THE BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE

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Effective and enduring democratic government requires broad public support for basic democratic orientations. Chief among these are political participation and political tolerance, which traditionally have been viewed as closely linked: virtually everyone agrees that democracy works best when people actively engage in political life and when they do not exclude others from doing the same. However, empirical evidence to date challenges the idea that political tolerance and civic engagement are positively, or even directly, related.

What are the behavioral consequences of political tolerance? Using novel experiments that randomly assign subjects to tolerate the rights of groups they strongly dislike, this dissertation finds that political tolerance directly stimulates participation in specific modes of civic engagement. I argue that tolerance for political minorities is a highly unpopular position that orients citizens toward disagreement and dissent and reduces conflict aversion among the politically tolerant relative to the intolerant. Through this mechanism, upholding the rights of groups that society prefers to repress independently raises the likelihood of participation in social modes of action in which the risk of disagreement and conflict with other citizens is high (e.g. protests), but does little to facilitate individual modes of action in which disagreement and conflict are unlikely (e.g. voting).

My evidence is based on two methodological innovations. First, I employ a “self-persuasion” experiment in which subjects develop original arguments to convince a discussion
partner to either permit (tolerate) or ban (not tolerate) public demonstrations by the subject’s most disliked group. Second, I directly observe subjects’ post-test participation using overt measures of subjects’ political behavior rather than survey items to measure only their behavioral intentions. Tracing the effects of randomized tolerance on subjects’ overt political behavior reveals, in support of my hypotheses, that practicing tolerance directly stimulates collective-contentious activism (in this case, signing one’s name to a petition to challenge the status quo), but has no effect on individual action (i.e. making an anonymous donation). I further corroborate these findings by applying nonparametric matching techniques to cross-national survey data from the U.S. and Europe, and through cross-national survey experiments that test my model in the U.S. and Hungary.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the broad questions and conceptual frameworks addressed in this dissertation, as well as the specific empirical and theoretical conundrums that motivate further analysis. This chapter also outlines the contents of each subsequent chapter and summarizes their contributions to the literature.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

A key contribution of public opinion research to the study of comparative politics is the observation that effective and enduring democratic government requires broad public support for basic democratic values. A liberal democratic citizen is one who “believes in individual liberty and who is politically tolerant, who holds a certain amount of distrust of political authority but at the same time is trustful of fellow citizens, who is obedient but nonetheless willing to assert rights against the state, who views the state as constrained by legality, and who supports basic democratic institutions and processes” (Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992: 332). When mass publics on balance exhibit such beliefs, they fulfill important cultural and attitudinal prerequisites to liberal democracy (Griffith 1956; Sullivan and Transue 1999).
The claim that public consensus over democratic values can enhance quality in democratic regimes at least partly depends on the assumption that citizens who embrace these norms in principle are also willing to apply them in practice. Over the past two decades, this observation has become an important theme in research on how democratic attitudes shape democratic activism across countries. Political behavior scholars increasingly investigate the consequences of support for democratic values for the individual citizens who hold them. Can beliefs in democratic principles explain voting or other forms of civic engagement? Do circumstances exist under which support for democratic norms directly stimulates political action?

Scholars generally disagree over the degree to which values can influence political judgments and behavior, and the relationship between democratic values and overt political behavior is likely “far from obvious, simple, and direct” (Gibson and Bingham 1985: 161). How support for democratic orientations matters for political behavior remains a core and unresolved issue in political science research (Finkel, Sigelman and Humphries 1999).

This dissertation further explores the behavioral consequences of democratic orientations by examining the individual-level relationship between political tolerance and political participation in the United States and Europe. These orientations traditionally have been viewed as closely linked foundations of liberal democracy – virtually everyone agrees that democracy works best when people actively engage in their society’s political life and do not exclude others from doing the same. And more participatory individuals traditionally have been viewed as more tolerant citizens, and vice versa. This is highly desirable from the perspective of democratic theory. When citizens who are committed to civil libertarian norms in principle and are willing to apply them in practice also regularly participate in politics, they hamstring repressive public
policy (McClosky 1964) and broaden opportunities for political expression for people with views outside the mainstream (Gibson 1992b). Hence the classic assumption that tolerant activists “serve as the major repositories of the public conscience and as carriers of the Creed” of liberal democracy (McClosky 1964: 374).

Empirical evidence to date generally does not support this assumption, however. While the earliest tolerance research consistently reports positive associations between individuals’ level of political involvement and their level of political tolerance, subsequent lines of research indict that relationship as spurious and point to problems of causal indeterminacy. In the first place, it is possible that tolerance and participation are not at all directly related. Individuals may possess a host of demographic and personality traits (e.g. high education; low psychological insecurity) that render them, at once, more tolerant and more participatory. It may not be the case that participating in politics increases one’s tolerance for nonconformity, or conversely that “putting up” with odious groups facilitates active political engagement, because these characteristics of good democrats derive from more primordial contributors to a general “democratic personality” (Sniderman 1975). Alternatively, more recent studies suggest that tolerance and participation may indeed be related, but as conflicting, rather than complementary, orientations: tolerance for minority rights is a weak and pliable attitude that conflicts with other democratic beliefs and usually does not yield attitude-consistent behavior (Gibson 1998; Marcus et al. 1995; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001; Sniderman et al. 1996). Forbearance also promotes ambivalent political preferences and can lead tolerant individuals to abstain from political activity in general (Mutz 2001, 2005). Tolerant individuals may therefore endure nonconformity at the expense of vibrant civic engagement; tolerance may fundamentally work against participatory democracy in plural societies.
These divergent accounts reveal that certain fundamental questions remain unanswered. Are individuals who “put up” with ideas and interests they oppose more likely to be the activist custodians of liberal democracy that normative theory requires? Or does practicing tolerance toward odious groups breed the sort of ambivalence and confusion over democratic commitments that stifle political action even among the most dedicated liberal democrats? Are these relationships correlational or causal and in what direction do they flow? In short, what are the behavioral consequences of political tolerance?

I advance a new theoretical perspective and methodological framework to help address these questions. Existing accounts give scant attention to the possibility that tolerance may positively influence participation rather than, or in addition to, the reverse. And certain limitations in extant explanations suggest it is worthwhile to investigate tolerance as a driver of civic engagement. On one hand, the positive relationship between tolerance and participation is either assumed to be spurious due to omitted variable bias (e.g. Sullivan et al. 1982) or a consequence of “learning effects” whereby the give-and-take inherent in political activism instructs citizens in the value of civil liberties and thereby generates tolerance (e.g. Pateman 1975; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). But it is well-known that people who (learn to) value civil liberties in the abstract often remain unwilling to afford political rights to their political opponents in practice (e.g. Prothro and Grigg 1960). Even the most recent field experimental evidence shows that scholastic curricula designed specifically to impart civil libertarian norms fail to generate support for actual political rights and civil liberties (Green et al. 2011). On the other hand, the negative effects of tolerance on participation have been more often conjectured than tested (but see Mutz 2001, 2005; Marcus et al. 1995), and this model of the relationship may
be theoretically underspecified to the extent that it does not fully clarify what types of participation political tolerance should influence.

I examine the effects of tolerance on participation by tying it to different avenues of political action. It is widely accepted in political science that different modes of engagement (e.g. protest, voting) present unique costs for participants, which individuals require diverse sets of resources and motivations to overcome. Tolerant and intolerant individuals may differ in terms of the individual-level resources and motivations that determine which actions they can take, but I propose that practicing tolerance or intolerance toward an unpopular minority group also conditions which actions they are willing to take. In particular, political tolerance may be directly and positively consequential for “high-cost,” contentious forms of political action.

My central claim is that affording rights of free expression to groups with which one disagrees strengthens citizens’ perception that they are free to communicate their own political views. That is, they will perceive less social disapproval for voicing their views, and perceive less potential for the government to repress expression of these views (Gibson 1992b). In the context of heated civil liberties disputes – such as the controversy surrounding Westboro Baptist Church rallies at recent U.S. military funerals, the French burqa ban, or the Ground Zero “mosque” dispute – support for the political liberty of widely reviled others is a highly disagreeable and socially risky, minority position that stands at odds with majority intolerance. I propose that tolerant citizens who incur nontrivial social costs to protect the expressive rights of unpopular others are as a consequence less likely to perceive social costs as a barrier to their own political activism. Psychological theories of consistency provide a plausible explanatory lever for this effect, as individuals tend to align their beliefs with their actions (e.g. Festinger 1957) and to behave consistently across similar types of situations (e.g. Furr and Funder 2003). Through these
mechanisms, upholding the rights of groups that society prefers to repress independently raises the likelihood of participation in social modes of action in which the risk of disagreement and conflict with other citizens and government authorities is high (e.g. protest, boycotts, petitions, rallies), but does little to facilitate individual modes of action in which disagreement and conflict are unlikely (e.g. voting, donating).

Political science currently lacks an appropriate methodology for examining the direct effects of tolerance judgments on participation and its attitudinal drivers. Spuriousness due to omitted variable bias is the central challenge: extant approaches cannot easily distinguish the behavioral consequences of tolerant and intolerant judgments from behavioral patterns that owe instead to preexisting differences between tolerant and intolerant individuals. Methodological innovations, like randomized experiments and “matching” techniques for strengthening the inferences that can be drawn from observational data, can help to clarify to what extent tolerance as an applied value can influence political behavior independently of such factors. I utilize nonparametric matching methods to scrutinize patterns of participation among tolerant and intolerant citizens in the U.S. and Europe, and trace the direct effects of tolerance judgments on citizen activism through original experiments that randomly assign subjects to manifest (in)tolerance and permit me to directly observe its subsequent influence on overt political behavior.

These new data and methodological innovations considerably strengthen the causal inferences that can be made about the behavioral effects of political tolerance. And, consistent with my theoretical perspective, these inferences paint a very different portrait of tolerance, its consequences for civic engagement, and whether tolerant activists may actually be hailed as “carriers of the creed” of liberal democracy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find that
tolerance directly stimulates participation in specific kinds of political action. Tolerant individuals are more likely than intolerant individuals to engage in contentious and collective acts – and this disparity is attributable in no small part to the practice of tolerance itself. In other words, extending expressive rights to heinous groups drives tolerant individuals to exercise their own rights to political expression.

1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS

In one sense, this dissertation argues an old point: Tolerance matters. Forbearance in the face of nonconformity has long been conceptualized as the lynchpin of plural societies and a key to democratic competition. Tolerance promotes the free exchange of new and diverse ideas, encourages individuality and autonomy, and allows society to progress by helping individuals to discover the good and bad aspects of different ways of life. But this dissertation does not aim to defend or justify political tolerance from a normative perspective. Rather, it evaluates empirically how countenancing ideas and interests one opposes affects individuals who tolerate and draws from this evidence some conclusions about whether and how it might be thought “good” to tolerate. In doing so, it offers several contributions.

Most basically, it begins to unveil whether, and in what ways, extending basic procedural rights and civil liberties to offensive groups affects individuals who tolerate. Although tolerance is often considered the most important democratic value, its consequences for individuals are poorly understood. This is so because empirical tolerance research has focused primarily on its sources, nature, and distribution in mass publics. Only a few studies have examined its micro-level effects, either on political participation (Gibson and Bingham 1985; Gibson 1987; Marcus
et al. 1995) or on other attitudes that may influence participation (Gibson 1992b, 2002). This study explicitly models tolerance as an independent variable and speaks directly to the question of whether it shapes political action potential.

Moreover, nearly all extant studies rely on cross-sectional data that render the directions of these relationships difficult to decipher, or on ( quasi-) experimental procedures that obscure causal inferences regarding possible downstream effects of political tolerance judgments. My evidence is based partly on cross-national survey data to which I apply nonparametric matching techniques in order to isolate and improve inferences about the independent effects of tolerance using observational data. In addition, I offer two methodological innovations to help assess the direct effects of tolerance on participation. First, I introduce a “self-persuasion” experiment in which subjects develop original arguments to convince a discussion partner to either permit (tolerate) or ban (not tolerate) public demonstrations by the subject’s least-liked group. This procedure more fully simulates the actual application of (in)tolerance insofar as subjects cultivate, express, and defend tolerant or intolerant positions via their own unique reasoning. Second, I directly observe subjects’ post-judgment participation using overt measures of subjects’ political behavior rather than survey items to measure only their behavioral intentions. Together, these procedures offer unobtrusive measures of participation which can be traced directly to individuals’ applied decision to uphold or restrict their political enemy’s rights.

More broadly, findings from this study speak to major theoretical questions and normative problems associated with political tolerance in modern democracies. Much empirical tolerance research suggests that tolerance is of little consequence to democratic politics and government. Most people are intolerant of ideas and interests they oppose; yet widespread mass intolerance neither catalyzes repressive public policy (e.g. Gibson 1989) nor stifles political
competition (Petersen et al. 2011). Tolerance may be a good in and of itself, but an important intellectual tradition in political science research maintains that it is not a necessary condition for liberal democracy. At the same time, tolerance increasingly faces objectives in normative scholarship based on the belief that it carries pernicious consequences for individuals and societies. As I will elaborate in the next chapter, tolerance has been labeled “repressive” (e.g. Brown 2006) or at best “inadequate and obsolete” (e.g. Ramadan 2010) by Marxist and New Left intellectuals who demand equal respect and recognition for diverse groups, rather than “mere” tolerance. Meanwhile, the cultural right maintains that tolerance constitutes an “insidious attack” on moral, cultural, and religious traditions (e.g. Caldwell 2009). These critiques are now central to real political debates. In France, for instance, many proponents of the ban on *burqas* challenged tolerance for religious expression on grounds that it erodes women’s equality. Religious conservatives in the Netherlands and Sweden have also come under attack for opposing these states’ commitment to equal rights for LGBT minorities (e.g. Mudde 2010).

Few compelling defenses of tolerance seem available: the liberal democratic value to which we normally attribute every virtue is deemed unnecessary in democratic theory and unfortunate in many areas of political philosophy. It is therefore useful to assess empirically whether tolerance is consequential in ways that suggests it is worthwhile. Indeed, such evidence may also be useful to governments and NGOs who dedicate much effort and resources to civic education and democratization programs that “teach” tolerance and participation where they are in shortest supply (Finkel 2003, 2006). These efforts currently proceed without a clear understanding of how tolerance affects liberal (and illiberal) democratic citizens.
1.3  DISSERTATION OVERVIEW

In the remainder of this chapter, I summarize the arguments and objectives of each subsequent chapter and briefly contextualize their contributions in terms of the broader theoretical, normative, and methodological questions at the center of this dissertation. The literature review in Chapter Two provides a more detailed profile of these issues and explicates the specific puzzle of whether and how tolerance and participation are related.

1.3.1  Does tolerance matter? Theoretical challenges in Chapters 2 and 3

Political science generally lacks a theoretical framework for understanding democratic values as drivers of actual political judgments and actions (Finkel, Sigelman and Humphries 1999). This is particularly true of political tolerance, for which a generation of research reports that despite widespread support for abstract civil libertarian norms in principle, most citizens are, in practice, unwilling to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to groups they strongly dislike (e.g. Prothro and Grigg 1960). This well established inconsistency suggests that values, as such, have little purchase over actual political judgments and has been used as evidence to attack the suitability of democratic rule by suggesting that democratic publics are hostile to a core democratic obligation.

One outgrowth of this view is the “elitist theory” of democracy, which maintains that widespread intolerance is largely innocuous – and mass political tolerance unnecessary – for liberal democratic government. Early empiricists essentially “assumed away” the consequences of (in)tolerance because 1) the intolerant masses tend not to participate and are politically negligible relative to the small subset of tolerant activists who influence policy through regular
civic engagement (McClosky 1964); 2) the intolerant masses cannot agree on which group is most threatening to society, and therefore cannot mobilize concerted calls for political repression (Sullivan et al. 1982); and 3) strong institutions exist to protect minority rights in the event that repressive public policies are passed. Mass public opinion is important to the degree to which it can be shaped and mobilized by elites, but citizens’ beliefs are generally not directly consequential for politics (Gibson 1992b: 339). Put somewhat more dramatically and precisely: mass political tolerance does not matter for public policy or political competition.

In response, Gibson (1992b) originated an important defense of political tolerance and its relevance on grounds that this attitude matters deeply for political culture. In particular, widespread mass intolerance fosters a “culture of conformity” in which citizens grow wary of their ability to express political views that might conflict with majority opinion. Individuals who live in intolerant communities or households are more likely to avoid political discussion, to self-censor their own political expression, and to question their freedom to participate in politics without government retaliation. Political intolerance matters because it could inhibit citizens’ development of “the attitudes toward political participation, disagreement, and political competition that are so beneficial for democratic politics” (Gibson 2006: 23–4). By implication, political tolerance matters because it broadens the opportunities for self-expression for those with views outside the political mainstream. Indeed, Gibson maintains that “tolerance matters because it is connected to a set of beliefs about the legitimacy and appropriateness of self-expression” (343).

In Chapter Three, I largely follow Gibson in arguing that the political consequences of tolerance and intolerance are best understood at the individual-level and I seek to advance his arguments about the relationship between political tolerance, political freedom, and political
expression. In particular, I push his arguments in two directions – between individuals and across countries – by tying them to the “social costs” of political participation.

Extant explanations of the tolerance-participation relationship, which I review in Chapter Two, give meager attention to the fact that different modes of participation vary in terms of the costs and risks they pose to participants and that individuals therefore require specific sets of resources and attitudinal dispositions to facilitate their engagement. Crucial among the latter are positive orientations toward risk-taking, argumentation, and conflict in one’s own life. I maintain that extending rights to groups that society prefers to repress also presents non-trivial risks to tolerant individuals because supporting basic rights for widely reviled groups that may be perceived as a threat to political and societal stability and generally invites social disapproval.

Therefore, I propose that citizens who incur substantial risk to defend the rights and liberties of society’s unpopular minorities should be less likely to associate risks with their own political activism. I draw on social psychological theories of cognitive and behavioral consistency to generate causal propositions from Gibson’s inference that “tolerance is associated with the belief that there are few significant costs to be paid for one’s own political expression” (1992b: 343). Tolerance is not merely a correlate of, but also a direct contributor to, perceptions of freedom and related attitudes toward risk and dissent. In turn, tolerance should more likely influence high-cost forms of political activism, such as protest, petitioning, and rallies, which involve a greater risk of disagreement and conflict with other citizens and government authorities, than low-cost avenues of engagement such as voting and donating.

However, I acknowledge that the costs of participation may also depend on the broader socio-political context in which activism takes place. In particular, countries with a recent history of authoritarian rule continue to differ substantially from established western democracies in
Chapter Three therefore devotes considerable attention to potential differences across the United States and Western Europe, on one hand, and post-communist East Central Europe, on the other.

Ultimately, Chapter Three proposes that tolerance does matter, but not in ways that conventional theories suggest. I challenge the causal ordering of the theory of democratic learning as it applies to the tolerance-participation relationship, and I build a case for the role tolerance plays in determining how much liberty people believe they have available to them and, more importantly, to what degree they are willing to exercise that liberty for themselves. Tolerance can be crucial to whether and how citizens participate in politics; this has downstream consequences for public policy as well as political culture.

1.3.2 Causal inference in the study of tolerance: Methodological challenges in chapters 4, 5, and 6

The specific puzzle at the core of this dissertation is whether tolerance stimulates, suppresses, or is unrelated to political participation. Two perspectives can be gleaned from the literature, which I review in Chapter Two. While a classic view posits positive correlations between political tolerance and political activism, recent studies conjecture that tolerance may exert a suppressive effect on political engagement. And a several studies suggest that any relationship between tolerance and participation is spurious due to unobserved factors that influence both democratic orientations simultaneously. An important methodological challenge therefore hinders scholars’ ability to adjudicate between these accounts of tolerance and participation. These accounts remain entangled because the effects of tolerant and intolerant attitudes are difficult to separate,
empirically, from influence of other factors that drive participation among individuals who possess and express these attitudes.

I address these challenges in two ways. First, Chapter Four examines the balance of evidence for divergent perspectives of tolerance and participation using the Neyman-Rubin “potential outcomes” causal framework and drawing inferences from observational data. Specifically, I apply nonparametric matching techniques to cross-national survey data from the United States and Europe to better isolate the effects of tolerance judgments from effects that are attributable to other individual-level traits that condition both tolerance and political engagement. This evidence furnishes preliminary support for the propositions outlined in Chapter Three; however, these findings remain open to several objections that cannot properly be addressed using observational data alone.

Ideally, students of political tolerance and its consequences would employ experiments that assign subjects to manifest tolerance or intolerance and, through random assignment, eliminate differences in antecedents across groups. Random assignment would allow researchers to observe whether and in what ways attitudinal tolerance and intolerance independently affect political outcomes. Chapter Five thoroughly discusses this claim and argues that extant experimental approaches to manipulating tolerance and intolerance contain certain properties that may obscure causal inferences regarding the downstream effects of (in)tolerance. It then introduces a novel experimental approach called the “self-persuasion” experiment, theoretically grounds it in social psychological research, contrasts it with extant experimental approaches in political tolerance, and tests its effects on attitudinal tolerance and intolerance within the potential outcomes framework. The findings indicate potent effects of the manipulation on both political tolerance and intolerance. The magnitude of attitude change is particularly strong and
significant among initially tolerant respondents assigned to practice intolerance and initially intolerant respondents assigned to practice tolerance. Given that previous work has largely struggled to convert intolerance to tolerance, the self-persuasion experiment offers an important advancement in our ability to randomly assign subjects to manifest (in)tolerance and to study their downstream effects on other political outcomes.

Finally, I employ the self-persuasion methodology in Chapter Six to examine the direct effects of tolerance on political participation and the attitudinal dispositions that may facilitate it. Using original survey-experiments in the United States and Hungary, I first randomly assign subjects to manifest tolerance or intolerance via the self-persuasion procedure and then trace the direct effects of this manipulation on subjects’ overt political participation. Following the manipulation, I present respondents with an opportunity to either sign a petition or make a donation to a non-profit group to advance a political cause they deem important. Technologies embedded within the online survey permit me to directly observe whether subjects did in fact deliver the petition or make a financial contribution. These unobtrusive measures of political engagement eliminate measurement error endemic in survey responses, while the experimental design mitigates concerns over ambiguous directionality of the relationship between tolerance and participation.

1.3.3 Tolerance as a virtue, tolerance as a vice: Responding to normative challenges in chapter 7

The concluding chapter reviews the main results and defines the contributions of the dissertation for political science. However, evidence of the behavioral consequences of political tolerance
also permits an empirical response to several normative critiques of tolerance, which are often made on consequentialist grounds.

Theorists from very diverse intellectual traditions appear to agree that tolerance carries pernicious ramifications for individual citizens and for broader society alike. For the Marxist left, for instance, tolerance is “repressive” because it preserves and fortifies minority groups’ subordinate social status (e.g. Marcuse 1965; Brown 2006). The culturally conservative right maintains that tolerance masks an insidious and far-reaching attack on traditional moral, social, and religious values (e.g. Caldwell 2009; Yildiz 2011). The post-modernist left contends that tolerance does not go nearly far enough because it rests on old assumptions about socio-cultural pluralism rather than multiculturalism, which mandates that we move beyond liberalism and tolerance altogether (e.g. Galeotti 2002; Ramadan 2010). Even Millian liberals contend that tolerance violates neutrality, a core precept of liberal governance, and may weaken individuals’ autonomy and commitment to their own principles and beliefs (Oberdiek 2001). The sweeping normative criticisms and divergent empirical accounts of the effects of political tolerance provide ample reason to scrutinize its consequences more carefully – especially its influence on citizens’ political action potential.

Empirical evidence from Chapters Four and Six demonstrate that tolerance is positively consequential in at least two ways. First, it appears to increase citizens’ confidence in their own rights by bolstering support for dissent from the majority as a democratic good and by decreasing the costs associated with contentious and collective action that challenges the status quo. Second, it appears to contribute directly to citizens’ participation in such collective and contentious action. Even if tolerance is normatively “antiquated,” it resonates with the still very modern, and very desirable, forms of participatory democracy on which successful governance relies. I
evaluate these conclusions in light of the contributions and limitations of my own work, and
draw from this discussion suggestions for future research.
2.0 POLITICAL TOLERANCE, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, AND POLITICAL THEORY

This chapter reviews and synthesizes selected literatures on political tolerance and political participation in modern democracies. It reveals lacunae in studies of applied tolerance and civic engagement and provides normative and methodological justifications for redressing them. Three major points emerge. First, scholars disagree over how political tolerance and political participation are connected, whether they are complementary or conflicting orientations and, ultimately, whether participatory democracy and plural society are compatible. Second, innovative design and statistical controls are necessary to adjudicate between these competing explanations of the tolerance-participation relationship. Third, advancing new accounts of the relationship requires greater attention to the dependent variable, particularly the various ways in which people participate in politics.

2.1 DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE

In social science research, political tolerance is conventionally understood as the willingness to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to groups one strongly dislikes, or which espouse ideas and pursue interests that one opposes (Sullivan et al. 1982: 2). The equivalent word in political philosophy is “toleration.” I use these terms interchangeably throughout this
dissertation. It is worth noting, however, that philosophers traditionally distinguish between “tolerance” as an abstract, attitudinal disposition to admit the validity of different viewpoints, and “toleration” as active, behavioral resistance against the impulse to repress unsavory ideas (Murphy 1997). A similar distinction is central to empirical research: Prothro and Grigg (1960) had great influence by demonstrating that Americans who claimed to hold universal civil liberties in the highest regard in fact gave little regard to the rights and liberties of groups they found particularly odious. This remains perhaps the single most robust finding in political tolerance research: despite widespread support for abstract civil liberties in principle, in practice, most citizens in most countries are unwilling to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to political minorities they dislike (e.g. Sullivan et al. 1985; Duch and Gibson 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003).

Tolerance exists in the space between indifference and acceptance (Oberdiek 2001); one cannot tolerate an idea one supports or a group towards which one is positively predisposed. Tolerance instead requires an “objective precondition.” To advance an analogy, one would not test a host’s hospitality by seeing how a close friend is treated but by how strangers – even enemies – are treated (see Miller 1990). For this reason, tolerance is now conventionally measured using a survey-based, “content controlled” methodology through which respondents first identify their own “least-liked group” and then respond to a battery of questions regarding their willingness to afford this group certain basic rights – such as the right to hold a demonstration, make a speech, run for public office, teach in public high schools, or exist as a political entity (Sullivan et al. 1979, 1982).¹

¹ Throughout this dissertation, I will use the terms “least liked” group and “most disliked” group interchangeably when discussing content controlled measurement of political tolerance.
Before Sullivan et al. (1979) introduced this approach, tolerance researchers relied on a measurement strategy based on Stouffer’s (1955) study of Americans’ attitudes toward leftist groups during the McCarthy Era. A contemporary version of this methodology continues to be employed in the General Social Survey (GSS) and its global variant, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Survey respondents are asked whether they would tolerate a variety of activities by groups presumed to be widely unpopular – such as communists, atheists against all religion and churches, LGBT minorities, militarists who oppose elections and invite the military to run the country, and racists. I refer to this measurement strategy as the “Stouffer” or “GSS” measurement of political tolerance. GSS and content controlled measures of tolerance do not tend to correlate strongly. But Gibson (1992a) reports that “substantive conclusions about the origins of intolerance are insensitive to the index employed” and argues that “tolerance research can profitably utilize either measurement approach” (560). The literature I review below relies on either or both content controlled and GSS measures of political tolerance.

2.2 POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND POLITICAL THEORY

Fifty-five years of empirical research has provided a robust model of the political, social, and psychological determinants of political tolerance (e.g. Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus 1982; Gibson 1992a; Marcus et al. 1995). This model travels well across advanced industrialized democracies (e.g. Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh and Roberts 1985; Duch and Gibson 1992; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003) and can explain sizeable variation in citizens’ tolerance attitudes in the developing democracies of Africa (Gibson and Gouws 2000, 2001, 2003) and post-communist Europe (e.g. Marquart-Pyatt Paxton 2007; Gibson and Duch 1993; Gibson 2002).
Individuals are generally more tolerant when they perceive their disliked groups as less threatening, when they more strongly support democratic processes and institutions, and when they are less dogmatic and psychologically insecure. Recent contributions reveal that attitudinal tolerance increases with exposure to diverse ideas in heterogeneous social networks (Mutz 2001, 2005; Ikeda and Richey 2009) and may be conditional on several additional factors, including the strength of individuals’ commitment to their social group (Gibson and Gouws 2000), tangible territorial threat (Hutchinson and Gibler 2007), multicultural values (Weldon 2006; van der Noll, Poppe and Verkuyten 2010) and characteristics of the act, as well as the group, at the center of a civil liberties dispute (Peffley and Hurwitz 2002; Petersen et al. 2011).

One basic conclusion of this sprawling literature is that most people in most democracies are, in fact, intolerant: they are unwilling to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to groups they strongly dislike. This finding – an empirical regularity across both time and context – undermines the assumption that public support for democratic values is necessary for stable and effective liberal democracy. How can liberal democracy prosper where most citizens are hostile to a core liberal democratic obligation?

The “elitist theory” of democracy provides the conventional solution to this paradox. Widespread intolerance may be relatively inconsequential for at least four reasons. First, the intolerant masses tend to abstain from political participation. To the extent that intolerant citizens are politically apathetic, their antidemocratic views are politically negligible (McClosky 1964; 

2 Hurwitz and Mondak (2002) demonstrate that the public considers some acts of political expression so offensive – like burning the American flag – that a majority will oppose it irrespective of their attitudes toward the actor. Petersen et al. (2011) find that intolerance is applied most readily to groups that respondents believe have violent and anti-democratic tendencies; Danish survey respondents are generally willing to tolerate groups they strongly dislike, provided that these groups are not violent or anti-democratic.
Prothro and Grigg 1960). Second, and by contrast, political activists and policy-making elites tend to be far more tolerant than rank-and-file citizens (e.g. Sullivan et al. 1993; but see Shamir 1991). These elites sustain liberal systems because they support civil libertarian norms in principle and are prepared to apply them in practice; tolerant activists “serve as the major repositories of the public conscience and as carriers of the creed” of liberal democracy (McClosky 1964: 374). Third, in most contexts, strong institutions exist to protect minority rights in the event that activists and elites abdicate the liberal democratic creed (Gibson and Gouws 2003). Finally, repressive public policy is an unlikely response to intolerant mass opinion in any case, because intolerance is “pluralistic” (Sullivan et al. 1982). That is, citizens generally cannot agree on whose rights merit repression. Where these conditions hold, mass intolerance could be largely inconsequential – and widespread tolerance largely unnecessary – for effective democratic government and liberal public policy.

However, empirical research challenges at least two of these conditions. Gibson (1986) and Sniderman et al. (1989) largely disconfirm the theory of pluralistic intolerance by discrediting its underlying assumption that tolerance is ideologically bound. Tolerance could be pluralistic where leftist ideologues prefer to repress rightist groups and vice versa; however, intolerant individuals are just as likely to target groups on the left as they are to target groups on the right (Sniderman et al. 1989). Although this raises the possibility that citizens may focus their intolerance on a single nonconformist group irrespective of its ideology, Gibson (1988, 1989a) finds no evidence that mass, “focused intolerance” carries pernicious policy effects (political repression largely stems from elite intolerance [Gibson 1988]). Mass political intolerance may “set broad constraints on the behavior of policy-making elites” (1988: 29), but does not exert a direct influence on policies’ repressiveness – even when it is focused on a single group, such as
Communists during the McCarthy Era (Gibson 1988) or student activists during the Vietnam War era (Gibson 1989a). Moreover, case studies of intolerance in emerging democracies validate the reasonable objection that courts and other institutions vary in their strength or mandate to protect minority rights from political influence (Gibson and Gouws 2003). The elitist theory and its notion that mass intolerance may be politically innocuous thus seem to hinge on differential patterns of political participation among tolerant and intolerant citizens – with highly engaged tolerant activists on one hand, and apathetic intolerant abstainers on the other.

There is a certain normative opaqueness in the elitist theory’s prescriptions for (read: against) widespread political engagement among ordinary citizens. Pateman (1975), for instance, notes that participation may carry salutary benefits for mass political tolerance such that the more rank-and-file citizens participate in politics, the better they understand why the free exchange of ideas is important, and hence they will grow more tolerant over time. The point at which one argues that ordinary intolerant citizens may become more tolerant via participation is the point at which the theory of democratic elitism ends and the theory of democratic learning begins. This perspective does not make strong claims about the relative merits of participation among tolerant and intolerant individuals, but rather calls for greater opportunities for all citizens to engage in politics so that they may learn to value those norms, like tolerance, that render liberal democracy more effective. In this sense, it is very much the antithesis of the elitist theory. Although it is more an explanatory, social scientific theory, than a prescriptive, normative one, democratic learning fits squarely with John Stuart Mill’s 1861 essay on *Democratic Participation and Political Education* – and ideas dating back to Aristotle – which maintains that more active individuals are better developed citizens than more passive individuals. Much of the empirical literature on the tolerance-participation relationship takes the theory of democratic learning as its
point of departure: by and large, empiricists’ central preoccupation has been participation as a cause, rather than a consequence, of political tolerance. But this work generally seeks to explain the level and distribution of tolerance across countries at diverse stages of democratization (e.g. Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007) without examining the relative merits of tolerance and without tying it to specific political outcomes of interest. The theory of democratic learning implicitly acknowledges the importance of tolerance to liberal democracy, but does not go beyond the elitist theory by making claims about precisely how it matters for democratic politics.

Scholars by now generally accept that mass political intolerance will not spur political repression because public policy does not depend directly on public opinion (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000; Stimson 1991). But it does not follow that (in)tolerance is politically irrelevant. Gibson (1992b, 2008) therefore pioneered the view that intolerance nevertheless remains highly consequential for political culture because widespread mass intolerance limits the freedom to self-expression that ordinary people perceive as available to them. Intolerance “contributes to a culture of conformity…in which political liberty is limited by intolerance of ordinary citizens” (1992b: 339). By implication and by contrast, political tolerance lays the groundwork for an expressive society whose members are confident in their political rights and willing, from time to time, to assert these rights against the state. Gibson (1992b: 343) demonstrates that “Tolerance of others is associated with the belief that there are few significant costs to be paid for one’s own political expression”; he asserts that “Tolerance matters because it is connected to a set of beliefs about the legitimacy and appropriateness of self-expression.” These claims have not been widely tested. However, they provide important foundations for empirical studies of whether political tolerance may in fact spur political participation.
The claim that tolerance yields positive benefits for political culture does not exclude the possibility that it matters little for public policy. But it contradicts arguments by political philosophers from very diverse intellectual traditions, who maintain that tolerance carries pernicious consequences for individual citizens and society at large. For the Marxist left, for instance, tolerance is “repressive” because it preserves and fortifies minority groups’ subordinate social status (e.g. Marcuse 1965; Brown 2006). From this vantage point, governing elites are self-serving: they act as a repressive force that refuses recognition to weak groups, keeps strong groups in power, and the uninformed public tolerates this intolerance (Wolff, Moore Jr. and Marcuse 1965). Brown (2006) echoes this view to argue that tolerance hides “inequality and regulation” of political subjects. She believes tolerance represents an act of unwarranted moral superiority that, “posing as both universal value and impartial practice, designates certain beliefs as civilized and others as barbaric” (7). The culturally conservative right maintains that tolerance masks an insidious attack on traditional moral, social, and religious values (e.g. Caldwell 2009; Yildiz 2011), such that “in the name of universal liberalism…tolerance [has become] a higher priority than any of the traditional preoccupations of state and society – order, liberty, fairness, and intelligibility – and came to be pursued at their expense (Caldwell 2009). The New, or Post-Modernist, Left contends instead that tolerance does not go nearly far enough (e.g. Galeotti 2002; Griffin 2010; Ramadan 2010). The New Left would move beyond tolerance toward values of recognition and respect for difference: “[A]ppeals for the tolerance of others are no longer relevant…[because] when we are on equal terms, it is no longer a matter of conceding tolerance, but of rising above that and educating ourselves to respect others” (Ramadan 2010: 48). Even Millian liberals contend that tolerance violates neutrality, a core precept of liberal governance, and may weaken individuals’ autonomy and commitment to their own principles and beliefs
(Oberdiek 2001). Their concern is that “we lose that which gives our life meaning and substance. We will become jaded and rootless. Tolerance…undermine[s] the solidarity that comes with utter commitment to one’s religion, ethnic community, sexuality, and so on” (Oberdiek 2001: 31).

The consequences of political tolerance therefore constitute an important theme in democratic theory and in several lines of political philosophy. But empirical research has not fully sorted through different claims about whether and how tolerance matters. Whereas a voluminous literature investigates the determinants, nature, and distribution of tolerance attitudes in democratic publics, far less is known about the political effects of tolerance. This is particularly true for the question of whether and how tolerance and participation are linked. Few direct tests of this relationship exist, and problems of spuriousness and causal ambiguity persist in extant analyses. Whether, and in what ways, tolerant citizens act as participatory custodians of liberal democracy in intolerant societies thus remain open questions in the literature.

As this chapter will clarify, there is little scholarly consensus on the relationship between political tolerance and political participation. The literature suggests two broadly divergent accounts of the tolerance-behavior linkage. According to what may be called the “syndrome account,” a positive association between tolerance and political activity may be explained by preexisting differences across tolerant and intolerant individuals. That is, individuals may possess a host of demographic and personality traits (e.g. higher education, lower psychological insecurity) that render them, at once, more tolerant and more participatory. Much empirical work to date falls into this explanatory category since, as noted above, a central question since Stouffer’s (1955) original study has been whether participation among ordinary citizens can increase tolerance among the mass public. This perspective also challenges the possibility that
tolerance is a cause, rather than a consequence, of political activism. By contrast, under what I will call the “tradeoff account,” a negative causal association exists between tolerance and participation due to differences across tolerant and intolerant attitudes. That is, attitudinal properties that tend to suppress political action potential characterize tolerance (e.g. ambivalence, inconsistency, and pliability), while intolerance boasts attitudinal properties that tend to catalyze political action (e.g. high intensity, consistency, rigidity).

These broad perspectives point to additional difficulties for the theory of democratic elitism (which assumes tolerant activists and intolerant abstainers), undermine support for the theory of democratic learning, and question the notion that tolerant activists serve to enhance a political culture of self-expression: in brief, the balance of available evidence suggests that tolerant citizens may not also be more participatory citizens. And while only a few empirical studies investigate tolerance as a predictor of less frequent activism, it remains possible that tolerance for others may fundamentally work against participatory democracy in plural societies in a manner that supports philosophers’ concern with the detrimental effects of toleration. These conjectures compel greater attention to the tolerance-participation relationship; particularly the effects of political tolerance on political participation. Therefore, my central objective in the remainder of this chapter is to cull clues from the political tolerance literature about the nature of its relationship to political participation, and how to conceptualize and model this democratic value as a determinant of democratic activism.3

3 This chapter does not provide a comprehensive intellectual history of the study of democratic values in general or political tolerance in particular; high quality summaries already exist (e.g. Finkel, Sigelman and Humphries 1999). Nor does it address the political participation literature in great detail; I rely heavily on that literature to develop my theory, in the next chapter.
The sweeping normative criticisms and divergent empirical accounts of the effects of political tolerance, which I detail in the next section of this chapter, provide ample reason to scrutinize its consequences more carefully – especially its influence on citizens’ political action potential. However, I will also lay out the central methodological challenge that hinders scholars’ ability to adjudicate between the two accounts of tolerance and participation. These explanations remain entangled largely because of spuriousness due to “unobservables”: it is difficult to distinguish behavioral effects that are attributable to tolerance judgments *per se* from effects that owe instead to differences across individuals who choose (not) to tolerate. To make this claim somewhat more intuitive, I demonstrate, in the fourth section of this chapter, that many of the most robust, individual-level predictors of political tolerance may also shape a person’s decisions about whether and how to participate in politics.

### 2.3 TWO EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

A central tenet of the elitist theory of democracy is that widespread mass intolerance will not necessarily threaten democratic viability where the intolerant majority abstains and the tolerant majority engages in political activity. Similarly, the salutary effects of tolerance for political culture (Gibson 1992b) may manifest themselves in individuals who are less willing to censor their own political expression and, presumably, are more willing to participate in politics. However, at least two broad perspectives on tolerance and participation can be gleaned from the empirical literature, and neither strongly supports the notion of a more participatory tolerant citizenry.
According to the first view, tolerant citizens may be *no more or less likely* to participate in politics than intolerant citizens. If a positive association between tolerance and political action exists, it is only because individuals possess a number of characteristics that simultaneously increase their tolerance for nonconformity and their potential for political action. For instance, open-minded thinking renders people more willing to accept disagreeable views as valid (Sullivan et al. 1982) and more flexible in situations that require collaboration and compromise (Gibson 1987), while higher education strengthens citizens’ grasp of democratic norms (Bobo and Licari 1989; but see Green et al. 2011) and also increases their engagement in the political process (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Positive correlations between tolerance and levels of political activism (McClosky 1964; Stouffer 1955) should wash out at low levels of education and high levels of dogmatism (Sullivan et al. 1982). The relationship is thus doubly conditional. It requires the right constellation of individual-level traits, which in turn can develop only in contexts where democratic values and institutions are sufficiently rooted in society.

From this perspective, tolerant individuals are not necessarily more likely to participate in politics than intolerant individuals, and neither tolerance nor participation exerts much meaningful influence on the other. This view calls into question two challenges to the elitist theory of democracy – the first positing that mass tolerance will increase as ordinary citizens are afforded more opportunities to participate (e.g. Pateman 1975; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003); the second suggesting that tolerance helps legitimate and perhaps also encourage greater participation (Gibson 1992b). In order to answer questions such as whether participation causes tolerance, whether tolerance causes participation, or whether some positive feedback loop exists whereby these orientations are mutually constitutive, one must first rule out the claim that any
positive relationship is spurious due to unobserved differences between tolerant and intolerant individuals.

By contrast, and for quite different reasons, the second view posits that tolerant individuals may in fact be less likely to engage in politics than intolerant individuals. Disparities in the attitudinal attributes of tolerance and intolerance account for this difference. Tolerance is a weak, pliable, and internally inconsistent position (Gibson 1998; Gibson and Gouws 2003; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001) that breeds ambivalence and abstention from political activity (Mutz 2005). Intolerance is instead strong, and can be justified with myriad democratic beliefs that render it rigid and increase the probability that intolerant individuals will act on behalf of their beliefs (Gibson 1998; Marcus et al. 1995).

Attitudes that are held with greater intensity tend to correlate strongly with intentions to act in a manner consistent with those attitudes (Petty and Krosnick 1995), which suggests greater activity among the intolerant than the tolerant. Not only is tolerance generally weaker than intolerance in this regard, but Gibson (1998) also reports that even strong tolerant attitudes are susceptible to persuasion to intolerance through counterarguments. Although we still lack evidence concerning the strength – hence, behavioral potential – of this “converted intolerance” among initially tolerant individuals, the factors that render tolerance pliable are also known to decrease the likelihood of political action. Tolerance is pliable to the extent that it is embedded within a broader set of democratic beliefs, like equality (Sniderman et al. 1996), and specific social goals, like anti-racism (Bleich 2011). These values and beliefs offer legitimate alternatives to tolerance and can be rendered accessible to individuals through counterarguments.

Even so, it is important to note that strong tolerant attitudes are generally pliable, regardless of their level of crystallization (Gibson 1998).
(Gibson 1998). In this sense, tolerance is more dissonant than intolerance. Such value-conflict and ambivalence can decrease participatory potential (e.g. Guge and Meffert 1998; Levine 2001). Mutz (2005), for instance, shows that tolerating diverse political views in one’s social network leads to ambivalent political preferences that in turn decrease political activity. Moreover, these attitudinal properties of tolerance and intolerance are “similarly different” in polities as diverse as the United States and Canada (Sniderman et al. 1996), Russia (Gibson 1998) and South Africa (Gibson and Gouws 2003). Therefore, this view conjectures a causal relationship between tolerance and participation with few contextual caveats: a direct, negative effect of tolerance on civic engagement owing to attitudinal, rather than individual-level, asymmetry should therefore hold across countries.

