

MAKING SENSE IN SREBRENICA

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Kenneth P. Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

University of Pittsburgh

2013

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
DIETRICH SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

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Using ethnographic field data and interview data, this study demonstrates the complicated relationships that exist between residents in Srebrenica and the politics and narratives that claim to represent those residents. It also examines the complicated relationship between those residents and the common practices in which residents engage in Srebrenica. It organizes the strategies that residents use in response to these relationships in terms of Hirschman's exit, voice, and loyalty framework. By examining the strategies in these terms, the data reveal that residents make sense of their daily lives and practices by distinguishing between the behaviors they practice and the motivations that energize those behaviors.

Using this distinction between behaviors and motivations, together with the exit, voice, and loyalty framework, this study demonstrates that in fact, understanding motivations for behaviors is an important element in order to understand life in Srebrenica. In Rawls' terms, this thesis shows that the people in Srebrenica have multiple meaning systems for the practices in which they engage. Sometimes practices constitute an image of an ethnically-tense Srebrenica as a social object. Other times those same practices constitute an image of Srebrenica that is cosmopolitan. The people of Srebrenica are constituting both of these social objects in their everyday practices. It is the shared meanings between individuals that determines which object is being constituted.

The thesis contributes to the literatures in sociology on constitutive orders, political disengagement, and collective narratives. It also develops an analytical framework that, in the same

way that A.O. Hirschman demonstrated that exit is an important concept for economists, exit is also an important concept for sociologists in order to understand how society works.

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1.0 SREBRENICA, 2012

SERBS AND MUSLIMS ARE ALL IN THE SAME SHIT ANYWAY.

**~ ZORAN
AUGUST 2012**

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Srebrenica, a town infamous for the events that took place there and in the surrounding region in the years between 1991 and 1995, offers for anyone who visits the chance to see whatever one wants to see. For many people who visit the small town—population around 3,000 during the winter, up to about 8 – 10,000 during the summer peak around the first and second weeks of July—the town is a place you visit to witness what remains of a genocide against the Muslim Bosnian Muslim population. The Potocari Memorial Center has a museum inside the battery factory that housed the UN troops and some of the Bosnian Muslim population during the war and during the events leading up to the weeks in July 1995. That was when most of the killing of Bosnian Muslim men occurred in massive numbers. Many in the international community have heard of the town only in this context.

For others, Srebrenica is a place you visit to remember the genocide committed against the Bosnian Serb population of the region from 1991 to 1995. While fewer in number, visitors from the international community also visit the Serbian Memorial Center in the center of Srebrenica. Inside

this memorial, the visitors find displayed photographs of those dead at the hands of the Bosnian Army and, in particular, the militia led by Naser Oric. This memorial is smaller in size, but is staffed and seems to be growing.

For still others, especially those who are Dutch, but the broader international community as well, Srebrenica is a place to visit in order to memorialize the successes and the mistakes of the United Nations during those war years. Sometimes, Dutch Battalion soldiers, who served their military duty at the UN compound and in the region, return to visit or to live in Srebrenica. Some of them are motivated by overwhelming guilt for having—they will admit—delivered the Bosnian Muslim men and boys into the hands of General Mladic and the Bosnian Serb Army. It was within days or weeks that many of these men were killed.

Other times, Dutch Battalion soldiers return because they are proud of their service with the United Nations, and want to revisit the place twenty years on. Even other times, they return to find out what happened to some of the people they knew during the war. They return to find out whether the woman or girl who stole their heart back then and who has occupied their minds and thoughts for the past twenty years remembers them, or better, loves them in return. Still other times, they return because they cannot explain why they want to return.

Srebrenica also has its visitors from the international community of journalists, academics, NGO employees, and representatives of international governmental organizations. Journalists come looking for a story, usually about the war, or, at the least, related to it. They tell stories remarkable for the extent to which they are dripping with hatred, or remarkable for the extent to which they are dripping with irony. How one can still find tension and violence, if only rhetorical, in the day-to-day. Or how one can find miraculous and unusual stories—because they are seldom found and unique—of cooperation between Muslims and Serbs in Srebrenica, even given all that hatred that surrounds

them. Even better, they can write stories about the love that, despite all the hatred that surrounds, blossomed into an interethnic, stable, life-long relationship.

NGOs come into Srebrenica to support women, women's rights, women's access to financial resources, or the roles that women fill in a post-war society heading toward peace and reconciliation. Others come in to work on local sources of agriculture in the region. Others come in to work towards sustainable development in the region. Others focus solely on the environment. Still others are working to clear the country of the land mines, which maintain the beautiful forests as scenery: admirable from a distance, but potentially deadly because of the very real risk you will become a victim of a war twenty years after that war ended. But fewer organizations come in to help with land mines anymore. Representatives from outside governments, from religious organizations, and from the United Nations often come in to offer support, usually in front of news cameras, usually for the Bosnian Muslim victims.

Academics come into and out of Srebrenica with an agenda almost too varied to document. Some want to support the Bosnian Muslim victims' search for justice, truth, and reconciliation about war crimes and genocide. Others want to document peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts in the region. Others want to understand war economies, and still others want to understand clientilism. Others examine cultural memory and landscape, and still others—sometimes those who survived the war—come to study the problems with democracy in a post-war society. Others want to study rape as a weapon of war; there is plenty to learn and study, if you can do so without offending or outing those women. I came to visit Srebrenica as an academic interested in understanding how life operates in a society that merely twenty years ago was embroiled in one of the worst, most intractable ethnic conflicts in the world in the 1990s.

All of these visitors are in addition to the thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Serbs that visit the city each year, especially during the summer months, especially during the first two weeks in July.

It is on July 11th every year that the Bosnian Muslim community holds a series of memorial ceremonies and mass burials at the Memorial Center in Potocari. And it is on the very next day, July 12th, every year that the Serbian community holds its series of memorial ceremonies in Srebrenica and the neighboring town, Bratunac. These visitors come from near and far. Some live only a few hundred kilometers away, somewhere in Bosnia or Serbia, while others have relocated to Europe, Australia, the United States, and other places.

All during this busy-ness and the in and out of thousands upon thousands of us visitors each year, the people who live in Srebrenica all the year round provide the background, scene, and context upon which all these visitors leave their marks in one way or another. Sadly, this is typically a one-way relationship—the residents rarely have an opportunity to express their voice or leave their mark on the people or the stories those visitors inevitably tell about their time in Srebrenica. This has little to do with their capacity as agents, for many of them are more than aware of the one-sidedness of this relationship.

Actually it has more to do with international politics and narratives that usually confront them in their interactions with these visitors, embedded in the form of the questions and the assumptions people from outside bring in with them. Sometimes, the residents do not want to leave *that* mark. These are the people who make Srebrenica their home and earn some income from these thousands of us traveling in and out every year. These are the people who provide the hostels, drinks, meals, groceries, vegetables, fruits, meats, entertainment, clean streets, running water, flowered balconies, and good conversations for all of us who visit. These are the people about whom, at least partially, we are talking when we talk about the Balkans wars of the 1990s.

In interaction with all these outsiders, the people who live in Srebrenica often experience situations that demonstrate to them that many of us visitors literally have no idea about what happened during the war—as much as there are books and news articles still being printed today.

Furthermore, we speak without realizing to whom we are speaking—people who live through it. We speak without considering the complexity of the situation in Srebrenica today; without accounting for the twenty years of society that has developed since the end of the war; without considering how, in many ways, that war will be an element of their lives most of the time, not because they want it to be but rather because we outsiders are always bringing it with us; or without realizing the complexity of the moral situation so many people in Srebrenica had to navigate during the war, and still must navigate today. We speak using terms we sometimes do not understand, like "genocide" or "Bosniak" or "Serbian." These words mean something at least a little bit different to the people who live there.

Admittedly, at the outset, I was skeptical about the real, material and the more symbolic, so-called "cultural" causes of the war—namely, ethnic identity—and I wanted to find out how, in a such a post-war society, ethnic animosity had not produced another war. I wanted to find out how people manage to live together in such a situation of heightened ethnic animosity. But instead, or rather along the way, I quickly came to learn that this in-and-out of international, regional, and local visitors, be they journalists, academics, NGOs, UN representatives, or representatives from other organizations, pose a bigger problem that these residents face everyday, as compared to what many of us think occupy the problems society is facing—ethnic animosity. Many times, this in-and-out has been seen by many of those people who live in Srebrenica as an annoyance, or worse—an oppression—rather than an enjoyable intrusion into daily summer life that, without all the focus on the war that outsiders bring in, most of these individuals would really welcome with a friendliness and openness for which the Balkan region is actually famous.

Having been on the ground for only a few days, and before I fully realized what I have since come to write in this thesis, I was impressed by the street dogs in Srebrenica. I had been in Sarajevo and Tuzla. The dogs I and others with whom I had spoken had observed there were scary dogs—

skiddish around humans: the kind of dogs you feel sorry for, but you do not try to feed or to pet. But the dogs of Srebrenica were different: they were friendly. Some of them—though not nearly all of them—had names. They laid lazily on the streets, they waited for food from residents, people would pet them, and they seemed to be a part of the town. The dogs had their boundaries—they were not allowed on the patios of the cafés and restaurants. The older dogs had learned, but the new puppies pushed limits and followed a different set of rules. But all the dogs can wait close by for scraps of food.

Driven by the skepticism in my mind about ethnic war more generally, I wondered whether those dogs knew who was Bosnian Muslim or Serbian, who hated whom, or why. I wondered if a person reading an account of a typical day in the life of a dog in Srebrenica would ever really know there even was a difference in ethnicity. And so it was by watching these dogs and their interactions with the people in Srebrenica that I really began to understand what I write herein. Through the people whom I interviewed and got to know over the next two months, Srebrenica began to offer up to me the answer for which I had been looking all along.

What I wanted to find in Srebrenica was an answer to the questions, "How does life work in a so-called post-ethnic-war society? If what happened in Srebrenica twenty years ago was really about ethnic hatreds, how does life today operate in any peaceful way?" And Srebrenica had an answer for me, too, which, at the very beginning, it first presented to me in that relationship between the residents in Srebrenica and a particular collection of those street dogs: Pujdo, Signorina, Zuto, the Dog With the Blue Legs, and Cuda.

The relationships that the people of Srebrenica have with these dogs, along with the stories and interviews I collected while there, capture symbolically many elements of the lives of the people in Srebrenica in the day-to-day. They demonstrate the sense of community and cooperation that operates daily in the city. They demonstrate how many people describe life in Srebrenica today—

blind to ethnicity. They demonstrate how life is flourishing, and how the generosity and humanity overwhelms all living creatures in the town. The struggles people have to help the dogs evade government regulation and capture also serve as a symbol. And more: in the relationship between the dogs and the people of Srebrenica, one can observe the day-to-day uncertainty about sources of livelihood, the reliance upon network connections to make ends meet sometimes, the days' hours spent in community with others—walking, talking, working, sitting, playing. That is all to say, in the microcosm of the relationship between the people and the street dogs in Srebrenica one can see a different image of Srebrenica, if one looks closely enough.

In the following pages, I take a closer look at that image.

1.2 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

In the following chapters, I take a strategic approach to explaining what it is I now understand. In the remainder of this first chapter, I outline and then modify a useful conceptual framework—A.O. Hirschman's exit, voice, and loyalty—for organizing the strategies the people of Srebrenica employ in their interactions with politics and collective trauma narratives—two structures in Srebrenican society that the individuals with whom I interacted identify as problems against which they struggle. I then describe, using interview excerpts, the opinion of some people in Srebrenica of the political system there and describe in brief detail the larger political system in Bosnia and Srebrenica. I then describe the two narratives that dominate the two main ethnic/religious identities in Srebrenica. Then I describe the research methods and data analysis approach I use in developing the arguments in later chapters.

In chapters two and three, I complicate the relationship between, on the one hand, the people who live in Srebrenica, and on the other hand, the political system of Srebrenica (in chapter 2) and the narratives (in chapter 3) that claim to represent the people that live in Srebrenica. In the second chapter, I discuss the political disengagement literature most broadly. I then use interview excerpts to give a general survey of how people in Srebrenica report they engage, disengage and protest the political system in Bosnia. I divide their interviews into loyalty, voice, and exit strategies. I conclude with some observations that are interesting in and of themselves, but also turn out to be important markers that I recall and use in later chapters as I build my argument.

In the third chapter, I take a very similar approach to collective memory and collective trauma narratives. I discuss the collective memory literature more broadly, identify and define some major concepts, and then I present interview excerpts that demonstrate loyalty, voice, and exit strategies that residents report they see or use themselves in relationship to the dominant collective trauma narratives. I conclude the chapter with some new and some repeated general observations that I recall from chapter 2, and then use again in later chapters to build my argument. In both of these chapters, I also show that, when relationships between people and systems that purportedly represent them—such as politics and narratives—are neither direct nor fully representative, Hirschman's exit, voice, and loyalty framework is an effective and fruitful means of organizing the strategic responses people have in those relationships.

In the fourth chapter, I take a pause from that loyalty, voice, and exit framework in order to describe some of the practices that confer meaning and sense into life in Srebrenica. These practices, as it turns out, are incredibly important for understanding daily life in Srebrenica. They also provide insight into answers to the questions I ask in this thesis. Namely, these practices and the meaning they carry demonstrate how it is possible that ethnic tension and identity is less important in Srebrenica than one might otherwise think. In this chapter, I show that any one constitutive practice

in Srebrenica can activate more than one system of shared meaning for the residents who live there. That means that sometimes those practices constitute an ethnically-tense image of Srebrenica. Other times those practices constitute a cosmopolitan image of Srebrenica. The ambiguity that these dual meaning systems produces is actually strategically used by the residents of Srebrenica to navigate a predatory economic and political situation.

Finally, in the fifth chapter, I examine voice, loyalty, and exit together with one important distinction that the residents in Srebrenica make in their interviews and in their everyday explanations of their own and others' behaviors: that between behavior and motivation for behavior. I provide an analytical framework that helps to explain and predict some of the findings of this research project. To the extent that this analytical framework accurately reflects at least part of daily life in Srebrenica, it also leads to some predictions about the future for Srebrenica. It also demonstrates how important the concept *exit* is for sociology as a field. In closing that chapter and the thesis, I discuss both sets of these implications.

1.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY

In order to explore, describe, and examine the strategies that the people of Srebrenica use in response to what they perceive as sometimes oppressive regimes against which they report feelings of powerlessness, I use A.O. Hirschman's *Exit, Voice, Loyalty*. Hirschman examines the ways in which competition within a market can lead sometimes to corrections of inefficiencies within a firm or organization, sometimes to monopolies, and sometimes to the decay and disappearance of firms in the market. He does this by using three terms: exit, voice, and loyalty.¹

Exit refers to the choice that consumers and firms sometimes make to leave an organization or a market permanently—when customers switch from one brand of product to another or a business sells everything and closes shop. Exit occurs when consumers perceive a decay in the quality of a good or service and decide to switch firms or organizations.²

Hirschman's model suggests that exit is permanent and consumers switch to another producer, firm, or organization in order to satisfy an unmet need.ⁱ Therefore, elasticity of quality,ⁱⁱ in the strict economic use of the term, influences in part whether, when, and to what extent consumers will choose to exit, as do consumers' perceptions as to whether or not voice is an effective and not-too-costly option.³

Voice refers to the choice that customers sometimes make to petition a brand to improve quality or petition a government to intervene on their behalf to improve a low-quality situation. Voice occurs when consumers or members "make an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the firm from which one buys or of the organization to which one belongs."⁴ Voice is

any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to the management directly in charge, through appeal to a higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in management, or through various types of actions and protests, including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion.⁵

Hirschman argues that voice and exit are related intimately. First, exit is the prime choice only in the context of lack of voice. Consumers choose to exit only when they know voice is not an

ⁱ Hirschman does discuss the possibility that exit might lead to consumers seeking "happiness elsewhere," but this seems only to happen under conditions of monopoly and the perceived futility of a search for satisfaction by replacing the inept product with another, higher quality brand (Hirschman 1970, p. 27).

ⁱⁱ As with price elasticity of demand, quality elasticity of demand is the measure of the change in the slope of demand as the quality of the good or service changes. The greater the change in slope, the higher is the quality elasticity of demand said to be, and vice versa. For example, if the quality of the water service in a city declines, fewer customers will exit because the quality elasticity of demand is low for water services. Customers cannot easily switch to another supplier, nor can they easily petition for changes. In contrast, quality elasticity of demand for bottled water is high. If the quality of the water declines quickly, the consumer can exit the brand, or the market, rather easily. The quality elasticity of demand is said here to be high.

option. Second, when a consumer cannot exit she is likely to use voice. In this way, voice is a residual of exit. Exit occurs when voice either is not an option, when voice is not preferred, or when voice is perceived as an ineffective alternative to exit.⁶

Hirschman draws an analogy between his market economy use of the terms and the applicability of those terms to the state and other social institutions.⁷ For Hirschman, exit is very limited in the state metaphor, as immigration is difficult and few places remain in the world where no state claims sovereignty. He writes that "[t]he voice option is the only way in which dissatisfied customers or members can react whenever the exit option is unavailable. This is very nearly the situation in such basic social organizations as the family, the state, or the church."⁸

That leaves voice and loyalty as the two options remaining. Those who use voice, according to Hirschman, are of a variety. First, there are those who engage in complaint or protest against the state when the state does not provide quality goods or services. Second, there are those who "simply refuse to exit and suffer in silence, confident that things will soon get better." Third, there are those who are in more advanced countries whose dissatisfaction is "more likely to take the form of silent exit." Finally, there are those who are apathetic. They have not exited, but they do not use voice either.⁹

To use these terms as a framework for analysis of the data I collected, I make a few adjustments to the definitions. In order to use the framework here, the terms exit, voice, and loyalty must be mutually exclusive. Second, the state must be viewed as a relationship between government and citizen rather than as a geographic space, in the way Foucault might describe the state in terms of biopower. Third, the concepts must categorize behaviors rather than people. Finally, the exit, voice, and loyalty concepts must describe a set of strategies that individual residents of Srebrenica employ. All of these adjustments are mostly to do with the definitions of the concepts. I address each of these definitional adjustments in turn.

Hirschman argues that exit from the state system is usually nearly impossible; this argument leads to some difficulties in distinguishing his term *voice* from his references to *apathy*, *exit*, and *silent exit* in reference to the state. For example, Hirschman describes those who disengage from the political system (do not vote, petition, lobby, influence...) as apathetic—those who are not using their voice. But he categorizes those people under "voice," the category which is defined by ascertaining whether a person is making any attempt at all to change the system. Apathetic people, by definition, cannot be using voice, but Hirschman categorizes them under the voice category. Meanwhile, exit refers only to those who move to different countries, seeking only to replace one (low-quality) state with another (high-quality) state. I want to modify these definitions to suggest that these individuals who Hirschman labels as apathetic are actually opting for *exit* strategies, and are neither suffering in silence nor are they necessarily apathetic.

I also want to suggest that individuals "seek happiness elsewhere"¹⁰ more often than what Hirschman indicated in his text. People who exit might not be satisfied with the state or the dominant narratives, but also may not feel compelled to find a different, better state or a better narrative. For my data, these individuals are opting for *exit* strategies.

It is rarely a reality within the political sphere that an individual must choose either exit, voice, or loyalty one time and one time only. In many polities, many (but certainly not all) voters can more or less vote as they choose (provided enough planning and lead-time to meet voting requirements). Likewise, protestors can become active or disengage as they please in a movement or action. Individuals can choose whether and when they use voice or exit over their lifetimes. I want to suggest that exit, voice, and/or loyalty are actually practices and individuals can and do practice each. Individuals develop an expert *set* of these strategies, and they use them differently based upon particular situations and contexts.

I want also to understand the state as 1) one of many structures in society that 2) exercises power through the relationship it has with the individuals in society. This allows a more dynamic understanding of the relationship between the individual and larger societal structures. It renders the option for exit more readily plausible because the structures are viewed instead as a *relationship* of power and not simply a structure within which the individual is geo-spatially located. This approach allows me to explain how individuals choose to re-enter the relationship, sometimes at will. It also allows me to explain how individuals choose to use a variety of exit, voice, and loyalty strategies in a variety of relationships in a strategic and expert way.

Finally, by focusing on categorizing behavior rather than people, I can explain how the individual is a strategic expert in the execution of her own daily life, that she recognizes the power relationships operating on and around her, and that she expertly chooses an array of strategies that sometimes includes exit, voice, *and* loyalty, and sometimes includes them all at one point in time. Also, from this perspective of the individual as aware and expert, I also can explain that this combination is neither chaotic nor contradictory at all; in fact, in her mind she can explain how each strategy is coherent and complementary.

With these few slight definitional adjustments, I employ Hirschman's intuitively accurate and simple framework as a way to understand the individual's relationship to politics, narratives, and other controlling schema in Srebrenica. I describe exit as referring to those strategies that look like political disengagement or apathy or silent exit. I describe voice as those strategies that seek to change the system or improve politics or narratives in some formal and informal ways. These might look like what sociologists refer to as social movements or political parties. And finally, I describe loyalty as those strategies that accept the political system or narrative as it is and which do not seek to change them.

In particular, as it relates to the concepts and regimes I examine here, I define these terms as follows. **POLITICAL LOYALTY** includes those behaviors that engage with the state through voting or taking help from politicians while refraining from trying to change the way politics works in Srebrenica or to change the way the political system is structured in Srebrenica or Bosnia. **POLITICAL VOICE** includes those behaviors that engage with the state through voting or taking help from politicians while trying to change the way politics works in Srebrenica or to change the way the political system is structured in Srebrenica or Bosnia. Finally, **POLITICAL EXIT** includes those behaviors that disengage with the state or politics while refraining from trying to change the way politics works in Srebrenica or to change the way the political system is structured in Srebrenica or Bosnia.

NARRATIVE LOYALTY includes those behaviors and statements that seem to assume the validity or truth of, or that seem to use, the narratives that dominate in Srebrenica. **NARRATIVE VOICE** includes those behaviors or statements that seek to change the dominant narratives or the way people use those narratives in Srebrenica. Finally, **NARRATIVE EXIT** includes those statements and behaviors that seem to contradict or conflict with the dominant narratives in Srebrenica.

1.4 THE POLITICAL SITUATION

In this section, I describe the political situation in Srebrenica as described by some of the interviewees. Politics in Srebrenica is marked by clientilism. The economy and the political system are closely intertwined and many people see being involved in politics as a requisite to having sustainable employment and livelihood in Srebrenica. Many people also believe that the local dominant narratives about the war remain in the public consciousness because politicians use those

narratives to maintain the status quo and to keep divisions between people of different ethnic backgrounds. The following excerpts from the interviews lend some support and context to this rendering of the political situation in Srebrenica.

In particular, I include this survey from the data here to demonstrate how the people I interviewed perceive the connection between politics and the dominant narratives, the two oppressive regimes that I examine in this thesis. The people I interviewed emphasize the clientilism that marks the system, the self-interestedness of the politicians in power, the way the system works to sustain itself rather than make a better future for citizens, the lack of transparency, and the use of Srebrenica as a symbolic tool in the hands of politicians. Politics is intimately intertwined with the war narratives; in this way, choices that people make about politics (whether through elections or through affiliations with a particular party) or about war narratives directly and significantly influence the economic viability of any individual. Throughout this thesis when I use the term "oppressive system," I am referring to this particular aspect and character of politics and narratives in Srebrenica.

In what follows, I include a large number of excerpts to demonstrate many aspects of the oppressive nature of that political system that residents identify, as well as to demonstrate that all the interviewees share a rather negative opinion of politics in Srebrenica and Bosnia. I include this discussion in the introduction in order to demonstrate that the political system is intimately and inextricably linked to the dominant narratives. In the two chapters directly following, I examine each of these regimes as analytically separate, but emphasize here how interrelated they are. When people are talking about politics, they also are talking about narratives, and vice versa.

In this first collection of interview excerpts, the residents explain the clientelistic nature of the political system in Srebrenica.

You have to know one thing about political structure of this country. Um, this is as close as you can get to clientelism on European soil. I mean, this is as close as it gets

to Latin America. I'm talking about Jorge Videla kind of Latin, Argentine [clientelism].

~MEDIN

No, I don't like [politics]. I think that [politicians] are not honest, and also they are not helping to these people. Or if you have, like, politician who is Bosniak, he will always [give] help to Bosniak side. If you have Serbian [politician], it is almost the same, he will help [the] Serbian side. There is just a small number of political people who don't, you know, who don't help people from [their] religion. They [give] help to everybody because they know that they are here because of the people, because people vote [in] elections for them. [The] situation in Srebrenica about political people is not nice. You know, like, I am living here almost all my life, and still I didn't get, you know, [a] job with [the] help of any of political man. Or when I want, you know, when there is some [competition] for some job, uh, all they ask me, "Am I member of some political party?" If I want to get job, I need to be in some political party.

~MILINA

And three nights ago, that guy, the president of that party [came] and [asked] me did I find job. I told him, like, [no], and he told me, "[There's] going to be [a] job for you." And I thought it's just some elections promises, you know. And after that it won't happen. And he said, "No, no, no, it's not like that." "But I don't believe you, you know. You had lot of chances to give me a job, to give me some support, you know, just maybe to talk with me, but now, you know, I..., with this elections, you can see that still..."

~MILINA

As I told [you], [the] entire society is politicized, so, it's pretty easy for one man or a group of people to make...pressure on an individual.

~DJORDJE

Yeah. I think that I can change nothing, because when you are just you, you have you on your side, [and all of] them on the other, so you are alone. There is...they are [one] big group. Also, in Bosnia, everything, you know, what you want to do, you need to be in political party. If you want to get [a] job, you need to be member of that political party. I am not in any of that political party. Because of that, I work in non-governmental organization.

~FATIMA

And not only politicians, because every man who work in municipality or in police or in court, or everywhere, or post, they all belong to some political party. And if you want to find a job, you must belong to some political party. It's impossible to find [a] job if you don't belong anywhere, and because of that I don't work ... Because they are all liars. And they asking people to do things what they said to them to do. And if that is wrong, if you want to keep that job, you must do what they say, or they will just replace you with someone who will do that thing for them.

~ZORAN

INTERVIEWER: How do these [politicians] keep getting elected [if everybody hates politicians]?

INTERVIEWEE: Because all of those stupid people voting for the same people every year.

INTERVIEWER: But why? If everybody hates them, then why?

INTERVIEWEE: Yeah. Because of the promises. "Okay, I don't want to vote for you." And [the politician] came to me, "oh come on, I will find you a job." [He has] some nice story to tell you or to give you some money, or something like [that]. "Okay, I will vote for you." [Then] I will go vote for this guy. And [after the] next four years, it will be the same thing. Just false promises. And the next four years, that same guy will come and: "Hey, come on. How are you?" And, what the hell?

INTERVIEWER: Do you think it will ever change?

INTERVIEWEE: Probably not. I don't see how it will if everybody is voting for the same person.

~ZORAN

In these excerpts, it is important to note how the residents perceive their opportunities for employment and inclusion in the economy is through their connections to politicians. However, they are perpetually disappointed by their politicians' failure to keep their campaign promises. Campaigning politicians quite literally will buy votes from the people, but they do not deliver on their promises. Also it is important to note how the political parties are divided along ethnic lines. Political association is organized by ethnicity, which is controlled by the dominant narratives. More on that later.

In this next collection, the residents note how politicians are the source of the ethnic problems that do exist in Srebrenica. People are not self-separating into ethnic divides; politicians, their rhetoric, and their control of the economy is the reason that people are segregated.

I can say what I think about Bosnian politics. It is that uh Bosnia would be much happier place to live, if politicians just stop this, uh, punching-another-man's-side politics, as I like to call it. Because that's what goes [on in] political parties. That's what's keeping them on top. If Muslims say something, Serbs will be against it. Vice versa. So I think that's the main problem around here.

~DJORDJE

I think that politics in Srebrenica or in all Bosnia, it's uh, [the] biggest problem. And politics makes [the] difference [between ethnicities], makes problems between people in Bosnia, in Srebrenica. People want to be together, want to talk, want to have a life together, want to work. They want to continue with life, but politics, it makes a big barrier. It's the biggest problem, because politicians, people in politics, they want to

stay in politics. They want to have power, they want to control everything. And if they see that people [from a different ethnic background] are together, they start with [the] war question: what happened in Srebrenica? What happened in Sarajevo? What happened in other cities, in other places in Bosnia, what happened not in Bosnia? But people cannot do anything because if they change government or uh politicians, heh, politicians always continue with that, "who did what before [during the war]?"

~DUSKO

These excerpts demonstrate that politicians use this ethnicity division in order to maintain their grip on political power. In this way, the use of the narratives serves political purposes, works to maintain the status quo, and also demonstrates how the self-interested politicians use the narratives to retain their status and position.

That self-interestedness is another theme that emerges from the data.

The politics is very difficult subject. Political, people who work in politics, they just remember us, like, just once or two times in [a] year, during elections. Or when they need something, they remember that there are people living in this city. On other days, they just think about themselves. Not about us. I don't have [anything]. People who live in Srebrenica don't have [anything] from politics here.

~MLADEN

I don't like [the] political situation in Bosnia, because every political member, you know, in every political party just looks [after] his own interests. It doesn't matter if it's [a] political party—the same interests. The sides, Bosniaks, Serbians, they look...in their interests, so, you know, it's all the time like that. When we have elections they are all the time giving promises to the people, you know, to get more votes from them, and if they got some position after election, then they just forget what they promised, so they are lying.

~FATIMA

I think that people involved in political life in Srebrenica actually do not care about the people living in Srebrenica. They care only for themselves. I don't know, probably it's the same everywhere, but here in this environment, it's a little bit stronger here than in other places. Probably because yeah, that's their only chance to do something in their lives. So, primarily, I see those people like their main objective is to make something for themselves and not for the people. Even if they do something for the people living in Srebrenica they do it because they gain some points for elections or something like that. So I don't have a high opinion about politics, about especially people involved in politics and other things, of course.

~MLADEN

You see, there is a very short time to know some [politicians], to recognize that they haven't introduced themselves very well. You know him one week and you should vote for him. That is very hard. [...] And I haven't been a member of any political

party. I didn't want it because there isn't,...I didn't have, I didn't know people, their goals. They all say, "We will do that," but they don't do it.

~ALMA

I must mention that I [had a job that put me close to politicians] for seven years. I was able to see some things from the other side of politics that are not presented in public. Like those people [politicians] meeting out of public [interethnically] and their way of communicating, of making deals about some funny things, some things that people living in the town would find very, very strange, if they knew about it and things like that.

~MLADEN

Because the economic situation is so dire in Srebrenica, politicians have the power to offer votes to people in exchange for access to sustainable livelihoods. But the politicians in the city also do very little to improve the economic situation. They are able to maintain their power by not improving the situation economically for the residents of Srebrenica, another theme that emerges from the data.

This way of politics doesn't really change anything. Nothing changed for the last I think fifteen years. Nothing changed. So I think the purpose of this kind of politics is just to keep, uh, the status quo. That's my opinion.

~DJORDJE

INTERVIEWER: If everybody feels this way, how do the same people keep getting elected?

INTERVIEWEE: Because we don't have too much choice. You know. We always have the same people on the election lists. And that's it. Which we maybe try with different kind of people, but we always end up with the same things. And that's it.

~MLADEN

You simply cannot [change things in politics]. You don't have enough resources. You don't have critical mass. And you don't have, um, propaganda. You don't have the medias. You simply don't have it. And you cannot do that in that kind of sense. And there [are] some failed attempts that, like,...From new political parties that, like, win only ten percent of the voter fund and from the initial fight—like let's make something different—they realize that with 10 percent of the vote, they need to make, like, consensus with other party. And without the vote even they have [become] like [the other parties].

~MILOS

These residents are fully aware of their seeming powerlessness to change anything within the political system. They see it as an oppressive regime, not democratic, and not serving their interests.

Instead, Srebrenica's political system serves the interests of the politicians, who use the symbolic capital the town's war history has with outsiders as a tool.

And politics here is one big shame. In entire Bosnia actually, not only in Srebrenica, but Srebrenica is really special because they are [local] politicians, Bosnian politicians, and politicians from both [Republika Srpska and Federation] and they [are] gambling with Srebrenica. They [are] doing whatever they want, how they want to do things here and people never...no one ask people what they want and how they want it. For elections, they [are] bringing people from [outside Srebrenica] to vote and it's stupid. People from Srebrenica, they don't decide anything about Srebrenica. That's ridiculous.

~ZORAN

Well, people in Srebrenica, the Srebrenica population, uh, has always been a place in the past twenty years somehow as a hostage of state level politics and policies. And the local people [to] a large extent have never had really any influence on their lives in that kind of sense. [It's] not surprising people say that they hate politics and policies because I think that if the local people [were] left to decide how they [are] going to organize their lives and everything, I think things would be much better.

~HASAN

People who don't live here can vote. I would change it so that people who live in Srebrenica can vote in this town. Not that one who lives in other cities can come here just to vote. The problem is that from Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Federation, people are coming here voting in elections, you know. They just come and vote. And you know, they are trying to make our life, you know. To think, you know, just in our name. So like, it's much better if people who just lives here, you know, get that right to go to vote, because they are living here, not those ones who are coming from different cities.

~MILINA

I think that politicians [that] are running Srebrenica are really puppets in the hands of state level politicians, because the state level politicians are very much interested in this town. This town has very large, very big importance to all sides in Bosnian war, in conflict, and uh. And therefore, you know, policies that are set here are not always policies that are in the best interests of the local people but are in the best interest or something that is serving people at the state level. So therefore I think that things could be much better and politicians could be much better than they are, but this is the way that it is.

~HASAN

Taken together, these themes—clientilism, self-interested politicians, status quo maintenance, Srebrenica's symbolic capital, etc...—describe the oppressive system of politics in the region. Politicians use Srebrenica as a symbol to become elected, they bribe constituents to become

elected. When they are elected, they seek to be re-elected, but they can only be re-elected if they can use the symbolic power of Srebrenica and bribe constituents. Therefore, they have an interest in maintaining the symbolic capital of Srebrenica, and in maintaining the dire economic situation in Srebrenica. They control the economic system—Srebrenica and Bosnia is largely clientilistic in nature. And so they use the symbols and bribery to gain election. It is a cycle that has been repeating itself for the past twenty or so years, with some creativity, but with little difference in results for the people who live there.

The discussions in the following chapters largely rely upon this background understanding of how people who live in Srebrenica understand the political system there today. But it is also important to try to put the politics of Srebrenica into the broader national context. Bosnia's political system largely is a product of the Dayton Accords, which established Bosnia as a state and determined its construction. That agreement created the Federation, which is the Bosnian and Croatian elements of the state, and Republika Srpska, which largely is the Bosnian Serb element of the state. These three entities function nearly totally independently of one another. Each one has its own ministries and its own agencies. Each of these entities has its own school system; each has its own sets of bureaucracy.

The Dayton Agreement made certain determinations about how the nation would be structured. It also created the office of the High Commissioner, who was granted a great deal of power. This office was established in order to force any of the entities to cooperate. However, from the perspective of many of the people I knew and interviewed, this office has little or no power left today. Srebrenica itself is located inside the Republika Srpska entity.

1.5 THE NARRATIVES

The narratives that are most influential in Srebrenica are the dominant Serbian narrative and the dominant Bosnian Muslim narrative. When throughout the paper I refer to the dominant Serbian narrative, I am referring to the narrative endorsed by the Republika Srpska government. When I refer to the dominant Bosnian Muslim narrative, I am referring to the narrative endorsed by the Potocari Memorial Center outside Srebrenica. I describe both of these narratives below.

These narratives, though they are dominant, are hotly contested. These narratives might be described as the more extreme narratives on each side of the war history in Srebrenica. For example, the Bosnian Muslim narrative emanating from the Potocari Memorial Center says little or nothing about the condition and treatment of women during the war. That narrative focuses mostly exclusively on the condition and treatment of the men during the war. Women's stories are included only as they are mothers, sisters, and wives of those men who fled and/or were killed. But many of these women suffered sexual abuse and rape, including forced prostitution, throughout the war. These acts of sexual violence were committed by Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and by the UN soldiers who occupied the battery factory during the war. Those soldiers referred to their system of gaining sexual access from women as "the sex bar." There is even graffiti inside the compound that memorializes this aspect of the war. However, the dominant Bosnian Muslim narrative in Srebrenica does not include all aspects of this story.

Additionally, this narrative on the Bosnian Muslim side is dominant in Srebrenica, but is sometimes viewed contemptuously outside of Srebrenica in other areas of Bosnia. Others who suffered during the war sometimes argue that the Srebrenica narrative detracts from the concentration camps, rape camps, and other atrocities that the Bosnian Muslim population experienced during the war.

On the Serbian side, what often is not included is the story of many men who refused to fight for the Bosnian Serb Army and who were forced into the military, were forced to hide, or were murdered for refusing to fight. Others were murdered for aiding Muslim families. Some of the men who lived in Srebrenica before the war fled into Serbia. They were brought back across the border when they were discovered, labeled as traitors and cowards. Some of them successfully hid. But their stories are disguised behind the hyper-nationalist narrative on that side of the war.

The contested nature of the narratives I recount below is important to keep in mind because these dominant narratives are really only dominant in Srebrenica itself. They are more contested in greater Bosnia and Serbia, and in the international community, by others interested in establishing a different narrative about the war. But the narratives I describe below are the disciplining narratives that seem to dominate in Srebrenica.

1.5.1 The Serbian Narrative

The Republika Srpska government has issued two reports on the events surrounding Srebrenica leading up to and during the war years. The first, issued in 2002, details a broad historical situation in Srebrenica, including references to atrocities against the Serbian population during and after WWII, and linking Alija Itzebegovic to a Muslim program to establish Bosnia as a Muslim state, which was announced in early 1992. In what follows, I describe how this report characterizes the history of the war in this first report.¹¹

In early 1992, Muslims gathered in Bratunac, a town about 10 kilometers from Srebrenica. During this gathering, Bratunac was declared a center for Muslims from the former Yugoslavia. It was more or less this event that began to incite fear between Muslims and Serbs in the region, who previously had all been afraid of this declaration by the Muslims.

According to this report, it was at this time that economic persecution against Serbs began, through dismissal of Serbs from government institutions. The Muslim militias in the area then began an onslaught against the towns and villages occupied mostly by Serbian civilians. Between May 1992 and January 1994, the report states that 192 villages were attacked, 8000 homes assaulted, and more than 1000 women, children, and elderly were killed. The report details some of the crimes committed by the Muslim militias in the region. Especially the period from 1992 – 1993 was a difficult time for Serbs in the region.

The Muslims devised and executed a plan to gather Muslims in Srebrenica and two other towns in order to connect them geographically as Muslim areas. The UN became a tool for this project. The report describes the UN safe area as a military base for the Muslim militia, where they could safely reside as soldiers, hold weapons and munitions, and regroup to commit more attacks on Serbian villages in the region. This is the situation within which Bosnian Serb Army killed the Muslim men and boys in July 1995.

Srebrenica began to fall into the hands of Serbs leading up to July 1995, and the Muslim militias responded chaotically to the military advance by the Bosnian Serb Army. During the negotiations between Mladic and Karremans, the UN/Dutch Battalion commander, the Serbs offered refuge to the Muslim soldiers if they gave up their arms within 24 hours. Because the Muslims feared revenge killings, they did not give up their arms.

These soldiers who did not surrender began fleeing into the woods, where they were militarily engaged with the Serb forces. The others who surrendered entered the UN Safe Area. The Bosnian Serb Army separated them from women and children in order that they might be used as exchanges for Serb prisoners of war. Some of these men were determined to be civilians and were transferred to the Muslim territory. The Bosnian Serb army separated other men into a group who required further investigation as to their involvement in the war, while the third group comprised

men who the Bosnian Serb Army declared to be war criminals. This group of men that was held by the Bosnian Serb Army numbered around 250 individuals. The other men who fled were engaged in heavy fighting with the Bosnian Serb Army in the woods. These fights produced between 300 and 500 casualties on the Bosnian Serb side, and about 2000 casualties on the Muslim side.

The report admits that some summary executions did take place against Muslims by Serb soldiers. The report interprets these as revenge killings by Serbs, recalling the massacre of their friends and families. The report also suggests that the number of missing persons following the military engagement is fewer than 100. The report reduces the count because some of those men were in the military (battle deaths). Also, the report decreases the estimated dead and missing by adjusting the number of Muslims that lived in Srebrenica before the war, by estimating the number of refugees that made it to Tuzla and Kladanj, and for a few other sources of inflation.

The second report of the Republika Srpska government retained many of these statements, but made a few adjustments to the total number killed. The following discussion uses the characterization of this information from that report.¹² The basic premise is that the Serbs who were fighting were fighting Muslims who were in the military and who were armed and engaging in military contact with the Bosnian Serb Army during the days between July 10th and July 19th, 1995. The report states that about 1,000 Muslim men of military age were inside the UN Safe Area. The report makes clear that the men seeking refuge at the UN base were not armed. Due to the terrible conditions of living in the UN base, the Bosnian Serb Army ordered busses and trucks to carry the women to Tuzla.

The report also states that the men of military age who were separated from the women and children in the base, and those men who were captured in the woods, were taken to execution sites in the region. The Bosnian Serb Army shelled the columns that were walking the woods to get to the

free territories. This column included between 10,000 and 15,000 men. The report concludes that the several thousands of Muslim men were executed criminally.

