

**THE BEGINNING OF THE PATH TO SELF-DISCOVERY:
A STUDY ON LIANG QICHAO'S CONCEPT OF NATION**

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In this thesis, I will analyze how Liang Qichao's idea of nation played a role in the emergence of national identity in China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The concept of nation in China didn't emerge from the bottom-up spontaneously. Rather, I will argue, the emergence of Chinese national identity can largely be explained as an imported ideology pursued by Chinese elites. In the formation of the concept of nation in China, not only the contact with the West but also interactions and tensions among the East Asian countries were crucial.

This thesis is divided into two interdependent parts. The first part deals with theoretical studies of nationalism and national identity, and it will provide a general picture of the major theoretical trend in nationalism. This part will explore three major perspectives: the primordialist perspective that describes ethnic identities as something fixed and unchanging; the ethno-symbolist perspective that argues that pre-modern ethnic ties are important in understanding the formation of modern nations and nationalism; and the modernist perspective that treats nationalism as a recent phenomenon. Through a critical evaluation of theories of nationalism and national identity, I will begin to discern the contours of how Liang Qichao's concept of nation was formed.

In the second part, by way of introducing nationalist discourses in China, I will explore historical concepts of nation and its boundaries. Since his arrival in Japan, Liang immersed

himself in Western political theory and read Japanese authors broadly, and his thoughts changed accordingly. As a result, Liang advocated great nationalism that would awaken a sense of belonging to China in all the peoples of the Qing Empire. In this regard, the introduction of Liang's borrowed concept of nation to China was a transformative event for Chinese national self-perception.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Discourses on national identity have been part of nation building in Western Europe since the eighteenth century.¹ Shaping a nation as part of a process of becoming national can also be found in Russia and Germany in the nineteenth century.² Outside of Europe, they started dominating intellectual disputes in Asia as soon as it was threatened by the Western powers and ideas. In other words, the formation of nation in East Asia began with the influence of the West, and differences among these countries' historical circumstances resulted in divergent national identities. However, the term "nation" is often included in journalistic and academic discourse without any explanation for its content and origin. Therefore, this research aims to better conceptualize the development of nationalism and Chinese national identities by analyzing the concept of nation in a historical context. This research is divided into two interrelated parts: the theoretical debate on national identity and nationalism; and the formation process of Chinese national identities.

¹ Willfried Spohn and Anna Triandafyllidou, "Introduction," in *Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration : Changes in Boundary Constructions between Western and Eastern Europe*, ed. Willfried Spohn and Anna Triandafyllidou(London [etc.]: Routledge), 3-4.

² Konrad Hugo Jarausch and Michael Geyer, *Shattered Past : Reconstructing German Histories* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 23.; Pål Kolstø, "Nation-Building in Russia: A Value-Oriented Strategy," in *Nation-Building and Common Values in Russia*, ed. Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 7-10.

The first part deals with theoretical studies on nationalism and national. By a critical analysis of the literature, the first part presents a synthesis of arguments from a larger body of literature on nations and nationalism. This part will explore three major perspectives, the primordialist perspective that describes ethnic identities as something fixed and unchanging, the ethno-symbolist perspective that argues that nation is founded on ethnic communities, and the modernist perspective that treats nationalism as a recent phenomenon. Following this theoretical analysis, an assessment will be made as to the relevance of each of these theoretical approaches. Through this assessment, I will explore the second part from the standpoint of the modernist perspective because it responds more adequately to the analysis of nationalist discourse in the context of nation building. The ethno-symbolist and primordialist perspectives that respectively emphasize the ethnic origin of nations and the sustainability of national communities beyond the historical period associated with modernity do not take into account the social construction of cultural, ethnic, or in some cases, racial and nationalist discourse. The main problem in the use of these perspectives was to find the ethnic or cultural essence of a particular nation.

In the second part, I will analyze the nationalist discourse in China with emphasis on Liang Qichao in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This study of the nationalist discourse will provide a broad perspective on the formation process of Chinese national identities. These dimensions also provide information about how intellectuals of the time played a significant role in pursuit of national identities for their own purposes of legitimation and political mobilization. This section attempts to show how the concept of nation in China is constructed as an imported ideology pursued by reformist intellectuals in the period throughout the course of modernization. More specifically, this section attempts to understand how the formation of Chinese national identities can result from such a relation between the imported

ideology and its acceptance by the people. I will demonstrate how the different concepts of race, ethnicity, and culture used in the identity debate at the turn of the twentieth century can be manipulated, redefined, invented, and reinvented according to the plan or policy of those who use them.

1.1 METHODOLOGY

I envision this thesis as an investigation of two primary issues: the analysis of the main theoretical approaches to nationalism and national identity and the process of establishment of Chinese national identity. The first part of my study will deal with the analysis of the main theoretical approaches to nationalism and national identity and the applicability of these theories to the development of Chinese national identities. This literature review provides a general picture of the major theoretical trend in nationalism. In addition, a critical evaluation of theories of nationalism will be used to analyze the formation of nation in China in the second part.

The second part of my study will consist of careful analysis of documents written in the late Qing dynasty as well as written articles in the Meiji period, wherein I will explore the relationship among these countries in terms of the concept of nation. I will also pay attention to when the socio-cultural context of the enlightenment period (of the early 1900s) is reflected in the process by which its meaning was fixed. Then, I will begin to discern the contours of how Chinese elites responded to the introduction of the new concept and its usage of meaning by analyzing their writings, publications, or periodicals. The usage of borrowed meaning of nation is a space wherein its important role in the establishment of a modern nation-state can be

witnessed and problematized. By examining such spaces, I will be able to explore the process by which Chinese national identities were established.

2.0 THEORIES OF NATIONS AND NATIONALISM

The study of nationalism has grown considerably after World War II, and nationalism has been a popular research topic for the modern social sciences.³ After the events of the First World War, few authors of that time, such as Carleton B. Hayes and Hans Kohn, focused on nationalism as a subject of study, but the political context of the interwar period left little room for an extensive analysis on the origin and the development of nationalism.⁴ According to Eric Hobsbawm, “the number of works genuinely illuminating the question of what nations and national movements are and what historical role they play is larger in the period 1968 to 1988 than for any earlier period twice the length.”⁵

It is possible to identify three phases in the development of academic research on nationalism since the Second World War. The first phase, from the mid-twentieth century to the late 1960s, threw into relief the reality of nations both socially and historically. This phase was characterized by a realist and optimistic view of nations and nationalism in the period of nation-

³ Edward A. Tiryakian, "Nationalism and Modernity: A Methodological Appraisal," in *Perspectives on Nationalism and War*, ed. John L. Comaroff and Paul C. Stern ([Amsterdam]: Gordon and Breach, 1995), 205-207.

⁴ For the most exemplary works, see Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: R.R. Smith, Inc., 1931).; Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism : A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1944).

⁵ E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780 : Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 4.

state building particularly in Asia and Africa.⁶ On this view, nationalism articulates each nation's strivings for autonomy and independence.⁷ However, with the change in the structure of the international system, nationalism could play a role in provoking international conflict, and most of the academic community has questioned the optimistic view on nationalism.

This reaction has been shaped by the work of Ernest Gellner that is demonstrating the social construction of nationalism through the phenomenon of modernity. This has led to the emergence of the classic modernist perspective that is prevalent in the study of nationalism. The Modernist perspective criticized what it saw as the perennialism and essentialism in the older perspectives, referring the immemorial or perennial character of the type of social and political organization known as nation.⁸ Classical modernism highlighted the specificity of the concept of nation and its relation to the rise of the enlightenment and modernity. However, the causal link between nationalism and historical context is exactly what will be questioned later by some scholars who rely rather on cultural, ethnic, and biological factors. The development of these schools of thought in the 70s and 80s is the second phase.

Finally, the third phase begins in the normative implication of nation and nationalism since the late 20th century. With socio-economic transformations and the inevitable historical change of social systems, the relevance and sustainability of the nation-state and nationalism were challenged. Several authors, such as Habermas and Omae, argued that the economic and social changes in the late twentieth century marked the beginning of the crisis for the nation-state,

⁶ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism : A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2003), 2-3.

⁷ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed : Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13-14.

⁸ Smith, 18-19.

national identity, and nationalism.⁹ Moreover, migration and associated economic globalization would inevitably lead the world into a new stage which produced the wave of post-national thinking. From this perspective, the authority of national identities is being replaced by more complex cosmopolitan identities.¹⁰ However, several scholars, such as James Tully and Michael Keating, raised questions about the consequences of such changes on various national and collective identities. They criticized the view of the end of the nation-state and stressed that the end of the nation-state is not anywhere on the horizon, even if relations between territory and politics are indeed changing.¹¹ Although some of these authors subscribed to the inevitability of the end of nationalism in the long term, most minimized the influence of historical changes associated with cosmopolitan approaches and still believed in the relevance and the usefulness of the nation-state and nationalism.

In summary, the first phase laid the foundation to enable the implementation of the concept of nation and nationalism in all communities. Based on the Western model, the theory was then applied to other cultural and ethnic communities living in other regions of the world. This period of post-colonial independence has led to the emergence of many nation-states with varying degrees of success. The second phase showed studies on the implementation of the nation-state model and found its essence in the academic debate on the origin and development

⁹ According to Omae and Habermas, in the face of economic globalization and the growth of technological power, the crisis of the nation-state occurred and its sovereignty is weakened. On the crisis of the nation-state, see Jürgen Habermas and Max Pensky, *The Postnational Constellation : Political Essays*, 1st MIT Press ed., Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).; Ken'ichi Omae, *The End of the Nation State : The Rise of Regional Economies* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

¹⁰ William D. Coleman and Steven F. Bernstein, *Unsettled Legitimacy : Political Community, Power, and Authority in a Global Era* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009), 152-153.

¹¹ Alain Gagnon and James Tully, *Multinational Democracies* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 55-56.; Alain Gagnon and Michael Keating, *Political Autonomy and Divided Societies : Imagining Democratic Alternatives in Complex Settings* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 186-189.

of the nation and nationalism. Finally, the third phase exposed the debate on the model of the nation-state and nationalism and its relevance and viability.

In this section, the primordialist, the ethno-symbolist, and the modernist perspective on nations and nationalism will be examined. These concepts raised heated debates academically, politically, and socially. Moreover, most of them that analyzed the emergence of nationalism since the late eighteenth century tend to focus primarily on Europe as a subject and try to apply their analysis to all nation states. These assumptions will be discussed, but the objective here is to compare different theories and major debates on the concept of nation and nationalism and to better understand the construction of East Asian national identities.

2.1 PRIMORDIALISM

The primordialist perspective is to demonstrate how nation is not an invention or imagination, but a reality that transcends historical movement of modernity.¹² Despite their significant differences of opinion, most primordialists often insist on ethnicity as causal analysis in the development of nations and nationalism. According to Pierre van den Berghe, a well-known primordialist, “ethnicity can be manipulated but not manufactured. Unless ethnicity is rooted in generations of shared historical experience, it cannot be created *ex nihilo*.”¹³ It is possible to divide primordialists into three groups according to their perception of the origin of nation: the sociobiological origin of nation can be traced back in the confines of humanity; cultural

¹² Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, *Nationalism : A Critical Introduction* (London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2002), 27.

