	SUKRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02581	NASRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02582	ALI FAUZI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02583	YASIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02584	IFANA	Female	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02585	UMAR KECIL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02586	MURTAJAB	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02587	HALIMAH	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02588	HJ AFIAH	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02589	HM KOZIN	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02590	JARAF SHODIQ	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02591	AMIN JABIR	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02592	TAFISR	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02593	TASRIFAH	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02594	SUMIAH	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02595	NAIMAH	Unknown	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02596	H NUR HASYIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02597	HJ TARIYEM	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02598	SITI ROHMA	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02599	JULIA MAHENDRA	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02600	ASTUTI	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02601	KHOIRIANA KHUSUSIATI	Female	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag02602	HAULA BINTI AMROZI	Unknown	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02603	BILAL/SAEED	Male	19920702	0	South Waziristan, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02604	AITEZAZ SHAH	Male	19930702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02605	SHER ZEHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02606	HUSNAIN GUL	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02607	MOHAMAD RAFAQAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02608	RASHEED AHMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02609	NASRULLAH ABDULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02610	BAITULLAH MEHSUD	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02611	MAULVI SAHIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02612	BRIGADIER EJZA SHAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02613	NAZIR (MUMBAI ATTACK)	Male	19800702	0	Faisalabad, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02614	SHOAIB (MUMBAI ATTACK)	Male	19870702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02616	JAVED (MUMBAI ATTACKS)	Male	19860702	0	Okara, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02617	IMRAN BABAR	Male	19830702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02618	MAHMOUD MOHAMMED BAHAZIQ	Male	19430817	0	Hyderabad, India	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02620	HAFIZ ARSHAD	Male	19850702	0	Multan, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02621	ABDEL REHMAN CHHOTA	Male	19870702	0	Chhota, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02622	FAHAD ULLAH	Male	19850702	0	Okara, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02623	NASER (MUMBAI ATTACKS)	Male	19850702	0	Faisalabad, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02626	ABU MUFTI SAEED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02627	ABU ABDURREHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02628	ABU MAAVIA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02629	ABU ANIS (LET)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02630	ABU BASHIR (LET)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02631	ABU HANJLA PATHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02632	ABU SARIA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02633	ABU SAIF-UR-REHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02634	ABU IMRAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02635	HAKIM SAHEB	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02636	KAAHFA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02637	SHAHID GHAFOOR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02638	TAHAWWUR HUSSAIN RANA	Male	19610702	0	Pakistan	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag02639	ABDUR REHMAN HASHIM SYED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02640	MAJOR HAROON ASIQ	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02641	ABU YAHYA AL-LIBI	Male	0	0	0	0	Libia	0	North Africa
Ag02642	BURHANUDDIN RABBANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02653	AL-HAJ MURAD EBRAHIM	Male	19490702	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02654	BENJIE MIDTIMBANG	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02655	JOHN MACK	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02656	ABDULLAH MACAAPAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02657	ALIM ABDULAZIZ MIMBANTAS	Male	19460702	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02658	GHAZALI JAFAAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02659	SHEIKH OMAR PASIGAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02660	SAMIR HASHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02661	SOLAMAIN PANGALIAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02662	OKASHA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02663	NASRULLAH (JI)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02664	ILYAS/HANIF	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02665	SAID (JI)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02666	ANWAR (JI)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02667	ABDURROHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02668	MUSTHOFA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02669	MUADZ	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02670	HAZAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02671	IBU SIRIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02672	ZUBEIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02673	ABU FARHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02674	ZAID	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02675	HUDAIFAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02676	MACAANGCOS MIMBANTAS	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02677	AMIR PAUTE	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02678	ZAINAL PAX	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02679	SALMAN MORO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02680	USTADZ SAID	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02681	OSAMA ARA	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02682	MOHAMMAD GUINDOLONGAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02683	JULKIPLI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02684	HAMDAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02685	NOOR MOHAMMAD UMUG	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02686	HAJI AKHMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02687	SULAIMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02688	HADJI ABDUL SASAMU	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02689	USTADZ BAEM SAMUYA	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02690	NASRUDDIN SULYANG	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag02691	ESMAEL AKMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02692	TOHAMI BAGUNDANG	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02693	ESMAEL MAMALANGKAS	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02694	IDAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02695	JIMMY BALULAO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02696	GUINDATU MAMINTAL DULANG	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02697	NASRUDDIN IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02698	DONGDONG PIDTUKASAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02699	REX MOHIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02700	MORI ALI USMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02701	TONG ABBAS	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02702	BILAL ABDULLAH	Male	19800702	0	Britain	0	Iraq	Britain	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02703	SHEIKH AMAD AL-KUBAISI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag02704	SABEEL AHMED	Male	19810702	0	Bangalore, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02705	KAFEEL AHMED	Male	19800702	0	Bangalore, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02706	MOHAMMED HANEEF	Male	19800702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02707	MOHAMMED ASHA	Male	19810702	0	0	0	Palestine	Jordan	Middle East
Ag02708	ADAM KHATIB	Male	19870702	0	0	0	UK	Richard Ford, "Converts and a young mother among accused," *The Australian* (Australia), August 23, 2006.	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02709	COSSAR ALI	Female	19830702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02800	MEHRAN HUSSAIN	Male	0	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02801	MOHAMMED AL GHABRA	Male	19800601	0	Damascus, Syria	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag02802	SADIQ SHEIKH	Male	19760702	19780702	Azamgarh district, Uttar Pradesh, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02804	AMIR RAZA	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02805	ABU RASHID	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02806	AFZAL USMANI	Male	19760702	0	Azamgarh district, Uttar Pradesh, India	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02807	ARIF SHEIKH	Male	19770702	0	Azamgarh district, Uttar Pradesh, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02808	MOHAMMED ZAKIR SHEIKH	Male	19800702	0	Azamgarh district, Uttar Pradesh, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02809	MOHAMMED ANSAR SHEIKH	Male	19770702	0	Azamgarh district, Uttar Pradesh, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02811	ROSHAN KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02812	AMEER RAZAQ	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02813	ASIF RAZAQ	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02814	ATIF AMEEN	Male	19840702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02815	RIYAZ BHATKAL	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02816	ABDUS SUBHAN QURESHI	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02817	FAISAL SHAIKH	Male	19740702	0	Malegaon, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02818	MAULANA ABDUL HALIM	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02819	SAMEER SADIQ	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02820	MUFTI ABU BASHAR	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02821	MOHAMMED SAIF	Male	19860702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02822	MOHAMMED ZEESHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02823	SAQIB NISAR	Male	19850702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02824	MOHAMMED SHAKEEL	Male	19840702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02825	ZIA-UR-REHMAN	Male	19860702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02826	MUJAHID SALIM	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02827	RASOOL KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02828	MAULANA NASEERUDIN NASIR	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02829	ANAS AL KANDARI	Male	0	0	0	0	Kuwait	0	Middle East
Ag02830	ABDUL RAHMAN JABARAH	Male	19800702	0	0	0	Kuwait	Canada	Middle East
Ag02831	AHMED SAHAGI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02832	ANWAR AL-AWLAKI	Male	19720702	0	New Mexico, USA	0	USA	Yemen	North America
Ag02833	NASSER AL-AULAQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag02835	AHMED MUHAMMED DHAKANE	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02836	ADANI LNU	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02837	MOHAMMED EREG	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02838	ABDRIZAK LNU	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02839	HASSAN YARE	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag02840	ABDELLAH BENYAICH	Male	0	0	Tangiers	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag02841	AQEEL ABDUL-AZIZ AI'AQEEL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02842	SALEH ABDULLAH KAMEL	Male	19410702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02843	OMAR ABDULLAH KAMEL	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02844	ADEL ABDUL JALIL BATTERJEE	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02845	SULAIMAN ABDULAZIZ AL-RAJHI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02846	SALEH ABDULAZAIA AL-RAJHI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02847	KHALID BIN MAHFOUZ	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02848	KALEDA BIN MAHFOUZ	Female	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02849	YOUSSEF NADA	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag02850	ALI GHALIB HIMMAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02851	YOUSSEF AL-QARDAWI	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag02852	ABDEL FATTAH ABU GHADDA	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag02853	AHMED HUBER	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02854	AHMED NASREDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02855	SOLIMAN AL-BUTHE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02856	PIROUZ SEDAGHATY	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02857	MARAT AVLARIGOV	Male	0	0	0	0	Georgian	0	Central Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02858	CHAMSOUDIN AVLARIGOV	Male	0	0	0	0	Georgian	0	Central Asia
Ag02859	MUNIB ZAHARIGAC	Male	0	0	0	0	Bosnia	0	East Europe
Ag02860	HAROUN ABED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02861	MUBARAK HAMED	Male	0	0	Sudan	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02862	AHMED MUSTAFA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02863	KHALID AL-SUDANEE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02864	MARK DELI SILJANDER	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02865	ABDEL AZIM EL-SIDDIG	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag02866	RABIH HADDAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02867	KHALED SMAILI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02868	USAMA HAMDAN	Male	19650702	0	Gaza, Palestine	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag02869	HAYTHAM MAGHAWRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02870	MOHAMMED EL-MEZAIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02871	MOHAMMED IBRAHIM SULAIMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02872	JAFFAR AHMAD ABDULLAH MAKKI	Male	19560702	0	Sudan	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag02873	ABDUL AZIZ ABBAKAR MUHAMAD	Male	19610702	0	Sudan	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag02874	KHALID AHMAD JUMAH AL-SUDANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02875	IBRAHIM BUISIR	Male	19620702	0	Libya	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag02876	AHMED SANTOS	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02877	ABU HAMZA ABU HAMID AL-LUZONI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02878	HANNAH SANTOS	Female	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02879	NURUMIJA AMDAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02880	MURSIDI BALAO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02881	ISMAEL IDIRIS	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02882	MALIK MIMUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02883	ANNE ANOVER	Female	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02884	BODOT ABDULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02885	RUBEN OMAR LAVILLA	Male	19721004	0	Sitio Banga Maiti, Barangay Tranghawan, Lambunao, Iloilo Province, the Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02886	REDENDO CAIN DELLOSA	Male	19720515	0	Manila, Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02887	YUSUF LEDESMA	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02889	JAINAL ANTEL SALI, JR.	Male	19650601	0	Barangay Lanote, Bliss, Isabele, Basilan, the Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02890	MOHAMMAD BARRIENTOS	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02891	ANGELO RAMIREZ TRINIDAD	Male	19780320	0	Gattaran, Cagayan Province, the Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02892	PIO ABOGNE DE VERA	Male	19691219	0	Bagac, Bagamanok, Catanduanes Province, the Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02893	FELICIANO SEMBORIO DELOS REYES, JR.	Male	19631104	0	Arco, Lamitan, Basilan Province, the Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02894	RICARDO PEREZ AYERAS	Male	19730915	0	Manila, Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02895	DINNO AMOR ROSALEJOS PAREJA	Male	19810719	0	Cebu City, Cebu Province, the Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02896	ISNILON HAPILON	Male	19660318	19670310	Bulanza, Lantawan, Basilan, the Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02897	RADULAN SAHIRON	Male	19550702	0	Kaunayan, Patikul, Jolo Island, the Philippines	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02898	CHHOTA SAJID	Male	19890702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02899	RIYAZ ISMAIL SHAHBANDRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02900	DR SHAHNAWAZ	Male	0	0	Azamgarh district, Uttar Pradesh, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02901	ASADULLAH AKHTAR	Male	0	0	Azamgarh district, Uttar Pradesh, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02902	RAHIL SHEIKH	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02903	AHAD SABET	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02904	FARUQ AL-TUNISI	Male	0	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag02905	FAISAL SHAHZAD	Male	19800702	0	Pakistan	0	USA	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02906	HAKIMULLAH MEHSUD	Male	19790702	19810702	Jandola, South Waziristan, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02907	HUMAM KHALIL ABU MULAL AL-BALAWI	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag02908	ABDELRAZZAK	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag02909	MOSOUD ELBARA	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag02910	ASIF CHUTO	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02911	MUFTI OBAID	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02912	MUHAMMAD ALI MEMON	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02913	ARIFA	Female	19870702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02914	HABIBA	Female	19850702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02915	JUMA NAMANGANI	Male	19690702	0	Namangan, Uzbekistan	0	Uzbekistan	0	Central Asia
Ag02916	SHERALY AKBOTOEV	Male	0	0	0	0	Uzbekistan	0	Central Asia
Ag02917	ABDUL QAHAR	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Uzbekistan	0	Central Asia
Ag02918	HUSSAIN (IMU)	Male	19900702	0	0	0	Tajikistan	0	Central Asia
Ag02919	MOHAMMED KHALID	Male	19880702	0	0	0	Tajikistan	0	Central Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02920	ABDUL AZIZ AL-GHAMDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02921	NURPASHI KULAYEV	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02922	IZNAUR KODZOYEV	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02923	MAGOMED AUSHEV	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02924	VLADIMIR KHODOV	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02925	KHANPASHI KULAYEV	Male	0	0	Engenoi, Nozhai-Yurt district of Chechnya	0	Chechnya	0	East Europe
Ag02926	ARSEN MERZHOYEV	Male	0	0	Engenoi, Nozhai-Yurt district of Chechnya	0	Chechnya	0	East Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02927	MAIRBEK SHAIBEKKHANOV	Male	0	0	Engenoi, Nozhai-Yurt district of Chechnya	0	Chechnya	0	East Europe
Ag02928	ABU UMAR (LET)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02929	ABU QASIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02930	SHAFAQAT IQBAL MIR	Male	0	0	Doda, Kashmir	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02931	SHABBIR AHMED	Male	0	0	Doda, Kashmir	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02932	DAWOOD IBRAHIM	Male	19551226	0	RATNAGIRI, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02933	ABDUL KARIM TUNDA	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02934	SAJID MIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02935	COLONEL R SADATULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02936	MAJOR GENERAL SAHAB	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02937	MOHD ALTAF	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02938	MOHD ABDU MATIN ABDUL BASIT	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02939	SHEIKH MOHD MUZZAMIL JAMIL AHMED	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02940	ZAHIR AHMED BASHIR AHMED SHAIKH	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02941	SAYED KHWAJA YUNUS KHWAJA AYUB	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02942	IRFAN REHMAN KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag02943	MOHAMED HAMID (ENGLAND)	Male	19580702	0	0	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag02944	KIBLEY DA COSTA	Male	19830702	0	0	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag02945	MUHAMMAD AL-FIGARI	Male	19640702	0	0	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag02946	KADAR AHMED	Male	19870702	0	0	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag02947	MOUSSA BROWN	Male	19660702	0	0	0	England	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02948	SALOUM JOH	Male	19850702	0	0	0	England	0	West Europe
Ag02949	SALEH AL QUUWAYE	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02950	ZAID AL AMER	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag02951	EMAD ELMUBARAK Y ALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag02952	HASH MI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag02953	MOHAMMAD ANEES	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag02954	ABDUL KAREEM JASSIM BIDAWI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02955	HALEEM JASSIM BIDAWI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag02956	JAMAAL JALOUD Y HATO	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag02957	IBRAHIM ABID	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag02958	NAJIM NASSER Y TAHER	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag02959	COMMANDER ROBOT	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02960	HECTOR JANJALANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02961	JULISAM HARUM	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02962	ABDUL MARAYIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02963	ABDULHAKIM EDRIS	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02964	USTAJ AHMAN HALIFA	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02965	HUSIN SAMIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02966	FAWAZ ZI AJJUR	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag02967	ALBADER PARAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02969	JUL AKRAM HADJAIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02970	ARULA ABUBAKAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02971	MUJIB SUSUKAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02972	BROTHER OF MUJIB SUSUKAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02973	LAKANDULA	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02974	BEN ISMI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02975	LANDASAN UMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02976	ITING AGA	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02977	HASHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02978	USTADZ UMBRA JUMDAIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02979	MUHAMMAD AMIN AJIJON	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02980	COMMANDER GLOBAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02981	ALTON LADJAALAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02982	KEFFREY JINNUI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02983	AJID HALIK	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02984	HAMDA SAMAC	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02985	COMMANDER KOSOVO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02986	HAFTI DAIS	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02987	SALIP ABDULLAH MASDAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02988	MADHATTA HAIPE	Male	19620702	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02989	JATIB USMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02990	PULAH ALIH	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02991	FAIZAL MUTIA	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02992	ALDREN AMIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02993	USTADZ SALIM TADO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02994	PULA	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02995	NUR HASSAN JAMIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02996	REYNALDO APILADO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02997	HTIMIL HARON	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag02998	ALLAN SABUDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag02999	MUAMAR ASTALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03000	ADONG SALAHUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03001	JEROME MUSTAKIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03002	BURRONG RASUL BARRO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03003	MUJIBAR ALIH AMON	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03004	BASARUN AROK	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03005	JUMADAIL ARAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03006	KARIM JULDANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03007	ALBASHIR ADJILI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03008	ROWENA AKSAN	Female	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03009	NURSIMA ANNUDDEN	Female	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03010	RABIA ASIRI	Female	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03011	MARWINA SALASAIN	Female	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03012	MADRIMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03013	MIDSFAR AKSAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03014	ALVIN BAGADI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03015	ALHASBY MISAYA	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03016	MUBIN SAKANDAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03017	TING JUMDAEL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03018	MAGDAR JUMDAEL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03019	ARMINDA JUMDAEL	Female	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03020	DARUL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03021	SALLAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03022	JULMILLUN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03023	SADDAM PARAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03024	MUNIR ARBISON	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03025	COCOY TULAWIE	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03026	MOAMIL ASKALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03027	JULHAN ALIHUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03028	SULAIMAN MUIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03029	HADJI NAHRIM AKMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03030	YASIR IGASAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03031	MARCIAL JABAROT	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03032	NADZMIR AMIRUL	Male	19900702	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03033	JAITUN TIMUAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03034	COMMANDER KIRRIH	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03035	TETENG MANDANGAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03036	JANATIN MADJAKIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03037	NURHASSAN JAMIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03038	COMMANDER TOTO SANTAWAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03039	HAJAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03040	COMMANDER JAVIER	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03041	HAMSIRAJI MARUSI SALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03042	ALDAM TILAO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03043	SHAMSUL BAHARI	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag03044	AHMAD HASAN	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03045	IWAN MUTHO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03046	MOHAMMAD CHOLILY	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03047	DWI WIDYARTO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03048	ALIAS OSMAN	Male	19660702	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag03049	ANSORI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03050	ACHMAD BASIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03051	BUDI DARMAWAN	Male	19810702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03052	TEDI SURYA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03053	AHMED MAAZ	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03054	MUHAMMAD RAZI	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag03055	AMIN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag03056	AKHWAN (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag03057	FIRDOUS (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag03058	MOHAMMAD SYAIFUDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03059	ILHAM SOFYANDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03060	FURQON ABDULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03061	DAOUD (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03062	ANWAR (JAMIA ABI BAKAR)	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03063	MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN MOHAMED YUNOS	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag03064	ACHMAD KANDAI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03065	NATSIR/RISTAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03066	DATUK RAJO AMEH	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03067	BASIT USMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03068	GUIDAY MUNTASIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03069	RICO ABURVA	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03070	IMAM LAMAI	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03071	ABDUL SAKIM SALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03072	AL POZE	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag03073	JOLING	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03074	ELMER AMBRAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03075	USTADZ USMAN COLANO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03076	JAYBE OFRASIO	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03077	ROHMAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03078	ALI AL-KHUDAIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03079	AHMAD AL-KHALIDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03080	NASSER AL-FAHD	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03081	KAHLED JEHANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03082	ZUBAYR AL-RIMI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03083	YOSIF SALIH FAHD ALA'YEERI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03084	ABDULLAH BIN IBRAHIM BIN ABDULLAH ALSHABRAMI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03085	YUSUF ABDULLAH	Male	19770702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03086	HILAL JABER EL ASSIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03087	AHMED ELMOULLA BILLAL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03089	JAMILUDDIN NASIR	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03090	SADAQAT KHAN	Male	0	0	Azamgarh, Uttar Pradesh, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03091	REHAN ALAM	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03092	MUSHARRAT HUSSAIN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03093	HUSRAT ALAM	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03094	SHAKIB AKHTAR	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03095	ADIL HASSAN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03096	MOHAMMED SABIR	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03097	RAJENDRA VRAJLAL ANADKAT	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03098	SHEIKH OBAIDULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03099	IDRIS MOHAMMAD ZAHID	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03100	ABDUL KAREEM MOOSA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03101	NOOR ABU ILAHI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03102	WALID JINNAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03103	MAHFOOZ ALAM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03104	DAWOOD ALI AHMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03105	EZAZ AHMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03106	JAMIR SHAYKH	Male	0	0	Mumbai, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03107	SOHAIL SHAYKH	Male	19700702	0	Pune, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03108	TANVIR ANSARI	Male	19750702	0	Mumbai, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03109	ABED AWAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag03110	FIROZ LATIF GHASWALA	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03111	MOHAMMED IQBAL (LET)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03112	MOHAMMED ALI CHHIPA	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03113	ASIF ABDUL KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03114	NOMAN SHEIKH	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03115	ABU HURERA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03116	RIZWAN DAWRE	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03117	MUZAMMIL SHAIKH	Male	19830702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03118	EHTESHAM SIDDIQUI	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03119	FAIYAZ KAGZI	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03120	MOHAMMED NAVED	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03121	KAMALUDDIN ANSARI	Male	19740702	0	Bihar, India	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03122	ABU UMAID	Male	0	0	Faisalabad, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03123	SALIM (LET)	Male	0	0	Lahore, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03124	MANISHA CHAVAN	Female	19810702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03125	ZAMEER SHEIKH	Male	19750702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03126	MIRZA HIMAYAT INAYAT BAIG	Male	19810702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03127	LAL BABA MOHAMMED HUSSAIN FAREED	Male	19830702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03128	MOHAMMAD AHMED ZARAR SIDDIBAPPA	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03129	MOHSIN CHAUDHARY	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03130	IKRAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03131	ABOUSFIAN ABDELRAZIK	Male	19620101	0	Sudan	0	Canada	0	North America

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03132	AHMED ABDI AW-MOHAMED	Male	19770710	0	Hargeysa, Somalia	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag03133	AHMAD ROFIQ RIDHO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesian	0	East Asia
Ag03134	JOKO TRI PRIYANTO	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Indonesian	0	East Asia
Ag03135	MUSTAGHFIRIN	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Indonesian	0	East Asia
Ag03136	SOLAHUDDIN	Male	19760702	0	0	0	Indonesian	0	East Asia
Ag03137	FADLI SADAMA	Male	19830702	0	0	0	Indonesian	0	East Asia
Ag03138	AYMAN AL-BALAWI	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Palestine	Jordan	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03139	MARUTO	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03140	SUSILO	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03141	PUTRI MUNAROH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03142	HAWIN MURTADLO	Male	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03143	MOHAMMED AZAM GHAURI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03144	ABU ABDALLAH AL-SHAMI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03145	ABU NASIR AL-QAHTANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03146	MUHAMMAD AHMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03147	ABDALLAH AL-SADIQ	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag03148	KHALID AL-SHARIF	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag03149	ABU-AL-MUNDHIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag03150	SHAYKH MIFTAH AL-DUWWADI	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag03151	ABD-AL-WAHAB QAYID IDRIS	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag03152	MUSTAFA QANFID	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03153	IBN AL-SHAYKH AL-LIBI	Male	0	0	Libya	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag03154	ABU LAITH AL-LIBI	Male	19670702	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag03155	UMBRA KATO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03156	SALIP ALOY ALSREE	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03157	LATIP JAMAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03158	NASSER MACABATO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03159	IMAM ABUBAKAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03160	WANING ABDUSALAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03161	SAIDAMEN ALICK	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03162	ADZMIE	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03163	ABUNAWAS	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03164	ABDULRAHMAN MACAPAAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03165	PLATON BLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03166	KULE MAMAGONG	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03167	DAUD SARIP	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03168	BIZNAR SALAHUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03169	ATTI LINTUNGAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03170	ZAHIDE ABDUL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03171	USMAN AL MAJAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03172	KASANADEL PIGKAWALAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03173	USI AMPATUAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03174	NAYANG TIMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03175	DATUKALAN MONTOK SAMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03176	TUMALAO BUTUAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03177	MANAMPAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03178	TOLNI SALIK	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	**0**	East Asia
Ag03179	KUMANDER NASER	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03180	BAY	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03181	AKA KEDIE	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03182	WAHAB UPAO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03183	MOHAMAD BAEHAQI	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03184	ASNAN SAWAJAAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03185	ABRAHAM IBNO	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03186	ANSAR YUSOP	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03187	ABRAL ABDUSALAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03188	GUINGONA SAMAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	**0**	East Asia
Ag03189	SMAWTIN BASILAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03190	EDGAR MALAYDAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03191	ARIF QADIR	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03192	SHADAAB	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03193	SHEHZAAD	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03194	SALMAN AHMED	Male	19890702	0	Sanjarpur, India	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03195	ARIZ KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03196	MOHAMMAD KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03197	HAMID SHEIKH	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03198	SHAHRUKH	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03199	ABDUL SATTAR	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03200	QAYAMUDDIN KAPADIA	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03201	IQBAL BHATKAL	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03202	SALEH MUHAMMAD AL-AOOFI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03203	ABDULAZIZ AL-MOQRIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03204	OMAR AHMED ABDULLAH ALI	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03205	MIKAEL DAVUD	Male	19710702	0	China	0	Norway	China	West Europe
Ag03206	DAVID JAKOBSEN	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Uzbekistan	0	Central Asia
Ag03207	SHAWAN SADEK SAEED BUJAK BUJAK	Male	19730702	0	Kurdistan, Iraq	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag03208	AHMAD/ISMAIL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03209	ABI PAMANAY	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03210	ABDULRAHMAN SAMUEL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03211	JOHER IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03212	MUJAHID IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03213	ABU TAHER	Male	19640702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03214	ALSHEED ALLING ALBANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03215	ABDUL BAKI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03216	BARAHAMA SALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03271	SHEIK MIYAR HAMZA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03272	FARDOSA ABDULLAHI	Female	19880702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03273	ASGHAR MUKADAM	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03274	SHAHNAWAZ QURESHI	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03275	SHOAIB GHANSAR	Male	19690702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03276	ABDUL GANI TURK	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03277	YAKUB MEMON	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03278	ESSA MEMON	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03279	YUSUF MEMON	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03280	RUBINA MEMON	Female	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03281	IBRAHIM (TIGER) MEMON	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03282	IMTIAZ GHAVTE	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03283	NASIM BARMARE	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03284	FAROOQ PAWLE	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03285	BASHIR KHAIRULLA	Male	19660702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03286	ZAKIR HUSSAIN SHAIKH	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03287	FEROZ MALLIK	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03288	ABDUL AKHTAR KHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03289	DAWOOD MOHAMMAD PHANSE	Male	19240702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03290	ANIS IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03291	NAIBUDDIN	Male	19740702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03292	MOHAMMED SHARIF	Male	19720702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03293	AYUB MEMON	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03294	ANEES MEMON	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03295	TANVIR SHEIKH	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03296	SANJAY KUMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03297	ABDUL JAVED	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03298	ABU SALEM	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03299	IQBAL SHEIKH KASKAR	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03300	EZAZ PATHAN	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03301	ATUL KANITAL SHAH	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03302	ASHOK BHANSALI	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03303	AFTAB BATKI	Male	0	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03304	ABU JINDAL	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03305	AHMED SIDDIQUI	Male	0	0	0	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag03306	SHAHAB DASHTI	Male	0	0	0	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag03307	RAMI MAKANESI	Male	0	0	0	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag03308	NAAMEN MEZICHE	Male	0	0	0	0	France	0	West Europe
Ag03309	GAFUR JUMDAIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Philippines	0	East Asia
Ag03310	NAIZ KHAN	Male	19830702	0	Afghanistan	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag03311	ABU MUHAMMAD HAMZA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03312	SALEM SAAD BIN SUWEID	Male	19630702	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag03313	YASIR FRIEHAT	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag03314	MUHAMMAD DEMES	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag03315	MUHAMMAD AMIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag03316	ALI KHALED AL-JABOURI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03317	MUHAMMAD HASSAN AL-SAMARAI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03318	UMAR BAZIYANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03319	MAHMOOD ABDEL AZIZ AL-HARAMI AL-JANABI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03320	FADHIL AL-KURDI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03321	MARWAN HADID AL-SURI	Male	19680702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03322	SAMI MUHAMMAD ALI SAID AL-JAAF	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03323	HASAM HAMAD ABDULLAH MUHSIN AL-DULAIMI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03324	HASSAN IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03325	ABU TALHA (IRAQ INSURGENCY)	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03326	SABHAN AHMAD RAMADAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03327	AZMI AL-JAYOUSI	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag03328	MOHAMMED SHARKAWA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03329	KHAMIS FARHAN KHALAF ABD AL-FAHDAWI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03330	ABU AZZAM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03331	BILAL MAHMUD AWAD SHEBAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03332	ABU SUFIAN	Male	19800702	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03333	SERGEI MALYSCHEW	Male	0	0	0	0	Belarous	0	East Europe
Ag03334	MUHAMMAD G	Male	19690702	0	0	0	Ghana	0	West Africa
Ag03335	MUHAMMAD WASFI	Male	19630702	0	West Bank, Palestine	0	Jordan	Palestine	Middle East
Ag03336	ABU MOHAMMED AL-MAQDISI	Male	0	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag03337	HUTHAIFA AZZAM	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag03338	SHEIK HARITH AL-DARI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03339	ABDULLAH RASHID AL-BAGHDADI	Male	0	0	Baghdad, Iraq	0	Iraq	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03340	ABU ABDUL-RAHMAN AL-IRAQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag03341	ABU HAMZA AL-MUHAJER	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03342	NASIR AL-WAHAYSHI	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03343	QASSEM AL-REMI	Male	19770702	0	Raima, Yemen	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03344	SAID AL-SHEHRI	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03345	NASIR AL-BAHRI	Male	19730702	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03346	MUHAMMAD HASSAN AL-SIHLI	Male	0	0	0	0	Syria	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03347	ABDELRAHMAN AL-SIHLI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag03348	ABDULLAH AL-SIHLI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag03349	MUHAMMAD HAMID HUSSEIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag03350	ALI HUSSEIN ALI AL-SHAMARI	Male	0	0	Anbar Province, Iraq	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag03351	RAWAD JASSEM MOHAMMED ABED	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag03352	SAFAA MOHAMMED ALI	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag03353	SAJIDA MUBARAK ATROUS AL-RISHAWI	Female	19700702	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03354	MUBARAK ATROUS AL-RISHAWI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag03355	NIDAL HASAN	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	0	North America
Ag03356	AYED AL-SHABWANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03358	SALEH AL-TEYS	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03359	IBRAHIM HASSAN AL-ASIRI	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03360	ABDULLAH AL-ASIRI	Male	19860702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03361	JABIR AL-FAYFI	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03362	MIDHAT MURSI AL-SAYID UMAR	Male	19530415	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03363	ABU MOHAMMED IBRAHIM BIN ABI AL-FARAJ AL-MASRI	Male	19530702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03364	ABD AL-WAHAB AL-MASRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03365	ABU ISLAM AL-MASRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03366	KHALID HABIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag03367	MAHMOUD MAHDI ZEIDAN	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Jordan	0	Middle East
Ag03368	TAYIP RAUF	Male	19840702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03369	MATIUR REHMAN	Male	19770702	0	Had Rajgan, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03370	MAROOF RAUF	Male	19870702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03371	TAHIR MASOOD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03372	KUSHMIR NESIRWAN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03373	ABDUL RAHIM AYUB	Male	19630702	19640702	0	0	Indonesia	Australia	East Asia
Ag03374	ABDUL RAHMAN AYUB	Male	19630702	19640702	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03375	RABIYAH HUTCHINSON	Female	19530702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03376	MUSTAFA HAMID	Male	19450315	0	Alexandria, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03377	AFIFA ROCHE	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03378	JOHN MUSA	Male	0	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03379	AZMAN HASHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag03380	JACK THOMAS	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03381	MARYATI IDRIS	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03382	AISYAH BARAJA	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03383	ZULFAH BASHIR	Female	0	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03384	MOHAMMED AYUB	Male	19870702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03385	ABDULLAH AYUB	Male	19850702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03386	MUHAMMAD RAB'A AL-SA YID AL-BAHTIYTI	Male	19710702	0	Al-Sharqiyyah, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03387	ALI SALEH HUSAIN	Male	19700702	0	al-Hudaydah, Yemen	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03388	AHMED KHADR	Male	19480301	0	Egypt	0	Egypt	Canada	North Africa
Ag03389	KHALID ABDULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03390	OMAR KHADR	Male	19860919	0	Toronto, Canada	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag03391	ABDUL RAHMAN KHADR	Male	19830702	0	0	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag03392	RAHMAH CHIEKHO	Female	19820702	0	Sydney, Australia	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03393	KHALED CHIEKHO	Male	19730702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03394	MAREK SAMULSKI	Male	0	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03395	YOUNIS MOHAMMED IBRAHIM AL-HAYARI	Male	0	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag03396	SAUD AL-OTAIBI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03397	OMAR BALADJAM	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03398	MOHAMED ALI ELOMAR	Male	19650702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03399	MIRSAD MULAHALILOVIC	Male	19760702	0	Bosnia	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03400	KHALED SHARROUF	Male	19810702	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03401	MAZEN TOUMA	Male	19800702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03402	MOUSTAFA CHEIKHO	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03403	ABDUL RAKIB HASAN	Male	19690702	0	Bangladesh	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03404	ABDUL NACER BENBRIKA	Male	19600702	0	Algeria	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03405	AHMED MEHRI	Male	19850702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03406	EZZIT RAAD	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03407	AIMEN JOUD	Male	19840702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03408	FADAL SAYADI	Male	19800702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03409	AMER JADDARA	Male	19790702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03410	AHMED RAAD	Male	19830702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03411	SHANT KENT	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03412	HANY TAHA	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03413	MUSTAFA AYUB	Male	19900702	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03414	AMINAH AYUB	Female	0	0	0	0	Australia	0	Australia
Ag03415	UMNYA AL ZAWAHIRI	Male	19510619	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03416	HEBA AL ZAWAHIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03417	MOHAMMED AL ZAWAHIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03418	HUSSEIN AL ZAWAHIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03419	KAMAL HABIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03420	AZZA NOWAIR	Female	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03421	ISAM AL-QAMARI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03422	KHALED ISLAMBOULI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03423	SAYYID IMAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03424	FATIMA AL ZAWAHIRI	Female	19810702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03425	NABILA AL ZAWAHIRI	Female	19860702	0	Peshawar, Pakistan	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03426	KHADIGA AL ZAWAHIRI	Female	19870702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03427	UMAYMA AL ZAWAHIRI	Female	19850702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03428	MOHAMMED BIN AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI	Male	19880702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03429	AISHA AL ZAWAHIRI	Female	19970702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03430	ISMAIL NASSIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03431	AHMAD SALAMA MABRUK	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03432	MAHMUD HISHAM AL-HENNAWI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03433	AHMAD IBRAHIM AL-NAGAR	Male	0	0	Nahya Village, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03434	AHMED ISMAIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03435	SARWAT SHEHATA	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03436	ADEL ABDEL QODDUS	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03437	HASSAN ZEMIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag03438	ABDEL-GHANI ALI JAWHAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03439	TAREK MERHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag03440	OSAMA AL-SHEHABI	Male	0	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag03441	MOHAMMED SHAWKI ISLAMBOULI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03442	ADNAN AL-SAYEGH	Male	19820702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03443	OTHMAN AHMED OTHMAN AL-GHAMDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03444	FAHD SALEH SULAIMAN AL-JATILI	Male	19830702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03445	MOHAMMAD AL-DUKHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03446	WAEL ABU JABER	Male	0	0	0	0	Lebanon	0	Middle East
Ag03447	RACHMAT PUJIPRABOWO	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03448	USMAN BIN SEF	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Indonesia	0	East Asia
Ag03449	SABTURANI	Male	19630702	0	0	0	Malaysia	0	East Asia
Ag03450	KARIM KHADR	Male	19880702	0	0	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag03451	ABU OBAIDAH AL-MASRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03452	MULLAH ABDUL RAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03453	FAQIR MOHAMMAD	Male	19700702	0	Chopatra, Pakistan	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03454	ABDUR REHMAN (KARWAN-E-NIAMATULLAH)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03455	NIAMATULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03456	MAULVI OMAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03457	FATEH MOHAMMAD	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03458	RAFIUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03459	ANWAR (TTP)	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03460	QARI ZIAUR REHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03461	WALI UR REHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03462	NEK MOHAMMED	Male	19770702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03463	QARI HUSSEIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03464	AAZAM TARIQ	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03465	REHMATULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03466	ABDULLAH MEHSUD	Male	19750702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03467	SHAKIR ULLAH SHAKIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03468	SHARQAWI ABDU ALI AL-HAJJ	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03469	MOHAMMAD OMAR ABDEL-RAHMAN	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03470	AHMAD ABDEL-RAHMAN	Male	19640702	19730702	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03471	ASSAD ABDEL RAHMAN	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03472	ABD AL AZIZ AL-JAMAL	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03473	IBRAHIM MUHAMMAD SALIH AL-BANNA	Male	19560702	0	Shibin al-Kawm, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03474	ABD-AL-MUN'IM AL-BADAWI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03475	MAHMUD AL-DIB	Male	0	0	Kirdasah, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03476	KHALID BAKIR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03477	IBRAHIM KARIM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03478	HASAN ABADI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03479	KHALIL NUR-AL-DIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03480	YUSUF MUHAMMADAYN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03481	CHIEFTAIN DARDIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Sudan	0	North Africa
Ag03482	MUHAMMAD UMAYR AL-AWLAQI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03483	ABDULLAH HAMAS AL FILISTINI	Male	0	0	0	0	Palestine	0	Middle East
Ag03484	ABU SULAYMAN JAZAIRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa
Ag03485	ZAIN UL ABU QASIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03486	ABDULLAH AZZAM AL SAUDI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03487	ABU ZUBAIR AL MASRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03488	ABDUR REHMAN WAZIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03489	ZANJIR WAZIR	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03490	ABDUL SALAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03491	ABU WAFA AL SAUDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03492	ABDUL KHALIQ HAQQANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03493	ABU HARIS	Male	0	0	0	0	Jordan	Palestine	Middle East
Ag03494	ABU HAMZA	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03495	ABU JIHAD AL MASRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03499	ABDUL RAUF NASSIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03500	MUHAMMAD SHARAF	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03501	MUS'AB SHARAF	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03502	QAED SALEM SUNIAN AL-HARTHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03503	MUNIR AHMED ABDULLAH AL-SAUDA	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03504	SALEH HUSSEIN ALI AL-ZONO	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03505	AOUSSAN AHMED AL-TIRIHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03506	ADEL NASSER AL-SAUDA	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03507	KAMAL DARWISH	Male	0	0	0	0	USA	Yemen	North America
Ag03508	MUHAMMAD SHOAIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03509	MEHMOOH KHALIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03510	IMRAN CHEEMA	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03511	MAHROOF MIRZA	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03512	AQEELUR REHMAN ABBASSI	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03513	MUHAMMAD TARIQ	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03514	QADEER MALIK	Male	19760702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03515	ABDUL HAFEZ AHMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03516	MUHAMMAD AYUB ELAHI	Male	19450702	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03517	ROSHAN JAMAL KHAN	Male	19590702	0	0	0	India	0	South Asia
Ag03518	NAZIMUDDIN ZALALOV	Male	19720401	0	Andijan region, Uzbekistan	0	Uzbekistan	0	Central Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03519	ABU AHMED AL-KUWAITI	Male	0	0	Kuwait	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03520	HASSAN GHUL	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03521	MUHAMMAD ALI QASIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03522	JALALUDDIN HAQQANI	Male	19430702	19420702	Khost, Afghanistan	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag03523	MOHAMMAD IBRAHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag03524	MUHAMMAD HAQQANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag03525	QARI ZAFAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03526	MUHAMMAD BEG	Male	0	0	0	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag03527	MULLAH ABDULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03528	SIRAJUDDIN HAQQANI	Male	19770702	19780702	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag03530	SALAHUDDIN	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03531	FAROUQ	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03532	NASIRUDDIN HAQQANI	Male	19720702	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag03533	KHALIL AL-RAHMAN HAQQANI	Male	19660101	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03534	SAID JAN 'ABD AL-SALAM	Male	19810205	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag03535	HOMAYOUN	Male	0	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag03536	BADRUDDIN HAQQANI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03537	ABDULLAH FARHAD	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03538	DARIM SEDGAI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03539	COL. IMAM	Male	0	0	0	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03540	ABU TAYEB	Male	0	0	0	0	Afganistan	0	South Asia