Finally, in 2010, the President of Republika Srpska stated that, "Republika Srpska does not deny that a large crime occurred in Srebrenica, but by definition it was not genocide as described by the international court in The Hague."¹³ And, "if a genocide happened then it was committed against Serb people of this region where women, children, and the elderly were killed en masse."¹⁴ This was an important moment in the narrative creation and dissemination on the Serbian side, because Dodik—the President of Republika Srpska—walked backed from the statements the Republika Srpska government made in its second report. He clarified that the government did not agree that the Bosnian Muslims had experienced a genocide, and advanced the claim that the Serbian population is more justified in claiming a genocide because the forces of the Bosnian Army attacked and killed so many elderly, women, and children.

1.5.2 The Bosnian Muslim Narrative

In Potocari, a village outside of Srebrenica, the Muslim community has erected a sizeable memorial center. The center itself is housed in the battery factory that previously served as the barracks for the UN troops, and during the war, housed about 5000 Muslims. About 25,000 – 30,000 more Bosnian Muslims were residents on the exterior grounds of the compound during the war. That Memorial Center has developed a wide range of material in order to provide visitors with information about the memorial center and its purpose. What follows is a long excerpt from one piece of material that describes, more or less, the narrative on the Bosnian Muslim side.

Srebrenica, as well as all other places throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), was the target of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) during Bosnian war (1992 – 1995). Formerly home to 36,666 residents of mixed ethnicities, the BSA sought to ethnically cleanse Srebrenica of all its Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) residents. In 1992 and early 1993 the Bosniak population from the surrounding municipalities of the Middle Podrinje (Eastern Bosnia's Drina River Valley) were banished to

Srebrenica, which, at the time, was the only free territory in this part of BiH. Daily shelling, bombings, sniper shooting, and the intensifying attacks by the BSA on the city resulted in many casualties. Living under inhumane conditions, without food, water, medical equipment, electricity, or housing made life unbearable for about 60,000 civilians.

On 16 April 1993, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed Resolution 819 and 824 which declared Srebrenica a demilitarized 'safe area'. Implementation of these resolutions had been entrusted first to a Canadian peacekeeping battalion (Canbat) and later to three successive Dutch peacekeeping battalions (Dutchbat). Although they lived in the UN 'safe area', the civilian population kept dying: suffering and hunger were felt at every step.

In a sudden and intense offensive, the BSA attacked and captured Srebrenica between 6 and 11 July 1995. Over 25,000 women, children, and the elderly who had found temporary refuge in the UN compound, housed in a former Battery Factory in the neighboring village of Potocari, were forcibly deported from the Srebrenica enclave. A separate column of between 12,000-15,000 Bosniak men and boys escaped into the forest hoping to reach the 'free territory' of Tuzla, held by the Bosnian Republic forces.

Between the 11th and 22nd of July, more than 8,500 men and boys separated in Potocari and those who tried to escape through the forest were systematically executed by BSA. In an effort to hide their crimes, the BSA buried the bodies in a series of mass graves throughout the Podrinje. Despite Srebrenica's protected status as one of six declared 'safe areas' (including Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Gorazde, and Zepa), members of Dutchbat and the international community did not do anything to protect the enclave's civilian inhabitants. To date, a few hundred primary and secondary mass graves have been located and exhumed around Srebrenica, Bratunac, and Zvornik. These killing became the single largest massacre to take place on the European continent since World War II.

In the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY)'s unanimous conviction of BSA General Radoslav Krstic, the crimes in Srebrenica were formerly declared by the proper name: Genocide. Krstic was found guilty of aiding and abetting the July 1995 genocide. Srebrenica today symbolizes this genocide, suffering, and horror.

The Memorijalni Centar Srebrenica-Potocari Spomen Obilježje I Mezarje za žrtve Genocida iz 1995 Godine Srebrenica (Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Center and Cemetery: SPMCC) was built to forever memorialize the crime of genocide that occurred in Srebrenica. The victims of this genocide deserved to be buried with dignity so that the bones of the slaughtered husbands, grandfathers, brothers, cousins, sons, and uncles stripped of their humanity could be restored to their families in the very place where they were last seen alive. ...

In October 2000., the former High Representative Wolfgang Pteritsch designated a site at Potocari in Srebrenica, as a memorial and cemetery to those who were killed during the fall of this town in July 1995. Thousands of the exhumed mortal remains of the persons massacred during the genocide are stored in different location across BiH. In May 2001, Petrtsch also established the Foundationa of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Centre and Cemetery (Foundation of the SPMCC).

The mandate of the SPMCC is to educate people of all ages and backgrounds to ensure that the Srebrenica message is heard by the whole world so as to avert future

genocides. The structure of the memorial, including its financing, are defined by the State Law on the Centre for the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide. The SPMCC is therefore directly governed by the State of BiH and is not part of either Entity (the Federation of BiH or the Republika Srpska). ...

The burials of the first 600 identified individuals took place on 31 March 2003. ...

To date, a total of 5,137 identified individuals are buried in the SPMCC. The burial process is ongoing. The former President of the United States, Mr. Bill Clinton, officially opened the site on 20 September 2003.

The Spomen Soba (Memorial Room) was opened on 9 July 2007 and is designed in the style of a museum. It is housed in the former Battery Factory that served as the Dutchbat base.

The Spomen Soba (Memorial Room) tells the stories about the events in July 1995 when more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys were murdered after the seizure of Srebrenica by the BSA. It is located opposite to the Cemetery in Potocari where the exhumed and identified victims are being buried progressively as they are identified through DNA analysis (conducted by the International Commission of Missing Persons). The Spomen Soba (Memorial Room) features a 27-minute documentary film; a series of twenty separate personal stories of the victims of the genocide; and a chronological exhibition of the fall of Srebrenica enclave in July 1995.¹⁵

It is important to note that these two renditions of the events in Srebrenica during the war prevent any reconciliation of the historical events that would otherwise be able to bring both stories into a single narrative. Acknowledging important elements of the Serbian narrative, as is recounted above, risks rendering the Bosnian Muslim narrative illegitimate. Acknowledging the Bosnian Muslim narrative does the same for the Serbian narrative.

By examining how the people in Srebrenica understand and engage with what many of them believe to be oppressive institutions against which they are powerless—politics and these collective trauma narratives—we can gain insight into how society works in Srebrenica.

1.6 METHODS

1.6.1 Description of Data Collection

In the chapters that follow, I draw on data that I collected in Srebrenica, Bosnia i Hercegovina, in July, August, and December 2012.ⁱⁱⁱ The collection of field notes I gathered from the two-month long immersion field stay in Srebrenica and the follow-up visit in December. The collection of interviews I conducted with residents of Srebrenica during the second half of the field immersion in August 2012.

1.6.1.1 Description of Interview Data Collection Method. Over the course of my first six weeks in Srebrenica, including informal conversations with individuals and interactions with those associated with the formal programming of the Summer University Srebrenica, I was able to make some formative observations and learn some common themes about what people in Srebrenica think is important in their own lives. One of the themes that most people talked with me about was their problem with politics.

Given that observation, I developed an informal interview question guide. The first half of that guide included the following questions:

- 1) What do you think about politics in Srebrenica and Bosnia more generally?
- 2) If you had the power to change anything about politics tomorrow, what would you change?
- 3) Do you think you have the power to make those kinds of changes? Why or why not?
- 4) Have you ever tried to change politics yourself? What happened?
- 5) Do you ever intend to try to change politics in the future?

The second half of the interview focused on trying to understand how life in Srebrenica works on a day-to-day basis. I asked the participants if they could explain to an outsider how life

ⁱⁱⁱ For a detailed description of my entry into the field, and the circumstances of the study, see Appendix 1.

works in a post-war society when that war is largely characterized by the international community as a war started by ethnic hatreds. This portion of the interview was much less structured because the interviewees had such wide-ranging explanations for how ethnicity operates in Srebrenica.

I conducted fourteen interviews with a variety of individuals: male and female, older and younger, employed and unemployed, from Srebrenica and from the villages around Srebrenica, Muslim, Serb, and interethnic, married and unmarried, those who have children and those who do not. Some of these interviews were conducted with a translator, while others were conducted with individuals who speak English as a second language.

1.6.2 Variables

POLITICAL LOYALTY includes those behaviors that engage with the state through voting or taking help from politicians while refraining from trying to change the way politics works in Srebrenica or to change the way the political system is structured in Srebrenica or Bosnia. **POLITICAL VOICE** includes those behaviors that engage with the state through voting or taking help from politicians while trying to change the way politics works in Srebrenica or to change the way the political system is structured in Srebrenica or Bosnia. Finally, **POLITICAL EXIT** includes those behaviors that disengage with the state or politics while refraining from trying to change the way politics works in Srebrenica or to change the way the political system is structured in Srebrenica or Bosnia.

NARRATIVE LOYALTY includes those behaviors and statements that seem to assume the validity or truth of the narratives that dominate in Srebrenica. **NARRATIVE VOICE** includes those behaviors or statement that seek to change the dominant narratives or the way people use those narratives in Srebrenica. Finally, **NARRATIVE EXIT** includes those statements and behaviors that seem to contradict or conflict with the dominant narratives in Srebrenica.

I also examine the social objects and constitutive practices that exist in Srebrenica. I identify the social objects and constitutive practices by examining in particular how the people in Srebrenica explain how they understand interactions in society, what disciplining strategies are used and when, how they explain their own behavior, and how they explain their assessment of others' behaviors. When appropriate, I include stories from my ethnographic field notes.

For example, when interviewees identify a behavior that they believe they cannot engage in—perhaps saying openly that they do or do not believe a particular dominant narrative—I ask them why they do not say such things. I ask them what are the consequences of saying something like that. And then I gather from these statements what are the practices that govern situations in Srebrenica. At other times, the interviewees were more explicit in their statement of what are the practices that govern interactions in Srebrenica. I combined these statements together to come up with a list of practices, which I describe in chapter four.

1.6.3 Propositions

Typical individuals in Srebrenica have a set of constitutive practices^{iv} that condition their choices and actions that is different from the set of constitutive practices that condition the choices and actions:

- PROPOSITION 1:** of those who behave more loyally in the political sphere;
- PROPOSITION 2:** of those who behave more loyally and act as carrier groups of cultural narratives; and
- PROPOSITION 3:** of those in the international community, peacebuilding and otherwise.

The constitutive practices that condition the choices and actions of typical individuals in Srebrenica:

- PROPOSITION 4:** inform the strategies for exit, voice, and loyalty that these individuals choose; and

^{iv} A more in-depth discussion of constitutive practices and rules is included in the literature review in Chapter 4.

PROPOSITION 5: are fundamental in the sense that these sets of constitutive practices can help make coherent those strategies and actions that might otherwise seem contradictory (e.g., claiming that ethnicity does not matter in Srebrenica, but describing one café as Serb and another as Bosniak).

1.6.4 Limitations to the Data. One major limitation of this study is that, at the time of data gathering, I did not speak the local language. I relied on a translator or on those people who live in Srebrenica who speak English to communicate. Many people in Srebrenica know English, especially the youth.

1.6.5 Description of Data Analysis

Using this data set, I examine, code, organize, and categorize my field notes and interview transcripts to identify residents' strategies in terms of exit, voice, and loyalty. Also, I identify the constitutive practices that, in some cases, seem apparent based upon field experiences and interview data, and also constitutive practices that the participants themselves describe in the interview data.

I followed the data analysis procedure outlined by Corbin and Strauss.¹⁶ I began my data analysis simultaneously with data collection; further analysis occurred during: transcription, reading, and coding of the data; memoing about the data; re-reading and re-coding of the data; re-reading of the memos.

The process yielded frameworks for thinking about the propositions of this study, and I link these results to larger questions about how society operates and produces social order when in intimate contact with oppressive regimes. I analyzed the fieldnotes, the memos, and other material (photographs, news reports, video clips, etc...) without using analytical software.

1.6.6 Politics and Poetics of Writing Ethnography

In making editorial decisions about the presentation of interview data, and general considerations about how and how much interview data to include, I attended to political and poetic controversies related to writing ethnography. I present the amount of interview excerpts in the text as a way to forcefully diversify and disperse the notion that Bosnian Muslims and Serbs are homogenous in their agreement with their respective dominant narratives, their mutual hatred for each other, or their representation by their political system.

These decisions are somehow at odds with the poetics of writing ethnography. While I write about the relationships between the people and the dogs of Srebrenica as a microcosm of the larger community in Srebrenica, including such a wide-range of excerpts from the interviews themselves makes the paper clumsy at times. I attempted to reduce this clumsiness as much as possible by increasing the analysis I provide of the excerpts I choose to use, and in some cases I eliminated interview excerpts that I otherwise would include. What is included in the chapters that follow is a delicate balance between the politics and poetics of writing ethnography.

Other considerations about the politics of writing ethnography include the use of names and decontextualizing the excerpts in order to make poignant certain conclusions I want to make. On the first, ethnicity is a sensitive topic in Srebrenica, as are the politics and narratives, mostly due to their connection to the economy. The people in Srebrenica are in many ways habituated to their economic situation to carefully navigate what they say to whom about what, as many of them perceive likely serious economic consequences if they say the wrong things too loudly, to too many people, or in the wrong situations.

Even so, when I read the full disclosure statements to interviewees, they mostly responded by saying they did not care if I revealed their identities. In this study, I do reveal explicitly their ethnic affiliation, at the same time that I change their names. That is to say, in an effort to preserve

the ethnic identities of the individuals whom I interviewed, I change all names but in the new names I use to disguise their identity, I reveal their ethnicity. For example, Milos is quoted several times in chapters 1, 2, and 3; these quotes originated from the same individual's interview transcript.

As for the decontextualization and the editing I performed on the interview excerpts themselves, I justify my decisions based upon my consideration that representing reality in another context through writing text is an improper goal for any ethnographer. The best ethnographers can hope to attain is to describe a particular problem, particular place or time, or some other reasonable claim to knowledge. What follows is a "good enough" ethnography that considers the politics, narratives, and constitutive practices that operate on and are created by the people who live in and visit Srebrenica.¹⁷ I make no claim to knowledge about the "people of Srebrenica" more generally, though for the ease and readability of the text, I do use that term.

The interview transcripts are in English based upon the interviewee's use of English or the translator's spoken English. In the interview excerpts included in this study, I have edited the transcripts for the purposes of readability, having in mind those readers who may not be familiar with the use of English as a second language by those whose first language is Serbo-Croatian or Bosnian. For example, some stuttering words are deleted altogether and in their place I insert ellipses [...]. In other cases, I add contextual knowledge in [box parentheses]. I also in some places delete significant lengths of a statement in order to preserve relevancy without sacrificing length or comprehensibility. I provide contextual information where necessary—either about the context of Srebrenica, or about the context of the interview. For example, when the interviewee uses a pronoun in reference to a person or group referenced previously in the interview, but not included in the excerpt, I insert the reference in [box parentheses].

This study sought to generate knowledge *with* those in Srebrenica, altering the more traditionally-conceived but recently challenged relationship between observer and subject in such a

way as to place both in the role of knowledge producer, at least in some ways. When I had questions about how to understand situations or statements or observations, I would ask them directly. In this way, I collaborated with these individuals to generate accurate data.

In some ways, this alleviates some of the ethical issues related to ethnography and interviews because it places some amount of control and voice in the hands of those upon whom the study focuses. In other ways, this exacerbates the ethical issues because confidentiality becomes less and less possible for the participants involved and this tends to underestimate the author's role in the production of "knowledge."

As to the first problem, as Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland suggest, obscuring and disguising are the best method for protecting individuals included in this project.¹⁸ As for the second problem, I claim only that what follows is my understanding of the situation for the people I interviewed, and I represent that understanding as faithfully as possible. In no way, however, has anyone I interviewed validated the contents of this paper. In that sense, the claims I make are rather limited.

2.0 POLITICS

**THERE IS A SORT OF SYMBOLICAL CAPITAL WITHIN THAT NAME
[SREBRENICA] THAT WARRANTS A HIGHER DEGREE OF MOBILIZATION FOR,
SORT OF, YOU KNOW, THE WIDER AUDIENCE.**

**~ CAMPAIGN MANAGER FOR A
MAYORAL CANDIDATE IN THE
SREBRENICA ELECTIONS
AUGUST 2012**

VOTE FOR PUJDO!

**~ CAMPAIGN POSTER IN SREBRENICA
OCTOBER 2012**

In October 2012, Pujdo, one of many street dogs in Srebrenica, mysteriously appeared on a number of political posters around the city. The city was in election season. The two top contenders had been campaigning for as many votes as possible amidst an election atmosphere that was in some ways ironic. The candidates were running for the Mayor's position in the city, but oddly, many (if not a majority) of the electorate live outside of Srebrenica. Some politicians have fought for refugees who have not returned to Srebrenica to be able to retain their right to vote in Srebrenica, despite the fact that they no longer live there. While this is an understandable response because it confronts the way that the voting system reinforces the strategic war campaigns to remove many residents from Srebrenica, it also has the unfortunate consequence of drowning out the voice of people who must live in the city year-round—those who consequently have little or no control over how the city is actually governed. Additionally, Srebrenica is viewed by politicians as a veritable gold-mine for mobilization potential because of the symbolic status that Srebrenica holds in Bosnia and around the

world. Pujdo ended up on posters because a number of people preferred that he become the Mayor: the poster reads, "Vote for Pujdo!"



GLASAJTE ZA PUJDU!!!

Figure 2.1 A poster—seen during elections in Srebrenica in October 2012—reads, "Vote for Pujdo!"

Reports from individuals in Srebrenica on election day were surprising—the city was full of people in a way many of the people who reported about it had not expected. This was partly due to that campaign to bring into the city voters who do not live in Srebrenica in order to vote. But it was also surprising because many of the people who reported such terrible feelings about politics also went to vote. For them, it was important. The voters turned out for the election.

This presents an interesting commentary on the relationship between politics and the individuals who live in Srebrenica. On the one hand, it demonstrates the animosity many residents report, as I describe in chapter 1. On the other hand, it also demonstrates a desire to be involved in politics anyway, even given the animosity and cynicism many of the residents reported to me. The

story highlights the contradictory and seemingly incoherent statements and behaviors. The story opens up some space to begin asking questions about how exactly it is that a system that includes choices and elections is oppressive at all.

In what follows in this chapter, I examine data from interviews that exhibit exit, voice, and loyalty behaviors. The data, and the exit, voice, and loyalty analytical framework I use to organize it, help to explain how these two sentiments and behaviors are coherent in Srebrenica. I show that the relationship between politics and people is complicated; the connections between what people really want and the political system that claims to represent them is weak—even though that system includes choices and elections. The exit, voice, and loyalty framework is a simple yet effective way to organize data about that relationship. This chapter confronts the connections between people and politics in Srebrenica and organizes some of their strategic responses to that political system, which they characterize as oppressive.

I begin with a literature review of the political disengagement field to examine how political engagement is understood in the social sciences. From there, I apply the loyalty, voice, and exit framework to my interview data, and organize excerpts and analysis of this data around the main themes that I discover in the data. Then I examine how the first proposition for this study fairs in light of the data analysis. I conclude with implications for the political disengagement literature as well as important observations that I revisit in the final chapter.

2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the past twenty or so years, many academics and politicians alike have grown concerned about the seemingly growing number of citizens they characterize as politically disengaged. The problem

has been well-documented.¹⁹ A particularly large portion of this literature focuses on the political disengagement of youth.²⁰ But this assessment of political disengagement does not go unopposed.²¹ Quite a few authors, academics, and politicians either suggest that political disengagement is not a new problem,²² that is a part of the life cycle,²³ or that political disengagement is not necessarily a bad thing.²⁴

This literature generally falls into one of two broad categories for explaining why this political disengagement occurs: psychological and institutional. As for the more psychological explanations, many older articles attribute political disengagement to a general sense of apathy amongst the non-politically engaged public.²⁵ However, others criticize the assumptions that literature makes about the motivations for political disengagement.²⁶

Other studies provide a wide-ranging array of more psychological explanations for political disengagement: a lack of trust;²⁷ an overabundance of inequality;²⁸ the electorate's lack of identification with politics and politicians more generally;²⁹ changes in the life cycle of the electorate;³⁰ a lack of feelings of empowerment;³¹ a lack of feeling heard;³² perceptions of being purposefully excluded;³³ and a lack of political efficacy.³⁴ A few authors, surprisingly, argue that political disengagement is partly a result of the electorate having too-high expectations.³⁵

As for the more institutional explanations, the media are the focus of the attention of a broad swath of literature³⁶ but this explanation often is challenged critically.³⁷ Others focus on declining or changing forms of civic education;³⁸ failing political institutions that do not connect with the individual or leave bad impressions when they do connect;³⁹ the centralized nature of political institutions;⁴⁰ and changing social systems, including increased consumerism, individualism, disconnections from family and friends and other social outlets, as all contributing to political disengagement.⁴¹ Still others suggest that political parties are inept⁴² or that new forms of activism are replacing older forms, but these new forms are upper-class-heavy.⁴³

It is important to note that hardly any of these explanations fall neatly into either psychological or institutional explanations; rather elements of each of the arguments broadly reflect this split. To sum up, Kisby and Sloam provide a nice overview of the explanations currently found in the literature:

"Decreasing participation in civic life," "low levels of trust," "the 'marketisation' of political competition," "the withdrawal of the state and the individualization of risks in society," "growing cynicism about electoral politics driven by the media," "more complex and less structured youth transitions," "political institutions that deny young people the opportunity to express their opinions," "party strategies that – in the UK's first-past-the-post electoral system – *rationaly* neglect marginalized groups (including young people) that are less likely to vote," and "the weakening of young people's position in relation to the labour market and the welfare state."⁴⁴

This literature also provides a variety of frameworks for thinking about the problem. Berger argues political engagement entails both *attention* to politics and *activity* in politics.⁴⁵ Dalton argues that political participation is both duty-based and marked by *engaged citizenship*.⁴⁶ Hay and Stoker and Flinders take a rational economic approach to the problem, suggesting understanding the problem in terms of supply-side versus demand-side explanations of political engagement.⁴⁷ Ultimately, Hay and Stoker argue that the problem is both demand-side (politicians blaming citizens) and supply-side (the democratic system is not supplying the goods).⁴⁸

Finally, this literature suggests what to do about the problem. These policy suggestions generally reflect the focus on psychological versus institutional causes of political disengagement. The majority of articles focus on institutional causes. Some argue we should change the definition of engagement or disengagement;⁴⁹ some argue for better civic education, at all levels of schooling;⁵⁰ others argue we need: to increase access to forms of direct action and direct influence over policymaking,⁵¹ to create new marketing campaigns to advertise what the government is doing,⁵² to address the structural changes of the past decades that result in generational differences of political engagement, to make better constitutions,⁵³ to decentralize government, to return to localism,⁵⁴ to reverse the depoliticization of the bureaucracy by politicians,⁵⁵ or to make the government listen

more.⁵⁶ Others focus on shoring up old institutions:⁵⁷ the media,⁵⁸ political parties,⁵⁹ and parent-teacher associations.⁶⁰

The articles that provide more psychologically-based policy suggestions focus both on politicians and citizens: make politicians more honest about what government actually can do;⁶¹ make people more responsible citizens,⁶² or increase their social capital.⁶³

More recently, two articles stand apart because their methodological approaches allow respondents to answer more freely to questions about their political habits. Snell interrogates what we mean when we say that emerging adults are less engaged in politics. She divides the disengagement literature into two categories. One characterizes disengagement as behavioral and a practice-based problem, relating it to demographics and social capital. Another characterizes disengagement as a belief and conviction problem, suggesting the problem is related to a person's moral convictions given an ambiguous situation.⁶⁴

Based upon responses to surveys and interviews, Snell finds six types of individuals amongst the youth surveyed in the United States: political, semi-political, apathetic, uninformed, distrustful, and disempowered. The first two she broadly characterizes as "a political person" while the latter four she characterizes as "nonpolitically interested."⁶⁵

Snell then statistically compares these typified individuals across a variety of variables, of which the statistically significant correlations were gender, materialism, trust, and moral relativism. Ultimately, Snell concludes,

Emerging adults' opting out of public life and focusing on more immediately rewarding activities is not a completely irrational life strategy. Even so, having said all of that, we think it would be simplistic to declare emerging adults' disengagement from public life to be caused merely by a combination of age effects and a reasonable assessment of the dismal prospects for trust and change in the public square. Other factors are also at work...⁶⁶

And,

Very many emerging adults today lack the basic cognitive, if not ethical and spiritual, tools for deciding what is genuinely morally right and wrong or what is really good for persons and society. Generally, lacking clear moral convictions themselves, and having typically been socialized not to engage but rather to avoid conflict, few emerging adults feel equipped to participate confidently and constructively in public, civic, or political life.⁶⁷

Snell takes an approach that asks the individuals why they disengage, which is one characteristic that marks a methodological departure from the other literature. She examines both behavior and motivations for behavior, and then performs a statistical analysis to determine who is likely to do what.

Bastedo, Chu, Hilderman, and Tucotte investigate the notion in Canada that citizens are not voting or participating in politics because they are apathetic or ignorant.⁶⁸ They brought together several focus groups to discuss their engagement and disengagement from the political system. Their results were remarkably consistent. The answers they received "transcended different social and economic backgrounds."⁶⁹ Their participants condemned politics generally and this condemnation fueled non-participation and was driven by a very clear understanding of how the political system actually works. These individuals view democracy as an ideal, but perceive politics in their own contexts as a source of frustration. Therefore, the authors conclude that there is a "disconnect between democratic *expectations* and political *reality*."⁷⁰

They also find that the disengaged conceive of themselves as *outsiders* and the engaged conceive of themselves as *insiders*.⁷¹ Outsiders think that politicians, bureaucrats, and parties work for themselves and their own interests, while insiders see the political system as working for them.⁷² These authors seem to focus squarely on explanations and motivations for political behavior and the perceptions and motivations that inform disengagement behaviors. In this way, as with Snell, this methodological approach adds to the current discussion on political disengagement because it is uncovering motivations for political behavior, and therefore shedding new light on political disengagement as a phenomenon.

2.1.1 Summary

I want to emphasize three aspects of this study in contrast to the more broad literature. First, this study adds to the innovative approaches that Snell and Bastedo *et al* take by providing ethnographically-contextualized interview data. The interview questions, as described in chapter 1, ask openendedly what respondents think about the political system more generally. In this way, the study is consistent with these two studies. Rather than respondents choosing from responses provided by a survey itself, these studies allow respondents to describe their political behavior and political motivations in their own terms. In this way, these studies uncover new information about the nature of political disengagement.

Second, this approach also avoids linking behaviors to particular identity groups because it does not statistically analyze the data for correlations. By focusing on behavior, this study and Snell and Bastedo *et al* highlight the remarkable consistency amongst respondents, an important aspect of this data. That aspect sometimes is obscured because statistical analyses often reveal how different groups (age-, gender-, class-, race/ethnicity-based) respond differently to the questions asked by researchers.

Finally, one aspect of this literature, more broadly, is its focus on developing policy to increase political engagement in democratic societies. By increasing engagement, society will benefit from increased legitimacy and increased socialization of individuals into a democratic polity. The upside is that the democratic system will be stronger if more people are involved in it. The downside is that the literature sometimes takes for granted the goodness or correctness of a democratic state. The democratic system and ideal is sound; the practical implementation is what requires improvement.

This study takes a mildly different approach to the question of political disengagement. Rather than focusing on improving the democratic state, this study reveals how individuals who are

dissatisfied with politics execute their livelihood strategies *given* the oppressive nature of the political system in which they live. Those revelations offer some explanations about how society works even when the state fails to deliver satisfactory services, or worse, when the state acts to constrain daily life. In this way, this study provides insight into how society operates largely outside any management by the state, at that same time that it begins to reveal some hopeful possibilities for alternatives to state-centered approaches to governance.

2.1.2 Research Questions

How do people in Srebrenica explain their engagement or disengagement with politics? What are the exit, voice, and loyalty strategies that people in Srebrenica use when they choose to or are forced to engage with the state? How do they cope with low-quality or oppressive political systems?

2.2 DATA

During interviews, many individuals described their relationship to and their opinion of politics in Srebrenica and politics in Bosnia more generally. I have divided the data into three sets: loyalty, voice, and exit. **POLITICAL LOYALTY** includes those behaviors that engage with the state through voting or taking help from politicians while refraining from trying to change the way politics works in Srebrenica or to change the way the political system is structured in Srebrenica or Bosnia. **POLITICAL VOICE** includes those behaviors that engage with the state through voting or taking help from politicians while trying to change the way politics works in Srebrenica or to change the way the political system is structured in Srebrenica or Bosnia. Finally, **POLITICAL EXIT** includes those behaviors that disengage with the state or politics while refraining from trying to change the

way politics works in Srebrenica or to change the way the political system is structured in Srebrenica or Bosnia.

2.2.1 Political Loyalty

The data I collected from the interviews suggest that people in Srebrenica remain loyal to the state for a variety of reasons. Some people genuinely respect, believe, or admire the politician for whom they are voting.

And now I have this political presentation. Every party presented their members for the elections. I have seen that man, and I know that he is good, and now I'm thinking to become a member of that party. Because I know how is he. I know his, he has achieved a lot of his work, he has a great family, he is good, he has a great personality, you see. It's very hard to see someone once on TV and would vote for him.

~ ALMA

Some characterize their loyalty to the state, to politics, or to a party in terms of a duty to the state, to their ethnic/religious group, or to the future.

I am thinking to join this party, maybe. I have to give my contribution back to the country.

~ ALMA

In addition to those who are loyal to the state, or to a particular politician, others vote for whomever they know who is on the ballot, presumably out of a sense of duty, while some suggest a vote is a way of ingratiating oneself for benefits later.

Why people are voting the same people every year, every election is because every time you see them on the lists, you vote for somebody. Like this year you vote for this one. Also in four years you [are] going to vote for him because you met him. It doesn't matter if you, if he was good with you. It doesn't matter, you [are] going to vote for him because maybe other candidate you don't know, so maybe you vote [for] somebody who you know.

~ ADO

My friends and people I know just don't think like me, they will do everything, you know, just to get something from the people who are on the top. They are just thinking about that. Be good to [the politicians].

~ SELMA

Others have been promised something, while others have not been threatened but are still afraid to try to change anything, so they remain loyal.

But, for this elections, I am disappointed because people, like, just, you know, ordinary people who lives here who don't get any support from municipality, why [do] they listen [to] all [those] political people? The political parties, when they call them at [a] meeting, ...promise them everything, and then after elections, they don't get [anything], and why, every time when we have elections here, the story is the same. Why [do] people believe them?

~ MILINA

The best example: when [we have] our elections, before them you can see every [politician] from any political party—Serbs, Bosniaks, Croatians—when they go and say to some member of the city, okay you will vote for me, I will give you 25 or 50 Euros. So in that case, if I don't have money, I have nothing, I will tell him, "Okay, I will take money just because I need it to bring food to my family." I'm not going to, in that moment when I am taking that money, I'm not going to think about it, what's going to happen in four years if that candidate is elected. You know, just in that time, I need that money so I took it. So is [the] situation in every political party here.

~ ADO

They [some citizens in Srebrenica], some of them were talking about, "let's make changes," you know. They are on both sides. They want to change the situation but, on the other hand, they have interests. They have good relations with political people so they get something from them. And when they go out, they talk against them. Some of them, you know, get donations from municipality and now they don't have the courage to talk... against people who help them, even if they are not happy with their work.

~ SELMA

Others describe their loyalty in terms of being coerced into engagement due to threats to their livelihood strategies or to the livelihood strategies of their families. Finally, still others engage with the state or politics because they have incurred a debt through the acquisition of employment or through taking money in exchange for a vote during the election.

And, the, luckily for me, I was warned what could happen, and I don't want to complicate my own life because of some high ideals. I don't feel, I don't feel happy about what is going on around me, but, I am not Che Guevara. I'm not going to sacrifice myself. I'm not that brave.

~ DJORDJE

People are reporting saying that, first of all, in order for them to gain some sort of employment opportunity they need to have something [of a] connection, family, political affiliation or whatever that connection means. And not only [do] they need to be connected, they need to be very, very much loyal to the people who are offering them these opportunities. And in that kind of sense, they are political slaves. They have no room for any initiatives outside of this.

~ HASAN

Because, I don't know, people are sheep and they are selling their wools for twenty, fifty, one hundred marks, for, I don't know, some stupid small job, something like that. For small things, some promises they never fulfill. It's ridiculous but it's true.

~ZORAN

Interesting to note about the diversity of responses here is that only one interviewee stated that she will vote for a person she personally knows and admires because of his character. She also views this vote as a matter of duty to the state. All the others explain their engagement and the engagement others have with politics in terms of bribery, slavery, or stupidity—believing that they will gain something by voting for an individual when it is more likely that they will gain nothing.

This analysis of political loyalty reveals that the motivations behind loyal behaviors are quite diverse. Few are and want to be loyal, and many more are coerced or bribed into engagement with politics through voting. In that sense, this analysis shows that even political engagement occurs under some rather undemocratic circumstances.

This analysis also reveals that one major motivation for political participation in Srebrenica is motivated not by a perceived need for government to help organize society, but rather by a need for the individual to gain access to the economy by behaving loyally to a particular candidate or party. In this way, the analysis reveals at least one role that government does play in society—regulating access to the economy. That insight also suggests another conclusion: none of the individuals in this sample indicate they are motivated to participate in politics because they want to produce a more democratic system.

2.2.2 Political Voice

The interview data that I categorize as *political voice* can be organized into four different categories. The first is a more general call to change the way of doing politics more generally in Srebrenica, the second is changing the political system itself, the third is to change the minds of the people who are voting in Srebrenica, and the fourth is to change the politicians themselves.

One interviewee—one of only two in the interview sample who is a politician—talks about changing the way of doing politics dominant in Srebrenica and Bosnia more generally.

We're not sitting in Sarajevo speaking, uh, on satellite phones with Pentagon or State Department, and you know, I mean, we're out here, people, everybody knows where we are, everybody knows what we're doing.

~ MEDIN

I mean, what we are doing here, even though it is called civic initiative, is Politics 101 and it actually shows that if you believe in something enough, strong enough, if you believe in something, if you get organized, you can actually pull it off. And this is, you know, I mean, what we are doing and the result we have achieved so far shows that you can do that. And you can do that without buying people, which is the stuff that they usually do.

~MEDIN

The other aspect of this campaign, which is far more constructive, is about hope that a) you can actually change things, and you don't even need official politics to back you if you believe in it and if you can get organized, and c), that um, this is about not what happened before, but what will happen after October 7 this year. But, essentially, this is about building a safer and more prosperous future for those that survived.

~MEDIN

What we are doing is, if it succeeds, and I'm pretty sure it will, it will discredit the way politics in this country were conducted for the past 17 years, for the past 20 years. It will discredit the Bosniak politics, it will discredit the Serb politics, it will discredit the Croat politics. Because you know, you really care about that particular part of this country? Good, get the fucking busses, get people on the busses, move them there and have them register there. What's so big a deal about it? If we can, if we could do this, I mean, you know, this is, this is where the magic happens. Alright, I mean, if you want to see inside [my house], you can see inside. It's not like we have laptops and satellite dishes. I mean, we're like a bunch of people working from out here. You know?

~MEDIN

Medin was, at the time of the interview, managing the campaign for one of the candidates running in the mayoral election in Srebrenica. His campaign tactic had been to manipulate the voting laws in Bosnia. Because of the large numbers of displaced individuals, the voting rules in Bosnia allow individuals to register to vote in any municipal election, regardless of residency. Medin has been orchestrating a campaign whereby he was bussing people from all over the country into Srebrenica to register to vote and ensured that they returned to Srebrenica on election day to actually cast a vote. Some of the people must ride the busses for several hours to reach Srebrenica, twice.

Interestingly, he is taking the way politicians have been doing business as his target in this campaign, but only in a limited sense. As I describe in the next chapter, Medin fully supports remaining loyal to the collective trauma narratives as a means to motivate people to vote. He is suggesting in the campaign that if those Bosnian Muslims do not go vote in Srebrenica, they will lose their ability to have a memorial there and their ability to go and visit the graves of their lost from the war.

At one and the same time, he wants to change the clientilism, but he does so by embracing the collective trauma narrative that many of the other, non-politician interviewees seems to despise. He seems to believe this is the only way he will be able to motivate them to vote if he does not bribe them to do so. The larger overall tone of his interview suggests that Medin is interested in creating a Bosnia that is secular, progressive, and economically viable. He wants the state to guarantee his rights—in particular to keep his land—and he sees the use of the collective trauma narratives and bribery as the reason the state is stagnant. He is interested in correcting the politics of Bosnia in order that Bosnia as a state advances, rather than in order that any one ethnic group or political party gains from keeping the state stagnant. In this way, he is using voice to try to change the political system, but is remaining loyal to the collective trauma narratives in order to do so.

Others of the interviewees were interested in changing the political system itself. Medin was one who was interested in this, as was Hasan. These two were the only interviewees that spoke of using voice in order to change the political system, and interestingly, they were the only two interviewees who are politicians in the data I collected.

And of course, I mean, the nature of my job is that I'm exposed to a lot of members or people that are at the state level. And I do, every time I have a chance or I am asked about politics of Srebrenica, I always express opinion. Which, I just told you, which is that I think that Srebrenica needs to be treated differently. Srebrenica needs to have a special status in terms of [the] political system in [Bosnia] and in terms of economic recovery and the money that is being spent at the entity levels and the state level government—the money that should be coming to Srebrenica.

~HASAN

I'm working completely outside. What we are doing is completely outside that political system. It's, it's, helping bring down the system um that was set up seventeen years ago in Dayton when the peace agreement was signed...We are now doing this within the system. We found a hole in the system. And we've entered that hole.

~MEDIN

As noted, Medin is entering the hole he exposed in the voting rules—whereby individuals can register and vote anywhere in the country they want to. He says he is doing this because he wants to see a viable, secular state that is able to guarantee its citizens' rights—regardless of ethnicity—and so that all of Bosnia grows economically. Hasan is also interested in the economic benefits that would come to Srebrenica if the political system were different. Hasan's notion of a different political system for Srebrenica would be to plan out who is governing in Srebrenica for the next 50 years so that politicians have no reason to use Srebrenica as a bargaining chip. They will know which positions go to the Serbian and Bosnian Muslim parties and can focus on the economy instead.

Those interviewees who were not politicians talked about trying to change the minds of the people voting in the elections.

But as a group we start in the youth center to do some projects, before elections, to motivate people to make their own opinion and they vote as they want to vote, not as someone [told] them to vote.

~ZORAN

INTERVIEWER: When you talk to younger people about those things, what do they say?

INTERVIEWEE: "What can I do? What can I do? [Politicians] can buy everybody, they can buy everything, they have power." Hah. I, my answer for that answer, "is that why you feel bad?" Hah... "Yes!" "You'll feel worse if you don't do anything." And I can take him [by the] hand and [say], "Come on, go, we talk." And they must find a way and make a decision what and how [they will do something].

~DUSKO

I wanted to influence the people, [...] to build an awareness of the people, to make them understand something, to start a riot would be a heavy word. But something like that, like a mental riot, something like that. Like make people start questioning themselves in the first place, and then everything around them.

~MLADEN

INTERVIEWEE: All I can say is what I would suggest to the young people is to, you know, [try to change things] because most of them have nothing to lose. They are already unemployed.

INTERVIEWER: You know, you could be right, but when they tell you, "you know, I have my whole future ahead of me and I can't jeopardize it now..."

INTERVIEWEE: Well, then they are chickens. I mean, we all have to take chances.

~ HASAN

What I talk is [to] people who go to vote. I don't speak about names. I speak with the youth: "Hello! How are you? What are you doing? Are you satisfied with your life? Think what they are doing for you. Do you need a change? Be careful. ... They give you 50 or 100 marks and you find his name [on the ballot], and it's okay."

I think I can't do anything because I am alone. Because I am alone. And I haven't my, I'm not SDA [political party]. I'm [a] free man. It's too hard, it's my opinion. It's not only politicians in Bosnia....[I] talk with people and tell him what I mean, what's good, what's bad. Try, try and wake up people and think [whether] it's good for you or not.

~DUSKO

This group of responses is marked by their focus on convincing people to vote for themselves and what they really think, rather than for the short-term benefits offered by the potential economic advantages any politician might offer. Notably, they do not seem to be advocating exit, rather advocating voting for different politicians. However, the sentiment of most of those I interviewed was that the politicians are all the same. They are putting differences between people, self-interested, and interested only in maintaining the status quo.

Finally, only two people spoke about trying to change the politicians themselves. One of them was Hasan, a politician himself. The other was Milina, who did not necessarily try to change the politicians' way of doing politics, but rather to try through dogged determination and persistence to acquire whatever promises a particular politician had made to her.

But you know, it's important to, the reason why I'm talking to local politicians is because I need to have, to create that kind of buy-in from their side. They have to be willing to see their own interests in that, and they do see their own interest in that.

~HASAN

Well, how to say, for me personally, when somebody give me some promise, you know, like, I'm [going to] keep going [to visit them] until I get it. That way, you know, that way of conversation that I have with political people, you know, when I need them, you know, for something. If you promise me something, you know, you're going to make it happen, you know. Because, I'm not going to say, I'm not going to forget it, you know. If you tell me it's going to happen, it must happen.