¹³ Pierre L. Van den Berghe, *The Ethnic Phenomenon* (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1987), 27.

background and essence is the core which nations are made; and nations and ethnic communities are identical, and thus biological primordialists and cultural primordialists can be combined under the name perennialists.¹⁴

The first group, which might be called biological primordialists, argues that the nation is genetically explainable and can be studied with the aid of a framework for biological analysis.¹⁵ The nation is in fact an extension of small communities, clans, families in which human beings has always worked since the beginning of time. Pierre van den Berghe is the main advocate of this approach linking the development of nationalism and sociobiological perspective. According to van den Berghe, human behavior must be interpreted in an evolutionary framework based on genes and environmental factors. In other words, social forms, such as kinship, tribe, and the nation, are created and maintained neither by human free will nor by the nature of social structure and culture, but by the internal driving force of genes.¹⁶

However, several criticisms have been made to this approach. Most scholars of nationalism challenged van den Berghe's theories by highlighting the major differences between a modern nation and clan or family. A main criticism of biological primordialism is that the members of multicultural and multiethnic nations do not share the same genealogical line. Moreover, wars, migration, and interethnic marriages have remained in operation for several millennia of mankind's history, and the fluidity and malleability of nations made obsolete all

¹⁴ However, some scholars, such as Anthony D. Smith, argue that perennialists need not be primordialists and it is necessary to keep the distinction in mind. Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism : Theory, Ideology, History* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), 53-55.

¹⁵ Sandra Fullerton Joireman, *Nationalism and Political Identity* (London; New York: Continuum, 2003), 21-24.

¹⁶ Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac, *When Is the Nation? : Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2005), 212-215.

attempts to explain the biological foundation for social groupings.¹⁷

For primordialists who based their analysis on culture, it is imperative to emphasize the cultural essence of communities to explain the birth of nations. In other words, there are the social and cultural links between the different members of a family, a community, and on a larger scale, a nation that form groups of individuals. According to Clifford Geertz, an anthropologist who wrote on the importance of culture in forming ethnic identities, primordial attachments stem as follows:

By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the “givens” – or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed “givens” – of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves.¹⁸

In addition, Geertz showed how primordial attachments, such as language and religion, persisted alongside the civil ties of the rational order of modern polities and society. He argued that the drive to create and live in an efficient, orderly state and civil society served to exacerbate primordial attachments among ethnic groups in the new states, because sovereign state power and its patronage introduce into society a new prize over which to fight and a frightening new force with which to contend.¹⁹ Thus, the newly formed states in Asia and Africa after the Second World War have been facing chronic internal problems “between the need to maintain a socially ratified personal identity and the desire to construct a powerful national community.”²⁰

¹⁷ Donald G. Ellis, *Transforming Conflict : Communication and Ethnopolitical Conflict* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 56-58.; Joireman, 31-33.

¹⁸ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures : Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 259-260.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 270.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 309.

While Geertz emphasized the significance of primordiality by negating the possibility of a view of identity construction, this primordial theory has been criticized by many scholars. Eller and Coughlan criticized that the assumption of primordiality abandons the empirical investigation as to how “cultural-symbolic practices...produce and reproduce identity and attachment” by assigning the identity markers *a priori* status.²¹ Hutchinson and Smith also argued that the main problem with the theory is that the highly fixed system does not explain the frequent cultural changes witnessed within ethnic groups, nor does it explain the emergence of new ethnic groups.²²

The third group, perennialists, also recounted nation as the pre-modern ethnic continuity of social and political organizations. Some perennialists used the hermeneutics of sacred texts, such as Torah and New and Old Testament, to show that nation, even by modern definition, has existed in various historical periods.²³ According to Steven Grosby, nation is a “community of kinship, specifically a bounded, territorially extensive, temporally deep community of nativity.”²⁴ He also argued that several communities in antiquity, Egypt, Greece, Assyria, Israel etc., had these characteristics and formed nations as well as modern nations. In the article on the community of Israel in antiquity, Grosby argued as follows:

²¹ Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, "The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachment," *Ethnic and racial studies* 16, (1993): 199.

²² John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnicity, Religion, and Language," in *Ethnicity*, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 32-34.

²³ Steven Elliott Grosby, *Biblical Ideas of Nationality : Ancient and Modern* (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2002).; Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).; David Aberbach, *Jewish Cultural Nationalism : Origins and Influences* (London; New York: Routledge, 2008).

²⁴ Steven Elliott Grosby, *Nationalism : A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 142.

the existence of the nation, whether ancient Israel or the modern nation-state, is predicated upon the existence of a collective consciousness constituted by a belief that there is a territory which belongs to only one people, and that there is a people which belongs to only one territory.²⁵

In other words, each of these communities exists insofar as it identifies a specific territory that belongs to that specific community. By linking the territory and the collective consciousness, Grosby demonstrated that nation exists in various forms for thousands of years.

However, Grosby's analysis left room for questions. First, the use of religious texts like the Old Testament as empirical source is problematic because of the numerous changes made to these works over the centuries. Translations, revisions, and omissions have drastically reduced the analytical value of their historic structures. Second, Grosby stressed the spiritual factor of the collective consciousness in relation to its territory. Modern society has little connection with pre-modern communities because of the transformations of institutional, cultural, and demographic nations that have shaped and changed the perception of territory.²⁶ It also overlooked the essential differences between the geographic area that provides subsistence resources to a given populations and political territories.²⁷ Third, Grosby's analysis does not explain how pre-modern nations developed an attachment to the state. Without the state that establishes the collective imagination in a national community by the standardization of language and popular culture, it is hard to imagine that the members of these communities could develop a collective consciousness beyond the limits of their place of origin.

²⁵ Grosby, *Biblical Ideas of Nationality : Ancient and Modern*, 27.

²⁶ Ichijo and Uzelac, 82-83.

²⁷ Adam T. Smith, *The Political Landscape : Constellations of Authority in Early Complex Polities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 152-156.

2.2 ETHNO-SYMBOLISM

Ethno-symbolism, developed by Anthony D. Smith, attempts to link primordialism and modernism. In other words, this approach attempts to link ethnic groups to the formation of nations. Although Smith does not refute the main argument of modernists that nation is a modern invention, he argued that it has its origin in pre-modern cultural and ethnic groups. According to Smith, collective cultural identity is as follows:

Collective cultural identity refers not to a uniformity of elements over generations but to a sense of continuity on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population, to shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of that unit and to notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture.²⁸

Smith's analysis on the relevance of the ethnic origins of nations becomes central to his understanding of "why and where particular nations are formed, and why nationalisms, through formally alike, possess such distinctive features and contents."²⁹ In his view, nations have as their foundations distinctive *ethnie*, defined as "named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity."³⁰ In addition, his definition of nation is "a named human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members."³¹ Although the definition of nation is similar to his definition of ethnic group, Smith distinguished two concepts by arguing that

²⁸ Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 25.

²⁹ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism : A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998), 191.

³⁰ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, UK; New York, NY, USA: B. Blackwell, 1986), 320.

³¹ Smith, *National Identity*, 14.

“ethnic communities do not have several of the attributes of the nation. They need not be resident in “their” territorial homeland. Their culture may not be public or common to all the members... Nor need they have common legal codes with common rights and duties for all.”³² He also argues that the modern nation is characterized by two dimensions, “the one civic and territorial, the other ethnic and genealogical, in varying proportions in particular cases.”³³ For him, it is therefore the interaction between these two dimensions which allows national identity to persist in the modern political society. Moreover, it also indicates that there is a gradual transformation of ethnic and cultural communities into a national political community.

Anthony D. Smith considers several elements that form the basic principles of ethno-symbolism: the study of nation and nationalism over long periods of time; the long-term relationship between national past, present, and future; the ethnic basis of nations; cultural components of *ethnies*; ethnic myths and symbols; the study of ethno-history; the context of transformation of ethnic communities to nations; and the sustainability of nation-state.

Smith argued that “we want to grasp the power and understand the shape of modern nations, as well as their possible future course, over long period of time and not tie their existence and formation to a particular period of history.”³⁴ This contrasts with the modernists’ relatively restrictive periodization, which is limited to the historical context of modernity. This methodological postulate is the first step towards a differentiation between the modernist and the ethno-symbolist perspective on nationalism. According to Smith, the study of nationalism

³² Ibid., 40.

³³ Ibid., 15.

³⁴ Anthony D. Smith, "Ethno-Symbolism and the Study of Nationalism," in *Nations and Nationalism : A Reader*, ed. Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 23.

requires a special analysis over a long period of ethno-cultural elements that make up the modern nations, but which are rooted in historical periods that precede modernity.³⁵

In addition, in the ethno-symbolist perspective, the relationship between national past, present, and future is crucial to understand the evolution and formation of nations, and it can be examined under three headings: recurrence, continuity, and reappropriation. First, through an empirical analysis of a long historical period, it is possible to see that some ethnic elements which determine their importance in a national context recur. According to Smith, these elements can be “ethnic origin myths, beliefs in ethnic election, the development of ethnoscares, the territorialization of memory, and the vernacular mobilization of communities.”³⁶ Second, continuity is the element that determines the origin of nations. Continuity of elements, such as names, symbols, languages, customs, rituals and territories of national identity, demonstrates the persistence of cultural components of particular nations, despite the breaks often introduced by conquest, colonization, migration, and assimilation.³⁷ Third, the reappropriation represents the movement reaching back into the ethnic past to obtain the authentic materials and ethos for a distinct modern nation. Despite the obvious manipulation of several philologists, historians and archaeologists to legitimize the formation of a nation, Smith argued that it is still necessary “to treat these activities of nationalist intellectuals as an essential element of the complex interrelationship between national present (and future) and ethnic past.”³⁸

³⁵ Smith, *Nationalism : Theory, Ideology, History*, 61-62.

³⁶ Smith, "Ethno-Symbolism and the Study of Nationalism," 24.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., 25.

The ethnic origin of nations and nationalism is the key element in the ethno-symbolist perspective. According to Smith, ethnic groups have always existed since the beginning of mankind. Moreover, ethnic communities or ethnic groups have a common name or emblem, a shared cultural element, and a link with a particular territory and a common degree of solidarity.³⁹ In this perspective, the vast majority of all modern nations have ethnic cores, dominant populations united by presumed ties of shared ancestry and vernacular culture, which allows the public to differentiate themselves from other people.⁴⁰ Thus, Smith argued that the study of ethnic cores can lay the foundations of different nation-state models.

The study of pre-modern ethnicities requires an analysis of the symbols and cultures that allowed members of these communities to be united. Cultural differentiation among ethnic groups can demarcate the boundary between ethnic communities and also unite “the members of each *ethnie* (ethnic community) and structure their relations and activities.”⁴¹ Myths and ethnic symbols are fundamental components of the cultural dimension of ethnic groups. Myths of origin and descent include accounts of the time and place of the community’s origins. In addition, symbols of territory and community include features that differentiate ethnic groups such as flags, totems, coins, ritual objects, hymns and anthems, special foods and costume, as well as representations of ethnic deities, monarchs and heroes.⁴² Thus, according to Smith, the presumed origins of ethnic groups have analytical significance because they can trace the cultural parameters by which a community defines itself.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 26.

⁴¹ Smith, "Ethno-Symbolism and the Study of Nationalism," 26-27.

⁴² Ibid., 28.