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03541	MR. C	Male	0	0	0	0	Afganistan	0	South Asia
Ag03542	HASSAN ALMREI	Male	19740702	0	Syria	0	Syria	0	Middle East
Ag03543	NABIL ALMARABH	Male	19670702	0	0	0	Kuwait	Syria	Middle East
Ag03544	AHMED AL KAYSEE	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03545	MAHMOUD JABALLAH	Male	19620702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03546	THIRWAT SHEHATA	Male	19600629	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03547	MOHAMAD ZEKI MAHJOUB	Male	19600702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03548	ESSAM MOHAMED HAFEZ MARZOUK	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Canada	Egypt	North America
Ag03549	HANI YUSEF AL SEBAI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03550	IBRAHIM ALLAM	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03551	ABU YASSER	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03552	MUSTAFA MOHAMED KRER	Male	0	0	0	0	Libya	0	North Africa
Ag03553	HASSAN FARHAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag03554	MOHAMED HARKAT	Male	19680702	0	0	0	Algeria	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03555	PACHA WAZIR	Male	0	0	0	0	UAE	0	Middle East
Ag03556	ABU MESSAB ALSHEHRE	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03557	KAMEL AGIZA	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03558	IHAB SAQR	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03559	SAEED RASOUL SOBRAHATOLLAH MUHAMMAD	Male	19740702	0	0	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag03560	MASOUD RASOUL	Male	0	0	0	0	Canada	0	North America
Ag03561	AL-MUGHIRA AL GAZA'IRI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03562	GHARIB	Male	0	0	0	0	Somalia	0	East Africa
Ag03563	SHAHWALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag03564	DZHOKHAR DUDAYEV	Male	0	0	0	0	Chechnya	0	East Europe
Ag03565	GHAIRAT BAHEER	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03566	AMANULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Afghanistan	0	South Asia
Ag03567	NOOR MOHAMMED	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03568	MUSTAFA HAMZA	Male	19570702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03569	METHAT AHMED ABDELRAHMAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03570	MOHSIN GHALAIN	Male	19810702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03571	MOHAMMED KAMEL MOSTAFA	Male	19820702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03572	ABU HASSAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03573	AHMED ABDEL SATTAR	Male	19590702	0	Egypt	0	USA	Egypt	North America
Ag03574	SHEIK SALAH HASHIM	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03575	SOFID HASSAN ADDULKANI AZIK	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03576	AL-ARAB TSADIK HASSIN MOHAMMED	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03577	ABDULKERIM ALNAZI ABDLURAZI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03578	SHERIF ABDEL-RAHMAN TEWFIK EL-MADANI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03579	HUSSEIN AHMED SHAHAF ALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03580	EZET YASSIN	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03581	HAMZA MUSTAFA KAMEL	Male	19870702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03582	MOHAMED CHIADMI	Male	0	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03583	ABDUL CHIADMI	Male	0	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03584	KHALID JEBARI	Male	0	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03585	MALIK NASSAR HARHRA	Male	0	0	Birmingham, England	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03586	SHAHID BUTT	Male	19660702	0	Birmingham, England	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03587	SARMAD AHMED	Male	19780702	0	Birmingham, England	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03588	GHULAM HUSSEIN	Male	19750702	0	Luton, England	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03589	SHAZ NABI	Male	19800702	0	Birmingham, England	0	UK	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03590	AYAD HUSSEIN	Male	19760702	0	Birmingham, England	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03591	YASSER MOSTAFA KAMEL	Male	19910702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03592	MUAMIN ALI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03593	KARIM ABDULLAH	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03594	MAJAD MAHMOUD	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03595	SULEIMAN FLAIFIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03596	MUHAMMAD FLAIFIL	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03597	MUHAMMAD ABDALLAH RIBA'A	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03598	MUHAMMAD GAYEZ SABAH	Male	0	0	Arish, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03599	NASSER KHAMIS AL-MALLAHI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03600	KHALED MUSSAED	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03601	YOUNIS ELIAN ABU JARIR	Male	0	0	Arish, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03602	OSAMA ABDEL-GHANI AL-NAKHLAWI	Male	19830702	0	Arish, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03603	IYAD AL-FALESTINI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03604	SALEM SHANOUB	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03605	MOHAMMED ABDALLAH ELIAN	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03606	HASSAN AL-ARAYSHI	Male	1980702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03607	TALEB MURTADA	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03608	ARAFAT OUDA ALI	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03609	AHMED MOHAMMED AL-KOREIMI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03610	MOHAMMED ABDELAZIZ NAFEI	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03611	ATALLAH AL-KORM	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03612	YUSRI MOHAREB	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03613	AYMAN MOHAREB	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03614	TAMER NUSSEIRAT	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03615	HASSAN RAFAAT AHMED BASHANDI	Male	19870702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03616	MOHAMED SOBHI ALI JIDAN	Male	19810702	0	Qalioubia Province, Egypt	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03617	GAMAL SOBHI ALI JIDAN	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03618	AKRAM MOHAMMED FAWZI	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03619	TAREK AHMED AL-SAYED	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03620	REDA SAYED AHMED	Male	19860702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03621	ASHRAF SAIED YOUSSEF	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03622	EHAB YOUSRI YASSIN	Male	19810702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03623	GAMAL AHMED ABDEL AAL	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03624	ASHRAF SAEED YOUSSEF	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03625	NEGAT YASSIN	Female	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03626	IMAN IBRAHIM KHAMIS	Female	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03627	MOHAMMED YOUSRI YASSIN	Male	19880702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03628	SABER FARHAT ABU EL-ELA	Male	19650702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03629	MAHMOUD ABI EL-ELA	Male	0	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03630	MOHAMED SALEM ABDEL-NABI	Male	19690702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03631	ISMAIL ABDALLAH	Male	19670702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03632	HAFEZ ABDEL HAKIM	Male	19640702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03633	TAHA YEHIA SAYYED	Male	19710702	0	0	0	Egypt	0	North Africa
Ag03634	GURUKANTH DESAI	Male	19820702	0	Cardiff, Wales	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03635	OMAR SHARIF LATIF	Male	19840702	0	Cardiff, Wales	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03636	ABDUL MALIK MIAH	Male	19860702	0	Cardiff, Wales	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03637	MOHAMMED MOKSUDUR RAHMAN CHOWDHURY	Male	19900702	0	London, England	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03638	SHAH MOHAMMED LUTFAR RAHMAN	Male	19820702	0	London, England	0	UK	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03639	NAZAM HUSSAIN	Male	19850702	0	Stoke, England	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03640	USMAN KHAN	Male	19910702	0	Stoke, England	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03641	MOHIBUR RAHMAN	Male	19840702	0	Stoke, England	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03642	ABUL BOSHER MOHAMMED SHAHJAHAN	Male	19840702	0	Stoke, England	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03643	TAIMOUR ABDULWAHAB AL-ABDALY	Male	19820702	0	Baghdad, Iraq	0	Sweden	0	West Europe
Ag03644	EZEDDEN AL KHALEDI	Male	19810702	0	0	0	Kuwait	0	Middle East
Ag03645	ABU OMAR AL-BAGHDADI	Male	0	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03646	MONA AL-ABDALY	Female	0	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03647	MUHARIB ABDUL LATIF AL-JUBOURI	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03648	ABU NIZAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03649	HASNA ALI YEHYE HUSSAIN	Female	19690702	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East
Ag03650	WATHI AL-JASSEM	Female	19610702	0	0	0	Iraq	0	Middle East
Ag03651	ABRAR SAEED AHMED	Male	0	0	Kuwait	0	Pakistan	0	South Asia
Ag03652	ABU UNAYS AL SAUDI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03653	MOHAMED ELLIAS S/O MOHAMED KHAN	Male	19730702	0	0	0	Singapore	0	East Asia
Ag03654	CHRISTIAN GANCZARSKI	Male	19650702	0	Poland	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag03655	WALID NOUAR	Male	0	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag03656	NIZAR NOUAR	Male	19780702	0	0	0	Tunisia	0	North Africa
Ag03657	BELGACEM NOUAR	Male	0	0	0	0	0	0	Unknown
Ag03658	ASIF MOHAMMED HANIF	Male	19820702	0	0	0	UK	0	West Europe
Ag03659	FRITZ MARTIN GELOWICZ	Male	19790901	0	Munich, Germany	0	Germany	0	West Europe

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03660	KARIM MEHDI	Male	19690702	0	0	0	Morocco	0	North Africa
Ag03661	TOLGA D.	Male	0	0	0	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag03662	DANIEL MARTIN SCHNEIDER	Male	19850702	0	0	0	Germany	0	West Europe
Ag03663	ADEM YILMAZ	Male	19780702	0	Turkey	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag03664	ATTILA SELEK	Male	19860702	0	0	0	Turkey	0	Middle East
Ag03665	BILAL BIN MARWAN	Male	19470702	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03666	SALIM AHMED HAMDAN	Male	19700702	0	0	0	Yemen	0	Middle East

ID No.	PRIMARY NAME	Gender	DOB	Alt. DOB	POB	Alt. POB	Citizenship/ Nationality	Alt. Citizenship/ Nationality	Region (Derived from Nationality)
Ag03667	YOUSUF AL-SHAHRI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03668	RAYED ABDULLAHI AL-HARBI	Male	0	0	0	0	Saudi Arabia	0	Middle East
Ag03669	YOUNIS AL-MAURITANI	Male	0	0	Mauritania	0	0	0	North Africa

APPENDIX E: EVENT ATTRIBUTES

Note on Interpretation: With the exception of the variables listing the date of events, the number of victims killed in completed attacks, the number of individuals injured in completed attacks, and the number of functional interactions recorded for each event, the attributes listed in this appendix are all coded as binary dummy variables. Per standard coding practice, values of ~~"1~~" indicate the presence of a condition, and values of ~~"0~~" indicate the absence of a condition. Attribute titles are self-explanatory, and thematically related variables have been grouped and color coded. Events are ordered by date of occurrence. As with the agent attributes, space considerations preclude a full recounting of the thousands of sources used to derive this information; however, a reasonable approximation of the sourcing underlying the attribute data on events can be derived from Appendix H.

Table 10.5 Event Attributes

Evt01525	Evt01482	Evt01454	Evt01441	Evt01440	Event Number
Training in Saudi Arabia	Failure to Join Taliban or AQ	Training in Philippines	Training in Lebanon	Training in Iran	Event Name
X	X	X	X	X	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
1	0	1	1	1	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01473	Evt01452	Evt02847	Evt02743	Evt02652	Evt01558	Event Number
Israel /Palestine Conflict	1998 - ???? Conflict in Sulawesi	Training in Palestine	Training in Yemen	Training in New South Wales	Training in Malaysia	Event Name
X	X	X	X	X	X	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	1	1	1	1	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
1	1	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	23	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00753	Evt00745	Evt00620	Evt00068	Evt01519	Evt01483	Event Number
Lived in London	Lived in Britain	Training in Sudan	Arrest	Travel to Macedonia	Travel to Bangladesh	Event Name
#N/A	#N/A	X	X	X	X	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	1	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	0	0	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00476	Evt00833	Evt00832	Evt00831	Evt00757	Event Number
Bombing of Hinde Temple (Date Unknown)	Move to Spain	Move to Spain	Move to Spain	Lived in San Blas Neighborhood of Madrid	Event Name
#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	#N/A	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	1	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
Un	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01465	Evt01354	Evt01352	Evt00974	Event Number
Smuggling/ Hiding of Bali Bombers	Plot to Attack Kissinger-owned Oil Company (Date Unknown)	Plot to Attack U.S. Nuclear Plants (Date Unknown)	Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy in Jakarta (Date Unknown)	Event Name
2002	0	0	0	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	1	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
18	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00393	Evt02676	Evt00815	Evt01534	Event Number
Arrives in London, England | London | 1974	Death — Egypt — 19660829	Move to Kuwait	2006-2007 Attacks on Int'l Peacekeepers in Somalia	Event Name
19740702	19660829	19620702	2002	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	1	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	N/A	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02885	Evt00375	Evt00676	Evt00837	Evt02811	Event Number
Death | | Kenya | 19800702	Arrival in U.K. | London, England | 7/1979	Arrest | Indonesia | 19781119	Move back to US 19780702	1975 Failed Insurrection Against Afghan-Communist Gov't	Event Name
19800702	19790715	19781119	19780702	19750702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01055	Evt02612	Evt00388	Evt00003	Evt00051	Evt00675	Event Number
Return to Kuwait	Arrest | Egypt | 19810702	Arrival in US | New Jersey | 1981	Assassination on Sadat 1981 Fatwa	1979-1989 Soviet-Afghan War	Immigrates to U.S.	Event Name
19810702	19810702	19810702	19810702	19800702	19800702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	1	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	1	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	1	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	4	N/A	N/A	86	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00390	Evt00379	Evt01070	Evt02921	Evt02611	Event Number
Arrived in Afghanistan | 1983	Arrival in U.S. | Brooklyn, NY | 1983	Return to US as Flight Instructor	Release from Detention | Indonesia | 19820702	1981 Assassination of Anwar Sadat	Event Name
19830702	19830702	19820702	19820702	19811006	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	N/A	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02613	Evt00886	Evt00424	Evt00825	Evt00671	Event Number
Release from Detention | Egypt | 1984 0702	1983 Murder of Detroit Imam	1983 Attack on Rajneesh-owned Hotel	Move to Pakistan	Immigrate to Spain	Event Name
19840702	19830815	19830715	19830702	19830702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	0	Attack
0	1	Un	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00066	Evt00549	Evt00475	Evt00474	Event Number
1984 Bomb ings in Prote st of Suhar to Regi me	1984 Custo dy Kidna pping	1984 Bomb ing of Hare Krish na Temp les (Den ver)	1984 Bomb ing of Hare Krish na Temp les (Phill y)	Event Name
19840915	19840702	19840702	19840702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	1	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	Attack
Un	0	Un	Un	Attack | Killed
Un	0	Un	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00366	Evt00392	Evt00378	Evt00368	Evt00367	Event Number
Arrival in Malaysia | Malaysia | 1985	Arrived in Spain | Spain | 1985	Arrival in U.S. | New Jersey | 1985	Arrival in Malaysia | Johor, Malaysia | 1985	Arrival in Malaysia | Johor, Malaysia | 1985	Event Name
19850702	19850702	19850702	19850702	19850702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	1	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00382	Evt02766	Evt00387	Evt01250	Evt00389	Event Number
Arrival in U.S. | Brooklyn, NY | 1986	1985 Hajj Pilgrimage	Arrival in US | NYC | 9/1985	Arrest (Juvenile Detention) | Chicago, IL | 19850702	Arrived in Afghanistan | Afghanistan | 19851985	Event Name
19860702	19850915	19850915	19850702	19850702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	1	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	1	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00734	Evt00453	Evt00848	Evt00843	Evt02548	Event Number
Left NC	Bayat to Sungkar	Moved to Britain	Moved to Brooklyn	Detention for Sexual Assault	Event Name
19861215	19860702	19860702	19860702	19860702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	1	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00377	Evt00356	Evt01774	Evt00744	Evt00357	Event Number
Arrival in U.S. | Jersey City, NJ | 1988	Arrival in Australia | Australia | 1988	Death | Texas | 19880529	Lived in Britain	Arrival in Australia | Sydney, Australia | 1987	Event Name
19880702	19880702	19880529	19870702	19870702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	0	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00927	Evt02549	Evt00783	Evt00619	Event Number
1988 Plot to Assassinate Gorbachev	Release from Detention for Sexual Assault | Jordan | 1988 0702?	1988 State Againments Saddam Hussein	1988 Exile to Malaysia	Event Name
19880702	19880702	19880702	19880702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	1	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01776	Evt01775	Evt00719	Evt00756	Evt00971	Event Number
Death | Iran | 1989 0603	Death | Jalalabad, Afghanistan | 1989 0215	Leaves Afghanistan	Lived in Philippines	1988 Plot to Bomb Hindu Temples of Borobodur	Event Name
19890603	19890215	19890215	19880702	19880702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00890	Evt00383	Evt01300	Evt00600	Event Number
1989 Murder of Imam Imad Rashid Khalifa	Arrival in U.S. | Kansas | 1989	1989 Weapons Training in Long Island	Deposed--Islamic Front Assumes Nationalist Power	Event Name
19890702	19890702	19890701	19890615	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	1	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
1	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	N/A	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01061	Evt00836	Evt00828	Evt00845	Evt00454	Event Number
Return to Saudi Arabia	Move to UAE	Move to Qatar	Moved to Corsica	Began Acquiring Property for UBL in Sudan	Event Name
19890702	19890702	19890702	19890702	19890702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	1	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00376	Evt00473	Evt01777	Evt01092	Evt01246	Event Number
Arrival in U.S. | ? | 1990	Gay Bar Gage Villa wich Gren ing of Bomb 1990	Death | Af/Pak Border | 1989 1124	Spent time in Chakary	Went to Mira m Shah City	Event Name
19900702	19900428	19891124	19891015	19890702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	3	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02918	Evt01003	Evt01263	Evt00444	Event Number
Release from Detention (Juvenile Detention) | Chicago, IL | 1990 0702	1990 Rebellion for Toure Regaining	1990 Murder of Egyptian Parliament Speaker Rifaat al-Mahgoub	1990 Azmarai Wedding	Event Name
19900702	19900702	19900702	19900702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	1	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	1	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00826	Evt00819	Evt00812	Evt01068	Evt00852	Evt00758	Event Number
Move to Peshawar	Move to Malaysia	Move to Dar es Salaam	Return to U.S.	Moved to Milan	Lived in Saudi Arabia	Event Name
19900702	19900702	19900702	19900702	19900702	19900702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	1	1	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00364	Evt00662	Evt01421	Evt01778	Evt00897	Evt00895	Event Number
Arrival in Dallas | Dallas, TX | 1991	1991 Hajj Pilgrimage	Revocation of Passport	Death | Brooklyn, NY | 19910301	1991 Murder of Mustafa Shalabi	1990 Murder of Rabbi Meyer Kahane	Event Name
19910702	19910615	19910415	19910301	19910301	19901105	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	1	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	1	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	1	1	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	1	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	N/A	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01252	Evt00391	Evt00669	Evt00994	Evt00452	Event Number
Arrest (Firearms Charge) | Broward County, FL | 19910702	Arrived in Afghanistan | 1991	1991 Hijacking of Passenger Jet	1991 Protest in Jordan	Bayat to UBL	Event Name
19910702	19910702	19910702	19910702	19910702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	3	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00113	Evt00279	Evt00969	Evt01388	Evt01058	Event Number
Arrest | Brooklyn, New York | | 10/1991	Arrest | Niagara Falls, NY | 10/1991	1991 Plot to Bomb Hindu Religious/Cultural Sites	Travel to Germany	Return to Malaysia	Event Name
19911015	19911015	19911015	19910702	19910702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	5	6	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00625	Evt01064	Evt00693	Evt00380	Evt01176	Evt01219	Event Number
1992 Fatwa or 1993 Against U.S. st	Return to Sudan	6/1992 NYC Bomb Plot	Arrival in U.S.	Travel to Iraq	Trip to Kenya	Event Name
19920702	19920615	19920615	19920415	19920401	19920115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	1	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
1	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	1	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	3	1	N/A	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01234	Evt01233	Evt02710	Evt02878	Evt02273	Event Number
Visit to Slovakia	Visit to Russia	Overthrow Gadafy	Attempted 1992? Failed	Arrival in Sweden	Arrival in England	Event Name
19920702	19920702	19920702	19920702	19920702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	0	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	1	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01216	Evt02920	Evt01155	Evt00498	Event Number
Trip to Budapest	Release from Detention (Firearms Charge) | Broward County, FL | 1992 0815	Training in Pakistan	1992-1995 Bosnian Jihad	Event Name
19920815	19920815	19920702	19920702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	1	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	1	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	39	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00384	Evt01302	Evt01215	Evt00381	Evt00183	Event Number
Arrival in U.S. | Jersey City, NJ | 10/19/92 Area	1992 Paramilitary Training in NYC	Trip to Bosnia	Arrival in U.S. | Jersey City, NJ | 9/1/1992	Arrest | JFK Airport, New York | 9/1/1992	Event Name
19921015	19921001	19920915	19920901	19920901	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	1	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	1	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01303	Evt01218	Evt02265	Evt02290	Event Number
1993 Parim ilitary Traini ng in NYC Area	Trip to Jorda n	Kidna pping of Nuns Julia Fores ter and Fatim a Uriba ren	1992 Com muna l Riots in Bomb ay	Event Name
19930201	19930115	19930115	19921215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
1	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	2	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00180	Evt00497	Evt00615	Evt00008	Evt00438	Event Number
Arrest | Jersey City, NJ | 3/4/1993	1993 Bombing of Zamboanga Int'l Airport	1993 Escape to Pakistan	1993 World Trade Center Bombings	1993 Dinner at UBL's to Celebrate Acquisition of Aircraft	Event Name
19930304	19930228	19930227	19930226	19930215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	1	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	1	0	Attack
0	Un	0	6	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	1000	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	22	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02281	Evt00254	Evt00645	Evt00116	Event Number
1993 Bomb ay Bomb ings	Arres t | Mapl ewoo d, NJ | | 3/10/ 1993	Fled U.S.	Arres t | Broo klyn, NY | 3/5/1 993	Event Name
19930312	19930310	19930306	19930305	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
257	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
713	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
21	1	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02284	Evt02282	Evt02289	Event Number
1993 World Trade Center Bombing (1993 Bombay Attacks)	1993 Plaza Theater Bombing (1993 Bombay Attacks)	1993 Grenade Attack on Mahim Fisherman's Colonys Bombay Attacks)	Event Name
19930312	19930312	19930312	Event Date
1	1	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	Attack
113	10	Un	Attack | Killed
Un	36	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02286	Evt00141	Evt02288	Evt02283	Event Number
1993 Failed Bombing of Dhanji St. (1993 Bombay Attacks)	Arrest | Egypt | 3/12/1993	1993 Bomb Bombing of Luck y Petrol Pump (1993 Bombay Attacks)	1993 Bomb Bombing of Zaveri Bazaar (1993 Bombay Attacks)	Event Name
19930312	19930312	19930312	19930312	Event Date
1	0	1	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	4	17	Attack | Killed
0	0	38	57	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00181	Evt00732	Evt00278	Evt00760	Evt02287	Event Number
Arrest | Jersey City, NJ | 6/24/1993	Left McNimr Street Offices	Arrest | Newark, NJ | 3/25/1993	Lived in Sydney	1993 Grenade Attack on Shar Airport (1993 Bomb Attacks)	Event Name
19930624	19930609	19930325	19930320	19930312	Event Date
0	0	0	0	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	N/A	1	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01091	Evt00530	Evt00409	Evt00363	Evt00114	Event Number
Some members leave AQ	1993 Hajj Pilgrimage	Asylum in Britain	Arrival in Canada	Arrest	Event Name
19930702	19930702	19930702	19930702	19930624	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	1	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01120	Evt02689	Evt01372	Evt00930	Event Number
Tested Explosives for 1993 WTC Bombing	1993 Failed Assassination Attempt on Former Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Sedki	Insurgency in Tajikistan	1993 Plot to Assassinate Mubarak	Event Name
19930702	19930702	19930702	19930702	Event Date
1	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	1	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	Un	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	4	5	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00973	Evt01305	Evt02331	Evt00782	Event Number
1993 Plot to Bomb Jewish Neighborhoods in NYC	1993 Plot to Break El-Sayyid Nosair Out of Attica	Arrest	Mahmoud Abouhalima's Escape from NYC	Event Name
19930702	19930702	19930702	19930702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	1	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
1	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
1	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	3	3	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00463	Evt00048	Evt00405	Evt00698	Evt00415	Event Number
Blinded and Crippled	1993 Abhkaz Revolt	1993 Assassination of Kasdi Merbah	1993 Kidnapping of Businessmen and Missionaries	1993 Attack on Hotel Housing U.S. Servicemen	Event Name
19930702	19930702	19930702	19930702	19930702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	1	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	1	Attack
0	0	1	0	2	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00866	Evt01046	Evt02945	Evt00993	Evt02679	Event Number
Moved to Tanzania to start mining operation	Return to Algeria	1993 Plot Against U.S. Embassy in Sanaa	1993 Plots in Jordan	Arrest	1993 0702	Event Name
19930702	19930702	19930702	19930702	19930702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00925	Evt00004	Evt01389	Evt01217	Evt01182	Evt01177	Event Number
1993 Plot to Assassinate Benazir Bhutto	1993 Plot against NYC landmarks	Asylum in Sweden	Travel to Egypt	Travel to Mogadishu	Travel to Kenya for AQ	Event Name
19930715	19930715	19930702	19930702	19930702	19930702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	1	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
1	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	1	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
7	51	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00282	Evt00050	Evt00348	Evt00182	Event Number
Arrest | NYC | 8/3/1993	Accidental Detonation of Bomb Under Construction	Arrest | Wildwood, NJ | 34172	Arrest | Jersey City, NJ | 7/1993	Event Name
19930803	19930723	19930722	19930715	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02857	Evt00849	Evt00057	Evt02677	Event Number
1993 Shooting at Cairo's Semiramis Inter-Continental Hotel	Moved to Kenya	1993 Airline Hijacking in Germany	1993 Suicide Attack on Egypt's Interior Minister (Failed Assassination)	Event Name
19931026	19931015	19930815	19930815	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	1	Attack
4	0	Un	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	1	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00844	Evt00768	Evt00544	Evt01102	Evt02858	Event Number
Moved to Cairo, Egypt	Living in Nairobi	Crashed UBL's Plane During Test Flight	Suicide Attempt While in Custody	Arrest	Event Name
19931115	19931115	19931115	19931111	19931026	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	N/A	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01184	Evt01060	Evt00658	Evt02098	Evt01178	Event Number
Travel to Nairobi	Return to Nairobi	1993 Grenade Attack on Roman Catholic Church	1993 Bombing of Train in Mumbai	Travel to Khartoum	Event Name
19931217	19931215	19931215	19931205	19931115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	0	Attack
0	0	7	Un	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	140	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
5	1	4	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00730	Evt02267	Evt00821	Evt00972	Evt00431	Event Number
Left Lond on Offic es	1994 Kidna pping of Fr. Cirilo Naca dora	Move to Nairo bi	1994 Plot to Bomb Israel i Emba ssy in Bang kok	1994 Atte mpt to obtai n South Afric an Urani um	Event Name
19940615	19940608	19940515	19940315	19940115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	1	1	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00609	Evt00442	Evt00385	Evt00362	Evt00492	Event Number
Arrest | Iraq | 1994 0702	1994 Mohammed Odeh's Wedding	Arrival in U.S. | Boston, MA | 1994	Arrival in Canada | Canada | Montreal, 1994	1994 Bombing of Shiite Shrine in Iran	Event Name
19940702	19940702	19940702	19940702	19940620	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	1	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	25	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	100	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01361	Evt00531	Evt00503	Evt00430	Event Number
1994 Plot Against West Targets in Senegal	Confrontation about theft of al-Fadl	Release of Khalid al-Fawwaz and Abel Hamed	Attempt to Infiltrate Ummah Party	Event Name
19940702	19940702	19940702	19940702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	1	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
1	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
1	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
5	5	5	5	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01223	Evt01358	Evt02688	Evt01117	Evt02285	Event Number
1994 Truck Bombing in Riyadh	1994 Plot Against Djibouti	1994 Failed Attack on Khan al-Khalili Tourist District of Cairo	Test of Airline Security	Arrest | India | 19940702	Event Name
19940702	19940702	19940702	19940702	19940702	Event Date
0	0	0	1	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	0	0	Attack
4	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	2	2	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01431	Evt01422	Evt01391	Evt01121	Evt00171	Event Number
Arrived in Afghanistan	Financial Asset Frozen By Saudi Gov't	Yemeni Civil War	1994 Theft of $110,000 of AQ Funds	Arrest	India	1994	Event Name
19940702	19940702	19940702	19940702	19940702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	1	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00638	Evt01174	Evt00752	Evt00049	Evt02755	Event Number
First Chechen War (12/11/1994 - 8/1996)	Travel to Cyprus	Lived in Kenya	1994 Abort ed Plot to Bomb US Embassy in Riyadh	Execution — Khartoum, Sudan — 1994 0702	Event Name
19940702	19940702	19940702	19940702	19940702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
1	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
16	N/A	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00737	Evt02269	Evt02268	Evt02312	Evt02266	Event Number
Left Somalia for Kenya	1994 Firefight w/ AFP	Death — Philippines — 1994 0804	1994 Killing of French Nationals in Algiers	1994 Kidnapping of Fr. Clarence Bertelsman	Event Name
19940815	19940804	19940804	19940803	19940715	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	1	1	Attack
0	N/A	0	5	0	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00697	Evt00273	Evt00935	Evt01909	Event Number
1994 Kidnapping of Americans & Britons in India	Arrest	1994 Plot to Assassinate President Clinton	Release from Detention	Event Name
19941115	19941115	19941115	19941015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
1	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	1	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	3	5	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00478	Evt01963	Evt02678	Evt01426	Event Number
1994 Bombing of Manila Theater	1994 Kidnapping of Land Surveyors in the Philippines	1994 Car-Bombing of Egypt's Prime Minister (Failed Assassination)	1994 Plot Against U.S. Cargo Planes	Event Name
19941201	19941118	19941115	19941115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	0	Attack
0	2	1	0	Attack | Killed
Un	2	21	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00251	Evt01964	Evt00229	Evt00449	Evt01116	Event Number
Arrest | Manila, Philippines | 1/6/1995	1994 Behe ading of Hostages	Arrest | Los Angeles, CA | 12/1994	1994 Battle of Grozny	1994 Test Bombing of PAL Flight /Murder of Haruki Ikegami	Event Name
19950106	19941225	19941215	19941215	19941215	Event Date
0	1	0	0	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	1	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	1	Attack
0	2	0	0	1	Attack | Killed
0	2	0	0	10	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	5	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00174	Evt00616	Evt00933	Evt00206	Evt00637	Event Number
Arrest | Islamabad, Pakistan | 2/7/1995	1995 Escape to Pakistan	1995 Plot to Assassinate Pope John Paul II	Arrest | Langkawi Island, Malaysia | 1/11/1995	Fire in Philippines	Event Name
19950207	19950115	19950115	19950111	19950107	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	3	1	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00184	Evt00785	Evt00247	Evt00077	Evt00191	Event Number
Arrest | Jolo, Philippines | 3/1/1995	1995 Mass Shiite of Worshippers	Arrest | Manhattan, NY | 2/21/1995	Arrest | ? | 2/1995	Arrest | Karachi, Pakistan | 2/1995	Event Name
19950301	19950225	19950221	19950215	19950215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	20	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00134	Evt00685	Evt00253	Evt00190	Evt00296	Event Number
Arrest | Davao, Philippines | 4/26/1995	1995 Ipil Raid	Arrest | Manila, Philippines | 4/1/1995	Arrest | Kalookan, Philippines | 4/1/1995	Arrest | Peshawar, Pakistan | 3/11/1995	Event Name
19950426	19950404	19950401	19950401	19950311	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	50	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	2	1	6	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02680	Evt01074	Evt00613	Evt00352	Evt00157	Event Number
1995 Faile d Assas sinati on of Muba rak	1995 Seizu re of Hosta ges at Hospi tal in Stavr opol	Jailbr eak | Manil a, Philip pines | 1995 0529	Arres t | Zamb oanga City | 4/26/ 1995	Arres t | Gener al Santo s, Philip pines | 4/26/ 1995	Event Name
19950626	19950615	19950529	19950426	19950426	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	1	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	0	0	Attack
2	100	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
8	1	2	1	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02820	Evt02819	Evt02818	Evt02817	Evt02816	Event Number
Death | Addis Ababa, Ethiopia | 19950701	1995 Firefight w/ Ethiopian Authorities	Arrest | Addis Ababa, Ethiopia | 19950628	Arrest | Addis Ababa, Ethiopia | 19950627	Arrest | Addis Ababa, Ethiopia | 19960626	Event Name
19950701	19950701	19950628	19950627	19950626	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	N/A	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00197	Evt00427	Evt00990	Evt00465	Evt01095	Event Number
Arrest | Khartoum | 1995	1995 Attack on U.S. Military/Armed Missions in Saudi Arabia	1995 Plot to Overthrow Bhutto's Second Gov't	1995 Bojinka Plot	Studied in Ireland	Event Name
19950702	19950702	19950702	19950702	19950702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	5	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	18	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00775	Evt00721	Evt00610	Evt00373	Evt00316	Event Number
Loss of most of UBL/ AQ's money	Left Afghanistan	Arrest	Arrival in the Philippines	Arrest	Event Name
19950702	19950702	19950702	19950702	19950702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01780	Evt01779	Evt01430	Evt01429	Evt01428	Evt01427	Event Number
Death — Saudi Arabia — 19950702	Death — Bosnia — 19950702	Travel to Brazil	Travel to Malaysia	Travel to Yemen	Travel to Sudan	Event Name
19950702	19950702	19950702	19950702	19950702	19950702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
1	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
		0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	1	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00817	Evt01200	Evt01403	Evt01151	Evt02946	Evt02744	Event Number
Move to London	Travel to Made ra, Soma lia	Moved to Florida	Training in Bosnia	1995 Raid on Algerian Security Forces	Death — Egypt — 1995 0702	Event Name
19950702	19950702	19950702	19950702	19950702	19950702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	1	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	24	N/A	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00926	Evt02085	Evt00188	Evt01210	Evt01179	Event Number
1995 Plot to Assassinate Benazir Bhutto	Arrest | Croatia | 19950913	Arrest | Jordan | 7/30/1995	Travel to Sudan	Travel to London	Event Name
19951015	19950913	19950730	19950702	19950702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02821	Evt01961	Evt02630	Evt02627	Event Number
1995 Plot to Assassinate Mubarak by Bombing His Motorcade	Arrest	Philippines	Manila	1995 1229	Arrest	Pakistan	Peshawar, Pakistan	1995 1203	1995 Bombing of Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad	Event Name
19951216	19951215	19951203	19951120	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	17	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	60	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	10	1	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01633	Evt02633	Evt00740	Evt02868	Evt01995	Event Number
Arrest | Al-Haditha, Saudi Arabia | 19960328	Release from Detention | Pakistan | 19960315	Left Sudan for the last time	1996 Armed Robbery of Bank in el-Ayyat, Egypt	1995 Kidnapping at Trankini Falls	Event Name
19960328	19960315	19960215	19960101	19951227	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	3	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02862	Evt00394	Evt01727	Evt01726	Evt01725	Event Number
1996 Armed Assault on Greek Tourists in Cairo	Arrives in Madrid| Madrid, Spain — 4/1996	Arrest| Saudi Arabia| 1996 0408	Arrest| Saudi Arabia| 1996 0407	Arrest| Saudi Arabia| 1996 0406	Event Name
19960418	19960415	19960408	19960407	19960406	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
18	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	N/A	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01211	Evt01781	Evt00630	Evt02812	Event Number
Travel to Tanzania to search for Abu Ubaidah al Banshiri	Death	Lake Victoria, Africa	Ferry boat Accident in Lake Victoria	1996 Nascent Plot to Kidnap Tourists to Secure Blind Sheik' s Release	Event Name
19960615	19960515	19960515	19960422	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	1	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00447	Evt00002	Evt00429	Evt01424	Evt00810	Event Number
1996 Bank Robbery	$7,000 Transfer for project in Mombasa	1996 Attempt to establish AQ cell in non Lebanon	1996 Khobar Towers Bombing	Move to Australia	Event Name
19960702	19960702	19960702	19960625	19960615	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
1	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	20	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	372	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	3	5	10	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02711	Evt02571	Evt02313	Evt02274	Evt00185	Evt00484	Event Number
Arrest | Saudi Arabia | 1996 0702	Arrest | Jordan | 1996 0702	Death | Algeria | 1996 0702	Arrest | London, England | 1996 0702	Arrest | Jordan | 1996	1996 Bombing of Paris Metro	Event Name
19960702	19960702	19960702	19960702	19960702	19960702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	1	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	4	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	86	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02863	Evt00767	Evt01063	Evt00865	Evt00830	Event Number
1996 Firefight w/ Egyptian Police in Central Egypt	Living in Kandahar, Afghanistan	Return to Spain	Moved to Tangiers	Move to Spain	Event Name
19960703	19960702	19960702	19960702	19960702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	1	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
N/A	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02712	Evt00689	Evt02572	Evt02864	Event Number
Release from Detention	1996 Fatwa Against U.S.	Release from Detention	Death — Egypt — 19960703	Event Name
19961015	19960823	19960815	19960703	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	1	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02867	Evt02869	Evt02866	Evt02865	Event Number
Death | Beni Suef, Egypt | 1996 1103	1996 Firefight w/ Egyptian Police in Beni Suef	Death | Minya Province, Egypt | 1996 1016	1996 Firefight w/ Egyptian Police in Minya Province	Event Name
19961103	19961103	19961016	19961016	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	1	Attack
0	N/A	0	N/A	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	0	N/A	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	1	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01733	Evt02681	Evt02683	Evt01962	Event Number
Arrest | Syria | 1996 1215	Arrest | Dagestan, Russia | 1996 1215	Failed Attempt to Establish Training Camp in Chechnya	1996 Plot to Bomb APEC Summit in Manila	Event Name
19961215	19961215	19961215	19961115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	1	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	3	N/A	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00370	Evt00814	Evt00355	Evt00827	Evt02790	Event Number
Arrival in Spain | Tudela, Spain | 2/1997	Move to Karachi	Arrested (as cooperating witness)	Move to Philippines	Arrest | Canada | 1996 1215	Event Name
19970215	19970115	19961219	19961215	19961215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01042	Evt00766	Evt02682	Evt00344	Evt01645	Event Number
Resided in Qatar	Living in Florida	Release from Detention | Dagestan, Russia | 19970515	Arrest | Valencia, Spain | 4/1997	Arrest | Canada | 19970315	Event Name
19970615	19970615	19970515	19970415	19970315	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	3	6	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02935	Evt01432	Evt01377	Evt01007	Evt00374	Event Number
1997(?) Plot to Attack U.S. Naval Vessels in Singapore	Living in Hamburg	Loss of Leg	Refusal to Make Bayat to UBL	Arrival in U.K. | London, England | 1997	Event Name
19970702	19970702	19970702	19970702	19970702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
1	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00248	Evt01167	Evt00834	Evt00408	Evt02923	Event Number
Arrest | Manhattan, NY | 7/10/1997	Travel between Kenya and Tanzania	Move to Sudan	1997 Assassination Plot Against Yemeni PM	Arrest | California | 1997 0702?	Event Name
19970710	19970702	19970702	19970702	19970702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	5	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01052	Evt02859	Evt02912	Event Number
Return to Comoros Islands	Release or Escape(?) from Egyptian Egypt Mental Institution | Cairo, Egypt | 1997 0915	Release from Detention | Jordan | 1997 0715	Event Name
19970915	19970915	19970715	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02254	Evt00733	Evt02861	Evt02860	Event Number
1997 Bombing of Sadar Bazar (Delhi)	Left Nairobi for U.S.	Arrest	Egypt, 1997	1997 Armed Assault on German Tourists at Cairo's Egyptian Museum	Event Name
19971001	19970920	19970918	19970918	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	10	Attack | Killed
30	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	2	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02831	Evt00778	Evt02256	Evt00603	Evt02255	Event Number
Death | Valley of the Queens, Egypt | 1997 1117	1997 Luxor Massacre	1997 Bombing of Karol Bagh Market (Delhi)	Disappearance	1997 Bombing of Rani Bagh Market (Delhi)	Event Name
19971117	19971117	19971026	19971015	19971010	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	1	Attack
0	58	1	0	1	Attack | Killed
0	Un	34	0	16	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	5	1	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00411	Evt02218	Evt02259	Evt02258	Evt02257	Event Number
1998 Attack on Algerian Soldiers	1998 Coimbatore Bombings	1998 Bombing Near Police HQ (Delhi)	1997 Bombing of Punjabi Bagh Bus (Delhi)	1997 Bombing of Red Fort (Delhi)	Event Name
19980219	19980214	19980109	19971230	19971130	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	1	Attack
27	58	0	3	3	Attack | Killed
Un	Un	50	25	70	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01527	Evt00867	Evt02292	Evt01212	Evt00829	Evt00624	Event Number
Training in OH	Moved to Turkey	Arrest | Mumbai, India | 19980405	Travel to Yemen	Move to Rome	1998 Fatwa Against U.S.	Event Name
19980428	19980415	19980405	19980315	19980315	19980223	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
1	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	1	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	1	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	1	1	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00295	Evt00159	Evt00633	Evt00395	Evt01362	Event Number
Arrest | Paris, France | 5/26/1998	Arrest | Germany | 5/26/1998	Filming of Martyrdom Video	Arrives in Nairobi | Pakistan | 5/1998	Arrivons Weapons Endorsement of Nuclear	Event Name
19980526	19980526	19980515	19980515	19980501	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	1	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	N/A	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt01169	Travel from Karachi, Pakistan to Nairobi, Kenya	19980615	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Evt00396	Arrives in Nairobi | Nairobi, Kenya | 6/19/1998	19980619	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt02260	1998 Bombing of Club at Kailash Colony (Delhi)	19980627	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A
Evt00359	Arrival in Australia | Sydney, Australia | 1998	19980702	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A

