Machery, E
(2010)
Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz.
Mind and Language, 25 (5).
634 - 646.
ISSN 0268-1064
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Abstract
In this response to Malt's and Prinz's commentaries, I argue that neo-empiricist hypotheses fail to threaten the argument for the elimination of 'concept' because they are unlikely to be true of all concepts, if they are true at all. I also defend the hypothesis that we possess bodies of knowledge retrieved by default from long-term memory, and I argue that prototypes, exemplars, and theories form genuinely distinct concepts. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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