Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz

Machery, E (2010) Reply to Barbara Malt and Jesse Prinz. Mind and Language, 25 (5). 634 - 646. ISSN 0268-1064

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Abstract

In this response to Malt's and Prinz's commentaries, I argue that neo-empiricist hypotheses fail to threaten the argument for the elimination of 'concept' because they are unlikely to be true of all concepts, if they are true at all. I also defend the hypothesis that we possess bodies of knowledge retrieved by default from long-term memory, and I argue that prototypes, exemplars, and theories form genuinely distinct concepts. © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Details

Item Type:	Article
Status:	Published
Creators/Authors:	Creators Email Pitt Username ORCID Machery, E machery@pitt.edu MACHERY
Date:	1 November 2010
Date Type:	Publication
Journal or Publication Title:	Mind and Language
Volume:	25
Number:	5
Page Range:	634 - 646
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01406.x
Schools and Programs:	Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > History and Philosophy of Science
Refereed:	Yes
ISSN:	0268-1064
Date Deposited:	11 Mar 2013 18:34
Last Modified:	02 Feb 2019 15:59
URI:	http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17481

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