How ethnic communities have come to form nations in the modern world is an important aspect of ethno-symbolism. According to Armstrong, a variety of factors, including “the influences of great religious civilizations like Islam and Christianity, the impact of imperial administrations and constitutive political myths, the differences in ecclesiastical organization, the role of particular languages,” were combined to create the impetus for particular nations.⁴³ Based on Armstrong’s argument, Smith traced the routes by which modern nations have been formed as follows:

A route of *bureaucratic incorporation* by which aristocratic *ethnies* may forge strong states and incorporate outlying regions and lower classes into their upper-class ethnic culture and symbolism; a route of *vernacular mobilization* whereby an indigenous intelligentsia uses folk culture to mobilize middle and lower strata and create ethnic nations; and finally, an *immigrant-colonist route* in which the founding immigrant *part-ethnie* is supplemented by waves of pioneering colonizers who together create a plural or *polyethnic* immigrant nation and culture.⁴⁴

However, the ethno-symbolist perspective was criticized for several reasons. First, according to modernist writers, the ethno-symbolist perspective minimized the differences between modern nations and ethnic communities. This criticism indicated that there is a lack of information which tells whether pre-modern ethnic communities were able to differentiate various groups. According to Ozkirimli, “even when a consciousness existed, it was mostly confined to an intellectual elite sentiments as the stage was not yet for the diffusion of ethnic sentiments to the wider public.”⁴⁵ Therefore, it is impossible to verify whether community awareness was embedded within all social strata. Second, ethnic communities have been subject to major changes over the centuries, such as wars, demographic shifts, and immigration, which

⁴³ Quoted in Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 18.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism : A Critical Introduction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 184.

greatly reduced the possibility of the persistence of ethnic identities. Third, ethno-symbolists do not sufficiently take into account the historical role of institutions in the development of nations and nationalism. According to Breuilly, “the problem with identity established outside institutions, especially those institutions which can bind together people across wide social and geographical spaces, is that it is necessarily fragmentary, discontinuous and elusive.”⁴⁶ In other words, without such institutions which can reach a large number of individuals over a large area, community identities remain confined to small groups.

2.3 MODERNISM

The modernist perspective regards nation as a modern political construction that emerged in the process of state-building. According to Ernest Gellner, the relation between nations and states in the modernist approach is as follows:

In fact, nations, like states, are a contingency, and not a universal necessity. Neither nations nor states exist at all times and in all circumstances. Moreover, nations and states are not the same contingency. Nationalism holds that they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy.⁴⁷

Gellner argued that the main vector of nationalism is found in the capitalist industrial societies of Europe in the nineteenth century and that nationalism took shape in the social transformation such as the transition from agrarian to industrial society. According to Gellner agrarian society is composed of horizontal strata that define the general population, comprised mostly of farmers

⁴⁶ John Breuilly, "Approaches to Nationalism," in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan and Benedict R. O'G Anderson (London; New York: Verso, 2012), 151.

⁴⁷ Ernest Gellner and John Breuilly, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), 6.

and a ruling class, such as clergies and civil servants.⁴⁸ A ruling class used culture to emphasize their separate status from the rest of the population.

As the result of the nature of agrarian societies, there was a differentiation between the elites and peasant communities through the use of liturgical language, the written and developed language of the ruling elite.⁴⁹ Peasant communities themselves do not often use the same dialect from village to village and had no political claims to encourage the clustering of these linguistic communities. Social mobility between occupations was also difficult, if not impossible, because of a rigid and established social order. According to Gellner, while there is no cultural homogenization of larger populations in greatly stratified agrarian societies, the advent of industrialization required a radical transformation of society, which enabled the development of nationalism. Gellner explained why industrial societies require nations and nationalism as follows:

In an age of universalized clerisy and Mamluk-dom, the relationship of culture and polity changes radically. A high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by the polity. *That* is the secret of nationalism.⁵⁰

Moreover, Gellner claimed that an insistently innovative industrial society tends towards greater mobility, equality and homogenization of standards and language of instruction in order to strive successfully in the world market.⁵¹ In this process, because “the generic education in basic

⁴⁸ Anthony D. Smith, "History and Modernity: Reflections on the Theory of Nationalism," in *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*, ed. John A. Hall and I. C. Jarvie (Amsterdam; Atlanta, Ga.: Rodopi, 1996), 130.

⁴⁹ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 11.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Smith, "History and Modernity: Reflections on the Theory of Nationalism," 130.

⁵¹ Rosaire Langlois, "Coercion, Cognition and Production: Gellner's Challenge to Historical Materialism and Postmodernism," in *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*, ed. John A. Hall and I. C. Jarvie (Amsterdam; Atlanta, Ga.: Rodopi, 1996), 614.

numeracy and literacy enables everyone to be in a position to become a specialist,” industrial societies create the standard of education and language.

The new division of labor led people to be more mobile because the nature of modern society became more complex and required rapid changes to respond to constant economic growth. In addition, a modern industrial society requires language standardization to implement such functions as administrative control and compulsory education. Gellner claimed that language standardization was an inevitable consequence of the state in the age of industrialization in order to create the “cultural infrastructure” without which a modern industrial economy could not function.⁵² In other words, a rapidly industrializing society required a mobile workforce and the capacity to communicate through a standardized language. Thus, people could achieve a sense of themselves which would be first based on their modern surroundings and only subsequently attached to cultural senses of self, namely national identity.

For modernists, nation-states and nationalism are modern inventions, namely, as a form of social organization that emerged due to technological progresses and industrialization, as well as the increase of mass literacy.⁵³ In addition, Eric Hobsbawm remarked that nationalism appeared at the end of the nineteenth century in European countries, such as France and Italy, when their aim was the creation of territorial states.⁵⁴ This also means that nations were characterized by the extent of their territory and the size of their population.

The term “imagined community” was popularized by Benedict Anderson who defined a nation as an imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and

⁵² Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 35-38.

⁵³ Gellner and Breuilly, *Nations and Nationalism*, 19-37.; Benedict R. O’G Anderson, *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London; New York: Verso, 1991), 37-46.

⁵⁴ E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 142.

sovereign.⁵⁵ According to Anderson, a nation is imagined because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”⁵⁶ He also argued that a nation is sovereign because it generates its own rules within its borders while it is continuously conceived as a “deep, horizontal comradeship” in which all are equal as members of the nation.⁵⁷ In the dissemination of a national consciousness, it was not only the commoditized production of print in books, novels, and especially newspapers that linked people and events from disparate places and times but also the clock and the calendar that enabled people to think of relations to others across countries and continents, and thus to encourage a consecutive view of history.⁵⁸

According to Anderson, media markets, especially the economic and technological forces of print capitalism, required the standardization of vernacular languages throughout a given territory in order to circulate printed material at larger scales. Thus, a disparate group of individuals, who can hear the same information from such media as newspapers and novels, could generate a national consciousness that allowed them to imagine modes of social belonging. This was when the imaginary “kinship of the nation” was created. Anderson said that “the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the state for the modern nation.”⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Anderson, 6.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 6-7.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 14-16.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 46.

As stated above, the modernist perspective shares the belief that nations and nationalism are distinctly modern phenomena and that the context and conditions of modernity both demanded and expedited the birth of these national phenomena.⁶⁰ Modernity referred to “the modernization process itself, and to the socioeconomic, cultural, and political trends that comprised it, namely industrialization, urbanization, increased literacy and social mobility, and the consolidation of the modern state.”⁶¹ This approach is useful to clearly identify the many conceptual and ideological changes of Chinese national identity especially in regard to the times of dynastic transition in imperial China and the transition from the late Qing to the Republican era. In China, it is difficult to establish the existence of an ethnic core which can culturally and traditionally define the members of the modern nation, and thus how national identity emerged can be analyzed by studying the changing notions of the people held by a leading thinker, Liang Qichao.

⁶⁰ Sheila L. Croucher, *Globalization and Belonging : The Politics of Identity in a Changing World* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 95.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

3.0 THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NATIONAL IDENTITY IN CHINA

In this part, I will analyze the process of the formation of Liang Qichao's ideas about nation and nationalism and how Japan influenced these ideas. In the emergence and development of national discourse in China in the late nineteenth century, Chinese political elites debated the term *minzu* (nation).⁶² It formed the basis of an ethnic-ideological formation affecting the way the Chinese nation is shaped. The term *minzu* and the concept of *minzu zhuyi* (nationalism) were first used by Liang Qichao in 1901. Moreover, this term and its concept were borrowed from Japanese by Liang Qichao and other late *Qing* intellectuals, such as Sun Yat-sen, to develop their own theory of the modern nation state.⁶³

Liang Qichao imported the term *minzoku* (nation in Japanese) from Japan, a term already used in the 1870s but popularized in the late 1880 by the Japanese intellectual Shiga Shigetaka

⁶² Before the usage of the term *minzu*, *zu* as meaning a group or a community has long been present in the language. A sentence from the Chronicle of *Zuo*, a narrative history covering the period from 722 to 468 B.C.E., “*fei wo zulei, qi xin bi yi*” (If he be not of our kin, he is sure to have a different mind), is often quoted as the earliest evidence of a collective identity in China. According to Peng Yingming, the original usage of the character *zu* contains two meanings, a small descent group tied by a blood-relationship like a family or a clan and a larger group of people inhabiting the same territory. Lydia He Liu, *The Clash of Empires : The Invention of China in Modern World Making* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 72.; Peng, Yingming, “Guanyu woguo minzu gainian lishi de chubu kaocha,” *Minzu yanjiu* 2 (1985): 5-11, quoted in Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China = [Jin Dai Zhongguo Zhi Zhong Zu Guan Nian]* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 28-29.

⁶³ Michael Yahuda, "The Changing Faces of Chinese Nationalism: The Dimensions of Statehood," in *Asian Nationalism* ed. Michael Leifer (London [u.a.]: Routledge, 2000), 27.; Lydia Liu, *Translingual Practice Literature, National Culture and Translated Modernity, 1900-1937* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Pr., 1995), 48.

(1863-1927), editor of the magazine called *Nihonjin* (Japanese).⁶⁴ Liang was exiled in Japan in 1898 and for more than a decade following the failure of the Hundred Days Reform.⁶⁵ The manifestation of the word *minzu* (nation in Chinese), therefore, marked intercultural and conceptual exchanges at this pivotal period in China. The Chinese usage of the term *minzu* has some similarities with the German word *Volk*. According to Michael Inwood, he defined *Volk* as follows:

Volk means “people”... but with the rise of nationalism it acquired the sense of a people related by language, customs, culture and history, which may, but need not, be united in a single state. It is not sharply distinct in sense from Nation, imported in the fourteenth century from the Latin *natio*, which comes from *nasci* [to be born] and thus indicates a collection of people inhabiting a single area and related by birth.⁶⁶

As the meaning of *Volk*, *minzu* is tinged with ambiguity: it is considerably difficult to define clearly the meaning of the Chinese term *minzu* because it tends to indicate not only nationality but also ethnic group and race.⁶⁷ The word *minzu* shows the political meaning of nation as well as racial and cultural meanings. In other words, the definition of *minzu* focuses on belonging to a

⁶⁴ Magazine *Nihonjin* is a centerpiece of *Seikyosha* (the Society for Political Education) which Shiga founded with twelve other members. Shiga was particularly active in the areas of education as revealed in his biography by Masako Gavin, and he was also an advocate of Japanese cultural identity. See Masako Gavin, *Shiga Shigetaka, 1863-1927 : The Forgotten Enlightener* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001). About the introduction of the term *minzoku*, see Michael Weiner, "The Invention of Identity, Race and Nation in Pre-War Japan," in Michael Weiner, "The Invention of Identity, Race and Nation in Pre-War Japan," in *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Frank Dikötter (Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997), 96-117.

⁶⁵ The Hundred Days Reform (*wuxu bianfa* or *bairi weixin*) was initiated by Kang Youwei's advice under the reign of Guanxu emperor in 1898. Reformers sought to establish a constitutional monarchy based on the Japanese and British model and aimed at modernizing the administrative, economic, educational, and military system of the existing Qing dynasty. However, the conservatives, led by Empress Dowager Cixi, retook control of the government and put an end to these one hundred and three days of reform. June M. Grasso, Jay P. Corrin, and Michael Kort, *Modernization and Revolution in China* (Armonk, (N. Y.); London: M. E. Sharpe, 2009), 54-56.

⁶⁶ M. J. Inwood, *A Hegel Dictionary* (Oxford, OX, UK: Cambridge, Mass., USA : Blackwell, 1992), 212.

