How to split concepts: A reply to Piccinini and Scott

Machery, E (2006) How to split concepts: A reply to Piccinini and Scott. Philosophy of Science, 73 (4). 410 - 418. ISSN 0031-8248

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Abstract

In "Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind" (2005), I argued that the notion of concept in psychology and in neuropsychology fails to pick out a natural kind. Piccinini and Scott (2006, in this issue) have criticized the argument I used to support this conclusion. They also proposed two alternative arguments for a similar conclusion. In this reply, I rebut Piccinini and Scott's main objection against the argument proposed in "Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind." Moreover, I show that the two alternative arguments developed by Piccinini and Scott are not promising for supporting the conclusion that concepts are not a natural kind. Copyright 2006 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

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Details

Item Type:	Article
Status:	Published
Creators/Authors:	Creators Email Pitt Username ORCID Machery, E machery@pitt.edu MACHERY
Date:	1 October 2006
Date Type:	Publication
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy of Science
Volume:	73
Number:	4
Page Range:	410 - 418
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1086/516812
Schools and Programs:	Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > History and Philosophy of Science
Refereed:	Yes
ISSN:	0031-8248
Date Deposited:	27 Feb 2013 20:02
Last Modified:	01 Nov 2017 13:58
URI:	http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17442

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