~MILINA

Some of these excerpts also demonstrate something of the transitory nature of voice behaviors. People who have used voice in the past mostly no longer do so. They have been disciplined effectively into either exit or loyalty (in Mladen's case, exit).

I experienced some things on my skin. I had some trials you know where I was innocent totally but about something that...I worked here in a local [job] as well and I was charged for something I said [...]. I mean, it's stupid, you know, it's freedom of speech, one of the main rights, human rights in democracy. But still I was charged for that. I ended up in trial. They didn't sentence me, but still it was an unpleasant experience, and the next time I was about to say something on the [that job], I was thinking twice: "Was it worth it?" You know? "Should I say it and experience some things again, or should I just be quiet and have a normal life, if you can call it like that?" So everything is possible. You can even be beaten, or under some legal investigation, anything is possible. I mean, nowadays it's different. It's not that tough as it was fifteen years ago. It's, the situation is improving regarding human rights, you know. Such things wouldn't happen today, I'm sure about that. Because we improved you know. But still, it's not, it's not quite safe to.

~MLADEN

The one exceptional response that does not seem to fit into the rest of the data was given by Milos, who indicated he was fully aware he would never, ever succeed at trying to use voice to

change politics in Srebrenica. Still, he continues to try. Here he explains why, and also lends insight into the transitory nature of the voice category.

INTERVIEWER: Why do you continue to try?

INTERVIEWEE: Why? It's boring [here]. I need to do something. I mean, come on, why? It's not always in the winning, something's in the fighting. You can fight, but, eventually we will get tired from all of that, and eventually we will get tired, there will come some new generation that shall start to follow, but, uh, probably when they start to fight, it will be too late. Even now it's maybe too late for anything.

~MILOS

Taken together, all these indications of the use of political voice indicate a few interesting trends. First, politicians are more likely to use voice to change the political system, the way politicians do politics, and the politicians themselves than are other non-politicians in Srebrenica. This seems to be related to their position economically. Those who indicated no use of voice or who indicated they would only try to influence others who are voting or engaging in politics were unemployed in many cases. Their unemployment, as they saw it, was a consequence of their refusal to join political parties or take the bribes offered them.

The second interesting trend in the voice category is that these individuals largely relied upon economic arguments to convince others. Their motivation was to improve the economic situation, or to demonstrate to others that they gain nothing economically in the long-run by trading votes for short-term favors, such as monetary bribes. As with the loyalty data, the focus is squarely on the economic situation and the political system is a tool towards that end. It does not seem to be seen or experienced as a genuine need or good in and of itself.

2.2.3 Political Exit

In Srebrenica, people reported a variety of behaviors that I categorize as exit from the political system. Some exit the political system because they do not know enough about the politicians or the political parties to make an informed decision.

There is a very short time to know [a politician], to recognize that they haven't introduced themselves very well. You know him one week and you should vote for him. That is very hard. And I haven't been a member of any political party. I didn't want it because there isn't, I didn't know people, their goals. They all say, "We will do that," but they don't do it.

~ALMA

Others exit because they know the parties too well and they disagree with the candidates' or parties' politics. There is simply no choice that reflects their thoughts about politics.

Also in Bosnia, everything you know what you want to do you need to be in political party. If you want to get [a] job, you need to be [a] member of that political party. I am not in any political party. Because of that, I work in non-government organization.

~FATIMA

Others exit because they previously tried to change politics but could not and have either become tired or want to preserve a livelihood without being loyal to politics. Mladen, who previously had experienced some problems with politicians when he spoke against them publicly, answers that he would not try again to change things in Srebrenica. Zoran indicated he had grown tired of trying, and also does not want to do things he considers to be immoral.

INTERVIEWER: Will you ever try again to change [politics]...?

INTERVIEWEE: No. I will not. For sure. Maybe through my writing, through some serious metaphors.

~MLADEN

INTERVIEWEE: I don't want to try. I'm just too tired of those kind of things. You try for a couple of years to try to make things better and they are just pushing you down and down and down. If you want to do anything good you must leave this country then because you will not be capable to find any work, or anything else because of them.

INTERVIEWER: You mean if you try then you won't be able to.

INTERVIEWEE: No, if you try, if you stay in someone's way, you're blocking his idea or something, you don't have support from the bigger group of people or someone who is influential and you cannot do anything because you will just go down....They will make your life hard. Harder than it is now.

INTERVIEWER: And who are the people who would make your life hard?

INTERVIEWEE: Politicians. And not only politicians, because every man who works in [the] municipality or in police or in court, or everywhere, or post, they all belong to some political party. And if you want to find a job, you must belong to some political party. It's impossible to find job if you don't belong anywhere, and because of that I don't work.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, so you don't belong to any political party?

INTERVIEWEE: No, and I never [will].

INTERVIEWER: And why is it that you don't belong to one?

INTERVIEWEE: Because they are all liars. And they [are all] asking people to do things what they [tell] to them to do. And if that is wrong, if you want to keep that job, you must do what they say, or they will just replace you with someone who will do that thing for them.

~ZORAN

I mean, there are a lot of things that are, how to say, public secrets about, I don't know, corruption, about those, that are publicly announced but still nobody does anything because nobody wants to put himself in trouble, to make himself additional problems. Because even without it, living is hard in Srebrenica. To provide everything your family needs, even without those kinds of problems, so everybody stays out of [the politician's] way and that's it.

~MLADEN

Others do not become involved in politics because they see clearly that politicians only work for themselves.

No, [I will not be involved in politics], not in this kind of situation. When people who works in politics change their interests, you know, when they start to think about [a] better future of their members, maybe yes. But in this kind of situation, when they are just taking care about themselves, no. I don't want to be part of it.

~ADO

Others simply see it as useless to try:

I don't know how to say it, sorry for my English, until we evolve, you know, as a society, as our awareness, our, the way we understand things, I think it is not possible in the near future, so it's a little bit useless to try at all.

~MLADEN

INTERVIEWER: Why do you think people stay passive?

INTERVIEWEE: Because probably they are, they are assured that they cannot change things.

~MLADEN

[We have] one failed attempt, we did try. And [we] cannot. Cannot. And it just cannot be done without the money. And to receive the money from some western power or something like that, that has its price and we don't want to pay that price. And so we cannot do anything just so far.

~MILOS

No I think that we mentioned it earlier in this interview, people are really not believing they can change anything. For example, I'm not going to get on elections at all, I do not vote for anybody. And that's it.

~MLADEN

This interview data clearly shows exit as a residual of voice. When voice did not work for these individuals, they either experienced disciplining that prevents them from trying again, or they experienced fatigue and are assured they cannot be successful in trying to change the political system. Either way, exit did not seem to be the primary strategic choice these interviewees would have made.

That said, because exit is a residual of voice for these interviews, the notable observation here again is the focus of those who are loyal and those who use voice is to fix the economy, not necessarily to create a more democratic society. The economy is controlled by the politicians, as is their access to it. Those who do pursue loyalty or voice strategies do so because they are motivated to improve their livelihoods.

2.3 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

2.3.1 In Relation to the Political Disengagement Literature

In the summary section of the literature review above, I note three aspects of this study that contribute to the discussion about political disengagement. First, this study adds to the innovative approaches that Snell and Bastedo *et al* take because it provides ethnographically-contextualized interview data. This analysis reveals rather undemocratic motivations for both political disengagement *and* political engagement.

In that sense, the study here introduces new questions about studying political disengagement as a phenomenon and suggests new directions researchers might take with this

literature. In particular, researchers might want to continue to investigate political disengagement by examining political engagement as well, because it might be a more common trend that even people who are normally and typically engaged in politics are engaged for reasons that reflect poorly on the democratic nature of that polity. In that sense, expanding the topic from political disengagement to a more general focus on the nature of the relationship between people and their polities would uncover that often complex relationship.

This data analysis makes clear that there is order and consistency lying behind behaviors that otherwise might be characterized as inconsistent or incoherent. The exit, voice, and loyalty framework proves to be a powerful, intuitive, and ultimately useful analytical framework for making sense of these inconsistencies. The framework provides an excellent alternative to the binary and often mutually exclusive nature of the terms *engagement* and *disengagement*. As I discuss in chapter 1, the framework emphasizes the relationship, has the capacity to examine the behavior of any individual over time, and also provides a way to make consistent otherwise seemingly inconsistent or incoherent behaviors. Those exit, voice, and loyalty behaviors can be read as a set of strategies for any individual to use in order to navigate a harsh political and economic terrain, rather than being read as illogical, irrational, or apathetic behavior, or behavior that needs to be corrected by implementing policy.

Second, this study encourages researchers to look at the consistencies across various identity groups, e.g., gender, race, class, ethnicity, age, or religion, among others. In particular, the data here reveal that, consistently, individuals in Srebrenica are motivated to participate in politics in order to remain engaged with the economy.^v None of the data suggests that politics can or should contribute

^v I should note that a few of the interviewees commented to me that part of the problem with Srebrenica is that the people who live there are not more engaged and trying to make it a better place to live. Hasan, in particular, believes this lack of motivation to solve problems by the people who live in Srebrenica is a residue from the more socialist and communist era of life in Yugoslavia under Tito. I note this here because it might be that these individuals focus on changing the economy through the state because they are more accustomed to do so as former Yugoslavs, rather than

to a better social or cultural situation; the focus is squarely on the economy. Other consistencies in the data include a general sense of disconnection between people and their government, animosity toward politics, self-centeredness of politicians, among others. In this way, this study contributes to a different understanding of political disengagement more generally by revealing a fairly widespread discontent with the political system in Srebrenica and in Bosnia more generally. That is valuable because it invites researchers to begin to interrogate the differences between the theoretical benefits of democratic states on the one hand and the practical benefits that are actually received by the individuals living in democratic states.

These observations lead to the third aspect of this study that seems to differ from many other studies. Because this study is not interested in policy suggestions to improve the democratic system, but rather is interested in how people respond to a seemingly oppressive democratic system, this study reveals that individuals in Srebrenica actually do not look to politics to answer problems facing society. In Srebrenica, society seems to function largely outside of any management or control by the state, and is also at the same time orderly. That observation leads to questions about the actual utility of the state in Srebrenica; it also invites questions about how society actually functions, a question which I address in chapters 4 and 5.

2.3.2 In Relation to Understanding Life in Srebrenica

In this final section of this chapter, I detail six general observations related to understanding life in Srebrenica more generally.

1. Individuals employ sets of strategies that include exit, voice, *and* loyalty behaviors.

The first observation is that the excerpts I organized in terms of exit, voice, and loyalty are all from

because the state is clientelistic. Or it is possible this focus on the state to fix the economy is a product both of Tito-era economics and politics as well as the clientelistic nature of the Bosnian government.

the same fourteen individuals. The residents of Srebrenica often use a combination of these strategies depending upon the expediency of any strategy in any given situation.

2. In-group and out-group situations. The second observation relates to a distinction that this body of data makes evident: that between how the situation in which a person behaves sometimes in part influences how a person will choose to behave. Many residents make an analytical distinction, even if only implicitly, between in-group and out-group situations. If the individual is in the presence of out-group members, s/he will speak freely about politics. If the individual is in the presence of in-group, s/he will behave consistently with previous agreements and/or conversations. I discuss and organize this distinction in chapter 4, but note the importance of this distinction here.

3. Distinction between motivations and behaviors. In some cases, individuals report that they vote because they feel they must in order to have a job. On the other hand, others report that individuals vote or behave a particular way politically because they are afraid—of the consequences of the other side winning, of the consequences for their own job prospects, or of not receiving other livelihood benefits upon which individuals rely. Still others vote because they genuinely admire or agree with a particular party or candidate.

The point to notice here is that there is a wide range of motivations for political engagement. As noted, some of the motivations are likely appropriate in a democratic system, such as genuinely admiring or agreeing with a candidate. Others seem more akin to slavery than democracy. In chapter 5, I collide the exit, voice, and loyalty analytical framework with this distinction between motivations and behaviors to make sense of how life in general works in Srebrenica and to present a useful framework for analyzing society.

4. Exit is more popular than either voice or loyalty, and voice is the least common behavior. I want to emphasize the proportion between political voice, political loyalty, and political exit. As noted previously, many individuals describe the voice option as only a transitory phase.

People become tired of trying to change the situation and either revert to political exit or political loyalty. Voice and loyalty are the least of the three cited types of strategies that people in Srebrenica utilize. And loyalty was really only expressed by one politician. That is also to say, the most common political behavior was exit. In chapter 5, I present an analytical framework that helps to explain why this is the case.

5. Actions of others are often interpreted based upon the narratives. In the absence of contradictory behavior (e.g., behavior that is explicitly practicing exit or voice to try to change politics), many people in Srebrenica interpret behaviors using the dominant narratives that govern the city. That is, a person who is actually motivated to a particular behavior because she wants to exit the political situation will be read sometimes by others as actually being loyal. The gap that exists between the motivations for particular political behaviors, on the one hand, and the way that the behavior is perceived by others, on the other hand, is filled by the meaning provided by the corresponding dominant narratives.

For example, a Serbian man who is casting his vote for a candidate in his party is interpreted by certain others as being loyal to that candidate or political party. And that in turn means that he is also loyal to the dominant ethnic narrative associated with Serbian political parties. In reality, perhaps he is motivated by a genuine loyalty to his party, or perhaps he fears he will lose his job if he does not vote, or perhaps he accepted money from the candidate in order to provide for his family, or perhaps there is some combination of these and other motivations. If in reality he is not loyal to the party, but instead only feigns loyalty, the person who is observing him, who perhaps also chooses not to be loyal to the party, misrecognizes that person as loyal to that political party and narrative. Observers of this behavior who are strangers to each other cannot see that, in fact, they might share more goals, opinions, and perspectives about politics or narratives and might be able to cooperate together.

Another example includes people coming in from the outside to watch, observe, or study politics in Srebrenica. In the same manner, outsiders who observe people voting for the more nationalist parties might come to the conclusion that life in Srebrenica today is still rather tense ethnically. Observers of this behavior cannot see that, in fact, the problem is more in the perceptions about reality rather than in the reality of Srebrenica itself.

In either case, the use of the narratives by people observing others' political behaviors as a means of interpreting those behaviors renders the reality underneath the behavior imperceptible. It is these misinterpretations of motivation that have very real consequences for the political system. It renders unlikely the chance that like-minded individuals can form a coherent mass to pool resources to try to take back politics [and narratives] in Srebrenica. It also renders unlikely that a different image of Srebrenica will be cast in the international arena. More on this in chapters 4 and 5.

6. Motivations for behaviors are often disguised. That leads to the sixth and final general observation: these motivations are largely disguised, because one cannot know the motivation for the dis/engagement behavior unless one asks for it explicitly. The result is that motivations are only really interpreted correctly when people who know each other personally are interpreting their own behaviors.

2.4 PROPOSITION 1

This chapter has been mostly related to the first proposition I set forth in the introduction: Typical individuals in Srebrenica have a set of constitutive practices or rules that condition their choices and actions that is different from the set of constitutive rules or practices that condition the choices and actions of those who behave more loyally in the political sphere.

The data I have presented so far suggests that typical individuals do have a different set of *strategies* for dealing with the state and politics in Srebrenica. However, that is different than saying whether they have a different set of *practices*. For now, the constitutive practices that condition the choices and actions of typical individual in Srebrenica does not seem to be different from the constitutive practices that condition the choice and actions of people who are more loyal. At times, many people are loyal who are also practicing exit and practicing voice at other times. Furthermore, it appears that the people who practice exit, voice, and loyalty are actually all using the same practices.

3.0 NARRATIVES

**YOU HAVE MANY PEOPLE WHO DON'T LIKE MUSLIMS, MANY SERBS.
MANY MUSLIMS WHO DON'T LIKE SERBS, HATE SERBS.**

**~ DJORDJE
AUGUST 2012**

**[WHEN] TWO PEOPLE HERE HANG OUT IN SREBRENICA, THEY
DO NOT HANG OUT AS A BOSNIAN AND SERB, THEY HANG OUT
AS JOE AND JULIAN WHO KNOW THEMSELVES PERSONALLY.**

**~ HASAN
AUGUST 2012**



Figure 3.1 Pujdo (foreground), Signorina (background), Srebrenica resident (background)

In this opening section of this chapter, I recount two interesting events that occurred one afternoon in the Summer 2012. Juxtaposing these two events, I complicate the relationship between narratives

and people in the same way that I complicate the relationship between politics and people in chapter 2. These two stories demonstrate both how the narratives I describe in chapter 1, and the assertions and assumptions that go with them, actually do and do not represent individuals in Srebrenica. On the one hand, the narratives work on individuals in a way that disciplines their behavior. Sometimes their choices for behavior are constrained by the presence of the narratives. On the other hand, normal, everyday events and interactions amongst the people who live in Srebrenica demonstrate the limits of how those narratives actually represent the people on whose behalf they claim to be speaking. The gap between the narratives and their capacity to actually represent these individuals seems rather large.

Related to disciplining, on that afternoon in August 2012, that street dog named Pujdo was laying on the road on his back, waiting for the man kneeling close to him—a resident of Srebrenica—to give him a pat on his belly. Meanwhile, another man in an SUV drove up and stopped in front of Pujdo, waiting for a moment for the dog to move out of his way. Pujdo, too distracted by his desire for a belly rub, paid no attention to the auto, while the man stood up, walked off the road and called to the dog. Pujdo did not listen but rubbed his back against the pavement in a seemingly obsessive manner. The man in the SUV then simply decided to drive over the dog. Pujdo ran away to lick his wounds, but the two men exchanged words and then the man in the SUV drove away.

Later, the man who was petting Pujdo reported that he had wanted to fight that driver. When asked why he did not, he said, "When the fight is over, everyone will forget about the dog. Instead they'll remember how a Serb beat up a Muslim." In this chapter, I lay out an argument that suggests that he was exiting the narrative and his actions were a strategic response in a situation constrained by those dominant narratives.

The second story is related to the gap between individuals and the narratives that presumably represent them. That same afternoon, just a few hours previously, I was sitting at the café bar that Pujdo and Signorina—another dog in Srebrenica—considered their territory. Signorina previously had birthed several litters, and one of those dogs—Bella—that day had given birth to a litter of nine or so pups.

As I had been walking up the road to the café, I heard a strange noise coming from the ditch just across the road from the café. When I looked, I saw a collection of newborn pups, but Bella was nowhere to be found. Without any idea what to do for them, I instead sat with a woman from Italy and her colleague and chatted.

Soon thereafter, something caught my attention and I grabbed my camera as I turned to look. I saw Nemanja climbing down into the ditch where I had seen the pups, and on the road above him was an older woman holding an empty cardboard box. Nemanja and this woman were helping each other to relocate the pups to their mother, who, as the woman had learned, was nestled in the front yard of the house next to the house beside the ditch. Bella had found the corner of a fence that was protected by a tree and had nestled there with her four other newly-born pups.

I followed Nemanja and the woman as they walked together and talked, Nemanja carrying the box with the puppies inside. When they arrived at the fence, they both stood and waited, slowly returning one puppy at a time to the mother to ensure she would accept them. After a few minutes, the woman returned home and Nemanja came to sit where I had been sitting previously.

Both Nemanja and this woman had lived through the war that engulfed this region twenty years earlier. I know very little about the woman. It is difficult to imagine she—as anyone who lived in Srebrenica then—was unaffected by the war. For his part, Nemanja lost his mother in a rather violent episode which he had witnessed. He was about six years old at the time.

Despite the dominant narratives, as well as their own memories and scars from the war, these two—one Serbian and one Muslim—had managed to cooperate in what seemed to be a very natural interaction between a young man and an older woman. If taken at face value, the narratives would render this sort of interaction impossible. But the seeming normality and ease of the interaction challenges the representativeness of the narratives on both sides of the war in Srebrenica.

In this chapter, I document the gap between, on one hand, what average, everyday residents of Srebrenica endorse or believe in their everyday lives and practices and, on the other hand, those narratives. I use the exit, voice, and loyalty framework as a guide to organize and explain the seeming contradictions between these two stories. I begin with a literature review of the collective memory field more generally. I then continue on to review a more specific subset of the literature that discusses in particular collective trauma narratives. Then, I organize and examine my interview data in depth to try to understand how people in Srebrenica interact in terms of exit, voice, and loyalty strategies with the narratives that dominate in Srebrenica. I also examine the second of the five propositions from chapter 1. Then I conclude the chapter with some observations focused on both literature reviews and then, as before, how life works in Srebrenica.

3.1 COLLECTIVE MEMORY LITERATURE REVIEW

In 2003, Barbara A. Misztal provided a useful framework for organizing the field of memory studies. In what follows, I loosely use Misztal's organization of the field in order to structure this literature review, while adding into her discussion resources she did not include as they fit and are relevant to the review.

3.1.1 History

Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy situate collective memory studies in a heritage greater than 100 years old.⁷³ In the past 30 or so years, academia and popular consciousness has witnessed a "memory boom" but a critical assessment of this claim actually reveals that memory studies has a parallel history that developed in the late 19th century as well.⁷⁴ Current memory studies is rooted in that intellectual heritage and Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy outline the contours of it.

These authors locate the emergence of *memory* as a topic in the popular discussion by recounting several broad institutional changes. First, there have been changes in the technology of memory: writing and storing data has changed the way we are able to store memories, and even the brain itself and its capacity for and responsiveness to different media technologies has changed, as argued by those who research neural plasticity.⁷⁵

Another change is in the way we consider time—in modernity time is linear, but in pre-modern times the concept of time was more cyclical, reflecting, say, the changing of the seasons. This change made possible the notion of distance from the past in linear time, which inspired the need for humanity to examine its relationship to the past.⁷⁶

Along with a separation from the past in terms of time, many modern societies experience a geographic separation from the past due to migration patterns. These discontinuities or changes in humans' relationship to time and geographic space prevent societies from congealing. "Collective identity is no longer as obvious as it once was."⁷⁷

Other authors argue that the concept *memory* responds to the quick pace of social change—we want to slow down the change we experience in modern society. Others suggest that capitalism and bureaucracy have changed individuality such that we feel isolated and estranged—we experience anomie. Finally, some argue that the continuity once provided by religious and other institutions

(e.g., the national community) has eroded. Nostalgia results and we collect memories to a past that we share.⁷⁸

Memory studies as a field of inquiry itself has a history. Classical philosophers provided metaphors for structuring memory studies and memory acquisition—the metaphor of a staircase, for example—or methods for preserving memories—the autobiography, for example.⁷⁹ During the Enlightenment period, Locke and other scholars focused on issues related to self-awareness and self-sameness that predates our modern use of the concept *identity*.⁸⁰

The way we think about knowledge and science also has changed. The purpose of science changed from "a rhetorical art of finding what was already there (which could still operate within a given body of knowledge) into a philosophical art of discovering something new (whose field of knowledge lay open before it)."⁸¹ Ironically, in today's practice of science, this has necessitated that scientists develop an art of *forgetting* in order to make progress in any field. But around the turn of the 20th century, this resulted in the accumulation of knowledge—scientific memory.⁸² Memory studies also followed from "a shift from an emphasis on knowledge *from* the past about *how* to do things to an emphasis on knowledge *about* the past *that* certain things happened."⁸³

The focus on knowledge acquisition at this particular period of time also entailed a hard-sciences approach to knowledge, whereby the *method* of acquiring knowledge—historicism—was heavily reliant upon a perception of history as progressive in nature, deterministic, and leading up to an apex, an end of history. In response, a counternarrative developed.⁸⁴ The severe and sterile logocentrism of the Enlightenment era ignited a Romantic reaction. This countermovement reaction to logocentrism and rationality had as its repository memory and memory studies itself. Henri Bergson, Marcel Proust, and Sigmund Freud were its champions.⁸⁵

The focus on logocentrism also studied the individual rather than the collective or community. Collective societies were seen as primitive. But early memory scholars noted the

connection between an individual's memory and the society within which it was formed. They accepted Lamarck's theory of acquired traits as a model for memory studies. Genes were understood as a species-memory store. Thus, cultural traits were passed on in the same manner as physical traits in a society.⁸⁶

The development of the nation-state as an institution was also important. Politicians recognized the usefulness of collective memories for mobilization and support: "In the late nineteenth century, when nation-states were increasing their demands for allegiance and fiscal extraction from their populations, memory thus served as the handmaiden of nationalist zeal, history its high counsel." Hobsbawm and Ranger base their theory of collective memory on this in particular, noting the contemporaneous development of mass media (more on this below).⁸⁷

In the past thirty or fifty years, post-modern critiques of knowledge have opened up space for historical relativism. Cultural memory had been studied more purely as a Science, in the tradition of Lamarck. The post-modern approach began to study memories as being constructed in the moment of recall rather than retrieved from a storage space in the memory centers of the brain. These latest developments in the field of memory studies have resulted in a variety of theoretical approaches to cultural or collective memory, as well as a variety of researches on specific concepts and their relationship to collective memory.

3.1.2 Theory

Misztal organizes current theories about collective memory into four approaches. The original founding theorist of memory studies—Maurice Halbwachs—represents the first approach. In response to some critiques leveled at his approach, the presentist approach developed. Then, with the post-modern turn in memory studies came the popular memory approach, to highlight power

relationships involved in collective memory making. Finally, in a response that largely tries to balance each of these approaches, there is a dynamics of memory approach in memory studies.

In what follows, I elaborate in detail Halbwachs' notion of collective memory to set a solid foundation, summarize the critiques leveled at his theory and the other approaches as defined by Misztal, and add in other authors who might be categorized in the terms Misztal sets out.

3.1.2.1 Halbwachs. Halbwachs wrote a theory of society in which he used collective memory to explain order and solidarity. He argues that a stable collective memory is a foundation for a national or group identity.⁸⁸ He combined Durkheim's ideas with that of the philosopher Henri Bergson. Both of these theorists were interested in diversifying knowledge in an age when many scientists were focused on aggregating similarities across individuals and other species—a process of homogenization.⁸⁹

Memory itself is "a matter of how minds work together in society, how their operations are not simply mediated by social arrangements but are in fact structured by them."⁹⁰ A memory is not a fact stored for retrieval; rather remembering is an inherently social act. "It is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories."⁹¹

There are a variety of social frameworks for individual memory which influence what, how, and when we can remember. These frameworks are affected and influenced by which memories we bring up to the conscious level and how we bring them up.⁹² Halbwachs distinguished between autobiographical—the memory related to an individual's own life—and historical memory—"residues of events by virtue of which groups claim a continuous identity through time."⁹³

Halbwachs argues that the collective representations, symbols, and meanings found in groups act something like durable structures, which are difficult to change. They "clearly support

some histories more than others, provide narrative patterns and exemplars of how individuals can and should remember, and stimulate public memory in ways and for reasons that have little to do with the individual or aggregate neurological records."⁹⁴

Collective memory is carried by the group and individual memories can only be understood if they are connected to all the groups to which an individual is a member. Individuals recall memories in the collective setting, and in this sense, memories are always reconstructed and reorganized as a social affair.⁹⁵ It is always individuals who remember the collective memories, but the collective carries with it the necessary elements for the occasion of remembering.⁹⁶

Scholars have identified not a few problems with this theory. Blondel suggests that the focus on the collective influence of memory oversteps the boundary between the individual and the collective so much as to almost eliminate the need for the individual to be present at all. Blondel reminds us that sometimes we forget certain episodes, even when we are with the group of individuals who are recalling the episode. We can say, "I don't remember that!" Other times, we can remember the memory of an individual episode, but we must recreate the situation in which it happened.⁹⁷

Others have pointed out that Halbwachs' terms are often considered fuzzy or murky because he did not clearly define them. He also did not provide clear explanations about how the individual is connected to the group exactly, how collective identity precedes collective memory, or how changes in group identities are possible if groups rely on stability of memories for their identities.⁹⁸

3.1.2.2 "The Presentist Memory Approach."⁹⁹ In this approach, memories are molded based upon present needs and interests, and in this sense collective memories are shaped in the present.¹⁰⁰ This approach is closely related to studies of nationalism. It is most valuable because it highlights the notion that tradition confers

legitimacy of continuity on what is in practice always changing; that there is no such thing as a completely pure tradition; that the appeal to the past has always been selective and often part of demagoguery, and therefore traditions always incorporate power, whether they are constructed in deliberate ways or not.¹⁰¹

Hobsbawm introduces the notion *invention of tradition*. He distinguishes between tradition and custom and then between tradition and routine or convention, and separates traditions that are justified by technical necessity from his concept. Invented tradition is "a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past."¹⁰² The intention of the invention is ideological.¹⁰³

Politicians, elites, and states invent tradition to serve their current purposes.¹⁰⁴ Hobsbawm argues this technique of power emerged at the same time as did mass politics because the state needed a way to symbolize itself, legitimate its institutions, and inculcate people into its value system. It also reflected other major transformations in society—industrialization, democratization, and urbanization.¹⁰⁵ These were methods of ensuring obedience and elites and politicians employed education, ceremonies, and public monuments to achieve effective inventions of tradition.¹⁰⁶

But many theorists disagree with Hobsbawm's notion on a variety of accounts. Ranger, who worked closely with Hobsbawm in developing the concept *invention of tradition*, later published a bit of a reversal and concludes that he prefers Anderson's notion of *imagined* because it stresses ideas, symbols, and images. Invention "implies too one-sided a happening."¹⁰⁷

Likewise, Schudson and others argue that not all memory is invented, nor that the inventing is malicious. Schudson reminds us that memories are constructed, but they are not invented *ex nihilo*. Construction is constrained by a past, present, and past memories that were constructed.¹⁰⁸ Smith argues that changes in modern society result in a nostalgia for the past. Sometimes the collective memories that emerge from this nostalgia are only partial. This is a perpetual process—these collective memories, or reconstructions of the past, are constantly reinvented and renewed. But they

are always constrained by the past.¹⁰⁹ Schwartz criticizes the functionalism that underlies Hobsbawm's argument. Hobsbawm focuses so much on the political that he underestimates the diversity that memories can and do take.¹¹⁰

Finally, Mitzsal argues that Hobsbawm's account places too much agency in the hands of politicians by assuming people will accept any invention. He does not answer questions about why some traditions persist and others do not. This approach leads to very cynical conclusions that perhaps all traditions are ideological in origin or represent some sort of false consciousness. Furthermore, it is not necessarily true that all collective memories are imposed from above.¹¹¹

3.1.2.3 "The Popular Memory Approach."¹¹² In line with many of these critiques, the popular memory approach highlights the contested nature of collective memory. This approach demonstrates the influence of bottom up memories. Foucault inspired theorizing in this approach.¹¹³

Foucault briefly addressed *popular memory* as a response to the imposition of official memory on the masses. Popular memory appears in the struggle over what people should remember, and the stakes in that struggle are high. Foucault argues that memory is an important element of struggle, and that memory aids those who would want to control or program the masses. Foucault uses the working class struggle and its popular memory location in folklore as an example.¹¹⁴

But Foucault's notion of popular memory emphasizes how it is marginalized rather than how it plays a role in the production of a dominant narrative.¹¹⁵ The Popular Memory Group corrected for this by including more sources of public history and private history. Public history includes historians by profession, history perpetuated by state-related institutions, cultural institutions such as libraries and museums as well as state agencies and schools, businesses who sell history, and the public media. And private history includes autobiography, diary, anecdote, and letters.¹¹⁶

Bodnar argues that public memory is a product of the conflict between official and vernacular memory. Official memory is espoused by the state and seeks unity, loyalty, and continuity. Vernacular memory is a product of more diverse origins and more localized expression and conflict. The public memory that is produced by the melding of these two together is really a discussion about how people will interpret reality.¹¹⁷

This approach has its critics: it conceptualizes the past as factual, a resource. It disguises counter-memory groups as unpatriotic when in fact patriotism might be a product of their memories. It cannot explain the effectiveness and success of some symbols and the failure of other symbols to be adopted in the public memory. Finally, it assumes that conflict is what structures the emergence of official memories, when it might equally be the case that local or smaller group narratives are coherent with those dominant narratives.¹¹⁸

But Foucault-inspired approaches to popular memory are still valuable because of their insight into the conflictual nature of memory production, revealing the power of the dominant narrative. This approach answers many of the problems associated with the invention of tradition approach to memory studies.

3.1.2.4 "The Dynamics of Memory Approach."¹¹⁹ The dynamics of memory approach is the most broad category of theories. In general, these theorists try to avoid the pitfalls of the other approaches: functionalism and reductionism. They acknowledge the constraints of history on the production of memory, incorporate the conflictual aspect of memory production, and highlight the contingency of memory production. In this approach, memory is processual, interactive, unstable, multiple, and fluctuating.¹²⁰ In this section, I describe two of the more broad theories of collective memory, and in a subsequent section, I more briefly describe a range of other theorists as they relate to more specific themes in the literature.

Schudson argues that yes, in fact, history is rewritten in memory production, but that the re-writing of history is constrained by the shape of the present, "the structure of available pasts, the structure of individual choices, and the conflicts about the past among a multitude of mutually aware individuals or groups."¹²¹ The past influences the present in at least three ways: personally through its effect on individual lives, socially in the form of institutions, and culturally through language and other meaning-making symbols.¹²²

In contrast, Schwartz emphasizes the cultural function that collective memory plays, in response to the field's emphasis on the political uses of collective memory (i.e., for nationalism or nation-building). Collective memories fulfill a basic human need for ordering and understanding the past and when only examined as a political tool, this cultural function is lost. By emphasizing the role that culture plays, scholars can focus not only on the question *why* we interpret the past, but also focus on questions about *how* we interpret the past.¹²³ "Memory is 'a cultural program that orients our intentions, sets our moods, and enables to us act.'"¹²⁴ Collective memory is a notion that, conceived in this way, allows us to understand its stability and identity, while also accounting for the way that memories and identities change over time.

3.1.3 In the Absence of a Codified Theory

There are quite a few topics of research interest popular in the field that have not been consolidated into more broad theories of collective memory. The next several sections briefly look at those themes: process, history, identity, time, and imagination.¹²⁵

3.1.3.1 Process. Some groups of scholars are trying to determine the process of memory acquisition and transmission over time as it relates to the actual individual. The questions these scholars are confronting include those about how individuals identify with collective identities and collective

memories, how individual's thoughts might be affected by those memories and identities, and how those identities and memories are transmitted from person to person and generation to generation.¹²⁶

One scholar in particular has set out a three-item paradigm useful for organizing this research. Prager argues that scholars must focus on the embodiedness of memories, the embeddedness of the individual, and on the individual's self-concept in order to understand collective memory.¹²⁷

3.1.3.1.1 Embodiedness. Prager argues that the embodiedness aspect of memory studies includes notions about how the brain itself works as it relates to memories, how emotions influence memory making and memory recall, and how the past relates to each of those in memory formation.¹²⁸ This is probably the least studied aspect of collective memory.

Related, Connerton focuses on the commemorative aspects of how societies remember. He contrasts social memory and cognitive memory with habit memory. He argues that muscle memory and bodily habit are transmitters of collective memory.¹²⁹ Wagner-Pacifici argues that memory must be embodied and it is the embodiment that brings in uncertainty in memory studies and memory recall. Form and content both matter: what is remembered is as important as the genre used to represent the memory. Importantly, Wagner-Pacifici argues that it is through the embodying of memory that changes in collective memory are possible.¹³⁰

3.1.3.1.2 Embeddedness. Occupying a far greater amount of space in collective memory studies are researches on the notion of embeddedness, which encourage the scholar to understand the socially constructed nature of memories by understanding the larger interpersonal and cultural worlds in which the individual is making and recalling memories. Here Myszal suggests the usefulness of

Goffman's concept *frames* as a way of understanding what exactly it is that embeddedness does and as a way of researching it.¹³¹

Theorists examining this aspect of collective memory largely fall into one of a few categories. Some focus on memory formation; some focus on the material of memories, some focus on memory transmission, and some focus on group identity.

3.1.3.1.2.1 Memory Formation. Scholars debate whether collective memory is more like history in that it is replaced when new frames emerge or whether memory is more cumulative, adding residue with new events and frames. Also many researches examine and propose the processes of memory formation.

Eviatar Zerubavel asks us to consider the role that others play in memory formation and recall. For example, what we remember of our childhoods is highly influenced by what our parents, grandparents, and older siblings tell us about childhood. Also, particular surroundings may filter what it is we remember. And the social environment plays a role in the depths to which we remember, determining, for example, when the historical story we are telling begins and which plot structures we use to tell the story.¹³²

Schwartz argues collective memories accumulate in the present from the past as a sort of residue, in contrast to theories that argue that memories are replaced, one with another.¹³³ Jan Assman's theory of cultural memory tries to bring together culture, memory, and the group. Cultural memory works to form an identity from an assembly of anchors such as events or rituals. It also reconstructs the past by using those anchors to determine knowledge about contemporary life.¹³⁴

Finally, Misztal argues that group memories are anchored in both time and space; time serves as an anchor by sequencing particular events in a particular order, while space serves as an anchor due to its stability as a spatial image—the image of the place of the memory remains stable.¹³⁵

3.1.3.1.2.2. Material. A range of scholars also offer different metaphors for understanding what material comprises collective memory: museum, horizon, anchor, and sign and symbol. Aleida Assmann uses a museum as an example: the public rooms of the museum, where artifacts are presented and arranged purposefully, are the canon. The storage rooms of the museum, where artifacts are merely stored, decontextualized, and disconnected from any previous framing, represent the archive. The ways items are selected from archive for use in the canon is neither arbitrary, clear, nor uncontested. Cultural memory is a product of what is stored in the archive and what is presented in the canon.¹³⁶

Jan Assman argues that the material that comprises cultural memory is fixed as a horizon, which acts a border between what is remembered and what is not remembered. The anchors that hold the horizon in place are certain events, texts, rites, monuments, and ritual communications that the group performs.¹³⁷

Kansteiner argues that collective memories are comprised of signs and symbols that are located in the group. Individuals within groups form memories when those individuals are allotted time and space to have conversations about the memory itself:

Collective memories originate from shared communications about the meaning of the past that are anchored in the life-worlds of individuals who partake in the communal life of the respective collective...'[M]emory seems to reside not in perceiving consciousness but *in the material*: in the practices and institutions of social or psychic life, which function within us, but, strangely, do not seem to require either our participation or our explicit allegiance.¹³⁸

3.1.3.1.2.3 Memory Transmission. A third area of scholarship focuses on memory transmission. Some scholars focus on notions of generational remembering to address how memory is passed on, but also how memory changes over time.¹³⁹ Collective memory is very important in developing these

generational identities. Misztal suggests the usefulness of Bourdieu's notion *habitus* as a way of understanding generational collectivities in order to understand memory and transmission. Other theorists propose new terms for understanding second-generation memories, examine the potential for memory uptake from one generation to the next, or examine the role of tradition in memory transmission.

Jan Assman's theory of cultural memory argues that cultural memory provides a stable form that allows it to be transmitted. That transmission occurs partly through rituals, which are organized, usually institutionally (e.g., commemorations).¹⁴⁰

Welzer points out that the transmission of collective memories is not exactly guaranteed to be the same for all participants in a commemoration event, arguing that "all the participants are entering the collective discussion from a different vantage point."¹⁴¹ Stories are received or understood differently based upon the viewpoint of the listener. "[I]t is precisely this dynamic which ensures that the memory of the group remains coherent, guaranteeing that the group persists as a group."¹⁴²

Hirsch questions the notion of cultural memory at the second-generational level of remembering. Questioning the proposal that descendants of survivors connect that deeply with survivors, Hirsch employs the term *postmemory* in an effort to denote the critical distance between those who experienced the trauma and their descendants. Postmemory is possible through "the stories, images, and behaviors among which they grew up. But these experiences were transmitted to them so deeply and affectively as to *seem* to constitute memories in their own right."¹⁴³

Another area of focus is on tradition, seen as a chain of memory. Tradition functions to both create and sustain group identity at the same time that it also acts as a norming and controlling device. Tradition is "the social transmission of cultural inheritance" and Misztal suggests the

usefulness of Goffman's concept *key* as a way of structuring discussions about and research into traditions.¹⁴⁴

One example of a tradition-based theory is Hervieu-Leger's piece that argues that religion is a chain of memory. The chain is upheld by the community that practices the religion and the rite is the mode of remembering. Within a group there are those who are simply believers and those who are imbued with power to produce collective memory.¹⁴⁵

3.1.3.1.2.4 Group Identity. Another area of interest in scholarship that focuses on embeddedness focuses on group identity. By way of introduction, it is useful to distinguish between group identity as it relates to embeddedness and individual identity as it relates to self-concept. This section focuses on the former, and Olick provides a way of understanding the distinction.

On the one hand, some scholars focus on individuals in a group and their memories; collective memory is understood as collected—an aggregation of the all the memories of the individuals. On the other hand, collective memory approaches embrace the notion that collective memories are not reducible to a collection of individual memories. Some argue that they have an institutional character above and beyond the interests, capacities, or activities of individuals.¹⁴⁶

In this section, I describe how a few scholars theorize about collective identity in relation to collective memories. In the next section on self-concept, I describe how scholars talk about the notion of individual self-concept and identity in relation to collected memories.

Jan Assmann argues that cultural memory carries knowledge that is formative in its constitution of a group and also normative in that it provides rules of conduct.¹⁴⁷ Cultural memory helps to create groups.

