SOCIAL NETWORKS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTCOMES: DO MOBILIZATION AND ALLIANCE STRUCTURES MATTER?

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Despite increasing scholarly interest in the relationship between social networks and collective action, there is still limited evidence on how networks matter at the global level in shaping collective action outcomes, and how these structures emerge in the first place. Consequently, this dissertation aims at addressing these relations within the context of collective action campaigns, and neighborhood level protest events that were identified using police records in Ankara, Turkey between 2006 and 2011.

The analysis of inter-organizational alliance networks shows that political opportunity structure related factors such as presence or absence of elite allies, relative openness or closeness of the institutional environment, still matter the most in understanding why some movements succeed while others don't in realizing their stated policy outcomes in semi-democratic settings. Different network structures have consequences only when political environment is conducive for successful outcomes.

With regard to explaining tie strength, certain homophily mechanisms such as operating at the same level of jurisdiction and specializing in similar issues areas seem to be most powerful in revealing why some organizations work intensively with each other while others don't.

At neighborhood level protest events, the form and nature of pre-existing social networks present in the neighborhood appear to be highly associated with the outcome of the protest events. Spatial arrangements are found to be very influential in the construction of these existing

networks. Findings suggest that hierarchical information networks are effective in mobilizing large numbers of participants for protest events whereas presence or absence of strong ties are crucial for explaining why only certain protest groups tend to embrace high-risk, disruptive protest strategies.

Overall, findings of this study indicate that different network structures interact with contextual factors in complex ways, and that certain types of networks are conducive to successful policy outcomes in combination with specific causal factors in particular contexts.

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1.0   INTRODUCTION

Consider a group of actors united by a common goal; does it matter if they organize in highly clustered subgroups vs. in one dense component? What kinds of factors and mechanisms explain the emergence of these different structures? Are these structures associated with the performance of the group in anyway? If so, through what kind of processes are the structures related to performance? What are the policy implications of such theoretical considerations for community organizers, social movements, and policy makers in general? These are some of the central questions that motivate this study within the context of collective action events in the developing world.

Most researchers trace back the study of social networks to Jacob L. Moreno's (1934) famous book, *Who Shall Survive* (e.g. Wasserman and Faust, 1994; and Degenne and Forsé, 1999). Between 1932-38, at the New York State Training School for Girls in Hudson, New York, Moreno studied informal interactions and emotional currents among the residents of the school. Based on a sociometric analysis of the affection among the residents, Moreno re-assigned the girls to residential cottages. After the re-assignment, Moreno observed significant decrease in the number of runaways from the facility. He also became the first social scientist to analytically show that social structures in which individuals are embedded can be as powerful in shaping human behavior as individual attributes.

It was probably the publication of Mark Granovetter's (1973) Strength of Weak Ties, article[1] at *American Journal of Sociology* that inspired most members of the social science community to start paying attention to the significance of social networks in understanding social phenomena. In his article, Granovetter argued that individuals embedded in a strong web of relations tend to receive mostly redundant information. If A is connected to B and C, through strong ties[2], then B and C are also likely to be well connected. Therefore A is likely to obtain similar information both from B and C. In contrast, A has more chances of receiving non-redundant information through weak ties, through connections to individuals that act as bridges across communities. Granovetter empirically confirmed his argument by showing that most individuals in a random sample of job changers in a suburban Boston area in the early 1970s had found their jobs through weak ties.

More recently, implications of social networks are no longer a topic of interest confined within the walls of academia. Even a cursory look at recent news stories in major media outlets reveals the fact that the significance of social networks is being recognized on a wide range of topics by practitioners and decision makers in public, private, and non-governmental organizations NGOs. A basic search on Google for *news* published between April 15th and May 7th 2013 returns numerous articles on diverse topics such as consequences of social networks for black unemployment[3], parents' decision to vaccinate their children[4], and spread of HIV[5].

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[1] At the time of writing this chapter, the Granovetter article was cited 24013 times, and remains the one of the most influential social science articles of all times.

[2] Granovetter defines tie strength based on level of emotional intensity, amount of time, intimacy, and reciprocity pg. 1361.

[3] http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/how-social-networks-drive-black-unemployment/

[4] http://healthland.time.com/2013/04/15/how-social-networks-influence-a-parents-decision-to-vaccinate/

The role of social networks in shaping social and political life came under the popular spotlight most recently during the protest events and regime changes in the Middle East and North African MENA countries following the self-immolation of a street vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010[6]. The local demonstrations in Bouazizi's town, Sidi Bouzid soon spread all over Tunisia, and to other MENA countries including Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan[7]. The most notable outcomes so far of these uprisings in region has been the toppling of decades old authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia. Nonetheless, whether these regime changes will lead to democratic outcomes is still yet to be seen[8].

Despite uncertainties and doubts regarding the future of Arab Uprisings, most scholars and analysts agree that social networks in social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube were instrumental in advancing regime change, especially in Egypt and Tunisia (Husain and Howard, 2013). One female activist in Egypt famously stated: We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world.[9]

More specifically, virtual networks in social media are claimed to contribute to revolutions in the Arab world by facilitating an alternative public sphere for activists to communicate and share information, by decreasing the transaction costs of organizing and coordination, and by increasing the cost of repression for the authoritarian states by enabling the

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[5]http://www.healthcanal.com/infections/38060-social-networks-may-help-slow-spread-of-hiv.html
[6] http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2044723,00.html
[7]http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline
[8]http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/01/world/middleeast/turn-to-violence-across-middle-east-raises-questions.html?_r=0
[9] http://www.psmag.com/politics/the-cascading-effects-of-the-arab-spring-28575/

dissemination of dramatic images and videos beyond the borders of authoritarian states (Lynch, 2011; Howard 2011; and Howard and Hussain, 2011).

On the contrary, skeptics of the relationship between social media and social change such as Evgeny Morozov (2011) and Malcolm Gladwell (2010) argue that the same networks used by the activists to communicate and coordinate can be easily turned into tools for identifying and suppressing activists by the authoritarian governments. The social media skeptics also claim that online activism does not directly convert into offline, street activism. More importantly, this group of researchers asserts that online activism can actually thwart social movements by creating a plethora of other distractions, and by promoting futile digital activism also known as slacktivism[10] or clictivism.

A recent empirical study shows that both arguments have merit to some extent (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012). Based on interviews with more than one thousand protestors in Tahrir Square during the climax of protests in January 2011, Tufekci and Wilson (2012) show that while almost half of the protestors were informed about the events through social media, these online networks were still mostly shaped by actual friends, family members, and acquaintances.

Current examples on how networks matter in understanding social phenomena in different contexts can easily be extended (Scott and Carrington, 2011). Central to all these studies on the consequences of networks on outcomes of various issues are the explicit/implicit theoretical mechanisms that analytically link network characteristics with individual and group outcomes.

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[10] http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/05/from_slacktivism_to_activism

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1.1   NETWORK MECHANISMS AND OUTCOMES

Regardless of the context of the study, whether it is social movements, policy networks, or intra-organizational networks, there are four main mechanisms through which social networks may affect outcomes: (1) transmission, (2) adaptation to changing contexts, (3) binding participants to shared beliefs, and (4) exclusion of dissent (Borgatti at al., 2009).

1.1.1   Transmission

The most obvious network mechanism is transmission. Network ties can be considered as "pipe lines" (Marin and Wellman, 2010, pg.2) through which both material and non-material elements are transmitted among actors that make up a networks. Whether it is flow of information, money, ideas, emotions, and norms and values, the transmission process may influence individuals' behavior e.g. participation in a protest event. These micro-level processes in return are likely to shape macro level outcomes e.g. if a network structure enables distribution of information regarding a protest event among a large number of people, more people may turn out to the protest event.

1.1.2   Adaptation to Changing Contexts

The adaptation mechanism emphasizes how actors exposed to similar structures may display similar behavioral patterns (Borgatti et al. 2009; and Marin and Wellman, 2010). In other words, actors that have similar positions in a network are likely to be exposed to similar constraints and

opportunities, and consequently are likely to respond alike to the structure in which they are embedded (Marin and Wellman, 2010).

For example consider a friendship network in a firm; if two actors/nodes[11] have lots of colleagues who they think they are very good friends[12], both employees may be less inclined to leave their jobs for another position. Whereas, other employees with no friends[13], or with only one friend[14] may tend to leave their jobs for another one more easily in comparison to highly central actors in the friendship network. In other words, nodes with many connections may behave similarly, and actors with no or only one connection may also act similarly in accordance with the adaptation mechanism.

1.1.3   Binding Participants to Shared Beliefs

Binding occurs in networks that are very well connected and not fragmented (Borgatti et al. 2009). When there are a few absent ties among an ego's alters[15] also known as structural holes[16] actors in the network can communicate and coordinate better, therefore can act as one unit (Marin and Wellman, 2010). For example Granovetter (1973), (cited in Marin and Wellman, 2010) argued that communities with less fragmented structures are more likely to successfully resist urban renewal projects due to higher levels of trust among actors and towards their leaders.

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[11] Actors in a network are also called as nodes in network terminology.
[12] Both actors have high degree centrality, the number of connections/links one has in a network.
[13] Such actors are called as isolates in network terminology.
[14] Actors with only one connection are called as pendants in a network.
[15] An alter in network terminology means the immediate ties of an ego.
[16] Coined by Ronald Burt (1992) structural holes are disconnections and nonequivalencies among actors of a network. According to Burt, structural holes are sources of competitive advantage since they are opportunities for information access, referrals and control. Structural holes provide information and control benefits, and these benefits are multiplicative, they augment and depend on one another

1.1.4   Exclusion of Dissent/Competitors

Exclusion mechanisms develop in competitive environments in which the formation of a tie between two actors occurs at the expense of ties with other actors (Borgatti et al., 2009). This mechanism is mostly observed in market like contexts such as business environments in which a company restricts a supplier to work only with itself, and excludes other companies from working with that supplier.

Among these four mechanisms, this study utilizes the transmission and binding mechanisms in theorizing and testing the relationship between overall network structure and collective action outcomes. The exclusion mechanism is more commonly observed in economistic / market related contexts. However, the civil society arena, the main context of this study, is mostly characterized by norms that promote binding types of mechanisms. Likewise, the adaptation mechanism is also less relevant because the adaptation mechanism predominantly has consequences at the individual level, whereas this study focuses on the global characteristics of social networks. The specific processes and contexts under which the binding and transmission mechanisms inform the theoretical framework will be discussed in coming sections.

1.2   GLOBAL NETWORK STRUCTURE AND COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTCOMES: AN INCOMPLETE LAYER OF ANALYSIS

There is no dearth of studies that investigate the relationship between collective action and network structure. Quite the reverse, it is highly unlikely to find any studies that ignore the role of social networks while analyzing collective action-related topics (Diani, 2011). Most of these

studies explore different structures among inter-organizational or interpersonal networks without examining the consequences of these networks in relation to any outcomes. Or even more common in the literature are studies focusing on the consequences of network structure for individual actors, e.g. are actors who are more central also more powerful, more wealthy, and more informed?

Probably the most studied aspect of social networks with regard to collective action is the determinants of differential participation (Diani 2004; Beyerlein and Andrews 2008; Passy and Guigni 2001; Lim 2008; della Porta 1988; Gould 1991, 2003; Schussman and Soule 2005; and Oliver, 1984). Following the work of Olson (1965) on the irrationality of participation in collective action due to the free rider problem[17], there has been a mounting line of research on how social networks determine individuals' decision to participate in collective action. The principal idea in these studies is the fact that individuals do not make decisions in isolation; the social networks in which they are embedded re-structure the costs and benefits of participation by disseminating emotions, ideas, and information (Melucci 1996; Passy and Guigni 2001; Diani 2003; Goodwin and Jasper 2004). They also act as a means of social control and source of peer pressure for individuals who are less likely to participate in the absence of social networks (Diani 2003; Passy 2003).

What is missing in this flourishing line of research are studies that go beyond individual level analysis, and consider the properties of whole or global network structure[18] in relation to

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[17] The free rider problem stems from the rational conclusion that in many instances the benefits of collective action outcomes cannot be restricted to the participants only. Especially in cases in which participation comes with high costs e.g. risk of police arrest in protest events in non-democratic settings, rational actors are likely to choose not to participate to avoid costs.

[18] From now on network topology, global network structure and whole network structure will be used inter-changeably.

collective action outcomes for the whole group of actors. As many prominent social network scholars have recently argued, there is still so much to be done at the whole network level, especially in relation to the macro level characteristics/performance of the groups under study (Provan, Fish, and Sydow, 2007; Siegel 2009; Borgatti et al. 2009; and Krackhardt, 2012).

Networks come in many forms and structures and we still know very little about how these network structures are associated with outcomes at the macro level (Siegel, 2009). Social networks that have the same size, or number of actors, and the same density, or number of ties among actors, can be substantially different from each other.

Figure 1. Networks with a Similar Number of Actors and Ties, but Different Structures

For example, the two hypothetical networks displayed in Figure 1 have the same size, and almost the same density, but the distributions of nodes and links are significantly different from each other. Network A has multiple central actors that have many ties amongst each other as

well some ties to mostly pendants, actors that are connected to the network only through one tie. Network B in contrast, consists of multiple dense subgroups that have very few ties among each other.

What are the consequences of having these different structures? Which one would be more efficient in disseminating information? Obviously transmission of information would progress faster in network A in comparison to B, because network A has a much smaller diameter, the longest possible path between two actors, in comparison to network B. Even when the seed of the information is a pendant in network A, it would take at most three steps to reach to any other pendant actors. Because each pendant is linked to a central actor, and central actors are all connected to each other, when a pendant wants to reach to the furthest pendant, the information needs to pass through only two central actors at most.

In contrast, in the network B, the information travels much slower, because each subgroup has only two actors or less that have ties to the outside group, and each of these actors has ties to only one another subgroup. Therefore in order for the information to travel, it first needs to reach an actor in the group that has connections to the outside world. This transaction can take up to three steps, and then may have to travel to the next subgroup via a few ties also in order to reach to the next bridging actor.

As the above illustration shows, the global structure of a network has crucial implications for the overall network; the fast spread of information may be crucial to mobilize large numbers of people for spontaneous collective action events, which in return may determine the policy outcome of that collective action. Consequently, the main goal of this dissertation is to address a mostly neglected layer of analysis: the relationship between the whole structure of collective action networks and their outcomes by empirically examining the associations reflected in the

global network structure of 31 collective action events from Ankara, Turkey. As will be discussed in more detail in the forthcoming chapters, I hypothesize that certain global network structures are associated with successful outcomes because they either facilitate efficient flow of information, resources, and are resilient to disruptions transmission mechanism, or affect propensity for risky behavior by having dense structures binding mechanism.

These network structures are entangled with other causal conditions as highlighted in the social movement literature. As will be discussed shortly in the forthcoming chapter, meaningful theoretical contributions are attained when network structures are examined in conjunction with other causal conditions emphasized by political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and framing approaches. Therefore, other important causal conditions are also considered in the analysis by utilizing Qualitative Comparative Analysis QCA to compare the network structure underlying multiple collective action cases.

1.3   RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The main goal of this study is decipher the relationship between the network structure of collective action events and their policy outcomes. The two main research questions that guide the study can be stated as (1) what types of network structures are conducive for successful collective action outcomes? And (2) how do these network structures interact with political opportunity structures, mobilization strategies, and cultural frames? While such questions have been explored using simulation studies, empirical investigation of networks in comparative perspective has been very rare. By using a small/medium N data set, this study will contribute to the empirical evidence on performance of networks.

In addition to these, secondary research objectives are as follows:

(1) Although there has been considerable progress in explaining the dynamics of social movements in the last decades, most of the empirical evidence represents cases that discuss the role of social movements in shaping public policies in Western democracies (Almedia, 2003; Tufekci and Wilson 2012; and Burstein, 1999). By focusing on a group of collective action event cases based in Ankara, Turkey between 2006 and 2011, this study aims at developing an understanding of social networks and collective action outcomes in semi-democratic cases.

While Turkey fares relatively well in overall democracy ratings in comparison to other majority Muslim countries, civil rights are in decline as displayed by increasing police brutality against protestors, and by the numbers of journalists, lawyers, scholars, students, and activists detained for long periods of time without trial[19]. Therefore, studying urban movements in Turkey will also likely shed some light on the social movements in semi-democratic settings.

(2) Moreover, despite extensive literature on democracy and social movements in Turkey at the national level since the 1990s, there has been limited focus on urban movements and neighborhood protests with the exception of a few studies of resistance movements against urban renewal projects in large cities such Istanbul and Ankara (Bayraktar,

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[19] Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2013 - Turkey*, 23 April 2013, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5180c8f414.html [accessed 13 May 2013]

2007). Consequently, this study also aims at contributing to the literature on urban movements, and neighborhood level struggles in Turkey.

(3) On a more methodological front, by combining QCA related techniques with social network analysis, this study seeks to contribute to the growing literature on mixed-method approaches in the study of collective action.

(4) Finally, the policy implications of this study, as highlighted in the concluding chapter, aim at providing community organizers and activists with novel ways of thinking about organizational strategies.

1.4   SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTERS

Overall, this dissertation consists of seven chapters. The introductory chapter presents the main research questions of the study as well as the theoretical and policy oriented research objectives of the analysis. The second chapter first reviews the main theoretical approaches used in explaining social movement outcomes: resource mobilization, political opportunity structure framework, and framing and cultural theories. Next, this chapter focuses on the literature concerning the relationship between social networks and collective action in general, and the role of network structure in shaping collective action outcomes in particular. The main goal is to clarify the causal mechanisms through which network structure may affect collective action outcomes. A discussion on the conceptualization of social change is also provided using

Complexity Theory. Moreover, characteristics of the ideal types of network structures are introduced with the research hypotheses, and a review of relevant literature.

The third chapter provides the details of data sources, data collection procedures, and coding techniques. Description of the operationalizations of causal conditions and outcomes is left for the empirical chapters since each chapter focuses on a different data set. Chapter III also provides a short discussion of Qualitative Comparative Analysis QCA as a research approach, since two of the three empirical chapters utilize QCA. The second half of this chapter presents the case selection rationale and context of the study. Discussion of civil society, state of local governance, the role of European Union in promoting stronger local governments and democratic participation in local politics in Turkey in general are followed by the presentation of a short history as well as some socio-demographic characteristics of Ankara in comparison to Turkey.

Chapter IV analyzes fourteen urban movement cases from Ankara. The data used in this chapter are based on semi-structured interviews with activists, content analysis of local papers, and newsletters of the participating Social Movement Organizations. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis, the analysis in Chapter IV primarily investigates the inter-organizational network structures of urban movements in Ankara between 2006 and 2011 in relation to their outcomes. After introducing the causal model and operationalizations, chapter IV continues with the presentation of the results. The findings of the analysis indicate that when combined with some other resource mobilization--related causal conditions, certain network structures are associated with positive movement outcomes. Causal conditions relating to political opportunity structures appear to be more influential determinants of successful movement outcomes.

Chapter V, the second empirical chapter, can be considered as an extension of the previous chapter. In this chapter, the inter-organizational networks of each movement analyzed in chapter IV are aggregated into one large inter-organizational network of social movements in Ankara. Since many organizations are involved in more than one movement, the merger of inter-organizational networks of separate movements generates a large, inter- connected network, except a few isolates and isolated dyads. The goal of this chapter is to investigate the larger inter-organizational landscape in Ankara. The analysis starts with the identification of the most influential actors using multiple centrality score analyses and some basic network parameters. Next, using the theoretical framework for urban movements as outlined by urban sociologist Manuel Castells, the overall network structure is analyzed based on global network measures. Finally, in order to understand the determinants of tie formation among the SMOS, a multiple regression quadratic assignment procedure (MRQAP) is performed. Findings of the MRQAP analysis suggest that homophily and assortativity mechanisms are present in the process of tie formation.

The final empirical chapter, chapter VI, focuses on a group of inter-personal network based neighborhood level protests. In accordance with the literature, the analysis in this chapter shows that most of the mobilization networks of the seventeen protest events under study are based on some form of pre-existing networks. After a short discussion of how different spatial arrangements interact and shape social relations at the neighborhood level, Chapter VI continues with a closer look at the two neighborhoods in which protests are observed more frequently than the other contexts and argues that, despite high levels of civic activism in both neighborhoods, the nature of ties reflects different types of social relations. The relationship between

mobilization networks and protest event outcomes are examined using Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

Findings presented in chapter VI suggest that hierarchical networks are instrumental in mobilizing large numbers of participants for protests when certain spatial conditions are present. In addition, in protests events that are based on pre-existing networks dominated by strong ties, disruptive tactics are more likely to be used, and disruptive tactics are associated with successful outcomes under certain conditions.

The final chapter, Chapter VII, first provides a summary of findings. Next, chapter VII presents a discussion of the limitations of the study in relation to internal validity and external validity. The last section outlines an agenda for future research. Possible research plans include the investigation of issues such as movement emergence in relation to pre-existing networks, interaction between online and offline network structures. Finally plans for examining the causal models identified in chapters IV and VI in different scales and context are discussed in this last section.

2.0 EXPLAINING COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTCOMES

The main challenges of studying outcomes of collective action include the difficulties in confirming that the relationship between action and outcome is not spurious, identifying the exact causal mechanisms that link actions and outcomes, and operationalizing and measuring specific outcomes, especially within the context of social movements[20]. While many researchers are drawn into studying social movements to decipher the processes that lead to meaningful social change, studies on outcomes are yet to be accumulated, mostly due to these challenges (Tarrow, 1998; Giugni, 1998; Amenta et al, 2010; Bosi and Uba, 2009; Andrew, 2001; Earl, 2004; and McAdam and Snow, 2010).

2.1 MULTITUDE OF OUTCOMES

Social movements can have a wide range of consequences that are neither easy to identify nor to measure simply as success or failure (Amenta et al, 2010; Giugni, 1998; and Bosi and Uba, 2009).

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[20] Social movements can be considered as a subset of collective action that operates outside of institutional channels McAdam and Snow, 2010. As will be discussed in the next chapter on research design, not all cases under study perfectly fit to the definition of social movement. Therefore social movement and collective action are used interchangeably.

First, it may take years to decades to assess whether a movement was a success or failure (Giugni, 2008). For example the Kurdish movement that started in the early 1980s seems only recently, almost after 30 years of struggle[21], to have achieved some degree of policy change (European Commission, 2006).

Besides, movements may have abstract or very complex goals, and small gains or losses, in other words incremental changes, may have profound consequences in the long run (Gupta, 2009; and Hasso, 2001). Therefore short-term and long-term consequences of movements need to be considered separately (Jenkins, 1982). Moreover, sometimes the unintended consequences of movements can be much more formative than the goals formally stated by the movement leaders (Tilly, 1999, cited in Giugni, 2004).

Movements may also have different kinds of effects on other movements, such as "influencing other movements' frames, discourses, collective identity, goals, tactics, and organizational structure" (Whittier, 2004; pg. 532). In addition to these, stated goals of a movement may fail, but participation in the movement may have profound personal and biographical effects (Giugni, 2004).

Another common form of unintended consequences of social movements is cultural changes such as changes in values, opinions, and/or emergence of new collective identities Earl, 2004. For example, in his analysis of the Occupy Wall Street OWS Movement, Gamson [22] argues that OWS had a substantial impact on changing the nature of political discourse and the

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[21]   http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/after-decades-of-war-can-the-kurds-finally-find-peace-8605190.html
[22]   http://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2012/01/02/cultural-outcomes-of-the-occupy-movement/

various spheres in which it is carried on, especially mass media, while policy and institutional impacts are yet to be seen.

2.1.1 Addressing the Challenges of Studying Outcomes

This study aims to address the challenges associated with studying outcomes by focusing on mechanisms, studying more than one case, and by selecting reactive mobilizations-claims of loss of political and/or economic resources (Tilly, 1978).

As Amenta et al. (2010) assert, Qualitative Comparative Analysis QCA is one of the a few techniques that enable researchers to elucidate different causal and combinational mechanisms that are associated with social movement outcomes. By using QCA, this study attempts to reveal multiple mechanisms that are at work in facilitating successful collective action outcomes.[23] The risk of spurious causation is minimized by applying a comparative approach to study multiple events/networks, and also by considering all major causal factors associated with movement outcomes derived from predominant social movement theories in addition to network related causal conditions.

Finally, measurement and operationalization issues are addressed by selecting cases that have limited locus of change at the local level, and also are aimed at reversal of a policy decision. In the words of Snow et al. (1998) it is possible to call such collective action events "…the results of actual or threatened disruption of the quotidian-that is in the taken-for-granted routines of everyday life" (pg.26). Since the cases under study do not aim at larger, complex

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[23] Further discussion of QCA and other data analysis techniques are provided in the next chapter that focuses on data collection and analysis procedures.

social changes[24], and mostly focus on reversing policy decisions, it is relatively easier to label the policy outcomes of these cases as success or failure. The consequences of movements for each other are addressed to a certain extent by considering whether movements tend to form allies with other movements. However, biographical, cultural, and long-term consequences of the movements are still not captured with the current analysis.

