RESTORING PARMENIDES’ POEM:
ESSAYS TOWARD A NEW ARRANGEMENT OF THE FRAGMENTS
BASED ON A REASSESSMENT OF THE ORIGINAL SOURCES

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The history of philosophy proper, claimed Hegel, began with the poem of the Presocratic Greek philosopher Parmenides. Today, that poem is extant only in fragmentary form, the various fragments surviving as quotations, translations or paraphrases in the works of better-preserved authors of antiquity. These range from Plato, writing within a century after Parmenides’ death, to the sixth-century C.E. commentator Simplicius of Cilicia, the latest figure known to have had access to the complete poem. Since the Renaissance, students of Parmenides have relied on collections of fragments compiled by classical scholars, and since the turn of the twentieth century, Hermann Diels’ Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, through a number of editions, has remained the standard collection for Presocratic material generally and for the arrangement of Parmenides’ fragments in particular.

This dissertation is an extended critique of that arrangement. I argue that the reconstructions of Parmenides’ poem in the last two centuries suffer from a number of mistakes. Those errors stem from a general failure to appreciate the peculiar literary character of his work as well as the mishandling, in particular instances, of the various sources that preserve what remains of his verse. By reconsidering a number of rarely questioned assumptions underlying the standard presentations and by revisiting the source material with greater care, a number of scholarly impasses that have beset the discussion of this difficult text are resolved, and the foundations for a more faithful and fuller reconstruction of Parmenides’ work are established.
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INTRODUCTION

The chapters that follow are contributions toward a reassessment of the sources for, and a new arrangement of, the fragments of the poem of the early Greek philosopher Parmenides of Elea. While attitudes about Parmenides’ verse and estimations of his thought have differed markedly, the composition of the poem in the early fifth century B.C.E. is widely regarded as one of the landmark moments in the history of Western thought. Hegel, for instance, pointed to Parmenides’ poem as the beginning of the “proper history of philosophy”, explaining his claim thus: “Philosophy began in the Eleatic school, especially with Parmenides. Parmenides, who conceives the absolute as Being, says that ‘Being alone is and Nothing is not.’ Such was the true starting-point of philosophy, which is always knowledge by thought: and here for the first time we find pure thought seized and made an object to itself.”¹ With less sympathy, but no less grandly, Nietzsche wrote of Parmenides, “By tearing entirely asunder the senses and the ability to think in abstractions, i.e., reason, just as if they were two thoroughly separate capacities, he demolished the intellect itself, and incited people to that wholly erroneous separation of “mind” and “body” which, especially since Plato, lies like a curse upon philosophy.”² The poem has received comparably momentous acclaim (and blame) from many quarters since, with Parmenides having been dubbed, by one author or another, the father of idealism, rationalism, materialism, metaphysics, ontology, logic, philosophical method, and so on. In evaluating such claims, we would do well to remember that Hegel and Nietzsche, like all others who have spoken of “Father Parmenides” since, knew his work only in the form of fragmentary quotations found

¹ Wallace and Findlay (1975) p. 126.
² Nietzsche (1911) p. 124.
in the works of other authors of antiquity. The latest author known to have consulted a complete copy of Parmenides’ poem was Simplicius of Cilicia, whose commentaries on Aristotle, which preserve most of what survives of the poem, were written in the middle of the sixth century C.E. Since the Renaissance, the closest that students of Parmenides have managed to get to reading the original poem has been by way of collections of fragments compiled by classical scholars. Since the appearance of its first edition over a century ago, the standard presentation of Parmenides’ poem has been that found in the various editions of Hermann Diels’ *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*.

Interest in the thought of Parmenides and other Presocratics has grown steadily since, but, despite an ever-increasing number of studies from classicists and philosophers over the last century, including several critical editions of the text, Diels’ text has remained the basic presentation of Parmenides’ poem. The first edition of Diels’ work appeared in 1903 and quickly established itself as the standard collection of the fragments of Greek philosophical writing before Plato. In that and the following three editions (published in 1906, 1912, and 1922) Diels repeated, with occasional textual changes, an arrangement of Parmenides’ fragments that had appeared earlier in his 1897 book, *Parmenides Lehrgedicht*, and his 1901 volume, *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*. The arrangement of Parmenides’ fragments in the fifth (1934) and following editions (1951 and later), edited by Walther Kranz, featured more substantial changes to Diels’ earlier arrangement, so that we ought properly to speak of two presentations of Parmenides’ poem in *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, that of the pre-Kranz editions (specified hereafter by “FdV”) and that of the Diels-Kranz editions (hereafter “DK”). It is the latter that is the generally accepted presentation of the poem today. For the most part, scholarship on Parmenides takes the basic arrangement of the fragments for granted and, where it concentrates
on textual questions, tends to focus on narrower issues, such as the merits of competing textual
variants, the meaning of doubtful words, the proper construal of difficult syntax, and the
identification of possible allusions to earlier literature. The placement within the poem of several
fragments is disputed, but rarely is the overall arrangement questioned, and even less frequently
do scholars ask whether, in the case of composite fragments drawn from multiple sources, the
constitution and enumeration of individual fragments provided by DK is the best possible
treatment of the source texts in question. In this dissertation, I revisit the task of reconstructing
the poem and I argue that the standard treatment mishandles the source material in several
important respects.

Its success in collecting and making accessible the fragmentary texts scattered throughout
the vast range of Greek and Latin literature makes Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker an
indispensable boon to the student of Presocratic philosophy. An unfortunate by-product of that
success is that the sources for those texts are rarely properly scrutinized for what they have to
contribute to our understanding of the fragments that they preserve. In order to assemble an even
moderately complete picture of the better-preserved philosophers included in its collection, the
texts from which the fragments and testimonia are drawn are presented in so truncated a manner
that they provide only a minimal sense of the broader context from which a given fragment
comes. Not infrequently, this leads to the fragments being read and studied entirely separate from
their original contexts. As concerns the text of any given Presocratic, this, in turn, can engender
either of two mistaken impressions: (i) that the arrangement in which the isolated fragments are
presented in DK is definitive; or (ii) that the arrangement of the fragments as presented is
essentially arbitrary.
Sometimes both mistakes can be found simultaneously, even among specialists well-versed in the literature. Néstor-Luis Cordero, for example, the author of many books and articles on Parmenides, including an essay, “L’histoire du texte de Parménide”, detailing the history of the reconstruction of the poem from the Renaissance on, has recently written about Parmenides’ fragments: “It is impossible to know (except in one case) what place in the Poem each of these quotations should occupy. Since the first attempts at reconstruction, they have been arranged in accordance with the conceptual content of each “fragment”.” Cordero makes mistake (ii) in claiming that it is impossible to know where all but one of the fragments stood in the poem. In fact, of the nineteen fragments recognized as authentic by Diels-Kranz (whose arrangement Cordero follows in the work from which the above statement comes), the sources that quote them give us at least some relatively explicit indication of the place they occupied for nine of them. The basic structure of the DK arrangement of the fragments is principally the result of these indications of placement rather than the “conceptual content” of the fragments, but readers are often unaware of this. Cordero makes mistake (i) in his handling of what he thinks is the one exception to the general dearth of information about placement. The fragment to which Cordero is referring is a quotation preserved by Sextus Empiricus, which Sextus tells us is the beginning of the poem. As it so happens, that quotation is (rather arbitrarily) divided in DK into two separate fragments, and Cordero follows suit.

A concise yet nuanced introduction to the sources for early Greek thought, admirably aware of both the merits and dangers of Diels-Kranz’s methodology, is Jaap Mansfeld’s “Sources”. Unfortunately, the closing words of that paper offer a prime example of mistaking an unquestioned contemporary supposition, canonized in DK, for fact. Mansfeld claims,

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3 Cordero (2004) p. 16. Cordero objects to the use of “fragment” to refer to what he prefers to call “quotations”, thus the quotation marks.
“Simplicius’ quotations enable us to see that the long continuous text of Parmenides, quoted by Sextus […] is in fact a patchwork, combining passages from different sections of the poem and omitting crucial lines in the poem. This should serve as a warning: even where we do have long verbatim fragments, we cannot always be certain that the extant text is correct, or allows a correct impression of the work from which it has been cited or compiled.”\(^5\) Mansfeld is referring to the very passage mentioned by Cordero. Mansfeld claims that Simplicius’ quotations reveal Sextus’ text as a patchwork because he assumes that Simplicius’ quotation of the “crucial lines” that Sextus is accused of omitting also comes from the beginning of the poem. Simplicius, however, makes no such claim about the verses in question. While Mansfeld is perfectly correct to warn us against accepting long verbatim passages uncritically, he could not have come to the conclusions he did without a conviction (which he shows no sign of having questioned) that changes made by Diels and Kranz to Sextus’ text were correct. The chapters that follow constitute an extended questioning, from various angles, of a number of such common assumptions in the reconstruction of Parmenides’ text.

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While modern readers have the additional difficulty of dealing with a fragmentary text, confusion over Parmenides’ work is not a modern phenomenon. Long before it was lost, Parmenides’ poem made a strong impression on its readers, who had difficulty agreeing what to make of it. Given the state of the evidence for the intellectual climate of the early fifth century B.C.E., any account of the immediate reactions to the poem involves much guesswork, but to judge from what we have, the central concepts in the philosophical or physical systems of his younger contemporaries Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, Empedocles of Acragas, and the atomist Leucippus (perhaps of Elea, perhaps of Miletus) all appear to have been shaped by a serious

engagement with Parmenides’ thought. If the dramatic depiction of Plato’s *Parmenides* can be relied upon, other early readers ridiculed the poem, leading Parmenides’ fellow citizen and pupil Zeno to mount a counter-attack in the form of a series of paradoxes still famous today. The sophist Protagoras of Abdera, for his part, seems to have attacked Eleatic monism, while Melissus of Samos, perhaps another of Parmenides’ pupils, wrote a prose work, *On Nature, or On Being*, defending it. Gorgias of Leontini, in turn, penned a piece of Eleatic-inspired reasoning, *On Non-Being, or On Nature*, but whether that work argues for or against Eleatic views, or is seriously intended as an argument at all, is far from clear. Controversy over its significance appears to be as old as the poem itself, and difficulties in ascertaining just what Parmenides might have been saying continued, and proved philosophically fruitful, for as long as the poem was read.

The vast array of impressions made by the poem on different thinkers is not only testimony to the enduring philosophical significance of Parmenides’ work, but it also, I think, offers a hint about the literary character of the work. That the aforementioned figures, with access to the complete poem, held such different opinions about it is an indication that even its earliest audience tended to leave an encounter with the poem with only a partial understanding of what it was they had experienced. In the modern scholarly literature, difficulties in reading the poem are commonly attributed to Parmenides’ attempt to present an entirely novel, austerely logical philosophy in the constraints of traditional hexameter poetry. Implicitly or explicitly, the common judgment is that, whatever truth or depth there might be to Parmenides’ philosophical teaching, his poetic achievement was not of the same order. (Ancient authorities are often invoked in support of this judgment, but the opinions of the ancients are not as one-sided as they are generally presented to be.) While it is only fair to concede that both Parmenides’ thought and
his mode of expression present many difficulties, the suggestion that these are due to Parmenides’ failings strikes me as a suspiciously convenient way of avoiding our own shortcomings as readers. The condescending attitude towards Parmenides’ poetic ability not only serves to mask the limitations we may have in appreciating his verse, but, more problematically, presupposes that we are in a position to judge what it was he was trying to express. It may be, however, that Parmenides meant for his audience to struggle over the poem, and that it is only by working through the difficulties of expression that we will really come to grips with whatever it is he was saying. Put another way, the puzzlement over the poem which has persisted from its first appearance down to the present day may be a deliberate effect of the poem, because it was intended to be something of a riddle. If so, then readers too eager to recast the poem’s message according to their own pre-set categories, whether to pass judgment on its exposition or to adapt its findings to their own philosophical agenda, will be missing something important.

Plato dramatizes this predicament well in his depiction of Socrates’ experiences with Parmenides and his poem. In the dialogues, Socrates is portrayed as acquainted with the poem in his youth, and as retaining, near the end of his life, both a reverent admiration for Parmenides’ depth and a cautious regard for the subtlety of his manner of expression. Plato’s *Parmenides* takes us back to Socrates’ youth, setting him among an audience of Athenians who have gathered to hear a reading of Zeno’s paradox-laden work. Zeno has come to Athens with Parmenides for the Great Panathenaea, and he is using the visit as a chance to make a proper presentation of his book, some version of which had apparently been circulating without his consent. After the work has been read, an enthusiastic Socrates asks Zeno to return to the opening argument, questioning him about what it says and offering his own opinion of how Zeno’s work compares to Parmenides’ poem, which Socrates has evidently studied and holds in high regard. Zeno
encourages Socrates by remarking that his understanding of the argument is on the right track (though his grasp of the intent of the work may not be entirely correct) and Socrates, perhaps too eagerly, goes on to put additional questions and challenges to Zeno, parsing Zeno’s argument in terms of the notions of “forms themselves” and “participation”. Although Pythodorus, the host of the event and one of the characters in the chain of transmission in the dialogue’s dramatic frame, is said to have been concerned that Socrates’ argumentative zeal might have offended the Eleatic guests, Parmenides and Zeno instead smile knowingly at each other, as though impressed by Socrates’ abilities and familiar with the difficulties he is raising. Parmenides himself then speaks with Socrates, echoing Zeno’s earlier remarks by praising Socrates’ enthusiasm for argument yet hinting that Socrates still has some work to do in order to understand their accounts fully. After a brief but devastating examination of Socrates’ understanding of “forms” and “participation” ending with a confession by Socrates that he is entirely at a loss about where to turn next, Parmenides explains to him:

That is because you are undertaking to define ‘Beautiful’, ‘Just’, ‘Good’, and other particular Forms, too soon, before you have had a preliminary training. I noticed that the other day when I heard you talking here with Aristoteles. Believe me, there is something noble and inspired in your passion for argument; but you must make an effort and submit yourself, while you are still young, to a severer training in what the world calls idle talk and condemns as useless. Otherwise, the truth will escape you.6

Yet again, Socrates’ passion for logoi is praised, while once more Socrates is reminded that a deeper inquiry is required if the truth is not to escape him. An example of the “severer training” to which Socrates must submit himself occupies the remainder of that demanding dialogue. Socrates looks on and listens while Parmenides and the young Aristoteles play out a “laborious game” and examine Parmenides’ own “hypothesis” of the One,7 ultimately concluding that

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6 Parmenides 135c-d, as translated in Cornford (1939) p. 103.
7 See Parm. 137b.
“whether there is or is not a One, both that One and the Others alike are and are not, and appear and do not appear to be, all manner of things in all manner of ways, with respect to themselves and to one another.”

We are to imagine that Socrates’ early encounter with the visitors from Elea had a lasting effect on him, for in the *Theaetetus*, on the eve of the indictment that will lead to his death, Socrates recalls that encounter in the middle of a conversation about *episteme* with the mathematician Theodorus of Cyrene and his promising young student, Theaetetus of Athens. Following a discussion of the views of those who claim that all things are in flux, the time comes to discuss those who, like Parmenides and Melissus, appear to claim the opposite. Despite his earlier insistence that these figures must also be considered, Theodorus, in what will be his final exchange in the dialogue, declares his intention to bow out of the conversation. When Theaetetus, eager to hear the views of Parmenides and Melissus investigated, reminds him of his earlier promise, Theodorus assures the youth that Socrates will still accommodate him. But Socrates surprises Theodorus by saying that he too will decline to discuss these figures:

> A feeling of respect keeps me from treating in an unworthy spirit Melissus and the others who say that the universe is one and at rest; but there is one being whom I respect above all: Parmenides himself is in my eyes, as Homer says, a ‘reverend and awful’ figure. I met him when I was quite young and he quite elderly, and I thought there was a sort of depth in him that was altogether noble. I am afraid we might not understand his words and still less follow the thought they express. Above all, the original purpose of our discussion—the nature of knowledge—might be thrust out of sight, if we attend to these importunate topics that keep breaking in upon us. In particular, this subject we are raising

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8 Cornford (1939) p. 244. The dialogue ends with Aristoteles’ answer to this formulation, “Most true.” Cornford unfortunately recasts the form of the work after 137c, eliminating the answers that Aristoteles gives in the dialectical exercise, so the closing words are missing from his translation. Cornford justifies his procedure as follows: “Since Aristoteles contributes nothing, nothing is gained by casting the arguments into the form of question and answer. The convention becomes tiresome and cumbrous; it only increases the difficulty of following the reasoning.” (Cornford (1939) p. 109) I trust that Plato was better equipped than Cornford to judge whether anything is gained by the form in which he cast his own dialogue. Cornford’s laudable enthusiasm for the reasoning combined with a disregard for the form in which it is cast is a convenient example of our problem.
now is of vast extent. It cannot be fairly treated as a side issue; and an adequate handling
would take so long that we should lose sight of our question about knowledge.9

Since the encounter in his youth, it appears that Socrates has moderated his earlier “passion”
somewhat and come to appreciate that we cannot do justice to Parmenides’ conception of the
One if we do not approach it in the right spirit. While no less dedicated to the giving and
receiving of accounts, Socrates’ earlier confidence in his grasp on the texts of Parmenides and
Zeno has been replaced by caution. In particular, Socrates now senses that the present discussion
(for whatever reason) will not be able to provide an adequate treatment of what Parmenides said
(τὰ λέγομενα), let alone the thought behind it.10 The recognition that there is difficulty even in
determining what was said (apart from what he had in mind in saying it) is an indication, I think,
that his early experience of aporia with Parmenides has led Socrates to a greater appreciation of
the expressive subtlety of the poem. An ancient anecdote informs us that the “noble depth”
(βάθος … γενναῖον) that Socrates praises in Parmenides was one he also associated with
Heraclitus of Ephesus, of whose writings Socrates is reported to have remarked, “The part that I
understand is excellent (γενναῖα), and so too is, I dare say, the part I do not understand; but it
needs a Delian diver to get to the bottom of it.”11 That is, the obscurity for which Heraclitus was
famous is also a feature of Parmenides’ work, and comparable care is called for in reading it.

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10 The distinction Socrates draws in the Theaetetus between Parmenides’ “words” (τὰ λέγομενα) and the “thought
they express” (τί … διανοούμενος εἶπε) echoes the repeated praise, by Zeno and Parmenides, in the Parmenides, of
Socrates’ keenness for logoi (cf. τὰ λεχθέντα at Parm. 128c2; τίς ὁρμῇ τίς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους at 130b1; and ἡ ὁρμὴ
ἡν ὁρμᾶς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους at 135d3), followed in each instance by an indication that Socrates still fails to grasp fully
the matter at issue.
11 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae II. 22, as translated in Hicks (1972) vol. I, p. 153. Cf. Vitae IX.11-12 for the source of
the story and a variant account of it. On Socrates’ use of “depth” in the Theaetetus, Seth Benardete comments,
“Such a use of “depth” is not common in prose. Herodotus speaks of “ways deeper than the Thracians” (IV.95.1)
and Socrates is said to have remarked that Heraclitus’ writings need for their interpretation a Delian diver (Diogenes
Laertius II.22); cf. Laws 930A.” (Benardete (1986) p. 1.188, n. 67) Cf. Simplicius, in Phys. 36.31 (Diels), where the
commentator appears to present Socrates’ remark about Heraclitus as Plato’s remark about Parmenides.
Just what all of this says about Plato’s own views of Parmenides is left an open question for readers of the dialogues to answer for themselves, but it is perhaps not an implausible assumption that the uncommonly high regard Socrates is made to show for Parmenides (in sharp contrast to Socrates’ account in the *Phaedo* of his disappointment upon reading Anaxagoras’ work) is a reflection of Plato’s own experience with the poem. The reverent reserve that Socrates exhibits towards Parmenides in the *Theaetetus* carries over into the dialogues that serve as its sequels. In the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, set on the day following the conversation of the *Theaetetus*, Theodorus introduces into the company a stranger from Elea, who takes over Socrates’ usual role of chief speaker. Although the stranger certainly discusses aspects of Eleatic thought in the attempt to define who the sophist is with Theaetetus, and who the statesman is with Theaetetus’ friend, also named Socrates, one may doubt whether the proper treatment of Parmenides postponed in the *Theaetetus* is ever attempted in the dialogues. Our Socrates, the irrepressible gadfly of Athens, remains remarkably silent for nearly the whole of both conversations, and the discussion that he proposes to have with his namesake, in which it seems the philosopher would have been defined, is left unwritten.

Whatever else this may reveal about Plato’s attitude towards Parmenides, I take it that part of the point in the open-endedness of the dialogues’ portrait of Parmenides is that Plato does not presume that one can do justice to what Parmenides said or thought without an uncommon readiness to reconsider one’s own preconceptions and a willingness to approach the matter with a degree of care rarely found even among those of some intellectual distinction and promise. It is a fair inference also, I think, that, in contrast to many of his modern descendants, Plato did not regard his predecessor as incapable of expressing himself adequately.
The caution of Plato’s mature Socrates will serve as something of a model for this study. Neither disregarding Parmenides’ manner of expression nor presuming that we possess a sufficient grasp on the intent of the poem in advance of our attempt to struggle through it, the following chapters are offered as contributions toward a new reconstruction of Parmenides’ poem. As Socrates did with Zeno’s work, we will begin by revisiting the beginning of the poem. Mindful of the dangers in being too eager to render a judgment, we will delay declaring what the proem means until we can become surer about just what it said. This is itself a task that will entail reconsidering a host of popular opinions about the reconstruction of the text and playing a game with a discipline that may at times seem laborious and may run the risk of striking many as idle and useless. How much closer to the truth we may be at the end of our game I will not venture to say here, but there will be some progress as we see our way clear of a number of longstanding mistakes.

Also in keeping with Plato’s example, we shall leave much unsaid. I have no pretensions of giving a comprehensive or definitive treatment of all that pertains to the reconstruction of the poem. With new critical editions of several of the major sources for the poem currently being prepared, such aspirations would be premature in any event. What I hope to provide in what follows are good reasons for rethinking a number of generally unquestioned presuppositions underlying the current arrangements, some clarification on how certain bits of underappreciated evidence should be taken into account in future efforts to reconstruct and to read the poem, and some preliminary but defensible proposals on how to fit several “new” fragments, hitherto

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12 In 1985, Leonardo Tarán gave a report of then ongoing work on a new critical edition of Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (see Tarán (2001) pp. 625-645). In 1987, Ilsetraut Hadot wrote that the preparation of a new critical edition of Simplicius’ de Caelo commentary, with annotated French translation, had been undertaken “several years ago” by Phillipe Hoffmann (Hadot (1990) p. 275). I have not seen a recent report of the state of either project, but presume these are still forthcoming. The Oxford Classical Text of Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides by Carlos Steel (in 3 volumes, 2007-2009) has recently been completed. A new critical edition of Sextus Empiricus is needed, but I do not know whether one has been planned.
regarded as corrupt variants of known lines, into a presentation of the poem which is fuller and more cohesive than prior ones. On none of these points, naturally, will what follows be the final word on the subject.

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Between this introduction and what is labeled as the conclusion of this study, there are four chapters, divided into two parts. These two parts are meant to be independent essays, with distinctly different starting points. The discussion of the second part will not take for granted the discussion of the first part, and offers a separate, if ultimately related, argument. Though independent, the two parts are complementary, both applying the potentially cumbersome caution called for above to separate sections of the fragments, the first part examining a number of common assumptions about the proem, and the second part doing something similar for the *Doxa*. This will involve an amount of repetition as different approaches to the questions involved give rise to related problems, but as I hope will become clearer as we proceed, such repetition is not altogether out of place when dealing with Parmenides’ poem.

The first part consists of three chapters focused on the beginning of the poem, or proem. In it, I argue that, contrary to the presentation of the poem in nearly every edition of Parmenides’ work in the last two centuries, Sextus Empiricus has preserved the opening of the poem largely intact. The general acceptance of the major alterations made to Sextus’ quotation by various hands is due, I claim, to a widespread failure to appreciate several important features of Parmenides’ mode of expression. Attention to the text of the proem itself, to the contexts in which it is quoted, and to other evidence of its early reception reveals that Parmenides did not share quite the same interests that interpreters often expect in a philosophical author. Apparently less interested in straightforward exposition than some of his later interpreters, Parmenides, like
Empedocles and others after him, introduced elements of obscurity into his poem intentionally. The proem is replete with verbal ambiguities, convoluted sentences, impressionistic imagery, and seemingly pointless repetitions. Nonetheless, patient analysis of the intricacies of the proem and comparison of various related texts can reveal a demonstrable integrity to the passage, even if it leaves us somewhat at a loss as to the meaning of it all.

The first chapter examines the long quotation that Sextus Empiricus presents as the beginning of the poem and the supposed evidence that shows it to be a patchwork, defending the arrangement of the text as Sextus preserves it. In the course of so doing, key methodological points come to light for the assessment of the source material generally. Most prominently, it is seen that Diels, Kranz, and other editors have failed to appreciate the special significance of repetition in Parmenides’ poem, which has led to numerous instances of mistaking different but similar portions of the original poem for a single passage. An analysis of repeated words (and roots) in the lines presented by Sextus reveals the integrity of his quotation, which is found to be structured around interlaced patterns of recurring forms.

The second chapter consists of a careful reading of the two most important source texts for the proem. By reading and comparing the accounts of Parmenides in Sextus and Diogenes Laertius, we can discern a shared source whose anachronistic reading of lines from the proem heavily influenced both presentations as well as, indirectly, most modern interpretations. Recognizing the nature of that influence helps to formulate an alternative understanding of those lines that accords better than the dominant one with the arrangement of the proem argued for in the first chapter. As a result, the common opinion of scholars on the meaning and status of *logos* in the poem is called into question. Given the predilection of historians of philosophy for portraying Parmenides as the father of logic (as exhibited in the remarks of Hegel and Nietzsche
quoted at the beginning of this introduction, and repeated countless times since), the consequences of that questioning may well require significant changes to the story that we tell about early Greek philosophy as a whole.

The third chapter provides additional support, through a detailed reading of a portion of Empedocles’ poetry, for the structure of the proem presented in the first chapter and for the attitude toward logos discerned in the second. A sampling of Empedocles’ verse provides close parallels for various elements in Parmenides’ proem. Moreover, examination of the context in which the Empedoclean lines are preserved—another passage from the same book of Sextus Empiricus’ adversus Mathematicos—reveals a parallel instance of modern editors’ overzealous “corrections” of a text preserved by Sextus. When these “corrections” are ignored, overlooked aspects of Empedocles’ work also come to light, and the ties to Parmenides’ work are seen to be even closer than is commonly realized.

The second part, a (lengthy) single chapter, addresses problems in the reconstruction of Parmenides’ poem from a different direction, focusing on the relationship of the Doxa or “Way of Opinion” to the better-preserved Aletheia or “Way of Truth”. The fourth chapter considers that relationship in light of a recent challenge to the prevailing arrangement of the fragments. In a series of articles focused on the status of doxa and of scientific inquiry in Parmenides’ poem, Néstor-Luis Cordero has been advocating an alternative ordering of the fragments, departing dramatically from the arrangements of DK and its predecessors. Maintaining, contrary to most interpretations of the Doxa, that doxai and “physics” were entirely unrelated notions for Parmenides, Cordero seeks to disentangle their common, but supposedly mistaken, association. According to Cordero, this confusion, which arose early among Parmenides’ ancient readers, has been ubiquitous in modern times because the scholars responsible for the reconstruction of the
poem have, in some measure accidentally, tended to place fragments of a “physical” nature in the *Doxa*. Cordero’s own suggestion is that some sort of “physics” was a part of Parmenides’ “Way of Truth”, and he proposes a new arrangement of the fragments in which material generally assigned to the *Doxa* would be included in the *Aletheia*. Through a detailed response to Cordero’s accounts of the reception and reconstruction of the poem, as well as his novel proposals for the placement of the purportedly “physical” fragments, this essay provides an overview of the early efforts of modern scholars to arrange the fragments and the evidence of the ancients that lay behind them. While Cordero’s proposals for the fragments in question are often found to run contrary to the evidence provided by the sources that quote them, his questioning of the common association of the *Doxa* with “physics” is important nonetheless. After the largely critical bulk of the rest of the essay, the chapter concludes with a suggestion that, though his changes to the ordering of the fragments are untenable, Cordero’s doubts about the “physical” character of the *Doxa* are in a certain manner on point, if not in quite the way he envisions.

The final chapter of this dissertation is a conclusion in name only. Although I will summarize there the lessons learned thus far, relating the findings of the two parts to one another, it will be clear that we nevertheless find ourselves still at the beginning of an inquiry. We shall indeed be better prepared than before to engage in a full-scale reconstruction of the poem, but that will remain a task for the future. In addition to summarizing the ground we have covered, therefore, I will also offer glimpses of what can be gained by continued study of the sources for the poem along the lines begun in the preceding chapters. The benefits of the approach we will have made will be seen to extend beyond the task of reconstructing Parmenides’ poem, offering improved prospects for better understandings of the many later thinkers and writers influenced by him.
As for the reconstruction itself, we will have to rest content with having found a few “new” fragments and having established a rough skeleton which future work will help to flesh out. Given the finds in the earlier chapters, further review of other source texts with a better understanding of Parmenides’ use of repetition holds the promise that a number of other “new” fragments, previously considered to be duplicate quotations or corruptions of known portions of the poem, will come to light.
I advance, in what follows, a seemingly straightforward but apparently unpopular suggestion. At VII.111 of his adversus Mathematicos, Sextus Empiricus quotes, and subsequently comments upon, just over thirty-five verses as the beginning of Parmenides’ poem. Sextus provides no indication that the lines quoted are anything other than an unbroken, continuous passage, and it is my contention that they are in fact just that. To my knowledge, this suggestion has not met with the approval of any editor, commentator, or translator of Parmenides for at least a century. Since Hermann Diels’ first edition of what remains of the poem, no presentation of Parmenides’ work has given the arrangement of the opening lines of the poem as they are found in Sextus. Among the reputedly critically-minded tribes of classicists and philosophers to have considered

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1 Adv. Math. VII. 111-114.  
2 The depth and breadth of my knowledge on this score are of course limited. I have not endeavored to ground this claim with an altogether exhaustive investigation into the scholarship of the last hundred years. Nor, I ought to add, should the above sentence be taken to imply that the suggestion I am advancing was much more accepted before the twentieth century than during it. More will be said of the earlier presentations of the poem in the second part of the dissertation. A convenient survey of the developments in the reconstruction of the poem from the Renaissance on is provided in Cordero (1987).  
3 Diels’ first presentation of Parmenides’ poem, which has been the basis for all subsequent arrangements of the fragments, appeared in 1897 in Parmenides Lehrgedicht (= “PL”). Diels repeated the arrangement, substantially the same (but with the introduction of “A fragments” and “B fragments” to designate testimonia and verbatim quotations respectively) in Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta (1901) and in the early editions of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1903; 1906 (2nd ed.); 1912 (3rd ed.); 1922 (4th ed.); collectively referred to below as “FdV”). Later editions of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, edited by Walther Kranz (and hereafter abbreviated “DK”), featured changes to a number of the fragments, including the proem. With rare exceptions, to be discussed below, Kranz’s alterations to Diels’ arrangement of the lines quoted by Sextus has been followed by subsequent scholars. For the end of the poem as it appeared in Diels (1901), see the appendix to this chapter, Texts: A, page 51 below.
Parmenides’ poem since Diels’ time, John Burnet, F. M. Cornford, W. K. C. Guthrie, Martin Heidegger, G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, Leonardo Tarán, Hans-Georg Gadamer, A. P. D. Mourelatos, M. E. Pellikaan-Engel, Jonathan Barnes, David Gallop, A. H. Coxon, Patricia Curd and John Palmer have one and all accepted the arrangement of the proem that either Diels or Kranz had offered.⁴ I propose, on the contrary, that Sextus’ text be allowed to stand more or less unmolested. In so doing, I am not suggesting that we ought to accept Sextus’ presentation of the proem uncritically (the lines quoted have naturally suffered their share of textual corruption, and the interpretation of them which he records is certainly open to question),⁵ but simply that the run of just over thirty-five verses which Sextus quotes as the beginning of the poem gives neither too few nor too many lines. When so read, the lines, though certainly puzzling, exhibit an integrity of style and sense that is disrupted if the changes incorporated into the DK text are accepted.⁶ Moreover, as we consider these lines anew, a number of interesting and enlightening points for our understanding not only of the proem but for the rest of Parmenides’ poem will also come to light.


⁵ It should be noted, however, that the interpretation which Sextus reports is not necessarily his own. Indeed, as I will discuss in the next chapter, there are indications not only that the interpretation comes from elsewhere, but that Sextus does not endorse it.

⁶ For Sextus’ text, incorporating some corrections based on Diogenes Laertius, see Texts: B, page 52 below.
Unreliable Sextus

The unanimous acceptance of the changes to Sextus’ text is surprising in light of the fact that he is regularly admitted to have been a relatively reliable source. Diels, for instance, although confidently altering Sextus’ text by interpolating into it two lines preserved in Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s *de Caelo*, still defended the general reliability of Sextus’ presentation of the proem, attributing what appeared to be the omission of two lines in his text to a simple *saut du même au même*. Coxon, although he maintains that “it is clear from the manuscript variants that nearly all the errors are medieval and that the text from which Sextus was copying preserved a reliable tradition of Parmenides”, nevertheless appears so committed to the additional change made by Kranz that he regards “Sextus’ apparent unawareness that the last five and a half lines of his quotation cannot have followed immediately on the first thirty” as evidence that the reliable text that Sextus had before him could not have been a full version of the poem. More recently, Simon Trépanier, seeking to cast doubt on Sextus’ testimony

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7 As noted in *Texts: A*. I will be referring to this as “Diels’ addition”, and I will call the relocation (into what becomes DK B 7) of the final lines quoted by Sextus “Kranz’s move”, using these phrases as shorthand for the two major changes to Sextus’ quotation that result in DK B 1. As discussion of the earlier editions of the text in chapter four will make plain, neither change originated with Diels or Kranz. To judge from Tarán’s account in his commentary on the proem (1965, pp. 17-31), it was the arguments of Karl Reinhardt in particular that convinced both Diels (eventually) and Kranz of the correctness of “Kranz’s move”. Tarán explicitly rejects Reinhardt’s reasoning, but claims, “Nevertheless, we possess enough evidence in the fragments themselves to reject Sextus’ arrangement.” (1965, p. 21). As I hope to show, Tarán’s (and others’) understanding of “the fragments themselves”, where this differs from the actual selections preserved for us by various authors, needs careful rethinking.


9 I.e., the relocation and accommodation of the lines from Sextus which followed the lines added by Diels to a position immediately preceding DK 8, resulting in DK 7. Again, though Kranz was not the first to make this alteration (Simon Karsten and others preceded him in it, as did, in a way, Joseph Scaliger), I shall, in order to avoid unnecessarily complicating the present discussion, refer to this simply as “Kranz’s move”.

10 Coxon (1986) p. 5. Coxon fails to offer any argument for his premise “that the last five and a half lines of his quotation cannot have followed immediately on the first thirty”, without which Sextus’ “unawareness” of that
elsewhere, grants that “in other cases Sextus seems reliable enough as a witness”, but cites Parmenides’ proem as an instance where “he is clearly not.” Indeed, doubt about Sextus’ testimony here has become so universally accepted as to appear a settled issue even in editions of Sextus’ work. In his translation of Against the Logicians, in a note on the thirtieth verse quoted by Sextus, Richard Bett remarks:

The lines so far make up almost all of the prologue of Parmenides’ poem as we have it; Simplicius gives us two additional lines. As Simplicius’ multiple quotations make clear, the remaining lines quoted by Sextus come from a different point in the poem (after the two “roads of inquiry” have been introduced and one has been dismissed). Where Sextus has “spirit of a road” (θυμός ἕδοιος) Simplicius has “story of a road” (μῦθος ἕδοιος).

Why this long tradition of regarding the usually “reliable enough” Sextus as so manifestly misleading in this instance? With Bett, as with the other commentators, the matter is “clear”. And here, at least, we are given something of a reason: “Simplicius’ multiple quotations”. This is a bit elliptical, but Simplicius is a valuable and reliable source, and were it the case that he had repeatedly quoted the five-plus lines remaining in Sextus’ passage with explicit mention of where they stood in the poem, the matter might well be clear. The situation, however, is not quite impossible would seem prima facie evidence that the passage is an uninterrupted whole. Elsewhere Coxon makes the allied but equally unsubstantiated claim: “No reasonable doubt is possible that θυμός in Sextus’ quotation of [DK B 7, line] 6 is an error for μῦθος [one of the accommodations necessary for Kranz’s move] and that the lines are identical with the first words of fr.8 as cited by Simplicius.” (1986, p. 193) I hope to show that such doubt is not only reasonable, but, given its due, is a key to an improved understanding of the text.

11 See Trépanier (2007) pp. 213-214, n. 84. Trépanier appears to refer to two such passages: Sextus’ quotation of Parmenides’ proem at adv. Math. VII.111, and adv. Math. VII.123-125, where lines from Empedocles (DK 31 B 2 and 3) are quoted. As it is Sextus’ reliability in the latter passage that Trépanier is calling into question, the Parmenides quotation is the only real parallel adduced to support the claim, and no argument for its unreliability is offered beyond quoting Coxon’s remark above about Sextus’ “unawareness”. In doubting the reliability of Sextus’ quotations of Empedocles, Trépanier is following the lead of Brad Inwood (cf. Inwood (2001) pp. 212-219, 276-277) and M. R. Wright. Wright’s justification for dividing DK 31 B 3 into two parts also relies on assuming an error in Sextus’ quotation of Parmenides’ proem: “That Sextus does omit a considerable number of lines from his quotations without indicating that he does so is supported by his citation of Parmenides earlier at 7.111. There frs. 7.2-6 and 8.1-2 of Parmenides run straight on from fr. 1.1-30, although it is known from Plato (Soph. 237a, 258d) and Simplicius (in Cael. 557.25 to 558.1-2) that the lines were not consecutive.” (Wright (1981) p. 157, emphasis added.) As we shall see, what “is known from Plato … and Simplicius” about the proem is less than scholars are in the habit of claiming. We will have occasion to consider Sextus’ quotations of Empedocles in chapter three.

12 I.e., the point at which Diels added the two lines from Simplicius’ in Cael.

13 Bett (2005) p. 24, n. 49. Against the Logicians is an alternative title for books VII and VIII of adversus Mathematicos (also known as Against the Dogmatists).
so simple. In fact, “Simplicius’ quotations” introduce two quite separate textual points, which we must distinguish carefully from one another before we can claim that anything is clear. The first is the question of the “two additional lines” Simplicius gives. These are quoted, once, in his commentary on the de Caelo (hereafter “in Cael.”), and bear on what I refer to as “Diels’ addition”.14 As I hope to show below, there are reasons for doubting the assumption that these lines come from the proem. An independent question is raised by a number of passages in Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (hereafter “in Phys.”) which present two issues relevant to what I am calling “Kranz’s move”:15

(i) of the lines which comprise the end of Sextus’ passage (D.1), one of them (άλλα σο τήσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα) is quoted five times (twice alone (D.5 and D.6), three times (D.2-4) preceded by a line that does not appear in Sextus’ passage: οὐ γάρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ εἴναι μη ἔόντα, or some variant thereof); (ii) the final words of Sextus’ text (μόνος δ’ ἐτι θυμός ὁδοίο / λείπεται) bear a definite resemblance to the opening lines of DK 8, which Simplicius quotes on three occasions in the same commentary (D.7-9). Simplicius’ quotations of the verse άλλα σο τήσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα, particularly the one at in Phys. 78.6 (D.5; cf. D.9), do give evidence for linking it with other lines of the poem, but nothing in any of the contexts of those quotations suggests that lines 32-34 of Sextus’ proem (i.e., DK 7.2-5) might belong with it on those occasions. As for the six words at the end of Sextus’ quotation, their resemblance to the opening words of DK 8 is, although striking, not exact. As Bett himself notes, where all the manuscripts of Sextus read θυμός ὁδοίο, the lines from Simplicius begin by speaking of a μοθος ὁδοίο. Coxon, as noted above,16 was convinced that θυμός could not be correct, and that the lines must be identical, but there are additional discrepancies between the two texts. In Sextus, the metrically necessary μόνος is the

14 See Texts: C.5 (page 53 below) for the lines quoted in Simplicius’ in Cael.
15 For the texts of Simplicius’ quotations relevant to this question, see Texts: D, page 54 below.
16 See footnote 10.
only attested reading, while in two of the three places that Simplicius reports his lines, the better attested reading is the epic form μοῦνος. Moreover, while the sentence Sextus was reading apparently ended with λείπεται, the one in Simplicius carries on for another two words.

Simplicius’ testimony, then, does not in fact contradict Sextus’, but, as Diels assumed in his earlier arrangements, may merely provide evidence of repetition within Parmenides’ poem and of variation within repeated phrases. I stress “repetition” because while the repetition of lines is obviously a regular feature of epic verse, the importance of this for the reconstruction and the reading of Parmenides’ poem has not, I think, been fully appreciated, even by those who emphasize the need for reading Parmenides in light of his epic models. The supposed contradiction that Simplicius provides to Sextus’ citation may amount to no more than this: (i) verses modeled on lines 28-30 of the proem appeared in later, as yet unidentified, contexts; and (ii) following a repetition of line 31 of the proem (as DK 7.2), the closing words of Sextus’ quotation were echoed (with a substitution of μῦθος for θυμός, among other changes) at the beginning of DK 8. It is the widespread failure by scholars to appreciate the simple possibility

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17 Coxon prints μόνος in his text, and remarks in his commentary on 8.1, “The epic form of the adjective is μοῦνος (cf. [DK 2.2]) but Homer has μονωθείς in Λ 470.” (1986, p. 194) This does not really address the variant readings in Simplicius, where μόνος is a more likely corruption from μοῦνος than vice-versa. This concern (among others) with Kranz’s arrangement was raised by P.J. Bicknell in Bicknell (1968a). In Sider (1985), David Sider also argues for the epic form, and the discontinuity of DK 7 and 8, but is not led by this to reconsider the placement of DK 7.

18 I am assuming that Sextus did not end his quotation mid-sentence, although this is indeed a possibility. As there is not, however, any comment in what follows on the final sentence of his quotation, there would seem to be little reason for Sextus to have bothered quoting it at all, only to break it off mid-sentence.

19 Fragment 7 of Diels’ original arrangement (before the reordering by Kranz) was simply the two lines quoted thrice by Simplicius (see Texts: D.2-4) and by Plato before him (see Sophist 258d, and cf. 237a).


21 As has been pointed out to me by Edwin Floyd, there is a Homeric model, featuring a substitution of μύθος, for such echoing of phrasing at Odyssey 1.358-359 (μόνος δ’ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει / πάσι, μάλιστα δ’ ἐμοὶ· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ’ ἐνί δίκῳ), where the poet recalls the phrasing of Iliad 6.492-493 (πόλεμος δ’ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει / πάσι, ἐμοὶ δὲ μάλιστα· τοῦ ἐγγεγαάσιν) and 20.137 (πόλεμος δ’ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει). In the Iliad, the contexts of the two passages call for understanding ἄνδρεσσι (and thus the overall sentiment) differently on the two occasions. In the earlier passage, spoken by Hektor to Andromache (intriguingly named, considering the statement being made), ἄνδρεσσι indicates “man” in contrast to “woman”. In the later passage, spoken by Poseidon to Hera, the contrast is between “men” and “gods”. In the Odyssey itself, where the many senses of ἄνδρεσσι are a concern from the opening word on, the pattern is repeated, with additional variation, ten books later at 11.352-353 (πομπὴ δ’ ἄνδρεσσι μελήσει / πάσι, μάλιστα δ’ ἐμοὶ· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ’ ἐνί δήμῳ), and occurs a third time, ten books (to the line) farther on at 21.352-
that different sources for Parmenides’ poem are sometimes quoting from similar, but separate, passages, that has made so many feel that the “improvements” to Sextus’ text were so clearly correct.

Finding Fragments: Methodological Points

It is an understandable impulse that lies behind the alterations made by Diels and by Kranz, so universally taken as the definitive word on the lines from Sextus. It is only natural to want to assemble the fragments available to us into the most coherent wholes possible. Diels’ addition seems to supply lines which we would not otherwise have known were missing from the proem and which have struck scholars since as among the more noteworthy therein. Kranz’s move, meanwhile, may appear especially attractive because it fills a known lacuna just before DK 8, the longest continuous (and, many would claim, most philosophically significant) fragment extant.

Such changes seem attractive, for they look like definite scholarly advances, providing us an improved sense of the overall structure of the poem. Piecing together the fragments can be an alluring exercise (and I shall offer some of my own proposals by and by), but some initial caution is called for. Prior to any reconstructive efforts, we must make as careful an assessment

353 (τόξον δ’ ἀνδρεσσι μελήσει / πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ’ ἐμοὶ· τοῦ γὰρ κράτος ἔστ’ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ). As has been further pointed out to me Professor Floyd, the treatment of Iliad 6.493 by editors provides a parallel to the editorial situation of Parmenides’ text. In place of the reading given above, which is found in the overwhelming majority of manuscripts and printed by van Thiel (1996), most editions, including the Oxford Classical Text of Minro and Allen (1920) and M. L. West’s recent Teubner edition (1998), print πᾶσι, μάλιστα δ’ ἐμοὶ· τοὶ Ἰλίῳ ἐγγεγαάσιν, “correcting” the manuscripts’ ἐμοὶ δὲ μάλιστα το μάλιστα δ’ ἐμοὶ on the basis of the appearance of the latter at Iliad 22.422 and its recurrence in the Odyssey.

22 This is especially so after Kranz’s move, which turns those lines into the closing lines of the proem. G. E. L. Owen begins his influential essay “Eleatic Questions” (1960, revised and reprinted in Allen and Furley (1975) pp. 48-81) with a discussion of these lines, described as “already for Diels in 1897 the most controversial text in Parmenides” (p. 49). Owen commits the common error already discussed when he continues, “It occurs, according to Simplicius’ quotation, at the end of the goddess’ opening remarks.” The context of Simplicius’ quotation in the de Caelo commentary in fact does not refer to the “goddess’ opening remarks” or otherwise explicitly locate the lines in the poem.

23 See footnotes 7 and 9.
of the evidence as we can, in order to prevent unwitting errors later on.\textsuperscript{24} Instead of instinctively assuming that all similar lines in what remains of Parmenides’ poem are points of overlap in the original, I suggest that where the available evidence might place similar, and even identical, lines in different contexts, we should be prepared to accept that, like Hesiod and Homer before him, and Empedocles and Lucretius after (and imitating) him, Parmenides repeated phrases, whole lines, and even runs of multiple verses at various points in his poem. We should not rush to piece together smaller fragments into larger ones simply because they share similar phrasing, and we ought to be especially wary when doing so would force us either into dismembering the larger and more coherent passages that do remain or into an artificial choice between apparent textual variants, when multiple “variants” may well be true readings and valuable aids to our appreciation and understanding of the poem. As we shall see, both of these unfortunate circumstances result from the “corrections” to the proem made by Diels and Kranz.

Diels, I claim, was right in resisting the impulse to assume that the recurrence of a single hexameter, όλλα σὺ τὴσδ’ ὁδὸν διζήσιον νόημα, in Sextus, Simplicius, and Plato meant that these authors were quoting those words from precisely the same point in Parmenides’ poem. Still, Diels did not see equally clearly in all instances, and I think that we can improve upon his efforts by hesitating over the interpolation that he himself admitted into Sextus’ text.

\textsuperscript{24} This is a less alluring enterprise, and if it is indeed true that no treatment of Parmenides in the last century has regarded Sextus’ version of the proem as needing neither supplement from Simplicius (Diels’ view) nor pruning (Kranz’s view), that is probably because it has seldom occurred to scholars even to raise the question. Many treatments of Parmenides pay little attention to the proem, and almost all are content to take the arrangements of Diels and/or Kranz for granted. There have been a few scholars, since Kranz’s alteration, who have voiced a preference for Diels’ earlier arrangement, or some variation thereof, but even these have not questioned Diels’ interpolation of the lines from Simplicius into Sextus’ quotation. One is Cornelia J. de Vogel, who prints Diels’ text, noting Diels’ objections (“\textit{VS} 4,, p. 151”) to the combination of Sextus’ final lines with fr. 8 (de Vogel (1963) p. 37). Bicknell, in the article mentioned above (1968\textit{a}), proposes a reinterpretation of the end of the proem, based on but modifying Diels’ arrangement. Bicknell also proposes to read DK 6, 4, and 8 as a continuous passage. The result has been described as “peu convaincante” by Denis O’Brien (in Aubenque et al. (1987) Vol. I, p. 245, n. 23) and has not, as far as I am aware, had any defenders since. Bicknell’s suggestions and the criticisms of them will be discussed below. A third to depart from the DK text is Philip Wheelwright; for his remarks, see Wheelwright (1960) pp. 96-97 and 294, and footnote 26 below.
His incorporation of the lines from Simplicius’ *in Cael.* within Sextus’ proem did not simply supply a pair of seemingly missing lines, but created two difficulties that remain with us today: first, the addition of these lines has forced every editor and translator of the text since to choose between competing adjectives modifying Ἀληθείης in the lines preceding them. Although uncontested itself, the interpolation has generated a distracting dispute among the poem’s commentators that cannot be said to have been settled.\(^{25}\) Second, the additional lines turned a coherent passage into an awkward one. Burnet, adopting Diels’ text for translation in the second and subsequent editions of his *Early Greek Philosophy*, felt this, and indicated the resulting discontinuity by a row of asterisks immediately following the inserted lines.\(^{26}\)

By preserving Sextus’ proem undisturbed, we can avoid generating these problems for ourselves. If we allow the possibility that the discrepancies found in the citations of otherwise reliable witnesses may be due to their having different portions of the poem in view, it is not surprising that the dispute over the variant adjectives modifying Ἀληθείης has been inconclusive, for the alleged conflict between the quoting authors looks like a phantom one. When we cease to regard the verses quoted by Sextus and Simplicius as quotations from the same portion of the poem, the difficulty of choosing between their respective readings disappears. The second difficulty, while less celebrated, is equally illusory. Because of the popularity of Kranz’s move, and a general lack of appreciation for the coherence of the proem, readers are less familiar with

\(^{25}\) There are in fact three competing variants. In addition to those of Sextus and Simplicius, a third comes from Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s *Timaeus* (= *in Tim.*). Of the three supposed variants, Proclus’ εὐφεγγέος is by far the least favored, but Sextus’ εὐπαθέος and Simplicius’ εὐκυκλέος both have their supporters.

\(^{26}\) See Burnet (1930) pp. 172-173. Wheelwright (1960, p. 96), who adopts a very similar order (but with the extra addition of what stands today as DK 7.1 between Diels’ addition and the remainder of Sextus’ quotation, effectively making DK 7 fragment 2 of his own arrangement), deals with the discontinuity by inserting a title, “The Way of Truth”, between his fragments 1 and 2. Wheelwright claims in a note (p. 294) on his own fragment 2 that, “In Sextus Empiricus’ quotation this passage follows the next to last sentence of Fr. 1. Parts of the new passage are quoted by Plato, *Sophist* 237a, Aristotle *Metaphysica* 1089a 4, and Simplicius, Comm. on the *Physica*, p. 650; but only Sextus quotes the whole of it.” This last remark is mistaken, because the line shared by the other three authors (DK 7.1) is not, as has been pointed out, in Sextus at all. Mistakes of this sort can be very difficult to avoid when working from DK, and underscore the need for a reconsideration of the various sources of the poem in light of the possibility of deliberate repetitions.
this problem, but it does not arise without Diels’ addition. The more sensitive we are to the internal coherence of the proem as quoted by Sextus (about which we shall learn more as the chapter proceeds), the more averse we will be to alterations that will disturb its integrity.

Should we, in reconstructing the poem, resist allowing Parmenides the kind of repetition that I am suggesting, Diels’ second difficulty helps make Kranz’s move seem attractive, at least initially. The lines which seemed awkward following Diels’ addition can be removed from the proem and transplanted so as to mesh with the beginning of DK 8. As already mentioned, however, despite the seemingly satisfying results, Kranz could not accomplish this without making certain other accommodations. Sextus’ θυμὸς ὅδοῖο must be changed to μῦθος ὅδοῖο, μόνος must be read in Simplicius against the “better” manuscripts’ μοῦνος, and we must imagine that Sextus decided to end a quotation in the middle of a sentence which he need not have included in the quotation at all. If at present these seem relatively minor points, they may appear less so as we proceed and come to better appreciate the intricate structure of the passage preserved by Sextus.

Diels’ and Kranz’s “corrections”, then, give the appearance of being elegant solutions, but at the cost of suppressing legitimate and potentially important readings, introducing difficult new problems, and disturbing what I hope to show is a demonstrable (if under-appreciated) unity in the received text. Accordingly, it may well be worth our while to examine each of these “improvements” to Sextus’ presentation of the proem in a bit more detail, keeping the possibility of repetition in mind.

27 Kranz’s fragment, i.e., DK 7, also includes, before the relocated lines from Sextus, a line quoted in isolation by Aristotle in the Metaphysics, and by Plato and Simplicius in connection with the line identical to the first of Sextus’ displaced lines (i.e., as the first line of the couplet that appears in Texts: D.2-4). See the preceding footnote for Wheelwright’s treatment of this line.
Diels’ Addition

With the texts before us, the reasoning behind Diels’ interpolation seems obvious enough. The first two and a half lines quoted in Simplicius’ *in Cael.* (Texts: C.5) are, but for one word, identical to lines 28-30 of Sextus’ quotation, and, absent the idea that these lines might have been repeated within the poem itself, Diels felt justified in inserting the unparalleled final two lines quoted by Simplicius. This would seem to be a standard enough reconstructive procedure and I have yet to find anyone expressing doubt about Diels’ alteration. Still, there remain the two significant difficulties already mentioned: there is a standing scholarly dispute over that one word, and the lines from Sextus that would then follow the added lines do not fit particularly well with what now precedes them. We will save the latter difficulty for our discussion of Kranz’s move, and turn now to the question of the variant adjectives applied to Ἀληθείης.

When we take a careful look at all the various sources for the lines in question, two distinct grades of textual variation become apparent. The lines as they appear in Plutarch (C.1), Diogenes Laertius (C.2), and Clement (C.3) present, when compared with one another and with Sextus’ text, the sort of corruption or variation we would normally expect to see among authors quoting the same original text: the easy substitution of ἀτρεκὲς for ἀτρεμὲς; ἡ μὲν and ἡ δὲ for ἠμὲν and ἠδὲ; the replacement of ταῖς (or τῇς) with αἷς; the alteration of οὐκ ἐνι to οὐκέτι, and

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28 Pointing to the form τῆς in Diogenes’ text (C.2), and claiming that ταῖς is “a form totally alien to Homeric and Hesiodic morphology”, Sider (1985, p. 363) argues for τῆς here. That Parmenides must conform to Homeric or Hesiodic morphology is implied in an earlier remark, in defense of reading ἔς for εἰς in line 10 of the proem: “I am merely asking that Parmenides be edited according to the same standards we apply to his literary models, Homer and Hesiod.” (p. 362) While Sider may well be correct in both readings, each of which has some textual support, the general editorial principle seems to equate the inescapable fact that Hesiod and Homer are among Parmenides’ literary models with the implausible belief that they are his only literary models. Some two centuries or more separate Parmenides from these writers, during which time other influences, with differing idioms, had no doubt come along. I am also dubious of Sider’s additional assertion about τῆς: “And if Parmenides used the Homeric form once, he would have used it consistently; hence B 12,2 ταῖς should probably also be read as τῆς.” (p. 363) First of all, Homeric spelling itself is hardly a model of consistency; second, even if it were, I see no reason to think that Parmenides was not at liberty to depart from it whenever it suited his purposes to do so. We have already, in fact, seen evidence of such freedom in the choice of μοῦνος in the last full line of Sextus’ quotation, where the epic μοῦνος is metrically unsuitable. Cf. Coxon’s remarks (1986, p. 7) on Diels’ reservations (*PL*, pp. 26-27) on this score.
the interesting but unlikely substitution in Diogenes of σε θεός for Sextus’ σ’ ἔθος. The lines from Diogenes even offer substantial improvements over readings found in the manuscripts of Sextus: κρίναι and πολύδηρν where Sextus has κρίνε and πολύπειρον (the latter evidently repeated from two lines above). Indeed, the manner in which Diogenes quotes his text is so similar to the treatment found in Sextus following the extended quotation of the passage (both present a reading in which logos is taken as Parmenides’ criterion of truth, citing nearly identical runs of verses, with line 31 omitted, in support of the claim) that they appear to be relying on the same (probably Stoic) source for the interpretation they record. Significantly, all of these texts agree in reading εὐπειθεός for the adjective modifying Ἀληθείης. In sum, none of the variations between these texts (C.1-3) and Sextus’ (B) is difficult to account for, and nothing from these texts would lead us to believe that the authors are quoting from different passages of the poem.