Halbwachs argues that collective identity precedes memory. But while it precedes memory, memory also helps to keep the group whole. "Collective memory, being both a shared image of a

past and the reflection of the social identity of the group that framed it, views events from a single committed perspective and thus ensures solidarity and continuity."¹⁴⁸

Others argue less about the origin of identity versus memory, and instead focus on how memory and identity are related. Misztal argues that collective memory is intimately linked with group identity. "The social standing of the group provides an important indicator of its memory's durability, visibility and power, while the diversity and variable intensity of individual remembrance is explained by the existence of a multiplicity of collective influences."¹⁴⁹

Renan, in defining what is a nation, suggests that people unite as nations because of a spiritual principle—that those in the group have a shared memory of the past and a shared present-day context.¹⁵⁰ Bellah et al argue that by participating in memorial ceremonies, rituals, habits in communion with others in a group—be it family, religious, ethnic, national, or otherwise—individuals learn the group's memory and perform them periodically. "People growing up in communities of memory not only hear the stories that tell how the community came to be, what its hopes and fears are, and how its ideals are exemplified in outstanding men and women; they also participate in the practices—ritual, aesthetic, ethical—that define the community as a way of life."¹⁵¹

Schwartz argues that these collective memories act as a model for society and a model of society. In this way, "collective memory affects social reality by:" reflecting society (how society was in the past vis a vis how society is today), shaping society (by prescribing actions and models for actions), and framing society (by setting ethical standards by which to judge the conduct of society).¹⁵²

Kansteiner's argument can act as a bridge between the types of scholars that Olick describes. The scholars above focus on the group aspects of identity formation, but Kansteiner argues that individual and collective memories are actually two distinct phenomena. They require distinct analytical frameworks for understanding them.¹⁵³

3.1.3.1.3 Self-concept. This argument in support of research along both phenomena roughly correlates to the notion of group identity as one analytical concept, and individual identity as another concept. The next of Prager's three terms is self-concept, which in particular describes one stream of research that tries to understand individual identity at its borders with group identity. Researches that engage each of the aspects seem to conflate the term *identity* but focus either more or less on group identity versus individual identity. That is to say, the distinction in the field of research that I make here is a matter of degree, rather than quality.

Prager argues that neither of these notions—embodiedness and embeddedness—is sufficient for understanding collective memory without accounting for how the individual interprets herself over time, how she is able to resist dominant frameworks, and how she carries with her an autobiographical memory also anchored into larger cultural or collective memories. "Individual memories become social through interpersonal communication and collective remembering that locate events in the thematic-causal structures in which they occur."¹⁵⁴

In regards to this relationship, Berger argues that collective memory is tied intimately with identity. We understand and identify ourselves, and interpret our past—our memories—based upon the current situation and milieu in which we find ourselves.¹⁵⁵

Rosenzweig and Thelen try to understand the connection between the individual and the collective memory by examining how people actually talk about their memories and identities in relationship to larger group memories. They conducted a study "to learn about the bridges people constructed between their personal pasts and larger historical stories."¹⁵⁶ They found that people who identified major historical events such as WWII as events that had affected them in the past did not talk about "the narrative most familiar to us from high school history books and popular culture: the war as a story of victory over fascism or as a key moment in a patriotic narrative of the nation-

state."¹⁵⁷ Instead, they wove the event and that event's influence on them personally into their personal narratives. They did not reject or ignore the narrative, they simply did not talk about it in those terms.

Sennett writes about laid-off computer programmers at IBM and concludes that the individualism that capitalism tends to encourage prevents these workers from "remembering well," which he defines as more objective remembering.¹⁵⁸ It is more objective because it is based upon others' experiences as well as your own. Sharing memories is a source of strength and solidarity, argues Sennett.¹⁵⁹ It is through the sharing of collective remembering that individuals really become related to the group and understand their own identity better.

Jan Assmann develops the concept mnemohistory as an analytical tool to understand cultural memory. Mnemohistory does not study the past, but rather studies what is remembered of the past. The study of mnemohistory seeks not to validate the truth claims that are made in cultural memory but rather is interested in investigating what it is specific memories do for those who remember them. By using this concept, scholars can understand how collective memory reconstruction is connected to identity.¹⁶⁰

Finally, Donald provides a useful metaphor that helps us to understand the link between the individual's conception of the self and the memories that are exterior to the self. Donald compares biological memory and external memory on the one hand with computer hardware, software, and networking on the other hand. Overall, he argues that biographical memory is the hardware and software stored within a single computer. The information stored here is more like the software that helps us access and interpret the memories that are stored externally, in the network.¹⁶¹ While useful, this metaphor risks suggesting that memory can be written and downloaded, leaving the human agentless.

3.1.4 Distinctions/Conceptual Clarity

In this final section of this literature review, I examine the distinctions between several concepts that are closely related to memory. Scholars have focused on these distinctions because the concepts are so closely related that it is difficult to say exactly what is the difference between them. These concepts include history, time, and imagination.

3.1.4.1 History. Memory and its relationship to history is a conversation in memory studies that seeks to answer questions about knowing the past. There is a debate about whether we can know history through memory, if so which methodologies are effective, and what exactly is the difference between memory and history. Pierre Nora has been a leading voice in this debate and the result of this debate for memory studies has been at the very least a proliferation in the types of memory scholars are identifying and then studying.¹⁶²

Halbwachs and Misztal both conclude, as do many authors, that memory is different than history. For memory studies, this is not very consequential, but this debate has remained relevant to history as a field that is now defending itself against post-modern attacks focused on, among other things, the difference between history and memory. For memory studies, Misztal concludes:

To comprehend the nature of memory requires the clarification of the type of causal connection between the present recollection and past events. Only by understanding that what memory supplies 'is not an itemized past but a continuity of conscience in which I recognize myself as a continuity of identity and my present experiences and engagements as my own,' will our remembering of the past not be confused with our historical understanding of it.¹⁶³

Halbwachs argues that collective memory is not history. Collective memory is connected to the past by way of its living in the present, whereas with history, each age is transformed from the previous age. It is the difference between one age and the next that is highlighted as history, whereas it is the resemblances that matter most in collective memory. In addition, there are innumerable collective memories, but only one history. Historians seek out facts and assemble them together in

order to get at History, whereas collective memories reside in the group. From the perspective of the group, the collective memory is made of remembrances common to each member of the group.¹⁶⁴

3.1.4.2 Time. Memory and its relationship to time is another conversation in memory studies. This topic has been theorized by many of the major names in memory studies, and the notion *time* itself recently has even culminated into its own subfield in Sociology. Misztal provides a short survey of the main ways scholars in memory studies have conceptualized time, writing that they "vary from insisting on the pastness of the past, through approaches regarding the past as being continuously recreated and reformulated into the emergent present, to positions stressing the timelessness of the past."¹⁶⁵

Bergson theorized inner time and time that applied to the material world. Proust talked about time as series of moments, stressing involuntary remembering. Durkheim argued time as socially constructed and Halbwachs endorsed this view.¹⁶⁶ Halbwachs added that individuals experience memory because that memory is a breaking with current time. If the individual is not interrupted from the current moment, time becomes an irrelevant notion.¹⁶⁷ And Mead focused on the way time passes within actions, the way we experience time while we are doing an activity.¹⁶⁸

3.1.4.3 Imagination. Memory and its relationship to imagination is a third conversation in memory studies. This topic has been theorized and investigated for centuries. There is a conceptual and sometimes practical overlap between the categories of memory, imagination, fiction, and history. There are generally two categories of research into which those studying this interconnection follow. One focuses on the hermeneutic, conceiving of memory in terms of images and noting how narrative imagination is connected both to identity and to memory. Another focuses on the social

reproduction of memory, and how the past is known not through imagination so much as rationalization.¹⁶⁹

Importantly, this debate has highlighted the role that trust plays in memory. Memory and imagination are very difficult to distinguish "[b]ecause memory involves the construction of mental images to 'place the past before our eyes.'"¹⁷⁰ And in order to make the distinction between the real and the imagined when thinking about the past, we largely rely upon trust, which adds to the difficulty in distinguishing between the concepts.

3.1.5 Summary

The major point to take away from these limited discussions on memory, history, time, and imagination is that all these concepts—as well as others such as identity—work together practically to ensure that memory is a hotly contested field. Not only is there a lack of means of proving history, especially when framing is involved and when the archive of the past is not whole, there is a lot at stake in the politics of memory. As has been made clear so far, collective memory is closely linked to collective identity, its uses can be political, and the results of such conflicts can have very real, material outcomes for the people who comprise these collective memory communities and collective identities.¹⁷¹ These are some of the issues I highlight and discuss in the data analysis below.

3.2 COLLECTIVE TRAUMA NARRATIVES LITERATURE REVIEW

In the introduction, I noted that many people in Srebrenica identified two main areas of concern they face in their daily lives. The first is politics, which I examine in the previous chapter. The second area of concern the residents of Srebrenica identified correlates more or less to the academic

subfield that studies cultural trauma and cultural narratives, embedded within the cultural memory literature.

Within that broad literature, which covers multiple disciplines and remains diverse in its approach to the topic, the present paper is located in the connection between collective memory, collective identity, master narratives, and collective trauma narratives. In addition to the discussion of memory and identity outlined above, a few more studies are relevant in this particular manner.

Yael Zerubavel presents the term *narrative* and makes a distinction between particular commemorative narratives and the master commemorative narratives to which they are attached. Narratives—the stories that groups tell about themselves—play a highly symbolic function for groups. Master narratives refer to a group's origin or emergence as that group, in an effort to create the group's distinct identity. They also periodize the collective memory by marking major stages in the group's past. Yael Zerubavel argues that in order to understand commemorative narratives, one must understand these master narratives.

Yael Zerubavel notes that not all narratives (or any narratives) are in an uncontested space. Counternarratives or counter memories try to dispute these more dominant narratives and they can be part of the master commemorative narrative or represent an alternative master commemorative narrative. This conflict makes collective memory a dynamic cultural force.¹⁷²

Schudson explains what narratives are. He defines narrativization as "both telling a story about the past and telling a story about the past's relations to the present," in "an effort to comprehend and interpret while making a story intelligible and interesting."¹⁷³ Traumas that affect an entire group of people sometimes become the material for narratives.¹⁷⁴ Groups will tell stories that are consistent with their master narratives in order to recount events in particular. These trauma narratives work to increase solidarity and group cohesiveness, as well give the members of the group a shared sense of the future, responsibility, and duty.¹⁷⁵

Eyerman defines cultural trauma as

a dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in the social fabric, affecting a group of people who have achieved some degree of cohesion. In this sense, the trauma need not necessarily be felt by everyone in a group or have been directly experienced by any or all.¹⁷⁶

Eyerman argues that collective identity formation is intimately linked with collective memory. "Memory provides individuals and collectives with a cognitive map, helping orient who they are, why they are here and where they are going."¹⁷⁷ The past is made present through symbolic interactions, the use of narratives and discourse, and material objects (e.g., museum objects).

Eyerman distinguishes between the Foucauldian term discourse and the term narrative by noting that "narratives are less institutionalized, more open and malleable."¹⁷⁸ "Collective narratives leave more room for individual agency even as they provide the framework through which individual stories gain wider meaning."¹⁷⁹ But Eyerman notes that collective trauma narratives can be used by powerful elites.

Alexander *et al* define collective trauma as, "a memory accepted and publicly given credence by a relevant membership group and evoking an event or situation which is a) laden with negative affect, b) represented as indelible, and c) regarded as threatening a society's existence or violating one or more of its fundamental cultural presuppositions."¹⁸⁰ Groups or collectives experience cultural trauma when an event or series of events or changes leads the group to realize that "the community no longer exists as an effective source of support and that an important part of the self has disappeared."¹⁸¹

In line with some of the theorists reviewed earlier, they argue that cultural trauma is a separate and distinct phenomenon from the aggregation of individual experiences of trauma. "Collective traumas are reflections neither of individual suffering nor actual events, but symbolic renderings that reconstruct and imagine them in a relatively independent way. This spiral of signification is the work of culture creators..."¹⁸²

How the event is transformed into a cultural trauma depends on a variety of factors. First, an agent of the community must broadcast certain representations about the event and how the event influences the past, present, and future of the collective.¹⁸³

Intellectuals, political leaders, and symbol creators make different claims about collective identity, about the nature of the wound and what caused it, about the identity of victim and perpetrator, and about what is to be done to prevent the trauma from happening ever again. Conflicting accounts weave protagonist and antagonist into powerful accusatory narratives and project these to audiences of third parties.¹⁸⁴

This symbolic representation is perpetuated by carrier groups, groups of individuals within the collective who dominate the construction of the cultural trauma memory.¹⁸⁵ This is an incredibly important element for the transformation of the trauma of the individuals into a particular collective trauma.¹⁸⁶ The audience of this narrative—the collective-at-large—receives the narrative and this reception determines the success of the narrative at creating a cultural memory and cultural trauma.¹⁸⁷

These narratives become "master narratives" when they identify the event that caused the trauma, identify who the victims are, identify how the victims are related to the wider audience, and identify who or what is to blame for the traumatic event.¹⁸⁸ These narratives are influenced by the institutional contexts within which they develop, including religious institutions, aesthetic institutions, legal institutions, scientific institutions, mass media institutions, and state institutions.¹⁸⁹

Eyerman, Alexander, and Breese argue that these cultural dramas "have material repercussions."¹⁹⁰ On the positive side, "they may lead to social reconciliation;....Institutionalizing a dominant trauma narrative is a singular social accomplishment. It stabilizes not only collective memory but also the contemporary sense of social reality, pointing the way forward in a confident way."¹⁹¹ On the negative side, they can lead "to divisive conflict and traumatic injury on a wider scale."¹⁹²

What these authors help us to see is that these narratives can also be oppressive for the very people they are said to describe. In the degree of separation that marks the difference between the individual experiences of trauma and the cultural narrative of trauma lies the opportunity for control and discipline by these narratives. The lives these narratives claim to represent may not experience the trauma or understand the situation in precisely the way the narrative articulates, and in some instances, those individuals might actively seek to resist these narratives.

Sometimes, such is the case in Srebrenica. Srebrenica's relationship with collective trauma narratives is complicated for several reasons. Politicians use the symbolic opportunity that they and other groups see in the very name Srebrenica. This is difficult in itself and is exacerbated by the clientelistic nature of politics and the economy I discuss in the previous chapters. Because the narratives and politics are so closely intertwined, the structure becomes larger, stronger, and more difficult to try to change—through voice—or to try to avoid—through exit. The collective trauma narratives on the Serbian and the Bosnian Muslim side of the conflict are both very present in the city, especially during the first two weeks of July, when many people come from places near and far to participate in the memorials for both sides of the war.

3.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THIS STUDY TO THE LITERATURES

This study is in direct conversation with much of this literature. The study has a lot to say about the various perspectives on collective memory, and also provides insight into many of the questions and debates emerging now. I briefly address those connections in the general observation section below.

In parallel to the contributions this study makes for the political disengagement literature, I want to state three contributions this study makes to the literature more generally. Firstly, this study

adds to this literature ethnographically-contextualized interview data, which allows respondents to describe their behavior in relation to the narratives in their own terms. In this way, this study uncovers new information about the nature of the relationship between people who purportedly are represented by those narratives and the narratives themselves.

Secondly, by analyzing the data in separate groups (e.g., Serb, Muslim) *and* analyzing the data as a whole, and by focusing on behaviors, this study highlights the remarkable *consistency* amongst respondents, an important aspect of data that often gets overlooked in analyses on Srebrenica in particular. That consistency suggests again that not only do the narratives fail to really connect with many members of the groups on each side, but furthermore many, many residents in Srebrenica see the narratives as the tool which is used by people with power (political and economic) to keep Srebrenica's economy near poverty and in a state of peril.

Thirdly, this study contributes to the literature by demonstrating a particular case study where the dominant collective trauma narratives are seen as oppressive structures in society by many individuals. This is an important aspect of this study and the literature more broadly. In particular, highlighting this aspect of collective narratives reveals the possibility that hatred or animosity is not such a deep problem in Srebrenica as the narratives might suggest. That has important implications for peace-building and reconciliation initiatives.

3.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

How do people in Srebrenica explain their engagement with these narratives? What are the voice, exit, and loyalty strategies that people in Srebrenica use when they choose to or are forced to engage with these narratives? How do they cope if and when they come into contact with narratives which

claim to, but do not in reality, represent them? How do the voice, exit, and loyalty strategies that people in Srebrenica use differ according to ingroup versus outgroup narratives, location of use, or time of year?

3.5 DATA

During the interviews, many individuals described their relationship to and their opinion of the narratives that dominate in Srebrenica and in Bosnia and the international community more generally. I have divided the data into three sets: loyalty, voice, and exit. **NARRATIVE LOYALTY** includes those behaviors and statements that seem to assume the validity or truth of the narratives that dominate in Srebrenica. **NARRATIVE VOICE** includes those behaviors or statements that seek to change the dominant narratives or the way people use those narratives in Srebrenica. Finally, **NARRATIVE EXIT** includes those statements and behaviors that seem to contradict or conflict with the dominant narratives in Srebrenica.

3.5.1 Narrative Loyalty

During my brief tenure in Srebrenica, I learned from a variety of individuals their dissatisfaction with these narratives. The interviewees distanced themselves from narratives when many of them stated that they do not see others in terms of ethnicity, or when they stated that there is no ethnicity problem in Srebrenica. This resulted in a data set where most of the interviewees were talking about when, how, and why *others* use the narrative.

The interview data I collected organizes into an interesting pattern when examining those instances where narrative loyalty is present. In those moments, those I interviewed were doing one

of a limited number of things: 1) actually using the narrative during the interview; 2) explaining why people are loyal to a narrative; or 3) explaining who uses a narrative and when—politicians [on stage], outsiders [usually during memorials and summertime], the media, and people from the villages [usually on the weekend when they are drinking]. I examine each of these instances in turn.

3.5.1.1 Using the Narrative. Only three people during the interviews—Milina, Hasan and Medin—actually employed the narratives, at least in part. It so happens that two were the only ones in the group of those I interviewed who are politicians. One is the Chief of Staff for a government minister in the Federation, and the other was formerly a Minister of Education in Sarajevo and was, at the time of the interview, the campaign director for one of the candidates running in the mayoral election in Srebrenica.

This man is one of those who walked through the woods from Srebrenica to Tuzla—about 120 kilometers—in the heat of July of 1995, and was in the woods for around 80 days.

This place was so small that I knew everybody. And this is why this conflict was so horrible because it was not on some sort of, when the conflict started, it was not on some sort of industrial scale of mass murder like what happened in Auschwitz where you had this kind of distance between the victims and the perpetrators where they did mechanically. When Bosniaks were being killed and burned down in houses and apartments here in 1992, they were burned down and killed by their neighbors who knew them all their life. And this is why this crime is even bigger than the one that I think happened during the Second World War, when there was a Jewish and Roma population. Because this was personal. I do not know what happened in people's heads. And I really want to know what happened in somebody's head to live together all their life, to go to the prom, or birthday parties and everything, and one morning just like that to decide, okay, I'm going to kill that person. What kind of, you know, software upgrade do you need to have in order to turn yourself from some kind of good-natured person to some evil individual? And just some evil individual, does that mean that you were evil all your life and you were just pretending to be my friend? Or, something horrible happened and you just became, you know, expression of true evil. I do not know.

~HASAN

This particular use of the narrative is important for a few reasons. First of all, Hasan, like most people in Srebrenica, has a very personal memory of the war. He spoke to me during the

interview about his survivor's guilt and other consequences from the war he experiences still today. This is very important to recognize because it highlights the very real nature of the narratives at the same time that I am investigating how these narratives become oppressive and how people react to them. This thesis in particular responds to two regimes that many people in Srebrenica identify as oppressive. But for Hasan, the narrative may not be a narrative at all because his actual personal biography largely reflects the narrative for his group. It is difficult to say whether Hasan is being loyal to the narrative, loyal to his biography, or in some ways loyal to both.

His interview is also notable because he is using the Bosnian Muslim narrative in order to extend an open hand to the Serbian side in order to make some kind of peace in Srebrenica for the future.

When I speak to the Serbs and I say, you know, look, you know, everything that could happen in Srebrenica happened in Srebrenica. In July of 1995, the gate of hell opened here. Anything, the worst thing imaginable that any human being can do to another happened here. And yet we are here, I am here, and you are here, and therefore, if you are here and I am here, uh, that means that we cannot escape each other. And therefore if we cannot escape each other it is in our best interest to work together which should be in our common interest you know. We've tried everything. We even tried ethnic cleansing and genocide, and it didn't work out. Obviously I'm the proof that you failed to accomplish whatever your mission was, even through this horrible atrocities. And I think it is about the time for, and I'm the first one to accept my end, to say let's sit down, let's work things out. Not for the sake of me, because my future is behind me. It is for the people who are going to live here. Let's work it out. Let's find some way of governing in which everybody is going to be equally happy or equally unhappy.

~HASAN

The other politician who used the narrative seemed to use it in a more typical way.

If you're a Bosnian Muslim, it's really about still fighting for survival, physical survival, biological survival and b) about your right, our right to a state, and uh, essentially it will come down to another issue that is central to Israel, and the Israeli Palestinian conflict, which is land.

~MEDIN

What is most interesting about his other statements is that this politician, as noted in the previous chapter, claimed to be trying to fix politics in Bosnia. He stated throughout the interview

that the way of doing politics currently clearly is not working, because politicians have incentives to focus on ethnicity. He wants to see the structure of the state voting laws changed dramatically to discourage that incentive.

He distinguished in the interview between his campaign and others as not engaging in politics as usual. At times he seemed to be dissatisfied with political use of the narratives, but when he said his campaign was doing it differently, he was referring to their restraint from buying votes. He used the narrative thusly:

INTERVIEWEE: What makes us different is that we are not offering anything [to] anybody [to come to vote for their political party]. We are just saying you have to do this, you should do this. Um, unless you do this, there will be consequences and there will be consequences you might not necessarily want to live with. And, uh, yeah, this is about emotions, this [is] about, um, this campaign is about emotions. It is about evoking feelings in the people that take them back to [the war]. I mean you can go and accuse us of playing to people's fears, and that argument would probably go only so far...

INTERVIEWER: Which fears?

INTERVIEWEE: Fears that in two years or five years down the road, they won't be able to come to Potocari [Bosniak Memorial Center] and pay their respect to their loved ones. And that is [a] realistic scenario.

~MEDIN

In his mind, the only way that their restraint from buying votes and using economic incentives would succeed would be if they were to use the narrative to evoke fear in the mind of the Bosnian Muslim public—if you do not vote, and vote for us, you will be sorry.

INTERVIEWEE: The only reason that it might succeed, the biggest reason that it might succeed is the mobili...the sort of mobilizational potential in Srebrenica. I mean, you couldn't do that for Bratunac.... But, uh, essentially, there's a, there's a potential for mobilization in Srebrenica, that no other place in this country has. And that's why we focused on that in this [election]....

INTERVIEWER: And what's the mobilization? Why is it so prime for mobilization?

INTERVIEWEE: Because it's Srebrenica.

INTERVIEWER: Because of the war?

INTERVIEWEE: Yeah. I mean, there is a sort of symbolical capital within that name, that warrants a higher degree of mobilization. For sort of, you know, the wider audience. When you say Bratunac, the only people that get up are from Bratunac. Srebrenica is a different thing, you know. And, you know, down the road, I see Srebrenica and what happened here in between 1992 and 1995 as becoming the sort of cornerstone for the strategic thinking of the state of Bosnia i Hercegovina.

~MEDIN

The third person used the narrative in a way that accepted the possibility that both the Serbian and the Bosnian Muslim narrative could coexist, a remarkable difference given the exclusionary manner in which most people who espouse the narratives use them, as I discuss in chapter 1. Paradoxically, during the interview, she spoke as if she had resolved the tension between the Bosnian Muslim claim to genocide and the Serbian claim to genocide. In the popular narratives on each side, the notion that a genocide occurred against one's own people is what prevents the group from acknowledging the innocence of those who suffered during the war on the other side. That resolution allows her to have sympathy for all the people who suffered during the war.

But uh, you never can know...you know my uncle is dead in war, and I can't say for sure that [a] Bosniak killed [him]. Maybe some Serbian killed him. Who knows, like it was war, you don't know who you are killing, you know. So just like, for you know, like, for, like, lost some member of your family, you can't blame, you know, all, all people, you know, who are in that religion. Like people who deserve to be hated are that one who [is in the] Hague, so they was that one who told the people to kill them. They was that one, you know. Also, like, I think that we don't need to hate them, you know, they don't deserve that, like, every night, they, I think that they are thinking about that like, "What did I do in war?" Like, do they really need it? What war brings good to them? You know, like all life they going to spend in jail. It's their punishment, they don't need nothing else. For me, I think like that.

~MILINA

3.5.1.2 Explaining Why People Are Loyal To a Narrative. Another set of interview excerpts explains why people are loyal to the narratives. As noted previously, only three of the interviewees really espoused the narratives themselves during the interviews. Most of them made it a point to say that they have no problem with ethnicity, that they see whether a person is good or bad, not whether a person is Serb or Bosnian Muslim. That is to say that these individuals are reporting why they think others use the narratives.

Djordje reports that some of the hatred results because of substantial changes in livelihood strategies as a result of the war. Those changes inspire resentment, and then these individuals blame the other side in the war, remaining loyal to the narratives.

You have to understand that most of the hating people are people who lost their lives during the war. I know a guy who was a lieutenant, at Yugoslav army, before the war, and now he is working hard physical work. I know a person, a guy who was a teacher before the war, now he works hard physical work. So, you have to blame someone. You blame Muslims....

~**DJORDJE**

Zoran reports that it is all economic. They will vote for politicians who use the narratives in their campaigns in order to score economic benefits.

People try to earn some money, because Serbs and Muslims are all in the same shit anyway.

~**ZORAN**

When you want to have a job, depends who is in charge of that of course, Muslims giving jobs to Muslims, Serbs to Serbs. It's kind of a normal thing. It's not normal, but it's kinda bit normal. There's not any fights or some hard words, it's just the way they do. It became a normal thing here, actually in the entire Bosnia, not only in Srebrenica. But in Srebrenica it is specific because of so-called genocide and of course the medias.

~**ZORAN**

Milos reports that good people who are trying to change the system are punished for their efforts by their political parties. Milos could see the potential good that was to come from Medin's previous work. But he sees how the system has even beaten that man to appear to be loyal to the narratives.

[Speaking of a political campaign manager in Srebrenica] And he is another example. He is [from the] liberal-secularist and progressive movement last year. In this year, he is in Srebrenica as a punishment leading that ID card registration [campaign]. He is paying his dues to the party because he tried something. And now, I mean, he fought with the system, lost, and now he is a part of the system. He just lost. And he is tired, and now, he probably is doing the bigger damage to the society than he [was] trying to contribute last year. And that is the issue. Every new generation becomes tired, becoming some 30 – 35 age, just swap and become part of the system.

~**MILOS**

Milos also reports that most people are ready for interethnic association, but they are afraid of being punished, as he reported Medin had been. In the general public, rather than in politics, the punishment is social exclusion. In Srebrenica, that can mean a variety of things, but importantly it can mean segregation from chances for access to the economy.

INTERVIEWEE: Maybe some, some group, some individuals, maybe entire population, maybe, even 90% of population are prepared on social interaction in any kind of sense.

INTERVIEWER: What does that mean, to be prepared?

INTERVIEWEE: You are prepared, are like [ready for] multi-ethnic marriages, multi-ethnic social groups, multi-ethnic political party, I don't know, joint memorial center. They may be prepared; but they are afraid of social infamy within their own groups because they will be punished. If you start like individual, you will be punished. You simply will.

INTERVIEWER: How? What does the punishment look like?

INTERVIEWEE: The punishment is social exclusion. You will not get a job, you will, even if you have a job, you will lose customers, no matter how, no matter how high are you or low on social class. You will just get this social punishment of exclusion, and yet again you will not be accepted by other group. You just simply will not be accepted. [Describing an interaction] "Yeah, Hi, how are you? You have a nice holiday" and it is ended. That is the end. You go have a cup of coffee and a couple of hours or two and that is the peak of the social interaction between the two.

INTERVIEWER: Why is that the peak?

INTERVIEWEE: Because you could be socially excluded.

~MILOS

Milos also reports how it was originally for his mother when the returnees came back to Srebrenica. For her, social ridicule and infamy was the punishment, and it effectively prevented her from displaying anything but loyalty to the narrative. Likewise, he explains how economic dependence is also directly responsible for the loyalty people in Srebrenica appear to pay to the narratives.

I remember when the first returnee came to Srebrenica. And that was one neighbor of mine, and my mother came to the yard and said hello to her. That was the main news in the community [for the] next three months. After that, my mother never, ever went to say "hi" to her. She was punished. I would, she even accepted [it] as her guilt....For true social interaction to be possible, we need something that is currently impossible in Bosnia, and that is [the] economically independent person. Until we have economically independent individuals, that could make social interaction or any social movement on their own and not afraid of any punishment, it won't be possible. That's that. And now we don't have socially independent individual, everybody are dependent from the other one. That is the system. That simply is the system. The presence of international agency here in the first ten years were

refreshment because there was several individuals, not individual, couple of hundreds of people that start with that interaction and many of them interact, um, just in the sense of economical interests. They weren't economically independent from the international agency, and international agency understood that social interaction between ethnics should happen, but they just hang around because they receive the payment from the international agency. And now when all that stopped, they are, like I said, quite the nationalists. So we need some economically independent individuals that are not dependent like someone is giving him the money to be independent, but that his work is independent.

~MILOS

Dusko explains that some people stay segregated more as a matter of habits of sorts. When the people try to come together, organizations say they are being disrespectful toward the war memories, e.g., the Mothers of Srebrenica. Dusko is careful to note that this group of women do not live in Srebrenica. It is probably the case that some of these women do not live in Srebrenica year round, but it is also important to point out that some of them were driven away from their homes in Srebrenica during the war. The war is likely one major reason why these women do not live in Srebrenica today.

We had Days of Srebrenica, Dani Srebrenice, [where] we bring here famous bands from Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, around Bratunac, Srebrenica, and Zvornik. It's a ton of bands. [The group of] women, Mothers of Srebrenica, they [do] not [live] here. They [are] in Sarajevo, in Tuzla...And they said that we cannot [have] a concert because in Srebrenica, grenades killed people. You know Bosnia; grenades killed people everywhere, but only in Srebrenica we cannot [have] a concert. If they make [it a] problem, people cannot stay in café bars after eleven o'clock. [They say], "It's too noisy." The [real] problem is people start to go out together, Muslims and Serbs.

~DUSKO

3.5.1.3. Explaining Who Uses the Narrative—Politicians, Outsiders, Media, Villagers. Milina recounted how she had seen flyers that were distributed in and around her building, urging her to vote for Bosnian Muslims. Presumably politicians and/or people associated with the political parties had distributed these flyers as election season was heating up.

And uh, for me, I never [had a] problem, with Bosniaks, or Croatians, or with Serbs. Never. But, for that [next] war, I am worried because [of] this election. Because a couple nights ago, on the street, you could see papers where they wrote, somebody,

they wrote, like, uh, all Serbian people need to vote for Bosniaks, or they [are] going to be killed.

~MILINA

Ado confirms that even after politicians are in office, they still talk about nationalism.

For those, in every political candidate when he is elected, he has, like, four years just to talk about nationalism, just to talk about other ethnicities, he has four years to [tell] to his people, "hate this one. He don't have your religion."

~ADO

Zoran suspects that the next war will be intraethnic, partly because, while in general people do not like each other, any ethnic divisions exist because of the politicians. He predicts the violence will be organized differently, presumably because the dislike is from the politicians, and not from most people.

[Explaining why a new war would be Muslim-Muslim and Serb-Serb violence:]
To clean the scum. Like politicians and the war, what is the word, people who make profit from war or something like that and that will probably be that kind of war. But in general, people don't like each other—Muslims - Serbs and Serbs - Muslims because of the politicians. Because those two subjects are really related. You can't speak anything to not to mention politics or politicians because they are worse kind here.

~ZORAN

Mladen also blames politicians for the tensions that sometimes permeate society. But he is careful to note that when his job required that he was around politics and politicians a lot, years earlier—but after the war—he saw clearly that politicians are duplicitous. They argue on camera but are friendly and cooperative when they are alone.

That's it, because, hmm, [politicians] just, they are just heating the situation with their statements, with their appearances, with their politics, but that's not what they really think because that's the story for the public.

~MLADEN

Edin describes how both sides of the Srebrenica conflict contribute to and perpetuate this kind of politics. They are all driven by their desire to win the elections, but they have not changed anything since the war ended—not even how they are talking.

[Describing how things are today in the political realm]:

Everything [politicians] were saying in 1995, they are repeating now. From Bosniaks' perspective, that Srebrenica going to be some, we'll have some special treatment, that they will bring investments here, and that way they [are] taking, um, this strategy to win on the elections, and um. On the other side, Serbs want to [be] negating the genocide, they want to, you know, to show us that it's still a part of the Serbian part of Bosnia, or Republika Srpska. So that is why it is the same all the time, they just using the same words, before every elections.

~EDIN

Dusko admits that he sees some segregation happening when people come into the city from outside, but he also is careful to note that it might just be because Bosnian Muslims and Serbs eat different diets.

INTERVIEWEE: Here in [this café bar], people sit together. Not in others...., there is Islamic [bar], everybody knows who is boss of the bar [based upon] what's his name [marked on the door]. Okay. I saw [a] couple time[s] when came [a] bus from Tuzla or Sarajevo, and people go out and eat somewhere. [The bar owners] write who is the owner on the door. [The people on the bus will say,] "Okay, we don't go there. Unless we find where is our [bar]...?"

INTERVIEWER: Why? Why do they do that?

INTERVIEWEE: Because maybe, I think maybe it is political, but Muslims don't eat pork. Maybe it's, they say it's a reason....

~DUSKO

Fatima also thinks that people who come from outside of Srebrenica are the ones who bring with them the ethnic problems.

You know, in this city, we have, like, Serbians and Bosniaks who are living together but when that, you know, people, Serbian or Bosniaks, doesn't matter, when they come from other cities and they are coming here, you know, like, they are just the one that [put] hate between [Bosniaks and Serbs]. They just, then they go and we stay here.

~FATIMA

And Milina highlights the problems that come from outside of Srebrenica especially during the memorial days during July.

The only problems are what you can see is by 11th of July when genocide against Bosniaks happened, and 12th July when genocide happened to Serbian people. Then people are coming from other countries in our city and telling you, "You need to hate him because he is Serbian. You need to hate him because he is Bosniak." But they want just to get you in conflict with your neighbors, with your friends, what you are seeing everyday.

~MILINA

Milina also reported that around the memorial days in July, the expressions of grief come out in full force. When the media reports on the memorial days in Srebrenica—a major event each year in the country—they are reproducing the narrative. And people who are coming in from the outside—including the media—are the source of ethnic tensions.

You know, just for 11 July, I definitely respect that date, like 12 July, you know. Like, and uh, the air is not the same like every other day, because 11 July you can hear the people, how they are crying. You can see them on the street, you can see that you know, every, all day on TV, you get reports what is happening. There also [is] for 12 July. There is a lot of people on the street completely a mess. You know, you can go from one city to another, but uh, that's normal, you know, people are sad in that time, and I understand them. I just don't understand people who are coming from other countries and then they are telling them, you know, [say] something [bad to others].

~MILINA

Zoran confirms the media as a source of ethnic narratives. He suggests here and throughout his interview that the media purposely seeks out the most vocal individuals to display because that story is interesting. The story that people do not hate each other so much is boring.

You can see that on 11th July when you go in Potocari, or 12 July if you go in Kravica or Bratunac. The Muslims kill Serbs, and this is your day on 11 July. And you can find people in those gatherings and you can talk with those people if you want those kind of people, and that is normal. [Journalists] wants to have that kind of story because that story is interesting. This story is boring.

~ZORAN

Djordje explained that good people, people he knows, appear to be loyal to the narratives. While other interviewees admitted that ethnic animosity is a problem with a small portion of the population, Djordje was the only one who described the situation thusly:

You have many people who don't like Muslims, many Serbs. Many Muslims who don't like Serbs. Hate Serbs. Many Serbs who hate Muslims. I know those people. Most of them are good people. But they have this problem, and they are not going to be violent about it, because after all, they are civilized. It is against their dignity to do something like that.

~DJORDJE

Hasan explained that it is normal for people in Bosnia to emphasize ethnicity. He is careful to note that 'there are people' but he is contrasting that to the larger population. There are some who focus only on ethnicity first. And they have a right in the country.

I mean, that's Bosnian reality [ethnicity]. I mean anybody who comes to Bosnia has to be faced with this reality. I mean Bosnia is a complex and multiethnic society, therefore there are people whose ethnicity to them is very important, and therefore, they should be recognized as a part of this ethnic group.

~HASAN

Another two common themes in the interviews were in some ways inextricably linked. Many of those I interviewed talked about people from the village, but also talked about how those people cause problems in the city, especially on the weekend, when they come into town to drink some beer and meet with people.

Dusko suggests that the fights that do occur because of the people from the villages are usually amongst themselves, and they are not always nationalist—sometimes it is a village rivalry.

Conflict isn't between those people [who have lived in Srebrenica for a long time]; it's [from] people around from villages, ... they [are] back in villages, [and] they have weekend in bars, and drink. And then, it was two years ago last time I think last fight between [them]. But they make fights and problems if they come from two villages, two different villages. It's not always a nationalist fight. But I think it's because [of] alcohol.

~DUSKO

Zoran talks about the people from the village who want to hang out with other people from the villages, regardless of ethnicity.

People from villages, when they come in the town, they [are] just, they are kind of, [stupid], you know. They don't want to hang with people, just want to be with their same kind of people. When I say kind of people, I don't mean like Muslims or Serbs or something like that. They just want to [be] hanging with people that have same opinion. They don't want to listen to anyone, they don't want to hear anything else. They are just like horses, they are just looking straight and that is it.

~ZORAN

As these excerpts demonstrate, the people who are loyal to a narrative are diverse—politicians, outsiders, regulars in the town, media, people from the villagers, and others just in the

general population for whom ethnicity is important. These interviews demonstrate the wide variety of people who seem loyal to the narrative, at the same that the excerpts demonstrate how few people seem to be loyal to the narratives but instead are driven to division by politics, economics, the media, or alcohol.

3.5.2 Narrative Voice

Only one person in my pool of interviews suggested that she ever used voice in reference to the dominant narratives in order to change the way people think about others and themselves. Interestingly, this young woman tells a story about when she was considerably younger, still in school. For now, I only remark that perhaps she had not been fully inculcated into the system of practices and meanings that govern in-group interactions in Srebrenica. I discuss this case, and those practices, in a later chapter. Otherwise, she was unique as the only individual who remarked upon or gave an example of narrative voice.

INTERVIEWEE: I can understand, uh like, if you know, like, my friend lost somebody in [the] war. Okay, he can't be friends with Bosniaks, [for] his reasons. You know, he is, the rest of [his] family don't allow him that. But that don't give him [the] right to talk bad about them [Muslims]. Like you never can know. I don't know, I'm going to say this. Like, if I have friend who [lost] somebody in the war, like if he can't be friends with Bosniak, for me, it is okay, he can't. But he can't talk bad about every Bosniak man and girl, you know, that he met.

I remember when I was so small and we came back to live [in] Srebrenica, and in our city come just one Bosniak girl. In my building was living [a] brother and sister who [lost their] father in the war, and, uh, they hated her, that girl. Like, "she is Bosniak; Bosniaks killed my father." And I asked them, like, uh, "do you think she is maybe [the one who] killed your father?" They said, "No, she isn't." Like, "Why you are then telling that to her? Like, everyday she is crying because of you." And they, you know, just look at me, and they went home.

INTERVIEWER: Did they say? Did they answer you?

INTERVIEWEE: They didn't say nothing, they just went in. And from [the next day] they was "Okay, never again." They didn't touch her, you know. And after some years passed, I talked with them, you know. I am friends with them. I ask them, "do they remember that period?" And they say, they tell me they was so stupid that time. They was small. They can hear from their mother when she is telling them, "you need to hate them," you know. But uh, you never can know...you know my uncle is dead in war, and I can't say for sure that [a] Bosniak killed [him]. Maybe some

Serbian killed him. Who knows? Like it was war, you don't know who you are killing, you know.

~MILINA

3.5.3 Narrative Exit

The people I interviewed in Srebrenica were careful to note where they think ethnic hatred comes from in Srebrenica: the politicians and the media—in one interview in particular, in addition to the interview excerpts I include earlier in this chapter and in chapter 1 and chapter 2. Many of them also took opportunities during the interview to demonstrate that they personally do not espouse the narratives, and they did this in a variety of ways. Finally, many of them also spoke about life strategies more generally they employ in order to avoid contact with use of the narratives.

3.5.3.1 Exiting Interviews with the Media. Zoran explains how journalists purposefully seek out people they think will confirm the typical story about Srebrenica:

'They are journalists, they are, I can freely say, cunts, because they don't want to know entire story about war or anything. They just want to sell a story and that is [a] normal thing. And they [are] making stories. Okay, you'll find hot heads you know, and you talk and make interviews with them, like normal people. Of course, what are [they] expecting? [They] talk with some aggressively behaving man or something and of course, he hates Serbs, and you find a Serb who hates Muslims, and that is completely normal to have that opinions. And [they] make [their] opinion and [their] entire story: okay, they hate each other. They want to kill each other. But that is not true.