Evt00936	Evt00976	Evt02141	Evt00365	Event Number
1998 Plot to Attack World Cup	1998 Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy in Tirana	1998 Hajj Pilgrimage	Arrival in Italy | Milan, Italy | 1998	Event Name
19980702	19980702	19980702	19980702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	1	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	4	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00349	Evt00074	Evt00985	Evt01373	Event Number
Arrest | Yemen | 1998	Arrest | ? | 1998	1998 Kidnapping of Western tourists in Yemen	1998 Plot to Use Stinger Missiles Against US Military Targets in Saudi Arabia	Event Name
19980702	19980702	19980702	19980702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	2	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01181	Evt00857	Evt00986	Evt00977	Evt00608	Event Number
Travel to Malaysia	Moved to Spain	1998 Plot to Kill Imam Boubakeur	1998 Plot to Bomb U.S. Military Installations in Germany	Electronics Thefts	Event Name
19980702	19980702	19980702	19980702	19980702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01128	Evt00811	Evt00809	Evt02059	Evt01581	Evt01254	Event Number
Training in Afghanistan	Move to Bahrain	Move to Afghanistan	1989-2001 Afghan Civil War	Bayat to Ba'asyr	Moved to Egypt	Event Name
19980702	19980702	19980702	19980702	19980702	19980702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
1	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	1	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	51	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01197	Evt00898	Evt01163	Evt02687	Event Number
Travel to Sanaa, Yemen	1998 Murder of Adam Wright and Michael Hurley	Transfer of Arms Trafficking Network from GIA to GSPC	Arrest	Event Name
19980715	19980715	19980715	19980715	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	1	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	2	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	2	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00397	Evt00015	Evt00009	Evt00648	Evt02261	Event Number
Arrives in Tanzania | Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania | 8/4/1998	1998 Embassy Attack (Dar)	1998 Embassy Attacks (Nairobi)	Flee to Afghanistan	1998 Bombing Haryana Roadways Bus Terminal	Event Name
19980804	19980804	19980804	19980801	19980726	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	1	Attack
0	10	212	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	85	4000	0	6	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	10	28	3	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01783	Evt01782	Evt00195	Evt00644	Evt00723	Event Number
Death | | Nairobi, Kenya | 1998 0807	Death | Dar es Salaam, Tanzania | 1998 0807	Arrest | Karachi, Pakistan | 8/7/1998	Fled to Karachi	Left Dar es Salaam for Mombasa	Event Name
19980807	19980807	19980807	19980806	19980805	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
1	1	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	3	8	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02684	Evt01048	Evt00139	Evt00272	Evt00727	Event Number
Rendition | Baku, Azerbaijan | 19980820	Return to Britain	Arrest | Eastleigh, Kenya | 8/12/1998	Arrest | Nairobi, Kenya | 8/11/1998	Left Dar es Salaam for South Africa	Event Name
19980820	19980815	19980812	19980811	19980808	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	2	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00820	Evt00642	Evt00249	Evt00729	Evt01910	Event Number
Move to Morocco	Fled to Afghanistan	Arrest	Left Kenya for the U.S. (in FBI Custody)	Release from Detention	Event Name
19980915	19980915	19980910	19980826	19980822	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	3	1	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01895	Evt00343	Evt00747	Evt00250	Event Number
1998 Kidnapping of Olga Uspenskaya (Wife of Ingushetian Presidential Advisor)	Arrest	Lived in England	Arrest	Event Name
19981010	19980927	19980923	19980916	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
1	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00881	Evt01088	Evt01784	Evt01773	Evt00451	Event Number
1998 Murder of Homosexual	1998 Shoot-up of Lake Lamba Police Station	Death	Yousoufia, Morocco	1998 Murder of Abdelaziz Fikri (for frequenting prostitutes)	1998 Battle with Algerian Forces	Event Name
19981115	19981115	19981015	19981015	19981015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	1	1	Attack
1	0	0	1	37	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	3	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02814	Evt01785	Evt00887	Evt02291	Event Number
Arrest | Aden, Yemen | 1998 | 1224	Death | Basilan, Philippines | 1998 | 1215	Murder of Drug-Lord Danny Karam | 1998	Arrest | Mumbai, India | 1998 | 1116	Event Name
19981224	19981215	19981215	19981116	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	1	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
8	1	3	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00151	Evt02622	Evt01786	Evt00888	Evt02813	Event Number
Arrest | France | 3/1999	1999 Deportation from Australia to Indonesia	Death — Campbell, California, Philippines — 1999 0115	1999 Murder of Edwin Angeles	1999 Plot Against Western Targets in Yemen	Event Name
19990315	19990215	19990115	19990115	19990105	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	1	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01528	Evt00187	Evt01457	Evt02332	Event Number
Training in Germany	Arrest | Jordan | 4/1999	1999 Robbery of Bank Central Asia/Bombing of Warte l Office	Release from Detention | Jordan, Amman | 1999 0315	Event Name
19990416	19990415	19990415	19990315	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
1	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	1	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	10	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00437	Evt00369	Evt01787	Evt01425	Evt01458	Event Number
1999 Confe rence on Islam ic Fund ament alism	Arriv al in Pakist an | Pakist an | 1999	Death | ? | 1999 0611	Livin g Near Kand ahar	1999 Bomb ing of Istiql al Mosq ue	Event Name
19990702	19990702	19990611	19990515	19990419	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	1	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01262	Evt00981	Evt00928	Evt01443	Event Number
1999 Moscow Bombings	1999 Plot to Establish Oregon-based Jihadist Camps	1999-2001 Plot to Assassinate Megawati	1999-2000 Plot Against U.S. Naval Personnel in Singapore	Event Name
19990702	19990702	19990702	19990702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	1	1	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	1	1	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
200	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	8	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00894	Evt00883	Evt01912	Evt01885	Event Number
1999 Murder of Politician Joe Fernandez	1999 Murder of Asylum Seeker	1999 Hijacking of India Airlines in Nepal (Hostages Traded for Release of Azhar Ahmed et al)	1999 Bombing/Assassination Attempt on Karimov	Event Name
19990702	19990702	19990702	19990702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	Attack
1	1	0	16	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01745	Evt01072	Evt00602	Evt00601	Evt00599	Event Number
Arrest | Taif, Saudi Arabia | 19990702	1999 Robbery of Southern Bank (Malaysia)	Arrest | Germany | 19990702	Arrest | UAE | 19990702	1999 Deportation to Morocco	Event Name
19990702	19990702	19990702	19990702	19990702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	1	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	1	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00342	Evt01196	Evt00754	Evt00750	Evt02914	Event Number
Arrest | United Kingdom | 7/12/1999	Travel to Philippines	Lived in Montreal	Lived in Ireland	Release from Detention | UAE | 19990702	Event Name
19990712	19990702	19990702	19990702	19990702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	1	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01073	Evt01788	Evt00892	Evt00663	Evt02685	Event Number
Second Chechen War	Death — Sulu, Philippines — 19990715	1999 Murder of Jovenal Bruno	1999 Hatchet Attack on Policeman	Resigned as Head of EIJ	Event Name
19990815	19990715	19990715	19990715	19990715	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
1	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	0	Attack
0	0	1	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
10	1	1	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00199	Evt00320	Evt01283	Evt02827	Evt01884	Event Number
Arrest | Kot Addu, Pakistan | 10/19/99	Arrest | South Africa | 10/5/1999	1999 Said Bhaji's Wedding	Release from Detention | Yemen | 1999 0915	1999 Kidnapping of Japanese Nationals in Kyrgyzstan	Event Name
19991015	19991005	19991001	19990915	19990825	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	1	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	N/A	3	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00016	Evt00303	Evt01789	Evt00839	Evt01459	Event Number
1999 Jordan Millennium Bomb Plot	Arrest | Port Angeles, WA | 12/14/1999	Death | Bogor, Indonesia | 1999 1115	Move to Yemen	1999 Armed Robbery of Gas Station	Event Name
19991215	19991214	19991115	19991015	19991015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
10	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00115	Evt00109	Evt00102	Evt00090	Evt01911	Event Number
Arrest | Brooklyn, NY | 12/30/1999	Arrest | Bellevue, Seattle | 12/24/1999	Arrest | Beecher Falls, VT | 12/19/1999	Arrest | Ammann, Jordan | 12/19/99	Release from Detention | India | 1999 1215	Event Name
19991230	19991224	19991219	19991215	19991215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00736	Evt01171	Evt01187	Evt00746	Evt00656	Evt00716	Event Number
Left Pakistan	Travel to Afghanistan	Travel to Pakistan	Lived in Denmark	Grand Jury Testimony	1999 LAX Millennium Bombing Plot	Event Name
2E+07	2E+07	2E+07	2E+07	2E+07	19991231	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	1	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	5	6	N/A	N/A	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01433	Evt00660	Evt00264	Evt01363	Evt01183	Evt00739	Event Number
9/11 Plotters Return to Hamburg	2000 Gunfight w/ Algerian Army	Arrest	2000 Plot Against U.S.S. The Sullivans	Travel to Morocco	Left Sudan for Afghanistan	Event Name
20000131	20000130	20000110	20000101	2E+07	2E+07	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	9	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01559	Evt02616	Evt02691	Evt02334	Evt02788	Event Number
2000 Bombing of Ferry at Ozam is City	2000 Plot to Bomb Israeli Embassy in Canberra	Arrest|UAE|2000|0215?	Living in Peshawar	Arrest|Bekaa Valley, Lebanon|2000|0203	Event Name
20000225	20000215	20000215	20000215	20000203	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01485	Evt01460	Evt01560	Evt02302	Event Number
2000 Plot to Bomb Mall in Columbus, OH	2000 Assault/Attempted Assassination of Mator i Abdul Jalil	2000 Conflict in Lano del Norte	2000 Capture/Beheading of India n Officer in Kashmir	Event Name
20000315	20000305	20000301	20000226	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	1	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
1	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	1	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	3	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02173	Evt00263	Evt01790	Evt00493	Evt01965	Event Number
Death — Andhra Pradesh, Pakistan — 20000415	Arrest — Milan, Italy — 4/2000	Death — Bouria, Algeria — 20000403	Bombing of Sonatrach Gas Pipeline	2000 Kidnapping of Students/Teachers in Sumisip	Event Name
20000415	20000415	20000403	20000323	20000320	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	1	N/A	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01983	Evt02048	Evt01993	Evt00696	Event Number
2000 Raid/ Kidna pping on Pearl Farm Beac h Resor t	2000 Kidna pping of Forei gn Journ alists in Sulu	2000 Kidna pping of Fr. Rhoel Galla rdo	2000 Kidna pping of 20 Asian and Europ ean Hosta ges from Sipad an Island	Event Name
20000522	20000516	20000515	20000423	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	Attack
2	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
2	Un	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	1	1	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
6	1	1	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02791	Evt00547	Evt01434	Evt01988	Evt01435	Event Number
Arrest | Ottawa, Canada | 20000626	2000 Custody Kidnapping	Return to Yemen	Arrest | Jolo, Philippines | 20010602	Arrival in Newark	Event Name
20000626	20000610	20000609	20000602	20000529	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	1	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	5	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02619	Evt01907	Evt01886	Evt01980	Event Number
2000 Training/Paintball at Myalup	2000 Hajj Pilgrimage	2000 Kidnapping of American Climbers in Kyrgyzstan	2000 Kidnapping of Wilde Almeda and Followers (Jesus Miracle Crusade)	Event Name
20000702	20000702	20000702	20000701	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
1	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	1	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
1	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00386	Evt00338	Evt02089	Evt00664	Evt00058	Event Number
Arrival in UA | USA | 2000	Arrest | Tetouan, Morocco | 2000	2000 Kidnapping of Businessman Niranjan Shah	Hiding in Bosnia	1999-2002 Conflict in Ambon and Maluku	Event Name
20000702	20000702	20000702	20000702	20000702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	1	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	2	64	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01979	Evt02235	Evt02617	Evt02913	Evt02745	Event Number
2000 Kidnapping of German Journalist Andreas Lorenz	Training in Chechnya	2000 Plot Against Sydney Olympics	Release from Detention	Death — Egypt — 2000 0702	Event Name
20000703	20000702	20000702	20000702	20000702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	1	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	1	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00485	Evt00742	Evt02621	Evt01484	Evt01981	Event Number
2000 Bombing of Philippine Ambassador's Residence	Lived in Afghanistan	Training in Australia's Blue Mountains	2000 Paintball in N. VA	2000 Kidnapping of French TV Crew	Event Name
20000801	20000715	20000715	20000715	20000709	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	1	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	1	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	1	Attack
2	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
21	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
15	N/A	N/A	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01364	Evt01987	Evt00856	Evt01772	Event Number
9/2000 Call For Jihad to Release Prisoners Everywhere	Arrest | Zamboanga City, Philippines | 2000-0824	Moved to Sheffield	2000 Kidnapping of Jeffrey Schilling	Event Name
20000901	20000824	20000815	20000815	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
1	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	2	N/A	7	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01225	Evt00477	Evt01982	Evt01366	Event Number
2000 U.S.S. Cole Attack	2000 Bombing of Jakarta Stock Exchange	2000 Kidnapping of Malaysian Pandanan Island	Tested Explosives for 2000 Bombing of U.S.S. Cole	Event Name
20001012	20000913	20000910	20000901	Event Date
0	0	0	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	0	Attack
27	15	0	0	Attack | Killed
39	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
25	2	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02541	Evt00082	Evt01791	Evt01734	Evt02137	Event Number
Arrest | Yemen | 2000 1101	Arrest | Aden, Yemen | 10/30 /2000	Death | Sapaua, Indonesia | 2000 1026	Arrest | Syria | 2000 1015	Death | Aden Harbor, Yemen | 2000 1012	Event Name
20001101	20001030	20001026	20001015	20001012	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00152	Evt00966	Evt00426	Evt00061	Evt01175	Event Number
Arrest	2000 Plot to Bomb Christmas Market in Strasbourg, France	2000 Attack on the Red Fort	2000 Ambush of Algerian Army	Travel to Frankfurt	Event Name
20001215	20001215	20001213	20001127	20001115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	0	Attack
0	0	3	27	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
5	10	3	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01792	Evt00021	Evt02943	Evt02251	Evt00987	Event Number
Death | Bandung, Indonesia | 2000 1224	2000 Christmas Eve Bombings	Failed hijacking of Pakistani Air passenger flight	2000 Grenade Attack on GenSan	2000 Plot to Mount Gas-Attack on European Parliament	Event Name
20001224	20001224	20001215	20001215	20001215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	1	0	Attack
0	18	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	20	0	1	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	87	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02264	Evt01984	Evt01638	Evt00178	Event Number
2000 Assassination of Fr. Benjamin Inocencio	Arrest	Arrest	Arrest	Event Name
20001228	20001227	20001225	20001224	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
1	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02573	Evt01207	Evt01255	Evt01436	Evt00479	Event Number
Arrest | 20010212	Travel to Spain	2001 Reconn of NYC-Area Targets	Travel to Casablanca	2000 Bombing of Manila Train Station (Rizal Day Bombing)	Event Name
20010212	20010115	20010115	20010115	20001230	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	1	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	22	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	100	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	2	N/A	18	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00086	Evt01908	Evt00350	Evt00219	Evt00144	Evt01445	Event Number
Arrest | Algeria | 3/27/2001	2001 Hajj Pilgrimage	Arrest | Yemen | 2/18/2001	Arrest | London, England | 2/2001	Arrest | England | 2/2001	2001 Plot Against Payas Lebar Airbase	Event Name
20010327	20010315	20010218	20010215	20010215	20010215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	1	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	2	1	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02299	Evt01437	Evt00506	Evt00177	Evt00147	Event Number
Arrest | Gurgaon, India | 2001 | 0425	Travel to Cairo	2001 Burglary Conviction	Arrest | Italy | 4/3/2001	Arrest | Faisalabad, Pakistan | 3/31/2001	Event Name
20010425	20010420	20010415	20010403	20010331	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	1	1	5	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01768	Evt01766	Evt01767	Evt01757	Event Number
2001 Behe ading of Guill ermo Sober o	2001 Behe ading of Hosta ges on Basil an	2001 Kidna pping at Hospi tal in Lamit an	2001 Kidna pping of Touri sts from Dos Palm as Resor t (Pala wan)	Event Name
20010611	20010601	20010601	20010527	Event Date
1	1	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	Attack
1	2	0	Un	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	4	17	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01438	Evt02181	Evt00087	Evt01269	Evt01692	Event Number
Travel to Malaysia	2001 MILF Cease fire w/ Philippine Gov't	Arrest | Alicante, Spain | 3706 4	Travel in North Africa	Arrest | Malaysia | 2001 0615	Event Name
20010625	20010622	20010622	20010615	20010615	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	6	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01317	Evt00922	Evt00631	Evt01284	Event Number
2001 Plot to Attack U.S. Naval Vessels in Singapore	2001 Plot to Attack U.S. Embassy in Paris	2001- ? Fighting Against U.S. in OEF	Diamond Trading/Money Laundering in Liberia	Event Name
20010702	20010702	20010702	20010701	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	1	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
5	18	39	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01793	Evt01420	Evt00176	Evt00681	Evt01318	Event Number
Death | Tora Bora, Afgh anista n | 2001 0702	Retur n to Keny a	Arres t | Italy | 2001	Nasce nt Plot Again st U.S. Navy Ships in Strait s of Horm uz 2001	2001 Plot to Bomb the Pana ma Canal	Event Name
20010702	20010702	20010702	20010702	20010702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	1	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00813	Evt00759	Evt01109	Evt00945	Evt02275	Event Number
Move to Jalalabad	Lived in Spain	2001 Suicide Bombing Plots in Milan	2001 Plot to attack Klein-Broge l Air Base	Release from Detention	Event Name
20010702	20010702	20010702	20010702	20010702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01173	Evt01154	Evt02815	Evt01994	Evt01153	Event Number
Travel to Chechnya	Training in Indonesia	Arrest	Arrest	Training in Georgia	Event Name
20010715	20010715	20010715	20010708	20010702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	1	0	0	1	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	1	4	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00019	Evt00136	Evt02086	Evt01447	Event Number
2001 Atrium Plaza Bombing	Arrest	2001 Kidnapping of Businessman Roy Burman	2001 Bombing of Churches in East Jakarta	Event Name
20010729	20010728	20010725	20010722	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
5	0	0	69	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
8	1	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01480	Evt00611	Evt01419	Evt01347	Event Number
2001 Jihadi Training in Oregon	Enters Canada	Arrived in Afghanistan	2001 Plot to Bomb the Israeli Embassy in India, Azerbaijan, the Philippines, and Australia	Event Name
20010815	20010815	20010801	20010801	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
1	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	1	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02886	Evt01794	Evt00399	Evt01660	Evt02792	Event Number
Death | Kwaja | Bahuddin, Afghanistan | 20010909	Death | Afghanistan | 20010909	2001 Assassination of Ahmed Shah Masoud	Arrest | MN | 20010816	Arrest | Canada | 20010815	Event Name
20010909	20010909	20010909	20010816	20010815	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	1	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	8	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01795	Evt01258	Evt01259	Evt01260	Evt00042	Event Number
Death | North Tower, WTC, Manhattan, New York | 2001 0911	American Airlines Flight 77 (9/11)	United Airlines Flight 175 (9/11)	American Airlines Flight 11 (9/11)	2001 Attacks on NYC/DC/Shanksville (9/11)	Event Name
20010911	20010911	20010911	20010911	20010911	Event Date
0	1	1	1	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	1	1	Attack
0	59	60	87	2977	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	6000	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	1	1	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	1	1	1	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
5	5	5	5	57	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00617	Evt01797	Evt01257	Evt01798	Evt01796	Event Number
2001 Escape to Pakistan	Death | Shanksville, PA | 20010911	United Airlines Flight 93 (9/11)	Death | South Tower, WTC, Manhattan, NY | 20010911	Death | Pentagon, Alexandria, VA | 20010911	Event Name
20010911	20010911	20010911	20010911	20010911	Event Date
0	0	1	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	1	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	1	1	Death | KIA
0	1	0	1	1	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0			Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	40	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	4	4	5	5	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00923	Evt01481	Evt00310	Evt00107	Evt00277	Event Number
2001 Plot Against US and Israeli Embassies in Manila	2001 Jihadi Training in Washington State	Arrest | Rotterdam, Netherlands | 9/13/2001	Arrest | Belgium | 9/13/2001	Arrest | Netherlands | 9/13/2001	Event Name
20010915	20010915	20010913	20010913	20010913	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	1	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
1	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
6	N/A	1	1	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00345	Evt00127	Evt00327	Evt00210	Evt02795	Event Number
Arrest | Valencia, Spain | 9/26/2001	Arrest | Casca nte, Spain | 9/26/2001	Arrest | Spain | 9/26/2001	Arrest | Leicester, England | 9/25/2001	Arrest | Chicago, IL | 2001 0919	Event Name
20010926	20010926	20010926	20010925	20010919	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	5	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00261	Evt01913	Evt01251	Evt00511	Evt00284	Event Number
Arrest | Milan, Italy | 10/10/2001	Release from Detention | Islamabad, Pakistan | 2001 1009	2001 Fatwa Against U.S.	Arrest | Afghanistan-Pakistan Border | 10/5/2001	Arrest | Pakistan | 10/3/2001	Event Name
20011010	20011009	20011009	20011005	20011003	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	1	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02295	Evt02294	Evt02672	Evt00271	Event Number
Death | Mumbai, India | 2001 | 1013	2001 Firefight w/ Mumbai Police	Arrest | Afghanistan-Pakistan Border | 2001 1011	Arrest | Munich, Germany | 10/10 /2001	Event Name
20011013	20011013	20011011	20011010	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	3	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01444	Evt01369	Evt00979	Evt02293	Event Number
2001 Plot Plot Against Singaporean Ministry of Defense	2001 Plot to Poison U.S. Water Supplies	2001 Plot to Bomb Western Embassies in Singapore	2001 Plot to Murder Bollywood Star Aamir Khan	Event Name
20011015	20011015	20011015	20011013	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	1	1	Plot | Interrupted
1	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	1	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	1	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	6	24	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01405	Evt02574	Evt02786	Evt02006	Evt02696	Event Number
Arrest | Afghanistan-Pakistan Border | 11/2001	Arrest | | 2001 1024	Arrest | Canada | 2001 1019	2001 Kidnapping of Marilyn Chu	Arrest | Tora Bora, Afghanistan | 2001 1015?	Event Name
20011101	20011024	20011019	20011015	20011015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00175	Evt01880	Evt00464	Evt00162	Evt00231	Event Number
Arrest | Italy | 11/20 01	Death | Logar Provi nce, Afgh anista n | 2001 1115	Boarded toget her in Philip pines	Arrest | Granada, Spain | 11/13 /2001	Arrest | Madrid, Spain | 11/13 /2001	Event Name
20011115	20011115	20011115	20011113	20011113	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	#	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	#	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	#	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	#	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	#	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	#	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	#	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	#	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	#	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	#	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	N/A	N/A	1	9	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00294	Evt00257	Evt00215	Evt01799	Evt00299	Event Number
Arrest | Paranaque City, Philippines | 11/20/01	Arrest | Milan, Italy | 11/15/2001	Arrest | London, England | 11/20/01	Death | Afghanistan | 2001 1115	Arrest | Philippines | 11/20/01	Event Name
20011115	20011115	20011115	20011115	20011115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01800	Evt00668	Evt00346	Evt00323	Event Number
Death | | Logar Provi nce, Afgh anista n | 2001 1115	Hidin g in Slova kia	Arres t | Vanc ouver , CA | 11/15 /2001	Arres t | Spain | | 11/20 01	Event Name
20011115	20011115	20011115	20011115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt02051	2001 Release of Bulk of Hostages Acquires at Dos Palmas and Lamitan Hospital	20011115	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt02631	Arrest | Kabul, Afghanistan | 20011115	20011115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt00988	2001 Plot to Mount Gas-Attack on France	20011115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt00755	Lived in Paris	20011115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A

