Machery, E
(2011)
Variation in Intuitions about Reference and Ontological Disagreements.
In:
A Companion to Relativism.
UNSPECIFIED, 118 - 136.
ISBN 9781405190213
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Abstract
Previous research suggests that intuitions about reference vary within and across cultures. After having examined and criticized some recent objections formulated against this body of research, I argue that, in combination with some plausible assumptions, variation of intuitions within and across cultures entails some form of referential pluralism - viz. the same word (e.g., "Paris" ) can refer differently for different competent speakers - and that, as a consequence, an infl uential kind of ontological disagreement (disagreements about whether there are such things as x's or whether x's are identical to y's) is vacuous. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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