FATAL DISCONNECT: LESSONS IN COMMUNITY POLICY DEVELOPMENT
FROM THE RESPONSE TO THE MURDER OF KA’SANDRA WADE—
A CASE STUDY

by

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ABSTRACT

In January of 2013, Pittsburgh, PA was shaken by the circumstances surrounding the murder of Ka’Sandra Wade. Her call to 911 had been disconnected, and although officers responded to it, they left the scene without seeking her after being turned away by a man at her window. She was found dead the next day. Public outcry and investigations into police conduct and procedures for 911 disconnect calls followed. Reporters pointed to a similar 1988 incident in Pittsburgh, where a woman had been raped after her call had been disconnected and officers neglected to seek her on the scene. Women’s groups, community watchdog organizations, and legislators all pushed for policy change. Ultimately, however, citizen groups felt their concerns were not addressed by the public policy response, and the departmental police policy changes that were adopted did not satisfy any of the parties involved.

Despite being framed by stakeholders as a women’s issue related to hostage and abuse situations, the problem of police response to 911 disconnect calls is a public health concern for all citizens. Its public health relevance is rooted in the fact that 911 disconnects could happen to anyone due to accidents, panic, or medical emergencies, thus it is important that effective policy be developed to address the issue of police response to such calls.

The incident was summarized using available media, including newspaper articles, radio broadcasts, and videos of Citizen Police Review Board meetings. These sources were also used
to describe subsequent police conduct investigations, the actions and recommendations of community stakeholders, and the adopted policy changes. To investigate the disappointing policy response, the process by which the policies were constructed is analyzed against the standard methods of policy formation. It is shown that roadblocks existed within the political circumstances of the issue, which negatively affected both the identification of the problem at hand and the generation of relevant solutions, thus preventing the development of satisfactory policy. An action plan is then proposed, which advocates for coalition building and the use of focus groups as a means for the community to impact future policy development in this area.
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1.0 Introduction

The tragic death of Ka’Sandra Wade brought problems in police 911 response procedures to light and mobilized citizen groups to rally for policy change. Despite the investment of multiple stakeholders, the policy changes that were adopted in response to Wade’s death were felt to be insufficient by all involved parties. This issue is of public health relevance as 911 disconnect calls could happen to anyone due to panic, accidents, or medical emergencies. It is therefore important that effective procedural policy be developed to guide police response in such cases. In addition to a recounting of the Wade incident itself, the case presentation includes an overview of the resulting police conduct investigations, stakeholders and their recommendations, and policy response. In order to analyze why effective policies were not developed and implemented, the process of the policy response is analyzed against the framework of traditional public policy formulation. This framework depends on the existence of favorable political circumstances, proper problem identification, and the generation of relevant alternative solutions (Longest, 2006). It is shown that the development of effective policy was impeded at each of these levels. A stakeholder action plan is then proposed, which advocates for coalition building and the use of focus groups as a method to inform policy development. Through these means, communities are better able to help shape the political circumstances surrounding the issue, construct an appropriate problem definition, and develop a set of acceptable alternative solutions.
2.0 The Ka’Sandra Wade Case

2.1 The Murder of Ka’Sandra Wade

At 10:38 pm on December 31, 2012, Ka’Sandra Wade called 911 from her cell phone, asking for assistance at her home in the Larimer area of Pittsburgh, PA (Silver & Navratil, 2013a). The conversation lasted 28 seconds before there was a muffled sound and the line became disconnected (Navratil & Silver, 2013e). At 10:43, two Zone 5 police officers were dispatched to her residence from their station in nearby Highland Park to investigate a report of “unknown trouble” (Navratil & Silver, 2013d; 2013e). The dispatcher had informed the responding officers that the caller was a woman, who had been calm at first, and that the line had been disconnected after a scuffle (Silver & Navratil, 2013a). Arriving shortly thereafter, the officers spoke through a window to her boyfriend, Anthony L. Brown, who told them “everything was fine” before he refused to answer further questions or to let them in, and then closed the curtains (Navratil & Silver, 2013e). Officers requested that the 911 center phone Wade, which would have allowed them to tell if the phone was ringing inside, but the call went to voice mail (Silver & Navratil, 2013a). The officers left at 11:01 pm, after spending ten minutes on the scene (Silver & Navratil, 2013a).

The following evening, Ms. Wade’s mother contacted Maryellen Deckard, Wade’s friend and boss at the community advocacy group Action United, and asked her to check on Ka’Sandra, who had neglected pick up her son and was not responding to phone calls (Guggenheimer, 2013). This worried Deckard, who months earlier had helped Wade move out of the house she shared with Brown, after he had threatened to kill her with a gun and a machete (Born, 2013b). Deckard contacted police for a wellness check, a plea
which was initially refused (Guggenheimer, 2013). Following a request to be contacted by a female officer, Deckard explained that Ms. Wade’s unresponsiveness was out of character, and that she had recently escaped a domestic situation (Guggenheimer, 2013). It was then decided that there was enough information to take action, and officers entered the home (Guggenheimer, 2013). Ka’Sandra Wade was found shot to death, in the room in which Mr. Brown had stood when he sent the officers away (Navratil & Silver, 2013e; Silver & Navratil, 2013a).

Less than three hours later, a SWAT team and negotiators surrounded Brown’s apartment in North Point Breeze, beginning a five hour standoff during which he confessed to murdering Ka’Sandra Wade before shooting himself in the head (Silver & Navratil, 2013a). Before his death, he tossed a note to police suggesting that the officers could have saved her life (Navratil & Silver, 2013d). He had written:

I did not mean to kill her. I lost it. I cannot live with it. An eye for an eye. If I don't [kill myself] the police will [...] They had a chance to save her and they didn't do it last night. They came and left. I did it right before midnight. May God have mercy on me. I already know he won't (Navratil & Silver, 2013e).