~ZORAN

He then goes on to explain how, when he realized interviews were going to be this way, he decided not to give interviews anymore.

I don't know, there was a group of Dutch who [came] here and they okay, they were looking for people to have interview with them...I don't know, that was five or six years ago, maybe more. And okay, they all wanted to talk about war, because that is always interesting story, you can sell that story. And when you start talking with them, "Okay, I will give you [an] interview, but you are interested in Serbs, the victims? Okay, what you interested in?" [They say,] "We are interested only in Potocari, for Muslim victims, about genocide, blah blah blah." "Fuck yourself, then.

You just came here, you know what you will write, but you just need someone to have..., 'Okay, I talk with twenty people and all twenty say this same story. Okay, I will little bit correct that and do it in my way and...' Why do you need people for interview? You have your interview, you just need to come into Bosnia to fulfill that paper [requirement] or something and that is it." And because of that, people are fools. I'm done with interviews and that kind of thing. It is boring, you [are telling] the same story a thousand times, and you don't have nothing from that. Just talking, talking, talking, talking. And for what? Nothing. You cannot change anything with those interviews. Because they don't care. They just need, people just want to know what they already know. They just want someone to confirm that what they came. [But then they say,] "Okay. Shit. That [war] was not like [I thought]? Fuck. What to do now? Okay, find someone who will tell that story [I] want to know." Okay, I have my side, what [happened] during the war. Someone else have another kind of story. Third person, another kind of story and you must talk with a million people here, and after that [you] will [say], "Fuck Bosnia, fuck the people here. They are all liars."

~ZORAN

In fact, Zoran and I had become acquainted in the weeks leading up to the interview he granted me. In one of our first conversations, he asked me why I had come to Srebrenica. When I told him why I was there—for research—he made it clear to me that he had no interest in being interviewed. But then he began to tell me all the sorts of things that I had come to find out—which I had just revealed to him moments earlier when I explained why I had come to Srebrenica.

Many days later, sitting at the café where I frequently would see him, another man was sitting nearby and he also asked me why I had come to Srebrenica. I explained again. And again, Zoran began to say what he thought about all the questions I have relating to my research.

And again many days later, a similar situation occurred. But this time I stopped him and asked him whether he realized he had already answered all my interview questions twice earlier. He said he did realize that. Then I asked him why he was comfortable talking with me in that way outside of an interview but did not want to say any of these things in an interview. He replied to me that he thought all interviews are going to be same, that he is telling the same stories over and over again but it does not matter because people write what they want to write anyway.

Over time, Zoran began to trust that I was not going to manipulate or throw away what he said because I had a different story to write in my mind. He said he would do an interview with me.

When it was all finished, he was surprised that it had not taken very long at all. He had not told the stories he thought he would be asked to tell. And he said he did not think I was trying to write something other than what he had said in the interview.

In fact, after the interview was officially over, Zoran then decided to tell me *those* stories—stories about his experience in the war, his opinion and perspective on what really happened during the war. This story demonstrates most forcefully the notion of exit. Zoran has a history with the media and the narratives. He made a conscious decision not to give interviews because he does not want to support the dominant narratives about the war. But what he does want is the opportunity to tell his story to people that really will listen rather than see him only as an ethnicity. As he said in the above excerpt, he wants to change it.

3.5.3.2 Exiting the Narrative During the Interview. In other sections of the interview, Zoran tried to paint a different picture of life in Srebrenica, one that normalized the people who live there, who struggle like everyone else in the world. He also goes so far as to suggest that the hatred people do have in Srebrenica is more toward politicians than anyone else—he suggests the next war will be fought in order to clean the scum of the politicians in each party. That is, the next war will be intraethnic, not interethnic.

Okay, people live normally, more or less. They don't live normally because they don't have a job. You know, and they don't have money. And that is the problem. Not a war. Not war stories, or something like that. People here have normal problems like everyone else in the world. They are trying to find a way to earn some money for family living, to go somewhere or do something normal. Not to have a war or killing people, something like that.

~ZORAN

But people in general, even in Srebrenica, they don't hate each other in that way.

~ZORAN

INTERVIEWEE: Actually, the word hate is not [the] correct, you know, word to say about relationship between people here. We don't hate each other anymore in that kind of way that we want to kill each other anymore. We don't want, nobody wants a

war again. But maybe it will be a good thing that it happens again. Because probably people will not be shooting Muslims and Serbs and Serbs and Muslims, but probably they will shoot between each other, you know like Muslims shoot Muslims and Serbs shoot Serbs.

INTERVIEWER: Hmm. Why is that? Why would that be the way they would...

INTERVIEWEE:: To clean the scum. Like politicians and the war, what is the word, people who make profit from war or something like that and that will probably be that kind of war. But in general, people don't like each other—Muslims Serbs and Serbs Muslims because of the politicians. Because those two subjects are really related. You can't speak anything to not to mention politics or politicians because they are worse kind here.

~ZORAN

Selma also was concerned to demonstrate that in Srebrenica ethnicity does not come between people. She wanted to show that though she has reason to hate, she does not. And she suggests that Bosnian Muslims and Serbs normally are together in the city.

This city is not divided, it's not true. Every café you can find Bosniak and Serb sitting together in all café. We don't have problems. Bosniaks don't have problems with Serbs, Serbs don't have problems with us. I [lost someone] during the war, in war I [lost] my father and many members of my family and somebody who is other religion than me, it is not his fault for it.

~SELMA

One of the most common phrases I heard during the interviews and otherwise was that people in Srebrenica do not see ethnicity. They only look to see whether a person is a good person or a bad person.

From my perspective, I don't see any divides. People sit here, these people sit here, others sit there. Also, I think that when you watch on TV, maybe you can hear different stories about this city, about this country, but I am blaming people who are in politics or are [in] power because they are doing that. Like this religion here and this here, it's their fault. On my part, basically, I don't have a problem with that. I am just seeing people as good and bad, and that's all. People from politics, it's easier for people who are in power to manipulate people when they are [telling] them they need to be divided, so it is [in] their interest.

~ADO

Dusko also normalizes the people who live in Srebrenica, suggesting they are looking for money to live and jobs to survive. They are interested in building a future.

People wanna have a life. They try [to] keep the money, they look for jobs, and uh, they haven't interest for politics or ethnic difference, for...what's happened in war.

They [look] forward and...sit together, they drink coffee, or they go to listen music if there's some concert. But, politics put fingers in between people.

~DUSKO

Medin—the politician who was so faithfully loyal to the narrative as a tool in the political campaign he was leading at the time—was careful to state his feelings about ethnicity in Bosnia:

But, as a Bosnian Muslim, I see my, you know my nationality is Bosnian. I don't feel very good in Bosniak skin, because you know to be a Bosniak, you have to believe in God. You know, and I don't. I am an atheist. I am an atheist. I'm a secularist. I'm a staunch secularist. I believe in the values of the French Revolution. I believe in the values of European Renaissance. I believe in the separation of church and state. Some of those values haven't percolated into this country, and that's another problem. But uh, to get back to what you were asking, this, as a Bosnian, for me, you know, my only nationalism is my state. You know my only...I am an entirist. I'm not a nationalist. I want to see a strong state because, because a strong and viable state, with strong and responsible, strong and responsive institutions is what ensures physical survival for a group of people that I was born into without even being asked.

~MEDIN

Milina reports how she commonly forgets about the narratives when she is in mixed company.

INTERVIEWEE: You know, I never do think about it. Sometimes, it is happening to me that I'm sitting with Bosniak and Serbian people and then I tell them—because the most beautiful place for me in Srebrenica is place next to the church—and then I tell them let's go there and sit there. And then I just realize in that moment, like oh my God, there is [a] Bosniak in this group. But just in that moment, I figure [it] out.

INTERVIEWER: So what did they say? What did the people that you said it to, what did they say back to you?

INTERVIEWEE: You know, they just start to laugh, and that was all.

~MILINA

3.5.3.3 Practicing Exit As Strategy. Hasan takes time to explain the nature of social relationships in Srebrenica today in light of the war years. He also talks about his motivation for improving life in Srebrenica—his children and their futures. Earlier in the interview, Hasan states that the situation that prevails today—lack of justice and lack of knowledge about the atrocities of the war—and a sober awareness of the likelihood that this situation will not change is the *only* starting point for

conversations between Bosnian Muslims and Serbs for the better of their future together. His strategy for working towards a better future in Srebrenica is a focused rejection of what the narrative would prescribe as appropriate behavior.

These people that are living here, they've lived together all their life, for example, from every Serb of my age, I know his family, I know his father and mother, I knew his father and mother if they are no longer alive. I knew his grandfather, his grandparents, you know. I know them as a person, as an individual. I do not know them as a Serb, or as a Bosniak, or as a Roma, I know them as an individual.... So if I can do my contribution to make sure that [my children] are going to have normal life and not live in this kind of limbo of mood swings and never being truly happy or never being you know....If I can do something in order to at least have their life not destroyed by such a horrible conflict then my life is not in vain, you know. But you know, the reason why is this possible is [when] two people here hang out in Srebrenica, they do not hang out as a Bosnian and Serb, they hang out as Joe and Julian who know themselves personally.

~HASAN

Fatima relates what it was like for her life during the war when she and her family fled to Germany. She compares that to when she returned to Bosnia, first Sarajevo and then eventually Srebrenica. Fatima's strategy has little to do with ethnicity and more to do with whether a person is good or bad.

1992, I was [a] child, then war happens. I went to Germany to work. After that I come back to live in Sarajevo. During my life in Germany, you know, like Muslims, Serbs, and Croats were living together. We was Yugos. Every Sunday we know that Serbs are going to church, you know Bosniaks going in mosque, the Croats go in their church. They finish their religious obligation and after that you go [to the same] street in Germany. We there in Germany, we was so unique, we was together, we didn't have [a] problem. Here it was war. Also when I come back to live in Sarajevo, you know I have friends who are Serbs, Croats, but I didn't look [at] them like they have different religion. I am looking [at] people just, "Are they good people or not?" Also in Croatia, when I [am] coming back to Srebrenica, I don't look if she is Serb or Muslim, I look if she is good or not. You know. When I came back to Srebrenica, I didn't, you know, like, split up the people like that, like religion, you know. I just see is that a good person, or not, or if I am Serbian, if I want to have contact with her it's okay. If I don't, it's okay, she respects that.

~FATIMA

Selma's strategy is simply to ignore family and friends who might question her interactions with friends of a different ethnicity. She is also careful to note that not all but only some of them question her behavior.

In Tito's time, I could go to my friends for Christmas or Easter, now I can't. I can, but people from my ethnicity will ask me why do you do it? Some of them, not all.

~SELMA

Zoran does not want even to talk with people like those from the village, who previously he had described as close-minded and more likely to get into fights.

[The people from the villages] are just like horses, they are just looking straight and that is it, and you cannot talk with those people at all. I don't want to talk with those kinds of people.

~ZORAN

Fatima employs a similar strategy. She avoids them and consciously ignores them.

That kind of people you know, village people, you just need to ignore, you just don't have to have them in your life. I ignore, I don't want to have to hear about them talking with them, just ignore them. I don't want to become, to get into discussion with them, to become nervous after, because when you talk with that kind of people, you can't explain to them that this happened—this religion lost this, [that] religion lost [that]. They don't understand it. They have just their opinion and they don't want to change it.

~FATIMA

Here Zoran explains to me why there appear to be Muslim bars and Serb bars. In fact, in Srebrenica, there seem to be places that people who identify as Serbian are less likely to frequent—though it is true that sometimes they will go into those places. And there are a few places that people who identify as Bosnian Muslim or Muslim are less likely to frequent. But those places are fewer in number. At the surface level, these places might appear to be segregated, but the reason for that segregation is not uniform hatred or animosity between the groups. Instead, to the extent that there is segregation, it is a conscious effort to avoid even the possibility of an overt conflict, on the off chance that someone from the village is in the bar, or that alcohol might have heated otherwise cool heads.

But I don't have problem to go down there [to a dominantly Muslim bar], but I just don't want to be a cause for some trouble, and better for me is to stay away from that. And not for safety, no one will kill you, no one will stab you, with knife or something like that, but you will have a verbal fight or something, and we don't need that, no one needs that kinds of things. It's much better for people to stay where they are.

~ZORAN

Medin, the campaign manager and former Minister of Education in Sarajevo, spoke about how he fought for the rights of non-Muslims in Sarajevo. His strategy is sometimes one of exit.

Uh, I was fighting for the rights of non-Bosniaks, of non-Muslims in Sarajevo. The same way, you know, with the same passion, the same intensity that I am fighting for the rights of non-Serbs in Republika Srpska. ... I believe that whoever considers this country his or hers should be equal before the laws of this country anywhere they are, regardless of who they are, what their name is, what their religion is, what their ethnicity is, what their I don't know, what their race is. I don't care about that. But it's a vision of a Bosnia for Bosnians. It's a vision for a Bosnia, in which the sovereignty is derived from the individual citizen rather than an ethnic group. Like, in, everywhere else in the world, every functioning democracy.

~MEDIN

This excerpt is particularly interesting because Medin is the campaign manager who is using the narratives in order to motivate people to vote. He dedicated his previous work to fighting for the rights of non-Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo. Now he is using the Bosnian Muslim narrative and the fear it inspires in order to win an election. Even though the strategy *seems* paradoxical, Medin makes sense of these strategies in combination because he interprets himself as fighting for the rights of *minorities* in Bosnia. In Sarajevo, non-Bosnian Muslims were the minority. In Srebrenica, non-Serbs are the minority. For him, it appears the narratives really are a tool—adding some credibility to others' interview statements suggesting that politicians, otherwise suspected of fierce nationalism, are duplicitously using the narratives as a tool to win elections.

Milina agrees with Fatima and others I interviewed that she first looks whether a person is good or bad, not whether she is Bosnian Muslim or Serb. The real determination for her is whether that person is like her in terms of values. Her exit strategy, like others, is to ignore people who focus on ethnicity.

I always understand, that for every normal man, that, if that friend is [a] different religion, that does [not] mean anything for me. He is the same like me; just [that] he has [a] different name. He is going in mosque. I am going in church. That is the only difference between us. I can work. I can go to school. I can go out with a Bosniak man [or] girl. It's not a problem for me. Also like, during this travel, traveling these three years, I met a lot of people, different religion, and never, never, I didn't have a problem. So you just need to be normal, to think normal to think positive.

~MILINA

On what happens when she meets people who are loyal to their in-group narrative:

And then I just ignore them and stop with having friendship with them.

~MILINA

In general, these examples of exit strategy demonstrate a few things. On the epistemological level, they demonstrate that the people in Srebrenica are very much aware of these narratives, are aware of what behavior is expected from them, consider thoughtfully what the long-term consequences of that kind of behavior is, and thoughtfully develop strategies to avoid situations where they will be disciplined into those behaviors.

These examples also demonstrate that many of the people I interviewed use a combination of strategies in their own lives, and that they interpret others' behaviors in terms of the narratives and then make their decisions about their strategies contingently based upon their interpretation of these situations.

3.6 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

At the conclusion of the literature review above, I explain that this study includes data that can be in direct conversation with many of the approaches to collective memory as well as some of the smaller, more specific debates and questions that the research in this literature is confronting. I address those connections in a limited way at the opening of the next two sections.

In the conclusion to the literature review above, I also outline three contributions to the literature that this study makes in particular. At the end of the next section, I expand on those contributions in light of the data analysis. In section 3.6.2, I describe the same six general observations about life in Srebrenica in particular that I describe in the concluding sections in chapter 2.

3.6.1 In Relation to the Collective Memory Literature

In this section of the paper, I discuss how the data I present in this chapter relates to the collective memory literature more broadly. First, I compare my data with the presentist, the popular memory, and the dynamics of memory approaches to collective memory. Then I compare my data to the more specific discussions on collective memory and group identity and collective memory and self-concept. Then, I use the first comparison with the more specific literature to draw some conclusions about how my data actually is in direct conversation with the more broad literature and suggest some important paths for future research.

Hobsbawm's notion of invention of tradition and his link between collective memory and nationalism has obvious relevance in Bosnia and Serbia. If narratives are understood as a type of tradition that can be invented, it is certain that politicians in both Bosnia more generally, Republika Srpska, and Serbia most certainly use the war memories and stories in order to promote themselves and gain election. The interview excerpts from Medin are but one example. These politicians use narratives to serve their current purposes. My data also provides a lot of evidence to support this, especially in the section on narrative exit and narrative loyalty in this chapter. When the interviewees say that ethnicity problems come from politicians and outsiders, the statements support Hobsbawm's thesis.

At the same time, the critiques that are leveled at Hobsbawm's presentist approach should be noted. Politicians use a variety of historical and anecdotal resources in order to support the narrative—the narratives are not *ex nihilo* invented. Their construction and use is constrained by history, by internal consistency, and by the stories that the public is willing to accept as factual. It is the nature of that acceptance that this study illuminates.

Also, while they did not enter into the geographic location of my ethnography, it is important to note that there is a large constituency that does directly support the narratives because their personal histories in many ways directly and genuinely mirror the events often highlighted in the narratives. For example, the experiences of many Muslim men who fled into the woods in 1995 occupy a large part of the narrative on the Muslim side. The experiences of the Mothers of Srebrenica are also intimately related to the narrative. In this way, a presentist approach to Srebrenica's narratives overstates the extent to which narratives are invented, for it is sure that many people directly relate to the narratives.

The popular memory approach, which highlights the power relationships in society and how they operate to produce an official memory, and how they trigger counter-narratives, also lends some insight into the case in Srebrenica. By looking for the popular memories—the counternarratives in this case—we can see how power has worked to produce and discipline two populations in Srebrenica.

On the one hand, the official narrative of the Federation government inspires a counternarrative by the Serbian population in Srebrenica, in greater Bosnia, and in Serbia. Those sorts of individuals' memories usually seem to highlight friendships that these individuals have now or had before the war. They include stories about friends who are buried in Potocari, about the struggles they faced as 'deserters' during the war, or about conversations they have had with their

Muslim friends who fought during the war in order to find out where, perhaps, a missing family member's body might be found.

On the other hand, the official narrative of the Republika Srpska government inspires a counternarrative by the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica and greater Bosnia. These individuals highlight their desire to see people as good or bad, rather than as Muslim or Serb. They demonstrate their relationships with Serbian friends and co-workers today. They talk about how life was before the war. They do not endorse the narrative's focus on collective guilt of the Serbian population.

In addition, in some ways both dominant narratives are responding to each other. The Memorial Center in Potocari responds to the Republika Srpska narrative by focusing on genocide denial as a rhetorical argument between themselves and the Republika Srpska government. The Serbian Memorial Center in Srebrenica responds to the Bosnian Muslim narrative by demonstrating their war dead and constructing their actions as actions-in-self-defense. In this way, the two narratives actually mirror each other. There is genocide denial on both sides of the war in Srebrenica, and they both deny on the basis that those they killed were killed in self-defense or were battle-deaths. It is probably more likely that both sides killed many, many people who were absolutely innocent, and both sides actually did experience their actions as defensive.

In this sense, the relationship of power between the official narratives and the more popular memory seems apparent. And the many critiques leveled at this approach are less relevant. Both sides *do* claim the past as factual, as a resource. And the production of memory is based—at least in part—on conflict between the official memories and the countertermemories on the opposing sides.

But it is also the case that there are many, many countertermemories in Bosnia on both sides of the conflict. On the Bosnian Muslim side, there are groups who claim that the Srebrenica narrative is so dominant that it overshadows and detracts from the history and suffering of tens of thousands of

other Bosnian Muslims during the war. On the Serbian side, there are groups who openly challenge the Republika Srpska and Serbia official narratives that deny that what the Bosnian Serb Army—at the behest of the Serbian army—committed in and around Srebrenica was in fact genocide. In this sense, the dynamics of memory approach really captures the nature of memory production in Bosnia in relationship to the war.

This approach encourages scholars to look at a variety of actors in the scene and the iterative process that is interactive, unstable, multiple, and fluctuating. In this way, scholars can begin to understand better the nature of collective memory and its production. Schudson points out that the past influences the present in personal, social, and cultural ways and Schwartz argues that collective memories are intimately related to cultural production as well. This is definitely the case in Bosnia more generally.

But this paper contributes to the literature in a more direct way in terms of the literature's discussion about collective memory transmission, collective memory and identity, and collective memory and self-concept. As discussed previously, much of the literature focuses on the relationship between group memory and collective identity. In the remainder of this section, I discuss how my research fits into this larger academic discussion. By doing so, I am better able to demonstrate how my data fits into a conversation with these three approaches to collective memory more generally.

As it relates to tradition, as noted above, Welzer argues that collective memories are not guaranteed to transmit in the same way for all participants. Participants come from different vantage points, and the reception of the memories and narratives by the individual is not given. It is this dynamic that allows for cultural change. And tradition is one of the mechanisms by which scholars have identified transmission. Tradition creates and sustains collective memory and can act to normalize and control individuals. Individuals remember by performing certain rites.

Welzer's observation that memories do not always transmit the same for all participants opens up some space for us to consider the difference between the individual's memory and the collective's memory as represented by the narrative. The data I present here makes very clear that there exists a gap between the individual's memory, identification, and behavior, and how the collective would have the individual remember or behave. The interview excerpts demonstrate the effectiveness of some of these memories, in the way that a few of the interviewees employ the narrative. Much more so, the interviews showed that many individuals disagree with the narratives.

But the individuals do not simply disagree with the narratives. They also experience the disciplining and controlling nature of the narratives. These people understand what it is they are supposed to do, as prescribed by the narratives, and many of them personally work against that prescription. They also at times interpret the behavior of others as a product of similar coercion to follow a narrative's rules even when the individual may or may not agree with the narrative.

The popular memory approach lends some help in understanding this disciplining and controlling aspect of official memory. Based upon my data, Foucault seems to have been correct when he highlighted the controlling aspects of official narratives. Where his assessment might have been misdirected was in his prediction that only popular memory would develop to counter or resist the official narratives. In fact, popular memories did react to resist. But individuals also resist this official memory and use of narrative in very personal and individual ways. My data shows that some individuals do not choose to use voice—which would be more akin to a popular memory—but instead simply exit the power relationship when and how they can. In fact they develop, as the data here demonstrates, novel, unique, and contingent means of resistance.

As noted previously, Jan Assmann argues that cultural memories are formative of groups and normative in the sense that the collective memory determines what is correct behavior. It also helps to keep the group together, and Halbwachs also argues that memories function to encourage

solidarity and continuity. Schwartz argues that collective memories act as a model for society and a model of society: it reflects society's past vis a vis the society in the present, it shapes society by prescribing behavior, and it frames society by setting ethical standards by which the society can judge itself.

All of these authors seem to be correct in the sense that collective memories are related to collective identities. In Srebrenica, even more moderate individuals who do not espouse the more extreme narratives that tend to dominate society talk about the war and politics in terms that reveal their group affiliation. For example, Bosnian Muslims are much, much more likely to use the term genocide to refer to the region's war period, whereas the Serbian population is much more likely to simply refer to 'the war.' Also, the Serbian population is less likely to refer to the state of Bosnia or identify as Bosnians than the Bosnian Muslim population.

Even so, the data here raises some questions about the reception of the collective memories *and* the collective identities by individuals. What is not so clear is whether and to what extent the population upon whom the norming and disciplining are operating are connecting with the larger collective memories and collective identities.

These questions lead to the next area of research in the review—self-concept. Prager proposes that neither the concept embodiedness—the biological aspect of individual memory—nor embeddedness is sufficient for fully understanding collective memory. In addition, the way a person understands herself and interprets herself through time is an important factor for understanding collective memories. Prager notes that understanding how she is able to resist dominant frameworks is an important element.

Eyerman also notes that collective narratives leave room for the individual to exercise agency in relationship to the narratives. And Rosenzweig and Thelen's research detailed the differences between how individuals report the relevance of historical events important in their lives and the

way we learn about those events in history classes. This research seems to support Prager's emphasis on understanding self-concept and its relationship to collective memory, because in that case, it appears that uptake, reception, or connectivity by or between the individual and the collective memory should not be understood as automatic or given.

The data I present here is consistent with Eyerman's predictions and Rosenzweig and Thelen's research, even though the studies examine two different things. The data here also tends to support the importance that Prager places upon understanding self-concept and how one resists dominant frameworks.

Noting the discrepancy between the individual's sense of identity and their non/acceptance of the collective memory or collective identity, the data I present here suggests that the three theoretical approaches to collective memory identified by Misztal need to be supplemented with research that looks more closely at this relationship.

The presentist approach most certainly describes part of the situation—that sometimes elites use collective memory for political gain, even if the narratives are less invented than Hobsbawm argues. The popular memory approach suggests the usefulness of examining the power relationships working in society, but focuses too closely at the group's response. The data here suggests that individuals resist the power relationships that exist between them and the narratives, but they do so through exit rather than voice. They also seem to do so individually. The relationship between collective memory and collective identity and individual memory and identity should be further examined in order to supplement these approaches and explain how some individuals accept the narratives and co-identify with the collectives, while others resist that identification and the norming and disciplining that comes along with it.

In the final chapter, I discuss more how the power relationships between the narratives and individuals actually work to keep the resistances at the individual rather than at the group level. In

the next section, I discuss more closely how the data I present relates to the more narrow collective trauma narratives literature.

3.6.2 In Relation to the Collective Trauma Narratives Literature

Eyerman, Alexander, and Breese suggest that the symbolic representation that collective trauma narratives provide is perpetuated by carrier groups, groups of individuals in society that dominate the construction of cultural trauma memory. In Srebrenica, according to these interviews, these individuals would appear to be politicians, who also control the economy, and by those who operate the memorial centers. The situation is exacerbated because these politicians are also the economic leaders of the town. Access to economic opportunity and livelihood sustainability is provided through these individuals in many instances. The cost of acquiring the economic means for survival sometimes is the acceptance of these narratives.

The narratives that are used in Srebrenica are master narratives on both sides of the conflict because they identify the event that caused the trauma, they identify who are the victims and who are the perpetrators of the atrocities, and they identify how victims are related to the larger audience in the international community.

On the Serbian side, the war and the Bosnian Muslim militia caused the trauma. The Serbian villagers and city folks who were murdered, raped, and/or driven from their homes and villages are the victims. And the Serbian victims are related to the larger international community as the scape-goats for the dominant narrative—the Bosnian Muslim narrative.

For its part, the Bosnian Muslim narrative identifies the genocide between 1991 and 1995 as the event that caused the trauma, they identify the men who were killed and those who walked from Srebrenica to Tuzla and their families as the victims, and they identify all Serbs as the perpetrators of this trauma—collective guilt is the term. And they relate themselves to the international community

as the victims who had to wait so very long for any intervention on the part of the United States, and the victims who were literally delivered into the hands of the Bosnian Serb Army by the United Nations Dutch Battalion 3.

Eyerman, Alexander, and Breese demonstrate how narratives can lead to conflict and further traumatic injury. In Srebrenica, such is the case. Srebrenica's relationship with collective trauma narratives is complicated. First, it is parasitic. Ironically, some of the people who live in Srebrenica in some ways depend upon the tourism industry, but that industry is largely centered around the memorial days in July every year. It is precisely the narratives that unite these visitors and helps to motivate them to make the journey to Srebrenica every year.

Second, the politicians use the symbolic opportunity that they see in the very name Srebrenica to gain politically. This is difficult problem for a few reasons. As noted in chapter 2, they are mobilizing people who no longer live in Srebrenica to come to Srebrenica to vote in, for example, the mayoral election. That is a sensible and moral response to a problem—that the policy of the armies to drive many residents from the city was largely successful. How would it then be fair to exclude that population that was driven away from the voting? How can that be considered anything resembling a democratic system?

On the other hand, this has the unfortunate consequence of silencing and counterbalancing the voices of the people who live in Srebrenica year-round and must live with the policies enacted by the government they likely do not really choose. Worse, they must live through that government's inaction or inability to confront real problems facing this population—the government often is too preoccupied with war politics rather than improving the economy or the infrastructure in Srebrenica.

For example, in August 2012, during the hottest weeks of the summer, the city water was turned off for days at a time reportedly because the reservoir was empty. Ironically, there is a stream of water that winds its way all the way through the town from the south to the north, in addition to

two small rivers that literally run underneath the main streets in the town. Residents complained to each other, but as would be expected based upon these interviews, they feel relatively powerless to try to change anything in Srebrenica, not even the politics of water.

In another example, the city manager, new to the post, has begun enforcing payment to the water company that provides water to the city. The hospital in Srebrenica, upon which all those people who live there and have not the means necessary to go to the next-closest hospital about 45 minutes away, has not paid the water bill. The city manager turned off the water to the hospital. The hospital is operating without running water, and residents are upset about it. People wonder how can the government turn off the water to a *hospital*.

At the same time, these people understand the politics of Srebrenica. This city manager, who belongs to a Muslim political party, is hated by many, many people in Srebrenica, including the mayor. The mayor is a member of another Muslim political party. But he will not do anything to remove this man from his position as a city manager because he is in coalition with that man's party, and other Muslim parties, in order to ensure that a Muslim mayor is elected, as opposed to a Serbian mayor. The symbolic politics over who controls the city quite literally prevents people who live here from hoping that they would ever be able to petition to have water restored to their hospital. Here is a concrete example demonstrating what people here mean when they say that all the problems in the city come to politics, and all politics come down to the war. These are the narratives at work interrupting the daily lives of these individuals in the city.

Third, this use of the narrative by the politicians is exacerbated even further, as I mentioned already, because the politicians own the means of production in the town. Because the narratives and politics are so closely intertwined, the structure becomes larger, stronger, and more difficult to try to change—through voice—or try to avoid—through exit.

Finally, the situation in Srebrenica is more complicated because both the collective trauma narratives on the Serbian and the Bosnian Muslim side of the conflict are both very present in the city especially during those first two weeks of July, when many people come from places near and far to participate in the memorials for both sides of the war. So the residents must not only be cognizant of their own ethnicity's narrative, but also the out-group narrative. They must also be careful to avoid the conflict that exists between these two narratives, which are mutually exclusive. If you accept one, you cannot accept the other. This creates a complicated situation, especially during the summer when more people visit the city who are more likely to subscribe to these narratives, if only because they do not live beneath the pressures of the narratives in Srebrenica year round.

As it relates to the collective trauma narrative literature above, this data shows that sometimes individuals are loyal to their in-group narratives; that in only limited circumstances did anyone try to use voice to change the narrative; that the interviewees practice exit from the narratives in a multitude of ways, sometimes under situations of discipline; and that they exit the narratives intentionally. This data confirms that sometimes collective trauma narratives have negative and oppressive consequences. And this data sheds some light onto the dynamics attendant to societies where multiple narratives exist, where the agents that perpetuate the narratives control both politics and the economy, and where at least some of the people on behalf of whom the narratives claim to speak themselves reject the narratives either partially or fully.

3.6.3 Contribution to the Literature More Broadly

In the summary section of the literature review above, I note three aspects of this study that contribute to the discussion about collective trauma narratives and collective memory. Firstly, this study adds to this literature ethnographically-contextualized interview data, which allows respondents to describe their behavior in relation to the narratives in their own terms. In this way,

this study uncovers new information about the nature of the relationship between people who purportedly are represented by those narratives and the narratives themselves.

In that sense, this study introduces some new questions about studying narratives and suggests new directions researchers might take with this literature. In particular, the actual connection between individuals and collective narratives remains largely unexplained. Some studies have interrogated the relationship between which aspects of collective narratives are highlighted by individuals in telling their personal narratives. That is important work. But many questions remain about the relationship between *identity* and *collective identity*, and *memory* and *collective memory*, as I note previously. This data demonstrates that many people either do not share in the collective memory at all, have serious reservations about elements of the narratives, or vigorously oppose the political use of the narratives. This study takes a first step in establishing that the relationship is complicated. A next step might be to examine some of these larger questions.

In moving forward with new case studies and new directions for engaging the complicated relationship between individuals and the narratives that claim to represent them, the exit, voice, and loyalty framework presents itself as a useful organizing tool to understand and capture the range of behaviors and strategies that people use when they experience the oppressive aspect of narratives. As I note in the previous chapter, the framework emphasizes relationships rather than category statuses, has the capacity to examine one individual's behavior over time, and also provides a way to make coherent otherwise seemingly contradictory behavior.

Secondly, by analyzing the data in separate groups (e.g., Serb, Muslim) *and* analyzing the data as a whole, and by focusing on behaviors, this study highlights the remarkable *consistency* amongst respondents, an important aspect of data that often gets overlooked in analyses on Srebrenica in particular. As noted, many residents in Srebrenica see the narratives as tools used by politicians. Importantly, the consistency that the data here reveal lead to some rather surprising observations.

The data reveals that many people consistently exit the narratives and the behaviors that those narratives entail. That is important because it also reveals the quieter side of Srebrenica—those who do not hate others based upon ethnicity, which happen also to be those whose voices are likely not heard because they choose more often than not to avoid giving interviews, to avoid the memorial centers and memorial days. On the one hand, their silence leaves open the possibility for others to misinterpret their behaviors. But on the other hand, they are in fact there, and there in larger numbers than anyone might otherwise assume. This marks an important question that needs further study in this literature—why collective trauma narratives or collective memories that do represent these more moderate perspectives do not emerge.

Thirdly, this study contributes to the literature by demonstrating a particular case study where the dominant collective trauma narratives are seen as oppressive structures in society by many individuals. In particular, highlighting this aspect of collective narratives reveals the possibility that hatred or animosity is not such a deep problem in Srebrenica as the narratives might suggest. That observation challenges a lot of the peacebuilding and reconciliation literature and on-the-ground implementation of peacemaking projects because it reveals that many, if not actually a majority, of people in Srebrenica do not need to learn how to be peaceful, or democratic, or tolerant. Further, it is precisely those traits—peace, democracy, and tolerance—that contributes to their silence. They often respect the rights of other and do not seek to silence them.

3.6.4 In Relation to Understanding Life in Srebrenica

As with the previous chapter, in this final section, I detail six general observations related to understanding life in Srebrenica more generally. Then I close out the chapter by examining the second proposition from chapter 1. These six observations relate to some of the broader arguments I make in the next and the final chapter.

1. Individuals employ sets of strategies that include exit, voice, *and* loyalty behaviors. The first observation is that these individuals employ a variety of strategies in order to negotiate their daily lives. But it is important to note that many people employ more than one, and they do so in a way that they can explain so as to eliminate any sense of a paradox. Their selection and application of diverse strategies—including loyalty, exit, and voice—make sense to them.

2. In-group and out-group situations. The second observation is that these individuals also distinguish between in-group situations and out-group situations, as also was the case in chapter 2. Some of the individuals were careful to note how in-group and out-group situations influence the use of narratives as well as influence the strategies that individuals will use to avoid the narratives. Some of the strategies I identify in the exit section of this chapter demonstrate this clearly. I specifically employ this distinction in the analysis in chapter 4.

3. Distinction between motivations and behaviors. The third is related to the distinction that most of the interviewees made between thoughts and behavior, as with chapter 2. In some cases, the individuals report that they are loyal to the narratives in order to gain politically. Others report that some people are loyal to the narratives because they can gain economically. At other times, people behave loyally to the narratives because they really do genuinely identify with their group and the group's narrative. The important point here is that multiple motivations can lie behind any behavior.

4. Exit is more popular than either voice or loyalty, and voice is the least common behavior. As with chapter 2, the data related to exit, voice, and loyalty and narratives shows that voice is overwhelmingly the least used of the strategies, though it is not completely absent. Exit was the most frequently cited and loyalty was not far behind—but much of what individuals discussed in their interviews related to loyalty was attempting to explain why others are loyal to the narratives. Exit mostly was used to describe and explain their own behavior.

5. Individuals interpret the motivations for behavior using the narratives. A consequence of the obliqueness of the motivations and the dominance of the narratives is that, when people are unsure of the motivation for the behavior of others, again as with the previous chapter, they employ the narratives to help them interpret the behavior of others. While this is more prevalent in the previous chapter's data regarding political motivations, it is still evident in this chapter. Different individuals interpret the behavior of others differently—some of the behavior is viewed as genuine, some very cynically, some as economically motivated, and some as motivated by fear of social exclusion or social infamy. The use of the narratives to fill in meaning is an important functional relationship between the narratives and the practices that have meaning in Srebrenica.

6. Motivations for behaviors often are disguised. The diversity of motivations for remaining loyal to, trying to change, or trying to exit the narratives is very much disguised by the difference between motivations and behavior. One cannot know the motivation for the behavior unless one explicitly asks about it. But part of living in society requires understanding and inferring meaning into practices. In this way, motivations for behaviors are often disguised, and many residents in Srebrenica actually use the gap between motivation and behaviors strategically to their benefit, especially as it relates to maintaining their access to the economy.

3.7 PROPOSITION 2

As with the previous chapter, voice is the least use of all these categories. As Milos explained, exit and loyalty are a residual of voice. This is related to the second proposition I set forth in the introduction: Typical individuals in Srebrenica have a set of constitutive practices that condition their choices and actions that is different from the set of constitutive practices that condition the

choices and actions of those who behave more loyally and act as carrier groups of cultural narratives. The data I have presented so far suggests that typical individuals do have a different set of *strategies* for dealing with the narratives than carrier groups or those who behave more loyally.

However, as before, that is different than saying that individuals operate using a different set of practices. In the next chapter, I demonstrate how the practices that govern life in Srebrenica in part determine how individuals comprise their sets of strategies. And in chapter 5, I expand on the conclusion to this proposition more fully. For now, as with chapter 2, the system of constitutive practices that people employ is not arbitrary; in fact, it does seem to be related to conflict management systems that have organically developed in the city over the past two decades. But that set of constitutive practices is not different for those who are more loyal than for those who exit more.

4.0 PRACTICES

**EVERYONE KNOWS THE THINGS YOU CAN TALK ABOUT
AND THE THINGS YOU CANNOT TALK ABOUT.**

**~ DJORDJE, ON OUT-GROUP INTERACTIONS
AUGUST 2012**

**I DON'T FEEL HAPPY ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON AROUND ME.
BUT I AM NOT CHE GUEVARA.
I'M NOT GOING TO SACRIFICE MYSELF.
I'M NOT THAT BRAVE.**

**~ DJORDJE, ON IN-GROUP INTERACTIONS
AUGUST 2012**

In the first section of this chapter, I begin with a few anecdotal stories that demonstrate how many people in Srebrenica are creating and sustaining an image of Srebrenica that is very different than the one that is portrayed by the political atmosphere there and the narratives I discuss in the previous two chapters. They are creating and sustaining an image of a cosmopolitan Srebrenica. They are doing that through their very ordinary, everyday practices. Unfortunately, when those efforts become too successful, others in the community who are trying to constitute an image of Srebrenica more consistent with politics and the dominant narratives are able successfully to antagonize and sometimes fully repress their efforts.

For example, in January 2013, Pujdo and a collection of other street dogs in Srebrenica were found one morning dead on the streets. Some residents reported that the dogs appeared to have been poisoned over a period of a few days. At first, no one knew, or admitted to knowing, who had

fed the poison to the dogs. Later, a rumor circulated that the Bosnian government, short on funds, had hired people to euthanize the dogs. They had done so in the cheapest way possible.



Figure 4.1. Pujdo was found dead on the street, presumably poisoned.



Figure 4.2 The Dog with the Blue Legs was also found dead on the street, presumably poisoned.

Many different people love and care for the dogs in Srebrenica—evidenced by their very friendly presence in the town—and, as mentioned, that was one of the first ethnographic observations I made while in Srebrenica. The dogs provided one way for the residents in Srebrenica to create that image of a cosmopolitan Srebrenica—it is something they do as a community of people who know each personally, not as a community of Serbs and Bosnian Muslims.

Another example, also during the summer: I attended a concert in the center of the city. The concert is a yearly event organized and sponsored by a band, named Stari Grad, and some local cafes. They play popular music from Bosnia and from Serbia, and they attract an interesting mix of individuals from the Diaspora. The men and women who attend this event are largely coming back to Srebrenica, those people who fled during the war and have since reconstructed their lives in Europe, Australia, the United States, and elsewhere. On this evening, the city is alive with a buzz, the excitement touching you on your skin. Old friends are reunited.

Hasan and I walked together to this concert and as we walked, he explained to me the significance of this yearly event. For him, it was as if, on one day every year, he could quite literally begin to forget there ever had been a war—not a small statement for this man whose free time is consumed by supporting causes to globally recognize the full extent of what happened to the Muslim population in Srebrenica. At the concert, you run into people you did not know were visiting, people with whom you went to school, fell in love, quarreled, and grew up. People you had not seen for some twenty years. They were there with their children. You spent the night with the music as a background hum to the catching up you knew you were going to do with all those people that once previously had lived so nearby. In fact, the concert theme every year is "Kao Nekad Prije"—"Like Sometime Before." This was *normal*.

A little too normal.

On that same evening, as I circled the crowd and watched, I noticed a woman I had seen previously—she was the inspector from the Srebrenica city government. This is the woman who inspects whether local businesses and individuals are complying with city laws and regulations. She is required to inspect so many businesses monthly, but she can also be sent to inspect a business by other citizens in the city.