2.2   THEORIES REGARDING COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTCOMES

The major theories that explain social movement outcomes are political opportunity structures, resource mobilization, and cultural and framing theories. In the past, these theories were seen as contradictory explanations of social movements. But more and more scholars recognize that they are rather complementary instead of being conflicting, since each focuses on an important aspect of social change (McAdam et al., 1996). The role of context, overarching structures, and institutions are emphasized in political opportunity structures--related theories; organizational strategies and resources are put under the spotlight by resource mobilization approaches; and the role of movement frames and shifts in values and public opinions are analyzed in detail by cultural theories.

Network related explanations are usually considered to be a subcategory of resource mobilization approaches; but after a brief review of the dominant social movement theories,

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[24] There was one such movement in the data set. The movement called Saltanata Son End the Sultanic Dominion mobilized before the mayoral elections in 2009 aimed at increasing rights to the city and to end the rule of I. Melih Gokcek, mayor of Ankara since 1994. The collective action events regarding this movement were removed from the analysis to achieve coherence on movement goals.

complexity theory demonstrates (Urry, 2005) that networked approaches play a crucial role in connecting micro-level and macro level processes in understanding social change.

2.2.1   Political Opportunity Structures

Political opportunity structure (POS) theories[25] are historically the most commonly utilized approach in studying social movements. POS approaches explain emergence, development, and outcomes of movements through shifts in political environment, and influences of variations in the structure of power relations and institutional arrangements (Tilly, 1978; Tarrow 1998; Kitschelt 1986; and Kriesi 2004). For example, Jenkins et al. (2003) explain the ebb and flow of African American protest activity between 1948 and 1997 using a POS approach and show that fluctuations in the protest activity in those years were a function of favorable opportunities such as Cold War policy constraints, strong northern Democratic allies, and divided governments. According to McAdam (1996, pg. 27), the main aspects of the political opportunity structure approaches can be summarized as:

> "-The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system,
>
> - The presence or absence of elite allies,
>
> -The stability or instability of that wide set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity,
>
> - The state's capacity and propensity for repression".

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[25] Also commonly called political process theories, McAdam and Snow, (2010)

The last two conditions identified by McAdam are not relevant for the cases under study because the cases analyzed are short lived, even spontaneous in many instances, and do not have a long life span to be influenced by oscillations in the institutional environment. Moreover, the city of Ankara, in which all the cases are based, has been governed by the same mayor for almost 20 years now, and it is possible to claim that political opportunity structures at the city level have remained pretty much constant over these years.

The 31 cases analyzed in the study have different claim makers, and this variation brings a degree of variation in the absence or presence of allies across cases. Moreover, openness and closure of the system also varies across cases, due to the presence of different combinations of antagonists. Operationalizations of these constructs are discussed further in the empirical chapters.

2.2.2   Framing Approaches

Cultural and framing approaches started to emerge in the 1980s as a reaction to the lack of attention to the relationship between social movements and meanings mostly based on works of scholars such as David Snow and Robert Benford. Studies using a framing perspective conceptualize social movements as struggles over meanings and ideas produced by movement protagonists and antagonists. According to the framing perspective, movements can mobilize larger segments of the society, if they can challenge the dominant definitions of reality and meanings; provide alternative meanings; and frame contested issues in a way that will resonate with a large number of people and their emotions (Benford and Snow, 2000; Poletta and Jasper, 2001; and Snow and McAdam, 2000).

The framing perspective also informs the selection of causal conditions in the empirical analyses sections, especially with regard to the perception and framing of the issues by the participants. Framing related causal conditions mostly focus on the level of urgency and significance of the demands as framed by the participants.

2.2.3   Resource Mobilization Theories

Resource mobilization theories emerged as a response to traditional social psychological explanations of social movements that emphasized grievances, personality, and alienation (Klandermans, 1984). Instead, the resource mobilization tradition in the study of social movements focuses on the role of organizational structure, material resources, and strategies utilized by activities for successful movement outcomes (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). The resources can range from material resources such as money, office space, and transportation to information and human resources. Unlike in social psychological approaches, in resource mobilization theories, individuals are rational actors that weigh the costs and benefits of participation (Oberschall, 1973; and Zald and McCarthy, 1979).

A number of causal conditions are also derived from resource mobilization theories in the study such as number of participants, movement tactics and strategies, and measures of participants' commitment. .

2.3 NETWORK STRUCTURE AND COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTCOMES

The role of each theoretical approach discussed above is vital to understand the mechanisms that structure the collective action outcomes. However, the main focus of this study to understand the consequences of social networks for collective action. This type of question can be studied at different levels of analysis.

Figure 2 briefly summarizes the most commonly used units of analyses in network studies[26]. As levels of analysis increase, so do the data requirements for analysis (Knoke and Yang, 2008). For example, data needed for the first level of analysis, analysis of ego networks, can be considered as attribute data since information about the alters of an ego can easily be collected during randomized surveys.

Collecting data for the fifth level, Cognitive Social Structures, is extremely difficult since it requires each actor in the network to answer questions about N^2-N possible relations in the network.

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[26] It is also possible to study the effect of multiple levels at the same time e.g. Wang, et al., (2013); and (Snijders and Bosker, 2012).

Figure 2 Different Levels of Analyses in the Study of Networks

Unit of Analysis	Focus	Example Research Questions
Ego Networks **Level 1**	Consequences of connections at the individual actor level.	Social Capital (e.g. Do individuals with dense ego-networks tend to have better health?)
Dyadic Networks **Level 2**	Consequences of the duration, intensity, and strength of relations between dyads (two actors).	Homophily (e.g. Are states with strong economic ties less likely to go to war?
Network Position **Level 3**	Consequences of the position of the actor within the whole network or within a subgroup in the network.	Structural Holes (e.g. Do people acting as bridges between unconnected group of actors perform better?)
Whole Network **Level 4** ★	Consequences of the topography of the network for the overall performance of the network	Density (e.g. How does the density of a network affect the innovation outputs of the whole group?) Core/Periphery vs. Hierarchy Structure (e.g. Do core periphery structure type of leadership perform better in comparison to hierarchies?)
Cognitive Social Structures **Level 5**	Consequences of perceptions of the network	Do individuals with better perception tend to be more powerful?

Among these different levels of analyses, Level 4, whole or complete networks, is the main level of analysis of this study. According to Knoke and Young (2008), this level of analysis "is the most important macro level of analysis" (pg.14). As one of the leading scholars in network studies, Steven Strogatz (2001) argues, "network topography is important ... because

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structure always affects function" (pg. 268). Social networks may exist in a variety of structures, and this variation in the structure of social networks shapes collective action efforts in substantially different ways (Gould, 1993).

Moreover comparative studies are more feasible at this level (Marsden, 1990), and only through comparative, or cross network studies, is it possible to make plausible causal claims about the relationship between network properties and group outcomes, whether it is a group of organizations, individuals, or countries.

Likewise certain questions can be studied only by looking at the global structure of networks. As Provan et al. (2007) assert;

> *"Only by examining the whole network can we understand such issues as how networks evolve, how they are governed, and, ultimately, how collective outcomes might be generated. This last point is especially relevant to policy planners and those having a perspective that goes beyond the performance of individual organizations… By focusing only on the members themselves and their interactions with others, however, the importance of individual organizations tends to be exaggerated and the importance of collective behavior underemphasized."* (pg. 480.)

With regard to collective action, the whole network level of analysis is especially crucial, because the mechanisms that are shown to be important in understanding collective action outcomes, such as the flow of information for coordination activities, spread of emotions, ideas, and values for recruitment activities as well as for movement strategies, and the resilience of the movement against disruption from the external environment, can all be considered as functions of variations in the global network structures.

But how do these social network structures emerge and evolve? The next section aims at providing a short discussion of the underlying assumptions of the study with regard to social change and also to shed some light on the dynamics of interaction between micro and macro levels of analysis using complexity theory and Gidden's structuration theory.

2.3.1   Social Networks, Complexity Theory, and Social Change: Theoretical Perspectives on Social Change

Arguments about the relationship between network structures and collective action outcomes originate from assumptions about social change in general, and the relationship between actors/ agents and structures in particular.

Two of the most comprehensive theories that explain the interaction between actors that make up a network and the structure of the network are Anthony Giddens' structuration theory and complexity theory. According to Giddens' (1981) theory of structuration, agents in a social system act intentionally, but in return, the totality of the purposeful acts of the agents creates a structure that constrains the individual behaviors. The interaction between social agents and structure is a continuous process through which individual agents constantly shape and are being re-shaped by structures. In Giddens' (1981) own words:

> *"All human action is carried on by knowledgeable agents who both construct the social world through their action, but yet whose action is also conditioned and constrained by the very world of their creation"* (pg. 54).

Similarly, in complexity theory, social structures that make up a society are considered as open and dynamic systems that function within an external environment. Complex systems are continuously shaped by the actions of actors, and these actors' behaviors are in turn constrained by the structural positions in which they find themselves (Cowan et al.1994; and Lewin, 1993). From a complexity theory perspective, social change is a result of constant interaction among agents. A pattern emerges that feeds back into the system, and re-structures the interactions of the agents.

The concept of a network as used by social network scholars strongly resembles this systems thinking in complexity theory (Walby, 2003). Similar to networked approaches to collective action and social movements, systems in complexity theory carry collective properties that may not be implicit at the individual level (Urry, 2005), because these emergent global properties of systems are consequences of non-linear interactions among actors (Urry, 2005). In other words, focusing on the micro dynamics at the individual level is not sufficient to comprehend the macro level characteristics of systems (Urry, 2005).

Therefore it is crucial to understand the global properties of networks and the types of relations between the agents rather than the agents themselves (Axelrod and Cohen, 1999). Overall, complexity theory emphasizes interaction, self-organization, and feedback loops to understand the dynamics of social change.

The most common element in both theories of social change is a mutual and circular causality and the co-evolution of agency and structure without championing the primacy of either one. Both approaches recognize the power of agents while acknowledging the constraints imposed on them by the structures in which they operate; just like in the famous quotation from Marx (1852) "Men make their own history, but they do not make it under circumstances of their

own choosing", (pg. 115). Consequently, complexity and structuration theories provide a balanced view to understand processes of social change that is neither overly structuralist, nor simply rational agent based.

How do these theories inform the hypotheses of this study? First, the main explanatory variable of the study, social network structure, is essentially a function of the interactions of the organizations and individuals involved in the protest events that will be analyzed in the forthcoming chapters. The overall network structures are not pre-defined or imposed either by a leader or by external forces[27]. Instead, they emerge as a result of the self-organization of actors that get involved in the movement. The same network structures that stem from the actors' interactions also restrain the processes of information exchange, coordination, and recruitment, which are shown to be significant at explaining the policy outcomes of collective action events. Moreover, the external environments in which these networks operate can hinder or facilitate effective collective action, as suggested by POS approaches. Finally, some actors in the network can function as norm entrepreneurs (Sunstein, 1996) that facilitate the transmission of new ideas and meanings that may have an effect on recruitment of participants as well as on the emergence of strong collective identities.

This dissertation aims at grasping both these micro and macro processes by analyzing both antecedents and consequences of social networks in the following empirical chapters.

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[27] These networks are obviously also constrained by external environments as argued in complexity theory.

2.4   TYPOLOGIES OF NETWORK STRUCTURES

Anthropologist John Barnes (1972) once described the state of scholarship on graph theory as "a terminological jungle, in which any newcomer may plant a tree" (pg.54). After four decades since Barnes' observation, it is still not possible to talk about a consensus among network scholars on a typology of social network structures.

Increasingly, scholars emphasize the presence of various network structures. The specific disciplines or issues one studies also have an influence on the identification and labeling of various network structures. Figure 3 provides a summary of some of the network topologies identified by Frantz et al. (2009); Kearns, et al. (2006); Brede and Vries (2009); Ravasz and Barabasi (2003); Diani (2003); and Lamertz, (2009). The list of network structures is far from being comprehensive, but aims at providing a sample of structures that are most commonly addressed in the literature.

The first network structure, random network, has been extensively studied since the groundbreaking studies of Erdös and Rényi (1959). The structure in random networks emerges completely as a result of random processes. However, as Ravasz and Barabasi (2003), indicate, "We learned that networks are far from being random, but are governed by strict organizing principles that generate systematic and measurable deviations from the topology predicted by the random graph theory of Erdös and Rényi" (p.67).

Figure 3 Network Typologies

Network Type	Network Characteristics
Random Networks	-Based on the work of Erdös and Rényi (1959). -Emerge as a result of random processes. -Not commonly observed in real world social networks.
Star Networks	Very basic network structures characterized by one node in the center that is connected to number of nodes that are not connected to each other.
Small World Networks	-Based on the works of Watts (1999); and Watts and Strogatz, (1998). -Defined by sub groups with high clustering and low average distance in comparison to random networks.
Scale Free Networks	-Based on the works of Barabasi et al. (1999); and Faloutsos et al. (1999). -Characterized by a few hubs, actors with lots of connections, and majority of nodes with only a few links to others power law distribution.
Core-Periphery	-Based on the works of Borgatti and Everett (2000). - A group of actors with large number of connections both among themselves and to the ones in the periphery, and groups of actors in the periphery that are weakly connected to each other and to the nodes at the center.
Cellular Networks	-Based on the works of Frantz and Carley (2005); and Tsvetovat and Carley (2005). -Sparsely connected, decentralized and non-hierarchical structures, social constructed, also known as dark networks, p terrorist networks.
Hierarchical Networks	-Based on the works of Krackhardt (1994) and Ravasz and Barabasi (2003). -Network hierarchies can be considered as an extended, iterative version of star networks.
Policephalous Networks	-Based on Diani (2003). -Centralized and segmented structures a few central actors, and large average distances among actors.
Segmented/Decentralized Networks	-Based on Diani (2003) -Decentralized and still segmented type of structure.
Isolated Cliques	-Based on Lamertz (2009). Similar to Diani's segmented and decentralized networks, consist of groups of cliques and isolates of a fragmented network.

In other words, it is not possible to observe actual networks that perfectly resemble random networks; instead there is some kind of order and pattern in real life networks. As the Figure 3 displays, network scholarship is still far away from agreeing on a typology of networks.

However, most of these structures are defined based three main dimensions of networks: (1) Degree of centralization/hierarchy; (2) Level of segmentation/subgrouping; and (3) Average path length[28].

A recent influential paper by David A. Siegel (2009) entitled "Social Networks and Collective Action" provides a useful typology of network structure that considers these dimensions to a great extent within the context of collective action. The four main network structures suggested by Siegel (2009) are: (1) Small World Network; (2) Elite Networks; (3) Village Networks; and (4) Hierarchical networks. One shortcoming of this typology is the assumption that most networks in collective action will have at least 20 to 30 actors, since it is not realistic to expect the formation of complex networks such Small World Networks. Moreover, all these structures assume connected networks are not fragmented, whereas fragmented and sparse networks are common, especially among small scale urban or neighborhood level movements.

Therefore, this study includes Isolated Clique network structure to consider sparse and fragmented mobilizations in addition to the typology suggested by Siegel (2009). The next section provides detailed illustrations of these network topographies before reviewing the literature on the performance of these structures within the context of collective action, and later situates the overarching hypotheses of this study within that literature.

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[28] Arithmetic mean of number of steps in the shortest path between every possible pair of actors.

2.4.1   Isolated Clique Networks

Isolated Clique networks resemble Diani's (2003) segmented and decentralized networks. The most obvious characteristic of this type of networks is fragmentation of the network into multiple subgroups. According to Lamertz (2009), these types of networks suffer from inability to coordinate across communities. Moreover, Lamertz (2009) argues that subgroup identity and trust are likely to supersede identification with the overall network community.

Figure 4 Isolated Cliques

`   More importantly, Lamertz (2009) suggests that networks that have a topography that resembles Isolated Clique networks are extremely vulnerable to inter-group conflict and disagreements. It is almost impossible to find empirical and theoretical scholarly studies on these

types of networks. Still, as the empirical chapters display, fragmented structures such as the Isolated Cliques are commonly observed, especially within the context of small-scale urban movements.

2.4.2   Small World Networks

Figure 5 Small World Networks

It was mostly the work of Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz (1998) that formalized the structural properties of Small World Networks. In their seminal paper published in *Nature* in 1998, Watts and Strogatz identified two essential characteristics of Small World Networks in comparison to random networks: (1) presence of highly clustered subgroups; and (2) frequent

bridging connections among these subgroups. Consequently Watts and Strogatz (1998) defined Small World Networks as networks that have a high clustering coefficient[29] and small average path length[30] in comparison to random networks. This type of structure is commonly observed in cities and suggests that any two random actors are connected to each other by a short chain of actors, regardless of the size of the network.

There is an increasing number of studies suggesting that Small World Networks are both efficient and robust because information and resources can travel between any given two actors at a very high speed, and removal of a bridging tie among subgroups may not affect the resilience of the overall structure since there is a large number of ties that connect these dense subgroups (e.g. Latora and Marchiori, 2001).

2.4.3 Village Networks

Village networks are associated with high-density subgroups or clicks in which almost everyone is connected to one another. These types of structures resemble villages and small towns with high levels of social control (Siegel, 2009). There are very few actors that act as bridges between the groups. In comparison to Small World Networks, Village networks are more tightly clustered and likely to have larger average path length and are less efficient, because information or resources can travel across subgroups only through a few actors. According to Siegel (2009) both in Small World Networks and Village Networks, actors tend to have an equal number of connections. In that sense, both networks lack strong central actors.

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[29]Clustering coefficient of a network represents the mean ratio of the existing links between the alters, or directly connected agents, of a node and the total possible links between all agents for that network.

[30] Average geodesic shortest distance between two actors.

Figure 6 Village Networks

2.4.4 Elite Networks

Opinion networks also known as core/periphery structure, (Borgatti and Everett 1999; 2000) are characterized by a group of actors with many ties among each other, and another group of peripheral actors that have very few or no ties among each other (Siegel, 2009). Actors in the periphery are connected to the network through their limited number of ties with one or a few actors in the core. In Opinion networks, the core group has the capacity to mobilize and coordinate activities of the overall network while the actors in the peripheries do not have such capacities (Lamertz. 2009).

Figure 7 Elite Networks

2.4.5 Hierarchical Networks

Hierarchical networks are the most centralized type of network structures among the five

typologies used in this study and closely resemble traditional bureaucratic structures that are

characterized by an increasing number of actors as one moves from the top of the hierarchy to

the bottom. Formalized by Krackhardt (1994) in mostly stylized hierarchical networks, each

individual is connected to one actor above, and multiple actors are connected to him from below.

The rate of expansion determines the size of the network: for example, if the expansion rate is 4,

there is one node at the top, four people connected to that node at the second level, 16 at the third

level (Siegel, 2009).

Figure 8 Hierarchical Networks

Siegel (2009) considers Opinion Leader and Hierarchical networks as different forms of

elite networks since each model is characterized by stark power inequality among actors in terms

of the number of connections they have. Both structures can be considered as more complex

versions of a completely centralized star type of structure.

The next section reviews the empirical literature on the performance of these networks

and develops some broad hypotheses about these structures within the context of collective

action. These hypotheses are later refined in empirical chapters to reflect differences between interpersonal and inter-organizational networks, as well as to consider the distinct external environments in which these networks operate.

2.5   REVIEW OF SCHOLARLY WORKS ON COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTOMES AND NETWORK STRUCTURE

Earlier studies analyzing the role of structure on collective action outcomes mostly focused on a single dimension of network characteristic: performance of centralized or decentralized networks. Analyses of more complex structures flourished mostly in the 1990s, following the groundbreaking work of Duncan Watts and Steven Strogatz (1998) on Small World Networks.

The evidence on the relationship between network topography and collective action outcomes is still far from conclusive. Collective action outcomes are the result of complex, nonlinear interactions of a multitude of causal conditions. As Suh (2012) indicates, intricate causal mechanisms need to be considered to understand the variation in collective action outcomes, and due to this causal heterogeneity, it is not possible to single out a particular network structure that is associated with successful collective action outcomes.[31]

In their comprehensive review of literature on research on the whole network level in comparative inter-organizational studies, Provan, Fish, and Sydow (2007) also show that network structure centralization vs. decentralized structures is still very contradictory. They

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[31] As will be discussed shortly in the next chapter, Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is used as the main tool of analysis since QCA is mainly a technique developed Ragin, (1987) to capture such causal complex, nonlinear mechanisms.

observe that network properties interact with a multitude of other factors based on the context and the external environment of the cases being of studied. Similarly, in his influential simulation study, Gould (1993) shows that network structure parameters such as density and size have nonlinear relationships with collective action outcomes. Gould (1993) warns against simplistic generalizations about the relationship between network structure and collective action outcomes and highlights the importance of particular external environments that collective action events operate in: " …it is risky to make generalizations about the impact of network structure in the absence of detailed information about [the] collective action setting" (pg. 195). Nevertheless, the majority of studies on the performance of centralized vs, decentralized structures conclude that centralized networks are more effective in managing information flow and coordination activities.

William Gamson's study, *Strategy of Social Protest* [1975] (1990) is probably the first crucial work analyzing the outcomes of social movements based on the organizational structure of the Social Movement Organizations SMOs. Instead of studying the inter-organizational networks among SMOs, Gamson focused on the internal organization of 53 SMOs. Gamson's analysis concluded that centralized and bureaucratic organizations are more likely to be successful because they were more effective at mobilizing resources by strict hierarchies. Moreover, Gamson (1990) argued that the bureaucratic and centralized structures were more efficient for timely decision making processes and worked better for reducing internal conflict, since the involvement of fewer people in the decision making processes facilitated the emergence of consensus more quickly than decentralized structures.

A number of replication studies of Gamson's data with more sophisticated techniques also produced similar findings, (e.g. Frey et al. 1992; and Mirowsky and Ross, 1981). Similarly,

in their third paper on the "Theory of the Critical Mass" series, Marwell and Oliver (1988) argue that centralized network structures combined with the presence of heterogeneous groups are more likely to mobilize larger numbers of people in comparison to decentralized structures.

On the contrary, some scholars argued that decentralized structures are more effective at generating solidarity among participants and also more adaptive and resilient during times of crisis, because decentralized structures are less likely to dissolve as a result of a few disruptions in the network (Jenkins, 1983).

The debate on the performance of centralized vs. decentralized networks appears due to the fact that networks do not directly affect collective action outcomes. Instead network structure is, most of the time, associated with certain causal conditions that are directly affecting the collective action outcomes such as number of people mobilized, sustainability and resilience of the movement, and tactics/strategies used by the participants. Furthermore, these direct effects almost always interact with other significant causal conditions. Therefore more refined explanations on the relationship between network structure and collective action outcomes are needed.

For example, following the tradition of threshold models proposed by Granovetter (1978), and Schelling (1978), Chwe (1999) explains the variation in the number of participants as a function of the interaction between possible participants' threshold levels, and the strength of ties[32]. Using simulation study, Chwe (1999) shows when the threshold to participate is high, weak ties work better since weak ties are more effective in spreading information to larger numbers of people. Strong ties are more effective in mobilizing people with low thresholds,

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[32] Chwe (1999) conceptualizes a strong tie similar to transitivity, or highly clustered localized cliques in which if A is friend with B and C, the probability of B and C being friends in very high.

because through strong links, local knowledge among a few friends is formed quickly and the threshold for action is met faster.

An influential study by Centola and Macy (2007) also challenges the effectiveness of the weak ties argument. Centola and Macy (2007) assert "Weak ties, ties that connect actors that are structurally distant from each other, are very powerful during dissemination of information, or contagious diseases. In the case of complex contagions, defined as spread of behaviors that are costly, risky, or controversial, the willingness to participate [in] independent affirmation or reinforcement from multiple sources…because successful transmission depends upon interaction with multiple carriers" (pg. 703). Using a simulation study, Centola and Macy (2007) confirm that strong ties are crucial for participation in complex contagions such as high-risk social movements, and weak ties can actually be detrimental in such cases.

McAdam and Paulsen (1993) also recognize the trade-offs between strong and weak ties and argue that strong ties are crucial for recruitment, whereas weak ties have an important function in communicating the message of the movement among larger populations. Likewise, in his review of the role of strong and weak ties during collective action, Diani (2011) concludes that strong, bonding ties are imperative for recruitment purposes, but they may also lead to emergence of cleavages and limit mobilization of larger populations. His review also determines that weak or bridging ties are instrumental for communication and coordination, but are not so effective for recruitment. Ahuja and Carley (1998) also show that centralized structures are efficient at communication and coordination.

Baldassari and Diani (2007) acknowledge the strength of centralized structures with weak ties for communication and coordination purposes, but they also claim that such network structures are not resilient because they are extremely sensitive to interruptions in the network, or

threats from the external environment. Moreover, they argue that high levels of power asymmetries characterize such networks and the absence of reciprocity among actors may be detrimental for the formation of a collective group identity that is crucial for the commitment of participants for a cause.