Hence, two basic and competing propositions emerge from the literature. While the classic view posits that greater tolerance and regular participation constitute a syndrome of pro-democratic orientations (the syndrome account), the modern view holds that greater tolerance and regular participation constitute a tradeoff between pro-democratic orientations (the tradeoff account). The syndrome account has its foundation in the regular finding that intolerance is far more widespread than tolerance, and subsequent debates over what factors – especially education and participation – might serve to increase tolerance among future generations of citizens. The tradeoff account can be assembled from two newer literatures: studies of the “asymmetry” of tolerant and intolerant attitudes – which propose that tolerant attitudes are less likely to compel tolerant actions (i.e. actions to uphold the rights of disliked groups) than intolerance will drive people to restrict groups’ rights (e.g. Gibson 1998) – and studies of tolerance and political action in heterogeneous discussion networks, which find that exposure to diverse political opinions
increases tolerance and decreases political participation (Mutz 2005). I address each literature in turn, below.

### 2.3.1 Evidence for the syndrome account

Early tolerance research reports positive associations between political tolerance and political participation. Comparing responses of community leaders with those of ordinary citizens, Stouffer (1955) finds strong relationships between political involvement and support for democratic norms. On nearly every question relating to tolerance, community leaders demonstrated greater support for civil liberties than the public at large. On an overall scale of tolerance, Stouffer reports that about 60 percent of the community leaders could be classified as “more tolerant” compared to only 31 percent of ordinary Americans.

Prothro and Grigg (1960) and McClosky (1964) further argued that intolerant citizens are relatively inactive citizens. Prothro and Grigg reassured that “Many people express undemocratic principles in response to questioning but are too apathetic to act on their undemocratic opinions in concrete situations. And in most cases, fortunately for the democratic system, those with the most undemocratic principles are those who are least likely to act” (1960: 293-4). Similarly, McClosky (1964) concluded that “Democratic viability is, to begin with, saved by the fact that those who are most confused about democratic ideas are also more likely to be politically apathetic and without significant influence. Their role in the nation’s decision-making process is so small that their ‘misguided’ opinions or non-opinions have little practical consequence for stability. If they contribute little to the vitality of the system, neither are they likely to do much harm” (376).
These arguments offered a glint of hope for democratic societies given an otherwise dismal portrait of democratic publics. Prothro and Grigg (1960) had great influence by demonstrating that Americans who claimed to hold universal civil liberties in the highest regard in fact gave little regard to the rights and liberties of particularly odious groups. This inconsistency challenges the suitability of democratic rule by suggesting that democratic publics would be hostile to a core democratic obligation. The elitist theory of democracy emerged in part due to these findings (see also: Schumpeter 1943; Converse 1964; Sartori 1987), but so did concern with whether and how publics might grow more tolerant over time. The positive association between tolerance and participation suggested to some that political tolerance could be learned and would increase among individuals who regularly participate in politics.

This argument is couched in terms of “democratic learning” theory, which suggests that citizens become increasingly tolerant as they are more regularly exposed to the give-and-take of real democratic politics (e.g. Pateman 1975; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). Political participation not only provides such exposure, but should also teach citizens about the value of different points of view, the importance of bargaining and compromise, and the utility of civil liberties – especially freedom of speech and association (Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus 1982: 196). Insofar as the tolerance-participation relationship has been tested empirically, tolerance has been most often conceptualized as a learned value – one to which citizens grow more committed as they more regularly participate in politics.

At least at high levels of policymaking, participation in politics seems to achieve these ends. Sullivan et al. (1993) show that debating and generating public policy as a member of parliament socializes adults into greater support for the norms of democracy, like tolerance, over

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5 It also suggested that values, as such, have little purchase over actual political judgments.
and above the demographic and personality traits that lead individuals to self-select into professional political life (and tolerance). These effects, however, are most likely indirect – mediated through the enhanced ability to “conduct a realistic assessment of extremist groups...[which] may in turn lead to lower levels of perceived threat” (Sullivan et al. 1993: 71).

Policymakers work closely with strongly opinionated political enemies; this permits elites to more readily uncouple feelings of threat from desires to repress the rights and liberties of political groups they deem dangerous to society.

However, this sort of political participation is not available to, much less perceived as desirable by, most ordinary citizens (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Sullivan et al. (1993) qualify that political participation must be both regular and meaningful: “Sporadic participation in electoral politics is not sufficient to promote individual growth or attitudes of tolerance. Indeed, the relationship between participation among members of the general public varies from context to context and is seldom very strong” (73). To be sure, scholars have struggled to substantiate even the basic claim that regular participation per se contributes to greater tolerance among ordinary citizens.

Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978) examined tolerance among community leaders and ordinary citizens approximately 20 years after Stouffer’s (1955) survey. Their results corroborated Stouffer’s findings, with 83 percent of community leaders but only 56 percent of ordinary Americans in the Nunn et al. sample emerging as “more tolerant.” The authors established an important caveat, however: significant differences between the two groups vanish when controls are introduced for education, gender, region, news media exposure, city size, and occupation. Jackman (1972) similarly concluded that differences in tolerance between active and inactive citizens would wash away after controlling for differences in education.
Sullivan et al. (1982) build on this framework and conclude that the relationship between participation and tolerance is probably spurious: “political activists tend to be more tolerant because they differ from non-activists in other relevant characteristics” (201). In particular, education, political information, and dogmatism are important moderating variables in the participation-tolerance relationship. To begin, the authors replicate previous research by demonstrating that individuals who are more participatory (i.e. those who engaged in at least five of the following political actions: contributed money, worked in a campaign, attended meetings or rallies, contacted public officials, belonged to political organizations, or voted) are substantially more tolerant than the rest of the sample, with 37 percent classifiable as “more tolerant” compared to only 12 percent and 17 percent of the low and middle participation categories, respectively.6

However, they also report that relationships between education and tolerance are stronger than those between participation and tolerance, that levels of tolerance increase more rapidly and more steadily moving from the lowest level of education to the highest level of education, and that the relationship between dogmatism and tolerance is characterized by similar patterns and strength. These patterns seem to overwhelm the influence of participation on political tolerance (Sullivan et al. 1982: 197 – 200). The authors’ extended, multivariate analysis finds “that political involvement has only minimal impact on political tolerance – the same as political ideology – and is not statistically significant” (219). Nor does political involvement influence other major predictors of tolerance, such as perceived sociotropic threat or support for the general norms of democracy (220). Political involvement therefore appears to lack even indirect

6 Note that these findings are based on Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus’ (1979) content-controlled measurement strategy; hence, their analysis provides an even more conservative test of the bivariate relationship between tolerance and participation.
effects on political tolerance. The authors conclude that “The greater tolerance of activists seems not to reflect participation itself but rather other characteristics of these people. Hence, increased participation, in conventional forms of political activity, will probably not make citizens significantly more tolerant” (201).

These conclusions form the core of the syndrome account of tolerance and participation. Any positive association between these two democratic orientations is attributable to other individual-level factors that render people, at once, more tolerant and more participatory. Such confounders present difficulties both for individual-level studies of democratic learning, which posit that participation increases mass political tolerance, and also for the proposition that tolerance may instead positively influence participation.

Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003), for instance, seek to identify heterogeneous effects on mass tolerance across different modes of participation in politics; they argue that ordinary citizens learn to value civil liberties when they themselves engage in protest actions that expose them to the “rough-and-tumble” of democratic politics. The authors report that protest participation increases political tolerance among individuals in longstanding democracies, controlling for the influence of education, psychological conformity (to proxy for dogmatism), support for free speech as an abstract value (to proxy for support for broader democratic values and procedures), and interest in politics. They deserve much credit for both their cross-national study of a largely U.S.-based subject, and also for introducing nuances of the political participation literature into their theoretical model (I follow them in both regards in this dissertation). Nevertheless, the authors’ analysis and findings remain open to criticism. In particular, their study does not adequately account for the central “syndrome” objection: the
effects of participation on tolerance may not be attributable to activism *per se*, but may instead owe to underlying factors that could promote both protest behavior and political tolerance.

Peffley and Rohrschneider introduce “protest activities” (e.g. legal and illegal demonstrations, nationwide strikes, and occupation of buildings), as opposed to more conventional political actions, as their central explanatory element. But they omit several variables from their model that have been shown to increase political tolerance and which may also lead individuals to *self-select* into contentious political activity. For instance, Brehm and Rahn (1997) and Benson and Rochon (2004) report on one hand that interpersonal trust is a strong predictor of protest behavior insofar as it increases the perception that protest participation is safe and worthwhile, reduces uncertainty that there will be a stable base for the movement and that it will be likely to succeed. On the other hand, Gibson and Gouws (2000) have shown that, to the extent that individuals trust others in general, they may be less likely to develop the particularistic group attachments that can give rise to more visceral out-group antipathy, stronger perceptions of threat, and greater intolerance. The relationship between tolerance and contentious participation that Peffley and Rohrschneider identify may nevertheless remain spurious due to one or more unobserved factors for which neither their statistical model nor identification strategy accounts.

Endogeneity also remains problematic in this study and similar analyses by Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton (2007) and Guérin, Petry and Crête (2004), which model tolerance as a consequence of democratic learning through participation. First, tolerance is among the most difficult democratic values to learn (e.g. Gibson and Duch 1993). Sullivan et al. (1993) emphasize that such learning is only likely to occur through participation if activism is regular and intense – as it is commonly among policymakers, but not among rank-and-file citizens.
Recent evidence from a field experiment designed to increase tolerance through specialized educational curricula (shaped specifically to increase knowledge about the nature and value of civil liberties) reports no direct effects of this training on support for the actual political rights and civil liberties of others (Green et al. 2011). These curricula did increase knowledge about civil libertarian principles; learning did occur. But this learning did not translate into tolerance. This finding, then, lends further support to the fact that even citizens who (learn) to value civil liberties in the abstract are often unwilling to afford these liberties and political rights to their most disliked groups in practice (e.g. Prothro and Grigg 1960).

Second, Gibson (1992b) finds that tolerance is connected in individuals’ minds to the perception that they are free to express their own political views (however unpopular these may be) and is tied, at least as a bivariate association, to less frequent self-censorship in political expression. Assuming a positive relationship between tolerance and participation is not spurious requires allowing for the possibility that tolerant attitudes can influence political behavior rather than the reverse. Indeed, the standardized coefficients in Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton (2007) illustrate that participation has only a weak effect tolerance – especially outside the U.S. – while Guérin, Petry and Crête (2004) conclude that the relationship between tolerance and protest activities may in fact be reciprocal (390).\footnote{Guérin, Petry, and Crête do not resolve the question of reciprocal causality; their claims – while certainly plausible – are based on a poor modeling strategy in which tolerance is first regressed onto participation and then participation onto tolerance using similar predictors in both multiple regressions with OLS estimators. Proper, multiple-wave panel data designed to test reciprocal causality between tolerance and participation are not currently available.}

Even fully accounting for syndrome-type confounders, the theory of democratic learning does not confront the possibility that tolerance may more powerfully influence participation than vice versa, or that some positive feedback loop exists whereby these democratic orientations are
mutually dependent. But no study to date has properly addressed the problem of unobserved confounders behind the tolerance-participation association. The syndrome account therefore should not be dismissed.

However, an alternate model of the tolerance participation is also available – one in which tolerance helps to predict participation, rather than the reverse, because of its attitudinal attributes instead of the individual-level traits particular to tolerant individuals. These models, which I collectively call the “tradeoff account” of tolerance and participation, derive from two bodies of recent empirical work. The first reveals that tolerance and intolerance are not opposite poles on the same attitudinal continuum, but are rather characterized by unique psychometric properties that imply different consequences for political behavior. The second ties tolerance to heterogeneous political discussion networks and less overall political participation. I address each literature below.

2.3.2 Evidence for the tradeoff account

Recent research suggests that tolerance may in fact decrease political participation. In particular, citizens may base their choice to engage in politics not only on notions of duty to their democratic society, but also on particular sensitivities within their personal social networks. Mutz (2001, 2005) reports that individuals whose social networks are characterized by greater diversity of political opinion – that is, whose members hold views and preferences about politics that diverge from their own – more readily acknowledge that disagreeable opinions can be valid and are, hence, more attitudinally tolerant. However, this increase in tolerance may come at a cost to vibrant civic engagement. The same cross-pressures that lead one to entertain greater
opinion diversity may also generate conditions that suppress political action potential (Mutz 2002, 2005).

Increasing exposure to different political views generates ambivalence about one’s own convictions, which in turn has been associated with less certain political judgments (Guge and Meffert 1998), delayed formation of voting intentions, and unstable candidate evaluations (Lavine 2001). Moreover, Mutz (2005) argues that individuals who tolerate greater diversity of opinion will experience discomfort if they manifest their own preferences through political action, because they risk disrupting social harmony in their own networks. It is common for “those with high levels of cross-cutting exposure in their networks to put off political decisions as long as possible or indefinitely, thus making their political participation unlikely” (Mutz 2005: 108). The fact that individuals in such networks are “socially accountable” to diversely opinionated constituencies generates ambivalence regarding political preferences, which further suppresses political action potential. Although individuals acquire sensitivity toward disagreeable views through discussion and deliberation, they are not necessarily more likely to participate in politics thereafter.

Certain properties of attitudinal tolerance may also directly constrain political action potential among tolerant individuals. Investigations into the nature and pliability of tolerance attitudes reveal considerable asymmetry between tolerance and intolerance. Tolerance and intolerance are no longer understood merely as opposite poles on the same attitudinal continuum; they are rather separate attitudes with distinct underlying properties (Gibson 2006). For instance, intolerance is generally a more intensely felt position than tolerance. Intolerance is highly responsive to “sociotropic threat,” which makes political intolerance, in Gibson’s (2006) words, “a social, not individual attitude…Intolerance increases not necessarily when people feel their
own security is at risk, but rather when they perceive a threat to the larger system or group (or normative community) of which they are a part” (25). Such commitments are deeply sensed and more easily intuited than principled commitment to liberal democratic norms like tolerance in the face of such threats. Moreover, tolerance is generally out of sync with other cherished democratic values. For many people, it is psychologically easier to reconcile intolerance (i.e. repressing a threat to democracy) with support for the democratic system; public order and security are legitimate concerns for political stability, for instance, especially in fragile new democracies. It is also easier to square political intolerance with liberal social norms to which many (western) publics now subscribe – anti-racism, women’s rights, secularism, etc. (Sniderman et al. 1996). Tolerance, by contrast, generally conflicts with these value commitments. Indeed, Gibson (1998) reports that individuals who cannot align their tolerance judgments with their broader beliefs about democratic institutions and processes are more persuaded to abandon their tolerance for intolerance (837).\(^8\) This asymmetry between tolerance and intolerance has been evinced in contexts as diverse as the United States and Canada (Gibson 1996; Sniderman et al. 1996), Russia (Gibson 1998) and South Africa (Gibson and Gouws 2003).

The unequal psychometric properties of tolerance and intolerance suggest that these attitudes will carry different consequences for political behavior. Strong attitudes tend to be stronger predictors of behavior than weak attitudes (Petty and Krosnick 1995). Attitudinal tolerance, which is not only weaker than intolerance, but also more ambivalent and inconsistent with other democratic beliefs (Sniderman et al. 1996) should produce less attitude-consistent

\(^8\) Gibson also reports that tolerant attitudes are more readily convertible into intolerant attitudes in general: irrespective of their level of internal crystallization (1998: 837).
behavior than intolerance (Gibson 1998; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001). More pointedly, this means that tolerance may not only lead individuals to disengage from political participation in general (Mutz 2005), but it may also be unlikely to drive political action on behalf of groups whose rights society prefers to repress. Attitudinal intolerance – which is strong, internally consistent, and rigid – is by contrast more likely to produce attitude-consistent behavior. Intolerant attitudes will more likely lead individuals to take direct action to repress the rights of nonconformist minority groups than tolerance will compel action to protect those groups’ rights (Marcus et al. 1995).

Beyond this, tolerance is often understood as a “laissez faire” judgment (McClosky and Brill 1983). Gibson (1987) describes the low rate of activism among tolerant individuals during a real civil liberties dispute in Houston, as highly regular: the tolerant course of action is to do nothing. This has intuitive appeal for Marcus et al. (1995) who posit that people who are intolerant of a group and its beliefs “…will act to limit or restrain the group’s rights. In essence, people hate the group, do not want it to spread its message, so do what they can to keep the group from espousing its hated doctrine. Tolerance, however, is different. The behavioral component of tolerance is often considered inherently passive: we will not take steps to prevent the group from doing what it is legally allowed to do” (205).

Marcus et al. (1995) take important steps toward evidencing this claim. Using a survey-experimental design, the authors first measure respondents’ tolerance toward a hypothetical, but

9 This view certainly pre-dates empirical tolerance research. As George Washington’s oft-quoted letter to the Hebrew Congregation at Newport in August 1790 makes plain, “the Government of the United States…gives to bigotry no sanction [but] to persecution no assistance.”
vile group (e.g. a fictitious organization of white supremacists), given varying levels of threatening or reassuring information that the researchers randomly provide about that group. Respondents are coded as “tolerant” when they would allow this particular group to hold public rallies, and “intolerant” if they would not allow rallies by this group. Subjects were then asked about their intent to act on behalf of, or in opposition to, the hypothetical group’s right to hold a rally. Based on their responses to the tolerance question, subjects imagined that “a local judge issued an order forbidding (tolerant response)/allowing (intolerant response) that group to hold a public rally in your community” and were asked “How likely do you think you would be to…
1) vote against the judge in the next election; 2) join a peaceful demonstration supporting/against their right to hold a public rally; 3) join an effort to appeal that decision and try to reverse it; 4) sign a petition objecting to the judge’s decision. The authors summed responses to these items to create a behavioral intentions scale.

A one-way between groups analysis of variance showed that intolerant respondents expressed significantly greater intention to act to restrict the group’s rights than tolerant respondents did intention to defend the group’s rights (Marcus et al.1995: 191). Intolerant individuals are more likely to act in accordance with their beliefs as the intensity of their intolerance increases. Tolerant action, by contrast, is conditional on intense commitment to democratic principles and tolerance, and assurance that the noxious group does not pose a real

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10 Marcus et al. retain the content-controlled measurement approach by generating fictitious counterparts for each of the real life groups that respondents could select as their least-liked group. For instance, respondents who selected the “Ku Klux Klan” as their least-liked group confronted a civil liberties scenario involving the fictitious “White Supremacist Faction” which was described as “an extremist group that evolved from the Ku Klux Klan of the 1980s.” Of course, this direct reference to the actual group in the fictitious group’s description probably weakens the experiment’s internal validity in the very manner that using hypothetical groups was meant to prevent in the first place (p. 68).
threat to the community (204-5). As the authors hypothesized, it takes much more to compel the tolerant citizen to act.

These results suggest that tolerance may directly suppress political action, though I suspect that omitted variable bias plays a nontrivial role in shaping the authors’ findings. The central behavioral intentions question invites respondents to oppose a local judge who issued the order to permit or ban the hypothetical demonstration. This question therefore introduces “political trust” as a potential confounder. Judges and courts in general enjoy high levels of public legitimacy (Caldeira and Gibson 1992) - greater than that afforded any other office in the United States (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Individuals who support a heinous group’s right to demonstrate – or, as McClosky (1964: 376) might put it, individuals who are least confused about democratic ideas – may also be more likely to accept the legitimacy of a court-issued ban on that group’s rally. Intolerant individuals who reject tolerance on principle may more quickly and more strongly question the legitimacy of institutions or political actors who put their community at risk. This is necessarily an empirical question, but one that cannot be resolved with the authors’ data. Moreover, the authors omit important predictors of political action propensity in general – such as past political participation, education, political interest, and other key determinants of civic voluntarism (e.g. Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Finally, behavioral intentions measures are by no means always strong predictors of actual political behavior (Aronson 1999; Cooper 2007).

Evidence from survey-based case studies of tolerant and intolerant individuals’ self-reported action on their beliefs demonstrates the importance of such factors. Gibson and Bingham (1985) and Gibson (1987) surveyed citizens involved in real civil liberties disputes over the proposed march by Neo Nazis in Skokie, IL and a planned demonstration by the Ku
Klux Klan in a gay community in Houston, TX, respectively. In both cases, intolerant individuals were generally more likely to take action to oppose these right-wing groups’ speech and assembly rights than tolerant individuals were to take action to protect those rights. Yet the percentage of “activists” on either side of the dispute was rather small. In Houston, only four percent (10 of 235) of members of the Houston Gay Political Caucus reported that they took any action to support the KKK’s right to demonstrate. A higher proportion of intolerant individuals – 16 percent – mobilized to stop the KKK from demonstrating. Similarly, Gibson and Bingham (1985) found that the percentage of “tolerant activists” was small compared to the number of intolerant participants.

For both tolerant and intolerant individuals, (in)tolerant behavior emerged as a function of issue salience, a general propensity toward activism (predicted by high education and low dogmatism), and expectation of violence at the rally (Gibson 1987). Intolerant activists in Houston were also less trustful individuals, which may suggest that omitted variable bias is indeed problematic for the Marcus et al. (1995) study. Importantly, Gibson (1987) identified certain “contradictions” in his data. He notes that “Though open-mindedness, activism, and education typically contribute to political tolerance, when subjects have intolerant opinions, these variables facilitate the translation of opinions into intolerant action” (1987: 444). This appears consistent with the tradeoff account. However, dogmatic thinkers were found to be more likely to oppose the demonstration, but also less likely to take action against it. Gibson alludes to the syndrome account when he concludes that “dogmatism is associated with intolerance, but also with inaction. Those who are dogmatic thinkers are probably too rigid to be able to work with others in political causes. Thus, dogmatism promotes the political paralysis of the politically intolerant” (Gibson 1987: 444 – 5, emphasis in original). These tensions in Gibson’s
data suggest additional need to adjudicate between tradeoff and syndrome accounts of tolerance and participation.

The “tradeoff account” of tolerance and participation suggests that certain properties of tolerance work against political activism, while the rather distinct features of intolerance promote it. Tolerance is a more conflicted, pliable, and ambivalent attitude than intolerance, and is hence characterized by less attitude-behavior consistency. Moreover, tolerance for others is the lynchpin of diverse political discussion networks; but tolerant individuals also tend to forego civic engagement to preserve harmony in these networks.

But the direct effects of tolerance on participation remain cloudy. We have seen that Marcus et al. (1995) attempt to isolate the effects of tolerance on activism, but they do not effectively control for those individual-level factors that Gibson (1987) and others (Sullivan et al. 1982) find to drive one to tolerate and also take action (e.g. low dogmatism, high education). Peffley and Rohrschneider’s (2003) design is characterized by similar shortcomings. These objections form the core of the “syndrome account” of tolerance and participation. Ultimately, these divergent syndrome and tradeoff explanations suggest that the most basic question remains unresolved: What are the consequences of political tolerance for political participation? The next section argues that difficult empirical and methodological problems must be resolved before we can redress this question.
Clarifying whether and how judgments about the civil liberties of others matter for one’s own political participation requires careful attention to the difficulties of causal inference. Empirically, extant research does not separate the behavioral effects of tolerant and intolerant attitudes from effects that owe instead to differences between tolerant and intolerant individuals. This interconnectedness is particularly pernicious because, as I argue below, many of the same factors that contribute to political (in)tolerance also help to determine how likely individuals are to participate in politics and society. To demonstrate this claim, I summarize the effects of several variables on both political tolerance and political participation in the following sections.

**Psychological Insecurity**

Psychological insecurity - manifest mainly in low self-esteem, authoritarianism, and a tendency toward dogmatic thinking - is a major predictor of political intolerance. Individuals who are insecure and who interpret the world in bipolar terms of good and evil tend to be intolerant of nonconformity because their rigid thought processes render uncertainty difficult to confront, and increase the likelihood that perceived threat will activate intolerant attitudes (Feldman and Stenner 1997). Stouffer (1955) initially found that individuals who support rigid categorization as well as authoritarian and conformist childrearing values tend to be intolerant toward communists and atheists. More generally, Stenner (2005) demonstrates that various kinds of intolerance originate from authoritarianism and intolerance is reinforced by a perceived “normative” or societal threat that consists of diverse goals and values. Hinckley (2010) has also demonstrated that psychological insecurity manifest through authoritarianism inhibits social learning and the acquisition of democratic values such as political tolerance. Finally, Gibson and
Duch (1993: 292) add that “Insecurity may also be connected to diminished cognitive skills, and virtually everyone is in agreement that tolerance is extremely demanding cognitively (e.g. McClosky and Brill 1983).”

Psychological insecurity has also been tied to political participation. Sniderman (1975) catalogues myriad ways in which high self-esteem (i.e. low psychological insecurity) serves to facilitate political involvement. Compared to individuals with low self-esteem, those with high self-esteem are more attentive to political communications, better able to understand political messages, more knowledgeable about politics, and ultimately “more likely to have internalized the modal values of the political culture” (Sniderman 1975). Beyond these indirect influences on political action potential, high self-esteem exerts a direct effect on participation because it better prepares individuals for involvement in political life. Sniderman argues that “to become involved in politics is to become involved with others…Political life is social life. What is more, it is a species of social life that demands a considerable measure of self-consciousness and assertiveness. It throws a man into close contact with other men, including men who are unfamiliar to him, differ considerably from him, whose motives may be hostile or – much more frequently – unfathomable.” (1975: 261-2). Sniderman reports that individuals with high self-esteem are more participatory than individuals with low self-esteem, and that these differences are largely driven by disparities in interpersonal competence.

Similarly, psychologically insecure individuals who manifest low self-esteem, dogmatism or authoritarianism may be less likely to engage in specific types of political behavior. Gibson (1987: 444) reports that dogmatic thinking increases intolerance, but decreases the likelihood of action on behalf of those beliefs because rigid thinking limits one’s ability to work well with others in pursuit of political objectives. Moreover, psychological insecurity may increase one’s
desire to avoid conflict with others and thereby limit in face-to-face and contentious actions, such as political discussion and protest (Ulbig and Funk 1999). Thus there is ample reason to expect that psychological insecurity may at least partially account for any positive relationship found between tolerance and participation.

**Support for General Democratic Values**

Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982), Sullivan et al. (1985), Gibson (2002) and many others have found that commitments to abstract democratic norms and procedures – e.g. a general commitment to civil liberties, support for multiparty competition and pluralistic media – are fairly strong predictors of citizens’ willingness to extend rights and liberties toward their least-liked political group. Support for such abstract democratic principles has been tied both directly and indirectly to political participation in emerging and longstanding democratic societies. Examining mass opposition to the Soviet Putsch of 1991, Gibson (1997) concludes that active resistance to the coup through protest was a function of support for democratic institutions and processes, and that this effect operated independently of several common causes of protest participation – including the perceived success of protest opposition, the perceived importance of one’s own contribution to the protest effort, and other selective incentives and concrete costs behind taking action. Similarly, Smith (2009) finds that support for representative government tends to increase protest activity among Bolivians.

Beyond broad system support and legitimacy, specific democratic values have also been tied to political activism. Benson and Rochon (2004) report that generalized social trust – a well-accepted element of democratic political culture (e.g. Inglehart 1990; Putnam 1993) – facilitates protest participation insofar as it acts as an exogenous influence on key determinants of the choice to act, including the expectation of low expected costs and high expected benefits of
participation. Brehm and Rahn (1997) also find that civic engagement and interpersonal trust are in a tight reciprocal relationship.

Democracy promotion programs have also been shown to influence political participation by “teaching” democratic values where they are undersupplied (Finkel 2003). In a series of studies, Finkel and colleagues report that individuals who are exposed to civic education workshops in developing democracies in Africa and Latin America become the “de facto experts on democratic processes within their social networks” (Finkel and Smith 2010: 420) and as a result increase their own participation in politics and that of their close contacts (Finkel and Smith 2010; Finkel, Horowitz, and Rojo-Mendoza 2012). These patterns again point to spuriousness as a central impediment to isolating the effects of tolerance on participation, as both may depend upon support for broader democratic norms and procedures.

**Threat Perceptions**

It is nearly axiomatic that individuals who perceive greater threat from their political opponents are also less likely to tolerate them. The threat that drives intolerance is sociotropic, not egocentric: intolerance is a response to perceived challenges to the society and its way of life, but not anticipated peril to the individual. Moreover, sociotropic threat perceptions are largely exogenous to other determinants of tolerance attitudes. Hence, citizens who believe that a group poses danger to their society and its mores will be less likely to tolerate it, even if they are open-minded thinkers who generally embrace democratic norms and processes.

According to Gibson (2006), that “sociotropic threat is a stronger driver of intolerance than egocentric threat…says something about the nature of political intolerance. Political intolerance is a social, not individual, attitude” (25). It also says something about the participatory potential of intolerant individuals. Self-interest fails to predict attitudes in many
issue areas (Sears and Funk 1990; Stoker 1994). But threats to social group interests have a stronger effect on behavior than attitudes. This may be the result of policy proposals that directly spur political activity by highlighting the potential for loss (Campbell 2003; Hansen 1985; Walker 1991), or political environments that indirectly encourage activism when they “trigger feelings of anxiety that in turn motivate people to more closely monitor political affairs” (Pantoja and Segura 2003). Marcus et al. (2000) posit a theory of “affective intelligence” in which people expressing feelings of anxiety during political campaigns display greater interest in the contest, care more about the political outcome, and more actively follow media coverage of the campaign. In short, a context where individuals perceive threat will induce anxious people to engage in activities that raise their overall levels of political awareness and, indirectly, their political participation. To the extent that threat perceptions also strongly influence tolerance, it becomes difficult to rule out that a relationship between tolerance and civic engagement cannot be attributed to underlying concerns about groups at the center of civil liberties disputes.

**Demographic Factors**

Education is among the most cited demographic factors believed to increase attitudes of tolerance among the mass public. Bobo and Licari (1989) find evidence for their rather straightforward argument is that education increases cognitive sophistication Stouffer (1955) was optimistic that tolerance would increase over time, in part because of the increasing years of education younger cohorts were receiving. Nunn, Crockett and Williams (1978) replication study reported slightly stronger effects of education on tolerance Davis’ (1975) study noted that increasing levels of education contributed 4 percent to the overall change of 22 percent in tolerance between Stouffer’s survey in 1954 and Nunn, Crockett and Williams’ replication in 1971. Others have argued that education also increases the consistency of application of general
democratic principles in concrete situations. Prothro and Grigg (1960) argued that education “provides greater acquaintance with the logical implications of broad democratic principles” (291). Lawrence (1976) found that the highly educated were more likely to apply general norms of tolerance to groups they disliked.

However other evidence challenges the notion that education carries salutary effects for political tolerance. Some argue that schooling and the educational process are ineffective at passing on democratic values (Bowles and Gintis 1976). Zellman and Sears (1971) conclude that political socialization of attitudes toward the specific civil liberty of free speech does occur in late childhood, but that school children are taught the abstract principle only in slogan form. Even stronger evidence is provided by Green et al. (2011), who test the effect of scholastic curricula designed to teach the value of civil libertarian norms explicitly by randomly assigning school students to receive this instruction or a control curricula which does not emphasize civil liberties. They find that exposure to the curriculum indeed increased individuals’ knowledge but that this knowledge had no effect on actual support for civil liberties.

Scholars have found more consistent evidence that education increases political action potential. Education and its augmenting effect on cognitive sophistication and the inculcation of cultural mores tends is a primary “resource” enabling participation in political life (Teixeira 1987; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). These effects are direct and indirect. In school, students acquire communication and organization skills, as well as perhaps an interest in politics. Level of education has a strong influence on the type of occupation one will have, which in turn determines the type of civic skills one will use and hone, the type of social networks in which one will mingle, and the degree of free time one will have at her disposal (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).
These effects, moreover, have been demonstrated across most political contexts. Even basic education – such as literacy and numeracy skills – increases the likelihood that one will engage in politics through many of the modes of action available to them (on Senegal, see Kuenzi 2006). Indeed, this has been the major conclusion of research on civic education in developing democracies (Finkel 2003, 2006; Finkel, Sabbatini and Bevis 2000; Finkel and Smith 2010; Finkel, Horowitz, and Rojo-Mendoza 2012), which consistently reports upticks in political engagement among those individuals who attend brief but intensive civic education workshops. Overall, the balance of evidence suggests that education serves to increase both tolerance and participation and may therefore account for any relationship between these two democratic orientations.

2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY

The conclusions to be drawn from extant research on tolerance and participation do not quite satisfy the normative prescription that tolerant citizens should also be more participatory citizens. If a positive association between these two democratic orientations exists, it is only because individuals possess a number of demographic and personality traits that render them simultaneously more tolerant and more participatory. Alternatively, tolerance itself may suppress political action potential.

Neither account supports the elitist theory of democracy, which posits that tolerant activists shield liberal democracy from intolerant majorities and weaken their contributions to public policy outcomes via more regular participation. And the tradeoff account bodes especially ill for liberal political culture. Gibson (1992b: 350) warns that “without a culture that legitimizes
political opposition, those outside the centrist mainstream have few political systems. Ultimately, the political system loses its democratic vitality.” Widespread mass intolerant opinion corrodes this culture, and the tradeoff account suggests that tolerance lacks the potential to stimulate – and may even suppress – the sort of activism that could repair it. Moreover, scholars positing a positive relationship between tolerance and participation give little attention to the possibility that tolerance shapes participation rather than the reverse. The democratic learning theory does not squarely confront the fact that it tolerance is extremely difficult to learn, or evidence that citizens who learn to embrace democratic norms in principle may never actually apply them to odious groups in practice.

But the behavioral consequences of political tolerance remain obscure. The overlap in factors that generate tolerance and contribute to political action potential poses a difficult challenge to identifying the effects of political tolerance judgments on civic engagement. Consistent with the syndrome account, the standard determinants of tolerance tend to increase participation while the classic drivers of intolerance reduce civic engagement. But in line with the tradeoff account, the main predictor of intolerance – sociotropic threat perceptions – may also tend to compel political action.

On one hand, specialized methodological techniques are needed to better separate the effects of tolerance judgments per se on participation from effects that may owe instead to factors that drive individuals to (not) tolerate in the first place. In other words, we must isolate tolerance decisions in order to determine whether tolerance affects behavior over and above the major predictors of civic engagement. Chapter Four of this dissertation applies nonparametric matching techniques to survey data to approximate this with observational data. And Chapters Five and Six introduce and apply an innovative experiment that enhances our ability to draw
scientifically valid causal inferences about the downstream effects of tolerance and intolerance for political participation.

On the other hand, it is also important to push theoretically beyond the syndrome and tradeoff accounts of political participation. Both offer insights into how tolerance does or does not matter for the likelihood that individuals will engage in politics. But neither generally predicts how people choose to participate. Different modes of civic engagement require unique resources and motivations; tolerant and intolerant citizens may not only differ in terms of the resources that determine which actions they can take, but also on attitudinal dimensions that condition which actions they are willing to take. Hence, Chapter Three culls from the political participation literature propositions about whether and in what ways tolerance for political minorities stimulates, suppresses, or is largely irrelevant to political action potential.
This chapter proposes an alternative theory of whether and how political tolerance matters for political participation. It begins with the well-established proposition that different modes of participation pose unique barriers to action and individuals require diverse sets of resources, motivations, interests, and dispositions to overcome them. It then elaborates how practicing tolerance can influence these barriers to action independently of the classic predictors of civic engagement. The central claim is that tolerance renders individuals more likely to engage in contentious and collective forms of action, but has comparatively little effect on the propensity to participate in conventional, individual modes of civic engagement. It argues that applied tolerance judgments cultivate individuals’ perceptions of freedom and support for dissent, and reduce conflict aversion among tolerant individuals relative to intolerant individuals. Through this mechanism, upholding the rights of groups that society prefers to repress independently raises the likelihood of participation in social modes of action in which the risk of disagreement and conflict with other citizens is high, but does little to facilitate individual modes of action in which disagreement and dissent are unlikely. Finally, this chapter also proposes caveats based on the political context in which political participation takes place. In particular, it suggests substantial differences in the tolerance-participation relationship across countries at diverse stages of democratization.
3.1 INTRODUCTION

There is little scholarly consensus over whether and how political tolerance and political participation are linked. The previous chapter gleaned two distinct perspectives from the literature; both run counter to the classic ideal of tolerant activists as custodians of liberal democracy. According to the “tradeoff account,” tolerance has the ability to suppress political action potential (Mutz 2005). According to the “syndrome account,” tolerance and participation are not at all directly related democratic orientations (Jackman 1975; Sullivan et al. 1982).

Divergent explanations of the tolerance-participation relationship remain entangled for at least two reasons. On one hand, it is particularly difficult to rule out spuriousness because many of the personality and demographic attributes that shape toleration also tend to influence participation. The methodological challenge is how to distinguish behavioral consequences of tolerant and intolerant judgments from effects that owe to other characteristics of tolerant and intolerant individuals. I address this issue in Chapters Five and Six. On the other hand, past “tradeoff” investigations into the tolerance-participation may obscure heterogeneous effects of tolerance across different modes of action because political participation is not a unidimensional concept (Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995), while democratic learning accounts struggle to overcome “syndrome” style objections and have not fully examined the possibility that tolerance may generate participation, rather than the reverse. The theoretical challenge is how to connect what we know about the nature of tolerance judgments to what we know about the nature of different forms of political engagement to conceptualize toleration as a contributor to participation.

Toward that end, Gibson (1992b) provides an important point of departure. Gibson suggests that tolerance for political expression by unpopular minorities may itself influence how
individuals calculate the potential costs associated with their own political activism. He reports that tolerance and intolerance are closely tied to perceptions of what he calls “political freedom”: the belief that one may express her views – particularly anti-majoritarian views – without fear of government retribution or constraint. Not only do tolerant individuals perceive greater political freedom than intolerant individuals, but they are also less likely to self-censor their own political expression. Gibson maintains that “tolerance is associated with the belief that there are few significant costs to be paid for one’s own political expression” (1992b: 343, emphasis added); however, the microfoundations of this relationship remain understudied.

This chapter connects tolerance and participation in terms of the social costs they pose to individuals as political actors. I will argue that tolerance is often a riskier and less socially desirable decision than intolerance, and will build a case for why individuals who bear nontrivial social costs to enable political expression by widely disliked others will be less likely to perceive social barriers to their own political action. I will draw on social psychological theories of consistency to argue that tolerance can facilitate engagement in “public” modes of action, which are cooperative and contentious in nature, but may have little influence on “private” forms of participation, which are not. Two microfoundations of this connection are possible.

First, individuals’ behavioral consistency across one situation to another is associated with similarities in those situations (Furr and Funder 2003) and may account for a direct effect of tolerance on participation. Tolerant citizens likely confront disagreement, conflict, and other social costs when they uphold the rights of groups that are generally reviled and perceived as dangerous to political stability or social integrity. Like tolerance, public activism is also a high-cost enterprise: individuals who join protests, attend rallies, or sign petitions, challenge the status quo through non-anonymous or face-to-face means and expose themselves to the possibility of
disagreement, criticism, and conflict. Private actions, like voting or donating, come with few such costs. To the extent that the social costs of tolerance are similar to the social costs of public participation, practicing tolerance may increase the tolerant individuals’ propensity for contentious and collective action.

Second, cognitive consistency may account for an indirect effect of tolerance on public participation. Tolerance is known to be a more internally conflicted position than intolerance because tolerant individuals usually also embrace alternate values like equality, beliefs like anti-racism, or concerns with public order and security that may “trump” tolerance (Gibson 1998). On its own, value-conflict of this sort may impede political action potential (e.g. Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001). However, such inconsistency also has the potential to produce a distressing psychological state that individuals are motivated to rectify by aligning their beliefs with their actions (Festinger 1957; Cooper and Fazio 1984; Cooper 2007). To the extent that tolerance is a more dissonant position than intolerance (Gibson 2006), tolerant individuals may develop or enhance corollary attitudes – such as perceived political freedom, support for dissent, and risk acceptance – that are consonant with the application of democratic principles to unsavory groups and which, in turn, facilitate contentious activism. Unlike more conventional forms of action, the social costs of public, contentious activism are generally not mitigated by resources like education or income, but rather by positive orientations toward risk (Kam 2011) and conflict (Hayes et al. 2005; Ulbig and Funk 1999). People who are generally acceptant of risk and conflict will attribute less weight to the costs of collective and contentious action when deciding whether to engage in politics than individuals who are risk and conflict averse. As a by-product of retrieving cognitive consistency after extending rights to highly unpopular groups, tolerance may yield psychic benefits that indirectly raise the likelihood of participation in public modes of
action in which the risk of disagreement and conflict with other citizens and government authorities is high (e.g. protests, boycotts, rallies, petitioning). But it may do little to facilitate individual modes of action in which disagreement and conflict are unlikely (e.g. voting, donating) and whose costs to action can be overcome largely by material resources and political interest – over which tolerance carries little plausible influence.

Whether effects of tolerance on participation exist, and whether these may be characterized as “direct” effects due to behavioral consistency across situations or as “indirect effects” facilitated by attitudinal by-products of preserving cognitive consistency, are the empirical questions I address in Chapters Four and Six. This chapter’s central theoretical claim is that individuals who incur nontrivial costs to protect the expressive rights of others will be less likely to perceive costs in their own political expression. I aim to establish this claim in three steps. The next section provides a framework for my arguments; I discuss varieties of participatory acts, differentiate them by the “social costs” they pose to potential participants, and identify factors scholars believe facilitate engagement in different modes of participation. I then merge findings from recent research into the social psychological determinants of participation with Gibson’s account of tolerance and perceived freedom and elements of consistency theories in social psychology to generate expectations about the micro-level relationship between tolerance and political action. Finally, I consider what macro-level factors could also shape how individuals perceive barriers to action across different types of democracies and establish predictions concerning whether and where tolerance may stimulate, suppress, or have no effect on political participation. I conclude by discussing the particular case countries on which I will base the analysis in subsequent chapters.
3.2 A POINT OF DEPARTURE: MODES OF PARTICIPATION AND THEIR SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS

There are several means through which individuals can communicate their interests, preferences, or demands to policymakers. Scholars generally accept that these acts are not interchangeable. Rather, they are “different in terms of the motivations of the acts, different in terms of the processes that bring people to activity, different in terms of the consequences of the acts” (Verba, Nie and Kim 1971: 10).

Different forms of political action therefore attract citizens with unique motivations and disparate sets of resources, skills and mobilization networks. And individuals tend to prefer certain forms of actions over others, sometimes with little or no overlap (Verba and Nie 1972; Dalton 2008). One important reason for this grouping is that political expression requires more than strong issue preferences; it also obliges citizens to face down certain barriers to action that each form of expression entails. In particular, how citizens choose to act (i.e. which barriers they deem surmountable) may depend on whether individuals believe that conflict and cooperation are bearable costs of action.

According to Verba, Nie and Kim (1971: 14), “The conflict dimension [of participation] refers to the extent to which individuals are opposed by counterparticipants (sic). The cooperative dimension refers to the extent to which they work along with others.” These factors generally enhance the difficulty of performing certain political actions because they introduce additional considerations into individuals’ decisions about whether and how to participate in politics. Whereas political interest and free time may compel someone to vote, protesting requires more than this: participants will potentially encounter heated debate with counter-protesters, may face arrest, and can expect no guarantee of anonymity. Indeed, conflict in
participation is enhanced when activities involve the public expression of beliefs, as opposed to when such expression is private (Ulbig and Funk 1999; Verba and Nie 1972). As Milbrath notes, “Some political acts are taken in full public view with exposure to the possibility of criticism and acclamation, while other actions are essential private” (1965: 10). The public expression of beliefs provides more opportunity for conflict with other citizens who hold countervailing viewpoints and with government authorities that represent the status quo.

For simplicity, I hereafter differentiate between “public” contentious-collective modes of action and “private,” individual acts. This is both intuitive and consistent with the literature. According to canonical accounts, private modes of participation include those actions a citizen may pursue on her own, with little contact and hence little conflict with others. For instance, one need not struggle with government authorities or disclose to other citizens that they donate money to a political cause. Although donating money may involve some associational connections that encourage such gifts, the act itself may be kept largely private. Contacting elected officials shares similar features; though it may become litigious when citizens oppose the status quo. Web politics – or joining causes on the internet – involves minimal conflict with other actors and is cooperative only through a virtual network of collaborators to whom one may forward political content or help support a political objective. Voting is the quintessential private political action; casting a secret ballot requires no cooperation and is non-conflictive.

Public actions by contrast, involve some face-to-face contact and cooperation and are more likely to involve conflict with counter-participants or government authorities. Volunteering for political campaigns or organizations entails participation in highly coordinated activities that may become conflictive if, for instance, one canvasses neighborhoods of hostile swing voters. Petitioning is commonly understood as a “protest act,” and requires cooperation in pursuit of a
cause that is contentious by virtue of the fact that it seeks to alter the status quo. Boycotts and rallies require much coordination among participants and, depending on their particular objective or location, may incite conflict with other citizens or the authorities. Protest demonstrations are the quintessential public political action in that they are highly cooperative and necessarily contentious.