It is hardly surprising, when multiple other authors are already believed to be quoting the same lines of the proem, that Diels would assume that the passages from Proclus (C.4) and Simplicius (C.5) were additional instances of the same. But, while there are errors of the same type as in the first group, in these cases there is also variation of a different order. Neither εὐκυκλέος in Simplicius nor εὐφεγγέος in Proclus is an obvious source for corruption into εὐπειθεός, or vice versa. As pointed out above, the unquestioned presumption that Simplicius and Proclus must have been quoting from the proem has led to considerable disagreement over

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29 A similar slip occurs in Bett’s translation of Sextus, where the Heliades are called “Daughters of Night” under the influence, one imagines, of the nearby “house of Night” (2005, p. 24). As Sider (see the preceding footnote) suggests, Diogenes may offer an additional improvement if the τῆς of his text is read as τῇς.

30 Note particularly this missing line. Its significance for the interpretation reported will be treated in the next chapter.

31 As will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, it is worth distinguishing between the Stoic interpretation each author is reporting and what we might be able to glean of Sextus’ and Diogenes’ own views about the matter. Tarán, strangely eager to pin the allegorical interpretation of the proem on Sextus and Sextus alone, rides roughshod over this distinction (1965, pp. 17-22).
which adjective truly belongs with “Truth”. Most who take up the issue are defenders either of ἐὐπειθέος or ἐὐκυκλέος, and solid reasons can be and have been mustered in support of each. The arguments against any of the readings, however, including ἐὐφεγγέος, are far less convincing. Coxon, for instance, dismisses ἐὐφεγγέος with the claim that “Proclus’s quotations from Parmenides seem generally to be from memory”, but this ignores the fact that Proclus not only quotes the couplet with that reading but explicitly comments soon thereafter on Parmenides’ reasons for calling truth ἐὐφεγγής. Each author also exhibits other variations unparalleled in the others: there are two additional lines in Simplicius, and, in Proclus, we find τὸ μὲν or τὸ μὲν rather than ἠμὲν in the first, and the nominative δόξαι rather than the accusative δόξας in the second line of the couplet. These differences, together with the three different adjectives, suggest that a better solution to the potential problems posed by the testimony of Proclus and Simplicius against Sextus is to suppose that we have evidence for three different passages, each featuring a recurrent Parmenidean couplet, but distinctively marked by its own characteristic adjective. In this way, the apparent conflict between our sources vanishes, and we are able to keep the full range of potentially significant readings. In addition to a restored proem based on Sextus, we will also find ourselves with two “new” fragments, the places of which


33 Coxon (1986) p. 168. Not infrequently, the appeal to “quotation from memory” seems a poor substitute for a more thoughtful consideration of the wide range of reasons why one author might be quoting another inaccurately. Doubtless, many a misquotation has occurred because an author has misremembered and failed to check his source, but before speaking as though we possess certain knowledge about the reading and writing habits of individuals dead a millennium or more, it is worth debating the alternatives.

34 The larger context is clipped in the presentation in DK (A 17), so this regularly goes unnoticed. Coxon, however, provides the necessary context himself in his selection of testimonia (1986, p. 132).
within the poem will have to be determined, and the significance of which will have to be more fully assessed, apart from our consideration of the proem.35

In advance of that fuller treatment, it is worth making some initial observations on Parmenides’ interesting employment of these lines. When we suppose three different passages, we may then notice that on each occasion when the goddess invokes the “untrembling” heart of Truth, Aletheia ironically appears less constant than we might have imagined: a new adjective appears each time. Moreover, it is specifically the “heart” of the adjective, positioned in the “heart” of the verse (with seven syllables on either side), that changes: within the EY-xxxx-ΕΟΣ pattern common to each, it is only the inner four letters of the words that alter. Parmenides’ interest in preserving this pattern (whatever it may mean to him) seems confirmed by his use here of the genitive form εὐκυκλέος (<εὐκυκλής); in DK 8.43 the “regular” form εὐκύκλου (<εὐκυκλος) appears.37 It has been argued in favor of reading εὐπειθέος in the proem that it suits the context particularly well. Mourelatos, in so doing, also notes how the resulting balanced contrast of faithful Truth (Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος) and true faith (πίστις ἀληθής) fits into an array of such contrasts in the two lines.38 It will be worth considering how the other adjectives may fit into whatever contexts we might find for them.

Inspection of Diels’ addition, then, not only shows that positing repetition in Parmenides’ poem is a simple way to reconcile many of the supposed inconsistencies between the sources for
the poem, but also illustrates how Parmenides can use repetition as an effective literary device. We need not undervalue our sources, or the poet himself.

**Kranz’s Move**

We have already seen that Kranz’s transposition of the end of Sextus’ quotation into DK 7 does not work without introducing certain changes to the text. Nonetheless, many have been prepared to make them, given what seemed to be evidence confirming the lines’ new location. Tarán, as noted earlier, even when rejecting the arguments that motivated Kranz, insists that “we possess enough evidence in the fragments themselves to reject Sextus’ arrangement.” He continues,

> Fr. II.1-2 begins to point out the two ways of inquiry (εἰ δ’ ἴσιν ἔγων ἔρέω, κόμισα πρὸς τὸν ἀκούσας, || ἀπέρ ὁδῷ μοῦν ᾧς διζήσις εἰς νόησαι) and therefore must have stood almost immediately after fr. 1, while fr. VII.5-6 (κρίνα δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον || ἐξ ἐμέθθεν ῥηθέντα) shows that there has already been an exposition, for these words refer to an ἔλεγχος already given by the goddess (cf. Verdenius, p. 64 with note 1 and the comm. to fr. VII.5-6) and consequently they could not have come immediately after fr. 1.40

This evidence of the “fragments themselves” hardly seems compelling. Even if it is true that lines 1-2 of fr. 2 suggest that they follow “almost immediately” after fragment one,41 how does that prevent the first fragment from being a few lines longer? As for the ἔλεγχος, the aorist participle ῥηθέντα suggests that the youth’s judgment of it will not take place before it has been spoken (which is hardly surprising), but it does not require that it has already been spoken as of this point in the goddess’ speech. Tarán’s reference to his commentary on fr. VII (= DK 7) does not help matters. The specific note on lines 5-6 referred to simply reiterates the claim that “the “much contested proof” has already been given by the goddess”, again citing Verdenius (while

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39 See footnote 7.
40 Tarán (1965) pp. 21-22.
41 I fail to see why beginning to point out two ways of inquiry in DK 2.1-2 should prevent there being intervening fragments between the proem (on anyone’s ending) and these lines. The earlier arrangements by Diels presented DK 2 as fr. 4, with DK 4 and 5 intervening between fr. 1 and it.
Tarán adduces what might look like better evidence:

Moreover, a text of Simplicius proves: (a) that he took fr. VII.2 to refer the second way; (b) that fr. VII (at least fr. VII.1-2) came after fr. VI; (c) that he made a distinction between the second way and the doctrine attacked in fr. VI (cf. Simplicius *Phys.* 78.2 ff.: μεμψάμενος γάρ τούς τὸν και τὸ μὴν συμφέρουσιν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ “οἷς ... ταύτών” [fr. VI.8-9] καὶ ἀποστρέψας τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ὁμοίας “ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἄφ’ ὅδοι διξήσιος εἶργε νόημα,” ἐπάγει “μονὸς δ’ ἐτι μύθος κτλ.”) Since there are good reasons to reject Sextus’ arrangement which would place fr. VII.2-fr. VIII.2 immediately after fr. I.30 (cf. comm. to fr. I.1-32) the evidence provided by this passage of Simplicius has to be considered decisive both for the relative order of VI, VII, and VII and for fr. VII.1-2 being directed against the second way of inquiry.

The “good reasons for rejecting Sextus’ arrangement” here are merely mentioned, not laid out, and we are referred back to the unconvincing passage we have already encountered. Nonetheless, the passage of Simplicius discussed is an important one, to be considered decisive, as Tarán says, for the relative order of fragments VI, VII and VIII. Of course, we may regard the Simplicius passage as decisive for the order of these fragments without sharing Tarán’s tacit assumption that this conflicts with Sextus’ arrangement. As indicated in the parenthesis of Tarán’s point (b) (underlined above), it is only lines 1-2 of Tarán’s fr. VII that are actually fixed as following fr. VII.2-fr. VII.3.

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42 Tarán (1965) p. 81. Verdenius claimed that ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα “could not be taken to mean ‘the enquiry which I recommend to you’ (Diels), or ‘which I submit (Capelle), or again, ‘which I expound’ (Albertelli), but only ‘the proof which I have uttered’ i.e., which I have given you.” (1942, p. 64) This argument appears to rest on the notion that the aorist participle establishes an absolute time by which the *elenchos* has been spoken. This is not true, but a number of other scholars have followed Verdenius on this point. Cf. e.g., Mourelatos (1970) p. 91, n. 46: “As Verdenius […] saw, the aorist ῥηθέντα clearly shows that the ἔλεγχος has already been delivered”; Curd (1998) p. 62, n. 107; and Cordero (2010) p. 243. J. H. Lesher, in Lesher (1984) pp. 17-18, n. 19, seems to echo this view in remarking that Diels “did not consider the possibility that the *elenchos* might already have occurred, ending with the *krisis* at 8.1 in part, I suspect, because he had placed lines 3-6 of Fr 7 at the end of the long Fr 1, which is far too early for any *elenchos* to have taken place. When he confronted the fact that the *elenchos* would have to have been spoken by the end of the initial fragment, he was forced to regard it merely as a ‘prospective’ reference to the *elenchos* yet to come in the *doxa* section, surely an odd reading of an aorist participle.” Lesher does not mention that in placing the lines where he did Diels was (more or less) following Sextus, nor does Lesher elaborate on why this is supposed to be “surely an odd reading of the aorist participle”. In a later publication, Lesher appears to have reconsidered, noting on the participle, “The fact that the goddess refers to the ἔλεγχος as ‘spoken by her’ does not imply that she has spoken it prior to Fr. 7; it may just as easily consist in the argument presented in Fr. 8 following.” (Lesher (1998) p. 38)

43 Tarán (1965) p. 76 (underlining added).

44 Tarán’s numbering here matches that of DK. I am less sure that the passage affords sufficient evidence to justify the claims of Tarán’s points (a) and (c), but (b) seems generally right, although, as I shall discuss presently, it needs stricter qualifications than Tarán applies.
VI, and, as has been pointed out already, line 1 is not in Sextus’ passage at all. The passage of Simplicius that Tarán quotes is perfectly consistent with a two line fr. VII, as in Diels’ original arrangement, prior to Kranz’s move. Tarán does not appear to take into account the important fact that, unless we make the overzealous identification of the last six words of Sextus’ proem with DK 8.1-2, none of the authors who appear to be quoting from DK 7.1-2 associates them with any of the other lines from Sextus’ passage. The evidence that Tarán adduces accords perfectly with assuming two (or more) separate passages. Tarán is not unaware of this possibility, but insists:

Some scholars would detach these lines [i.e., DK 7.3-6] from fr. VII.1-2 (cf. note ad loc.) but there is no good reason for doing so. The fact that Sextus quotes fr. VII.2-6 where line 2 is the same one quoted by Plato and Simplicius makes it reasonable to assume the unity of the whole fragment; this is strengthened by the fact that the content of lines 3-6 is not incompatible with that of lines 1-2, as Reinhardt believes.

Again, it is difficult to see what makes for a “good reason” here. Since no source for Parmenides’ poem other than a modern editor ever actually “attaches” line 1 of DK 7 to anything from lines 3-6, it is a bit perverse to demand a good reason for “detaching” them. Behind the appeal to the “fact” that Simplicius, Plato, and Sextus are quoting the “same line” is the tacit assumption that Parmenides would not have repeated the line. I have been calling this assumption into question generally, but this particular line, ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ ἀφ ὁδὸ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα, is already one of the more conspicuous cases of Parmenidean repetition (Tarán’s own reading of 6.3 is πρῶτης γάρ σ’ ἀφ’ ὁδὸ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>), making it an especially weak link on which to hang the unity of his (and DK’s) fragment seven. Nor is the unity of this

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45 Nor in fact is it quoted by Simplicius in the passage Tarán is discussing. Thus, to go by Simplicius alone, only line 7.2 (possibly without line 1) must lie between VI and VIII. If, following Sextus, we restore most of DK 7 to the proem, there will remain a “fragment Z” (at least DK 7.2, possibly DK 7.1-2, which would match Diels’ original fr. 7) between DK 6 and 8.
46 See Simplicius (at the passages compiled in D.2-9), Plato (at Sophist 237a and 258d), Aristotle (at Metaphysics 1089a4), and the commentaries of Ps.-Alexander and Syrianus on Aristotle’s passage.
47 Tarán (1965) pp. 76-77.
pieced-together fragment particularly strengthened by the additional alleged “fact” that lines 3-6 are “not incompatible” with lines 1-2. Not only are the same lines “not incompatible” with the first thirty lines of Sextus’ passage, but they are actually so preserved and handed down to us by a credible authority! Moreover, their proximity to one another and relative order are corroborated by the report of Diogenes Laertius.48

As noted earlier, problems with Kranz’s move had been raised by P. J. Bicknell.49 He departs from the arrangement of both Diels and Kranz, and thus in certain respects anticipates the present study, but objects (repeatedly) to arrangements that make for repetition in the poem. One of the principal merits of Kranz’s move, according to Bicknell, is the elimination of “the need to regard [Diels’ original 7.2] as a later repetition of a verse from the prologue”. Nevertheless, Kranz’s arrangement makes for other problems (most of which should be familiar ground by now):

1. The well-attested μοῦνος at Simplicius’ Physics (145.1ff.) has to yield to μόνος so that the metre of fragment 8 line 1 is preserved. This involves violation of the principle that of two readings the more ‘difficult’ one is normally the more acceptable.
2. Sextus’ addition of six lines to the prologue drawn from some other part of the poem is perhaps less likely than his omission of verses between lines 30 and 31.
3. The unanimous reading θυμὸς at line 35 of Sextus’ citation is ignored.
4. If we suppose that fragment 6 preceded fragments 7 and 8 fairly closely, and this seems a fair supposition, the poem becomes, in this section, intolerably repetitive. In the space of a few lines, Parmenides twice warns against following the opinions of mortals and at the end of fragment 7 line 2 (ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆς ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα) he repeats fragment 6 line 3 (πρώτης γάρ σ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>) almost verbatim. Parmenides is not a master poet, but here at least the goddess’ pronouncements are singularly uninspired.50

To avoid these difficulties, Bicknell recommends restoring the end of Sextus’ quotation to the proem, where, along with the two lines inserted by Diels, DK 7.1 will also be included, immediately following them. DK 6 and 8, Bicknell further recommends, can be seamlessly

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48 As already mentioned, we shall compare the accounts of Diogenes Laertius and Sextus in the next chapter.
50 Bicknell (1968a) pp. 46-47.
bridged by DK 4, instead of either Diels’ or Kranz’s fragment 7.\textsuperscript{51} Among the advantages Bicknell claims for his arrangement, “we avoid having to suppose irksome repetitiousness by Parmenides’ goddess”.\textsuperscript{52}

Bicknell aims both to give due deference to the sources for the poem and to put Parmenides in the best possible poetic light. This is, indeed, a marked improvement over interpreters who exploit Parmenides’ reputation as a poor poet in order to justify their neglect of the literary dimensions of his work and to rework the evidence of the sources to suit their own sense of what Parmenides must have meant to say. Still, the repetitions that Bicknell finds “irksome”, “intolerable”, and “uninspired” might not have seemed so to Parmenides or his desired audience. While I share Bicknell’s other concerns, and think it important not to dismiss them, his intolerance towards repetition seems mistaken, especially when considering a poet who opens his poem by repeating the same verb four times in the first four verses, and whom Proclus quotes as saying, “It is all the same to me / Where I shall begin, for I shall come back to it again. (fr.5)\textsuperscript{53} The removal of any trace of a fragment 7 from between DK 6 and 8, against the explicit evidence of Simplicius, seems to me hard to justify on stylistic grounds, particularly when what we can discern of Parmenides’ own style suggests a different sensibility. If, on the contrary, we should grant that repetition is a conspicuous (if possibly peculiar) trait of Parmenides’ muse, we can eliminate a whole host of other seeming conflicts, simply by following, in the main, the lead of our sources.

\textsuperscript{51} This is attractive in that it finds a seat for DK 4, but the elimination of any trace of a fr. 7 from between DK 6 and 8 runs afoul of the text of Simplicius that Tarán rightly emphasized as decisive on the point. Bicknell refers to this ordering as “a fair supposition”, perhaps indicating that he regards it as a good enough guess without being fully aware of the information about the ordering that Simplicius provides.

\textsuperscript{52} Bicknell (1968\textit{a}) p. 49.

\textsuperscript{53} Proclus, \textit{in Parm.} 708.10-11 (Steel), as translated in Morrow and Dillon (1987) p. 83.
Irksome Repetitions

We have already, in our examination of Diels’ addition, seen something of Parmenides’ verbal dexterity in his use of the different adjectives modifying Ἀληθείης, where the pointed variations within the repeated line play provocatively against our expectations of an ἄτρεμὲς ἠτόρ. This use of repetition to unsettle the audience begins to appear a characteristic feature of Parmenides’ verse when we reconsider the restored (i.e., Sextus’) text of the proem. For, when we pay close attention to the patterns of repeated words in the proem, a carefully constructed and perplexingly rich array of repetitions begins to reveal itself.

Repetition within the proem has been observed on occasion before, but few have regarded it as a point in the poem’s favor. Those who note the four forms of φέρω in the four opening lines, for instance, typically cite this as an example of Parmenides’ shortcomings. Some are quite unequivocal in their judgment. Kirk and Raven claimed that Parmenides “has little facility in diction”, 54 while Barnes describes Parmenides’ hexameters as “clod-hopping” and “ungainly”, and his choice to write in verse “unfortunate” and “hard to excuse”.55 Even among authors who hold Parmenides’ poetry in higher regard, the repetition can seem overdone: Mourelatos, for instance, while calling for qualifications to the overly harsh criticisms of other scholars, points to the recurrence of φέρω in the opening lines as an example of “awkward and pointless repetition.”56 Against this general trend, Peter Kingsley has insisted that the repetitions are neither clumsy nor pointless, but deliberately composed, “with consummate craft”, for a very particular purpose.57 The repeated words in the proem are used, he claims, to create an

57 Kingsley (1999) p. 117. In particular, drawing in part on evidence from archeological finds in Velia in the 1960s linking Parmenides to a medical center of some sort, Kingsley presents Parmenides and his school as a circle of mystical healers as much as “natural philosophers” of the Ionian mold, and argues that the proem reproduces an
incantatory effect, inducing in the audience an altered state of consciousness, priming them for the exceptional teaching to come. The multiple instances of “carry” that occur are themselves intended to carry the audience into a sort of trance, and the repetitions of “axle” and “pipe” (in the descriptions of the chariot in line 6, and of the gates in line 19) contribute to a sense of whirling and piping that the incantation aims to bring about.\textsuperscript{58}

Setting aside for now the very interesting question of the intent of the repetition, I agree heartily with Kingsley in his conviction that Parmenides’ employment of repetition is neither amateurish nor inartistic. Not everyone, it must be admitted, is instantly enchanted by Parmenides’ verses, but with repeated readings the craft that Kingsley refers to becomes clearer.

**Chiasmi**

It is worth spending some time spelling out, since I have not found it done elsewhere, just how carefully structured the pattern of repeated forms is in the proem. As is pointed out by critics and admirers alike, the first four lines feature a fourfold repetition of φέρω. What seems to have gone unnoticed is that these four instances of the verb are the backbone of an extended chiasmus: the presentation of the words ἵπποι - φέρουσιν - πολύφημον - φέρει over the course of first three lines is concisely recalled, in inverted order, in the fourth: φερόμην - πολύφραστοι - φέρον - ἵπποι.

\textit{ἵπποι} ταί με φέρουσιν, δόσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ικάνοι, πέμπον, ἐπεὶ μ’ ἐξ ὄδον βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι δαίμονος, ἢ κατὰ πάντ’ ἄτη\textsuperscript{59} φέρει εἰδότα φώτα·

incubation experience. On incubation generally, see Deubner (1900) and Hamilton (1906). For a more recent collection of relevant source texts, see Edelstein and Edelstein (1945) pp. 209-254.\textsuperscript{58} See Kingsley (1999) pp. 116-135. Cf. too Gemelli Marciano (2008) pp. 21-48 and Ustinova (2009), esp. pp. 191-209.\textsuperscript{59} Ignoring differences in word breaks and accentuation, the manuscripts of Sextus’ text agree in the sequence of letters παντατη. This is generally regarded as corrupt and attempts to correct it abound, but the reading is sanely discussed and defended by John Newell, whose text I adopt here. See Newell (2002) pp. 282-293 and the earlier discussion in Tarrant (1976). The word ἄτη (or possibly the name Ate) may seem surprising if we expect to hear
τῇ φερόμην τῇ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι...

The return at the end of the fourth line to the opening word of the first brackets off these first four hexameters as a whole of some sort, despite the fact that the opening sentence itself, the *periodos* proper, is as yet unfinished. This constitutes an additional Homeric element to add to those observed by various commentators hitherto. As pointed out by Samuel Basset, the proems of both the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* feature something similar:

At the end of the proem in both poems the thought returns to the beginning. This is better done in the *Odyssey*, where θεὰ, εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν, repeats with a pretty chiasmus μοι ἐννεπε, Μοῦσα, of vs.1. This ‘paragraphing’ is less clear in the *Iliad*; still ἐρίσαντε... Ἀχιλλεύς (vss. 6f.) repeats the thought of μήν... Ἀχιλῆος, and the question, τίς τ’ ἄρ σφωθε θεόν ἐρίδῃ ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι; recalls us to αἰείδε, θεὰ. 60

With its “pretty chiasmus”, as in other respects, 61 the *Odyssey* is the closer text to Parmenides’ proem. Beyond being pretty, however, and serving to “paragraph” this part of the proem, it is not easy to say what further function the chiasmus serves. As Basset himself observes elsewhere, “In modern editions we often find the remark, “Note the chiastic order,” but rarely any reason for doing this.” 62 From studies of the device in various literary traditions, John Welch suggests that one effect of the more elaborate chiastic structures, that is, those involving more than two pairs of assureds that the philosophic inquirer is on the right path, but it actually sits nicely among a number of “bewilderment”-inducing elements at work here. Contributing to a general sense of disorientation and anxiety in the passage are the use of the ambiguously gendered nouns ἵππος and δαίμων, fixed as feminine only by the pronouns that follow them; the uncertainty over whose the θυμὸς of line 1 is; the abundant use of relative and other subordinate clauses, making the main clause somewhat difficult to discern; the lack of a direct object for πέμπον (in line 2 as well as in line 8), which generates a sense of expectation never quite fulfilled; the apparently allusive, but obscure phrases ὁδὸν πολύφημον, εἰδότα φῶτα, and πολύφραστοι ἵπποι; and the uncertainty of the referent of ἥ in line 3 (it may refer to either δαίμονος or ὁδόν), which may carry over to the repetitions of τῇ in line 4 (possibly “to her” as well as “in/on this way”).

60 Basset (1923) p. 340.

61 Even without the emendation of ατη to ἄστη, line 3 can be said to recall the third line of the *Odyssey*, while the immediate leap into a journey already underway, the multiple *poly-* compounds (particularly *πολύφημος*), the anonymity of the figures spoken of, and the prominence of the feminine figures (and objects) all underscore the connection. Cf. Havelock (1958) and Frame (1978) pp. 158-160 and 170-74.

62 See “Appendix: The Relation between the Aristarchan Deuteron Proteron and Chiasmus” of Basset (1920) p. 59. While Basset is concerned there with the distinctions between various figures of inversion, my own use of “chiastic” here is a broad one. At present I am interested only in pointing out the observable structures in the proem that can help us gauge the integrity of the passage as given by Sextus.
of terms, is to emphasize what lies at the center of the chiasm. If such is the case here, attention is drawn to the intriguing phrase “witting wight” (εἰδότα φῶτα).

As mentioned, however, with the opening sentence not yet complete, this first “paragraph” is not independent of what follows. Just as it caps a first chiasmus, ἵπποι in line four opens a second, still more elaborate one: ἵπποι (4) - ἅρμα (5) - κοῦραι (5) - ἄξων and σύριγγος (6) - πύλαι (11) and θυρέτροις (13) (ignoring for the moment the repetitions of κοῦραι in lines 9 and 15, between which Νυκτός twice appears, at lines 9 and 11) are revisited, on the far side of Dike, in the shorter span of lines 17-21: πυλέων, θυρέτρων (17) - ἄξονας, σύριγξιν (20) - κοῦραι (21) - ἅρμα (21) - ἵππους (21).

63 Welch (1981) p. 10: “As the structure expands in number of elements, the abrupt repetition by which the last elements of the first [half] of the system become the first elements of the second half can draw unusual attention to the central terms, which are repeated in close proximity to each other. [...] An emphatic focus on the center can be employed by a skillful composer to elevate the importance of the central concept or to dramatize a radical shift of events at the turning point. Meanwhile, the remainder of the system can be used with equal effectiveness as a framework through which the author may compare, contrast, juxtapose, complement, or complete each of the flanking elements in the chiastic system. In addition, a marked degree of intensification can be introduced throughout the entire system both by building a climax at the center as well as by strengthening each element individually upon its chiastic repetition.”

64 Though not itself a repeated phrase within this chiastic structure, I take it that the focusing effect described by Welch nonetheless highlights its innermost element. While its precise significance here is not readily apparent, the audience may be expected to recall φῶτα here when in DK 14 the moon, with apparent reference to its reflecting the sun’s light, is described as an “alien light” (αλλότριον φῶς), playing on the Homeric phrase “alien wight” (αλλότριος φῶς). Some connection is thus made between the “knowing” or “seeing” mortal travelling the polyphemos path in line 3 and the prominent use in the Doxa of φῶς/φάος as the “principle” opposed to “night.”
Again, it is easier to note the chiasmus than to feel confident about what, exactly, it is doing, but I take it as self-evident that the pattern of repetitions is deliberate. Curiously, however, there seem to be indications that the symmetry between the two “halves” of the chiasmus is intentionally askew: as with lines 1-4, the first “half” here again occupies a greater number of verses (incorporating within itself another chiasmus, if Ἡλιάδες ... Νυκτός (9), Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἄματος (11) qualifies); ἂξον and σῦριγξ, though repeated, have changed sense from (chariot) “axle” and (musical) “pipe” in line 6 to “(door-)post” and “socket” in line 19 (which helps to obscure the repetition in most translations); the repetitions of κοῦραι, as observed, do not all seem to fit into this frame; and, while the whole appears to revolve around Δίκη πολύποινος, the repeated words do not pinpoint this center precisely.65

Still other patterns of repeated words emerge when the first twenty-one lines are taken as a whole, framed again by forms of ἵππος: as ἵπποι at the opening of line 1 was answered by ἵπποι at the end of line 4, so πέμπον, the first word of line 2, is answered by πέμπειν at the end of line 8. (Cf. too αὐταῖ in line 13 with αὐτέων in line 20.) Also conspicuous (once one begins attending to these things) is how verbs of “bearing” (the four occurrences of φέρω already indicated) and “sending” (two occurrences: πέμπον, line 2; πέμπειν, line 8) are replaced by repeated “holdings” (ἔχει, lines 12 and 14, ἔχον in 21, and perhaps ὀχήμα, line 16) and “pushings” (two occurrences: ὀσάμεναι, line 10; ὀσεῖε, line 17). There is also a second pair of poly- compounds with

65 This vagueness is also exhibited by the component parts of the chiasmus itself, with the exterior, single-word elements (i.e., the “mares”, “car”, and “maidens”) defining the outer bounds of the chiasmus more sharply than the two-word, inner elements (of which the “axle(s)-pipe(s)” pairing, occurring each time, within a single verse, is perhaps still “sharper” than the “gates-doors” pairing, reinforcing the sense of a nebulous center).
πολύποινος in line 14 and πολυχάλκους in 18, between which intriguingly occur one instance, in new compounds, of each of the stems combined with poly- in the earlier pair: the phem- of πολύφημον recurs in line 15 with παρφάμεναι, and the phrad- of πολύφραστοι in the adverb ἐπιφραδέως of line 16. In line 18, of course, there is the relatively obvious figura etymologica χάσμ’ ἀχανές. The repetitions of κοῦραι not only feature in the second, more elaborate chiasmus spanning lines 4 and 21, but over the course of that passage overtake the total number of repetitions of ἵππος to that point, a development that parallels the syntactical dominance of the maidens: it was initially the mares doing the bearing and sending, but the maidens gradually emerge as the ones leading the way (5), taking control of the πομπή (8-9), arranging for the opening of the gates (15-16), and keeping the car and the mares on track (21).

This composite passage, framed by forms of ἵππος that open and close two separate chiastic structures, does not initially seem to be structured around a chiasmus itself. In fact it is, but to see it we have to extend the passage to the next mention of “mares” at line 25. As just noted, the number of occurrences of “maidens” and “mares” is made equal at four each with the appearance of ἵπποις in line 25. Taking all these instances into account, along with the two instances of Νυκτός between the two instances of κοῦραι that did not fit the pattern of the second chiasmus above, we find a third chiasmus in the proem, one composed of double occurrences of the same word: ἵπποι (1), ἵπποι (4) - κοῦραι (5), κοῦραι (9) - Νυκτός (9), Νυκτός (11) - κοῦραι (15), κοῦραι (21) - ἵππους (21), ἵπποις (25). Recalling that the phrase εἰδότα φῶτα, at the end of line three, was situated at the center of the first chiasmus of lines 1-4, it seems more than

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66 This will be leveled out at line 25 so that the number of “maidens” and “mares” in the proem as a whole is equal at four, although the goddess’ addressing of the narrator as κοῦρ in line 24 adds an (intentional) element of insecurity to this sense of balance.

67 Observe that, for the “mares” and “maidens”, even the placement of the words within their respective verses fits the chiasmus: ἵπποι (1, first foot), ἵπποι (4, final foot) - κοῦραι (5, second and third feet), κοῦραι (9, third and fourth feet) - // - κοῦραι (15, third and fourth feet), κοῦραι (21, second and third feet) - ἵππους (21, final foot), ἵπποις (25, first foot).
coincidence that the phrase εἰς φάος, at the beginning of line 10, is at the center of the present chiasmus. Once again, however, detecting the pattern does not serve to simplify matters. Much as the fitful “heart” of the various Αληθείης … ἦτορ verses seems to run counter to what one might expect, the “centers” of these chiasms only amplify the atmosphere of oddity of the proem: the “witting wight” is strangely borne along “in bewilderment”, while the light at the center of the present chiasmus is positioned between mentions of Night. As noted in connection with the first four lines, the increasingly elaborate patterning of repetitions as the proem proceeds seems designed to disorientate. As we read on, we become enmeshed in an intricate web of sounds, images, and semantic associations that may excite our interest, but provide no very certain sense of who is on this journey, where the journey is headed, or what to make of all.

The Unity of Sextus’ Quotation

Having gained from the foregoing some sense of the role that repetition plays in the structure of the proem, we are in a better position to observe the unity of the text as Sextus gives it. As we read the remainder of the proem, the way that ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν of line 25 recalls the opening words of the proem is unmistakable. What is less obvious is that the rest of the opening line, ὅσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι, is also echoed in the words that form the transition from the proem to its sequel: μόνος δ’ ἐτι θυμός ὁδοῖο (/, λείπεται). Not only is the scansion identical, but

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68 The connection between the phrases is (orthographically) closer if we keep εἰς, instead emending to ες, as recommended by Sider (see footnote 28), but cf. footnote 97 below. In any case, from Parmenides’ pun in DK 14 (cf. footnote 64), it is clear that he associates φῶς/φάος (“light”) and φῶς (“person”).

69 This again anticipates DK 14, which opens with the phrase νυκτὶ φάος. (The reading νυκτιφαὲς in DK and other editions is an emendation by Scaliger.)

70 Contrast the view of Cordero, who, from the questionable bases that (i) “At a time when sages […] expressed themselves in prose, […] Parmenides decided to compose a Poem”, and (ii) “Although Parmenides is of Ionian stock and most of the inhabitants of the Elea region are Dorians, the poem is written in the pan-Hellenic dialect of the Homeric poems”, concludes from “all these details” that “Parmenides wants to interest (and be understood by) the widest possible public.” (2004, pp. 14-15, italics added) Cordero goes on to describe the proem as “a series of images easily interpretable by the public of his time.” (p. 17, italics added)
even the sequence of vowels is the same up to the final word of each verse (which still opens with an aspirate in each case).\textsuperscript{72} As with ἵπποι in line 4, which closed the first chiasmus and opened the second, the latter half of line 35 closes the proem as a whole by echoing the θυμός clause of line 1, while also anticipating the opening clause of DK 8, with which Kranz and company mistakenly identify it (but where, as already noted, Parmenides will replace μόνος with μοῦνος, and θυμός with μῦθος). The passage framed by these echoes of the separate halves of the opening line, meanwhile, is another “paragraph” of the proem, in which more of the verbal dexterity already noted is on display.

One such instance begins with the replacement of the first person with the second person pronoun in ἵππος ταί σε φέρουσιν. This calls our attention to the placement of personal pronouns in the proem thus far. After appearing in the opening phrase of the poem, ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, we next find μ’ (following ἐπεί) in line 2, then με again two lines later (following two occurrences of τῇ in the same line), with two more occurrences further on in two consecutive lines (22 and 23). As for the second person pronoun, σε first appears in the phrase echoing the poem’s opening in line 25, appears next one line later (following ἐπεί), then two lines later (following two occurrences of τε in the same line) with (when we allow ourselves to ignore Kranz’ move) two more occurrences, a bit later, in two consecutive lines (31 and 32). This parallelism extends to the placement within the line of the first three instances of each pronoun:

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
1 & \text{ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, …} \\
2 & \text{πέμπον, ἐπεί μ’ ἐς ὁδὸν …} \\
& \text{…} \\
4 & \text{τῇ φερόμην τῇ γάρ με …} \\
25 & \text{ἵππος ταί σε φέρουσιν …} \\
26 & \text{χαίρ’, ἐπεί οὐτί σε μοῖρα …} \\
& \text{…} \\
28 & \text{ἄλλα θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεώ δέ σε …}
\end{array}
\]

\textsuperscript{72} The pattern of consonants before θυμός also exhibits considerable balance: nasals and sibilant with the omicrons, followed by a dental before ἐπτὶ and ἐτι.
It is, I think, no accident that the pronoun proceeds farther into the line each time. This seems linked, moreover, to the parallel use of ὁδός, which appears twice in the “με” paragraph (in lines 2 and 5), but four times over the span of lines 27-35, where it is thrice paired with the demonstrative. Just as there is a progression in the first three uses of each pronoun further into the hexameter each time, the phrase “(this) way” actually makes a complete journey across the verse, occupying the first foot of line 27, the second and part of the third in line 31, stretching from the third into the fifth foot in line 32, and ending the line in 35:

ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἰκάνων ἠμέτερον δὖ, 25
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὕτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι
τίνι οὖν ὁδόν (Ἠ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἔστιν)
ἀλλὰ θέμες τε δίκη τε. χρεώ δὲ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἡμέν Ἀληθείης εἰπεῖθες ἀτρεμές ἤτορ
ηδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἕν πίστες ἀληθῆς.
30
ἀλλὰ σοὶ τίνι ὁδὸν ἄφ' ὀδοῖν διήςπος εἴργε νόμιμα·
μηδὲ σ' ἐθος πολύπειρων ὁδὸν κατά τίνις βιάσθω,
νομάν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἑξήςεσαν ἀκουήν
καὶ γλώσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηρῳ ἐλέγχον
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ἰστείτα. μόνος δ' ἐτι θυμὸς ὁδόις
35
λείπεται.

Displacing lines 31-36 with Kranz would obviously obliterate this effect, and including two extra lines between verses 30 and 31 with Diels would mar it considerably by widening the gap between the first two occurrences of the phrase.73

By keeping Sextus’ text, we also find a third pair of poly- compounds in the proem, πολύπειρων and πολύδηρων, in lines 32 and 34. This mirrors the proximity of the placement of the first pair in lines 2 and 4, and it is probably no coincidence that the first adjective of the pair here,

73 Although only two lines would be added, they would significantly affect the continuity of the lines. In the text of PL, Diels marks a paragraph break after the added lines (see Texts: A), and, as mentioned above (footnote 26), Burnet and Wheelwright introduce even stronger breaks.
πολύπειρον, could be read as agreeing with ὁδὸν, like πολύφημον, the first adjective in the first pair. This pair of poly- compounds thus suggests a return to the beginning of the proem, matching the return to θυμὸς (again, not a mistake for μῦθος) in line 35 which marks the end of a very complex period. The overall impression created by these elements is that of an extended kuklos coming to a close. It is easy to imagine that Sextus concludes his quotation at this point because it is here that one senses the multiplicity of threads introduced over the course of the proem being gathered together and rounded off into some sort of whole. Of course, it is not a resounding conclusion, and like a number of such “paragraph” markers already encountered, it points beyond itself, but, even if not perfectly well-rounded, it is a convincing enough conclusion that we can see why Sextus would include the final sentence in his quotation even when no specific comment about it will be forthcoming.

In rushing to point out the final “paragraph” of the proem I hurried over the important lines 22-24, where our narrator meets his goddess:

καὶ με θεᾶ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί
dεξιτερὴν ἔλεεν, ὄδε δ’ ἐπος φάτο καὶ με προσηύδα·
ὦ κοῦρ’ ἄθανάτοισι συνάορος ἠνίχοισιν,

The repetitions of με have already been noted. Less strikingly, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί recalls the occurrence of χερσὶ in line 10, and with πρόφρων the prefix προ- seems to assume a certain degree of prominence, anticipated in line 9, which carries on into 26, perhaps suggesting a sense of the progression of the journey. And, while not an actual repetition, ἠνίχοισιν may strike the

74 It can also be taken, as the majority of readers seem to do, with ἔθος. I am inclined to regard this as a deliberate syntactical ambiguity, but feel that the line divides most naturally between πολύπειρον and ὁδὸν, and if pressed would take πολύπειρον with ἔθος.

75 Though the goddess’ apparently kindly reception of the kouros, taking his “right hand in hers”, as many have translated it, may appear an unalloyed expression of welcome, Floyd has pointed out that the expression πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο and the repetition of the word for “hand” link this scene with other epic instances of greeting where an element of deception or misperception is regularly at play (see Floyd (1992) pp. 252-255). There is, moreover, an additional subversive subtlety in Parmenides’ expression here: the goddess is not exactly said to take the kouros’ “right hand in hers”, but to take his right hand with her hand. That is, it is only the hand of the kouros that is
ear as an echo of ἐν χνοίῃσιν in line 6. These, along with other less apparent repetitions not included in the chiastic structures already treated, find a place when we finally come to consider the proem as a whole. The following schema will help to bring these out:

A. πέμπαν (2)
B. ὁδὸν (2) - κατὰ πάντ’ (3) - ὁδὸν (5)
[C. ἐν χνοίῃσιν (6)?]
D. πέμπειν (8) - προβλησθοῦσα δῶματα (9)
E. αἰθόμενος (7) - χερσί (10) - αἰθέριαι (13)
F. ἀμοιβοῦς (14)
G. ἀπτερέως (17)
H. χάσμ’ ἀχανὲς (18)
G’. ἀναπτάμεναι (18)
F’. ἀμοιβαδὸν (19)
E’. ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί (22) / δεξιτερὴν (23)
D’. δῶ (25) - προβάμεπε (26)
[C’. ἤνιοχοὶ (24)?]
B’. ὁδὸν (27) - πάντα (28) - ὁδὸ (31) - ὁδὸν κατ’ (31) - ὁδῷο (35)
Α’. λείπεται (36)

Within the frame suggested by the occurrences of θυμός in lines 1 and 35, we first observe that the midpoint of our 35-plus-line proem coincides neatly with the phrase χάσμ’ ἀχανὲς at the beginning of line 18 (H). While we noted the phrase earlier, it now emerges that this figura etymologica playing on a chi-based verbal root is, appropriately, the centerpiece of a chiasmus spanning the whole proem. The elements of this chiasmus, however, only become evident when we observe that Parmenides is not only repeating whole words, but certain stems and roots, too.

Once we are alerted to this, we see that the “gaping gap” at the middle of the proem is flanked on
either side by ἀπτ- (G and G’), and more remotely by ὅμοιβ- (F and F’). Outside of this core is a
more complex pair of elements, where a pair of αἰθ- stems surrounding the maidens’ “hands” (E)
is balanced by the pair of δεξι- words containing the “hands” of the youth and the goddess (E’).
The next set, D and D’, is still more involved. In each pair, the pattern emanating out from the
center of the chiasmus is: δῶ-, the prefix προ-, the verbal stem πεμπ-. In D’, this is concisely
achieved with two words. In D, it takes three, since the prefix is attached to a different verbal
stem. The stem in προλιποῦσαι is not otiose, however, because, as a glance at A and A’ reveals,
it plays its role in the overarching structure πέμπον (2) - προ[λιποῦσαι δόματα (9) - δῶ ... προύπεμπε (25-26) - λείπεται (36) (A – D – D’ – A’). Whichever verb appears without the
prefix on one side of the “houses” (or the “gaping gap” at the center) appears with it on the other
side, and vice versa.

Of the two remaining elements in the scheme above, C and C’ make a somewhat
questionable pairing. There is no repeated root or stem involved, just a similarity of sound, and,
as indicated by the brackets and question marks, the placement in the scheme does not fit
perfectly: C’, in line 24, should be placed between D’ (25-26) and E’ (22-23). Still, despite the
lack of any real etymological connection, ἡνιόχοισιν may nonetheless have been felt to echo ἐν
χνοῖσισιν, and as we have seen what seem to be intentional elements of asymmetry in earlier
chiastic structures, we might be expected to tolerate them here.

The final pair, B and B’, might also seem odd. Again, it is not word stems that are in play,
but rather the repetition of whole words (as in the chiasms treated earlier), and, as with D and D’,
the parallelism between the elements is also peculiar. Taking these points hysteron proteron, it
can be observed that, though it adds ὁδοῦ and ὁδὸν between the occurrences of κατὰ and πάντα,
B’ nonetheless preserves, in inverted order, the pattern that B establishes with ὁδὸν - κατὰ -
πάντ’ - ὡδὸν. With its additions, B’ adds the flourish of placing each interior element in that pattern within its own “cell”, between one accusative and one genitive form of the same word.76 This involves greater departures from the stricter correspondence that we saw in comparing D and D’, but even this, I think, is not without its place in the greater whole. Looking at the whole structure, we notice that the farther we stray outside the root-based core of F-G-H-G’-F’, increasingly greater anomalies occur in the correspondence between one side of the “gap” and the other. The dissonance is just enough at each stage to seem continually disorienting, but never so great as to violate the overall pattern.77 As we depart from the center, the tension grows by gradual steps, devised carefully enough that at the extreme limits of the structure, in A and A’, we can recognize as corresponding elements two antonymic roots! B and B’ occupy a definite place in this progression, with B’ repeating the patterns of B in a more fragmented fashion (over the space of nine lines) than in any of the “inner” correspondences, but still shy of the starker contrast achieved in A and A’, which sets “escorting” or “sending” against “leaving behind”. The reason why B and B’ feature whole word forms as opposed to roots is, I think, because this pair forms one of the links between this chiasmus and the other patterns of repetition already observed.78 Like the instances of κοῦραι and the forms of ἱππος shared between earlier chiasms, the use of ὡδὸς in framing B and B’ binds this root-based chiasmus to the earlier ones, forming a complicated quilt of overlapping but distinctly discernible structures.

76 But with different genitive forms. Note too that the chiastic order in B’ is so carefully preserved as to have the accusative that κατά governs precede it. The increase in the number of “ways” is probably not without meaning of its own. One of the more contested points in current Parmenidean scholarship is the precise number of “ways” of inquiry travelled or entertained in the poem.

77 Thus the present chiasmus seems to answer to or correspond in some manner with the second chiasmus, the outer edges of which seemed more clearly defined than the interior ones, which seemed centered vaguely around Dike, with the “doors” and “gates” on either side.

78 Perhaps, however, κατά (like προ-) should be regarded as something in between a root and an independent word, so that B and B’ are not quite the exception that they appear in this respect.
All four extended chiastic structures are thus bound together, unifying the passage through the various repeated forms shared between them. Irksome or no, these repetitions in the proem are obviously intentional, very intricately patterned, and of some special interest to Parmenides. Even if we cannot say with certainty just what Parmenides’ purpose was in producing these designs, they make plain the tightly-knit integrity of the passage. Indeed, in light of what we have so far discerned, Diels’ addition seems intrusive, while Kranz’s move looks like an especially infelicitous attempt to make the evidence fit preconceived notions about what Parmenides means to be telling us and how he composed his poetry. Moreover, given Parmenides’ manifest repetitiousness, it seems perfectly possible that the lines found in Simplicius and Proclus that are similar (but not identical) to verses 28-30 of Sextus’ quotation came from elsewhere in the poem.
Appendix to Chapter One: Texts

Texts: A. The end of the proem in Diels’ Poetarum Philosopherum Fragmenta (1901)

καὶ με θεά πρόφρον ως εξεστάτο, χειρά δέ χειρί
dεξιτερήν ἐλευν, ὅδε δ’ ἔπος φάτο καί με προσηθοῦσαν
οὐ κοῦρ’ ἀθανάτωσι συνάρχον ηγόχοσιν,

25 ἔποις ταίς σε φέρουσιν ἦμετέρον δό
χειρί’, ἐπεὶ οὔτε σε μοίρα κακή προὑπέμπε νέεσθαι
tηνδ’ ὤδόν (ἡ γάρ ἀπ’ ἀνθρώποιν έκτός πάτου ἐστίν)
ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεόδ δε σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἡμέν Αληθείης εὐκυκλεός ἀτρεμές ἢτορ

30 ἤδε βροτον δόξας, ταίς οὐκ ἐνί πίστις ἀληθης,
<ἄλλ’ ἐμψής καί ταύτα μαθῆσαι, ὡς τα δοκοῦντα
χρήν δοκιμός εἶναι διά παντὸς πάντα περόντα>.

35 νομάν ἀσκοπον ὦμα καί ἠγέτησαν ἀκοουν
καὶ γλώσσαν, κρίνατ δὲ λόγῳ πολύθερην ἐπελεχν
εἴ ἐμέθεν ὑπῆρθηντα. μόνον δ’ ἐτι θείος ὅδοι
λειτπέτα . . .

22 θεᾶ = δαίμων (3); clausula versus homerica 23 sqq. cf. Hom. a 120 sqq. 24 ἀθανάτησιν Brandis at cf. Parm. 53 24 συνήχος homeric (θ 99) Brandis; at cf. κράσιν 16, 1; δίκρασιν 6, 5. Xenoph. 1, 4. Emped. 20, 6
Karstenni, ι’ οἶναι Cobeti διά παντὸς πάντα Heraclitum, quem hic potissimum petit, imitatus rhetorice cf. Parm. p. 60 περόντα Simpl.(A): περ’ ὀντα (DEF) 33 = 7, 2, ~ 6, 3 34 σ’ ἔθος Sext.: σε θεός Laert. 36 πολύθερην Laert.: πολύθερην Sext. (ex 34): interjelice pugnantium opinionum disquisitionem 37 ὑπῆρθηντα] cf. 31. 22 θείος sic Sext., quod si verum sit, explicitur vivida vis Rationis i.e., ἀτρεμές ἦτορ Ἀληθείης (29); vulgo μύθος ὅδοι secundum 8,1.

Points of note:

* lines 31-32 added to Sextus’ text from Simplicius’ commentary on Aristotle’s de Caelo.
* εὐκυκλεός in line 29 adopted from the same, and εὐφεγγέος from Proclus noted.
* πολύθερην (and κρίναι, not noted in the app. crit.) in line 36 adopted from Diogenes Laertius.
* θείος retained in line 37 (cf. μύθος in DK 7.6/8.1).
* In DK, lines 33-38 will be moved, by Kranz, to become DK 7.2-8.2. DK 1 ends at line 32.
ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ικάνοι, πέμπον, ἐπει μ’ ἐς ὄδὸν βῆςαι πολύφημον ἁγουσαι δαίμονος, ἢ κατὰ πάντ’ ἄτη φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα· τῇ φερόμην· τῇ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ὅποι πάμε ἁμία τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραί δ’ ὄδὸν ἠγεμόνευον. ἀξον δ’ ἐν χνοήσιν ι<ει> σύριγγος αὐτήν αἰθόμενος (δοιοῖς γάρ ἐπείγετο δινωτότιν κύκλοις ἁμοτέρωθεν), ὡτε σπερχαίσαι πέμπειν Ἡλιάδες κοῦρα, προλυεύοντα δώματα Νυκτός, εἰς φάος, ὃςάμεναι κράτον ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπταις. ἐνθα πύλα Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἕματός εἰσι κελεύον, καὶ φασὶ ὑπέρθυρον ἁμίς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός· αὐταί δ’ αἴθεια πλήντα μεγαλοίς θυρέτροις· τὸν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. τὴν δ’ παράφαμεν κοῦρα μαλακοῖς λόγοισι πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὡς φανερωτοῖς ὑπερθύροις ἀμφὸς λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοις θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. τὴν δ’ παράφαμεν κοῦρα μαλακοῖς λόγοισι πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὡς φανερωτοῖς ὑπερθύροις ἀμφὸς λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοις θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. τὴν δ’ παράφαμεν κοῦρα μαλακοῖς λόγοισι πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὡς φανερωτοῖς ὑπερθύροις ἀμφὸς λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοις θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. τὴν δ’ παράφαμεν κοῦρα μαλακοῖς λόγοισι πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὡς φανερωτοῖς ὑπερθύροις ἀμφὸς λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοις θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. τὴν δ’ παράφαμεν κοῦρα μαλακοῖς λόγοισι πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὡς φανερωτοῖς ὑπερθύροις ἀμφὸς λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοις θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. τὴν δ’ παράφαμεν κοῦρα μαλακοῖς λόγοισι πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὡς φανερωτοῖς ὑπερθύροις ἀμφὸς λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοις θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. τὴν δ’ παράφαμεν κοῦρα μαλακοῖς λόγοισι πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὡς φανερωτοῖς ὑπερθύροις ἀμφὸς λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοις θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. τὴν δ’ παράφαμεν κοῦρα μαλακοῖς λόγοισι πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὡς φανερωτοῖς ὑπερθύροις ἀμφὸς λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοις θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. τὴν δ’ παράφαμεν κοῦρα μαλακοῖς λόγοισι πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὡς φανερωτοῖς ὑπερθύροις ἀμφὸς λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοις θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. τὴν δ’ παράφαμεν κοῦρα μαλακοῖς λόγοισι πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὡς φανερωτοῖς ὑπερθύροις ἀμφὸς λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοις θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. τὴν δ’ παράφαμεν κοῦρα μαλακοῖς λόγοισι πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὡς φανερωτοῖς ὑπερθύροις ἀμφὸς λάινος οὐδός· αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοις θυρέτροις· τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύψην ἔχει κληδᾶς ἁμοικόις. 

Departures from Sextus’ text:

3 πάντ’ ἄτη is Newell’s punctuation, following Tarrant (1976), of παντατη, the sequence of letters common to all mss. (Mutschmann’s attribution of ἄστη to N is an error, as pointed out in Coxon (1968a)).

6 ι<ει> Diels 14 Δίκη edd. : δίκη mss.

34 κρίναι (for mss. κρίνε) and πολύψην (for mss. πολύψειρον) are adopted from D.L. Vitae IX.22.
Texts: C. Lines identical or similar to DK B 1.29-30 in authors other than Sextus Empiricus
(differences from Sextus’ text in bold)

1. Plutarch, adv. Colot. 1114 d-e (188.21-23 Pohlenz-Westman)

   ἡ μὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκ<ές ἦτορ >
   ...  
   ἡ δὲ βροτῶν δόξαις, αἰς οὐκ ἐνι πίστις ἀληθῆς.

2. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae IX.22 (646.10-11, 647.1-3 Marcovich)

   ...χρε ὧδε σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
   ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκές ἦτορ
   ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξαις, τῆς οὐκέτι πίστις ἀληθῆς.

2 εὐπειθέος PFD: εὐτίθεος B

followed shortly by (without quoting the 31st line of Sextus’ longer quotation at adv. Math. VII.111, which is also omitted in adv. Math. vii.114):

   μηδὲ σε θέδες πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,
   νομίμων άσκοπον ὁμμα καὶ ἡρχήισαν ἀκούην
   καὶ γλώσσαν, κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηρην ἐξελέγχω.

3. Clement, Strom. V.59.21-22 (Le Boulleuc)

   ἡ μὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ
   ἡ δὲ βροτῶν δόξαις, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνι πίστις ἀληθῆς.

4. Proclus, in Tim. II.105 b (I.345.15-16 Diehl)

   τῶ μὲν Ἀληθείης εὐφεγγέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ
   ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξαί ταῖς οὐκ ἐνι πίστις ἀληθῆς.

X.1

X.2

1 τὸ μὲν CN: τὸ μὲν P  2 ἠδὲ NP: ἡ δὲ C  δόξαι C: δόξας NP

5. Simplicius, in Cael. 557.25-558.2 (Heiberg)

   ...χρε ὧδε σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
   ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμές ἦτορ
   ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνι πίστις ἀληθῆς.

   άλλ’ ἐμπιστεύεται καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσει, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
   χρὴν δοκίμος εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῴντα.

Y.1

Y.2

Y.3

Y.4

Y.5

4 μαθήσεια DE: μαθήσεται A: μοθήσομαι Fc  5 περῴντα A: περ ὄντα DEF
Texts: D. Alleged overlaps between the end of Sextus’ proem and lines cited in Simplicius’ *in Phys.*

1. Sextus’ text (incorporating alterations from D.L. *Vitae* IX.22)

   ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὖκ ἐνι πίστις ἀληθῆς.  
   ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὀδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα,  
   μηδὲ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὄνον κατὰ τίνδε βιάσθω  
   νομὰν ἡσκοποῦν ὅμμα καὶ ἑξῆσσαν ἁκουήν  
   καὶ γλώσσαν, κρίνει δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηραν ἐλεγχον  
   εξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. μόνος δ’ ἐτι θυμός ὀδοῖο  
   λείπεται.