Figure 4.3 Stari Grad performs live in Srebrenica.

I watched as she went first to talk with the owner and operator of one of the local bars. After filling out her paperwork, she moved onto to the other owner and operator of a second local bar. She filled out her paperwork and I did not see her again throughout the rest of the evening. This event was also creating and sustaining a different image of Srebrenica—as cosmopolitan. And the government came in at that time and sent a signal to these two business sponsors.

Another example re-uses an interview excerpt I recounted in a previous chapter. Dusko told me the story of a yearly concert given by a number of local bands popular in the region. According to Dusko, the Mothers of Srebrenica, a group of women who work to create memorial ceremonies for their lost loved ones during the war, among other things, protested that the concert was inappropriate because of the tragedies that have taken place in Srebrenica. The concert exists no more.

On the one hand, what ties these stories together is the interpretation that many people in Srebrenica apply to these situations—that when people in Srebrenica from different ethnicities become too close together—whether it be due to, for example, the dogs, due to a local Srebrenica concert, or due to a larger regional connection to music—the government or other groups are sure to step in and divide the people. In my terms, they try to constitute an image of Srebrenica based upon ethnicity, hatred, and war. On the other hand, what these stories indicate is that some people

in Srebrenica are trying to enact through their very everyday practices a Srebrenica that is quite different than the one about which we often read in newspapers and academic books. It is also different than the one that the government and the carrier groups of the narratives are constituting.

In the previous two chapters, I demonstrate that some people in Srebrenica view the political system and the dominant narratives in Srebrenica as oppressive. I also demonstrate that they are practicing a combination of exit, voice, and loyalty strategies, with exit being the most popular. The previous two chapters demonstrate that these regimes—narratives and politics—are oppressive, and how people strategize in response to them. And, as the conclusions to the two propositions I review in the previous two chapters state, while many people vary in the extent of their voice, exit, and loyalty behaviors, they all appear to be using the same constitutive practices.

In what follows in this chapter, I take a closer look at the actual practices that people of all political and narrative dispositions are engaging and I explicitly identify some of them. As I demonstrate in the previous chapters, many residents with whom I spoke make critical distinctions between behaviors and motivations in their own sense-making project for everyday life. In the second section of this chapter, taking that clue from the previous chapters, I show how it is possible that these constitutive practices—common to most of society in Srebrenica—can constitute more than one social object.

In the final sections of this chapter, I make some general conclusions about this study and what it tells us about studying society. I also make some general notations about life in Srebrenica. Ultimately, this chapter closes out the necessary preparation for my presentation of an analytical framework useful for explaining all of this, which I do in the next and final chapter.

4.1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to analyze the data, I use Rawls' notion of constitutive practices. In this section, I outline her framework briefly, and in the next section, I present the data. Rawls articulates what she terms constitutive practices or rules. Constitutive practices are "the performative criteria that enable the existence of identities, objects and action."¹⁹³ "[C]onstitutive rules, or expectancies, precede and define domains of action..."¹⁹⁴ Rawls argues that "[p]erformative, or constitutive, acts create objects that are entirely social in character (such as second base, questions, pre-requests, and marriages)."¹⁹⁵ These objects "exist only when, and as, participants in situated practices, adhering to constitutive expectations that are shared, perform such acts, in such a way that other participants in the same situated practice recognize their performances as social objects of a particular sort."¹⁹⁶ The social objects are "made to exist in and through the talk (and action) that enacts them."¹⁹⁷

The idea behind the constitutive order approach is that in order to live in a mutually intelligible world as social beings, with mutually intelligible social identities, reasons and purposes, people must be guided by some set of rules, expectations or preferred orders of action at a basic level.¹⁹⁸

In order to show this in Srebrenica, I first identify and make explicit some of the constitutive practices that govern some aspects of life in Srebrenica. In the previous chapters, the first general observation I make from the data is that individuals in Srebrenica make conceptual distinctions between in-group and out-group situations. In the data analysis that follows, I use that distinction to attempt to identify two of these sets of constitutive practices in Srebrenica.

4.1.1 Research Questions

What are the local constitutive practices that govern interactions in Srebrenica? How do these practices change from situation to situation? How do individuals in Srebrenica interpret these practices?

4.2 DATA

The interview data I collected gives some insight into these questions because some of the interviewees explicitly explained what are the practices for interaction. Others gave implicit insight into the practices by describing when a violation occurs, or by describing the consequences an individual will experience when she violates the practices.

I begin the discussion of the data with definitional prerequisites. **IN-GROUP SITUATIONS** are those situations in which a person's family, ethnic group, or political group are the majority in the situation or constitute all the individuals in the situation. In-group situations can be characterized by the practices I make explicit below, but are also characterized by what they lack—the presence of members of the out-group.

OUT-GROUP SITUATIONS are those situations in which a person's family, ethnic group, or political group are not the majority in the situation. Mostly, when talking about these situations, the interviewees were talking about work interactions, street interactions, interactions at bars, and interactions at cafés, with individuals from the other ethnic identity backgrounds. These situations also are characterized by the practices I make explicit below, and they are characterized by what they lack—an in-group majority, or significant number of in-group individuals compared to out-group individuals.

One final note. I reemphasize this note below, but want to preface my use of this distinction between in-group and out-group practices. My data makes very clear that many, many people in Srebrenica do not organize their social lives or interactions in society according to ethnicity. Of course, there are some people who do. This distinction between in-group and out-group situations is an analytical distinction that many interviewees were using, but were doing so especially when they were explaining the behavior of general others—strangers. When they spoke of themselves or their

friends, they were not using these distinctions. This is an important point to which I return in the next chapter.

4.2.1 In-Group Practices

Two practices more or less govern interactions in the in-group settings. First, you cannot explicitly disagree with the group's narrative. If you do, you are exposing yourself to a loss of the benefits that you or your family or group members may have due to their positions in larger society. You might risk your employment or the employment of family members with whom you are close.

In relationship to this practice in particular, the interconnections between narratives, politics, and the economy become even more important. In the first chapter, I demonstrate how people in Srebrenica perceive the connections between the economy and politics, and in chapter 2, I explain how the economy determines in part what people will do politically. In chapter 3, I explain how the narratives are intimately related to politics in Srebrenica. This nexus between narratives, politics, and the economy creates a strong incentive for those otherwise motivated to speak against the narratives to choose to be silent instead—to exit. In relationship to the practices, this situation is equally if not more important to note.

In his interview with me, Mladen, specifically in response to my questions about why he is concerned not to say his true thoughts about the in-group narrative, explicitly explains that to do so is to risk his employment. I asked him why and he explained:

...Here, [politics and economics are] the same, because you cannot own this business if you are not in politics.

~MLADEN

Here Armin describes the silencing that is a consequence of the practices, explains what are the taboo topics, and also who comprises the groups in the settings where you cannot speak freely.

INTERVIEWEE: A lot of people can not say publicly [what they think]. They can only say in internal circles. And smaller groups.

INTERVIEWER: What happens if they talk about it publicly?

INTERVIEWEE: It depends on which subject it is.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. So, for example...?

INTERVIEWEE: We can talk openly only about irrelevant things. Sport or whatever....A lot keep information they get only for them or their family.

INTERVIEWER: Um, so when you say groups, that people only talk in small groups, what kind of groups?...

INTERVIEWEE: Well, it's family, also when they are going, it's like now, we are sitting and we are talking. Also in, if you are member of some political party, and you are talking, and they have the same point of view, and they are talking, also.

~ARMIN

Armin goes on to explain the consequences for breaking this practice about speaking freely about your political opinion when it is at odds with the dominant political and narrative opinions of the group.

For example, I am in the group and you are [an] individual, and then...we are talking about something now that is different. You have one opinion, and I have another opinion. But then when I need something, and you are in the group, and...I need something you have, and you are in charge, and you have been employed. You have the power. You have the power. Yes, you have the power. So why would I confront you?

~ARMIN

One person described to me the pressure he personally felt when he started to talk about how he disagrees with the dominant narrative about the war. He had attended some discussion given by a man who had compiled and analyzed data from the Hague about the circumstances surrounding the war. In that presentation, that man had provided what he described as irrefutable evidence that something like the legal term *genocide* had occurred against the Muslim population in Srebrenica.

This resident of Srebrenica had written a paper about what he learned and was enthusiastic about providing a translation of that paper for me to read. He seemed to believe what he wrote. He also seemed to indicate to me that it was certain that what had occurred against the Bosnian Muslim population in Srebrenica was genocide. But even in that paper, which, based upon the evidence provided, should conclude that genocide had occurred against the Bosnian Muslim population in

Srebrenica, he could not bring himself to put that into writing. He avoided that conclusion by stating his lack of scholarship and expertise in the law, and instead deferred the readers of the paper to consult with attorneys who are experts in the legal definition of *genocide*. For to say so explicitly would have been a serious challenge to the narrative, and this person was in no position to risk social infamy to make such a claim.

Djordje, who also had attended a similar workshop, upon returning, was excited about what he had learned and he began talking with people about it. And this was the result:

INTERVIEWEE: Many pressures were on me, of course, secretly, and, uh...

INTERVIEWER: What kind of pressures?

INTERVIEWEE: Considering my future, for instance.

INTERVIEWER: Okay. So, your future. You thought your future was being...

INTERVIEWEE: Threatened, yeah.

INTERVIEWER: By?

INTERVIEWEE: As I told [you], [our] entire society is politicized, so, it's pretty easy for one man or a group of people to make a pressure on an individual. And, the, luckily for me, I was warned what could happen, and I don't want to complicate my own life because of some high ideals. I don't feel, I don't feel happy about what is going on around me, but, I am not Che Guevara. I'm not going to sacrifice myself. I'm not that brave.

~DJORDJE

Djordje did say that he would speak his opinion in situations in which he had been asked for it. But he was no longer going to try to spread his opinion—in my terms, to use voice.

Djordje also provided some insight into the nature of the disciplining he expected to receive.

INTERVIEWEE: First thing is using, as I like to call it, Slobodan Milosevic propaganda. Everyone who [is] against the ruling establishment [is a] traitor of the people. No one likes that label on himself. Even me. I don't like to be called a traitor, even though I don't really care for big national interests or something like that. And the other thing, I am, uh, close to finishing my studies, graduating. I need a job when I'm done. And I'm...

INTERVIEWER: ...So, if you have that label, then you won't get a job?

INTERVIEWEE: Not just because of that label, but it's because for being openly against. Because we here have like five or six parties, but all of them have pretty much the same goals and the same policy, so you can't really go against that. Because even if this now ruling party leaves, another one will be the same with the same policy, and you can't really go openly against that policy. You are closing some doors for yourself. And I want to keep these doors open still.

~DJORDJE

And finally, Hasan talks about the tremendous pressure that individuals in Srebrenica feel. He talks about the consequences—people who violate the rules are 'sanitized.' He identifies the source of the pressure on Serbs as the government of Republika Srpska.

Anybody from the local government, not the local government, but the local population, who is willing to recognize that horrible crimes happened is sanitized. It's uh, I mean, it's turned into some sort of outcast of society and somebody who should not be willing, should not be living there. Should you know...And it goes through, and I can just imagine they are under tremendous pressure not to do anything towards reconciliation. Because the general politics of the country, of the region, and the international community, to a large extent, is that everybody is equally guilty. And let's not, uh, you know, talk about, you know, genocide or anything that has to do with that. And I think [Republika Srpska] are doing, they are spending a lot of money exercising this policy, these politics.

~HASAN

The second practice I identify—that you cannot spend too much time with the out-group—while explicitly stated by a few of the interviewees, seems to be less enforced, suggesting that the practice itself governs only certain interactions, such as intimate relationships like marriage. Even so, this practice has the functional consequence of working to keep groups more or less separate in those intimate spaces, even though it is hardly effective in everyday life in Srebrenica. That said, the interview data I report in chapter 3 from Milos in particular suggests that people feel these rules being enforced—they fear the social infamy and exclusion that will result if they break these rules.

When we see that [interaction with the other group], when we see [an individual's] affiliation within the ethnical group, you are at loss. Very, very big loss. You are condemned to social infamy, exclusion, and uh, and in that case it's not good. I mean, fifteen years? Not even one inter-ethnical marriage? That is strange. There need to be some individual [example], like some specimen, but not even one? So, surface [of] society, at the surface is harmonical. In that deep [sense], it is profoundly segregated, profoundly, really, profoundly segregated.

~MILOS

Interesting to note in this excerpt that Milos is describing how profoundly segregated society is, but it not segregated because of ethnic animosity or hatred. It is segregated because of social infamy that comes with mixing too much with the other side. More on that below.

Selma says that she has to answer questions about why she goes with her friends of the other ethnicity for holidays like Easter or Christmas.

In Tito's time, I could go to my friends for Christmas or Easter, now I can't. I can, but people from my ethnicity will ask me why do you do it? Some of them, not all.

~SELMA

This practice is evident in the everyday life of the city, but as in the previous chapter, I show how many individuals violate this practice in the everyday. Though they may experience some verbal consequences, they risk the exposure regardless.

4.2.2 Out-Group Practices

The major difference between the in-group versus the out-group practices is that the out-group practices have more contingencies. The contingencies correlate to the diversity of individuals in Srebrenica. For people who do not want any contact with the other side, there is a conservative guideline, and for people who want intimate contact with like-minded people, regardless of ethnicity, there is a more liberal guideline.

In that sense, it is important to note again that there is a wide range of individuals in Srebrenica. Many of the individuals with whom I interacted were careful to say to me that they personally had no problem with the other ethnicity (one more piece of evidence that they are trying to enact a different social object). What matters to them is whether the person is good or bad, not whether they are Serbian or Bosnian Muslim. Even so, some of the population in Srebrenica still avoids too much interaction with the other ethnicity more generally. Others try to avoid any interaction whatsoever. In other cases, the separation is more about family connections and holiday celebrations than it is about ethnicity. Even so, there seems to be a final practice that cannot be transgressed by anyone in society, whether you are talking about the war or any other topic, really:

you may not, under any circumstances, try to convince the other person that s/he is wrong and you are right. This is the line past which you do not venture.

I arrange the interview excerpts below progressively, to display first the more conservative situations and corresponding practices and then the more liberal situations and corresponding practices. I follow the interview excerpts and analysis with a summary of the practices for each of these situations.

On the conservative end of the continuum are those who ignore their respective others. In practice, this translates into a non-situation and therefore, has no attending practice.

If [a person is] not forced to have contact with [the other], they will just ignore them.

~DJORDJE

Slightly less avoidant are those who, if they must, are willing to work with others from the other ethnicity. The practice attendant to the situation is to be polite—limited conversational interaction.

So [if] they are forced to do work with some Muslims, they will just be polite.

~DJORDJE

Others are unlikely to go build friendships or go for coffee, but they will be friendly in the workplace or when they need each other's help. The rule attendant to these situations is to focus the conversation on the task at hand.

Well, between, uh, friendships, new friendships between people who lost everything are rare... The real friendships, like going out to have a cup of coffee together—that probably won't happen. But there are this uh, how do you call it, the, friendships for benefits. You are a good mechanic. I know how to grow plants, I am a good farmer. So we met there. My car gets broken. I know this Muslim guy, he will fix it, he is a good guy. He is a Muslim, but he is a good guy. So we are not actually friends, but I consider him as a good man, and I know he will fix it for me and he will not rip me off. That Muslim guy, he has this problem, how to grow blackberries. What should I do? It's a dry year, we didn't have good rain. I know this Serb guy. He seems to know about that. I will give him a call—he is a good guy. I won't call him to have a cup of coffee, but I will call him for advice or help.

~DJORDJE

Djordje also explains the types of things one can and cannot say in these kinds of situations.

INTERVIEWEE: Everyone knows the things you can talk about and the things you cannot talk about.

INTERVIEWER: What are those things? What are the things you can...

INTERVIEWEE: Well, for instance, you cannot praise Radovan Karadzic in front of Muslim people. You know that. You are not crazy. You are not stupid. And you don't do that. If you are forced... You hate Muslims, you are forced to work with them. You will not praise General Mladic or Ratko Karadzic. They will not talk about Naser Oric or Alija Izetbegovic. You will talk about the weather. You will talk about quality of cigarettes. I don't know. And how to get the job done.

~DJORDJE

Hasan helpfully explains that people are not afraid to talk to each other, even about politics or about war. The practice here is to talk about the war once, and then never talk about it again.

Most Serbs do not want to talk about war. Because most Bosniaks see themselves as victims. And the perpetrators do not want to talk to their victims. It makes them uncomfortable. They cannot digest very well. You know, and it's not only between Serbs and Bosniaks. If you go to Sarajevo or Tuzla and you say you are from Srebrenica, most people who do not have that kind of experience like what we had here in Srebrenica. They do not want to talk about it because you know it's not something that they can have coffee or lunch while they talk about Srebrenica.

~HASAN

Hasan also goes into a bit more detail:

INTERVIEWEE: So when you for example, when I speak to the Serbs here and I ask them, "Who burned down my house?" They will start explaining how on that particular day, they were two hundred, three hundred miles away from Srebrenica, you know. That they were not the ones who took part in it. And we all know that we lie to each other. We all know that's not really what happened. But it's more comfortable. It's more livable to say, okay.

It's like your wife [is] cheating on you, but she's telling you she's not. And you are more content with the fact that she's not admitting it. You know. And, you know, you gain this hope that really it's not true, but you know it's true. You know. Uh, that kind of resent....

INTERVIEWER: So, there is a sort of code for communicating that makes...

INTERVIEWEE: Yeah....

INTERVIEWER: You understand it, they understand it....

INTERVIEWEE: You know, all Bosniaks want to talk about the war. They want to take it out. They want to go to their Serb friends in front of them and say, and tell them off, and say, "How can you be such a horrible person after so many years together?..." on and on and on... You guys did this, you know?"

And, uh the first defense that the Serbs will have is that they were not, at that particular day, in that particular location. I'm just explaining what, how this situation happens, you know. And if, and they all say that. And sometimes if they say they were involved, they were always involved in some sort of... They were giving some

sort of military support, like they were cooks. They were chefs. They were medical people. They were not committing crimes. They were not the ones burning down people in houses. They were not the ones. Somebody else did it. So that's the first kind of initiation of conversation that you have.

And once you're done with that, because we all came here, when we came back to Srebrenica, we came with...pumped up with this kind of anger towards [them]. We felt betrayed by our brothers, next door neighbors, schoolmates, you know. And uh, I had, many of this kind of conversations with people my age, you know.

Uh, so, you know, once you're done with that part, they'll tell you, "Let's talk about anything, but let's not talk about war." They never want to talk about war. We want to talk about war. You know. I want to talk about war. I want to clean everything out. I want everything in open. I want to make sure that we all understand who did what, you know. But, no. That's not, that's not. And then you, if you are willing [to] walk around and not completely have to ignore them, then you come to some sort of understanding that, "Okay we will not talk about war. Let's talk about weather. Let's talk about what we are going to do tomorrow."

You know. I don't think, I don't think you ever, you never really can bring back that kind of level of trust and understanding like we had before the war. Uh, but we learn to live with it. You know, and you still know this is the guy or person or individual that you spent a very nice period of your life together in school, or you know hanging out, or maybe went chasing the same girl or whatever. You know, and you remember that part of life, and you are comfortable with that, so you just go to that. You know you skip this horrible part, and you just continue where you left off. You know that happens to me. And that's my kind of attitude toward life.

~HASAN

Finally, Edin makes explicit the point on the other end of the continuum. Interestingly, however, he starts his statement by suggesting that people cannot talk about war or politics. But when I ask him about that he corrects my thinking and explains how it works.

INTERVIEWEE: Yeah sure, you know, you can, if you know there is some Serbian shop, Muslims go there to buy some things, or the opposite. So people helping each other especially in agriculture, or they are sitting together drinking coffees together, but [only] until they don't talk about things—politics, war—then it's okay.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, so there are some rules about how people talk to each other?

INTERVIEWEE: Yeah, yeah. No, no, they can talk about it. But they will never have the same opinion. They can talk.

INTERVIEWER: What happens if they talk about it?

INTERVIEWEE: Nothing, it will finish same as usual, you know. You have your opinion. I have mine. I am right. You are not. And the opposite. And that's it, okay. We go. And I finish this. I finish that. And people know how it's going to finish—that they will never change the opinion of the other, so that they just don't start about it.

INTERVIEWER: Oh, okay. And so you walk away, these two men walk away from this conversation and tomorrow they see each other, they still say hello, they might....

INTERVIEWEE: No, they are sitting in front of the same table. They drink coffee. They start to speak about it, and they don't go away. They just change the subject and start you know...

INTERVIEWER: Oh, I see.

INTERVIEWEE: Talk about something else, so. They just don't try to convince anyone that it's true, because it's impossible.

INTERVIEWER: Okay, so the rule isn't that you don't talk about it, the rule is that when you do talk about it you know that you're not going to change their mind. He's not going to change your mind. So you say what you think, and then, that's it. You don't expect anything else.

INTERVIEWEE: Yeah, yeah, yeah.

~EDIN

These statements are important to set out for a few reasons. Acknowledging the diversity of individual preferences for out-group interaction prevents a binary, strict understanding of life in Srebrenica. These practices are practices that people in Srebrenica identify as the rules that *everyone* knows. But, what motivates people to follow these rules in Srebrenica is as variable as the diversity of individual preferences (a point to which I return below).

Also, many, many people in Srebrenica have developed relationships and cultures with each other, ethnicity being of literally no importance or matter. In that sense, when people of different backgrounds come together, sometimes the practices also change. These practices are institutions in society that help in the sense-making project, but the sense they actually make to any given individual is variable; they are flexible; and there are situations where two people, recognizing themselves as two people who are not interested at all in ethnicity, develop different practices for interaction. In any case, the practices and the people who are using them seem to give way to friendship across ethnicity lines, sometimes when ethnicity does matter to the individuals involved, and other times when ethnicity is of literally no consequence for the individuals involved.

The following is a summary of the situations and the various practices that apply.

SITUATION 1: A non-situation.

PRACTICE: Ignore anyone from the other ethnic group.

SITUATION 2: Some people say you must work with the other side. You never really become friends with the other side.

PRACTICE: You say hello, but you never go for coffee or a beer (though one person that said this had coffee everyday with someone from the "other" side).

SITUATION 3: Some people say you can go have coffee or beer.

PRACTICE: , You never talk about politics or the war. You just talk about the weather, sometimes about sports.

SITUATION 4: Some people say you can go have coffee or beer. You can be friends.

PRACTICE: You can talk about politics. But you cannot talk about the war.

SITUATION 5: Some people say you can go have coffee or beer, or dinner at each other's houses. You can develop genuine friendships.

PRACTICE: As long as everyone in the situation knows that they currently disagree, they will probably always disagree, but that everyone gets to say what they think, the interaction will remain sterile or positive.

FINAL PRACTICE: The line not to be crossed is that line that marks the separation between stating your own opinion about things and trying to convince the other side that they are wrong and you are right.

4.2.3 Motivations

Having identified some of the practices, in this section, I reveal some of the variation in motivations of those who are following the rules. Here I bring in the third general observation from the previous chapters: many people in Srebrenica make a distinction between behaviors and motivations for behaviors. Ultimately, I argue in this section what I argue in chapters 2 and 3: The relationship between people who are enacting these practices, on the one hand, and the meanings behind those practices, on the other hand, is complicated.

As I argue throughout this thesis, behaviors themselves—acts that are interpreted by others—are not always motivated by the more obvious explanation for those behaviors. Motivations for behaviors are not necessarily self-evident. The difference between what motivates an individual and how the behavior that individual performs is read by others has important consequences in terms of the "shared meanings" that these constitutive practices signify. A typical reading of the segregation in Srebrenica would suggest that, for example, the presence of mostly Muslim or mostly Serbian cafes and bars is evidence of ethnic hatred or animosity.

But Zoran explains that people are not actually trying to avoid the other ethnicity, rather they are trying to avoid a situation in which tensions might build, leading to a heated exchange of words.

INTERVIEWER: So you think people are more or less trying to avoid...

INTERVIEWEE: Uh, no, you have normal places...

INTERVIEWER:...I mean, not that people, not that they are trying to avoid each other, but that they are trying to avoid starting, like you said, they are actually trying to avoid starting any sort of fight or conflict.

INTERVIEWEE: Yes. Yes, yes. Yes.

INTERVIEWER: So they just avoid situations where it might come up.

INTERVIEWEE: If you want to go in that kind of bar, okay you are going, and you are going [to take a] risk. No one will beat you or nothing like that. But if you want to have a fight, or something, of course you can go to that bar to play pool to do whatever you want. And no one will probably not say you anything. But you never know, or the opposite side when you go somewhere else.

~ZORAN

Zoran recognizes the variety of types of individuals you might meet in any given situation. He says that you never know. Not knowing who is at the bar, whether a person there is more conservative or less, the practices that these people follow is not based on ethnic animosity, but rather a degree of caution to avoid situations that *might* lead to a problem if someone present in that situation chooses a more conservative rule for interaction. Furthermore, as one of the stories from chapter 2 demonstrates, they are sometimes avoiding fights so that those fights are not read as ethnic when in reality they have little or nothing to do with ethnicity at all.

That is to say, Zoran recognizes that his actions are open to multiple interpretations, and furthermore that that meaning is not always shared between him and others constituting an out-group situation. Edin indicates something similar, but for him, alcohol is a big component of any problems that do arise.

INTERVIEWEE: I could see the both nations sitting in both cafes, so I don't think that, maybe, some places, but it's, for, you know, the places where people don't go because they don't want to have a problem with drunkards, you know.

INTERVIEWER: What kind of problem with drunks?

INTERVIEWEE: I mean, you know what kind of problem you can have with drunk people. So. It's just, it's just that reason, not because they are Serbs or because they

are Bosniaks, it's cause they just don't want to have a problem with drunk people, and you know you will have a problem with that people like you have in all places. But I don't think that there is Bosniak or Serbian places. Maybe it was before, but now, no.

~EDIN

Edin observes that the problem is with alcohol, not with ethnicity. He is using a different meaning to interpret this behavior. Many people in Srebrenica avoid one café in particular. But it is not because it is mostly frequented by the Muslim population. Muslims also avoid that café because it is famous for the fights that occur there. People explain to me that people from the villages, usually drunk, get into fights there, so they avoid it altogether.

Mladen explains that people in Bosnia are characteristically concealing their true feelings and one can never be sure what another person thinks. But even so, he explains that the way the situation is portrayed in the international community is probably not too much like life really operates in Bosnia.

The people living in Bosnia is like that, you know. I will try to explain. They will never show, they will not easily show how they feel, that they love somebody or that they hate somebody. It's in the nature of the people living around here. Even if, if they, you know, live normal, a normal life, we'll never be sure what they think about it. Of course, it's sure that that—probably, probably, the picture you are getting in America, it's not, it's not the true picture that you can see by spending time around here. Of course, that hatred is much lesser, how to say it, than it's being represented. But it's still present and you know, not, not, not with so many people that someone would think. But I must get back to politics, because you know, this is very, very connected because politicians are using that hatred to, to stay in power, to get in power in the first place. They are trying to fight people. Still.

~MLADEN

Mladen's explanation highlights the distinction between motivations for behavior and behavior itself. He is making explicit the strategy that many, many people use in Srebrenica—hiding the way they truly feel.

Milos gives an estimate—maybe 90% of people in Srebrenica are ready for interethnic situations and contact on a more regular and familial basis.

INTERVIEWEE: Maybe some, some group, some individuals, maybe entire population, maybe, even 90% of population are prepared on social interaction in any kind of sense.

INTERVIEWER: What does that mean, to be prepared?

INTERVIEWEE: You are prepared for like, multi-ethnic marriages, multi-ethnic social groups, multiethnic political party, I don't know, joint memorial center, they may be prepared [for having that interaction]. But they are afraid of social infamy within their own groups because they will be punished. If you start like individual, you will be punished. You simply will.

~MILOS

Milos explains that the social infamy is what motivates people away from exposing their true feelings about the other ethnicity. They want and are ready to have more interaction with others. Their motivations are different than the typical interpretations of their motivations would indicate. They are not avoiding the other ethnicity; they are avoiding social infamy.

Mladen confirms that the diversity of people in Srebrenica suggests that only marginally are people unwilling to interact and talk with others from the other ethnicity.

I mean, everybody talks with everybody. I mean, I don't know, did you notice that?...So there are not too much examples of people who are totally trying to avoid some other people from some other ethnic groups.

~MLADEN

In the longer interview excerpt above from Hasan explaining out-group interactions and the attendant practices, it is important to notice that Hasan is interpreting the behaviors of his Serbian conversation counterparts using the Serbian narrative as a lens. But in fact, many people from both backgrounds with whom I interacted suggested that they feel very sorry for the Muslim victims of the war, as they do for *all* victims of the war. Ethnicity is not important to inspire sympathy or empathy. For many people, their own silence about the war actually has little to do with whether they feel guilty—many Serbian and Muslim people who live in Srebrenica today were not a part of the war.

Instead, many people have questions about where certain individuals who were involved in the war, and who live in Srebrenica still today, were on a particular day during the war. Many people

are also seeking answers about where, when, and how their family members were killed, or questions about where that family member's body is located today. That is to say, they do not want to ask someone from the other side—whom they also see as a victim of a terrible war—to answer for crimes that that person did not commit. Often that is a motivation for the silence on the part of both Serbian and Muslim survivors of the war.

This set of interview excerpts demonstrates the claim I make toward the beginning of this chapter—that many people in Srebrenica are following the same practices that everyone else is following, but the motivation is different. It is that different motivation that constitutes a different social object, an image of Srebrenica as a cosmopolitan place that welcomes all good people, regardless of their race or ethnicity.

In parallel to the discussions in the previous chapters, there is a relationship between the people, on the one hand, and the practice that help organize society, on the other. That relationship is not direct; it is complicated. But the interpretation of these behaviors—largely influenced by the politics and narratives dominant in Srebrenica—is often masking the more genuine motivations that people use to explain their compliance with these practices. Where one person is motivated by hatred or animosity to avoid certain cafes, another person is constituting a different social object. The motivations that lead one person to follow the practices in Srebrenica can be often quite different than the motivations pushing any other person. That difference can be described analytically as a difference in sets of shared meanings.

Those who are motivated to constitute a different social object—a different image of Srebrenica—share one set of meanings and do in fact create that social object in their everyday lives. Sometimes, they are all too successful, as the anecdotes at the opening of this chapter demonstrate. Despite those attempts by more powerful others to constitute the hate-filled image of Srebrenica as a social object, these individuals use exit, disguised as loyalty, in order to expertly strategize their

navigation through life in Srebrenica. They maintain their ties to the economy at the same time that they are able comfortably to share meanings and motivations with countless like-minded others.

4.2.4. On the Development of the Practices

Many of the interviewees talked about how life is possible in a post-war town like Srebrenica in response to the question I asked them during the interview. Some of them answered that question by explaining how the situation developed over time. Djordje explains how life as it is today in Srebrenica became possible:

I think what made it possible is, in the early 2000s Muslims starting to come back to Srebrenica, but it uh it didn't happen over the night. It was like, five families today, one family tomorrow. And next thing you know, you have 50/50 town. And you are in that kind of situation. After all, we were in the war. And that war uh made people do some terrible things. But those are individuals and manipulated masses. After all we are civilized people.

~DJORDJE

Hasan explains it differently. For him, these interactions are possible because people just forget about the war, what happened during the war, and they just pick up where the war started, as if it never happened.

You know. I don't think, I don't think you ever, you never really can bring back that kind of level of trust and understanding like we had before the war. Uh, but we learn to live with it. You know, and you still know this is the guy or person or individual that you spent a very nice period of your life together in school, or you know hanging, or maybe went chasing the same girl or whatever. You know, and you remember that part of life, and you are comfortable with that, so you just go to that. You know you skip this horrible part, and you just continue where you left off. You know that happens to me. And that's my kind of attitude toward life.

~HASAN

Mladen explains that sometimes the interactions are fake but that, because these interactions must happen, they are fake for a reason. He also notes that this has been improvement over time on the part of the people that live in Srebrenica.

INTERVIEWER: But for those other people that do hate, they still have to go to the same supermarket, because there's only one here, they still have to walk down the same streets, there are only so many cafes that you can go to, so at some point in time, there is a forced interaction.

INTERVIEWEE: But it's fake interaction. That's the point.

INTERVIEWER: That's what I want to know—how is it possible that they are actually...

INTERVIEWEE: That's not the...It's not the true interaction. It's not the true friendships, or it's all fake you know, faking you know, to hide their hate, you know. That's maybe a little bit of evolvment, you know, of improvement because they are getting ashamed of their hate so they are pretending, you know, because...

INTERVIEWER: Why are they ashamed?

INTERVIEWEE: Maybe that's a little bit of our improvement because maybe we are a little bit evolved. And hate became something that's that's that's you know, savage, or accepted as savage so that they aren't, not want to be recognized as those kinds of people that are....haters...Maybe that's our improvement.

~MLADEN

This is an important aspect of the practices that Mladen highlights. The practices are changing—at one time it was okay or acceptable in society to demonstrate that hatred outwardly. But something has changed over the past twenty years; the practices seem to be changing such that those who do not hate, who probably have always been there, are gaining a little more power to influence how the practices operate in Srebrenica. Even if they cannot outwardly speak against politics and narratives, they can at least discourage everyday exhibits of hatred from those who do actually hate from occurring.

4.2.5 On When the Practices Break Down

Many of the interviewees talked about particular times or situations when things are tense. These situations include those where the situation is out-group—there are members of the other group present, but those members are the minority. Another situation is when alcohol is present. And finally, the times around the memorial days each year in July are situations of increased tension in the city.

Djordje describes when the rules that govern out-group situations might break down. When the other group's presence in the situation is marginal, when the other group is clearly outnumbered, individuals might break the rules.

There are some provocations. They happen mostly when you get in a situation where you are in majority and you don't depend or nor are you going to have any consequences for that kind of behavior. And those are not that big provocations but still, that is a provocation.

~DJORDJE

Djordje goes on to provide an example. In this case, the people who were involved in this situation were saying things that Djordje previously had advised me were among that list of things that everyone knows you do not say.

INTERVIEWEE: Like, I have a story about it. When I was working in the woods, there some part-time jobs, and we were coming back. And near that woods there are some Muslim villages. And we have this small bus, you know. We were coming back, and uh on the road to Srebrenica, there was this old lady, and the bus driver, who also is some, let's call them full of hate, he is one of them. But he is a good man, so he stopped the bus. He saw an old lady far away from town. Automatically, in the bus, atmosphere changed. They have this urge to praise Mladic, to praise Karadzic, to say they should be, they should have been more brutal and stuff like that. So I don't think that was a pleasant ride for that lady.

INTERVIEWER: But that would never happen if there was a bigger group of Muslims on the bus, or if it was half and half.

INTERVIEWEE: No no no. That wouldn't happen.

~DJORDJE

Zoran explains why it is better to avoid the bars where the villagers go on the weekends. They are violating that practice that requires that every person has his own opinion and is allowed to say it.

They don't want to listen to anyone, they don't want to hear anything else. They are just like horses, they are just looking straight and that is it, and you cannot talk with those people at all.

~ZORAN
(EMPHASIS ADDED)

Dusko calls attention to the role of alcohol in causing fights.

It's people who is coming and go. It's, uh,...in Srebrenica stay only old Srebrenicans, old people who lived here before the war, and they are together—all. I remember all: your son, your dad, your brother, your sister. I know your sister, your brother. They don't, conflict don't be between that people. [That conflict] is people around from

villages...they have weekend in bars, and drink, and then. It was two years ago last time I think last fight between. But they make [a] fight and problem. If they come from two villages, two different villages. It's not always a nationalist fight. But I think it's because [of] alcohol.

~DUSKO

And in this section of the interview, Dusko makes explicit what alcohol does. It brings forward to the front of a person's head that memory that he is always carrying in the back of his mind. He talks now of Nemanja. Nemanja's mother was killed by a sniper during the war. Dusko thinks that Nemanja, when he is not drinking, knows and understands that the people who killed his mother are not in Srebrenica, but alcohol brings that memory forward.

But I said...Always when people have something here [pointing to the base of his head in the back]. Everybody have something from [the] war [that] they lost. Do you know [Nemanja]? He lost [his] mother, same car. He was in [the] same car with [his] mother [when] Muslimans attacked Skelani. They killed [his] mother in [the] car. And uh, hm, how he can forget that? He knows he's not, he knows people here in Srebrenica. [He thinks], I know [that man] is not, he is not [who] killed my mother. But it is, it's somewhere in his head. Maybe he drinks too much. He [is] off somewhere. It's somewhere in head. All people have [that] somewhere, it's uh....They need only, only one second that they....it's a moment.

~DUSKO

Milina describes how the provocations that are coming from people from the outside around the memorial days are confusing to her. They are transgressing one of the practices: be polite.

You know, just for 11 July, I definitely respect that date, like 12 July, you know. Like, I just don't understand people who are coming from other countries and then they are telling them, you know, [say] something [bad to others].

~MILINA

Alma describes how around the memorial days there is tension in the city that was not there during other days. On July 11 last year, Alma reports that someone organized a game to play on the day of the funerals, which she interpreted as a sign of disrespect.

But what is more interesting about this statement is the uneasiness she experiences. She can not say precisely what it is that is different about the city that day. She also cannot say what kind of actions or behaviors she would avoid. Only she notes that "everything could happen."

INTERVIEWEE: Have you been [here] on 11 July?

INTERVIEWER: Yeah, I was here.

INTERVIEWEE: On that day, I was here also. And I can feel some kind of tension because there is...I think they played some kind of game here.

Maybe you will say to [someone] hello on the street. But there is...you need some just wrong word or something bad, to just, so everything could happen, something bad could happen. I say there are good people and there are bad people. You understand. But what kind of people or person will you meet? You may be in bad time or bad day, bad time or bad place, it all depends. You have seen maybe good people. They are, they live in the same neighborhood, they are good. But if you, for example, come from the local villages, I don't know maybe they are Serb or Muslim, it all depends which kind of conflict. Maybe sometimes only one word can be wrong to cause some kind of conflict. Do you understand?

INTERVIEWER: And what does that conflict look like? Is it violent, or verbal?

INTERVIEWEE: Um, I haven't seen it. But you can maybe. You can, on that day, when was 11 July, we were, Muslims, I was a little bit afraid. You never know how they would react. That [game] was some kind of provocation, I think, because that day was strictly the day when we have funerals of our loved ones. And just on that day, they organized that game. That could be, it is some kind of provocation. It could be a cause of conflict. And that's very...I think that people should live in peace. They shouldn't be provoking.

~ALMA

In terms of the practices, I want to suggest two things. Firstly, the uneasiness she senses is that she does not understand the practices that are governing the town on that day. The practices are different; she is unaccustomed to them. But when the people who follow those practices leave the city after the memorial, things are back to normal again. I discuss this more below.

Secondly, Alma also cannot attribute meaning. She cannot interpret the behavior because she is not sure what the behavior means—in analytical terms, she is unsure of the meanings behind the behavior. She is aware that there are multiple meanings and she lacks a contextualized relationship with these individuals in order to be certain what is motivating their behavior.

Mladen is also puzzled by what he has seen around the memorial days. He cannot understand the kind of provocations that people from the outside are trying to make in the city.

[In a previous job] I spent a lot of days down there in Potocari during that commemoration, but as well, I had also, for a small time...I was running a small business in Srebrenica. I had a shop you know. And uh, I remember, whenever I was working on that day in my shop, lots of people that actually are not living in Srebrenica but they are coming on that day in Srebrenica from foreign countries,

from Germany or Sweden, doesn't matter. And they are, they were always provocative when they were coming to my shop, asking some strange questions, trying to build up tensions, you know.

~MLADEN

Mladen goes on to say that he cannot really explain why this is the case in Srebrenica around the memorial days. As with Alma, I suggest two things. This confusion stems from the influx of so many people coming into the city with a variety of sets of practices different from those that have developed over time in Srebrenica. The inability to interpret or to understand these behaviors is a product of the collision of practices. Mladen cannot understand because the people from the outside are using different practices than what is normal for Srebrenica during the rest of the year.

For example, there's a completely different kind of life when 11th of July comes near, you know, in Srebrenica, than that is the days after and every other day in the year, because for example, in those days people are getting a little bit I don't know how to say it. Hmm. More intolerant, you know, that hate that still in disguise are coming a little bit more on the surface, you know, and I couldn't really explain why is that happening, but still.

~MLADEN

Secondly, Mladen is unsure how to interpret some of those behaviors because he is aware that there exist in Srebrenica different motivations for identical behaviors. He is cautious. As with Alma, he is unsure, without a relationship to contextualize the information, which set of shared meanings he should use to interpret these strange behaviors.

Milina says that the memorial days are the only days when there is a problem in the city and, again, it is because people from the outside are promoting conflict.

The only problems are what you can see is by 11th of July when genocide against Bosniaks happened, and 12th July when genocide happened to Serbian people. Then people are coming from other countries in our city and telling you, "You need to hate him because he is Serbian. You need to hate him because he is Bosniak." But they want just to get you in conflict with your neighbors, with your friends, what you are seeing everyday.