Baldassari and Diani (2007) assert that polycentric structures characterized with more balanced dependencies and higher levels of reciprocity across actors are a better fit for a solidaristic model of collective action. Because they state that although the decision making processes are based on diffused agreement among actors in polycentric structures which tends to reduce effectiveness, such structures are more resilient to interruptions and external threats and are more conducive to the emergence of collective identity and solidarity.

One of the most important additions to this literature on network topography and collective action outcomes is Siegel's (2009) simulation study. In his study, Siegel works with the four main network structures that were discussed previously: Small World Networks, Hierarchical Networks, Core-Periphery Networks, and Village Networks. Siegel assesses the performance of these networks at mobilizing high numbers of participants at different levels of motivation. Based on a simulation study, Siegel's study yields the following testable hypotheses (pg. 136):

Small World Networks: Since small world networks consist of both weak and strong ties, they are effective in both spreading information and recruiting participants. When motivations are high, increasing weak or/and strong ties also increases participation. In scenarios with fewer motivations, weak ties increase participation if strong ties do not dominate the network. Adding weak ties to a network characterized by strong ties actually decreases participation.

Village Networks: Similar to small world networks, but less efficient in spreading information, weak ties across villages increase participation.

Core/Periphery Elite Networks: If the motivation and the number of elite actors with strong ties to each other in the core are high, this type of network structure performs much better than small world networks. When the motivation is low among the elites, the core/periphery structure performs very poorly in mobilizing participants for a collective action event.

Hierarchical Networks: Findings are very similar to Core/periphery networks. But, if the motivation of the proletariat, people that are at the lower levels of the hierarchy, is low, it can successfully impede participation.

2.5.1 Deriving some Hypotheses

As mentioned previously, the data for this study consist of two different types of protest events: (1) mobilizations based on inter-organizational networks, and (2) mobilizations based on inter-personal networks. These very different types of events also carry significantly different characterizations with regard to the external environment in which they operate in mobilization, strategies/resources, and framing tactics. Therefore, each type of case requires unique hypotheses, and these hypotheses are introduced in relevant analytical chapters.

Based on the literature reviewed, it is possible to develop some overarching hypotheses. First, one shortcoming of the literature is its emphasis on the number of participants as the major indicator of collective action outcomes. This is in accordance with the argument that mobilization of large numbers of people tends to be associated with successful policy outcomes for the movements, because participation of large numbers of people indicates: (1) high levels of public support for the cause and may delegitimize the antagonists, (2) larger threat and costs for

the antagonists, (3) likely possibility to garner more media attention, especially when the demands of the group may be addressed by the antagonists, and (4) when the cost of repression is higher than meeting the demands (Earl et al, 2003; Luders, 2006; and Button, 1978) .

Based on the current evidence on network structure and size of participation the first general hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 1: If the motivations of the possible participants are high, hierarchical networks will mobilize a higher number of participants in comparison other network types, because hierarchical networks are the most efficient ones in spreading information. If the motivations are low, Small World Network type of structures will be more effective at mobilizing people because these networks consist of both strong and weak ties that are needed to activate participants.

In addition to participation of a large number of participants, sometimes a small number of participants may be able to make antagonists meet their demands through use of disruptive tactics, if the larger population is sympathetic to their demands (Gamson, 1990; and Rojas, 2006). Disruptive tactics require participants to be involved in high-risk activities such as the risk of detention and exposure to police violence. Consequently:

Hypothesis 2: Strong ties are needed for participation in high-risk events. Village types of mobilization structures are likely to be more conducive for such behavior, because they mostly consist of strong ties, and very few weak ties, and they tend to mobilize [a] small number of people in comparison to other structures.

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Finally, the literature on social movements emphasizes that sometimes movements fail to realize their stated goals, but can have larger cultural and social impacts such as emergence of alliances with other movements (Giugni, 1998; and Earl, 2004). Such consequences may be crucial in nurturing potential movements that may have wider impacts in future.[33] Based on the current evidence on resilience and robustness of social movements, the third larger hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 3: Small World Network type of structures will be more likely to generate links with other movements.

2.6   SUMMARY

This chapter first discussed the challenges of understanding collective action outcomes since social movements tend to have a multitude of outcomes such as cultural, biographical, and incremental outcomes. Next, it made the argument that this study addresses those challenges to a certain extent by studying small scale collective action events that have relatively clear and simple policy goals that are somewhat easier to measure in comparison to the outcomes of complex and long term national or international movements. Section 2.2 provided a short overview of major social movement theories that explain the emergence, dynamics, and

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[33] The roots of the Egyptian revolution is a good example of how failed movements from the past can merge forces with other mobilizations and lead to meaningful change at some future time point. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/02/egypt-revolution-mubarak-wall-of-fear

outcomes of movements based on three theoretical traditions: resource mobilization, framing perspective, and political opportunity structures.

Section 2.3 moved the discussion to the relationship between network topography and collective action outcomes. This section first introduced most commonly used levels of analysis of social networks, and then explained the reasoning behind focusing the study on whole level networks. Since the larger goal of this dissertation is to provide a contribution to understand the process of social change, the next section clarifies the overarching perspective of the study on social change, mostly using complexity theory.

The section on typologies of network structures introduced some of the major network structures that have been studied by social scientists and physicists over the years. Next, short explanations and visual descriptions of the network types used in this study are provided. The final section aims at providing a review of the literature on the performance of these different network structures in relation to collective action outcomes. It concludes with some general hypotheses and highlights some caveats about simplified generalizations about the performance of different network structures and collective action outcomes.

3.0   DATA COLLECTION, RESEARCH DESIGN, AND DESCSRIPTION OF THE CONTEXT

3.1   DATA SOURCES

There are three main sources of data used in this study: police records, newspaper articles, and semi-structured interviews with the representatives of Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) and neighborhood residents. The three following analytical chapters also rely on some additional data sources for the specific research questions asked in each chapter. The details of the collection of additional data are discussed in relevant chapters.

3.1.1   Data From Police Records

One of the main challenges of this study was to identify major protest events in Ankara, Turkey, the geographical focus of the study. The universe of the study is the major protest events that took place between June 2006 and June 2011. Studies on reliability/validity of event analysis show that police records are the most reliable sources to identify past events (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002). Therefore, I used police records to identify the protest events in Ankara between 2006 and 2011, provided by the Department of Social Movements of the General Directorate of

the Turkish National Police.[34][35] Overall, there are 183 events in the data set, and some of these events are related to the same issue. After categorizing these events into unique event categories, 31 unique cases of social movements/collective action cases emerged. This data set also includes information about the approximate number of participants in each event, as well as the main organization or social group that organized event.

After a closer look at these cases, I realized there were two distinct groups of cases. The first group consists of cases based on inter-organizational networks. These cases are mobilized by professional SMOs, carry a diverse repertoire of protest activities, have some kind of financial support, and their locus of change is towards issues regarding larger populations in Ankara. They include resistance movements against urban renewal projects, the use of water coming from Kizilirmak river as tap water due to health concerns, or protection of Kugulu Park from losing some of its space to new road construction. These cases can be called social movements[36] to a great extent because they have temporal continuity, and are mostly organized by professional SMOs with clear goals.

The second group includes cases that hardly qualify as social movements. In these cases, mobilization is mostly based on neighborhood level interpersonal networks, protests mostly develop spontaneously with minimal planning, no or very few formal organizations are involved,

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[34] http://www.egm.gov.tr/en/Pages/default.aspx
[35]   Also worth mentioning that I first tried to acquire the data from the Ankara branch of the Turkish National Police, but I was simply told that such data did not exist. I believe that over the years the General Directorate of the Turkish Police became more researcher friendly, mostly as a result of European Union adjustment programs and also increasingly well educated staff of the General Directorate.
[36] What constitutes as a social movement vs. collective action is discussed further in detail.

and such mobilizations do not tend to turn into social movements, due to lack of temporal continuity.

I was not expecting two such strikingly different groups of cases when I started to work on this project. As I looked deeper at these cases, I realized they tell two very different stories. Most importantly from a network perspective, these two groups of cases also enabled me to study two different types of network structures. In the first group, I study the inter-organizational networks of social movement events based on newspaper data. This type of network data just tells us about the alliances formed across organizations. It is not feasible to call every organization involved in the event and ask them how they found out/heard about this event. In other words, we can only know who was at what event and can only make claims about the alliance structures using network data from newspapers (Oliver et al. 2003).

While the second group of cases at the neighborhood level does not qualify much as social movements, through my field interviews I was able to study the mobilization structures of these protest events. In other words, I was able to identify the pre-existing networks that facilitated the mobilization of neighborhood level protest events. These networks ranged from networks based on spatial arrangements of the neighborhood to women's friendship networks. Overall, this study started with the expectation of analysis of a single type of social movement cases, but had to adapt to the nature of the data and turned into analysis of two distinct, but still highly related types of cases.

3.1.2 Data from the Local Newspapers

The data derived from the police records did not include information about the all organizations involved in the protest events. Therefore I used two local papers to extend my analysis: *Hurriyet*

Ankara[37]*,* and *Baskent Gazetesi*[38]. I chose to use only local news sources since studies on the extent of coverage of protest events show that local newspapers are much more inclusive than the national papers (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002). This observation holds especially true for studies that focus on local events.

Once I found the relevant newspaper articles for each event, I coded all names of the organizations involved in the event, if present, number of participants, location of the event, and type of event press release, vigil etc. I also tried to reach all other newspaper articles on all events that are affiliated with the movement such as conferences, festivals by simply going through the daily editions of each paper. As daunting as this task sounds, both papers are relatively small, they both report about 10 to 15 current local events excluding pages on sports, economy etc.. This approach enabled me to capture a more complete picture of each movement by including various movement activities in addition to protest type of events that are captured by the police records.

Relying on newspaper data has some obvious and significant shortcomings as highlighted in numerous reviews (e.g. Earl et al. 2004; Baranco et al. 1999; McCarthy et al.., 1996; and Oliver et al. 2003). Earl et al. (2004) categorize common biases observed in newspaper data into two: (1) selection bias; and (2) description bias. Selection bias concerns the selection of events to be covered in the paper based on numerous factors such as the size of the event, proximity of the event to news agency, use of violence, or simply editorial decision making processes that label some events as newsworthy and some as not (Oliver et al. 2003; and Earl et al. 2004). This type

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[37] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ankara/
[38] http://www.baskentgazete.com.tr/

of bias is not a major concern for this study since selection of the events is based on the police records.

The second type of bias, description bias, on the other hand is a relevant concern for the study. Description bias is concerned with accuracy of the coverage of the news. The most important aspect of such bias in reporting of events is omission of information, or missing data (Earl et al. 2004; and Oliver et al. 2003).

This is a major concern especially from a network perspective, because studies show that central/core organizations tend to be overly reported whereas smaller, less influential organizations in the peripheries tend to be omitted during the reporting process (Diani, 2011). Studies further show that such biases tend to be constant, especially in over time data coming from the same source (Earl et al. 2004). Therefore it is very likely that the inter-organizational networks analyzed in the next chapter suffer from errors of omission of peripheral actors. While recognizing this problem, this research is still likely to produce generalizable findings, since the main goal is the categorization of the networks into five ideal types. In other words, the goal is not so much about identifying the exact numerical values of the network parameters, but instead it is to be able to rank each event network based on the network parameters.

In addition to these issues, Oliver (1989) (cited in Oliver et al. 2003) indicates that solely focusing on organizations neglects crucial non-organizational dynamics in collective action. The interviews I did with activists and extensive archival research on the cases will likely mitigate this type of validity problem to a certain extent.

I did not choose to include network data gathered through interviews due to three major issues. First, it was practically impossible for me to do interviews with all the organizations involved in the data set. Secondly, research on the validity and reliability of social network data

shows that people do very poorly when it comes to remembering all of their acquaintances, especially their acquaintances in some past event (Carrington et al. 2006; and Knoke and Yang, 2008). Finally, during my interviews, I observed a level of competition among the organizations involved in the same events. Some of the representatives of SMOs tend to inflate their centrality in the network while deflating the participation of others[39]. Or sometimes some SMOs refused to give credit to an organization because they just participated in the events, but were not involved in the course any further.

3.1.3   Data from the Interviews

In order to complement the inter-organizational network data gathered from the newspapers, I conducted 27 interviews with representatives of various SMOs located in Ankara. [40] All interviews were conducted by myself, at the offices of the SMOs. These interviews mostly were helpful to gain a better understanding of the critical issues that Ankara has been facing in the last decade.

The role of interviews for the analysis of inter-organizational networks has been complementary to the data I gathered from the police and newspapers. However, the network data I collected for the analysis of inter-personal networks solely depended on my interviews with the participants in the events. For each of the 17 events involving inter-personal networks, I contacted persons using the names included in the newspaper articles. Some of these meetings

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[39] There is an extensive literature on accuracy of network perception, and on determinants of accuracy. E.g. Casciaro, T. (1998). Seeing things clearly: Social structure, personality, and accuracy in social network perception. *Social Networks*, *204*, 331-351.
    [40] See Appendix A for interview protocols.

took place at muhtar's[41] office, sometimes in coffee shops, and sometimes in civic center types of places. In some of these meetings there were other participants from the events. My main goal in assessing these events was simply to identify the structure of mobilization networks based on the qualitative descriptions of the respondents. Consequently I asked the following questions that mostly required further clarifications:

(1) Can you explain to me the events took place on …/…/… with regard to the issue of…?

(2) Who were the people involved in these protests?

(3) How did they hear about this protest event? What were main means of communication used for coordination purposes?

For example, from the following statement of a respondent, I concluded that the network structure resembled an elite core/periphery network with strong ties and high levels of motivations among the elites.

"The women in the neighborhood organized the protest event that stopped traffic. They were very scared for their children, because there is no overpass and the traffic is very fast in the Istanbul road. While they were walking to block the road they asked the people they saw at the coffee shops and other places to join them."

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[41] Elected head of a neighborhood, mostly responsible for issuing IDs and organizing electoral bullets.

3.2   DATA ANALYSIS

3.2.1   Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

QCA is the main analytical technique used in two of the analytical chapters. QCA is a technique developed by Charles Ragin (1987), and is used for medium-n cases in order to identify different causal mechanisms that may lead to the same outcome. QCA is based on the assumption that causal relations are very complex, and different combinations of causal conditions may lead to the same outcome (Ragin, 2007). As Ragin (2007) explains:

"An especially useful feature of QCA is its capacity for analyzing complex causation, defined as a situation in which an outcome may follow from several different combinations of causal conditions, that is from different causal recipes" (pg. 23).

While causal complexity can be handled to a certain extent using econometric models, such efforts usually come with a great deal of technical problems such as the multicollinearity issues that result from including interaction effects (Wagemann and Schnedier, 2010). Causal complexity is effectively used in comparative case studies, but such studies "suffer from generalizability since they yield idiosyncratic explanations for every single case" (Wagemann and Schnedier, 2010, p.11).

A similar notion known as equifinality is also one of the epistemological foundations of QCA. George and Bennett (2005) define equifinality as "a pervasive characteristic of social phenomena, namely the fact that *different* causal processes can lead to *similar* outcomes of a given dependent variable" (pg.63). Equifinality contrasts highly with the unifinal approach

common in large-n statistical analyses that use linear and additive regression models (Wagemann and Schneider, 2010).

Another important concept that undergirds the QCA's epistemological underpinnings is called asymmetric causality. Unlike correlational approaches, QCA is based on set-theoretic connections in which explaining the presence of a phenomenon does not imply that this recipe also works for the absence of the same phenomenon. Ragin (2007) gives the example of the set theoretic relationship between political conservatives and religious fundamentalists. The fact that there are many political conservatives that are not religious fundamentalists does not undermine the fact that religious fundamentalists are politically conservative, since the religious fundamentalists constitute a subset of the universe of the political conservatives.

In more practical terms, QCA utilizes set theoretic approaches to compare cases included in the analysis. Each case in the analysis is represented as a combination of causal conditions and outcome conditions. Later, these combinations are compared with each other and logically simplified. For example, consider a simple example with three causal conditions: A, B, C, and an outcome condition denoted with O. Let's assume there are two configurations that lead to the same outcome:

$$A*B*c + A*B*C \rightarrow O$$

This Boolean notation reads as follows (Rihoux and Meur, 2008, pg.35): [The presence of A, combined with the presence of B and with the *presence* of C] OR [The presence of A, combined with the presence of B and with the *absence* of C lead to the presence of outcome O. Since whether the condition C is present or absent does not make a difference, condition C is

dropped from the formulas, and the following reduced formula is attained (also known as *Prime Implicant*).

$$A*B \rightarrow O$$

The final formula reads as presence of condition A in combination with the presence of B leads to the outcome O.

QCA is especially relevant for studying collective action and social movements. As three of the leading scholars in the study of social movements, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001) assert in their seminal work, *Dynamics of Contention*, the main goal of students of social movements is to decipher the causal mechanisms and processes. McAdam et al. (2001) invite scholars of social movements to study contentious episodes in comparative perspective and to identify the common causal mechanisms among cases that may seem quite different from each other. Similarly, Ragin (2013) argues that QCA is a particularly suitable method for studying social movements because "social movements are conjectural in nature and a central goal of research on social movements and collective action is to unravel the relevant causal recipes and to specify their various ingredients" pg. 1031. [42]

QCA also has certain shortcomings, most significantly lack of consideration of probabilistic processes. Such limitations affect the study and will be further discussed in the concluding chapter.

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[42] Some major studies that use QCA to study collective action are McAdam et al (2010); Dixon et al. (2004); Cress and Snow (2000); and Amenta et al. (1992)

3.2.2 Multiple Regression Quadratic Procedure (MRQAP)

The fifth chapter looks at the larger picture of the state of urban movements in Ankara, using the classic urban movement theories of Manuel Castells. In order to achieve that larger picture, all the matrices of the social movement cases analyzed separately in the fourth chapter are combined. The combination of these matrices generates one large matrix of inter-organizational networks in Ankara. After some basic analysis of this combined network (e.g. which organizations are most central, structural properties etc.), a Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure (MRQAP) is carried out in order to understand the emergence of ties across SMOs included in the analysis. MRQAP is a regression-like analysis in which matrices are used instead of vectors as input variables. For both QCA and MRQAP analyses, packages available in the *R* environment are used.

3.3 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

The study focuses on certain collective action events/cases that took place between 2006 and 2011 in Ankara, Turkey. There are several reasons for choosing Ankara as the main setting of the study. First, my preliminary observations in other major cities showed that urban movement type of events are very few in Turkish cities other than Ankara and Istanbul. Istanbul, on the other hand, had too many cases to cover, even based on my preliminary review of newspapers. I decided to choose Ankara, because the amount of urban movement activity seemed neither too little, nor too much to handle.

Secondly, the local political environment in Ankara has been relatively constant in comparison to other cities in Turkey. The same mayor has governed the city since 1994. Similarly the heads of municipalities did not change during the local elections of 2009 among the townships that cover most of the cases analyzed, except Yenimahalle. Therefore, political opportunity structure related conditions remain mostly steady across the time span of the study. This situation also limits the number of conditions included in the analysis, since as a rule of thumb, no more than five or six conditions should be included when the number of cases is between 13 and 25 (Marx, 2006).

The following sections give a succinct overview of the context of study by looking at state-civil society relations in Turkey, state of local governance in Turkey, and some basic socio-demographic information about Ankara in comparison to Turkey.

3.3.1 Civil Society in Turkey

It is a known fact that Turkey is characterized by a very strong and centralized state tradition and a weak civil society (Heper, 1985). The roots of weak civil society can be easily traced back to the power of the state and bureaucratic elite during the Ottoman era (Mardin, 1969). As Mardin (1969) argues, the Ottoman ruling class was very much concerned with keeping control of a religiously and ethnically heterogeneous empire. Consequently, there was no tolerance for the emergence of different interest groups (Heper, 2000). Moreover, all of the land under the control of the empire legally belonged to the Sultan. Having total control over economic life also contributed to the suppression of any social group that could challenge the power and authority of the state elite (Mardin, 1969).

As Mardin 1969 puts it:

"In Ottoman society there were no institutional political privileges and immunities, all Ottoman citizens stood in a direct rather than mediated relationship to the supreme authority. This missing link we call civil society. It could be expected that Turkey would encounter difficulties in the development of modern democracy to the extent that this depends on this missing link" (pg.279).

This picture of an omnipotent centralized state did not change much with the birth of the new republic in 1923. Some of the peculiarities of Turkey's extreme emphasis on the formation of a unitary state can be traced back to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In late 1800s and early 1900s, many non-Muslim minorities such as the Serbians, and Greeks claimed their independence, almost all the time with the support of a foreign power Akcam, (1992). This dissolution process has mostly been perceived as an act of betrayal by the Turks and developed a sense of insecurity and fear towards the minorities that remained within the borders of modern Turkey (Akcam, 1992).

A series of Kurdish insurgencies in the 1920s and 1930s also fed the feelings of threat and anxieties of the Kemalist elite, and led to the emergence of a very strict centralized state system that emphasized unity at the expense of diversity and pluralism (Baban, 2005). Following the proclamation of the new republic, the Turkish state actively promoted the formation of NGOs, but this top down approach led to emergence of many NGOs that acted as extensions of the state and failed to function as intermediaries between citizens and the state (Karaman and Aras, 2000).

According to Keyman and Icduygu (2005) the four defining elements of the modern Turkish republic are: (1) *a strong state tradition* through which the state acts as the privileged and sovereign power operating almost independently from society with an assumed capacity to transform the society from above and deciding which groups, in what ways could legitimately participate in the political life. (2) *National Developmentalism* as a corollary of the strong state tradition, where the state has been the dominant economic actor till 1980s with an emphasis on planned imports substituting for industrialization. (3) *The organic vision of society-* as a way of defining state society relations on the basis of mutual duties and services instead of individual rights and freedoms. (4) *The republican model of citizenship-* through which the republican elite framed the notion of citizenship as a morally loaded category to achieve a unified national identity by emphasizing national interest, individual duties, and state sovereignty, instead of a more liberal approach that would emphasize individual autonomy, rights and freedoms.

By the early 1980s, these four elements of Turkish modernity started to be challenged and transformed by the forces of globalization. Despite such recent trends, civic participation remains very low in Turkey

As displayed in Figure 9, Turkey ranks last in almost all measures that are used to gauge civic participation in the European Social Survey. Only 2.7 % of the participants in the survey worked in a political party, 4% worked in an association other than political parties, 3.2% worked or displayed campaign badge/sticker, 4.3% signed a petition, and 6.1% participated in a lawful demonstration.

Figure 9 Civic Participation in Turkey

The military coup in 1980 had a tremendously detrimental effect on civic participation because the military junta punished all sorts of political and organized civil society activity in dramatic ways upon taking power. Following the coup[43],[44]:

- The parliament and all political parties were shut down,

- 650,000 people were detained,

- 1,683,000 people were blacklisted,

- 50 people were hanged,

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[43] http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/24999286/
[44] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/1980-coup-facts.aspx?pageID=238andnid=17628

- Newspapers were not allowed to publish any issues for 300 days,

- And all civil society organizations were shut down except the Red Crescent, which acts more like a state organization.

On the other hand, civic participation seemed to be sparked by the Gezi Park uprising that started at the end of May 2013. What started as an environmentalist effort to protect the last green space in downtown Istanbul from becoming a mall, quickly turned into an anti-government rights based movement. According to some preliminary studies on the profile of the protestors, 79% of the participants in the protest events do not have membership in any type of organization, and 40 % of the participants had never participated in a protest event before[45]. Therefore, there is a chance that civic participation in Turkey will significantly increase following the Gezi Park movement.

3.3.2 Local Governance Structure in Turkey

With the rise of neo-liberal policies in 1980s, local governments also went through significant transformations (Erder and Incioglu, 2008). The autonomy and resources of local governments increased considerably (Erder and Incioglu, 2008).

On the other hand, as Bayraktar (2007) argues, this transformation of the local governments did not translate into development of local democracy in Turkey. In 1984 a new legislation Law No. 3030. led to the emergence of two layered municipal governments in large cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir (Erder and Incioglu, 2008). With this new law, district

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[45] http://sosyalmedya.co/konda-gezi-parki-anketi/

based municipalities were preserved but with the birth of metropolitan municipalities they lost most of their powers and resources (Bayraktar, 2007). Moreover, the structure of municipalities was far from being democratic since transparency, accountability, and public participation in decision making processes was not part of the new legislation (Bayraktar, 2007).

According to Bayraktar (2007) and, Erder and Incioglu (2008), the metropolitan municipalities are very much characterized with very powerful mayors. Despite the existence of municipal councils, they have limited power in decision-making processes since the mayor is also the president of the council and s/he decides the agenda of the meetings. In the case of inconclusive voting, the mayor has the power to make the final decision (Bayraktar, 2007). Moreover, members of the council tend to follow the opinions of the mayor, especially when they belong to the same political party, and the composition of the councils is far from representing the diverse social and economic structure of the local citizens (Erder and İncioğlu, 2008, and Bayraktar, 2007). In addition to these conditions, citizen participation in the council's decisions is also quite limited; bridges get built, roads change, and houses get demolished without any input from the citizens (Koker, 1995).