### 2.2 Police Conduct Investigations and Publicized Findings

After the story broke in the media, numerous investigations into the case itself and into potential policy solutions were undertaken by multiple agencies. Three agencies looked into the handling of the case itself. In addition to their initial homicide investigation, the Pittsburgh Police Department conducted an internal investigation to learn whether or not the responding officers followed the appropriate procedures and policies (Navratil & Silver, 2013d). Pittsburgh Public Safety Director Michael Huss announced an administrative investigation, and Allegheny County District Attorney Stephen A. Zappala
launched a separate analysis of the actions of the officers (Navratil & Silver, 2013e; Silver, 2013b). The results of the policy investigation made by the police were not made public, and Pittsburgh Public Safety’s findings have yet to be announced. Stephen Zappala, the chief law enforcement officer for Allegheny County, revealed the results of his investigation in a press conference roughly three weeks after the incident (Navratil & Silver, 2013e). The District Attorney found that “to a large extent the officers did not do what they are trained to do,” explaining that “you want to talk to the complainant. If you come to the door and you’re not able to talk to the complainant, then what you should do is communicate with the supervisor” (Navratil & Silver, 2013e). The two responding officers had communicated with neither (Navratil & Silver, 2013e). Despite these findings, Zappala did not opt to pursue criminal charges against the responding officers (Navratil & Silver, 2013e). He also stated that the officers did not have enough information when they were on the scene to amount to an “exigent” circumstance, which would have allowed for a warrantless entry, claiming “I don’t think a judicial officer would issue a warrant. We are not a Nazi state. It is not OK to just kick doors down” (Navratil & Silver, 2013e). It is important to note that the responding officers both possessed five years of experience on the force, and their supervisor, who had been relieved early, was a 19-year veteran. (Navratil & Silver, 2013d; 2013e). This is mentioned in order to clarify that the incident was not due to officer inexperience. Further, one of the officers had recently been awarded the Medal of Valor, the highest honor in the Pittsburgh Police Department, for his acts of bravery in helping to rescue more than a dozen motorists who were stranded in a flash flood that killed four in 2011 (Navratil & Silver, 2013d).
2.3 Policy Change: Stakeholders, Approaches, and Recommendations

Four major groups made investigations into policy solutions. Both Pittsburgh mayor Luke Ravenstahl and Councilman Ricky Burgess, whose district the incident occurred in, announced intentions to convene working groups (Balingit, 2013f). The grassroots advocacy group Action United held focus groups with victims of domestic violence in order to generate ideas for policy changes (Todd, 2013a). Lastly, the Citizen Police Review Board (CPRB) researched police policies in other jurisdictions to formulate a set of recommendations (Citizen Police Review Board [CPRB], 2013c; Silver, 2013b).

2.3.1 The Working Groups

After Wade’s death, Mayor Ravenstahl announced his plans to form a working group which would involve community stakeholders, including members of the Pittsburgh police force and local women’s groups (Balingit, 2013f). Aside from this announcement, little information exists concerning the actual formation or work of this group. Councilman Burgess announced the formation of a working group that would consist of members of the Pittsburgh Police Department, the Law Department, and domestic violence service providers, with later input sought from advocacy groups like Action United (Balingit, 2013f). Despite these stated intentions, Action United spokesperson Maryellen Deckard expressed anger that the working groups had “upstaged” the efforts of the focus groups, and fear that their voice would be “diluted” in a working group setting (Balingit, 2013f). She requested that the proposed legislation be tabled to allow the community process to continue unimpeded (Balingit, 2013f). This request was denied, as Burgess soon developed and brought two pieces of legislation to women’s groups, including the Women’s Center and Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh (Guggenheimer, 2013).
Burgess’ legislation included the adoption of the Maryland Lethality Assessment Program, an evidence-based domestic violence police protocol, and the annual publication of a public, abridged version of the operating procedures and policies of the Pittsburgh Police Department (“Ordinance”, 2013). While other major US cities make their police policies and procedures public, Pennsylvania state law allows police departments to keep them private, and in order to preserve public safety they are not voluntarily published in the city of Pittsburgh (Balingit, 2013d). Burgess argued that transparency is an integral part of public safety, stating that “the best way to increase public safety is to increase community confidence [...] the police must be willing to be transparent enough for the community to hold them responsible” (Balingit, 2013d). Shirl Regan, the president and CEO of the Women’s Center and Shelter, prompted Burgess to sponsor a bill which advocating for the mayor and City Council to convene a panel consisting of domestic violence service providers and representatives from the Pittsburgh Police Department and the Prosecutor’s office, in order to jointly explore best practices for law enforcement in domestic disturbance situations (Guggenheimer, 2013).

2.3.2 Community Advocacy: Action United

Formed in 2010, Action United is a Pennsylvania organization that advocates for the interests of low and moderate income families, focusing on such issues as affordable healthcare, safe environments, and fair lending practices (Action United, n.d.).

Ka’Sandra Wade, then a student at Kaplan Career Institute, had began working at Action United as an intern before being hired as a part time administrative assistant (Born, 2013b). After her death, Action United staged a rally and announced that it was going to form a focus group consisting of victims of domestic violence, in order to develop
recommendations for new legislation (Balingit, 2013d). Maryellen Deckard, campaign manager at Action United, explained that the group convened to “discuss what happened to them when they [...] called and received a 911 response from police over the course of the abuse that they experienced in their own personal lives” (Guggenheimer, 2013). Deckard stated that the strongest recommendation produced by the focus group was to create a “requirement for all emergency responders to actually respond to the person who called 911,” with the desire that this should be legislated in light of the fact that “in the heat of the moment everybody responds differently” (Guggenheimer, 2013). The suggestions developed by the focus group were drafted by the Women’s Law Project into “Ka’Sandra’s Law,” a one-sentence piece of proposed legislation which Action United had hoped to see passed by City Council by March 8, International Women’s Day (Todd, 2013a).

2.3.3 Community Watchdog: The Citizen Police Review Board

The Citizen’s Police Review Board is an independent agency which investigates complaints by citizens concerning the improper conduct of Pittsburgh police (CPRB, 2013a). According to Deitch (2010), the CPRB was created in 1997 by a public referendum, after a similar measure to form such a group had been rejected by the Pittsburgh City Council. As of 2010, he reported, there were 115 such boards in existence in the United States, the majority of which were based off of the idea that the police cannot effectively police themselves (Deitch, 2010). Through the CPRB, citizens can file formal allegations of misconduct, known as Citizen Complaints, against members of the Pittsburgh Police Department, which the board then has the power to investigate (CPRB, 2013a). If a claim is found to be serious, the board can hold public hearings,
subpoena the attendance of witnesses and officers, and in cases where misconduct is found to have occurred, can recommend disciplinary actions to the chief of police (Deitch, 2010). According to Philip Eure, the immediate past president of the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE), Pittsburgh’s CPRB is considered to be one of the stronger review boards in the US, due to its subpoena power (Deitch, 2010). Despite this fact, the board is not held in high regard by the Pittsburgh Police Department: in the past, officers have ignored subpoenas or have remained silent when compelled by the courts to attend hearings (Deitch, 2010). Further, Pittinger claims that the Chief of Police only agrees with the findings of the Board 55% of the time, a figure which Eure calls “startlingly low” (Deitch, 2010).