2. *In Phys.* 135.21-22 (part of a quotation of Plato’s *Sophist* 258c-259b)

   οὐ γὰρ μῆποτε τούτῳ δαμῇ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα,  
   ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὀδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα.

3. *In Phys.* 244.1-2 (also apparently drawn from *Sophist* 258d)

   οὐ γὰρ μῆποτέ τούτῳ δαμῇ εἶναι μὴ ἔόντα,  
   ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὀδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα.

4. *In Phys.* 143.31-144.1 (perhaps drawn from *Sophist* 258d rather than a copy of the poem)

   οὐ γὰρ μῆποτε τούτῳ δαμῇ εἶναι μὴ ὄντα,  
   ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὀδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα.

5. *In Phys.* 78.6 (preceded by DK 6.8-9, followed by entry 9 below)

   ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὀδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα,

6. *In Phys.* 650.13 (a comment on non-being, from “the great Parmenides”; cf. *Sophist* 237a)

   ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ’ ἀφ’ ὀδοῦ διζήσιος εἴργε νόημα,

7. *In Phys.* 145.1-3 (beginning a 52-line quotation = DK 8.1-52)

   …μούνος δ’ ἐτι μῦθος ὀδοῖο  
   λείπεται, ὡς ἔστιν. ταύτῃ δ’ ἐπὶ σήματ’ ἔασι  
   πολλὰ μᾶλ’, ὡς ἀγένητον ἐόν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἔστιν,

8. *In Phys.* 142.34-36 (partial quotation of Parmenides’ “signs” of the “One Being”)

   … μονὸς δ’ ἐτι μῦθος ὀδοῖο  
   λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν. ταύτῃ δ’ ἐπὶ σήματ’ ἔασι  
   πολλὰ μᾶλ’, ὡς ἀγένητον ἐόν καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ἔστιν.

9. *In Phys.* 78.8-10 (preceded by entry 5 above, followed, after a brief remark, by DK 8.3b-14)

   …μονὸς δ’ ἐτι μῦθος ὀδοῖο  
   λείπεται, ὡς ἔστι. ταύτῃ δ’ ἐπὶ σήματ’ ἔασι  
   πολλὰ μᾶλα.
CHAPTER TWO – EXAMINING THE SOURCES

The foregoing has been a defense of the integrity of Sextus Empiricus’ quotation of Parmenides’ proem on structural grounds, independent, for the most part, of the content expressed. We have proceeded in this manner in order to avoid imposing on our assessment undue presuppositions about Parmenides’ intent or compositional method, and to allow us to follow, as far as possible, the lead of the text itself. 79 This procedure has revealed that, whatever misgivings modern readers and writers may have about repetition, Parmenides seems either not to have shared them, or to have had other reasons for running the risk of irking his later editors. What exactly those reasons may have been has not concerned us thus far, nor shall I presently offer a full-scale interpretation of the proem. That is a task better carried out with an eye toward what can be discerned of the poem as a whole, and for a proper reconstruction of that, a fresh look at the sources of the other fragments is needed, in full consciousness of Parmenides’ habits of repetition and with due regard for the guidance those sources provide about the shape of the poem. Prior to such a review, however, it will be opportune to examine two of the passages in which the proem is quoted: that of Sextus himself, and Diogenes Laertius’ chapter on Parmenides. We will be better able to judge the reliability of Sextus’ quotation of the proem following a close reading of the context in which he does so, and the Laertian chapter provides vital information for that assessment. 80 Moreover, by comparing the two in light of the preceding

79 Naturally, certain changes must be allowed where the text itself seems faulty and/or other texts suggest better readings, but in general this study is intended to be more textually conservative than most.
80 I will not here treat in detail the passages of Plutarch and Clement that our earlier analysis suggested are also (that is, in addition to Sextus and Diogenes Laertius, and in contrast with Proclus and Simplicius) quoting lines from the
analysis of the structure of the proem, a hitherto unappreciated alternative for reading the lines generally regarded as part of DK 7 will present itself.

Unreliable Sextus?

We shall consider Sextus’ text first. In the midst of a long survey of opinions held by various thinkers on the question of the criterion of truth, Sextus turns from the Pythagoreans to Xenophanes:81

These things,82 then, the Pythagorikoi [regard as criteria], while Xenophanes, according to those who explain him so differently,83 when he says,

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὐ τις ἀνήρ ἴδεν, οὐδὲ τις ἔσται
εἰδός ὧμοι θεόν τε καὶ ἢσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τόυτο τετελεσμένον εἰπὼν,
αὐτὸς ὃμως οὗκ οἶδε, δόκοι δ’ ἐπὶ πάσι τέτυκται,

proem. It is well worth noting, however, that Plutarch, like both Sextus and Diogenes Laertius, quotes lines 29-30 in connection with the question of the criterion of truth (see adv. Colot. 13, 1114d-e; cf. DK A 34). In Clement’s case, the context of the quotation is a discussion about the use of symbolism in veiled presentations of truth. The whole of the reference to Parmenides, following a quotation from Heraclitus (DK 22 B 29), is as follows: “and the Eleatic, Parmenides the great, introduces a teaching of double ways, writing somehow so: the one [way], persuasive Truth’s untrembling heart, / the other, by mortals’ opinions, in which true trust is not.” [ὅ τ’ Ἐλεάτης Παρμενίδης ὁ μέγας διττῶν εἰσηγεῖται διδασκαλίαν ὧδέ πως γράφων· ἡ ἡμείς ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἢτορ, / ἡ δὲ βροτῶν δόξαις, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνί πίστις ἀληθῆς. Strom. V.59.21-22.]

81 Adv. Math. VII.110-114 (text: Mustchmann (1914)). Note that we begin with the transition to Xenophanes. The phrase that opens section 111, ὁ δὲ γνώριμος αὐτοῦ Παρμενίδης, is picking up on the opening of 110, Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ Πυθαγορικοί Ξενοφάνης δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ὡς ἐπέρος αὐτὸν ἐξηγούμενον. The passages on Xenophanes and Parmenides are continuous, and, it appears, due to the same source.

82 That is, logos (specifically, mathematical logos) and number.

83 So differently, that is, from those who regard the lines about to be quoted as denying the existence of any criterion of truth. Sextus reported this view earlier (adv. Math. VII.49-52; cf. VIII.326). It is important to be aware that, throughout this portion of the work (§§ 39-260), Sextus is reporting others’ claims about what earlier thinkers regarded as the criterion of truth, and not, in the main, giving his own estimations of the commitments of those thinkers. Sometimes Sextus identifies his sources explicitly, sometimes refers to them elliptically, as here, and at other times makes no mention of the particular source for the account he is relating. (Tarán, in his belief that the allegorical interpretation of Parmenides’ proem was Sextus’ invention, seems to overlook this.) Nonetheless, Sextus is not quite, as David Sedley has claimed, “an entirely transparent figure” (1992, p. 24). Glimmers of Sextus’ own attitude are present, but expressed by slight touches, such as ὡς ἐπέρος, where I take it that ὡς gives an additional stress to the difference between the views Sextus is reporting. Sextus’ overall strategy in this portion of the work is to undermine confidence in dogmatic views about the criterion (even the view that there is no criterion) by displaying the variety of equally plausible positions that different dogmatists have adopted. The ultimate skeptical aim is to suspend judgment, refraining from dogmatic pronouncement on matters understood to be inherently unclear. When a single text, such as Xenophanes’, serves as the basis for opposing interpretations, Sextus may be interested in stressing the fact.
[And as for to saphes, not any man has seen it, nor will there be anyone
Witting what I say concerning gods and about all things;
For even if, at best, one actually happens to speak tetelesmenon,
Nevertheless he himself knows not; but dokos has been fashioned for all.]

appears to abolish not all apprehension, but the epistemonic and infallible one, and to leave
the doxastic one. For “but dokos has been fashioned for all” indicates this. And so, according
to this man, the doxastic logos (that is, the one that keeps to what’s likely, not the one
keeping to what’s fixed) becomes a criterion. His acquaintance, Parmenides, condemned the
doxastic logos, I mean the one having weak suppositions, and assumed as a criterion the
epistemonic one (that is, the infallible one), withdrawing even from the assurance of the
senses.84

It is important, though not always easy, to distinguish between the accounts about the various
thinkers that Sextus is reporting and Sextus’ own intermittent remarks. In the preceding
discussion about the Pythagoreans, Posidonius was specifically named as one source for the
views reported,85 and the interpretation of Xenophanes reported here, at odds with one presented
earlier, is explicitly attributed to others.86 It is his source, not Sextus himself, who claims that

84 (110) Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ· Ξενοφάνης δὲ κατὰ τοὺς ὃς ἔτερος αὐτὸν ἐξηγούμενος, ὅταν λέγῃ καὶ τὸ µὲν σαφὲς οὗ τις ἀνήρ ἰδεῖν, οὐδὲ τις ἄδηται εἰδὼς ἄμφιθεαν τε καὶ ἄδητα λέγων περὶ πάντων· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ µάλιστα τύχα τετελεσμένα εἰπὼν, αὐτὸς δὲ δοκεῖ οὐκ ὄνειδος, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πάσι τέτυκται, φαίνεται μὴ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἀναιρεῖν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν καὶ ἀδιάπτωτον, ἀπολείπειν δὲ τὴν δοξαστήν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμφαίνει τὸ “δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πάσι τέτυκται”. ὥστε κριτήριον γίνεσθαι κατὰ τούτον τὸν δοξαστὸν λόγον, τουτέστι τὸν τοῦ εἰκότος ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν τοῦ παγίου ἐχόμενον. (111) δ' ὡς γνώριμος αὐτῷ Παρμενίδης τὸν µὲν δοξαστὸν λόγου κατέγνω, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀσθενεῖς ἐχόντος ὑπόληψες, τὸν δ' ἐπιστημονικόν, τουτέστι τὸν ἀδιάπτωτον, ὑπεθέτοι κριτήριον, ἀποστάς καὶ <αὐτὸς> τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πίστεως. (I ignore the
addition of αὐτὸς in the final sentence.)

85 Adv. Math. VII. 93. The reference there is to a discussion of Plato’s Timaeus, but the nature of the work in which
86 The reference may be to Posidonius himself. The naming of Posidonius just mentioned, combined with the report
in Diogenes Laertius (Vitae VII.54) that Posidonius wrote a work On Criterion in which some early Stoics were said
to have made “right reason” (orthos logos) a criterion, makes Posidonius a plausible source for much of this portion
of the work (i.e., adv. Math. VII.89-140), where a logos of one kind or another is claimed to have been the criterion
of some early thinker. Some (though suspicious of the value of Diogenes’ report) regard the whole portion
243; cf., in relation to Parmenides’ text, Kingsley (2003) p. 568, with references). I have no real dispute with this
identification, provided that it is understood that recognition of its “Posidonian origin” does not entitle us to treat the
entire section as though it were a quotation from Posidonius rather than as a passage of Sextus’ work. Sedley (1992),
quoted earlier (see footnote 83), in making a case for Posidonius being not only the primary, but (it seems) the only
source for adv. Math. VII.89-140, presents an overly simplified account, attributing to Posidonius material that
appears to be drawn from elsewhere or Sextus’ own contributions.
Xenophanes’ verses affirm a doxastic *logos* as a criterion of truth. For a proper estimation of what Sextus relates about Parmenides, we must understand that this distinction carries over seamlessly into the discussion about him. The pairing of Xenophanes and “his acquaintance” comes from Sextus’ source, and it is that source that views them as committing to either a doxastic or an epistemonic *logos* as a criterion. Sextus’ own contribution comes with the clarifications of these terms, presented in the clauses that I have set in parentheses in the translation above. A hint of Sextus’ reserve about the claim itself may be present in the remark that immediately follows, which introduces his quotation:

At any rate (γοῦν), in beginning his *On Nature*, he writes in this manner: 88

Then follows the whole proem, from the opening word ἱπποὶ to λείπεται in the 36th line. In introducing the lines, Sextus not only very helpfully informs us that they come from the beginning of Parmenides’ poem, but with γοῦν (“at any rate”, “at least”) he may also signal that the lines being claimed as evidence for the interpretation he is reporting are less than fully convincing. Sextus relates the manner in which his source read the opening of the poem immediately after the quotation:

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87 The talk of “epistemonic” and “doxastic” apprehensions (*katalēpseis*), as well as of “weak suppositions” as a type of *doxa*, suggests that source is Stoic, whether Posidonius or not (cf. LS 40 and 41, esp. 41C and 41G, with notes). Some of the same language also appears in the *Didaskalikos* of the middle Platonist Alcinous (see Dillon (1996) pp. 273-276 with Afterword pp. 445-446), so is not exclusively Stoic. For convenience, but with the caveat that the label is more of a placeholder than a means of identification for the figure behind much (but not necessarily all) of *adv. Math.* VII 89-140, who is probably Stoic, and who may or may not be Posidonius, I will speak hereafter of Sextus’ “Stoic source”.

88 ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τοῦ Περὶ φύσεως γράφει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον

89 Cf. the parallel uses of the expression ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν at *adv. Math.* VII.60 and (if the emendation of the manuscripts’ ἐναρχόμενος σῶν is accepted) VII.132, where Sextus quotes the openings of works by Protagoras and Heraclitus (quoting each, as with Parmenides’ proem, in the fullest form known to us) as offering possibly doubtful evidence for claims, advanced by other parties, about Protagoras’ and Heraclitus’ positions on the criterion. At VII.60-64, Sextus reports the view that Protagoras’ *homo mensura* statement abolished any criterion. Sextus’ own view on Protagoras’ commitments can be found at *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* I.216-219, where he interprets “man is the measure” as a positive assertion that a human being is, for Protagoras, a kind of criterion. Heraclitus is discussed in *adv. Math.* VII.126-134, where the source for the interpretation Sextus is reporting seems likely to be the same as
For in these [verses], Parmenides, in saying that “mares” bear him, is speaking of the irrational (alogos) impulses and desires of the soul, while progressing “down the polyphēmos way of the divinity” is the contemplation according to the philosophic logos, which logos, in the manner of an escorting divinity, leads the way toward the cognition of all things; The explanatory particle “for” (γὰρ) here indicates that the equivalences being claimed between the features of the proem and the mental and perceptual faculties mentioned are offered in support of the earlier claim that Parmenides assumed an epistemonic logos as a criterion, “withdrawing even from the assurance of the senses”. This would seem so elementary a point that it hardly needs pointing out, but γὰρ goes untranslated in both the Loeb and Cambridge versions of the work, and the failure to see this connection can easily lead to the impression that these equivalences are Sextus’ own. What is happening, rather, is that after quoting the lines (introduced with a touch of skepticism, and fully enough that we might form some independent sense of what Parmenides might be saying) Sextus brings us back to the that for the Xenophanes-Parmenides passage (VII.110-114). On the view reported, Heraclitus is supposed to have rejected the senses, and adopted logos (specifically the “common and divine” logos) as his criterion.

As this identification seems to rely in part on an ambiguity of the preposition κατά in the phrases κατά τὴν πολύφημον ὁδὸν (“down” or “along” the way) and κατὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον (“according to” the logos), it is worth noting that the preposition does not actually occur in the relevant phrase in the proem itself (the phrase ὁδὸν … πολύφημον in the third line is governed by ἐς). This is one of a number of apparent discrepancies between the text of the proem in Sextus’ full quotation of it and the text as the Stoic interpreter presents it.

It seems a common assumption that Sextus, even when it is recognized that he is dependent on another source, endorses the allegorical interpretation of the proem (although Taran’s insistence that it is Sextus’ own creation may be a rarity). The allegorical interpretation is often disparaged and/or ignored in the literature (cf. Cornford (1939) p. 30; Coxon (1986) p. 13; Mourelatos (1970) p. 39; Barnes (1982) p. 156). For a recent attempt to redeem it, see Latona (2008). Although tracing back the roots of the allegorical interpretation (rightly, I think) not only to Plato but to a broader Indo-European context, including the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, Latona does not question that Sextus endorses the view. In fact, he makes Sextus’ conviction on this score the motive for his supposedly distorted presentation of the proem: “Sextus appends six additional lines (DK Fr. 7.2-6, 8.1-2), which are now generally accepted to have originally appeared in a different context in the poem, but were moved by Sextus to reinforce his point about sensation and reason.” (2008, p. 201)
interpretation being reported. Points of tension between that interpretation and the proem as quoted soon begin to show themselves. Other discrepancies appear as the allegorizing identification of phrases from the proem with psychological faculties continues:

and [in saying] that “maidens” lead him forth, [Parmenides is speaking of] the senses, of which he refers riddlingly to acts of hearing in saying, “for by two whirling wheels it was led on” (that is, by those [wheels] of the ears, through which they receive the voice), while the acts of seeing he has called “Heliad maidens”, “having left behind the houses of Night” and “pushing into light” (because, separated from light, there is no use of them); and coming to “much-punishing” Dike, who keeps “keys of requital”, is the reasoning that keeps the apprehensions of things unfaltering.

At points in this list of equivalences it is difficult to determine whether the explanations of them belong to Sextus or to his source. I have placed parentheses as though Sextus is explaining the “riddling” identification of the wheels of the chariot with those of the ears, and the Heliades with vision, but it may be that these too belong to his source. In any case, the equivalences themselves clearly belong to the interpretation being reported, and it is in these that we note discrepancies with the continuous text. These discrepancies make all the more likely what is, given Sextus’ habit of quoting extensively from various authors discussed in this portion of his work.

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94 See footnote 90 above, and footnotes 96, 97 and 103 below. Also to be noted is the questionable assumption (which the Stoic source was hardly the last one to make) that the anonymous narrator is to be identified with Parmenides. This has become a quite common assumption, and scholars have even suggested dates for the composition of the poem based on the fact that the narrator is called a “youth” by the goddess. The assumption is not, of course, incompatible with the text as we have it, but it bears pointing out that it is an assumption.

95 κούρας δ’ αὐτοῦ προάγει τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὃν τὰς μὲν ἁκοῖς αἰνίττεται ἐν τῷ λέγειν ἵνα ὑπείγετο δινωτοῖσι κύκλοις”, τοῦτεστι τοῖς τῶν ὠτῶν, τὴν φωνὴν δὲ ὑπὸ ὑπηκόα απακογόνια, (113) τὰς δὲ ὁράσεις Ἡλιάδας κούρας κεκλήκη, δώματα μὲν Νυκτὸς ἀπολιπόουσας, “ἐς φάος ὁδηγεῖται” διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρὶς φωτὸς γίνεσθαι τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν “πολύποινον” ἐλθεῖν Δίκην καὶ ἔχουσαν “κληῖδας ἀμοιβόγοις”, τὴν διάνοιαν ἀσφαλεῖς ἔχουσαν τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων καταλήψεις.

96 This paraphrase swaps prefixes on the participle. In the full quotation at VII.111, the Heliades were προλιποῦσαι, here they are ἀπολιποῦσαι.

97 Note that the Stoic source’s construal of ἐς φάος with ὁδηγεῖται is at odds with the continuous text, where, in εἰς φάος, ὁδηγεῖται, the participle goes with what follows, and εἰς φάος with what precedes (although whether with σπερχοίατο πέμπειν of line 8 or προλιποῦσαι of line 9 is not immediately certain, and perhaps deliberately ambiguous). That the Stoic source uses ἐς instead of εἰς gives some support to Sider’s suggestion that we ought to print ἐς in the verse. Cf. footnotes 28 and 68.

98 Again, the full stop of the editions interrupts the sentence (cf. footnote 91).

99 See footnote 90, 94, 96, 97 and 103.

100 As noted earlier (see footnote 89), Sextus also preserves the opening passages, identifying them as such, of books by Heraclitus and Protagoras, in the fullest forms known to us. At VII.123-5, Sextus is also our best witness for two
already a plausible assumption: that Sextus’ quotation of the whole proem is independent of the source for the interpretation reported.  

The next passage is of prime importance for judging Sextus as a witness to the proem and for our assessment of the sources for Parmenides’ poem more generally. Sextus’ text continues:

She, having received him, proposes to teach these two things:

\[ \text{ἐμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ,} \]

[Both persuasive Truth’s untrembling heart]

which is the immovable basis of understanding (episteme), and, second,

\[ \ldots \text{βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής,} \]

[... mortals’ opinions, in which true assurance is not]

(that is, the “all” (to pan) lying in opinion (doxa), because it was unstable),

and at the end she makes quite clear in addition that one must not attend to the senses but to the logos. For, μὴ [...], she says,

passages of Empedocles (DK 31 B 2 and 3, to be discussed in the next chapter), on whose relative proximity he comments in a manner which again suggests familiarity with the original work. Perhaps most impressively, he offers in VII.65-86 a rather full if not quite complete transcription of Gorgias’ On Non-Being. Note that the Gorgias passage precedes the beginning of the supposedly “Posidonian” portion of the work (see footnote 86), and thus the habit of quoting from the beginnings of the works of certain predecessors looks like Sextus’ own.

This does not, of course, preclude readings from one patch of Sextus’ text finding their way into the other through scribal error or other mishaps of textual transmission. The presence of πολύπειρον in line 34 of the proem (where Diogenes Laertius gives the better πολύδηριν) in both the continuous quotation and in the report of the allegorical interpretation below is apparently one such instance.

Once more (cf. footnotes 91 and 98) I suspect that the editors have tried to end a sentence prematurely, mistaking the end of a parenthetical remark with the end of the overarching sentence. If καὶ simply continues the same sentence, ἥτις (i.e., the goddess, apparently identified by Sextus’ source with Dike – another questionable identification) remains the subject for both προσδιασαφεῖ and φησίν (thus the two appearances of “she” in the
... ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κάτα τήνδε βιάσθω
νωμὰν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἰχήσεσαν ἀκοῦν
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύπειρον ἐλεγχον
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.

Again, it is not immediately clear whether the remark in parentheses belongs to Sextus or to the Stoic source. The remark on the first verse quoted is surely the Stoic source’s, and intended to help connect Parmenides’ Truth to the epistemonic criterion, but the comment that follows the line about mortals’ opinions is harder to judge. On an initial reading, and with a reasonable expectation of balance or parallelism in the argument, one might suppose that the entire second remark also comes from the source. After some consideration, however, my own inclination is to attribute it (or at least its first part) to Sextus, and thus I place the remark in parentheses, for the following reasons. First, “that is” (τουτέστι) seems to be a marker of Sextus’ own comments, whereas the source (if Sextus is preserving the Stoic source’s language closely, or is simply keeping his own remarks stylistically distinct from commentary drawn from others) seems to be in the habit of starting clauses of clarification with a relative pronoun, as with ὅπερ ἐστὶ here.104

Secondly, the remarks made on the lines are not perfectly parallel. Each remark does, it is true, identify something from Parmenides’ verses with one of the criteria he is supposed to be speaking about, and does so in such a way as to indicate something of Parmenides’ alleged attitude toward the criterion in question. Functionally, however, the remarks are slightly different. The first remark, glossing the “heart of truth” explicitly in terms of episteme, is needed to lend an air of plausibility to the claim of the Stoic source that Parmenides was affirming an epistemonic logos, as the word episteme does not appear in what remains of the poem. In the second verse,

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104 In the entire passage we are presently considering, four other of Sextus’ clarifications begin with τουτέστι, while ὅπερ ἐστὶ is paralleled by the clause beginning ὅς λόγος in section 112 (see footnote 91).
since Parmenides himself uses the word *doxa*, the link to a “doxastic” criterion is fairly obvious, and there is little need for an additional remark making that connection. Indeed, the remark on the second verse seems to add little actual clarification, and may well be thought more obscure than Parmenides’ own verse. This obscurity is related to a third reason for seeing the remark as Sextus’, namely, that it is not quite saying what readers often take it to be saying. There appears to be a consensus among translators of this remark in rendering τὸ ἐν δόξῃ κείμενον πᾶν as “everything that rests on opinion” and in ignoring the tense of the verb of the clause ὅτι ἦν ἀβέβαιον (“because it was unstable”). However, if the sense were “everything that rests on opinion”, a better text would be πᾶν τὸ ἐν δόξῃ κείμενον. The expression τὸ ἐν δόξῃ κείμενον πᾶν, it seems to me, means rather “the All (to pan) that lies in doxa” or even “the All laid out in (the) Doxa”. That is, *to pan* here is the common scientific/philosophical expression “the All”, generally (though not always strictly) equivalent to “universe” or “cosmos”. In the additional clause, “because it [the All] was unstable”, the imperfect indicates that the instability of the All was a point previously recognized. This is appropriate if the causal clause is explaining Parmenides’ reasons, when he composed the poem, for placing the description of the All where he did. Taking the remark as Sextus’, the first part provides a bit of information perhaps not

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105 Bury (1935, p. 63): “that is to say everything that consists in opinion because all such things are unsure”; Gallop (1984, p. 96): “that is to say, everything which lies in the realm of belief, because all such things are uncertain”; Bett (2005, p. 25): “that is, everything that rests on opinion, because it is insecure”; McKirahan (in Coxon (2009) p. 182): “that is to say, everything that rests on opinion, because it is uncertain.” Despite minor changes in phrasing, I take it that all these renderings are in substantial agreement in their construal of the remark (and that in the last two translations, the antecedent of “it” is intended to be “everything”, not “opinion”).

106 The use of ἐν δόξῃ as a way of referring to the part of the poem commonly known as the Doxa has a potential parallel in Proclus’ *Platonic Theology* I.9 (cf. Saffrey-Westerink (1968) p. 35.17 and testimonium 184, with McKirahan’s translation, in Coxon (2009) pp. 218-219).

107 On the common construal, the first part of the remark seems pointless and confusing, at best merely repeating what is stated more directly in the verse itself. The causal clause would presumably be explaining that there is no real assurance to be had in mortal opinions because they are unstable. This is a sensible enough point to argue in making the case that Parmenides rejected a doxastic criterion, and I suspect that Sextus’ source did indeed make some such argument (the adjective ἀβέβαιος certainly has something in common with the phrase ἀμετακίνητον βῆμα, used in the remark on the preceding line), but having “mortals’ opinions” glossed as “everything that rests in opinion” does not seem to help advance that case.
given by the Stoic source, namely, that the teaching of “mortals’ opinions” takes the form of a
description of the All given in the Doxa. Sextus then adds, probably using an adjective borrowed
from his source, what is imagined to be one of Parmenides’ reasons for that arrangement. 108
Seeing the remark as Sextus’ parenthetical interjection also helps us not to lose track of the
overarching sentence, which goes on to offer the lines that the Stoic source took as making
“quite clear” Parmenides’ rejection of the senses. 109

As they are introduced, those lines are explicitly stated to have been spoken “at the end”.
It is Sextus himself, I think, who provides this information, 110 and “at the end” does not mean “at
the end of the poem” or “just before the arguments about the ‘signs’ of what-is” (i.e., before DK
8, where Kranz will place the lines), but refers simply to the end of the passage he quoted less
than a page ago. Sextus will similarly inform us later, following a quotation of the opening words
of Heraclitus’ book, that a second quotation from Heraclitus (DK 22 B 2) was added “after he
proceeded a little”. 111 Of course, Sextus does not always indicate so clearly where the words he
quotes originally stood in the texts from which they were drawn, but it seems an unnecessarily
contorted reading of the available evidence to attempt to explain away the explicit indications
that he does provide either by inventing ulterior motives for him or concluding that he had an
incomplete text before him. 112 Once more, then, with a better sense of what’s being said by
whom, we read:

108 Cf. the goddess’ words from the transition to the Doxa at DK 8.60-61: τὸν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα
φατίζω, / ὡς οὐ μὴ ποτὲ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσῃ.
109 The verb προσδιασαφεῖ may come from the Stoic source, retained by Sextus with a touch of sarcasm. Cf.
διασαφεῖ in the discussion of Empedocles seemingly drawn from the same source, at adv. Math. VII.124. These, it
appears, are the only two instances of the verb in Sextus.
110 As we shall see shortly, Diogenes Laertius, when quoting nearly the same lines as Sextus does here in support of
the same argument, introduces the quotation with the words “as [Parmenides] says somewhere”. This may suggest
that Diogenes could not confirm the location of the lines in the source that he appears to have shared with Sextus.
111 ὀλίγα προδιελθὼν: adv. Math. VII.133. A similar case, Sextus’ quotations of two fragments of Empedocles (DK
31 B 2 and 3) at adv. Math. VII. 123-125, will be considered in detail in the following chapter.
112 Latona (as mentioned in footnote 93) is an example of the former, Coxon (see footnote 10) of the latter.
She, having received him, proposes to teach these two things:

ημὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἢτορ,
[Both persuasive Truth’s untrembling heart]

which is the immovable basis of understanding (episteme), and, second,

... βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθής,
[... mortals’ opinions, in which true assurance is not]

(that is, the All set out in Doxa, because it was unstable), and at the end she makes quite clear in addition that one must not attend to the senses but to the logos. For, μὴ [...] σε, she says,

... ἐθος πολύπειρον ὄδὸν κάτα τήνδε βιάσθω
νωμᾶν ἁσκοπον ὁμμα καὶ ήχητεςαν ἄκουην
καὶ γλῶδσαν, κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύπειρον ἐλέγχον
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.

The source for the allegorical interpretation that Sextus is relating cites the last four lines as indicating Parmenides’ rejection of the testimony of the senses in favor of the rule of (an epistemonic) logos. A translation in line with this reading would be:

Let not polypeiron habit force you, along this way,
To ply an aimless eye and echoing hearing
And tongue, but judge by logos the polypeiron elenchos
Spoken by me.113

Though modern commentators differ over what, precisely, the phrases “aimless eye” and “echoing hearing and tongue” are meant to suggest,114 and just what an elenchos must be here,115

113 Note that though the repetition of πολύπειρον is retained here, I regard this, as others do, as a mistake in the transmission of the text, and not a repetition in Parmenides’ poem. The advantages of the correct reading, preserved by Diogenes Laertius, will become apparent shortly.

114 For instance, where Cornford saw a more general criticism (“Eye and ear have no real external object. The tongue may stand for taste or speech, which is sometimes ranked with the senses; Hippocr. π. διαίτης, I, 23, the seven αἰσθήσεως include στόμα διαλέκτου and respiration.” (1939, p. 32, n. 2)), Benjamin Farrington claimed that Parmenides “specifically attacks a method of research. Nor is it difficult to suggest the contemporary activities which he denounced. The astronomical activities of the Ionian school were carried on at this time in an observatory on the island of Tenedos. This affords an outstanding example of the use of the ‘blind eye’ in the interpretation of the universe. The ‘echoing ear’ irresistibly suggests the acoustic experiments of the Pythagoreans. The tongue, no doubt, is to be understood, not as the organ of speech, as so many commentators strangely suppose, but as the organ of taste so accurately described by Alcmaeon.” (1944, p. 52)
there is a broad consensus on how to understand the words κρίνασι δὲ λόγῳ, and in this the modern commentators agree with the Stoic source. “Judge by reason” is a very common rendering of this phrase, and might well serve as the motto for most contemporary interpretations of Parmenides. For many scholars, these words mark a pivotal moment in the history of human thought. According to Guthrie, “Here for the first time sense and reason are contrasted, and we are told that the senses deceive and that reason alone is to be trusted. It is a decisive moment in the history of European philosophy, which can never be the same again.”

Similarly, Wheelwright describes the Eleatic school, beginning with Parmenides, as “the first all-out attempt in the western world to establish pure reason, with its demands of logical consistency and relatedness, as the sole criterion of truth.” As Wheelwright’s use of the Stoic source’s own idiom well shows, contemporary scholars, despite their widespread dismissal of the details of the allegorical interpretation of Parmenides’ proem, are by and large in agreement with the basic thrust of the interpretation.

Sextus, himself, however, gives additional hints of his skepticism in his last remarks on Parmenides, before moving on to reports about Empedocles:

Well then, this very man too, as is obvious from the things mentioned, having proclaimed the epistemonic logos as a standard measure of the truth in the things that are, withdrew from the

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116 Guthrie (1965) p. 25. This and similarly grandiose remarks (a sampling of which appear in the next footnote) seem intemperate considering how vast our ignorance of philosophy before Plato must be said to be. I do not mean to minimize Parmenides’ importance in the history of thought, but it should be noted that in claiming Parmenides as the inventor of rationalism, logic, or abstract thought, modern historians go beyond the claims of ancient thinkers about him, high though their opinion of him may have been.

117 Wheelwright (1960) p. 90. Like remarks about the momentousness of the above utterance can be found from an array of scholars with widely divergent views on the nature and value of Parmenides’ real contribution to philosophy. Cf. the comments by Hegel and Nietzsche in the Introduction. More recently, Richard McKirahan has written, “It is universally recognized that Parmenides’ introduction of argument into philosophy was a move of paramount importance.” (Curd and Graham (2008) p. 189). James Warren, though stressing, “It is easy to overstate the discontinuities between Parmenides and what had come before”, sees with Parmenides “a new turn towards a self-conscious application of principles of logical analysis and argumentation that has not previously been centre-stage.” (2007, pp. 77-78)
observation of the senses, while Empedocles the Acragantine, according to those seeming to explain him rather simply, hands down six criteria of truth.\footnote{Ἀλλ’ οὗτος μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὡς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων συμφανές, τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον κανόνα τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὐσίων ἀληθείας ἀναγορεύσας ἀπέστη τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιστάσεως: (115) Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἀπλούστερον δοκοῦντας αὐτὸν ἔξηγεν καὶ δὲ κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας παρασκέυασε.\footnote{For ἄλλα indicating reluctant acquiescence see Smyth § 2784b and Denniston (1950) p. 19; other examples in this portion of adv. Math. are to be found at VII.89, VII.119 and VII.126. Instances of sarcastic overstatement comparable to the use of συμφανές here are προφανὲς … κατὰ πολὺ διενήθησαν at VII.45, ῥητῶς at VII.133 (raised to ῥητότατα at VII.134), and προδήλως at VII.141. Cf. too the uses of (προς)διασφαλέωι noted in footnote 109.} Sextus does not go on to elaborate his doubts, because his concern here is not with the interpretation of Parmenides \emph{per se}, but with presenting the wide variety of views that people have been said to hold with regard to the criterion of truth. Sextus thus moves smoothly on to report differing claims made about Empedocles. Ever the good Pyrrhonist, Sextus has withheld his own judgment on Parmenides, but has nonetheless provided us with material vital to our own understanding of the poem. His quotation alone has allowed for our earlier observations on the structure of the proem, and, with the additional information provided by Diogenes Laertius, an alternative reading of its closing lines will come to light.

\textbf{Reliable Diogenes?}

The ten books of Diogenes Laertius’ \emph{Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers} are rarely introduced without an apparently obligatory slight on the fitness of their author for the task he set
himself, coupled with some remark about how considerable caution is required in dealing with
the reports to be found therein. Such warnings are not entirely uncalled for, but, despite its faults,
the work remains an indispensable source on many matters. Here, then, is the opening of
Diogenes Laertius’ chapter on Parmenides:121

Parmenides, son of Pyres, of Elea, was an auditor of Xenophanes (Theophrastus in his
Epitome claims that this one heard Anaximander), but, although indeed an auditor of
Xenophanes, he did not follow him. He communed (so Sotion claims) also with Ameinias,
Diochaites’ son, the Pythagorean, a poor man, but a gentleman. It was him, rather, that he
followed, and to whom, when he died, he dedicated a hero shrine, belonging to a luminary
and wealthy family; and it was by Ameinias, and not by Xenophanes, that he was turned to
quietude.

This man was the first to assert that the earth is ball-shaped and placed in the middle; that
there are two elements, fire and earth, and the one (fire) holds the position of a craftsman, the
other (earth) that of material; that the generation of human beings comes about first from the
sun;122 and that the hot and the cold were really an “auton”123 out of which “all things” are
constituted;124 and that the soul and the intellect are the same thing, as Theophrastus also
mentions in his Physics, setting out the doctrines of just about everyone.

There are points of biography and doctrine here that will call for more detailed treatment
elsewhere, but for the present discussion, let us focus on Diogenes’ use of his sources. He is
somewhat more inclined than is Sextus to inform us where he found a particular item, but he is
not always especially careful in how he does so. In reporting Theophrastus’ remark that “this

121 Vitae IX.21-23. The text below is that of Long (1964), modified in a few places. Occasional references are also
made to the text of Marcovich (1999). (21) Ξενοφάνους δὲ διήκουσε Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἑλεάτης — τοῦτον
Θεόφραστος ἐν τῇ Ἐπιτομῇ Ἀναξιμάνδρου φησὶν ἀκούσα — ὃς δ᾽ οὖν ἀκούσας καὶ Ξενοφάνους οὐκ
ήκολούθησεν αὐτῷ. ἐκοινώσε δὲ καὶ Αμεινίᾳ Διοχαίτα τῷ Πυθαγορικῷ, ὡς ἔφη Σωτίων, ἀνδρὶ πένητι μέν,
καλῷ δὲ καὶ ἀγαθῷ. ὧν καὶ μᾶλλον ἠκολούθησε καὶ ἀποθανόντος ἡρώον γένους τε ὑπάρχουν λαμπροῦ καὶ
πλούτου, καὶ ὑπ᾽ Ἀμεινίου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ὑπὸ Ξενοφάνους εἰς ἡσυχίαν προετράπη.

Πρῶτος δ᾽ αὐτὸς τὴν γῆν ἀπέφαινε σφαιροειδῆ καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κεῖσθαι. δῶε τε εἶναι στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆν,
καὶ τὸ μὲν δημιουργοῦ τάξιν ἔχειν, τὴν δ᾽ ὑλήν. (22) γενέσθαι τ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἡλίου πρῶτον γενέσθαι αὐτὸν
dὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα συνεστάναι. καὶ τὴν ψυχήν καὶ τὸν νόον ταύτων εἶναι,
καθὰ μέμνηται καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς, πάντων σχεδὸν ἐκπράξεινος τὰ δόγματα.

122 Reading, with Long, ἡλίου of the manuscripts, rather than, with Marcovich, ἢλυος of the early editions. G. Rocca-
Serra proposes reading ἢλυος τῆς Φυσικῆς, πάντων σχεδὸν ἐκπράξεινος τὰ δόγματα.

123 Marcovich prints Diels’ conjecture αἴτια for the manuscripts’ αὐτόν here. Untersteiner (1958, pp. 10-12) defends
the manuscript reading, using αὐτόν to refer to humankind. I favor preserving the reading, but regard this as
an indication of Parmenides’ peculiar use of αὐτός, not unrelated to the use of τοῦτον in the next clause. For now I
simply note this as an oddity to be treated elsewhere.

124 There are indications in Parmenides’ poem and other Eleatic contexts that πάντα is something of a technical term.
This, like the use of αὐτός, will call for discussion elsewhere.
one” heard Anaximander, for instance, the English translation makes clearer than does Diogenes’ Greek that the auditor in question was Xenophanes, not Parmenides. In the passage above, aside from Sotion’s account about Parmenides’ relationship with Ameinias, Diogenes’ biographical information on Parmenides is presented as drawn from Theophrastus. That is, Diogenes’ presentation thus far consists of a Peripatetic doxographical account, supplemented by a (Peripatetic?) biographical point. With his next remarks, he appears to shift from Peripatetic sources to the Stoic source shared by Sextus:

He said his philosophy was twofold, According to Truth, on the one hand, and According to Opinion, on the other, wherefore he also says somewhere:

... χρεώ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ημὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκὲς ἢτορ,
ηδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθῆς.

[... And you must needs hear all things,
Both persuasive Truth’s exacting heart,
And mortals’ opinions, in which true assurance is not.]  

The claim that Parmenides’ philosophy was twofold has a parallel in a remark by Theophrastus to the effect that Parmenides went along “both ways”, one κατὰ Ἀλήθειαν, another κατὰ δόξαν, but is also comparable to the remark in Sextus, just before the same lines are quoted (apart from

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125 Diogenes’ ambiguity is apparently behind the historically improbable claim found in the Suda entry on Parmenides (= DK 28 A 2) that he was not only a pupil of Xenophanes, but also, according to Theophrastus, a student of Anaximander.

126 Elsewhere (Vitae VIII.48 = FHSG 227E) Diogenes explicitly credits Theophrastus for the claim about the shape of the earth, and it seems likely that the whole of the second paragraph above ultimately comes from Theophrastus. Cf. the parallel arrangement of doxographical excerpta de Parmenide in Diels (1879) pp. 141-142. On Sotion, see Diels (1879) pp. 147-148. It is of course quite possible that Diogenes consulted neither Theophrastus’ nor Sotion’s works directly, but relied on intermediary texts. For a survey of approaches to the question of the sources behind Diogenes’ work, a particular preoccupation of nineteenth-century scholars, see Hope (1930) pp. 36-97.

127 διεσή τι ἐφε τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὴν μὲν κατὰ Ἀλήθειαν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ δόξαν. διὸ καὶ φησὶ ποιον:
χρεώ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ημὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθεῖος ἀτρεκὲς ἢτορ,
ηδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐνὶ πίστις ἀληθῆς.
I substitute εὐπειθεῖος ἀτρεκὲς for Long’s εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμές, which reflected the more popular reading of Parmenides at the time, but has no manuscript authority for Diogenes’ text.

128 See Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Metaphys. p. 31.7-14 Hayduck (= DK 28 A 7 = FHSG 227C), quoting from what he calls the first book of Theophrastus’ Περὶ τῶν Φυσικῶν.
the quotation of the proem as a whole), that the goddess proposed to teach “these two things”.\textsuperscript{129} In the “wherefore” clause, the word “also” (καὶ) may indicate that Diogenes is now working from a new source, while “somewhere” (που) may imply that he is doing so without the poem itself before him. Though what follows is similar to Sextus’ report, there are differences which suggest that Diogenes was not using Sextus’ text. In Sextus, we will recall, the Stoic source identified the speaker of the lines above with Dike, and the closing lines of the proem were said (by Sextus) to come “at the end”. Diogenes, though quoting the very same lines, attributes them simply to Parmenides, and, more significantly, indicates that he does not know quite where the lines were located. That the source for Diogenes’ text at this point was nonetheless closely related to, if not the same as, Sextus’ Stoic source seems assured by what follows:\textsuperscript{130}

(He himself philosophizes in poetry too, just as Hesiod, Xenophanes and Empedocles did.) He said logos was a criterion, and that sense perceptions were not really precise. At any rate, he says:

\begin{quote}

μηδὲ σε θεός πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω
νομάν ἀσκοπον ὃμμα καὶ ἤχοςασαν ἄκουσθαι
καὶ γλώσσαν, κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύπειρῳ ἔλεγχον.
\end{quote}

Here, apart from the interjection on Parmenides’ choice of verse (a natural one for Diogenes to make upon first quoting him, since most of the philosophers he is dealing with wrote in prose), Diogenes presents the same argument as the one we saw in Sextus’ text. After mentioning the two “ways” of Truth and Doxa, and quoting lines 29 and 30 of the proem, (a non-doxastic) logos is proclaimed the Parmenidean criterion of truth, and the senses are characterized as faulty. Just

\textsuperscript{129} Note also the remark in Clement, before the quotation of the same lines, that Parmenides introduced “a teaching of double ways” (see footnote 80).

\textsuperscript{130} Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ διὰ ποιημάτων φιλοσοφεῖ, καθάπερ Ἡσίοδός τε καὶ Ἑσιόφανῆς καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς. κριτήριον δὲ τὸν λόγον εἶπε· τάς τε αἰσθήσεις μὴ ἀκρίβεις ὑπάρχειν. φησί γοῦν·

μηδὲ σε θεός [sic Diogenes] πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω
νομάν ἀσκοπον ὃμμα καὶ ἤχοςασαν ἄκουσθαι
καὶ γλώσσαν, κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύπειρῳ ἔλεγχον.
as in Sextus’ text, lines 32-34 (that is, of Sextus’ proem)\footnote{These are generally regarded as DK B 7.3-5, and are so identified in Long’s text. Note that in Sextus’ version of this argument, the first three words from the following line were also quoted. The “at least” (γοῦν) with which Diogenes quotes these lines probably reflects (like ποι with the verses quoted just before) his uncertainty about the text, rather than doubt about the soundness of the argument (as with Sextus’ use of the particle when quoting the whole preom).} are quoted in support of that claim. Although there are differences worth noting, some of which point to different versions of the source text, the likeness between the two strongly suggests the same ultimate source. One such difference is in their quotation of line 29, where, in Diogenes, Truth’s heart is \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\zeta\) rather than \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\mu\epsilon\zeta\). \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\zeta\) suits Diogenes’ subsequent description of the senses as \(\mu\heta\ \alpha\kappa\rho\iota\beta\epsilon\iota\zeta\), whereas \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\mu\epsilon\zeta\) matches the descriptions in Sextus’ text of Truth as an \(\alpha\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\kappa\iota\kappa\iota\iota\tau\iota\nu\ \beta\iota\mu\alpha\) and opinion as \(\alpha\beta\beta\beta\beta\iota\alpha\nu\). These are not stark differences, but very similar paraphrases with a slight shift in imagery. In Diogenes’ presentation, Truth’s superiority to opinion is expressed in terms of exactness and precision, while in Sextus the matter is put in terms of stability. Here Diogenes, or an intermediary source, conceiving the distinction slightly differently, might easily have read \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\zeta\) for \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\mu\epsilon\zeta\).\footnote{Diogenes, however, is not alone in reading \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\zeta\), which was evidently also in the version of these lines quoted by Plutarch (although there the line actually ends mid-word; see Texts: C in the Appendix to Chapter 1), who also quotes them in connection with the criterion of truth, and in certain later manuscripts of Sextus at adv. Math. VII.114 (and all the manuscripts in the full quotation of the proem at VII.111, if the editors’ reports are accurate). This might seem reason to suppose an authentic line or lines featuring \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\zeta\) in place of \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\mu\epsilon\zeta\), but \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\zeta\) does not appear as a variant in the repetitions of the lines quoted by Proclus and Simplicius (i.e., fragments “X” and “Y”), or in Clement, who also seems to be quoting from the proem, but not clearly dependent on the Stoic source that Plutarch, Diogenes, and Sextus seem to share. Thus \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\zeta\) appears to be a reading limited to a subgroup of those drawing on the Stoic source that quoted the lines to articulate Parmenides’ stance on the question of the criterion of truth, and in such a context, where precision and exactitude are a natural concern, reading \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\zeta\) for \(\alpha\tau\rho\epsilon\mu\epsilon\zeta\) seems an easy substitution to make.} The integrity of the argument, however, is nevertheless preserved. Among the other differences are those in the quotations of lines 32 and following, where each text helps to supplement or correct deficiencies of the other. Sextus quotes the beginning of line 35, omitted by Diogenes, and he also preserves the correct reading \(\sigma^\prime\ \varepsilon\theta\omega\zeta\) where Diogenes gives us the corrupt \(\sigma\varepsilon\ \theta\varepsilon\omega\zeta\). Diogenes, in turn, shows us that, in Sextus’ version of line 34 (in both the full quotation of the proem and the excerpt parallel to Diogenes’ quotation), the unmetrical \(\kappa\rho\iota\nu\epsilon\)
and the adjective πολύπειρον (repeated from line 32) should be read as κρίναι and πολύδηριν respectively.

We will see shortly how the corrections from Diogenes here allow us to read these lines in a way that differs markedly from the manner in which the source on whom each of our authors is drawing takes them. As for the rest of Diogenes’ chapter, he continues: 133

Wherefore Timon says about him too:

Παρμενίδου τε βίην μεγαλόφρονος οὐ πολύδοξον,
δὲ ρ’ ἀπὸ φαντασίας ἀπάτης ἀνενείκατο νόσεις.

[And great-minded Parmenides’ force, not many-opinioned, Who bore thinkings away from imagination’s deception.]

This transition I take to be Diogenes’ own.134 Here again, Diogenes adds an element to his portrait of the thinker by shifting to another of his sources.135 Quotation from Timon is a typical Laertian maneuver, but it is not without value for us. Timon’s phrasing οὐ πολύδοξον to describe Parmenides’ force is telling, for it picks up on Parmenides’ fondness for poly-compounds and associates them directly with doxa. One noteworthy result of undoing Kranz’s move is that nearly all of the known occurrences of poly-compounds are then encountered in the proem, 136

133 (23) διὸ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ φησιν ὁ Τίμων·
Παρμενίδου τε βίην μεγαλόφρονος οὐ πολύδοξον,
δὲ ρ’ ἀπὸ φαντασίας ἀπάτης ἀνενείκατο νόσεις.
134 Contrast the view of Rocco-Serra (1987, pp. 261-264), who thinks that the lines from Timon are drawn from the same source as the immediately preceding material, a source which, due to the inclusion of Timon, he suggests was a Skeptic rather than a Stoic one. As it is a regular habit of Diogenes to round out his chapters with verses from Timon or some other poet (even quoting his own verses wherever possible), it seems to me that this is simply another instance of the same. Though both were Skeptics, there is no hint of Timon’s lines in the parallel passage in Sextus, and the connection of Timon’s verses with the preceding material does not seem particularly tight. What Timon’s lines share with the material presented also in Sextus are features that would probably have been familiar to anyone who had read the poem: a strong division between thinking (noein) and seeming (doxa), an association of appearance or imagination with deception, and a fondness for compound words (particularly poly-compounds associated with doxa).
135 Note the recurrence of διὸ καὶ ... φησιν, also above (see the text in footnote 127), marking in each instance Diogenes’ shift from one source to the next. Cf. III.13, VII.1 and VII.170.
136 The exception to this is DK B 16, which is generally assigned to the Doxa, after multiplicity has re-entered the scene. This fragment will call for special consideration later, in light of the remarks in the first chapter about
prior to the goddess’ restriction of the discourse to the unchanging aspects of what is. The poly-
compounds thus seem to serve as markers of the multiplicity encountered in the domain of
opinion, which will be inappropriate during the teaching about Truth’s heart. The snippet from
Timon seems to confirm this.

Finally, Diogenes completes his entry on Parmenides with a multiplicity of opinions about
Parmenides’ activities and influence:

Plato too has written his dialogue on this man, entitling it *Parmenides, or On Ideas.*
He was in his prime in the sixty-ninth Olympiad. He also seems to have been the first to
detect that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same (so Favorinus claims in the fifth book of
*Remembrances*; some say Pythagoras, but Callimachus claims the poem isn’t his). He is also
said to have given laws to his citizens (so claims Speusippus in his *On Philosophers*). He was
also first to advance the Achilles argument (so Favorinus in his *Miscellaneous History*).
There was also another Parmenides, a rhetor and handbook writer.¹³⁷

“**But Judge by Reason**”?

We noted earlier that while scholars have shown little hesitation in making drastic alterations to
the text that Sextus preserves, and while they are generally dismissive and often gratuitously
superior about aspects of the interpretation that he reports, they nevertheless tend to embrace the
central point of that interpretation. We are now, however, nearly in a position to formulate an
alternative reading of the lines almost universally regarded as Parmenides’ declaration of a
commitment to “reason” or “argument”. To judge from the common elements of the
presentations of both Sextus (at *adv. Math.* VII.114) and Diogenes,¹³⁸ the source they shared

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¹³⁷ εἰς τοῦτον καὶ Πλάτων τὸν διάλογον γέγραφε, “Παρμενείδης” ἐπηγράψας “ἡ Περὶ Ἰδεῶν.”

¹³⁸ See pages 69-70 above, with footnotes 127 and 130.
seems to have quoted the following lines in the following sequence (each omitting, as the space
in the text below indicates, line 31 of Sextus’ continuous quotation at *adv. Math.* VII.111):

... χρεὼ δὲ σε πάντα πιθέσθαι
ημὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμὲς ἔτιερ
ηδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.

... οἰκόμαν ἀσκοπον ὃμα καὶ ἡξῆκαν ἀκούν
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδημιν ἔλεγχον
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.139

From the interpretation reported by our authors, it seems plain that that source wished us to
understand these lines as saying something like the following:

... And you must needs hear all things,
Both persuasive Truth’s untrembling heart
And mortals’ opinions, in which true trust is not.

Nor let the habit of much experience force you, along this way,
To ply an aimless eye and echoing hearing
And tongue, but judge by reason the much-contested *elenchos*
Spoken by me.

As already mentioned, there are differences of opinion over the precise meaning of various
phrases in these lines, but there is a widespread and almost unquestioned assumption that the
final lines here quoted are a commandment to place one’s trust in reason rather than the
senses.140 There is occasionally some apprehension voiced about anachronistically translating
*logos* as “reason”, but almost as often this is carefully managed in order not to lose the substance

139 As the final three words are not quoted by Diogenes Laertius, it may well be that the Stoic source, like Diogenes,
ended his own quotation at ἔλεγχον. Sextus, when presenting the argument at *adv. Math.* VII.114, may have simply
added the end of the sentence from his complete copy of the proem.

140 As pointed out above, the dominant translation of κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ has been “but judge by reason” or a close
equivalent: “but judge by reasoning”, Cornford (1939) p. 32; “But judge by means of reason (Logos)”, Freeman
(1948) p. 43; “Let reason be your judge”, Wheelwright (1960) p. 96; “but judge with reason”, Tarán (1965) p. 73;
“but do thou judge by reason”, KR p. 271; “but judge by reason (logōi)”, Hussey (1972) p. 86; “judge by reason”,
of the claim. In the fourth edition of his *Early Greek Philosophy*, for instance, Burnet, translated *logos* as “argument”, explaining, “This is the earliest instance of λόγος in the sense of (dialectical) argument which Sokrates made familiar. He got it, of course, from the Eleatics. The Herakleitean use is quite different.” Among the (relatively few) subsequent translators and commentators reluctant to translate *logos* as “reason” outright, there is the same tendency, given the dominant view of Parmenides as the father of logic or rational argumentation, towards similar renderings of *logos* along these lines. To judge from its use elsewhere in the poem, however, *logos* is simply “speech”.

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141 Burnet (1930) p. 173, n. 1. One can trace the changes in Burnet’s views on this bit of text through the various editions of his work. In the first edition, Burnet proposed to read not λόγῳ πολύδηριν, but λόγων πολύδην (πολύδην being a proposal by Karsten, whose arrangement he followed), and translated the whole clause, “but do thou judge the subtle refutation of their discourse uttered by me”, noting, “Λόγος does not mean ‘reason’ as opposed to sense.” (Burnet (1892) p. 185 and n. 12) The genitive (without Karsten’s πολύδην) was adopted by Arthur Fairbanks, who translated, “but do thou weigh the much contested refutation of their words, which I have uttered.” (Fairbanks (1898) pp. 92-93) With this genitive, the “discourse” or “words” refuted belong to the senses. This is awkward, but it avoids the anachronism of translating *logos* as “reason”. In the second edition, Burnet, now following Diels’ arrangement and text, dropped this suggestion and translated, without additional comment, “but judge by argument the much disputed proof uttered by me.” (Burnet (1908) p. 197) The note in the fourth edition, I take it, reveals some lingering concern that even rendering *logos* as “argument” (implicitly understood as “dialectical” argument) calls for qualification.