Differentiating between public, contentious-collective actions and private, individual actions is useful because these dimensions reflect unequal social costs of performing different political acts (Verba, Nie and Kim 1971, 1978). They also suggest a host of socio-demographic and social psychological prerequisites for participation, i.e. factors necessary to bear such costs. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) famously catalogued and analyzed the former in their “civic voluntarism model” (CVM) of political activism. The CVM acknowledges that participatory acts pose unique hurdles and identifies the resources, skills, and motivations are required to overcome these barriers. For instance, education and political interest contribute to the tendency to vote, but these are far less relevant than income to patterns of financial donations to political causes. Far greater civic skills (e.g. public speaking and letter writing), stronger interest, and often vibrant associational networks are required to mobilize citizens into public participation through volunteering, boycotts, and protests, precisely because such activities demand much more from individual participants.

The main conclusion from this account is that people participate in higher-order, public modes of action because they have assets at their disposal that enable political action, because they are sufficiently interested in political matters, and because they are in a better position to be called into action (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Still, cooperation with others and conflict with counter-participants and government authorities (e.g. the police) are uniquely daunting
barriers to action. In rational choice terminology, the potential for public exposure, arguments, and even loss of freedom constitute significant “costs” that individuals must weigh against the potential benefits of civic engagement, such as the chance to improve one’s personal finances, collaborate and socialize with others, performing one’s civic duty, and influencing collective policy outcomes (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).

Recent models of non-voting participation highlight an important role for social psychological factors in determining how individuals will evaluate these costs. In particular, risk aversion (the unwillingness to put oneself in a position to incur loss) and conflict avoidance can play a central role in shaping whether individuals participate through public political actions. Kam (2011) advances a “psychophysical return model” in which “decision makers weigh the subjectively perceived risks of an action against the subjectively perceived returns from the action” to determine the optimal avenue for civic engagement (817). Her findings establish a general relationship between risk attitudes and political participation: risk acceptant individuals are more likely to participate across a variety of acts, especially public, contentious or collective activities. By contrast, risk tends to be unrelated to voting, the quintessential private action, and negatively related to financial contributions (826-7) – an isolated, individual action.

In a similar vein, Ulbig and Funk (1999) tie contentious political action to “conflict avoidance”: a measure of individuals’ desire to avoid interpersonal conflict, which is strongly related to a willingness to do things that differentiate oneself from others, including expressing

11 Kam’s account and, for that matter, the account I develop in this chapter, may be distinguished from both hard and “soft” rational choice models of participation in that risk acceptance does not act as a unique factor that counterbalances costs in the participation function. (To put it more visually, there would be no “R” term on the right-hand side of the participation calculus). Rather, risk acceptance constitutes a weight on costs \( C \) on the left-hand side of the equation, such that C is smaller for risk-acceptant individuals than for risk-averse individuals, presumably independently of the concrete benefits or selective incentives associated with participation.
dissenting opinions (e.g. Maslach et al. 1987; Whitney et al. 1994). Ulbig and Funk find that conflict avoidant individuals are less likely to participate in contentious, public actions relative to more conflict-acceptant individuals. Hayes et al. (2005) similarly found that individuals who are more tolerant of argumentation approach conflict with less hesitation and often look forward to the opportunity to express their own position when it differs from a discussion partner’s view. Gottweis (2007) further suggests that individuals who are more tolerant of argumentation are also more likely to participate in the political process.

It is important to recognize that, although these factors have been tied closely to personality traits, they do not themselves constitute immutable characteristics of individuals. Psychologists recognize that risk assessments are strongly related to attitudes toward uncertainty, but they ultimately tend to vary according to the perceived negative consequences of a specific situation (e.g. Mandrik and Bao 2005). Rohrmann (2005: 1) maintains that “there is no convincing evidence that [risk aversion] is a general trait (rather than a state, or a domain-specific attitude, e.g. distinct for physical, financial, or social risks people may encounter).” Perhaps for these reasons, Kam (2011) finds that effects of risk aversion on participation that are independent of personality traits that shape attitudes toward uncertainty but also influence participation, such as Openness (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010), and Extraversion, which strongly relates to public activism (Gerber et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2011). Moreover, argumentation, and its related construct of “tolerance for disagreement” (McCroskey 1998) are able to be acquired over time, through exposure to countervailing opinions and unpleasant situations.
3.2.1 Summary

Political participation scholars acknowledge several avenues of civic engagement. These modes of action are not interchangeable, in particular because they differ in terms of the social costs they pose to potential participants. *Public* political actions – like protest, boycotts, rallies, and petitioning – involve high social costs, such as cooperation with other citizens and potential conflict with counter-participants and government authorities. *Private* political actions – like voting, donating, and contacting – do not. Although socio-demographic and resource-based models of participation explain private political activism, citizens require certain social psychological dispositions to overcome the high social costs of public political activism. In particular, low risk aversion and conflict avoidance lead individuals to view collaboration and conflict as *less costly*, and hence predict engagement through public, contentious and collective actions. This more nuanced view of civic engagement raises important questions about the tolerance-participation relationship. Does tolerance serve to raise or lower barriers to political participation? Which barriers might it influence and to which forms of political action might it therefore be relevant? And how might tolerance be consequential *over and above* the constellation of individual-level traits that lead one to tolerate in the first place?

3.3 POLITICAL TOLERANCE, CONSISTENCY, AND BARRIERS TO CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

How citizens choose to participate in politics depends upon how they perceive the costs of a particular political action. How does tolerance for nonconformity influence this process?
According to the syndrome account, the individual-level factors that lead citizens to tolerate should also lower the barriers to their participation. But this would seem to apply only to private modes of political action, and then only in the weakest sense. Resources and motivations like education and political interest contribute to the tendency to vote, but are far less relevant than income to patterns of financial donation to political causes (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Apart from education, resources appear inconsequential for tolerance, while political interest does not preclude interest in repressing minority rights. In general, however, private forms of action present such low social barriers to action that differences between tolerant and intolerant individuals should be muted or insignificant.

Vibrant associational involvement may increase tolerance (Iglič 2010; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007), but according to tradeoff accounts, it will also suppress political behavior. Mutz (2005) argues that individuals whose interpersonal networks entail greater diversity of opinion will experience discomfort if they manifest their own preferences through political action because they risk disrupting social harmony in their networks. It is common for “those with high levels of cross-cutting exposure in their networks to put off political decisions for as long as possible or indefinitely, thus making their political participation unlikely (Mutz 2005: 108). Moreover, the major points of attitudinal asymmetry at the core of the tradeoff hypothesis are known to influence private modes of behavior. For instance, ambivalence – which is related to the fact that tolerance is an internally conflicted position (Gibson 1998; Sniderman et al. 1996)
is associated with delayed formation of voting intentions and unstable candidate evaluations (Lavine 2001). Indeed, Mutz’s (2005) strongest evidence relates to voting behavior.\textsuperscript{12}

The syndrome and tradeoff accounts – wherein tolerance is unrelated or negatively related to participation, respectively – appear largely divided over whether tolerance affects conventional, private modes of participation. I argue that practicing tolerance may actually help to facilitate engagement in more costly public actions. This is because, like public forms of activism, tolerance is also a costly enterprise; tolerance may directly shape contentious activism because they share similar costs, or it may indirectly facilitate public activism by strengthening attitudes that lower the perceived costs associated with contentious and collective avenues of civic engagement. I call this the “Costs-Consistency Theory” of tolerance and participation.

3.3.1 The social costs of political tolerance

Tolerance requires that citizens “uncouple” perceptions of threat from decisions about how to allocate liberty to unsavory groups (Sullivan et al. 1993). These threat perceptions stem most directly from characteristics of the group whose rights are contested – groups that presumably endanger society and social norms. But to the extent that tolerance is the minority position among opponents of a target group, the intolerant majority also poses certain risks: tolerant citizens will likely confront disagreement, conflict, and other social disapproval when they protect the rights of groups that most of society prefers to repress.

\textsuperscript{12} Mutz (2001, 2005) also supports her theory with an index of overall activism that includes two public actions – working for a campaign and wearing a campaign button or sticker – but she does not provide results by individual mode of participation.
Consider first that tolerance is a highly disagreeable and unpopular judgment. It is the minority position among people who strongly dislike a disputed group, and who are threatened by its ideas. Intolerance is instead a more natural first response to a dangerous political minority (e.g. Marcus et al. 1995; McClosky and Brill 1983; Kuklinski et al. 1991); it is the majority opinion among people who dislike an offensive political minority. Second, upholding the rights of a group that so many fellow citizens find abhorrent is also a “risky” position for the tolerant individual. In the extreme, it poses “material risks,” such as supporting a hotly contested public demonstration that might lead to property damage or violence. More commonly, it poses risks to the “normative community” (Stenner 2005): adherence to abstract civil libertarian principles can violate broadly accepted social norms such as anti-racism, women’s rights, secularism, (Bleich 2011; Mudde 2010; Sniderman et al. 1996). Tolerance also poses “social risks” such that the tolerant individual’s principled forbearance may be misconstrued as acceptance and respect for a vile group (e.g. white supremacists), or overt support for its beliefs.

Such dimensions of conflict and risk are often reflected in experimental vignettes that vary situational features of civil liberties disputes to render tolerance increasingly difficult (e.g. Gibson and Gouws 2001; Marcus et al. 1995). The normative literature also reflects these ideas. The tolerant individual may not only come into conflict with intolerant opponents of a group who would repress the group’s rights, but insofar as tolerance is premised on the negative judgment of a group (e.g. Muslim women are permitted to wear headscarves in France, though this is widely viewed as an affront to French norms of secularism and as a threat to “Frenchness”), the tolerant individual also offends “anti-tolerance accommodationists” who would urge respect and understanding rather than “mere” toleration (Furedi 2012; Galeotti 2002; Ramadan 2010).
Toleration might therefore be understood as an unpopular act of dissent from intolerant majority opinion and a socially risky position that may expose individuals to social disapproval and other non-trivial costs. Intolerance, by contrast, is consonant with majority opinion and exposes individuals to few social costs. It is possible that tolerance contributes to public activism because tolerance implies disagreement and dissent, whereas intolerance presupposes fundamental limitations on difference and dispute that render conflict less desirable. But this could still reflect a spurious relationship: tolerant individuals might already be more supportive of dissent and be more risk acceptant than intolerant individuals and therefore participate because of these predispositions. Instead, social psychological theories of consistency suggests two mechanisms through which the act of toleration could either directly lead to participation through public means, or indirectly promote civic engagement by strengthening attitudes that moderate the perceived social costs associated with public avenues of participation.

3.3.2 Consistency theories and tolerance as a contributor to public activism

First, behavioral consistency across similar situations could account for a direct effect of tolerance on public modes of political engagement. The psychological literature indicates that situations are important determinants of what people do – situations, for instance, that have been characterized in terms of the demands they make on actors (Shoda et al. 1993), the emotions they elicit from actors (Pervin 1977; Tomkins 1962), and the behaviors deemed appropriate of actors in these situations (Price and Bouffard 1974). Importantly, situations that are similar on one or more of these dimensions tend to compel similar rates and types of behavior from the actors that encounter them. Shoda, Mischel and Wright (1993, 1994) found evidence for a relationship between behavioral consistency and situational similarity, with similarity defined by the degree
to which situations were rated as making similar demands on children’s psychological competencies. Furr and Funder (2003) report that similar situations – regardless of whether similarity is defined subjectively by participants or objectively by researchers – tend to elicit similar behavior among individuals across over 60 types of behaviors. Cross-situational consistency in behavior is well-documented even though people may not be consciously aware of a situation’s contextual elements or of these elements’ effects on their behavior.

Extending rights of free expression to broadly disliked groups and exercising one’s own expressive rights through public means pose similar social costs to individuals. To the extent that tolerant individuals can effectively manage the high costs of enabling broadly disliked others’ participation, they may be more willing to face down the costs to their own political participation – especially collective-contentious “public” actions which tend, like tolerance, to expose participants to disagreement and conflict with other citizens and government authorities. Private political actions, like voting or donating, are not associated with costs of this sort; rather, barriers to this type of activism can be surmounted given sufficient free time, interest in politics, education and income (e.g. Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Therefore, while it is possible that tolerant and intolerant individuals differ in terms of the resources and motivations that determine which private political actions they can take, practicing tolerance exposes individuals to high social costs, which in turn conditions their willingness to engage in contentious and collective activities whose barriers to action standard resources generally cannot overcome alone. Therefore,

**Proposition 1**: Tolerant individuals are more likely than intolerant individuals to engage in public modes of political action
Second, theories of cognitive consistency point to a mechanism through which practicing tolerance could indirectly move citizens to engage in more contentious and collective political actions. One of the most frequently demonstrated phenomena in social psychology is that people who act in a way that is inconsistent with their attitudes experience a motivational state that causes them to alter those actions or attitudes (Festinger 1957; Cooper 2007). This is based on the principle of cognitive consistency, and assumes that an aversive, drive-like state is aroused when people either experience inconsistency between their beliefs or inconsistency between their attitudes and behavior (Gawronski 2012). Attitude or behavior change follows as a means of restoring this consistency (Scher and Cooper 1989; Cooper 2007).

Tolerance judgments imply inconsistency by definition: given its “objective precondition,” tolerance is the result of how individuals weight and ultimately choose between conflicting attitudes toward civil liberties and toward political minorities they find offensive (Sullivan and Transue 1999: 643). And scholars accept that tolerance is a more internally dissonant position than intolerance (Gibson 1998; Gibson and Gouws 2003) because political tolerance attitudes are “more highly integrated” with similar, alternative attitudes (Gibson and Gouws 2003: 142-5). Toleration thus readily comes into conflict with other legitimate – and often more viscerally felt – values (Sniderman et al. 1996), beliefs (Bleich 2011), and social norms (Mudde 2010).

Although one line of social psychology research shows that this type of value-conflict and ambivalence may, on its own, impede the translation of attitudes into action (e.g. Petty and Krosnick 1995; Mutz 2005; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001), research in the cognitive consistency tradition (e.g. Festinger 1957; Cooper and Fazio 1984; Cooper 2007) would suggest that tolerant individuals would be motivated to rectify such inconsistencies by aligning other
beliefs with their tolerance decision. In particular, tolerant individuals should develop attitudes that are logically related to the tolerance decision to minimize doubts they would otherwise experience (e.g. Regan and Kilduff 1988). This “behavior justification strategy” (e.g. Frey and Mills 1965) of consistency restoration provides an indirect pathway through which tolerance may influence public political participation: in short, tolerance can be justified with attitudes that in turn facilitate participation in contentious and collective, public actions.

Some evidence already indicates that attitude change follows political tolerance. Using two-wave longitudinal data, Gibson (2002) demonstrates that Russian adults who extended tolerance toward their most disliked groups in the first wave of the survey were less likely to feel threatened by this same group two years later – even controlling for respondents’ prior levels of threat and changes in economic outlook. Other research suggests that tolerance reflects individuals’ ability to “uncouple” threat from decisions about how to allocate liberty to different groups (Sullivan et al. 1993). That is, tolerance requires individuals to compartmentalize the risks of tolerance, separate them from and perhaps render them subordinate to other relevant considerations, such as the merits of liberal democratic norms in principle and the value of applying them in practice. In this sense, tolerance may render individuals less averse to risks and other social costs in their own decision-making.

Moreover, extant research suggests that tolerance “…is connected to a set of beliefs about the legitimacy and appropriateness of self-expression” (1992b: 339); cognitive consistency maintenance may help account for this relationship. Gibson unveils bivariate associations between tolerance and self-expression, such that tolerant individuals 1) perceive themselves as “more free” than intolerant individuals in that they tend to believe the government will not restrict or otherwise infringe upon their right to dissent, and 2) are less likely than intolerant
individuals to “self-censor” their political expression when they hold unpopular views that may lead to disagreements with others. To clarify, consider Gibson’s original survey data in Tables 1 and 2, which reveal these associations in both the liberal democratic American context (Gibson 1992b, 2008) and the illiberal Russian context (Gibson 1998, 2002).

**Table 1** Perceptions of Available Freedom in the United States and Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Believe government would allow:</th>
<th>Percentages†</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Speeches criticizing government actions</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>48.9 (16.2)</td>
<td>44.8 (14.9)</td>
<td>49.3 (15.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public meetings opposing government</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>32.3 (19.5)</td>
<td>35.1 (16.3)</td>
<td>34.9 (16.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protest marches opposing government</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>29.8 (24.5)</td>
<td>35.9 (16.4)</td>
<td>25.2 (17.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance and political freedom‡</td>
<td>0.49*</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>0.12*</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1218</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1635</td>
<td>1330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†Percentages reflect respondents who believe government would “probably” or “definitely” allow dissenting behavior. Those who “don’t know” whether the government would allow them to engage in the activity might be legitimately included with those believing that they would not be allowed to do so. Since uncertain respondents in the U.S. never exceed 2.5 percent of any sample, they are simply excluded. For Russian data, they appear in parentheses.

‡ Entries are bivariate correlation coefficients between content-controlled tolerance index and average perceived freedom; *p ≤ 0.05

Beyond mere rights consciousness, perceived political freedom reflects confidence in one’s rights to free expression. Large percentages of the population in both countries are skeptical about their expressive rights, though Russians perceive far less freedom as available to them than Americans (Gibson argues that “those who ‘don’t know’ whether the government would allow them to engage in the activity might be legitimately included with those believing that they would not be allowed to do so”). The significant bivariate associations in the highlighted, penultimate row of Table 1 suggest that tolerant Americans tend to perceive greater liberty for themselves than their intolerant counterparts. Significant associations between tolerance and perceived freedom are also apparent in Russia, though the correlations are weak.
Table 2 Self-Censored Expression in the United States and Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unwilling talk about politics because:</th>
<th>Percentages†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They might create enemies</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Their views might not be understood</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People might think poorly of them</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The government might find out</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance and self-censorship‡</td>
<td>-0.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1218</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†Percentages reflect respondents who would restrict their own speech for specific reasons. Those who don’t know whether they would censor themselves might be included with those who would under some circumstances. There are extremely few such individuals in the U.S. sample and they have been excluded. For Russian data, they appear in parentheses.
‡Entries are bivariate correlation coefficients between content-controlled tolerance index and average “self-censorship”; *p ≤ 0.05

Table 2 demonstrates a similar pattern among tolerant and intolerant individuals with regard to “self-censorship” – or, the willingness to talk about politics when one holds highly unpopular views. Among Americans higher tolerance for nonconformity – as measured by the willingness to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to one’s most disliked political opponent – is connected to a willingness to express one’s own political views, however unpopular they may be.

Gibson infers from these associations¹³ that “[t]olerance is associated with the belief that there are few significant costs to be paid for one’s own political expression” (1992b: 343, emphasis added). Gibson’s evidence is based on bivariate associations, so he interprets it with caution: “Whether tolerance flows from some sort of norm of reciprocity (because I am able to express my views, others should be allowed to express theirs) or individuals are projecting their own tolerance onto others cannot be determined” (1992b: 343). He reiterates this restraint in a

¹³Specifically, those represented in the first columns of Tables 1 and 2
follow-up study, noting that “the nature of the causal relationship between [intolerance and perceived political freedom] cannot be dissected – perhaps because they perceive themselves as not having freedom, it is easier to justify denying freedom to others – but a close connection exists between perceptions that the government should deny civil liberties to disliked groups and that it does deny civil liberties to groups to which one is favorably predisposed” (Gibson 2008: 106 – 7).

Cognitive consistency provides a mechanism through which tolerance may be conceptualized as an actual driver, not merely a correlate, of perceived political freedom. To the extent that tolerance is a riskier and more dissonant position than intolerance, practicing tolerance may catalyze individuals to strengthen or develop new attitudes that help justify toleration. They may not only “compartmentalize” the social risks of tolerance (e.g. Sullivan et al. 1993), but tolerant individuals may also rationalize their tolerance with the belief that dissent from majority opinion is useful to democracy, with the belief that government will not punish dissenting opinion, and with less overall aversion to conflict and risk in their own decision-making. In short, to maintain cognitive consistency, tolerant individuals may validate the application of civil libertarian principles to unpopular groups by bolstering pro-democratic orientations:

**Proposition 2:** Practicing tolerance carries positive psychic benefits for individuals in the form of decreased risk aversion, increased support for dissent, and increased perceptions of political freedom.

As I demonstrated in section 3.2, scholars of political participation have recognized these attitudes as fundamental determinants of contentious and collective action. Through a cognitive consistency mechanism, upholding the rights of groups that society prefers to repress may thus indirectly raise the likelihood of participation in public modes of action in which the risk of
disagreement and conflict with other citizens and government authorities is high (e.g. protest, boycotts, rallies, petitioning), but do little to facilitate individual modes of action in which disagreement and conflict are unlikely (e.g. voting, donating). Individuals who incur nontrivial costs to protect the expressive rights of others may be less likely to perceive costs in their own political expression.

Behavioral and cognitive consistency theories provide unique microfoundations for the positive, causal effect of tolerance on participation proposed in this dissertation – a rather different portrait of the tolerance-participation relationship than the syndrome and tradeoff accounts offer. According to the former, tolerance should be largely irrelevant to how citizens weight the costs associated with different avenues of participation; according to the latter, tolerance may lead citizens to attribute greater weight to the overall costs of participation. But tolerant and intolerant individuals do not differ only in terms of the resources or associational networks that determine which actions they can take; practicing tolerance or intolerance may also directly and/or indirectly condition which actions they are willing to take. Tolerance is a minority position through which one incurs substantial costs to defend the rights of offensive others. To the extent that tolerant individuals face disagreement, dissent, and conflict to ensure offensive groups’ right to free speech and assembly, they may be more likely to confront similar social costs associated with exercising these same rights for themselves (Proposition 1). And to the extent that toleration yields stronger perceptions of political freedom, support for dissent, and risk acceptance (Proposition 2) – attitudes which mitigate the social costs of public activism – it may indirectly facilitate contentious and collective political engagement.

This “costs-consistency theory” rests upon novel microfoundations. In terms of its predictions for political behavior, however, it occupies the space between the syndrome and
tradeoff accounts. It is therefore possible that these three perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive at the individual-level. Tolerance may lower the perceived costs of public forms of action while increasing (tradeoff account) or remaining fundamentally irrelevant to (syndrome account) the costs individuals associate with private forms of action. Empirical analysis is required to assess the balance of evidence for each account. At the system-level, however, these models may not apply to all political contexts equally well. The following section considers the generalizability of each theoretical perspective, and develops expectations about their applicability across countries.

3.4 TOLERANCE, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT

A simple idea underlies the perspective developed above. The choice to uphold a political minority’s rights interacts with the social costs of political engagement to shape how individuals participate in politics. But the costs individuals associate with civic engagement – costs that determine an action’s difficulty – may themselves be contingent upon the broader political context. It is possible, for instance, that the distinction between high-cost public actions and low-cost private actions may be less relevant in illiberal polities where real constraints on political opposition exist. Similarly, individuals may be unable to “uncouple” threat from civil libertarian quandaries where that threat is more real than perceived and toleration may likewise carry few of the psychic benefits discussed above which facilitate participation. More basically, whether individuals will draw any connections between democratic orientations like tolerance and civic engagement depends in the first place on the availability of these values in the public.
These contingencies have footing in theories of political socialization, which I discuss in this section with respect especially to post-communist democracies. Empirical research generally suggests that the success of democratic government and the breadth of public support for democratic values are co-dependent and develop simultaneously over the course of a country’s experience with democracy (e.g. Bratton and Mattes 2001; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Muller and Seligson 1994; Whitefield and Evans 2001). Theories of “political socialization” therefore expect long-term differences across publics in established and new democracies: while citizens in longstanding democracies have learned to unconsciously support and accept liberal democratic norms as they are socialized into them throughout their lives, broad swaths of the population in new democracies have often been socialized into illiberal or anti-democratic norms (Dalton 1994; Finkel, Humphries and Opp 2001; Klingemann, Fuchs and Zielonka 2006; Mishler and Rose 1996). In new democracies it is possible that citizens’ “understanding of democracy [will] differ significantly from Western democratic principles – such as majority rule, minority rights, individual liberties, multi-party systems, or representative government” (Neundorf 2010: 1098). To this list we may add political tolerance and political participation – both of which tend to differ substantially across established democracies and those with a recent history of authoritarian rule.

A country’s experience with authoritarian rule is therefore an important, albeit coarse, dimension of political context that may limit whether, where, and how political tolerance and political participation are connected. New democracies in general tend to differ in significant ways from longstanding democracies in terms of civic engagement. In particular, where democracy has flourished for long periods of time, democratic institutions are more deeply rooted and publics are more strongly committed to democratic norms of civic duty. For instance,
East Central Europe continues to suffer weaknesses in civil society (Howard 2004) because much political interaction remains grounded in informal village community structures, extended clans, or other less formalized types of social networks (Immerfall et al. 2010; Mondak and Gearing 1998). Attitudes toward the government and toward participation also remain marked by suspicion. Communist regimes often forced their citizens into mass engagement in state-controlled activities and organizations (Coffé and van der Lippe 2009; Howard 2004; Letki 2004), while simultaneously suppressing autonomous forms of civic engagement (Flanagan et al. 1993). As a result, a deep general distrust in political and civic institutions emerged after communism (Mishler and Rose 1997; Rose 1994).

While it is true that the term “post-communism” gradually loses its relevance with each passing year (Howard 2002), legacies of the communist experience still tend to promote different patterns of participation across East Central and Western Europe. More than twenty years later, researchers still find lower rates of active participation in East central Europe compared to the rest of the continent, as well as differences in various aspects of civic resources, interest, and the “density” of civil society organizations between post-communist and Western Europe (e.g. Haskins 2009; Wallace, Pichler and Haerpfner 2012). These resilient differences are especially remarkable considering that newly emerged regimes of the 1990s often compelled their citizens to “relearn” civic and political behavior through drastic educational reforms to facilitate revisions to political socialization (Coffé and van der Lippe 2009; Torney-Purta 2002).

Not only is participation less widespread in new democracies (Wallace, Pichler and Haerpfner 2012), but evidence also suggests that overall levels of political tolerance are lower in these contexts than in the west. In one of the few comparisons of tolerance across Western and post-communist publics, Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton (2007) find that citizens in East Central
Europe are generally less willing to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to their least liked groups than citizens in the United States and Western Europe. The authors couch this finding in differential patterns of political socialization: “Citizens in newer democracies have simply had less time to internalize democratic norms and values and may not yet have learned to translate democratic principles into democratic practice” (2007: 90). This explanation has also been applied explicitly to the tolerance-participation relationship (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). In short, post-authoritarian citizens should be not only less likely to grant rights and liberties to offensive groups, but those who do tolerate may be less likely to infer that their own rights and liberties are more secure as a result.

Socialization theories therefore suggest that a relationship between democratic orientations is unlikely where democratic orientations are not widely embraced by the public. This caveat can be viewed through the lens of the syndrome account of tolerance and participation. The syndrome hypothesis maintains that tolerant citizens are no more or less likely to participate in politics than intolerant citizens; rather, any association between the two orientations is attributable to other characteristics of individuals that simultaneously influence their levels of tolerance and potential for political action. This account is doubly conditional if we consider political context: positive associations between tolerance and activism require the correct constellation of individual-level traits and these traits are only likely to develop in those countries where democratic values and institutions are deeply rooted in society – in longstanding, western democracies. Thus, the relationship between tolerance and participation in new democracies may be far more tenuous, such that:

**Proposition 3:** Controlling for individual differences in resources, motivations, and psychological dispositions, tolerant citizens are no more or less likely than intolerant citizens to participate in politics in post-communist democracies.
Alternatively, political context may have a more nuanced effect on the tolerance-participation relationship, which reflects behavioral and cognitive consistency arguments I develop above. Differential political socialization offers a superficial and paternalistic view of post-authoritarian publics that ignores the possibility that citizens in these contexts may believe they have good reason not to tolerate or not to participate.

I have argued, on one hand, that citizens who defend the basic rights of others at great cost should, as a result, be more likely to endure the costs associated with exercising their own rights to public political expression. This squares with the idea that tolerance requires citizens to “uncouple” perceptions of threat from decisions about whether to grant liberty to disliked minority groups (Sullivan et al. 1993). However, tolerant individuals tend to be better “threat managers” than intolerant individuals only where that threat is not imminent. Israeli politicians who perceive a rather real threat of political disruption and state destruction from all sides, tend to be less tolerant than national policymakers elsewhere (Shamir 1991; Sullivan et al. 1993). Similarly, Hutchinson and Gibler (2007) find that the real risk of territorial threat from irredentist groups or state actors significantly increases intolerance. Shamir and Sullivan (1983: 916) qualify that “in the absence of a strong threat, belief in abstract norms will constrain responses to specific instances in which citizens’ tolerance is tested. If the threat is strong enough, however, it will override these abstract beliefs.”

Democratic transition in some formerly repressive regimes generated considerable political uncertainty, facilitated corruption and crime, and aggravated ethnic and linguistic divisions in society (Pétry, Guerin, and Crête 2004). Such factors generate considerable threat and undermine civil society in ways that can fundamentally alter the risks individuals associate with tolerance and with their own political engagement (Howard 2004; Mondak and Gearing
Context has the potential to alter the costs of participation with which the costs of tolerance are consistent.

In extreme cases, such as South Africa in 1994 (Gibson and Gouws 2003) or Kenya in 2007 (Finkel, Horowitz, and Rojo-Mendoza 2012), merely casting a secret ballot could pose mortal risk to participants. Citizens under communism often self-censored their political discussion due to fear of constant surveillance and monitoring by police forces and their secret informants (Mondak and Gearing 1998). In cases like Hungary under Viktor Orbán (e.g. Mudde and Jenne 2012) and Romania under Victor-Viorel Ponta, media freedom, opposition rights, and free assembly by anti-government protesters have been circumscribed as recently as this year (Freedom House 2013). While a “culture of suspicion” toward government and collective action remains in many post-communist states (Howard 2004; Mishler and Rose 1997; Wallace, Pichler and Haerpfer 2012), some governments thus continue to pose a “real risk” of retaliation against citizens who object to its actions or express views outside the mainstream.

In these cases, the distinction between high-cost public political actions and low-cost private political actions loses some traction and the social psychological dispositions toward risk and conflict conventionally associated with public, contentious political acts in established democracies may become relevant predictors of private, individual political participation in the post-authoritarian context. If private political actions are indeed more costly in new democracies – such that standard resource models cannot sufficiently account for civic engagement – then post-authoritarian citizens who confront the difficulties of tolerance may also be more likely to participate in individual, private avenues of engagement than intolerant citizens:

**Proposition 4:** Tolerant individuals are more likely than intolerant individuals to engage in private modes of political action in post-communist democracies.
There are additional reasons to speculate that toleration breeds private, rather than public activism in the post-communist context. Recall from Table 1 above that, compared to the United States, the connections between tolerance and perceived political freedom are far more tenuous in illiberal Russia. This may be a function of the fact that the Russian government does not in fact guarantee citizens’ right to dissent, or of the widespread culture of intolerance that places a ceiling on how much liberty people believe is available to them (Gibson 1992b), or of some combination of the two. Whatever the case, to the extent that risks associated with public actions are heightened in illiberal contexts, it is unlikely that tolerance can generate sufficient confidence in one’s ability to challenge government actions to facilitate contentious-collective, public actions.

Tolerance may also do little to increase support for dissent where anti-majoritarian opinion may realistically be punished. Moreover, even where no such risk is perceived dissent and disagreement may not be viewed as intrinsically useful to democratic stability in fragile new political systems. Gibson (2002), for instance, finds that Russians who are more supportive of abstract democratic values tend also to be more threatened and less tolerant. Citizens in former socialist countries are familiar with the concepts of democracy and democratic values (Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1992; Whitefield and Evans 2001); however, socialization theory predicts that their understanding of the role of these values is likely to differ (cf. Neundorf 2010). Hence, it is possible that tolerance contributes to perceptions of freedom and support for dissent to a lesser extent in post-communist democracies than in longstanding democracies. These arguments lead me to speculate that if a relationship between tolerance and participation exists in the post-communist context, it will manifest as a positive association between tolerance and private avenues of engagement.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in contrast to these context-dependent propositions, the “tradeoff” account of tolerance and participation does not seem to depend upon political context. From this perspective, tolerance is too weak, too pliable, and too dissonant a position to compel attitude-consistent behavior (e.g. Gibson 1998; Peffley, Knigge and Hurwitz 2001) and generates ambivalent preferences that can lead to abstention from politics (Mutz 2005). Intolerance is rather strong, rigid, and consonant with other democratic beliefs and therefore may be more behaviorally efficacious than tolerance (Gibson 1998; Marcus et al. 1995). Importantly, attitudinal properties of tolerance and intolerance are “similarly different” across polities as diverse as the United States (Gibson 1996), Canada (Sniderman et al. 1996), Russia (Gibson 1998) and South Africa (Gibson and Gouws 2003). The direct, negative effect on civic engagement owing to attitudinal-level asymmetry should therefore hold across countries.

3.5 CASE SELECTION

The universe of cases in this dissertation includes Western and post-communist Europe and the United States. Chapter Four relies on survey data from the United States and 16 European countries whose populations are sampled for the International Social Survey Programme – Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. These countries exhibit a wide range of experience with democracy and authoritarianism and are generally included in cross-national comparisons of tolerance (e.g. Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007) and participation (e.g. Wallace et al. 2012). They therefore permit a litmus test of
propositions 1, 3 and 4, which predict differential patterns of participation across tolerant and intolerant individuals and across established Western and new, post-communist democracies.

Special attention is given to two cases in particular: the United States and Hungary. These cases are rarely paired for comparison; but there are important methodological and theoretical reasons to rely on them in this study. The American population is the traditional target of political tolerance research, which has its roots in the McCarthy Red Scare Era of the 1950s. Methodological debates over the definition and measurement of political tolerance, which continue to this day, have produced highly reliable explanations of the predictors of tolerance and instruments for its measurement that have been subjected to much validity testing (e.g. Gibson 1992a). The United States therefore constitutes a crucial case for this analysis, since researchers generally “do a much better job of explaining political tolerance in the areas of the globe where tolerance has been most intensively studied” (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003: 25).

With the exception perhaps of the United Kingdom, the United States is also an exceptional case among western democracies in terms of its institutional protections of illiberal expression. As Eric Bleich’s (2012) comparative study of free speech and association demonstrates, the US affords uniquely broad protections for illiberal speech and assembly compared to most other countries in the world. While the Supreme Court of the United States vigorously defends the First Amendment and its libertarian principles, most countries in Europe – east and west – provide legal character to specific limitations on speech and assembly that is racist, anti-Semitic, or that otherwise may be perceived as anti-democratic.

Among the European countries studied here, Hungary provides the other exception. Viktor Orbán and his “center right” Fidesz Party won a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections of April 2010 and many observers agree that Orbán’s victory “has put an end to the
liberal democracy existing in Hungary since 1990 and has smoothed the path to a populist autocracy” (Lendvai 2013: 207). Institutional checks and balances on the executive have practically disappeared in Hungary – the previous Hungarian constitution was amended ten times during the government’s first year in office to strengthen the authority of Fidesz. On January 1, 2012, it was replaced by an entirely new constitution that cannot be amended save for a two-thirds majority in any subsequent parliament. Since then, Orbán has replaced independent agency staff with his personal supporters (Lendvai 2013: 218) and has substituted Constitutional Court justices at will.

In March 2013, Fidesz passed the “Fourth Amendment” – a 15 page document that wipes out more than 20 years of prior Constitutional Court precedent and which, according to US State Department spokesperson, Victoria Nuland, “could threaten the principles of institutional independence and checks and balances that are the hallmark of democratic governance.” The Fourth Amendment establishes the “National Judicial Office” (NJO), an executive agency through which the chief public prosecutor may select which Constitutional Court justice will hear which case. The head of the NJO, Tuene Hando, holds her position for nine years; she is president of the Budapest Labour Court and married to the principal author of the 2012 constitution (Lendvai 2013).

The Fourth Amendment also restricts media freedom via the newly established National Media and Telecommunications Agency (NMTA). The NMTA restricts the press during election campaigns; bans all political advertising during campaigns except for ads in the public media, which in any case has been purged of employees that sympathize with the opposition (Schepple 2013). The NMTA reviews all bids for broadcast frequencies, which require that political parties gather signatures from all over the country for a “national party list,” which is currently
extremely difficulty for opposition parties to achieve. Moreover, the NMTA is equipped with the right to review the compliance of all public and private media coverage with vague standards of “balance” and “proper” news coverage, which affords Orbán and his Fidesz party virtually full control over media content (Freedom House 2013).

Beyond this, Orbán has legitimized right-wing intolerance by working closely with the neo-fascist Jobbik Party – one of the most successful extremist parties in Europe (Mudde 2009). As recently as 2012, Orbán officially decorated three extreme right leading figures: journalist Ferenc Szaniszlo, known for his diatribes against the Jews and the Roma people who he compares to “monkeys”; anti-Semitic archaeologist Kornel Bakav, who blames the Jews for having organized the slave trade in the middle ages; and artist Petras Janos who strongly supports the Jobbik party and its paramilitary militia that has been implicated in several hate crimes against the Roma minority.

Modern Hungary is an illiberal democracy similar to Russia’s – with regular elections but without a legitimate opposition. For more than three years, the Fidesz government has eroded constitutional freedoms and has promoted a culture of intolerance that stands in stark contrast to the United States. Hungary therefore provides the sort of illiberal context in which to test predictions regarding the tolerance-participation relationship where a real threat of government retaliation against dissent exists.

3.6 LOOKING AHEAD TO THE EMPIRICAL CHAPTERS

Two basic perspectives emerge from the extant literature on political tolerance and political participation. From the first, tolerance and participation are not directly related; they are
associated as a “syndrome” of pro-democratic orientations. From the second perspective, tolerance has attitudinal properties that are antithetical to vibrant civic engagement; they are related as a “tradeoff” between pro-democratic orientations.

This chapter introduces a third alternative. Tolerance is positively consequential to some forms of actions, but not others. Whether and how tolerance matters for civic engagement is a function of the social costs of participation, as defined by the difficulty of performing a given political action and the broader political context in which participation occurs. This view is consistent with early arguments by Gibson and Bingham (1985: 162): “Whether a given propensity (i.e. attitude) will result in behavior…is determined partly by the ‘difficulty’ of performing the act. Strong propensities will only be blocked by high hurdles, whereas weak propensities may be blocked by relatively low hurdles. The strength of the propensity interacts with the situational context in producing behavior.”

I have argued that, in established democracies where democratic norms are deeply rooted, political tolerance lowers hurdles to collective and contentious public action, but does little to facilitate the propensity to engage in private, individual modes of behavior over and above the standard, resource-based predictors of civic voluntarism (Proposition 1). This is because the costs of tolerance and the costs of public forms of engagement are similar and people tend to behave consistently across similar situations. Moreover, upholding the rights of a group that society prefers to repress cultivates individuals’ support for dissent, risk acceptance, and perceptions that their own rights are protected (Proposition 2). To the extent that these attitudes mitigate the perceived costs of public participation, tolerance will indirectly increase contentious and collective action through its bolstering effect on these beliefs. To echo Sniderman et al.
(1989), “The more tolerant citizens are of the rights of others, the more secure are the rights of all, their own included.”

In new democracies – in particular those of post-communist Europe – two caveats are possible. According to standard theories of political socialization, the influence of tolerance on participation is blocked because civil libertarian and participatory norms have not been internalized by the public. In post-authoritarian contexts, tolerance and participation may be unrelated as the syndrome account predicts (Proposition 3). Alternatively, given the resilient culture of suspicions and, in cases like Hungary, real threat of government retaliation against dissenting behavior, the attitudes toward risk and conflict that predict public forms of activism in established democracies may become important considerations for exercising even basic rights to vote, donate, or engage in other private actions in the post-authoritarian context. Hence, context vitiates the dichotomy between public and private actions such that the high costs of tolerance are consistent with the high-costs of private activism in illiberal democracies (Proposition 4).

The next three chapters offer various tests of these propositions. I begin, in Chapter Four, with a broad evaluation of the syndrome, tradeoff, and cost-consistency theories of tolerance and participation. I apply coarsened exact matching procedures to cross-national survey data from the United States and Europe, to better isolate the effects of tolerance and participation and improve the strength of causal inferences that can be made about how tolerance influences civic engagement. Chapter Five builds a case for a randomized experimental analysis of the tolerance participation relationship. As a first step I introduce, develop, and test a novel approach to randomly assigning individuals to manifest tolerance or intolerance, such that the independent effects of these judgments may be assessed. Chapter Six then reprises the analysis of tolerance and participation using two original experiments, conducted in the United States and Hungary.
Using the method developed in Chapter Five, I randomly assign subjects to manifest tolerance or intolerance and *directly observe* their overt, post-test political participation.
4.0 CROSS-NATIONAL PATTERNS OF PARTICIPATION AMONG POLITICALLY TOLERANT AND INTOLERANT CITIZENS

What are the behavioral consequences of democratic orientations? Although early classics and recent studies of democratic learning find positive associations between tolerance and participation, the “syndrome account” maintains that these effects are spurious due to omitted variable bias: tolerant individuals possess demographic and personality traits that render them simultaneously more tolerant and more participatory. The “tradeoff account” implies negative consequences of political tolerance for political participation because attitudinal properties unique to tolerance suppress political action potential. The costs-consistency theory I advanced in Chapter Three maintains that tolerance poses high costs to individuals, which are similar to the costs associated with contentious and collective “public” forms of activism; citizens who confront risk to enable political expression by reviled minorities should be more likely to face down social barriers to their own engagement through public means. To adjudicate between these accounts, I apply coarsened exact matching procedures to U.S. and European survey data to isolate the effects of tolerant and intolerant attitudes from effects attributable instead to differences between tolerant and intolerant individuals. Findings lend preliminary support to the costs-consistency theory: attitudinal tolerance stimulates certain types of participation independently of individual-level factors that drive tolerance and activism.
This chapter compares conventional accounts of the tolerance-participation relationship against the cost-consistency theory proposed in Chapter Three to begin to reveal how tolerance matters for political engagement. In doing so, it begins to confront the central methodological challenge at the core of this dissertation. As I have argued in previous chapters, different perspectives remain entangled because it is difficult to separate the effects of tolerance judgments on participation from effects that owe instead to individual-level factors that generate tolerance attitudes and also shape participation. Teasing out the independent effects of a tolerance judgment from the individual who passes that judgment requires rather sophisticated techniques. In Chapters Five and Six, I introduce, evaluate, and employ a new approach using randomized experiments to identify the direct effect of tolerance judgments on overt behavior and the attitudes that facilitate it. However, most political tolerance research is based on survey evidence; this first empirical chapter seeks to strengthen the causal inferences that can be made using observational data. To do so, I apply nonparametric matching techniques to U.S. and European survey data to better isolate the effects of tolerance attitudes on political activism from the resources, interest, and mobilization networks that shape civic voluntarism.

Given certain disparities in the cross-national data, which are discussed below, this chapter offers only a preliminary assessment of the possible relationships outlined in the previous three chapters. In particular, this chapter only tests the syndrome and tradeoff accounts against Propositions 1, 3 and 4 offered in the previous chapter. I examine more nuanced causal mechanisms relating to risk, conflict, and perceived political freedom (Proposition 2, Chapter 3) using cross-national experiments in Chapter Six. Moreover, although this chapter employs a sophisticated means of isolating the effects of tolerance on participation, it nevertheless relies on
cross-sectional data; appropriate three wave longitudinal studies for analyzing tolerance and modes of participation are not currently available. Therefore, this chapter cannot examine the possibility of a positive feedback loop between political tolerance and political participation.

Still, this chapter contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, it begins to unveil whether and in what ways extending basic rights and liberties to offensive groups affects individuals who tolerate. Although tolerance is often considered the most important democratic value, its consequences for individuals remain poorly understood. This is so primarily because tolerance research has focused largely on its sources or determinants. Only a few observational studies have examined its micro-level effects, either on other attitudes (Gibson 1992b, 2002) or on political participation (Gibson 1987; Gibson and Bingham 1985). This chapter explicitly models political tolerance as an explanatory variable and speaks directly to the question of whether forbearance shapes political action potential. Second, whereas existing analyses of observational data have not effectively addressed the criticism that the relationship between tolerance and participation is spurious, this chapter applies nonparametric matching techniques to cross-national data, which increases both the power and the generalizability of causal inferences that can be made about whether and how political tolerance matters.