Evt02940	Evt02896	Evt02741	Evt00731	Evt01288	Event Number
Arrest | Afghanistan | 20011124	Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain | 20011119	Arrest | Afghanistan | 20011118	Left Madrid	Training in Somalia	Event Name
20011124	20011119	20011118	20011115	20011115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	1	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	1	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01628	Evt00307	Evt02081	Evt00258	Evt00104	Event Number
Arrest | Afghanistan | 20011201	Arrest | Rome, Italy | 11/30/2001	Arrest | Hamburg, Germany | 20011128	Arrest | Milan, Italy | 11/28/2001	Arrest | Belgium | 11/26/2001	Event Name
20011201	20011130	20011128	20011128	20011126	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01728	Evt02091	Evt01630	Evt01448	Evt01446	Event Number
Arrest | Singapore | 20011209	Death | Rajkot, India | 20011207	Arrest | Afghanistan | 20011203	2001 Plot to Bomb Churches in Riau, Indonesia	2001 Plot Against Singapore American School (SAS)	Event Name
20011209	20011207	20011203	20011202	20011201	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00328	Evt01801	Evt00416	Evt00884	Evt00265	Event Number
Arrest | Srinagar, India | | 12/15/2001	Death | Delhi, India | | 12152001	Attack on India in Parliament	Murder of Civilians at Block Road 2001	Arrest | Montreal, Canada | 12/12/2001	Event Name
20011215	20011215	20011215	20011213	20011212	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	0	Attack
0	0	7	2	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	18	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	5	10	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01629	Evt00135	Evt00095	Evt02550	Evt01585	Event Number
Arrest | Afghanistan-Pakistan Border | 20011215	Arrest | Delhi, India | 12/15/2001	Arrest | Balagana City, Philippines | 12/2001	Arrest | Afghanistan | 20012001 1215	Arrest | | 20012001 1215	Event Name
20011215	20011215	20011215	20011215	20011215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00525	Evt00105	Evt00947	Evt02600	Evt01802	Evt01693	Event Number
Changed Hide-outs	Arrest | Belgium | 12/19/2001	2001 Plot to attack Manila	Arrest | Afghanistan | 2001 1215	Death | Melawa, Afgh anistan | 2001 1215	Arrest | Malaysia | 2001 1215	Event Name
20011219	20011219	20011215	20011215	20011215	20011215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	1	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00173	Evt01729	Evt02941	Evt00073	Evt01085	Event Number
Arrest | Islamabad, Pakistan | 12/25/2001	Arrest | Singapore | 20011224	Arrest | Tora Bora, Afghanistan | 20011223	Arrest | ? | 12/22/2001	2001 Failed Shoe-Bombing Attack	Event Name
20011225	20011224	20011223	20011222	20011222	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	1	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00283	Evt00448	Evt00665	Evt01384	Evt00285	Event Number
Arrest | Pakistan | 1/14/2002	2002 Battle Between Rival Algerian Islamist factions	Hiding in Cave in Afghanistan	Fled to Pakistan	Arrest | Pakistan | 12/30/2001	Event Name
20020114	20020112	20020102	20020101	20011230	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	17	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	3	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02088	Evt01803	Evt00666	Evt00070	Evt00063	Event Number
Arrest | Dubai, UAE, 20020115	Death | Zawar Kili, Afghanistan | 20020115	Hiding in London	Arrest? | 1/15/2002	2002 Ambush of Algerian Paratrooopers	Event Name
20020115	20020115	20020115	20020115	20020115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	54	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01053	Evt00975	Evt00912	Evt02826	Evt02739	Event Number
Return to France	2002 Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy in Rome	Plot to Bomb Grand Central Station (Date Unknown)	Release from Detention	Arrest	Event Name
20020115	20020115	20020115	20020115	20020115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt00097	Arrest | Barcelona, Spain | 1/19/2002	20020119	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt00170	Arrest | Hospitalet de Llobregat | 1/19/2002	20020119	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt00065	2002 Attack on Calcutta's American Center	20020122	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	Un	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Evt01914	Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain | 20020122	20020122	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Evt00550	Evt00204	Evt00286	Evt00192	Evt02094	Event Number
2002 Daniel Pearl Kidnapping/Murder	Arrest | Lahore, Pakistan | 37299	Arrest | Pakistan | 2/12/2002	Arrest | Karachi, Pakistan | 2/6/2002	Death | | Hazaribagh, India | | 20020126	Event Name
20020215	20020212	20020212	20020206	20020126	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
1	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
10	1	N/A	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt01707	Arrest | Oman | 20020215	20020215	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Evt00172	Arrest | Iran | 2/15/2002	20020215	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt02551	Release from Detention | Saudi Arabia | 20080215	20020215	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt02169	Arrest | Ilford, London, England | 20020218	20020218	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt01577	2002 Gujarat Violence	20020227	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Evt01915	Evt00252	Evt02767	Evt02090	Evt01563	Event Number
Defac to Relea se from Deten tion | Islam abad, Pakist an | 2002 0315	Arres t | Manil a, Philip pines | 3/13/ 2002	Arres t | Garde z, Afgh anista n	Arres t | Mum bai, India | 2002 0308	2002 Fitna rt Bomb ing	Event Name
20020315	20020313	20020310	20020308	20020304	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	15	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	40	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	5	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00289	Evt01746	Evt01888	Evt01564	Evt02303	Event Number
Arrest | Pakistan | 3/2002	Arrest | Sarajevo, Bosnia | 2002 0321	Death | Chechnya | 2002 0319	2002 Arson of Kimball Plaza	2002 Ambush of India n Officers in Kashmir	Event Name
20020328	20020321	20020319	20020319	20020315	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00099	Evt02801	Evt01917	Evt01916	Event Number
Arrest | Barcelona, Spain | 4/13/2002	2002 Bomb Plot Against Interim Karzai Gov't	Release from Detention | Lahore, Pakistan | 20020403	Release from Detention | Faisalabad, Pakistan | 20020401	Event Name
20020413	20020406	20020403	20020401	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	5	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02925	Evt00287	Evt00786	Evt00494	Evt01320	Event Number
Death | Djebel Terrif, Tunisia | 2002 0415	Arrest | Pakistan | 4/2002	2002 McDonald's Attack in Lebanon	2002 Bombing of Synagogue (Djerba)	2002-2003 Plot Against Suspension Bridges in NYC	Event Name
20020415	20020415	20020415	20020415	20020415	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	21	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	4	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	5	6	9	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00189	Evt02898	Evt00238	Evt01256	Evt01978	Event Number
Arrest | Justice, IL | 4/30/2002	Release from Detention | Spain | 2002 0426	Arrest | Madrid, Spain | 4/24/2002	Travel to Zurich	2002 Kidnapping of Journalist Arlyn de la Cruz	Event Name
20020430	20020426	20020424	20020415	20020415	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00491	Evt00516	Evt01992	Evt02280	Evt01406	Event Number
2002 Bomb ing in Hotel Karachi	2002 Car-bomb ing of Sheraton Hotel (Karachi)	2002 Arrest | Santos City, Philippines	2002 Arrest | Indonesia | 0504	2002 Arrest | Pakistan | 5/2002	Event Name
20020508	20020508	20020506	20020504	20020501	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	0	0	Attack
10	10	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01653	Evt00288	Evt00001	Evt02907	Evt00131	Event Number
Arrest | Cotabato City, Philippines | 2002 0515	Arrest | Pakistan | 5/15/2002	2002 "Dirty Bomb" Plot	Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain | 2002 0510	Arrest | Chicago, IL | 2002 0508	Event Name
20020515	20020515	20020515	20020510	20020508	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	3	6	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00266	Evt00978	Evt02798	Evt01804	Event Number
Arrest | Casablanca, Morocco | 20020601	2002 Plot to Bomb U.S. Navy Ships in Straits of Gibraltar	2002 Plot to Bomb U.S. Navy Ships in Surabaya Harbor	Death | Pakistan | 20020515	Event Name
20020601	20020601	20020525	20020515	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	1	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	1	0	Plot | Nascent
0	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	4	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00428	Evt02270	Evt02052	Evt02797	Evt02915	Event Number
2002 Attack on US Consulate in Karachi	Arrest | Miami, FL | 20020612	2002 Firefight with AFP (Resulted in Death of Burnham)	Arrest | Bogor, Indonesia | 20020605	Arrest | Morocco | 20020601?	Event Name
20020614	20020612	20020607	20020605	20020601	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	0	0	Attack
10	0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00121	Evt00290	Evt01770	Evt01323	Event Number
Arrest | Canada | 6/21/2002	Arrest | Pakistan | 6/2002	2002 Kidnapping Aboard MT Singet Marine 88 Vessel	2002-2003 (?) Plot to Bomb Thai Night clubs Catering to West erners	Event Name
20020621	20020615	20020615	20020615	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01906	Evt01044	Evt00360	Evt01273	Evt01918	Event Number
2002 Paintball in N. VA	Resigned as Head of Lashkar	Arrival in Manchester, England | 2002 Britain |	2002 Armed Robbery/Credit Card Fraud	Release from Detention | 2002 0629 | Spain	Event Name
20020702	20020702	20020702	20020701	20020629	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
1	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	N/A	4	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00963	Evt00032	Event Number
2002 Plot to Attack Western Embassies in Phnom Penh	2002 Plot to Attack L.A. Using 9/11 Tactics (Second Wave of 9/11 Attacks)	Event Name
20020702	20020702	Event Date
0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	Training
0	0	Death
0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	Escape
0	0	Deportation
0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	Paintball
0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	Radicalization
0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	Plot
0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	Attack
0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	1	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	Tactic | Unknown
9	16	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01376	Evt01986	Evt01322	Evt01371	Event Number
2002 Plot to Attack Israel	2002 Kidnapping of Jehovah's Witnesses on Sulu	2002 Plot Against Heathrow Airport and British Landmarks	2002-2003 Plot to Smuggle Explosives into NYC via Textile Shipments	Event Name
20020702	20020702	20020702	20020702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
1	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	2	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	4	5	9	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02233	Evt02101	Evt01805	Evt02596	Evt02937	Event Number
Fled to London	Arrest | Syria | 20020702	Death | Malaku, Indonesia | 20020702	2002 Explosions in Sanaa	2002 Plot to Attack Ships in the Straights of Hormuz	Event Name
20020702	20020702	20020702	20020702	20020702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	Un	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00735	Evt02936	Evt01386	Evt02597	Event Number
Left Netherlands	2002 Plot to Attack U.S. Naval Vessels/Oil Tankers in Straights of Gibraltar	Kidnap 2002 Plot to West Bank Aid Workers in Hargeysa	Arrest, Sanaa, Yemen, 2002 0702	Event Name
20020702	20020702	20020702	20020702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	1	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	1	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	1	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01345	Evt01319	Event Number
Plot to Use 9/11-Style Tactics Against Israel Elat, (Date Unknown)	Plot to Assassinate President Jimmy Carter and Other Former U.S. Presidents (Date Unknown)	Event Name
20020702	20020702	Event Date
0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	Training
0	0	Death
0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	Escape
0	0	Deportation
0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	Paintball
0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	Radicalization
0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	Plot
0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
1	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	Attack
0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
1	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01353	Evt01349	Evt01346	Event Number
Plot to Attack NATO HQ in Europe (Date Unknown)	Plot to Attack "Deep in Israel" (Date Unknown)	Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassies in Indonesia, Australia, and Japan (Date Unknown)	Event Name
20020702	20020702	20020702	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	1	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
1	1	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	3	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02632	Evt01891	Evt01272	Evt01395	Evt01321	Event Number
Arrest | Abdul Khail, Afghanistan | 20020727	2002 Bombing of Russian Rock Concert	2002 Escape from Kenyan Custody	Arrest | Mombasa, Kenya | 7/12/2002	Plot Against Sears Tower (Date Unknown)	Event Name
20020715	20020715	20020713	20020712	20020702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	1	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	10	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	60	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00126	Evt01586	Evt00325	Evt00128	Evt00243	Event Number
Arrest | Casablanca, Morocco | 8/7/2002	Arrest | Baranggay Kuramanao, Mindanao, Philippines | 2002 0721	Arrest | Spain | 37454	Arrest | Castellon, Spain | 7/16/2002	Arrest | Madrid, Spain | 7/16/2002	Event Name
20020807	20020721	20020717	20020716	20020716	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02542	Evt01450	Evt02170	Evt00270	Evt01771	Event Number
Release from Detention | Yemen | 20020901	2002 Gold Store Robbery	Release from Detention | London, England | 20020821	Arrest | Morocco | 8/2002	2002 Kidnapping on Jolo Island	Event Name
20020901	20020822	20020821	20020815	20020815	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	1	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	21	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01806	Evt01396	Evt02335	Evt02802	Evt02799	Event Number
Death | Banta Provi nce, Alger ia | 2002 0911	Arres t | Pakist an | 9/11/ 2002	Illega l Entry into Jorda n	2002 Bomb ings of Kabul	2002 Assas sinati on Atte mpt on Hami d Karza i	Event Name
20020911	20020911	20020909	20020905	20020905	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	0	30	Un	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	100	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00361	Evt00226	Evt00179	Evt00505	Evt01680	Event Number
Arrival in Cambodia | Phnom Penh | 9/2002	Arrest | London, England | 9/2002	Arrest | Jakarta, Indonesia | 9/2002	2002 British Ricin 'Plot'	Arrest | Lackawanna, NY | 2002 0915	Event Name
20020915	20020915	20020915	20020915	20020915	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	6	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01920	Evt00225	Evt01919	Evt01708	Event Number
Release from Detention | London, England | 20020920	Arrest | London, England | 9/19/2002	Release from Detention | London, England | 20020915	Arrest | Pakistan | 20020915	Event Name
20020920	20020919	20020915	20020915	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
1	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01694	Evt00228	Evt00209	Evt02899	Evt00227	Event Number
Arrest | Malaysia | 20020927	Arrest | London, England | 9/27/2002	Arrest | Lebanon | 37526	Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain | 20020924	Arrest | London, England | 9/21/2002	Event Name
20020927	20020927	20020927	20020924	20020921	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01407	Evt01315	Evt01367	Evt02804	Event Number
Arrest | UAE | 10/2002	2002 Filika Island Attack on U.S. Marines	2002 Attack on French Oil Tanker Merchant Vessel Limburg	2002 Bombing Near U.S. Embassy in Kabul	Event Name
20021001	20021001	20021001	20020929	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	1	Attack
0	1	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	1	4	2	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	3	5	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01808	Evt00486	Evt00026	Evt01807	Evt02908	Event Number
Death | Kuta, Bali, Indonesia | 2002 1012	2002 Bombing of Philippine Consulate	2002 Bali Attacks	Death | Failka Island | Kuwait | N/A | 2002 1008	Release from Detention | Spain | 2002 1001	Event Name
20021012	20021012	20021012	20021008	20021001	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	202	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	1	240	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	91	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00901	Evt00924	Evt01715	Evt00403	Evt00169	Event Number
2002 Nord-Ost Siege	2002 Plot Against US Companies in Mindanao	Arrest	Assassination of Lawrence Foley	Arrest	Event Name
20021015	20021015	20021015	20021015	20021015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	0	Attack
170	0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
680	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	6	6	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01589	Evt01588	Evt01765	Evt01587	Evt00093	Event Number
Arrest | | 2002 1021	Arrest | Indonesia | 2002 1018	2002 Bombing of Department Store in Zamboanga	Arrest | | 2002 1015	Arrest | Antwerp, Belgium | 10/2002	Event Name
20021021	20021018	20021017	20021015	20021015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02803	Evt02656	Evt02655	Evt01900	Event Number
Arrest | Islamabad, Pakistan | 20021030	Release from Detention | London, England | 20050311	Arrest | London, England | 20021023	Jailbreak | Alabel, Sarangani, Philippines | 20021023	Event Name
20021030	20021023	20021023	20021023	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	1	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02096	Evt01809	Evt02756	Evt01374	Event Number
Death | New Delhi, India | 20021104	Death | Yemen | 20021103	Death | Maarib, Yemen | 20021103	2002 Plot to Crash a Small Plane Into a Military Vessel	Event Name
20021104	20021103	20021103	20021101	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	1	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	1	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	1	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
			0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	6	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01455	Evt00216	Evt01590	Evt02931	Evt02095	Event Number
2002 Robbery of Money Changer	Arrest | London, England | 11/9/2002	Arrest | | 2002 1105	Arrest | Lyon, France | 2002 1105	2002 Failed Attack on New Delhi Market During Diwali	Event Name
20021112	20021109	20021105	20021105	20021104	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
1	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	3	1	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00774	Evt02050	Evt01968	Evt01591	Event Number
2002 Londo n Gas Attac k Plot	2002 Plot to Truck - Bomb Unspecified Manila Targets	Arrest | Pasay City, Philippines | 20021112	Arrest | | 20021112	Event Name
20021115	20021112	20021112	20021112	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
1	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02618	Evt02116	Evt01683	Evt00150	Evt02805	Event Number
Arrest | Australia | 2002 1115	Living in Dubai	Arrest | Java, East Indonesia | 2002 1115	Arrest | France | 11/2002	2002 Missile Attack on Kabul's Main Power Station	Event Name
20021115	20021115	20021115	20021115	20021115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01665	Evt00072	Evt02911	Evt01705	Event Number
Arrest | Indonesia | 2002 1125	Arrest | ? | 11/21/2002	Release from Detention | Lahore, Pakistan | 2002 1120	Arrest | Ngawi, Indonesia | 2002 1118	Event Name
20021125	20021121	20021120	20021118	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02133	Evt01593	Evt01265	Evt01264	Event Number
Death | Kikambala | Kenya | 20021126	Arrest | | 20021126	2002 Attempt to Shoot-Down Israeli Airliner	2002 Suicide Bombing of Paradise Hotel (Mombasa-Kikambala)	Event Name
20021126	20021126	20021126	20021126	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	0	10	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	80	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	3	10	19	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01453	Evt02296	Evt01676	Evt01954	Evt00148	Event Number
2002 Makr asar Bomb ings	Arres t | Dubai ' UAE | 2002 1203	Arres t | Klape n, Java, Indon esia | 2002 1203	2002 Bomb ing of BEST Bus in Mum bai	Arres t | Faub ourg- Saint- Denis ' Franc e | 11/27 /2002	Event Name
20021205	20021203	20021203	20021202	20021127	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	0	Attack
3	0	0	2	0	Attack | Killed
1	0	0	30	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
10	1	1	7	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01958	Evt01093	Evt00643	Evt02794	Evt01594	Event Number
Arrest | | India | | 2002 1215	2002 Stoning for 'Debauchery' (Extrajudicial Killing)	Fled to Algeria	Arrest | Ottawa, Canada | 2002 1210	Arrest | | 2002 1210	Event Name
20021215	20021215	20021211	20021210	20021210	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	N/A	1	1	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01957	Evt01921	Evt01810	Evt00472	Event Number
Arrest | Dubai | UAE | 20021215	Release from Detention | Lahore, Pakistan | 20021215	Death | Makrasar, Indonesia | 20021215	2002 Bombing of Chechen Gov't HQ	Event Name
20021215	20021215	20021215	20021215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	1	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	40	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00512	Evt00201	Evt02142	Evt01966	Event Number
Arrest | Algeria | 12/16/2002	Arrest | La Cour neuve, France | 12/16/2002	Arrest | Malaysia | 20021215	Arrest | Bulacan, Manila, Philippines | 20021215	Event Name
20021216	20021216	20021215	20021215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	3	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01922	Evt00140	Evt01681	Evt01967	Event Number
Release from Detention	Arrest	Arrest	Arrest	Event Name
20021218	20021218	20021217	20021216	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	5	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02673	Evt01959	Evt00214	Evt00217	Evt00198	Event Number
Arrest | Dorset, England | 20030112	Jailbreak | Pune, India | 20030107	Arrest | London, England | 1/5/2003	Arrest | London, England | 12/18/2002	Arrest | Kilmarnock, Scotland | 12/18/2002	Event Name
20030112	20030107	20030105	20021218	20021218	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01596	Evt02623	Evt00213	Evt00885	Evt01595	Event Number
Arrest | | 2003 0117	Arrest | Pakistan | 2003 0115	Arrest | London, England | 1/14/2003	2003 Murder of Constable Steven Oake	Arrest | | 2003 0113	Event Name
20030117	20030115	20030114	20030114	20030113	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
5	1	1	1	5	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02800	Evt01956	Evt01955	Evt00212	Evt01673	Event Number
2003 Bombing of Bridge Near Kandahar	2003 Deportation to India	Arrest	Dubai, UAE	20030126	Arrest	Indonesia, Island of Lombok	1/23/2003	Arrest	Kalimantan, Indonesia	01172003	Event Name
20030131	20030127	20030126	20030123	20030117	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	1	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
15	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02628	Evt02183	Evt02237	Evt01735	Event Number
Arrest | Iran | 20030215	2003 Firefight w/ AFP (Raid of Bulio k Complex)	2003 Plot to Crash Planes into Changi Airport	Arrest | Tanjung Pinang, Riau, Indonesia | 20030203	Event Name
20030215	20030211	20030203	20030203	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	1	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02740	Evt02297	Evt01039	Evt00341	Evt00220	Event Number
Arrest | Quetta, Pakistan | 20030215?	Arrest | Dubai | UAE | 20030215	Rendition | Milan | Italy | 20030215	Arrest | Ukraine | 2/2003	Arrest | London, England | 2/2003	Event Name
20030215	20030215	20030215	20030215	20030215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00703	Evt00701	Evt01759	Evt02298	Evt01597	Event Number
2003 Kidnapping of European Tourists (Ouargia)	2003 Kidnapping of European Tourists (Djanet)	2003 Awan Airport Bombing	Arrest	Dubai, UAE	20030217	Event Name
20030221	20030221	20030220	20030218	20030217	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
1	1	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	1	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	Un	3	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	6	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01408	Evt02625	Evt02171	Evt00702	Event Number
Arrest | Mogadishu, Somalia | 3/2003	Arrest | Sandakan, Malaysia | 2003 0228	Conviction and Detention | London, England | 2003 0225	2003 Kidnapping of European Tourists (Illizi)	Event Name
20030301	20030228	20030225	20030223	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01253	Evt00706	Evt01565	Evt02736	Event Number
3/8/2003 Kidnapping of Europeans (Southern Algeria)	2003 Kidnapping of Europeans (Northern Mali)	2003 Bombing of Dava Airport	Release from Detention	Event Name
20030308	20030308	20030304	20030301	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
1	1	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	0	Attack
0	0	21	0	Attack | Killed
Un	Un	100	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	1	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00705	Evt01695	Evt00720	Evt00306	Evt02806	Event Number
2003 Kidnapping of European Tourists (Southern Algeria II)	Arrest| Malaysia| 20030315	Leaves Cambodia for Thailand	Arrest| Rawalpindi, Pakistan| 3/2003	2003 Bomb ing of Road b/w Kandahar and Heart	Event Name
20030317	20030315	20030315	20030315	20030310	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
1	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02807	Evt00509	Evt01969	Evt02644	Event Number
2003 Rocket Attack on ISAF Headquarters in Kabul	2003 Call for Holy War Against U.S.	Death | Baranggay Maluso, Basilan, Philippines | 2003 0326	Arrest | Norway | 2003 0320	Event Name
20030331	20030331	20030326	20030320	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	1	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02924	Evt02645	Evt01566	Evt01392	Evt00704	Event Number
Arrest | Saudi Arabia | 20030405	Release from Detention | Norway | 20030402	2003 Bombing of Sasa Warf	Arrest | mombasa, Kenya | 4/2/2003	2003 Kidnapping of European Tourists (Tanzanras set)	Event Name
20030405	20030402	20030402	20030402	20030401	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	1	Attack
0	0	16	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	100	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01713	Evt00155	Evt01598	Evt01561	Evt01654	Event Number
Arrest | Palu, Indonesia | 2003 0415	Arrest | Galee n, Netherlands | | 4/2003	Arrest | | 2003 0415	2003 Conflict in Mindanao	Arrest | Cotabato City, Philippines | 2003 0408	Event Name
20030415	20030415	20030415	20030415	20030408	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	1	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	N/A	5	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01103	Evt01451	Evt02068	Evt01236	Evt01758	Event Number
2003 Suici de Bomb ing in Tel Aviv	2003 Bomb ing of Soeka rno-Hatta Airpo rt (Jakar ta)	Arres t | Indon esia | 2003 0424	Visite d Casab lanca	2003 Plot to Bomb Manil a	Event Name
20030429	20030427	20030424	20030415	20030415	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	0	0	Attack
3	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	10	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02192	Evt01599	Evt01409	Evt02132	Evt01397	Event Number
2003 Kroro nadal City Bomb ings	Arres t | | 2003 0507	Arres t | Karac hi, Pakist an | 5/200 3	Death | Tel Aviv, Israel | | 2003 0429	Arres t | Karac hi, Pakist an | 4/29/ 2003	Event Name
20030510	20030507	20030501	20030429	20030429	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
10	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
50	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01462	Evt00300	Evt00358	Evt00450	Evt01378	Event Number
2003 Bank Robbery in Medan	Arrest | Phnom Penh | 5/2003	Arrival in Australia | Sydney, Australia | 5/2003	2003 Battle to Free Kidnapping Victims	2003 Suicide Bombing of Western Compounds in Riyadh	Event Name
20030515	20030515	20030515	20030513	20030512	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
1	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	29	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	200	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	3	N/A	N/A	20	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00738	Evt01764	Evt01600	Evt00372	Evt00096	Event Number
Left Spain	2003 Plot to Bomb Unspecified Targets in Zamboanga	Arrest | | 2003 0515	Arrival in Sydney, Australia | 5/2003	Arrest | Bangkok, Thailand | 5/2003	Event Name
20030515	20030515	20030515	20030515	20030515	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt00517	2003 Casablanca Bombings	20030516	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	45	100	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	19
Evt01811	Death | Casablanca, Morocco | 20030516	20030516	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt00123	Arrest | Carriere Thomas, Morocco | 5/18/2003	20030518	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt00119	Arrest | Cagayan de Oro, Philippines | 5/25/2003	20030525	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Evt00268	Arrest | Morocco | 37767	20030526	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A

Evt02182	Evt01812	Evt00149	Evt01001	Evt02653	Event Number
2003 MILF Cease fire	Death | Casablanca, Moroco | 2003 0528	Arrest | Fez, Morocco | 5/26/2003	2003 Raid on Earthquake Aid Convoys	Arrest | Casablanca, Moroco | 2003 0526	Event Name
20030528	20030528	20030526	20030526	20030526	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	1	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02079	Evt02078	Evt02077	Evt00269	Event Number
Death | Turba | Saudi Arabia | 20030531	Arrest | Turba | Saudi Arabia | 20030531	2003 Car Chase /Firefight w/ Saudi Police	Arrest | Moroco | 5/30/2003	Event Name
20030531	20030531	20030531	20030530	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02926	Evt02927	Evt01536	Event Number
Arrest	2003 Plot to Bomb Reunion Island	2003 Nascent Plot to Bomb Hotels/Cruise Ships in Mombasa (Follow-up to Kikambala)	Event Name
20030601	20030601	20030601	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	3	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01699	Evt01524	Evt00337	Evt01375	Event Number
Arrest | Media, Saudi Arabia | 2003 0609	2003 Nascent Plot to Assassinate President George W. Bush	Arrest | Tangiers | 6/3/2003	2003 Plot to Attack US Housing Compound in Saudi Arabia	Event Name
20030609	20030609	20030603	20030601	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02161	Evt01923	Evt00085	Evt01601	Evt02054	Event Number
Arrest | Indonesia | 2003 0615	Release from Detention | Tetouan, Moroco | 2003 0615	Arrest | Algeciras, Spain | | 6/14/2003	Arrest | | 2003 0612	Arrest | Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia | 2003 0609	Event Name
20030615	20030615	20030614	20030612	20030609	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02072	Evt01970	Evt00713	Evt01813	Evt01398	Evt00864	Event Number
Arrest | Saudi Arabia | 20030626	Arrest | Philippines | 20030624	2003 Killing of 2 Pakistani Policemen	Death | Beni Amrane, Algeria | 20030618	Arrest | Eastleigh, Kenya | 6/17/2003	Moved to Syria	Event Name
20030626	20030624	20030624	20030618	20030617	20030615	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	2	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	5	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01351	Evt01299	Evt00324	Evt02906	Evt01602	Event Number
2003 Istanbul Bombings	Disappearance from Karachi	Arrest | Spain | 2003	Release from Detention | Indonesia | 20030701	Arrest | | 20030627	Event Name
20030702	20030702	20030702	20030701	20030627	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
57	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
700	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
18	N/A	N/A	1	9	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01297	Evt01275	Evt01119	Evt01314	Event Number
2003 Plot to Blow -up Under Gas Tanks in Baltimore	2003 Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy in Nairobi	Test of Detonators	2003 Plot to Attack Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti	Event Name
20030702	20030702	20030702	20030702	Event Date
0	0	1	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
1	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	3	4	7	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01099	Evt01350	Evt01348	Evt01368	Event Number
2003 Suici de attack in Iraq	2003-2004 Plot to Attack American Target in South Korea	2003 Plot to Bomb El-Al Flight Leaving Bangkok	2003 Karachi Plot Against US Consulate, Western Residences, and Airport	Event Name
20030702	20030702	20030702	20030702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	1	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	1	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
28	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	2	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02793	Evt02131	Evt01411	Evt01410	Evt01274	Evt02008	Event Number
Arrest | Kurdistan, Iraq | 20030702	Death | Iraq | 20030702	Arrest | Southwest Turkey | 2003	Arrest | ? | 2003	Left Kenya for Ethiopia	2003 Firefight w/ AFP in Sulu	Event Name
20030702	20030702	20030702	20030702	20030702	20030702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	1	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	N/A	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	N/A	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02642	Evt01754	Evt01385	Evt01379	Event Number
2003 Supp osed "Dirt y Bomb " Plot	2003 Abort ed Plot Again st Luzo n	2003 Plot to Down Ethio pian Jetlin er in Soma lia	2003-2004 Plot to Assas sinate US Amba ssado r to Yeme n	Event Name
20030702	20030702	20030702	20030702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	1	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
1	0	1	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
1	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02073	Evt01235	Evt00667	Evt00749	Evt02944	Event Number
2003 Firefight w/ Saudi Authorities	Visited Britain	Hiding in Pakistan	Lived in France	2003 Plot Against Sudanese Vice Presidents and Presidents	Event Name
20030703	20030702	20030702	20030702	20030702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	1	1	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
N/A	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	5	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02626	Evt01603	Evt01901	Evt01814	Evt01815	Event Number
Arrest | Iran | 20030715	Arrest | | 20030715	Jailbreak | Manila, Philippines | | 20030714	Death | Philippines | | 20030713	Death | Al-Jawaf | Saudi Arabia | 20030703	Event Name
20030715	20030715	20030714	20030713	20030703	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0			Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	1	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	3	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02060	Evt01562	Evt01054	Evt02654	Evt00120	Event Number
Arrest | Gulhane-e-Iqbal, Pakistan | 20030723	2003 Negotiations/Ceasefire w/ Philippine Gov't	Return to Germany	Arrest | Bangkok, Thail and | 20030715	Arrest | Cambodia | 7/2003	Event Name
20030723	20030719	20030715	20030715	20030715	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	N/A	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00094	Evt02138	Evt02134	Evt01393	Evt00422	Event Number
Arrest | Ayutthaya, Thailand | 8/11/2003	Death | Jakarta, Indonesia | 20030805	Death | Mombasa, Kenya | 20030801	Arrest | Mombasa, Kenya | 8/1/2003	2003 Attack on Mumbai City Bus	Event Name
20030811	20030805	20030801	20030801	20030728	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	1	1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0			0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	52	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	150	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02336	Evt00937	Evt00033	Event Number
2003 Bombing of Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad	2003 Plot to Attack APEC Summit/ Western Embassies in Thailand and/Commercial Airlin ers	2003 Jakarta Marriott Attack	Event Name
20030815	20030815	20030815	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	Attack
17	0	10	Attack | Killed
40	0	150	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	3	21	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02692	Evt02587	Evt01816	Evt01674	Evt00995	Event Number
Arrest | Khartoum, Sudan | 20030815	Arrest | Baghdad, Iraq | 20030815	Death | | Philippines | 20030815	Arrest | Kalimantan, Indonesia | 20030815	2003 Shelter Hindus after Monsoon	Event Name
20030815	20030815	20030815	20030815	20030815	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01817	Evt02916	Evt02588	Evt01114	Evt00515	Evt00302	Event Number
Death | | Srinagar, India | | 2003 0830	Arrest | Denmark | 2003 0829	2003 Car Bombing of Shiite s in Najaf	2003 Taxi Bombing of Mumbai	2003 Car-bomb ing of Mumbai	Arrest | Phuket, Thailand | 8/23/2003	Event Name
20030830	20030829	20030829	20030825	20030825	20030823	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	1	0	Attack
0	0	124	50	52	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	Un	150	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	1	1	1	4	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00260	Evt02074	Evt01818	Evt00163	Evt00080	Evt00941	Event Number
Arrest | Milan | | 9/2003	Arrest | Yemen | 2003 0909	Death | Srinagar, India | | 2003 0906	Arrest | Granada, Spain | | 9/5/2003	Arrest | ? | 9/1/2003	2003 Plot to Attack Delhi	Event Name
20030915	20030909	20030906	20030905	20030901	20030831	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	1	4	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02894	Evt02202	Evt01819	Evt01722	Evt01045	Event Number
Arrest | Madrid, Spain | 2003 0915	Arrest | Malaysia |2003 0915	Death | Kashmir | 2003 0915	Arrest | Sabah, Philippines | 2003 0915	Resigned/Removed as Emir/ Leader	Event Name
20030915	20030915	20030915	20030915	20030915	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00353	Evt02075	Evt02076	Evt00196	Evt00088	Event Number
Arrest | Zamboanga, Philippines | 9/25/2003	Death | Jizan, Saudi Arabia | 2003 0924	2003 Firefight w/ Saudi Police in Jizan	Arrest | Gulahan-e-Iqbal, Pakistan | 9/22/2003	Arrest | Alicante, Spain | 9/19/2003	Event Name
20030925	20030924	20030924	20030922	20030919	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	7	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00298	Evt02706	Evt02705	Evt01977	Event Number
Arres t | Philip pines | | 10/2/ 2003	2003 Firefi ght w/ Pakist ani Force s	Death | | Wazir istan, Pakist an | 2003 1002	2003 Kidna pping of Filipi no TV Journ alists	Event Name
20031002	20031002	20031002	20030927	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	1	Attack
0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00322	Evt01820	Evt00297	Evt00332	Evt01537	Event Number
Arrest | Spain | 10/14/2003	Death | Mindanao, Philippines | 2003 1012	Arrest | Philippines | 10/10/2003	Arrest | Sydney, Australia | 10/9/2003	2003 Assassination of Nurse Annalena Tonelli (Somaliland Killing)	Event Name
20031014	20031012	20031010	20031009	20031005	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	1	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01416	Evt01821	Evt00275	Evt00098	Evt00371	Event Number
Arrest | Mombasa, Kenya | 10/18/2003	Death | Islamabad, Pakistan | 2003 1015	Arrest | Netherlands | 10/20 03	Arrest | Barcelona, Spain | 10/15 /2003	Arrival in Spain | Madrid, Spain | 10/20 03	Event Name
20031018	20031015	20031015	20031015	20031015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01412	Evt02055	Evt02062	Evt02061	Evt01538	Event Number
Arrest | Turkey | 11/2003	Arrest | Cirebon, West Java, Indonesia | 2003 1029	Arrest | Singapore | 2003 1025	Arrest | Singapore | 2003 1023	2003 Assassination of British Teachers (Somalian Killing)	Event Name
20031101	20031029	20031025	20031023	20031021	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	2	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00161	Evt01741	Evt02136	Evt00232	Evt02135	Event Number
Arrest | Gloucester, England | 11/27/2003	Arrest | Yemen | 2003 1125	Death | Istanbul, Turkey | 2003 1120	Arrest | Madrid, Spain | 11/2003	Death | Istanbul, Turkey | 2003 1115	Event Name
20031127	20031125	20031120	20031115	20031115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	1	0	1	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01890	Evt02007	Evt01478	Evt01721	Evt01604	Event Number
2003 Bombing of Train in Yessentuki, Russia	2003 Bombing of Airport Road in Jolo	2003 Plot to Attack Jakarta Police HQ	Arrest	Indonesia	2003 1202 Arrest	Sabah	2003 1128	Event Name
20031206	20031203	20031202	20031202	20031128	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	0	0	Attack
41	2	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
200	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02825	Evt00406	Evt01417	Evt01889	Evt01989	Event Number
Release from Detention | Yemen | 20031215	12/14/2003 Assassination Attempt on Pervez Musharraf	Arrest | Turkey | 12/10/2003	2003 Bombing of Moscow's national Hotel	Arrest | Indian, Sulu | Philippines	Event Name
20031215	20031214	20031210	20031209	20031207	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	1	0	Attack
0	Un	0	6	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	6	1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00407	Evt01418	Evt01078	Evt00143	Event Number
12/25/2003 Assassination Attempt on Pervez Musharraf	Arrest	Sentenced in Absentia for Role in Casablanca Attacks	Arrest	Event Name
20031225	20031219	20031219	20031215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
6	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01124	Evt01724	Evt01756	Evt00482	Event Number
2004 0115 Threat Made Against Atocha Station	Arrest | Sanaa, Yemen | 20040115	2004 Plot to Bomb Philippine VP Candidate Lorena Legarda	2004 Bombing of Pakistani Bible Society	Event Name
20040115	20040115	20040115	20040115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	1	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
1	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	10	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02314	Evt02315	Evt02065	Evt02761	Event Number
2004 Bomb ing of Iraqi Army 's Bagh dad Recru iting Statio n	2004 Bomb ing of Iraqi Polic e Statio n in Iskan darry a	Arres t | Belfa st, Irelan d | 2004 0201	Arres t | Kurdi stan, Iraq | 2004 0125	Event Name
20040211	20040210	20040201	20040125	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	0	Attack
25	55	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01749	Evt02316	Evt02317	Evt00318	Evt00186	Event Number
2004 Super Ferry 14 Bombing	Death | Habbaniya, Iraq | 20040225	2004 Firefight w/ Coalition Forces in Habbaniya	Arrest | Sint-Jans-Molenbeek, Belgium | 20040215	Arrest | Jordan | 20040215	Event Name
20040227	20040225	20040225	20040215	20040215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	0	0	Attack
116	0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02754	Evt02319	Evt02318	Evt02262	Evt02263	Event Number
Arrest | Abyane, Yemen | 20040304	2004 Failed Bombing of Kirkuk Durin g Ashura	2004 Failed Bombing of Basra Durin g Ashura	Death | Jolo, Philippines | 20040303	2004 Firefight w/ AFP in Jolo	Event Name
20040304	20040304	20040304	20040303	20040303	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	N/A	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	N/A	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	N/A	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00597	Evt00311	Evt02657	Evt02321	Evt02320	Event Number
Departure from Spain	Arrest | San Sebastian, Spain | 3/15/2004	Arrest | Madrid, Spain | 20040313	2004 Bombing of Karbala Durin g Ashura	2004 Bombing of Baghdad Durin g Ashura	Event Name
20040315	20040315	20040313	20040304	20040304	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	0	60	60	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	5	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02892	Evt01755	Evt01249	Evt01605	Evt00779	Event Number
Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain | | 20040318	Arrest | Philippines | | 20040315	2004 Wana Raid by Pakistani Army	Arrest | | 20040315	2004 Madrid Attacks	Event Name
20040318	20040315	20040315	20040315	20040315	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	191	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	2050	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	16	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02728	Evt02659	Evt01624	Evt00425	Evt00235	Event Number
2004 Battle Against Pakistani Military (March 16-28)	Arrest	Arrest	2004 Attack on Rangers' Van	Arrest	Event Name
20040320	20040320	20040319	20040319	20040319	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	0	Attack
N/A	0	0	2	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	2	2	5	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01606	Evt00340	Evt02660	Evt02658	Evt02667	Event Number
Arrest | | 2004 0330	Arrest | Ujena | Spain | 3/29/2004	Arrest | Madrid, Spain | | 2004 0329	Arrest | Madrid, Spain | | 2004 0326	Arrest | Tangiers, Morocco | 2004 0325	Event Name
20040330	20040329	20040329	20040326	20040325	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
5	1	3	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00741	Evt00133	Evt02893	Evt02215	Evt00236	Event Number
2004 Leganes Suicide	Arrest | Cuenca, Spain | 4/2/2004	Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain | 2004 0402	2004 Peace Talks w/ Philippine Gov't	Arrest | Madrid, Spain | 2004 0330	Event Name
20040403	20040402	20040402	20040331	20040330	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
8	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
8	1	3	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00714	Evt02808	Evt01709	Evt01242	Evt01822	Event Number
2004 0404 - Killing of 5 Pakistani Policemen	2004 0403 - Arrest - Afghanistan - Provincence, Afgh Ward ak	2004 0403 - Arrest - Pakistan - Pakist	Warned Legaes Apartment	2004 0403 - Death - Legaes, Spain -	Event Name
20040404	20040403	20040403	20040403	20040403	Event Date
0	0	0	1	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
5	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
9	1	1	1	8	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00514	Evt01823	Evt01739	Evt00239	Evt00614	Event Number
2004 Car-bombing of Marina Club (Karachi)	Death | Kupwara District, Jammu and Kashmir | 2004 0408	Arrest | USA | 2004 0406	Arrest | Madrid, Spain | 4/6/2004	Escape to Belgium	Event Name
20040410	20040408	20040406	20040406	20040406	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
1	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
9	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00640	Evt00334	Evt00496	Evt02559	Evt02824	Event Number
Fled Australia for Lebanon	Arrest | Sydney, Australia | 4/2004	2004 Bombing of UN Building in Damascus	2004 Plot to Use Chemical Weapons Against Jordan	Release from Detention | Yemen | 2004 0411	Event Name
20040415	20040415	20040415	20040415	20040411	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
1	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	4	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01763	Evt02661	Evt02547	Evt02049	Evt01750	Event Number
2004 Plot to Bomb Unspecified Targets in Zamboanga	Arrest | Spain | 2004 0415	Death | Fallujah, Iraq | 2004 0415	Arrest | Philippines | 2004 0415	Arrest | Manila, Philippines | 2004 0415	Event Name
20040415	20040415	20040415	20040415	20040415	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
1	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01887	Evt00083	Evt00333	Evt01237	Event Number
Death | Chechnya | 2004 0418	Arrest | Henares, Spain | 4/18/2004	Arrest | Sydney, Australia | 4/16/2004	Visited London	Event Name
20040418	20040418	20040416	20040415	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00111	Evt01659	Evt01387	Event Number
Arrest | Berrachid, Morocco | 4/20/2004	Arrest | Dogo Somalia | 20040419	Kidnapping of German Aid Worker/Murder of Kenyan Contract Employees (Somalian Killing)	Event Name
20040420	20040419	20040419	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	Attack
0	0	1	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02665	Evt02888	Evt01924	Event Number
Arrest|Madrid, Spain|20040423	Release from Detention|Madrid, Spain|20040423	Release from Detention|Falls Church, VA|20040420	Event Name
20040423	20040423	20040420	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00154	Evt02666	Evt02729	Event Number
Arrest | Fuenlabrada, Spain | 4/26/2004	Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain | 20040426	Shakai Agreement (Pardon in Exchange for Expelling Foreign Fighters from Waziristan)	Event Name
20040426	20040426	20040424	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01106	Evt02889	Evt02900	Evt00124	Event Number
2004 0505 – Suicide bombing of Hyderi Mosque (Shiite)	Release from Detention	Release from Detention	Arrest	Event Name
20040507	20040505	20040430	20040430	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	1	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
45	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
127	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
5	3	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt00293	Arrest | Parala, Spain | 5/7/2004	20040507	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt02322	2004 Kidnapping/Beheading of American Nicholas Berg	20040508	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Evt01925	Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain | 20040511	20040511	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt01463	Noordin's Second Wedding	20040515	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A

