Machery, Edouard
(2006)
Two Dogmas of Neo‐Empiricism.
Philosophy Compass, 1 (4).
398 - 412.
ISSN 1747-9991
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Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>This article critically examines the contemporary resurgence of empiricism (or “neo‐empiricism”) in philosophy, psychology, neuropsychology, and artificial intelligence. This resurgence is an important and positive development. It is the first time that this centuries‐old empiricist approach to cognition is precisely formulated in the context of cognitive science and neuroscience. Moreover, neo‐empiricists have made several findings that challenge amodal theories of concepts and higher cognition. It is argued, however, that the theoretical foundations of and the empirical evidence for neo‐empiricism are not as strong as is usually claimed by its proponents. The empirical evidence for and against neo‐empiricism is discussed in detail.</jats:p>
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