The next section develops operational hypotheses and explains the coarsened exact matching procedures used to test them. Following a discussion of the data, measurement, and model specification, I then examine the effects of tolerance on both levels of participation and modes of participation across 17 countries.
4.2 OPERATIONAL HYPOTHESES

Two empirical accounts challenge the theoretical ideal of tolerant activists as custodians of liberal democracy. They assume different microfoundations, predict opposite directional associations, and respond to political context in unique ways. According to the first, if a positive association between tolerance and political action exists, it is only because individuals possess a number of characteristics that simultaneously increase tolerance and their potential for political action. Hence, greater tolerance and regular participation constitute a syndrome of pro-democratic orientations, shaped by similar underlying individual-level factors:

**Syndrome Hypothesis**: *Tolerant individuals are no more or less likely to participate in politics than intolerant individuals.*

By contrast, the second account suggests that tolerance and participation are conflicting, not complementary, orientations. From this perspective, tolerance and participation constitute a tradeoff between pro-democratic orientations. Moreover, this perspective conjectures a causal relationship between tolerance and participation with few contextual caveats. The attitudinal properties of tolerance and intolerance are “similarly different” in polities as diverse as the United States and Canada (Sniderman et al. 1996), Russia (Gibson 1998) and South Africa (Gibson and Gouws 2003). A direct, negative effect of tolerance on civic engagement owing to attitudinal, rather than individual-level, asymmetry should therefore hold across countries and should be robust to the inclusion of various control variables:

**Tradeoff hypothesis**: *Tolerant individuals are less likely to participate in politics than intolerant individuals*

It is not clear from either of these standard accounts which forms of political action, if any, political tolerance should influence. As I argued in Chapter Three, whether and how
tolerance influences participation depends on the difficulty of performing the political act. The hurdles posed by different modes of political expression may be understood as contextual determinants of whether tolerance stimulates or suppresses political action potential.

_Private_ political actions (e.g. voting, donating, contacting) pose low hurdles – usually loss of time, energy, or money – which civic skills and material resources serve to overcome. _Public_ political actions (e.g. protest, boycotts, rallies, petitioning) pose high hurdles because they involve cooperation with other citizens and potential conflict with counter-participants and government authorities. Beyond resources, interest, and mobilization networks, these high social costs require certain positive dispositions toward disagreement, risk, and conflict.

To the extent that tolerance is a more unpopular, disagreeable, and risky position than intolerance, it poses non-trivial social costs to the tolerant individual which are not unlike those costs associated with expressing one’s own political views through public means. This correspondence is important because social psychologists have demonstrated that individuals tend to behave consistently across similar types of situations, e.g. situations that make similar demands on actors who encounter them (Furr and Funder 2003; Shoda et al. 1993). Individuals who endure weighty costs to protect political expression by nonconformist groups may be more willing to confront similar costs to their own political expression. Hence, a direct relationship between tolerance and political activism is conditional on parallels in their relative costs to the individual actor:

**Behavioral Consistency Hypothesis:** _Tolerant individuals will be more likely to participate in high-cost, public forms of political action than intolerant individuals._

Importantly, the connection between individuals’ applied support for civil liberties and their willingness to participation through contentious and collective public action may be far
more tenuous in certain political contexts. Whether individuals will draw any connections between democratic orientations like tolerance and civic engagement depends in the first place on the availabilities of these values in the public. Theories of political socialization expect broad disparities in the distribution and support for democratic norms across countries at different levels of democratization. Past studies find persistent differences across post-communist and Western democracies in levels of both tolerance (e.g. Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007) and civic engagement (Wallace, Pichler and Haerpflner 2012). Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) also fail to identify connection between tolerance and participation in relatively new democracies. Political socialization therefore may account for:

**Political Socialization Hypothesis:** Tolerant citizens are no more or less likely than intolerant citizens to participate in politics in post-communist democracies while they are more likely to participate in established democracies.

Still, citizens in post-socialist democracies do not entirely lack democratic values (e.g. Gibson, Duch and Tedin 1993; Whitefield and Evans 2001); however, their understanding of democracy may differ significantly from Western publics’ (Dalton 1994; Neundorf 2010). Democratic transition in some formerly repressive regimes generated considerable political uncertainty, facilitated corruption and crime, and aggravated ethnic and linguistic divisions in society. Tolerant citizens in these contexts may be less likely to view dissent and disagreement as intrinsically useful to democratic stability and, in some cases, may continue to view the government and political actions taken in full public view with suspicion. For similar reasons, the costs of *private* participation may be perceived as higher in these contexts. Therefore, to the extent that connections can be drawn between tolerance and participation in post-authoritarian systems,
New Democracy Hypothesis: Tolerant citizens are more likely to engage in private modes of participation than intolerant citizens in post-communist democracies.

4.3 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

One reason explanations of the tolerance-participation linkage remain entangled is that scholars have not been able to separate the direct effects of tolerance attitudes on participation from effects that owe instead to individual-level factors that generate tolerance attitudes. Fortunately, researchers using observational data can now minimize differences between tolerant and intolerant individuals on a host of observable traits that drive (in)tolerance and may also shape differences in participation (e.g. education, dogmatism, support for democratic norms and institutions, discussion network heterogeneity). Through coarsened exact matching (CEM) procedures (Iacus, King and Porro 2012; Ho et al 2007), it is possible to balance and pair individuals on such dimensions as completely as possible and constrain analysis only to respondents who mirror one another on all observable dimensions except tolerance.

Statistical matching designs have their basis in the Neyman-Rubin causal framework (Neyman 1990; Rubin 2006), which increases the power of causal inferences in non-experimental settings where selection confounders pose problems for analysis. In brief, let $Y_{i1}$ be the potential outcome for the $i$th individual if she receives a treatment (e.g., a non-smoking program), and $Y_{i0}$ if she does not. The causal effect of treatment then is $\pi_i = Y_{i1} - Y_{i0}$. However, the “fundamental problem of casual inference” (Holland 1986) is that we cannot both treat and not treat individual $i$; $Y_{i1}$ and $Y_{i0}$ cannot both be observed.

Instead, we treat some but not others and observe differences across the groups. Experiments use random assignment to ensure that observed differences between the groups
result from treatment exposure rather than other factors. Nonrandom designs must rely on the assumption that selection into treatment depends only on $X$ observable covariates and on no other observable or unobservable characteristics.\footnote{This is typically called the Selection on Observables Assumption (SOA), which is assumed by most causal approaches in observational social science (Rubin 1974). The SOA requires that there are no unobserved or excluded characteristics that drive selection into treatment after conditioning on $X$. Therefore, SOA must be assumed to hold after conditioning. In practice, there is no direct way to assess whether SOA is reasonable in a particular study. However, balance and sensitivity tests can provide information about how strong the selection assumption will be in a particular research design. For instance, see Table 5 in this chapter.} That is, conditional on $X$, the potential outcomes of receiving treatment or control are orthogonal to the particular treatment assignment, or $\{T \perp Y_i, Y_0\}|X$. In the present analysis, conditioning on the set of observable factors that drive the choice to tolerate one’s most disliked political out-group – factors that have been theoretically grounded and shown to be empirically robust over a half-century of empirical research – permits me to assess the independent effects of tolerance on levels of participation.

There are several matching methods for improving covariate balance between tolerant and intolerant individuals. Mahalanobis Distance Matching (MDM) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) “choose a fixed number of observations ex ante (typically a multiple of the number of treated units) and hope for imbalance reduction [between treatment and control groups] as a result of the procedure. In contrast, Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) and caliper-based approaches choose a fixed level of imbalance ex ante and hope that the number of observations left as a result is sufficiently large” (King et al. 2011: 2).

However, two advantages of CEM over PSM are that the former makes no functional form or distributional assumptions about the relationship between treatment and outcome, and that its statistical properties enable CEM to further reduce imbalance, model dependence,
estimation errors, bias, and variance between treatment and control respondents on most important covariates. By contrast, the balancing properties of PSM hold “only on average across samples and even then only by assuming a set of normally unverifiable assumptions about the data generation process. In any application, a single use of [PSM] techniques can increase imbalance and model dependence by any amount” (Iacus, King and Porro 2011: 2). Moreover, CEM can be applied to any modeling strategy – such as OLS regression or maximum likelihood estimation – as a simple weighting of respondents to render their values on selection confounders statistically balanced. This makes interpreting estimates derived from models in which CEM has been applied relatively straightforward; akin to conventional standards.

The principal difference between non-parametric (i.e. pre-estimation) matching methods and statistical controls using multiple regression is that the former restricts analysis to a reasonable comparison group. That is, a group in which the “treated” and “control” subjects are approximately equivalent on factors that could predict their selection into the treatment or control categories. For instance, suppose that individuals “select into” treatment – tolerance, in this case – based only on their level of dogmatism and support for democratic procedures. Through CEM, the researcher stratifies tolerant and intolerant respondents by “coarsened” levels of each underlying variable to facilitate pairing a tolerant individual of moderate dogmatism and strong support for democratic procedures with an intolerant individual of moderate dogmatism and strong support for democratic procedures. Where differences between dogmatism and democratic procedures support have been balanced across tolerant and intolerant respondents, any disparity in these respondents’ levels of participation can be attributed to the fact that one respondent in the matched pair is tolerant while the other is not.
As a consequence of this type of procedure, matching sacrifices large sample sizes in order to furnish unbiased effects of tolerance on participation; this approximates the assumption of no omitted variable bias in linear regression (Zanutto 2006) – an assumption that is often violated according to the syndrome account of tolerance and participation. Matching techniques are generally unnecessary when covariate distributions are similar across “treatment” and “control” groups (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba 1999; Rubin 1997). This will not be the case where tolerance is employed as an independent variable, because tolerant and intolerant individuals tend to differ substantially in terms of their basic psychological orientations (e.g. dogmatism, insecurity), broad democratic orientations (e.g. support for procedural norms), and concern for the normative community (e.g. sociotropic threat).

I therefore employ CEM procedures to conduct a basic operational test of the perspectives developed here. If tolerance and participation constitute a syndrome of pro-democratic traits, positive and significant bivariate correlations between them should vanish when tolerance is conditioned on individual-level selection confounders that cause tolerance and may also influence participation (the syndrome hypothesis). If instead the tradeoff hypothesis is accurate, tolerance should exert a significant but negative influence on participation after controlling for observable antecedents that cause it. Alternatively, the behavioral consistency hypothesis expects tolerance to stimulate participation – but only through collective and contentious, public means, and only in established democracies.

### 4.3.1 Data, measurement, and model specification

Analysis relies on the 2006 “U.S. Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy” (USCID) survey and the 2004 “International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) “Citizenship” survey of 16
European countries.¹⁵ Coarsened exact matching requires a dichotomous explanatory variable to allow each tolerant individual to be matched with her best “intolerant counterfactual.” I first generate tolerance indices for each dataset and then split at the index mean to create a grouping variable in which tolerant individuals are “more tolerant” than the sample mean and intolerant individuals are “less tolerant” than the sample mean. Dividing in this manner sacrifices no observations and allows for a more conservative test of between-subject differences by not limiting comparison to extremely (in)tolerant individuals. In the USCID, tolerance is measured as respondents’ mean willingness to allow “public demonstrations” by radical Muslims, atheists, communists, and religious fundamentalists. Tolerance in the ISSP is one’s average willingness to permit “public meetings” by religious extremists, racists, and militarists. These items are not “content-controlled” – that is, respondents formulate tolerance judgments about preselected groups rather than a particular group that they strongly dislike. Content-controlled tolerance items are available only in USCID data and I include results based on these measures for comparison throughout the analysis.¹⁶ Question wording for these and all other variables is presented in the appendix to Chapter Four.

The theoretical rationale for CEM is to minimize differences across respondents on those individual-level factors that predict (in)tolerance but may also shape participation. As I discussed in Chapter Two, individuals are generally more tolerant when they perceive their political enemies as less threatening, when they more strongly support democratic norms and

¹⁵ These are Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
¹⁶ Alternative cross-national datasets, such as the World Values Survey (1995) and Eurobarometer (1997) offer content controlled tolerance items but lack extensive or even similar participation items. The European Social Survey does not include tolerance items in any wave.
procedures, and when they are less dogmatic and psychologically insecure. These same factors may account for variation in levels of participation across tolerant and intolerant citizens.

Dogmatism represents the propensity for closed-minded thinking and is measured with five items: that there is only one correct philosophy in the world, that it is better to pick friends who share one’s beliefs, that people in the world are either for “truth” or against it, and that compromise with political opponents is dangerous. Sociotropic threat is measured as the extent to which respondents perceive their target group is dangerous, unwilling to follow the rules of democracy, un-American, or likely to “change everything” if they came to power. Support for democratic norms and procedures is a composite index of individuals’ support for individual freedom over public order and security and a firm belief in multiparty competition. Social network heterogeneity indicates the average opinion diversity among respondents’ political discussion partners who are friends, neighbors, or coworkers.

Among these, discussion network heterogeneity and sociotropic threat measures are unavailable in ISSP data. To proxy for network heterogeneity, I match European respondents by population density. This cannot ensure that they do in fact discuss politics with people who hold different views, but research consistently reports higher network heterogeneity in terms of race, religion, income, occupation, and education among individuals who reside in urban areas (e.g. McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001). To the extent that such factors influence political views, greater opportunity for ideologically diverse discussion partners will exist in urban areas than in the countryside. Threat measures are not offered in the ISSP, but these are not conventionally included in models that do not employ content-controlled measures of tolerance (Gibson 1992a).
Statistical models will compare the effects of tolerance on participation when tolerance has been “conditioned” on these factors through CEM and when it has not. But tolerance must also significantly influence political action independently of conventional predictors of “civic voluntarism” (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). According to standard accounts, people participate because they have assets at their disposal that enable political action, because they are sufficiently interested in political matters, and because they are in a better position to be called into action. Indicators of these three dimensions – resources (education, income, and free time), psychological engagement with politics (political interest and efficacy), and mobilization networks (involvement in civic associations) – are included in the vector of control variables in all models. Additionally, since education and associational involvement have been found to also increase tolerance (Bobo and Licari 1989; Iglič 2010), I also include these variables in the CEM function. Respondents’ education level ranges from 0 – 6, and at the poles represents no formal schooling and completed post-graduate degree, respectively. Free time is the weekly hours respondents do not spend working, and their income is categorized by decile. Efficacy is measured as respondents’ belief that they grasp political matters and that politicians are concerned with their political opinions. Political interest is respondents’ average frequency of political discussion and general interest in political matters, while associational involvement is a count of 0 – 17 memberships in voluntary organizations.

Finally, I control for a variety of demographic and other predictors of political participation through simple regression adjustment. Previous research shows that using conventional controls to adjust for remaining covariate imbalances is robust against violations of the linear model in matched samples (Rubin 1979; Rubin and Thomas 2000). Gender has an important and variable influence on voting behavior while race carries mixed but nontrivial
effects, especially for non-voting participation (Leighley 1995). Dichotomous measures of both traits are incorporated into the models, as is respondents’ age. Beyond demographics, I control for strength of party identification, interpersonal trust (the belief that people are fair, helpful, and trustworthy), and institutional trust (average confidence in the legislature, political parties, constitutional court, and legal system). Whitely (1995) finds that strong party identifiers are more likely to be activists, while social trust increases participation especially in public actions like protest (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Benson and Rochon 2004). Political/Institutional trust is expected to decrease the probability of civic engagement (Kaase 1999).

I examine the effect of political tolerance on participation in several activities, including: voting, contacting elected officials, donating to political candidates or causes, volunteering for campaigns or other political work (USCID only), petitioning, boycotting products, attending political rallies (ISSP only), protest, and joining political causes via the internet. To assess whether political tolerance influences participation, initial models will examine the effects of tolerance on overall levels of participation using a full count of political activities, ranging from 0 – 8 in both datasets. This serves as a preliminary test of the syndrome and tradeoff accounts of tolerance and participation, which do not predict heterogeneity across modes of action. I then examine how political tolerance matters for participation using a series of ordinal logistic regressions to compare cross-national patterns of participation through public and private forms of action. This serves to test the revisionist costs-consistency hypothesis and new democracy hypothesis proposed here.
4.4  POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND LEVELS OF PARTICIPATION

According to the *syndrome hypothesis*, political tolerance and political participation are positively associated because tolerant and intolerant citizens differ on a number of individual-level characteristics that influence both tolerance and political activism. Operationally, this relationship should manifest as positive and significant bivariate correlations that *wash out* once tolerance is conditioned on individual-level differences through CEM. By contrast, the *tradeoff hypothesis* posits that tolerance will suppress political action potential because attributes unique to tolerance render preferences weak, pliable, and ambivalent. This relationship should emerge where tolerance has been conditioned on individual-level selection confounders through CEM. The results in Table 3 do not support either claim. Positive and significant bivariate relationships between tolerance and participation do not become insignificant and do not change direction when coarsened exact matching is applied. Instead, tolerance exerts a consistently positive effect on participation levels, whose magnitude surges as additional control variables are introduced. Political tolerance appears to *increase* political activity over and above the conventional predictors of political participation.
Table 3 Political Tolerance and Levels of Participation in the United States and Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Europe†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( r )</td>
<td>CEM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free time</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational involvement</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional trust</td>
<td>-0.143</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Party ID</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-0.973</td>
<td>(0.305)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.170</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 3</td>
<td>1.424</td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 4</td>
<td>1.947</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 5</td>
<td>2.603</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 6</td>
<td>4.008</td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 7</td>
<td>5.093</td>
<td>(0.583)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-557.788</td>
<td>-303.489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results from CEM-balanced ordered logistic regression. Standard Errors in parentheses. Boldfaced entries significant at \( p \leq .05 \)
†Standard errors clustered by country. Table A.1 in Appendix A includes country fixed effects in the ISSP model.
This is an important finding. Tolerance is, according to previous work, an ambivalent and weak position compared to intolerance. Yet it appears to stimulate participation in both the American and European contexts even after controlling for the most widely accepted and potent determinants of civic voluntarism. And the effect is not trivial. Exponentiation of the coefficients reveals that, in the United States, tolerant individuals are likely to take part in nearly 2.5 additional actions than intolerant individuals, while Europeans will engage in at least 1.2 more actions – a 31 and 15 percent increase in participation, respectively. In the United States, this is roughly half of the cumulative effect on participation of resources, psychological engagement, and mobilization potential.

Such influence merits additional robustness and specification checks. First, note the significant loss of U.S. observations in column three of Table 3. This loss is partially attributable to the CEM procedure itself (214 observations are lost from column 1 to column 2) and further attributable to the inclusion of additional control variables for which there are low response rates (namely, network heterogeneity and strong party identification). Since it is not theoretically defensible to exclude these latter controls, I address this problem by employing an alternate matching procedure – Propensity Score kernel Matching. PSM tends to preserve more observations. But it retains them at the expense of greater and sometimes random imbalance in other covariates and increased model dependence (Iacus, King and Porro 2011). However, a similar pattern of results across CEM and PSM models would increase confidence that the results are not model-dependent.

PSM using the kernel algorithm uses all observations from the control, i.e. intolerant, group and weights them. The closer each intolerant individual’s propensity to in fact be tolerant – that is, the more similar each intolerant individual is to a tolerant individual in terms of their
threat perceptions, dogmatism, support for democratic values, etc. – the higher their weight. By contrast very low weights are given to intolerant observations that differ significantly from tolerant observations. Therefore, PSM using kernel matching retains more observations because each tolerant individual is matched with several intolerant individuals, and during estimation, weights are applied which are inversely proportional to the distance between tolerant and intolerant observations on selection confounders.

The outcome of estimation represents the “Average Treatment effect on the Treated” or ATT, which in this case is the difference between the levels of participation between tolerant individuals and the levels of participation of tolerant individuals if they were instead intolerant:

Equation 1

\[ ATT = E(\Delta | D = 1) = E(y_1|x, D = 1) - E(y_0|x, D = 1) \]

where \( D = 1 \) represents “treated” or in this case “tolerant” individuals, and \( x \) represents confounding variables sociotropic threat perceptions, dogmatism, support for democratic procedures, network heterogeneity, and education. The last term of Equation 4.1, \( E(y_0|x, D = 1) \), is a counterfactual condition that cannot be observed, as we wish to know what the outcome would be for the tolerant if they had not in fact been tolerant \( y_0 \). Propensity score matching provides a good approximation of this term by strongly weighting observations of intolerant individuals with very similar underlying characteristics as tolerant individuals in the data set, such that these matched pairs share similar propensity scores \( p(x) \) for being tolerant, but in reality differ in their observed levels of tolerance:

Equation 2

\[ ATT = E(\Delta | p(x), D = 1) = E(y_1|p(x), D = 1) - E(y_0|p(x), D = 1) \]
Table 4 presents the results for the United States using Propensity Score kernel matching. As can be seen in the first column, this method retains fully 871 observations. In the second column, we see that the average effect of tolerance on participation is 0.477, which can be interpreted as the percent change in number of participatory actions in which an intolerant individual would engage if she had instead been tolerant. Given our underlying scale of 8 participatory actions, tolerance contributes to an increase of approximately 3.8 participatory actions over intolerance where threat, dogmatism, democratic procedures support, education and network heterogeneity are equivalent across these groups. This suggests that the results are not method-dependent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tolerance and Levels of Participation in the United States using Propensity Score Kernel Matching</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Propensity score weighting on dogmatism, threat, democratic procedures support, education, and discussion network heterogeneity. Additional controls: institutional and social trust, income, free time, political interest, race, gender, age.

A second possible objection to the findings in Table 3 is that CEM did not fully eliminate statistical differences across tolerant and intolerant groups and failed to minimize the influence of selection confounders on the relationship between political tolerance and political activism. In Table 5, I report the degree of imbalance between tolerant and intolerant groups on the main covariates before and after matching. The table shows that substantial differences between the groups on mean values of main covariates were largely eradicated after CEM procedures were implemented. This helps confirm that the observed difference between tolerant
and intolerant groups is not an artifact of preexisting disparities in the major predictors of tolerance and participation.
Table 5: Imbalance between Tolerant and Intolerant Groups on Main Covariates, USCID and ISSP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5.754</td>
<td>5.693</td>
<td>5.768</td>
<td>5.844</td>
<td>5.754</td>
<td>5.693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>5.504</td>
<td>5.570</td>
<td>5.719</td>
<td>5.736</td>
<td>2.691</td>
<td>2.974</td>
<td>2.725</td>
<td>2.720</td>
<td>2.606</td>
<td>2.985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>3.352</td>
<td>2.862</td>
<td>2.911</td>
<td>2.910</td>
<td>5.371</td>
<td>5.301</td>
<td>5.455</td>
<td>5.766</td>
<td>5.662</td>
<td>5.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free time</td>
<td>140.22</td>
<td>140.75</td>
<td>142.83</td>
<td>142.27</td>
<td>126.63</td>
<td>125.86</td>
<td>126.50</td>
<td>125.79</td>
<td>125.94</td>
<td>126.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>2.427</td>
<td>2.455</td>
<td>2.405</td>
<td>2.412</td>
<td>2.818</td>
<td>2.682</td>
<td>2.780</td>
<td>2.795</td>
<td>2.936</td>
<td>2.615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>2.874</td>
<td>2.816</td>
<td>2.825</td>
<td>2.827</td>
<td>2.794</td>
<td>2.681</td>
<td>2.823</td>
<td>2.817</td>
<td>2.895</td>
<td>2.622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational involvement</td>
<td>1.363</td>
<td>1.215</td>
<td>1.153</td>
<td>1.161</td>
<td>1.382</td>
<td>1.131</td>
<td>1.419</td>
<td>1.427</td>
<td>1.504</td>
<td>1.083</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Boldfaced comparisons indicate significant differences at .10 level between tolerant and intolerant groups
A third source of bias may relate to how tolerance is measured. The tradeoff hypothesis is based on evidence that tolerance and intolerance are qualitatively different attitudes when measured in relation to groups that respondents select as their most disliked (i.e. content controlled measurement). The evidence herein that challenges the tradeoff hypothesis is based instead on measures of tolerance toward groups that researchers selected, which respondents may not necessarily oppose (i.e. GSS measures). However, the same patterns emerge in Table 6, which repeats the analysis in the United States using tolerance for each respondent’s most disliked group as the independent variable.

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17 See Chapter 2, Section 2.1 for a review of these measures of political tolerance.
18 Results are presented for U.S. respondents only; alternative tolerance items are not available in the ISSP.
Table 6 Tolerance for Most-Disliked Group and Levels of Participation in the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$r$</th>
<th>$CEM$</th>
<th>$CEM$ with Controls</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.468 (0.254)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.236 (0.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.026 (0.077)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.004 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.713 (0.191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.149 (0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational involvement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.500 (0.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.049 (0.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.034 (0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Party ID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.278 (0.271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.887 (0.366)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.031 (0.274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.010 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.050 (0.154)</td>
<td>2.207 (1.960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.838 (0.162)</td>
<td>3.303 (1.968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.477 (0.183)</td>
<td>4.227 (1.991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.145 (0.184)</td>
<td>5.147 (2.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.881 (0.179)</td>
<td>6.006 (1.990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 6</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.269 (0.314)</td>
<td>7.529 (1.982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.913 (0.427)</td>
<td>8.382 (2.033)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log pseudolikelihood   -937,540 | -504,396 |
Observations            928       | 611      | 376       |
Pseudo-$R^2$            0.005     | 0.137    |

Results from CEM-balanced ordered logistic regression. Standard Errors in parentheses. Boldfaced entries significant at $p \leq .05$.

Tolerance remains positively consequential for political participation where it is conditioned on sociotropic threat, dogmatism, support for democratic values, discussion network heterogeneity, education, and associational involvement. Respondents who extend basic rights to their most disliked groups participate in 1.6 more actions than respondents who do not ($b=0.468$; $p \leq .05$). Again regression-adjusted CEM sacrifices a large number of observations; however,
Table 7 presents the same pattern of outcomes using propensity score kernel matching where tolerance is measured using content-controlled methodology.

**Table 7** Tolerance and Levels of participation in the United States using Content-Controlled Measures and Propensity Score Kernel Matching

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>ATT</th>
<th>Bootstrapped Standard Error</th>
<th>t-score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>3.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerant</td>
<td>458</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Propensity score weighting on dogmatism, threat, democratic procedures support, education, and discussion network heterogeneity. Additional controls: institutional and social trust, income, free time, political interest, race, gender, age.

Finally, pooled European analysis in the ISSP may bias findings toward statistical significance given the large number of observations. Moreover, applying matching procedures to a pan-European sample ignores real variation across countries in both tolerance and its predictors. For instance, completing the highest level of education in the Netherlands and in Latvia may not produce identical knowledge effects across Dutch and Latvian citizens. As a final robustness check, I disaggregate the ISSP data, match tolerant and intolerant respondents within each country, and run unique models for each country sample. The third column of Table 8 presents the marginal effects of tolerance on participation based on CEM-balanced ordered logistic regression estimates.
Table 8 Marginal Effect of Political Tolerance on Participation Levels, by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Marginal Effect</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New democracies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.819</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>1.704</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>-0.395</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.674</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>1.105</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>1.269</td>
<td>1129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>1.349</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>1.049</td>
<td>842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Old democracies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>1.610</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>1.355</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>1.374</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>1.018</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>1.452</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.314</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>1.369</td>
<td>895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>1.611</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.286</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>1.331</td>
<td>851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>1.551</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA†</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>2.433</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA (content-controlled [c-c])†</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>1.597</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results from ordered logistic regression with CEM balancing. Boldfaced entries significant at p ≤ .05

The evidence again casts doubt on conventional syndrome and tradeoff accounts of tolerance and participation. Tolerance _stimulates_ political action in 11 of 17 countries studied by an average of approximately 1.5 additional actions among tolerant over intolerant respondents. The effect is not entirely limited to longstanding democracies, as tolerance stimulates participation in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. But the effect is far weaker in the post-communist context and, in the case of Hungary, suppresses political participation as the tradeoff hypothesis suggests.
The findings thus far challenge conventional notions of how tolerance and participation are linked. The increase in political activity that accompanies tolerance cannot be understood merely as a symptom of a broader constellation of democratic traits, as the syndrome hypothesis maintains. Matching procedures successfully isolate tolerance and intolerance from these factors (cf. Table 5), meaning that the observed differences between individuals are likely to have resulted from differences in tolerance attitudes. This in turn poses new questions for the “tradeoff” between greater tolerance and more vibrant civic engagement, either because being tolerant facilitates exposure to the kinds of cross-cutting political talk that sinks confidence in one’s own views and makes citizens socially accountable to diversely opinionated constituencies (Mutz 2005), or because tolerance is too weak and too dissonant a position to stimulate political action. The unexpected regularity emerging here is that attitudinal tolerance – divorced from those individual-level characteristics that lead one to tolerate in the first place – increases political engagement.

Of course, the skeptic may still be skeptical: limitations in the USCID and ISSP survey data prevent me from examining the influence of additional variables that I argue in Chapter Three are crucial to public participation – namely attitudes toward conflict and dissent. Having matched on all important observed factors, these remaining unobserved factors could still account for the positive relationship. Matching reduces the degree to which the tolerance-participation is spurious due to other observed variables in the statistical model. And while it cannot perfectly render unobserved factors inconsequential, the effects of such factors can be simulated empirically and ruled out theoretically (see section 4.6, below). I more fully address these factors using original survey-experiments in Chapter Six. Moreover, without longitudinal data, it is not possible to address whether a positive causal feedback between tolerance and
participation accounts for the relationship demonstrated above. However, the next section will
test certain implications of both these perspectives by evaluating the influence of tolerance
across different modes of participation, and across different countries. These analyses cannot
conclude beyond a shadow of a doubt that only tolerance causes participation rather than the
reverse, but they will provide a bevy of support for the heretofore understudied behavioral
consequences of political tolerance.

4.5 POLITICAL TOLERANCE AND MODES OF PARTICIPATION

In what sense does being willing to extend expressive rights to disliked groups drive the tolerant
individual to embrace those same rights for herself? I have proposed the behavioral consistency
hypothesis to explain this outcome. Tolerance is an unpopular, disagreeable, and risky position
that dissents from majority intolerance and may be misconstrued as overt support for a widely
reviled group and its nonconformist ideals. In this sense, tolerance is not unlike public activism,
which seeks to challenge the status quo through non-anonymous actions taken in full public
view. On one hand, people tend to behave consistently across situations that make similar
demands of the actors engaged (Shoda et al. 1993). On the other hand, previous research
suggests that tolerance has the capacity to reduce perceptions of threat (Gibson 2002) and risk in
a manner that may directly facilitate their engagement in high-cost forms of political activity.
Individuals who endure weighty costs to protect political expression by nonconformist groups
may be more willing to face-down similar barriers to their own political expression. Hence, the
relationship between tolerance and political activism is conditional on parallels in their relative
costs to the individual actor. The important contextual caveat, however, is that this relationship
may be reversed in new democracies where deep seated suspicion of government and collective political activities persists (Wallace et al. 1995) and where citizens may perceive very real risks of government reprisal should they publicly challenge the status quo. In the post-authoritarian context, I therefore speculate that tolerant citizens may be more likely to engage in private, rather than public, forms of action (the new democracy hypothesis).

As evidence for these propositions, Table 9 illustrates the marginal change in participation in each particular action from intolerant to tolerant individuals within each country in the data. The entries reflect the increase or decrease in likelihood of taking each form of action that corresponds with a shift from intolerance to tolerance. The marginal change coefficients are grouped into quadrants so it is easier to visualize clusters of private and public activities among respondents in post-communist and longstanding democracies. Boldfaced entries are significant at p ≤ .05.
The clearest results, in the lower-right quadrant, support the hypothesis that tolerance stimulates participation in contentious-collective, public actions in longstanding democracies. A shift from intolerance to tolerance raises the likelihood of at least one activity in every country in the sample. In Austria, tolerant citizens are more likely than their intolerant countrymen to engage in every public activity. The pattern is weakest in Denmark, where tolerant Danes are nearly 10 percent more likely to protest than intolerant Danes, but not significantly more or less likely to petition, boycott, or attend rallies.
In general, the magnitudes of marginal change in each public mode of participation from intolerance to tolerance are moderate to small in size. But the range of tolerance’s influence on public participation is far broader than it is on private modes of action. In the lower-left quadrant, it is clear that tolerant citizens in some—especially Scandinavian—countries will also tend to take more private actions than intolerant citizens. The effects are mostly confined to contacting, however, which has the most potential for conflict and may in some cases involve face-to-face encounters. Taken together, the lower half of Table 9 supports the liberal commitment hypothesis: tolerance stimulates more participation through public rather than through private political actions.

The new democracy hypothesis is not supported, however. Tolerance in post-communist democracies does not tend to increase the likelihood that citizens will engage in private political activities. In Bulgaria and Hungary respectively, tolerance instead decreases the likelihood of voting and contacting officials, and is otherwise inconsequential. Tolerant Poles are 6.8 percent more likely and tolerant Czechs 4.9 percent more likely than their intolerant compatriots to donate to political parties or causes. But in these countries, and in Slovenia, tolerance also increases the probability of involvement in certain public acts as well, though the effects are generally small. These states experienced rather smooth transition to democracy and are characterized by low corruption and little ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. The positive influence of democratic orientations on activism may be taken as a sign of democratic consolidation in these countries.

The core idea behind the behavioral consistency hypothesis is that tolerance, as a high-cost decision, has the capacity to increase the degree to which individuals are willing to confront costs associated with public political action. In that sense, tolerance facilitates public political
action in the same way that resources, psychological engagement with politics, and mobilization potential lowers barriers to civic engagement in general. Does tolerance truly help lift citizens over the high barriers to public political action? A strong test of this proposition would show that tolerant individuals at the *lowest* level of resources, psychological engagement with politics and mobilization potential are nonetheless more likely to engage in public political activities than intolerant individuals at the *highest* levels of these factors. Using the most conservative, content-controlled measures of tolerance for respondents most disliked group in USCID data, Figure 1 depicts the marginal increase in probability of public action among tolerant and intolerant individuals at the minimum and maximum levels of associational involvement, political interest, and education.

![Figure 1: Public Participation among Tolerant and Intolerant Citizens at Polarized Levels of Civic Voluntarism Predictors](image)

*Figure 1* Public Participation among Tolerant and Intolerant Citizens at Polarized Levels of Civic Voluntarism Predictors
The effects of associational involvement make the point most clearly. Public actions, which require much cooperation and may involve conflict, require connections to organizations that create both the opportunity for actions like protest, volunteering, and boycotting (e.g. Diani and McAdam 2003), and also the encouragement to get involved in such activities. Yet tolerant individuals with the lowest levels of associational involvement remain more likely petition, boycott, volunteer, or demonstrate than the most involved intolerant individuals. Similarly, less educated tolerant citizens (i.e. those who have completed no more than a high-school education), remain more likely to engage in contentious and collective political actions than the most educated intolerant individuals (i.e. those who have completed at least some college). Although intolerant individuals who are more interested in politics appear slightly more likely to engage in public political activities than tolerant individuals, the difference does not achieve conventional levels of statistical significance.

4.6 ROSENBAUM SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF TOLERANCE’S EFFECT ON PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Attitudinal tolerance increases public political action after conditioning on differences across tolerant and intolerant individuals on observed factors that drive tolerance and may also influence participation. Yet it remains possible that the effects demonstrated thus far owe instead to unobservable factor(s), and that these “hidden biases” account for the positive relationship between attitudinal tolerance and civic engagement. In Chapter Three, for instance, I reviewed evidence from political participation research that finds orientations toward risk and conflict in particular may render the costs of public activism less daunting. I argued that tolerance has the
capacity to shape these factors; however, it is possible that tolerant and intolerant individuals differ in terms of these dispositions as *preexisting* factors. If that is the case, then emergent regularity in this chapter may nevertheless remain spurious and the theoretical perspective I have developed in this dissertation may be indefensible. Fortunately, Rosenbaum (2002) proposes a sensitivity analysis that can be used to estimate the size of the effect on the individuals’ selection into tolerance that any bias due to unobserved factors would need to reach in order to overturn inferences about the influence of tolerance on public participation.

The procedure relies first on propensity-score matching (as opposed to coarsened exact matching), and second on the estimation of a series of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of the effects for public participation under increasingly restrictive assumptions about the probability of each individual in a matched pair being tolerant. A baseline is first established under the assumption that each individual in a matched pair shares equal likelihood of being tolerant. This is associated with an odds ratio (or, in the parlance of Rosenbaum Bounds analysis, a gamma “Γ”) of 1. The procedure then simulates gammas of larger values owing to the influence of unobserved factors such that the odds that one individuals in a matched pair being tolerant would be 10 percent higher (gamma = 1.1), 20 percent higher (gamma = 1.2) and so on. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is calculated until the null hypothesis of “no effect of tolerance” can be rejected at the .05 level. The gamma value at this point represents the magnitude that hidden bias would have to have on the selection process in order to alter the inferences about the effects of tolerance on public participation. Such a procedure has been used effectively elsewhere in political science, perhaps most clearly by Finkel, Horowitz, and Rojo-Mendoza (2011).

As a means of substantively grounding the size of this effect, the gamma estimate can be compared against the influence of the *observed* effect of the major theoretical predictors of
tolerance on individuals’ propensity to extend procedural rights and civil liberties to groups that they dislike the most. Table 10 estimates these observed effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low perceived Sociotropic threat</th>
<th>0.641</th>
<th>1.899</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High support for democratic values and procedures</td>
<td>1.004</td>
<td>2.729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low dogmatism</td>
<td>0.522</td>
<td>1.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High discussion network heterogeneity</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>1.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-9.858</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.073)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Results from logistic regression with standard errors in parentheses. Boldfaced entries significant at p≤ .10 (two-tailed).

As expected: Tolerance is far more likely where respondents do not believe that their most disliked group poses a threat to society, where they more strongly support democratic values and procedures in principle, and where individuals are open-minded, rather than dogmatic, thinkers. Additionally, having a diverse political discussion network significantly increases the likelihood that an individual will countenance ideas and interests they strongly oppose.
Table 11 Sensitivity Analysis for Effects of Tolerance on Public Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratio of Gamma Associated with Unobserved Confounder(s) to Gammas (Selection Effect Odds-Ratios) Associated with:</th>
<th>Gamma (Γ)</th>
<th>Low threat</th>
<th>Low Dogmatism</th>
<th>High support for democratic values and procedures</th>
<th>High network heterogeneity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Participation</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>1.899</td>
<td>1.685</td>
<td>2.729</td>
<td>1.146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11 compares these magnitudes against the simulated effects of unobserved factors on process of selection into tolerance, which are estimated through the Rosenbaum Bounds method. The Gamma value of 1.97 indicates the level at which the effect of tolerance becomes sensitive to hidden bias (upper bound p-value > 0.05): an unobserved factor would need to increase the odds that an individual would be tolerant by 97 percent in order to overturn the inferences I have reported. Substantively speaking, the unobserved factor would need to increase individuals’ propensity to tolerate over and above the effects of sociotropic threat and dogmatism by approximately 27 and 43 percent, respectively. This seems implausible, as these are among the strongest and most consistent predictors of tolerance across countries, and since they almost certainly capture, to some extent, unobserved factors related to personality, evaluations of current political and economic circumstances, etc. It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that the results I have reported are robust to reasonable levels of potential bias caused by unobserved factors.
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that political tolerance matters for political action potential, but not in a way that conforms to extant empirical research. Tolerance is a democratic orientation not only towards which ideas may be expressed legitimately in a society, but also toward how those ideas may be expressed. Independently of both the traits that lead one to put up with her political opponents and also the resources, interest, and opportunities that drive her participation, political tolerance stimulates greater civic engagement – especially through collective and confrontational modes of action that aim to alter the status quo through dramatic means. Tolerance facilitates participation the same way that standard predictors of civic voluntarism lower certain barriers to action. As an exercise in disagreement and dissent, tolerance renders the collective and contentious exercise of political rights and civil liberties less challenging or more endurable. Even at low levels of associational involvement – a factor that mobilizes individuals into public action – tolerant individuals are more likely to petition, volunteer, boycott and protest than intolerant citizens.

Among the more important findings to emerge from the analysis is, hence, a null finding: political tolerance and the choice to vote are generally unrelated. This makes sense from the perspective developed in this dissertation. Beyond support for political rights and civil liberties, tolerance influences modes of participation because it is an orientation toward the actual exercise of those liberties. Voting, as well as other more private forms of action, are perhaps taken for granted in consolidated democracies and do not register as liberties to be exercised. They are simply fundamental features of life in a democracy.

It is therefore important to pay greater attention to the types of participation under consideration when examining the behavioral consequences of democratic orientations. As
Gibson and Bingham (1985) note, “Whether a given propensity (i.e. attitude) will result in behavior...is determined in party by the ‘difficulty’ of performing the act. Strong propensities will only be blocked by high hurdles, whereas weak propensities may be blocked by relatively low hurdles. The strength of the propensity interacts with the situational context in producing behavior” (162). This chapter suggests that political tolerance lowers hurdles to collective and contentious action over and above the enabling effects of resources, psychological engagement with politics, and mobilization potential. It does little to facilitate the propensity to vote, donate, or contact officials.

Several objections to this conclusion can be raised, however. Most basically, the casual arrow could point in the other direction. In fact, this was precisely the democratic learning hypothesis examined by Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) in their multilevel analysis of political tolerance in seventeen countries using the 1995-1997 World Values surveys. Finding that unconventional, public, forms of participation were more strongly tied to political tolerance than more conventional, private, forms of participation, Peffley and Rohrschneider hypothesized and found that “because such modes of participation are frequently used by those in the minority to win concessions from those in the majority, they serve to instruct participants on the value of procedural rights. Thus, by using civil liberties, individuals are also likely to develop a stronger appreciation for political tolerance” (2003: 245, emphasis added). Peffley and Rohrschneider also found that one of the strongest level-2 predictors of political tolerance was democratic longevity. Moreover, the causal dynamic between political tolerance and civic engagement remains unclear. Although I present a bevy of evidence indicating that tolerance drives participation in collective and contentious action, survey data alone cannot begin to uncover what moves the politically tolerant to participate in more social modes of political participation.
Finally, substantiating the causal effect of tolerance on participation is made more difficult where the dependent variable relies on respondents’ self-reported level of political activism. Random measurement error in the dependent variable is not terribly pernicious because it does not bias coefficient slopes and inflates standard errors. It is possible to conclude that the this chapter’s analysis underestimates the effects of tolerance on participation. However, there is also risk of systematic measurement error in self-reported participation, especially among highly educated respondents and respondents residing in longstanding democracies in which political participation is cultivated as a civic responsibility. Although nonparametric matching techniques help rebut the individual-level concern (e.g. the effects of tolerance are estimated for tolerant and intolerant individuals at approximately equal levels of education), the tolerance-participation linkage’s inequality across longstanding and new democracies may be explained by something other than tolerance. Superior measurement of political participation is the best way to refute measurement-error concerns.

Randomized experiments in political tolerance and direct measures of overt political behavior would help respond to these objections. Ideally, researchers would isolate the effects of tolerance on participation with experiments that assign subjects to manifest tolerance or intolerance and, through random assignment, eliminate differences in antecedent factors across individuals. Random assignment would allow researchers to observe how tolerance and intolerance independently affect participation.

However, manipulating tolerance and intolerance in a manner conducive to examining their downstream effects on political behavior is challenging. As I argue in the next chapter, tolerance is more pliable in response to direct persuasion through counterarguments (Gibson 1998), while framing civil liberties disputes variously in terms of public order or free speech
(Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997) exerts only minimal influence over individuals’ natural proclivity toward tolerance (Marcus et al. 1995). I therefore set out in Chapter Five to introduce, test, and evaluate a novel framework for manipulating tolerance judgments in a manner that permits strong causal inferences regarding its effects on participation. This methodological interlude lays the foundation for my cross-national experiments, presented in Chapter Six, where I randomly assign subjects in the United States and Hungary to manifest tolerance or intolerance, and trace the effects of this judgment on subjects’ overt political behavior.
5.0 CAUSAL INFERENCE IN THE STUDY OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE: THE SELF-PERSUASION EXPERIMENT

This chapter develops and tests a novel framework for randomly assigning subjects to practice tolerance or intolerance toward their least-liked group during a hypothetical civil liberties dispute. I first discuss the goals of causal inference and then highlight certain limitations inherent in extant experimental approaches, which hamper successful causal inference about the consequences of tolerance and intolerance for political outcomes. I next present the “self-persuasion experiment.” I theoretically ground it in social psychological research, and test its effects on attitudinal tolerance and intolerance. The findings indicate potent effects of the manipulation on both political tolerance and intolerance. The magnitude of attitude change is particularly strong and significant among initially tolerant respondents assigned to practice intolerance and initially intolerant respondents assigned to practice tolerance. Given that previous work has largely struggled to convert intolerance to tolerance, the self-persuasion experiment offers an important advancement in our ability to randomly assign subjects to manifest (in)tolerance and to study their downstream effects.
Causal inference requires that scholars unequivocally attribute variation in outcomes to the presence or absence of a unique stimulus. The “fundamental problem of causal inference” (Holland 1986) facing social scientists who employ observational data is the lack of the counterfactual condition: researchers can never simultaneously observe within a single unit the presence and absence of the same stimulus. Hence, one cannot attribute unambiguous explanatory power to that stimulus alone without invoking additional assumptions.