142 As already mentioned (see above, page 66, with footnotes 116 and 117), Parmenides is regularly so regarded in most contemporary histories of philosophy, and at the heart of this portrait of him is the supposed command to “judge by reason”. Scholars shy of rendering *logos* simply as “reason” tend to settle on an alternative with strong rational or logical overtones. Verdenius seems to combine elements of Burnet’s various attempts (see the preceding footnote), but with dubious success, claiming, “the term λόγος does not mean ‘thinking’, ‘understanding’, or ‘reason’, according to the familiar translations, but ‘reasoning’, ‘argument’.” (1942, p. 64) Verdenius appears to differ from Burnet’s first position in wishing to qualify the assertion that the clause in question “does not deal with the distinction between sense-perception and thinking”. Verdenius goes on to say (with what justification I cannot determine) that Parmenides does not “appear to have been aware of thinking as of a particular mental faculty. From the fact that he could not conceive of thinking as a psychological phenomenon it should, however, not be inferred that he was not able to grasp its methodical function, reasoning.” (1942, pp. 64-65) Fränkel’s rendering was “judge rather by thought”; “thought” being understood as “the logic of pure thought”, thus leaving it unclear whether he intended for there to be any difference between “thought” and “reason”. (1973, p. 355) Coxon gives “but decide by discourse” (1986, p. 58), and speaks in his commentary of “the judgement of reason (κρίνω δὲ λόγῳ, l.5)” (1986, p. 192). Lesher (1998, p. 38) glosses the phrase “judge by the account”, adding, “Λόγος is often translated here as ‘reason’, but this is probably a later use of the term”, referring to Guthrie (1965) pp. 419-424 for a review of fifth-century uses of *logos*. Curd, in translating the verse, wisely sidesteps the problem by rendering “but judge by *logos*”, but later adds that *logos* is “here understood as “thought”, “reckoning,” or “discourse””, also noting Guthrie’s discussion. (Curd (1998) pp. 61 and 63, with n. 109)

143 The two other uses come in line 15 of the proem and DK 8.50. Cordero, who deserves credit for acknowledging the anachronism in translating *logos* as “reason” and for taking account of occurrences of the word elsewhere in the poem, does not make a convincing case for an alternative by claiming that *logos* in the singular means “reasoning”
This widespread reading, which takes the words κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ as a repudiation of the senses and a command to judge by reason or (rational) argument, appears to be, generally without appreciating the fact, following the lead of the Stoic source (for whom logos did mean “reason”, and much else besides). While the anachronistic understanding of logos is a major component of that reading, the influence of the Stoic source on how these lines have been read extends further. Not only is translating logos as “reason” or “argument” suspect, but the construal of κρίναι as an imperative is also problematic once it is read (as Sextus’ fuller quotation allows us to do) in the context of the passage as a whole. The Stoic source intends for us, of course, to understand κρίναι as an imperative (and such a construal led, presumably, to the form κρίνε preserved in Sextus), but it seems as though he manages this by carefully selective quotation.144

Because the two portions of text cited by the source have generally, in the scholarship of the last century or so, been thought to come from different places in the poem, it has gone unnoticed, or else been thought unremarkable that, compared to the proem as Sextus quotes it in full, the Stoic source omits line 31. I think that the omission is indeed remarkable, and that the line was intentionally omitted because it was inconvenient for the Stoic reading of the lines that follow. In a sentence that has begun ἀλλὰ σὺ τῇσδ’ ἀφ’ ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα, “But do you bar (your) thought from this way of seeking”, the strong adversative ἀλλὰ is going to exercise an influence over the remainder of the sentence such that the weaker particle δὲ in the phrase κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ is unlikely to be felt as adversative, especially in the absence of any preceding μέν. It reads, instead, as a connective particle, making the infinitive κρίναι parallel with νόμιζε in the

(2004, pp. 134-138). What makes the logos of 8.50 “trustworthy” is not that it is in the singular but that it is modified by the adjective πιστὸς.

144 This is not to say that the Stoic source was the first to read the lines this way. There are a number of earlier examples of understanding the Eleatic message as a commitment to logos, which is not surprising given the thoroughgoing use of ambiguity already observed in the proem.
preceding line. Both infinitives are thus complementary with βιάσθω. This alters the sense of the whole considerably. We now understand the lines as follows:

But do you bar thought from this way of seeking,
And let not habit of much experience force you, along this way,
To ply an aimless eye and echoing hearing
And tongue, and to judge, by means of speech, the elenchos
Spoken by me (to be) much-contending.

On this alternative construal, δὲ is connective, κρίνατ a complementary infinitive, and with the dative λόγῳ, “by speech”, Parmenides is not making a monumental statement marking the advent of rational discourse into human history, but the more modest (though curious) claim that, just as one should be wary, along this way, of what the senses may present (though we regularly do depend upon them), so too speech (as regularly employed) is not going to be a fully reliable instrument for comprehending the teaching which the goddess has to impart. An additional grammatical shift in this reading is that πολύδηρην is now understood as a predicate accusative. The goddess is thus not claiming that her elenchos is “much-contesting”, but warning the youth against judging it to be so, due to a mistaken application of linguistic habit.¹⁴⁵ That is, while the elenchos might appear contentious to those too preoccupied with the way it is expressed, from the perspective that the goddess is revealing, that would be an error. Read thus, these lines become the first of a number of places in the poem where the goddess points out the potentially deceptive nature of mortal speech and naming.¹⁴⁶

This new construal presents us with the prospect of a Parmenides who may be starkly at odds with the “mainstream” interpretation of Parmenides as the father of logic, and more akin to

¹⁴⁵ On this construal of the sentence, the Furley/Lesher debate over whether the word elenchos in the phrase polydēris elenchos means “testing” or “refutation” has been preoccupied with the wrong word. The point of the goddess’ command is that she not be judged to be offering a polydēris account (or refutation, or testing). I understand polydēris, as used here, to be a poetic precursor of what would later be called “eristic”.¹⁴⁶ Cf., e.g., DK 8.38-41, 50-61; DK 9; and DK 19.
the portrait of Parmenides as a mystic proposed by Kingsley. Stanley Lombardo, in a verse translation of Parmenides and Empedocles that appears to have received little attention from specialists, suggested something similar three decades ago. Taking seriously the parallels sometimes noted, but often neglected, by earlier generations of scholars between Parmenides’ proem and reports of shamanic spiritual journeys, Lombardo pointed out that the resemblance extends beyond the proem, existing “both in the details of the journey recounted in the prologue, and in the substance of what the goddess tells him, which is that the universe and our minds form a mutually committed whole.” On this view, “Parmenides’ poem is concerned with a unique inner experience, the encounter of one’s mind with Being and the realization that they are one and the same. The road that leads to this experience is therefore a “Way,” a spiritual path rather than a logical route or an analytical method.” Of course, to those who regard Parmenides as the father of rationalism, the command to “judge by reason” seems to directly contradict such a proposal, and Lombardo’s translation of the critical clause, “but use your mind to respond to my challenge”, may be regarded as an evasion of the potential problem it presents. In promoting a similar portrait of Parmenides, Kingsley addresses this question at length, noting, as we have here, the dependence of Sextus’ and Diogenes’ reports on a Stoic source (whom he takes to be Posidonius) and the Stoic habit of accommodation. Kingsley’s solution is to propose that Posidonius’ reading involves not only an anachronistic understanding of logos, but textual corruption as well. Maintaining that logos at this stage of its history, as yet untainted with
rational overtones, means simply “what is spoken”, and arguing that no good sense can be made, in the context (which he takes to be DK 7), of a command to “judge by talk”, Kingsley claims that Parmenides’ text did not have the dative λόγῳ but read κρίναι δὲ λόγου, with a genitive, and suggests that the resulting lines can then be translated “but judge in favor of the highly contentious demonstration of the truth contained in the words as spoken by me.” The textual change from the dative to the genitive is not an extreme one, and Kingsley’s emendation has won some support, but the sentence that results seems less natural to me than the use of the instrumental dative, and the emendation, in light of the alternative offered above, seems unnecessary, at least for countering the rationalist interpretation of the lines.

Whether Parmenides was in fact more of a mystic or shaman than a logician is a question we may be better prepared to address following a full review of the sources for the rest of the poem. The new reading of the lines that I have proposed does, I think, introduce good grounds for doubting an exclusively rationalistic portrayal of Parmenides, certain advocates for which attempt, by appeal to DK B 7.5, to downplay or dismiss outright the significance of any mystical, religious, or non-Greek influences detected in the poem. It is, however, well worth

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153 Cf. Burnet’s proposal of λόγων, mentioned above (see footnote 141). Burnet’s λόγων would be an objective genitive, dependent on ἔλεγχον, so that the command would be construed “judge my refutation of the accounts (of the senses),” but runs into the difficulty that without something in Greek to correspond to “(of the senses)” it is difficult to know that the logos in question belong to the senses. On the other hand, Kingsley’s λόγου, as I understand it, is a subjective genitive, so that we read, “judge (my) speech’s polydēris elenchos, spoken by me”. Kingsley’s suggestion avoids the odd leap of understanding the logos, without any modifiers, as belonging to someone other than the present speaker, but given that the goddess goes on explicitly to identify the elenchos as her own, λόγου seems otiose.
155 Inasmuch as the reading I am proposing eliminates any positive command to judge at all, it seems a stronger counter to the rationalist interpretation that Kingsley opposes. On Kingsley’s own reading, even if logos on its own does not carry strong rational overtones, the goddess is still commanding the youth to judge her elenchos, which means, presumably, to subject it to some form of critical assessment. Cf. the remarks of Furley (1989) p. 38 and Cordero (2004) p. 134 (for the latter, see the following footnote).
156 Thus Gregory Vlastos objected to Cornford’s connection of the proem with shamanism in Cornford (1952) by saying, “though Parmenides does present his doctrine in the guise of revelation, he does not rest his claim to its truth on supernatural inspiration. His goddess does not say, “Believe,” but κρίναι λόγῳ (B7.5), appealing to an austerely logical demonstration, whose cogency is wholly rational; this is the exact opposite of shamanism.” (1955, p. 65) Guthrie, though willing to tolerate some discussion of mystical or shamanic elements in the proem (1965, pp. 11-13),
underscoring that this does not mean that something we might be inclined to call “reason” is not an important element in Parmenides’ teaching. I am not denying that Parmenides had and indeed valued some such notion, but it seems doubtful that he would have called it *logos*. Without wishing to enter into that debate here, I suggest that, ultimately, the division between the logical and the mystical, and the rationalist/empiricist dichotomy, may simply be unhelpful for an accurate understanding of Parmenides’ thought.\(^{157}\) What is attractive, at this stage, about the new construal of the lines commonly placed in fragment DK 7 is how well they fit with what we’ve seen of the proem so far and thus confirm the integrity of Sextus’ quotation.

The specific adjectives employed in this passage are generally given little attention beyond a remark about whether or not ἡχήςαν modifies γλῶσσαν as well as ἀκούην.\(^{158}\) In particular, it is underappreciated by those who would regard this passage as “the first explicit statement of the contrast between reason and the senses”\(^{159}\) that the goddess, in warning against an *aimless* eye and *echoing* hearing, is not necessarily objecting to the senses *per se*, but rather, it seems, to senses which are not being used as they ought to be.\(^{160}\) It is perfectly possible that the goddess does endorse some special form of *focused* gaze, or a manner of listening that hears past the din of everyday experience to something else worth attending to. Even in the place assigned to them in DK, then, these lines need not be an outright rejection of the senses, but appear instead to direct our attention to particular potential weaknesses in them. However, when the

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\(^{159}\) McKirahan (1994) p. 165.

\(^{160}\) It is possible, particularly if one believes that Parmenides indeed had “little facility in diction”, to understand the adjectives as fairly dull pejoratives applying to any and all uses of the senses spoken of, so that the warning against plying an aimless eye amounts to a judgment that all vision is misleading, but to those less convinced of Parmenides’ shortcomings such a reading seems an acutely ironic instance of the point the goddess is making.
lines are restored to the proem and read as proposed, Parmenides’ choice of adjectives appears more inspired. *Logos* is then no longer contrasted to, but grouped with the (other) senses as the products of the “habit of much experience”: the “aimless eye”, the “echoing hearing”, and the (also echoing) “tongue”, with which it may well be identical.\(^\text{161}\) These descriptions are especially apt in light of the observations made in the previous chapter on Parmenides’ use of repetition, for throughout the proem, the reader’s ear and tongue (at least if one has been reading aloud) have been echoing the same words and sounds—featuring familiar phrasing, in a well-known meter — but the effect, as we have repeatedly noted, is disorienting. Again, while we have been able to see numerous patterns in those repetitions, they were consistently slightly askew, and no clear, central focus ever quite emerged; that is to say, just as our ears have echoed with the words repeated, our eye has been aimless. And, though we may strain to make sense of the multiplicity of sounds and images, unless we remain open to the possibility of something unfamiliar or unexpected emerging, the impression that one may take from the manner of expression (that is, the *logos*) in the proem as well as the subsequent account (that is, the *logos*) of “what is”, is that Parmenides (or his goddess) is simply engaged in so much eristic word-splitting. Accordingly, the goddess, in her own inimitable and enigmatic way, warns the youth against this very thing.

\(^\text{161}\) It was not, it seems, unusual for speech to be considered one of the senses before Aristotle (and later the Stoics) canonized the list of senses at five. As noted above (footnote 114), Cornford refers to a list of seven senses found in *Regimen*, a work in the Hippocratic corpus probably dating from the second half of the fifth century B.C.E. That list included the mouth as an organ of conversation, and passages outward and inward for warm or cold breath, as well as the more familiar hearing, vision, nose, tongue (for pleasant and unpleasant taste) and body (for touch). Other theorists seem to have considered the capacity for pleasure (and pain) as a distinct sense (cf. Theophrastus, *de Sensibus* §§ 9 and 16, in connection with Empedocles and perhaps other “like by like” theorists). Stobaeus reports Democritus as claiming that the gods, the wise, and the irrational animals have extra senses, but does not report what those senses were (see DK 67 A 116). In the survey of earlier thinkers in his *de Sensibus*, Theophrastus remarks that Parmenides and Empedocles each treated *phronēsis* as the same as *aisthēsis* or as something close to it (§§ 3 and 10), and that Plato defined hearing through *phōnē*, “voice” (rather than *just psophos*, “sound”?). Even Aristotle, before he argues for there being only five senses at *de Anima* 3.1, sees fit to treat voice as part of his discussion of hearing in 2.8, and at the close of the work, in the list of senses other than touch, which contribute not only to mere living but to living well, accounts for the tongue and hearing in terms of their *communicative* functions. Cf. also Aristotle, *de Sensu* 437a3-17.
The mention of the senses (including *logos*) in lines 32-35 thus reflects the experience of the audience in reading (or listening to) the proem, which is equivalent to the disorienting journey the youth has undergone. When preceded by the 31st line, and read accordingly, those lines constitute the goddess’s cautionary note before the full exposition of her teaching, pointing out some ways not to mistake her account. Like the senses, language too has its limitations. When handled carelessly, or perhaps simply when used by mortals, it can appear contentious and invites misunderstanding in manifold other ways. The goddess is calling attention to these risks, but this does not entail an outright rejection of these faculties. Despite its (perhaps inevitable) dangers, *logos* is still the goddess’ instrument for instructing the youth and it is Parmenides’ tool for teaching us. Thus, while it is, I claim, a misreading of the lines to claim that Parmenides or the goddess is here rejecting the senses and establishing *logos* as the criterion of truth, neither is it appropriate for the goddess to be read as promoting misology.162 It falls to the youth to attend to the words of the goddess, and, alerted to possible pitfalls, to cope somehow with whatever it is that her speech discloses, employing eye, ear and tongue in whatever manner might be appropriate.

Doubtless, this is a demanding encounter for the youth. It is thus important to note that, at least here, the goddess does not provide him with any more positive expressions of just how to understand the coming account. There is no promise of clarity in it, no guarantee that reason vouchsafes understanding it, and no helpful guidance given on how it is that one can look and listen, speak or judge, in a way that avoids the aimless, echoing and contentious states that mark habitual mortal behavior. With the second half of line 35 (where δ’ ἔτι marks the transition from

162 I borrow this term from the language of Socrates at 89d of Plato’s *Phaedo*, coined on the model of “misanthropy”. In a passage more indebted, I think, to Parmenides than is commonly realized, and highlighted dramatically by a break in the dialogue’s narrative frame (88c-89b), Socrates warns his interlocutors, whose *pistis* in *logos* has been shaken by the insufficiency of the preceding accounts to furnish a proof of the immortality of the soul, against allowing that experience to turn them into haters of *logos*, and believing that there is nothing sound in it.

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the sentence begun with ἄλλα in line 31) the goddess appears to introduce a more appropriate “spirit” in which to proceed, but it is there, unfortunately, that our text runs out: “Still, a solitary spirit of a way is left. …” As with so much of the proem so far, this is suggestive and evocative, but not as informative as a listener might like it to be. If what followed gave any clearer expression of the value of *logos*, one imagines that the Stoic source would have referred to it to make his point. It is unsound, then, to assume that this other “spirit of a way” was any easier to follow, any more transparent or straightforward, than the proem. It seems that the cultivated air of confusion remained dominant, despite the goddess’ reassurance that the journey on which the youth finds himself is a right and just one.
CHAPTER THREE – PARMENIDES’ PROGENY: EMPEDOCLES

While I hope that the preceding chapters have provided an adequate case, based upon the text itself and the sources that quote it, for the basic arrangement of the proem as preserved by Sextus Empiricus, it might not be amiss, before leaving the proem, to present some supporting evidence, from an author nearer Parmenides’ own time, for both the general character of the proem presented above and for the particular notion that a misuse of \textit{logos}, no less than of the senses, can be an impediment to grasping the goddess’ teaching. It would indeed be good grounds for doubting the reading of the proem and the construal of \textit{κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ} proposed in the last chapter were there no indication that readers closer in time to Parmenides than we are, with access to the entire poem, read the proem along the lines suggested. Of course, given his apparently deliberate attempts to disorient and unsettle his audience, it is to be expected that, even among Parmenides’ near-contemporaries, some readers will simply not have known what to make of the poem, while others will have, intentionally or not, exploited points of uncertainty in order to present an image of Parmenides tailored to suit their own purposes. Still, one would hope to find indications that at least some of Parmenides’ ancient readers read the lines in a way compatible with that proposed. In this chapter, I focus on one particularly important early reader of Parmenides’ poem: Empedocles of Acragas.\footnote{Empedocles provides an especially instructive example, but the lines of inquiry in the present chapter could be pursued with a number of other figures whose works show sensitivity to the aspects of the proem we have been discussing. Although in different ways, Gorgias’ \textit{On Non-Being}, Aristophanes’ \textit{Clouds}, many of Plato’s dialogues and Aristotle’s \textit{Physics} have something to teach us about Parmenides’ repetitiousness, the language and imagery of
Empedocles’ own philosophical poetry provides valuable testimony to repetitiousness as a mark of Parmenidean style, echoes other elements of the proem presented above, and reflects the goddess’ specific warning to the youth against misapplying *logos* in the encounter with Truth. Though there are many examples of one or another of these traits in what survives of Empedocles’ work, we shall examine two fragments particularly closely, along with the context of the principal source in which they are quoted. Those fragments are DK 31 B 2 and B 3, which are quoted most fully, like Parmenides’ proem, by Sextus Empiricus in the survey of opinions about the criterion of truth in book VII of his *adversus Mathematicos*. In the course of our examination of Sextus’ passage, we shall find further support for the reliability of his quotations in some instances where doubt has been cast upon them. As in the preceding chapters, I shall try to avoid assuming too much about Empedocles’ doctrinal commitments, and concentrate on verbal and structural features that reflect his reading of Parmenides.

**Empedocles’ Poem(s)**

The arrangement of the fragments of Empedocles is in certain ways a more involved and disputed problem than in the case of Parmenides. To begin with, there are many more fragments, and scholars are at odds over whether the extant fragments belong to one or to two (or more) poems, some dividing the bulk of the fragments between two works, an *On Nature* and a *Purifications*, other scholars arguing that the two titles are simply different ways of referring to the same poem. For some time, it was common to assume two separate poems, *On Nature* being regarded as philosophic or scientific in character, the *Purifications* being considered a religious work. In more recent decades, that dichotomy has come to seem facile to many, more reflective

the poem, or the status of *logos* in the poem. Even in the case of Empedocles, the treatment that follows could easily be augmented.
of the preoccupations of the scholars responsible for the arrangements of the fragments than of Empedocles’ own outlook. Some of those who reject that dichotomy still believe Empedocles to have written more than one poem, distinguishing between them on some other basis. With the recent publication of the Strasbourg papyrus,\(^{164}\) the only known representative of the direct transmission of Empedocles’ work, the range of interpretations of our scientist-poet-philosopher-healer-prophet has only widened. However these matters may stand, it is, I think, readily admitted on all sides that Parmenides’ verse served as a model for Empedocles’ own philosophic poetry.\(^{165}\) It is therefore telling that, in addition to including obvious echoes of Parmenides’ own phrasing,\(^{166}\) Empedocles’ verse provides a host of examples of the sort of repetition that I am claiming was a significant feature of Parmenides’ poem.\(^{167}\) As this is a recognized if perhaps underappreciated feature of Empedocles’ poetry, there is no need to detail it here.\(^{168}\) Such repetition in an acknowledged imitator of Parmenides should help us to accept the possibility of the same in Parmenides where our sources suggest it.

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\(^{164}\) In Martin and Primavesi (1999).

\(^{165}\) Diogenes Laertius (\textit{Vitae VII.55}) records that Theophrastus said Empedocles was an emulator (ζηλοτής) of Parmenides and imitated him in his poetry.

\(^{166}\) Standard examples include the description of the moon as an ἀλλότριον φῶς at DK 31 B 45 (repeating Parmenides’ phrasing in DK 14, on which cf. footnotes 64, 68 and 69 above) and the command σὺ δείκτης λόγον στόλον ὑπεπηθής at DK 31 B 17.26 (typically taken as a response to Parmenides’ μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀκούων at DK 8.52).

\(^{167}\) Fragment DK 31 B 17 is an especially good example of this, where lines 1-2 are repeated word for word at lines 16-17; line 6 is echoed in line 12 of the same fragment, as well as 26.11; lines 7-8 and 10-13 are repeated, with variations, in 26.5-6 and 9-12 (17.9 is actually a supplement, reproducing 26.8, on the basis of the parallelism); line 7 alone is repeated at 20.2; line 29 is echoed by 26.1; and lines 34-35a are echoed closely at 21.13-14a and 26.3-4a. This fragment is now augmented by the material in Martin and Primavesi (1999). The extended passage shows additional signs of repetition; see the apparatus to their \textit{ensemble a}, pp. 131-139.

\(^{168}\) See, e.g., Guthrie (1965) pp. 136-137 and Wright (1981) pp. 21 and 184-187. The only attempt of which I am aware to explain away this patent feature of Empedocles’ verses was Fairbanks (1898a). While allowing certain repetitions as acceptable instances of “the epic style which Empedokles affects” or “the literary devices appropriate to philosophic poetry”, Fairbanks sought to purge those due, as he claimed, “to a wrong reconstruction of the text”. Prominent members of the last class were the repetitions of DK 31 B 17.7-8 and 17.34 mentioned in the previous footnote. That fragment is quoted by Simplicius in its entirety (but for the missing line 17.9) as a continuous run of 34 lines at in \textit{Phys.} 158.1-159.4, and thus calls for little “reconstruction”. Fairbanks’ attempt to eliminate the offending repetitions, on the other hand, involves much rearranging of the transmitted texts and seems not to have been adopted in any editions of Empedocles’ text besides Fairbanks’ own (1898b). Moreover, his proposed sequence of DK 31 B 17.31-33, 26.1-2, 17.34-35 is now contradicted by the traces of 17.31-35 preserved in the Strasbourg papyrus (see Martin and Primavesi (1999) pp. 130-131).
Καὶ δὶς γὰρ, ὃ δεῖ, καλὸν ἔστιν ἐνισπεῖν: Unreliable Sextus Again

In connection with the structure of Parmenides’ proem argued for above, two fragments of Empedocles are worth special attention here: DK 31 B 2 and 3, which not only exhibit Parmenides’ influence on Empedocles but bear directly on the question of Sextus’ reliability. These fragments, generally agreed by editors to belong to a proem (on either a single-work or a two-work hypothesis), are quoted by Sextus Empiricus not long after he gives us Parmenides’ proem. While Sextus does not, as with Parmenides and Heraclitus, quote the very beginning of Empedocles’ work, he is nonetheless quite explicit about the sequence of the verses that he does quote. Both fragments are quoted as part of Sextus’ report of an interpretation according to which Empedocles’ criterion was “right” or “correct” logos (ὀρθὸς λόγος). After reporting the “rather simple” interpretation of Empedocles to which he transitioned at the end of the report on Parmenides, Sextus introduces the orthos logos interpretation, very likely drawn from the same Stoic source responsible for the preceding accounts of Xenophanes and Parmenides. There are numerous problematic points in the text of the fragments themselves to which we will have to

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169 Cf. Trépanier (2004) p. 52: “The probable location of B 2 and 3 in the proem of either the Physics or the single work is something upon which all modern editions agree, and needs no defense. Indeed the content of both passages, including an analysis of the shortcomings of normal mortal understanding (B 2), the address to the Muse, and the injunctions directed to the disciple (B 3) make their most natural location a position before the doctrinal sections of the poem.”

170 At adv. Math. VII.123-125. These are the fragments in connection with which Trépanier appeals to Sextus’ supposedly faulty quotation of Parmenides (see pages 20-21 above, with footnote 11). Following the lead of Wright (see Wright (1981) pp. 157-158 and 160-163, and cf. Inwood (2001) pp. 214-219), Trépanier doubts Sextus’ reliability here and proposes dividing DK 31 B 3 into at least two fragments, the principal break occurring after the fifth verse quoted. Showing still greater suspicion of Sextus’ testimony than Wright does, Trépanier also suggests dividing DK 31 B 2 into two separate fragments, placing lines 2.8-9 before lines 2.1-7, and locating both 2.8-9 and 2.1-7 between separated portions of DK 3.

171 The opening is preserved by Diogenes Laertius (Vitae XIII.54 and 61-62 = DK 31 B 112), if those who maintain that the On Nature and the Purifications are the same poem are correct.

172 See pages 66-67 above, with text in footnote 118. On that interpretation, each of Empedocles’ four elements or “roots”, as well as Philia and Neikos, are all considered criteria.
But there have been others saying that according to Empedocles the criterion of truth is not the senses but correct reason \([\tauον \ ρθ�行 λ\rho\gammaον]\), and that of correct reason one sort is divine and the other human; and of these the divine one is inexpressible \([\alphaν\epsilonξιςτον\epsilon\nu]\), while the human one is expressible \([\epsilonξιςτον\epsilon\nu]\). (123) On the fact that the judgment of what is true does not belong to the senses he speaks thus:

Narrow are the devices \([\piαλάμου, \text{literally "palms"}]\) scattered over our limbs,
Many are the wretched sudden things that blunt our thoughts.
Seeing a small part of their own life
Lifted up like smoke they fly off to a swift fate
Persuaded only of that which each has met with
While being driven in all directions, but everyone boasts that he has found the whole.
These things are not thus to be seen by men nor to be heard
Nor to be grasped by the intellect. [= DK 31B 2.1-8a]

(124) On the fact that the truth is not completely ungraspable, but is graspable as far as human reason \([\logos]\) reaches, he provides clarification when he adds to the preceding lines \([\deltaι\sigmaαφεϊ \ τοις \ προκειμένοις \ επιφέρον]\)

["...But you, since you have strayed hither,
Will learn; mortal wit \([\muής]\) has not stirred itself further. [= DK 31 B 2.8b-9]

And in the next lines \([και \ δύ\υ τον \ εξής\epsilon\nu]\), after criticizing those who profess to know more, he establishes that what is grasped through each sense is trustworthy when reason \([\logos]\) is in charge of them, despite earlier running down the assurance \([\piς\tau\iota\sigma\iota]\) gained from them.
(125) For he says

But gods, turn away these people’s madness from my tongue,
And from holy mouths make flow a pure stream.
And you, white-armed virgin Muse who remembers much \([\piαλαμής\τη\iota]\), I entreat: what it is right for creatures of a day to hear,
Send to me, driving your well-reined \([\epsilonυήνιον]\) chariot from Piety’s place.
Nor will the blooms of well-reputed \([\epsilonυδόξοι]\) honor from mortals
Force you to take them up, on condition that you have the audacity to say More than is holy, and then sit upon the heights of wisdom.
But come, observe with every device \([\piαλάμη]\), in the way each thing is clear, Not holding any sight in trust \([\piς\tau\iota\sigma\iota]\) more than by way of hearing,

\(^{173}\) Bett (2005) pp. 26-27, with italics and material in square brackets (including the ellipsis before DK 31 B 2.8b, to indicate that the line begins mid-verse) added.
Or any loud-sounding hearing above the things made plain by the tongue,  
Nor by any means hold back trust [pistis] from the other limbs,  
As many ways as there is a path for thinking, but think in the way  each thing is clear. [= DK 31 B 3]

(126) Such are the things Empedocles said.

In the italicized portions of the two remarks that straddle DK 31 B 2.8b-9, Sextus appears to inform us, in a fairly straightforward manner, that B 2.8b-9 was continuous with B 2.1-8a (with which it meshes metrically) and that DK 31 B 3 followed it, perhaps after some unquoted lines directed against “those who profess to know more”. Indications of placement in the sources for Presocratic fragments are seldom more explicit than this. Nonetheless, in a note keyed to “Piety’s place” at the end (in the translation) of DK 31 B 3.5, Bett adds, “As commentators have noticed, these first five lines seem quite separate from those that follow; “you” up to this point refers to the Muse, but in the following lines to the addressee of the poem (Pausanias). Either some lines have dropped out of the text or Sextus is combining passages from different places (cf. 111).”

Here again, as with VII.111 (that is, the quotation of Parmenides’ proem), the conjectures of Presocratic scholarship have been overly influential in Bett’s characterization of Sextus’ quotation. Bett’s first sentence, pointing out the shift in addressee that takes place over the

174 Bett (2005) p. 27, n. 54. As noted above (see footnotes 11 and 170), Wright had split DK 31 B 3 into two separate fragments, placing DK 31 B 131 and B 1 between the two halves, explaining as follows: “The fragment has been divided after the fifth line, for the person addressed changes from the Muse to Pausanias, and a transitional passage is needed. That Sextus does omit a considerable number of lines from his quotations without indicating that he does so is supported by his citation of Parmenides earlier at 7.111.” (1981, p. 157) Richard McKirahan follows suit, breaking the quotation after the fifth line and noting, “I divide DK fr. 3 into two fragments, since it is implausible to identify the addressee of lines 6 ff. as the Muse.” (McKirahan (1994) p. 234, n. 4.) Trépanier more cautiously observes that 3.6-8 may be directed to either the Muse or the disciple, and that it is really with lines 9-13 that it becomes difficult to imagine an addressee other than the disciple (see Trépanier (2004) pp. 56-57, 59-65).

175 See above, page 21. I hope that the intervening pages have provided enough of a corrective to the prevailing doxa about Sextus’ reliability in quoting Parmenides’ proem at VII.111 that appeals to Sextus’ “clear” errors there by those wishing to cast doubt on the quotations in the Empedocles report will be met with skepticism. Other reasons given for doubting the report of Empedocles’ lines will be the focus of the following few pages. Doubts about Sextus’ quotation of DK 31 B 3 seem to go hand in hand with the acceptance of “Kranz’s move”, which supplies the appearance of a parallel example of Sextus’ unreliability. For an instance of this before Kranz’s own time, cf. the treatment of the lines in Karsten (1838). Having earlier introduced drastic alterations to Sextus’ quotation of
course of the lines, is an observation worth making, but it is mistaken, I believe, to conclude from this that there is something missing from Sextus’ quotation. As with the Parmenides passage, a proper estimation of Sextus’ reliability in the present case requires reading it in the context of the general plan of the work and distinguishing between Sextus’ views and the opinions that he is reporting.

**Sextus’ Strategy in *adv. Math.* VII.122-124**

A nuanced treatment of Sextus’ passage is provided by Simon Trépanier as part of his argument for reading the extant fragments of Empedocles as belonging to a single work. Trépanier’s discussion makes more explicit what is often assumed or implied in other criticisms of Sextus’ report, so it will be worth examining in some detail. As has been noted, Trépanier follows other scholars in questioning the unity of Sextus’ quotation of DK 31 B 3, and goes even further to suggest that, against Sextus’ explicit statements about the relative positioning of the fragments, DK 31 B 2 should also be divided, with its parts (their own order rearranged) following parts of B 3, which, he claims, may mistakenly conflate not just two, but as many as four fragments.¹⁷⁶

On the whole, Trépanier presents a compelling case for the single-work hypothesis, and his

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¹⁷⁶See footnotes 11, 170, and 174. Trépanier’s divisions of DK 31 B 3 coincide with those of Karsten (see previous footnote), but their treatments differ significantly in that Trépanier introduces material both between 3.1-5 and 3.6-8 (in this following Wright and Inwood) and between 3.6-8 and 3.9-13 (without precedent, as far as I am aware). Though Karsten indicates possible omissions, he does not introduce other fragments between the divided portions of Sextus’ continuous quotation.

As for DK 31 B 2, Trépanier, discounting Sextus’ remarks and the metrical fit, not only doubts the continuity of the lines, but places 2.8b-9 before 2.1-8a. He cites Wright and Inwood as having anticipated him in dividing the fragment (2004, p. 54), but I find no evidence for this in Wright, while Inwood seems non-committal. Wright prints Sextus’ full text, including the intervening remark between the halves of line 8, but does not in translating the fragment (her own fragment 1) mark a lacuna or express any doubt about the fragment’s unity in her commentary. Inwood does print the fragment (fragment 8 in his ordering) with a lacuna (2001, p. 214), and remarks in a textual note that “Sextus breaks his quotation at this point” (2001, p. 276), but it is not clear from this that Inwood means to indicate anything more than the possibility of missing lines.
proposed reconstruction for the beginning of the work is an admirably careful presentation of the evidence, but the exceptional degree of skepticism that he shows towards Sextus’ testimony is, I think, unwarranted, and seems to involve a misreading of Sextus’ strategy in the passage.

Specifically, Trépanier appears to think that the “rather simple” interpretation that credits Empedocles with six criteria is Sextus’ own view, and, perhaps because of this, believes that Sextus’ attitude in the discussion of the orthos logos interpretation is polemical. Neither of these, in my estimation, is accurate. Trépanier rightly recognizes that the orthos logos interpretation is not Sextus’ own, but comes from what, in the absence of more specific evidence,

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177 Trépanier does not dwell on the first interpretation, so I am unsure just whether, and if so, how strongly, he really believes that Sextus endorses the “rather simple” view of Empedocles, but this seems to be what is suggested in the following: “Sextus first mentions Empedocles in paragraph 115, one part of a longer section devoted to the thinkers who assume that all cognition is through the senses, on the principle that “like perceives like.” There Sextus tells us that, since Empedocles postulated six first principles, and assumed that like perceives like, he must have thought there were six criteria.” (Trépanier (2004) p. 53) Though Trépanier points to VII.115 as the first mention of Empedocles, verses of Empedocles (DK 31 B 109) were actually quoted earlier as an illustration of the “like by like” principle at VII.92. Empedocles was not named there, but the digression in VII.116-119 makes it clear that Sextus is recalling the earlier discussion.

The earlier “mention” of Empedocles is obscured by the fact that both editions and translations of the text at VII.92 misleadingly present the material immediately preceding Empedocles’ lines as a quotation from Philolaus. This seems wrong. Rather, the words καθάπερ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ Φιλόλαος are a parenthetical remark in the passage, which should be read, “And so, while Anaxagoras claimed that logos generally is a criterion, the Pythagoreans say that logos, not generally, but the one that comes about from ta mathēmata (just the way Philolaus also said), being contemplative of the nature of wholes, has a certain kinship to that, if indeed what is similar is of a nature to be apprehended by its similar.” [ὡστε ὁ μὲν ἀναξαγόρας κοινῶς τὸν λόγον ἔφη κριτήριον εἶναι· (92) οἱ δὲ Πυθαγορικοὶ τὸν λόγον μὲν φασίν, οὐ κοινῶς δὲ, τὸν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων περιγινόμενον, καθάπερ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ Φιλόλαος, θεωρητικόν τε ὡς τῆς τῶν ὀλίγων φύσεως ἔχειν τινὰ συγγένειαν πρὸς ταύτην, ἐπείπερ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὡμοίου τὸ ὡμοιού καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέρυκεν:] Cf. Mutschmann, Bury, and Bett ad loc. Huffman (1993) pp. 199-201 is better on this passage, recognizing that the mention of Philolaus is only an aside and that Empedocles is quoted as a Pythagorean example of the “like by like” principle, but does not distinguish between Sextus and the source of the interpretation, and refers to points of the interpretation as “Sextus’ assertions”.

178 Reading Sextus as a partisan of the “rather simple” six-criteria interpretation of Empedocles might provide a motive for his attacking the second approach as a rival interpretation, but that is not quite how Trépanier seems to read the treatment of the orthos logos view. On Trépanier’s reading, Sextus seems not to be making a direct attack on the orthos logos interpretation, but exploiting the materials provided by the source of that interpretation in order to expose a contradiction in Empedocles’ own epistemology. As I shall discuss presently, however, there seem to be no sure signs of this being Sextus’ intent.

Why Sextus is taken to endorse the “rather simple” view, if indeed he is, is not spelled out. If one does not read ἁπλόστερον in VII.115 as sarcastic (cf. above, with footnote 120), it might seem an indication that Sextus endorses the view as the more straightforward of the interpretations of Empedocles under consideration, although how six criteria are simpler than one will take some explaining. In the larger context, particularly given the complexity of the Pythagorean logos/number criterion with which the lines of DK 31 B 109 are linked (Sextus’ exposition of the Pythagorean view runs from VII.93 to the shift to Xenophanes at VII.110), it is hard to take ἁπλόστερον at face value.
Trépanier terms “the Stoic source”. This is a convenient designation, since the source here seems to be the same as that responsible for the interpretation of Parmenides’ proem reported earlier in Sextus, and discussed in the preceding chapter. As we saw there, distinguishing clearly between the material Sextus is reporting and his own additions can be difficult. According to Trépanier, Sextus quotes DK 31 B 2 and B 3, drawing on the Stoic source, in order to expose a contradiction in Empedocles’ thought about the senses. The notion that Sextus is looking to catch Empedocles in a contradiction leads to the impression that the Stoic source is somehow more reliable:

As for the sources of B 2 and B 3, it appears that the earlier, possibly Stoic, source was closer to the truth than Sextus. Against the more sympathetic, if anachronistic, treatment of Empedocles’ epistemology by the first source, Sextus thought that Empedocles’ views on the status of human knowledge—and its dependence on sense-perception—were open to a charge of contradiction.  

That contradiction, Trépanier claims, was “predicated on a misreading of B 2.7-8, where Empedocles does not reject either the senses or reason completely, but merely the status of either as final and authoritative, to the exclusion of the other.” It would indeed be a misreading of the lines to take them as a complete rejection of the senses, but there do not seem to be any signs that Sextus actually misunderstood the lines in this way. Sextus does not obviously allege any contradiction on Empedocles’ part. The remark with which DK 31 B 2.1-8 are introduced does

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179 “Sextus’ source … quoted them [i.e., fragments DK 31 B 2 and 3] to support an interpretation according to the epistemology of “right reason,” while Sextus himself makes use of that later interpretation, apparently because he wants to see in it a contradiction between B 2 and 3 on the issue of the validity of the senses. In arguing for this alleged inconsistency Sextus is engaging in a polemical refashioning of the material to his own skeptical ends.” (Trépanier (2004) p. 53)


181 Trépanier (2004) p. 56. In an endnote, Trépanier articulates what he takes to be Sextus’ argument more fully: “Sextus first quotes B 2.8-9 as involving a denial of the possibility of knowledge, i.e. thesis (A) knowledge is impossible for men. He then quotes B 2.8-9 to support the idea that “truth is not altogether unattainable, but is attainable as far as mortal thought can reach”; note in particular B 2.9 you will learn. This would be thesis (B): some knowledge is attainable by men. In (A), Sextus says that Empedocles claims that knowledge is impossible for men, but in lines 8-9 he implies (B). The point of B 3, for Sextus, is to reinforce (B), especially “come, see, etc.” where Empedocles endorses the cognitive value of sense-perception.” (Trépanier (2004) p. 213, n. 74)
not suggest that Empedocles rejected the senses completely, but only that the “judgment of the truth” does not lie in them.\textsuperscript{182} Similarly, the remark before the quotation of DK 31 B 3, with its mention of the earlier running down of the senses, does not appear to be a claim to have caught Empedocles in a contradiction, but an appreciation of the point that the senses, despite their limitations, do still promise some assurance (insofar as it is available to human beings) when governed by \textit{logos}. The interpretative content of both remarks, in any event, would seem to belong to the Stoic source. If Sextus is contributing anything of his own to the account, it would seem to be the information about where the lines quoted were situated in the poem.

If we rein in our speculation about Sextus’ intent, a less complicated reading of the passage is possible, even if Empedocles’ lines are themselves somewhat difficult. Sextus’ skeptical aims being well enough served simply by having conflicting views about Empedocles’ criterion to report, he need not be committed to any particular interpretation. He appears neither to be promoting the six criteria view nor intent on refuting anything in his presentation of the \textit{orthos logos} view. In the passage quoted above (i.e., \textit{adv. Math.} VII.122-125), he is simply paraphrasing the latter, with the addition, perhaps, of some helpful information about Empedocles’ text. According to the interpretation that Sextus is reporting, Empedocles’ criterion is, like Xenophanes’ and Parmenides’, a variety of \textit{logos}. But while Xenophanes’ was a \textit{doxastic logos} (because likelihood is the best that human beings can hope for) and Parmenides’ was an \textit{epistemonic} one (because Parmenides allegedly rejected the senses outright), Empedocles’ criterion is “correct” or “right” \textit{logos}. This, claims the Stoic interpreter, comes in two forms, one divine, one human. The former, it is noted (whether by the Stoic source or by Sextus is not quite

\textsuperscript{182} Thus neither Sextus nor the Stoic source should be understood as claiming that Empedocles asserts “thesis (A)” in Trépanier’s analysis of the argument in the preceding footnote. Thesis (B) is a fair (if vague) description of the point made in connection with 2.8b-9, elaborated on in DK 31 B 3.
clear), is inexpressible, the latter expressible.¹⁸³ Fragments from Empedocles are then quoted to illustrate the interpretation. As the remarks that frame the quotations make clear, DK 31 B 2.1-8a are taken to indicate Empedocles’ awareness of the inadequacy of the senses (thus implying a commitment to a criterion of logos rather than the senses), while DK 31 B 2.8b-9 are understood to assure us that learning is nonetheless possible for humans (thus eliminating the possibility that there is no humanly attainable criterion of truth at all).¹⁸⁴ Next DK 31 B 3 is taken to establish the special role of (human) “correct” logos, which appears to consist in how it controls the senses so as to make them trustworthy. Once those lines have been quoted, the report is complete and Sextus makes no further comment on the interpretation. As there is no interpretative remark over and above the report of the orthos logos view which is clearly attributable to Sextus, it is hard to argue that the Stoic source is “closer to the truth than Sextus”. If, as Trépanier claims, the verses quoted offer only weak support for the points they are intended to establish,¹⁸⁵ that failure must be attributed to the Stoic source rather than Sextus, absent other evidence to show that Sextus is misrepresenting his source.

As for the remarks that frame Empedocles’ verses, then, provided we keep the contributions of Sextus and the Stoic source distinct, Sextus’ manner of quotation shows nothing worthy of suspicion. Still, as Trépanier observes, it is not obvious whether Sextus is quoting directly from a copy of the poem or relying on excerpts that may have appeared in the Stoic

¹⁸³ The terms for “expressible” and “inexpressible”, ἐξοιστός and ἀνέξοιστος, otherwise appear in Sextus only in his report about (Empedocles’ pupil) Gorgias at adv. Math. VII.65 and 83, in passages that may preserve Gorgias’ own language. The text of Gorgias at issue is the Eleatic-style On Non-Being, of which Sextus gives a lengthy account. How close Sextus’ paraphrase (as well as that in another source, the Pseudo-Aristotelian de Melisso, Xénophane, Gorgia) is to Gorgias’ original wording is a matter of scholarly dispute.
¹⁸⁴ The μὲν… δέ construction in the remarks introducing the parts of DK 31 B 2 should be noted. The fragment is treated as a whole making two correlated (but not contradictory) claims.
¹⁸⁵ “Whatever its ultimate origin, Sextus’ interpretation of Empedocles’ epistemological presuppositions is at best partial, for the passages quoted in its support do not fit very closely the general scheme it proposes.” (Trépanier (2004) p. 53) At this point in Trépanier’s argument, “Sextus’ interpretation” is not, I think, to be regarded as distinct from the Stoic orthos logos interpretation. For similar complaints (with that distinction in mind) that the texts quoted are not very well suited to the points they are intended to support, see Trépanier (2004) pp. 56-57.
source (or elsewhere). \(^{186}\) Trépanier allows that “the former would be a natural assumption, except that in B 3 Sextus mistakenly strings together an address to the Muse (3.1-5) and an address to the disciple (3.6-13), so that he is more likely depending upon an intermediary.”\(^ {187}\)

But are we so sure that Sextus is mistaken here? Trépanier refers to Wright’s remarks, already noted, on this point, which again appeal to Sextus’ supposedly faulty quotation of Parmenides’ proem.\(^ {188}\) Having seen reason to doubt that assumption, the question reverts to being one of how we read the fragment itself. Is the change of addressee a sign that something is wrong with Sextus’ quotation?

**Empedocles’ Addressees and the Integrity of DK 31 B 3**

I think it is not. Again, as with Parmenides’ proem, the manuscripts of Sextus do not preserve the lines so perfectly that we do not benefit from comparing other sources’ quotations of the lines, but the lines are not as incoherent as is sometimes claimed. There are, indeed, multiple (and not simply two) addressees over the course of the thirteen consecutive lines that Sextus gives us, and it is true that the transition from the lines spoken to the “white-armed virgin Muse” to the last lines, apparently addressed to a disciple, could be more explicit, but this need not mean that the

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\(^{186}\) “It is unclear if Sextus is excerpting the fragments directly from Empedocles, or perhaps from a longer quotation in his source.” (Trépanier (2004) p. 53) It seems to be stacking the deck against Sextus to assume that the source would have given a longer quotation, and that Sextus would merely be “excerpting” fragments from it. To judge from the case of Parmenides’ proem earlier, where we have the additional evidence from Diogenes Laertius for the manner in which the Stoic source presented the material, Sextus may well be presenting fuller extracts than the Stoic source did. If so, that may explain why, as Trépanier points out, only some of the lines of each fragment quoted seem to bear directly on the points at issue.

\(^{187}\) Trépanier (2004) p. 53. This “more likely” scenario is taken for granted in the rest of Trépanier’s argument, becoming “most likely” at the bottom of the same page, and “probable” on the next. Discounting the alleged parallel of Parmenides’ proem, however, the only substantial evidence for dividing the fragments remains the perceived problem of the multiple addressees within the fragment itself.

\(^{188}\) For references, see footnotes 11 and 172. Cf. Karsten (1838) p. 177, justifying reading DK 31 B 3.8 as an independent statement: “Etiam haec sententia nec cum praeecedentibus nec cum sequentibus sat is bene cohaeret. Nam quale illud est, quod uno velut tenore nunc modestia in philosophando et religio inculcator, nunc ad audendum impellitur, nunc sensuum fides redarguitur? Haec si non contraria, diversa tamen; ideo sejuxi, praesertim quum Sextus pari confusione alios quoque veterum locos perturbaverit, ut jam in Parmenid. Carm. princ. vidimus.”
A quotation is bad. If it is unclear whether it is the Muse or disciple being addressed in lines DK 31 B 3.6-8, I propose that this is because Empedocles intended it to be so. Why, after all, should we feel entitled to expect a clear transition? One gets the impression from various sources that Empedocles sometimes left it to his readers to determine for themselves the precise identity of certain figures mentioned in his verses. Diogenes Laertius informs us that the first two lines of DK 31 B 129 (“And there was someone among those, a man surpassingly witting, / who, indeed, acquired the farthest wealth of propides”) were taken by some to refer to Pythagoras, by others to Parmenides. More famously, there was in antiquity (and there remains today) debate over which of the four Empedoclean elements is referred to by which of the divine names in the list of four “roots” (ῥιζώματα) in DK 31 B 6 (“For hear first the four roots of all things: / bright Zeus and life-bearing Hera, and Aidoneus / and Nestis, who wets with tears the mortal spring”). Given this habit, the lack of a clear transitional passage from one addressee to another in DK 31 B 3 does not seem sufficient reason to doubt the integrity of Sextus’ quotation.

In fact, a certain vagueness about the identity of the addressees appears to be one of several ways in which this fragment echoes elements of Parmenides’ proem. This will become

\[\text{Vitae VIII.54 (Long): Ακοῦσαι δ’ αὐτὸν [sc. Empedocles] Πυθαγόρου Τίμαιος διὰ τῆς ἐνάτης ἱστορεῖ … μεμνῆσαι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν Πυθαγόρον λέγοντα: ἦν δὲ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνήρ περιώσια εἰδῶς, ὃς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον. οἰ δὲ τούτῳ εἰς Παρμενίδην αὐτὸν λέγειν ἀναφέροντα.}
\]

The fragment is quoted in fuller form (six lines) by Porphyry (Vit. Pythag. 30) and Iamblichus (Vit. Pythag. 15), the latter remarking on the riddling character of the verses. For discussion, see van der Ben (1975) pp. 178-187.

\[\text{Vitae VIII.54 (Long): Ακοῦσαι δ’ αὐτὸν [sc. Empedocles] Πυθαγόρου Τίμαιος διὰ τῆς ἐνάτης ἱστορεῖ … μεμνῆσαι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν Πυθαγόρον λέγοντα: ἦν δὲ τις ἐν κείνοισιν ἀνήρ περιώσια εἰδῶς, ὃς δὴ μήκιστον πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον. οἰ δὲ τούτῳ εἰς Παρμενίδην αὐτὸν λέγειν ἀναφέροντα.}
\]

For a list of sources for the fragment and their doxographical affiliations as Diels saw them, see Diels (1901) p. 108. For recent critical discussion of the doxography, see Osborne (1987) pp. 89-92, Kingsley (1994), and Mansfeld (1995b). For summaries of, and contributions to, the debate over the allocation of the divine names to the elements, see Guthrie (1965) pp. 144-146, Wright (1981) pp. 22-30 and 165-166, and Kingsley (1995) pp. 14-68. The present chapter is not the place to make the detailed case for it, but DK 31 B 6 is one fragment where the lessons learned in the first chapter may be fruitfully applied to Empedocles’ text. As repetition is generally more tolerated in Empedocles than Parmenides, editors have been more apt to recognize similar but differently attested quotations as independent fragments (see, e.g., Wright (1981) pp. 184, 187 and Inwood (2001) p. 281). Nonetheless, a number of fragments may still remain hidden. In this case, the most telling source text is Clement, Strom. VI.17.4, where lines close or identical to DK 31 B 6.1, 17.18 and 21.9 are quoted as three consecutive verses and Empedocles is accused of plagiarizing his “roots” from the Pythagorean Athamas.

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more evident as we reread the fragment, part by part, paying closer attention to Empedocles’ Greek. Here are the first five lines:

ἀλλὰ θεοί τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσῃς,
ἐκ δ’ ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγήν.
καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκόλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,
ἄντομαι, ὃν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
pέμπε παρ’ Εὐσεβίης εὔηνιον ἅρμα.

Which we may read, in a slightly retouched version of Bett’s translation:

But gods, turn away the madness of these (people?) from (my?) tongue,
And from holy mouths make flow a pure stream.
And you, white-armed virgin Muse who remembers much,
I entreat: what it is right for creatures of a day to hear,
Send (to me), driving (your?) well-reined chariot from Piety’s place.

In the first five lines there are already multiple addressees, since, before the Muse is singled out, unnamed plural gods are asked (or ordered) to avert the madness belonging to some also unidentified “these”. This transition does not seem to bother readers, since the Muse is a god, and the transition is marked well enough by “and you” (καὶ σέ) in line 3. The Muse is generally, with the help of DK 31 B 131, identified with confidence as Calliope, and different readers have more or less definite ideas about who the “they” of “their madness” might be, but it seems significant that, aside from Piety (if it is right to personify her), none of the personalities in the passage, not even the Muse, is actually named. The lines alone do not tell us which gods the speaker has in mind, who (or perhaps what things) the madness mentioned belongs to, or even, as my alterations to Bett’s translation are meant to highlight, just whose are the tongue and mouths in question. Indeed, it is not entirely plain from the passage that it is Empedocles

191 This is Mutschmann’s text, which Bett is translating.
192 Diels, with an eye on the remark introducing the fragment, thought Parmenides might be one of “those who profess to know more”. Burnet was confident in this identification (1930, p. 227: “No doubt he is thinking of Parmenides”), but Wright regards this as “unlikely” and thinks it “in keeping with the Presocratic tradition” to read Empedocles’ attack as “a general one on all who put forward rash and ill-considered opinions.” (1981, p. 158). Trépanier would disregard the introductory remark and understand the madness in question as blood sacrifice and cannibalism. (2004, p. 58)
(assuming that the narrative voice is Empedocles’) who is speaking these lines, and that they are not put in the mouth of another character. In the rest of the fragment, this studied under-determination will continue, and this all seems rather similar to the state of things in Parmenides’ proem, where our unnamed narrator is borne through an obscure topography in an otherworldly chariot, led by vaguely identified maidens to an anonymous goddess. The use of the verb “send” (πέμπε) here also seems to recall Parmenides’ proem, where, we will remember, the reader had to supply the implied object for the verb at the beginning of line 2 and the end of line 8. The epithets given the Muse and the chariot, “much-remembering” (πολυμνήστη) and “well-reined” (εὐήνιον; note too εὐδόξου … τιμῆς in the following line), likewise call to mind the curious use of compounds beginning with poly- and eu- in Parmenides’ proem. The adjective πολυμνήστη is a special puzzle, for while it may mean “much-remembering” (the translation preferred by those who wish to divide the fragment), “much-wooed” is another possibility, and one which obviously bears on how we read the next part of the fragment. If our Muse has many suitors, it is not so implausible, as some have suggested, to read DK 31B 3.6-8, which carry on with the call for holy speech, as addressed to her:

\[
\text{μηδὲ σὲ γ’ εὐδόξου βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς}
\]

\[
\text{πρὸς θνατῶν ἀνελέσθη ἐφ’ ὑ’ ὤσὶς πλέον εἰπὲν}
\]

\[
\text{θάρσεῖ, καὶ τότε δὴ σοφὶς ἐπ’ ἄκροισθεν θο[(.]κεῖν.}
\]

193 Karsten, at least, thought that he detected not only multiple addressees but multiple speakers in this fragment, the poet addressing the Muse early on, the Muse addressing the poet in lines 6-7 (and 8-13?); see Karsten (1838) pp. 176-177. Other sources for the fragment, particularly Proclus (see in Tim. I, 351 Diehl), seem to regard Empedocles as the speaker, so the attribution is certainly not an unjustified one, but it is worth pointing out that the common assumptions that it is Empedocles speaking in DK 31 B 3, and that the final lines, apparently addressed to a disciple, are addressed to Pausanias, are in fact assumptions. Again, even if those assumptions are correct, we cannot be sure that, where these lines originally appeared in Empedocles’ poem, the identities of the poem’s narrator and dedicatee had already been made explicit. Diels’ placement of DK 31 B 1 (Παυσανίη, σὺ δὲ κλῦθι δαίφρονος Αγχίτου υἱέ, “Pausanias, do yourself hearken, son of fiery-minded (?) Anchites”) at the head of the poem, and the insertion, by Wright, Inwood and Trépanier, of the line between the separated portions of B 3 in their arrangements, presume this, but Diogenes Laertius, who records the line at Vitae VIII.61, gives no indication of where it stood.