⁶⁷ Peter C. Perdue, "The Chinese," in *Demystifying China : New Understandings of Chinese History*, ed. Naomi Standen (2013), 20-21.

nation which claims a unique and distinct political community that is both inherently “limited and sovereign” as Benedict Anderson described. Therefore, the term *minzu* or nation, which contains new concepts and meanings at this period, occurred while searching for a new model for the country.

3.1 THE CHINESE COLLECTIVE IDENTITY BEFORE THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

A sentence from the *Zuo zhuan* (the chronicle of *Zuo*), a narrative history covering the period from 722 to 468 B.C.E., “*fei wo zulei, qi xin bi yi*” (If he be not of our kin, he is sure to have a different mind), is often quoted as the earliest evidence of a collective identity in China.⁶⁸ The term *zulei* (type of lineage) first appeared in the letter written by Ji Wenzhi, an adviser to the ancient state of Lu.⁶⁹ When the King of Lu tried to ally with the state of Chu against another rival state, Ji Wenzhi argued that “although Chu is great, it is not our *zu* (lineage).”⁷⁰ The state of Chu had sovereignty over the Yangzi River during the Spring and Autumn period. What Ji argued was that the Chu cannot be trusted because they are not of the same *zulei* as the Lu. In this sense, the term *zulei* indicated a small kinship unit or a low-level descent group.

⁶⁸ Sung-chiao Shen and Sechin Y.S. Chien, "Turning Slaves into Citizens: Discourses of Guomin and the Construction of Chinese National Identity in the Late Qing Period," in *The Dignity of Nations : Equality, Competition and Honor in East Asian Nationalism*, ed. Sechin Y. S. Chien(Aberdeen, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ. Press, 2006), 56-58.

⁶⁹ Tamara T. Chin, "Antiquarian as Ethnographer: Han Ethnicity in Early China Studies," in *Critical Han Studies : The History, Representation, and Identity of China's Majority*, ed. Thomas S. Mullaney(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2012), 130-132.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 133.

The relationship between the reigning Zhou kings in the capital and the feudal lords in the regional states had become one that was closely bound by blood connections.⁷¹ However, the blood ties weakened significantly in the late Spring and Autumn period. The boundaries of *zulei* had expanded gradually, and political regionalism replaced blood relationship.⁷² Moreover, the collapse of the Western Zhou under the attack of the Rong stimulated a rising consciousness of *Huaxia* (China) during the Spring and Autumn period.⁷³ The Zhou people made a distinction between their culturally more progressive selves and the peoples of adjacent regions that were thought of as culturally more backward.

Although the distinction between *Huaxia* and the barbarians often seems to be based on kinship, according to the mainstream of Confucianism represented by Mencius and Confucius, the standard determinant was mainly culture. For example, Mencius claimed Shun and King Wen, two of the most respected sage-kings in Chinese history, were barbarians.

Mencius said, "Shun was an Eastern Barbarian [dong-yi]; he was born in Chu Feng, moved to Fu Hsia, and died in Min T'iao. King Wen was a Western barbarian [xi-yi]; he was born in Ch'i Chou and died in Pi Ying. Their native places were over a thousand *li* apart, and there were a thousand years between them. Yet when they had their way in the Central Kingdoms [*Zhongguo*], their actions matched like the two halves of a tally. The standards of the two sages, one earlier and one later, were identical."⁷⁴

⁷¹ Archaeological study of the Spring and Autumn period during the past few decades focused on various regional cultures as material representations of the political regionalism of the period. Feng Li, *Landscape and Power in Early China : The Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou, 1045-771 Bc* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 292-293.

⁷² Lothar von Falkenhausen, "The Regionalist Paradigm in Chinese Archaeology," in *Nationalism, Politics, and the Practice of Archaeology*, ed. Philip L. Kohl and Clare P. Fawcett (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁷³ Stella Yingzi Xu, "That Glorious Ancient History of Our Nation : The Contested Re-Readings of "Korea" in Early Chinese Historical Records and Their Legacy on the Formation of Korean-Ness" (Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2007, 2007), 27-30.

⁷⁴ Mencius and D. C. Lau, *Mencius* (Harmondsworth, England; Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1970), 128.

Shun and King Wen were barbarians, but Mencius legitimated their control over the Central Kingdoms.

However, some Confucian scholars, such as Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692) and Gu Yanwu (1613-1682), never acknowledged the legitimacy of a non-Chinese ruler because of the problem of culture. For the boundary between the Barbarians and *Huaxia*, Wang Fuzhi argued as follows:

There are two great barriers in the empire: [the first is the barrier between] Chinese [*hua-xia*] and barbarians [*yi-di*], [and the second is that between] superior people [*junzi*] and petty-minded people [*xiaoren*]... The barbarians, with respect to the Chinese, are born in alien lands. As their lands are alien, their customs are alien, and as their customs are alien, so their behavior is entirely alien.⁷⁵

Wang insisted that non-Chinese rulers cannot be legitimated because their custom and culture are different. Moreover, although Confucian scholars acknowledged changes of dynasty, they could not accept that barbarians should take precedence over Chinese and corrupt Confucian ethics. Gu Yanwu wrote about the distinction between *tianxia* (all under heaven) and *guo* (country) as follows:

There is the perishing [*wang*] of *guo*, there's also the perishing of *tianxia*. The changing of names and titles [of dynasties] is the former, while blocking of *ren* [humanity] and *yi* [righteousness] even to the degree of eating each other like beasts is the latter... Therefore one knows to protect *tianxia* before he knows to protect his *guo*. Protecting *guo* is the obligations of *guo*'s emperors, ministers and officials, while protecting *tian xia* is the duty of everybody, including those in the lowest rank.⁷⁶

Confucian scholars considered barbarians who do not have the sense of Confucian morality, such as *Ren* (benevolence) and *Yi* (righteousness), as beasts. Gu advocated that the ordinary people should also be responsible to prevent the rule of the Barbarians, the cause of disturbing the stability of a society. However, while emphasizing the responsibility of the people, it should be

⁷⁵ Quoted in Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way ; the Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 23.

⁷⁶ Quoted in Tong Shijun, "Chinese Thought and Dialogical Universalism," in *Europe and Asia Beyond East and West*, ed. Gerard Delanty (London: Routledge, 2006), 306.

noted, what the sentence “protecting *tianxia* is the duty of everybody, including those in the lowest rank” means does not indicate sovereignty. This is a different concept from nationalism, which is based on the sovereignty of the people.

Therefore, the ancient Chinese had the concepts of *xia* and *yidi*, but did not have the concept of nation in the modern sense. According to the concept of *tianxia* (all under heaven), the Han civilization was considered as the center. The distinction between *huaxia* and *yidi* was not based on race and ethnicity but on whether or not the ruling class accepted Confucianism and was assimilated.⁷⁷ In other words, the way of distinguishing *xia* from *yi* is based on cultural attainment rather than race and ethnicity.

Since the 1840s, Western political ideas of national sovereignty increasingly flowed into China. China signed various unequal treaties in response to a series of failures in the war with the Western powers, such as the Opium War (1839-1842), the Arrow War (1856-1860), and the French-Chinese War (1884-1885).⁷⁸ In these circumstances, in order to enhance the national strength of China, the Chinese started the self-strengthening movement (1861-1895) to try to introduce Western science and technology to China.⁷⁹ Some intellectuals and bureaucrats, such as Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), Li Hongzhang (1823-1901), Feng Guifen (1809-1874), Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885), and Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), adopted the idea of national sovereignty

⁷⁷ Suisheng Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction : Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), 41-44.

⁷⁸ The usual content of the unequal treaties included ceding territory, paying indemnities, concessions, extraterritoriality, doing business and opening trading ports, negotiating tariffs, and designating spheres of influence. Xiaobing Li, *China at War : An Encyclopedia* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 468-469.

⁷⁹ Ting-yee Kuo, and Kwang-Ching Liu, "Self-Strengthening: The Pursuit of Western Technology," in *The Cambridge History of China. Volume 10, Part 1 Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911*, ed. Cambridge University of, John King Fairbank, and Denis Crispin Twitchett(London; New York; Melbourne: Cambridge university press, 1978).

and tried to fix the unequal treaties. However, the core idea of the movement was *zhong xue wei ti, xi xue wei yong* (Chinese learning as the fundamental structure and Western learning for its practical utility). In other words, Western arms, science and technology were to be utilized to preserve Confucian values.⁸⁰ It looks to be similar to the slogan *wa kon yo sai* (Japanese spirit, Western technology) in Japan. But while the Japanese slogan implies that Japan needs the learning and the technology of the West, but must preserve its own Japanese spirit, the Chinese slogan put the emphasis on maintaining the Confucian world order and its traditional culture.⁸¹

Despite a series of failures in the war, China continued to play a central role in politics in the East Asian region. However, after the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894, the Qing dynasty Northern Fleet, launched by Li Hongzhang, was defeated in the naval battle against the Japanese navy.⁸² The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in 1895, became a new illustration of the failure of the Qing dynasty and the failings of the new modern armies.⁸³ As a result, China handed the leadership in Northeast Asia to Japan, a newly emerging nation-state. Thereby, Chinese intellectuals' pride in Confucian culture shattered, and their *tian xia* system collapsed. As Liang Qichao (1873-1929) noted, the war "awakened China from the great dream of four thousand years."⁸⁴ Moreover, as Murata Yujiro pointed out, "the concept of the nation-state

⁸⁰ Zhao, 52-56.

⁸¹ Gordon Mathews, *Global Culture/Individual Identity : Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket* (London: Routledge, 2005), 30-35.

⁸² Jianhai Xiang and yuan Zhongguo ke xue, *Marine Science & Technology in China : A Roadmap to 2050* (Beijing; Heidelberg: Science Press ; Springer, 2010), 5-6.

⁸³ According to Crossley, in this battle, the Japanese fleet destroyed 8 out of 10 of the Qing ships, some of which had been supplied by corrupt military officials with rice instead of ammunition. Pamela Kyle Crossley, *The Wobbling Pivot, China since 1800 : An Interpretive History* (Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 94-96.

⁸⁴ Qichao Liang, "Gai Ge Qi Yuan," in *Yin Bing Shi He Ji* (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju : Xin hua shu dian Beijing fa xing suo fa xing, 1989), 113.

replete with sovereignty and territory took shape in modern China at the end of the nineteenth century after the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.”⁸⁵ Some intellectuals, such as Yan Fu (1854-1921) and Kang Youwei (1858-1927), became aware that China needed to learn not only Western military and industrial techniques but also its political system.

Yan Fu enrolled in naval school when he was 14 years old, and after graduation he served in the Chinese Navy as a practitioner. He was then sent to the British Naval Academy and studied in Britain for three years.⁸⁶ During his stay in the UK, he studied many Western works in various subjects such as philosophy and political economics.⁸⁷ In 1898, he translated *Evolution and Ethics* by Thomas Henry Huxley, published under the title of *Tian Yan Lun* (Theory of evolution). It was one of the most significant books in modern Chinese history. Especially, his translation of terms such as evolution (*tianyan*), struggle for existence (*wujing*), and survival of the fittest (*tianzhe*), had a tremendous impact on the Chinese people.⁸⁸

On the other hand, Kang Youwei had already begun the *bianfa weixin* (changing the laws and political reform) reform movement after the French-Chinese War. By the mid-1880s, he had produced an organized argument of his political and philosophical position. In his book, *shili gongfa quanshu* (a complete book of substantial truths and universal principles), Kang outlined

⁸⁵ Murata Yujiro, "Dynasty, State, and Society: The Case of Modern China," in *Imagining the People : Chinese Intellectuals and the Concept of Citizenship, 1890-1920*, ed. Joshua A. Fogel and Peter Gue Zarrow (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 113.