Ankara is no exception when it comes to the state of local democracies in Turkey. I. Melih Gokcek, member of the ruling Justice and Development Party AKP, has been the mayor of Ankara since 1994. The Gokcek administration is known to use all available means to suppress opposition in local politics. Union member public employees are forced to resign, there is a tremendous increase at the outsourcing of municipal services to private companies without any public surveillance; transportation, energy, and water fees in Ankara are the highest in Turkey, and there is almost no public participation in policy making processes.

Despite some attempts by the central government such as local city councils to include citizen participation in the decision-making, such councils in Ankara are mostly defunct since most civil society actors in Ankara were either not invited to meetings or were not given voice. Participation in such councils has decreased significantly since they were first established in 2007. Members of the municipality councils or groups that are sympathetic to the current mayors and heads of local municipalities continue to occupy the important seats in these councils. Recommendations produced in these councils almost never conflict with the views of the mayors.

3.3.3   Turkey and the European Union

There was an era of promising reforms by the Turkish governments and optimism for full membership following the recognition of Turkey as a candidate country by the Helsinki Council in 1999. Currently the state of EU-Turkey relations can be described as stagnant at best, if not in a state of downfall. Among the thirty-five chapters that Turkey needs to close in order to complete the negotiations, only thirteen have been opened, and only one is closed (the chapter on research and science), while eight of them are frozen by the EU Council in order to respond to Turkey's decision to refuse to establish trade relations with the Greek Cyprus[46]. Furthermore, public support for EU membership in Turkey dropped from 73% in 2004 to 38% in 2010s, and support for Turkey's membership in EU at member states continues to remain scant[47].

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[46] EU Commission calls for opening of energy chapter in Turkish accession process. (April, 23, 2013). *Hurriyet Daily News. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-commission-calls-for-opening-of-energy-chapter-in-turkish-accession-process.aspx?pageID=238&nID=45042&NewsCatID=351*

[47] For Turkey, Lure of Tie to Europe Is Fading. (December 4, 2011). *New York Times.* http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/world/europe/for-turkey-lure-of-european-union-is-fast-fading.html?pagewanted=all

One of the major challenges for Turkey to realize full membership in EU is to succeed in the application of "the Copenhagen political criteria" which require the development and stabilization of institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities" (Muftuler-Bac, 2005). In 2001, the EU Commission adopted the Accession Partnership for Turkey (Ministry of EU Affairs, 2007). Following the adoption of the Accession Partnership, Turkish government declared its National Program for the Adoption of the EU acquisition on March 19th, 2001 (Ministry of EU Affairs, 2007). Following the Copenhagen summit of December 2002, Turkey was given two years, till 2004 to meet the Copenhagen political criteria in order to open the negotiations without any delay (Ministry of EU Affairs, 2007).

Meanwhile, Turkish politics was going through significant changes. In 2002, the conservative AKP won the general elections, and was able to set up a majority government without the need for coalition partners for the first time in more than ten years. While the reform processes had already started in 2001, it was the AKP government that displayed strong political will to implement extensive reforms to meet the Copenhagen political criteria (Kirissci, 2004; and Muftuler-Bac 2005). These reforms were in the form of changes in the 1982 constitution that was written by the junta regime, and legislation of new laws. By the end of 2004, nine reform packages had been passed by Turkish National Assembly, TBMM (Kubicek, 2005).

These institutional changes had significant impact on a variety of issues that are vital for the development of a functioning democracy such minority rights, women's rights, restriction of

the military power, and on the legal framework in which NGOs operate[48]. However, the reform process has been increasingly stagnating since 2005, and the EU has been losing its leverage as an external force for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey especially following the increasing authoritarian tendencies of the AKP government after its second electoral victory in 2007 (Aydin-Duzgit and Keyman, 2013)

3.3.4 Some Basic Facts about Ankara

Figure 10 Picture of Ankara in 1920s

*Source: **Personal Archive of Onge, 2007***

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[48] There is an extensive research on these institutional reforms initiated by the EU accession process in Turkey (e.g. Onis, 2003; Sarigil 2007; Rumford 2001; Heper, 2005; Usul, 2010; Schimmelfennig, 2003; Oguzlu, 2004; and Kubicek, 2005).

Ankara was a small declining Ottoman town with a population less than 30,000 when the new Republic decided to make it the capital city of Turkey in October 1923 (Onge, 2007; Tankut, 1994; and Batuman, 2013). It had been a central and very multicultural production and commercial town during the Ottoman Empire in 17th and 18th century, but it lost prominence within the empire due to various political and economic reasons.

Figure 11 Picture of Ankara in 1920s-II

*Source: **Personal Archive of Onge, 2007***

As the Figure 12 demonstrates, Ankara is strategically located in the center of Anatolia, and was considered to be suitable to be the new capital of a new nation mostly due to this reason.

Figure 12 Map of Turkey

Source: Google, Mapsengine

Ankara was not only important as the new capital of the Republic, but it had been designed and built as the new symbol, example city of a modern Turkey, similar to European capitals without any references to Ottoman cultural heritage or architectural style that dominated Istanbul (Onge, 2007; Tankut, 1994; and Batuman, 2013).

By the early 1950s, technological improvements in agriculture and improved roads and infrastructure generated a large migration to cities.

Table 1 Population Growth in Ankara and Turkey

Year	Population Ankara	Population Turkey
1927	74553	13648270
1935	122720	16158018
1945	226712	18790174
1955	451241	24064763
1965	905660	31391421
1985	2228398	50664458
1997	2917602	66835052
2000	3203362	67803927
2007	3763591	70586256
2009	4650802	72561312
2012	4965542	75627384

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2013

The infrastructure and labor markets of cities were not ready for this unprecedented migration to cities in 1950s. Unable to meet the demand for housing, authorities condoned the emergence of squatter houses on public land known as gecekondu, meaning built over night by the migrants with the help of migrant communities.

Figure 13 Dostlar Neighborhood, Ankara

Source, Photo taken during fieldwork, November 2012.

The *gecekondu* neighborhood in the picture above is one of the last remaining ones that were built in 1950s. More and more such neighborhoods are redeveloped by the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKI). Such projects are further discussed in the coming chapters since some cases that mobilized against such redevelopment projects are included in the study. In sum, these projects are very controversial due various reasons. Most importantly, *gecekondu* residents are forced to pay exorbitant amounts for an apartment building, move to distant suburbs of the city, and many ex-*gecekondu* residents have trouble adjusting to

the life style in tall apartment buildings, since many of them used to rely on informal economic and social support systems common among the migrant communities in *gecekondu* neighborhoods. Moreover, many people I interviewed resist to leave their *gecekondus and* state that for decades they are used to live in a certain life style that is characterized by close contact with nature most of them have small gardens, and by strong supportive community networks despite all the infrastructure related problems in the poorly constructed *gecekondu* type of structures e.g. toilets outside the main house.

Figure 14 An Example of Apartment Complexes that Replaces *Gecekondu* Neighborhoods

Source: Turkey's Housing Development Administration of Turkey TOKI website, 2013

The mass affordable housing projects in Ankara as displayed in Figure 14 highly resemble the grand ensembles of Paris that were common in 1960s and were not constructed after the 1970s anywhere in France. The current experience in many grand ensembles of Ankara is very similar to how Castells 1984 defined the life in *Sarcelles*[49], the first and most memorable grand ensemble of Paris:

"… They were forced to live in the midst of a construction, with no amenities, poor transportation, and a total absence of urban life. The studies on the social relationships in Sarcelles during the 1950s and early 1960s show dramatic decreases in the extension and richness of social networks and human interaction in comparison with the resident's former experiences. The isolation was especially acute for women many of whom had to give up their jobs in Paris in order to take care of their children, while also losing their contacts with their friends, family, and neighbors which they enjoyed in their overcrowded by intense human environment" (pg. 80).

Table 2 Urban Renewal Projects in Ankara

Year	Number of Projects	Area
2005	21	13.042.80
2007	45	29.91.13
2010	55	32.282.80

Source, Batuman 2013

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[49] There is even a disease called sarcellite named after the Sarcelle experience in France to denote a condition when a person feels alienated and disconnected from other human beings as a result of poor spatial and social arrangements of the neighborhood in which one lives . A few of my respondents mentioned their friends that committed suicide as a result of their in ability to adjust to the lifestyle in multistory buildings built on spaces literally in the middle of nowhere with no social and cultural amenities or proper public transportation.

Figure 15 Districts of Ankara

Source: Ankara Metropolitan Municipality

Ankara consists of 25 districts. During local elections that are held every five years, the mayor for the Ankara, as well as heads of municipalities for each district are elected. Despite having power on most practical issues on Ankara, the mayor is still considered hierarchically below the governor, who is appointed by the central government for each city in Turkey. Most importantly, police forces mostly operate still directly under the control of the governor. Election of the governor by popular votes instead of being appointed by the central government is one of the major demands of many mobilizations towards democratization in Turkey.

Table 3 Socio-demographic Characteristics of Ankara by Districts

District	Population	% Ankara Pop.	% Illeterate
Akyurt	19031	0.38	3.20
Altindag	274137	5.52	4.38
Ayas	6756	0.14	1.47
Bala	5954	0.12	7.22
Beypazari	28284	0.57	3.00
Camlidere	2250	0.05	5.38
Cankaya	697207	14.04	1.52
Cubuk	56.416	0.00	4.66
Elmadag	32300	0.65	4.11
Etimesgut	321774	6.48	1.85
Evren	1518	0.03	7.05
Golbasi	81368	1.64	2.51
Gudul	2142	0.04	2.15
Haymana	6928	0.14	4.33
Kalecik	6979	0.14	4.86
Kazan	29875	0.60	2.65
Kecioren	647816	13.05	2.89
Kizilcahamam	13.001	0.00	2.65
Mamak	428752	8.63	3.98
Nallihan	9992	0.20	3.28
Polatli	75557	1.52	3.43
Pursaklar	85873	1.73	2.56
Sincan	353047	7.11	2.99
Sereflikochisar	21865	0.44	6.18
Yenimahalle	551244	11.10	2.12

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2013

Table 3 represents the distribution of Ankara's population across its districts. The highlighted districts constitute the urbanized central districts of Ankara, whereas the remaining districts mostly remain as rural settings. All of the cases studied in the following chapters are set within these urban districts of Ankara. More contextual information about the analyzed cases is provided in analytical chapters.

3.4   SUMMARY

The main goal of this chapter was to provide information about the main data sources collected in the study. The first section discussed the data collection processes for protest event-data based on police records, use of newspaper accounts, and interviews with SMO representatives and neighborhood residents. Discussion of data aimed at also highlighting some of the weaknesses of reliance on newspaper accounts such as description bias.

Next section briefly introduced QCA, and discussed some of the epistemological underpinnings of this method such as complex causality, equifinality, and asymmetric causality, in addition to the illustration of the minimization process with a simple example.

The following sections were aimed providing some background information about the context of the study. It started with a short view of the state of state civil society relations in Turkey, continued with a short overview of the local governance structure in Turkey, and finally provided some basic information about Ankara and its districts.

4.0 CONSEQUENCES OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS: THE CASE OF URBAN MOVEMENTS IN ANKARA, 2006-2011

The structure of organizations is rapidly moving away from the well-known bureaucratic arrangements first criticized by Weber in early 20th century that are characterized by strict centralization of functions and hierarchical command and control systems that were designed by the unrealistic assumptions of perfect rationality and a simple linear approach to the design and implementation organizational tasks. The collapse of the Socialist Bloc by the end of cold war and the rise of globalization were among the most important political factors that pushed the governance model around the globe. As the omnipresent state that provided all kinds of services to its citizens while closing all channels for its citizens for challenging its operations was not anymore a viable option by the defeat of Soviet Union, the role of government started to be more and more debated around the world (Kettl, 2005).

These socio-political changes around globe since the early 1980s also led to some kind of legitimation crisis for traditional political parties. Inter-organizational networks, a unique form of organizing that is neither purely bureaucratic and hierarchical nor completely self-governing as markets started to replace political parties as the main form of political representation of the masses (Powell, 1990; Hadenius, 2001).

These leaderless, decentralized alliances of organizations are assumed most of the time to be the result of reciprocal trust, and characterized by participatory and egalitarian decision

making processes that are considered to be more democratic forms of organizing in comparison to hierarchical, traditional party based mobilizations (Diani, 2011). In contrast, research on inter-organizational networks show that these networks come in many different forms and can still be hierarchical, and characterized by lack of trust, reciprocity and democratic decision making processes (Ashman and Sugawara, 2012).

The goal of this chapter is to investigate these different forms of inter-organizational networks in relation to the policy outcomes of these networked mobilizations using QCA. The first section of this chapter provides description of the cases. As Rihoux and Lobe (2008) indicate there are three main phases of QCA: (1) case descriptions that provide some historical, context based information, (2) analytic moment of QCA by identifying the minimal formulas, and (3) interpretation of different causal paths.

4.1   CASE DESCRIPTIONS

4.1.1   Kugulu Park

Kugulu Park is a small 2.47 acres park located in middle class/upper middle class Cankaya district of Ankara known for its swans and its little pond. It is around a neighborhood surrounded by embassies, as well as by many shops and restaurants. It addition to the swans, the park also houses 24 different bird species. It is a first degree preserved natural site protected by the Turkey's Culture and Natural Heritage Preservation Board. The park is considered as one of the symbols of Ankara, and is one of very few recreational spaces in central Ankara. It is an important space that has an important role in Ankarian identity, also has a special place for

people who grew up in the 1980s and onwards, because it is a common activity among families with small children to visit the park, and feed the swans and the pigeons.

In August 2006, the Greater Municipality of Ankara, headed by I. Melih Gokcek, applied for, and got a permission from the Ankara Branch of Culture and Natural Heritage Preservation Board to demolish a portion of the park for an underpass project that was opposed by most of the residents, the main neighborhood association Kavakliderem, as well as by professional organizations such as Chamber of City Planners, Chamber of Architects, and Chamber of Environmental Engineers. The project was criticized since it prioritized car traffic over pedestrian rights and because underpasses encourage drivers to drive faster and can cause accidents[50].

Despite general discontent with the underpass project, there was no organized opposition until the Culture and Natural Heritage Preservation Board granted permission for the demolition of some part of the park. The news spread quickly and an occupy type of self-organized movement emerged within hours. When people arrived at the park, they were confronted with the bulldozers of the Greater Municipality of Ankara. Various activities such as concerts, art related workshops for kids were carried out for about three days. Most importantly, the head of Cankaya district/municipality, who is a member of the main opposition party CHP, provided vital support during the occupation by sending municipality workers to protect the trees of the park from destruction.

The occupation ended with success, the trees of the park were saved, and the underpass project had to be modified by the Greater Municipality of Ankara in order to exclude

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[50] As a result of this project numerous pedestrian lost their lives because cars leaving the underpass tend to drive very fast. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ankara/20787291.asp

the parts of Kugulu Park from the plan.

4.1.2 Kavaklidere Movie Theater

Kavaklidere Movie Theater was one of the few remaining non-mall based historical theaters when it was shut down in 2007 after 38 years since its establishment. Only 350-400 feet away from the Kugulu Park, it was also considered one of the symbols of downtown Ankara, and it had been home to many festivals from Turkey and Europe. Kavaklidere Theater would mostly show art movies that were rarely selected by the multiplex theaters in the malls. The family that owns the theater also owns some other shops and businesses around Kavaklidere Theater, and decided to close the theater due to lack of enough revenues. On October 2009, a group of neighborhood organizations headed by Kavakliderem started a campaign to reinvigorate the interest of the public at the theater and organized multiple events. This mobilization failed to ignite a determined and strong resistance among large populations in Ankara, and the theater still mostly remains an idle space.

4.1.3 Kizilirmak River as Water Supply of Ankara

The summer of 2007 in Ankara is also known as the summer of drought. As a result of poor policy and planning, and also due to little precipitation in the winter and spring months, water levels in the dams that supply the city water of Ankara were mostly exhausted by the beginning of summer. I. Melih Gokcek, the elected head of Greater Municipality of Ankara famously asked Ankarians to not to take showers very often, and suggested that residents of Ankara should

consider going on vacation or visiting their relatives in other cities[51].

In order to conserve water, the municipality started to employ a 'two days on, two days off' strategy (Franz, 2012). To deal with the water crises I. Melih Gokcek advanced the Kizilirmak project to provide additional water supply for Ankara. Simultaneously, a group of experts started to raise concerns about the health risks associated with the quality of Kizilirmak water. Professional associations such as Chamber of Civil Engineers, and Chamber of Chemical Engineers released various technical reports and press releases (e.g. IMO, 2007). The main concern of these experts was the high levels of arsenic found in the Kizilirmak River, which may lead to health problems such as diarrhea and dysentery. In order to refute the claims of such organizations, a couple of technical reports based on the tests of the municipality as well as the Ministry of Health were also published[52].

Meanwhile, multiple protest events, as well as conferences were organized by a larger network of organizations that involved SMOs, political parties, professional associations, neighborhood organizations, and consumer rights groups. Despite such efforts, during the days following the crisis, I. Melih Gokcek stated that the water brought from the Kizilirmak River had been used in the city for the last 21 days. He argued that he chose not to make this information public because he did not trust the opposition and that they would fabricate high numbers of diarrhea cases if they knew ahead. In contrast, the chairman of the Chamber of Physicians of Ankara stated that the long-term chemical effects of the Kizilirmak River could be detrimental to

[51]http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/08/02/haber,6A3F1D60841B4861B0D7DF9AF0D52D04.html
[52]http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?load=detayandlink=144713

public health in the long term.[53]

4.1.4   Saving Yeni Sahne

Yeni Sahne, located in the city center in Kizilay, was the main theater hall where the Turkish State Theaters of Ankara, Ankara Devlet Tiyatrolari, staged their shows. The building belonged to the Foresters' Association of Turkey (TOD), but has been rented by the State Theater for more than 40 years when TOD decided not to renew the contract of the building in the summer of 2006. There was a large mobilization of mostly art communities of Ankara. Many, including the Chamber of Architects, and Planners, considered it a historic heritage for Ankara due to its unique architecture as a signature building that constitutes a significant role in the urban visual memory of Ankara. The Head of Cankaya district and member of the opposition party, Muzaffer Eryılmaz, also participated in the protests and even offered to provide a new space for TOD that had more land value than Yeni Sahne. Despite all efforts, TOD turned the Yeni Sahne building into a mini-mall and signs of Burger King replaced the signs of Yeni Sahne by 2008.

4.1.5   Labor Standards in OSTIM and Ivedik

OSTIM and Ivedik are organized industrial zones that host businesses on various sectors such as furniture production, production of car parts, electrical works etc. On February 2011, two consecutive explosions happened in OSTIM and Ivedik that led to the deaths of 21 workers. The families of these workers demanded increased inspection at these businesses and inspection by

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[53]   http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/107329-gokcek-ishal-yok-dedi-peki-ya-kizilirmak-in-kimyasal-etkileri

the municipality increased to a certain extent. The families of the workers formed a platform among themselves to bring responsible parties to justice. From a movement perspective, the greatest achievement of the mobilization that started following the OSTIM and Ivedik explosions are the ability of families to form relations with families of other workers that die due to low labor standards in other cities, and as well as in other sectors.

Currently the families of the victims of OSTIM and Ivedik explosions are organized under Conscience and Justice Watch and continue to work for higher labor standards not only in OSTIM and Ivedik but in overall Turkey.

4.1.6   Rights and the Protection of Street Animals in Ankara

The winter of 2006 in Ankara witnessed massacre of many stray animals, mostly dogs in Ankara. Bodies of about 60 dogs were found dead in Mamak, and Portakal Cicegi Street within a week. Animal rights' organizations blamed the workers of municipalities, and charged them with carrying out most of the killings.

The following months witnessed very successful mobilizations by the animal rights' NGOs. Multiple protests events were organized by large numbers of participants in Ankara and in some other cities. There was significant coverage of the protest events in national TV and papers. These protests were also supported by animal rights groups internationally, most notably in Germany. There was tremendous support from celebrity figures as well as political parties. The mobilizations efforts were supplemented with a media campaign that used powerful videos and stories of street animals in Ankara. The protests ended with a new legislation that increased fines for crimes against animals, the number of shelters for street animals increased significantly, and massacres at the scale that started the movement have not been seen again since the protests.

4.1.7 Mobilizations against the Price Increases in Bread, City Water, and Heating Gas

Three of the cases focus on protests and other forms of social movement activities against the increasing prices of essential goods including bread, water, and gas. Ankara continues to have the highest prices for all these commodities in comparison to all other cities in Turkey.

Protests against the price increase in gas started in 2006. Despite the protests, gas prices have continued to increase every year, as much as 80% in the five years following 2006. Mobilizing organizations consisted of mostly consumer rights organizations, and these organizations claimed that the motivation behind the unparalleled increases were due to the irresponsible planning of the Greater Municipality of Ankara in terms of managing its debt to BOTAS, Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, the main public institution that provides natural gas to municipalities. Similarly, in 2009 there has been a short-lived mobilization against the increases in water prices mostly led by consumer rights groups, and Halk Evleri.[54]

Finally, there has been a short mobilization towards increases in the price of bread sold at state subsidized bakeries. In this mobilization the main antagonist was the association of bread makers of Ankara. Similarly, this urban movement also failed to reverse the decision of the price hikes.

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[54] HalkEvleri is a human rights organization that works on a multitude of issues including the right to housing, work, and basic services. It is organized all around Turkey, and follows a bottom up organizing approach with many branches in working class neighborhoods in many cities of Turkey. Based on my field work, HalkEvleri seems to be the most effective SMO, with a large social base in the *gecekondu* areas, as well as other working class towns of Ankara.

4.1.8 Resistance Movements against Urban Renewal Projects in Polatli, Altindag, and Dikmen

As shortly mentioned in the previous chapter, the urban renewal projects in large cities such as Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul have been one of the defining characteristics of urban experience in Turkey in the last decades. Once built in not so preferred urban spaces like on valley bottom sloping hillsides, the squatter houses known as *gecekondus* were still located close to central business districts and the main transportation axes (Uzun, 2003; and Senyapili, 1997). As the cities expanded, the value of the land occupied by the *gecekondus* increased tremendously over the years. As Smith (2002) states about such projects around the globe, most of the urban renewal projects carried out by local municipalities are motivated to make use of this increased land value. In a way these projects aim at physical and demographic 'upgrading' (Kuyucu and Unsal, 2010) of deteriorating neighborhoods.

During my interviews at these sites of the contested projects, most residents stated that they were not against the projects as long as their interests were prioritized. Most residents made statements that highly resonated with the literature suggesting that the projects aimed at getting rid of them, and make space for upper class gated housing complexes. The demands of the resisters across different projects tend to be similar: (1) Not be forced to move to outside of the city, (2) Each owner of the *gecekondu* is compensated based on the size of the land owned. Owners require higher rates of compensation, so that they owe less for the apartment that will be provided by TOKI. (3) Also, *gecekondu* renters require rent support since it is almost impossible

to find rental housing in the city with similar rates to *gecekondus.* If they move outside of city, then the transportation costs per month increase dramatically[55].

4.1.9   Saving Ataturk Orman Ciftligi/ Atatürk Forest Farm and Zoo (AOC)

The story of AOC starts with Ankara becoming the capital of Turkey in the 1920s. AOC was founded by Ataturk in 1925 on a vast parcel of land, about 25 204.748 91 acres[56]. AOC includes experimental farming lands, diary products are produced and sold under AOC brand, and there are many recreational areas as well as cafes and restaurants (Gokturk, 1997).

Managed by the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (Gida Tarim Hayvamcilik Bakanligi), over the years AOC lost about 36% of its land to various projects including housing projects, construction projects for building modern buildings for various government institutions, and also   provision of land for new universities (Atak and Sahin, 2004).

In April 2006, the legislation proposed by Ankara MP Salih was passed to allow further redevelopment of AOC. The main concern of the opposition to the legislation was the ambiguity of the bill in terms of how much land it allowed the Greater Municipality of Ankara to be used for infrastructure projects. Mostly consisting of professional organizations like Chamber of Planners, Architects, the protesting organizations raised their concerns that this new legislation may bring the end of AOC in the hands of Greater Municipality of Ankara by allowing the municipality to build roads, bridges, and subway entrances/exits.

The mobilization ended with success with participation of many SMOs in multiple protests, petition campaigns, and forums aimed at raising awareness about the passed legislation.

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[55] More information provided for each case in the raw data matrix.
[56] For the English Webpage of AOC: http://www.aoc.gov.tr/index.php?act=langandlid=1

4.1.10 Underpass by the Historic Train Station

On December 2008, Greater Municipality of Ankara approved a project of interexchange and underpass to be built right in front of the old train station TCDD. I. Melih Gokcek, head of Greater Municipality of Ankara claimed that the project was necessary to solve the traffic problem at the old town section of Ankara.