194 See Wright (1981) p. 158 for different approaches to dealing with the verb in Empedocles’ fragment.

195 So Karsten, Wright, Inwood, McKirahan, and Trépanier.

196 Again, this is (with the addition of the comma after θάρσεϊ) Mutschmann’s text, which in these lines incorporates corrections from quotations of the fragment in sources other than Sextus. Clement provides ἐφ’ ὑ’ ὤσὶς for
In Bett’s translation (again, slightly retouched):

Nor will the blooms of well-reputed honor from mortals
Force you to take them up, on condition that you have the audacity to say
More than is holy, and then to sit upon (hasten to?) the heights of wisdom. 197

Without the italics or some such modification, the translation mutes the clear stress that Empedocles puts on the pronoun “you” (σέ γ’), which is placed early in the sentence and followed by the particle. This emphasis is a significant feature of these lines, calling attention at the outset to the person addressed. But just who is “you” here? We may read μηδέ σέ γ’ as transitional, like καὶ σέ in the third line, marking the speaker’s shift to another addressee, whom, in light of the remainder of the fragment, we might fairly describe as a disciple. In this case we do not really lack a transition; it simply happens that the speaker’s switch from what is requested of the Muse to what is demanded of the disciple is a bit abrupt. Just as easily, however, “you” may refer to the “much-wooed” Muse, the emphasis placed on the pronoun indicating the speaker’s conviction that she, surely, will not be swayed by merely mortal suitors, many though they be. The final clause, in either case, stresses the incompatibility of saying more than is holy and thereafter attaining (or returning to, perhaps, in the case of the Muse) the heights of wisdom.

Either figure is a possible addressee and neither calls for supposing any break in Sextus’ text. If Sextus’ ἐφωθοεῖς, while θοάζειν is an emendation (by Fabricius, according to Mutschmann’s apparatus; by G. Hermann, according to Diels’ and Wright’s) of the manuscripts’ θοᾶζει (also in Proclus, who has τάδε τοι rather than τότε δῆ earlier in the line) based on the infinitive in Plutarch’s partial quotation, σοφίας ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θαμίζειν. 197 I modify Bett’s rendering here by italicizing the first “you” in the second of the three lines printed (which translates σέ γ’ towards the beginning of Empedocles’ sentence) and “then” in the third, on both of which Empedocles places some stress, and by adding “to” before “sit” in order to better convey the syntax of the infinitive θοᾶζειν (the meaning of which, as Trépanier points out (2004, pp. 64-65), is perhaps more plausibly translated “hurry” or “hasten” than “sit”). Trépanier, reading DK 31 B 3.8 as syntactically independent from the rest of the fragment, departs from Mutschmann’s text by reading θάρσει not as a dative (i.e., as θάρσει) but as an imperative, by replacing Sextus’ τότε δῆ with Proclus’ τάδε τοι, and by emending θοᾶζει to θοᾶζε, read as another imperative, with the τάδε supplied from Proclus as its direct object. As to the meaning of θοᾶζειν, I am inclined to follow Trépanier, but (since I am less inclined to make the other changes – taking θάρσει as dative and adding the ν to θοᾶζει seem unobjectionable, given that Proclus’ quotation, καὶ τάδε τοι σοφίς ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θοᾶζει, even if a doublet, supports a verse structure with a break after the first foot, and Plutarch’s quotation, even if θαμίζειν has been substituted for θοᾶζειν, is some corroboration for an infinitive) I understand the verb as intransitive here.
this ambiguity is deliberate, the stress placed on the pronoun here and in line 3 (and cf. συ <δ'> οὖν in DK 31 B 2.8b), in addition to focusing attention on the addressee, also calls our attention to the fact that we are not quite sure who that is.

Trépanier, rightly noting the difficulty in deciding on an addressee for lines 6-8, and, more questionably, supposing that we are without a context to help guide us, looks to Parmenides to cast light on lines 6-7. The comparison is illuminating; all the more so, in fact, when we compare the texts without presupposing errors on Sextus’ part. Trépanier finds help in what he considers to be two passages of Parmenides’ poem. First, he points to the goddess’ words to the kouros at DK 28 B 7.3-5 (i.e., verses 32-34 of Parmenides’ proem as quoted by Sextus) as “[o]ne apparent inspiration” for DK 31 B 3.6-7. That the lines are related seems clear: “The opening words and the main verb are the same in both passages (the verb in Empedocles is a future indicative, an imperative in Parmenides) and in both passages we find a dependent infinitive clause in the following line. In terms of syntax, this seems undoubtedly to have been Empedocles’ model.” This parallelism might incline us to think that the addressee of DK 31 B 3.6-7 is the disciple. But, Trépanier remarks, “a second Parmenidean passage, while further from B 3.6-8 in grammatical form, is closer to it in spirit.” That passage is DK 28 B 1.24-28, where the goddess, according to Trépanier,

is at pains to assure Parmenides that his extraordinary voyage is not a transgression, a violation of divine prerogatives, for which he would be punished like the great criminals of myth, perhaps more specifically Phaethon, who stole the chariot of his father the Sun, and had to be killed by Zeus. She explains that it is right and just for him to be received by her. His access to her home, after all, through mighty aitherial gates, was won thanks to soft words and cunning persuasion (B 1.14-15), not stealth or violence.

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199 See Trépanier (2004) p. 61. The supposition that we have no context to help us stems from his suspicion of Sextus’ testimony and his consequent division of the fragment into multiple parts.
201 Trépanier (2004) p. 62, where it is assumed that Parmenides is the kouros of his poem. I suspect that the situation in Parmenides’ proem is indeed meant to bring Phaethon (among other associations) to the mind of his audience, but
Given this “second” Parmenidean text, wherein the goddess reassures the kouros of the rightness of his journey, Trépanier suggests, “In Empedocles, if we posit that the addressee is the Muse, we can see that the passage amounts to an indirect formulation of the same assertion. Empedocles is saying: But you at least, μηδέ σέ γ’, the blooms of fair-seeming honor will not force you to take <them> up from mortals, and for that to say more than is holy.” That is, each passage indicates some form of divine sanction for the teaching to be given. This consideration seems to tip the balance in favor of reading the addressee as the Muse, and Trepanier arranges the lines accordingly.

Though I read the shared “spirit” of the passages somewhat differently than he does, Trépanier is entirely right, I think, to compare DK 31 B 3.6-7 with DK 28 B 1.24-28, and no less right that DK 28 B 7.3-5 served as the grammatical model for Empedocles’ lines. What is mistaken, if the argument of the earlier chapters is correct, is the assumption that these are two different passages of Parmenides. Once we disallow the misguided changes that Diels and Kranz have made to the proem, both the syntax and the spirit of Empedocles’ lines point to a single Parmenidean passage: lines 24-34 of Sextus’ quotation of the proem. That passage is perhaps not decisive for determining the addressee of the lines of Empedocles in question, but the parallels Trépanier points out are yet more evidence in favor of reading Sextus’ quotation as an intact presentation of Parmenides’ proem.

I doubt that the contrast would be as stark as Trépanier suggests. Grouping Phaethon among the “great criminals of myth” (such as Tantalus and Sisyphus, I suppose) and suggesting that he “stole” the Sun’s chariot risk mischaracterizing the situation in the Phaethon myth. As for Parmenides’ kouros, the “soft words” and “cunning persuasion” which permit him access to the goddess, while not violence, may not be far from “stealth”. Cf. footnote 75 above.

202 Trépanier (2004) p. 62. Trépanier’s translation reflects his preference for taking ἐφ’ ὅθ’, rendered “and for that”, as expressing “the motivation of the verb εἰπεῖν, not as introducing a condition” (2004, p. 63). In either case, the Muse will be refusing to say more than is holy in exchange for mortal honors.
Indeed, when Empedocles’ verses are compared with the lines of the proem as Sextus preserves it, we can see that the parallelism extends even farther than Trépanier supposes. The grammatical parallelism, moreover, provides support for the reading of κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ proposed in the preceding chapter as well as additional evidence for the integrity of Sextus’ quotation of DK 31 B 3. Let us remind ourselves of Parmenides’ passage. Lines 24-35a of Sextus’ proem (incorporating the corrections from Diogenes Laertius) run as follows:

ὦ κοῦρ ἄθανάτοις συνάορος ἦνιόχοισιν, ἔποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ικάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ, χαίρ’, ἐπεὶ οὕτι σε μοίρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι τίνι’ ὁδὸν (ἳ γὰρ ἄπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεῶ δὲ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι ἡμὲν Ἀληθεῖς εὑπεθέος ἄπρεμες ἔτορ ἦδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἕνι πίστις ἄληθής. 25

ὦ κοῦρ ἄθανάτοις συνάορος ἦνιόχοισιν, ἔποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ικάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ, χαίρ’, ἐπεὶ οὕτι σε μοίρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι τίνι’ ὁδὸν (ἳ γὰρ ἄπ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν), ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεῶ δὲ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι ἡμὲν Ἀληθεῖς εὑπεθέος ἄπρεμες ἔτορ ἦδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἕνι πίστις ἄληθής. 25

ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆς’ ἄρ’ ὁδὸν διζήσιον ἐγγε νόημα, μηδὲ σ’ ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τίνω βιάσθω νομίμα ἁκοπον ὃμμα καὶ ἠχήσασαν ἀκουήν καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηρον ἐλεγχον ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. 30

Trépanier, treating DK 31 B 3.6-7 in isolation from the other lines of the fragment as quoted by Sextus, and comparing them with lines of Parmenides which, following DK, he refers to as B 7.3-5 (i.e., lines 32-34 of Sextus’ quotation), points out that the first line in each selection begins with the words μηδὲ σ(ε) and has a form of βιάω as the main verb, which governs a dependent infinitive in the following verse. This is, to be sure, good evidence that Empedocles was imitating Parmenides’ verses. This parallelism is strengthened, however, when we show a little more confidence in Sextus’ testimony. If we refrain from separating DK 31 B 3.6-7 from the lines that precede them in Sextus, the earlier lines in each author can also be seen to correspond. The preceding lines of Parmenides’ proem provide reassurance, on the one hand, that the youth was sent on “this way” (far from the path of humans) by Dike and Themis (lines 26-28), and, on
the other hand, call on the youth to bar thought from another “this way”, now one of “mortals’ opinions” (lines 30-31). The preceding lines in Empedocles’ passage, in turn, offer the reassurance “you will learn” to the disciple who has stepped aside at the limits of mortal metis (DK 31 B 2.8b-9), and call for the gods to avert “their” (apparently mortals’) madness and to channel speech that is themis from holy mouths (DK 31 B 3.1-5). The spirit common to both passages is equal parts assurance and warning, neither of which is made in unambiguous tones. In each case, in an ostensible call for “pure” speech, the poet’s ambiguous language serves to highlight the limitations of mortal logos.

The lines that follow reinforce the parallelism even more. DK 31 B 3.8, provided that the fragment is left intact and we read Parmenides’ lines as suggested above, carries on the grammatical parallelism to which Trépanier draws our attention. I argued in the second chapter that, in Parmenides’ sentence, we would do better to read the particle δὲ of κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ as connective, not adversative, and κρῖναι as a complementary infinitive with βιάςθω, like νωμᾶν in the preceding line. On the standard reading of DK 31 B 3.8, that is just the way that Empedocles’ sentence is structured:

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\text{μηδὲ σὲ γ’ εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἀνθεὰ τιμῆς πρὸς θνατῶν ἀνελέσθαι ἐφ’ ὕπ’ ὧ’ ὀσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν θάρσει, καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίς ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θοάζειν.}
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Here, as in Parmenides, the line opening with μηδὲ σ(ε) provides the main verb, βιήσεται (βιάςθω in Parmenides), which governs not only one complementary infinitive, ἀνελέσθαι (νωμᾶν in Parmenides), in the following verse, but also a second, θοάζειν (κρῖναι in Parmenides), linked by a connective, καὶ (δὲ in Parmenides), in the verse after that, which is, moreover, a

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203 Note too how Empedocles’ emphasis on the second person pronoun, observed above, recalls Parmenides’ repetitions of the second person pronoun, interestingly paired, as pointed out in the first chapter, with instances of the phrase “(this) way” (see above, pages 44-45). As was just indicated, the referent of the latter phrase, like that of the pronoun in Empedocles’ fragment, seems to shift uncertainly over the course of the lines in which it appears.
204 Trépanier, treating the line in isolation, construes it differently. See above, footnote 197.
verse marked by enjambment and an early line break after θάρσεϊ (cf. καὶ γλῶσσαν in Parmenides). Parmenides’ passage indeed “seems undoubtedly to have been Empedocles’ model”, and one Empedocles followed even more closely than Trépanier suggests.

Further (and perhaps the most obvious) echoes of the same Parmenidean verses are found in the remaining lines of Empedocles’ fragment. Despite the apparent change in addressee, the rest of the fragment wrings yet more out of the goddess’ words to the kouros, providing additional evidence that suspicion of Sextus’ quotation(s) is ill-founded. In Mutschmann’s edition, the lines that the Stoic source read as articulating the criterion of “correct” logos (DK 31 B 3.9-13) are printed as follows:

[Γραμμάτια απεξαίρετα]

Let us (departing rather more from Bett’s rendering this time) translate:

[Translation of the quoted lines]

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205 Establishing the text of these lines, not cited by other authors, is less troublesome than for the preceding lines (though actually construing the lines is a different matter, and editors have, as will be noted, sometimes made problems for themselves). In DK, the only difference from Mutschmann’s text is the unnecessary substitution, in the final line, of δὲ for the manuscripts’ θ’. This was an emendation by Karsten, who had placed a full stop after νοῆσαι at the end of the preceding verse. Diels (1901) prints θ’, noting Karsten’s suggestion. DK, de Vogel, Wright, KRS, Inwood, and Graham, though they do not follow Karsten’s punctuation, adopt the emendation without explaining the preference (only Wright among them recording the manuscript reading). One possible reason for the preference might be that Parmenides’ κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ, understood as “but judge by reason”, looks like a parallel. As argued above, however, δὲ in Parmenides’ text is not adversative. In Empedocles, where a contrast is being drawn, the contrast is achieved by the structure μήτε … μήτε … τέ (see Smyth § 2945), so the emendation to δὲ is gratuitous.

A number of scholars prefer to read πίστην, as predicate adjective with ὄψιν, in place of πίστει in the second line quoted (i.e., DK 31 B 3.10), the dative use (meaning “in trust”, “for an assurance”) apparently being without parallel (Diels compares Iliad 2.30 for the construction, but the word πίστει itself does not appear there). I have no very strong opinion on the matter, but keep to the manuscript reading for two reasons (beyond the fact that it is the unanimous manuscript reading): (i) even if unparalleled, that does not mean that Empedocles, who is hardly aiming for everyday speech here, did not write it (the noun τρανώματα in the next line is also unique, and νόει in the following line is very rare); (ii) Empedocles does seem to be aiming for some special effect by repeating a number of words, πίστει among them. In keeping with the passage’s instructional aim of establishing a balance among the senses, a notable number of expressions in these lines come in pairs: πῇ δῆλον ἐκαστὸν (9), ἡ δῆλον ἐκαστὸν (13); μήτε τιν’ (10), μῆτε τι (12); πίστει (10), πίστην (13); ἡ κατ’ ἄκουσθ’ (10), ἡ ἁκοή (11); νοῆσαι (12), νοεῖ (13). One may perhaps see here a skewed chiasmus in the Parmenidean style, with the phrase τρανώματα γλώσσης (on which, see below, with footnote 208) at the center. It would perhaps not be too jarring to substitute πίστην for πίστει in this pattern, but as the other pairings listed all match grammatically like items, the noun seems preferable.
But come, observe with every palm in what way each thing (is) evident,
Neither holding any sight in assurance too much more than hearing,206
Or booming hearing above the piercing clarities of the tongue,
Nor check at all, insomuch as207 there is a passage for being aware,
The other limbs’ assurance, but be aware in which way each thing (is) evident.

That Empedocles had Parmenides in mind in these lines is regularly recognized by commentators.

The mention, in sequence, of sight, hearing, and the tongue is an obvious echo of the goddess’
criticism of the habitual use of the senses in Parmenides’ poem.208 Generally, however, it is

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206 On ἕ κατά w/ acc. in (dis)proportional comparisons (cf., e.g., Plato, Apology 20e1), see Smyth § 1079, and
Cooper (1997) 49.4.0 and (2002) 2.49.4.0. The element that this adds to the comparison, of exceeding the bounds of
what is proportional or commensurate, reflected above by the addition of “too much”, is regularly overlooked in
translations of the line. Cf., e.g., Burnet (1930) p. 205 (“Hold not thy sight in greater credit as compared with thy
hearing”); KR p. 325 (“neither holding sight in greater trust as compared with hearing”); Wheelwright (1960) p. 127
(“trusting no more to sight than hearing”); Wright (1981) p. 160 (“without holding any seeing as more reliable
compared with hearing”); Inwood (2001) p. 217 (“not holding any vision as more reliable than what you hear”);

207 Related to the sense of proportionality pointed out in the preceding footnote is, I think, Empedocles’ use of
ὁπόση, which seems not to have been fully understood. Early editors sought to do away with some of the
awkwardness of the expression by emendation. Karsten suggested ὡςη, Stein ὡςημιν, i.e., “in whatever way” or
“of however many [limbs] as”, respectively. Fairbanks, following Stein’s reading, translated “nor keep from trusting
any of the other members in which there lies means of knowledge” (1898b, p. 161). Diels glossed ὡςη as
quot viis,
“by however many ways”, and this seems to have granted subsequent translators license to give the word the sense
that Stein or Karsten wanted without feeling the need to emend the text. Thus Burnet has “do not withhold thy
confidence in any of the other bodily parts by which there is an opening for understanding” (1930, p. 205); Bury,
“Nor from the rest of the parts wherein are the channels of knowledge / Hold thou back thy trust” (1935, p. 69);
Guthrie, “by whatever way there is a channel” (1965, p. 139); Wright, “by which there is a channel” (1981, p. 160),
without remark on the word in her commentary. KR5, “by whatever way there is a channel” (p. 285); McKirahan,
“whatever way there is a channel” (1994, p. 235); Inwood, “by which there is a passage” (2001, p. 219); Graham,
“by which” (2010, p. 343); Lesher, in a grammatical note on the text, provides the gloss: “ὁπόση: Rel. Adj., ‘by or in
whatever way’” (1998, p. 46). In one way or another, these translations, like the emendations of Karsten and Stein,
either eliminate the quantitative character of the adjective or smooth over the fact that ὡςη does not agree in
number or gender with τῶν ἄλλων, if not both.

Though an understandable compromise of the sort involved in any translation, the loss of the quantitative
element is particularly unfortunate, for here, as with the immediately preceding instruction not to put too much more
assurance in any sight than in hearing, the notion of proportionality is important. Empedocles (or whoever is
speaking) is not quite, as is sometimes claimed, declaring that all the senses are equal and should be given equal
standing, but that no single sense should be given a disproportionate authority over the others. I will touch upon the
significance of this point in the next section. An overly explicit rendering of ὡςη, attentive to each of its
component parts, would be “by (or in) howsoever much of a way”, for which “insomuch as” seems to serve as a
readable alternative.

208 What is less obvious to those who assume that the tongue, here or in Parmenides, is simply the organ of taste (or
of speech alone, if there are such today) is that Empedocles preserves Parmenides’ ambiguous use of “tongue” to
refer to both taste and speech. There was debate on this at one point (cf. Karsten (1838) p. 179: “τρανώματα
γλώσσης Sturzius ad vocem et orationem refer et melius Schneiderus Lex. Gr. gustum intelligit”) and Fairbanks’
r Rendering of the phrase, “clear assertions of the tongue” (1898b, p. 161), might have been an attempt to retain the
ambiguity. If so, it does not seem to have been particularly influential, and in the wake of a brief note in favor of
taste by Burnet (1892, p. 219, n. 34: “The sense of taste, not speech. So already Karsten, after Schneider, Lex. Gr.”;
made briefer still by the deletion of the second sentence in later editions) the notion that Empedocles might be
neither believed that that criticism takes place in the poem, nor that it might be something short of a wholesale denunciation of the senses. Consequently, Empedocles’ lines are typically understood as a departure from Parmenides’ supposed rejection of the senses. For instance, while observing that, elsewhere, most of Empedocles’ “deliberate echoes of Parmenides … are used to emphasize points of agreement”, Guthrie understood the echoes in DK 31 B 3 as highlighting a marked contradiction: “Parmenides’s outright condemnation of the senses is countered by the claim that all alike are aids to knowledge and none is to be preferred.”209 Alternatively, however, just as we need not follow the Stoic source in understanding Parmenides as rejecting the senses wholesale, neither need we follow the Stoic source’s modern counterparts in reading Empedocles’ lines as making a radical break from Parmenides. As we have seen earlier, the warning of Parmenides’ goddess is more specific than is often appreciated: it is the aimless eye, and the echoing ear and tongue that are problematic. Rather than contradicting Parmenides,

209 Guthrie (1965) pp. 138-139. For comparable contrasts, see Burnet (1930) p. 227 (“we must not, like Parmenides, reject the assistance of the senses”); KR p. 325 (under the section title “Empedocles’ Defense of the Senses”); Wright (1981) p. 162 (“picking up on the Eleatic distinction between perception and reason (cf. Parmenides frs. 7.4-5 and 6.6-7) and contradicting it”); KRS pp. 284-285 (“he promises that an intelligent use of all the sensory evidence available to mortals, aided by his own instruction, will (contrary to Parmenides' claims) make each thing clear to us”); McKirahan (1994) p. 269; Lesher (1998) p. 46 (“Empedocles’ choice of words here would have reminded his audience of Parmenides’ indictment of the sensory faculties in his Fr. 7, and alerted them to the fact that this was his response to it”); Trépanier (2004) p. 72 (“[DK 31 B 3.9-13] amplify a similar statement at DK 2.7-8, and the intent in both is quite likely a polemical response to Parmenides’ choice of nous to the exclusion of the senses”; cf. too p. 56).
Empedocles may simply be elaborating on the same point. We shall pursue this question further shortly. Before doing so, however, it is worth stressing once again that, regardless of whether Empedocles is refuting or reaffirming Parmenides’ point, it should be clear by now that DK 31 B 3, both piece by piece and as a whole, is modeled on the closing lines of Parmenides’ proem as faithfully preserved by Sextus. Though we may be unsure at times about the identity of the addressee(s), the extensive parallelism with Parmenides’ lines provides strong reasons to resist any temptation we may feel to divide the fragment. Indeed, on my reading, even the uncertainty about the addressee(s), far from being evidence of Sextus’ unreliability, is an indication of Empedocles’ attentive imitation of Parmenides.

**The Orthos Logos Interpretation and the Unity of DK 31 B 2 and 3**

Assuming that Sextus’ quotation of the thirteen lines of DK 31 B 3 is reasonably reliable, do they say what the Stoic source claims they do? The various Stoic interpretations of the Presocratics, assigning each thinker a position in the Hellenistic debate over the criterion of truth, obviously involve some anachronistic categorizing, but that does not necessarily make them invalid. Nevertheless, I have suggested that in the case of Parmenides, the attempt (shared by many of Parmenides’ readers today) to read κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ as a declaration of commitment to an epistemonic criterion not only involves the use of labels which Parmenides would not have recognized, but, by reading into logos a sense it would not have borne in Parmenides’ time and by ignoring or suppressing elements of the passage where that declaration is supposedly found, does indeed get the central point that Parmenides is making wrong, and is therefore a serious interpretative error. What about the orthos logos view of Empedocles?
To answer this question in a satisfactory manner would lead us far afield from our central concern with Parmenides, so I will not really attempt that here. Even if we cannot answer it satisfactorily, however, this is a question worth posing, for we are immediately confronted with the task of explaining what it would mean to say that Empedocles made orthos logos a criterion of truth. This is a more difficult task than explaining how a doxastic or an epistemonic logos is a criterion, for these seem to be familiar technical terms in Hellenistic epistemology, as well as direct descendants of earlier efforts to articulate something of the nature of knowledge.210 Orthos logos or “right reason”, by contrast, seems to belong rather to Stoic and earlier ethical discussions.211 Whether or how those discussions are related to the present one I will not venture to say here, where I shall concentrate simply on how Sextus presents the matter.

With Xenophanes and Parmenides, the attribution of a doxastic and an epistemonic logos respectively had some (if on inspection dubious) grounding in the texts given along with the Stoic source’s interpretations. Xenophanes’ declaration that to saphes was beyond men’s grasp, “but dokos has been fashioned for all,” provided something of a textual basis for portraying him as an advocate for a doxastic logos. Parmenides’ proem, meanwhile, when edited to suit the point, could offer what looked like a commandment to steer clear of doxai and the senses and to “judge by logos” (which, granted a standard doxa/episteme dichotomy, is easily understood as an epistemonic logos) instead. When we come to Empedocles’ text, is there something distinctively “correct” about the logos he supposedly champions?

211 The phrase orthos logos occurs in Plato (e.g., Phaedo 73a10 and 94a1), becoming more of a technical term in ethics with Aristotle (cf. Nichomachean Ethics II.2 1103b32 and VI.13 1144b26-28). For the phrase in discussions of Stoic ethics, see LS 59M, 61G, and 63C; on the question of orthos logos as a criterion in the Stoa in particular, see Kidd (1989).
The signs of adopting *orthos logos* as a criterion are supposed to be found in DK 31 B 3. After the two portions of DK 31 B 2 have been quoted as evidence of the fallibility of the senses, on the one hand, and a promise, on the other hand, that the disciple will nevertheless learn (something; just what is to be learned is perhaps unclear), we read (in our evolving version of Bett’s rendering):

And in the next lines, after criticizing those who profess to know more, he establishes that what is grasped through each sense is trustworthy [*piston*] when reason [*logos*] is in charge of them, despite earlier running down the assurance [*pistis*] gained from them. For he says

But gods, turn away their madness from (my?) tongue,
And from holy mouths make flow a pure stream.
And you, white-armed virgin Muse who remembers much and is wooed by many,
I entreat: what it is right for creatures of a day to hear,

And in the next lines, after criticizing those who profess to know more, he establishes that what is grasped through each sense is trustworthy [*piston*] when reason [*logos*] is in charge of them, despite earlier running down the assurance [*pistis*] gained from them. For he says

![B 3.5]
Send (to me?), driving a well-reined chariot from Piety’s place.
Nor will the blooms of well-reputed honor from mortals
Force you to take them up, on condition that you say more than is holy
In boldness, and *then* to hasten to the heights of wisdom.
But come, observe with every palm in what way each thing is evident,

![B 3.10]
Neither holding any sight in assurance too much more than hearing,
Or booming hearing above the piercing clarities of the tongue,
Nor check at all, insomuch as there is a passage for being aware,
The other limbs’ assurance, but be aware in which way each thing is evident.

Compared to the treatments of Xenophanes and Parmenides, where there was an effort to connect “doxastic” with *dokos* and to explain the relation of Parmenides’ *logos* to *episteme*, it is notable that *orthos* does not feature in Empedocles’ verses themselves or in the remarks preceding them. Also notable is the absence of *logos* in Empedocles’ lines, although this ought not surprise us, given that *logos* elsewhere in Empedocles, as in Parmenides (and Xenophanes), principally means “speech” or “(spoken) account”.\(^{212}\) Of course, something must have suggested the notion of an *orthos logos* to the Stoic interpreter. What was it?

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\(^{212}\) Cf. DK 31 B 4.3, 17.26, 35.2 (twice), 131.4. In Xenophanes, see DK 21 B 1.14 and 7.1.
As I indicated in the last section just before our first rereading of them, the relevant material seems to be in lines 9-13. The most obvious lexical connection between the Stoic paraphrase and Empedocles’ verses is *pistis*, “assurance” or “trust”. Perhaps, then, an *orthos logos* is one which is trustworthy or produces trustworthy evidence through some kind of control over the senses. But this is not really to say anything more than that it is a criterion of truth. Empedocles’ verses warn against trusting too much in one sense over another or rejecting the assurance of any sense that might prove helpful, but they do not, as the Stoic paraphrase might lead us to expect, appear to describe *how* it is that reason is supposed to control the senses. That is, Empedocles seems to be speaking more about misuse of the senses than he is “establishing” their trustworthiness when reason is in charge of them. Focusing on *pistis*, then, does not reveal very much.

Another possibility is that the Stoic source read the final clause of the fragment, “but be aware (νόει) in which way each thing is evident” as a parallel to the way he (mis)read Parmenides’ statement to mean “but judge by reason”. To the ears of a Hellenistic philosopher, “be aware” would perhaps seem a weak translation of νόει, and Bett’s “think”, suggesting the intellectual more than the perceptual aspects of *nous*, might represent well how Sextus’ contemporaries would have read Empedocles’ lines. The claim, related earlier in Sextus’ work, that Anaxagoras made a criterion of “*logos* generally”, is very likely related to the central role of

213 See above, pages 103-104. As already mentioned (see page 94 above, with footnote 185), Trépanier had noted that “B 3 itself is only in part concerned with that question [i.e., of the criterion], namely B 3.9-13, and it is difficult to see how B 3.1-8 bear on it” (2004, p. 56), considering this as evidence against the integrity of the fragment. While I agree that it is lines 9-13 that the interpreter has in view, lines 1-8 are perhaps not so out of place in a discussion of the criterion as “correct *logos*”, given that they may be said to be concerned with correct *logos* in that they call for pure and holy speech.

214 KR and Barnes also translate “think”, and “understand”, used by Wright, Inwood, McKirahan, and Graham, seems equivalent. Earlier translators seem to have favored renderings that preserved something of the perceptual dimension as well (“know each thing”, Fairbanks; “Note each thing”, Leonard; “Consider” Burnet; “Use whatever way of perception makes each thing clear”, Freeman); “grasp” in Guthrie (and KRS) runs counter to the trend in later translations towards the more exclusively cognitive.
nous (Mind or Reason with a capital letter) in his system, so perhaps νόει here suggested to the Stoic the “correct” exercise of logos in the sense of “rational faculty”. However, in these lines νόει seems to retain something of the perceptual and intuitive as well as the mental character of the early uses of the verb. If a defense of the less “rationalized” rendering “be aware” is needed, it can be pointed out that, according to both Aristotle and Theophrastus, Empedocles did not distinguish sharply between sensing and thinking. At any rate, the distinction being drawn in DK 31 B 2 and 3 seems rather to be one between mortal and immortal modes of awareness or consciousness (whether thinking or sensing).

Perhaps it is wisest to admit that presenting Empedocles as committed to a criterion of orthos logos probably entails making some questionable interpretative leaps in any event, and one therefore ought not to spend too much effort inspecting the reasoning in what may ultimately be not only a biased interpretation but a hopelessly confused one. Nonetheless, there is, I think, an overlooked possibility for what orthos logos might mean in this case, namely, “correct proportion”. Rather than looking to pistis or νόει, I submit that a proper understanding of the Stoic claim lies with the expressions that I noted earlier, πλέον ἡ κατά and ὁπόσῃ. There is a precision to Empedocles’ statements here that easily escapes notice. Trépanier again expresses clearly what seems to be a common assumption when he writes of DK 31 B 3.9-13, “Empedocles specifies that the disciple must not exclude any one means, but must trust them all equally.”

215 See adv. Math. VII. 90-91 and cf. footnote 177 above. For Anaxagoras’ description of nous, see esp. DK 59 B 12. In its only appearance in the B fragments of Anaxagoras, logos is again used for “speech”. See DK 59 B 7, where logos replaces epos in the epic phrase “in word and deed”.
216 Cf. Aristotle, de Anima III.3 427a21-29 with Theophrastus, de Sensibus 10 (and see footnote 161 for related texts).
217 Note in particular that in DK 31 B 2.7-8 the vision, hearing and noos of men are all incapable of grasping “these things”: οὕτως οὔτ' ἐπιδερκτά τάδ' ἀνδράσιν οὔτ' ἐπακουστά / οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά.
218 See footnotes 206 and 207.
219 Trépanier (2004) p. 72. Cf. the remark of Guthrie quoted above (with footnote 209) and see footnote 206 for translations of DK 31 B 3.10 in line with the idea of a general equality of the senses. Cf. too Lesher, who, though noting that ἡ κατά w/ acc. following a comparative “denotes either too high or too low a degree” (his reference to
This is perhaps an improvement over Guthrie’s statement that Empedocles countered Parmenides with “the claim that all alike are aids to knowledge and none is to be preferred” (it is, at any rate, closer to what Empedocles said to say that we must not exclude any one means than to say that none is to be preferred), but it still does not, I think, quite capture what Empedocles is saying. The phrases πλέον ἢ κατ’ ἀκουήν and ὁπόσῃ πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι add important qualifications to Empedocles’ apparently democratic attitude towards the senses. The senses are not all created equal, nor are we (in these lines, at least) forbidden to prefer one over another. What is wrong is to put a disproportionate trust in sight over hearing, or to ignore the assurance of any of the other “limbs” wherever (and insomuch as) it supplies a passageway for understanding. That is, the means to whatever kind of awareness or thinking Empedocles is promoting might come from any of the senses, and all of them, it seems, may be required to attain it fully. At least, every “palm” is to be used to observe in what way each thing becomes clear, and each “palm” or sense is to be given its due. From DK 31 B 2, it seems that the common mortal condition is one in which our “palms” are “straitened” and many worthless things serve to blunt our “cares” or “meditations”.220 This may well mean that some senses (the less straitened ones) are to be preferred over others. What is needed, Empedocles appears to be claiming, is a proper sense of

“Smyth § 1078” involves a misprint; the correct section number is 1079), goes on to write, “Sight would naturally be considered the most trustworthy form of sense perception, but Empedocles urges that we not place a greater degree of trust in sight than in hearing, perhaps because he wants his own (spoken) message to the world to be accorded a high degree of credibility.” (1998, p. 46) Putting aside the supposed naturalness of sight being considered the most trustworthy of the senses and the speculation about Empedocles’ motives (which involves a questionable chain of equivalences connecting the comprehension of Empedocles’ (in fact written) message with the sense of hearing), the clause “Empedocles urges that we not place a greater degree of trust in sight than in hearing” eliminates the element of proportionality from the statement and reverts to a direct comparison. Whether sight is naturally the most trustworthy sense or not, the construction does imply some standard proportion of trustworthiness in sight compared to hearing, but what Empedocles urges is not to put more trust in sight than it deserves. It is conceivable that Empedocles believes that the standard proportion should be one of equality, but he is not quite saying that here. The audience is being urged not to grant sight so much more trust that they miss out on what hearing has to offer. They are not (as it appears Lesher reads it) to accord hearing a greater degree of credibility than is natural.

220 This is Wright’s translation of merimnas in DK 31 B 2.2; Inwood follows Wright; Burnet had translated “careful thoughts”; McKirahan and Graham, like Bett, translate “thoughts”; Kingsley, “cares”. Merimnai also appear at DK 31 B 11.1 and 110.7.
how much trust to place in a given sense in a given situation, which is to say, a sense of what is proportionate. Empedocles is not, alas, particularly forthcoming on what the proper proportion is, but this is, presumably, only the beginning of the work.

It was, I suggest, with attention to Empedocles’ expressions of proportionality that the Stoic source identified his criterion as an *orthos logos*, where *logos* is best understood in the sense of “ratio” or “proportion”. Whatever value this identification may or may not have within the boundaries of the Hellenistic debates about the criterion of truth, the connection of Empedocles with *orthos logos* thus understood, i.e., as “correct proportion”, highlights a significant though perhaps underappreciated feature of Empedocles’ writing and thought. It has become increasingly apparent that Empedocles’ warnings about the limitations of mortal awareness (in speech as well as sensation) closely follow those of Parmenides’ goddess. She, we have observed, tells the *kouros* not to misapply his eye, ear and tongue in the coming encounter with Truth, but offers little positive guidance on just how, exactly, he ought to see, hear and speak of what is to be revealed. Empedocles’ lines do much the same, but they offer a hint more of what is required. It may be something of an overstatement to say that lines 9-13 “consist of a set of positive instructions to the disciple on how to maximize the openness to the teachings that will follow,”221 since Empedocles’ lines, like the goddess’ words to the *kouros*, are dominated by prohibitions, while what is positive in them (“observe in what way each thing is evident”, “be aware in which way each thing is evident”) is rather cryptically put. Nonetheless, those prohibitions, expressed (though subtly) in terms of proportionality, are marked with a distinctively Empedoclean stamp, for throughout what remains of Empedocles’ poem(s) today, we find him repeatedly engaged in one form or another of overtly analogical thinking. Time and again, the lessons that Empedocles teaches employ novel and instructive analogies, often drawn

between items that few, it seems, were in the habit of comparing before Empedocles’ influence began to be felt. The range of forms such analogies take is vast. There are “chemical” descriptions of the composition of bone, blood and flesh in terms of numerical ratios of the four elements (see DK 31 B 96 and 98); there are elaborate similes drawn from different spheres of human craft used to illustrate the workings of various bodily processes (e.g., DK 31 B 100, using the clepsydra to illustrate respiration, and DK 31 B 84, using a lantern’s structure to describe the eye; cf. DK 31 B 23); there are biological correspondences made between one domain of nature and another (e.g., DK 31 B 79, where olive trees are spoken of as “egg-laying”, and DK 31 B 82, where the equivalence of hair, feathers, the scales of fish and the leaves of trees may provide Aristotle his paradigm example of analogical sameness); and there are remarkable metaphors (e.g., DK 31 B 55: “earth’s sweat, sea”), a number of which (DK 31 B 138, 143 and 152) Aristotle used to explain the analogical structure of metaphor in his Poetics, despite his seeming ambivalence about the value of Empedocles’ verse. The common element in all of these is an uncommon capacity for seeing likenesses in apparently unrelated forms. This ability is perhaps the kernel of all real learning, and is certainly not unique to Empedocles, but it seems to receive a special emphasis in his writing and to be exploited as a tool for uncovering hidden features of nature in a more conscious manner than we find in many other authors.

To return to the passage at hand, however, and the obscure command to “observe, with every palm, in what way each thing is evident”, let us take a closer look at the lines we have

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222 See de Partibus Animalium I.4 644a16-22 and Historia Animalium I.1 486b17-21. Aristotle’s standard example of analogical sameness is feather : bird :: scale : fish; he does not follow Empedocles in extending the comparison to the leaves of trees.

223 See Poetics 21 1457b6-33. Although Aristotle reserves the name “analogical” for a particular variety of metaphor, his general classification reveals the analogical structure of all metaphor. Earlier in the Poetics, Aristotle appears dismissive of Empedocles’ poetic gifts, claiming that Empedocles and Homer “have nothing in common but the meter” and that the former is more rightly called a physiologos than a poet (1447b16-20). On this Lombardo remarks, “Aristotle is quibbling, dissembling, or both. In a less celebrated passage (On Poets, fr.70) he gives credit to Empedocles’ sense of metaphor, powerful phrasing, and poetic technique in general.” (1982, p. 23)
largely neglected thus far. Despite the various attempts to segment and/or separate them, DK 31 B 2 is a natural companion to B 3. Trépanier’s characterization of the positive instructions of 3.9-13 as concerned with maximizing “openness” to the teachings ahead picks up on Empedocles’ bold description of mortal awareness in the opening lines of B 2: “For straitened palms have been poured over their limbs, / But many the wretched things that crash in and blunt merimnas.” (στεινωποὶ μὲν γάρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται, / πολλὰ δὲ δείλ᾽ ἔμπαια, τά τ᾽ ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας.) Whatever merimnai are precisely, we presumably do not want them blunted by many wretched things, and proper attention to the lesson, it seems, will involve an opening of the normally narrowed “palms”. The rest of the fragment also contains other connections to DK 31 B 3. Lines 3-8a of DK 31 B 2 appear as follows in Sextus:

\[ \begin{align*} 
\text{παῦρον} & \text{ δὲ ζωῆσι βίου μέρος άθρήσαντες} & \text{[B 2.3]} \\
\text{όκύμοροι καπνοῦ γίγνην άρθέντες ἀπέκταν} & \text{} & \text{} \\
\text{αύτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ἃτῳ προσεκύρεσαν ἔκαστος} & \text{[B 2.5]} \\
\text{πάντοσ᾽ ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ᾽ ὄλον <πᾶς>} & \text{ἐυχέται εὐρέιν.} & \text{} \\
\text{οὕτως οὕτ’ ἐπιδερκτά τάδ’ ἀνδράσιν οὕτ’ ἐπακουστά} & \text{} & \text{} \\
\text{oὔτε νόῳ περύληπτα.} & \text{224} & \text{} \\
\end{align*} \]

These lines are soon capped by:

\[ \begin{align*} 
\text{σὺ} <\delta'> & \text{ οὖν ἐπεὶ διδ᾽ ἐλάσθης,} & \text{[B 2.8b]} \\
\text{πεύσεαι, οὐ πλεῖὸν γε βροτείη μῆτις ὀρῳφεν.} & \text{225} & \text{[B 2.9]} \\
\end{align*} \]

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224 In line 3, Mutschman prints ζωῆς ιδίου, a conjecture of Diels for the manuscript reading printed above. The supplement <πᾶς> is Bergk’s, where some emendation is needed to fix the meter. Stein’s proposal <μᾶς> (not reported in Mutschmann’s apparatus) is favored by Kingsley (2002, pp. 360-361, n. 62), as yielding “the same basic sense although with a finer nuance” and “neatly anticipat[ing] ματαίως in B39.2”. Kingsley devotes a section (§ 7, pp. 360-369) of his article to DK 31 B 2, discussing the sense in the imagery of “palms” being “poured over” limbs, defending the manuscript reading in line 3 and explaining it as an expression of the doctrine of reincarnation, comparing the description of human boasting while being “driven” in all directions to a similar one in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, and relating the uses of στεινωπός, προσκυρεῖν, and ἐλαυνέων, which echo language from the chariot race of Iliad 23, to the use of μῆτις in the final line of the fragment, which Kingsley sees as the key to a proper understanding of Empedocles’ poem.

225 Bett notes (2005, p. 27, n. 53) that he translates the manuscript reading πλεῖόν γε rather than the emendation πλέον ἰδ., printed by Mutschmann. Wright, giving the manuscript reading in cruxes, and translating “But you, since you have come aside to this place, will learn within the reach of human understanding”, takes this as an expression of modesty: Empedocles’ disciple will learn whatever it is possible for humans to learn (see Wright (1981) pp. 93-94 and 155-157). Kingsley, also preferring the manuscript reading, understands “no more” to refer not to learning, but
Once more, Bett’s translation (again, modified):\textsuperscript{226}

\begin{quote}
Observing in their lives (ζωῆσι) a small part of life (βίου)  
Lifted up like smoke they fly off to a swift fate  
Persuaded only of that which each has bumped into  
While being driven in all directions, but everyone boasts that he has found the whole.  
Not thus are these things to be seen by men nor to be heard  
Nor to be grasped by the awareness. But you, since you have strayed hither,  
Will learn; mortal cunning manages no more.
\end{quote}

In addition to the “palms” that feature in each fragment, the “each thing” repeated in the phrases that end lines 9 and 13 of DK 31 B 3 is anticipated with ἐκαστὸς in B 2.5, while the chariot “driven” from Piety’s place at DK 31 B 3.5 is foreshadowed by the description of mortals as “driven in all directions” in DK 31 B 2.6. The verb for the meager “observing” that those mortals do in B 2.3 is the same as that with which the disciple is told to use every palm in 3.9. That disciple is first singled out (but not named) with the nominative pronoun σὺ (you) in DK 31 B 2.8, which, whatever it is that the stepping aside means and the learning will amount to, matches the stress on the second person pronouns in B 3. Even the “no more” in DK 31 B 2.9, whose reference may well puzzle us, has a match in the Muse or the disciple not saying more than is holy in DK 31 B 3.7.

I do not have an interpretation to offer that clarifies everything in these lines, but the correlations just mentioned can be pushed further to provide a more secure sense about the relation of these two fragments. Let us recall that Sextus moved from quoting the final line and a half of DK 31 B 2 to quoting the whole of DK 31 B 3 by saying, “And in the next lines, having

\textsuperscript{226} Many of the modifications are in the direction of Kingsley’s sensitive reading of the text in the discussion referred to in the preceding footnotes. The reading and interpretation presented there are taken up and elaborated on in Kingsley (2003), pp. 326-341 focusing on DK 31 B 2 in particular.
criticized those who profess to know more, he establishes that [...]". As already noted, various scholars have taken the reference to “those who profess to know more” in various ways, and different arrangements have placed different portions of text between DK 31 B 2 and 3 (or their parts) depending upon what form the criticism of those people is imagined to have taken. I suggest a simpler solution. I propose that Sextus’ reference to “those who profess to know more” is to those in DK 31 B 2 who, while “observing a small part of life”, boast of having “found the whole”. When Sextus says “in the next lines” he means precisely that, and we need imagine no break between DK 31 B 2 and 3. Not only is each fragment quoted as an intact whole, but the two together form a continuous passage. We are not missing anything between them.

How can we can be sure about this? Apart from appealing to Sextus’ general reliability (which I hope to have gone some way toward rehabilitating), some sense of security comes from a careful look at the passage when printed as a continuous run of text, paying attention to the repetitions that our comparision of the two fragments has brought out. Behold:

1 στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ πολύμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται, πολλὰ δὲ δειλ’ ἐμπαια, τὰ τ’ ἁμβλύνουσι μερίμνας. παύρον δὲ ζωῆσι βίου μέρος αὐθήςαντες ὁκύμοροι κατανοοῦ δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν

5 αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτως προσέκυρσεν ἐκαστὸς πάντωσ’ ἑλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ’ ὅλον <πᾶς> εὐχεταί εὐρεῖν. οὕτως οὔτ’ ἐπιδεικτὰ τάδ’ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ’ ἐπακουστά οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά. σὺ <δ’> οὖν ἐπει ὥδ’ ἐλιάσθης, πεύσει, οὐ πλεῖὸν γε βροτείῃ μῆτις ὁροφεν. οὐκότε, ᾧτ’ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀπεπρέπετε γλώσσῃ, ἐκ δ’ ἀσίον στομάτων καθαρὴν οχετεύσατε πηγήν. καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκόλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα, ἀντομαι, ὃν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίσιν ἀκούειν,

227 καὶ διὰ τὸν ἐξής ἐπιπλήξας τοῖς πλέον ἐπαγγελλομένοις γγεγνόσκειν παρίστησιν, ὃτι [...]. I have tweaked Bett’s translation once more by altering the translation of ἐπιπλήξας from “after criticizing” to “having criticized”.

228 Diels (1901) placed DK 31 B 5 between the two fragments; Wright places DK 31 B 131 and 1 between portions of DK 31B 3; Inwood follows Wright in this and adds DK 31 B 115 and 6 between 131 and 1; Trépanier’s proposed arrangement would have DK 31 B 3.1-5, B 131, B 3.6-8, B 1, B 2.8-9, B 2.1-7, followed by DK 31 B 111, 110, 11, 15, 4, 12, 13, and 14, all before 3.9-13.
Πέμπε παρ’ Εὔσεβίης ἑλάουσ’ εὐήνιον ἀρμα·

Μηδὲ σὲ γ’ εὐδόξῳ βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς
πρὸς θνατῶν ἀνελέσθαι ἂν’ ὃθ’ ὑσίης πλέον εἰπέιν
θάρσει, καὶ τότε δὴ σοφῆς ἕπ’ ἀκροσὶ θοαζεῖν.

Άλλα’ ἄγ’ ἀθρεί πάσῃ παλάμη
Πῇ δῆλον ἐκαστον,
Μήτε τίν’ ὑπὶν εξον πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ’ ἄκουήν
Πῇ δῆλον ἐκαστον.

For convenience, I break line 18 into two halves, but this is in no way intended to suggest a lacuna in the text. I break the text between παλάμη and πῇ δῆλον ἐκαστον because it is with the former that the first of two extended chiasmi around which the passage is structured ends and with the latter that a second one begins. Just as careful attention to the repetitions in Parmenides’ proem revealed a series of overlapping chiastic structures serving as a sort of skeleton to the whole proem, so with the above text (which we have already seen imitates Parmenides’ proem in other ways) a pair of complex chiasms confirm the unity of the Empodoclean passage quoted by Sextus generally taken as two fragments, sometimes broken into many more.

The second of the two chiasms was already noted in passing when we were considering the closing lines of DK 31 B 3. It is only in comparison with the first, as we shall see, that we can appreciate its structure fully. The first, whose outer edges are set by instances of παλάμη, stretches from the beginning of first line of DK 31 B 2 to the middle of the ninth of DK 31 B 3.

To facilitate their comparison, I present a schema for each of these structures, the parallelism of which should be immediately apparent (the component words of the chiasmi are those in bold in the passage above; the line numbers beside the words refer to the continuous numeration of the passage as presented above):

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229 See page 104, footnote 205.
Empedoclean Chiasmus I (DK 31 B 2.1-3.9a):

A. παλάμαι (1)
B. ἄδρήσαντες (3)
C. ἐλαυνόμενοι (6)
D. ἐπακουστά (7)
E. σὺ (8)
F. πλεῖον ... γλώσσης (9-10)
G. ὀσίων (11)
E'. σὲ (12)
D'. ἀκούειν (13)
C'. ἐλάουσ' (14)
G'. ὀσίης πλέον (16)
B'. ἄθρει (18)
A'. παλάμη (18)

Empedoclean Chiasmus II (DK 31 B 3.9b-3.13):

A'. πῇ δῆλον ἕκαστον (18)
C'. μήτε τιν' (19)
G'. πίστει πλέον (19)
D'. ἢ κατ' ἀκουήν (19)
D. ἢ ἀκοήν (20)
F. πλέον ... γλώσσης (19-20)
C. μήτε τι (21)
B'. νοῆσαι (21)
G. πίστιν (22)

B. νόει (22)
A. ἢ δῆλον ἕκαστον (22)

230 The labels applied to the components of the second chiasmus are assigned in what might seem to be reverse order (A', e.g., being assigned to the first element, A to the final one), or worse, a random one (if the reader is wondering why C' seems to correspond to B). Both apparent oddities are due to the fact that the labels for both chiasms are assigned from the outside of the passage in. For the second chiasm, this means beginning with ἢ δῆλον ἕκαστον in line 22, then moving on to ἢ δῆλον ἕκαστον, etc. In order to help see through the (deliberate) displacement of certain elements in the second chiasmus, the letters assigned to the components pair related words, while their placement in the schema reflects their position within the chiastic structure.

231 Note that a single instance of πλέον in line 19 is shared by F and G' in the schema for the second chiasmus.
The basic structure of the first chiasmus is quite clear. Spanning eighteen verses, forms of παλάμη, ἄθρεῖν, ἐλαύνειν and ἀκούειν converge towards a middle where the two separate fragments meet. Initially, there is no obvious central item. The second person pronouns in lines 8 and 12 narrow the range somewhat, but πλεῖον in line 9 and ὁ σίων in line 11 each has a mate in ὁσίης πλέον in line 16. The equal distances at which the corresponding of forms in lines 6 and 14, 7 and 13, and 8 and 12, lie from line 10 suggests that the center of the structure is at or near line 10, but it may be difficult to pick a single key theme from among the nearby candidates of mortal metis, madness, and gods. “Tongue” perhaps does not seem the most attention-grabbing of the words in these central lines, but, as comparison with the second chiasmus will show, it does seem to be Empedocles’ focus.

The second chiasm, as already noted, recalls Parmenides’ habits in developing his chiastic structures. Presenting a basic outline similar to that of the preceding structure in a shorter span of lines, Empedocles also skews the pattern by shifting the placement of various parts of the figure. Despite this skewing, the parallelism with the first structure is unmistakable. The phrases “in which way each thing is evident” (which might be equivalent to saying “with every palm”) function as do the “palms” of the first chiasmus, establishing the outer frame (A and A’ in each structure). Within them are pairs of expressions for “being aware” (B and B’) and “hearing” (D and D’), each grouping corresponding semantically to the similarly labeled items in the first chiasmus, but placed so that both items in each pair fall on one side of the center of the present chiasm, B and B’ both following the center, D and D’ both coming before it. The placement is skewed further by having both B and B’ outside of C, but D and D’ inside of C’. At the center (in

232 There is also a third instance of the second person prounoun (the emphatic but ambiguous σὲ γ’ of DK 31 B 6) in line 15.
line 20) is again γλώσσης, preceded by πλέον (in line 19), as πλεῖον in line 9 preceded γλώσσης in line 10 (F). In this chiasmus, πλέον plays a secondary role of echoing πλέον in line 16 of the first chiasmus, thus replicating the feature wherein πλέον is paired once in each chiasmus with a word that, though repeated, seems to sit outside of the chiastic structure (G and G’).²³³

Once again it is perhaps easier to note the chiasmi than to give the reasons for why we should do so. At any rate, it is enough for now to have seen their structures clearly, which seem to have gone unnoticed by scholars. The first chiasmus is quite crisply structured, displaying a remarkable balance of its corresponding elements, particularly towards the center of the structure. As it is at precisely the center of this chiasm that the conventional break between DK 31 B 2 and 3 comes, we can be confident in abandoning that convention and refusing to accept interpolations of material from elsewhere at that point. The structure of the chiasm, spanning all of the breaks that various scholars have tried to introduce in these lines, confirms the unity of the passage that Sextus provides in three parts.

Each of Empedocles’ chiasms shows a more finely balanced structure than was the case with those in Parmenides’ proem and, despite the skewing of certain elements in the second chiasmus, the parallelism between the two Empedoclean chiasmi is striking. I will venture to suggest at least one reason for this. This doubling of the particular chiastic scheme is a perfect example of the overt proportionality that I have suggested is characteristic of Empedocles’ writing and thought. The repetition in the second chiasm of the same general structure and of many of the same components of the first is designed to encourage the comparision of the elements of the passage in analogical terms. We are invited, for example, to consider whether the

²³³ The dedicated reader will note that the schema for the second chiasmus lacks an E and E’. As the labels are assigned to facilitate the comparison of like items in the two structures, I have taken the liberty of skipping E and labeling the center of the second chiasmus F. Those concerned with the lack of a parallel for the personal pronouns in the first chiasmus may be consoled somewhat to have it pointed out that a pair of indefinite pronouns is lurking (without a separate label) in C and C’.
relationship in the first structure of the “straitened palms” to the “tongue” from which madness is to be averted is equivalent to the relationship between “in which way each thing is evident” and the “tongue” the “piercing clarities” of which are apparently favored in the second structure. It would be premature to judge what lesson we are to learn from such a comparison or to declare that this preoccupation with proportionality is at the heart of Empedocles’ teaching, but it is undeniably, I maintain, something which we are meant to confront in reading the poem(s). An appreciation of the importance of analogical or proportional thinking is, I think, needed to get far in understanding why Empedocles is so interested in telling a “twofold tale”.\textsuperscript{234} Of course, there are positive and negative aspects to this sort of doublespeak. As instructive as analogies can be, and as vital to proper conduct as a sense of proportion is, false analogies and illusory likenesses are at least as commonly encountered. We have not, in all of this, strayed too far from Parmenides’ own ambivalent attitude towards \textit{logos}. Empedocles (or whoever is speaking in these lines) certainly leaves enough obscure in these lines that the disciple here is faced with much the same problem as the \textit{kouros} of Parmenides’ proem.

\begin{footnote}{234} The famous fragment DK 31 B 17 opens with δῖπλ’ ἐρέω in its first line, and the phrase recurs at the beginning of 17.16. \end{footnote}
PART TWO

CHAPTER FOUR - THE TRUTH ABOUT “PARMENIDES’ DOXA”

The relationship between the two major parts of Parmenides’ poem, the Aletheia or “Way of Truth” and the “Way of Opinion” or Doxa, is one of the central questions of Parmenidean scholarship. But while it is a much discussed matter, treatments of the topic commonly take the established arrangement of the fragments for granted. Recently, however, Néstor-Luis Cordero has been arguing that a proper understanding of the difference between the two parts of the poem entails a radically different arrangement of the material generally assigned to the Doxa.¹ In his 2010 article “The ‘Doxa of Parmenides’ Dismantled”, Cordero offers an interesting account of how scholars may have been misreading Parmenides’ poem for centuries, as well as some provocative suggestions on how to correct that misreading. He calls into question the typical notion of the Doxa as a section of Parmenides’ poem providing an account of the phenomenal world, and he challenges the standard arrangement of the fragments which assigns lines featuring “physical” topics to that portion of the poem. The “Doxa of Parmenides”, if that phrase is understood to imply that Parmenides himself embraced doxa of any kind, is, Cordero insists, an imaginary fusion, like Centaurs or Sirens, of two independently legitimate notions. There was a Parmenides, and there are doxai presented in the poem, but to speak of Parmenidean doxai,

¹ See, e.g., the “Postscriptum 2007” in Cordero (2008) pp. 78-80, Cordero (2010) and Cordero (2011b). In what follows, I focus primarily on the presentation in Cordero (2010), from which the more recent paper (2011b) does not appear to differ substantially. References to Cordero (2010) in the main body of the text are by page number(s) alone, given in parentheses. References in the footnotes are in longer form. The abbreviation “DK” refers to the 5th and later editions (edited by Walther Kranz) of Hermann Diels’ Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, while “FdV” refers to the earlier (pre-Kranz) editions of that work. Items such as “DK 10” or “DK 7.5” are shorthand for referring to the “B” fragments (and line numbers, if given) in the chapter in DK on Parmenides.
Cordero maintains, is an error. As Cordero sees it, it is a mistake to regard what the poem speaks of as *doxai* as Parmenides’ own views (because all *doxai* must be false) and it is wrong to place the surviving fragments of a “physical” character (or at least many of them) under the heading of *Doxa*. In the new arrangement that Cordero proposes, only a few of the fragments generally included in the *Doxa* (specifically, DK 8.52-61, and DK 9, 12 and 19) would remain there, while the rest (DK 10, 11, and 13-18) are to be placed earlier in the poem, as part of the *Aletheia*, where they may be regarded as endorsed truths of Parmenidean natural science.