Following the Wade incident, investigators from the Citizen’s Police Review Board conducted research into policies in other jurisdictions, including Chicago, Cleveland, Los Angeles, and San Diego, in order to review their policies on calls of unknown trouble, crime in progress, serious nature, and known domestic violence (CPBR, 2013b). Based on this research, their review of the Wade case, and their review of the response to a 1988 case in which a woman was assaulted under similar circumstances (see Section 2.5), the Board issued a draft of policy recommendations to facilitate and promote discussion.

The board made two recommendations concerning calls of unknown trouble. First, the board found that while there are protocols in place for both known domestic disturbance calls and calls of a serious nature, there are no policies in place for the handling of calls of unknown trouble (CPRB, 2013c). This deficit has the potential to create dangerous situations for officers and citizens alike (CPRB, 2013c). Therefore, the CPRB recommended developing protocols for responding to unknown trouble calls
which should emphasize the role of the supervisor (CPRB, 2013c). Pittinger stated that these protocols should instruct officers “to gather pertinent information including whether or not the caller or a witness is on scene; if on-scene, the officer must observe the caller in person; the officer must require a report from dispatch on callback efforts” (CPRB, 2013b).

Second, the CPRB recommended that when calls involve some degree of ambiguity, Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) officers should be utilized (CPRB, 2013b). This team consists of officers who have undergone voluntary training in how to identify and manage those who are mentally ill or dealing with addiction (McCune, 2007). In the first Citizens Police Review Board meeting after the Wade incident, board CEO Elizabeth Pittinger claimed that CIT officers were currently being under-utilized, and could help in discerning the mental health or disability of callers, as well as help to deescalate situations (CPRB, 2013c).

The Board also made recommendations about determining incidents of domestic violence and their severity. Based on both the way domestic violence calls are identified and flagged in other jurisdictions as well as the availability of current technology, it was recommended that a voluntary enrollment system be instituted for victims of domestic abuse to register their phone number with 911 (CPRB 2013b; 2013c). This service would allow calls from the registered number to be immediately flagged as a potential domestic violence issue, denoting the calls as emergencies even in the event of a disconnection (CPRB, 2013b). It was suggested that such a service be offered in places of refuge, such as shelters, as well as during the filing for Protection from Abuse Orders (CPRB, 2013b).
Additionally, the Board recommended that dispatchers and call takers should be required to ask if calls involve a domestic disturbance, worded in a way which would require only a yes or no answer (CPRB, 2013b). Barring that, the CPRB suggested that when there is any suggestion that a call might involve a domestic disturbance, responding officers should ask if weapons are involved (CPRB, 2013b). Further, the board recommended that more training in domestic violence be offered to call takers, dispatchers, and police officers, and that sessions should be led by experts rather than other officers or “generic trainers” (CPRB, 2013b). In terms of assessing the severity of domestic situations, the board supported Councilman Ricky Burgess’ proposition that the city implement the Maryland Lethality Assessment, a set of domestic violence harm reduction protocols (CPRB, 2013b).

A third area in which recommendations were made involved enhancing communication between departments and across shift-changes. Pittinger proposed that in order to give both dispatchers and officers “more of a practical exposure to each other that might be of assistance while they’re doing their jobs,” dispatchers should be required to go on “ride-alongs” with officers, and officers should experience the atmosphere of 911 call centers (CPRB 2013b, 2013c). While there is currently mandatory training in these call centers for new Pittsburgh Police recruits, the Board suggested that all officers should be required to spend periodic in-service time in call centers (CPRB 2013b). Additionally, she proposed that a practice should be instituted whereby “odd calls for service, open line calls, and unusual observations are included in the pass-along information” (CPRB 2013b).
The final set of recommendations made by the Board was focused on increasing support and guidance for police officers and emergency service personnel. In order to help officers cope with traumatic incidents such as the murder of Ka’Sandra Wade, a system of screening and monitoring for early identification and intervention of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder should be put into place, including more training for supervisors (CPRB, 2013b). In recognition of the fact that police officers are professionals who act on their own discretion, the Board suggested that their decision making skills should be nurtured by their supervisors (CPRB 2013b, 2013c). Thus, supervisors should be enrolled in “a professionally recognized management program or course of study to assure effective management techniques and best practices are employed throughout the Bureau of Police” (CPRB, 2013b). Finally, the board recommended that fire, police, and EMS supervisors should be employed at Emergency Operations Centers to provide support to responding officers, dispatchers, call takers, and supervisors (CPRB, 2013b). Retaining such supervisors should be easy and should not take away from any of the respective departments, Pittinger argued, as the position is an ideal one for any personnel returning from injury or disability (CPRB, 2013b).

2.4 Adopted Policy Changes

There were three major policy changes made in response to the Ka’Sandra Wade case. The first two were bills sponsored by City Councilman Ricky Burgess, and the third a formalization of Pittsburgh police policy.

2.4.1 The Institution of the Maryland Lethality Standards

In what Action United campaign manager Maryellen Deckard called “the most significant piece of legislation for women in this city in decades”, a bill requiring police
in the city of Pittsburgh to be trained in the Maryland Lethality Assessment Program was passed on May 14, 2013 (Balingit, 2013b; Blazina, 2013). The Lethality Assessment Program (LAP) consists of an evidence-based 11-question screening assessment and a set of response and referral protocols which allow law enforcement officers and associated field practitioners to identify “high risk” victims of domestic violence (Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence [MNADV], n.d.). If a victim rates as high risk for being seriously injured or killed, a domestic violence hotline is phoned on site, the victim is encouraged to speak to them, and follow-up calls or visits are made (MNADV, n.d.). The developers of the Maryland LAP program recognized that utilization of shelter services reduces the risk of severe assault by 60%, and that a mere 4% of actual or attempted victims of intimate partner homicide utilize domestic violence programs (MNADV, n.d.).

