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Concept empiricism: A methodological critique

Machery, E (2007) Concept empiricism: A methodological critique. Cognition, 104 (1). 19 - 46. ISSN 0010-0277

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Thanks to Barsalou's, Damasio's, Glenberg's, Prinz' and others' work, neo-empiricism is gaining a deserved recognition in the psychology and philosophy of concepts. I argue, however, that neo-empiricists have underestimated the difficulty of providing evidence against the amodal approach to concepts and higher cognition. I highlight three key problems: the difficulty of sorting out amodal predictions from neo-empiricist predictions, the difficulty of finding experimental tasks that are not best solved by imagery and the difficulty of generalizing findings concerning a given cognitive process in a given context to other cognitive processes or other contexts. Finally, solutions to these three problems are considered. © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.


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Item Type: Article
Status: Published
CreatorsEmailPitt UsernameORCID
Machery, Emachery@pitt.eduMACHERY
Date: 1 July 2007
Date Type: Publication
Journal or Publication Title: Cognition
Volume: 104
Number: 1
Page Range: 19 - 46
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1016/j.cognition.2006.05.002
Schools and Programs: Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences > History and Philosophy of Science
Refereed: Yes
ISSN: 0010-0277
Date Deposited: 01 Mar 2013 19:21
Last Modified: 02 Feb 2019 15:59


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