Cordero’s essay is a valuable reminder that the arrangements of the fragments that we encounter today are reconstructions by modern editors, a fact too easily and too frequently overlooked. However, his account of the history of the scholarship on the *Doxa* calls for correction on a number of points, and his own proposed reconstruction of the poem seems to me as chimerical a production as the more familiar presentation that Cordero likens to the fantastic creatures of Greek myth. Thus, while I share with Cordero a conviction that the “orthodoxy” about the *Doxa* (if there can be said to be such a thing) is incorrect, my own view of where it goes wrong is rather different. In this essay, I address a number of points, either raised in or touched upon by Cordero’s article, about the ways the *Doxa* has been or should be read. Although I treat these issues in connection with Cordero’s account, the discussion should be pertinent to any attempt to understand this curious material.

**Parmenides’ *Doxa* Dismembered?**

There are several stages to Cordero’s dismantling of the allegedly mistaken tradition. The first seeks to expose faults in the modern reconstruction of the text, which Cordero presents as the haphazard result of developments in which chance has played too dominant a part. The second stage traces elements of the current misunderstanding further back, into antiquity, placing the
blame for the widespread confusion (as Cordero sees it) of *doxai* with “appearances” or “physics” on the Platonizing bias of Simplicius and others. A third stage highlights the characteristic traits of “mortal opinions” when viewed from a perspective that does not presuppose their association with physical phenomena. Finally, with that association (one ultimately traced back to Aristotle) having been exposed, Cordero proposes to rescue fragments featuring Parmenides’ own physical doctrines from the *Doxa* and restore them to the *Aletheia*. I will address each of these stages in turn, though without devoting equal attention to all aspects of Cordero’s treatment. While an adequate account of the material requires going into detail on many matters, I shall concentrate less on the more idiosyncratic features of Cordero’s reading of Parmenides than on the wider implications of his claims for a faithful reading of the surviving fragments. The principal aim will be to clarify which assumptions involved in the standard reconstruction are supported by the source texts for the poem, and which are not. ²

**Stage One: The Modern Reconstructions Reconsidered**

Cordero begins with a story of how the contemporary view of the “*Doxa* of Parmenides” arose, the moral of which lies in the salutary reminder that Parmenides’ text as we typically read it is a modern arrangement, several centuries in the making, of quotations collected from an array of sources spanning the millennium following Parmenides’ own lifetime. Our prejudices, Cordero warns us, can often conceal what is otherwise obvious. Should we overlook the fact that what we are reading is a reconstruction, there is greater risk of accidentally and anachronistically reading our own expectations and interests back into Parmenides’ poem. The familiar notion of

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2 The stages as presented above are not explicitly delineated as such by Cordero, but reflect my own understanding of the way the argument of his essay develops, and should also serve as a helpful frame for discussing the broader questions raised by his paper. I hope that this has not meant misrepresenting his views. Criticisms of the specific solutions he proposes as answers, where these bear less directly on the general issues, will generally be confined to the footnotes.
“Parmenides’ *Doxa*” is, Cordero claims, in no small part the product of just such misreading. Indeed, Cordero alleges that the use of the heading *Doxa* for “texts that mainly concerned ‘physical questions’ [...] was only an accident in the reconstruction of the poem.” (p. 234) According to Cordero, it just so happened that, in the early attempts of Henri Estienne (1573) and Joseph Scaliger (c. 1600), in which lines drawn from the same source were grouped together, fragments of a more “physical” character were placed at the end of their collections. (p. 233) In time, this chance concatenation received the misleading title *Doxa*, a designation which Cordero dates to G. G. Fülleborn’s 1795 *Fragmente des Parmenides*. That presentation would prove decisive for how Parmenides would be read thereafter: “the poem was divided into three parts: A Prologue (fragment 1); a section Fülleborn titled περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἢ τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν; and one he titled τὰ πρὸς δόξαν (fragment 8.52 to fragment 18; fragment 19 was unknown at the time). Here we have the birth certificate of Parmenidean *Doxa.*”3 For Cordero, this birth was a fateful one, with dire consequences for our understanding of Parmenides: “The French like to say that ‘le destin fait bien les choses’ [...] but, in the case of the reconstruction of the Poem, destiny played a tragic role.” (pp. 233-234)

From these remarks, it might seem as though we are invited to think that the familiar division of the poem into a Proem, a Way of Truth, and a Way of Seeming was Fülleborn’s invention. Cordero acknowledges, however, that the division between an *Aletheia* and a *Doxa* is an ancient and a genuine one.4 What he disputes is that fragments which appear to be concerned

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3 Cordero (2010) p. 233 (correcting the misprint of ἀλήθειαν for ἀλήθειαν – on the accentuation in the edition of Fülleborn, see footnote 7 below). Cordero guesses at Fülleborn’s reasoning in what follows: “The rather ‘physical’ character of this whole [i.e., the fragments allegedly grouped together by chance at the end of the earlier collections] probably invited Fülleborn (1795) to constitute a ‘doxastic’ whole [...] placed under the title [...] τὰ πρὸς δόξαν.” (2010, p. 234)

4 See Cordero (2010) p. 232. As evidence that “*Doxa*” is a legitimate label for some portion of Parmenides’ poem, Cordero points to the goddess’ transition, at DK 8.50-52, from her faithful account about truth to the verses about *doxai*, as well as the occurrence of the phrase κατὰ δόξαν in DK 19. For the terminological point, cf.: “There is no doubt that Parmenides [...] had also taken care to expound the ‘doxai of mortals’ (indeed, we can verify this today,
with “physics” or natural science belong in the Doxa, claiming about the distribution of fragments between the two parts, “we simply do not know today which verses belong to which section.” (p. 233) Still, Cordero’s description might be thought misleading, for neither did Fülleborn invent the names that serve as titles for the sections in his edition, nor were the earlier editors, in their arrangements, simply grouping together fragments preserved by the same author. In fact, both Fülleborn, in applying the titles, and the earlier editors, in arranging the fragments as they did, were guided by the evidence they found in the authors who quoted the fragments. It appears that Cordero overlooks this because he himself significantly undervalues the information those sources provide. In the reconstruction of the poem as a whole, Cordero claims that “the only certitude” is that the proem, preserved by Sextus Empiricus, ought to be placed before any of the other fragments. As for the rest, he says, “Most of the remaining eighteen quotations of the poem can actually be placed in any order.” Both of these general claims reveal some inattention because the word ‘doxa’ appears on three occasions in the preserved texts).” (2010, p. 233) While I think Cordero is right to admit the Doxa as a genuine portion of the poem, it seems odd, given his strong skepticism of the way the Doxa has traditionally been conceived, that he regards three occurrences of the word ‘doxa’ as indubitable evidence of a portion of the poem dedicated to it.

5 Cordero undervalues the sources’ testimony throughout his article, though his own remarks on this point are not perfectly consistent. His early claim (2010, p. 232) that there is but a single certitude about the reconstruction (provided by Sextus Empiricus, who quotes the beginning of the poem) is contradicted in the following paragraph by his granting that DK 9 and 12 must have followed DK 8 (on the authority of Simplicius). Later (2010, pp. 242-3), in order to make the placement of “physical” fragments within the Aletheia seem plausible, Cordero returns to the claim that “the haphazard origin (with the exception of fr. 1) of the present arrangement […] allows us total liberty to place the ‘physical texts’ […] anywhere (subject to one constraint […]”). On my own view of the matter, Cordero is claiming more liberty than we are entitled to, and misrepresenting the constitution of the DK text by calling it “haphazard”.

6 Cordero (2010) p. 232. Cordero qualifies this in what immediately follows: “It is true that the rigorous method of Parmenides suggests, for the first time in a philosophical text, a certain organization”, and then outlines how he thinks the present arrangement follows a certain logical order. For what seems the same point, cf. Cordero (2004) p. 16: “It is impossible to know (except in one case) what place in the Poem each of these quotations should occupy. Since the first attempts at reconstruction, they have been arranged in accordance with the conceptual content of each fragment.” The “one case” here is the proem (though not as Sextus Empiricus actually quotes it, but as presented in DK, where lines from Sextus are removed and incorporated into DK B 7). In both passages Cordero implies that it was not the testimony of the sources, but the expectation of a logical course of exposition on Parmenides’ part, that determined the DK order of the fragments. Not only does this ignore the fact that much of the DK order was determined by the explicit testimony of the sources (cf. footnote 45 below), but it assumes that the organization of the material in the poem was determined by Parmenides’ “rigorous method”, as though it were obvious just what that is. While I do not deny that Parmenides had his own methods of composition, or that they were rigorous, to
to the source material, as we discover when we consider Cordero’s account of the early phases of the reconstruction in detail.

**Fülleborn’s Titles.** To begin with, in employing the phrases περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ, τὰ πρὸς ἀληθείαν (sic), and τὰ πρὸς δόξαν as titles or headings, it should be pointed out that Fülleborn was not making them up, but borrowing Simplicius’ ways of referring to portions of the poem from which he quotes. The writings of Simplicius (6th century C.E.), it should be emphasized, are by far the most important resource available for the reconstruction of Parmenides’ poem, as for much else in matters Presocratic. His commentaries on Aristotle’s *Physics* (hereafter “in Phys.”) and the *de Caelo* (hereafter “in Cael.”) supply more than half of all the verses of Parmenides known to us. He was in possession of a complete copy of the poem (which many of our earlier sources may not have been), and he repeatedly quotes from it to clarify his discussions of Aristotle’s texts and to substantiate the claims he makes. The phrases τὰ πρὸς ἀληθείαν and τὰ

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7 This is the form found in Fülleborn (as well as in Brandis and, later, Stein). Exactly why the word is so written, rather than ἀληθείαν or ἀληθείην, I am unsure. LSJ reports it as an epic form (but without citing any instances) or an early Attic one (citing Herodian).

8 See Fülleborn (1795) p. 54. Simplicius contrasts Parmenides’ account περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ with his account about τὰ αἰσθητὰ when he quotes the transition in the goddess’ speech (DK 8.50-52) at *in Cael.* 557-558 (in Heiberg’s edition) and *in Phys.* 38-39 (in the edition of Diels). Simplicius often describes the subject matter of what precedes in DK 8 as “the intelligible”, but not in such a way as to suggest that he understood περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ as a title. Indeed, in a third passage where Simplicius quotes the verses of the transition, he speaks of Parmenides μετελθὼν ... ἀπὸ τῶν νοητῶν ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ..., ἣτοι ἀπὸ ἀληθείας ὡς αὐτός φησιν ἐπὶ δόξαν (*in Phys.* 30.14-16). Simplicius thus indicates that what he will sometimes speak of as a move from the intelligible to the sensible is, in Parmenides’ own terms, a transition from reality or truth to seeming or opinion. Where the phrases πρὸς ἀληθείαν and πρὸς δόξαν occur, they, unlike περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ, sometimes can be read as titles. This seems to reflect a common way of referring to major portions of the poem, even if they were not found as headings in copies of the text itself. See, e.g., *in Cael.* 556.13-14, *in Phys.* 38.19 (where πρὸς ἀληθείαν may preserve the phrasing of Alexander of Aphrodisias), and *in Phys.* 179.31.

9 For a study of Simplicius’ methodology generally (with some specific discussion on Simplicius’ treatment of Parmenides), see Baltussen (2008). For a full study of Simplicius as a source for Parmenides, see Perry (1982). That Simplicius possessed a complete copy of the poem can be inferred not only from his extensive quotations, sometimes accompanied by a remark about the relative proximity of different quotations or the portion of the work from which a quotation is drawn, but also from passages where he remarks that something or other was not mentioned or said in Parmenides’ poem. See, e.g., *in Phys.* 140.23: οὕτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Παρμενιδείσι σέλεται τι τοιοῦτο (about the “argument from dichotomy”).

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πρὸς δόξαν were regarded as titles by Simplicius’ contemporary Philoponus,\(^{10}\) by Proclus a century earlier,\(^ {11}\) and perhaps by Alexander of Aphrodisias around the beginning of the third century C.E.\(^ {12}\) Earlier still, commentators seem to have expressed the same division with the phrases κατ’ ἀλήθειαν and κατὰ δόξαν.\(^ {13}\) Both sets of phrases seem related to the image of “ways” of inquiry, πρὸς apparently replacing κατὰ at some point as the preposition to best convey that notion.\(^ {14}\) Sometimes writers speak about a point made ἐν τοῖς περὶ δόξης or simply ἐν δόξῃ.\(^ {15}\) The variability in usage suggests that these were all labels employed by those who discussed the poem rather than headings found in the text itself, but I know of nothing in the testimonia to support the view that these labels gave the impression of a division in the poem that was not otherwise there. Fülleborn’s titles, then, were hardly without precedent. Granted, we may doubt whether every fragment in Fülleborn’s *Doxa* was correctly placed, but Cordero’s claim that he was applying that label to an entirely chance collection of sayings holds good only if the modern collection was indeed a random one. It is certainly not unreasonable to claim that affixing titles to the reconstructed sections has played a role in how we have read the poem since

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\(^{11}\) Proclus, *in Tim.* vol. I., p. 252 Diehl. Only Πρὸς δόξαν appears here, but it is clearly regarded as a title for a portion of the poem treating sensible things.


\(^{13}\) See Theophrastus *ap. Alexander, in Metaph.* 31(Hayduck) (= DK 28 A 7 = Coxon t. 40 [i.e., testimonium number 40 in Coxon (1986/2009)] = FHSG 227C) and Diogenes Laertius, *Vitaes* IX.22 (= DK 28 A 1 = t. 140), the source for which appears to have been the same as that of Pseudo-Plutarch, *Strom.* 5 (= DK A 22 = t. 87).

\(^{14}\) Theophrastus links the κατὰ phrases with the two “ways” taken by Parmenides, while Diogenes Laertius and Clement connect Parmenides’ “ways” and the κατὰ phrases, respectively, to his “twofold” teaching or philosophy. For the πρὸς phrasing as expressing “ways”, cf. Osborne, cited in footnote 10 above.

\(^{15}\) For ἐν τοῖς περὶ δόξης, see Asclepius, *in Metaph.* 42.26 (= t. 189); for ἐν δόξῃ, see Proclus, *Platonic Theology,* I.9, p. 35.17 Saffrey-Westerink (= t. 184) and cf. Sextus Empiricus, *adv. Math.* VII.114 (= t. 136), discussed in chapter two (pages 63-64) above.

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Fülleborn’s time, but the charge that it was actually misleading needs some argument to support it.

**Estienne’s Collection.** As for the purportedly accidental grouping of “physical” texts at the end of early collections of fragments, Cordero’s account involves some sleight of hand. The arrangements of Estienne and Scaliger, which Cordero adduces as supposedly influencing Fülleborn’s “naming” of the *Doxa*, are starkly different presentations of the poem. Cordero pairs the two, presenting each of them as (i) an early collection grouping fragments simply according to their source, which (ii) gives the accidental impression, because of its arrangement, of a section of a “rather ‘physical’ character” toward the end of the poem. Cordero first lists the ordering for Estienne’s collection, providing the source for each fragment in parentheses, as follows: “1 (Sextus), 7 (Sextus), 10 (Clement), 4 (Clement), 8.3-4 (Clement and Plutarch), 8.43-45 (Plato), 13 (Plato), 15 (Plutarch), 14 (Plutarch), 2 (Proclus version) and 16 (Theophrastus version).” Initially, this looks like good evidence for a grouping exclusively by author: two fragments from Sextus Empiricus (who informs us he is quoting from the beginning of the poem)

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16 One might wonder here, given Cordero’s report that Scaliger’s reconstruction went unpublished and ignored, exactly how it was supposed to have contributed to Fülleborn’s opinion about the character of the *Doxa*. Cordero in fact stops short of claiming a direct influence, and only gestures at the connection (see footnote 3). This leaves open the possibility, I take it, that some other allegedly accidental grouping of “physical” fragments was the actual historical source for the impression made on Fülleborn, but such hypothesizing is, I think, ultimately a distraction. Fülleborn is in fact quite forthcoming about the chief influence on his presentation of the fragments: it was Simplicius. See Fülleborn (1813) pp. 31-32 (partially quoted below; see footnote 38).

17 In an earlier publication, “L’histoire du texte de Parménide”, Cordero reports Estienne’s text as drawn from Sextus, Clement, Plutarch, Proclus and Theophrastus (Plato is not listed) and including the following lines: DK 1.1-30 (1.29-30 twice [the second instance presumably the lines quoted by Proclus at *in Tim.*. 1. 345], 2.1-8, 4.1-4 [in the original article this is given as “II.1-4”, with “II” evidently a misprint for “IV”], 7.2-6, 8.1-2a, 8.3-4, 8.43-45, 10.1-4, 13.1, 14.1, 15.1, and 16.1-4 (see Cordero (1987) p. 8). Given the attribution of DK 8.43-45 and DK 13 to Plato in the 2010 article, as well as a footnote in the 1987 article which adds that Estienne included as a Parmenidean verse a Platonic phrase from the passage in the *Sophist* in which 8.43-45 were cited (1987, p. 8, n. 27), it looks as though the absence of Plato from the 1987 listing was accidental. If this is the case, it is surprising that DK 7.1, quoted twice in the *Sophist* (at 237a8-9 and 258d2-3, paired with slightly different versions of 7.2 on the two different occasions), is not included in Estienne’s collection. The line numbers given in the earlier article are helpful, as they make it clear that the lines represented above by “1 (Sextus), 7 (Sextus)” did not include DK 1.31-32 or 7.1. This confirms that Estienne did not group multiple fragments from Sextus at the beginning of his collection, but simply gave as a single passage the proem as Sextus quoted it (which closes with the lines reported as “8.1-2a” in the 1987 article). The more recent article does not inform us where the second quotation of “1.29-30” (which I assume comes from Proclus) appeared in Estienne’s collection.
are followed, now in (Latin) alphabetical order, by three from Clement, two from Plato, two from Plutarch, and one each from Proclus and Theophrastus. However, Sextus doesn’t quote DK 1 and 7 as two separate fragments, but as a single continuous one, so it is illegitimate to count this as an instance of grouping fragments together. The other fragments, absent any clear indication on where they were to be placed, do appear to have been grouped together and listed alphabetically by the quoting author’s name, but this is not necessarily the only justification for so grouping them.\footnote{The two lines credited to Plutarch alone (i.e., DK 15 and 14) are quite naturally grouped together because both are descriptions of the moon.} Clearly, Sextus’ testimony that his quotation comes from the beginning of the poem determines its placement at the start of the collection while the alphabetical grouping by author is secondary. As for the fragments “toward the end of the poem”, it is theoretically possible that any sense of a progression from more metaphysical or philosophical matters to physical questions could well be regarded as an accident due to the arrangement of the material, but in entertaining this notion we must pause for a moment and see how little of the poem there was in Estienne’s arrangement after Sextus’ proem. Following the 35 or so lines from Sextus, the remaining fragments together total less than 31 lines.\footnote{I am calculating here based on the information Cordero provides, not having seen Estienne’s text, and leaving out of the account the lines from Proclus that roughly match DK 1.29-30, reported in Cordero (1987) – see footnote 17– but not mentioned in the 2010 article.} Nearly all of what we today might think of as the “middle” of the poem, the “Way of Truth”, was missing, and it is hard to believe that the fragments that Cordero counts as the “end of the poem” in this instance (i.e., 13, 15, 14, 2, and 16) give the impression of any “whole” at all, let alone that of a group “mainly concerned with ‘physical questions’.”\footnote{Not that quantity is solely or even primarily determinative in such matters, it is still striking that, in this collection of lines, fragment 2 – which Cordero recognizes does not fit the “physical” character of the supposed section – outweighs, at just over seven lines, all five of the “physical” texts put together (seven lines in total).} Estienne’s collection does not appear to pretend to, nor indeed does it provide, much sense of the shape of the poem beyond the first fragment. Pairing it with Scaliger’s version allows Cordero to gloss over how little a sense of the poem Estienne’s text
really gives us, while allowing us to imagine that the arrangement of Scaliger’s text was no more complicated than was Estienne’s alphabetical order.

**Scaliger’s Arrangement.** Scaliger’s text of the poem is considerably more involved, and more coherent, than Estienne’s. Unfortunately, Cordero’s report of it, “1 (Sextus), 7 (Sextus), 8 (Simplicius), 2 (Proclus and Simplicius), 6 (Simplicius), 13 (Plutarch and Simplicius), 15 (Plutarch), 14 (Plutarch), 7.1-2 (Plato), 17 (Galen), 4 (Clement), 10 (Clement), 16 (Aristotle version) and 18 (Caelius Aurelianus)”, inadvertently leaves out DK 9 and 12.21 Fragments 9 and 12 (both from Simplicius) should also be included, in that order, between fragments 8 and 2.22 Again, the fragments appear neatly grouped by quoting author, inviting the reader to assume that, apart from placing Sextus’ quotation first, the only principle of ordering in both collections was the grouping together of fragments from the same source. The situation is not so simple, however, and the differences from Estienne’s arrangement merit mention. First of all, the material added from Simplicius (the entirety of DK 8, along with fragments 9, 12, and 6) amounts to an addition of over 74 new lines. This more than doubles the text of Estienne’s collection, and substantially alters our sense of the whole. Next, while there is indeed some clustering according to quoting

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21 Cordero (2010) p. 233. At first glance, it even appears as though Cordero is mysteriously giving the order of Brandis’ 1813 edition rather than Scaliger’s. In praise of Scaliger’s accomplishment, Cordero introduces Brandis’ book as the first work, after about two centuries during which Scaliger’s work was unknown or ignored, “to return to the level of Scaliger’s work”. (This too might be slightly misleading, since Fülleborn, whose work preceded Brandis’ by almost 20 years, gives a comparably full collection of fragments (though without DK 17). It would be more accurate to say that it was not until Brandis’ work, which included additional material from Simplicius’ *in Cael.*, that the completeness of Scaliger’s work was surpassed.) Next, Cordero recounts the order quoted above, in a sentence beginning, “Brandis’ book followed this order:”, from which the reader might easily conclude that the order that follows is that found in Brandis’ work, and may or may not be repeating the order of Scaliger. In fact, the list given does not match the order in Brandis’ edition, and Brandis’ arrangement differs markedly from Scaliger’s. In an earlier article bringing attention to Scaliger’s work, Cordero listed the order of his arrangement as follows: DK 1 (1-30), 7 (2-6), 8, 9, 12, 2, 6, 13, 15, 14, 7 (1-2), 17, 4, 10, 16, 18 (see Cordero (1982) p. 398). The order in the 2010 article, quoted above, thus appears to omit fragments 9 and 12. The order in Brandis’ edition, according to the numeration of DK, is: 1, 7.2-7a, 2, 6, 7.1-2, 8.1-15, 4, 8.16-61, 9, 12, 13, 10, 11, 15, 14, 16, 18, 22, 19 (see Brandis (1813)). The most significant difference from Scaliger, in addition to the material added from Simplicius’ *de Caelo* commentary, is the placement of fragment 8 after 2 and 6, which reflects an improved appreciation of the testimony of Simplicius about the placement of the fragments, as shall be discussed later.

22 See the preceding footnote. An overview of the different early arrangements of the fragments is given in the appendix to this chapter, *Synopsis A*, page 190 below.
author (DK 8, 9, 12, 2, 6 and 13 are all quoted (at least in part)\textsuperscript{23} by Simplicius; 13, 15 and 14 by Plutarch;\textsuperscript{24} and 4 and 10 by Clement), the arrangement is more complex than was Estienne’s. Cordero has omitted the names of sources that would complicate the picture,\textsuperscript{25} but differences are evident nonetheless. Most conspicuously, the alphabetical order for the fragments following Sextus’ quotation has been abandoned. Surely there was some reason for this, and careful attention to the order of the fragments drawn from Simplicius helps us to see it. The sequence of fragments 8, 9, 12, 2, 6 is \textit{not}, I think, the correct order in which to place those fragments, but it does reveal something about what guided Scaliger in arranging the fragments as he did.

\textit{Pace} Cordero, the order is not the arbitrary outcome of accident, chance or misfortune. To paraphrase Parmenides’ goddess, it was not any bad fate that set Scaliger on this way, but the just and right guidance of Simplicius. Cordero actually follows the same lead himself when he allows that Simplicius’ remarks about fragments 9, 12, and 19 confirm their placement after fragment 8.\textsuperscript{26} These fragments would thus be exceptions to his complaint that the sources give us little information to guide a reconstruction:

Except for the prologue (fragment 1, today) we do not know in which order the other eighteen passages actually were in the original text. The ancient quotations’ sources are not precise, and in most cases their authors limit themselves to affirming, before each purported quotation, that ‘then Parmenides said X’, or that ‘in another place he said Y’, but they never point out any kind of ‘parts’ in the Poem. (p. 233)

\textsuperscript{23} Simplicius provides only six of the eight lines of DK 2, which Proclus gives in full.
\textsuperscript{24} Note that here Cordero attributes DK 13 to Simplicius and Plutarch, but leaves out Plato (to whom the fragment was assigned in the Estienne listing), Aristotle and others, including whom would complicate the tidy arrangement Cordero wants to present.
\textsuperscript{25} In addition to listing DK 2, better preserved in Proclus than Simplicius, under the latter, and changing the attribution for 13 from Plato to Plutarch and Simplicius, neither Simplicius nor Aristotle are mentioned as sources for 7.1-2.
\textsuperscript{26} See Cordero (2010) pp. 232, 234, 240, and 243 (citing \textit{in Phys.} 180 for DK 9, \textit{in Phys.} 39 for DK 12, and \textit{in Cael.} 559 for DK 19) and cf. footnote 5 above. In the arrangement Cordero proposes, these are the only known fragments allowed to follow DK 8.50-61.
The claim that the sources “never point out any kinds of ‘parts’ in the Poem” is, as the consideration of the phrase τὰ πρὸς δόξαν has shown, in error, although it remains possible that the parts mentioned by the sources might reflect their own manner of dividing the poem rather than Parmenides’. The assessment of our ignorance about the placement of fragments, likewise, is an exaggeration arising from too exacting a demand for information. Even if “in most cases” the authors who quote from the poem do not do us the courtesy of providing precise citations, a remark such as “then Parmenides said X” is still informative, if we can determine where “then” places us in the poem, which often enough we can.

Bearing these points in mind, let us consider the order of the fragments with which Scaliger’s arrangement begins: 1.1-30, 7.2-6, 8, 9, 12, 2, 6, 13. As already mentioned, the first two items, despite the appearance of the citation, are quoted as a continuous passage by Sextus. Moreover, the final clause of Sextus’ quotation, μόνος δ’ ἔτι θυμὸς ὡδοῖο / λείπεται, is a close match with the beginning of DK 8 as quoted by Simplicius: μοῦνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὡδοῖο / λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν. This similarity has led many editors to believe that the quotations overlap. This is assumed, for instance, in DK, where Sextus’ quotation is divided between two fragments, with the result that the closing lines of Sextus’ quotation are cited as DK 7.2-5 and DK 8.1-2. Examining Scaliger’s arrangement, it appears that he shared this assumption, and combined Sextus’ and Simplicius’ quotations accordingly. Next comes 9, then 12, and I venture to claim that Scaliger put them in this order not by mere chance, but because he was, like Cordero, aware of Simplicius’ testimony that these two fragments followed the end of DK 8. Similarly, the

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27 For references, see footnotes 8 and 10-12.
29 Because of the assumed overlap, what is printed as one and the same line in DK may be cited as either 8.1, or, in the interest of emphasizing that one has in mind the words from Sextus, as 7.6. Likewise, the final word of Sextus’ quotation (λείπεται) will sometimes be cited as DK 7.7a (e.g., in Synopsis A).
relative position of the next two fragments, with 2 before 6, also reflects the order in which Simplicius reports them. Simplicius’ report is not as explicit as with 9 and 12, each of which are said to come “a little after” (μετ’ όλίγα) 8.59 and 8.61 respectively, but in the passage where he quotes from both DK 2 and DK 6, the latter follows the former, and nothing on the other occasions when either fragment is quoted conflicts with the natural assumption that Simplicius was giving the lines in the order in which they appeared in the poem. Admittedly, this is not particularly precise, but it is more than nothing. Scaliger’s placing DK 2 and 6 in that order reflects Simplicius’ text, and his placing of these two fragments after DK 8, 9 and 12, whose original locations are more precisely reported, may well indicate a lesser degree of confidence in where to place the pair. Later editors, including Fülleborn, Brandis, and others, would rightly place both of these fragments before DK 8, but always with 2 preceding 6, as given by Simplicius. That they were right to place them before DK 8 is shown by additional evidence from Simplicius, either overlooked or discounted by Scaliger, that DK 6, 7.2, and 8 occurred in that order.

DK 13 is the last of the fragments in Scaliger’s collection quoted by Simplicius. With it begins the run of fragments (13, 15, 14, 17, 4, 10, 16, 18) whose accidental but generally “physical” character, claims Cordero, helped Fülleborn fantasize a “doxastic’ whole’. It is here that Cordero’s characterization of the arrangement as arbitrary looks most accurate, and it must be admitted that it becomes more difficult to divine the motives behind it. What deserves noting, however, is that things in Scaliger’s arrangement get particularly messy once the hints from

31 See in Phys. 116-117.
32 Cf. Synopsis A.
33 At in Phys. 78, Simplicius indicates clearly that DK 6.8-9 preceded DK 7.2, which in turn preceded DK 8.1-14. Scaliger may have overlooked this passage, but more likely, I imagine, is that he discounted it because he was (mistakenly) convinced that DK 8 continued seamlessly the lines from Sextus Empiricus.

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Simplicius give out. This is no accident. If my account of Scaliger’s thinking is correct, the process up to this point was a fairly straightforward one: he began with what appeared to him to be a continuous passage, partly preserved by Sextus (DK 1.1-30, 7.2-6), partly by Simplicius (DK 8), followed by two passages known to have followed shortly after the end of 8, DK 9 and 12. Next he added two groups of lines (DK 2 and 6) quoted by Simplicius in connection with DK 8, but whose precise placement was in doubt. Then, as the last of the fragments from Simplicius, he placed DK 13. In doing so Scaliger probably had in mind the indication from Simplicius, apparently overlooked by Cordero himself, that DK 13 follows DK 12. From that point on, what we get is something of a mishmash: two more fragments (DK 15 and 14, each one line) from Plutarch (also a source for DK 13) about the moon; a pair of lines from Plato forbidding the thought of the being of non-beings (DK 7.1-2); an embryological hexameter drawn from Galen (DK 17); two quotations from Clement of seemingly different character (DK 4, about the integrity of being, and DK 10, listing celestial matters to be learned); DK 16 (four lines on the blend of human noos) as quoted by Aristotle; and, finally, six lines of Latin hexameter, again embryological (DK 18). This does seem a rather arbitrary collection of material. But, while the case might be made that the “end matter” here constitutes a “physical whole” better than did that of Estienne’s collection, that is not saying much. Cordero notes that DK 4 would seem to be an “intruder”, and so too would the lines from Plato (DK 7.1-2), which

34 See the preceding footnote. The other passages from Simplicius and Proclus in which DK 2 and 6 are quoted also suggest that these fragments were drawn from a part of the poem concerned with “being” or “the intelligible”. If Scaliger, in addition to assuming that DK 8 followed Sextus’ proem without break and that DK 9 and 12 followed a few lines later, also took DK 13 as belonging to the portion of the poem “concerning the sensible things” (justification for which we will encounter soon), there may have seemed no other place for DK 2 and 6 than between DK 12 and 13.

35 Cordero, while having DK 12 follow DK 8, would place DK 13 well before DK 8. This ignores that in the very passage which Cordero cites as evidence for placing DK 12 after DK 8 (in Phys. 39) Simplicius continues by quoting DK 13, understanding the δαίμων of 12.3 as the subject of the verb μητίσατο in DK 13. Simplicius does not indicate (even vaguely) the distance by which DK 13 followed the lines from DK 12, but Scaliger’s placement of DK 2 and 6 between them certainly yields an awkward result. Later editors generally place DK 13 immediately after 12.
Cordero omits when he specifically lists the material “toward the end of the poem”. (p. 234) The embryological fragments (DK 17 and 18) add a new element, so the collection is a bit fuller, but they are not even grouped together. This, together with the fact that DK 10 is placed after DK 15 and 14, likely indicate that Scaliger did not intend to present any kind of “whole” at this point either.36 Thus, while the apparent randomness of the arrangement here supports one aspect of Cordero’s characterization (that it is arbitrary), the suggestion that the “physical” character of Scaliger’s “Doxa” (or another like it) influenced Fülleborn’s titling the section τὰ πρὸς δόξαν is doubtful. In the first place, Fülleborn’s arrangement of the fragments generally, and of the Doxa in particular, differ considerably from Scaliger’s.37 More decisively still, Fülleborn makes perfectly clear that his own arrangement is not due to chance, but follows the lead of Simplicius.38 As with Scaliger, behind what might have looked like mere fortune was Simplicius’ good guidance.

**Simplicius’ Significance.** As already touched upon, Cordero’s account generally neglects this guidance, placing the responsibility for the arrangement of the fragments, when it is not simply a matter of fate, on editors’ assumptions about what makes for a logical ordering of the fragments’ “conceptual content”.39 Cordero does not provide the details of the early editions that followed Scaliger’s work, but appears to assume that, the fortuitous nature of the earliest arrangements

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36 Presumably DK 18 is placed last because it survives only in Latin translation. More telling is that the descriptions of the moon (DK 15, 14) appear before the fragment (DK 10) which lists the moon among the topics to be learned.  
37 See Synopsis A. Most importantly, DK 8 is no longer connected to Sextus’ proem. This makes space for DK 2, 6, and 7.2 to appear before DK 8, and allows the beginning of the “physical” section of the poem to coincide with the transition from *Aletheia* to *Doxa* at 8.53. In turn, DK 9 and 12 (not among the quotations included by Cordero in Scaliger’s collection of “physical” fragments) become portions of the *Doxa*. Moreover, DK 10, freed from 4 (the other fragment from Clement), is fittingly placed before 15 and 14.  
38 “Die Zusammenstellung der Fragmente ist nicht auf gutes Glück geschehen: sondern beruht grossentheils auf dem Ansehn des Simplicius. […] Diese nahm ich mir zum Leitfaden.” (Fülleborn (1795) p. 31)  
39 See footnotes 5 and 6 above. Cordero accounts for the DK order in the *Aletheia* by appealing not to the indications provided by Simplicius but to Parmenides’ “rigorous method”. Thus fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8 are said to be arranged in that order because “[t]he two possibilities of research presented in what we now call fragment 2 complete themselves in a text considered today as ‘fragment 6’, which seems to continue with another text placed as ‘fragment 7’. The latter, ostensibly without any interruption, appears continuous with the long fragment, called ‘fragment 8’.” (2010, p. 232)
having been demonstrated, the subsequent arrangements can likewise be treated as arbitrary and haphazard. For instance, when Cordero remarks that, after Fülleborn’s edition, Peyron (1810) provided still more material for the reconstruction of the Doxa from Simplicius’ in Cael. (most notably DK 19), this additional contribution seems to be mentioned only to suggest that it added a false impression of completeness to the illusion of Fülleborn’s “physical” Doxa. This leaves a major gap in the story of the reconstruction, for, by omitting the details of the other early arrangements, Cordero’s presentation obscures the fact that with each major leap forward in the reconstruction, from Estienne to Scaliger, from Scaliger to Fülleborn, and from Fülleborn to Brandis, the perceptible gain in each instance is principally due to an improved appreciation of the evidence that Simplicius provides about the shape of the poem.40 The importance of Simplicius’ in Phys. for both the content and ordering of Scaliger’s arrangement has already been sketched in some detail, and it has been noted that the chief improvements over Scaliger’s work by Fülleborn and Brandis are likewise due to a better grasp of the clues that Simplicius’ text gives.41 Brandis, with the added benefit of the material drawn from Simplicius’ in Cael.,42 was able to add not only DK 19 as the closing passage of the Doxa, but also DK 11.43 Though the latter is among the fragments which Cordero suggests moving into the Aletheia, Brandis, in placing it in the Doxa, was here too following the lead of Simplicius’ text.44 No less influenced by Simplicius’ hints were Hermann Diels’ arrangements, which have become, in modified form, the standard text that Cordero considers haphazard.45

40 The developments described in what follows may be traced in Synopsis A.
41 See above, footnote 37. Specifically, Fülleborn followed Simplicius, against Scaliger, in placing DK 2 and 6 before DK 7.2 and 8, and in linking DK 12 closely with DK 13.
42 Relevant selections from this commentary were made available by Amadeo Peyron in Peyron (1810).
43 Brandis also breaks from Simplicius (and Fülleborn) in inserting DK 4, from Clement, into DK 8. As Cordero observes, DK 4 is the most variously placed of the fragments.
44 This point will be discussed below.
45 Diels, who had edited Simplicius’ in Phys. in Diels (1882) and (1895), records these debts in the brief annotations to the fragments in his Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta (1901). The omission of these brief notes in the various
Despite the oversights we have noted, Cordero’s reminder about our text being a reconstruction is an important point, and well worth emphasizing. Diels’ success in collecting and making accessible the fragmentary texts of Presocratic philosophy scattered throughout Greek and Latin literature has made the DK arrangement of the fragments virtually canonical. An unintended consequence of this is that the fragments can be read and studied without adequate attention being given to the contexts from which they are drawn. Overly trusting readers may then suppose that the arrangement in which the isolated fragments are presented in DK is somehow definitive, while overly suspicious ones may imagine that the DK arrangement is essentially arbitrary. Cordero’s own account of Parmenides’ poem may include both excesses, but that does not invalidate the key point. Moreover, his characterization of the arrangement as arbitrary may still be more or less valid for the material assigned to the Doxa (which is, after all, his central concern in the article), most of which is drawn from sources less helpful for reconstructing the poem than Simplicius. Few students of the poem will dispute that the reconstruction of the Doxa (in DK or comparable arrangements) is less secure than that of the Aletheia. Even to those uninitiated into the mysteries of the modern attempts at reconstructing the poem, the material that makes up the Doxa, compared with that of the proem or the Aletheia, appears plainly as a meager sampling of stray bits. Is it, then, as capriciously constituted as Cordero claims?

editions of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (where the scope of the work demanded as concise a presentation of each figure as possible) has helped to contribute to the widespread impression that contemporary arrangements of the fragments are less dependent on ancient evidence than they are.

Cordero is inordinately suspicious in statements about our uncertainty as to the original order of the fragments, repeatedly suggesting that within the limits of the organization called for by Parmenides’ “rigorous method”, we are free to arrange the fragments at will. At the same time, he is too trusting, I would claim, in adopting the division of Sextus’ proem by Kranz (and Karsten before him) into two separate fragments, DK 1.1-30 and DK 7.2-7a. In the latter supposition Cordero shares the company of nearly all the scholars to have treated the poem since Kranz (re-)introduced the change.

As Fülleborn himself was well aware. See Fülleborn (1795) pp. 84ff. for his annotations to these fragments.
Stage Two: The Ancient Accounts Examined

In the second stage of his argument, Cordero argues that not only is what survives of the Doxa woefully incomplete, but that most of the bits generally believed to belong to the Doxa actually do not. He maintains that the texts commonly grouped together as the Doxa exhibit inconsistencies of style and content which tell against assigning them all to the same portion of the poem, and he links the failure of modern scholars to see this with a confusion perpetuated among their ancient antecedents. In antiquity too, Cordero claims, there was widespread confusion over what Parmenides meant to say about doxai. Interestingly, he singles out Simplicius for special blame. Simplicius, as the “stronger paradigm of the ‘Platonization’ of Parmenides”, is said to have denied the full force of the negative valuation of doxai in the poem and to have committed so many interpretative anachronisms as to make him a rarity among the ancient commentators! Our sole source for so much that survives of the poem, has, according to Cordero, communicated it with an overlay alien to Parmenides’ own thinking, so that modern interpreters have failed to recognize the difference, for Parmenides, between “physics” or “appearances” on the one hand and “mortal opinions” on the other. How persuasive a case does Cordero make for all of this?

“Internal Anomalies of the Doxa”. As regards the alleged inconsistencies of style and content in the conventional Doxa, Cordero’s case is unconvincing. While it will be readily admitted that the Doxa is far from complete, there does seem to be a general coherence to it: the end of DK 8 and

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48 See Cordero (2010) pp. 234-237. Although dismissive remarks about Simplicius’ (Neo-)Platonism and/or his endeavor to harmonize the views of early Greek philosophers are not uncommon in the scholarly literature, this accusation seems an extreme one, and likely to give a grossly distorted impression of the relative merits of the ancient commentators. Platonist though Simplicius may have been, he seems as conscientious a scholar as anyone in the commentarial tradition. If there is any truth in the claim, “Indeed, one rarely finds in the ancient tradition of commentary anachronisms as numerous as are found in Simplicius with reference to Parmenides”(2010, p. 236), it is only because, compared to what Simplicius provides, others in the commentarial tradition tell us so very little about Parmenides.
DK 9 lead us to expect a discussion of “all things” in terms of heavy night and aitherial light; DK 10 adds that the addressee will know “all the signs” of the aither and the works of the sun and the moon; DK 11 numbers the sun and moon among a list of other celestial lights that come to be (to which the mentions of the moon in DK 14 and 15 certainly seem related), while DK 12 associates bands of fire and night with a divinity directing male-female pairings (to which DK 13, which speaks of Eros, and the embryological fragments 17 and 18, would all seem linked); finally, in what is possibly the conclusion of the Doxa, DK 19 seems to be a summarizing statement that “these things” have grown, and now are, and will in time meet their end, all κατὰ δόξαν. DK 16, seemingly more concerned with human noos than the generation of the cosmos, seems like the only possibly odd fit, but, given the recurrent pairing of doxa with mortals in the poem, it is far from being obviously out of place.\(^{49}\) If these are loose connections, the content here nonetheless seems distinct from the material that runs from DK 2 through most of DK 8, over the course of which we hear little hint of celestial objects, or night and light, and where any talk of generation appears to deny its existence. Cordero dismisses such connections among the fragments of the standard Doxa as mere “family likenesses”, insisting that, actually, the Doxa so composed presents patent “internal anomalies”.\(^{50}\) Even “a very superficial reading” of this Doxa, he claims, reveals both undeniable truths and obvious falsehoods:

> Nothing truer, for example, than to affirm that the moon does not have its own light, and that she revolves around the earth (fr.14); that if the kosmos is a kosmos this is because the Necessity governs the whole (fr. 10). And yet a likewise superficial reading of the same set shows that there are also false affirmations, for example, that there is nothing outside light

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\(^{49}\) As Cordero notes, Loenen (1959) and Hershbell (1970) presented cases for placing DK 16 in the Way of Truth, but neither has won widespread approval. Cf. Patricia Curd’s recent remark about DK 16 (which she would keep in the Doxa): “I have long taken this to be one of the most confounding passages in Presocratic thought; I might add that I find most attempts to translate and explain it (including my own) equally perplexing.” (Curd (2011) p. 129)

\(^{50}\) These phrases belong to assertions made at Cordero (2010) pp. 235-236. By p. 241 it is taken as proven that “the whole of what traditionally passes as ‘the Doxa’ […] is marred by a notorious imbalance—in style, as well as in content.”
and night (fr. 9), or that what ensures the coherence of the cosmos is the action of a goddess (fr. 12). (p. 236)

It is not explained quite how he draws the lessons he does from the fragments in question, but for supposedly evident examples of truths and falsehoods, these seem weak ones. While it may be second nature to us to think that the moon reflects the light of the sun, this may have been a novelty in Parmenides’ own day, and it does not inspire confidence that Cordero’s own formulations of the lessons of fragments 10 and 12 are almost interchangeable, given that Necessity might well be described as a goddess in the poem. The distinction Cordero claims to find is one between “physical” truths and false doxai, and his solution to the problem this poses to the unity of the Doxa will be to place the “physical” fragments earlier in the poem. Without further elaboration, however, the “notorious imbalance” of style and content that Cordero claims to detect in these fragments seems to be one uncomfortably forced upon the text, not one arising freely from an unbiased reading.

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51 Cordero offers a slightly different list of “anomalies” in Cordero (2011b): “even a superficial reading of the set of texts that are supposed to constitute the δόξα shows that the critical judgment of Parmenides [i.e., the goddess’ descriptions of doxai as without true trust and deceptive, which Cordero treats as spoken in Parmenides’ own voice] is justified only on certain occasions (e.g., in the case of fr. 9, which affirms that there is nothing outside of light and night, an idea that is evidently absurd). But in other passages a negative judgment is not relevant: why would it be deceptive to affirm that the Moon lacks a proper light, or that it turns around the Earth, or that Eros was one of the first (or the very first) of the gods (Hesiod dixit), or that opposite sexes mixed “the seeds of love”? (Cordero (2011b) pp. 101-102). These examples are no better than those in the earlier paper. “Hesiod dixit” is surely shaky ground for the self-evident primacy of Eros “affirmed” in DK 13. Not only is it unclear why Hesiod should be regarded as an authority for Parmenides in this matter, but it mistakes what Hesiod actually said. In Hesiod, it is Chaos, not Eros, that comes to be “firstmost” (see Theogony 116). Again, while it may be plain that the opposite sexes mix “the seeds of love” (the phrase in quotation marks being a reference, I take it, to the first line of DK 17, femina virque simul Veneriscum germina miscent), this is hardly an observation that Parmenides could claim as his own discovery, and is a dubious paraphrase of whatever it is that the whole of DK 17 might actually be affirming. Moreover, the same notion seems implied in DK 12, which Cordero assigns to the Doxa.

52 Where Cordero does directly address the fragments, his claims are often problematic. He claims, e.g., that in the “physical” fragments, the goddess speaks of celestial objects as things to be learned or known, language which is allegedly not used in connection with doxai (2010, pp. 240-241). Given how little of the Doxa is left (especially in Cordero’s arrangement), such a claim, even if true, would not amount to much. As it happens, it is not quite true: the very first occurrence of the word in the poem, δόξας at B 1.30, is a direct object of πυθέσθαι in 1.28 (cf. πεύσῃ at 10.4, which Cordero (2010, p. 240) seems to include among the verbs for knowing physical realities) while δόξας at 8.51 is the object of μάνθανε in the following verse. Similarly dubious is the remark that DK 16, which “describes the formation of the intellect in the case of men (ἀνθρώπους, 16.3) [...] has hardly any sense in a context that
Doxai and “Appearances”. Cordero’s other claim against Simplicius and others who align the Doxa with the physical and/or phenomenal world has two principal components. One is the claim that to do so weakens the poem’s strongly negative valuation of doxai. This valuation finds expression in the distinction drawn between “persuasive Truth’s (Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος) intrepid heart”, on the one hand, and the “doxai of mortals, in which true trust (πίστις ἀληθής) is not”, on the other, as well as in the goddess’ remark, at the transition from the Aletheia to the Doxa, that, with her trusty speech (πιστὸν λόγον) at an end, the youth will henceforth learn mortal doxai, “hearing the deceptive order of my verses” (κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων).53 No reader of these lines will fail to recognize that, in the distinction drawn here, the doxai are marked as deficient in some important way. Against interpreters who might want to minimize that deficiency in order to grant mortal opinions some degree of validity, Cordero demands that “it is untenable to affirm that Parmenides can propose to any extent to share in or to tolerate the δόξαι βροτῶν”.54 Cordero draws particular attention to the second of the two passages. “It is necessary”, he insists, “to respect the strong negative sense—especially in Parmenides—of the word ἀπατηλόν. The poem is eminently didactic, and a teacher should not ‘deceive’ his disciples.” (p. 235) Respecting the full force of the adjective apatêlos entails, according to Cordero, strictly aligning anything persuasive with truth and anything deceptive with falsehood, with no possibility of any middle ground, for this would violate Parmenides’ “bivalent logic”. (p. 235) For Simplicius, however, the beings that populate Parmenides’ Doxa occupy just such a

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53 DK 1.29-30 and 8.50-52. The translations above are my own, but do not, I think, differ in substance from Cordero’s reading of the lines.

54 Cordero (2010) p. 235. Among the attempts to suggest that the Doxa was a presentation of reliable knowledge, the first part of Giorgio de Santillana’s 1964 essay, “Prologue to Parmenides”, makes an interesting companion to Cordero’s, using similar tactics to trace a nearly parallel path to precisely contrary conclusions about the Doxa. In his own answer to the riddle posed by the “Sphinx of Metaphysics”, Santillana claims that the preconceptions of generations of modern scholars, the misappropriations of centuries of ancient authors, and the misreading of the such terms doxa and apatêlos has obscured the “obvious fact” that the Doxa is a physics (Santillana (1968) p. 89).
middle ground. They possess “seeming being”: they fall short of the fullest reality, but are still something more than utter non-being.\textsuperscript{55} They are “appearances”, with the full ambiguity that that term (or *phainomena* in Greek) has in ordinary speech, occupying a spectrum ranging from things that may merely appear to be of a certain sort (while not really being so) to things that it is apparent are so (i.e., things that manifestly, obviously, patently, are so).

Since deception generally involves precisely the confusion of truth and falsehood, and the exploitation of the ambiguity often present in “appearances”, Cordero’s supposedly Parmenidean sense of *apatēlos* seems suspiciously *ad hoc*, and his appeals to the didactic character of the poem or its bivalent logic in order to justify such a sense look question-begging. Cordero grants that in Gorgias’ *Encomium of Helen*, persuasion and deception are paired as capacities of *logos*, but he claims that this is a *contra naturam* coupling, post-dating Parmenides, and suggests that in doing so Gorgias was writing as an “anti-Parmenidean philosopher”. (p. 235) I hope it will not be embarrassing to those who played a role in my moral development if I admit that persuasion and deception do not seem to me to be an entirely unnatural pairing. At any rate, Gorgias, innovative figure though he was, was not the first to connect the two notions, which are paired together often enough from the earliest Greek literature onward, particularly in contexts where *eros* is involved.\textsuperscript{56} And, while he certainly wrote some things in response to Parmenides, it is far from clear that Gorgias was “anti-Parmenidean” in suggesting that persuasive *logos* is not always perfectly forthright and truthful. When the maidens of Parmenides’ proem persuade Dike to open the gates of Night and Day by “beguiling her with soft speeches, cunningly” (DK 1.15-16: τὴν


\textsuperscript{56} In Hesiod, Pandora provides a good illustration of this. Devised by Zeus in answer to Prometheus’ attempts to deceive him, Pandora, portrayed as deception incarnate, is outfitted for the task of beguiling mankind by a number of gods, Peitho (“Persuasion”) among them (see *Works and Days* 47-105, and cf. 373-375). In the *Iliad*, the episode in book 14 known as the *Apate* of Zeus springs readily to mind, but an example of this appears as early as book 1. At 1.130ff., Agamemnon insists that Achilles, with his appeal to return Chryseis to her father, will not deceive him and persuade him to give up his prize. From the *Odyssey*, I imagine the reader can supply for him- or herself one or two examples of figures to whom persuasion and deception are at least second nature.
δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγουσιν / πείσαν ἐπιφραδέως), this is only one of several Parmenidean expressions that echo episodes of deceit or disguise in the epics. The phrasing kosmon epeōn, too, is traditionally employed in contexts where the “arrangement of words” is used to somehow mediate, rather than to reinforce, a hard-and-fast, either/or dichotomy of the sort that Cordero sees Parmenides drawing.57 Without presupposing Parmenides’ commitment to

57 On the epic expressions, see Floyd (1991) and (1992). Cordero’s stance in his recent papers reflects his earlier thesis, developed at length elsewhere, that there is no “third way” in the poem. In Cordero (2004), he speaks of the “third way” as “hypothetical”, and claims that “for twenty-one centuries nobody ever found three ways, routes, or paths in Parmenides’ thought.” (2004, p. 138) The textual issue at the core of his insistence on only two ways is the lacuna at the end of DK 6.3. For DK 6.3-5, Diels printed: πρὸςίτη γάρ σ’ ὄρον ὁδοὺς ταύτης διείσιος <ἔργω>, / αὐτάρ ἔπειτα ἀπὸ τῆς, ἢν δὴ βροτοί εἰδότες οὐδὲν πλάττονται, δικρινόν. (“For <I keep> you from this first way of seeking, but then from that one, which indeed mortals, knowing nothing, two-headed, fashion for themselves”). In place of Diels’ supplement εἴργω, Cordero proposes ἄρξει, and also reads τ’ rather than σ’ earlier in the line, translating, “…since you will begin with this first way of investigation, but then with that made by mortals who know nothing, two-headed…” (2004, pp. 187, 192). In “On Parmenides’ Three Ways of Inquiry” (reprinted in Nehamas (1999)), Alexander Nehamas independently proposed a similar alternative for eliminating a third way from Parmenides’ poem. As Cordero’s defense of his emendation is intricately interwoven with his interpretation of the whole of the poem, I cannot attempt a detailed treatment here, but it is worth pointing out that his discussions of the matter (see, e.g., Cordero (2004) pp. 112-117 and 138-149) seem to overlook two significant facts which tell against his alternative: (i) in support of some form of the verb εἴργω, Diels had not only the examples of the Aldine edition and other modern scholars (whose influence Cordero stresses), but the parallel expressions of at least two other lines of the poem: both 1.33 and 7.2 in the early arrangements of Diels read ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆς ὄρου ὁδόν διείσιος εἴργε νόμιμα, not only 7.2, as Cordero reports (see Cordero (2004) p. 116, but note the potentially confusing misprints: after correctly citing 7.2, the text twice reads 7.1 where 7.2 is meant). Though the later editions of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker edited by Kranz reduce these to a single line, I think Diels was right to regard them as independent (in fact, Plato’s Sophist may provide evidence of yet another nearly identical line), and, if that is so, the case for Diels’ supplement is considerably strengthened (Cordero’s remarks about the parallelism being “deceptive” (p.116) notwithstanding); (ii) in his conviction that the notion of “three ways” is a modern “hypothesis”, Cordero does not address (nor does Nehamas in his essay) an important passage from Simplicius, in Phys. 78.2-23, where the same “hypothesis” seems present. There Simplicius, having said that we would do well to attend to what Parmenides himself says about “what-is”, goes on to quote several sequences of verses, framed by the following remarks: “For, having found fault with those who bring what is and what is not together in the intelligible, ‘for whom to be and not to be are considered the same / and not the same’ [= DK 6.7-8], and having turned away from the way that seeks what-is-not, ‘But do you keep your thought from this way of inquiry’, [= DK 7.2], he continues, ‘Still, a solitary story of a way / is left, that it is, and on this there are signs / very many [= DK 8.1-3]’ and finally he transmits the signs of what is in the proper sense, “that, being ungenerated, it is also undestroyed / whole, …[the quotation continues through DK 8.14]”. [μεμισμάμενος γὰρ τοῖς τὸ δὴ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἢν συμφέροντι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ. “οὐς τὸ πάλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταύτην νενόμισται / καὶ ταύταν,“ καὶ ἀποστρέψας τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς τὸ μὴ ἢ ζητουσίς. “ ἀλλὰ σὺ βήσθαι ἄφ’ ὁδὸν διείσιον εἴργε νόμιμα,“ ἐπαινεῖ, “μοῦνος δ’ ἐπὶ μίθος ὁδὸν / λειπεῖσθαι, ὡς ἐπὶ ταύτη δ’ ἐπι σήματ‘ ἐπισά /πολλὰ μᾶλα,“ καὶ παραδίδοσι λοιπὸν τὸ τοῦ κυρίου ὄντος σημεῖα: “ὡς ἵγνητον ἐνόν καὶ ἀνιόλοχδρον ἐστιν, / ὀφθαλ’ …]” Here Simplicius himself seems to be marking off three distinct attitudes, each accompanied by a quotation characterizing it, differentiated by their seeking (i) a combination of being and non-being “in the intelligible”; (ii) non-being (alone?); (iii) being “in the proper sense” (i.e., without non-being), and indicating that Parmenides rejected the first two before elaborating on the third in DK 8. That Simplicius intends a distinction between the first and second attitudes is suggested by the discussion that precedes the quotations, and the distinction perhaps appears later in the commentary when, at in Phys. 116-117, Simplicius quotes DK 2.3-8 as lines expressing the notion that “what is apart from what is non-being and nothing” and most of DK 6 as “finding fault with those who lead the contradictories into the same”. Of course, the suggestion that the idea of multiple “ways” in
some such rigid dualism, Simplicius’ view of doxa as an intermediate between the highest condition of being and its utter privation seems more in accord with the language to which Cordero draws our attention.