~MILINA

Recalling from the observations in chapters two and three, the interviewees were typically drawing distinctions between themselves, on the one hand, and politicians, the media, outsiders, and

people from the village on the other hand. By examining these situations of tension and situations where others seem to be different than the interviewees, I suggest that these are situations when 1) the system of practices break down and 2) the extent to which the meanings people infer into these behaviors are shared becomes ambiguous. People who are unaccustomed to the practices or who are not inculcated to that system follow a different set of practices. People from the outside also lack relationships with many people who live in Srebrenica, and that in turn renders the extent to which meanings are shared unintelligible. The people I interviewed seemed unable to interpret this behavior from the outsiders. I suggest this is precisely because they no longer share the same practices or the same meanings with these others who have flooded into the city.

4.3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

4.3.1 In Relation to Rawls' Constitutive Practices

Rawls argues that constitutive practices or rules are "the performative criteria that enable the existence of identities, objects and action"¹⁹⁹ and that they help to define the domains of actions. These objects "exist only when, and as, participants in situated practices, adhering to constitutive expectations that are shared, perform such acts, in such a way that other participants in the same situated practice recognize their performances as social objects of a particular sort."²⁰⁰ The social objects are "made to exist in and through the talk (and action) that enacts them."²⁰¹ She writes further that these rules and practices exist so that people can live together in a social order. Part of what makes that social order possible is that members live in "mutually intelligible" spaces with social identities that are also "mutually intelligible."

This data suggests a few insights about this notion of constitutive practices and what they function to do in a social space. On the one hand, the people in Srebrenica have what might be analyzed in terms of constitutive practices or rules, as I have shown. There are practices you must follow within your own social group and there are different practices that you should follow when you are in out-group situations. And these social practices are clearly mutually intelligible.

But my data suggests three caveats. Firstly, mutual intelligibility is not always, or perhaps ever, *accurate*. That is to say, one person interprets another person's behavior and that interpretation can be more or less accurate. It is in this gap between what a person sees—a constitutive practice—and how that person interprets it—a social object—that the dominant narratives and politics become, in the case of Srebrenica, insidiously influential.

As my data demonstrates, the people who I interviewed consistently denied their own espousal of the dominant narratives but also more or less consistently used those same narratives in order to interpret the behavior of others with whom they did not have a personal relationship. This suggests that constitutive practices do have meaning, but that meaning does not necessarily lead all those who know how to interpret the practice to the same conclusion or interpretation. The same practice has multiple meanings, and the narratives I describe in the previous chapters have a great deal of influence over which meaning any particular person will ultimately infer into the behavior of another person. That is, those who are loyal to the narratives interpret meaning one way, while those who are more inclined to voice or exit are open to interpreting meaning in a different way.

Secondly, my data also demonstrates that relationships amongst individuals help to clarify which set of meaning operates between any two individuals. The last set of interviews I include make this distinction clear. One problem that seems to face the people I interviewed during the memorial days in July every year is that they do not know all these people coming from the outside in a personal way. Because they do not know them, they do not know which sets of meanings they

share with those other people. The relationship that otherwise provides that sort of information helps to reduce ambiguity and allows people to better interpret meaning and motivations.

The third insight into this notion of constitutive practices is its apparently social character. These times of tension around the memorial days confuse the people who live in Srebrenica. They cannot seem to interpret or understand the behavior of people from the outside. They recognize the behavior as odd, as provocations of a sort, as strange. But they cannot explain it.

Even though they are in the same geographic space, the constitutive practices and rules that ordinarily would govern interactions in the city are overwhelmed by the constitutive rules and practices that those who are visiting for a few days in July carry with them. The displacement of normal times by this flood of what can only be assumed to be a wide array of practices and norms suggests that these new and diverse rules are shared with others—somewhere.

But they are not widely intelligible in Srebrenica. And that lends some insight into the nature of constitutive rules and practices. They are used, performed, and interpreted at the level of the group, but they are carried and performed by individuals. While geographic space is important somehow, the spaces themselves do not seem always to have fidelity to a set of rules. Instead, the spaces are seemingly always open to contestation. For Srebrenica, it is when the ratio between insiders—those who are inculcated into the system of rules—and outsiders—those who abide by different rules—shifts in favor of the outsiders that the people of Srebrenica begin to describe the behavior as unintelligible and begin to sense 'tension' in the city.

When the people of Srebrenica make the distinctions between themselves and others—those others being politicians, the media, the Diaspora, or the villagers—what they really seem to be identifying is a difference in the sets of constitutive practices that individuals are following. That is to say, that identity *outsider* appears not to be a label related to background or history, lineage, or faith. Instead identity seems to be a matter of the rules you carry with you, the practices that you use

in society to govern your own behavior and to infer meaning into the behaviors of others. Outsiders are not outsiders because they live in the Diaspora. Villagers are not villagers because they live in the village. Outsiders and villagers belong in the "different" category because they follow different practices and because it is not clear to many people in Srebrenica which set of shared meanings they endorse.

4.3.2 In Relation to Understanding Life in Srebrenica

These practices also have important consequences for the way life more generally works in Srebrenica. I identify and discuss three of these consequences in this section of the chapter, and in the final section conclude with an assessment of the first three propositions I set forth in the introduction.

Firstly, the interaction between the in-group and out-group practices work to stabilize life in Srebrenica and to perpetuate the in-group versus out-group distinction. One important observation from this data is the near-perfect reversal between the in-group practices—which encourage one to discipline and influence the motivations and behaviors of other in-group members to remain loyal—and the out-group practices—which discourage one from disciplining or influencing the motivations and behaviors of out-group members. The practices balance each other in some significant ways. While the in-group practices discourage inter-group contact, they most certainly work to keep the narratives from changing. The out-group practices also reinforce the retention of the in-group narratives—you cannot try to convince another person their narrative is incorrect.

The out-group practices also work against the in-group narratives, too, because they provide opportunity after opportunity to demonstrate how reasonable individuals from the out-group in reality are. This could work to change the in-group narrative, but the practices that govern the in-

group seem to be strong enough to overwhelm the possibly positive side effects of the out-group practices. In these two ways, the practices are a force for stability in the city.

Secondly, the practices act as conflict management mechanisms. As I note previously in this chapter, the practices are changing over time. I present a few statements from individuals that demonstrate that this system of practices has evolved through time. These practices are dynamic. But, equally important to note, they are not arbitrary. This evolution of hiding hate—as Mladen referred to it—has a functional consequence in terms of conflict emergence or conflict suppression.

This is not necessarily to make a functionalist argument, but rather to note that at the very least these practices actually do perform a function. They seem to be a product of the organic, spontaneous, and creative interactions within society. They confront the problems society faces in a functional way. And they demonstrate the conflict expertise of the people who live in Srebrenica. They also highlight the democratic values that the people in Srebrenica hold—everyone has a right to an opinion, and a right to state that opinion.

Thirdly, the practices that encourage this depression of conflict through avoidance—of situations where outsiders or villagers are more present, or when alcohol might become a problem—disguise the cosmopolitan nature of Srebrenica behind a veil of ethnic hatred. Segregation is read as ethnic animosity rather than as smart conflict avoidance by those from the outside who do not understand that there exist multiple sets of shared meaning in Srebrenica. People sometimes avoid out-group situations but their motivation for doing so is to avoid the *potential* for conflict for any reason—not just ethnicity. This tendency also has something to say about the conflict expertise of the people who live in Srebrenica.

4.4 PROPOSITIONS 1 – 3

In the introduction, I set out the following three propositions. Typical individuals in Srebrenica have a set of constitutive practices or rules that condition their choices and actions that is different from the set of constitutive rules or practices that condition the choices and actions:

- PROPOSITION 1:** of those who behave more loyally in the political sphere;
- PROPOSITION 2:** of those who behave more loyally and act as carrier groups of cultural narratives; and
- PROPOSITION 3:** of those in the international community, peacebuilding and otherwise.

For propositions 1 and 2, the data I have presented so far suggests that typical individuals do have a different set of strategies for dealing with politics and narratives in Srebrenica. However, as I note in those chapters, that is different than saying whether they have a different set of practices or rules. Based upon the data I present in those two chapters, I conclude that while individuals in the city do have different sets of strategies they employ, the system of constitutive practices do not seem obviously different for those who are more loyal politically or those who are carrier groups of the narratives. In that sense, these two propositions are incorrect.

However, in light of the clarity that examining the constitutive practices brings, there seems to be support for proposition 3, and a strong argument to reword the first two propositions in different terms. On proposition 3, the data, discussions, and arguments I have made in this chapter suggest that indeed, the practices that typically inform the behavior of the individuals I interview—people who consider themselves to be insiders—are different than the practices that inform the behavior of outsiders, including those who the people of Srebrenica identify as 'villagers' or 'politicians'.

On propositions one and three, it is not accurate to suggest that those who are more loyal follow a different set of practices. Instead, the distinction is between insiders in the city and

outsiders. People who live in the city can behave loyally, try to use voice, or try to exit politics or narratives. Whichever strategies they choose to use, they are still operating under the same practices. Instead it seems to be the case that when these practices are breached—when people try to convince others that they are wrong, as politicians do, e.g.—that those who are breaching the rules are accustomed to a different set of practices.

In the next and final chapter, I bring together the general observations from the Politics and Narratives chapters, and the conclusions from this chapter, in order to present an analytical framework that explains in visual and more theoretical terms why things are the way they are in Srebrenica.

5.0 MAKING SENSE

**HOW IT FEELS TO ME TO BE A CITIZEN OF BOSNIA I HERCEGOVINA:
I DON'T HAVE A PROBLEM WITH IT. I EVEN LIKE IT IN SOME WEIRD WAY.
BECAUSE TO BE HONEST, HERE IS IT TOUGH TO LIVE. BUT I LIKE IT,
BECAUSE—WE WERE TALKING ABOUT IT THE OTHER NIGHT—
THE STRENGTH OF THE COMMUNITY.**

**~ DJORDJE
AUGUST 2012**

After the residents in Srebrenica learned that many dogs had been killed by poisoning, they later also learned that two of the dogs—Signorina, a famous dog in Srebrenica, known by some for her persistent capacity to survive euthanization campaigns, and a puppy she had conceived with Pujdo, later named Cuda ("miracle")—had survived the poisoning campaign after all. Some residents had helped nurse Signorina back to health.

A few weeks later, Signorina was picked up by animal control and taken to an animal control site in Sarajevo. She was scheduled to be euthanized, along with Cuda. But a former resident of Srebrenica who lives in Sarajevo heard about the incident and went to claim Signorina and Cuda. That resident was warned by the agency not to return the dogs to Srebrenica. Instead, he made arrangements with a woman who previously lived in Srebrenica to take the dogs to her village in central Bosnia. Later, the dogs ended up in Italy with a family that seems to take care of them.



Figure 5.1 Signorina



Figure 5.2 Cuda

This story highlights a few things about practices and social objects in Srebrenica. The dogs were able to survive the state campaign in part because the community intervened cooperatively to help those dogs. In that sense, in some ways, the dogs can serve as evidence of a practice that constitutes a different image of Srebrenica—a Cosmopolitan image.

In a practice constituting that other image of Srebrenica, a variety of individuals nursed Signornia back to health. Later, they rescued her from the animal control center in Sarajevo. They employed expert strategizing and sense-making that ensured the dogs would survive. They made

their strategies contingent and situation dependent, very much like everyday life in Srebrenica. There, people respond to situations that they see as unfair or oppressive in spontaneous ways that often take into consideration a wide range of information. But most importantly, their strategies not only often achieve their desired results, but they also often conceal what is their true motivation in a way that protects them from any negative consequences. That is, they used a combination of exit, voice, and loyalty strategies in order to navigate a complex situation.

In this particular case, the man in Sarajevo more or less lied to animal control when he claimed the dogs as his own. In my terms, he disguised his motivations behind a veil of some sort of loyalty. The agency might have suspected that the man intended to return the dogs to Srebrenica. They inferred a particular motive into his behavior. But this man simply told the agency he would keep the dogs. At the time, he had no idea. He told that agency what it wanted to hear in order to retrieve these dogs.

It was only later that it turned out his promise—at least for the time being—is true. But his statement was a contingency, a strategy to get what he wanted—to save the dogs—in the context of a bureaucracy that failed to know, understand, or appreciate the role that those two dogs in particular had played in the lives of the people in Srebrenica. From the gaze of the state, the man was not going to return the dogs to Srebrenica. His motivation was irrelevant, and it was the disguise that had protected him.

In the end, it turns out the state got what it wanted—the dogs are not in Srebrenica. The dogs presumably got a better deal out of it—they were still alive and now living with a family who was at least familiar to them. And some of the people in Srebrenica, who had been concerned about the dogs, also got a better deal out of it—they know that Signoria and Cuda are alright after such a tremendous ordeal as having been poisoned.

But that outcome, I want to argue, is only possible because those individuals understood the practices that constitute society, strategized exit masked as loyalty to get what they wanted without experiencing the consequences of those actions from the state, relied upon the state's misreading of their motivations, and at the same were constituting a different image of Srebrenica. It worked because the individuals involved were able to conceal from the gaze of the state what they really intended to do. In my terms, they were able to display loyalty, but exit was the true motivation. It worked because they knew how to make it work, even though no one really had a plan. It was an expertly executed contingency from beginning to end.

The framework of exit, voice, and loyalty is one useful way to understand that expert strategizing. In coordination with an understanding of the practices in Srebrenica, with an understanding of the way people in Srebrenica think about those practices in multiple ways, and by heralding some of the contextual knowledge of Srebrenica related to politics and narratives in Srebrenica, in this chapter I begin to make sense about why things are the way they are in Srebrenica. I make sense of what those things—practices, strategies, politics, and narratives—do in terms of enhancing life and prospects for a better future in Srebrenica. And I make sense of what those things do in terms of constraining life and prospects for a better future in Srebrenica.

In what follows in this chapter, I begin with a conclusion about the contributions this study makes to the fields I directly address in this thesis. In this way, I conclude that part of the discussion in this thesis. In the second section, I introduce an analytical framework. I explain a variety of possible scenarios that this analytical framework makes explicit. Then I examine a handful of variables that directly address and explain some of the general conclusions I make in each of the previous chapters. I conclude that section with some observations the analytical framework makes more generally about Srebrenica. In the final section of the chapter, I briefly discuss some of the contributions this analytical framework makes in terms of policy-making, makes in relation to the

field of Sociology more generally, and I discuss how the remaining propositions fair in light of this analytical framework.

5.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY IN RELATION TO THE LITERATURE

In chapters 1, 2, and 3, I come to a few conclusions, which I want to restate and reiterate at the opening of this final chapter. Firstly, this study contributes to academic conversations in its use of ethnographically-contextualized interview data and the exit, voice, and loyalty framework. The data reveals the complicated relationship between people and purportedly representative structures in society. Furthermore, the framework exit, voice, and loyalty is useful for organizing the strategies people use in response to those relationships. It has the added benefit of making sense of sometimes seemingly illogical and incoherent actions and observations.

For the political disengagement literature, this insight opens up new directions for research and supplies good reasons to expand the topic from political disengagement to something more broad that considers the relationship between people and the state. For the collective memory and collective trauma narrative literature, this insight opens up new questions about the receptiveness of individuals to collective trauma narratives, about how much they represent the individual at all, and questions about why other narratives—in the case of Srebrenica, the more moderate narratives—do not emerge as forcefully as do the dominant narratives.

The exit, voice, and loyalty framework organizes the behaviors that people use to strategize that complicated relationship between themselves and politics, narratives, and practices. The framework also provides the capacity to examine behavior over time, which invites researchers to consider the strategic combinations that people employ in navigating these relationships. Finally, in

that way, the framework is able to explain how these sets of strategies are coherent or consistent over time.

Secondly, this study reveals remarkable consistency across various identity groups, revealing the extent to which the relationships between people and the politics and the narratives that claim to represent them are concealing their actually quite limited representational capacity. This study reveals a rather widespread discontent with politics and narratives in Srebrenica. It is an important observation because it encourages researchers to focus on the differences between the theoretical benefits of politics and narratives and the real, received benefits to individuals in society. Research along these lines of inquiry promises to produce better political and sociological theory by integrating information about those differences into some of the theories we currently use today.

Thirdly, this study also demonstrates one approach to understanding society and how order emerges in society. Rawls' framework is useful because it provides an analytical object for which researchers can search—the constitutive practice—and encourages the researcher to understand the social object that these practices constitute. This study demonstrates that the same constitutive practices can produce more than one social object when people mutually recognize different motivations behind the practices.

This section of the chapter concludes discussion about how this study contributes in particular to the literatures I review in previous chapters. In a subsequent section, I include a discussion about how the results of this study—the analytical framework I describe below—can contribute to research in the field of Sociology more generally.

5.2 APPROACHING AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In this section of the paper, I partially summarize the general conclusions from each of the previous chapters in order to present an analytical framework for exposing and explaining some of the findings of this thesis. In the chapters on Politics and Narratives, I report six general observations important for understanding strategies of life in Srebrenica. The first is that individuals use a variety of these exit, voice, and loyalty strategies. I conclude major discussion of this general observation in the summary in the previous section of this chapter. The second—the distinction that residents sometimes make between in-group and out-group situations—I use as an organizing device in chapter 4.

The remaining general observations I want to discuss in terms of the analytical framework I use to organize the information I provide in the thesis. The third general observation from previous chapters is the distinction many residents make between motivations and behaviors. Individuals perform diverse and sometimes seemingly contradictory strategies in their use of each of the three strategies exit, voice, and loyalty. Exit strategies often go unnoticed or are misrecognized or interpreted as loyalty because in order to distinguish between loyalty and exit, often one needs to know the motivations a person has. Knowledge of the motivation will reveal which social object is being constituted by a particular practice. It is the separation between behavior and motivation for behavior that proves to be an essential protective space for individuals in Srebrenica employing exit strategies. That disguise creates the appearance of seemingly contradictory strategies. Furthermore, it is precisely that separation that gives the dominant narratives the necessary space to constitute a particular social object—an ethnically-tense Srebrenica—rather than the other image of Srebrenica as cosmopolitan.

In order to make sense of exit, voice, and loyalty strategies, then, it is important to examine both the motivations for behaviors and the behaviors themselves of individuals in Srebrenica more explicitly. In order to perform that examination, I separate exit, voice, and loyalty *motivations* from exit, voice, and loyalty *behaviors* and situate them into a nine by nine matrix, as shown below.

In the next sections of this chapter, I explain the matrix and the scenarios it contains in order to situate subsequent discussions related to the matrix itself. Then I ask and answer those questions about each of the scenarios I ask above (interpreting the behavior, obscuring the motive, and constituting a social object), and then discuss separately what the results of each scenario mean, and how they relate to life in Srebrenica. I also highlight how they explain a few of the general observations I have emphasized so far in the thesis. I discuss more generally some of the implications for life in Srebrenica the matrix makes apparent.

Firstly, two brief notes about the matrix itself. The matrix is asking two questions. Along the motivation axis, the matrix is asking the question, "Is the individual motivated to use exit, voice, or loyalty behaviors?" Along the behavior axis, the matrix is asking the question, "What does an individual actually do in any given situation?" Also, a few of the scenarios produced by arranging the matrix in this way are non-sensical. I discuss this in more detail in subsequent sections.

5.3 SCENARIOS

In what follows, I explicitly explain the matrix in order to briefly describe the possible scenarios, beginning with the situation in which a person wants to use voice, and describing what are the results of remaining consistent or of switching to either exit or loyalty. I then do the same with exit and loyalty.

		MOTIVATIONS		
		EXIT	VOICE	LOYALTY
BEHAVIORS	EXIT	SCENARIO 1	SCENARIO 2	SCENARIO 3
	VOICE	SCENARIO 4	SCENARIO 5	SCENARIO 6
	LOYALTY	SCENARIO 7	SCENARIO 8	SCENARIO 9

Figure 5.3 Behavior and Motivation Matrix: Blank

5.3.1 Voice

A person who wants to use voice has two options: she can exit (Scenario 2), or she can remain loyal (Scenario 8). The consequences residents report encourage her to switch to one or the other. In addition, as described in previous chapters, either choice (loyalty or exit) has the same, lesser consequence for her. For her, the decision is between suppressing the behavior she would otherwise choose (protest, e.g.) on the one hand (Scenario 2), or on the other hand, suppressing the voice behavior *and* producing loyalty behavior (Scenario 8).

An example: an individual who is unhappy with the situation surrounding her might want to use voice to challenge her in-group's narrative. Evaluating the consequences of that use of voice, she might consider to either exit or to behave loyally, both of which result in the same consequences. If she decides to exit, she must suppress her desire to use voice, and otherwise simply behave normally—her normal behavior will be read by stranger others as loyalty, but not as exit.

Or she might choose to behave explicitly loyally. Perhaps she needs to secure a job, to correct for a previous use of voice that has called her loyalty into question, or perhaps the environment pressures her into loyalty. In any case, she not only must she suppress her desire for voice, she must also produce behavior that is not genuinely motivated.

5.3.2 Exit

A person who wants to exit can decide to exit (Scenario 1), to use voice (Scenario 4), or to display loyalty (Scenario 7). For the first option voice, as the previous chapters demonstrate, voice is largely discouraged in society. Furthermore, in this case, it would be mostly nonsensical for this person to switch to voice (Scenario 4) because the consequences are so severe for doing so. Perhaps this is a person who wants to fight, or needs to have a fight. In those cases, the issue really has little to do with a genuine motivation toward voice and more to do with the person's desire for confrontation, so I dismiss this scenario as requiring any further discussion.

On the other hand, this person might decide to switch to displaying loyalty (Scenario 7). To remain silent—exit—is to be consistent, but perhaps the individual feels pressure to explicitly demonstrate loyalty for some reason. Or the person is so motivated by some other reward—Medin, the campaign director, might fall under this category. Either way, even though she does not want to do it, she does it anyway because the situation so requires it. She is silenced into producing behavior.

5.3.3 Loyalty

Finally, a person who wants to remain loyal can remain loyal (Scenario 9), use voice (Scenario 6), or decide to exit (Scenario 3). The person who remains loyal suffers no consequences, and probably increases some social reward or economic reward (Scenario 9). This person is, as in the previous discussion about the person who may want to exit, unlikely to switch their behavior from loyalty to

voice. This would be contradictory and at an increased cost (Scenario 6). Because this is unlikely, as before, I dismiss this as not requiring any further discussion. Finally, this person might choose to behave exit instead; in this situation, perhaps the person is feeling some cognitive dissonance or is feeling some pressure somehow not to behave loyally (Scenario 3).

5.4 OUTCOMES

Inside each of the nine possible scenarios I discuss above, below I list the likely outcomes for a variety of variables: evaluating the consequences, obscuring the motive, interpreting the behavior, and constituting a social object. In the next several sub-sections, I address each of these variables individually. Where relevant, I explain how the practices I identify in chapter 4 help to inform the results in each scenario in the matrix. I also include discussions about the implications of these variables.

5.4.1 Evaluating the Consequences

The fourth general observation in the previous chapters is that exit is the most popular. This analytical framework explains why that is the case and predicts when one might exit rather than remain loyal or use voice. Residents must evaluate the consequences for each desired behavior and the consequences that people experience for the behavior they perform are varied. On the one hand, a person might experience some more emotional or psychological consequences for any disparity between their desired behavior (their actual motivation) and the behavior they actually perform. A person who thinks one way and behaves another way might be experiencing shame, or guilt, or fear,

or pride, or anger. These are emotional consequences that, important as they might be, were never mentioned by any interviewee as a reason for disguising motivations.

		MOTIVATIONS		
		EXIT	VOICE	LOYALTY
BEHAVIORS	EXIT	SCENARIO 1 Consequences: None Interpretation: loyalty Motive: obscured Constituted object: Cosmopolitan Srebrenica	SCENARIO 2 Consequences: None Interpretation: loyalty Motive: obscured Constituted object: Cosmopolitan Srebrenica	SCENARIO 3 Consequences: None Interpretation: loyalty Motive: obscured Constituted object: Ethnically-tense Srebrenica
		SCENARIO 4 Consequences: Yes Interpretation: voice Motive: obscured Constituted object: Cosmopolitan Srebrenica	SCENARIO 5 Consequences: Yes Interpretation: voice Motive: manifest Constituted object: Cosmopolitan Srebrenica	SCENARIO 6 Consequences: Yes Interpretation: voice Motive: obscured Constituted object: Ethnically-tense Srebrenica
		SCENARIO 7 Consequences: None Interpretation: loyalty Motive: obscured Constituted object: Cosmopolitan Srebrenica	SCENARIO 8 Consequences: None Interpretation: loyalty Motive: obscured Constituted object: Cosmopolitan Srebrenica	SCENARIO 9 Consequences: None Interpretation: loyalty Motive: manifest Constituted object: Ethnically-tense Srebrenica
	VOICE			
	LOYALTY			

Figure 5.4 Behavior and Motivation Matrix

On the other hand, those consequences that interviewees did mention were mostly social infamy for in-group situations, which manifests itself in economic terms, and inter-group conflict for out-group situations. For that reason, the matrix evaluates whether there are consequences in terms of economic outcomes for the individual and whether there are consequences in terms of conflict.

I use the practices I identify in chapter 4 to determine whether an individual can expect to experience consequences for their behaviors. The results show that for all loyalty and for all exit behaviors, the result is the same: there are no consequences in terms of social status, access to economic resources for the individual, or for conflict. In contrast, the consequences for using voice can be severe, life-threatening even, so the risk is high for using voice.

Within the voice behavior row (Scenarios 4 – 6), conflict or economic consequences can occur in any of the three situations. However, as I note in the previous section, two of the scenarios (4 and 6) are unlikely. Otherwise, the only actually plausible scenario in the matrix for those who use voice is Scenario 5. Here, there are likely consequences in both in-group and out-group situations.

For in-group situations, individuals risk their access to the economy due to social infamy, as I discuss in depth in previous chapters. For out-group situations, individuals risk intergroup conflict if they use voice to try to change the narrative of their out-group counterparts in any given situation. As chapter 4 makes clear, the practices I identify seem to work to reduce the possibility or potential for conflict by encouraging those included to try to change the out-group's narrative to switch to either loyalty or exit behaviors.

But the larger point that this matrix makes explicit is the surprisingly small likelihood that anyone is even motivated to use voice. The matrix makes explicit the probability that many, if not most, residents in Srebrenica are displeased with their own groups' narratives and politics. In this way, this analytical framework also importantly demonstrates how unlikely conflict is in Srebrenica—not only because explicit intergroup conflict is discouraged by the practices, but also

because most people do not even agree with their own narratives. Most people are choosing to exit the narratives.

What the framework demonstrates is the likeliness that what many of the residents in Srebrenica said to me is actually often true: Srebrenica does not have a problem with ethnicity. For those individuals, Srebrenica is a cosmopolitan place, which they create everyday with their practices. The problem is not that Srebrenica is mostly ethnically-tense. The problem instead is that Srebrenica is mostly *read* as being ethnically-tense. The other meanings behind these constitutive practices are not discovered. On the one hand, the narratives are rather powerful. On the other hand, residents report that many people coming in from the outside never even look for other possible meanings. It is so impossible to imagine that Srebrenica is not ethnically-tense that that social object is quite literally unimagined. That has consequences, and I discuss those in some limited detail in the next sections.

5.4.2 Interpreting the Behavior

This variable in the matrix asks the question, "How is a stranger who is evaluating the behavior of an individual likely to interpret that individual's behavior?" There are two outcomes for this variable. One is that the individual evaluates the behavior as loyalty and the other is that the individual evaluates the behavior as voice. The matrix shows that in all behavior scenarios marked as exit and loyalty, the behavior is interpreted as loyalty. In scenarios where an individual behaves using voice, the interpretation is voice. Notably, exit is never the interpretation.

This variable asks the question about how a *stranger* interprets behavior. In this case, the stranger is likely either to refrain from making a conclusion (less likely) or to infer meaning into the behavior based upon the narratives, rather than based upon the individual's actual motivations (more likely). In this way, the matrix makes explicit the fifth general observation: the conclusion from the

data analysis that states that individuals will interpret the motivations of strangers using the narratives.

This is an important sociological intersection: this is one point where individuals who live in Srebrenica come into contact with the dominant narratives, usually but not always brought in by outsiders—academics, politicians, journalists, travellers, war memorial consumers. Their behaviors are being interpreted as loyalty, as constituting an ethnically-tense Srebrenica, rather than constituting a different social object. The people of Srebrenica with whom I interacted are very much aware of this interpretation. That is, this is the point where structure meets the individual. Importantly, in Srebrenica, the residents often experience this as an oppressive relationship.

5.4.3 Obscuring the Motive

The sixth general observation from the previous chapters is that motivations for behaviors are often disguised. This analytical framework demonstrates how and when this is the case. There are two possible outcomes for the second line in each scenario—that the motive is obscured or that the motive is manifest. When the individual's behavior and motivation are the same, and when others who are strangers are able accurately to interpret that behavior, I identify the motive as manifest. When the individual's behavior and motivation are different, and when the interpretation of the behavior by strangers is inaccurate, I identify the motive as being obscured.

There are only two scenarios in the matrix where the motive is manifest: 5 and 9. When a person wants to use voice, uses voice behaviors, and the voice behavior is interpreted as voice by others, the motive is manifest. Likewise, when a person wants to remain loyal, uses loyal behavior, and others interpret that behavior as loyalty, the motive is manifest. In all other cases, the individual is being misinterpreted by others as being loyal.

This aspect of the framework reveals how and why any individual's collection of exit, voice, and loyalty strategies is actually strategic. The individual can choose carefully for herself to whom she discloses her personal opinions and in this way manages her risk-taking. She decides who will and will not know her true motivations and this ultimately has very positive consequences for the individual: it can function in a protective capacity—allowing those who wish to exit the opportunity to boycott the narrative without risking their social status or economic resources.

This also has potentially negative consequences for others, and arguably, for the larger society, because it functions to confirm that observer's likely interpretation that this person endorses her own group's narrative. In other words, it decreases the possibility that two individuals who are unacquainted but who both are motivated to exit the dominant narratives will recognize each other as allies.

The connection between the practices, the strategic choices individuals make, and the narratives as a dominant structure in society is obvious. In both cases, the observers—strangers, both in-group and out-group—infer that the behavior confirms that the individual espouses the dominant political narrative. But as the matrix makes clear, that conclusion is true only in a minority of cases—33% of the time, all other things being equal. Instead, the behavior is interpreted as loyalty 66% of the time because people use the dominant narratives to make sense of the world, sometimes even if they do not actually believe them themselves. The narratives become a sort of set of default shared meanings. It is a vicious cycle in this sense because, as Rawls argues, social objects can only be constituted when those meanings are shared. As I discuss below, power relationships largely influence when in fact a cosmopolitan Srebrenica will be intelligible.

From there, it is easy to see the implications of this combination of practices and narratives for larger society. The interview data supports this conclusion and is clear: Nearly everyone I interviewed claimed for themselves that they do not see ethnicity when they see another person—

they only look if the person is a good person or a bad person (notably an assessment that implies a relationship exists between the individuals). But in the interviews, they consistently interpret and explain strangers' behaviors using the dominant narratives. And this leads to the curious conclusion they make about themselves that they, the interviewees, are among the exceptions in society, rather than seeing themselves as part of a much larger group that, in all likelihood based upon my data, probably does exist in Srebrenica. That larger group is comprised of individuals who are dissatisfied with the political and narrative situation in Srebrenica and would like to see it changed. But the in-group and out-group practices, which discourage voice, and the narratives, which fill in many of the blanks, work together to keep these individuals from identifying one another. This is a powerful societal structure in Srebrenica.

5.4.4 Constituting a Social Object

Finally, the matrix shows which social object is being constituted in each scenario. The exposure of the otherwise hidden motivations for behavior reveals a contest in Srebrenica over which image of Srebrenica will be recognized. On the one hand, some groups are interested in enacting an image of Srebrenica filled with ethnic animosity, suspicion, fear, and tension. People in these groups share sets of meanings that they use to interpret the behaviors of others. When people are following the practices of Srebrenica I identify in chapter 4, they are doing so because they are afraid of others and/or hate others. In doing so, they are constituting a particular social object.

On the other hand, some groups are interested in enacting an image of Srebrenica marked by cosmopolitanism. People in this group share a set of meanings that they use to interpret the behaviors of others whom they know endorse this set of shared meanings. When people in this group are following the practices of Srebrenica, they are doing so because they are avoiding situations where that other image of Srebrenica might be reinforced. They are also actively creating a

different society, not as Serb or Muslim but as members of a community. In doing so, they are constituting a particular social object.

What I want to demonstrate in this thesis is not necessarily that one object or another is the *real* object that exists in Srebrenica. While there is evidence to suggest that a large number of individuals does recognize and seeks to constitute a different image of Srebrenica (more on this below), what I want to emphasize in this thesis is that Srebrenica is comprised of a multitude of individuals who are strategizing their lives in ways that make sense to them. Sometimes that produces an image of an ethnically-tense Srebrenica and other times that produces an image of a cosmopolitan Srebrenica. Each of these individuals has many good reasons for practicing their strategies.

For example, Hasan is a man who lived through the war. His story includes a troubling 80 days walking through the woods from Srebrenica to Tuzla in July 1995. He was in the woods in order to avoid capture and likely execution by the opposing army. The distance he walked was approximately 100 kilometers, in the hottest part of the year. This man helps organize a yearly memorial Peace March (Mars Mira) that begins near Tuzla three days before the yearly burial at the Potocari Memorial Center.

Each day, thousands of individuals walk the mountains to arrive at the cemetery on the third day. The men who walk each year arrive in Potocari and make their way into the battery factory where the caskets of those identified by the International Commission on Missing Persons through DNA analysis are waiting to be carried across the road to the cemetery, where they will be buried after a ceremony the following day, July 11th. Those who walk include men who walked the woods in 1995, their family members and friends, and people from the international community who typically want to show support for the men who fled through the woods in 1995. Some people view this walk as a display of nationalism. It is controversial in many ways. That said, when Hasan organizes

and participates in this march, he is trying to constitute that cosmopolitan Srebrenica. That is his motivation.

Hasan stated during his interview that he wants to talk about the war. He wants answers. He wants to know who killed his family. He wants to confront the people he considered to be his friends before the war, and still considers to be his friends today. But, he says that they do not want to talk about the war. Hasan extends his hand, knowing he will likely never get any answers, but he has somehow managed to conclude for himself that this situation—in which he does not get answers and the people who killed his family never are punished—is the only starting point for peace in Srebrenica and Bosnia. He wants a cosmopolitan Srebrenica.

Another man, Camil, who walked the distance from Srebrenica to Tuzla in 1995 and spent nearly 80 days in the woods, is similarly oriented. Camil never told me his story of the walk in the woods personally, though he showed me what remains of his village. I visited his home, which he is working on in the evenings and on weekends during the summer to rehabilitate after he finishes his day job. He lost many of the male members of his family during the war.

When I visited his house, he walked with me through the village and pointed to what are now the remains of foundations of buildings, overgrown with brush and trees after twenty years have passed over this place with little change. He pointed to the remains of the school he attended as a child, showed me where he played futbol as a child, pointed to what was left of his uncles' houses. That night that he walked me through the village, he said little else. But he did say, motioning for me to look around the village: "This is genocide." This man and I never had a conversation about interactions between Muslims and Serbs in Srebrenica. But I have seen him in the city. He has many friends of both ethnicities in Srebrenica.

Another afternoon, I and a colleague and Belma and Camil went to the Drina for an afternoon to celebrate Bajram together. Camil brought with him the man with whom he walked

through the woods when they fled Srebrenica in 1995. When they arrived together in Tuzla, Camil was literally insane. He also was sustaining three bullet wounds to his legs.

As these two men drank, they became jollier. Then his friend went off by himself a few yards away from the picnic table just next to the river. He began screaming. Intermittent. Sustained. Loud. Camil explained that sometimes that man goes crazy, but he is okay. At some point in the afternoon, two people in a boat floating down the river came to the edge of the river where we were picnicking to get some spring water that feeds the river. Camil obliged them for some water. But when they left, Camil—now more or less drunk—asked, "How can you commit genocide and then ask for water?"

But Camil's close friend Belma explained to me on a few occasions that Camil—when he is not drinking—does not blame any other Serb than the ones who killed his family for what happened to him during the war. That is to say, he also believes that there exist in the world good people and bad people. Some of them are Serbs and some of them are Muslims. I cannot say which social object Camil is constituting in his everyday practices, but there is evidence to suggest that, at the very least, he is constituting both at different times.

Another man explained to me that community is possible in Srebrenica because those people that cannot tolerate their respective others simply avoid those interactions altogether. For him, his choice is to avoid giving any money to shop or restaurant owners who are Serb who were of fighting age when the war started. Because he does not know who did what during the war, he maintains his own ethical stance by avoiding even the possibility that he is supporting someone who killed his family. He walked through the woods for about 20 days in 1995.

A Bosnian poet relates this sentiment:

REVENGE²⁰²

I know who killed my wife and
son and
daughter.

I know, one of them came back.
Opened a bakery.
But I make sure
I never buy anything there.

**~ADISA BASIC
WAR SURVIVOR AND POET**

For Alija, it seems more likely to me that he is constituting that more dominant image of Srebrenica in his everyday practice. But it is important to note that he is doing so genuinely, in contrast to what many people in Srebrenica consider that politicians are doing when they are constituting that image of Srebrenica. It is important to note his sincerity because it shows that the contest over the image of Srebrenica is not between innocents on one side and bullies, politicians, and outsiders on the other side. Alija, and others like him, constitute that image of Srebrenica for some very real, very morally sound, and in many ways justifiable reasons. In this way, his story demonstrates how complicated are many ethical questions in Srebrenica.

Nemanja lost his mother during the war. He was six. His friend tells me that he was crossing the Drina, riding in the back seat of the car. Then his mother was murdered. A sniper had shot her in the head. Nemanja reported to me that he believes it was intentional because it was a shot to the head, and it was a sniper. How could a sniper accidentally kill a woman by shooting her in the head?

These days, Nemanja does not say very many nice things about Muslims. Notably he does not say much bad about them either. But his resentment seems more aimed at the fact that he is not only not afforded any legitimacy for his loss typically—because he is Serb—but that in a complete reversal, he is told that he is collectively guilty for the war because he is Serb. The opposing dominant political narrative tells him that. But Nemanja reported to me that he avoids Muslim bars because he does not want to risk the possibility of a fight. And when he wanted to fight a Muslim man, he refrained because he did not want to be interpreted as a Serbian man beating up a Muslim. He is constituting a different social object, at least in some ways.

Aleksandar similarly sometimes is told he is guilty for the war, though his story of the war is a bit different. Leading up to the war, he knew he did not want to fight. He fled to a city in what is now Serbia. He and many like him were labeled and hunted as deserters. Some of his friends were caught. He was able to evade capture by staying in his apartment for up to as many as 30 days at a time. His friends were deported back to Bosnia and forced to fight against the Bosnian Muslim militias.

One of Aleksandar's closest friends was Muslim. He had implored him to come with him to the place in what is now Serbia. But his friend felt a responsibility to his family to stay. Aleksandar asked his mother, who had stayed in Srebrenica up to the beginning of the war, to ask after his friend to find out whether his friend had survived. For a long while, his mother had no news, but later he found out that his friend was killed. He wept. He has stated that he would like to visit his friend's gravesite in Potocari, if his body has been found and identified. But he holds no hope that he will ever actually go to Potocari because he is Serb: he risks his economic access in society at the same time that he thinks and fears that people who work or visit that memorial center will not welcome a Serbian man into the cemetery.

These days, as in the days leading up to and during the war, Aleksandar, says he loves all people. He also reports that he wants to know only whether a person is a good person or a bad person. He does not see ethnicity and make decisions about people. On both memorial days, July 11th and July 12th, he opens his shop in Srebrenica, but keeps his shop quieter than normal, not playing any music on the speakers. He does this because he wants to respect all those who are mourning their losses from the war. He is constituting a cosmopolitan image of Srebrenica.

These stories all demonstrate that *everyone* has stories and they each respond to those histories in very different ways. Even so, the same practices in which they engage that govern those who are more loyal to the narrative also govern those who want to exit or who want to try to change

the dominant narratives. The combination of strategies that each of these individuals uses is different and varying, and the social object each one is constituting in their daily practices is different. But the practices that govern them are the same.

This discussion about constituting a social object is the counterpart to the discussion above on interpretation, because that variable asks a very particular question—how does a *stranger* evaluate the behavior? Based upon the evidence I present in previous chapters of this thesis, it is clear that when an individual is personally acquainted with another individual, both individuals can interpret each other's behaviors based upon the contextual knowledge implied in the relationship. That is to say, they know which set of meanings they share—which social object they are constituting—when they perform constitutive practices. In situations between acquaintances and friends, interpretations are more likely to be accurate because the individuals know themselves personally.

In chapter 4, one conclusion I draw from my data related to Rawls' framework is that relationships matter greatly for the individual who is deciding which way to interpret the behavior of another person. If the two individuals have a personal relationship, they are able to understand each other and the social object that is being constituted by any given practice. So, in contrast to that previous question, this question asks, "How does an individual interpret the behavior she sees a friend or acquaintance enacting?" Importantly, this question assumes that the individual doing the evaluating knows the true motivation behind the behavior she is witnessing, and can therefore identify which set of social meanings is being enacted by the behavior: the image of Srebrenica as an ethnically-tense town, or the image of Srebrenica as a cosmopolitan town.