2.4.2 Increased Oversight Privileges of the Citizen Police Review Board

On May 23, 2013, Pittsburgh City Council unanimously passed a bill which gives the Citizen Police Review Board the opportunity to review proposed changes to police policy and make non-binding recommendations (Balingit, 2013d). This legislation, drafted and sponsored by Councilman Burgess, was an adaptation of his original bill, which called for the annual publication of an abridged version of the operating procedures and policies of the Pittsburgh police department (Ordinance, 2013). While broadening the role of the Citizen Police Review Board does not necessarily increase its power, it does enable them to serve as a public witness, a role intended to supply residents with a better understanding of the appropriateness of both policy and police actions (Balingit, 2013d; Ordinance, 2013).
2.4.3 Formalized Police Policy on Calls of Unknown Trouble

On May 20, 2013, nearly five months after Ka’ Sandra Wade’s death, the Pittsburgh police instituted a policy to differentiate between 911 hang up calls and those classified as “unknown trouble,” and outline proper police response to unknown trouble calls (Silver, Belcufine, & Navratil, 2013). Navratil and Silver (2013c) report that these guidelines “suggest officers attempt to learn whether dispatch has the name, gender, and rough age of the caller, as well as information about whether there was a struggle and whether the call came from a land-line or cell phone.” Once on the scene, Navratil and Silver (2013c) claim, the officers are instructed to attempt “knocking on the door, asking for a callback, walking around the building, trying to reach neighbors and looking for cars that might indicate someone is present.” In the event that the caller cannot be reached, officers are advised to contact a supervisor, who would then decide if a forced entry is warranted (Navratil and Silver, 2013c).

This policy change left community stakeholders, police, and the District Attorney unsatisfied. Elizabeth Pittinger of the Citizen’s Police Review Board noted that the policy did not address one of the Board’s major recommendations, “to observe the caller,” and Maryellen Deckard of Action United echoed this sentiment, noting that this contact was “the most important piece” (Navratil & Silver, 2013c). The president of the police officers’ union, Sgt. Michael LaPorte, felt the policy to be unnecessary, calling it “kindergarten police work” (Navratil & Silver, 2013c). Allegheny County District Attorney Stephen Zappala remarked that this change simply codified current training as policy, and expressed disappointment that his major concern, having officers with
specialized domestic violence training in each shift, was not addressed by the policy (Navratil & Silver, 2013c).

2.5 An Ongoing Problem? The 1988 Point Breeze Case

In 1988, an incident occurred in Pittsburgh which shared many similarities with Wade’s. A woman in the Point Breeze neighborhood heard someone trying to break in to her home and called 911, frantically giving her address and asking for police assistance (Lash, 1988d). While she was on the phone with the civilian dispatcher, a man broke in and cut the phone wires (Lash, 1988d). The dispatcher sent police to investigate a “potential robbery in progress” and instructed officers to “redball” (hurry), but did not tell them that the caller was in the house, was a woman who was frantic, or that the call had been disconnected (Lash, 1988d). Six responding officers searched around the residence, knocked at the front and back door, and phoned the house after acquiring the home number from a neighbor (Lash, 1988b). The officers noted broken glass at the rear door, but concluded that a robber could not have gained entrance from that location (Silver, 2013a). Both the suspect and the woman, whom he held at knifepoint, watched the police investigate from a window (Silver, 2013a). They also watched them leave, at which point the suspect raped the woman twice before she gained control of the weapon and he fled (Silver, 2013a).

The public safety director ordered an internal investigation of the dispatchers and police officers involved, and officials found missteps on both sides (Lash, 1988b; Silver, 2013a). The information given by the dispatchers was incomplete, and should have included that the caller, a woman, was phoning from inside the house, and that the call had been disconnected (Silver, 2013a). The officers had not sought further information
from dispatch, did not coordinate the information they gathered from the scene, and did not properly evaluate the scene to locate the source of the forced entry (Silver, 2013a).

The 1988 incident prompted three major changes in police and emergency response system procedure and policy (Lash, 1988a). First, dispatchers were required to provide first responders with all of the information they gathered from the 911 caller (Lash, 1988a). Second, before officers were permitted to leave the scene, they were to tell dispatchers how the call was resolved, and conversely dispatchers were required to question police about the resolution of the call (Lash, 1988c). Third, and most importantly, Silver (2013a) reports, “the assigned police unit will contact the caller in every case which the caller is known, unless the caller requests otherwise. If contact cannot be made, communications must be so notified prior to leaving the scene”. According to then Public Safety Director Glenn M. Cannon, the provision requiring contact with the caller was intended to “ensure that a 911 supervisor was notified if a police officer could not get in touch with the person who made an emergency call” (Silver, 2013a). Structural changes to the 911 centers were made which may explain why these policies are no longer followed: city of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County 911 centers completed a lengthy merger process in 2006 (Sherman, 2006; Silver, 2013a). Due to the PA law allowing police departments to decline to make their operating policies public, it is unclear when and why the police policy requiring caller contact fell away (Balingit, 2013d).

3.0 Problem and Diagnosis

In the past twenty-five years, two Allegheny County women have been victimized in incidents that may have been preventable given clearer lines of communication between
911 callers, 911 operators, and responding officers. While measures were taken to address these communication issues after the incident in 1988, the 2013 Ka’Sandra Wade case has proven them to be insufficient, demonstrating the necessity of further policy intervention. Despite this clear need for new policy solutions, the initial flurry of public and media attention, and the investment and investigations of multiple community stakeholders, effective policy to address and rectify this issue has yet to be developed. In order to analyze the insufficient policy response to the issues surrounding the Wade case, it is necessary to look to the process of public policy formulation itself. By doing so, it can be shown that appropriate policy was not developed due to a combination of four major factors: low incentives for policy intervention by legislators, opposition to institutional changes by policymakers, the misidentification of the problem at hand, and the weak political influence of the stakeholders most invested in policy change.

Kingdon (1995) described the circumstances under which action toward policy initiatives is possible as a “window of opportunity” (p. 166). According to Kingdon (1995), these windows, which open both briefly and infrequently, do so under the following set of circumstances: “a problem is recognized, a solution is developed and available in the policy community, a political change makes it the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are not severe” (p. 165). These policy windows may open due to a shift in the political landscape, such as a party turnover in the white house (Kingdon, 1995). They may also open due to a focusing event, such as global warming, or a crisis event, like Hurricane Katrina (Kingdon, 1995). Within the larger setting of the policy formulation phase of public policymaking, the opening of a window of
opportunity gives items which have earned a place on the agenda the potential to pass through the window and be codified by legislation (Longest, 2006).