Evt02324	Evt02323	Evt00221	Evt00103	Event Number
Death | Bagh dad, Iraq | 2004 0517	2004 Suici de Bomb ing of Ezzed ine Slaim (Presi dent of Iraqi Gove rning Coun cil)	Arres t | Lond on, Engla nd | 5/200 4	Arres t | Beiru t, Leba non | 5/200 4	Event Name
20040517	20040517	20040515	20040515	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	7	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01824	Evt00483	Evt00326	Evt00130	Evt02330	Event Number
Death | Karachi, Pakistan | 20040530	2004 Bombing of Pakistan-American Cultural Center	Arrest | Spain | 5/21/2004	Arrest | Chad | 5/18/2004	2004 Suicide Bombing of Iraqi Governing Council	Event Name
20040530	20040526	20040521	20040518	20040517	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	6	Attack | Killed
0	#	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	6	1	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02662	Evt00259	Evt00125	Evt01875	Evt02325	Event Number
Arrest | Asturias, Spain | | 20040609	Arrest | Milan, Italy | | 6/7/2004	Arrest | Casablanca, Morocco | 6/1/2004	2004 Bombing of Ali Reza Mosque (Shiite)	Arrest | Iraq | 20040530	Event Name
20040609	20040607	20040601	20040531	20040530	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	10	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	38	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
6	2	3	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02668	Evt00906	Evt02809	Evt00413	Event Number
Arrest	2004 Pakistani Army Raid on Jihadi Safeh ouses	2004 Killing of Chinese Engineers in Kunduz Province	2004 Assassination Attempt on Gen. Ahsan Saleem Hayat	Event Name
20040611	20040611	20040610	20040610	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	10	10	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	1	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01877	Evt01876	Evt02230	Evt00194	Event Number
Death | | Karchi, Pakistan | 20040612	Arrest | Karachi, Pakistan | 20040612	Kidnapping & Behe ading of Amerian Contractor Paul Johnson	Arrest | Karachi, Pakistan | 6/12/2004	Event Name
20040612	20040612	20040612	20040612	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01224	Evt00918	Evt02329	Evt02810	Event Number
2004 Truck - Bombing of Algerian Electrical Facility	2004 Plot Against Nuclear Reactor in Holland	2004 Suicide Bombing of GE Contractors in Baghdad	Arrest/ Baghlan, Afghanistan / 2004 0612	Event Name
20040615	20040615	20040614	20040612	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	0	Attack
Un	0	5	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	1	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02232	Evt02730	Evt00991	Evt02663	Evt00276	Event Number
2004 Firefight w/ Saudi Police	Death | Wana | Pakistan | 2004 0617	2004 Plot to Shoot Down El-Al Flight in Zurich	Arrest | British | 2004 0615	Arrest | Netherlands | 6/2004	Event Name
20040618	20040617	20040615	20040615	20040615	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
N/A	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01892	Evt00110	Evt01825	Evt02231	Evt02326	Event Number
False Report of Death | Russia | 2004 0622	Arrest | Benimellal, Morocco | 6/21/2004	Death | al-Qasr, Algeria | 2004 0620	Death | Saudi Arabia | 2004 0618	2004 Kidnapping/Behading of Korean Kim Sun Il	Event Name
20040622	20040621	20040620	20040618	20040618	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	1	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	1	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	1	1	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0			0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	1	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02704	Evt02337	Evt02328	Evt02327	Evt00309	Event Number
Arrest | Sukoharjo, Java, Indonesia | 2004 2004 0630	2004 Kidnapping /Behading of Bulgarian Truckers	2004 Armed Assault on Baquba	2004 Bombing of Mosul	Arrest | Rotterdam, Netherlands | 2004 2004 0624	Event Name
20040630	20040629	20040625	20040625	20040624	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	1	0	Attack
0	2	2	62	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
5	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01769	Evt00917	Evt01071	Evt00545	Evt00241	Evt01701	Event Number
2004 Jolo Bomb ings	2004 Plot again st Dutch Politi cians	2004 Robb eries in Switz erlan d	2004 Crevi ce Plot	Arres t | Madri d, Spain | 7/1/2 004	Arres t | Moga dishu, Soma lia | 2004 0630	Event Name
20040702	20040702	20040702	20040702	20040701	20040630	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	1	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	0	Attack
10	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
200	0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	3	5	7	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02150	Evt01927	Evt01926	Evt01696	Evt00317	Event Number
Release from Detention | Malaysia | 20040702	2004 Deportation to Spain	Release from Detention | Netherlands | 20040702	Arrest | Malaysia | 20040702	Arrest | Shaka i, Pakistan | 7/2/2004	Event Name
20040702	20040702	20040702	20040702	20040702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
1	0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	1	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00992	Evt00956	Evt00946	Evt00943	Evt02272	Event Number
2004 Plot to "Dirty Bomb" Londo n	2004 Plot to Attack Sydn ey Electr ical Grid	2004 Plot to attack Madrid Real's Stadium	2004 Plot to Attack Heathrow	Arrest | Egypt | 2004 0702	Event Name
20040702	20040702	20040702	20040702	20040702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	1	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	1	1	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	1	1	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02083	Evt00205	Evt01231	Evt00751	Evt00743	Event Number
Arrest | Iran | 20040713	Arrest | Lahore, Pakistan | 7/12/2004	Vanished from London	Lived in Italy	Lived in Barcelona	Event Name
20040713	20040712	20040702	20040702	20040702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	1	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00166	Evt02643	Evt00920	Evt02338	Event Number
Arres t | Gujra t, Pakist an | 7/25/ 2004	2004 Rumo red Plot Again st West ern Emba ssies in Hond uras	2004 Plot again st U.S. Cons ulate in Karac hi	2004 Arme d Assau lt on Conv oy of Gov. of Ninev eh Provi nce	Event Name
20040725	20040715	20040715	20040714	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	1	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	Un	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	1	9	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00224	Evt02339	Evt00122	Evt01667	Evt01608	Event Number
Arrest | London, England | 8/3/2004	2004 Kidnapping/Beheading of Turkish Hostage Murat Yuce	Arrest | Carbanchel, Madrid, Spain | | 7/28/2004	Arrest | Indonesia | 20040725	Arrest | | 20040725	Event Name
20040803	20040802	20040728	20040725	20040725	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	1	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00137	Evt00081	Evt01632	Evt02646	Evt02647	Event Number
Arrest | Dubai | 8/6/2004	Arrest | Abha | Saudi Arabia | 8/5/2004	Arrest | Albany, NY | 2004 0805	Death | Mosul, Iraq | 2004 0804	2004 Firefight w/ Coalition Forces in Mosul	Event Name
20040806	20040805	20040805	20040804	20040804	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	N/A	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	N/A	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00223	Evt01486	Evt00035	Evt02693	Event Number
Arrest | London, England | 8/2004	2004 Plot to Bomb NYC Subway Near RNC	2004 WMD Plot Against NYSE and other US Financial Targets	Release from Detention | Khartoum, Sudan | 2004 0808	Event Name
20040815	20040815	20040815	20040808	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	1	0	Plot
0	1	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	1	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	4	10	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02056	Evt01461	Evt00354	Evt01703	Evt00280	Event Number
Death | Jakarta, Indonesia | 2004 0909	2004 Bombing of Australian Embassy in Jakarta	Arrest | Zurich, Switzerland | 3822 7	Arrest | New York, NY | 2004 0827	Arrest | Northern Iraq | 8/2004	Event Name
20040909	20040909	20040828	20040827	20040815	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	9	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	150	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	24	1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01928	Evt01893	Evt01609	Evt01894	Evt00461	Event Number
Release from Detention | Lebanon | 20040915	Arrest | Besla n, Russia | 20040915	Arrest | | 20040915	Death | Besla n, Russia | 20040915	2004 Beslan School Siege	Event Name
20040915	20040915	20040915	20040915	20040915	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	385	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	783	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	4	9	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02576	Evt01929	Evt02575	Event Number
2004 Behe ading of Amer ican Engin eer Euge ne Arms trong	Relea se from Deten tion	2004 Kidna pping of Amer ican and Britis h Engin eers in Bagh dad	Event Name
20040919	20040916	20040916	Event Date
1	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	Attack
1	0	2	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01827	Evt02839	Evt02834	Evt01826	Evt02578	Event Number
Death — Karachi, Pakistan | 2004 1009	Death — Taba, Egypt — 2004 1007	2004 Taba Bombings	Death — Nawabshah, Pakistan | 2004 0928	2004 Kidnapping/Behe ading of Iraqi Intel Officers'	Event Name
20041009	20041007	20041007	20040928	20040928	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	1	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
		0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	1	Attack
0	0	34	0	2	Attack | Killed
0	0	171	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	8	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00953	Evt02234	Evt02577	Evt02732	Event Number
2004 Plot to Attack Spanish National Court Building in Madrid	Death — Gamuzriyevo, Russia — 2004 1010	2004 Behe ading of Britis h Engin eer Ken Bigle y	2004 Kidna pping of Chine se Engin eers	Event Name
20041015	20041010	20041009	20041009	Event Date
0	0	1	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	2	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
10	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00244	Evt00142	Evt00117	Evt01583	Evt00168	Event Number
Arrest | Malaga, Spain | 10/18/2004	Arrest | El Ejido, Spain | 10/18/2004	Arrest | Cabanuelas, Spain | 10/18/2004	Bayat to Kevin James	Arrest | Hamburg, Germany | 10/15/2004	Event Name
20041018	20041018	20041018	20041015	20041015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00291	Evt00230	Evt00156	Evt00118	Evt00089	Event Number
Arrest | Pamplona, Spain — 10/19/2004	Arrest | Madrid, Spain — 10/19/2004	Arrest | Gandia, Spain — 10/19/2004	Arrest | Cabanuelas, Spain — 10/19/2004	Arrest | Almeria, Spain — 10/19/2004	Event Name
20041019	20041019	20041019	20041019	20041019	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02580	Evt02731	Evt02579	Event Number
2004 Execution of Shosei Kodai	2004 Battle Against Pakistani Military in Spinkai Raghzai	2004 Failed Assassination Mo. Essa Baher (Commander Iraqi Nat'l Guard)	Event Name
20041024	20041021	20041020	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	Attack
1	N/A	0	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	1	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01668	Evt00641	Evt01123	Evt01883	Evt01747	Event Number
Arrest | Bogor, Indonesia | 20041105	Fled Netherlands	2004 Theo Van Gogh Murder	Arrest | South Waziristan, Pakistan | 20041101	Arrest | Zamboanga, Philippines | 20041025	Event Name
20041105	20041102	20041102	20041101	20041025	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	1	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	1	1	1	9	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01501	Evt00167	Evt00661	Evt00234	Evt00233	Event Number
Rudimentary Training in Georgia, USA	Arrest	Hague Standoff	2004 Hague	Arrest	Event Name
20041115	20041110	20041110	20041109	20041108	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
1	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	2	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	2	2	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01700	Evt02822	Evt01882	Evt01881	Evt01125	Event Number
Arrest | Minneapolis, MN | 2004 2004 1209	Arrest | Iran | 2004 2004 1204	Arrest | North Waziristan, Pakistan | 2004 2004 1123	2004 Road side Bomb ings in Pakistan	2004 Threats Made Against US Interests	Event Name
20041209	20041204	20041123	20041123	20041116	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	Un	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	4	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01753	Evt02581	Evt00207	Evt02789	Evt00711	Event Number
2005 Plot Against Manila (The Big Bang)	Arrest | Baghdad, Iraq | 2004 1230	Arrest | Lanzarote, Canary Islands | 12/20/2004	Arrest | Tripoli, Libya | | 2004 1218	2004 Kidnapping of Qatari Nationals	Event Name
20050101	20041230	20041220	20041218	20041211	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02584	Evt00060	Evt00462	Evt02583	Event Number
2005 Assassination of Gov. of Baghdad Province	2005 Ambush of Algerian Army	2005 Biskra Attack	2005 Execution of 5 Members of Iraqi Security Forces	Event Name
20050105	20050103	20050103	20050102	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	Attack
1	18	9	5	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	1	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	6	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01535	Evt00336	Evt01488	Evt02585	Event Number
2005 Desecration of Italian Colonial Cemetery	Arrest/Syria/Iraq border/1/2005	2005 Plot Against Militarys and Jewish Targets in LA	2005 Assassination of Baghdad's Deputy Police Chief	Event Name
20050115	20050115	20050115	20050110	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	1	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	2	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt01930	Release from Detention | France | 20050115	20050115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt02586	2005 Internet Statement Against Democracy in Iraq	20050123	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A
Evt02942	Arrest | Mainz, Germany | 20050125	20050125	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A
Evt02589	2005 Assassination of Salem al-Kanani (Iraqi Political Candidate)	20050128	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Evt02891	Evt01059	Evt01932	Evt01931	Event Number
Arrest | Legaines, Spain | 20050201	Return to Montreal	2005 Deportation to Australia	Release from Detention | Guantanamo Bay, Cuba | 20050128	Event Name
20050201	20050129	20050128	20050128	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	1	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01752	Evt01751	Evt01057	Evt00256	Evt00208	Event Number
Arrest | Philippines | 20050215	2005 Valentine's Day Bombing	Return to London	Arrest | Melilla, Spain | 2/3/2005	Arrest | Lavapies, Madrid, Spain | 2/2/2005	Event Name
20050215	20050214	20050208	20050203	20050202	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	6	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	100	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	3	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01087	Evt02590	Evt02901	Evt02151	Evt00330	Event Number
2005 Shoot -out w/ Karac hi Polic e	Ashur a Attac ks on Shiite s	Relea se from Deten tion| Madri d, Spain | 2005 0215	Arres t| Solo, Java, Indon esia| 2005 0215	Arres t| Switz erlan d| 2/200 5	Event Name
20050302	20050220	20050215	20050215	20050215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	0	0	Attack
N/A	39	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	150	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02904	Evt02591	Evt00153	Evt00410	Evt00193	Event Number
Relea se from Deten tion| Madri d, Spain | 2005 0311	2005 Bomb ing of Bagh dad's Sadr Hotel	Arres t| Fuenl abrad a, Spain | 3/7/2 005	Attac k on Alger ian Muni cipal Guar ds 2005	Arres t| Karac hi, Pakist an| 3/2/2 005	Event Name
20050311	20050309	20050307	20050303	20050302	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	1	0	Attack
0	1	0	18	0	Attack | Killed
0	40	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02066	Evt01991	Evt01990	Evt01500	Event Number
Arrest | Mindanao, Philippines | 20050315	2005 Bicutan Prison Riot	Death | Bicutan Prison, Philippines | 20050315	2005-2006 Nascent Plot to target U.S. Oil Refineries and Military Bases	Event Name
20050315	20050315	20050315	20050312	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	4	4	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01971	Evt02053	Evt02227	Evt02226	Evt00319	Event Number
Arrest | Zamboanga City, Philippines | 2005 0326	Release from Detention | Malaysia | 2005 0322	Death | Qatar | 2005 0320	Suicide Bombing of Theater in Qatar 2005	Arrest | Slough, England | 3/19/2005	Event Name
20050326	20050322	20050320	20050320	20050319	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00292	Evt00160	Evt00237	Evt02271	Evt00526	Event Number
Arres t | Parac uellos del Jaram a, Spain | 4/1/2 005	Arres t | Getaf e, Spain | 4/1/2 005	Arres t | Madri d, Spain | 4/1/2 005	Arres t | Detro it, MI | 2005 0327	2005 Chief Attac k	Event Name
20050401	20050401	20050401	20050327	20050327	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	9	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	4	7	1	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01933	Evt02638	Evt02640	Evt01610	Event Number
Release from Detention | 2005 0405 | Spain | Madrid,	Death | Al-Rus, Saudi Arabia | 2005 0403	2005 Firefight w/ Saudi Forces in Al-Rus	Arrest | | 2005 0401	Event Name
20050405	20050403	20050403	20050401	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	2	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02850	Evt02849	Evt02848	Evt01934	Event Number
Arrest | Egypt | Cairo | 20050410	Death | Egypt | Cairo | 20050407	2005 Bombing of Cairo's Khan al-Khalili Bazaar	Release from Detention | Netherlands | 20050406	Event Name
20050410	20050407	20050407	20050406	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	3	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	8	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02854	Evt02855	Evt02853	Evt02851	Evt00084	Event Number
Arrest | Cairo, Egypt | 20050428	2005 Armed Assault on Tourist Busses in Cairo	Death | Cairo, Egypt | 20050428	Arrest | Cairo, Egypt | 20050417	Arrest | Algeciras, Spain | 4/12/2005	Event Name
20050428	20050428	20050428	20050417	20050412	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	2	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	3	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02903	Evt02856	Evt00255	Evt02852	Event Number
Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain | 2005 0510	Arrest | Libya | 2005 0507	Arrest | Mardan, Pakistan | 5/4/2005	2005 Bombing Near Cairo's Egyptian Museum	Event Name
20050510	20050507	20050504	20050428	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	1	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	7	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00335	Evt01098	Evt00331	Evt01511	Evt02902	Event Number
Arrest | Syria | | 5/2005	2005 Suicide attack in Iraq	Arrest | Switzerland | 5/2005	Training in England's Lake District	Release from Detention | Spain | Madrid, 2005 0511	Event Name
20050515	20050515	20050515	20050515	20050511	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	1	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	1	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	8	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00339	Evt00891	Evt00398	Evt02130	Event Number
Arrest | Tours, France | 5/18/2005	2005 Assassination of Iraqi Government Counsil President	2005 Arson of Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko Theater	Death | Baghdad, Iraq | 2005 0515	Event Name
20050518	20050516	20050515	20050515	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	1	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	Attack
0	1	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02558	Evt01487	Evt02557	Evt00091	Event Number
2005 Car Bombing of Baghdad Airport Checkpoint	2005 Armed Robbery of Gas Station in Los Angeles, CA	Death — Nineveh, Iraq — 20050525	Arrest — 5/19/2005 — Netherlands, Amsterdam,	Event Name
20050601	20050530	20050525	20050519	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	1	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
15	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01828	Evt01002	Evt01247	Evt02895	Event Number
Death — Lemgheity, Mauritania | 20050604	2005 Raid on Mauritanian Military Post	White water Rafting	Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain — 20050601	Event Name
20050604	20050604	20050604	20050601	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	6	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
8	10	N/A	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01489	Evt02311	Evt01829	Evt00423	Event Number
2005 0605 Armed Robbery of Gas Station in Torrance, CA	Arrest | Sacramento, CA | 2005 0605	Death | Mali | 2005 0604	2005 Attack on Northern Mauritanian LtMg hiti Army Camp	Event Name
20050606	20050605	20050604	20050604	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
1	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	15	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	17	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	2	5	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02560	Evt00240	Evt01490	Evt01879	Evt01878	Event Number
Arrest | Mosul, Iraq | 2005 0614	Arrest | Madrid, Spain | 6/14/2005	2005 Armed Robbery of Gas Station in Playa Del Rey, CA	Arrest | Swat, Pakistan | 2005 0609	2004 Plot to Bomb Shiite s in Pakistan	Event Name
20050614	20050614	20050612	20050609	20050608	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	1	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	4	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01491	Evt02669	Evt02153	Evt00138	Evt00101	Event Number
2nd 2005 Armed Robbery of Gas Station in Torrence, CA	Arrest	Arrest	Arrest	Arrest	Event Name
20050616	20050615	20050615	20050615	20050615	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
1	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00069	Evt01494	Evt01493	Evt01492	Event Number
Arrest | | 6/23/2005	2005 Armed Robbery of Gas Station in Pico River a, CA	2005 Attempted Armed Robbery of Gas Station in Los Angeles, CA	2005 Armed Robbery of Gas Station in Bellflower, CA	Event Name
20050623	20050621	20050620	20050618	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	1	1	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00145	Evt00606	Evt02147	Evt00108	Evt00092	Event Number
Arrest | England | 2005	2005 Dry Run of 7/7 Attacks	Release from Detention | Kenya | 20050627	Arrest | Belgrade, Serbia | 6/23/2005	Arrest | Amsterdam, Netherlands | 6/23/2005	Event Name
20050702	20050628	20050627	20050623	20050623	Event Date
0	1	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	3	3	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01477	Evt02152	Evt02537	Evt00623	Event Number
2005 Behe ading of Scho olgirl s in Poso	2005 Nasce nt Plot Again st Christ ian Scho ol in East Java	Letter Quest ionin g Killin g of Shiite s in Iraq	2005 Faile d Robb ery of Armo red Car Depot	Event Name
20050702	20050702	20050702	20050702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	1	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
3	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	N/A	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00939	Evt02102	Evt01611	Evt00267	Event Number
2005 Plot to Attack Basilica of San Petronio	Release from Detention	Arrest	Arrest	Event Name
20050702	20050702	20050702	20050702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
1	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00951	Evt00950	Evt00944	Evt00942	Event Number
2005 Plot to Attack Paris Metro	2005 Plot to Attack Orly Airport	2005 Plot to Attack HQ of Milan Police	2005 Plot to Attack Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire	Event Name
20050702	20050702	20050702	20050702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	1	1	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	1	1	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02639	Evt01497	Evt00957	Evt00952	Event Number
2005 Firefight w/ Saudi Forces in Riyadh	2005 Armed Robbery of Gas Station in Playa Vista, CA	2005 Plot to Attack Sydney Harbor Bridge by Plane	2005 Plot to Attack Saharan Oil Refineries	Event Name
20050703	20050703	20050702	20050702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	1	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	1	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
N/A	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01612	Evt01498	Evt02637	Evt02562	Event Number
2005 0705 Arrest | |	2005 Armed Robbery of Gas Station in Fullerton, CA	2005 0703 Death | Riyadh, Saudi Arabia |	2005 Kidnapping/Assassination of Egyptian Ambassador to Iraq	Event Name
20050705	20050705	20050703	20050703	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	1	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	1	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	4	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00607	Evt00481	Evt00715	Evt00471	Evt00039	Event Number
2005 Edgw are Road Bomb (7/7)	2005 Bomb ing of No. 30 Bus at Tavis tock Squar e (7/7)	2005 King' s Cross Bomb ing (7/7)	2005 Bomb ing of Aldga te Unde rgrou nd (7/7)	2005 Lond on Bomb ings (7/7)	Event Name
20050707	20050707	20050707	20050707	20050707	Event Date
1	1	1	1	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	1	1	Attack
0	10	27	8	56	Attack | Killed
0	110	140	171	700	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	1	1	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	17	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01833	Evt01832	Evt01831	Evt01830	Event Number
20050707_Death_Tavistock Sq, London, England	20050707_Death_Kings Cross, London, England	20050707_Death_Edgware Road, London, England	20050707_Death_Aldgate, London, England	Event Name
20050707	20050707	20050707	20050707	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	1	1	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	1	1	1	Death | KIA
1	1	1	1	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
				Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00692	Evt01935	Evt00351	Evt01902	Evt02561	Event Number
2005 July 21 London Failed Bombing	Release from Detention	Arrest	Jailbreak	Arrest	Event Name
20050721	20050719	20050715	20050710	20050709	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	1	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
9	1	1	5	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01508	Evt01507	Evt01506	Evt02563	Event Number
2005 Failed Bombing of Shepherd's Bush (21/7)	2005 Failed Bombing of Hackney Bus (21/7)	2005 Failed Bombing of Little Wormwood Scrubs (21/7)	2005 Kidnapping/Assassination of Algerian Diplomats	Event Name
20050721	20050721	20050721	20050721	Event Date
1	1	1	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	Attack
0	0	0	2	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02836	Evt02833	Evt01510	Evt01509	Event Number
2005 Firefight w/ Egyptian Police at 'Ataqa Mtns.	2005 Sharm al-Sheik Attacks	2005 Faided Bombing of Stock well Train (21/7)	2005 Faided Bombing of Warren Street Station (21/7)	Event Name
20050725	20050723	20050721	20050721	Event Date
0	0	1	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	Attack
N/A	88	0	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	150	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	5	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01688	Evt00165	Evt00112	Evt01687	Evt02835	Event Number
Arres t | Lond on, Engla nd | 2005 0729	Arres t | Gujra nwala , Pakist an | 7/28/ 2005	Arres t | Birmi ngha m, Engla nd | 7/27/ 2005	Arres t | Lond on, Engla nd | 2005 0726	Death | 'Ataq a Moun tains, Egypt | 2005 0725	Event Name
20050729	20050728	20050727	20050726	20050725	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02843	Evt02841	Evt02277	Evt02279	Evt01720	Event Number
Death | al-Arish, Egypt | 2005 0815	Arrest | al-Arish, Egypt | 2005 0814	Arrest | London, England | 2005 0807	Arrest | England | 2005 0731	Arrest | Rome, Italy | 2005 0730	Event Name
20050815	20050814	20050807	20050731	20050730	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02229	Evt02844	Evt01502	Evt02870	Evt01761	Event Number
2005 Firefi ght w/ Saudi Police	Arres t	Al-Arish , Egypt | 2005 0815	Failur e to Join Lashk ar e-Taiba	2005 IED Attac k on Cana dian MOF Troop s	2005 Zamb oanga City Bomb ings	Event Name
20050818	20050815	20050815	20050815	20050815	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	1	Attack
N/A	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	0	0	2	26	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02544	Evt02543	Evt02842	Evt02228	Event Number
Arrest | Syria | 2005 0822	2005 Rock et Attack on USS Ashland and USS Kearsarge	Arrest | al-Arish, Egypt | 2005 0818	Death | Medina, Saudi Arabia | 2005 0818	Event Name
20050822	20050819	20050818	20050818	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	1	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	5	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01467	Evt02566	Evt00513	Evt01466	Evt02564	Event Number
2005 Bali Bombings	2005 Bombing of Balad (Shiite Town)	2005 Car Bombing in Iraq	2005 Robbery of Mobile Phone Shop	2005 Declaration of "Full-Scale War on Shiites All Over Iraq"	Event Name
20051001	20050929	20050929	20050915	20050915	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	1	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	0	0	Attack
26	60	60	0	0	Attack | Killed
100	70	70	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
10	1	1	3	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00508	Evt02568	Evt00274	Evt02694	Evt02139	Event Number
Call for End to Conflict in Algeria	Death | Ramadi, Iraq | 2005 1014	Arrest | Netherlands | 10/14 /2005	Arrest | Khartoum, Sudan | 2005 1005	Death | Jimbaran, Indonesia | 2005 1001	Event Name
20051015	20051014	20051014	20051005	20051001	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02909	Evt01569	Evt02569	Evt01644	Evt00919	Event Number
Release from Detention | 2005 1101 | Netherlands	2005 Delhi Bombings (Pre-Diwali Blasts)	2005 Suicide Car Bombing of Palestine Hotel	Arrest | Bosnia | 2005 1019	2005 Plot Against Schipholl Airport	Event Name
20051101	20051029	20051024	20051019	20051015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	0	Attack
0	62	6	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	15	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	7	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02649	Evt02650	Evt02651	Evt02641	Evt02674	Event Number
2005 Suici de Plot Again st Sydn ey	Arres t | Sydn ey, Austr alia | 2005 1108	Arres t | Melb ourne , Austr alia | 2005 1108	Arres t | Quett a, Pakist an | 2005 1104	Arres t | Lond on, Engla nd | 2005 1104	Event Name
20051108	20051108	20051108	20051104	20051104	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	8	9	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02545	Evt02058	Evt02567	Evt02057	Evt02648	Event Number
2005 1109 | Amman, Jordan | Death	2005 Firefight w/ Detachment t-88 in Mela ng	2005 Bombing of Western Hotels in Amman an	Arrest | Java, Indonesia | 2005 1108	2005 Firefight w/ Australian Police	Event Name
20051109	20051109	20051109	20051108	20051108	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	1	Attack
0	N/A	60	0	N/A	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	115	0	N/A	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	1	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	3	6	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01997	Evt02538	Evt02546	Evt01834	Event Number
2005 Firefight w/ AFP in Tawi-Tawi	Video Praising Zawahri and Urgings Iraqi Insurgency Onward	Arrest	Armman, Jordan	2005 1113	Death	East Java, Indonesia	2005 1109	Event Name
20051116	20051115	20051113	20051109	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	1	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	1	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
N/A	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
4	N/A	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02742	Evt01999	Evt01998	Event Number
Death — Miran Shah, Pakistan — 20051201	Arrest — Buan Villa Pangilinan, Sugal Philippines — 20051116	Death — Buan Villa Pangilinan, Sugal Philippines — 20051116	Event Name
20051201	20051116	20051116	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
1	0	1	Death
1	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
1	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00200	Evt01503	Evt00304	Evt01499	Event Number
Arrest | Kuringgai, Sydney, Australia | 12/2005	2006 'Plot' to Bomb the Sears Tower	Arrest | Prague, Czech Republic | 12/11/2005	2005 Plot to Bomb U.S. Oil Pipelines and Refineries	Event Name
20051215	20051215	20051211	20051201	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	1	Plot
0	1	0	1	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	3	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00347	Evt02879	Evt01515	Evt02276	Evt02570	Event Number
Arrest | Vilanova, Spain | 11/10/2006	2006 Kidnapping of American Journalist Jill Carroll	Firearms Training at dsbor o, PA	Arrest | Gatwick, London, England | 20051220	Arrest | Spain | 20051219	Event Name
20060110	20060107	20060103	20051220	20051219	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	1	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02278	Evt00146	Evt01836	Evt00305	Evt00312	Event Number
Arrest | London, England | 20060128	Arrest | Estepona, Spain | 1/22/2006	Death | Toudja, Algeria | 20060117	Arrest | Rabat, Morocco | 1/2006 ?	Arrest | Santa Coloma de Gramanet, Spain | 1/12/2006	Event Name
20060128	20060122	20060117	20060115	20060112	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01504	Evt01571	Evt02770	Evt02107	Evt01903	Event Number
2006 'Plot' to Bomb FBI Buildings	2006 Varanasi Bombings	2006 Suicide Bombing Near U.S. Consulate in Karachi	2006 Failed Bombing of Karnavati Express	Jailbreak | Yemen | 2006 0203	Event Name
20060315	20060307	20060302	20060219	20060203	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	0	Plot
1	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	1	0	Attack
0	22	3	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
7	5	1	1	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02204	Evt01613	Evt00079	Evt02880	Event Number
2006 Bombing of Cooperative Market in Jolo	Arrest | | 2006 0323	Arrest | ? | 3/2006	2006 Kidnapping/Killing of American Christian Aid Worker Tom Fox	Event Name
20060327	20060323	20060315	20060315	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	Attack
9	0	0	1	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02104	Evt02253	Evt00062	Evt02887	Event Number
Arrest | New Delhi, India | 2006 0415	2006 Bombing of Jama Masjid (Delhi)	2006 Ambush of Algerian Customs Officials	Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain | 2006 0407	Event Name
20060415	20060414	20060407	20060407	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	Attack
0	0	10	0	Attack | Killed
0	10	8	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	N/A	2	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02539	Evt02540	Evt01640	Evt02105	Evt01837	Event Number
Death | Khaar | Pakistan | 20060421	20060421 Firefight w/ Pakistani Forces	Arrest | Bangladesh | 20060417	Death | New Delhi | India | 20060415	Death | Waziristan, Pakistan | 20060415	Event Name
20060421	20060421	20060417	20060415	20060415	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	1	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	1	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0			Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	N/A	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02155	Evt01838	Evt02154	Evt02846	Evt02832	Event Number
Arrest | Wono sobo, Indonesia | 20060429	Death | Wono sobo, Indonesia | 20060429	20060429 Firefight w/ Detachment-88 (Wonosobo Raid)	Death | Dahab, Egypt | 20060424	20060424 Dahab Bombings	Event Name
20060429	20060429	20060429	20060424	20060424	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	23	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	62	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	4	3	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00100	Evt02840	Evt02838	Evt02837	Evt01738	Event Number
Arrest | Barcelona, Spain | 5/11/2006	Arrest | al-Arish | Egypt | 20060509	Death | Near al-Arish | Egypt | 20060509	2006 Firefight w/ Egyptian Police Near Arish	Arrest | United Kingdom | 20060506	Event Name
20060511	20060509	20060509	20060509	20060506	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01936	Evt01839	Evt01689	Evt02845	Evt00913	Event Number
Release from Detention | Indonesia | 2006 0614	Death — Hibhib, Iraq | 2006 0608	Arrest — London, England | 2006 0606	Death — Rafâh, Egypt | 2006 0519	2006 Plot to Conduct Suicide Bombing in Iraq	Event Name
20060614	20060608	20060606	20060519	20060515	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02939	Evt02552	Evt01496	Evt01495	Evt01266	Event Number
Arrest | Iraq | 2006 0702?	2006 Paintball Near London	2005 Armed Robbery of Gas Station in Orange, CA	2005 Armed Robbery of Gas Station in Walnut, CA	Hiding in Somalia	Event Name
20060702	20060702	20060621	20060621	20060615	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	1	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	1	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	1	1	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	2	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02695	Evt02947	Evt02175	Evt01505	Event Number
Release from Detention | Khartoum, Sudan | 20060704	2006 Plot Western Centrals in Asia	Arrest | Afghanistan | 20060702	2006 Liquid Bombs Plot Targeting London to US Flights	Event Name
20060704	20060702	20060702	20060702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00036	Evt01840	Evt00242	Evt02082	Evt01730	Event Number
2006 Mumbai Attacks	Death | Ingushetia | 2006 0710	Arrest | Madrid, Spain | 7/10/2006	Arrest | Bolton, England | 2006 0707	Arrest | Solo, Indonesia | 2006 0706	Event Name
20060711	20060710	20060710	20060707	20060706	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
209	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
714	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
29	1	1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02110	Evt02109	Evt02108	Event Number
2006 Khar Train Bomb ing (2006 Mum bai Attac ks)	2006 Mira Road Train Bomb ing (2006 Mum bai Attac ks)	2006 Joges hwari Train Bomb ing (2006 Mum bai Attac ks)	Event Name
20060711	20060711	20060711	Event Date
1	1	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	Attack
Un	Un	Un	Attack | Killed
Un	Un	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02112	Evt02118	Evt02111	Event Number
Death — Mumbai, India — 2006 0711	2006 Borivali Station Train Bombing (2006 Mumbai Attacks)	2006 Matunga Train Bombing--Bandra Station (2006 Mumbai Attacks)	Event Name
20060711	20060711	20060711	Event Date
0	1	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	Death
1	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	Attack
0	Un	Un	Attack | Killed
0	Un	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02097	Evt01937	Evt02119	Evt01841	Event Number
False Report of Death | Arrest | Mombasa, Kenya | 20060721	Release from Detention | Paris, France | 20060721	Arrest | Madhubani, Bihar, India | 20060720	Death | Middelburg, Netherlands | 20060715	Event Name
20060721	20060721	20060720	20060715	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	1	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01938	Evt02120	Evt02117	Evt02099	Evt02100	Event Number
2006 Depo rtatio n to Tunis ia	Arres t | Mum bai, India | 2006 0729	Arres t | Mum bai, India | 2006 0727	Arres t | Mum bai, India | 2006 0726	Arres t | Mum bai, India | 2006 0724	Event Name
20060807	20060729	20060727	20060726	20060724	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
1	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02553	Evt02238	Evt01636	Evt01690	Evt01740	Event Number
Arrest | Sanaa, Yemen | 20060815	Arrest | London, England | 20060810	Arrest | Batha, Pakistan | 20060809	Arrest | London, England | 20060809	Arrest | Walthamstow, London, England | 20060809	Event Name
20060815	20060810	20060809	20060809	20060809	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	7	1	3	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02125	Evt02126	Evt01582	Evt02624	Event Number
Death — Anto p Hill, Mumbai, India — 2006 0820	2006 Firefight w/ Police at Anto p Hill	Bayat to Taib	Release from Detention	Event Name
20060820	20060820	20060815	20060815	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00412	Evt01976	Evt01115	Evt02127	Event Number
2006 Attack on Batna	Death | Jolo, Philippines | 2006 0904	Terrorist Training in South east England	2006 Plot Against Atomic Research Center and/or Siddhivinayak Temple	Event Name
20060906	20060904	20060901	20060820	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	1	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
22	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02124	Evt02796	Evt01960	Evt01576	Evt01104	Event Number
Arrest | Hyderabad, India | 2006 0930	Death | Basra, Iraq | 2006 0925	Arrest | England | 2006 0910?	2006 Male gaon Bombing	2006 Suicide Bombing of Algerian Coast Guard Barracks	Event Name
20060930	20060925	20060910	20060908	20060908	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	0	37	28	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	125	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	7	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00329	Evt00490	Evt01530	Evt02191	Evt02106	Event Number
Arrest | Switzerland | 10/2006	2006 Bombing of Police Station in Algeria (Algiers)	2006 Bombing in Makilala City	2006 Cotabato Bombings	Arrest | Begaum, India | 2006 1003	Event Name
20061015	20061015	20061011	20061010	20061003	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	1	0	Attack
0	3	0	Un	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	10	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02635	Evt02634	Evt01637	Evt01468	Event Number
2006 Plot to Smuggle Arms to Somalia	Arrest	Arrest	2006 Hamer Attack on Christian Convert/Preacher Yosua Wina di	Event Name
20061017	20061017	20061016	20061016	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	3	1	15	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01939	Evt01737	Evt01762	Evt02190	Evt01842	Event Number
Release from Detention | Indonesia | 20061115	Arrest | Turkey | 20061115	2006 Plot Against ASEAN Summit	Arrest | Tacurong City, Mindanao, Philippines | 20061113	Death | Chingai, Pakistan | 20061030	Event Name
20061115	20061115	20061115	20061113	20061030	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00940	Evt00414	Evt01682	Evt02636	Event Number
2006 Plot to Attack Cherry Valley Shopping Center (Rockford, IL)	2006 Attack on Halliburton Convoy	Arrest	Release from Detention	Event Name
20061215	20061210	20061205	20061203	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	Plot
1	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	2	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	8	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00211	Evt00129	Evt02080	Evt01286	Evt01760	Event Number
Arrest | Lerida, Spain | | 1/4/2007	Arrest | Catalonia, Spain | | 1/3/2007	Release from Detention | Yemen | 2006 1225	Somali Civil War	Arrest | Philippines | | 2006 1215	Event Name
20070104	20070103	20061225	20061220	20061215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	1	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	5	1	8	1	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt01843	Death | Southern Somalia | 20070107	20070107	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt01844	Death | Djebel Terif, Tunisia | 20070115	20070115	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt02675	Arrest | Philippines | 20070115	20070115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt02047	2007 Firefight at Bud Daho Mountain	20070116	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	N/A	N/A	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Evt02046	Death | Talipao, Sulu, Philippines | 20070116	20070116	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Evt01518	Evt00488	Evt00489	Evt02148	Event Number
2006-2007 Plot to Attack JFK Airport	2007 Bombing of Police Station in Algeria (Boumerdes)	2007 Bombing of Police Station in Algeria (Tizi Ouzou)	Arrest	Event Name
20070222	20070213	20070213	20070203	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	Attack
0	6	Un	0	Attack | Killed
0	10	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
6	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00301	Evt02709	Evt02708	Evt01517	Event Number
Arrest | Phoenix, AZ | 3/7/2007	Death | Bagram, Afghanistan | 20070227	Suicide Attack on Bagram Airbase During Chengey's Visit	2007 Paintball in Cherry Hill, NJ	Event Name
20070307	20070227	20070227	20070226	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	1	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	23	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01684	Evt02145	Evt01940	Evt01469	Event Number
Arrest | Lamppung, Indonesia | 20070315	2007 Attacks on Ethiopian Troops	Release from Detention | Indonesia | 20070315	2007 Abort ed/Failed Plan to Rob Chinese-Owned Business in Lamppung	Event Name
20070315	20070315	20070315	20070315	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	Un	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01943	Evt02115	Evt01942	Evt02114	Evt01941	Event Number
2007 Deportation to Australia	Death | Poonch, Kashmir, Pakistan	Release from Detention | Iraq | 20070328	2007 Firefight w/ Pakistani Military	Release from Detention | Lampung, Indonesia | 20070316	Event Name
20070329	20070328	20070328	20070328	20070316	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
1	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02144	Evt02245	Evt02244	Evt01101	Event Number
2007 Assau lt on Basil Hotel (Mog adish u)	2007 Non-specif ic Plot to Attac k Amer icans Abro ad Using WM D	Arres t | Colu mbus, Ohio | 2007 0411	2007 Suici de Attac ks on Algie rs	Event Name
20070415	20070411	20070411	20070411	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	Attack
Un	0	0	33	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	1	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01898	Evt01897	Evt02664	Evt01973	Evt01972	Event Number
Arrest | Delhi, India | 20070426	2007 Plot to Bomb Delhi	Release from Detention | Britain | 20070425	2007 Beheading of Road-Construction Workers	2007 Kidnapping of Road-Construction Workers	Event Name
20070426	20070426	20070425	20070423	20070416	Event Date
0	0	0	1	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	7	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	5	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01516	Evt02881	Evt02882	Evt02735	Event Number
2006-2007 Plot to Attack Fort Dix	Death | Taji, Iraq | 20070502	2007 Firefight w/ Coalition Forces Near Taji	2007 Suicide Attack Targeting Pakistan's Interior Minister	Event Name
20070507	20070502	20070502	20070428	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	N/A	27	Attack | Killed
0	0	N/A	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
10	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02225	Evt02620	Evt01845	Evt02146	Evt01647	Event Number
2007 Gora khpur Bomb ings	Relea se from Deten tion | Austr alia | 2007 0517	Death | Alger ia | 2007 0515	Assas sinati on of Soma li Judge	Arres t | Cherr y Hill, NJ | 2007 0507	Event Name
20070522	20070517	20070515	20070515	20070507	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
6	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01716	Evt02890	Evt01736	Evt01704	Evt01572	Event Number
Arrest | Port-of-Spain, Trinidad | 20070605	Release from Detention | Madrid, Spain | 20070604	Arrest | Trinidad | 20070602	Arrest | New York, NY | 20070601	2007 Hyderabad Bombings	Event Name
20070605	20070604	20070602	20070601	20070525	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	42	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	54	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	1	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02186	Evt02164	Evt02163	Evt01471	Evt00222	Event Number
2007 Kidnapping of Fr. Giancarlo Bossi	Arrest	Indonesia	2007 Murder of Dago Simamora	Arrest	Event Name
20070610	20070610	20070610	20070608	20070607	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	10	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01568	Evt00313	Evt01567	Evt02601	Event Number
2007 Attempted Suicide Bombing of Glasgow Airport	Arrest	2007 Attempted Car-Bombing of London	Release from Detention	Event Name
20070630	20070629	20070629	20070615	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	4	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01846	Evt01381	Evt01686	Evt01663	Evt01648	Event Number
Death | Amizour, Algeria | 20070730	2007 Suicide bombing of Spanish Tourists in Yemen	Arrest | Liverpool, England | 20070630	Arrest | Glasgow, Scotland | 20070630	Arrest | Chesshire, England | 20070630	Event Name
20070701	20070701	20070630	20070630	20070630	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	10	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	3	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01944	Evt01742	Evt01635	Evt01413	Evt02930	Event Number
Release from Detention | Yemen | 20070702	Arrest | Yemen | 20070702	Arrest | Australia | 20070702	Arrest | Pakistan | 20070702	2007 Plot Against U.S. Military Base in Hanau	Event Name
20070702	20070702	20070702	20070702	20070702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
1	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	5	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01100	Evt02043	Evt02603	Evt02910	Evt01945	Event Number
2007 Suici de Attac k on Alger ian Army Barra cks	2007 Bebe ading of Marin es at Albar kah	2007 Red Mosq ue Seige	Relea se from Deten tion	2007 Depo rtatio n to USA	Event Name
20070711	20070710	20070703	20070702	20070702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	1	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	0	0	Attack
8	10	10	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	248	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01946	Evt02905	Evt02734	Evt02670	Evt01896	Event Number
Release | Detention from | Australia | 20070727	Release | Detention from | Madrid, Spain | 20070726	Death | Zhob, Pakistan | 20070724	Arrest | Spain | 20070724	Death | Bandarwah, Pakistan | 20070718	Event Name
20070727	20070726	20070724	20070724	20070718	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
1	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02103	Evt01656	Evt02166	Evt01848	Evt01723	Event Number
Death | Syria | 2007 0815	Arrest | Decatur, IL | 2007 0815	2007 Ambush of AFP Troops in Jolo	Death | Glasgow, Scotland | 2007 0803	Arrest | San Jose, CA | 2007 0802	Event Name
20070815	20070815	20070809	20070803	20070802	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02723	Evt00404	Evt01110	Evt02928	Evt02929	Event Number
2007 Capture of 300 Pakistani Soldiers	2007 Assassination Attempt on Benazir Bhutto	Surrender | Algeria | 2007 0922	Arrest | Ulm, Germany | 2007 0904	Arrest | Frankfurt, Germany | 2007 0815	Event Name
20071015	20071015	20070922	20070904	20070815	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	0	0	Attack
Un	140	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02042	Evt02932	Evt01947	Evt01849	Evt01743	Event Number
Arrest | Mindanao, Philippines | 2007 1016	Arrest | Turkey | 2007 1015	Release from Detention | Yemen | 2007 1015	Death | Gamaroo, Kashmir | 2007 1015	Arrest | Yemen | 2007 1015	Event Name
20071016	20071015	20071015	20071015	20071015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01105	Evt01850	Evt02224	Evt02041	Evt01748	Event Number
2007 Suici de Bomb ing of Alger ian Gov't Build ing	Death | Algie rs, Alger ia | 2007 1211	2007 Varan asi Court house Bomb ing	Arres t | Tawi-Tawi, Philip pines | 2007 1109	2007 Bomb ing of Glori etta 2 Mall	Event Name
20071211	20071211	20071123	20071109	20071019	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	0	1	Attack
40	0	20	0	10	Attack | Killed
Un	0	100	0	129	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01904	Evt00889	Evt01470	Evt02040	Evt01108	Event Number
Jailbreak | Pakistan | 20071215	2007 Murder of French Tourists	2007 Plot to Bomb Café Bedudelin Bukit tinggi	2007 Kidnapping of Mayoral Staffers	2007 Suicide Bombing of UN Offices (Algiers)	Event Name
20071215	20071215	20071215	20071213	20071211	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
1	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	1	1	Attack
0	4	0	0	40	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	3	9	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01107	Evt02129	Evt01295	Evt02554	Event Number
2008 Suici de Bomb ing of Polic e Statio n (Naci ria)	Death | Rawa lpindi , Pakist an | 2007 1227	2007 Assas sinati on of Bena zir Bhutt o	Relea se from Deten tion | Sanaa , Yeme n | 2007 1215	Event Name
20080102	20071227	20071227	20071215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	0	Attack
4	0	25	0	Attack | Killed
10	0	91	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	5	1	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt02772	2008 Suicide Bombing of Serena Hotel in Kabul	20080114	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	6	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	5
Evt02775	Death | Kabul, Afghanistan | 20080114	20080114	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Evt00164	Arrest | Guinea Bissau | 1/2008	20080115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Evt02201	2008 Murder of Fr. Jesus Reynaldo A. Roda/ Kidnapping of Omar Taup	20080115	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1