⁸⁶ Xinyan Jiang, "Enlightenment Movement," in *History of Chinese Philosophy*, ed. Bo Mou (London: Routledge, 2009), 474.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ As Yan Fu's translations became popular, *wujing* and *tianzhe* arose among Chinese intellectuals as neologisms. Sung-hwan Yi, *A Topography of Confucian Discourse : Politico-Philosophical Reflections on Confucian Discourse since Modernity* (Paramus, N.J.: Homa & Sekey Books, 2006), 129.

absolute moral truths based on a scientific approach that supported his universalism.⁸⁹ Moreover, he claimed not only the equality of humanity but a notion of individual autonomy based on the Confucian value of *ren* (benevolence).⁹⁰ Kang believed that the military successes of Meiji Japan served as a model for China and that China needed expanded education in the sciences and industry.⁹¹ In the wake of the Sino-Japanese War, it was possible to see the seeds of modern nationalism among the Chinese intellectuals, such as Yan Fu and Kang Youwei. However, the concept of nation in the modern sense had not yet been clearly recognized by Chinese elites.

3.2 LIANG QICHAO'S EARLY THOUGHT

Liang Qichao (1873-1929) was a native of Xinhui, Guangdong Province. When Liang was at the age of sixteen, he obtained his *juren* degree (literally recommended man).⁹² He spent the next few years studying in Guangzhou in a program that combined Neo-Confucian studies with the detailed and critical research on classical texts.⁹³ In 1890, after he failed the civil service examinations in Beijing, on his way back south he stopped in Shanghai, where he realized that

⁸⁹ Peter Zarrow, "The Reform Movement, the Monarchy, and Political Modernity," in *Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period : Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China*, ed. Rebecca E. Karl and Peter Gue Zarrow (Cambridge, Mass.: Published by the Harvard University Asia Center : Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2002), 24-33.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Federico Masini, *The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and Its Evolution toward a National Language : The Period from 1840 to 1898* (Berkeley: Project on Linguistic Analysis, University of California, 1993), 71-83.

⁹² John E. Wills, *Mountain of Fame : Portraits in Chinese History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 276-277.

⁹³ Ibid.

beyond the boundless Middle Kingdom were five continents and many other flourishing nations.⁹⁴ In the same year, Liang called on the prominent reformist thinker Kang Youwei. Thereafter Liang studied for four years at Kang's private school, *Wanmu Caotang*, in Guangzhou. During those four years, Kang's teachings laid Liang's intellectual foundation for his whole life.⁹⁵

The content of Kang's teachings was Confucian, but Kang also taught a vision of forward-looking change in human history, from disorder to small order to great harmony, in which all the usual barriers and disparities of human society would be swept away.⁹⁶ At the end of the nineteenth century, Confucian scholars had begun to place an emphasis on the importance of practical use in governing the world (*jingshi zhiyong*). Scholars focused not only on understanding the Classics but also using their knowledge toward social and political involvement.⁹⁷ Especially, Kang spent a great deal of time in developing his vision of a future in which all the world would be unified under a single universal government. In his book, the *Datong Shu* (the Book of great harmony), he proposed that all of human history has shown a movement through three great ages, that of chaos, of "small peace" (*xiaokang*), and of "great harmony" (*datong*).⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Xiaobing Tang, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity : The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), 1-2.

⁹⁵ Hao Chang, *Liang Ch`I-Ch`Ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890-1907* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 58-60.

⁹⁶ Wills, 277.

⁹⁷ Alison Adcock Kaufman, "One Nation among Many : Foreign Models in the Constitutional Thought of Liang Qichao" (Thesis (Ph. D. in Political Science)--University of California, Berkeley, Fall 2007, 2007), 50-51.

⁹⁸ For more background on Kang's idea, see Youwei Kang, *Da Tong Shu. The One-World Philosophy of K`Ang Yu-Wei* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958).

In 1895, Liang and Kang went to Beijing in 1895 for the *jinshi* examinations (literally presented scholar), the qualification that was required for the most senior official appointments in the empire.⁹⁹ In the same year, the Qing dynasty was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki which concluded the war, China was forced to cede the Liaodong region of southern Manchuria and Taiwan to Japan and grant many other privileges as well as a huge indemnity.¹⁰⁰ With other graduates of the provincial level examinations, Kang and Liang submitted a petition to the emperor demanding that the Treaty of Shimonoseki be rejected. Moreover, this was followed by petitions from across the country, demanding that the government implement a program of social and political reform.¹⁰¹

After the Sino-Japanese War, hundreds of newspapers and magazines were published in China and abroad. In 1895 and 1896, Liang Qichao assumed the editorship of two pioneering newspapers, *Zhongwai jiwen* (the Chinese and foreign news) and *Shiwu bao* (Current affairs).¹⁰² The first issue of *Zhongwai jiwen* was printed in December 1895. Besides national news selected from the Chinese official gazette and international news translated from the Reuters news agency and other Western newspapers, it also introduced translated Western scientific or other useful books, such as on Western railways and the mining industry.¹⁰³ However, after the Society for

⁹⁹ Michael Dillon, *China : A Modern History* (London; New York; New York: I.B. Tauris ; Distributed in the United States and Canada exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 115.

¹⁰⁰ An indemnity from the Qing to Japan granted by the treaty was 200,000,000 silver taels. And besides an indemnity, the treaty also granted Japan the right to open industrial factories within the Qing domain. William T. Rowe, *China's Last Empire : The Great Qing* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 233-236.

¹⁰¹ Dillon, 115-117.

¹⁰² Tang, 49.

¹⁰³ Xiantao Zhang, *The Origins of the Modern Chinese Press : The Influence of the Protestant Missionary Press in Late Qing China* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 70.

the Study of National Strengthening (*Qiangxue hui*), founded by Kang Youwei himself in Beijing and Shanghai in 1895, was outlawed, *Zhongwai jiwen* was also banned.¹⁰⁴ In September 1896, Liang Qichao officially launched *Shiwu bao* in Shanghai. The paper came out every ten days with about twenty pages of content, and the contents included current affairs reviews, news outside of the capital city, and summaries from foreign newspapers.¹⁰⁵ As the editor, Liang paid attention to the situation in China in order to persuade the readers to support reformist ideas.

Liang's main interests during this period appeared in "*Bianfa tongyi*" (General discussion of reforms), "*Xixue shumu biao*" (Bibliography of Western knowledge), and "*Du xixue shu fa*" (On reading books of Western learning). In *Bianfa tongyi*, published serially in 1896-97, Liang proposed that China's outmoded governmental system needed a fundamental overhaul, and he also analyzed the need to reform the civil service examination system, to invest in the education of women and children, and to establish a parliamentary government.¹⁰⁶ In *Xixue shumu biao*, he emphasized the importance of Western learning as well as traditional Chinese learning.¹⁰⁷ In October 1897, Liang was invited and joined the faculty of the *Shiwu xuetang* (Academy of current affairs) in Hunan. The *Shiwu xuetang* was based on modern, primarily Western, principles for education, and its main political agenda was legal reforms and the strengthening of civil right.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Hao Ping, *Peking University and the Origins of Higher Education in China* (Los Angeles: Bridge21 Publications, 2013), 133-134.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Qichao Liang, "Bianfa Tongyi," in *Yin Bing Shi Wen Ji : Dian Jiao*, ed. Qichao Liang and Song Wu(Kunming Shi: Yunnan jiao yu chu ban she, 2001), 1: 23-80.

¹⁰⁷ Qichao Liang, "Xixue Shumu Biao," in *Yin Bing Shi Wen Ji : Dian Jiao*, ed. Qichao Liang and Song Wu(Kunming Shi: Yunnan jiao yu chu ban she, 2001), 1: 141-146.

¹⁰⁸ Rune Svarverud, *International Law as World Order in Late Imperial China : Translation, Reception and Discourse, 1847-1911* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 215-217.

With the support of Emperor Guangxu, in 1898, the Hundred Days Reform (*Bairi weixin*) was launched with the aim of establishing a constitutional monarchy.¹⁰⁹ During this period, Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei had not used the term *guomin* (the people) or *minzu* (nation). However, because of Kang's influence, Liang had stressed the need for national unity. In *Bianfa tongyi*, Liang criticized the racial prejudice of the Han people toward the Manchus, insisting that over time evolutionary change would erase the difference between the two races, and that only by putting aside their differences could China unite against imperialism.¹¹⁰ After the reform movement failed, many reformers fled to Japan. In 1898, Liang started *Qing yi bao* (Journal of disinterested criticism) in Japan, issuing political essays, translations of Western and Japanese writings, and summaries of foreign papers.¹¹¹ In Liang's essay *Lun bianfa bi zi ping man han zhijie shi* (the Discussion on the fact that the recovery of the boundary between the Manchus and the Han people is necessary for the reform), he also claimed that the Han people and the Manchus should form an alliance for social reform.¹¹²

However, Liang's understandings about nation and national sovereignty were insufficient at this time. It is because their reform movement was based on the *san shi shuo* (three generations theory) from the *Chunqiu Gongyang zhuan* (the *Gongyang* commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals). According to this theory, human societies had to undergo three

¹⁰⁹ Japan played a significant role in this reform movement, both as a model for modernization, and as a safe exile for some of the reformers when it failed. Urs Matthias Zachmann, *China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: China Policy and the Japanese Discourse on National Identity, 1895-1904* (London: Routledge, 2011), 89-92.

¹¹⁰ Liang, "Bianfa Tongyi," 1: 1-95.

¹¹¹ *Qing yi bao* was published at interval of every ten days and lasted for three years, until the Qing court banned Liang Qichao's writings in China. Yuxin Ma, *Women Journalists and Feminism in China, 1898-1937* (Amherst (N.Y.): Cambria Press, 2010), 54-55.

¹¹² Liang, "Lun Bianfa Bi Zi Ping Man Han Zhijie Shi," 1: 68-72.

periods: Disorder (*Ju luan shi*); Emerging peace (*Shengping shi*); Great peace (*Taiping shi*).¹¹³ In Kang's opinion, China was relatively backward compared to the Western powers because China had lived in the period of Emerging peace for two thousand years. Thus, he argued that it was time to enter the period of Great peace.¹¹⁴ In addition, his pupil Liang Qichao also pointed out the importance of adopting the idea of the people's power (*minquan*) in such works as *Lun jun zheng min zheng xiang shan zhi li* (On the principle of succession of monarchy by popular rule) published in 1898 in Japan, which combined Western political theories with the three periods' theory.¹¹⁵ In other words, Liang's ultimate goal at this period was to realize Great peace in Confucianism.

3.3 THE CHANGE IN THE THINKING OF LIANG QICHAO

After the Hundred Days Reform failed, the conservatives, led by the Empress Dowager, imprisoned Emperor Guangxu, and arrested and executed many leaders of the movement. Kang Youwei fled to Hong Kong with help from British authorities in the summer of 1898.¹¹⁶ Liang Qichao also fled to Tianjin, from where he sailed to exile in Japan. When Liang Qichao initially

¹¹³ Wang Juntao, "Confucian Democrats in Chinese History," in *Confucianism for the Modern World*, ed. Daniel A. Bell (Oxford [etc.]: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), 74-75.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 75.

¹¹⁵ Liang, "Lun Jun Zheng Min Zheng Xiang Shan Zhi Li," 1: 84.