Behind Simplicius’ and others’ alleged failure to appreciate the negative valuation of doxa lurks the other component of Cordero’s criticism: Platonism. The ease with which a reader may associate Parmenides’ Aletheia with the intelligible or the Doxa with the sensible betrays, according to Cordero, a tendency to employ anachronistic, Platonizing categories in reading the poem. This is, at least potentially, a separate point from the preceding claim, and its merit should be measured independently. The charge comes first in a general, then in a more specific form. “First,” Cordero claims, “such dichotomies as sensible/intelligible, being/appearance, do not exist in Greek thought before the Sophistic period.” (pp. 236-237) It is unclear to me what Cordero thinks justifies this assertion, or how it could be true without the addition of qualifications that vitiate its validity in charging Simplicius with anachronism. The vagueness introduced by the wording “such dichotomies as…” makes the charge ambiguous. “Such … as” suggests that Cordero has in mind a class of conceptual contrasts which includes those specifically named (i.e., sensible/intelligible, being/appearance) but he does not indicate what the boundaries or defining features of that grouping might be. If “such … as” is meant to cover divisions that are generally or broadly similar to those given, Simplicius can respond that these distinctions or similar ones seem to be part of the common property of human experience, as

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Parmenides’ poem is not a modern invention does not mean that the conventional understanding of the three ways in the poem is correct. How well Simplicius’ divisions match the contemporary division(s) of three “ways” is an open question, which I must leave unaddressed here.

58 The sentence quoted is immediately followed by: “Atomism is a paradigmatic example. When the mortals fail in the quest of truth, Parmenides finds fault both with the senses as well as with the intellect. In addition, the consequence of this failure is the production of ‘opinions’.” Since Cordero explains neither of what, precisely, nor how, atomism is supposed to serve as a paradigmatic example, I will not venture to interpret his remark. As to Parmenides finding fault with both senses and intellect, that hardly seems a point against the existence of the distinction between the two.
pervasive as the use of language itself. Naturally, we encounter these distinctions in more and less sophisticated forms, and in different inflections in various cultures, but surely, from millennia before recorded history began, children the world over, as they have learned to play tricks, to make-believe, or have come to find that what looked a certain way from one perspective was actually otherwise, have done so with some fairly explicit recognition of the difference between being and appearance, or between what is perceived and what is understood to be the case. Cordero is presumably making the less sweeping claim that it was not until some point well into the fifth century B.C.E. that Greek thinkers framed this distinction in a theoretical way, too late for Parmenides himself to have employed it. Even this much, however, is historically questionable. While it is safe to say that Parmenides was active before Protagoras or Gorgias, we are not, given the state of the chronological record for these figures, in a position to say with real confidence precisely how much before. The argument *ex silentio* for the absence of ideas from an intellectual scene for which the available evidence is so meager is a risky one. The attempt to articulate the fixed being that underlies the various appearances of the world is often regarded as the defining feature of the whole of early Greek philosophy from Thales forward. Moreover, specific, pre-Parmenidean (or at any rate pre-Sophistic) expressions articulating the difference between genuine understanding and mere seeming to know are to be found in Xenophanes and Heraclitus, and Alcmaeon of Croton, while echoing that division.

59 Elsewhere (Cordero (2004) pp. 5-8), Cordero expresses a preference for dating Parmenides’ birth to the late 540s, with Diogenes Laertius, rather than *circa* 515, as suggested by the dramatic setting of Plato’s *Parmenides*. I do not find the reasons there given for doubting the Platonic dating compelling, and incline for other reasons towards the later date, but that is separate point. That the discrepancy exists at all is an indication of how unsure our basis for judgment is.

60 Xenophanes (anticipating, it appears, Parmenides’ own usage) consistently distinguished human or mortal “seeming” or “opinion” (*dokos* and *dokein*) from the thinking (expressed by *noein* and its cognates) of his divinity (cf. DK 21 B 14, 23, 24, 25, 34, and 35). Heraclitus shows a similarly low regard for *dokein* (in DK 22 B 17 and 28a), a higher estimation for *phronein* or *noos* (in DK 22 B 40, 104, 113, and 114), and an apparent preference for the hidden over the “apparent” (in DK 22 B 45 and 123). While it is less than obvious just how Heraclitus valued the testimony of the senses, he does appear to have a special attitude toward them, plainly different from his view of
also clearly distinguished sensation from intelligent thought. If Cordero’s point is more limited still, and he is only claiming that it was not until the Sophists’ time that the distinctions being/appearance and sensible/intelligible were regarded as dichotomies in a stricter sense, entailing that a given thing must belong to one and only one side of the division, then the criticism of Simplicius founders, for Simplicius, in paraphrasing the Aletheia as concerned with the intelligible and the Doxa as concerned with the sensible, did not view the split as unbridgeable.

This brings us to the more specific complaint: Simplicius’ notion of a “doxastic” level of being, claims Cordero, “does not have anything to do with the Parmenidean alternative ‘is or is not’ (8.16). Simplicius interprets Parmenides as if he provided an antecedent of the Divided Line of the Republic.” (p. 237) While Cordero is right to say that Simplicius sees Parmenides as providing an antecedent of Plato’s divisions, that does not seem to me as obviously unreasonable as Cordero assumes it to be, nor does he does develop much of an argument that it is. Rather

noos (cf. DK 22 B 55, 101a and 107). In Cordero (2011b), Cordero remarks that it “is evident that among the so-called pre-Socratic philosophers one can find “polar” schemes of thought”, citing the Pythagorean table of oppositions and Heraclitus, DK 22 B 45 as examples, but he insists, “in all of these cases, both parts of the dichotomy have a real existence. It is not that one is “being” and the other is “appearance”. The whole thing is different from Plato, to whom, in order to reject sophistry, everything that belongs to the realm of sensation (i.e., all “physical” realities) belong [sic] to the realm of “appearances,” which can only be grasped through sensations and therefore are the object of “opinions”. “ (Cordero (2011b) p. 103) This statement helps one get a sense of what may lie behind Cordero’s claim that “such dichotomies […] do not exist in Greek thought before the Sophistic period”, but the implication that “appearances”, in Plato’s view, lack any reality, seems mistaken. It is true for both the pre-Socratics and Plato that the objects of noos and the objects of the senses have a real existence. Plato is more clearly insistent that the objects of intellectual cognition are more real than sense objects, but he does not deny that a tree, say, really exists, and is appreciably more real than its reflection in a nearby pond. It would be misleading, likewise, to suggest that, in the case of Xenophanes or Heraclitus, the conceptions involved in the dokein associated with mortals were regarded as equally real as the thinking pointed to when they say that god thinks (noei) as a whole or that polymathy does not teach noos.

61 Alcmaeon appears to echo Xenophanes’ distinction between divine and mortal modes of cognition in the opening of his book (DK 24 B 1), before marking off human beings from other animals by stating that while both possess perception, animals do not have intelligent thought (DK 24 B 1a). His fellow Crotonian Philolaus will situate these faculties in separate bodily organs, making the brain the seat for noos, and locating aisthēsis in the heart (DK 44 B 13).

62 Something of the thinking behind the accusation may be provided in Cordero (2011b) pp. 106-107, where Cordero says, “it is not fair to interpret the δόξα of Parmenides in an anachronistic way, in the sense of “appearances.” ” To do so, Cordero claims, is to forget “that in the so-called pre-Socratic philosophy, at least until the atomists, δόξα was
than detailing the numerous anachronisms of which Simplicius is allegedly guilty, Cordero briefly sketches what he takes to be the Simplician correspondences between Parmenides and the Divided Line, and repeats the assertion that “Parmenides has nothing in common with these patterns of thought.” It ought to be pointed out, however, that the correspondences Cordero presents are not to be found in Simplicius, but are Cordero’s own.63 Cordero does make one direct reference to Simplicius’ text, saying, “Simplicius speaks explicitly: when he arrives at the end of the true logos (fr. 8.50), he says that Parmenides passes now from the intelligible (τὸ νοητὸν) to the sensible (τὰ αἰσθητά), that means, from the alētheia to the doxa. (In Phys. 30, 15-16)”64 This distorts the point Simplicius is making if it leaves the impression that Simplicius did not appreciate the potential for anachronism in that identification. As we have already seen,65 in describing Parmenides’ move as “from the intelligible things to the sensibles, or rather, as he himself says, from truth to opinion”, Simplicius is displaying a clear awareness that what he, using Platonic terminology, is describing as the shift from τὰ noēτα to τὰ aisthēτα, is properly, in the poem’s own words, a shift from alētheia to doxa. That is, Simplicius has the historical and critical sense to differentiate between the terms and concepts involved. It simply happens that he

always related to knowledge and never meant “appearance”. Y. Lafrance, who in his work on Plato’s δόξα resented [sic; lege “presented”?] a complete status quaestionis, wrote that, “in pre-Socratic thought the use of the terms δόξα, δοκεῖν and δοξάζειν appear in a context of criticism to human knowledge,” which can already be observed in Xenophanes (fr. 34) and in Heraclitus (fr. 28).” Not having seen Lafrance’s work, I can only point out that the remark quoted may be perfectly correct without supporting Cordero’s claim that connecting doxa with “appearances” is illegitimate. As already noted (in footnote 60), Xenophanes and Heraclitus do indeed use doxa and its cognates in contexts that criticize human knowing. Moreover, the former links “appearing” with mortals (DK 21 B 35) while the latter connects the “hidden harmony” with the gods (DK 22 B 45).

63 Simplicius himself does not explicitly correlate conceptions from Parmenides’ poem with the portions of the Divided Line. The general framework within which Simplicius aims to harmonize the various views of the ancients is the Neoplatonic schema of grades of being. Of course, since the Neoplatonists viewed the Divided Line as an early expression of this framework, Cordero’s claim that Simplicius viewed Parmenides as anticipating the Divided Line is not necessarily misleading, but it ought to be noted that the particular correspondences that Cordero draws (correlating the Alētheia with the larger epistēmē portion of the Divided Line, the Doxa to the doxa portion, and, more doubtfully, the diakosmon eikōta of DK 8.60 with the eikasia subsection within the doxa section of the Line) are not actually taken from Simplicius.

64 Cordero (2010) p. 237. The clause “when he arrives … true logos (fr. 8.50),” would be better placed after “Parmenides” to avoid the suggestion that “he” refers to Simplicius.

65 See footnote 8.
disagrees with those who would want to claim that Parmenides and Platonists have nothing in common.

It is possible that a detailed account of the particulars of Simplicius’ interpretation might bring to light serious anachronisms that undermine his testimony on one or another point of Parmenides’ thought, and those might be numerous enough, in sum, to call his entire account into question, but Cordero does not provide such a critique. Instead, he summarizes his own take on Parmenides’ teaching, as follows: Parmenides, trying to explain the reality of *ta onta*, finds it necessary to admit that “Being is in the ὄντα”. Next, “ὄντα are not ‘appearances’ of a hidden being”, but “realizations of Being, because Being is not ‘elsewhere’, but ‘in’ the ὄντα: ‘you will not cut what is, so that to be connected to what is’ (fr. 4.2), because ‘that which is-being [now] touches that which is-being [now]’ (fr. 8.25).”66 I am not confident that I follow the train of thought perfectly here, but the distinction between “appearances” as opposed to “realizations” of being seems to be one of the points where Cordero’s view of Parmenides differs from Simplicius’. According to Cordero, ὄντα are (or at least include) “physical realities”, which are misunderstood by Simplicius and others suffering from the “Platonic prejudice” as mere appearances, and thus regarded as *doxai*. It is this prejudice, on Cordero’s view, that leads to fragments about “physical realities” being included in the *Doxa*.67 However, as Cordero provides no detailed illustration of this prejudice at work, this general claim is left without real substantiation. Thus, while Cordero articulates something of an alternative to Simplicius’ interpretation of Parmenides’ ontology, his account does not amount to a refutation of Simplicius’ view, nor are the grounds for the charge of anachronism compelling, unless one is

66 Cordero (2010) p. 237. The two instances of “[now]” are part of Cordero’s text.
67 Cf. Cordero (2010) p. 240: “Only Platonizing prejudices would and do motivate and invite researchers […] to place everything concerning ‘physical topics’ in the section dedicated to the *Doxa*.”
already inclined to accept Cordero’s dualistic application of the “is or is not” alternative, drawn from the Aletheia, to the Doxa or the poem as a whole.\textsuperscript{68}

Fortunately, detailed analyses of the differing views about Parmenides’ metaphysical commitments are not a prerequisite for gaining some important information about the composition of the Doxa from the texts of Simplicius and others, and I will happily forego such analyses here. In many cases, the charges of anachronism or bias are simply not pertinent to the evidence presented by the texts. However Simplicius viewed “physical” things, whether as onta in Cordero’s sense, as mere “appearances” (as Cordero claims of Simplicius), or in yet some other way, the question of where he found a given fragment in his text of the poem is often an independent one.\textsuperscript{69}

As for Cordero’s complaints that the Doxa as constituted by our modern editors is incoherent, and that Simplicius and others responsible for what remains of the poem overlooked the strongly negative valuation of doxa or otherwise perverted the text because of Platonic

\textsuperscript{68} As it unfolds in the paper, Cordero’s alternative view of the Doxa looks more and more problematic. A variety of formulations, increasingly contorted, are given of what doxai amount to on his view. First we read, “doxa consists in assigning some names to things, and to believe, as a consequence of this naming, that these words correspond to a certain reality.” (2010, p. 239) This seems a reasonably sound statement, and something with which Simplicius himself might well agree. The nature of the correspondence of names to reality is made more specific in what follows: “The error of humans consists principally in assigning real existence to opposite principles (tāvtria, 8.55), because one of which ‘is not the same as the other’ (8.58): fire is ‘in itself the opposite of the dark night’ (8.59).” (2010, p. 239) That opposites are crucial to the naming that humans do also seems right. Why these are to be called “principles”, however, is not clear, and what follows “because” in the sentence is opaque to me, but we soon get another expression of mortals’ mistake: “they do not realize that both viewpoints must partake of the fact of Being. If they accept the existence of both fire and night it is because both ‘are’. This duality of criteria leads them to grant absolute existence to these ‘forms’, because outside of them, there is nothing.” (2010, p. 240) By this point the text of Parmenides seems to have been overshadowed by idiosyncratic jargon that needs more explanation than it gets. The suggestion appears to be that mortals, ignoring the “fact of Being”, are nonetheless invested in claiming that fire and night are the only things endowed with “absolute” existence. If this seems quite unlike the day-to-day musings of most people, this is, it turns out, because Parmenides had a particular group of mortals in view. We are to imagine that some unknown predecessors of Parmenides “pretended to explain reality by two principles, day and night, […] without realizing they are contraries, and as such they are ‘absolute’ (a principle is always absolute), therefore they mutually revoke themselves.” (p. 240) Not only are these unhappy theoreticians ignorant of the “fact of Being”, but now they do not even realize that day and night are contraries! On this understanding of the poem, the point of view that the Doxa allegedly aims to refute ultimately seems so unlikely that one wonders why Parmenides would bother combating it.

\textsuperscript{69} I assume that Cordero does not think Simplicius’ prejudice extended so far that he willfully misinforms us about the text before him.
prejudice, his arguments in each case are less than convincing. On balance, it looks instead as though Cordero’s own prior convictions about Parmenides have led him to ignore important bits of evidence when they tell against his own view. There is, in fact, a general consensus among our ancient sources, who had better access to the poem than we do, aligning the *Aletheia* with an intelligible, ungenerated unity and the *Doxa* with a sensible multitude of generated things. Cordero may perhaps view the entire tradition as operating under the spell of Platonism, but this suspicion itself seems suspect without a more convincing story of his own to tell.

**Stage Three: Features of a “Physics”-free *Doxa***

Although neither of the two major points of Cordero’s second stage (i.e., neither the claim of anomalies in the conventional *Doxa*, nor the allegation that Platonizing prejudice has blinded readers to a distinction in the poem between “physical realities” and *doxai*) seem to bear scrutiny particularly well, there are elements of the third stage of Cordero’s account, his characterization of what *doxai* look like dissociated from “physics”, that are worth heeding. As just noted,\(^70\) I have difficulty following Cordero very far into this characterization, but I wish to emphasize that his points of departure are important observations on the text as we have it. Cordero’s separation of “physical” truths from *doxai* puts into greater relief certain features of the poem’s presentation of the latter which might not always get the attention they deserve when the *Doxa* is regarded as a cosmology. Specifically, Cordero stresses two points: (i) where the word *doxa* appears in what is left of the poem, it is regularly mentioned in conjunction with *mortals*;\(^71\) (ii) an activity repeatedly associated with these mortals is *naming*.\(^72\) Cordero insists that these points must be

\(^{70}\) See footnote 68.

\(^{71}\) The noun appears at DK 1.30 (which, I have argued elsewhere, represents three independent lines of the original poem), 8.51 and 19.1. One of the instances of “DK 1.30”, preserved by Simplicius, is followed by two additional lines (DK 1.31-32), including the participle *dokounta* and the adverb *dokimēs*.

taken into account in any attempt to explain the *Doxa*. I think he is right to do so, even without sharing his view that *doxai* have nothing to do with “appearances”.

As Cordero interprets them, the first point, the linking of *doxa* with mortals, establishes that the “copyright” of anything the poem speaks of as *doxai* belongs to human beings, not to the goddess or to Parmenides himself. The second point, the association of mortals or humans with naming, provides a sense of what really constitutes *doxa*: it is something to do with mortals’ use or misuse of language. More specifically, “*doxa* consists in assigning some names to the things, and to believe, as a consequence of this naming, that these words correspond to a certain reality.” (p. 239) For Cordero, however, this naming and believing has nothing to do with “physics” or “appearances”.

While the poem certainly links *doxai* with mortals, it is not so obvious that Parmenides’ aim in repeatedly so characterizing *doxai* is to disclaim any involvement in *doxai* on his own part. That is not to say that we must understand Parmenides as promoting some particular set of *doxai* (which is what Cordero appears to object to when he speaks of the phrase “*Doxa* of Parmenides” as an imaginary being), but that some acquaintance with *doxai*, far from the truth though they may be, might well be part, and perhaps an important one, of the teaching that the goddess is

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73 Cordero also suggests that the mention of *doxai* at several places in the poem reinforces his earlier claim about the arbitrariness of the current reconstructions: “Contrary to what is usually said, Parmenides’ account of the *doxa* begins well before the section arbitrarily named ‘the *Doxa*’ (which shows once more the uncertain character of the present arrangement of the fragments).” (2010, p. 238) I don’t know who those are who “usually” deny that *doxai* are a concern of the poem prior to the transition to the section often called *Doxa*, but, granting that they are wrong to do so, that does not seem to amount to evidence of any uncertainty in the arrangement of text.

74 Thus the understanding of *doxa* in the poem is, according to Cordero, distinctly different from the later, Platonic understanding of *doxa*: “a conjectural knowledge of the appearances, the cognitive state that ranges over ‘the ‘opinable’’ (δοξαστόν) of Plato.” I am prepared to agree with the description of “Parmenidean *doxa*” as quoted, but do not see precisely why it must be at odds with the Platonic one.

Cordero appears to think that the first point also tells against the association of *doxai* with “appearances”. At least, in explicating mortals’ “copyright” over *doxai*, he claims that “human viewpoints” offer a mistaken account of *ta onta*, doomed to fail “because it follows an erroneous method, guided by a wandering intellect and by empty sensations,” adding, “‘Appearances’ have nothing to do in this context.” (2010, p. 238) Again, it seems odd that “appearances” are supposed to be out of place in an account of human error in terms of a “wandering intellect” and “empty sensations”. Is it not to the intellect and the senses that appearances appear?
giving. After all, are not the youth, Parmenides, and his audience themselves mortal? Perhaps it is precisely mortals who need to hear this teaching, which amounts in some sense to a corrective or remedy for what is a peculiarly mortal condition. The criticisms leveled by the goddess are not uncommonly understood to be directed at some more or less specific targets among Parmenides’ predecessors or contemporaries, rival philosophers or cosmologists, but the term “mortal” suggests a rather wider range.75 And, while naming does indeed appear to be a conspicuous feature of the *Doxa*, not to be overlooked or dismissed lightly, the textual basis for Cordero’s development of this point is less evident. He connects naming, reasonably enough, with the dualism that the verses point to as typical of mortal speech. Detailing what that dualism entails, Cordero claims that “mortals” not only assign “real existence” to the opposites “fire” and “night”, but, not realizing the “fact of Being”, “grant absolute existence to the ‘forms’, because outside of them, there is nothing”. (pp. 239-240) This seems far less obvious, and to make matters worse, Cordero claims that (despite their supposition that there is nothing outside of those “forms”) they also suppose that there is, “beyond the presence of night and fire, the activity of an anonymous goddess responsible for ‘government’.” (p. 240) Ultimately, Cordero grants the “copyright” over mortal *doxai* to a hypothetical group of theoreticians who—otherwise unknown to us—“pretended to explain reality by two principles, day and night […] without realizing that they are contraries” (p. 240).76 The purely hypothetical status of the group and the implausibility of the position imputed to them make this seem like a strained attempt to maintain the supposed

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75 Cf. e.g., Burnet (1930) pp. 182-185, where the “mortals” are identified as Pythagoreans. Coxon, while noting numerous instances of what he regards as references to earlier philosophers, remarks that “the subject of κατέθεσαν [at DK 8.53] is not merely Pythagoreans but (as in [8.39]) human beings in general” (1986, p. 218). According to Curd, while there is no predecessor who fits the bill precisely, the goddess uses “beliefs of mortals” not to refer to “any belief held by a mortal human being” but as shorthand for “some particular set of beliefs or philosophic views.” (1998, p. 124). Jean Frère (2011), against what is claimed to be the “common opinion” that by “mortals” Parmenides refers to all human beings, argues for Heraclitus and the Pythagoreans as specific targets.

76 According to Cordero, it seems that only DK 8, 9, 12, and 19 preserve traces of those views. Cf. Cordero (2011b) pp. 104-106.
separation between the Parmenidean and Platonic notions of doxa, and thus the distinction between “non-doxastic physical texts” and “doxastic” ones.

Aside from these points, it remains unclear why the Doxa would be a part of the poem and what it amounted to. The changes Cordero proposes would remove most of the fragments generally placed there, leaving only DK 9, 12, and 19 after the end of DK 8. Given that all these come from Simplicius, who Cordero says was so grossly mistaken in his understanding of the poem, our prospects for recovering the authentic Doxa seem even dimmer than on the standard reconstruction.

Stage Four: Restored “Physical Truths”

Even if some of the motivation for Cordero’s alternative to the standard arrangement seems to have been undercut in the foregoing, it may still be worthwhile to consider his proposed changes briefly. As already mentioned, most of the fragments concerned are those from sources that provide relatively little information about their placement in the poem. Might some of the material in Diels-Kranz’s Doxa belong to the Aletheia?

Of the fragments normally included in the Doxa, Cordero departs from the DK arrangement by placing DK 10 and 11, 13-15, and 17 and 18, in that order, before DK 6, and in placing DK 16 either after DK 6 or before DK 4. As already mentioned, for at least one of these fragments (DK 13), Simplicius’ text tells directly against this arrangement. For the most part, however, the sources for these fragments give no very clear indication of where the lines

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77 Cordero does not mention DK 15a, so it is not clear what he intends to do with this one-word fragment. In addition to the changes to the material from the standard Doxa, he also places DK 4 after DK 5, although he seems uncommitted to a precise location for DK 5 itself (see p. 244). The placement of DK 16 is unclear. In the main body of the paper (pp. 243-244), Cordero seems to settle on a placement before DK 4, but the presentation in the appendix (p. 245) gives DK 16 between DK 6 and DK 7. In Cordero (2011b) DK 6 and 16 are placed, in that order, before DK 4 and the texts relocated from the Doxa.

78 See page 136 with footnote 35, above. I have also said (in footnote 44) that Brandis’ placement of DK 11 in the Doxa also reflects Simplicius’ text. I will justify that claim presently, with more to say in the following sections.
quoted stood in the poem. This state of affairs is the basis for Cordero’s claim that we are allowed “total liberty to place the ‘physical texts’ that are non-doxastic […] anywhere (subject to one constraint […]”). (pp. 242-243) Although this must be said to be an oversimplification, it is an understandable reaction to the evidence, particularly as one generally encounters it in the form of extracts presented in DK. Nevertheless, a brief survey of the sources for the fragments in question will show that such evidence as there is lends its support to the standard arrangement rather than to Cordero’s.

**Constraints on the Reconstruction.** The “one constraint” mentioned is inferred from the verses of the poem themselves rather than the testimony of the quoting sources. Cordero’s account of it unfortunately relies on several questionable assumptions, and is, I think, ultimately mistaken, but the error is an instructive one if we consider it carefully. The argument is this: because DK 8.51 marks a transition from a discussion of realities to mere doxai, the texts presenting “physical truths” must have preceded that transition. Further, since Cordero (like many others) takes DK 7 and 8 as an uninterrupted stretch of text, they must have preceded DK 7 also. Cordero’s collection of non-doxastic, physical texts is therefore placed between DK 4 and DK 6,79 before DK 7-8. Cordero finds confirmation of this placement in the goddess’ mention of a “much-contending elenchos” in DK 7.5-6: “It is precisely the narration before the present fr. 7 of the physical events that is alluded to in the phrase πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον (7.5), that ‘has been announced’ (ῥηθέντα). […] We must note that in the present state of the reconstruction of the text, there is not any ἔλεγχος (controversial or not) before fr. 7. This ἔλεγχος, surely, must be placed before fr. 7.” (p. 243)

There are problems at each step of this argument. In the first place, even if we grant that the texts at issue are obvious examples of “non-doxastic” truths, we are not provided any reason

79 In Cordero (2011b), they are placed between DK 4 and 7 (with DK 6 and 16 preceding DK 4).
for believing that each and every mention of such truths must have happened before the
transition at DK 8.51. On any reconstruction, our ignorance about what the poem looked like
following that transition is vast, and our grounds for excluding material from that portion of the
poem virtually non-existent. Next, the common assumption that DK 7 and 8 constitute an
unbroken stretch of text may very well be, as noted earlier, an unfortunate accident in the modern
history of the reconstruction of the text. The ancient sources preserve the bulk of DK 7 as part of
the opening of the poem, not as a text continuous with DK 8. This bears repeating, given how
unquestioned the DK reading has become. Part of the case in favor of the DK arrangement
(against Diels’ earlier—and better—judgment to keep Sextus Empiricus’ proem more or less
intact and to print only two lines, equivalent to DK 7.1-2, as fragment 7) has been an appeal,
much like that Cordero makes in confirmation of his arrangement, to the supposed “fact” that the
elenchos mentioned by the goddess has already been “uttered” (rhēthenta). In DK 7.5-6, which
are lines 34-35 of the beginning of the poem as Sextus quotes it, the goddess appears to invite the
youth narrating the poem to “judge, by logos, the contentious elenchos spoken by me.” It
seemed to earlier generations of scholars that such a reference was out of place in the proem,
which contains no such elenchos in the preceding lines. Accordingly, they argued for the
relocation of the final lines of Sextus’ proem to DK 7. Cordero’s suggestion to provide some of
the “missing” elenchos with the “physical” fragments is an ingenious attempt to fill the
imaginary lacuna, but it is necessary, in judging both his claims and those of earlier scholars, to
appreciate that the tense of the participle rhēthenta does not, as they suggest, establish an
absolute time by which the “proof” has been spoken, but simply indicates that it will have been

80 κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον / ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. In fact, as Sextus actually quotes it, the elenchos is
πολύδηριν is a correction made from Diogenes Laertius. For an alternative construal of these lines, see Kurfess
(forthcoming).
spoken by the goddess by the time the youth might judge it. We are not, from the participle alone, in a position to conclude anything more about the timing of the *elenchos*. It thus cannot confirm the placement of the lines which Cordero thinks constitute that *elenchos*, nor provide straightforward guidance on where to place them in our reconstruction.  

Beyond showing that the text at this point provides no real constraint on the placement of the fragments in question, consideration of this example helps to highlight a problem with using the verses themselves as a guide to ordering the fragments. Any ambiguity in what is a notoriously problematic poem provides an opportunity to slip into reading one’s own presuppositions into the poem. Flattering though it may be to think that we have better insight into Parmenides’ thought than did Simplicius, Theophrastus, Proclus or other figures in the ancient tradition, it behooves us to remember that, even for the worst readers and thinkers of the lot, their access to the poem was superior to our own. When their text or interpretation appears to conflict with ours, we ought to reconsider the bases for our own reading before dismissing theirs as mistaken. It is all too easy to avoid inconvenient readings by invoking a source’s habit of quoting from memory, tendency to rely on second-hand information, or bent for being too blinded by doctrinal prejudices to see what seems to us clearly stated in the text. Granted, all of these complications, as well as scribal corruption and even deliberate tampering or misrepresentation, may be met with in our readings of the sources for Presocratic philosophy, but the various alternatives ought to be considered carefully before we draw our conclusions. In piecing together Parmenides’ text, it is helpful to differentiate between suggestions about placement drawn from the verses themselves and other indications provided by the authors who quote the fragments. Both sorts of information are needed, but the second, though not without its

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81 Cordero’s additional claim, that the “physical truths” of his reconstruction fit the goddess’ description of her speech as a “controversial proof” because “it is a polemic against what one says, ‘the opinions’” (2010, p. 243) seems truer, on Cordero’s view, of the fragments he considers parts of the *Doxa* than the fragments he relocates.
potential problems, generally provides more straightforward guidance. Cordero’s “constraint” is an example of the former type, and of the problems that come with it. Simplicius’ references, by contrast, are often helpful instances of the second type. We need not be committed to Simplicius’ interpretation to admit that, when he says that the lines of DK 12 followed “a little after” DK 8.61, we have decisive evidence on the relative placement of two of the fragments. It is a sounder strategy for reconstructing the poem to limit ourselves, initially, to evidence of the second type. This is apt to provide a guide for the layout of the text less influenced by whatever prejudices or shortcomings the quoting authors had, or we ourselves may have, as readers. Little evidence of this type will be as clear as Simplicius’, but the distinction is a useful one. Since Cordero’s placement of what he regards as “physical truths” within the *Aletheia* relies on indications of the first sort, the result often appears unpersuasive if one is not already inclined to share his views on a number of highly controversial points of interpretation.

**Survey of the Sources.** I have already let on that, even absent the supposed “one constraint” that Cordero mentions, we are not entitled to quite the liberty that he claims we are when it comes to placing the fragments in question. Closer attention to the sources of those fragments reveals a few fairly clear indications of placement overlooked by Cordero, as well as other material which, if not absolutely decisive on the matter, seems to support the more traditional arrangement.

Cordero, on Simplicius’ testimony (of the second sort), includes DK 9, 12 and 19 in the *Doxa*. We have also seen that Simplicius clearly links DK 13 with DK 12, treating the divinity of 12.3 as the one who devises Eros first of all the gods.82 Among the other sources for DK 13, Plato has Phaedrus quote the line in the *Symposium* as what Parmenides says about *genesis*,83

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82 See footnote 35.
while in Plutarch’s *Amatorius* the verse is quoted as what Parmenides wrote “in the cosmogony”. Cordero’s placement of DK 13 among his “physical truths” seems a mistake, and, unless we imagine this to be one of the lines repeated in Parmenides’ poem (and I know of no particular reason to do so), it does not look good for Cordero’s thesis of a “physics” within the *Aletheia* that a line known from Simplicius to be in the *Doxa* is cited in Plutarch as from “the cosmogony”.

Simplicius is also the source for DK 11, which Cordero regards as “completing” the enumeration of the topics of Parmenidean physics begun in DK 10. (p. 241) The fragment is quoted at *in Cael.* 559, introduced by the remark, “Parmenides, having begun to speak about the perceptibles, says: ‘how earth and sun and moon […].’” While Simplicius does not directly connect the lines of DK 11 with other lines from the poem, since we have seen elsewhere that Simplicius considers DK 8.50-51 as marking the transition from the intelligible (*to noēton*) to the sensibles or perceptibles (*ta aisthēta*), this comment is a clear enough indication that DK 11 comes from somewhere towards the beginning of the *Doxa*. Immediately following the quotation, Simplicius adds, “And he sets out the coming to be of things that come to be and perish up to the parts of animals.” This seems more or less in line with Plutarch’s reference to a “cosmogony”, again suggesting that the common placement of the “physical” texts in the *Doxa* is correct.

DK 10, which does cover very similar ground to DK 11, comes from Clement of Alexandria. He provides almost no context, but there might be a hint about placement in the little

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84 Plutarch, *Amatorius* 756E. Eros is there spoken of as the oldest of “Aphrodite’s works”, but that need not be taken, as Coxon and others do, to mean that Plutarch regarded Aphrodite as the subject of the verb. In the context in which the line is quoted, it is clear that Plutarch (as a character in the dialogue) is taking interpretative liberties with the texts he is quoting.

85 Mueller (2009) p. 33. Mueller’s translation here adopts an emendation to Simplicius’ text, but the textual difficulty involved does not affect the point at issue here.

86 See footnote 8 and page 149 above.

87 Mueller (2009) p. 33. “As far as the parts of the animals” (*μέχρι τῶν μορίων τῶν ζῴων*) is an interesting detail, to which we will return below.
that he does say. Clement begins his quotation by saying, “Having come, then, to the true study, let him who wishes hear Parmenides the Eleatic, promising: ‘You will know…”88 While the “true study” (alēthēs mathēsis) that Clement has in mind as a proper propaedeutic to Parmenides’ promises is Christian doctrine, I suspect that he also intends an allusion to Parmenides’ Aletheia, only after which came the topics that DK 10 goes on to mention. This is of course not in itself decisive evidence on where to place the lines of DK 10, but it fits well with the other evidence about the major parts of the poem, and is supported by the close ties in content between DK 10 and 11 (which Simplicius, we have just observed, took from the Doxa).

Plutarch, who is the sole source for both DK 14 and 15, makes still more problems for Cordero’s arrangement, which takes for granted that “nothing suggests that in the case of the isolated verses 13, 14, 15 we are being offered mere doxai.” (p. 241) In making this claim, Cordero appears to have in mind only the verses themselves, not the contexts in which they are quoted. Trying at present to keep to evidence of the second type, we may consider whether the verses themselves show signs characteristic of the Doxa separately. With respect to the contexts, not only is Cordero’s claim untrue for DK 13, but Plutarch quotes DK 14 while speaking of the moonlight as an example of things that exist by way of participation in something more enduring, having just referred to such entities as doxastic.89 DK 15 is quoted twice in other works of Plutarch’s corpus, once directly connected with the phrase allotrion phos of DK 14, and it is understood on both occasions as an expression of the moon’s subordinate or derivative status.90

89 See adv. Colot. 1115c -1116a, noting particularly doxaston at 1115d. In this passage, Plutarch’s principal point of contention with the Epicurean Colotes (who had written against Parmenides, and all other non-Epicurean philosophers, claiming that they made it impossible to live) is that viewing the moon, say, as of a different order than Being itself does not entail an outright rejection of the of the sensible world.
90 See Quaestiones Romanae 282 a-b and de facie quae in orbe lunae apparat 929a-b.
Though this is all indirect evidence for their placement in the poem, it does associate these fragments with one another and with doxai.

Perhaps nothing very certain can be gleaned from the four sources that quote DK 16, which, as Cordero points out, other scholars have also argued belongs to the Aletheia rather than the Doxa.91 The fragment appears in book Γ of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, in Theophrastus’ de Sensibus, and in two commentaries on Aristotle’s work, one by Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 C.E.), the other by the Neoplatonist Asclepius (6th century C.E.). Neither of the two commentators appears to have looked at Parmenides’ lines independently of Aristotle’s quotation of them. We will return to Theophrastus’ passage in the following section, so for the moment it will be sufficient to say that it provides no explicit information on where the lines were found in the poem, but mentions them as the place in Parmenides’ poem that provides the closest thing to an account of how sensation occurs, suggesting that sensation varies according to the predominance of one or the other element in a blend of the two opposites hot and cold.92 The blending of opposites, until we discover some actual evidence for such a topic within the Aletheia, seems on balance to favor placing the lines in the Doxa, as does Theophrastus’ additional remark that a corpse, lacking the hot, perceives only cold and silence, in light of the connection that Cordero rightly emphasizes between mentions of doxai and mortality.93 Aristotle’s passage, sometimes

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91 Cordero refers specifically (2010, p. 231) to Loenen (1959) and Hershbell (1970).
92 Most of Theophrastus’ passage is printed as DK 28 A 46. While Theophrastus does not refer directly to the location of the lines in the poem, it is implausible to suggest, as Hershbell does, that this or Theophrastus’ “repeated complaint about Parmenides, ἀδόξα oὐδὲν ἄφωρικεν and oὐδὲν ἔτι διώρικεν, may be based on lack of information about Parmenides’ poem.” (1970, pp. 6-7)
93 This perhaps surprising bit of information should be compared with Simplicius’ remarks following his quotation of B 13 (making reference to the divinity of DK 12.3): “He claims she is the cause of the gods, too, saying, ‘Firstmost she devised Eros of all the gods’ and what follows. He also claims that she sends the souls at one time from the manifest to the unseen, at another time back again. I am compelled to go on about these things at length on account of the widespread current ignorance of the ancient writings.”[καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀειδὲς, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν φησιν. ἄλλα ταῦτα μὲν δὲ τὴν πολλὴν νῦν ἄγνοιαν τῶν παλαιῶν γραμμάτων μηκόνειν ἀναγκάζομαι.] (in Phys 39.17-21) The student of the Doxa wishes that Simplicius had felt inclined to go on at least a little longer. Though ἀειδὴς is generally “formless” rather than “invisible” (for which reason Coxon presumably prints ἀνύδες where ἄειδες appears in Diels’ text), Simplicius may be preserving
regarded as the source for Theophrastus’ quotation of the fragment, actually presents a different text at several points. Aristotle quotes the lines to show that Parmenides, like others, including Democritus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Homer, assumed that knowledge was sense-perception. He gives no indication of the lines’ location in the poem, making no further reference to Parmenides’ views specifically.

Finally, there are two embryological fragments, DK 17 and 18. DK 17 is a single verse found in Galen, from a context which specifies only that in “boys on the right, girls on the left”, the right and left in question are the sides of the womb on which the male and female offspring are conceived or develop. DK 18 is a six-line fragment in Latin that the context presents, not particularly convincingly, as a description of the circumstances at conception that lead to homosexual or effeminate male offspring. The source, On Chronic Diseases, is an adaptation, in large part a translation, by Caelius Aurelianus of a Greek medical work by the physician Soranus of Ephesus. While Aurelianus has been good enough to translate the fragment into Latin

Parmenides’ usage, which could antedate the lexical distinction. If Parmenides used ἀειδής to mean “unseen”, this might explain the appearance of the form in Plato at Phaedo 79a4 (where Burnet prefers to read ιδή rather than ἀειδή; see Burnet (1911) p. 68 of his “Notes”).

94 Among other variants, the first line in Aristotle’s quotation has the phrase μελέων πολυκάμπτων, while the text in Theophrastus is μελέων πολυπλάγτων. Coxon comments that Theophrastus “clearly has his master’s argument and citation before him, but quotes the lines for a different purpose and from an independent text.” (1986, p. 247) The general tendency is to view Theophrastus’ quotation as the more accurate (see, e.g., Tarán (1965) pp. 169-170; Coxon (1986) p. 4; Palmer (2009) pp. 386-387; and Kahn (1994) pp.17-24 on the relation generally). I agree with the general assessment of their accuracy, but I am not quite convinced that Theophrastus had Aristotle’s text before him.

One alternative, given that the different adjectives paired with μελέων looks like a possible instance of the sort of repetition with variation that I think Parmenides engages in conspicuously elsewhere (see Part One, and footnotes 57 and 71 above), may be that Theophrastus and Aristotle were quoting different lines of the original poem. Another alternative (which, for reasons that will require a lengthy treatment elsewhere, I believe is closer to the truth) is that Aristotle had Theophrastus’ book before him. There is, I suspect, much material of Theophrastan origin hidden unacknowledged in Aristotle’s surveys of earlier thinkers. Scholars tend to take for granted that the commonalities between the two authors are due to Theophrastus’ reception of the “master’s” thought, generally ignoring the possibility that Theophrastus may have influenced Aristotle as well.

95 It is difficult therefore to sympathize with Hershbell’s claim, “Mansfeld’s contention that Aristotle quoted B16 from memory, whereas Theophrastus had a copy of the whole poem, is difficult to understand. Given the evidence, one can as convincingly maintain that Theophrastus quoted B16 from memory whereas Aristotle had a full copy of the poem.” (Hershbell (1970) p. 7)

96 Diels took the lines as referring to hermaphroditism instead. In his edition of Caelius’ work, Drabkin (1950, p. 903, n. 9) refers to Wilamowitz’s argument against Diels in Sappho u. Simonides, p. 72.
hexameters approximating Parmenides’ style, there is no indication of where the lines featured in the original poem, which he describes as Parmenides’ “books on nature”. That he refers to the fragment itself as an “epigram” may be a sign that he knew the lines only from Soranus’ work. These contexts offer no definitive suggestions about placement, but Galen does inform us of the embryological import of DK 17, which might otherwise have escaped us. It is simplest, absent better guidance from the sources, to suppose that these fragments are related to the pairings of male and female mentioned in DK 12, and thus to consider them part of the *Doxa*.98

While in some cases the evidence for placing these fragments in the *Doxa* is certainly slimmer than others, in none of the sources is there any positive hint for placing any of them within the *Aletheia*. There seems to be nothing, then, to support Cordero’s hypothesis of a “physical” section within the “Way of Truth”, and it seems sounder to keep the material in the *Doxa*.

**An Opinion about Parmenides’ *Doxa***

I mentioned at the beginning of this essay that I shared with Cordero a conviction that something in the standard presentation of the *Doxa* was incorrect. In what remains I will indicate what I think a couple of the mistakes are, and what this might mean for how we ought to read Parmenides’ poem.

**Something Else We Owe to Simplicius.** Like Cordero, I believe that DK has inherited from its antecedents a number of errors in the reconstruction of the poem and that a second look at the

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97 “cuius quia graecum est epigramma, et hoc versibus intimabo. latinos enim ut potui simili modo composui ne linguarum ratio misceretur.” (Drabkin (1950) p. 902)
98 I do not know that either fragment presents claims that Cordero would want to insist upon as “physical truths”. Those who aim to promote Parmenides’ positive contributions to natural science are more likely to cite his reputed astronomical discoveries than his embryological speculations.
sources for the fragments is required to correct them. Contrary to Cordero, however, I do not find fault with the placement of DK 10, 11, or any of the other fragments generally assigned to the Doxa (including DK 16). The totality of the ancient evidence supports the placement of these fragments in the latter part of the poem, and it does not seem to me that Cordero has provided persuasive reasons to reconsider their placement. Where DK and other arrangements go astray, I suggest, is in what they leave out of the Doxa.99

Since the publications of Peyron and Brandis in the early nineteenth century, editions of the fragments have made use of material from not only Simplicius’ in Phys. but his in Cael. as well. As already mentioned, DK 11 and 19 are known from the in Cael. alone. The same passage

99 This is perhaps the point to register a disagreement with another proposal for moving material from one part of the poem to the other. John Palmer has recently praised Theodor Ebert’s revival (in Ebert (1989)) of a suggestion by Guido Calogero for the relocation of DK 8.34-41 from the Aletheia to the Doxa, following DK 8.52. Palmer calls the emendation “the most important advance in Parmenidean textual criticism in recent years” (2009, p. 352) and scolds scholars for not having taken sufficient notice of it. Ebert argues that relocating the lines eliminates the strangeness of finding remarks about mortal opinions in the middle of the series of arguments of DK 8 and that it resolves a number of supposed problems with the transition from DK 8.52 to 8.53. Such arguments are in my view only persuasive if we can assure ourselves that Parmenides did not intend for his audience to find something strange about his verses. Unassured as I am that Parmenides was seeking to arrange everything as unproblematically as possible, I do not find those arguments convincing. There are however, other considerations (evidence of the second sort according to the distinction made above) which supposedly support the relocation. For those disinclined to doubt the standard ordering based on Simplicius’ text, Palmer adds, “We know, however, from the end of Sextus Empiricus’ long quotation of the opening of Parmenides’ poem (S.E. M. 7.111) that in later antiquity the text of Parmenides was capable of falling into serious disorder. It is crucially telling, moreover, that in none of the many quotations from Parmenides fr. 8 by other ancient authors does v. 34 follow v. 33, v. 42 follow v. 41, or v. 53 follow 52. Ebert’s effort to make scholars recognize that vv. 34-41 have suffered transposition within fr. 8 should not be allowed to pass into oblivion like Calogero’s original proposal. Unfortunately, editions appearing since the publication of Ebert’s study have inexcusably failed to take account of it.” (2009, p. 354)

Since in these points Palmer touches on our present concern with taking a proper account of the ancient evidence for the poem, it is worth addressing them briefly here. As to the first point, while errors in transmission are always a possibility, the “serious disorder” of Sextus’ text is, as I have argued elsewhere and shall touch on immediately below, an example of the hazards of meddling by overconfident editors rather than the errors of scribes, and the lines of the proem should be kept in the order in which Sextus gives them. In any case, a problem with Sextus’ text would not tell us anything about the quality of Simplicius’. Palmer’s other point, that “in none of the many quotations from Parmenides fr. 8 by other ancient authors does v. 34 follow v. 33, v. 42 follow v. 41, or v. 53 follow 52”, deserves some scrutiny. Since some portion or other of DK 8 is quoted on dozens of occasions by perhaps as many as fifteen authors, this initially sounds like weighty evidence indeed. If all of the other authors who quote from the fragment are in agreement against Simplicius, then we may have to allow that his text was faulty here. What Palmer neglects to mention, however, is that of those “many quotations” from DK 8 from authors other than Simplicius, not only is it true that in none of them does DK 8.34 follow 8.33, or 8.42 follow 8.41, or 8.53 follow 8.52, but in fact none of them quotes either DK 8.33 or DK 8.34, none of them quotes DK 8.42 or 8.41, and none of them quotes DK 8.52 or 8.53. That is, Simplicius is the only source for any of the relevant lines. The “crucially telling” evidence against the order of the lines in Simplicius’ text, it turns out, is at most the absence, in texts that we do not have, of evidence confirming his ordering.
from which those fragments come also provides four and a half lines which editors have universally, as far as I am aware, taken as lines 28-32 of the proem. This is understandable, given that the first two and a half lines of Simplicius’ quotation are a close match for lines 28b-30 of the proem preserved by Sextus. Nevertheless, I think that the identification is an error. The lines are a close match, but not an exact one: in what are imagined to be two versions of DK 1.29 (that is, the twenty-ninth line of the proem), Simplicius and Sextus give different adjectives modifying the noun Ἀληθείης. Moreover, the two additional lines that follow in Simplicius’ text do not feature in Sextus’ proem, and editors are wrong to add them. The proper place for the lines quoted by Simplicius is, I submit, in the Doxa, as part of a second proem there. The assumption that Simplicius’ quotation is from Sextus’ proem, that is, from toward the beginning of the entire poem, adds difficult and unnecessary problems to what is already a puzzling enough text. Both the text and meaning of the two unparalleled lines in Simplicius are intensely debated, as is the question of the proper reading of the adjective modifying “Truth” in the lines that precede them. Placing Simplicius’ quotation in the Doxa instantly resolves the latter impasse (for when we no longer assume that Simplicius’ and Sextus’ quotations come from the same place in the poem, the conflict over which source preserves the right reading vanishes), and may provide us a better foundation on which to discuss the former.

But why place them in the Doxa? Simply put, because it is the Doxa that Simplicius seems to have in mind in the passage that supplies us those lines, along with DK 11 and 19. Let us consider his text. The passage comes from early in Simplicius’ commentary on the third book

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100 Ἀληθείης is εὐπειθέος, “persuasive”, in Sextus’ proem (and in a few other authors), but εὐκυκλέος, “well-wheeled”, in Simplicius’ lines. Proclus in his commentary on the Timaeus provides a couplet with yet another adjective, εὐφεγγέος (“brilliant”), among other variants. The identification of Proclus’ couplet with DK 1.29-30 is, I believe, also mistaken. Cf. footnote 71.

101 This intrusive addition to the proem helps to contribute to the widespread acceptance, mentioned earlier, of the division of Sextus’ quotation into two parts, with the lines of the second part transferred into DK 7. See above, footnotes 46 and 71.
of Aristotle’s *de Caelo*. Aristotle, having discussed in the prior books of his treatise the nature of the eternal, unaltering material of the heavenly bodies, and turning now to the sublunary simple bodies that are subject to change, observes that treating the elements involved in coming-to-be assumes the existence of such change. On this point, Aristotle says, some of those who “earlier philosophized about the truth” expressed opposing views, and “those about Parmenides and Melissus” are named as examples of thinkers who generally abolished coming-to-be, saying that nothing that *is* comes to be or passes away, but only *seems* (*dokein*) to us to do so. Aristotle deftly avoids dealing with these figures in detail by saying that, even if they speak well in other respects, they must not be considered to be speaking *physikós*, that is, in a manner suitable to the study of nature. Their concerns properly belong to a different and prior study.\(^{102}\) In his commentary on Aristotle’s remarks, Simplicius explains the views of Parmenides and Melissus as follows:\(^{103}\)

those men hypothesised a double reality (*hupostasis*), one consisting of what really is, the intelligible, the other of what comes to be, the perceptible, something which they did not think it right to call being without qualification, but only apparent being [δοκοῦν ὄν]. And so Parmenides says [φησι] that truth concerns being, and opinion [δόξαν] what comes to be. For he says [λέγει γοῦν ὁ Παρμενίδης]:

*You should learn all things,*
*both the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth*

\(^{102}\) Aristotle continues, “Those men, because they did not, on the one hand, suppose that anything existed apart from the substance (*ousia*) of perceptible things, and were, on the other hand, the first to intuit any natures of that sort [i.e., natures that do not come to be or pass away], if in fact there will be cognition (*gnosis*) or being mindful (*phronein*), thus transferred the arguments from there [i.e., the higher study] to these things [i.e., perceptible things].” (*de Caelo* III. 1298b21-24) Simplicius is uncomfortable with the suggestion that Parmenides and Melissus supposed that only the substance of perceptible things existed and addresses this point in his commentary. Since it is not essential to understanding the arrangement of the fragments, I will not dwell on this curious point here, but an awareness of this concern is needed to make some sense of Simplicius’ remarks in the final paragraph in the passage quoted below.

\(^{103}\) Simplicius, *in Cael*. 557.21–558.17, as translated in Mueller (2009) pp. 31–32, with material in brackets added. In order to follow Simplicius’ train of thought adequately, we must recognize that he is quoting texts that feature Parmenides’ use of *doxa* and related words in order to illustrate Aristotle’s reference to the distinction Parmenides and Melissus drew between being and seeming (*dokein*). Mueller’s translation obscures Simplicius’ illustration by using too wide a range of translations for those terms for the English reader to see the connection between them, and further confuses things by using “belief” to translate both *doxa* and *pistis* in Parmenides’ verses, despite the repeated rejections of the combination of those terms in the poem. To mitigate this, the Greek for these and other expressions which deserve attention is provided in brackets.
and the opinions \[δόξας\] of mortals in which there is no true belief \[πίστις\].
But nevertheless you must also learn these things: how things which are
believed \[τὰ δοκοῦντα\]
should be acceptably \[δοκίμως\], since they permeate all things everywhere.

[DK 1.28-32]

But also \[ἀλλὰ καὶ\], having completed his account of what really is and being about to
explain perceptibles, he says \[ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπληρώσας τὸν περὶ τὸν ὅντος ὅντος λόγον καὶ
μέλλων περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν διδάσκειν ἐπήγαγε\]:

Here I end my trustworthy account and thinking
about truth; hereafter learn the opinions \[δόξας\] of mortals,
listening to the deceptive ordering of my words. [DK 8.50-52]

And in setting out the ordering of perceptibles, he again says \[παραδοὺς δὲ τὴν τῶν
αἰσθητῶν διακόσμησιν ἐπήγαγε πάλιν\]:

Indeed in this way, as belief has it \[κατὰ δόξαν\], according to \[doxa\], these things
were born and now are
and hereafter they will grow and reach an end;
for them humans have laid down a name, a distinctive one for each. [DK 19.1-3]

So in what sense did Parmenides, who philosophized in this way about the intelligible,
assume that only perceptible things exist – this is now an extraordinary charge to make.
And how did he transfer things which fit intelligibles to perceptibles when he clearly sets
out the unity of the intelligible, which really exists, and the ordering of the perceptibles,
each separately, and does not think it right to apply the word ‘being’ to the perceptible?

In this passage, Simplicius quotes three selections from the poem, typically identified as
indicated in the bracketed references to DK. Mueller so identifies each of the fragments in his
endnotes, duly remarking that DK 19, like the second sentence of the lines identified as “DK
1.28-30”, is quoted only here.\(^{104}\) DK 19 is typically placed at the end of the collection of
fragments deemed authentic by Diels because of the comment with which Simplicius introduces
the lines.\(^{105}\) Similarly, Simplicius helpfully identifies his second selection (DK 8.50-52) as
coming from the transition from the discussion of the intelligible to that of the sensibles, and,

\(^{105}\) A better translation, given the aorist tense of the participle \[παραδοὺς\] and the verb \[ἐπήγαγε\], would be “after
having handed down the ordering (\[diakosmesis\]) of the perceptibles, he again went on”.