Evt02785	Evt01948	Evt02774	Evt01697	Evt00281	Event Number
Death | | Pakistan | 20080116	Release from Detention | Illinois | 20080116	Arrest | Afghanistan-Pakistan Border | 20080115	Arrest | Malaysia | 20080115	Arrest | Nouakchott, Mauritania | 1/2008	Event Name
20080116	20080116	20080115	20080115	20080115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02758	Evt02757	Evt02128	Evt02592	Event Number
Arrest | Barcelona, Spain | 20080120	2008 Plot to Suicide Bomb Barcelona's Subway System	Arrest | North West Frontier Province, Pakistan | 20080119	2008 Attack on Belgian Tourists	Event Name
20080120	20080120	20080119	20080118	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	1	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	3	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
10	10	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02205	Evt02206	Evt02039	Evt02178	Event Number
2008 0131 | Death | Panglima Sugala, Tawi-Tawi, Philippines	2008 0131 Tawi-Tawi in Firefight w/ AFP	2008 0128 Kidnapping of Female Trader in Jolo	2008 0128 | Death | North Waziristan, Pakistan	Event Name
20080131	20080131	20080128	20080128	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	1	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	Attack
0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01851	Evt02172	Evt01277	Evt02207	Event Number
2008 0212 — Death — Damascus, Syria	2008 0207 — Arrest — Pakistan	2008 Attack on Pakistani Air Force Base in Sargodha	2008 0131 — Arrest — Tawi-Tawi, Philippines	Event Name
20080212	20080207	20080204	20080131	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
1	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	Un	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01399	Evt01292	Evt02203	Evt00707	Event Number
Arrest | Lahore, Pakistan | 2/26/2008	2008 Assassination of Gen. Mushtaq Baig	Arrest | Davao, Philippines | 2008 0219	2008 Kidnapping of European Tourists (Southern Algeria I)	Event Name
20080226	20080225	20080219	20080215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	1	Attack
0	7	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	30	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	10	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02773	Evt02771	Evt01279	Evt01905	Event Number
Death | Kabul, Afghanistan | 2008 0303	2008 Suicide Bombing of US Military Base in Afghanistan	2008 Suicide Bombing of Luna Caprese Restaurant (Islamabad)	Jailbreak | Singapore | 2008 0227	Event Name
20080303	20080303	20080301	20080227	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	1	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	Attack
0	5	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	19	10	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02038	Evt02765	Evt02707	Evt00246	Evt02747	Event Number
Arrest | Zamboanga City, Philippines | 20080321	Death | Wana, Pakistan | 20080315	Death | North Waziristan, Pakistan | 20080315?	Arrest | Mali | 3/2008	Death | Bajaur, Pakistan | 20080314	Event Name
20080321	20080315	20080315	20080315	20080314	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	1	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0			0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02778	Evt02776	Evt02883	Evt01614	Evt02784	Event Number
2008 Firefight w/ Afghan Force in Kabul	2008 Assassination Attempt on Hamid Karzai	Death | Baghdad, Iraq |20080424	Arrest | 20080415	2008 Kidnapping of Journalist Sean Langan	Event Name
20080427	20080427	20080424	20080415	20080326	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	0	1	Attack
N/A	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02724	Evt01574	Evt01199	Evt01852	Evt02777	Event Number
2008 Camp aign Again st Nato Conv oys Arou nd Pesha war	2008 Jaipur Bomb ings	Trave l to Saudi Arabi a	Death — Dusa mare b, Soma lia | 2008 0501	Death — Kabul , Afgh anista n | 2008 0430	Event Name
20080515	20080513	20080508	20080501	20080427	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0			Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	1	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	0	0	Attack
Un	80	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	216	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02721	Evt02184	Evt02069	Evt01974	Evt01278	Event Number
2008 Behe ading of Afgh an 'Spies'	2008 Firefi ght in AFP w/ Ticul ab	Death — Islam abad, Pakist an — 2008 0615	2008 Kidna pping of Journ alists and an Acad emic	2008 Bomb ing of Danis h Emba ssy in Islam abad	Event Name
20080627	20080625	20080615	20080608	20080602	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	1	1	Attack
2	N/A	0	0	7	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	0	Un	24	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	4	3	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt01615	Arrest | | 20080629	20080629	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt01712	Arrest | Palembang, Indonesia | 20080701	20080701	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
Evt01414	Arrest | Ghazi, Afghanistan | 7/2008	20080701	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Evt01290	Denouncement of Danish Cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed	20080702	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	N/A

Evt01282	Evt01949	Evt01291	Evt02084	Event Number
2008 Suici de Bomb ing of Pakist ani Naval War Colle ge	Relea se from Deten tion | Indon esia | 2008 0715	2008 Plot to Attac k Unsp ecifie d Targe ts in Rawa lpinid i and Islam abad	Death | Afgh anista n | 2008 0712	Event Name
20080702	20080702	20080702	20080702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	#	Death | Accident
0	0	0	#	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	#	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	#	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	#	Death | KIA
0	0	0	#	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	#	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	#	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	#	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	#	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	1	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	1	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	6	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02718	Evt01280	Evt01522	Evt01298	Event Number
Arrest | Hangu, Pakistan | 20080712	2008 Suicide Bombing Near Islamabad's Red Mosque	2008 Nascent Plot to Bomb Long Island Rail System	2008 Plot to Attack NYC Landmarks	Event Name
20080712	20080707	20080702	20080702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	1	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	19	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	40	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02219	Evt02037	Evt02717	Evt01533	Event Number
2008 Bangalore Bombings	Arrest	2008 Kidnapping of Pakistani Police Officers, State Bank Officials, et al	2005 Assassination of Peace Activist Abdulkadir Yahya	Event Name
20080725	20080718	20080718	20080715	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	1	Attack
2	0	0	1	Attack | Killed
20	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02174	Evt01639	Evt02609	Evt01631	Evt01573	Event Number
Death | | 2008 0731 (reported)	Arrest | Bangalore, India | 2008 0729	Death | South Waziristan, Pakistan | 2008 0728	Arrest | Ahmedabad, India | | 2008 0727	2008 Ahmedabad Bombing	Event Name
20080731	20080729	20080728	20080727	20080726	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
1	0	1	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	56	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	200	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	4	1	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00037	Evt01281	Evt02750	Evt02713	Evt01267	Event Number
2008 Mumbai Attacks	2008 Pakistani Independence Day Bombing	Death – South Waziristan, Pakistan – 2008 0813	2008 Ambush of Pakistani Troops	2003 Raid/Bombing/Harun Escape	Event Name
20080815	20080814	20080813	20080808	20080801	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	1	0	Attack
164	Un	0	22	0	Attack | Killed
308	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
34	1	2	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02751	Evt01664	Evt02699	Evt02193	Evt02189	Event Number
Death | | Pakistan | 20080904	Arrest | Gujarat, India | | 20080815	2008 Bombing of Lebanese Soldiers	2008 Attacks on Civilians in North Cotabato	2008 Attacks on Civilians in Lanao del Norte	Event Name
20080904	20080815	20080815	20080815	20080815	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	1	Attack
0	0	Un	Un	7	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	Un	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	3	7	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02087	Evt02212	Evt01570	Evt02239	Evt02748	Event Number
Arrest | Mumbai, India | 2008 0915	2008 Battle w/ AFP Troops in Maguindanao	2008 Delhi Bombings	Acquittal and Release | London, England | 2008 0908	Death | Miran Shah, Pakistan | 2008 0908	Event Name
20080915	20080914	20080913	20080908	20080908	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	0	Attack
0	N/A	30	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	24	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01853	Evt01578	Evt02595	Evt00421	Evt02629	Event Number
Death | Delhi | India | 2008 0919	2008 Shoot -out w/ Delhi Police	2008 Attack on U.S. Embassy in Yemen	2008 Attack on Mauritanian Military	Release from Detention | Iran | 2008 0915	Event Name
20080919	20080919	20080915	20080915	20080915	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	0	Attack
0	0	10	10	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	1	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	4	1	1	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01642	Evt01641	Evt01400	Evt01616	Evt01276	Event Number
Arrest | Bhiwandi, India | | 20080924	Arrest | Bel Tara, Uttar Pradesh, India | | 20080924	Arrest | Gujranwala, Pakistan | 9/23/2008	Arrest | | 20080921	2008 Islamabad Marriott Bombing	Event Name
20080924	20080924	20080923	20080921	20080920	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	54	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	266	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	3	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01575	Evt01702	Evt01679	Evt01646	Event Number
2008 Plot Against Mumbai	Arrest|Nehru Nagar, Mumbai, India|2008 0924	Arrest|Kurla, Mumbai, India|2008 0924	Arrest|Chembur, Mumbai, India|2008 0924	Event Name
20080925	20080924	20080924	20080924	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
1	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
5	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02036	Evt02216	Evt01296	Evt02565	Event Number
Arrest | Patrick Philippines | 2008 | 1011	Arrest | Uttar Pradesh, India | 2008 | 0930	2008 Kidnapping /Murder of Police Engineer Piotr Stanczak	Death | Baghdad, Iraq | 2008 | 0925	Event Name
20081011	20080930	20080928	20080925	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02610	Evt02752	Evt02700	Evt02701	Evt01557	Event Number
2008 1016 an | Pakist , | Wana | Death	Funds an Talib ani Pakist ent of zzlem Embe 2008	t | Leba non | 2008 1015 Arres	b Khati a al- Mutaf ber Mem /PLO Fatah er of Murd 2008	cer Produ Film wood Boly of ppng Kidna 2008	Event Name
20081016	20081015	20081015	20081015	20081015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	1	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02702	Evt01854	Evt02714	Evt02753	Event Number
Arrest | Ain al-Hilweh, Lebanon | 2008 1109	Death | | 2008 1108	2008 Suicide Attack on Anti-Taliban Tribal Jerga	Death | North Waziristan, Pakistan | 2008 1031	Event Name
20081109	20081108	20081106	20081031	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	1	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	1	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	2	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	50	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	3	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01556	Evt02241	Evt02703	Evt02194	Evt02783	Event Number
2008 Murd er of Retire d Pakist ani Gener al	2010 Norw ay Bomb Plot	Arres t	Bead non	Leba dawi, 2008 1114	2008 Firefi ght w/ AFP in Lana o del Sur	2008 Kidna pping of Journ alist David Rohd e	Event Name
20081115	20081115	20081114	20081110	20081110	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	1	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	1	Attack
1	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	4	1	2	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01855	Evt02749	Evt01950	Evt01710	Event Number
Death | North Waziristan, Pakistan | 2008 1122	Death | North Waziristan, Pakistan | 2008 1119	Release from Detention | Indonesia | 2008 1115	Arrest | Pakistan | 2008 1115	Event Name
20081122	20081119	20081115	20081115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
1	1	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01548	Evt01542	Evt02113	Evt01549	Event Number
2008 Attack on Tridents Ober oi Hotel (Mumbai Ramp age)	2008 Attack on Taj Mahal Hotel (Mumbai Ramp age)	Arrest | London | 20081125	2008 Hijacking of the MV Kuber (Boat -- Mumbai Ramp age)	Event Name
20081126	20081126	20081125	20081123	Event Date
1	1	0	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	1	Attack
32	31	0	4	Attack | Killed
Un	250	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	1	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hijacking
1	1	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
7	10	1	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01543	Evt01539	Evt01546	Evt01541	Event Number
2008 Attack on Mumbai CST (Mumbai Ramp age)	2008 Attack on Leopold Café (Mumbai Ramp age)	2008 Hijacking of Skoda Car (Mumbai Ramp age)	2008 Attack on Nariman House (Mumbai Ramp age)	Event Name
20081126	20081126	20081126	20081126	Event Date
1	1	1	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	Attack
58	10	Un	6	Attack | Killed
104	Un	Un	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	1	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	2	5	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01550	Evt01544	Evt01547	Evt01540	Event Number
2008 Murder of Solanki (Kuber's Capitain)	2008 Hijacking of Police Vehicle (Mumbai Rampage)	2008 Gunfight at Chowpatti Beach (Mumbai Rampage)	2008 Mazgaon Taxi Blast (Mumbai Rampage)	Event Name
20081126	20081126	20081126	20081126	Event Date
1	1	1	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	1	Attack
0	6	2	3	Attack | Killed
0	1	2	15	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01553	Evt01552	Evt01551	Event Number
2008 Vile Parle Taxi Bomb ing (Mu mbai Ramp age)	2008 Attac k on Bysta nders Outsi de Metro Theat er (Mu mbai Ramp age)	2008 Attac k on Cama Hospi tal (2008 Mum bai Ramp age)	Event Name
20081126	20081126	20081126	Event Date
1	1	1	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01857	Evt01856	Evt01651	Event Number
Death | | Nariman/ Chabad House, Mumbai, India | | 2008 1127	Death | | Chowpatti Beach, Mumbai, India | | 2008 1126	Arrest | Chowpatti Beach, Mumbai, India | | 2008 1126	Event Name
20081127	20081126	20081126	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
1	1	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	1	0	Death | KIA
1	1	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00699	Evt00202	Evt01859	Evt01858	Event Number
2008 Kidnapping of Canadian Diplomats	Arrest	Death	Death	Event Name
20081215	20081210	20081129	20081128	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	1	Death | KIA
0	0	1	1	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0			Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	1	4	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02217	Evt02196	Evt02197	Evt02195	Event Number
Arrest	2008	2008	2008	Event
t	Faile	Fireli	Bomb	Name
Keral	d	ght	ing of	
a,	Bomb	w/	Malls	
India	ing of	AFP	in	
|	Iligan	in	Iligan	
2008	/Assa	Tubo		
|	ssinat	d		
1225	ion			
	Atte			
	mpt			
	on			
	Glori			
	a			
	Maca			
	pagal			
	-			
	Arroy			
	o			
20081225	20081221	20081220	20081218	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	1	Attack
0	0	N/A	2	Attack | Killed
0	0	N/A	48	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02221	Evt01584	Evt02828	Evt01975	Evt01860	Event Number
Arrest | London, England | 20090115	Bayat to Wahhabism	Arrest | Hyderabad, India | 20090120	2009 Kidnapping of Red Cross Workers	Death | Pakistan | 20090101	Event Name
20090115	20090115	20090115	20090115	20090101	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	1	4	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02198	Evt02070	Evt01714	Evt00700	Event Number
Loss of Troops Who Surrendered to AFP	Arrest	Arrest	2009 Kidnapping of Edwin Dyer and Other European Tourists	Event Name
20090203	20090129	20090122	20090122	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	9	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02829	Evt01294	Evt00076	Evt00075	Event Number
Arrest | London, England | 20090315	2009 Attack on Sri Lankan Cricket Team	Arrest | ? | 2/18/2009	Arrest | ? | 2/15/2009	Event Name
20090315	20090301	20090218	20090215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	Attack
0	8	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	9	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00078	Evt02236	Evt01474	Evt01554	Event Number
Arrest | Karachi, Pakistan | 2009 0319	2009 Nascent Plot to Attack Malaysia	2009 Smoke Bombing of UNIC EF Offices	2009 Nascent Plot to Attack India National Defense University (Delhi)	Event Name
20090319	20090315	20090315	20090315	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	1	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02606	Evt02607	Evt01089	Evt02608	Event Number
2009 Attack on Police Academy in Lahore	2009 Suicide Attack on Security Convoy in Bannu	2009 Skirmish w/ Algerian Authorities	2009 Attack on Islamabad Police Station	Event Name
20090330	20090330	20090330	20090325	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	Attack
9	17	0	1	Attack | Killed
95	Un	Un	3	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	1	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	6	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02045	Evt02720	Evt02746	Evt01617	Evt01531	Event Number
2009 Firefight w/ AFP in Jolo	2009 Conquest of Buner	Death | Pakistan | 20090401	Arrest | Johor, Malaysia | 20090401	2009 British Plot Against Manchester (Compannion Plot to N. Zazi Plot)	Event Name
20090407	20090404	20090401	20090401	20090401	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	0	0	Attack
N/A	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01122	Evt01040	Evt02034	Evt01662	Evt01661	Event Number
2009 Theft of Rifles from Libyan Military Base	Renounce ment of Jihad	2009 Assassination Attempt on Sulu Gov. Abdusakur Tan	Arrest | England | 20090415	Arrest | England | 20090408	Event Name
20090515	20090515	20090513	20090415	20090408	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
1	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	1	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	10	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	2	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02830	Evt02035	Evt02030	Evt02149	Event Number
Arrest | London, England | 20090528	Arrest | Pakistan | Sulu, Philippines | 20090526	Arrest | Pakistan | Philippines | 20090522	Release from Detention | Malaysia | 20090515	Event Name
20090528	20090526	20090522	20090515	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01513	Evt01685	Evt01512	Evt01382	Event Number
2009 Failed Attempt to Fire-Bomb Rabbi's House	Arrest	Little Rock, AR	2009 Shooting at Army Recruiting Station	2009 Kidnapping of German and British Nationals in Yemen	Event Name
20090601	20090601	20090601	20090601	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	1	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00618	Evt02033	Evt02032	Evt01514	Event Number
2009 Execution of Edwin Dyer	Death | Inland an, Philippines | 2009 0611	2009 Firefight w/ PNP in Inland an (6/11)	2009 Failed Attempt to Attack Army Recruiting Center (KY)	Event Name
20090615	20090614	20090611	20090601	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	1	Attack
1	0	N/A	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	6	10	1	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt00064	2009 Ambush of Algerian Police	20090617	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	20	Un	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt02199	2009 Firefight w/ AFP in Guindulungan	20090618	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	N/A	N/A	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Evt02200	Death | Guindulungan, Philippines | 20090618	20090618	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt02031	2009 Firefight w/ AFP in Jolo (6/21)	20090621	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	N/A	N/A	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Evt01652	Arrest | Cilacap, Java, Indonesia | 20090621	20090621	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Evt02063	Evt02177	Evt01261	Evt01355	Event Number
2009 Bomb ings in Cotab ato City	Suici de in Priso n	Libya | 2009 0702	Kidna pping Atte mpt/ Murd er of Saudi Hunte rs	2009 Najib ullah Zazi NYC Subw ay Plot	Event Name
20090705	20090702	20090702	20090702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	3	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	2	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	6	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02026	Evt02027	Evt02028	Evt02029	Evt02064	Event Number
Arrest	2009 Bomb	2009 Car	2009 Bomb	Arrest	Event Name
20090709	20090707	20090707	20090706	20090705	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	1	0	Attack
0	2	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	27	9	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
6	1	N/A	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01401	Evt01476	Evt00420	Evt02092	Event Number
Arrest | Sabzi Mandi, Pakistan | 7/15/2009	2009 Plot to Assassinate Indonesian President Yudhoyono	2009 Attack on Malian Army Convoy	Arrest | Shahjalalpur, Bangladesh | 2009 0710	Event Name
20090715	20090715	20090711	20090710	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	1	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	28	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	6	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01669	Evt02185	Evt01618	Evt01861	Evt01472	Event Number
Arrest | Jakarta, Indonesia | 2009 0805	2009 MILF Ceasefire	Arrest | | 2009 0722	Death | Jakarta, Indonesia | 2009 0717	2009 Jakarta Marriott/Ritz Carlton Bombings	Event Name
20090805	20090725	20090722	20090717	20090717	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	8	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	53	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	2	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01953	Evt01863	Evt01862	Event Number
Arrest | North West Frontier Province, Pakistan | 2009 0808	Death | Jatiasih, Bekasi, Indonesia | 2009 0808	Death | Temanggung, Indonesia | 2009 0807	Event Name
20090808	20090808	20090807	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	1	1	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0			Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01677	Evt02599	Evt01864	Evt02593	Event Number
Arrest | Kuningan, Java, Indonesia | 2009 0817	Death | | 2009 0815	Death | | 2009 0815	2009 Suicide Bombing Targeting Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef	Event Name
20090817	20090815	20090815	20090815	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	1	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	1	0	Death | KIA
0	1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0			0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	1	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01996	Evt01619	Evt01711	Evt02719	Evt01678	Event Number
Arrest | USA | 20090827	Arrest | | 20090825	Arrest | Pakistan | 20090823	Arrest | Mohammand, Pakistan | 20090818	Arrest | Kuningan, Java, Indonesia | 20090818	Event Name
20090827	20090825	20090823	20090818	20090818	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02759	Evt02760	Evt02213	Event Number
Death — North Wazir istan, Pakist an — 2009 0914	False Report of Death — North Wazir istan, Pakist an — 2009 0907	Arrest — Midsayap, North Cotabato, Philippines — 2009 0905	Event Name
20090914	20090907	20090905	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
1	1	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
1	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	1	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01657	Evt02165	Evt01866	Evt01865	Evt01532	Event Number
Arrest | Delhi, India | 2009 0919	2009 Firefight w/ Detachment 88 (Solo)	Death | Solo, Indonesia | 2009 0917	Death | Baraawe, Somalia | 2009 0915	2009 Suicide de Bombings against Peacekeepers in Mogadishu	Event Name
20090919	20090917	20090917	20090915	20090915	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0			0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	17	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	6	6	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01731	Evt01520	Evt02310	Evt01672	Event Number
Arrest	2009 Plot to Bomb Federal Buildings in Springfield, IL	Arrest	Arrest	Event Name
20090923	20090923	20090920	20090919	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	1	0	0	Plot
0	1	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	4	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02023	Evt02022	Evt02093	Evt01655	Evt01521	Event Number
2009 0927 — — Sulu, Philippines — — Death	2009 Firefight w/ Police in Sulu	Arrest — 2008 0924 — — Mumbai, India	Arrest — 2009 0924 — — Dallas, TX	2009 Plot to Bomb Fountain Skyscraper in Dallas, TX	Event Name
20090927	20090927	20090924	20090924	20090924	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	0	0	Attack
0	N/A	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	N/A	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	1	5	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02016	Evt01293	Evt02025	Evt02021	Evt02024	Event Number
2009 Bomb ing of Talat ak Bridg e	2009 Raid on Pakist ani Army HQ	2009 Road side Bomb ing in Jolo	2009 Bomb ing of Polic e Outp ost in Patik ul	Arres t	Sulu, Philip pines	2009 0927	Event Name
20091002	20091001	20090930	20090929	20090927	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	0	Attack
0	10	3	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	2	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	1	1	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02920	Evt02919	Evt01649	Evt01555	Event Number
2009 Plot Against Unspecified Saudi Targets	Death | Jizan, Saudi Arabia | 2009 1005	Arrest | Chicago, IL | 2009 1003	2009 Plot to Attack Danish Publishers of Mohammed Cartoons	Event Name
20091005	20091005	20091003	20091003	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	1	15	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02187	Evt02725	Evt02168	Evt02167	Event Number
2009 Kidnapping of Fr. Michael Simmett	2009 Attack on Pakistani Army HQ in Rawalpindi	Firefight w/ Detachment 88 (Banten)	Death | Ciputat, Banten, Indonesia | 2009 1009	Event Name
20091011	20091010	20091009	20091009	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	0	Attack
0	10	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	Un	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	1	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
9	1	2	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02604	Evt02018	Evt00262	Evt00435	Event Number
2009 Attacks on Police Targets in Lahore	2009 Bombing of Cell Tower in Indian	Arrest	Milan, Italy	10/12/2009	2009 Attempted Suicide Bombing of Italian Army Barracks	Event Name
20091015	20091014	20091012	20091012	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	0	1	Attack
26	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	1	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02020	Evt02019	Evt02017	Evt02010	Evt02605	Event Number
2009 Road side Bomb ing in Zamb oanga	2009 Bomb ing of Cell Towe r in Paran g	2009 Bomb ing of Lagto h Bridg e	2009 Kidna pping of Teach er Gabri el Caniz ares	2009 Suici de Bomb ing of Polic e Statio n in Kohat	Event Name
20091021	20091018	20091017	20091015	20091015	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	1	1	1	1	Attack
1	0	0	1	8	Attack | Killed
2	0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	1	1	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	N/A	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00314	Evt01475	Evt02555	Evt02015	Event Number
Arrest | Santa Pola, Spain | 11/7/2009	2009 Assassination Attempt of German Red Cross Worker	2009 Fort Hood Shooting	2009 Bombing of Tang an-Tang an Bridge	Event Name
20091107	20091106	20091105	20091022	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	1	Attack
0	0	10	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	29	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00710	Evt01706	Evt02594	Evt02014	Event Number
2009 Kidnapping of Pierre Camatte	Arrest | Nigeria | 2009 1115	2009 Ambush of Yemeni Security Officers and Body guards	2009 Kidnapping of Plywood Factory Employees in Basilan	Event Name
20091126	20091115	20091115	20091110	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
1	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	Un	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	Un	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02176	Evt00315	Evt02240	Evt00712	Event Number
False Report of Death | North Waziristan, Pakistan | 2009 1211	Arrest | Sargodha, Pakistan | 12/9/2009	Death | Spalga, North Waziristan, Pakistan | 2009 1208	2009 Kidnapping of Spanish Aid Workers	Event Name
20091211	20091209	20091208	20091129	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	1	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
1	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	6	1	3	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01658	Evt01268	Evt01951	Evt00709	Event Number
Arrest | Detroit, MI | 2009 1225	2009 Failed 'Underpants' Bombing Christmas Day	Release from Detention | Barcelona, Spain | 2009 1218	2009 Kidnapping of Italian Tourists	Event Name
20091225	20091225	20091218	20091218	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	1	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	1	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	4	1	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01867	Evt01580	Evt02179	Event Number
Death | Khost, Afghanistan | 20091230	2009 Suicide Bombing of U.S. Base in Afghanistan (Double Agent Bombing)	2010 Prohibition Against MILF Participation in Philippine Elections	Event Name
20091230	20091230	20091229	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	0	Attack
0	7	0	Attack | Killed
0	6	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02252	Evt02614	Evt01718	Evt02917	Event Number
False Report of Death — North Waziristan, Pakistan — 2010 0114	Death — Wazir — Pakistan — 2010 0109	Arrest — Queens, NY — 2010 0108	Arrest — Spain — 2010 0107	Event Name
20100114	20100109	20100108	20100107	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	1	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
1		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01744	Evt01868	Evt02556	Evt02722	Event Number
Arrest | Yemen | 20100115	Death | Yatama, Yemen | 20100115	Death | al-Jouf, Yemen | 20100115	False Report of Death | North Waziristan, Pakistan | 20100114	Event Name
20100115	20100115	20100115	20100114	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	1	1	Death
0	0	#	0	Death | Accident
0	0	#	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	#	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	1	#	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	#	0	Death | KIA
0	0	#	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	#	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	#	0	Death| Executed by State
0		#	1	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	#	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	4	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02209	Evt02208	Evt02013	Evt01952	Event Number
Arrest | Ipil, Zamboanga, Philippines | 20100207	2010 Kidnapping of Fisherman/ Ex-Soldier	2010 Kidnapping of Road Workers in Sulu	Release from Detention | Sargodha, Pakistan | 20100115	Event Name
20100207	20100206	20100205	20100115	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	1	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	1	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	3	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01675	Evt01626	Evt02248	Evt02123	Event Number
Arrest | Kansas City, MO | 20100215	Arrest | Aceh, Indonesia | 20100215	2010 Firefight w/ AFP in Maimbung, Sulu	2010 Bombing of German Baker Pune	Event Name
20100215	20100215	20100215	20100213	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	N/A	17	Attack | Killed
0	0	N/A	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	10	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02012	Evt02768	Evt02698	Evt02697	Event Number
Arrest | Manila, Philippines | 20100219	Death | Dandaray Darpakhel, Pakistan | 20100218	2010 Deportation to Algeria	Release from Detention | Guantanamo Bay, Cuba | 20100215?	Event Name
20100219	20100218	20100215	20100215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	1	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	1	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01671	Evt02247	Evt02305	Evt02005	Event Number
Arrest | Jantho, Aceh Besar, Indonesia | 20100222	Death | Maimbung, Sulu, Philippines | 20100221	20100221 Firefights w/ AFP in Jolo	Arrest | Indanan, Sulu, Philippines | 20100220	Event Name
20100222	20100221	20100221	20100220	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02249	Evt02769	Evt02011	Evt02009	Event Number
2010 0303 — Philip pines — Tagui g City, Arres t	2010 0224 — Pakist an — Darpa khel, Dand ay — Death	2010 0223 — Philip pines — Sulu, Patik ul, — Death	2010 Firefi ghte w/ AFP in Sulu	Event Name
20100303	20100224	20100223	20100223	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	1	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0			0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	1	Attack
0	0	0	N/A	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	N/A	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	1	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01869	Evt02938	Evt01670	Evt02223	Evt02715	Event Number
Death | — | Jakarta, Indonesia | 20100309	False Report of Death | Arrest | Karachi, Pakistan | 20100308	Arrest | Jakarta, Indonesia | 20100306	Arrest | India-Nepal Border | 20100305	Death | Swat Valley, Pakistan | 20100305	Event Name
20100309	20100308	20100306	20100305	20100305	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
1	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	N/A	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01627	Evt01620	Evt01871	Evt01523	Evt01870	Event Number
Arrest | Aceh, Indonesia | 20100312	Arrest | | 20100312	Death | Aceh, Indonesia | 20100312	Nascent Plant to Bomb American Amer Stadiums (Soldier Field?)	Death | Pamulang, Indonesia | 20100309	Event Name
20100312	20100312	20100312	20100311	20100309	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01732	Evt01621	Evt01625	Evt02004	Evt02250	Event Number
Arrest | Sumedang, Java, Indonesia | 20100319	Arrest | Indonesia | 20100319	Arrest | Aceh Besar, Indonesia | 20100318	Arrest | Zamboanga City, Philippines | 20100317	2010 Plot to Bomb Metro Manila	Event Name
20100319	20100319	20100318	20100317	20100315	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	4	No. Functional Interactions