¹¹⁶ Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: Norton, 1990), 230.

arrived in Japan, he had a written conversation with Shiga Shigetaka on 26 October, 1898.¹¹⁷

Liang started this conversation as follows:

I am a lonely servant banished from the country. The emperor is in confinement, and my comrades have been murdered. I hope you understand this unbearable feeling. Fortunately, a number of people in Japan protected me. I received warm hospitality as well as a room with meals, and it even made me forget that I am living away from home. The current political upheaval in our country is not only a problem of my country, but also an incident with a great influence on the entire world. In addition, because Japan and China depend on each other, it is a particularly important problem that should be considered... However, whether our country can stand on our own feet depends on whether reform is possible and whether the emperor can take political power back. If so, the fact that the emperor lost authority will have a fairly direct impact on Japan. Therefore, we sincerely hope that Japan give assistance to us for the reinstatement of our emperor.¹¹⁸

Shiga replied as follows:

It is also unbearable for me that you encountered a very difficult time and have to wander foreign lands. It is very reasonable that you said that your country and our country depend on each other, and thus the misfortune of your country should be our country's misfortune. It should also be the misfortune of East Asia, and thus a prime task at this time is the reinstatement of your emperor. The foreign minister previously asked Yano, the envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Beijing, to handle the situation.¹¹⁹

Although Liang's plan to help the Guangxu Emperor with Japan's assistance was not realized, Japan offered a chance for Liang Qichao to adopt the concept of nation. He began to devour the information about Western modern knowledge which was available in Japan as soon as he had acquired a sufficient grasp of the Japanese language.¹²⁰ In his article *Lun xue Riben wen zhi yi*

¹¹⁷ Tamura Norio and Chen Li-xin argued that the date of conversation, first appeared in the book *Liang Qichao nian pu chang bian* (the chronicle of Liang Qichao's life with large compiling) edited by Ding Wenjiang and Zhao Fengtian in 1983, is not authentic because the original text, *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho* (documents on Japanese foreign policy; No. 500282-500330), does not contain it. Norio Tamura and Li-xin Chen, "Ryokeicho No Nihon Bomei Chokugo No Uke Zara [Reception Situation among Several Months after Liang Qichao Fled to Japan]," *Journal of Humanities and Natural Sciences*, no. 118 (2004): 20.

¹¹⁸ Wenjiang Ding and Fengtian Zhao, *Liang Qichao Nian Pu Chang Bian* (Shanghai: Shanghai ren min chu ban she : Xin hua shu dian Shanghai fa xing suo fa xing, 1983), 159-162.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Saito Mareshi, "Liang Qichao's Consciousness of Language," in *The Role of Japan in Liang Qichao's Introduction of Modern Western Civilization to China*, ed. Joshua A. Fogel (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 2004), 264-270.

(On efficiency of learning Japanese), he delineated his learning of the Japanese language as follows:

It has been several months since I arrived in Japan. After I studied Japanese and read Japanese books, I realized that books that I have never seen before jumped to my eyes and theories that I have never had revolved around in my mind. As you see the light of day in the dim room or as you drink wine when you feel hungry, I was beside myself with joy. However, I could not be too selfish.¹²¹

Because of the influence of modern civilization in Japan, Liang Qichao's thought began to change. And as a result, the change of his thought first appeared in his Great Harmony thought. In his article *Lun jun zheng min zheng xiang shan zhi li* mentioned above, Liang advocated that not only the Han people and the Manchus but also other yellow races should unite to compete with white races.¹²² What made Liang Qichao turn from the notion of a Confucian-inspired Great harmony to race theory?

While Liang Qichao was in exile in Japan after 1898, he not only received a generous preferential treatment under the aegis of the Government of Japan but also met many Japanese friends. One of the Japanese groups at the time that was active in supporting reformers in China such as Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei was the *Tōa Dōbun kai* (the East Asia common culture society), which had strong ties to the Foreign Ministry and sought to foster good relations between China and Japan and support progressive reform in China.¹²³ The *Tōa Dōbun kai* emerged in 1898 as a merger of two groups established earlier in 1897, the *Tōa kai* (East Asia association) and the *Dōbunkai* (common culture association). Because Liang was closely connected to the *Tōa Dōbun kai*, his thought was affected by this group. During this period, there

¹²¹ Liang, "Guojia Sixiang Bianqian Yitong Lun," 3: 1372.

¹²² Liang, "Lun Jun Zheng Min Zheng Xiang Shan Zhi Li," 1: 68-72.

¹²³ Barbara J. Brooks, *Japan's Imperial Diplomacy : Consuls, Treaty Ports, and War in China, 1895-1938* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), 64.

was widespread Asianism in Japan, an ideology that encourages the unity of Asian peoples, mainly based on nationalism. In addition, Liang was also influenced by *aikoku* (patriotism). The Imperial Rescript on Education in Japan stressed *chukun aikoku* (loyalty and patriotism to state interests) as well as the Confucian concept of *xiao* (filial piety) as the subjects' most essential obligations.¹²⁴ In his article *Aiguo lun* (Essay on patriotism) published in February 1899, he referred to patriotism in China as follows:

It is not likely at all that Chinese do not have patriotism. The reason why we did not know patriotism is that we did not know what a state [*guo*] is. China was considered as a unity for a long time...the people called it as under heaven [*tianxia*], but Chinese did not say it as the state [*guo*]. If there is no state, it is hardly possible to have a feeling that you love it. But, recently states [*guo*] are established based on equality, and thus love [*ai*] should emerge.¹²⁵

However, the term *guo* (state) is already widely used in China from ancient times. For example, in traditional Chinese historical writing, the period between the fall of the Tang Dynasty (618-907) and the founding of the Song Dynasty (960-1279) is known as the "Five Dynasties and Ten States" (*wudai shiguo*).¹²⁶ The difference between a dynasty and a state reflects traditional Chinese understandings about the legitimacy of governments. The mere states were recognized as polities while dynasties were considered as they possessed the Mandate of Heaven (*tian ming*).¹²⁷ The meaning of the term *guo* which is referred in Liang's article is still vague. Although he might have been aware of the disparate nature between *guo* in ancient times and modern *guo*, it does not indicate that he understood the state in the modern sense in which

¹²⁴ Nobuya Bamba and John F. Howes, *Pacifism in Japan : The Christian and Socialist Tradition* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), 255.

¹²⁵ Liang, "Lun Jinshi Guomin Jingzheng Zhi Dashi Ji Zhongguo Zhi Qiantu," 2: 661.

¹²⁶ Frederick W. Mote, *Imperial China, 900-1800* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 8-16.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

people can observe an authority with sovereign power throughout the territory with clearly defined boundaries and a shared sense of identity.

Moreover, it should be noted that Liang Qichao addressed China as *Shina* (China) at this time. According to Stefan Tanaka, the term *Shina* was used to encapsulate a worldview of “the superiority of a modern Japan over an unchanging China.”¹²⁸ In the nineteenth century some Japanese scholars who specialized in Dutch learning began to use *Shina* as a translation from the Dutch in place of Chinese-origin terms such as *Chugoku* (*Zhongguo*; China) or *Chuka* (*Zhonghua*; China).¹²⁹ Also, *Shina* is associated with the colonization of China by the Western powers and the troubled period of Sino-Japanese relations. According to Lydia He Liu, the use of *Shina* in Japan was designed to supersede the established Japanese toponyms for the Central States such as *Chugoku* and *Chuka* and to name a China for the purpose of Japanese colonial conquest.¹³⁰ However, Liang brought this loanword to China and even adopted it for self-identification. Thus, it is obvious that Liang did not yet have the concept of nation and national sovereignty.

As time passed on, the position of the *Tōa Dōbun kai* that was active in supporting Chinese reformers began to change in subtle ways. More specifically, the *Tōa kai*'s members such as Kuga Katsunan or Inukai Tsuyoshi initially showed much sympathy toward the Hundred Days Reform and the reformers, but this changed when the *Tōa kai*'s successor *Tōa Dōbun kai* tried to distance itself from the Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao group.¹³¹ In fact, Kang and

¹²⁸ Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient : Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California, 1993), 9.

¹²⁹ Joshua A. Fogel, *The Cultural Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations : Essays on the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 66-69.

¹³⁰ Liu, *The Clash of Empires : The Invention of China in Modern World Making*, 78-79.

¹³¹ Zachmann, 100-101.

Liang's position in the Japanese press even before he came to Japan was not well liked. For example, Shiga Shigetaka wrote about the Chinese reformers on *Yorozu choho*, the popular daily newspaper founded in 1892 by Kuroiwa Ruiko (1862-1920), on 23 September 1898 as follows:

It is a scandal that the morale is so low. There is that person Kang Youwei. He is the leader of the reform-party. Conversations with him are lively and quite enjoyable. Among his disciples there is Liang Qichao, who has a singular perception of current events. [But] I have met the two often and come to understand that they are not the gentlemen of such great promise [as they profess to be]. To begin with, as Kang is being attacked from all sides, he has realized that he cannot bear it. He quietly has decided on the strategy to move south and thereby avoid the strikes of the enemy party. He is planning to depart, but has not, yet. By chance he was summoned to the emperor, and that changed his life. In fact, this was due to the patronage of the censor Yang Shenxiu. To sacrifice one's life for the affairs of the state [*mi o motte kokuji ni junzuru*] has always been a thing which a Chinese would never dream of. Thus, Kang Youwei to eighty or ninety percent is just someone who gathers the spittle of Westerners and takes delight in his own mindless chatter. And Liang Qichao, after all he is just some literary fellow, and it is not hard to see that others are much of the same kind.¹³²

In these circumstances, Kang left Japan for Canada in the spring of 1899, where he founded the Emperor Protection Society (*bao huang hui*). For his disciple Liang, Kang's departure opened up the possibility of taking his own line.

After Kang left for Canada, Liang Qichao dealt with Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), a revolutionary leader. Because Sun believed that China needed to overthrow the Manchu monarchy and turn itself into a republic, Kang, as a Confucian scholar, could not collaborate with Sun. However, although Liang did not agree with the revolutionaries' anti-Manchu stance, he was sympathetic to Sun's anti-monarchy stance. But in late 1899, Kang ordered Liang to travel to Hawaii and America to seek support from overseas Chinese.¹³³

¹³² Shiga Shigetaka, 'Shina mondai,' *Yorozu choho*, 25 September 1898. Quoted in *ibid.*, 100.

¹³³ Jianhua Chen, "Chinese "Revolution" in the Syntax of World Revolution," in *Tokens of Exchange : The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations*, ed. Lydia He Liu (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 366.

The reason that Liang was able to have sympathy with the revolutionaries was that they shared a vision on the future of China, especially in terms of the people's rights (*minquan*). The reformists such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao sought to preserve the existing structure of authority and expand popular empowerment while the revolutionaries used this term in a more radical sense.¹³⁴ Kang Youwei's understanding of *minquan* as the unification of ruler and ruled based on constitutional principles appeared in his book, the *Datong shu* as follows:

The power of the people [*minquan*] from bottom and up is the forerunner of the principle of Great Unity [*datong*]. When the power of the people develops, it comes from below and moves upwards. That is the natural law. Therefore, after America was established and the French revolution had taken place, every nation followed this pattern. Thereupon, constitutions were established everywhere, republics flourished, the theory of the equal distribution of property was suggested and labour parties became more powerful day by day. If a nation is ruled by a monarch [*junquan*], then everybody comes selfish and the nation is difficult to unite. But if a nation is ruled by the people [*minquan*], then it is easy to unite. The common people strive for profit, but when the benevolent man advocates the joy and benefits of Great Unity, this naturally reflects the mind of the people. When the main tendency is set, then the common people will follow it like water running downstream. Therefore, the instigation of the power of the people [*minquan*], the establishment of constitutions, the union of the people and the principle of the equal distribution of property are all heralds of the Great Unity. Once a constitution is established, the monarch will have lost his power [*quan*], and this nothing else than the rulership of the people [*minzu*]. Someday the monarchy will inevitably crumble and all will settle in Great Unity.¹³⁵

Under the influence of Kang, Liang Qichao also asserted the importance of the people's rights, and his idea was further connected to patriotism when he was in exile in Japan. In his article *Aiguo lun* (Essay on patriotism) stated above, he described the relation between *aiguo* (patriotism) and *minquan* as follows:

If the people's rights flourish, national rights also stand upright. If the people's rights go down, national rights also perish. If a monarch or a prime minister tried to subdue the people's rights, it is called as being one's own enemy. If every person does not try to increase his right, it is called

¹³⁴ Joan Judge, "The Concept of People's Rights (Minquan) in the Late Qing: Classical and Contemporary Sources of Authority," in *Confucianism and Human Rights*, ed. William Theodore De Bary and Weiming Tu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 197-199.