Figure 16 Photo taken During Construction of the Underpass

Source: Hurriyet Ankara, December 2008

A similar group of professional organizations mobilized to reverse the decision on the grounds that too many trees would be lost in the process, the historical train station could get physical damage, and most importantly, the area would lose its pedestrian friendly character that is vital to a healthy, lively downtown. Despite multiple protests and various other movement activities, the movement failed to reverse the decision of the Greater Municipality of Ankara.

4.2   NETWORK DATA AND OPERATIONALIZATIONS OF THE NETWORK
STRUCTURES

The raw data used for the analysis include a two-mode matrix in which rows represent organizations and columns represent social movement events such as protests, press releases etc. Two-mode matrices can easily be transformed into one mode by multiplying the two mode matrix with its transpose e.g. assume *X* is a two-mode network, *X* is transformed into A, the one mode network by using the simple formula *A=XX`,* (Borgatti, 2009).

After the transformation, each case has a one-mode network, Organization X Organization, both rows and columns are organizations. These weighted, undirected matrices are then transformed into non-valued matrices 0,1 since the structure-related analysis is harder to perform with weighted data. The weighted data will be considered in the next chapter while analyzing determinants of formation of ties across organizations.

The network structures are visualized using VISONE[57] software. The particular layout algorithm used for displaying networks is called stress minimization[58], a technique developed as a version of techniques referred to as *multidimensional scaling* MDS. Borgatti (2009) defines MDS as "a method of locating points in space such that Euclidean distances [shortest paths]

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[57] Version 2.7 downloaded from http://visone.info/html/download.html. This software is free and allows for visualizations as well various analyses.

[58] Stress minimization is the suggested layout algorithm by VISONE since it performs best among many other layouts at optimizing the following criteria: (1) Links should have more or less the same length. (2) Nodes should be distributed well over the drawing area.(3) the number of meaningless link crossings should be kept small.4 Structural symmetries in the network should be represented well.5 the layout should reveal specific structural properties.6 given a sequence of networks, the layout should ease comparison with respect to the layout of the previous network in the sequence.From Visone Wiki at http://visone.info/wiki/index.php/Visualization_tab#stress_minimization. The last criterion is particularly important for the purposes of this study since some network types are visually categorized.

between the points correspond to a matrix of input similarities/distances used to provide visual representations of 1-mode matrices such as correlation matrices or perceptual distances among objects." (pg.2)

One of the most serious challenges of this study is categorizing, differentiating the network structures of the cases into the pre-defined ideal type network types: Small World Networks, Hierarchical Networks, Elite Networks, Isolated Clique Networks, and Village Networks. I utilized various measures and techniques for the grouping of the networks into these categories.

My analyses showed that there were no networks that fit the Elite Network type. These networks are characterized by strong core/periphery structures as identified by Borgatti and Everett (1999). As discussed by Borgatti and Everett (1999), core-periphery networks are characterized by a few elite actors, and all other actors are connected through more or less closely around a single core. In order to detect that, I inspected the degree distributions of networks specifically looking for distributions characterized by a few hubs with lots of connections with high degree centrality and the remainder of the actors with very few connections. None of the 14 networks resemble such structure.

Figure 17 Degree Distributions of Cases

Figure 17 displays, the degree distributions Y-axes show the number of actors, and the X-axes show the value of degree centrality, that is, how many actors one is connected to. First , we can see that there is not much inequality in terms of having a group of elites with many connections, and peripheral actors with very few. Instead what we see is a fairly egalitarian distribution. In other words, even in large networks, there are no actors with 20-30 connections and rest with a few connections. In other words, there are no cases in which the difference between a maximally connected actor and a minimally actor exceeds 2, ignoring the isolates-actors with zero connections. Therefore I concluded that there was no elite type of network structure among the cases studied.

I hypothesize that the reason for this is due to the nature of the data. As previously mentioned, the data represent only alliance networks, there is no way to find out which organizations were the main organizers for each and every single event. In the presence of such directed data, it could be possible to analyze mobilization networks that are very likely to have core-periphery networks[59].

My interviews also suggest that regardless of the number of organizations present, there is always a core group of actors that act as main organizers, communicating and making calls for other organizations to join the social movement event. Consequently, as a weakness of the study, I am able to analyze only alliance networks, which represent groups of organizations that may or may not act together for a common cause.

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[59] Such networks are analyzed in Chapter VI.

Figure 18 Network Visualizations Cases I-V

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

Case 4

Case 5

Figure 19 Network Visualizations cases VI-X

Case 6

Case 7

Case 8

Case 9

Case 10

Figure 20 Network Visualizations XI-XIV

Case 11

Case 12

Case 13

Case 14

Through visual inspection of the network structure, it is possible to identify the presence of multiple Isolated Cliques types of structures. I identified cases # 3, 4, 8, and 13 as isolated cliques since the visualization clearly shows that these networks have very low levels of connectivity and they are highly fragmented structures. Network parameters displayed in Table 4 also confirm this conclusion. Cases # 1,2,7,11,12 and 14 resemble a Village type of network

structure with one core single component characterized by a high level of density and low levels of efficiency, as confirmed in Table XX.

For Small World Networks and Hierarchical networks, it is hard to make use of visualizations for categorization. Therefore I solely relied on network parameters to categorize these types of networks as displayed in Table 4. Small World Networks are characterized by high levels of clustering and lower or similar levels of average path length (APL) in comparison to random networks with same density and size[60]. Case # 9 on animal rights is the only network that met the requirements to be labeled as a Small World Network.

Finally, for hierarchy, I simply used Krackhardt's (1994) measures of hierarchy: connectivity and efficiency[61]. Connectivity measures the reachability of each node, a connectivity value of "1" means the network is not fragmented, there are no isolates, and each actor is reachable to any other actor. Efficiency looks at the amount of redundancy that connects two ties. The higher the efficiency closer to "1" value implies the absence of redundant ties.

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[60] Clustering of a network is the average of the densities of the neighborhoods of all of the actors also known as transitivity represents and APL is the average of all shortest paths between all possible dyads in a network Hanneman and Riddle, 2005.

[61] In addition to connectivity and hierarchy, Krackhardt 1994 uses two more measures, Least upper boundness, and Krackhardt hierarchy. These two measures are only relevant for directed networks and therefore are not used for analysis of the inter-organizational data that is available for this study.

Table 4 Network Parameters

ID	Name	Type of Network	Krackhardt Connectivity	Krackhardt: Graph Efficiency	Number of Edges	Density	Number of Organizations	Clustering	APL	Number of Isolates	Number of Components
1	ALTINDAG	Village	1.00	-0.75	113	0.83	17	0.95	1.18	0	1
2	AOC	Village	0.90	-0.71	620	0.76	41	0.96	1.16	2	3
3	BREAD	Isolated Cliques	0.20	negative infinity	2	0.20	5	0.00	1.00	1	3
4	KAVAKMOVIE	Isolated Cliques	0.71	-0.30	9	0.42	6	0.65	1.40	1	2
5	OSTIM	Hierarchy	0.80	0.40	103	0.25	29	0.88	2.32	3	4
6	DIKMEN	Hierarchy	1.00	0.52	1533	0.25	112	0.67	1.83	0	1
7	GARONU	Village	1.00	-0.80	37	0.82	10	0.86	1.18	0	1
8	GAS	Isolated Cliques	0.39	-0.33	212	0.26	41	0.93	1.35	5	9
9	ANIMAL RIGHTS	Small World	0.97	0.08	1282	0.45	76	0.92	1.58	1	2
10	KIZIL	Isolated Cliques	0.63	-0.32	79	0.41	21	0.82	1.38	3	4
11	KUGULU	Village	0.69	-1.11	190	0.68	24	1.00	1.00	4	5
12	POLATLI	Village	1.00	-0.33	42	0.63	12	0.87	1.36	0	1
13	WATER	Isolated Cliques	0.14	-3.00	3	0.14	7	1.00	1.00	4	5
14	YENISAHNE	Village	0.69	-0.91	94	0.61	18	0.95	1.10	3	4

As Butts (2005) states, a network cannot be considered if its density is larger than .5, since higher levels of density decrease the efficiency significantly. Based on measures of efficiency, connectivity, and density, Cases # 6 and 7 are categorized as hierarchical networks.

4.3   MAJOR HYPOTHESES

The structure of alliance networks does not have direct causal impact on the policy outcomes of social movements. Instead alliance networks are associated with other causal conditions that are likely to impact the outcomes. The first is the number of participant organizations. Protest events with a lot of participants demonstrate the presence of mass support for the challengers, and that alone should matter in democratic contexts. Moreover, such protests are more likely to attract media attention, and threaten the legitimacy of power holders and existing policies, hence they are likely to impose high levels of costs on power holders (Rojas, 2006; Della Porta and Diani, 2006). Consequently the first major hypothesis is as follows:

> *Hypothesis 1:*   Successful policy outcomes are likely to be associated with subsets of social movements that have support from a large number of organizations.

Secondly, I hypothesize that the mobilizations that are able to scale up from a local agenda to national in terms of being able to carry the debate to the national parliament and national media are more likely to succeed. As an extremely centralized government system, the national public organizations in Turkey are always able to pressure and influence decision making at the local level. Therefore the second major hypothesis is as follows:

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Hypothesis 2: Successful policy outcomes are likely to be associated with subsets of urban mobilizations that are able to generate public opinion and discussion at the national level

4.3.1 Network Related Hypotheses

As theoretically discussed, hierarchical networks tend to more efficient; therefore in relation to participation related causal condition, I hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 3: Widespread participation is more likely to be associated with subsets of urban mobilizations that have hierarchical alliance networks.

In relation to scaling up to the national level,

Hypothesis 4: Small world networks are more likely to be successful in terms of scaling up the debate, because these networks tend to link communities that each may have different pressure points and channels to raise their voices.

4.3.2 Operationalizations of the Non-Network Causal Conditions

Selection of causal conditions in QCA is based on substantive knowledge of cases, as well as on theoretical insights (Rihoux and Meur, 2008). Following are various causal conditions based on

major theories that explain the emergence and outcome of social movements, including, Political Opportunity Structures, Cultural Approaches, and Resource Mobilization Theories.

Antagonist **A:** There are two main types of antagonists among the cases under study: public organizations and private organizations. Public organizations mostly consist of municipalities at different levels and despite previously discussed non-democratic context in local governments in Ankara, local governments are still expected to be more accountable and serve the interests of citizens in comparison to private institutions that are solely driven by profit maximization. Consequently, I expect cases in which the antagonist is a public organization to be more prone to be responsive to the demands of citizens and end with successful outcomes compared to cases in which the antagonist is a private organization. This condition is coded as 1 (one) for public organizations as antagonists and 0 (zero) for cases when the antagonist is a private organization.

The Presence or Absence of Elite Allies E: Alliance with the elites is considered present in a case when a political party in the parliament supports the movement by participating at movement events. If a political party in the parliament participates in at least one movement event, that case is considered to have elite support. I anticipate that elite support will be associated with successful political outcomes.

Direct Beneficiaries B: All cases under study have support from conscience adherents, groups that do not have immediate interest in the outcome of the movement. Unions, professional organizations e.g. Chamber of Architects, Chamber of Physicians, advocacy NGOs constitute most of the conscience adherents in the cases. But only certain cases have direct beneficiaries as

in the case of groups resisting urban renewal projects. These groups have a lot of support from conscience adherents, but because the outcomes have very dramatic effects on the livelihood of the people that are victims of these projects, these groups show strong resistance and do not refrain from confronting the police or other public officials despite high risks. Consequently, when such groups define the nature of the case, I expect successful outcomes due to increased levels of commitment and solidarity among the participants.

***Scaling Up to the National Level* N:** For these conditions, I consider for each case whether the issue was discussed at the Parliament, and whether this discussion was covered in the national news media.

Participation: The number of participating organizations in various social movement events is considered as a proxy measure for the size of participation for each movement. This condition is coded as low 0, medium 2, high 3.[62]

Table 5 is the data table, and provides details of conditions and cases before the data is transformed into a truth table. Next, Table 6 is the truth table that summarizes the cases. The truth tables' each row shows an empirically observed combination of causal conditions and outcomes for the Model I, the first stage of the causal model introduced previously (Ragin, 2008).

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[62] See Appendix XX for the details of the calibration of this condition.

Table 5 Raw Data Matrix

Case ID	Case Name	Type of Network	Elite Alliance	Antagonist Public	Direct Beneficiaries	Participation	National Level	Outcome
1	ALTINDAG	Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	17	No	Succesful
2	AOC	Village	Yes	Yes	No	41	Yes	Succesful
3	BREAD	Isolated Cliques	No	No	No	5	No	Not Succesful
4	KAVAKMOVIE	Isolated Cliques	No	No	No	6	No	Not Succesful
5	OSTIM	Hierarchy	Yes	Yes	Yes	29	Yes	Succesful
6	DIKMEN	Hierarchy	Yes	Yes	Yes	112	Yes	Succesful
7	GARONU	Village	Yes	Yes	No	10	No	Not Succesful
8	GAS	Isolated Cliques	Yes	No	No	41	No	Not Succesful
9	ANIMAL RIGHTS	Small World	Yes	Yes	Yes	76	Yes	Succesful
10	KIZIL	Isolated Cliques	Yes	Yes	No	21	Yes	Not Succesful
11	KUGULU	Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	24	Yes	Succesful
12	POLATLI	Village	Yes	Yes	Yes	12	No	Succesful
13	WATER	Isolated Cliques	No	Yes	No	7	No	Not Succesful
14	YENISAHNE	Village	Yes	No	No	18	Yes	Not Succesful

4.4   ANALYSIS

Due to the nature of the data, Multi-Value QCA (mvQCA) is used as the data analysis technique. mvQCA can be considered as an extension of crisp QCA (Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser, 2009). The main difference between mvQCA and traditional crisp QCA is that mvQCA allows incorporating nominal and ordinal level measures to be included as causal conditions, in addition to the dichotomous ones (Cronvist, 2003; 2007). Consequently, mvQCA avoids loss of information and decreases the chances of observing contradictory configurations (Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser, 2009). Yet, the outcome condition in mvQCA still needs to be coded as a dichotomous one (Cronvist, 2003; 2007).

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Minimization process in mvQCA is also similar to the process in crisp QCA. Ragin (1987) summarizes the reduction process in crisp QCA as follows: "if two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition, yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression" (p.93), cited in Rihoux and De Meur, (2009). In other words, causal condition A is not included in the reduced expression, if absence and presence of A in combination with the same causal conditions lead to the same outcome. In mvQCA, a causal condition is removed from the reduced expression if all possible values of this condition in combination with the same causal conditions are associated with same outcome (Cronqvist and Berg-Schlosser, 2009.) For example in crips QCA condition A is considered irrelevant if:

$$aBC + ABC \rightarrow O$$

Meaning, the absence of A in combination with the presence of B and C, *and* the presence of A in combination with the presence of B and C lead to the same outcome. Therefore A can be removed from the formula BC$\rightarrow$ 0. Now, if we assume A and B are dichotomous conditions, and C is a three valued condition, C can be reduced only if all three values of C are combined with the same values for A and B as shown in the hypothetical example below;

$$A_1B_0C_0 + A_1B_0C_1 + A_1B_0C_2 \rightarrow O$$

The example shows, if C has any of the three values it can get in combination with the presence of A and presence of B, the outcome does not change. Hence, the formula can be reduced to:

$$A_1B_0 \rightarrow O$$

All analysis is carried out in *R* environment using the QCA package written by Dusa and Miller (2013).

4.4.1 Model I- Outcome = Success/Failure

The first model analyses the direct causal conditions including presence of elites, nature of the antagonist, presence of beneficiaries, and participation. Table 6, the truth table for this model summarizes the combination of causal conditions associated with successful outcomes.

Table 6 Truth Table for Model I

Case IDs	Elite Alliance	Antagonist Public	Direct Beneficiaries	Participation	National Level	Number of Cases	Outcome
5,11	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
6,9	1	1	1	2	1	2	1
12	1	1	1	0	0	1	1
2	1	1	0	2	1	1	1
1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
3,4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
8	1	0	0	2	0	1	0
14	1	0	0	1	1	1	0
7	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
10	1	1	0	1	1	1	0

The clearest pattern in the truth table is the presence of elite alliance and public organization as the main antagonist in all recipes that end with successful outcomes. No contradictory cases are present. Overall there are 7 cases with successful outcomes, and 7 cases with non-successful policy outcomes.

Table 7 Boolean Minimization Results for Model I

Configurations	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
E{1}*B{1}*A{1}	0.857	0.571	5,11,6,9,12,1
E{1}*A{1}*N{1}*PS{2}	0.429	0.143	3; 10

Figure 21 summarizes the two different causal paths that have successful outcomes based on the Boolean minimization.[63] As expected from the truth table, presence of elite alliance and public organization as the main antagonists are the two major causal conditions present in both paths. The first path combines these two causal conditions with the presence of direct beneficiaries, which indicates that highly motivated organizations' individuals only succeed when their efforts are combined with support from elites and when a more accountable antagonist is presence. Next path shows that up scaling and wide spread participation need to co-exist in addition to the first two causal conditions

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[63] As suggested by Ragin (2008), intermediate solutions are used.

Figure 21 Causal Paths for Model I

This path displays the causal complexity between up scaling and wide spread participation, in the sense that neither of the two paths alone is sufficient for successful outcomes, unlike the presence of a group of highly motivated actors. In a way, less committed but larger groups need to scale up the debate about the movement for successful outcomes.

Next models look at how network structure interacts with these two last causal conditions, since other conditions are endogenous characteristic of each movement. The alliance structure may not affect the presence of direct beneficiaries, elite allies or the nature of the antagonist.

4.4.2   Model II-Outcome= Participation

Model II looks at how causal conditions interact and lead to wide spread participation. The truth table summarizes the causal combinations without the logical remainders. Model II also introduces a new causal condition, presence or absence of vertical or horizontal integration.

This condition is based on whether the movement was able to forge ties with similar horizontal movements and different vertical movements in other cities and locales.

Table 8 Truth Table for Model II

Case IDs	Elite Alliance	Direct Beneficiaries	Network Structure	Horizontal/ Vertical Integration	Number of Cases	Outcome
5,6	1	1	2	1	2	1
9	1	1	3	1	1	1
8,10	1	0	0	0	2	0
2,14	1	0	1	1	2	0
3,4,13	0	0	0	0	3	0
1,12	1	1	1	1	2	0
7	1	0	1	0	1	0
11	1	1	1	0	1	0

The truth table shows that this model is not very strong due to lack of conditional diversity; there is only one network structure that resembles Small World Networks, and only 3 cases that were able to mobilize wide spread participation.

Table 9 Boolean Minimization Results for Model II

Configurations	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
E{1}*B{1}*I{1}*NS{2}	0.400	0.400	5,6
E{1}* B{1}*I{1}*NS{3}	0.200	0.200	9

Despite weak model fit, the two causal paths suggest that hierarchical networks, and small world networks are both efficient in mobilizing large number of participants, when commitments are high, the movement works together with other mobilizations, and also when elites are present.

Figure 22 Causal Paths for Model II

4.4.3   Model III-Outcome =National Agenda

The last model in this chapter looks at what factors work together to facilitate the scaling up of the issue that is the main concern of the movement.

Table 10 Truth Table for Model III

Case IDs	Antagonist Public	Horizontal/ Vertical Integration	Elite Alliance	Direct Beneficiaries	Network Structure	Number of Cases	Outcome
5,6	1	1	1	1	2	2	1
14	0	1	1	0	1	1	1
10	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
11	1	0	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
9	1	1	1	1	3	1	1
3,4	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
1,12	1	1	1	1	1	2	0
8	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
13	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
7	1	0	1	0	1	1	0

The last model includes the Antagonist Public (A) condition, since mobilizations towards public organizations are more likely to rise to the national agenda. There are 7 cases that were able to move their cause to the national level while the remaining 5 were limited to the local level.

Table 11 Boolean Minimization Results for Model III

Configurations	Raw Coverage	Unique Coverage	Cases
A{1}*E {1}*B{1}*NS{2}	0.286	0	5,6
A{1}*E{1}* B{1}*NS{3}	0.143	0	9
A{1}*E{1}*I{1}*NS{2}	0.286	0	5,6
A{1}*E{1}*I{1}*NS{3}	0.143	0	9

Figure 23 Causal Paths for Model III

Similar to the Model II, the main causal paths are only differentiated by the presence of Small World Networks or Hierarchical Networks. Both paths require the presence of elite allies, with public organizations as the main antagonists. Next, these two causal conditions are combined either by presence of direct beneficiaries, or with presence of integration with other movements. This pattern may be explained by the power of the presence of individuals that are directly affected by the issue at hand, as is the case with resistance movements towards urban renewal projects. The dramatic stories of individuals and families are more likely to be captivated by the national media as well as in the Parliament. In the absence of groups of people that put a human face to the issue, it appears that better organization is needed either in the form of horizontal or vertical integration.

Overall, the findings suggest that, within the case of Turkey, political opportunity structure-related causal conditions are more powerful and necessary in understanding policy outcomes of urban movements. As highlighted in the literature (e.g. Arsla, 1999 and Ozbudun, 1993), it appears that the power dynamics among the state elites still mostly dominate the political landscape in Turkey. When the opportunity structure is not favorable, different forms of

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organizing or strategies do not seem to be relevant in facilitating successful policy outcomes. This finding also shows support for the poor state of local democracy in Turkey since if there are no elite allies the governance system seems to be unresponsive to the demands of the citizens.

With regard to network structure, the findings do not suggest a strong role for network structure. Network structure appears important to a certain extent when the external environment is conducive to the realization of the movement goals. Results suggest that both small world networks and hierarchical networks are efficient in terms of mobilizing large numbers of people and in promoting a debate about the issue at the national level.

4.5   SUMMARY

This chapter aimed at looking at the role of variation in the network structure on the role of policy outcomes of urban movements in Ankara between 2006-2011. The chapter provided descriptive accounts for all of the 14 cases. Next, it provided a short discussion of Multi-Value QCA that is the major data analysis technique used in this chapter.

Chapter IV also focused on the operationalizations of different network structures under the 5 ideal type network structures discussed in the second chapter. Analyses of network parameters revealed that there were no networks that resembled opinion leader networks, also known as core/periphery networks, and each case's network structure was categorized into the four remaining categories: Small World Network, Hierarchical Network, Isolated Cliques, and Village Networks.

Further analyses showed that network structures, or alliance structures mattered when political opportunity structures were favorable for the movement to succeed. The findings

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showed the significant role played by the elites in accordance with the literature on Turkish politics.

5.0 URBAN MOVEMENT NETWORKS IN ANKARA: A WHOLISTIC LOOK AT THE GLOBAL STRUCTURE, SIGNIFICANT ACTORS, AND EMERGENCE MECHANISMS

This chapter aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of the larger complete network of SMOs involved in urban movements in Ankara between 2006 and 2011. In order to achieve this analysis, the first section reports descriptive characteristics of the merged network of fourteen cases discussed in the previous chapter. The following section identifies the crucial actors and discusses their specific roles and functions. The final section offers explanations for the emergence and strength of ties among SMOs using regression analysis.

5.1 THE STRUCTURE OF URBAN MOVEMENT NETWORKS IN ANKARA, 2006-2011

Manuel Castells in his renowned analysis of urban movements, The City and the Grassroots (1983) defined urban movements as "urban-orientated mobilizations that influence structural social change and transform the urban meanings" (pg. 305). Unlike his previous works that mostly regarded urban movements as the crystallized forms of contradictions in the capitalistic mode of production, in *The City and the Grassroots* Castells conceptualized urban movements

within three sometimes overlapping lines of contestations: collective consumption public services/ infrastructure issues, territorial identities minorities, and contesting of state power. Castells argued that these divided localized particularities weakened the power of urban movements to achieve meaningful social change at larger scales.

In order to understand and ameliorate these limitations of urban movements, Nicholls (2008) argues that we first need a better conception and analyses of how complex cities function and when networked urban mobilizations are more effective. Without naming the structure of urban movements in cities as Small World Networks, Nicholls (2008) actually argues that the "strength of successful urban movements lies at their ability to optimize strong-weak tie coalition structures "(pg. 856). More specifically he states:

*"Cities stimulate the formation of diverse groups with strong ties. These strong ties enable actors in these groups to pool and concentrate high-grade resources to address particular concerns. …However, the rich and diverse resources found in complex cities can only yield their advantages when weaker ties or bridges are built between different groups. Location in a common urban system facilitates bridging opportunities because actors have better information of the resources and organizations 'out there', there is a greater availability of brokers to establish contacts between different groups, and it facilities the transposition of resources from one context to the other. Thus the specific role of the city for general social movements is in its function as a **relational incubator,** facilitating complex relational exchanges that generate a diversity of useful resources for campaigns operating at a variety of spatial scales"(pg. 841-842).*

Were localized urban movements of Ankara able to form such a larger structure that connected different social groups with diverse resources and string ties through weak ties across different movements?

Figure 24 Networks of Urban Movements in Ankara Combined[64]

The network map clearly shows that most mobilizations are connected to each other through organizations that participate in more than one case, because the network mostly consists of one large component, and very few organizations that are not linked to the main component.

