Against arguments from reference

Mallon, R and MacHery, E and Nichols, S and Stich, S (2009) Against arguments from reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79 (2). 332 - 356. ISSN 0031-8205

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Abstract

It is common in various quarters of philosophy to derive philosophically significant conclusions from theories of reference. In this paper, we argue that philosophers should give up on such 'arguments from reference.' Intuitions play a central role in establishing theories of reference, and recent cross-cultural work suggests that intuitions about reference vary across cultures and between individuals within a culture (Machery et al. 2004). We argue that accommodating this variation within a theory of reference undermines arguments from reference. © 2009 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC.

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Details

Item Type:	Article
Status:	Published
Creators/Authors:	Creators Email Pitt Username ORCID Mallon, R MacHery, E machery@pitt.edu MACHERY Nichols, S Stich, S
Date:	1 September 2009
Date Type:	Publication
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume:	79
Number:	2
Page Range:	332 - 356
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00281.x
Schools and Programs:	Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > History and Philosophy of Science
Refereed:	Yes
ISSN:	0031-8205
Date Deposited:	01 Mar 2013 19:15
Last Modified:	24 Jan 2019 00:55
URI:	http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17496

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