Consequently, political scientists increasingly adopt and combine novel approaches to minimizing this problem. One such approach generates counterfactual outcomes from observational data through procedures like nonparametric matching, which I employed in Chapter four. Such techniques appreciably diminish the fundamental problem of causal inference; however, they remain open to objections at their assumptions. In particular, the choice of variables on which to “balance” treatment and control groups and the exact procedure for partly depends on researcher decisions. This discretion can unintentionally jeopardize estimators’ unbiasedness. Although matching methods are superior to regression because they restrict analysis to an appropriate comparison group and therefore come closer to fulfilling the assumption of no omitted variable bias, unobserved factors may still affect the relationship. The Rosenbaum sensitivity analysis in section 4.6 suggested minimal influence of unobservables on the positive relationship between tolerance and participation; however, while these effects can be estimated they cannot be ruled out entirely using observational data alone.

A second, and more powerful approach, employs experiments to randomly assign subjects to different treatment conditions. The boon to causal inference, according to Gerber and Green (2012), is that “The procedure of assigning treatments at random ensures that there is no
systematic tendency for either the treatment or control group to have an advantage…In other words, random assignment implies that the observed and unobserved factors that affect outcomes are equally likely to be present in the treatment and control groups” (p. 7-8).

The standard empirical model in current political science research utilizing randomized experiments is the “downstream model” of treatment effects. Its logic is simple. Subjects are assigned at random to either receive or not receive a treatment. Assignment to treatment is then used as an instrument to estimate effects of the actual receipt of treatment on a particular outcome. Differences between “treatment” and “control” subjects on an outcome of interest are calculated following exposure or non-exposure to the treatment. The discrepancy in mean outcome values between treated and untreated subjects provides an accurate estimate the effect of receiving treatment, because probability dictates that subjects have equal chance of being assigned to treatment or control, and hence are not likely to differ on selection confounders. Covariates can be included in the “downstream” model, but these serve to improve the precision of standard errors and do not fundamentally alter the relationship between treatment and outcome.

Ideally, students of political tolerance and its consequences would employ experiments which assign subjects to manifest tolerance or intolerance and, through random assignment, eliminate differences in antecedents across these groups. Random assignment would allow researchers to observe whether and in what ways tolerance and intolerance independently affect political outcomes. Certain properties of political (in)tolerance render this ideal solution difficult to operationalize, however. On one hand, tolerance and intolerance are attitudinal responses to stimuli that individuals experience and process differently; in the strictest sense, attitudinal (in)tolerance per se cannot be randomly assigned. One solution to this problem employs
“emphasis frames” to manipulate tolerance attitudes indirectly by randomizing variation in stimuli that predict tolerance, like how threatening to society a group appears or how relevant democratic values like free speech are to a particular dispute. Still, these procedures hamper valid causal inferences about the direct effects of tolerance because they directly manipulate beliefs antecedent to tolerance, which themselves may influence outcomes of interest. As I argue below, framing violates the exclusion condition of the “downstream model.”

On the other hand, tolerance judgments are not immutable or intrinsic properties of individuals and are not entirely inflexible in response to direct attempts at persuasion (Gibson 1998; Gibson and Gouws 2003; Sniderman 1996). Tolerance and, to a much lesser extent, intolerance are labile in response to counterarguments that introduce considerations individuals may not have contemplated prior to rendering their initial judgment. Like framing experiments, these procedures facilitate explanations of the etiology of (in)tolerance but pose problems for causal inferences about the consequences of (in)tolerance. For instance, extant “persuasion experiments” tend not to employ control groups (i.e. individuals who are not exposed to any counterarguments) and thus lack a key counterfactual. It is impossible to gauge whether those individuals who have been “converted” (Gibson 1998) to tolerance and intolerance would exhibit different outcome patterns had they not been exposed to counterarguments. The solution, as I argue below, is more complicated than simply adding a control group, because direct persuasion has the potential to introduce other influences on outcomes as well – especially behavioral outcomes.

The central methodological obstacle to understanding the consequences of tolerance and intolerance is that no adequate methodology for randomly and directly manipulating (in)tolerance currently exists. The purpose of this chapter is to develop, test, and evaluate novel
experimental techniques for randomized experiments in political tolerance. Even if individuals cannot be directly and randomly assigned to experience (in)tolerance as an attitude, I argue in this chapter that individuals can be randomly assigned to direct manipulations that compel them to apply tolerance or intolerance in practice. This distinction between attitudinal and applied (in)tolerance is more than a semantic end-around the challenge of manipulating core values and beliefs. Political (in)tolerance is unique among democratic values insofar as civil liberties disputes and contests over how to allocate rights and liberties in a society furnish very concrete circumstances that oblige the application of this value. Philosophers and political theorists have thus long distinguished between tolerance as a general disposition toward admitting the validity of different viewpoints, and toleration as behavioral resistance against the impulse to repress unsavory groups and ideas (e.g. Murphy 1997).

The empirical portion of this chapter develops an experiment that randomly assigns individuals to apply tolerance or intolerance in response to a civil liberties dispute; demonstrates its potent influence on post-test tolerance attitudes; and justifies employing the experiment in the next chapter, which aims to substantiate the direct causal effect of tolerance on political participation. Before discussing my own methodological choices, I review current approaches to manipulating tolerance attitudes and explicate their limitations for causal inference with respect to the consequences of tolerance and intolerance. I then introduce an alternative framework for manipulating tolerance judgments, ground it in the psychology of “self-persuasion, and present the results of several trials. The final section describes how this method will be employed to answer substantive questions in the next chapter.
5.2 EXPERIMENTS IN POLITICAL TOLERANCE

One reason the consequences of political tolerance remain unclear is that scholars have not been able to separate the direct effects of toleration from those individual-level factors that drive tolerance. Manipulating tolerance judgments, and only these judgments, is challenging. Scholars general employ one of two conventional approaches to manipulate tolerance attitudes: framing through experimental vignettes or direct persuasion through counterarguments. These techniques yield varying results with respect to their influence on attitudinal tolerance, but they have made undeniable contributions to what we know about the etiology and nature of tolerance and intolerance. However, neither method is appropriate for understanding the independent effects of tolerance judgments on political outcomes. Here I discuss each approach and detail why a methodological alternative is desirable.

5.2.1 Framing and experimental vignettes

The framing tradition in tolerance research is based on the idea that civil liberties disputes pose difficult questions that cross-cut multiple values, beliefs, and political issues. Media and political elites can shape citizens’ tolerance judgments by framing a civil liberties dispute in terms of (usually) just one of these dimensions. Frames in communication promote specific definitions, constructions, and interpretations of political issues (Gamson 1992). Framing effects may be distinguished from persuasion in that frames alter the relative importance of particular concepts for judging attitudes and beliefs toward an issue or idea, rather than try to change the content of one’s beliefs (Nelson and Oxley 1999), which characterizes the counterargument line of tolerance experiments (Gibson 1998).
For instance, Nelson, Clawson and Oxley’s (1997) canonical framing experiment in
tolerance compares subjects’ willingness to allow a public rally by the Ku Klux Klan when the
choice to do so is framed as either a matter of protecting public order or a question of upholding
free speech. In cognitive psychological terms, frames increase the accessibility and salience of
attitudes that are already available in individuals’ minds. In the case of tolerance judgments,
perceived threat posed to society by their least-liked group and civil liberties support – two of
the strongest predictors of tolerance judgments – are preexisting, available attitudes among
subjects. In turn, framing a civil liberties dispute as an exhortation to uphold free speech will
increase the importance subjects attribute to democratic and civil libertarian norms when judging
whether the KKK should be allowed to hold their rally, while emphasizing threats that the KKK
pose to public order and security increases the salience of sociotropic threat in subjects’ minds.
The former should stimulate tolerance; the latter should suppress it.

Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) find, in support of these propositions, that subjects
exposed to “free speech” frames express 13 percent greater tolerance than subjects exposed to
“public order” frames – an increase of 0.65 points on the 1-5 scale. Consistent with emphasis
framing theory (e.g. Gamson 1992), this effect appears to be mediated by the differential
importance subjects in each frame attribute to free speech versus public order considerations.
Using both real media coverage of a proposed KKK rally in Ohio, as well as highly controlled
vignettes to simulate newspaper coverage of the same rally, the authors report in their
mediational analysis that public order frames directly increase the importance subjects attribute
to security concerns (b=0.35, p≤0.05), which in turn decreases tolerance (b= -0.24, p ≤0.05).
However, although Nelson, Clawson and Oxley find that free speech importance increases
tolerance (b=0.48, p≤0.01), they cannot tie increased importance to the framing effect (b= -0.18,
p>0.05). They explain that the insignificant finding emerges “perhaps because of the already stratospheric level of support enjoyed by free speech values” (1997: 574).

This outcome reveals important limitations of framing procedures in manipulating tolerance judgments. On one hand, the authors admit that the potency of the procedure is questionable: without evidence of a direct framing effect on the importance of free speech, it is not clear that the procedure carries any exogenous influence over subjects’ political tolerance. A control group (in this case, a group of subjects exposed to an issue-irrelevant frame) is necessary to rule out that the between-group treatment effect is not merely attributable to the bolstering influence of public order frames on perceived threat and, in turn, intolerance. In other words, Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) evince that they can indirectly decrease tolerance, but not that they can increase tolerance. For any between-groups design analyzing consequences of tolerance judgments, this problem is similar to an implementation problem known as one-sided noncompliance, when subjects assigned to receive treatment go untreated (Gerber and Green 2012: 133). When this occurs, inferences based on between-groups comparisons are not unbiased.

Nor does this procedure provide an unbiased estimator of intolerance for use in a “downstream model” of treatment effects. Framing experiments introduce unique complications that obscure the independent influence of tolerance judgments on any number of outcomes. Specifically, framing only permits researchers to indirectly shape political tolerance or intolerance. The procedures in the Nelson et al. study, for example, target two of the most theoretically grounded and robust predictors of tolerance attitudes – democratic norms and perceived threat – by increasing their salience to individuals who are confronted with questions about civil liberties. These factors themselves have been tied to directly to a variety of outcomes,
including civic engagement: threat breeds anxiety, which in turn motivates people to more closely monitor and engage in political affairs (Pantoja and Segura 2003), while support for democratic values has been directly tied to protest and other contentious political actions in several contexts (e.g. Benson and Rahn 1997; Benson and Rochon 2004; Finkel and Smith 2010; Gibson 1997). Directly manipulating the salience of threat or democratic values in order to influence tolerance judgments therefore paradoxically makes it difficult to isolate the effects of tolerance per se on downstream outcomes such as political participation. In methodological terms, randomization in framing experiments no longer satisfies the exclusion condition for use as an instrumental variable for any downstream effects to be measured.

A third problem with framing procedures is the tradeoff between theoretically informed measurement and operational costs. Framing experiments in political tolerance generally sacrifice content controlled measurement because they require lengthy vignettes or visual stimuli that are costly to vary. Moreover, it is difficult to convey verisimilar circumstances of civil liberties disputes across multiple types of groups – for instance, a respondent who selects the KKK as her most disliked group may find the threat of conflict and disorder plausible given the group’s violent past, whereas the respondent who selects atheists or Christian fundamentalists as her most disliked group may find such claims unrealistic. At a minimum, standardizing the target group across all respondents requires a control group that can provide a baseline measure of tolerance which is not subjected to exogenous manipulation attempts. Finally, framing effects are highly contingent upon a variety of additional factors, such as source cue and credibility (e.g. Druckman 2001), which increases the cost of variation and distances the manipulation’s degree of separation from a direct effect on political tolerance.
5.2.2 Persuasion experiments

Persuasion experiments – efforts to convert individuals’ tolerance attitudes through counterarguments – offer several advantages over framing procedures. This approach, advanced largely by Gibson (1996, 1998; Gibson and Gouws 2003), invites subjects to express their authentic, uninfluenced position (i.e. tolerant or intolerant) toward their least-liked group and then seeks to alter these attitudes through several arguments favoring the opposite judgment. Persuasion experiments thus employ content controlled methodology and manipulate tolerance judgments directly while (like framing experiments) preserving real dimensions of decision making in civil liberties disputes. That is, authentic decisions to uphold or repress hated political opponents’ rights are contextual; they are social choices that are pushed and swayed by political discussion and exposure to a variety of opinions, including countervailing views. Persuasion experiments procedurally simulate this feature of civil liberties decisions. An interviewer first gauges respondents’ baseline tolerance and then advances three pro-tolerance arguments to subjects who initially express intolerant positions, three anti-tolerance arguments to respondents who initially take tolerant positions, and one pro-tolerance and one anti-tolerance argument to respondents who express uncertainty over how to respond to the hypothetical dispute. These procedures are considered successful when original tolerance is converted to intolerance, and vice versa.

The lasting contribution of persuasion experiments is what they reveal about the nature of tolerance and intolerance, especially the fundamental asymmetry of tolerant and intolerant attitudes. In particular, it is far easier to convert tolerance to intolerance than the reverse. Moreover, this disproportionate pliability is largely a function of the fact that tolerance is embedded within – and, in certain circumstances, at odds with – a host of broader democratic
beliefs that can be made accessible and “trump tolerance” (Gibson 1998: 844). The importance of persuasion experiments to scholars’ understanding of the nature of tolerance and intolerance cannot be understated. However, there are important reasons why direct persuasion through counterarguments is an inappropriate tool for evaluating the downstream consequences of these attitudes.

Gibson (1998:846) adumbrates one of these reasons when he advances the following research question, implied by his results: “To what extent do future replies of these respondents reflect their ‘original’ views or their ‘converted’ views?” The problem for inferring causal effects of tolerance that has been manipulated through direct persuasion is that we cannot know whether what we observe is attributable to respondents’ original views or their converted views. A group of “pure” control subjects – whose judgments regarding toleration remain free from researcher influence – would be necessary to surmise how converted and original tolerance judgments differ. Since Gibson and colleagues primarily have been interested in comparing the relative pliability of tolerance and intolerance and the determinants of this pliability, such control groups generally have not been included as theoretically relevant design components.

While this limitation is easy to resolve, the direct persuasion approach poses other, less mechanical, threats to unbiased causal inferences about the effects of (in)tolerance. The social psychology literature on persuasion and resistance to persuasion suggests that the mere attempt to directly persuade a subject carries at least one important implication for a subject’s attitudes. Attitudes that change in response to persuasive counterarguments tend to be weaker than original, unmanipulated attitudes (Crano and Prislin 2006), while individuals who resist attempts at direct persuasion in turn develop stronger attitudes and tend to be more certain that their initial attitude is correct than individuals whose original attitudes are never challenged in the first
place (Tormala and Petty 2002). This is especially true when the persuasive argument is perceived as strong. A related problem, as Gibson (1998: 846) notes, is that no means of “independently calibrating the arguments” for equal potency exists; anti-tolerance arguments may simply be stronger by virtue of the fact that they plug into alternate, valid democratic values while pro-tolerance arguments do not strongly appeal to respondents (i.e. the attitudinally intolerant) who more weakly embrace democratic values in the first place. Unless this can be validated empirically, it would be difficult to rule out that the effects of “converted” (in)tolerance relative to resistant (in)tolerance are attributable to unintentional differences across argument strength.

This is potentially important because strong attitudes last longer over time, show greater resistance to attack, and have a greater impact on judgments and behavior (Petty and Krosnick 1995). Attitude certainty functions in a similar way, and it has been shown that as individuals are increasingly certain of their attitudes, these attitudes increasingly predict behavior (Fazio and Zanna 1978). In other words, although an attitude’s content may not change in response to persuasion, the resistant attitude’s properties do not fundamentally remain the same, either. Hence, both persuasion and resistance yield consequences for attitude strength that may affect outcomes despite the change or lack of change in content of the attitude itself. The apparent solution to this problem – randomly assigning individuals to pro-tolerance or anti-tolerance “counterarguments” – makes little theoretical sense in the context of direct persuasion experiments, because we must first know what individuals’ tolerance attitudes are. In other words, there are theoretical and methodological justifications against full randomization in direct persuasion experiments (Gibson, Caldeira and Spence 2002).
A final consideration remains important for persuasion experiments that employ counterarguments. According to the preeminent social psychologist, Elliot Aronson (1999), the balance of evidence from decades of social psychology research suggests that “the attitude change induced by direct persuasion is usually small and short-lived, especially when communication departs radically from the recipient’s original attitude…And that is when they are listening at all!...[W]hen faced with communication that…runs counter to their own attitudes or beliefs, most people are adept at either tuning out, turning off, or simply refusing to expose themselves to that message (Hyman and Sheatsley 1947; Pratkanis and Aronson 1992” (Aronson 1999: 876, emphasis added).

The framing and direct persuasion approaches to manipulating tolerance judgments reveal much about the etiology and nature of tolerance and intolerance. However, neither is appropriate – or capable – as a means to randomly assign subjects to tolerance or intolerance so as to draw causal inferences about these judgments’ consequences for political outcomes. Framing experiments influence tolerance indirectly, with questionable strength, and can lead to biased inferences based on between-groups analyses. Direct persuasion experiments are not theoretically suited for randomization and may inadvertently alter attitudinal properties that distinguish converted and resistant (in)tolerance from the (in)tolerance of individuals who are not exposed to counterarguments.

In the next section, I develop an alternative framework for randomly assigning individuals to express tolerance or intolerance in a manner that is both internally valid and applicable to the study of the consequences of tolerance judgments. I base this approach on social psychological research on “self-persuasion,” take care to discuss and anticipate threats to internal validity, and introduce the experimental procedure.
5.3 APPLIED (IN)TOLERANCE AND THE SELF-PERSUASION EXPERIMENT

One unexplored possibility for advancing experiments on the consequences of (in)tolerance is to randomly assign subjects to conditions that compel them to actively apply tolerance or intolerance in practice – regardless of whether they hold tolerant or intolerant attitudes or would (not) tolerate in principle. At a minimum, practicing tolerance suggests doing nothing; one will repress neither the expression of an objectionable idea nor others’ expression of their desire to repress that idea. At a maximum, it means vigorously countering intolerance by taking a stance in favor of allowing objectionable ideas by abhorrent groups to be expressed. Practicing intolerance, by contrast, requires that one actively oppose the expression of objectionable ideas or interests. Researchers may randomly assign individuals to scenarios that compel them to actively take up and defend a tolerant position or an intolerant position, regardless of their natural predisposition to do so, and regardless of their variable responsiveness to stimuli surrounding the disputed group, ideas, rights, or actions.

To simulate these situations, I propose the self-persuasion experiment. Unlike direct persuasion through counterarguments, in this experiment interviewers do not attempt to talk respondents out of attitudes or beliefs they have previously expressed. Instead, the subject persuades someone else to change their tolerance judgment. In other words, the onus of developing and defending a tolerant or intolerant position falls to the subject, not to the researcher. Through this design, subjects can be assigned at random to scenarios in which they must convince a confederate to abandon her intolerant position (i.e. the subject applies tolerance) or tolerant position (i.e. the subject applies intolerance).

This procedure therefore permits researchers to assign individuals to a task where they more realistically practice tolerance or intolerance toward a group that they strongly dislike. In
direct persuasion experiments, individuals may or may not acquiesce to a tolerant or intolerant position after exposure to up to three counterarguments. In the self-persuasion experiment, subjects must reconcile with their negative attitudes toward a target group in a cognitively intensive manner and then put them aside in order to advocate a tolerant position. In the case of intolerance, they instead must put aside any commitments to civil liberties and prioritize negative characteristics of the target group or negative consequences of affording it rights. In this sense, the self-persuasion experiment more closely approximates the actual practice of tolerance or intolerance and, as such, individuals may be randomly assigned to defend these positions regardless of their underlying attitudinal disposition toward or against tolerance.

Beyond randomizing applied tolerance and intolerance, the self-persuasion experiment furnishes a powerful alternative method of manipulating attitudinal tolerance and intolerance. Janis and King (1954) discovered that a side effect of subject-to-audience persuasion (e.g. through essay writing, debates, or advice-giving) is that subjects tend to persuade themselves that the position they have advocated approximates their true belief. Even participants who argue a counterattitudinal point of view (i.e. devil’s advocacy) are more likely to be persuaded by themselves than by others’ arguments that favor this same counterattitudinal position (e.g. Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Wilson 1990).

Several explanations for this “self-persuasion” effect exist (e.g. Janis 1968), but dissonance reduction is the most prominent. Festinger (1957) argued that advocating a counterattitudinal opinion leads to cognitive dissonance, which is reduced through attitude change. When the inducement (e.g. financial reward) to defending such an opinion is low, people must seek additional justification for the position they advocated. They accomplish this by persuading themselves that the position they advocated is not really far from their true position.
The end result is a shift in attitude away from their original belief, toward the argued position (Aronson 1999). Self-persuasion can also occur following proattitudinal argumentation (Crano and Prislin 2006), as subjects adopt new justifications for their initial positions (Cooper 2007).

Self-persuasion exerts powerful influence over both attitudes and behavior. It has been shown to reduce hostile attitudes, negative stereotypes, and prejudice toward minority groups (e.g. Aronson and Patnoe 1997; Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Blaney and Snapp 1978); to increase condom use among college students (Aronson, Fried and Stone 1991; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow and Fried 1994), and to increase water conservation and recycling (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson and Miller 1992). In general, self-persuasion more readily influences the content of attitudes, rather than their intensity, and its effects are particularly noticeable among subjects who argue counterattitudinal positions. Nevertheless, both proattitudinal and counterattitudinal advocacy exert similar (and generally potent) influence over behavioral intentions (Gordijn, Postmes, and de Vries 2001). According to Aronson’s (1999) review of this research, “Self-persuasion is almost always a more powerful form of persuasion (deeper, longer lasting) than more traditional persuasion techniques – that is, than being directly persuaded by another person, no matter how clever, convincing, expert, and trustworthy that other person might be – precisely because in direct persuasion, the audience is constantly aware of the fact that they have been persuaded by another. Where self-persuasion occurs, people are convinced that the motivation for change has come from within” (882).

I hypothesize that the self-persuasion experiment will produce similar patterns of change in tolerance attitudes. Subjects assigned to receive treatment complete an “intensive manipulation” in which they develop arguments to convince another person to abandon her intolerance (i.e. the tolerance treatment condition) or tolerance (i.e. the intolerance treatment
condition). A control group completes a similar persuasion task about an unrelated issue. Following several distractor questions, subjects express their post-test tolerance. I expect that attitudinal tolerance among subjects assigned to the tolerance condition will be greater than the control group, while subjects assigned to apply intolerance during the manipulation will exhibit less tolerance than the control group. Moreover, I expect to observe stronger evidence of attitude change among those subjects assigned to write arguments that ran counter to their original beliefs.19

Self-persuasion experiments are not without threats to internal validity. I have designed the present experiment to account for several of these challenges. For instance, systematic differences in the intensity of arguments in favor or against toleration may emerge across treatment groups or types of individuals. I have sought to keep this more or less constant with constraints on essay length and writing time and hired coders (blind to the study’s purpose) to independently code the intensity of each elaboration. These procedures also serve to check against active noncompliance – a condition in which subjects may elect to write nonsense or simply fill the space required by the survey software to move forward, rather than dedicate their full attention to the task (McDermott 2011: 31).

A more pernicious threat to internal validity is mortality – particularly when attrition occurs following random assignment. In this case, subjects might elect not to write arguments out of principle, to write nonsense, or to write arguments that squarely oppose what they have been asked to write. This can introduce bias especially when attrition occurs disproportionately in a single treatment group, or among respondents writing counterattitudinal positions. Forcing

19 As I will describe below, the tolerance post-test is unrelated to the actual task subjects complete during the manipulation.
respondents to write through a validation mechanism or by threatening to refuse payment is not a valid solution, as this can lead to active noncompliance and generally blocks the dissonance reduction mechanism of producing attitude change (e.g. Cooper 2007). “Best practices” in the literature suggest allowing respondents to opt-out and receive full payment at that point of the study, while also appealing to their good will by describing what a great service they would be providing researchers if only they would comply (Aronson 1999; Cooper 2007). Fortunately, as I describe below, post-randomization attrition was not a systematic problem in this study.

5.4 EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL

5.4.1 Sample

A sample of 300 Americans, selected at random from respondents available to the online survey agency, Qualtrics, was recruited, to participate in a study of “How people persuade one another in politics.” Participants completed the online survey-experiment in two sittings: three days after responding to the pre-test survey, they were assigned to receive treatment and completed the post-test questionnaire. The results, given the 27.3% attrition rate, are based on the final sample of 218 subjects.

20 Qualtrics’ survey partners began call backs as soon as 24 hours after the initial survey and concluded their efforts after 72 hours. Fully 73% of respondents completed the second wave of the study on the third day. Treatment was administered when re-contacting was successful, and differences in duration between pre- and post-test questionnaires do not alter the findings.

21 This represents the pre-treatment attrition rate, as respondents were assigned to treatment conditions in the second wave of the survey.
5.4.2 Pre-test questionnaire and measurement

The pre-test served to gauge respondents’ baseline tolerance for their least-liked group; the level of threat respondents believed that group poses to society; respondents’ support for individual liberty over public order; their level of dogmatic thinking, and a host of demographic traits. Respondents were asked to select one of ten “political groups currently active in American society today”: The Ku Klux Klan; Islamic fundamentalists; pro-choice groups (abortion supporters); pro-life groups (abortion opponents); the Occupy Movement; the Tea Party; American communists; Christian fundamentalists; atheists; or gay rights supporters.22

Initial tolerance for their least-liked group is based on respondents’ average level of agreement ($\alpha = 0.85$) that the group: 1) should be banned from your community; 2) should be allowed to make public speeches in your community; 3) should be allowed to stand in elections for public office; 4) should be allowed to teach in public schools in your community. To tap sociotropic threat perceptions, respondents then rated (from 1=not at all, to 100= extremely) the extent to which they believed the group they selected is dangerous to society, likely to take away Americans’ freedoms if they came to power, and unwilling to follow the rules of democracy. I rescaled the items to range from 1-10 and averaged them ($\alpha = 0.81$).

Support for freedom over order was measured as respondents’ average level of agreement ($\alpha = 0.83$) with five Likert-scaled items based on Gibson (2002): 1) Freedom of

22 48.91 percent of respondents selected the Ku Klux Klan as most-disliked, followed by 18.48 percent selecting Islamic fundamentalists. Atheists and Gay Rights Supporters tied as the third most commonly abhorred group, with only 5.43 percent of respondents selecting one or the other. While this bias against the far right appears suggestive of ideological skew in the data, 67.24 percent of ideological conservatives (who comprise 31.52% of the final sample) selected the KKK or Islamic fundamentalists as their least-liked group, compared to 71.64 percent of liberals (36.41% if the sample) and 62.71 percent of self-described “pure moderates” (32.07% of the sample).
speech should be given to all political organizations, even if some of the things they say are
dangerous or insulting to others in society; 2) It is better to live in an orderly society than to give
people so much freedom that they can become disruptive; 3) Free speech is just not worth it if it
means that we have to put up with the danger to society of extremist political views; 4) Society
shouldn’t have to put up with political views that are fundamentally different from the views of
the majority; 5) Because demonstrations frequently become disorderly and disruptive, radical
and extremist groups should not be allowed to demonstrate.

I also followed Gibson (2002) in measuring dogmatic thinking as the average support for
four statements (α = 0.72): 1) There are two kinds of people in this world: Good and Bad; 2) A
group cannot exist long if it puts up with many different opinions among its own members; 3)
Out of all the different religions in the world, probably only one is correct; 4) Compromise with
our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own position.
Finally, respondents answered half of the total demographic and ideology questions in the pre-
test, including their level of political conservatism (1 = Extremely liberal, 7 = Extremely
conservative), race, gender, and education level. Remaining demographic items were employed
in the post-test questionnaire among the distractor questions between the manipulation and post-
test tolerance measure.

5.4.3 Manipulation, post-test questionnaire, and measurement

Prior to beginning the post-test, subjects were alerted to the possibility that they may be asked to
advocate a counterattitudinal position and were informed that they could exit the study without
penalty. This condition ensures low justification for writing a counterattitudinal position, as the
reward for participation and non-participation is identical. Following much of the self-persuasion
and counterattitudinal advocacy literature (e.g. Cooper 2007), the instruction set also petitioned respondents for their assistance despite any discomfort they might experience:

In this portion of the study, we will ask you to write a short but strong argument that you think could persuade the opinion of someone like you. Please remember: we politely ask that you try to write a strong argument, even if you disagree with what you have been asked to write. If you feel that you must refuse to write such an argument, you will have the opportunity to exit the survey without loss of payment. But your participation is very important to our research and would be of great help to us. We thank you for taking this task seriously.

Following this statement, respondents were randomly assigned to receive treatment (tolerant condition N=73; intolerant condition N=73; control condition N=72). Subjects in the treatment (tolerant or intolerant) conditions confronted the following scenario, which portrays a civil liberties issue involving the political group each respondent selected as least-liked in the pre-test survey:

Imagine that a large group of {GROUP members} wish to hold a public demonstration in your community. Some people openly hate this group while many others find what the {GROUP} believes to be very offensive. In the past, members of this group have not cooperated with the authorities and have sometimes violated the conditions of their parade permits. Other recent demonstrations by this group have led to property damage and open conflict with counter-protesters and the police.

This scenario portrays equivalent levels of normative threat (e.g. refusal to cooperate and to follow all the laws) and evidence of violence (e.g. property damage, conflict) across tolerant and intolerant conditions and across groups. I intentionally worded the scenarios to suggest moderate-to-high threat, to reduce the possibility that any increase in tolerance could be attributable to variation in probable threat across the scenario conditions. Subjects were next prompted to,
In the tolerant condition:

Think of someone you know who would think that {GROUP} should not be allowed to hold their demonstration. Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that {GROUP} should be allowed to hold its demonstration in your community,

and in the intolerant condition:

Think of someone you know who would think that {GROUP} should be allowed to hold their demonstration. Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that {GROUP} should not be allowed to hold its demonstration in your community.

Control group subjects were asked to:

Imagine that you are in charge of a media campaign to promote the use of renewable energy sources – such as solar, wind, and hydroelectric power. Your goal is to convince the public that it is better for American industries to develop and invest in these new sources of energy and that Americans should stop using fossil fuels like oil, coal and natural gas. Some people believe that a shift to renewable energy could badly damage the economy, while many others believe that new energy sources are all that necessary.

Think of someone you know who would think that Americans and American industry should not try to replace fossil fuels with renewable energy sources. Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that developing renewable energy sources is the more sensible policy.

In each condition, subjects had 20 minutes to “write at least 5 sentences, but not more than 10 sentences” in a text box that appeared at the bottom of the page. Alternatively, and in line with the instructions, they could voluntarily opt out of the exercise and exit the survey. Only 5 individuals elected to exit the survey upon assignment to treatment, a rate of 2.3 percent, distributed rather evenly across conditions. Two subjects assigned to the tolerant condition (2.8%) and two assigned to the intolerant condition (2.7%), refused to write compared to only one subject assigned to the control condition (1.4%). Higher rates of active noncompliance are apparent; I discuss this issue at length in the analytic section below.
Subjects completed several distractor questions prior to expressing their post-test tolerance attitudes (using the same questions and scales as in the pre-test). These distractor questions included the ten-item personality inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow and Swan 2003), the general risk aversion scale (Mandrik and Bao 2005; Kam 2012), and the remaining demographic questions – age, income, and political interest. The exact question wording for these and other items are included in this chapter’s supplemental appendix.

Finally, I included several covert and coder-based post-test measures to help rule out threats to internal validity. Although length and time of the arguments were limited in the same manner across conditions, I embedded into the online survey a hidden measure of “writing duration” in order to analyze whether differential time spent advocating a position influenced the results. Subjects spent as little as 144 seconds (approximately 3 minutes) and as much as 1169 seconds (approximately 19 minutes) writing their essays, with an average of 629 seconds (10 minutes). Moreover, following (Gordijn, Postmes and de Vries 2001), I hired four coders – blind to the study’s objectives – to independently code the intensity of each elaboration on two dimensions – the number of arguments generated and the persuasiveness of the arguments (1=absolutely not, 7=absolutely). Inter-coder reliability for the number of arguments (α = 0.71) and for the quality of arguments (α = 0.66) is acceptable according to Orwin (1994). Mortality threats to internal validity – particularly active noncompliance – have been addressed statistically and are discussed below.

5.4.4 Active noncompliance

In order to discuss noncompliance, it is important first to be clear about what constitutes “treatment” in the self-persuasion experiment. The manipulation centers on an intensive essay-
writing task; individuals who have been assigned to treatment may be considered as having *received treatment* if and only if they have, in fact, written an essay. A more restrictive definition of receiving treatment is also possible: one could require for designation as “treated” that this essay be written on the required topic, and in the required direction (i.e. in favor or against allowing a group to demonstrate). However, this restrictive definition is ill- advised in experiments on political tolerance, as one must acknowledge the possibility that some of individuals will systematically refuse to take certain positions on civil liberties disputes involving their most disliked groups. Therefore, I describe two types of noncompliant groups – those who eschewed the essay task and those who confronted it in order to reject the required position.

A total of 29 respondents (13.3%) who chose to write essays refused to comply with the treatment. Of these, 22 subjects (10.1%) wrote “nonsense” arguments or entered a random series of alphanumeric characters to meet the 200-character minimum required by the survey software in order to move forward with the questionnaire. An additional 7 subjects (3.2%) squarely rejected the instruction set and wrote arguments defending the opposite point of view. Examples of all arguments can be found in Table B.1 of Appendix B. Overall, however, this post-assignment attrition occurred rather evenly across treatment groups (Table 12):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12 Pre- and Post-Assignment Attrition by Treatment Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-assignment attrition</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerant condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although the total number of noncompliant participants is small, it is best to be forthcoming about what types of people tended to exit, ignore, or reject treatment. Table 13 presents summary statistics using several variables included in the pre- and post-test questionnaires:

### Table 13 Attrition Rates across Demographic and Attitudinal Traits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-assignment Attrition</th>
<th>Post-assignment Attrition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voluntary Exit</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-test Tolerant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly threatened</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly dogmatic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly risk averse</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continuous variables have been dichotomized at the mean; entries represent the count and percent of noncompliant respondents with above-average scores on the grouping variable in column 1.

Conservative and highly dogmatic respondents exhibited disproportionate rates of post-assignment attrition. Active rejection of the treatment appears most commonly among ideological conservatives, whereas dogmatic individuals account for by far the most nonsensical entries in the noncompliant sample. However, dogmatists and conservatives failed to comply rather evenly across treatment conditions. All 6 of the nonsensical “intolerant condition” essays, all 7 of the nonsensical “tolerant condition” essays, and 6 of 7 nonsensical control condition essays can be attributed to respondents with above average dogmatism. Conservatives and non-conservatives evenly rejected the intolerant condition by writing pro-tolerance essays, while
conservatives penned 4 of 7 essays to reject the tolerant condition. Five of seven noncompliant control essays can be connected to conservative authors.

Given that treatment has been defined as “received” when subjects truly write an essay, that the number of subjects who eschewed the essay task by composing nonsense or random alphanumeric strings is relatively small, and that the distribution of nonsensical essays is fairly well-balanced across treatment conditions, I am inclined to exclude them from certain analyses below. By contrast, anti-treatment essays meet the conditions for “received” treatment and, although they are small in number, should be included for important theoretical reasons.

Still, one important question is whether active noncompliance via “nonsense” essays varies systematically by counterattitudinal or proattitudinal groups or by pre-test tolerance levels. If so, these essays ought perhaps to be interpreted the same way as anti-treatment essays – i.e. as principled and unmovable objection to the position required to be argued. Again, however, among subjects assigned to the “tolerant condition,” individuals who expressed intolerance during the pre-test authored only 4 of 7 nonsensical essays. In the “intolerant condition,” half of the nonsensical essays are attributable to individuals originally holding intolerant attitudes. Hence, noncompliance does not appear to vary by direction of the argument. ANOVA finds no statistical difference in noncompliance (coded 1 for a nonsensical essay and 0 otherwise) across pro- and counter-attitudinal essay writers in the tolerant condition ($M=0.003, F=0.05, p=0.832$), intolerant condition ($M=0.051, F=0.50, p=0.483$) or control condition ($M=0.033, F=0.53$).

\footnote{Note that I return these subjects to the sample to conduct a proper “downstream effects” model, in section 5.6. In any case, exclusion does not alter the substantive findings.}
A second analysis of variance attributes no significant difference in noncompliance to pre-test tolerance levels \(^{24}\) \((M=0.061, F=0.45, p=0.500)\).

Given these patterns, I shall exclude from the first empirical section below those 22 subjects who failed to receive treatment by eschewing the essay-writing task. This helps to more accurately document the directional effects of the manipulation on post-test attitudinal tolerance and intolerance. However, I return these 22 subjects to the second empirical analysis in order to evaluate both the impact of the assignment procedure (i.e. the “Intent to Treat” Effect, or ITT), and also the magnitude of the treatment’s influence on attitudinal tolerance (i.e. the Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE)). In these cases, sampling and non-compliance are relevant considerations for unbiased casual inference (Gerber and Green 2012: chapter 5).

5.4.5 Compliant essays

The intensive manipulation – in which respondents write brief essays – gives the self-persuasion experiment certain advantages over extant alternatives. First, unlike direct persuasion through counterarguments, the manipulation at the center of the self-persuasion procedure more fully simulates the application of tolerance or intolerance toward highly disliked groups. By placing subjects in a situation in which they must devise and defend their own original arguments in favor of or against toleration, subjects are compelled to manifest tolerance or intolerance irrespective of their attitudinal proclivity to (not) tolerate. Second, to the extent that subjects are persuaded by their own unique arguments, few assumptions need to be made about the relative strength of arguments across conditions. This has been a problem for the direct persuasion

\(^{24}\) Pre-test tolerance was split at the mean, such that only respondents with above-average tolerance scores were classified as “tolerant.”
approach, where it has been conjectured that pro-tolerance and anti-tolerance counterarguments provided by researchers may differ in convincingness (Gibson 1998).

Third, the essay-writing task helps to overcome the central problem framing experiments face as a tool for examining downstream effects of tolerance. Procedures that indirectly influence tolerance by manipulating perceptions of threat or support for democratic norms lose the ability to exclude these variables’ extraneous influence over any outcome which tolerance is believed to influence. One could argue that the self-persuasion technique is open to the same criticism, since whatever reason a particular individual may have to self-persuade into tolerance could act as an extraneous influence on participation. However, there is at least a pluralistic failure of the exclusion condition, which in turn will cancel out in the aggregate, and which does not cancel out in framing experiments of the Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997) approach.

Indeed, subjects who complied with the instructions (i.e. subjects who did not write nonsensical essays) defended tolerance and intolerance from a variety of perspectives. Some of these arguments reflect those advanced by researchers using the direct persuasion approach. For instance, standard pro-tolerance counterarguments invite respondents to consider that 1) the government shouldn’t be allowed to decide who has rights; 2) it is unfair to allow some groups to express their views but not others; and 3) groups (that respondents dislike) should express their views openly so people can see that they are wrong. Some subjects in the self-persuasion experiment included these same arguments in an overall pro-tolerance position:

As much as I abhor the Tea party, it is important that they have the right to demonstrate on behalf of their beliefs. Denying them this right would be the beginning of a slippery slope in which other groups, like Occupy [The Occupy Movement], are denied theirs as well. Besides, they are their own worst enemy. The more they shout from the rooftops, the more their ignorance is on display for all to behold and ridicule. If we know exactly what they think, we are in a better position to counter their arguments, no matter how badly misspelled (sic) they are.
Or, more bluntly, as another respondent put it: “How would you feel if someone told you that you couldn’t say what you think? What if the Irish couldn’t hold our annual parade but the Italians could do all that Columbus Day stuff? You can’t let some people do things that you don’t let other people do.”

Still, respondents assigned to write a tolerant essay found many unique justifications for their position. Some promoted a “generic tolerance,” such as “Everyone is entitled to an opinion. People have a choice about what they believe in even if it may be different from your own.” Others subjects support “conditional tolerance,” such that they are willing to uphold the rights of a group they strongly dislike so long as there are means to ensure that nothing goes wrong: “Everyone has the right to peacefully protest. There can be a strong police presence in place if need be. And we can bring machine guns and tear gas if need be. We can give them a set amount of time and no more.” Another wrote, “First off, I do not care. They are a bunch of idiots anyway you look at it. They can say what they want. But if they get violent we will shut them down ASAP.”

Other respondents couched their tolerance in patriotic exhortations: “Our soldiers have fought and died for our freedoms. One of those freedoms is the freedom of speech. While we have the right to disagree with them, they still have the right to say what they want to say. If you take that away, then what happens when it comes your chance to be heard, and you can’t because someone won’t let you?” Still others appealed to “end times” theology, such that tolerance is what the bible commands: “True Americans should have a right to say what they want. For GOD so loved the world. We as a people have lost what really matters were here for one reason to save the lost and to prepare for Christ’s return. GOD gave us the right for free speech and we must use it to prevent the Devil’s return.”
Some subjects make compelling procedural arguments for allowing their least-liked group to demonstrate. One respondent wrote: “The [KKK] should be allowed to talk because they might have something important to say...sure, some folks might end up supporting them, but there needs to be a positive back and forth exchange to where a person who opposes the KKK can also counteract their views.” Another argues that “by allowing the demonstration you get more people engaged and thinking about the stuff that matters. If you can’t prevent what you think is wrong, then get out and demonstrate for yourself! Raise your voice! Get involved! People will never lift a finger if they don’t have something to fight against.”

Subjects assigned to argue against the public demonstration by their most disliked group (i.e. subjects in the intolerant condition) also found diverse reasons for delimiting who gets rights. Few offered procedural arguments or concern with threat to the democratic system (e.g. “the group won’t follow parade permit rules”; “if the group came to power it would take away my freedoms”), which are standards in direct persuasion experiments. Instead, many respondents appealed to far more basic norms of “common decency,” such as: “My community is three-quarters Hispanic/Latino and one-quarter African American. We experienced a historic low in 1992 after the Rodney King verdict and any white supremacists who came here would obviously just be instigating. No way the KKK should be allowed here”; or “pro-lifers just want to add more trauma to a bad experience. They can believe what they want but their actions are so indecent.”

Others showed concern for public costs, “This would require too much mob control. There’s no way people can express counteropinions (sic) – and people would definitely want to – without a clash in the street. That causes damage and costs way too much money.” Some expressed intolerance in xenophobic terms – “Islamists want to make all of us pray to
Mohammed and have no idea that we are a Christian nation that will fight them in the streets” – while others equated tolerance with Liberals and Democratic Party supporters, “We have a constitution that places limits on what you can and cannot say. Like, you can’t say fire in a theater. But the liberals would say you can’t say “no” to a group that would just as soon get rid of you. I’d say let the [Islamic fundamentalists] have their rally just to show the Liberals what they’ve turned this country into, but I love America too much.”

In my future research, I plan to examine these responses more carefully. In general, however, subjects appear to offer so many different and unique defenses of tolerance or intolerance, that it seems reasonable to argue that any failure to satisfy the exclusion restriction at the individual will wash out in the aggregate, because of the pluralistic nature of subjects’ essay content.

5.5 INITIAL FINDINGS

The self-persuasion experiment randomly assigns subjects to practice tolerance or intolerance. In the tolerant condition, subjects elaborate an argument to convince a hypothetical discussion partner to abandon her intolerance; in the intolerant condition, subjects encourage that person to abdicate her tolerance. The control group advocates that US industry rely on renewable energy sources instead of fossil fuels. My basic hypotheses are:

H₁: Subjects in the “intolerance condition” will exhibit lower post-test tolerance than subjects in the control group;

H₂: Subjects in the “tolerance condition” will exhibit higher post-test tolerance than subjects in the control group and subjects in the “intolerance condition”
A one-way, between-subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the effects of treatment on attitudinal tolerance in the applied tolerance and applied intolerance conditions. A significant effect of manipulation on attitudinal tolerance at the p<0.05 level is apparent for the three conditions (applied tolerance, applied intolerance, control) \[ F(2, 186) = 14.47, p<0.001 \]. Table 14 presents mean differences across the conditions. The Sidak, Bonferroni, and Scheffe values represent increasingly conservative tests of significant mean differences.