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[64] The master network data was attained by simply combining all fourteen networks. The common organizations in different cases connect different movements.

In other words, it is possible to talk about a larger network of organizations in Ankara that are reachable to each other easily through organizations that function as bridges, or brokers across subgroups that are highly clustered. It is still hard to claim whether the network structure resembles a Small World Network, or some other type based on simple visual inspection. Therefore, Table 12 presents basic descriptive parameters of the merged network.

Table 12 Network Parameters

Connectivity	.957
Efficiency	.787
Density	.22
Clustering	.67
Average Path Length	2.49
Random Clustering	.21
Random Average Path Length	1.77
Small World Ratio	2.22

The network parameters indicate that the merged network is a highly efficient one, and almost fully connected and has density below .50. These features indicate that the merged network closely resembles a hierarchical network. The clustering coefficient of the network is .61, more than 3 times, if the network were a random one[65] with same size and density. With

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[65] Random networks are generated using igraph package in R based on Erdos Renyi random graph models N=10,000.

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regard to average path length, the average geodesic distance between two actors in the network, the merged network has a much larger value in comparison to the random average path length.

According to Watts and Strogatz (1998), small world networks tend to have similar average path length to random networks, whereas the global clustering coefficient of small world networks is much larger compared to random networks. The Small World Ratio[66], calculated as the ratio of the observed clustering coefficient to random clustering coefficient divided by the ratio of observed average path length to the random average path length is 2.22. According to Kilduff et al. (2008), the threshold value for a Small World Ratio is around 4.75, much higher than the observed value.

5.1.1 Identifying Prominent Actors

The most obvious technique to identify significant actors is to analyze organizations' centrality scores. Three main centrality scores are used for this task:

(**1**) **Degree Centrality:** number of other actors to which one is connected (Freeman, 1978). Degree centrality is a powerful measure to signify the connectedness of an actor locally, but it is limited when it comes to indicating the significance of an actor globally, since one can have many links in a subgroup that is peripherally located in the network.

(**2**) **Betweennesss Centrality:** quantifies the degree to which an actor lies on the shortest paths that connect two actors that may otherwise would not be connected. An actor may have low

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[66] Small World Ratio= $\dfrac{\textit{Observed Clustering Coefficient/ Random Clustering Coefficient}}{\textit{Observed Average Path Length   Random Average Path Length}}$

degree centrality, but his/her connections may be very crucial by connecting groups of actors that are not connected to each other (Freeman, 1978).

(3) Eigen Vector Centrality: measure how well ones' alters are connected to the other actors. Eigenvector centrality is determined not only by actors' immediate connections as is the case with degree centrality, but also considers how well-connected these immediate connections are to the rest of the actors in the network using an iterative algorithm. Therefore, Eigenvector centrality provides a more global perspective of a node's position in a network and considers the effect of indirect ties as well (Bonacich 2007).

These three measures tend to be highly correlated with each other (Valente, 2008). In other words, actors that have many connections tend to lie as bridges across different groups, and also are likely to be important to other actors in the network.

Table 13 Correlation Matrix for Centrality Measures

	Betweennesss	Degree	Eigenvector
Betweennesss	1	.627**	.518**
Degree			.828**
Eigenvector			

**. Correlation is significant at .01 level.

The correlation matrix reveals that only eigenvector centrality and degree centrality are strongly correlated whereas the correlation between betweennesss and degree centrality, and the correlation between the eigenvector centrality and betweennesss centrality are moderately

correlated. The latter correlations suggest that some organizations have high level of variance with regard to their centrality measures.

In order to identify such organizations, I plotted the latter relations using a scatter plot, and determined outlier organizations visually.

Figure 25 Scatter Plot: Eigen Vector X Degree Centralities

The red arrow signifies the outlier organizations that have high degree centrality relative to their Eigen vector centrality. In other words, these organizations have working relations with many

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organizations but they are not very well connected to the whole network. All four organizations are NGOs that specialize in animal rights.

This observation demonstrates the fact that the most central organizations within the animal rights movement in Ankara are not very much involved with the activities of other types of mobilizations. This finding also confirms my overall observation that the mobilization towards animal rights is extremely well organized, with support from both international and national organizations, but fails to create bridges with other mobilizations.

Figure 26 Scatter Plot: Degree X Betweennesss Centralities

The second scatter plot demonstrates that most organizations tend to have very low betweennesss centrality, in other words most of the actors in the network do not function as

bridges across subgroups. The red arrows signify two organizations that have relatively high levels of betweennesss centrality, especially with regard to their level of degree centralities. These organizations can be considered as two important organizations with high levels of bridging function across different movements.

These two organizations are the Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition party, and Ankara Medical Chamber (ATO). The first one is the main opposition party, and the high betweennesss ranking of the CHP suggests that the CHP is actively participating in a variety of mobilizations in Ankara. The main antagonists in most mobilizations are the municipalities headed by the members of AKP (Justice and Development Party). Therefore the extensive participation of CHP in urban movements in Ankara can be interpreted more as involvement with larger political agenda.

The Ankara Medical Chamber is a professional organization that was founded to protect the rights of the medical community in the 1950s, but it is among many other professional organizations that function as the most effective SMOs in Turkey due to unique historical and social processes that will be discussed shortly.

Table 14 shows the top ten ranking organizations for each of the three-centrality measures. Similar to the previous discussion, one apparent pattern in the lists is the high frequency of professional organizations. The obvious question is how did professional organizations that were established to protect and promote the interests of certain professional communities become such prominent civil society actors in Turkey?

Table 14 Top Ranking Organizations Based On Centrality Scores

Degree Centrality	Betweennesss Centrality	Eigen Vector Centrality
Chamber of Architects	Ankara Medical Chamber	Chamber of Architects
People's House	Republican People's Party	Chamber of Environmental Engineers
Chamber of Environmental Engineers	Dikmen Right to Housing Bureau	Chamber of Urban Planners
Chamber of Urban Planners	People's House	Chamber of Civil Engineers
Dikmen Right to Housing Bureau	Ankara Bar Association	People's House
Ankara Medical Chamber	Chamber of Urban Planners	Kavakliderem
Chamber of Civil Engineers	Association for the Protection of Environment and Animals	Chamber of Landscape Architects
Republican People's Party	We Are Not Alone Platform	Ankara Medical Chamber
Confederation of Public Workers' Unions	Chamber of Architects	Dikmen Right to Housing Bureau
Kavakliderem	Kavakliderem	Confederation of Public Workers' Unions

Table 14 shows the top ten ranking organizations for each of the three-centrality measures. Similar to the previous discussion, one apparent pattern in the lists is the high frequency of professional organizations. The obvious question is how did professional organizations that were established to protect and promote the interests of certain professional communities become such prominent civil society actors in Turkey?

All chambers included in the study are members of The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects TMMOB that was established in 1954. Currently TMMOB has 24 Chambers, 194 branches in various cities of Turkey, with more than 410.000 members[67]. A short look at the website of TMMOB demonstrates the highly politicized nature of TMMOB, with many references to democracy and equality, and emphasis on public service instead of stressing the interests of its members in defining the goal and the purposes of the organization.

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[67] For more information on TMMOB in English see: http://www.tmmob.org.tr/index_en.php

According to Batuman (2008) these urban professionals became very much involved in the building the new modern Turkey through the dominant statist development approach following the birth of the new Republic, and they were especially politicized in 1960s as a result of their involvement with *gecekondu* struggles, as well as the result of high levels of mobilization in urban settings in Turkey in the 1960s and '70s.

Batuman (2008) likens especially the urban architects and planners in Turkey between 1960 and 1980 to Gramsci's (1971) famous *organic intellectuals* that "function in the building of the hegemony of their respective class with which they are 'organically' linked" (pg. 1927). Similarly, another possible explanation is the socialization of young urban professionals in 1960s at technical universities such as Middle East Technical University in Ankara that were the foci of political mobilizations in 1960s.

Another crucial organization that deserves attention is People's Houses (Halk Evleri)[68] that were first established as community centers focusing on culture and educational services all over Turkey by the state in the 1940s. When People's Houses were first established, they were mostly a social engineering project to educate and modernize the citizens of the young Republic (Lamprou, 2009; and Simsek, 2005). The organization was shut down twice for enabling political mobilization that was at odds with ruling governments at the time.

In 1983, People's Houses were opened as an association that works in working class neighborhoods around the country on various issues including health, labor rights, empowerment of women and education. Most notably People's Houses have been effectively working in mobilizing against urban renewal projects. It is an extremely effective organization that has branches in most working class neighborhoods of Ankara and other big cities around Turkey.

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[68] http://www.halkevleri.org.tr/

People's Houses work extensively to unite local mobilizations at distant locales through people's councils and national meetings.

Kavakliderem is another notable organization in the lists, and it is the only local community organization that participates in many social movement events in various issue areas that acts as a bridging organization between groups of organization that mostly focus on single issues.

5.2   EXPLAINING TIE STRENGTH AMONG ORGANIZATIONS: A MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS USING QUADRATIC ASSIGNMENT PROCEDURE

The final section of the chapter aims at explaining the variation in tie strength among organizations that were active in urban movements in Ankara between 2006 and 2011. In other words, this section asks what factors explain why some organizations extensively work together; participate in social movement events together, whereas others do not.

5.2.1   Multiple Regression Quadratic Assignment Procedure (MRQAP)

MRQAP is a permutation-based non-parametric test that is similar to Ordinary Least Squares OLS regression that is suitable for interdependent data (Dekker, Krackhardt, and Snijders, 2007; and Krackhardt, 1988). The presence of independent observations is one of the main assumptions of OLS regression as in most standard parametric tests, and failure to meet this assumption is likely to produce biased, deflated standard errors that tend to produce erroneous statistical significance (Krackhardt, 1988).

Social network data almost always violates the independence assumption since the main premise of the social network approach is that we can't understand the social world simply by looking at the attributes and characteristic of factors (e.g. Do more educated persons tend to earn more income?); instead we need to look at the relations among actors to understand differences/similarities in social phenomena (e.g. do people with higher social capital tend to earn more?). A social network approach emphasizes the role of structure and relations in shaping outcomes. Therefore the assumption of independence is not only violated in studies analyzing the role of networks, a social network researcher is primarily interested in extracting the information that is present in the structure of dependencies among units being analyzed.

The input variables for MRQAP are square matrices for each independent and dependent variable. Vector variables can easily be converted into actor-to-actor matrices that show similarities/differences or distances for each dyad in the network. For categorical variables, actors in the same category would get a value of 1 at their intersection cell in the matrix x_{ij}, and a value of 0 if they do not belong to the same category. Similarly, a distance matrix can be created for continuous variables by assigning the absolute differences of the values of the variable for each dyad. Let's say A is 22 years old, and B is 19; the intersection cell of A and B in the distance matrix would get a value of 3.

MRQAP algorithm first performs a standard OLS regression by considering each corresponding cell in input matrices as an observation. Next, random matrices of the dependent variable are created as a result of the random permutation of the existing matrix corresponding columns and rows kept together. Each permutation is followed by a regression analysis, similar to the OLS regression performed in the beginning. This process is carried out thousands of times,

usually at least 1000 times or more, and the distribution of the regression coefficients replaces the distribution of the null hypothesis that would normally be based on deflated standard errors.

The distribution of regression coefficients coming from the simulation analysis is then used to estimate standard errors for the regression coefficients. If the probability of observing the actual regression coefficients calculated with the original dependent variable matrix in the beginning is small enough, we can reject the null for a given regression coefficient (see Gibbons and Olk, 2003 for more details).

5.2.2   Model Description

The first group of independent variables includes network related variables and consists of difference matrices created for betweennesss, degree, and eigenvector centralities. The network related independent variables aim at testing assortativity related hypotheses. Assortativity related mechanisms emerge in social networks when actors with similar structural properties tend to form connections with each other (Rivera et. al 2010). In other words, assortativity related hypotheses test whether structurally important actors are more likely to build ties with each other.

The correlation matrix in Table 15 demonstrates that none of the centrality related variables are weakly correlated with the dependent variable matrix based on tie strength. As expected there is strong correlation between eigenvector centrality matrix and degree centrality matrix. Therefore, these two matrices are not included in the same model; instead two different models are run for each of them.

Table 15 Correlations among Centrality Matrices

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	Tie Strength	Betweennesss	Degree	Eigenvector
Tie Strength	1	.22**	.10**	.052*
Betweennesss		1	.61**	.49**
Degree			1	.81**
Eigenvector				1

**. Significant at .01 Level; * Significant at .05 Level

The second group of variables is derived from the attributes of organizations involved in the network. These group of variables tests hypotheses on homophily and heterophily related mechanisms. Homophily can be defined as the strong tendency in social networks that contact between similar actors in the network is likely to be more frequent than contact with dissimilar actors (McPerson et al. 2001). According to McPerson et al. (2001) "homophily means that cultural, behavioral, genetic, or material information that flows through networks will tend to be localized" (p.416).

In addition to homophily, recent studies show that heterophily, the tendency to form ties with diverse actors, may also be at work in the formation process of network ties. Especially complex problems require a degree of heterogeneity to allow room for innovative approaches as well as integration of diverse material and non-material resources that are available to heterogeneous group of actors. As Page (2007) states "[t]he simple facts of the matter are that when society confronts difficult problems—putting people on the moon, curing diseases, designing new products, crafting changes in the tax code—we create teams of diverse people" (pg. 322, cited in Rivera et al. 2010). Consequently, homophily based tie formation may be effective in situations that require high levels of trust, risk taking behavior and high levels of

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solidarity, whereas heterophily mechanism dominated networks are more likely to effective in solving long term policy related problems.

The first of these attribute based variables is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether an organization functions in a single-issue area, or more than one issue area coded as single or multiple based on goal statement of each organization.

The second of these variables is generated based on the level of jurisdiction that each organization operates. This variable consist of five categories, (1) Local: for organizations that function within a local administrative unit within Ankara, (2) City: for organizations that operate within Ankara, (3) National: for organizations that have operations in more than two cities in Turkey, (4) International: for organizations that are based outside of Turkey, and (5) Other: for organizations that operate at city level in cities other than Ankara in Turkey.

The final categorical variable is generated based on the primary issue area that an organization works in such housing, human rights, animal rights, gender etc. as displayed in Table 16 .

Table 16 Distributions of Organizations by Categorical Variables

	Count	Percentage
Function		
Multiple	147	54.6
Single	127	46.4
Level		
Local	48	17.5
City	101	36.9
National	63	23
International	16	5.8
Other	46	16.8
Purpose		
Animal Rights	57	20.8
Art	41	15
Community	20	7.3
Consumer Rights	7	2.6
Education	6	2.2
Environment	10	3.6
Housing	22	8
Human Rights	3	1.1
Idea Based	8	2.9
Labour Rights	30	10.9
Professional Organization	32	11.7
Private Business	3	1.1
Public Organization	22	8
Urban Issues	10	3.6
Womens Rights	3	1.1

5.2.3 Results of the MRQAP Analysis

MRQAP analysis is carried out in *R* environment using the "netlm" function in SNA package (Butt, 2013).

Table 17 displays the results of the analysis for two separate models due to the high multicollinearity problem between Eigen vector centrality and degree centrality.

Table 17 MRQAP Results

	Model I	Model II
Intercept	0.04187209*	0.04584038*
Network Measures		
Betweenness Centrality	3.18311682**	3.18558496**
Degree Centrality	-0.10994704	
Eigen Vector Centrality		-0.05350806*
Organizational Attributes		
Function	0.10970076**	0.10729449**
Level	0.12615862**	0.12603071**
Purpose	0.55408964**	0.549834**
Adjusted R-Square	0.1273	0.1279
N	274	274

*. Significant at .05 level. **Significant at .01 level, Two-tailed

Both models yielded very similar results. All organizational attributes are significant at .01 level have positive coefficients. This finding is supports the homophily argument for organizational characteristics due to the positive sign of the coefficients. If the coefficient were negative, in any of the three variables, there would be some evidence of heterophily. In other words, most organizations in the merged network tend to work with organizations that operate at same level of jurisdiction, and share similar functions and purposes.

For the network related centrality variables, negative sign of the coefficients indicate presence of assortativity because the values in centrality matrices represent absolute value of the differences for each dyad of actors. If there were presence of the assortativity mechanism, we

would expect small values in centrality matrices; smaller distances denote similar centrality measures and a high number of co-presence in SMO activities as measured by the merged matrix of urban movements.

The assortativity seems to be present only for eigenvector centrality; the organizations that are connected to other organizations that are well connected to the network tend to be connected with each other as well. The sign for degree centrality coefficient is also negative, but was not significant only at .10 alpha level. This suggests similar assortativity phenomena may be work with degree centrality, but statistical evidence is limited for such a conclusion.

For betweennesss centrality, the coefficient sign is positive and significant, implying that organizations that have high levels of difference in their betweennesss scores tend to work together. In other words, organizations that act as bridges across subgroups tend not to be connected to other organizations with similar bridging functions.

Overall, both models have relatively small-adjusted R square values, suggesting limited model fit. The low adjusted R square value may indicate that the models may be missing important mechanisms as variables that may explain the variation in the tie formation and tie strength.

5.2.4   Some Alternative Explanations

My interviews with activists suggest that reciprocity is an important norm in shaping organizations' decisions to participate in various social movement events. While the level of analysis in this chapter is the organization, organizations are still made up of human beings who are very receptive to the issue of reciprocity. If an event is outside the main domain of an organization, the decision to participate is not only determined by how much that particular

organization cares about the cause, but also based on members' previous experience with the main organizers of the event, more specifically whether they had participated in earlier events planned by the same event organizers or not.

Consequently, the personal aspect that shapes tie strength could be better captured with a data set that has directed data instead of symmetric that is used in this analysis, It is not possible to derive this type of data from newspaper articles, since newspaper articles rarely mention who were the main organizers of the events, and which organizations were merely responding to the call made by these main organizers.

In addition to the reciprocity factor, it is possible that ties among organizations may be formed as a result of unique historical and social circumstances in the past, and the current structure is also a function of these path dependencies. A longitudinal, panel data set may work better to identify the specific path dependent mechanisms in understanding tie formation among actors.

5.3   SUMMARY

Chapter V focused on the analysis of the overall network structure of social movement organizations by merging networks of all fourteen cases analyzed separately in chapter IV. Such an approach enables a more holistic look at the action field of the social movement organizations in Ankara between 2006 and 2011.

The first section concentrated on the network parameters of the merged network, and based on high efficiency and low-density scores showed that the merged network mostly resembled a hierarchical network.

The next section performed a centrality-based analysis to identify the most significant actors in the network. Professional organizations such as the Chamber of Architects, Chamber of Urban Planners, and Chamber of Environmental Engineers appeared to be the most central organizations.

The final section presented the findings of MRQAP analyses and reported the presence of homophily mechanisms based on organizational attributes, and the limited presence of assortativity based on Eigen vector centrality. The final section also suggests alternative explanations for tie formation, such as reciprocity and path dependence that were not tested due to the nature of the data used in the analysis.

6.0 INTERPERSONAL NETWORKS AND PROTEST EVENTS AT NEIGHBORHOOD LEVEL

Interpersonal network based cases are considerably different from the previously discussed urban movements that are mostly characterized by inter-organizational networks. These collective action events[69] do not qualify as social movements due to two main reasons: First, almost all cases lack temporal continuity. As McAdam and Snow (2010) state, the word movement suggests a social phenomenon that develops over time. The collective action cases that are studied in this chapter mostly consist of short-lived neighborhood level protests; they emerge and conclude in a matter of a few hours, or a few days at most.

Secondly, most of these cases are not professionally organized activities. Since the resource mobilization approach emerged in the late 1970s, the organized activity aspect of social movements gained significance. According to McAdam and Snow (2010), there are almost no social movements that are not associated with any kind of formal or informal SMOs. The reason is the need for professional approach to organizing in order to achieve a degree of continuity.

Therefore, the absence or presence of SMOs constitutes a fundamental component in the conceptualization of social movements. While some of the cases analyzed in this section have a

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[69] Since most of the collective actions events examined in this chapter consist of one or two protest events, I will use collective action events and protest events interchangeably.

local SMO involved in the organizing processes, most cases lack any formal or informal organizations.

Another common characteristic across most of the collective action events based on interpersonal networks is the spontaneity of the protests. According to Rosenthal and Schwartz (1989): "Spontaneity in social movement refers to an *impromptu* action or series of actions undertaken by collectivity" (pg. 40). A more precise one, Gemici's (2003) conceptualization that identifies two main characteristics of spontaneity during social protests: mobilization without a prior planning, and emergence of the protest group in a short period of time.

The prevalence of spontaneity[70] across the protest events is not surprising since most of these protests are mobilizations to halt the construction of cellular towers that require immediate action. As most of my respondents mentioned during our interviews, it is much easier to stop construction of a cellular tower in comparison to make authorities demolish cellular towers. Not surprisingly, in general social movements are more likely to succeed if the protagonists can mobilize before a policy decision and implementation take place since the reversal of already existing policies require more complex legal processes, and participation of larger and more diverse number of actors in the process.

The issue of spontaneity raises another important matter in the study of collective action: the role of spatial environments at facilitating and/or hindering collective action. The spatiality of different forms of collective action has become an increasing focus of social scientists across

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[70] One may consider the community-organizing model suggested by Saul Alinsky (1971) to understand the cases analyzed in this chapter. However, the community organizing suggested by Alinksy in 1960s in US has a substantially different context in comparison to the cases under study. Most importantly, due to the prominence of spontaneity and self-organization in the cases that are focus of this chapter.

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disciplines in recent years, most notably among geographers, sociologists, and political scientists (see Featherstone and Kopf, 2012 for an extensive review).

Space especially among sociologists, has been commonly conceptualized as a type of social structure such as economic, social, and political structures (Sewell, 2001; Zhao, 1998; Tilly, 2000; and Martin and Miller, 2003). Therefore researchers understand and analyze space in the same way as they study other types of structures, both as a product of the interaction of social agents, and as a constraint on social action. In a similar tone with complexity theory, Sewell (2001) explains this relationship as follows: "Spatial structures, like other sorts of structures, are durable and constraining, but they also are subject to transformation as a consequence of the very social action that they shape" (Pg.55). Likewise Massey (1984) argues: "Spatial distributions and geographical differentiation may be the result of social processes, but they also affect how those processes work. 'The spatial' is not just an outcome; it is also part of the explanation." (pg. 4, cited in Martin and Miller, 2003)

The obvious question that follows is through what mechanisms do space and collective action interact and affect each other. According to Sewell (2001) space mostly matters in terms of determining co-presence, because increasing co-presence is what most collective action efforts strive to achieve as a pre-requisite for success. Evidently, the physical environment plays an important role at facilitating or hindering co-presence, particularly within the context of spontaneous neighborhood protest events.

By determining co-presence, spatial arrangements may also have a crucial impact on the formation and nature of social networks that are shown to be the basis of mobilization in numerous collective action events (e.g. Zhao, 1998; Futrell and Simi, 2004). As Zhao (1998) states, space matters to understand mobilization processes during collective action, because ".. it

determines the structure and strength of social networks as well as the spatial position and routine activities of people in a community" (pg. 195). For example, Zhao (1998) in his analysis of the 1989 student movements in Beijing showed that the spatial configuration of campuses in Beijing facilitated the spread of dissident ideas and communication about movement activities, and the densely populated life in the dormitories led to the development of strong networks among students that fostered high levels of participation by enhancing the psychological and social costs of not participating.

Similarly, in the case of the inter-personal network based protest events analyzed in this chapter, it is evident that the spatial arrangements had an important role in shaping the structure of mobilization networks as well as the strength of ties that make up these social networks. While the analysis shows that network structure and nature of tie strength matter in explaining the outcomes of the protest events under study, certain network structures are also associated with successful outcomes through different processes.

6.1   DESCRIPTION OF CASES

There are overall 17 cases, 12 of which are about the removal or stopping the construction of cellular towers. The high frequency of cellular tower related neighborhood mobilizations is not a unique social phenomenon to Ankara. Despite lack of reliable evidence about the adverse health effects of cellular towers, there is a commonly held belief in Turkey that being close to cellular

towers is associated with high levels of risk for cancer[71]. Recent research on the potential health risks of cellular towers shows that cellular towers may carry physiological, even sometimes physical side effects through a mechanism called nocebo effect (Khurana et al. 2010). Similar to placebo effect, nocebo effect takes place when a neutral treatment causes negative effects on the respondents when they believe that the treatment will lead to an undesired condition.

The main public institution that regulates cellular towers, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority BTK (2013), also states that as long as the transmitted radiofrequency (RF) levels remain within the legal limits, cellular towers do not pose any health risks. Yet, there are increasing numbers of legal cases against unwanted cellular towers all around Turkey, and court decisions for these cases are rather conflicting.

While some courts decide that cellular towers may pose a threat to human health and should not be built in close proximity to residential areas, others ruled that cellular towers are safe as long as they abide by the BTK regulations. The court decisions are not binding for the companies in the sense that they can immediately build another tower in the close proximity of the removed towers. As will be discussed shortly, only successful mobilizations keep the contested space cellular tower free even after the court decision.

