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The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issues

MacHery, E (2008) The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issues. Mind and Language, 23 (2). 165 - 189. ISSN 0268-1064

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Abstract

Recent experimental findings by Knobe and others (Knobe, 2003; Nadelhoffer, 2006b; Nichols and Ulatowski, 2007) have been at the center of a controversy about the nature of the folk concept of intentional action. I argue that the significance of these findings has been overstated. My discussion is two-pronged. First, I contend that barring a consensual theory of conceptual competence, the significance of these experimental findings for the nature of the concept of intentional action cannot be determined. Unfortunately, the lack of progress in the philosophy of concepts casts doubt on whether such a consensual theory will be found. Second, I propose a new, deflationary interpretation of these experimental findings, 'the trade-off hypothesis', and I present several new experimental findings that support this interpretation. © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.


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Details

Item Type: Article
Status: Published
Creators/Authors:
CreatorsEmailPitt UsernameORCID
MacHery, Emachery@pitt.eduMACHERY
Date: 1 April 2008
Date Type: Publication
Journal or Publication Title: Mind and Language
Volume: 23
Number: 2
Page Range: 165 - 189
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00336.x
Schools and Programs: Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > History and Philosophy of Science
Refereed: Yes
ISSN: 0268-1064
Date Deposited: 01 Mar 2013 19:19
Last Modified: 02 Feb 2019 15:59
URI: http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17505

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