Evt00659	Evt01650	Evt02308	Evt01623	Evt01622	Event Number
2010 Gunfi ght w/ Alger ian Army	Arres t	Chica go, IL	2010 0327	2010 Firefi ght w/ AFP at Patik ul-area Camp	Arres t | | 2010 0323	Arres t | | 2010 0320	Event Name
20100328	20100327	20100326	20100323	20100320	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	0	0	Attack
1	0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	N/A	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02210	Evt01872	Evt01698	Evt02948	Evt01415	Event Number
2010 Kidna pping of Busin esswo man Nena Tore moch a	Death | Aceh Besar | Indon esia | 2010 0412	Arres t | Meda n, Indon esia | 2010 0411	Death | Yeme n | 2010 0405?	Arres t | Kamp ala, Ugan da | 4/201 0	Event Name
20100412	20100412	20100411	20100405	20100401	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	6	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01579	Evt02884	Evt02764	Evt02780	Evt00708	Event Number
2010 Time Squar e Attac k	Arres t | Tikrit , Iraq | | 2010 0418	Death | Tikrit , Iraq | | 2010 0418	2010 Kidna pping of Col. Imam (For mer ISI Offic er)	2010 Kidna pping of ISI Offic ers and Journ alist	Event Name
20100501	20100418	20100418	20100415	20100415	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	1	Attack
0	0	0	0	1	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	1	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
5	2	2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02307	Evt02615	Evt01873	Evt00893	Evt01717	Event Number
2010 Firefi ght w/ AFP in Sulu	Death | Boya, Pakist an | 2010 0521	Death | North Wazir istan, Pakist an | 2010 0515	2010 Murd er of Khali d Khaw aja	Arres t | Quee ns, New York | 2010 0503	Event Name
20100604	20100521	20100515	20100515	20100503	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	1	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0			0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	0	Attack
N/A	0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
N/A	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01526	Evt02300	Evt01899	Evt02306	Event Number
2010 Plot to Bomb DC Metro rail	2010 Plot to Use Mumbai-Style Tactics in Europe	Alleged 2010 Plot to Attack Non-Specified Targets in India	Death — 2010 0604 — Sulu, Philippines	Event Name
20100702	20100702	20100702	20100604	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	1	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
1	1	1	0	Plot
1	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	1	1	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	1	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	3	4	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt01270	Evt02243	Evt02242	Evt01271	Evt02160	Event Number
2010 Kampala Bombings	Arrest | Germany | 20100708	Arrest | May | 2010 0708, Norway | Oslo,	2010 Plot to Bomb Undisclosed Kenyan Targets	2010 Plot to Kidnap Oil Executives	Event Name
20100711	20100708	20100708	20100702	20100702	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	1	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	1	1	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
74	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
70	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
23	1	2	1	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02188	Evt02003	Evt02301	Evt02159	Event Number
2010 Rido b/w Maguindanao Clans (MILF v. MILF Fighting)	Arrest | 2010 0728 | Philippines City, Zamboanga	Arrest | Afghanistan | 2010 0715	Release from Detention | Indonesia | 2010 0715	Event Name
20100801	20100728	20100715	20100715	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02140	Evt01719	Evt02002	Evt02214	Event Number
Death | Zamboanga | Philippines | 20100805	Arrest | Rochester, MN | 20100805	2010 Suicide Bombing of Zamboanga Airport	Arrest | Complaint Valle Philippines | 20100802	Event Name
20100805	20100805	20100805	20100802	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
1	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
1	0	0	0	Death | KIA
1	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	1	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	24	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	2	5	1	No. Functional Interactions

Event Number	Event Name	Event Date	Sub-Event	Training	Death	Death | Accident	Death | Natural Causes	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike	Death | KIA	Death | Suicide	Death | Foul Play	Death| Executed by State	Death | False Report of Death	Death | Means Unknown	Arrest/Detention	Release from Detention	Escape	Deportation	Hajj Pilgrimage	Lodging/Travel	Wedding/Celebration	Paintball	Non-Terrorist Crime	Radicalization	Fatwa/Decree	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction	Plot	Plot | FBI Sting	Plot | Interrupted	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted	Plot | Nascent	Plot | Developed	Plot | Threat/Hoax	Attack	Attack | Killed	Attack | Injured	Tactic | CBRN	Tactic | Armed Assault	Tactic | Firefight	Tactic | Assassination	Tactic | Bombing	Tactic | Suicide Operation	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted	Tactic | Hijacking	Tactic | Hostage Taking	Tactic | Unarmed Assault	Tactic | Unknown	No. Functional Interactions
Evt02922	Arrest | West Java, Indonesia | 20100809	20100809	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt02157	2010 Robbery of CIMB Niaga bank in Medan	20100815	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Evt02143	Arrest | Eastleigh, Kenya | 20100822	20100822	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Evt01287	2010 Plot to Bomb Kampala for a Second Time	20100901	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Evt02726	2010 Bombing of Shiites in Quetta	20100903	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	73	206	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Evt01874	Evt01402	Evt01985	Evt02122	Evt02121	Event Number
2010 Kidnapping of European Tourists in Niger	Arrest	Arrest	Arrest	Arrest	Event Name
20100916	20100915	20100912	20100907	20100907	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
1	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
1	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	3	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02158	Evt02156	Evt01634	Evt02602	Evt02071	Event Number
2010 Plot to Break Out of Toni Togar Prison	Arrest	Arrest	Surrender	Release from Detention	Event Name
20101013	20101013	20101008	20100925	20100925	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	1	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	1	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	1	9	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02779	Evt00158	Evt02222	Evt02598	Evt02727	Event Number
Arrest | Peshawar, Pakistan | 2010 1210	Arrest | Geona, IL | 12/8/2010	2010 Varanasi Bombing	Remote-Bomb Cargo Plane Flights in Flight	2010 Plot to Arrest | Orakzai, Pakistan | 2010 1023	Event Name
20101210	20101208	20101207	20101029	20101023	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	1	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	1	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	#	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	1	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02871	Evt02872	Evt02211	Evt02877	Evt02876	Event Number
Arres t | Cardi ff, Wale s | 2010 1220	Arres t | Stoke -on- Trent, Engla nd | 2010 1220	2010 Kidna pping of Nurse Maria Chris Sogra diel Cuart ocruz	Death | Stock holm, Swed en | 2010 1211	2010 Stock holm Bomb ing	Event Name
20101220	20101220	20101214	20101211	20101211	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	1	0	Death
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	1	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	1	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0		0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	1	Attack
0	0	1	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	2	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
3	4	1	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02737	Evt02220	Evt02874	Evt02873	Event Number
2011 Suici de Attac ks on Shiite s Durin g Ashur a (Laho re)	Death ? | Gulsh an Iqbal, Pakist an | 2011 0105	2010 Plot to Attac k Lond on Land marks at Christ mas	Arres t | Lond on, Engla nd | 2010 1220	Event Name
20110125	20110105	20101221	20101220	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	1	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	1	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	0	Attack
10	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
Un	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
1	0	1	0	Tactic | Bombing
1	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	N/A	9	2	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02781	Evt02180	Evt02738	Event Number
2011 Execution of Col. Imam (Former ISI Officer)	2011 Resumption of Talks b/w MILF and Philippine Gov't	2011 Suicide Attacks on Shiite Mourning Ashura (Karachi)	Event Name
20110215	20110208	20110125	Event Date
1	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	1	Attack
1	0	3	Attack | Killed
0	0	Un	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
1	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	1	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	1	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
2	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02067	Evt02875	Evt02001	Evt01691	Evt02782	Event Number
Arrest | Pakistan | 20110317	Arrest | Glasgow, Scotland | 20110308	2011 Kidnapping of Rolando de La Cruz	Arrest | Lubbock, TX | 20110223	Death | North Waziristan, Pakistan | 20110215	Event Name
20110317	20110308	20110307	20110223	20110215	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	1	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	1	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0		Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	3	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02246	Evt02690	Evt02000	Evt02686	Event Number
Arrest | Isulan, Sulta n Kudarat, Mindanao, Philippines | 20110412	Arrest | Egypt | 20110320	2011 Kidnapping of Fishermen near Sulu	Release from Detention | Egypt | 20110317	Event Name
20110412	20110320	20110319	20110317	Event Date
0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	1	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	1	0	Attack
0	0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	1	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	3	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02934	Evt02763	Evt02762	Evt02044	Evt02162	Event Number
2011 Armed Assault on Pakistan's Mehran Naval Base	Arrest	Death	2011 Firefight w/ AFP in Basilan	Arrest	Event Name
20110522	20110505	20110502	20110416	20110415	Event Date
0	0	0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	0	0	Training
0	0	1	0	0	Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	1	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	0	0	Death | KIA
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0		0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
0	1	0	0	1	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
1	0	0	1	0	Attack
18	0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Killed
16	0	0	N/A	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
1	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	1	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
1	1	3	1	1	No. Functional Interactions

Evt02922	Evt02921	Evt02933	Event Number
Arrest | Quetta, Pakistan | 20110905	Death? | Afghanistan-Pakistan Border | 20110822	Death | Lamma, Pakistan | 20110603	Event Name
20110905	20110822	20110603	Event Date
0	0	0	Sub-Event
0	0	0	Training
0	1	1	Death
0	0	0	Death | Accident
0	0	0	Death | Natural Causes
0	0	0	Death | Police/Military 'Encounter'
0	1	1	Death | Missile/Bomb Strike
0	0	1	Death | KIA
0	0	0	Death | Suicide
0	0	0	Death | Foul Play
0	0	0	Death| Executed by State
0	0	0	Death | False Report of Death
0	0	0	Death | Means Unknown
1	0	0	Arrest/Detention
0	0	0	Release from Detention
0	0	0	Escape
0	0	0	Deportation
0	0	0	Hajj Pilgrimage
0	0	0	Lodging/Travel
0	0	0	Wedding/Celebration
0	0	0	Paintball
0	0	0	Non-Terrorist Crime
0	0	0	Radicalization
0	0	0	Fatwa/Decree
0	0	0	Large-ScaleMilitaryAction
0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	Plot | FBI Sting
0	0	0	Plot | Interrupted
0	0	0	Plot | Abandoned/Aborted
0	0	0	Plot | Nascent
0	0	0	Plot | Developed
0	0	0	Plot | Threat/Hoax
0	0	0	Attack
0	0	0	Attack | Killed
0	0	0	Attack | Injured
0	0	0	Tactic | CBRN
0	0	0	Tactic | Armed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Firefight
0	0	0	Tactic | Assassination
0	0	0	Tactic | Bombing
0	0	0	Tactic | Suicide Operation
0	0	0	Tactic | Infrastructure Targeted
0	0	0	Tactic | Hijacking
0	0	0	Tactic | Hostage Taking
0	0	0	Tactic | Unarmed Assault
0	0	0	Tactic | Unknown
N/A	N/A	1	No. Functional Interactions

APPENDIX F: LIST OF EVENTS DIVIDED BY BALEIAN CATEGORY AND ORDERED BY YEAR

A Note on interpretation: Although the numbers included in the tables below have the appeal of hard statistics, cautious interpretation is vital. Aside from the obvious impact that incomplete data has on the grouping process that underlies this statistical estimate, the numbers may sometimes understate organization's involvement by excluding indirect support. Individuals involved in the Islamist extremist movement often assist other *jihadists* without knowing the exact purpose of their help. In large part, this ignorance is willful and deliberate, since it prevents logistical supporters on the periphery of an attack from providing authorities with information that might compromise an operation. However, this safeguard also obfuscates historical studies of terrorism; it is sometimes impossible to pair monies and materiel to specific attacks even after events enter the open-source record. Consequently, some important participants in terror attacks may remain two steps removed from an incident, and the tables above may understate the involvement of some organizations in events.

Issues of scale also complicate efforts to estimate organizational responsibility for attacks, especially as they pertain to the finance of terrorism. Although monetary transactions vary greatly in their amount, the estimative process treats all interactions as equal. For example, the model treats KSM's negligible financing of his nephew Ramzi Yousef's 1993 attack on the World Trade Center—KSM wired 660 USD into an account used by the conspirators[1178]—as identical to the tens of thousands of dollars that KSM helped to funnel to the 9/11 attackers to support their training and living expenses in the U.S.[1179] Metrics for evaluating the scale of operational ties to an attack are less clear, because it is, for example, debatable whether an attack planner or the triggerman who detonated a blast played a greater role, but regardless of the actual answer, the weight of operational interactions certainly varies in ways that the estimate does not take into account. Unfortunately, ambiguities inherent to the field of terrorism research prevent these scaling issues from being adequately resolved, because the true financial cost of terror attacks is rarely, if ever, known, and the total

[1178] Chitra Ragavan, Nacy L. Bentrup, Ann M. Wakefield, Shelia Thalhimer, and Monica m. Ekman, "Tracing terror's roots," U.S. News and World Report, February 24, 2003; Terry Mcdermott, "The mastermind; Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the making of 9/11," The New Yorker, September 13, 2010; 9/11 Commission Report.
[1179] 9/11 Commission Report

weight and number of individual‘s operational interactions can only be partially reconstructed, even when using the best sources available.

In the end, the estimates of operational involvement should be read in broad terms. There is a substantial difference between al-Qaida‘s 43.33 percent involvement in the 1997 Luxor Massacre, in which armed gunmen targeted tourists visiting Egyptian historical sites, and the organization‘s total responsibility for the following year‘s bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. However, there is little reason to assume that al-Qaida‘s 38.89 percent involvement in the 2001 plot against the U.S. Embassy in Paris indicates substantially more organizational responsibility than the terror group‘s 37.5 percent involvement in the same year‘s bombing of the Atrium Mall in Jakarta, irrespective of the Paris plot‘s 1.39 percentage edge. Simply put, this estimate cannot be approached in the same way as more familiar statistics derived from physical measurements or economic data.

Small values are not, however, always irrelevant. They may indicate organizations that provided indirect support by virtue of shared members, or, in the case of the Taliban, by providing the physical sanctuary necessary to prepare for events in lands far removed from the actual attack. Moreover, small values can indicate organizations that merit close monitoring, because they may share additional ties not yet in evidence. Finally, when small values appear alongside an unexpected partner organization, it may indicate burgeoning organizational partnerships that herald future patterns of functional cooperation, especially when these measurements occurred in years that only recently drew to a close.

Table 10.6 Comprehensive Listing of Events in the First Baleian Category

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Interactions
1	Evt01263	1990 Murder of Egpytian Parliament Speaker Rifaat al-Mahgoub	1990	0	1	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
1	Evt00415	1993 Attack on Hotel Housing U.S. Servicemen	1993	0	1	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
1	Evt00049	1994 Aborted Plot to Bomb US Embassy in Riyadh	1994	1	0	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
1	Evt01223	1994 Truck Bombing in Riyadh	1994	0	1	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
1	Evt01361	1994 Plot Against Western Targets in Senegal	1994	1	0	70.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	30.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	5

1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	BaleCat
Evt01373	Evt00465	Evt00933	Evt00972	Evt00478	Evt01426	Evt00935	Evt01358	Event ID
1998 Plot to Use Stinger Missil	1995 Bojinka Plot	1995 Plot to Assassinate Pope John Paul II	1994 Plot to Bomb Israeli Embassy in Bangkok	1994 Bombing of a Theater	1994 Plot Against U.S. Cargo Planes	1994 Plot to Assassinate President Clinton	1994 Plot Against Djibouti	Event Name
1998	1995	1995	1994	1994	1994	1994	1994	Event Year
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Attack
50.00	55.56	50.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	50.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	44.44	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
3	18	3	1	2	2	5	2	Total Interactions

1	1	1	1	1	1	1		BaleCat
Evt01347	Evt01318	Evt01225	Evt01363	Evt01262	Evt00009	Evt00015		Event ID
2001 Plot to Bomb Israeli Embassy in India.	2001 Plot to Bomb the Panama Canal	2000 U.S.S. Cole Attack	2000 Plot Against U.S.S. The Sullivans	1999 Moscow Bombings	1998 Embassy Attacks (Nairobi)	1998 Embassy Attack (Dar)	Against US Military Targets in Saudi Arabia	Event Name
2001	2001	2000	2000	1999	1998	1998		Event Year
1	1	0	1	0	0	0		Plot
0	0	1	0	1	1	1		Attack
75.00	75.00	75.67	100.00	100.00	91.07	100.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	3.00	0.00	0.00	8.93	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
25.00	25.00	13.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	3.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	0.00	4.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
4	4	25	1	1	28	14		Total Interactions

1	1	1	1	1		BaleCat
Evt01323	Evt00978	Evt00494	Evt02801	Evt00550		Event ID
Plot to Bomb Thai Night clubs Catering to Western (Date Unknown)	2002 Plot to Bomb U.S. Navy Ships in Straights of Gibraltar	2002 Bombing of Tunisian Synagogue	2002 Bomb Plot Against Interim Karzai Govt	2002 Bombing/Murder	2002 Daniel Pearl Kidnapping; Azerbaijan, the Philippines, and Australia	Event Name
2002	2002	2002	2002	2002		Event Year
1	1	0	1	0		Plot
0	0	1	0	1		Attack
50.00	75.00	91.67	50.00	76.92		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
50.00	0.00	8.33	0.00	3.85		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	19.23		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	25.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
4	4	6	1	13		Total Interactions

1	1	1	1	1	BaleCat
Evt01367	Evt02799	Evt02936	Evt02937	Evt01386	Event ID
2002 Attack on French Oil Tanker Merchant Vessel Limb	2002 Assassination Attempt on Hamid Karzai	2002 Plot to Attack U.S. Naval Vessels/Oil Tankers in Straights of Gibraltar	2002 Plot to Attack Ships in the Straights of Hormuz	2002 Plot to Kidnap Westerm Aid Workers in Hargeysa	Event Name
2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	Event Year
0	0	1	1	1	Plot
1	1	0	0	0	Attack
60.00	50.00	50.00	75.00	100.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	50.00	25.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
40.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
5	1	1	2	1	Total Interactions

1	1	1	1	1	1		BaleCat
Evt01264	Evt01265	Evt02805	Evt01374	Evt00486	Evt01315		Event ID
2002 Suicide Bombing of Paradise	2002 Attempt to Shoot-Down Israeli Airliner	2002 Missile Attack on Kabul's Main Power Station	2002 Plot to Crash a Small Plane Into a Military Vessel	2002 Bombing of Philippine Consulate	2002 Filika Island Attack on U.S. Marines	urg	Event Name
2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002		Event Year
0	0	0	1	0	0		Plot
1	1	1	0	1	1		Attack
86.84	92.86	50.00	100.00	50.00	50.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
2.63	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	16.67		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
10.53	7.14	0.00	0.00	0.00	33.33		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
19	14	1	2	1	3		Total Interactions

1	1	1	1		BaleCat
Evt01524	Evt01536	Evt01375	Evt01378		Event ID
2003 Nascent Plot to Assassinate	2003 Nascent Plot to Bomb Hotels/Cruise Ships in Mombasa (Follow-up to Kikambala)	2003 Plot to Attack US Housing Compound in Saudi Arabai	2003 Suicide Bombing of Western Compounds in Riyadh	2003 Suicide Hotel (Mombasa-Kikambala)	Event Name
2003	2003	2003	2003		Event Year
1	1	1	0		Plot
0	0	0	1		Attack
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
2	4	1	20		Total Interactions

1	1	1	1	1		BaleCat
Evt01368	Evt01314	Evt01351	Evt01385	Evt01275		Event ID
2003 Karachi Plot Against US Consulate, Western Residences, and Airport	2003 Plot to Attach U.S. Naval Vessels in Djibouti (Date Unknown)	2003 Istanbul Bombings	2003 Plot to Shoot Down Ethiopian Jetliner in Somalia	2003 Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy in Nairobi	Presidente George W. Bush	Event Name
2003	2003	2003	2003	2003		Event Year
1	1	0	1	1		Plot
0	0	1	0	0		Attack
66.67	71.43	75.93	100.00	100.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	28.57	9.26	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	5.56	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	3.70	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
33.33	0.00	5.56	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
3	7	18	1	3		Total Interactions

1	1	1	1	1	1	BaleCat
Evt00407	Evt00406	Evt02588	Evt02336	Evt01350	Evt01348	Event ID
12/25/2003 Assassination Attempt on Pervez Musharraf	12/14/2003 Assassination Attempt on Pervez Musharraf	2003 Car Bombing of Shiite Mosque in Najaf	2003 Bombing of Embassy in Baghdad	2003-2004 Plot to Attack American Target in South Korea	2003 Plot to Bomb El-Al Flight Leaving Bangkok	Event Name
2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	Event Year
0	0	0	0	1	1	Plot
1	1	1	1	0	0	Attack
63.89	63.89	100.00	100.00	50.00	50.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
8.33	8.33	0.00	0.00	50.00	50.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
5.56	5.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
5.56	5.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
16.67	16.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
6	6	1	1	2	2	Total Interactions

1	1	1	1	1		BaleCat
Evt01224	Evt02323	Evt02322	Evt02559	Evt00425		Event ID
2004 Truck - Bombing of Algerian Electrical	2004 Suicide Bombing of Ezzedinne Slaim (President of Iraqi Governing Council)	2004 Kidnapping/Beheading of American Nicholas Berg	2004 Weapons Against Jordan Plot to Use Chem	2004 Attack on Rangers' Van	Mushrraf	Event Name
2004	2004	2004	2004	2004		Event Year
0	0	0	1	0		Plot
1	1	1	0	1		Attack
50.00	100.00	50.00	75.00	50.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	50.00	25.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
1	2	1	2	2		Total Interactions

1	1	1	1	1		BaleCat
Evt01346	Evt02300	Evt01580	Evt01556	Evt02717		Event ID
Plot to Bomb U.S. Emba	2010 Plot to Use Mumbai-Style Tactics in Europe	2009 Suicide Bombing of U.S. Base in Afghanistan (Double Agent Bombing)	2008 Murder of Retired Pakistani General	2008 Kidnapping of Pakistani Police Officers, State Bank Officials, et al	Facility	Event Name
Unkn	2010	2009	2008	2008		Event Year
1	1	0	0	0		Plot
0	0	1	1	1		Attack
50.00	50.00	50.00	100.00	50.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	50.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
3	3	2	2	1		Total Interactions

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Interactions
		ssies in Indonesia, Australia, and Japan (Date Unknown)																																														
1	Evt01353	Plot to Attack NATO HQ in Europe (Date Unknown)	Unkn	1	0	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	3
1	Evt01354	Plot to Attack Kissenger-owned Oil Company (Date Unknown)	Unkn	1	0	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1

Table 10.7 Comprehensive Listing of Events in the Second Baleian Category

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Interactions
2	Evt01485	2000 Plot to Bomb Mall in Columbus, OH	2000	1	0	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	2
2	Evt00945	2001 Plot to attack Klein-Brogel Air Base	2001	1	0	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
2	Evt00922	2001 Plot against U.S. Embassy in Paris	2001	1	0	0.00	97.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.78	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	18
2	Evt01317	2002 Plot to Attack U.S. Naval Vessels/Oil Tankers in Hormuz, Gibralter, and Singapore	2001	1	0	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	5

2	2	2	2	2	2	BaleCat
Evt01371	Evt01322	Evt01320	Evt01085	Evt01369	Evt00042	Event ID
2002-2003 Plot to Smuggle Explosive	2002 Plot Against Heathrow Airport and British Landmarks	2002-2003 Plot Against Suspension Bridges in NYC	2001 Shoe-Bomb Plot	Plot to Poison U.S. Water Supplies (Date Unknown)	2001 Attacks on NYC /DC/ Shanksville (9/11)	Event Name
2002	2002	2002	2001	2001	2001	Event Year
1	1	1	0	1	0	Plot
0	0	0	1	0	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
50.00	70.00	61.11	87.50	83.33	74.42	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.88	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.32	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
27.78	30.00	16.67	12.50	16.67	18.27	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.88	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.49	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
22.22	0.00	22.22	0.00	0.00	1.75	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
9	5	9	4	6	57	Total Interactions

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Interactions
		s into NYC via Textile Shipments																																																
2	Evt00032	2002 Plot to Attack L.A. Using 9/11 Tactics ('Second Wave' of 9/11 Attacks)	2002	1	0	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	43.75	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	16
2	Evt00001	2002 "Dirty Bomb" Plot	2002	1	0	66.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	16.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	33.33	100.00	3
2	Evt02927	2003 Plot to Bomb Reunion Island	2003	1	0	0.00	66.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	33.33	100.00	3
2	Evt01297	2003 Plot to Blow-up Underground Gas Tanks in Balitmore	2003	1	0	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	3

2	2	2	2	2	2	2	BaleCat
Evt01555	Evt01355	Evt02757	Evt01505	Evt00692	Evt00039	Evt00545	Event ID
2008 Plot to Attack Danish	2009 Najibullah Zazi NYC Subway Plot	2008 Plot to Suicide Bomb Barcelona's Subway System	2006 Liquid Bomb Plot Targeting London to US Flights	2005 July 21 London Bomb Plot	2005 London Bombings (7/7)	2004 Crevice Plot	Event Name
2009	2009	2008	2006	2005	2005	2004	Event Year
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
80.00	66.67	50.00	87.50	100.00	100.00	85.71	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
13.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
6.67	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	12.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	33.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	14.29	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
15	6	11	12	9	17	7	Total Interactions

2	2	2	2		BaleCat
Evt01345	Evt01321	Evt01349	Evt01523		Event ID
Plot to Use 9/11-Style Tactics Against Israel (Date Unknown)	Plot Against the Sears Tower (Date Unknown)	Plot to Attack "Deep in Israel" (Date Unknown)	2010 Nascent Plant to Bomb American Stadiums (Sold Field?)	Publishers of Mohammed Cartoons	Event Name
Unkn	Unkn	Unkn	2010		Event Year
1	1	1	1		Plot
0	0	0	0		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
50.00	50.00	83.33	50.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
50.00	50.00	16.67	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
3	2	3	1		Total Interactions

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Interactions
2	Evt01352	Plot to Attack U.S. Nuclear Plants (Date Unknown)	Unkn	1	0	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1

Table 10.8 Comprehensive Listing of Events in the Third Baleian Category

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Interactions
3	Evt00431	1994 Attempt to obtain South African Uranium	1994	1	0	21.43	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	14
3	Evt02688	1994 Failed Attack on Khan al-Khalili Tourist District of Cairo	1994	0	1	25.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	75.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	2

3	3	3	3	3	3	3	BaleCat
Evt00716	Evt00016	Evt00928	Evt01443	Evt00778	Evt02627	Evt02680	Event ID
1999 LAX Millennium Bombing Plot	1999 Millennium Bomb Plot	1999 Jordan	1999 Plot to Assassinate Megawati	1999 Plot in Singapore	1999 Plot Against U.S. Naval Personnel in Singapore Frequented by Sites	1997 Luxor Massacre	1995 Bombing of Egyptian Embassy in Islamabad	1995 Failed Assassination of Mubarak	Event Name
1999	1999	1999	1999	1997	1995	1995	Event Year
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	0	1	1	1	Attack
14.29	32.50	6.25	43.06	46.67	45.83	6.25	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	2.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	5.56	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	46.67	45.83	93.75	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	32.50	68.75	43.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
42.86	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	2.50	0.00	0.00	6.67	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
42.86	30.00	25.00	8.33	0.00	8.33	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
14	10	8	12	5	12	8	Total Interactions

3	3	3	3	3	3	3	BaleCat
Evt00979	Evt00923	Evt00019	Evt00479	Evt00021	Evt00485	Evt02617	Event ID
2001 Plot to Bomb Western	2001 Plot Against US and Israeli Embassis in Manila	2001 Atrium Plaza Bombing	2000 Train Station Bombing of Manila (Rizal Day Bombing)	2000 Christmas Eve Bombings	2000 Philippine Ambassador's Residence Bombing of	2000 Plot Against Sydney Olympics	Event Name
2001	2001	2001	2000	2000	2000	2000	Event Year
1	1	0	0	0	0	1	Plot
0	0	1	1	1	1	0	Attack
25.00	19.44	6.25	9.26	42.72	24.44	33.33	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	40.74	14.18	36.67	33.33	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
70.83	69.44	93.75	40.74	42.72	36.67	33.33	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	9.26	0.00	2.22	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
4.17	11.11	0.00	0.00	0.38	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
24	6	8	18	87	15	1	Total Interactions

3	3	3	3	3	3	3		BaleCat
Evt02807	Evt01453	Evt00026	Evt00963	Evt01376	Evt01564	Evt01563		Event ID
2003 Rock et Attack on ISAF Head quarters in Kabul	2002 Makr asar Bomb ings	2002 Bali Attac ks	2002 Plot to Attac k Weste rn Emba ssies in Phno m Penh	2002 Plot to Attac k Israel	2002 Arson of Kimb all Plaza	2002 Bomb ing Fitma rt	Emba ssies in Singa pore	Event Name
2003	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002		Event Year
0	0	0	1	1	0	0		Plot
1	1	1	0	0	1	1		Attack
16.67	2.38	47.07	11.11	12.50	16.67	6.67		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	95.24	52.56	88.89	12.50	66.67	86.67		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	2.38	0.37	0.00	0.00	16.67	6.67		(MILF)
16.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
16.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	75.00	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
2	14	91	9	4	2	5		Total Interactions

3	3	3	3	3	3	BaleCat
Evt00514	Evt00714	Evt00779	Evt00482	Evt00033	Evt00937	Event ID
2004 Car-bomb ing of Marina Club (Karachi)	2004 Killing of 5 Pakistani Policemen	2004 Attacks Madrid	2004 Bombing of Pakistan Bible Society	2003 Jakarta Marriott Attack	2003 Plot to Attack APEC Summit/ Western Embassies in Thailand/Commercial Airliners	Event Name
2004	2004	2004	2004	2003	2003	Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot
1	1	1	1	1	0	Attack
25.00	11.11	3.13	33.33	11.90	27.78	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	83.33	61.11	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
75.00	88.89	0.00	66.67	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	84.38	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.76	11.11	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	0.00	12.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
4	9	16	3	21	3	Total Interactions

3	3	3	3	3	BaleCat
Evt01461	Evt00035	Evt00920	Evt00413	Evt00483	Event ID
2004 Bombing of Australian Embassy in Jakarta	2004 WMD Plot Against NYSE and other US Financial Targets	2004 Plot against U.S. Consulate in Karachi	2004 Assassination Attempt on Gen. Ahsan Saleem Hayat	2004 Bombing of Pakistan-American Cultural Center	Event Name
2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	Event Year
0	1	1	0	0	Plot
1	0	0	1	1	Attack
2.08	10.00	11.11	7.69	16.67	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
97.92	10.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	88.89	92.31	83.33	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	80.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
24	10	9	13	6	Total Interactions