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thanks to his lengthy quotations of DK 8 in the *Physics* commentary, we have a comparatively good grasp on what the poem looked like at that point. As for the lines tagged as “DK 1.28-32”, it is worth stressing that Simplicius does not, as he is sometimes claimed to do, attribute these lines to the goddess, nor does he tell us that he took them from the proem, or otherwise make any sort of overt reference to where these lines were situated in Parmenides’ poem.

Even without an explicit reference to their location, however, one might easily imagine that we are justified in identifying the verses of the first quotation with the similar lines in Sextus’ proem. After all, Simplicius first quotes the lines in question, then goes on to quote from the end of *Aletheia*, and finishes up by quoting DK 19, generally taken as the end of the *Doxa* if not the whole poem. This is, I grant, a natural enough assumption, and, given that I am claiming that we ought to place the lines in the *Doxa*, my suggestion might seem at odds with the sequence in which the texts are quoted, since the second of the three texts that Simplicius quotes would have to have come from an earlier point in the poem than the first one. Were that so, Simplicius might have mentioned the fact.

Actually, while he is not very explicit about it, Simplicius does give a subtle indication of just such an ordering. Mueller’s translation unfortunately obscures it by rendering each of the verbs with which Simplicius introduces the three quotations with “he says”. It is actually only the first quotation, the lines that I would like to put in the *Doxa*, which Simplicius introduces with “he says”. Before each of the other two quotations, it is not λέγει that introduces them, but ἐπήγαγε(ν), “he continued” or “he went on”.\(^\text{106}\) The shift in tense between the verb introducing the first quotation and the verb introducing the second reflects, I propose, Simplicius’ turning back to an earlier point in the poem. The sentence introducing the third quotation then simply

\(^{106}\) Cf. the translation of McKirahan (in Coxon (2009) p. 232) where each instance of ἐπήγαγε(ν) is translated “continues” (present tense).
carries on with the newly established tense. That is, for the main point about Parmenides’ dual attitude toward the two “hypostases”, Simplicius quotes lines that provide its clearest articulation, taken from somewhere near the beginning of the *Doxa* (where, in addition to echoing lines of the poem, Parmenides adds the two additional lines particularly concerned with *doxai*) with “At any rate, Parmenides says”. The use of the present tense “says” in relating the thought or words of an author (even a much earlier one) is very common, another such instance occurring in the previous sentence with *φησι*. Using a past tense for the same purpose is just as natural, but one does not generally want to alternate between them when making a series of points from a single source. The switch to a verb in the aorist tense in the introduction to the next quotation (“having completed the account of being and being about to teach the sensibles, he continued, [DK 8.50-52]”) therefore stands out, and I suggest that what it indicates is that DK 8.50-52 were found earlier in the poem than the lines just quoted. The use of two participial phrases to pinpoint the location of the second set of lines would be particularly appropriate if Simplicius is not here, as he often does, quoting the lines in the order in which they appeared in the poem. The use of ἐπῆγαγεν re-sets the sequence of tenses for the passage as a whole, so that when Simplicius moves forward to lines from the end of the *Doxa* (or a part of it), he retains the tense: “and having handed down the *diakosmēsis* of the sensibles, he continued again, [DK 19]”.¹⁰⁷

To repeat, this is far short of an explicit statement of where the lines were found. Still, the broader context of Simplicius’ quotations, that is, an explanation of Parmenides’ and Melissus’ attitude(s) towards sensible, generated objects, which includes not only DK 8.50-52 and DK 19 but the quotation of DK 11 less than a page later, makes the suggestion that the first quotation came from the *Doxa* a reasonable one. Moreover, there is an interesting feature of Simplicius’

¹⁰⁷ While Simplicius reports these lines as coming at the end of a section, his words do not seem to suggest that the poem ended with them. The recurrence of ἐπῆγαγε need not mean that the poem carried on for very long afterward, but if DK 19 were indeed the ending of the entire poem, it is perhaps a little odd to introduce the lines in this way.
reading of Aristotle’s text that might be explained by supposing a repetition in Parmenides’ poem of lines from the proem at the beginning of the *Doxa*. Just before the discussion of Parmenides and Melissus, in his comments on the opening of the third book of the *de Caelo*, Simplicius makes a special point of explaining that Aristotle himself has given a second introduction to his treatise at the beginning of his third book, echoing language from the opening of the first book. Simplicius comments on the beginning of Aristotle’s third book as follows: “That he discusses these topics as concerning simple, primary bodies, just as he did in discussing the heavens is made clear by the fact that he again uses the same proemium and shows that the subject of the study of nature is bodies. This will also be made clear by what will be said in <this> proemium.”¹⁰⁸ Simplicius had forecast this repeated proem when discussing the beginning of the treatise, and mentions it again in the commentary on the third book.¹⁰⁹ Simplicius seems fond of this observation, which he uses to criticize Alexander of Aphrodisias’ commentary on the treatise. Is it possible that Simplicius’ sensitivity to Aristotle’s repetition of his own proem was due in part to the observation that Parmenides had done the same thing when making a related transition in his poem? Simplicius does not come out and say so directly, but he may have left it for his readers to pick up on their own. To have to reveal the strategy outright might spoil

¹⁰⁸ *In Cael. 551.21-23*, as translated in Mueller (2009) p. 25. Mueller notes, “Simplicius compares the beginning of this chapter, 298a24-b8 with the beginning of the whole work, 268a1-6; see also his commentary on that passage at 6,30-8,8.” (2009, p.123, n. 3) In the third book, it is only 298b1-6 that echo the opening of the treatise, and more interesting for this point than Simplicius’ commentary at 6.30 and following is an earlier remark at 4.4-13: “Against the other exegetes, it should be said that the discussion of the four elements in these texts does not appear merely adventitious, and nor do they seem to be treated for the sake of the study of the heavenly bodies in themselves, but rather he discusses them in their own right. For not to mention the fact that the account of them takes up almost half of the whole treatise, it is also the fact that after the exposition concerning the heavenly bodies which he offers in the first two books of the treatise, at the beginning of the third book he once again uses the prologue [προοιμίῳ] from the first, thus emphasizing the coherence of the work and showing that physical enquiry is concerned with the [simple] bodies, so that the final two books have the same subject as well.” (Simplicius, *in Cael. 4.4-13*, as translated in Hankinson (2002) p. 21.)

¹⁰⁹ See the preceding footnote for the passage in the first book. In the commentary on the third book, Simplicius repeats the point at 552.22-24: “As I said, because he is going to again discuss other simple bodies, the sublunary ones, he again uses the same proemium which he used at the beginning of the treatise.” (Mueller (2009) p. 26)
his readers’ appreciation of his own arrangement when they see that Simplicius himself has done
the same thing in his commentary.

Even if Simplicius’ concern with prooemia is no more than an interesting parallel, the
lines of the first quotation of Parmenides are suggestive of a proem themselves. Moreover, the
differences from the lines of Sextus’ proem all suit a proem belonging to the *Doxa.* Even better,
the four and a half lines that Simplicius preserves can be combined seamlessly with those of DK
10. This suggestion had essentially been made by P. J. Bicknell several decades ago, although he,
believing for a variety of unsound reasons that DK 10 could not have come from the *Doxa*,
proposed placing it immediately after DK 1.32 (that is, the last of Simplicius’ lines when fused
with Sextus’ proem). Nonetheless, Bicknell well observed that, with DK 10 following
immediately upon Simplicius’ quotation, “the goddess quite naturally goes on to give a brief
synopsis of the topics which the opinions of men embrace.”\(^\text{110}\) Bicknell does not in that article
indicate what variant adjective he prefers in DK 1.29, but it is worth noting that Simplicius’
εὐκυκλέος nicely anticipates the use of κυκλωπός in DK 10.4. While Bicknell was mistaken to
believe that DK 10 could not have belonged to the *Doxa*, he is right that DK 10 makes a natural
sequel to “DK 1.28-32”. If we resist identifying Simplicius’ lines with Sextus’, there is nothing
to prevent us from adopting Bicknell’s suggestion of having DK 10 follow the final line of
Simplicius’ quotation without break, and placing the combined fragments in the *Doxa.* To allay
suspicion about such a placement based on any awkwardness the reader may feel with the
goddess repeating the words χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι, I suggest borrowing the opening half-
line of Empedocles, DK 31 B 17.15 in order to repair that awkwardness and to complete the line.
The composite fragment will read:

\[
< \text{ὡς γὰρ καὶ πρὶν ἔειπα,}> \chi ρεὼ \delta \varepsilon σε παντα πυθεσθαι \quad \text{Y.1}
\]

\(^{110}\) Bicknell \((1968b)\) p. 631.
I would not insist on the wording of the opening half-line, but words to that effect do not seem unlikely, and given Empedocles’ many borrowings from Parmenides, this seems like a fair trade. In line 5, where there is some uncertainty over the reading at the end of the line, I print περῶντα rather περ ὄντα, but would not insist upon it at this stage either. Apart from the textual reading, there is considerable debate on how to understand the lines, and determining how best to interpret them is a task for another time. In any event, the two extra lines, where δοκοῦντα makes it look pretty certain that ταῦτα refers to the “doxai of mortals” in the preceding line and there is surely some play on words intended with δοκίμως,111 are clearly suited to the Doxa. I would insist that the adjective εὐκυκλέος here is right. Its appearance in a proem for the Doxa, that is, a point of transition from discussion of divine truth to mortal concerns, is entirely appropriate. As pointed out by Floyd, uses of eukuklos in Homer and Pindar and uses of the Sanskrit cognate sucaakra in the Rig-Veda indicate that “well-wheeled” was a traditional Indo-European expression associated with transitions, particularly those between divine and mortal spheres.112

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111 Cf. the similar wordplay in Heraclitus, DK 22 B 28: δοκέοντα γὰρ ὁ δοκιμότατος γινώσκει, φυλάσσει.
Once again, Simplicius has helped us clarify matters where editors had muddled things unnecessarily and has provided us with “new” material from the Doxa which we can use in future attempts to determine whatever it was Parmenides was doing there.

**Doubts about Cosmology.** While Cordero’s attempt to place a number of fragments generally (and rightly) regarded as belonging to the Doxa earlier in the poem mark a decided break with other presentations of Parmenides’ poem, some of his motivation for doing so is less unique. Cordero’s placement of what he takes to be Parmenidean physical truths in the Aletheia is in part an effort to present Parmenides as a respectable investigator of the natural world. A number of other interpreters share the aim of situating Parmenides squarely in the tradition of Presocratic physiologoi by stressing the positive contributions he is thought to have made to natural science. Those contributions may have included the discoveries of the sphericity of the earth, of the reflected nature of the moon’s light, and of the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars, as well as the division of the earth into tropical, temperate and polar “zones”.

Santillana, whose remark on the obviousness of the Doxa being a “physics” was quoted earlier, remarked critically of the metaphysical approaches to Parmenides that he considered dominant in the mid-twentieth century,

One should like to ask those bold modernizers: who would imagine Fichte, Hegel or Heidegger proceeding from cryptic statements on Being and Non-Being to a treatise concerning the mechanism of the planets and the illumination of the moon, or the sterility of mules? For these are the subjects in the second part of Parmenides’ poem. And if the inattention and the prejudice of commentators had not left us with the pitiful shreds we have of it, no one would have entertained the idea that Parmenides’ physics was an insignificant appendix to his doctrine of Truth.

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113 One or another source connects credits Parmenides with each of these discoveries, but one or another source also credits Pythagoras (among others) with each of these. For both figures, the testimonies in question are late and suspect. Putting aside the question of *discovery*, that Parmenides was aware of these ideas and made use of them in his poem seems reasonably certain.

114 See above, footnote 54.

115 Santillana (1968) p. 83.
Santillana is cheating a bit. One will look through the testimonia in vain, I believe, for any report of Parmenides’ view on the sterility of mules. There is no doubting that Parmenides spoke of the illumination of the moon, but whether it is accurate to describe whatever he had to say as a “treatise” on celestial mechanics is another matter, about which I do have my doubts. This is not to say that the *Doxa* was an insignificant appendix, but simply to admit that, given the “pitiful shreds” that we have, it is rash to assume that anything about the general character of the *Doxa* as it appeared in Parmenides’ poem is obvious.

Variations on Santillana’s outlook are readily met with in the literature. One standard resource informs us, “The second half of the poem did not simply describe or analyse current opinions about the cosmos. It contained an elaborate and distinctive theogony and cosmology reminiscent in parts of Hesiod, in parts of Anaximander. Parmenides’ object, as we shall see, is to present mortal opinions not as they actually are, but as they might be at their best.” David Gallop dismisses the suggestion that the *Doxa* might have been an explanation of human illusion by claiming that such an aim “would hardly call for an elaborate cosmology of the sort that the Way of Seeming appears to have contained. Eight of the eleven extant fragments (10-15, 17-18) deal with astronomical, biological, or theological matters, whose bearing upon universal mortal illusions is, to say the least, remote.” For Panagiotis Thanassas, DK 10 and 11 are “central fragments of the poem […] which promise some insight into the nature of the –altogether real–world of phenomena.” Giovanni Cerri takes the cosmology to have been so extensive that he describes B 10 as coming from the “protasis” of “the astronomical section of the poem, or from

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116 A chapter in Aetius’ doxographical work (V.14) seems to have recorded views on this, but there is no trace of anything from Parmenides. See Diels (1879) pp. 424-425.
117 KRS p. 254.
119 Thanassas (2007) p. 20. On p. 61 DK 10 is described as an outline of “[t]he plan and content of Doxa, the second and longest part of the poem”, while DK 11 “promises to describe in detail” the various items listed in its verses.
one of its subsections”, finding in it “unmistakable” allusions to a “cosmogonic history” with a “double outlay, synchronic on the one hand, that is, a depiction of the structure of the starlit sky as it is or appears, diachronic on the other hand, that is, a tentative reconstruction of the probable origin of the stars and their orbits.” Of DK 10 and 11, Cerri asks,

Can one doubt that in these two fragments Parmenides is doing anything other than promising exactly an extensive and detailed astronomical treatment? Or that the facts followed the promise, that is, that the rest of the poem tallied with the protasis? If one cannot reasonably doubt either possibility, we are prompted to admit that, at least in large part, Parmenides’ poem had to belong to the same genre and to be quite similar to the later Phaenomena, Aratus' didactic-astronomical poem; and further that, thanks to this section, Parmenides’ was the oldest astronomical poem of Greek literature, since it seems that in Xenophanes’ poem On nature there was not anything so full-fledged, rather just the dispersed cues of astronomical teaching.

In the end, in light of the evidence that he considers “objective and indubitable” Cerri finds it curious that “for the most part, modern scholars of Parmenides keep on discussing his philosophical thought and his poem as if it were bereft of a scientific-astronomical dimension, as if—literally—it had not a dense section set out as a sort of map of the heavens.”

Some of these descriptions involve more outlandish claims than others, but the common element which I wish to question is the assumption that the Doxa presented an extensive, elaborate or detailed cosmology, an assumption often coupled with a claim about how the verses of the Doxa outnumbered those of the Aletheia. To answer Cerri’s rhetorical questions: one can indeed reasonably doubt that DK 10 and 11 are best read as Parmenides’ “promise” to provide an

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120 Cerri (2011) p. 83.
121 Cerri (2001) p. 84.
122 Cerri (2011) p. 86
123 Cerri (2011) p. 93. The next sentence reads, “Hundreds, if not thousands of lines, as has already been shown, are similar in content to Aratus’ Phaenomena or Manlius’ Astronomica (just to mention poems which have reached us by means of direct tradition) and are much closer to these poems than to the first part of Parmenides’ poem itself, usually known by the name of ἡ Ἀλήθεια.” This appears to be claiming that the Doxa might have run to thousands of lines, and that it has somehow been “shown” that at least hundreds of them (which we do not have) are closer to Aratus’ and Manlius’ poems than to the Aletheia. I do not think that the comparison with Aratus and Manlius is not worthwhile, but it cannot be conceded that Cerri has “shown” anything at all about the number of lines in the Doxa, let alone their comparative closeness to the verses of Aratus and Manlius.
“extensive and detailed astronomical treatment” and that the other passages that survive from the
*Doxa* are appropriately described as “facts” fulfilling the promise of those programmatic
passages. It does not seem to me true that modern scholars treat the poem as though it were
“bereft of a scientific-astronomical dimension”, but it should not be surprising if they do not
always have a great deal to say about it.

The assumption I am calling into question is not without evidence to support it. The
doxographical tradition does record tidbits about Parmenides’ supposed cosmological opinions,
but this evidence is on the whole of a rather poor sort. We hear, for instance, that according to
Parmenides, among others, the heaven is fiery (DK 28 A 38). So too are the stars (DK 28 A 39),
the sun (DK 28 A 41), and the moon (DK 28 A 42). Even for twenty-five hundred years ago, this
hardly seems like cutting-edge science. More informative, perhaps, is the claim that, according to
Parmenides, the sun and moon were separated off from the circle of the Milky Way, with
differing densities and degrees of heat and cold (DK 28 A 43). Nonetheless, it takes more than a
few imaginative leaps to get from the testimonia to something that could be considered an
elaborate and detailed cosmology, and most of the testimonia look suspiciously like attempts to
extract physical opinions out of some extant but obscure portion of the surviving verses.124 Still,
this is more evidence than there is to support the various estimates on the number of verses that
the *Doxa* contained. Diels’ (qualified) estimate that we possess nine tenths of the Way of Truth
but only one tenth of the *Doxa* (which would suggest a *Doxa* of four to five hundred lines) is not
based on any ancient stichometric report.125 Diogenes Laertius says that Parmenides, like

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124 The most extensive testimonium of this sort is DK 28 A 37, a report of Aetius (II.7.1) which reads something like
an attempt to elucidate the passage to which DK 12 originally belonged. For a detailed recent analysis of the
composition of this passage in light of the findings of an ongoing reevaluation of Diels’ work on the doxographical
tradition, see Mansfeld and Runia (2009) pp. 394-408.
125 “Von der Ἀλήθεια sind etwa neun Zehntel erhalten, von der Δόξα nach einer weniger sicheren Abschätzung
Melissus and Anaxagoras, left a single composition (DK 28 A 13), but gives no estimate of its length. From the fact that Simplicius does not ever mention the book or scroll from which a quotation of Parmenides comes (as he does do on occasion when quoting Empedocles), it may be safe to infer that Parmenides’ entire poem fit on a single scroll, but even this much cannot be counted as certain.

Those who would present the *Doxa* as a serious cosmology, however, have better evidence to adduce. The favorite item, to which most of the scholars mentioned in the earlier paragraph refer, is a passage from Plutarch’s *Reply to Colotes*.\(^{126}\) Colotes, an Epicurean who had written a polemical piece attacking all other philosophies, apparently claimed that Parmenides, in saying that “all is One”, effectively abolished the world as we know it. Plutarch makes a spirited rebuttal:

> But Parmenides for one has abolished neither ‘fire’ nor ‘water’, neither ‘a precipice’ nor ‘cities lying in Europe and Asia’ in Colotes’ words, since he has actually made a cosmic order, and by blending as elements the light and the dark produces out of them and by their operation the whole world of sense. Thus he has much to say about earth, heaven, sun, moon, and stars, and has recounted the genesis of man; and for an ancient natural philosopher—who has put together a book of his own, and is not pulling apart the book of another—he has left nothing of real importance unsaid.\(^{127}\)

As is repeatedly pointed out by those who cite this passage as evidence for the extensiveness and detail of Parmenides’ cosmology, Plutarch shows signs of first-hand acquaintance with Parmenides’ poem (he implies elsewhere that Colotes’ book does not) and there is a clear correspondence between the topics Plutarch mentions and those listed in DK 10 and 11 (although the addition of “the genesis of man” is noteworthy). I agree that Plutarch’s testimony is trustworthy, but we must not press it too far. We need to recognize that in his rebuttal he is

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putting the best possible face on the argument and that there are qualifications on the claims about Parmenides’ production of “the whole world of sense”. In saying that Parmenides has made a “cosmic order” (διάκοσμον) and the “whole world of sense” (τὰ φαινόμενα πάντα, “all the appearances”), he is careful to use Parmenides’ own terms. It is not clear from the verses, however, just how extensive a range the words διάκοσμος and πάντα actually have there. While the close correspondence between Plutarch’s list and the items in DK 10 and 11 may assure us that Plutarch had the poem before him, there is a vagueness about Parmenides’ having “much” to say that makes it seem as though the poem itself may have been short on details (or perhaps short on details that Plutarch felt comfortable paraphrasing with any precision). This air of caution is reinforced by the way that Plutarch qualifies his final claim, shifting some of the attention away from Parmenides to Colotes himself (it is Colotes who is “pulling apart the book of another”) and suggesting that we must judge Parmenides by the standard of an early practitioner of natural science; it is on those terms that Parmenides “left none of the chief points unmentioned” (καὶ οὐδὲν ἄρρητον, ὡς ἀνὴρ ἀρχαῖος ἐν φυσιολογίᾳ καὶ συνθεὶς γραφὴν ἰδίαιν ὡς ἀλλοτρίαν διαφορῶν, τῶν κυρίων παρῆκεν). But that may have left many things without a detailed or elaborate treatment. There is a world of difference, so to speak, between mentioning all the main points and leaving nothing important undiscussed. Plutarch is careful to claim only the former of Parmenides.

Plutarch’s passage is often compared to Simplicius’ remarks from in Cael. just after his quotation of DK 11. We looked at a part of this briefly above. The full remark is:

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128 It is insensitive to the meaning of ἄρρητος and gives Parmenides credit for more than Plutarch does to translate οὐδὲν ἄρρητον … τῶν κυρίων παρῆκεν by “he has left nothing of real importance unsaid” (as above; cf. Gallop (1986) p. 101)). It is even more inaccurate to say he left nothing important “undiscussed” (as in KRS p. 257 and Coxon (2009) p. 168).

129 See page 160, with footnote 87.
And he sets out the coming to be of things that come to be and perish up to the parts of the animals [καὶ τῶν γενομένων καὶ φθειρομένων μέχρι τῶν μορίων τῶν ζῴων τὴν γένεσιν παραδίδωσι]. And it is clear that Parmenides was not unaware that he himself came to be, just as he was not unaware that he had two feet, even though he said that being is one [δὴλον δὲ, ὅτι οὐκ ἠγνόει Παρμενίδης, ὅτι γενητὸς αὐτὸς ἦν, ὡσπερ οὐδὲ, ὅτι δύο πόδας εἶχεν, ἐν λέγων τὸ ἄν].

Given the correspondence between the celestial objects of DK 11 and the early items in Plutarch’s list of things about which Parmenides said “much”, it seems that we should perhaps associate Simplicius’ reference to “the parts of animals” with Plutarch’s mention of “the genesis of man”. Both authors also mention that Parmenides’ understanding of the oneness of being did not keep him from seeing the multiplicity of the everyday world. Like Plutarch, Simplicius gestures at the scope of what the Doxa covered, but offers nothing particularly helpful for determining just how extensive or detailed a treatment the topics mentioned received. Neither author provides quite the evidence that Cerri and others suggest they do when these authors are cited to support the notion that the Doxa presented an elaborate and lengthy cosmology that would have dwarfed the Aletheia.

Indeed, when one considers the paraphrases that each author offers along with the fragments as we have them, one may begin to wonder if the Doxa was not far less sweeping than is often supposed. Something on the scale of Lucretius’ and Manilius’ works would be ruled out if we are right to infer that Parmenides’ poem was contained on a single scroll, but even something like Aratus’ poem may be far longer than whatever the Doxa contained. I suspect it is significant that the accounts of Plutarch, when replying to Colotes’ attack, and of Simplicius, in what seems an almost off-hand remark about what followed DK 11, coincide as neatly as they do not only with one another but even with the extant material from the Doxa that happens to have survived in other authors. All of the fragments of the standard Doxa, with the possible exception

130 Simplicius, in Cael. 559.26–560.1, as translated in Mueller (2009) p. 33, with material in brackets added.
of DK 16, fall readily into one of the two main categories in the paraphrases of each author. We have “astronomical” fragments (or better, fragments that talk about various heavenly lights) on the one hand (DK 9, 10, 11, 14, 15), and those to do with one or another aspect of human generation on the other (DK 12, 13, 17, 18, 19). Some of these might be assigned to both groups (most obviously DK 12), but this only reinforces the impression that the Doxa was curiously focused on these two domains. That we do not even possess significant testimonia that take us beyond the confines of these topics again suggests that the Doxa was both shorter and more focused than is generally supposed.

Additional, albeit indirect, evidence for a less extensive Doxa is the pervasiveness of the attitude towards Parmenides of which Colotes was but one representative. Even if Colotes’ criticism of Parmenides relied on a polemical mischaracterization of Parmenides’ views, it is reasonable to suppose that there was something about the poem that made it susceptible to the attack that in saying that what is one, Parmenides effectively abolished “all things”. Colotes was not the first to think that Parmenides did away with nature in some manner. The suggestion was an early and a persistent one, present in Socrates’ explanation, in Plato’s Parmenides, that the aim of the writings of Zeno and Parmenides is to assert, “contrary to all the things that are said” (παρὰ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα), that things are not many but one. Later Aristotle, evidently reacting to the rejection of nature entailed by their apparent denial of movement, reportedly called Parmenides and Melissus stasiōtai (“partisans of the standstill faction”) and aphysikoi (“unnaturalists”). Though also capable of prejudiced and distorted views of his predecessors,

131 Though I do not assign DK 16 or the single-word DK 15a to either group here, these fragments are susceptible to readings on which they could be assigned to one or both of these groups. As spelling out those readings here would be getting ahead of ourselves, I simply set them aside with the justification that it seems that nobody knows quite what to do with them. Cf. footnote 49 above.

132 Plato, Parm. 127e

133 Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. X.46 (= Aristotle, On Philosophy fr. 9 (Ross)). Aristotle’s pun on stasiōtēs seems to come from Plato, Theaetetus 181a6. The evidence of this attitude towards Parmenides seems to be ignored by
Aristotle, like Colotes, must have had some reason for separating Parmenides and Melissus from the regular run of *physikoi*. These characterizations would probably not have been customary had the *Doxa* presented an elaborate and detailed “treatise” on the whole of the natural world. It is noteworthy that in the vast bulk of Aristotle’s works on nature Parmenides’ name appears only rarely. Where it does, it is generally in connection with his supposed rejection of the reality of change. On the very few occasions where Aristotle has something to report about Parmenides’ “physical” views, there is nothing to suggest that he treated a wider range of phenomena than is exhibited in the extant fragments. To judge, then, from the regrettably meager reports we have about it, it looks as though the *Doxa* included neither an elaborate cosmology including separate subsections for various astronomical topics nor so wide-ranging an account of more mundane topics as to allow for detailed speculations on the unhappy reproductive prospects of mules, but was a writing of a somewhat different sort.

That the *Doxa* was short on satisfying details is a point made by Theophrastus. Let us, before concluding, revisit the passage in which he quotes DK 16. This will provide us with another important impression of the general character of the *Doxa* and will also help us formulate a guess as to why “astronomical” and “embryological” material might be so prominent among the the traces that remain of it. The source text is Theophrastus’ *de Sensibus*. That work is

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Giovanni Casertano when, in support of the assertion that “[t]he fact that Parmenides was a φυσιολόγος, that is, a scholar of nature, was well-known in ancient times”, he follows two rather dubious references to Iamblichus and Simplicius with: “even Aristotle himself, who […] is mainly responsible for the distortion of some aspects of the Elean’s philosophy, does not hesitate to place Parmenides inside what he saw as a trend shared by the whole line of research of the first Greek philosophers. Parmenides, philosopher of being, metaphysical thinker, “father of western metaphysics,” is thus not an idea stemming from ancient times, but rather a modern (from Hegel on) and contemporary (from Heidegger on) reading.” (Casertano (2011) pp. 23-24)

134 See *Physics* I. 2-3, 5 and 8-9; *de Gen. et Corr.* I. 3 and 8; and *de Caelo* III.1.

135 Aristotle’s brief report at *de Gen. et Corr.* II.3 330b13-15 is a vague reference to a mixing of fire and earth that seems to echo DK 8.52-60 and DK 9, and *de Part. Animalium* II.2 (with which cf. *de Gen. Animalium* IV.1) can be related to the embryological fragments.

136 As for the scientific discoveries, mentioned earlier, in which Parmenides is sometimes said to have played a role, Aristotle again gives no indication of Parmenides as a pioneer in these researches, although discussions of the sphericity of the earth and its zones as well as of the moon’s light are to be found in his corpus.
an extended survey of the views of various predecessors, from Alcmaeon to Plato, on the nature of the senses and sensible objects. Diels regarded the de Sensibus as a fragment of Theophrastus’ massive work on physical opinions, and saw that larger collection as the source for the entire later doxographical tradition. Those views are subject to doubt, but whether we ought to regard the de Sensibus as an independent work or not, and whether or not we hypothesize some doxographical tradition anterior to Theophrastus, the present passage is relevant for how we read not only the verses it preserves, but (and perhaps even more so) the bulk of the later, indirect reports about Parmenides as well. Theophrastus’ testimony here is as objective and well-informed as any that we possess. It is not the most informative, to be sure, but Theophrastus is operating with less obvious bias (either doctrinal or as a result of the distortions that may be due to literary form) than any other major source, and was clearly familiar with the poem first-hand. It is unfortunate that in the broader context of the brief passage in question, Parmenides’ poem is something of a side issue. Nonetheless, there is value for us in what he does say. Particularly when we read the stray bits of information that make up most of the doxographical record on Parmenides, where one may suppose that the substance, if not the form, of Parmenides’ physical opinions is preserved in a matter-of-fact manner, it is good to bear in mind that the key source for that tradition had a hard time extracting definite doctrines from the poem.

Theophrastus’ remarks on Parmenides are introduced by way of contrast with Empedocles’ fuller treatment of the individual senses:

Parmenides gives no definition whatsoever, saying merely that there are two elements, and that our knowledge depends upon the excess of one or the other. [ὅλως οὐδέν ἀφώρικεν ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι δύοῖν ὄντοι τοῖς κατὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἔστιν ἡ γνῶσις.] For according as the hot or the cold predominates does the understanding vary,
there being a better and purer understanding derived from the hot; yet even such knowledge requires a certain proportion.

“For ever as it finds the blend in their far-wandering members,” he says, “so does mind come to men; for that which has intelligence in men each and all is the same,—the substance of their members; since what is there in greater measure is their thought.” [DK 16]

For to perceive by the senses and to have intelligence are treated by him as identical [τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὡς ταύτῳ λέγει]; consequently both remembering and forgetting arise, by the mixture <of the elements mentioned>. But if there should occur an exact equality in the mixture, he does not make it clear [οὐδὲν ἐτι διώρικεν] whether there would or would not be thought, nor what would be the general state <resulting>. But that he also attributes perception to the opposite <element> in its own right is evident [φανερόν] from the passage where he says that a dead man —since now the fire has left him—does not perceive light and warmth and sound, but does perceive cold and silence and the other contrasting qualities; and that absolutely all being possesses some power of knowing [καὶ ὅλως δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὄν ἔχειν τινὰ γνῶσιν]. Accordingly by this thesis he seems arbitrarily to preclude discussion of the difficulties attending to his position [οὕτω μὴν οὖν αὐτὸς ἔοικεν ἀποτέμενες τῇ φάσει τὰ συμβαίνοντα δυσχερή διὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν].

Let us reserve the many special problems involved in trying to understand DK 16 for a later time, and concentrate on what the context tells us about Theophrastus’ more general impression of Parmenides’ poem. Theophrastus remarks repeatedly on the indefiniteness of Parmenides’ writing: “In general, Parmenides gives no definition”; “he speaks of perceiving (aisthanesthai) and thinking (phronein) as the same thing”; “he makes nothing further definite” than that memory and forgetting arise by blending. For anything specific, it seems, Theophrastus has to draw inferences from Parmenides’ indistinct and cryptic generalizations. What Theophrastus takes to be “apparent” or “evident” (that perception occurs by the contrary “in its own right”) is deduced from the curious statement that a corpse, deprived of fire, does not perceive light and warmth and sound but cold and silence, and Theophrastus complains that Parmenides seems to curtail dealing with the difficulties of his conception by assertion rather than offering explanations. It does not seem credible to chalk these complaints up to limited access to the
poem, \(^{140}\) nor in fact do Theophrastus’ complaints seem unfair reactions to DK 16 or to the other verbatim quotations that we have of the poem.

Indeed, the indefiniteness of which Theophrastus complains is a characteristic of Parmenides’ poem generally. Very little, at least, is firmly and determinately fixed in a way that readers can feel especially sure that they have grasped exactly what is being communicated. Where we are offered specifics, they tend to be exasperatingly ambiguous. In the *Doxa*, as Cordero stresses, the goddess specifically alerts the youth to the deceptive *kosmos* of her verses. It is worth lingering a moment, however, over just what that might mean. While this has been taken as a blanket rejection of anything that follows, there is a subtlety to these words that calls for careful attention. One aspect of this pregnant phrase is revealed by considering, quite literally, the order of the words in her verses. In DK 12.3,

\[
\text{ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων ἥ πάντα κυβερνᾷ}
\]

[in the middle of these, the divinity who steers all things]

the word δαίμων, “divinity”, is placed precisely in the middle of the verse, reflecting her position in the middle of things. \(^{141}\) How this may be deceptive deserves fuller consideration elsewhere, but I suggest that if mortal opinion or seeming is something in which there is no true trust, the confirmation that impressive arrangements of words, that is to say, naming, can appear to provide beliefs in *doxai* may be misleading. There is something similar in the description of the moon in DK 14:

\[
\text{νυκτὶ φάος περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον ἀλλότριον φῶς}
\]

[in night a light, around earth roaming, an alien light].

\(^{140}\) Cf. the remarks of Hershbell in footnotes 92 and 95 above.

\(^{141}\) Cf. Empedocles’ borrowing of this at DK 31 B 35.4: δίνης, ἐν δὲ μέσῃ Φυλότης στροφάλιγγι γένηται.
Here “earth”, though not at the exact metrical center of the verse, is the central of the seven words in it, once we restore the opening of the line preserved in the manuscripts. On this fragment John Newell very perceptively points out: “At the start, we get a light where it does not belong (in the darkness of night) and at the end we are told that the light comes from elsewhere. The middle of the line reports that the moon wanders around the Earth, which sits at the line’s center. The line, therefore, models the geocentric orbit of the moon.” Another intriguing instance of the κόσμος ἀπατηλός of the verses in the Doxa is DK 17:

δεξιτεροῖσιν μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δὲ κούρας
[on the right-hand side boys, on the left-hand side, girls].

Again I quote Newell:

The line is composed in a way that is typical of the whole poem. It begins by placing the word for ‘right’ in the position that is furthest to the left, and places the girls (who belong on the left) as far to the right as possible. The boys, who should be on the right, are in the left half of the line while the word for ‘left’ occupies the center. Everything is in the wrong place! […] What we have here would appear to be one of the worst possible arguments. Given what we have seen elsewhere in the poem, however, it would be a mistake to see this as faulty craftsmanship. Instead, what we have here is a deliberate structural confusion which allows the author to signal to the reader that the speaker does not know what she is talking about.

I am not ready to say that the goddess does not know what she is talking about, but Newell is surely right that the line is deliberately constructed with each element out of order, and that this sort of wordplay is a recurrent feature of the poem, present, as the above examples illustrate, in the various phases of Parmenides’ supposedly scientific treatments. As such involved wordplay is a characteristic that would seem ill-suited to a detailed and elaborate “treatise” on natural

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142 The opening of the verse in the manuscripts is νυκτὶ φάος. DK prints νυκτιφάος, which is Scaliger’s emendation.
144 Galen does not quite preserve the verse intact, giving δεξιτεροῖσι μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δὲ αὖ κούρας. The above is Karsten’s restoration, which serves well enough to illustrate the point. Gallop, following “most recent editors of Galen” prints δεξιτεροῖσι [μὲν] κούρους, λαιοῖσιν δ’ αὖ <κτίσε> κούρας. See Gallop (1986) p. 88.
philosophy, again it seems desirable to entertain an alternative model for how to envision the Doxa. Theophrastus’ mention of corpses provides us a hint of an alternative “genre” which, if less “scientific”, is more consistent with the entirety of the evidence for the Doxa. Recalling Simplicius’ mention of the daimon sending souls from the visible to the invisible realm and back again, it appears that the Doxa contained some sort of description of the souls of the dead, the things that they saw or failed to see, and what they may have remembered or forgotten.

A moment’s reflection supplies a “genre” in which the souls of the dead, the basic elements of a cosmology, and an account of human generation would all be at home: the myth of Er in Plato’s Republic, the “Somnium Scipionis” of Cicero’s own Republic, and related stories such as the account of Timarchus’ vision in Plutarch’s de genio Socratis might provide a better model for imagining what the Doxa looked like. Each of those relatively brief episodes features the journey of some select figure beyond the sphere of everyday human affairs, where he hears of the fates of the departed, attains a unifying (but scarcely straightforward) vision of the cosmos, and learns about the (re)birth of souls into bodies, which is associated in some manner or other with the circular movements of the celestial lights. A central lesson to be learned in each episode is how the “true” life differs from that which is conventionally so called.

Taking these texts as a guide, the seemingly unrelated astronomical and embryological fragments of the Doxa can be bridged by Theophrastus’ and Simplicius’ references to the dead and to souls’ being sent to the “invisible” realm and back again by the divinity. The Doxa then begins to look like some sort of account (very likely a rather opaque one) of the fate of the reincarnated soul. The tales in Plato, Cicero, and Plutarch link the character of human births to

146 See above, footnote 93.
147 In line with his presenting the episode as a dream rather than a divine visitation or shamanic-style journey, Cicero mutes the element of reincarnation in his work, but in other ways echoes Parmenides more closely than does Plato. Consider, e.g., his description of the moon quae ultima a caelo, citima terris, luce lucebat aliena. (De Re Publica, VI. 20 [16]; 139.19-20 Powell).
the cycles of the heavenly bodies, and it is worth considering whether the same might have been true in Parmenides’ *Doxa*, which is, let us not forget, the *Doxa*, as Cordero rightly insists, of mortals. DK 12 appears to offer some such connection between the cosmic stephanai and male-female pairings, and the earlier mention in the poem of unknowing mortals “wandering” a “back-turning path”, confusedly borne between being and non-being, would not be an inapt description of the cycle of rebirth.\(^{148}\)

While the Er narrative has been connected with Parmenides’ poem before,\(^ {149}\) the point of comparison has typically been that of Parmenides’ stephanai and the “whorls” of the Spindle of Necessity in Plato’s story, with the aim of clarifying the arrangements of each author’s presumed cosmology. DK 17 and 18 are rarely if ever included in such discussions, but they clearly add to the comparison if we simply pay attention to what follows the cosmic vision in Er’s account. The emphasis in Plato’s dialogue is on the choice that precedes a soul’s next incarnation, but this ends in a departure towards its birth. Supposing that Parmenides’ poem provided a more graphic description of the stages involved in the soul’s assumption of its new identity in the womb, we would have a considerably more concrete scenario in which to place the fragments generally viewed as isolated bits of Parmenides’ otherwise lost “biology”.

Clearly, this suggestion is something that needs to be pursued more fully elsewhere. A compelling case for it can only be made through a close reading of the fragments, the relevant

\(^{148}\) Tarán (1965) pp. 248-249, n. 51 declares that the connection of Simplicius’ remarks to “the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration […] cannot be accepted” and that “there is nothing in the text of Simplicius to suggest that the souls which the goddess sends back to Hades and from Hades to life are the same, which is a necessary condition for metempsychosis.” Apart from the inaccuracy of Tarán’s paraphrase of the text (the souls are not sent back to Hades, but back to “life”, which is the crucial point for reincarnation), that they are sent “back” anywhere suggests that the souls are in some sense the same souls. Exactly how they are the same is, I believe, a central question of the poem.

There is further evidence for reincarnation in Parmenides (and a connection with Plato’s myth of Er) in Porphyry’s essay, *de Antro Nympharum*, where it is reported (21.3) that Parmenides mentioned the celestial gates (identified by earlier commentators as the solstitial points on the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn) whereby souls descend into human births and return to the gods. On this, cf. Coxon (2009) p. 371.

testimonia, and the accounts with which I wish to compare them (which are by no means limited to the three examples mentioned). For the present, I simply submit that the hints from some of our best sources that the *Doxa* dealt with reincarnation should not be ignored. They offer a ready explanation for why the evidence for the “astronomical, biological and theological matters” in the *Doxa* seems to fall short of the “elaborate cosmology” that many commentators assume. Moreover, in an account of reincarnation, such matters will hardly seem remote from an explanation of “universal mortal illusions”.\(^{150}\) Indeed, this more focused conception of the *Doxa* not only gives a tighter coherence to the fragments there, but raises prospects for a more unified account of the whole poem. The otherworldy character of the journey in the proem has long been recognized (whether we regard it as a descent or an ascent may make little difference), and the ties between the Way of Truth and Way of Seeming might become clearer when we read the insistence in the *Aletheia* that what *is* is ungenerated and unperishing in light of the *Doxa*’s concern with the soul.

\(^{150}\) Cf. the comments of Gallop quoted above, page 175.
Appendix to Chapter Four: Synopsis A: Early Arrangements of the Fragments of Parmenides’ Poem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estienne (1573)</th>
<th>Scaliger (c.1600)</th>
<th>Fülleborn (1795)</th>
<th>Brandis (1813)</th>
<th>Karsten (1835)</th>
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<th>Diels (1897)</th>
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<td>DK 7.2-6 (31-35)</td>
<td>DK 7.2-7a (31-36)</td>
<td>DK 7.2-7a (33-38)</td>
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<td>DK 7.3-6a (33-36)</td>
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<td>DK 2 (39-46)</td>
<td>DK 2/3 (33-40)</td>
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<td>DK 2 (37-44)</td>
<td>DK 6 (47-55)</td>
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<td>DK 10 (100-105)</td>
<td>DK 6 (45-53)</td>
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<td>DK 7.1-2 (60-61)</td>
<td>DK 8.1b-61</td>
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<td>DK 12 (127-132)</td>
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<td>DK 19 (156-158)</td>
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1 The consecutive line numbers of editions before Diels (1897) are given in parentheses. For information about the arrangements of Estienne and Scaliger, I rely on Cordero (1982), Cordero (1987), and Cordero (2010), occasionally using one to correct another. For the others, the editions themselves have been consulted. It should be noted that the report in DK of Karsten’s numeration for DK 19 (given as 157-159) is inaccurate, as is that of Stein’s for DK 7.3-6 (reported as 34-37). The text of Mullach (1845/1860), although influential on a number of textual matters, is not given, as it follows the arrangement of Karsten.

2 In Karsten’s edition, lines from the proem have been rearranged, and appear in the following order: DK 1-5, DK 9-10, DK 6-8, DK 11-32.

3 In Stein’s edition, lines from the proem have been rearranged, and appear in the following order: DK 1-3, DK 9-21, DK 4-8, DK 22-32.

4 In Diels (1897), as in each of the earlier editions given except for Karsten’s, the first two portions of text listed were presented as a continuous passage.

5 The full title Fülleborn gives to the section that follows is περὶ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἢ τὰ πρὸς ἀληθείαν. (ἀληθείαν is so accented by Fülleborn, Karsten and Stein.)

6 Diels (1897) assigns separate numbers to DK 2 and DK 3, but considers it probable that (as in Stein and Karsten) 2.8 and 3 are two parts of the same line.
CONCLUSION

As mentioned in the Introduction, “Conclusion” is not the most appropriate term for the following closing remarks. After some preliminary exercises, we are better prepared to avoid a good number of missteps in subsequent attempts to read Parmenides’ poem, but we are still some way off from the ultimate aim of understanding what it said. For now, I will review some of the ground covered so far and point out a few signs of what lies ahead.

The simple supposition with which the first chapter began, namely, that despite the apparently unanimous opinion of modern scholarship on the matter, Sextus Empiricus may have preserved the proem of Parmenides’ poem intact, has yielded interesting results. Supposing that Sextus’ proem is sound has meant allowing Parmenides greater license than some would like for a purportedly irksome repetitiousness, but granting Parmenides that liberty has been worthwhile, providing a way to resolve multiple impasses in the scholarly literature and raising prospects for a better appreciation and a more accurate reconstruction of his poem. Diagnosis of the two major changes to Sextus’ text, “Diels’ addition” and “Kranz’s move”, found the causes for their widespread acceptance to be a general failure to appreciate the possibility of repeated verses and the related presumption that Parmenides’ writing ought to conform to modern editors’ own expectations of style and exposition. Doubful that such presumption is sound, and trying to attend carefully to the repetitions that Parmenides’ proem obviously presents, we have seen that, despite an undeniably cultivated obscurity of the proem, there is a strong internal coherence to it,
structured around the use of recurring words and sounds. The extended (and skewed) chiasmus has come to light as a particularly important structural feature of the proem. As many of these structures seem to have been entirely overlooked in earlier analyses of the proem, we may count it an advance in our grasp on the poem simply to have detected them, even if we cannot yet fully account for Parmenides’ motives in composing his proem in this way.

Acknowledging Parmenides’ repetitiousness also enabled us to recognize as independent two “new” fragments which previous editors have regarded as variants of DK 1.28-30, and raised the possibility that a reconsideration of the source texts for other fragments might well yield additional “new” fragments hitherto undetected. The “new” lines matching those from the proem afforded us a glimpse of how artfully Parmenides could employ his repeated lines: while the phrase “untrembling heart” at the end of the line in DK 1.29 and in the other verses that echo it serves, on the surface, as a bold image for the fixity of Truth, it also covertly directs attention to the variation that occurs at the very core of the line each time it occurs. This playful use of the placement of words within the line is a feature paralleled in other Parmenidean verses, including other “new” fragments that further scrutiny of the sources will bring to light.

In the second chapter, a close reading of two of the contexts in which the proem is quoted, has also been instructive, allowing us to get a more nuanced sense of the texts of Sextus and Diogenes Laertius. These readings, particularly that of Sextus’ passage, serve to illustrate how important familiarity with the habits and outlook of a quoting author is for a proper assessment

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1 These “new” fragments are texts C.4 and C.5 in the appendix to the first chapter, for the time being referred to as fragments X and Y. The restoring of most of the lines from DK 7 has also entailed recognizing a fragment Z between DK 6 and 8 (see page 34, footnote 57). This is still less new than the other two texts, and really amounts to a return to the fr. 7 of Diels’ earlier arrangements.

2 There are numerous instances of this to be found in the source material, and existing scholarly impasses are a good guide for where to look. Like the dispute over DK 1.29, that over the readings at DK 8.4 is also due to the failure of scholars to recognize that the various sources for it are quoting from at least three different points in the poem.

3 Cf. pages 185-186 above. In the DK 8.4 and the “new” fragments referred to in the preceding footnote Parmenides adds a further twist to his ἀτρεμές wordplay.
of any fragments that they preserve, and, consequently, how much is regularly missed by reading fragments in isolation from their sources or with the minimal contexts provided in DK. Through careful attention to the text of Sextus, who is often credited with interpretations that do not belong to him, and at other times dismissively treated as a simple excerptor, we have gained some insight into the manner in which he frames his discussions and have learned how to read his texts in a manner that avoids these and other errors. This is important not only for a proper assessment of his quotation of Parmenides’ proem, but (as the following chapter also shows) for many other texts for which Sextus is our best source. With regard to Parmenides in particular, we have seen reasons to believe that Sextus’ quotation of the proem is independent of the allegorizing rationalist interpretation that he reports along with it, which increases Sextus’ value all the more. Diogenes Laertius’ chapter on Parmenides is something of a miscellany, but, by a stroke of good fortune, he affords us another view of the source of the rationalist interpretation recorded by Sextus.  

Comparing the two sources brought to light an alternative construal of the closing lines of the proem, regularly assigned to DK 7, which may have significant consequences for reading not only Parmenides’ poem, but many of the authors influenced by him, and for the standing of logos in early Greek philosophy generally. Rather than commanding the kouros to “judge by reason”, the goddess might just have been warning the youth not to judge her teaching superficially by the confusing language it employs, much in the way that Plato, in his Parmenides, has the Eleatic check the young Socrates’ impressive but immature impulse for logoi. The alternative construal helps us begin to put some of the repetitions detected in the first chapter into a more comprehensible perspective.

4 This is by no means the only item of value in Diogenes’ chapter. As mentioned earlier (see page 68, with footnotes 135 and 136), he records important information about Parmenides’ contacts with other thinkers and preserves traces of Parmenides’ expressions that call for special treatment.
The third chapter, through a close reading of another passage of Sextus in which Empedocles is quoted, reinforced the chief points made in the previous two chapters and illustrated how the lessons learned there can further our understanding of authors other than Parmenides. The internal integrity of the proem as Sextus quotes it, the attitude towards logos and the senses expressed by the goddess in its closing lines, and the general reliability of Sextus’ testimony were all confirmed by consideration of Sextus’ passage on Empedocles. In the process, a number of important points for reading Empedocles’ poem(s) came to light (in particular, many of the ways in which DK 31 B 2 and 3 are modelled on Parmenides’ proem), as did prospects for “new” Empedoclean verses of the sort that the first chapter revealed in the case of Parmenides.5 As with the preceding chapters, numerous scholarly confusions have been disentangled, and a securer basis has been provided for an important fragment in the collection of Empedocles’ writing that scholars have recently tended to mistreat.

From the first part as a whole, a methodical examination of the sources for the full catalogue of Parmenidean fragments emerges clearly as a desideratum. Yet more “new” fragments may appear when the sources are considered with a greater awareness of Parmenides’ penchant for repetition, and, beyond the discovery of new verses, the sources deserve more consideration for the guidance they can offer about the reconstruction of the poem. Due to the canonical status DK has assumed for contemporary scholarship, it is not as appreciated as it should be how these sources have contributed to the standard arrangement of the fragments. As a result, the arrangements occasionally proposed as alternatives to the DK ordering often ignore even the relatively explicit information that the quoting sources provide. A careful accounting of this information is therefore needed. In addition, the depth of Empedocles’ debt to Parmenides in the small portion of his poetry that we reviewed in chapter three gives a glimmer of the light that

5 See page 97, footnote 190.
can be cast upon the task of reconstruction by a sensitive reading of authors influenced by Parmenides, even when they do not mention Parmenides by name. As well as the review of sources for verbatim fragments, therefore, an extensive comparison of a number of texts that show signs of such influence is also needed. In addition to Empedocles’ poem(s), that literature will include what remains of the treatises of Zeno and Melissus, Gorgias’ *On Non-Being*, most of Plato’s “middle” and “late” dialogues, as well as Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, Aristotle’s *Physics*, and the Pseudo(?)-Aristotelian *de Melisse*, *Xenophane*, *Gorgia*, among other works.

The second part illustrates how essential such a thorough review of the source material is as a preliminary step in our attempts to reconstruct, let alone interpret, Parmenides’ poem. Through a detailed response to an alternative to the DK arrangement proposed by a prominent Parmenidean scholar, we have reviewed the bases for some of the major modern arrangements of the fragments. Despite Cordero’s suggestions to the contrary, those orderings were not random or haphazard, nor primarily guided by the “conceptual content” of the fragments, but by statements of Sextus, Simplicius and others about the order of the fragments they preserved. Mistakes have certainly been made in reading the ancient evidence at times, and it is true that for the material in the *Doxa*, there are fewer explicit guides to placement than for the *Aletheia* fragments, but there is really nothing to lend support to Cordero’s proposal of moving material related to “physics” within the *Aletheia*. Nevertheless, Cordero’s challenge to the standard arrangement is in itself valuable, for it raises the question of the constitution of the text, which can indeed be improved upon. What is crucial in that process is reading the source texts without a preset view on Parmenides’ meaning, that is, trying to avoid the trap of interpreting the “conceptual content” of the fragments, and to limit oneself, in the first instance, to arranging the texts according to the leads provided by the reliable sources. A relatively unbiased survey of the
evidence has led us to the conclusion that the *Doxa* likely included all the fragments generally placed there, and then some. That is, the lines from Simplicius’ *in Cael.* also appear to belong to the *Doxa.*

Assembling various points made throughout the chapter, we can construct a reliable skeleton to serve as the foundation for further reconstruction of the poem. The division of the poem into a *Truth* and a *Doxa* is not a modern invention, but testified to by ancient commentators in possession of the whole poem (most notably Simplicius), and reflected in remarks by earlier authors. Despite Simplicius’ Platonizing tendencies, his own indications of the order of the fragments are our best guide to the text, and nothing in what Cordero claims gives us cause to doubt his reports. From those, combined with Sextus’ testimony, we can be confident that the following fragments were found in the following order: Sextus’ 35-plus line proem (= DK 1.1-30 and DK 7.2-7a); DK 2; DK 6; fragment Z (= DK 7.1-2); DK 8; DK 9 or DK 12 (or the reverse); DK 13; DK 19. DK 11 and the combined fragment Y + DK 10 (if allowed), are to be placed in the general vicinity of DK 9 and 12, towards the beginning of the *Doxa,* and DK 19 is to be placed at the conclusion of the arrangement of perceptible things, which presumably includes DK 14-18 (the ordering of which is not directly indicated by the sources). DK 3, 4, and 5, along with other fragments that come to light, will have to be fit into that general structure.

It is only following that preliminary determination of placement that we ought to engage seriously in the more speculative task of relating the fragments to one another and trying to make sense of what we have. We have encountered repeatedly, throughout both parts of this dissertation, occasions where reasonably clear evidence from a source has been overlooked or rejected because of an editor’s insistence on what Parmenides must have meant to be saying. Assembling a new arrangement of the fragments offers us an opportunity for a fresh reading of

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Thus a place is found for the “new” fragment Y that came to light in the first chapter.

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the poem, less encumbered by expectations of the logical character of the *Aletheia* (or the whole poem) or the cosmological character of the *Doxa* (or the whole poem). Such expectations are perfectly understandable, as both logical and cosmological interests, that is, the aspiration to maximal clarity in thought and expression and the project of giving a convincing and comprehensive account of the world in which we live, are both core concerns of the philosophical enterprise. Moreover, both are, I believe, important elements in the poem. Clearly, the goddess’ *pistos logos* in the *Aletheia* reflects early habits of what would later become formalized as the discipline of logic, and the *Doxa*, likewise, contained elements borrowed from prior speculation about the nature and structure of the “all”, and without doubt influenced subsequent efforts in what we think of as the scientific tradition to describe, with increasing accuracy and comprehensiveness, the change and stability of the world as we know it.

But while elements of the poem, it may be that neither of these two concerns suffice to define it. Indeed, when viewed as the essential aims of the poem, readers have felt a deep tension between the two, for the conclusions of what may be thought the strictly logical portion of the poem appear to invalidate the attempt in the *Doxa* to give an intelligent account of the phenomenal world. If we take the *Aletheia* as seriously as the goddess seems to suggest we should, what distinguishes the world described in the *Doxa* from any other “mortal opinions, in which there is no true trust”? Why aim to offer any description of the world at all? This is a tension almost all commentators on the poem are obliged to address, and the typical result is a scholarly impasse, some readers promoting Parmenides as the father of logic and privileging the *Aletheia*, others defending the importance of the scientific enterprise (and Parmenides’ place in it) by seeking ways to make the arguments of the *Aletheia* more compatible with it than they initially seem to be. For the former, the lack of unity in the poem is a sign that Parmenides’ mode
of expression was indeed ill-suited to his central message, while the latter, though in some cases more able to tell a coherent story about the poem, seem to give too little regard to the gulf that it is suggested exists between truth and *doxa*. Perhaps another look, less committed to either position, will reveal that some third way still remains.
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