**Table 14** Post-Hoc Significance Tests of Mean Differences in Tolerance across Experimental Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tolerant vs. Control</th>
<th>Intolerant vs. Control</th>
<th>Tolerant vs. Intolerant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean difference</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>-0.466</td>
<td>0.959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidak</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonferroni</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheffe</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sidak, Bonferroni, and Scheffe tests are increasingly conservative post-hoc estimates of significant differences in between-group means identified by ANOVA.

Post-hoc comparisons – by even the most conservative, Scheffe test of significance – indicate that the average level of tolerance for one’s most disliked-group was significantly lower among subjects in the applied intolerance condition (M=2.117, SD=0.879) than among subjects in the control condition (M=2.583, SD=1.174). Moreover, all post-hoc significance tests indicate that the average level of tolerance for one’s most-disliked group was significantly greater among subjects exposed to applied tolerance (M=3.077, SD=0.925) than among subjects exposed to applied intolerance or the control argument. Figure 2 depicts these mean differences:
No differences were found for the time participants spent writing down arguments ($M=629.41$, $F=1.10$, $p=0.336$). Also, no differences were found for the number of arguments generated ($M=4.83$, $F=0.55$, $p=0.571$) or the average quality of those arguments as perceived by the coders ($M=4.96$, $F=1.77$, $p=0.172$). This suggests that assignment schedule did not influence the nature of the arguments, the intensity of the elaboration, or the degree to which subjects strived to develop compelling points of view. Nor were any significant differences in pre-test tolerance levels apparent across the treatment groups.
Entries in the top row of Table 15 represent subjects’ average tolerance toward their least-liked group prior to random assignment. They are grouped by treatment condition, and a one-way between-subjects ANOVA shows that pre-test tolerance levels were indeed “balanced” before exposure to the intensive manipulation. In other words, subjects holding originally tolerant attitudes were not disproportionately assigned to practice tolerance and attitudinally intolerant subjects were not disproportionately assigned to practice intolerance.

Finally, I examine in Table 16 whether the intensive manipulation increases tolerance in the tolerant condition and intolerance in the intolerant condition relative to the untreated group after controlling for the most robust and theoretically grounded predictors of political tolerance. Substantively speaking, treatment via elaborating a pro-tolerance argument increases tolerance for respondents’ least-liked group by nearly one half point on the five-point scale – an increase of almost 10 percent. Intolerance treatment exerts a similar decrease in attitudinal tolerance. These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2, above. Randomly assigning individuals to apply tolerance or intolerance in practice significantly influences their average level of attitudinal tolerance relative to control subjects that are not compelled to actively tolerate or not tolerate their least-liked group during a civil liberties dispute. Table 17 confirms that these substantive results hold when controlling for pre-test tolerance levels as well.
Table 16 Regression-Adjusted Treatment Effect on Tolerance toward Least-Liked Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tolerant Condition</th>
<th>Intolerant Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Robust SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>0.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for individual liberty</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td>0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>0.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>0.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td>0.470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 125 127
R-squared 0.458 0.390

Notes: Boldfaced coefficients significant at p≤ .10

Table 17 Regression-Adjusted Treatment Effect on Tolerance toward Least-Liked Group, with Pre-Test Tolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tolerant Condition</th>
<th>Intolerant Condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Robust SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Test Tolerance</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for individual liberty</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>-0.167</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constant</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 125 127
R-squared 0.728 0.645

Notes: Boldfaced coefficients significant at p≤ .10

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The particular advantage of “self-persuasion” over direct persuasion through counterarguments is evident in its robust influence on attitude change among subjects that advocate counterattitudinal positions. That is, self-persuasion should not only convert tolerance to intolerance, but it should also convert intolerance to tolerance – a transformation that existing studies have found extremely difficult and less common than the reverse (e.g. Gibson 1998; Gibson and Gouws 2003). This is achieved through attitude change, whereby subjects advocating counterattitudinal positions come to believe that the argued opinion reflects their true belief (e.g. Festinger 1957; Cooper 2007). Self-persuasion may also lead to similar changes among advocates of proattitudinal positions because the intense manipulation often compels these individuals to find new justifications for their beliefs. Still, the effects tend to be more potent among subjects that engage in counterattitudinal advocacy. I therefore expect the self-persuasion experiment to have exerted stronger effects on counterattitudinal essay writers than on subjects who wrote proattitudinal essays in the treatment conditions.
This pattern is apparent in Figure 3. As expected, the self-persuasion procedure compelled change among those who advocated positions running against their true (i.e. original) beliefs. The rightmost bar over “prior tolerant” shows that tolerant subjects who practiced intolerance by arguing against allowing their most disliked group to hold a demonstration express far less tolerance than the tolerant control group ($t_{62} = -4.784, p<0.001$). Similarly, the middle bar over “prior intolerant” indicates a perceptible increase in tolerance among initially intolerant subjects who practiced tolerance relative to the intolerant control group that did not ($t_{63} = 4.049, p<0.001$). By contrast, proattitudinal positions differ little from the “natural” positions among control group subjects – practicing tolerance modestly, but does not significantly, increase post-test tolerance among those who entered the experiment with above-average tolerance levels ($t_{91} = 0.939, p=0.175$), while only a slight but insignificant decrease is apparent across among the originally intolerant who also practiced intolerance relative to the control subjects who completed a distractor task ($t_{56} = -0.695, p=0.245$).

Inasmuch as the self-persuasion experiment is more successful than direct persuasion through counterarguments at converting intolerance to tolerance, it makes an important contribution to our ability to study the downstream effects of randomized tolerance on political outcomes. The ultimate objective is to make valid between-group comparisons on patterns of political participation among subjects assigned to apply (in)tolerance. This requires increased confidence that – as a whole – the self-persuasion experiment brings the initially tolerant and the initially intolerant closer together via the actual practice of tolerance or intolerance.
5.6 COMPLIERS AVERAGE CAUSAL EFFECT (CACE) OF THE TREATMENT ON (IN)TOLERANCE

In the previous section, I demonstrated that the self-persuasion experiment moves attitudinal tolerance in the correct directions – individuals who apply tolerance to their least liked group express higher levels of post-test attitudinal tolerance than the control group, while individuals who apply intolerance express lower levels of attitudinal tolerance – and this movement, by and large, is significant. In this section, I demonstrate that the magnitude of the experimental treatment’s effect on tolerance and intolerance is nearly identical. More importantly, I establish that the effect is causally attributable to the actual practice of tolerance or intolerance.

Such claims cannot be substantiated without careful attention to sampling and treatment fundamentals – especially the discrepancy between subjects the experiment intended to treat and subjects it indeed treated. If every subject who was assigned to treatment received treatment (and every subject assigned to not receive treatment did not receive it), causal effects are measured as the difference in outcome Y when subject i has been treated \(d_i=1\) and when subject i has not been treated \(d_i=0\), or \(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)\). Given the fundamental problem of causal inference – that we cannot simultaneously observe \(Y_i(1)\) and \(Y_i(0)\) for the same subject – experimenters can observe the average treatment effect (ATE), which is the “sum of the subject-level treatment effects, \(Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)\), divided by the total number of subjects” (Gerber and Green 2012: 25). In practice, this means subtracting the average outcome in the control group from the average outcome in the treatment group.

Recall that the definition of “treatment” in this experiment is satisfied when a subject who was assigned to write a substantive essay did in fact write such an essay. We thus excluded 22 “nonsense” essay-writers in the above analysis as a first cut of the “directional” validity of the
self-persuasion effect. However, we cannot assess the power of the treatment effect – or its direct causal influence – over attitudinal tolerance and intolerance without statistically accounting for the noncompliant subjects. Although only a small percentage of subjects in this experiment ignored or actively rejected the instructions, excluding them impedes our ability to appraise the overall magnitude of the treatment effect, and to evaluate its parity across treatment conditions – i.e. whether practicing intolerance increases intolerance as much as practicing tolerance increases attitudinal tolerance.

Non-compliant subjects become problematic in the “potential outcomes” frameworks for causal inference for at least two reasons. First, excluding subjects who were assigned to receive treatment but, in fact, did not is equivalent to attributing to them an outcome score of “zero.” That amounts to assuming that the 14 subjects in the tolerant condition who wrote “nonsense” essays would not have expressed different levels of tolerance had they actually written the essay. To the extent that this assertion is implausible, the true impact of the treatment on attitudinal tolerance will be underestimated. Second, one should not draw equivalence between subjects that have been assigned to treatment and have been treated, on one hand, and subjects that have been assigned to treatment and have not been treated, on the other. The latter is most likely not a random sub-set of the original treatment group and ignoring this “opens the door to biased inference” (Gerber and Green 2012: 134).

In other words, noncompliance yields biased estimates of the Average Treatment Effect because researchers lack the complete schedule of potential outcomes for the subjects. Under noncompliance, researchers should estimate the local average treatment effect or, in Gerber and Green’s (2012: 142) terms, the “Complier Average Causal Effect,” or CACE. The CACE is calculated as average outcome Y among the group – including non-compliers – that was assigned
to receive treatment (this is denoted the “Intent-to-Treat” effect, or ITT), weighted by the percentage of that treatment group that was *successfully treated* (this ratio is denoted ITT_D). The CACE is a more conservative estimate of causal influence than my prior estimates (but not more conservative than the ITT); it converges toward the ATE as ITT_D approaches 1 (i.e. as the percentage of the assigned treatment group that was actually treated approaches 100 percent).
Table 18 Complier Average Causal Effect of Self-Persuasion on Post-Test Tolerance and Intolerance toward Least-Liked Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tolerant Treatment</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>ITT</th>
<th>ITT_D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome among the Treated</td>
<td>3.106</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome among the Untreated</td>
<td>2.286</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.581</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome among all subjects Assigned to Treatment</td>
<td>2.949</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2.581</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Intolerant Treatment</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>ITT</th>
<th>ITT_D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome among the Treated</td>
<td>2.121</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome among the Untreated</td>
<td>2.614</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.581</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome among all subjects Assigned to Treatment</td>
<td>2.195</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2.581</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Treated” refers to subjects who were assigned to treatment and who received treatment, while “Untreated” refers to subjects who were assigned to treatment but did not receive treatment. The overall outcome among the group “Assigned to Treatment” is simply the average outcome among the scheduled treatment group, whether that treatment was successfully received or not. The ITT, or “Intent to Treat” effect represents the difference in post-test tolerance between all subjects assigned to write a tolerant or intolerant essay (whether they complied or not) and all subjects assigned to write an essay about renewable energy sources.
Table 18 calculates the Complier Average Causal Effect of self-persuasion on subjects’ attitudinal tolerance and intolerance. The top panel of Table 18 estimates the CACE of applied tolerance on attitudinal tolerance, while the bottom panel estimates the causal effect of applied intolerance on attitudinal tolerance. The three quantities of interest in each panel appear in the first substantive column. They include the average post-test tolerance among the actually treated, the average post-test tolerance among subjects who were assigned to be treated but went untreated (i.e. who wrote nonsense essays), and the overall level of post-test tolerance among subjects assigned to treatment – regardless whether they successfully received it or not. We estimate ITT by subtracting from the overall post-test tolerance in the assigned-to-treatment group the post-test level of tolerance among the control group. This latter quantity is identical to the “outcome among the untreated” in the same column because the factorial design ensures that subjects in the control group were never inadvertently induced to apply tolerance or intolerance.

The ITT, or “intent-to-treat” effect can be interpreted as a measure of the overall effectiveness of assignment to treatment rather than the causal effect of the treatment itself. This is useful to know because, in the next chapter, I will assign subjects to practice tolerance or intolerance and trace the effect of this manipulation on political participation. That is, assignment to treatment will function as an instrument for the practice of tolerance of intolerance; if the effect of this treatment on attitudinal (in)tolerance are too weak, the procedure would lack adequate power for predicting effects on political participation, and an alternate experimental approach would merit consideration. Fortunately, the effects are not: Those subjects assigned to practice tolerance were 0.368 more tolerant than the control group, while those assigned to practice intolerance were 0.386 less tolerant than the control group.
Noncompliance was a relatively minor problem in this study – ITT\textsubscript{D} for the tolerant condition yields 0.808, and the ITT\textsubscript{D} estimate for intolerant condition is 0.849 – meaning that I successfully treated 80.1 percent and 84.9 percent of subjects assigned to practice tolerance and intolerance, respectively. Nevertheless, the causal effect of these treatments must account for non-compliance. This estimated Compliers Average Causal Effect, or \( \overline{CAE} \), is calculated as

\[
\frac{\Delta\overline{ITT}}{\Delta ITT_D}.
\]

As the far right entries in Table 18 indicate, the boost in post-test attitudinal tolerance among individuals who practiced tolerance is 0.455, while the nearly identical drop in attitudinal tolerance among subjects who practiced intolerance is 0.454. How potent are these effects given that subjects enter with different levels of dogmatic thinking and support for basic individual freedoms, have unequal education, and respond differently to stimuli like sociotropic threat? In order to obtain these parameter estimates, I employ two-stage least squares as a regression-adjustment strategy (Gerber and Green 2012: 104, 157 – 60).

In the first stage of the regression, we estimate the effects of actual treatment (i.e. among compliers) on post-test tolerance. This model does not include the assignment schedule because assignment to treatment is assumed to have no effect on outcomes over and above the effect of the actual treatment (Gerber and Green 2012: 159). The second stage model uses assignment to treatment (i.e. including non-compliers) as an instrument for successful treatment because it is assumed to be independent of the disturbance term. In addition, it includes as covariates the most common and strongest predictors of tolerance – sociotropic threat, dogmatism, and general support for democratic values – and other demographic factors that may influence post-test attitudinal tolerance. Including this vector of confounders \( Z \) on the right-hand side of the
equation produces a more accurate estimate of the compliers average causal effect. Put simply, we subtract from the disturbance term the amount of unexplained variation in attitudinal tolerance attributable to the most theoretically grounded and robust predictors of political tolerance and, in turn, reduce the standard error of the CACE. Moreover, the two-stage least squares instrumental regression enables us to calculate a 95% confidence interval for the $\widehat{CACE}$ with which we may understand the effect in more familiar terms.
Table 19 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimate of CACE and Covariate-adjusted CACE of Applied Tolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
<th>Coeff</th>
<th>Robust SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CACE</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental Model</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>0.574</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for individual liberty</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.046</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.532</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>2.581</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Covariate-adjusted CACE</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental Model</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for individual liberty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.235</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.045</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.909</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.907</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Boldfaced entries achieve significance at p ≤0.05
Note that in the second column, “treatment” is instrumented by “assignment to treatment”
### Table 20 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimate of CACE and Covariate-adjusted CACE of Applied Intolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CACE</th>
<th>Covariate-adjusted CACE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Instrumented Model</strong></td>
<td><strong>Instrumented Model</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff</td>
<td>Robust SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td><strong>-0.464</strong> 0.173</td>
<td><strong>-0.454</strong> 0.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic threat</td>
<td><strong>-0.079</strong> 0.025</td>
<td><strong>-0.080</strong> 0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>-0.077 0.121</td>
<td>-0.074 0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for individual liberty</td>
<td>0.574 0.117</td>
<td><strong>0.569</strong> 0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.077 0.121</td>
<td>0.074 0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.213 0.146</td>
<td>-0.217 0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-0.032 0.206</td>
<td>-0.021 0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.035 0.050</td>
<td>0.035 0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td><strong>2.585</strong> 0.113</td>
<td><strong>2.581</strong> 0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Boldfaced entries achieve significance at $p \leq 0.05$

Note that in the second column, “treatment” is instrumented by “assignment to treatment”
Tables 19 and 20 presents the two-stage least squares estimated CACE and covariate-adjusted CACE of applied tolerance and intolerance, respectively. The stage two model, in each case, returns precisely the CACE estimate derived from simple calculations above. In the case of applied tolerance (Table 19), however, that effect appears to have been slightly underestimated. This is because the other independent variables are balanced as they should be; they affect the outcome, but not the relationship between the treatment or the instrumented treatment on the outcome. Controlling for the predictive power of perceived threat, dogmatism, support for democratic values, education, and demographics, the second-stage of model 2 – in the far right column – returns a CACE of 0.458. By contrast, the second-stage covariate-adjusted model of applied intolerance, in Table 8, indicates that prior models overestimated the effect of treatment on attitudinal intolerance. But not by much: CACE = 0.425.

Overall, the effect of the self-persuasion experiment is comparable across groups assigned randomly to practice tolerance and groups assigned to practice intolerance. Moreover, this effect is robust following the inclusion of several major predictors of political intolerance. Given sampling uncertainty, the procedure can probably generate up to nearly a half-point increase in tolerance – averaged across all respondents assigned to practice tolerance – and just over an average of four-tenths decrease in tolerance among all subjects assigned to practice intolerance. It forces tolerant subjects and intolerant subjects together within each treatment group, by substantially decreasing tolerance among the initially tolerant by over eight-tenths of a point, and by increasing tolerance among the initially intolerant by approximately the same degree.
This chapter has introduced a means of randomly assigning subjects to the conditions in which they simulate the actual practice of tolerance and intolerance. The logic of this “self-persuasion experiment” is grounded in social psychology research, in which subjects who take up a position that is contrary to their original beliefs change these beliefs to conform to the counter-attitudinal argument. The effects are powerful among subjects advocating counterattitudinal positions, but changes are also evident among subjects who write proattitudinal positions.

The self-persuasion experiment offers several advantages over alternative experimental techniques in the political tolerance literature, while also preserving most of their benefits. Unlike framing experiments, the self-persuasion experiment constitutes a direct manipulation of political (in)tolerance insofar as subjects are assigned at random to apply tolerance or intolerance in civil liberties dispute scenarios that are presented identically – with equal probabilities of threat, equal (i.e. zero) mention of free speech or democratic values, and equal situational elements (e.g. location is each respondent’s local community). Moreover, this manipulation successfully moves political tolerance in both directions. Whereas framing experiments have not been able to provide evidence that between groups comparisons are not attributable entirely to the suppressive effect of public order and security frames on tolerance (as opposed to in combination with the stimulating effect of free speech considerations on tolerance), the self-persuasion experiment can stimulate and suppress political tolerance the applied tolerance and applied intolerance conditions, respectively.

The self-persuasion experiment shares with traditional persuasion experiments the feature of a direct manipulation of political (in)tolerance. However, whereas direct persuasion experiments using counterarguments have struggled to convert originally intolerant respondents
to tolerant judgments, the strongest effect to emerge from the self-persuasion experiment is the increase in tolerance among subjects who entered the experiment holding intolerant attitudes and who were assigned to practice tolerance toward their least-liked group in response to the hypothetical civil liberties dispute. Furthermore, direct persuasion experiments leave open the possibility that resistance to persuasion might generate stronger attitudes among a subset of the sample. Since intolerant subjects are far and away more likely to resist persuasion than tolerant subjects, it is difficult to attribute any downstream effects of manipulated tolerance on political outcomes to differences in attitude content. This is particularly relevant when the dependent variable is participation, since strong attitudes are more predictive of behavior than weak attitudes; resistance to direct persuasion may strengthen attitudes while acquiescence may weaken attitudes.

A final fundamental difference between the self-persuasion experiment and direct persuasion through counterarguments is that no assumptions need to be made about the differential strength of pro-tolerance and anti-tolerance arguments. The intensive elaboration at the core of the self-persuasion experiment requires each respondent to devise an argument that they themselves deem convincing. In combination with the content-controlled measurement strategy, one might claim that the self-persuasion experiment not only ensures that each subject generates judgments about tolerance in relation to a group they abhor, but also that each subject has a relatively equal opportunity to unravel and overturn the reasoning or feelings that led to their initial tolerance judgment in the first place.

Previous research on attitude change following self-persuasion suggests that its effects endure much longer than those associated with direct persuasion through counterarguments (e.g. Aronson 1999). Moreover, this is particularly true of attitudes that compel behavior – such as
attitudes toward water conservation and shower duration or environmental attitudes and recycling frequency (Dickerson, Thibodeau, Aronson and Miller 1992) – and high-risk behavior, at that (on condom use among college students, see Aronson et al. 1991, 1994). But additional research is required to compare the relative duration and potency of tolerance attitude change following direct and self-persuasion, especially in the context of a longitudinal study.

One important challenge to the self-persuasion experiment is that allowing respondents to control the arguments they make in favor or against allowing their most-disliked group to demonstrate publicly means researchers effectively lose control over the extraneous influence these arguments may have on outcomes like political participation. I have argued, however, that in the aggregate there is a pluralistic failure of the exclusion condition such that this failure cancels out in the aggregate. Section 5.4.5 provides anecdotal evidence to suggest that individual subjects do offer a bevy of different pro- and anti-tolerance justifications. In my future research, I will address this more rigorously, especially comparing cross-national justifications for (in)tolerance across countries where democratic values are presumed to be deeply ingrained and where they are not. Moreover, the essay task at the core of self-persuasion procedures provides an important source of qualitative data in tolerance research, not unlike the intensive interviews conducted by Chong (1993) for his study of “How Americans Think, Reason, and Feel about Rights and Liberties.” Americans may differ widely in their conceptualization of tolerance and their understanding of the rationale for toleration in general. This may have implications for political attitudes and behavior depending on the nature of civil liberties disputes as they emerge and develop in real time.

The results in this chapter show that simulating applied tolerance and intolerance exerts powerful effects over attitudinal tolerance and intolerance. This finding is a central stepping
stone in this dissertation: attributing causal effects of political tolerance on political participation requires that, at a minimum, experimental researchers randomly assign tolerance and intolerance in a convincing manner. The self-persuasion experiment by and large satisfies this requirement. The next step is to build this manipulation into a substantive study of the consequences of those attitudes. In the next chapter, I return to the question of how tolerance influences political behavior and examine what moves the politically tolerant to engage in more social forms of action than the politically intolerant.
6.0 THE BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE:
EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES AND HUNGARY

This chapter employs the self-persuasion experimental procedure to randomly assign American and Hungarian subjects to manifest tolerance or intolerance. Following exposure to manipulation, subjects are presented with the opportunity to either sign a petition or make an anonymous donation. Technologies embedded within the online survey experiment framework permit me to directly observe whether subjects assigned to tolerance participate more or differently than subjects assigned to intolerant or control conditions. Results of the experiment provide the first direct assessment of whether, how and where political tolerance may influence actual political behavior.

6.1 BRIEF REPRISE AND INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTER SIX

What are the behavioral consequences of political tolerance? In theory, tolerant activists serve as the custodians of liberal democracy. But it remains unclear whether tolerant citizens are necessarily more active citizens. One line of literature maintains that any positive association between tolerance and participation is spurious – explained by more fundamental demographic and personality traits (Sullivan et al. 1982). Another suggests that one endures nonconformity at the expense of vibrant civic engagement – tolerance is attitudinally too weak, pliable, and
dissonant to compel action on behalf of nonconformist others and leads individuals to abstain from expressing their own political views through even the most ordinary forms of participation, like voting (Mutz 2005).

This dissertation offers the costs-consistency theory of tolerance and participation as a third alternative. Its core idea is that tolerance and participation may be linked in terms of the “social costs” they pose to individuals as political actors. Individuals who bear substantial social costs to enable political expression by widely disliked others will be less likely to perceive barriers to their own political activism. Two mechanisms may explain this effect. On one hand, behavioral consistency across similar situations (e.g. Furr and Funder 2003) may account for a direct effect of tolerance on contentious and collective, or “public” participation. Practicing tolerance exposes individuals to high social costs, which in turn conditions their willingness to engage in contentious and collective actions that entail similar costs – costs that material resources cannot overcome alone (cf. Figure 1).

On the other hand, cognitive consistency may indirectly motivate tolerant individuals to engage in public political actions. Tolerance is a more dissonant position than intolerance (Gibson 2006) because it readily contradicts other cherished social and democratic norms (e.g. Sniderman et al. 1996). To the extent that such inconsistency is psychologically distressing (Festinger 1957), individuals will be motivated to strengthen or develop beliefs related to tolerance – such as perceived political freedom, support for dissent, and risk acceptance – that justify the decision to extend rights to unsavory groups and restore cognitive consistency. Therefore, tolerance may produce certain psychic benefits that facilitate engagement in high-cost public modes of participation.
Chapter Four tested the first of these two mechanisms and offered preliminary support for this revisionist account of tolerance and participation. The behavioral consistency hypothesis expected tolerant individuals to associate lower costs with – and, hence be more likely to engage in – “public,” contentious and collective forms of action than intolerant individuals. By contrast, I expected few differences between tolerant and intolerant citizen participation via “private,” individual avenues of engagement. Model estimates based on nonparametric matching of tolerant and intolerant respondents on a bevy of confounders that explain the propensity for both tolerance and participation generally support the behavioral consistency hypothesis in longstanding Western democracies.

However, from analysis of survey data in Chapter Four, no clear pattern of a relationship between tolerance and participation emerges in the post-communist context. While this appears consistent with pooled country-level analyses that rely on political socialization perspectives (e.g. Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), certain anomalies emerge that weaken this view. In Poland and Czech Republic, for instance, tolerance increases the propensity for private political actions in a manner consistent with the new democracy hypothesis. However, in these cases and in Slovenia, tolerance also increases the likelihood of engagement in public actions (petitioning, boycotting, and protesting) in a manner consistent with the behavioral consistency hypothesis. Finally, in the most fragile new democracies – Bulgaria and Hungary – political tolerance decreases political participation in a way that reflects the tradeoff account of tolerance and participation.

What this may suggest is that a general effect of tolerance on participation exists across countries, but this effect may also be counterbalanced by certain contextual forces in the post-authoritarian context. For instance, I speculated in Chapter Three that the relative fragility of
democracy in certain East Central European countries could lead citizens to perceive contentious acts of dissent as less intrinsically useful to the democratic process or democratic stability. Alternatively, the communist legacy has left citizens in many countries deeply suspicious of collective actions, and in some regimes (e.g. Hungary and Romania), real risks of government retaliation and repression for dissenting behavior persist.

On balance, evidence from Chapter Four suggests two things. Most importantly tolerance stimulates participation in collective and contentious political activities in many cases, but does less to influence private, individual forms of activism over and above the classic predictors of civic engagement. This pattern – most strongly apparent in longstanding, Western democracies – challenges conventional empirical accounts of the tolerance-participation relationship. Moreover, cross-country variation in the tolerance-participation relationship is likely more nuanced than political socialization theory suggests. Still, these conclusions remain open to at least three important objections, to which I attempt to respond in this chapter. First, the causal arrow could run in the opposite direction: participation in contentious and collective action may itself increase political tolerance, rather than the reverse. Second, survey respondents’ self-reported participation is susceptible to measurement error and may bias the results. Third, survey analysis does little to substantiate the potential micro-level processes underlying this relationship.

Randomized experiments offer an important means of ruling out endogeneity, improving measurement, and determining what moves the politically tolerant to engage in more public forms of action. Chapter Five introduced the “self-persuasion experiment” to exogenously and randomly manipulate tolerance and intolerance. Its value is twofold. First, it more closely simulates the actual practice of tolerance or intolerance because respondents elaborate their own argument for upholding or restricting the rights of their least liked group. Second, in the course
of developing this argument, subjects ultimately convince themselves that (in)tolerance is the appropriate response to a civil liberties dispute. Intent-to-treat analysis shows that random assignment to applied tolerance or intolerance meaningfully influences subjects’ underlying attitudinal tolerance. Importantly, assignment to treatment significantly bolsters intolerance among initially tolerant subjects and tolerance among initially intolerant subjects with equal frequency and similar power – a balanced influence that direct persuasion experiments have not yet been able to achieve – which can improve causal inferences about the downstream effects of political (in)tolerance.

This chapter employs the self-persuasion experiment to refine and extend the analysis in Chapter Four. I first randomly assign subjects in the United States and Hungary to manifest tolerance or intolerance and then directly observe their post-judgment participation using overt measures of subjects’ political behavior. This unobtrusive measurement strategy is not open to self-reporting bias in survey research and improves upon previous experimental work that has evaluated only behavioral intentions (e.g. Marcus et al. 1995). These experiments permit a direct test of the tolerance-participation relationship. They also illuminate cognitive consistency as a potential causal mechanism. In particular, a mediational analysis explores how protecting or restricting the rights of hated political opponents influences subjects’ perceptions of political freedom, support for dissent, and risk aversion – attitudes that shape how individuals weigh the costs of different political actions.

I review the operational hypotheses and case selection in the next section. In the third section, I discuss the experimental protocol and measurement strategies. The final sections present and discuss the results.
6.2 OPERATIONAL HYPOTHESES

This chapter will re-test the *behavioral consistency hypothesis* advanced in Chapter Four because endogeneity and measurement error may remain problematic in survey analysis even when matching techniques are employed. Original survey experiments conducted in the United States and Hungary also permit me to test additional hypotheses derived from Proposition 2, which posit that practicing tolerance carries positive psychic benefits for individuals in the form of decreased risk aversion, increased support for dissent, and increased political freedom. In general, I will call these the *cognitive consistency hypotheses*.

Individuals’ innate need to maintain cognitive consistency may account for these latter effects. Tolerance cross-cuts other important democratic norms like equality (Sniderman et al. 1996), desires for public order and security (Gibson 1998), and legitimate social goals like anti-racism (e.g. Bleich 2011) and women’s and LGBT minorities’ rights (e.g. Mudde 2010). Tolerance is therefore recognized as a more internally inconsistent, or dissonant, position than intolerance (Gibson 1998, 2006). Social psychology research consistently reports that individuals who experience inconsistency between two beliefs or between their beliefs and their actions encounter, as a consequence, a palpable psychological discomfort which they are motivated to reduce (Festinger 1957; Cooper 2007). This is achieved by restoring cognitive consistency; individuals bolster existing attitudes or develop new beliefs to reduce any ambivalence they experience.

Through this consistency restoration mechanism, tolerance may influence three attitudes that should lower the perceived costs of contentious and collective activism. First, based on Gibson’s (1992b) bivariate associations between tolerance and perceptions of freedom (i.e. the
belief that the government will not repress or otherwise infringe upon individuals’ right to express views that challenge the government), I expect that:

**Political Freedom Hypothesis**: *Individuals who practice tolerance will express greater perceptions of political freedom than individuals who practice intolerance.*

Gibson cautions against drawing inferences about the causal direction of this relationship; however, the methodology developed in Chapter Five permits a direct assessment of the association. By randomly assigning subjects to practice tolerance or intolerance in response to a hypothetical civil liberties dispute, I am able to discern whether tolerance judgments carry independent effects on perceptions of political freedom. Citizens who incur substantial costs to protect the basic rights of offensive groups may justify this decision through increased confidence that they lay unfettered claim to these same rights. Hence, tolerance should increase perceptions of political freedom.

In a similar vein, upholding the expressive rights of heinous groups poses certain risks to the tolerant individual – such as violating broadly accepted social norms of having one’s tolerance mistaken for acceptance of an unpopular group and support for its views. Restricting rights to these groups shields the intolerant individual from such risks. To the extent that individuals incur risks in order to defend the legitimacy of unsavory political expression by widely disliked groups, tolerant individuals may rationalize that the risk was justified. In turn, tolerance may decrease individuals’ aversion to potential risks associated with their own political expression:

**Risk Aversion Hypothesis**: *Individuals who practice tolerance will express greater risk-acceptance attitudes than individuals who practice intolerance.*
Finally, tolerance may be conceptualized as an act of dissent from the majority. A generation of political tolerance research demonstrates that, despite widespread support for civil libertarian norms, most citizens in most democracies are unwilling to extend basic procedural rights and civil liberties to groups they strongly dislike (e.g. Stouffer 1955; Sullivan et al. 1985; Duch and Gibson 1992; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007; but see Petersen et al. 2011). Hence, tolerant individuals are a minority subset in the broader, intolerant population. Individuals may reduce the dissonance associated with minoritarian tolerance by bolstering their belief that dissent from the majority is a necessary condition for good democracy.

**Support for Dissent Hypothesis:** *Individuals who practice tolerance will express greater support for dissent than individuals who practice intolerance.*

Via these products of cognitive consistency restoration, tolerance should contribute to citizens’ propensity for public political activism, which is contingent upon attitudinal dispositions toward risk, conflict, and dissent. But such psychic benefits should do little to facilitate engagement in private, individual actions whose low costs to action do not require positive attitudinal dispositions toward freedom, risk, and dissent to overcome.

However, certain theoretical allowances need to be made for contextual differences across entrenched liberal democracies and post-authoritarian (and potentially illiberal) democracies. In particular, contextual forces in the post-authoritarian context may block or counterbalance these proposed effects of tolerance. It is possible that cognitive consistency restoration will not increase perceptions of political freedom where real constraints on political freedom exist. In the case of Hungary, where Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party have eroded civil liberties and de-legitimized the political opposition vigorously over the past several years, post-communist citizens who already view the government and collective action with suspicion
(e.g. Wallace et al. 2012) may not develop new assurances that their rights are secure by extending them to others in the political opposition. Moreover, one could speculate that few citizens will perceive dissent as intrinsically useful to democratic stability where democratic backsliding is underway, as it is in Hungary.

Indeed, Hungary is the clearest case of a post-communist democracy whose authoritarian roots were never fully clipped and aerate once more. In Hungary, democratic transition generated considerable political and economic uncertainty, aggravated linguistic and ethnic tensions, and opened the door to Orbán’s authoritarian revival. It is possible that such considerations block the basic availability of pro-democratic orientations toward freedom and dissent as “justifications” for tolerance. I therefore speculate that if a connection between tolerance and participation exists in Hungary, it should be driven by behavioral consistency, such that enduring the costs of tolerance equips individuals to endure costs associated with their own political engagement. But I reiterate the new democracy hypothesis here as well: given the heightened (perhaps prohibitive) risks of public activism in Orbán’s Hungary, tolerance should be more likely to generate private, individual activism than contentious and collective activism.

25 It is at least the clearest case in the European Union, and clearest among the countries included in cross-national survey analysis from Chapter Four.
6.3 EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL

6.3.1 Summary

The purpose of this experiment is to examine whether tolerance judgments shape political participation and the attitudes toward freedom, risk, and dissent that may condition how individuals perceive costs of different avenues of action. The pre-test procedures and questions largely match those described in Chapter Five; however, certain basic differences are discussed below. This study’s major novelties are then discussed in the “treatment and post-test” subsections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4.

First, to test the micro-theoretical framework, subjects responded to post-test items designed to tap risk perceived freedom, risk aversion, and support for dissent. Second, subjects were provided with the opportunity to take action on behalf of a political goal they listed as “most important” to them in the pre-test. These measures of behavior are overt and unobtrusive: respondents could either donate money to, or sign their name to a petition circulated by, a group working to advance the subjects’ particular cause. Technologies embedded within the online survey framework permit me to directly observe not only whether and how respondents participate following the practice of tolerance or intolerance, but also whether they were willing to do so in a manner that sacrifices their anonymity.26 The fundamental details of these procedures are discussed below; the full text of the survey-experiment along with the exact forms respondents could access are included in the appendix to Chapter Six.

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26 This approach builds on current research design advances through which overt measures of behavior are increasingly incorporated into experimental settings (e.g. Shineman 2012).
6.3.2 Sample and cover story

A random sample of 880 subjects in the United States and Hungary was purchased through the online survey agency, Qualtrics. A total of 440 Americans and 440 Hungarians participated in the study of “How people persuade one another in politics.” The Hungarian survey was administered in Hungarian by “Research Now,” Qualtrics’ partner in Budapest. The survey translated into Hungarian independently by four contractors at TransPerfect – a professional translation agency based in New York, NY – and proofread for errors and consistency.

The basic structure of the survey experiment closely matches that described in Chapter 5. Importantly, however, given the high cost of “call-backs” in the Hungarian context, I was unable to separate the pre-test questionnaire from the treatment and post-test measures by dividing the survey-experiment into two separate sittings. Instead, participants completed the online study in a single sitting. I therefore took additional steps toward minimizing the influence of testing effects that could alert respondents to the purpose of the study and potentially bias its findings. In particular, I furnished a deceptive description of the survey format to help obscure similarities between pre-test and post-test questionnaires and to reduce subjects’ ability to infer the intention of the experiment from its basic structure. Subjects were informed that they had agreed to participate in two separate research studies regarding their political beliefs:

*Thank you for agreeing to participate in these research studies. In what follows, you will respond to two separate surveys about politics and current events in [country]. You will be paid for both. [Survey Agency name] has adopted this two-survey format to improve the survey experience for you, the respondent. In particular, you will be asked only once to answer basic questions about yourself – such as your age, education, gender, and so on – as this information is relevant to both research studies. Separate instruction sets have been provided for each study, so you will know when you have completed one and have begun the other.*
This device allowed me to provide unique introductions and instruction sets for the pre-test and post-test. This strategy helped divorce pre-test and post-test content in a credible manner and reduce the degree to which subjects might assume a relationship between questions preceding and following the manipulation. This procedure is consistent with deceptive practices employed in social psychological studies of attitude change, such as through cognitive dissonance (e.g. Cooper 2007), in which pre-test and post-test questions are often identical.

6.3.3 Pre-test questionnaire and measurement

The pre-test served to gauge respondents’ baseline tolerance for their least-liked group, the level of threat respondents believed that group poses to society; respondents’ support for individual liberty over public order and security; their level of dogmatic thinking, and basic demographic traits. The questionnaire employed in this study is identical to that described in Chapter Five with a few important exceptions. For brevity, I summarize in Table 21 the variables I have previously discussed.
Table 21 Pre-Test Questionnaire Items and Reliability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-test variable</th>
<th>#Items</th>
<th>Range/meaning of high values</th>
<th>Scale Reliability</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance†</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1-4 (4=most tolerant)</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1-10 (10=most threat)</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for individual freedom over order</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1-5 (5=most freedom)</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1-4 (4=most dogmatic)</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1-7 (?=most conservative)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,1 (1=female)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnicity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,1 (1=black; ethnic minority)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1-7 (?=advanced degree)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1-5 (5=most interest)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† American respondents could select one of ten “political groups currently active in American society today”: The Ku Klux Klan; Islamic fundamentalists; pro-choice groups (abortion supporters); pro-life groups (abortion opponents); the Occupy Movement; the Tea Party; American communists; Christian fundamentalists; atheists; or gay rights supporters. Hungarian respondents were able to select from among eight groups: Gypsies; Jobbik party supporters; Jews; Homosexual rights supporters; Communists; “Milla” supporters (anti-government protesters); Fidesz party supporters; Catholic nationalists. These groups represent the broad range of targets of Hungarian intolerance, from political leftists and social liberals (Romani rights groups, Homosexual rights supporters; Communists) to political rightists and social conservatives (Jobbik party supporters; Fidesz party supporters; Catholic nationalists). I have also included “Gypsies” and “Jews” were included as the most common targets of xenophobia and intolerance in modern Hungary.

The basic claim of this dissertation is that tolerance influences political action independently of conventional predictors of civic voluntarism (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). Moreover, case studies of tolerance and participation around a specific political issue report that, for both tolerant and intolerant individuals, political behavior is at least partly a function of a general propensity toward activism and issue-salience (Gibson 1987). I included three pre-test questions to account for these factors.

First, I measured subjects’ associational involvement – a strong predictor of activism – by asking “How often do you participate in activities that are organized by groups you belong to, such as churches, sports clubs, political organizations, volunteer or charity groups, unions, professional associations, etc.?”

Second and following Gibson (1992b), I evaluated respondents’ broad propensity for engagement in different sorts of political actions with the following question: “Suppose the
government did something you believed was wrong and you wanted to do something about it. Would you be willing or unwilling to take the following actions… 1) Put a sign in front of your home or apartment; 2) Join a peaceful protest; 3) Contact an elected official to express your opinions; 4) Donate money to an organization that supports your views; 5) Vote more frequently; 6) Create a local organization to oppose the government’s actions; 7) Create and gather signatures for a petition to oppose the government’s actions; 8) Sign your full name to a public petition to oppose the government’s actions. Four-category responses ranged from “definitely unwilling” to “definitely willing” and were averaged to generate a participation potential index (α = 0.84, United States; α = 0.84, Hungary).

Third, I introduced a question concerning subjects’ political goals to address issue-salience. After reporting their political ideology, respondents encountered a list of political issues generally covered by the news media at the time of each survey. They were asked “Which policy goal would you say is the MOST important to you right now?” In most cases, a clear liberal (leftist) and conservative (rightist) issue position had been advocated in the news. American subjects could choose from six policy questions, designed to represent liberal or conservative issue positions:

- End tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans
- Cut wasteful government spending
- Repeal Obamacare
- Fast-track immigrant children to U.S. citizenship
- Legalize same-sex marriage across the country
- Ban same-sex marriage across the country
Likewise, Hungarians could select from among six questions that dominated political news coverage throughout March 2013.

- Cut government-funded subsidies for college tuition
- Protect government-funded subsidies for college tuition
- Rename “Horthy Park” to its original name - Gyromo Park
- Require voters to pre-register before 2014 general election
- Protect protesters’ rights at the March 15th rallies
- Increase police presence at the March 15th rallies

Technologies embedded within the online survey allowed me to tailor options for real participation (described below) for each subject based on their response to this question. For instance, Americans selecting “cut government spending” as their most important political goal were offered an opportunity to advance this goal; Hungarians who opposed the re-naming of Gyromo park after notorious Nazi sympathizer, Miklos Horthy, could take action to revert the name change; and so on. I adopted this approach to partially limit the role that unequal issue-salience may play in generating participation in the post-test. Survey costs prohibit extensive measurement of issue-salience and attitude strength. However, this basic measure provides at least minimal assurance that all respondents encountered an opportunity to act on an issue they perceived as important.

6.3.4 Manipulation and post-test attitudinal measures

Subjects next encountered instructions for a distinct research study of “How people persuade one another in politics.” As the central manipulation, described in Chapter Five, subjects wrote an essay to convince a hypothetical discussion partner to either permit (tolerant condition) or prevent (intolerant condition) a public demonstration by the subject’s own least-liked group. Subjects in the control condition argued in favor or against selling genetically modified,
laboratory-grown tomatoes in place of natural, farm-grown tomatoes in their local stores. Again following conventions in self-persuasion research, subjects were informed prior to the writing task that they may be asked to advocate a counterattitudinal position, were given the option to exit the study without penalty, and encountered a gentle plea for their assistance despite any discomfort they might experience.\footnote{Subjects read: You will be asked to write a short but strong argument that you think could persuade the opinion of someone like you. Please remember: we politely ask that you try to write a strong argument, even if you disagree with what you have been asked to write. If you feel that you must refuse to write such an argument, you will have the opportunity to exit the survey without loss of payment. But your participation is very important to our research and would be of great help to us. We thank you for taking this task seriously.}

Subjects elected whether to withdraw from the study before assignment to treatment.\footnote{20 American subjects and 18 Hungarian subjects withdrew from the study.} This protects against one-sided attrition by condition, but increases the possibility of noncompliance. I consider subjects as having received treatment if and only if they have completed the intensive essay-writing task. I therefore excluded from the analysis noncompliant treatment-group subjects who wrote “nonsense” essays rather than developing and defending a tolerant or intolerant position on the hypothetical civil liberties dispute. However, subjects who wrote essays opposing the position they were asked to advocate (i.e. subjects assigned to tolerance who wrote defenses of intolerance and vice versa) were not excluded (see Chapter Five, Section 5.4.4).

Subjects who chose to proceed were then randomly assigned to treatment conditions, in which they had up to 10 minutes to “write at least 5 sentences, but not more than 10 sentences” in a text box that appeared beneath the question. After completing the tolerant, intolerant, or control essay task, subjects answered three questions – presented in random order – designed to measure their perceptions of political freedom, aversion to risk, and support for dissent.
Following Gibson (1992b), I measured perceived political freedom with the question: “Suppose you felt very strongly that something the government was doing was very wrong and you wanted to do something about it. Do you think the government would definitely allow, probably allow, probably not allow, or definitely not allow you to… 1) Organize a nationwide strike; 2) Organize public meetings to oppose the government’s actions; 3) Organize protest marches or demonstrations; 4) Make a speech criticizing government’s actions; 5) Create and gather signatures for a petition to oppose the government’s actions. The four response categories included “definitely not allow, probably not allow, probably allow, definitely allow”; responses were averaged and higher values represent higher perceptions of political freedom ($\alpha=0.88$, United States; $\alpha=0.84$, Hungary).

