Two conceptions of subjective experience

Sytsma, J and Machery, E (2010) Two conceptions of subjective experience. Philosophical Studies, 151 (2). 299 - 327. ISSN 0031-8116

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Abstract

Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

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Details

Item Type:	Article
Status:	Published
Creators/Authors:	Creators Email Pitt Username ORCID Sytsma, J Machery, E machery@pitt.edu MACHERY
Date:	15 October 2010
Date Type:	Publication
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophical Studies
Volume:	151
Number:	2
Page Range:	299 - 327
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1007/s11098-009-9439-x
Schools and Programs:	Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > History and Philosophy of Science
Refereed:	Yes
ISSN:	0031-8116
Date Deposited:	01 Mar 2013 16:23
Last Modified:	02 Feb 2019 15:59
URI:	http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17474

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