In the Wade case, the window of opportunity was opened by the crisis event of the murder of Ka'Sandra Wade and the confession and subsequent suicide of Anthony Brown. While the opening of this window enabled the passage of bills adopting the Maryland Lethality Assessment (Appendix A) and broadening the oversight powers of the Citizens Police Review Board (Appendix B), no legislative changes addressing the communication issues between the users and providers of emergency services were made. Effective legislation in this arena was not adopted due to interrelated problems in at each stage of agenda setting: political circumstances were not ideal, leading legislators to ignore the problem at the core of the Wade event, thus rendering them unable to generate relevant alternative solutions.

3.1 Political Circumstances

Price (1978) writes that legislators can be moved action on an issue by two key determinants: the public salience of the issue and the level of conflict that surrounds it. He explains that there are three aspects that lend public salience influential power, the weakest of these being the concern of the public at large. More important than the attention of the public en masse is the intensity of interest within the affected groups (Price, 1978). The most significant factor, however, is the composition of the affected groups. In addition to public salience, legislators are also influenced by the level of conflict among groups who have a stake in the issue (Price, 1978). It follows that legislative incentives are high when salience is high and conflict is low, and vice versa (Longest, 2006, p. 166). The Wade incident can be argued as having both low public
salience and a high level of conflict among interest groups, leading to little incentive for legislators to intervene.

One way to demonstrate the low public salience of the Wade incident is to observe the media response. In doing so, one sees that the interest in the tragedy predictably faded, for, as Kingdon (1985) explained, “a crisis or focusing event [...] is by its nature of short duration. People can stay excited about an airline crash or a railroad collapse for only so long.” (p. 169). A survey of items published by Western Pennsylvania’s largest newspaper, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, shows that between the second and 30th of January 2013, 28 news items about or pertinent to the Wade case were run (see Appendix A) (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, n.d.). This was followed by three months of silence on the topic, broken on May 8, 2013, with an article on the advancement of the Maryland Lethality Assessment bill (Blazina, 2013). To date, only four additional articles pertinent to the case have run, all in May of 2013, and all reflecting policy changes (see Fig. 1 and Appendix C).

Figure 1. Media Overview: Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Salience is also found to be low when one looks to the two stakeholders most
invested in legislative intervention, Action United and the Citizens Police Review Board.
Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997) write that stakeholders and their claims are defined by
three core attributes: power, legitimacy, and urgency. In stakeholder theory, the three
explain, a party has power “to the extent [that] it has or can gain access to coercive,
utilitarian, or normative means, to impose its will” (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997,
p. 865). Legitimacy is conferred when the actions of the group are generally perceived to
be appropriate, desirable, or proper (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). Lastly, urgency is
defined by both time sensitivity and the stakeholder’s perception of the criticality of the
issue (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).

The group most invested in the issue, victims of domestic violence, possesses the
least amount of influential power. This group is can be classified as a dependent
when they “lack power but have urgent legitimate claims,” and thus “depend on others
for the power necessary to carry out their will” (p. 877). The Citizen Police Review
Board can be classified as a discretionary stakeholder. These are stakeholders who have
legitimate claims, yet lack both power and urgency (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).
Their claims are do not have real urgency, and despite being a recognized community
watchdog, they have no real power. While they can investigate police conduct, hold
public hearings and subpoena officers, and make disciplinary recommendations, they
cannot enforce the subpoenas, their recommendations are perpetually ignored, and they
are held in low regard by the Pittsburgh Police Department in general (Deitch, 2010).
Legislators invested in the issue, such as Councilman Burgess, are classified as dominant stakeholders, as they possess both legitimate claims and the power to impose their will (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). The legitimacy, in the Councilman’s case, stems from the fact that the incident occurred in his district (Brode, 2013). The strongest stakeholder group in this case is the Pittsburgh Police Department itself, which is invested preventing legislative intervention. Mitchell, Agle, & Wood (1997) would describe the Department as a definitive stakeholder, as they have power (in their political pull), legitimate claims (concerns of litigation and officer safety), and urgency (given the groups pushing for change while the window of opportunity is open). Given the relative weakness of the stakeholders most invested in policy change, the strength of those wishing to prevent it, and the quickly fading attention of the public at large, one can say that the issues surrounding the Wade case had low public salience, thus leading to low incentives for legislators to push for change.

The second factor that can act as an incentive or disincentive for legislative action is the degree of conflict between stakeholder groups (Price, 1978). While the contention between the CPRB and the Pittsburgh Police Department has already been addressed, there are other reasons that the interests of law enforcement officers conflict with those of Action United and the CPRB. To delineate these issues and the assess the degree to which they motivate the department to resist legislative change it is necessary to look into what exactly is at stake for the Pittsburgh Police. Their investment in preventing an officer/caller contact mandate may be rooted in two major factors: the aforementioned issues of officer safety and potential litigation.
How might a mandate requiring officers to speak directly to the 911 caller put officers at risk? To answer this question, one can look to what constitutes the largest category of requests for police assistance: domestic violence calls (Klein, 2009). A survey by the National Institute of Justice found that in districts across the US, domestic violence-related emergency service calls accounted for as little as 15% to more than half of police calls (Klein, 2009). For numerous reasons, domestic violence related calls are high-risk assignments for officers (Garner, 2005). Emotions run high, as does the potential for the involvement of weapons, intoxication, intervening parties such as allies or juvenile offspring, as well as the potential for the victim to turn on the officer (Garner, 2005). While the potential for officer assaults in domestic violence response settings has long been a topic of debate, with some studies claiming low assault rates and others suggesting the setting is one of the top three situations in which an assault might occur, officer safety remains a major concern (Johnson, 2011). The FBI reports that between 1980 and 2003, over 224,000 officers were assaulted while responding to calls of family disturbance (Johnson, 2011). Further, between 1996 and 2010, 116 law enforcement officers were killed during responses to domestic disturbance calls, a figure amounting to 15% of law enforcement officer homicides (Kercher, 2013). Of all officer homicides recorded in this period (n=796), domestic disturbance responses were the third most common setting in which officers were killed (Kercher, 2013). This danger is something Pittsburgh officers know all too well. In 2009, three Pittsburgh police officers were killed and two more were injured while responding to a domestic disturbance call in Stanton Heights (Fuoco & Sherman, 2009). The Associated Press reported that outside of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, this incident was “one of the deadliest single-day
incidents for law enforcement in 40 years” (Associated Press, 2009). When one considers the high volume of domestic disturbance calls, the safety risks they pose for responding officers, and the tragic loss to the force in Pittsburgh’s recent history, it is easy to understand why police would both be wary of a law mandating that they must speak to the party who made the 911 call, and advocate against such a change.