¹³⁵ Quoted in Rune Svarverud, "The Notions of 'Power' and 'Rights' in Chinese Political Discourse," in *New Terms for New Ideas : Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China*, ed. Michael Lackner, Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2001), 139-140.

as being one's own enemy. Therefore, in order to discuss patriotism, people have to begin to flourish the people's rights.¹³⁶

Then, his idea evolved further, and he began to recognize the essence of modern nation states. In his article *Lun jinshi guomin jingzheng zhi dashi ji Zhongguo zhi qiantu* (On the recent trends in the competition between national peoples and the future of China) published in October 1899, he said as follows:

A nation (*guomin*) means that a country is owned by the people who govern that country by making rules and who seek the public good by ensuring the safety of a country. Then, the people would not suffer an indignity, and a country would not perish. In other words, the people are just a nation (*guomin*).¹³⁷

Compared to *Aiguo lun* published eight months ago, the people's rights became not only a way to protect national rights but also an end in itself. In addition, the idea that a nation means that a country is owned by the people definitely indicated a sense of community, namely a nation in the modern sense. Based on the concept of *guomin*, Liang made a clear division between national competition and *guomin's* competition.

The presence of the people is not known in China. Because the presence of the people is not known, national competition has been misunderstood as *guomin's* competition. Therefore, we could not have a way to deal with it, and we were finally under restraint. How should we respond to this situation? If a country is attacked by a country, a country should resist with national strength. If a nation [*guomin*] is attacked by a nation [*guomin*], a nation should resist with the power of the people.¹³⁸

As stated above, Liang Qichao formed a concept of *guomin* by combining sovereignty and the people's rights and clearly distinguished *guojia* (state) and *guomin*. In fact, before Liang asserted the concept of *guomin*, some Chinese scholars and bureaucrats, such as Wang Tao (1828-1897) and Zeng Jize (1839-1890), already argued about sovereignty. For example, although Wang

¹³⁶ Liang, "Lun Jinshi Guomin Jingzheng Zhi Dashi Ji Zhongguo Zhi Qiantu," 2: 661.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 2: 811.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 2: 812.

emphasized the unchangeable Way of Confucius, he supported the Western political system of parliamentarianism and said that “the sovereign is the lord above, and the subject is the lord below.”¹³⁹ Moreover, Sun Yat-sen also advocated the concept of *minquan* in China, and he included *minquan* among his “Three Principles of the People” (*sanmin zhuyi*). However, it was Liang Qichao who first used the concept of *guomin* by combining sovereignty and the people’s rights. His advocacy of *guomin* had connotations of a nation and nationalism.

3.4 THE CONSTRUCTION OF MINZU (NATION) AND NATIONALISM

In fear of the growing influence of the reformists, the Qing government, under the control of the Empress Dowager, banned the circulation of Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao’s publications in February 1900.¹⁴⁰ Also, both Kang and Liang were accused of being lawbreakers and traitors and a reward of 100,000 taels was offered for their elimination.¹⁴¹ However, the Boxer Rebellion, an anti-foreign movement, occurred in 1900, and the Qing government fell into an unprecedented crisis. With this as a momentum, Tang Caichang (1867-1900), one of the few advocates for constitutional monarchy, attempted an uprising in Shanghai, but was arrested and executed.¹⁴² The stated goals of Tang’s uprising were a fusion of Sun Yat-sen’s vision of revolution and Kang

¹³⁹ Tu-gi Min, Philip A. Kuhn, and Timothy Brook, *National Polity and Local Power : The Transformation of Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University : Harvard-Yenching Institute : Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1989), 69-70.

¹⁴⁰ Zhang, 149.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Crossley, 140.

Youwei's reform, reestablishing the Guangxu emperor as head of state for a new autonomous Chinese country after toppling the Manchus.¹⁴³

In the wake of the uprising, a conflict between the revolutionaries and Liang Qichao about loyalty to the King was escalated. One of the reasons that Liang and his colleagues refused to join with the revolutionaries was their feelings of distrust and vigilance against the Japanese government. Contrary to what Liang and Kang had initially expected, the Japanese government did not embark on a restoration of Emperor Guangxu. In Japan at this period, although Asianism, shared by the Japanese government itself, offered political asylum to Qing reformers such as Kang and Liang, there was an intense discussion about China's future and Japan's responsibility to ensure it. While the discussion was initially juxtaposed between the realist argument of a partition of China (*Shina bunkatsu ron*) and the idealist advocacy of protecting China's integrity (*Shina hozen ron*) or even Asian solidarity against the Western powers (*ajia rentai ron*), antagonistic positions emerged even in the idea of protecting China.¹⁴⁴ In view of such a situation, Liang published *Guafen weiyan* (Dangerous remarks in regard to the melon-cutting) in 1899 and warned about the world powers' ambition to divide China.¹⁴⁵

In addition, Liang's concept of the people (*guomin*) based on the principle of the people's rights started turning to the concept of nation (*minzu*), emphasizing distinct characteristics such as culture, tradition, and religion and so on.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, Liang rejected the word *Shina* which

¹⁴³ Stephen R. Platt, *Provincial Patriots : The Hunanese and Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), 94-96.

¹⁴⁴ Zachmann, 55-56.

¹⁴⁵ Liang, "Guafen Weiyan," 2: 872-886.

¹⁴⁶ Liang defined *minzu* as a group with a common geographic origin, a common bloodline, common physical characteristics, common language, common writing, common religion, common customs, and a common mode of livelihood. Stevan Harrell, *Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China* (Seattle: University of Washington

was popular in Japan and began to use the term *Zhongguo minzu* (Chinese nation). The word *minzu* (read *minzoku* in Japanese with the same Chinese character) was a neologism created in Meiji period. Nishikawa Nagao summarized the term *minzoku*, the Japanese meaning of the Chinese characters, as follows:

As for the term *minzoku*, this is a Japanese neologism that combined two terms *min* [people] and *zoku* [tribe; clan] [it is not originally a Chinese term]. It may be a bit difficult to align it with a European term but it is closest to the German term *Volk*. And then, we would have to say that what best approximates the term nation from a civilizational perspective is the term *kokumin* [citizen], and when approached culturally, *minzoku*.¹⁴⁷

For China, the term *Shina minzoku* (the Chinese nation) was used in Japan at that time. However, Liang Qichao became increasingly dissatisfied with the term, because he felt that the term *Shina* in Japan was used disparagingly after the Sino-Japanese War. Before the Meiji Restoration, Japanese had used the name *Chugoku* (China in Japanese), the equivalent of *Zhongguo* (China in Chinese).¹⁴⁸ However, as Tanaka stated, “*Shina* emerged as a word that signified China as a troubled place mired in its past, in contrast to Japan, a modern Asian nation.”¹⁴⁹

Instead of *Shina minzu*, Liang advocated the term *Zhongguo minzu* (the Chinese nation) in his article *Zhongguo shi xulun* (the narrative account of Chinese history) published in September 1901. Liang argued that “our greatest shame is that our country has no name. The names that people ordinarily think of, such as Xia, Han, or Tang, are all the titles of bygone

Press, 2001), 29.

¹⁴⁷ Quoted in Kevin M. Doak, *A History of Nationalism in Modern Japan : Placing the People* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2007), 169.

¹⁴⁸ Lung-Keen Sun, *The Chinese National Character : From National to Individuality* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 32.

¹⁴⁹ Tanaka, 3-4.

dynasties.”¹⁵⁰ In other words, he established the thoughts of others and adopted the concept of *minzu* (nation) as well as the ideas of *guojia* (state) and *guomin* (the people). As a result, Liang began work on finding a way to apply the concept of nation to China.

The Boxer Rebellion ended in complete defeat of the Qing Dynasty in 1901, and the official Peace Protocol of Peking was signed by the Allied and Chinese representatives: it required the Qing government to pay an indemnity of 450 million taels of silver over thirty nine years; and it banned all anti-foreign activities and allowed the permanent stationing of foreign armies to guard legation quarters.¹⁵¹ Moreover, by the treaty, China lost a great deal of sovereignty, it was already impossible to call China an independent country.

The failure of the Boxer Rebellion and the Peace Protocol of Peking had a great impact on Liang Qichao. He strongly felt that the age of imperialism had arrived. In these circumstances, Liang published *Guojia sixiang bianqian yitong lun* (Differences and similarities among various transformations in theories of the state) in October of the same year. In his article, based on the theory of social contract by Rousseau, Liang highly appreciated *minzu zhuyi* (nationalism) and said that “it is the most fair and impartial principle in the world and that nationalism will prevent other nations from invading our freedom.”¹⁵² He also pointed out that a country that did not go through the stage of nationalism cannot be called as a country and that China must advocate for nationalism in order to resist *minzu diguo zhuyi* (national imperialism).¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Quoted in Joseph Esherick, Hasan Kayali, and Eric Van Young, *Empire to Nation : Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 235.

¹⁵¹ Zhao, 56.

¹⁵² Liang, "Guojia Sixiang Bianqian Yitong Lun," 2: 761-768.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

This is the first time that Liang Qichao used the concept of nationalism. It also indicates that Liang clearly recognized nationalism, as defined by Ernest Gellner as a movement that tries to tie the cultural unit of the nation with the political unit of the state. Moreover, he made a distinction between modern nation-states and nations in ancient times. However, it should be noted that Liang also distinguished between nationalism and national imperialism because he defined imperialism as the final stage in the development of nationalism.¹⁵⁴ Liang argued that “imperialism in the nineteenth century may appear to be similar to imperialism in the eighteenth century, but in fact, it is disparate.”¹⁵⁵ In addition, he also pointed out that all men are not endowed with equality in this world and thus his own right can only be acquired by his own efforts and that the government has the infinite power and thus the people must serve the government.¹⁵⁶ These ideas became the basis of Liang’s argument that the only way China could resist imperialism was by following the law of Social Darwinism and mobilizing its people. In Liang’s article *Lun minzu jingzheng zhi dashi* (On the tendency of national competition) published as a series from February to April 1902, he explained that “nationalism is formed through competition and evolution, derived from the desire of ethnic survival and the progress of civilization.”¹⁵⁷ According to Ishikawa Yoshihiro, Liang’s concept of *minzu zhuyi* and *minzu diguo zhuyi* was influenced by foreign works, such as Franklin Henry Gidding’s democracy and

¹⁵⁴ Guoqi Xu, *China and the Great War : China's Pursuit of a New National Identity and Internationalization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 76.