The remaining 5 cases are on a wide range of issues: a mobilization to reverse the decision to change street names, a protest event to compel the municipality to rebuild an overpass that was taken down during road construction, multiple protests to facilitate the repair of street lights, mobilization targeting the proposal to build an amusement park, and protests

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[71] Despite advice and reports from experts, most of the public in Turkey continues to believe that cellular towers can be deadly. During my interviews, I met with many individuals who believed that certain cancer cases among their neighbors in their buildings were caused by nearby cellular towers. There are even attempts for nation wide organizing against cellular towers. The following website demonstrates such an attempt where cellular tower victims from all over Turkey post messages about their problems and struggles. http://www.bazistasyonuistemiyoruz.com/

against the relocation of an inter-city bus stop. Next section provides a short summary description of the mobilization process for each case. The raw data table in the following pages supplements the information provided in the case summaries.

6.1.1 A Closer Look at Each Case

Overpass in Varlik, 11/1/2006: Varlik is a working class neighborhood. A large road with very fast and busy traffic cuts the residential areas into two sections. Because authorities did not build the overpass after a road construction project, women in the neighborhood were very worried for their children crossing the road without an overpass or traffic light. As authorities did not respond to the demands of the residents, a closely-knit group of housewives walked to the road, and they also asked for the participation of acquaintances during their walk. This well-connected women's friendship network then became larger with the mobilization of their acquaintances on their way *Elite Network*. The group made a human chain and blocked the road for about an hour. The next day the construction of overpass started.

Street Names in Bahceli , 7/17/2007: Bahceli is one of the oldest middle-class neighborhoods in Ankara and it is known to support electorally more secular parties, but not the ruling AKP, party, as well as the mayor's party. The street names were changed over night without any in put from the residents. The changes caused lot of chaos and problems with mail services. A *muhtar*[72] mobilized the neighborhood by making calls in the streets via a megaphone-installed car

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[72] *Muhtar* is the elected head of a neighborhood. His/her responsibilities are mostly limited to operational tasks such as keeping track of residents ID information and organizing the ballot boxes during elections.

provided by a secular political party, CHP. No clear pre-existing network structure is present. The dominant form of the network is *a isolated clique*. The attempt to bring back the old street names failed.

Street Lights in Oguzlar and Atakent, 7/14/2007: In Oguzlar and Atakent residents took to the streets to protest the non-working streetlights, a major security concern at nights. Oguzlar and Atakent mostly consist of massive suburban apartment complexes built for low and middle income Ankarians in the early1990s. Each apartment complex has a manager, and each apartment building in the complexes also has managers. Consequently, there is a *hierarchical* information network, despite a lack of strong ties.

Amusement Park in Cayyolu, 12/17/2009: Cayyolu is a middle, upper-middle class suburban neighborhood in the west side of Ankara. Over the years it became populated mostly by secular and pro-CHP residents. Similar to Oguzlar and Atakent, Cayyolu typically consists of apartment complexes that generate a *hierarchical* information network. In 2009 the Greater Municipality of Ankara decided to build an amusement park on an unused but very central area in the neighborhood. Residents of Cayyolu instead demanded the construction of a town square. Especially people living in apartment buildings around the area opposed to the amusement park. Large numbers of residents participated in the protests. The amusement park plan eventually got cancelled.

Cellular Tower in Doga Sitesi , 2/2009: The cellular tower in Doga Sitesi an apartment complex in Cayyolu was the first tower type cell site that was removed as a result of community

mobilization in Turkey. Organized by a local NGO dedicated to the minimization of electromagnetic fields, CEKOD, the multiple protests were also supplemented with a legal case. Similar to the amusement park case, residents of Doga Sitesi were more intensely involved with the case due to their perception of high levels of health risks. The cell tower was removed by court decision, and the expert witness' report mentions that the decision was justified by the neighborhood protests as a representation of the will of the community members.

Inter-city Bust Stop in Cayyolu, 11/2009: Buses are still the most commonly used modes of transportation for traveling between cities in Turkey. Situated in the South West to the entrance of Ankara, Cayyolu residents could easily get off at a bus stop by Cayyolu instead of going to the inter-city bus station in the city center and going back to Cayyolu. In early 2009 Greater Municipality of Ankara decided to cancel the bus stop. This decision was met with uproar by the Cayyolu community since now they had to go all the way into the central city bus station and were forced to take a taxi ride back home. Cayyolu Platformu, a community organization tried to mobilize the community for protests each Sunday. But participation steadily declined and the protests' waned shortly. Unlike cellular tower and amusement park cases, there were no groups that were more prone to physical harm or health risks.

Cell Tower in Ziraat, 10/26/2010: Ziraat Neighborhood is located within the old town of Ankara. It is a mixture of residential buildings, small shops located under these buildings, and public buildings. Despite being an old neighborhood, there is high mobility reflected by the high rates number of residents as renters. The mobilization towards the cell tower was organized

mostly by the network of small shopkeepers, an example of an *elite network* with weak ties. Protests did not lead to any change.

Cell Tower In Aziziye , 5/12/2007: Aziziye in Cankaya is a relatively old, pro-CHP, and middle-upper middle class neighborhood. As a result of increasing migration to suburbs and gated communities within the city, most residents of the neighborhood are renters, and there are no formal or informal networks that connect the residents. A cell tower construction in the neighborhood was discovered by a group of residents in May of 2007. Due to the shortage of pre-existing mobilization networks; spontaneous mobilization was not able to bring together large numbers of people. The tower construction was stopped by the intervention of the mayor of Cankaya, through the network of some of residents with the mayor's office.

Cell Tower in Ovecler, 8/17/2007: Ovecler is a recently developing neighborhood in Dikmen, Cankaya. Residents are mostly from middle and lower middle classes. There is mixed development in the sense that residential buildings are juxtaposed with office spaces and small shops, as well as larger grocery stores and gas stations. There was a group of random bystanders when GSM company representatives were building a cell site in a residential building. Despite the confrontation with the police, the cell site was successfully built.

Cell Tower in Eryaman, 5/25/2008: Eryaman is a working class suburban town at the West side of the city center. Its development was initiated by Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKI) as an affordable housing project in the 1990s. Their inhabitants consist of low-middle income families, single professionals, and college students. Eryaman consists of *etaps,*

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multiple tall housing blocs. Each housing block contains about 60 apartments. Due to high numbers of renters, and high mobility of students, neighborhood relations mostly consist of weak ties. While the spatial setting enables an information network similar to Cayyolu and Oguzlar, this mobilization was mostly mobilized by a movement entrepreneur individual by sticking up notices in the neighborhood, and communicating through his online and offline networks. As a result of multiple protests and a legal case, the disputed tower was removed, only to be replaced with another one, a hundred meters away.

Cell Site in Ilkyerlesim, 12/2010: Ilk Yerlesim is a neighborhood in Batikent, another working class suburban town. The site of the incident is a townhouse complex. After one of the owners of the townhouses decided to rent his house for a GSM company, other residents spontaneously gathered for the protest. The mobilization network in this case also resembles *Isolated Cliques.* Multiple protests over the month of December 2010 failed to bring any change.

Nato Yolu, Multiple Cell Towers, 12/2008: Nato Yolu is a neighborhood in Mamak, one of the oldest shantytown areas in city. Nato Yolu is actually the name of a very long and wide street on which there are multiple grade schools. The mobilizations towards the cell towers around the schools were organized by the mothers of students in the schools. A few entrepreneurial mothers, who were also members of women's rights NGO organized multiple protests that focused on stopping the traffic. Additional participants from each school supplemented the dense network among the entrepreneurial mothers core network. The mobilization network in this case resembles an *Elite Network.* None of the cell towers were removed as a result of these protests.

Cell Tower in Ege, 11/29/2011: Ege is also a neighborhood in Mamak. In this incident, company representatives and police arrived at a neighborhood park to build a cell tower during daytime. Participants were mobilized through the loudspeakers in a close by mosque by the help of *Halk Evleri.* The mobilization network can be characterized as *isolated cliques.* Cell tower was built despite the protest of small number of residents living around the park.

Cell Tower in General Zeki Dogan, 4/8/2009 General Zeki Dogan GZD is another neighborhood in Mamak. The key figure in GZD is the *muhtar,* who has been working very hard to develop social networks and promote participation in local politics in the neighborhood. As an active member of women's movement, GZD's *muhtar* has been influential in fostering strong solidaristic ties among the women of GZD especially with her efforts to fight against domestic violence and to provide shelter for victims of domestic violence. The *muhtar of GZD* also generated an unusual information network by having a street representative for each street. Moreover, she encouraged civic participation by organizing demonstrations on different issue areas. The pre-existing network structure resembles a *village* network characterized by dense, and strong ties in the neighborhood. In this particular instance these networks were spontaneously mobilized and were able to stop the GSM company workers from building a cell tower despite the presence of police.

Cell Cite in Kutlu Neighborhood, September 2011: Kutlu is also a neighborhood in Mamak. This case is also an example of spontaneous mobilization, and the mobilization network resembles a *village* type, based on strong ties developed over the years of attending the same mosque for Friday prayers. The incident happened just after a Friday prayer service and

attendants of the prayer service confronted the police and company representatives and were able to prevent them from building the cell site.

Cell Cite in Tuzlucayir, 12/2009: Tuzlucayir is another neighborhood in Mamak. This was also a successful and spontaneous mobilizations towards a cell site that was planned to be built within an apartment building. The main sources of mobilization in this case were the patrons of a coffee shop and close by residents. The interesting point about this mobilization is how participants developed a phone chain to alert each other in case the company representatives came back. The mobilization structure is similar to a *village* type of network.

Cell Cite in Sahintepe, 5/11/11: Sahintepe is also a neighborhood in Mamak. But unlike other mentioned neighborhoods, it still mostly remains as a *gecekondu* area. Consequently, due to lack of urban regeneration, immigrants who first moved there about 30 years ago still live there. This long-term residency obviously signals the fact that people have very strong ties. This incident happened while women of the neighborhood were working together for winter preparation. Once they realized who the company representatives were, they physically confronted both with the police and the company workers, and did not let them build the cell cite. The mobilization network in this case also looks like a *village* type of network.

6.1.2 Geographical Distribution of Cases

As displayed in Figure 27, twelve of the cases are concentrated in the towns of Mamak and Cayyolu area while the remaining five are scattered mostly around the city center. Therefore, this

section will focus on the to the dynamics of civic participation and protests particularly at Mamak and Cayyolu.

Mamak and Cayyolu display very different socio-demographic characteristics, but it is possible to claim that these two towns have the highest levels of activism in Ankara not only based on the high frequency of protest events, but also due high number of neighborhood associations in comparison to other towns as displayed in Table XX.

Figure 27 The Geographical Distribution of Cases

Source: Google Maps

Cayyolu is a middle-upper class suburban neighborhood that started to develop in late 1980s in the South-West of Ankara (Karagol, 2007). The current population of Cayyolu is about 125.000 (Cankaya Municipality, 2013). Most of the land in this area was farming land with small populations. The majority of the initial housing projects in the area were initiated by the Turkish Army Members Solidarity Fund (OYAK), for the members of the Turkish military. Moreover, in early 1990s, and late 1980s, the urban middle-upper middle class in Ankara still consisted of secular, Kemalist, and bureaucratic and military elite, since the rise of the Islamist urban middle classes was still in the making (White, 2011; Narli, 1999)[73]. Consequently, over time this secular middle class socio-economic structure, and its anti-AKP stance became one of the defining characteristics of the residents of Cayyolu in Ankara.

Many of my respondents have raised this defining nature of Cayyolu community during my interviews in Cayyolu. With an implicit elitism, it was common for my respondents to start the interview with statements like,

"You know, Cayyolu is a very different place... Cayyolu has a special demographic structure that is not found to be anywhere in Ankara..." or *"Melih Gokcek[74] hates Cayyolu, he knows he will never get enough votes from here, that's why he keeps messing with us."*

On November 7, 2013, Turkish Parliament passed a new legislation that re-categorized Cayyolu district to be within the borders of Cankaya municipality[75], another district that

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[73] See Yavuz (2009) for further discussion on the transformation of the middle class in Turkey starting early 1990s.

[74] Elected mayor of Ankara

[75] http://www.cayyolu.com.tr/haber/FLAS-Cayyolu-Cankaya-ilcesine-baglandi/69818

consistently elects mayors that are members of CHP. For many CHP supporters, this act is a perfect example of gerrymandering (Demir, 2013), since one of the major reasons for CHP's victory in Yenimahalle, the previous district that Cayyolu was a part of, was due to votes coming from Cayyolu. In the absence of Cayyolu votes, Yenimahalle is likely to be won by AKP in upcoming municipal elections (Demir 2013).

Located on the North-East of Ankara, Mamak is a low income, working class town populated by migrants from mostly other central Anatolian cities. Despite the recent transformation to apartment building types of housing, both as a result of state sponsored urban regeneration projects and through initiatives of the *gecekondu*[76] owners[77], Mamak is still known as a *gecekondu* dominated town (Karagol, 2007). Most inhabitants of Mamak are migrants from peripheral rural districts of Ankara or from mid-Anatolian cities including Yozgat, Kirikkale, Kirsehir, Corum, Sivas, Kayseri, and Cankiri (Coskun, 2003).

Mamak is also known to be a spatial center of mobilization of left-wing groups in the 1960s and 1970s. Many left-wing groups carried out their organizing activities in the *gecekondu* neighborhoods of Mamak in these years, and these neighborhoods were known as "Liberated Areas (*Kurtarılmış Bölgeler)"* since police forces would have a hard time even physically getting inside (Coskun 2003, pg. 4.)

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[76] Type of housing built by the immigrants in large cities on state land without permission. Gece means night, kondu means built, *gecekondu* literally meaning built overnight, in order to avoid government authorities.

[77] Many gecekondu owners starting 1980s worked with private contractors to turn their *gecekondus* into apartment buildings. *Gecekondu* owners transfer the ownership of their land to private contractors in return for a few apartments in the apartment buildings that are constricted by the contractors known as *mutahits*.

Table 18 The Comparison of Mamak and Cayyolu

	Number of Neighborhood Organizations	Population	Average Rent for a Three Bedroom Apartment
Mamak	205	558,000	450 TL
Cayyolu	35	120,000	940TL
Ankara	1447	4,965,000	500 TL

Source: TUIK 2013, and Hurriyet Emlak

Despite the apparent socio-economic and demographic differences between Cayyolu and Mamak, one striking similarity is the high number of neighborhood organizations in both areas. Although not all cases in this study involve mobilizations with formal organizations, we can still consider the high numbers of local organizations as an indicator of a high level of civic participation in both Mamak and Cayyolu.[78]

A closer look at these organizations reveal the fact that the nature of the dominant type of neighborhood organizations in Mamak and Cayyolu are fundamentally different. Most organizations in Cayyolu can be categorized in three groups: 1 social clubs for leisurely activities such as singing and sports e.g. Cayyolu Musiki Cemiyeti, Cayyolu Halk Muzigi Dernegi, and Bric ve Satranc Sevenler Dernegi; 2 Service oriented organizations, mostly services for the elderly and the disabled e.g. Cayyolu Yaslilara Saygi Dernegi, Omurilik Felclileri Dernegi; and 3

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[78] The question of why we observe such relatively high levels civic participation in these two areas, but not in other neighborhoods or districts is not the major concern of this study. As will be discussed in the coming conclusion/future research section, this question of emergence in itself is a very important question that requires a separate study based on a different research design.

Advocacy and rights oriented organizations for women's rights, consumer rights, animal rights, environmental organizations, and branches of more politicized organizations such as Ataturkce Dusunce Dernegi.

Unlike Cayyolu, most neighborhood organizations in Mamak consist of village associations established by the migrant communities. The two main functions of these organizations are representing the interests of their members, and providing formal and informal support for migrants that lack the social support networks in Ankara. The formal function of these organizations is mostly compensating the costs of weddings and funerals for needy families by using the membership dues (Coskun, 2003). But more importantly, village associations play a crucial role by facilitating the social inclusion of migrants into the urban milieu through informal functions such as helping them to find a job, providing child support, and acting as intermediaries between local politicians and migrant communities (Keyder, 2005; and Coskun, 2003).

Consequently the nature of associational life in Cayyolu and Mamak are very different; while organizations in Cayyolu brings residents together based on shared interests, belief systems, and common recreational interests such as hobby clubs, the dominant form of local organizations in Mamak, village associations is mostly concerned with exclusive needs and interests of their members. This diversion is also reflected in the difference of formal ties among organizations in both settings; organizations in Cayyolu are successfully organized under the Cayyolu Platform[79] whereas attempts of to form an effective platform in Mamak under The Mamak Mass Organizations Platform MMOP, *Mamak Kitle Örgütleri Platformu* practically failed (Coskun, 2003).

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[79] http://www.cayyoluplatformu.com/

Accordingly it is possible to argue that inter-organizational social networks in Cayyolu resemble bridging social capital in which associations are more open to larger community interests in Cayyolu rather than exclusive interests, which are characterized by crosscutting and vertical networks of trust, and also mostly consist of weak ties Putnam, 2000; Granovetter, 1982; and Anheier and Kendall, 2002. This structure is also reflected in the physical office space of neighborhood associations in Cayyolu; most of the organizational members of Cayyolu are located on a floor provided by the municipality, and many members have more than one membership. It is possible to claim that these networks look like bridging networks *within* the Cayyolu, and when we consider the possibility of integrating these networks with the larger inter-organizational networks in Ankara, and Turkey, they would be remarkably exclusive towards Islamist groups, religious and ethnic minorities in Turkey[80].

Contrarily, inter-organizational networks in Mamak appear to have high levels of bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000; Narayan, 1999; and Anheier and Kendall, 2002), in the sense that these migrant associations are exclusively concerned with the interests of their members. They lack weak ties with organizations that represent different interests, and are characterized by strong ties or what Anheier and Kendall, (2002) call as thick trust among their members. This is not very surprising since across different cultures it is common to observe that when individuals from more collectivist settings migrate to individualistic milieus, they tend to overemphasize their identity of origin, and depend heavily on the informal networks of migrant communities (Bashi, 2007). Such mechanisms can lead to the emergence of exclusive identities.

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[80] This argument shows that setting the boundaries of a network may have a profound effect on whether the overall network is characterized by bonding or bridging ties. Consequently, analysis of only certain layers of a nested system Ostrom, 2007 is not complete without the consideration of the overall system and ties across different layers.

Overall whether bridging or bonding types of ties are defining the nature of civic participation does not matter much in the process of neighborhood protests, because the issues of contention are bounded by the interests of smaller communities as in the case of protests against cellular towers[81]. Especially when the low levels of civic participation in Turkey are considered, it neither likely nor surprising that these protests do not unite and turn into city-wide or nation wide movements. As will be discussed shortly, the types of ties matter in terms of shaping the size and tactics used in protest events.

The remaining five settings lack the vibrant associational life as exemplified in Cayyolu and Mamak and this phenomenon deserves further examination.

6.2   MAIN HYPOTHESES

How and why should networks have an effect on the outcome of the collective action cases under study in this chapter? Apparently, the structure of the networks does not have a direct effect on the outcome; networks matter in indirect ways through various mechanisms. Based on a review of literature, I hypothesize that two distinct processes result in successful outcomes in the case neighborhood level protests.

The first process focuses on the tactics used during the protest events, more specifically the absence or presence of disruptive tactics. The evidence on whether disruptive strategies work or not remains mixed due to diverse approaches to measure collective action outcomes as well as

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[81] It not surprising that most participants in protest events against cellular towers come from the same block, or residents of a small locale that feel threatened by the adverse health effects of cellular towers.

measurement related problems (Rojas, 2006; Giugni 1999). Overall, as Rojas (2006) argues social movements are likely to succeed when the costs of repressing the movement are larger than the costs of meeting the demands. In that regard Button's (1978) study on Black riots in 1960s in the US still provide the most nuanced description of the conditions under which disruptive tactics are more likely to succeed.

According to Button 1978 disruptive protests are likely to succeed when:

1- The demands of the protagonist are possible to meet by the power holders;

2 - Disruption is not threatening to spread and generate instability in the larger society;

3 -Public and bystanders are sympathetic to the goals of the protestors;

4 -Demands are clear, confined, tangible, and specific; and

5- Disruptive tactics are used in combination with peaceful measures.

When we consider the nature and demands of the cases analyzed in this chapter, it is obvious that most cases almost perfectly meet the criteria stated by Button. For example, in protests against the cell towers: when both GSM companies and local authorities can condone the absence of a single cellular tower, such protests do not seem to be very strong all over the country Most people sympathize with the protestors since many individuals continue to believe in the adverse health effects of cell sites, and goals of the challengers are notably limited and clear; they simply ask for the removal of a cellular tower. Therefore the first main hypotheses of this chapter as follows:

Hypothesis I: Disruptive tactics are more likely to succeed.

The second causal condition that is likely to be associated with successful outcomes is participation of large number of participants based on the rationale previously identified in Chapter IV. When disruptive tactics are utilized by a large number of protestors antagonists may be concerned about larger instabilities, therefore, I hypothesize that disruptive tactics and large number of participants in protest events are mutually exclusive causal conditions that are both likely to be associated with successful outcomes. Thus the second main hypothesis of this analysis is as follows:

Hypothesis II: Protests with a large number of participants are more likely to succeed.

6.2.1 Network Related Hypotheses

The nature of the mobilization networks in the protest events being studied have an indirect influence on the outcomes by having an effect on the previously stated major hypotheses. As discussed in detail in the second chapter of this dissertation, one crucial function of network structure is affiliating/hindering coordination activities by having an effect on the flow of information. Consequently, if the network structure enables the fast flow of information among large number of people, more people are likely to participate in the protest events. Consequently the hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis III: The network structure will be associated with the size of protest events.

It is not possible to hypothesize exactly which types of structure can facilitate the most efficient and effective flow of information due to lack of reliable evidence in the current literature. Secondly, high levels of bonding social capital or strong ties among the participants are more likely to be involved in risk confrontation with the police and getting into custody. Consequently the final hypothesis in this chapter is:

Hypothesis IV: Presence of strong ties among the community is associated with utilization of disruptive tactics during protest events.

Figure 28 summarizes the causal model to be tested in in this chapter. Women in the picture not only migrated to Ankara from the same village, but also have been living in the same *gecekondu* neighborhood for more than thirty years, and resemble a perfect example of a network characterized with strong ties.

Figure 28 Causal Model

6.2.2 Operationalizations of the Outcome and Causal Conditions

The analysis in this chapter is based on QCA similar to Chapter IV. Causal conditions are also similar to the ones identified in Chapter IV order to consider all possible explanations of collective action outcomes in the literature. However the operationalization of these conditions is quite different since the cases under study have different characteristics as discussed in the beginning of this chapter. Following are the explanation of the operationalizations:

Outcome (O): Outcome condition displays whether the protest event/s led to successful outcomes or not.

History (H): Neighborhoods with previous experience of activism are more likely to be motivated to be involved in non-institutional forms of collective actions, such as protest events. Expected direction of relationship: positive

*SMO (*SMO): SMOs provide many material and non-material resources for collective action events. Consequently, events in which SMOs are present are expected to be more likely to be successful in comparison to events without SMO involvement.

*STOP (*STOP): This causal condition shows whether the protest event is aiming at halting an action, and trying to reverse an already present condition. Expected direction of relationship: positive since as previously mentioned, it is easier to stop an action in comparison to reversal

Life (L): Based on framing theories, this condition evaluates whether participants of the protest events perceive the problem as life threatening as in the case in cellular tower cases or as in the case of overpass case. If the protagonists of the event perceive a life threatening risk, they are assumed to be more motivated to pursue the goals of the protest event. Expected direction of relationship: positive

*Elite (*E): Based on theories of opportunity structure, this causal condition reflects whether the challengers have allies with elites. More specifically, this condition is coded based on the absence or presence of elected local politicians, and/or members of the parliament at protest events. Expected direction of relationship: positive.

*Population (*P): Population condition is simply based on the number of estimated participants at the protest events according to the police records. This causal condition has multiple values 0=low number of participants,1=medium number of participants,2=high number of participants. The assignment of cases for each category is based on Figure 29.

Figure 29 Calibration of Population Condition

As the Figure 29 displays, cases with smaller than 70 participants are coded as 0, between 70 and 500 are coded as 1, and larger than 500 re-coded as 2. The decision to do so is based on the sudden changes in the slope as signified by the blue vertical lines.

*Disruptive (*D): This condition shows absence or presence of disruptive tactics such as physical confrontation with the police.

*Strong (*SR): SR displays the presence or absence of strong ties among protest participants. According to Krackhardt (1992), strong ties have three main characteristics: (1) relatively long history of interaction, (2) affection, liking among dyads, and (3) high frequency of interaction. Cases with all three characteristics are coded as 2, cases with two characteristics are coded as 1, and cases with only one or none of characteristics are coded as 0.