The second stake officers hold in the issue of mandated police/caller contact involves Constitutional concerns and related litigation. When asked about such a mandate, Deputy Police Chief Paul Donaldson responded to reporters in an email, "you cannot MANDATE contact with an individual, we can only make an effort. No one can be forced to speak with [the] responding officer, and Constitutional guidelines prohibit forced entry without justification" (Navratil & Silver, 2013c). The Fourth Amendment grants the right of the people “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” and states that warrants can only be issued “upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (U.S. Const. amend. IV).

The Supreme Court has endorsed certain exceptions to the warrant requirement, including that of exigency, which can be applied when “the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment” (Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978), citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948).).

In the wake of the Wade case, a representative from the police department stated that within their operating policy, “exigent circumstances may ... (sic) exist where there is
a continuing danger, or where officers have a reasonable belief that people are in need of assistance” (Navratil & Silver, 2013a). Following his investigation of the conduct of the responding officers, Allegheny County DA Stephen Zappala claimed that the information they had was not enough to amount to exigency (Navratil & Silver, 2013e). The Wade incident serves as a perfect example of the Pittsburgh Police Department’s concerns over a law mandating officer/caller contact. The only way the officers could have spoken to her would have been to kick the door down, which, without exigency, would be an unconstitutional action on behalf of the police. Having such a mandate in place could leave both the department and the city vulnerable to litigation. When one considers this threat, in combination with compromises to officer safety, one can understand the high level of conflict surrounding officer/caller contact legislation. Given both the low level of public salience and the high degree of conflict surrounding this issue, incentives for legislators to push for policy change in this arena were few and far between.

3.2 Problem Identification

Longest (2006) states that in both private and public sectors of the US, the standard pattern of the decision-making process is reflected in the rational model of decision-making. This model holds that there are four steps to decision making: first, the problem is defined; second, relevant alternative solutions are developed; third, these alternatives are evaluated; and fourth, a solution is selected (Longest, 2006). Numerous critics of this model have claimed that it is not an accurate depiction of reality (Kingdon, 1985). Kingdon (1985) summarizes these claims by stating “the ability of human beings to process information is more limited than such a comprehensive approach would prescribe. We are unable to canvass many alternatives, keep them simultaneously in our
heads, and compare them systematically” (p. 78). Valid though these claims may be, they involve later points in the process, and the idea that problems must first be defined before solutions can be generated is not contested. It is in precisely this area that policymakers failed. The failure to define the problem at the core of the Wade case may have been unintentional, but seems more likely to have been prompted by a low political incentive and in the interest in avoiding conflict, legal or otherwise. As Rist (1981) explains, “if the issue is interpreted as one beyond the range of alternatives open to the policy maker, the response then becomes one of avoiding the issue or placing blame elsewhere” (p. 487).

Different players defined the main issue surrounding the Wade case in many ways. Some pointed to the lack of mental health services in general, and barriers to access to such services for the Black community in particular (Nuttall, 2013). Campaigning mayoral candidates framed the issue in terms of gun violence (Todd, 2013a). Others cited staffing issues within the Pittsburgh Police Department (Balingit, 2013a). Councilman Burgess used the issue as a springboard for domestic violence legislation and increasing police accountability (Balingit 2013b, 2013d). Three entities identified the problem at the heart of Wade’s murder and Brown’s suicide: a woman called the police for help, they arrived, they left without speaking to her. Were it not for this lack of contact, both Ka’Sandra Wade and Anthony Brown may still be alive today. The problem was defined in these terms by the Citizen Police Review Board, after their extensive policy investigation (CPRB, 2013b). It was defined in these terms by the gathering of domestic violence victims, through the focus groups conducted by Action
United (Guggenheimer, 2013). And it was defined in these terms by Anthony L. Brown himself, in the moments before he took his own life (Navratil & Silver, 2013e).

Longest (2006) writes that “health policies always reflect various mixes of public-interest and self-interest influences” (p. 120). The group with the most potential to be affected by the lack of police/caller contact, victims of domestic violence, represent a small sector of the public interest and possess little ability to influence policymakers. The makers of police policy have little incentive to change their organizational procedures, due to the issues concerning constitutionality and officer safety. Public policymakers chose to define the problem in more politically conventional terms, discussing gun laws, domestic violence, and mental health. Some of the policy response was positive: the adoption of the Maryland Lethality Standards was a great gain for victims of domestic violence in Allegheny County, and the increased oversight privileges of the CPRB may well lead to a greater level of police accountability and community trust. However, the procedural change undertaken by policymakers in the Pittsburgh Police Department in response to the issue of disconnected 911 calls was ill received by the District Attorney, invested groups such as Action United and the Citizen Police Review Board, and by the officers themselves (Navratil & Silver, 2013c).

### 3.3 Conclusion

The 2013 Ka’Sandra Wade case and the 1988 Point Breeze case before it both involved victimizations of women in Allegheny County which may have been preventable given clearer guidelines for communication between 911 callers, 911 operators, and responding officers. Despite calls for policy change from community stakeholders, effective policies addressing the issue of communication were not developed. When the circumstances
surrounding the Wade case are taken into account against the framework of the policy formulation process, one can ascertain potential reasons for this deficit. Although the crisis event of the Wade case opened a window of opportunity for policy change, effective legislation did not occur. Adverse political circumstances led to the misidentification and redefining of the problem at the core of the case, preventing the development of relevant alternative solutions. In regards to the political circumstances of the issue, incentives for legislative intervention were low for two reasons. First, the issue had low public salience, which is reflected in both in the drop-off in media attention and the relative weakness of the stakeholder groups most invested in the case. Second, there was a high level of conflict surrounding the case for the strongest stakeholder group, the Pittsburgh Police Department, who opposed mandated communication guidelines due to concerns over officer safety and constitutional violations. For these reasons, policymakers redefined the officer/caller communication problem, and aimed public policy solutions were at improving the role of community watchdog groups and at preventing lethality due to domestic violence.