¹⁵⁵ Liang, "Guojia Sixiang Bianqian Yitong Lun," 2: 761-768.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Liang, "Lun Minzu Jingzheng Zhi Dashi," 2: 787-803.

empire and Ukita Kazuomi's *nihon no teikoku shugi* (imperialism in Japan) and *teikoku shugi no risō* (the ideal of imperialism).¹⁵⁸

Liang's claim that China should foster nationalism in order to resist imperialism meant his separation from Kang's *datong* (great unity) thought. As a result, Liang Qichao began work on the theory of *xinmin shuo* (on the new citizen). The concept of *xinmin* (the new citizen) was taken from the *Da Xue* (Great learning), one of the "Four books" of the Confucian canon. The Confucian ideal was a conception of the transformative power, which leads from self to family, state, and empire. Thus, as Tu Weiming stated, "the cultivation of the self and the regulation of the family are seen as roots, and the governance of the state and the universal peace are seen as branches."¹⁵⁹ While Liang still took self-cultivation and the family as the roots, he emphasized civil associations and communities to change the structure of the traditional relationship. He said as follows:

Governance in Europe and America takes the individual person as a unit; governance in China [takes] the family. This is why people in Europe and America belong directly to the state, whereas people in China belong indirectly to the state. Confucian sages say that the root of the state is the family, and that when the family is well-regulated, the state can be well-governed. In such societies, there are no associations outside the family...[T]hus I once said that there are only members of the family [*zhumin*], but no citizens [*xinmin*] in China. For China never had *xinmin*, the so-call "citizen" in English.¹⁶⁰

Xinmin shuo was published in *Xinmin congbao* (Collection for the new citizen), a semi-monthly journal published by Liang Qichao in Japan in 1902 for the promotion of reformist ideas. *Xinmin congbao* was a sequel to *Qingyi bao* (Journal of disinterested criticism). In its "Publication Note"

¹⁵⁸ Ishikawa Yoshihiro, "Ryokeicho to Bunmei No Siza," in *Kyodo Kenkyu Ryo Keicho : Seiyō Kindai Shiso Juyō to Meiji Nihon*, ed. Naoki Hazama (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1999), 120-121.

¹⁵⁹ Quoted in William Theodore De Bary, *The Trouble with Confucianism* (Cambridge, Mass.; London, England: Harvard University Press, 1991), 97-98.

¹⁶⁰ Quoted in Yang Xiao, "Liang Qichao's Political and Social Philosophy," in *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy*, ed. Zhongying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 30-31.

the journal made the following statements: it is necessary to create a new people in order to form a new nation; to accomplish the fore-mentioned goal, education should take priority over politics; public interest and public well-being should always be the most significant concern.¹⁶¹

In March 1902, Liang Qichao raised the term *Zhonghua minzu* (Chinese nation) in *Xinmin congbao*. In his article *Lun Zhongguo xueshu sixiang bianqian zhi dashi* (General tendencies in the development of Chinese thought), Liang insisted as follows:

What is the country that is located in the largest continent among the five continents? It is China [*Zhonghua*]. What is the country that has one third of the world's population? It is China. What is the country that is proud of her four-thousand-year history? It is China... In the age of high antiquity [*shanggu*], the state of Qi was the only one that had the concept of maritime rights among Chinese nation [*Zhonghua minzu*]. Then, two concepts were formed: one is a view of state; and another is a view of the world.¹⁶²

However, while the term *Zhongguo* (China) was used in the title of this article, Liang also used *Zhonghua* (China) in the content. In other words, *Zhongguo* and *Zhonghua* used herein have the same meaning, and thus the term *Zhonghua minzu* (Chinese nation) may be replaced by *Zhongguo minzu* (Chinese nation). Moreover, it is quite ambiguous that whether *Zhonghua minzu* indicates only the Han people or is a generic term for the people of the entire area ruled by the Qing Dynasty. Finally, although Liang kept arguing that Chinese began to recognize the existence of a country only after the Sino-Japanese War, the origin of a view of the state and the world traced back to the age of high antiquity. The reason why such contradictions came out was not clearly stated in his article. However, the term *Zhonghua minzu* was very attractive for the Chinese nation. It is reminiscent of the glory of China in the past and well bonded the history and

¹⁶¹ Ke-wen Wang, *Modern China : An Encyclopedia of History, Culture, and Nationalism* (New York: Garland Pub., 1998), 241.

¹⁶² Liang, "Lun Zhongguo Xueshu Sixiang Bianqian Zhi Dashi," 1: 215-228.

tradition of China to the Chinese people. Therefore, it is likely to cause a sense of belonging to a cultural community called the nation.

Although the concept of nation and nationalism introduced by Liang Qichao were widely used soon in China, nationalism was also combined with *paiman zhuyi* (anti-Manchuism). In fact, Liang agreed, to some extent, to anti-Manchuism. After the Boxer Rebellion failed, the Empress Dowager came up with reform plans in education, administration, and the legal system such as the dispatch of foreign students and the abolition of the civil service examinations.¹⁶³ However, these changes in the system were only minor and there were many who were dissatisfied with the Qing government's reform program even among the reformists. Liang was one of those people.

However, after his trip to the United States in 1903, Liang Qichao's idea about *geming* (revolution) changed dramatically. From January to October in 1903, Liang crossed the continent twice by railroad and visited dozens of cities, including Boston, New Orleans, Seattle, and Los Angeles, as well as traveling to Montana and Yosemite.¹⁶⁴ The purpose of his travel was: to check the conditions of Chinese living in America; to learn the socio-political establishment of the United States; and to gain financial backing for the Emperor Protection Society (*bao huang hui*).¹⁶⁵ Also, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 that suspended immigration of Chinese laborers to the United States became increasingly restrictive with further legislation in 1902.¹⁶⁶ Although

¹⁶³ Louis D. Hayes, *Political Systems of East Asia : China, Korea, and Japan* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2012), 22-23.

¹⁶⁴ Liang Qichao, "The Power and Threat of America," in *Land without Ghosts : Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present*, ed. R. David Arkush and Leo Ou-fan Lee (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 81.

¹⁶⁵ Charles A. Laughlin, *Chinese Reportage : The Aesthetics of Historical Experience* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 37.

¹⁶⁶ Jane Leung Larson, "The Chinese Empire Reform Association (Baohuanghui) and the 1905 Anti-American Boycott: The Power of a Voluntary Association," in *The Chinese in America : A History from Gold Mountain to the New Millennium*, ed. Conference Chinese American and Susie Lan Cassel (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira

Liang himself was able to meet Americans of all political persuasions, from socialists to President Theodore Roosevelt, as well as many Chinese residents, the situation in America made him disillusioned about the philosophy of the people's rights and equality.

In 1903, when he came into conflict with the revolutionaries on their anti-Manchuism, Laiang proposed the idea of *da minzu zhuyi* (great nationalism) in which all the people of China would be integrated to create a single nation. In his article *Zhengzhi xue dajia bolunzhili zhi xueshuo* (the teachings of Bluntschili, the great political scientist) published in 1903, he explained the concept of *da minzu zhuyi* as follows:

When we speak of the nation in the Chinese context we should promote great nationalism alongside narrow nationalism [*xiao minzu zhuyi*]. By narrow nationalism is meant the Han people as opposed to the other nations of the country; by broad nationalism I mean the combination of all the nations in China as opposed to the nations of other countries... From now on, if China lasts after all, we have to adopt an imperial strategy, combining the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Muslim, Miao and Tibetan peoples into a huge nation of one third of the world population to be proud of ourselves over the five continents.¹⁶⁷

This indicated that Liang's nationalism became *guojia zhuyi* (statist nationalism), defining the people in terms of the category of citizen by articulating the political state. The goal of Liang's nationalism was to resist the challenges of foreign imperialism. In other words, Liang's adoption of the concept of the nation and nationalism finally transformed into *da minzu zhuyi* (great nationalism).

Press), 199-200.

¹⁶⁷ Liang, "Zhengzhi Xue Dajia Bolunzhili Zhi Xueshuo," 1: 449.

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this research, I analyzed the trajectory of changes in Liang Qichao's concept of nation and nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The concept of nation in China did not emerge from the bottom-up spontaneously. Rather, the emergence of Chinese national identity can be explained as an imported ideology from Japan and the West. Especially, Japanese nationalism had a major impact on his thought. In this regard, the introduction of Liang's borrowed concept of nation to China was a transforming event for Chinese national self-perception.

In the second part of this thesis, I analyzed the main theoretical approaches to nationalism and national identity and the applicability of these theories in the development of Chinese national identities. As a result, various perspectives of nationalism were classified into three categories: primordialism, modernism, and ethno-symbolism. In the primordialist perspective, nations are seen as something inherent in human nature and as a type of social group that human beings need to organize in order to survive. Therefore, nations may be found in antiquity as well as in modern times. Modernists, on the other hand, place nations in the modern era. In this perspective, nations which are created by nationalism can only be modern since nationalism is a modern phenomenon. As a middle path between these two schools of thought, ethno-symbolism insists upon the ethnic origin of modern nations. According to ethno-symbolists, successful nations are built upon pre-modern heritage, and it is possible to recognize their roots and origins

in the ethnic groups of the pre-modern period. Thus, this perspective emphasizes historical clusters, or heritages, memories, and symbols and the important role of ethnic communities in providing a basis for the emergence and persistence of nations.

Based on the modernist approach that shares the belief that nation and nationalism are distinctly modern phenomena, I explored the third part of this thesis. In China, it is difficult to establish the existence of an ethnic core which can culturally and traditionally define the members of the modern nation. Thus, the modernist approach was useful to clearly identify the many conceptual and ideological changes of Chinese national identity especially in regard to the transition from the late Qing to the Republican era. Consequently, the third part of this thesis revealed the birth of nation as an imported ideology pursued by reformist intellectuals and as a response to the imperialist encroachment in China in the period throughout the course of modernization. In order to understand how the concept of nation emerged in China, one needs to look at the inception and development of *minzu* (nation), a word meaning a historical and social category based on primordial ties such as lineage, language, tradition, etc. The meaning of *minzu* came from a borrowed primordialist and ethnicity-based understanding of nation. It showed its symbolic connection with the nation's sovereignty and the impact of China's rapid transition into a modern nation-state.

When Liang Qichao advocated modernization and reform in the Hundred Days Reform of 1898, he was not that far away from Confucian tradition. At this period, the old utopian *datong* (great harmony) was developed further by such intellectuals as Kang Youwei. Based on the concept of *datong* (great harmony), Liang also remained within a universalist Confucian perspective. When the conservatives, led by Empress Dowager, crushed the reform movement,

Liang was forced into exile in Japan, where he immersed himself in Western political theory and read Japanese authors broadly.

After Liang arrived in Japan, he was influenced by various concepts, such as *guomin* (the people), *minzu* (nation), *minzu zhuyi* (nationalism), and applied them to China. Liang borrowed the term *guomin* from Meiji Japan, where the term *kokumin* (citizen) had been invented in response to the influences of Western political ideas. He defined the term *guomin* as the people within a nation-state to encourage full participations in the responsibility of saving China from Western and Japanese intruders. This reflected his understanding of international competition between nation-states and a dispute among Chinese intellectuals over whether Manchu should be included in Chinese. The term *minzu* was also translated from Japanese, and it referred to a community of people sharing common spirit and culture. Liang's concept of *minzu* was influenced not only by social Darwinism but also by China's historical circumstances. In other words, he borrowed the concept of nation from Japanese as a way through which China could strengthen itself and thereby escape the fate of elimination. Because Liang formulated theories about a multi-ethnic state, he was negative about anti-Manchuism. Consequently, his nationalism developed into the idea of great nationalism (*da minzu zhuyi*).

As a result of this process, Liang established the concept of nation that included all ethnic groups in China. The difference between narrow nationalism (*xiao minzu zhuyi*) and great nationalism was that whether other nations in China except the Han people, such as Manchu, Mongol, Muslim, Miao and Tibetan people, should be included when a country is newly established after the fall of the Qing Dynasty. Eventually, Liang chose the route of great nationalism. It was because he believed that narrow nationalism would lead an imperfect republican form of government, causing the division of China, and eventually ruin the whole

country. In other words, the reason that Liang advocated great nationalism was largely because of the political situation at China and abroad. When Liang imagined a nation, he advocated the creation of a nation through inheritance of the traditional Chinese culture. However, it does not mean going back to Confucianism. Rather, he tried to use Chinese history and traditional culture in order to draw a clear picture of nation.

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