Network (NW): This multi-value condition signifies 4 main types of mobilization networks: isolated cliques (0), village (1), elite (2), and hierarchy (3). There are no cases that fit to be operationalized as Small World Network.

Table 19 is the data table, and provides details of conditions and cases before the data are transformed into a truth table[82].   Next, Table 20 is the truth table that summarizes the cases. Each row of the truth table shows an empirically observed combination of causal conditions and outcomes for the Model I, the first stage of the causal model introduced previously (Ragin, 2008). According to the truth table, there are seven collective action cases with successful outcomes. Overall four configurations cover these seven cases.

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[82] All analysis is carried out in *R* environment using the QCA package written by Dusa and Miller 2013.

Table 19 Raw Data Table

ID	Name	Elite	Disruptive	Population	Strong	Network	Life	History	SMO	STOP	Motivation	Outcome
1	varlik	No	Yes	70	Strong	Elite	Yes	No	Absent	No	Low	Success
2	oguz	No	No	700	Weak	Hierarchy	No	No	Absent	No	Low	Success
3	aziziye	Yes	No	15	Weak	Isolated Cliques	Yes	No	Absent	No	High	Success
4	ovecler	No	No	20	Weak	Isolated Cliques	Yes	No	Absent	No	High	Failure
5	eryaman	No	No	300	Medium	Isolated Cliques	Yes	No	Absent	No	High	Failure
6	ziraat	No	No	55	Medium	Elite	Yes	No	Absent	No	High	Failure
7	lunapark	Yes	No	1,500	Medium	Hierarchy	No	Yes	Present	Yes	High	Success
8	otobus	Yes	No	500	Weak	Hierarchy	No	Yes	Present	No	Low	Failure
9	bahceli	Yes	No	350	Weak	Isolated Cliques	No	No	Absent	No	Low	Failure
10	cayyolu	Yes	No	500	Medium	Hierarchy	Yes	Yes	Present	No	High	Success
11	batikent	No	No	50	Medium	Isolated Cliques	Yes	No	Absent	No	High	Failure
12	natayolu	No	Yes	500	Medium	Elite	Yes	Yes	Present	No	High	Failure
13	ege	No	No	10	Weak	Isolated Cliques	Yes	Yes	Present	Yes	High	Failure
14	gzd	No	Yes	45	Medium	Village	Yes	Yes	Present	Yes	High	Success
15	kutlu	No	Yes	70	Medium	Village	Yes	Yes	Present	Yes	High	Success
16	tuzlu	No	Yes	10	Strong	Village	Yes	Yes	Present	Yes	High	Success
17	sirin	No	Yes	15	Strong	Village	Yes	Yes	Present	Yes	High	Success

Table 20 Truth Table Model-I

Case Names	Elite	Disruptive	Population	Life	History	SMO	STOP	n	Outcome
Ovecler,Ziraat,Batikent	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0
Ege	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0
Eryaman	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0
Oguzlar	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1
GZD, Kutlu, Tuzlu, Sirin	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	4	1
Varlik	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1
Natayolu	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Aziziye	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
Bahceli	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Otobus	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0
LunaPark	1	0	2	0	1	1	1	1	1
Cayyolu	1	0	2	1	1	1	0	1	1

Logical remainders, logically possible configurations that are not observed empirically (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009) are not displayed in the truth table. There are no contradictions in the truth table, in the sense that no similar configurations lead to different outcomes. The configuration that covers most cases is represented as the fifth configuration, covering cases from GZD, Kutlu, Tuzlu, Sirin. Folliwing. The configuration with next highest coverage is displayed in the first row, and covers three cases; Ovecler, Ziraat, and Batikent.

6.3   DATA ANALYSIS

Similar to Chapter IV, the main analysis technique is Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (mvQCA).

6.3.1   Boolean Minimization Results for Model I

The intermediate solution for the first model led to three configurations. Table 21 displays the results from the first model.

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Table 21 Minimization Results for Model I

Configurations	Coverage	Inclusion	Cases
P{2}	0.333	1	2,7;10
E{1}*L{1}	0.222	1	3; 10
D{1}*L{1}*SMO{0}	0.556	1	14,15,16,17;1

In accordance with the *Hypothesis II,* the first configuration solely consists of presence of high number of participants. The second configuration on the other hand, combines presence of elite allies with the presence of perception of life/health risks in relation to the issue being contested. This finding is also consistent with the literature and displays that elites of the protagonists may tend to insert more pressure on decision makers if the issue is framed as urgent and life threatening.

The final configuration also confirms *Hypothesis I* to a great extent by combining presence of disruptive tactics, presence of perception of the issue as life threatening and absence of formal SMOs. This finding is not surprising; as previously discussed disruptive tactics are more likely to be successful if there is strong sympathy and support from the general public. Lack of presence of formal organizations and framing of the issue as a matter of health are both conditions that would inflate public sympathy for the contesters, especially in Turkey. The reason for that is the presence of general distrust towards SMOs, particularly the politically oriented ones. Even the Turkish word that denotes that a person is a member of a SMO, *orgutlu,* is used in a pejorative way by both policy makers and majority of the public.[83]

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[83] For example, during the clashes between the police forces and citizens on May Day in Istanbul labor day, 5/1/2003, a young girl , Dilan is severely injured by the police and the at the time of writing this chapter she is still in intensive care. The mayor of Istanbul defended the action of the police by

The remaining analysis section investigates whether the second phase of the causal model is also plausible. Causal conditions that may be associated with the second configuration are not examined any further because having elite allies is most likely to be explained with class related characteristics of the neighborhood and not with network structure related conditions.

The next truth table displays all the empirically observed configurations when the outcome is a high number of participants.

Table 22 Truth Table Model II=Outcome Participation

Case Names	Life	History	SMO	Strong	Network	SPO	n	Outcome
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	1
8	0	1	1	0	3	0	1	1
7	0	1	1	1	3	0	1	1
3,4	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	0
5,11	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0
6	1	0	0	1	2	0	1	0
1	1	0	0	2	2	1	1	0
13	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0
14	1	1	0	1	1	0	2	0
15	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0
16,17	1	1	0	2	1	1	2	0
12	1	1	1	1	2	0	1	1
10	1	1	1	1	3	0	1	1

claiming that Dilan was "orgutlu". http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25439663/ Soon it was clear that the Dilan was not a member of any legal/illegal organizations and suddenly the public support increased dramatically. http://www.aksam.com.tr/guncel/dilanin-avukatlarindan-aciklama/haber-202517

There are overall 14 configurations. Only five of these configurations had a high number of participants in the protest events while the remaining nine configurations have negative outcomes.

The truth table shows that cases #3 and 4, and cases #5 and 11, and cases #16 and 17 have the same configurations of 0s and 1s. The rest of the cases have unique configurations.

Table 23 Minimization Results- Model II

Configurations	Coverage	Inclusion	Cases
NW{3}*SPO{0}	0.667	1	2,8,7,10
H{1}*SMO{1}*SPO{0}	0.667	1	8,7,12,10

Minimal formulas produced by intermediate solution reveal two different causal paths to mobilizing high number of participants for a protest event. For both paths, presence of pre-planned protest activity is required SPO {0}. The first path combines planning activity with presence of hierarchical network structure to disseminate information about the protest events. As previously discussed, hierarchical social networks are criticized for not being robust enough, and also for lacking the structural properties for feedback loops.

This finding suggests that these types of networks may be valuable if the main purpose it to simply disseminate information for a future event, This finding also suggests that the long criticized suburban housing complex projects that squeeze large numbers of people into tall apartment buildings may actually create some unexpected opportunities for effective organizing by enabling the formation of hierarchical information dissemination networks across large populations that are not available in the more traditional urban apartment housing style dominant in Turkey.

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One problem with this argument is the absence of small-world network type of structures among the cases under study; therefore it is hard to tell how hierarchical structures would perform in comparison to small world network types of structures.[84]

The second path combines absence of spontaneous protest with the presence of history of previous mobilization in the neighborhood, and organizational efforts by SMOs. This finding is not surprising since if individuals have previous experience of participation in protest events, they are more likely to participate again, and when organizing efforts are facilitated by the resources of a formal SMO without a time pressure, more people are likely to turn out in protest events.

Table 24 Truth Table for Model III-Outcome= Disruptive

Case Names	Life	History	Network	SPO	Strong	STOP	Elite	n	Outcome
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
2	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0
8	0	1	3	0	0	0	1	1	0
7	0	1	3	0	1	1	1	1	0
5,11	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	0
4	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
3	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0
6	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	1	0
1	1	0	2	1	2	0	0	1	1
13	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
14	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
15	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1
16,17	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	2	1
12	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	1	1
10	1	1	3	0	1	0	1	1	0

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[84] Future research can address this issue using simulation analysis.

Findings of the final leg of the causal model are presented in the coming tables. This final analysis examines the relationship between network structure and tendency for disruptive tactics

Table 25 Minimization Results for Model III

Configurations	Coverage	Inclusion	Cases
L{1}*SPO{1}*SR{2}	0.5	1	1,16,17
L{1}*H{1}*SR{1}*E{0}	0.5	1	14,15,12

The final truth table displays 15 configurations when outcome is absence or presence of disruptive tactics. Among those, only five configurations have positive outcomes for presence of disruptive events. The truth table used in the minimization process shows that cases #5 and 11, and cases #16 and 17, have the same configurations of 0s and 1s. The rest of the cases have unique configurations.

Similar to previous analysis, the intermediate solution is used as the final finding of the Boolean reduction. The two paths identified as a result are rather interesting: Perception of a life-threatening problem by the contesters is the first requirement in both paths. This comes as a natural finding since confronting the police forces physically is really a risky action, especially in Turkey[85], and it is expected that groups perceiving a life-threatening issue may be more likely to take such risks. As expected, strength of ties does matter in explaining the process in relation to disruptive tactics.

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[85]   http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2011/dec/11/turkey-progressive-repression

In the first causal path, we see that strong ties in combination with the presence of spontaneous protest events and life-threatening perception is associated with successful outcomes. This is an interesting finding and suggests that when spontaneity is combined with higher risks, only strong ties can mobilize people. Overall, the first path suggests that trust is an important factor in mobilizing people for risky action, especially under time constraints.

The second path shows that medium strength ties can still mobilize people for high-risk protests; if possible participants have previous experience of protest participation. Previous research also confirms that participation in social movement activity is more likely for individuals that have participation history in the past (Diani and McAdam, 2003).

The presence or lack of elite allies also suggests that individuals are more likely to participate in high risk protest activity when they know that they are alone, in the sense that they lack clientelistic networks with decision makers that could have been utilized instead of participating in protest events with high risks.

6.4   SUMMARY

Chapter VI aimed at understanding the role of pre-exiting interpersonal networks in shaping neighborhood level protest outcomes. The first section focused on the issue of spontaneity, and the interaction between space and formation of social ties that turn into mobilization ties in many cases.

Next, Chapter VI concentrated on two neighborhoods with the highest level of civic participation as reflected in the high number of protest events and neighborhood level civic

organizations. A closer look at these two neighborhoods revealed that the nature of social capital was quite different from each other.

The roots of activism and types of ties in Cayyolu resemble bridging type of social capital, networks of trust and tolerance among groups that do not necessarily represent similar ethnic religious groups. However, the whole neighborhood in Cayyolu is in a way united around the secular statist ideology represented by the CHP. The nature and borders of civic participation in Mamak on the contrary resemble bonding social capital since civic participation in Mamak is mostly determined by immigrant communities and their organizations that exclusively work to seek benefits for their members and these organizations have few strong ties that connect them with each other.

Next section of Chapter VI carried out a two-layered QCA analysis, similar to the one in Chapter IV. This section identified disruptive techniques and widespread participation as the two crucial causal conditions that tend to be shaped by the structure and/or nature of pre-existing interpersonal networks in the neighborhoods. The mvQCA analysis showed that the presence of strong ties among a small number of residents was important in order for protestors to utilize disruptive techniques.

In order to facilitate the mobilization of a large number of protestors at the neighborhood level, further analysis suggests that hierarchical information networks are crucial if the possible participants have low thresholds for participation, and high levels of motivation and commitment as is the case in most cellular tower related cases. The main channel of these hierarchical networks has been the spatial plans and the nature of apartment complexes in most neighborhoods.

Overall, this chapter highlighted the vitality of the pre-existing networks that can be present in many shapes and forms. Community organizers need to consider innovative ways to activate these possible networks that may stem from spatial arrangements, or simply be there as a result of strong friendship among women in the neighborhood.

7.0   CONCLUSION

7.1   BEYOND SIMPLE ANSWERS

This study did not aim at providing a simplistic answer to the intricate problem of understanding when and how social networks matter in explaining collective action outcomes. As Giugni (1999) highlights, collective action outcomes are the results of various complex mechanisms:

> *"Looking for general causes and invariant models is doomed to failure, for there are no such invariant patterns in social life. In fact, this may be all the more true when we are dealing with the consequences of social movements, as we are confronted with variation in the characteristics of movements, in the contexts in which they operate, and in the outcomes of their activities. Instead of searching for general explanations, we would do a better job by taking into account the historically contingent combinations of factors that shape the possibilities for movements to contribute to social change."* (pg. XXV)

To make things even more complicated, social network researchers have also argued that there is no single magic bullet network structure that outperforms the others when it comes to

explaining collective action outcomes (e.g. Gould, 1993; and Siegel, 2009). These scholars showed how different network structures strongly interact with the causal conditions derived from the specific context of each collective action case. In that sense, it is not surprising that the findings of this study show that different network structures are conducive to successful outcomes in combination with different causal factors in different contexts.

Charles Tilly (1999) once described the strength of a movement by the following formula (pg. 260):

"Strength= worthiness X unity X numbers X commitment"

Tilly (1999) argued that low values in one component could be compensated by high values in another one, but a value of zero for any of the factors would mean zero strength for the movement. My analyses also confirmed that all the factors Tilly mentioned were crucial in facilitating successful collective action events. Further analyses of these factors in relation to networks showed that specifically the last two factors, numbers and commitment, tend to be affiliated with different types of alliance or mobilization structures.

Consequently, my findings suggest that organizers need to first evaluate the specific context of each collective action case and devise network design strategies accordingly.

7.2   SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

The main research question that guided this study asked when, how and which type of network structure mattered in shaping collective action outcomes. The secondary research question, as investigated in Chapter V, considered the processes of tie formation and strength.

The first analytical chapter, Chapter IV focused on the role of alliance networks in enabling successful movement outcomes based on urban movement cases from Ankara, Turkey between 2006 and 2011. The findings of this chapter illustrate that political opportunity related factors such as presence or absence of elite alliance, relative openness or closeness of the system operationalized based on whether the antagonist is a public agency.

This finding underlines the limited power of social movements in semi-democratic settings. In other words, when the larger institutional system is relatively closed in response to demands of citizens with the exception of electoral cycles, movement based strategies rarely make a difference. However, the QCA analysis showed that network structure mattered to a certain extent in mobilizing large numbers of organizations and moving the debate from local to national levels, two causal factors that are shown to be important for positive outcomes when the political opportunity structure is favorable.

Chapter V demonstrated that homophily and assortativity related mechanisms were at work in the process of tie formation and in understanding variation in tie strength. Based on the knowledge gained during the fieldwork and relevant literature, this chapter closed with an

emphasis on the further data needs to consider the reciprocity and path dependency mechanisms for explaining tie formation and tie strength among the SMOs in Turkey. [86]

The last analytical chapter, Chapter VI, focused on interpersonal mobilization networks at the neighborhood level protest events. Most of these cases were mobilizations towards cell towers in close proximity to residential areas. The analysis in this chapter showed that strong ties such as long-term friendship ties among immigrant women in squatter neighborhoods were instrumental for the presence of high levels of commitment as reflected in willingness to participate in high-risk protest events involving disruptive techniques.

This chapter also stressed the interaction between space and the formation of collective action. The analysis of pre-existing networks that were activated during the protest events indicated that particular spatial setting of a neighborhood could facilitate or hinder successful collective action by influencing the dissemination of protest- related information that strongly determines the size of a protest event.

7.3   SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS

There are a few policy lessons to consider based on the findings of the study for the organizers of non-institutional forms of collective action:

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[86] Directed network data would be necessary for the study of reciprocity and panel data would be required to formally analyze the path dependent nature of tie strength.

- In semi-democratic, increasingly authoritarian contexts such as Turkey, collective action organizers need to primarily focus on the external dynamics in the political structure and look for opportunities to form alliances with elites. When the political environment is favorable, organizers can look for ways to form ties across cohesive SMO communities or expand their network by encouraging tie formation

- Community organizers, social movement activists, and national and international donors for civil society organizations in developing countries should consider the role of networks in shaping policy outcomes of social movements. Therefore, organizations should not be considered in isolation, instead the networks can be evaluated at the main unit, especially with regard to funding purposes.

- Forming weak ties among well-connected groups of actors is likely to increase material and non-material resources available for the movement organizers, as well as to boost the resilience of the movement

- Community organizers need to pay special attention to the spatial arrangements of the neighborhoods in which they work, since spatiality strongly interacts with the formation of social networks in the neighborhoods that can be activated during a protest event.

- Similarly, pre-existing social networks that tend to exist in places of worship, coffee houses, and strong friendship networks among homemaker women in traditional

neighborhoods can be considered for triggering collective action, instead of trying to build networks around the issue that constitutes the main concern of the protest events.

7.4 CONSIDERING SOME OF THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

7.4.1 Limitations due to the data

The data used in chapters five and six are based on newspaper reports. As previously mentioned, the network matrices derived from the newspaper accounts may not be sufficiently comprehensive, as they do not cover all social movement related events, and also do not report more peripheral, smaller, and lesser known organizations that are involved in the event. These are concerns regarding the internal validity, more specifically, the content validity of the data. While acknowledging the presence of some content validity problems, this study assumes that the reporting error/bias is more or less similar across cases.

Similarly, the police records that are used to identify social movement/collective action events may not be comprehensive enough, especially since the records do not cover events in townships on the outskirts of Ankara.

In addition to these limitations, the main unit of analysis used in Chapter IV and V is organizations. However, individuals with no organizational membership may be present at the social movement. As Oliver (1989) suggests "Whole social movements are complex phenomena encompassing organizations, informal groups, crowds, consciousness, and the interactions among all these elements. It is a mistake to equate a movement with the organizations pursuing its goals (pg. 18).

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For example, during the recent uprising in June 2013 in Turkey that started as a protest to save the last green space in central Istanbul and soon spread to the major cities, many participants were not affiliated with any organization[87]. One of the exploratory studies on profiling the protestors revealed that 79% of the participating protestors were not affiliated with any civic or political organization KONDA, 2013.

Unfortunately, none of the cases analyzed in this study was able to gather popular support as in the recent Gezi[88] movement. Except the mobilization for stopping the killing of street animals and for improving animal rights, none of studied cases was able to steadily mobilize more than 100-200 people at a time. Therefore, the effect of ignoring the role of individuals with no organizational membership is assumed to be minimal.

7.4.2 Limitations of the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

Most QCA researchers claim that one of the strengths of QCA is that it falls midway between large-n quantitative research and case studies by providing depth about cases while allowing for some level of generalization (e.g. Kim and Lee, 2008). Yet, QCA neither provides in-depth analyses and thick descriptions of cases as in case study approach, nor has generalizability as large-n quantitative studies. Moreover, it is a technique based on deterministic causality that does not recognize stochastic processes.

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[87] For a review of the major findings of the study in English see http://www.bianet.org/english/youth/147543-94-percent-of-gezi-resisters-participate-individually-poll-says

[88] Gezi is the name of the park that was planned to be demolished to be replaced by a mall that resembled an old military barracks from the Ottoman Era.

Despite these limitations, it is the best available technique for analysis of data that consist of fourteen or seventeen cases. As Provan et al. (2007) stated, one of the challenges of conducting cross-network studies is identifying comparable cases and collecting network data for multiple networks. In that regard, the current study still makes an important contribution to cross network studies.

7.4.3   Limitations Due to the Conceptualization of the Antagonist

Another limitation of the study is the monolithic conceptualization of the antagonists. Every case analyzed, presents a primary organization that is challenged by the participants. Yet, these primary organizations are also embedded within complex networks of interests. By considering the interactions among the antagonists as well as the ones between the antagonists and the challengers, it would be possible to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between network structure and non-institutional forms of collective action.

Future research can incorporate the network of antagonists by utilizing the Strategic Action Fields (SAF) framework outlined by Fligstein and McAdam (2011). Fligstein and McAdam's theory of SAF aims at explaining social change based on a view of society governed by a "a complex web of strategic action fields" (pg.3). SAFs are dynamic meso-level fields of struggle between networks of challengers and incumbents and Fligstein and McAdam consider "fields as embedded in complex webs of other fields" (pg.8).

7.5   FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

7.5.1   Emergence of Collective Action

Having examined the collective action outcomes, I intend to turn to processes of emergence to develop a more holistic understanding of the relationship between social networks and collective action. Specifically, I would like to investigate why in some neighborhoods in Turkey we observe high levels of activism towards cell towers, whereas such activism is absent in other neighborhoods with similar socio-demographic characteristics.

Most studies on the emergence of collective action revolve around strain/breakdown related explanations (e.g. Tilly, 1975; Goldstone and Tilly, 2001; and Buechler, 2004). In a more recent study, Snow et al. (2010) argue that the disruptions and threats to the quotidian, the routines and expectation of daily life, are significant to understand emergence of social movements.

I would like to combine strain/breakdown theories with network approaches and explore the mechanisms through which pre-existing social networks are triggered and transformed into networks of activism.

7.5.2   Online and Offline Activism

Finally, I would like to focus more on the relationship between online and offline activism. None of the cases included in the study effectively utilized online networks for

mobilization, except the case on animal rights.[89] Yet, most organizing efforts during the recent Gezi protests were organized online. Even the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan acknowledged the power of social media in facilitating the communication and coordination of tens of thousands of protestors: "There is now a scourge that is called Twitter. The best examples of lies can be found there. To me, social media is the worst menace to society."[90]

Consequently, any work on non-institutional forms of collective action in Turkey cannot ignore the role of online networks anymore. As Table 26 displays, the number of Internet subscribers in Turkey has increased exponentially since 2011.

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[89] Yet, organizing online is not considered as a causal factor in the analysis section of Chapter IV. This is due to the fact causal conditions with not enough diversity can not be included in QCA. Animal rights oriented case is also the only one that represents the grievances of middle-upper middle class citizens in Ankara. Due to same reason, social class is not considered as a causal condition in the analysis.

[90] http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/06/03/turkey_recep-tayyip-erdogan-twitter-social-media_n_3377233.html

Table 26 Internet Subscribers in Turkey 1998-2013

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute Website

In addition to these technical necessities, there is so much to be uncovered about the complex relationship between presence in social media and street level activism since current research shows that neither technology skeptics nor social media optimists can fully explain the intricacies of the interaction between virtual and offline networks.

During the recent Gezi uprisings, social media were used extensively for various reasons by the protestors. For example, an exploratory analysis of Gezi-related tweets by the NYU's Social Media and Political Participation laboratory[91] revealed that while only 30% of the tweets about the Egyptian revolution in 2011 originated within Egypt, about 90% of all Gezi- related tweets had originated within Turkey.

Therefore, I would like to do a more content-based analysis of these tweets from the first few weeks of the uprising to show how social media were utilized particularly for learning and adaptation to resist the police brutality and to avoid detention. More specifically, I would like to study how protestors used Twitter in real time, while they were protesting to share information about the police activity at specific streets, protestor friendly establishments, spaces that acted as temporary infirmaries, and for legal help.

7.6   CONCLUDING REMARKS

During one of the presidential debates for the 2008 presidential elections, the moderator asked whether Martin Luther King Jr. would support any of the candidates if he was still alive. Obama responded Martin Luther King Jr. would not support either candidate; he would be busy on the streets leading a social movement.

Most rights we take for granted today such as equal voting rights, basic rights at the work place, are the results of years long, organized struggles of determined men and women. Yet, we still have much to learn why certain movements succeed, while others don't. It is certain that the

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91   http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/06/these-charts-show-how-crucial-twitter-is-for-the-turkey-protesters/276798/

alliance and mobilization networks matter to a great extent in shaping movement outcomes by facilitating/hindering coordination efforts, determining movement strategies, and affecting the level of commitment to a movement by its adherents.

APPENDIX A

Questionnaire Used During the Semi-Structured Interviews with the Organizations

History

(1)   When was your organization established?

(2)   What are the main goals of your organizations?

Organizational Structure

(1) How many employees do you have? How many of them are paid?

(2) Do you have membership system? Can you explain how does it work?

(3) What are the main sources of for financing your operations?

Activities

(1) Can you explain your main activities/projects?

(2) Who do you target as your main beneficiaries?

(3) Can you name at least five organizations that you consider allies?

(4) Can you name at least five organizations that you work together?

Ankara Related Work

(1)   Think about the major urban movements/campaigns that centered on Ankara related issues since 2006. Among these, which ones your organization was involved in?

(2)   For each campaign/movement you had participated since 2006 can you name the organizations that you collaborated with?

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