To measure support for dissent, respondents were invited to “Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 1) It is very good that people have freedom to protest against issues they dislike; 2) Most disagreements undermine society; 3) You have to be ready to accept new ideas; new ideas are needed for the advancement of society; 4) Challenging ideas held by the majority of people is essential to democracy. The averaged Likert-scaled items generate a reliable index in both countries ($\alpha=0.70$, United States; $\alpha=0.69$, Hungary) in which higher values represent greater support for dissent.

Lastly, I measured risk aversion with 10 statements employed in recent political science research (e.g. Kam 2000; Morgenstern and Zechmeister 2001). Specifically, respondents were invited to “Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 1) I do not feel comfortable about taking chances; 2) I like new and exciting experiences, even if I have to break the rules; 3) Before I make a decision, I like to be absolutely sure about how things will turn out; 4) I would like to explore strange places; 5) I prefer
situations that have foreseeable outcomes; 6) I feel comfortable improvising in new situations; 7) I feel nervous when I have to make decisions in uncertain circumstances; 8) I prefer friends who are exciting and unpredictable; 9) I avoid situations that have uncertain outcomes; 10) I like to do frightening things. These scales, on which higher values have been coded to represent higher risk acceptance, are also reliable across contexts (α = 0.79, United States; α = 0.65, Hungary).

6.3.5 Direct measures of political behavior

I built two separate measures of political participation into this experiment. The first directly measures subjects’ overt political behavior. The second aims to explicitly capture the “public” or “private” dimensions of political participation.

To properly distance these measures from the manipulation, respondents were first led to believe they had completed the online survey. Following the post-test attitudinal questions, they were thanked and informed that they would be paid $5.00 (1,700 Hungarian Forints).29

At the same time, subjects were also informed that the study was partly funded by the “Citizens Initiative Lobby Group” – a fictitious organization described as “a non-partisan, non-profit group that advances citizen interests in {Washington/Budapest}. Since 2002, the CILG has worked daily in courts, {legislatures/parliament}, and communities to promote the public’s views on important government decisions. We operate only in response to public demand.” Prior

29 Subjects were remunerated in these exact amounts via Qualtrics and Research Now survey houses. Note that Hungarian respondents were paid more than American respondents – these values do not represent exchange rates.
to exiting the study, subjects were invited to “view an important message from the Citizens’ Initiative Lobby Group” on the next page.  

**Overt Behavior Measure.** Upon advancing the page, each subject viewed a message tailored to reflect concern over the issue they selected as “most important” to them during the pre-test. Half of subjects selecting each issue were asked whether they would like to sign a petition distributed by the Citizens Initiative Lobby Group to advance their cause; half were asked whether they would like to donate a portion of their earnings from their survey to the Citizens Initiative Lobby Group to advance their cause.

For instance, American respondents who reported “legalize same-sex marriage” as the most urgent priority for US politics read:

*As you probably have heard, several states now officially recognize same-sex marriage. But many others do not. Several activist groups maintain that this imbalance is not sustainable. The Citizens’ Initiative Lobby group is now [circulating a petition around the country / raising money for its campaign] to legalize same-sex marriage across the country.*

Those selecting “Ban same-sex marriage” as the most important issue read:

*As you probably have heard, a few states now officially recognize same-sex marriage. But many others do not. Several activist groups maintain that this imbalance is not sustainable. The Citizens’ Initiative Lobby Group is now [circulating a petition around the country / raising money for its campaign] to ban gay marriage across the United States, at the federal level.*

I furnished similar vignettes for each issue; these are presented in the appendix to Chapter 6. As a measure of overt political behavior, subjects were next invited to download the petition or donation form, complete it, and re-upload it to the survey website:

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30 In practice they had no choice but to view the message.
Feel free to download and fill out the [petition/donation form] by clicking this link: [link].

Save it to your computer and, when you are finished, you may upload your [signed petition/completed donation form] by clicking {“Choose File”} below. If you do not wish to participate, please click “next” to exit the survey interface.

[Petition]: Upon exiting this survey on the next page, your signed petition along with your name and email address will be automatically forwarded to the specified recipients, and the Citizens Initiative Group will receive a copy for their permanent records.

[Donation]: Upon existing this survey on the next page, the amount you elect to donate will be automatically withheld from your payment for participating in this study. This is to ensure your anonymity.

I furnished unique petition and donation forms for each issue, which can be viewed in the Appendix to Chapter 6. By way of example, Figure 4 presents the Citizens’ Initiative Lobby Group petition to ban same-sex marriage. Note that subjects are asked to provide their last name and first initial, and to indicate whether their name may be forwarded to the government actors listed in blue at the top of the page. Standards of research conduct limit the amount of information I could ethically request from individual respondents. Nevertheless, the petition contains at least two credible suggestions that participation would reveal the participant’s identity to the petition’s recipients – in particular, the government and media actors’ names are highlighted in blue and the respondent is explicitly asked whether their name (even if not fully revealed) can be kept on record.
Figure 4 Petition Viewed by Subjects selecting "Ban same-sex marriage" as Most Important Political Goal
By contrast, the donation form in Figure 5 assures anonymity. Subjects do not provide their name, and in any case must explicitly request that it be included in a list of “contributors.”

![Donation Form Viewed by Subjects selecting "Ban same-sex marriage" as Most Important Political Goal](image_url)
The re-upload function allowed me to directly measure which respondents returned a completed petition or donation form. Respondents are coded as having “signed the petition” or “made a donation” if they returned a completed form to the online survey. On the other hand, “non-participants” are those individuals who did not re-upload a completed form before proceeding to the end of the survey.

**Public vs. Private Action Measure.** The division between petitioning and donating is partially theoretical and partially functional. In theory, these behaviors can be differentiated by the degree to which they expose participants to potential conflict with the government. Hence, petitioning represents “public” political activism, whereas “donating” is an example of private, individual activism. As the examples above suggest, I took additional steps toward emphasizing this in each condition. Moreover, this distinction has been validated by other empirical research. In her study of risk attitudes and political participation, Kam (2011) finds that donations stand apart from other behaviors in that they are only weakly conditioned by risk-acceptance relative to more public actions, like petitioning. And in the case of donations to religious organizations, risk acceptance predicts abstention. Functionally, these are the easiest behaviors to map using online survey technologies.31

Still, there may be other reasons why a subject would be more likely to petition than donate that do not relate to the collective-contentious or individual dimensions of costs proposed here and in the participation literature. For instance, these studies were conducted during economic recessions in both the U.S. and Hungary; respondents may be reluctant to part ways with money they just earned over the past 30 minutes. Even though I can control for income in

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31 Ideally, I would contrast protest or rally attendance against voting or donating behavior; but this requires a natural experimental setting, such as emerged around the Ground Zero “Mosque” dispute. This is a subject for future research.
the analysis, subjects invited to donate may be primed to think about the amount of time they dedicated to the study relative to their remuneration and be reluctant to give more, whereas this is not a consideration for subjects offered the opportunity to sign a petition.

Therefore, I embedded a cleaner measure of the public vs. private dimension of participation directly into the petition and donation forms. Petitioning respondents were informed that: *Your signature to this petition will be published with other signatures, unless you elect to remain totally anonymous by selecting the appropriate box on the petition itself.* Donating respondents were told: *Your donation will be deducted automatically and is completely anonymous. If you would like your name to be included among the published list of “contributors” to this cause, please select the appropriate box on the donation form itself.* Respondents therefore explicitly revealed their willingness to preserve or forego their anonymity in the case of both donating and petitioning. This strengthens the validity of my conclusions in the event that some unknown characteristic associated with these behaviors renders categorizing them as “public” vs. “private” untenable.

### 6.4 DIRECT EFFECTS OF TOLERANCE ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In the self-persuasion experiment, treatment is considered to have been “received” when a subject who was assigned to write a substantive (i.e. non-control condition) essay did in fact write such an essay. A total of 23 American respondents (15.8 percent) in the tolerant condition and 19 Americans assigned to the intolerant condition (13 percent) returned alpha-numeric strings or nonsensical commentaries unrelated to the hypothetical civil liberties dispute at the core of the treatment. By definition, these subjects have been coded as “non-compliers” who did
not receive treatment in line with the experimental design. The Hungarian sample returned a similar rate of noncompliance: 16 (12.5 percent) of subjects assigned to tolerance and 20 (13.1 percent) subjects assigned to intolerance wrote nonsensical essays.

When not every participant receives the assigned treatment, experiments commonly provide two estimates of treatment effect. The “intent-to-treat” (ITT) analysis compares rates of participation across conditions, independent of essay content. That is, the ITT estimates the causal effect of treatment assignment, rather than treatment-receipt – ignoring, for the moment, whether subjects actually defended a tolerant or intolerant position in a manner consistent with the manipulation’s intent. Then, the Compliers Average Causal Effect (CACE) is estimated as the average rate of participation weighted by the percent of the treatment group that actually received treatment.

6.4.1 Tolerance and participation in the United States

Before turning to the main results, a manipulation check confirms that the self-persuasion experiment influenced levels of tolerance for respondents’ most disliked groups. A one-way between subjects ANOVA finds significant and substantively meaningful difference in tolerance cross subjects assigned to write tolerant, intolerant, and control essays \( F (2, 373) = 8.97, p<0.01 \). Cross condition mean differences, depicted in Figure 6, are significant at the .05 level using the Scheffe post-hoc test.
Looking next at overt behavior among American respondents, Table 22 presents the rates of petitioning and donating among subjects across experimental conditions. The top panel reveals a large effect of assignment to tolerance on petitioning, with approximately 81 percent of the treatment group downloading, signing, and re-uploading to the online survey their completed petition to push the government forward on the issue they identified as “important” in the pre-test. Nearly two-thirds of subjects assigned to intolerance and control conditions also signed petitions. While the difference in petitioning across intolerant and control group subjects is small, fully 21 percent more subjects petitioned following assignment to tolerance relative to the control. By contrast, the lower panel shows that subjects in the tolerant condition were somewhat less likely to make an anonymous donation than subjects assigned to the intolerant or control conditions, with small differences apparent across the three treatment conditions.
Table 22 Effect of Manipulation on Participation Rates, United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance (%)</th>
<th>Petitioning (%)</th>
<th>ITT</th>
<th>CACE</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>84.93</td>
<td>21.67</td>
<td>25.52*</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerant</td>
<td>86.30</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance (%)</th>
<th>Donating (%)</th>
<th>ITT</th>
<th>CACE</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>83.56</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerant</td>
<td>87.67</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Scheffe post-hoc means comparison significant at p≤.05

The Compliers Average Causal Effect (CACE) is the Intent-to-Treat effect weighted by the percent of the treatment group that actually received treatment or, referring to Table 22, the observed difference between treatment and control in column 3 divided by the rate of compliance in column 1. This estimate returns the effect of toleration on the rate of participation among individuals who wrote essays consistent with the instruction-set. Practicing tolerance exerts a 25.52% increase in the likelihood of petitioning over the control group. Intolerance by contrast increases the rate of petitioning by 2.89 percent. By contrast, tolerant subjects are approximately 0.5 percent less likely to donate, and intolerant subjects approximately 2.7 percent less likely to donate than the control group.

In other words, individuals who developed and defended an argument to allow their least-liked minority groups to demonstrate more readily downloaded, signed and returned their petitions than individuals who refused demonstration rights to their least-liked group and control subjects who wrote an essay having nothing to do with civil liberties \(F(2,188) = 4.09, p = 0.018\). Post-hoc comparisons using the Scheffe test of significance find that the average rate of
petitioning was significantly higher among tolerant subjects than control and intolerant subjects at the p<0.05 level. By contrast, no significant differences in intent to donate emerge across conditions \( F(2,188) = 0.11, p = 0.900 \).

These results provide the first clear evidence of a direct effect of tolerance judgments on overt political action. They lend further credence to the behavioral consistency hypothesis, and the broader notion that it is important to take stock of variation in the participatory act when evaluating the behavioral consequences of tolerance and democratic values in general. Still, while differentiated between petitioning as a “public” contentious-collective action and donating as a “private” action may be theoretically defensible (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978) and has been validated by other recent empirical work (e.g. Kam 2011), these acts may differ in other ways that do not reflect the public-private dimension of participation.

In defense against these unobserved sources of bias, I embedded directly into each petition and donation form a direct indicator of the “public” vs. “private” dimension of action. Those individuals who encountered the petition were asked for permission to “send their name to the recipients” of the petition. They could either agree to expose their identity, or elect to be represented as a “confidential supporter” (cf. Figure 4). Individuals who completed the donation form were able to provide their name, though this was explicitly optional, and were asked whether “we may publish your name among our list of supporters” (cf. Figure 5) Hence, petitioners were able to “opt out” of the public dimension of petitioning, while donors were able to “opt out” of the private dimension of donating.

Tolerance requires that citizens “uncouple” perceptions of threat from questions of whether to extend rights to unsavory groups. The sources of this threat not only lay with the target group, but also stem from the broader intolerant majority. To the extent that tolerant
citizens confront disagreement, conflict and other social costs to uphold the rights of groups that society prefers to repress, they should be more willing to expose themselves to these same costs to voice their own political views. Individuals confront these costs when they participate in “full public view” (Milbrath 1965: 10). Therefore, one plausible measure of this exposure is the willingness to reveal one’s identity as a participant.

Figure 7 illustrates mean differences across conditions in subjects’ willingness to forego anonymity. Subjects in the tolerant condition were 16 percent more likely to willfully attach their name to their petition than the control group, and 22 percent more likely to do so than subjects assigned to refuse rights to their least liked group. More importantly, the same pattern is apparent among subjects who made a donation. Approximately 36 percent of tolerant subjects agreed to have their name “published” among the list of donors to the hypothetical Citizens’ Initiative Lobby Group: a significantly higher ratio than both intolerant (21.7 percent) and control-group subjects (22.6 percent). Mean differences \( F (2, 128) = 3.99, p = 0.021 \) are significant across tolerant and intolerant group subjects \( (p_{\text{Scheffe}} = 0.054) \) and across tolerant and control group subjects \( (p_{\text{Scheffe}} = 0.068) \).
In line with the *behavioral consistency hypothesis*, this pattern suggests that the influence of tolerance on participation might be understood in terms of preparing individuals to incur costs associated with their own political participation. Table 22 and Figure 7 confirm the pattern of results reported in Chapter Four. In longstanding democracies like the United States, tolerance appears to *directly stimulate* participation through public means relative to intolerance, but it does little to facilitate activism through more conventional, private modes of engagement.

### 6.4.2 Tolerance and participation in Hungary

I hypothesized that this pattern may very well be reversed in new democracies with a recent history of authoritarian rule. Hungary exemplifies this case, not only because of its communist past, but also because the modern opposition – in politics, media, and the public – suffers real constraints on its freedom under Prime Minister Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Moreover, Hungary is a deeply intolerant society which publicly scapegoats and disparages its Jewish, Romani, and homosexual minorities. In this illiberal context, it is possible that the costs one incurs on behalf of one’s opponents will not translate into a greater willingness to risk exposure to the regime. Hence, to the extent that tolerance and participation are meaningfully related in Hungary, tolerant citizens may be more likely to engage in private modes of participation.

Before turning to the main results, a manipulation check confirms that the self-persuasion experiment did in fact influence tolerance levels in a meaningful fashion in Hungary. A one-way between subjects ANOVA finds that assignment to treatment yields a significant and substantively meaningful influence on attitudinal tolerance in Hungary \( F(2, 397) = 12.47, p < 0.01 \). Mean differences across conditions, depicted in Figure 8, achieve significance at the .05 level using the post-hoc Scheffe test.
Unlike results from the American sample, however, the manipulation did not exert a strong effect on overt political behavior among Hungarians. The bottom panel of Table 23 shows that only 2.15 percent more subjects assigned to the tolerant condition than the control condition freely donated a portion of their remuneration to the fictitious Citizens Initiative Group to advance a cause of importance to them. Neither these differences, nor those across treatment and control conditions with respect to petitioning, are significant by conventional F-tests.
Table 23 Effect of Manipulation on Participation Rates, Hungary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance (%)</th>
<th>Petitioning (%)</th>
<th>ITT</th>
<th>CACE</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>91.55</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerant</td>
<td>87.34</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance (%)</th>
<th>Donating (%)</th>
<th>ITT</th>
<th>CACE</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant</td>
<td>84.51</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intolerant</td>
<td>84.81</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first blush, the experimental results appear to contradict the behavioral consistency hypothesis and comport instead with the findings from Chapter Four, where tolerance appears to exert no meaningful influence on patterns of participation in post-communist countries. A common supposition of public opinion research in new democracies is that citizens in countries like Hungary have not had long enough to fully understand, embrace, and draw connections between liberal democratic norms such as tolerance and civic engagement. In this sense, the lack of a relationship between tolerance and engagement in Hungary and the post-communist area in general may simply be a function of its short and uncertain experience with democracy.

However, the rates at which Hungarian participants elected to publish their names with their petitions and donations point to a wrinkle in these “political socialization” explanations offered thus far. Regardless of the type of political engagement, Figure 9 shows that Hungarian subjects assigned to practice tolerance are also significantly more willing to sacrifice their anonymity. This is true for tolerant petitioners ($M=0.310$) relative to subjects assigned to intolerance ($M=0.180$) and control ($M=0.221$), and for tolerant donors who are also significantly less willing to attach their names to contributions to the Citizens’ Initiative Group than intolerant
or control subjects \[F(2,43) = 2.58, p = 0.087]\). What this means is that there is no difference in actual petitioning or donating across the manipulations, but there are differences in the rate of public behavior provided that a behavior was chosen.

![Figure 9 Non-Anonymous Activism across Experimental Conditions, Hungary](image)

This result is highly unexpected. Survey evidence in Chapter Four suggests tolerant Hungarians are less likely to participate through even conventional, private modes of activism than their intolerant counterparts. Experimental results point to small increases in donations among tolerant relative to control and intolerant-treatment subjects, but tolerance also stimulates willingness to expose oneself to the potential costs of participation through either public or private means for which a participation opportunity was presented. To what form of participation does tolerance contribute in Hungary?

This can be evaluated more clearly by restating the behavioral consistency hypothesis precisely in terms of its implications for public expression, irrespective of how different modes of action are categorized theoretically. In other words, tolerance increases individuals’ willingness to reveal their identity as participants regardless of how they choose to engage in
politics. This represents the core of the behavioral consistency hypothesis’ notion that the costs of tolerance render individuals more likely to face down the costs of public participation, costs to which an individual is exposed only if he or she participates in “full public view” (Milbrath 1965). This hypothesis can be tested using a dependent variable with three unordered outcomes: public (petition or donation with respondent’s name published voluntarily), private (petition or donation with respondent’s name kept confidential), and inaction. To model this variable, I rely on multinomial logistic regression. In Tables 24 and 25, I estimate a model for each treatment condition (against the control group), controlling for pre-test measures of individuals’ overall willingness to participate in politics, extent of associational involvement, level of education, gender, and age. To control for policy-specific effects, I generate a dummy variable for “anti-government policy” if the respondent selected as his or her most important political goal an issue preference that contradicts the Orbán regime’s status quo policy.

### Table 24 Treatment Effects of Tolerance on Willingness to Participate vs. Not to Participate (Base Outcome)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public participation</th>
<th>Private participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>0.925 (0.400)</td>
<td>0.014 (0.506)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to participate</td>
<td>1.302 (0.350)</td>
<td>2.445 (0.659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational involvement</td>
<td>0.062 (0.139)</td>
<td>0.257 (0.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.091 (0.182)</td>
<td>0.248 (0.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Government Policy</td>
<td>-0.125 (0.189)</td>
<td>-0.864 (0.233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.296 (0.408)</td>
<td>0.248 (0.135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.211 (0.150)</td>
<td>-0.296 (0.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>9.442 (8.987)</td>
<td>9.425 (8.725)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-152.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs</td>
<td>288</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent multinomial log-odds ratios of a change from non-participation to public or private participation. Boldfaced entries significant at $p \leq .10$; standard errors in parentheses
Table 25 Treatment Effects of Intolerance on Willingness to Participate vs. Not to Participate (Base Outcome)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public participation</th>
<th>Private participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treatment</td>
<td>0.029 (0.474)</td>
<td>0.111 (0.413)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to participate</td>
<td>0.953 (0.292)</td>
<td>0.778 (0.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associational involvement</td>
<td>0.359 (0.153)</td>
<td>0.199 (0.145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.100 (0.238)</td>
<td>0.018 (0.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Government Policy</td>
<td>-0.201 (0.263)</td>
<td>-0.478 (0.188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.080 (0.497)</td>
<td>-0.154 (0.409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.033 (0.173)</td>
<td>-0.117 (0.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.927 (11.818)</td>
<td>7.302 (3.583)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-164.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obs</td>
<td>304</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries represent multinomial log-odds ratios of a change from non-participation to public or private participation. Boldfaced entries significant at p ≤ .10; standard errors in parentheses.

Coefficients represent the marginal effect of a one-unit change in the corresponding independent variable on the log-odds outcome (e.g. public participation) relative to the base outcome (e.g. no participation). Table 24 suggests rather strongly that tolerance principally influences individuals’ willingness to confront costs associated with public political participation. The multinomial logit estimate for a unit increase in treatment (i.e. tolerance relative to control) changes the log-odds for public participation relative to complete inaction by 0.925 while holding all other variables in the model constant. By contrast, in column 2 it is apparent that practicing tolerance has no statistically significant influence on the log-odds ratio for private participation relative to non-participation. Table 25 suggests that, in Hungary, practicing intolerance does little to influence participation of any sort – where no treatment effects significantly alter the log-odds ratio of being overtly or privately participatory relative to the control group.
Although political socialization theory has been advanced elsewhere to account for the lack of a relationship in new democracies (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003), my experimental evidence suggests that upholding the rights of disliked groups in Hungary renders citizens more willing to expose themselves to the costs of activism. Although tolerance and participation are unrelated to the direct behavioral measures of petitioning and donating, practicing tolerance does produce statistically significant influence over the “public vs. private” behavior measure embedded into the petitions and donations. Substantively, this means that tolerant Hungarians are significantly more willing than others to reveal to government, media, and advocacy group actors that they are engaging in public affairs. In this sense, evidence from Hungary does not fit with political socialization argument. But nor does it directly support the behavioral consistency hypothesis I advanced in Chapter Three and tested in Chapter Four. The next section explores cognitive consistency restoration as a potential mechanism behind this pattern of results.

### 6.5 UNCOVERING THE CAUSAL MECHANISM

I have presented two plausible mechanisms for the effects of tolerance on public modes of participation. The first posits that the costs of tolerance mirror the costs associated with collective and contentious action; to the extent that individuals tend to behave consistently across similar situations, I argued that practicing tolerance may directly contribute to individuals’ willingness to engage in more costly, public political actions. Experimental evidence from the United States supports this behavioral consistency hypothesis; evidence from Hungary does not. However, in Hungary we nevertheless see effects of tolerance on subjects’ willingness to expose themselves to the potential costs associated with taking action in full public view.
The second possibility is that toleration indirectly facilitates public political actions by producing attitudes that reduce the degree to which citizens will perceive contentious or collective actions as costly or socially undesirable. Tolerance is a high-cost, risky, and minoritarian position that potentially conflicts with other legitimate and more intensely held beliefs about the goals of democracy and about norms of common decency. (Such conflict is apparent in the essay examples I provided in section 5.4.5, above.) This sort of value conflict can produce psychological discomfort that tolerant individuals will be motivated to reduce by strengthening or developing new beliefs that justify the decision to tolerate a heinous group. The cognitive consistency mechanism thus suggests that practicing tolerance confers psychic benefits in the form of higher perceptions of political freedom, reduced risk aversion, increased support for dissent relative to intolerant individuals.

Subtle evidence for post-tolerance attitude changes exists elsewhere in the literature. Sullivan et al. (1993) argue that tolerance requires individuals to “uncouple” perceptions of threat from decisions about how to allocate rights and liberty to others. The authors argue for this effect among national policymakers who often perceive higher levels of threat from their political enemies than rank-and-file citizens, but who are nevertheless more willing to extend rights to these groups (but see Shamir 1991). Gibson (2002) shows that this “uncoupling” may have downstream effects to the extent that ordinary citizens who extend rights to their least-liked groups are subsequently less likely to perceive threats from these groups. And Gibson (1992b, 2008) finds consistent bivariate associations between tolerance and the belief that one is free to express one’s own political beliefs without fear of government retribution or restraint.

The experimental procedures developed in this dissertation permit a test of the implications of the cognitive consistency argument by comparing post-judgment attitudes toward
freedom, risk, and dissent across subjects assigned to control and subjects assigned to practice tolerance or intolerance.

First, I posited that citizens who incur substantial costs to protect the basic rights of offensive groups may justify this decision through increased confidence that they themselves lay unfettered claim to these same rights. Hence, the political freedom hypothesis: individuals who practice tolerance will express greater perceptions of their own political freedom than individuals who practice intolerance. However, I speculated in section 6.2 that the same pattern may not be apparent in the Hungarian context. Under Viktor Orbán, a real threat of repression exists in: the Fidesz Party’s white-knuckled clutch on the courts and media, their successful attempts to marginalize and delegitimize the political opposition, and a recent history of subtle repression of free association by the anti-government “Milla” group suggest a rather real risk of government retribution for nonconformist political activism. To the extent that a real threat of government repression is present in Hungary, I proposed that tolerance may do little to increase perceptions of freedom or risk acceptance.

![Figure 10](image.png)  
**Figure 10** Effect of Manipulation on Perception of Freedom in the U.S. and Hungary
Reading across Figure 10 from left to right, each column represents the mean value of perceived freedom among individuals assigned to tolerant, intolerant and control conditions in the United States and Hungary. Scores have been recoded to range from 0-1. Looking first at evidence from the U.S., subjects who wrote arguments defending the rights of their least-liked group reported significantly higher perceptions of freedom \( F (2, 379) = 4.74, p = 0.009 \) than subjects in either the intolerant or control conditions. Moreover, in Hungary, practicing tolerance increases perceptions of political freedom \( (M=0.642) \) relative to the control group \( (M=0.603) \), with mean differences significant at the 0.05 level. Among subjects who actually received treatment (i.e. those who wrote an essay consistent with the instruction set), the average causal effect of developing and defending a tolerant argument is nearly a five percent increase in the belief that the government will not punish political expression that opposes its policies. This is remarkable in Hungary, where the government has intensively and overtly restricted opposition rights over the past three years.

These results are important. While Gibson (1992b, 2008) has previously demonstrated micro-level associations between attitudinal tolerance and perceptions of political freedom, findings from this experiment show that individuals assigned to practice tolerance perceive greater overall freedom to challenge the government’s action than individuals who do not – and that this effect is robust to rather wide variation in country context. Given that tolerance is manipulated exogenously via the self-persuasion procedure, we are able to be more confident that this effect is attributable to the practice of tolerance itself.

A second mechanism through which individuals might reduce the internal conflict that tolerance produces is via increasing support for dissent as a “democratic good.” Tolerance is commonly the minority position among ordinary citizens in response to disputes over civil
liberties – even in established liberal democracies (e.g. Stouffer 1955; Sullivan et al. 1985; Duch and Gibson 1992; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton 2007). By contrast, intolerance is more internally consistent with other beliefs and tends to be the majority reaction to disputes over the rights of widely disliked groups. To the extent that individuals must justify standing at odds with majority opinion, the support for dissent hypothesis proposes that individuals who practice tolerance will express greater support for dissent from majority opinion relative to individuals who practice intolerance. The left panel of Figure 11 supports this hypothesis with respect to the U.S., where subjects assigned to develop tolerant arguments exhibit significantly higher support for dissent \[ F (2, 379) = 5.55, p = 0.004 \] than subjects in either the intolerant or control conditions.

![Figure 11](image-url)  
**Figure 11** Effect of Manipulation on Support for Dissent in the U.S. and Hungary

I conjectured that certain contextual features of illiberal politics may work against this effect in Hungary. On one hand, citizens may be less likely to view dissent as intrinsically useful to democratic stability in new democracies, especially those where economic conditions are
fragile and democratic backsliding is well-underway. In Hungary, tolerance and intolerance both exert a suppressive effect on support for dissenting behavior relative to the control group \(F(2, 413) = 5.29, p = 0.005\), though the causal effect is somewhat stronger among subjects who actually received the tolerant treatment (4.1 percent decrease relative to the control) than subjects who complied with the intolerant manipulation (2.7 percent decrease relative to the control). If dissent is generally considered threatening to stability in brittle democratic systems, then exposure to a civil liberties dispute involving a nonconformist group may prime individuals in both treatment conditions (i.e. tolerant and intolerant) to consider these threats more fully when responding to post-manipulation questions about dissent. In other words, the manipulation may have an unintended, secondary effect on subjects in Hungary that it does not exert on subjects in the United States, where democracy too stable for nonconformist political expression to disrupt. This effect in Hungary would explain why the control group – which was not exposed to a civil liberties dispute or a nonconformist group (they wrote essays about genetically modified tomatoes) – expresses comparatively strong support for dissent.

![Figure 12 Effect of Manipulation on Risk Acceptance in the U.S. and Hungary](image-url)
The *risk aversion hypothesis* – which proposes that practicing tolerance renders individuals less averse to risk in their own decision making than practicing intolerance – is not supported in either context. I argued that upholding the expressive rights of heinous groups poses risks to the tolerant individual – such as violating broadly accepted social norms or having one’s tolerance mistaken for acceptance of an unpopular group and support for its views – while restricting rights to these groups shields the intolerant individual from such risks. Tolerant individuals may therefore justify enduring these risks on behalf of widely disliked groups by perceiving less risk in general. This argument is not substantiated by the data. Tolerance exerts no meaningful effect on attitudes toward risk in the United States or Hungary (Figure 12). Although tolerant subjects reported higher levels of risk acceptance than their intolerant or control counterparts in the U.S. \(F(2,379) = 2.20, p = 0.110\)], by the most conservative post-hoc tests these differences do not achieve significance across paired conditions. In Hungary, risk acceptance is somewhat lower among treatment condition subjects relative to control group subjects, but these differences are insignificant.

Somewhat stronger support for the cognitive consistency mechanism becomes apparent when we chart the effects of tolerance on perceptions of freedom and support for dissent by levels of pre-test tolerance. We should expect to observe strong effects of tolerance on these perceptions among the *initially intolerant* subjects in the sample, who presumably experience high levels of psychological discomfort upon practicing tolerance.
Figure 13 shows that initially intolerant Americans who were assigned to write an essay defending their least-liked group’s right to hold a demonstration (i.e. tolerant-treated intolerant) express marginally greater political freedom than even control group subjects whose pre-test tolerance exceeds the sample mean (i.e. control-tolerant). Also consistent with Gibson’s (1992b, 2008) findings, practicing intolerance reduces perceptions of political freedom: initially tolerant subjects who wrote an essay opposing the rights of their least liked group to demonstrate (i.e. intolerant-treated tolerant) recognize less political freedom than the tolerant control group (but not less than control subjects who expressed intolerance in the pre-test). In general, the same pattern of results characterizes support for dissent: practicing tolerance generates greater support for dissent both among subjects who expressed tolerant attitudes (i.e. tolerant-treated tolerant) and intolerant attitudes (tolerant-treated intolerant) in the pre-test questionnaire.
Figure 14 reveals that in Hungary, as in the United States, tolerant individuals assigned to the control condition (i.e. whose tolerance was not manipulated) express “naturally” higher levels of perceived freedom than intolerant individuals in the control group. However, Hungarians who entered the experiment with intolerant attitudes and were assigned to practice tolerance (i.e. tolerance-treated intolerant) profess significantly higher levels of perceived freedom than the control-intolerant – levels that approximate those in the control-tolerant group. Similarly, perceptions of freedom among initially tolerant Hungarians who composed intolerant essays (i.e. intolerant-treated tolerant) do not significantly differ from the perceptions of intolerant Hungarians who wrote control essays (i.e. control-intolerant). These patterns suggest that the application of tolerance and intolerance significantly and independently shapes
perceptions of liberty among citizens in new and illiberal democratic Hungary, just as it does in the established liberal democratic United States.

Figure 14 also suggests that rendering any applied judgment – tolerant or intolerant – on a civil liberties dispute in Hungary decreases citizen support for dissent relative to the control group. Support for dissent does not significantly differ across tolerant and intolerant Hungarians in the control group; nor does it in the United States (cf. Figure 13). However, whereas applied tolerance increases support for dissent among both initially tolerant and intolerant American subjects, it universally decreases that support among Hungarians. The same pattern characterizes subjects assigned to practice intolerance.

These patterns may shed some explanatory light onto the curious effects of tolerance on participation demonstrated in section 6.4.2. Recall that while tolerance does not tend to increase political activism directly in Hungary, it does influence Hungarian subjects’ willingness to expose themselves to the potential costs of “public” political activism by increasing the rates at which they reveal their names along with their petition and donation forms. It is possible that the former relationship is mediated by support for dissent, whereas the latter effects are mediated by perceptions of political freedom: citizens who do not fear government reprisal for their actions should perceive few costs associated with revealing that they are active participants in Hungarian political life. An individual may oppose dissent and nevertheless believe that the government will not punish it.
This notion can be tested via a path analysis to examine the mediational effects of support for dissent and perceived political freedom on overt participation and the more specific measure of the public dimension of this participation. The upper panel of Figure 15 finds no direct effect of assignment to tolerance on the likelihood of petition. While tolerance significantly increases perceptions of freedom and decreases support for dissent, these factors do not influence “public participation.” The bottom panel of Figure 15 suggests that perceptions of political freedom
mediate citizens’ willingness to reveal their identities to the state. In Hungary, then, extending rights to one’s least liked group increases one’s perception of political freedom. This in turn stimulates citizens’ willingness to expose themselves to “full public view” (Milbrath 1965: 10).

However, to the extent that tolerance decreases support for dissent, Hungarians may be less likely to engage in the sort of actions that require a disposition toward non-anonymity.

Figure 16 Mediation Analysis, United States
Treatment is coded so that 1 = assigned to tolerant condition; 0 = assigned to control. *p<0.10.
These effects work against one another in the Hungarian case; they work in concert in the American case. Figure 16 conducts the same mediational analysis on the US sample and finds a very similar pattern of results. The effect of tolerance on petitioning is partially mediated via its bolstering effect on support for dissent; its effect on “publishing” is mediated by its stimulating influence on perceptions of political freedom. Importantly, however, in the American case, tolerance continues to exert a positive, independent impact on both outcomes.

6.6 DISCUSSION

This chapter presents direct evidence that putting up with one’s political opponents carries consequences for political behavior. Tolerance stimulates participation in public, contentious and collective actions (in this case, signing one’s name to a petition to alter the status quo) but does little to facilitate private, individual actions (e.g. making an anonymous donation). Moreover, extending basic procedural rights and civil liberties to offensive groups cultivates individuals’ belief that they also enjoy unfettered access to these same rights. While previous research (Gibson 1992b, 2008) has identified strong micro-level associations between tolerance and perceptions of political freedom, evidence from a randomized experiment in political tolerance shows that toleration is not merely a correlate but also a direct contributor to these perceptions in both the American and Hungarian context.

The experimental procedures employed in this chapter offer several advantages over previous work. First, causal inferences regarding the downstream effects of tolerance on political activism are strengthened because tolerance and intolerance have been exogenously manipulated at random. Differences across individuals’ other characteristics therefore do not vary
systematically across treatment assignments, and complex statistical procedures are not required to simulate a control group. Intent-to-Treat and complier average causal effects represent the direct effect of assignment to (in)tolerance and the actual application of that (in)tolerance on political behavior. The randomized experiment in tolerance therefore helps to rule out endogeneity concerns, which are ever-present in observational research. Second, the present study mitigates concerns over self-reporting bias in survey-based studies of political participation by generating unobtrusive measures of political participation. Technologies embedded within the online survey experiment allow me to directly observe whether a subject actually petitioned or donated on behalf of a cause they deemed important to them.

Of course, this approach considerably strengthens the internal validity of the experiment at the expense of its external validity. Compared to survey-based reports of political activism across countries (e.g. Wallace et al. 2012), rates of participation are generally high in both the American and the Hungarian contexts. This may be attributed to the fact that the survey-experiment eliminated variation in one of the most important determinants of activism: opportunity. This is a crucial limitation to the experiment’s external validity, but one that is necessary to enhance internal validity with regards to direct measurement of political participation. It is therefore important to place a realistic ceiling on the meaning of the rates of activism across tolerant, intolerant, and control group subjects. These results do not necessarily imply that an individual who exercises tolerance will go out and seek to engage in politics; rather, when the opportunity to participate presents itself, these results suggest that an individual who has recently upheld the rights to free expression of others will be significantly more likely to exercise these same rights for himself.
However, the general validity of these results is strengthened by the fact that patterns based on experimental procedures largely reflect estimates based on cross-national survey evidence in Chapter Four. This is especially true of longstanding democracies, of which the United States is exemplary. Here, and across countries of Western Europe, tolerance tends to stimulate engagement in public, contentious and collective actions relative to intolerance, but seems not to influence private, individual modes of political activism. Experimental evidence supports this pattern, defends its directionality, and provides important insights into a possible causal mechanism for why tolerance may stimulate activism rather than the reverse. The evidence provides support for both the behavioral and cognitive consistency mechanisms through which tolerance may exert an effect on public modes of participation. On one hand, tolerance carries a direct effect on petitioning; on the other hand, it directly increases perceptions of freedom and support for dissent in a manner that increases subjects’ willingness to expose sacrifice anonymity when pursuing political objectives of importance to them.

But additional analysis is required to more carefully address the particular psychological propositions underlying the cognitive consistency mechanism. In order to facilitate a first-cut examination of the notion that toleration can shape participation, I have devoted considerably greater effort in this dissertation to demonstrating the relationship empirically than I have to pinning down with precision the assumptions underlying the costs-consistency theory. The effect of tolerance on participation is apparent; future research is required to explicate and evince its microfoundations.

The evidence I have provided thus far suggests a call for additional theorizing and further cross-national comparative analysis. For instance, survey analysis from Chapter Four provides no clear evidence of a generalizable relationship between tolerance and participation in the post-
communist context. At first blush this appears to fit well with political socialization perspectives, which expect the reservoir of democratic orientations to be too shallow in new democracies for citizens to be able to draw meaningful connections across them. Experimental evidence from Hungary, however, suggests a more nuanced perspective. Hungarian subjects who develop and defend tolerant arguments perceive greater political freedom following the manipulation than subjects assigned to write intolerant or distractor arguments. These beliefs, in turn, increase subjects’ willingness to expose their identities to a repressive state when they participate in politics. This “covert” measure of public participation contrasts sharply with the overt measure of behavior: Hungarian subjects are generally unwilling to sign and send actual petitions to advance their particular political agendas. This suggests that tolerance may indeed have something of a general effect on perceptions of freedom across societies, but also that political context plays a role in constraining the degree to which this effect translates into actual political engagement.

This may help account for variation across post-communist states in terms of the tolerance-participation relationship and in terms of the mixed survey-based results in Chapter Four. Czech Republic, Slovenia and, to some extent, Poland are widely regarded as among the most stable political and economic systems in post-communist Europe. There, survey evidence suggests that toleration contributes to the likelihood of engagement in public political actions as it does in established western democracies. By contrast, no effect is apparent in the least stable systems – Bulgaria, Hungary, and Latvia. Should citizens be more concerned over the future of democracies in these countries, tolerance may not influence support for dissent in a manner that facilitates contentious political activism. But these effects can be viewed only in terms of behavioral consistency, given that corollary attitudinal measures are unavailable in these data.
and, even if they were, the temporal priority of tolerance could not be established without longitudinal data. Additional experiments in other illiberal contexts are required to fully test whether and where tolerance exerts effects on political participation and the attitudes that facilitate it in a manner suggested by the costs-consistency theory.
Political tolerance may be the only democratic value that is also extolled as a virtue (Moreno-Riaño 2006). In theory, citizens who countenance ideas and interests they oppose not only enhance free expression and promote democratic competition, but they also pass what Polish philosopher and Member of European Parliament, Ryszard Legutko, describes as the “ultimate and almost the only generally accepted litmus test of morality” (Legutko 1994). This is perhaps because, in practice, tolerance is extremely difficult. It means, for instance, protecting radical Christians’ right to protest military funerals and neo-Nazis’ right to march near synagogues. It means allowing Muslims to wear *burqas* where society defends women’s rights, and protecting Holocaust denial and Mohammed mockery with equal vigor. Such forbearance has been central to liberal conceptions of democratic government and citizenship. But it has not been clear how extending procedural rights and civil liberties to offensive groups affects individuals who tolerate.

This is so for at least three reasons. First, tolerance research has primarily focused on its sources, nature, and distribution in mass publics. Only a few previous studies have examined its micro-level effects, either on other attitudes (e.g. Gibson 1992b, 2002, 2008) or on political participation (e.g. Gibson and Bingham 1985; Gibson 1987; Marcus et al. 1995). Moreover, nearly all extant studies rely on cross-sectional data that render the directions of these relationships difficult to decipher or (quasi-) experimental procedures that obscure causal
inferences regarding the downstream effects of political tolerance judgments. Third, political science generally lacks a theoretical framework for conceptualizing political tolerance as a cause or contributor to actual political judgments and behavior.

This dissertation revisits each of these elements in order to scrutinize the consequences of political tolerance for political participation. It models political tolerance explicitly as an independent variable and employs advanced techniques designed to strengthen the causal inferences that can be made using observational and experimental approaches. It creates connections across deep basins of knowledge about political tolerance and civic engagement to develop a causal theory of how tolerance may in fact stimulate political activism. And it tests these propositions across Western and post-communist democracies with disparate experience with authoritarianism and repression. Based on these new data and methodological innovations, findings from this dissertation paint a new portrait of political tolerance, its consequences for civic engagement, and whether tolerant individuals may verily be hailed as “carriers of the creed” of liberal democracy.

Recent research has raised important questions about unintended, negative consequences of tolerance for civic engagement. These accounts suggest that tolerant individuals cannot be entrusted to “carry the creed” of liberal democracy. On one hand, tolerant individuals might just as well abdicate their commitment to civil libertarian norms because tolerance for highly disliked groups is often at odds with other beliefs, like anti-racism and desires for public order and security (Sniderman et al. 1996) and is hence weak, dissonant, and readily convertible into intolerance (Gibson 1998). Intolerance is robust and rigid, by contrast, and therefore more behaviorally efficacious than tolerance (Gibson 2006). In addition, frequent exposure to diverse political opinions – a contributor to tolerance – generates ambivalent political preferences that
stymie participation and causes tension within heterogeneous social networks when members of these networks do participate. Tolerance may be a virtue in itself, but not necessarily one that contributes to the viability of the political system as classic accounts suggest (e.g. McClosky 1964).

The findings presented in this dissertation suggest that political tolerance indeed matters for political action potential, but not in a way that conforms to conventional expectations. Tolerance is a democratic orientation not only towards which ideas may be expressed legitimately in a society, but also toward how those ideas may be expressed. Independently of both the traits that lead one to put up with her political opponents and also the resources, interest, and opportunities that drive her participation, practicing tolerance stimulates greater civic engagement – especially through collective and conflictual modes of action that aim to alter the status quo through dramatic means. And this effect is attributable in no small part to the act of toleration itself. In other words, extending expressive rights to others drives tolerant individuals to exercise rights of political expression for themselves.

This finding casts the notion of tolerant activists as “carriers of the creed” in new light. Plamenatz (1956) remarked that “There are people whose passion for freedom and justice is sincere and strong and yet who are not good democrats…It is one thing to desire freedom and accept the democratic ideal; it is quite another to have the moral preferences and habits that make democratic institutions function properly” (116). To the extent that putting up with the rights of unsavory groups contributes directly to the participatory habits that strengthen democratic institutions, tolerance contributes to a democratic political culture that supports participation (Almond and Verba 1963; Gibson 1992b) and tolerant individuals sustain this culture through participation (McClosky 1964). But herein lies an important revision to the classic perspective:
whereas the original view was that activists were carriers of the creed because they became tolerant, I have provided a bevy of evidence to suggest that by individuals become active by virtue of their tolerance.