4.0 Community Action Plan

If effective policy to address the communication issues at the heart of the Ka’Sandra Wade case was not developed due to the issue’s low public salience, high levels of conflict, and misidentified core problem, it stands to reason that in order to effectively address the issue it would be necessary to increase its public salience, lower the attendant levels of conflict, and correctly define the problem. In order to successfully impact policy development, Longest (2006) states that invested stakeholders need to engage in “helping to shape the conceptualizations of problems, the development of potential
solutions to the problems, and the political circumstances that help drive the policymaking process” (p.145). Stakeholders can help shape political circumstances by raising incentives for legislative action. It can be shown that they can raise the public salience of the issue by by improving their policy competence and strengthening their influential power through coalition building. In turn, the alliances formed by coalition building can help decrease the level of conflict surrounding the issue at hand. Once a coalition has been established, the partnership can work together to identify the problem at hand and formulate new potential solutions. Qualitative research methods, specifically focus groups, can be utilized by the coalition to inform the construction of policy that will better address the demands and concerns of the invested stakeholders.

4.1 Short Term

In order to have more of a voice in the policymaking process, community stakeholders should strive to increase their policy competency. Longest (2006) describes policy competency as “the knowledge, skills, and abilities that permit one to successfully analyze the public policymaking process to the point of accurately assessing its impact on his or her domain of interest [...] and to successfully exert influence on the public policymaking process” (p. 126). One way that stakeholders can both build on their knowledge of the policymaking process and strengthen their ability to influence it is to engage in coalition building. In discussing ways to empower communities to work to influence public policy, Thompson and Butler (2001) explain that “building a coalition strengthens the cause and provides encouragement. [...] there is power in numbers, and a collective voice is important” (p. 169). It stands to reason that a stakeholder group can expand their knowledge base by partnering with new organizations. Strengthening their
power to influence, however, is slightly more complex. Longest (2006) writes that influence can come from three different types of power: positional power, which is based on societal roles; reward or coercive power, which reflects the ability to punish noncompliance or reward compliance; and expert power, which is based on the possession of expertise which is valued by others. Coalition building can increase power in each of these key areas.

How could the stakeholders in the Wade case reach out to potential partners, and who should they approach? In order to help build a coalition in this case, the issue of 911 disconnects and police/caller contact needs to be reframed in order to appeal to a broader audience. Longest (2006) writes that “problems can be spotlighted by their widespread applicability to many people [...] or by their sharply focused impact on a small but powerful group” (171). In the Wade case, the problem was framed as one which affected a small and traditionally voiceless group: victims of domestic violence. The issue, however, has the potential to affect many. Hostage or abuse situations are not the only times in which 911 calls could become disconnected, leaving the caller in danger. Disconnects could occur due to accidents, panic, or medical issues. By reframing the issue to reflect this fact, other organizations could be made to recognize their stake in the issue, and motivated to press for change. Community health partnerships, neighborhood groups, public safety groups, and groups which focus on older adults, such as the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), could all be reached out to for partnership. Ideally, this coalition would include representatives from law enforcement. If this is not feasible in the early stages of the partnership, the group should familiarize itself with the realities of police work to correctly and accurately engage in dialogue.
concerning police reform (Sadusky, 1994). One way to go about this would be for advocates to participate in ride-alongs, and to observe procedures in other police assignments (Sadusky, 1994).

4.2 Long Term

Once a coalition has been formed, the next step would be for members to engage in qualitative research methods in order to correctly identify the problem at hand and help to develop relevant alternative solutions. It is at this point that the involvement of law enforcement officers would be key, as it could help to lower levels of stakeholder conflict and enable the group to craft policy solutions that better appease all involved. For instance, Action United had constructed their problem definition and legislation development based solely on insights from a focus group of domestic violence victims. Had they involved members of the Prosecutor’s Office or law enforcement in their development of legislation, they may have been able to draft Ka’Sandra’s Law in a way that did not raise concerns over officer safety or Fourth Amendment violations. A coalition would have had the ability to conduct multiple focus groups consisting of different stakeholders in order to construct more satisfactory solutions.

Kahan (2004) defines a focus group as “a carefully planned discussion whose objective is to learn about the perceptions, feelings, attitudes, and ideas of the group participating in the discussion with respect to a defined area of interest” (130). In use since the 1940s, focus groups are most commonly associated with marketing research (Kahan, 2004). By the 1980s, they had become an accepted method for research in the social sciences (Kahan, 2004). They have since become a tool for policy development, and are “increasingly [...] becoming part of the standard toolkit” of policy analysts
(Kahan, 2004, p. 129). While other qualitative methods such as case studies, community-based participatory research, and participant observation are also utilized to inform policy development, focus groups allow valuable insights to be gathered under the constraints of both time and resources (Minkler, 2010; Straw & Smith, 1995). They are often favored by policy analysts as they are a relatively inexpensive research method (Straw & Smith, 1995).

Rist (1981) writes that qualitative research methods can be used in policy development to restrict the problem definition and identify the unintended consequences of potential policies. If a problem is not restricted by the use of focus groups, at the very least it can provide policymakers with a view of the differing problem definitions across stakeholder groups, while also providing potential solutions from all sides (Rist, 1981; Straw & Smith, 1995). Aside from restricting the problem definition and illuminating competing definitions, utilizing focus groups as a policy tool across stakeholder factions could be a crucial means of lowering existing levels of conflict between parties that could and should be working together. Murphy (2003) writes that “any proposals for change that do not acknowledge, respect, and address the functionality” of an organization’s practices “are likely to provoke hostility, lack of cooperation, or active resistance” (p. 35). By involving law enforcement officers in policy development focused research, it may be possible to craft solutions which are more fully considered by policymakers, and more widely accepted by the Police Department itself. As Murphy explains, “qualitative research can support a more thoughtful or subtle approach that goes with the grain of an institution rather than cutting across it” (p. 35).
By building a coalition of varied community stakeholders, the invested groups would gain a higher level of policy competency, and collectively would be better able to influence the political circumstances surrounding the Wade case. By utilizing this partnership in order to conduct focus groups across its membership, the coalition would be in a better position to influence both the construction of the problem definition as well as the development of alternative solutions. By involving all of the stakeholders in seeking solutions to this complex policy issue, it could be possible to increase the chances of making changes that satisfy both community groups and law enforcement agents.