When an individual knows the true motivations of the individual whose behaviors she is evaluating, and can therefore identify which social object is being constituted, she can decipher whether the behavior is constituting the cosmopolitan or the ethnically-tense town—or a different image altogether.

The matrix shows that, when behaviors are distinguished from motivations, and when both are organized in terms of exit, voice, and loyalty, all other things being equal, it is two times more likely that any given behavior is actually constituting a cosmopolitan Srebrenica rather than an ethnically-tense Srebrenica. This is in direct contrast to the discussion above about how behaviors are interpreted by strangers, where behaviors are two times more likely to be interpreted as loyalty (constituting the ethnically-tense town) than as voice or exit.

These results demonstrate the important role that relationships play amongst individuals in society in constituting social objects. One major determinant of how an individual's motivations will be recognized or misrecognized is the nature of the relationship between the individual observing and the individual observed. The relationship is incredibly important.

Rawls addresses this in a bit of a different way. She writes,

in a modern world not based on shared belief, such constitutive orders are becoming increasingly important...Within constitutive orders of practices, objects exist only when, and as, participants in situated practices, adhering to constitutive expectations that are shared, perform such acts, in such a way that other participants in the same situated practice recognize their performances as social objects of a particular sort. The existence of the objects is not only performative (and must meet performative criteria), it is also reciprocal—requiring mutual cooperation in, commitment to and confirmation of practices that exist independently from individuals and in advance of action. A single actor cannot claim the mutual intelligibility of objects if they are the only one who is committed to a practice. ...Social objects are made to exist in and through the talk (and action) that enacts them...²⁰³

What this excerpt highlights is what the data in this thesis and the distinction between interpretations based upon narratives and interpretations based upon personal relationships makes evident. Individuals must *mutually* understand each other and the motivations they carry. When that relationship exists, the meaning is shared and mutual understanding is accurate; it follows that at that point social objects are created and constituted.

But this study demonstrates that the same constitutive practices can constitute different social objects. That makes clear that social objects are not all created and constituted equally. In

Srebrenica, the evidence I provide suggests that at least two different social objects are competing with each other. The social object *cosmopolitan Srebrenica* is at a disadvantage because it is not based upon the narratives that dominate in Srebrenica. The other ethnically-tense Srebrenica as a social object is at an advantage because it is based upon those dominant narratives in Srebrenica. When individuals are interpreting each other's behaviors, and that interpretation is not based upon a relationship in which those individuals have come to an understanding about which social object is being constituted, the narratives ensure that behavior will be interpreted in such a way as to constitute that ethnically-tense image of Srebrenica.

Furthermore, in situations where one individual endorses the narratives more loyally and another individual does not—even when they have a relationship that clarifies the understanding each individual has of the other person's motivations—the social object that will be constituted will be that ethnically-tense Srebrenica. This is a product of the power relationship that exists between those who support the narratives and those who do not. The very fact that the individual who does not endorse the narratives risks losing access to the economy for using voice or explicitly exiting is the mark that identifies that unequal power relationship. It also ensures that the ethnically-tense image of Srebrenica will be constituted more by the practices common in society.

That is a striking finding for one reason in particular. Above I come to the conclusion that the image of a cosmopolitan Srebrenica is two times more likely to be the social object being constituted by everyday practices. That is based upon a reading of this matrix that assumes that motivations and behaviors are distributed equally across each of the three exit, voice, and loyalty options. It is unlikely that this is the case.

However, even given that unlikelihood, the data I present in the previous chapters suggests that exit is actually the motivation and the behavior that many, many people are using—far more than those who are actually motivated to be loyal. That means that this estimate that predicts a

cosmopolitan image of Srebrenica two times more than an ethnically-tense image of Srebrenica actually is conservative. In other words, the data I collected suggest that the cosmopolitan Srebrenica is numerically superior. In some ways, that is irrelevant because of the imbalance in power between those who are seeking voice and exit versus those who are loyal. Those who are loyal, for the present time, have more power.

5.4.5 Discussion

In the previous section, I argue that the matrix supports, at least in part, the assertion many people in Srebrenica made to me that Srebrenica does not have an ethnicity problem. Behaviors that otherwise could be read as constituting a cosmopolitan Srebrenica are usually being interpreted by strangers as constituting an ethnically-tense Srebrenica instead. This is partly because sometimes residents strategically disguise their exit as loyalty and partly because the dominant narratives supply meaning in order for individuals to interpret the behavior and motivations of others. The social object *Cosmopolitan Srebrenica* almost never, according to the residents with whom I interacted, is constituted as a social object between strangers—typically outsiders coming in, taking notes, making interpretations (largely falsely, if this matrix reveals anything close to accurate information), leaving, and reconstituting that other image of Srebrenica.

Unfortunately, the strength of the narratives about Srebrenica and the people who live there, which largely focus on identity and ethnic animosity, renders the possibility that many people will see the other social object at all highly unlikely. This is a vicious cycle. And it explains what it is that the people in Srebrenica with whom I talked and lived identify as oppressive about these narratives. The narratives largely ensure that they are read, and always will be read, as constituting a social object that they themselves exit in daily practice, and furthermore, actively try to replace with a different social object.

This point should be read as a rather important asterisk to all the previous discussions throughout the thesis related to ethnicity, identity, and conflict. Many of those discussions have at their base the assumption that ethnicity and identity are some of the most important organizing concepts in society. Not only is it possible, it is rather likely based upon my data, that most people in Srebrenica do not organize their understanding of the world in terms of identity. Identity matters, but it matters in a way that what is written about Srebrenica, Bosnia, and the war often fails to capture. The data in this thesis and the analytical framework I present demonstrate that it is rather more likely that a *majority* of individuals in Srebrenica are cosmopolitan, moderate, welcoming, and democratic.

That is, they do not need programs that bring together teens of different backgrounds. They do not need reconciliation programs in order to prevent another genocide. They do not need to be taught to be democratic, or to respect another's human rights, or to solve problems with others peacefully—many of the reasons that people are coming to Srebrenica in the first place. They already are together with people of different backgrounds. They already practice democratic values, respect for human rights, and non-violent conflict management. If they need anything at all—a rather large assumption—they need their social object to be recognized mutually. While there exist residents in Srebrenica who are constituting a more ethnically-tense image of Srebrenica, this thesis suggests that another image exists, that it is likely numerically superior in its representativeness of the residents of Srebrenica, and that the problem for many who live in Srebrenica is not ethnic tensions but rather the overwhelming recognition of that image of Srebrenica instead of the one they are faithfully and consistently constituting in their everyday practices.

5.5 CONCLUSIONS

5.5.1 In Relation to the Propositions

At this point in the thesis, I have addressed each of the five propositions I set out in the first chapter. Typical individuals in Srebrenica have a set of constitutive practices or rules that condition their choices and actions that is different from the set of constitutive rules or practices that condition the choices and actions:

- PROPOSITION 1:** of those who behave more loyally in the political sphere;
- PROPOSITION 2:** of those who behave more loyally and act as carrier groups of cultural narratives; and
- PROPOSITION 3:** of those in the international community, peacebuilding and otherwise.

The constitutive rules that condition the choices and actions of typical individuals in Srebrenica:

- PROPOSITION 4:** inform the strategies for exit, voice, and loyalty that these individuals choose; and
- PROPOSITION 5:** are fundamental in the sense that these sets of constitutive rules can help make coherent those strategies and actions that might otherwise seem contradictory (e.g., claiming that ethnicity does not matter in Srebrenica, but describing one café as Serb and another as Bosniak).

Propositions 1 and 2 both are false. As I discuss in the previous chapters, the same practices seem to condition both those who behave more loyally in the political sphere and the carrier groups of the narratives.

That said, it seems likely to be the case that politicians and other people who some residents of Srebrenica classify as outsiders do operate according to a different set of practices altogether. Politicians in Bosnia will fight with each other on television or through print media concerning the dominant narratives. That explicitly violates the practices that govern out-group situations. It would appear that a different set of practices governs politicians in the culture they have developed together.

Furthermore, as this thesis demonstrates, many people from Srebrenica who are coming back to Srebrenica to visit during July are creating a tension in the city that some residents feel on their skin. They are asking strange questions and encouraging strange behaviors. Journalists come in and ask equally strange questions, as do people like me, academics.

All this means that Proposition 3 seems to be correct—the constitutive practices that condition the choices and actions of the international community—and those who are from Srebrenica but no longer reside there and visit each summer—are different than those that govern life in Srebrenica.

Proposition 4 also seems to be correct, but incomplete. It is more accurate to say that the constitutive practices that condition the choices and actions of typical individuals in Srebrenica inform the strategies for exit, voice, and loyalty that these individuals choose, but that the practices constitute different images of Srebrenica. Sometimes that is an image of a cosmopolitan Srebrenica, when an observer and the person observed share that set of meanings behind the constitutive practices. Other times that is an image of an ethnically-tense Srebrenica.

Finally, Proposition 5 is correct, in a limited way. The constitutive practices do help make coherent those strategies and choices that people in Srebrenica make. They do so in the sense that these practices have multiple meanings, and sometimes they are constituting different images of Srebrenica. By exposing the motivations behind the practices, one can make sense out of otherwise seemingly contradictory pieces of evidence.

5.5.2 Implications for Policy

5.5.2.1 Peacebuilding and Reconciliation. The literature reviews in chapters 2 and 3 argue that cultural narratives and the way politics is conducted have consequences. "Which narrative wins out is not only a matter of performative power. It is also a matter of power and resources and the

demographics of the audiences who are listening."²⁰⁴ In particular, in many cases of civil war, atrocity, and episodes of extreme violence, the international community comprises at least a part of that audience. These narratives influence the way that this community understands a conflict and the people who endured it. That influence has real, material consequences.

More generally, the narratives that inform the assumptions that many outsiders are bringing with them into Srebrenica are based upon and reinforcing an image of Srebrenica that does not necessarily reflect reality. In particular, in post-war Bosnia, the dominant narrative—mostly influenced by the Bosnian Muslim narrative—was largely informed and aided by the popularity granted to Robert Kaplan's *Balkans Ghosts* by then-President Clinton, who, it has been rumored, originally declined to intervene in the conflict because the conflict was supposedly based upon ancient ethnic hatreds.

These narratives are not only schemas for outsiders to make sense of the world. They also inform the policies and programs that many outsiders are bringing into Bosnia. This is another intersection between the individual living in Srebrenica and the international community. Based upon those narratives, policies emphasizing the cultivation of tolerance, democratic systems of governance, and alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution, for example, all seem to make a lot of sense.

The data I present here suggests that this is indeed the correct lever for peacebuilding work in Bosnia. The problems are that this lever is being pulled in the wrong direction, and it is focusing on the wrong people. On the first problem, the lever many organizations choose to pull is one that attempts to change the intergroup interactions in Bosnia. But as my data shows, if there is to be an intervention in Bosnia, the focus should not be on putting Serbs and Bosnian Muslims into a room in order produce a common history. That is equivalent to asking them to use voice strategies in out-group situations in order to change the other person's understanding of the war and narrative. In the

scheme of life in Srebrenica, this is the one scenario in which conflict is most likely. Based upon the practices I discovered there, this is almost guaranteed to result in more, not less, conflict. At the very least, it puts those people who are involved in such processes in economic and social danger because of the in-group practices that keep them from challenging their own group's narrative.

On the second problem, the data in this thesis suggests that ethnicity actually is not the biggest problem in Srebrenica. Even though empirical data exists to suggest that ethnicity is a major problem there—e.g., segregated bars—the data I present suggests that at least in some instances what motivates that segregation is not ethnic animosity or hatred but rather sometimes a deep respect for others, sometimes a personal interest in avoiding potential conflict situations, and sometimes a desire to avoid social infamy.

The point is that, in fact, many of the average everyday people of Srebrenica are not the ones who hate others. This is not so evident because they also happen to be quieter and their narratives about the war—usually ones that acknowledge the complexity of the war and understand that most people on both sides were innocents—are not the dominant narratives in society. In other words, these people do not need to be democratized or taught how to resolve conflict or taught how to be tolerant. But much of the conflict resolution and reconciliation literature encourage organizations to do just that.

Instead, if there is to be any intervention in Bosnia—which is not necessarily the morally correct policy either—it first should focus on in-group practices before it ever even considers confronting inter-group situations. The people in Srebrenica already more or less have a conflict management system that suppresses conflict in those rather limited instances where it might erupt.

Furthermore, if the in-group practices were adjusted so that individuals who disagree with the dominant narratives could freely express themselves, there may not be much of a need after all to do so much peacebuilding work. As the interview data shows, and the matrix supports, most

people in Srebrenica are not those who hate and are not those who are unprepared for interethnic interaction. The problem for both in-group and out-group change in Srebrenica arguably lies with a minority of the population, those who happen to be the loudest and most powerful.

It seems unlikely that an intervention would be effective even for those who are unprepared for interethnic interaction. Moreover, it might not even be morally correct because, as a few of my interviewees demonstrate, their histories with the war are very much in line with their group's narratives. To the extent that individuals like Hasan or Alija or Nemanja or Zoran have animosity toward their out-group, that animosity seems to me to be genuinely a product of their experiences during the war. That leads to some very difficult ethical questions for the peacebuilding and reconciliation community. Is it moral to try to change their personal narratives when that narrative represents their personal histories? Do they have a moral right to have their stories as well, even if it results in animosity or hatred?

I cannot claim to answer these questions. However, what I try to show with this thesis is that the situation in Srebrenica, and likely in other places in Bosnia, or other post-war locations around the world, is complicated. More than a few narratives exist. Each of those narratives seem to represent genuinely at least some portion of the population. At the same time, the extent to which those narratives really represent the people they claim to represent is an open question.

Furthermore, each post-war situation is unique. For Srebrenica, trying to change the opinion of others in an out-group situation violates one of the fundamental constitutive practices in Srebrenica. At first glance, that seems like a bad idea. The findings I report in this thesis and the analysis I provide suggest a degree of caution and self-reflection is most certainly necessary for the international community heading into and out of Srebrenica. We have been identified by not only a few individuals in Srebrenica as contributing to a problem these individuals face in their everyday lives. It influences their strategizing in their everyday lives. It affects how they are able to access

what they require for livelihood sustainability. It affects the way the government is (not) working in Srebrenica for those who live in Srebrenica.

Part of the reflection requires that we examine the extent to which we are importing meaning into what we see based upon these narratives or other schema. Ultimately, what this data shows, using Rawls' terms, is that we are constituting an image of Srebrenica that is contested. We should be more careful to consider the multiple meanings behind the constitutive practices we witness and constitute ourselves. Otherwise, the work that many of us do will continue to be just one colonial move after another.

5.5.2.2 Anarchy As Peacebuilding. Throughout the interviews, the people in Srebrenica referred to specific days of the year where things feel different. The days most referenced were those days around July 11th and July 12th each year, during which the city is flooded by people coming in from outside. When the residents spoke about those days they often referred to a tense feeling, a situation in which people are acting strangely, asking strange questions, or making provocations purposefully in the hopes of making some sort of bad event.

As I argue in the previous chapter, this difference the people I interviewed sense on and around these days is likely due to a collision of multiple practices and multiple meanings. Supposing that the practices I identify in chapter 4 did develop organically, supposing that they developed slowly over time, and supposing that they developed as an answer to a problem that people who live in Srebrenica were facing after the war, increasingly so as residents returned to the city, it seems likely that the people who have not lived in Srebrenica for this period of time are probably unaware of those practices and unaware of the meanings behind them. For they are operating according to a set of different practices, or more accurately, a variety of sets of different practices.

Ironically, it is the reassembly of all these people from all over the world with all their different practices and meanings that lends some insight into the success of local, organic conflict resolution mechanisms in Srebrenica. Let me explain:

The time, space, and context in Srebrenica during the years just after the war arguably helped individuals navigate probably difficult situations. What stands in place now as a product of that delicate navigation is a rickety system of constitutive practices that holds up most of the year. I suggest that, while this process is far from perfect, and while many people in Srebrenica today and those who fled during and after the war who have not returned might choose a different outcome if they could, many of the people I interviewed love the Srebrenica they have today, even if they hate the politics and the narratives.

That is to say, what developed in Srebrenica after the war was *not* statebuilding, it was *not* state-directed. These practices developed as a response to local situations and were crafted by a community, together. That is, it was not crafted by a bureaucracy. It is also unlikely that anyone involved in that process knew from the day-to-day what the outcome eventually would be.

Out of the disorder of war emerged the order that makes a seemingly peaceful society in Srebrenica for most of the time. Furthermore, what developed there, at least in some ways, developed despite the presence of the state. Srebrenica can probably tell anyone who comes looking for it something about that, too. And I want to suggest it might not be a bad idea.

I want to suggest that the relative effectiveness of the system of practices that did develop in Srebrenica after the war does do a pretty good job at keeping the peace between those probably marginal elements in society who would otherwise want to have a larger fight. That system of practices developed over time, in the community, and was not based upon good, democratic governance. In the sense that there was little hierarchical, top-down management that developed this set of practices, I want to say that these practices developed *out of anarchy*.

There is very little consensus in the international academic literature and in Srebrenica as to whether the war started because everyone hates the other ethnicities and religions and they had to have their normally-scheduled war every fifty years—as some people in Srebrenica are wont to suggest—or whether people were more or less getting along just fine leading up to the last war. As I mentioned in the introduction, you can find evidence for whatever it is you seek in Srebrenica.

But supposing for a moment that the war did not start because of ethnic identity—even then, the fact that so many people lost so very much during the war really goes pretty far to demonstrate how sturdily were those practices built. If many of them did not have a reason to hate before the war, most of the people in Srebrenica after the war certainly did. Based upon my data—and admittedly I went there looking for this story—there should be *more* hatred in the city than there really is. That there is less, surprisingly less, is a testament to the people who live there, who have lived through the practice-making process and have come out of it with such spectacular results merely twenty years later. That is to say, there is something valuable in considering anarchy as peacebuilding:

5.5.3 Implications for Sociology

In this section of the chapter, I briefly demonstrate one final contribution this study can make to the field of Sociology in its efforts to understand how society works. In terms of understanding life, understanding how people strategize their daily lives, especially in light of seemingly unchangeable, large structures that shape our daily lives, this matrix makes explicit how individuals in their lives deal with these structures.

In many ways, sociological theory and research focuses on understanding how people are, to use the framework from this study, loyal to these structures or how people try to change them using voice (e.g, social movement literatures, literatures on resistance, literatures on revolution). This study

demonstrates, just as did Hirschman in relationship to the field of economics, that exit is a viable, intelligent, and strategic response that people are using. Furthermore, this response can act as a corrective mechanism.

Sometimes, as the political disengagement literature demonstrates, exit is recognized. But it is approached as a problematic behavior that requires policy to correct. Other times, it seems that exit itself is underrecognized as a phenomenon requiring study. For the narrative literature, I show that many people are exiting as a strategic response to what they might describe as oppressive representation. What this thesis and framework demonstrate is that exit is a popular option and that it can be a strategic response to otherwise impossible situations.

This is an important insight because it leads to different and interesting questions. What is exit? How do people experience it? How do people enact it in daily practice? Why? Under what types of regimes are people using exit as a strategy? How is exit enacted under various oppressive regimes? What potential does exit have as a strategy in response to increasingly powerful, global institutions such as neoliberal globalization or the increase in the power of the state over the individual? What potential does exit have as a strategy in response to biopower? What social objects are people constituting when they are practicing exit? Is there a tipping point for exit as a strategy that would lead to the collapse of oppressive regimes, such as neoliberal capitalism or the state? Is it possible that revolutions that have occurred in the past are actually a result of not solely voice, but voice and exit strategies together? If so, how would the social objects that are being constituted by the practice of exit strategies likely fair in supplying different ways of organizing society for the future when revolution does occur?

Hirschman's framework can act as an organizing device that does bring new questions and new ways of thinking about sociological questions. These questions are a few that I find most interesting and represent some of the avenues I might take in future research endeavors.

5.7 FINAL STATEMENT

On the cover page for the introduction of this manuscript, I quoted one interviewee thusly: "Serbs and Muslims are all in the same shit anyway." What I try to argue in this thesis is that that "shit" is comprised of complex—but definitely intelligible—relationships between politics, narratives, and practices that work together in some ways to make a better future for the people of Srebrenica more likely. In other ways, it works to make a better future for the people of Srebrenica less likely. That complex relationship also helps clarify how life in a post-ethnic-war society can operate in a relatively peaceful-looking manner in the day-to-day. And that was the question I had set out to answer.

6.0 APPENDIX: DESCRIPTION OF FIELD STUDY

FIELDWORK APPROACH

The field work from which the data originated employed an ethnographic field study approach. As Bourdieu warns in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, anthropologists and other social scientists that rely upon interviews and self-reports of subjects about their practices risk focusing on the subjects' stated reasons and motives.²⁰⁵ While such a focus does provide some insight, it also risks, on the one hand, an account of practice that is overly deterministic and structuralist, typically denying the subjects their human agency. On the other hand, such a focus also risks affording too much agency to the subject such that, as with many symbolic interactionist approaches to social practices, the subject is able to create meaning spontaneously and at will.

Furthermore, as Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland write,

rich data [are] a wide and diverse range of information collected over a relatively prolonged period of time in a persistent and systematic manner. Ideally, such data enable you to grasp the meanings associated with the actions of those you are studying and to understand the contexts in which those actions are embedded...You achieve this primarily through sustained and direct face-to-face interaction with the participants in some social location or circumstance.²⁰⁶

And, "face-to-face interaction is potentially the fullest condition for achieving intimate familiarity with the actions and orientations of other human beings."²⁰⁷ In order to avoid the warnings Bourdieu presents, and in order to gain the benefits Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland present, the study engaged with the field using an ethnographic approach.

I was an active participant in the site selected for research. As such, participant observation was the appropriate mode for ethnographic field research.²⁰⁸ Participant observation "refers to the process in which an investigator establishes and sustains a many-sided and situationally appropriate relationship with a human association in its natural setting for the purpose of developing a social scientific understanding of that association."²⁰⁹

ETHNOGRAPHIC DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTION

The ethnographic data was collected during a two-month immersion study in Srebrenica Bosnia, from June 29, 2012 – August 31, 2012. The sponsoring organization for the research is called Summer University Srebrenica and is affiliated with the Potocari Genocide Memorial Center, a Muslim-operated center that has transformed the battery factory that housed the U.N. during the war into a memorial center and transformed part of the area outside the compound into a cemetery to commemorate those individuals (mostly Muslims but also a few Serbs) who were killed during the war. The initial two-and-a-half weeks of the program consisted of lectures, panels, and presentations given by scholars, politicians, artists, musicians, survivors, poets, and others, mostly from the Muslim perspective of the war. The university attracted scholars from around the world, but the larger majority were from the former-Yugoslavian region and eastern Europe.

The summer university programming also included participation in the annual *Mars Mira*, a peace march that mimics in reverse the route that many men who fled Srebrenica in 1995 walked to reach what was then the edge of the free territory for Muslims. The march covers about 110 kilometers over the course of three days and I participated wholly.

Following the formal programming of the summer university, I remained in Srebrenica for an additional seven weeks. I stayed in a flat with a woman associated with the program's director by family and business ties. I had a room of my own, shared a bathroom with another researcher, and spent a significant amount of time with this woman in her flat, one floor up from the room in which I slept. It was in her flat upstairs that I ate, read, studied, watched television, prepared meals, and talked with her, her friends, her boyfriend, her family, and other guests she hosted during that time. Initially, I spent much of my time with her and it was through her I was able to connect with others in the community. Some of the interviews I conducted (see below) were made possible by my association with her.

Not far from her flat were two cafes and bars that became the centers for my ethnographic research. Many people in Srebrenica describe one place as the Serbian bar and the other as the Muslim bar, though many of the people that live in Srebrenica do not faithfully abide by these distinctions. I became acquainted with the owners of both locations and developed relationships with the individuals who work in both places and also with the guests that often frequent these two establishments.

During my time there, I was able to develop relationships with people by playing pool (billiards), playing chess, talking over Google Translate, drinking coffee, smoking cigarettes, and having normal conversations with whichever individuals would casually talk with me. Over time, as my relationships with these individuals grew stronger, I was able to ask many of these individuals for formal interviews.

Most if not all my conversations with individuals that I met there began with introductions and with me answering the question "Why are you here?" first. In this way, I was able to explain to all of my contacts my position in the community as an academic researcher.

I spent most of my time going places with my hostess, accepting invitations to dinner or for coffee or beer or going to surrounding villages, the lake, or the Drina River, common mini-getaways for the groups of individuals with whom I had the most intimate contact.

I used a field note jotting technique, as described by Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw,²¹⁰ and relied upon digital voice recordings of fieldnotes during and after observations in the field. These digital recordings were transcribed and saved, and the transcriptions serve as one of the primary data sources for subsequent analysis.²¹¹

SAMPLING AND ISSUES OF VALIDITY

Because this study relied upon an invitation to the Summer University Srebrenica, its interview sampling was purposeful.²¹² The study examines a particular, 'extreme' case – a post-war society where memory and international community involvement is heightened – in order to draw conclusions that should then generalize its lessons to the way we approach these studies, and generalize the applicability of the approach to other cases (though the specific conclusions about Srebrenica are particular—that is to say, I do not intend to generalize the conclusion to other cases).²¹³

Following Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland, this study acknowledges that the best knowledge any research endeavor can hope to attain is one that merely approximates reality.²¹⁴ That said, this study takes seriously issues related to validity. Therefore, the study will adhere to the canon presented by Lofland, Snow, Anderson, and Lofland. That includes reporting in the research findings how the study came to employ the schemes for analysis, reporting "both the practical theoretical considerations that led the researcher to gather data from these specific sources," and by reporting "(1) the procedures for processing and analyzing the data and (2) the practices of presenting data in the report."²¹⁵ By adhering to these guidelines, the researcher ensures that the reader can assess for herself the validity of the research findings.

Researcher bias may also enter into the data collection because I have been and continue to be a participant in the larger Srebrenica context, and also because of the way I gained entry to the community in Srebrenica. That history includes entry into the site through a Muslim organization, initial colonization into the context from a heavily Muslim-biased history and narrative of the context, and initial segregation from the Serbian population in Srebrenica. Even so, following the initial two-and-a-half weeks, I sought out and gained access to a Serbian population in Srebrenica and even during the initial two-week programming, sought alternative narratives of the conflict to broaden perspective. Still, my position as an outsider and as one that was brought into Srebrenica by a Muslim organization certainly affected and affects still the perception that all individuals in Srebrenica have about me. Some of my informants had candid conversations about this with me while others never mentioned it. Disclosure of this important positionality is the appropriate response.

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8.0 ENDNOTES

¹ Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, Loyalty* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 1 – 3.

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⁴ Ibid., 30.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., 33.

⁷ Ibid.

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¹⁰ Ibid., 27.

¹¹ *Annual Report About Srebrenica* (Banja Luka, Bosnia i Hercegovina: Republika Srpska Documentation Centre 2002) 9 – 37.

¹² *The Events In and Around Srebrenica Between 10th and 19th July, 1995* (Republika Srpska, Bosnia i Hercegovina: Republika Srpska Government, 2004), 8 – 42.

¹³ Associated Free Press, "Srebrenica massacre 'not genocide'," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, July 13, 2010.

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¹⁷ Phillip Bourgois, *Righteous Dopefiend* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 15.

¹⁸ John Lofland *et al*, *Analyzing Social Settings* (Belmont: Wadsworth/Thompson Learning, 2006), 98.

¹⁹ For examples of the concern regarding political disengagement, see Matthew Flinders (2009); Colin Hay and Gerry Stoker (2009a); Colin Hay and Gerry Stoker (2009b); Lee Tien-Tsung (2005); Declan McHugh (2006); David Miller (2004); Heather Bastedo, Wayne Chu, Jane Hilderman, and Andre Tucotte (2011); Graham Smith (2009).

²⁰ For examples of the focus on youth disengagement, see Stephen Bennett (2000); Russell Dalton (2006); Matt Henn, Mark Weinstein, and Sarah Hodgkinson (2007); Marc Hooghe (2004); Chris Huhne (2009); Ben Kisby and James Sloam (2009); Therese O'Toole, David Marsh, and Su Jones (2003); Therese O'Toole (2003); Patricia Snell (2010); Jon Tonge (2009).

²¹ For examples challenging this literature, see Ben Berger (2009); Dalton (2006); Russell Dalton (2008); Flinders (2009); McHugh (2006); Tonge (2009).

²² Jon Tonge, "Revitalising Politics: Engaging Young People," *Representation* 45, no. 3 (2009): 237 – 240.

²³ Russell J. Dalton, "Citizenship Norms and Political Participation in America" (Irvine: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2006): 4 – 5.

²⁴ Ben Berger, "Political Theory, Political Science, and the End of Civic Engagement," *Perspectives on Politics* 7, no. 2 (2009): 335.

²⁵ Stephen E. Bennett, "Political Apathy and Avoidance of News Media Among Generations X and Y" in *Education for Civic Engagement* (St. Paul: U.S. Department of Education, 2000): 10 – 11; Lee Tien-Tsung, "Media Effects on Political Disengagement Revisited," *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 82, no. 2 (2005): 416.

²⁶ James Sloam, "Teaching Democracy," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10 (2008): 509; Therese O'Toole, "Engaging with Young People's Conceptions," *Children's Geographies* 1, no.1 (2003): 71; Theresa O'Toole, David Marsh, and Su Jones, "Political Literacy Cuts Both Ways," *The Political Quarterly* 74, no. 3 (2003): 348 – 349.

²⁷ Colin Hay and Gerry Stoker, "Politics: Have we lost the play?," *Representation* 45, no. 3 (2009b): 10; Tien-Tsung, "Media Effects on Political Disengagement Revisited," 417; Patricia Snell, "Emerging Adult Civic and Political Disengagement Revisited," *Journal of Adolescent Research* 25, no. 2 (2010): 264, 280.

²⁸ O'Toole, Marsh, and Jones, "Political Literacy," 356 – 358.

²⁹ Bennett, "Political Apathy and Avoidance of News Media," 20; O'Toole, "Engaging with Young People's Conceptions," 79 – 81.

³⁰ Dalton, "Citizenship Norms and Political Participation in America," 8 – 11; Marc Hooghe,

"Political Socialization and the Future of Politics," *Acta Politica* 39, (2004): 331; O'Toole, "Engaging with Young People's Conceptions," 85 – 87.

³¹ Henn, Weinstein, and Hodgkinson 2007, p. 473; Tien-Tsung, "Media Effects on Political Disengagement Revisited," 417; Snell, "Emerging Adult Civic and Political Disengagement," 277.

³² Declan McHugh, "Wanting to Be Heard But Not Wanting to Act?," *Parliamentary Affairs* 59, no. 3 (2006): 546 – 552.

³³ O'Toole, "Engaging with Young People's Conceptions," 81; O'Toole, Marsh, and Jones, "Political Literacy," 352.

³⁴ Matt Henn, Mark Weinstein, and Sarah Hodgkinson, "Social Capital Political Participation," *Social Policy and Society* 6, no. 4 (2007): 473; Miller 2004, p. 379.

³⁵ Matthew Flinders, "Bridging the Gap," *Representation* 45, no.3 (2009): 338 – 342; Ben Kisby and James Sloam, "Revitalising Politics: The role of citizenship education," *Representation* 45, no. 3 (2009): 319 – 320; Hay and Stoker, "Politics: Have we lost the play?," 12.

³⁶ Bennett, "Political Apathy and Avoidance of News Media," 18; Hay and Stoker, "Politics: Have we lost the play?," 5.

³⁷ Tien-Tsung, "Media Effects on Political Disengagement Revisited," 417 – 418 and 426 – 428; David Miller, "System Failure," *Journal of Public Affairs* 4, no.4 (2004): 379 – 380.

³⁸ Bennett, "Political Apathy and Avoidance of News Media," 21; Dalton, "Citizenship Norms and Political Participation in America," 6; Kisby and Sloam, "Revitalising Politics: The Role of Citizenship Education," 313 – 314.

³⁹ Hay and Stoker, "Politics: Have we lost the play?," 5 – 9.

⁴⁰ Chris Huhne, "Revitalising Politics: Responding to the Challenge," *Representation* 45, no. 3 (2009), 325 – 335.

⁴¹ Snell, "Emerging Adult Civic and Political Disengagement," 280.

⁴² Hay and Stoker, "Politics: Have we lost the play?," 5 – 10; Tien-Tsung, "Media Effects on Political Disengagement Revisited," 417.

⁴³ Hay and Stoker, "Politics: Have we lost the play?," 10.

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⁴⁵ Berger, "Political Theory, Political Science, and the End of Civic Engagement," 340.

⁴⁶ Dalton, "Citizenship Norms and Political Participation in America," 1.

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- ⁴⁹ Berger, "Political Theory, Political Science, and the End of Civic Engagement," 341 – 342.; Dalton, "Citizenship Norms and Political Participation in America," 1 – 2.
- ⁵⁰ Bennett, "Political Apathy and Avoidance of News Media," 21; Dalton, "Citizenship Norms and Political Participation in America," 1 – 2; Kisby and Sloam, "Revitalising Politics: The Role of Citizenship Education," 314; Sloam, "Teaching Democracy," 509;
- ⁵¹ Dalton, "Citizenship Norms and Political Participation in America," 7; Hay and Stoker, "Politics: Have we lost the play?," 10;
- ⁵² Flinders, "Bridging the Gap," 346.
- ⁵³ Smith 2009 and Hay and Stoker 2009b provide a brief summary of this literature.
- ⁵⁴ Huhne, "Revitalising Politics: Responding to the Challenge," 325 – 335.
- ⁵⁵ Hay and Stoker, "Politics: Have we lost the play?," 7.
- ⁵⁶ O'Toole, Marsh, and Jones, "Political Literacy," 359.
- ⁵⁷ McHugh, "Wanting to Be Heard...", 546 – 552.; Tonge, "Revitalising Politics: Engaging Young People," 2009: 237.
- ⁵⁸ Bennett, "Political Apathy and Avoidance of News Media," 22 – 23; Hay and Stoker, "Politics: Have we lost the play?," 11; but see Tien-Tsung, "Media Effects on Political Disengagement Revisited," 426 – 428.
- ⁵⁹ Bennett, "Political Apathy and Avoidance of News Media," 22; Hay and Stoker, "Politics: Have we lost the play?," 5.
- ⁶⁰ Bennett, "Political Apathy and Avoidance of News Media," 22.
- ⁶¹ Flinders, "Bridging the Gap," 338 – 342.
- ⁶² Ibid., 342 – 343.
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⁶⁶ Ibid., 284.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

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⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid., 9 – 12.

⁷² Ibid., 12.

⁷³ Jeffrey Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy, *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 3 – 16.

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⁷⁵ Ibid., 6.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 7.

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⁷⁸ Anthony Smith, "The Ethnic Origins of Nations," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 235 – 236.

⁷⁹ Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy, *The Collective Memory Reader*, 8 – 9.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Harald Weinrich, "Lethe: The Art and Critique of Forgetting," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 389.

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⁸⁵ Ibid., 10 – 11.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 11 – 12.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 13 – 16.

⁸⁸ Barbara Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering* (Berkshire: McGraw Hill Professional Publishing, 2003): 50 – 51.

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⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Levy, *The Collective Memory Reader*, 19 – 20.

⁹³ Ibid., 19.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 20.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Maurice Halbwachs, "The Collective Memory," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 141.

⁹⁷ Blondel (2011), p. 156.

⁹⁸ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 54 – 56.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 56.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁰² Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 271.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

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¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 57.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 57 – 59.

¹⁰⁷ Terence Ranger, "The Invention of Tradition Revisited," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 277.

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- ¹⁰⁹ Smith, "The Ethnic Origins of Nations," 235 – 236.
- ¹¹⁰ Barry Schwartz, "Abraham Lincoln and the Forge of American Memory," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 247.
- ¹¹¹ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 59 – 61.
- ¹¹² Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 61.
- ¹¹³ Ibid., 62.
- ¹¹⁴ Michele Foucault, "Film in Population Memory...", in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 253.
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- ¹¹⁶ Popular Memory Group, "Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 254 – 260.
- ¹¹⁷ John Bodnar, "Remaking America...", in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 255 – 256.
- ¹¹⁸ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 67.
- ¹¹⁹ Ibid.
- ¹²⁰ Ibid., 73.
- ¹²¹ Schudson, "The Past in the Present...", 287.
- ¹²² Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 71.
- ¹²³ Schwartz, "Abraham Lincoln...", 245.
- ¹²⁴ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 72.
- ¹²⁵ Misztal (2003) loosely organizes her discussion covering the field along these themes.
- ¹²⁶ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 75 – 76.
- ¹²⁷ Ibid., 77 – 78.
- ¹²⁸ Ibid., 75 – 83.

¹²⁹ Connerton (1989) elaborates the connections between cognitive, social, and habit memory throughout his book *How Societies Remember*.

¹³⁰ Robin Wagner-Pacific, "Memories in the Making," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 394 – 397.

¹³¹ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 82 – 83.

¹³² Eviatar Zerubavel, "Social Memories" in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 221 – 224.

¹³³ Schwartz, "Abraham Lincoln...", 242 – 248.

¹³⁴ Jan Assmann, "Moses the Egyptian," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 213 – 215.

¹³⁵ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 15 – 19.

¹³⁶ Aleida Assmann, "Cannon and Archive," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 334 – 337.

¹³⁷ Assmann, "Moses the Egyptian," 209 – 215.

¹³⁸ Wulf Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 303.

¹³⁹ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 88.

¹⁴⁰ Assmann, "Moses the Egyptian," 209 – 215.

¹⁴¹ Harald Welzer *et al*, "Grandpa Wasn't a Nazi," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 344.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Marianne Hirsch, "The Generation of Postmemory," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 347.

¹⁴⁴ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 98.

¹⁴⁵ Daniel Hervieu-Leger, "Religion As a Chain of Memory," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 386.

¹⁴⁶ Jeffrey K. Olick, "Collective Memory: The Two Cultures," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 228.

¹⁴⁷ Assmann, "Moses the Egyptian," 213 – 215.

¹⁴⁸ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 52.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 51.

¹⁵⁰ Ernst Renan, "What is a Nation?," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 83.

¹⁵¹ Robert Bellah *et al*, ""Habits of the Heart," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 230.

¹⁵² Schwartz, "Abraham Lincoln...", 245.

¹⁵³ Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory," 301.

¹⁵⁴ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 81.

¹⁵⁵ Peter Berger, "Invitation to Sociology," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 216 – 220.

¹⁵⁶ Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen, "The Presence of the Past," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 269.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Richard Sennett, "Disturbing Memories," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 284.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 284.

¹⁶⁰ Jan Assmann, "Moses the Egyptian," 211 – 213.

¹⁶¹ Merlin Donald, "Origins of the Modern Mind," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 324 – 333.

¹⁶² Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 99 – 125.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 108.

¹⁶⁴ Halbwachs, "The Collective Memory," 139 – 149.

¹⁶⁵ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 109.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 109 – 115.

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- ¹⁶⁷ Halbwachs, "The Collective Memory," 147 – 149.
- ¹⁶⁸ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 109 – 115.
- ¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 115 – 120.
- ¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 124.
- ¹⁷¹ Ibid., 120 – 125.
- ¹⁷² Yael Zerubavel, "Recovered Roots," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 241.
- ¹⁷³ Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 70.
- ¹⁷⁴ Ron Eyerman, "The Past in the Present," in *The Collective Memory Reader* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 304 – 306.
- ¹⁷⁵ Renan, "What is a Nation?," 83.
- ¹⁷⁶ Eyerman, "The Past in the Present," 304.
- ¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 305.
- ¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 306.
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- ¹⁸⁰ Jeffrey C. Alexander *et al*, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004): 44.
- ¹⁸¹ Alexander *et al*, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, 4.
- ¹⁸² Ron Eyerman, Jeffrey C. Alexander, and Elizabeth Butler Breese, *Narrating Trauma* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2011): XXVII.
- ¹⁸³ Alexander *et al*, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, 10 – 24.
- ¹⁸⁴ Eyerman, Alexander, and Breese, *Narrating Trauma*, XII.
- ¹⁸⁵ Alexander *et al*, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, 10 – 24.
- ¹⁸⁶ Eyerman, Alexander, and Breese, *Narrating Trauma*, XXVII – XXX.
- ¹⁸⁷ Alexander *et al*, *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, 11 – 12.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 12.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 15 – 21.

¹⁹⁰ Eyerman, Alexander, and Breese, *Narrating Trauma*, XXII.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., XXX.

¹⁹² Ibid., XXII.

¹⁹³ Anne Rawls, "An Essay on Two Conceptions," *Journal of Classical Sociology* 9, no. 4 (2009): 502.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 503.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 508.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 509.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 510.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 502.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 508.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 509.

²⁰² Basic, A. (Publication Date Unknown). *Revenge*. Accessed online at <http://www.word-express.org/participants/adisa-bai/adisa-bai-in-translation-censorship/>.

²⁰³ Ibid, 508 – 509.

²⁰⁴ Eyerman, Alexander, and Breese, *Narrating Trauma*, XII.

²⁰⁵ Bourdieu 1977

²⁰⁶ Lofland *et al*, *Analyzing Social Settings*, 15.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw, 1995.

²¹¹ Lofland *et al*, *Analyzing Social Settings*, 15.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 170.