This main finding further suggests further support for the idea that democratic values matter for democratic activism in liberal democracies. Over the past two decades, mounting scholarly evidence indicates a significant role for abstract democratic values in shaping politics on-the-ground. Thousands of Russians thwarted Soviets’ attempt at authoritarian reversal in 1991; support for democratic processes and institutions directly contributed to individuals’ participation and confidence in anti-coup protests (Gibson 1997). Political trust can stimulate political involvement and commitment to a broader constellation of democratic beliefs (Mishler and Rose 2009), and such trust can be taught through civic education programs and in turn kindle activism in embattled democratic contexts (Finkel 2002). Where publics’ commitment to these values erodes, civil society weakens, citizen influence wanes, and democratic backslide becomes a real possibility (e.g. on Hungary, see Jenne and Mudde 2012). Moreover, the notion that applied democratic values can fortify society during antidemocratic crises can also be a deeply comforting belief. Norwegian Foreign Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, found in this idea a silver lining following the Utøya massacre in July 2011: “What we have seen is that membership in youth organizations has gone up sharply. We have seen that intentions to vote in the regional elections of the 12th of September have gone up sharply…I’m happy to see that because that is a democratic response to a highly undemocratic challenge” (PBS Newshour 2011).

This dissertation reports that tolerance, too, has important and positive consequences for democratic activism. This finding contrasts with earlier empirical accounts proposing that tolerance would suppress or be unrelated to political action potential. It also furnishes an
important justification for further work to develop tolerance and civic engagement through international aid programs. Governments and NGOs have dedicated copious effort and resources to civic education programs that aim to “teach” tolerance where it is in shortest supply (Finkel 2003, 2006). These programs are often successful in the world’s most inchoate and unstable democracies (e.g. Finkel and Smith 2010), though civic education has been less effective in longstanding liberal contexts, like the U.S. (Green et al. 2011). Their success notwithstanding, all these efforts are based on the same “consequentialist” assumption that tolerance yields benefits for democracy and for liberal democratic political culture. This dissertation supports that assumption.

From a democratization perspective, the Hungarian case is particularly instructive. Although tolerance does not contribute directly to overt political behavior, it increases individuals’ confidence in their own rights to self-expression by augmenting perceptions of political freedom. And, as the mediational analysis in Chapter Six reveals, these perceptions create important preconditions for the sort of contentious political action that is often necessary to effectuate pro-democratic change in authoritarian and illiberal polities. In other words, practicing tolerance may have important downstream consequences not only for individuals’ civic engagement and democratic outlook, but also for the ultimate democratic quality of political systems.

In this sense, my work here also furnishes an important empirical response to several critiques of tolerance in normative scholarship. According to the radical Hegelian, Herbert Marcuse, “the prevailing theory and practice of tolerance [turns] out on examination to be in varying degrees hypocritical masks to cover appalling political practices” (Wolff, Moore Jr., and Marcuse 1965: vi). Modern governments ask citizens to tolerate intolerance, which strengthens
the tyranny of the majority that classic liberals protest, such that “stupid opinion is treated with the same respect as intelligent one...[and] all contesting opinions must be submitted to ‘the people’ for its deliberation and choice” (ibid: 85). This may smack of the “elitist theory,” but for Marcuse and his Marxist ilk, governing elites are concerned only with furthering their own affluence. Hence, self-serving elites can act as a repressive force that refuses recognition to weak groups, keeps strong groups in power, and the uninformed public tolerates this intolerance. Brown (2006) echoes Marcuse to argue that tolerance hides “inequality and regulation” of political subjects. She believes tolerance represents an act of unwarranted moral superiority that “posing as both universal value and impartial practice, designates certain beliefs and practices as civilized and others as barbaric” (7).

The post-modernist or “New” left believes that tolerance is anachronistic. Italian political philosopher, Anna Galeotti (2002) insists that minorities do not just need to be tolerated, but also respected, whereas those who use “hate speech” against them can be censored and silenced. Tolerance is challenged because of its negative connotations – judgment; “putting up” with “wrong” or “inferior” views – “it is frequently rejected as a political principle in favor of loftier ideas of equality, liberty or respect” (Griffin 2010: 27). Tariq Ramadan regards tolerance as a form of paternalism towards the objects of tolerance – “intellectual charity” of the powerful (Ramadan 2010: 47). People want more than tolerance: “the demand for more than mere toleration is the demand that what one is or does no longer be the object of negative valuation that is an essential ingredient of toleration” (Horton 1996: 35). Instead, the post-modernist left advocates moving beyond tolerance altogether toward values of recognition and respect for difference: “When it comes to relations between free and equal human beings, autonomous and independent nations, or civilizations, religions, and cultures, appeals for the tolerance of othres
are no longer relevant…[because] when we are on equal terms, it is no longer a matter of conceding tolerance, but of rising above that and educating ourselves to respect others” (Ramadan 2010: 48).

Whereas the New Left bemoans the lack of unconditional affirmation for minority groups, the conservative right blames tolerance for being too accepting of competing values and norms. The latter is concerned with the loss of identity of the tolerator, while the former is concerned about the status of the tolerated. These cultural rightists assert that tolerance encourages unwholesome attitudes, beliefs, and practices. As Caldwell (2009) writes, “in the name of universal liberalism…tolerance became a higher priority than any of the traditional preoccupations of state and society – order, liberty, fairness, and intelligibility – and came to be pursued at their expense.” Moreover, “false tolerance”32 has entered the lexicon in several European countries. It targets tolerant liberals who are believed to have gone too far in accommodating minority practices that the majority deems unacceptable and in need of regulation (Yıldız 2011). When used to indict the political left, “false tolerance” is understood as motivated by social liberal agendas, like multiculturalism and antidiscrimination, rather than classic liberal laissez faire principles (van der Veer 2006; Mudde 2010).

Finally, some normative theorists now criticize tolerance for its detrimental effects on individual citizens. The concern, summarized by Oberdiek (2001) is that citizens lose confidence in their own convictions and judgments about the values of what they believe and do: “We lose that which gives our life meaning and substance. We will become jaded and rootless. Tolerance is just a genteel way for liberals to undermine the solidarity that comes with utter commitment to

32 This is translated from the German falsche Toleranz and may also be understood as “misguided tolerance” (falsche verstandene Toleranz).
one’s religion, ethnic community, sexuality and so on. Tolerance is fine for liberals, because they only celebrate abstract principles.” These criticisms are particularly relevant for Gibson’s view of tolerance’s salutary effects on democratic political culture (1992b). Can tolerance truly erode the culture of conformity that mass political intolerance nourishes? Or does tolerance for others render individuals uncertain, unwilling, or unable to engage in political life in a manner that serves the broader political cultural good?

This dissertation suggests evidence for the former. In this sense, it supports the more classical view of tolerance and participation which work together, in the work of John Stuart Mill and other classic liberals, to develop and advance citizens. Tolerance toward unusual “experiments in living” promotes individuality and autonomy and allows society to progress by helping individuals to discover the good and bad aspects of different ways of life. A liberal polity theoretically should “encourage in all individuals the development of the capacity for autonomy as rational deliberation, critical scrutiny, and reflection on the projects and goals that we adopt” (Gill 2001: 3), an end requiring both tolerance for nonconformist opinions and exposure to new views through civic engagement. This dissertation

Tolerance is a crucial, and highly contested, democratic value. It is conceptualized as both a virtue and a vice. It continues to be prescribed as a foundation for liberal democracy, and governments and non-profit continue to encourage and impart tolerance to democratic publics. This dissertation justifies these efforts by demonstrating that forbearance affects individuals who tolerate in a manner that prepares them to participate in the political life of plural societies.

To what extent can we be confident with this conclusion? Of course, certain limitations in the analysis call for further research into the tolerance-participation relationship. In particular, although I have demonstrated that tolerance carries direct and indirect consequences for political
participation, I have not empirically addressed the possibility that these two democratic orientations are co-dependent. It is possible, for instance, that tolerance and participation are connected in terms of a positive reciprocal causal relationship. Testing this relationship requires a combination of multi-wave panel data and experiments in political action. Longitudinal models would provide excellent leverage over the “cross-lag” effects of each orientation on the other over time, while experiments would help rule out unobserved factors that may confound the relationship. Moreover, large scale field experiments using “encouragement” designs to randomly mobilize individuals to attend protests or vote or contact their representatives would offer strong tests of the propositions originally developed my Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) for comparison against those offered in this dissertation.

Furthermore, this dissertation raises certain questions about how individuals practice tolerance or intolerance and how this relates to participation. For instance, are the effects of intolerance on participation more robust if, say, an individual attends a demonstration to oppose a minority group’s rights – will a person’s civic engagement benefit or suffer when they exercise their own expressive rights to demand that the rights of others be revoked? Once again, randomized field experiments with encouragement designs could exogenously mobilize such behavior for the purposes of rigorous analysis.

Such questions require additional theorizing and more careful tests of the assumptions underlying the micro-mechanisms that shape the tolerance-participation relationship. This dissertation sacrificed precision in the analysis of the micro-theoretical framework to facilitate a fuller presentation of the independent effect of tolerance on participation across countries and across avenues of action. In doing so, I generated hypotheses that were implied by consistency theories in social psychology without directly evaluating those theoretical foundations at their
assumptions. The empirical relationship at the core of this dissertation is robust to various specification and robustness checks, and also to some extent variation in political context. But the psychological microfoundations of this relationship merit further consideration.

But the contributions in this dissertation also lead to new research directions. The self-persuasion experiment – whose ability to convert tolerance to intolerance and vice versa I demonstrated three times, using three separate samples in two very different countries – may be a source of much fruitful empirical and theoretical work. On one hand, the manipulation at the core of the self-persuasion experiment raises questions about how different individuals conceptualize tolerance and understand the rationale for extending rights and liberties to diverse groups. Several unique definitions of tolerance can be gleaned from respondents’ essays. It is possible that different patterns of behavior depend in some part on whether tolerance is grounded in a principled defense of democratic principles, or a more visceral “anti-intolerance” such that abstract norms matter less to tolerant action than attitudes toward those individuals who would deny others their rights. On the other hand, the self-persuasion experiment can presumably be applied to other important democratic orientations that are traditionally difficult to manipulate (e.g. interpersonal trust) in a more cost- and time-effective manner than alternative approaches in the behavioral economics tradition of experimentation.

Finally, the ability to exogenously manipulate political (in)tolerance provides an important tool with which to examine the wider effects of tolerance and intolerance for political, attitudinal and behavioral outcomes; to render these consequences less enigmatic (Gibson 2006) and increasingly plain.
APPENDIX A: Appendix to chapter four
A.1 MEASUREMENT OF KEY VARIABLES

The U.S. Citizenship, Involvement and Democracy (USCID) survey and the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) survey included several questions relating to political tolerance and political participation. Although substantial similarities exist in question themes and also often in measurement, some degree of difference is inevitable. Variable construction took into account differences across question-wording and scaling in each survey to enhance comparability across surveys. I discuss question wording and variable construction in thematic groups, below, and account for substantial differences across surveys where necessary. These groups include: Political Tolerance items, which measure respondents’ willingness to countenance ideas they oppose through both content-controlled and traditional, “general social survey” or “Stouffer” items (Stouffer 1955); Political Participation scales, which are based on several activities through which respondents may express their political views; Predictors of Tolerance, which include questions about the major predictors of tolerance attitudes; and Predictors of Civic Voluntarism, which include items designed to measure respondents’ resources, psychological engagement with politics, and mobilization potential.

Tolerance toward ideas and interests one opposes is conventionally measured in one of two ways. Classic studies (e.g. Stouffer 1955) present respondents with a series of pre-selected groups and activities that are presumably objectionable. Such items continue to appear in General Social Survey questionnaires and may be termed “GSS items.” According to Sullivan et al. (1982), this measurement strategy is open to criticism by virtue of the fact that it cannot ensure that the group in question is equally objectionable to all respondents. The principal alternative to GSS tolerance measurement is the “content controlled” methodology, in which respondents first select a political group that they dislike more than any other and then answer
questions about their willingness to extend basic rights and liberties to that group. GSS items are included in both the USCID and ISSP survey, and therefore constitute the main basis for comparison. Although Gibson (1992a) has demonstrated that substantive conclusions based on GSS and content controlled items do not differ greatly, content controlled items are also available in the USCID and offer a useful specification check for findings in the United States.

GSS tolerance in the USCID is measured with four questions that ask whether respondents would strongly support, support, oppose or strongly oppose a ban by the authorities of a public demonstration by 1) radical Muslims, 2) those against all churches and religion, 3) U.S. Communists, and 4) religious fundamentalists. In the ISSP, respondents are asked whether they strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree that 1) religious extremists, 2) people who want to overthrow the government by force, and 3) people prejudiced against any racial or ethnic group should be allowed to hold public meetings. In the USCID, respondents determine whether members of their most disliked group should be allowed to 1) make a speech in our community, 2) to hold public rallies and demonstrations, or 3) should be banned from running for public office. All indices are constructed first by averaging responses and are subsequently dichotomized by splitting at the mean of each scale to permit the binary grouping necessary for coarsened exact matching.

A.1.1 Political tolerance

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A.1.2 Political participation

Each survey included questions on whether the respondent engaged in any of several activities in the past year. In the ISSP, these included 1) donated money or raised funds for a social or political activity; 2) contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express your views; 3) contacted or appeared in the media to express your views; 4) joined an internet forum or discussion group; 5) signed a petition; 6) attended a political meeting or rally; 7) boycotted, or deliberately bought, certain products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons; 8) took part in a demonstration. The two contacting items (items 2 and 3) were collapsed into a single “contacting” variable and whether the respondent voted in the last election was included in the count of total political actions in which an individual could engage.

The USCID included several items that were collapsed into a scale of comparable size. Three items – whether the respondent had, in the past year, worked in a political party or action group, for the campaign of a candidate for office, or in another political organization or association – were collapsed into a single “volunteering” variable (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978). Another three items constituted an “internet politics” variable: whether the respondent had visited websites of political organizations or candidates, forwarded electronic messages with political content, or participated in political activities over the internet. In addition to 1) volunteering and 2) internet politics, USCID respondents could indicate that they had 3) voted in the most recent election; 4) contacted a politician or local government official, 5) donated money to a political organization or group, 6) boycotted or deliberately bought products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons, or 7) taken part in protest activities.

A factor analysis showed that these items tended to “load” on two different dimensions, one corresponding to private participation (voting, donating, contacting, and internet) and the
other corresponding to public participation (petitioning, volunteering (USCID)/attending rallies (ISSP), boycotting, and protest). These are analyzed using count variables in Table 4. For the final analysis on which Figure 1 is based, I dichotomized public political activity such that 0 represents participation in no political activity and 1 indicates participation in any political activity.

A.1.3 Predictors of tolerance

The most robust and theoretically grounded predictors of tolerance include perceived sociotropic threat, dogmatism, and support for democratic values and procedures. The dogmatism scale is based on five Likert-scale items: 1) Of all the different philosophies that exist in the world, there is probably only one that is correct; 2) There are two kinds of people in this world: those how are for the truth and those who are against it; and 3) to compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. Dogmatism scale reliability is 0.67. Sociotropic threat – which is only available in the USCID – is measured using 7-point antipodal scales on which respondents locate their most disliked group as either 1) American or un-American; 2) Dangerous to society or Not dangerous to society; 3) Unwilling to follow the rules of democracy or Willing to follow them; and 4) likely to “change everything” or “nothing” if they were to come to power in the United States. The reliability of the threat scale is 0.66.

Support for democratic values and procedures, in the USCID, is measured using respondents’ average support for individual freedom over public order and a firm belief in multiparty competition. Freedom vs. Order is measured as respondents’ willful rejection of three statements: 1) Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put up with the danger to society of extremist political views; 2) Society shouldn’t have to put up with those who have
political ideas that are extremely different from the majority; 3) It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they can become disruptive. Multipartism support is tapped by three statements: 1) what our country needs is one political party which will rule the country; 2) The party that gets the support of the majority ought not to have to share political party with the political minority; 3) Our country will be better off if we just outlaw all political parties. Coding of these items was reversed and they were averaged to produce the support for democratic values and procedures scale (reliability = 0.71). In the ISSP, questions are available that permit a scale of support for civil freedoms (democratic values) and rule of law (democratic procedures). For the former, respondents were asked “On a scale of 1 to 7…how important is it: “That the government authorities 1) respect and protect the rights of minorities; 2) that government authorities treat everybody equally regardless of their position in society.” For the latter, respondents were asked “as far as you are concerned personally on a scale of 1 to 7…how important is it: 1) always to obey laws and regulations; 2) never to try to evade taxes.” The composite scale, based on average importance of these principles to each respondent, carries a reliability of 0.65.

Finally, two additional concepts with ties to tolerance – perceived political freedom and discussion network heterogeneity – are measured as follows. Perceived political freedom is the average trust that the government will not repress or otherwise interfere with citizens’ political expression (Gibson 1992b). It is based on this question: “suppose you felt very strongly that something the government was doing was very wrong and you wanted to do something about it. Do you think that the government would definitely allow, probably allow, probably not allow, or definitely not allow you to: 1) make a speech in public criticizing the actions of the government; 2) organize public meetings to oppose the government; 3) organize protest marches and
demonstrations to oppose the actions of the government.” I constructed the perceived freedom scale (reliability = .88) by averaging responses for each individual across these items. Network heterogeneity is the average of all political opinion diversity within respondents’ networks of family, friends, coworkers, and neighbors, measured as respondents’ estimated percentage of individuals in these networks who “have political different political views from yours.”

A.1.4 Predictors of civic voluntarism

Political participation is responsive to three particular individual-level dimensions – resources, psychological engagement with politics, and mobilization potential. Among resources, education level is measured as respondents’ highest degree or extent of schooling, ranging from 0 – 6 in both the USCID and ISSP. Free time in both data sets is the total number of hours a respondent does not spend working (subtracted from total hours in the week), and efficacy is measured as respondents’ average belief that they grasp political matters and that politicians are concerned with their political opinions. Political interest is respondents’ average frequency of political discussion and general interest in political matters, while associational involvement is a count of memberships in voluntary organizations.
### Table 26. Tolerance and Levels of Participation in Europe, with Country Fixed Effects

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<thead>
<tr>
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Log pseudolikelihood  
-24619
Obs  
15198
Pseduo R-squared  
0.1422

Results from CEM-balanced ordered logistic regression. Boldfaced entries significant at p≤0.05; robust standard errors in parentheses. Norway as referent.
APPENDIX B: Appendix to Chapter Five
Introduction:

Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of this study is to learn how people persuade each other in politics. You will be asked to write a short and strong argument that could be used to persuade someone like you to change their political opinion. You may not agree with what you are asked to write, but we politely ask that you try to write a strong argument anyway – this is very important for our research. If you feel like you will not be able to do so, please use this opportunity to exit the survey now. Thank you for taking this task seriously.

Least-Liked Group:

Here is a list of some political groups that are active in American society today. Please select the group that you dislike the most:

- Ku Klux Klan; Islamic fundamentalists; pro-choice groups (abortion supporters); pro-life groups (abortion opponents); the Occupy Movement; the Tea Party; American communists; Christian fundamentalists; atheists; gay rights supporters

Group Affect:

Using the following scale, please rate the degree to which you sympathize with the beliefs of the following groups. On this scale, “1” means that you fully oppose the group and “100” means that you fully support the group.

- Ku Klux Klan; Islamic fundamentalists; pro-choice groups (abortion supporters); pro-life groups (abortion opponents); the Occupy Movement; the Tea Party; American communists; Christian fundamentalists; atheists; gay rights supporters

Sociotropic Threat

To what extent do you believe that {least-liked group} are...

- Dangerous to American society
- Likely to take away your freedoms if they came to power
- Unwilling to follow the rules of democracy
Political tolerance (pre- and post-test measure)

*Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:*

- {Least-liked group} should be banned from your community
- {Least-liked group} should be allowed to make public speeches in your community
- {Least-liked group} should be allowed to stand in elections for public office
- {Least-liked group} should be allowed to teach in public schools in your community.

Support for Individual Liberty over Public Order and Security

*Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:*

- Freedom of speech should be given to all political organizations, even if some of the things they say are dangerous or insulting to others in society
- It is better to live in an orderly society than to give people so much freedom that they can become disruptive
- Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put up with the danger to society of extremist political views
- Society shouldn’t have to put up with political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority
- Because demonstrations frequently become disorderly and disruptive, radical and extremist groups should not be allowed to demonstrate

Political Conservatism

*Selecting from the categories below, how would you describe your political views in general?*

- Extremely liberal; Mostly liberal; Somewhat liberal; Purely moderate; Somewhat conservative; Mostly conservative; Extremely conservative

Dogmatism

*To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:*

- There are two kinds of people in this world: Good and Bad.
- A group cannot exist long if it puts up with many different opinions among its own members
- Out of all the different religions in the world, probably only one is correct
- Compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own position
Treatment lead-in:

- In this portion of the study, we will ask you to write a short but strong argument that you think could persuade the opinion of someone like you. Please remember: we politely ask that you try to write a strong argument, even if you disagree with what you have been asked to write. If you feel that you must refuse to write such an argument, you will have the opportunity to exit the survey without loss of payment. But your participation is very important to our research and would be of great help to us. We thank you for taking this task seriously.

Treatment Condition Scenario:

- Imagine that a large group of {GROUP members} wish to hold a public demonstration in your community. Some people openly hate this group while many others find what the {GROUP} believes to be very offensive. In the past, members of this group have not cooperated with the authorities and have sometimes violated the conditions of their parade permits. Other recent demonstrations by this group have led to property damage and open conflict with counter-protesters and the police.

Control Condition Scenario:

- Imagine that you are in charge of a media campaign to promote the use of renewable energy sources – such as solar, wind, and hydroelectric power. Your goal is to convince the public that it is better for American industries to develop and invest in these new sources of energy and that Americans should stop using fossil fuels like oil, coal and natural gas. Some people believe that a shift to renewable energy could badly damage the economy, while many others believe that new energy sources are all that necessary.

Tolerant Treatment Elaboration Task:

- Think of someone you know who would think that {GROUP} should not be allowed to hold their demonstration. Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that {GROUP} should be allowed to hold its demonstration in your community.
Intolerant Treatment Elaboration Task:

- Think of someone you know who would think that {GROUP} should be allowed to hold their demonstration. Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that {GROUP} should not be allowed to hold its demonstration in your community.

Control Condition Elaboration Task:

- Think of someone you know who would think that Americans and American industry should not try to replace fossil fuels with renewable energy sources. Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that developing renewable energy sources is the more sensible policy.
B.2 TABLES AND FIGURES

| Table 27 Excerpts from Nonsense, Anti-Treatment, and Compliant Elaborations |
|---|---|---|
| **Alphanumeric Strings** | ------/------- ------/------- ------/------- ------/------- | Sdfkajsdf \ \adfadf adf / / dfa dffafaadfadpfia vak;nv a/\ d hva: |
| **Repetition / Copy-Paste** | Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that these Ku Klux Klan members should be allowed to hold a public demonstration in your community. | Because we want to/because we want to/because we want to/because we want to/because we want to. |
| **Irrelevant** | Look around you and see all the people walking around feeling like they own the place. Sure they look good in their new jeans, but we don’t have a GAP around here. | The Legend of Zelda. In our premiere episode of the Timeline, we delve into the Legend of Zelda series’ realm of Hyrule to connect the dots! |
| **Anti-Treatment 1: subject rejects tolerant essay** | I do not agree with the KKK or the principles that they promote. I have not grown up knowing anything good about the KKK. I am a believer of individuality. The KKK doesn’t really appeal to what I want in life. I just seek to find happiness. They should go away. | My community is not accustomed with acceptance as communities that would accept it to happen so I disagree with it ever to happen. |
| **Anti-Treatment 2: subject rejects intolerant essay** | Even though I am opposed to the views espoused by Islamic Fundamentalists, I cannot argue that they should be denied their right to demonstrate. I believe it is more important that a person or group’s right to freedom of speech be guaranteed than silencing views I don’t agree with. This is a principle our country was founded on. | The demonstration should be allowed, but it must be peaceful. Freedom of speech should always be protected. Violence does not always solve the problem. Be brave to support from the front not in the back. |
| **Compliant with Tolerant Condition** | Freedoms are essential for a democracy in order to survive within itself. A democracy allows groups within its domain the right of free assembly and speech. As long as this assembly is peaceful we must allow freedom of speech in our community even if we disagree with what this group says or disagree with what they stand for. | I myself am against gay rights. All Americans though have the right to freedom of speech and assembly. Once we take that right away from one group that sets us on a slippery slope to losing those same rights ourselves. Though we do not have to agree with all groups, we have to defend everyone’s right to free speech and assembly. |
| **Compliant with Intolerant Condition** | This group has demonstrated in the past that it is incapable of adhering to the laws during its demonstrations. If they are allowed to hold public demonstrations, it is likely that there will be property damage and it should be prevented. I suggest that they hold an event online or through another method. | It just seems like the Tea Party is looking for trouble. My community would not allow them to come to a place that is completely against them to ask for trouble. My community will not allow this demonstration or there will be hell to pay. |
APPENDIX C: Appendix to Chapter Six
MAIN INTRODUCTION

Thank you for agreeing to participate in these research studies. In what follows, you will respond to two separate surveys about politics and current events in Hungary. You will be paid for both. Research Now has adopted this two-survey format to improve the survey experience for you, the respondent. In particular, you will be asked only once to answer basic questions about yourself – such as your age, education, gender, and so on – as this information is relevant to both research studies. Separate instruction sets have been provided for each study, so you will know when you have completed one and have begun the other.

QUESTION 1
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.

- Extroverted, enthusiastic
- Critical, quarrelsome
- Dependable, self-disciplined
- Anxious, easily upset
- Open to new experiences, complex
- Reserved, quiet
- Sympathetic, warm
- Disorganized, careless
- Calm, emotionally stable
- Conventional, uncreative
QUESTION 2
Suppose the government did something you believed was wrong and you wanted to do something about it. Would you be willing or unwilling to take the following actions?

- Put a sign in front of your home or apartment
- Join a peaceful protest
- Contact an elected official to express your opinions
- Donate money to an organization that supports your views
- Vote more frequently
- Create a local organization to oppose the government’s actions
- Create and gather signatures for a petition to oppose the government’s actions
- Sign your full name to a public petition to oppose the government’s actions

QUESTION 3:
Here is a list of some groups that are active in Hungarian politics and society today. Please select the group that you dislike the most:

- Romani Groups
- Jobbik supporters
- Jewish Groups
- Homosexual rights groups
- Communists
- “Milla” supporters
- Fidesz Party supporters
- Catholic Nationalists

QUESTION 5:
Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

- {Group} should be banned from your community
- {Group} should be allowed to make public speeches in your community
- {Group} should be allowed to compete in elections for public office
- {Group} should be allowed to teach in public schools in your community
QUESTION 6:
To what extent do you believe that {GROUP} are:
- Dangerous to Hungarian society
- Likely to take away your freedom if they came to power
- Unwilling to follow the rules of democracy

QUESTION 7:
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
- Freedom of speech should be given to all political organizations, even if some of the things they say are dangerous or insulting to others in society.
- It is better to live in an orderly society than to allow people so much freedom that they can become disruptive.
- Free speech is just not worth it if it means that we have to put up with the danger to society of extremist groups.
- Society shouldn’t have to put up with political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority.
- Because demonstrations frequently become disruptive, radical and extremist groups shouldn’t be allowed to demonstrate.

QUESTION 8:
Selecting from the categories below, how would you describe your political views in general?
- Far left of center
- Mostly left of center
- Somewhat left of center
- Purely centrist
- Somewhat right of center
- Mostly right of center
- Far right of center
QUESTION 9:
Which policy goal would you say is MOST important to you right now?
- Cut government-funded subsidies for college tuition
- Protect government-funded subsidies for college tuition
- Protect anti-government protesters’ rights to free assembly
- Increase public order and security at anti-government protests

QUESTION 10:
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
- There are two kinds of people in the world: Good and Bad.
- A group cannot exist for long if it puts up with many different opinions among its own members.
- Out of all the different religions in the world, probably only one is correct.
- Compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own position.

QUESTION 11:
People sometimes talk about what the goals of this country should be for the next 10 years. Here is a list of some of the goals that different people would give top priority.
Which one of these goals would you say is most important to you?
- A high level of economic growth
- Making sure Hungary has a strong military
- Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities
- Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful
QUESTION 12:
In general, how interested are you in politics?
- Very interested
- Interested
- Neither interested nor uninterested
- Uninterested
- Very uninterested

QUESTION 13:
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
- Less than High School
- High school
- Some College
- College
- Master’s Degree
- Doctoral Degree
- Other advanced Degree

QUESTION 14:
What is your annual income range?
- Below €20,000
- €20,000 – €29,999
- €30,000 – €39,999
- €40,000 – €49,999
- €50,000 – €59,999
- €60,000 – €69,999
- €70,000 or more
QUESTION 15:
How often do you participate in activities that are organized by groups you belong to, such as churches, sports clubs, political organizations, volunteer or charity groups, unions, professional associations, etc.?

- Never
- Less than once a month
- 1-3 times each month
- Once each week
- 2-3 times each week
- 4-5 times each week
- More than 5 times each week

QUESTION 16:
What is your gender?

- Male
- Female

QUESTION 17:
What is your current age?

- 18 to 24
- 25 to 34
- 35 to 44
- 45 to 54
- 55 to 64
- 65 or older

QUESTION 18:
Would you describe yourself as an ethnic minority?
Thank you for participating in this study. The purpose of this study is to learn how ordinary citizens persuade each other in politics. You will be asked to write a short and strong argument that could be used to persuade someone like you to change their political opinion. You may not agree with the argument you are asked to write, but we politely ask that you try to write strong arguments anyway – this is very important for our research. Thank you very much for taking this task seriously.

TREATMENT INSTRUCTION SET:
Next, we will ask you to write a short but strong argument that you think could persuade the opinion of someone like you.

PLEASE Remember: We politely ask that you try to write a strong argument, even if you disagree with what you have been asked to write. This is very important for our research and would be of great help to us.

TOLERANCE TREATMENT:
Imagine that a large group of {Group} wish to hold a public demonstration in your community.

Some people openly hate this group and many others find what the group believes to be very offensive. In the past, their demonstrations have led to property damage and open conflict with counter-protesters and the policy.

Think of someone you know who would want to prevent {Group} from holding their demonstration.

Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that these {Group} should be allowed to hold a public demonstration in your community.

Please write at least 5 sentences, but not more than 10 sentences in the space provided below.
INTOLERANCE TREATMENT:
Imagine that a large group of {Group} wish to hold a public demonstration in your community.

Some people openly hate this group and many others find what the group believes to be very offensive. In the past, their demonstrations have led to property damage and open conflict with counter-protesters and the policy.

Think of someone you know who think that {Group} should be allowed to hold their demonstration.

Please write a short but strong argument that can help convince this person that these {Group} should not be allowed to hold a public demonstration in your community.

Please write at least 5 sentences, but not more than 10 sentences in the space provided below.

CONTROL:
Imagine that your local market plans to start selling tomatoes that are grown in a laboratory instead of tomatoes that are grown on a farm. These “laboratory tomatoes” are perfectly healthy and are cheaper than natural tomatoes, and many people are concerned that this trend will hurt farmers. But the market’s owners report that people from other communities think laboratory tomatoes taste better and are perfectly happy with them.

Imagine that you work for a group that supports natural tomatoes.

Please write a short but strong argument that might help convince the market owners that natural tomatoes are better for business and for the public than laboratory tomatoes.

Please write at least 5 sentences, but not more than 10 sentences in the space provided below.
POST-TEST TOLERANCE
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements

- {Group} should be banned from your community
- {Group} should be allowed to make public speeches in your community
- {Group} should be allowed to compete in elections for public office
- {Group} should be allowed to teach in public schools in your community

POST-TEST SUPPORT FOR DISSENT
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

- It is very good that people have freedom to protest against issues they dislike
- Most disagreements undermine society
- You have to be ready to accept new ideas; new ideas are needed for the advancement of society
- Challenging ideas held by the majority of people is essential to democracy

POST-TEST PERCEIVED POLITICAL FREEDOM
Suppose you felt very strongly that something the government was doing was very wrong and you wanted to do something about it. Do you think THE GOVERNMENT would definitely allow, probably allow, probably not allow, or definitely not allow you to…

- Organize a nationwide strike
- Organize public meetings to oppose the government’s actions
- Organize protest marches or demonstrations
- Make a speech criticizing government’s actions
- Create and gather signatures for a petition to oppose the government’s actions

POST-TEST RISK AVERSION
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements:

- I do not feel comfortable about taking chances
- I like new and exciting experiences, even if I have to break the rules
- Before I make a decision, I like to be absolutely sure about how things will turn out
I would like to explore strange places
I prefer situations that have foreseeable outcomes
I feel comfortable improvising in new situations
I feel nervous when I have to make decisions in uncertain circumstances
I prefer friends who are exciting and unpredictable
I avoid situations that have uncertain outcomes
I like to do frightening things

BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS LEAD-INS:

Issue 1: Student Subsidies (Pro)

As you probably have heard, the government has decided to cut the number of free and reduced-rate university places to around 10,000, down from over 50,000 in 2010. These reforms have sparked many protests around Hungary, even though the government has now promised not to cut education subsidies.

Several groups maintain that this unfair policy hurts Hungarian young people and their chances of becoming well-trained professionals. The Citizens Initiative Group is now circulating a petition around the country to demand that Prime Minister Orbán government maintains its promise and does not cut education subsidies for Hungarian students.

Would you like to sign the petition to push the government forward on this important issue?

Issue 2: Student Subsidies (Con)

As you probably have heard, the government has decided to cut the number of free and reduced-rate university places to around 10,000, down from over 50,000 in 2010. These reforms have sparked many protests around Hungary, even though the government has now promised not to cut education subsidies.

Several groups maintain that education subsidies hurt the Hungarian economy because Hungary cannot afford the luxury of training doctors and other professionals to go and work in Germany, Norway, or Britain. The Citizens Initiative Group is now circulating a petition around
the country to demand that Prime Minister Orbán and his government cuts education subsidies for students.

Would you like to sign the petition to push the government forward on this important issue?

**Issue 3: Anti-Government Protests (Pro)**

As you probably have heard, opposition groups will not be able to hold anti-government rallies over the 15 March bank holiday weekend after the government has reserved 12 large squares for official celebrations.

Some groups believe the government has preemptively blocked freedom of assembly and the Citizens Initiative Group is circulating a petition around the country to demand that the Ministry of Public Administration and Justice protect free speech by allocating at least one square for the Milla anti-government protesters.

Would you like to sign the petition to push the government forward on this important issue?

**Issue 4: Anti-Government Protests (Con)**

As you probably have heard, opposition groups will not be able to hold anti-government rallies over the 15 March bank holiday weekend after the government has reserved 12 large squares for official celebrations. The fear now is that protesters will march in the city streets.

Some groups believe the anti-government protests have the potential to become disorderly, disruptive, and dangerous. The Citizens Initiative Group is circulating a petition around the country to demand that the government increase policy presence and ensure public order and security.

Would you like to sign the petition to push the government forward on this important issue?
PETITION INSTRUCTION SET:
Feel free to download and fill out the petition by clicking this link: {link}

Save it to your computer and, when you are finished, you may upload your signed petition by clicking {“Choose File”} below.

Upon exiting this survey, your signed petition will be automatically forwarded to the specified recipients, and the Citizens Initiative Group will receive a copy for their permanent records.

Your signature to this petition will be published with other signatures, unless you elect to remain totally anonymous (do this by selecting the appropriate box on the petition itself).

When you are finished, please click “>>”

SURVEY CONCLUSION:
Thank you for your participation!
Please click >> one last time to exit the survey.
TRANSLATION OF HUNGARIAN PETITION TEXTS:

**PETITION 1: Support Educational Subsidies!**
To: Prime Minister Victor Orbán; Hungarian Ombudsman Dr. Sándor Fülöp; Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner
Hungarians desire change!
It is time for the government to keep its promise to maintain or expand current education subsidies for college tuition. Young Hungarians and the future of Hungary depends upon them! Please move immediately to secure these subsidies for all students.
Signed,

**PETITION 2: Cut Educational Subsidies!**
To: Prime Minister Victor Orbán; Hungarian Ombudsman Dr. Sándor Fülöp; Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner
Hungarians desire change!
It is time for the government to keep its promise to cut education subsidies for college tuition. Government pays for expensive education and training, but students only leave to work in other countries. We cannot afford to pay for young people who protest what they have been gifted and then leave Hungary behind. Please move immediately to cut these subsidies.
Signed,

**PETITION 3: Protect Freedom of Assembly on March 15!**
To: Prime Minister Victor Orbán; Hungarian Ombudsman Dr. Sándor Fülöp; Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner
Hungarians desire change!
It is time for the government to protect freedom of speech and assembly for all Hungarians. Hungary is a democracy and we demand that the government allocate at least one public square for protests by Milla and other critics of the government on 15 March. Please move immediately to protect this fundamental right to protest.
Signed,

**PETITION 4: Protect Public Order and Security on March 15!**
To: Prime Minister Victor Orbán; Hungarian Ombudsman Dr. Sándor Fülöp; Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner
Hungarians desire change!
It is time for the government to protect Hungarian cities against protesters! Hungary is an orderly and peaceful democracy and we demand that the government allocate more police and resources to prevent damage at protests by Milla and other critics of the government on 15 March. Please move immediately to protect public order and security.
Signed,
C.2 SAMPLE PETITIONS
EXTEND TAX CUTS AND STOP WASTEFUL SPENDING!

Tell President Barack Obama, Congressional leaders, and the media that Americans want change now! We are the voice of this country and we demand representation!

To: President Barack Obama, Speaker John Boehner, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, CNN News Editor Rachel Clarke

We the People of the United States of America desire change. It is time for the federal government to put its house in order and cut its wasteful spending WITHOUT raising taxes on the people. Please move immediately to address this most important issue of our time.

Signed,
First Name, Last Initial:
May we send your name to the recipients in blue, above?
YES ☐ NO, include me as a "confidential supporter" ☐

Citizens' Initiative Lobby Group
2829 Connecticut Ave. NW
Washington, D.C. 20008

Figure 17 Petition Sample 1
END TAX CUTS TO THE WEALTHIEST AMERICANS!

Tell President Barack Obama, Congressional leaders, and the media that Americans want change now! We are the voice of this country and we demand representation!

To: President Barack Obama, Speaker John Boehner, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, CNN News Editor Rachel Clarke

We, the People of the United States of America desire change. It is time for the federal government to act on the People’s behalf and ensure that the wealthiest Americans pay their fair share. Now is the time to end tax cuts and other special privileges for the wealthy. Please move immediately to address this most important issue of our time.

Signed,

First Name, Last Initial

May we send your name to the recipients in blue, above?

YES ☐ NO, include me as a “confidential supporter” ☐

Citizens’ Initiative Lobby Group
1829 Connecticut Ave. NW
Washington, D.C. 20006

Figure 18 Petition Sample 2
MARRIAGE FOR ALL LOVING COUPLES!

Tell President Barack Obama, Congressional leaders, and the media that Americans want change now! We are the voice of this country and we demand representation!

To: President Barack Obama, Speaker John Boehner, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, CNN News Editor Rachel Clarke

We the People of the United States of America desire change. Several states have legalized same-sex marriage, while others have not. This inequality is not sustainable. The federal government must move to amend the Constitution and officially recognize same-sex marriage. Please move immediately to address this most important issue of our time.

Signed,

First Name, Last Initial:

May we send your name to the recipients in blue, above?

YES ☐ NO, include me as a “confidential supporter” ☐

Citizens' Initiative Lobby Group
2829 Connecticut Ave. NW
Washington, D.C. 20008

Figure 19 Petition Sample 3
PROTECT TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE AND MORALITY!

Tell President Barack Obama, Congressional leaders, and the media that Americans want change now! We are the voice of this country and we demand representation!

To: President Barack Obama, Speaker John Boehner, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, CNN News Editor Rachel Clarke

We the People of the United States of America desire change. The majority of U.S. states forbid same-sex marriage. It is time for the federal government to move to amend the Constitution and officially recognize traditional marriage as the only legal bond between two people who love each other. Please move immediately to address this most important issue of our time.

Signed,

First Name, Last Initial:

May we send your name to the recipients in blue, above?

YES ☐  NO, include me as a “confidential supporter” ☐
CITIZENSHIP FOR IMMIGRANT CHILDREN NOW!

Tell President Barack Obama, Congressional leaders, and the media that Americans want change now! We are the voice of this country and we demand representation!

To: President Barack Obama, Speaker John Boehner, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, CNN News Editor Rachel Clarke

We the People of the United States of America desire change. It is time for the federal government to step in and offer a fast path to citizenship for all children of illegal immigrants raised in this great nation—the only nation they know. We demand that this issue be prioritized. Please move immediately to address this most important issue of our time.

Signed,

First Name, Last Initial:

May we send your name to the recipients in blue, above?

YES ☐ NO, include me as a “confidential supporter” ☐

Citizens’ Initiative Lobby Group
2829 Connecticut Ave. NW
Washington, D.C. 20008

Figure 21 Petition Sample 5
REPEAL OBAMACARE NOW!

Tell President Barack Obama, Congressional leaders, and the media that Americans want change now! We are the voice of this country and we demand representation!

To: President Barack Obama, Speaker John Boehner, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, CNN News Editor Rachel Clarke

We the People of the United States of America desire change. It is time for the government to act on the People’s behalf—you must ensure that Obamacare is repealed and that a superior alternative is discussed by Congress with the citizens’ needs in mind. Please move immediately to address this most important issue of our time.

Signed,

First Name, Last Initial:

May we send your name to the recipients in blue, above?

YES ○ NO, include me as a “confidential supporter” ○

Citizens' Initiative Lobby Group
2819 Connecticut Ave. NW
Washington, D.C. 20008

Figure 22 Petition Sample 6

279
Csökkenteni az egyetemi támogatásokat!

Címzett: Orbán Viktor miniszterelnök; Dr. Fülöp Sándor országgyűlési biztos; Parlamenti Biztosi Hivatal

A magyarok változást akarnak!


Alulírott:

Utónév, vezetéknév kezdőbetűje:

Elköldhetik nevét a fenti, kik színnel írt címzettnek?

IGEN  ○  NEM, „titkos támogatóként” nevezzénék meg  ○

Figure 23 Petition Sample 7 (Cut government-funded subsidies for college tuition)
ÁLLJUNK KI AZ EGYETEMI TÁMOGATÁS MELLET!
Cízmert: Orbán Viktor miniszterelnök, Dr. Fülöp Sándor országgyűlési biztos; Parlamenti Biztosi Hivatal

A magyarok változást akarnak!

Itt az ideje, hogy a kormány betartsa ígéretét és megőrizze vagy növelje a jelenlegi egyetemi tandíjtámogatásokat. A magyar fiatalok és Magyarország jövője rajtuk áll! Kérjük, azonnal tegyen lépéseket minden diáktámogatásának biztosítása érdekében.

Alulírott:
Utónév, vezetéknév kezdőbetűje: 

Elkülönítjük nevét a fenti, kék színvel írt címzeteteknek?

IGEN ○ NEM, „titkos támogatóként” nevezzenek meg ○

Figure 24 Petition Sample 8 (Protect Government-funded subsidies for college tuition)
Védjük meg a gyülekezési szabadságot március 15-én!

Cízmeltető: Orbán Viktor miniszterelnök; Dr. Fülöp Sándor országgyűlési biztos; Parlamenti Biztosi Hivatal

A magyarok változást akarnak!


Alulírott:

Utónév, vezetéknév kezdőbetűje: 

Elkülönítéjük nevét a fenti, kék szál mellett címzetteknek?

IGEN ○ NEM, „titkos támogatóként” nevezzenek meg ○

Polgári Kézidőszakos Csoport
1051 Budapest
Vigyázó Ferenc utca 4

Figure 25 Petition Sample 9 (Protect Protesters’ rights at March 15th rallies)
Védjük meg a közrendet és közbiztonságot március 15-én!

Címzet: Orbán Viktor miniszterelnök, Dr. Fülöp Sándor országgyűlési biztos, Parlamenti Biztosi Hivatal

A magyarok változást akarnak!

Itt az ideje, hogy a kormány megóvja a magyar városokat a tüntetőktől! Magyarország egy rendszerető, nyugodt demokratikus állam és azt követeljük, hogy március 15-én, a Milla és más kormányt bíráló csoportok által szervezett tüntetések idejére a kormány több rendőrt és erőforrást biztosítson a károk megelőzése érdekében! Kérjük, azonnal tegyen lépéseket a közrend és közbiztonság megóvása érdekében.

Alulírott:

Utónév, vezetéknév kezdőbetűje:

Elkülönítjük nevét a fontok, kék színnel írt címzetteinek?

IGEN ○ NEM, „tithos támogatóként” nevezzének meg ○

Polgári Kézdelemésztés Csoport
1051 Budapest
Vigyázó Ferenc utca 4

Figure 26 Petition Sample 10 (Increase police presence at March 15th rallies)
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