3	3	3	3	BaleCat
Evt01319	Evt02241	Evt00037	Evt01522	Event ID
Plot to Assassinate President Jimmy Carter and Other Former U.S. Presidents (Date Unknown)	2010 Norway Bomb Plot	2008 Mumbai Attacks	2008 Plot to Bomb Long Island Rail System	Event Name
Unkn	2008	2008	2008	Event Year
1	1	0	1	Plot
0	0	1	0	Attack
33.33	25.00	5.88	33.33	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	33.33	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
33.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	85.29	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	33.33	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
33.33	75.00	8.82	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
3	4	34	1	Total Interactions

Table 10.9 Comprehensive Listing of Events in the Fourth Baleian Category

BaleCat	4	4	4	4	4
Event ID	Evt00008	Evt01305	Evt00930	Evt00973	Evt00004
Event Name	1993 World Trade Center Bombings	1993 Plot to Break El-Sayyid Nosair Out of Attica	1993 Plot to Assassinate Mubarak	1993 Plot to Bomb Jewish Neighborhoods in NYC	1993 Plot against NYC landmarks
Event Year	1993	1993	1993	1993	1993
Plot	0	1	1	1	1
Attack	1	0	0	0	0
AQ Alumni	36.36	33.33	16.67	50.00	1.96
al-Fuqra	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
AQAP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
AQIM	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ARCF	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
ASG	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
BaI	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
D-Company	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
EIJ	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Fatah al Islam	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
GICM	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
GRG	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Haqqani Network	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Hofstad Group	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
HUJI	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
IG	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	94.12
JAM	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
JI	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
JIS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Jundallah	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
LeT/IndMuj	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
LJ	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
MfM	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Palembang	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Raw-9	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
RSM	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
RSRSCBM	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
SaudHizb	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Shabaab	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
SoD	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
TTP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
TQJ	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(Hizballah)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(MILF)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(HIG)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(GIA)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(Taliban)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(HAMAS)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(GAM)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(LeJ)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
(AQI)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Other/Unknown	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.88
Sum	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Total Interactions	22	3	6	2	51

4	4	4	4	4	BaleCat
Evt01965	Evt01995	Evt00427	Evt01963	Evt00925	Event ID
2000 Kidn appi ng of Stud ents/ Teac hers in Sumi sip	1995 Kidn appi ng at Tran kini Falls	1995 Atta ck on U.S. Milit ary/ Aid Miss ion in Saud i Arab ia	1994 Kidn appi ng of Surv eyor s in the Phili ppin es	1993 Plot to Assa ssina te Bena zir Bhut to	Even t Nam e
2000	1995	1995	1994	1993	Event Year
0	0	0	0	1	Plot
1	1	1	1	0	Attack
50.00	50.00	100.00	50.00	42.86	AQ Alumni
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
87.50	100.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	42.86	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
12.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	57.14	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
4	2	1	2	7	Total Interactions

4	4	4	4	4	BaleCat
Evt01767	Evt01757	Evt01445	Evt00987	Evt01772	Event ID
2001 Kidn appi ng at Hosp ital in Lami tan	2001 Kidn appi ng of Tour ists from Dos Palm as Reso rt (Pala wan)	2001 Plot Agai nst Leba r Airb ase	2000 Plot to Mou nt Gas- Atta ck on Euro pean Parli ame nt	2000 Kidn appi ng of Jeffr ey Schil ling	Even t Nam e
2001	2001	2001	2000	2000	Event Year
0	0	1	1	0	Plot
1	1	0	0	1	Attack
25.00	5.88	33.33	100.00	14.29	AQ Alumni
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
4	17	3	2	7	Total Interactions

4	4	4	4	4	4	BaleCat
Evt00517	Evt02237	Evt00786	Evt00975	Evt00988	Evt01447	Event ID
2003 Casablanca Bombing	2003 Changi Airport Plan to Crash Plane into Plaza	2002 McDonald's Attack in Lebanon	2002 Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy in Rome	2001 Plot to Mount Gas-Attack on France	2001 Bombing of Churches in East Jakarta	Event Name
2003	2003	2002	2002	2001	2001	Event Year
0	1	0	1	1	0	Plot
1	0	1	0	0	1	Attack
21.05	100.00	20.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	AQ Alumni
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
92.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
2.63	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
5.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
19	1	5	1	1	1	Total Interactions

4	4	4	4	4		BaleCat
Evt01751	Evt00462	Evt00953	Evt01756	Evt01538		Event ID
2005 Valentine's	2005 Attack	2004 Plot to Attack Spanish National Court Building in Madrid	2004 Plot to Bomb Philippine VP Candidate Lorena Legarda	2003 Assassination of British Teachers (Somalia and Killing)	s	Event Name
2005	2005	2004	2004	2003		Event Year
0	0	1	1	0		Plot
1	1	0	0	1		Attack
33.33	33.33	8.33	50.00	33.33		AQ Alumni
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
3	6	12	2	3		Total Interactions

4	4	4	4	4	4		BaleCat
Evt02191	Evt00036	Evt01467	Evt02543	Evt00423	Evt00526		Event ID
2006 Cotabato Bombings	2006 Mumbai Attacks	2005 Bali Bombings	2005 Attack on USS Cole and USS Ashland and Kearsarge	2005 Attack on Northern Mauritanian LNG Army Company Camp	2005 Chleff Attack	Day Bombing	Event Name
2006	2006	2005	2005	2005	2005		Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	0		Plot
1	1	1	1	1	1		Attack
33.33	20.69	27.27	20.00	16.67	33.33		AQ Alumni
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	16.67	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	93.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	6.90	0.00	100.00	83.33	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
3	29	11	5	6	6		Total Interactions

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ Alumni	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Interactions
4	Evt02708	2007 Suicide Attack on Bagram Air Base During Cheney's Visit	2007	0	1	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	2
4	Evt02245	2007 Non-specific Plot to Attack Americans Abroad Using WMD	2007	1	0	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	1
4	Evt01101	2007 Suicide Attacks on Algiers	2007	0	1	50.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	2
4	Evt02144	2007 Assault on Basil Hotel (Mogadishu)	2007	0	1	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
4	Evt02735	2007 Suicide Attack Targeting Paki	2007	0	1	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	1

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ Alumni	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Interactions
		stan's Interior Minister																																																
4	Evt01381	2007 Suicide Bombing of Spanish Tourists in Yemen	2007	0	1	66.67	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	3
4	Evt00404	2007 Assassination Attempt on Benazir Bhutto	2007	0	1	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	2
4	Evt01277	2008 Attack on Pakistani Air Force Base in Sargodha	2008	0	1	33.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	3
4	Evt01292	2008 Assassination of Lt. Gen. Mushtaq Beig	2008	0	1	10.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	48.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	48.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.33	0.00	0.00	100.00	10
4	Evt02771	2008 Suicide Bombing	2008	0	1	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	2

4	4	4	4	4	4		BaleCat
Evt02783	Evt01276	Evt01573	Evt01298	Evt02721	Evt01278		Event ID
2008 Kidn appi ng of Jour nalis	2008 Isla mab ad Marr iott Bom bing	2008 Ahm edab ad Bom bing	2008 Plot to Atta ck NYC Land mark s	2008 Bebe adin g of Afgh an 'Spie s'	2008 Bom bing of Dani sh Emb assy in Isla mab ad	Even t Nam e of US Milit ary Base in Afgh anist an	Event Name
2008	2008	2008	2008	2008	2008		Event Year
0	0	0	1	0	0		Plot
1	1	1	0	1	1		Attack
33.33	50.00	33.33	100.00	100.00	33.33		AQ Alumni
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
83.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	41.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	41.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
16.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	16.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
3	4	6	1	1	3		Total Interactions

4	4	4	4	4		BaleCat
Evt02593	Evt01472	Evt01476	Evt01382	Evt02236		Event ID
2009 Suici de Bom bing	2009 Jakar ta Marr iot/ Rtiz Carlt on Bom bing s	2009 Plot to Assa ssina te Indo nesia n Presi dent Yud hoyo no	2009 Kidn appi ng of Ger man and Briti sh Nati onals in Yem en	2009 Nasc ent Plot to Atta ck Mala ysia	t Davi d Roh de	Even t Nam e
2009	2009	2009	2009	2009		Event Year
0	0	1	0	1		Plot
1	1	0	1	0		Attack
50.00	15.38	33.33	100.00	100.00		AQ Alumni
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	84.62	100.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	15.38	0.00	0.00	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
2	13	6	1	1		Total Interactions

4	4	4	4		BaleCat
Evt01899	Evt01271	Evt02250	Evt01268		Event ID
2010 Alleged Plot to Attack Non-Specified Indian Targets	2010 Plot to Bomb Kenyan Targets	2010 Plot to Bomb Metro Manila	2009 Christmas Day Underpants' Bomb Plot	Targeting Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef	Event Name
2010	2010	2010	2009		Event Year
1	1	1	0		Plot
0	0	0	1		Attack
50.00	100.00	25.00	25.00		AQ Alumni
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
4	1	4	4		Total Interactions

4	4	4	4	BaleCat
Evt02874	Evt02598	Evt01270	Evt02160	Event ID
2010 Plot to Attack London Landmarks at Christmas	2010 Plot to Remote-Bomb Cargo Planes in Flight	2010 Kampala Bombings	2010 Plot to Kidnap Oil Executives	Event Name
2010	2010	2010	2010	Event Year
1	1	0	1	Plot
0	0	1	0	Attack
11.11	33.33	4.35	50.00	AQ Alumni
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
9	3	23	2	Total Interactions

Table 10.10 Comprehensive Listing of Events in the Fifth Baleian Category

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeI)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Interactions
5	Evt00473	1990 Bombing of Greenwich Village Gay Bar	1990	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
5	Evt00895	1990 Murder of Rabei Meyer Kahane	1990	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	2
5	Evt00057	1993 Airline Hijacking in Germany	1993	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
5	Evt01773	1998 Murder of Abdelaziz Fikri (for frequenting prostitutes)	1998	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Interactions
5	Evt00881	1998 Murder of Homosexual	1998	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
5	Evt00966	2000 Plot to Bomb Christmas Market in Strasbourg, France	2000	1	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	11
5	Evt00416	2001 Attack on Indian Parliament	2001	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	10
5	Evt01103	2003 Suicide Bombing in Tel Aviv	2003	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	2
5	Evt00741	2004 Leganes Suicide	2004	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	8
5	Evt01535	2005 Desecration	2005	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	1

5	5	5	5		BaleCat
Evt02567	Evt02649	Evt02152	Evt00957		Event ID
2005 Bombing of Western Hotels	5 Suicide Plot Against Sydney	5 Nascent Plot Against Christian Schools in East Java	5 Plot to Attack Synagogues by Bride Bomber Hardened by Plan	of Italian Colonial Cemetery	Event Name
2005	2005	2005	2005		Event Year
0	1	1	1		Plot
1	0	0	0		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
33.33	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
66.67	100.00	0.00	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
6	3	2	1		Total Interactions

5	5	5	5		BaleCat
Evt01469	Evt01504	Evt01503	Evt01499		Event ID
2007 Aborted /Failed Plan to Rob Chinese-Owned Businesses	2006 Plot to Bomb FBI Building	2005 Plot to Bomb the Sears Tower	2005 Plot to Bomb U.S. Oil Pipelines and Refineries	in Amman	Event Name
2007	2006	2005	2005		Event Year
1	1	1	1		Plot
0	0	0	0		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	100.00	100.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
4	7	3	1		Total Interactions

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Interactions
		in Lampung																																																
5	Evt01516	2006-2007 Plot to Attack Fort Dix	2007	1	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	11
5	Evt02603	2007 Red Mosque Seige	2007	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
5	Evt01470	2007 Plot to Bomb Café in Bukittinggi	2007	1	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	9
5	Evt01295	2007 Assassination of Benazir Bhutto	2007	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	5
5	Evt02714	2008 Suicide Attack on Anti-Taliban Tribal Jerg	2008	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	1

5	5	5	5		BaleCat
Evt01520	Evt01514	Evt01513	Evt01512		Event ID
2009 Plot to Bomb Federal Building	2009 Attack Armory Recruiting Center (KY)	2009 Failed Attempt to Bomb Rabbi's House - Fire	2009 Shooting at Armory Recruiting Station	a	Event Name
2009	2009	2009	2009		Event Year
1	0	0	0		Plot
0	1	1	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
4	1	1	1		Total Interactions

5	5	5	5		BaleCat
Evt02876	Evt01526	Evt02555	Evt01521		Event ID
2010 Stockholm Bombing	2010 Plot to Bomb DC Metrorail	2009 Fort Hood Shooting	2009 Plot to Bomb Fountain Plaza Skyscraper in Dallas, TX	ding s in Springfield, IL	Event Name
2010	2010	2009	2009		Event Year
0	1	0	1		Plot
1	0	1	0		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
1	2	2	5		Total Interactions

Table 10.11 Comprehensive Listing of Events in the Sixth Baleian Category

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MIM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Ints.
6	Evt00927	Plot to Assassinate Gorbachev (Date Unknown--early 1990s?)	1988	1	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
6	Evt00890	1989 Murder of Imam Imad Rashid Khalifa	1989	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	3
6	Evt00897	1991 Murder of Mustafa Shalabi	1991	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
6	Evt00669	1991 Hijacking of Passenger Jet	1991	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	3
6	Evt00969	1991 Plot to Bomb Hindu Religious/Cultural Sites	1991	1	0	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	6
6	Evt00693	6/1992 NYC Bomb Plot	1992	1	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
6	Evt02265	1993 Kidnapping of Nuns Julia Forest	1993	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	2

6	6	6	6	6	6		BaleCat
Evt02857	Evt02689	Evt02945	Evt00698	Evt00405	Evt02281		Event ID
1993 Shooting at Cairo's Continental Hotel	1993 Failed Assassination Attempt on Former Egyptian Prime Minister Atef Sedki	1993 Plot Against U.S. Embassy in Sanaa	1993 Kidnapping of Businessmen and Missionaries	1993 Assassination of Kasdi Merbah	1993 Bombings	1993 Bombay Uribaren	Event Name
1993	1993	1993	1993	1993	1993		Event Year
0	0	1	0	0	0		Plot
1	1	0	1	1	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00		D-Company
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
1	4	1	1	1	21		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt01074	Evt00685	Evt00697	Evt02312	Evt02266	Evt00658	Evt02098	Event ID
1995 Seizure of Hostages at Hospital in Stavropol	1995 Ipil Raid	1994 Kidnapping of Americans & Britons in India	1994 Killing of French Nationals in Algiers	1994 Kidnapping of Fr. Clarence Bertelsman	1993 Grenade Attack on Roman Catholic Church	1993 Bombing of Trains in Mumbai	Event Name
1995	1995	1994	1994	1994	1993	1993	Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	2	2	1	1	4	1	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt01962	Evt00484	Evt01424	Evt02812	Evt02862	Evt02821	Evt00990	Event ID
1996 Plot to Bomb APEC Summit in Manila	1996 Bombing of Paris Metro	Khobar Towers Bombing	1996 Nascent Plot to Kidnap Tourists to Secure Blind Sheik's Release	1996 Armed Assualt on Greek Tourists in Cairo	1995 Plot to Assassinate Mubarak by Bombing His Motorcade	1995 Plot to Overthrow Bhutto's Second Gov't	Event Name
1996	1996	1996	1996	1996	1995	1995	Event Year
1	0	0	1	0	1	1	Plot
0	1	1	0	1	0	0	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	95.83	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	4.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
11	1	12	1	4	1	2	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt00985	Evt00936	Evt00976	Evt02218	Evt02860	Evt02935	Evt00408	Event ID
1998 Kidnapping of Westerners in Yemen	1998 Plot to Attack 1998 World Cup	1998 Plot to Bomb U.S. Embassy in Tirana	1998 Coimbatore Bombings	1997 Armed Assualt on German Tourists at Cairo's Egyptian Museum	1997(?) Plot to Attack U.S. Naval Vessels in Singapore	1997 Assassination Plot Against Yemeni PM	Event Name
1998	1998	1998	1998	1997	1997	1997	Event Year
0	1	1	0	0	1	1	Plot
1	0	0	1	1	0	0	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
2	3	4	1	2	2	1	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt00663	Evt00894	Evt01912	Evt00883	Evt01458	Evt02813	Evt01088	Event ID
1999 Hatchet Attack on Police	1999 Murder of Politician Joe Fernandez	1999 Hijacking of Indian Airliner in Nepal (Hostages Traded for Release of Azhar, et al)	1999 Murder of Asylum Seeker	1999 Bombing of Istiqlal Mosque	1999 Plot Against Western Target s/Embassies in Yemen	1998 Shoot-up of Lakemba Police Station	Event Name
1999	1999	1999	1999	1999	1999	1998	Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	Plot
1	1	1	1	1	0	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
2	1	1	1	1	2	3	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6		BaleCat
Evt00696	Evt01460	Evt02302	Evt02616	Evt01884	Evt00892		Event ID
2000 Kidnapping of 20 Asian and Europe an Hostages	2000 Attempted Assassination of Matori Abdul Jalil	2000 Capture/Beheading of Indian Officer in Kashmir	2000 Plot to Bomb Israeli Embassy in Canberra	1999 Kidnapping of Japanese Nationals in Kyrgyzstan	1999 Murder of Jovenal Bruno	man	Event Name
2000	2000	2000	2000	1999	1999		Event Year
0	0	0	1	0	0		Plot
1	1	1	0	1	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
10	3	1	1	3	1		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt01979	Evt02089	Evt01980	Evt01983	Evt02048	Evt01993	Event ID
2000 Kidnapping of German Journalist Andreas Lorenz	2000 Kidnapping of Businessman Niranjan Shah	2000 Kidnapping of Wilde Almeda and Followers (Jesus Miracle Crusade)	2000 Raid/Kidnapping on Pearl Farm Beach Resort	2000 Kidnapping of Foreign Journalists in Sulu	2000 Kidnapping of Fr. Rhoel Gallardo	Event Name
2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
1	1	1	1	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	2	1	6	1	1	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt00681	Evt02264	Evt02943	Evt02251	Evt00426	Evt00477	Evt01982	Evt01981	Event ID
2001 Nasce nt Plot Agains t U.S. Navy	2000 Assass ination of Fr. Benja min Inocen cio	Failed hijacki ng of Pakista ni Air passen ger flight	2000 Grena de Attack on GenSa n	2000 Attack on the Red Fort	2000 Bombi ng of Jakarat Stock Excha nge	2000 Kidna pping of Malay sians from Panda nan Island	2000 Kidna pping of French TV Crew	Event Name
2001	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	Event Year
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
50.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
2	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6		BaleCat
Evt02006	Evt01444	Evt02293	Evt00399	Evt02086	Evt01109		Event ID
2001 Kidnapping of Marilyn Chu	2001 Plot Against Singaporean Minister of Defense	2001 Plot to Murder Bollywood Star Aamir Khan	2001 Assassination of Ahmed Shah Masoud	2001 Kidnapping of Businessman Roy Burman	2001 Suicide Bombing Plots in Milan	Ships in Straits of Hormuz	Event Name
2001	2001	2001	2001	2001	2001		Event Year
0	1	1	0	0	1		Plot
1	0	0	1	1	0		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	12.50	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
100.00	100.00	100.00	87.50	0.00	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
1	3	3	8	3	1		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt00491	Evt01978	Evt00065	Evt00947	Evt00884	Evt01448	Evt01446	Event ID
2002 Bombing of Sheraton Hotel in Karachi	2002 Kidnapping of Journalist Arlyn de la Cruz	2002 Attack on Calcutta's American Center	2001 Plot to attack Manilla	2001 Murder of Civilians at Road Block	2001 Plot to Bomb Churches in Riau, Indonesia	2001 Plot Against Singapore American School (SAS)	Event Name
2002	2002	2002	2001	2001	2001	2001	Event Year
0	0	0	1	0	1	1	Plot
1	1	1	0	1	0	0	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	1	10	1	1	1	1	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt00403	Evt00924	Evt00505	Evt01771	Evt01891	Evt01986	Evt01770	Evt02798	Event ID
2002 Assassination of Lawrence	2002 Plot Against US Companies in Mindanao	2002 British Ricin 'Plot'	2002 Kidnapping on Jolo Island	2002 Bombing of Russian Rock Concert	2002 Kidnapping of Jehova's Witnesses on Sulu	2002 Kidnapping Aboard MT Singtic Marine 88 Vessel	2002 Plot to Bomb U.S. Navy Ships in Surabaya Harbour	Event Name
2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	Event Year
0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	Plot
1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	50.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
6	2	6	1	2	4	1	2	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6		BaleCat
Evt00701	Evt01759	Evt00472	Evt01954	Evt00774	Evt02050	Evt02095	Evt00901		Event ID
2003 Kidnapping of Europe	2003 Awang Airport Bombing	2002 Bombing of Chechen Govt HQ	2002 Bombing of BEST Bus in Mumbai	2002 London Gas Attack Plot	2002 Plot to Truck-Bomb Unspecified Manila Targets	2002 Failed Attack on New Delhi Market During Diwali	2002 Nord-Ost Siege	nce Foley	Event Name
2003	2003	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002	2002		Event Year
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0		Plot
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
6	1	1	7	3	1	2	1		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6		BaleCat
Evt00706	Evt01253	Evt01565	Evt00702	Evt00703		Event ID
2003K idnapp ing of Europe an Tourist s (North ern Mali)	3/8/20 03 Kidna pping of Europe an Tourist s (South ern Algeri a)	2003 Bombi ng of Davao Intl Airpor t	2003 Kidna pping of Europe an Tourist s (Illizi)	2003 Kidna pping of Europe an Tourist s (Ouarg la)	an Tourist s (Djane t)	Event Name
2003	2003	2003	2003	2003		Event Year
0	0	0	0	0		Plot
1	1	1	1	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
1	1	2	2	2		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt01764	Evt02192	Evt01451	Evt01758	Evt01566	Evt00704	Evt00705	Event ID
2003 Plot to Bomb Unspecified Targets in Zamboanga	2003 Kroronadal City Bombings	2003 Bombing of Soekarno-Hatta Airport (Jakarta)	2003 Plot to Bomb Manila	2003 Bombing of Sasa Warf	2003 Kidnapping of European Tourists (Tamanrasset)	2003 Kidnapping of European Tourists (Southern Algeria II)	Event Name
2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	Event Year
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	1	1	0	1	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	1	1	1	1	2	2	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt00515	Evt00422	Evt02944	Evt01099	Evt01379	Evt01754	Evt00713	Evt01001	Event ID
2003 Car-bombing of Mumbai Consulate	2003 Attack on Mumbai City Bus	2003 Sudanese President and Vice President Plot Against	2003 Suicide attack in Iraq	2003-2004 Plot to Assassinate US Ambassador to Yemen	2003 Aborted Plot Against Luzon Police	2003 Killing of 2 Pakistani Policemen	2003 Earthquake Aid Convoys Raid	Event Name
2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	Event Year
0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	Plot
1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
4	2	1	1	1	1	5	1	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6		BaleCat
Evt01124	Evt01889	Evt01890	Evt02007	Evt01478	Evt01537	Evt01977		Event ID
2004 Threat Made Against	2003 Bombing of Moscow's National Hotel	2003 Bombing of Train in Yessentuki, Russia	2003 Bombing of Airport Road in Jolo	2003 Plot to Attack Jakarta Police HQ	2005 Assassination of Annalena Nurse (Somiland Killing)	2003 Kidnapping of Filipino TV Journalists	ai	Event Name
2004	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003		Event Year
1	0	0	0	1	0	0		Plot
0	1	1	1	0	1	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
1	2	2	1	1	1	1		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6		BaleCat
Evt01106	Evt01387	Evt00496	Evt01763	Evt01749		Event ID
2004 Suicide bombing of Hyderi Mosque (Shiite)	2004 Kidnapping of German Aid Worker/Murder of Kenyan Contract Employees (Somaliland Killing)	2004 Bombing of UN Building in Damascus	2004 Plot to Bomb Unspecified Targets in Zemboanga	2004 SuperFerry 14 Bombing	Atocha Station	Event Name
2004	2004	2004	2004	2004		Event Year
0	0	0	1	0		Plot
1	1	1	0	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
20.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
80.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
5	4	1	1	3		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt00943	Evt00918	Evt00991	Evt02230	Evt02809	Evt01875	Event ID
2004 Plot to Attack Heathrow	2004 Plot Against Nuclear Reactor in Holland	2004 Plot to Shoot-Down an El-Al Flight in Zurich	2004 Kidnapping & Beheading of American Contractor Paul Johnson	2004 Killing of Chinese Engineers in Kunduz Province	2004 Bombing of Ali Reza Mosque (Shiite)	Event Name
2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	Event Year
1	1	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	1	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	33.33	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	66.67	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	2	1	2	1	3	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt02732	Evt02834	Evt00461	Evt01486	Evt01769	Evt00946	Evt00956	Evt00917	Evt00992	Event ID
2004 Kidnapping of Chinese Engineers	2004 Taba Bombings	2004 Beslan School Siege	2004 Plot to Bomb NYC Subway Near RNC	2004 Jolo Bombings	2004 Plot to attack Madrid Real's Stadium	2004 Plot to Attack Sydney Electrical Grid	2004 Plot against Dutch Politicians	2004 Plot to "Dirty Bomb" London	Event Name
2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	2004	Event Year
0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	Plot
1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	8	9	4	2	1	1	3	1	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt01500	Evt00410	Evt01488	Evt01753	Evt00711	Evt01881	Evt00661	Evt01123	Event ID
2005-2006 Plot to target U.S. Oil	2005 Attack on Algerian Municipal Guards	2004-2005 Ill-Formed Plots Against Military and Jewish Targets in LA	2005 Nascent Plot Against Manila	2004 Kidnapping of Qatari Nationals	2004 Roadside Bombings in Pakistan	2004 Hague Standoff	2004 Theo Van Gogh Murder	Event Name
2005	2005	2005	2005	2004	2004	2004	2004	Event Year
1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	Plot
0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	50.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	JI
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
4	1	3	4	2	4	2	1	Total Ints.

9	9	9	9	9	9		BaleCat
Evt00891	Evt00398	Evt01098	Evt02852	Evt02855	Evt02848		Event ID
2005 Murder of Iraqi Governing Council President	2005 Arson of Stanislavsky and Nemirovich-Danchenko Theater	2005 Suicide attack in Iraq	2005 Bombing Near Cairo's Egyptian Museum	2005 Armed Assault on Tourist Busses in Cairo	2005 Bombing of Cairo's Khan al-Khalili Bazaar	Refineries and Military Bases	Event Name
2005	2005	2005	2005	2005	2005		Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	0		Plot
1	1	1	1	1	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
1	1	1	1	2	8		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt00513	Evt01761	Evt02833	Evt02562	Evt01477	Evt00952	Evt01878	Evt01002	Event ID
2005 Car Bombing in Iraq	2005 Zamboanga City Bombings	2005 Sharm al-Sheik Attack	2005 Kidnapping/Assassination of Egyptian Ambassador to Iraq	2005 Behead ing of School girls in Poso	2005 Plot to Attack Sahara n Oil Refineries	2004 Plot to Bomb Shiites in Pakistan	2005 Raid on Mauritanian Miliar y Post	Event Name
2005	2005	2005	2005	2005	2005	2005	2005	Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	Plot
1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	1	5	1	1	1	2	11	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt02880	Evt01571	Evt02770	Evt02107	Evt02879	Evt01569	Evt00919	Event ID
2006 Kidnapping/Killing of American Christian Aid Worker Tom Fox	2006 Varanasi Bombings	2006 Suicide Bombing Near U.S. Consulate in Karachi	2006 Failed Bombing of Karmavati Express	2006 Kidnapping of American Journalist Jill Carroll	2005 Delhi Bombings	2005 Plot Against Schiphol Airport	Event Name
2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2005	2005	Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	5	1	1	1	7	1	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt02127	Evt02947	Evt00913	Evt02832	Evt00062	Evt02204	Event ID
2006 Plot Against Atomic Research Center and/or Siddhivinayak Temple	2006 Nascent Plot Against Western Interests in Central Asia	2006 Plot to Conduct Suicide Bombing in Iraq	2006 Dahab Bombings	2006 Ambush of Algerian Customs Officials	2006 Jolo-Sulu Cooperative Bombing	Event Name
2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	2006	Event Year
1	1	1	0	0	0	Plot
0	0	0	1	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	50.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	1	1	10	2	1	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt02146	Evt01897	Evt01972	Evt01518	Evt00940	Evt01762	Evt01468	Event ID
2007 Assassination of Somali	2007 Plot to Bomb Delhi	2007 Kidnapping of Road-Construction Workers	2006-2007 Plot to Attack JFK Airport	2006 Plot to Attack Cherry Vale Shopping Center (Rockford, IL)	2006 Plot Against ASEAN Summit	2006 Hammer Attack on Christian Preacher Yosua Winadi	Event Name
2007	2007	2007	2007	2006	2006	2006	Event Year
0	1	0	1	1	1	0	Plot
1	0	1	0	0	0	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	5	1	6	2	2	15	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6		BaleCat
Evt02930	Evt01568	Evt01567	Evt02186	Evt01471	Evt01572	Evt02225		Event ID
2007 Plot Against U.S. Military Base in Hanau	2007 Attempted Suicide Bombing of Glasgow Airport	2007 Attempted Car-Bombing of London	2007 Kidnapping of Fr. Giancarlo Bossi	2007 Murder of Dago Simaora	2007 Hyderabad Bombings	2007 Gorakhpur Bombings	Judge	Event Name
2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007		Event Year
1	0	0	0	0	0	0		Plot
0	1	1	1	1	1	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
5	2	4	1	10	6	1		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt00889	Evt02040	Evt01108	Evt01105	Evt02224	Evt01100	Evt02043	Event ID
2007 Murder of French Tourist	2007 Kidnapping of Mayoral Staffers	2007 Suicide Bombing of UN Offices (Algiers)	2007 Suicide Bombing of Algerian Govt Building	2007 Varanasi Courthouse Bombing	2007 Suicide Attack on Algerian Army Barracks	2007 Beheading of AFP Marines at Albarkah	Event Name
2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	2007	Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
3	1	1	1	2	1	2	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6		BaleCat
Evt01279	Evt00707	Evt02039	Evt02201	Evt02772		Event ID
2008 Suicide Bombing of Luna Capresse Restaurant (Islamabad)	2008 Kidnapping of European Tourists (Southern Algeria I)	2008 Kidnapping of Female Trader in Iolo	2008 Murder of Fr. Jesus Reynaldo A. Roda/ Kidnapping of Omar Taup	2008 Suicide Bombing of Serena Hotel in Kabul	s	Event Name
2008	2008	2008	2008	2008		Event Year
0	0	0	0	0		Plot
1	1	1	1	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	66.67	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	33.33	0.00	100.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
1	3	1	1	5		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt01282	Evt01291	Evt01974	Evt02724	Evt01574	Evt02776	Evt02784	Event ID
2008 Suicide Bombing of	2008 Plot to Attack Unspecified Targets in Rawalpindi and Islamabad	2008 Kidnapping of Journalists and an Academic	2008 Campaign Against Nato Convoys Around Peshawar	2008 Jaipur Bombings	2008 Assassination Attempt on Hamid Karzai	2008 Kidnapping of Journalist Sean Langan	Event Name
2008	2008	2008	2008	2008	2008	2008	Event Year
0	1	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	50.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	6	4	1	2	1	1	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6		BaleCat
Evt01570	Evt02699	Evt02189	Evt02193	Evt01281	Evt02219	Evt01280		Event ID
2008 Delhi Bombings	2008 Bombing of Lebanese Soldiers	2008 Attack on Civilians in Lanao del Norte	2008 Attacks on Civilians in North Cotabato	2008 Pakistani Independence Day Bombing	2008 Bangalore Bombings	2008 Mosque Red badʼs Islamabad Bombing Near	2008 Suicide Bombing Pakistani Naval War College	Event Name
2008	2008	2008	2008	2008	2008	2008		Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	0	0		Plot
1	1	1	1	1	1	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	50.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	50.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	100.00	66.67	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
0.00	0.00	0.00	33.33	0.00	0.00	0.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
24	2	7	3	1	1	1		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt01474	Evt01294	Evt00700	Evt01975	Evt00699	Evt01296	Evt01575	Event ID
2009 Smoke Bombing of UNIC EF Office	2009 Attack on Sri Lanka n Cricket Team	2009 Kidnapping of Edwin Dyer and Other European Tourists	2009 Kidnapping of Red Cross Workers	2008 Kidnapping of Canadian Diplomats	2008 Kidnapping/Murder of Polish Engineer Piotr Stanczak	2008 Plot Against Mumbai	Event Name
2009	2009	2009	2009	2008	2008	2008	Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	Plot
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	1	1	4	3	1	5	Total Ints.

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Ints.
		s																																																
6	Evt02608	2009 Attac on Islama bad Police Station	2009	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
6	Evt02606	2009 Attack on Police Acade my in Lahore	2009	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
6	Evt02607	2009 Suicid e Attack on Securit y Convo y in Bannu	2009	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1
6	Evt01531	2009 British Plot Agains t Manch ester (Comp anion Plot to N. Zazi Plot)	2009	1	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	3
6	Evt02034	2009 Assass ination Attem pt on Sulu Gov. Abdus akur Tan	2009	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	2
6	Evt00618	2009 Execut ion of Edwin Dyer	2009	0	1	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	1

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt02605	Evt02010	Evt02604	Evt00435	Evt02187	Evt02725	Evt01293	Event ID
2009 Suicide Bombing of Police Station	2009 Kidnapping of Teacher Gabriel Canizares	2009 Attacks on Police Target s in Lahore	2009 Attempted Suicide Bombing of Italian Army Barracks	2009 Kidnapping of Fr. Michael Simnott	2009 Attack on Pakistani Army HQ in Rawalpindi	2009 Raid on Pakistani Army HQ	Event Name
2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	2009	Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Plot
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	100.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	1	2	1	9	1	1	Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6		BaleCat
Evt02210	Evt02123	Evt02208	Evt00712	Evt00710	Evt01475		Event ID
2010 Kidnapping of Businessworman Nena Torenocha	2010 Bombing of German Bakery in Pune	2010 Kidnapping of Fisherman/Ex-Soldier	2009 Kidnapping of Spanish Aid Workers	2009 Kidnapping of Pierre Camatte	2009 Assassination Attempt of German Red Cross Worker	in Kohat	Event Name
2010	2010	2010	2009	2009	2009		Event Year
0	0	0	0	0	0		Plot
1	1	1	1	1	1		Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		AQAP
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	0.00		AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		(AQI)
100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00		Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		Sum
1	12	3	3	1	1		Total Ints.

6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	BaleCat
Evt02211	Evt02222	Evt01874	Evt02726	Evt01287	Evt02002	Evt01579	Evt02780	Event ID
2010 Kidnapping of Nurse Maria Chris Sograd	2010 Varanasi Bombing	2010 Kidnapping of European Tourists in Niger	2010 Bombing of Shiites in Quetta	2010 Plot to Bomb a Kampala for a Second Time	2010 Suicide Bombing of Zamboanga Airport	2010 Times Square Plot	2010 Kidnapping of Col. Imam (Former ISI Officer)	Event Name
2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	Event Year
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	Plot
1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	Attack
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	al-Fuqra
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQAP
0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	AQIM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ARCF
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	ASG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	BaI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	D-Company
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	EIJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Fatah al Islam
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GICM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	GRG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Haqqani Network
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Hofstad Group
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	HUJI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	IG
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JAM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JI
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	JIS
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Jundallah
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LeT/IndMuj
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	LJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	MfM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Palembang
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Raw-9
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	RSRSCBM
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SaudHizb
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	Shabaab
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	SoD
0.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	TTP
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	TQJ
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Hizballah)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(MILF)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HIG)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GIA)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(Taliban)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(HAMAS)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(GAM)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(LeJ)
0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(AQI)
100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	100.00	100.00	0.00	0.00	Other/Unknown
100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	Sum
1	1	1	1	3	5	5	1	Total Ints.

BaleCat	Event ID	Event Name	Event Year	Plot	Attack	AQ	al-Fuqra	AQAP	AQIM	ARCF	ASG	BaI	D-Company	EIJ	Fatah al Islam	GICM	GRG	Haqqani Network	Hofstad Group	HUJI	IG	JAM	JI	JIS	Jundallah	LeT/IndMuj	LJ	MfM	Palembang	Raw-9	RSM	RSRSCBM	SaudHizb	Shabaab	SoD	TTP	TQJ	(Hizballah)	(MILF)	(HIG)	(GIA)	(Taliban)	(HAMAS)	(GAM)	(LeJ)	(AQI)	Other/Unknown	Sum	Total Ints.
		iel Cuarto cruz																																															