### 4.3 Risk and Response

A primary barrier to the implementation of this action plan could be the unwillingness of the Pittsburgh Police Department to participate in a coalition or in policy-oriented focus groups. To circumvent this issue, stakeholders would need to familiarize themselves with the ethnographic process of identifying and reaching out to potential gatekeepers, those key individuals who can help facilitate, smooth, or grant access to a population (O’Reilly, 2011). A secondary barrier that may impede progress is one of funding. Community groups face many financial pressures, and other issues may prove to be more pressing. To overcome this restriction, the coalition could rely on fundraising through benefits and donations, which would be more fruitful given a higher level of public salience.
APPENDIX A

Adopted Legislation: Maryland Model (“LAP”)

Resolution authorizing the Mayor, Director of Public Safety and the Chief of the Bureau of Police to enter into agreement/agreements and/or contract/contracts with the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence (“PCADV”) and the Women’s Center and Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh (“WCS”) to implement the Domestic Violence Lethality Assessment Program—Maryland Model (“LAP”) as required by Bill 2013-1091. Costs not to exceed Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000).

Whereas, in the United States approximately 1 in 4 adults will be subjected to domestic violence by an intimate partner; and

Whereas, in the United States an estimated 1.3 million women are victims of physical assault by an intimate partner each year; and,

Whereas, approximately 1 in 4 LGBTQ people experience domestic violence; and

Whereas, in the United States 1 in 4 women will become victims of domestic violence in their lifetime; and,

Whereas, Domestic Violence is the leading cause of injury to women ages 15 – 44 in the United States – more than car accidents, muggings and rapes combined; and,

Whereas, in the United States 1 in 3 teenage girls will be physically assaulted by a boyfriend; and,

Whereas, boys who witness domestic violence in their homes are 1500 times more likely to perpetrate abuse later in life; and,

Whereas, 50% of girls growing up in an abusive home will go on to be victims of abuse themselves; and,

Whereas, Pennsylvania has the third highest number of murder suicides in the nation and seventy-three percent of those deaths involved an intimate partner – spouse, common-law spouse, ex-spouse, or girlfriend/boyfriend; and,

Whereas, Pittsburgh City Council finds that working to reduce and eliminate domestic violence in Pittsburgh and the surrounding area serves a critical public purpose.
Be it resolved by the Council of the City of Pittsburgh hereby as follows:

Section 1. The Mayor, Director of Public Safety and the Chief of the Bureau of Police, in a form approved by the Solicitor, are hereby authorized to enter into agreement/agreements and/or contract/contracts with the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence (“PCADV”) and the Women’s Center and Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh (“WCS”) to implement the Domestic Violence Lethality Assessment Program, *Maryland Model (“LAP”) as required by Bill 2013-1091 1482.* Costs not to exceed Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000).

Section 2. The costs for agreements and/or contracts let hereof shall be and are hereby made payable from funds appropriated therefore to the various Departments of the City of Pittsburgh, and the Mayor is hereby authorized to issue, and the City Controller to countersign, warrants on said funds in payment thereof.
APPENDIX B


Ordinance supplementing the Pittsburgh Code of Ordinances, Title One: Administrative, Article III, Organization, Chapter 116: Department of Public Safety, Chapter 116.02 Powers and Duties of Bureau Chiefs and Director of Public Safety, by adding a new Subsection VI entitled "Publication Review of Operating Procedures and Policies of the Bureau of Police."

Whereas, the best way to improve Pittsburgh residents' public safety is to increase their confidence in Pittsburgh's Bureau of Police; and,

Whereas, the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police can become a more effective police Department by investing in Technology, Training and Transparency; and,

Whereas, public publication review of Pittsburgh's Bureau of Police's Standard Operating Policies and Procedures will increase police transparency; and,

Whereas, the purpose of the Pittsburgh's Bureau of Police's Standard Operating Policies and Procedures is to explain the organization, policies, and procedures of the Police Department; and,

Whereas, these Standard Operating Policies and Procedures are broadly stated principles and values intended to guide Pittsburgh's Bureau of Police members in the performance of their duties in conformity with department objectives; and,

Whereas, adherence to the Pittsburgh's Bureau of Police's Standard Operating Policies and Procedures ensure the Department's mandate to the continued protection and enhancement of our diverse neighborhoods by working in partnership with our citizens to creatively solve problems always remaining sensitive to the authority with which they're entrusted; and,

Whereas, adherence to the Pittsburgh's Bureau of Police's Standard Operating Policies and Procedures encourages the Department to provide committed service through accountability, integrity and respect; and,

Whereas Police Departments in cities including Los Angeles California, Seattle Washington, Chicago Illinois, Portland Oregon, Tampa Florida, Louisville Kentucky, Denver Colorado, Houston Texas, Albuquerque New Mexico, Milwaukee Wisconsin, Atlanta Georgia, along with many other County, State and University police forces around the Country have made their Standard Operating Policies and Procedures public; and,
Whereas public publication review of the Pittsburgh's Bureau of Police's Standard Operating Policies and Procedures will provide Pittsburgh residents a greater understanding of appropriate policy behavior; and,

Whereas public publication review of the Pittsburgh's Bureau of Police's Standard Operating Policies and Procedures will provide Pittsburgh residents a standard by which to judge the appropriateness of specific police actions; and,

Whereas public publication review of the Pittsburgh's Bureau of Police's Standard Operating Policies and Procedures will provide Pittsburgh residents a greater confidence in the Bureau of Police.

The Council of the City of Pittsburgh hereby enacts as follows:

Section 1. The Pittsburgh Code of Ordinances, Section 116.02 Powers and Duties of Bureau Chiefs and Director of Public Safety, is hereby supplemented as follows:

§ 116.02 - Powers and Duties of Bureau Chiefs and Director of Public Safety.

VI. Publication Review of Operating Procedures and Policies of the Bureau of Police

a. The Bureau of Police shall publish, annually, an abridged public version of its operating policies and procedures;

   The Citizen Police Review Board shall review proposed changes and amendments to the operating policies and procedures of the Bureau of Police for the purpose of providing advice and comments for consideration by the Chief of the Bureau of Police.

   a. The Bureau shall redact such information that, in the opinion of the City Solicitor and the Director of Public Safety, that would jeopardize departmental preparedness, public safety or the protection of residents;

   All records pertaining to the Citizen Police Review Board’s advice and comments shall be considered drafts of policy statements or of management directives.

   a. The Bureau shall publish, in paper and electronic form, said abridged version of its operating procedures and policies and make the same readily available to the public.
# APPENDIX C

## Pittsburgh Post-Gazette Items Pertinent to or Mentioning the Ka’sandra Wade Case, January-November 2013

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U.S. Const. amend. IV.

